


266036

JPRS 81454

5 August 1982



USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 5, May 1982

19980902 134

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

8
104
A06

JPRS 81454

5 August 1982

USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 5, May 1982

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

5 August 1982

USSR REPORT
USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No. 5, May 1982

Translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

CONTENTS

Contents of May Issue.....	1
Strike Movement Shows Class Tensions Growing (S. A. Yershov).....	3
Soviet-American Relations: Ideological Aspects (A. Yu. Mel'vil').....	16
Economic Theories of the Republican Administration (V. M. Shamberg).....	29
Washington's Stakes in the Persian Gulf Zone (Ognyan Avramov).....	41
Soviet Military, Diplomatic Response to U.S. Aggressiveness (R. G. Bogdanov).....	52
Washington's Anti-Polish Hysteria and Western Europe (Yu. P. Davydov).....	57
Reagan Administration Policy on Science and Technology (Yu. A. Yemshanov and S. K. Oznobishchev).....	63
Book Reviews	
U.S. Style of Diplomacy, by V. P. Abarenkov.....	69
American Bourgeois Mentality, by V. I. Borisyuk.....	70
Think Tanks vs. Militarism (N. A. Dolgoplova).....	72
U.S. Shows of Strength as a Political Instrument (V. V. Potashov, S. Ye. Puzanov, N. N. Sokov and K. E. Sorokin).....	80
Discussion of U.S. Military Strategic Aims.....	88

PUBLICATION DATA

English title	:USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY No 5, May 1982
Russian title	:SShA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA
Author (s)	:
Editor (s)	:N. D. Turkatenko
Publishing House	:Izdatel'stvo Nauka
Place of Publication	:Moscow
Date of Publication	: May 1982
Signed to press	: 12 April 1982
Copies	: 33,640
COPYRIGHT	: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika ideologiya", 1982

CONTENTS OF 'USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY,' No 5, 1982

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 12 Apr 82) pp 1-2

[Articles not published by JPRS are indicated with an asterisk (*)]

[Text] Contents

"The Working Class Struggle"--S. A. Yershov.....	3
"Soviet-American Relations: Ideological Aspects"--A. Yu. Mel'vil'.....	15
"Economic Theories of Republican Administration"--V. M. Shamberg.....	27
"Washington's Stakes in the Persian Gulf Zone"--Ognyan Avramov.....	39
Issue of the Day	
"The Key Issue Is the Prevention of Nuclear War"--R. G. Bogdanov.....	49
Commentaries and Reports	
"Washington's Anti-Polish Hysteria and Western Europe"--Yu. P. Davydov.....	53
"Reagan Administration Policy on Science and Technology"--Yu. A. Yemshanov and S. K. Oznobishchev.....	58
Economic Surveys	
*"Venture Capital in Research and Development"--A. N. Tkachenko.....	64
Translations and Digests	
*"Why Survive? Being Old in America"--Robert N. Butler.....	71
Science and Technology	
*"Microprocessor Industry"--Yu. D. Shcherbina and Yu. A. Savinov.....	76
Agriculture	
*"Sunflower Production"--L. V. Ospinnikova.....	86

Book Reviews

New Books Reviewed by Ye. P. Ionova*, A. V. Kortunov*, T. V. Kuznetsova*,
S. N. Kuznetsov*, V. P. Abarenkov and V. I. Borisjuk..... 94

Background Material

"Think Tanks vs. Militarism"--N. A. Dolgopolova..... 106

"U.S. Shows of Strength as a Political Instrument"--V. V. Potashov,
S. Ye. Puzanov, N. N. Sokov and K. E. Sorokin..... 115

In the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies

"The Shaping of the Reagan Administration's Military-Political Strategy"..... 119

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982

8588

CSO: 1803/12

STRIKE MOVEMENT SHOWS CLASS TENSION GROWING

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 12 Apr 82) pp 3-14

[Article by S. A. Yershov: "The Working Class Struggle"]

[Text] It has been 96 years since the American working class organized a huge nationwide strike, on 1 May 1886, to demand an 8-hour working day. In honor of the heroic fighters, many of whom were killed by police bullets, the First Congress of the Second International decided in 1889 to hold international workers' demonstrations each year and chose the first of May as the day to demonstrate the solidarity of proletarians in all countries, to organize, in F. Engels' words, a review of the fighting power of laborers, marching in a single army under a single banner.

The American laborers will celebrate this May day under difficult conditions. The U.S. economy is experiencing another recession, the rate of inflation is high and the army of unemployed will soon number 10 million, according to official statistics, for the first time in the postwar period. As a result of the new President's ineffective policy of "revitalization," the Republican Administration's mounting offensive against social security and the present colossal military expenditures, the standard of living of the broad popular masses is falling.

Monopolistic capital thought it could reduce the intensity of class struggle, curb and disorient the labor movement and weaken working class ties with other social strata. The realities of class conflict, however, combined with the intensified polarization of sociopolitical forces and the growing desire of workers for unity and solidarity indicate that the present relationship between labor and capital is quite different.

The Growth of the Strike Movement

The strike movement is still an important sphere of class struggle by laborers defending their economic interests and democratic rights. It is therefore not surprising that bourgeois science and propaganda have never stopped trying to belittle the importance of strikes in every way possible and undermine the faith of the working class in the possibility of gaining the satisfaction of demands through open confrontation with employers.

It is quite indicative that whenever the American economy has to make a "sharp turn" and there is intense social friction in the United States, studies are published, by authors who pretend to be objective, to prove the "gradual extinction of the strike movement." One book which caused quite a sensation in the West two decades ago was "Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict," by A. Ross and P. Hartman, who predicted an unavoidable and dramatic decline in the American strike movement within the near future. Even bourgeois scholars had to admit the utter falsity of these predictions. C. Tilly, for example, has noted that "the gradual disappearance of strikes from the developed industrial society never did take place although it was anticipated by many Western theorists."² Now the work by Ross and Hartman is commonly cited as a classic example of the attempt to portray wishes as facts.

Nevertheless, authors are still returning to this topic today. Last year, for example, FORTUNE magazine, the organ of the U.S. business community, published an article entitled "The Decline of the Strike Movement."³ Its author, G. Meyer, cited official statistics to back up his claim that the number of class conflicts in the United States has constantly decreased in recent years, that the "exhaustion of the labor movement" is becoming apparent and that there is less "public support for strikers." He also reported, with apparent satisfaction, that the working class has had to deal with an increasingly aggressive opponent. "The administration," Meyer wrote, "is now taking a more resolute stand with regard to the unions. It has concluded that strikes can be stifled, that this costs less than the damages inflicted by strikers and, finally, that strike breaking (if it is legal and nonviolent) is not necessarily a dirty business."

One of Meyer's arguments is the reduced number of large strikes (with more than 10,000 participants). Meyer sees this as evidence of some kind of "historical change in the development of the American labor movement." This change, in his words, "benefits management because it reduces the danger of strikes," which have supposedly become "a less effective means of exerting pressure on employers."

There is absolutely no basis for these conclusions. Of course, the development of the class struggle in any capitalist country has been uneven for a number of reasons. The number of large strikes in the United States has dropped in some years, due, in particular, to the number of collective contracts renegotiated during these periods in the leading branches of the economy. In the last 30 years, however, there has been a tendency toward a higher number of massive class conflicts between labor and capital in the nation (Table 1).

Table 1

Dynamics of Largest Strike

<u>Indicators</u>	<u>1950's</u>	<u>Years</u>	
		<u>1960's</u>	<u>1970's</u>
Average annual number of strikes	21	20	22
Average annual number of participants, thousands	789	600	941

Calculated according to: "Analysis of Work Stoppages, 1977," U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, 1977, p 7; FORTUNE, 2 November 1981, p 56.

The process of strike augmentation was given new momentum at the beginning of the 1980's and took the form of sectorial demonstrations (by miners, metal workers and automobile workers)--a remarkable development in the American strike movement. Broad-scale demonstrations of social dissatisfaction have considerable political repercussions, even if they are brief, and have forced the dominant class to make concessions in many cases.

When we examine the development of the American strike movement for the purpose of determining its inherent characteristics over the long range, we can see a "historic change," but it is the absolute opposite of the one pointed out by the author of the FORTUNE article. After declining slightly in the 1960's, all of the indicators of the state of the strike movement in the United States rose in the past decade to far above the levels of the 1950's (Table 2).

Table 2

Average Annual Indicators of Strike Dynamics by Decades

<u>Indicators</u>	<u>1950's</u>	<u>Years</u>	
		<u>1960's</u>	<u>1970's</u>
Number of strikes	4,248	4,104	5,253
Number of strikers, thousands	2,198	1,809	2,288
Number of strike man-hours, millions	34.2	18.3	39.4

Calculated according to: "Handbook of Basic Economic Statistics," March 1981, p 68.

"Considering the declining strength of the labor movement," Meyer writes, "many companies now respond to the announcement of strikes much more harshly than in the past."⁴ The author notes that employers are taking a more rigid stand but he does not mention the increased determination of labor to wage a persistent struggle for the satisfaction of its just demands. This is clearly attested to by such indicators as the length of strikes and the number of strike days per striker; these reflect a perceptible tendency to rise (Table 3).

Table 3

Dynamics of Indicators of Strike Intensity

<u>Indicators</u>	<u>Average Annual Data by Decades</u>		
	<u>1950's</u>	<u>1960's</u>	<u>1970's</u>
Length of one strike, days	19.0	23.2	27.7
Number of strike man-hours per striker	15.7	15.0	17.4

Calculated according to: "Handbook of Basic Economic Statistics," March 1981, p 68.

The effectiveness of strikes is so self-evident that even Meyer cannot ignore it. "Enterprise administrators," he writes, "always regard strikes with a mixture of fear and anxiety. Fear because even the threat of a strike could force them to make concessions that could ultimately undermine the competitive potential of products. Anxiety because strikes often presuppose a move by workers from simple work stoppages to the kind of fierce struggle that poisons labor relations for many years."

Pointing out the self-evident fact that "the cost of strikes to the workers themselves is rising," Meyer nevertheless falsely concludes that "the balance of power between labor and management is shifting in the latter's favor." This conclusion ignores the workers' search for new tactical means of pressuring employers. At times of acute economic problems, when each demonstration, even if its demands are purely economic, threatens all participants with layoffs and interminable unemployment, the unions are more likely to use new forms and methods of struggle, as well as ways of expressing protest that are not connected with the risk of joblessness or sizable financial losses. Certain methods of "defining class relations" are being widely used in the United States: the picketing of enterprises and boycotts of company products, sometimes on the international scale. One vivid example was the strong international support the American labor movement received during its many years of struggle against the country's second largest fabric monopoly, J. P. Stevens, which had put maximum opposition to the formation of labor organizations at its enterprises in a number of southern states. A campaign has now been launched in the United States for a boycott of many of the household chemicals produced by the well-known Procter and Gamble monopoly. Even the reformist leadership of the AFL-CIO has had to support this struggle.⁵

The effectiveness of the American laborers' class struggle in general and their strikes in particular depends largely on the labor unions, the more powerful working class organizations. The unions are trying to compensate for member recruitment difficulties by uniting their efforts through the formation of coalitions to fight for specific demands or to force specific companies to renegotiate contracts with a view to union recommendations. Demonstrations by a united front of 26 labor unions, representing workers in the copper industry, led to a victory for workers who went on strike for 5 months (July-November 1980) for higher wages. The tendency toward coordinated action by labor unions in various branches on a long-term basis and with regard to a broad spectrum of issues is becoming more pronounced in the nation.

One important development in the strike movement has been the increasing activity of rank-and-file union members, who frequently and openly take action to oppose the leadership's attempts at class cooperation. The initiatives put forth by American labor unions to promote a search for solutions to crisis situations in a number of branches were largely due to the intensification of member activity. Steelworkers, for example, want the government to be more involved in the technical modernization of their industry, and automobile workers have proposed government control of corporations receiving federal financial assistance. Although measures of this kind have not always been fully in the interest of labor, as the history of class struggle proves, even their partial implementation will restrict the freedom of big capital to some degree.

Expansion of the Social Base of Class Confrontation

The social structure of today's American society is undergoing considerable changes under the influence of the technological revolution. One of these is the progressive growth of the army of hired labor, which now constitutes an absolute majority--around 9 percent--of the economically active population. The process of class polarization has not only broadened the base of the social pyramid as a result of proletarianization, but has also minimized its peak, reflecting the continuous monopolistic concentration of production and capital and its results--concentration of colossal economic power and political authority in the hands of a small and constantly contracting group of "final decisionmakers."

An important social result of the development of productive forces is the convergence of the status of much of the intelligentsia with that of most of the working class, particularly the strata that are involved directly in the production process. The interests of today's engineering and technical personnel and their increasing determination to defend their position actively constitute a sufficiently solid foundation for a strong and longstanding alliance of all categories of hired labor.

All of this also applies to civil servants. Employment in this sector is rising quickly. Between 1970 and 1980 the number of civil servants rose from 12.5 million to 16.2 million, or by 29.6 percent (this indicator was 27.8 percent for the economy as a whole and only 4.6 percent for the processing industry). In 1980 civil servants represented 17.9 percent of the total labor force (workers in the processing industry represented 22.4 percent).⁶

Recent events have once again refuted the old myth about the social neutrality of American civil servants. This category of labor occupies a unique position in the sociopolitical hierarchy of the American society: Most civil servants are exploited by the capitalist class as a whole, but many protect the interests of the latter. Until the 1960's there were legal, administrative and judicial restrictions forbidding civil servants to join unions, negotiate collective contracts and go on strike. The later establishment of a collective labor relations system in the public sector was supposed to aid in the adaptation of personnel management methods to the changing social situation, establish control over the new unions in this sector and inhibit the development of strike activity by civil servants.

The desire of civil servants for organization is growing. In 1979, 4.9 million full-time state and local government employees, or around 50 percent of the total, were members of unions.⁷ Between 1969 and 1979 alone, the number of civil servants belonging to AFL-CIO unions rose from 1.3 million to 2.3 million.⁸ Between 1970 and 1980 there were 3,158 strikes by civil servants, with 1,655,000 workers taking part in these strikes and the number of strike days exceeding 13.5 million.⁹ It is indicative that more and more civil servants who do not belong to unions are becoming involved in the strike movement. In 1980 civil servants in the six states with the lowest levels of public employee organization were responsible for 75 percent of all the work days lost during strikes in the public sector.¹⁰

More and more new segments of American society are therefore becoming involved in the struggle against state-monopoly capital's attack on the economic and democratic achievements of the laboring public. This indicates that the burden of capitalist exploitation and economic upheaval is now being shouldered not only by the working class, but also by all other categories of laborers and intermediate strata. The influx of new energy into the general current of social protest is broadening the scales and heightening the intensity of class battles and is widening the boundaries of confrontations between labor and capital.

The expanding social composition of strikers is an interesting feature in the development of the American strike movement. This tendency is reflected not only in the more active involvement of engineering and technical personnel, civil servants and other categories of hired labor in the class conflicts of industrial workers, but also in the growing number of their own strikes.

The American working class itself is growing in size and developing new qualities. Today its ranks include, in addition to persons engaged primarily in physical labor, or "blue-collar workers," many workers engaged in mental labor, or "white-collar workers," who account for a higher percentage of the membership of this class with each new stage of the technological revolution.

Of course, this does not in any way detract from the role of the working class nucleus as the leading, mobilizing force of the entire anti-monopoly movement but, rather, strengthens it. Reality itself has assigned the working class the double task of coordinating all forms of expression of social dissatisfaction and, after giving them a more purposeful nature, launching a consistent struggle for urgently needed reforms within the framework of a general confrontation with the entire system of state-monopoly authority. This means that the working class must find the best way of coordinating its own current objectives and long-range goals with the interests of other laboring strata that have not yet acquired precise ideological outlines. The dimensions of the general democratic movement, which are larger than those of the workers movement, represent a sizable reserve for more energetic antimonopoly action by the working class.

People in the American labor movement are becoming increasingly aware that the present administration's measures to revitalize private business initiative, which have been given the name "Reaganomics," are actually only a new class weapon held by state-monopoly capital and aimed at most of the laboring public. In essence, "Reaganomics" should ultimately intensify the exploitation of the working class.

The attack launched by ruling circles on the position of the laboring masses has strengthened their willingness to retaliate. The growing radicalization of mass attitudes was reflected in the declaration of a nationwide Solidarity Day on 19 September last year. This was an unprecedented U.S. proletarian action, both in terms of its scale and in terms of the social composition of its participants. It was an example of the strong unity of the American working class.

In addition, 19 September 1981 became the day marking a kind of watershed, separating the waiting period, during which the working class observed and interpreted ongoing events, from a new stage marked by the gradual mobilization of strength for the repulsion of the grand bourgeoisie.

It would be no exaggeration to say that most of the American labor movement began to actively oppose the administration's undemocratic policy in the past months of 1982. This change in working class tactics was not unexpected. At the end of last year, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT was already noting: "The unions are taking off their gloves for a fight with Reagan."¹¹ Even Chairman L. Kirkland of the AFL-CIO is now referring to the day of this year's congressional election as a new Solidarity Day.

Anti-Reagan feelings have become particularly strong in ethnic minority groups. Organizations of senior citizens, women, young people, farmers, intellectuals and professionals are becoming more active. Small businessmen, including building contractors, who have been pushed into a corner by the price escalation practices of monopolies and the astronomic interest rates of banks, are also uniting against "Reaganomics." Even the mayors of some cities and the governors of some states have rebelled against the administration's favorite offspring, the so-called new federalism. They have warned of the impending catastrophe connected with the cancellation of federal aid and are protesting the "Reaganization" of states and cities. Mayor Koch of New York, who voiced his support for Reagan numerous times in the past, now describes his policy as "a shame and a fraud."

New currents have also taken shape in some liberal bourgeois groups seeking a compromise between "Reaganomics" and the dismissed Keynesian theories. These strivings are supported by a large segment of the younger generation inclined toward coalition activity. The term "new progressive" has been used by some American authors of scientific and sociopolitical publications to define these attitudes. Reagan's beloved saying that "a rising wave raises all boats" is taking on a completely different sociopolitical meaning.

New Conditions of Class Struggle

The Reagan Administration's economic policy, the most important element of which is the sharp reduction of federal allocations for social needs, is helping to establish the necessary conditions for a broader frontal attack by monopolistic capital on the financial gains and democratic rights of the laboring public. This offensive has been launched in all areas of class confrontation--in the economic, political and ideological spheres.

The loss of many American corporations' earlier leading position in the international competitive struggle is being used as one of the excuses for this attack of unparalleled intensity and severity on the position of the working class. Most labor contract negotiations are now dominated by the idea that production costs, especially wages, must be lowered to the Japanese level. "If we do not cut our expenditures on wages, we will have to close down more plants and lay off more workers,"¹² General Motors Chairman R. Smith threatened the unions.

Anti-union hysteria has been simultaneously stirred up in the nation, accompanied by attempts to undermine the unions. This is being done, in particular, by distributing contracts to companies whose workers are nonunionized. Several monopolies have tried to force unions to extend the length of collective contracts to 5 years so as to reduce the threat of the strikes that generally accompany the

renegotiation process. There is also a tendency toward the decentralization of wage negotiations, modeled on systems adapted in some Western European countries where unions and employer associations determine maximum wage increases. This gives the administrators of some companies the right to lower them if they can plead economic difficulties. The American variety of this system essentially ties union demands to company revenues.

The unions have recently encountered fierce opposition from the monopolies to their membership drive. The weekly wages of union members are higher than those of people who do not belong to unions--ranging from 30 to 58 percent depending on the branch of industry, the professional category and the worker's race, gender and age. On the whole, however, if the social fringe benefits and other provisions of collective contracts are considered, organized workers earn approximately 40 percent more than people who do not belong to unions.¹³ This is the main reason for employers' attempts to prevent the unionization of their enterprises.

The system of privileges awarded for seniority is being nullified. In particular, this is being done by hiring workers for a part-time week or firing them before they have worked long enough to be eligible for any kind of supplementary wages. The budget of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration has been minimized, and this has already increased the number of industrial accidents.

As the crowning touch, the administration is doing everything within its power to encourage antilabor legislative measures and statements by officials. The situation has gone so far that a bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate at the end of last year which will make participation in a picket line a crime punishable by a fine of 250,000 dollars and a 20-year prison sentence.¹⁴

All of this has been accompanied by a mass campaign at American enterprises to perfect existing methods of exploitation and institute new ones on the pretext of "enhancing the quality of the work environment." The Japanese experience in the formation of "quality clubs" is being employed. The workers who belong to these clubs are rewarded for efficiency-related suggestions. An association of these "quality clubs" has even been established in the United States. According to its data, the number of these clubs rose from 150 to 1,000 in 1981 alone. Around 2,500 workers have joined 284 "quality clubs" at enterprises of Tetronichs, Inc., a radioelectronic company (Beaverton, Oregon). Honeywell, Inc. increased the number of these "clubs" from 40 in 1979 to 300 in 1981 and called this tendency its "philosophy of labor relations."¹⁵

Another method used to perfect the system for the exploitation of the working class consists in the formation of "semiautonomous brigades," modeled on those in Swedish industry, to perform labor operations with minimum supervision by the heads of production divisions. In the capitalist enterprise, the ultimate purpose of this method is the more severe exploitation of workers by heightening the intensity of their labor. In addition to this, "special control groups" are being formed at enterprises, made up of representatives of labor unions and the enterprise administration, for the joint elaboration of measures to heighten labor productivity.

Monopolistic capital is seeking new ways of controlling what bourgeois scholars have termed the "human side of the production enterprise," mainly for the purpose of heightening each worker's "sense of individual social confidence." A theory centering around the idea of achieving total administration and union agreement on company affairs, which was tested at plants of the Westinghouse Electric monopoly, is becoming quite popular in industry.

The various programs to "enhance the quality of working life" in the United States already encompass around one-fourth of all hired workers.¹⁶

The class purpose of these innovations is obvious: Most of the burden of economic disorder is to be transferred to the shoulders of members of the working class by convincing them of their direct involvement in the monopolistic competition on the international level. "Foreigners are eating our lunch," said D. White, vice president of the American Center for the Quality of Work, "and we can only correct this situation by making fundamental changes in the structure of relations between labor and management."¹⁷

Data cited in FORTUNE magazine clearly indicate how the American laboring public will be affected by these "changes in the structure of relations." "The average annual sales volume per worker at enterprises of the 500 largest U.S. companies," the magazine noted, "rose from 17,400 dollars in 1953 to 103,700 in 1980. Even if allowances are made for inflation, this indicator has more than doubled."¹⁸ In 1980 these same monopolies earned a total of 225 billion dollars in profits (after taxes), or 14,000 dollars for each of the 16.2 million workers at their enterprises, which is far in excess of the wages of each worker.¹⁹

It is quite indicative that even some of the leading bourgeois publications have expressed grave doubts about the longevity, not to mention the stability, of the "cooperation" between labor unions and company administrations. "On the enterprise level," writes, for example, BUSINESS WEEK, "the unions are participating more in various committees and other joint bodies for the improvement of product quality and the augmentation of labor productivity. It is still too early to judge whether this tendency is developing or subsiding. There is the possibility, however, that the normalization of the economic situation in the country will give the unions new and stronger incentives to fight back during contract negotiations. The unions are afraid, and with good reason, that management's attempts to involve them in its affairs will turn them into junior partners in a victory and senior partners in a defeat."²⁰

The sectorial crisis that has stricken a number of large subdivisions of the American economy, especially the automotive industry, metallurgy, ship building and some others, have forced the large unions operating in these branches to refrain from massive strikes. In an attempt to separate various segments of the working class and drive a wedge between the unions that call strikes and the laborers in branches depending on the continuous operation of other industries, the monopolies are trying to influence public opinion with the aid of the mass media at their disposal; they are spreading rumors about the inevitability of a chain reaction of layoffs in the event of large strikes and about the threat they allegedly pose to national security.

Consulting firms, specializing in giving advice to companies about ways of avoiding labor conflicts and fighting against the strike movement, have sprung up in the United States. One large firm of this kind is John Sheridan Associates (Des Plaines, Illinois). Sheridan, the head of the firm, says: "About 30 years ago, company administrators were petrified at the thought of a possible strike. Now they regard strikes as part of their business. We help them prepare for disturbances."²¹

When social conflicts reach their highest pitch, the monopolistic bourgeoisie resorts, either directly or with the aid of the government that protects its interests, to the use of overtly violent and repressive actions against the labor and democratic movements.

The Republican Administration viewed the crushing defeat of the air traffic controllers' union in the summer and fall of 1981 as a stern warning to other labor organizations, especially the unions of civil servants, including, above all, the postal workers' union with its 500,000 members and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees with more than 300,000 members. Even the NEW YORK TIMES had to admit that the majority of American citizens were "disturbed by the President's harsh treatment" of public employees.²²

The anti-people, anti-worker offensive launched by monopolistic capital in a conspiracy with the Reagan Administration has forced the American labor movement to modify its tactics. The class struggle is now taking place in an atmosphere of fierce battles in defense of the achievements of past years.

The round of contract renegotiations scheduled for this year will be the largest in the last 35 years in terms of the number of agreements subject to renewal. They cover more than 4.5 million workers and employees in many sectors of the American economy--the petroleum refining, rubber, electrical engineering, clothing, food and machine building industries, civil engineering, airlines, government institutions and public transport enterprises.

The high rate of unemployment will naturally give management greater advantages in the collective bargaining process. Furthermore, the sharp exacerbation of employment problems in the United States due to the deterioration of the general conditions of reproduction and the stronger competition of Japanese and Western European monopolies, has become one of the main reasons for the emphasis on job guarantees in the demands of the working class. Wage increases, which have been one of the traditional motives of strikes, have temporarily been assigned a position of secondary importance. Whereas the unions once tried to improve the standard of living of the laboring public by demanding the growth of wages at a rate exceeding the rate of inflation, in 1982, even in branches that have not been seized by a critical production decline, they will try to at least maintain the present correlation between the wages of workers and employees and the prices of the main consumer goods; more moderate demands have also been made. "The high rate of unemployment," U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT noted with unconcealed pleasure, "has put the unions on the defensive. Their basic premise is this: Save our jobs, we are willing to make sacrifices."²³

Some unions, however, have not reduced the intensity of their demands for wage increases even under the present difficult conditions. They include the large union of workers in the petroleum refining, chemical and nuclear branches of industry, which launched a stubborn struggle at the beginning of the year for a 27-percent increase in wages for the 2 years the renegotiated contract will be in force.²⁴ The union of workers in the rubber industry is insisting on a significant increase in the retirement pensions of former employees.²⁵

The unions are now encountering as many difficulties in the struggle to solve employment problems as in the fight for higher wages. The natural course of capitalist development compels the U.S. monopolies, which have entered a new stage of fierce competition on the international scale, to resort to mass layoffs. "For the sake of economy, machines must replace as much live labor as possible,"²⁶ remarked one American magazine, explaining the reasons for the new steps to robotize production processes and automate control.

