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1 August 1984

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CVP'S SWAELEN ASSESSES RESULTS OF EUROPEAN ELECTION

Brussels LE SOIR in French 28 Jun 84 p 1, 2

[Editorial by Frank Swaelen, national president of the CVP: "After the Elections of 17 June"]

[Text] The CVP [Christian Democrat Party], my party, has begun an initial analysis of the electoral results of 17 June. Important conclusions may be drawn from them: conclusions about policies followed, about the functioning of the parties, of the life of society in general.

The governmental policy of austerity and recovery was not disapproved of by the people. In fact, the opposite is true. In Flanders, the CVP showed a slight gain over the legislative elections of 1981; and in Wallonia, the two governing parties, the PSC [Christian Social Party] and the PRL [Liberal Reform Party], maintained or improved their positions.

There is only one shadow on the government's horizon: the setback of the PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress] (still compared to 1981). The national opposition had hoped that on 17 June the people would vote for it en masse and thus demonstrate their profound disapproval of the government. The opposition was wrong, for the Flemish socialists were the only ones to make notable gains. These gains are mostly the result of a formidable election campaign centered around the person of their president Karel Van Miert. The other opposition party in Flanders, the VU [People's Union], lost ground.

In Wallonia the PS [French Socialist Party] made slight gains, but at a price! The PS owes this progress entirely to Jose Happart. If you subtract the roughly 230,000 preference votes collected by Jose Happart, the party of Guy Spitaels would lose the election.

Personally, I am forced to deplore the success of a Jose Happart, for the country, for the Socialist Party and, above all, for Europe. A man who, in his own region, systematically preaches intolerance and who, in our country, incites people to confrontation, now has the intention to pass himself off as fundamentally tolerant and open to dialog on the European level. Another element which must not be misjudged and of which all the political parties--including the CVP--should be aware is the breakthrough of the "green" parties, AGALEV in Flanders and ECOLO in Wallonia. It is obvious to me that AGALEV in

Flanders--I do not have precise information about Ecolo--is recruiting most of its electoral support from the youth of traditionally Christian families. There is no doubt that AGALEV sets itself apart from the CVP, simply by virtue of its philosophy--as yet it has no balanced ideology--, it does however retain many points in common with the CVP.

The election results reveal still other interesting facts, facts which will convince the electorate of this newspaper that they are not a minority in the Belgian context.

On 17 June the CVP received 1,134,012 votes, a fact which gives it the right to send 4 representatives to the European Parliament. This equals the 4 seats won by the SP [Flemish Socialist Party] with 980,668 votes. In the French-speaking part of the country, the Socialist Party received 762,377 votes--nearly 400,000 fewer votes than the CVP--and 5 European seats.

A French-speaking representative needs fewer votes than his Flemish counterpart to be elected. It would be well if our French-speaking fellow citizens, reading these figures, could disabuse themselves of the notion that they are a minority, which has no real basis in fact.

A very important finding and one that pleases me enormously is the setback of the linguistic parties, at least in Wallonia and in Brussels. The FDF [Democratic Francophone Alliance] and the RW [Walloon Assembly] no longer have any representatives in the European Parliament. Why does this please me? Because the disgrace of the linguistic parties should finally give the other parties the freedom essential for them to apply themselves to all the problems facing our country, whether they be of socio-economic or institutional order. Naturally I assume and hope that the Socialist Party, under a man like Jose Happart, will not undertake the rebuilding of the FDF and will not turn its attention away from socio-economic problems.

Seventeen June was a day of European elections. The CVP is realistic enough to admit that many "national" considerations played a role which cannot be ignored. Governmental policies were not rejected. Besides, the possible gains and losses registered at the time of these elections have no effect on national parliamentary majorities. A decision at that level does not come until the end of 1985. At that time the CVP will present itself to the voter with all the national themes.

Only then will governmental policies be put to a real test. The CVP does not fear this confrontation, knowing that the inhabitants of this country--in Flanders, in Wallonia and in Brussels--are reasonable people who prefer rationality to irrationality.

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DENKTASH CRITICAL OF INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS IN CYPRUS CRISIS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 17 Jun 84 p 27

[Article by Jan Ivar Askelin: "We Are Not Going to Start a War!"]

[Text] "I am conservative, and my heart is Social Democratic, but I think that social issues should take a back seat to my foremost obligation, which is to defend our nation."

This was the way that Rauf Denktash described his political profile the day before making his first diplomatic visit to Turkey. Two years after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Rauf Denktash is president of his own country, the Turkish republic on North Cyprus, and it is only in Turkey that he has been received as head of state, welcomed by General Kenan Evren who, like Denktash, came to power with the help of the Turkish army, and was later elected president under special conventions.

Denktash will probably not be advertising his Social Democratic heart in Ankara. It is more appropriate to advertise it to a Swedish newspaper readership. Denktash does hardly anything without deliberation. Greek Cypriot statesmen and highly-placed UN officials here in Nicosia say that he is a very canny politician. He has played his cards to his maximum advantage, has an almost jovial public image, avoids the obvious propaganda which otherwise is a characteristic feature of life in North Cyprus today, and is loath to call himself the terrorist and extremist which he has been called in Cyprus and Greece.

Ten years after the war, there are a sizeable number of Turkish troops stationed on the island. Objective observers have estimated that they amount to some 20,000 men. Greek Cypriots call North Cyprus "the occupied zone," and their first demand in negotiations is that the troops go home. This is an idea which Denktash will not even consider, and like the top-flight lawyer he once was, he pleads for his case.

No Offensive Attacks

"Without the Turkish troops," Denktash told us, "we would fall unconditionally into the hands of the Greek Cypriots, who are continually arming. You have

to remember that the Turkish soldiers did not come here with offensive motives, but as defenders. Why is there a line from west to east across the island? That was where we halted the advance of the Greek Cypriots. If the Turks had not been there to help us, the Greeks would have thrown us into the ocean. We can certainly consider asking the Turkish troops to go home sometime--but not until we have solved our problems. We can't win an eleven-year-old war just by sending the army home. The Turkish troops are necessary for our security," he concluded.

By using the expression, "an eleven-year-old war," Denktash shows that the Turkish Cypriots do not see 1974 as the year the Cyprus crisis became acute. According to the Turkish Cypriots, it started in 1963, when Greek Cypriots attacked towns and urban sectors and forced the minority to take shelter in enclaves all over the island. "They blew out our towns like candles," is the expression used. Since 1964, the UN has maintained a peace-keeping force on the island.

There Is No "Cyprus"

"They threw us out from all the governmental organizations in 1963," Denktash went on, "and therefore we cannot recognize the 'Cyprus' of the Greek Cypriots as a nation. Unless there are Turkish Cypriots included in the leadership, there is no nation called 'Cyprus'. The Greek Cypriots have no right to call their part of the island 'Cyprus', and we are opposed to having the southern part of the island called 'Cyprus' in resolutions from the UN."

Denktash granted us this interview a few days prior to the date when the UN commission was scheduled to run out. Usually, the UN Security Council has been able to routinely extend the six-month commission, but this time there was a nervousness apparent in the air. Denktash took off more or less suddenly for Ankara, and the Greek Cypriot leaders went out into the world to plead their case.

"We are definitely not regarded as an independent nation in the United Nations, but in connection with the Cyprus issue we are considered as a nation," said Denktash. "Without us, the commission cannot be extended. We have no agreement with the UN, but we can allow the peace-keeping forces to remain here as our guests."

Denktash laments that there has been no such agreement, and mentions incidents where UN soldiers have photographed Turkish military installations, caused traffic accidents, participated in smuggling, etc.

"The situation is not satisfactory," he said. "We can do nothing. If we put any of the UN soldiers in jail, the whole world would come down on us. If we can't put them in jail, though, we can't maintain our own interests."

UN Doing a Good Job

There is one more negative thing which Denktash had to say about the UN troops, and that is that they are not well liked among the Turkish Cypriots, who maintain that they have not provided sufficient protection in their first ten years of service. Denktash disagrees.

"The UN troops do their job very well, and are generally impartial," said Denktash, "considering that they have been in this country for ten years. Especially at the 'green line,' the UN is providing a significant contribution."

Denktash does not agree with those who maintain that the UN presence is meaningless, since the UN cannot prevent war. "That has never been my opinion. The UN's job is to see to it that a war doesn't develop. But everything depends on the factions. If one of them decides to attack, the UN nations won't be able to do anything about it. We can't ask Swedish boys to come out and die for our sake. It isn't their affair if Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots fight with each other.

"It is important for us to have the UN troops here. If they weren't here, then the Greek Cypriot propaganda would get out of hand. But now we have an eyewitness on location who can tell the truth of the matter," Denktash said, in a statement which surprised us by mentioning how difficult it has been for the UN to increase its freedom of movement in the northern sector.

Denktash does not believe that it would constitute any great danger if the UN troops were to leave.

"We aren't going to start a war. Everything depends on the Greek Cypriots," he said.

Cyprus has a strategic location. Protecting the Suez Canal used to be a priority for the British, and Great Britain continues to maintain two large bases on the southern part of the island. The unease in the Middle East also affects Cyprus, because of its propinquity, and Turkey is an important link in NATO's chain. According to the Greeks, the United States bears the brunt of the responsibility for the Cyprus crisis. They maintain that the U.S. intelligence organization, the CIA, supported the coup in Athens, was behind the coup attempt against Makarios in 1974, and gave Turkey free rein to occupy 40 percent of Cyprus. But what does Denktash think of the role of the United States in this conflict?

U.S. Did Not Dare

"The United States had the responsibility of treating the two factions alike, but Washington didn't dare to do so, because of Greek lobbyists putting pressure on Congress. The United States has always supported Greece. For example, in 1963, when Archbishop Makarios was appointed, the United States could have told Greece to stop him. But because of the Greek lobby, the United States declared itself neutral. In 1964 and 1965,

the United States offered us money unofficially if we would leave Cyprus. Later, Turkey was offered a base in Karpas in northeast Cyprus in exchange for Enosis, where Cyprus adjoins Greece.

"Great Britain has always adjusted its policies so as to protect the interest it has in its bases, and has not lived up to its calling as one of the powers guaranteeing the independence of Cyprus. When the Greeks attacked us in 1963, Great Britain could have intervened as a major power, but they chose not to, since they knew that if they did, the Greeks would attack their bases. The British have been the virtual hostages of the Greek Cypriots, and have opted to ignore their responsibility as a guaranteeing power. It was not until we declared ourselves independent, on 15 November 1963, that the British remembered that they were supposed to be a guaranteeing power, and they said to us that we should not do what we had done."

Athens Controls the South

According to Denktash, it is Greece which bears the greatest responsibility for what has happened.

"Greece's aim for a long time has been to unite the areas where the ancient Greeks once lived. And so Cyprus is supposed to be earmarked for Greece. It is Athens that controls what happens in the southern half, he said.

But when the Turkish Cypriots living there proclaimed their own nation, it came as a shock for the Greek Cypriots. Hopes for a solution to the crisis declined radically. And the deed has had its consequences. North Cyprus and Turkey have exchanged ambassadors, the Turkish Cypriots have drafted up a new constitution which is to be submitted for popular vote, and Denktash's presidential palace is flying the new flag, a red crescent moon on a white field with two red stripes, symbolizing Turkey and north Cyprus.

The new nation was proclaimed at the same time as the general secretary of the UN was supposed to be initiating a new, serious attempt to bring the two factions together for negotiations.

"It was the only way we could tell the Greeks that we did not accept having them call us a minority living in a Greek Cyprus. We had no other way to tell the world that we existed, that we had just as much right to exist as the Greek Cypriots, especially when it came to the right of self-determination," said Denktash. "But this doesn't mean we have closed the door on negotiations, or the possibility of a united Cyprus with a two-part federal system," he added. "The only way to reach a solution is through crosscultural communication, negotiations between ethnic groups. But the Greek Cypriots refused to communicate."

Rauf Denktash gets his arguments from whatever quarter he can, and referred in the interview to a current statement from the powerful Communist Party on Cyprus.

"The communists say that it was a mistake of the Greek Cypriots to break off the dialogues. It was for that reason that the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed their own nation. It was because the Greek Cypriots refused to be involved in a dialogue in 1963 and 1974 that there was no solution, and it was a mistake to initiate what happened in 1963," he said.

"What we need is to have more and more people coming to the same conclusion as the communists."

The former lawyer in the service of the crown of Great Britain has spoken. At sixty years of age or so, he is sitting rather comfortably as president of his own little republic. The Greeks maintain that he came to power with the help of boatloads of mainland Turks who then acquired citizenship and the right to vote. Forty years ago he began his study of law in England, becoming one of Cyprus's most skilled jurists and a leader in Turkish Cypriot society. Twenty years ago, Archbishop Makarios refused Denktash permission to reenter Cyprus. In 1968 he was allowed to return, and six years later, Cyprus was a partitioned land.

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EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT VOTING FOR COUNTRY EXAMINED

Social Democrats Main Losers

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 22-28 Jun 84 p 2

[Commentary by John Wagner: "The Conservative People's Party Won the EC Election, the People's Movement Against EC Lost, and Social Democratic Hangovers After Historic Defeat"]

[Excerpt] The Social Democratic Party's vice-chairman, former Finance Minister Knud Heinesen, has been appointed chairman of a committee which is to analyze why the party lost the EC election and how it is possible to avoid repetitions. Here WEEKENDAVISEN takes stock of a completely surprising EC election which in Prime Minister Poul Schlüter's opinion will leave its mark on Danish domestic policy.

The results of the EC election were available four days after the EC election on Thursday, June 14. Eventually 11 of the 16 Danish members of the EC Parliament up to now won certain re-election and in comparison with the election of five years ago there thus occurred only a few, but quite decisive, shifts in voter support--shifts which can give, not least, the Social Democrats occasion for profound contemplation.

For the time being the Social Democratic Party's central committee has appointed a committee which is to quickly investigate what mistakes--organizational as well as political--the party made in the election campaign. The party's vice-chairman, former Finance Minister Knud Heinesen, who had chief responsibility for the Social Democrats' election campaign strategy, has been appointed chairman of the committee, which, in addition, consists of re-elected EF parliamentarians Eva Gredal and Ove Fich, EC candidate Hanne Juul Jørgensen, central committee members Ole Lennart Hansen of Ribe County and Knud Petersen of Copenhagen County, party functionary Jørgen Damgaard and the leader of the party's news service, Ole Skovgaard.

Social Democratic Party Secretary Ejner Hovgaard Christiansen, who won election to the EC Parliament and thereby will resign as party secretary at the congress in September, tells WEEKENDAVISEN:

"The committee is to evaluate our election campaign. We have to openly and honestly admit that our efforts were insufficient. The entire nomination procedure, preparation of the election campaign and development of our political message must be analyzed. We must find out as quickly as possible what we can do better the next time--and not least what we EC parliamentarians can do the next five years to prevent a repetition. Of course, the Social Democratic Party cannot be content with just 20 percent of the vote."

However, Ejner Hovgaard Christiansen maintains unequivocally that the Social Democratic Party will /not/ [in italics] modify its EC policy, although there are, as he expresses it, "many different attitudes among our voters."

"A democratic, socialist party does not change its policy in order to please voters. But we must do a better information and debate job here at home," the party secretary says and makes no secret of the fact that his party can draw a certain lesson from Democratic Center Party Chairman Erhard Jakobsen's special work as "EC's man in Denmark."

"The EC election showed how important it is that EC parliamentarians use a certain part of their time on informing voters here at home regarding what is quite actually being done in EC. Then the European alliance will be demystified and then we can seriously take up the fight against the People's Movement Against EC and the 'union supporters,' like Erhard Jakobsen, for example," Hovgaard Christiansen says.

The Social Democratic Party's election defeat was striking. In spite of persistent attempts to make the EC election a domestic policy election for and against the four-party coalition government the party received fewer votes than the largest of the four government parties, the Conservative People's Party, and the People's Movement Against EC. In comparison with the EC election of June 1979, the Social Democratic Party lost 2.4 percent of the votes cast. This can perhaps be endured. But in comparison with the Folketing election in January the party lost 12.1 percent. And this is hard to bear, for the absolute figures disclose that 675,330 of the voters who voted Social Democratic in January either stayed at home or voted for other parties than ballot A in the EC election. According to a poll taken for TV by the Vilstrup Institute on election day, 47 percent of Social Democrats stayed home. And a third of those Social Democrats who turned out at the polls voted for the People's Movement Against EC, the Socialist People's Party, or the Socialist Left Party.

Hangovers

But there are others in addition to the Social Democrats who must have hangovers after the EC election.

