

287024

JPRS 81619

24 August 1982

China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 330

19980825 179



FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

11
61
A04

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

24 August 1982

CHINA REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 330

CONTENTS

PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

India's Gandhi Leaves for U.S. Visit (XINHUA, 27 Jul 82).....	1
Thai Papers on Nguyen Co Thach's ASEAN Tour (XINHUA, 30 Jul 82).....	2
Japan Adopts 1983-97 Defense Fiscal Plan (XINHUA, 23 Jul 82).....	4
Japanese Dietmen Hit History Distortion (XINHUA, 5 Aug 82).....	5
Japanese Scholars Criticize Education Ministry (XINHUA, 30 Jul 82).....	7
Japanese Critical of Textbook Revision (XINHUA, 30 Jul 82).....	8
Japan Cultural Exchange Figures Condemn Revision (XINHUA, 4 Aug 82).....	10
Japanese Professors Repudiate History Distortion (XINHUA, 8 Aug 82).....	12
History Revision Still Under Fire in Japan (XINHUA, 7 Aug 82).....	14
S. Korea Critical of Japan's Textbook Rewrite (XINHUA, 4 Aug 82).....	16

Indonesian Paper Fears Japanese Militarism (XINHUA, 10 Aug 82).....	17
Japanese Scholars Comment on Textbook Revision (XINHUA, 3 Aug 82).....	18
Textbooks Compiled According to 'Directives' (XINHUA, 31 Jul 82).....	19
Asian Press Condemn Japan's History Rewrite (XINHUA, 30 Jul 82).....	20
Briefs	
Opposition Parties Hit History Rewrite	22
Textbook Rewrite Protested	22
History Distortion Deplored	22
Paper Criticizes Distortion	23
Opposition to Textbook Rewrite	23
Rewrite Aims To Revive Militarism	23
Japan's History Distortion Protested	24
SRV Foreign Minister in Malaysia	24
Indian Pilgrims to Tibet	25
SRV-USSR Military Bases	25
Australia's Fraser to Malaysia	25
SRV Border Reinforcements	25

PARTY AND STATE

Mao, Peng Roles in Northwest Battle Recounted (Yang Dezhi, Li Zhimin; SHIDAI DE BAOGAO, Jul 82).....	26
19th Lecture on Draft Revised Constitution (XINHUA Domestic Service, 5 Aug 82).....	49
20th Lecture on Draft Revised Constitution (XINHUA Domestic Service, 7 Aug 82).....	51
21st Lecture on Draft Revised Constitution (XINHUA Domestic Service, 9 Aug 82).....	53
'XINHUA' Lecture 22 on PRC Draft Revised Constitution (XINHUA Domestic Service, 10 Aug 82).....	54
Tianjin Professor Hails Convocation of Party Congress (Tianjin City Service, 9 Aug 82).....	56

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

INDIA'S GANDHI LEAVES FOR U.S. VISIT

OW270944 Beijing XINHUA in English 0834 GMT 27 Jul 82

[Text] New Delhi, 27 Jul (XINHUA)--Indian Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi left here for New York today for a 9-day visit to the United States. A PTI report said that according to official sources, the visit is mainly aimed at achieving better understanding between the two countries.

She told newsmen before her departure that she would not discuss any defence matters during her talks in the United States. That is for the defence department to consider, she said.

Some days earlier, Mrs Gandhi said in an interview with an American journalist, that she disagrees with many U.S. policies but hopes her visit will ease long-standing tensions and suspicions. She said her goal is to be friends with the U.S. and the Soviet Union as well as China. "What I want to achieve is a better understanding," she said.

As known to all, India and the United States have disagreed on some international problems.

However, there have been noticeable changes in the attitudes of the two countries towards each other, although they continue to adhere to their respective positions on some important issues, as was pointed out by the Indian press. The Indian criticism of the U.S. weapon sales to Pakistan, for instance, has slackened and India itself is talking about buying weapons from the U.S.

The fluctuation in the political relations and different views on world issues between the two countries have not altered the basic fact that the United States and India have close economic ties. Indo-U.S. trade accounts for 13 per cent of this country's total. In regard to foreign investment, the share of the U.S. is the biggest. More recently, cooperation in trade, technology and other fields between the two countries has increased.

CSO: 4000/171

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THAI PAPERS ON NGUYEN CO THACH'S ASEAN TOUR

OW302229 Beijing XINHUA in English 1850 GMT 30 Jul 82

[Text] Bangkok, 30 Jul (XINHUA)--Thai newspapers pointed out today that the changing attitudes of Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach displayed in his recent ASEAN-nations tour show that he is playing tricks. If Vietnam is genuinely sincere to improve relations with ASEAN, it should pull out its troops from Kampuchea.

MATUPHUM DAILY says in a commentary that whatever tricks Nguyen Co Thach may play in Thailand, either intimidation or consolation, Thailand's attitude is the same as that of other ASEAN nations--Vietnam must withdraw its troops from Kampuchea and let the Kampuchean people, instead of Vietnam decide their own destiny with their own wisdom.

The commentary says ASEAN leaders did not attach much importance to Thach's visit.

No matter how brilliant Nguyen Co Thach's diplomatic genius might be, the pursuance of erroneous and unjustified policy would only lead him into a blind alley, the commentary notes.

THE NATION REVIEW says editorially that Nguyen Co Thach is "playing his hand as a superb poker player." "He knew the cards he was holding and played them not for what they were worth but for how much bluffing mileage he could get."

It points out that "a diplomacy based on fallacy is quite evident when he said that Hanoi appreciates Thai concern about Vietnamese troops along her border and so Vietnam will make the goodwill gesture of withdrawing troops away from the Thai border.

"But across our eastern border, there are no Vietnamese troops but only those of the Khmer coalition government. Practically it may be impossible to pull back non-existent troops, but we will credit Thach with a goodwill gesture because of the very fact that he did say it," it notes.

SING SIAN YIT PAO says in an editorial that Vietnam has no sincerity at all to seek a solution to the Kampuchean problem. As a result, talks remain talks while the problem remains unsolved.

The editorial says Nguyen Co Thach, through his visit to Southeast Asian nations, is trying to induce ASEAN nations into his trap of coercion and inveiglement.

"The aim of the Vietnamese scheme is to place the whole of Indochina ultimately under Hanoi's control so as to suit its expansionist policy," the editorial stresses.

CSO: 4000/171

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

JAPAN ADOPTS 1983-97 DEFENSE FISCAL PLAN

OW231631 Beijing XINHUA in English 1616 GMT 23 Jul 82

[Text] Tokyo, 23 Jul (XINHUA)--Japan will increase sharply the number of its tanks, warships and fighter aircraft in view of the "volatile international situation."

This comes in a National Defense Agency plan for fiscal 1983-87 approved today by the National Defense Council, under which the overall military expenditure for the five-year period will be between 61,600 and 64,700 million U.S. dollars. If the plan is carried out, Japan's self-defense capacity will meet the "general defense outline" drawn up in 1976, which called for enhancing the country's capacity to resist a "limited and small-scale aggression."

The plan stressed air and anti-submarine protection as well as the defense of the coastlines. It also underlined the importance of improving Japan's logistics, training installations and knowledge of electronic warfare.

Under the plan, the ground force will acquire more tanks, trucks, armored trucks, anti-tank or anti-warship missile launchers. Forty-nine warships totalling 97,000 tons will be built in the period. The air force will receive up-to-date F-15 fighter plans.

Under the latest plan, Japan's military expenditure could exceed in 1984 one percent of the country's Gross National Product (GNP), the ceiling set by the Japanese Government in recent years. The military budget this year rose to 10,200 million U.S. dollars, or 0.93 percent of the GNP. Director General of the Defense Agency Soichiro Ito said that with an annual economic growth rate of 5.1 percent during the five years, Japan's military expenditure will be between 0.97 and 1.02 percent of the GNP in the period.

CSO: 4000/171

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

JAPANESE DIETMEN HIT HISTORY DISTORTION

OW050118 Beijing XINHUA in English 0105 GMT 5 Aug 82

[Text] Tokyo, 4 August (XINHUA)--Japanese dietmen have pointed out that distorting historical facts in textbooks by the Japanese Education Ministry Ran Counter to the basic spirit of the Japan-China joint statement.

Shoichi Shimodaira, member of the House of Representative and vice-chairman of the Japan Socialist Party, told XINHUA today that the essence of the distortion of historical facts by the Japanese Education Ministry is to whitewash the war of aggression against China and to justify that aggression. This is a new reactionary and conservative trend in Japan and a manifestation of Japanese militarism.

He said that by substituting "aggression" against China with "advance" to China in textbooks, the Japanese Education Ministry has committed perfidy and trampled upon the spirit of the Japan-China joint statement. Domestically, it is a manifestation of revival of militarism. Whether Japan is to take the road of peace or militarism is a grave political struggle, he said. The Japan Socialist Party will launch a great campaign against this erroneous trend in Japan, he added.

Referring to the Japanese Education Ministry's view that a lucid explanation would make the Chinese side understand, he said Japanese militarism committed aggression against China is a historical fact and needs no explanation.

[Sentence as received] China will never make any concessions on a matter of principle.

Representative Susumu Kobayashi told XINHUA today that Japanese militarism had brought enormous loss to the Chinese people and the Japanese people were also victims. Moreover, he said, China has never demanded any reparation, nor did it occupy a single inch of Japanese territory.

He went on to say that most of the Japanese people have worked tirelessly for Japan-China friendship in the 37 years after the war. But the Japanese Ministry of Education now tries to write off the results of their efforts by whitewashing the aggression against China. The Japanese people cannot but express their profound indignation and will never allow this to happen, he stressed.

He refuted the lies fabricated by the Ministry of Education to absolve itself of the responsibility in distorting history. "Japan will find itself isolated in the world if it does not correct its mistake," Kobayashi said.

Representative Izumi Inoue told XINHUA yesterday that "we who are engaged in promoting friendship between militarism is the touchstone by which to distinguish between genuine desire for Sino-Japanese friendship," he added [sentence as received].

CSO: 4000/172

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

JAPANESE SCHOLARS CRITICIZE EDUCATION MINISTRY

OW310057 Beijing XINHUA in English 1836 GMT 30 Jul 82

[Text] Tokyo, 30 July (XINHUA)--A number of Japanese dietmen and scholars who met here today were critical of the Education Ministry for prettifying the aggressive wars launched by the Japanese militarists when it screened school textbooks.

Professor Rokuro Hidaka said at the meeting: "In compiling textbooks in 1955, I used the word invasion to describe the 18 September 1931 incident. At that time, the Education Ministry made the suggestion that the word invasion be changed to advance, because it said the word invasion was confusing. This attitude of the Education Ministry has become even more obvious in the past 2 or 3 years."

Ichio Asukata, chairman of the Japan Socialist Party, said that by tampering with history in school textbooks, the Education Ministry has tried to play down the Japanese aggression against Asian countries, and even to write it off from history, it is a matter of course that this has aroused strong indignation among the Asian people, victims to the Japanese aggression.

Recalling the enormous sufferings brought to the Chinese people by the Japanese militarists in the war of aggression, Hideo Den, representative of the United Social Democratic Party who visited China in 1971, said: "We should tell the later generations of the historical facts about the war of aggression waged by Japanese warlords. We should defend democratic education. The Education Ministry should restore the history it has tampered with."

Professor Keiji Nagawara said, "in compiling the history textbooks for secondary schools in 1978, I added a subtitle, the invasion of China, to passage on the 7 July 1937 incident. But the Education Ministry made a "suggestion for improvement" that the word invasion be changed to advance. I have no way out but to change the subtitle to the Japan-China war."

CSO: 4000/172

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

JAPANESE CRITICAL OF TEXTBOOK REVISION

OW310059 Beijing XINHUA in English 1857 GMT 30 Jul 82

[Text] Tokyo, 30 July (XINHUA)--Japanese people of various circles this morning demanded that the Japanese authorities reproach themselves deeply for the past war of aggression and colonial rule.

This demand was contained in a petition signed by 25 prominent figures of the cultural and educational circles. Secretary general of the citizens association for considering the textbook problem and professor of Tokyo Metropolitan University Masatomo Yamsumi presented the petition to Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa this morning.

The petition says: "We are deeply concerned over the recent textbook problem. Especially, the narration of Japanese aggression against Asian countries was revised in recent screening of social science textbooks for secondary schools. We hold that this is a serious problem."

The association, it says, is concerned about the criticism of Japan by regions and countries in Asia which were victims of Japans aggression. In a strong appeal to Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, the petition says, "the fundamental cause which triggered off the incident is that the authorities including those authorized to censor textbooks did not reproach themselves deeply for the past war of aggression and colonial rule. They should show the attitude of reproaching themselves to the public both at home and abroad."

Now, it points out, "the narration which distorted the historical facts should be corrected according to the results of historical study."

Some readers letters published in todays papers also condemned the Japanese Education Ministry for whitewashing the militarist aggression in recent vetting of textbooks.

A letter from Hiroshi Takeichi printed in todays MAINICHI SHIMBUN says: "The policy of aggression and expansion of Japanese militarists in the past had caused enormous sacrifices not only to the people of China and southeast Asia but also to the people of Japan themselves. This is an irrefutable fact. It is of great importance to recognize the history in this period. It must not be forgotten that the Japanese diplomacy will be a fruitful and friendly diplomacy only if it is based on reproaching and regretfulness."

A letter of Junji Nasu from Kyoto says, "China's protest with Japanese Education Ministry's behaviour provided an opportunity for the Japanese people to understand the sufferings they imposed on the Chinese people in the past, and consider the present life from the root cause.

A letter of Rokunosuke Arri from metropolitan Tokyo says, in answering China's protest, the Education Ministry decided not to revise the screened textbooks. By so doing, the ministry will not only further deepen the disharmony between Japan and the countries and regions concerned, but also mislead the students.

Tsuneo Watabe from metropolitan Tokyo said in his letter printed in today's ASAHI SHIMBUN: "No matter how the Japanese side sophisticate, it will not gain forgiveness if it does not take an attitude of correcting an error when being aware of it."

CSO: 4000/172

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

JAPAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FIGURES CONDEMN REVISION

OW042006 Beijing XINHUA in English 1840 GMT 4 Aug 82

[Text] Tokyo, 4 August (XINHUA)--Namio Enomi, president of the Pan-Asian Cultural Exchange Center, told XINHUA recently that Japanese militarists had waged a war on aggression against China and other Asian countries and that is a fact acknowledged by the Japanese people and the whole world. The revision of textbooks by the Japanese Education Ministry is aimed at denying this historical fact.

Namio Enomi, a famous Japanese archaeologist and historian, pointed out that it is very dangerous to compile textbooks with strong national chauvinist colour.

