MacArthur as the Operational Commander in Korea: A Pawn of Conflicting Policies
Abstract
The operational leader develops plans and formulates campaign strategy within the spectrum of the levels of war somewhere between the faint lines of strategy and operational art. National policy and military strategy meet at the operational level. Success is equated to the accomplishment of the military plans. Unfortunately for General MacArthur, conflicting directives and a lack of policy permeated the Korean Conflict. Initially aligned, the President, and the Departments of State and Defense feared an escalation of the conflict and a potential World War III. As the ground campaign developed though, differing directives from these offices were delivered to General MacArthur with respect to US and UN expectations and desires in the region. MacArthur was then left to decipher the conflicting and often inadequate guidance and do what he believed was best for the forces on the ground, the Far East, the United States and consequently the United Nations. The contradictory policies are most evident when examining decisions to permit activity across the 38th parallel, determining what type of war was being waged in Korea, whether or not the drive should be for reunification of the North and the South, and lastly what actions to take against the Chinese in North Korea. In each of these situations, MacArthur was forced to develop theater and operational plans without a solid national strategy to guide him. Needless to say, this placed the operational commander in a variety of precarious situations and ultimately led to his demise as the Commander of the Far East. General Douglas MacArthur was a pawn of conflicting policies in Korea.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 18, 1998
- Accession Number
- ADA351774
Entities
People
- Dennis M. Barletta
Organizations
- Naval War College