The government parties must be fretting over the fact that they split into two election coalitions, C-V and M-Q. If the four parties as in 1979 had formed one big election coalition it would have won the 16th Danish seat, which the Socialist People's Party will now get, when Greenland withdraws from

EC on the New Year. The "Greenland seat" would have gone to law student Lars Poulsen from the Conservative People's Party.

The Danish EC Election

<u>Parties' voter support</u> <u>in percent. The re-</u> <u>sulting number of EC</u> <u>seats is given in</u> <u>parentheses.</u>	<u>Folketing election</u> <u>of 10 January 1984</u>	<u>EC election of</u> <u>7 June 1979</u>	<u>EC election of</u> <u>14 June 1984</u>
A. Social Democrats	31.6	21.9 (3)	19.5 (3)
B. Radical Left	5.5	3.2	3.1
C. Conservative			
People's Party	23.4	14.1 (2)	20.8 (4)
Liberal Party	12.1	14.5 (3)	12.4 (2)
M. Democratic Center	4.6	6.2 (1)	6.6 (1)
Q. Christian People's	2.7	1.8	2.8
Z. Progressive	3.6	5.8 (1)	3.5
N. People's Movement			
Against EC	-	21.0 (4)	20.8 (4)
F. Socialist People's	11.5	4.7 (1)	9.2 (1-2)
Y. Socialist Left	2.7	3.5	1.3
Others	2.3	3.3 (a)	-
Voter participation	88.4	47.8	51.8

Although the Progressive Party's founder, convict Mogens Glistrup, received almost 58,000 personal votes, the EC election was a new disappointment for ballot Z. The party lost its seat in the EC Parliament and had a vote setback in comparison with the Folketing election.

The People's Movement Against EC must have some tremendous hangovers, although ballot N's top candidate, Else Hammerich, regards it as "fantastically dashing that the EC opponents held the fort as they did." The fact is that ballot N in comparison with the 1979 election lost 3.5 percent of votes cast, when it is taken into consideration that the Single-Tax Party, which was nominated this year via the People's Movement Against EC, was nominated independently five years ago and received 3.4 percent of the votes.

Prime Minister Poul Schlüter is happy about the fact that the election was not a breakthrough for the opponents of EC. In a comment on the result, the prime minister said that "any talk about the fact that Denmark should leave the European alliance now will be completely senseless." He adds:

"Now I hope that it will be possible to work in peace in the European alliance. As prime minister, I wish to invite the government and opposition to enter into considerably closer cooperation than previously regarding the development of EC. If this is possible we will together be able to strengthen Denmark in European politics."

As chairman of the Conservative People's Party, Poul Schlüter is happy over the fact that his party for the first time ever in a national election received more votes and seats than the Social Democratic Party. "This can be of great importance in the future, domestic-policywise, as well," Schlüter remarked.

All the Danish EC parliamentarians who were renominated for the election last Thursday won the election. They were Conservative Poul Møller, Social Democrats Eva Gredal and Ove Fich, Liberals Tove Nielsen and Jørgen Brøndlund Nielsen, the Socialist People's Party's Bodil Boserup, the Democratic Center's Erhard Jakobsen, and three from the People's Movement Against EC, i.e., Else Hammerich, Jørgen Bøgh and Jens-Peter Bonde. In addition, Greenland EC Parliamentarian Finn Lynge of the Siumut Party won re-election until the New Year. Thereafter the 16th Danish seat will be taken over by the Socialist People's Party, whose second seat went to Teacher John Iversen.

The voters elected five new people to the EC Parliament. But in any case three of them are known faces.

Media Consultant Claus Toksvig won a fantastically dashing election on the Conservative ticket. The "Screen Goblin" received no fewer than 130,728 personal votes, while the other two newly elected Conservatives, Lawyer Jeanette Oppenheim and County and City Council Member Marie Jepsen had to be content with a normal number of votes.

The Single-Tax Party's political leader for over 20 years, former Folketing Member Ib Christensen, won election on ballot N. Thus it appeared to be tactically clever of the Single-Tax Party to be nominated via the People's Movement Against EC instead of alone, as the party did five years ago without gaining a seat.

The Social Democratic Party's Party Secretary Ejner Hovgaard Christiansen won his party's third seat with 15,618 personal votes, although the party's annual meeting had nominated him only as No 5 on ballot A.

In contrast to here at home, the EC election was in almost all other EC countries a despondent election for government parties.

Socialist People's Party Reels

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 25 Jun 84 p 6

[Article by Erik Matzen: "Socialist People's Party's Clash with People's Movement Drawing Near"]

[Text] In spite of assertions from the People's Movement Against EC regarding a good election, the fact is the opposite. There is still a pronounced majority among the people in favor of Denmark's remaining in EC.

In the Socialist People's Party they are beginning to talk about how the party's future relations with the People's Movement are to be. Torben Krogh

has made himself spokesman for having a showdown with the People's Movement, which the party in his opinion should have tossed out a long time ago, but which it in a mixture of a groundless feeling of inferiority and a romantic confusion of the People's Movement with people's movements retreated from.

That Torben Krogh is really handling a hot potato can be seen from Party Chairman Gert Petersen's comments:

"This is Torben Krogh's own account. I have no comment."

[Question] Have you been too inferior?

[Answer] "I have no comment on that."

The Socialist People's Party's re-elected Parliament Member Bodil Boserup says:

"I think that we should let the People's Movement take up an encounter with itself. Then we can see what comes of it. For it is just as obvious that it will have a very hard time of it if it does not have a clear conflict established which it can run on. It cannot in the long run live on the destruction of tomatoes."

"It is just as obvious that it is we who represent the political movement against the Socialist People's Party [as published], and the People's Movement represents the non-political. Therefore, a clash will have to come at some time or other, but time must show whether it will be now. We are cooperating with the People's Movement but it is on our terms."

[Question] Do you feel inferior?

[Answer] "We perhaps did earlier, but we absolutely no longer do."

The Social Democratic Party's Eva Gredal:

"I completely agree with Torben Krogh that the Socialist People's Party must take up the battle against the People's Movement, and this should certainly end with the fact that the Socialist People's Party represents the uniting political factor in the opposition to EC. It must be so that influence is gained through political parties and not through a people's movement which waters down ideas."

"I would like to say to our own Social Democrats Against EC that they must make themselves completely aware of the fact that there is a clear majority among the people for our remaining in EC. We are in EC to stay, and therefore we will go down to EC in order to fight and gain the greatest possible influence. The People's Movement is dead now. It cannot even survive a parliamentary vote on the question of yes or no to EC and I think that the many Social Democrats who stayed home should think about this already now."

Boost for Schlüter

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Jun 84 p 14

[Editorial: "A Non-Socialist Election"]

[Text] The government has every reason to be satisfied with the outcome of the election for the European Parliament. This election, it can be seen, was used by European voters to give their governments marks according to their merits, without its supposing to have further political consequences. In most of the alliance's countries this meant that the governments got a whipping. But it was different in Denmark. Not only did the prime minister's own party, the Conservative People's Party, come out of the election as a bit of a conquering hero, with a very big gain in votes and immediately the only seat gains. The government as a whole also received the voters' recognition, with a combined gain in votes for the four-party coalition of more than six percent, a couple of which came from the languishing Progressive Party. It was in itself one of the bright moments in the result that the attempt to use Mogens Glistrup as a locomotive in the European election completely failed, in decency.

It was a defeating election for the Social Democratic Party, with a direct decline in spite of increased voter participation. In this election the Social Democratic Party was no longer the country's largest party. It had to relinquish first place to the Conservatives and at the same time see the Socialist People's Party double its votes and become almost half as large as the Social Democratic Party. It can console itself with the fact that it would not go like this in a real election, for then the Social Democratic armchair voters would not desert the party and the Socialist People's Party would not have the People's Movement's vote reserves to draw on. But it is slim consolation after an election campaign which to so great an extent had staked on a Social Democratic advance after the bad setback five years ago. It is a low point for the large labor party, which will provide occasion not only for direct hindsight criticism of the election campaign, but a self-searching for the reasons for the party's continued weakening in the longer term.

The European outlook in the election result was not bad. The People's Movement and "No" parties together suffered a setback in comparison with the last European Parliament election in spite of the Socialist People's Party's large gain in votes. The attempt to once more make the election a popular vote regarding Denmark's place in EC lost, insofar as 31 percent of the votes went to those who wanted to say no, while 69 percent voted for those parties which with greater or less or no reservation say yes. But the election was not to be a popular vote, and this part of the result can just as well be regarded as an assertion of the fact that it was not. The overwhelming majority of the Danish people know that the question regarding Denmark's relations with EC was decided in 1972, and more and more are voting therefore once again for parties for the purpose of having Danish interests looked after both critically and constructively.

The prime minister can well take with him to the summit meeting in Paris next week this message regarding a beginning normalization of Danes' attitude toward the European alliance. It was expressed directly in the results and indirectly in voter participation, and it deserves to be made note of. And then he can, incidentally, tell Prime Minister Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl how conservative policies are carried out in a time of prosperity without losing votes. This election has been for both of them a warning of coming difficulties, only a year after they won re-election so grandly.

Socialist Paper Comments

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 20 Jun 84 p 8

[Editorial: "The Biggest"]

[Text] There is no end to the Conservatives' exultation after the EC election. "We have become the biggest--bigger than the Social Democratic Party," Prime Minister Poul Schlüter says, and it is true that the Conservatives became the EC election's Danish victors in seat gains. On the other hand, the conservatives suffered a setback in the other EC countries.

The question is what the Danish "victory" can be used for. In reality it is only an expression of the deplorable fact that the voter percentage is low and that the Social Democratic Party cannot get its people out for the EC election. It is the voter percentage situation which has made European top politicians talk about the tragedy of the EC election. And wretched it is. Anything more miserable could certainly only be imagined if someone got the idea to hold a public election for the Scandinavian Council.

The Social Democratic Party of course has hangovers today and it is necessary to discuss the situation thoroughly. Denmark's largest party nominated a balanced ticket of 20 candidates, predominantly elected in local party organizations. The People's Movement Against EC, the Conservatives, the Democratic Center Party and Glistrup, to be sure, were able to muster more personal votes than Eva Gredal as "the best" of the Social Democrats, as far as personal votes are concerned.

Would a Social Democratic policy not be just as good a bid as a Claus Toksvig? One would certainly think so, but then something completely wrong must have happened anyway in the election campaign when the country's biggest party can push only three seats through.

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LEVEL OF CITIZEN AGREEMENT ON FOREIGN POLICY, POLITICS

Paris LE DEBAT in French May 84 pp 4-25

[Round table with Alain Duhamel, Olivier Duhamel, Jerome Jaffre]

[Text] Jerome Jaffre: Alain Duhamel might begin by summarizing for us the thesis of the article which is the subject of this debate, "An Outstanding French Consensus."*

Alain Duhamel: My title was purposefully provoking or provocative. When I said "outstanding French consensus," I knew that it was a way of launching a debate. From this point of view, the result was entirely satisfactory.

Basically, I nonetheless think that the thesis is correct. On the one hand, contrary to the myth, there is in France a real consensus, that is to say not a fabricated unanimity or even an artificial unity, but an agreement on what is basic. And on the other hand, insofar as we know, this agreement is at least as extensive in France as it is in the neighboring countries--which does not correspond to the common concept either.

That having been said, let us make a distinction. When it is said that there is a consensus on what is basic, this does not mean that there is 100 percent agreement, but agreement by a majority which goes considerably beyond partisan divisions.

This consensus exists concerning the institutions and concerning foreign policy. It exists, I would say, on a certain number of the rules of the social game, thus allowing antagonisms to be resolved in peaceful fashion.

The striking fact is that for 10 years or so--since the beginning of the economic crisis, while there has been an attack on living conditions in France, while there has been a political earthquake, because for the first time in a quarter of a century, it has been the left which has been in power, and while at this time the opposition between the left and the right could be seen to revive and appeared to resuscitate precisely the traditional struggles and classic stereotypes (consider the quarrel about the schools), the consensus nonetheless continued to make progress. Because the left wing has

* LE MONDE, 8-9 May 1983. In this article, Alain Duhamel commented on the SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] survey on France in 1983 taken between 16 and 21 March 1983 for the magazine L'EXPANSION.

legitimized the institutions by using them as they were, and using them in ways extraordinarily close to what prevailed earlier. And because invulnerable to the crisis and against all expectations, the basic differences which very frequently had to do with economic and social concepts are in the process of becoming blurred. I do not say they are disappearing.

One last point. None of this of course prevents the existence of antagonisms of interest, as well as opposition between classes, groups, castes or social strata, as well as clashes between organized political forces. The question to be answered is whether the myth about the lack of a French consensus is not due to the excessive importance assigned to the partisan political psychodrama or melodrama as it exists in France. Doesn't this partisan melodrama conceal underlying agreement?

Olivier Duhamel: Expressed in such complete, complex and detailed fashion, the theses of Alain Duhamel cannot lead to overall contradictions except in minds which are either extremely fatigued or relying on some absolute bias.

Let us take them up in order, in order to establish the precise focus of the debate. First point: the existence in France of a consensus, an agreement on what is basic. The whole problem lies in the definition of what is basic. I agree absolutely in believing that if the state of opinion in France at the end of the 20th century is compared to what it might have been at the end of the 19th century, the consensus is much greater. There is in fact a broad agreement on the minimal values of democracy as it is defined today. It seems to me moreover that "we," taking the term to mean those who in one way or another regard themselves as democrats, can only be pleased thereby.

But this consensus on certain basic values must not be allowed to conceal the persistence of dissension, divisions and profound disagreements, nor should it conceal the shifts in the agreements and disagreements among Frenchmen. Particularly since these divisions and disagreements could, if care is not taken to avoid it, challenge even the agreement noted on the basic values. At the least, all this could do for the cause of democratic consensus, to speak politically at the outset, is to drown the opinions of Frenchmen in this concept. Let us take for example the possible disagreement on the issue of racism: if a bias on consensus is allowed to conceal it, there is a risk of preventing a confrontation of the realities of this problem. If these divisions are not noted and analyzed, the end product could be an insidious challenge to the definitive consensus having to do with the basic democratic issues. Thus the first possible point of disagreement lies in excessive extension of the reality of the consensus and erasure of the real divisions which, if they are not recognized, may be extended dangerously.

Second disagreement: I think that there is implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, a kind of apology for consensus in the concepts of Alain Duhamel. I say "in his concepts," because he has often developed this theme, and one should not be limited to this single article in LE MONDE which serves as our point of departure. Now I think that we should not deplore the fact that such dissension exists. The foundations of modern democracy do not require that there be a consensus on all subjects at any price, or as much consensus

as possible. On the contrary. One of the characteristics of democracy is and should be the free expression of contradictions and divergent points of view. Democracy implies the recognition not only of a certain diversity of opinion, but also diversity to the point of conflict. It simply requires a certain method of settling conflicts.

That having been said, I want absolutely to specify, as a third point, that I do not intend to contrast systematic dissension with the outstanding French consensus. I reject the idea that the debate should be expressed in schematic terms of the "The French people are united" versus "The French people are divided" type. It is not a question at all of opposing the thesis of consensus to a thesis of systematic division, which has moreover all the supporters needed, as exemplified by the spokesmen paid to play this role by the organized political forces.

Alain Duhamel: First of all, a clarification. The key issue in consensus involves in fact establishing what the relationship between a general consensus on the basic values of a society and the mechanics of the antagonisms within that society are. To what extent is there a contradiction, or lack of it, between the two things? Let it be clear at the outset that, to my mind, not only is there no conflict between a consensus on basic values and the mechanics of conflicts within a society at a given moment, but into the bargain, the consensus and the antagonisms complement each other. One could even say that it is because there is a consensus, in a way, that there can be organized antagonisms developing in peaceful fashion. And it is because there are these antagonisms that the consensus is forced to develop, to modernize and to renew itself sufficiently to be able to survive and adapt. Put in another way, a consensus presupposes antagonisms, and the antagonisms allow the consensus to pursue a constant process of adaptation, change and modernization.

