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
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USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 1, JANUARY 1986

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3 April 1986

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 1, JANUARY 1986

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CAPITALISM'S 'DEEPENING CRISIS,' IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE DISCUSSED

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[Article by T. T. Timofeyev: "The General Crisis of Capitalism and Some Aspects of the Ideological Struggle"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The severe conflicts and crisis-related processes in the world capitalist system, which became more pronounced in various spheres of public life in the last decade, can only be assessed accurately with a view to the interaction of the general crisis of capitalism with other crises, including cyclical and structural ones.

Marxist-Leninist science views the general crisis of capitalism as a lengthy process reflected in a variety of facets and forms. Above all, it is reflected in the presence of two opposing social systems in the world and includes the collapse of imperialism's colonial system and its consequences, the dramatic intensification of conflicts in the world capitalist economy and the growth of imperialism's economic and political instability. It has also affected the social conflicts of state-monopolist capitalism, among which the struggle between labor and capital is the main conflict. As the draft of the new edition of the CPSU Program stresses, **"THE GENERAL CRISIS OF CAPITALISM IS GROWING MORE SEVERE. Its sphere of domination is being irreversibly diminished and its historical futility is becoming increasingly obvious."**¹

Ideas about the "automatic collapse" of monopolist capitalism and the "shut-down" of its productive forces are just as incompatible as reformist theories, which usually try to diminish the severity of economic, social and other contradictions in the world capitalist system, with the scientifically sound, Marxist-Leninist approach to the disclosure of monopolist capitalism's internal and external contradictions.

The Leninist procedures for the study of imperialism and the comprehensive analysis of new events in world economics and politics serve as a reliable scientific basis for a correct understanding of these processes. The organic elements of this basis include the fundamental premises of the theory of the general crisis of world capitalism and the conclusions communists have drawn about various phases of its development (as the scales of the competition and

struggle between the two systems have expanded and the internal and external contradictions of the imperialist system have grown more pronounced).

The 1970's were marked by important qualitative changes in the development of the current phase of capitalism's general crisis. Above all, these included the intensification of the capitalist economy's internal instability and the deterioration of the existing structure of the world capitalist system of economic transactions, accompanied by mounting social tension and the intensification of the bourgeois society's ideological and political crisis. In other words, the increasingly severe general crisis of capitalism has become much more all-encompassing.

Under these conditions, the CPSU and the fraternal communist and workers parties are keeping a close watch on studies of new phenomena in the development of capitalism's general crisis. As their documents stress, we are witnessing the considerable intensification of this social system's all-pervading crisis. The methods with which capitalism was able to maintain the relative stability of its development in the postwar period are growing less and less effective. One fact is becoming increasingly obvious: Imperialism is incapable of coping with the social consequences of a technological revolution of unprecedented depth and breadth, a situation in which millions of laborers are doomed to unemployment and poverty. It is enmeshed in internal and inter-governmental antagonisms, upheavals and conflicts, and these are having profound but diverse effects on the policies of the capitalist countries.

In recent years the world capitalist economy has been distinguished by the interaction of the consequences of structural and cyclical crises and of a succession of lengthy recessions with phases of depression, intermittent recovery and insignificant growth, evolving into a period of new economic difficulties, increased mass unemployment and the infiltration of the political and spiritual spheres as well as economics by these processes.

Whereas previously, just two or three decades ago for instance, the overall state of affairs was distinguished by relatively cheap raw materials and energy, giving capital some leeway in questions pertaining to wages and compensating to some extent for the rising cost of live labor, this reserve was largely depleted by the second half of the 1970's. This created an additional incentive to economize on live labor as well as on energy and raw materials.

This accelerated the accumulation of "surplus" manpower even in the capitalist countries where the extensive development of production had created a labor shortage in previous years. As a result, the unemployment problem became much more pervasive and chronic. This has been pointed out by researchers in many countries who analyze economic and social processes in various parts of the capitalist world.²

In an attempt to retain its position in the historical competition with socialism, state-monopolist capitalism has tried to stimulate the development of several advanced industries and is "striving to put the latest scientific and technical achievements at its own service."³

During this phase of the technological revolution, however, the stepped up transition to new types of initial raw material, the reliance on new types of energy and the reorganization of production are being accompanied by the curtailment of certain types of production. This is the reason for the slump in some capitalist countries, including the United States, in such industries as ferrous metallurgy, light industry, the textile industry and others.

The crisis of 1973-1975 was the most severe postwar crisis-related upheaval to date in terms of scales--the slump in industrial production, the number of countries it affected, the number of unemployed and several other parameters. It engulfed all of the leading capitalist countries almost simultaneously, as if it were restoring the war-ravaged synchronicity of the world capitalist cycle. The subsequent recovery and economic growth were quite sluggish, inflationary tendencies remained apparent, and mass unemployment continued to exist even after the stage of maximum production decline had passed.

A few years later, in the beginning of the 1980's, the world capitalist economy entered a new period of crisis. It was also distinguished by a cyclical slump combined with intense reorganization processes dictated by the latest technological advances.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that the expectations of Western ruling circles to employ state-monopolist regulation for the guarantee of the relatively crisis-free development of capitalism were an illusion. Life has demonstrated the futility of the different--Keynesian and neoliberal--theories of state-monopolist economic regulation intended to "alleviate" capitalism's socioeconomic conflicts. Under the conditions of fierce competition, incessant efforts to continue dominating the market have led to a situation in which the monopolies sometimes expand production and raise prices even when the market is saturated. This kind of overproduction was seen, for example, in the U.S. automobile market during the crisis of 1973-1975. It is not surprising that many economists have justifiably pointed out the obvious ineffectiveness of this regulation in the past decade.⁴

The crisis of the early 1980's had much in common with the previous one and testified eloquently to the serious ailments of the capitalist society.

In the first place, in all of the leading capitalist countries but the FRG and Japan, this crisis was preceded by a period of much higher price increases than the crisis of 1973-1975. In the second place, whereas the decline of wages during the crisis of 1973-1975 was witnessed primarily in the United States, in 1979-1982 it took place in many other capitalist countries. And in the United States the real income of the laboring public fell to the level reached at the end of the 1960's. In the third place, this phase of the world capitalist cycle was distinguished by the deterioration of the monetary system (primarily as a result of the colossal growth of public and private debts). The largest debtors--private corporations and governments--were faced by the acute problem of covering short-term debts. High interest rates and the depressed state of the securities market simultaneously reduced opportunities for investment expansion. In the fourth place, the economic and other conflicts between the three "power centers" of the world capitalist system--the

United States, Western Europe and Japan--became even more severe. The trade wars between them are constantly moving into new markets. Another significant factor was the more intense struggle by the people of the developing countries for the establishment of a new international economic order. The use of force by the imperialist powers, headed by the United States, to transfer the burden of losses to these people began to encounter much stronger resistance.

Furthermore, the militarization of many sectors of the economy in capitalist countries, especially the United States, was stepped up in the beginning of the 1980's. Washington's rising military expenditures became the main cause of a huge budget deficit. They are heightening disparities in the American economy and are giving the laboring public a heavy burden to bear.⁵

Another significant fact is that the rate of unemployment was already quite high when the crisis began at the turn of the decade. During the crisis it rose to its highest point in over four decades. This dealt severe blows to the status of the working class by lowering the standard of living and heightening the insecurity of millions.

Another noteworthy development was the combination of unemployment with inflation in many imperialist countries. In the past, the majority of Western economists believed that the inflationary rise of prices always accompanied rapid production growth. Prices fell when a cyclical crisis began. Besides this, high inflation had previously been accompanied by low unemployment, and vice versa.

The previous connection between the state of the economy on the one hand and inflation and unemployment on the other has recently been disrupted. As a result, rates of inflation and unemployment, as U.S. statistics testify, remained high during different phases of the economic cycle, especially in the 1970's. This engendered new social friction by intensifying the crisis of the strategy and social policy of state-monopolist capitalism.

An analysis of the distinctive features of capitalist reproduction in the 1970's and 1980's indicates that they reflected long-term tendencies in capitalist economic development--that is, characteristics engendered not by coincidental sets of circumstances and not by temporary reversals in market conditions, but by the natural laws governing the general crisis of capitalism.

These objectively determined new signs of the intensification of capitalism's general crisis aroused the completely understandable worries of many bourgeois economists and politicians protecting the interests of reactionary state-monopolist groups. The more pronounced the contradictions of state-monopolist capitalism become, the more often bourgeois ideologists will have to acknowledge the broad scales of crisis-related processes in the capitalist system.

The increasingly pronounced socioeconomic conflicts of the bourgeois society intensified the criticism of old economic doctrines in the West and led to the "reordering of priorities" and to the aggravation of differences of opinion and conflicts between various currents of bourgeois political economy. This was reflected in the bankruptcy of many earlier bourgeois theories of state-monopolist economic and social regulation which had made their appearance

during different phases of the general crisis of capitalism. It was also reflected in the distinctive "volte face" of the leading bourgeois economists and politicians representing the interests of exploitative classes.

This gave rise to all kinds of reversals in the development of economic thinking in the West, in which the place of the "Keynesian revolution" was taken by theories connected with the "marginalist counterrevolution" (the ideologists of the latter took up arms against K. Marx and even against A. Smith and D. Ricardo) or by eclectic attempts to combine the contradictory postulates of different (from overtly anti-Marxist to more subtle, reformist) kinds of apologist theories--monetarism, the "post-Keynesian" schools, neo-institutionalism and other theories intended to alleviate the contradictions of state-monopolist capitalism.⁶

Pointing to various aspects of crisis-related developments in the bourgeois society, the opponents of Marxism-Leninism sometimes blame them primarily on temporary changes. Furthermore, crises and their social consequences, in their opinion, are surmountable within the framework of the capitalist method of production.⁷ Many of them are incapable of accurately associating the "national" symptoms of the capitalist crisis with the international factors of its intensification.

Now, however, some Western researchers who had previously (in the 1960's, for instance) adhered to different varieties of the theory of "growth," "the mixed economy" and "goal-oriented management" have to change their "logical deductions."⁸ This tendency has been characteristic of several schools of bourgeois political economy in recent years.⁹ Theories of crises and their various aspects are being discussed more and more frequently by Marxists and by petty bourgeois ideologists representing reformist and leftist radical currents and also by some bourgeois authors.¹⁰ Of course, the different politico-ideological aims and outlooks of representatives of different schools must be taken into account. The intensification of the crisis of bourgeois political economy, however, is still an indisputable fact.

It is true that some Western preachers of ideas distinguished by total pessimism and social agnosticism, who identify the future of humanity with the history of only the capitalist system, are trying to portray the exacerbation of the bourgeois society's contradictions as the crisis of "all human civilization." What is more, some of them allege that "the present crisis of civilization is so severe...that the very attempt to analyze it, much less to solve it, is beyond the limits of human reason and imagination" (?).¹¹

Therefore, bourgeois ideologists are incapable of revealing the real causes of the crisis-related processes inherent in the exploitative order. This is why many of them are inclined to believe that crises are completely the result of "a combination of coincidences and indefinite factors."¹² Other liberal bourgeois researchers display a mechanistic approach and reduce the entire combination of structural advances and various socioeconomic, political and other developments compounding the all-round crisis of bourgeois society to purely qualitative changes--to changes in the economic sphere or solely to "business cycles"--and thereby understate their deep-seated social causes and consequences.

In addition to everything else, the more pronounced disagreements between representatives of different schools and currents of the bourgeois social sciences provide grounds for statements about their deadlocks and contradictions, which, incidentally, cannot be completely denied even by some Western researchers.

One of the main areas of the present-day ideological-theoretical and political struggle is the assessment of the social aspects of scientific and technical progress. The position of Marxist-Leninists on this matter is clearly set forth in the new edition of the CPSU Program, which says: "The technological revolution has grave social consequences in the capitalist society. The millions of workers laid off by enterprises are doomed to professional dequalification, financial deprivation and total insecurity. Most educated young people have no outlet for their energy and knowledge and suffer from the futility of their situation. Mass unemployment continues to exist under any economic conditions and the real prospect of its continued growth could bring about the most severe upheavals in the capitalist social order."¹³

It is not surprising that the hopeless state of the employment sphere in the capitalist world in recent years has forced even bourgeois economists and sociologists to pay more attention to the problem of chronic unemployment. Insisting on the "reinterpretation" of several earlier economic theories, many in the West are appealing for the study of the scales of poverty in various parts of the world capitalist system.¹⁴

It is therefore completely understandable that matters pertaining to the dynamics of mass unemployment, the poverty of low-income strata and other incurable ills of the capitalist system in the past, present and future are being analyzed more frequently than before.