He said that if the change of the word aggression into "advance" is described as "objective and just" as the Education Ministry said, then the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which has been opposed by the Japanese Government should also be regarded as a just act.

The revision of textbooks was carried out under the direction of the Education Ministry and the ministry of course has to be responsible for this.

He criticized some Japanese politicians for going against the tide of history, not knowing how to draw lessons from past history.

The distorting of history by the Education Ministry has aroused objections in China, Korea and other Asian countries. Therefore, it is not at all an internal affair. He urged the Education Ministry to admit its mistake and correct the wrong statements in the revised textbooks.

The Pan-Asian cultural exchange centre is now making preparations for the "Japanese-Chinese peoples friendly get-together in celebration of the 10th anniversary of normalization of relations between Japan and China" to be held in Beijing on 25 August. The centre is to organize more than 160 Japanese people from various strata in different parts of Japan to go to China to take part in the get-together. Its General Director Kazuhiro Morizumi said in a written statement.

"In censoring school textbooks, the Japanese Education Ministry has repudiated the historical facts of Japanese militarists' aggression against China and shifted the responsibility for the heinous rape of Nanjing onto the Chinese people. This is against the tide of Japan-China friendship and hurts the feelings of the people to take part in the Japanese-Chinese peoples get-together."

He said that friendship should be based on mutual understanding. Distortion of historical facts could in no way lead to mutual understanding, nor to friendship.

The people to take part in the get-together are all ordinary people from various parts of Japan. They are also victims of the wars in the past. They will not allow the glorification of the aggression and inhuman doings of the Japanese militarists and the re-embarking on the old militarist road, he said.

CSO: 4000/172

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

JAPANESE PROFESSORS REPUDIATE HISTORY DISTORTION

OW081539 Beijing XINHUA in English 1510 GMT 8 Aug 82

[Text] Tokyo, 8 August (XINHUA)--Emeritus Professor Kiyoshi Inoue and Professor Masaaki Ueda of Kyoto University, both well known historians, in their recent interviews with XINHUA charged the Japanese Education Ministry with distortion of the history of Japanese aggression.

Inoue said that no Japanese historian with a conscience would deny the Japanese aggression against China.

He said Japanese militarists had launched an aggression war against China and executed the notorious massacre in Nanjing. How to narrate the facts in textbooks is a major problem concerning the Japan-China relations. The Japanese Education Ministry has refused to recognize the facts and tried by all means to cover them up. This behaviour cannot but arouse indignation from China and other Asian countries.

He pointed out that the Education Ministry's distortion of the history of Japanese aggression against China showed that some elements were attempting to revive militarism in Japan. They were trying to obliterate the history of the militarist war of aggression so as to inculcate the younger generation with militaristic ideas.

By distorting the history of aggression, Inoue said, the Japanese Education Ministry has exposed itself to denunciation by Japanese public opinion.

Ueda pointed out that the distortion of history by the Japanese Education Ministry has been strongly opposed not only in China and other Asian countries but also in Japan itself.

He said that only when the history of Japanese aggression is correctly described can it play a role in promoting peace and friendship. Japan should develop its friendly ties with Asian countries in the course of criticizing its own mistake of practising militarism in the past. Should Japan distort and conceal its history of militarist aggression, a healthy development of its friendly relations with other Asian countries would be impossible. The distortion of Japan's history of aggression against China by the Education Ministry is an act in violation of the spirit of the Japan-China joint statement and has created a great obstacle to the promotion of friendly relations between the two countries. It is therefore absolutely impermissible.

He said that to study history, one should have a correct understanding of the past and the present by drawing lessons from history so as to create a better future. It is a most elementary principle that textbooks should be based strictly on historical facts.

CSO: 4000/172

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

HISTORY REVISION STILL UNDER FIRE IN JAPAN

OW072022 Beijing XINHUA in English 1955 GMT 7 Aug 82

[Text] Tokyo, 7 August (XINHUA)--Japanese prominent figures and newspapers continued to repudiate the distortion of history by the Japanese Education Ministry.

Chairman of the Japan Socialist Party Ichio Asukada told newsmen on 6 August that the Japanese Government should correct the erroneous description in textbooks by clarifying responsibilities. His statement was printed in today's ASHI SHIMBUN.

He said, "both the government and the people should not forget to carry out serious self-examination with regard to Japanese militarism and historical facts of aggression against Asian countries." If the mistakes in textbooks are not corrected, "the distrust of Japan by the people in China and other Asian countries will be further deepened."

Professor Kojima Yoshio, who is in charge of the compilation of the Asian chapters of the high school textbook "world history," was quoted by MAINICHI SHIMBUN today as saying that in the 19th chapter of the textbook, the original subtitle was "Japans aggression against China." But the Education Ministry strongly insisted on "rewording it more objectively." Accordingly, the subtitle was rewritten as "Manzhou Incident, Shanghai Incident." The original caption to a sketch map, "Japans aggression against China," was rewritten as "Japans intrusion into China."

Yoshio said, "I hope that this will be corrected immediately. I am going to talk over this with the publishing house."

"HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN in an editorial on 4 August said: "The censorship of textbook contents by the Education Ministry has aroused stern denunciation from China, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Singapore and other neighboring Asian countries." It said, "The problem could not be solved by diplomatic tricks."

The editorial pointed out that the distortion not only is an important problem in the field of education but also runs counter to the basic principles of the peace constitution.

"To the Asian countries, Japanese militarism is not simply a nightmare in history. Its revival is, to them, a constant concern, it said.

It was reported that speeches were made and leaflets distributed by students of various universities in Tokyo today calling on the citizens and students to oppose the distortion of history by the Education Ministry.

CSO: 4000/172

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

S. KOREA CRITICAL OF JAPAN'S TEXTBOOK REWRITE

OW041402 Beijing XINHUA in English 1212 GMT 4 Aug 82

[Text] Pyongyang, 3 August (XINHUA)--South Korean political parties and leaders of social organizations in their recent statements denounced Japanese Education Ministry for attempting to legalize its aggression of Korea by distorting Japans militarist invasion history in its new textbooks.

The Democratic Korea Party, the biggest opposition party of South Korea, in a recent statement stressed that it cannot ignore the distortion of history of Japans invasion of Korea by the Japanese Education Ministry. The statement expressed strong dissatisfaction over the sophistry of the officials in the Education Ministry.

Choe Chang-kyu, president of the Association of Martyrs Families of South Korea, in a recent statement said: "The Japanese Government must correct its distortion of history and throw away its old evil nature of militarist aggression."

The democratic Korea Party, the Korea National Party and other political parties held respective meetings yesterday to study counter-measures and demanded an early revision of the textbooks, some organizations also sent protesting letters or messages to Japans departments concerned.

On 2 August, about 1,500 elderly Koreans demonstrated in Seoul to protest against Japans revised account of its colonization of Korea in school textbooks and urged the Japanese Government to correct repeated distortion of history about Korea.

Five hundred members of the Korea Old Peoples Association rallied in Kwangju on 31 July. They exposed by their own experiences Japanese imperialist atrocities committed in its colonial rule period in Korea. They also urged the Japanese authorities to revise the content of the textbooks which distort history.

CSO: 4000/172

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

INDONESIAN PAPER FEARS JAPANESE MILITARISM

OW102024 Beijing XINHUA in English 1929 GMT 10 Aug 82

[Text] Beijing, 10 August (XINHUA)--A recent article in the *INDONESIAN OBSERVER* pointed out that the distortion of Japan's aggression history makes "outsiders suspect the reemergence of militarism seeds in Japan's community."

The article written by Ibrahim Noori was entitled "New Historiography in Japan." It said, "this militarism requires a narrow nationalism, chauvinism and jingoism."

It said, "there have since long been complaints from the industrialists and big capitalists that the Japanese young generation is not as militant as those in the past. And the scapegoats are the Japanese teachers united in the Japan Teachers Union."

"Not only do they blame the teachers, but also history textbooks," it said, adding, "that's why old history books should be replaced by new ones. In the new books the evil of militarism in the Pacific War should be obliterated and chauvinism should be re-encouraged."

It noted that the revision of Japanese aggression history "are not only found in the history textbooks but also in the films already circulated." The film "Grand Fleet," for example, does not describe the Pearl Harbor attack as a sly aggression but as a "legitimate act of self-defense." The film "Southern Cross" justifies the assassination of 5,000 Chinese in Singapore by the Japanese occupation army. Other cruelties are no longer shown in the film, as if there never were. The film "Greater Japanese Empire" describes the then Prime Minister Tojo as a sympathetic person who always loved peace, while in fact Tojo was sentenced to death by the allied force court in 1948 as a "war criminal."

CSO: 4000/172

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

JAPANESE SCHOLARS COMMENT ON TEXTBOOK REVISION

OW031608 Beijing XINHUA in English 1538 GMT 3 Aug 82

[Text] Beijing, 3 August (XINHUA)--Members of the Waseda University delegation said here today that the revision of textbooks by the Japanese Ministry of Education is aimed at whitewashing Japanese militarists aggression of China during World War Two.

In an interview iwth Chinese reporters, the scholars pointed out that the revision is not a mere question of changing a few words or phrases, but an indication that fascism is gaining ground in Japan.

Professor Hikotaro Ando said, "I have been studying the history of Sino-Japanese relations. My opinion is that in studying history, one must respect history and stick to the facts. I object to imbuing the younger generation with something that is not true to the historic facts," he added.

"When I visited Beijing University this morning," he said "a member of the delegation recalled his own experience in the war of Japanese aggression in China. He was then a Japanese soldier. He saw the Japanese troops burn Chinese houses, reducing a large number of villages and towns to ruins." Hikotaro Ando asked, "isn't that an act of aggression by the Japanese troops?"

Professor Takeshi Kurahashi, a drama theoretician, said, "the revision of historical facts in the textbooks is a sign of revival of Japanese fascism." He said that he was indignant at what the Japanese Ministry of Education had done, and felt worried about it.

Law Professor Yasuhiro Tsutsumiguchi said, "distortion of history by officials of the Ministry of Education is a shame to the Japanese people."

Taizo Hamada, professor of the department of literature and art, said, "I am a teacher, in my contact with the young students, I shall tell them the true story about the aggression by Japanese militarism abroad."

He pointed out that some officials in the Ministry of Education had intended to revise the textbooks a few years ago, but it was criticized from the very beginning. Now the matter has become such a mess, it will touch off a mass movement against revival of militarism." [Quotation mark as received]

CSO: 4000/172

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

TEXTBOOKS COMPILED ACCORDING TO 'DIRECTIVES'

OW311740 Beijing XINHUA in English 1526 GMT 31 Jul 82

[Text] Tokyo, 31 July (XINHUA)--Japanese textbook compilers and publishers said the work to screen textbooks had been carried out under the strict "directives" of the Education Ministry officials, reported ASAHI SHIMBUN today.

If they failed to make revisions according to opinions of the officials, the censors wouldn't let it pass, they pointed out. They refuted the arguments advanced by officials of the Education Ministry at a DIET debate that "instructions on screening school textbooks are opinions for improvement which are not compulsory."

"This is a distortion of facts in regard to the screening of textbooks."
"It amounts to a lie rather than sophistry," they added.

Reports said last October a university professor brought with him the "History of Japan," a textbook for senior middle schools he compiled, to the Education Ministry for censorship. After a 15-hour debate in two days he had to take the instructions.

His original version about the Nanjing massacre said: "When the Japanese troops occupied Nanjing, they did raping, plundering, burning and killing. Numerous Chinese army men and civilians were murdered. Therefore, Japan has been condemned internationally for the rape of Nanjing. Some said over 200,000 Chinese were killed at that time."

But censors said: "The incident occurred in a turmoil and couldn't be separated from war operations. The number of victims was not clear." They insisted that the professor revise his version. As a result, the professor had to rewrite this way: "In the turmoil of occupation of Nanjing, many Chinese army men and civilians were killed by the Japanese army which has received international condemnation for the Nanjing massacre."

Gakashi Takagi member of the editorial board of MAINICHI SHIMBUN said in an article today that the Education Ministry attempted to shirk the responsibility of distorting history onto compilers of the textbooks by saying the alteration of wording in textbooks was done by non-governmental publishers. It is "incomprehensible" for one to deal with historical facts by resorting to little tricks, he said.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ASIAN PRESS CONDEMN JAPAN'S HISTORY REWRITE

OW310053 Beijing XINHUA in English 1504 GMT 30 Jul 82

[Text] Tokyo, 30 July (XINHUA)--Mass media in southeast Asian countries have accused the Japanese Education Ministry of distorting history to beautify aggression in censoring school textbooks.

YOMIURI SHIMBUN of 28 July carried reports by its correspondents in southeast Asian countries on the ever greater impact of Japans textbook affair on those countries.

The reports indicated that the southeast Asian countries, once victims of Japanese occupation and massacres, are very sensitive to the issue.

The Singapore paper NANYANG SIANG PAO was quoted as saying editorially on 26 July: "Japans aggression against China and the southeast Asian countries and its atrocities in China, the Korean Peninsula and southeast Asia were facts which cannot be covered up."

One of the reports gave the background that during the period of Japanese occupation, Singapore became another Japanese slaughter-house. People in Singapore can find in their current school textbook of history the conclusion that "the Japanese army's occupation brought great sufferings to our people." The textbook describes Japanese actions in southeast Asia during the second world war as "aggression," "invasion" and "southward invasion" to remind the people of the Japanese aggression.

The editor of the Philippine paper DAILY EXPRESS was quoted as saying in an interview that the Filipinos are indignant at Japan's attempt to describe the aggression against their country in other terms. The grown-ups in Japan should not deceive their children, he said.

The chief of the world news desk of the Indonesian TIME magazine was quoted as saying in an interview that the facts of Japanese aggression cannot be covered up. What Japan is doing now is ridiculous, he said.

Titled "Will Japan Slip Back Into the Old Rut?", an editorial in the Singapore paper SIN CHEW JIT POH said that the present Japanese attitude towards the history of the Japanese militarist aggression against other Asian countries,

especially the history of the Pacific war launched by Japan, cannot but arouse vigilance against it. The Asian peoples still have apprehensions about the Japanese militarists sincerity in turning over a new leaf, it added.

The editorial pointed out that following the Meiji reform in 1868, Japan colonized Korea, committed aggression against China, and trampled upon southeast Asia under the name of the "greater East Asia-coprosperity sphere." However, Japan has never resolutely and sincerely repented its misdeeds.

The editorial said the Japanese Government's recent screening of the revised textbooks, which changed the wording of Japanese "aggression" against China, Korea and southeast Asia into "advance," has made people worry about the path Japan is going to take.

