Civil Reserve Air Fleet Stage III: Viability and Implications.
Abstract
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a vital component of the nation's strategic airlift capability. Stage III is the most aggressive CRAF activation level, contributing heavily to wartime lift needs but also withdrawing the greatest amount of capacity from commercial service. This paper explores the thesis that Stage III is not a viable policy option, and examines the impact such a conclusion would have on our two major theater war (MTW) strategy. Section One analyzes the viability of activating Stage III with respect to feasibility ("Could it be done?") and acceptability ("Would it be done?"). To assess the economic and political costs of activation, this section focuses on how much residual air carrier capacity would be left in the private sector after Stage III activation and mobilization of aircrews with reserve component obligations. Section Two examines the affect the absence of Stage III would have on our two MTW strategy. Finally, Section Three puts forth conclusions and makes recommendations to improve the realism of the assumptions that underlie US contingency and airlift modernization plans. The paper concludes that the economic and political costs of implementing Stage III make the assumption of activation an unsound basis for contingency planning. Also, the absence of Stage III lift capacity would seriously degrade our two MTW strategy, elevating risk in the halting phase of the second MTW and ceding operational initiative to the enemy for a longer period. Recommendations include a call for airline industry executives and senior government officials to reduce Stage III to a level that could be reliably activated in time of crisis. On the basis of this new, smaller Stage III, contingency and airlift modernization plans merit revision.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 19, 1998
- Accession Number
- ADA351755
Entities
People
- Mark W. Graper
Organizations
- Naval War College