With a view to the fact that the employment crisis and the growing scales of unemployment are seriously discrediting the exploitative order in the eyes of the general public,¹⁵ some representatives of bourgeois political economy are alleging that the growth of unemployment is normal and that it is something the laboring public and the society must accept, especially under the conditions of the present technological revolution. These views are preached by the supporters of monetarist theories and other currents of bourgeois economic thinking.¹⁶ A great deal of literature has been published in the West in recent years to convince the general reading public that there is "nothing frightening" about chronic unemployment and that there are no real alternatives to the capitalist crisis in employment.

At the same time, the class struggle of the laboring public, as the new edition of the CPSU Program stresses, sometimes "forces capitalists to make partial concessions and agree to some improvements in working conditions, wages and social security. This is done to preserve the main thing--the supremacy of capital. These maneuvers, however, are more and more likely to be combined with coercive behavior and a direct attack by the monopolies and the bourgeois state on the standard of living of the laboring public."¹⁷

It never occurs to the opponents of Marxism-Leninism that the general crisis of capitalism is a crisis encompassing the entire world system of imperialism.

"Under the conditions of state-monopolist capitalism, uniting the strength of the monopolies and the state in a single mechanism," the new edition of the CPSU Program says, "the conflict between the colossally increased productive forces and capitalist production relations is growing increasingly acute. The economy is becoming more unstable internally, which is reflected in slower overall growth rates and in overlapping and more severe cyclical and structural crises. Mass unemployment and inflation have become chronic diseases and budget deficits and public debts have acquired colossal proportions."¹⁸

In our day, the fundamental difference and extremely deep watershed between creative Marxism and various kinds of non-Marxist bourgeois theories are quite distinct. The latter essentially try to smooth out or conceal the fundamental contradictions of the exploitative order. These tendencies are characteristic of overt opponents of Marxism (W. Rostow and others) and of petty bourgeois, pseudo-Marxist, "leftist"-radical doctrinaires of the anarchist or "neo"-Trotskyist currents (P. Mattick and E. Mandel), who have long interpreted the theory of crises in the spirit of unscientific allegations about the inevitability of capitalism's "automatic collapse."¹⁹

These petty bourgeois ideologists, for whom the scientific explanation of the general crisis of capitalism is beyond their comprehension, give it a simplistic interpretation and project it to almost the entire worldwide historical process. This reflects their incorrect assessment of changes in the world capitalist economic system and their frequent mechanistic interpretations of various crisis-related processes. Some reformist doctrinaires and leftist-radical interpreters of Marxism try to imply that the revolutionary and creative Marxist-Leninist legacy is hardly capable today of serving as a procedural basis for the analysis of the natural laws of world development under the conditions of the general crisis of capitalism and the struggle between the two systems. Any attempts to "separate" the dialectically related Leninist view of imperialism from the theory of the general crisis of capitalism and to dispute the accuracy of communist assessments of the class essence of the present era and their analysis of its driving forces are theoretically invalid and completely groundless.

As the new edition of the CPSU Program stresses, our era is the "era of transition from capitalism to socialism and communism, of historic competition between the worldwide sociopolitical systems, the era of socialist and national-liberation revolutions and the downfall of capitalism, the era of struggle between the main driving forces of social development--world socialism, the workers and communist movement, the people of the newly liberated states and mass democratic movements--against imperialism and its policy of aggression and oppression and for democracy and social progress."²⁰

Questions connected with the definition of the nature and basic aims of present-day imperialism's militarist, aggressive policy line during the current phase of the general crisis of capitalism are the object of a fierce politico-ideological struggle. Communists believe that U.S. monopolist capital has become the chief exploiter in the world, that American imperialism is actually performing the role of a world policeman and that it represents the main bulwark of international reaction.

Any efforts to whitewash imperialism and conceal its inhumane essence are refuted by the realities of capitalist life.

Communists have pointed to the race imperialism started for nuclear and other arms as one of its greatest crimes and as a clear sign of the general crisis of capitalism. It has provided monopolies with huge profits but it has put the world on the verge of nuclear conflict. "The sinister alliance of the death merchants and the imperialist government is the supporting framework of extreme reaction, a constant and growing source of military danger and conclusive evidence of the political and sociomoral bankruptcy of the capitalist system."²¹

No camouflage can repeal the internal laws of capitalist development or eliminate the acute antagonisms between labor and capital and between the monopolies and society.

The increasing economic instability and exacerbated political contradictions of the bourgeois society are naturally accompanied by heightened social tension in many links of the world capitalist system. Under these conditions, even some Western bourgeois-liberal and reformist authors are unable to completely deny the accuracy and pertinence of Marxist ideas about the class struggle and the role of the working class in society. It is true that some in the West give these ideas an extremely vague interpretation. For example, sometimes they speak of some kind of "latent conflicts," which are supposed to alleviate or prevent real class struggle. They also talk about the "spontaneous play" of various sociopolitical forces, during the course of which elements of "conflict and cooperation" between labor and capital are supposedly intermingled or "intermixed."²²

In fact, however, neither rightwing conservative nor various kinds of neo-corporativist theories can stand up to the realities of class confrontation, which is inherent in the exploitative order.

In recent years, new developments have been witnessed in the intensification of the crisis of "industrial relations" and the mounting social conflicts which have been acknowledged to some extent even by some bourgeois economists and sociologists. One is the indisputable fact that the strategy of "social revenge," to which reactionary circles of state-monopolist capitalism decided to resort, has aggravated class conflicts and increased socioeconomic and political instability in several capitalist countries.

It is indicative that the number of participants in social conflicts in the capitalist countries has constantly risen over the last 10 years. For example, whereas around 282 million people took part in such conflicts just in the zone of developed capitalism in 1975-1979, the figure was 335 million during the next 5 years--from 1980 through 1984. Furthermore, there was a particularly noteworthy increase (of almost 43 percent) in the number of participants in political demonstrations. These data cogently confirm the conclusions stated in the new edition of the CPSU Program, that during class battles the working class unites its ranks and becomes more active in "an economic, political and ideological struggle against capitalism. The struggle is acquiring broader scales, more diverse forms and a richer content."²³

In contrast to all sorts of adherents of "historical pessimism," Marxist-Leninists have a life-affirming, revolutionary view of the world. Communists have pointed out the historical inevitability of the replacement of capitalism by socialism. Even today, however, during the course of their daily activity they are mobilizing the laboring public for a struggle against the attempts of monopolist circles to transfer the burden of crises to the shoulders of the general public, mobilizing the laborers for more active demonstrations for social progress, peace, disarmament and common security.

The stronger bonds and interaction of the labor and peace movements are a sign of the times. This is promoting the growth of strong potential for peace.

For example, stronger antiwar feelings in broad segments of the U.S. population, including demonstrations by various social, professional and political organizations against the escalation of the arms race and for the normalization and improvement of American-Soviet relations, were indisputably among the important factors making the Geneva summit meeting of November 1985 possible. The progressive, peace-loving public now has enough strength and influence to force the U.S. administration to pay attention to statements by the masses and to their desire for stronger peace and real steps toward disarmament.

The Geneva meeting of General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev of the CPSU Central Committee with U.S. President R. Reagan, which marked the beginning of regular summit-level Soviet-American dialogue, was a major event in international affairs. It could provide opportunities for new steps to eliminate the threat of war by keeping the arms race out of space and stopping it on earth. The attainment of this objective will demand great responsibility and a substantial contribution from all states and from various sociopolitical forces.

The course of world events has conclusively proved that people all over the world are becoming increasingly aware of the obvious fact that there can be no reasonable alternative to the peaceful coexistence of states with differing social orders in the nuclear age. As the policy-planning documents of the CPSU reaffirmed, the historical dispute between the opposing social systems into which today's world is divided can and must be solved by peaceful means.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Novaya redaktsiya). Proyekt" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New Edition). Draft], Moscow, 1985, p 13.
2. B. Cohen, "The Theory and Practice of Reaganomics," POLITICAL AFFAIRS, 1982, No 9; idem, "Marxist and Bourgeois Theories of Crisis," ibid., 1983, No 12; H. Claude, "Sur la crise economique de 1982 et le cycle americain d'apres guerre," RECHERCHES INTERNATIONALES, 1983, No 7.
3. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Novaya redaktsiya). Proyekt," p 14.

4. M. Aglieta, "A Theory of Capitalist Regulation. The U.S. Experience," London, 1979. Also see V. Kuznetsov, "The Crisis of the System of Capitalist Economic Regulation," MEMO, 1979, No 8, pp 66-81.
5. The negative effects, including the economic and social consequences, of the unprecedented growth of military expenditures in the United States, especially since the start of the Reagan Administration, have become a matter of increasing interest to researchers in the West, especially in the United States. See, for example, "The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1983," SIPRI, London-N.Y., 1983; U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 13 February 1984.
6. For more detail, see "Kritika sovremennoy burzhuaznoy politekonomii" [Criticism of Contemporary Bourgeois Political Economy] (with an introduction by Academician A. G. Mileykovskiy), Moscow, 1977; R. Clower, "The Keynesian Counterrevolution: A Theoretical Appraisal," in: "The Theory of Interest Rates" (edited by F. Hahn and F. Brechling), London, 1965; J. Benassy, "Neo-Keynesian Disequilibrium Theory in a Monetary Economy," REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1975, vol 42, No 132, pp 503-523.
7. See, for example, W. Rostow, "The World Economy. History and Prospects," Austin-London, 1978, pp 561-562, 645-646, 656; idem, "Getting from Here to There. America's Future in the World Economy," N.Y., 1978; idem, "The Barbaric Counter-Revolution: Cause and Cure," London, 1984; S. Butler, M. Sanera and W. Weinrod, "Mandate for Leadership II. Continuing the Conservative Revolution," Wash., 1984.
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9. See, in particular, I. M. Osadchaya, "Conservatizm protiv reformizma (dve tendentsii v burzhuaznoy politekonomii)" [Conservatism vs. Reformism (Two Trends in Bourgeois Political Economy)], Moscow, 1984; T. Bottomore, "Theories of Modern Capitalism," Boston, 1985.
10. See, in particular, "The Faltering Economy," edited by J. Foster and H. Szlajfer, N.Y., 1984; P. Mattick, "Economic Crisis and Crisis Theory," London, 1981; "Alternatives. Proposals for America from the Democratic Left," N.Y., 1984; G. Lodge, "The American Disease: Why the American Economic System Is Faltering...and How the Trend Can Be Changed with a Minimum of Crisis," N.Y., 1984.
11. J. Camilleri, "Civilization in Crisis. Human Prospects in a Changing World," N.Y., 1978, p 1.
12. "Beyond the Crisis," edited by W. Birnbaum, N.Y., 1977, p 3.
13. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Novaya redaktsiya). Proyekt," p 14.
14. See, in particular, "On Mass Unemployment in the Capitalist Countries," RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYIY MIR, 1984, No 6, pp 46-59; also see D. Gordon,

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ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY DETAILED

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[Article by V. V. Zhurkin: "On Strategic Stability"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] It is a paradox of our time that everyone is willing to sign an appeal for strategic stability. States and political forces are in favor of stability, regarding it as the most important condition for lasting peace on the planet. Some of its advocates, however, are the very politicians and strategists who persistently undermine it in their daily activities.

As a result, strategic stability, which was once a defensive political theory, has now become an object of ideological struggle as well. This, in turn, has considerably exacerbated an already pressing problem closely related to the main question of our day: Will there or will there not be a nuclear war?

It is easy to explain why such a fierce political struggle has broken out over questions of strategic stability in the international arena. Whatever might have been said about it in the past, just the irrefutable fact that nuclear war will mean the end of human history has made the issue of strategic stability one of the central matters of concern in contemporary political and military thinking. The term stability has a persuasive psychological import and inspires confidence in the solidity of peace.