Employment has also been hit hard by Reagan's plans to continue escalating the arms race. According to the Labor Research Association, a progressive American organization, the "defense" appropriations of 146 billion dollars in 1980 created 5,058,000 jobs. If the same amount had been spent in civilian branches, there would be 7,069,000 new jobs, or 2,010,000 more.²⁷ Between 1976 and 1980 the number of persons working directly in U.S. military production rose from 1,076,000 to 1,379,000, or only by 303,000.²⁸ During these years the Pentagon budget increased by 63.5 billion dollars. This means that there was one new job for each 210,000 dollars in military expenditures. In the civilian branches of the U.S. processing industry, however, product sales of 90,000 dollars resulted in the creation of a job in 1980.²⁹ In light of these facts, Ronald Reagan's remark at a meeting of the carpenters' and joiners' union--"The key to all of our problems is jobs and more jobs!"³⁰--sounds like a joke on labor.

Recent events have objectively led the American laboring public to the realization that struggle against individual companies cannot provide any radical solution to employment problems. A decision made, under pressure from the working class, by the administrators of one monopoly, even a large one, not to curtail production at one enterprise cannot, as experience has shown, serve as reliable protection against the rising rate of unemployment throughout the nation. The realization of this fact was one of the main reasons for the proposal of emergency measures in the area of economic development, a proposal adopted at the AFL-CIO congress at the end of 1981 and addressed to President Reagan. It points out the need to organize broad-scale public works, government financing for low- and middle-income housing and the extension of the term of compensation for the chronically unemployed.³¹

Reality itself, therefore, is urging labor organizations to launch a broad class confrontation on a higher, national level, where their chief opponent is the bourgeois government. The growing dissatisfaction of the broad masses with the policy of the dominant class as a whole is important proof of the stronger anti-capitalist nature of the social protests of the American working class.

Several important conclusions can be drawn from the events of recent months on the front of social confrontation in the United States. Firstly, in spite of the much more complex economic situation, the working class has continued to intensify its

struggle against monopolistic capital. Secondly, the direct connection between the economic and political demands of the laboring public is becoming increasingly apparent, and their content is more clearly directed against the monopolies. Thirdly, American capitalism's political system and ideological machinery have revealed an obvious inability to suppress the growth of the mass class struggle, in which more and more broad laboring masses are becoming involved, or to dislodge it from its offensive position.

FOOTNOTES

1. A. Ross and P. Hartman, "Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict," New York. 1960.
2. C. Tilly, "From Mobilization to Revolution," Michigan University Press, 1978, p 162.
3. FORTUNE, 2 November 1981, pp 66-70.
4. Ibid.
5. STEELABOR, December 1981, p 4.
6. Calculated according to: EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, October 1981, p 67.
7. "Labor-Management Relations in State and Local Government: 1979," Washington, 1980, p 7.
8. AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST, July 1981, p 9.
9. Calculated according to: "Analysis of Work Stoppages, 1977," 1979, p 74.
10. ECONOMIC NOTES, June 1981, p 5.
11. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 30 November 1981, p 86.
12. Ibid., 28 December 1981-4 January 1982, p 90.
13. "Earnings and Other Characteristics of Organized Workers. May 1977," Washington, 1979, p 11.
14. UNION NEWS, December 1981, p 4.
15. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 30 November 1981, p 54.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p 55.
18. FORTUNE, 5 May 1981, p 141.

19. Ibid.
 20. BUSINESS WEEK, 21 December 1981, p 47.
 21. FORTUNE, 2 November 1981, p 68.
 22. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 30 August 1981, p 2.
 23. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 28 December 1981-4 January 1982, p 89.
 24. DAILY WORLD, 9 January 1982.
 25. BUSINESS WEEK, 21 December 1981, p 51.
 26. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 30 November 1981, p 55.
 27. ECONOMIC NOTES, January-February 1981, p 7.
 28. BUSINESS CONDITIONS DIGEST, 9 December 1980, p 5.
 29. ECONOMIC NOTES, January-February 1981, p 7.
 30. LABOR, 23 September 1981, p 2.
 31. STEELABOR, December 1981, p 5.
- COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982

8588
CSO: 1803/12

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 12 Apr 82) pp 15-26

[Article by A. Yu. Mel'vil'; continuation of discussion of ideological factor in American approach to policy of detente and Soviet-American relations*]

[Text] "Within the historical context, one might say that we have divined the source of the greatest threat to international peace today, and it is the Marxist-Leninist movement,"¹ U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig said in an interview. Neither he nor other members of the present American Administration have been the slightest bit embarrassed by the obvious contradictions in their views and official statements. For example, on the one hand, public announcements are made about the "decline" of socialism and Marxist ideology but, on the other, the Americans are still being intimidated with the "communist menace" that is supposedly hanging over the "free world."

The present American leadership and the theorists of the rightwing conservative groups backing it up have suggested that the reasons for international friction can be found primarily in the profound ideological differences between the USSR and United States. They have singled out the ideological aspect as the central one in Soviet-American relations.

"By portraying the Soviet Union as a competing superpower, with which we can conclude lasting peace agreements, instead of portraying it as communist state, hostile to us by its very nature and attempting to spread its authority and its political standards to more and more parts of the world, the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations divested the Soviet-American conflict of its moral and ideological dimension, for the sake of which the government is justified in demanding sacrifices, and the people are willing to make them,"² N. Podhoretz, one of the leading ideologists of American neoconservatism, declared. When rightwing conservative ideologists demand these sacrifices from the average American and seek support for the colossal burden of excessive military spending at a time of cuts in social programs, they frankly say that the object of the "containment" policy they invented should be not merely the Soviet Union, but communism as such, so that the West can oppose the mounting "communist danger."

* See Yu. A. Zamoshkin, "Ideology in the United States: For and Against Detente," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 4, 1982.

In today's Washington, ideological differences are described as something just short of the main factor inhibiting the development of Soviet-American relations. This approach to the relations between the two countries is being employed today by rightwing conservative groups in the United States to justify the plans to undermine detente and escalate the arms race. Furthermore, in addition to over-emphasizing ideological differences, the opponents of detente would like to subject all of the experience in the development of Soviet-American relations during the past decade to revision. In fact, they are openly criticizing the fundamental principles of the only possible form of Soviet-American relations in the nuclear age, as set forth in the document "The Fundamentals of Interrelations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America." This document says that differences in ideology and social systems are not an obstacle to the development of normal bilateral relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, nonintervention in internal affairs and mutual benefit.

Therefore, there is a clearly defined line in the strategy of American rightwing conservatives, representing an attempt to explain the present deterioration of Soviet-U.S. relations as a result of fundamental ideological disagreements and to use these disagreements for the further escalation of tension. What role does ideology actually play in Soviet-American relations, and how is it assessed by American authors?

Ideology and Foreign Policy

There is no question that events and processes in the sphere of ideology are acquiring increasing significance among the factors determining the nature and state of Soviet-American relations. There are several reasons for ideology's increasing effect on international relations in general.

Above all, the role of ideology has become more important as a result of the general rise in the significance of the factor of ideological theory in world politics. Ideological considerations are closely interwoven with specific political motives and introduce a definite ideological content into foreign policy, including moral judgments of the goals of a particular foreign policy line and the means of their attainment. In this sense, foreign policy concepts (including the concepts held by American strategists with regard to the development of relations with the USSR) have purely political and ideological undertones.

Ideological systems furnish the ideals of foreign policy and lie at the basis of foreign policy decisions. Under present conditions, now that the empirical method of forceful "trial and error" in the sphere of international relations can have catastrophic results of global dimensions, the role of theories, including the ideological factor, and the systems of ideological motives, ideals and standards lying at the basis of foreign policy activity and guiding it, is becoming particularly important. These motives, ideals and standards are formed and converted into political practices during the course of an uninterrupted ideological struggle.

Along with this, the role of the ideological factor in the international arena has been augmented by the importance that is attached today to the effective ideological propaganda substantiation of a particular foreign policy line. Now

that international relations are approaching actual relations between nations, with millions and millions of people participating directly in these relations, questions connected with the ideological influencing of human thinking and the regulation and purposeful redirection of the heightened political activity of the masses, which has also been manifested in the sphere of international relations, are acquiring particular importance. The objective tendency toward more participation by the masses in politics is bringing about qualitative changes in the role of ideological phenomena and processes as a means of influencing public awareness and public opinion to secure support for a specific foreign policy line.

The interaction of ideology with politics (including foreign policy) represents a complex process with two sides. One side is that ideology performs the functions of motivating and formulating long-range goals and political objectives and evaluates the means of their attainment. To a certain degree, the ideological element can make a foreign policy line predictable and consistent. The influence of ideological factors is present in all stages of the political (and foreign policy) process--the stages during which a political problem is analyzed, choices and decisions are made and results are evaluated. Ideology's influence in policymaking and implementation is apparent not only on the purely theoretical level (doctrines and concepts), but also on the level of mass political awareness, where the factor of ideology often takes the form of an ideological stereotype.

A foreign policy devoid of ideological content and purpose, or a "deideologized" one, represents a far from realistic abstraction because ideology not only performs the propaganda function of justifying and rationalizing a foreign policy line, but is also an internal structural part of the foreign policymaking process.

At the same time, a strictly differentiated approach must be taken to the problem of ideology's influence in foreign policy. In the first place, various ideologies can have different effects on foreign policy. Some varieties of bourgeois ideological views include more purely illusory, reality-distorting elements than others. Under their influence, foreign policy does not set realistic goals and insists that political decisions be governed by certain ideological stereotypes (as was the case, for example, during the cold war era). Therefore, the important thing is not the degree to which foreign policy has been "ideologized," but the presence (or absence) of realism in the given foreign policy ideology, the realistic consideration of facts, and not the desired situation in the international arena.

In the second place, ideology can influence foreign policy to varying degrees (or on various levels), including deliberate "ideologization" and the artificial intensification of "ideologism" in foreign policy.³ The "abnormal," overdramatized "ideologization" of foreign policy, in contrast to the objectively determined role of the ideological element in foreign policymaking, is often aimed at strictly pragmatic political goals. In these cases, ideology is an instrument of political struggle, particularly as a weapon of intervention in the internal affairs of other states (as was the case during the "human rights" campaign).

The second side of the matter is that political processes and events influence the ideological views and concepts of various classes and social groups. The development of the political process and new events in the political life of

society and the international arena affect the evolution of ideological beliefs and concepts. In some cases the development of ideological views and the appearance of new ideas and concepts precede political developments and changes; in other cases there is a kind of ideological "inertia" or lag, due largely to the tenacity of ideological stereotypes.

The problem of ideology's interaction with politics in Soviet-American relations can be examined on three levels. Firstly, there are the ideological phenomena and processes that develop within the United States but have an "outlet" in foreign policy, primarily in American policy on relations with the USSR. Secondly, there is the effect of political processes in American society and in U.S. relations with other countries (primarily the USSR) on the prevailing ideology and ideological views of various social groups and strata. Finally and thirdly, there are the actual ideological relations between the USSR and the United States, which are an immediate part of the international ideological struggle.

Below we will discuss the first two topics. The ideological struggle in Soviet-American relations requires separate analysis.

'Idealism' or 'Ideologism'

Although all spokesmen of American foreign policy thinking and the people responsible for engineering and implementing U.S. foreign policy pay close attention to ideological considerations and motives, they are far from likely to admit this fact openly. In the United States there is the widespread belief that the American political tradition with its pragmatic foundations is totally isolated from any kind of ideology, which is viewed strictly as a phenomenon of European culture with no counterpart in the New World. This belief rests on a peculiar interpretation of the very concept of ideology, an interpretation which is firmly established in American sociopolitical thought. Often, "ideology," which is taken to mean a dogmatic system of permanent postulates, is contrasted to "idealism," which is seen as a set of high moral standards and ideals. Maximum emphasis is placed on the fact that the ideological views and beliefs that have influenced and are still influencing American foreign policy have never taken the form of a "monolithic ideology" and are not "official."⁴

Furthermore, there is the widespread belief that ideological factors have no significant effect on U.S. foreign policy because ideology in general, as a supposedly dogmatic system of various postulates, can be assigned only a modest place in the system of "American pluralism." According to this belief, the "democratic society," which strives to consider and reconcile the interests of the most diverse social groups and political forces, is poorly adapted in general for the engineering of foreign policy according to one single "doctrinaire ideology." This is precisely why many American experts on international affairs prefer to say that U.S. foreign policy is influenced not by "ideology," but by "morals"--that is, certain universal moral standards, values and ideals that are contrasted to "preachy" ideologies. In this way, "idealism" is contrasted to "ideologism."

There are, however, still certain differences of opinion in American political academic circles over the relationship between ideology and foreign policy. For example, authors who adhere to the doctrine of "political realism" frequently view ideological motives and considerations only as an impediment to the accurate assessment of national interests, including foreign policy interests. They regard the ideological factors of foreign policy as "disturbances" that disrupt the "normal" course of international relations. Even in those cases when the spokesmen of "political realism" acknowledge (as the head of this school, H. Morgenthau, has done) that "ideology is not merely a propaganda supplement to foreign policy, but an organic part of the foreign policy process,"⁵ they give the role of ideology in foreign policy a purely functional interpretation. In the final analysis, they view ideology only as a function of the moral justification and theoretical substantiation of a foreign policy line. There is no meaningful interpretation of the role and place of ideology as an element of domestic and foreign policy; it has been excluded by the interpretation of ideology almost exclusively as an aspect of foreign policy propaganda.

The advocates of "political idealism" assign the ideological factor a much more important role in the foreign policy process. The increased popularity of these ideas and concepts during the second half of the 1970's was directly related to the peculiarities of the Carter Administration's foreign policy, particularly its characteristic moralizing and ideologization of international relations, especially Soviet-U.S. relations. Discussions about "American idealism" as the "guiding star" of U.S. foreign policy were prevalent during this period, not only in academic works but also in official government statements.

It is indicative that both the liberals and the conservatives in the United States agree that the values of "American idealism," in the form they take in the sphere of foreign policy activity, are timeless, universal and suitable for all countries and peoples. "The United States is the only nation in the world which does not draw distinctions between itself and other nations, races and peoples when it discusses its own national values,"⁶ asserted American sociologist N. Glazer. This indicates a belief in the universal significance and applicability of the sociopolitical values and ideas prevailing in the United States, regardless of whether they are defined as "ideology" or "idealism."

What is more, the term "freedom," which allows for quite diverse interpretations, is used as the central "moral" element of American foreign policy. "The history of the United States' involvement in international affairs has been a history of the promotion of freedom within states and in the relations between them,"⁷ declared, for example, American expert on international affairs W. Kintner.

Of course, the ideal of freedom has served and can serve as an expression of general democratic aims and can counteract various types of authoritarian tendencies. Nevertheless, when American authors speak of freedom as the ideal of U.S. foreign policy, this broad and emotionally appealing term usually conceals a different, absolutely specific social class meaning. The American traditions of political ideology invest the term "freedom" with a set of principles and ideals corresponding to the classic bourgeois democratic social order. Above all, the term refers to the freedom of private capitalist enterprise and other individualistic rights and freedoms. In line with this, the attainment--and not

only in the United States, but in other countries as well--of the kind of public consciousness conditioned to accept at least the tendency toward the economic freedom of market relations and the level of political democracy and formal judicial freedoms recorded in bourgeois constitutions, is regarded as the personification of the ideal of "freedom," the main element of "American idealism."

But if this is the case, then which polar system of ideological views is the opposite of "American idealism" in the international arena?

Whereas, according to the popular view in American political academic circles, the influence of "ideology" in the sphere of U.S. foreign policy is quite questionable just by virtue of the absence of "authoritarian and dogmatic ideologies" in American society because their place has been taken by "morality" and "idealism," the situation in the Soviet Union is alleged to be the absolute opposite. Soviet foreign policy is usually viewed only as a simple "function" of communist ideology. This alone is regarded as some kind of "threat" to international peace.

"The distinguishing feature of Soviet foreign policy," H. Kissinger said, "is, of course, the communist ideology, which transforms relations between states into a conflict of philosophies."⁸ Since "ideology" itself is invested by the supporters of this view with such arbitrary characteristics as "dogmatism" and "authoritarianism" and is contrasted to "ethics" and "morality," the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is also described in this manner. The "idealism" of U.S. foreign policy is contrasted to the misinterpreted "ideologism" of Soviet foreign policy.

As a result of this ideological operation, Soviet foreign policy acquires mutually exclusive characteristics in descriptions by American bourgeois specialists. In the first place, it is supposed to be "ideological" through and through because it is the immediate political function of Marxist-Leninist ideology. In the second place, it lacks "moral content," or the moral element in its bourgeois interpretation ("Russia's actions in the world," TIME magazine remarked "are not governed by moral standards, but by an ideology to which it adheres with ruthless and stubborn consistency").⁹ In the third place, it is also profoundly cynical because it is governed by the principle that the "end justifies the means." For example, recently the President of the United States said that the Russians "do not share our view of morality because they do not believe in what we believe: They do not believe in a life hereafter, they do not believe in God and they do not have a religion. For this reason, morality for them is anything that promotes the cause of socialism."

It is quite significant that these tendentious basic beliefs about the nature of Soviet foreign policy and its interrelations with communist ideology as a kind of a priori ideological premise are shared by the majority of American experts on international affairs, despite the differences in their specific political approaches to Soviet-American relations. Furthermore, even the American authors who advocate the normalization of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union usually do not question these basic ideological premises as much as they simply assert that serious domestic and foreign obstacles are now impeding the attainment of the final ideological goals of Soviet foreign policy.

Disagreements between the supporters and opponents of detente in the United States are not concerned as much with the need to revise certain false ideological beliefs about the essence and nature of Soviet foreign policy as with disagreements about the extent to which new international and domestic political conditions are modifying Soviet foreign policy and its interrelationship with ideology. It is this that seriously restricts and weakens the position of many of those who support the normalization of Soviet-American relations and even makes them vulnerable to criticism from the right.

Therefore, certain initial ideological premises can be discerned in the concepts of leading American experts on international affairs (despite the variety of approaches to Soviet-American relations they support). In the first place, there is acknowledgment, in one form or another, of the exacerbation of the ideological struggle in the international arena, affecting Soviet-U.S. relations. What is more, ideological differences are generally regarded as a factor engendering and escalating political tension in Soviet-American relations. "During periods of tension, the ideologically irreconcilable elements in Soviet-American relations acquire great importance and preclude the normalization of relations,"¹⁰ stated, for example, the authors of a report on the state of Soviet-American relations and the prospects for these relations in the 1980's, prepared by the United Nations Association of the United States.

In the second place, there is the popular American belief that the ideological outlooks opposing one another in the world arena belong to different qualitative species. This refers less, however, to the fundamental contrast between the bourgeois and communist ideologies than to the contrast between the "idealism" of American foreign policy, which supposedly reflects universal moral values common to all mankind, and the "ideologism" of Soviet foreign policy, which is supposedly "class-restricted" and "amoral."

In the third place, it has been suggested that the United States' success in opposing ideologies in the international arena should be secured by the extensive use of means and methods going beyond the competition of ideas. This applies to methods of "psychological warfare" and subversive ideological propaganda and to the very knowledge of the means by which the United States can oppose the communist ideology most effectively. Many American authors, particularly those with right-wing conservative views, appeal for a "more aggressive" ideological offensive but are nonetheless inclined to believe that, in the final analysis, the most effective counterbalance to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism in the international arena is force, or the power (especially military strength) of the United States as a "supplement" to ideology.

In the fourth place, the widespread views in American political academic circles on the essence and nature of ideological differences of opinion in Soviet-American relations and the ways of resolving them include the idea that ideological means should be used, along with economic and political methods, to undermine the socialist society. As R. Barnet, American researcher of Soviet-American relations, remarked in this connection, "a constant theme in American strategy with regard to the Soviet Union is that ideological conflicts should be resolved by means of internal changes in the USSR."¹¹

Let us stress once again that, despite the variety of American approaches to the development of relations with the Soviet Union, one of their most common features is the insistence that tension and problems in Soviet-American relations are largely the result of the ideological incompatibility of the two sides, socialism and capitalism. But whereas the Soviet view is that peaceful coexistence can be achieved through the kind of restructuring of international relations that gives sober consideration to the fundamental differences, including ideological ones, between the two social systems, most American authors have a totally different opinion. For them, the main condition for the normalization of Soviet-American relations is their "deideologization" and "pragmatization," which primarily presupposes the departure of Soviet foreign policy from the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology and its class aims.

These initial premises are present to some degree in the foreign policy views and beliefs of liberals and conservatives, of supporters and opponents of detente and the normalization of Soviet-American relations. What this indicates, therefore, is firmly established patterns of American political thinking, certain basic (and not always clearly realized) ideological premises that must sooner or later affect political decisions. It is not difficult to see that differences in specific foreign policy approaches (including views on Soviet-American relations) stem primarily from the different conclusions drawn from these ideological premises.

The Logic of 'Deideologization'

The ideological postulates of American foreign policy thinking described above have a long history. To a considerable degree, they hark back to the basic attitudes of the opponents of the normalization of Soviet-American relations during the first years after the revolution.

American researcher D. Yergin calls these attitudes the "Riga axioms" because they were based on the views of the American diplomats who gathered in Riga to observe the new regime in Soviet Russia during the period when this new country was not recognized. At the basis of these views lay "an idea about the Soviet Union as a state devoted to the ideal of world revolution, denying the possibility of coexistence and waging a ruthless ideological struggle governed by Messianic desires for world supremacy."¹² The main conclusion drawn by this group of observers was that Soviet Russia was an "abnormal" state whose foreign policy was governed by the goals and principles of the communist ideology, which refused to recognize the "rules of international play" and which was striving for "world revolution" and "expansion."

This interpretation of the interrelationship between Soviet foreign policy and communist ideology served and is still serving as "theoretical" substantiation of the tough approach to relations with the USSR. It must be said, however, that these same ideas are found, even if only in the form of covert assumptions, in the views of many American authors and politicians who have arrived at a realistic recognition of the need to normalize relations with the Soviet Union but who have made this normalization conditional upon the "departure" of Soviet foreign policy from its ideological aims. The tenacity of this view explains why the tendency toward smooth Soviet-American relations at the beginning of the 1970's was viewed by American authors of varying convictions as a result of their "deideologization."

To a certain degree, the idea of "deideologization" attested to the disappearance of the anticommunist hysteria of the cold war era and the artificially ideologized U.S. foreign policy of that time, aimed at the "containment" of the Soviet Union and the "communist threat." In this sense, we must agree that "the idea of the deideologization of foreign policy was the natural reaction of realistic American ideologists to its over-ideologization in the cold war years, which consisted primarily in the maximum saturation of this policy with anticommunist dogmas to such a degree that these very dogmas became the driving force of American foreign policy."¹³ Nevertheless, the theory of "deideologization" obviously could not become the necessary ideological basis of the policy of detente, which the American leadership had to accept at the beginning of the 1970's. Furthermore, attempts to build a policy of detente on a "deideologized" foundation eventually worked against detente.

It was a fact, however, that the policy of detente and the normalization of relations with states which had been regarded for a long time as the personification of "world evil" and as irreconcilable ideological and political adversaries of the United States demanded the most serious and thorough reassessment of central ideological postulates and stereotypes in the foreign policy sphere. Neither the illusions about the "deideologization" of international relations nor the artificial "ideologization" of American foreign policy and the augmentation of its traditional ideological components would suffice in this case. The new era, which was exceptional in the full sense of the word in the American national experience, when the Soviet Union achieved a state of strategic parity and when America felt vulnerable essentially for the first time, required a serious reassessment of the traditional ideological basis of foreign policy and the development of a qualitatively new system of values and, to some degree, a new mentality, corresponding to the principles of detente and negating the cold war mentality. From the very beginning, however, the American approach to relations with the USSR displayed certain features that could work against detente.

Above all, there was a difference between the interpretation of the policy of detente and the basis for the normalization of Soviet-American relations that was recorded in bilateral documents and reflected the objective conditions of the new situation in the world, and the interpretation of detente that became popular in the United States and eventually helped to create the specific preconditions for the rightwing conservative onslaught. The most important aspect of this was that "for domestic consumption" in the United States, detente was portrayed as a long-awaited foreign policy victory for "American idealism" and a forced Soviet departure from the fundamental ideological and class bases of its foreign policy.

American strategists tried to convince the U.S. public that a number of changes had taken place in Soviet foreign policy, consisting essentially in "deideologization" and the renunciation of the wish to "dominate the world." Furthermore, as a condition for peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union was actually ordered to renounce its class solidarity with revolutionary and national liberation forces in the world and to give up the ideological struggle in the international arena. After demanding ideological disarmament from the USSR, representatives of rightwing and conservative forces began to cite the continuation of the ideological struggle under conditions of detente as "proof" of the impossibility of "genuine" peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union.

Some mention should be made here of the "double standard" that is characteristic of American policy in general. In this case, despite the loud rhetoric about "deideologization" as an alleged condition for detente, the engineers of American foreign policy saw additional opportunities in the new international situation for a more vigorous ideological attack on the Soviet Union and communist ideology. "One of the signs was the reinforcement of the ideological element of American foreign policy, especially in relations with the USSR. This refers to the use of ideological factors in official government policy because the anticommunist propaganda of rightwing forces and the mass media on the non-governmental level did not lose any of its intensity even during the period of the so-called pragmatization of relations with the socialist countries in the second half of the 1970's."¹⁴ Therefore, the common denominator of this approach, which was most fully developed at the time of the Carter Administration, was, firstly, the plan to "ideologize" foreign policy and energize U.S. ideological struggle while simultaneously demanding the "deideologization" of Soviet foreign policy and, secondly, the search for new, more "subtle" and "effective" means of ideological and propaganda influence and new bridgeheads for the ideological offensive against communism.

Another important fact needs underscoring. All new American ideological "initiatives" (the "human rights" campaign is a characteristic example of this) have essentially led to the creation of additional obstacles on the way to detente and have further complicated Soviet-American relations. In an attempt to make use of the new international situation to obtain unilateral advantages, the strategists of American foreign policy began to create the necessary political, ideological and psychological conditions for an offensive by the opponents of detente, which was launched with great vigor at the start of the 1980's.

In connection with this, it is also interesting that one of the main critical targets of rightwing conservative forces was the concept of "deideologization" as an alleged condition for the normalization of Soviet-American relations. The strategy of deideologization, which demanded ideological disarmament from the Soviet Union and envisaged the possibility of an ideological offensive by the United States, aided in the consolidation of the forces that ultimately subjected it to criticism from the right. Acting as the heirs of the Carter Administration's "ideologized" foreign policy, these forces denied its content. Whereas President Carter had once called upon Americans to give up their "unaccountable fear of communism," in the hope of updating his own ideological arsenal and seizing the initiative in the ideological struggle in the international arena, his rightwing conservative opponents, who rallied round the Reagan Administration, made the "communist threat" their central theme, just as it had been in the 1950's.

