


NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

Improving Unity of Effort at the Theater-Strategic Level

By

Andrew K. Weaver
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

IMPROVING UNITY OF EFFORT AT THE THEATER-STRATEGIC LEVEL

Effective policy requires interweaving military and political instruments; yet the United States frequently plans and employs military and political instruments separately. U.S. policies would be better served if the individual at the theater-strategic level had control over all the instruments of power within the theater.

Because of U.S. strategic culture, the military resides within its own stovepipe. The foundation of U.S. strategic culture is the separation of military force and diplomacy. The geographical CINC is the linchpin for strategic success. He is the nexus of strategic objectives and operational design. To build an integrated national security team requires viewing the present theaters as theaters of policy and not as theaters of war.

What is needed is a theater-strategic leader responsible for the employment of all assigned U.S. assets within his region. The theater-strategic leader concept would permit the sequencing and synchronization of all instruments of power to achieve regional objectives. To implement such a concept requires a larger reorganization of the Executive Branch. Such a change will not take place until there is a shift in the strategic culture and the current national security framework is perceived to be inadequate.

Improving Unity of Effort at the Theater-Strategic Level

Clausewitz admonishes soldiers and politicians of the underlying importance of viewing policy as a whole. Effective policy requires interweaving military and political instruments; yet, the United States frequently plans and employs military and political instruments separately. The military resides within its own stovepipe and the instruments of power are integrated only at the national level. However, it is the individual at the theater-strategic level, presently the military geographical combatant commander (CINC), who is best positioned to integrate the instruments of power within a region. He is at the nexus of strategic objectives and operational design. He is the one best suited to translate military success into strategic victory. U.S. policies would be better served if the individual at the theater-strategic level had control over all the instruments of power within the theater. This paper will examine the feasibility of such an arrangement. First, it will review the present command arrangements and their background. Second, it will examine the ability of a geographic CINC to integrate other instruments of power using Operation DESERT STORM as a case study. Finally, it will examine alternative command arrangements to improve unity of effort at the regional level and make recommendations.

The effect desired at the theater level is unity of effort. Unity of effort is the "coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective."¹ The

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Pub 3-0) (Washington, D.C.: February 1, 1995), A-2.

military, as well as most businesses, achieves unity of effort by placing all forces assigned to an objective under a single commander—unity of command. The commander sequences and synchronizes his subordinates' actions to ensure they achieve their assigned aim. Theoretically, subordinate organizations will operate in a coherent fashion and not at cross-purposes, producing the maximum output for the resources given. Is unity of effort possible in the conduct of U.S. national security policy?

Background on Present Command Arrangements

Presently the United States has unity of command at the national and the embassy level. At the national level, all the instruments of national power are under the control of the President in his constitutional role as head of government and head of state. Supported by the National Security Council, the President determines national security objectives and assigns them to the various executive branch departments. For the military, he assigns military strategic objectives to geographical CINCs and provides the CINCs with the means to achieve their aims.² The foundation of interagency coordination occurs in the National Security Council System during the development of national security policy.³

The Country-Team

The present country-team concept for U.S. embassies provides unity of command for country-centric problems. The Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, usually an ambassador, is

² Milan Vego, *On Operational Art*, 2d ed. (Newport: U.S. Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department, 1998), 79.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* (Pub 3-08) (Washington, D.C.: October 9, 1996), vi-vii.

responsible for coordinating all "official American activities in his country of assignment."⁴ The ambassador's responsibilities include directing, coordinating, and supervising all executive branch activities within his assigned country except those under the command of a geographical CINC.⁵ For example, the U.S. Ambassador to Germany does not have control over U.S. forces deployed to Germany in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. For country-specific problems, the ambassador's unity of command enables him to sequence and synchronize the efforts of all U.S. government agencies towards a common aim.⁶ The Reagan Administration efforts to eradicate Soviet and Cuban-backed insurgencies from Latin America provide a good example.