The attempts the United States has been making since the beginning of the 1980's to gain military superiority to the USSR and to tip the balance of power between imperialism and socialism, which has already existed for a decade and a half now, in its own favor make the issue of strategic stability exceptionally pertinent. All of the systems of first-strike strategic weapons (the MX, Midgetman and Trident II missiles, the B-1B and Stealth bombers and the long-range cruise missiles), the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and the Far East and, finally, Washington's latest dangerous innovation--the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), intended to turn space into a bridgehead for aggression--are separately and collectively intended to undermine strategic stability.

This militarist policy line is distinctive because its authors, seeing the growing popularity of the idea of strategic stability in the world, are

shamelessly speculating on it by camouflaging their peace-jeopardizing activity with slogans about "stronger stability." Lofty statements about stability are already being used for the hypocritical sanctification of the "Star Wars" program, first-strike missiles and the plans to demolish the military-strategic balance.

Two methods of adapting the idea of strategic stability to fit the needs of the arms race are being used particularly extensively in the United States. One is simple, just as the majority of present-day Washington's propaganda constructs are. It is precisely the method that is being employed by Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, his loyal assistants and a few of his superiors. It essentially consists in the monotonous reiteration that the American weapons systems are "stabilizing" the situation, while the Soviet ones (which, incidentally, are retaliatory) are not. The persistence and indefatigability of the U.S. propaganda machine compensate for the lack of arguments and facts.

More complex maneuvers around the issue of stability have a long history in the United States. Their authors do not acknowledge all of the complexity and diversity of the strategic situation but simply isolate one or two weapons systems (Soviet, of course) from the complex of factors making up the strategic balance and brand them "destabilizing." Exaggerated stories about Soviet land-based ICBM's are particularly fashionable in Washington. By taking certain elements of the entire complex of factors determining strategic stability--political, military-technical and others--out of context, Washington hopes to use this false and far from realistic picture of the military-strategic situation in the world as a cover for its own far-reaching destabilizing actions.

Influential groups of American political scientists, the "civilian strategists" serving Washington's military policy, played an important role in the creation of the distorted view of strategic stability. For more than a quarter of a century they have been developing their own system of concepts, dividing the issue into separate elements so that virtually all major U.S. strategic decisions have been camouflaged as measures to strengthen stability. Since U.S. military-political thinking is dominant in the West, American ideas about strategic stability now serve as something like axioms in Western political and scientific communities.

This issue, however, is too important to all mankind to become the object of selfish political speculation or the onesided scientific investigations serving this purpose. The disruption of strategic stability will heighten the most horrifying danger in history--the danger of nuclear war--whereas the reinforcement of stability will enhance mankind's ability to avoid self-annihilation.

What is strategic stability in our day? Above all, it must be understood that this is a complex and multifaceted concept, representing a system of inter-related but quite diverse elements. For this reason, all of its main components should be examined collectively. They fall into two main categories--political and material--and combine the policies of states, the balance of power, military-technical capabilities, arms limitation and reduction issues

and, finally, the distinctive interconnection between strategic and regional stability in the important parts of the world where the forces of imperialism and the socialist community come into direct contact with one another.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, strategic stability (or instability) is the result of the policies of states. It is precisely political decisions that stabilize or destabilize the strategic situation. The development of any weapons system is the result of a political decision.

The arms race is a particularly negative form of the destabilizing influence of the policies of states on the strategic situation. As researchers at the University of California recently calculated, 13 of the 14 turning points in the buildup of nuclear arms in the first 30 years after the war were completely initiated by the United States, and the other was partially initiated by the United States (the Soviet Union was slightly ahead in the testing of ICBM's at the end of the 1950's, but the United States was nevertheless the first to deploy these missiles).¹ The testing of the atomic and then the hydrogen bombs and the development and deployment of heavy strategic bombers, nuclear artillery, submarine-carried ballistic missiles, multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's) and many other actions were initiated by Washington in an unsuccessful attempt to achieve decisive military superiority to the USSR. Our country countered--and always successfully--the efforts of the overseas strategists.

The persistent attempts at breakthroughs and superiority continued in the 1980's. This aim was openly declared at the Republican convention prior to the 1980 presidential election ("to regain military superiority to the USSR") and reaffirmed at the 1984 convention before the last presidential election. The United States was the first to develop and deploy strategic cruise missiles and it is preparing for the development of mobile ICBM's and for an arms race in space.

The approach to the issue of the first use of nuclear weapons and the first strike is an extremely important indicator of the political intentions of states and their attitudes toward strategic stability. The USSR has pledged not to use nuclear weapons first and has unconditionally condemned the concept of the first strike.

The inertia of militarist thinking, however, is still being felt in the United States. The concept of the first use of nuclear weapons is still an element of U.S. and NATO strategy. And there has certainly been no disavowal of the first-strike concept, which is mentioned in the latest central document on U.S. nuclear intentions--the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP-6), which went into effect on 1 October 1983.

In his recent book "The Button. The Pentagon's Strategic Command and Control System," prominent American researcher D. Ford makes the following justifiable comment: "The basic emergency plan--the one that will work quickest if a nuclear conflict starts to look inevitable, envisages a concentrated first strike against key military targets in the Soviet Union."² This is the real reason for the vague euphemisms and subterfuges to which the U.S.

administration resorts when its attitude toward the first use of nuclear weapons is discussed. As former President R. Nixon recently admitted in a TIME magazine interview,³ Washington was prepared on several occasions to use nuclear weapons against the USSR, GDR, PRC, DPRK, Vietnam, India and other countries.

Initiative and consistency are the distinctive features of Soviet policy. In our day, these qualities are clearly reflected in the USSR's constructive efforts to prevent an arms race in space and stop the race on earth and in a major new Soviet initiative--the proposal that the USSR and United States negotiate a total ban on space attack weapons and make radical cuts of 50 percent in their nuclear weapons capable of reaching one another's territories. In the future, the Soviet Union will struggle for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It is proposing the kind of world in which the USSR and the United States will set an example for other nuclear powers and stop all nuclear tests, a world in which the USSR and United States will give up the development of new nuclear arms, put a freeze on their stockpiles and prohibit and destroy all antisatellite systems. The Soviet Union has reinforced its proposal with bold unilateral actions--moratoriums on nuclear tests, the deployment of Soviet intermediate-range missiles in its European half, the emplacement of antisatellite systems in space and others.

As a whole, the recent foreign policy steps taken by the Soviet Union (particularly in connection with the Soviet-American summit meeting of 19-21 November 1985 in Geneva and other major international undertakings) represent a group of sweeping constructive measures capable of leading to a real turning point in the development of international relations--a turning point in favor of peace, security and cooperation between nations. A reversal of this kind and decisions of this kind would also aid in the radical reinforcement of strategic stability.

IN THE SECOND PLACE, military-strategic doctrines and concepts have a direct effect on the state of strategic stability. If these doctrines are defensive, do not envisage the first use of nuclear weapons and proceed from the belief that the main purpose of strategic nuclear forces is to keep the potential aggressor from starting a war, they aid in strengthening strategic stability and consolidating the international situation in general. Soviet military doctrine (just as Soviet military strategy) is indissolubly connected with the peaceful foreign policy of the USSR and is intended to strengthen strategic stability as the most important condition for the prevention of nuclear war.

The United States and NATO have been distinguished throughout the postwar period by a succession of doctrines and concepts increasing the possibility of global conflict--"counterforce," "limited" and "protracted" nuclear wars and others. All of them are directly or indirectly related to the most dangerous military-strategic concept--the first strike--regardless of the form it takes: the disarming first strike, the forestalling strike, the preemptive strike or any other.

Concepts and doctrines of this kind have a destabilizing nature because they are designed to undermine strategic stability. Although the factor of certain

retaliation is inexorable, the existence of destabilizing doctrines and concepts of this kind could facilitate--particularly in times of acute crisis--the adoption of the suicidal decision to start the aggression.

The current U.S. leadership has tried to make the American military-strategic concepts constituting its military doctrine even tougher. This toughness is recorded in its fundamental military-policy documents--National Security Council memoranda NSC-13 (October 1981), NSC-32 (May 1982), NSC-85 (25 March 1983), NSC-119 (6 January 1984) and NSC-172 (30 May 1985). The declarations on the struggle against the "evil empire" and on the achievement of military superiority were translated in these memoranda into the dry language of operative documents.

Specifically, however, these directives gave detailed descriptions of the dangerous concepts of "controlled," "limited" and "protracted" nuclear wars, which were supposed to facilitate the aggressor's start of a conflict. Furthermore, the Washington planners still had a global nuclear confrontation in mind. What other explanation could there be for the zeal with which they are promoting the concept of "decapitation"--a first strike against the other side's command centers? It can only be part of a system of global nuclear aggression, in which case the discussion of any kind of "controlled" nuclear wars is out of the question.

The plans for Washington's space adventures only make the entire system more dangerous and provocative. As two of the foremost experts in this field, G. Rathjens and J. Ruina, remarked in a special issue of DAEDALUS magazine on space weapons, "the Strategic Defense Initiative is the ugliest episode in the dismal history of the nuclear arms race."⁴ It has an equally ugly effect on strategic stability, which the "Star Wars" program is designed to undermine.

In essence, the "Star Wars" program envisages the creation of a complex of space attack weapons, a kind of space shield under which the aggressor will attempt to take cover when the victim of the aggression delivers his weakened retaliatory strike. Therefore, the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) is part of a complex of measures to prepare for a first strike.

"The possibility of the militarization of space signifies a qualitatively new leap in the arms race, which would lead unavoidably to the disappearance of the very concept of strategic stability--the basis of the preservation of peace in the nuclear age,"⁵ M. S. Gorbachev stressed.

Washington's unbridled race for more and more new strategic weapons systems and its plans to extend this race into outer space are being countered by the Soviet Union's precise program for the limitation and radical reduction of nuclear weapons and the peaceful exploration of outer space under the conditions of its non-militarization. The USSR is countering the concept of "star wars" with the concept of "star peace."

IN THE THIRD PLACE, the fact that the policies of states, both foreign and military, and their military doctrines and concepts did and do rest on a material basis, on the possibilities opened up by scientific and technical

progress and by the development of the economic potential of states, is particularly significant in a discussion of the factors determining strategic stability. In this context, the decisive turning point took place a decade and a half ago, when the Soviet Union achieved strategic parity with the United States and its strategic nuclear forces were approximately equal to U.S. forces. The balance of Soviet and U.S. strategic forces is embodied in weapons systems, comparable to one another in terms of the main quantitative indicators (for example, in terms of the number of launchers or carriers of strategic weapons or warheads).

Of course, for technical reasons and because of traditions and many other factors, the two sides do not have equivalent numbers of specific types of strategic weapons: The United States has more of some (for example, bombers or submarine missile warheads) and the USSR has more of others (for example, ICBM's). The structure of strategic forces was freely chosen by each side. Comparisons of their potential do not focus on structure, but on overall quantitative and qualitative parity, and this is reinforced by the approximate balance of power between the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Pact. The main result of the existing balance of strategic forces is the absolute guarantee that the aggressor will suffer crushing retaliation. The first strike that some strategists overseas are dreaming about will certainly also be the last strike, with all of the ensuing monstrous consequences for their own country and for all mankind.

The technological (and economic) potential for the creation and development of strategic weapons and the policies of states are distinguished by close interdependence and a form of interpenetration. Political decisions can promote or restrict the development of weapons, allow for the concentration of resources (physical and human) and dictate new areas of investigation. All rational decisions, however, are made with a view to reality, especially scientific, technical and economic potential. The creation of new weapons systems promotes the invention of new doctrines and concepts. Nuclear weapons and modern means of their delivery naturally had the strongest effect on them and led to the development of the "triad" of strategic forces--intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) and heavy bombers (HB's).

It was not easy for the Soviet Union and socialist community to achieve a military-strategic balance with imperialism. It was the result of years of persistent effort. It took almost a quarter of a century (from the mid-1940's to the early 1970's) for our country to establish a nuclear weapon and carrier potential equal to the U.S. potential. The process by which the Soviet Union achieved strategic parity with the United States differed from the American process, and this ultimately led to the imbalance of various elements of the correlation of forces within an overall balance.

