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No. 2653



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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

UAE DRAFTS LEGAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH MAURITANIA

Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 4 Sep 82

[Article by Husayn al-Samadi: "Justice Prepares Draft Agreement for Legal Cooperation, Compliance with Regulations and Extradition of Criminals Between the UAE and Mauritania"]

[Text] The Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs and Religious Trusts has prepared a draft agreement on legal cooperation, legal announcement and requests for legal assistance, compliance with regulations and extradition of criminals between the UAE and Mauritania.

The draft agreement provides that the two countries will regularly exchange information on the legal structure and work to take steps aimed at reconciling the legislative provisions and legal systems of the two countries.

The two contracting parties will encourage the holding of conferences and exchanges of visits of courts in the two countries and the legislative and judicial machinery with the object of legislative and judicial development in each country.

The two sides will also encourage the exchange of judges and legal researchers and also the exchange of official gazettes carrying the laws which have been passed in each country and magazines in which judicial regulations and legal research are published.

The nationals of each of the contracting parties will have full freedom and the same rights to appear before judicial quarters of whatever type and level to demand their rights and to defend themselves. The nationals of each country will enjoy the legal assistance enjoyed by the nationals of the other country in accordance with the systems in effect.

The draft agreement stipulates that procedures for issuing announcements will be handled through the Ministry of Justice in each country and will be done in conformity with the procedures authorized for that by the laws of the country requesting it. They must contain data on the identity of the wanted person and the bulletin. Each country will bear the expenses of the announcement made on its territory. Expenses of witnesses' or experts' travel will be borne by the country seeking the person.

Each country can ask the other to institute on its territory on behalf of the former any legal action involving a case under consideration and submit a request for legal assistance through the minister of justice to the minister of justice in the country seeking the legal action. The appropriate judicial authorities will implement the request in conformity with accepted legal procedures. The legal authority making the request will be advised of the time and place for complying with the request if it explicitly desired that so that the party concerned can be present or have an agent there. The country receiving the request for legal assistance will bear the costs except for the costs of witnesses and experts which will be borne by the requesting country.

Any final approved judgment involving civil or commercial rights or a judgment for compensation from penal courts or a judgment involving personal circumstances issued by a legal body in one of the two contracting countries will be valid in the other country in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. In determining the final judgment the law of the country promulgating the law will be taken into account.

The country receiving a request for implementation of a judgment cannot discuss the subject of the case and cannot refuse to comply with the judgment except in cases when the judicial body issuing the judgment was improper, when they did not advise the defendants to appear, when the judgment contains something in violation of the general system or public morals of the country receiving the request for implementation or when a final judgment has been rendered between the same litigants on a given issue by a court in the country receiving the request for implementation.

With regard to extradition of criminals, the draft agreement states that extradition will be required for persons on the territory of one of the countries who has been charged by or sentenced by the judicial authorities of the other country if the following prerequisites are met: the crime for which extradition is requested was committed on the territory of the country requesting extradition; or it was committed outside the territory of both countries and the laws of each provide for punishment for said act were it committed on their territory; or the crime is a felony or misdemeanor punishable by at least 1 year in prison by the laws of each country; or the person for whom extradition is requested has been sentenced to prison for at least 6 months. If the act is not punishable by the laws of the country from which extradition is requested or if the statutory penalty for the crime in the country requesting extradition has no counterpart in the laws of the country from which extradition is requested, extradition will not be mandatory unless the person for which extradition is requested is a national of the country requesting extradition or a national of another country with the same statutory penalty and requests for extradition are made through diplomatic channels.

In cases where there are multiple requests for extradition for a single crime, penalty will be given to the country whose security or interests have been harmed by the crime and then to the country where the crime was committed and then to the country to which the person for whom extradition is requested belongs. The country requesting extradition can ask that the person in question be detained until the request for extradition and the necessary documents arrive.

There will be no extradition in the following instances:

If the crime for which extradition is requested is considered by the country receiving the request as a political crime or linked with a political crime. In the application of the agreement political crimes are not considered to include assault or attempted assault against the head of state of either country or members of his family or crimes of assault or attempted assault against a member of the UAE Supreme Council or a member of his family or murder or theft accompanied by assault against persons or authorities or means of transport and communications or terrorist crimes.

If the person for whom extradition is sought is a national of the country from which extradition is sought and upon determining the citizenship of the person whose extradition is requested at the time the crime for which extradition is sought was committed--in this case, the country from which extradition is requested will try this person at the request of the other country, using any investigations which the requesting country has made.

If the person whose extradition is sought had been previously tried for the same crime and found innocent or found guilty and had served the prescribed sentence.

If the person whose extradition is sought is under investigation or being tried for the same crime by the country of which extradition is requested.

The draft agreement stipulates that the country requesting extradition shall take receipt of the person whose extradition is requested within 30 days of the date notification is sent; otherwise, the country from which extradition is requested has the right to release the person and there can be no second request for extradition for the same crime.

The person for whom extradition is requested can be tried by the country requesting extradition and can be sentenced only for the crime for which extradition was sought or crimes associated with it or crimes committed after extradition. If during the process or after extradition of the person whose extradition is requested there is a change in description of the crime attributed to him, the process cannot be continued nor can he be tried unless the elements of the crime given the new status permit extradition in accordance with the provisions of the agreement.

The draft agreement stipulates that the period of preventive detention shall be deducted from any sentence passed in the country requesting extradition against the person whose extradition was sought. The two contracting countries will equally bear all expenses incurred in extraditing the person and the country requesting the extradition will also pay all costs of returning the extradited person to where he was when extradited if he is proven to be not responsible or innocent.

8389

CSO: 4404/681

SAUDI ARABIA TO FINANCE BAHRAIN WATER PROJECT

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 289, 4 Sep 82 p 39

[Article: "Water Crisis in Bahrain; Saudi Arabia to Finance Dessalination Project"]

[Text] Bahrain has begun to carry out a comprehensive program to guide water consumption after it became clear that the water was being depleted and that an increasing portion of it was turning into water unfit for drinking purposes.

The Bahraini authorities concerned announced that the goal of the program was to reduce the pumping of groundwater from about 8.6 million gallons a day to about 6 million. This will require cutting off water from some areas of Bahrain during specified hours.

Reports of the Minister of Electricity and Water indicate that water consumption rates in Bahrain are excessive, particularly in light of the country's fundamental dependence on groundwater. This rate per capita in some areas has reached 200 gallons a day, that is, four times the worldwide per capita rate of water consumption. The reports also indicated that water consumption in Bahrain had risen by 50 percent in just the last 3 years because of the housing expansion, economic and social development and the rising standard of living in general. This has forced the authorities to drill more groundwater wells and to expand some existing wells.

However, the expanded drilling of groundwater wells and the draining of more than the capacity of underground reservoirs by existing wells will in time create underground "empty areas" through which the water of the sea surrounding Bahrain will flow because of water pressure. This will cause increasing salinity in the wells until it becomes so high that the water will become unfit for drinking for all practical purposes for a long time. This in fact is what has begun to happen since salt water has seeped into the al-Dammam area which supplies the major groundwater wells in Bahrain. At the beginning of this year, the salinity of one well was 3 parts in 1,000 but a few months later it had reached 3.4 parts in 1,000 and this means that salinity is constantly increasing.

Geologists say that Bahrain is not the only area that will suffer from a potable water shortage in the future. There is the Eastern Province in Saudi Arabia and some areas of the UAE. However, at the same time they stress that Bahrain's situation is more serious than the others because it is primarily dependent on groundwater. In this regard, water users in Bahrain were warned that if one of the desalination stations stopped completely or were it to break down partially, the officials would have to use the very salty groundwater.

In order to reduce Bahrain's dependence on water wells and the provision of this water for selective uses, the Bahraini authorities are turning to increasing the number of desalination stations and, in this regard, is receiving direct assistance from Saudi Arabia which expressed willingness to finance and implement a program of water desalination projects on the island. A number of Saudi engineers in fact visited al-Manama recently and held discussion with officials in the Ministry of Public Works, Electricity and Water. They made field visits to sites on which desalination projects will be constructed. Saudi sources say that within the framework of this program, the Kingdom will build no less than two desalination units with a capacity of at least 10 million gallons a day.

8789

CSO: 4404/681

DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL EDUCATION SUPPORTED

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 970, 24-30 Sep 82 pp 22-26

[Article by Mimi Maziz: "For a More Valorizing School"]

[Text] Is it possible today, without falling into an excess of analytical theory, to make a closer assessment of the economic effectiveness of our schools during the past 20 years? These 20 years have given birth to a new generation. Does school inculcate social habits that will generate social behavior patterns compatible with the creation of a modern socioeconomic world? One of the essential economic functions of school, especially primary school, is actually to attempt the creation of social uniformity by inculcating it in the students, along with the spirit of the socioeconomic system that we have chosen.

It so happens that CREA [expansion unknown] researchers and sociologists have had to study this phenomenon as part of their specific activities. The results of their research in the field tend to show that the cultural action of the school presents distinctive features that will vary both quantitatively and qualitatively according to the social classes and groups on which it exerts itself. The cultural action of the school in a rural environment is, we believe, especially interesting. Of course, the school system offers distinctive features related both to the social characteristics of the students involved and to the institutional, pedagogical and morphological characteristics of rural schooling.

In 1981, a survey of children who had received previous schooling (starting in 1965) and who were then (in 1981) 18 to 25 years old, was conducted by a CREA researcher, Mr Haddab Mustapha. The typical model is 19 years old: 51.3 percent of all boys and 48.6 percent of all girls. Thanks to this realistic analysis of cultural characteristics, it was possible to distinguish more specifically what part school is playing in cultural inculcation; to what extent rural Algerian schools have contributed in producing socioeconomic agents able to adapt themselves to the nature of an economic system that is highly centralized and technical and managed in a complex and deformed manner.

For that, it was necessary to try and get closer to the cultural world of this young schooled population through an analysis of attitudes that appear to be related to the predispositions required in the social agents of modern socioeconomic systems.

What kind of cultural world is that of the schooled rural youth? This approach to the cultural world of the schooled rural youth population was made through reading and writing, through the use they make of modern means of information, through their relations with political and labor institutions, their attitude toward work, looking for a job, and the conception they have of leisure. The authors also tried to determine to what extent traditional family solidarity ties are preserved. They also tried to determine the impact of school on the religious life of the rural youth.

Based on these various approaches to the social behavior patterns of the rural youth, it is in fact possible to establish a typology. This, in turn, can provide the basis for a reflection on social factors and contribute to strengthen them.

Referring to the hierarchical organization of linguistic attitudes, although the information provided by the questionnaires is certainly limited, we can still note that the mere fact of answering the questionnaire showed in many instances how uncomfortable the subjects surveyed were with writing and written material: for instance, to be understood the questions had to be enunciated, not as they were written but in a form adapted to the structures of the oral language. Moreover, the few questionnaires actually handed out to the subjects were in most cases filled out in very few words and the spelling was often phonetic. An example is given. It is the following: "We had the opportunity to read letters written by a rural 17 year-old youth living in Ahmar El Ain, who had decided on his own to leave school when he was 14, at the end of the school year and after completing his final year, but without having obtained the Primary and Elementary Studies Certificate. His letters were addressed to his mother, a cleaning woman in Algiers. They were written in rudimentary Arabic, and classical words and phrases were intermixed with dialectal Arabic expressions. They were laconic and the handwriting rather shaky."

It was also observed that letters to family members are mostly written by the rural young themselves. Only 18.2 percent of them admit to having recourse to a relative or a friend to write to their family, whereas 30 percent will do so for administrative letters.

However, it was pointed out to us that girls write their own letters less often than boys, whether administrative letters or letters to the family; 27.8 percent of the girls have recourse to third parties to write letters to their family, compared with 14.5 percent of the boys. Girls also prefer writing in Arabic. The same preference is reflected in the attitude of the rural youth toward reading. Thus, 38.2 percent of the boys and only 29.9 percent of the girls stated they had read at least one book during the year. Of these, 27.2 percent of the boys and 33 percent of the girls had read one or more books in Arabic during the year. As for foreign-language books, i.e. French books, 51 percent of the boys had read one or more during the year, compared with 40.9 percent of the girls.

It may seem surprising that girls, who seldom have any activity outside the home and are often confined in their parents' house, are less likely to occupy their leisure with reading or even have less leisure than boys--67.4 percent of the girls exert no activity compared with 38.7 percent of the boys.

It may be that the many girls who rarely have access to places where books and magazines are sold and often have less money to spend than the boys are reduced, at least when they are no longer in school (21.4 percent of the girls in the sample surveyed), to making do with the few books and magazines that "lie about" at home, whether remnants of the schoolyears of family members or acquired through various other contingencies.

What does the rural youth read? General literature, detective stories and comic books (4.4 percent).

Girls as a whole also read these types of books. However, they will read books that lead to introversion rather than to extraversion--they read few detective stories (5.16 percent) and few comic books (1.2 percent)--and we believe that this shows affinities that would indicate the persistence of an objective orientation of girls toward interiority, that of the home as well as that of the personality.

What proved rare among the rural youth is the reading of books to find out definite information related to their jobs, a desire for socioprofessional promotion or ideological curiosity.

Very few boys (0.6 percent of those surveyed, i.e. 8 boys) read technical books, and no girl mentioned that type of books. As for political works, they are mentioned more frequently by the boys--20 of them, i.e. 1.6 percent of those surveyed--and much less often by the girls--4 girls, i.e. 0.8 percent of those surveyed. Religious works are mentioned by 12 boys and only 4 girls. Can we assume that the attitude of the schooled youth toward reading is not the same in urban and in rural areas? A definite answer to this question could have enabled us to better assess the respective roles of the school and the sociocultural environment in inculcating reading habits and in promoting the use of books as a means of information or leisure. Among the rural youth, it was also observed that the nature and number of the books they read vary depending on whether they prefer reading Arabic or French. To a greater extent than among boys, the language used determines the kind of books girls will read. Thus, 46.8 percent of the girls stated that they preferred reading French; that percentage was only 26.1 percent for Arabic. On the other hand, those who prefer reading Arabic often read school textbooks--29.4 percent--compared with only 17.7 percent of those who prefer reading French. Are the girls restrained in choosing what they will read? Probably, considering that girls are less likely to have ready access to books than boys.

Reading Habits	Practice of Prayer					Subtotal Have prayed since 14 and have always prayed
	Did not answer	Have never prayed	Have prayed before age 14	Have prayed since age 14	Have always prayed	
Have not read a book	20	86	9	8	5	13
Did not answer	10	496	53	52	51	103
Several Arabic books	1	49	9	11	18	29
One Arabic book		29	5	6	6	12
Several French books	3	133	20	17	10	27
One French book		60	5	7	10	17
One French and one Arabic book		12	5	1	5	6
Several French and several Arabic books	1	45	10	7	5	12

Reading Habits of Algerian Rural Youth

As for religious practice, it is pointed out that the proportion of those who do not say their prayer is about the same among boys (73.8 percent) as among girls (71 percent); it is slightly higher among the latter [as published]. These proportions seem high but, there again, it is not possible to make a comparison with religious practice in towns. Religious practice among the rural youth, and its relations to schooling and social background is characterized by the fact that those--boys and girls--who prefer reading in Arabic say their prayer more frequently than those who prefer to read a foreign language or who say they do not read. It also appears that the relation between the use of Arabic in reading books and the practice of prayer is stronger among boys than among girls. As a result, we can say that boys will practice their religion only if they are more strongly integrated into the cultural world marked by the dominant knowledge and use of the Arabic language.

Numerous facts tend to confirm the existence of significant affinities between the use of Arabic as a reading language and the proximity of a rather traditional cultural system.

Thus, the practice of prayer is much more assiduous when the subject prefers reading Arabic. Is it significantly related to Coranic schooling?

Schooling seems to result in preferential arabization of students in whom out-of-school sociocultural factors determine predispositions for arabization or constitute reinforcing factors for the learning of Arabic.

The study also points out that rural youths (boys) are all the more likely to practice praying as their scholastic achievements in the middle cycle were higher.

This is also verified for girls. In fact, this tendency is stronger among them than among boys.

The survey confirms, and figures are there to prove it, that girls tend to be more "arabized" or less "gallicized" than boys. In fact, it appears that girls will give preference to French only if the factors acting in favor of Arabic, in this case Coranic schooling, have a reduced effect on boys.

As far as information is concerned, the rural youth who favor French seem to have more curiosity for the problems and events outside their local environment. For instance, we should mention that a relatively larger number (15 percent) of those who read Arabic books never buy a newspaper. Among those who read French books, 20.3 percent regularly buy a newspaper, compared with 17.1 percent of those who read Arabic books. A similar trend is noted among girls: 30 percent of the girls who read Arabic books never buy a daily, compared with only 18 percent of those who read French books.

The potential of schools in developing bilingual reading aptitudes appears quite limited. In fact, the rural youth show a marked tendency to read Arabic newspapers if they read Arabic books, and to purchase EL-MOUDJAHID if they read French books. Thus, it was possible to show that 31.5 percent of the schooled rural youth who read Arabic books also read EL-MOUDJAHID, compared with 70.3 percent of those who read French books; 22.7 percent of

those who read Arabic books will purchase AN NASR or ECHAAB, compared with only 5.78 percent of those who read French books.

These data, therefore, lead to the conclusion that, even in rural areas, the dominance of French in the socioeconomic and cultural environment will reinforce and, in many cases, probably further the practice of the French language learned at school, at the expense of the Arabic language.

The practice of either language appears to be tied to an individual's socioeconomic status and to which differentiated cultural background happens to be his. A cleavage seems to take place fairly early in the school and social progress of the rural youth population. Some find themselves objectively oriented toward a sociocultural world that opens on institutions and sectors of activity rallied around the city and modernity. Others are led to fit to a greater or lesser degree into sociocultural structures that threaten to become marginal.

The ability to gain access to information is usually considered as an indicator of, or a prerequisite for the ability to adapt oneself and share in the dynamism of modern economy and social activity.

One of the socioeconomic functions of schooling is to endow the individuals with the aptitude required to receive, recognize and make use of messages that are deemed likely to play a part in increasing the effectiveness of socioeconomic agents.

The level of schooling achieved has a marked influence on the ability and need to read the press; it appears that, among the rural young who left school during or before the fifth elementary grade, the habit of purchasing a weekly magazine is almost non-existent.

Among girls, the reading of weeklies is also noticeable only among those who have completed the elementary cycle; it is still well below what it is among boys. Eighty percent of the girls did not answer when asked what weekly they buy, but 11.3 percent said they bought one, and 6.9 percent said they bought other weeklies, including women's magazines.

It is somehow normal to observe strong correlations between the level of schooling and the practice of reading. Teaching how to read and inculcating the habit of having recourse to the book or the newspaper as a means of information or education are one of the most direct and most consciously aimed at objectives of the school. A large proportion of the teachers' pedagogical efforts is devoted to achieving this objective. What about the cultural practices and types of behavior for which the school offers no such direct or systematic training as for reading? What are the relations that can be observed between the frequency and nature of radio or TV message reception, movie attendance and the level of schooling? Can these be indicators as to the ability of the school system to provide rural generations born after independence with a code that will ensure that they share to various degrees in a common cultural fund? Is the inculcation action exerted by the school system effective enough to enable the rural youth to understand the

discourse that will convince them of their social value? Or does the nature of the school cultural action leave the field open to cultural currents that run contrary to the models which the state wishes to promote?

There is no systematic answer to all these questions. Nevertheless, the data provided by Mr Haddab Mustapha's survey seem to indicate that, contrary to access to written information (books, newspapers, magazines), access to oral information is less dependent on the level of schooling achieved. There again, it seems that a higher level of schooling coincides with a broader scope of programs in which the students are interested. There is every indication that the information received by the rural young, through television, is characterized by a great diversity, depending on their level of schooling and their social background.

For films as for TV programs, there are significant correlations with the nature and quality of the films the rural youth will watch and with the quantitative variations of movie theater attendance.

The reactions of the rural youth to films lead to believe that a specific image interpretation code is created in those who are not familiar with French: it seems to begin with a richer perception of non-verbal language signs (gestures, attitudes, expressions, disposition of the object, layout of the space, etc.), their facts [as published] of understanding dialogues.

In this preliminary analytical approach, it appears that the social function of the school is still strongly valorized, even in a rural environment, although the latter is more severely affected by selection through the school than urban environments.

The characteristics of cultural behavior patterns among the rural youth and of their relations to the mode and length of their schooling show above all the lack of autonomy of the rural school. This weakness of school culture in recent years is probably to a large extent at the origin of the fairly prevalent tendency to consider the school essentially if not exclusively as a means and very seldom and to a very small extent as an end.

Until the reform introduced during the past two years by the adoption and implementation of the Fundamental Polytechnical School, and the reform of higher education, the school actually had a tendency to reduce itself to a formal means--i.e. with little content--to social success, a delusive means for many students and parents.

In the future, at least, the youth who did not succeed at school will no longer have the feeling of being forever excluded from the most modern and most highly valorized sphere of society. Does not this feeling of banishment constitute a psychologically favorable ground for the development of vindictive social utopias that are both radical and regressive in their content?

YOUTH ROLE EXAMINED

Algiers ALGERIE-ACTUALITE in French 16-22 Sep and 30 Sep-6 Oct 82

[Article by Lies Boukra, Assistant Professor at the Algiers Social Sciences Institute: "Algerian Youth"]

[16-22 Sep 82 pp 4-5]

[Text] I. Between Society and the Nation

The young are the future of the nation, not only because of their age, but mainly because of the ideas they carry, the content they give to their struggles...

One of Shakespeare's characters compares the course of human life to a seven-act play in which we, the actors, play successively seven major roles. We begin our careers as defenseless babes and end it as helpless old men. Between these two opposites, there is one part we would like to play as long as possible, that of the youth. Is not that one of the oldest dreams of mankind, for the realization of which we kept calling on all the resources of alchemy, its formulas and its youth elixirs and baths? Nowadays, that is true, we prefer having recourse to the resources of the cosmetics industry.

For the natural sciences, the division of human life--seen as a natural scientific process--into biological age groups (childhood, adolescence, youth, maturity, old age) does not present many problems. Biological sciences offer a set of objective, stable and regular criteria (both morphological and physiological) for differentiation.

The sociologist, however, is confronted with another level of appreciation of the same reality. He is not interested in biological age per se. The object of his study is the manner in which biological age is socially represented, constructed, experienced, organized in a hierarchy and, therefore, reproduced. In other words, the sociologist studies the relation between biological age and social age. Youth is a word that does not refer to the same reality in different societies or in different social environments. This relation is not stable. It is a variable relation. It varies from culture to culture, from social class to social class within the same culture, and from one historical era to another for the same culture. In other words, we

should be careful not to overlook essential differences under pretense of a false homogeneity. To be 25 does not at all mean the same thing everywhere and does not everywhere refer to identical social realities.

Age: A Biological Fact That Is Socially Constructed, Organized and Manipulated

In all human societies, individuals are divided into generations, into age groups (child, youth, adult, old man). How and on what basis does a given society achieve this division into generations?

a) Certainly not in a neutral way: (i.e. without moral and cultural pre-suppositions or, if you will, without mental reservations). Actually, to distribute means to effect a division, a breakdown. Dividing and breaking down amounts to producing an order and a hierarchy (of positions, status, etc.). In any given society, the fact of identifying ages and organizing them in time, the placement of an individual in a system of relations and on a scale of values that will give him a meaning, and the means of identification used will vary with the representations that society has of time and history in relation to individuals. These representations are the crystallization of a conception of the world, of a "spontaneous philosophy," of a set of beliefs and the sum total of cultural and moral values. Therefore, this division into generations covers a set of cultural, moral, religious, ideological and political interests.

b) Certainly not on the basis of purely biological considerations: for the representation a society has of time (the notion of age, childhood, adolescence, youth, maturity, etc.) and its history (war generation, independence generation, etc.) never coincides with the biological distribution into age groups. This representation is a function of the historical nature of society (feudal, capitalist, socialistic), of its internal structure (i.e. the manner in which it produces its material goods), its relations with its environment and the social struggles that take place within it. In a word, it depends on dominant social relations. Indeed, social relations tend to exclude certain representations of time from the field of social representations, and to favor others. Therefore, what is current in a society is never biological age, but a social age constructed, organized and manipulated by society (always shifted with [line missing] function of a set of ideological and political interests; interests that are determined by the dominant social relations and by the objective social struggles that unavoidably result from them.

The notion of youth, therefore, is an ideological notion that results from a social manipulation of biological age. And once again, what is valid for all human societies is also valid for ours. In our society too, the notion of youth results from a social manipulation of biological age. In our society, the notion of youth, too, is an ideological notion.

Youth: An Ideological Notion and an Empty Set

By ideology, we mean a mode of appropriation of reality, i.e. a way of comprehending reality, of representing it mentally or, again, imagining it which:

- does not make use of theoretical criticism or scientific analysis;

- covers a set of moral and political interests and positions;
- aims at conditioning practical attitudes and behaviors and, therefore, at integrating individuals in society as a whole.

The ideological nature of the notion of youth is explicit in two respects: with respect to its conflicting content (the stereotypes of youth) and with respect to its non-conformity with the reality to which it refers.

a) Conflicting content: If we take a closer look at the stereotypes concerning youth, it is easy to see that this notion refers to two conflicting sets of attributes. First, it refers to a set of socially and culturally valorizing attributes (freshness, vigor, enthusiasm, beauty, life, health, future, freedom, luck, perspectives, innovation, etc.). Simultaneously, it refers to a set of devalorizing and derogatory attributes (immaturity, irresponsibility, carelessness, lack of discipline, instability, lack of wisdom, lack of judgment, lack of measure, extremism, violence, disorder, etc.).

b) Non-conformity with the reality to which it refers: Actually, there are not one but several youths. To convince ourselves of that fact, we need only take a close look at the living conditions of an unemployed youth in Algerian society, a young farmer or a young worker, and at those of a young bourgeois. On one side, the hardships of a harsh existence, deprivation, hard-earned money and material constraints; on the other side, the potentialities of a welfare world, the ragged symbols of ill-accepted and ill-assimilated city-life (in Algeria, the dominant fraction of the bourgeoisie developed right after independence) and the disappointments brought about by cultural mimetism (often supported with foreign currencies). Therefore, we should be careful not to overlook these essential differences for the sake of an assumed homogeneity.

If the notion of youth is an ideological notion, it must of necessity cover moral and political interests. Actually, we can easily observe that youth is assumed to present a number of (valorizing and devalorizing) characteristics with the immediate consequence that the young leave to the adults a set of characteristics which render the latter socially (morally and politically) capable of holding patrimony and power (not political power only, but power in the broader meaning of the word, in the family, the street, the school, on a stadium, etc.).

To conclude this first part, we can say that division into youth and adults is a matter of power. It produces and reproduces an order of aptitudes and inaptitudes with respect to the holding of patrimony and power. (The same is also true of the division into sexes: women/men, feminine/masculine, male/female). It is a division that produces and reproduces a relation of social domination.

The concrete reality veiled by the notion of youth is precisely the fact that division into age groups is a matter of power. Now, every society possesses specific laws (determined by its dominant mode of production) for the distribution of patrimony (material, aesthetic values) and power. As a result, every society divides its generations or its agents into youths and adults according to a specific hidden logic (of which the social agents are not aware).

According to what logic does our society operate the division of generations, the division between youth and maturity, between youths and adults? The knowledge of this particular logic is what determines the form and content of the relations of young Algerians with society and culture.

In Algeria: Society Is Still a Prisoner of the Nation

To be more accurate and closer to the truth, we should add that the nation (El Wattan) is itself also a prisoner of religion (El Oumma). Civil society is a prisoner of political power and the latter, in turn, is a prisoner of faith. The demonstration of this working hypothesis requires much more room and time. We apologize to our readers for not providing such a demonstration in this article. An analysis of the Charters of the Algerian Revolution and speeches on youth reveals that the problem of youth has always been presented in terms of training and supervision. The question of the Algerian youth is a question of training and supervision.

The Algerian youth (variously referred to, depending on the context, as a ferment, a potential, an energy, a revolutionary force, an elite and an heir) must be trained and supervised (the verbs used are: organize, orient, channel, integrate, mobilize, train and make effective) in order to contribute to the nation's construction.

Why does this youth have to be trained and supervised? The reason is that today's youth (the heir of that of November 1954) has not known the revolution and the national liberation war. Now, participation in the national liberation war is experienced as a historical mediation step which each individual must undergo if he is to achieve the minimum political awareness required to become capable of: (1) integrating into the national collectivity, (2) achieving revolutionary legitimacy and, therefore, (3) taking part in, or benefiting from the distribution of patrimony and power.

As a result, the young Algerians (and we should point out that, because of its high birth-rate, the Algerian population is very young: 47.3 percent were under 15 in 1977 and approximately half of all Algerians were born after independence) are not:

a) capable of automatically integrating into the national collectivity because they are threatened by foreign influences, by the "facile imitation of behaviors imported from a different social environment..., a factor of demobilization and both antinational and antisocialist deviation." (see National Charger, page 39).

b) capable of automatically achieving revolutionary legitimacy because they have not experienced the national liberation war.

Since 1962, however, this function of mediation (of ferment taken on by the liberation war from 1954 to 1962) falls to what is considered to be the only heir to revolutionary legitimacy, the FLN party. As a result, the youth can claim revolutionary legitimacy only indirectly, through the necessary media-

tion of the party. This, in turn, is why the question of youth in Algeria is still considered to be a question of training and supervision. (See, in the recent history of our country, the question of relations [line missing]

Party, UGEMA [General Union of Moslem Students of Algeria], UNEA [National Union of Algerian Students], JFLN [National Liberation Front Youth], SMA [Algerian Moslem Scouts], UNJA [National Union of Algerian Youth]

Therefore, youth is temporarily excluded from power (we must repeat that we do not mean political power alone, but power in the sociological sense of the word) and patrimony, and restricted to the role and rank of continuator, heir and potential to be trained and supervised.

Therefore, we observe that, in Algeria as in all other societies, youth is an ideological notion and that the division between youths and adults is a matter of power. What is characteristic of our society, however, is that this division into generations takes place according to a logic induced by national or, more accurately, nationalistic feeling. It is a logic anchored not in society, but in the nation. For the very simple reason that Algerian society is still a prisoner of the Algerian nation. Therefore, this logic possesses an emotional and irrational content. This is why it is urgent for our country to do all that is possible to promote the indispensable transfer from the nation to society. Otherwise, we shall continue to transfer on the young generations the deficiencies and divisions of an era in which they did not live, and to mark with the seal of anachronism generations that should not be thus marked.

[30 Sep-6 Oct 82 pp 7-8]

[Text] II. Past Values and Present Prohibitions

From the content of the first part of this article (see ALGERIE ACTUALITE No 883), we should remember two essential points:

- the notion of youth is, objectively, an ideological notion, the result of a social manipulation which aims at watching (and therefore justifying) a relation of social domination, a characteristic mode of distribution of power and patrimony.
- in Algeria, the division into generations occurs according to a logic that is anchored in the nation rather than in society. As a result, the question of youth (i.e. the policy with respect to youth) is a matter of training and supervision.

To be more precise, what is involved is the notion of militant nationalism with an emotional and religious content. In other words, nationalism through which concrete society is diluted into the nation while the latter remains a prisoner of faith, of religion. Therefore, the question of youth in Algeria

is that of its integration into the nation (defined in terms of purity, authenticity and intrinsic specificities) the attributes of which are of a spiritual order and possess a sacred character (these attributes fall within the province of religion, not within that of temporal power).