"The problem is that a key concept has almost disappeared from discussions of Soviet-American rivalry. This concept is communism," the abovementioned N. Podhoretz wrote. "The Soviet Union is not a state like all other states. It is a revolutionary state.... It is striving to create a new international order in which it will be the dominant force and will determine its national aims and ideological imperatives."¹⁵ Reviving the "fear of communism" in the odious forms of cold war ideology, rightwing conservative forces expanded the ideological offensive that had been launched by their predecessors. A central place has been assigned to the reappraisal of Soviet-American relations and Soviet foreign policy.

First of all, this will involve the revival of the tendentious "ideologized" (in the spirit of the "Riga axioms") interpretation of Soviet foreign policy as a policy with the "obsessive" ideological goal of "world revolution." Secondly, American public opinion is being assured that "world communism" must be counter-balanced not only by the restoration of "American strength" and the military power of the United States, but also by the "revival of faith" in the traditional values of the bourgeois ideology. Thirdly, communist ideology is being portrayed as the main reason for the present escalation of international tension and the increased danger of war in today's world.

It is clear, therefore, that ideological motives and considerations have invariably played an important, but not identical, role in American policy toward the USSR and have affected the making and implementation of this policy during all stages of the history of Soviet-U.S. relations. Anticommunist motives and traditions, taking various forms, have held and now hold the dominant place among these ideological motives and considerations. During certain periods, the ideology of anticommunism has had a particularly strong effect on American foreign policy, to the point that it has sometimes led to decisions that are obviously contrary to the U.S. national interest.

As far as the necessary reappraisal and restructuring of obsolete ideological views is concerned (especially views on the Soviet Union and communism), this process is obviously not keeping up with the needs of politics. Attempts to build relations with the USSR on a "deideologized" basis were undertaken instead of the fundamental reassessment of clearly obsolete ideological views permeated by the spirit and traditions of cold war. We repeat, however, that the plans to "pragmatize" Soviet-American relations could not have become the ideological foundation of the policy of detente and, in fact, were part of the reason for the increased activity of the rightwing conservative opposition, which was hostile to detente and launched its offensive under the banner of unconcealed anti-Sovietism and anticommunism.

Of course, bourgeois political thinking (particularly in the foreign policy sphere) has always been distinguished by ideological inertia and the retention of long obsolete ideological stereotypes. "The long years of cold war left their traces, and not only in the minds of professional politicians. They are prejudice, suspicion, an inadequate knowledge of the views and abilities of others and even a reluctance to acquire this knowledge. It would certainly not be easy to change, but it must be done and people must learn to cooperate,"¹⁶ L. I. Brezhnev stressed.

The present escalation of unconcealed anticommunism testifies to the definite consolidation of the influence of the particular forces in the United States that were and are opposed to detente, but it has acquired a "boomerang effect" because this escalation is not only influencing world public opinion but is also having an impact on influential politicians and statesmen who take part in making important foreign policy decisions in the United States.

Under present conditions, the only alternative to the "deideologization" and "pragmatization" of Soviet-American relations, and to the artificial "ideologization" of American policy in relations with the USSR, is political realism, based

on a recognition of the realities of the nuclear age and singling out the struggle against the danger of war as the central ideological principle of international relations, especially the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

FOOTNOTES

1. TIME, 16 March 1981, p 19.
2. N. Podhoretz, "The Future Danger," COMMENTARY, April 1981, p 39.
3. See "Razryadka mezhdunarodnoy napryazhennosti i ideologicheskaya bor'ba" [International Detente and the Ideological Struggle], Ed-in-chief V. I. Gantman, Moscow, 1981, p 5.
4. P. Seabury, "Ideology and Foreign Policy," in: "Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy," edited by A. DeConde, vol 2, New York, 1978, p 399.
5. H. Morgenthau, "The Organic Relationship Between Ideology and Political Reality," in: "Ideology and Foreign Policy: A Global Perspective," edited by C. Schwab, New York, 1978, p 118.
6. N. Glazer, "American Values and American Foreign Policy," COMMENTARY, July 1976, p 32.
7. W. Kintner, "A Program for America: Freedom and Foreign Policy," ORBIS, Spring 1977, p 140.
8. H. Kissinger, "White House Years," Boston-Toronto, 1979, p 116.
9. TIME, 14 January 1980, p 19.
10. "U.S. Soviet Relations: A Strategy for the 1980's. Report of a UNA-USA National Policy Panel on U.S.-Soviet Relations," New York, 1981, p 20.
11. R. Barnet, "The Giants. Russia and America," New York, 1977, p 72.
12. D. Yergin, "Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State," Boston, 1978, p 11.
13. G. A. Trofimenko, "The Basic Postulates of U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future of Detente," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 7, 1981, p 7.
14. P. T. Dodlesnyy, "Amerikanskiye kontseptsii razvitiya otnosheniy s SSSR" [American Theories About the Development of Relations with the USSR], Moscow, 1980, p 156.

15. N. Podhoretz, Op. cit., p 39.

16. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following in Lenin's Footstep], vol 4, Moscow, 1974, p 341.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982

8588

CSO: 1803/12

ECONOMIC THEORIES OF THE REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 12 Apr 82) pp 27-38

[Article by V. M. Shamberg]

[Text] In the United States, just as in other capitalist countries, the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's were marked by increasing economic difficulties and contradictions. There were more frequent cyclical crises, there were structural crises and galloping inflation, currency and financial difficulties became more acute, the rates of economic growth and labor productivity augmentation slowed down and the rate of unemployment rose sharply. State regulation based on Keynesian principles turned out to be groundless and could not cope with the problems facing the economy.

This forced ruling circles to conduct a much more energetic search for ways of improving the state of the economy. Conservative economists pointedly criticized Keynesian theories and put forth their own ideas. These ideas stem from the traditional conservative line of limiting the economic role of government, but they also include the conservative economists' own updated "alternatives" to Keynesian economic concepts. These concepts, which lie at the basis of the present Republican Administration's economic program, promised the radical improvement of economic conditions in the nation.

The economic crisis, which seized the United States in the second half of 1981, when the chief measures in Reagan's economic program began to be implemented, and crisis-related difficulties aroused debates and disputes among bourgeois economists. During the course of the debates the conceptual bases and contradictions of this program were pushed to the foreground.

The Conservatives and Their Economic Aims

Conservatism as a current of bourgeois social thought and a political factor now represents a particularly influential force in the United States. The conservatives' principal aim is the preservation of the "traditional" foundations and institutions of societal life. A researcher of this current, G. Nash, wrote: "The very word 'conservatism' presupposes that the person who calls himself a conservative wants to preserve or conserve something that exists in the present or existed in the past.... For the real conservative, the past, or 'tradition,' regardless of how it is interpreted, must be of special interest."¹

The separation of liberals from conservatives in the United States dates back to the beginning of the last century. Both are bourgeois politicians. Both express and defend the interests of American capitalism. The differences between them are the differences between the views of different segments of the bourgeoisie and between their approaches to the means and methods of capitalism's reinforcement. The main dividing line here cuts through matters of domestic policy. They include the attitude toward the government and toward its role in the economic and social sphere. The original meanings of the terms "liberal" and "conservative" has changed considerably, however. At the beginning of the 19th century the liberals wanted minimum government interference in economic affairs and the conservatives supported more sweeping prerogatives for the government. By the end of the 19th century, however, the liberals and conservatives had exchanged sides with regard to the economic and social role of the government.²

The differences between liberals and conservatives, as reflected in the Democratic and Republican positions, have been particularly distinct since the beginning of the 1930's. Franklin Roosevelt's liberal "New Deal" envisaged the considerable expansion of the government's functions in the economic and social areas and the extensive use of government authority and government budget funds to stabilize the economy and solve the most pressing social problems. This line was unavoidably connected with certain restrictions on the freedom of individual monopolies in the overall strategic interest of monopolistic capital and with higher taxes on the income of corporations and the bourgeoisie, particularly its petty and middle segments. Roosevelt's liberal socioeconomic program, its implementation and its further development considerably expanded the mass base of the Democratic Party, especially among the underprivileged strata, and this ensured its victory in elections. As a result of this, the Democratic Party, headed by liberal bourgeois groups, has dominated the American political scene since the 1930's.

The Republican Party has been headed chiefly by conservative bourgeois groups advocating the limitation of the government's economic functions. The Republicans have been the minority party. The administration and Congress have primarily pursued a liberal policy. Nevertheless, conservative Republicans have frequently been able to block or kill liberal bills by allying themselves in the Congress with rightwing Democrats.

In the 1960's the conservative wing of the American ruling elite began to gain strength, and the process continued in the 1970's. The conservatives acquired more influence in politics and ideology as economic and social difficulties and problems grew more acute and liberal methods of state regulation grew less effective. Their influence was also strengthened by the increasing proportion of middle-income groups in the total population--that is, the middle strata, where the mass support of the Republican Party took shape. These groups became an extremely influential political force, although an extremely heterogeneous one. In the 1970's they grew increasingly dissatisfied with their status. They were disturbed by the rising taxes that were absorbing a perceptible share of their income, by government social programs that were of little benefit to them, and by inflation, which was constantly devouring much of their income and savings. As a result, these groups began to believe that the main reason for the deterioration of their financial position was the government's increased interference in economic affairs, leading to higher taxes, government spending and budget deficits,

giving rise to inflation. Correspondingly, they viewed the limitation of government activity in the economic and social spheres as the way to achieve economic stability, constant prices and low taxes. This was the reason for the growth of conservative attitudes.

Today's conservatives, primarily a large segment of the monopolistic elite and most of the middle and petty bourgeoisie, the middle strata of the population, want to return to the "golden age" of American capitalism. In their opinion, this age was the decades when the capitalist economy developed onward and upward in an atmosphere of free competition and virtually unlimited exploitation of the laboring public in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. In international affairs, the conservatives feel nostalgic about the policy "from a position of strength" during the first years after World War II. At that time the American ruling elite believed that the United States had entered a protracted era of indisputable world supremacy. In domestic policy, today's conservatives want the minimization of the social gains achieved by labor as a result of stubborn struggle, they want business to be free of the restrictions instituted within the framework of state regulation and they want the wider redistribution of national income in the bourgeoisie's favor. In foreign policy, they insist on a more aggressive line for the United States, on the continued acceleration of the arms race, on military superiority over the Soviet Union and on the resolute consolidation of American imperialism's influence in the world economy and in world politics. Therefore, the primary aims of contemporary American conservatism are governed by the interests of the bourgeois groups advocating a more reactionary domestic policy and a more aggressive foreign policy.

It must be borne in mind, however, that conservatism is not a monolithic political force. Even the bourgeois press has noted this. For example, soon after Ronald Reagan won the presidential election, the English weekly *ECONOMIST* spoke of the longstanding division of this current into Wall Street and Main Street conservatives, with Wall Street symbolizing the monopolistic bourgeoisie, and Main Street signifying the petty and middle bourgeoisie, the middle strata of towns and small cities.³ These two groups constitute the conservative wing of the Republican Party, which is headed by Ronald Reagan. He relied on their support and they put him in office.

Their economic aims, however, differ considerably. The chief goals of Main Street, as pointed out by prominent American economic analyst L. Silk in the book "Reagan: The Man, the President," are "lower taxes, the cancellation of all government programs that are non-military, limited government regulation and more freedom for individuals and private enterprise." Although the aims of Wall Street, representing "big business and big finance," do not conflict openly with the aims of Main Street in each specific area, Silk wrote, they "focus primarily on the importance of curbing inflation, stimulating corporate capital investments, ensuring the stability of the international currency system, balancing the federal budget, limiting the growth of the total amount of money in circulation and securing economic stability rather than rapid economic growth."⁴

Reagan has always been regarded in the United States as a representative of Main Street, as a politician expressing the views and interests of primarily the petty and middle bourgeoisie. It would be wrong to believe, however, that he became the

President against the wishes of Wall Street--the representatives of big capital who head the party and constitute the traditional Republican establishment. Reagan has had close ties with big business for a long time. Even in the 1960's, when he began his career as a major politician, he was surrounded by a group of millionaire close friends who influenced his political program substantially. These were big businessmen from the American West, mainly California. Representatives of big business and big finance in the Northeast and prominent Republican economists gave Reagan their strong support after he was officially nominated his party's candidate for the presidency. "The alliance between Wall Street and Main Street," the ECONOMIST reported, "is now the main trend in American conservatism."⁵

Ronald Reagan's economic program⁶ reflects the conflicting interests and aims of the main conservative groups supporting him, which, as has been demonstrated, do not agree on many matters. The main elements of the Republican Administration's economic program are corporate and personal income tax cuts, limited federal spending, "limited regulating activity" by the government in the economy and a non-inflationary credit and monetary policy. The central measures are the "limitation of government regulation" and the tax cuts.

'Limitation of Government's Economic Role'

The "limitation of the economic functions" of government is a point of departure for the economic theories of the American conservatives. The argument here is quite simple. The conservatives maintain that the main constructive force in the capitalist economy is private enterprise, the struggle for profits in an atmosphere of free competition. During the course of the competitive struggle, businessmen try to heighten the effectiveness of economic activity and take the risk of introducing new products and new technological processes. It is this, in the opinion of bourgeois economists and ideologists, that moves the economy ahead, while the restrictions connected with government regulation inhibit its development. Therefore, the revitalization of the economy and the acceleration of economic growth necessitate, above all, "private enterprise unfettered by government regulation." This was the view expressed, for example, by Richard Nixon when he was the Republican presidential candidate in the 1960 election and by Senator Goldwater in the 1964 election, when he was the leader of the party's extreme right wing.

It is true that free competition has promoted the accelerated economic development of American capitalism. But this took place in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. Competition acquired more destructive forms later, when the social nature of productive forces developed, the technical level rose and the monopolies consolidated their positions. This was most clearly demonstrated by the economic crisis of 1929-1933, which gave the development of state-monopoly regulation considerable momentum. It produced definite results for several decades.⁷ Under these conditions, conservative criticism of state regulation, particularly in the 1960's and early 1970's, was unsuccessful.

The situation changed in the second half of the 1970's. The conditions of economic functioning changed perceptibly. State regulation based on Keynesian ideas became less effective. The state of the economy deteriorated noticeably. In this atmosphere, conservative economists not only appealed for the "limitation of the economic functions" of government and greater reliance on "free enterprise," but

also called the government the chief cause of economic difficulties and source of instability. For example, W. Simon, the renowned conservative politician and big businessman who was the secretary of the Treasury in the previous Republican Administration and was Reagan's economic adviser in the 1980 campaign, wrote in his book "Time for Action": "Rapidly growing expenditures, confiscatory taxation, stifling regulations and the intolerable inflation stemming from all this are squeezing the vital juices out of our economy. It is precisely this gigantic burden that is reducing our capital investments, lowering productivity and resulting in recession in a number of industries, an energy shortage, chronic unemployment and galloping inflation."⁸

The same views have been expressed by other prominent conservative economists, including Professor M. Friedman, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics and head of the monetarist current of bourgeois economic science, G. Shultz, former secretary of the Treasury in the Nixon Administration, and J. Hilder, the author of "Poverty and Wealth," a book which had a significant impact on the economic views of some of Reagan's associates.

The conservatives are particularly dissatisfied with the huge size of the federal budget deficit, which they blame on excessive government regulation and regard as one of the important reasons for the escalation of inflation and the rise in interest rates. A balanced budget is therefore one of the principal economic aims of the conservatives and the first commandment of a "responsible" economic policy. They want the budget to be balanced by means of cuts in government social programs, and not in the colossal military expenditures, which they want increased.

Criticism of the economic policy of the Democrats and of the "excessive" role of government in the economy occupied a prominent place in Reagan's campaign. His speeches contained promises to "reduce government regulation," "unshackle private business," give private initiative and "free enterprise" more scope and balance the federal budget. Reagan assured the voters that he would conduct a "consistent and systematic revision of thousands of federal laws and statutes with an economic impact," declaring that many of them were "excessive and likely to slow down the rise in productivity." "I am certain," Reagan said, "that we can compete better in the world market if we free American industry of excessive federal regulation."⁹

The line of "limiting government regulation" can be seen in virtually all areas of the Republican Administration's economic policy. It reflects the President's own views. A NEW YORK TIMES editorial about his economic program after Congress had approved his proposed cuts in federal spending and taxes noted that the President was acting in "the belief that a dollar spent in the private sector creates more wealth than a dollar spent by the government."¹⁰ In general, it must be stressed that the present administration attaches special significance to the "limitation of government's role in the economy." "The White House feels," BUSINESS WEEK remarked, "that the success of Reagan's presidency will be measured largely by whether he is able to reverse the 50-year-old tendency toward increased government interference in the affairs of American business."¹¹

To what degree is the administration actually "limiting government's role in the economy" and reducing government regulation?

First of all, it must be said that the cuts in government spending and taxes are reducing the part of national income that is redistributed through the federal budget. In other words, the scales of government economic activity are being reduced. The administration's economic program frankly states this is one of its central objectives.¹²

But this is only in general terms. In more specific terms, the reduced scales of government economic activity were supposed to have a distinct class purpose. It was toward this end that the cuts in government spending began to be made--almost all of them in social budget expenditures, striking at the least privileged strata of society. This evoked particularly pointed criticism from the Communist Party of the United States of America, the labor movement and black American organizations. As for the tax cuts, they mainly benefit those with a high income--that is, primarily the grand bourgeoisie.

Furthermore, the administration is lifting all remaining price controls. In the first weeks after the inauguration, price controls on oil produced within the nation were lifted. The President has also repeatedly declared his intention to lift natural gas price controls. This measure¹³ will be taken in the interest of energy corporations and will give them tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in additional profits.

The "social regulation" of production is being reduced considerably. At one time laws were passed and agencies were created to control and regulate the activity of corporations and small and medium-size businesses in the spheres of environmental control, consumer product quality, labor safety standards, etc. The observance of these laws, statutes and regulations meant large expenditures for private capital and complicated and prolonged the processes by which new products are introduced and new enterprises are opened. The administration decided to free business of many restrictions imposed by legislation and the activities of various agencies and departments in such areas as, for example, occupational safety and health, equal hiring opportunities, environmental protection and consumer protection. "If all these changes are made in regulations," BUSINESS WEEK remarked, "they could have a tremendous impact on the economy and on the operational conditions of private companies."¹⁴ It is completely obvious that the government is acting in the interests of the bourgeoisie and against the interests of the laboring public in this sphere as well.

Of course, the Reagan Administration has no intention of curtailing all government regulation and returning the American economy to the days of the unlimited free competition of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The development of state regulation was not dictated by the subjective aims of politicians, but by objective trends in the development of the productive forces of monopolistic capitalism and its inherent contradictions, by the natural evolution of monopolistic capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism. Any attempt to curtail state regulation would be tantamount to reversing the objective processes of capitalist development. The Republican Administration is not making a transition from state regulation to unlimited free competition, but to the definite limitation and, what is most important, restructuring of this regulation. The current objective seems to consist, firstly, in the avoidance of the further expansion of government regulation and the growth of federal budget dimensions, secondly, business is to be

relieved of the "excessive" expenditures connected with the "social regulation" of production; and, thirdly, macroeconomic regulation is to be limited to some degree by discarding the particular elements and aspects that, according to conservative economists, slow down economic development, have a destabilizing effect and reorient economic policy on the basis of the "economic theory of supply" (which will be discussed below).

It should also be stressed that the Republican Administration has been insisting on the reduction of government's economic functions while it has simultaneously been responsible for an unprecedented increase in military spending and has broadened and strengthened the military sector of the economy. In the interests of a limited number of huge monopolies in the military-industrial complex, it has intensified the most parasitical aspect of the government's economic activity--the financing of the production of destructive weapons.

The conservatives' statements in favor of the reduction of government's economic functions and "maximum freedom for business from government restrictions" are extremely symptomatic. They reflect one of the fundamental contradictions in the contemporary capitalist economy. It is true that competition and the struggle to maximize profits are the main driving force of its development. Nevertheless, the capitalist collectivization of production is making the contradiction between the social nature of production and the private capitalist appropriation of its results even more pronounced. When state regulation tries to smooth out and overcome contradictions, it can produce definite results for a specific period of time. But the role of government in the capitalist economy, which is based on private ownership of the means of production, must always be limited. The peculiarities of private ownership objectively impede efficient government regulation and spontaneous market forces continue to have a certain effect on economic development. As a result, government activity solves some problems while giving rise to new contradictions, which eventually leads to the general exacerbation and accumulation of problems and contradictions in the capitalist economy. They certainly cannot be resolved, however, by backward movement, by movement toward unlimited free competition.

From the Regulation of Total Demand to the 'Economic Theory of Supply'

The cuts in personal income taxes and taxes on the income of corporations and small and medium-size businesses are the most important elements of the administration's economic policy and are supposed to accelerate economic growth rates, raise labor productivity, accelerate technical progress, lower the rate of unemployment and put an end to inflation. This role of the tax cuts is substantiated by a concept called "supply-side economics" by bourgeois economists, signifying the theoretical aims of an economic policy aimed at the stimulation of production and the growth of the supply of goods and services. In short, this concept can be called the "economic theory of supply." These premises were put forth in recent years by some American economists as a response to the increasing ineffectiveness of Keynesian methods of state regulation.

According to Keynesian ideas, the main goal was the regulation of total demand, maintaining it at a level ensuring the optimal use of resources. For many decades, American bourgeois economists believed that the production potential of

capitalism in the United States was virtually unlimited. They assumed that the main problem consisted in securing the appropriate total demand and that the economy would function normally if purchasing power corresponded to production potential. These aims of government regulation were first set forth in response to the crisis of 1929-1933, when up to half of the United States' production capacities were not being used and one-fourth of the labor force was unemployed. Under these conditions, production potential was no problem and purchasing power was the main objective. In the 1970's, on the other hand, especially in the second half of this decade, it became obvious that the American economy had entered a new stage of development, marked by disparities, bottlenecks and shortages, the deceleration of technical progress and a sharp decline in labor productivity augmentation rates.

In the new economic situation, many American economists have transferred their attention to problems connected with total demand, its patterns, the possibilities and means of its regulation, its effect on the dynamics of economic development and the effect of changes in basic macroeconomic indicators on the production potential of the economy. Their main conclusion is that production must be influenced not through total demand, but directly. Direct influence can be exerted with the aid of various methods, however, using quite diverse forms of leverage. It was this kind of influence that was advocated by economists who have sometimes taken the opposite stand. Liberal economists said that the current situation demanded the further development of government regulation, right up to the institution of nationwide planning in the United States. Conservative economists felt that production activity in the private sector should be stimulated primarily with the aid of goal-oriented tax cuts. These aims began to be called the "economic theory of supply." The Reagan Administration's economic program rests on this theory.

In reference to this theory, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT remarked that, according to its supporters, the stimulation of production "necessitates greater incentives for individuals and enterprises--incentives to produce, invest, work and save. The main method is the reduction of income tax rates for individuals so that they will have more left if they earn more from more persistent labor and more intelligent capital investments. Business must be given tax incentives to invest more capital in new plants and equipment.¹⁵ Therefore, according to the supporters of supply-side economics, this is the chief way of accelerating economic growth, raising labor productivity, reducing unemployment and, later, even lowering the rate of inflation.

Advocates of supply-side economics often cite the conclusions of University of Southern California Professor A. Laffer. Federal income tax rates, Laffer writes, have become so high that they discourage hard work and capital investments and thereby inhibit the development of production. Inflation has become chronic because the supply of goods cannot keep up with demand. The lowering of tax rates, Laffer maintains, would be followed by a boom in energetic labor, personal savings and investments. The "supply side" in economics would be stimulated to such a degree by this measure that the federal Treasury would soon be filled with additional tax revenues, considerably in excess of the sum lost as a result of the tax cuts.

Laffer substantiates his view with the aid of a graph that is now known as the "Laffer curve." This curve indicates how a rise in tax rates changes the amount of revenue. The curve is bell-shaped. It suggests that revenues rise from zero (a tax rate equal to zero) to a specific point on the curve, after which they begin to decrease and eventually reach zero.¹⁶ Laffer believes that the American economy has passed the critical point on this curve and that the further elevation of rates can only produce tax revenues. Lower tax rates will stimulate economic development.

At the beginning of his campaign, Reagan supported the Kemp-Roth bill, based on conclusions drawn from the "Laffer curve" and stipulating a tax cut of 30 percent over the next 3 years, and made this measure one of the central points of its economic program (when this became law in August 1981, the total reduction was limited to 23 percent). L. Silk notes in the book mentioned above that it was the "simple logic" of the "Laffer curve" that appealed to Reagan.¹⁷

Sound arguments in favor of supply-side economics have been set forth by renowned American economist M. Evans. His conclusions and line of reasoning are based on his experience in the development and use of Keynesian econometric models and a new model, developed at the request of the Senate Committee on Finance, which is based on the new theory and is therefore of particular interest.

Just as other American economists, Evans believes that the main tendency undermining the American economy in the 1970's was the slower rise of labor productivity. It was this that accelerated inflation and slowed down the rate of real GNP growth. According to Keynesian premises, increased expenditures raise total demand and increased savings inhibit demand. According to this view, the quickest way of raising rates of economic development is the redistribution of income in favor of low-income groups, which spend more and save less of their income than groups with a higher income. Over the short range, Evans said, this is true. But the reduction of savings leads to higher interest rates and reduces the funds that could be used for capital investments. As a result, the capital formation process slows down, and this slows down technical progress and the rise of productivity.

The results of his work with an econometric model based on supply-side economics, Evans writes, indicated the following: "Inflation is stimulated by increased government spending but is decelerated by tax cuts. The economy's production potential is augmented by tax cuts, but it stays the same or is even reduced when the government spends more. This is why the tax cuts can accelerate economic growth and lower the rate of inflation."¹⁸

It is obvious that the supporters of supply-side economics are trying to substantiate the need to revitalize the economy by redistributing national income between consumption and accumulation in favor of accumulation and redistributing personal income between low-income and high-income groups in favor of the high-income groups. Therefore, this theory is aimed at solving national economic problems in the interest of the bourgeoisie, especially the monopolistic bourgeoisie, at the cost of the laboring public.