In the 1980s, U.S. policy sought to thwart the insurgencies in El Salvador and Honduras. Within his country (area of operations), the U.S. Ambassador combined all the U.S. agencies in the host nation under the umbrella of the Country Team. The Ambassador wove together Defense Department programs to institutionalize civilian control over the host nation military, Justice Department initiatives to improve the host nation's judiciary, and USAID programs to build roads to economically disenfranchised regions into a coherent plan to achieve the desired operational objective—a viable, prosperous country free of a credible

⁴ Barry K. Simmons, "Executing U.S. Foreign Policy Through the Country Team Concept," *The Air Force Law Review*, Vol. 37, 1994, 126.

⁵ President Clinton letter to Ambassador Lauralee M. Peters, 16 Sep 1994.

⁶ The ambassador's ability to translate unity of command into unity of effort is a function of his personal management skills and the propensity of his subordinates to take back-channel direction from their parent organization, e.g., Agriculture, Commerce, and Defense.

insurgency.⁷ Without such unity of command, competing U.S. agencies could have negated each other's efforts and stymied U.S. policy. For example, in the late 1940s, before the development of the Country Team concept, the U.S. government had three independent missions in Greece—diplomatic, economic, and military. The lack of unity of command resulted in the U.S. Ambassador attempting to strengthen the political party in power while the Economic Aid Mission was attempting to strengthen the opposition party.⁸

While the Country Team provides for unity of command within a country, many problems transcend national boundaries and are beyond the scope of any single executive agency. For example, the U.S. counterdrug effort in Central and South America and the new weapons of mass destruction counterproliferation initiative. Both of these problems will require the combined efforts of federal law enforcement agencies, the intelligence agencies, the military services, and numerous embassies. To deal effectively with these two issues will require a regional coordinator. However, the federal government lacks regional unity of command. The only regional organization with the wherewithal to perform such an integration function is the geographical CINCs. Unfortunately, the geographic CINCs have only military units assigned. To understand why the present military commands are stovepipes, it is necessary to review the background on the geographical CINCs (unified commands).

⁷ The eradication of Soviet/Cuban-backed insurgencies was the strategic objective and the eradication from individual countries was an operational objective. Central America was the theater of operations, and each individual country was an area of operations.

⁸ Simmons, 125.

Unified Commands

The unified commands are a product of custom and culture. The commands are an outgrowth of the theaters of operations from World War II. President Truman established the first unified commands in 1946 in his *Outline Command Plan* and the Congress codified them in the National Security Act of 1947 and in Title 10 of the United States Code.⁹ Formed in the beginning days of the Cold War, the unified commands embodied the U.S. grand strategy of containment as well as U.S. strategic culture.

The foundation of U.S. strategic culture is the separation of military force and diplomacy. "America's strategic culture holds that military force is a last resort."¹⁰ This reflects a view that war and peace are separate conditions, the former the province of the military, and the latter the province of the diplomat. For example, during World War II, the State Department completely abdicated to the military. Just before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor Secretary of State Hull told Secretary of War Stimson, "it is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and the Navy."¹¹ The State Department did not participate in any major allied conferences about the conduct of the war or the post-war environment. Likewise, the Commerce Department rebuffed the Navy's request for policy to guide the development of the cross-Pacific campaign to defeat Japan.¹²

⁹ Charles S. Robb, "Examining Alternative UCP Structures," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 96-97, 85.

¹⁰ George T. Raach and Ilana Kass, "National Power and the Interagency Process," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1995, 8.

¹¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 317.

¹² Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1991), 11.

As a result of our strategic culture, the unified commands were established to perform only military missions.¹³ Operating at the theater-strategic level, the geographical CINCs are responsible for orchestrating military actions within their theater of war necessary to accomplish their assigned strategic objectives. The present CINC command structure provides unity of command for the military units within the theater of war. However, the CINC lacks direct control over other U.S. agencies within the region that could help him achieve theater-strategic objectives. As the continuum of policy in Figure 1 illustrates, this is most noticeable in the pre- and post-conflict phases where the situation requires a more balanced use of the instruments of power. War termination and post-conflict operations seek to translate the conditions achieved on the battlefield into a strategic victory. Operation DESERT STORM provides a good case to illustrate this point.