This view was largely valid and justified during the period of colonial occupation and, a fortiori, during the national liberation war against colonialism that would negate the national fact; once independence was acquired, it became in fact anachronistic. "Therefore, let us stop defining our national specificity exactly as at the time when occupying forces were trying to invest us on all sides, i.e. strictly as a reaction against them."*

The revolutionary and historical prerequisite for political independence is the passage from the stage of political and cultural nationalization of the youth to that of its socialization. Indeed, once independence is acquired, the nation is no longer directly and immediately threatened. It still is, however, but in another way, for political independence opens the way to a new historical stage, that of struggle for independence and national construction during which imperialism remains the chief enemy. It continues to be threatened and aggressed, but through society which becomes the sole location, object and stake of struggles.

Now, today, after 20 years of national construction, the question of youth is still presented "as at the time when occupying forces were trying to invest us on all sides"; this means that the necessary transfer (necessary culturally, ideologically and practically) from the nation to society has not yet been made. The persistence of this logic (which, in fact, is that of a narrow nationalism) reveals how far behind our society is still lagging ideologically, culturally and mentally, in spite of its undeniable progress with respect to institutions, technology and economic conditions. With respect to its relations with society and culture, the Algerian youth is therefore still forced to live in the past. "Now," according to Mostefa Lacheraf, "this brand new youth has already been matured by the war; what idea can it have of the old-fashioned nationalism of its elders? If, through ethical and doctrinal poverty, we persist in inculcating this nationalism into the youth, when it no longer corresponds to its normal group sensitivity, without nostalgia nor constraint alienations, it may know that this nationalism contributed to free the country, but it will soon become aware that, as far as this new stage is concerned, it is empty; it will be left unsatisfied, thus tragically beginning again the cycle of century-old shortcomings and historical absurdities. Along this downward path, and in a context that is now free and less deficient, we find: either repeated vacuum and its fastidious lack of measure, where what could be gained has already been gained; or the demagogical and patriotic demand orchestrated from the top to the bottom, as in a game of sorcerer's apprentice, toward greater moralism and bigotry, greater partisanship and chauvinistic inflexibility; or, finally, in a youth frustrated and exasperated by too many negative and senilizing excesses, deviation toward a pseudo-

* A. Mazouni: "Culture en Enseignement en Algerie et au Maghreb" [Culture and Education in Algeria and the Maghreb], Maspero, Paris, 1969, p 168.

culture leading to dehumanization and antisocial and uncivic-minded contempt, the culture of individual revolt and chaos."*

That individual revolt is tearing and dividing our youth between "the difficulty of living and the desire of being." This situation which, in fact, pushes the young to individual revolt is made worse by:

- I. The inadequacies of the school and vocational training systems and a frozen job-market
- II. The gaps and conflicting effects of a transition stage
- III. The inadequacy of the ideological and cultural national sphere.

Inadequacies of the School and Vocational Training Systems and the Job Market

One of the outstanding facts of these 20 years of independence is that the various classes and social layers have gained increased access to education. This is an important social fact; as a result of the democratization of education, even environments that were traditionally farther removed from schools and the university in colonial times have now been reached.

We know that the school is not only a place where we learn reading and writing, where we go to acquire a certain knowhow and a certain knowledge. School is above all the institution that holds a monopoly on one of the most important means of social promotion and valorization in our society: diplomas. A diploma is a piece of paper that gives its owner an opportunity to fulfil a set of social and economic aspirations. This is how the relation to school is experienced. In our society, the school is often expected to perform a miracle. Nevertheless, during the past few years, the number of dropouts (school failures) has increased considerably. In addition, the economic and the vocational training systems have proved unable to absorb all the products of the school system, the school "failures" (primary school, high schools) and, increasingly, those with a diploma. We should mention that, according to statistics from the Ministry of Planning, close to 1,100,000 young people of both sexes, including 702,000 aged 15 to 17 and 395,000 aged 18 to 20, form a "floating" population that is integrated neither into the educational and vocational training system, nor into the job market. According to the same document, unemployment in Algeria is essentially youth unemployment since over half the unemployed are between 18 and 25. Among those under 25, nearly one out of four is looking for work. In 1977, 90,000 young people aged 15 to 17 said they were looking for work. Those with a university diploma (especially with a social sciences or law diploma) find it increasingly difficult to find a job.

Gaps and Conflicting Effects of a Transition Stage

The Algerian society is going through a transition period that is complex and conflicting in many respects. Industrialization is emerging in a rural social

* M. Lacheraf: "Algerie: nation et societe" [Algeria: nation and society], Maspero, Paris, 1969, pp 335 and 336.

environment without industrial traditions. This brings about the decomposition of traditional cultural and moral values and triggers a complex process in which value systems and behavior models become differentiated and heterogeneous. The result is a set of conflicting and uncomplete systems which sometimes interlock. This excess of inconsistencies and conflicting processes is what causes an impression of cultural and ideological vacuum (in fact there is no vacuum). Algerian society has not yet developed its social fabric (by which I mean a uniform and homogeneizing social fabric).

The young Algerians who express social, political and cultural forms still in gestation, in their beginnings, still looking for a way of expression, meet with a barrier. Their ideological, political and cultural availability declines as a result of the lack of a system of values and of a homogeneous and coherent discourse able and likely to acknowledge, reinforce and orient their availability. Thus, the young Algerians are in fact pushed to a spontaneous extremism which finds in ideologies of revolt the means for a general calling into question.

Inadequacies of the Ideological and Cultural National Sphere

The lack of a uniform and homogenizing social fabric (which, in last analysis, is accounted for by the multistructured character of our national economy and by the fact that the social question has not been settled yet) is not without consequences on the dominant consistent ideological level, and the continued narrowing of the national cultural sphere are [as published] only its most obvious effects. We can safely state that the national cultural sphere is organized around four interdicts or taboos (which condition collective psychological repression); these are:

- a) sex or sexuality;
- b) politics or the struggle for power;
- c) history or the problem of defining the historical content of national culture;
- d) religion.

These taboos deprive society (and those who organize it) of the means to answer satisfactorily and convincingly certain questions asked by the young in a situation of crisis (see above):

- 1) the question of the cultural identity of their society and their culture, i.e. the problem of its historical past as related to that of its future;
- 2) the question of their sexuality which definitively asserts itself at this age (the problem of identity of the young in society);
- 3) the question of injustice, social inequalities and power.

Through these questions (which they are asking in a situation of lack of confidence, failure and frustration), the young are trying to give a meaning to their lives. Once again, their availability and their questions remain unanswered.

Meaning of Present Struggles

Through the democratic youth movement (started right after independence by UNEA and continued to the present day by JFLN and UNJA), the young have led a struggle that has taken many forms. Their increased numbers provide their age group with a new value, and the realization of their weight in society contributes to their awareness. The youth's struggle is at the origin of the four major movements that marked independent Algeria politically, culturally and ideologically. These four movements are:

- 1) students volunteering to work for the agrarian revolution;
- 2) non-professional theater;
- 3) Arabization, and
- 4) the emergence of progressive songs.

These four movements were born and developed outside official structures and, one way or the other, involve the content of the social question (or again one of its aspects). The two following facts are significant:

- The young have actually demonstrated and given practical and concrete proof that they are able to train and supervise themselves. This means that they deny that the question of youth is basically a matter of training and supervision. They are able to contribute on their own to the emergence of cadres and structures for their training and supervision as long as democratic conditions of mobilization and action are met.
- They pose the social question. In fact, they impose a logic that is no longer anchored in the nation, but in society. They demonstrate that they are in a position to realize the transfer which society and those organizing it have proved unable to operate. They show us the way and demand that we should all accept to live in the present.

The youth are not tomorrow's Algeria, they already are today's Algeria. Their struggles are the best proof of that.

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CSO: 4519/23

VOCATIONAL TRAINING PRIORITY EMPHASIZED

Algiers ALGERIE-ACTUALITE in French 23-29 Sep 82 pp 10-11

[Article by K. Yessad: "Vocational Training. Top Priority"]

[Text] One thing is certain. The dossier on vocational training which has just been the subject of a communication in [line missing] from now on as a top priority. It should be one of the major concerns of political authorities in coming years. It is evidently a dossier of national importance which must be approached and studied in all its aspects as it will concern and condition the immediate future of hundreds of thousands of young people. We must absolutely take care of their future and reassure all these young people who will now always be denied access to secondary and higher education. These young school dropouts should not and cannot on any account be considered as society's rejects. We must realize that condoning their exclusion amounts to accepting that they become idle individuals whose presence will never be allowed either in a social environment or on the job market. It is high time to think and consider what solutions are necessary. Time is short and the situation may simply become explosive as problems are bound to take another turn. This is why we all must do something. It is the duty of every official concerned to promote a new environment where the young will feel secure. In plain language, this means that we must now make available to them all the means likely to ensure their training and qualification in order to get them off the street and, thus, save them from idleness and delinquency.

The present situation of the young dropouts from schools and other teaching institutions cannot be considered inextricable. There are opportunities for training and apprenticeship. They are offered by professional training centers (CFP's) which remain open to all the young wishing to acquire a training and to erase forever the sad experience of their school failures. Every year, tens of thousands of young people apply for admission. But very few are lucky enough to be accepted.

This disproportion is the result of the imbalance existing between the demand for vocational training, which remains high, and the small number of existing vocational training centers. According to figures for 1980 and 1981, the centers placed under the authority of the minister of Vocational Training could offer approximately 25,000 openings which could provide qualification for some 33,000 workers per year. In addition, the Five-Year Plan provides for a large program under which 268 new centers are to be built, thus increasing

the number of vocational training openings by approximately 80,000, to a total of 105,000 that would ensure the vocational training at various levels of qualification of close to 130,000 workers per year. This not bad at all.

This side of the question implies a consistent search for all ways of meeting obligations in this domain. The efforts of the ministry in charge are supplemented by those of other training organizations placed under the authority of several ministries not oriented toward training, and by state enterprises, which provide a nationwide vocational training capacity of approximately 90,000 workers per year.

Right now, the best would be to provide the country with as many vocational training centers as possible. As you can guess, that will need time and money. Building a vocational training center is not easy. There are numerous constraints, especially with regard to the availability of building sites. For the minister of Vocational Training: "It has become practically impossible to contemplate building new centers in large cities or large urban centers where there are practically no building sites available. To plan the construction of a new center in Bab El Oued or El Harrach, for instance, is both a feat and an utopia."

Besides the lack of building sites, high costs and construction times represent additional obstacles. To help overcome them, there is now a trend toward more frequent use of prefabricated structures, based on a repetitious type of architecture and using materials manufactured in Algeria by state enterprises. Before starting a project, it would be a good idea to see if it is really necessary; past experience has shown that operational vocational training centers are often not used to full capacity. "There are many examples," Mr Mohamed Nabi went on. "In many areas, training centers are not put to full use. As a result, there is a loss of training opportunities."

All this must not make us lose sight of the fact that considerable efforts must be expended at government and district level as part of an effective decentralization of vocational training. Many governorates are still lacking any vocational training center. Yet, god knows that these governorates possess a human potential that need only be taken charge of to become qualified. This will require a preliminary field study by those in charge in order to determine the specific characteristics of each region and its skilled-labor requirements. Has it not been said again and again that governorates must possess the human and material means corresponding to their development objectives? Those in charge of the sector all agree: "We have always tried to contribute actively in coordinating all efforts, in close cooperation with all the centers and organizations involved, both nationally and regionally."

Considering the inadequacy of the infrastructures available to the Ministry of Vocational Training, intersectorial participation and complementarity are more than desirable: "We must gather all our strength," the minister of Vocational Training added, "and, all together, use all the vocational training resources of ministries and state enterprises. In other words, everything that is available and likely to contribute to the realization of planned objectives in this domain." There are 20 ministries not oriented toward training

but intending to provide some. In 1981, they offered a total of 70,000 training openings. In 1982, that figure will increase to 75,000; the additional 5,000 openings were offered in the sectors of water-supply systems, Post and Telecommunications, health and civil service. As school begins this fall, the Ministry of Vocational Training will take charge of 87,720 trainees, including 40,000 apprentices and 4,720 teacher trainees. In addition, many ministries are increasingly involved in on-the-job training (training in enterprises). One initiative should be mentioned, that of the Ministry of Health. It offered 11,000 openings in 1980, 17,000 in 1981 and 20,000 in 1982.

The increase in the number of trainees is accounted by a better utilization of training facilities due to the fact that all ministries involved are now following the guidelines of the interdepartmental teaching-training commission chaired by MPAT [expansion unknown] and working group No 20 chaired by MFP [expansion unknown]. The conditions of this coordination, however, must still be determined and it must be provided with an effective framework aiming at the same objectives, namely fulfilling the requirements of the economy for skilled and semi-skilled labor.

To enable young people aged 15 to 18 to acquire the theoretical and practical knowledge that is a prerequisite to holding a job, the law on apprenticeship was implemented (June 1981). The objective of the law is to solve young people's problems; it also contains provisions to ensure that all employers, no matter what their legal status (public or private sector, natural or artificial person) will shoulder their responsibilities. Its objective is to provide young people with training through apprenticeship. To achieve this objective, all opportunities and potentialities must be taken advantage of. These are: state enterprises, artisans, small repair shops and small private enterprises. There is something new, though: private employers are exempt from the various social security taxes and from the lump sum tax on apprentice wages. "This is a praiseworthy initiative, but apprenticeship should not exceed the time usually allotted to it. Otherwise, apprentices could remain forever in the same place, thus preventing other applicants from obtaining the same training." In 1982, the apprenticeship law will make it possible to take charge of 40,000 young people aged 15 to 18.

"All ways and means must be explored and identified," according to Mr Mohamed Nabi, minister of Vocational Training, who said he is "convinced that, all together, we shall in the coming years achieve in-depth changes in the terms of the problem of taking charge of this potential labor force which is available and, besides, so badly needed by our economy, and fulfilling the legitimate aspirations of our youth."

Apparently, results were not late in coming since 30 vocational training centers opened their doors this year. This will reinforce officials in promoting vocational training so as to make better use of existing potentialities.

CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES FOR SELECTION OF VICE PRESIDENT RECOMMENDED

Cairo AL-SH'AB in Arabic 31 Aug 82 p 17

[Article by Dr Ibrahim Salih, Vice President of Court of Cassation: "A Look at the Egyptian Constitution: When and How Vice Presidential Appointments Are Made"]

[Text] According to the Egyptian constitution the appointment of one or more vice presidents is the absolute and unrestricted right of the president. Because the vice president's position is one that is important and grave, the president may exercise as much deliberateness as he chooses in making that appointment despite the risks that may exist in keeping that position vacant for a long time, particularly when we consider that a person who is active in public life will have to be chosen. If deliberateness is a virtue, and as the current proverb says safety lies in deliberateness, the steps that one takes in the world of politics have to be charted. This requires that the steps one takes are not to be hasty or precipitous since hastily taken steps could be dangerous. By the same token steps taken in the world of politics are not to be slow; they must rather follow the pace of events so as not to lag behind and be out of step with the pace of events.

There is no doubt that the stipulations of the Egyptian constitution fall short with regard to regulating the appointment of the vice president. Since it is indisputable in the world of politics that nations and peoples are to review their steps to correct mistakes they may have made, to strengthen correct ones and to complete what they had forgotten to complete, [Egyptians ought to do the same] because no matter how long-lived rulers and presidents are, they are mortal and will eventually die. Consequently, the national obligations that were entrusted to them require that leaders give some thought to the future of their countries so they can spare their countries from upheavals and disasters under which they may falter.

Recent events in Egypt--those that took place and those that were prevented by God's care and mercy--may sound the alarm that would reach our ears, awaken our minds and stimulate our resolve so we can review the situation--without retreating. We would know the source of the problem and the proper remedy for it, and we would not become like the ostrich that buries its head in the sand so as not to see the hunter who is preparing himself to kill it. It may be that courage, or rather national honesty, requires us to contemplate everything [pertaining to this matter] because it is known in the science of politics that all political regimes, no matter how advanced and successful they are, must have

some faults. Political regimes that enjoy continuity and stability are those that are corrected immediately. What the former prime minister of France, Mr Leon Blum wrote in his jail before his death may be tantamount to a political maxim. Mr Blum wrote, "A political regime that discovers its flaws and does not take steps to correct them is besieged and beleaguered by these flaws and is [ultimately] destroyed by them."

When we contemplate the events that took place on the Egyptian scene, we become more convinced that it is the rightful constitution that provides safeguards in the transfer of constitutional authority. We recall especially the maneuvers and intrigues that followed the death of the late leader, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. These maneuvers and intrigues were about who had the right to succeed him as president. It was then that people were heard calling for a return to the system of the Revolutionary Command Council [even though] that system had ceased to exist after the 1956 Constitution was issued. Others were heard making comparisons [among others], recommending themselves [for the job] and enumerating the advantages of one person over the other. It was with great difficulty that the late President Anwar al-Sadat settled this problem, but he had to get rid of those who rose to the surface, and he brought about the Corrective Revolution in May 1971.

In comparing the two situations--despite the tremendous difference there between the day the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir died and the day President al-Sadat was assassinated--[one concludes that in the latter case] the transfer of the constitutional authority to the president was dignified, orderly and outstanding. It was commended and appreciated by the entire civilized world. Accordingly, we have to consider what the constitution states regarding the president's position. Although the authors of the constitution took pains to devote the first section of chapter five to the system of government and the head of state, they did mention [therein] articles 73 to 85. Then they devoted the first subsection of the third chapter, in articles 137 to 153, to the president as the chief of the executive authority. All these articles indicated the conditions that have to be met by those who become candidates for the presidency. Article 75 is one of those articles; it stipulates that "anyone who is elected president must be an Egyptian citizen born to parents who are Egyptians. He has to have his full civil and political rights, and he is not to be less than 40 years old." Then the authors of the constitution followed all this by indicating how the president is to be nominated; the duration of the presidential term; the authorities of the president; and his role in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities as well as in the armed forces. However, the authors of the constitution forgot all [the requirements] regarding the position of the vice president. The only constitutional text that talks about the vice president is that in Article 139. It stipulates that "The president may appoint one or more vice presidents. He may determine their authorities and relieve them of their positions. The rules that regulate the president's accountability apply to the vice presidents."

Although the vice president's position is one of the extremely important political positions in the system of government because it follows that of the president in the political hierarchy, Article 82 of the constitution therefore stipulates that "If the president is temporarily unable to pursue his functions, the vice president is to carry out those functions on behalf of the president." Despite the fact that the vice president's position is extremely important, it

may be said that the authors of the permanent constitution did not become aware of this matter and did not do what should have been done regarding the placement of controls in choosing the vice president and [requiring] the necessary guarantees. It may even be said that the course they pursued involves abuse and negligence because according to the existing stipulation the appointment and retention of a vice president, the determination of his functions and even his removal from this position is the absolute right of the president. He is accountable to no one in appointing, retaining or firing a vice president. In fact, the constitution mentions no controls and conditions that must be met by those who choose to hold that position, such as age for example. Nor does it mention the conditions for qualifying for the position as it did with regard to the president, to ministers, to the socialist public prosecutor and others.

For this reason one of the most splendid statements made by President Muhammad Husni Mubarak is that in which he said that the controls he will observe in choosing a vice president [will involve] "the maximum degrees of commitment and the maximum degrees of competence." This undoubtedly bodes well [for the country] and is reassuring. But shouldn't we translate what the president said and transfer and codify it either in the constitution itself or in an amendment to the constitution so as to preserve the future of our nation and maintain the continuity of our course through the lawful constitution that has been our protective armor and the shore of safety for all of us in what befell us? We should apply this wisdom because the vice president will become the future president, and the people have a right to be reassured about their destiny and their future.

The selection, retention, or removal of a vice president and the determination of his role in the system of government are matters that must be codified, and the people or their representatives must play a role in that process. And here, with the permission of Anis Mansur, I quote what that author and man of letters wrote when he compared the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir and the late Anwar al-Sadat and the method each one of them had used to deal with the matter of his successor. "When 'Abd-al-Nasir became ill, the world wondered, who will come after 'Abd-al-Nasir? People had no answer to that question, for al-Sadat had not stood out beside Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. Anwar al-Sadat had stood in 'Abd-al-Nasir's shadow and 'Abd-al-Nasir had misunderstood him. And because he had misunderstood him, 'Abd-al-Nasir had kept al-Sadat by his side; he was not afraid of him. Anwar al-Sadat lived longer than all the members of the Revolutionary Command Council because he was the least dangerous of them, the least ambitious and the least talented. This was what 'Abd-al-Nasir believed. Al-Sadat came and proved that contrary to all Soviet and American assessments [of him], he was a shrewd talent of another kind. However, we did not ask after al-Sadat who will come after al-Sadat because al-Sadat [himself] had answered that question by choosing his successor, the man who was to become president after him. Al-Sadat had prepared himself for that day and had selected Husni Mubarak. He saw in Husni Mubarak a more vital picture of himself."

Accordingly, the status of the vice president must not remain uncoded because the constitutional status of the vice president is not that of a mere assistant to the president. The vice president is the president's representative and deputy. He serves as acting president, and he succeeds the president when the position passes on to him as it did to the president before him. It may be

beneficial in this regard to refer to Article 5 of the Socialist Public Prosecutor Law which stipulates that "The president informs the People's Assembly of the name of the person he chose for the position of the socialist public prosecutor, and the general committee in that assembly presents its report to the assembly in that regard. When a majority of the members approve the nomination, a presidential decree is issued appointing the president's nominee to this position. If the nominee does not receive a majority vote, the president nominates another candidate."

If this is what the law required with regard to the socialist public prosecutor and his position--the socialist public prosecutor is no more than a public employee whose rank is comparable to that of a minister--is it not more proper for the vice president to be selected in this manner and for the People's Assembly and the Consultative Assembly to play a role in approving his selection? The president would present the names of three candidates to these assemblies, and the assemblies would choose two of them for example. We firmly believe that when the president chooses one or more vice president, he takes God and the homeland into account. But we are human and fallible. Only God is infallible, and the destinies of homelands are more enduring and more sacred [than ours]. [Therefore], the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a vice president may not be left to the discretion of the president. The president may not grant or withhold functions from the vice president, nor may he prevent him from carrying out these functions as he sees fit, leaving him thereby in the shadows. People are entitled to have a vice president who plays a role and who would gain experience in shouldering political responsibilities. They are entitled to having the constitution spell out the controls that will be observed by the president in selecting the vice president.

It may be important in this regard to ask this question: is it wiser for the president to have one vice president or is it better that he have several? Contemporary experience that may be referred to is that of the United States. We have to know, however, that the U.S. presidential system is not suitable as a standard of measurement in this regard because the constitutional system of government in Egypt is a mix of the parliamentary and presidential systems. This means that it is not a purely presidential system like the American system. Furthermore, the U.S. president is elected by a grassroots organization in a partisan fashion that allows numerous candidates to run in the presidential election. The vice president's name is usually voted upon along with that of the president, even though he is not elected [separately]. Therefore it would be best that we have more than one vice president. [It would be best] for the president to have two vice presidents provided that the president be allowed to determine who would be his first vice president. He can thus ward off any wicked ideas that some people may get and ensure stability and continuity.

In concluding, it may be that I ought to extend my apologies to the committee that authored the constitution since it is no secret that they neither chose nor formulated some of the constitutional stipulations in the permanent constitution. Perhaps the absence of a special stipulation pertaining to the vice president is the best evidence of that. Accordingly, he that can guide one to the truth is more worthy of being followed. As God is my witness, I have informed my fellow men.

FEMALE STUDENT SHORTAGE IN AL-AZHAR INSTITUTES

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 22 Aug 82 p 2

[Article by Muhammad Bassayuni]

[Text] At a time when the government is concerned with increasing religious materials for school and university students, for the purpose of protecting society from perversion and deviation, we find that the al-Azhar preparatory institutes are almost empty of female students!

More than one question mark can be raised, when we note that 'Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, director general of al-Azhar examinations, has denied entry to female students, who hold general preparatory certificates, to al-Azhar secondary institutes!

Despite the fact that there is a republican law that clearly stipulates the acceptance of female students, with general preparatory certificates, for study in al-Azhar institutes, this "position" has led to creating a problem for female, general preparatory students who want al-Azhar studies.

There might be a need for this, if al-Azhar institutes were overcrowded with female students, but the reality is completely different, since the number of female students matriculating in al-Azhar education is a great deal less than the actual capacity of the institutes.

Fifty Students and Five Classes

Mrs 'Afaf al-Mahdi, directress of the al-Azhar Secondary Institute for Girls in Saydi Bashr, Alexandria, said that the number of female students working for al-Azhar secondary certificates this year does not exceed 50 students. This number only allows opening two classes, while the first secondary grade usually has five sections. In addition, the number of teachers is sufficient to accommodate the latter number of students, as well as the fact that the amenities and assets of the institute are also available.

The directress of the al-Azhar Institute for Girls in al-Haram, in Giza Province, said that this decision harms the al-Azhar institutes, especially the institutes for girls, and that this will lead to crippling the abilities and potentialities of the al-Azhar institutes. They could be used to prevent overcrowding of female students in the public secondary schools.

Opinion of People Concerned

The "position" to prevent general preparatory female students from matriculating in al-Azhar institutes has affected the lives of people concerned. They have gone everywhere in attempts to oppose this strange position, which has no justification, especially since there are many empty places in the al-Azhar institutes.

* Ibrahim Muhammad 'Ali, the guardian of one of the female students, said that after al-Azhar education was very good for female students of this age, in which the young woman's personality was being formed. "I insist that my daughter receive an Azhari education, so that she will become a proper mother."

* Saniyah 'Abd al-Fattah, the mother of one of the students, said: "My daughter is qualified to enter public secondary education, but I prefer that she have al-Azhar education, which educates the young lady and makes her a mature woman, conscious of matters of her religion, and capable of raising her children on religious values and Islamic principles."

* Husni 'Abd al-Mawjud, an official in Alexandria, said: "The result of general secondary education in al-Azhar Institute in Saydi Bashr was 99 percent this year. This confirms that the female graduates of the institute are better educated, despite the fact that they are a mixture of public preparatory and al-Azhar preparatory."

Despite the fact that Alexandria Province has only two institutes for al-Azhari secondary education, the numbers of al-Azhari preparatory certificate holders coming to the two schools are not even enough for one institute.

AL-SIYASI raised this issue with Shaykh 'Abd al-Hakim Nu'na', director general of al-Azhar institutes. He said: "The matriculation of female students, holding general preparatory certificates, into al-Azhar institutes showed some decline in the desired numbers, but it was not significant.

"This year we found that the numbers of female students who obtained al-Azhar preparatory certificates was sufficient for the secondary stage. Therefore, we will not accept additional numbers.

"As for young girls who obtain general preparatory certificates, general secondary education is more suitable for them!

"In any event, a number of appeals have come from directresses of al-Azhar institutes to the Imam Shaykh of al-Azhar, requesting that the classes be filled with holders of general preparatory certificates, and we are still studying this question."

There are in fact al-Azhar institutes that are nearly empty. It should be possible to permit such institutes that do not have sufficient numbers of female students to take in holders of general preparatory certificates, even though a minimum is set for acceptance, as is the case in secondary education.

ARMY TO HELP IN SUPPLYING BREAD

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 22 Aug 82 p 6

[Article by Hassan 'Utman: "Three Million Loaves a Day From Armed Forces Bakeries in October"]

[Text] On 15 October, new bread markets will be opened, based on the production of automated bakeries belonging to the war industries.

Joint actions between the Ministry of Defense and War Production and the Ministry of Supply have been completed to build 100 automated bakeries to produce 3 million loaves of bread daily, and to establish locations for the kiosks that will be built to distribute the fresh bread each day at 0800, 1300 and 1800 local time.

'Abd al-Rahman Farid, director of the Cairo labor directorate and chief of the central office for the employment of bakery workers, stated that the Ministry of Supply is currently studying a reconsideration of bakery workers' wages, in order to support their stability and give them comprehensive insurance, so that they will be insured against the dangers of old age, disability and death, in addition to granting them sick leave, annual leave and ordinary leave.

Bakery Workers' Problems

He said that the office had representatives from the Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Social Insurance, and they were looking into holding a weekly meeting to study the problems of bakery workers and to work to solve them, in addition to establishing a branch office in each province for the same purpose.

Lines

He said that the presence of lines in front of the bakeries and the inadequate production of bread, despite the fact that the government has raised the workers' wages and social and health insurance, stems from the fact that workers are leaving this profession because of its difficulty. Many of them are getting out of it. In addition, the population increased about one and a half million each year, requiring 4,500,000 loaves a day. In light of these

factors, the government has begun to draw up its plan of action to provide a loaf of good bread and to make it available in the market each day from 0800 until 1800.

Automated Bakeries

He said that it was decided to develop all the standard bakeries currently in existence into automated bakeries, through the war industries in Abu Qir, where automated bakeries were developed and produced completely by Egyptian labor. They operate no less efficiently than any imported bakery, in addition to the fact that the standard bakery produces 10 sacks per day, while the automated bakery produces 30 sacks and requires non-professional labor.

Only 6 Months

He pointed out that the war factory in Abu Qir can produce 100 automated bakeries a year, and that can be increased to 200. In light of the president's instructions for the armed forces to help to produce bread for the people, these factories have succeeded in being able to manufacture 100 bakeries in only 6 months. This resulted in the government deciding not to import bakeries from abroad and to establish bakeries in the provinces using war industry production.

Facilities for Bakery Owners

He stressed that the minister of supply had opened the door for bakery owners to buy automated bakeries. The Agricultural Credit Bank will pay the cost of the bakery, which is about 30,000 pounds. This can be paid in installments at 6 percent interest. A training center for automated bakery workers is currently being established, since the Governor of Cairo has given the office 500 meters on which to build it. In addition, a maintenance center will be built to service Cairo and the provinces and to provide spare parts.

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GREATER CAIRO WATER PROBLEMS EXAMINED

Utility Chief's Views

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 23 Aug 82 p 3

[Article by Khalid Jabr: "Water Outage in Cairo: Why Does It Happen and When Will It End; Appropriations for Building New Plants Are Nearly Suspended and Construction Expansion Is Intensifying Without Plan"]

[Text] Where does water in Cairo go? Why does it disappear from most of Cairo and when will the constant outages surprising Cairo's residents and the constant search for a drop of water end?

AL-AKHBAR has interviewed Eng Husayn Tal'at, chairman of the Cairo Water Utility to explain the cause of this phenomenon and tell us when it will end.

God help Cairo's residents. Millions of them still live a medieval life. They spend their days and nights waiting for a drop of water. Millions have become used to playing a daily cat-and-mouse game with their faucets, entreating the faucets, which give them just a few drops. Only God knows the color, taste and smell of these drops.

How could this be avoided when the Public Authority of the Greater Cairo Water Utility--this is the name of the agency in charge of supplying the water--is preoccupied these days with a crushing battle going on between the Authority's chairman on the one hand and the deputy chairman on the other. The dispute has extended beyond the limits of the Authority to expose the manner in which most of our vital utilities are managed.

How could this be avoided when the governor of Cairo enjoys watching the capital's residents fighting for a drop of water every day, when the government is stingier than the faucets on upper floors and when it has allocated only a very small part of what is needed to develop the water network? Instead of having the development completed in a few years, it will now take decades, during which time the population will grow and prices will rise and God help the capital's residents. For example, the water utility asked for 100 million pounds in this year's budget. The government has allocated only 28 million. The problem did not start recently and will not end tomorrow. The Cairo of 2 million residents is not the same as the Cairo of 8 million residents and today's

problems are not the same as yesterday's problems. But before all of Cairo's residents are unable to find a drop of water and before all the faucets dry up, we carried all of today's and tomorrow's complaints and put them before Eng Husayn Tal'at, chairman of the Public Authority of the Greater Cairo Water Utility.

Where Does Water Go

[Question] To start with, there is a question that may seem brief but that reflects an acute problem for more than half the population of Cairo and its suburbs, namely: Where does the water go?

