


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Southeast Asia Report

VIETNAM

TAP CHI CONG SAN

No. 12, December 1984

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16 February 1985

SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

VIETNAM

TAP CHI CONG SAN

No. 12, December 1984

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the monthly theoretical and political journal of the Vietnam Communist Party published in Hanoi.

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THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE VIETNAM PEOPLE'S ARMY: BUILDING A
POWERFUL ARMY, ONE STRONG ENOUGH TO WIN VICTORY OVER EVERY ENEMY

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 12, Dec 84 pp 1-6

[Editorial]

[Text] One of the great achievements of our country's revolution has been the creation of an invincible people's army. Never in the history of our country have we had an army as powerful as today's army. The invincibility of our army has been eloquently proven through very glorious victories won in 40 years of almost continuous fighting.

Born of regular and irregular armed units in the revolutionary high tides of the masses and building itself up while fighting under very difficult and arduous circumstances, our army rapidly grew and has, together with the people, won victory over cruel, cunning enemies many times larger and more powerful, thereby bringing about turning points in our country's revolution along the path to national independence and socialism.

With the brilliant victory of the 1945 August Revolution, our army, along with all the people, seized political power throughout the country and established the first worker-peasant state in Southeast Asia. Our army became the army of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

With the resounding victory of the war of resistance against the French colonialist aggressors, which was brought to an end by the earth-shattering victory of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, our army, along with all the people, put a permanent end to the rule of the French colonialists in our country, thereby ushering in the era of the collapse of colonialism, both old and new, throughout the world, liberating one-half of our country, setting the North on the path to socialism and laying a solid foundation for the struggle to liberate the South and reunify the country.

With the great victory of the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation, which concluded with the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign in 1975, our army, along with all the people, defeated the largest and most powerful of the imperialists, thus bringing the longest, most difficult and greatest war in our nation's history of resistance against foreign aggression to a glorious conclusion. That war of resistance crushed the largest counter-

attack by imperialism against the forces of revolution since World War II, ushered in the period of the unavoidable failure of neo-colonialism throughout the world, liberated the entire South, made our country independent and reunified and set it on the course to socialism, thereby marking our nation's most brilliant period of development. Our army became one of the most powerful armies in the world.

With the glorious victories of the two wars fought to defend the socialist fatherland against the Chinese expansionist and hegemonist aggressors in 1978 and 1979, our army, along with all the people, inflicted initial defeats upon the immediate, dangerous enemy that lies right next to us in their plan to annex our country, thereby creating a new position and new forces for the revolution, a position and forces unprecedented in our country and throughout the Indochina peninsula, and creating very favorable circumstances for our people in their cause of building socialism and defending the fatherland. Our army was tempered and grew by another important degree.

A revolutionary army, a people's army, an army that fights, works and produces as taught by President Ho Chi Minh, our army has enthusiastically increased its production, achieved an important degree of self-sufficiency in grain, food and other items, reduced the contributions that need be made by the people in war time as well as peace time and taken positive steps to build the national defense industry and the army's rear services. Together with the other sectors, our army participates in the maintenance of political security, the maintenance of social order and safety, especially in economic construction, thereby making direct contributions to socialist construction.

Imbued with the pure and loyal proletarian international spirit that "to help a friend is to help yourself," our army has, in the long course of the revolution, stood shoulder to shoulder with the armies and peoples of the two fraternal countries of Laos and Cambodia in the fight against the common enemies of the three countries of Indochina, first the French colonialists and U.S. imperialists and, today, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists who are collaborating with the U.S. imperialists, thereby fulfilling its international obligation to the Lao revolution and the Cambodian revolution.

Throughout its 40 years of struggle filled with hardship and sacrifice, our army has excellently completed each task assigned to it by the party and people, be it fighting on various battlefields or fulfilling its international obligation in fraternal countries; maintaining its readiness to fight and protect the peaceful labor of the people or carry out economic construction at difficult, strategically important places or in key fields; coordinating with public security forces in the struggle against the schemes and acts of sabotage of the enemy to maintain political security and social order and safety or working with the people to combat flooding and other natural disasters. Our army has displayed unquestioned loyalty to the fatherland, the party and the people. It is truly deserving of the praise bestowed upon it by the revered Uncle Ho: "The army is loyal to the party, filial to the people and ready to fight and die for the independence and freedom of the fatherland,

for socialism. It completes every task, overcomes every difficulty and triumphs over every enemy."(1) It is worthy of being the reliable tool of the party and the proletarian dictatorship state, a solid pillar of the new socialist system, the beloved sons and daughters of the people.

For these reasons, our army has been awarded the highest of honors by our party and state.

The cadres and soldiers of our army fully realize that each feat of arms and achievement of our army stems first from the wise leadership provided by the communist party, from the care and teachings of Uncle Ho, the father, the teacher, the beloved comrade of our people's armed forces. Creatively applying Marxism-Leninism to the specific circumstances of our country, the party has set forth a correct revolutionary line and held aloft the banner of national independence and socialism in all periods of the revolution. On this basis, it has formulated a correct military line and correct strategies for both the people's war of liberation and the present day war to defend the fatherland. The party has provided close leadership and successfully resolved numerous problems in the buildup of the people's armed forces, in the guidance of armed uprisings and the conduct of revolutionary war, in the development of Vietnamese military science and art, in the strengthening of the national defense system...

Our party has displayed undeniable skill in military leadership and attached importance to changing and improving the mechanism by which the party leads the army during the various periods of the revolution with a view toward increasing the effectiveness of party leadership and insuring that our army completes each task assigned to it well. President Ho Chi Minh said: "Our army possesses invincible strength because it is a people's army built by our party, led and educated by our party."(2)

The deep love and wholehearted help and assistance of the people are the inexhaustible source of strength and the solid foundation through and upon which our army has won victory and grown. Since the day it was established, the people have always cared for every need of the army like a good, kind, noble and brave mother. Our people have given all that is most precious to them, their manpower, material and money, to the army. Even in the face of towering difficulties, our people have willingly endured every shortage and sacrifice in order to insure that the army is well fed and well clothed, has adequate housing and has the equipment and weapons needed to win victory over the enemy. Everyone, from the very old to the very young, of all nationalities in all regions of the country cherishes the fine virtues of the troops of Uncle Ho. The feeling of the army and the people being united, the army and the people sharing one will is truly pervasive and deep.

The new social system, which began as a people's democracy and has now become a socialist system with all its superior qualities, provides our army with a tremendous strength through which to win victory and continuously grow. Under the leadership of the party, our state apparatus and the various social organizations from the central to the basic level mobilize every force among the people to assist our army in completing the tasks it faces in combat and the buildup of its forces. The new system has tapped the country's large

potentials and created abundant sources of supplemental manpower and materiel for the buildup of the people's armed forces, the building of a solid and strong rear area and the building of the national defense system.

The victories and growth of our army over the past 40 years have been due, to a very important degree, to the large and effective assistance provided in the fraternal spirit by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, to the very close unity and coordinated efforts in our common fight of the armies and peoples of the two fraternal, neighboring countries of Laos and Cambodia and to the active support and strong encouragement of the revolutionary and progressive forces of the entire world, especially to the roles played by the Soviet Union, Laos and Cambodia. Every victory and every step in the growth of our army have been closely associated with this extremely valuable international support and assistance. International assistance has created some very important conditions enabling our army to promptly meet the rising requirements of war, of its development toward a regular force and modern army.

Our army is as large and strong as it is today also as a result of the tireless efforts the army, itself, has made. Educated and tempered in the crucible of struggle over the past 40 years, our army is truly an army of, by and for the people, an army tied to the people by blood, an army that fights for the happiness of the people, that loves, respects, assists and protects the people, that relies upon the people when fighting. Our army exemplifies the essence of the working class in combat as well as in the buildup of its forces and upholds its glorious traditions and those of the nation. Our army brings determination to fight and win to combat against the enemy, to its efforts to learn modern military science and technology, to its work and production, to its participation in economic construction; possesses the spirit of close internal unity, a strong bond of unity between itself and the people and loyal international solidarity; possesses self-imposed discipline, always displays a high proletarian international spirit and always stands ready to fulfill its international obligation.

The worldwide struggle between the forces of peace, national independence, democracy and social progress, on the one side, and imperialism and the other reactionary powers, on the other side, is a very decisive and complex struggle. In Southeast Asia, the class struggle between revolution and counter-revolution is also a very sharp struggle, a struggle in which Indochina has been and continues to be a hot spot. As regards our country, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, acting in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists, are waging a wide-ranging war of sabotage involving increasingly frenzied and brazen activities while frantically preparing for a large-scale war of aggression when conditions permit.

In the face of this very complicated situation, our army and people cannot be satisfied with what they have accomplished. The important achievements and valuable experiences of the 40 years of the development and growth of our army provide a very good foundation upon which we can move forward to meet the new requirements of the situation. Making extensive efforts to strengthen the national defense system, build up the armed forces and defend the fatherland in conjunction with promoting socialist construction continue to be the

extremely important tasks of our army and people, tasks in which they cannot relax their efforts for one moment. The sacred responsibility and obligation of each one of us at this point in time is to make our country truly strong both economically and militarily and create the greatest possible combined strength for defending the country.

Within this combined strength, the people's army (consisting of main force troops, local troops and border defense troops) is the main tool, the solid pillar in the defense of the fatherland and symbolizes the military strength of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. To fully implement the resolution of the 5th Congress and the other resolutions of the party, we must continue to accelerate the development of our army into a revolutionary people's army that possesses an unshakeable will to win, strict discipline and a serious bearing, an army that becomes more regular and modern with each passing day and is constantly achieving a higher state of combat readiness. This work must be raised to a new level of effort and carried out in a comprehensive, well coordinated and balanced manner. The foremost requirement in this work is to actively improve the quality and increase the fighting strength of our army. As part of this requirement, we must establish the proper relationships between size and quality, between the army's revolutionary character and its regular force and modern character, between manpower and weapons-technical equipment and between the buildup of the army and its combat operations, with attention to the other requirements that exist regarding the quality of the various elements of the military, especially improving the quality of the corps of cadres, which is the key in improving the quality of our army. At the same time, it is necessary to closely tie the buildup of the people's army to the development of strong, widespread mass armed forces, to the work of building a modern and complete national defense system and developing the socialist economy.

Only in this way can our army meet the new requirements of the people's war to defend the socialist fatherland against our new economy, meet the requirements involved in becoming a regular force and modern army, completing combat readiness and combat missions and, along with all the people, defending the fatherland, maintaining political security and maintaining social order and safety while working, producing, building the economy and fulfilling its international obligation.

Our party and people always consider building the people's army to be one of their foremost tasks. To strengthen its leadership of the army in the face of the new situation, our party has established a new mechanism by which it leads the army. We must have a correct and full understanding of what this change entails, must change our old ways of thinking and working, must quickly put the new mechanism on a regular basis and achieve the impact it is intended to have. At the same time, the various party committee echelons on the local level must provide close leadership and promptly resolve the problems that arise in the buildup of local forces.

The entire party, all the people and every sector, level and organization must, depending upon their task, functions and circumstances, concern themselves with building the people's armed forces, look after the material and spiritual lives of troops, solidify and strengthen the unity between the

army and civilians, implement the army's rear area policies well, care for the families of war dead, disabled veterans and the families of troops and encourage and teach youths to eagerly fulfill their military obligation.

With pride and excitement over the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Vietnam People's Army, the glorious traditional festival of the people's armed forces, let our entire party, all our people and our entire army display a high spirit of responsibility and actively participate in the buildup of the army. Let all cadres and soldiers actively promote the campaign to "display the fine nature and raise the fighting strength of the people's armed forces" so that our army becomes increasingly strong and constantly grows.

We are confident that, under the correct leadership of the party, the concern and assistance of the various levels of government and the wholehearted care provided by the people together with the efforts made by cadres and soldiers to grow and improve themselves, our army will become even more powerful and be the solid pillar in the cause of defending our socialist fatherland.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ho Chi Minh: "Tuyen tap,"[Selected Works], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1980, Volume 2, p 345.

2. Ibid.

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THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM, THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN EVERY VICTORY AND THE GROWTH OF THE VIETNAM PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 12, Dec 84 pp 7-14

[Article Senior General Chu Huy Man]

[Text] During the past half century and more, our people, under the leadership of the party of the Vietnamese working class, have won great victories and advanced our society by leaps and bounds to the level of development of our times, thereby realizing their long held dream to be independent, free and build a civilized and happy life.

During that period of time, our people's armed forces, which were founded, built and led by the Communist Party of Vietnam and the revered President Ho Chi Minh and with the care and trust of the people, have stood shoulder to shoulder with the people, contributed to the remarkable strength of the revolution and excellently completed the tasks of liberating the nation and defending the fatherland.

The 40 year history of victories and growth of our people's armed forces has been closely associated with the great victories of the nation and the turning points and development of our country's revolution under the leadership of the party and has also been the history of the party's organizing, teaching and leading the army. "The greatest gains made in that process of revolution were that our people won total independence and completely reunified the fatherland, our entire country began the advance to socialism and acquired an invincible people's army."(1)

This glorious history has shed further light on the great revolutionary truth of our times: the leadership of the party of the working class is the origin of, is the factor determining the growth and victories of the Vietnam people's armed forces. This is the most important lesson learned, the most important experience gained by our party in building the revolutionary armed forces.

The party's scientific analysis of the objects of the revolution and the immediate, dangerous enemy of the revolution during each stage provided the basis for the armed forces to recognize their strategic enemy, correctly see

the nature, schemes, strengths and weaknesses of the enemy, be vigilant against and hate the enemy, be determined to fight and win victory over the enemy.

The correct political and military lines, the consistent strategy of taking the offensive and the ingenious methods of struggle of the party have successfully resolved fundamental and even specific problems encountered in the building of the national defense system, the buildup of the people's armed forces, in the development of Vietnamese military science and art and in the conduct of the war of liberation and the war to defend the fatherland.

The party established and has always attached foremost importance to the requirements of cultivating, strengthening and developing upon the working class nature of the army so that the army possesses unquestioned loyalty to the revolutionary thinking of the party, of the people, upholds the heroic, unyielding tradition of the nation, combines genuine patriotism with pure proletarian internationalism and builds a close relationship between the army and the people, with the people being considered the source of the army's inexhaustible and invincible strength. Our party has constantly concerned itself with building its organization within the army so that it is strong and solid in every respect, strengthening the principles and procedures that govern the party's leadership of the army and forging the corps of party members and cadres to serve as the solid nucleus uniting and leading the army forward in all circumstances.

These are the main elements of the lessons and experiences learned and gained by the party in its leadership of our army in recent history.

From the realities of the past 40 years, we clearly see that further strengthening the party's leadership of the armed forces is an extremely important prerequisite, is an objective demand if our army is to fulfill its present political task and make worthy contributions to the common cause of revolution throughout the country. This is because:

First, our people must simultaneously perform the two strategic tasks of successfully building socialism and firmly defending the Vietnamese socialist fatherland.

We are advancing to socialism without experiencing the stage of capitalist development from an economy in which small-scale production predominates, an economy that is seriously imbalanced. In many respects, the aftereffects of the long war are still very serious. The major obstacle with which our people must contend as they move ahead is the wide-ranging war of sabotage being waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists in a vain attempt to weaken and annex our country and the other countries of Indochina and eventually achieve their insane ambition to rule the world.

The struggle to resolve the question "who will triumph over whom" that exists between the socialist path and the capitalist path in our country, which is closely tied to the struggle to defend the Vietnamese socialist fatherland, is a complex, bitter and long struggle. This struggle is also closely tied to

the struggles being waged by the two fraternal countries of Laos and Cambodia. In addition, it is inseparably linked to the struggle between the forces of revolution and the forces of counter-revolution, between the forces of peace and the forces of war throughout the world.

Secondly, the tasks of the people's armed forces in the new stage are very large. Maintaining combat readiness, winning victory in combat and firmly defending the fatherland are our army's foremost political tasks. The army must contribute along with the people to defeating the wide-ranging war of sabotage of the enemy while being ready to defeat a war of aggression of any size and at any time should the enemy recklessly unleash one. Working and producing to help build the economy are an extremely important political task that is part of the nature and tradition of our army. This task must be carried out in an active manner and with increasingly high returns. In the new stage, our army must continue to fulfill its international obligation to the revolutions of Cambodia and Laos. The purpose of this long-range and no less complicated task is to strengthen the strategic, militant alliance among the three countries of Indochina, which is an extremely important factor guaranteeing that the people of each country will successfully build socialism, staunchly defend their national independence and help to preserve peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the world.

Our army must also actively participate in building a strong and solid rear area in order to lay a solid foundation and provide a plentiful source of everything needed for the frontlines to fight and win victory both in the immediate future and over the long range. It must also fulfill its role as a "great school" and cultivate and forge the new man among the young generations.

In order to further strengthen the party's leadership of the people's armed forces in the new stage of the revolution, the experience of the past 40 years shows us that we must, in our practical activities, have a full awareness and firm grasp of the following several matters of fundamental importance:

We must clearly recognize who our enemy is, know their nature, schemes and tactics, adopt a clear, unambiguous and resolute attitude toward them, continuously heighten our revolutionary vigilance and be determined to defeat them. The experience of our party in revolutionary struggle during the past half century and more shows that during each period, especially preceding turning points in the revolution, firmly adhering to the stand and viewpoints of Marxism-Leninism, correctly defining the targets of the revolution and, on this basis, correctly determining who the strategic enemy of the army and people is, adopting a precise revolutionary line and method, adopting an unequivocal attitude toward the enemy and being determined to defeat them are very important matters in the leadership provided by the party. Whether a leading party views and evaluates the enemy correctly or incorrectly and whether its attitude toward the enemy is resolute or not have a direct impact upon the strategy and tactics employed in the revolutionary struggle, upon the destiny of the country. Whether or not the attitude of a revolutionary soldier toward the enemy is unequivocal is a measurement of his political awareness, his stand, his will to fight and his revolutionary qualities.

From the time of the struggle to seize political power to the periods of the war of liberation and the wars to defend the fatherland, our party has always clearly shown the people and the people's armed forces what the basic, long-range targets of the revolution are, who the direct and dangerous enemies of the revolution are and who their strategic enemy is.

Today, despite suffering heavy defeats in their attempts to threaten, harass and sabotage us in our work of restoring and building the country, especially the defeats suffered in the two wars of aggression against our country in 1978 and 1979, the reactionaries within Chinese ruling circles continue to pursue their basic plan and are waging, by very malicious methods, a wide-ranging war of sabotage against our country and all three countries of Indochina while preparing for a large-scale war of aggression when they consider the time to be right.

In the aftermath of their defeat in Vietnam and Indochina in 1975, the U.S. imperialists are now making extensive efforts to assemble forces and intensifying the arms race in a vain attempt to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union and block the development of the three revolutionary currents, thereby pushing mankind to the brink of a destructive nuclear war. Acting in collaboration with the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, they have been promoting a plan to return to Indochina, especially ever since the Beijing reactionaries agreed to serve as their "shock force" in Asia.

In the face of this situation, the party has made it clear that the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, who are acting in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists, are the immediate, dangerous enemy of the Vietnamese, of the peoples of Laos and Cambodia, that the U.S. imperialists are the basic, long-range enemy of our people and the people of the world and that it is the Chinese aggressor army with which our army and people must deal from the standpoint of strategic warfare.(2) The Vietnamese as well as the people of Indochina, the people of Southeast Asia and the world must also be very highly vigilant, be ever vigilant in the face of the schemes of the reactionaries within Beijing ruling circles and the bellicose imperialist powers.

The fundamental, unchanging policy of the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists is to collaborate with the U.S. imperialists in opposing the Soviet Union, opposing Vietnam and the world revolutionary movement. As regards Vietnam and the three countries of Indochina, their strategy and tactics have never changed, only become more hostile. They are frantically intensifying their wide-ranging acts of sabotage and escalating their military activities along the northern border to new and dangerous levels as well as escalating their activities and those of their lackeys in Laos and Cambodia.

To the armed forces, knowing the enemy and correctly assessing the enemy, which are always matters of fundamental importance, are now pressing requirements that are constantly being faced from the standpoint of strategy and campaigns as well as combat. We must have a thorough understanding of the basic assessments of the party regarding the nature and schemes of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and our strategic adversary, the Chinese aggressor army, so that both our stand and will to fight are firm. This must be the basis that we use to gain a deep understanding of our immediate

adversary and their activities on the battlefield so that we become determined to defeat them, make every effort to avoid complacency or pessimism and confusion in the face of temporary difficulties and always remain so vigilant that we are not tricked by enemy attempts at concealment, not taken in by their very clever psychological warfare schemes and do not for one moment relax our grip on our weapons or lose our revolutionary vigilance, the consequences of which would be incalculable.

We must have a firm grasp of the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism and the realities of the country and thoroughly understand the general line of the party in order to lay the foundation for fully comprehending the military line and thinking of the party and completing the political task of the armed forces.

In its leadership of the revolution, our party sets forth correct lines, lines that reflect the objective laws of society and the interests and aspirations of the people. Through organizational work and mass agitation, it turns these lines into living reality and moves the revolution steadily forward.

As the effective tool of the proletarian dictatorship state led by the party, our army must have a deep understanding of the entire line of the party. Only by fully comprehending the party's line can our army understand all that is involved in the nation's revolutionary struggle in the present age and see that the ideals and objectives for which it fights are national independence and socialism, are the national task and the country's international obligation. Only by comprehending the line of the party can a solid foundation be established for understanding and applying in practice the numerous matters of fundamental importance in defending the socialist fatherland.

Our army, in addition to its tasks of maintaining combat readiness, winning victory in combat and fulfilling its international obligation, must also work, produce and help to build the country. Therefore, it must have a clear understanding of the line on building the economy as well as the socio-economic goals of the party during the initial stage of the period of transition to socialism.

To reflect a thorough understanding of the party's foreign policy, our army, along with all the people, must strengthen the relations of friendship and comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries and be ready to protect the special relations of friendship and solidarity, to strengthen the strategic, long-range militant alliance among Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The military line is an integral part of the party's line on the socialist revolution. This line guided our army and people to victory in the wars we have fought to save and defend the country. Today, this line entails building a national defense system in which all the people participate, building people's armed forces and defending the socialist fatherland by means of a people's war.

