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**THE IMPACT OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN
MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

by


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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The Impact of Religious Belief in Military Operations Other Than War

"We have to have a deep understanding of the culture because it affects our decision-making. 'Cultural intelligence' is the greatest initial need for the commander on the ground and the one that leads him into more problems."¹

Introduction

The military commander charged with planning and executing military operations other than war (MOOTW) faces a challenge of tremendous proportions. The rubric of MOOTW includes a broad range of activities encompassing at least sixteen types of operations with the potential for numerous additional variations and combinations.²

For many of the circumstances which will precipitate MOOTW, religion is a strong element which can prove to be either an aid or an impediment to successful mission completion. While religion will not be a significant concern in every operation, it is likely to be a major consideration in missions such as humanitarian assistance and peace operations. It may, in part, be the spark that ignites the powder keg of instability. From a more positive perspective, religion is often part of the stimulus behind the private voluntary organizations (PVOs) providing humanitarian relief, as in the case of such organizations as Catholic Relief Services or World Vision. Military operations may occur in an area where only one religion is prevalent or in an area where there are many religions vying for both a spiritual and a political presence. In either case, religion will be an important factor for the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to consider in planning the military operation.

For the JFC, careful consideration of and response to the tangible and intangible aspects of religion within the operation can be a means of gaining and maintaining legitimacy. Likewise, neglect, dismissal, or confusion about

religion can be extremely detrimental to the legitimacy of the operation. Impressions of religious alliance and partiality will almost always hinder operations. Religion may very likely be a key consideration in evaluating a fragmented political authority.³

The thesis of this paper is that an understanding and appreciation of the religious dynamics of an indigenous people and geographic area can enhance a JFC's legitimacy and should be an important consideration throughout the planning process. One of the ways the JFC can obtain an appreciation of the religious dynamics is through expanded usage of chaplain assets. In this paper, the author will lay out the case for why this is important to the JFC and then make a case for the utility of chaplain asses in meeting this need.

Understanding MOOTW's Religious Diversity

Religious values and beliefs can serve as a catalyst for both peace and war. Belief in a divine mandate can lead one individual or group of individuals to acts of charity and mercy in feeding the starving and caring for the dying. Yet, another individual's belief in the supernatural can lead to acts of religiously-motivated terrorism or religious warfare.⁴

The JFC in MOOTW is faced with many diverse elements in an area of operations in which the mission is driven by political objectives and subject to real-time media coverage. In such circumstances and within the "microclimate" of a specific operation, gaining an adequate understanding of the situation in order to act and achieve and maintain legitimacy can be extremely difficult. The recent history of MOOTW bears this out. Intelligence analyst Jeffrey White observes:

In a political-geographic microclimate like those in Lebanon, Somalia, or Kurdistan, understanding is elusive. Shifting patterns of family, tribal, religious, economic, and military relations overlaid on specific geography produce a complex, dynamic, and uncertain analytic environment—one

likely to make intelligence analysts cautious and policymakers and commanders uncomfortable and vulnerable.⁵

Increasingly, ethnicity and religion are growing in importance as factors in MOOTW.

Religion as an Emerging Element in MOOTW

Post-Cold War Eastern Europe, the decline of the established order in much of the Third World, and a continuing legacy of hatred and conflict in the Middle East provide ample potential for the full range of military operations in both the near and long term. In these operations, religion is very likely to be contributing factor.⁶ Nationalism, religion (especially religious fundamentalism), and the collapse of contemporary political structures, as well as famine and natural disasters, all combine to make an environment in which increased military activity is likely in efforts to stabilize increasing chaos.⁷

The rise of visible religious fervor and fundamentalism should give pause and concern to the JFC. Distinctions between religion, ethnicity, politics, war, and crime quickly blur in failed and fragmenting states. Any effort to make sense of such a situation or, if tasked, achieve operational success, requires serious consideration of religious dynamics and history. One need only look at the history of military and humanitarian responses in places such as Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Chad, Chechnya, Liberia, Sudan, and Northern Ireland, to name a few, to see the fusion of politics, religion, race, and ethnicity. It is in light of these cultural considerations, religion among them, that Huntington claims, "In this new world the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities."⁸

Circumstances which bring about MOOTW and influence the course of it are not necessarily affected by enhanced military technology. Commanders may find, as in the experience in Somalia, that better technology does not guarantee success. Information, not equipment, may be the key to operational success in a new kind of warfare.