[Answer] Water is available, but nearly half the volume is lost without being utilized. Imagine that Egypt gets a fixed share of the Nile water, namely, 155 billion cubic meters annually or 150 million cubic meters daily. This amount is supposed to irrigate 6 million feddans of land, reclaim 2 million more, generate electricity from the High Dam, serve the waterway for navigation and, on top of all this, supply water for drinking.

Consequently, our plants produce 2.3 million cubic meters daily and all of this is consumed. We require 4 million cubic meters daily to meet our consumption needs. In the year 2,000 we will need 8 million cubic meters daily to meet our consumption needs on the basis that the per capita daily consumption in Cairo is 400 meters [as published]. This is a very high figure, one that far exceeds consumption rates in most of the advanced European countries.

Thus, the water is not sufficient to meet the citizen's requirements. What intensifies the problem is that nearly 40-50 percent of the water we produce is lost as a result of leakage from the pipelines (10 percent) and individual misuse (30-40 percent).

Water Color

[Question] But even the fortunate ones who find water in their faucets complain that the water reaches them with such strange colors that they are afraid to drink it. Those who can drink imported or locally produced bottled mineral water. However, the majority has no choice but to drink this colored water and pray to God to keep them from harm.

[Answer] This does actually happen, but only during the summer and in certain areas in Heliopolis, Imbabah, al-Haram, al-Duqqi, Shubra al-Khaymah and al-Zaytun. This [coloring] is due to the fact that these areas rely on the water they pump out of artesian wells, which contain .01 percent of dissolved salts, iron and manganese. This percentage is too high for potable water.

[Question] Then the citizens, who go to terrible excess in consuming water, are solely to blame?

[Answer] It is truly so. Every citizen is responsible for any damage to the facilities. For example, it happened that the pipeline that carries water from al-Jizah to al-Minyil and passes under the University Bridge developed a

small crack, which was left unattended for 2 years and which we found out about from the newspapers. When I inquired, I found that the reason for the failure to repair the crack was the lack of water cranes and that repairing the crack is very difficult and will cost us a lot.

What is required is to raise our water production from 2.3 million meters daily to 4 million meters daily. Therefore, we need production plants, main lines, subsidiary lines, storage tanks and pumping stations. We have relied on foreign and Arab loans to finance these projects.

Numerous Loans

There is a U.S. loan of \$160 million to expand Rawd al-Faraj plant to raise its production from the 350,000 cubic meters produced daily by the plant at present to 750,000 cubic meters daily. This expansion was to have been completed, but the lack of local financing has delayed the project.

There is a combined local and Arab loan valued at 10 million Kuwaiti dinars to build al-Qistat water plant to produce 600,000 cubic meters daily. This is a totally new plant for which the financing and equipment are available. But local financing is suspended and, as a result, the work is nearly suspended, the equipment has begun to be damaged and the guarantee offered by the manufacturing company has expired.

There is also a German loan of DM 60 million to build a new water plant in Imbabah with a production capacity of 300,000 cubic meters daily. This plant is supposed to produce 150,000 cubic meters daily next year and to operate at full capacity in 3 years.

New Network

As for the water network and storage tanks, there is a Japanese loan for \$200 million to build a new network, including four main lines, a water plant, subsidiary lines and three storage tanks.

The first line is the al-Zaytun main line with a length of 12.5 kilometers; the second line is the Hulwan line, 7.5 kilometers long; and the third is the central Cairo line with a length of 6 kilometers. There is also a plant to treat turbid water in Heliopolis and a main line from the plant 9.5 kilometers long. The subsidiary lines are the lines branching from the main lines and hooked to the internal water fittings in homes. The total length of these lines is 43.5 kilometers. There are also three tanks to store water in al-Muqattam (a tank with a capacity of 20,000 cubic meters), a tank in al-Sayyidah Zaynab (with a capacity of 120,000 cubic meters) and a third in Salah al-Din with a capacity of 10,000 cubic meters.

Implementation of the Japanese loan started a year ago and the major part of the project has been completed. However, the problem is that these lines will remain dry until we finish building the water plants.

And Solution!!

The financial appropriations are on the way. We keep the governor and the officials informed of all the obstacles that confront us and they exert the utmost efforts to overcome them.

But there remains the main problem, namely, the citizens' consumption of water. There has to be a national campaign to preserve water and prevent its waste. Every citizen must know that if he consumes one drop of water more than he needs, he will be denying another citizen this drop of water. Government agencies and mosques must repair their faucets. The chiefs of the city's quarters must repair the public faucets in their quarters and on which some areas still rely. Allotments must be reallocated on the basis of reasonable individual consumption and anybody who consumes more than his share must be brought to account so that every citizen will feel that water has its price--a high price that another citizen and the state as a whole pay.

Conflicting Reports On Problem

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 710, 23 Aug 82 pp 12-14

[Article by Kamal Jaballah: "Mont Edison's Adventures in Water Utility"]

[Text] It is the public's right to know the full truth of what is going on in the Greater Cairo Water Utility. It is also the public's right to have us tell this truth frankly in reply to all of the questions that arise and the confusion created by reports issued by the authorities concerned and by counter-reports. Should we believe the report of the Executive Board of the Public Authority of the Greater Cairo Water Utility or the report issued by the Central Accounting Agency on 25 July 1982 concerning what had been discovered upon investigation of the issue of the importation of 30,000 tons of alum for the authority in 1981? Should we believe the report presented by the minister of interior to the prime minister after the successful ambush organized by the ministry to trap the branch manager of the Italian Mont Edison firm while bribing the deputy chairman of the utility's Executive Board and after the Ministry of Interior rewarded the work team that caused the incident? Or should we believe the latest report issued by the committee formed by a decree of the minister of housing that examines all of the technical and financial aspects of the issues pertaining to the Greater Cairo Water Utility?

Today, in reopening the dossier of the Greater Cairo Water Utility, AL-IQTISADI asserts at the outset that the issue is not a personal one or one confined to differences between the Executive Board's chairman and his deputy, as indicated by the latest report from the Ministry of Housing. Rather, it is a public issue pertaining to deviations in a vital utility. From the whirlpool of reports and statements filed in the dossier since the beginning of the accusations and up to the present, we will review the issue anew in search of the lost truth about the Greater Cairo Water Utility.

Governor Demands Arbitration

Sa'd Ma'mun, governor of Cairo, says in the message he sent to Eng Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, minister of reconstruction and minister of state for housing and land reclamation--a message in which he demanded the formation of a committee to take the necessary measures to set matters right in the Greater Cairo Water Utility, that when he noticed what had been done in contracting with the Italian Mont Edison firm to supply 30,000 tons of alum in 1981 and the objection of the Executive Board's deputy chairman to awarding the contract to that firm when other Executive Board members approved the contract at the rate of DM-400 per ton, he demanded the formation of a committee to examine the minutes of the utility's Executive Board meeting on 15 September 1981 before approving the Board's decision in this matter. This committee submitted a report pointing out that the Executive Board's decision to approve the decision of the contract-awarding committee [lajnat al-batt] is sound and faultless. Thus, the minutes of the utility's Executive Board meeting were approved and Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din was notified that the offer made by the Italian Mont Edison Company in accordance with the rules set by the committee was the least expensive. This came in reply to a complaint submitted by the agent of the Swedish (Boliden) Company protesting the decision to change the alum specifications, according to the governor.

On the 14th of last July, the governor says, I received a letter from the Executive Board's deputy chairman for technical affairs regarding the importation of 24,000 tons of alum for fiscal year 1982-83. The letter contains the points that the deputy chairman considers suitable for the new bid invitation and his proposals in this respect. I wrote him in reply that the issue is within the jurisdiction of the authority's Executive Board. On 18 July, he sent me another letter citing violations in the Public Authority of the Greater Cairo Water Utility concerning alum importation deals and the modification of a contract with an American adviser for the Rawd al-Faraj water plant project. He requested that positive, urgent measures compatible with the importance of this utility be taken, especially since the authorities concerned in the Ministry of Interior had seized the manager of the Cairo branch office of the Mont Edison firm handing the Water Authority Executive Board's deputy chairman \$6,250 as an initial [graft] payment. The seizure took place after advance preparations between the deputy chairman for technical affairs and the security agency. The deputy chairman said that the bribe was offered to make him exert efforts to respond to four demands to modify the general terms and technical specifications of the new deal--modifications that would result in raising the price and, consequently, increasing profits and the [agent's] commission. The Authority's deputy chairman pointed out in his letter that the man charged with making the bribe acknowledged that those dealing with the firm and collecting commissions from it included three of the Authority's prominent officials, namely; the Authority's chairman, his deputy for financial and administrative affairs and the general manager for water plants and the sector's acting chairman.

At this point, Eng Husayn Tal'at, chairman of the Cairo Water Utility, asked to see me. He explained his viewpoint and said that the Executive Board deputy chairman was creating all this "uproar" for numerous reasons, the most important being that he wants to unsettle matters in order to get rid of the utility

chairman and create a serious crisis in the timing for the delivery of alum supplies so that a crisis similar to the chlorine crisis that erupted last year could develop. But an alum crisis cannot be solved if it develops because the quantities, volumes and weights are huge and cannot be transported from abroad easily should deliveries be delayed. Then I had another meeting with the Executive Board's deputy chairman, who informed me of the board chairman's decision to appoint him full time supervisor over implementation of new water projects in al-Jizah and of his refusal to carry out this decision.

Finally, the governor of Cairo says that in view of this exchange of accusations in one of the most important and vital utilities, out of concern for the public interest and money and considering that the Ministry of Housing is the technical supervisory authority concerned, he hopes that the minister of housing will form a committee to set all matters aright. Thus ends the message of the governor of Cairo. So what has the housing committee done?

Housing Committee's Report

Eng Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, the minister of housing, issued a decision forming a committee comprised of Eng Salah Fahmi, the ministry's first undersecretary; Counselor Abu Bakr Damardash, Ministry of Reconstruction counselor; Eng 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Ashmawi, chairman of the National Drinking Water and Sewerage Authority; Eng Mahmud Shabakah, ex-chairman of the National Drinking Water Authority; Eng Majd 'Abd al-Rahim, deputy chairman of the National Drinking Water and Sewerage Authority's Executive Board; Eng Michel Ilyas, the ministry's undersecretary for operations at the National Drinking Water and Sewerage Authority; and Eng Fawzi Nashid, general technical inspector at the National Drinking Water and Sewerage Authority.

The committee studied all of the financial and technical aspects of the issues raised by the governor of Cairo and reviewed all of the papers and documents submitted by the authorities concerned on the following issues:

The 1981 Bidding

In reviewing all the papers, documents and "complications" concerning the issue, it is evident that the specifications and conditions announced in the invitation for bids, the procedures followed in this regard, the [contract-awarding committee's] decision, the Executive Board's approval and the governor's ratification are all correct. There were no reasons to justify cancellation of the bid invitation and to announce a new invitation with new specifications, due to the following:

Reannouncement, making the decision and issuing the orders for delivery take a long time and, thus, a long time passes before the alum is delivered to the authority's stores, all of which leads to exhausting the stores and exposing the country to a serious situation.

The price is compatible with the market value and is lower than the prices at which the 1980 bid was awarded. This price was the lowest at the time the bids were opened.

The tests and experiments conducted on the crushed alum cannot be relied on.

The committee recommends continued technical and economic studies on crushed alum so that consideration can be given to setting the specifications and (conditions) required for announcing the invitation for bids in the future in case the tests prove successful.

The 1982 Bidding

The committee report says that the conditions and specifications of the 1982 bidding are faultless and that there is no basis for the objections of the Executive Board's deputy chairman. Moreover, there is no justification for responding to the modifications that he wanted introduced into the 1982 bidding. Insofar as awarding the bid to the producing firms, there is nothing legally to stop this in order to avoid the commissions and profits collected by the distributors and to guarantee that the authority receives the quantities specified in the bid with the required specifications and on schedule. It has been noted that when the apparatus to dissolve the crushed alum was put into operations, operational difficulties did develop. Regarding the demand that the Mont Edison firm be excluded from the bidding because of the suspicions surrounding it, this issue is in the hands of the judiciary and will be considered in light of the sentence to be issued.

Contract With American Adviser

The committee also reviewed the objections of the Executive Board's deputy chairman to the voiding of the contract and his demand that the duties of the American adviser be terminated and that the supervisory work be entrusted to Egyptian expertise, and the Executive Board chairman's insistence that the adviser continue performing the task at increased cost [presumably meaning pay]. The report says that the Executive Board was right in approving the continued contract with the American because this was the Board's only option after excluding all other options.

Mont Edison Fine

According to the authority's view, the firm owes fines due to the presence of impurities in the alum delivered in previous years and due to the finding of analysis differences. After the firm's objection to the outcome of the analysis, the Public Authority of the Greater Cairo Water Utility impounded the letter of guarantee submitted by the firm and asked the firm to supply alum equal in value to the fine. The company refused to do so and was supported by the Italian Embassy. The authority could not reach a satisfactory solution and the matter was referred to the governor of Cairo for examination. Therefore, the committee feels that the issue should be delayed until the examination is completed.

Despite the speedy manner in which the housing committee prepared its reports and the numerous observations that can be made on the reports--especially the report saying that the contract was awarded to the Mont Edison Company in consideration of the fact that it was the lowest price quoted (DM 415) and be-

cause it complied with the specifications. The correct figure is DM 400. Moreover, the committee describes the (al-jilbat) alum as crushed alum whereas there is a big difference between (al-jilbat) alum and crushed alum. This is in addition to excluding (al-jilbat) alum from the bidding despite its cheap prices and despite the success of the tests conducted on it at al-Ma'adi water plant. Despite all this, we say we don't know if the committee read the Central Accounting Agency's report or not. What does this report say?

Accounting Agency's Observations

Accountant Janet Jirjis, a ministry undersecretary at the Central Accounting Agency, says in her report that an investigation must be conducted on the irregularities and violations involved in examining the importation of 30,000 tons of alum in 1981 and those responsible must be named preparatory to referring the issue to the Higher Prosecutor for the Public Domain to take the necessary measures.

Janet adds that on examining the documents, the following became evident:

On 30 June 1981, the Authority published an invitation for bids to import 30,000 tons of alum. There were 11 bids and the least expensive were the following:

Bid No 5 submitted by the Egyptian Company for Foreign Trade on behalf of the Italian Mont Edison firm and containing two prices for the same ton with the same quality and the same specifications and conditions--one price in dollars and the other in Deutschmarks--as a way of cheating in order to win the bid. The company did this, relying on the mark exchange price in June, which was 33.1044 piasters and which rose to 34.739 piasters on the contracting date and to 37.55867 piasters on the date the credit [account] was opened, whereas the dollars exchange rate was stable at 84 piasters.

At the bid opening on 8 August 1981, the bid-awarding committee equated the prices offered with the foreign currency prices approved for the commercial banks on that date, namely 84 piasters per dollar and 33 piasters per Deutschmark. The committee compared the prices after excluding the offers from No 9 to No 11 and decided that bid No 5, offered in Deutschmarks, was the lowest.

Had the committee equated the prices on the basis of the foreign currency exchange rates in the accredited banks pool on this date, it would have found that the dollar rate was 84 piasters and the Deutschmark rate was 33.10344 piasters and that bid No 9 was lower than the offer made in Deutschmarks, equalling 137.738 pounds [per ton].

The committee excluded bid No 11/2 made by al-Nasr Import and Export Company on behalf of the (Flarmajit) firm because it posed the condition that delivery be made (outside Port Said) even though the price it quoted was closest to the lowest price and that it was likely that the company would cede this condition through negotiation.

The committee excluded bid No 9 made by the Arab International Trade Office on behalf of the Swedish (Boliden) firm even though this bid offered the lowest price. The committee did so on the pretext that the alum sample presented by this office did not meet the specifications, keeping in mind that the tests conducted on (al-jilbat) alum in al-Ma'adi water plant at the request of the Authority's Executive Board chairman proved that (al-jilbat) sample is similar to, and even a little better than, ordinary alum, and in sedimentation and filtration efficiency as well. By using it through the dose-controlling apparatus, this alum produced the same results as ordinary alum. Therefore, the committee should have negotiated with the lowest bidder, namely, No 9, to make it give up its reservations and agree as much as possible to the tender invitation terms so as not to leave any doubt that it was better than the next bid.

Despite this, the bid-awarding committee negotiated on 7 September--i.e., after the results of the analysis on the (al-jilbat) alum became known--with the Egyptian Company for Foreign Trade, which had presented bid No 5 on behalf of the Mont Edison firm, and entrusted it with the operation after the company agreed to reduce its price to 400. The committee contracted with this company even though the price the company offered was not the lowest and despite the violations previously committed by Mont Edison and resulting in financial losses to the Authority of public funds. This should have precluded the firm from taking part in bids in implementation of Article 85 of amended ministerial decree No 542 of 1957. Examples of the violations are:

Upon implementing contract No 174 of 1981 to supply alum, Mont Edison failed to abide by the stated specifications. This is made clear in a report by the Foreign Contracts and Purchases Department. These violations have caused the firm to owe the authority the price differential. The company has not yet supplied alum for the value of the price differential and the issue is not yet settled.

Mont Edison has persistently shipped the alum on old and small boats. This hampers unloading operations at the ports and causes the authority to shoulder fines of nearly \$2,500 daily.

Ministry of Interior Ambush

It remains for us to point out that the latest report referred to Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din by Deputy Prime Minister Maj Gen Nabawi Isma'il is not the only report. There is another extremely important report referred to him by Maj Gen Hasan Abu Basha, the minister of interior, on the ambush organized by the ministry's Graft-Control Directorate which resulted in apprehension of the branch manager of the Italian Mont Edison firm while he was paying the deputy chairman of the Executive Board of the water utility \$6,250 as a bribe. The report asserts that the firm pays money to prominent officials of the utility so that it can control the supply process. The wire taps made for 8 months on the Cairo branch manager of the firm (in his own voice) and some utility officials show that the company pays vast sums to many utility officials, some of the payments being deposited in foreign accounts and some made in cash at home. The branch manager also says that he has in the firm's safe documents showing the account numbers of the beneficiaries and special symbols (for these

accounts) and that the documents are destroyed every 3 months. The firm's branch manager in Cairo adds in the recordings that the utility Executive Board's chairman cooperates with Mont Edison, keeps it informed of the prices of rival companies and puts obstacles in the path of rival companies in return for material benefits from the firm.

Following the presentation of this report to the prime minister, a reward was given to the members of the police team who made the seizure in appreciation for their efforts and success in this operation. What other information is there that we can present to the public on this serious issue? Is it truly an issue of personal differences between the Executive Board chairman and his deputy for technical affairs or is it an issue that demands the formation of a top level and neutral fact-finding committee to reach the truth and settle the question?

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NATURE OF EXTREMIST RELIGIOUS GROUPS, CONSPIRACIES EXPLORED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 3024, 24 Sep 82 pp 4-9

/Article by Makram Muhammad Ahmad: "The Secrets in Full on the Most Dangerous Terrorist Organizations That Have Been Curbed since Last October"/

/Text/ At the outset, we must state that the dangerous nature of the terrorist society on which a crackdown was made 3 weeks ago does not lie in the organizational plan, which the imagination has carried to great limits--indeed to limits that almost amount to precipitate action lacking the least chance of success.

Its dangerous nature lies, rather, in the destructive violence which drives the spirits of its members to terrible limits. It is certain that the chance for success was totally lacking in the three plans which have been unmasked, but there was nonetheless nothing to prevent the repetition of unsuccessful bloody escapades like what happened in Asyut.

Consequently, the issue, as far as these organizations go, is not one of the nation's stability; this kind of organization is not the host to any sort of imminent peril that might effect this stability. Rather, it is host to the fact that these ideas still enjoy currency, because we still lack an integrated national plan to cope with the danger that these ideas will dominate the lost generation of our youth.

Perhaps it would also have been in our power to say that from the time its links were first formed until it was completely run to ground, this organization was under careful surveillance and observation by security officials. Perhaps it would also have been in our power to say that the arrest in full of the members of the organization in the three governorates--Cairo, al-Sharqiyah and al-Minufiyah--did not take more than 24 hours, since the organization's network and deployment were under careful surveillance and observation. However, that must not be an element of reassurance on which we can depend, because the phenomenon of the spread of extremist ideas must be confronted not by security measures alone; rather, it must be confronted, as we said earlier, by a national plan in which everyone's efforts, those of proselytizers, men of religion, experts in sociology and economics, psychologists, university professors, writers, journalists, and the young people themselves are integrated, so that agreement may be reached on a comprehensive confrontation that will thwart these ideas and prevent them from finding a reception with this generation.

Unfortunately, agreement has not yet been reached on the outlines of this national plan. Unfortunately, we are still making the security /forces/ alone bear the burden of the problem, and we are still failing to create an enlightened religious current that will confront with ideas and discourse this extremist thinking which emerged and grew because of rash ideas which came to Egypt from outside, starting in the fifties. Because no one faced them boldly and no one discussed these ideas openly in the light of day, they gained currency beneath the surface, in the context of the absence of a national goal and religious enlightenment.

More than anything else we have mentioned, the confrontation of ideas can take place only through ideas, and we have called most of all for the dialogue this requires. Indeed, the conviction has grown that such dialogue is important. It has started within the prisons, with the people who have been detained, but unfortunately, for numerous motives, we have not been able to reach national agreement that it is necessary that this discourse develop. The opposition, which ought to have felt that it, like the regime, was a target of these organizations, has fought the idea of the dialogue on grounds that a dialogue taking place in prison lacks the prime condition for success, and that such a dialogue would be more feasible if it took place after the detainees were released.

The opposition has been unmindful of many of the positive features this dialogue has yielded up. It has ignored a right the press has obtained for the first time, that of being present as a witness to this dialogue. It has also ignored the fact that this dialogue was aimed not only at the people inside the prisons but also at the thousands of Egyptian youths who have not gone through the experience but could be exposed to it.

Perhaps one of the most prominent positive aspects of the dialogue taking place in the prisons--in spite of the observations made against it--is that it has revealed how intense the contradictions and extreme conflicts among all these ideas are. There are 99 groups, each of which renounces the others; in some cases a group is no bigger than its commander and his follower.

Perhaps another of the most prominent aspects of the discourse is that for the first time it has revealed the nature of the ideas that dominate the minds of these people who have appointed themselves the commanders and protectors of religious ideas, although their minds have been stuffed with nonsense and they all lack a valid understanding of the spirit of religion. If the discourse has highlighted other positive features, perhaps they lie in this new conviction that it is not true that everything cited in the books of our heritage must be elevated to the rank of sacred belief, but that what is true is that a group of enlightened men of religion have the duty of going through this heritage carefully and redefining it.

The records of the most recent organization reveal that 30 of the people who have been released went back and were absorbed into the framework of this organization. However, that does not mean that the dialogue has not achieved its objectives. Just as the dialogue was not fruitful in the case of some people who closed their minds out of fanaticism and ignorance, it was fruitful with others whom the organization tried to recruit again, but who refused to be recruited.

While these are the positive features of the dialogue, its main problem is that just a few of our scholars have borne the burden of confronting this thinking with total courage, considering themselves to be individual proselytizers in this society.

In this regard we can only praise the role of men like 'Umar al-Talmasani, who expressed his desire to participate in this dialogue, stressing, in his meeting with these young people, that violence is not part of religion in any way, because religion consists of advice and good exhortation, not coercion, destruction, chaos, or the imposition of the will of the minority on society by the force of violence and blood.

Al-Azhar has not wholly tried to support the notion of the dialogue from the beginning, and we do not know the secret why many of its scholars refrained from taking part, especially at the start of the dialogue. Perhaps the situation may subsequently have changed, and al-Azhar may now be extending its hand of help to rescue this lost generation of our young people. However, its efforts have not been adequate.

Why isn't Muhammad 'Abduh Hall turned into a tribunal for a weekly dialogue in which these ideas can be examined, revealed and tracked down, so that their corrupt nature may be exposed? While the security /forces/ assumed part of the responsibility for the dialogue in the prisons, why doesn't al-Azhar assume the responsibility for the dialogue outside them? Why doesn't al-Azhar invite the waves of young people who have been released to take part in a discussion out in the open in the light of day, in a free setting, so that the remnants of the ideas which might have been implanted in their heads can be unearthed? There is in reality nothing to prevent some young people from resorting to a sort of pious style which will enable them to display thoughts different from those they harbor within themselves. These are all risks to which the discussion could succumb, but that does not justify the partial absence of al-Azhar, with its immense responsibility, or the total absence of the Ministry of Religious Endowments, which is responsible for proselytizers in all the mosques of Egypt.

Unfortunately, we can state most plainly that the Ministry of Religious Endowments has been totally absent from this discourse.

If we may conclude this lengthy introduction with the conditions the most recent organization has revealed, we must concentrate on a number of facts:

First, it has been revealed, through documents, that there is a sort of foreign financing which reached the proportions where checks have been seized for \$60,000, in addition to cash equal to 60,000 Egyptian pounds--a massive amount of money, when one considers that the organization was brought to ground when it was only a few weeks old.

The fingers of accusation indicate that the financing came through the Islamic Liberation Party, which uses Jordan as its headquarters and has been behind all the attempts at black terror which have attempted to permeate into Egypt, from Salih Sariyah's escapade in the Military Technical /College/ incident to the most recent organization.

The most serious feature of this party is that it has suspicious origins and wrongful goals. Historians all agree that in spite of its Islamic appearance it emerged in specific historic circumstances with the goal of undermining the stability of the Arab world. A recent Islamic Liberation Party publication reveals that the optimum solution, as the party sees it, would be to take over all the reins of power in the Arab world through a series of bloody military coups. Indeed, a number of items of evidence stress the goals of the Islamic Liberation Party, in spite of its Islamic appearance, have always been in with ones that continue to be characterized by hostility toward the higher Arab interest.

The investigations also reveal another serious point: members of the organization sought to establish relations with Khomeyni's Iran. Preparations actually were made to send Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mawjud al-Zumr, the younger brother of 'Abbud al-Zumr, to Sweden to meet the Iranian ambassador to Sweden, who, on instructions from Khomeyni, oversees all the Iranian revolution's conspiracies against Arab capitals.

We find the extension of this thread in the former al-Jihad organization, whose command was assumed by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj, author of the book "The Hidden Obligation" and the second defendant in the case of al-Sadat's assassination. One goal of the organization which Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj headed was to contact the Iranian revolution to have its personnel trained in Iran and to make up for the shortage in financing which it faced.

Second, as we stated earlier, the seriousness of the organization does not arise from the effectiveness of its plans, which have been characterized by a defiant fantasy world which cannot be attained, but rather from its members' readiness to commit crimes of destructive violence, as happened in Asyut.

It may not be in the interests of the investigation now underway to publish the details of the first alternative, the defiant plan, but ultimately it had the goal of conducting sabotage on a broad scale through surprise operations founded on uncalculated killing and bloodshed, as with the Central Security Headquarters in Asyut, although this time the target was different in nature.

To this end, they tried to accumulate all available information. Although the goal was impossible to carry out by all standards, the records on the arrest of the accused persons show that at the same time they were trying to track the target, security personnel were following this organization's intelligence agents.

The other alternate plan was for them to sneak narcotics into a prison in order to release some of their leaders by totally intoxicating all the guards in the prison, as is done in the movies--on the condition that these leaders immediately go to Cairo airport to hijack a passenger airplane there and force its pilot to take off for Tehran and impose the condition that the other prisoners be released in exchange for the release of the hostages in the plane.

The third alternative plan was a confused mixture of the two other ideas, in which the deluded view predominated that just carrying out such an operation would be enough to get the people on the street to join the partisans and members of the

extremist groups, providing them an opportunity to take over the streets, overrun the Central Security headquarters, and appropriate their arms, as was the case in Asyut.

Third, the most recent organization, like all previous ones, strove to make up for the deficiencies in its active personnel, who might be known to people on the Egyptian streets, by trying to obtain the support of some religious figures.

While Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj tried to meet his requirements through Dr 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman, the leaders of the new organization tried to meet theirs through Shaykh Hafiz Salamah, the chairman of the Islamic Guidance Society in Suez.

Here we find ourselves faced with two accounts, which differ in several details:

The account given by the leaders of the organization, who made a detailed confession of their meeting with Shaykh Hafiz Salamah, as compared with the account Shaykh Hafiz Salamah himself gave in the investigation made into him on the facts of this meeting.

The organization members asserted that they presented the idea to Hafiz Salamah, and Hafiz Salamah ruled out chances for its success, describing it as childish and fantastic. However, he proposed another alternative to them, which was represented by individual assassinations, considering that the organization could not take power because of its current circumstances and the nature of its composition, as its members and partisans did not even amount to 200; the alternate solution would be to seek to shake up the regime through a number of assassinations in order to create comprehensive chaos, through which the extremist societies could impose their grip over the Egyptian streets.

By Shaykh Hafiz Salamah's account, the meeting actually did take place and they presented him with two alternative plans, one to appropriate arms and equipment from guards and the other to free the prisoners by smuggling a type of narcotic into the prison to intoxicate its guards. He considered that the matter was nothing more than childish foolishness and advised them to renounce these ideas, from which extreme damage would result, though one could not hope for the least benefit from this plan, which was not characterized by the slightest realism.

Fourth, according to plans hatched abroad, documents on which were seized, the foreign financing had specific goals, as follows:

1. The effort to get in contact with the leaders of the al-Jihad groups still in Turah Penitentiary through visits made by their relatives, so that the leaders in the prison would be totally aware of the organization's steps and plans abroad and would realize their duties in prison, especially once the operation began.

The first letter to outside members of the organization went out with 'Abbud al-Zumr's wife, who visited him with his children. The letter contained 'Abbud al-Zumr's observations on the organization's plans. Letters from 'Abbud al-Zumr followed in succession through members of his family; in the end there were three of

these. The third letter seized in one of the organization's hiding places, in the possession of a leader and official just 3 weeks after it had been sent out.

2. The organization was to try to concentrate its efforts in a smaller number of governorates, on condition that its presence in these governorates be effective and influential, regardless of its size. Priority would go to Cairo and Giza, then the Governorates of al-Sharqiyah and al-Minufiyah, perhaps because of their proximity to Cairo and perhaps also because some organization personnel who had not been arrested were present in these two governorates. What happened was that the Cairo network was under total surveillance, as were the two places where the meetings took place. The first was a dwelling located at 168 al-Jabal Canal Street, which one of the leaders of the organization, Muntasir al-Zayyat, had rented. The second location was situated in al-'Abbasiyah, at 7 al-Baramuni Street, and was rented out in the name of Muhammad al-Tayyib, one of the other leaders.

Since the organization had been under surveillance from the beginning, all its Cairo members were arrested in just 2 and a half hours. The wave of arrests started at 0030 hours in the morning and ended at 0300 hours with the arrest of all the leaders in the organization--Majdi Muhammad Salim, Muntansir al-Zayyat, Muhammad Hafiz al-Sayyid Talib, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mawjud al-Zumr, 'Adil 'Abd-al-Majid Sayyid, Khalid Muhammad al-Halawi, Salah-al-Din 'Abd-al-Qadir, Mahmud 'Abd-al-Hamid Sulayman, Hisam Ahmad Tawfiq, Mahmud Ahmad Siyam, and Muhammad Ibrahim al-Shafi'i. Most of them were university students who had not completed their studies.

In another 24 hours, the organization members in the other governorates had been arrested.

Fifth, on the basis of these plans, which had come from abroad, the instructions stipulated that the greatest number of arms were to be obtained, whatever their price might be, and that an attempt was to be made to manufacture a number of grenades by hand. In fact, the organization members did manage to obtain 12 weapons, which were all seized; the materials they had prepared to make these primitive bombs out of empty tin cans stuffed with explosives mixed with small nails, so they would have a terrible spread effect when used, were also seized.