A deep understanding of and strict adherence to the complete line of the party provide an important basis for solidifying and strengthening the unity and consensus within the army, within the party and in our society. This is closely tied to teaching Marxist-Leninist theory in order to strengthen the working class stand and viewpoints of the cadres and soldiers within the armed forces and provide them with the command of theory needed to deeply understand, fully grasp and steadfastly adhere to the line and display creativity in organizing the implementation of the party's revolutionary line.

The party's line on building a national defense system in which all the people participate and preparing for a people's war to defend the socialist fatherland not only creates military strength, or strength in the form of weapons and technical equipment, but also the combined strength of national independence and socialism, of the system of socialist collective ownership of the working people, a strength based on the military, economic, political, cultural and scientific-technical achievements recorded in the process of building socialism in our country. It is the strength of all our people, of our entire nation in this new era, a strength closely tied to the strength of the three revolutionary currents of our times. Leading great undertakings is the task of the party, of the Party Central Committee, the various party committee echelons of the localities and sectors and the basic organizations of the party. Building combat villages, developing the districts into military fortresses and developing the provinces and municipalities into integrated strategic units in a manner closely linked to building the economy, carrying out cultural development and building localities that are strong and solid in every respect are, in the immediate future and over the long range, the tasks of the people of all localities, tasks to be performed under the direct leadership of the various party committee echelons within the locality.

With regard to building people's armed forces, it is the policy of our party to continue the buildup of our army into a powerful people's army that is more combat ready with each passing day and always fulfills each task assigned by the fatherland. Our party considers one of the basic factors determining the fighting strength of the army to be continuously strengthening the working class nature and developing upon the glorious tradition of the army. The working class nature of the army is seen in its combat objectives, political task, organizational structure, system of leadership and military science and art as well as in the political-spiritual qualities and political relationships within the army.

The Vietnam People's Army, which has been built in accordance with the organizational line of the party, is under the direct, centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, leadership which is provided on a day to day basis directly by the Political Bureau. Its internal leadership, command and management relations fully reflect the revolutionary nature, the democratic centralism and the high degree of conformity of a revolutionary army of the working class.

To fully comprehend the military line and the viewpoints of the party regarding the building of people's armed forces, we must be fully aware of and correctly establish the following basic relationships:

--The relationship between the revolutionary nature of the army and how regular and modern the army is: the army's revolutionary nature is closely linked to how regular and modern the army is. Revolutionary is the political character of the army. The material strength of the army is created by how regular and modern it is. The constant enhancement of the army's revolutionary character and the constant improvement of the army in terms of how regular and modern it is have an impact upon and stimulate each other and result in the army possessing well developed, solid fighting strength.

--The relationship between human resources and weapons-technical equipment, which are the basic factors of the army's fighting strength: within this relationship, people play the decisive role. These are people who fight for the correct ideals and objectives, meet the necessary political and military standards, have the ability to exercise ownership and are able to use weapons and equipment in a proficient and effective manner. With such people, combat efficiency rises as equipment and weapons become more modern.

--The relationship between the buildup of forces and combat: there must be full adherence to the viewpoint that the purpose of building up the army is to enable the army to fight and win victory. It is to fight and win victory that we build up the army. While fighting and winning victory, we must build strong and solid forces so that the army possesses enduring, resilient fighting strength and wins another victory with every battle.

--The relationship between size and quality: size is important but very much importance must be attached to quality. Once the necessary size has been reached, quality must become the main objective. In view of the fact that our adversary is the Chinese aggressor army, improving the quality of the army assumes even more special importance. We must build standing forces of the necessary size, standing forces that are large enough to meet the demands of every situation; at the same time, we must build reserve, militia and self-defense forces that are large and strong from the standpoint of their size and quality so that they can take the initiative in meeting the requirements and changing demands of war.

We must establish an appropriate leadership mechanism, one which firmly guarantees that the party leads the army in every situation.

The system consisting of the collective of the party committee, which provided comprehensive leadership, the commander, who was in charge, the network of party committees on the various echelons, from the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee to the basic organizations of the party, and the network of political agencies, which assisted the party committee and commander in the performance of party work-political work, played a large and important role in the buildup and combat of the armed over the past 40 years. In the period just past, facts proved this leadership mechanism to be a correct one.

In the new stage of the revolution, the specifics involved in building the national defense system are diverse and complex. A people's war to defend the socialist fatherland is becoming increasingly popular, comprehensive and modern in nature. Our army has been and is being equipped, trained and

managed in accordance with the standards of a regular, modern army. In modern combat, troops must take decisive, urgent and closely coordinated actions and the commanders on the various echelons must be able to make decisions and deal with situations in a timely and accurate manner on their own so that they can win victory and complete their mission well. We also have a corps of party cadres within the army that has grown in many respects and gained much experience in 40 years of being tempered and challenged. These factors demand that we improve the leadership provided by the party. They also provide conditions that permit us to improve the leadership provided by the party. The Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee issued a resolution on "changing and improving the mechanism by which the party leads the Vietnam People's Army and national defense work and implementing the 'one person in command' policy within the army."

Our party has elaborated upon and concretized the most basic element of this issue, namely that "the party must provide the army with direct, centralized and unified political, ideological and organizational leadership..."(3), in the form of the main principles that underlie the new mechanism by which the party leads our armed forces. They are:

"The Party Central Committee, the Political Bureau on a direct, day to day basis, providing direct, centralized and unified leadership of every aspect of the Vietnam People's Army; implementing the 'one person in command' policy on all echelons within the army and establishing military councils on certain echelons to serve as a collective military leadership organization; changing the functions of the political agencies on the various echelons within the Vietnam People's Army and making the political agency an agency that provides party leadership and undertakes party work-political work within the army; establishing the basic organizations of the party within the army on the regimental and equivalent echelons and insuring that they operate in exact accordance with party statutes and the regulations of the Party Central Committee; and requiring Political Bureau and Secretariat approval for the appointment of cadres as commanders and political directors on the division level and upward and the appointment of the members of the military councils on the various echelons."(4)

The new leadership mechanism within the army is a complete entity. Every organization within this system has a different function, task and method of operation but all of these organizations are closely tied to one another, all operate within the same framework and all have the common objectives of guaranteeing firm leadership by the party in every situation and increasing the fighting strength of the army. Party leadership is not only seen in the activities of the Party Central Committee, the Political Bureau and the Secretariat, but also in the practical, day to day work of the corps of commanders and management cadres, the political agencies, the basic organizations of the party, each party member and the mass organizations. When disorder exists in any one of these areas, when one of these components fails to fulfill its function and does not comply with principles, the strength of the entire system is reduced and the synchronized nature of the new leadership mechanism is lost.

One matter of importance is that each cadre and party member within the army, most importantly those cadres and party members who hold management positions on the various echelons, must display high party consciousness and adherence to principles; consciously act in accordance with the lines and viewpoints of the party; struggle to defend the lines and viewpoints of the party and protect its unity; join efforts to improve the quality of party leadership and the fighting strength of the army; and excellently complete each assigned task.

Within the new leadership mechanism, the basic organizations of the party occupy an extremely important position. Increasing the fighting strength of the basic organizations of the party, especially the party chapters, is always the foremost responsibility of the entire party. Within the armed forces, the building of basic organizations of the party that are pure, solid and strong must be the nucleus of the effort to build basic units that are strong and solid in every respect, that possess high fighting strength and successfully complete each task. The building of the basic organizations of the party must be closely tied to the building of units. The quality of leadership provided by the basic organizations of the party must be measured by how well the unit completes its political task. Conversely, it is through the performance of the political task that the basic organizations of the party must be built and their fighting strength must be increased.

The decisive element in building the basic organizations of the party is the building of strong and solid party chapters within combat units. Only with a strong and solid party chapter on the company level can the party know the unit, know each of its members and fulfill its central role in leading the entire unit in tenacious combat, in winning victory over the enemy even in the worst possible situations. Only with a strong and solid party chapter does the commander have a solid foundation upon which to act and the masses receive direct guidance and assistance.

Building the basic organizations of the party and the basic units is the responsibility of the basic organizations themselves and the responsibility of the various echelons, of each party member and cadre. The echelon immediately above the basic units must fully recognize its responsibility and orient each of its activities toward the basic units so that each work program is quickly and thoroughly understood, is carried out with high results. Leadership and command effectiveness must be measured by the actual results achieved by the basic unit in the performance of its task. The building of basic units that are solid, strong and pure in every respect must be a widespread effort; at the same time, efforts must be periodically focused on key areas that have a direct effect upon the performance of the unit's task. At present, we are concentrating on building the basic organizations of the party within combat units, at places that manage many weapons, much technical equipment, large material bases and large amounts of money and at places where many middle level and high ranking cadres are concentrated, which is consistent with practical requirements.

A strong corps of party members makes the basic organizations of the party strong; conversely, party members can only grow and mature when the basic organizations are pure, solid and strong. The building of the corps of party

members within the army is closely tied to the building of the corps of party cadres within the army, which is the force that plays the decisive role in leading and commanding the army, in providing a thorough understanding of and organizing the successful implementation of the revolutionary line and tasks of the party and the tasks of the army. The corps of party cadres within the army must be built in a way that meets the basic requirements involved in strengthening the national defense system and building the people's armed forces, a way that insures victory in a war to defend the fatherland, a way that is consistent with the requirements of implementing the mechanism by which the party leads the army in the new stage.

While giving attention to the corps of high ranking cadres, management cadres must attach full importance to the corps of basic level cadres because it is the largest corps of cadres and because it plays the decisive role in the building of basic units that are strong and solid in every respect. The responsibility of each person is to strengthen the unity among cadres, to preserve the good qualities of cadres in order to tap the sense of responsibility and the capabilities of the entire corps and each individual person and enable cadres to develop and grow continuously while avoiding attrition and losses that are related, not to combat or work, but to activities in a cadre's personal life.

In their 40 years of combat and growth, the Vietnam people's armed forces, together with all the people, have recorded remarkable achievements in revolutionary struggle and revolutionary war. The sacred wars fought by the nation of Vietnam stand in world military history as 20th century miracles. There are many subjective and objective reasons for this but the most important is the fact that Vietnam's people's armed forces have been organized, educated and forged by the Communist Party of Vietnam and the very highly revered President Ho Chi Minh. President Ho said: "Our army possesses invincible strength because it is a people's army built by our party, led and educated by our party."(5)

To meet the requirements set by our party regarding the buildup of the armed forces, the requirement of building "a revolutionary people's army that possesses an unshakeable determination to win, strict discipline...and is increasingly regular and modern"(6), we must further strengthen the party's leadership of the people's armed forces. This is how we can continue to develop upon the most important lessons and experiences learned and gained by our party in the process of building the revolutionary armed forces.

FOOTNOTES

1. Le Duan: "Xay dung quan doi nhan dan cach mang hung manh"[Building a Powerful Revolutionary People's Army], TAP CHI CONG SAN, No 1-1980, p 25.
2. Political Bureau Resolution Number 03 dated 25 October 1982.
3. Van kien Dai hoi Nam [Proceedings of the 5th Congress], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1982, Volume III, p 89.
4. Political Bureau Resolution Number 07 dated 15 December 1982.

5. Ho Chi Minh: "Tuyen tap"[Selected Works], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1980, Volume 2, p 345.
6. Van kien Dai hoi Nam [Proceedings of the 5th Congress], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1982, Volume I, p 45.

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SOME LESSONS AND EXPERIENCES IN BUILDING THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 12, Dec 84 pp 15-23, 31

[Article by Senior General Hoang Van Thai]

[Text] As soon as it was founded, our party adopted the line on revolution by violent force and saw the need to build revolutionary armed forces.

In the 40 years of their existence, the Vietnamese people's armed forces have steadily grown, from small to large, from weak to strong, and now have a complete organizational structure consisting of militia and self-defense forces, local forces, powerful main force military corps and increasingly modern branches and services.

Born of the people, fighting for the interests of the people and victoriously completing each mission assigned to them in the various periods of revolutionary struggle, the armed forces of Vietnam are truly armed forces of the people and have always been worthy of being the effective tool of the party, of the revolutionary state.

The 40 years of growth and victory of the Vietnamese people's armed forces have provided us with many valuable lessons. Over the years, these lessons in the nature of laws have retained their practical value in the course of our army's continuous growth and glorious victories under the leadership of the party.

I. The Vietnamese People's Armed Forces Are Born, Grow and Win Victory on the Basis of the Large and Powerful Political Forces of the Revolutionary Masses

Since it was founded, our party has always considered enlightening and organizing the masses to be of foremost importance in its work of revolutionary agitation. When armed uprising became an urgent issue, our party attached even more importance to organizing the revolutionary masses into powerful political forces to lay the foundation for the development of revolutionary forces, in general, and revolutionary armed forces, in particular.

The founding of the Viet Minh Front (May, 1941) and the rapid growth of the various national salvation organizations within the front caused the political

forces of the revolutionary masses to develop rapidly and, upon this firm foundation, revolutionary armed forces were widely established, especially after the party made its appeal to "prepare for an uprising." With this, the opportunity had ripened for the Unit for National Liberation--a main force unit--to be born in the tide of preparations for the general uprising.

When issuing instructions for the establishment of the Unit for National Liberation (December, 1944), President Ho directed that the word "propaganda" be added to its name, making it the "Vietnam Propaganda Unit for National Liberation, a name which indicates that greater importance should be attached to the political side than to the military side. It is a propaganda unit."(1) The unit's immediate task was to agitate and organize the masses, to "turn its hands to work among the masses, to organizing the Viet Minh everywhere; once we have the masses on our side, we will have everything."(2)

The realities of the two wars of resistance against France and the United States as well as the current fight against the forces of Chinese expansionism have proven that the political forces of the masses play a role of decisive importance for the people's armed forces. The political forces of the masses are the base upon which the armed forces are built and developed, are the foundation upon which the armed forces exist, fight and win victory.

The experience gained within enemy held areas during the years of resistance shows: wherever there were powerful political forces and a strong, solid base among the masses, the armed forces, even though deep within the clutches of the enemy, were still protected by the people, were still helped by the people to overcome seemingly insurmountable difficulties in the process of preparing for and conducting combat operations.

The history of the growth and victories of the Vietnamese people's armed forces confirms: "The Vietnamese people are truly the good and kind mother, the brave mother of our army, the inexhaustible source of strength of our armed forces."(3)

II. The Three Elements of the Military, a Creative Way To Organize Armed Forces, One Consistent with the Conditions of the Uprising and the Vietnamese People's War

In the process of leading the preparations for and the actual conduct of the uprising and war, our party always firmly adhered to its line on widely arming the masses in conjunction with building a powerful people's army. Engels said: "A nation that seeks to achieve national independence for itself need not limit itself to conventional modes of warfare. Mass uprisings, revolutionary war and guerrilla units everywhere, this is the only mode of warfare by which a small nation can triumph over one that is large, an army of lesser strength can oppose an army that is stronger and better organized."(4) On the basis of the requirements of the revolutionary task, the forms of revolutionary struggle, the adversaries faced and the specific historic conditions that have existed during each period, our party has displayed creativity in answering the question of how the armed forces should be organized.

The party plenum held in October, 1940, in conjunction with deciding to organize the People's Revolutionary Army (main force troops), resolved: "At present, we must select persons within the mass organizations of the Front to expand the self-defense units. At this decisive point in the struggle, the Front must directly arm the masses..."(5)

In May, 1941, the 8th Plenum of the Party Central Committee decided to form three revolutionary armed forces: regular guerrilla units, which were "main force revolutionary units armed to fight the enemy"; national salvation guerrilla squads to assist and coordinate with regular guerrilla units in preparing for and conducting combat operations and sabotaging enemy means of transportation and weapons; and national salvation self-defense units to protect and help revolutionary fighters evade capture and protect the agencies of the mass organizations.

In December 1944, when the Vietnam Propaganda Unit for National Liberation was born and became the main force unit, there were armed units in the districts and semi-armed self-defense units in the villages. The relationship between main force troops and the local armed forces was one in which both forces were under unified guidance. These forces closely united and coordinated with each other. Main force troops had the task of guiding and assisting the growth of the local armed forces. This has also been the guideline governing the buildup of the Vietnamese people's armed forces over the past 40 years.

After 9 March 1945, the Vietnamese revolution reached a new level of development. Uprisings and guerrilla wars broke out in many localities. In keeping with the resolution of the Bac Ky Revolutionary Military Conference (April, 1945), the regular armed forces (which consisted of the National Salvation Army, the forerunner of which was the Bac Son Guerrilla Unit established during the Bac Son uprising in September, 1940, the Vietnam Propaganda Unit for National Liberation, the Ba To guerrillas, which came into being during the Ba To uprising in March, 1945...) were united to form the Vietnam Liberation Army. By this time, local armed units had developed everywhere. By the day of the general uprising, the armed forces consisted of the liberation army and the widespread armed forces of the masses (the guerrilla squads and the self-defense units organized from within the national salvation mass organizations).

In the war of resistance against France, the experience gained from the successful operations of small units in the Viet Bac campaign helped us to organize our armed forces in a manner consistent with the new conditions that prevailed. In 1948, to implement the policy of "making the enemy's rear area our frontline," we decentralized a large percentage of our main force troops, dividing them into independent companies for the purposes of launching a widespread guerrilla war and helping the localities deep within enemy territory with every aspect of the buildup and operations of their forces. Our remaining forces were formed into assembled battalions (on the provincial level) and main force regiments on the central level in order to launch small-scale campaigns, wipe out a portion of enemy troops, reduce the scope of their occupation and season our troops in combat through medium and small-scale battles.

In the summer of 1949, facing the need to launch large-scale attacks, we centralized the independent companies and assembled battalions in order to build main force units. On the other hand, we also established many units of local forces, mainly companies on the district level and battalions on the provincial level. These were the central forces in the people's war within the localities and enabled our main force troops to move widely about while still continuing the development of the guerrilla war.

From then on, the Vietnamese people's armed forces consisted of three elements: main force troops on the central and regional levels; local troops on the provincial and district levels; and guerrilla militia and self-defense forces in the villages and hamlets, at worksites, farms, forestry sites and enterprises and along streets.

The realities of the war of resistance against France showed: our party was quick to recognize the law that a guerrilla war inevitably must develop into a conventional war and, as a result, quickly built regimental size main force units and then mobile infantry divisions.

In the war of resistance against the United States, the mass armed forces in the South were born in the uprising movement and steadily grew and developed in the guerrilla war. With the support of the great rear area in the North, main force troops were established in each region, on each battlefield, and rapidly grew in the realities of combat. During the years from 1973 to 1975, the strategic reserve force grew from the size of a division to the size of an army, was supplied with increasingly modern equipment and gradually developed complete, well coordinated technical branches.

Today, with the country being built in peace while having to maintain its readiness to fight the schemes of the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists, the Political Bureau has established the following task: "We must build up the armed forces in a comprehensive and well coordinated manner. We must build a regular and modern army that reflects coordination and balance among and within the various services and branches and between units and agencies. Importance must be attached not only to the buildup of main force units, but also to the buildup of local forces, militia and self-defense forces and reserve forces..."(6)

The realities of the past several decades have proven that the three elements of the military--when their functions, tasks and relationships are clearly and correctly defined--provide the best form of organization for mobilizing all the people to fight the enemy and are the nucleus in that fight. This form of organization has met the requirements of both conventional war (the people's war fought by the main force military corps) and guerrilla war (the local people's war).

III. Correctly Establishing the Basic Relationships Involved in the Buildup of the Vietnamese People's Armed Forces

1. The relationship between people and weapons-technology.

People and weapons are the basic factors that create the fighting strength of the armed forces. Of these two factors, people are the factor of most decisive significance, weapons and technology are a factor of very important significance. The principles of Marxism-Leninism on war and the army confirm: in the final analysis, the outcome of a war is determined by the soldiers who shed their blood on the battlefield. However, the persons within the armed forces can only become the decisive factor when they are aware of the goals for which they are fighting, possess high fighting spirit, possess strict, self-imposed discipline, know how to make maximum use of weapons and technology and have appropriate methods of fighting that enable them to win victory. In fact, "when in battle, it is the members of the unit who plant mines and destroy bunkers. If their thinking is firm, if they are politically steadfast, technically skilled and in good physical condition, victory will surely be theirs. Conversely, if they are better trained politically than militarily or if they are equally skilled in political and military matters but in poor physical condition, victory will not be theirs..."(7)

U.S. General Maxwell Taylor's admission of defeat in the war of aggression in Vietnam was also an admission of a mistake in the use of weapons: "While air power can provide support, it cannot play the decisive role in interdicting forces that are determined to fight on the ground... We failed to correctly evaluate the extremely determined spirit of the Vietnamese and their willingness to die for their cause."(8)

While our party attaches importance to both of the factors of people and weapons-equipment, it attaches foremost importance to people. "People first, weapons second" was not only the guideline governing the building of our armed forces during the early days of the revolution, it has also been our guideline over the past several decades and will always remain our guideline.

Examined from the standpoint of the human factor, the people's armed forces, together with all the people, have staged uprisings and fought wars against the background of a qualitative change in our country in the revolutionary consciousness and awareness of the people.

The 40 year history of the armed forces has confirmed that the revolutionary forces of Vietnam are, by nature, "loyal to the country, loyal to the party and filial to the people." Our cadres and soldiers, the "troops of Uncle Ho," are prepared to give their lives to complete every mission, overcome every difficulty and prevail over every enemy.

Because it attached importance to the human factor in war, our party has always concerned itself with upholding the fine traditions of the Vietnamese people's armed forces and cultivating political qualities, military skills and specialized technical skills so that our cadres and soldiers are fully capable of completing each task and winning victory over each enemy.

Examined from the standpoint of technical equipment, on the basis of the view that weapons and equipment are very important factors in the development of fighting strength and through the policies of "buying weapons and driving off the common enemy" during the days spent preparing for the uprisings, "killing the enemy with weapons stolen from them," "arming ourselves while fighting,"

"one dead enemy for every round of ammunition"...that were adopted in the course of fighting the enemy and building our forces, our party successfully resolved the problem of how to equip the revolutionary armed forces of Vietnam with technology. During the very first days of the war of resistance, our party pointed out that the battlefield is the main source of equipment for the revolutionary army. Even when the fighting reached peaks in the winter and spring of 1953-1954 and the spring of 1975, our ground forces continued to consider the use of war booty as one of the best and timeliest ways to meet combat requirements.