Now does the idea I have conceived contribute to a voluntaristic concept, indeed a voluntaristic usage of consensus, as if it sufficed to speak of it to create it? I do not think so. What I think is only that the development of French society, not solely just recently but over a much longer period of time, reveals a deepening of the consensus. And this is true through all of the instances of conflict imaginable: war, decolonization, the economic crisis, political alternation with the communist party represented in power. You have referred to the end of the 19th century. Without going back that far, one could say that the fragmentary consensus which consisted in France up until World War II was largely a consensus imposed by the Jacobin concept of the state, by the dominant ideological role of the church and the Marxist vulgate. What is in the process of happening now is the replacement of this consensus of a partisan, partial and somewhat totalitarian inspiration with a consensus which is in a way more modest and more moderate but better accepted, better internalized and more consistent with the functioning of a democratic society. The consensus as it is in the process of being formed in France is one of acceptance of others, a consensus of voluntary agreement on a certain number of values, and not just a consensus resulting from a contest between sets of values seeking to impose themselves, one over the other, all of them having a foundation of an authoritarian nature in their inspiration, whether they be Jacobin, Catholic or socialist.

Jerome Jaffre: Then you reject the criticism that you have adopted a consensualist bias, leading to approval of everything contributing to consensus?

Alain Duhamel: It is true that it is not simply in one article that I have put forth this thesis. I agree entirely with Olivier on that. I had already maintained it, for example, in a book entitled "French Opinion in 1977,"* to which I contributed a section on the French consensus in which I put forth this same thesis. This diagnosis was not included in one article accidentally, but is in fact the product of an approach. To what extent is this approach partisan or not? To what extent is it legitimate or not?

As it is necessary to try to be honest in a debate, I admit that I have always had a tendency to stress the consensual factors in society, knowing that I emphasize them and even that I encourage the inclination. First of all as a journalistic maneuver: when one wants an idea accepted, one always pushes a little too hard! And then out of the desire to react against the false idea. It appeared to me that the image presented of French political society was somewhat weak and myopic. It emphasized all of the divisive factors and blurred the reality of the basic consensus.

Olivier Duhamel: On this point you are perhaps correct. In your first articles on the French consensus, you had seen beyond the deceptive effect of an exaggerated political debate. But the situation has now reversed. Everyone agrees that there is consensus, gives it full value and justifies it. This is what I warn against in saying that disagreement exists as well. And it may perhaps be perceived in the future that it must be given greater value.

Alain Duhamel: Naturally, I do not question your foresight. However, I would like to note that it is not possible to say that there is general agreement on the idea of consensus in the political world in France today. This is not true, because a certain number of factions reject the concept. And it is particularly false just now, when French political life is polarized, antagonistic and passionately partisan.

Olivier Duhamel: The new president of the republic, like the former one, appeals daily for the development of a broader consensus, a rallying of thought beyond the bipolar division, in order to manifest the profound unity of the French people.

Alain Duhamel: That is an excellent response, but not a resourceful one. Giscard d'Estaing used it in part out of a conviction about consensus, which is not the case with Francois Mitterrand. But both have used this as a presidential strategy. Any president of the republic naturally sees an interest in doing so in order to broaden his base. It is very possible that Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand simply played their institutional role. The institutional role of the president under the Fifth Republic, being a double and ambiguous one, that of a symbol as well as a leader, creates the need for the appearance of consensus, or failing that, of a search for consensus. And this is so that the president will benefit, in the best of cases, from a

* SOFRES, "French Opinion in 1977," included in Publications of the National Political Science Foundation.

broadier agreement, or in the worst of cases, will get credit for the effort, or in other words enjoy the image of one who has after all extended a hand. This has been true as long as the Fifth Republic has existed, but it is still more true today because it is more deliberate.

On the other hand, it seems to me very important to keep the difference between a real consensus and a false consensus clearly in mind.

Methodologically, one must not confuse a consensus on the basic values of society and a fabricated and artificial partisan unity, for example the national unity wherein the demand for prerogatives is one of the Gaullist traditions. Mr Goguel wrote in a recent article in LE MONDE that he was among those who would wish that in a difficult period such as we are experiencing, the partisan "game" could be set aside and a "party truce" established. A party truce is the opposite of a consensus. It is a political operation within the context of the "interplay" of political groups, while consensus is an agreement on the values of society. The use of the term "political unity" by the actors on the political stage is one thing, and an approach in terms of consensus to the basic values in society is another. The one has nothing to do with the other, and they are not to be found on the same level at all.

Olivier Duhamel: When you speak of agreement on the basic values of society, we must specify what we mean thereby, even if where the essential basics are concerned, I postulated at the outset that we are in agreement. There is a danger in this realm of a tautological maneuver, which consists of defining what one finds to be points of agreement as essential.

Alain Duhamel: Let us make a little list. What is included in consensus?

Olivier Duhamel: Let us take an example--the existence of political parties. In a pluralistic democracy, is this a basic value or not?

Alain Duhamel: Naturally it is.

Olivier Duhamel: And is there a consensus on this point, do you think, or not?

Alain Duhamel: The existence of political parties is a basic value, because it has to do directly with the basic principle calling for the accepted organization of plurality. Is it fully or reluctantly accepted?

One must be very careful when dealing with the image of the political parties, precisely as is the case with regard to the image of the trade unions. On the basis of principle and method the polling techniques inevitably work against the parties and the trade unions. As of the moment a party or a trade union is active, its image is one of division, and it is naturally unpopular with its adversaries. There will be more or less enthusiastic acceptance of the idea that the political parties and the trade unions are basic factors in pluralism depending on whether one considers them at such a moment not as an observer but as an adversary or a partisan of this or that party or

trade union. The response has less to do with the principle than the image of the adversary. And in fact it reveals to what extent one sees oneself as a partisan. Put in another way, it seems to me it is because there is a real consensus on the basic values of society that there is no appearance of consensus in the image of the trade unions and the political parties.

Olivier Duhamel: And this is where I disagree with the extravagant resourcefulness of Alain Duhamel, or let us say with the subtlety of his reasoning. It seems to me to have to do with the risk of tautology mentioned a moment ago. "I do not take into account what has to do with the parties or the unions, because since they are seen as tools of division, there cannot be a consensus concerning them. It is normal that there be no consensus concerning them, because there is a consensus." A strange syllogism. We see how Alain Duhamel makes a consensus of disagreement. When disagreement develops, he sees in it basically an indication of a consensus. It is necessary to note simply that on one of the basic components in political democracy, to wit the existence of political parties, there is relative disagreement in France. When one poses the question of whether the elimination of the political parties would be a very serious matter, and when one obtains affirmative answers ranging, depending on partisan preferences, between 24 percent among the UDF [French Democratic Union] voters and 52 percent among the PCF [French Communist Party] voters, one is well and truly dealing with real disagreement. The span between the affirmative answers is 28 points.

Alain Duhamel: One cannot ask the active citizen who votes and who has his political preferences to have a neutral image and attitude toward what naturally involves division. By their function, parties or unions represent a force which takes an antagonistic position toward other forces. As of that moment, their capacity to inspire consensus is limited. For matters to be different, it would be necessary for each citizen to be instantly capable of performing the mental gymnastics whereby one opposes this or that political party or trade union, but one is naturally, generally speaking, in favor of the existence of the trade unions and political parties. In a way, both parties and unions are hampered by the polling method.

Jerome Jaffre: I have a number of questions to raise in connection with Olivier Duhamel's method, as well as criticisms of it. While Alain Duhamel is a lover of consensus, Olivier, for his part, likes to define dissent. Why? Because he takes as his basis the distances separating subgroups, and inevitably, as soon as one develops a survey, one finds disparities. This is what he calls the dissent range method in his SOFRES-Public Opinion article. Taking the voters in the four groups into account, one calculates the span between the most extreme opinions. Where the existence of political parties, mentioned a moment ago, is concerned, for example, this yields 24 percent for the UDF and 52 percent for the PCF, or a dissent range of 28 points. But there is no reason to stop with this subdivision. Why not distinguish between socialists who are workers and socialists who are higher cadres, or between disillusioned socialists and satisfied socialists? You systematically intensify the phenomenon as of the moment you begin to divide the results of a poll into subcategories. In the final analysis, what seems to me most important in evaluating the consensus is the overall representative opinion as revealed by the poll.

Let us go farther: your method may be extremely deceptive. There is an example which shows this, and it is that of the retrospective image of General DeGaulle and Georges Pompidou. "Were they the presidents of all the French people?" We obtained answers in 1976 and 1983. In 1976, 68 percent of those polled believed that General DeGaulle was the president of all the French people, while 73 percent thought so in 1983. The figures for Georges Pompidou were 51 percent in 1976 and 57 percent 1983. As you put it so nicely, "time produces consensus." The two past presidents are increasingly perceived as having been presidents of all the French people.

But if I take the dissent range method, I will find that, for General DeGaulle, the dissent range developed between 1976 and 1983 from 28 to 29, and for Georges Pompidou, from 48 to 51. In short, time produces consensus, but your method produces dissent!

This method of the extreme range could lead to the following paradox. If tomorrow the Socialist Party were to govern France jointly with the RPR [Rally for the Republic] and the UDF, the dissent, if approached in this manner, would increase substantially, while the political base of the majority would change from simple to double! In fact, the communist voters would be pushed to an extreme position, and suddenly between the RPR on the one hand and the communists on the other, the range would be much more pronounced than today, while at the same time, the government would be representing 80 to 85 percent of the French people.

Another thing bothers me equally. You take the figures best suited to your demonstration, using only the answer "very serious" concerning the elimination of the political parties. You tell us that 33 percent of French citizens would regard the elimination of the parties as very serious, ranging from 24 percent in the UDF to 50 percent in the PCF. But there was a whole range of responses: "Very serious," "rather serious," "not very serious," not serious at all." It is a very moot point whether the people answering "very serious" in a poll are the only ones who would miss the political parties! One must add to them those who answered "rather serious," in order to have a proper idea of the number of people expressing their attachment to political parties. And at that moment, the figures are no longer the same at all. Then we have 63 percent of the French people indicating attachment to the political parties. The span of dissent varies little, because the answers range from 57 percent in the UDF to 81 percent in the PCF, but the interpretation is no longer the same. Among all the voters, we have indeed a majority attachment to the political parties, which allows me to conclude that you went too far in isolating the extreme response. Which you did not do, it should be noted, with regard to many other issues such as the strike force, military service, or being a good citizen. These are the objections which came to my mind in rereading you. Are you not fabricating dissent to some extent?

Alain Duhamel: Great Britain has a society which is generally recognized as democratic. It is thought to reveal a rather high level of consensus. The extremist parties there are particularly weak, and everyone accepts the rules of the game. And yet at the same time it is a society in which the political

parties and the trade unions have an extraordinarily negative image. According to the criteria of Olivier Duhamel, their existence there would be a question inspiring dissent.

Olivier Duhamel: The seriousness of your criticisms surprises me, to such an extent do they caricature what I think and what I have written. I do not see how I can be charged with having used only the disparity method, that is to say the dissent range, when I defined the methods of evaluating divisions or unity in French opinion. I began by saying that "the overall majority figure (thus-and-such a percentage of the French people think that...) shows us the consensus, while the maximal span between the groups--in statistical terms, the range--tells us the scope of the dissent."* In order precisely to evaluate an opinion, the two approaches must be combined. If I allowed myself in my article to emphasize the range, it is because of the small contribution it appeared to me it might provide at least to the presentation, and perhaps sometimes to the basis of the evaluation. But I reiterate that the two series of figures, the two methods, must be compared. Daily we are told that "57 percent of the French people think that..." or "67 percent of French citizens believe...." Behind this total figure, there may be an important variety of opinions according to social and political groups. The overall figure does not suffice. In doing this work, I focused on the political groups. This should be extended to take into account the social groups, the different generations, age groups. I did not do this because they showed a smaller range. I was researching the status of divisions of opinion. And I found, by looking at the figures overall, that those who were fabricating division relied on political affiliation. What differentiates some of the French people most from the others is not sex, age or profession, but political identification. There is no bias: I always quote the overall majority figure again, but I show that one cannot be content with that.

Alain Duhamel: It is always the non-majority figure which is stressed.

Olivier Duhamel: One must indeed focus the beam where everyone publicly dissembles!

Alain Duhamel: To each his own beam.

Olivier Duhamel: As I want to look for the key a little beyond the spotlight, I emphasize dissent, but I do not use for the purpose a method which would reveal only dissent.

Jerome Jaffre: I do not say that it reveals only dissent. I say that it creates dissent.

Olivier Duhamel: On the contrary, it allows me to draft a summary chart capable of revealing with much greater accuracy those points where there is real consensus and those points where there is real dissent. In some cases, behind a relatively high overall majority figure, we have real agreement, with identical positions in all of the large political groups. For example, there is a real consensus in France on the basic nature of the vote. Not

* SOFRES-Public Opinion (...) 1984, Paris, Gallimard, 1984, p 134.

only because more than three-quarters of the French people indicate support of the right to vote, but because they indicated whether they support Giscard, the socialists, the RPR or the communists! The differences in response depending on whether one supports the communists or Giscard d'Estaing are almost zero. Now there is a real consensus.

On the other hand, there is not a similar consensus on whether General DeGaulle was the president of all the French people, although three-quarters of the French citizens, here again, say yes. Only the fact is the answers vary by 30 points depending on political affiliation. Thus there is, at the same time, consensus, because there is an overall opinion which is voiced by three-quarters of the French people and which represents the majority and all the political groups. But there is a limited partial consensus, since behind this overall agreement, the intensity thereof varies considerably in fact, with political affiliation.

Jerome Jaffre: Is it not striking to note that the extreme range is increasing, while the view that the general was president of all the French people has clearly grown? This is irritating in terms of the method you propose!

Olivier Duhamel: Is it irritating that the SOFRES provides us with full enough information so that we can conclude on the one hand that there is a kind of retrospective idealization of General DeGaulle, while on the other, it does not affect all political groups equally?

Jerome Jaffre: But it does! It affects all political groups. It is revealed everywhere. It seems to me beyond challenge that your method leads to exaggerated emphasis on the role of the most distant group in majority opinion. I postulate my typical case again: What happens if the socialists and the RPR govern jointly, from the point of view of the range between the communists and the RPR?

Olivier Duhamel: If there were a government including the present opposition and the socialists, but not the communists, would my method show an increased development of dissent, while in fact there would an increase in consensus? That is not true. Once again, my method does not involve taking the range or the disparity into account alone, but comparing the range with the overall majority figure. Thus it would show simultaneously the extent of consensus (increase in the overall majority figure) and the scope of dissent (increase in the range due to the exclusion of the communists).

I do not see that I am placing undue emphasis when I utilize such data in connection with the image of General DeGaulle or Georges Pompidou, while writing that time increases consensus. The example reveals the subtleties of the evidence. It shows that contradictory movements can exist. For example, the retrospective improvement of the overall image of Georges Pompidou is fully at work among the socialists (39 percent in 1976, 50 percent in 1983: +11), moderately so among his natural supporters (+6 in the UDF, +4 in the RPR), and practically not at all among the communists (from 25 to 27 percent). Pompidou "is on the rise" everywhere, but dissent continues. This makes it

possible moreover, let it be said in passing, to undertake a revealing comparison with the image of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, which does not show the same development at all. This development of consensus with time and this kind of retrospective idealization which political leaders undergo in terms of history and the collective memory do not affect all men. Probably they are favored by death, and in any case they are dictated by conditions which prevent Valéry Giscard d'Estaing from being a beneficiary.

The last objection, to wit the emphasis placed on the "very serious" answers, remains. This is deliberate, where questions having to do with the democratic values are concerned, since it seems to me it makes it possible to establish the intensity of the attachment of the French people to the various elements making up democracy. The answers reveal this very clearly, because in some cases there is a true consensus--"It would be very serious to eliminate the right to vote," yielding an overall majority figure of 81 percent and a very limited range in the responses (UDF 79 percent, PS 81 percent, RPR 87 percent, PCF 88 percent), while in other cases there is real dissent--"It would be very serious to eliminate the right to strike," yielding an overall majority figure of only 49 percent, with a very wide range in the responses (UDF 29 percent, RPR 38 percent, PS 61 percent, PCF 81 percent).

Alain Duhamel: The dissent approach emphasizes the margins, and the consensus approach the nuclei. This is what is clear.

Jerome Jaffre: I would like us to return to a statement made by Alain Duhamel which seems rather surprising to me. According to him, crisis would strengthen consensus. A large number of objections immediately come to mind. Numerous surveys indicate that there is in fact a rather perceptible contraction on rights gained, greater division than in the past on social protection measures, a drop in the credibility of representative organizations such as the trade unions, and finally, a deep division of opinion on the extent of the reforms to be introduced or maintained in French society.*

A second comment: Political dissent is very strong in French society today. The division of votes among the social categories has increased. The gap is much wider than a few years ago between the bourgeois and independent categories, on the one hand, and the modest wage-earning categories, on the other. The worker class stands much more isolated than in the past, because it remains more faithful to the leftist options than the middle classes. In political terms, the rapprochement between the workers and the middle cadres which was an outstanding characteristic of your 1977 analysis on consensus seems to me today to be less clear. The thesis of the outstanding French consensus thus appears much diminished.