The evolution of the postwar strategic situation began at the time of the United States' complete atomic monopoly, although it is true that it did not last long--around 4 years--and ended on the day of the first Soviet test of an atomic bomb on 29 August 1949. It is true that the potential of the nuclear weapon was not great and that the means of its delivery--medium bombers--

were quite vulnerable.⁶ Nevertheless, this marked the beginning of a long period of American superiority, at first in nuclear weapons (here parity was recorded in a relatively short time, when both sides tested hydrogen bombs at around the same time: the United States on 1 November 1952 and the USSR on 12 August 1953) and then in the means of their delivery, which became the main indicator of the strategic balance.

Asymmetry was a distinctive feature from the very beginning. It had many causes: specific differences in the scales and nature of threats to the security of the USSR and United States, differences in the geographic positions of the two countries (size of territory, access to oceans, etc.), differences in military traditions and differences in the technical characteristics of weapons systems, the creation and development of which followed different patterns in each country.

Carried by the inertia of its World War II successes, the United States immediately concentrated on building up a strong fleet of bombers to carry nuclear weapons, medium bombers at first and then heavy bombers, and on establishing bases for them, closer to Soviet borders. Projects in rocket engineering were less successful and were only stepped up after the first Soviet satellite had been launched.

The USSR was more successful than the United States in combat missile engineering (it also had stronger traditions in this field), the forerunners of the powerful ICBM's of the future. The first Soviet long-range ballistic missile was tested on 18 October 1947 and its first intercontinental missile was tested 10 years later, on 21 August 1957 (the first American ICBM was tested a year later, on 29 November 1958). In December 1959 the Soviet Union decided to create a new branch of the armed forces--the Strategic Missile Forces. This contributed to the more effective development and deployment of various types of Soviet land-based ICBM's.

Soviet successes in rocket engineering, which were achieved at a time when the Soviet Union was still far behind the United States in terms of economic development, refute the thesis that the U.S. role at that time and later as the initiator in the arms race was the result of American scientific and technical "superiority."

Of course, if the USSR and United States had agreed to stop or limit the production of strategic weapons at that time, during the first stages of their development, the accumulation of strategic weapons systems might have been stopped or might have been conducted along more similar lines. But this turned out to be impossible: The United States started a race for strategic arms and made persistent efforts to get ahead by creating more and more new weapons systems and the Soviet Union would then catch up. This applies to the qualitative and quantitative parameters of strategic arsenals.

The major qualitative advance of the 1960's was the deployment of nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles (SLBM's) capable of being launched under water. This was accomplished in the United States in 1960 and in the USSR in 1967. The most important advance of the 1970's was the equipping of

ICBM's and SLBM's with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's). The United States began doing this in 1970-1971 and the USSR began in 1975-1977.

As for the quantitative parameters of the strategic competition between the United States and the USSR, the Americans had already reached their present number of ICBM's and SLBM's by the mid-1960's and then concentrated on replacing one generation of missiles with another. The Soviet Union did not catch up with the United States in the number of ICBM's until the end of the 1960's and the number of SLBM's until the first half of the 1970's. The United States is still far ahead of the USSR in the number of heavy bombers.

When the balance of Soviet and U.S. strategic forces was finally achieved in the 1970's, it consisted of components of different sizes. The Soviet Union keeps 70 percent of its strategic potential (calculated in terms of warheads) in land-based ICBM's and around 30 percent on submarines and heavy bombers. The U.S. situation is different. More than 80 percent of the American strategic potential (again calculated in terms of warheads) is on submarines and heavy bombers and less than 20 percent is in land-based ICBM's. Nevertheless, the two sides agreed after many years of negotiations that the total situation reflected a sound balance.

It is significant that all strategic weapons systems have what might be called inherent "stabilizing" and "destabilizing" properties, particularly now that the development of strategic weapons is such that all of their components are becoming comparable in terms of combat capabilities.

For example, the Americans have traditionally assigned special importance to such characteristics of the land-based ICBM's as the force of nuclear charges and accuracy. The SLBM warheads (for example, the American Trident I, not to mention the Trident II) are comparable to the warheads of land-based ICBM's in terms of these combat properties. The same can be said of heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles, the development and deployment of which were initiated by the United States.

There are other destabilizing properties in addition to those mentioned above, such as short flight time (this is a property of the intermediate-range Pershing II ballistic missiles and of SLBM's, although the Pershing II warheads are much more accurate), or flight along unpredictable trajectories, facilitating surprise attacks (cruise missiles and SLBM's), or strategic systems not always 100-percent controllable by their command (this is true of submarines and heavy bombers), etc.

In its attempts to regain its lost military-strategic superiority, Washington is putting special emphasis on weapons systems with many destabilizing characteristics. The Pentagon planners' hope of escaping the grip of parity, however, was and is futile. In the late 1970's and early 1980's Washington had high hopes for the latest "miracle-weapon"--long-range cruise missiles. The Soviet response was decisive and quick. C. Weinberger, who was bragging just recently that the United States would advance far ahead of the "technologically backward" USSR, is now shedding tears over the combat effectiveness of the new Soviet long-range cruise missiles.

The "Strategic Defense Initiative" announced by Reagan on 23 March 1983 is another attempt to achieve superiority, this time with the aid of a land-space "shield" for protection from a retaliatory strike by the side subjected to American aggression. More and more military specialists in the United States are admitting that the Soviet Union will confidently frustrate these plans as well.

The strategic nuclear weapons of the United States and the USSR are the main components of the strategic balance. When it is being assessed, however, other weapon elements, both nuclear and conventional, must be borne in mind, as well as the armed forces of not only these two great powers but also all other members of the two opposing military coalitions of our time, representing the opposing social systems of imperialism and socialism. The state of the strategic balance is influenced by U.S. nuclear weapons deployed outside the United States, both intermediate-range and tactical, the nuclear forces of U.S. allies, England and France, and, finally, the conventional armed forces and arms of NATO, as well as of Japan, South Korea, Israel and other U.S. allies. All of the fighting strength of the Warsaw Pact and other countries of the socialist community influences the state of the strategic balance. Of course, this does not diminish the central role of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces--the dominant factors, surpassing all others combined in terms of significance.

It is true that some stipulations must be made with regard to the place occupied in the strategic balance by Western intermediate-range nuclear weapons. The most perceptible of the many imbalances in the Soviet and U.S. geostrategic positions is the fundamental difference in the capabilities of the intermediate-range nuclear forces of the two powers: Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces, whether medium bombers or missiles, have no bases or positions on territories in countries adjacent to the United States. American medium-range forces, on the other hand, have always had such bases and positions. In the 1970's and early 1980's these were American medium-range combat planes based on airfields in Western Europe and carrier-based aircraft on the seas around Europe and in the Pacific and Indian oceans. In November 1983 these forces were supplemented with the powerful group of Pershing II intermediate-range missiles (IRM's) and cruise missiles deployed in Europe. Their colossal strategic importance is being acknowledged more and more even in the United States. (For example, Pentagon "directives" for fiscal years 1985-1989 frankly state that the Pershing II missiles can perform "strategic functions.")

Surface combat ships began to be equipped with cruise missiles in 1983, and attack submarines were equipped with them in 1984 (both operate on the seas around Europe and the Far East). American medium-range planes are beginning to be deployed in Japan.

As for the Soviet Union, it does not have any bases and positions of this kind near U.S. territory. The only exception to this general rule in all of postwar history was the brief deployment of Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Cuba in 1962 for the purpose of defending Cuba against the threat of a planned American invasion. In accordance with a Soviet-American agreement on the resolution of the Caribbean crisis in October 1962, the United States

solemnly pledged not to invade Cuba and the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles. Incidentally, this agreement also envisaged the withdrawal of American intermediate-range missiles from Turkey and Western Europe, and this was done by the middle of the 1960's. Therefore, in 1983 Washington essentially violated the agreement reached on the Caribbean crisis.

The nuclear forces of the United States' allies, England and France, certainly influence the state of strategic stability. They are a significant and, what is most important, rapidly growing addition to U.S. strategic forces. Therefore, the military-technical factors influencing strategic stability represent a fairly intricate complex in themselves.

The military-strategic balance between the socialist world and the capitalist world, with nuclear strategic parity making up its central aspect, is a fact of fundamental historical importance. It constitutes the material foundation of strategic stability, which is constantly guarded by the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community.

IN THE FOURTH PLACE, the most important feature of the strategic stability of our time, built on a balance of power, is its ability to engender a new quality in the international political situation; it aids in reducing the danger of nuclear war. It is precisely the balance of strategic forces, which the Soviet Union achieved by the beginning of the 1970's after many years of persistent effort, that serves as the foundation for all efforts to prevent a global conflict.

Another, alternative concept of stability, in which one power (or one side) completely dominates its adversary, is sometimes set forth in the abstract theorizing of some American researchers. The ability to look beyond the abstract scheme and to see the actual strategic stability in the actual international situation of the last quarter of the 20th century leads to the realization that stability of this kind has been impossible since the time the world split up into two opposing systems and is completely out of the question in our day. The road to this kind of alternative is closed to imperialism in general and U.S. imperialism in particular.

During the period of the U.S. nuclear monopoly, American leaders dreamed of this kind of stability and persistently advanced toward it. They hoped that the creation of a position of strength vastly superior to the Soviet position would constantly force the Soviet Union to choose between submission to American diktat or annihilation.

Officials of the current administration have repeatedly boasted that they did not drop their bomb on the USSR during the period of the U.S. atomic monopoly. This has become a variation on the theme of Washington's "love of peace."

Disregarding the moral character of those who employ the possible annihilation of millions of people to play propaganda games, we should examine these statements in detail. In reality, Washington persistently prepared to use the atomic bomb and intensified the buildup of its atomic strength to secure a position of absolute superiority by the 1950's.⁷ Furthermore, this was done

in the complete certainty that the United States had a free hand because it would be many years before the Soviet Union could undermine the American atomic monopoly. Washington lost this race before it had time to deliver an atomic strike. And the Soviet Union's creation of its own atomic weapon in response to the U.S. atomic weapon was the first major step toward the establishment of strategic stability and the prevention of nuclear war.

IN THE FIFTH PLACE, the state of strategic stability depends on dynamic factors. For this reason, regardless of the strength of the military-strategic balance on which stability is based, it will always be influenced by many factors and forces. The effects of these factors and forces have varied during the two main phases of the postwar evolution of strategic stability. The first of these phases covered the period from the end of World War II until the time when the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community achieved military-strategic equality with the imperialist world at the beginning of the 1970's. The second phase is developing under the conditions of this equality and its main feature is that the forces of socialism will never allow a return to the first phase, to the past, will not allow the United States and NATO to regain their position of strategic superiority, regardless of the efforts Washington and its allies might make and regardless of the funds they might spend. As the draft of the new edition of the CPSU Program stresses, "the Soviet state and its allies are not striving for military superiority but they also will not allow any disruption of the present military-strategic balance in world affairs. Furthermore, they are constantly striving to lower the level of this balance, to reduce the quantity of weapons on both sides and to guarantee the security of all peoples."⁸

The dynamic factors influencing strategic stability in our day, under the conditions of parity, can develop in two directions. The escalation of the arms race can lead to the constant renewal of stability on new and higher levels of military confrontation. Furthermore, the situation will be increasingly dangerous on each of these new levels of confrontation because of the simple increase in the quantity and improvement of the quality of weapons on both sides and because of the destabilizing uncertainties created by new weapons systems due to their new characteristics, particularly their non-traditional properties, additional difficulties in control, etc. As the level of military confrontation rises, the side initiating the continuation of the arms race can sometimes foster the dangerous illusion that it has raced so far ahead that it is superior to the side which has been forced to participate in the race in accordance with the "action-counteraction" principle. The danger of these illusions is that they could motivate the decision to launch a nuclear attack in the expectation of impunity or acceptable losses from a retaliatory strike.

Of course, illusions are just illusions. There is the possibility that ruling circles in the United States and other Western powers will sooner or later realize the futility of the hope of achieving strategic superiority, just as they realized--although somewhat belatedly--the inevitability of crushing retaliation if they should start a nuclear war. In this connection, we should recall that in the joint Soviet-American statement adopted in November 1985 at the summit meeting in Geneva, the USSR and the United States pledged not to strive for military superiority.