Today, to build up the armed forces under the conditions of a country that is at peace but must maintain its combat readiness and fight, it is the policy of our party that we "focus every available capability on providing technical equipment for the combat and combat readiness tasks of all three elements of the military... We must improve the management, maintenance and use of weapons and equipment and warehouse security... Every possible measure must be taken to insure that equipment is well matched... We must gradually build a national defense industry that is capable of providing the armed forces with the necessary weapons and equipment..."(9)

It can be said that through the self-reliance of our people, of our cadres and soldiers and the proper utilization of large international aid, we gradually managed to overcome very many difficulties with technical equipment in the long fight of our country that, from the standpoint of a war industry, has lagged far behind the enemy.

2. Increasing the size of the armed forces while attaching importance to and improving their fighting skills.

Size and quality are the two factors that combine to form the strength of the armed forces, with quality, especially the quality of main force troops, being the factor of decisive significance.

In the process of building the armed forces over the past 40 years, our party has given its attention to both the size and quality of all three elements of the military, especially our strategic mobile forces.

With regard to size, whereas the troops we assembled during the days spent preparing for the uprising numbered only about 1,000, our forces numbered in the tens of thousands during the war of resistance against France and the hundreds of thousands during the war of resistance against the United States, during which we had powerful armed forces everywhere.

Primarily because we quickly increased the size of our main force troops to divisions and numerous regiments in 1949 and 1950, we brought about a strategic turning point through our victory in the border campaign. One of the important factors in the historic victory of Dien Bien Phu was the fact that, several years earlier, our party expanded our mobile main force troops into many divisions, thereby creating strong strategic units, while steadfastly maintaining and increasing the size of our local forces and guerrilla militia by millions of troops, thus making them strong enough to maintain and expand the guerrilla war in the areas deep behind enemy lines.

In the war of resistance against the United States, especially after U.S. forces began pouring into the South and launched the war of destruction against the North, our armed forces developed to a degree unprecedented.

It was only through the timely expansion of our air defense forces that we were able to twice defeat the air war of destruction waged by the enemy, the pinnacle of which was the strategic bombings by B-52's in late 1972. It was only because we had established large, powerful strategic mobile forces and had organized them in military corps with many technical weapon regiments and brigades that we were able to put together the truly strong strategic offensive needed to seize the opportunity, strike a decisive blow and win complete victory in the spring of 1975.

However, size itself is only one factor in victory. The issue of improving the quality of the armed forces assumes increasing urgency as their size increases. The fighting quality of the armed forces (which consists of political qualities, military skills, equipment, organization, command skills and so forth) is the factor determining victory. President Ho always reminded us: our army must be pure, its fighting strength must be strong. "We must build very good forces of very high quality." Specifically:

"We must strengthen the leadership of the party within the army.

--We must intensify our political education in order to heighten the socialist awareness of the entire army.

--We must provide increased military and technical training and strictly comply with regulations and the code of discipline."(10)

The campaigns that were conducted to improve the quality of troops during the two wars of resistance against France and the United States, especially in the years 1952-1953 and 1973-1974, effectively increased the fighting strength of the main force military corps and created the conditions for the army to win victories of decisive strategic significance.

After the country was totally liberated, our party decided to maintain the combat troop strength of main force units at the level necessary for each battlefield and throughout the country while continually improving the fighting quality of our strategic mobile forces. With regard to the local armed forces, we have attached importance to improving the quality and increasing the size of these forces in key areas and at places where they are still weak while guiding and closely coordinating the various levels and sectors in actively promoting the buildup of reserve forces, thus insuring that reserve forces are of high quality and can be quickly mobilized. As regards the guidelines governing party work and political work, "we must focus systematic efforts on successfully resolving a number of matters of basic but practical and timely significance, must do a good job of building the basic organizations of the party, insure that they are pure, solid and strong, take positive steps to develop the party, with quality being the foremost standard, and be determined to expel from the party those persons who are not qualified to be party members. Under present conditions, improving the quality of the corps of cadres is the key in the buildup of the armed forces."(11)

3. The relationship between emphasizing discipline and broadening the practice of democracy.

A basic principle in the management of our people's armed forces is properly establishing and firmly maintaining the relationship between emphasizing discipline and broadening the practice of democracy.

Self-imposed and strict discipline is an important factor in guaranteeing a unity of will, a unity of action and is of decisive significance in the development of fighting strength. As the armed forces develop, as their equipment becomes increasingly modern and complex, as combat requirements and the need for coordination among the various branches and services rise and as fighting becomes increasingly urgent and heavy, the more important it is to emphasize discipline and achieve greater centralization and unity. "It is strict discipline that makes the army strong... We must maintain strict discipline in order to be worthy of being a revolutionary army..."(12)

As soon as the Unit for National Salvation was born, soldiers were taught the Ten Oaths of Honor of the Vietnamese revolutionary armed forces. The 10 oaths reflect the goals for which the liberation fighter fought and the four points in President Ho's instructions to the entire army: "Good democracy, strict discipline, internal unity and unity between the army and the people."

Cared for and educated by the party, our army has forged a very fine tradition of revolutionary discipline. This tradition has always been a very important factor in every victory of the Vietnamese people's armed forces.

The discipline of our army is the self-imposed, strict discipline of a revolutionary army, discipline that reflects the revolutionary nature and the ideological and organizational principles of the army of the working class. It is the genuine iron discipline of a new style army, a discipline never to be found in any army of the exploiting classes.

However, we do acknowledge the fact that besides their good qualities, which predominate, our cadres and soldiers still exhibit thinking, customs, behavior and styles of life that are not consistent with the high degree of organization of a regular, modern army. To correct these shortcomings, our party, in the face of the new stage of development that the army has reached from the standpoint of its organization and equipment, in the face of the increasingly large and complex requirements involved in the combat task and buildup of the army, constantly concerns itself with leading and intensifying the effort to teach the entire army to strictly comply with each order and directive of the upper echelon, fulfill the duties and fully execute the regulations, orders and rules of the army and always set a good example in complying with the positions and policies of the party and respecting the laws of the state.

The discipline of our army is further heightened by the broad practice of internal democracy politically, militarily and economically. Internal democracy is a fine tradition that our army must continue to uphold and enhance. The tradition of democracy in daily life, in work and training, even in preparations for and the actual conduct of combat operations is a

manifestation of the revolutionary nature of our people's armed forces. In combat, we have utilized the role played by the Council of Revolutionary Military Personnel, which conducts democratic discussions and widely surveys opinions, thereby enabling the commander to make an accurate decision, to issue an accurate order without affecting the position or role of the commander. Following battles, each unit conducts a review to learn from experience and evaluate its technique, tactics and command operations so that everyone sees their strengths and weaknesses and, as a result, steadily grows and develops.

The practice of internal democracy also involves tapping the spirit of collective ownership and applying the party's mass line to lead, command and manage troops. Only by broadening the practice of democracy is it possible to tap the activism, initiative and creativity of large numbers of cadres and soldiers and focus the intelligence of everyone on resolving difficult and complex problems that arise in the buildup of forces and combat. Only by broadening the practice of democracy can we build stronger unity and consensus from top to bottom and build a solid foundation for strict, self-imposed discipline. Therefore, within our army, democracy does not conflict with discipline. The more widely democracy is practiced, the better are the conditions that exist for maintaining strict discipline. Democracy is both a political and organizational principle and one of the basic measures in encouraging the masses to maintain strict, self-imposed discipline.

4. Closely coordinating the buildup of forces and combat.

Over the past 40 years, our army has become stronger with each battle through the process of a long-term buildup during combat and promptly building its forces to meet the requirements of victory in combat.

As a result of expanding from what was first only several platoons to 5,000 men in the course of the local uprisings and local guerrilla wars, the Unit for National Liberation was able to join the local armed forces in serving as the nucleus of the people in the victorious general uprising. Taking advantage of the 15 months of peace in the North following the August Revolution, our party quickly built the forces needed for the nationwide war of resistance.

In all three areas of strategy, campaigns and combat, our party made timely projections concerning the logical course of development of the war so that it could guide the steady buildup of the armed forces during the periods of the resistance against France and the resistance against the United States. The total liberation of the North provided favorable conditions for our party to carry out a large-scale buildup of the armed forces under the guideline of gradually building regular, modern forces. That period marked a stage of growth in every aspect of our army. Through aid from the fraternal countries, we began building technical branches and services that we previously did not have (Navy, Air Defense, Air Force, Armored, Heavy Artillery and Chemical). The armed forces from the North that reinforced the battlefield in the South played a large role in changing the comparison of forces between ourselves and

the enemy, not only from the standpoint of mobile forces, but stationary forces as well, thereby establishing important conditions for winning victory on the battlefield.

The success of our party over the past 40 years in guiding and closely coordinating the buildup of forces and combat operations lies in the following: the breadth of its strategic vision and its early prediction of the logical course of development of the war, thereby enabling it to always be one step ahead in the buildup of forces and keep pace with steadily rising requirements on the battlefield; its concern for building all three elements of the military, maintaining balance and coordination among all forces and always maintaining a strong strategic mobile force, especially at important times of decisive significance; and, from the standpoint of equipment, the seeking of aid from the fraternal countries and, on the other hand, the production of light weapons suited to our method of fighting and the efforts it has made in leading the entire army in emphasizing frugality and responsibility in the maintenance and full utilization of strategic goods, especially heavy equipment taken from the enemy.

The party has attached importance to providing training even in the course of combat in order to continuously improve the fighting skills of troops and promptly meet the requirements of war and has incorporated the experiences of the nation in its struggle against foreign aggression while gradually developing Vietnam's unique military science.

5. Attaching importance to building the corps of cadres.

Since the very first days following the establishment of the armed forces, our party has always given its attention to building a corps of cadres who possess unquestioned loyalty to the revolutionary cause of the people and the ability to fully meet the requirements of their military task in each stage the revolution.

The 8th Plenum of the Party Central Committee (May, 1941) confirmed: "The training of cadres has now become a matter of pressing importance and cannot be ignored for one moment. All levels...of the party must give special attention to this work. They must quickly find party members whose loyalty is beyond question and who possess both skill and ingenuity to start training classes..."(13)

In the various periods of the revolution, party policies have provided schools and classes for short-term training, long-term training, supplementary training and formal training, training in the rear area in the North and even on the battlefield in the South and training in foreign countries. The school systems of the various sectors within the army have constantly been expanded and improved. The buildup that occurred in the North from 1955 to 1964 brought about a leap forward in the growth of the corps of cadres within the armed forces. We built a large and strong corps of cadres for all sectors and levels, including command cadres and technical cadres for the various services and branches. When the U.S. imperialists widened the war to the entire country, the school system in the great rear area of the North was further expanded to urgently provide elementary and supplementary training not only to

command, staff, political and rear service cadres, but also to a large corps of technical cadres for the different branches and services, especially the air defense-air force. The fact that importance has been attached to political work and party work within the army and the fact that cadres have been seasoned through the realities of combat over the past 40 years have played a very large role in the growth of the corps of cadres.

Through several decades of long and bitter armed struggle, our party has built and forged a corps of cadres that is large and of high quality, a corps of cadres who possess unquestioned loyalty to the cause of the party and are skilled and experienced in revolutionary struggle and armed struggle.

Today, in order to meet the requirements and combat tasks involved in the combat and buildup of the army as it moves toward becoming a regular, modern army, elementary training, advanced training and the improvement of the qualifications of cadres have become work of pressing importance. The realities of recent years and especially the present situation offer further proof of how accurate Lenin was when he said: no amount of dedication, no amount of prestige on the part of the party can replace the fundamental factor that applies in this case: knowledge of one's job. Therefore, in the immediate future, we must do a good job of formulating and implementing cadre planning.

Of key importance to the various leadership levels as well as cadre agencies and the persons engaged in cadre work is to fully comprehend the spirit of the Political Bureau resolution: "Improving the quality of the corps of cadres is the key in the buildup of the armed forces."

The Vietnamese people's armed forces look back on their 40 years of growth and victory with even greater confidence in the leadership of the party, with deep gratitude to Uncle Ho for his guidance and the people for their support and with increased realization of how very large are the tasks they presently face in the buildup of their forces and the maintenance of combat readiness.

In the face of the insidious schemes and actions of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, we are ever more mindful of and faithful to the teaching of President Ho Chi Minh: "Be it peace time or time of war, we must always take the initiative, look ahead and be prepared in advance."(14)

We are deeply confident that, under the leadership of the party, with the love and support of the people, with the fine traditions that have been cultivated in the realities of combat over the past 40 years and with the valuable lessons and experiences that have been learned and gained from the history of their growth and victories, the Vietnamese people's armed forces will surely successfully carry out each task assigned by the party and people.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Ho Chu tich voi cac luc luong vu trang nhan dan"[President Ho and the People's Armed Forces], Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1962, p 17.

2. Ho Chi Minh: "Chien tranh nhan dan Viet nam"[The Vietnamese People's War], Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1980, p 12.
3. Le Duan: "Xay dung quan doi nhan dan cach mang hung manh, kien quyet chien thang moi ke thu"[Building a Powerful Revolutionary People's Army, Being Determined To Win Victory Over Every Enemy], TAP CHI CONG SAN, No 1-1980, p 29.
4. K. Marx and F. Engels: "Collected Works," Russian version, National Political Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1957, Volume 6, p 416.
5. "Van kien quan su cau Dang"[Military Documents of the Party], Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1969, Volume I, p 154.
6. Political Bureau Resolution 12, May, 1983.
7. "Ho Chu tich voi cac luc luong vu trang nhan dan"[President Ho and the People's Armed Forces], Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1975, p 184.
8. "Suc manh Viet nam"[The Strength of Vietnam], Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1976, p 181.
9. Political Bureau Resolution 12, May, 1983.
10. Ho Chi Minh: "Chien tranh nhan dan Viet nam"...p 30.
11. Political Bureau Resolution 12, May, 1983.
12. Ho Chi Minh: "Chien tranh nhan dan Viet nam"...pp 32-33.
13. "Van kien quan su cua Dang,"..., p 205.
14. Ho Chi Minh: "Chien tranh nhan dan Viet nam"...pp 202 and 205.

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THE REAR SERVICE SUPPORT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 12, Dec 84 pp 24-31

[Article by Lieutenant General Bui Phung]

[Text] Our army was born as small units that lacked everything an army needs. It went into combat as soon as it was established, had to build itself up while fighting and fought continuously in the armed uprising and the wars to liberate and defend the fatherland within our country, a poor, backward agricultural country, against enemies that were many times stronger than it and possessed powerful economic and military might. Such an army, regardless of how heroic or well trained it might be, could not have won victory without extraordinary achievements being recorded in rear service support work. Rear service support is truly revolutionary work of a political, military, scientific, technical and economic nature. It demands that hardships be endured and sacrifices be made, demands that we constantly try to overcome each difficulty, demands creativity and tireless effort, demands that we meet and exceed the requirements placed upon us by combat and the intensity of warfare. It must always have as its highest purpose the successful support of political and military tasks. It must fully reflect the ideological viewpoints and military line of the party and a firm grasp of rear service science and technology. It must be adapted to the socio-economic circumstances of our country and be consistent with the laws of development of the people's war. In other words, it must clearly reflect the class character, the popular character, the scientific character of the Vietnamese people's armed forces rear services.

For these reasons, from the time that the first units of the army were established, our party and President Ho Chi Minh attached very much importance to the army's rear service support. President Ho pointed out: "Supply work is just as important as fighting the enemy on the front; troops can only win victory in battle when they are provided with a full supply of weapons and ammunition, when they are well fed and well clothed."(1)

Part I

In the 40 years of the buildup of our forces and combat, our rear service work has been strictly controlled by the following basic factors:

--The need to organize rear service support within an underdeveloped agricultural economy and in the face of enemies that employ every clever and barbarous means possible to interdict and sabotage the supplying of our army and take full advantage of the basic weaknesses of our country's economy.

--The fact that our country is long and narrow, has many rivers and streams and has a harsh climate and weather, all of which have a very large impact upon rear service activities. When war breaks out, our country can easily be cut in half by the enemy.

--In the war of liberation as well as in the present day war to defend the fatherland, we fought and are fighting within the strategic alliance with the two fraternal countries of Laos and Cambodia and on a single, common battlefield. This factor has exerted strong control over how we lead and organize coordinated support activities over a scope that is broad, very complex and involves many different requirements.

Under the leadership of the party, the diligent and creative people of our entire country, with large and effective aid from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, have repeatedly contributed manpower and materiel to the cause of liberating and defending the country. In this way, we have managed to overcome the difficulties caused by the factors described above in rear service work and made large contributions to the growth and victories of the army.

Prior to the August Revolution in 1945, we had no army rear service organization. However, the organizations of the party, the revolutionary mass organizations and the people in the base areas actively performed rear service work by providing support of every kind, from supplying everyday needs and providing medical evacuation and treatment for wounded soldiers to producing rudimentary weapons in coordination with taking weapons from the enemy to use against them. During that period, the rear service support provided by the people helped to insure the victory of the general uprising.

It was not until the war of resistance against the French colonialists that we developed a relatively complete rear service system extending from the central level to the military regions, main force units and local forces. Rear service work supported combat operations on the basis of what was available locally. Gradually, we established clearly defined viewpoints to guide rear service work, formulated state regulations and standards and organized supply councils from the central to the provincial and district levels. We gradually established strategic transport lines... As a result, rear service work quickly developed and provided the troops on the various battlefields with the support needed to fight the enemy, thereby contributing to the large victories that were won in the winter-spring strategic offensive (1953-1954) and the historic Dien Bien Phu campaign.

Following the victory of the war of resistance against France, rear service work focused on supporting the buildup of our army into a regular, modern army and participating in the construction of the North while accelerating the construction of the strategic transport lines to the battlefields in the South.

In our support of the South, we promptly changed the focus of our organization and the modes by which we took delivery of the large shipments of materiel from the North and the large aid shipments from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, thereby enabling us to perform our task of providing rear service to our battlefields and to our friends in southern Indochina.

On the battlefields in the South, we set up regional rear service organizations and flexibly applied different modes of local support in coordination with the supplies transported down from the great rear area, as a result of which we met the needs of the buildup of our forces and combat operations, created the primary material conditions we needed, capably supported the strategy of the party and carried out President Ho Chi Minh's instruction to "drive off the Americans."

During the period following the Paris Agreement, rear service work was urgently stepped up from the central level to the various battlefields in order to make strategic preparations for seizing an historic opportunity. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was expanded, we developed a network of strategic roads connected to the network of campaign roads and prepared a strategic reserve of technical materials for all battlefields in the South, Laos and Cambodia.

When the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee made its strategic decision, rear service work promptly helped to provide capable support of the general offensive and mass uprisings in the spring of 1975, which culminated in the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign, while capably supporting the Lao and Cambodian battlefields in achieving the total liberation of those countries.

Following the reunification of the country, urgent efforts were made in rear service work to resolve the problems posed by the aftermath of the war within the army while taking positive steps to organize support for the army in the buildup of its forces and its participation in the restoration of the economy and socialist construction in coordination with strengthening the national defense system, maintaining its readiness for a war to defend the fatherland and continuing to fulfill its international obligation. As a result, rear service work provided good, timely support for the two wars fought to defend the southwestern border and the northern border, wars that brought victories over the Chinese expansionist and hegemonist aggressors.

Today, in the face of the new requirements of the situation and our tasks, rear service work has been and is being conducted on the basis of the system of socialist collective ownership, the nationwide rear area and the expanding economic zones in order to create the capabilities needed to develop plentiful sources of local rear service support. At the same time, positive steps are being taken to improve the quality and efficiency of rear service operations. On this basis, rear service work will fulfill its task of providing our armed forces with the support needed to win victory over the enemy in every situation.

Part II

The rear service operations of our army over the past 40 years have truly been diverse and have been marked by many outstanding achievements. These

operations have provided us with valuable experiences. Here, we shall present only the several most important of these experiences.

1. Having a thorough understanding of the people's war line and the political and military tasks of the party during each stage of the revolution while always having in mind and properly applying the thinking of an offensive strategy and the tactical decisions of the party to each aspect of rear support work.

This is a requirement in the nature of a principle governing rear service work. It has become the factor of foremost importance in laying the foundation for the adoption of correct operational decisions and measures. Because, to implement each decision concerning military strategy, the combat plans for the various battlefields must be supported by certain material and technical conditions. This demands that rear service work always be one step ahead of battlefield requirements. Without quickly responding and firmly adhering to the resolutions of the party, it is impossible to develop a correct understanding of the situation, general strategic guidelines or the task during each stage in order to establish rear service contingency plans. For example, during the 1970-1971 dry season, having correctly predicted what the enemy would do, the Political Bureau observed: "If the enemy moves along Route 9 to attack, we will have a good opportunity to wipe them out... We absolutely must win victory over the enemy in this battle..."(2) As a result of our quickly comprehending the campaign decision, rear service work from the general department to the concerned battlefields and the Ho Chi Minh Trail was conducted in the spirit of actively taking the offensive, of taking the initiative in making the necessary preparations and enabled our troops to counterattack and wipe out the enemy when they launched the invasion of Cambodia in 1970 and Laos in 1971.

History has proven that all victories in rear service work stem from a full understanding of the party's line and strict adherence to the strategy of the party during each stage and the campaign decisions made on each front and from creatively applying them under the specific circumstances that exist. Conversely, a number of places, because they have failed to firmly grasp the thinking of the party and not established the proper relationship between winning victory quickly and preparing for a long fight, have become impatient in the fight and taken the attitude of "pouring everything into the pipeline." When the enemy intensifies their counter-attacks and destroys the rear service bases of the people and the army, they have no choice but to withdraw in passive defense.

In the new stage, the revolutionary-offensive strategy of the party has reached a new level of development in the line on the people's war to defend the fatherland. Thoroughly implementing this strategy in rear service work demands that we give special attention to building a material base for our army, one which insures that the army is strong enough to seize the initiative so that it can take the offensive and, at the same time, strong enough to intensify its offensive operations so that it can take the initiative in every situation and in all strategic areas of operation.

Every aspect of rear service work must fully and clearly reflect the viewpoint "all the people, comprehensive, modern and aligned." Most importantly, the initiative must be taken in preparing the capabilities needed to take delivery of the large aid in the form of modern technical equipment and materials from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. At the same time, we must bear in mind that strategy and combat requirements apply to a single, common battlefield that we share with Laos and Cambodia in order to take the initiative in quickly preparing the elements involved in rear service work within the new relationship of coordination.