CSO: 4000/172

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

OPPOSITION PARTIES HIT HISTORY REWRITE--Tokyo, 30 July (XINHUA)--The Japan Socialist Party and other opposition parties demanded that the word "advance" be changed to "aggression" in the forthcoming issue of textbooks relating to the Japanese war of aggression against China. According to today's ASAHI SHIMBUN, the Japan Socialist Party and other opposition parties called special meetings yesterday to discuss the censorship of textbooks by the Education Ministry. They all opposed "censorship behind closed doors." The Japan Socialist Party considered such practice of the Education Ministry a right deviationist act. It called for changing the word "advance" to "aggression" in the revised school textbooks. [Text] [OW301352 Beijing XINHUA in English 1232 GMT 30 Jul 82]

TEXTBOOK REWRITE PROTESTED--Tokyo, 1 August (XINHUA)--The Japanese Education Ministry's scheme to cover up Japanese militarists' atrocities in Okinawa in the last world war has touched off strong public protests in Okinawa, ASAHI SHIMBUN reported today. A compiler of a screened history textbook for secondary schools said that in the original manuscript there was an account of the killing of about 800 Okinawa residents by Japanese troops under the pretext of "obstruction of the operations" at the end of the second world war. However, the record of this incident was deleted under pressure and coercion from the Education Ministry. The Okinawa prefectural council for democratic education, which is formed by members of the Okinawa prefectural teachers union, the prefectural federation of trade unions and other mass organizations, issued a statement of protest which says, "The people of Okinawa prefecture, who had been victims of the war calamities, cannot tolerate a total deletion of the important historical facts about the killing of the local people by the then Japanese troops." The council started a drive for collection of "100,000 signatures" in August to urge the Education Ministry to compile history textbooks based on correct historical records. Village councils of the Okinawa Island in a protest said, "It is absolutely intolerable for the Education Ministry to suppress historical facts." [Text] [OW011316 Beijing XINHUA in English 1257 GMT 1 Aug 82]

HISTORY DISTORTION DEPLORED--Tokyo, 4 August (XINHUA)--With the approaching of the 10th anniversary of normalization of Japanese-Chinese relations in the coming fall, the history of friendship between the two countries must not be tarnished. This was stated by Japan's lower house Vice-Speaker Haruo Okada in reference to the distortion of historical facts in textbooks by the Education

Ministry. In an article entitled "Mistakes, If Any, Must Be Corrected in Order to Promote Genuine Friendship" which was published in the August issue of JAPANESE-CHINESE MONTHLY, Okada said that the focal point of recent press comments is "the basic attitude behind the revision of the textbooks, a matter of national morality as regards historical truth." Citing relevant articles in the Sino-Japanese joint statement, Okada stressed: "Mistakes, if any, must be corrected. The (Japanese) Government should not try to absolve itself of responsibility by resorting to rhetoric, but take prompt action to have historical facts truthfully reflected in textbooks." [Japan's Lower House Vice-Speaker Criticizes Distortion of History"--XINHUA headline] [Text] [OW050150 Beijing XINHUA in English 0116 GMT 5 Aug 82]

PAPER CRITICIZES DISTORTION--New Delhi, 9 August (XINHUA)--Indian newspaper THE HINDU today criticized the distortion of history by the Japanese Ministry of Education, terming it "an attempt to whitewash a black period in the recent history of that nation." The newspaper said in an editorial that when China and Japan formally terminated the state of war and established diplomatic relations in 1972, the then prime minister of Japan, Mr Kakuei Tanaka, publicly declared in Beijing that "it is regrettable that for several decades in the past the relations between Japan and China have been unfortunate" and that "during that time our country caused great troubles to the Chinese people, for which I once again make profound self-examination." The Sino-Japanese communique included the formulation that "the Japanese side is keenly aware of Japan's responsibility for causing enormous damage in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself." In turn, China renounced its demand for war indemnities "in the interest of friendship between the peoples of China and Japan." Analysing the reason of the distortion, the editorial said, the event "makes little sense, unless it is interpreted as an expression of something going on deep beneath the surface of Japan's complex political-ideological development." [Text] [OW092032 Beijing XINHUA in English 1858 GMT 9 Aug 82]

OPPOSITION TO TEXTBOOK REWRITE--Tokyo, 2 August (XINHUA)--Doi Takako, Socialist Party member of the House of Representatives, told reporters here today that it was groundless for the Japanese Education Ministry to distort the history of the Japanese aggression against China through the censorship of the newly revised history textbooks, according to a Kyodo report. She held that any attempt to shift the responsibility of the distortion on to compilers of the textbook would not be allowed. She added that distortion of history is an attempt to deceive the Japanese children. The 34th National Congress of the Association of Japanese History Educationists, a national organization of history and social-science teachers in primary and middle schools and universities, today adopted a statement calling for measures to stop the distortion of history. Takahashi Shinichi, chairman of the association, pointed out that the association was formed to make known the truth of history including the historical facts about the aggression against other countries, launched by Japanese militarists. He stressed that the Japanese Governments action in screening the revised textbooks, can not be overlooked. [Text] [OW030850 Beijing XINHUA in English 0824 GMT 3 Aug 82]

REWRITE AIMS TO REVIVE MILITARISM--Bangkok, 1 August (XINHUA)--The distortion of historical facts by the Japanese Education Ministry in connection with the

Japanese militarist aggression is aimed to prepare public opinion for a revival of militarism by a handful of persons, said the Thai press today. TONG HUA YID PAO said that the Japanese Education Ministry tampered with historical facts in school textbooks in connection with the Japanese aggression against China and Korea. "If the Japanese rulers do not reproach themselves in earnest, their relations with the countries in the Asian-Pacific region would inevitably be impaired," the paper added. The NEW CHINESE DAILY NEWS wrote that the sole purpose of the Japanese Education Ministry in distorting historical facts is to make the younger generation in Japan forget Japan's historical lesson and their forefather's crimes of aggression against China and southeast Asia. "Those who favor the tampering with history would make a blunder if they still want to renew the fond dream of militarism. Today's China is not the one 40 years ago. Whoever wants to invade China will end in complete failure," the paper said. SING SIAM YIT PAO pointed out in an article on 29 July that the textbook affair proves that a handful of Japanese rightists really want to revive militarism. [Text] [OW011854 Beijing XINHUA in English 1840 GMT 1 Aug 82]

JAPAN'S HISTORY DISTORTION PROTESTED--Newspapers in the capital today continue to publish commentaries, articles and photos to express the Chinese people's solemn and just stand regarding the falsification of history by the Japanese Education Ministry through examining and approving history textbooks. The JIEFANGJUN BAO carries a commentator's article prominently on its front page, pointing out: The Japanese Education Ministry has forced the delegation of the world "aggression" against China and (?changed it to "entrance"). This is not minor question. It is an important signal of the attempt to revive Japanese militarism. The GUANGMING RIBAO carries an article by Ye Shengtao, vice chairman of the Central Committee of the China Association for Promoting Democracy and well-known educator, entitled "The Truth and Facts Must Be Told to Posterity." The RENMIN RIBAO publishes on page 4, under the headline "How Can History be Falsified?" five photos of the massacre committed by Japanese troops in Nanjing 45 years ago to remind people to consider what the real purpose is behind the Japanese Education Ministry's falsification of the history of Japanese aggression against China. [Text] [OW030230 Beijing Domestic Service in Mandarin 2230 GMT 1 Aug 82]

SRV FOREIGN MINISTER IN MALAYSIA--According to a XINHUA report from Kuala Lumpur, a Malaysian Government spokesman said yesterday: Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, currently visiting Malaysia, again refused to withdraw all Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. Vietnam and Malaysia have failed to reduce their wide differences on the Kampuchean issue. The spokesman said: The Malaysian side will study the explanations made by Nguyen Co Thach at the talks. However, the Malaysian side remains firm in its demand that all Vietnamese troops be withdrawn from Kampuchea and that the Kampuchea issue be resolved in accordance with the declaration of the international conference on the Kampuchean question. But Vietnam remains opposed to the declaration. According to a REUTER report, Nguyen Co Thach holds that the Kampuchean issue is related to the so-called Chinese threat. However, the ASEAN countries are mainly concerned with Vietnam's military occupation of Kampuchea and the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces. Malaysia also rejected a Vietnamese proposal to hold an international conference on Southeast Asian issues. Prime Minister Mahathir pointed out during the talks that the Heng Samrin regime does not qualify as a legal government elected by the people. [Text] [OW291437 Beijing Domestic Service in Mandarin 1200 GMT 28 Jul 82]

INDIAN PILGRIMS TO TIBET--New Delhi, 12 Jul (XINHUA)--A group of 200 Indian pilgrims will visit the Gangdise range and Lake Matam Yumco in China's Tibet this year, according to an agreement reached between China and India. The offer for the Hindu people to visit the two holy places was made by Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua when he visited India June last year. Fifty-eight pilgrims made the pilgrimage last year. The first group of this year's pilgrims has recently come back. [Text] OW121602 Beijing XINHUA in English 1504 GMT 12 Jul 82]

SRV-USSR MILITARY BASES--Beijing, 4 Aug (XINHUA)--Malaysian Foreign Minister Ghazali Bin Shafie has expressed regret over Vietnamese foreign minister's statement that his country would leave its door open to Soviet military bases, according to reports from Kuala Lumpur. In a statement issued yesterday, Ghazali said that such a move only meant that "Vietnam had no qualms about turning Southeast Asia into a theatre for war or nuclear conflict which was contrary to Vietnamese professed policy of promoting peace and stability in the region." The minister was commenting on a report from Bangkok which quoted the Vietnamese foreign minister as saying that his country had left its door open to Soviet military bases. "It is most regrettable that Vietnam maintains such an attitude," Ghazali said. "As a member of the non-aligned group, it is highly inconsistent and dangerous for Vietnam to be keeping its doors open to Soviet military or strategic bases," he said. "I hope that Vietnam would not shed its self-respect and betray the sense of nationalism of its people," he added. [Text] [OW041746 Beijing XINHUA In English 1632 GMT 4 Aug 82]

AUSTRALIA'S FRASER TO MALAYSIA--Beijing, 3 Aug (XINHUA)--Australian Prime Minister Malcom Fraser expressed the hope yesterday that the recent formation of a tripartite coalition of anti-Vietnamese resistance groups would "contribute positively to a settlement" of the Kampuchean issue, according to a report from Kuala Lumpur. Speaking at a dinner given in his honor by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Bin Mohamed, Fraser said that Australia supports the U.N. resolutions on Kampuchea. Fraser, who arrived in Kuala Lumpur on August 1 for a three-day official visit to Malaysia, held three-hour talks with Mahathir earlier yesterday in which he accused the Soviet Union of intensifying the world tension by pursuing an expansionist policy. [Text] [OW031347 Beijing XINHUA in English 1231 GMT 3 Aug 82]

SRV BORDER REINFORCEMENTS--Bangkok, 31 Jul (XINHUA)--The recent reinforcement of Vietnamese troops near the Thai-Kampuchean border ran counter to Hanoi's much publicized partial withdrawal from Kampuchea, said the information office of the Supreme Command of the Thai Armed Forces in a statement yesterday, according to MATUPHUM DAILY here today. The statement said that the Vietnamese authorities have increased troops along the Kampuchean border opposite to Thailand's Trat Province. Fighting takes place occasionally in Kampuchea and Vietnamese-Heng Samrin troops have received blows from time to time from Democratic Kampuchean troops. [Text] [OW311209 Beijing XINHUA in English 1201 GMT 31 Jul 82]

CSO: 4005/1184

PARTY AND STATE

MAO, PENG ROLES IN NORTHWEST BATTLE RECOUNTED

HK180655 Beijing SHIDAI DE BAOGAO in Chinese No 7, Jul 82 pp 4-16

[Article by Yang Dezhi [2799 1779 1807] and Li Zhimin [2621 1807 3046]: "Another Masterpiece by Chairman Mao and Marshal Peng--Decisive Battle in the Northwest Battlefield"; article "based on the manuscript provided by the Office for the Collection of Data on Party History of the Lanzhou Army Units and the Office for Editing Revolutionary Memoirs of the Gansu People's Publishing House"]

[Text] Editor's note: How were the five northwest provinces liberated? How was the Hu Zhongnan, Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui military group, one of Chiang's main forces, annihilated? Few people know the details about it and our young readers know especially little about it. In this issue, we publish, in particular the reminiscences written jointly by Yang Dezhi, PLA chief of general staff, and Li Zhimin, an adviser to the Central Military Commission. This article gives a faithful narration of how the PLA fought under the command of Comrade Mao Zedong and in accordance with Comrade Peng Dehuai's elaborate planning and paid the lowest price for victory in the decisive battle in the northwest battlefield by making use of contradictions among the enemy and destroying the enemy separately, one by one, and thus thoroughly defeated the Chiang Reign's attempt to hold on to the northwest area as its last counter-revolutionary base. The article is full of profound strategic and tactical thinking and military dialectics. It describes the great foresight of the commanders of our army, the mutual confidence of our generals and their close cooperation. These deeds were stirring and are worth reading. [end of editor's note]

In June 1949, our No 19 Corp and No 18 Corp together marched toward Taiyuan together, with more than 200,000 troops. After an arduous march of over 1,000 li in hot weather and across the Huanghe River, the two corps joined friendly northwest troops. Immediately afterward, they began the decisive battle against the bandit troops led by Hu Zhongnan, Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui.

This was a major strategic situation, which was decided on by Chairman Mao and the Central Military Commission as early as March that year while the second plenary session of the seventh CPC Central Committee was being held. After this session was finished, at the order of Chairman Mao, Commander Peng went to the front at Taiyuan to temporarily take over Comrade Xu Xiangqian's work in

commanding the troops because Comrade Xu, who had commanded the Taiyuan battle, was seriously ill. At that time Xu's troops had been victorious in wiping out enemy troops at their outer defensive line and were preparing to launch a general offensive against Taiyuan. At a meeting attended by the commanders of all the corps, Commander Peng said, "I have come to the Taiyuan front for the following two reasons: First, I am to participate in the general offensive against Taiyuan. The enemy's defense of the Taiyuan City is very strong and my primary aim in joining this battle is to gain experience in the storming of heavily fortified positions. Second, I have come here to command the army. After we take Taiyuan, the No 18 and No 19 Corps will move to the northwest battlefield and join the decisive battle against Hu Zongnan, Ma Bufang and Ma Hongku's troops. We will strive to liberate the large area of northwest China in about 1 year's time." Commander Peng called on us to pay attention to finding out ways and summing up experiences in storming heavily fortified positions in seiging Taiyuan and thus make preparations for the tough fighting in the decisive battle in the northwest battlefield. When we heard what Marshal Peng said, we were very excited. We recalled the countless crimes that Ma Bufang committed in the past in cooperating with Chiang Kai-shek in attacking our Red Army and killing a large number of our revolutionary comrades when the Red Army was marching north to resist the invasion of the Japanese Army. We also recalled how Hu Zongnan had for a long time been Chiang Kai-shek's most aggressive henchman in fighting against the CPC and had committed his full share of crimes. The broad ranks of our commanders and fighters had long hated Ma and Hu to the very marrow of their bones. How they have longed to join the fraternal troops in northwest to thoroughly wipe out Hu and Ma bandit troops as soon as possible.