The papers of the investigation of the accused contain a statement of all the meetings that were observed, starting with the attempt to buy the first rifle and ending with the purchase of several kilograms of small nails to make these bombs.

The accused persons' confessions also contain an acknowledgment of the enormous difficulties they encountered to obtain single weapons this time, contrary to the situation that existed in the organization of Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj, who managed to obtain large amounts of hand grenades and a number of automatic weapons of all types, including RPG's, which were seized in a villa in al-Ma'adi.

If we conclude these items of evidence with an attempt to follow the thinking of these organizations, and the principles of the operations of the conspiracy, they will reveal from beginning to end that the extremist ideas arose from the rash notions which came to Egypt in the early sixties by way of Shiite scholars of the likes of Abu-al-A'la al-Mawdudi and Abu-al-Hasan al-Madani.

The basic source of the ideas is strange, alien thinking which Sayyid Qutb embraced in his book "Signposts on the Road." After him came Shukri Ahmad Mustafa, who built the idea of renouncing society on his book, then Salih Sariyah, Iraqi by nationality and Palestinian by origin, who linked the duty of renouncing of society to action to change it through bloody destructive acts.

In fact, Salih Sariyah represents the Islamic Liberation Party's most serious attempt to infiltrate into Egypt by trying to ride the wave of the Islamic groups. In addition, the timing of his internal conspiracy against Egypt coincided with other odd schemes which began at that time, whose objective was to make Egypt seem to be suffering from a sort of instability.

Via Salih Sariyah's organization, Hasan al-Halawi, one of the members who managed to flee, in participation with another person--Salim al-Rahhal, of Palestinian origins, who worked all his life in service of the Islamic Liberation Party, concentrating all his efforts on Egypt--managed to form a number of cells with the same objective, making Egypt appear unstable. Indeed, the documents seized in 1977 reveal this organization's determination to carry out a wave of assassinations, but the security /forces/ movement was faster than theirs, the scheme was aborted at its outset, and everyone was arrested, except for Salim al-Rahhal, who managed to flee.

In the wake of the crackdown on al-Halawi's organization, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj, who was not a well known member of the organization, succeeded in reorganizing this group, which schemed to assassinate President al-Sadat. The evidence in the case of President al-Sadat's assassination revealed the same foreign links.

This chronological succession of conspiracy activities reveals the degree of viciousness of the preparations made outside Egypt for the operations of a conspiracy which it was known in advance could not bring down the authorities, take over Egyptian streets or take power, but were a successive series whose goal was to make the situation in Egypt appear to be lacking in stability.

If we can deduce anything from the outcome of these episodes, which is supported by complete confessions on the part of the organization members who have been arrested so far, who are 180 in number, we can say:

Once again, everyone must join together on behalf of a national plan aimed at protecting our young people from the dangers of this alien, deviant thinking. In this plan, the work of proselytizers will be integrated with that of thinkers, sociologists and people in the media, it is a plan that will not rely on security alone as a deterrent factor but will extend to include a broad confrontation with the roots of the problem and certain other symptoms which have appeared recently on the surface of Egyptian society and have given these deviant currents justifications which we must eliminate.

Once again, we must open our eyes to the great truth that the series of conspiracies against Egypt from abroad has revealed and the objective they are aiming at, which is just to create an explosion which will impugn the notion of Egyptian stability.

Once again it becomes necessary that these facts all be put before the members of the People's Assembly, in its new session which will start next October, and that it have the courage to adopt decisions to guarantee that Egyptian security is made immune from the group of fools who are manipulated by interests alien to the nation through ideas that are alien to religion.

However effusive our enthusiasm for the restoration of normal conditions to Egypt may be, the restoration of normal conditions must be contingent on a type of deterrent measure which will guarantee that Egypt is cleansed of these ideas with which secret organizations that are trying to spread violence through the society have become linked.

While we are all partisans of the rights of opposing views not just to exist but also to state their view boldly in full in a sound objective context, it is the obligation of the opposition to be aware of the goals some foreign forces are aiming at now, to make the Egyptian stage appear unstable, and not to view the issue from a limited party viewpoint.

If there are people who are fond of doubting every fact, and if there are people who seek to achieve a fabricated connection between the timing of the exposure of the organization and the date for the renewal of the emergency law, in order to cast doubt on everyone's intentions, we can only, in the face of this insistence, demand that the People's Assembly hear all the minutes of the investigation, as contained in the ledger of the prosecutor's office. In the People's Assembly bills, there are provisions that enable the assembly to summon anyone it wishes in order to hear his testimony.

No one can favor any type of restriction against ideas, no matter how much he might be in agreement or disagreement with them, but we must all favor the protection of Egypt from the schemes whose real objectives have been unearthed in a manner that leaves no room for doubt, especially in the light of events going on now on the Arab stage. A great conspiracy now has the Arab nation as its target, and Egypt is not exempt from this conspiracy, although people are trying to choose instruments of a very different nature here!

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SEMINAR EXAMINES POVERTY, POPULATION GROWTH

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 23 Aug 82 p 8

[Article by Lima Nabil: "Seminar on Study of Basic Problems in Development Continues Its Discussions"]

[Text] The seminar entitled the "Study of Basic Problems in Jordanian Development" continued its meetings at the Amman Chamber of Industry yesterday.

The seminar discussed two working papers on poverty and its effects on developments and the effects of rapid population growth on development in Jordan.

The first working paper, which was prepared by Dr Ahmad Abu Shaykhah and Mr Ghazi 'Assaf, attempted to explore the extent of the spread of the problem of poverty in Jordan and the policies being followed to remedy this problem.

Overview of Poverty in Jordan

The paper explained that a number of important questions arise when an effort is made to give an overview of poverty. The first is the question of defining poverty. Poverty in any society can be seen as a relative phenomenon that reveals the status of the poor groups when they are compared with the remaining groups in that society. Therefore, poverty exists in almost all societies. However, there are levels of abasing poverty that can be characterized by malnutrition, illiteracy, and disease to a degree that is below any definition of human dignity.

Abasing poverty assures the inability to secure the basic necessities of life whereas relative poverty indicates the share of low-income groups in the distribution of income. These two concepts are connected but they do not correspond. It is easy to identify the level of abasing poverty based on the world standard. The estimates of the World Bank indicate the existence of around 780 million poor people in the states of the developing world.

In an assessment of abasing poverty in Jordan in 1977, the paper indicated that the poor made up 7 percent of the total population. It was also pointed out that the maximum income of the families making up the lowest 5 percent in income in 1980 was estimated at around 760 Jordanian dinars in the urban

areas and 335 dinars in the rural areas. By comparison, the maximum income of families in the third category (20 to 30 percent) is estimated at around 1,206 dinars in the urban areas. Upon examination of the estimated income limits, we find that the income of the 5-10 percent group lies in the range 670 to 804 in the urban areas and 335 to 570 in the rural areas. If we consider that the size of the family is 6.3 in the urban areas and 6.7 in the rural areas, we find that this range of incomes may be the minimum that will ensure the minimum requirements in the urban and rural areas, reflecting the price differences between the city and the country. In our opinion, a conservative estimate of the scale of abasing poverty in Jordan is 10 percent of all families.

Statistics for 1973 indicate that the share of total income of the lowest 40 percent of the families was only 16 percent in the urban areas and 19.2 percent in the rural areas. There are indicators that show that more than 70 percent of the urban families had incomes below the mean income and 65 percent of the rural families fell below the mean income.

Rise in Rate of Illiteracy Among Females

The paper stated that education constitutes an effective channel toward obtaining new skills and increasing opportunities for creating positions that pay good wages. Although about one-third of the population of the East Bank were in the schools in 1977, the preliminary results of the 1979 census point to the existence of an illiteracy problem approaching 35 percent. There is a difference in the illiteracy rate between males and females. While the average illiteracy rate among males is 20 percent, the rate among females approaches 50 percent. This situation indicates that males have benefited more from educational opportunities than females. There are also regional differences in illiteracy. We find that the highest illiteracy rate is in the Governorate of al-Karak with 48 percent as opposed to a 30 percent rate in the Governorate of Amman. Added to that is the fact that the illiteracy rate in the rural areas is double the rate in the urban areas--49 percent versus 25 percent.

Urban Women Better Off

Thus, it is completely clear that rural women do not find the opportunities that women in the urban areas find in the fields of educational attainment. Knowing how to read and write does not guarantee a sufficient income. However, it does dramatically alter the individual's view of life and his environment and the extent of his participation in the activities of his society. Literacy also opens new learning opportunities in the pursuit of various skills. Therefore, it is not surprising that we find poverty connected with illiteracy, especially in the rural areas where there are fewer opportunities of finding work. In 1978, the rate of participation of males in elementary schools was 74 percent while the participation of women in the same age groups was 41 percent in the middle classes in the developing states. More than 60,000 Jordanian students continue their university study at home and abroad. This represents 2 percent of the total population in the East and West Banks.

Fiscal Policies to Fight Poverty

The official budget in Jordan has a large impact on the allocation of resources and the distribution of benefits. In 1980, for example, the budget constituted 56 percent of the total domestic income at market prices. Therefore, fiscal policy can play an effective role in fighting the problem of poverty. In addition, monetary policy can play a lesser role at the current level of economic and social development. Added to that is the fact that various policies in each sector can play a role in affecting the people's welfare. These policies can be declared as part of a comprehensive strategy or part of a national plan. The Jordanian development plans have reflected to different degrees a basic goal of distributing the benefits of development among the regions and among the country's population. The goal of the three-year plan (1973-1975) was the development of economic and social activities throughout the kingdom and especially in the rural areas. The aim behind this was to concentrate on quantity. There are certain limits to the distribution of investment, growth goals, or shares of income to the various governorates or rural areas. Therefore, that goal can be interpreted as evidence of conscious efforts on the part of the planners to spread the benefits of development on regional bases through their selection of projects.

The first five-year plan (1976-1980) was more explicit in stating its distribution aims regarding the distribution of the benefits of development among the population in the various regions of the kingdom. This means the development of economic and social activities through the development of projects, especially in the rural areas. The plan acknowledged the importance of just distribution, but there was no mention of poverty. We do not know the extent of the importance given to the aim mentioned above upon the selection of the projects in the plan. However, it was clear that there were a number of large projects--especially in industry and the mining sector--located outside the Governorate of Amman. While not all of the benefits of these large projects go to the people in the region, they do help increase the region's income.

The distributional goal was stated with perfect clarity in the second five-year plan (1981-1985). This plan stipulated that the citizens should be supplied with their basic needs and identified the lack of equality among the regions. This goal was set forth more clearly through a call for the distribution of investments with the goal of attaining voluntary distribution of population and the benefits of development among the various regions. There is another goal in this plan calling for the development of human resources through the expansion of education and an increase in the rate of participation of women in the workforce. Compulsory education--which covers a period of 9 years--will cover 95 percent of those in the age groups concerned.

The study added that the proposed measures and policies state that the government will adopt a wages and income policy aimed at defining the minimum level of income that will be sufficient to cover the basic needs of the people. This income level should be kept subject to changes due to increases in prices. In the long run, this will contribute to a more just distribution of the benefits of development. The plan showed some concern with meeting the basic needs of the people. However, there were no direct measures or policies aimed at fighting poverty.

Improvement of Circumstances

The study emphasized that the most important of the projects aimed at improving the circumstances of the poor is the urban project in Amman. This project is aimed at improving housing conditions in the poor quarters, which include some 60,000 persons living on land they do not own in the Amman-al-Zarqa' region. The segment of the population chosen consists of families with monthly incomes between 40 and 90 Jordanian dinars in the poor areas. These areas were defined as among the poorest areas in Amman where housing conditions were totally unsuitable, characterized by crowding and a lack of public services. The project proposes several actions including the development of some 8,000 tracts of various sizes and with various structures where some families with specified incomes can pay the loans covering the entire cost of the land, building, and services. A similar method will be used to help the population in some poor areas of Amman to improve their conditions through the enlargement of houses and the provision of water and conveniences. Some supplementary programs will be applied in the fields of health education and vocational training inasmuch as these elements require a series of administrative, constitutional, and legal measures to ensure that they are implemented effectively. This project will offer a new means of confronting the needs of the poor. It also aims at making housing on land not owned by the residents a legal measure and at improving the houses that are already in existence while holding demolitions to a minimum. This project has already begun in some areas of Amman. At this point, it must be pointed out that the people with monthly incomes in the 40- to 90-dinar range remain the poorest classes in society and cannot pay the loans they have obtained to cover all the costs of the project. In spite of this, the measures involving the services and housing that the people need raise the living conditions of the poor in a tangible manner.

There are no specific government programs to improve the income of the poor substantially. However, there are some government programs that raise the real income and buying power of the poor. The government intervenes in importation and the pricing of certain necessary commodities, especially foods. These measures take the following forms:

- Setting prices of necessary commodities, particularly foods.
- Direct purchases from abroad and subsidies on the purchased items.
- Establishing and running stores for retail sales to government employees and members of the armed forces.

It was also proposed that the government set the prices of fruits, vegetables, certain other food products, locally produced consumer products, cement, water and electricity services, and the services of some restaurants and hotels. In spite of the fact that the price system controls most economic exchanges in Jordan, there are feelings that the local market for the price-controlled products is not competitive. Added to that is the fact that certain goods are subsidized by the government. This formerly included sugar, meat, and rice, but these subsidies have been eliminated. On the other hand, the government now subsidizes wheat, flour, and petroleum products. These subsidies are on a large scale, amounting to 32.8 million Jordanian dinars in 1980 and declining to 22.6 million dinars in 1981.

The study added that the government is the sole importer of sugar, rice, wheat, flour, and meat. This came after the establishment of the Ministry of Supply, which was assigned the task of securing these commodities and providing them to the population at reasonable prices. Here it must be pointed out that the price of domestic sugar is now higher than world market prices. The government is utilizing the difference to subsidize other foods.

Confronting the Problem

The paper explained that the chief means of confronting the problem of poverty in Jordan has led to high rates of growth in national income. This was the means of fighting general poverty, and for this reason the issue of distribution and cases of poverty has not been given sufficient and appropriate attention.

It stated that the programs aimed at the poor are limited, both in their coverage and in the lack of effective coordination among the agencies implementing these programs. The local and international voluntary federations and societies have a long history of providing assistance to the needy in their housing areas. These societies provide some opportunities for traditional training such as sewing and weaving. However, few individuals take advantage of these services. In addition, some individuals are helped in one way or another by projects and the Ministry of Religious Trusts through alms.

One of the government projects that has an effective impact on the poor is subsidies on certain foods, fuel, and other materials. In 1973, when the three-year plan began, there was support for one article for emigrants who left the West Bank during and after the 1967 war. However, the worldwide increase in the prices of foods and fuel (some or all of them imported) was the chief reason that the policy of subsidies was initiated. The volume of support reached 57.2 million Jordanian dinars in 1980 and declined to 43 million dinars in 1981. All of this is from the state budget.

The Proposed Strategy

Jordan is formulating a clearly defined strategy for fighting poverty. This strategy can be implemented by giving priority to the elimination of abasing poverty during the years 1985-1990 with implementation beginning as soon as possible. Serious thought must now be given to the problem of relative poverty, with special attention given to the relative shares of the lowest 40 percent in income. Any attempt to set quantitative targets at the present time is not realistic in the absence of recent and accurate statistics relating to the distribution of income. Therefore, priority must be given to the data related to the various aspects of poverty. After that, the desired relative shares for the various groups can be set. We can adopt much of the expertise of other states with regard to the connection between relative shares and economic development.

Rapid Population Growth

The study on the effects of rapid population growth on development in Jordan stated that many attempts have been made recently to understand the nature of the relationships to the presence of a positive relationship between these

two things. Formerly, the countries that have experienced rapid population growth have simultaneously experienced rapid economic progress. However, the opposite situation has appeared recently. The developing states that have low rates of income growth have also experienced rapid population growth in the past few decades--especially since World War II.

The question that comes up here is this: What are the probable effects of population growth on economic development? The answer to this question gives rise to a great deal of debate and contradiction. Therefore, there are conflicting policies. On the one hand, there are policies that see rapid population growth as the chief factor standing in the way of economic growth. These policies thus call for immediate intervention to curb rapid population growth. On the other hand, there are policies that see population growth as an incentive for increased economic development.

Foreign Transfers

This factor exhibits a dimension in which the positive saturation of this factor is increased by the per capita share of foreign transfers of capital, the per capita share of other services, the share of the total combined total per 1,000 persons, and the per capita share of imports. At the same time, a high negative saturation appears with the per capita share of industrial and agricultural production. This is in addition to its moderate negative change with other variables such as the per capita share of private consumption expenditures, education expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures as well as health expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures.

One thing that will be noted from the interdependence of the variables mentioned, which are embodied in the second factor, is the diminution of the per capita share of agricultural and industrial production, which leads to increased imports and then to foreign drafts of capital. There is apparently an increase in investment in the field of other services at the expense of industrial and agricultural production, which has led to an increase in the per capita share of other services and has weakened the per capita share of industrial and agricultural production. This may be attributable to investment in services that gives a quicker return than in industry and agriculture. In spite of that, other services are among the least productive activities after the agricultural sector. The phenomenon of the expansion of the base (other services) is a widespread phenomenon in most developing countries. It is attributable to the inability of the industrial sector to attract manpower. As a consequence, this manpower is transferred to those services that are characterized by low productivity.

The study added that the rapid rate of population growth has created a large population complex characterized by a young age distribution. This imposes a burden on the economy and its resources. This rapid population growth has worked to increase the pace of expansion in consumption, education, health, housing, and other services. So that the government could maintain prevailing living conditions, it has been forced to channel investment into the services sector at the expense of the productive sectors such as industry and agriculture. For this reason, the services sector has dominated the economic situation, which has led to small investment in productive sectors which in turn has limited the growth of wages and income to a certain extent.

Recommendations

Rapid growth has raised the level of the consumption sectors and lowered the per capita share of industry and agriculture. This has caused an increase in imports, which in turn has increased the drain of capital. The low level of wages in Jordan in comparison to the oil producing countries has led to an outward flow of Jordanian workers and has consequently increased the level of their transfers. These transfers have been absorbed in the fields of consumption in various forms. Accordingly, it is possible to continue on this course or to adopt two alternative policies. These are:

1. Permit the continued increase in population as long as this increase works to increase the number of workers abroad and thus increases transfers from emigrants. However, under these circumstances, the government must channel these transfers into the productive sectors, not the consumption sectors. This can be done through policy and appropriate incentives. This method [decreases] imports and therefore decreases the flow of capital abroad. However this policy would have a number of flaws if the host government were to limit the number of Jordanians working on its soil for political or other reasons. Other flaws in this policy include the fact that it affects development efforts in Jordan. This is because the individuals working abroad possess high qualifications. However, this can be remedied through programs aimed at training Jordanians residing within the country and through the importation of manpower from neighboring countries.

2. As long as population growth has negative effects on developments in Jordan (except for transfers from emigrants), the government has the power to adopt a policy aimed at gradually decreasing the rate of population growth. This in turn would have a positive effect on consumption, which would increase stock accumulation and thus investment in the productive sectors. Such a policy would undoubtedly work to improve the standard of living and the level of income.

8591

CSO: 4404/686

ACCOMPLISHMENTS, GOALS OF COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORTATION SECTOR NOTED

Tripoli AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in Arabic 1 Sep 82 p 13

[Article: "Transportation and Maritime Transport Sector: Complete Road Networks, New Airports, Mammoth Railroad Project and Augmented Air and Maritime Fleets"]

[Text] The importance of the transportation and communications sector in the comprehensive development of any society lies in this sector's effective influence on enhancing economic and social activities. Since its inception, the great 1 September revolution has exerted efforts to develop this sector because of its importance in acting as the arteries of life to various parts of the Jamahiriya through the construction of roads, domestic airports, ports and other projects in order to supply the best services to the citizens, facilitate their movement and supply them with products wherever they happen to be throughout the Jamahiriya.

Thus, the great 1 September revolution's awareness of the role played by the transportation and communications sector in economic and social development led to the allocation of a total sum of 1,185,155,000 Libyan dinars to finance the projects of the 1976-80 5-year plan.

The 1973-75 3-Year Plan for Development of the Transportation and Communications Sector

The total allocations for the transportation and communications sector, including roads, airports, maritime transport, public passenger transportation, postal services, telecommunications and meteorological observation, amounted to 160,840,500 dinars, of which 42.4 percent went to road construction, 20.9 percent to airports, 21.3 percent to postal services, 8 percent to air transportation and 5.4 percent to public transportation. Land transportation received 1.3 percent and meteorological observation .7 percent.

The plan's investment expenditures amounted to 122,904,867 Libyan dinars, representing 76 percent of the allocations. Spending on road construction alone amounted to 41.5 percent of the expenditures on the entire sector, spending on the postal sector 21.7 percent, on air transportation 7.8 percent, on public passenger transportation 6.6 percent, on land transportation .8 percent and on meteorological observation .7 percent.

The plan's completion rate for the sector's various activities ranged from 49 percent in land transportation to 93 percent in air transportation. Implementation of the plan encountered the following problems and difficulties:

Failure to adequately study some development projects before offering them for public bids. This required the issuance of modifying or complementary instructions during the process of implementation or the enactment of the system of stages, thus causing delays in implementation of the projects.

Entrusting some public sector companies with work beyond their implementation capability, thus causing these companies to fail to fulfill their commitments and to be unable to implement on schedule.

The weak capabilities of most of the private sector contractors, whether technically, administratively or financially.

Uncertainty about the prices of construction materials. This causes contractors to present high-priced bids, which are consequently rejected. As a result, new bid invitations are announced or the projects are postponed.

The difficulty of finding suitable plots of land on which to build workshops and warehouses.

The delay of some projects in the (housing control agencies) which causes delays in implementation.

Goals of the 1976-80 Transformation Plan for the Communications and Maritime Transportation Sector

The 1976-80 transformation plan for the communications and maritime transportation sector sought to enable transportation and communications services to keep pace with the economic development phase undergone by the Jamahiriyyah and to link this sector's needs with the economic planning for other activities.

Consequently, the following was taken into consideration:

Creating a complete network of main, subsidiary and agricultural roads.

Conducting studies on linking the various parts of the Jamahiriyyah by rail.

Developing the airports.

Building new airports and landing strips to link the various parts of the Jamahiriyyah.

Forming an air fleet for passengers and goods.

Setting up and equipping new workshops in all municipalities.

Developing public passenger transportation services.

Raising the capacity of the telephone exchanges and designing ground telephone networks.

Designing an automatic telephone and cable communications system.

Bolstering and expanding the international and internal communications networks.

Covering the various parts of the Jamahiriyah with meteorological observation stations to serve air traffic and agricultural and industrial research efforts.

Expanding and developing the Jamahiriyah's seaports and enlarging their capacities.

Developing the passenger, cargo and oil tanker fleet.

Conducting studies on the establishment of a naval college.

To achieve these goals, and others that cannot be mentioned here for lack of space, the 1976-80 transformation plan's allocations for all of this sector's activities amounted to 1,185,155,000 Libyan dinars, of which 1,089,536,638, or 92 percent, were spent.

Goals of the 1981-85 Plan for the Communications and Maritime Transportation Sector

The plan's general goals call for continuing the development and expansion of the communications and maritime transportation sector's utilities and enhancing the capability of the sector's workers, especially since this sector is considered the backbone on which depend all the other sectors, such as agriculture and industry, which are moving in long strides to expand and develop their plans, and is the sector, moreover, that links and provides services to the population centers.

The goals of this sector include the following:

Regarding roads: The plan seeks to complete the roads carried over from the previous plan and to pave a number of new main roads--excluding roads built by the municipalities--in order to complete linking the Jamahiriyah through main axes [highways], two of which are latitudinal, namely, that parallel to the coastal highway and the highway along latitude 28, and four vertical [longitudinal] axes, namely Ajbabya-Jalu-al-Kfarah-al'Uwaynat-Abu Qurayn-Waddan Waddan-Sabha-Umm al-Aranib-al-Qatrun Chad borders-Tripoli-al-'Aziziyah-Bi'r 'Ayyad-al-Jawsh-Nalut-Ghadamis. The plan seeks to conduct studies on Ghat-Tripoli-Charyan-Mazdah-al-Shuwayrif-Brak [highway].

Regarding railroads: The plan seeks to construct a number of railroad lines and to have studies and blueprints prepared for others, depending on the strategic importance of the lines. The targets include the Tripoli-Ra's Jadir and Tripoli-Misratah lines, the main railroad station in Tripoli, the

administrative building, the railroad training center and the workshops. Construction of the Misratah-Brak-Sabha line is to be started.

Regarding public passenger transportation: The plan seeks to enhance the efficiency of this utility by increasing the number of buses, supplying the buses needed for replacement, building and equipping workshops, building the central bus stations and setting up a center to train workers.

Regarding airports: The plan seeks to build, equip and develop three international airports, complete a network of 18 domestic airports, build 11 desert landing strips, complete the Civil Aviation Institute and develop and equip the Aviation Information, Research and Rescue Center, in addition to equipping the airports and supplying them with the necessary lighting, equipment and machinery.

Regarding air transportation: The plan seeks to bolster the passenger transportation air fleet to enable it to carry 10,000 passengers daily by the end of the plan. It also seeks to build a nucleus for an air cargo fleet.

Regarding ports: The plan emphasizes proper utilization of the capacity of existing ports through increased use of the automatic loading-unloading system, in addition to implementing port development projects to increase the ports' capacity to nearly 17 million tons annually.

Regarding maritime transportation: The plan seeks to enlarge the size of the existing fleet by augmenting it with a number of various kinds of ships so as to enable it to carry 40 percent of the Jamahiriya's international trade volume. The plan also seeks to build and equip the maritime college.

Regarding meteorological observation: The plan seeks to enable it to improve the standard of services it offers and to absorb new projects pertaining to the utilization of solar and wind energy and to the seeding of clouds. It also seeks to complete the project for the National Meteorological Observation Center, the construction and equipping of various kinds of new stations and the training and preparation of the needed national cadres.

8494

CSO: 4504/532

EFFORTS, EXPENDITURES TO IMPROVE UTILITIES SECTOR REVIEWED

Tripoli AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in Arabic 1 Sep 82 p 14

[Article: "Utilities Sector: Advanced Modern Services for Utilities of Age of Masses"]

[Text] The importance of the utilities sector stems from the services it offers the population centers, such as supplying potable water, paving and lighting streets, building public gardens and parks and providing sewerage and rainwater drainage services and environmental protection services.

The utilities sector's strategy is fundamentally based on improving and developing the services of the municipal utilities with the purpose of enhancing the rate of utilization of the existing projects and of raising the level of the utilized capacity to that of the designed capacity in order to achieve optimum utilization of these projects and strategic goals.

Accomplishments of Utility Sector From Time of Great 1 September Revolution to 30 June 1982

The utility sector plays a major role in the economic and social transformation plans by virtue of its firm link with the other sectors connected with the masses' indispensable needs.

The importance of this sector is evident in what it offers in meeting the masses' essential and vital needs, such as adequate and healthy sources of drinking water, a healthy environment adopting sanitary rainwater drainage and sewerage methods and paved and lighted roads for cities and villages within the approved plans. This sector also carries out numerous projects to protect the environment from pollution, in addition to building plants that process wastes into fertilizer and supplying modern machinery for sanitation purposes. Furthermore, this sector performs a vital role in recreation through the public parks it builds and the beaches it develops as a natural outlet for all citizens.

First, allocations:

The allocations made for this sector from the time of the revolution to the end of the 1981-85 5-year plan amount to 2,317,015,753 Libyan dinars distributed to the following programs:

Drinking water program: 529,232,000 Libyan dinars.

Sewerage and rainwater drainage program: 788,932,000 Libyan dinars.

Programs for other projects: 964,851,753 Libyan dinars.

Planning, studies and training program: 43 million Libyan dinars.

Second, contracts:

The total value of contracts concluded by 30 June 1982 amounted to 2,293,599,344 Libyan dinars, or 98 percent of the allocations. This sum is divided as follows:

Drinking water program: 451,550,115 dinars, or 85 percent.

Sewerage and rainwater drainage program: 777,274,984 dinars, or 98 percent.

Program for other projects: 1,056,934,022 dinars, or 109 percent.

Planning, studies and training program: 7,840,223 dinars, or 23 percent.

Third, accomplishments:

The value of the works completed from the onset of the great 1 September revolution up to 30 June 1982 amounted to 1,652,074,635 Libyan dinars, or the equivalent of 110 percent of all allocations by the end of 1982. This sum is divided among the sector's development programs as follows:

Drinking water program: 396,324,184 dinars, or 106 percent.

Sewerage and rainwater drainage program: 497,646,594 dinars, or 99 percent.

Program for other projects: 750,305,730 dinars, or 122 percent.

Planning, studies and training program: 7,798,127 dinars, or 50 percent.

Fourth, expenditures:

Total expenditures during the said period amounted to 1,644,181,432 Libyan dinars, or 109 percent of all allocations up to the end of 1982. The expenditures are divided as follows:

Drinking water program: 367,028,678 dinars, or 98 percent.

Sewerage and rainwater drainage program: 478,760,050 dinars, or 95 percent.

Program for other projects: 733,124,449 dinars, or 119 percent.

Planning, studies and training program: 65,268,255 dinars, or 420 percent.

Central Projects

Thus, the commitment existing by 1 July 1982 to the 1981-85 transformation plan amounts to 671,759,178 dinars, or 51 percent of the allocations for the 1981-85 plan. Numerous accomplishments have been scored during this period in the standard units of the program's sectors. These accomplishments are demonstrated in the following:

Drinking water program:

A total of 1,302 drinking water wells with a production capacity of 242,000 cubic meters daily have been surveyed.

A total of 832 ground and overhead storage tanks with a capacity of 430,000 cubic meters daily [as published] have been built.

Water networks with a total length of 7,919 kilometers and 294 water-pumping stations have been built.

A total of 38 drinking water treatment plants and water analyses laboratories have been built.

Sewerage and rainwater drainage program:

A total of 21 sewage water treatment plants with a daily capacity of 179,000 cubic meters and sewerage networks of various diameters with a total length of 3,021 kilometers have been built. A total of 125 pumping stations with a production capacity of 289,000 cubic meters daily have also been built.

Program for other projects:

A total of 3,914 kilometers of roads have been graded, paved and lighted.

A total of 171 parks with an area of 2,227,000 square meters have been built.

A total of 29 administrative buildings and numerous livestock markets have been built.

To develop and protect the environment, 130 modern slaughterhouses and 4 fertilizer plants in the cities of Tripoli, Benghazi and al-Jabal al-Akhdar have been built and 2,456 cleaning machines have been supplied.

The utility sector is also reexamining and developing the approved plans, which are nearly complete.

Final studies are also being conducted on utilities for 50 complete cities and villages throughout the various parts of the Jamahiriyah. Most of these studies are in their final stages.

The 1981-85 plan includes four main programs, namely: Drinking water, sewerage and rainwater drainage, other projects and planning, studies and

training; 1,304,850,000,000 dinars have been allocated for this plan. The sum is divided among the programs as follows:

Drinking water: 254,090,000 dinars.

Sewerage and rainwater drainage: 430 million dinars.

Other projects: 592,760,000 dinars.

Planning, studies and training: 28 million dinars.

The sum of 274 million dinars was allocated in the 1981 budget for the first year of the plan. This sum was divided among the various programs as follows:

Drinking water program: 55,385,000 dinars.

Sewerage and rainwater drainage program: 78,378,000 dinars.

Other projects: 133,336,000 dinars.

Planning, studies and training programs: 3.65 million dinars.

Last year, contracts were concluded for a total of 456 projects with a total value of 460 million dinars.