The possible effect of the tax cuts on the economy, however, is far from clear. The effect anticipated by the supporters of supply-side economics is quite doubtful. Consumers whose taxes are cut could decide to save more, and then the administration's expectations with regard to growth and savings, and consequently the possibilities for capital investments, will be invalid. However, consumers might spend the additional funds instead of saving them. At a time of galloping inflation this is quite probable. In this case, the tax cuts will not accelerate economic growth and recovery and will even stimulate inflation. Many Republican economists who adhere to the traditional conservative view were well aware of this. After Reagan won the nomination in 1980, the key roles in his group of advisers were taken by such renowned economists as A. Greenspan, G. Shultz and A. Burns, who had held high offices in previous Republican administrations, and the supporters of supply-side economics began to lose their influence. These economists, according to TIME magazine, "began to gradually change Reagan's economic program by departing from the original aims of this theory. Laffer believed that large tax cuts would not be inflationary because they would stimulate business activity.... The President's more conservative economic advisers convinced him, however, that the tax cuts, and the resulting large budget deficits, would intensify inflation if they were not supplemented by measures to limit total demand."¹⁹

As a result, the administration's economic program is based on the views of several different groups of conservative economists, each with their own principal goal. The supporters of supply-side economics are primarily interested in accelerating real economic growth. The goal of the monetarists is the quickest possible drop in the rate of inflation. And, finally, traditional conservatives are primarily concerned with balancing the federal budget.²⁰ It is quite obvious that these are conflicting goals. The tax cuts are intended to stimulate production and accelerate economic growth. At the same time, the limitation of government spending, which is intended to reduce the budget deficit, and the restrictive credit and monetary policy, which is supposed to combat inflation, will slow down economic growth.

In reference to the contradictions in the program, Democratic Congressman J. Jones, chairman of the House Budget Committee, said: "I am afraid that the planned...measures are comparable to a situation in which you try to simultaneously push hard on the accelerator and slam on the brakes. The prospects might appear marvelous until the brakes give out or the engine blows up."²¹

The current economic crisis in the United States,²² according to the estimates of government economists, will be accompanied by increased government spending and reduced tax revenues, which will add considerably to the already colossal budget deficit. Without any new significant cuts in budget expenditures and a rise in taxes, the deficit, according to the Office of Management and Budget, could rise to 160-200 billion dollars by fiscal year 1984. This is precisely the year by which Reagan promised that his economic program would balance the budget.

Famous American political correspondent J. Kraft has written that the President's approach to economic policy and his program have not had the anticipated results and that the present state of affairs "is ruining the reputation of theories emphasizing the growth of supply. Many of the President's most influential

advisers have already renounced these theories."²³ In this connection, Kraft named OMB Director D. Stockman, Chairman M. Weidenbaum of the President's Council of Economic Advisers and several Republican senators. Some economists and politicians are now appealing for higher taxes and cuts in excessive military spending. The draft budget submitted to Congress by the administration for fiscal 1983, however, envisages another sharp increase in military expenditures, cuts in social expenditures and the continuation of the tax cut program. A deficit of 91.5 billion dollars is anticipated in fiscal 1983. The draft budget has been criticized harshly in the Congress, by economists and by labor movement spokesmen. The NEW YORK TIMES remarked that President Reagan has "apparently become reconciled" to huge budget deficits and does not want to give up the tax cuts and military spending increases. All of this could raise the rate of inflation and interest rates even higher, which would undermine the hope of reviving economic activity.²⁴

Disagreements over economic policy are profoundly symptomatic. Bourgeois economists are trying to find a way out of mounting difficulties within the framework of capitalism's limited capabilities. They would like to overcome problems at the expense of the laboring public and ensure the growth of capitalist corporate profits and bourgeois income. The Republican Administration's economic program is not producing any results, however, and the economic premises of the conservatives are not solving any of the economic problems of the 1980's brand of American capitalism. However, the political future of Reagan, the Republican Party and American conservatism will depend largely on the results of the administration's economic program.

FOOTNOTES

1. G. Nash, "The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America: Since 1945," New York, 1976, p 191.
2. For a long time the main distinguishing feature of liberals and conservatives was their attitude toward the place and role of government in the economic and social sphere. In recent decades, however, new social problems have arisen, and some of them began to move to the foreground of the political struggle in the late 1960's and early 1970's. As a result, it has become much more difficult to distinguish between liberals and conservatives because this division cannot be based on one main position.
3. THE ECONOMIST, 3 January 1981, p 40. "Main Street" is a specifically American political term symbolizing the views, beliefs and aims of the inhabitants of small cities and towns--representatives of the petty and middle bourgeoisie. The most typical Main Street towns are supposed to be in the Midwest--the birthplace of Senator Robert Taft, longtime (in the past) leader of the Republican Party right wing (Ohio), and Ronald Reagan (Illinois).
4. H. Smith, A. Clymer, L. Silk, N. Lindsey and R. Burt, "Reagan the Man, the President," New York, 1980, p 52.
5. THE ECONOMIST, 3 January 1981, p 41.

6. It is described in detail in issue No. 9, 1981 (pp 118-127), and No 10 (pp 115-125).
7. In this situation, even when the Republican Richard Nixon took the office of President in January 1969, he continued the Democratic line of broad-scale government regulation in economics and the social sphere, and went even further than his predecessors in some areas, at least verbally.
8. W. Simon, "Time for Action," New York, 1980, pp 11-12.
9. Quoted in: H. Smith et al, Op. cit., pp 65-66, 72.
10. Quoted in: INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 4 August 1981.
11. BUSINESS WEEK, 9 March 1981, p 42.
12. "America's New Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery," Washington, 1981, p 11.
13. For more detail, see the comments by L. N. Karpov in issue No 6 for 1981--Editor's note.
14. BUSINESS WEEK, 9 March 1981, p 47.
15. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 23 February 1981, p 22.
16. FORTUNE, 23 February 1981, p 86.
17. H. Smith et al, Op. cit., p 54.
18. M. Evans, "The Bankruptcy of Keynesian Econometric Models," CHALLENGE, January-February 1980, p 19.
19. TIME, 21 September 1981, p 38.
20. FORTUNE, 15 November 1981, p 153.
21. TIME, 21 September 1981, p 39.
22. See the reports by Yu. I. Bobrakov and Yu. G. Kondrat'yev in issue No 2 for 1982--Editor's note.
23. THE WASHINGTON POST, 3 December 1981.
24. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 9 February 1982.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982

8588

CSO: 1803/12

WASHINGTON'S STAKES IN THE PERSIAN GULF ZONE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 12 Apr 82) pp 39-48

[Article by Ognyan Avramov (People's Republic of Bulgaria)]

[Text] The present Republican administration, which took office with the intention of showing the entire world its "determination, firmness and energy," hastened to put a military emphasis wherever it felt these matters were not being given enough attention. One of the first of these areas was the Persian Gulf, which, as the Western press reported, had already become a "potential theater of hostilities" even during the previous administration.¹ Under the present U.S. leadership, this part of the world is much more likely than before to be regarded as a bridgehead for a possible "test of strength" with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states and for the vigorous opposition of the consolidation of national independence and social reforms in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

The "interest" of U.S. ruling circles in the Persian Gulf is based on Washington's desire to secure a dominant position in this zone, where almost 70 percent of all known oil deposits and around 50 percent of the world petroleum output (outside the socialist countries) are located.

Despite the fact that supply now exceeds demand in the world oil market, questions connected with the oil imported from the Arab countries are still being widely discussed in the United States. According to American experts, the United States will continue to be dependent on the energy of these countries in the foreseeable future and will even grow slightly more dependent, in terms of the Persian Gulf's share of total U.S. oil imports. It has been suggested that the cessation or considerable reduction of the flow of oil from the Arab states or a continuous rise in its cost would severely injure the American economy.

Statements like these are used by Washington spokesmen to artificially stir up alarmist feelings and to substantiate the idea that "everything is permissible" as long as it guarantees access to Persian Gulf oil resources. For example, U.S. Secretary of State Haig said that he did not "exclude the possibility of the use of force if necessary"² for this purpose. Similar statements have been made by other members of the Reagan Administration.

Western Europe and Japan, however, are much more dependent on Persian Gulf oil than the United States. In 1979, for example, oil from this region accounted for

31, 63 and 73 percent respectively of the total oil imported by the United States, Western Europe and Japan.³ Most of America's allies, however, do not share Washington's inclination for sword-rattling, believing that the direct or indirect use of military force could have serious negative effects, not only on the normal oil trade but also on international trade and economic relations in general.

A number of works published in the West in recent years have analyzed various possible situations in the Persian Gulf and the proper "responses" by the large oil importers. It must be said that virtually none of the conscientious and unbiased researchers in the United States and Western Europe can give any serious thought to the propaganda about the alleged Soviet threat, just as the majority of politicians, especially in Western Europe, do not believe it either.

"The danger of prolonged stoppages in the export of oil is directly related to the internal situation in the Persian Gulf states and the relations between them," wrote K. Waltz, for example.⁴ According to another prominent American political scientist, R. Tucker, "the revolution in Iran and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war revealed the nature of the local threat to the West's access" to oil produced in this part of the world.⁵

As far as the Arab countries are concerned, former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Egypt H. Eilts admitted in American congressional hearings that "it is unlikely that any of the leaders of the Persian Gulf states believe that these states might become the target of Soviet military action."⁶

These and many other similar statements testify that the story about the "Soviet threat" is regarded in the West and in the Arab world primarily as a malicious lie that has been invented for selfish purposes. The present U.S. rulers, however, have armed themselves with the anti-Soviet rhetoric of officials in the Carter Administration and their predecessors and have made the thesis about the "Soviet threat" to the Persian Gulf a major consideration in propaganda and in the decision-making process. Above all, the potential for direct U.S. armed intervention in the Persian Gulf is being created so that the United States can secure, under the cover of the "Soviet threat" scarecrow, unlimited control in this part of the world, backed up by military strength which is to be used both in the resolution of "local problems" (including those that are not necessarily connected with oil) and in the context of the "global challenge" to the Soviet Union from yet another strategically important region.

Reliance on Military Strength

The policy of the Reagan Administration in the Persian Gulf is not something fundamentally new, but a variation on the policy of previous U.S. administrations, adapted in line with changes in international and domestic American affairs.

After World War II the United States depended on others to protect its own interests in this part of the world for around two decades. Washington first used Great Britain, which performed police functions here, and later, when the English ceased their military presence "east of Suez,"⁷ acted through the Baghdad Pact, which later became the CENTO military bloc.

American policy was considerably modified after the start of the Nixon Administration at the end of the 1960's. By that time Arab oil had become much more important and Washington's interest in the Persian Gulf increased accordingly. But the CENTO alliance was on its deathbed⁸ and the continuing war in Vietnam precluded the performance of police functions by American armed forces. American ruling circles believed that they had found a solution to the problem when they built up the military strength of the shah's regime in Iran as their main support point in the region. In accordance with the "Nixon Doctrine" ("Let the Asians fight the Asians"), the United States began to send Iran huge shipments of American weapons, with the aid of which it was supposed to secure a regional balance of power to the U.S. liking without Washington's direct military presence.

This approach--"low-profile" direct military presence--was originally supported by the Carter Administration as well. But the Iranian revolution completely undermined the policy of relying on local pro-American regimes. By the end of the last decade, there was not one reliable internal or external force in the Persian Gulf that the United States could use to protect its interests. Under these conditions, the U.S. leadership decided to rely primarily on its own military strength in the future.

These views were officially recorded in the "Carter Doctrine," which was announced in January 1980 by the American President. In particular, he announced Washington's intention to use U.S. military strength to secure the interests of this country in the Persian Gulf zone.⁹ The United States took on most of the burden of safeguarding the "security" of this region, primarily with the aid of special contingents adapted for rapid long-distance transfers (the Persian Gulf is more than 11,000 kilometers away from the United States).

When then Assistant Secretary of State H. Saunders explained the "Carter Doctrine" to the Congress, he commented that, in his opinion, what made it new was, in particular, its emphasis on American military presence in the region.¹⁰ The augmentation of this presence had begun earlier, however, when the U.S. Government used the Iranian crisis as an excuse to send two carrier task groups to the Persian Gulf. In the beginning of the 1980's the U.S. administration began to regard this region as a possible theater of war and, what is more, as one in which nuclear as well as conventional weapons might be used, as yet another "central strategic zone" (along with Western Europe and the Far East). When Z. Brzezinski, then the President's national security adviser, was interviewed by West Germany's DER SPIEGEL magazine, he said that there was now a "third zone of vital importance to the United States: the Persian Gulf and the Near East."¹¹

The "Carter Doctrine," which was, in the words of American political scientist W. Quandt, largely a response to the Iranian revolution, which had demonstrated the inefficacy of the American policy of relying on regional "understudies,"¹² aroused widespread criticism in the United States and in other countries. This doctrine, R. Tucker wrote, "is regarded by an increasing number of Americans and Western Europeans as a military response to an essentially nonmilitary problem; furthermore, it is a military response which is being used to preserve the status quo in a region where change might be the only indisputable fact."¹³ Prominent American researcher S. Hoffmann, in a discussion of the "average" Western European point of view, remarked that the "Carter Doctrine" was considered to be "militaristic and oversimplified" by the majority of researchers.¹⁴ In relation to the Persian Gulf,

according to Western analysts, the "weaknesses" of this doctrine were particularly apparent in two areas: In the first place, it actually proceeded from nothing more than reliance on military strength and could thereby create an extremely dangerous situation in the region; in the second place, the "Carter Doctrine" completely ignored the interests, desires and existing interrelations of Arab states in this region, as well as their relationship with the rest of the Arab world.

Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration, judging by events during its first year in office, has not only accepted the previous administration's policy in this area, including its most criticized elements, but has decided to make them even more rigid. This applies above all to the anti-Soviet, antisocialist elements of the "Carter Doctrine." When U.S. Secretary of State Haig was pretending to be the chief engineer of American foreign policy, he said, in reference to the Persian Gulf zone, that "our dominant consideration is the strategic importance of the region" and that all problems in this area, including those connected with oil deliveries, "should be approached with a view to the increasing (!) Soviet (!) intervention in the region." The secretary of state went on to declare, expressing this nation's characteristic imperial ambitions, that it was in the "common interest" of all countries in this region to "counteract this danger in every way possible."¹⁵

This statement provides some idea of the Reagan Administration's general line, which lies at the basis of its practical policy toward the Persian Gulf. It envisages the reinforcement of the "rapid deployment forces" and the preparation of a local system of bases and installations for temporary or permanent U.S. presence in the region; the achievement of a "strategic consensus" between Washington and the states in this part of the world and an anti-Soviet "strategic community" of these states; the encouragement of Western European and other allies to safeguard "order and security" in the Persian Gulf, including direct or indirect contributions to the augmentation of military potential here.

The plans to create "rapid deployment forces," intended for use in "non-NATO" situations--that is, outside of Europe--in the 1980's, were among the basic elements of the Democratic administration's policy virtually from the very beginning, according to a report by a special study mission set up by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. Congress.¹⁶ The idea was first brought up at the time of the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973 and then lay at the basis of the Carter Administration's decision in August 1977 to create a special unit of mobile armed forces, which would mean that American troops in Western Europe and Asia would not have to be involved in "local conflicts." During Carter's last year in office, the question of interventionist "rapid deployment forces" was a matter of primary and constant concern.

A great deal of attention was simultaneously given to the buildup of American naval presence in the Indian Ocean, including the Persian Gulf, which, according to R. Komer, assistant secretary of defense in the Democratic administration, was already "significant" by the beginning of the 1980's.¹⁷ The United States reinforced its Near East squadron, operating in the Persian Gulf or close to it, and sent two carrier task groups to the Indian Ocean.

Members of the previous and the present administrations have repeatedly stressed the primary significance of the naval aspect of U.S. policy. Washington needs

U.S. naval ships not only and not so much for displaying the American flag as for carrying military contingents and military equipment to be used in a "crisis situation" in addition to servicemen flown to the region in civil aviation and Air Force planes.

The emphasis on naval presence, according to the American leadership, will eliminate the need for large land bases in the Persian Gulf zone because heavy weapons, ammunition and so forth can be stored on ships, and it will establish the material prerequisites for the transfer of "rapid deployment forces."

The Pentagon is planning specific actions with a view to the experience of the "Iranian crisis." It believes that the United States is capable of forming two carrier task groups in the Arabian Sea within a relatively short time--within 2 weeks. Land-based aviation can be transferred within a few days. Special infantry units, kept in a state of high readiness, would be transferred to the area on troop carriers within a week (light brigade) or 2 weeks (light division). Marine subdivisions could be transferred to the region within the same amount of time. According to the program adopted by the Carter Administration to considerably augment U.S. capabilities, a "transitional" group of 7, and later 14, ships with equipment and ammunition for a Marine brigade would be deployed and CX transport planes would be built at a cost of around 11 billion dollars.¹⁸

Steps were simultaneously taken to reinforce military transport aviation, which reflected Washington's desire to supplement its growing naval presence in the Persian Gulf and on the approaches to it and to create the potential for the effective and rapid transfer of American military contingents to this region, especially the "rapid deployment forces." The original plan called for these forces to number 100,000 men, but by the end of the previous administration's term in office the projected figure was 200,000, with an "attached" reserve of another 100,000.

On the whole, American official and unofficial strategists and specialists in various fields support the idea of building up the mobile potential of U.S. armed forces and this country's naval presence in the Indian Ocean, although many have openly expressed doubts about the expediency of carrying out these plans in their present form. One fairly popular view is that the creation of the "rapid deployment forces" will not be enough and that viable concepts with regard to their use are also needed. For example, K. van Hollen believes that "it is important to realistically assess" the possibilities of using military force in specific situations in the Persian Gulf countries with consideration for the "presence of strict limitations of an objective nature" on the use of American troops and for the vulnerability of oil production facilities and pipelines: the "confinement" of the export of two-thirds of the oil to only three ports with eight pumping stations, which could be easily destroyed, etc. Besides this, "even conservative states like Saudi Arabia," he stresses, "have declared that they would rather blow up their oilfields than allow them to fall into foreign hands."¹⁹

According to frequent verbal and written statements in the United States, however, the U.S. interventionist forces are intended expressly for the seizure of oil deposits and of everything connected with the extraction, transport and shipment of oil. An excuse for this might be found, for example, in an embargo or a

considerable reduction of oil exports as a result of "revolution or internal disorder" in an Arab country or intraregional conflicts. For example, K. Waltz believes that decisions on the use of the "rapid deployment forces" should be approached with great caution for the maximum "postponement" of U.S. military actions in the Persian Gulf because they could cause the situation to deteriorate sharply.

It has been suggested that a small, highly mobile sea-based contingent could be created in place of the "rapid deployment forces." For example, the previously mentioned van Hollen has supported this idea because "the majority of states in the Persian Gulf regard the rapid deployment forces as more of a threat to their oil resources than a means of defending them against 'external danger.'"²⁰

The Arab countries have been particularly disturbed by the statements by some Pentagon spokesmen regarding the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in the region, which could be transferred there on the same pretext of the Soviet "military threat."

It is completely obvious that waving the nuclear stick for purposes of blackmail will not strengthen security in the Persian Gulf. What is more, by creating the possibility of the "local" use of nuclear weapons by Washington, it creates the danger of an all-out nuclear conflict.

The Regional 'Security Structure'

Like the Democrats, the Reagan Administration has made a great effort to find allies or, rather, policemen to defend American "vital interests."

In Washington's view, the best choice would be a broad anti-Soviet bloc of states stretching from Pakistan in the east to Egypt and Turkey in the west, including Saudi Arabia and some of its neighbors, as well as Israel. What is more, the latter is being relied on most--as the striking force.²¹

According to many American experts, however, this goal is virtually unattainable, just as the idea of forming a pro-Western alliance of states directly in the Persian Gulf zone is doomed to failure, although Washington has made some attempts to attain concrete results. During the first year of the present U.S. administration, several reports in the American press referred to attempts like this, calling them attempts to create a regional "security structure."

The United States has been forcing a "security structure" on this part of the world for several years now. According to the Carter Administration, it was supposed to consist of two main elements. The first would be a series of bilateral U.S. agreements with the countries of this region. The second would be "special relations" between the Persian Gulf states and some of their neighbors, such as Pakistan. In plans for multilateral, including intraregional, cooperation, the Pentagon assigned priority to the reinforcement of U.S. ties with individual countries in the region. The Pentagon is mainly motivated by a desire for access to what it prefers to call "auxiliary facilities" rather than military bases. "The viability of U.S. military policy will depend to a critical extent" on this, R. Komer stressed.²² Washington officials have often said that the United States does

not need traditional military bases and is simply trying to secure the capability for the military and technical supply of the "rapid deployment forces."

Steps in this direction are being taken in line with the so-called "network theory" worked out for the Persian Gulf zone by the Carter Administration. This theory envisages the creation of a network of U.S. military facilities, linked into the Diego Garcia base, which is supposed to give general naval and air support to American armed forces. The entire system of U.S. "auxiliary facilities" in the region should create the necessary conditions for permanent American presence and for the transfer of additional military contingents to the region, especially the "rapid deployment forces."

Washington has exerted strong pressure on a number of states, employing its favorite "stick and carrot" tactic, and forced Kenya, Somalia and Oman to sign agreements in June-August 1980 on the allocation of their territory for American facilities.

As for the states directly in the Persian Gulf zone, Oman has an agreement on "auxiliary facilities" with the United States. Washington is still not certain whether it will be able to use these facilities to intervene in intraregional conflicts and other crisis situations because, as a special congressional report noted, this country is "extremely sensitive about direct U.S. military presence."²³ The United Arab Emirates have objected to the American military presence and agreements like the one signed by the United States and Oman. Although Bahrain has served as an operational base for the U.S. Navy's Near East squadron since 1949, it is reluctant to take the risk of broader military cooperation with Washington, as experts testified in congressional hearings. The anti-Americanism of the present Iranian leadership is no secret.

Saudi Arabia plays a special role in U.S. plans. The United States, as the American press has repeatedly noted, is trying to make this country the main support base of its policy in the Persian Gulf. In particular, Washington wanted Saudi Arabia to be the initiator of regional "military cooperation." To this end, Washington is prepared to continue sending huge shipments of the most modern weapons to Saudi Arabia (between 1971 and 1978 Saudi Arabia received weapons and military equipment worth a total of 19 billion dollars from the United States).²⁴ The decision on the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia testifies that the Reagan Administration views the long-term technical assistance connected with Riyadh's acquisition of the AWACS systems as a means of making Saudi Arabia the focal point of the regional Washington-designed "security structure."

The Pentagon intends to build military installations here which can be used by American armed forces. Furthermore, the efforts of Pentagon emissaries have been aimed at having "the Saudis themselves build these installations, which can later be used by rapid deployment forces."²⁵

Not all American experts approve of this, however. There are those who stress that the government must not forget the "lessons" it learned from its previous policy toward Iran and are warning against the excessive buildup of a Saudi army that might turn into a force capable of a coup d'etat. They have also pointed out the Saudi opposition to American military presence in the Persian Gulf. For example, a WASHINGTON POST article entitled "Saudis Looking Askance at U.S. Military Role"

reported that in November 1981 "Saudi Arabia and other Arab states in the Persian Gulf offered the Sultanate of Oman 1.2 billion dollars in aid if Oman would consent to cancel the agreements allowing the United States to use its military facilities." By making this move, the article noted, "Oman would receive approximately the same amount it apparently expects to receive from Washington in the form of military and economic aid in exchange for authorizing the United States to use the Oman bases." The newspaper stressed that the official Saudi view is that "the Persian Gulf states should keep the United States at a distance."²⁶

Virtually all of the Persian Gulf countries refused at one time or another to approve the "Carter Doctrine" and they are viewing the manipulations of the present U.S. administration with considerable suspicion.

Having no solid base of support directly in the Persian Gulf zone, such as, for example, Israel in the Middle East, American ruling circles are planning the "collective" resolution of its "security problems" along with the United States' allies in various military blocs. A significant role has been assigned to the NATO countries.

'Division of Labor'

It was pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress that "the United States is trying to broaden the functions of the NATO bloc so that expenses can be shared with other countries and so that the NATO partners can simultaneously be bound more closely to the United States. Washington strategists obviously want to involve dozens of other states in their own military preparations and enmesh the world in a web of their own bases, airfields and weapon depots."

As for the "defense" of the Persian Gulf, the American leadership has frankly said that it will require the assistance of its "junior partners," stressing that the interaction of Western countries is supposedly dictated by their common exceptional interest in securing safe access to the region's oil.

It is no secret that the expansion of the geographic limits of NATO's "responsibility" has long been discussed by its members. In particular, it was suggested that the Persian Gulf zone and even the Indian Ocean should be included in the bloc's sphere of action. It soon became clear, however, that the allies' differences of opinion are so great that this idea is politically impracticable.²⁷

This was followed by the suggestion of a strategic "division of labor," so to speak, on an individual basis, in accordance with which, R. Komer, assistant secretary of defense in the Carter Administration, stressed, "the United States must take on greater responsibility, on behalf of the entire Western world, for deterrence and defense in a region where only the United States has the actual strategic potential needed for this." But Washington demanded that its Asian and European allies "do more for the defense of Northeast Asia and Western Europe."²⁸

For the United States' Western European NATO partners, this was an appeal for the continuous growth of military budgets, for the reinforcement of the bloc's armed forces in Central Europe and on its flanks, especially the southern one, and for greater solidarity in matters connected with the military policy of the North

Atlantic alliance. Some of Washington's allies took on special commitments. For example, the FRG took Turkey under its "patronage,"²⁹ giving it considerable military and economic assistance.

Washington concluded that countries with experience in military actions in this part of the world, such as, for example, England and France, should unite with the United States in securing "regional defense," with Australian troops and subunits from other allies "east of Suez" joining them in the event of "complications."

Significant doubts have been voiced in the West, however, about the actual methods of "sharing the burden." People there believe it would be more realistic to expect Washington's Western European and Asian allies to contribute by giving the Persian Gulf states economic aid, and sometimes even military assistance, in peacetime, with a view to the fact that some Western European countries might make use of the remnants of their earlier influence in the region in the common interest of the imperialist camp.

In this context, Great Britain has been assigned a prominent role, particularly because it has retained some special influence in Oman. As for France, its "duties" are connected with Saudi Arabia, which it (and several other NATO members) supplies with weapons, and with Iraq. The United States has not had diplomatic relations with Baghdad for many years now, while France still has fairly broad ties with this capital. Washington would like to use these, along with Italian and Japanese trade contacts, to drive a wedge between Iraq and the socialist countries. Operating through its allies, especially the FRG and Japan, the United States is also trying to return one of the strategically most important Persian Gulf states, Iran, to the "West's bosom," making every effort to urge ruling circles in this country to take an anti-Soviet stand. In fact, the Washington administration is trying to impose a harsh anti-Soviet policy on the Persian Gulf countries as well as on its own allies.

Another extremely dangerous element of U.S. policy, which is having a destabilizing effect on the region and poses the real threat of armed conflicts, is the encouragement of the militarization of countries in the region and the saturation of this zone with the most diverse weapons. As we know, when Reagan took office he lifted all restrictions on weapon sales.