During the month-long training and reorganization after the Taiyuan battle, our troops summed up the experiences of the battle for Taiyuan and carried out in depth education in the idea of "carrying out the revolution to the end." By so doing, we fully mobilized our troops and prepared them for marching to the northwest. Our troops set out according to the schedule, but because of the hot weather, we decided to cover 50 li a day and march for only 5 days a week. However, after our troops had just set out, we unexpectedly received a telegram from Commander Peng pointing out that the wheat harvest would soon begin in the northwest and the rainy season would begin in August. If we did not start the battle around the end of June and the beginning of July, we would have to fight the battle during the rainy season, when marching and fighting would be difficult. Moreover, the summer wheat reaped would be plundered by the enemy and this would aggravate difficulties in our troops' food supply. Commander Peng asked us to cover at least 70 li every day. As soon as our troops crossed the Huanghe River, Marshal Peng told our corp to finish concentrating our troops in the designated positions by the end of June and make preparations for swiftly plunging into the battle. This was an arrangement that Marshal Peng had planned beforehand. Therefore, the speed of this 1,000 li of march continued to increase and in the end the march became a day-and-night forced march. After overcoming many difficulties, the troops arrived at the designated place in time.

At that time, our corp formally became a part of the northwest field army and began to fight shoulder to shoulder with the fraternal northwest troops. From the beginning of the civil war launched by the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique, the fraternal northwest troops, though greatly outnumbered, had repeated-

ly defeated the enemy under very difficult material conditions. They not only wiped out more than 200,000 of the enemy's effective troops, but also pinned down hundreds of thousands of the enemy troops and vigorously cooperated with the fighting in other battlefields. The courage and skill of the northwest troops and their many wonderful military achievements had long won the admiration of all the commanders and fighters in our corp. We all regarded the northwest fraternal troops' sagacity, indomitable fighting style and revolutionary spirit of hard struggle as an example for us to learn from. All the commanders and fighters in our corp felt infinitely honored when they joined the northwest fraternal troops in fighting the decisive battle in the northwest battlefield.

Bitterly Wiping Out the Main Force of Hu Bandit Troops and Sowing Discord Between Hu's and Ma's Troops

Four days after Taiyuan was liberated, on 28 April 1949, Chairman Mao summoned Commander Peng back from the Taiyuan front to Beijing and discussed with him how to further solve problems related to the northwest area. In accordance with the rapid development of the domestic revolutionary situation, Chairman Mao pointed out the possibility of solving the problems by peaceful means. At the same time, he emphatically pointed out that in order to solve the problems peacefully, we first of all had to wipe out Hu's and Ma's main forces militarily in a decisive battle.

At that time, through the Liaoning-Shenyang, the Huaihai, and the Beijing-Tianjin campaign's, the enemy lost nearly all its main forces and the Kuchmintang reactionary clique was militarily, politically and economically in a hopeless situation.

On 21 April, Chairman Mao and Commander in Chief Zhu issued an order for the PLA to march everywhere in our country. After crossing the Changjiang River, our 1 million of PLA troops routed the enemy troops on the other side of the Changjiang River as easily as if they were crushing dry weeds and smashing rotten wood. As a result, they liberated Nanjing, Shanghai and other cities and areas one by one. Then, they marched to southeast, central-south and southwest China. The Kuomintang reactionary government officials vied with one another to flee to Taiwan, Guangzhou and Chongqing in a frightened manner like stray mongrels. In the face of certain defeat, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique completely lost its confidence on the battlefields in southeast and south China and placed its final hope on Hu's and Ma's bandit troops in the northwest and on Bai Chongxi's bandit troops who were retreating into southwest China as its last counterrevolutionary base where it would strive to win the support of the imperialists and gain time to reorganize its forces and wait for the opportunity to stage a comeback.

The area of the five northwest provinces is very big, constituting one-fourth of the total area of the country. Hu Zhongnan's bandit troops, entrenched in the northwest, were one of the well-armed main forces under Chiang Kai-shek's direct control. Although these troops had suffered successive losses under the heavy attack of our troops and their combat effectiveness had been greatly reduced, they still had 17 armies consisting of 41 divisions with 200,000 troops. The troops of the Ma's in Qinghai and Ningxia had 7 armies consisting of 27 divisions (or battalions) with 150,000 troops and had not suffered any annihilative blow from our troops. For a long time, Hu Zongnan, Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui had been scrambling for power and profit and intriguing against one

another. In order to retain northwest China as a place for it to linger on, the Kuomintang reactionary clique made great efforts to draw the two Ma's over to its side. On 24 May 1949, the Kuomintang central authorities appointed Ma Bufang chief military and administrative official of northwest China as a special favor, and promised Ma Hongkui that he would not only continue to hold the post of deputy chief military and administrative official of northwest China, but would also be appointed governor of Gansu. By so doing, the Kuomintang central authorities tried every possible means to persuade the two Ma's to lead their troops into Shaanxi and join Hu Zhongnan in fighting against our troops. Carried away by the obtainment of the military and administrative power in northwest China, Ma Bufang became so swollen with ambition and arrogance that he called himself "a pillar in the northwest." In order to defend his old nest, he attempted to take Shaanxi with his troops. With the help of Ma Hongkui, he organized three corps, put them under the command of his son Ma Jiyuan and sent them east along three routes into Shaanxi to cooperate with Hu Zongnan's bandit troops in an attempt to attack and take Xianyan and then seize Xian. Our 1st field army was ready in full battle array to face the enemy's attack. After luring the enemy deep behind our frontlines, the 1st field army dealt bitter blows at the enemy and took the edge off the enemy's spirit. Thus, it protected the PLA corps that were then entering Shaanxi from north China and enabled them to safely concentrate their troops.

After the two corps from north China came to northwest China, the military strength of the 1st field army increased to 12 armies with 35 divisions and 340,000 commanders and fighters. This was roughly equal to the 26 armies of Ma and Hu, which consisted of 68 divisions and 350,000 commanders and fighters. However, our troops could be deployed concentratively while the enemy troops had to garrison vast areas in northwest China. As a result, in order to counter our attack, the enemy could only deploy a little more than 150,000 troops of its main force, of which more than 70,000 belonged to Hu Zongnan and more than 80,000 belonged to the two Ma's. Therefore, conditions were ripe for a decisive battle. As our troops had only a relative advantage in the northwest battlefield, it was difficult to wipe out Hu and Ma's main force once and for all in one battle. We had to divide into separate forces and concentrate our strength on annihilating it piecemeal. There had been deeprooted contradictions between the two Ma's and Hu Zhongnan for a long time. Although at that time the two Ma's and Hu Zongnan were forced to unite with one another because they were faced with the common danger of being wiped out, they kept a wary eye on one another, appearing in harmony, but actually at variance. In their joint fighting, each of them tried to exploit the strength of the other to preserve his own strength at the expense of the other. Therefore, in the course of their joint military actionism this, along with their intrigues against one another provided us with favorable conditions to take advantage of contradictions among the enemy and to wipe them out piecemeal.

After the enemy was defeated in their attack at Xianyang and Xian, Hu Zongnan concentrated his main force on the banks of the Weihe River and the two Ma's concentrated their main force around Qianxian and Liqian counties. At that time, our troops were faced with a decision. Which of the enemy troops should be attacked first? Should we attack Ma while encircling Hu or should we attack Hu while encircling Ma? This was the first problem we had to solve before beginning the decisive battle; this was also the key problem that had a bearing

on the smooth development of the decisive battle. We had to make a resolute decision after making a correct analysis of both our situation and that of the enemy. In doing so, Commander Peng time and again reported on the situation at the front to Chairman Mao and put forth a number of battle plans; Chairman Mao time and again gave his directives. Judging by the whole situation in the northwest battlefield at that time, both Chairman Mao and Commander Peng were of the opinion that although Hu Zongnan's bandit troops were one of the main forces under Chiang Kai-shek's direct control, they had been greatly weakened by the repeated heavy attacks of our troops; therefore, the two Ma's, especially Ma Bufang's troops, was the strongest enemy force and the key problem related to the decisive battle in the northwest battlefield was to annihilate the main force of troops belonging to the two Ma's. If only this main force was annihilated, the northwest problem in the main would be solved. In wiping out Ma's troops while encircling Hu's troops, our favorable conditions were that the main force of the two Ma's was a long distance away from its old nest and not familiar with the geographic conditions and the people in the battlefield and its supply line was very long. On the other hand, our troops were fighting in an area that was in the vicinity of the Guanzhong basin which abounded in material and was densely populated and was also near to the old liberated areas; therefore, we could easily get supplies of materials and manpower. Moreover, it was far more favorable for us to wipe out the main force of the two Ma's in Shaanxi than in their old nest. What was unfavorable for us was that the main force of the two Ma's was more difficult to wipe out than Hu's. We had to make adequate material and spiritual preparations and plan a perfect fighting strategy and tactics. As Chairman Mao said, "we had to be prepared to lose tens of thousands of our troops." Moreover, there had been too much haste in the timing of the battle because the two corps from north China had marched 1,000 li and were very tired. These two corps needed time to rest and recover their strength, especially the No 19 Corp which had just arrived. While Chairman Mao and Commander Peng were considering the problem of how to attack the enemy, the enemy heard about the entry into Shaanxi of the two corps from north China and the main force of the two Ma's quickly retreated from Qianxian and Liquan to the Linyou mountainous area from where it could maneuver into the Guanzhong area to support Hu's troops when the situation was favorable and easily retreat to Pingliang when the situation took a turn for the worse. The two Ma's dispersed their main force along a long line in front of us in order to avoid being suddenly encircled and wiped out. At that time, Hu Zongnan's main force remained on the banks of the Weihe River and its five armies were stationed close to one another. They deployed in this manner in order to give them a favorable position both for launching an attack and defending themselves. The troops of both Hu and the two Ma's were deployed in positions which were favorable both for joint fighting and defense. However, the troops of the two Ma's were dispersed along a long line in front of us. This made it indeed very difficult for us to encircle them. On the other hand, Hu Zongnan's main force was concentrated in Fufeng and Meixian and its defensive lines were few and weak. Although there were a few troops in the Qinglin mountain these troops could only play a pincer role in coordination with troops of the two Ma's and there was a vast area in between for our troops to move behind Hu's main force. This provided our troops with a good chance to encircle Hu's main force and wipe it out. In the face of this situation, Commander Peng resolutely carried out Chairman Mao's directive on encircling the two Ma's and wiping out Hu's main force and decided

to send No 19 Corp to clamp down the two Ma's and deploy the No 1, 2 and 18 corps to wipe out Hu Zongnan's main force in the area of Fufeng and Meixian counties.

On 6 July, we went to Xian to attend a front committee meeting. As soon as Commander Peng saw us, he said: "You must be very tired after a long march. It would be better to give you a month for rest and reorganization. However, we shall go to war very soon and we have little time for preparations. Although adequate preparations are a key to victory, failure to grasp a good opportunity to engage the enemy makes it impossible to wipe out the enemy even if there are adequate preparations. Fortunately the main attack force has already made preparations. In dealing with the two Ma's, you should never take the enemy lightly. It is necessary to take strict precautions against the enemy attacking us from the rear. This is a habitual practice of the enemy. So long as we are not subjected to a surprise attack by the enemy, we shall be in an impregnable position. This is also what Chairman Mao wanted me to tell you." As he said this he handed us a telegram which Chairman Mao sent on 26 June. The telegram read: "The army group led by Yang Dezhi should immediately head west and, after closing in on the two Ma's, build fortifications there. It is responsible for the task of containing the two Ma's and for guarding against their counter-attack. It is necessary to strictly tell Yang Dezhi this point: never take the two Ma's lightly or else he will suffer losses. Yang Dezhi and company have no experience in dealing with the two Ma's."

After the meeting ended, we returned to the army group and relayed the instructions of Chairman Mao and Commander Peng from one level to another. We carefully studied, in light of our assignments, the special features of Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui and their habitual strategies as well as the methods of dealing with them. In light of the enemy's special features, we made the best use of our time in tactical and technical training, particularly in fighting mounted troops and fighting it out with the enemy with bayonets. By conducting an extensive ideological mobilization in a deepgoing way, all commanders and fighters further overcame the tendency of taking the enemy lightly and took precautions against self-satisfaction brought about by success.

At the start of the Fufeng-meixian County campaign, our army group went into immediate action to an operational plan. On 10 July, we marched into the highlands to the north of Qian County and Liquan opposite the Ma bandits, built fortifications and threatened to attack them. On the other hand, the 61st Xian garrison army made a feint attack against the enemy in the Nanshan and Qinling mountains in an attempt to give the enemy a false impression, confuse them and shield the movement of the main force, contain the Ma bandits as well as the Hu bandits at the Qinling mountains and ensure the safety of the main force's flank. On 11 July, the main force started an offensive against the Hu bandits before dawn. The 2d army group which took cover and gathered at a predetermined place made a concealed rapid march to the rear of the enemy's flank through the gap between the Hu and Ma bandits. The 18th army group carried out a deep interdiction of the enemy from east to west along the Longhai railway and the Xianyang-Fengxiang highway. The 1st army group made a two-pronged offensive against the enemy in the west from the southern bank of the Weihe River along Chang'an-yimen highway and the northern foot of the Qinling mountains. Hu Zongnan

had originally reckoned that it would take the north China army group a least a month to rest and reorganize before they could conduct operations. He also considered that with his five army groups being equipped as they were, our forces would not dare to swallow them at one gulp. Moreover, he vainly hoped to take advantage of our offensive against the Ma bandits to make an all-out attack at our flank in an attempt to achieve the victory of a joint operation between the Hu's and Ma's troops. With the suddenness of a thunderbolt, our troops launched a vigorous offensive against the Hu bandits so that, taken by surprise, they were surrounded ring upon ring by our troops in one day. After a fierce battle of 2 days and nights, we succeeded in wiping out, with the exception of the remnants of the enemy forces who fled helter-skelter by crossing over the Qinling mountains, 4 enemy armies with a total of more than 43,000 persons and liberating eight county seats.