2. Organizing stable sources of rear service support by taking the initiative and actively coordinating with state agencies and localities and applying suitable, flexible measures.

To win victory over an enemy many times stronger than we in a war of aggression, we must rely upon the people to provide some of the material support needed for combat. However, once a war becomes a large-scale war and demands large quantities of technical materials, it is impossible to merely rely upon the economy within each region because, if we were to do so, we would be unable to take the initiative in meeting combat requirements. Therefore, we must establish "stable sources of support," that is, must organize the production and receiving of rear service means and materials approved by the party and state (including the local government) and done in accordance with the specific norms and measures set forth within the general plan.

Examined from the standpoint of supplying equipment and materials for combat, the establishment of "stable sources of support" occupies a key position and plays a dominant role within the entire system of deployment of rear service forces and determines the efficiency of rear service work.

In fact, only by developing the quantities of materials needed to meet immediate and long-range requirements, only by controlling these quantities is it possible to implement the right of ownership and assign management responsibilities to units in accordance with combat base figures. Otherwise, all methods of organizing support and all distribution measures are in vain.

From this perspective, "creating sources" is the basis of "support." Without creating sources, there can be no support operations, that is, no rear service operations.

In both wars of liberation, "support sources" were established as follows:

The support sources of the country's rear area were the principal sources. The rear area consisted of large, contiguous regions, base areas and small liberated zones on each battlefield. At these places, the state (or local government) undertook the task of mobilizing the people to organize the largest sources of materiel of all types for supply to the army, materiel that included weapons, grain, food, uniforms, public health medicines, building materials and means of transportation, as well as manpower and money for the army.

In the wars of liberation, the people also directly supplied each unit fighting within the locality. In units far from rear service base areas, our troops relied upon the people and provided their units with rear service support mainly by mobilizing the potentials among the local people, thereby providing cadres and soldiers with their minimum daily needs. However, these supply sources could not meet the requirements of large-scale combat and made it difficult to take the initiative in the course of developing a campaign.

The aid from the Soviet Union and the socialist countries has been very effective. It has made us better able to supply advanced technical equipment and materials to troops in our rear service work. However, this aid demands that we increase our research, that we study and learn the properties and uses of this equipment in order to maintain and utilize it in a manner consistent with climatic and geographical conditions on the battlefield in our country and the circumstances under which our troops live and fight. Special importance must be attached to cultivating the sense of ownership and a high spirit of political responsibility throughout the army to insure that modern technical goods and materials are properly stored and maintained, can be used for a long time and are used in a manner that yields the highest possible returns.

Products produced by the armed forces themselves are also very important. In the past, during the war of liberation, increased production by troops for the purpose of achieving self-sufficiency was constantly encouraged by President Ho Chi Minh: "The agencies within the army must endeavor to raise crops and livestock in order to achieve partial self-sufficiency and reduce the heavy burden being borne by the people." (3) In keeping with his instructions, troops in the rear as well as on the front began attaching importance to producing more for themselves. President Ho also taught: "It is useless to increase production without practicing frugality. If we do not increase production, there is nothing with which to be frugal." (4)

Today, troops have been assigned the task of participating in the building of the socialist economy in a manner closely tied to strengthening the national defense system. The rear service organizations on the various echelons are stepping up production and promoting the practice of frugality at units. Some units have undertaken the production of products for use in the development of the country's economy, thereby creating stable sources of rear service support at the same time.

Equipment and supplies taken from the enemy constitute a rather large source of rear service support. President Ho said: "Collecting large amounts of war booty when our troops are victorious in battle, this, too, is a form of increased production." (5) In the general offensive in the spring of 1975, our troops collected a very large quantity of weapons, equipment and rear service materials of all types. They have provided our troops with a very large, supplemental source of support in the course of their combat and victories.

Each of the sources of support mentioned above occupies a position of certain importance. Of primary importance in achieving the combined strength of these sources of rear service support is the need to display a high spirit of

ownership and responsibility, always look for ways to open new sources and put these new sources on-line in the way that is most effective.

3. Establishing a stable, nationwide rear service network and achieving rear service support by all the people.

In all periods of our history, the wars we have fought against aggressors in our country have been very bitter wars. The enemy usually concentrates on interdicting the resupplying of our troops on the battlefield by every means possible. This leads to a very fierce struggle between ourselves and the enemy.

The requirements of the people's war and the establishment of the battlefield deployment of the people's war demand that rear service work involve ways of making effective use of sources of support that have been prepared in advance. At the same time, we must be extremely vigilant and thwart every attempt by the enemy to attack our rear area, our rear service bases. The realities of the wars of liberation and the wars fought to defend the fatherland confirm the following experience: it is necessary to establish a stable, interconnected rear service battlefield deployment that is supported by all the people--in which the deployment of rear service forces is closely linked to the military, political and economic battlefield deployment of the people's war and is consistent with strategy, with campaign plans and with the mobile force deployment of main force troops, of the local armed forces.

To establish a stable rear service network supported by all the people, we must suitably deploy our rear service forces by front, by line and by region.

In the war against the United States, while we employed all three of these methods in deploying our forces, we relied mainly on regional rear service support. Deploying rear service forces by region of fighting and closely coordinating the army's rear services with the rear service support provided by the people, the strategic rear service echelon with the campaign and tactical rear service echelons, main force rear service units with provincial and district rear service units and local supplies with supplies brought in from other places proved to be the most effective way to operate.

One matter in the nature of a principle is that all rear service support, regardless of the echelon, must be based on the economic resources that exist within the area of operation. In particular, in rear service work on the tactical echelon, it has frequently been necessary to rely upon the economic resources of the local people not only within the liberated zone, but even in areas deep behind enemy lines in order to provide rear service support. For example, in the Dien Bien Phu campaign, one of our divisions was ordered to move into upper Laos before the necessary rear service support could be prepared. So, we relied upon the people of that friendly country who lived in the Nam Hu River Valley, developed local sources of supply and, as a result, provided our troops with the support needed to win victory over the enemy.

To establish the rear service network, we must be determined to invest manpower in road construction in conjunction with organizing the forces and means of transportation needed to capably support rear service work. Only

when this has been done can we connect rear service bases, promptly shift forces from one region to another and achieve the combined strength of the rear service network supported by all the people.

The rear service network supported by all the people, which is an important component of the battlefield deployment of the people's war, is built in mainly three ways: through local rear service support, through rear service support from the country's rear area and through regional rear service support.

Under the new conditions of our country today, the rear service network must be formed on the basis of the strategic deployment of coordinating the state economy with the national defense system so that "every village and cooperative is a combat unit, every precinct and district is a fortress, every province and municipality is a battlefield, the entire country is one large battlefield." This will provide favorable conditions for building a complete rear service network supported by all the people in peace time so that we are ready to meet the requirements of a war to defend the country.

4. Upholding the tradition of self-reliance, being the masters of public property, providing strict management, practicing frugality and combating all waste and misappropriation.

The guideline "strengthening ourselves, being frugal and relying mainly upon ourselves" in building the army reflects the objective realities of our country, a country that is still poor, a country that has experienced one war after another, a country that is not yet able to produce much by way of modern technical equipment or materials, a country that has difficulty obtaining international aid. Therefore, in rear service work, it is even more necessary for us to view this guideline as the main guideline of our actions in organizing the management and use of the sources of supply that lie in large and complicated technical bases.

Most importantly, efforts must be focused on correcting the existing weaknesses and inadequacies in rear service work very well by immediately restructuring the support organization within units so that it is a highly efficient organization; emphasizing a planned method of operation and eventually planning every aspect of rear service work, especially management and use; implementing a policy of frugality in production and rear service support; and quickly strengthening the rear service management apparatus and management measures.

Everyone, especially the cadres and personnel of the rear service sector, must fully realize that the most practical way for them to supplement local rear service reserves is to economize on the use of manpower and materiel and make sensible and highly efficient use of materials. Regulations governing rear service work must be adopted on the basis of army orders and the policies and regulations of the state. All echelons must strictly comply with work regulations and established procedures and standards, that is, absolutely no reason can be used as an excuse for violating these established procedures and standards. All regulations that are not uniform or consistent with the realities of the new situation must be abolished. It is the responsibility of

everyone to struggle against irresponsible attitudes that result in the waste, misappropriation or sabotage of the rear service resources of the army or people and weaken the army's fighting strength.

President Ho considered misappropriation, waste and bureaucracy to be the enemy. They directly undermine the revolutionary ethics of cadres and soldiers. "Combating misappropriation, waste and bureaucracy is just as important and necessary as fighting the enemy on the front."(6)

5. Steadily building a solid and strong rear service network and attaching importance to the training of specialized rear service cadres.

The buildup of our armed forces in war time usually involves organizing new forces while fighting the enemy. The same applies to the rear service sector, from the military region echelon downward. While we consider it important to build a strong and solid organization, the backbone of this strength and stability is the nature of the organization as a system, the rules of operation of the organization and the overall quality of cadres and personnel.

In the wars of resistance, many battlefields were cut off and had to depend upon the circumstances and habits that existed under the old organization within each area, which led to a lack of uniformity from the standpoint of organization and adherence to rear service principles, regulations and work methods.

In the face of the demands of a growing war situation and on the basis of the practical experience gained in our work under combat conditions, we built a system of main force rear service organizations that consists of three echelons, the strategic, campaign and tactical echelons, and is closely tied to the local rear service bases and the rear service support provided by the people to form a national rear service network.

Also through our work, we have gradually defined the scope of the duties of each support echelon and made each echelon able to display initiative in developing its area of operation, in creating the position and forces it needs to maintain firm control over everything for which it is responsible.

The corps of rear service cadres has also been seasoned and developed through the realities of work and combat but the majority of these cadres have yet to receive basic training at schools. This places a major limitation upon a sector that deals with both the social sciences and the natural sciences in many areas of its work.

Our experience in correcting these weaknesses on battlefields is that the military region, using supplemental manpower and high level technical cadres sent in from the national rear area, must train basic level technical personnel through practical training and on-the-job training. Annual training conferences should be held for cadres and personnel to increase their knowledge of rear service work and improve their rear service organizational and command skills. Every specialized sector, such as the quartermaster sector, the military medical sector, the transport sector, the supply sector, the petroleum products sector, the finance sector and so forth, must also

adopt plans of its own for training personnel in accordance with the norms and requirements of the sector.

In the course of combat, although the corps of cadres has suffered considerable losses, the rear service sector has successfully undertaken very large and important jobs and the corps of cadres has steadily grown as a result of the appropriate attention given to them by the various echelons and our successful application of our experiences in providing training in combat, providing training at schools, providing on-the-job training and, supplementing this corps and purifying it through the realities of its work.

In the future, when our army becomes a more regular and modern army and must meet the new requirements of a war to defend the fatherland, many aspects of rear service work will have changed and new developments will have occurred. However, the character of the army's rear service work as work that is performed by all the people, work that has the purpose of insuring victory in a people's war to defend the fatherland will remain the same. Therefore, continuing to review and develop upon the experiences gained in rear service work over the past 40 years is a matter of very real and practical significance.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ho Chi Minh: "Ve cong tac hau can quan doi,"[On Army Rear Service Work], Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p 39.
2. Directive to the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee at the end of the 1970 rainy season.
3. Ho Chi Minh: "Ve cong tac hau can quan doi"...., p 43.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p 73.

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A MILITARY WORK OF MAJOR VALUE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SUMMARIZING THEORY AND PROVIDING PRACTICAL GUIDANCE

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[Book review by Lieutenant General Hoang Phuong]

[Text] In the course of their revolution, the revolution of a colony that arose to seize political power, defend its national independence and build socialism, our people have always had to fight enemies who were stronger than we both economically and militarily. All of these enemies have employed violent force to suppress and wipe out the revolution. For this reason, our party and President Ho saw "revolution by violent force as the basic means by which to seize political power." Following the success of the August Revolution and the birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the French colonialists returned and invaded our country again. With the defeat of France, the United States jumped into Vietnam and then came the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists with their scheme to annex Vietnam. To this day, the sound of gunfire in the fight against violations of the fatherland's border continues and true peace has yet to be achieved in our country because the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, acting in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists and international reactionaries, are waging a wide-ranging war of sabotage, one that includes military operations, against Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The above situation has made it necessary for our people to take up arms and fight for many years. Military struggle has become a very important front, frequently the decisive front, in our nation's revolution. The brilliant success of the August Revolution and the glorious victories won in the two wars of resistance against France and the United States as well as in the two wars to defend the socialist fatherland against the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists on the southwestern border and the northern border have proven that our party and President Ho resolved the basic questions of the Vietnamese revolution, including military questions, in a correct, creative and very successful manner. In the course of leading the revolution, in general, and leading the armed struggle, in particular, our party and President Ho Chi Minh have creatively applied Marxism-Leninism to the specific circumstances of Vietnam, found precise and creative answers to the questions mentioned above, done much to enhance our nation's tradition of fighting the enemy and defending the country, elaborated the theory of Vietnam's unique military

science and art and won victory over every enemy, thereby helping to enrich the storehouse of military theory of Marxism-Leninism.

The book "Some Matters Military in the Vietnamese Revolution" by Truong Chinh, member of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee and chairman of the Council of State, constitutes an important contribution to this success. Through 14 selected articles and speeches on military affairs, the book systematically describes the formation and development of the party's military line and the military organization led by the party in the various periods of the revolution since the party's founding. This work explains the fundamental ideological views concerning armed struggle and military strategy in the people's war led by our party. It deeply analyzes the key elements of Vietnamese military theory while giving the reader insight into the methods employed by our people under the leadership of the party in revolutionary struggle and armed struggle.

We all know that the fundamental issue of each revolution is the issue of political power and, to put political power into the hands of the people, there must be a situation conducive to revolution, certain subjective conditions and a correct line and methods for seizing political power. In our country following the "coup d'etat" carried out by Japan in Indochina in March, 1945, there emerged a situation conducive to revolution and subjective conditions for our entire nation to boldly arise in general uprising. Chuong Trinh appealed: "The decisive hour is here. An excellent opportunity is at hand. Let those who grieve, who feel shame over the destruction of families and the loss of the country, let those who have been deceived and duped by the Japanese join the ranks of the revolution"(p 19*). At that time, Truong Chinh pointed out that the most important military issue facing our party, and also the Vietnamese revolution, was that of preparing for an armed uprising in advance of a general uprising to seize political power. Of foremost importance in accomplishing this from the standpoint of the art of military leadership and leadership of the revolution was the need to clearly identify the various types of enemies and our immediate and most dangerous enemy during each stage of the revolution so that we could adopt suitable tactics and measures to defeat them. In the article entitled "The 'Coup d'Etat' by Japan in Indochina," he exposed the schemes and hypocrisy of the Japanese and stated that the Japanese fascists were the enemy that we had to topple. "The Japanese have removed the yoke of France in order to thrust the yoke of Japan upon our necks"(p 12). At the same time, he deeply analyzed the opportunity for revolution that had materialized. Concerning the lessons learned from the 1945 August Revolution, the author wrote: "The major success of our party lay in knowing how to use that favorable, one of a kind opportunity to mobilize the masses for the general uprising"(p 108). As a result of this, our party adopted a very correct policy: leading the masses in arising and disarming the Japanese before the allied forces arrived in Indochina, seizing political power from the Japanese, toppling the puppets, the lackeys of Japan and, as the force in power, welcoming the allied forces arriving to disarm the Japanese forces in Indochina. Responding to this policy, the party organizations at many places led the people in uprisings to seize political power even though they had yet to receive the order to launch the general uprising.

Truong Chinh presents as one of the important experiences of our party the profound understanding that it acquired at an early date of the concept of revolution by violent force--the foundation of the entire doctrine of Marx and Engels--and its decision, also at an early date, to build armed forces and wage armed struggle. He points out: "Only by employing the violent revolutionary force of the masses to crush the violent counter-revolutionary force of the exploiting ruling classes is it possible to seize political power for the working class and laboring people and build the new society. Never has an exploiting class voluntarily withdrawn from the political arena, given up its political power or ceased oppressing and exploiting the laboring people"(p 147).

Summarizing the practical experience gained in the revolutionary struggle waged by our people over the past several decades against cruel and cunning enemies, Truong Chinh writes: the basic forms of violent revolutionary force in our country are armed forces coordinated with political forces, armed struggle coordinated with political struggle. Under the leadership of our party, the Vietnamese revolution has always employed political struggle and armed struggle to reach a stage of uprising to seize political power and always used two forces--the political forces of the masses and the people's armed forces--to crush the state apparatus of the imperialists and their lackeys and win political power for the people. The experience of the Vietnamese revolution over the past several decades stands as a rejection of every trend toward accommodation and compromise, of struggle by legal means and pacifism of every kind and confirms that violent revolutionary force was the basic approach, was the only correct path to follow in order to put political power into the hands of the people, protect the revolutionary government and advance our country's revolution to victory in the spirit "we would rather lose everything that suffer the loss of our country, than be enslaved."

Truong Chinh presents and deeply analyzes many matters regarding the people's war, the relationship between war and revolution in our country and explains the ideological viewpoints and military line of the party and President Ho as well as the military science and art of Vietnam. He states: "People's war is the fundamental viewpoint in the military line of our party. It is the class viewpoint, the mass viewpoint of the party applied to war"(p 114). "A people's war is a revolutionary war (war of liberation, war to defend the fatherland or a revolutionary civil war) fought by the broad masses to liberate themselves and seize political power. Under present historical conditions, the people's war in our country is a war fought by the laboring people, primarily by workers and farmers, under the leadership of the working class." According to him, the factors that determine victory in a people's war in our times are: "It must be led by a Marxist-Leninist party and be governed by the party's political line; the rear area of the people's war must be consolidated, must provide a plentiful supply of manpower, money and materiel for the war and must be the solid and strong base of the armed forces; the fighting spirit of the armed forces and the people must be high; the people's armed forces must be powerful and well trained in politics, technical subjects and tactics; there must be an adequate supply of all types of weapons and these weapons must be of good quality; and military and other cadres must be skilled in organization and command"(p 115). It is these factors, not simply the use of many weapons and modern technology, that give

the people's war the invincible strength needed to win victory, because war, the most bitter form of struggle between classes, between persons who are armed, is not simply fought between the various types of weapons and technology. From the realities of the past several decades of our people waging war under the leadership of the party, Truong Chinh presents a summary of our major experiences in people's war. "To wage a people's war, you must mobilize and arm all the people and build people's armed forces to serve as the nucleus in the fight"(p 116). Our armed forces were born of the people, fight for the people, possess the character of the working class and, as President Ho taught, are wholeheartedly "loyal to the party, filial to the people...complete every task, overcome every difficult and defeat every enemy." They are an army that fights, produces and works, are the main tool in armed struggle, in winning political power for the people in protecting this power, in protecting and developing upon each gain made by the revolution against every enemy, both domestic and foreign. The armed forces must be under the absolute, direct and comprehensive leadership of the party. One of the important experiences gained concerns the need to develop the military art of people's war. Truong Chinh points out that "our military art is the military art of a small, weak nation living in a backward agricultural country"(which, however, has been a socialist country, a member of the socialist camp since the restoration of peace) that "attaches full importance to fighting and winning victory over enemies many times stronger than we from the standpoint of physical strength by employing the political and spiritual superiority of the armed forces themselves and all our people," that knows "how to use weakness to triumph over strength, use spiritual strength to triumph over physical strength, use inferior crude equipment to triumph over modern equipment"(p 119). Therefore, we must always bear in mind and resolutely implement "the guideline governing combat operations in our people's war: taking the initiative in attacking the enemy, wiping out the enemy and attacking when victory is assured..."(p 121).

Another important experience is that a people's war of liberation must be waged under the strategy of a protracted war, of practicing self-reliance, winning victory gradually and eventually winning total victory; however, when a favorable opportunity arises, we must seize it and quickly win decisive victory. As regards a people's war to defend the fatherland, we can, under certain conditions and when fighting certain enemies, win victory relatively quickly but must still be prepared to wage a long fight, be determined to defend the fatherland in every situation. The building of a solid rear area and bases also occupies a very important position among the major experiences gained in people's war. "The rear area of a people's war, a revolutionary war, lies primarily in the hearts of the revolutionary people." "The strength of the rear area is political, economic and military strength, mainly political strength. It is the political-moral consensus of the people under the leadership of the vanguard party. The political and economic factors are military potentials of the rear area and the entire war"(pp 122-123).

In an article written on the 3rd anniversary of the victory over the Chinese aggressor army (March, 1979-March, 1982), the author clearly analyzes the nature of the war of aggression unleashed by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, points out that it is they who are the immediate, dangerous enemy of our people and describes the dimensions of the victory of our war to defend

the fatherland against the Chinese aggressor army. He observes: "Our armed forces and people incorporated and developed upon the many good experiences gained during the several decades of the war of liberation against imperialism under the specific conditions of today's war to defend the fatherland against the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and their lackeys. From this, we have learned many valuable lessons, lessons that will enable us to continuously improve the country's defenses, closely coordinate the economy with the national defense system, build a comprehensive and modern socialist national defense system supported by all the people, build powerful people's armed forces and be ready to deal with every situation"(p 382).

During the past several decades, war and revolution in our country have been closely tied to and had an impact upon each other. It can be said that our country's revolution developed for many years within a state of war in accordance with the general laws of revolution and the specific laws of war. The relationship between war and revolution in our country, according to Truong Chinh, is seen most clearly in the following several points: "To liberate themselves, the Vietnamese had no choice but to wage armed struggle and revolutionary war against the imperialists and their lackeys.

To our people, revolutionary war was the most decisive way to win and maintain national independence, to complete the tasks of the revolution.

The tasks of the Vietnamese revolution had to be carried out gradually amidst the long process of armed struggle"(p 127). He explained that we had to and could do this "because our peoples war is the use of weakness to defeat strength; therefore, we had to wage a protracted fight in order to turn our weakness into strength, had to mobilize the people to actively participate in the war, had to vigorously tap the activism and creativity of the masses and fight the enemy while looking after the daily needs of the people, building the forces of the people, building the forces of resistance, strengthening the rear area and winning victory over the enemy"(p 138).