Third comment: There is a very strong sense of division among the French. To the question as to whether the French are more or less united under François Mitterrand than in the past, the people answer that they are less

* On these various points, the reader should refer to Elisabeth Dupoirier, "The French People in the Crisis," in SOFRES-Public Opinion (...) 1984, pp 199-209.

united. And in the assessment of Francois Mitterand, it is on the unity of the French people that the judgment of these people is harshest where the president is concerned--apart from strictly economic issues.

Alain Duhamel: It is true that the French people do not have a sense of their unity. This is logical for two reasons. It reflects the extreme political polarization existing at present, which has institutional bases, because the voting methods create these antagonisms, exacerbate them and consolidate them. On the other hand, the fact is that the present majority is culturally less assimilated in the exercise of power. Thus it arouses--I am noting this, not judging--more definite reactions of rejection than are usual. Finally, within this majority there is a communist party presence--symbolic or not, that is open to debate--which spurs polarization. The fact that there is in France today a sense of division is thus explained by the political situation. And this is confirmed by the historic French culture, by the dominant interpretation of French political history, which is an interpretation in terms of antagonisms. The idea that France is a divided country is one which has been taught to the French people and which is illustrated, almost to the point of caricature, by the present political situation. Thus it is normal that people should have a sense of division.

Olivier Duhamel: In fact there is a prevailing consensus which is almost a commonplace on the division of the French people, which is in large part without any basis.

Alain Duhamel: I am in absolute agreement with this statement. There is consensus on a commonplace, and there is agreement on the idea of division.

Jerome Jaffre: But let us come back to my first question: Is the crisis creating consensus?

Alain Duhamel: It may seem paradoxical, in fact, to set forth the idea that the crisis has to some extent consolidated the consensus. The problem can be approached in two ways. One can take today's figures and those for 6 or 7 years ago and question systematically whether, invulnerable to the crisis, subject by subject and sector by sector there has been an expansion or a shrinkage in the French consensus. There is another way of approaching the question, which it is true defies measurement, but which must nonetheless be borne in mind if one wants to analyze matters properly. It involves the question as to whether a society which survives a military crisis (war), a crisis of status (decolonization), a serious, profound and enduring economic crisis, and a political crisis, overall, is not despite everything a more united society than even it realizes.

I think all in all that despite the crisis, the French consensus has not only remained profound, but has developed. For example it has developed insofar as, for example, the fact that the institutions of the Fifth Republic, we must remember, had until a short time ago been a major focus of division in France. They were given legitimacy by the rise of the left wing to power (which goes without saying) and by the use it has made of them (which does not, on the contrary, go without saying). This was perhaps obvious to the

most brilliant minds, but the current president of the republic, nonetheless, surprisingly, wrote the contrary! And not only was this accepted, but the citizens made it their own. Beyond the clamor, the parliamentary theater and the partisan polemics of which we have 10 examples every week, there is agreement on the institutions, despite difficult circumstances.

Olivier Duhamel: On this precise point, I cannot obviously maintain the opposite thesis, having devoted much time to establishing the acceptance of the Fifth Republic by the voters and the protagonists on the left. There is indeed a profound phenomenon of support by the French people of the basic mechanism of the Constitution, the election of the president by universal voting, as well as the existence of checks on the constitutionality of laws, although this goes against 2 centuries of tradition in French political law.

Alain Duhamel: And the constitutional council was typically the institution which could provide a focus for the polemics in periods of leftist alternation in power.

Olivier Duhamel: Absolutely. Consensus is advancing thanks to the effects of alternation. But once this, which is undeniable, has been seen and stated, the surveys show us, where the institutions are concerned, that there are on the other hand criticisms and desires for change germinating here and there, both with regard to an excess of presidentialism and the dearth of parliamentarianism. A need for participation, a need for referendum, a need for a more direct procedure is beginning to dawn. There are simultaneously overall support of the basic mechanism and a need to supplement it with something else.

Alain Duhamel: There is a second example of consensus which seems spectacular to me. Foreign policy: it is a major focus of division by nature, a great subject for partisan polemics in all terms of office without exception, characterized recently by fearsome deadlines easily capable of arousing impassioned reactions, such as the issue of the SS-20 Pershing missiles and the matter of the strike force. Now one must note at the outset the natural way in which the continuity of French politics is objectively dictated. It must be noted next that the focus of division which dominated it for a long time, that is to say the French strike force, has become today, with a left-wing president, communist ministers and a leftist electorate, the subject of consensus. Even the communist voters, in a period of polemic discussion on the subject of nuclear forces, today accept the idea of the French strike force.

Olivier Duhamel: Where the strike force is concerned, it is undeniable. I cite it as a typical example of the integrating effect of alternation in power.

Alain Duhamel: A third fact has been completely overlooked in the current discussion, although it seems to me of great importance. Everyone puts forward today the phenomena of corporativism and the exacerbation of category interests. They seem to me commonplace and normal in a period of crisis. What strikes me is that despite the crisis, unemployment and the lamentable state of French education, despite this defensive climate, everything which

points in the direction of social communication, not total but much less strained, continues to strengthen. The polls make it evident that people have the feeling that the social barriers are lower today than they were before. This did not come about of itself.

Olivier Duhamel: Here too, shadings must be introduced. And contrasts shown in an extremely complex picture. In foreign policy, for example, what anyone might note if he did not take care is that the Euromissiles issue is the focus of an extreme division of opinion. Only a minority of French citizens support the point of view defended by Francois Mitterrand, i.e., the installation of the Pershing missiles (33 percent). There is on the contrary a real dissent, real opposition by a majority inversion: 65 percent of the communists oppose it as do 56 percent of the socialists. Conversely, in the UDF and the RPR one finds 50 and 48 percent in favor. This is a strange kind of consensus, Alain Duhamel!

Alain Duhamel: This clearly shows what the consensus is, what its limits are and to what extent it does not preclude antagonisms. The fact that the communist voters are hostile to the deployment of the Pershing missiles while the UDF and RPR voters are in favor of it and support the president of the republic on this point simply shows that people are capable of a little intellectual tolerance. This is normal and natural. It is not proof of dissent, but merely an illustration of the consistency of the choices of your favorite subgroups. Against this background, consensus stands out on the basic point. The basic thing in the nuclear issue is the French strike force. This has been the subject of a long-standing and ongoing discussion. It is on this basis one must judge. If there is a development, it is moving in the direction of consensus.

Olivier Duhamel: The basic thing at the end of 1983 was whether one could install the Pershing missiles in Western Europe or not. On this political issue, there is dissent.

Alain Duhamel: No. You are reasoning too much as a journalist and not enough as an academic. Consensus is a sociological mechanism. It is created on the basis of duration and stabilities. By nature, it develops in relatively slow fashion through the conflicts and the new problems which arise. The issue of the Pershing missiles may well be capital, decisive, and it is new. One cannot speak of consensus in connection with an issue which was being seriously discussed by the president of the republic for the first time just when the survey was being made.

Jerome Jaffre: I would like to present to you the results of a small effort I made based on Olivier Duhamel's study. I went back to the summary tables included in *Public Opinion* (...) 1984 (pp 146-149) and the classification of subjects of public division given at the end of the text--the 18 items on which we had the same question in the 1976 survey. Thus one can calculate the range of dissent in 1976 and compare it with the range of dissent in 1983, making it possible to answer the key question in our debate: "Is consensus strengthening or is it not?"* First result: There is indeed a

* See the appended table on the development of dissent from 1976 to 1983.

reduction in the range of dissent, with a change in fact from a range in dissent of 28 points to 25 points. The effect of alternation is the main explanation thereof. We have a greater integration of the French Communist Party without, however, a complete movement away from their earlier positions by the RPR and the UDF. Matters are very clear therefore in connection to respect for the rules: a very great communist increase, with a decline, but a relative decline, for the RPR and the UDF. Thus there is indeed a reduction in dissent on the themes of society and on institutional themes.

On the other hand, and this is the second result, the development is not at all the same on political themes, in connection with which dissent has broadened everywhere. That dissent is greater on political issues than on the rest is no surprise. But that it increased between 1976 and 1983 is more surprising. One might have thought that the effect of alternation would have sufficed to reduce it, on political issues as well. Now this is not what happened.

Olivier Duhamel: I would add that the selection you are forced to make in order to establish your comparison eliminates a certain number of the questions raised in 1983, which it would have made no sense to ask earlier, but which are those in connection with which the greatest division is seen. Almost all of the reforms introduced by the left wing, from the death penalty to the reduction of the retirement age, and including the Auroux laws, are the subject of considerable division. Except for a few major social gains which no one wants to see affected, there is in connection with structural reforms, economic reforms and the nationalizations a radical division among French citizens.

Alain Duhamel: There are, then, two levels to be distinguished. Jerome's work confirms my hypothesis first of all, to wit that crisis or no, alternation in power or no, there is somewhat of a reduction in dissent.

And now in connection with recent political steps, it is normal that antagonists should oppose each other. This seems to me to come within the logic of things.

Jerome Jaffre: Alain, it was not obvious that political dissent was deepening between 1976 and 1983. This goes against your demonstration of the "outstanding French consensus."

Alain Duhamel: How many times has the left wing, with the communists and based on its program, been in power in France? What could this mean on the cultural level? How might this have been received? From that moment on, was it a logical hypothesis that we would move toward unanimity?

Up to the present we have reasoned on the basis of the contrast between the existence of a consensus on a small number of basic and enduring values and the existence of dissent, that is to say on more partisan issues. The two things are not mutually exclusive.

But there is a third parameter which must be introduced now, and that is the development of the public ideology. I stress in fact that along with the overall consensus on society and the points of dissent, which have been abundantly stressed, there is at the same time a development of the dominant ideology which, when the left wing was in the opposition and the liberals were in power, was a predominantly social democratic ideology, and which now that the left wing is in power, is tending after 3 years to become a neo-liberal ideology. The question which arises is whether this development is of a mechanical nature, in that when a policy is effectively pursued it provokes rejection, above all in a period of crisis, and thus creates a symmetrical and opposing ideology. As a function of this interpretation, the current mode of neoliberal ideology would only be a mode resulting from the fact that the left wing is in power. And it would be a mode in symmetry with that which prevailed earlier, when the liberals or the conservatives were in power, and which was social democratic. I would be tempted to put forth another interpretation. I admit that this is but a working hypothesis, and that it would have to be tested and confirmed. Alternation in political power has had an integrating effect for a part of the left wing and a stabilizing effect on French society. I wonder if similarly and in depth, the economic policy of the left wing's first year in office, the policy pure and simple, the doctrinaire policy, may not have given rise to an awareness of the impossibility of changing a certain type of society at a given moment, and whether it may not have therefore led to increasing and enduring importance, among a part of the leftist voters included, for a certain number of values of a neoliberal sort, whether involving enterprise, the need for profit and competition or the need for risk. I wonder if it is not in this fashion that the new challenge to a certain number of social democratic convictions which were previously dominant should be interpreted.

Olivier Duhamel: The hypothesis is a very interesting one. There is one point, however, on the basis of which it must be considerably modified, and that is the relevance of the contrast between liberal ideology and social democratic ideology. Like you, I see in the surveys an undeniable trend toward a reduction in the social democratic ideological elements and an increase in the liberal ideological elements. But another reality which already existed in 1980 and which still continues among the French must be taken into account. It is the partial juxtaposition of the two ideologies, the simultaneous attachment to elements in the one and the other. If for example we look at the classification of a certain number of key words in terms of whether the French people attach a positive or negative value to them, we will see that "capitalism" is at the bottom of the list. Conversely, heading the list are participation, competition, liberalism, trade union and socialism.

Alain Duhamel: I agree. There is a juxtaposition and opposition of the two alternating dominant ideologies, which are primarily social democratic and neoliberal, although there are other secondary ideologies. But these ideologies themselves are affected by the crisis and their balance of forces in the country changes. As to the fact that a certain number of elements in both are valued by the majority of Frenchmen, this is to my view one of the component parts of the consensus.

Jerome Jaffre: When a significant proportion of the liberal voters values a social democratic concept, and when a significant proportion of the social democratic voters values a liberal concept, there is a broadening or development of the French consensus.

Olivier Duhamel: A last example which works too much in favor of Alain Duhamel for me to conceal it, and which seems to me indicative of the upset occurring in the ideology of French citizens, has to do with the considerable rejection being experienced by Marxism. Out of a list of 13 items offered in a question as to whether this or that faction "suggests something positive or negative to you," Marxism placed next to the last, just above the extreme right wing. Its index came to -64 (70 percent of the Frenchmen polled answered "negative," and 6 percent answered "positive"). Most important, this negative attitude was found in all the political groups, since it was shared by 70 percent of the socialists, while if among the communists themselves 36 percent still see it as positive, 41 percent saw "something negative" therein!*

Jerome Jaffre: Thank you for this last item of information.

* See "The Ideological References of the French People," survey taken by the SOFRES between 21 and 26 October 1983 for the FIGARO group, quoted in SOFRES-Public Opinion (...) 1984, pp 83-88.

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CONTINUED STRIFE ROCKS COMMUNIST PARTY RANKS

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 16 Jun 84 p 12

[Article by Turid Veber]

[Text] "I have come to the conclusion that NKP (Norwegian Communist Party) is digging its own grave. The reason for this is the party's lack of ability to discuss and solve its differences."

This was written by executive committee member John Atle Krogstad from Sor-Trondelag. In a statement Krogstad sent to the newspapers and to NORSK TELEGRAMBYRA, he explained that he was leaving NKP and why he was leaving.

"There is an atmosphere of distrust among leading party members. The present personality conflicts in the executive committee have convinced me to withdraw from the party," Krogstad said.

Battle

According to Krogstad, former editor of FRIHETEN Arne Jorgensen, former chairman Martin Gunnar Knutsen, and executive committee member Magne Mortensen are involved in a bitter struggle for their supporters against those of chairman Kleven.

"The party is permeated with personality conflicts, despite the unanimous agreements at the national congress last April and despite the fact that the chairman was chosen unanimously."

Unacceptable

The attempts to divide the party along artificial lines are totally unacceptable. This is particularly true in the light of NKP's difficult situation and of all the work that remains to be done, according to John Atle Krogstad. He concluded that the party was digging its own grave.

Hans I. Kleven confirmed the resignation, but withheld comment.

REPORT, ANALYSIS OF SALAT LEAN TOWARD FRAGA CAMP

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 23 Jun 84 p 5

[Article by Pilar Cernuda and Carlos Davila]

[Text] Madrid--Carlos Ferrer Salat will decide in September if he will accept the vice presidency of the AP [Popular Alliance] which Abel Matutes has offered him. He said yesterday: "If I decide to actively enter politics, it seems that this solution will be the most reasonable. Right? I believe I could be useful in the AP."

In a telephone conversation from Barcelona, Ferrer--who in all probability will say "yes" to Fraga--repeatedly asked the source of this news. He had his telephone out of service all morning. Although "I have always said that I would devote myself to the foundation and to being a businessman, Matutes' idea seems right to me.

"On many occasions, I have defended the idea that unity is necessary. My position has always been to favor that unity and not provoke quarrels. I feel this initiative is at least consistent with what I think but I am not going to make any decision until September." We asked him about his wife's opinion since she is so influential in his decisions. He answered immediately: "She says yes, it is best." Then he spoke to her; she must have been at his side. He added: "She tells me that I don't have to consult her about this type of thing."

Great Politician

Abel Matutes, AP vice president and chairman of the electoral committee, received a telephone call at his residence in Ibiza yesterday from Carlos Ferrer Salat. According to Matutes' statements: "He asked me where the news had leaked out and said he still had not made a decision on the matter. I hope he does it as soon as possible, hopefully before the end of the year, although I know he is a man who takes his time about things. This means he is serious in his statements."

Matutes continued: "I feel that when the need to unite the right and the center is mentioned, it is necessary to do everything possible to accomplish it. There is no point in spouting words; it is necessary to be consistent. I have

been Carlos' friend for a long time. In May we talked on several occasions about his joining the AP. I offered him my vice presidency and told him that I understood his reasons for taking a break. However, there are times when it is necessary to take a step forward.

"He asked me for time and repeated that entering politics now was not in his plans. I repeated that elections could be advanced and we wanted to have him as soon as possible. When I spoke to Fraga and Verstrynge about my offer, because Carlos could not enter the AP as a base member, they were enthusiastic."