The sector has made accomplishments with a total value of 289 million dinars or 109 percent of the 1981 transformation budget. The sector's expenditures totaled nearly 343 million dinars, or 125 percent of the said year's allocations. The sector's accomplishments are represented in the following:

Eleven wells with a production capacity of 139,208 cubic meters daily.

Eleven water plants with a capacity of 28,654 cubic meters daily.

Construction of 65 ground and overhead storage tanks with a capacity of 140,110 cubic meters.

Construction of a water network with a length of 950 kilometers.

Grading and paving of roads with a length of 356 kilometers and an area of 4,798,000 square meters.

Lighting over an area of 269 square kilometers.

Twenty-one parks with an area of 183,000 square meters.

Training courses on the operation and maintenance of water purification plants.

The sum of 215 million dinars, divided over the various programs of the plan, was allocated in the 1981-85 5-Year plan for fiscal year 1982.

From the start of the year to the end of June 1982, contracts were concluded for 11 projects with a total value of 2,562,823 dinars. Thus, the commitment to the sector's plan up to 1 July 1982 amounted to 2,234,000,000 dinars, or 87 percent of the plan's allocations. The value of the works completed amounted to 160 million dinars or 74 percent of this year's allocations. The following has been completed [this year]:

Forty-two wells with a production capacity of 32,620 cubic meters.

Five pumping stations with a production capacity of 5,440 cubic meters.

Water networks with a length of 200 kilometers.

A total of 19 ground and overhead storage tanks with a capacity of 15,550 cubic meters.

Sewerage networks with a length of 55 kilometers.

Grading and paving of planned roads with a length of 151 kilometers and an area of 1,558,871 square meters.

Eight public parks with an area of 4,192 square meters.

In the sphere of studies, planning and training, most of the studies on reconsidering the plans have been completed.

As for conducting studies on and designing 50 cities and villages in various parts of the Jamahiriyah, these studies are in their final stages.

In implementation of the resolutions taken by the General People's Committee for Utilities at past meetings, out of awareness of the importance of applying modern management systems and in confirmation of the introduction of new concepts in the sphere of the sector's work, this secretariat has prepared a program for its work in the coming years--a program embodied in the following:

1. Developing systems used in managing the utility sector by introducing a computer system into some activities, such as the land register, documentation, civil affairs, and land and building surveys and by reviewing and redesigning projects, controlling plans and preparing follow-up charts.
2. Establishing specialized libraries and data centers for all municipal utilities and providing these utilities with the necessary documents and references.
3. Creating specialized cadres and training them to take over leadership positions in the future, as well as training and preparing skilled elements to perform the tasks of operating and maintaining the municipal facilities.
4. Developing means of communication in the municipal utilities and working to combine the activities of each municipality in a single building so as to

facilitate supervision, simplify the work and reduce costs and number of workers.

5. Exerting efforts to prepare capable and qualified leaders for the municipal guard and conducting refresher courses for members of the municipal guard corps.
6. Developing the system of tax and revenue collection and exerting efforts to find new revenues for the municipal utilities.
7. Developing the systems used to maintain the municipal utilities and studying ways to improve the machinery and equipment used in water and sewerage plants.
8. Drawing up a program for the maintenance of old cities and eliminating collapsed buildings according to the plans.
9. Applying the approved plans on the spot and preparing drawings of the layout of the public utilities in each municipality.
10. Exerting efforts to name and number streets and post direction signs on them.

These are some explanations of the efforts exerted in the utility sector to enhance its services. Your observations and opinions will be our best help in performing our duty.

8494

CSO: 4504/532

RECURRING EXPENSES SEMINAR CONSIDERS LIVESTOCK BREEDING POLICY

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 24, 27 Sep 82

[24 Sep 82 p 3]

[Text] An important national seminar on recurring expenses was held in Nouakchott between 13 and 16 September.

A number of subjects pertaining to all sectors of national life were taken up. Within this broad framework, Dr Gaye of the Livestock Department presented an important report on livestock breeding in our country for those attending the seminar.

The following is the first portion of that report.

Following the decade of drought our country has experienced, the livestock herd in Mauritania is suffering drastic effects. Therein lies the explanation for the livestock recovery policy.

We currently estimate the herds at:

Cattle--1,200,000
Goats and sheep--6,700,000
Camels--800,000
Horses, donkeys, etc.--185,000

In 1969, the national herd included nearly 2 million cattle and more than 8 million goats and sheep (obviously, these estimates should be regarded with caution).

In almost all cases, livestock breeding in Mauritania is of the extensive type, providing all of the stages in production from reproduction to the sale of meat in butcher shops under traditional conditions. This type of livestock breeding is characterized by the nomadic way of life and the seasonal moving of herds. We cannot therefore discuss certain livestock breeding subsectors you have listed in your master plan, such as fattening stations and ranches, finished product farms, etc., because these very simply still do not exist in our country.

Strategy for Livestock Development

Since independence was won, the strategy for the development of livestock breeding has been based on three sorts of activity:

1. Animal health measures, in particular the annual campaigns to combat the principle epizootic and other diseases: cattle plague, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, the telluric ailments, parasitoses, etc.
2. The safeguarding of natural pastureland through the establishment of the firebreak network.
3. Irrigation of pastureland through the digging of new wells and repair of existing ones.

These three activities have been pursued above all within the framework of the two projects we will discuss later on: the development of livestock breeding in the Southwest, financed by the World Bank, and the development of livestock breeding in the Southeast, financed by the European Development Fund (EDF).

Let us note that to date, these activities have served to benefit the livestock breeders at no cost to them.

Past Projects

A. Project to Develop Livestock Breeding in the Southeast

This project was financed by the EDF to the extent of 162 million UM [Mauritanian ouguiyas], which was initially 138 million UM.

Field Projects

1. Health Protection

General vaccination campaigns were organized by teams assigned for the purpose. They were designed to provide the herds with suitable immunization and were accompanied by popularization and training campaigns. This effort was accompanied by improvement in the basic infrastructures:

--Construction of three immunization centers and the installation of three new containment run pens.

--Supply of vehicles, cold storage and other equipment, and assumption of only a part of the following operational expenditures:

- a. Maintenance and operation of vehicles
- b. Acquisition of minor veterinary and livestock breeding equipment
- c. Supplementary supply of vaccines and medicine.

2. Irrigation of Pastureland

In this sector, it was possible to improve 70 wells, among other things by:

- Repairs and improvements to the pumping system
- Repair of the superstructures and casings
- Strengthening and equipping existing brigades.

3. Protection of Pastureland

The project developed a network of firebreaks, including almost 1,000 kilometers in the primary category and 3,000 kilometers in the secondary category.

Counterpart funds to cover certain recurring expenditures for this project came to 20 million in all, at 5 million per year for 4 years, covered by the state budget.

B. Project for the Development of Livestock Breeding in the Southwest

Same activities as above.

This project was financed in the amount of 264 million UM.

Activities

1. Health protection, as above.
2. Irrigation of pastureland, including the repair, reconstruction and maintenance of 300 wells, establishment of 3 well maintenance teams and the purchase of the necessary equipment, and construction of 15 new pastureland wells.
3. Protection of natural assets: the development and annual maintenance of a protective system including 6,500 kilometers of firebreaks.

The counterpart funds to cover certain recurring expenditures for this project came to 16 million in all, i.e., an average of 4 million per year covered by the state budget. Subsequently, the government undertook an agreement to guarantee certain actions for 10 years, particularly in connection with animal health and the protection of natural assets, and after the completion of various aspects of the project, to guarantee the maintenance and upkeep of facilities and to develop, as the need arises, the funds, installations, services, and other resources needed to this end.

C. Other Individual Aid Provided

Purchase of several dozen cold storage installations and vehicles by the FAO, OSRO, UNDP [UN Development Program] and CEAO.

D. Participation in the Animal Health Program in Mauritania

In the amount of 20 million UM, allocated for the construction of a veterinary pharmacy and the purchase of vehicles.

E. Projects Being Implemented

1. Supplying cadres for the Gorgol livestock breeders.

This project has two phases: one for staffing in an initial phase, followed by a second livestock-fattening phase.

The project comes to a total of 16 million UM.

Recurring expenses of nearly 1 million UM.

2. Iraqi Projects:

--Construction of 10 veterinary clinics, involving a total of 60 million UM.

--Construction of the livestock breeding office, at a cost of 13 million UM.

--Construction of a central garage, costing 8 million UM.

--Purchase of vehicles for 16 livestock-breeding subsections and cold storage equipment.

There is no provision for the recurring expenses anywhere, and the estimates of these costs should come to between 7 and 8 million UM."

[27 September 82 p 3]

[Text] In our 24 September issue (No 2121), we published the first part of the report presented by Dr Gaye of the Livestock Breeding Department on livestock breeding methods in our country to a seminar held on recurring expenditures held between 13 and 16 September in Nouakchott.

The following is the conclusion of this important report.

"As can be seen, the efficiency coefficient fell below standard, except for the year 1960 (which is understandable), showing that for more than 20 years now, the efficiency of the livestock breeding department has truly dropped, tending almost toward total paralysis, which would have already occurred without the contribution of foreign financing, to obtain which the department is currently deploying every effort.

This year, for example, the Livestock Breeding Department has had, for all its operations (purchase of biological and pharmaceutical products, fuels, ingredients, vehicle maintenance, etc.) only a total of 10 million UM. However, by way of example, to treat the young cattle in our country against a single disease today--gastrointestinal parasitosis--the sum of 13 million

UM would be needed simply for the purchase of pesticides. This does not include the cost of transportation and shipment in a vast country, to serve a scattered population which is constantly on the move.

This credit obtained from the state budget does not allow us to continue our traditional activities, much less to safeguard the vital investments made earlier, or even to equip our mobile teams and clinics suitably.

Foreign Financing

If livestock breeding has worked more or less satisfactorily it is thanks to these projects financed by foreign aid. But within the operational framework, two major problems can be noted even on this level:

1. Foreign aid took into account only a part of the recurring expenditures. A large part of them had to be covered by domestic counterpart funds. If we take by way of example the two past livestock breeding development projects (EDF and IDRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development]), the state would have to allocate from its budget the sum of 9 million UM per year for certain operational expenditures which are absolute prerequisites to the goals to be achieved. Now 9 million per year comes to something like the equivalent of the budget funds allocated to the Livestock Department for all its activities. We believe that the establishment of these counterpart funds when the plan was conceived totally lacked realism. Although the government made a great effort to respect its commitments, the administrative procedures and financial legislation in effect were such that it took considerable time to obtain the money allocated for the purpose of certain specific actions which were to be specified then, and which could brook no delay. This explains certain unplanned allocations in the program at certain points in time.

2. When this project was completed, the state undertook signed agreements, as we have said, promising to continue to cover the recurring expenditures. Now 9 or 10 million per year would not under any circumstances serve to cover all these expenditures, if we realize that on an average:

- Vaccines and other treatment items for the care of one animal cost 40 UM per year.

- The maintenance of 1 kilometer of a firebreak 6 meters wide costs 600-1,000 UM.

- To maintain wells of an average depth of 50 meters properly, the cost is between 30-40,000 UM per well per year.

It is quite simply impossible for the state to cover the recurring expenditures on these major completed projects under the present conditions. It goes without saying that whatever the commitment for which the government has contracted, these expenditures are determined when the execution of these projects has been completed.

Suggestions and Recommendations

1. We believe that in drafting plans, recurring expenditures should be studied much more carefully. The obtaining of financing for these expenditures should be one of the prerequisites for the execution of these projects. The Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Planning should make every effort to find financing for the operation of all of these facilities which the livestock office has been able to secure.

It is not only a question of finding financing for the planned investments, but it is necessary also and above all to consider the situation after the completion of these investment projects.

2. The program for past projects often involved a number of phases which could not be termed integrated, and which are complex and costly to carry out. Thus less ambitious and more feasible projects would be more advantageous, and the followup after completion would be, in our view, easier.

3. The planning departments should further place greater stress on project selection. They should make a systematic evaluation of the projects proposed.

A search for a method of selecting projects based on the overall national goals in terms of development is essential.

5. The past method of covering recurring expenditures on development projects--that is to say the financing of some of them within the framework of the project carried out by the lender, followed by state financing after completion--is not, in our view, the best formula. This situation involves many difficulties and does not prove satisfactory.

There is justification for trying something else. This is what the Livestock Department, which is aware of the scope of the problem, plans to do now. It is in this connection, within the framework of our major future projects--Development of Livestock Breeding in the Southeast No 2, by the EDF, and Development of Livestock Breeding in the Southwest No 2, by the World Bank, that information, training and above all participation in the achievement of these projects by the livestock breeders will be pursued. A rotating fund of production factors will be made available to the livestock breeders, which will be transferred to themselves and by themselves for financial consideration, except where the prophylactic campaign against cattle plague and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia is concerned.

But obviously, this cannot be done without prior organization of the livestock breeders. We think that such organization represents the primary stage of any activity, not only in production, but also in participation in certain recurring expenditures, both for the exploitation and the rational management of the natural environment, the infrastructures developed, and the handling of the herds.

The organization of the population in a specific framework on all levels of the production and marketing systems is a necessity. It is only through

organization and participation directly on the base level that our livestock breeders can participate in the recurring expenditures to which our projects give rise.

Thus it is a question of gradually motivating and training these people for change. It is with this in view that the livestock office, with its two EDF and BM projects and the project to provide cadres for the Gorgol livestock breeders (FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund]), will attempt to establish, on an experimental basis first of all, organization of this sort and of livestock supports (staffing with cadres, popular education, training of livestock breeders and staffing agents, and marketing). This last mentioned element is basic. In fact, whatever concept is developed and popularized, no participation by the population involved in recurring expenditures is possible if it is not accompanied by a proper marketing policy, that is to say the development of prices to the producer. This is an acute problem, but it should be mastered with a true political will.

6. Our strategy of livestock breeding development is essentially based on the management of pastureland. Once organized, our livestock breeders can take over a large part of the recurrent expenditures created where the management of pastureland, water resources and animal resources is concerned.

a. Management of Pastureland

The management of pastureland involves a number of activities: combatting brush fires, the production of hay and silage, rotation and regeneration of pasture areas, reforestation and land management of pasturage, etc. Here we will speak only of firebreaks to combat brush fires, which cost the state heavily. The battle against brush fires cannot be waged without the participation of the people. In addition to campaigns to make the livestock breeders aware of the dangers posed by brush fires, in terms of the immediate damage they cause to pastureland and crops, the establishment of firebreaks by the people, organized with the assistance of cadres and the authorities should be one of the goals of the departments concerned. (Hasn't the national volunteer movement established patterns which we are currently taking pride in imitating?)

Management of Animal Resources

Where animal health is concerned, we think that the state cannot pay the cost of all veterinary care.

The people must begin to take responsibility for a large part of the veterinary care their herds need.

The establishment of veterinary pharmacies should be planned in order to meet the urgent needs of the people.

5157

CSO: 4519/15

DEVELOPMENT IN EDUCATION EXAMINED

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 16 Sep 82 pp 3, 8

[Text] The conference on recurring expenses of development projects and programs continued at ENA yesterday for the third consecutive day.

Among other things, the conference attendees examined an estimate of recurring expenses for the Fourth Economic and Social Development Plan.

Today we are publishing the second part of this estimate which is devoted to recurring expenses in the national education sector.

2.1 Overall View

For several years, the Mauritanian educational system has faced a series of bottlenecks which have slowed its expansion despite the human and financial effort which has been devoted to it.

In addition to the natural constraints found in the country (dispersed population, vast territory, inadequacy of the communications network), the system is very expensive and not very functional. The school attendance rate is 25 percent, although it varies according to region with the urban population receiving more education than the rural population. Internal efficiency is mediocre (high level of waste), and the teaching is poorly adapted to the economic reality of the country, especially with regard to the labor market.

In 1978, public expenditures for education amounted to more than 5 percent of the nation's gross domestic product, and in 1980 they represented 16 percent of the total state operating budget. Table 2.1 shows us the growth in operating expenses from 1971 to 1980 by level and type of education.

Table 2.1

Operating Expenses by Level of Education
1971-1980
in million ouguiyas and percentages

<u>Level of Education</u>	<u>1971</u>		<u>1975</u>		<u>1980</u>	
Elementary Education	201.06	54.3%	327.6	45.3%	567.98	37.9%
Secondary Education	84.61	22.8	185.8	25.7	431.91	28.8
Teacher Education and Pedagogic Research ¹	17.74	4.8	43.7	6.0	144.62	9.7
Technical Education, Professional Training and Higher Education ²	56.87	15.4	161.4	22.3	337.7	22.5
Estracurricular education and central administration	9.94	2.7	4.6	0.7	16.41	1.1
TOTAL - Education Sector ³	370.22	100%	723.1	100%	1,498.62	100%

Source: State Budget.

1. Including the Advanced Teacher Training School and the National Pedagogic Institute.

2. Including national stipends for study abroad.

3. Not including the national contribution to technical assistance and housing expenses for emigrants recruited under Mauritanian contract.

Thus, in 1980, 38 percent of total operating expenses for education were devoted to elementary education, while elementary education included 81 percent of the school population. Secondary education received 17 percent of the students and spend 29 percent of total operating expenses on them. Although still hardly developed, higher, technical and professional education (2 percent of total students) represented 22 percent of total operating expenses in 1980.

2.2 Objectives of the Fourth Plan

For the 1981-1985 period, the Fourth Economic and Social Development Plan has selected the following objectives for the education sector:

a) increasing the school population, going from 85,000 students in elementary education in 1980 to 138,000 in 1985 (passing to a school attendance rate of 35 percent). In secondary education, the increase in the school population for the same period has been established at 13,600 students;

- b) promoting the training of Mauritanian teachers with the training of 1,670 elementary education teachers on the one hand, and "Mauritanization" of secondary school teachers on the other hand;
- c) development of educational facilities through a program of construction and expansion of schools and colleges. This program will consist of two-thirds expansion and one-third new construction;
- d) continuing education for teachers by means of courses at the National Pedagogic Institute;
- e) teaching assistance, including the preparation of manuals for elementary and secondary instruction;
- f) reducing the costs of education by the implementation of organizational measures and methods by the school administration;
- g) establishment of an Institute of National Languages as part of a program to recognize regional languages.

Taking these objectives into consideration, a group of projects which we list in Table 2.2 has been selected. Note that this list has been modified and does not include all the projects initially planned by school officials.

Table 2.2: Educational Projects--Fourth Economic and Social Development Plan 1981-1985

<u>Title</u>	<u>Cost in Million Ouguiyas</u>	<u>Outside Financing</u>	<u>Source of Domestic Financing</u>	<u>Domestic Financing</u>
Construction of 1,000 classrooms for elementary education	885	885	n.d.	-
Construction of 10 elementary schools	80	80	Iraq	-
Construction of 300 classrooms for secondary education	450	450	n.d.	-
Construction of a lycee and 3 colleges	140	140	Iraq	-
Construction of a 100-bed dormitory and a library (ENI Rosso)	60	60	Iraq	-
Construction of a maritime training center*	120	120	EDF	+
CEG teacher training center*	282	282	ADB	-

Expanding the administrative staff of the Ministry of National Education*	175	175	IBRD/ADB	-
Regionalizing the Center for Advanced and Professional Training*	500	500	n.d.	-
Expansion of the ENA ¹	90	90	FSD	-
Expansion of the ENS ²	70	70	FSD	-
Expansion of the ENISF ³	80	80	ADB	-
Nouakchott National University	2,000	2,000	n.d.	-
Establishment of a BTS division at the Lycee Technique	250	250	n.d.	-

1. National School of Administration
2. Advanced Teacher Training School
3. expansion unknown

2.3 Estimating Recurring Expenses

Our approach to estimating recurring expenses varies according to the project or group of projects. Thus, for all projects involving elementary and secondary education, we approached the calculation not as a function of each project, but rather as a function of the quantitative objectives set by the plan. The reasoning underlying this approach is that all the facilities projects planned are ultimately intended to increase the school population. We have therefore based our estimates of recurring expenses on this objective.

For the other educational projects, we approached the question in a more conventional manner by estimating all the corresponding operating costs project by project.

In Table 2.3, as a guideline, we present all the basic data to which we referred in our calculations.

2.3.1 Elementary Education

First of all, we estimated the cost of establishing the facility, and secondly, the corresponding recurring expenses for the 1981-1985 period.

2.3.1.1 Cost of Facilities

The plan includes construction of 1,000 classrooms and 10 elementary schools. Of these two projects, only the second has received financing from Iraq. Despite uncertainties as to its completion, we have estimated the construction

program for 1,000 classrooms. In conformance with the plan objectives, we have assumed that this program will consist of two-thirds expansion and one third new construction. We have also assumed that this program will be uniformly completed during the plan period.

Taking these assumptions into consideration, in Table 2.4 we present the schedule for construction and expansion work for the 1981-1985 period.

The construction costs vary considerably depending on whether it is an expansion or construction.

At any rate, a stronger and stronger tendency toward regionalization of school construction and expansion programs is noted at the Ministry of Elementary and Secondary Education. Instead of having the work done under state supervision, the government is entrusting the jobs to local contractors, thus cutting construction costs in half. For our part, we will assume that the entire expansion program will be entrusted to subcontractors, while the construction of new schools will be state supervised.

Construction and equipment costs, taking an average deferment of 30 percent into consideration, are indicated in Table 2.5.

Using the two preceding tables, we can estimate the total investment required for elementary education, an estimate which we present in Table 2.6. However, this table necessitates the following comments:

- 1) the expansion program has been estimated at half the state-supervised construction cost;
- 2) for the year 1980-1981, we have added in the construction costs for the 10 elementary schools financed by Iraq. These schools officially opened on this date;
- 3) to Table 2.6, we have added the investment in equipment required for the operation of the entire infrastructure. The equipment includes vehicles, duplicating machines, typewriters and photocopiers. Cost and quality were estimated by taking into consideration the standards set by the Ministry of Elementary and Secondary Education. The breakdown of these costs is shown in the Annex.

9693

CSO: 4519/16

PROBLEM OF ILLEGAL ALIENS EXAMINED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 713, 11-17 Aug 82 pp 3-7

[Article: "Runaway Workers"]

[Text] Runaway workers has become one of the most famous "press corners" in our newspapers. It is no exaggeration that in any daily newspaper scores of advertisements appear each day, announcing the escape of a group of workers and warning against hiring or sheltering them. These ads have recurred and increased, until they have become a phenomenon in our lives. Despite the fact that we are nearly unique in this phenomenon, aside from the Gulf states, it unfortunately has not aroused anyone to scientifically and objectively look into its roots and reach the best solution to put an end to its evil consequences on individuals, organizations and above all on the nation. Undoubtedly, there is a "group" that benefits from the presence of these workers, and from trafficking in them, and there is another group that benefits from the phenomenon. The latter group hides behind these workers and profits from them. We reject all this, because we reject everything that is wrong in our lives. We demand a reconsideration of the basis of the problem of runaway workers, in order to protect our country's security. This is our issue for this week.

This issue causes us to lose sleep, not because it is a provocative press matter, but because it is an issue that concerns the nation.

Therefore, we are committing ourselves to deal with it in an objective manner, rationally and calmly, without any sensationalism.

Our discussion of this issue will be on three intellectual axes that will complement each other.

--The first theme will deal with the causes of the phenomenon.

--The second theme will clarify the consequences that derive from it.

--The third theme will look at solutions and proposals.

Any social or non-social problem cannot be scientifically or practically solved, unless one first determines its causes. That is, we must analyze

the phenomenon before anything else, in order to answer a group of questions that begins with one simple question, which nearly crystallizes the entire issue. That question is: Why do the workers run away?

In AL-YAMAMAH, through our coexistence with social reality in this country, we were able to answer this question, but we did not want to do this. We preferred to get the answer from the mouths of those who really know. In this regard, AL-YAMAMAH met with scores of workers of all nationalities, especially those having frequent cases of runaways. In the end, it was possible to obtain 10 reasons that could have a bearing on the factors of the runaway worker, with all the consequences that that entails. These 10 reasons were "distilled" from the hundreds of answers that were given by the workers, including Pakistanis and others from Bangladesh, Egypt, Syria, Southeast Asia and elsewhere. These reasons can be summarized as follows:

1. The first reason which more than any other causes the worker to flee is his sensitivity to exploitation, whether that exploitation is mental or material. The latter, especially, is the one that causes the worker to run away, regardless of the consequences, because the worker who came from his country, or rather, who came here seeking a better life and is rewarded with exile and harsh labor, unless the pay counterbalances those conditions, the worker will have no recourse but to escape.

2. The reason that follows this in importance might be somewhat surprising. It is that the conditions of the job have turned out to be completely different from the terms of the contract that he signed in his country before coming here. The conditions might be different in terms of the pay, or the place and time of work, or the nature of the work itself. However, the important point is that the contract's lack of agreement with the job itself forms an important cause of workers running away. Therefore, the labor contracts must be realistic, objective and fair, if we want to find a solution to this phenomenon.

3. One of the causes of workers running away is the state of misinformation that surrounds the worker. This occurs in his country regarding the nature of life and the standard of living in the kingdom. A worker from Bangladesh told us that he works in one of the cleaning companies and his pay is only 17 riyals a day. They told him in his country that he could eat three meals in the kingdom for not more than three riyals and that living was very cheap. When he came to the kingdom, he was amazed to find that all his daily pay was only sufficient for food. He ran away from his job in the cleaning company and is looking for another job.

This means that the process of obscuring and concealing the facts, and giving false information about the nature of life here, is one of the causes for workers to run away. Of course, that is the responsibility of the brokers who offer this spurious information.

4. The existence of imaginary organizations. The worker, as soon as he arrives, discovers that they do not exist, or rather, that he has come here merely to be dealt with by some in these organizations that are nothing more

than some individuals and offices that do not carry out any real work or production. These organizations themselves encourage the workers to flee, because they deal in their incomes. They divide up this income with them.

5. Another reason is that the worker finds a job in another place, with better pay. This means that the freedom of work in the kingdom, and its expanding fields, gives the worker the freedom to move around from place to place and from job to job. If the "labor market" in the kingdom were restricted in one way or another, and regulated to some degree by regulations, cases of running away would be cut down considerably. This means that the open labor market in all parts of the kingdom must be reexamined in terms of the regulations that control it.

6. One of the reasons for workers to run away is that probably this person is a technical or specialized worker, who is working outside of his specialty, or a technical worker placed in a non-technical job, for example. This would certainly cause him to flee. This means bringing in everyone without any control, and letting freedom reach the point of uncontrolled anarchy as well. This would contribute to the downfall of a group of objective and practical standards that must control the system of labor. Accordingly, one of the terms of bringing a worker into the country must be that the person works in his speciality.

7. The lowering of the educational level, or rather, the lowering of the civilized conscious level in general among the workers might cause them to run away. The civilized worker cannot resort to "flight" as proper behavior, but the worker who is lacking in education, culture or experience is well-suited by his nature to behave in any manner incompatible with the system. Therefore, establishing standards for selecting individuals before they are brought in might be an important way in which to effectively reduce the phenomenon of running away.

8. The worker might resort to fleeing from his job or from his sponsor under the inducement of a relative working in another place or in another country. A Palestinian worker told us that there is a natural tendency for each group or nationality to stick together in a work place. Therefore, natives of each country congregate together. The problem might increase when the members of one family congregate together in some place, and they make an attempt to stay in the same place together. This means that the inducement of relatives or compatriots might be an important motive behind the flight of workers from their jobs.

9. An owner of one of the large firms told us that the small companies operating in the kingdom had created several frauds concerning labor regulations, which are helping to spread this phenomenon. One of these fraudulent practices is the so-called "open visa," which permits the worker to move and work as he wishes. Because of these practices, 99 percent of the contracts that the workers get from these organizations are irregular contracts. If the employer himself is not subject to the law, why should we impose it on the worker. It is self-evident that he will also violate this law. That is, the "responsibility of the citizen" is what leads to the worker's

sensitivity toward responsibility or the lack of it. Whenever the citizen is responsible, the worker will be responsible as a consequence.

10. Another reason leading to the spread of this phenomenon is that the punishments, whether against the worker or against the employer are ultimately ineffective and non-detering penalties. The worker's punishment for running away or staying behind is deportation. The punishment against the employer, who brought in workers under fraudulent conditions and who let them live in whatever work areas they desired, varies between 2000 and 5000 riyals. These kinds of penalties encourage people to violate the law.

These are the 10 reasons that nearly summarize why workers run away from their jobs. These reasons, which have become quite well known, are encompassed by the hundreds of sad and unfortunate stories. On any morning on al-Batha' Street, one can meet with a number of these astonishing human examples. What concerns us now is not just the effect of this phenomenon on individuals, but also on the nation itself.

Undoubtedly, the phenomenon has a negative effect on people, but its consequences for society itself is the greater danger. That is what compels us to raise this matter.

It is possible to enumerate these consequences in the following manner:

1. The flight of the workers represents an acute form of breaking the law. It is a case of constant violation of the law. The fugitive worker means a violation of the law on his part, and a violation of the law by his sponsor. The hundreds or rather thousands of workers that we see every day, apart from the hundreds of ads in the newspapers that refer to the flight of workers, gives a good picture of the size of the problem. In a country that is building itself, we must begin now to clearly apply the law, even to the point of harshness sometimes. This phenomenon means that there is "anarchy" that must be stopped.
2. The flight of tens of thousands of workers throughout the kingdom, in every city and village, will in one way or another lead to the breakdown of jobs and projects, some of which might be important and cannot afford to be idled. It goes without saying that we are certainly a country that is building itself, and the flight of these workers will disrupt this building, which we must hasten to complete.
3. The flight of the workers in this fashion indeed means that a huge burden is being placed on the backs of the agencies concerned. That is, we are adding another burden to the burdens of government, including pursuit, arrest and deportation. The processes are overburdening the security agencies, and the reason is that we are sheltering them!
4. The spread of the phenomenon in this way means that there is a group of middlemen or brokerage offices that profit without taking part in any real productive efforts, either in the construction or servicing of this nation. This is a bad thing, the factor of agents and brokerage offices for workers, and it must be stopped at once.

5. The presence of these workers in the tens of thousands, whether they are illegal aliens or fugitives, spreads a condition of undisciplined security throughout the kingdom. The fugitive worker, not by what he does but by what he could do, is a factor that could spread anarchy and upset the people's spirit, security and stability. It alarms the security authorities, who are preoccupied with the people's security.

6. The presence of tens of thousands of this type puts an additional burden on the public utilities and services in the country.

These people are, in one way or another, using the state's utilities, but they in fact are not effective or productive elements in their construction. Therefore, they represent a burden on the nation, instead of being a help to it.

7. The spread of this phenomenon casts a shadow which, ultimately, harms the "nation's reputation," because the fugitive worker has fled from material or moral conditions that he could not tolerate. This distorts the image of the kingdom to others. This is a matter that we do not need; on the contrary, we reject it and stand against everything that it promotes.

All of these negative consequences mean that the phenomenon of fugitive workers has become a social factor that merits debate and study. In fact, we are not against the workers, nor are we against the employers. However, we are also not for them. We, first and foremost, are for the law, the interests of the nation and the Ministry of Interior, which is distressed by this phenomenon. And then finally, we are for the human considerations and aspects in this matter.

There are two very important aspects that we must study before we attack these fugitive workers and those thousands of people banished by the deportation offices.

The first aspect is connected with the employers themselves. We don't want to deceive ourselves and claim that all employers in the kingdom are like those who deal in the sweat of the worker, and the right of the worker himself to his efforts. The truth is, of course, the opposite of this. But we know that there is a group that brings in the workers for its own profit. There is another group that employs the workers and then takes large amounts from the income of their jobs. This type of person deals in hundreds of workers, and then each month takes some sum or other from each of them, without any work or without even any investment or share in the construction of this country. This is a case of dealing in the sweat of people and their livelihood, in exchange for sponsoring them.