The acquisition and use of modern military technology is often seen as a solution to the problems of warfare in the late 20th century, with information warfare the latest example. Irregular warfare, however, remains confoundingly unaffected by changes in technology. In an irregular conflict, sociology, psychology, and history will have more to say about the nature of the conflict, including its persistence and intensity.⁹

A very large part of the sociology, psychology, and history noted above is likely to be permeated by religious values, beliefs, traditions, and taboos. It therefore becomes very important for the JFC to gain quickly an understanding of the cultural environment in which he is called to lead.

Any future military intervention, especially in the Third World, is likely to involve a population and environment in which religious values are prevalent and perhaps preeminent. MGen. William Stofft and Dr. Gary Guertner note regarding the historically unique trends such as social, cultural, environmental, and technological issues which make the post-Cold War world unpredictable: "These trends are capable of producing synergistic effects that fast-forward systemic collapse in the Third World, *reducing the radius of trust and loyalty to ethnic kinsmen, tribe, clan, or religious group*¹⁰(emphasis added).

If the trust and loyalty of the indigenous population resides in religious values or religious groups, then it is imperative that the JFC understand and utilize the religious dynamics within the area of operations. The significance of religion across the entire spectrum of operations, including MOOTW is

recognized in joint doctrine and is being increasingly emphasized. Joint Pub 1-05 states:

Religion plays a pivotal role in the self-understanding of many people and has a significant effect on the goals, objectives, and structure of society. In some cases, religious self-understanding may play a determinative or regulating role on policy, strategy, or tactics. It is important for the joint force commander (JFC) to have an understanding of the religious groups and movements within the theater and the potential impact that they may have on the accomplishment of the assigned mission.¹¹

The power of religion to influence individuals and entire societies is enormous. The resurgence of religious activity coupled with the diversity of religious beliefs will likely create many traumatic situations as religion, ethnicity, and politics combine.¹² This in turn will call for increased U.S. leadership and participation in MOOTW.

Religion as an Aid in MOOTW

For many of the operations in which religion is a factor, such as humanitarian assistance and peace operations, long term solutions will have to come from indigenous resources. Military intervention may enable a region or situation to be stabilized, but it will be local institutions and assets utilized in an appropriate and timely manner that will bring final resolution.¹³ In such circumstances, religion is a key element. As a social force, religion can serve as an agent of unity and cohesion. Properly understood and channeled, religion can be used by the JFC in the control and coordination of large segments of the population. In such circumstances, early identification and utilization of recognized religious leaders is necessary.

The significance of religion was recognized early in Operations GTMO (1992) and SEA SIGNAL (1994-96) involving Cuban and Haitian Migrants. In Operation GTMO, because of "the significance of the spiritual dimension of the

Haitian culture," the JTF Commander asked for additional chaplains and assistants to provide religious services and assist in the operation.¹⁴ This need was again recognized in Operation SEA SIGNAL during 1994-96 when large numbers of chaplains were utilized in response to the migrant crisis.¹⁵ Because of the central role of religion in the daily lives of Haitians and Cubans, the presence of chaplains allowed for immediate identification with them by the migrants who trusted the chaplains. Through their own actions and the identification of lay religious leaders within the migrant population, chaplains were able to assist the JFC in gaining and maintaining legitimacy. As will be seen below, religious dynamics have not always been observed, as in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, and there have been detrimental effects.