The victory of Fufeng-mei County campaign brought about a fundamental change in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves in the northwest theater. From a relative superiority our forces succeeded in achieving an absolute superiority and the war initiative was completely in the hands of our forces. While the Hu bandits were being annihilated by our forces, the two Ma bandits assumed the posture of supporting Hu by concentrating their forces. However, they dared not hit out but sat back and watched the destruction of the Hu bandits. After the main force of Hu Zongnan's troops was annihilated, the remnant forces retreated to the Qinling mountains. By this time they were like a clay idol forging a river--hardly able to save themselves, let alone come to the aid of the two Ma's troops. Seeing that the game was as good as lost for Hu Zongnan, both Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui immediately beat a hasty retreat to the north in order to conserve their strength and escape being annihilated. The operational alliance between Hu Zongnan on the one hand and Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkuo on the other was finally smashed by our forces and the two Ma's were completely isolated.

Prior to the start of the Fufeng-mei County campaign, Chairman Mao instructed Commander Peng on 26 June: "The Kuomintang central government is preparing to move from Guangzhou to Chongqing. In order that the puppet regime could move to Chongqing with an easy mind instead of moving to Taiwan and to prevent the Hu bandits from going into Sichuan at an early date, it seems inadvisable for you to occupy Hanzhong for the time being. It seems more advantageous for Hanzhong to be in the hands of the Hu bandits for a few months." In accordance with this instruction of Chairman Mao, our forces after wiping out the main force of the Hu bandits, did not occupy Hanzhong for the time being but followed up the victory with hot pursuit of the Ma bandits. At this time, Chairman Mao sent a telegram to Commander Peng, saying: "I am greatly relieved to learn that you have achieved an extremely great victory over Hu Zhongnan. It is very good that despite the hot weather you should follow up the victory with campaign against the two Ma's."

Pursue and Attack the Enemy for 1,000 Li over Eastern Gansu, Carve Up the Troops of Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkuo

After the Fufeng-mei County campaign in which the main force of Hu Zhongnan was wiped out, the Kuomintang reactionary clique placed even greater hopes on Ma

Bufang and Ma Hongkui to have a trial of strength with our forces. By this time the Ma bandits had not been dealt a crushing blow. The Kuomintang reactionary clique which was in a desperate state again overestimated the strength of the two Ma's, vainly attempting to rely on them to reverse the war situation in the northwest. They actively instigated the two Ma's to engage our troops in a decisive battle in the Pingliang area. They held that controlling both Gansu and Ningxia, Pingliang was a strategic place which our troops would certainly fight for when advancing to the northwest. In Pingliang there were lots of deep gullies and cliffs and the mountain passes were strategically located and difficult of access. Moreover, Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui had both Lanzhou and Yinchuan in their rear. This made it relatively easier for them to procure supplies. Our troops, on the other hand, were far from the rear and it would be very difficult to procure supplies. If Hu Zhongnan took advantage of this opportunity and coordinated their attack with an attack from the Qinling mountains, our troops would certainly be placed in a difficult position of being cut off from both the vanguard and the rear. They also attempted to stir up national contradictions after we entered the minority nationality regions so that we could not gain a foothold there and then wipe out our forces in the mountains of Gansu.

On 19 July 1949, at a meeting of ranking cadres at and above army level, held at Wenguang Village near Guozhen, Commander Peng summed up the Fumei campaign. He called this campaign the first round in our decisive battle with the Hu and Ma bandit troops. He also set forth an operational plan for the second round--the Pingliang campaign. When analyzing the enemy's situation, Commander Peng pointed out; "after the Fumei campaign, Hu Zhongnan still has more than 100,000 troops but they are scattered over the Qinling mountains' Dongjiangkou and Fuping in the east, Hui, Cheng, Liangdang and Wudu area in the West, Ankang, Hanzhong as well as the area to the south. They have become badly frightened people who are constantly afraid that we will attack them. They have lost the ability to launch an offensive against us in Guangzhong in the near future. After retreating to eastern Gansu, Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui will lose Pingliang--the passage to Gansu and Ningxia--if they continue retreating. This will inevitably create a condition in which our forces can drive straight to Lanzhou and Yinchuan. It is estimated that unless they are dealt a crushing blow by us, the two Ma's will not resign themselves to defeat. They will certainly put up resistance by relying on natural barriers in Pingliang." Therefore, Commander Peng decided to contain the Hu bandits with two armies from the 18th army group to ensure the security of our rear. He also decided to concentrate the 1st, 2d and 19th army groups as well as the 62d army from the 18th army group, making up 10 armies, in hot pursuit of the two Ma's and strive to wipe out their main force in the Pingliang area. The 19th army group, with the help of the 2d cavalry brigade, will serve as the right flank and advance along the Xilan highway and both sides of the highway. The 1st and 2d army groups will serve as the left flank and advance to the north along three routes. They should first occupy long county, drive straight to the west of Pingliang in order to cut off the enemy's retreat and strike at enemy reinforcements that may come from Lanzhou and Guyuan. Commander Peng also pointed out: the rainy season is approaching in the northwest region. In the south and north of Long County, the mountains are high and the mountain paths are dangerous. It is sparsely populated. We should strive to move up the operation to an early date because delay will result in more difficulties.

Chairman Mao completely agreed with the operational plan of Commander Peng and gladly concluded: so long as we can wipe out the main force of the two Ma's in the Pingliang campaign, the war situation in the northwest can be basically solved. Hereafter, occupying Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Xinjiang will be basically a problem of walking and taking over control. Meanwhile, Chairman Mao repeatedly instructed us: the fight against the two Ma's is a fairly serious campaign. We must be prepared to pay a relatively high price. Under no circumstances must we lower our guard, become careless and take the enemy lightly.

After a few days of rest and reorganization, our forces carried out a political mobilization from top to bottom. On the basis of "the three main rules of discipline and the eight points for attention," specific stipulations were made on uniting compatriots of the Hui nationality. The troops were requested to give full play to their role of "being a combat force as well as a work team" and while fighting, do a good job of mass work in the newly-liberated areas. To counter the deceitful propaganda carried out among the troops of the Ma family by Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui, we drew up the "regulations on giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war of the Hui nationality." Set free prisoners of war of the Hui nationality and gave each of them three silver dollars as travelling expenses. In order to ensure supplies for the troops, Commander Peng also personally made arrangements for vehicles and organized communications and transport in the rear. The various units also organized work teams, which would follow the troops, raise grain and borrow grain from the masses locally in order to make up for the deficiency of supply from the rear.

On 21 July, our army groups started off from Qian County and Liquan and pursued the enemy along the Xilan highway and on both sides of the highway. We organized scores of tanks and armoured cars into a motorcade which opened a way for the troops. These tanks and armored cars had been seized from the enemy when our army groups fought in the north China theater. They now served as a powerful weapon in our hands for dealing with the enemy cavalymen and for frightening the enemy. The 1st and 2d army groups also set out on 23 and 24 July, respectively in accordance with the schedule.

At this time, the two Ma's whose troops retreated in haste were in an awkward situation. It was difficult for them to decide whether to fight or to retreat. They wanted to fight but they felt that it was difficult to withstand our mighty troops, 300,000 strong. They were very much afraid that they would be surrounded and annihilated by our troops. They wanted to retreat but they were afraid that they would lose the strategic passage to Gansu and Ningxia, which would result in an unfavorable situation in which our forces could drive straight into Lanzhou and Yinchuan. Therefore, it was not until 24 July that a military meeting was held which was attended by commanders at the divisional commander level or above and presided over by Liu Zhiyuan, deputy commanding officer of the enemy's northwest commissioner's office of military and political officers. The meeting drew up what they called the "reconsidered plan for guiding the mass campaign in Guanshan" and made arrangements for a decisive battle in Pingliang as follows: it was decided that the six divisions, as well as a cavalry regiment and two artillery battalions from the 128th and 11th armies of Ma Hongkui's troops should stand in defence to the east and south of Pingliang

and form an arch-shaped defence zone from the northeast to the southwest stretching from Sishilipu, Ankouyao and Huating area with Pingliang as the center, in an attempt to wear down the main force of our troops by active resistance. Ma Bufang's troops would move west from the Ankouyao area to Liupanshan where they would await an opportunity to advance by a roundabout route and make a surprise counterattack on our right flank from the direction of Huating and Ankouyao--the right flank of their arc-shaped defence zone. They would also rely on Hu Zhongnan to launch an attack on our rear from the Qinling mountains and "destroy the enemy forces one by one with concerted actions."

As soon as the so-called "reconsidered plan for guiding the mass campaign in Guanshan," drawn up under the direction of Ma Bufang was dished out, Ma Hongkui, who was on his guard against Ma Bufang, immediately perceived that Ma Bufang was attempting to conserve his own strength in the decisive battle at Pingliang by letting Ma Hongkui fight in the van. According to the plan, even if Ma Hongkui was victorious in the decisive battle, his main force would also be worn down while Ma Bufang would get the benefit. If the decisive battle was lost, Ma Bufang's troops which would retreat west to Liupanshan to wait for an opportunity to advance by a roundabout route would certainly take advantage of this opportunity to flee at the expense of Ma Hongkui's troops. Particularly when Ma Hongkui saw that we had placed massive forces on his right flank, he was on tenterhooks and profoundly felt that it would be difficult to escape the misfortune of being annihilated. Ma Hongkui, who felt discontented with Ma Bufang long before, nursed bitter hatred for him because the post of chairman of the Gansu provincial government promised him by the Kuomintang central authorities was taken away by Ma Bufang. When he learned that Ma Bufang was to deploy troops for a decisive battle in Pingliang in such a manner, he immediately sent a telegram to Lu Zhongliang, provisional commander in chief of his own troops, instructing him to conserve his strength by retreating to, and guarding, Ningxia. Thereby, the enemy's plan for a decisive battle in Pingliang was discarded before it was put into effect.

Our troops drove straight into east Gansu along various routes pursuing and attacking the Ma's bandit troops. By 27 July, Ma Hongkui's main force had withdrawn to the west of Pingliang and Ma Bufang's main force had withdrawn to the Jinning area. This state of affairs made Commander Peng come to the conclusion that the enemy had already given up its original attempt to fight a decisive battle with us in Pingliang and had shifted to adopting the strategy of defending their home area by means of resisting our troops line by line in order to delay their progress. Therefore, on 27 July, he issued an order for the implementation of the original plan, directing the No 19 Corps to continue to pursue and attack Ma Hongkui and the No 1 and 2 Corps to pursue and attack Ma Bufang along two routes. He ordered them to wipe out all the enemy they caught. On 28 July, the No 1 corps caught Ma Bufang's No 4 cavalry brigade at Guguan path, one of the important paths on the Longshan mountains, when the brigade was covering the retreat of Ma Bufang's main force. After 1 hour of fighting, our No 1 army quickly took the highland on both sides of the enemy's stronghold. Having found that it was impossible to retain the stronghold, the enemy fled in panic to the west of Guguan path. However the No 20 division of our No 7 army had already gone round the Guguan path to the back of the enemy and cut off the enemy's avenue of retreat. As a result, the enemy brigade was

completely wiped out by us and the only one to escape was the wounded brigade Commander Ma Chengxian. This was the first time a whole brigade of Ma Bufang's was wiped out by us and Ma Bufang was greatly shocked. He quickened his speed in fleeing to Lanzhou. Ma Hongkui fled even quicker. Our No 19 Corps pursued hard for more than 10 days, but could not catch up with it to fight a battle. It was not until 1 August that we fought a battle with Ma Hongkui on the bank of the Renshan River to the south of Guyuan. After 6 hours of fierce fighting, our No 64 army wiped out five regiments of the enemy's No 11 army, killing and capturing all the 5,000-odd troops. At the same time, Ma Hongkui ordered his No 128 army to guard the three paths on the east side of the Liupan mountains in an attempt to check the advance of our troops at that section of the highway which had steep cliffs on either side. The No 193 division of our No 65 army bravely stormed and took the enemy's position, seized the three paths and opened up the way. On 2 August, the No 195 division of the No 65 army took the strategically important Liupan mountains. By that time, our main forces had already gone deep into Gansu by various routes. Although we failed to wipe out two Ma's main force in Pingliang, we achieved the aim of separating Ma Bufang from Ma Hongkui and thus had created favorable conditions for later wiping out the enemy piecemeal. Having lost the favorable position for a decisive battle in Pingliang, the enemy was in an unprecedentedly unfavorable predicament because the loss of Pingliang made Lanzhou and Yinchuan directly vulnerable to our troops' attack.

Our separation of the two Ma's and the emergency reports from Lanzhou and Yinchuan put the Kuomintang reactionary government, that had fled to Guangzhou, in a great panic. This dealt a heavy blow at the enemy and destroyed its dream of vainly attempting to preserve northwest and southwest China as its last counterrevolutionary base. At that time, Nian Xishan, the then president of the executive yuan of the Kuomintang Government hurriedly summoned Ma Bufang, Ma Hongkui and Hu Zongnan to Guangzhou to attend a "meeting on the united defense of the northwest." At this meeting, they drew up a plan to fight a decisive battle with us at Lanzhou. It was planned that Ma Bufang would withdraw to Lanzhou, intermittently fighting our troops on his way and thus attracting the main force of our troops to Lanzhou and pinning it down there. Then the plan directed that Ma Hongkui move his force to Lanzhou after he withdrew from Guyuan. On the other hand, Hu Zongnan was to march into the south of Gansu to encircle our main force and cooperate with the two Ma's in attacking our main force. Nian Xishan promised to send the central airforce to vigorously support fortifications in Lanzhou, the natural barrier of the Huanghe River, its concentrated force and sufficient munition and material supplies, to hold up our troops. Moreover, by means of strengthening the defense, clearing the field and cutting off our troops' avenue of retreat, it would result in our troops lacking supplies and then they would be able to wipe out our troops at the outskirts of Lanzhou. At the meeting, Nian Xishan made every effort to reconcile the contradictions between Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui. He appointed Ma Jiyuan as deputy chief military and administrative official of northwest China and approved the appointment of Ma Hongkui as governor of Gansu. After the meeting, Ma Bufang time and again tried to persuade Ma Hongkui to go to Lanzhou and take his office as governor of Gansu. This was in fact aimed at keeping Ma Hongkui as a hostage in Lanzhou in order to obtain his support. The two Ma's time and again cried bitterly together and they swore to share weal and woe

and decided to return to Lanzhou together. Unexpectedly, when the plane took off, Ma Hongkui suddenly changed his mind and decided that he would return to Yinchuan on the excuse that he had to personally arrange the dispatching of troops to support Lanzhou. Thus, the two Ma's returned to the northwest separately.