Figure 1. Continuum of Policy

Operation DESERT STORM

The fact that the military planned and conducted the war termination phase led to the achievement of military objectives while shortchanging political objectives. The armistice terms prepared by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) staff focused on the military as-

¹³ General Military Law, *U.S. Code, Title 10—Armed Forces*, sec. 161a (1996).
<<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode//10/161.htm>> (26 Mar 1998)

pects to negotiate a cease-fire.¹⁴ The CENTCOM prepared terms represented the basis of the conditions President Bush used in his television address to announce the cessation of hostilities.

That the CENTCOM prepared terms were solely military may be due to one of two reasons. First, it could be the result of insufficient State Department representation on the CENTCOM staff. Each unified command has only one State Department officer assigned to the headquarters—the Political Advisor. The Political Advisor works directly for the CINC; there are no State Department action officers assigned to the planning staff who would have drafted the war termination terms. Alternatively, the CINC, General Schwarzkopf, viewed himself to be concerned only with the military aspects and assumed someone else would handle the political aspects of the cease-fire. Unfortunately, no one did. When the proposed terms went to Washington, the State Department merely coordinated on General Schwarzkopf's terms. The effect of State's coordination was to substitute the word "discuss" for "negotiate." The State Department's position was only they could negotiate for the United States.¹⁵

The absence of the State Department in the war termination phase meant General Schwarzkopf, not a professional negotiator, was in charge of the armistice talks.¹⁶ From

¹⁴ John T. Fishel, *Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, August 31, 1992), 33; H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, *General H. Norman Schwarzkopf: The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 479.

¹⁵ Schwarzkopf, 480.

¹⁶ This is not meant to disparage General Schwarzkopf, rather a recognition that negotiations with other nations is the core competency of diplomats. The core competency of the military is the managed application of violence.

Schwarzkopf's perspective, the purpose of his meeting with the Iraqi generals was to dictate terms—not to negotiate.¹⁷ Intoxicated with the defeat the United States had inflicted upon the Iraqi military, Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell entertained the idea of holding the cease-fire talks on the deck of the battleship *Missouri*, just to emphasize the point to the Iraqis. Schwarzkopf and Powell failed to recognize that most wars conclude with some form of negotiation—even the vanquished retain a limited negotiating position. For example, the United States modified the unconditional surrender terms and allowed the Japanese to retain their emperor as an inducement to cooperate with the allied occupation.¹⁸ In the case of Iraq, they quickly agreed to all of Schwarzkopf's demands and in return requested only one thing—an exception for their military helicopters to operate in the no-fly zone. What appeared innocuous militarily was significant politically. The helicopters enabled Hussein to crush the revolts in the South and the North and retain power.

Despite State's position only they could negotiate for the United States, State's absence during the war termination process foisted the military into a diplomatic role. Untrained for the task the military limited the talks to topics it is comfortable with—military matters. This would be sufficient if the armistice was a stepping stone to a peace treaty. However, the armistice frequently becomes the *de facto* peace settlement. Such settlements are long on military conditions to establish a cease-fire and short on the post-conflict non-military conditions to seal the military victory. The lack of coherent interagency effort on

¹⁷ Schwarzkopf, 480.

¹⁸ James W. Reed, "Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning," *Parameters*, Summer 1993, 46, 51-52.

war termination often leads to a failure to translate the conditions achieved on the battlefield into a strategic victory.

DESERT STORM Post-Conflict Operations

After a cease-fire or surrender, the most difficult phase now begins—post-conflict operations. Post-conflict operations transform the military conditions achieved into the desired end state. Countries liberated, e.g., Kuwait, must be reconstituted, and countries defeated, e.g., WW II Germany and Japan, must be occupied and rehabilitated. Liberation or occupation, the goal remains the same—a viable nation returned to the fold of pacific nations. The first step in post-conflict operations after the war's end is to stabilize the internal situation. The second step is to reestablish a functioning infrastructure and government. Failure in post-conflict operations can turn a military success into a strategic failure.