The only reasonable and realistic way of strengthening strategic stability consists in lowering the level of military confrontation while maintaining the balance of forces on both sides. Only this can augment the positive factors accompanying stability.

IN THE SIXTH PLACE, therefore, strategic stability in the real sense of the term is closely related to the arms limitation and reduction process. This is not a simple connection, but an interdependent relationship. Strategic stability creates the necessary conditions for a more resolute approach to arms limitation and far-reaching reductions. These measures, in turn, literally cement strategic stability by lowering the level of arms and strengthening trust.

In some Western scientific circles, it has become fashionable to discuss the "dangers of destabilization" in the event of the radical reduction of strategic weapons, as this will allegedly cause the sides to lose the surplus of weapons systems creating the impression of a fundamental balance. In spite of the seeming "concern" about the maintenance of stability, this thesis is essentially groundless and detracts from the efforts to strengthen stability, because the nuclear potential of the two sides is now so colossal that they would have to travel a long, complex and difficult road of reductions until the allegedly "dangerous levels" referred to by these scientists will be seen on the horizon. In other words, they are actually impeding the transition from the arms race to actual arms reduction and heightened stability.

As for the essence of the matter, the supposedly dangerous levels, the process of arms reduction will unavoidably engender greater and greater trust between the sides and will eventually lead to a fundamentally different climate of mutual trust than the present one. An effective system of confidence-building measures will be established and it will unavoidably accompany the process of arms limitation and reduction. An extensive and sweeping system of control will be developed at the same time. Finally, during the process of radical arms reduction, the parties will have to work together on the planning and implementation of methods of comparing weapons systems, assessing the balance and preventing any potential "lopsidedness" that might impair stability in the future.

The most important thing, however, is to stop and reverse the arms race. As General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev stressed, "if we do not put an end to the present tendencies now, we might not be able to overcome their monstrous inertia tomorrow."⁹ Everything impeding the cessation of the arms race complicates international affairs.

Washington's constant efforts to destabilize the strategic situation in recent years have also been reflected in its approach to talks with the USSR. As S. Talbott, the renowned American researcher of these talks, remarked in his book "Deadly Gambits," this administration has believed from the very beginning that "the arms control process (that is, the talks) should be used for nothing other than turning the Soviet strategic missile forces upside-down and achieving the specific changes in the nuclear balance the United States has been unable to achieve with its military programs."¹⁰ Many U.S. proposals

at the talks with the USSR have been openly intended to severely weaken the strong points of Soviet strategic potential, leave all of the main components of U.S. nuclear forces untouched and secure the possibility of their unimpeded reinforcement. The use of these talks, which have traditionally been employed to improve the world situation, for the disruption of strategic stability in the naive hope of achieving military superiority ultimately proved to be absolutely futile.

The possibility of real progress in the process of arms limitation and radical reduction, however, does exist. This will necessitate the attainment of the objectives set forth in the joint Soviet-American statement regarding the talks on nuclear and space weapons and reaffirmed by the leaders of the USSR and the United States at the summit meeting in Geneva: the prevention of the arms race in space and its cessation on earth, the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and the reinforcement of strategic stability. The Soviet Union is doing everything within its power for the attainment of this goal.

Continuing our discussion of the basic features of the concept of strategic stability, it is important, IN THE SEVENTH PLACE, to note that past experience, especially the experience of most of the 1970's, has demonstrated the real possibility of institutionalizing this stability and securing it in international treaties and agreements. In particular, the concept of strategic stability was present either directly or indirectly in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki in 1975 and in such major Soviet-American documents as the 1972 Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the United States and the USSR and the 1973 Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War. The Soviet-American SALT I and SALT II treaties and agreements on strategic arms limitation embodied the desire to establish strategic stability.

It is indicative that the progress in strategic arms limitation and reduction in the atmosphere of detente was accompanied by the increasing interest of both states in the maintenance and reinforcement of strategic stability. This term began to be used more widely in Soviet-American documents and in international documents in general.

The institutionalization of strategic stability was not at all a formality, primarily because it was a reflection and result of the successful search by both sides for mutually determined and mutually acceptable beliefs about stability and the willingness to consider the other party's interests and positions to the degree that they do not contradict equality and provide opportunities for compromise for the sake of the common interest in stronger security. Only the U.S. reversal in the late 1970's and early 1980's in the direction of attempts to undermine the military-strategic balance and destroy strategic stability for the purpose of achieving superiority put an end to this complex and delicate process.

The Soviet Union has waged a persistent struggle for its renewal, has repeatedly stressed that strategic stability is the most important element of the present concept of international security and is actively seeking the acknowledgement of this by the other side. It must be said that the objective of

stronger strategic stability was recorded in the joint Soviet-American statement on the results of the 1985 summit meeting in Geneva.

IN THE EIGHTH PLACE, an important feature of the process of the institutionalization of stability was the initial determination of the fundamental principles on which strategic stability must be based. This applies above all to the principle of equality and equivalent security. It was mentioned in the above-mentioned documents and in several other major international documents. It must be said that the Soviet Union has persistently set forth these principles at international conferences on the consolidation of security and the limitation of weapons and during bilateral talks with the United States, the FRG, England, France and other Western powers.

The principle of equality and equivalent security reflects an objective reality of our day--the state of military-strategic parity between socialist and capitalist forces. It embodies the impartial approach to the limitation and reduction of arms and armed forces, requiring that parity not be violated during this process and that the approximate balance of forces on both sides be maintained while the level of their confrontation is being lowered.

Strategic stability can be defined as a stable strategic situation stemming from the foreign and military policies of the sides and the correlation of their strategic forces (at present, the balance of these forces)--preferably, secured in international treaties and agreements--and leading to the reduction of the danger of nuclear war. The level of strategic stability drops as the level of military confrontation drops.

The military-strategic balance is the central axis of strategic stability in our day. In the past and the present, the relative strength of the sides during each specific period of history served and still serves as the material basis of this stability (or instability).

Of course, it would be wrong to assume that there were no periods of strategic stability during the phase preceding the military-strategic balance. These periods did exist and were the result of the policies of states and the actual world situation. The strategic stability of those periods, however, could be called incomplete or relative because it did not have enough material capacity to ensure the full-scale punishability of nuclear aggression.

The present phase, which could be called the phase of fully mature strategic stability, is distinguished by the presence of this capacity. This phase, just as the previous one, is not absolutely uniform. There can be periods of weaker strategic stability as a result of dramatic breakthroughs by one side in the arms race (if these actions are not matched by the countermeasures of the other side) or the general escalation of tension, as in the early 1980's, when it was a result of U.S. and NATO policy. The approximate parity of Soviet and U.S. strategic forces, reinforced by the approximate equality of Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic bloc forces, will secure the fundamental steadiness of this stability in principle, however, because it will deprive the potential aggressor of the possibility of acting with impunity. Furthermore, the scales of this punishment are absolute.

In a discussion of strategic stability it is impossible to ignore the connection between this global category and regional stability, especially in Europe, where two of the strongest groupings, abundantly equipped with nuclear weapons, are facing one another. The interconnection consists precisely in the ability of regional stability to prop up strategic stability in this case and make it more stable. In a healthier international climate, strategic stability should promote stronger regional stability. This is the positive aspect of the interconnection.

The negative aspect of the interconnection of strategic and regional stability is manifested on a broader scale, more acutely and more perceptibly--especially now, in the middle of the 1980's, at a time of escalating international tension. An international political crisis which flares up in any region and in which the strongest nuclear powers, the United States and the USSR, become involved to some extent, can undermine regional stability and seriously impair strategic stability. This is a particularly real danger today, now that the United States is trying to destabilize regional affairs in the Middle East, in Central America and in other parts of the world. The deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe has particularly dangerous destabilizing potential. Finally, the spread of the arms race to outer space, which Washington is rapidly engineering, poses new threats, both obvious ones and ones that are still difficult to predict.

There is no question that strategic stability is composed to a considerable extent by the relative strength and policies of the United States and USSR. This assigns them a special responsibility to other countries and peoples in the prevention of nuclear war. The results of a contemptuous attitude toward this responsibility were clearly demonstrated by U.S. military policy in the early 1980's, which led to the dramatic exacerbation of the entire international situation.

FOOTNOTES

1. J. Holdren, "The Dynamics of the Nuclear Arms Race: History, Status, Prospects," Berkeley (Cal.), 1983, p 33.
2. D. Ford, "The Button. The Pentagon's Strategic Command and Control System," N.Y., 1985, p 11.
3. TIME, 29 July 1985, pp 24, 25, 27.
4. DAEDALUS, "Weapons in Space, vol II: Implications for Security," Summer 1985, p 255.
5. PRAVDA, 28 November 1985.
6. The Western allegation that the Soviet Union then counterbalanced the American atomic bomb with a multimillion-strong army left over from World War II, while the American Army had been demobilized, is inconsistent with the facts. During the process of demobilization the numerical strength of

the USSR Armed Forces was reduced from around 11.4 million personnel in May 1945 to under 2.9 million by 1948. This is comparable in general to the American demobilization, which reduced the number of U.S. Armed Forces personnel from 12.1 million in 1945 to under 1.5 million by 1948, with a view to the fact that the United States' allies, Great Britain, France and others, then had large armed forces of their own.

7. The plans for nuclear attacks on the USSR and its allies adopted in Washington just in 1945-1949 provide ample evidence of this. These were "Totality," "Pincher," "Broiler," "Grabber," "Intermezzo," "Gun-powder," "Doublestar," "ABC-101," "Dualism," "Fleetwood," "Bushwhacker," "Offtackle," "Trojan," "Charioteer," "Dropshot" and others (see V. L. Chernov, "Strategy of the Absurd," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 7; G. A. Trofimenko, "U.S. Military Strategy as a Weapon of Aggressive Policy," *ibid.*, 1985, No 1--Editor's note).
8. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Novaya redaktsiya). Proyekt" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New Edition). Draft], Moscow, 1985, p 71.
9. PRAVDA, 4 October 1985.
10. S. Talbott, "Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control," N.Y., 1984, p 7.

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FRENCH-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE 1980'S ANALYZED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 86 (signed to press 20 Dec 85) pp 26-37

[Article by V. S. Mikheyev: "United States-France: Cooperation and Conflicts"]

[Text] When the Socialists formed a government in France with Communist participation in May 1981, American-French relations deteriorated perceptibly. Traditional conflicts were supplemented by new ones, stemming from Washington's view of some of the domestic and foreign policy statements of the French Socialist Party (PS) and of the government's first steps as encroachments on its own interests. Representatives of the French Communist Party (PCF) were members of the cabinet of ministers for 3 years, until they withdrew in the middle of 1984. Since anticommunism is the basis of U.S. foreign policy, PCF participation in the French Government aroused a hostile reaction in Washington.

The American leadership took a negative view of the program for the partial nationalization of French industry and almost the entire banking system. And not only because it was an expression of ideological disagreements between Paris and Washington but also because one of its chief aims was to limit the influence of American capital in the French economy.

And even the stronger "Atlantic" emphasis in the approach to East-West relations, which was apparent from the very beginning of the Socialists' term in office, was viewed by U.S. leaders as a tactical ruse. People in Washington were disturbed by the PS policy objective demanding "the precise definition of the purpose and content" of the North Atlantic alliance and by the fact that this objective was combined with increased allocations for nuclear weapons in the French military budget.

This resurrected the memory of the time when France withdrew from the NATO military organization and assigned priority to nuclear weapons in its own military organization to stress its independence to Washington. The U.S. administration was worried that this change of emphasis would complicate France's cooperation with the allied NATO forces in the sphere of non-nuclear weapons, which gradually grew more extensive in the 1970's. The assertions of loyalty to the North-Atlantic alliance by President F. Mitterand and members of his government had not been reinforced yet by actual steps to broaden military contacts with NATO. Political observers in the West, including the

United States, almost unanimously predicted the further deterioration of American-French relations.

Within around 2 years, however, Paris' policy line had changed. Within the country the Socialists pursued an economic policy of "austerity," characteristic of rightist and not leftist forces, and in the sphere of foreign policy the pro-Atlantic rhetoric acquired more and more tangible content. American experts described this reversal as a "diplomatic miracle"¹ (A. De Porte), an "amazing change"² (S. Hoffman) and an "unexpected development"³ (M. Harrison).