The socialist states see another way of guaranteeing peace and security in the Persian Gulf zone and on the approaches to it, proceeding from the need to solve problems with a view to the legitimate interests of all sides. The Soviet Union's proposals have been widely publicized. When L. I. Brezhnev addressed Indian parliamentarians on 10 December 1980, he said: "We want the United States, the other Western powers, China, Japan and all other interested states to agree on the following mutual commitments:

"Not to establish foreign military bases in the Persian Gulf zone and on adjacent islands; not to deploy nuclear arms or any other weapons of mass destruction there;

"Not to use force or threaten the use of force against any Persian Gulf country and not to interfere in their internal affairs;

"To respect the nonaligned status chosen by the Persian Gulf states; not to encourage them to join any military groups with nuclear members;

"To respect the sovereign right of states in this region to their own natural resources;

"Not to create any obstacles or threats to normal commercial exchange and the use of shipping lanes connecting the states in this region with other countries in the world."³⁰

The question of securing peace in the Persian Gulf was brought up again at the 26th CPSU Congress, which remarked on the Soviet initiative aimed at the creation of an atmosphere of stability and calm in this region through the conclusion of the appropriate international agreement, taking the legitimate interests of all sides into account.

This initiative has won widespread support in the world, including the support of some Persian Gulf states. But Washington and the NATO countries are among its opponents. It is not difficult to guess why. An atmosphere of peace and calm and the consideration of the legitimate interests of states in this region do not enter into U.S. plans. The goals of its strategy are the direct opposite.

FOOTNOTES

1. DEFENSE NATIONALE, August-September 1980, p 53.
2. TIME, 16 March 1981, p 18.
3. "U.S. Interests in, and Policies Toward, the Persian Gulf, 1980," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Wash., 1980, p 218.
4. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 1981, p 55.
5. COMMENTARY, November 1980, p 26.
6. "U.S. Interests in, and Policies Toward, the Persian Gulf," p 311.
7. See V. F. Davydov, "U.S.-English Military and Political Cooperation 'East of Suez,'" SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 11, 1971.
8. See A. D. Portnyagin, "The Collapse of CENTO," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 7, 1979.
9. "U.S. Interests in, and Policies Toward, the Persian Gulf," p 12.
10. Ibid., p 26.
11. DER SPIEGEL, 21 April 1980, p 160.

12. "U.S. Interests in, and Policies Toward, the Persian Gulf," p 135.
13. COMMENTARY, November 1980, p 25.
14. THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 17 July 1980, p 41 ff.
15. "Department of State Press Briefing by Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Israeli Foreign Minister Litzhar Shamir,"[sic] Wash., 24 February 1981, p 13
16. "U.S. Security Interests in the Persian Gulf," Report of a Staff Study Mission to the Persian Gulf, Middle East and the Horn of Africa to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Wash., 1981, p 4.
17. "U.S. Interests in, and Policies Toward, the Persian Gulf," p 64.
18. Ibid., pp 64, 84.
19. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1981, p 1067.
20. Ibid., p 1066.
21. For more about Israel's role in Washington's strategy in the entire Near and Middle East region, see S. M. Rogov, "The American-Israeli Alliance: Its Nature and Peculiarities," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 1, 1982--Editor's note.
22. "U.S. Interests in, and Policies Toward, the Persian Gulf," p 65.
23. "U.S. Security Interests in the Persian Gulf," p 4.
24. SURVIVAL, January/February 1981, p 38.
25. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 2 March 1981, p 34.
26. THE WASHINGTON POST, 2 December 1981.
27. For more detail, see S. A. Ulin, "American Plans To Expand the NATO Zone," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 7, 1981--Editor's note.
28. "U.S. Interests in, and Policies Toward, the Persian Gulf," p 76.
29. As for Turkey, it is this country's geographic location that appeals most to the United States and to NATO in general: It borders on Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Soviet Union and is actually adjacent to the Persian Gulf zone. "In contrast to some other states in the region," a report prepared for the American Congress stressed, "Turkey has airfields that are completely ready to use and essentially meet NATO standards. Planes taking off from these bases could easily reach any crisis point north of the gulf" ("U.S. Security Interests in the Persian Gulf," p 90).
30. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following in Lenin's Footsteps], vol 8, Moscow, 1981, pp 557-558.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982

SOVIET MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE TO U.S. AGGRESSIVENESS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 12 Apr 82) pp 49-52

[Article by R. G. Bogdanov: "The Key Issue is the Prevention of Nuclear War"]

[Text] It is again the month of May. It is spring, the time when the flowers bloom. Once again thoughts about May 1945, when Hitler's military machine was finally smashed, come to life in everyone's memory. People remember that this defeat, with the Soviet Union making the decisive contribution, was accomplished through the efforts of the allied powers, including the United States.

It has been 37 years since that time. "Minor" wars have been started by imperialism, but through the truly titanic efforts of the Soviet Union and people in all countries, peace on the planet as a whole has been maintained and is being strengthened. This is why the senseless attempts of sinister forces to knock the props out from under the structure of peace that took so much work and such great effort to build are now evoking so much anxiety, anger and opposition.

At the 17th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions, L. I. Brezhnev defined the present state of international affairs. He stressed that it was probably not enough to merely call it complex and acute. It is arousing anxiety about the future development of international relations. It could probably be said that international relations as a whole have now come to a clearly marked fork in the road.

On one side is the road toward stronger peace and peaceful cooperation by all states. On the other side is the road under which mankind is being strongly urged by the self-proclaimed champions of cold war and dangerous brinksmanship.

We should recall that the policy of the Reagan Administration has been marked since the first days after the inauguration by an adventuristic approach to the most serious problems impinging on the fate of mankind. The world has already witnessed the attempts of the most aggressive members of U.S. ruling circles to assume the "right" to command some and to judge and "punish" others. They try to replace normal relations between countries with "sanctions" and blockades, to replace contacts and talks with the mounting threat of the use of armed force, right up to the use of nuclear weapons. These circles would like to disregard the legal and ethical standards of relations between states and nullify their independence and sovereignty. They are trying to redesign the map of the world

by declaring vast regions of the planet on all continents zones of their own "vital interests." Washington's line has been quite justifiably described throughout the world, and even in the United States, as one leading to catastrophe.

Militaristic aims in U.S. foreign policy are nothing new. What is "new" is that the foreground of the political stage has once again been occupied, for the first time since the cold war, by the most rabid representatives of the military-industrial complex, conservatives and racists who have never given up the great-power ideology and the sacred belief that the United States can and must be "superior" to the rest of the world. It is these circles that have given the administration a "mandate" to turn military force into the main U.S. political instrument in relations with the rest of the world. Their ideas, which are set down in pseudoscientific centers and in various rightwing associations and organizations, are now having the most direct effect on the foreign policy line of the Reagan Administration. Primitive, frenzied anti-Sovietism has once again been chosen as their banner.

The bases of these ideas have been reinforced by Washington's recent moves and measures. The fairly recent decision regarding the full-scale production of neutron weapons is now to be followed by such dangerous steps as the deployment of the MX system, the development of Trident 2 missiles, the deployment of Pershing 2 medium-range missiles and three types of cruise missiles in Europe and the improvement of several other systems. Within 10 years, 17,000 pieces of nuclear hardware are to be added to the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which now consists of around 30,000 pieces. President Reagan's decision to begin intense preparations for chemical warfare was recently announced.

For decades, the United States has been the leader in the development and accumulation of chemical weapons--just as of other types. Research and development in this sphere have been conducted constantly. Now the Pentagon plans the large-scale production of binary charges filled with a lethal nerve-paralyzing compound and is perfecting the use of toxic substances. The United States is sabotaging the talks on a chemical ban because it wants a free hand.

The present administration's senseless aims and plans are being reinforced by the development of concepts about waging and even "winning" a nuclear war. These concepts are based on the hope of disrupting the present approximate balance of forces and acquiring military superiority over the Soviet Union. This is not being concealed in Washington. The creation of a "safety margin" is mentioned several times as an "important goal" of military organization in the reports submitted by U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the Congress on 8 February. This only partially camouflages the plans to make the United States militarily superior to the Soviet Union. In this context, the United States especially wants to change the balance of forces in Europe in the West's favor. The possible effects of these plans and expectations on Europe and the rest of the world can be judged from a statement by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy J. Wade. "The acquisition of the potential to wage nuclear war," he said, "is a fundamental and necessary part of the policy of containment.... We must be prepared to carry the nuclear battle to enemy territory. We must not be afraid of war." Among the conditions which should secure the U.S. potential to fight a

nuclear war, Wade mentioned the existence of a balanced group of medium-range nuclear systems, deployed according to the principles of forward basing.

All of these measures and other recent steps taken by the United States testify that the militaristic line and aggressive policy of the NATO bloc, headed by the United States, are becoming increasingly dangerous to the cause of peace and public security.

Convincing evidence of this can also be seen in the recent developments in the Caribbean and Central America. Washington has openly threatened Cuba, has conducted naval maneuvers involving the ships of several NATO countries near the Cuban coastline, is intensifying preparations for direct armed intervention in Nicaragua and is giving political support and direct military assistance to the dictatorial regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala.

Under the cover of shameless lies and various types of rumors, Washington is trying to create a political climate here that would facilitate the organization of new American adventures in this region. The nature of the Pentagon's real plans can be judged merely from the acknowledgments of Admiral T. Hayward, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who recently announced that U.S. military leaders are examining the "possible variants" of the extensive use of the Navy and Marines in Central America and the Caribbean. Without considering the dangerous consequences of this policy, Washington has continuously escalated tension and intensified its campaign of intimidation.

As J. Martin, former U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic, wrote recently in a WASHINGTON POST article, in the last century the United States has been responsible for 199 cases of undeclared military aggression abroad, and 81 took place in Latin America. What next?

In a thorough appraisal of the aggressive policy of the NATO bloc, with the United States at its head, L. I. Brezhnev stressed:

"Objectively speaking, the plans to continue creating international friction, escalating the arms race and disrupting normal relations between states can benefit neither side. And this naturally includes the American side. But they could bring many misfortunes to all mankind. This is why we are firmly convinced that this kind of policy cannot win public support and has no future. The sooner its initiators realize this, the better off everyone will be."

As for the Soviet Union, it is calmly and confidently continuing its work to strengthen peace and develop peaceful cooperation by all states--cooperation based on the strongest respect for the independence, rights and interests of each state, on nonintervention in internal affairs and on concerted action to consolidate universal security and mutual trust. It is this policy that was clearly defined in the decisions of the Helsinki conference and in many other international documents of the last decade. This line has been confirmed by the actual experience of people, especially the Europeans.

Of course, given the present situation, the Soviet Union has had to take steps to maintain its defense potential at the necessary level. If the U.S. Government and its NATO allies were to pose any real additional threats to the security of

the Soviet Union and its allies, the Soviet Union would have to retaliate in ways that would put the other side, including the United States' own territory, in a similar position.

Striving for reasonable agreements based on the equality and equal security of sides, the Soviet Union resolved to institute a unilateral freeze on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR, which will be in effect either until an agreement has been reached with the United States on the reduction of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe, based on equality and equivalent security, or until such time as the U.S. leaders decide to disregard the security of others and begin actual preparations for the deployment of Pershing 2 missiles and cruise missiles in Europe.

Besides this, the Soviet Union intends to reduce its medium-range missiles by a specific quantity this year, if there is no new friction in international relations. The USSR has requested the U.S. Government not to set up any artificial obstacles to inhibit the SALT talks and to begin them without delay. It has also proposed that, until the talks are resumed, both sides pledge not to open any new arms race channels and not to deploy any submarine- or land-based long-range cruise missiles. The Soviet Union would be willing to negotiate the mutual limitation of naval actions. In particular, the USSR believes that the missile-carrying submarines of both sides could be withdrawn from their present vast patrol regions so that their navigation could be limited to mutually acceptable areas. The Soviet Union would also be willing to discuss the extension of confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans, particularly in the zones of the most lively shipping.

These are the new Soviet proposals aimed at curbing the arms race and preventing a new world war.

These proposals, which were set forth by L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at the 17th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions, have had exceptionally widespread repercussions throughout the world. Prominent politicians and public spokesmen throughout the world regard the Soviet Union's new, specific and far-reaching proposals as clear evidence of its sincere desire to eliminate the threat of war, put an end to the arms race and preserve and consolidate detente.

Official circles in the United States and their closest military and political allies, however, immediately tried to denigrate the new Soviet peaceful initiatives by implying that there was nothing new about them. Statements by President Reagan proved that the American Administration cannot take an objective approach to the Soviet proposals. The position of Washington spokesmen reaffirms the fact that they, judging by all indications, want to make unlimited use of their military potential and spread the arms race to every part of the world. Instead of replying specifically to the new Soviet peaceful initiatives, the American Administration has tried to juggle statistics and misinform people about medium-range nuclear weapons and has deliberately said nothing about the American forward-based systems and sea-based missiles with 7,000-warhead capability.

Washington's response to the Soviet proposals has been more than just negative; it has responded with extreme irritation. This reaffirms the fact that Washington officials approach all proposals regarding arms limitation and measures to

strengthen mutual trust from the same standpoint: from the standpoint of whether they will further inhibit the implementation of their militaristic plans, their plans to escalate the arms race and their plans to deploy new American missiles in Western Europe.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to carry out such plans today, however. The extreme importance of the Soviet initiatives is confirmed by the fact that they have taken the primary place in world politics and have made all other issues secondary. This is strong evidence that the world has rejected Washington's policy based on the concepts of aggression, armed intervention and confrontation.

This must be understood by those who are trying to substitute the policy of cowboy ambushes for a sensible and responsible policy.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'svo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982

8588

CSO: 1803/12

WASHINGTON'S ANTI-POLISH HYSTERIA AND WESTERN EUROPE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 12 Apr 82) pp 53-57

[Article by Yu. Davydov; passages between slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Washington's escalation of the anti-Polish campaign, intensified after the introduction of martial law in Poland on 13 December 1981, is continuing. The stages of the escalation were the 11 January 1982 conference of NATO foreign ministers and the anti-Polish TV spectacular in which the Reagan Administration involved about 10 European leaders. Next in line are the NATO Council session at the level of heads of government and state, planned for 8-10 June, and the economic summit conference of heads of the seven major capitalist states in Paris on 5-6 June. It is expected that at both meetings Washington will again try to exert pressure on the allies with the aim of enlisting their more active support, primarily in economic sanctions against Poland and the USSR, pressure that will be all the stronger since the "arm-twisting" this time is to take place at the summit level, for which the President himself has decided to cross the Atlantic for the first time.

There is no doubt that these attempts reflect the desire of R. Reagan's Administration to increase the potential for pressure on the Polish leadership, internationalize the Polish crisis and create an atmosphere around Poland which would hinder the solution of the crisis in the interests of socialism within Poland itself.

At the same time, another aim can be seen behind these aspirations in addition to their global trend of weakening socialism and increasing international tension: This whole hysterical campaign is, to a considerable degree, geared to the allies and must compel them, according to Washington's scheme, to follow in the wake of U.S. policy.

Trying to internationalize the crisis situation in Poland and asserting that it is a "major issue" in international relations and that the course of the official Polish authorities (operating, it is alleged, on the Soviet Union's instigation) is a "very great threat to peace," Washington is not only reminding its partners of their common class interest in opposing world socialism but is also hoping to strengthen its leadership within NATO.

In its approach to the Polish situation, the Reagan Administration has brought economic sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union to the fore. And this is no coincidence considering the fact that both states are major trading partners of Western Europe and Japan. Fairly stable and broad economic ties developed in the 1970's between the socialist community countries and the U.S. allies in Europe. Suffice it to say that at present the volume of trade between the EEC and the states of the European socialist zone generally exceeds the community's trade with the United States (although economic relations among the Atlantic partners, of course, are not restricted to the trade sphere), economic ties between the two parts of Europe which are marked by stability and a tendency toward growth have enabled Western Europe to diversify its sources of raw materials, primarily energy, and this, plus other factors, forces its ruling circles to view East-West detente as something that by and large meets their interests. This position is causing a negative reaction on their part to Washington's attempts to worsen relations between the socialist and capitalist industrially developed states.

The Western European countries are now encountering an unusual situation. On the one hand, economic ties with the East help to resolve their internal economic problems, including the promotion of employment (this is exceptionally important primarily for the social democratic governments). For this reason at least, and despite Washington pressure, they find it difficult to view the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries as an enemy and as the "main threat to peace." But the character of economic relations with the United States (their most "loyal friend") and, above all, the effect of "Reaganomics" on these relations are undermining the efforts of Western European ruling circles to resolve the economic problems that they are encountering. Furthermore, Washington's economic policy is, to a great extent, seriously worsening the economic situation in the Western European states. This situation gave the West German magazine DER SPIEGEL grounds for remarking that many West Europeans fear the Bolsheviks less than their U.S. allies.

The course toward undermining mutually beneficial economic ties between the Western European countries and the Soviet Union and a number of other socialist countries is by no means something absolutely new or characteristic solely of the present administration's policy. Let us recall that this line began to appear quite clearly in the previous Democratic Administration's policy. On that occasion the Carter Administration availed itself of the events in Afghanistan. As we know, it too introduced sanctions against the Soviet Union and strove for the broad participation of its allies in implementing them. The present administration has used the events in Poland as a pretext for stiffening this course. The Reagan Administration is "involving" America's allies in that policy by far more vigorous and tough methods.

And it is not just a question of Washington's desire to weaken the socialist community and simultaneously consolidate "Atlantic solidarity" and its position as the West's political leader. The fact is that Washington is also quite consciously counting on weakening the Western European countries' economic positions in comparison with the United States. Looking at matters objectively, this is what Washington's efforts are aimed at--not just at discrediting the very idea of expanding economic relations between the Western European countries and the USSR (and at the same time with their other major partner, Poland) but also at wrecking

previously concluded contracts, above all those of a long-term nature such as the gas pipeline deal.

Now let us consider the following factor. We are approaching 1983--the deadline when, according to the NATO "dual" decision, U.S. medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads are to be deployed in Western Europe (unless results are obtained at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear arms limitation in Europe). This prospect is worrying Western European leaders increasingly since they realize that the situation in which the "Eurostrategic arms" deployment decision was taken is substantially different from the present one, primarily because Washington has effectively broken off the SALT process. Furthermore, its desire to assign Western Europe the role of a "nuclear cordon sanitaire" protecting the United States from retaliation has provoked the kind of broad antimilitarist movement on the continent, mainly of an anti-American tendency, that not one West European government can ignore.

In playing up the Polish theme and portraying the USSR as the main source of tension in Europe, Washington is hoping to neutralize the influence of the Soviet peace initiatives, stem the antimissile, anti-U.S. wave which has arisen in Western Europe, block the Geneva talks behind verbiage about martial law in Poland and, ultimately, deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

The U.S. Administration is working along several avenues to achieve all these aims. Above all, it is using NATO channels, demanding concerted tough decisions and action on "the Polish question" in the name of "Atlantic solidarity," blackmailing its partners--should they be recalcitrant--with the prospect of reducing the U.S. military presence in Western Europe and threatening to torpedo once and for all any possibility of the continuation of the all-European process begun in Helsinki.

As. L. I. Brezhnev noted in his speech to the 17th USSR Trade Union Congress, revealing the genuine motives of Washington's stance at the Madrid meeting, "...the real aim in Madrid was to inflame the general atmosphere even further and thereby facilitate the implementation of the United States' sinister plans for Western Europe."

The atmosphere of international tension, particularly in Soviet-U.S. relations, the atmosphere of hysteria created by Washington over Poland and its attempts to internationalize the Polish crisis are of course having considerable influence on the position of Western European ruling circles. Under the conditions of an East-West confrontation and even if that confrontation is being whipped up artificially, the majority of Western European leaders, perhaps not so much /from Atlantic/ as /from class/ solidarity, are at times ready and at times compelled, to a particular degree or in a particular form, to support their transatlantic partner's anti-socialist attacks. Evidence of this was provided by the "statement on the events in Poland" signed by the NATO members in Brussels on 11 January, which demanded the lifting of martial law in Poland and the authorization of the "Solidarity" leadership to continue its activity, which was effectively aimed at wrecking the socialist system. The statement is an attempt at flagrant interference in a sovereign socialist state's internal affairs. In the statement the NATO allies pledged themselves to examine "measures which may include a decision on imports

from the Soviet Union, agreements on marine shipments, air communications, the scale of Soviet trade representation, export credit terms and so forth. The statement contained hints that if matters in Poland did not develop as the NATO leadership wanted, the United States might fully block talks on very important questions, including the problem of nuclear arms limitation in Europe.

Following this, the EEC "ten" (at the foreign minister level), adopted a communique which described the Polish situation in even harsher and more categorical terms. It spoke of the EEC's resolve to adopt economic sanctions against Poland and the USSR should they not accept the West's demands. French President F. Mitterand, FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt, British Prime Minister M. Thatcher and others participated in a 31 January 1982 TV propaganda spectacular organized by the Reagan Administration and staged by the International Communication Agency (the U.S. foreign policy propaganda department).

However, there are serious divergences in approaches to "Polish affairs" on both sides of the ocean, not that they are convergent among the various Western European countries.

First, when defining their position toward Poland, the majority of West European politicians, unlike the U.S. ruling elite, tend to proceed to a greater extent from the realities of postwar Europe. This applies above all to the assessment of the situation in Poland and the possible ways in which the situation on the continent might be affected by the actions of counterrevolutionary forces in Poland and the measures taken by the Polish Government. This has been most apparent in the position of countries such as Greece. Let us recall that it refused to sign the NATO foreign ministers' statement of 11 January 1982 and disavowed its EEC representative who agreed to the "ten's" Brussels declaration. A more balanced assessment of the Polish situation is also present in a number of official comments by Copenhagen and Bonn, despite some inconsistency and hesitation. When he was interviewed by the Dutch newspaper HAAGSCHE COURANT on 1 March 1982, Chancellor H. Schmidt deemed it necessary to stress that "nowdays an attempt to split one Warsaw Pact country off from the remaining members--so long as two systems and two pacts exist--would be a supremely dangerous operation." The West German magazine STERN published an article on 12 January 1982 by its chief editor, W. Nannen, who wrote: "It would simply be hypocrisy to ignore the fact that an increasing role was being played within 'Solidarity' by extremists who had lost all contact with reality and were simply going too far." Further on, the author admitted quite categorically: "The Jaruzelski Government, which can rely on the indestructible prestige of the army and the people, acted on its own authority and not on Russian orders."

Second, many West European leaders realize that the sanctions policy, toward which the Reagan Administration is nudging them, will not yield the results for which it was designed and, furthermore, will inevitably have a "boomerang effect." The recent experience of the Carter Administration's use of sanctions over the Afghan events highlighted this for all to see. The sanctions policy may now also hurt the West European economy, which is already experiencing a crisis. Some 300,000 jobs created by Soviet orders in the FRG alone cannot be left out of the reckoning when there are nearly 2 million unemployed in the country. And this does not apply only to West Germany.

Western Europe as a whole cannot fail to realize that the fulfillment of the U.S. demands would threaten the entire structure of the political and economic relations on the European continent which took shape here during the detente years and which meet the interests of the Western European countries just as much as they meet their socialist partners' interests. Washington's sanctions, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington noted, "will deal a far more serious blow, on the political and economic level, to the West European countries' relations with Moscow than to Soviet-U.S. relations."

Third, Western Europe is aware that Washington is trying to redirect West Europe's increased might to an economic and political confrontation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries and would like to avoid the resolution of the most important European problems and the imminent restructuring of inter-Atlantic relations or, in any event, to implement the restructuring on U.S. terms. After all, it is now becoming increasingly obvious that the principles on which "Atlantic partnership" was based in the 1950's and 1960's are outdated and do not correspond to the altered international situation, to the new disposition of forces within the bloc itself or to the divergence of interests which has appeared between the two centers of the capitalist world. Tremendous potential for mutual dissatisfaction has built up on both sides of the Atlantic, creating a need to reassess the alliance's old values. But the initial premises of that reassessment are by no means identical in the United States and Western Europe. Washington, realizing the inevitability of some concessions to its partners, is trying to preserve its privileges in the bloc, arising from its superior nuclear missile power, and is thus whipping up tension in the world and in Europe so as to justify increasing that power. Its partners' initial premises are different. An increasing number of Western European politicians are coming to the conclusion that the problem of limiting military potential, which Washington is trying to avoid solving, is at least of equal, if not greater, importance from the standpoint of West European security as the functioning of NATO itself. The West European leaders' unconditional support for the U.S. course of rigid confrontation with the Soviet Union and Poland would objectively mean a confirmation of the unshakeability of those principles which were the basis both of NATO and of the structure of U.S.-West European relations during the cold war years.

Fourth, and surely most important, the escalation of tension on the continent as a consequence of the outburst of anti-Polish and anti-Soviet hysteria in the United States does not correspond to the Western European states' interests in the sense that it does not promote the resolution of their problems in relations with the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, the United States, the developing states or with one another nor will it lead to a solution of their internal problems. In general, it will reduce Western Europe's potential in all these areas and will postpone the attainment of its long-term goal, which is the use of economic might to intensify its influence in the world so as to use this influence in the interest of its countries and their ruling elites, and not in the interest of the U.S. establishment.

Western Europe's political leaders are in a difficult situation. They are being involved in actions that are, in general, not in the Western European interest. Meanwhile, the framework of the NATO bloc, to whose orientation and functioning they have made, and are still making, a substantial contribution, restricts the opportunities for the pursuit of a policy which meets those interests.

On the whole, it can now be said that the anti-Polish and anti-Soviet hysteria fanned up by Washington, which was designed to, among other things, consolidate the "Atlantic partnership," has not only not achieved its set goal but, rather, has led to the opposite result. "A side-effect of the Polish crisis is that it has demonstrated the lack of understanding and trust within the Western alliance," London's TIMES wrote on 2 February 1982.

But it seems to be more than just another disagreement. Washington's anti-Polish and anti-Soviet hysteria has highlighted for Western Europe the fact that its "senior partner," the United States, is not only unreliable but also dangerous as a partner since it unhesitatingly threatens a cause of vital importance to everyone, the cause of creating a new structure of international relations with a view to the realities of the modern world.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'svo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya" 1982

CS0; 1803/12

REAGAN ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 12 Apr 82) pp 58-63

[Article by Yu. A. Yemshanov and S. K. Oznobishchev]

[Text] Questions connected with the development of science and technology, the major guidelines for scientific research and development, the forms and methods of realizing the advantages of American science and technology, the coordination of the efforts of government and private organizations in the development and incorporation of new technology and, naturally, the development of applied military research constitute one of the most important areas of any American administration's activity. A characteristic feature of the Reagan Administration's general approach to scientific and technical development is the intention to reduce financing in various fields and cut allocations for some projects. Although the level of federal participation in government research and development has stayed the same (the Republican administration allocated 400 billion dollars for these purposes in fiscal 1982), there has been an obvious reordering of priorities. The Department of Defense, which already received at least half of the federal budget research and development allocations, has increased its share by 8 percent in real terms in comparison to the previous fiscal year. Civilian research and development projects received almost 10 percent less federal financing and the financing level dropped in university science--"the pride of American research activity," as the press calls it. According to some estimates, the Republican administration could cut research and development allocations by another 3 billion dollars during the calendar year of 1982, but these would naturally be non-military research and development projects. If this should occur, total government expenditures on science would amount to only 37 billion dollars, which is already alarming the U.S. scientific community. On the whole, the list of research and development projects has not undergone any significant changes under the Reagan Administration. There were cuts in allocations for a number of environmental research projects,¹ space science has suffered--several planetary and outer space research projects have been cancelled or postponed--but power engineering allocations have remained on the same overall level. Private corporations have been requested to take a more active part in studying the achievements of fundamental science and to display more initiative in putting them to practical use.