Nevertheless, there is another group more "honorable" than this. This group brings in workers, so that they can in fact work for them. However, the question is: What wages do these employers pay to the workers? The fact is that the level of wages in the kingdom, in the private sector, with regard to foreign workers has declined to a degree that cannot be imagined. Whenever prices rise, and the level of income rises, workers' wages are reduced.

There are those working in the kingdom now for a monthly wage that might be less than 400 riyals. What can we expect from a worker who earns this kind of a wage?

Naturally, he runs away, or wanders aimlessly, or looks for an alternative job. The important point is that the behavior of some of us is what causes these workers to break the law. Then after that, these workers become the suspects. Nevertheless, in fact, they are the victims of some of us. Therefore, before we talk about the responsibility of these workers for staying behind, we should first look at the causes hidden behind their being fugitives.

The second aspect, which may seem to be a moral aspect, but is so important that it should not be covered up, is the collapse of all the worker's dreams of a "paradise on earth," for which he has come, as soon as he arrives in the kingdom. The worker brings a dream with him from his country, of a rich society where he will find the opportunity to work and prosper. However, he is quickly shocked by reality. He discovers that the paradise that he came for is only a "large labor camp," from which he wants to get the most he can, but he is shocked to find that the pay is low, the prices high and the cost of living on the rise. He cannot save, he cannot stay, but at the same time, he cannot return to his country. At the instant that this individual coming from Africa or Asia discovers all these factors, the beautiful dream begins to evaporate, and all the factors of discipline and sound behavior evaporate with it. At that instant that person may resort to anything, flight, staying behind, breaking the law, fraud or working in more than one place. The important point in all cases is that this not become the regular model for the worker, who has to be disciplined. This is where the mission of the agencies begins, which deport this person, without anyone thinking for an instant about the nature of the material circumstances that forced him into this undesirable behavior.

Despite all this, we do not support mistakes or breaking the law. Therefore, before deporting violators, we demand an answer to this simple question: why did they violate the law?

When we answer this question, we must refer back to the deportation offices in the kingdom and their mission, which is to search for those who stay behind, arrest them and deport them. We should say that this method that these offices follow might be impractical and a burden on the state, and most especially on the Ministry of the Interior. The process of pursuing and arresting every person walking down the street is impossible and a process that requires a great deal of time and effort. In the end, it might lead to a suspension of the jobs of citizens and persons from abroad who have unintentionally forgotten to carry their identity cards, which puts the deportation officials in an embarrassing position. This is aside from the fact that many of those persons know the men of the deportation offices by sight and have become aware of the times in which they begin their raids and the places that they go to.

AL-YAMAMAH met with Captain Sa'id al-Ghamidi, director of the deportation office in Jiddah, to learn whether there were other means that the office

follows in order to face up to this problem, other than the raids that it carries out on the city's streets. The "reply" was that the office, apart from the investigatory campaigns on the streets, carries out other raids on civilian offices and organizations and workers' communities, looking for illegal aliens. Moreover, the State Deportation Bureau is currently studying the possibility of devising a better plan and a more comprehensive way of putting an end to this phenomenon.

Perhaps the statement we heard from the director of the deportation office in Jiddah, about the intention of the State Bureau of Deportation to find other ways and better means of dealing with this situation, confirms the unsuccessfulness of the idea of these raids and the belief of officials in the need to look for better alternatives.

There is no doubt that the alternatives for which the Bureau is looking will be considerably better than those currently being applied. If we look at the current law, despite the negative aspects to which we referred, the deportation offices have not achieved any goal except to go around in a circle. This circle that we mean is the deportation officers continuing to arrest a violator, deporting him to his country, so that he can return again and become a transient guest. Thus the situation continues and ultimately becomes one that is in the interests of the "illegal alien," on the one hand, and increases the troubles and problems of the deportation officers on the other. The reason is that this "deportee" can have a new passport issued by his country for any reason. If the kingdom's consulates abroad were provided with the names of those "deportees," none of them could return again.

The fact is that the matter of stopping the raids is unlikely, but what is hoped for is that there will be specific regulations and special arrangements made for coordination between officials in the government and officials in the nations from which most of these violators come, so that the line of retreat can be blocked for those for whom a deportation order has been issued as a result of their violating the law.

After that, it comes down to the raids having to be concentrated and organized, beginning with the organizations, firms and all the civilian offices. There must be severe penalties for those who support the violations and help to broaden them. There must also be surprise raids at the entry points of the kingdom's cities, so that the inspection can include both rental and private cars, because most owners of private cars can carry illegal aliens due to a personal connection, or blood ties or for material interest. On the contrary, some private car owners undertake to transport those illegal persons from one city to another for very large sums of money, which results in their covering up for them. In addition to this, there must also be strict identification of all travellers on domestic flights, and coordination with Saudi Airlines, so as not to issue tickets to any traveller before ascertaining his identification. This identity card must be valid. It would be best when issuing these instructions for the Public Relations Office in the Ministry of the Interior to circulate them to all the kingdom's embassies abroad, in the form of small pamphlets that could accompany the passport of any traveller, whether on a visit, minor pilgrimage or the pilgrimage, so

that he can be familiar with the laws and regulations in force within the kingdom. This should include the violations and the penalties that will be applied when violations occur. We would thus fulfill our responsibility regarding any individual who does not adhere to the laws of the country and attempts to remain here without official permission, while at the same time we will have also achieved another goal, which can be summarized as enlightening everyone who comes to the kingdom and tries to remain here without a visa or valid work permit as to the consequences and penalties which he can suffer, when he embarks on a deed such as this.

We also met with Captain Muqarran 'Abdullah Mutayri, director of the office of illegal aliens, and posed several questions to him regarding this same issue. His replies were frank and spontaneous.

[Question] Approximately how many workers are detained each day?

[Answer] Between 150 and 200 workers each day. As for the number who leave, that does between 150 and sometimes 300 workers every day.

[Question] Do you believe that the percentage of workers who run away is rising?

[Answer] Yes, the percentage is rising, because the number of firms and organizations that employ workers is rising.

[Question] What is the direct cause?

[Answer] Salary. When he makes a contract in his country for a specific wage, and then is shocked later when he comes here by the deficiencies of that wage, or the existence of a higher wage in another place for the same job, then he runs away.

[Question] What is the effect of this flight?

[Answer] The flight has a very negative effect. When the person leaves his sponsor, he becomes an unknown person. He might do anything, and then he will become a violator. In addition, running away causes projects to be delayed and puts pressure on public services. There is also the loss that the fugitive causes his sponsor, when he is brought in and later deported.

[Question] What community has the most violations?

[Answer] The Pakistani; it has the most number of fugitives and illegal aliens, since it comprises 90 percent of the total. The remaining 10 percent is distributed among the other nationalities.

[Question] What are these workers' crimes?

[Answer] There are three, violation, staying behind and running away. The violator is the person who comes with the sponsorship of an organization or firm, works with it for a while, and then leaves the job. The stay-behind is the one who comes for a visit or the pilgrimage or the minor pilgrimage, and does not return to his country.

[Question] What are the penalties?

[Answer] With respect to the stay-behind, it is deportation. If a person employs an illegal alien, then he pays a fine of between 2000 and 10,000 riyals and imprisonment of 2 to 6 weeks.

[Question] Are there other actions against illegal aliens other than deportation?

[Answer] The only penalty is deportation. He is detained until the actions are completed. If he has made money from his job during the period of his staying behind, we let him keep it, out of humanitarian considerations.

[Question] If he is deported, is the illegal alien permitted to enter the kingdom again?

[Answer] Yes, if he enters legally.

[Question] Do you find that some illegal aliens have large amounts of money?

[Answer] Sometimes. We check the source of it, to make sure there has been no robbery. Then we let them keep it.

[Question] What if he does not have the price of a ticket?

[Answer] We pay the deportation costs.

[Question] Does influence play a role with regard to sponsors who are in violations?

[Answer] I will answer frankly, yes. Influence plays a role. When influence intervenes, it weakens the effect of the law. It consequently lessens respect for authority. Sometimes the person comes and says, "allow me to help him." It is illogical for you to come and go with workers, and then at the end of every month, you take 500 riyals from each of them. Then when he stands there saying "allow me," how can I help a person like this. Sometimes we receive orders from higher authorities, and we explain everything to these authorities. We say that this person is supposed to be punished for such and such. One is seldom freed from punishment, because this is a question of conscience and the law.

[Question] What about the forging of passports?

[Answer] There is forgery, and the Ministry of Interior is very concerned about this matter. About 99 percent of passport forgery is done outside the kingdom. Forgery was very bad some years ago. We used to detain the person and search for the company or organization. If it was false, we began our investigations to search for the gang that committed this forgery, whether inside or outside the kingdom. If it is proved that the person detained has not committed a crime, we are content to detain him for a short time and then deport him. We have people who are well trained in identifying forged passports just by looking at them.

[Question] How do you uncover illegal aliens?

[Answer] We have intensive campaigns in the streets, and sometimes in the houses, whenever we confirm that there are violators in them. There are a great many places where they congregate, such as al-Batha' and al-Arba'in Street in al-Nasim.

[Question] Where do all these problems come from?

[Answer] From the small organizations whose owners try to profit by any means. The big and respected firms never give us any problems.

[Question] What is your view regarding the problem?

[Answer] The government cannot do everything. The citizens must cooperate. The citizen must be responsible for his country, to the same extent that the law and government are responsible for this nation.

This is the problem of fugitive workers, stay-behinds and violators, as they were classified by the director of the office of illegal aliens.

What is the solution?

This is the question.

We have an answer to this question, and we have raised a number of proposals and solutions. However, the problem is in implementing these proposals. This is a matter that can only be done through the citizen's sense of responsibility. Using this sense as a starting point, we make these proposals to meet the problem:

1. To make sure that the organizations that import workers are real organizations and that the project on which they will work is a real project. The number of workers to be imported must be the number of workers required for this project.
2. Establish labor offices to make contracts with workers in the nations in which the kingdom has embassies. These offices must make the contracts with the workers, and not individuals and false firms.
3. Define the import period for workers and reconsider the penalties for harboring fugitive workers and employing them, since these penalties are limited to such a degree as to tempt people to violate them.
4. Establish or expand the establishment of offices for services under the supervision of the municipality and the Ministry of Labor, so that the worker or those who wish to employ him can only work through these offices.
5. There is a bold proposal that the government itself assume the importing of workers, so that this becomes an absolute right of the Ministry of Interior. However, this proposal requires further study.

6. Study the conditions of the open labor markets, without alarming anyone in them, in order to learn the identities of those who work for their behalf and those who fire them.
7. Conduct serious and immediate studies of fugitive workers, so that we can safeguard the worker whose honor has been damaged, and not deprive him of his natural right to a steady job that guarantees him some benefit from his effort, and at the same time, guarantee the rights of the employer, if the worker violates the terms of the contract or trifles with the organization's interests.
8. Draw up a list of principles pertaining to the importation of labor, which can be distributed free through our embassies abroad, to be given to those who wish to work in the kingdom. It would be preferable for these principles to include the setting of a minimum salary rate for the worker, to enable him to live successfully, without needing to resort to other means to improve his income.
9. Make the workers aware of mercenaries and middlemen, who rob them of their money and falsely promise them riches. Then these workers discover, when they arrive here, the bitter truth, which may lead them to cause problems.
10. Prepare a brief pamphlet, containing the most important laws of the kingdom, which can be given to workers who obtain visas to enter the kingdom or even to visitors.

This is the issue of runaway workers, their violations and their staying behind. All of this comes down to one point. There is a social phenomenon that has been prevalent among us for years. We-- and we must recognize this-- are the ones who manufactured it. And we are also the ones who have to put an end to it, not out of caring for ourselves alone, but out of concern for our country itself, which is being injured by things like this, and out of concern for the efforts of the Ministry of Interior in keeping this nation secure and tranquil, which everyone wants. Harboring a fugitive or a violator is an act against the interests of the nation and the security officers. This is an issue that requires everyone to study some more and then to commit themselves to the minimum of citizenship.

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JOURNALISTS PROBE WOMEN'S INCREASING INVOLVEMENT WITH PRESS

Jiddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 12 Aug 82 pp 12, 13

/Article by Hayat 'Anbar: "An Issue for Discussion: Saudi Woman Journalists between Amateur and Professional Status"/

/Text/ This issue, which the World of Eve /Section/ is presenting on its pages, involves one of the most important subjects in Saudi society, which is women's proclivity to take part in journalistic activity. The cream of the masters of the written word and editors in chief of newspapers took part in the discussion, and they were more or less unanimous in the view that young Saudi women have no less ability than men, their other half and their colleague in the profession whose issue is raised if the appropriate environment is provided them. They also unanimously agreed that the profession exercised through the press is a talent that must be refined through study and specialization in this field. Therefore the World of Eve requests that media departments be opened up in all the girls' universities in the kingdom to provide coursework appropriate to the nature of women in their Saudi society. Without a doubt, it is talent, along with knowledge based on foundations and bases, that creates specialized professionals. On this account, in the name of the women's section, we thank everyone who has contributed to this interesting subject, whose echo I hope to witness with every sincere person and the readers of the World of Eve. I also thank our sister the editor Khuzaymah al-'Attas, who has made concentrated personal efforts to get in touch with everyone who contributed to this issue and provided the preparations and organization. We also thank our sister Salwa Mugharbal for her contribution. I hope that the day will come when I will see a special magazine or newspaper devoted in its management and editing to Saudi women, arising from the depths and the heart of this beloved kingdom--and there are many such women, in the opinion of the gracious Dr Fatinah Shakir--so that the society may make use of all women's powers which can offer beneficial self-sacrifice.

Young Saudi women, through the prominence and success they have achieved in the various fields that have been made available to them, have become conspicuous, especially as a result of officials' awareness of the importance of their role as effective members of this society to whom attention must be given. Their roads into the field of journalism have coincided with their inclinations and have been compatible with their nature and with subjects that do not cause them to deviate from the traditions and customs of our society, so that they may realize a mission which is important in their opinion, through which they can be of benefit, and

from which they can derive benefit. Their causes, ideas and feelings can be conveyed to them only through the press and its special writers. In spite of their limited number, the personalities in the Saudi press have been able to make a mark as writers with importance and roles to play. What, however, is the viewpoint of society toward them, in the midst of all these considerations?

This is what we have tried to learn through this report, which we have sought to present as the issue of the week, in order to learn the views of our writers, the editors in chief and editors of our papers, public opinion as reflected by the young men and women in society, others, and husbands, and also the view of Islamic law, in hopes that this report of ours might perhaps offer a convincing answer to all women who want to find the road to this door, which is to work in the queen's palace. These were the most important questions raised for discussion and presented on the pate of the World of Eve:

To what extent do you consider that women are able to succeed in press activity?

How can the Saudi press play an effective role in the press field, and what is this role?

Do you believe that Saudi female journalists should be given the scope to express various subjects and not be confined to women's pages?

Which of these does press activity require: amateurism or professionalism?

Are you in favor of having young Saudi women work in the field of the press?

What is your view regarding the Saudi press?

Do social circumstances have anything to do with the fact that Saudi female journalists do not stay in this field?

Do you refrain from contact with female journalists? Why?

Would you agree to have your sons marry female journalists? Why?

What is the view of Islamic law regarding girls working in the area of the press? Is this a suitable activity for them?

With Mr 'Aziz Diya'

In response to the questions presented, let us begin by seeking to open the door of the discussion with the statement our great writer Mr 'Aziz Diya' offered by saying:

"As regards the questions presented to me, you know that women in the world have demonstrated an ability to succeed not just in the press and other media, but also in areas that are more important, sensitive and complex, such as top-level management--for example, as prime ministers, as is well know in Britain and India.

Like Any Women in the World

"Women in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are no different from other women in the world. What women in any country in the world can do, Saudi women can do. Women can succeed in press activity, like other activities, here, just as men succeed in it. However, it may not be possible for women to sit down in front of male officials, because of our preservation of the commands of our religion, traditions and customs entails or prevents anything of this sort. However, women can even do this, I mean, female journalists, without having to meet officials--telephone communications make it possible to do without meeting face to face. The most important aspect of the issue is that female journalists are able to command respect through their strong, serious personalities in the framework of the subject they want to deal with or write about. For example, I received your questions in writing and here I am answering them. What difference does it make if a man presents me with such questions or I receive them from a girl, and reply to them?"

We Have Splendid Examples of Female Journalists

Regarding his belief that scope should be given to female journalists to express every issue and that they should not be restricted to the women's pages, he said, "The fact is that I see nothing to require that we follow the rule of the harem and seal women's journalism off in the women's pages. Whenever I turn the pages of 'UKAZ and my eyes alight on the Eve page, I wonder what there is to prevent women writers from venturing forth and performing women's press work on all the pages--indeed, what is there to prevent me from seeing an observer's views, for example, which generally involve political affairs, written by one of our young lady journalists or a lady in our society? More than 80 percent of the commentaries and analyses on certain Arab radio stations are written by lady journalists or women who are employed in the radio as commentators. What is certain is that women journalists should not /just/ deal with affairs of cuisine, children and housework. They are required to do all that and also to contribute opinions and interact with events and all the issues of the country, and indeed with the issues of the whole Arab nation. They are part of this society and it is meaningless that they should be isolated or that this pernicious wall should be put up around them. On the occasion, I would like to record my immense pleasure with the young lady Khayriyah al-Saqqaf, from whom I have heard things that add to her stature as a writer of the most lofty personal level and as a leading thinker, and also Dr Fatin Amin Shakir, editor in chief of the magazine SAYYIDATI, which has managed to show female and male readers in the Arab world that women in this land are capable of providing an advanced level of female journalism, with all the innovation they do possess for producing reading matter which transcends levels of /mere/ brilliance. There also are female writers like Juhayr al-Masa'id, Sarah al-'Ubaydi and others whose names I am sorry I have forgotten--the fault lies with my old age. They are splendid examples of the truly cultured Saudi women in my country. I hope that I will not anger some young male writers if I tell them that they trouble my thoughts with the errors I find in their articles, not just in grammar and language but also in composition. I might find the likes of that among some female writers, but to a degree that is almost not worth mentioning.

Amateur Pursuits End with Professionalism

"On the question as to whether press activity requires an amateur spirit or professionalism, I can say that a woman who sincerely and truthfully pursues her hobbies is one who must end up becoming a professional, if she wants to become a professional. We all started as amateurs who were passionately devoted to literature and art, and we ended up in what could be called the pursuit of a profession. However, if journalistic activity is an everyday pursuit in all its various fields, and, in addition to editing, it is the nerve center of production, preparation, the study of the political climate, the settlement, and so forth, it requires professionals in the field. I mean, it requires experienced producers, layout experts, artists in what is called pictorial expression, and so forth. Here one must rely on professionals and, alongside them, amateurs who become trained and educated and, if they continue, can end up as professionals."

A Single Distinguished Lady Journalist

On his opinion about Saudi female journalists, he replied, "I have already expressed my opinion on Saudi female writers. As for female journalists, I hope to see many people of the stature of the young lady Khayriyah al-Saqqaf, who I know heads the women's section in the newspaper AL-RIYAD. If I have not seen the likes of her yet, that does not mean that they do not exist. They might exist, and at very satisfactory levels, but the rule or tradition of isolating them prevents me from reading what they write. I hope they will forgive me for not noticing them."

With Mr 'Abdallah Jifri

As regards Mr 'Abdallah Jifri, the well known writer and assistant publisher of the newspaper AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, which is published in London, his response was as follows:

"Journalism is a science, a talent, and the specialized study of an active art which serves the development and enlightenment of the whole society. Among its arts is that of enhancing the awareness, perceptions and feelings of the members of society. I think that art does not depend on men, nor is it prohibited for women; it belongs to everyone. It is based on the perception of the affairs and pathways of life. If we believe in this rule, the press becomes one of the modern sciences which play their part in the context of the resurgence of every nation.

Journalistic Talent First of All

"Journalism is a talent. Talents do not discriminate on the basis of whether one is a man or a woman. One of the most important requirements for working in the field of journalism is that talent be present, and if it happens to a person, be that a man or a woman, that he fulfils this cultural requirement, science, and if talent exists in this person, there remains an important requisite, which is the ability of the man and the ability of the woman to pursue this activity and develop this talent. We note that there are some men who have studied and specialized in the press but on engaging in practical activity have become alienated from these studies and have taken a different turn in their lives, in practice; this means

that education is not enough to affirm that a person will be a success but that talent and the ability to transcend the vexations of journalistic activity and rise above these vexations must exist. We observe that there are some women who have studied this art or this science, have succeeded in it and have done innovative work, or did not study journalism but discovered their talent and ability to engage in the activity and perform.

The Proportion of Men Is Greater

"However, it is clear to us that the proportion of people working in journalism is greater in the case of men, because the profession of journalism requires followup, running around, tenacity and sometimes contentiousness if the journalist is to reach his desired goal. I believe that this requirement causes women distress and effort which sometimes exceeds their capacity, although this is not a rule. There are female journalists who are more successful than male journalists, because the reasons I mentioned have not prevented women from working as journalists; if their work is more excellent that is because they have grasped the real essence of questions that are concerned with the true state of women's lives, since they are more closely attuned to these issues.

A Sense of Smell for News among Women

"There is a nice distinctive feature which one might state in this sort of area, namely that journalism is the job of looking for news and publishing it, and women, by nature, have been brilliant in finding news out, whatever it might be, and publishing it with the speed of light. In this area, they are more capable than men of ascertaining the sources and the smell of news."

Political Writing Is the Rage in the Arab Press

On the subject of making the Saudi press available for the expression of various issues, he replied by stating, "If the question is absolute and includes the press everywhere, the Arab and international press contain many female journalists who write on a number of subjects. However, the press in the Arab world is more concerned, as we have said, with women's cares and issues, the home and the family, which is normal and a matter of personal identity. Among female journalists there are people who have proceeded to involve themselves in political writing. It appears that political writing is the 'rage' in the Arab press, but it is standard writing. However, we have not observed female journalists writing on economics, for instance, though they do write about the arts and literature, and perhaps science, because women pursue an education in various fields of specialization and sciences. Saudi female journalists are linked to the traditions and customs of their society and the limits of social relations and interaction, and they are divorced from religious education. The field in and to which they set forth does not give them the scope in which to express various fields, as you say.

The Feminine Experience Has Been a Success in Journalistic Coverage

"In addition, the success of journalistic activity is dependent on movement and field coverage, which is something women are unable to provide, and, it seems to

me, do not aspire to either. However, they can provide field coverage in areas that are of interest to women and the family; experience with the work of female journalists in the local daily and weekly press has proved that they have been a success in moving, have carried out field coverage and have moved on, within the limits, or in the limits defined by, women's pages or specialized women's magazines, to other fields, even though they have adhered to the limits of traditions and customs. This is as far as purely journalistic activity goes. In the field of writing on the affairs of society in general and literary writing, poetry, stories and articles, we have well-versed, innovative female writers and we have good pioneering young female writers who are proficient with good expression and words. I follow up on these pioneering spirits with amazement. Even though some of them did not study journalism as an academic subject in university, nonetheless, through a talent for writing and a talented journalistic sense, they have managed to crystallize a point of light, which radiates from their efforts. Journalistic activity requires amateurs and professionals both. The amateur spirit, as I have said, is usually an important matter through which the journalistic sense, innovativeness with words, movement, field coverage and the ability to perform that can be provided.

Actual Practice Is Separated from Women

"Journalistic work requires professionalism, because journalistic achievements are not made behind desks. Otherwise, a person who hides behind his or her desk becomes just a writer or originator of articles, investigation and reportage. However, professionalism involves the actual pursuit of press activity, and I do not believe that the circumstances of the female Saudi journalist now would qualify her for this sort of unremitting professionalism, because she cannot reconcile numerous contradictions and conflicting points!"

With Mr Turki al-Sudayri

The reply of Mr Turki al-Sudayri, the editor in chief of AL-RIYAD newspaper, was:

"It is not possible for an effective role to be played by a woman who is enthusiastic about press work, or for us to give her the title of journalist, until we can consolidate her journalistic identity through administration, a desk, incentives and guidance. This requires that people who draw up newspaper policy in general be won over to her presence, because many women whom you call Saudi journalists are in reality just helpers, most of whom write recordings of their personal reactions or discuss repetitive, conventional subjects such as women's work, education, the relationship to traditions and other similar ordinary subjects.

"Even some people who call themselves female writers are running away from their isolation and their failure to realize the true nature of journalistic work or the specialized pursuit of writing in order to discuss ridiculous subjects such as remedying the Iraqi-Iranian dispute, the events in El Salvador or the dispute taking place between Britain and Argentina. This is all just evasiveness. Some papers help encourage them by giving them the title of female journalists and writers, but they are just brilliant journalistic aides who do not exercise journalistic activity in a sound manner. Here I mean some, not all. When we went about creating a woman's journalistic desk in AL-RIYAD newspaper, and put a woman at the head

of it who had a career in writing and administration, a distinguished academic university education and the official salary of a managing editor, which is equivalent in terms of salary and responsibility to those of male colleagues occupying this position, we created an atmosphere of trust in families and in the society, and at the same time made women writers, by virtue of their resources and ability, choose their place in the actual exercise of activity, and gave them some power of guidance, which the managing editor herself was in charge of. Here female participation was no longer just 'prestige'--it was a position that existed, was categorized, and involved responsible activities. I believe that social circumstances have a relationship to women's failure to remain in journalistic activity. When a woman journalist quits, that is either because of marriage, which may make it inevitable for her to move to another province or country, or the other reasons I previously pointed to, which are that groups of people have to be won over to the legitimacy of having women engage in journalism, and that might take place here in AL-RIYAD through the independence of the women's desk and the manner in which it is managed."

With Dr Maryam Baghdadi

Dr Maryam Baghdadi, the vice dean of the Faculty of Letters and Humane Sciences at King 'Abd-al-'Aziz University, says:

"As far as Saudi women go, their social circumstances govern their work and the limits within which they can function, under specific notions from which they cannot deviate. Nonetheless, they can make big contributions to journalistic activity in the field of society and women, and the extent of their success is connected to the breadth of their culture and their ability to deal with problems after they have been set out in clear, logical form. Why shouldn't they succeed in the writing field? They have established their success in most fields; if the society stands by them, they will achieve a great deal, with God's permission. As to the extent of women's ability to succeed in journalistic activity, the knowledge of that belongs to God.

"Giving them scope for various subjects, such as soccer, singing and so forth, is not promising. However, if the subject involves matters which require that one go down to construction workshops and other such men's jobs, there is no need to tire them out /with that/. As for the subjects which require their observations and their proper, effective participation, there is no harm in that--for instance, subjects bearing on societies, schools and social problems which intimately or vaguely affect society. In this case, they must take part in presenting issues, helping to solving them and striving to eliminate their harmful effects. The degree to which their participation is effective and to which the success or failure of their participation is determined will continue to be the female journalist's cultural level and level of awareness in observing the sources of given people's suffering, by making the intelligence decide before all else and not resorting to preachiness, which is of no benefit."

With Dr 'Abdallah Manna'

Dr 'Abdallah Manna', editor in chief of the magazine IQRA, replied by stating:

The fact is that there is no Saudi female journalist in the well known sense of the word. Rather, there are female Saudi writers who pursue journalism as a hobby or semi-profession. I believe that the stage we are going through perhaps cannot tolerate the presence of professional female journalists. It will take women a long time before they can enter the field. The reasons, in my opinion, are that journalism requires real everyday application and the traditions of society that exist now obstruct the anticipated process of Saudi female journalists. To that one should add religious factors or religious interpretations which make it mandatory that women not be in contact with other people; it is that contact which must be considered the cornerstone of journalistic activity.

A Long Task ahead of Women Journalists

"In addition, there are social circumstances. Although we have overcome some [prohibitions/ now, such as moving from place to place in given towns or from town to town, all this, in the case of women, is encumbered by difficulty and therefore I say that there is a long road ahead before women will achieve actual participation in the press as journalists, not as assistants or amateurs.

Journalistic Activity Which Has Not Matured

"If one wants to know my opinion on the limited journalistic activity women are providing in the press, I believe that that has not yet matured to the point where it can influence the society or to the point where it would have to be evaluated at this stage. However, one must consider these as pioneering attempts to open horizons to Saudi women journalists over a period which cannot be estimated.

"As to whether journalistic activity needs professionalism or amateurism, professionalism cannot do without amateurism, while the latter can do without the former. In any event, successful journalists must be devoted amateurs. Amateurism here means love, zeal and the aspiration to innovate. Professionalism is mechanization and the full-time pursuit of this activity to the exclusion of others.

Female Journalists and Questions of Motherhood

"I support the activities of young Saudi women in this field. There are many fields in the press where women can stand out from men, especially on issues of motherhood, childhood, various social affairs and the effects of science on the generations, as well as the fields of the arts, because in my opinion women are more fit to cover these fields, as opposed to being successful sports commentators."

An Effective Role for Women

Our female colleague Na'ilah Qisti, an editor with AL-RIYAD newspaper, says:

"It is in women's power to perform an effective role in journalistic activity. Why now? First, they make up half of this society, and the time has come for the society to awaken from its deep sleep and come to terms with its issues, which in the first place are issues of concern to the society as a whole, more than being issues that are just of concern to women. In no society composed of two halves

can one half do without the other. Through the interaction of these two halves, the society becomes integrated--through the publication of general issues and the search for solutions to them which are satisfactory to both sides. Women have a very big role in the journalistic field. It is their duty to perform the role, in spite of inherited obstacles, which they can transcend most easily and smoothly. The world is full of successful examples of women's personal strength and their successful entry into various areas, including space.

Integrated Women's Journalism Departments

"As regards the provision of opportunities for women in various fields, through all our observations of our domestic press, opportunities have actually started to open up for women to express their opinions on various issues without being restricted to issues that are of concern to them alone. As an example of that, we find that many Saudi women have expressed their opinions in regular places and columns in the newspapers. Now there are integrated women's journalism departments where female journalists pursue their activities within the limits of their available resources. Thus opportunities have actually started to open up for Saudi women to engage in journalistic activity in its broadest sense and to make their statements. Social circumstances rarely constitute an obstacle limiting the activity of female journalists; when they do, that is a result of very special social circumstances. As a general rule, however, one should believe that social circumstances, whatever they might be, help form a good atmosphere for female journalists and provide them with material that requires boldness and firmness of them at the outset, after which the way is paved for them to perform their mission most thoroughly in dissecting the particular features related to their society and in taking part in preserving what is good and criticizing what is evil. Women journalists can find their way, in spite of the social circumstances surrounding them, by presenting numerous issues of the utmost importance, in view of the importance of their position in society."

With Hana' 'Abd-al-Malik

The opinion of our colleague Hana' 'Abd-al-Malik, supervisor of the Veiled Woman's Page in the newspaper AL-MADINAH, is:

"While the name 'women's pages' conjures up a notion of limited comprehensiveness and broadness among some people, that is their affair, because most of our women's pages in our local newspapers and magazines are now proving the contrary. They have addressed themselves to numerous issues and are trying to reach neglected shores. It is in the power of Saudi women to venture forth more on these pages and on all other pages, whether specialized or not, because anyone who enjoys conscious freedom and delves deeply into any issue will relate to them sincerely.

"While we imagine that there are issues which have been kept outside the reach of Saudi women, because of social convention, it should not be absent from one's mind that there are university specializations which women have studied in our country and in which they lack the practical expertise to deal with matters wisely and sagaciously. We are the people who should provide ourselves with opportunities and establish our presence."