More recently, during Operation PACIFIC HAVEN (September 1996-April 1997), when more than 6000 Kurds were evacuated from northern Iraq and sent temporarily to Guam under the operation which was run the State Department, religion was one of the most important factors in gaining legitimacy for the JFC. In this instance, the deliberate assignment of the Navy's only Muslim chaplain and the construction by Seabees of a temporary building designated as a mosque *prior* to the arrival of the refugees greatly enhanced legitimacy. The refugees stated that Iraqi propaganda had stated that Islam was illegal in the U.S. and they therefore believed that they would have to practice their faith in secret.¹⁶ The presence of the hastily-constructed mosque and a chaplain who served as their imam and became a major resource throughout operation greatly eased the beginnings of their long transition into a pluralistic and democratic environment.¹⁷

Religion also has the power to reduce violence. In some operations, such as in Rwanda and Bosnia, the problem of retributive violence among clans, factions, and tribes is always a potential, especially within the first month

following the cessation of hostilities. From his military and NGO leadership experiences, Andrew Natsios writes:

The best way to avoid retributive violence is to deal with it through a carefully planned strategy. A commander could initiate an aggressive public affairs campaign using radio broadcasts and newspapers to warn against any resort to violence for revenge. Religious and political leaders could be encouraged to make similar broadcasts.¹⁸

Recognition and use of religious leaders is one means of retaining legitimacy and ensuring unity of effort. However, religious leaders from each of the religions present, not just the majority religion must be included. Religion is intensely personal, but in much of the world it has very public manifestations and allegiances.

Part of the commander's estimate, especially in the analysis of the factor space and in analysis of enemy courses of action (if warranted), should include evaluation of the religious dynamics and appropriate means of capitalizing on the religious element within the area of operations. Religion can be a significant intangible element affecting the center of gravity, especially if that center at the strategic level is in popular support of various factions and entities within the area of operations.¹⁹ Because "political objectives drive MOOTW at every level from strategic to tactical," the strategic and operational levels are much closer together and therefore susceptible to dynamics and changes within each level.²⁰

Religion as an Impediment in MOOTW

Religion can also serve as an impediment to MOOTW. Just as it has the power to reduce violence, it also has the power to produce violence. No major religion eschews violence under all conditions, and when religious violence is initiated, religion has the capacity to inspire ultimate commitment.²¹ By

raising past and present-day disputes to a spiritual level, religion can be a significant impediment to achieving peace.

Religion is a powerful force in tribal warfare, and it can reinforce ethnicity in making a conflict more intractable and cruel. Like ethnicity, religion is not a simple guide to a tribal conflict. Muslims have fought Muslims, and Christians have fought Christians. In Lebanon they formed cross-religion alliances: the Christian Franjiyahs aligned with the Muslim Syrians against their co-religionists.²²

For the JFC involved in peace operations, keeping the smoldering embers of religious and ethnic bitterness from reigniting into open warfare can be an enormous challenge.

Because the religious rivalries are often centuries old and flow from deep religious conviction, they can make achieving an effective peace particularly challenging. There is a difference between wars justified by religion and religious wars. It is one thing when the moral sanction of religion is brought to bear on such worldly and non-spiritual matters as political struggles. It is quite another when the struggles themselves are seen primarily as religious events in which there is a spiritual struggle occurring on social and political planes. In the case of the latter, reason and logic may not be adhered to and therefore the JFC needs to consider the irrational as well as rational courses of action of elements and forces which are not his own. Religion may obscure real underlying antagonisms as in the case in Lebanon.²³

There are also instances in which religious concerns or values are not immediately apparent. In such case, religion has the potential of unexpectedly disrupting operational progress. In such cases dormant spiritual values can erupt and overshadow other needs and values. For example, during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, Kurdish Muslims were fed MREs containing pork. Although starvation was averted there were later complaints and

disturbances by the Kurdish Muslims because they had been given food that violated dietary laws within their faith.²⁴

There is a saying among missionaries in Haiti that "Haiti is 80% Christian and 100% voodoo."²⁵ Though clearly untrue, the words reflect the syncretism in religion in Haiti, in which symbols, practices, and values from one faith are mixed with another faith. Such a mixing of religious values is prevalent throughout the Third World. The presence of syncretism and animism, especially prevalent in Africa presents unique challenges for a Western perspective that does not accept amulets and religious garb as providing adequate protection from the perils of warfare.