Ronald Reagan set forth the basic elements of the present administration's program in science and technology during his campaign. He laid special emphasis on the

fact that, in his opinion, it is extremely important to develop the technical fields that will help to strengthen U.S. national security and turn American technology into the "best and most advanced in the world." He also said that he did not intend to "show restraint" with regard to the production of binary combat chemical charges² and planned to substitute them for several other types of chemical ammunition. The President's dangerous plan is already being carried out: Binary artillery charges of varying caliber are ready for use. Soon the U.S. Armed Forces will use this new type of chemical ammunition in basic types of artillery as well as airborne bombs, Lance surface-to-surface tactical missiles and cruise missiles.

Among fields of scientific and technical development connected with the resolution of pressing economic problems, Reagan singled out the study of alternative energy sources, "from solar energy to the production of energy from biomass." In contrast to the head of the Democratic administration, he supported federal allocations for nuclear power engineering, especially for the development of breeders. In Reagan's opinion, more attention should be given to increasing the proportional use of coal, primarily by using it as a raw material in the production of various synthetic fuels. He expressed his intention to support federal engineering and technical personnel training programs. He announced his intention to eliminate the "main obstacles" keeping technological innovations out of the private sector--high taxes and the "excessively complex" system of government regulation of technological progress.

The new administration did not propose any original changes in the priorities of U.S. scientific and technical policy. It has not introduced anything fundamentally new into the system linking technological potential with the arsenal of American diplomacy's "power instruments" either. The main reason is that the development, testing and incorporation of major technical systems take a fairly long time. In this sense, any new administration inherits technical potential from its predecessors. The changes made in the priorities of scientific and technical policy by any particular administration will only have an impact after a fairly long period of time, after it has left the political stage. The present Republican administration is no exception. It inherited a thoroughly mapped out strategy for the use of science and technology in the sphere of government policy from the Democrats.

Since the Republican administration has not set forth any well-balanced and integral theory about scientific and technical development, the new elements of its scientific and technical policy can only be determined from an analysis of its specific actions and policy-planning statements with regard to the objectives and problems to which it has assigned top priority and the organizational forms and methods of regulating technological progress which, according to the Republican leadership, should ensure the quickest possible resolution of these problems.

In spite of the general nature of the statements made by the President and his closest advisers regarding the future development of American science and technology, they have already displayed some common features which indicate the peculiarities and directions of the Republican administration's scientific and technical policy.

In the first place, they have displayed a striking, even more vividly expressed pragmatic approach to the development of science and technology, motivated by the

desire for immediate results. Furthermore, they have ignored the completely obvious negative effect of this approach on present and future generations of Americans and on the development of science itself. As for the various means and methods of analyzing the long-range consequences of technological progress (primarily the "technology assessment" methods that have already been perfected in the United States), members of the upper echelon of the present executive branch approach them with poorly concealed contempt. In particular, the President's special adviser on science and technology, J. Keyworth, frankly admitted that he was not familiar with the contents and conclusions of the long report, "Global Problems in the Year 2000," prepared at the request of former President Carter by a large group of experts from 14 government agencies under the supervision of the Council on Environmental Quality and the State Department. This report, which forecasts the evolution of issues of great importance to the United States and all mankind, such as the mineral, raw material, energy and food crises, demographic patterns and environmental protection, and advises the government to take them thoroughly into account in its future activity, is simply "a joke to today's Republican ideologists," according to one American magazine.

In the second place, the Reagan Administration's belief that a rigid system of state scientific and technical regulation is ineffective was the reason that restrictions on private business activity were lifted and the corporations' share of the government's technological potential has, according to expert estimates, already increased slightly. The government expects its plans for "deregulation" to stimulate scientific and technical activity on the local level and give state and local government a chance to find local solutions to many pressing socioeconomic problems. The influential CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS weekly, however, noted that during the first year of the Republican administration it had already been criticized for destroying the system of government economic, scientific and technical regulation with a zeal that is "actually nothing more than a screen for the replacement of existing (federal) programs with others that are more suitable for private business."

In the third place, a direct result of the Reagan Administration's attempts to create international friction, return to the already obsolete power tactics of the cold war era and acquire unilateral military advantages for the United States has been the sharp intensification of military research programs and projects aimed at the creation of new weapon systems and, therefore, capable of having a significant destabilizing effect on the military and political situation in the world. It is not surprising that the American press has listed "an obvious inclination to think in terms of weapons and national security" among the clearly expressed convictions of J. Keyworth, the President's special adviser on science and technology. During hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, when his appointment was being confirmed, Keyworth spoke in favor of a stronger role for the Defense Department in science and technology, including space research. The press immediately noted his "complete devotion to the ideological predilections of the administration, which has embarked on a dramatic arms buildup."

In summer 1981 the main principles which the new administration intends to take as a guide in research and development financing decisions were set forth at the annual colloquium of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. An old principle was reaffirmed: that the government would support fundamental research projects on civilian subject matter with a high degree of risk and

uncertainty, but development projects promising a quick economic impact will primarily be entrusted to corporations. It was also announced that there would be a change in priorities in the sphere of research and development, but nothing specific was said about this change. Assistant Director G. Schlied of the Office of Management and Budget stressed that the federal government was fully determined to derive the maximum return on funds allocated for research and development.

After Keyworth took office, his remark that changes would have to be made in the very concept of American scientific and technical improvement did not go unnoticed. "We can no longer take the lead in all fields of science. We must make our contribution to the fields that can be most productive for us." This was not the first admission that the United States cannot qualitatively develop all fields of science on its own. But the present administration is trying to concentrate more on military research and development even in the fields where competition is an important factor.

These facts, which indicate the pragmatic nature of the Republican administration's philosophy regarding the most appealing fields of research and development and, in particular, regarding the "liberalization" of forms and methods of regulating science, testify that the new administration has not completely rejected the Democratic analytical legacy. In the beginning of 1981 the President's commission for the compilation of a program of government activities for the 1980's, appointed by James Carter, presented a report on "Science and Technology: Prospects and Dangers in the 1980's," with whose conclusions and recommendations the Republican administration had apparently agreed (in contrast to the conclusions and recommendations of the previously mentioned "Global Problems in the Year 2000"). The conclusions of this report, which was compiled by a large group of scientists, businessmen and public spokesmen under the chairmanship of G. Watts, president of the Communications Workers of America union, essentially said that the future economic status of the government would depend largely on the development of science and technology but the total allocations for these purposes, particularly from the federal budget, have decreased perceptibly. One of the most dangerous consequences of this is the reduction of U.S. competitive potential in relation to Western Europe and Japan. After considering the broad spectrum of problems connected with scientific development and the use of the results of technological progress in the foreign policy sphere, the Republican administration decided to concentrate on regulating relations between the government and business for the purpose of raising the overall level of scientific and technical development in the United States and clarifying the system of scientific policy priorities with the same percentage, or even a higher one, of applied military projects.

The administration's position on environmental protection is quite indicative. It has insisted on the cancellation of many earlier standards which were supposed to ensure at least the minimal norms of environmental protection, the efficient use of mineral resources and the consideration of ecological factors in plans for the development of power engineering, transportation and several branches of industry. The press has already reported Secretary of the Interior J. Watt's views on the use of natural resources. They are distinguished by open contempt for the interests of present and future generations with regard to the preservation of the planet's biosphere. But this is only one part of the sweeping plans of the Reagan Administration, which has decided to ignore the objective and valid recommendations of

scientists with regard to the reconstruction of the economy, the technical base of industry, agriculture and the service sphere in such a way as to secure a more harmonious balance between society and nature.³

Huge losses were also incurred by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which was forced by budget cuts to cancel a number of space projects and postpone others.

The Republican administration's steps toward the more pragmatic development of science and technology have been accompanied by the institution of obviously more rigid terms, primarily political, on which the United States will be willing to develop scientific and technical contacts with other countries and give international organizations and the developing states scientific and technical assistance. The "technological diplomacy" of the United States under the Reagan Administration will most probably augment the arsenal of power instruments and means of forcing other countries to follow a Washington-approved course in the world arena.⁴

The second annual report on "Science, Technology and American Diplomacy," which was published in May 1981 but was prepared by experts from the Democratic administration, contains a fairly broad discussion of the use of scientific and technical achievements by the United States in relations with other countries. The report describes the U.S. approach to such problems as the use of outer space, population growth, disease prevention, the development of world ocean resources, environmental protection, the mineral and food shortages and the development of power engineering, including nuclear energy. The problem of overcoming the backwardness of the developing countries is the subject of a special discussion. It is easy to see that the United States' heightened interest in global problems is due primarily to the fact that it is still quite dependent on foreign sources of mineral resources, including energy raw materials, and that other problems of this kind can no longer be ignored when foreign policy is being planned.

The global problems whose resolution requires concerted effort by states with maximum technical potential were placed on the agenda by the Carter Administration. The Republican administration has simply changed the emphasis in the approach to them. It is quite indicative that this new emphasis also affects U.S. bilateral relations with all countries in the area of science and technology, including the developing states. It includes the closer coordination of scientific and technical relations with the political and military-political interests of the United States and the attempt to "raise the price" of familiarization with American technology and thereby facilitate access to the natural resources of other countries and ensure the penetration of their economies by American corporations.

As INTERDEPENDENT magazine has acknowledged, the use of American economic (and scientific and technical) aid to attain foreign policy goals "has already become a constant theme in the Reagan camp." The view of the developing countries expressed in the United Nations in November 1981 by Secretary of State A. Haig is largely based on the certainty that the scientific and technical gap between these countries and the United States is "insurmountable." For this reason, Washington believes that these countries can be threatened and pressured and that the amounts of economic, scientific and technical aid can be made directly conditional upon their

consent to give American corporations access to sources of mineral and energy resources on their territory and upon their willingness to take part in the Republican administration's political and military-political intrigues.

The United States has refused to sign the new draft convention regulating the use of the world ocean. The Republican administration took this step because the developing countries were supposed to gain control over part of the mineral deposits on the ocean floor and American corporations were supposed to transfer their technology to the jurisdiction of a special UN agency.

American representatives at the UN conference on new and renewable sources of energy objected to the establishment of a special international body for the creation of technical potential for international use. The Republican administration also announced its intention to reduce its contributions to international organizations aiding the developing countries, such as the International Development Association and the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and to stop financing the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).

The abovementioned actions and intentions of the Republican administration provide some idea of the conditions that will directly or indirectly influence the development of American science and technology in the near future.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more detail, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 3, 1982, pp 51-56.
2. Binary charges contain two chemical substances which produce a lethal nerve-paralyzing gas as soon as they are mixed--that is, as soon as the charge explodes. For more detail, see PRAVDA, 2 March 1982.
3. See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 3, 1981, pp 51-56.
4. Ibid., No 8, 1981, pp 3-14.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982

8588

CSO: 1803/12

BOOK REVIEWS

U.S. Style of Diplomacy

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 12 Apr 82) pp 103-104

[Review by V. P. Abarenkov of book "Mnogostoronnyaya diplomatiya SShA. Teoriya i praktika" [The Multilateral Diplomacy of the United States. Theory and Practice] by T. F. Dmitrichev, Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1981, 288 pages]

[Text] This work by T. F. Dmitrichev is essentially the first comprehensive study in our scientific literature of the activities of American diplomacy in international organizations and at conferences. Focusing his analysis on the theory and practice of multilateral American diplomacy during the period of its most intense activity (the postwar years), the author cites abundant factual information to cogently demonstrate how U.S. diplomacy has stayed in line with all of Washington's foreign policy reversals and has tried to use international forums as, on the one hand, a means of carrying out plans for the retention and consolidation of U.S. global positions and, on the other, as a means of combating socialism and defending the foundations of world capitalism. The theory and practice of American diplomacy in international organizations have gradually changed under the influence of confrontation and competition between the two world systems and as a result of the birth of the movement for non-alignment and the evolution of this movement into a strong global force. This gradual change has been a symptom and an organic part of the process by which U.S. foreign policy has been adapted to the realities of international organizations.

The author analyzes the theory and practice of U.S. multilateral diplomacy in equal depth and reveals their indissoluble internal connection. For example, he explains and criticizes specific American theories about the international organization. This is a valuable work because the author is the first to classify the various schools of American political analysts of multilateral diplomacy in terms of their outlook ("idealists" and "political realists") and methodological approach (traditional and behaviorist). He also examines their analytical techniques and methods (factor, content and comparative analysis, simulation and quantification).

This work is the first in our literature to analyze the main theoretical game models and sociopsychological negotiation tactics in combination with the instruments and methods used by American diplomacy under the specific conditions of international

organizations and conferences. This is also of great practical value because the majority of American models and classification systems are supposed to reveal possibilities for the attainment of unilateral advantages for American diplomacy with the aid of a broad range of means of influencing representatives of other states (pressure, blackmail, coercion, threats, promises of assistance in the implementation of procedural regulations and the services of secretariats, the use of "contingencies" and "loopholes," complaints about the absence of instructions, etc.). One important feature of this analysis is its presentation within the context of all postwar American multilateral diplomacy in major international political, economic and financial bodies and organizations, such as the United Nations, IBRD, IMF, OAS, OECD, IAEA and GATT, and the military-political groups created by the United States in the postwar years--NATO, SEATO and CENTO.

The section on the peculiarities of American diplomatic style is of indisputable interest. The author correctly points out its distinctive features--pragmatism, duplicity, pretentious moralizing, a tendency toward obsession with abstract ideas and moral slogans and insistence on the settlement of technical details (pp 237-242).

Although the work is quite broad in scope, the author should have said more about U.S. participation in major international conferences and talks in recent years, such as, for example, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the meetings conducted within its framework or the Disarmament Commission in Geneva. This would have added a great deal to the author's study.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982

American Bourgeois Mentality

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 12 Apr 82) pp 104-105

[Review by V. I. Borisjuk of book "SShA: evolyutsiya burzhuaznogo soznaniya" [The United States: Evolution of the Bourgeois Mentality] by K. S. Gadzhiyev, Moscow, "Mysl'," 1981, 255 pages]

[Text] This is essentially the first full-scale "intrusion" by a Marxist historian into a topic traditionally "reserved" for bourgeois sociology and social psychology, the "phenomenology of the bourgeois spirit of America." This study was undertaken for the purpose of understanding the sources and determinants of the thinking and ideology of the dominant class in the United States.

It is significant, from the standpoint of principles and ideas, that the central topic of Gadzhiyev's study is the evolution of the bourgeois consciousness in America. Since the time of Max Weber, and mainly through the efforts of his least talented disciples, Western literature has been dominated by the idea of the "spirit of enterprise" in the American bourgeois mind, engendered and reinforced by Protestantism and the "Protestant ethic," which has undergone an evolution that is integral, irreversible and creative by its very nature.

Gadzhiyev rightfully criticizes Weber's central idea, although he oversimplifies it to some degree, which is unjustified in a work as serious as this one, and cites

evidence from a large and representative group of sources to prove that the formation of the bourgeois consciousness in the United States was essentially a complex, ambiguous and uneven process.

Recognizing the need to examine as many bourgeois "states of mind" as possible (the mass interpretations of religious dogmas, popular beliefs, legendary myths, philosophical ideas, ideological and political doctrines, etc.), Gadzhiyev took an interdisciplinary approach to this study and, for this reason, his work combines the merits of skillful historical and sometimes historiographic research with quite thorough sociological analysis. Although the historian's approach prevails, even on the surface, the author's general sociopsychological "grounding" is apparent from his desire to understand the complex process by which elements of consciousness are retained and pass through the "corridors of time."

According to prominent Hungarian sociologist K. Kulczar, politics and political beliefs represent a "mold" of several sociohistorical situations in the past, influencing the present through norms, values, political ideals and standards of behavior. K. S. Gadzhiyev has demonstrated, as far as possible, that this also seems to apply to the evolution of mental values, when the beliefs of one generation, time and place are passed on through the process of socialization to an individual in another time and place. It is important to simply determine the degree to which the transferred values have changed or been transformed.

It is not surprising that a work of this complexity and scope has some shortcomings. The author's independent research and original ideas, his thorough knowledge of American history and the care with which he has analyzed the mentality of the bourgeois class, however, make this book a good starting point for subsequent interdisciplinary research by experts on American affairs and specialists in social psychology.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982

8588

CSO: 1803/12

THINK TANKS VS. MILITARISM

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 12 Apr 82) pp 106-112

[Article by N. A. Dolgopolova]

[Text] The recent surge of antiwar feelings in American society is quite obviously connected with the working public's realization that the White House policy of escalating the arms race and cutting social expenditures is a threat to its vital interests. This surge also proves that even under the difficult domestic political conditions of the second half of the 1970's, despite the vigorous attempts of militaristic and pro-militaristic groups to instill public opinion with the cold war spirit, the potential of the antiwar struggle has not been lost. A perceptible role in the development of the antiwar mentality has been played by independent research centers which conduct realistic studies of the economic, political and social consequences of the militarization of the U.S. national economy, the arms race and the policy of cold war.

In the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's, temporary task groups were set up by various universities and research organizations to study the economic aspects of disarmament and the redirection of the economy into peaceful channels, the effect of militarism on American society, etc. These research findings were published in a number of reports and studies, were cited during congressional hearings and were quoted in the press. This research became particularly lively in the late 1960's and the early 1970's, when the antiwar movement was at its height. Now there is a new wave of analytical works of this kind. Furthermore, in contrast to the task groups of past decades, the research centers discussed in this article operate on a permanent basis and according to a specific research program; they publish periodicals, brochures and books, and this certainly makes their work more purposeful and publicizes their findings more extensively and effectively.

A great deal of analytical work has been performed by the Boston Study Group, an association of experts on military matters and social policy founded at the end of the 1970's. A book prepared by researchers from this group--F. Morrison, former chairman of the Federation of American Scientists and physics professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; P. Walker, an expert on matters of military detente who was once a staff member of the Army Security Agency and is now a researcher at Harvard University; and others--and entitled "The Price of Defense. A New Strategy for Military Spending"¹ was published in 1979 and evoked an

impressive response from the American progressive and liberal press. The book contains analytical estimates of the results of the reduction of the U.S. military budget to 73 billion dollars.

The military-industrial complex, the authors of this work write, is still getting rich at the expense of the federal treasury and has retained its high rates of technical progress. It has a "vigilant and powerful lobby" with a vested interest in arms race escalation. Its opponents, however, are not represented by any single comparable force capable of controlling the military establishment. The authors stress that "since World War II, the United States has led the world into increasing militarization more than any other state," thereby "setting a standard for other countries."²

Allegations about the mounting "Soviet military threat" are primitive, the authors write, are not based on fact and conflict with reality. The Soviet defense programs which the United States calls "provocative" and "destabilizing" are actually only an attempt to keep up with Western programs.

On the basis of readily accessible statistics, including official Pentagon estimates from the 1960's, the experts from the Boston Study Group prove that the United States could maintain a stable "balance of fear" even if it limited its strength to 31 strategic Poseidon submarines and simultaneously scrapped all of its land-based ICBM's and strategic bombers. The radical reduction of conventional armed forces, they write, would also be possible.

In this work and in the SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN magazine, Morrison and Walker also published their own ideas about the possible consequences of a nuclear exchange between the USSR and United States. If a city like Boston, for example, were to be hit by just one missile with 14 warheads, 40 percent of the people living within the city limits, or 3 million people, would be killed or severely wounded. Radioactive fallout would eventually kill another 100,000 people. The use of nuclear weapons even on an extremely "limited" scale, the authors stress, would have the most tragic consequences. According to experts from the Boston Study Group, the tendency toward increased military spending, noted at the turn of this decade, could lead to "sporadic intervention," culminating in "minor and major Vietnams," and pose the threat of nuclear annihilation.

In 1980 the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies was founded as part of the Boston Study Group. A peace activist, R. Forsberg, previously a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, became the president of this organization. The members of the institute board include specialists who are famous in the United States: Co-Director R. Barnet of the Institute for Policy Studies (discussed further on in the article); MIT Professor G. Rathjens, expert on military matters; Princeton University Political Science Professor R. Falk and the above-mentioned F. Morrison. These and other researchers, members of the board and consultants plan institute research strategy and take part in projects. Within a relatively short period of time, the institute managed to publish a handbook, the "Index of American Peace Organizations," a monthly magazine, ARMS CONTROL REPORTER, and a bimonthly journal, DEFENSE AND DISARMAMENT NEWS. The institute administration plans to publish its own estimates of the East-West and U.S.-USSR balances of armed forces and arms, providing a more realistic look at the "balance of power" than the West's leading "authority" in this field--the London Institute for Strategic Studies.

The institute is now actively involved in the growing U.S. campaign for a nuclear freeze, serving as this campaign's main information center and one of its leading organizers.

Washington's Center for Defense Information, a research organization opposed, according to its own admission, to "excesses in military spending," was founded in 1972. Since that time the center has performed a great deal of analytical work and has become quite famous inside and outside the United States. The center's founders and leading specialists include: its director, Rear Admiral (Ret) G. LaRocque, former Joint Chiefs of Staff adviser and director of the Inter-American Defense College; its deputy director, Brigadier General (Ret) B. Horwitz, also a former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the center's senior consultant, Colonel (Ret) R. Whittaker, former Defense Department and State Department staff member; President H. Scoville of the Arms Control Association, former deputy CIA director in charge of science and technology; Doctor E. Ravenal, former director of the Defense Department Asia division, and other prominent Americans. The fact that retired military men and specialists in defense participate in the organization's work testifies that even some members of the military establishment realize the danger of the arms race and the inexpedient and wasteful nature of defense budget growth.

The Center for Defense Information takes part in organizing and holding seminars on military problems in the U.S. Congress and publishes a monthly magazine, DEFENSE MONITOR, which has printed many articles containing logical criticism of the administration's military policy and the theories of militaristic and pro-militaristic groups in recent years. They include such articles as "U.S. Ground Forces. Inappropriate Objectives, Unacceptable Costs," "The Artificial Crisis of American Security," "Nuclear War: Causes, Combat, Consequences," "The B-1 Bomber: Is It Worth \$92 Billion?" and others.³

Recent center publications have stressed that the present increase in military spending is not backed up by reasonable estimates of U.S. defense needs, but by political considerations, presupposing shows of U.S. "determination" and firmness in the resolution of world problems and in relations with the Soviet Union. This was discussed, in particular, by G. LaRocque in a NEW YORK TIMES article at the beginning of 1981, in which he stressed that even the administration's planned "additions" to the defense budget could not finance the many military programs that have been drawn up. Furthermore, the augmentation of nuclear potential, which absorbs a large portion of the Pentagon budget, "will do nothing to solve the majority of real problems in the world." "New nuclear missiles will do nothing to ensure oil deliveries or settle international conflicts," LaRocque wrote.

The center's chief economist, G. Treires, has written that all of the allegations, unsubstantiated by any kind of proof or documents, that the Soviet Union is spending more on defense than the United States, have only one purpose: "to convince the American people that we must spend more."

It should be noted that the center has supporters among former high-ranking military men in Western Europe, who have criticized the 1979 NATO Council decision on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. They include, in particular, General (Ret) N. Pasti, former chief of staff of the Italian Air Force, Bundeswehr General (Ret) H. Bastian, former deputy supreme allied commander of the European

NATO forces, French Admiral (Ret) A. Sanguinetti, former deputy commander of NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean, and others.

The Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) was founded in Washington in 1963 as a scientific center for the study of a broad range of political and social problems. They are being studied by more than 40 of the institute's researchers, such as, for example, institute Co-Director R. Barnet, M. Klare, R. Aldridge and others. In recent years the institute has concentrated on matters connected with the growth of militarism in the United States, giving a generally critical appraisal of the foreign and military policies of the Carter and Reagan administrations.

In 1979 a work entitled "Resurrected Militarism" was compiled at the institute. In this work, the American administration's move toward cold war was criticized from various vantage points and its negative domestic political consequences were described. Among the important social consequences of the arms race, which would ultimately weaken U.S. economic positions, the authors listed the possibility of the "fatal alienation" of U.S. workers, who would have to fight one another for the crumbs left over from the "economic pie" devoured by militarism.⁴

At the request of 56 members of Congress, the institute studied the federal budget in 1978. Reporting on the results of this study, the institute noted the need to transfer to a foreign policy based on the principle of nonintervention in the affairs of other countries, including the gradual withdrawal of all American armed forces from Western Europe and the Near East. The experts also advised the radical reduction of American forces in Asia and adjacent regions and proposed cuts of 34 billion dollars in the fiscal 1979 defense budget.

In 1979 the institute organized a conference on Soviet-American relations, with the speakers including its leading researchers R. Barnet and M. Klare, scholars from other centers and representatives of sociopolitical organizations. In his speech, Barnet mentioned the need for broad-scale Soviet-U.S. military agreements to alleviate the arms burden and reduce the danger of nuclear war.⁵ In articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS and THE PROGRESSIVE, Barnet remarked that it was the Soviet Union that had put forth initiatives which could curb the arms race. "The USSR has repeatedly proposed the conclusion of an agreement which would ban all types of nuclear arms," he stressed, "and the United States has rejected these proposals." The conclusion of an agreement on no first use of nuclear weapons and a pledge not to use nuclear weapons as means of settling foreign policy problems would also help, the author wrote, to curb the arms race.

Analyzing the results of the more vigorous military efforts of recent administrations, Barnet wrote in a NEW YORKER article that government contracts for military equipment do not strengthen national security, but, rather, undermine it, because they absorb resources needed for the resolution of such urgent problems as the eradication of U.S. dependence on foreign oil. "Weapons cannot produce energy," he said, "just as they cannot guarantee access to it."