When the Socialist Party was still in the opposition, its leaders acquired the firm conviction that the main economic threat to their government would be posed by the United States. This was underscored by F. Mitterand in his book "Here and Now,"⁴ published in 1980. For this reason, he believed, the implementation of domestic socioeconomic reforms would require the Socialist government to--for the purpose of securing favorable external conditions--establish a good relationship with Washington. After choosing this line of action, the French leadership made several serious concessions to the United States in the politico-military sphere.

This article will concentrate precisely on this reversal in French foreign policy.⁵ This does not, however, signify an underestimation of the severity of the conflicts between Washington and Paris which will be summarized in the article, conflicts which are rooted in France's long-standing desire to pursue its policies independently of the United States and which have recently grown increasingly apparent, attesting to the transitory nature of the "diplomatic miracle." It must be said, however, that France's concrete moves toward convergence with the United States have retained much of their significance in spite of the fluctuating political barometer.

Paris first changed its mind about the deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Whereas it had displayed restraint under Giscard d'Estaing, the Mitterand government decided to strengthen relations with Washington by supporting the deployment of the missiles. Although the French president said in a televised speech on 16 November 1983 that the countries consenting to the use of their territory for the missiles would have no chance to make decisions on their use, he nevertheless actively urged the Bonn leadership to carry out NATO's plans, particularly during an official visit to the FRG in January 1983. THE TIMES of London had this to say: "It is impossible to imagine General De Gaulle setting off for Bonn to persuade the Germans to agree to the deployment of American missiles on their territory."⁶ When French Minister of External Relations R. Dumas visited Washington in February 1985, he reaffirmed President F. Mitterand's "resolute support" of the deployment of these weapons in Western Europe. Furthermore, Paris is stubbornly insisting that its nuclear weapons are "independent" and should not be included in the balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact weapons.

Officially, French leaders stress that their country's nuclear weapons do not serve the goals of NATO's "flexible response" because they represent the "last means of retaliation," and French nuclear strategy is built on the formula of "the weak against the strong" and essentially consists in the delivery

of "strikes against cities." Underscoring the difference between French nuclear strategy and American strategy, C. Hernu announced on 15 November 1983 when he was France's minister of defense that his country "believes in deterrence," and not in nuclear conflict, which "some people" would like to "limit" to specific geographic regions and specific categories of targets. The situations in which French nuclear weapons might be used have deliberately not been revealed to heighten the effect of "deterrence." It is known, however, that France's military doctrine specifies that its nuclear weapons will serve to protect the country's "vital interests." "France's vital interests are not merely a geographic concept; they cannot be confined to a single territory; they are political and economic, and some of them are just coming into being--we could hardly define them precisely,"⁷ French General Fricaud Chagnaud wrote.

Differences between U.S. and French military strategies do exist, but when the issue in question is the inclusion or non-inclusion of French nuclear weapons in the total balance of NATO nuclear forces, these differences do not appear to be the main thing. The main thing is that French weapons, just as U.S. ones, are aimed against the USSR and are part of the collective Western military potential. The Ottawa Declaration of 1974, an official NATO document, quite definitely stipulates that the nuclear forces of France and England are part of the bloc's "common deterrence potential."⁸

Recently retired Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces G. Lacaze frankly admitted in an article in DEFENSE NATIONALE that the French strategy was based not only the ability to inflict significant injuries on an adversary with a nuclear-missile strike but also on the fact that if France should be the first of the Western nuclear countries to deliver this kind of strike, the potential of the allies would remain untouched and its significance would thereby be augmented. General Lacaze believes that this factor is of "fundamental importance."⁹ When the leaders of the seven main Western countries met in Williamsburg in 1983, the French president signed a joint politico-military statement saying that the security of these countries was "indivisible" and that it had to be approached from "global positions." This was essentially an admission that France's "vital interests" (the defense of which will serve as grounds to use nuclear forces) are fundamentally identical to the interests of the allies under the aegis of the United States.

According to a French government report published in 1980, the use of the combat potential of only 3 missile submarines, half of the 18 S-3 missiles and 36 Mirage IV bombers (France has 44 of them) would kill 20 million people; the same number would be wounded.¹⁰ France now has six missile submarines, and the newest, launched in the beginning of 1985, has missiles with independently targetable warheads, which approximately doubled the force of French nuclear missiles immediately.

The continued modernization and quantitative buildup of French nuclear forces have considerably augmented their combat capabilities. Modernization has taken the following main directions: the re-equipping of the missile submarine fleet (all but one ship) with MIRV'ed missiles and the creation of a new category of missile submarines; the development of the CX land-based mobile missile; the substitution of air-to-ground nuclear missiles for

nuclear bombs on Mirage IV bombers. According to current plans, the number of warheads on French nuclear intermediate-range weapons in Europe should rise to 692 by the middle of the 1990's.¹¹

All of these facts--the modernization of French nuclear forces, the increase in the number of warheads and the enhancement of their accuracy--are regarded in the United States as a good material basis for the gradual evolution of French military strategy in a direction benefiting the United States and for broader American-French cooperation in the nuclear sphere. On 5 February 1985, *NEWSDAY*, an American newspaper, reported the existence of a secret American-French agreement concluded in 1978. In accordance with this agreement, the United States is supplying France with the "Cray-1" super-computer, which is playing an important role in the buildup and modernization of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to sending these supercomputers, the United States is exporting special materials for the new M-4 submarine missiles, intended to constitute the basis of French nuclear missile strength, the latest radio equipment for communications with missile submarines, and KC-135 tanker planes for the in-flight refueling of Mirage IV bombers.¹² In exchange for the supercomputers, Paris pledged to cooperate more closely with Washington within the Western military alliance against the USSR. The newspaper cited the testimony of an anonymous "informed source" that the agreement envisaged France's participation in conjunction with the United States and England in the determination of targets for a missile strike against USSR territory.

These data attest to the groundlessness of the French leadership's objections to the inclusion of its nuclear missiles in the total balance of NATO intermediate-range nuclear weapons (we must stress that this is merely a matter of inclusion, and not of "forcible" reduction or elimination).

As for the French tactical nuclear weapons, which, according to official statements, are to serve as a means of advance notification of the use of strategic nuclear forces, a decision to link the two systems more closely was made under the Socialist government. However, *LE MONDE* pointed out a contradiction between this decision and the desire of the country's leadership to conduct "rapid action force" (RAF) operations in Central Europe, beyond national boundaries.¹³ French nuclear forces--tactical and intermediate-range, armored tank and mechanized corps, and the American-inspired RAF--are the three main levers of French military potential, which, as G. Lacaze pointed out, can be set in motion to meet the requirements of each specific crisis.¹⁴

The increase in French allocations for nuclear weapons (the figure was 7.5 percent higher in the 1985 military budget than in the budget for the previous year, whereas the budget itself showed a 5.7-percent increase) has been combined with broader contacts between Paris and the NATO military command. These contacts are so well organized and coordinated that they guarantee, according to General B. Rogers, the North Atlantic bloc's supreme allied commander in Europe, "a high level of cooperation between the French and NATO staffs."¹⁵ During NATO exercises, for example, the French military command puts missile launchers on Plateau Albion in southern France and Mirage IV bombers in a state of combat readiness according to a previously planned scenario. French warships, including the aircraft carrier "Foch," have participated in NATO maneuvers several times (for example, in "Ocean Safari-85" at the end of

August 1985); the permanent inclusion of one or two French aircraft carriers with escort ships in NATO's naval forces in the Mediterranean is being considered. American nuclear submarines have been authorized to enter French ports since 1983. In March 1985 NATO air force maneuvers were conducted in the French Alps. Furthermore, French pilots worked with their allies to perfect the repulsion of an air attack by a "potential adversary from the east." French pilots who participate in maneuvers over U.S. territory also practice the delivery of strikes "against targets in the east."

Most of France's military equipment has been brought in line with the standards governing the armed forces of other NATO countries. Units and formations of the First French Army with around 55,000 personnel are located in the FRG (in the southwest). According to one overseas source, they are designated for participation in combat operations as part of the second echelon of allied forces, but according to another source they are intended for operational advancement to NATO's "forward lines." In any case, neither B. Rogers nor FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner has any doubt that France would act jointly with its NATO allies from the very beginning in the event of a military conflict.¹⁶

Plans for broader opportunities to "fulfill commitments" in NATO are reflected in the French military program for 1984-1988. This fundamental document specifically mentions this as one of the main objectives of French military policy. It also contains the first open statement that the USSR represents the main threat to French security.¹⁷ Practical results in the sphere of broader cooperation with the NATO military organization are to be obtained by reorganizing the army, heightening the mobility of units and formations and relocating some of them to the northeast, from where the threat supposedly comes.

The main part of the reorganization of the army consists in the creation of the abovementioned "rapid action force" of 47,000 men. In Europe it will be used as part of the first echelon of NATO troops and will participate in a military conflict during the earliest stages. Since France has nuclear weapons, this should, according to G. Lacaze, heighten the effect of NATO's "deterrence."¹⁸ C. Hernu admitted that the RAF would depend on the allies for air support and rear services support in the event of combat operations in Europe because it would be too far from French supply bases.¹⁹ Soon after its creation, as the NEW YORK TIMES reported, the use of this force in crisis situations was discussed by officers from the United States, France and the FRG at secret conferences. The level of talks relating to joint operations in Central Europe in the event of a war reached its highest point since the time of France's withdrawal from the NATO military structure.²⁰

The creation of the RAF was supplemented with plans to relocate the Third Army Corps, equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, from a base west of Paris to Lille, near the Belgian border, to repulse "threats from the northeast." Plans call for the augmentation of the mobility and firepower of French troops in the FRG. Measures have been taken to step up general mobilization for the purpose of more effective "frontline defense."

The perceptibly more active bilateral military and political cooperation between France and the FRG and the change in Paris' approach to the rearming of West Germany accord with the U.S. intention to increase the allies' contribution to the West's total military potential. The French leaders were disturbed by the mounting "neutralist tendencies" of large political forces in the FRG. In the fear that the "West German buffer" between France and the Warsaw Pact countries might grow weaker in the future, they decided to stimulate military and political cooperation between France and the FRG and proposed the cancellation of the Western European Union (WEU)²¹ restrictions on the production of long-range missiles and heavy bombers by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1984. A Franco-West German commission on military affairs was established in 1982 to strengthen the Paris-Bonn axis and is actively functioning. "Military-strategic relations between France and West Germany are experiencing a genuine boom. There has been a minor but genuine revolution since Kohl and Mitterand decided last year to restore the 'forgotten' military provisions of the 1963 Elysee Treaty between France and the FRG," the French newspaper LE MATIN reported in 1984.²² Although this activity has been conducted on a bilateral basis, it nevertheless supplements common NATO efforts considerably because these are the two leading West European members of the bloc.

Sweeping proposals are being made in influential political circles in France and the FRG with regard to Franco-West German military and political integration and the extension of French military guarantees, especially nuclear ones, to the FRG. Some are saying that the line of French "defense" should begin at the Elbe--that is, on the border between the FRG and the GDR. A public opinion poll in France in 1985 indicated that 57 percent of the French support these ideas.

West German politicians, such as Chairman A. Dregger of the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag and its military expert J. Todenhofer, have pointed out the need for the FRG to have a say in decisions on the use of French nuclear weapons and on their targets. When former Chancellor of the FRG H. Schmidt addressed the Bundestag on 28 June 1984, he proposed not only that the FRG be "covered" by the French nuclear shield but also that the two countries create joint armed forces consisting of 30 divisions.

The reaction of C. Hernu to the proposed extension of French nuclear guarantees to the FRG when he was a member of the government is interesting. When he was interviewed in July 1985 by the West German DEUTSCHLANDFUNK radio station, he said that France did not have enough nuclear missiles for this purpose yet, but it would probably be able to do this in a few years, when the number of warheads had been increased substantially.

The American administration actively supports the idea of Franco-West German military and political integration, regarding it as a serious contribution to NATO and expecting this to lighten its military spending burden. Furthermore, American politicians are stimulating support for a stronger Paris-Bonn axis by speculating on the withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe. For example, Senator S. Nunn proposed a troop withdrawal in fall 1983.