Few Westerners have an understanding of the worldview of much of the Third World in which multiple spiritual and religious forces are an assumed fact of daily existence, and without which few decisions are made. In cultures where digging wells, planting crops, moving populations, and going to war are often prefaced and guided by religious ritual and beliefs. Any foreign military force faces the serious potential for misunderstanding, misperception, and loss of legitimacy is very real and should be a major concern. In such cases, part of the solution for the JFC rests in adequate "cultural intelligence" and a proper understanding and utilization of it. As General Zinni noted, "What is needed is a base of cultural experts. . . [who] know the frameworks and the questions to ask."²⁶

Analyzing Religious Dimensions within MOOTW

Analyzing the problems of human behavior, religion, politics, and regional history, which are often mixed together in the operational environment, will likely require all of the intelligence assets the JFC can muster. Joint doctrine states:

Information collection and analysis in MOOTW must often address unique and subtle problems not always encountered in war. It will require a depth of expertise in (and a mental and psychological integration with) all aspects of the operational environment's peoples and their cultures, politics, *religion*, economics, and related factors; and any variances within affected groups or people. *It is only through an understanding of the values by which people define themselves, that an intervenor can establish for himself a perception of legitimacy and assure that actions intended to be coercive, do in fact have the intended effect.*²⁷ (emphasis added)

Similarly, defense intelligence analyst Jeffrey White gives a good illustration of the challenges:

First, these operational environments consist of a number of elements, including geography, ecology, history, ethnicity, religion, and politics. *These are not topics to which the military intelligence community devotes much attention.* Second, for irregular warfare, these have to be seen in a detailed and nuanced context. It is specific local geography, history, and politics that are crucial. Arab history is one thing, the history of Christian-Druze conflict in Lebanon is another, and the role of specific families and family members yet another. Collecting, analyzing, and assimilating information at this level of detail is a formidable challenge for intelligence analysts, policymakers, and warfighters alike.²⁸ (emphasis added)

Religion, politics, history, and many other factors often combine to create unique situations in which there are no clear patterns or guides for those who seek to remedy the problems.

For the JFC, understanding and analysis is of the subtleties and nuances of these issues essential to the success of the mission. Misunderstanding or miscalculation can prove disastrous. For example, in Somalia, Bengali troops were assigned to back up U.S. forces but were hesitant to implement the ROE and fire on armed Somali's when U.S. forces came under fire. A major factor in this hesitation was that both the Bengalis and Somalis are Muslim and there had been no fatwah (religious legal ruling) that permitted overriding the Koran's prohibition of Muslim fighting against Muslim.²⁹

"Many of these alignments surprise US planners and leaders because we don't study the hard stuff. If electronic collection means can't acquire it, we pretend we don't need it—until we find ourselves in downtown Mogadishu with everybody shooting at us."³⁰ As an intangible element, religion is part of the "hard stuff." While it is possible to learn religious structures, religious history, and religious customs before an operation begins, gauging the effect of such things as religious enthusiasm, support, alliances, and practice may not be possible until after troops are on the ground. Nevertheless, as an element of human intelligence (HUMINT), religion may become a crucial factor in maintaining legitimacy and mission success. As such, the JFC must be prepared to continually revise his situational awareness in light of whatever he can learn on the impact of this issue. He should keep in mind that as joint doctrine states, "In MOOTW conducted outside the United States, human intelligence (HUMINT) may provide the most useful source of information."³¹

Areas of Religious Concern Affecting Legitimacy and Operations

There are numerous questions regarding religion that can affect legitimacy and operations. Questions regarding religions in the area, religious beliefs, religious relations with the government, religious landmarks, holy days and anniversaries, and the socio-economic influence of religion can all be critical to an operation (see Appendix A). The prominence and diversity of religion in many cultures should raise concerns for the JFC. How does the religious history of the area affect operations? What are the various religions represented in the region and what are their agreements and disagreements? Are there religious dietary rules or considerations that need to be considered? Is religiously-motivated terrorism a threat and if so, when and how? What are the religious requirements of detainees, refugees, or evacuated nationals and

are there resources to meet these requirements? How can chaplains assist CA and PSYOPs personnel?