The majority of the skills required for post-conflict operations are not military, but often only the military has the capability to organize and implement such operations. To rebuild a country's physical infrastructure requires agencies such as USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Army's Corps of Engineers to contract out the work. Military Civil Affairs personnel can identify the shortfalls and provide emergency restoration. Likewise rehabilitating a government is beyond the scope of military expertise. It requires experts from the Justice, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and State Departments.

Operation DESERT STORM's post-conflict operations illustrate the successes and shortcomings of today's interagency process. The Kuwaiti Task Force (KTF) conducted the

majority of post-conflict reconstruction planning. The KTF's formation was serendipitous—Army Civil Affairs reservists, whose regular jobs were in the State Department and USAID, formed the task force on their own initiative.¹⁹ The success of the task force stems from the fact it was comprised of representatives from 27 government agencies and worked under the aegis of an interagency working group. Furthermore, the task force's deputy was the director of USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). In addition to his expertise, the OFDA director brought an OFDA contractor into the fold, as well as his agency's checkbook. The KTF succeeded where its counterpart in Operation JUST CAUSE failed, integrating inter-agency efforts before the conduct of military operations.²⁰

However, the reason for the KTF's success was also the reason for its shortcomings—interagency coordination. Because the KTF conducted most of its planning in the Washington, DC, area, it was very successful building an interagency effort to restore Kuwait after the liberation. Unfortunately, the KTF was not under CENTCOM's control until it arrived in theater; consequently, it was ignorant of CENTCOM plans.²¹ As a result, the KTF had focused on the restoration of the Kuwaiti government whereas CENTCOM offensive plans required the emergency restoration of services be first priority. If General Schwarzkopf had possessed control over the KTF during its planning phase it might have prevented the problem. Other officials operating within the CENTCOM region outside of CINC control compounded post-conflict operations. Besides the U.S. goals of restoring the Kuwaiti

¹⁹ Fishel, *Liberation*, vii

²⁰ John T. Fishel, *Civil Military Operations in the New World* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 69.

²¹ Fishel, *Civil Military Operations*, 138.

government and improving regional stability, there was a third U.S. objective, although not publicly stated—a more democratic Kuwaiti government.²² The U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait had this objective. The KTF was not cognizant of this goal and many of their actions to restore the Kuwaiti government could have supported this objective. Again, CINC control over all the assets in his area could have ensured the military actions supported the Ambassador's assignment.

An Alternate Command Arrangement

The geographic CINC is the linchpin for strategic success. He is at the nexus of strategic objectives and operational design. The geographic CINC breaks assigned military strategic objectives into operational objectives and employs operational art to achieve those objectives using assigned military forces. The NCA may also assign non-military assets to assist the CINC but he does not retain control over them. The integration occurs at the inter-agency level in Washington, DC. Washington is the appropriate place to develop national strategic objectives and apportion non-military assets to the CINCs. Washington is not the proper place to sequence and synchronize those assets into the operational scheme. Force is not just military but economic, diplomatic, and information assets as well. Combining all the instruments to achieve synergy will lead to the most decisive effect. The proper place to orchestrate these instruments is with the individual tasked with the objective—the U.S. ambassador for country-specific objectives and CINCs for multi-country or regional objectives.

²² Fishel, *Liberation*, 61.

The post-Cold War strategic environment and the corresponding U.S. grand strategy require a different unified command structure. Today's strategic environment finds the United States without a peer competitor. The major strategic challenge is to assist Russia, her former Soviet republics and satellite states, and China transition from totalitarian governments with command economies. Consequently, the thrust of U.S. grand strategy is regional stability. Whereas in the Cold War containment heavily influenced regional issues, nowadays the primary focus is promoting democratic reform and market economies. The evolution of a stable environment is central to our security strategy. That is why the National Defense Panel's Report says maintaining and strengthening regional stability should be the principal function of our instruments of national power.²³ It will require an arrangement better able to integrate the instruments of power. The embassies have unity of effort at the country level. What is lacking is unity of effort at the regional level. To meet the challenge will require a different national security apparatus than today's geographic CINC charged with military forces. Already, the roles of today's CINCs are no longer solely military but the resources assigned to them have not changed since the Cold War. The National Defense Panel calls for involving "all agencies of the national security apparatus as an integrated team," without proposing a solution.²⁴