The Hobby Is the Start of the Pursuit of a Profession

As to whether journalistic activity requires amateurs or professionals, she says, "The dynamism of the press and its diverse fields, in addition to the organizational form of given newspapers or magazines, means that journalistic activity requires women who are amateurs as well as professionals, just as it requires the same in the case of their brothers who work in journalism. Journalistic activity does not seem to be a professional pursuit to some people, as long as it is a hobby, indeed a passion that is found agreeable over time."

With Luluwah al-'Imari

Our colleague in AL-YAMAMAH magazine, Luluwah al-'Imari, says:

"Journalistic activity requires sagacity, elegant expression and rapid improvisation. That is, it is intellectual activity and does not depend on physical effort. Therefore I consider that women, as journalists, are in the right place, because by their nature they look for news and things that are new. By this I do not mean that they are gossips but rather that by their nature they are without a doubt inquisitive, and they are always involving themselves in many matters. Therefore, if this power is directed into the right places, they will be able to succeed in journalistic activity. Opportunities must also open up to Saudi female journalists to express various issues and they should not be confined to women's pages, because women are readers and citizens just like men. They must grasp all their country's affairs in this stage of development and serve the nation well. As long as women read male writers, what is wrong with their reading women, as long as the issue serves the mind, the country and social issues and is not devoted to a single element?"

Far Removed from the Traditions of Others

On her advice to beginning women journalists, she said, "I am giving them my advice although I admit that I am not a journalist. I believe that journalism is a talent before it is a subject of study, and of course any talent refined through study is better. I advise people who have talent to read a great deal, stay away from making descriptions with brilliant words, and get into the subject that is to be discussed. I cannot judge whether what I see in the papers today will have a bright or dark future but one can deduce from matters that we should create our own papers which arise from our own deep experience and not depend on the traditions that are followed because they are journalistic traditions. Rather, we should write about what concerns the country and the citizen. In my opinion, enlightening Arab women about their role in the service of their country is much more important than preparing meals or nursing children, because these are things we can teach without the press. Why should we squander the vast area of space available to us in the press on regurgitated material?"

Views from outside the Press

In this flood of conflicting views on the part of writers, editors in chief and editors, it was necessary that we seek the opinions of members of the public of both sexes regarding female journalists and their work.

Our sister 'Aliyah Mishyakh, a media graduate from Cairo University, said:

"There is no doubt that because of the social circumstances and the customs and traditions of our country, which are in keeping with our Islamic law, it is difficult for Saudi women to set out as journalists, like their counterparts in other countries. In spite of that, our beloved country is trying to give suitable opportunities for women to participate in the press field, so far as circumstances will permit, but I believe that the women's field is the most suitable one for them, in view of the part it plays in every woman's life. I do not object to having Saudi girls work in the journalistic field, on condition that they be at a level which is in keeping with the material they provide, especially since the press has a great effect on every individual in society, men and women. I consider that journalism is a talent before all else, but it must be refined through practice, because by that means it will be possible to create proper views and ideas for the society."

Through Ability and Bearing Responsibility

Miss Samiyah 'Atallah, who has a bachelor's degree in English, said:

"The fact is that the Saudi family has become very aware and has started to strive earnestly to advance God's word by having its daughters work in fields that are suited to them. Since journalistic activity prompts Saudi women to devote attention to the issues of religion and the society, I do not believe that social circumstances play a part in their failure to continue with this work, especially when they have the desire to work, and there is ability and the bearing of responsibility."

Connections with a Female Journalist

The opinions of a group of young people, 'Adil Zahran, 'Abdallah Kadsah and Hisham Sharaf, students at the university stage, were as follows:

'Adil: There is nothing to keep women from working in journalism, as long as that brings benefit to the society and develops women's intellectual talents. I see nothing to prevent people from having contact with female journalists, because they will have a general culture and will understand life in a clearer manner and that will help them create a better life, if they know how to benefit from that.

Hisham: I am not opposed to having contact with female journalists, or females who are not journalists, because I am in favor of women working, provided that their work not be at the expense of their family obligations. We must encourage young Saudi women to pursue what we find to be of benefit to them and the society.

'Abdallah: I am in favor of women working in journalism, but within the framework of our pure religion. Women can do research and write on subjects that concern them better than men can.

The views of some mothers were as follows:

The mother of our colleague Salwa Mugharbal says, "In reality, I did not object to my daughter's working in journalism, as long as that did not violate our traditions

and customs. I found that she had bent toward that and I was in favor of her participation, but I follow what she writes and object to it if it is not appropriate. Young Saudi women are superior to some people in most fields, and it is therefore necessary to encourage them and stand alongside them in order to eliminate certain wrong ideas they might have, as long as it is their goal to create a generation that is outward-looking through the pens they truthfully bear."

Mrs Fatimah Ibrahim Zahid: "I anticipate a bright future for our journalist daughters, if they commit themselves to Islamic morality in their dealings and conduct. With thanks to God, the female journalists that are active now are performing their mission truthfully and there is nothing against my daughter's working in this field. I would support my daughter or my son marrying a female journalist if she was a human being who could reconcile her work with her married life."

Mrs Aminah Haydar: I am not opposed to having Saudi girls break into press work, as long as they have enlightened ideas that will qualify them for this work and for what is useful for society. There is nothing against the presentation of good, purposeful ideas, whatever their field might be, as long as they promote virtue. I do not believe that social circumstances have anything to do with their failure to engage in journalistic activity, because, in the heart of Islam, Moslem women have taken part in the recounting of stories and the conveyance of messages of different types in war and peace. Foremost among them was our lady 'A'ishah and many like her who played well known roles in helping to raise the level of women's missions as main members of society."

The View of Religion

In this flood of various views and approaches, it was necessary to ascertain the opinion of religion regarding young women's work in this field, which is the thing that most concerns every woman who works in it, or intends to work in it, and society in general. The opinion of Shaykh Salih ibn Sa'd al-Luhaydan was as follows:

"Almighty God has made women men's partners in work and in expressing opinions on the participation that the matter requires, as her religion demands. If, however, one is discussing the field of journalism, women bear the mission of Islam and through it are concerned with reforming society of its conditions and reforming the human spirit of what it contains. This is something which is desired of women now, because the situation, in all eras, requires their participation in the knowledge of Islamic law and general reform.

Journalistic Activity Is Not Prohibited for Women

"When we go back to the first era, we find that the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, listened to the poetry of al-Khansa'. In his sayings and doings of the prophet, al-Darihi, on whom God show mercy, said, 'women are the siblings of men.' Journalistic activity now is the voice of the nation and the interpreter of the nation before the people. If the situation is as it is now, and women, as we mentioned above, bear a sincere Islamic mission, they have the duty of performing this mission properly, and in this field, if women are honest, have upright morals,

and feel in themselves that they are worthy of carrying out reform through press participation, they must make their contribution. Journalistic activity is prohibited for women only if they have no mission, no goal or no purpose in what they write or quote. With God's permission, Islam will be spread through men and through women, and each of them will have their own field, and general fields. Since in this period we are going through a period of opening up to foreign countries and to the advances civilizations are offering through science, letters and art, Moslem women have the duty of arming themselves with the weaponry of faith and bearing the mission of Islam, in order to take part in constructive, purposeful guidance and criticism at this time."

In conclusion, do you suppose we have exhausted this issue, which is important to all Saudi girls who intend to exercise their right to enter into journalistic activity, or are there other opinions? It is an issue which is open for discussion and we are prepared to receive everything which might provide enlightenment for everyone.

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HEALTH MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON TRIP TO EASTERN REGION

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 12 Sep 82 p 5

[Interview with 'Ali Muhammad Fadl, Minister of Health, by Badr al-Din Muhammad al-Amin, date and place not given]

[Text] AL-SAHAFAH met with Prof 'Ali Muhammad Fadl, Central Minister of Health, during the working trip he made to the Eastern Region recently, starting with the capital of the region and ending with the city of al-Thaghr, and posed some questions about the region. The first question was about:

[Question] What goals did the trip accomplish?

[Answer] In compliance with the directive of the president of the republic in his speech for the regional government holidays last July and in response to the wishes of Hamid 'Ali Shash, Governor of the Eastern Region, and Muhammad al-Amin Hamad, Minister of Public Services, I made this trip in the company of some officials of the Ministry of Health to get acquainted with the assistance expected of us by the brothers in the region in the field of health services, to learn about the problems and difficulties they are encountering and to discuss the possibility of our getting involved in these aspects to improve performance in the health services area in this region. Praise be to God, we were able to visit certain areas, starting with Kassala, Halfa al-Jadidah and al-Qadarif and finally Red Sea Province. It was clear to us that there are many areas where we can provide assistance to the brothers handling health services, primarily by supplying them with a trained staff of doctors, health inspectors, technicians, etc. The minister continued:

Secondly, we can help them in training medical aides, nurses and technicians in various specialties. We were also able to get some good results with regard to the projects which had fallen within the development projects of the Ministry of Health. After the regional government law came into effect, supervision of those projects was supposed to go to the regional government and there has been no contact between the Ministry of Services in the region and the Central Ministry of Health. We discussed this, computed remaining costs and reached agreement with the minister of public services in the region on working together to complete those projects.

[Question] What about unknown fevers?

[Answer] We had received some reports and information from the Red Sea area that some fevers were spreading and learned from our colleague doctors that these fevers exhibited some symptoms similar to malaria. We immediately sent a medical team comprising internists and specialists in various branches of laboratory work. The results were sent to Khartoum for scientific tests by specialists in medical entomology. The reports indicated that a large percentage of the fevers were not malaria while the remainder were. We gave officials in the region the recommendations of the specialists in this regard and have been monitoring implementation of these recommendations with them. Some of the recommendations have not been carried out, particularly the establishment of an anti-malaria office and establishment of a large regional laboratory which would play the same role as the central laboratory. We discussed these two issues with the minister of services and workers in the health sector and reached agreement on taking speedy steps to accomplish them. The Ministry of Health will undertake to provide them with the necessary staff, principally a large number of environmental health workers.

[Question] What about the deterioration of environmental health services?

[Answer] Unfortunately, it appears that this has drawn the attention of the people and of officials working in the public health field. We discussed this with the minister of public services and brothers involved in this field in Kassala and Port Sudan. The fact is that environmental health services are one of the burdens of the regional ministry. However, this does not stop us from offering advice to the ministry, providing them with some workers or training some workers. There is an obvious area where we can help, that is, providing the area with an adequate number of health inspectors and officers.

Secondly, the central laboratory in Khartoum is fully prepared to run any tests or handle any practical operations needing a capable laboratory until the regional laboratory is established.

If the region needs more doctors specializing in the field of preventive medicine, even though Sudan as a whole complains about a shortage of these personnel, as we in the central ministry are responsible for dividing up this tiny number among the other regions of Sudan, we can give this area particular attention and consideration and will send it an adequate number of specialists in the field of preventive medicine. We will earnestly try, God permitting, to do everything in our power to give assistance to the brothers working in this field because the Port Sudan area occupies a place of particular importance in health services because of its position as a sole port in Sudan. Particular attention is directed to it these days because of its strategic importance to Sudan and its security significance by virtue of the fact that it is located in very sensitive boundaries and the fact that this region as a whole is subject to intense pressures because of internal migration to this major city and migration to its many cities, principally Port Sudan, because of the presence of refugees from neighboring countries. We know that the new road linking Khartoum with Port Sudan has created new burdens on services in Port Sudan and we all hope, God permitting, that we can come up with specific projects to implement so that the brothers handling these matters in the Eastern Region can meet their obligations to the citizens.

SURVEY OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENTS

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 420, 20 Sep 82, No 421, 27 Sep 82

[20 Sep 82 pp 32-37]

[Article by Othman Gharbi: "Does Agricultural Credit Benefit the Small Farmer?"]

[Text] The considerable contribution of the Sixth Plan--and especially the large benefits provided under Law No. 82-67 dated 6 August 1982 to encourage investments in agriculture and fisheries--prompt us to start by elucidating the notions related to agricultural credit, in order to provide a healthy awareness of rights and duties. Therefore, this article will:

- recall what agricultural credit is;
- analyze its positive and negative aspects;
- and suggest practical means to remedy the latter and thus prepare the ground for the realization of the ambitious objectives of the Sixth Plan (this will form the subject of the first part of our study).

Then--in a second part--we shall more particularly analyze the investment code which provides a new look at agricultural financing scaled up to the dimensions of the Sixth Plan.

We shall first recall a few "obvious" facts (they are not obvious to all!) in view of the obscurity that often prevails in this field, especially among small farmers, the subject of our study.

Actually, agricultural credit finds itself in the middle of apparently conflicting interests:

- those of the farmer,
- those of the bank,
- and those of the government.

The farmer--that is easy to understand--wants to obtain credit on time and with a minimum number of steps and a minimum of red tape.

The bank, on the other hand, is very cautious in making credits available--in view of the very real risk of default--and requires all sorts of guarantees, i.e. often necessary red tape. The small farmer (campaign credits) must provide the guarantee of a group.

As for the government, it orients credits and, when all is said and done, its main objective is to find a tangible result in the fields and thus achieve the development desired.

The only common factor between these three partners is that they borrow or lend money under current regulations, which are intended to unify their interests.

However, credit is not only money. It is time or money. It is time given until money is paid, or money given for a certain time.

Here, time and money are accurately measured in days and dinars. Now, to begin with, we must state that the three partners mentioned above do not have the same notion of time. City (the bank's) language often conflicts with rural (the farmer's) language. Therefore, we must either bring financing sources (granting credits and making the money available) closer to the farmer himself (while reducing paperwork) to immerse them in the world where he lives and works; or the opposite, which is not rational.

One of the first measures taken by the Mzali government consisted in a total decentralization of agricultural credit (the decision to grant credit is now made at the governorate seat for investment credits, and locally for campaign credits).

However, we believe that sooner or later all forms of credit should be authorized and especially made available at delegation level, on the basis of an initial programming at regional level (to be approved by the central government).

For the farmer, there is only one type of credit.

The other anomaly in the present agricultural credit system is that campaign credit--which is decentralized--requires the small farmer to provide the (theoretical) guarantee of a mutual guarantee association.

On the other hand, investment credit--which is decentralized and larger--does not require such a guarantee. As a result, a skimming takes place at bank level. Imagine a meeting between a large bank and a small farmer! It is not an even match...

The small farmer must receive the support of a group to become a valid partner.

In both cases, and in spite of all guarantees, default is frequent because, even standing at the bank, the farmer is known from a distance, through a

number and a file. On the contrary, what he needs is to be known and recognized, and helped by a bank branch office (if there is no local mutual credit bank) where he can form personal relations. The old saying that "you can govern from far away, but you can administer only from close by," is especially well-founded in the case of agricultural credit.

Only if the government and the banks get as close as possible to eventual beneficiaries will it become easier to study the impact of credit within the basic development unit represented by the delegation.

The objective aimed at is the actual decentralization of agricultural financing.

At this level the small farmer's "right to credit" as defined in the Sixth Plan actually provides a choice framework accompanied by a guarantee, and the problem of supervising credit from the outside and from far away then becomes moot since there is automatic local supervision. As a result, all credits can then be supervised.

In this respect, one can suggest the intervention of local government (delegates) assisted by agricultural technicians within local grant commissions to provide a moral weight (or a dynamic deterrent) that will prove useful in obtaining repayment.

Indeed, collective responsibility is a safe guarantee of repayment only if credit is in line with the small farmer's means and if the guarantee group is reliable. Otherwise, it is inadequate, especially at the stage when the group is formed or consolidated, as it could cause that very group to break up. Let us not forget that plethoric groups are at the origin of all supervised credits (SCM [Mutual Credit Associations])...

In spite of all, the approach suggested here could, in our opinion, reduce the existing gap between the framework provided by the Sixth Plan (a framework which is very close to the farmer) and the organizations that grant credits and make the money available, which are located at a distance. In the long run, such a coordination will prove necessary, all the more so as it will enable banks and government to save on travel expenses (cars, gasoline, etc.).

In our opinion, organization at the local level alone will make it possible to solve 80 percent of the present agricultural credit problems.

For that, bank infrastructures must be adequate to cover all agricultural delegations and a real decentralization of the banks must take place (telex, etc.). Government decentralization is already completed or under way...

Trust is inseparable of credit, by definition, and nowadays the banker's trust in the farmer's solvency is based essentially on the (present and especially future) profitability of the farm as a result of the injection of credit.

Similarly, the agricultural technician's trust in the economic justification of credit is based on a comprehensive evaluation including all statistics (location, type of soil, etc.) or dynamic data (development potential) of interest to the farmer.

Thus, the financial study and the technical study converge to provide a series of data that will lead to a decision based on the farm development potential and especially on the farmer's own greater or lesser ability to modify his farm by design, using credit.

But this development potential remains dependent on numerous other factors, so true is it that credit is only one element in the process of agricultural development.

It is a determining element, sometimes a decisive one, but one that comes into full play only when the economic environment as a whole can respond positively, immediately or within a relatively short time, to the development process triggered by credit.

Among these additional factors, let us mention:

- an acute sense of civic responsibility on the part of the farmer;
- a good assimilation of popularized techniques by the farmer and his neighbors;
- attractive prices;
- existing and well-maintained dirt roads;
- rapid and... safe means of transportation (404 covered vehicles);
- ease of marketing (service cooperatives);
- a reduced number of middlemen;
- actual demand on the domestic and foreign markets, both quantitatively and qualitatively;
- and... consistent profit at the end of the campaign.

Thus, it becomes increasingly evident that credit--especially to small farms--is ineffective if it is isolated.

Therefore, we must make sure that all conditions for development are present and especially, in a first stage, training, popularization and organization in groups (viable service cooperatives), so as to make sure that all credit profitability factors are present.

We can draw at least four rules that are as many pillars of agricultural credit:

- 1) Agricultural credit must be justified.
- 2) Agricultural credit must be used advisedly.

3) Agricultural credit must have a real impact on the farmer's production, productivity and income and eventually increase his potential for subsequent self-financing.

4) Agricultural credit must be repaid.

Let us consider successively these four substrata, bearing in mind that a "substratum" represents the essential part, not the accessory or the secondary...

1. Agricultural Credit Must Be Justified

Agricultural credit is not a panacea for all the ills of agriculture.

In some cases, the injection of credit, especially in the form of investment, can be considered counter-indicated. Getting into excessive debt has never been a good way for the farmer to solve all his problems.

On the other hand, debt in proportion to his capacity for repayment is desirable as it will bring about progress.

And--even for so-called "punctual" operations--it is only through a complete diagnostic examination of the farm that we can determine whether the credit application is or not integrated in the, so to speak, natural development of the farm and, therefore, is justified with respect to both the farm and the country as a whole.

In other words, the quality of the investigation is essential in granting credit. When all is said and done, what is needed is an overall view of the farm revealing the presence or absence of actual development potential with respect to well-defined speculations. Therefore, credit is selective, not exhaustive.

Nevertheless, the cure suggested may sometimes be integrated and spread over a period of time. This is the case--providing the farmer's solvency is adequate--when it is found more effective to give a farmer a substantial and justified integrated credit rather than a limited and ineffective credit (in that case, the guarantee of a reliable group is essential).

The first type of credit will make it possible to develop the farm from within and will lead to a real increase in the farmer's production and income. The second type will have only a superficial effect and, therefore, will benefit neither the debtor nor the creditor. Nothing is more ineffective than a scattering or sprinkling of credits. Their effect is nil, both economically and socially.

The social aspect--which used to be connected to credit until the appearance of specific programs such as the rural development program--must now result from the economic contribution. Durable social welfare can be achieved only through a production effort that will make it possible for the parties involved to achieve it on their own. The social prerequisite is fulfilled to a large extent by third parties.

Besides, present regulations make it possible to grant subsidies after a job has been completed. This solution is the best when the mechanism of credit cannot be used (as in the South) for several reasons (having to do with the soil or with the people). But it assumes that adequate self-financing is available. That brings us back to prices...

2. Credit Must Be Used Advisedly

It has often been noticed that farmers will focus excessive attention on obtaining credits and then more or less neglect to follow up, or even to repay the credits.

Sometimes, it is as if credit were a youth elixir or a philosopher's stone and as if, once it is obtained after going through varying amounts of red tape, nothing else mattered any more.

Now, it is essential that credit be not dilapidated in whole or in part in the acquisition of consumer's goods.

Then, it must be used on the farm, for the farm and by the farmer.

This farmer-farm dialectic is what must be safeguarded and promoted: a farmer who will use innovation and a farm ready to interact with such innovation.

Through soil improvement, it is human promotion that must be achieved, as the beginning and the end of development. This is why, one way or the other, popularization and credit, innovation and subsidies must go hand in hand.

Territorial popularization cells must act simultaneously with, or somewhat preceding the granting of credits. This synergistic effect is vital in putting the small farm back on its feet and ensuring durable promotion for the small farmer. Some of the present agricultural credit problems result from the dissociation of vulgarization and credit, except for so-called supervised credits. However, the weakness of such credits lies elsewhere...

Some difficulties encountered in this field result from the age difference between the farmer or fisherman on the one hand and the popularization agent (who is often younger) on the other hand.

This (real) psychological approach problem can be solved if the popularization agent has a rural background, an unfailing patience, a sense for human relations, and a scientist's humility in front of experience, not the contrary.

Indeed, we do believe that actual experience, even negative, is superior to a more or less bookish theory which has not yet been put to the test. In addition, success is often born from failure. Agriculture is the privileged domain of pragmatism and perseverance.

Many popularization agents recognize that it takes concrete examples to convince farmers. It can be that of a more or less envied neighbor, or that of

a model or state farm. Such a healthy emulation has often given good results. Even then, the farmer--we are still talking about a small farmer--must be able to travel and see for himself farms like his that have reached a higher level of development than his own. The small farmer must not remain isolated physically. With transistor radios, there is no rural isolation.

When all is said and done, it is high time for agricultural credit to focus on the follow up and profitability of the projects for which it is made available.

3. The Impact of Agricultural Credit

This impact cannot be uniform all over the country because of differences in climate, soil, and even sociological (at farmer's level) conditions. A feat in the Southwest is not a feat in the North, etc.

When it comes to the impact on production, therefore, a follow-up of the farm is necessary and farm performances must be integrated in the area where the farm is located.

The traditional way is to compare the results of two campaigns, one of which must have preceded the obtention of credit.

All the same, negative factors may come into play in spite of the farmer's intrinsic efforts; these factors must then be taken into account.

Apart from these minor setbacks, credit must have a direct or indirect effect on production and the beneficiaries' income, taking into account the subsequent additional elements mentioned earlier in this study.

The impact of credit can be reduced to nought when credit is not given in time and results in a lost campaign.

The banking system often relies on the theoretical premises that there are three types of credits: short term or campaign credits; medium term credits for equipment and livestock; and long-term credits (wells, arboriculture, etc.).

It is then assumed that campaign credits alone must follow a strict timing. Now, all types of credit are time-related.

A tractor must be there when it is time to plough, a well before the dry season, etc.

The distinction between types of credits is an invention of the cities and of the banks. It is used to classify dates of payment. From the farmer's point of view, the needs of the farm as a whole must be considered, and the whole farm will often suffer from the failure of a single element. The disintegration of credit is the number one danger for the small farm.

As a rule, credit which is not received on time is more likely to be diverted from its purpose (it is then consumed). Added to that is the opinion the farmer gains of city people's irrationality...

To control this factor, the farmer should prepare for all necessary steps well ahead of time and the bank should consider its examination periods.

4. Credit Must Be Repaid

A credit must naturally be repaid when the crop is sold. The better the crop, the more positive repayment campaigns should be.

Default is very significant and often serious for it must be related to one of the three following causes:

- 1) The farmer dilapidated the credit outside the production system.
- 2) The result of the investment was nil, in spite of the farmer's efforts. Then, either it was a mistake to grant that credit, or subsequent investment conditions are at fault, because or in spite of the farmer.
- 3) The farmer does not intend to repay the credit, although he could do so, and although that may mean that he will never again get credit from a bank.

Three Solutions Are Then Possible

1. In the first case, closer supervision is required to make sure that credit is used advisedly and to test the beneficiary's good faith (requirement for 10-20 percent self-financing to start the project).
2. In the second case, when large production variations result from unreliable climate conditions, more flexible repayment terms must be granted and the repayment dates rescheduled to match actual production.
3. Finally, when default is due to the farmer's ill will, when he can afford repayment, a series of pressures adapted to individual cases must be applied:
 - moral pressure in the village (notables, cooperative, delegate, etc.);
 - serving of a writ;
 - preliminary legal steps (summons to appear);
 - legal steps with an actual threat of attachment.

In the latter case, it is impossible to underestimate the value of example in a village where default due to actual ill will is rampant...

Repayment is in fact an essential element of credit (credit has no meaning without it). Normally, a poor repayment rate denotes a defective assimilation of credit and, therefore, the uselessness of the credit injection itself: it is an indicator of the project profitability.

Unfortunately, there is a tendency to consider loans as a special form of government liberality which people are not unduly eager to repay.

This kind of "transfer" is the worst there can be because it is neither social nor economic. Besides, rather than a transfer, it is more like a unilateral misappropriation under cover of the law.

Whereas it is just and justified to turn our attention to human cases and cases of force majeure (also called "unpredictable" or "unavoidable") when no protection is available against natural disasters, and in order to re-schedule the dates of repayment, on the other hand it is unjust and unjustified to overlook uncivic-minded willful default when repayment is possible, a phenomenon that in the long run will generate an uneradicable type of behavior, as is shown by cases similar to that of Tunisia in several third-world countries.

In our opinion, many amalgams and abuses have been made possible by the failure (or lack) of the three following structures:

1. The Agricultural Credit Adjustment Fund, or FACA, provided under the law but not operational, in charge of repaying the farmer's debt when default is due to natural disaster over one or two years.
2. The coverage of normal agricultural insurance (insurable risks) must be expanded both horizontally (to reach as many farmers as possible in key agricultural sectors: cereals, livestock farming, etc.) and vertically (to increase the range of insurable risks beyond fire and hail).
3. The Natural Disaster Protection Fund--planned by the government--which must help directly the farmer victim of disasters (which must be precisely defined).

For instance, a farmer victim of the April 1982 hail declares himself in good faith the victim of a natural disaster when, obviously, he did not take out an insurance against hail, etc.

It is also possible to imagine a broader connection between credit and normal insurance.

At present, the latter is required only for certain campaign credits and against two or three major risks. Insurance should be extended to cover the various type of credits.

Then, only the farmer who has acquired normal coverage of most insurable risks could prevail himself of a natural disaster (a risk that cannot be assured except by a public fund).

As a result, social security in the rural world--one of the government's outstanding achievement, would find itself increased by economic security which, in turn, would promote increased investment expansion and result in an in-depth improvement of rural life.

Contrary to industrial investment, to which it should not be fully assimilated, agricultural investment, subject as it is to certain major risks, requires greater security, i.e. the coverage of certain risks inherent in the agricultural sector itself.

In fact, the increase in non-covered risks restricts the contribution of banks. Now, this contribution will be considerable under the Sixth Plan. We shall study it in the second part of this study.

When all is said and done, and considering the overall development of the country, agricultural credit can only be a locomotive acting as a driving force in endowing farms with a dynamic economic existence.

In spite of problems which are said to be insoluble, small and medium-size farms can contribute to the improvement of rural living conditions, can help farmers settle and take an active part in the country's overall development, for these farms are the backbone of Tunisian agriculture.

[27 Sep 82 pp 34-42]

[Article by Othman Gharbi: "The Agricultural Investment Code. Green Light For Accelerated Progress"]

[Text] In the first part of this study on agricultural credit (see DIALOGUE No 420 dated 20 September 1982), we analyzed the lines of force and inadequacies of the agricultural credit system that existed prior to the promulgation of the new agricultural investment code (Law No 82-67 of 6 August 1982 providing incentives for investments in agriculture and fisheries).

The second part will essentially deal with this code, the main constituents of which have been "reprinted" so to say, to provide the reader with somewhat easier access to a legal text that is formally exhaustive and of an often austere rigor. This is the purpose of the many "inserts" which the reader will find below and which are mainly informative.

The code has also given rise to many comments.

A coincidence! Nothing is less certain. Since legislation is involved, it is more likely to be a manifestation of the legislator's will. Nothing else. There were only two full days between the law of 3 August 1982 approving the Sixth Economic and Social Development Plan and the law of 6 August 1982 providing incentives for investments in agriculture and fisheries.

After a debate, the Chamber of Deputies adopted both laws on the same day, 30 July 1982.

This is another reminder of the importance given by the Sixth Plan to agriculture in general and agricultural investment in particular.

A paragraph of the Sixth Plan is significant in this respect.

"As far as agriculture is concerned, the size of the investments allocated to that sector, the eventual creation of an Agricultural Investments Promotion Agency (APIA) and the installation of banks oriented toward the promotion of this sector should make it possible to develop agriculture and contribute to the improvement of small farmers' living conditions and income and to the emergence of a new generation of farmers interested in modern farming methods." (Sixth Plan, Volume I, page 218).

In fact, the total amount provided by the Sixth Plan for agricultural investments is 1.55 billion dinars, i.e. 19 percent of all investments, compared with 584 million dinars actually invested under the Fifth Plan, i.e. 13 percent.

This amount is allocated to the various sectors as follows:

- 620 million (i.e. close to 40 percent) for agricultural infrastructure investments (large water-supply systems, etc.)
- 110 million for small water-supply systems and drinking water supply points (compared with 11 under the Fifth Plan)
- 820 million for investments that will be productive immediately (equipment for irrigated areas, livestock farming, fishing, etc.).

In other words, 60 percent of the agricultural investments provided under the Sixth Plan will be immediately profitable (and therefore put to intensive use), compared with 55 percent under the Fifth Plan.

Immediate profitability means production, and production should show an average growth rate of 5 percent per year.

Therefore, the Sixth Plan is an agricultural production promotion plan.

<u>Profitability</u>	<u>Fifth Plan</u>	<u>Sixth Plan</u>
Investments with immediate profitability	55 %	60 %
Investments with deferred profitability	45 %	40 %

Increasing Self-Financing

To promote agricultural production, we must first remove all obstacles, especially obstacles resulting from the Tunisian farmer's low capacity for self-financing his projects.

His self-financing capacity could be increased year after year through a sound pricing policy that would reduce the number of middlemen (without "doing away" with them, for they play a useful part) in order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the producer and those, no less legitimate, of the consumer.

This balance is certainly difficult to achieve (it has been justly compared to "squaring the circle"), but we do believe that means can be found to break this inflationary vicious circle through the continued organization of producers (sound distribution networks, storage and preservation structures, etc.) and through consumers' information--if not organization--to avoid ending up with a situation when producers and consumers would be wronged and the middlemen alone would prosper and thus become petty kings of the market. The weakness of small producers still working in isolation, and the excessive appetite of some (well-off) consumers are the major causes for the proliferation of middlemen and speculators and the reason why they remain unpunished under cover of the law of supply and demand. In other words: from the producer to the... speculator!

On some occasions, such as the Aid El Kebir [Feast of Immolation], the producer--in this case the small livestock farmer--deals directly with the consumer: if prices still remain high, we must understand that this situation, which occurs only once a year, is the farmer's only opportunity to free himself from middlemen and to... free his prices! Not taking into account the serious ups and downs of the economy.

It is then up to the consumer to resist certain excesses and abuses!

This parenthesis was required to show that agricultural financing must start with self-financing, no matter how modest, followed by other bank or state contributions.

Indeed, this factor has proved decisive in ensuring that the producer will work for his own promotion, independently of the size of his effort.

It does not matter if this self-financing capacity appears to remain stagnant from one Plan to the next. The present objective, as far as agriculture is concerned, is true in-depth development taking all development factors into account simultaneously and, for once, not overlooking any!

Under the Sixth Plan, agricultural financing will result from cooperation between the state, banks (credits) and the farmers themselves.