Vice Presidency

"Ferrer has not said yes or no but I hope he will join the AP very soon. As to leaving the vice presidency...the truth is that, as chairman of the electoral committee, I constantly ask others for sacrifices. I make them see that sometimes there are party reasons that make it necessary to give up positions on a slate. I believe that I will be able to ask for these sacrifices with more moral force next time if I have been capable of renouncing a top position in order to achieve a strengthening of the AP. This seems important to me facing the coming elections."

Jorge Verstrynge, one of the men who has worked carefully on the Ferrer Salat operation in the AP, stated: "I already said that Carlos had everything. He is not only a good businessman with knowledge of the economic and social world but he also has everything to be a great politician. If it is confirmed that he will enter our party, he would be welcomed with open arms. He is a very highly esteemed person in the AP."

Fraga, One Man Among Many

Strictly speaking, the offer to Carlos Ferrer to become one of the AP vice presidents is not an operation of "réplacement" but one of "unity." The agents of the Spanish center-right are not preparing to replace Fraga but are preparing an all-encompassing expansion of the popular coalition in order to construct an alternative capable of winning the elections within a year. It is predicted that Felipe Gonzalez will dismiss the second constitutional legislature within that period of time.

The summer will be the key to launching this operation which will be difficult to accomplish by fall. One reason is that Ferrer will not join the AP without first leaving the Institute for Economic Studies and the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] Foundation functioning. Abel Matutes is not a sacrificial lamb who generously gives up his position to this former boss. He is the compiler of this alternative that will culminate the day Manuel Fraga agrees "to be one more man with shared power."

I put this phrase in quotation marks because it precisely reflects the intention of those who believe that it is still possible to convince Miguel Roca to join the "grosse koalition" and those who state that if the incorporation occurs, the socialists will be defeated in the coming elections. The agents--Matutes among them--state to whomever listens that in the coming elections

"they will no longer be voting for a person but an option." They announce, on one side, that Fraga will no longer be the leader of this alternative, at least not the only leader, and on the other side that the vote for the coalition will get around the reluctance that a great part of the Spanish electorate still has to vote directly for Manuel Fraga.

In any case, Ferrer's probable joining of the coalition and the desire to negotiate that Matutes proclaims are symptoms that the right is moving with some speed to avoid being destroyed in 1985. If the probable crisis in Suarez' party, the CDS [expansion unknown], is added to this, if the former president refuses any type of understanding with Roca, the political situation of the center-right can change substantially before the end of this year. The French example and the confidence of the powers most involved in the success of the operation that Fraga "no longer be the man" add two interesting surprises that it would be stupid to ignore.

Until now, however, Ferrer's incorporation and the talks not even begun yet only mean that the AP is trying to liberalize and modernize itself. For the center, the reformists do not have any real need to submit to any timetable of negotiations. One reason is that perhaps within a year, if the Galician elections are held, the pure right will be the one that has to ask for talks.

7717

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ELUSIVE PSOE 'CRISIS' BLAMED FOR GOVERNMENT TURMOIL

Gonzalez Denies Crisis, Reshuffle

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 6 Jul 84 p 5

[Article by Antxon Sarasqueta]

[Text] Madrid--"...And you should be at ease, because there is no crisis, really." Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez had just bid Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia goodbye at the door of Moncloa Palace when, amid the regards conveyed to the other guests, he addressed this reporter to deny the possibility of imminent changes in the cabinet which have been cited insistently during the past few days by the very members of the executive body.

It was exactly midnight when this brief dialog took place on the front steps at the entrance to the presidential palace, with two other reporters and about 20 personages from the government "establishment."

"Seriously," reiterated the prime minister, with a firm but conscious gesture, "There is no crisis. If you want to be well informed, this is the truth."

"Of course you, Prime Minister, are the one one who seems to know it."

"Yes, yes, of course, I am the only one. And I tell you that there is no crisis."

"But, Prime Minister, you would not claim that this was invented by the press. There is a well founded source of the information."

"No, no, of course; but there is nothing, neither a crisis nor a reshuffling."

Economist Angel Rojo, the president of Telefonica, Luis Solana, the president of INI [National Institute of Industry], Enrique Moya, the government spokesman, Eduardo Sotillos, and the prime minister's secretary, Julio Feo, as well as a dozen more onlookers, listened to the comments made by Felipe Gonzalez. Fernando Moran, the minister of foreign affairs, approached. Two other members of the cabinet, whose tenure has been considered certain, Narcis Serra (defense) and Jose Barrionuevo (interior) were close by, as was Enrique Baron (transportation), whose departure from the government has been mentioned.

Felipe Gonzalez, wearing a dark twill suit, smiled occasionally and had an unruffled demeanor. The night's sultry weather was reflected on some shining foreheads, when Felipe Gonzalez, without hesitation or ambiguity, finished announcing the postponement of his first government crisis.

In the Summer

"Prime Minister, you yourself said that the changes would occur in the summer."

"All right, the summer...of course; it will have to come some time."

"But you were the one who claimed, a few days ago, that summer was a good time for thinking about changes."

"Yes, all right...during the summer. August is vacation time, but for the present there is nothing. That is not the way things are going."

"You cannot deny that these leaks have made many ministers nervous."

"That's true, but I don't think that any of them have been bothered; they should not be bothered by it. In fact, there is no crisis."

"You know that you are going to claim that you are not causing a crisis, because it has come out in the press; isn't that so?"

"Of course, and if I had caused it, they would say so too; in that case because it had been made public. They can always say that, but this is not the time."

"Have the leaks troubled you?"

"No, really, they have not, but...there are even some who not only tell me what I must do now, but also to what extent I must do it."

"Are you referring to the statements made in Valencia today by Nicolas Redondo?"

"That's an example."

After changing his expression, Prime Minister Gonzalez smiled, something imitated faithfully by some of those present and, after saying goodbye, he entered the residence with Julio Feo.

Nervousness

The nervousness and tension within the government had been triggered to such an extent that the prime minister was forced to tell the ministers during the Council of Ministers session held during the morning that he intended to make a formal statement denying the possibility of a crisis or cabinet changes.

Before this official banquet in honor of the Saudi prince and his party, this had been done by spokesman Eduardo Sotillos at a press conference, at which he read a written note: "Insofar as I know, the head of the government has not considered making a reshuffle in the government, or causing a crisis," remarked Sotillos.

The cautious "insofar as I know" was later explained by Prime Minister Gonzalez' comments, when he claimed that he was "the only one" who really knew about the matter of the crisis, denying its existence exactly a week after the press published the news that Felipe Gonzalez was hastening the changes in the government. At that time, some ministers and high-ranking officials considered the imminence of the crisis certain. At least four ministers regarded the changes as occurring within a matter of hours or days. This was admitted by Miguel Boyer, Joaquin Almunia, Javier Solana and Jose Barrio-nuevo, among others, in public or private comments.

The UGT [General Union of Workers] leader, Nicolas Redondo, confirmed that the changes are anticipated and that they must be made quickly, adding that this is a demand from the public. At Moncloa, the prime minister's collaborators (including the government spokesman) considered the changes to be certain within a very short period of time, until a few hours before the Council of Ministers session on Wednesday.

It has been the strong disagreements with UGT on the part of Gonzalez and Boyer's economic team, the leaks to the news media and the internal power struggle between Deputy Prime Minister Alfonso Guerra and the minister of economy and finance that have comprised the set of circumstances advising Gonzalez to put off the crisis in order to gain time.

Fraga, Iglesias, Castellano Viewpoints

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 6 Jul 84 p 6

[Articles by Pilar Cernuda and Francisco Frechoso]

[Text] Madrid--According to Manuel Fraga, there will be no crisis so long as there is no change in the head of government "who, after all, is the one responsible for the policy that his ministers are making. So long as the problem is whether they replace Guerra or Boyer or Moran, the crisis is not of the slightest importance to me, and I prefer not to discuss that topic. The only thing that occurs to me is that the entire matter has been handled very badly, also entailing an erosion in the team with internal effects. It has been claimed that the speculation has come from a particular sector of the government, and I don't know; but of course I must consider this alleged reshuffling as a whole, because of the way in which it has been handled, as another failure of the government."

Fraga claims that the external image of the Socialist team is rather mediocre, and that he has observed this in his constant meetings with dignitaries from

other countries. "Some politicians have told me really shocking things; they are surprised particularly by the language sometimes used by the Spanish Socialists, a revolutionary language in which they say things that have very little in common with what Felipe Gonzalez, for his part, maintains."

This year, for the first time, the Democratic and Republican Parties in the United States have invited Popular Alliance to their conventions; and Fraga will go to Dallas for the Republican one, where he will meet the current president, Reagan, for the first time. "I know many members of his team, but I have not yet had an opportunity to talk with him" Foreign relations and international policy are very important to the head of AP as the diplomat that he is, and he comments on those subjects with great concern.

He still believes that the general elections will be held in 1985, "or perhaps early in 1986. I have studied everything that is on the table, and I always come up with the same date, 1985." And he is not sure that the Socialists are going to win them. "I don't preclude anything, because, the way things are going, to gain 180 seats we are not going to have to do any juggling."

He says little about Ferrer Salat. "He is not the only one who will join AP; other prominent individuals will come. When? I have no reason to think that this will not occur during the periods anticipated, but I shall not give any names."

NATO, Yes

With regard to the NATO referendum, AP's constant Atlantist position is delicate: "If the question asked is something like 'do you back the government's position, etc.?' of course we shall not accept it impassively. If the Spanish people are asked whether they approve of the government's measures regarding the NATO situation, the government would not have our support.

"But if the government acts with a minimum amount of integrity, and the question is asked clearly, without any tricks, we shall not protest. We are participating in military affairs of the Atlantic Alliance; the country cannot be deceived. We are participating in plans for construction and arms with other countries; so they cannot claim that we are not integrated into the military part. And all that seems very fine to us, but the truth must be told; the people cannot be deceived."

He is optimistic about the Galician elections and does not seem to fear the rise of a Galician Coalition. "It is not a new party; it involves the vestiges of UCD [Democratic Center Union]. Mr Franqueira is a major manipulator of rural politics in Galicia. He is not an unknown personage by any means, and I must necessarily feel optimistic, because if the Galician Coalition could not overcome us when it had the UCD government in power, I don't know why it would entail a problem now. What we are confronted with is far less than what we faced in 1981 and 1982."

PNV Pacts

As for the Basque Country, there are no coalitions with PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] as had been claimed previously, although pacts involving the legislature are possible on concrete issues. And with regard to the "peace table," he said: "I am absolutely sure that it is a lost cause, a balloon that has been punctured many times already."

He does not preclude the possibility that coalitions with other parties might be reached before the elections. In principle, he does not seem to attach much importance to the "reformist operation." "It is understandable that the Catalan Regionalist Party should want to avoid the transfer of its votes to the national parties in the general elections; hence it is understandable that it should be mounting that operation."

And he claims to be willing to give up the AP leadership if the party requests it of him. "My magnanimity is unlimited, but not my foolishness; and thus far no one has asked me to leave the position, but rather to remain in it."

Before the press banquet ended, mention was made again of the announced but not created government crisis; but Fraga refused to embark upon personal ratings of the members of the cabinet. "I can only say that the lack of experience that they had upon their arrival has been more than sufficiently demonstrated."

Madrid--"The public cannot be sold the change in ministers as the solution to the government's management problems. The problem is not a change of ministers, but rather a change in policy." With this comment, the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] secretary general, Gerardo Iglesias, summarized the opinion of the party's executive committee which met yesterday to discuss, among other topics, the rumors of the government crisis.

The Communist leader explained that these rumors, denied at the last minute by the head of the executive body himself, Felipe Gonzalez, "are an unmistakable sign of the government's erosion, caused by the abandonment of its political hypotheses regarding a real change and the subjugation to the national and international conservative forces."

Gerardo Iglesias stressed that "a reshuffle will not solve the underlying problems," adding: "If a radical change does not take place, particularly in the policy for creating employment, PCE intends to carry out mobilizations that will be more intensive than ever this fall."

As the Communist executive entity agreed, the purpose of the mobilizations would be "to uphold a policy for the creation of employment and an increase in the purchasing power of workers and retirees, as well as to express our disagreement with the projects for naval reconversion and the new electoral law."

This law was criticized in particular, since the members of the executive committee think that it represents "an attempt to establish the two-party system dissociated from the criteria for proportionality called for in the Constitution."

The negotiations for Spain's entry into the EEC was another timely issue analyzed at the meeting. Gerardo Iglesias stated that the action had been taken "hastily, without providing the public with accurate information and excluding the participation of other sociopolitical sectors of the country." For the final part of these negotiations, he cited the need to create a consultative council "in which the social forces would be included, along with the central administration and the autonomous administrations."

Yesterday, the executive committee was informed of a report prepared by five members of the Central Committee, headed by the party's deputy secretary general.

Madrid--Pablo Castellano, leader of the Socialist Left, is of the opinion that Felipe Gonzalez should consult the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] leadership regarding the potential government crisis.

In statements made to EFE [Efe Press Association], Castellano deemed it necessary to recover the PSOE image, claiming that the party "must have pre-eminence" over the government.

In his view, although the Constitution grants authority to the head of the government to resolve the crisis "personally," the Socialist federal executive body must be informed of the prime minister's plans.

According to Castellano, the government is an "epiphenomenon" based on a party which won the last general elections; whereas PSOE is "the engine of a car," the government is "its driver," he added.

Pablo Castellano summarized the Socialist Left's critical position before PSOE's 30th federal congress, to be held in December, a position divided into four major lines.

Strategy, economic and international policy, autonomies and party organization or model are the four basic points on which Socialist Left will state positions to the congress.

Intensification of democracy and strengthening of the institutions, with a clearcut definition of party-government relations, are key issues for the Socialist Left.

In organizational policy, it is considered necessary to strengthen the local groups and to recover the image of the party and the Socialist ideology, "seriously and austerely, without attempts to besmirch the party in cases of corruption."

In economic policy, according to Castellano, there is a need to reduce inflation, and "for not always making the working class be the one to pay for the crisis, while private enterprise benefits from public funds."

"No" to remaining in NATO, a renegotiation of the agreements on military bases to dismantle them, and "no" to the policy of blocs and to the "shameless misappropriation of public funds for weapons," comprise the Socialist planks on international policy.

There is a reaffirmation of the autonomous state, "with magnanimity, in the service of the citizen and not for the distribution of power among the parties."

All these points will be finally approved at the assembly that the members of the Socialist Left will be holding in Madrid next weekend.

2909

CSO: 3548/295

REPORT ON COMMUNIST PARTY VISIT TO PRC

Geneva VOIX OUVRIERE in French 14 Jun 84 p 5

[Article by Andre Rauber, member of the Politburo of the Swiss Labor Party:
"Trip of the Swiss Labor Party (PST) Delegation to China, Warm Welcome and
Meeting With Hu Yaobang"]

[Text] Arriving on the evening of Thursday 7 June in Beijing, the delegation of the Swiss Labor Party*, on a visit to China with a view to reestablishing relations with the Chinese Communist Party, received a warm and gracious welcome. Greeted at the airport by Li Shu Zheng, assistant head of the International Affairs Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, and later by Qiao Shi, deputy member of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCP, at the residence placed at their disposal, the group was received the next morning for a short meeting with Hu Yaobang, secretary general of the CCP, who saw them again Tuesday 19 June at a farewell banquet. On Friday and Saturday, 8 and 9 June, political discussions took place during which the two parties shared their respective positions and their analyses of various problems. Agreement exists on a great many points while some others lead to differing interpretations, a fact which should however not hinder the resumption and development of relations between the two parties.

On 11-12 June, the delegation of the PST visited Xian, the historic city with the amazing remains of terra-cotta warriors from the Qin dynasty (an exhibition of which came to Switzerland about two years ago). After going to Shanghai for 13-14 June, then to Changchou, a built-up area and center of the textile and food industries on the Nanching-Shanghai rail line, the group traveled on 17 June to Hangchou, capital of Zhejiang province. In all of these places the delegates of the PST, besides making tourist visits, had the opportunity to see agricultural and industrial enterprises and socio-cultural accomplishments.

*We recall that the delegation of the PST is made up of our comrades Armand Magnin, secretary general, Bernard Burkhard and Andre Rauber, members of the Politburo, Georges Lechleiter and Anna Maria Nava, members of the Central Committee (see VO, 7 June).