In recent years, the revolutionary war of our people has not only had the purpose of completing the national task, but also helping to fulfill our international task. In the spirit of pure proletarian internationalism and correctly believing that "to help a friend is to help yourself," our armed forces and people have stood shoulder to shoulder in combat with the armed forces and peoples of the two fraternal countries of Laos and Cambodia against the common enemies of the three countries on the Indochina peninsula, from the French colonialists and Japanese fascists to the U.S. imperialists and, today, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists. This special solidarity is the strength that has enabled the revolutions of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to win tremendous victories. In an article entitled "Concerning the 'Cambodia Issue'," Trung Chinh points out that the common experience of the three fraternal nations of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia is that the enemy "always tries by every means possible to rule all three countries in Indochina...and generally uses the people of one country to fight the people of another country, uses one country to invade another...turning Indochina into a battlefield"(p 307). "Therefore, the peoples of our three countries absolutely must closely unite and help one another fight the common enemy. The militant solidarity and alliance among the three peoples of Vietnam, Laos

and Cambodia, which were built, strengthened and tempered in the long war of liberation, are one of the factors in the victories won by the people of each country"(p 308). In the face of the genocide carried out against the Cambodian people by the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, the lackey of Beijing, "the Vietnamese were determined not to stand idly by and had to save both themselves and their Cambodian brothers and sisters from that tragedy." The peoples of the three countries of Indochina "definitely must unite in the fight to defeat the schemes of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists under all circumstances...thereby making practical contributions to maintaining the independence and sovereignty of the countries of Southeast Asia and South Asia, maintaining security within the region and peace in the world"(p 308). "The Vietnamese are determined to fulfill their sacred national task and fulfill the noble international obligation that history has entrusted to them"(p 309).

The "combining of genuine patriotism with the proletarian international spirit, the combining of the interests of the nation with the interests of the world revolution" are thoroughly explained by the author on the basis of the view that the Vietnamese revolution is an integral part of the worldwide proletarian revolution and in the spirit, as President Ho Chi Minh so often reminded us, that "the proletarians of the entire world are brothers and sisters." He attaches great importance to "solidarity with the Soviet Union, the great fruit of the August Revolution, the first socialist country, the pillar of world peace and revolution"(p 351), with the international communist and worker movement, with national liberation movements, with the non-aligned countries and the peace and justice loving people of the entire world.

Today, under the leadership of the party, the people of our entire country must carry out the two strategic tasks of successfully building socialism and firmly defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland. We must also deal with the new enemy, an enemy whose country is immediately adjacent to ours, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists who, every hour of every day, are waging a wide-ranging war of sabotage against us in preparation for wars of aggression that vary in scale. Closely tied to building and developing the socialist economy and developing the socialist culture is the need to intensify the strengthening of the national defense system and the buildup of the people's armed forces in order to meet the new requirements of the tasks of the revolution. In view of this situation, studying the work "Some Matters Military in the Vietnamese Revolution" by Truong Chinh will help us gain a more thorough understanding of the military thinking and line of the party and President Ho Chi Minh and deepen our knowledge of the military affairs of our country.

The effect of this work is to guide and inspire our entire army and all our people to make every effort to strengthen the national defense system, build up the people's armed forces, strengthen the country's defenses and be ready to win victory over every enemy that commits aggression against our country.

FOOTNOTES

- * All passages within quotation marks followed by page numbers are excerpts from "Some Matters Military in the Vietnamese Revolution," Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1983.

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UPHOLDING A PRECIOUS TRADITION: UNITY BETWEEN THE ARMY AND PEOPLE, THE ARMY
AND PEOPLE SHARING A COMMON WILL

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 12, Dec 84 pp 37-43

[Article by The Truong]

[Text] Over the past 40 years, under the glorious banner of the party and faithful to the teachings of the revered Uncle Ho, our army has built a close and warm relationship of unity between the army and the people. This unity has truly been one of the great strengths through which our army has recorded remarkable feats of arms, won victory over every enemy and excellently completed each task while helping to create and develop the combined strength of our country's revolution.

Unity between the army and people, the army and people sharing a common will are one of the fundamental principles in the building of the revolutionary army, are an important part of the working class nature of our army. They are among the reasons for the existence and development of our army and are attributes that no aggressor army can achieve. Unity between the army and people is also the fervent aspiration and deep desire of the soldiers within the army, an army born of the people, and citizens whose sons and daughters are serving in the army. This aspiration and desire stem from the clear and full realization on the part of our entire party, our entire army and all our people of the sacred need to firmly defend our beloved fatherland in any situation.

Through the challenges of time, from the founding of our army until the present day, especially during the years and months of the bitter wars and even during the period of peaceful construction, this close, warm relationship has truly become a precious tradition of our entire army and people. This tradition has been enhanced by the brilliant feats of arms recorded by our army and people over the past 40 years, by the flesh and blood of several generations that have fought the enemy to save the country. It is a rich tradition, one that is being enhanced more with each passing day in the course of our army's growth. Today, in the face of the new requirements of building and defending the socialist fatherland and the demands of building a powerful people's army, we must uphold this precious tradition even more.

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The close unity between our army and people is, above everything else, based on implementing the revolutionary lines, policies and goals set by the party and has as its highest objective the successful performance of each political and military task. The correct and creative lines and policies of the party during the various periods have been the cement of the unity between the army and people because they have reflected and satisfied the aspirations and interests of all our people, of our nation. They have guided the actions and set the revolutionary goals of our army and people, have mobilized, inspired and closely tied all our people and our entire army together in a solid bloc, have enabled them to overcome countless difficulties and challenges and fight together to win total victory for our noble revolutionary cause.

During the 9 years of the war of resistance against France, the more than 2 decades of the fight against the United States and the years and months of the fight against the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, our army and people, in keeping with the correct and creative lines and policies of the party and sharing their common will "we would rather lose everything than suffer the loss of our country, than be enslaved"(1) and "there is nothing more precious than independence and freedom"(2), have endured every sacrifice and hardship in order to win and protect their independence and freedom and advance to socialism.

The party's line on a full-scale war of resistance fought by all the people and its other positions and policies have provided a solid foundation upon which our armed forces have been able to associate with the masses, win the hearts of the people, win the boundless support and assistance of the people and create a tremendous combined strength with which to win victory over every enemy. Under the light of these correct lines and positions, our people have clearly seen the obligation they have to defend the fatherland, the tremendous responsibility they have to their army, have provided food and clothing to support the army, have enthusiastically contributed manpower and materiel and stood shoulder to shoulder with the army in fighting the enemy and saving the country.

On the basis of the lines and positions of the party, the unity and closeness of our army and people are manifested in their common will and actions, in their clear recognition of their responsibilities in building and defending the fatherland. Wherever the army is operating and regardless of the task it is performing, it always makes time and takes advantage of every opportunity to get close to the people, to explain and spread the lines and policies of the party and state among the people, thereby helping to create increasingly high political and spiritual consensus among the people and between the army and people and, on this basis, giving the people a clear understanding of their responsibility and strengthening the unity, mutual support and mutual assistance between the army and the people.

The highest purpose of unity between the army and people is the successful performance of each political and military task established by the party. Therefore, unity between the army and people is not only a requirement of warm relations, but also a requirement of revolutionary tasks. Above everything else, unity between the army and people must be governed by and meet these requirements.

In the fight against France, the fight against the United States and the fight against the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, our army and people, cognizant of the significance and purpose of unity between the army and people, joined forces and united in combat, winning one victory after another. Our troops, especially local troops, closely coordinated with the guerrilla militia and self-defense forces, bravely and tenaciously clung to the land, to the people, actively fought the enemy and assisted the masses in intensifying the guerrilla war movement, the political struggle and the uprising movement to seize control. Our army actively helped the people of the various localities build the guerrilla militia forces, consolidate the revolutionary government and mass organizations, organize combat hamlets and villages, develop production and stabilize daily life, thus helping to make the rear area stronger and more solid with each passing day.

In particular, in the extremely hard and bitter war of resistance against the United States for national salvation, the unity between the army and people displayed even greater strength. Our troops played an active part in conducting propaganda and agitation among the people encouraging them to participate in killing the enemy and record feats of arms, mainly by joining the militia, the guerrillas and self-defense forces, protecting their villages and hamlets, protecting their factories and cities and carrying out the slogans "when the enemy attacks, young and old alike fight," "every village is a fortress, every citizen is a brave American killer" and so forth. On whatever battlefield they were operating, all units of our army coordinated with the local government and mass organizations to agitate among the people to join the army and kill the enemy; emulate in production and contribute to the frontlines; fight the enemy with crude, home-made weapons; emulate in shooting down enemy aircraft with infantry weapons; attack enemy vehicles and communications; guard against and fight spies, commandoes, etc. These actions by our cadres and soldiers made positive contributions to strengthening the increasingly close relationship between the army and people, between the armed forces and the local mass organizations and government, between the organizations of the party within the army and those at places where units were operating. These actions also helped the localities to complete important jobs that directly supported combat missions, such as the recruiting of troops, the building of guerrilla militia and self-defense forces, transport operations to resupply the battlefield, the building of local rear bases and so forth, thereby creating favorable conditions for our army to win victory over the enemy.

In the work of defending and building the socialist North, the strategic rear area of the entire country, during the resistance against the United States for national salvation, our army helped the people of the various localities maintain combat readiness and fight well while carrying out their production tasks well. Along with intensifying the various emulation movements to record feats of arms within the army, our cadres and soldiers participated in conducting propaganda and agitation among workers, farmers, youths and women to encourage them to successfully carry out the "three readies," "three responsibilities," "five assaults," "a hammer in one hand, a rifle in the other, a plow in one hand, a rifle in the other," "skilled in the work of the state, responsible in the affairs of the home," "keep communications and transportation lines open" and other emulation movements. Many units of our

army directly contributed manpower to assist state farms, cooperatives, agencies and basic units within the state-operated economy during busy planting and harvesting seasons and to protect the property of the state, collective and people in times of natural disasters and enemy attacks. These positive activities by our entire army not only had the effect of strengthening the fine unity between the army and people, but also forging the ideological stand, the mass viewpoint of our army, forging within our army a deep love of the people, which is a very important factor in the political-moral strength of our army. As a result, our army was faithful to the teaching of the revered Uncle Ho: "Main force troops, local troops and guerrillas should know more than how to fight. It is good that they know how to fight but if they only know how to fight and give light attention to politics, to economics, to propagandizing and educating the people, they only know how to perform part of their job because fighting cannot be separated from politics and economics."(3)

Secondly, the close unity between our army and people stems from the character of our army as an army of the people, an army born of the people that fights for the people.

Unity between the army and people is a matter of survival and, at the same time, a sacred sentiment of our army. This relationship between the army and people is profoundly ideological in content: "Without the people, we would have no troops." "We fight the enemy for the sake of the people. However, we are not the 'savior' of the people, rather, it is our responsibility to serve the people. All military personnel must act in a way that brings them the trust, the support, the love of the people. They must act in a way that causes the people to look forward to their arrival, to help them when they arrive, to miss them when they leave."(4)

Fighting with selfless dedication to liberate and protect the people became the sacred obligation and sentiment and the powerful motivating spirit of our soldiers, became the fine tradition of our army. This tradition has been enhanced through countless examples of brave and tenacious fighting, dedication and sacrifices on the part of our cadres and soldiers to protect the people, to defend each bit of soil of the fatherland. Due to the selfless sacrifices they have made for the people, their fine work in propaganda and agitation among the people and their respect and help for the people during the long years and months of defending and building the country, our cadres and soldiers have won the love and respect of the people.

"Uncle Ho's troops" are talked about with love and fondness by our people and this image of them has been deeply ingrained in the hearts of our people. To repay the tremendous sacrifices of flesh and blood made by our soldiers, the people have willingly given manpower and materiel to assist troops in every situation and done so with warm feeling and a profound sense of responsibility. Therefore, our troops have bases that are solid and unshakeable--bases that lie within the hearts of the people. Countless images and examples of the people's boundless love, support and assistance for troops have blossomed in the long and hard fight to win our independence and defend our fatherland. As a result, during the years of the extremely bitter and hard fight against the United States, the liberation armed forces of the South

were able to remain in areas deep behind enemy lines, hold their positions in the dangerous areas bordering enemy territory, stand their ground in coastal areas, in the lowlands and even on the edge of the major cities, such as Saigon and Da Nang, the strongholds of the enemy, etc. In the current fight against the heavy artillery attacks and the acts of infiltration and encroachment by the Chinese reactionaries to defend the areas along the northern border, our troops at the border defense posts, the forward bases and other places have received the wholehearted assistance of the ethnic minorities and the active support and coordination of the local militia and self-defense forces. Together with troops, the people have bravely remained in their fields to produce and support combat operations, thus maintaining firm control over the border of the fatherland under very difficult and arduous circumstances.

In a spirit of ardent patriotism, with the feeling that the relationship between the army and people is the same as that between fish and the water in which they live, our people, especially mothers and older sisters, have developed a wide variety of ways to assist and support troops: preparing jars of rice for troops, organizing units to launder, mend and sew clothing for soldiers, resupplying troops with grain, caring for wounded soldiers, assisting the families of troops, organizing associations of soldiers' mothers, sponsoring troops, organizing groups to visit troops and wounded soldiers at forward positions, establishing stations to receive wounded soldiers, ill soldiers and troops, the various forms of brotherhoods between the army and people and so forth.

To win the trust, support, love and wholehearted assistance of the people, Uncle Ho taught: "Troops must help the people, must love the people. Every military man must, through his work, be a propagandist." (5) Our troops are an army that fights but they are also an army that conducts propaganda. However, it is not only through what they say, but mainly through what they do, that is, through the examples set by their actions and the assistance they provide to the people, that troops help to give the people a thorough understanding of the lines and policies of the party, help to raise their political awareness, deepen their patriotism and love of socialism and develop in their hearts a deep hatred of the enemy while making practical contributions to the various revolutionary movements within the locality. Assisting the people also means respecting the people, means being grateful to the people for the help they give to troops. Therefore, our troops must always look for every way to become more self-sufficient in every area. This, too, is a practical way to help the people, to reduce the heavy burden that the people bear and build a solid and strong rear area. Therefore, our troops have made many major efforts to assist the people in difficult and laborious jobs, including the maintenance of order and security, while achieving a significant degree of self-sufficiency, even at places where circumstances are very difficult and hard.

Thirdly, maintaining strict discipline in the army's relations with the people is a factor of foremost importance in maintaining unity between the army and people.

The experience of the past 40 years has made one thing very clear: maintaining strict army discipline in the army's relations with the people is the first and most basic prerequisite to maintaining the prestige of the army, winning the trust and respect of the people for troops and solidifying and strengthening the unity between the army and people. Discipline in the relations between the army and people is a very important aspect of the class character of our army, is one of the standards distinguishing our army from an army of the exploiting, reactionary classes. At the same time, it is a basic requirement in guaranteeing the strength of our army. The discipline in the army's relations with the people is strengthened as the requirements of revolutionary tasks and the buildup of the army rise. Our party, as was Uncle Ho, is very concerned with teaching troops to maintain strict discipline in their relations with the people. When our army was still the National Defense Force, Uncle Ho set forth a 12-point code of discipline for troops, which included the following very strict requirements: "Do not touch one needle or piece of thread of the people..."

Keep the homes and gardens of the people clean. Be polite, show respect for the elderly and show love for children. Be fair in all trade with the people.

Return everything borrowed from the people.

Pay for what you break.

Assist the people in all jobs large and small..."(6) Uncle Ho also issued specific, detailed instructions concerning six things that troops should do and six things they should not do when in contact with or living among the people so that "the people see them as upright persons who are diligent in their work and attach importance to discipline."(7)

During the past 40 years, as a result of the concern shown for their education by the party and Uncle Ho and the advance and assistance received from the people, our army has, generally speaking, maintained good discipline in its relations with the people. The mass of cadres and soldiers realize the importance of this matter and maintain strict, self-imposed discipline, as a result of which the unity between the army and people has been solidified and strengthened with each passing day, thereby helping to increase our army's fighting strength. Through positive, concrete deeds, through exemplary actions in matters of both minor and major importance in their relations with the people, by respecting everyone and not violating the property of the people, our cadres and soldiers have exerted positive influence among the people and further enhanced the beautiful image of "Uncle Ho's troops" that has been deeply ingrained in the hearts of our people for many years. It was not surprising that the compatriots of the Northwest said: "Uncle Ho is like the sun and each of his troops is like a ray of light." These fine aspects of the relationship between the army and people defeated the schemes and attempts of the enemy to divide our army and people, to undermine the traditional unity between them, to weaken the very important bases of our troops that lie in the hearts of the people and the large rear area.

However, at certain times and places, some units have failed to maintain strict discipline in their relations with the people, thereby having an

adverse influence upon the people. The main cause continues to be the fact that cadres and soldiers do not have a full understanding of the army's discipline, in general, and the discipline involved in relations with the people, in particular, consequently, they continue to cite one difficulty or another as an excuse for haphazard, less than strict discipline. They are neither timely nor effective in their criticism and struggle to differentiate between right and wrong and thus have little effect by way of teaching troops and preventing things that are wrong. Some units still deal with shortcomings in a manner lacking resolve and fail to see the long-range, serious harm caused by violations and are, as a result, quick to indulge or overlook them. The role that the collective ownership of troops plays in managing the maintenance of discipline in the relations between the army and people is not being properly utilized. Only by handling infractions of discipline in the relations between the army and people in a proper and strict manner wherever and whenever they occur is it possible to maintain and strengthen the unity between the army and people. This is a very important matter, one that cannot be overlooked. And, it is not only the responsibility of the various command echelons of the army, but also the responsibility of the various party committee echelons and the local government at places where infractions occur.

Constantly raising the level of political awareness and heightening the sense of respecting and obeying commanders, respecting orders and fully complying with regulations while continuously enhancing the revolutionary nature and fine tradition of the army also build a solid foundation for our cadres and soldiers and instill in them the fine habit of maintaining strict, self-imposed discipline in the relations between the army and people. In particular, when war breaks out and fighting becomes extremely complex, urgent and bitter, troops generally encounter many difficulties with resupply, with local rear service support, with combat support, with medical evacuation and treatment of the wounded and so forth; if they do not possess a high sense of self-imposed discipline, cadres and soldiers easily commit shortcomings with regard to maintaining discipline in their relations with the people, such as adopting a superior, arrogant or overbearing attitude, not respecting the people, violating the property of the people or using the sentiments that exist between the army and people to commit shortcomings in one's personal life.

In view of present circumstances, we must do a better job of teaching politics to cadres and soldiers and deepening their knowledge of the policies of the party, the laws of the state, the rules of society, the right of collective ownership of the people, etc. In everything from matters of minor importance to matters of major importance, the army must set a good example in complying with the positions and policies of the party and the regulations, rules and laws of the state. As regards the other organizations within the dictatorship of the proletariat system, such as the various levels of government, the public security sector, state-operated commerce and the mass organizations, the cadres and soldiers of the army must take the initiative in uniting with them, in supporting and respecting them and must cooperate and coordinate with them in the performance of tasks while making every effort to avoid an attitude of arrogance or superiority, avoid a loss of love and affection, avoid allowing disputes and misunderstandings to occur.

Maintaining strict discipline in the relations between the army and people is also the process of struggling to differentiate between right and wrong, to develop upon positive factors and correct shortcomings. This demands that our cadres and soldiers display activism and initiative in their thinking, that they not only rid themselves of mistakes, but also be determined to do that which they perceive as beneficial to the people, regardless of how difficult it might be. Conversely, they must make every effort to avoid that which is harmful to the people, to the revolution, to the unity between the army and people. Of importance in accomplishing this is the need for our cadres and soldiers to always bring a pure soul, proper thinking and close, warm feelings to their relations with the people and not have misgivings about performing jobs that benefit the people, benefit the revolution in a practical way and further strengthen the unity between the army and people.

The role played by the local people, agencies of government and mass organizations at the places where troops are stationed and within their home villages also has a tremendous influence upon our troops from the standpoint of maintaining strict discipline in the relations between the army and people. Words of praise, timely encouragement of the good qualities of troops, the offering of sincere opinions and the criticism of public opinion concerning the shortcomings of troops and the advice and reminders of family members are usually of profound educational significance to our cadres and soldiers. Many places have periodically organized army-people festivals or held activities participated in by troops and the people, by troops and the agencies or mass organizations of the locality in order to further solidify the unity between the army and people, the unity between the army and the various organizations within the locality. All of these are practices that have a good effect.

Today, in the face of the new situation and tasks of the revolution, the precious tradition of unity between the army and people has become an even more important factor in helping to increase the fighting strength of our people's armed forces, in bringing the combined strength of all the people to to the fight against the enemy, to the building of the armed forces and having all the people participate in defending the fatherland and maintaining our readiness to win victory over every enemy aggressor.

Today, the forms of unity between the army and people, the specifics involved in this unity are new. It is no longer simply a matter of sentiment, of continuing to uphold tradition, but a matter of correctly satisfying interests, of working together to carry out plans for cooperation and coordination well with a view toward exercising the rights and fulfilling the obligations of both the army and the people. This unity is not just political unity, not just unity in combat, but also socio-economic unity. Therefore, to make the unity between the army and people even more solid, a number of places have launched brotherhood movements, not simply to establish brotherhoods between a small unit and a hamlet or village, but between a large unit and a district or province. These brotherhoods are broad in content. In addition to the members of a brotherhood assisting one another with daily needs, they also give their attention to helping one another complete revolutionary tasks, work together to instill a will to fight and revolutionary ideals in troops

and the people, coordinate their efforts in maintaining order and security and accelerating cultural and sport movements and, in particular, share a common concern for cultivating the qualities of the new, socialist man.

Under the close leadership of the various party committee echelons and with the cadres and soldiers of our army and the people working hard to keep it strong, the close unity between our army and people will surely grow and develop and this precious tradition will continuously be enhanced.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ho Chi Minh: "Tuyen tap,"[Selected Works], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1980, Volume 1, p 403.
2. Ibid., Volume 2, p 430.
3. Ho Chi Minh: "Ve doan ket quan dan,"[The Unity Between the Army and People], Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1975, p 39.
4. Ibid., pp 34 and 36.
5. Ibid., pp 34-35.
6. Ibid., pp 28-31.

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UNDERSTANDING THE UNIQUE ASPECTS OF MODERN VIETNAMESE MILITARY ART

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 12, Dec 84 pp 44-50

[Article by Vu Khac Long]

[Text] Since the Communist Party of Vietnam was born and began leading the revolution, through the uprisings, the wars of national liberation and the wars fought to defend the fatherland, especially during the 40 years that our army and people have been fighting and growing together, modern Vietnamese military art has developed rapidly.