The first step in building an integrated national security team is to view the present theaters as theaters of policy and not as theaters of war. Given the post-Cold War strategic

²³ National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense—National Security in the 21st Century* (Washington: 1997), 29. <<http://www.dtic.mil/ndp>> (25 March 1998)

²⁴ NDP, 32.

environment and the U.S. grand strategy, it is imperative to view the theater from a policy perspective rather than a military perspective. The NCA should not separate our regional strategic objectives into military and nonmilitary strategic objectives. Regional strategic objectives require a balanced use of the instruments of power. The appropriate mix is dependent upon the objective and its placement on the continuum of policy. If the United States embraces the concept of theaters of policy, the next step is how to organize the theaters.

The Theater-Strategic Leader

Theaters of policy require an individual who has the unity of command over all the instruments of national power within his region. Instead of today's military geographical CINCs, who are tasked with military strategic objectives, what is needed is a new theater-strategic leader²⁵ responsible for the employment of all assigned U.S. assets (diplomatic, economic, informational, and military) within his region. The present regional boundaries of Southern, Central, Pacific, European, and Atlantic Commands could be retained or new regional boundaries established—it is immaterial for this discussion.

The theater-strategic leader should be a civilian since he will have more than military forces assigned to him. Because he is a political appointee, he should have a better understanding of the strategic objectives of the Administration. Assisted by a 4-star general or flag officer, the new theater-strategic leader would have the staff and assets to develop and execute regional strategies. The staff would include individuals from a multitude of executive branch departments and agencies, e.g., Defense, State, and federal law enforcement agencies.

²⁵ This paper will not assign a formal title to the new theater-strategic leader because many readers may be tempted to debate the suitability of the title vice judging the idea on its merit.

The forces assigned would include military units, embassies, and interagency task forces (e.g., Joint Interagency Task Force Bravo who patrols the transit zone of the Caribbean against drug traffickers).

Such a civil-military arrangement is not unprecedented in the U.S. government. In 1967, the Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, was assigned a civilian deputy for civil operations and revolutionary development support (CORDS). The CORDS deputy had both military personnel and civilians under a single chain.²⁶ Soldiers served under civilians and civilians served under soldiers. Previously relegated to a secondary role, pacification teams now worked hand-in-hand with combat units towards a total policy of a viable, prosperous South Vietnam.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Theater-Strategic Leader

The advantages of the theater-strategic leader concept are several. For regional problems, as well as major theater wars, it would permit the sequencing and synchronization of all the instruments of national power to achieve regional objectives much like a military leader links battles to achieve an operational aim. Military units are not the sole means to apply force. Force is any lever of power that can coerce an adversary, and all the levers must be integrated into the theater campaign. The theater-strategic leader concept would achieve such unity of effort through unity of command.

Despite the merits of such an idea, there are several serious obstacles. The first obstacle is the question, To whom should the theater-strategic leader report? The interagency

²⁶ Guenther Levy, *America in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 123-4.

nature of the theater-strategic leader makes none of the present executive departments suitable. One alternative would be for the theater-strategic leaders to report directly to the President. Some would argue this would exceed the President's span of control. However, technically the 100 plus ambassadors all work directly for the President and span of control has never been an issue for them. Ideally, the theater-strategic leaders should report to a new executive agency, but that must be part of a larger executive branch reorganization as recommended by the National Defense Panel.²⁷

A second obstacle stems from placing the ambassadors under a theater-strategic leader. Such an arrangement would violate the Treaty of Westphalia conventions that a country's ambassador is the king's personal representative. Foreign leaders expect that when they talk to an ambassador, they have the king's ear.²⁸ The theater-strategic leader concept could seriously undercut the ambassador's authority. Foreign leaders may feel only the theater-strategic leaders have the U.S. president's ear and circumvent the ambassadors.