Each of the above questions regarding religion has proven critical in MOOTW in recent years. In some instances the questions were answered before difficulties arose, but in other operations such as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, failure to recognize or address the religious concerns created unanticipated problems and affected legitimacy.

Enhancing Religious Information Gathering Abilities

Resources for Analyzing Religious Dynamics

The JFC has a wide variety of resources available for information gathering during an operation. Through JDIS and JWICS, electronic and database information is available from a wide variety of sources. However, the primary source of mission-specific information may be human sources. Civil Affairs and PSYOPS personnel may be able to provide information regarding the religious dynamics. If there is a local U.S. embassy, officers from there are likely to be a fertile source of insights on this topic. After all, they will have been resident in the country for a considerable period and their jobs require a sophisticated understanding of the local culture.

The use of a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) can also provide assistance in analyzing religious dynamics *assuming* such expertise is resident within the team. However, such a nuanced ability may be as unlikely as within the military intelligence community. While religious dynamics are looked at by CIA and DIA personnel, analysts may have regional rather than country specific background information if the humanitarian crisis occurs in an area which is not a priority for U.S. national interests. Jeffrey White observes that MOOTW, including "irregular warfare,"

exists in highly specific operational environments, "microclimates," which need to be understood by intelligence analysts, military commanders, and policy-makers. This presents several challenges. First, these operational environments consist of a number of elements, including geography, ecology, history, ethnicity, religion, and politics. These are not topics to which the military intelligence community devotes much time."³²

The capability for analyzing the religious dynamics should be addressed as a necessary element as the JFC is organizing information gathering resources. "Your knowledge of the ethnic and religious factions and fissures in the JOA . . . will be vital in . . . achieving the objectives of the operation."³³

In addition to standard information-gathering resources, chaplains are a potentially valuable JFC resource in researching and interpreting cultural and religious factors pertinent to an operation. Increasingly chaplains are being utilized in accordance with joint doctrine to advise the JFC on the role and influence of the religious history and role and customs of indigenous religious practices as they affect command mission accomplishment.³⁴ There is however, still a need for more uniform, effective, and widespread utilization of chaplains in joint operations.

Utilizing National Religious Resources and NGO/PVO Religious Structures

National religious resources should be utilized to the extent possible without the appearance of partiality. As a unifying factor and element that transcends geographic and political boundaries, religion and religious leaders can assist the JFC in bringing about stability in most operations. Unless religious hostilities are part of the problem, the sociological force of religion can be beneficial. Many of the PVOs that will function alongside the JFC will be religious organizations. For example, of the more than fifty NGO/PVOs working with the JTF in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, more than one third were religious. Depending upon the type of operation, there may be the

opportunity to gain information and assistance from missionaries and religious agencies working in the area.³⁵

Utilizing Chaplain and Religious Assets

While the primary responsibility of chaplains is to provide for the free exercise of religion among military personnel, their efforts extend beyond pastoral care of military members. Chaplains face new and broader challenges in MOOTW. While some tasks are clearly defined, others are not, and non-traditional roles for the chaplain may emerge.³⁶

Chaplains involved in recent humanitarian assistance and peace operations have become increasingly more involved in cooperation and planning with Civil Affairs, PSYOPs, Mortuary Affairs personnel, NGOs and PVOs. The increased role of chaplains was especially evident in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT with the Kurdish refugees in 1991 and Operation SEA SIGNAL, the Haitian and Cuban refugee mission in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 1994-96. Additionally, the increased use of Navy chaplains assigned to the United States Coast Guard and serving aboard cutters in the Caribbean in the parallel operations ABLE MANNER and ABLE VIGIL greatly enhanced initial rescue and interdiction efforts and crowd control by permitting chaplains to serve as calming influences among the migrants because of the strong religious disposition of the Haitians. The success of the utilization of chaplains in these circumstances makes a strong case for encouraging the JFC to consider doing this up front as part of doctrine.