In March 1981 the institute published a report entitled "A Balanced Budget for the People," in which Ronald Reagan's economic program was criticized. The report was prepared by a budget study group, headed by M. Raskin, one of the institute's founders. The authors of the report pointed out the fact that the President's proposed measures to limit social spending and cut taxes while simultaneously

increasing military spending would cost the United States a great deal because they would sharply escalate inflation, undermine U.S. positions in the world economy, widen the gap between corporations and the groups receiving funds from government social programs, escalate urban decline and "deplete" the capital investments needed by civilian branches of production. "The most dangerous thing for all of us is the emphasis on military solutions," wrote one of the compilers of the report, R. Engler. "Economic and social payment for the arms race is being portrayed as a politically inviolable element of the national interest. The heavy burden of the military budget on society has not been given the slightest consideration.... In place of this, we have been given the dubious argument that the reinstatement of America as the top-ranking military power is essential for its economic renewal."⁶

Interesting scientific studies of the economic consequences of the arms race have been conducted by the Council on Economic Priorities, founded in New York in 1969. This noncommercial organization specializes in studies of American corporate activities in spheres affecting the interests of society as a whole, such as employment or environmental quality, and also studies the political influence of corporations. Investigations of the economic and social consequences of American corporate activity in the military sphere are prominent among the council's research projects.

The council has two branches, in New York and San Francisco. Alice Marlin is the executive director. Military research is conducted by Rutgers University Law Professor and Chairman of the Board of the Corporate Data Exchange research center G. Adams and economists M. Edelstein, S. Lydenberg, G. Duffy, H. Kerwin and L. Reed. The products of this scientific center include a monthly bulletin and various brochures, books and reports in which military matters are widely discussed.⁷

"The Economic Impact of Military Spending," a brochure by M. Edelstein which is short but is filled with valuable factual material, was published in 1977 and summarizes the results of studies by other researchers on the effect of the arms race on employment, particularly an analysis conducted by Chase Econometrics Associates and studies by Doctor R. Bezdek, an economist. These works prove that the reduction of weapon purchases, accompanied by a commensurate increase in other government expenditures, should raise production volume and employment 2.1 percent over the "base level" proposed in these forecasts, while an increase in military spending with a commensurate reduction in other expenditures would reduce production volume and employment by 1.3 percent. The reason is that defense expenditures are concentrated in so-called capital-intensive industries, where relatively few jobs are created per unit of product, while expenditures on social needs also benefit such labor-intensive branches as construction and the performance of various social services.⁸

Professor G. Adams has compiled a series of studies and reports on the activities of the Pentagon's main contractors--the Boeing, General Dynamics, Grumman, McDonnell Douglas, Northrop, Rockwell International and United Technologies corporations--and on the ties between these military firms and the government. He has established the fact that in 1977 the Pentagon's top 10 contractors received one-third of all the funds allocated for military equipment and arms purchases from the 100 largest companies producing weapons. Each of these companies received contracts valued at over 1 billion dollars, and the top 100 contractors appropriated more than two-thirds of all the funds allocated for these contracts. The author of the report

concludes that the advantages gained by a few powerful corporations, which earn huge profits from the escalation of the arms race, are financed by losses suffered by the multitude of firms experiencing the negative effect of military preparations. "The effect of military spending on the American economy," Professor Adams wrote, "can be compared to the effect of narcotics on the individual: For a short time they give him a burst of strength and energy, but over the long range they are a drain on vital energy; military expenditures raise the cost of living and ultimately lead to unemployment."⁹

On the basis of studies conducted by the Council on Economic Priorities in recent years, Adams published a book entitled "The Iron Triangle" in 1981, in which he describes the workings of the trilateral alliance uniting the Pentagon with conservative congressmen and Pentagon contractors.¹⁰

The effect of the arms race on employment has been studied for almost 10 years by another research organization, Employment Research Associates, based in Lansing, the capital of Michigan. In 1975, 1978, 1979 and 1981 it published the results of its analyses of the effect of increasing military expenditures on the number of jobs in the country.¹¹ According to its calculations, each billion spent on military purposes ultimately leads to an average reduction of 10,000 in the number of jobs (in comparison to the impact of equivalent capital investments in the civilian economy). "Contrary to the popular belief, military spending is not good for the economy. It does not create jobs but generates unemployment," the last report said. Each billion spent, for example, on the MX program provides jobs for 17,000 people, while the same billion spent in public health or retail trade would create 48,000 and 65,000 jobs respectively. Economist M. Anderson, the director of this organization, believes that an increase in military spending at a time of high unemployment and inflation is inconsistent with the administration's declared goal of improving the state of the economy. From the standpoint of employment, the projected growth of military expenditures will be particularly injurious to the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota, where the number of jobs lost will total 623,000.

At the request of the Machinists Union, Employment Research Associates conducted a study of the specific effect of increased military spending on this profession in 1979. The report on the research findings states that 100,300 members of the union were employed in defense production in 1975, but the number had dropped to 88,000 in 1978, signifying a decrease of 12,300 in the number of jobs. When the defense budget rose to 124 billion dollars, the union's "net losses" totaled 30,000 jobs. As an alternative to military spending, the report suggests the transfer of part of the funds from the military budget to such branches of the economy as railroad and urban public transport, production waste recycling, solar energy development and others,¹³ which will expand employment more effectively than military spending.

In terms of legal status, all of these research centers are known as non-profit organizations. This means that they do not have to pay taxes and, consequently, do not have the right to engage in commercial practices (issue stock or pay dividends) and must use all of the income from their activity to expand their research, pay their researchers, pay for the services of consultants, etc. Their main sources of financing are contributions from philanthropic foundations, private contributions, income from the sale of publications, lecture fees and income from research

contracts. For example, the financing base of the Institute for Policy Studies is a foundation grant from S. Rubin, the founder of Faberge, a widely known cosmetics firm in the United States. The Center for Defense Information receives most of its funds from the Peace Foundation, which was established in 1957 by a group of businessmen and scientists and which collects funds for several projects in the humanities and international research; the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies operates on funds received from the sale of periodicals, fees and contributions. In general, the solicitation of funds, the recruitment of wealthy patrons and so forth make up a necessary and important part of the "inner workings" of these organizations.

The organizations mentioned above are not a complete list of the U.S. scientific centers which specialize in studies of militarism's effect on the American society and approach this issue from a realistic standpoint. Some work in this field is now being performed by sociopolitical peace organizations. For example, Physicians for Social Responsibility¹⁴ has been studying the consequences of nuclear war and is conducting several research projects in this field. Brochures by the president of the organization, H. Caldecott, and organization member K. Kahn contain thorough statistical evidence and solid professional estimates of the disastrous effect of radiation on human health. The authors stress that Washington's invented alternative of "limited" nuclear exchange between the USSR and United States, just as "full-scale nuclear war," would be tantamount to national suicide.

Analytical work is being performed by the Council for a Liveable World, the Arms Control Association, the Federation of American Scientists, the Mobilization for Survival coalition, the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy and many other organizations.

Americans have displayed exceptional interest in the theoretical aspects of the struggle against militarism. The dissemination of knowledge in this field, however, is a highly complicated process because the efforts of researchers advocating arms race limitation are opposed by numerous militaristic, rightwing conservative centers, such as the Heritage Foundation, the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Stanford Research Institute Center for Strategic Studies, the Hudson Institute, the RAND Corporation and other organizations financed by generous contributions from multimillionaires and monopolies. These centers buy the "glib pens" of famous journalists and have access to the information of the military-industrial complex, particularly information that "justifies" its gigantic appetite.

The works of rightwing conservative centers are constantly publicized by the press and television, while antimilitarist centers can only reach a mass audience in rare cases.

Realizing that the arguments of militarism's opponents are confirmed by the realities of life, extreme rightwing forces use any opportunity to denigrate the activities of antiwar "think tanks" in the eyes of the American public by accusing them of "betraying the national interest." Extreme rightwing news organs, such as HUMAN EVENTS or AMERICAN OPINION, call their activities "pro-communist" although the researchers working for these centers are far from Marxist. They support the preservation of the bourgeois order in general and are simply trying to find a way

of preserving peace, curbing the arms race and eliminating the danger of nuclear war.

FOOTNOTES

1. "The Price of Defense. A New Strategy for Military Spending," N.Y., 1979.
2. Ibid., p 8.
3. See, for example, "The B-1 Bomber: Is It Worth \$92 Billion?" THE DEFENSE MONITOR, June 1975; "U.S. Ground Forces: Inappropriate Objectives, Unacceptable Costs," THE DEFENSE MONITOR, November 1978; "The Artificial Crisis of American Security," THE DEFENSE MONITOR, May-June 1976, pt I, II; "Nuclear War: Causes, Combat, Consequences," THE DEFENSE MONITOR, March 1979; "The New Military Budget: Throwing Money at Problems," THE DEFENSE MONITOR, April 1980.
4. M. Klare, "Resurrected Militarism," Wash., 1979, p 14.
5. "Myths and Realities of the 'Soviet Threat,'" Proceedings of an IPS Conference on U.S.-Soviet Relations," Wash., 1979.
6. "A Balanced Budget for the People. Comments on the Reagan Budget," A Report Prepared by the Budget Study Group of the Institute for Policy Studies, 20 March 1981.
7. M. Edelstein, "Does Military Spending Create More Jobs?" N.Y., 1976; S. Lydenberg, "Weapons for the World," N.Y., 1977; G. Adams, "The Invisible Hands," N.Y., 1976; G. Adams, "The B-1 Bomber: An Analysis of Its Strategic Utility, Cost, Consequences and Economic Impact," N.Y., 1976.
8. M. Edelstein, "The Economic Impact of Military Spending," N.Y., 1977, p 3.
9. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 1 February 1979.
10. G. Adams, "The Iron Triangle," N.Y., 1981.
11. M. Anderson, "The Empty Pork Barrel: Unemployment and the Pentagon Budget," Lansing, 1975; 1978; 1979; 1981.
12. DAILY WORLD, 30 September 1981.
13. M. Anderson, "The Impact of Military Spending on the Machinists Union," Lansing, January 1979, pp 1-2.
14. For more about this organization, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6, 1981, pp 61-64--Editor's note.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982

U.S. SHOWS OF STRENGTH AS POLITICAL INSTRUMENT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 12 Apr 82) pp 112-118

[Article by V. V. Potashov, S. Ye. Puzanov, N. N. Sokov and K. E. Sorokin]

[Text] the establishment of military-strategic parity between the socialist and capitalist worlds made it meaningless and, what is more, extremely dangerous for imperialist circles to resort to the use of armed force as a foreign policy instrument. Now that the Reagan Administration is in power, however, U.S. ruling circles are again striving for military superiority and are trying, just as they did at the height of the cold war, to demonstrate their strength and threaten the use of this strength--that is, they are engaging in brinksmanship, on the brink of direct armed intervention in crisis situations, for the sake of imperialist political goals.

We should recall that the history of just the postwar period records hundreds of cases of the direct and indirect use of military strength by the United States for intervention in international relations. According to the American Brookings Institution, which was once close to government circles and which published a book entitled "U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument" in 1978, the United States resorted to the political use of military strength 215 times between January 1946 and May 1975.¹

Articles analyzing the circumstances and consequences of the use of armed force by the United States for political purposes have also been published by Soviet press organs, including our journal.²

The following analysis continues the list of such actions by the United States. Although it has not resorted to the direct and broad-scale use of its armed forces outside the country since 1975, it has nevertheless committed actions which were essentially shows of strength or threats to use this strength for political purposes. These actions were generally taken in "unforeseen circumstances," when "conventional means" were not enough to influence various political circles in U.S.-approved ways. There are many examples of this--from the transfer of U.S. naval ships to conflict regions, unplanned maneuvers, blockades and military presence to the maintenance of U.S. armed forces, including strategic forces, in a state of combat readiness. These actions, which were taken in peacetime, represent nothing other than crude blackmail and a demonstration of U.S. determination to institute large-scale military escalation unless its political demands are met. In connection with this, the Reagan Administration's loud campaign about "international terrorism,"

which Washington has elevated to the status of state policy, seems extremely hypocritical.

It must be stressed that this list would have been much longer if we had used American criteria for the assessment of foreign policy actions, which were used by the author of another Brookings Institution work published in 1981.³ This study, which is based on bourgeois methodological concepts, is a typical example of the "double standard" in assessments of Soviet and U.S. military-political actions. The actions categorized as cases of the political use of force on the U.S. side have been carefully selected, but the assessment of Soviet foreign policy actions assigns all purely defensive and even diplomatic moves of the postwar period to this category.

Even this tendentious approach cannot, however, conceal the sharply heightened aggressiveness of the U.S. policy line in the international arena.

Examples of the "ostentatious" use of U.S. armed forces for political purposes between 1976 and 1982 are listed below.

No.	Date	Description of action
216	Mar '76	The deadline set a year before for the withdrawal of all American troops from Thailand was 20 March. Washington exerted the strongest pressure, demanding that at least 3,000 of its "advisers" stay behind. American troops in Thailand were ostentatiously brought to a state of combat readiness.
217	Mar '76	At the height of the anti-American movement in Greece, against American-Turkish military rapprochement (the return of 26 Turkish military bases to the United States in exchange for 1 billion dollars in military aid), the massive "National Week-20" maneuvers of the U.S. Navy Sixth Fleet, involving 20 ships and 1,700 Marines, were held in the Mediterranean.
218	Apr '76	At the height of the civil war in Lebanon, a large unit of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, including the aircraft carrier "Saratoga," a helicopter carrier, four destroyers, a force of landing ships and 1,700 Marines, approached its shores to exert pressure on Lebanon and demonstrate support for Israel; an American destroyer simultaneously entered the Israeli port of Haifa on a visit.
219	Apr '76	The parliamentary elections in the Republic of Portugal were drawing near, and the questions of its NATO activity and of communist participation in its government were critical issues. Large-scale NATO naval maneuvers, "Open Gate," were conducted near Portugal for the purpose of forcing it to become more active in the bloc and to keep communists out of the government.
220	Jul '76	There was a conflict between Uganda and Kenya. The frigate "Biari" sailed into Mombasa to demonstrate political support for Kenya, American patrol aircraft from Diego Garcia were sent to Kenyan airfields and a large unit of five U.S. naval ships with the carrier "Ranger" in the lead approached its shores.

[Table continued on next page]

[Continuation of table]

No.	Date	Description of action
221	Jan '77	There was a border conflict between Thailand and Kampuchea. The carrier "Enterprise" and two missile cruisers "Long Beach" and "Traxton" were sent to the shores of Thailand.
222	Mar '77	American-Ugandan relations were sharply aggravated by the question of the status of American citizens in Uganda. An aircraft carrier, two cruisers and a submarine of the U.S. Navy were sent to the East African coast close to Uganda.
223	Apr '77	Thailand supported antigovernment forces in Laos and a unit of ships from the U.S. Seventh Fleet with the carrier "Constellation" in the lead entered the Thai port of Pathay on a "visit."
224	May '77	The American-Panamanian talks on the future status of the Panama Canal began in Washington; American troops in the Canal Zone were ostentatiously brought to a state of enhanced combat readiness.
225	Jul '77	Libyan territory was invaded by Egyptian troops for 2 days; an American reconnaissance plane violated Libyan air space; ships of the U.S. Sixth Fleet approached its shores for a show of strength.
226	Oct '77	To exert political pressure on the Philippines when the talks on the status of American bases reached an impasse, the United States conducted the large-scale 10-day "Fortress Lightning" maneuvers, involving 31 naval ships and 6,500 Marines, near the coast of this country.
227	Mar '78	Tension was growing in Southeast Asia. The United States conducted the massive "Team Spirit-78" maneuvers with South Korea, involving the Air Force (B-52, F-111, F-4) and Navy (carrier "Kitty Hawk" and cruiser "Oklahoma City," helicopter carrier and submarines) and over 35,000 U.S. servicemen.
228	Apr '78	In support of Somalia's aggression against Ethiopia, U.S. armed forces, along with English and French forces, conducted maneuvers involving aircraft and 14 naval ships near the Ethiopian coastline.
229	May '78	There was a popular uprising in Zaire's Shaba province. The United States sent out transport planes and more than 600 military pilots to carry NATO troops to Shaba and ostentatiously put its 82d Airborne Division in a state of combat readiness.
230	Jul-Sep '78	The Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea was collapsing. China conducted subversive activity against the SRV. The United States organized a series of military maneuvers in the region: U.S. and Japanese naval forces, training exercises to "master the seas," involving 42 ships of two carrier forces with 200 airplanes of the U.S. Seventh Fleet; the ANZUS countries, large-scale Air Force exercises in South Korea with the transfer of AWACS planes to that region for the first time.

[Table continued on next page]

[Continuation of table]

No.	Date	Description of action
231	Nov '78	After accusing Cuba of deploying new aviation equipment, the United States conducted the largest "exercises" of the last 16 years near its shores, involving 36 naval ships and 20,000 servicemen.
232	Jan '79	There was revolution in Iran. The shah's regime was overthrown. A large unit of U.S. naval ships was sent to the Persian Gulf, American F-15 fighter-bombers and 300 servicemen were sent to Saudi Arabia and the 82d Airborne Division and U.S. Air Force planes in Western Europe were ostentatiously put in a state of combat readiness.
233	May '79	China committed an act of aggression against the SRV and Chinese troops were concentrated on the Lao border. The United States conducted its first large-scale Marine training exercises with air support on Okinawa since its defeat in the Vietnam War.
234	Jul '79	The Egyptian-Israeli separate agreement was signed in Camp David. A U.S. naval unit with the carrier "America" in the lead sailed into Alexandria for a "visit."
235	Jul '79	Ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet sailed close to the shores of Vietnam and Kampuchea on the pretext of a "search for refugees."
236	Oct '79	Dictator Somoza was overthrown in Nicaragua (in July). The creation of a United Caribbean Command was announced in Washington; the U.S. Navy conducted large-scale maneuvers near the Cuban coastline with a 1,700-Marine landing in Guantanamo.
237	Oct '79	Dictator Pak Chong-hui was killed in South Korea; there was unrest in several cities. In a show of determination to resist democratic changes, the United States brought all American troops stationed in South Korea to a state of combat readiness and sent a naval unit with the carrier "Kitty Hawk" in the lead to its shores.
238	Nov '79	The American embassy was seized in Tehran. The U.S. Navy's second task force was sent to the shores of Iran within carrier striking range. By January, 25 naval ships, including 3 carriers and around 350 combat planes were concentrated near the Iranian borders; sub-units of U.S. strategic forces were brought to a state of combat readiness twice, supposedly as a result of computer errors.
239	Jan-Mar '80	The Pentagon suggested that tactical nuclear weapons might be used in the event of any military conflict in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Air Force conducted an ostentatious intercontinental flight by B-52 strategic bombers, passing over the Persian Gulf zone.
240	Apr '80	The United States conducted a provocative military action against Iran: an attempt to free American embassy personnel; the AWACS system was activated for the first time in a combat situation, and six

[Table continued on next page]

[Continuation of table]

No.	Date	Description of action
		C-130 Hercules military transport planes, eight heavy assault helicopters and two communication satellites took part in the operation. By this time the number of U.S. naval ships in the region, including landing ships with Marines, had reached its highest point--37.
241	May '80	There was a popular uprising in the South Korean province of Kwangju. In a show of support for the regime, the United States brought its troops to a state of enhanced combat readiness and sent a naval unit led by the carrier "Coral Sea" to South Korea.
242	May '80	Using the "search for Cuban emigrants in the sea" as an excuse, the United States sent 11 naval ships to the shores of Cuba, transferred from the zone of the "Solid Shield-80" maneuvers in the Atlantic.
243	Jul '80	Large-scale training exercises of the new Caribbean task force to perfect the seizure of "enemy territory" were conducted on the island of Vieques (Puerto Rico).
244	Oct '80	There were hostilities between Iraq and Iran. The United States engaged in a series of shows of military strength in the Persian Gulf, intended primarily for the Iranian Government. On the pretext of protecting Western oil shipments, four American AWACS planes were sent to Saudi Arabia and the antisubmarine missile cruiser "Leahy" was transferred to its coastline. In all, more than 60 U.S., English, French and Australian naval ships were concentrated in the Persian Gulf. The plan (Presidential Memorandum 51) to use nuclear weapons in the region and establish a nuclear ammunition depot on Diego Garcia for the basing of B-52 bombers there was announced. Joint U.S.-English 16-day naval maneuvers were conducted in the Indian Ocean by 25 ships with the carrier "Midway," 170 planes and 18,000 servicemen. Three landing vessels of the U.S. Sixth Fleet with 1,800 Marines were transferred there through the Suez Canal.
245	Nov '80	Relations between Egypt and Libya developed friction. In a show of support for the Sadat government, the United States conducted the first transfer of 1,400 Marines from the "rapid deployment force" and held the "Bright Star" training exercises jointly with Egyptian air and ground forces.
246	Feb '81	In a show of support for the reactionary regime in El Salvador and to exert pressure on the governments of Nicaragua and Panama, the United States conducted the provocative "Black Hawk" maneuvers with three classes of troops in this zone, in violation of the status of the Panama Canal.
247	Feb '81	To strengthen its military presence in the Persian Gulf, the United States sent the first permanent "rapid deployment force" contingent to a new military base in Oman for training in the deployment of primary forces during a crisis.

[Table continued on next page]

[Continuation of table]


No.	Date	Description of action
248	Aug '81	The Sixth Fleet conducted provocative maneuvers, led by the carrier "Nimitz," near the shores of Libya, during which American F-14 fighter planes shot down two planes of the Libyan Air Force.
249	Sep '81	On the pretext of perfecting "countermaneuvers" against the Warsaw Pact countries, U.S. Air Force and Navy maneuvers were held first in the Mediterranean and Black Seas and then in the Baltic Sea, with 80 naval ships, 280 planes and 19,000 servicemen taking part.
250	Oct '81	Two American AWACS planes flew over the Libyan border.
251	Oct '81	After the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat was announced, the United States demonstrated its military presence in the region by announcing the postponement of the planned withdrawal of Navy and Marine units from the East Mediterranean and sent the carrier "Nimitz" there for support; the Sixth Fleet and "rapid deployment forces" were put in a state of combat readiness.
252	Oct-Nov '81	Greek membership in the NATO military organization was hotly debated during the election campaign in Greece. Naval forces of the United States, England, France, Italy, Portugal and Turkey conducted large-scale maneuvers in the Mediterranean with Greek forces to demonstrate the "political unity" of the bloc.
253	Nov '81	In response to the mutual assistance agreement signed by Libya, Ethiopia and the PDRY, the United States conducted the largest training exercises of the "rapid deployment forces" in this region: "Bright Star-2," with a landing of 1,000 Marines in Oman, the perfection of combat actions in Somalia and Sudan and maneuvers by 4,000 servicemen in Egypt. Six strategic B-52 bombers made an ostentatious intercontinental flight, bombed the Libyan desert and returned to bases in the United States.

Therefore, the list of 215 cases in which the United States used military strength for political purposes between 1945 and 1975 was supplemented by at least 38 other such actions in the last 6 years. Regular maneuvers and exercises were not taken into account in this analysis, although they were being held more frequently and on broader scales by the beginning of the 1980's. In the first half of 1980 alone, the NATO countries conducted more than 50 such operations for a total of over 600 days. Another significant factor is the consistent and constant rise in Washington's military-political activity: Whereas the average annual number of U.S. actions was under five during the previous decade (between 1966 and 1975), it constantly rose during the Carter and Reagan administrations, reaching eight in 1981. The diagram is a continuation of the illustration of American military-political activity in the book "U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument," showing this activity between 1975 and the present.

Changes in the regional patterns of U.S. shows of strength are evident. There has been a dramatic rise in the number of actions in the zone of the oil-producing countries of the Near East, Persian Gulf and North Africa; it represented almost half of the total number of U.S. shows of strength in the 6 years. This is directly related to the Carter Administration's declaration of this region a zone of U.S. "vitally important" interests and the ensuing aggressiveness of U.S. imperialist policy. There was also a considerable increase in U.S. military activity in the Caribbean, reflecting American imperialism's intensification of the struggle against national liberation movements in this region.

Significant changes also took place in Washington's choice of political situations for shows of U.S. military strength. Whereas American intervention was essentially a response to conflicts between states in the preceding period, in recent years the United States has resorted to threats of force in connection with domestic political situations in sovereign states much more frequently--in 50 percent of all cases (previously one-third).

Number of actions



The nature of intervention has also changed somewhat. At the end of the 1970's there was more emphasis on the organization of "collective" shows of strength by the United States for political purposes, as in the cases involving intervention by NATO countries in the province of Shaba or the establishment of a veritable naval blockade of Iran in October 1980.

Besides this, the United States has recently emphasized massive shows of military strength of unprecedented scales. The concentration of three carrier forces, consisting of 37 naval ships, near the shores of Iran in 1980, the series of large-scale military maneuvers off the Cuban coastline in the last 16 years and other situations are examples of this.

A special role has been assigned to the interventionist "rapid deployment forces," consisting of up to 300,000 servicemen, one of whose functions is the effective demonstration of U.S. military strength whenever and wherever Washington wants. The ostentatious "Bright Star" maneuvers took on truly global proportions, and new

bases, with a virtually permanent U.S. military presence, were established for them in several countries.

Another distinctive feature of American shows of strength in recent years is the extensive use of the reconnaissance-coordinating AWACS system, which secures new combat capabilities and is intended to intimidate countries and peoples.

Washington's tendency to rattle the nuclear saber with increasing frequency is extremely dangerous. In addition to sending aircraft carriers and cruisers carrying nuclear bombs and missiles to foreign shores, the United States has begun to use intercontinental flights of strategic B-52 bombers in shows of strength, it is establishing new nuclear weapon depots in explosive regions and it is announcing plans for the "limited" use of these weapons in various theaters of combat. The announcement of problems with U.S. strategic forces, presumably due to computer errors, in a tense international situation testifies at least that Washington sometimes cannot wait to push the nuclear button.

All of this confirms the fact that Washington is persistently trying to resurrect the cold war and balance on the brink of hot war.

FOOTNOTES

1. B. Blechman and S. Kaplan, "Force Without War. U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument," Wash., 1978, pp 547-553.
2. See, for example, V. I. Bugachev, "Armed Intervention as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6, 1980.
3. S. Kaplan, "Diplomacy of Power. Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument," Wash., 1981.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1982

8588

CSO: 1803/12

DISCUSSION OF U.S. MILITARY STRATEGIC AIMS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 12 Apr 82) 119-127

[First part of unattributed report on a "Discussion at Session of Foreign Policy Section of Academic Council on U.S. Economic, Political and Ideological Problems": "The Shaping of the Reagan Administration's Military-Political Strategy"]

[Text] Participating in the discussion of the theme "The Shaping of the Reagan Administration's Military-Political Strategy" were Academician G. A. Arbatov, Director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies; deputy directors V. V. Zhurkin, doctor of historical sciences, and R. G. Bogdanov, candidate of historical sciences; section chiefs Professor G. A. Trofimenko, doctor of historical sciences, and A. A. Kokoshkin, candidate of historical sciences; sector heads Professor M. A. Mil'shteyn, candidate of military sciences; Yu. P. Davydov, candidate of historical sciences, A. A. Popov, candidate of historical sciences, and P. T. Podlesnyy, candidate of historical sciences; senior scientific staffers of the Institute Professor B. N. Zanev, candidate of historical sciences. L. S. Semeyko, candidate of historical sciences, S. M. Rogov, candidate of historical sciences, and Yu. V. Katasonov, candidate of historical sciences; Maj Gen A. K. Slobodenko, professor and candidate of military sciences (Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff); Professor A. N. Glinkin, doctor of historical sciences (USSR Academy of Sciences, Latin America Institute); Professor Yu. M. Mel'nikov, doctor of historical sciences, Yu. G. Strel'tsov, candidate of economic sciences (USSR Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Academy); and junior research associates of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies V. I. Biryukov, candidate of historical sciences, S. A. Kulik, G. M. Sturua, candidate of historical sciences, S. Ch. Aytmatov and M. I. Gerasev.