In addition to cancelling important restrictions on the rearming of the FRG, the Western European Union decided to reorganize the Standing Armaments Committee in such a way that it could become actively involved in West European military construction. Plans envisage a common approach to politico-military issues and broader cooperation in arms production. The members of the WEU have underscored their loyalty to NATO. In the WEU Rome Declaration, they announced their intention to work out a common approach to the reinforcement of the bloc with an emphasis on the importance of "transatlantic ties."

In view of the fact that all of the WEU countries but France belong to the integrated NATO military command, this increased activity signifies France's actual convergence with the military organization of the North Atlantic bloc in another direction--through Western European military integration.

Although the United States supports the increased activity of the WEU in general, it must realize that this will strengthen the political independence of the allies in the future, especially in view of the buildup of their own military potential, including nuclear-missile potential (England and France). Apparently, the Washington administration views the West European integration France is stimulating primarily as a contribution, as mentioned above, to the West's total military potential. Besides this, close cooperation in the military sphere has its own inexorable logic: It will inevitably motivate France to participate in combat operations with its NATO allies in the event of a military conflict. As P. Schwed and H. Bagnouls, French researchers of West European military integration, pointed out, new ideas in this sphere "do not overshadow the need for the existence of the North Atlantic alliance, which is less debatable than ever before."²³

Without questioning the significance of NATO, Washington's allies, especially France, are nevertheless striving to defend their own interests and are already trying to employ WEU forums to work out a common position on important politico-military issues arousing disagreements with the United States. In particular, President Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) was discussed at the Bonn WEU session in April 1985. It is true that the West European countries could not arrive at a common opinion, primarily as a result of disagreements between Paris and Bonn.

Although Paris officially opposes the expansion of NATO's sphere of action, it is participating in its actual expansion in bilateral actions with the United States and the multilateral interaction of leading bloc members. When F. Mitterand visited the United States in March 1984, he made a reference to nothing other than the "Franco-American brotherhood-in-arms from Yorktown to Beirut."²⁴

Nevertheless, despite the rapprochement between Washington and Paris after the French leadership's noticeable rightward shift in the foreign and domestic policy sphere, they are still separated by several conflicts, connected primarily with France's unique status in NATO, intergovernmental rivalry and the highly muffled but nevertheless latent differences between the social-democratic and conservative ideologies.

Although France's contacts with the NATO military organization are extensive, the difference between its status and the status of the majority of other bloc members still irritates Washington. It believes that the best proof of the allies' loyalty is their consent to put their armed forces under the NATO command headed by an American general. In June 1983, when Secretary of State G. Shultz returned to the United States after a NATO Council session in Paris, he called France's position in the organization "ambiguous." His remark to newsmen on the plane that it is "simply impossible" to deal with the French clearly showed how intolerant the U.S. leadership is of displays of independence by the allies. Nevertheless, F. Mitterand repeatedly declared that the Socialists excluded the possibility of France's return to the NATO military structure.

President Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative" became a stumbling-block in American-French relations. The French leadership believed that its implementation would destabilize the strategic situation. People in Paris feel that French nuclear missiles would lose their importance if the United States--and the Soviet Union in response--were to create antimissile systems with space-based elements. At a meeting of the leaders of the main capitalist countries in May 1985 in Bonn, F. Mitterand rejected the SDI.

In the fear that the SDI would considerably widen the technological gap between the United States and Western Europe, France proposed project "Eureka" in April 1985, mainly for the purpose of securing maximum independence for Western Europe in the development of a new generation of computers and microelectronic equipment, high-power lasers, long-range communication media, artificial intellect, space equipment, etc. A conference of the foreign ministers and heads of scientific research agencies of the Common Market countries and of Austria, Norway, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland and representatives of the Commission of the European Communities was held in Paris in the middle of July 1985. Conference participants supported the project in principle but disagreed on many specific aspects of its implementation. A working group met in Bonn at the end of September 1985 for the preliminary resolution of some differences. The main fields of research were clarified. Industrial companies are to perform most of the work with government assistance. Many large firms and several West European research establishments have expressed an interest in project "Eureka."

The project also won the approval of the abovementioned Commission of the European Communities, which drew up the COMETT program to promote the Eureka project and submitted it to the EEC Council of Ministers for its approval. The program envisages cooperation in the development of state-of-the-art technology and is calculated initially for a 4-year period. In 1986 it will begin supplementing the Eureka project through EEC channels. In particular, it stipulates the creation of special funds for research in universities and industrial enterprises and the establishment of a single West European "university-industry" network.

French representatives have stressed that Eureka is primarily a civilian project. According to LE MONDE war correspondent J. Inar, however, in view of France's desire to create space reconnaissance and observation equipment

independently of the United States with the aid of other West European countries, it is likely to use Eureka for these purposes.²⁵

When President Reagan was interviewed by LE FIGARO at the end of September 1985 and was asked about the compatibility of Eureka and the SDI, he replied that the two programs would not interfere at all with one another.²⁶ President Mitterand, who is one of the opponents of the American "Star Wars" plans, nevertheless believes that the FRG, for example, could participate simultaneously in Eureka and the SDI. He does not exclude the possibility of the independent participation of French firms in the SDI. In fact, the REOSC company, specializing in precision optics, has already been contracted by the U.S. Navy to manufacture a special mirror for use in experiments with lasers.²⁷

England, Italy and the FRG declared their willingness to participate in project "Eureka" on the condition that it will not exclude their participation in the SDI.

French-American differences are now being exacerbated again by the situation in Central America. When F. Mitterand visited Brazil in October 1985, he said that the cause of the tension in this part of the world was the U.S. support of the Nicaraguan counterrevolution. He also favored participation by Salvadoran rebels in the talks on the resolution of the crisis in their country and criticized U.S. policy in the region.

Although France's actions in the Middle East helped the United States considerably,²⁸ Paris nevertheless supports contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization, in contrast to Washington, and favors its participation in the Mideast settlement process. France finds nothing wrong with the presence of Cuban volunteers in Angola and has condemned South Africa's invasion of this country. It decided to withdraw from the West's "contact group" on Namibia after the group had discredited itself with its reluctance to reach a real settlement. At the end of 1984 the American leadership gave up diplomatic subtlety and expressed displeasure with the withdrawal of French troops from Chad and employed flagrant and unconcealed pressure to achieve their return to this country.²⁹ The Reagan Administration made it clear that it disapproved of France's decision to put a freeze on all new capital investments in South Africa in connection with the Pretoria regime's police brutality against the black majority.

As we know, during their first years in government, the Socialists actively supported Washington's anti-Soviet actions, the regularity of the meetings of Soviet and French leaders was disrupted, and in 1983 a group of staff members of Soviet establishments was deported from France on trumped-up charges. In time, Paris realized that this policy was erroneous, particularly after it failed to produce any tangible dividends. The French side made some moves to resume dialogue with the Soviet Union on the summit level.

President F. Mitterand of France was in the USSR on an official visit in June 1984. During talks in Moscow, the two sides favored the use of existing potential to expand cooperation between the USSR and France in the resolution of several important international problems. The two states attach the

greatest importance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space (whereas the United States is pursuing the opposite policy). In a televised speech following his trip to the USSR, F. Mitterand said: "The main thing is to try to regain what we might have lost in the respect the Soviet Union had for France."

Nevertheless, before his trip the French leader felt the need to call Ronald Reagan and assure him of his "firm adherence" to the Western alliance. The President of the United States tried to convey the impression that the resumption of the Franco-Soviet dialogue on the summit level would not affect American-French relations. He called F. Mitterand after his return and underscored his "extremely positive" impression of the French president's position on the issue of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and some other issues. In this way, Washington tried to promote the retention of the anti-Soviet thrust of French foreign policy. It is afraid of the considerable experience the USSR and France have accumulated in cooperation and of the prospect of the future development of mutually beneficial ties between them.

It must be said that the extensive Soviet-French cooperation in the political, economic, scientific, technical and cultural spheres since the middle of the 1960's has always aroused the displeasure of the United States. Bilateral contacts between the USSR and France, built on the principles of peaceful coexistence, did much to promote the development of detente in Europe and in the world in general. Whereas the United States officially acknowledged the principle of peaceful coexistence as the only possible basis for Soviet-American relations in the nuclear age in 1972 but began to nullify this principle and to impede broad-scale Soviet-American economic cooperation soon afterward, the relationship between the USSR and France shows how a solid political foundation gives the principle of peaceful coexistence real meaning in the economic, scientific and technical spheres. Impressive results were achieved in an important area of economic relations, the construction of large-scale industrial facilities in the USSR on a compensatory basis-- ammonia, paraxylene, orthoxylene and benzene plants and an aluminum complex, with the subsequent purchase of part of the products of these enterprises by French firms on a long-term basis. Whereas the U.S. administration decided to curtail Soviet-American scientific and technical contacts in several fields and divested many intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements in this area of most of their meaning with its sanctions, Soviet-French scientific and technical cooperation is undergoing comprehensive and broad-scale development. It encompasses advanced spheres of modern science and technology, including computers and electronics. Therefore, considerable positive experience in cooperation and advancement along the road of detente has been accumulated in Soviet-French relations.

In October 1985 General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium M. S. Gorbachev was in France on an official visit as the guest of President F. Mitterand of the French Republic. The results of this visit present new opportunities for the development of productive Soviet-French cooperation and the improvement of the international climate.

During the visit the Soviet side publicly announced the proposals it had made to the U.S. leadership, proposals which became topics of discussion at the talks in Geneva. They envisage a total ban on space attack weapons and a reduction of 50 percent in the USSR and U.S. nuclear weapons capable of reaching one another's territories. The French leaders expressed their understanding of the importance of the Soviet initiative.

The Soviet side also announced that, to facilitate agreements on the quickest possible mutual reduction of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, the USSR feels that an agreement of this kind could be concluded separately, without any direct relationship to the issue of space and strategic weapons. Furthermore, the Soviet Union proposed a direct exchange of opinions with France and England on this matter.

The USSR and France signed an agreement on economic cooperation during the 1986-1990 period and agreed that a French astronaut would again take part in a lengthy manned flight on a Soviet orbital station. The president of France agreed to consider the possibility and expediency of cooperation in the construction of the Tokamak international thermonuclear reactor for the derivation of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Both sides declared their willingness to continue strengthening existing ties in various spheres and find new spheres of collaboration and cooperation. M. S. Gorbachev's visit to France made an important contribution to the cause of detente.

The Soviet-French agreement on economic cooperation in 1986-1990 is another indication of the existence of serious differences in the U.S. and French approaches to commercial relations with socialist countries. France played an important role in the frustration of Washington's plans to sabotage the construction of the pipeline between Siberia and Western Europe. During preparations for a meeting of the "big seven" in Williamsburg in 1983, the American administration had to give up one of its main proposals--the compilation of an augmented "code" of restrictions on technology transfers to socialist countries. Furthermore, just as in the case of the embargo, France's position played the leading role in this.

Trade between the USSR and France from 1980 through 1984 more than doubled in comparison to the previous 5 years. Trade volume in 1984 was 4.2 billion rubles. At the 19th session of the Permanent Joint Soviet-French Commission on Technological and Economic Cooperation in April 1985, the French side agreed to lower the interest rates on credit for the USSR in spite of the United States' persistent attempts to compel the allies to raise these rates to the maximum.

It is interesting that whereas F. Mitterand hesitated to violate the "unanimity" at the annual conferences of the leaders of the seven main Western countries in the past, in May 1985 he did this during the discussion of the SDI and during the discussion of the immediate commencement of a new round of trade talks within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In connection with the huge deficit in the U.S. balance of foreign trade, one of the Reagan Administration's main objectives was to acquire new possibilities for the sale of the products of American firms on

the markets of U.S. allies by diplomatic means, without a trade war. F. Mitterand, however, promoted the discussion of monetary issues and the consideration of the interests of West European farmers by insisting on the postponement of the GATT talks.

When the finance ministers and central bank governors of the United States, England, France, the FRG and Japan met in New York in September 1985, Washington had to agree with the need for a lower dollar exchange rate, which had long been demanded by its allies, especially France. The exchange rate of the dollar dropped perceptibly immediately following the conference.