Numerous chaplains have received or are receiving intensive graduate education in the subspecialty "Religion and Culture." This training, coupled with the inherent humanitarian perspective and diverse professional backgrounds of chaplains makes them a unique asset to the JFC. Because of their role, training, and experience, chaplains may more quickly or easily gain

rapport, information, and insight that will be beneficial to the JFC. "The chaplain also may be better attuned to the religious sensitivities in the JOA which in peace operations may be a major factor in reaching desired end state."³⁷

Many chaplains are bilingual, and many served previously as missionaries, educators, or in humanitarian assistance capacities prior to entering the military. Because they share a humanitarian perspective similar to that of religious nationals and NGOs/PVOs, they can easily serve as a bridge between those entities and the military. As a principal advisor to the JFC, the chaplain can be a vital asset for the commander in facilitating support and working relationships with the NGOs/PVOs.³⁸ While joint doctrine places the responsibility for this coordination with CA and not the chaplain, such utilization should not be overlooked.³⁹

Limitations of Religious Perceptions and Activities

Joint Pub 1-05 recognizes that MOOTW may require chaplains and religious ministry teams to support the JFC in nonstandard roles. "Because there may be no precise boundary where one condition (peace, conflict, and war) ends and another begins, changes in religious ministry support activities will be more a matter of changing intensity and emphasis than dramatically altered duties."⁴⁰ The responsibility of religious ministry support does not change, but the manifestations of it may. Due to the fluid nature of MOOTW, "chaplains must continually focus on their primary mission of direct support and ministry to the commander's primary asset, the operating force."⁴¹ However, expanded usage of chaplains and religious ministry team assets can greatly enhance the functioning and legitimacy of the operation.

Maximizing Religious Activity for Legitimacy

The role of religion across the full range of operations is gaining attention in joint doctrine. Commanders and chaplains need to continue to evaluate the benefits of utilization of religious assets. The chaplain's knowledge of the religious requirements of various faith groups from within

indigenous or displaced populations can be vital to the JFC. Increasingly, Unified Command Chaplains are working with J-2 staffs to provide religious histories and analyses within AORs.⁴² This same activity can be employed at any level and greatly enhance the commander's overall understanding of the environment in which operations transpire. Chaplains should be encouraged to assist CA, PSYOPs and other appropriate personnel in evaluating religious dynamics and working with NGOs/PVOs within the JOA. Utilization of indigenous religious leaders or missionaries may greatly enhance information gathering abilities and legitimacy as long as this is done in an even-handed manner which avoids the appearance of partiality to one religious group.

Conclusion

Frederick the Great noted in 1747 that, "Religion becomes a dangerous arm when one knows how to make use of it."⁴³ This is as true in MOOTW as in war. As such, religion can be directly related to legitimacy. "In MOOTW, legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. . . . In MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently the decisive element."⁴⁴ The stronger the religious element in the JOA, the more critical it becomes with respect to legitimacy and operations. As an element of cultural intelligence, knowledge of religious dynamics in the JOA can be invaluable to the JFC. Conversely, ignorance or underestimation of those same dynamics can be catastrophic.

Increasingly, religion is capturing headlines and hearts around the globe. Writing of the impact of religion in the theater of operations, Paul Wrigley noted,

Touching the lives of countless people throughout the world, religion can be both intensely personal and notably political, its effects extending from individual motivation to national or group goals, strategies, and

decisions. While the role of religion is difficult to quantify, the wise commander will carefully study its effects on military operations.⁴⁵

The extent to which the JFC utilizes the numerous resources available for gathering, interpreting, and acting upon religious information and the religious impulse, will greatly enhance the probability of gaining and maintaining legitimacy. Religion is not the only concern of the JFC, but it may be a watershed in the success or failure of the operation.