Modern Vietnamese military art is the perfect embodiment of the political and military lines of the party during the various stages of the revolution and fully reflects the fundamental military views of the party, which constitute the theoretical base of Vietnamese military science. At the same time, it has incorporated and developed upon the traditional military art of our forefathers and selectively incorporated the valuable knowledge and experience represented by the military science and art of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries. This military art has also been cultivated and developed through the realities of more than 30 years of war to liberate and defend the fatherland and through a process of continuous armed struggle between the army of a small, weak country and the armies of large countries many times stronger than we. Thus, Vietnamese military art is both national and traditional in character as well as modern and scientific and has been tested in the realities of a long and bitter fight. The past 40 years have marked the period of most brilliant development of Vietnamese military art, a military art that is both rich and interesting. This article presents but a few of the unique features of this military art.

1. Having Limited "Forces," We Learned How To Take Full Advantage of "Position" and Skillfully Combined "Position and Forces" To Create an Invincible Combined Strength

In armed struggle, be it offensive or defensive warfare and be it revolutionary armed forces or an aggressor army, "position" and "forces" are always the dual components of the fighting strength of the forces of either side.

The organic relationship and direct reciprocal effect between "position" and "forces," while controlled by objective circumstances, are directly influenced by the subjective dynamism of the persons participating in the fight.

Sometimes, forces are strong or very strong but their skill in the use of position is marginal, they fail to establish or create an advantageous position for themselves and must fight from a disadvantageous and inferior position, as a result of which their ability to fight and combat efficiency are low and they are easily defeated in combat. Conversely, when forces weaker than the opposition's create a position that is advantageous and effective, their ability to fight and combat efficiency are high and it is possible for them to prevail over a larger, better equipped force. Of course, the ability to fight and combat efficiency of a strong force that has established a good position are even greater. It is similar to the art of playing chess. When one is in a good position, even a pawn can make an important move; conversely, when one is not in a good position, even the two knights might have to be sacrificed. A rock placed atop a steep incline is different than the same rock when lying on flat ground if we roll it down from the top of the incline: its position at the top gives the rock powerful force when it is rolled down the incline.

In the two wars of resistance against France and the United States for national salvation, our armed forces were smaller than the enemy's and our army had less technical equipment than the enemy. Measured by the military might of our country compared to the military might of France during the years from 1945 to 1954 and that of the United States between 1955 and 1975, the economic potentials and scientific-technological potentials of our country were very far inferior to those of the enemy. In the face of this very lopsided situation, we applied military art in a creative and resourceful fashion by designing and successfully establishing an optimum battlefield deployment in all three fields of military strategy, campaigns and combat, making full use of a battlefield position advantageous to us, skillfully combining forces with position and, in this way, achieving a combined strength with which to win victory over the enemy.

The optimum battlefield deployment from a strategic standpoint is the military strategic deployment of a highly developed, protracted people's war that mobilizes the forces of the entire people to fight the enemy, with the nucleus of this fight being formed by revolutionary armed forces consisting of all three elements of the military, that coordinates the two modes of warfare (conventional war and guerrilla war, war fought by the main force military corps and the local people's war), that closely coordinates political and military forces and builds and vigorously taps the spirit and will to resist of all the people. This battlefield deployment was studied and established by our party with tremendous results. It has made full use of our forces and created the conditions for them to become many times stronger, to form a tremendous combined strength that enabled them to total defeat the war strategies and strategic plans of both the French imperialists and the U.S. imperialists.

In campaigns and combat, modern Vietnamese military art has made extremely resourceful and flexible use of position, thus enabling our combat forces to

win victory over the enemy in many different situations. All of the heralded operations of France and the United States, operations which had grand strategic objectives, were conducted by large forces equipped with modern equipment, operations which appeared capable of quickly wiping out the opposition were defeated by our armed forces, which were usually smaller and less well equipped than the enemy. All of the United States' latest and most modern technical weapons and the great power of the United States were rendered ineffective by the battlefield deployment of Vietnamese military art and Vietnam's will. The strength of our "position" was supported and made even more effective by the strength of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and progressive mankind.

The way we established our position met the requirements of creating a position that the enemy could not disrupt and that enabled us to wipe out the enemy when attacking. Establishing our position and destroying the position of the enemy was the process of resourcefully utilizing "position" in coordination with "forces" to create an invincible combined strength. Through this military art, we were able to use few forces to triumph over many, use resourcefulness to triumph over strength, use position to triumph over force.

Establishing our position and destroying the position of the enemy can be considered the most characteristic aspect of modern Vietnamese military art.

2. Always Achieving a High Degree of Surprise

Both the French and U.S. imperialists were frequently taken by surprise on the Vietnam battlefield. They were continuously taken by surprise in the course of their wars of aggression, taken by surprise as soon as they launched their wars and taken by complete surprise in the concluding stages of their wars.

On the Vietnam battlefield, the armed forces of France and the United States were taken by surprise from the standpoint of strategy, campaigns and combat operations. They frequently misjudged our combat plans and operations. At critical junctures in those wars, they often failed to accurately predict the scale and direction of our activities, as a result of which they were usually taken completely by surprise by our strategic offenses.

The French colonialists, who enslaved our country for nearly 1 century, understood and kept abreast of every aspect of our country's situation. However, in their war of aggression against our country (1945-1954), they were continuously taken by surprise. On the battlefield of Nam Bo, the French expeditionary army, supported by British and Japanese forces, were taken by surprise by the widespread and effective guerrilla activities of our armed forces and people. The enemy's Nam Bo pacification plan, therefore, could not be implemented, even though they temporarily controlled the municipalities, cities and important roads.

The enemy was taken completely by surprise when the nationwide war of resistance broke out (19 December 1946) and when our fight in the capital Hanoi lasted for nearly 2 months. They were also taken by surprise in their strategic offensive in Viet Bac (the fall-winter of 1947), which led to the failure of their "fait accompli" strategy.

In 1950, they were again taken by surprise and stunned by our offensive campaign that shattered their Cao Bang-Dong Khe and That Khe-Lang Son defense lines. In 1951, Tassigny was taken by surprise and defeated in his plan to regain the initiative on the Bac Bo battlefield by attacking Hoa Binh. This talented French general was defeated twice, on the front and behind the front. The surprise of the French army grew in the face of the collapse of the Navarre plan in our 1953-1954 winter-spring strategic offensive and strategic Dien Bien Phu campaign.

The U.S. imperialists were much stronger than the French colonialists. However, in Vietnam, the U.S. aggressor army was continuously taken by surprise, and their surprise increased as the end of the war grew nearer. As the involvement of the United States deepened and their war strategy and strategic plans became more ambitious, each defeat caused them to reel more, each defeat brought them greater surprise. The U.S. imperialists never anticipated that they would employ so many strategies in their war of aggression against Vietnam and they were always taken by surprise whenever one of them failed.

By using modern air and naval forces to conduct strategic raids and wage a large-scale and extremely intense war of destruction against North Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists thought that they would quickly crush the opposition and had no idea that they were actually courting defeat. But the ones who were taken by surprise by and could not comprehend the very effective resistance offered by the opposition were none other than the leaders in the United States and the U.S. armed forces in Vietnam.

When the Paris Agreement on Vietnam was signed (1973), the United States never suspected that Vietnam's revolutionary armed forces were capable of completely liberating South Vietnam and reunifying the fatherland. In the spring of 1975, the United States was taken completely by surprise by the rapid, chain reaction collapse of military positions from Buon Me Thuot, Hue and Da Nang to Saigon, by the collapse and unconditional surrender of the Saigon puppet government on 30 April 1975.

Achieving surprise in combat is a very important principle of warfare and a very important element of military art. Only by taking the enemy by surprise is it possible to win victory over the enemy or win victory over the enemy more easily.

It is not only necessary to be skilled in the art of maintaining secrecy, but also necessary to employ the art of decoy forces, of deceiving the opposition so that they constantly make mistakes in their assessment of the situation and in judging our intentions, plans and combat operations. Some of the most unique characteristics of modern Vietnamese military art pertain the art of achieving a high degree of surprise over the enemy.

3. Retaining the Initiative on the Battlefield

In their wars of aggression against Vietnam, the French and American armies, although they enjoyed superiority of armed forces and technical equipment, generally failed to maintain the initiative on the battlefield. Conversely,

the revolutionary armed forces of Vietnam usually retained the initiative on the battlefield, beginning with military strategic initiative and tactical initiative and gradually took the initiative from the standpoint of campaigns. Toward the end of those wars, we retained the initiative even more firmly in all three fields of strategic military initiative, campaign initiative and tactical initiative.

During the very first years of the war of aggression, the French aggressor army was put on the defensive by the widespread guerrilla war being waged by our armed forces and people. Their "fait accompli" strategy was defeated by our strategy of waging a protracted war. Although enemy search and destroy operations were conducted continuously, they were unable to take the initiative and succeed in their mission of wiping out our main forces.

Beginning in 1950, the French expeditionary army completely lost the initiative on the Bac Bo battlefield, the main battlefield in Indochina. The two strategies of Tassigny and Navarre to regain the initiative on the battlefield failed. And, the enemy ultimately suffered total defeat on the battlefield in the face of our 1953-1954 winter-spring strategic offensive and Dien Bien Phu campaign.

In its war of aggression against Vietnam, the U.S. aggressor army found itself more on the defensive with each change in war strategy, each change in generals. The four different war strategies applied by the United States in South Vietnam led to the following results: defeat and being deprived of the initiative; defeated and deprived of the initiative again; and totally defeated.

Following the defeat of the policy of using the Ngo Dinh Diem puppet regime and U.S. aid to impose neo-colonialism in South Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists were forced to wage a unilateral war. When this unilateral war strategy failed, the United States was forced to wage the special war. And, when that was defeated, the United States was forced to wage the limited war. In the end, the limited war, the highest level reached in the war's escalation, was also defeated, thus forcing the United States to implement the "Vietnamization" of the war strategy.

Suffering heavy and continuous defeats on the battlefield in South Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists were forced to launch the war of destruction against the North. The war of destruction followed the same pattern: involuntary escalation followed by defeat; another involuntary escalation followed by another defeat; continued involuntary escalation followed by a heavier defeat; and involuntary escalation to the highest level followed by suffering the heaviest of defeats and being forced to sign the Paris Agreement.

In the war of destruction, the United States used very powerful and ultra-modern air and naval forces and was fully capable of retaining the initiative over its opposition on the battlefield; however, in the face of the realities on the battlefield of North Vietnam, these air and naval forces were also put somewhat on the defensive in all three areas of military strategy, campaign operations and tactics. It was for this reason that this war of destruction,

one unequalled in the world's history of war, against North Vietnam was tragically defeated.

In armed struggle, the failure to seize and retain the initiative naturally results in being on the defensive, in confusion and difficulty in dealing with the situation and makes it hard to avoid defeat even if our forces are still strong.

We were able to seize and retain the initiative on the battlefield because our war against aggression was a just war and because we were led by the correct and clear-sighted lines and policies of the party. Therefore, we were able to launch a full-scale and highly developed people's war, one in which our entire party, our entire army and all our people had a deep understanding of the party's line and displayed a tenacious revolutionary will and revolutionary-offensive thinking while developing many correct methods of waging revolution and war, methods consistent with our country's specific circumstances.

Always retaining the initiative on the battlefield and in all situations during a war is also a unique aspect of modern Vietnamese military art.

4. Developing and Applying Highly Efficient Methods of Fighting.

On the battlefield, each side has its own methods of fighting, methods designed to wipe out the opposition and win victory. The actual results achieved can only be high when optimum methods of fighting are successfully employed. The subjective dynamism of man is the most decisive factor in the development and application of highly efficient methods of fighting.

Here, modern Vietnamese military art is set apart by the fact that we have been able to develop and apply highly efficient methods of fighting even though our forces and equipment have been inferior to those of the enemy.

In the wars against France and the United States, we studied and established optimum methods of fighting that made full use of our strengths and compensated for our weaknesses while limiting the strengths and taking full advantage of the weaknesses of the enemy. Both the professional and well-trained French expeditionary army and the U.S. aggressor army, which was armed "to the teeth" with modern equipment, found it difficult to deal with the methods of fighting of the revolutionary armed forces of Vietnam. Even during the initial periods of those wars, our strategic methods of fighting proved to be superior to those of the enemy. They were very well suited to the objective situation and developed in a very logical manner. As seen in the 1953-1954 winter-spring strategic offensive and the general offensive and uprising in the spring of 1975, our strategic methods of fighting became even more efficient toward the end of those wars.

In the field of combat, our methods of fighting employed diverse tactics unique to Vietnam, tactics that struck tremendous fear in the French and American aggressor armies. Not only did our special operations troops possess uniquely Vietnamese methods of fighting that the enemy had no way to defend against, but the services and branches of our main force troops, our local troops, our guerrilla militia and self-defense forces and the various strata

of the people also employed many good methods of fighting when in combat with the enemy.

On the campaign level, we employed many very effective methods of fighting, as seen in the offensive campaign along the Sino-Viet border in 1950, the offensive campaign in the Northwest in 1952, the Dien Bien Phu strategic offensive campaign in 1954, the Ap Bac and Binh Gia campaigns, the offensive campaigns and uprisings in 1968, the Route 9-southern Laos counter-offensive campaign and the Tri Thien offensive campaign in 1972, the Central Highlands offensive campaign in 1975, the Hue-Da Nang offensive campaign in 1975 and the Ho Chi Minh strategic offensive campaign in 1975.

Mention must also be made of the methods of fighting employed by us on the strategic, campaign and tactical levels in the people's war against the air and naval war of destruction waged by the United States against North Vietnam. Our young air defense force and air force employed methods of fighting that brought them victory over the U.S. Air Force. It was the superiority of our methods of fighting that brought us victory over the ultra-modern weapons of the United States.

During the past 40 years of fighting and victory, modern Vietnamese military art has produced and successfully applied highly efficient methods of fighting, methods that have insured victory in our revolutionary wars.

5. Bringing About Development by Leaps and Bounds in the Course of the Armed Struggle and Stimulating the Favorable Development of the War

Military art must bring about leaps forward in the development of the armed struggle and stimulate the favorable development of the war. In particular, at important times in a war, it must bring about leaps forward of a decisive significance on the battlefield. How skilled the forces participating in fighting are in the art of guiding the conduct of the war and in military art has a direct impact upon the course and development of the war for both sides.

In the course of waging our revolutionary wars, we achieved leaps forward in the development of the armed struggle that changed the situation on the battlefield and caused the war to develop in a manner favorable to us.

In the resistance against France, leaps forward in the development of fighting on the battlefield in Vietnam occurred many times. In 1947, we brought about the first leap forward when we defeated the autumn-winter strategic offensive of the French expeditionary army, thereby defeating France's "fait accompli" strategy. In 1950, with the offensive campaign along the Sino-Viet border, through which we seized the strategic and campaign initiative on the Bac Bo battlefield, the main battlefield in Indochina, we brought about the second leap forward. In 1952, with the victory of the offensive campaign in the Northwest, we liberated a large area and took another leap forward on the battlefield. In 1953 and 1954, at the critical point in the final stage of the war and through the winter-spring strategic offensive and the Dien Bien Phu strategic campaign, we brought about the decisive leap forward on the battlefield and victoriously concluded our war of resistance against France.

In the resistance against the United States, every time we defeated a war strategy of the United States, we achieved success in bringing about a leap forward in the armed struggle on the battlefield (1959-1960, 1964-1965, 1968, 1971, 1972 and 1975).

Also at the critical point in the war (1975), the extraordinary efforts made by our armed forces and people in both the North and the South in the general offensive and uprisings in the spring of 1975 brought about the most decisive leap forward. With that leap, modern Vietnamese military art reached a pinnacle of resourcefulness and skill.

In the several decades of continuous armed struggle, modern Vietnamese military art waged a victorious test of strength against the modern military arts of French colonialism and U.S. imperialism.

In the present stage of the revolution, we must fight the wide-ranging war of sabotage being waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists and be ready to deal with whatever schemes or actions they might have or take to unleash a war of aggression. In the face of this situation, modern Vietnamese military art must be enhanced and developed with a view toward fully meeting the requirements involved in successfully building socialism and firmly defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland.

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BLACK PAGES IN THE HISTORY OF U.S. MILITARY ART

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 12, Dec 84 pp 51-53

[Article by Nhuan Vu]

[Text] For the first time in the history of the United States, the U.S. Army was defeated on the battlefield in a war. The defeat of the United States in Vietnam was, above everything else, a military defeat, a defeat for U.S. military might, for U.S. military art.

When talking about U.S. military art, we are talking about the battlefield application of the nine fundamental principles of warfare recorded in the U.S. Army's Official Combat Orders, principles which govern everything from strategy to the U.S. commands and staffs on the various echelons. These nine fundamental principles of warfare are: correctly defining objectives; taking the offensive; concentrating forces at decisive places and times; economizing on forces through rational and proper force deployment and utilization; achieving rapid force mobility; establishing a unified command on the battlefield and within each battlefield zone; taking measures to insure safety and secrecy; achieving surprise; and, lastly, insuring simplicity of plans and command decisions in order not to cause complications or difficulties and avoid the possibility of orders being misunderstood or not clearly understood by the echelons that execute them. As part of the Official Combat Orders of the U.S. Army, these principles also constitute the main standards by which the proficiency in military art of the command and staff officers on the various echelons of the entire U.S. Army are measured through the actual challenges faced on the battlefield. According to U.S. military circles, defeat or victory in a battle as well as the entire war depend upon whether the fundamental principles of warfare described above are applied incorrectly or correctly, poorly or well.

When they embarked on their military adventure in Vietnam, the authorities at the White House and Pentagon maintained that the U.S. expeditionary army was fully capable of implementing the basic principles of warfare, the backbone of U.S. military art. On the one hand, all U.S. battlefield commanders, such as General Westmoreland and General Abrahms, were viewed as being the best generals in the U.S. Army and the West and the other command and staff officers of the U.S. expeditionary army had received systematic training at the officers schools and military academies of the United States. True, the

moral of the U.S. soldier was "lower than grass" but this was compensated for by the "formidable might" of U.S. firepower on the battlefield. On the other hand, with the economic might and especially the industrial might of the United States, Washington ruling circles maintained that the United States was fully capable of supplying the U.S. Army with the means and materiel needed to effectively apply on the battlefield those principles that had been established as orders.

However, the realities of the war in Vietnam showed: "Those principles (of warfare) reflect an impermanence of value when we recognize that all nine of these principles were obeyed (by the U.S. Army) in World War II but not one was fully observed (by the U.S. Army) in the war in Vietnam. In Vietnam, it (the U.S. Army) failed to establish clear objectives and was indecisive when it came to taking the offensive; its combat and support plans were marked by confusion and disorder; it failed to achieve the unified command because appropriate consideration had to be given to the political situation of South Vietnam; its rear service manpower and support were decentralized; its tactics were cumbersome and slow; and it frequently lost the element of surprise because secrecy could not be maintained."(1)

The development of the fighting on the battlefield in Vietnam from mid-1965 to January, 1973, from the ground in South Vietnam to the skies over North Vietnam, proved that those who wanted to take the offensive were continuously kept on the defensive everywhere; that those who wanted to achieve surprise were taken by surprise; that those who had at their disposal all the mobility they could ever need were pinned down; that those who had large forces and many weapons at their disposal were forced to decentralize their forces and spread them thinly; that those who had ultra-modern electronic reconnaissance equipment at their disposal frequently had their own secrets divulged... They were the U.S. aggressor expeditionary army. Embarking on a war is easy, but withdrawing from a war is difficult. Therefore, the objective of the U.S. Army, the first of its nine fundamental principles of warfare, which was initially established as completely wiping out the revolutionary forces and permanently occupying South Vietnam, changed over time and ultimately became "the safe withdrawal of the U.S. expeditionary army from South Vietnam." U.S. military art in the war of aggression of the United States in Vietnam led the U.S. expeditionary army to the conclusion that "of our 36 different options, withdrawing back to the United States is the best."

In summary, throughout the course of the war, although they were fully qualified from the standpoint of devising strategy and commanding combat operations and had in their possession all the means needed to implement the fundamental principles that had been established, U.S. officers, from the commander-in-chief to the officers on the unit command echelons, were unable to fight in the way that had been taught through lessons prepared and put together on the basis of U.S. military art. Generally speaking, they were unable to fight in a way that utilized the strengths of the U.S. Army. Moreover, they were being manipulated by certain invisible forces to base their methods of fighting on the methods of fighting of the opposition, that is, were being made to fight in a way dictated to them by the opposition. These invisible forces were the direction given to the war by the opposition, the opposition's strategy and tactics, Vietnamese military art and the

cleverness and bravery of the armed forces and people of Vietnam. As a result, the U.S. expeditionary army found itself in a strategically defensive position as soon as it recklessly launched the war of aggression against Vietnam. When they began pouring into South Vietnam in mid-1965, they found themselves enveloped by the battlefield deployment of the people's war that the armed forces and people of the South had ready and waiting for them. When, with self-assurance and arrogance, they implemented the "search and destroy" strategy, the revolutionary armed forces of South Vietnam in actuality led them down a strategic tunnel from which there was no escape, drew them into a strategy that led to a "dead end" everywhere they went.

During a "special lecture" presented at the puppet national defense academy on 30 December 1971 on the implementation of the nine fundamental principles of warfare of the U.S. Army on the battlefield in Vietnam, Australian Chief Warrant Officer F. P. Sarong lamented: "The Vietnam war has brought about a totally new situation, not only from the standpoint of tactics, organization and politics, but even from the standpoint of the ability to use strength. The United States is strong but has been unable to find ways to use this strength effectively... We--the United States and its allies--have been placed in a position in which we cannot, in terms of forces, cope with the development and escalation of the war by the opposition."