After returning to Beijing on Monday 18 June, our comrades were able also to visit the Great Wall and the Ming tombs and to have some visits and discussions in more specialized areas (education, urbanism, the judiciary, etc) before flying 22 June to Pyongyang, capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Instructive and Serious Discussions

During the first days of their visit, the delegates of the PST exchanged views with a delegation of the CCP, led by Qiao Shi and several members of the Department of International Affairs.

In the course of these discussions, our comrade Armand Magnin, secretary general of the PST, presented some individual points of the political, economic and social situation in our country and the work of the party as well as our analysis of the international situation, referring to the detailed discussions which our comrades Jean Spielmann and Andre Rauber had had during their preliminary trip last March. For his part, Qiao Shi presented interesting information to the Swiss delegates about the interior situation in China --especially about its evolution since the end of the era of the cultural revolution--which revealed important, positive results in economic and political development. He also set forth the point of view of the CCP regarding various aspects of the international situation. During this frank but cordial exchange of views, the two parties agreed upon the fact that a very serious international situation had developed between the United States and the USSR. While keeping in mind the fact that this situation can only be defused by a renewal of negotiations and movement toward the suppression of the opposing military blocs, the two parties have differing opinions about the origins and causes of this situation. Likewise, the PST delegation, which insisted on the necessity of depending on negotiation for the settling of all conflicts, and especially of those between certain socialist countries, does not share all the opinions of the CCP concerning the necessary means of solving these problems.

Importance of Resumption of Relations Based on Independence

During the banquet given the evening of 8 June by Comrade Qiao Shi, he stated notably that "even though there exist differences of opinions and analyses between our two parties on certain questions because of the differences in our pasts and in the conditions in which we find ourselves today, there also exist identical or similar points of view on many questions. But that is only normal and does not keep our two parties from reestablishing and developing their friendly relations on the basis of the principles of Marxism."

For his part, our comrade Magnin heartily thanked the Central Committee of the CCP for the invitation allowing the PST to confer with the principal leaders of "this great country, great not only by virtue of its dimensions and the number of its inhabitants, but also by virtue of its entire history, its rich culture of many thousands of years and its revolutionary traditions."

He also emphasized the importance that the PST places on this resumption of relations between our two parties, relations which ought to be based--as the CCP itself emphasizes--upon independence, full equality, mutual respect and noninterference in internal affairs, principles which unfortunately have not always been the rule in the international workers movement.

The PST delegation, along with a delegation of the Spanish Communist Party, which was in Beijing at the same time, with its secretary general Gerardo Iglesias, also attended on Friday evening 8 June a ballet spectacular given in their honor; and the Swiss delegates visited the Institute of Physical Culture in Beijing on Saturday 9 June (we will come back to this subject in the report which we will publish upon the return of the delegation in the July issue).

12666

CSO: 3619/72

NATO COMMAND, CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEYED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Jun 84 pp 82-86

/Article by Eberhard Skibbe: "NATO Command and Control Systems"/

/Text/ First a definition of the term "command and control," especially since the term "control" can be understood in a variety of ways, in the meaning of steering, leading, guiding, as well as checking and monitoring. "Command" clearly covers the part of military command by orders, while "control" on the one hand actually characterizes the monitoring of the effect of orders given, but also at the same time the command component in one's own situation and in the enemy situation.

From this it is clear that a command control system must have the characteristics of an automatic control system. Reports as status information from all the principal command sectors are brought together and form the basis for decisionmaking for the appropriate military command echelon which requires them. It is up to the latter whether any and which information is continuously entered onto a status board, is available on call or is passed on as information to the responsible authority with a kind of alarm designation because designated threshold values have been exceeded.

Both the measures we take on the basis of commands and directives and the reactions of the enemy result in changes in status and situation which in turn become part of the C² system and influence other decisions. Command and control systems in the German-language definition are therefore "command-information systems."

These functions and their relations to one another are by no means new; they have existed in some form or other ever since there have been wars, and it surely was true in those days that the quality of the "command system" and its functioning have a decisive influence on military success.

Moreover, similar ground rules likewise obtain in the civilian sector, and many an industrial enterprise--which no attentive observer can miss--is managed more strictly than the current level of military command-information systems makes possible. The level of weapons technology and technology as command

systems must counterbalance one another--but at this point the demand for the highest level of perfection quickly encounters the limit of available funds.

What Does NATO Have Today?

It is indispensable for the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to have a command system which is effective even to the outermost flanks of this defense alliance. In NATO this system is called NCCIS (NATO Command and Control Information System) and exists as a working term for the components involved in it. What the ACE (Allied Command Europe) has at present was evaluated more or less as follows by one of the highest ranking generals in this command:

"If someone would take a closer look at the ACE's command and control systems he would see that even the most modern system which we have in the central region is composed almost totally of equipment of the second generation. In the north the situation is even worse because the equipment is first generation, and the systems in the south are clearly archaic."

In the opinion of a responsible general at the head of NATO's military command the criticism is harsh but also understandable if development and organization of a modern integrated NATO command system was unable to keep pace with weapons technology. But in this connection we should also not overlook the fact that since the first beginnings of national command systems there has been enormous progress in the area of electronic data and information processing, not only in the area of technology, but also in a very substantial complex of utilization possibilities--and there are continually new developments and findings.

In NATO the communications links in the ACE HIGH programs with forward scatter links from the extreme north as far as Turkey and the trans-Atlantic satellite communications net were pushed forward early and vigorously.

A basic condition for being able to command at all is a good, secure communications net of adequate capacity which is capable of surviving. This is all the more true of a command system which is supposed to function to a large extent automatically. For this reason NATO made decisions and took steps which are oriented toward the end goal, an EDP-supported command and information system for the entire NATO area.

Thus, the NATO Command, Control and Information Systems and Automatic Data Processing Committee (NCCDPC) has been in existence since 1970. Its job is to implement the developmental work for the planned command system. The committee gives fundamental recommendations in the area of the command and information systems and is responsible for the overall organization of NATO's command and information system up to identifying and defining the features which are in need of standardization.

One year later in 1971 there was an agreement in the North Atlantic Council to establish an integrated NATO communications system (NICS) and to set up a special office, the NICS Management Agency (NIC SMA). It is responsible for planning and building the new system whose design calls for an automatically

switched communications net which is accessible to all users. Highly developed EDP-controlled exchanges will guarantee telephone, teleprinter and data transmission operation. Here we are dealing with one of the largest jointly financed infrastructure projects that the alliance has ever tackled and whose development is to be finished by 1995. It will improve the Alliance's capabilities to deal with crises and is also the communications-technical base for a functionally efficient command and information system.

The significance of this view is openly expressed in military language use and writing by the fact that the "C²" for communication is raised by one power to "C³" in the acronym for the command system. With the increasing importance of the "intelligence part" in the command system there is now the concept "C³I." This definition is, of course, not without controversy. There are those who say that that no longer clearly expresses the central objective, namely command and control for the commander whom it is supposed to serve. However, in fact the use of this integrated communications system does to beyond what is correctly understood by C² and also serves the political leadership, that is, the governments of the Alliance's partners for mutual consultation.

Although the decision by the North Atlantic Council to establish the committee for the NATO Command and Information Systems is about ½ year older than the NICS agreement, the work to establish NATO's own EDP-supported command systems for the upper command echelons has not moved forward to the extent that the communications facilities have. In the latter case there were the experiences of the NATO-wide air defense system (NADGE /NATO Air Defense Ground Environment/) which was finished in 1962.

Thus, in a further developed program for air defense in the ACE it was determined that--even before NATO establishes efficient management and the material means for an air force command system--the currently existing forces and the level of technology which can be expected in the future are to be brought into the necessary studies.

Industry in the NATO countries in the context of the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) was first involved in these deliberations in 1978 via the Ad Hoc Group on Air Defense (HGAD). On the basis of their cooperation the objectives for the technical-operational system features, the basic program operation and special conditions of the program were developed which are roughly as follows:

With an Air Command and Control System (ACCS) program a command system which will meet the requirements of the year 2000 will be developed over the next 15 years on the basis of today's systems. This can be derived from the foreseeable threat which can be anticipated for the year 2000 and must have the following features:

--Integration of the command components for defensive, offensive and general support operations;

--High-level survivability by virtue of a dispersed system design, integration of subsystems and use of mobile components;

- High-level efficiency because of advanced technology, based on sensors, communications and data processing;
 - Balance in respect to the weapons systems used so that the highest level of cost efficiency can be achieved;
 - Integration into the overriding command system ACENCCIS and integration with "neighboring" command systems, as for example of the army and the navy.
- Ongoing updating of the program beyond the year 2000 is part of the planning.

Scope and Technical/Operational Features of the ACCS

Geographically the ACCS covers the entire ACE area. The planned increase in efficiency and survivability refers to all relevant subsystems, such as sensors, command posts, communications systems on up to the weapons systems.

For airspace surveillance in the ACCS the typical system is one into which many different kinds of sensors are integrated. Comprehensive net management with efficient sensor control optimizes the efficiency of the surveillance system and decreases its physical and electronic vulnerability.

The requirement to combine the command of defensive and offensive components with the general support operations can be met, depending on their importance, by means of a close data grid between the command posts or by common command posts for all three functions. Work in the command posts is supported by extensive automated data processing. This is primarily true of assembling, exchanging and processing information relevant to command, but also of the support of decision processes and the implementation of operations. This effects a basis for high speed of response and optimal reactions through the availability of all relevant information when under consideration. The technical potential can be fully utilized with appropriate representations of information and with favorable shaping of the man-machine dialogue.

The communications system of the ACCS will include many different transmission techniques such as radio relay, light wave transmissions, conventional cable technology and radio methods which resist interference.

As links to the individual weapons systems there is a provision for direct data exchange, even for flying and mobile systems. A suitable mode of operation determines the degree of decentralization while the technical equipment permits all possibilities of operation ranging from the highly centralized on up to the most extensively decentralized.

Fundamental Program Operation and Areas of Responsibility

The ACCS program is subdivided into a central planning operation and the implementation of planned projects which can be handled either as NATO projects or via the host nations.

For planning, a NATO ACCS Team (NACCST) has been established which is supported by industrial studies and whose program of studies at present provides for three topics:

--the ACCS Multi-Sensor Integration Study (MSIS),

--the ACCS Automatic Data Processing and Communications Design Options Study, and

--the ACCS Automatic Data Processing Support Tools Study.

The MSIS is already in the implementation phase in which two firms are participating independent of one another.

The ACCS Team which--and there was surely good reason for it--is located in the house of the NICSMA in the Rue de Geneve in Brussels, has defined several rather large working packets whose results will culminate in seven documents and can be subdivided into two groups: the "Requirement Analysis" as the main work sector until 1984 and the "System Design" for revision between 1984 and 1986. In chronological order they are as follows:

--translating the Military Operation Requirements (MOR) into the goals for the future ACCS,

--a stocktaking of the efficiency of the systems, components and facilities which will be present at the point in time of the "baseline" in 1985 and will play a role either as elements of ACCS or as corresponding systems.

--Comparison of the features of these components with the goals of the future ACCS in order to determine to what extent the inclusion of operational necessities on the one hand and financial limitations on the other influence priorities. The Regional Supplements must be available at the latest for these jobs.

--Beginning of developing the system with the designing of the desired overall system.

--Establishing a plan for the sequence of operations which will put the totality of all individual projects, improvements and conversions into chronological order and which describes the steps to reach the situation desired for 1995.

As mentioned earlier two companies have been charged independently of one another with the development of the ACCS Multisensor Integration Study. One of these is AMS (Airspace Management Systems), a consortium of companies: Boeing (United States), ESG Electronics System Co (FRG), ISR Informatique de Systemes et de Roeaux (France), Italtel and Associated Members (Italy), Logica (Great Britain), Racal-Decca (Great Britain), SEL Standard Electric Lorenz (FRG), Sintra-Alcatel (France), Westinghouse (United States), with headquarters in the immediate vicinity of the ACCSS team and also registered as a company in Belgium. The AMS recently also received the order for the ACCS Automatic Data Processing Support Tools Study.

The second company which--as was mentioned--received totally independently from the other the order for the MSIS form NATO is called ACCSCO S.A. "Air Command and Control Systems" is quite clearly a part of this name as a characterization of its task, but is to be viewed as a proper name according to Belgian law and not as an acronym. These companies are involved in this international consortium: AEG Telefunken Systems Technology (FRG), Hollandse Signaalapparaten B.V. (Netherlands), Hughes Aircraft Co (United States), Marconi Co Ltd (Great Britain), Philips & MBEL Associated S.A. (Belgium,) The Plessey Co Ltd (Great Britain), Selenia Industrie Elettroniche Associate S.p.a (Italy), Siemens Inc (FRG), Thomson-CSF (France).

The companies commissioned have a rich variety of experiences in the areas of communications, automatic data processing (ADO) and sensors, radar systems for early warning, air defense with fighter command. Some of the partners within the AMS and ACCSCO participated in the work of drawing up the NATO and national command subsystems, systems which later--even if in a different configuration--will have to be integrated into the ACCS. Thus, there are good conditions for successful development of such studies.

While a period of about 1 year is planned for the studies on the MSIS, at present the award of contracts for the ACCS Automatic Data Processing and Communications Options Study is under preparation. The bids by those competing, whose number ranges beyond the companies mentioend above, are due by the end of May 1984. From what could be learned ACCSCO does not intend to compete for the third study, the ACCS-ADP Support Tools Study.

According to the ACCS team's net plan for the course of the studies in terms of the time element the results of the ADP Com Options Study are to be available in August 1985 and those of the ADP Support Tools Study ultimately by July 1986.

The orders will be placed by the ACCS Team for NATO according to its guidelines. In respect to the above-mentioend set of tasks this team has to cope with a substantial amount of work. In order to do this a number of sections have been set up in the organization of this team and limited tasks are assigned to each:

There are the following organizational elements under the Team Leader (ACCST/TL) and his deputy, the Deputy Team Leader (ACCST/DTL):

- Administration,
- System Design Section (ACCST/DS)
- Plans & Program Section (ACCST/PP),
- Contract Section (ACCST/CONT),
- Surveillance and Sensors Section (ACCST/SS),
- Automated Data Processing Section (ACCST/ADP),
- Communications and Data Exchange Section (ACCST/COM),
- Operations/Technical Section (ACCST/OT),
- Operations and Maintenance Section (ACCST/OM),
- Major NATO Commanders (NMC) Cell (ACCST/MNCC).

Financing

One can proceed on the basis that all these initiatives and measures basically are not only directed toward improving the command capability of the air forces, but directly or indirectly will provide a very substantial performance share for NATO's overriding command and information system, the NCCIS. That would also contribute to justifying the substantial costs which are linked with the creation of the ACCS.

The Air Defense Planning Group (ADPG) has set the cost of this project at 400 million IAU (NATO clearing units) which is about DM3.2 billion. Of course, this amount was not calculated analytically on the basis of cost determinations for essential acquisitions of additional components, but rather was based on a computer forecast of the financial shares which thus far have been provided in the NATO infrastructure budget for command control communications on the assumption that the share provided to date for C³ will undergo no increase in the next few years. Whether these are realistic assumptions, however, in view of the additional very costly projects which must be financed in the next few years from this budget is not only questionable, but will perhaps pose substantial problems for the responsible authorities.

Command-information Systems in the NATO Countries

In spite of the negative evaluation at the beginning concerning the quality of existing command systems by the deputy of NATO's supreme general, considerable efforts have been made in the last few years in a number of partner countries to improve command capability by means of computer-supported systems. This is especially true of the central region of NATO on the one hand and of direct command on the battlefield.

Thus, development of the Electronic Information and Control System for the Operational Readiness of the Air Force (EIFEL) was begun in Germany in 1969. This project, about which Lieutenant General Eimler, chief of staff, Air Force, gave a full report at this year's symposium of the German Society for Defense Technology in May, emerged from the finding that the precision, up-to-dateness, scope and above all else the processing of important situation information no longer met the Luftwaffe's requirements.

Since this was established the Luftwaffe has been trying to develop with the means of electronic data processing a system which is appropriate to the level of technology to improve the command capability and to make it operational. In spite of some speedy initial successes in improving the registration system and the command of the air strike units through the functional systems which were set up first as precursors, a real breakthrough was still not achieved.

Nonetheless, the result was still so attractive that the ATOC-CCIS/EIFEL 1 (Air Tactical Operations Center-Command, Control Information System) project developed out of the interest of the NATO partners in EIFEL and parallel to that the national EIFEL 1 developed.

The additional command system EIFEL 2, which has been designed and whose design in principle was agreed to, had to be "cut back" quite significantly because of limited funds in the budget and resulted in the design of the EIFEL which is no longer classified by any identification code. Additional information will be available about this project in the report by Lieutenant General Eimler which will appear in one of the next issues of WEHRTECHNIK.