¹LTGEN Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, "Military Interaction with Non-Military Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations: Examples from Somalia and Elsewhere," videocassette of presentation to CIA audience, Langley, VA., 6 March 1996.

²Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington D.C. Government Printing Office, 1995), ix.

³Andrew S. Natsios, "Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies," *Parameters* 26 (Summer 1996): 55-56. See also Mark A. Walsh, "Managing Peace Operations in the Field," *Parameters* 26 (Summer 1996): 39-40.

⁴For information on the growing threat of religiously-motivated terrorism, see Bruce Hoffman, "Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative." Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp. 1994 and Mark Juergensmeyer, "Terror Mandated by God." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 1997): 16-23.

⁵Jeffrey B. White, "Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare," *Studies in Intelligence* 39:5 (1996): 52.

⁶Samuel P. Huntington reminds us that "People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against" in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 21.

⁷For a helpful perspective on emerging trends, see Ralph Peters' "Vanity and the Bonfires of the 'isms'" *Parameters* 23 (Autumn 1993): 39-50 and "The New Warrior Class" *Parameters* 24 (Summer 1994): 16-26. In the former article (p. 50) the author paraphrases Clausewitz, keenly observing, "Nationalism is merely the continuation of fundamentalism by other means."

⁸Huntington, 28.

⁹White, 51. The term "irregular warfare" is White's phrase for tribal warfare, primitive warfare, "little wars," and low-intensity conflict, all of which spill over into the response of MOOTW.

¹⁰William A. Stofft and Gary L. Guertner, "Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention," *Parameters* 25 (Spring 1995): 31.

¹¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub. 1-05 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), I-1.

¹²Cf. Huntington, 95-101.

¹³Walsh, 35.

¹⁴U.S. Atlantic Fleet memorandum 1331 serial N02C of 18 May 1992, cited in Paul R. Wrigley, "The Impact of Religious Belief in the Theater of Operations," *Naval War College Review*, 49:2 (Spring 1996): 98.

¹⁵Margaret Grun Kibben, "The Role and Mission of Chaplains in Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations (HA/POs)," (Unpublished paper, U.S. Naval War College, 1996), 5.

¹⁶Telephone conversation with LT Malak Noel, CHC, USNR, 28 April 1998. The importance of the religious element of the operation was recognized from the onset of the mission and throughout the chain of command, including the Chief of Naval Operations.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Natsios, 59.

¹⁹Carol D. Clair, "Humanitarian Assistance and the Elements of Operational Design," (Unpublished paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 37 and Stofft and Guertner, 38.

²⁰Joint Pub 3-07, I-2-3.

²¹David C. Rapoport, "Some General Observations on Religion and Violence," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 3:3 (Autumn 1991): 119.

²²White, 53.

²³John W. Jandora, "Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War," *Parameters* 25:1 (Spring 1995): 56.

²⁴Presentation on "Supervising Joint Ministry Operations," by CAPT E. F. Blancett, CHC, USN, at Naval Chaplains School, 11 February 1998. See also Kibben, 15 and Wrigley, 88.

²⁵The author's parents served as missionaries in Haiti.

²⁶Zinni, *Military Interaction with Non-Military Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations*, video.

²⁷*Joint Pub. 3-07, IV-2.*

²⁸White, 51.

²⁹Samir J. Habiby lecture on "War and Peace in Islam," 29 April 1998, U.S. Naval War College.

³⁰Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class," *Parameters* 24 (Summer 1994): 24.