Therein lay the crux of the entire issue. One of the key elements of military art is the art of employing the two factors of "position" and "forces" on the battlefield. On the Vietnam battlefield, the military power of the United States was greatly reduced by being in a defensive posture while the military power of the armed forces and people of Vietnam was multiplied many times by our taking and maintaining the initiative. This was the result of the victory of Vietnamese military art over the military art of the U.S. imperialists. Within the battlefield deployment of the people's war, the armed forces and people of Vietnam mobilized the combined strength of Vietnam, which consisted of every strength of our country plus the support and assistance of the revolutionary and progressive forces of the world, the pillar of which was the Soviet Union, thereby enabling us to defeat the military might of the United States on the battlefield. This was the most decisive of the factors that pushed the U.S. imperialists into the position of the vanquished in the war of aggression that they waged in Vietnam.

In the arduous, decisive and long test of strength with the U.S. imperialists, the armed forces and people of Vietnam, under the skilled and clear-sighted guidance of the war and strategy by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, headed by General Secretary Le Duan, wrote the most glorious pages in the 2,000 year history of Vietnamese military art. From the standpoint of the enemy, pages filled with tragedy and edged in black appeared for the first time in the 200 year history of U.S. military art.

FOOTNOTES

1. See: "Re-examining the Principles of Warfare," JOURNAL OF U.S. MILITARY AFFAIRS, No 12-1972.

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EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON BUILDING THE DISTRICT AND STRENGTHENING THE DISTRICT
LEVEL: THE DISTRICT LEVEL BATTLEFIELD DEPLOYMENT

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 12, Dec 84 pp 54-58

[Article Hoang San, secretary of the Trang Dinh District Party Committee]

[Text] Building the district and strengthening the district level at a place that must directly deal with the schemes and acts of sabotage of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, who are acting in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists and the other reactionary powers, are a very detailed and vital job of strategic significance. Beginning in 1978, Trang Dinh District in Lang Son Province became the site of a pilot project in the building of the district. However, due to the war of aggression unleashed by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in February, 1979 against the northern border provinces of our country, the building of the district in Trang Dinh came to a stop and was reversed somewhat, as a result of which differing opinions arose. Some persons maintained that building material and technical bases for this border district was no different than throwing money into the river, into the sea. What, they maintained, was the sense of building something only to have it destroyed by invading Chinese troops(!?). Some sectors wavered and did not want to make investments in capital construction for our district. Meanwhile, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists continued to mass troops along the border and carry out their wide-ranging war of sabotage.

In the face of this situation and under the light of the resolution of the 5th Party Congress and the resolutions and directives of our Party Central Committee, our district party committee reaffirmed that the only way to win victory over the enemy, firmly defend the border of the fatherland and stabilize and improve the living conditions of the people is to firmly stand our ground, develop production, strengthen the national defense system and build a district level battlefield deployment that is solid in every respect.

On the basis of that determination, our district has solidified its organization, intensified its education of the people, removed bottlenecks and accelerated production while building the border defense line and has begun to record encouraging results. The results that have been achieved in the recent past as well as the direction in which the development of our district is headed in the years ahead, both of which are presented below, reflect an

entire process of groping for answers while working, gaining experience and making improvements.

Trang Dinh is a border district that measures 1,012 square kilometers and has a population of 48,000, which consists of six ethnic groups: the Tay, Nung, ethnic Vietnamese, Yao, Mong and Hoa. Our district has four villages that share a total of 52 kilometers of border with China: Quoc Khanh, Doi Can, Tan Minh and Dao Vien. Our district is one of the main targets of enemy sabotage. They have been constantly employing psychological warfare and spy warfare and dispatching intelligence agents and commandoes to infiltrate our country in order to establish contacts and threaten and control the population. They frequently send forces into the district to ambush, harass, kidnap or murder cadres and soldiers of ours. They have attacked checkpoints and observation towers and encroached upon and occupied land of the district. They have used reconnaissance aircraft and all types of artillery and mortars in savage attacks on our villages and on economic, political, military and cultural targets. Their objectives are to divide the minorities from one another, divide our army and people, make it impossible for our people to engage in production with peace of mind and reduce our vigilance and will to fight so that they can easily encroach upon and occupy our territory.

Consequently, we realize that the building of the district must be very closely tied to building and defending the fatherland, both in the immediate future as well as over the long-range. The district's master plan must meet the requirements of developing production and stabilizing and improving the living conditions of the people while supporting the present combat task well and any future combat tasks should a large-scale war break out. On the basis of the agro-forestry-industrial economic structure that has been and is being built and on the basis of the situation, characteristics and strengths of a mountain border district, we have divided the district into four economic zones, which correspond to the four interconnected combat clusters and into three lines (the frontline, the rear line and the rear area).

--Economic Zone 1 consists of Dai Dong, Hung Son, De Tham, Chi Lang, That Khe and Bac Ai 1 Villages.

It is in this zone that the intensive cultivation of rice and subsidiary food crops are practiced. Within this zone, there are 750 hectares under the cultivation of spring rice, 650 hectares of which are high yield rice, with yields of 8-9 tons per hectare per year being sought. Other crops are also raised there, such as soybeans (140 hectares), winter tobacco on two rice crop fields (200 hectares), fruit crops (230 hectares), forests for timber and raw materials for paper production (2,000 hectares), trees for firewood (1,500 hectares), anise (1,400 hectares) and Tung trees (2,000 hectares). In addition, hog production, duck raising, the keeping of bees for honey, pisciculture and so forth are being developed. Concentrated within this zone are the enterprises that process forestry products, wood, sugarcane, and fruit, paper mills and so forth. Within this zone, we will establish enterprises and cooperatives producing building materials in order to annually provide ourselves with 6 million bricks, 300,000 tiles and 800 tons of lime.

--Economic Zone 2 consists of Tri Phuong, Quoc Khanh and Doi Can Villages.

This is a zone that has the potentials for the intensive cultivation of grain and annual industrial crops. In addition to 150 hectares of established farmland, this zone can also raise 260 hectares of spring rice, 753 hectares of 10th month rice, 240 hectares of soybeans, 250 hectares of tobacco, 50 hectares of sugarcane, 110 hectares of fruit trees, 1,000 hectares of T'ung trees, 300 hectares of citronella, 100 hectares of cinnamon and 400 hectares of timber bearing trees. One very important task in this zone is to protect and plant forests along the border and headwater forests in order to provide camouflage, retain water and combat soil erosion. This zone has the conditions needed to develop livestock production and can raise 2,450 buffalo and head of cattle and 4,500 hogs. In addition, bees and fish can be raised in this zone.

As regards industry, this zone is mainly involved in developing the production of building materials, producing 300 tons of lime and 1 million bricks annually.

--Economic Zone 3 consists of Tan Minh, Dao Vien, Trung Thanh, Quoc Viet, Hung Viet and Khang Chien Villages.

In an effort to resolve the grain problem locally and build a 3 to 4 month grain reserve, this zone has attached importance to stepping up the clearing of land and increasing the amount of area under cultivation in order to put 200 hectares under the cultivation of annual crops. There are 50 hectares of sugarcane and fruit crops, such as plums, apricots and pineapples. The other economic targets of this zone are: raising 6,190 buffalo and head of cattle for products and goods and 4,000 meat hogs; keeping 1,000 beehives and developing the zone into the district's beekeeping center; planting and restoring 590 hectares of forests, 3,900 hectares of anise, T'ung trees, citronella and cinnamon for oil and 1,700 hectares of timber bearing trees; harvesting vau and nua bamboo for use in capital construction and to supply raw materials to paper mills; developing small industry and the handicraft trades, such as building material production, the weaving of wooden furniture, carpentry, blacksmith forges, masonry and so forth.

--Economic Zone 4 consists of Kim Dong, Chi Minh, Tan Tien, Doan Ket, Tan Yen, Cao Minh, Khanh Long, Vinh Tien and Bac Ai II Villages.

This zone has many hills and mountains and a small amount of widely scattered cropland. The people there are nomadic and subsist mainly through slash and burn cultivation. Where water is available, we will raise two rice crops and one subsidiary food crop or industrial crop per year on the cropland of this zone. During the winter-spring season, we will mainly raise spring rice, corn, tobacco and soybeans. We will carry out the settlement of nomads, plant industrial crops and forests and protect the forests in the highland villages. Some 11,100 hectares of oil-bearing plants, including 300 hectares of cinnamon, 100 hectares of anise, 5,000 hectares of T'ung trees and 3,000 hectares of citronella, will be planted. Some 1,200 hectares of rosewood, and "mo" trees will be planted. A tea growing area will be established in the villages of Vinh Tien and Cao Minh. We will restore the raising of Agaricus

rhinocerotis, Auricularia polytricha and other forestry products. This zone has the potential for raising and supplying draft power and beef from buffalo and cattle, specifically, 5,600 buffalo, 400 head of cattle and 1,000 beehives for honey. We will replace and upgrade the sow herd in order to develop a herd of high yield meat hogs. In terms of industry, the conditions exist within this zone for developing small-scale hydroelectric power projects to serve the population centers and processing enterprises and for accelerating the development of such small industry and handicraft trades as brick and tile production, furniture weaving, carpentry, masonry, the processing of agricultural products and so forth.

Corresponding to Economic Zones 1, 2, 3 and 4 are interconnected combat clusters 2, 1, 3 and 4. Each combat cluster has an integrated military command tasked with developing combat plans, deploying and moving forces from one place to another, commanding combat operations and coordinating with main force troops, with the other combat clusters in combat when fighting breaks out. Each combat cluster establishes its specific task on the basis of its terrain, location and circumstances and the activities of the enemy. For example, the enemy routinely sends intelligence agents and commandoes into combat cluster 1 which consists of the villages along the border, to harass, direct sniper fire against, kidnap and entice our cadres, soldiers and people, consequently, the task of this combat cluster is to seal off the border and prevent the enemy from encroaching upon and occupying land within the district, from penetrating our territory while combating every act of harassment by the enemy. Production forces there must also be deployed in sections and groups to prevent kidnappings and murders by the enemy, to prevent enemy attempts to entice and buy the allegiance of persons, to prevent the enemy from dividing us internally. At strategically importance places, forces have been deployed to conduct patrols, stand guard and set up ambushes.

Although the task of each combat cluster differs, they all must maintain political security and social order and safety, clean up their area of operation, combat all sabotage by the enemy, protect production, promptly win victory over the enemy and firmly defend the fatherland's border.

The economic zone and the combat cluster must form a single entity and have an impact upon each other. Only by building and developing the economy is it possible to create local sources of grain, food products, goods, raw materials and building materials and insure a solid and strong national defense system. Conversely, only by building solid and strong interconnected combat clusters can we develop the strength needed to defeat each scheme and act of sabotage of the enemy, protect production and everyday life and defend the border.

The division of the district into three lines, the frontline, the rear line and the rear area, also fully reflects the spirit of standing our ground to produce, fight and defend the border. The frontline consists of the villages along the border, the rear line of the adjacent villages and the rear area of the villages deep within the district. The frontline must constantly deal with each act of sabotage and harassment of the enemy, consequently, the arrangement of the population, material-technical bases and warehouses as well as the deployment of forces there must be efficient and afford easy mobility in order to go into combat against the enemy as soon as fighting breaks out

and guarantee the safety of both people and property. Although the rear line and the rear area are far from the enemy and more secure, the enemy still has many ways of committing sabotage against these villages and can even land troops in these, attack them from the air or with large artillery or send in intelligence agents and commandoes to conduct acts of harassment. Therefore, every line must be vigilant, must adopt plans and develop the forces needed to win victory over the enemy in every situation.

In order for the economic zones, combat clusters and lines to complete their tasks well, each village must be strong and solid in every respect. Therefore, we have established the standards of a strong and solid village as:

--Having a strong and solid village party organization;

--Having a stable, pure government and mass organizations;

--Building defenses and adopting production and combat plans that insure victory in every situation;

--Maintaining political security and social order and safety and strengthening the confidence of the masses in the party;

--Building cooperatives that are strong and solid, developing their production and supporting the material and cultural lives of the people while properly completing and implementing each program and policy of the party and state.

Intensifying the building of material-technical bases supporting production, everyday life and combat not only increases the strength of the district, but also serves to encourage the people to stay where they are. In the years ahead, we will make every effort to build roads, post-telecommunications facilities, hydroelectric power plants, water conservancy projects, machine centers, stations and farms, warehouses, public health, cultural and educational facilities, stores, markets, etc. Even within a number of border villages, such as Quoc Khanh, we will build such projects as cultural centers, museums, tradition halls, etc. Each such project must fully reflect the spirit of closely coordinating the economy, culture and national defense system and must yield the highest possible returns in both peace time and time of war.

One very important battle line, a battle line of decisive significance, that we have been and are building is the battle line that lies in the hearts of the people. On the basis of strengthening the socialist production relations, we have constantly attached importance to and done a good job of conducting propaganda and educational work, purifying the district, mobilizing the masses, raising their awareness, deepening their love of socialism, sharpening their vigilance and maintaining our readiness to fight and defend the fatherland's border. Only by building a solid battle line within the hearts of the people can we achieve the strength needed to firmly defend the district's more than 50 kilometers of border, all along which the enemy is spying on us and intensifying their wide-ranging sabotage day and night. In the recent past, as a result of building a good battle line within the hearts of the people, we have killed or captured six enemy intelligence agents,

apprehended 38 persons who intended to cross the border into China, broken up a reactionary political organization, uncovered four cases of conspiracy with China and prevented psychological warfare goods from making their way into the country's interior.

During the past several years, as a result of the initial steps taken to implement the planning and plans described above, production in Trang Dinh has steadily developed, the standard of living of the people has become increasingly stable, the border has been firmly defended and political security and social order and safety have been maintained. As our difficulties have mounted, socialist production relations, the unity among the minorities and the unity between the armed forces and the people have been strengthened. To date, more than 93 percent of farm families have joined production cooperatives. Toward the border, the percentage of families that has joined cooperatives is even higher, as high as 100 percent at some places.

From early April to early May, 1984, in the space of 40 days and nights, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists fired tens of thousands of artillery shells and mortar rounds of all types into our district. An especially serious incident occurred on 6 April 1984 when the enemy sent a number of infantry battalions to occupy Hills 636 and 820 in Quoc Khanh Village. However, the soldiers of H. Unit of the 37th Group, together with the armed forces and militia of Quoc Khanh, Doi Can, Tri Phuong and other villages, fought bravely, killed many enemy and pushed them from those hills, thereby immediately thwarting their plan of encroachment and occupation. During those days of bitter fighting, our district firmly maintained its battlefield deployment. The people of the ethnic minorities remained calm and coordinated with troops in fighting the enemy. Once the enemy had been driven off, every aspect of life returned to normal.

During the past 5 years, our piece of the border has been firmly defended. Although fighting has occurred, production has been maintained. Our 5th month-spring rice crop was a rather good crop this year, with an average yield of nearly 30 quintals per hectare being recorded on a district-wide basis. Some villages, such as Dai Dong and De Tham, averaged 35 quintals per hectare. The villages along the border, such as Quoc Khanh and Doi Can, still managed to put all of their rice fields under cultivation and recorded rather high yields. Although we still face many difficulties, our district continues to implement each program and policy of the party well, continues to complete, and in some areas, exceed the norms assigned under the state plan.

Although the course that lies ahead of our district still involves many difficulties and hardships, is a complex and demanding course which will sometimes require that we pay for the progress we make with our flesh and blood, we are determined, under the wise leadership of the Party Central Committee and the Lang Son Provincial Party Committee, with the encouragement,

inspiration and positive support of all sectors, all levels and the compatriots of our entire country and by upholding our tradition as a strong and solid district party organization, to fulfill our noble, sacred task of successfully building and firmly defending a border district of the beloved fatherland.

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CSO: 4210/5

YEN MINH WORKS TO DEVELOP ITSELF INTO A DISTRICT THAT FIGHTS AND PRODUCES WELL

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 12, Dec 84 pp 58-63

[Article by Nguyen Dinh Mien, secretary of the Yen Minh District Party Committee]

[Text] Yen Minh, a highland, northern border district of Ha Tuyen Province that shares a 25 kilometer border with China, measures 800 square kilometers and has a population of 40,000, which consists of 15 fraternal ethnic minorities living amongst one another: the Mong, Tay, Nung, Yao, Giay, etc. The largest minority, the Mong, accounts for 41 percent of the population, the smallest minority, the Pu Peo, accounts for 0.05 percent. The minorities have displayed a high spirit of unity and closeness in fighting to defend the border of the fatherland, stepping up production, moving forward through self-sufficiency to resolve the grain problem and making improvements in the other areas. The February 1984 resolution of our district party committee once again defined the specifics involved in the building of the district: "Raising our vigilance, maintaining combat readiness, performing good security work, effectively dealing with and defeating each scheme and act of wide-ranging sabotage of the enemy, insuring that our armed forces and people remain in the areas along the border to fight and produce and moving forward through self-sufficiency to develop the labor, arable land and potentials of the district as highly as possible." In the recent past, under the leadership and guidance of the Yen Minh District Party Committee and People's Committee, the minorities of the district have made numerous efforts to carry out the two strategic tasks and have gradually been developing Yen Minh into a district that fights and produces well.

I. Insuring that We Fight Well by Closely Tying Combat Operations to the Maintenance of Security

The Chinese expansionists and hegemonists have long been conducting many acts of provocation and encroachment in the border areas of our district. In late March, 1984, they reinforced all of their forces and means of war massed along the border. They opened roads, dug trenches and built fortifications and battle positions. They began to regularly shell important targets of ours along the border and send intelligence agents into our district to gather information and assess our forces. In particular, on every day in April, 1984, they fired at our district with many types of heavy weapons, such as 122

and 152 millimeter artillery, H12 rockets, 120 millimeter mortars, etc. They directed heavy fire against bases day and night. In the space of only 5 days, from 2 to 6 April, they fired 3,716 artillery rounds of all types onto a piece of ground on Bac Mountain measuring less than 2,500 square meters. On the morning of 30 April, after firing 3,000 rounds to open the way, they employed numerous infantry divisions in attacks on our bases all along the border, causing much loss of life and property within the district. In an even more vile act, they planted mines in corn fields and paddy bins to kill innocent civilians.

These actions have once again confirmed that the vile intentions of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists are to intensify their war of sabotage, encroachment and occupation and slowly eat away at land of our fatherland. Clearly aware of these intentions, our party organization established the district's most important task as displaying a high spirit of vigilance, maintaining combat readiness and winning victory in combat in order to defend the border of the fatherland. Of central importance in the building of our district is the strengthening of our military and security agencies, the organizations of the party and government and the mass organizations, especially the need to strengthen the border villages in every respect, build determination to fight and win throughout the party and among all the people of the district, launch a local people's war, achieve a combined strength and uphold the tradition of unity among the minorities and between the armed forces and the people in order to win victory over each scheme and act of sabotage and aggression of the enemy.

In the recent past, although the enemy has employed a very large force of troops and strong firepower in heavy attacks along the entire border of our district, our armed forces and people have calmly but sternly retaliated, killing nearly 2,000 enemy troops and destroying many enemy means of war. The soldiers of the 3rd Battalion of the local forces, the armed forces and people of Phu Lung Village, Bach Dich Village and others are typical examples of a brave fighting spirit, of tenaciously standing one's ground and killing many enemy troops.

The events that have occurred in the recent past have been major challenges from the standpoint of the combat readiness of the ethnic minorities of Yen Minh since the enemy's war of aggression in February 1979.

Of utmost importance to our district party organization in developing the ability to fight well is the need to give the people a truly clear understanding of the enemy and raise their spirit of vigilance so that they maintain combat readiness and promptly shift every activity from a peace time to a war time footing when necessary.

The minorities living in the border areas have close family ties to the people living on the other side of the border. For example, as many as 90 percent of the persons living in Bach Dich Village are related to persons on the other side of the border. The Beijing reactionaries frequently use these family ties to deceive our compatriots and spread lies to defend their

criminal actions. Through what the enemy has actually done, through the contradiction between what they say and do and by appealing to the common sense of the ethnic minorities, we have exposed the enemy's lies.

Through such easily understood forms of propaganda and education, we have given the minorities of the district a clearer understanding of the enemy, heightened their spirit of patriotism, their sense of defending the fatherland and deepened their hatred of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, as a result of which they were prepared to retaliate and wipe them out when they recklessly violated the fatherland's border.

Due to making relatively good ideological and organizational preparations, the people of the various minorities were able to promptly shift each of their activities from a peace time to a war time footing. They contributed many mandays to building a solid border defense line so that military forces could stand their ground and wipe out the enemy. Large numbers of militia forces and the various strata of the people eagerly participated in combat and combat support, in the support of war time jobs. The ethnic minorities fulfilled their grain and food obligations. At many places, they were prepared to sell or give vegetables, firewood, grain and food to troops. In keeping with the district's policy, the minorities of the villages along the border and the villages in the rear actively participated in relocating population centers and reorganizing the forces on the various lines in order to be able to fight and produce well at the same time.

The distinguishing feature of Yen Minh District in combat was that it launched a local people's war, thereby achieving the combined strength of the compatriots of the ethnic minorities in order to win victory over the enemy. Although the enemy employed a large force supported by dense and strong artillery fire of all types in order to overwhelm us, the armed forces and people of many villages developed mobile and flexible methods of fighting that enabled them to stand their ground, attack and kill many enemy troops while protecting themselves. The armed forces in Bach Dich and Phu Lung Villages fought the enemy in very flexible and ingenious ways: they fought the enemy in and outside their belt, on either side of their line, fought the enemy under circumstances in which communications with the upper echelon had been lost, developed their battle positions in both breadth and depth, broke up the enemy formation and killed many enemy troops, thereby making it possible for our main force troops to wipe out the enemy. Local troops, border defense troops, militia and self-defense forces and even the people closely coordinated with one another and achieved a local combined strength through which victory was won over the enemy in many battles along the border.

The local people's war in our district is also reflected in the fact that the minorities of the district have supported combat and provided many effective forms of local rear service support. Villages in our district have built roads by mobilizing many different age groups to participate so that work could proceed night and day depending upon the circumstances of the families within the village. As a result, completion time was reduced. One road that was supposed to take 3 months to build was completed in only 20 days by this method. During the first 6 months of 1984, the people contributed several thousand pieces of timber to make tunnels, sheds and electricity poles and

transported thousands of tons of goods over a total distance of several tens of thousands of kilometers. The militia and self-defense forces excavated and spread tens of thousands of cubic meters of dirt and stone and built tens of thousands of fortifications.