As far back as on 6 July 1949 before the Fufeng-Meixian battle, Chairman Mao pointed out in his "directive on conquering the enemy troops in the northwest" that we had to adopt different attitude in dealing with the two Ma's. We had to hit at Ma Bufang first because Ma Hongkui was Fu Zuoyi's sworn brother and had sent people to express through Fu Zuoyi his desire for a peaceful solution. Chairman Mao thought that after we had wiped out Ma Bufang's troops, we would, in coordination with military attacks, do our best to strive to obtain a political solution with Ma Hongkui. On the other hand, because Ma Bufang held the ruling political position and was militarily stronger than Ma Hongkui, if we wiped out Ma Bufang, we would in the main have solved the northwest problem. That was why Commander Peng decided to first concentrate our troops on wiping out Ma Bufang. At that time, we envisaged two possibilities for Ma Bufang's further movement. First, he might fight a decisive battle with us at Lanzhou and second, he might withdraw to his old nest in Qinghai. If the enemy withdrew into Qinghai, our troops would encounter serious difficulties in marching and fighting in Qinghai and the liberation of the whole northwest would be delayed. Moreover, Lanzhou was a key city that linked Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Xinjiang Provinces. Though it was an arduous task to storm the fortified city of Lanzhou, the battle conditions were more favorable than those in Qinghai. Therefore, our troops had to do our best to strive to fight a decisive battle with the enemy at Lanzhou and strictly prevent the enemy from fleeing to Qinchai.

On 4 August, Commander Peng issued the combat order for advancing to Lanzhou to annihilate Ma Bufang of Qinghai, making the following battle deployment: Three armies of the second corps and two armies of the 19th corps would attack Lanzhou in a pincer-like encirclement. The first corps together with the 62d army would penetrate into the right wing of the enemy and then outflank Ma Bufang's den--Qinghai--with a view to shaking the morale of the enemy troops, and blocking and wiping out the enemy which would run away from Lanzhou. Then our troops would cross the Huanghe River from the west side and head directly to Xining. In addition, the 64th army of the 19th corps would make a feint towards Ma Hongkui in the Guyuan area, ready to check their reinforcement forces. The main force of the 18th corps (except the 62d army) and the 7th army, altogether three armies would forge ahead along the Sichuan-Shaanxi highway to clamp down on the bandit troops of Hu Zongnan. Like this, Ma Bufang would be tightly encircled to meet his doom.

On 8 August, the main force of our troop formations set out directly forward the west of Lanzhou. Advancing along the Zigzag roads, we climbed up to the top of the towering Mount Liupan. Looking into the distance of the boundless motherland, we saw an enormous and powerful liberation army marching west like waves of molten iron. Recalling a poem which Chairman Mao composed 14 years previously when the Chinese workers' and peasants' Red Army was passing Mount Liupan, I remembered the magnificent verse: "High on the crest of Mount Liupan,

red banners wave freely in the west wind. Today we hold the long cord in our hands; when shall we bind fast the grey dragon?" At this moment, all sorts of feeling welled up in my heart. With tears flowing, we were seeking the footprints left by the Chinese workers' and peasants' Red Army 14 years before and cherishing the memory of the images of the deceased revolutionary comrade-in-arms who were massacred by the bandit troops of Ma Bufang. At that time, the Red Army soldiers vowed to return by fighting. Now, at long last we had come back. Not only should we make Ma Bufang pay his blood debt, but also it would not take long before we would overthrow Chinag Kai-shek and liberate the whole of China. The revolutionary martyrs, then, would smile in their graves.

In the course of pursuit and attack by our troops, the enemy, being afraid of being encircled and suppressed, engaged our troops only with the dispersed cavalymen. They ran away as soon as they engaged us. The enemy infantrymen fled pell-mell, 1 or 2 days journey away from our troops. Wherever our troops went, the local armed forces of the enemy one after another revolted and crossed over. Some enemy troops took to their heels with the regular army and some were defeated and went back home. People's regimes were immediately set up and social order was maintained in vast areas that had been freed from the reactionary domination of bandit Ma. Compatriots of Hui and Han nationalities who had suffered the cruel oppression of bandit Ma indignantly condemned the bandit's outrageous behavior. Many youths of Hui and Han nationalities asked to join the liberation army to wipe out bandit Ma. Our troops, being highly disciplined, did not commit the slightest offence against the civilians. They did mass work in the intervals between marching and fighting and helped the masses in productive labor. The masses of Hui and Han nationalities treated our troops as members of their families, vacating their own houses, boiling water, presenting firewood and grain, cooking, acting as guides and giving active and warm support to our troops in fighting. In addition, our field army units were backed in operation by 150,000 laborers who had come from the new or old liberated areas together with thousands of trucks and carts, giving first-aid to the wounded and delivering war materials. Our officers and men were greatly inspired by the full support of the masses of Hui and Han nationalities. On the other hand, they were filled with rage and hatred witnessing the tyrannical rule of bandit Ma.

Our large troop formations had continuously marched forward over a long period of time. This brought about numerous difficulties to our troops. The whole way was like no man's land and there were no transport facilities. Roads became muddy and miry in the rainy seasons. Provisions such as grain, shoes, ammunition and funds were not able to be supplied in time. Wheat was often cooked for eating without being ground to flour due to there being no time to grind captured grain or cereals borrowed from the people. After arriving in the west of Pingliang and Guguan, the weather suddenly became very cold. Due to the few houses in villages, our soldiers had to sleep in the open. As a result, many of them fell ill contracting flue, dysentery and malaria because they were not accustomed to the climate of the northwest plateau. Facing numerous difficulties, our troops all along maintained high morale, thanks to the strong leadership of the party, the might of political work and the great inspiration of the coming nation-wide triumph. Officers and men of our troops, closely uniting and mutually helping, surmounted difficulties one after another as they marched, with indomitable combat will, toward Lanzhou to pursue and attack the enemy.

Fight a Decisive Battle in Lanzhou to Greet the Liberation of the Whole Region

On 20 August 1949 our corps joined forces with the 2d corps led by Comrade Xu Guangda in the outskirts of Lanzhou in order to surround the city from east, west and south. Upon arrival at the assembly place, we immediately surveyed the terrain. Lanzhou, facing the Huanghe River to the north and nestling among hills from three sides, is strategically located and difficult of access. The Gaolan mountains with towering ridges and peaks which embraces Lanzhou, provides a natural defence for the city. On the mountain there was strong defence [words indistinct] built by the Kuomintang troops during the anti-Japanese war, which were further cemented during the liberation war. A great mass of block-houses were built in important positions. A belt highway in the mountain which led to the city was linked with all such positions. At the front side, there were one or two rows of cliff with a height of 6 to 12 meters. In the middle of the cliffs were fortified with covered machine guns. In front of the cliff were several lines of trenches with depths of 3 to 5 meters. There were hidden fortresses and field warfare fortifications between the trenches which were cut off by ditches and hidden paths. The front part of the positions was heavily laid with barbed wire entanglement and were densely covered with mines. It was rare to see such fortified defence work. So, it was not [words indistinct] "an invulnerable iron city." With the strong fortifications, not only could the enemy make full use of their firepower, but they also could launch a counteroffensive to retrieve lost ground. However, our troops had to surmount ditches and trenches and mount steep cliff while climbing upward to make an attack on the enemy. In this way it was hard for our troops to move and stretch. Looking to the north, we saw the torrent of the Huanghe River surging forward to the east along the mountain. The water current became more swift and waves ran high in the rainy season. The enemy were entrenched on both sides of the river, so it was extremely difficult for our troops to cross the river to surround the enemy. The [word indistinct] to wiping out all the enemy was first to capture Mount Nanshan, a major natural defence for Lanzhou and command the Huanghe River bridge, the only [word indistinct] enemy. According to the battle plan made by Commander Peng, the tasks for the 2d corps were to attack Yingpan Ridge, Shenjia Ridge and the Qilihe area and then to storm the western and southern gates of Lanzhou City. Part of the forces would forge ahead eastward along the south of the Huanghe River to seize the Huanghe River [sentence indistinct] an opportunity to cross the Huanghe River from the north to wipe out the enemy there. The tasks of our corps were to attack and occupy Mount Majiashan, Gucheng Ridge and Mount Doujiashan on the southern side of the Xilan highway as well as Mount Shilishan on the northern side, and then make an assault on the eastern gate of Lanzhou City. Having inspected the terrain, we decided to take Zhuju [words indistinct] and post. From here, the enemy's positions were all in our sight.

In order to carry out its plan of retaining a counterrevolutionary base through the decisive battle in Lanzhou, the Kuomintang reactionary government did not have any scruples about resorting to a stopgap measure detrimental to long-term interests by continuously airlifting war materials to Lanzhou. In order to stake all at a single throw, Hu Zhongnan concentrated four corps of troops at Hui, Cheng, Liangdang and the Sichuan-Shaanxi highway preparing to storm the rear of our troops in coordination with Ma Bufang. Being aware that the Lanzhou cam-

paign would determine his fate, Ma Hongkui also assembled his main forces and assumed a posture of supporting Ma Bufang in an attempt to make a flank attack on our troops from the rear if the occasion demanded. Ma Bufang reckoned, too, the decisive battle in Lanzhou to be a matter of life and death. After attending the northwest joint defence conference called by the Kuomintang central government, bandit chieftan Ma Bufang hurried back to Lanzhou by air from Guangzhou on 19 August in order to make arrangements. The enemy dispatched 50,000 crack troops of the 82d army and the 129th army to guard Lanzhou. On the left wing, about 20,000 troops of the 91st army, the 120th army and the 81st army were entrenched in Jingyuan and Jingtai along the Huanghe River and the Dalachi area for defensive purpose. On the right wing, about 20,000 newly-recruited cavalymen were commanding the Lingtao and Taosha areas. With the strong fortifications around Lanzhou, Ma Bufang vainly attempted to first blunt the edge of our troops' advance, and then Ma Hongkui and bandit Hu Zhongnan would launch a two-pronged offensive from the rear of our troops. The enemy vainly hoped to annihilate our troops at one stroke at the periphery of Lanzhou with the tactics of frontal resistance and double envelopment. At the same time, Ma Bufang hastily moved troops stationed in Xinjiang to Lanzhou as reinforcements, and repeatedly sent messages to the Kuomintang central government asking for the air force to join in the impending decisive battle by dispatching a powerful air armada every day.

Of course, all the above was made clear to us when the battle was over. At that time, our troops had already penetrated into the hinterland of the enemy. However, our party's foundation in this area was very weak and there was no insider. Moreover, bandit Ma was wily and as crafty as a fox. So it was very difficult for us to find out about enemy troop movements and to make correct judgements. Drawing near to Lanzhou, our troops obtained contradictory information from two sources: One source said the 91st and 120th corps of the enemy had pulled out to the north from Lanzhou and would retreat to Jiuquan, and together with the Gansu provincial government, large quantities of war materials were being transferred from Lanzhou to Xining, the enemy in Lanzhou were about to blast factories, cut electric wires and destroy the Huanghe River bridge; the other source said the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique was airlifting ammunition to Lanzhou every day, Ma Bufang of Qinghai was rushing grain and millstones into the city, its 82d corps were busy strengthening strongholds around Lanzhou, and Ma Hongkui of Ningxia was preparing to dispatch 6 divisions to support Lanzhou. Based on such contradictory information, two completely different conclusions might be drawn. Through detailed analysis, Commander Peng held that the enemy's situation in Lanzhou was different from that in Pingliang. The enemy's plan for a decisive engagement in Lanzhou would not be discarded as they were in Pingliang. Our troops should have done their utmost to force the enemy into a decisive engagement in Lanzhou. At the same time, we should have considered the conditions more serious and difficult than what they were. Taking this as a foothold, we should have become fully prepared in all fields.

When Lanzhou was besieged by our troops, Commander Peng immediately sent a cable to Comrade Wang Zhen who was leading the 1st troop formation to outflank Qinghai on the left. In the cable, he pointed out: The bandit troops of Ma Bufang are now resolved to tenaciously defend Lanzhou. After our troops on the left occupy

Linxia, the enemy probably will decide not to defend Lanzhou. But it is also possible that they will remain firmly entrenched in Lanzhou at all costs by abandoning Xining, pulling out from the eastern side of the Datonghe River and from Xiangtang, Xincheng and the north of the Huangshui River in order to protect their retreat route toward Hexi. If our troops fail to attack and occupy Lanzhou within 6-7 days, the main force of Ma Hongkuo of Ningxia will probably reinforce Lanzhou. The two Ma's of Qinghai and Ningxia have more than 2,000 trucks. We must fully estimate the possibility that the main force of Ma Hongkuo will be transported to Lanzhou. If this happens, the 2d troop formation will move and outflank Lanzhou in the north. Thus our side will concentrate three troop formations to join the decisive engagement in Lanzhou. On the same day, in the name of the headquarters of the first field army, Commander Peng issued directives concerning the tactics of launching an offensive on Lanzhou. The directives emphatically pointed out: the bandit troops of Ma Bufang are now the most militant forces of the enemy. They are the most stubborn enemy known in the country. We must fully estimate the strength of the enemy and be mentally prepared, and avoid being proud, hasty and ignorant of the enemy. The directives requires that various army units must "make careful reconnaissance, precise plans and complete preparations before launching an attack" and "must concentrate superior forces, fire and techniques on one target so as to wipe out the enemy by taking over its mountain strongholds, houses and positions one after another. Once an attack is launched, it should be a successful one." "While launching an attack, we must also be ready at all times to annihilate the enemy's countercharge forces, destroy its countercharge fire and build our own defense works." "Both artillery and infantry troops must more closely coordinate with each other. In order to prevent blind firing, the artillery troops must make repeated and careful reconnaissances of the enemy forces and fires and make excellent field observations. We must realize that a superior artillery fire is not omnipotent before the stubborn enemy." "As the front trenches and precipitous cliffs on the enemy's side, they must be approached by means of approach-trench operations and by changing the topographical features, and then be destroyed by explosives. Since transporting ammunition is difficult, artillery bombardments can be used only as a supplementary means."