³¹*Joint Pub 3-07, IV-2.* Peters offers a similar scenario of confusion: "For instance, to begin to identify the many fuses under the Caucasus powderkeg, you have to understand that Christian Armenians, Muslim (and other) Kurds, and Arabs ally together because of their mutual legacy of hatred toward Turks. The Israelis support Turkic peoples because Arabs support the Christians (and because the Israelis are drawn to Caspian oil). The Iranians see the Armenians as allies against the Turks, but are torn because the Azeri Turks are Shi'a Muslims. And the Russians want everybody out who doesn't 'belong.'" in "The New Warrior Class," 23-24.

³²White, 51.

³³Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Ft. Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 16 June 1997), VII-4.

³⁴*Joint Pub 1-05, I-2, I-4.*

³⁵Cooperation from religious agencies and missionaries who have a strong presence in an area may pose a problem if hostilities are possible or present. In such cases, because of a desire to maintain their own legitimacy with the local population and remain after military forces have left, there may be a reluctance to help the JFC.

³⁶Kibben, 2.

³⁷*Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, III-13.

³⁸*Joint Pub 1-05, II-6.*

³⁹*Joint Pub 3-07, IV-7.* See also U.S. Navy Chief of Chaplains Policy & Guidance, "Religious Ministry Support During Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)," 3. Additionally, like legal and medical services, the function of the chaplain can also be an important element in bringing cohesion to the JTF. Because religion transcends military differences, it can be used to bring unity to diverse military components through the efforts of the chaplain and religious ministry team.

⁴⁰*Joint Pub 1-05, I-1-2.*

⁴¹"Religious Ministry Support During MOOTW," 1.

⁴²Blancett presentation 11 February 1998.

⁴³Cited in Charles W. Freeman, ed., *The Diplomat's Dictionary* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), 330.

⁴⁴*Joint Pub 3-07, II-5.*

⁴⁵Wrigley, 99.

Appendix A

GUIDE TO ANALYSIS OF LOCAL RELIGIONS*

AREAS OF CONCERN	SPECIFIC INFORMATION
Religions in the area	- Organized. - Unorganized. - Relations between religions and religious leaders, both indigenous or missionary.
Clergy	- Number, locations, and educational of clergy. - Influence on government and / or populace.
Religious Beliefs	- Major tenets of each religion to include: * faith. * impact of faith on life. * concepts of salvation and the hereafter. * rites of cleansing and purification. - Degree of religious conviction in lives of indigenous populace
Worship	- Forms of worship. - Places of worship. - Frequency of worship. - Significance of worship.
Relationship between religion & motivation of indigenous people.	- Strength of religious sentiment. - Influences on daily life of people.
Relationship between religion and trans-cultural communication	- Attitudes toward people of other races and culture. - Acceptable kinds of social interaction.
Socio-economic influence of religion	- Influence of religious leaders. - Influence of religion on society. - Economic influence of religion. * Religious ownership of property and other possessions. * Teachings of religion about private property. * Relationship of religious leaders to economic leaders.
Relations with government	- Relationship of religious leaders to government officials. - Role of religion and religious leaders in the armed forces. - Political influence of religious leaders.
Religious Schools	- Locations, size and attendance. - Influence. - Relationship with non-religious schools

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS	
Religious Hospitals / benevolent organizations, etc.	- Location, capacity and function, - Influence. - Relationship with other secular organizations performing the same functions
Possible impact of military operations on religious population.	Taboos, religious restrictions, restricted areas, etc.
Cultural landmarks and treasures.	Names, locations and historical or cultural significance of each.
Religiously-motivated terrorism	- Location - Holy days and anniversaries - Relationship with other secular organizations posing the same or similar threat
Possible PVO/NGO assistance	Presence of missionaries, relief workers, etc. previously in the area
Religious and legal limitations.	Real and perceived boundaries for chaplains and religious ministry teams

* The top portion of this chart is taken from the Army's document FM 16-1 Religious Support. The bottom portion is an expansion by the author of information in U.S. Navy Chief of Chaplains Policy & Guidance, "Religious Ministry Support During Military Operations Other Than War." This latter document is currently in process. I am indebted to CAPT James Harwood, CHC, USN and CDR Tom Verner, CHC, USN for their assistance.

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