While the Luftwaffe in this instance, too, was clearly the advanced rider in this initiative toward computer-supported command systems, the army and navy have not been exactly inactive. As in the case of the Luftwaffe, the army also came to the realization that its performance potential can be converted only to a limited extent into combat capability if a clear and cost-effective improvement is not created by putting into operation computer-supported command information systems. To do this the army command information system for computer-supported conduct of operations in headquarters (HEROS) was developed to support management functions in the army's headquarters. It covers the army's management functions in all echelons of the command organization of this military service whose organization and distribution required a structure which is adapted to the diverse jurisdictions, assignments and operation conditions. The high mobility of the corps, division and brigade headquarters imposes special demands on the system components which are provided for this and on the means of communications with which these command systems must interact among themselves and with overriding and coordinated systems.

In order to cover the different command levels and the different assignments in a manner that relates to, but is limited to one issue the system was divided up into seven projects:

HEROS 1--support of the division and brigade headquarters,
HEROS 2--support of the corps headquarters,
HEROS 3--support of the army/HQ and army command headquarters,
HEROS 4--support of the home defense brigades,
HEROS 5--support of the headquarters of the territorial army,
HEROS 6--additional assignments for crises, tensions and mobilization,
HEROS 7--additional assignments in peace.

With the HEROS 1, 2 and 4 projects it is a matter of mobile components while the remaining subsystems are fixed.

As in the case of EIFEL the army is involved in many NATO working groups to agree on standards and for exchange of information and is cooperating bilaterally with U.S., Danish, British and French ground forces. Through cooperation, primarily with the U.S. Army, it was even possible, on the basis of jointly developed subcomponents, to achieve a 50-percent sharing of the burden in the development costs.

The advanced state of development of HEROS 3 and of the mobile experimental system with an eye on NATO demands for interoperability, EMP /expansion unknown/-protection, high security against failure and low susceptibility to interference have suggested presenting NATO the system with the goal of offering the NATO command authorities on German soil an alternative to U.S. and British systems.

The German Navy calls all its command resources by the term "Navy Command System" (MFueSys) and with this term it brings together sufficiently independent mission-based command information systems, command components and communications systems. These function amongst themselves within the context of the mission of those using them via defend interfaces and also work together with command systems outside the navy. The goals of the navy command system and its components are basically the same as those of the other service branches where there are, of course, both land- and sea-based system components.

Insofar as interoperability with overriding NATO command and information systems is concerned, like the ACCS which was discussed in the beginning, it is definitely an advantage that industrial firms which are involved in these national plans and their realization are also working on preparations for the NCCIS and also prominently on NICS. This permits us to expect that the problems which come as a result of the indispensable interoperability with all the interface and software questions have been equalized in the preliminary studies or have been taken into consideration.

In the case of these comprehensive systems it is not only a question of computer hard- and software, but also of the sensors, the reconnaissance and early warning systems and the distinctly technical EDP systems, for example, in personnel and in logistics, and naturally with a certain priority also of communications technology. Intercommunication by the subsystems with the sensors among themselves and with overriding command and information systems must operate faultlessly and reliably not only in peace, but also under extremely difficult conditions of electronic warfare they must guarantee communications certainty and survivability.

With these objectives a large number of systems have been developed in the Western industrial countries which have also been put into operation in other European and overseas NATO countries or will be and which are definitely suitable for inclusion as subsystems in the Nato-wide NCCIS because of their design and level of operation.

A development from the Plessey Defence Systems Ltd company may be cited as an example; it has been successfully tested by the British Army under the name "Wavell." Here it is a question of a highly mobile automatic data processing system for command and control on the battlefield. It has the following properties:

--Collecting, checking, evaluating and processing information and communications with accelerated methods represented immediately on the video terminal screen as opposed to the no longer up-to-date status boards and long teleprint messages,

--Delivery of a continuous situation report about one's own forces in just a few minutes in place of a 3 to 4 hour working period.

--"Wavell" provides information in a timely and correct manner about enemy and one's own forces in order to support the use of weapons as opposed to information which is incomplete and obsolete.

--Improvement in disseminating information. In place of long written reports these are transmitted in a uniform format to all offices which are equipped with "Wavell."

These properties enable the headquarters to handle precisely and quickly their tactical plot and thus to be able to implement more flexible operational planning, to shorten reaction time vis-a-vis hostile actions, to simplify a change in command, to utilize the communications net better and to improve checking of their own supplies.

As a supplement to this computer-supported command system the same company created for the British Ministry of Defense a tactical communications system which is called "Ptarmigan" and is used by NATO-assigned British forces as a successor to the "Bruin" system. "Ptarmigan" is perhaps roughly comparable in its operational role to the German "Autoko" system.

In describing communications systems, measures should not go unmentioned which pertain to interference-resistant wireless transmission of information and data. One of the most well-known systems which has also been introduced in NATO is called JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) which at present is used for data transmission, which is safe from monitoring and interference (ECM-resistant), between the AWACS /airborne warning and control system/ aircraft and the ground stations of the NADGE system and is supplied by the partner companies of Hughes Aircraft, Italtel and Siemens.

A large number of developments and products characterize the efforts of the industry to find suitable solutions for improving the command capability of their national forces and the forces in the Western alliance.

The competition which emerges in the process can perhaps counteract somewhat the cost explosion in this sector.

12124

CSO: 3620/354

MILITARY

NORWAY

POLL FINDS CONTINUED HIGH SUPPORT FOR ARMED DEFENSE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 Jun 84 p 5

[Text] Support for the Norwegian military remains at the same record-high level as last year, 87 percent. Only 5 percent are opposed to military defense, 3 percent are unsure and 5 percent "don't know." Men are more supportive than women, by a ratio of 91 percent to 83 percent. Only among members of the Socialist Left Party and the Liberal Party has support declined from last year's levels.

These figures were obtained in a poll taken by Norwegian Marketing Data for Folk and Forsvar [People and Defense] in March/April. Such polls have been taken every year since 1969, and the percentage of positive responses has never been as high as it has been over the last two years. The Christian People's Party registered the largest increase, from 86 percent last year to 97 percent this year.

The question asked by Norwegian Marketing Data was worded as follows: "Do you think that Norway should have a military defense given the current situation?"

8954

CSO: 3639/129

NEW NORWEGIAN-SWEDISH FIRM TO MAKE ELECTRONICS FOR FORCES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Jun 84 p 38

[Text] The new Nordic Electronic Systems A/S radar factory will, according to plans, create approximately 80 new jobs in Halden during the course of the '80s. The factory is owned by the Swedish Ericsson company's radio equipment subsidiary and by Lehmkuhl Elektronik A/S, a Norwegian firm. The operation is the result of contracts between Ericsson and the Defense Ministry concerning delivery of mobile radar units to the Norwegian Armed Forces. At a press conference on Monday, Halden's mayor, John Erik Eriksen, did not try to hide the fact that the municipality has invested a great deal of effort in bringing this operation to Halden.

Initially the firm will assume a central position in efforts to develop a prototype of an all-terrain radar for the Norwegian Army's surface-to-air missile defense. Development of the "Giraffe mobile radar" should be completed by the end of 1986, at which time it will be possible to begin series production.

At the press conference, the Norwegian and Swedish partners in the project indicated that the new company will start with a staff of roughly 15 employees, and that this figure will increase to between 30 and 50 workers over the next two years. When series production begins in 1987, the number of employees is expected to rise to about 100, with 80 in Halden and the remaining 20 at the main office in Oslo.

Nordic Electronic Systems A/S will begin operation with share capital of two million Norwegian Kroner, divided 60/40 between Ericsson and Lehmkuhl. Present Administrative Director Kjell Indreberg, who will chair the board of directors for the new company, indicated that Ericsson's holdings in the firm will not decrease to less than 51 percent, but that the partners are interested in addition other Norwegian companies to the list of shareholders in the new concern.

Both Indreberg and Chief Administrator for Ericsson Radio Systems AB Lars P. Afzelius, stressed the importance of manufacturing the radar in Norway. From the Swedish firm's point of view, this specialized radar system will create export possibilities to all of NATO.

"Halden has an official unemployment rate of 9.5 percent. This level puts us on a par with the northern Norwegian counties. This being so, it is obvious that we have hoped to attract this type of new business for quite some time. We have seen that electronics companies can undergo rapid change. Many of them grow quickly. Up until now Halden has been exporting computer expertise to other parts of the country. I believe that there are 300-400 Norwegian mayors who are envious of my opportunity to welcome such a company to our city," said Mayor John Erik Eriksen at the press conference in Halden.

8954

CSO: 3639/129

SMALL BUSINESS SECTOR ONLY BRIGHT SPOT IN LAPLAND ECONOMY

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 26 Jun 84 p 11

[Article by Thomas Olander]

[Text] Rovaniemi--Imagination, creativity, enterprise, and highly developed technology: these are some of the words that have been used frequently in recent years to describe the small-business sector in Finnish Lapland. At present, small business are experiencing a genuine boom there. The program the national government and local planners initiated almost 10 years ago in the form of a special Lapland Project is now beginning to bear fruit.

The project was developed between 1976 and 1980. It was based on the people of Lapland and the local conditions there. Or, as county governor Asko Oinas stated, it is incorrect to use the same yardstick in Lapland that is used elsewhere in Finland.

Despite high unemployment levels of 10 to 13 thousand every year, which is about 15 percent, there is now a strong feeling of optimism and confidence in the future among small business owners.

"What we have done so far is just the beginning of an expansion that could occur in the future," said businessman and chairman of the Small Business Association, Taisto Oikkonen.

His own company, a plastics factory, provides a good example of this faith in the future. After an extremely modest beginning in 1968, his company has grown so that it now employs 15 to 18 people and grosses about 20 million marks annually.

"The most important thing for us here in Lapland is to invest in new technology. Despite our northern location, we must have advanced production methods. Otherwise we cannot survive. Technology, new ideas, and creativity mean everything to us." This reveals something of the truth behind the small industry boom, where companies are springing up like mushrooms, and yet the unemployment problems persists.

The small companies, with their highly developed technology, have been unable to absorb all the unemployed who have been forced to leave their jobs at the

large plants--in the forestry industry, in the mines, and in the metal industry.

Nevertheless, small businesses have had a significant impact on employment.

In 1970, according to county governor Oinas, there were about 300 companies in Lapland. Today the figure is 1,200. During the 1970's, when the Lapland Project was just getting underway, the number of new jobs increased by 200 to 300 each year. During the 1980's, the figure has dropped to its present level of 150.

All this has created a positive climate, which is also important from a psychological standpoint. "The enterprising spirit and belief in the future are our most important assets," Oikkonen said.

Another example of the project's impact on employment is an experiment that began in 1982, whereby economic assistance is provided to families who want to start a small family company in which all the work is done by family members.

After 2 years, the experiment has created 400 new jobs. Over half those employed under this system were previously without work. According to Timo Korva of the County Governor's Office, most of the assistance has been given to businesses involved in the production of textiles and the raising of sheep and fur-bearing animals.

It is expected that 600 to 800 new applications will be received this year.

These are the smallest companies that can receive economic assistance. For slightly larger companies, financial support is available from the Commerce or Industry Ministry or from the fund for underdeveloped areas.

"We are in the same boat as companies elsewhere in the country. We can obtain assistance to start a company or expand an existing one, but otherwise the company must stand on its own," said Taisto Oikkonen.

He added that the new companies represent highly diversified industries--some producing goods for Lapland and the Arctic North, while others export goods to such countries as Japan and Saudi Arabia.

"Specialized firms are now being established here that we did not have before."

As an example of an imaginative company, he mentioned a firm that is specializing in equipment for tracks and outdoor playgrounds.

Oikkonen said there was still room for new companies, but only if their production is based on their own ideas and their own product development.

Companies involved in mass production do not stand a chance. They cannot compete with the rest of Finland or with other countries, according to Oikkonen.

Oikkonen does not gloss over the problems that must be solved by a businessman in Lapland, with its enormous expanses. According to him, there are no problems

with transportation to southern Finland, but Lapland itself and the Arctic North are a different situation. He said that transportation in an east-west direction leaves much to be desired.

The question of labor and training is a difficult one. County governor Oinas also discussed this problem.

"Only now have we begun to get our basic education in order, so that we now have enough elementary and high schools. Now, for example, there is a high school in every municipality. Vocational training, however, is a completely different matter. We still have much to do in this area," he said.

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CSO: 3650/243

OIL DIRECTORATE LOWERS ESTIMATES FOR TROLL FIELD PRODUCTION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 12 Jun 84 p 33

[Article by Bjorn H. Tretvoll: "Oil Directorate: Less Oil from Troll-area"]

[Text] The Oil Directorate in its yearly report for 1983 follows Statoil's adjustment downward of the extractable reserves in the Troll field. The Directorate's estimate is 462 billion cubic meters for Troll West and 825 billion cubic meters for Troll East, a total of 1,287 billion cubic meters. The Directorate's earlier estimate was about 1,600 billion cubic meters of gas.

Statoil published recently a sale of 1,200 billion cubic meters of gas of the two main parts of the Troll field. The Directorate has also undertaken a considerable reduction in the estimate of how much oil can be extracted from the western part of Troll. In the yearly report from 1982 it was estimated that the extractable oil reserves were over 750 million barrels, while one now can count on only 365 million barrels. This adjustment downward makes the Directorate's figures correspond to those put forward by the operator for Troll West, Norwegian Shell.

The Oil Directorate has also made a few other changes in the reserve estimates, so that it is now assumed that the total oil and gas resources shown on the Norwegian continental shelf south of Stad correspond to 1.6 billion tons of oil equivalents. Besides they are counting on discovering an additional 1.4 billion tons, plus an unstated quantity of more speculative reserves on top of this. No corresponding number for the resource potential north of Stad has been put forward.

Ekofisk Adjusted

After it was decided to carry out the water injection project on Ekofisk, the Oil Directorate has adjusted this field's extractable reserves by over 180 million barrels of oil and 14 billion cubic meters of gas. This implies that the estimates for Ekofisk reach 1,210 million barrels of oil, 8 million tons condensed (NGL) plus 125 billion cubic meters of gas.

The reserves in Valhall A are adjusted downward considerably from over 200 million barrels of oil in 1982 to 120 million barrels of oil in this year's

report. The gas reserves are now estimated at 16 billion cubic meters as opposed to 26 billion cubic meters a year earlier. Reserves for the rest of the Vålhall area are also reduced. This year's estimate is barely 95 million barrels of oil and 12 billion cubic meters of gas.

Tromso Flake

The Directorate's estimate of the reserves for the gas fields on the Tromso flake is a total of 116 billion cubic meters. The reserves on the Askeladden field are adjusted downward from 75 to 46 billion cubic meters as a result of a dry hole in the summer of 1983.

A successful drilling in the area now called Gullfaks South has led to an adjustment upward of the estimates of this field to 120 million barrels of oil and a total of 77 billion cubic meters of gas.

The total production of oil and gas from the Norwegian continental shelf arose in 1983 to 55 million tons of oil equivalents, which is a record. Of this 30.6 million tons were oil, while the gas production equalled 24.5 million tons of oil equivalents.

40 New Holes

Forty new drilling holes were started during 1983 on the Norwegian shelf. This is a decrease of nine holes compared to the year before. Of the find made in 1983, Statoil's find in block 6407/1 on Haltenbanken is denoted as especially encouraging. This find consists of two separate structures which have received the name Tyrihans. Furthermore Statoil has made a new oil discovery in the so-called Beta-Structure in the Gull-faks block 34/10. Gas has been found in the Sleipner area in several smaller structures.


A total of thirty new projects were drilled in 1983 and finds were discovered in 14 of these. This gives a find frequency of a total of 47 percent which is characterized as very high.

Troll-West

The main reason for the adjustment downwards of the reserve estimates for the Troll-fields is that new drillings on Troll East showed that the reservoir qualities in this part of the field are not as good as on Troll West. The reduction in the oil reserves is blamed on the fact that oil amounts on Troll West are currently estimated to be smaller and the possibilities of extracting oil from the areas where the oil zone is as thin as 10-17 meters are not being considered.

KEY: [To Figure on following page]

- (1) Oil
- (2) Other
- (3) Sweden
- (4) West-Germany



Figuren viser hvordan leveransene av norsk olje og gass er fordelt på de ulike markeder de siste årene. Andelen som er levert til USA er redusert, mens en økende andel er levert til landene i Vest-Europa.