Given the sanctity of the ambassadorial relationship to the head of government, Is it still possible to achieve unity of effort without unity of command? One alternative is to retain the theater-strategic leader but in a regional coordinator role. The theater-strategic leader would still have an integrated staff to develop regional strategies as well as sequence and synchronize all the instruments of power within the region. However, the ambassadors

²⁷ National Defense Panel, v.

²⁸ In reality, an ambassador does not forward all communications between him and a head of government to the U.S. President. The ambassador forwards some to the regional assistant secretary of state and some to the Secretary of State. Nonetheless, the perception is maintained that the ambassador provides a direct link to the President.

would retain their direct line of communication between the President and the host nation leader, and be responsible for all "official American activities in his country of assignment."²⁹ For regional issues, the ambassadors would take their cues from the theater-strategic leader much as they do today from the assistant secretary of state for their region. This might resolve the problem with the Treaty of Westphalia conventions. On the other hand, the theater-strategic leader's regional authority may still undermine the authority of the ambassador despite it being no different from the informal relationship between the ambassador and the regional assistant secretary of state.

Another alternative, using the current CINC structure would be to replace the regional strategies the geographical CINCs prepare with joint State-Defense regional strategies. The geographical CINCs and the regional assistant secretaries of state would co-develop the new regional strategies. Armed with a common strategy both communities could work towards common aims despite separate organizations. Unfortunately, the areas of responsibility are not coincident, except for one—the CINC of U.S. Southern Command and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.³⁰ The other CINCs would have to work with two or more assistant secretaries of state to build a regional strategy. This idea is bureaucratically infeasible unless both State and Defense adopt common geographical divisions.

Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* suggests that neither solution, the theater-strategic leader as regional coordinator or joint State-Defense regional strategies,

²⁹ Simmons, 126.

³⁰ Department of State, "The U.S. Department of State: Structure and Organization." 26 May 1995. <http://www.state.gov/about_state/dosstruc.html> (16 May 98)

is feasible. He noted that change rarely occurs in increments.³¹ As long as the current national security framework is perceived to be sufficient there is nothing to compel either State or Defense to make changes, e.g., adopt common regional boundaries. Instead a paradigm will continue until it can no longer adequately explain reality. At that time a revolutionary change will occur which replaces the paradigm with a new one. Such a shift occurred with the National Security Act of 1947.

To implement the theater-strategic leader concept will require a similar paradigm shift. There must come a recognition that the strategic culture which grounds the current national security structure is no longer valid. Already such recognition is beginning to surface. Two guest speakers at the Naval War College have highlighted the difficulties with the present national security architecture. These are individuals with vast high-level experience in policy making and implementation. Additionally, the National Defense Panel's report calls for the same. This may be the initial fracture within the current paradigm.

Conclusion

This paper asserted U.S. policies would be better served if the individual at the theater-strategic level controlled all the instruments of power within the theater. As Operation DESERT STORM illustrates the unity of command the regional CINC wields enables him to achieve his assigned military strategic objectives. However, once the military strategic objectives have been achieved, the problem migrates to the interagency arena where U.S. efforts become diffuse, thanks in large part to the lack of unity of command. The theater-

³¹ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2d ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 208.

strategic leader concept remedies these problems. The theater-strategic leader would sequence and synchronize all the instruments of power to achieve strategic objectives, vice military strategic objectives. This would ensure unity of effort from pre-conflict to post conflict.

However, the theater-strategic leader concept will be still born until there is a paradigm shift in the U.S. strategic culture. Diplomacy and military force must be viewed as parts of policy, and policy must be viewed as a *gestalt*. Only after such a shift occurs can the requisite reorganization of the national security apparatus of the Executive Branch occur. The obstacles are not insurmountable. There is hope; fissures are beginning. If debating the merits of the theater-strategic leader can spark further debate on how better to link operational design to strategic objectives then the concept will have served its purpose.

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