Meanwhile, since the enemy were besieged by our army on only three sides, and the iron bridge across the Huanghe River on the north exit was under their control, there was still the possibility for a sudden escape by the enemy when our army pressed onward. So Commander Peng decided on 21 August to launch a trial offensive with nine regiments on the enemy positions. Five regiments of the 65th and 63d army in our corps were ordered to attack Doujiashan, Guchenling and Shilidi. However no sufficient preparations were made and the offensive was launched in haste. Moreover, in this thousand-li pursuit and attack, since the enemy always fled without fighting, a new tendency among the commanders and fighters to take the enemy lightly soon grew. For fear that the enemy would run away, some commanders led the soldiers to make a fierce assault on the enemy without investigating the topographical features and the disposition of the enemy forces and fire. They did not even bring with them the necessary explosives and other blasting equipment and did not order artillery and infantry troops take concerted actions. One company even made a hasty assault before knowing what the target was. Not knowing the enemy's situation, a regiment commander said: "Give me 2 hours and I am sure to fulfill the tasks!" After 2 days' offensive, on 21 and 22 August, although the soldiers fought

bravely and indomitably, and although several bayonet clashes occurred which caused casualties on the enemy side, no enemy positions were taken, and our side also suffered serious casualties. The other four regiments of the second corps did not succeed in the trial offensive either. In view of this, Commander Peng resolutely decided to stop the offensive and immediately make field summaries, so that the general offensive could be launched with good preparations made in line with the directives of 21 August. Although this trial attack was not a success, it made us more aware of the enemy's deployment and resolution. We learned that the three main divisions of the enemy's 82d army were deployed in Majiashan, Yingpanling and Shenjialing to defend these three main positions of the enemy's defensive line. We also learned that the enemy's 129th army and other troops were deployed at the east and west wings as well as on the north bank of the Huanghe River so that they could control the Nanshan Hill and, with the help of the river as a natural barrier, divide forces to guard the city, and we also learned that there were no reserve forces in the city. What was more important was that by drawing lessons written in blood, the commanders and fighters recognized the harm of the tendency to take the enemy lightly and, being more clear-headed, began to make preparations for the general offensive.

On 23 August, Marshal Peng came to the army corps headquarters. Because we did not fight well 2 days ago, we were in low spirits. We said to Marshal Peng in a reproving tone: "The 19th corps has never in its history witnessed such a situation: In storming several of the enemy's positions, we have not captured a single one in 2 days. Cadres at the army, divisional and regimental levels feel very bad about it. They just couldn't wait to keep fighting to prove their worth. Chairman Mao has once and again taught us: Never make light of the enemy: otherwise we will surely suffer. Now we have really suffered because we have thought little of the enemy. We have often reminded ourselves of this. We have also once and again educated the army units, urging them to overcome the idea of underestimating the enemy. But there has recently been relaxation in our education of army units. The idea of making light of the enemy has again reared its head. The responsibility for not fighting this battle well rests chiefly with the leadership of our corps." Marshal Peng said: "The army unit has tried to storm the enemy positions without success. The primary reason is because the enemy has a strong defense and is tough. The decision to attempt this trial attack was made by me. I was then pressed for time and the army unit did not have adequate preparation. But after this trial attack, we have achieved our aim of learning about the enemy. You must tell the cadres to be patient. They must sum up experiences and lessons, keep a close watch over the enemy, make proper preparations in a down-to-earth manner and wait for the orders to launch a general offensive against the enemy."

Marshal Peng told us: The first corps of the left wing of our army led by Comrade Wang Zhen was advancing at a very quick pace. It occupied Linxia on the 22d. Now it had temporarily stopped advancing. It was sending some of its troops to occupy Yongqing to control the Huanghe River and to cut off the links between Lanzhou and Xining, and as a result be poised to intercept the enemy at any time. Marshal Peng analyzed the several possible situations likely to arise after our army's occupation of Linxia, and suggested appropriate counter-measures by our army. The first situation likely to arise was that the enemy

defending Lanzhou would pay more attention to its old nest of Xining and divert some of its forces to defend it, while continuing to put the major emphasis on Lanzhou. This would help us to capture Lanzhou and would divert some of our forces to join the first corps in attacking Xining after the capture of Lanzhou. The second possible situation was that the enemy would give up Xining to concentrate all its forces on consolidating its defense of Lanzhou. This possibility was very slim. Or the enemy might send the new 6th cavalry army and the guards unit (one division) stationed at Xining to defend Xining. This possibility was very great. Given such a situation, it was temporarily not possible for our first corps to attack Xining alone. If our army suffered setbacks in simultaneously attacking Lanzhou and Xining, Ma Hongkui's main forces in Ningxia would take advantage of our exhaustion from our expedition to attack our flank. Now, with the weather gradually getting cold, our army would be put in a due situation if it was not provided with winter clothing in time. Even given the capture of Xining by our army, we had yet to capture Lanzhou. With our forces dispersed, we would still have such fears. The third possible situation was that if Ma Bufang's troops in Qinghai gave up Lanzhou and retreated to Xining, the second corps would pursue and attack them, while the first corps would seize the chance to intercept the enemy, annihilating Ma's main forces in an area 100 li east and west of Xiangtang, and then capturing Xining. The fourth possible situation was that if our army unsuccessfully attacked Lanzhou and if Ma Hongkui's main forces in Ningxia were sent to Lanzhou to reinforce the enemy, making it difficult for us to attack Lanzhou again, we could wait temporarily for another chance to attack Lanzhou and Xining. We could spend 1 or 2 months concentrating on the proper handling of local work in newly liberated areas and establishing regional work bases. We could gain time reorganizing the whole army, solving the food problem, hauling and concentrating adequate ammunition supplies, launching a political offensive against the enemy and actively creating conditions for the attack on Lanzhou. Of course, everything possible was to be done to avoid such a situation. Therefore, it was decided to transfer five regiments from the local forces in three areas to reinforce the 64th corps. The 64th corps were to concentrate all its forces on intercepting Ma Hongkui's troops in Ningxia, so that the latter could not come to Lanzhou's aid. After listening to Marshal Peng's analysis of the situation, we felt that he had given overall consideration to the problems and had taken all difficulties into full consideration. His approach was entirely in line with the spirit of Chairman Mao's cable. We felt greatly enlightened. We immediately made it known to Marshal Peng that all levels of the 64th corps was ready to fight. It had seized more than 400,000 rounds of bullets from the enemy in Guyuan and Haiyuan and had a 2 month grain supply. It was fully stocked with both grain and bullets. Its military works were continuously being strengthened. The corps members had every confidence that they could accomplish the assignment of intercepting Ma Hongkui's troops in Ningxia. Given the support of five regiments, things would be made all the easier. Regarding the attack on Lanzhou, a clear idea had been obtained of all of the enemy positions and its military dispositions. Given 1 or 2 days of preparations, everyone was confident that the enemy's positions could be captured.

In the 12 days or so before and after the Lanzhou battle Marshal Peng briefed the military committee and Chairman Mao on the conditions along the front almost every day. He also received instructions from Chairman Mao on many

occasions. On 23 August, Chairman Mao said: Since Ma Bufang resolved to defend Lanzhou, this helped our army's efforts to annihilate Ma's troops. To annihilate his troops, we must concentrate three corps on the attack of Lanzhou. After Wang Zhen's corps crossed the river in the upper reaches, it seemed better for the corps to make a detour to the rear of Lanzhou, or to cut off the road leading from Lanzhou to Qinghai and to Xinjiang and join in the attack. The most important thing was for the corps to cut off the road leading to Xinjiang. In addition, Ma Bufang must be prevented from retreating to Xinjiang to cause more trouble. Before the attack, it seemed that we needed 1 week or more at our disposal. Thus, we could let the army units freshen up, make a close observation of the enemy and the relevant terrain, seek to boost the soldiers' morale and make full preparations for fighting. We also needed to be prepared to launch the second and third attacks if the first should fail. The aim was to annihilate Ma Bufang's troops and occupy Lanzhou. Acting upon Chairman Mao's instructions, Marshal Peng immediately reorganized his military dispositions in anticipation of the most difficult situation. He submitted a report to Chairman Mao on the 24th, pointing out that he had decided to send three corps to attack Lanzhou. Wang Zhen's corps would make a detour back to north Lanzhou from the upper reaches of Lanzhou. The possibility that Ma Hongkui would send three corps from Ningxia to reinforce Lanzhou from the left side of the Huanghe River was very great. If both Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui amassed troops on Lanzhou, there would be 130,000 people defending the city, given two additional units under Zhou Jiabin and Huang Zuxun, respectively. Even if our army concentrated three corps, it could hardly succeed in the attack in a short period of time. Meanwhile, there were such factors as the difficulty of obtaining food supplies, the great length of the supply route, and the scarcity of any transportation. An adequate supply of ammunition could not be maintained. Transportation of grain would be all the more difficult. So it was decided to encircle Lanzhou before the arrival of Ma Hongkui's troops. The aim was to get rid of Ma Bufang's main forces first. Now the second corps and the 19th corps had completed their preparations for the attack on the city. But they had not yet fully recovered from their exhausting maneuvers. They had an inadequate supply of grain, and their edible oil and vegetable problems were all the more difficult to solve. Bandit Ma Bufang continued launching a counterattack. This made it difficult for them to rest. As far as preparatory work at its current stage was concerned, chances of success in the attack on the city were 70 or 80 percent. So it was decided to start the attack on the morning of the 25th. If Ma Bufang's troops were not annihilated and Ma Hongkui's troops pressed close, four corps would be mobilized to encircle Lanzhou, and five corps would be concentrated on fighting Ma Hongkui's troops. After receiving Marshal Peng's report, Chairman Mao replied to him by cable on the 26th, pointing out that if he succeeded in capturing Lanzhou on the 25th, there would be a change in the situation. If he failed, then the whole thing would be written off as a tentative operation. The whole army would then receive a wholesome lesson from this tentative operation. The whole army would then receive a wholesome lesson from this tentative operation involving bloodshed, and would lay a basis for victory in fighting again. If on the 25th, he did not make it and Ma Hongkui came to Lanzhou's help, then he might as well act according to the decision mentioned in Marshall Peng's cable of the 24th. He might first fight the reinforcements and then attack the city.

In the 2 days of preparations on the 23d and the 24th, the army units extensively mobilized people for political education, seriously reviewed experiences and lessons, carefully studied the terrain, repeatedly groped their way in the dark, staged sand table exercises, promoted military democracy, aroused the masses to study the tactics of attacking the enemy, organized forces to dig tunnels to improve the terrain, and mobilized all manpower and animal power and means of transportation to haul materials and equipment. This preparatory work was completed by overcoming many difficulties. It was a race against time. It rained all day on the 24th. The whole area was shrouded in mist as it drizzled. This helped our army conduct its preparatory work. But everyone hoped that such drizzly weather would not last long, as this would interfere with our army's general offensive. Late at night, the rain stopped. The sky cleared up. It was really a blessing from the ruler of heaven. Such fine weather was bestowed on us. Everyone joked: "Ma Bufang has been up to every mischief. He has aroused the anger of both heaven and men. Heaven has taken our side in annihilating bandits like Ma."

In the early dawn of the 25th, our army started a general offensive against Lanzhou. Under cover of heavy gunfire, our infantrymen bravely charged the enemy's position. After fierce fighting, the 4th army of the second corps captured the middle and lower parts of the Gouwa Mountains, representing the enemy's main position in Shenjialing. At 5 p.m., the 6th army attacked Sanyingzi, or the Yingpanling position on the highest peak of the Nanshan Mountains. Within our corps, the 189th division of the 63d army captured the enemy's main position of Majiashan at 4 p.m. The 193d division of the 65th army captured Guchengling that night. During the fighting, the enemy commanders directed the operations with machine guns and bayonets, launching a series of counterattacks against our army. Only after hardfighting and repeated struggles and after hand-to-hand fighting with bayonets did our army capture one after another a one tunnel, a precipice or a position from the enemy.

Upon learning the news about our first corps' occupation of Linxia, Ma Bufang, keeping watch over Lanzhou, showed great panic, as he was caught totally unprepared. He was convinced the rear was insecure and that the old nest of Xining was being jeopardized. He immediately ordered the 8th cavalry brigade and the 14th cavalry brigade to return to Qinghai to strengthen the defenses of Xining. Meanwhile, he was greatly dissatisfied with the fact that Ma Hongkui and Hu Zongnan had not ordered their troops into battle. His army was allowed to defend Lanzhou alone. On 23d August, he specially sent cavalry men to rush to Ningxia to seek help. On 24 August, he again sent a cable to the central government of the Kuomintang, which reads as follows: "The communist first and second armies that have invaded the neighborhood of Linxia on the West Bank of the Tao River are intruding into Yongqing and Xunhua. It is a direct threat to our position! The situation is extremely serious! If our troops and the air force in Shaanshu and Ningxia do not immediately join in to annihilate the enemy, it is feared that Lanzhou and Xining will be put in jeopardy. The situation is critical. Time is running! Please take immediate action. There should be no more delay." The same day, Ma Bufang slipped back to Xining from Lanzhou by plane. Ma Bufang left a message for his son Ma Jiyuan: If Ma Hongkui, Hu Zongnan and the air force do not come to our aid, then you should maintain our strength and defend Qinghai to the last. On the 25th, after our army launched a general offensive against Lanzhou, Ma Jiyuan, general commander in charge of the enemy troops in Lanzhou, still dreamed of

defending the city to the last and repulsing our attack. He wanted to gain time by waiting for help from Ma Hongkui and bandit Hu and for the mobilization of the air force. By the afternoon the same day, Ma Jiyuan had suffered heavy casualties in his main forces defending the suburban and urban areas of Lanzhou. His positions were captured one after another. There was still no sign of help from Ma Hongkui, bandit Hu and the air force. In view of this situation, Ma Jiyuan lost all his confidence. He was also afraid that our army might seize the opportunity to attack Xining, capturing his old nest and cutting off his retreat. Therefore, he decided in a panic to withdraw from Lanzhou to the northern bank of the Huanghe River and to reorganize his troops. At 4 p.m., the military and government offices of the enemy in the northwest and its various military units began withdrawing to the northern bank of the Huanghe River. Ma Bufang's main forces were mostly in the battlefield. For fear of being discovered by our army, they had to secretly slip away under cover of the darkness of night. Because the enemy was forced to make a hurried evacuation in a critical situation, things were in chaos at the very outset.

That night, when our army continued our attack on the enemy, we discovered that the enemy troops were running away. We immediately gave pursuit. The 3d army of the second corps first moved into the city and fought with the enemy at close quarters. One of our units made straight for the iron bridge of the Huanghe River and seized it after annihilating the enemy troops, which put up stiff resistance. The only path of retreat for the enemy was thus cut off. The main enemy forces that had withdrawn from the Nanshan Mountains were massing in the city. They were immediately annihilated by our army. At that time, the 6th army also entered the city. The 63d and 65th armies of our corps pursued the enemy troops for over 20 li until they reached Dongshaomen and annihilated the remnants of the enemy. At noon on the 26th, our army occupied various important points inside and outside the city and annihilated all the enemy troops. We also crossed the Huanghe River iron bridge and occupied Beitashan. The liberation of Lanzhou was announced.

The enemy troops that escaped over the Huanghe River iron bridge ran for their lives, each concerned only with his own safety. Mounted troops and infantrymen mingled, as people, horses and cars fought their way through. Countless people were killed in the confusion and some also fell off the bridge and drowned. After our army gained control of the Huanghe River iron bridge, bandit Ma's commanding officers ordered their soldiers to swim across the Huanghe River without regard to their safety. A countless number of them were mangled and killed by sharks. Those enemy troops fortunate enough to make it across blindly ran in the direction of Qinghai. Officers of low rank and their soldiers went their separate ways, bringing with them their horses and rifles. Those few officers who made it back to Qinghai had lost all their soldiers.