(11)

(Kilde: Oljedirektoratet)

- (5) The Netherlands
- (6) Great Britain
- (7) Norway
- (8) Gas
- (9) France
- (10) Belgium
- (11) The figure shows how the deliveries of Norwegian oil and gas have been distributed to different markets the last years. The share which is delivered to the United States is reduced, while an increasing share is delivered to the countries in Western Europe.

Source: The Oil Directorate.

In the last few years an increasing share of the Norwegian oil production has been delivered to the countries of Western Europe, while the share sold to the American market has been reduced. In this Center Statoil's share of the total production has increased as Statfjord's production has escalated.

12550

CSO: 3639/126

IEA ISSUES RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXPLOITING OIL, GAS RESERVES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Jun 84 p 38

[Article by Elisabeth Holte: "IEA's Advice to Norway: Flexibility in the Oil Policy"]

[Text] Paris, 13 June. The Norwegian government ought to continue its efforts to secure a level of oil and gas production in line with the Norwegian policy goal and in this connection be prepared to show flexibility in carrying out the present development policy. This is among the recommendations from The International Bureau of Energy, IEA, regarding the development of energy in Norway. The recommendations will be published in "the chapter on Norway" in the report on energy from the OECD-area which IEA is publishing soon.

In the 19-page long report on Norway IEA discusses Norwegian energy policy in detail, both regarding reserves and production, the development of the utilization of electricity and oil, respectively, and the consideration of energy security.

Wealthy Country

It was pointed out that Norway energy-wise is a very wealthy country, where in 1982 electricity made up 42 percent of the total consumption, as compared to 48 percent for oil, and it was also pointed out that Norway produced five times more oil and gas than she needed for her own use. Since 1971, when the first field on Ekofisk started, Norway has developed and has become one of the leading European oil and gas producers with a production in 1982 of 24.8 million tons oil equivalents (mtoe) and 22.8 million tons tmoe gas. From this 15.9 mtoe oil and 22.0 mtoe, respectively, were exported and resulted in Norway being now the third largest exporter of gas to Western Europe, after Holland and the Soviet Union.

Oil and Gas

According to the Norwegian prognoses oil and gas production will increase by more than 50 mtoe in 1990 and then decrease sharply to 8-9 mtoe oil and 3-4 mtoe gas in year 2000, the report says. These prognoses included, however, only fields already in production or those which the government has given signal to develop. The Norwegian government thinks, however, that the

expected decrease in production in 1990 will be more than compensated for by starting production of new fields, it says further.

Regarding electricity, protests from environmental protection circles and other interest groups have caused the developments of new projects to slow down somewhat, and this can result in a strained supply situation at the end of the 1980's, it is maintained in the report. In the 1990's hydroelectric power, on the other hand, will probably increase because projects planned in the 1980's will then be in operation. Norwegian hydroelectric potential is estimated to reach a total of 172 TWh, of which 97 TWh has already been developed.

Coal

Regarding coal production reference is made to the production from the Longyear mine which was 328,794 tons in 1982 and the Svea mine with 119,516 tons. In the Longyear mine the production will be increased by 400,000 tons in 1984, but further development plans will be discussed in the Parliament in the fall session this year, the report says. There is also a reminder about the plans to increase the Svea production to about 300,000 tons. The Norwegian import of coal came to a total of 805,000 tons in 1982 and was mainly from Poland, Great Britain and the United States.

It was pointed out in the report that Norway's own supply of energy is secured, but that Norway at the same time plays an important role where other IEA-countries' assurance of energy supply is concerned.

Recommendations

At the end of the report IEA gives, among other things, the following recommendations to the Norwegian government:

A preservation program which considers the social and economic costs of ineffective use of energy ought to be developed. Also, information and counseling of better use of energy should be intensified. Measures to increase efficiency of energy used in a power-demanding industry ought to be introduced together with a nation-wide plan to increase installations of electric boilers in order to reduce the consumption of oil.

The government ought to ensure that no shortage of electricity arises at the end of the 1980's and studies ought to be implemented to look at long-term alternatives to electric power after year 2000.

The government ought to continue its efforts to ensure oil and gas production in line with the Norwegian policy goals and in this connection be prepared to show flexibility in carrying out the present development policy.

The government ought to increase the efforts regarding seismic investigations and issuing of licenses to identify the oil reserves.

Furthermore the government ought to ensure that the efforts to develop Norwegian energy supply industries continue to be characterized by encouragement and support and not by protective measures.

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CSO: 3639/126

LABOR PARTY ORGAN HITS MINISTER'S INTERFERENCE IN STATOIL

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 16 Jun 84 p 6

[Commentary by Per Brunvand]

[Text] The question has come up as to whether Prime Minister Kare Willoch should give Oil and Energy Minister Kare Kristiansen the same advice Prime Minister Christian Michelsen gave Bjornstjerne in 1905: "You had better shut up!"

This situation is the result of the serious problems the cabinet minister is creating for the Sleipner contract because of his loose tongue.

200 Billion

The Sleipner Field contract provides for the sale of natural gas to Great Britain for 200 billion kroner over a 15 to 20 year period. Last February, after 2 years of negotiations, an agreement was finally reached between Statoil and the British Gas Corporation. In February it was believed that the British authorities would approve the deal within a short time. Now 4 months have passed and this has not occurred. It is clear that the Thatcher government wants a better contract, from the British standpoint, in order to demonstrate that her government can deal with the problem better than British Gas.

In various ways, London has sent out feelers to see if Norway would be willing to renegotiate. In this situation, it has been a catastrophe that our Oil and Energy Minister Kare Kristiansen, in various comments, has given the impression that the Norwegian authorities could be willing to talk over the agreement with the English authorities. Obviously, the minister should have refused to comment and insisted that Norway expected the British authorities to approve the agreement that has been reached.

Statoil

For Statoil's future as a business partner, the outcome of this affair is of decisive significance. It is impossible for a company to negotiate business agreements, only to have them "doctored" by the Norwegian authorities in such a way as to harm Norwegian interests. If this happens, Statoil will not be taken seriously in its negotiations. For this reason, it is extremely important

that the government--preferably the prime minister--make clear as soon as possible that negotiations of this type cannot be conducted directly with the Norwegian authorities. The Sleipner contract is a business agreement between British Gas as the purchaser and Statoil as the seller. Any negotiations must be between these companies. Minister Kare Kristiansen must not be allowed to bungle this deal any more.

9336

CSO: 3639/132

SKP'S VOLKER HAUFF ON PARTY'S PROGRAM FOR ENVIRONMENT

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 25 Jun 84 p 17

[Interview with Volker Hauff, West German SPD politician and environmentalist, by ARBEIDERBLADET correspondent Erik Sagflaat; date and place not specified]

[Text] "West Germany must assume a leading role in reducing sulfur emissions from power plants and nitrogen from automobile exhaust. This could then be used to force other countries in Europe to enter binding agreements to reduce air pollution. Environmental problems have their price. In addition to damage to forests and buildings, health problems are beginning to increase at an alarming rate."

This was stated by West German politician Volker Hauff in a conversation with ARBEIDERBLADET. Hauff is the leading environmentalist politician of the Social Democratic Party. He is also a member of the Brundtland Commission, which is working out a long-range strategy for our survival on earth. Volker Hauff was research and technology minister from 1978 to 1980 and transportation minister from 1980 until the Schmidt government stepped down in 1982.

[Question] How seriously are German politicians taking the problems of air pollution?

[Answer] Extremely seriously. In 1981 somewhere between 1 and 3 percent of our forests had been damaged. In 1982 the figure was 9 percent and by 1983 it was up to 34 percent. We expect this trend to continue. Consequently, this must be seen as a national problem that must be solved as soon as possible. In the past, environmental protection was in the hands of the individual states.

[Question] Is there agreement on the causes of the dying forests?

[Answer] There is no doubt about it: without air pollution our forests would not be dying. There may be other secondary causes, such as drought, but they are insignificant. Sulfur from power plants and nitrogen from automobile exhaust are responsible for over 50 percent of the air pollution. Sulfur

emissions have been reduced somewhat, but I believe it is the combination of sulfur and nitrogen that has caused the sudden, explosive increase in damage.

[Question] Measures to combat sulfur emissions and, especially, automobile exhaust will be expensive and perhaps unpopular, as well. Are the politicians strong-willed enough to carry out these measures?

[Answer] Yes, at least my party and I are willing to do that. We must stop killing our forests. Environmental protection has its price, but the environmental problems are expensive, too. Air pollution destroys valuable forests. We are talking about 1 to 2 billion German marks each year. The destruction of forests also affects tourist trade. A reduction in tourism has already been seen in the Black Forest. Acid rain destroys buildings worth 2 to 3 billion marks each year by corrosion. The damage to people's health is perhaps the most important issue. In addition to the human suffering, this has enormous economic effects. Cases of asthma and colds have increased dramatically. The same is true of whooping cough among small children. Thus, there are many good arguments, including economic ones, in favor of environmental protection.

[Question] Are there differences between the SPD and the West German trade unions over this issue?

[Answer] Unfortunately, an artificial barrier was set up, but now it has been overcome. There is no contradiction between jobs and the environment. The environmental problems also endanger jobs in the forestry, wood, and pulp industries. In addition, there is now general agreement that a higher priority should be set on the living conditions of the people. Environmental problems hurt workers more than anyone else. It should be noted that working-class neighborhoods in German towns are in areas that are most often downwind from sources of pollution. As a result, the German labor movement is prepared to work actively toward a drastic reduction in air pollution.

[Question] How will the situation be improved.

[Answer] Half the pollution in West Germany's air comes from abroad and half the pollution we emit into the air is exported to other countries. This means that we must reach international agreements if we are to improve the situation. But such agreements will be impossible if we are unwilling to say what we believe is necessary and to start living up to these requirements immediately. West Germany must assume a leading role so we can put pressure on other countries.

[Question] Can this effort succeed?

[Answer] This will not occur overnight, neither within the EC, in Western Europe, nor in East-West relations in Europe. Eventually, everyone must be included. This will require a long and difficult process. This was demonstrated by the attempt to reach an agreement reducing automobile exhaust. (France and Italy, among others, which produce many compact cars with relatively

high exhaust levels balked at these talks.) But West Germany cannot wait too long. Consequently, we must begin alone on the national level.

[Question] Will it be possible to reach an agreement to reduce sulfur emissions by 30 percent before 1993? This proposal will be presented to the conference of European environmental affairs ministers that will begin Sunday in Munich.

[Answer] It is important for us to try, but I do not know if we will be successful in Munich. The Kohl government has our full support on this question. But it will be difficult. Forests in Italy are not dying. The same is true of Great Britain. On the other hand, France, the Benelux countries, Austria, and Switzerland support the proposal. What the Eastern European countries do is also important. I have had some interesting discussions with the GDR and Czechoslovakia. There is hardly any reason to expect quick results in this area, however. They are trying to reduce sulfur emissions by expanding the use of nuclear power. In any event, there will be no improvement this century.

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CSO: 3639/132

MINISTRY ISSUES GUIDELINES TO COMBAT AIR POLLUTION

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 29 Jun 84 p 10

[Article: "Standards to Guarantee Air Quality"]

[Text] Last Thursday the government established air quality standards. These standards set out the maximum concentrations of sulfur dioxide, particulates, nitrogen dioxide, and carbon monoxide. The resolution will take effect in early September. The values are nonbinding goals. According to the Environmental Affairs Ministry, these standards should be taken into account during the planning stage of operations that could pollute the air.

According to the resolution, the maximum permissible sulfur dioxide level is 40 micrograms per cubic meter, as a yearly average. The Environmental Affairs Ministry originally proposed a maximum level of 50 micrograms, but this requirement was made tougher after the report was discussed.

The maximum permissible level of sulfur dioxide on a daily basis is 200 micrograms per cubic meter and, on an hourly basis, it is 500 micrograms. The hourly rate was also toughened after the original proposal was discussed.

The maximum permissible level of particulates is 60 micrograms per cubic meter on an annual basis and 150 micrograms over the course of a day. The maximum nitrogen dioxide level is 150 micrograms per cubic meter on a daily basis and 300 micrograms during an hour. The maximum carbon monoxide level during an 8-hour period is 10 mg per cubic meter and 30 mg per cubic meter on an hourly basis.

This resolution does not apply to the quality of air, for example, in homes, inside buildings, or on the job. These levels are determined by special regulations in health codes, building codes, and labor legislation.

More Effective Forest Protection

The Environmental Affairs Ministry has determined that the new sulfur dioxide standard is insufficient to guarantee forest growth and hinder damage to trees in all parts of the country. For this reason, the government established special standards for sulfur dioxide levels in major forestry and agricultural regions and in areas of particular environmental interest.

In these regions, the sulfur dioxide level in the air may not exceed 25 micrograms per cubic meter on an annual basis. The purpose of this regulation is to prevent air pollution problems in populated areas from being shifted to rural areas, for example through the use of high stacks. The regulations will be applied in the planning stage and will be used to judge permit applications.

Long-Range Goal

The government also decided on Thursday that its long-range goal was to reduce sulfur fallout to 0.5 grams per square meter per year. The purpose of this position is for it to serve as a guideline for authorities involved in cleaning up the air. It will not be used directly, for example when cases of pollution are reported to the County Governor's Office.

'Must Become Tougher'

At a press conference on the new standards, Environmental Affairs Minister Matti Ahde said yesterday that the new regulations were relatively strict, from an international standpoint. The new values are clearly tougher than the recommendations issued by the Public Health Service in 1978. They are in close agreement with the latest recommendations from the World Health Organization (WHO).

The latest international experience in this area served as a basis for the standards, which are believed necessary from the standpoint of public health and environmental protection.

The new regulations will help Finland meet its obligation to reduce sulfur emissions 30 percent by 1993. Ahde promised even tougher regulations in the future, based on international developments in this area.

Positive International Trend

In this connection, Ahde expressed his satisfaction with the results of the acid rain conference held in Munich last week. It demonstrated that there is a strong desire to do something about pollution. It was decided that a binding agreement would be prepared, as a result of which sulfur emissions would be reduced by at least 30 percent by 1993. A total of 18 countries have already expressed their willingness to achieve this goal. These countries include all our closest neighbors. The United States, Great Britain, Poland, and Czechoslovakia are among the countries that have yet to make this commitment.

'Financing System Needed'

Par Stenback, chairman of the Swedish People's Party, said that the government's decision on air quality standards must be followed by a system for financing cleanup measures. Otherwise, it will be an empty gesture.

Considering the latest available information on the threat to the environment, the new standards are relatively modest, Stenback said Thursday in his comments

on the government's decision,

As early as 1973 Sweden set standards that are only slightly higher than the new regulations in Finland.

According to Stenback, the significance of the new regulations is that they will support the authorities in their dialog with the facilities that are responsible for pollution. If we are to achieve the goal of cleaner air, however, a system of financing purification methods will be of the greatest importance, according to Stenback.

The Swedish People's Party has repeatedly called for a financing system based, in part on government subsidies and, in part, on a pool of fees from which money could be borrowed to be invested in equipment that reduces emissions. Stenback pointed out that the Environmental Affairs Ministry still has not presented any guidelines for financing, even though the first appropriations for preventing the death of our forests must be included in the 1985 budget. According to Stenback, the reason for this situation is a lack of legal and economic planning.

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CSO: 3650/243

BRIEFS

LOCALITIES WASTE TREATMENT CRITICIZED--Extensive lack of efforts against pollution. The state's pollution protection agency (SFT) has worked out a long-term plan pointing out big failures plus a number of flaws in efforts initiated against pollution in this country. It appears that of 260 municipal dumps only 20 percent are operated in a proper manner. Only half of the municipal cleaning installations work satisfactorily, and between 30 and 50 percent of the sewers do not reach the cleaning installations due to failures in the main system. Of 120,000 tons of special trash only 40 percent can be disposed of properly. According to information from SFT the measures taken against pollution on part of agriculture are very insufficient. The tests indicate that only half of the country's 65,000 silos function satisfactorily. Of 60,000 manure cellars about 20,000 are not working. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 Jun 84 p 7] 12550

GOVERNMENT SURVEYING HAZARDOUS WASTE--The country's pollution protection agency (SFT) has initiated a survey to find out how great a danger there is for acute pollution from substances harmful to the environment and health in this country. The purpose of the survey is to provide a basis for establishing and preparing measures against pollution from dangerous substances, if this is considered to be necessary. In order to carry out the survey, SFT has hired the consulting firm PETRECA A/S in Trondheim. The report should be ready at the end of this year. [Text] [NTB Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Jun 84 p 12] 12550