A report on the topic of discussion was delivered by Professor V. V. Zhurkin, doctor of historical sciences, section chairman and deputy director of the institute.

V. V. Zhurkin: Although the Republican Administration's military-political strategy is continuing to take shape,* its main guidelines have been clearly defined--an aspiration to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union and to take a tremendous new quantitative and qualitative leap forward in the arms race.

* See V. V. Zhurkin, "The Republican Administration: The Shaping of Military-Political Strategy," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 11, 1981--Editor's note.

We would seem to be dealing with several trends in U.S. military policy at the same time. For example, there is a discernible line toward the disruption of the existing parity between the United States and the USSR on both the global and the regional level, and not only in Europe but also in other regions of the world. There is another trend--to spend as many billions as possible on military aims and launch new military programs to the maximum possible extent and see whether this forces the Soviet Union to make some concessions. In my opinion, this is the dominant trend at present.

The main avenues for building up nuclear arms were formulated in the program announced on 2 October 1981. Leaving aside the change in the planned deployment of MX ICBM's (the original number has been halved in comparison with the Carter Administration's plan), in the remaining areas a course has been taken toward the accelerated development of strategic forces (Trident-1 and Trident-2 SLBM's, B-1 heavy bombers and, subsequently, the Stealth bomber, cruise missiles and so forth) with a clearly expressed "counterforce" bias and the plan to adapt these forces for first, "preemptive" strike capacity.

As for the particular features of the approach to conventional arms and armed forces, the Reagan Administration in this sphere, perhaps as much as or even more than in the nuclear sphere, has proceeded to step up the arms race process and has gone considerably further than the Carter Administration.

First there is the readiness to fight a large number of "limited" or "local" wars (Defense Secretary C. Weinberger talks persistently about five such war zones, adding Africa and the Caribbean to Europe, the Far East and the Near and Middle East region). Second, there is the augmentation of the mobility and flexibility of the armed forces and the increasing reliance on "rapid deployment forces." A third innovation is the call to be prepared for a protracted conventional war. It cannot be ruled out that this means a larger war than the Vietnam war since the idea that a war involving conventional forces could also be waged against the Soviet Union crops up in discussions on this theme. A fourth innovation is the overt proclamation, even if only for purposes of intimidation, of an unusual method of escalating a conventional war: Should a conflict arise in one region of the world, the United States reserves the "right" to strike in other regions of its own choosing.

The present administration is definitely striving to create the impression that it is not opposed to "measuring swords" with another side in any local conflict where the United States would be in a very strong position and the other side would be in a comparatively weak position--that is, in a region where Washington could expect to escape the consequences of its use of force with relative impunity.

Two other features are by and large old ones but are characterized by a quantitative increase. I am referring to the rising number of existing military bases and the construction of new ones, the creation of military coalitions, perhaps not always enshrined in due legal form, and the revival of the idea of "aggregate force" once put forward by M. Laird, which amounts in essence to reinforcing and increasing the number of allies; it is typical of the present administration to attempt to mobilize all forces, even those not very close to the United States in spirit, on an anti-Soviet platform.

In conclusion, I would like to speak very briefly about the factors opposing these basic trends in the development of U.S. military-political strategy, trends which are very dangerous to the cause of peace. The first is the durability of military parity. When we say that the United States will strive for superiority in a particular sphere, we would not discount the extent to which the existing parity has been successfully strengthened, especially in the 1970's. During this time, approximate equality was established in the quantity and quality of the two powers' nuclear arms. When SALT II was being worked out, this correlation was thoroughly verified by both sides' experts. This made it possible to reach the conclusion that approximate equality exists in terms of missile delivery vehicles: 2,500 on one side and about 2,300 on the other.

Any attempt to upset this parity would be a futile undertaking.

There is a further complexity keeping the United States from resolving the tasks it has set itself--its allies. This is a large and separate topic, but it is important to stress that this factor will quite possibly restrict Washington's aggressive efforts.

Finally, the vast military programs that have been planned will undoubtedly cause great difficulties within the United States itself on the economic and social levels.

These factors are part of objective reality and Washington will not be able to ignore them, although none of them reduces the danger of the bellicose U.S. efforts and actions at all.

A. A. Kokoshin: This speech has been prepared jointly with A. A. Popov. In our view, it is now possible to see an increasing number of signs that the development of military policy and the implementation of military programs are encountering certain difficulties in the United States and this, of course, will have the most direct effect on the shaping of U.S. military-political strategy.

First of all, there are difficulties of a purely economic nature. The central question is whether the GNP growth rate of 4-4.5 percent predicted by R. Reagan's economic advisers will be sustained. More sober forecasts proceed from 2 percent growth or less. The rate of inflation, the level of unemployment, the balancing of the federal budget and so forth will all depend on this.

The second major factor is socioeconomic. What it amounts to is that the Reagan Administration and Congress have now come close to the limit (in peacetime conditions) to which social spending can be cut without disrupting the whole mechanism set up 40-50 years ago. The biggest cut--over 20 percent--is in the part of social spending which used to be used for the poverty relief program and various social needs. A further cut in that part will mean a level of poverty for those living on social benefits that was seen in Britain in the 19th century or in the very worst times in the United States, which cannot fail to cause the sharp aggravation of social contradictions.

The third factor is the inevitable increase in the dissatisfaction of the entire population should the economic improvement programs fail. It would spread to other aspects of the Reagan Administration's policy, including military policy. In this context, circles close to the administration have begun discussing the possibility of cutting a number of secondary military programs so as to maintain the growth rate of military spending planned for the main programs.

A matter of great political and economic importance is the question of selective military service, which could reduce the cost of maintaining the armed forces (approximately 50 percent of military spending is now used for maintenance). At the same time, this would be a serious domestic political factor. At present the overwhelming majority of Americans oppose even limited military conscription. This question could be central in the 1982 congressional elections, provided there is no further deterioration of the international situation, which would justify such a measure in the public's eyes.

To date the opposition to the Reagan Administration's peace-endangering political actions, particularly in the U.S. ruling elite, is largely latent. In the main it surfaces, one could say, in the intellectual discussion of military and foreign policy programs. The main charge leveled during this kind of discussion is that the administration's military programs are adventuristic.

As an analysis of various materials shows, there are quite different views on U.S. military, foreign and economic policy in the eastern establishment and in the new centers of influence in the United States--the South and California. Reagan's 1980 election victory was, to a considerable extent, a victory for these new forces, which see in the administration's military policy an opportunity to get rich quick. Very often they fail to take account of the long-term consequences, including the dangers that the Reagan Administration's military program contains for the U.S. economy. At the same time, the southern group is the most dynamic: It has seized the initiative and is holding on to it.

There is another factor. The planned growth in military spending will delay the country's reindustrialization, which is deemed to be the number one problem over the long range for maintaining the leading U.S. position in the capitalist world. A question posed with increasing pointedness recently concerns the fact that, from the standpoint of security, reindustrialization is at least as important as increased military spending, the purchase of military hardware and so forth.

A certain degree of skepticism with regard to the administration's military program is even being displayed by some representatives of the military-industrial complex. They fear that a rapid increase in military spending may cause a backlash. They would prefer steady long-term orders and lower rates of growth. This was stated recently by former Defense Secretary J. Schlesinger.

And now a few words on the existence of a foreign policy consensus in the U.S. ruling elite. This consensus has now been restored to a certain extent on a rightwing conservative basis. It applies to a number of central problems of U.S. foreign and military policy, primarily the high level of military spending and rigid confrontation with the Soviet Union. But at the same time this consensus

still seems very fragile: It has not embraced the whole spectrum of foreign policy and military problems as was the case among the U.S. ruling elite during the cold war period and it could be destroyed if the economic situation changes (international political factors could also play an important role here, of course).

And finally--the possible alternative to the Reagan Administration's course in the military and foreign policy sphere. According to our observations, such an alternative is now taking shape within a section of the eastern establishment on a bipartisan basis. So far it is taking shape at an "intellectual level," but in the near future it could be transformed into political action. This will depend on the factors mentioned earlier and on the eastern establishment's ability to consolidate its forces and switch to the counteroffensive for at least a partial recovery of the positions that it has lost. This alternative course may be more rational but may also include greater elements of rigidity in the approach to relations with the USSR.

M. A. Mil'shteyn: The major and extremely dangerous changes taking place in U.S. military-strategic concepts, aimed primarily at intensifying their extreme and adventurist tendencies, did not begin recently or even with the Reagan Administration's advent and they will scarcely have acquired final shape or sufficient material backup when the administration's 4-year term of office is over. Slowly, step by step, the upper hand has been gained by those groups and forces in the United States which have always held positions of shakeless anti-Sovietism and anticommunism, proceeded from the need to achieve military superiority over the USSR and contemplated the attainment of their foreign policy goals with the aid of the use of force.

The dominant positions in the corridors of power have been taken by those who always believed that the Vietnam war could be won and had to be won, that detente "yielded dividends" to the Soviet Union alone, that the agreements concluded on strategic offensive arms limitations only benefited the latter and would harm U.S. security and that talks with the USSR should be conducted from a position of strength. In their view, the restoration of the United States' former power and influence in the world is to be found in an unrestrained arms race and the implementation of a rigid and uncompromising foreign policy relying on superiority in military strength in all spheres and all directions.

Those scientific organizations and institutions, research institutes and various centers which for many years have traditionally played a prominent role in formulating and evaluating political programs and acted as suppliers of civil servants--the Brookings Institution, Harvard and Columbia Universities, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and so forth--have now, in one way or another, been pushed into the background. To the fore have come such institutions and organizations as the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, the Contemporary Studies Institute and the Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies. To these can be added organizations such as the American Security Council, with which A. Haig has been connected (incidentally, the "Coalition for Peace Through Strength" was conceived here), the Foreign Policy Analysis Institute, which prepared the proposals for the creation of the "rapid deployment forces" and so forth. They all possess considerable resources.

The studies prepared by the abovementioned institutions relating to military-political strategy are often used by the administration as initial premises for substantiation of U.S. military policy.

The changes proposed by them relate to the whole spectrum of military-strategic and military-political views on both nuclear and conventional war and on both weapons of mass destruction and conventional means of waging war. Briefly, they amount to the following:

First, the reliance on armed force in general and nuclear weapons in particular in the interests of achieving the goals and resolving the tasks of U.S. foreign policy, is increasing sharply; second, there is a change in the opinion of the nature of nuclear war and its possible consequences in the sense that, unlike before, it is viewed as an "acceptable war" and potential losses are viewed as "tolerable losses," especially with the availability of the appropriate means of defense. A recently published Arms Control and Disarmament Agency document says: "By 1985, given planned evacuation, we calculate that from 35 to 65 percent of the U.S. population will be able to survive the immediate consequences of a large-scale nuclear attack. The implementation of a civil defense program could increase the number of survivors to 50-70 percent of the total population." It is on this plane that one should examine the widespread views in the country on the need to create anti-missile defenses and to formulate and implement the requisite measures for a ramified civil defense infrastructure.

The concepts of "limited" nuclear war and the "counterforce" option of nuclear war are being given further theoretical and material backup. Essentially, all the programs in the nuclear weapons sphere, including the decisions on the deployment of medium-range missiles and the production of neutron weapons, are aimed primarily at providing the potential for waging a "limited" nuclear war. Plans are being formulated for creating invulnerable nuclear forces which, in conjunction with increased accuracy and antimissile defense systems, could lead to the formation of a first strike potential.

Views on conventional armed forces are also changing. It is no longer a question of the concept of one and a half or two and a half wars. The foreign and military policy special group created by Reagan has come to the following conclusion: "There is no region in the world to which American interests could not extend, and the United States must have enough military might to cope with the use of force on any scale anywhere in the world." Is this not a repetition of what J.F. Dulles said long ago about a "Pax Americana"?

Nor can one fail to mention that views are also changing on arms limitation and disarmament talks. Since the aim is now to achieve military superiority over the USSR (in which the arms race is seen not just as a path for achieving that superiority but also as a means of causing the Soviet Union irreparable economic damage and a means of influencing Soviet foreign policy), it is to be expected that many arms programs (including neutron weapons) may be used as "bargaining cards" at upcoming talks.

On the whole, one should proceed from the premise that the United States is returning to its "classic," "pre-Vietnam" strategy, ignoring the fact that the world has changed substantially since then, as has the U.S. role in the world, and that this may lead to a clash of interests between the United States and its European partners, and also ignoring the fact, which is the main point, that the danger of nuclear war is increasing sharply.

In the light of what has been said, no positive changes should be expected in U.S. policy, unfortunately; just as no significant results should be expected, at least in the next 2 or 3 years, at the arms limitation talks. Changes may occur in this course, but primarily as the bankruptcy and adventurist character of U.S. military-political plans become evident.

G. A. Trofimenko: On the propaganda level we are facing a situation in which U.S. official strategy changes once every 4 years--with each change of administration--because every president wants to bequeath to his successors the "legacy of his own strategic thinking." Real strategy cannot change this frequently because such a change depends primarily on changes in the material base of war--in weapons systems and armed forces. And these processes, even with the present military-technical revolution, are relatively gradual. In the last 10-12 years, U.S. nuclear strategy has essentially remained within the framework of the "flexible response" strategy formulated by J. Kennedy and R. McNamara in line with the weapons systems deployed in the United States toward the end of the 1960's. However, this strategy has of course been somewhat updated in tandem with the improvement in weapons systems, and the declared strategic tenets based on that improvement and intended to put psychological pressure on a "potential adversary" may be quite varied depending on the precise stage at which the United States wants to "signal" its intentions and potential to the world.

It is primarily a question of aiming for strategic superiority over the Soviet Union by means of a new leap forward in the arms race. The measures concerned, begun by J. Carter, are widely known. Why is this being done? I believe that the United States wants to achieve strategic superiority primarily in the hope of obtaining greater freedom of action in local military operations. It is hoping that strategic superiority can be used as a backdrop against which it can "wage war with an enemy on several fronts" (in U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger's words).

As for the Reagan Administration itself, it can begin a series of new arms-building programs with no particular effort. Beginning programs is cheap, but finishing them is expensive when matters reach the point of massive purchases and the deployment of newly created systems. By beginning new programs, the present administration is thereby also involving future administrations in the arms race since it is always difficult to cancel a particular program when it has reached the implementation stage. This is the first consideration.

The second factor is that, by all accounts, the U.S. military leadership believes that, given the existence of Soviet-U.S. strategic parity--and it will continue to exist in the 1980's, despite Washington's efforts to overcome it--the main type of conflict that the United States will be able to allow itself to launch is a non-nuclear conflict, large scale perhaps, but non-nuclear. Hence the increased interest in conventional arms and armed forces (including naval forces).

The third factor is the growth of troop mobility, and primarily of the potential for using the "rapid deployment forces." The great attention paid by the present administration to these forces is evidence that it attaches paramount significance to military operations in regions with developing countries, including the Near East region.

The next factor concerns the approach to military bases abroad. By all accounts, Washington will increase the stationing of U.S. forces abroad as a means of "delineating" the sphere of "vitally important" U.S. interests and creating a "trigger" mechanism there to activate the main nucleus of the armed forces based in the United States itself.

There is another feature--the desire to urge the European NATO countries into independent confrontation with the Warsaw Pact states and increase their "relative weight" in such a confrontation. The program for the deployment of 572 new missiles in Western Europe seems to be designed to separate U.S. strategic forces from the nuclear forces in the European theater. The U.S. leaders are attempting to prove to the West Europeans in various NATO councils and committees that with the existence of the "Chinese factor" the strategic situation must be evaluated differently, in a more favorable light. But in public Washington states the direct opposite and fans the "Soviet threat" campaign, which once again attests to its hypocrisy.

As for doctrinal guidelines, here it is primarily a question of heightening those qualities of the strategic arsenal which increase its capability for waging a "counterforce" war. It is important to picture clearly that "counterforce" concepts are linked primarily with plans for a first ("disarming") strike against the other side's forces and the imposition of the "rules of nuclear exchange" on that side from a position of superiority. The Americans have been toying with the "counterforce" concept for 20 years now and have gradually been adapting their strategic arsenal to it by improving ICBM accuracy and reliability, reaction speeds and so forth. However, the U.S. hopes attached to the possibility of making use of "counterforce advantages" when the USSR has a dispersed and well-defended "triad" are illusory. As Soviet leaders have repeatedly stressed, only someone who has decided to commit suicide can begin a nuclear war in the hope of winning it.

Another factor in the doctrinal guidelines sphere is the advancement of the concept of "geographic escalation," that is, the threat to wage several wars against the USSR simultaneously. Admittedly it is not clear where and how C. Weinberger intends to wage these wars, especially in view of the fact that the United States even failed to emerge victorious from what Washington regards as two "small" wars on the Eurasian mainland--in Korea and Indochina. And the United States can hardly rely entirely on China as a military ally here.

And the final factor: The U.S. leadership has been stressing with increasing frequency, its readiness to make use of force and particularly to demonstrate it. The attack on the Libyan aircraft was graphic confirmation of that. To justify plans for an arms buildup, the U.S. leadership is now launching an unprecedentedly large-scale propaganda campaign about the "Soviet military threat" and the

"belligerence" of Soviet military doctrine. The thesis that the United States must allegedly overtake the Soviet Union in the arms sphere is being intensively played up. This is a deliberate ideological line aimed at disguising the U.S. leap toward superiority. On this level, too, it is impossible to ignore the intensive U.S. attacks on the principle of the "sides' mutual strategic vulnerability," on which the present Soviet-U.S. disarmament agreements are based. According to this principle, each side possesses a guaranteed opportunity--regardless of the "scenarios" for the beginning and progress of strategic nuclear war--to deliver a crushing retaliatory blow against the side which launched the nuclear aggression. American theorists have called this principle the maintenance of the capability to destroy an enemy with a retaliatory nuclear missile attack or the "mutual assured destruction" [MAD] principle.

The MAD principle is possibly not the ideal way of stabilizing the strategic balance. Perhaps in time the creative thinking of theorists will devise something more positive. Nor is there any doubt that the complete removal of the nuclear missile arsenals in the world would create a better situation than this "balance of terror," but there is still a long way to go toward the complete removal of these arsenals; and on the other hand, a situation of invulnerability is unattainable given the present power and ramified nature of the U.S. and USSR strategic arsenals, and given the fact that they are at approximately the same scientific and technical level.

It is the MAD principle that the U.S. Administration's "hawks" are opposing. They do not like it because it creates a situation of mutual deterrence and not unilateral U.S. "influence" over the USSR as some figures who are dreaming of freeing U.S. militarism's hands would like. But when they attack the MAD principle, U.S. theorists and officials use an illicit, base method: They allege that it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, which is waging an offensive against strategic parity and that the United States must catch up with the USSR. Everything is being turned upside down.

In fact the level of the Soviet Union's strategic forces, determined by the relevant Soviet-U.S. agreements in the 1970's, remains within the guidelines envisaged by the agreements, and the U.S. leadership is well aware of this.

Yu. M. Mel'nikov: Although Reagan's Republican Administration has not put forward any truly new ideas or strategic concepts, at least not so far, a major quantitative change can still be observed in the military preparations themselves, not to mention the continuous buildup of threatening rhetoric. This is all very dangerous. I would like to single out some particularly alarming trends, prompting an extremely attentive look at what is currently happening in the United States.

The first trend is the intensification of the arms race, which the Americans have been whipping up since 1945. The U.S. authorities now give little thought to constructive talks with the USSR. Instead they are thinking about disorienting the West European public and "testing" the Soviet Union.

The second trend is the active search for ways of making realistic and practical, rather than diplomatic, use of military force, particularly nuclear weapons. This is not a new trend. Americans began talking in earnest about the "tactical" use of atomic weapons for the first time as long ago as 1950, when the so-called "Project Vista" was formulated. Later there appeared R. McNamara's "counterforce" concept. Then, in 1974, J. Schlesinger put forward the concept of "limited" nuclear war.

The Americans are now conducting particularly dangerous discussions. What R. Reagan, A. Haig and C. Weinberger are saying cannot be treated as mere rhetoric. These statements reflect their beliefs and intentions. They want to convince themselves and us that, if a nuclear conflict should start, they will be able to "limit" it, saving a considerable section of their strategic forces for the aversion of "total" war and destructive nuclear strikes against U.S. territory. And they are implying that this will be "acceptable" to the USSR.

The danger of this kind of "talk" is heightened by the fact that an administration such as the present one is in power in the United States. It could indulge in dangerous adventures. Take for example its attitude toward Western Europe, which has been declared the probable theater of "limited" nuclear war. Its attitude is characterized by impudence and shamelessness: On 6 August, Hiroshima Memorial Day, the United States decided on the mass production of the neutron bomb. The next step may be the deployment of this weapon in various regions of the world, and, above all, in Western Europe. In this matter, world public opinion, even the allies' opinion, is being utterly ignored, just as it is being ignored on the issue of the deployment of new U.S. medium-range missiles. The pressure on the NATO countries, aimed at forcing them to align with anti-Soviet and anti-Polish sanctions, is another example.

This kind of treatment of one's allies, in my view, is a no less vivid and ominous indicator of imperial "all is permissible" thinking than the attitude of Reagan's Washington toward the Soviet Union and the socialist countries.

There are two lines in imperialist policy; an aspiration to adapt and an aspiration to achieve imperialist aims at all costs and to reverse the course of history. For a number of years U.S. imperialism tried to adapt to the changes taking place in the world. But the many failures and defeats in Africa, Latin America and Asia have strengthened the revanchists' position. In my view the second trend intensified sharply in the late 1970's: Imperialism is trying to switch to the offensive and recover lost positions.

A. K. Slobodenko: U.S. military strategy is distinguished at present by a number of specific features determined by factors influencing its development.

Among these the main factor is the U.S. leaders' desire to achieve world political and economic supremacy. At the same time the U.S. ruling circles have made it their aim to obstruct the objective course of historical development along the path of social progress, to suppress national liberation, revolutionary and democratic movements, to prevent the spread of socialist ideas and to continue the exploitation of other peoples. All this is portrayed as a way of defending "vital U.S. interests." It is believed that military strength is the main means of achieving these military-political goals.

The second important factor influencing U.S. military strategy is the weaponry available to U.S. ruling circles, primarily strategic nuclear missiles. Trends and rates of missile development and the creation of new, more efficient types influence the character and method of waging war and military strategy. The Reagan Administration has begun intensive activity relating to strategic nuclear missile production and the creation of new models and types of missiles.

However, the development of U.S. military strategy at the present time is perhaps most strongly influenced by the correlation of forces in the world arena and the balance of forces with the Soviet Union, or parity--the approximate equality in decisive forms of weapons and in strategic nuclear missiles. This circumstance has meant that U.S. military strategy, primarily its nuclear strategy, is deadlocked. It envisages the destruction of the enemy and at the same time risks the destruction of its own country. Strategy has acquired a method of armed struggle which is dangerous to use since it may lead to the death of the one who uses it first.

Can nuclear war be waged under present-day conditions and, if so, by what methods? U.S. strategists answer this question in the affirmative. They believe that the main condition for waging such a war is the delivery of the first nuclear strike. The problem consists in determining which targets (and how many) should be subject to the first nuclear strike.

This problem has been resolved in different ways at different stages of the development of U.S. strategy. At first a preventive nuclear strike was envisaged, mainly against Soviet cities. The whole scheme was based on impunity. But when the Soviet Union acquired the potential to deliver an immediate retaliatory strike against the United States, the latter's strategists concluded that the first nuclear strike concept was unrealizable because it did not guarantee victory. However, U.S. ruling circles do not want to accept this position. They are feverishly seeking a way out. In what direction? One way is to acquire the kind of military might which Washington calculates would give the United States the potential to destroy not only the Soviet Union's cities but also its military installations, so that Soviet nuclear forces could be destroyed with a first nuclear strike at the very beginning of a war and would have no opportunity to deliver a retaliatory strike.

The main long-term trend in the development of U.S. nuclear strategy involves seeking the potential for a first ("disarming") strike against the Soviet Union. With this aim in mind, the Reagan Administration has adopted a sweeping program to build up offensive strategic nuclear weapons--to both increase their power and accuracy and improve the survivability of weapons systems and the flexibility and operational efficiency of their combat use. It is striving for superiority over the Soviet Union in decisive categories of arms. The "limited" nuclear war concept, in my view, is merely a stage along the way to the planned goal.

The second trend in the development of U.S. military strategy is preparation for conventional war. It is wrong to believe that the conventional (non-nuclear) arms race is innocuous. The United States is striving to outstrip the Soviet Union not in numbers of conventional forces but in quality. Furthermore, it is setting itself the aim of creating "total" or "general" armed forces--that is, of using the imperialist countries' combined armed forces against the USSR and other socialist states.

A new concept--"geographic escalation"--has appeared in the United States. In essence it rejects the restrictions imposed by the "two and a half" or "one and a half" wars concepts. In other words, it proposes to extend military conflict in any region of the world to all other regions and turn it into a general conventional war.

Finally, the premise of the possibility of using nuclear weapons, including neutron weapons, in a localized war is new in U.S. military strategy.

Thus there are a number of distinctive features in current U.S. military strategy. The main features are aggressiveness and adventurism, which are exceptionally dangerous to peace. The strategy is based on a recognition of the possibility of preventive, preemptive multi-option actions of a distinctly offensive character and, as its architects assert, is designed to enable the United States to retain the long-term initiative.

The adventurism of U.S. military strategy lies not just in the fact that it accepts the possibility of waging a controllable "limited" nuclear war according to definite "rules" with the graduated use of nuclear weapons, but also in the fact that it strives to achieve the potential for delivering a first ("disarming") nuclear strike.

The danger of U.S. strategy lies in the attempt to make the very idea of nuclear war acceptable to public opinion and to hoodwink mankind into believing that nuclear war is not really so very dangerous and can be waged "rationally" and "humanely." Its danger lies in the fact that it lowers the "nuclear threshold," that is, it creates a greater likelihood of nuclear war.

This is why the exposure of the true essence and content of U.S. military strategy and its development trends is currently assuming great significance in the struggle to strengthen peace.

COPYRIGHT" Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya," 1982

CSO: 1803/12

- END -