In the decisive battle of Lanzhou, Ma Hongkui and Hu Zongnan had anxiously waited, so that Ma Bufang could deal a crushing blow to our army. This would give them a chance to attack our flank. They wildly hoped for a victory in the decisive battle. By 24 August, Ma Hongkui was still concentrating his main forces, poised for action. Ma Bufang's main forces were annihilated in the battle of Lanzhou, dashing all their hopes. Lest they be annihilated, Ma Hongkui's main forces immediately slipped back to their old nests in Zhongning and Zhongwei in Ningxia.

After the annihilation of Ma Bufang's main forces, bandit Hu sent troops to Baoji and Longnan as a gesture of support. They were intercepted by our 18th corps. They suffered a crushing defeat and ran away pell-mell. The fifth day after the liberation of Lanzhou--30 August--when our army was observing a solemn enter-the-city ceremony and the people of the whole city of Lanzhou were jubilantly celebrating its liberation, the Kuomintang air force at last sent two airplanes to fly over Lanzhou. Under the fierce attack of our anti-aircraft guns, they flew away in panic after circling twice. This was the only response to the help repeatedly sought by Ma Bufang.

With Lanzhou liberated, Ma Bufang's main forces, representing the strongest force of the enemy fighting in the northwest region, were annihilated. A victory in the decisive battle in the northwest was declared. After that, the enemy in the northwest region lost its ability to organize any battle. Our army for its part could move around freely, annihilating the remnants of the enemy. Just as Chairman Mao had expected, there was no more serious fighting in the northwest battlefield. For our army to complete the task of liberating the whole of northwest China was basically a matter of walking in and taking over. The first corps soon advanced on Qinghai. On 5 September, Xining, the capital of Qinghai, was liberated. The first and second corps, following different routes, advanced upon the Hexi corridor of Gansu and converged in Zhangye, annihilating most of the troops of two enemy army corps. They availed themselves of the victory to head west, heading straight for the Xinjiang border. On the way, they annihilated more than 30,000 of Ma Bufang's troops. Our corps entered Ningxia and quickly annihilated the enemy troops that dared to resist. Under the military threat of our powerful army, Ma Hongkui's 81st army offered to be reorganized by our army on 19 September. The 128th army, the 11th army and the remnants of the Helan army sent representatives on 23 September to sign peace treaties in Zhongning. That night, our army moved into Yinchuan. In less than 1 month, beginning with the start of the advance, all of Ningxia was liberated. In the second half of September, our first and second corps pressed close to Xinjiang. The Kuomintang army defending Xinjiang, led by General Tao Shiyue, sent a cable offering to stage an uprising. The Xinjiang provincial government, led by Bao Erhan, also sent a cable offering to accept the leadership and establishment of the central people's government of Beijing. On 20 October, our army moved into Urumqi. The peaceful liberation of Xinjiang was announced. The Kuomintang reactionary group's plan to preserve the northwest region as the last counterrevolutionary base on the mainland was completely bankrupt.

In the northwest battlefield, our army took less than 2 months to win victory in the decisive battle. Then it pressed on to swiftly wipe out the remnants of the enemy, liberating all parts of the five provinces in the northwest. At a minimum cost, our army scored the greatest and swiftest victory, creating a great miracle in military history. This victory was a victory for Mao Zedong's military thinking. This decisive battle has, operationally speaking, given full expression to Chairman Mao's idea, "strategically we should despise all our enemies, but tactically we should take them all seriously"; has given full expression to the principle, "exploit the enemy's contradictions and wipe out the enemy forces one by one"; and has given full expression to a high degree of flexibility in working out the fighting methods based on changes in the features

and conditions of the enemy. Chairman Mao's farsightedness and keen sense of perception, Marshal Peng's conscientious devotion to research and his resourcefulness and decisiveness, and the close ties and mutual trust between the marshal and generals--all these will always be worth our study and imitation.

CSO: 4005/1195

PARTY AND STATE

19TH LECTURE ON DRAFT REVISED CONSTITUTION

OW051305 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0155 GMT 5 Aug 82

[Text] Beijing, 5 Aug (XINHUA)--Nineteenth lecture on the draft revised constitution: "Protection of Citizens' Freedom of Religious Belief."

Freedom of religious belief is a consistent policy of our country. The draft revised constitution embodies this policy in its stipulation that organs of state, public organizations or individuals shall not compel citizens to believe in religion or disbelieve in religion, and that they shall not discriminate against citizens who believe, or do not believe, in religion.

Fundamentally speaking, feudal and idealistic religious ideas are opposed to our guiding ideology, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. The draft revised constitution's stipulation on this question of protecting citizens' freedom of religious belief springs mainly from consideration of the following factors.

1. Religion is a reversed world outlook originating from an early period of human society when oppression in nature and human society were beyond man's comprehension. Its birth and survival have their social and historical origins as well as class roots. So long as these origins and roots are not eliminated, religion cannot be done away with. Therefore, the historical task of the proletariat should be to pay attention to the social and historical origins of religions, and not to "prohibit" religion by coercive methods or legal means.
2. The question of religious belief is mainly one of thinking and ideas. Any question of thinking and understanding can be solved only by methods of persuasion, education and raising consciousness. Prohibition by any form of administrative order or any coercive means is wrong and even harmful.
3. In our country, religious issues are often closely related to nationality issues, and religious policies often have a bearing on nationality policies and relations. On the one hand, we must not confuse nationality issues with religious issues, and on the other hand, we should realize the close relationship between nationalities and religions. Correct implementation of the policy of freedom of religious belief is conducive to enhancing the unity of all our nationalities.

The implementation of the policy of freedom of religious belief does not mean the practice of bourgeois "liberalization." The draft revised constitution stipulates: The state protects legitimate religious activities. No one may use religion to carry out counterrevolutionary activities or activities that disrupt public order, harm the citizens' health or obstruct the state educational system. No religious matters shall be dominated by any foreign country.

The policy to protect the freedom of religious belief does not contradict the prohibition of feudal superstitious activities. Religious activities are organized activities with historical origins. Generally speaking, every religion has its own name, a written system of canons, specific procedures for joining and so forth. Feudal superstitious activities are not religious activities. In the past we banned all reactionary superstitious sects and secret societies and all witches and sorcerers according to law. From now on, none of these activities may be resumed.

CSO: 4005/1183

PARTY AND STATE

20TH LECTURE ON DRAFT REVISED CONSTITUTION

OW080931 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0215 GMT 7 Aug 82

[Excerpts] Beijing, 7 Aug (XINHUA)--Lecture (20) on the draft revised constitution: "The Freedom of Person of Citizens Is Inviolable."

The inviolable freedom of person is one of the most fundamental rights of our country's citizens. Freedom of person means that the person of a citizen and his personal activities are protected by the constitution and laws and must not be willfully restricted, denied or violated by anyone else. It is for this purpose that the draft revised constitution explicitly stipulates that the person of a citizen shall not be illegally arrested, his personal freedom shall not be illegally violated, and so on and so forth.

For every citizen of our country, the right of person is very important because it involves the exercise of such basic rights as the protection of a citizens' personal safety. Only when their freedom of person is protected will it be possible for citizens to engage in normal studies and work and lead a normal life, to participate in administering the affairs of the country under the leadership of the party and the government, and to enjoy democratic and other rights.

How can citizens' freedom of person be protected? The draft revised constitution stipulates: 1) No citizen may be arrested except with the sanction of a people's procuratorate or by the decision of a people's court; 2) Extralegal detention of citizens, or extralegal deprivation or restriction of citizens' freedom of person by other means is prohibited; and 3) Extralegal search of the person of citizens is prohibited. Arrest is a restriction of a citizen's freedom of person, a coercive measure to detain him by a public security or judicial organ in accordance with specified procedures. The detention or arrest of a citizen by any organ, except by a public security or judicial organ, is a violation of his freedom of person and is illegal.

On citizens' right to their homes, the draft revised constitution stipulates: "The homes of citizens of the People's Republic of China are inviolable. Searches of, or intrusions into, citizens' domiciles, in contravention of the law, are prohibited." Citizens' right to their homes is a part of their rights. Thus, this stipulation is of great significance for protecting citizens' rights.

Article 39 of the draft revised constitution provides: "The freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens of the PRC are protected by the law." Correspondence refers to various forms of normal correspondence, such as letters, telephones and telegrams. Citizens' correspondence involves a wide range of content, such as their personal lives, thoughts, personal contacts and friendly connections. All these are important components of citizens' freedoms and rights. Therefore, this stipulation is also of great significance.

CSO: 4005/1183

PARTY AND STATE

21ST LECTURE ON DRAFT REVISED CONSTITUTION

OW090849 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0134 GMT 9 Aug 82

["Lecture (21) on the draft revised constitution: 'The Personal Dignity of Citizens Is Inviolable!'"--XINHUA headline]

[Excerpts] Beijing, 9 Aug (XINHUA)--The draft revised constitution stipulates: "The personal dignity of citizens of the People's Republic of China is inviolable. Insult or slander against citizens in any form is prohibited." This stipulation of the draft revised constitution carries important significance for maintaining comradely relations between man and man under the socialist system and for protecting citizens' right of person.

Article 145 of the criminal law enacted in 1979 stipulates: "Whoever seriously insults another person by force of other means, including the use of 'big-character posters' or 'small-character posters,' or fabricates facts to libel him will be sentenced to detention, deprivation of political rights or imprisonment for not more than 3 years." The purpose of the stipulation in the criminal law is to protect the personal dignity of citizens by means of the law.

To protect a citizen's personal dignity from violation is favorable to maintaining the comradely relations between the members of society while engaging in productive social activities. It is also favorable to correctly conduct criticism and self-criticism in social life, in addition to promoting social morality, fostering fine social values and establishing new types of socialist relations among citizens basing on equality, friendship, mutual respect and mutual cooperation. Besides, personal dignity is closely related to national dignity. In our contacts with people of other countries, to protect our personal dignity, in a certain sense, is to protect our national dignity.

CSO: 4005/1183

PARTY AND STATE

'XINHUA' LECTURE 22 ON PRC DRAFT REVISED CONSTITUTION

OW102116 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0048 GMT 10 Aug 82

[Excerpts] Beijing, 10 Aug (XINHUA)--XINHUA lecture (22) on the draft revised constitution: "Citizens of the People's Republic of China Have the Right and Obligation To Work and Receive Education."

The right to work means that citizens who are able to work are entitled to work and to be paid according to the amount and quality of work they have done.

In accordance with the stipulations of the draft revised constitution, our country guarantees citizens' right to work mainly in two aspects: 1. The state creates conditions for employment through various channels; and 2. On the basis of increased production, the state gradually improves working conditions, strengthens labor protection and raises remuneration for work. An important aspect in guaranteeing citizens' right to work is to solve the employment problem. Judging from the practical experiences gained in this regard since the 3d plenary session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, this problem cannot be solved by the state alone; to solve this problem, we must implement the principle of combining employment on the recommendation of state labor departments with employment through collective self-organization and the individual search for jobs.

In view of the fact that our country is economically rather backward and the level of its productive forces is rather low, the draft revised constitution, with respect to working conditions, labor protection and remuneration for work, stipulates that the state shall, "on the basis of increased production, gradually improve working conditions, strengthen labor protection and raise remuneration for work." In addition, it also, provides that "the state provides necessary vocational training to citizens who have not yet been assigned work." These stipulations give profound expression to the superiority of our country's socialist system and form a striking contrast with those of bourgeois constitutions which provide for the right to work but do not guarantee the exercise of this right.

The stipulations of the draft revised constitution on citizens' right and obligation to receive education are extremely important. In accordance with the stipulations of the draft revised constitution, there are four main guarantees

for citizens' right to receive education: 1. The state promotes the planned, socialist development of education, science, public health and sports, culture and art, publishing and distribution of publications, and of the press, television and broadcasting, libraries, museums and cultural centers and other cultural undertakings. 2. The state operates, and encourages nongovernmental bodies to operate, various types of schools in order to wipe out illiteracy, universalize primary education and develop secondary, vocational and higher education. 3. The state increases various types of cultural and educational facilities and promotes political, cultural, scientific, technical and professional education among the workers, peasants and other working people. 4. The state promotes the spoken Han language's wide use throughout the country to facilitate the development of the cultural and educational work.

The hope of the motherland is placed on young people and children who are a vital new force or reserve force in realizing the four modernizations. Hence, the draft revised constitution especially stipulates that "the state promotes the all-round development--moral, intellectual and physical--of young people and children."

CSO: 4005/1183

PARTY AND STATE

TIANJIN PROFESSOR HAILS CONVOCATION OF PARTY CONGRESS

SK100720 Tianjin City Service in Mandarin 1430 GMT 9 Aug 82

[Radio talk by (Wu Daren), professor and vice president of Nankai University: "The Decision To Hold the 12th Party Congress Reflects the Common Desire of All Party Members and the People of Various Nationalities Throughout the Country"--read by announcer]

[Text] After studying the communique of the 7th plenary session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, I was deeply inspired. The important resolution adopted at the session to convene the 12th party congress on 1 September totally conforms to the requirements of the party's work and the national program to achieve socialist modernization and reflects the common desire of all party members and the people throughout the country.

Over the past few years, practice has shown that the party's line, principles and policies set forth since the 3d plenary session of the 11th CCP Central Committee are correct. Our country has scored marked achievements and made remarkable progress in various fields under the guidance of these lines, principles and policies. The party and the people of various nationalities across the country have sensed that they have a bright future.

There is no doubt that the 12th party congress, which will be held under a new situation, will certainly carry forward the revolutionary cause and forge ahead into the future and make a new breakthrough in achieving socialist modernization. The letters adopted at the session on extending the cordial regards and respect of the party membership to comrades Liu Bocheng and Cai Chang fully demonstrate the respect and concern shown by the CCP Central Committee for elderly revolutionaries and leaders, as well as the love and esteem held by the people across the country. This attaches great significance to education for all party members and the people throughout the country. In effect, these letters also urge us to learn from elderly revolutionaries and to value the fine revolutionary character and their lofty spirit displayed in exerting themselves to the utmost to the party and the people and fighting all their life for the revolutionary cause. I am convinced that all elderly revolutionaries who are unable to work ordinarily due to their age will be greatly comforted by these letters and that as long as they have made contributions to the party and the people and have not given up, all elderly revolutionaries will be respected by the party and the people.

CSO: 4005/1183

END

56