As a result of launching the local guerrilla war, the unity among the ethnic minorities and the unity between the minorities and the armed forces are stronger. When the people's armed forces were fighting the enemy on the frontline at such places as Bac Mountain, Bach Dich Village and Phu Lung Village, the compatriots on the rear line resupplied them, evacuated the wounded and provided shelter and food for the persons evacuated from the front. The people of the minorities consider soldiers to be their own sons and stand ready to do anything necessary to help soldiers record a feat of arms. They have contributed tons of food to troops, thousands of pieces of timber to help troops build trenches and thousands of dong to buy gifts for troops. The agencies within the district, such as those in the post-telecommunications and public health sectors, the grain stores, commerce stores and so forth have also stood their ground, completed their tasks in an excellent fashion and actively assisted troops.

To fight well, it is very important that combat efforts be closely tied to maintaining security, purifying the area and protecting the organizations of the party, the government and mass organizations. This is also a matter to which our district party committee has attached very much importance. Because, Yen Minh was once part of Dong Van District, a stronghold of reactionaries of the Nationalist Party, and was not separated from that district until 1963. In 1959, China's special service fomented an uprising among local reactionaries in eight villages. Since the day that the Chinese reactionaries betrayed and committed aggression against our country, undesirable elements among the ethnic Chinese have been conspiring with veteran reactionaries in activities to undermine order and security within the district.

To support their actions against our border, the Beijing reactionaries have made extensive efforts to buy the allegiance of our people, divide the minorities and divide the armed forces and the people through psychological warfare in a vain attempt to weaken our forces. In the recent past, the enemy has sent many items, such as cloth, thermos bottles, batteries, farm implements and even leaflets, into our district by many different means in order to buy the allegiance of our compatriots. They have used undesirable elements to spread rumors among the minorities of the mountain villages to distort and attack the policies of our party. In times of fighting, they kidnap civilians and lure people back to their former villages to live under their "protection and assistance." They have used a number of weaknesses in the relations among the ethnic minorities and between the armed forces and the people to spread rumors about one minority or another in order to sow divisions among the ethnic minorities and undermine the unity between the army and people.

The Chinese reactionaries continue to routinely send commandoes and intelligence agents into our country to assess the situation and commit sabotage against our economic and military facilities while pursuing their

plan to establish a shadow government in the border villages to facilitate their acts of aggression.

To combat these schemes and acts of sabotage, we have taken many appropriate steps to give the ethnic minorities a clear understanding of the sinister intentions and despicable, cruel nature of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, told the minorities not to believe or listen to them, not to use their psy-war goods, etc. We have intensified the search for spies and the effort to root out and punish the nests of traitors working for the enemy. We have reorganized the revolutionary organizations on the basic level to insure the purity, strength and stability of our bases. We have rectified our shortcomings in economic management, prevented negative phenomena and generated an atmosphere of enthusiasm and confidence among the people. We have attached importance to stepping up the mass movement to maintain the security of the fatherland and build a steel border defense wall within the hearts of the people.

As a result, we have promptly detected suspicious phenomena and not one attempt to flee to the other side of the border occurred during the first 6 months of the year. The good maintenance of order and security has effectively supported our combat efforts.

II. Developing Production and Moving Forward Through Self-Sufficiency To Resolve the Grain Problems

Although our central, number one task is fighting to defend the fatherland, we cannot for one moment give light attention to developing production, supporting the daily needs of the people or providing local rear service support for combat operations. "Fighting so that we can protect production, producing so that we can fight well," this is our slogan.

In past years, our district did not produce sufficient food for itself and relied upon relief aid from the province and the central level each year. Since 1983, we have been self-sufficient in food and have contributed some grain and food products to the state. To resolve this problem, we decided that the first job that had to be done was to achieve self-sufficiency in grain. Within grain production, we have attached importance to developing the production of rice and corn. We do not have much land on which to raise rice and corn: 1,300 hectares of rice, mainly one-crop rice, with 250 hectares of two-crop rice, and 4,900 hectares of corn. Moreover, farmland is still being lost to erosion each year. In addition, we face other difficulties, such as dryness and drought during the summer and cold weather and frost during the winter. During some seasons, rice seedlings must be started over two or three times. As a result of the enemy's frequent shelling of the villages along the border, fields and terraces have been torn up, people and livestock have been killed and production is impossible at many places.

The measures of foremost importance in raising crop yields within our district are practicing intensive cultivation in a way that closely ties cropland to the forests; planting and protecting forests in order to retain farmland and provide irrigation water for fields; and prohibiting the destruction of forests in order to open new land to cultivation while focusing our efforts on



the construction of a number of water conservancy projects, on increasing the supply of fertilizer, selecting good crop varieties and improving depleted soil. In the border villages, our policy is to remain there and struggle with the enemy for each meter of ground in order to carry out production.

As a result of such efforts, despite encountering numerous difficulties in the form of enemy attacks and natural disasters, we have maintained the amount of area under cultivation. We even managed to increase the amount of area under cultivation during the first 6 months of 1984 compared to 1983: spring rice production increased by 5 percent and corn production by 7 percent. The yield of rice has been raised from 25 quintals per hectare per season to 32 quintals per hectare per season.

Besides grain crops, we have also given attention to developing the production of some industrial, food and pharmaceutical crops and increasing the size of livestock herds in order to improve the living conditions of the people. At present, our district has roughly 15,000 buffalo and head of cattle, 4,000 horses and more than 20,000 hogs.

In conjunction with the food problem, we have also concerned ourselves with resolving the clothing problem. The amount of cloth annually supplied to the district by the state does not meet the clothing needs of the minorities. Therefore, they raise cotton and ramie and weave their own cloth. In recent years, we have been encouraging the people to make full use of the land in forests and hills to raise more cotton and ramie for cloth production. Today, we are providing an average of 4 square meters of cloth per person per year on our own. This represents a major effort, an effort that reflects the spirit of self-reliance of the minorities within our district.

In addition, we have also given attention to implementing plans to develop the handicraft trades and local industry and promote public health, cultural and educational work with a view toward gradually building an agro-forestry-industrial structure, developing a diversified economy within our district, meeting the requirements of combat and production, serving the daily needs of the people and fulfilling obligations to the state.

The achievements described above are due to many reasons, the most important among which are:

1. We have always closely complied with the resolutions of the Central Committee and the province in leading the people in combat and production and have promptly adopted appropriate policies during each specific period of time. In the process of providing guidance, we have always respected the principle of collective leadership and personal responsibility and have insured the correct implementation of the policies and resolutions of the party while vigorously tapping the revolutionary creativity, flexibility and zeal of each basic unit, each cadre and party member.

2. We have learned how to employ the combined strength of all the people, how to develop the potentials of the ethnic minorities and have begun to build the battlefield deployment of the local people's war in order to defeat the acts

of sabotage, encroachment and occupation of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists.

3. We have upheld the tradition of close unity among the ethnic minorities and between the armed forces and the people and achieved the sharing of a common will by the armed forces and the people.

4. We have received the very close guidance and wholehearted assistance of the provincial party committee and people's committee, of the departments and sectors of the province and central level and the encouragement and support of the people of the entire country.

In the years ahead, in order to deal with the possibility of the situation becoming more difficult and complex, we will continue to educate the people of the ethnic minorities so that they have a clear understanding of and successfully carry out the two central tasks of fighting and producing. We will organize an effort to gain experience from our combat and production in the recent past. We will develop upon the victories that have been won and expand the forms of the local people's war in such places as Phu Lung and Bach Dich Villages. We will reorganize the combat and production villages to deal with the possibility of heavier enemy attacks, strengthen line 2 and repair trenches so that we can stand our ground well. We will adopt a passive defense plan, one which insures that production is carried out better. We will study and propose to the upper level amendments to a number of policies to bring them in line with the requirements of work in the highland areas and suggest that our district be provided with the assistance needed to promptly meet the requirements of combat and production in the years ahead.

7809

CSO: 4210/5

STUDIES: THE LAWS OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION--
PROTECTING THE GAINS OF SOCIALISM AGAINST SABOTAGE BY FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC
ENEMIES

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 12, Dec 84 pp 64-70

[Article by Quyet Tien]

[Text] This is a law that the communists and working people of every country following the path of socialism must fully understand and strictly implement.

In fact, Lenin once said: "A revolution is only of value when it learns how to defend itself." For the socialist revolution, this is even more necessary because the enemies of socialism never voluntarily withdraw from the arena of history without launching a counter-attack; to the contrary, they do everything in their power to oppose the proletariat and working people that won victory over them in a vain attempt to regain the "paradise" they lost.

Proletarian revolutionaries must remember the following words of Lenin: "The transition from capitalism to communism takes an entire historical epoch. Until this epoch is over, the exploiters inevitably cherish the hope of restoration, and this hope turns into attempts at restoration. After their first serious defeat, the overthrown exploiters--who had not expected their overthrow, never believed it possible, never conceded the thought of it--throw themselves with energy grown ten-fold, with furious passion and hatred grown a hundred-fold, into the battle for the recovery of the 'paradise,' of which they were deprived, on behalf of their families, who had been leading such a sweet and easy life and whom now the 'common herd' is condemning to ruin and destitution (or to 'common' labor...)." (1)

According to the views of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian revolutionaries must display high vigilance against class enemies, not only because of the greatly increased passion and energy with which they fight once they have been toppled by the revolution, not only because their hatred of the revolution has grown many fold, but also because the exploiters continue to enjoy significant, real advantages long after the start of the revolution: they still have money, large estates, contacts, organizational and management skills, a high level of education, close ties to highly skilled technical personnel (because they share their lifestyle and thinking, these persons are still bourgeois in nature), a very high level of experience in military art, etc. Especially

deserving of attention is the fact that they have strong and solid relations with the international capitalists; moreover, they have power in the strength of habits, in the strength of small-scale production, small-scale production that gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie every hour of every day in a spontaneous fashion and on a large scale.

Domestic enemies, according to Lenin, are of many different types. They are first and foremost the exploiters, that is, the bourgeoisie and landowners who were defeated but not completely eliminated. They are the whiteguard, that is, the counter-revolutionary armed forces of these exploiters. They are the spies and lackey saboteurs of the exploiting classes and their reactionary armed forces. They are the civil servants and public officials, persons who support the bourgeoisie because they think that to defend the old system is to defend the interests of society. They are the members of the reactionary political parties who are learning how to disguise themselves as persons "without a party." They are the thieves and hoodlums, the dregs that were completely crushed by the old society and cannot bring themselves to the level of the thinking of proletarian struggle, etc.

Chief among foreign enemies are, of course, the imperialists. However, since the days of Lenin, they have also included the capitalists, other counter-revolutionaries and former civil servants who could not adapt to the policy of the revolution and fled overseas. "They are there, they are still alive and awaiting an opportunity. Therefore, we must watch them closely, especially those that have not recovered from their wounds. Otherwise, they will become the direct lackeys of the capitalist world, will draw their pay from the budgets of the capitalists and operate in close coordination with them"(2)--such was Lenin's advise.

The objective of class enemies is always to destroy the revolutionary government, destroy the socialist fatherland of the working people. And, to achieve this despicable goal, they carry out acts of sabotage in each and every field of social life--economic, political, cultural and ideological--and even wage wars of aggression. Their tactics are clandestine and sophisticated at some times, open and brazen at others. Their methods of sabotage are diverse: organizing boycotts and strikes to undermine the measures taken by the government to carry out socialist reforms; destroying machinery and warehouses; sabotaging transportation, especially the transportation of food to the people when famine breaks out; setting up reactionary organizations to foment counter-revolutionary rebellions when the opportunity arises; engaging in espionage and conducting activities that have an impact upon the thinking of the masses in order to cause them to be dissatisfied with the soviet government; carrying out military intervention or aggression when the opportunity arises, etc. Deserving of attention, as Lenin said, is that they go into hiding, lie low, very often disguising themselves by a "soviet" "protective" coloring. Many of them infiltrate state-operated production units or state agencies where they work as soviet civil servants. They always watch every step of the soviet government, waiting for it to make a mistake or show weakness, in order to overthrow it.

What should the attitude of the revolution be toward all these domestic and foreign enemies?

Lenin maintained, as Marx and Engels explained, that a dictatorship must be established to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, to strike great fear in the hearts of reactionaries, to maintain the authority of the armed masses over the bourgeoisie and to enable the proletariat to suppress its enemies by armed force.

Lenin stressed that proletarian revolutionaries must suppress the resistance of the propertied classes by all of the very same measures that they used to suppress the proletariat because no other measures have yet been devised to achieve this end.

Lenin held that the response of revolutionaries to the schemes of sabotage of class enemies can only be severe, quick, immediate suppression based on the support of workers and peasants. And, to achieve this, it is necessary to solidify and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, especially the organs of suppression of this dictatorship, that is, the public security agencies and the revolutionary army; on the other hand, it is necessary to teach the spirit of revolutionary vigilance to the working people and encourage them to stand up to protect the gains of the revolution, protect the soviet government.

In 1919, in the midst of the bitter civil war, Lenin appealed to the people to guard against spies as follows: "all enlightened workers and peasants must stand up to protect the soviet government, must arise in struggle against spies and the traitorous whiteguard. Everyone must remain at his guard position and maintain constant, military style communications with the various party committee echelons, with the special committees (that is, the security agencies---QT) and with the most dependable and experienced of soviet cadres."(3)

Thus, relying upon the people, relying upon their spirit of vigilance, their sense of awareness and their forces to suppress the resistance by class enemies and safeguard the gains of the revolution, this is some of Lenin's most important thinking concerning this matter.

Together with this important thinking, Lenin attached very much importance to strengthening the security agencies, which he considered to be an effective weapon of the revolution in combating the schemes and acts of sabotage of the enemy. Lenin also placed particular emphasis upon the need to maintain revolutionary order, revolutionary discipline. He said: "The slightest lawlessness, the slightest infraction of soviet law and order is a loophole of which the foes of the working people take immediate advantage." He stressed that, in the struggle against class enemies, revolutionary discipline must be iron discipline.

Lenin also advanced a series of important views concerning a war by working people to defend the socialist fatherland and the building of the "Red Army" to oppose aggression by foreign enemies.

In contrast to the traitorous leaders of the 2nd International, that is, the chauvinist socialists who served the interests of the bourgeoisie of their countries in the name of "defending the fatherland," it was Lenin's policy

that the imperialist war be turned into a civil war in order to defend the legitimate interests of the working class and laboring people. However, once the laboring people had seized political power and had their own fatherland, it was Lenin's determined policy to defend the socialist fatherland against the acts of sabotage and aggression of the imperialists and their lackeys.

To defend the socialist fatherland, Lenin demanded that a serious attitude be brought to all discussions of national defense capabilities and that the country be made ready to fight. He said: "Increasing our preparedness to fight so that we can seriously wage war demands not enthusiasm, not appeals or fighting slogans, but disciplined, determined and tireless efforts over a long period of time and on a large scale. The country must be prepared in every way possible, militarily as well as politically, economically as well as culturally and ideologically, so that it can win victory over an aggressor, because, war is always a stern challenge to every social system.

To wage a victorious war, Lenin focused his attention on strengthening the leadership of the party, intensifying the political and ideological education of the people, building up the country's defenses, increasing the fighting strength of the armed forces, building and strengthening the rear area, putting the slogan "everything for the war" into effect, strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat, solidifying the alliance of workers and peasants, strengthening the apparatus of violent force, suppressing counter-revolutionaries, etc.

Lenin considered defending the fatherland to be the task of all the people and also to be a great international task because the victory of soviet Russia over the imperialist aggressors would make a worthy contribution to the cause of liberating the working class and laboring people of the entire world. In the fight against aggression, Lenin appealed to all soviets and revolutionary organizations to defend each position with their last drop of blood, to employ every resource and force of the country in the war to defend the fatherland, to make the entire country one revolutionary camp.

In strengthening the country's defenses and increasing the fighting strength of the armed forces, Lenin gave his full attention to building the worker-peasant Red Army, intensifying party work and political work within the Red Army and sending very many cadres and party members to serve in the army. At the same time, he attached importance to building and training reserve forces, to building and strengthening the rear area. He was very impressed by the innovations among workers in the rear area that led to higher productivity. He attached special importance to the mobilization of grain and transportation and, at the same time, took drastic and effective measures to resolve these problems.

In his military leadership, Lenin resolutely adhered to and successfully implemented the strategy he devised. He concentrated the Red Army on the main front to defend the fatherland; at the same time, he took many other measures to strengthen that front, such as mobilizing youths and sending them to the frontlines, stepping up the transportation and resupplying of grain,

ammunition and arms to the members of the trade union in areas near the front, having women take over the jobs of men, promoting a revolutionary style of work, intensifying propaganda and agitation among workers and peasants, etc.

In his analysis of the victories won in the war fought to defend the fatherland, Lenin cited many factors, such as the leadership provided by the party, the organizational role played by the soviet state, the invincible strength of the Red Army, a strength based on the awareness of political ideals, proficiency in the use of technical equipment and weapons, the support of all the people, the reinforcements from the rear area, the spirit of unselfish sacrifice on the part of workers and peasants, the international support of the working class and laboring people of other countries, etc. However, the basic causes of these victories were explained by Lenin as follows: "When we fully analyze the defeat of the most powerful countries in the world by a weak, crippled and backward country, we find that the basic causes underlying this historic achievement were centralism, discipline and an unprecedented spirit of sacrifice..."(5) Of course, we all know that centralism and discipline, even the spirit of sacrifice of the people, could not be separated from the leadership, organizational and educational role of the party and working class as the factors, as Lenin said, that "united millions and millions of laborers in Russia as well as the entire world," thereby building an extremely large strength with which to win victory over the enemy aggressors.

The revolutionary realities of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries offer eloquent proof of the correctness of the above mentioned arguments of Lenin on protecting the gains of the revolution, defending the socialist fatherland and combating the sabotage of foreign and domestic enemies. These realities also prove just how correct Engels was in his following comment concerning the Paris Commune: to win victory, the party must use the weapons it has to strike fear into the hearts of reactionaries in order to maintain its rule. Would the Paris Commune have lasted for more than 1 day if it did not rely upon the armed masses to oppose the bourgeoisie? To the contrary, can we fault it for making too little use of this authority?

As the first socialist state in the world, soviet Russia (which subsequently became the Soviet Union) had to deal with extremely intense sabotage and aggression by domestic and foreign enemies. The sabotage by domestic counter-revolutionaries, which was covert at some times and overt at others but unprecedented in scope, evolved into an very bitter civil war. Fourteen imperialist, capitalist countries waged a war of aggression in a vain attempt to strangle the soviet government in its infancy. All of these factors combined to pose a very large threat to the gains of the October Revolution. However, under the direct leadership of Lenin and the Russian Bolshevik Party, the working class and laboring people of Russia, displaying a high spirit of vigilance and a boundless spirit of sacrifice, together with the invincible Red Army and their security forces and backed by effective international support, fought with great bravery against every class enemy and ultimately defeated them, thereby defending their fatherland and soviet government. Several decades later, the Soviet Union fought the great war of national defense against Hitler's fascists. The outcome of that war we know: the people and army of the Soviet Union completely annihilated the German

aggressors, firmly defended their fatherland and made a decisive contribution to saving mankind from fascism.

All of the other socialist countries have had to wage difficult struggles against the schemes and acts of sabotage of class enemies, the salient examples of which were the counter-revolutionary incidents in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Poland in the early 1980's. These incidents clearly prove that many years after the socialist revolution, the former capitalists, the former landowners, the former high-ranking civil servants, military personnel and police personnel and the other representatives of the apparatus of suppression of the former bourgeois state continue to nurture the hope of regaining power with the assistance of international imperialism. Of course, their forces pose no serious threat to the socialist system. Ordinarily, they do not dare engage in overt activities. However, when a country that faces objective difficulties commits very many shortcomings and mistakes and the imperialists on the outside take advantage of this situation to provoke domestic reactionaries into creating the semblances of a crisis and turning these semblances into profound political and social crises, it is then that the gains of the revolution can be truly threatened. Therefore, revolutionaries must always keep a vigilant eye on their enemies and constantly concern themselves with correcting their shortcomings so that their enemies cannot use them to oppose and undermine the revolution.

The realities of our country's revolution have also proven that protecting the gains of the revolution and combating sabotage by foreign and domestic enemies are a law of the socialist revolution and socialist construction. The furious opposition by domestic reactionaries supported by international reactionaries during the first year following the 1945 August Revolution, the war of aggression waged by the French colonialists, the war of aggression waged by the U.S. imperialists, the war of aggression waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists (1979), the activities of domestic reactionaries during those wars of aggression and, finally, the wide-ranging war of sabotage being waged against our country today by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists are stark reminders of the need for us to always keep a vigilant eye on class enemies and perform well every job involved in protecting ourselves against the enemy and preparing to fully protect the gains of socialism in every situation.

At present, as observed by the 5th Party Congress, "our country is in a situation in which it is at peace but must contend with a wide-ranging war of sabotage being waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists; at the same time, we must be ready to deal with the possibility of a large-scale war of aggression unleashed by the enemy."

In his speech at the 6th Plenum of the 5th Party Central Committee, Le Duan, general secretary of the Party Central Committee said: "Maintaining the defense and security of the country are the law of revolutionary struggle in the present world situation."(6)

Therefore, along with building socialism, which is our foremost task today, our people must perform the strategic task of maintaining combat readiness and firmly defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland very well.

Our people are determined to build a comprehensive and modern national defense system supported by all the people, build powerful people's armed forces, build people's public security forces that are pure, solid and strong in every respect.

Under the close leadership of the party and with the strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat state, our people are determined to display a high spirit of revolutionary vigilance, increase the country's overall strength and, along with their army and security forces, stand ready to thwart each scheme and act of sabotage and aggression by domestic and foreign enemies.

In this way, we show the importance we attach to effectively applying one of the important laws of the socialist revolution: protecting the gains of socialism and combating sabotage by foreign and domestic enemies.

FOOTNOTES

1. V.I. Lenin: "Selected Works," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1959, Book II, Part II, p 51.
2. Ibid., p 477.
3. V.I. Lenin: "Collected Works," Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, Volume 38, pp 480-481.
4. V.I. Lenin: "On Defending the Socialist Fatherland," Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1965, p 26.
5. V.I. Lenin: "On the Red Army," Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1964, p 97.
6. Le Duan: "Nam vung quy luat doi moi quan ly kinh te," [Fully Understanding the Laws that Govern the Improvement of Economic Management], TAP CHI CONG SAN, No 9-1984, p 33.

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