An Ambitious Effort

The table below gives a breakdown of agricultural investments financing (in million of dinars).

Source	Fifth Plan		Sixth Plan	
	Million dinars	Percent	Million dinars	Percent
State	437.7	75	1,107	71.4
Banks	96.0	16.5	310	20.0
Self-financing	50.3	8.5	133	8.6
Total	584.0	100.0	1,550	100.0

The breakdown of agricultural investments financing under the Sixth Plan is therefore characterized by a large financial effort on the part of the state and the contribution of bank credit and farmers' self-financing.

Already, these three sources of financing have major assets at their disposal: for instance, the development banks just created, and especially the Agricultural Development Bank (see below).

The financing of large agricultural projects (by companies) will be furthered at the same time as small and medium-size farmers will be encouraged to set up small or medium-size projects that are viable, profitable and able to weather all winds and other agricultural hazards.

If agricultural credit and investment are to take place on a larger scale under the Sixth Plan (whether based on state or bank resources), a clear and sound view of the role of credit and investment must prevail, rather than the image of a bottomless barrel that must be kept full as is the case when private projects are found to be in reverse proportion to the financing granted to set them up.

Like common sense, this civic-minded and economical view must be shared by all.

It should, because the investment code provides safeguards; the beneficiaries of the incentives provided by the code will undergo periodic controls to make sure that they are carrying out the investment programs for which these incentives were given.

This is not the least merit of the code.

In this case, responsibilities are well-defined from the start and the risk of going wrong, if still there, is reduced.

To Set Up Valid Projects

There remains the major problem: that of preparing bankable projects.

Indeed, in 20 years of planning, the government has learned how to prepare well rigged out projects born of thorough studies before submitting them for financing; the private farmer (whether an individual or a company, it does not matter), on the other hand, is usually neither used nor able to do so.

Are existing organizations--such as the National Center for Agricultural Studies--going to help in preparing these projects, or will APIA itself or other organizations, such as banks, do so? Are we to see a cropping up of agricultural promotion consultants?

That is the question everyone is asking. Identifying projects, even (and especially) small and medium-size ones, is not an easy task. It requires a truly comprehensive study, from the production contemplated to its marketing, not to mention cost and prices. This is a prerequisite for modernization.

More particularly, is the small or medium-size farmer well armed to face these demands, or will he, for a time, leave the field open to others who are better prepared?

If he does, he will most certainly be left behind.

We should ask ourselves a second question: even though the code provides exceptional benefits for little developed regions, will there not be more projects in regions where the basic infrastructure is adequate, at the expense of those which are less developed precisely because they lack such an infrastructure?

Or would there be projects without any radiation potential, with a costly marketing restricted to the coast?

Finally, a third question, since no agricultural investment map (like APIA's) is available, what are the sectors that, here and there, could provide an impetus and give free rein to private initiative, thus acting as prime movers of agricultural investments?

These three questions dealing with the promoter, the location and the project itself will, we hope, find adequate answers in the decrees that are to provide for the implementation of the law (which, as always, has a broad scope) and give future promoters the practical means to realize their projects under the best possible conditions.

A Key Institution: APIA [Agricultural Investments Promotion Agency]

Among other things, the law of 6 August 1982 creates the Agricultural Investments Promotion Agency, a key institution that is at the crossroads of all the new incentives granted by that law.

Article 16 provides that: "An Agricultural Investments Promotion Agency is created and placed under the authority of the minister of Agriculture. APIA is a public institution of an industrial and commercial nature, endowed with the status of an artificial person and financial autonomy."

"Its object is to promote investments in agriculture and fisheries."

"APIA will operate under the aegis of the investments commission as a sub-commission to approve projects related to agriculture and fisheries."

APIA will submit projects it has identified and that have been selected by agricultural promoters to the approval of the minister of Agriculture.

Its scope includes:

- Investments undertaken by small and medium-size farmers and fishermen as small and medium-size integrated projects.

- Investments undertaken on larger farms as punctual operations or integrated projects, or as part of the realization of highly productive projects.

The law defines investments in agriculture and fisheries as any development operation having for its objective:

- to improve the lot of farmers and fishermen;
- to increase agricultural and fisheries production;
- to improve productivity in agriculture and the fisheries.

Such an investment in agriculture or fisheries can be undertaken either as part of an individual punctual operation, or as part of an integrated project.

What is a punctual operation?

What is an integrated project?

A punctual operation consists in one or several individual investment operations meeting a given need.

Lists of investment operations undertaken as part of punctual operations are defined in current regulations concerning state incentives to the development of agriculture and fisheries.

An integrated project is any project that forms an individual unit and includes several interconnected operations intended to optimize the utilization of the patrimony forming the object of that project.

A list of branches of activity in which integrated projects can be undertaken will be published by decree.

Let us hope that this new institution will be provided with all adequate means to enable it to start within a reasonable time so it can fulfill its role and rapidly become a major pole for justified, viable and profitable agricultural investment.

Investment Promotion In Less Developed Regions

The law provides exceptional incentives for all investments made in the less developed regions (especially the Northwest, Center-West and Southwest).

These incentives are as follows:

1. Natural persons and partnerships will be exempt from the agricultural tax under the law governing real property, for the first 10 years of production (instead of 7).

The agricultural tax paid at the time of sale of agricultural production will be either refunded, or deducted on the annual income tax statement.

2. Enterprises subject to licensing fees will be exempted from that fee for the first 10 years of production.

The agricultural tax paid at the time of sale of agricultural production will be refunded.

A decree will list the territorial delegations included in the less developed regions where agricultural investment will entitle to the above incentives.

However, the law also provides that, if a project is of special importance or special interest for the national economy, its promoters could receive, directly or in addition to the incentives provided, the same incentives under more favorable conditions, depending on the type of production generated by the project, on the amount of production intended for exportation, on the degree of integration of the project, taking into account the priority objectives contained in development plans.

These incentives may be granted through agreements, upon advice from the investments commission.

For Young Technicians and Future Agricultural Promoters

You are a young farmer, under 35--the son of a farmer or trained in an agricultural or management institution--and are looking for means to promote an agricultural project.

The new law of 6 August 1982 directs you to APIA (Agricultural Investments Promotion Agency), a new organization now being created, placed under the authority of the minister of Agriculture and in charge of promoting investments in agriculture or fisheries.

This agency "would" operate like a projects bank: it would be qualified to identify and locate them, and prepare a financing plan. It will submit the project you selected to the approval of the minister of Agriculture.

As soon as approval is obtained, the beneficiary officially becomes an agricultural promoter for whom the law provides several incentives:

- First incentive: The law will provide for the payment of the project study cost, up to a certain amount.
- Second incentive: It enables you to obtain a loan to acquire agricultural land on which to build the project.
- Third incentive: When you purchase such land, you will pay only 50 percent of the transfer tax provided that:
 - you do not sell the land set aside for your project for 10 years starting with the date of the purchase agreement; and
 - you diligently start working on the project.

If execution of the project is not started within two years of the project approval, the "tardy beneficiary" will be summoned to explain and the approval withdrawn if his explanations are not convincing.

- Fourth incentive: If you lack the self-financing required to start, the law enables you to obtain up to 80 percent of it as a repayable grant.

- Fifth incentive: You are entitled to a bank credit at a preferential rate, and even to a subsidy.

- Sixth incentive: You are exempt from any agricultural tax for the first 7 years of production and from [as published] that tax at the reduced rate of 5 percent from the 8th to the 10th year of production.

The agricultural tax paid at the time of sale of agricultural production will be refunded to you, or you can deduct it from your annual income tax statement.

- Seventh incentive: You can import equipment for your project (durable goods); this will be exempt from importation, manufacturing and sales taxes and duties.

- Eighth incentive: Finally, your profits and revenues reinvested in agriculture--up to 30 percent of your annual income subject to personal income tax--will be taxed at a lower rate.

These considerable financial and tax incentives granted to young agricultural promoters demonstrate the desire of public authorities to spare no effort and neglect no opportunity to help the enterprising youth of this country in order to provide a new impetus to agriculture, on the basis of integral modernization.

Practically, there is only one technical requirement (to be an agricultural or management technician). It is a necessary condition nowadays, for agriculture must be valorized as much as possible through the implementation of well thought-out, viable and profitable projects that will ensure the free flow of technology without any human or other barriers. Young technicians and future agricultural promoters, it is up to you to show that this trust is not misplaced.

A Novelty: Agricultural Development Companies

These are public companies incorporated under the laws of Tunisia and in which the state has a direct or indirect capital interest.

Their objective is to develop agricultural land owned by the state, the production potential of which is still unexploited.

This land will be leased for an approved term that cannot exceed 30 years. It should be noted that these companies cannot obtain ownership of agricultural land. (See below)

These companies will be subject to state technical and financial control, independently of the level of direct or indirect state participation in their capital.

If these companies wish to undertake investments on larger farms, as punctual operations, integrated or highly productive projects, they must also go through APIA (Agricultural Investments Promotion Agency).

To benefit from the incentives offered by the law, they must first obtain the approval of the minister of Agriculture, upon recommendation from APIA.

And, to be approved, their projected investments must follow a financing schedule including at least 30 percent of capital owned by them. However, they may apply for a repayable grant.

The tax and financial incentives granted are as follows:

I. The benefits and revenues reinvested in agriculture and fisheries--up to 50 percent of taxable profits--will be subject to lower rates with respect to:

- licensing fees,
- the tax on non-commercial professional profits, or
- the agricultural tax in the case of artificial persons, in accordance with current regulations.

These reduced tax rates will apply to actual reinvestments as well as to reinvestments through the purchase of shares in the sectors of agriculture or fisheries.

II. Agricultural and fisheries equipment goods will be exempt from all taxes and duties resulting from importation, manufacturing or sale, in accordance with current regulations.

III. The transfer tax resulting from the purchase of agricultural land in connection with approved projects will be reduced by 50 percent.

This reduction is granted under two conditions: the land thus set aside for the project must not be sold for a period of 10 years after the date of the purchasing agreement; and work on the approved project must start within 2 years of that date.

IV. Natural persons and partnerships will be exempt from the agricultural tax under the law governing real property for the first 7 years of production, and will be taxed at the reduced rate of 8 percent from the 8th to the 10th year of production.

The agricultural tax paid at the time of sale of agricultural products will be either refunded or deducted on the annual income tax statement.

V. Enterprises subject to licensing fees will be exempted from such fees for the first 7 years of production, and will be taxed at the rate of 8 percent from the 8th to the 10th year of production.

The agricultural tax paid at the time of sale of agricultural products will be either refunded or deducted from the licensing fee owed.

VI. For all approved projects promoted by artificial persons, the incorporation instruments, as well as any instruments relating to capital increases during the first five years, will be subject to a fixed stamp duty.

VII. For the first five years, all dividends paid on stocks and shares, as long as they do not exceed an annual value of 6 percent of the face value of said stocks and shares, will be exempt from the tax on dividends from stocks and shares.

VIII. For all approved projects, the project study cost will be reimbursed to the extent of 1 percent of the investment required, and this reimbursement shall not exceed an amount determined jointly by the ministers of Planning and Finance and of Agriculture.

IX. The credits obtained to realize approved investments projects will be provided at preferential rates compared with the investment rates commonly applied to investment credits in sectors other than agriculture.

X. For all approved investment projects, non-resident investors will have a guaranteed right to transfer the capital invested in foreign currencies and the resulting income, subject to their providing the Central Bank of Tunisia with a justification of the amounts to be transferred.

In case of a cession or liquidation, the transfer guarantee for the capital invested in foreign currencies will cover the actual cession or liquidation amount of the investment.

XI. Non-resident promoters of approved projects may also benefit from easy settlement terms in Tunisia, as part of the project realization, in accordance with current regulations.

The operation of these new companies will open the doors to industrial agriculture based on high yields, scientific work organization, modern management, and domestic or foreign marketing based on marketing studies.

Six New Development Banks

The in-depth action of the Sixth Plan will essentially aim at providing the country with development institutions powerful enough to identify, promote and finance large-scale projects which are indispensable for industrial expansion and agricultural promotion.

As a result, Tunisia's financial landscape will be radically transformed. All the more so as this action will also aim at creating durable and fruitful relations with brother Arab countries whose financial means are adequate to enable them to contribute to Tunisia's development through joint projects that will enlarge the Tunisian market and improve its potentialities.

This action started already in 1980, continued in 1981 and will continue in 1982 and during the remainder of the Sixth Plan.

In fact, the years 1980 and 1981 saw the creation of three new development banks with increased resources:

- the Tunisian-Kuwait Development Bank,

- and the Tunisian-Saudi Investment and Development Company, each with a capital of 100 million dinars distributed evenly between Tunisia and Kuwait and between Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, as well as the Bank for Arab Maghreb Cooperation (capital: 40 million dinars), the capital of which is shared

evenly between its present shareholders (Algeria and Tunisia), but which, as its name indicates, remains open to other Maghreb countries.

1982 has already seen the negotiation, conclusion and ratification of agreements concerning the creation of two new development institutions, the Tunisian-Qatari Development Bank (capital: 70 million dinars), and the Bank for the development of Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates (capital: 50 million dinars). These two institutions will start operating before the end of 1982.

In addition, and simultaneously, the two oldest institutions (the Bank for the Economic Development in Tunisia and COFIT [expansion unknown]) have appreciably increased their capital, thanks to contributions from brother countries, Kuwait and the Sultanate of Oman.

Finally, considering that agriculture is to receive priority, the activity of these institutions will be supported in the agricultural sector by the creation--approved in the 1982 budget--of the National Agricultural Development Bank with a capital of 40 million dinars, 60 percent of which will be held by the state, the remaining 40 percent being distributed among all the other banks (deposit and development banks), so that all energies and all partners will take part in this priority action in the agricultural sector.

All this development network will be installed progressively during the Sixth Plan, will improve its methods and train its men and, while providing a non-negligible contribution to the Sixth Plan, will form Tunisia's financial spearhead during the next two decades.

Other creations are under study or under negotiation, and will complement this financial reorganization of the country.

(Sixth Plan, Volume 1, pages 320 and 321)

Agricultural Land: Ownership, Exploitation and Investment

The new law refers to, and clarifies ownership.


Ownership of agricultural land is a right that can belong only to Tunisian citizens, cooperatives or public companies, as well as to partnerships or limited-liability companies the partners of which are Tunisian citizens.

"This right can also belong to Tunisian artificial persons consisting of Tunisian citizens and engaged in apiculture, aviculture, seed-growing, tree-growing, flower-growing or hothouse crop growing, and is then restricted to the acreages required to exert these activities."

As for agricultural land belonging to the state, it can be exploited only by the following:

- 1) State-owned companies and public institutions.

Carte montrant le degré de développement des régions du pays



Map Showing the Degree of Development of the Country's Regions

Key:

- Zone I Most highly developed regions (usually large coastal towns)
- Zone II Regions around poles of development and, therefore, fairly well developed
- Zone III Fairly well developed regions ranking third in decreasing order of development
- Zone IV Regions slightly more developed than those of Zone V.
- Zone V The most disadvantaged regions (most of the national territory)

- 2) Agricultural development companies (which cannot own the land).
- 3) Agricultural cooperatives.
- 4) Tunisian citizens.

Who are the beneficiaries of investment?

Investment in agriculture and fisheries can be made:

- 1) In an individual enterprise.
- 2) In an enterprise run by state-owned companies or public institutions.
- 3) In an enterprise run by the following artificial persons, provided their partners or shareholders are Tunisian citizens:
 - cooperatives
 - partnerships
 - limited-liability companies.
- 4) Through public companies incorporated under the laws of Tunisia and duly authorized--according to a procedure to be determined by decree--to farm agricultural land (public companies can of course never obtain ownership of agricultural land).
- 5) On a farm operated by agricultural development companies (these companies cannot obtain ownership of agricultural land either).

The two above type of companies cannot own a business related to such a farm.

6) Apiculture, aviculture, seed-growing, tree-growing, flower-growing and hothouse crop growing can be undertaken under any legal form by Tunisian citizens or Tunisian artificial persons consisting of Tunisian citizens.

These artificial persons may obtain ownership of the agricultural land required for the activities into which they engage.

7) Fishing, aquaculture and fish-breeding outside the inner lakes can be undertaken under any legal form by Tunisian enterprises, as defined by current regulations, provided they have been duly approved by the Ministry of Agriculture.

As for investments in agriculture and fisheries, they are classified as follows under the law:

I - Investments Not Subject To APIA's Approval:

These are investments undertaken by small and medium-size farmers and fishermen as punctual operations or as part of regional supervised-credit programs.

Small and medium-size farmers have been defined, by decree, according to their agricultural income, the size of the tracts of agricultural land they own and the size of the farm on which the project is realized, depending on the type of speculation adopted.

Small and medium-size fishermen have been defined, by decree, according to the equipment and means of production available to them.

These investments are not subject to APIA's approval.

For these investments, the state-aid granting procedure is the procedure described in the laws providing state incentives for agricultural and fisheries development.

II - Investments Subject To APIA's Approval

They fall into two categories:

- Investments undertaken by small and medium-size farmers and fishermen as small and medium-size integrated projects, the cost of which is below a maximum cost to be determined by decree, taking into account the type of activity and the size of the operation.

- Investments undertaken by large enterprises as punctual operations or integrated projects, or as part of the implementation of highly productive projects.

These investments can be managed either by natural persons, or by companies.

9294

CSO: 4519/19

DUBAYY WATER PROJECTS OUTLINED

Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 28 Aug 82 p 4

[Article by 'Abd-al-Wahid Saqr: "Dubayy's Deputy Director of the Water Bureau: 'Water Pipelines in Dubayy Are Being Expanded To Fully Meet the Needs of Development'"]

[Text] Sayf Nasir Muhammad 'Umayr, the deputy director of the water bureau in Dubayy, said that the bureau was constructing new water pipelines to meet the needs of development in Dubayy. These pipelines will serve as a backup in the event of emergencies, such as the bursting of a pipe or a water cutoff from the al-Rashidiyah reservoir during maintenance work.

The deputy director emphasized that after these new pipelines have been installed there will be no interruptions in the flow of water in Dubayy.

The bureau has completed two 36-inch diameter pipelines. The first extends from Jabal 'Ali to the al-Rashidiyah reservoir. The other stretches from Jabal 'Ali to the al-Maqabir district in al-Qissis. From these two pipelines subsidiary pipelines branch from al-Rashidiyah to the al-Shariqah road and to the district of Ra's al-Khawr to meet the needs of development in those regions. Another subsidiary pipeline connects with the pipelines in the al-Shariqah road. Sayf Nasir Muhammad 'Umayr said that the bureau is attempting to obtain 4 km of 36-inch pipe and 20 km of 24-inch pipe to complete this system. He said that the bureau currently has only 3 km of 24-inch pipe in its warehouses.

Sayf Nasir indicated that the Dubayy Electric Company is constructing three new units to produce a total of 17 million gallons of fresh water daily. The first unit will begin production in mid-1983, while the other two units will begin production at the end of 1984.

Because the water pipelines will not have sufficient capacity to carry the new additional production the bureau will build new pipelines from the district of Jabal 'Ali to the city of Dubayy. The capacity of this line will be determined in accordance with the city's needs and in keeping with Dubayy's economic and social development plan.

The Dubayy water bureau's deputy director said that there had been no unforeseen increase in water consumption during 1980 and 1981 but that consumption did increase this year by 20 percent and that it is expected to continue to rise at an average rate of 15 to 20 percent a year.

During the summer the city of Dubayy and its suburbs are reported to consume between 37 and 38 million gallons of fresh water daily. These quantities are produced at two principal sources: the Dubayy Aluminum Plant at Jabal 'Ali, which produces 20 million gallons a day, and which can increase production to 25 million gallons a day, and the Dubayy Electric Company, which produces about 13 million gallons a day. About 19 million gallons a day are produced by wells in the districts of al-'Uwayr, al-Wuhush and al-Habab.

Sayf Nasir said that the Dubayy Water Bureau currently employs about 1,300 office workers and laborers, and that the percentage of office workers working in the bureau is very low due to its low wage scales. Salaries do not exceed 2,000 dirhams, which is low considering the high cost of living in the UAE.

He said that the job of collecting water bills is proceeding smoothly and that the bureau is giving customers a 3-month grace period to pay their bills, but after the end of this grace period water service will be cut off if they refuse to pay.

He said that the bureau has 105 ordinary vehicles, 10 large trucks, 16 heavy equipment units and 7 tractors in addition to well-drilling equipment and approximately 15 bicycles for the bill collectors.

9123

CSO: 4404/688

PRINCE DISCUSSES LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 29 Aug 82 p 4

[Interview with Sa'ud al-Mu'alla, the crown prince of Umm al-Qaywayn, by Ali Sultan: "The Crown Prince of Umm al-Qaywayn tells AL-BAYAN: 'The GCC Is an Important Step Toward Full Unification' "; date and place not specified]

[Text] His majesty Shaykh Sa'ud ibn Rashid al-Mu'alla, the crown prince of Umm al-Qaywayn, said that the establishment of the GCC is an important step toward complete Arab unity, and that its information was the inevitable product of circumstances in the Arab World and the Arabs' need for reunification and consensus, particularly at this difficult time.

In his discussion with AL-BAYAN his majesty noted the heroism of the Palestinian resistance in the face of the Zionist attack in Lebanon. He described the agreement by which the Palestinians withdrew from Beirut as an honorable withdrawal.

His majesty also spoke about the new projects that have been scheduled for implementation in the emirate. In this interview, the first of its kind given to a local newspaper, he spoke about matters of housing, services, agriculture, industry and tourism in Umm al-Qaywayn. The text of the interview follows.

A Step Toward Unity

[Question] How does your majesty view the establishment of the GCC, and what do you expect its role to be in pursuing Arab causes at this stage?

[Answer] The GCC is an important national step toward complete Arab unity. Its formation was the inevitable result of circumstances in the Arab World and the Arabs' need for reunification, consensus and service to the cause, particularly in this difficult stage we are going through in the Arab World in the wake of the vicious Zionist attack against our Arab people, not only in Palestine and Lebanon, but in the entire Arab World. The goal of the Zionist enemy is to impose its hegemony and influence over the entire Arab World, not only on a part of it. This is what compels us to adopt a unified Arab position against these imperialist plans. Since its establishment, the

GCC has been working for consensus and accommodation among the viewpoints of the sister nations within the framework of the principles of the Arab League which is the primary representative of common Arab enterprise.

[Question] How do you see the future of the Palestinian resistance after the withdrawal of the fighters from Beirut?

[Answer] It must be said that we have great respect, admiration and esteem for our brethren the Palestinians who are leaving Beirut under entirely honorable circumstances after valiantly resisting the Zionist enemy. The withdrawal of the Palestinian resistance from Lebanon is merely a switch from one front to another, as their leaders, who are continuing the struggle to liberate the occupied land and regain the holy places, have already explained. I can do nothing more right now than praise their extraordinary heroism and their just struggle against the forces of evil and aggression. The Palestinian struggle will increase in intensity as long as there is a Zionist presence in Palestine.

Housing Projects

[Question] The emirate of Umm al-Qaywayn is witnessing a housing boom. What specific plans do you have for future housing?

[Answer] Housing occupies the highest priority among the government's concerns. It intends to provide suitable housing for every citizen. On this basis we will make an effort to study the living situation of the inhabitants and provide other services to raise the living standard of families that live in houses.

With regard to apartment houses the government of Umm al-Qaywayn has a specific construction policy and housing plan in keeping with the housing needs of visitors.

In view of the high demand for apartments the government will make an effort to increase the number of apartment houses to keep pace with requirements.

[Question] The inhabitants of Umm al-Qaywayn are having certain difficulties with the water and sewer system. How will you take care of these difficulties?

[Answer] The local and federal government will certainly try to accomplish whatever it can to serve the interest of the country and its citizens. With regard to the water shortage studies and explorations are still underway in the district of Falj al-Mu'alla. The Ministry of Electricity and Water has taken responsibility for this. Some experiments have proven that there is water in certain districts. This forecasts a solution to the shortage in the near future despite the fact that the shortage results from the region's natural circumstances.

The government has worked along with the Ministry of Electricity and Water to find a solution to this problem by establishing the commercial station project which will be completed at the end of 1984 and which will serve to provide water in large quantities as well as solve the electricity problem.

As far as the sewers are concerned the municipality has submitted its studies on this huge project to the Ministry of Labor. The matter is awaiting the ministry's approval for implementation.

[Question] The Umm al-Qaywayn hospital project has been delayed. This is hindering the availability of health services to the citizens. What is the fate of this project?

[Answer] The Umm al-Qaywayn hospital project is on the verge of completion within the next few days. It will help solve many health-related problems that the emirate currently is facing

As for the villages neighboring the emirate the Falj al-Mu'alla clinic covers the needs of the residents of the surrounding districts.

The Ministry of Health is constructing another clinic to serve the inhabitants of the al-Ra'ifah district.

The inhabitants of the al-Shalmah district, which is near the city, use with clinics of the emirate itself.

[Question] Are you considering improving Radio Umm al-Qaywayn, strengthening its signal and extending its broadcast day?

[Answer] Broadcasting is by nature a sophisticated information system in its important role in disseminating information. We are definitely planning to extend the number of hours the Arabic program is on the air in the very near future as part of the plan to develop the broadcasting system. Work is underway to offer programming in Urdu 2 hours a day to serve Muslims who are not proficient in Arabic with religious guidance programs. This is an indication of our concern with broadcasting and improving its services.

[Question] What industrial and agricultural development projects do you expect to be implemented in the emirate?

[Answer] The government is showing special interest in development projects, particularly industrial and agricultural projects. In the area of industrial development the government has done as much as possible to encourage projects, and even to participate in establishing them, such as the Umm al-Qaywayn Gas Company and the Umm al-Qaywayn Cement Company.

There are also small industrial projects which are a first step on the road to industrial development.

As for agriculture, we have made an effort to encourage this important sector. Despite the region's environmental circumstances the government has made an effort to grant citizens arable land at no cost. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fish Resources has effectively helped to advance the agricultural sector by giving farmers pumps, by digging water wells and by providing seeds, chemical substances and other items.

This support has helped the agricultural sector to meet the needs of the local market and to produce a surplus for export to the sister countries.

[Question] Is there a plan to improve Umm al-Qaywayn's port to make better use of it in the future?

[Answer] The government is taking steps to put the Umm al-Qaywayn port into operation in the coming months. Several companies have offered to manage it and one has already been selected. It will make an effort to put it into operation soon.

The port will serve to facilitate import and export operations along with the UAE's other ports.

[Question] What about the project to build the new royal government office building in Umm al-Qaywayn?

[Answer] Work on the new royal government office building is well underway. It is a blend of modern architectural style, elements of the Islamic architectural tradition, and modern construction. This district will include the buildings of the local bureaus, such as the municipality of Umm al-Qaywayn, in addition to the bureau of petroleum and minerals currently located here.

[Question] To what extent are you planning to take advantage of the agricultural potential of the Falj al-Mu'alla region?

[Answer] The Falj al-Mu'alla district is one of the most important agricultural areas in the Emirate of Umm al-Qaywayn. We have worked to take advantage of the special qualities of this agricultural region by exploiting the flat, level land and increasing its area by leveling some of the agricultural areas which have been subject to encroachment of sand dunes or flooding.

In the area of agriculture we have made an effort to provide every facility and equipment needed by agriculture and farmers. We have also distributed land for free, and have encouraged farmers to take an interest in this line of work. We have encouraged them to grow economically useful crops needed by the inhabitants such as date palms, fruit, vegetables and other items.

[Question] Is there particular interest in the future of tourism for the island of al-Siniyah? What potential advantages does this island have?

[Answer] We have worked for several years to take advantage of al-Siniyah island for tourist purposes because conditions there are suited for tourism. In particular, it is near the emirate, it has ample seashore vegetation as well as gazelles, rabbits, islands and small coves. We have extended water pipes from the city to the island across the bay, and have carried out a project to afforest the island which is nearly completed.

The city itself has a beach club which is an important tourist project. It has berths for a number of sailboats and motorboats. Furthermore, Umm al-Qaywayn has a beautiful seashore that is frequented by vacationing visitors.

BRIEFS

DRILLING WELLS FOR WATER--The Ministry of Agriculture and Fish Resources began work yesterday on drilling 18 new water wells on citizens' farms in various areas of the eastern coast. Of these 5 wells are in Kalba', 2 in Hafrah, 7 in al-Tuyayn and 4 in al-Siji. Work on them will be completed by the end of the year. This was announced by Mr Sa'id 'Umar 'Abdallah, an official in the water and soil department in the eastern coast. He said that the ministry had finished drilling 47 other wells, among them 21 in Dadna, 14 in Sayh Dabba, 1 in al-Badiyah and another in Sharm. The average depth of each of these wells is about 60 meters. He added that these wells were being dug by an international company that specializes in drilling wells. The project will cost about 50 million dirhams. The project comes under the ministry's plan to provide water to citizens' farms. The district's water and soil official said that the ministry was also deepening wells on all the farms in the region to increase the quantity of water utilized for irrigation and to reduce its salinity. Work is also underway on repairing the concrete canals in the Farfar region in al-Fujayrah which were destroyed by rain this year. The work will be completed in five months. [Text] [Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 25 Aug 82 p 4] 9123

DUBAYY TRADE STATISTICS--Dubayy's non-petroleum foreign trade during last January amounted to 379,514 tons valued at 1.818 billion dirhams. During the previous December foreign trade amounted to 557,457 tons with a value of 2.029 billion dirhams. These figures were reported in statistics prepared by the Dubayy Chamber of Commerce and Industry which indicated that imports during January comprised 82.15 percent of the total volume of foreign trade and 82.30 percent of its total value. Exports during the same month comprised 11.50 percent of the total volume of foreign trade and 5.40 percent of its value. Reexports during January accounted for 6.35 percent of the total volume of foreign trade and 12.30 percent of its total value. The statistics indicated that in January the volume of imports was 23 percent lower than in the preceding December. The value of exports during the same month was down 48.80 percent from the previous December. During the same period reexports in January were 11 percent below December levels. [Text] [Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 27 Aug 82 p 2] 9123

DUBAYY MEAT, DAIRY IMPORTS--Dubayy's imports of livestock, meat, eggs and dairy products rose sharply last year compared with 1980. The value of these imports amounted to 613.6 million dirhams in 1981, an increase of 19 percent above the previous year. Statistics prepared by the Bureau of Ports and

Customs in Dubayy indicate that the value of livestock and meat imported last year amounted to approximately 392 million dirhams, while the value of milk and dairy products amounted to 192.6 million dirhams, and the value of eggs amounted to 29 million dirhams. According to these statistics the value of imported livestock, most of which was imported from India, amounted to 2 million dirhams. The value of live sheep, lambs and goats, most of them imported from India, Australia and Somalia, amounted to 31 million dirhams. Live chickens, valued at 729,000 dirhams, were imported mostly from Holland, the United Kingdom and Bahrain. The value of imported camels amounted to 181,000 dirhams, coming from one country in Africa, Kenya. Horses valued at 127,000 dirhams were imported from the United Kingdom. Imports of frozen chickens valued at 23.6 million dirhams came mostly from Denmark, the United States, Brazil and Mozambique. Approximately 6 million dirhams worth of fresh meat was imported, most of it from India. The value of refrigerated and frozen meat amounted to 337 million dirhams. Most of it came from Australia, India, New Zealand and the United States. The value of prepared meat, such as chopped meat, amounted to 25 million dirhams, most of it coming from the United Kingdom, the United States, China, Denmark, France and Singapore. The value of eggs imported last year amounted to 29 million dirhams. Most of them came from the United States, India, Japan and Brazil. Milk and dairy products amounting to 192.6 million dirhams were imported, mostly from Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, West Germany, France and Holland. [Text] [Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 12 Sep 82 p 2] 9123

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