President Mitterand's refusal to participate in a new special conference of the leaders of the "big seven," proposed by R. Reagan just before the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva, was conclusive proof of France's recent departure from resolute support of the American military policy line in East-West relations. Washington did not expect this kind of severe blow to the "Atlantic partnership."

France's move away from the United States is due to politico-military considerations, Paris' more sober and balanced approach to international issues and a reaction to the egotism of "Reaganomics." With its high interest rates and high dollar exchange rate, "Reaganomics" pumped French capital into the United States. The rising cost of imports had a severe deteriorating effect on France's balance of trade. Its total debt--domestic and foreign--increased 2.6-fold between 1981 and the end of 1984, rising from 450 billion francs to 1.174 billion. According to American Professor M. Harrison, the constant flow of French capital into the United States is a fundamental cause of the French Government's institution of its "austerity" policy.³⁰

One of the main foreign policy goals of the Socialist government--to weaken U.S. economic pressure and thereby keep campaign promises and implement a fairly broad initial program of socioeconomic reforms--has not been attained.

Besides this, the French leadership is striving to muffle the impact of actions disturbing Washington. The Western press regards French President F. Mitterand's visit to West Berlin as one of these moves. It is indicative that Mitterand invited FRG Federal Chancellor H. Kohl to fly there in the president's plane. The French press viewed this as an attempt to "calm the overseas ally."

Nevertheless, deep-seated conflicts between Washington and Paris still exist.

FOOTNOTES

1. A. De Porte, "France's New Realism," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Fall 1984, p 147.
2. S. Hoffman, "Gaullism by Any Other Name," FOREIGN POLICY, Winter 1984/85, p 47.
3. M. Harrison, "Mitterand's France in the Atlantic System," POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Summer 1984, p 231.

4. F. Mitterand, "Ici et maintenant," Paris, 1980, pp 233-252.
5. For more about American-French relations during the initial stages of the Socialist government, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 2--Editor's note.
6. THE TIMES, 22 January 1983.
7. General Fricaud Chagnaud, "France's Defense Policy," NATO REVIEW, 1984, No 1, pp 5-6.
8. Quoted in "NATO Handbook," Brussels, 1979, p 84.
9. G. Lacaze, "Concept de defense et securite en Europe," DEFENSE NATIONALE, July 1984, p 18.
10. LE MONDE, 26-27 October 1980.
11. R. Laird, "French Nuclear Forces in the 1980's and the 1990's," COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, 1984, No 4, p 398.
12. Washington suspended the agreement when representatives of the PCF became members of the French Government in 1981. It was only after F. Mitterand's assurances that he would bear "personal responsibility" for "national security" and after the military functions of the Ministry of Transportation, headed by PCF member C. Fiterman, were transferred to the Ministry of Defense that the United States resumed its fulfillment of the agreement.
13. LE MONDE, 9 November 1984.
14. G. Lacaze, Op. cit., p 21.
15. LE MONDE, 6 January 1983.
16. STRATEGIC REVIEW, Spring 1983, p 20; ORBIS, Spring 1984, p 87.
17. LE MONDE, 21 May 1983.
18. G. Lacaze, Op. cit., p 20.
19. LE MONDE, 13 November 1984.
20. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 3 December 1983.
21. The WEU in its present form dates back to 1954. Its members are England, France, Italy, the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Until recently, the organization was primarily concerned with controlling the rearmament of the FRG. After the previously mentioned restrictions were lifted in June 1984 (the ban on the production of nuclear and chemical weapons by the FRG is still in force) and after the anniversary Rome

session of the WEU at the end of 1984, it became more active and its functions were diversified.

22. LE MATIN, 11 March 1984.
23. P. Schwed and H. Bagnouls, "Vers une defense europeenne," DEFENSE NATIONALE, October 1984, p 50.
24. THE TIMES, 29 March 1984.
25. LE MONDE, 3 June 1985.
26. LE FIGARO, 30 September 1985.
27. NEWSWEEK, 17 June 1985, p 21.
28. At the end of 1981, France was the first of the West European countries to agree to send a military contingent to join the multinational force in Sinai; in 1982 it agreed to participate in the multinational forces in Lebanon.
29. NEWSWEEK, 3 December 1984, p 14.
30. M. Harrison, Op. cit., p 239.

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FOREIGN TRADE STRATEGY OF CANADIAN CONSERVATIVES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 86 (signed to press 20 Dec 85) pp 38-48

[Article by B. I. Alekhin]

[Text] Canada's domestic and foreign policies have undergone a noticeable shift to the right in a year and a half of conservative government. After choosing the openly pro-monopolist line of economic "deregulation," a smaller state sector and cuts in government spending for the purpose of stimulating private business initiative, the Mulroney government launched an attack on the achievements of P. Trudeau's policy of economic nationalism, which had strengthened Canadian sovereignty in some areas. The conservatives essentially abolished the Foreign Investment Review Agency, which had served as an instrument of government control over TNC activities, curtailed the National Energy Program, which was supposed to Canadize the oil and gas industry, and decided to take bids from private buyers for several state corporations representing an outpost of national enterprise in some areas. In addition, they not only continued the talks the previous government had begun with the United States on the further liberalization of bilateral trade but also openly advocated an all-encompassing Canadian-American agreement to eliminate all trade barriers. Ottawa's free-trade venture won Washington's approval. The main result of B. Mulroney's meeting with R. Reagan in Quebec in March 1985 was that, as Secretary General of the Communist Party of Canada W. Kashtan put it, "the door was opened for free trade by the lowering of tariffs and other barriers. The abrupt reversal reflects the fact that the dominant circles of Canadian monopolist capital favored the policy of continentalism. Canadization is giving way to Americanization."¹

The Turn Toward Continentalism

Continentalism is the ideology of the financial magnates and military-industrial corporations in Ontario, farmers, raw material merchants and stock exchange speculators in the Western and Atlantic provinces. Their profits depend directly on the volume of American investments in Canada and sales of Canadian products in the United States. For this reason, the ideologists of continentalism, particularly G. Johnson and P. and R. Wonnacott, condemn economic nationalism as a "form of economic suicide" and argue that Canada's complete economic development will be made possible only by integration with the United States. The free flow of commodities and capital between the two

countries, they maintain, will allow Canada to make more extensive use of its relative advantage in raw material supplies, establish several large and highly efficient enterprises (in place of the many small and noncompetitive ones) in the processing sector and thereby augment labor productivity and raise the Canadians' standard of living. Those who will lose their jobs during the course of this reorganization have been promised generous government assistance. Continentalism envisages the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers in mutual trade, equal rights and possibilities for foreign investors and local firms, the standardization of government regulation systems in the two countries and the eventual creation of a Canadian-American economic union.

Continentalism was already becoming a stronger element of Canada's foreign trade policy under the liberals and, just as in the past, was connected with mounting American protectionism. Although Canada trades with around 150 states in the world, the lion's share of its exports (76.3 percent in 1984)² go to the United States. These are mainly raw materials, semimanufactured goods and motor vehicles. More than one-fourth of the Canadian GNP is sold on the American market. It is therefore understandable that protectionist forces in the United States pose the main external threat to Canadian exporters. This is why the question of how access to the American market can be maintained and expanded is always a focal point of Canadian foreign trade policy, and the prevailing trend in the postwar period has been continentalism. The mutual elimination of trade barriers would deliver strong export branches from the blows of American protectionism and would make their products more competitive (by lowering the cost of U.S.-exported goods used in these branches).

Continental arguments of this kind have an irresistible appeal for Ottawa. All Canadian governments have pursued a policy of commercial convergence with the United States with varying degrees of success, employing not only the possibilities of bilateral commercial-political dialogue but also their GATT powers. As a result, by 1987, when the agreements reached at the last, Tokyo GATT round of talks are implemented, 80 percent of Canada's exports to the United States will be sold duty-free. For this reason, all of this can only be regarded as a turn toward continentalism if the mid-1980's are compared to the "Trudeau era," when the "third alternative," intended to reduce Canada's dependence on the American market by assigning priority to trade with Western Europe, was being pursued.

Under the present government, adherence to GATT is the cornerstone of Canadian trade policy, but this cannot solve the entire problem of maintaining and augmenting access to the American market. In the first place, the severity of this problem is mounting more quickly than the GATT members can agree on each successive lowering of trade barriers. In the second place, the leading Western states, especially the United States, have done much to undermine the process of multilateral trade liberalization. For example, the flourishing of non-tariff protectionism virtually nullified the most-favored-nation principle, which is what made the GATT so appealing to Ottawa. For this reason, the past successes of GATT talks have never caused Canadian ruling circles to lose sight of the importance of commercial-political dialogue with the United States itself. And the main topic is now more likely to be non-tariff barriers in mutual trade than ordinary import duties.

Returning to the present situation, we must point out the fact that the 1979 U.S. act on trade agreements already provided a fairly complete expression of the latest views of American industrialists and legislators on the methods of waging contemporary trade wars. It essentially established the use of non-tariff sanctions, primarily quotas and compensatory duties, against states resorting to what Washington viewed as "dishonest" competition on the U.S. market (dumping and subsidized exports). In turn, the growth of protectionist feelings in the United States was promoted by the Reagan Administration's domestic economic policy, which raised the exchange rate of the American dollar and facilitated the sale of foreign products in this country. One important cause of the exacerbation of Canadian-American commercial-political relations was the latest crisis of overproduction, which seized the economies of the two countries in the early 1980's and aggravated the problem of commercial sales for Canadian and American firms. For example, falling American demand caused a decrease of 4.5 billion Canadian dollars in Canada's exports during 1980-1982 in comparison to the 1979 figure (in constant prices).³

Washington's concessions to certain noncompetitive branches--and the sweeping protectionist action was inconsistent with domestic economic policy and the President's own free-trade views--nevertheless represented an impressive demonstration of American protectionism, which intimidated the Canadian bourgeoisie. In the words of Director F. Bergsten of the Washington International Economic Studies Institute, "despite all of its free-trade rhetoric, the Reagan Administration has imposed more restrictions on imports in the last 2 years than any other administration since the 1930's."⁴

The crisis in Canada's commercial-political relations with the United States began to acquire distinct outlines at the end of 1981, when the American Government instituted new compensatory duties to protect its producers against "subsidized" imports. These duties were used in the past as well, but at the Tokyo round the United States, Japan, the EEC countries and Canada reserved the right to take additional measures to defend their industry against foreign competitors receiving government subsidies. "The rigid U.S. compensatory system," R. Grey, Canada's representative at the GATT talks, wrote at that time, "could seriously inhibit Canada's industrial development. This influence is difficult to define and impossible to measure; it will take the form of the refusal of companies to invest in Canada."⁵ In 1982 the Canadian press was already up in arms about the "commercial threat" posed by the United States, "the surge of protectionism that could injure Canada."⁶ This referred specifically to the protectionist position of Congress, which was then considering 53 protectionist bills, each of which could be used against Canada, as well as certain cases of trade competition between the two countries and, above all, the lawsuit of a group of American lumber companies against the Canadian Government. Asserting that Ottawa was subsidizing exports of lumber to the United States, this group demanded the institution of compensatory duties. If it had been able to win the suit, the Canadian woodworking industry would "probably no longer exist as a potential source of deliveries to satisfy American demand in the future."⁷

In an attempt to secure its exports, the Canadian bourgeoisie exerted stronger pressure on Ottawa, as it had so many times in the past, to neutralize

Washington's protectionist moves and to strengthen its own position in the American market with the aid of new free-trade agreements. The increasing popularity of the idea of free trade with the United States in the Canadian business community was attested to, for example, by the results of a REPORT ON BUSINESS MAGAZINE survey of the top thousand (in terms of assets) Canadian corporations. When companies were asked whether they would prefer complete freedom of trade or the confinement of free trade to specific sectors, 39 percent expressed a preference for complete freedom, 59 percent chose sectorial freedom and 2 percent had no opinion.⁸ As the Canadian press commented, "Canada's motives are clear: Canadian business wants to lay hold of the huge American market."⁹ And it informed the federal government of this through the most diverse channels.

In 1982, for example, the report on Canadian-American relations of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs not only requested the government once again to create a zone of free trade with the United States but also explained the procedure in full detail.¹⁰ The Clarence Decatur Howe Institute in Montreal (a non-profit research organization) published a work by R. Lipsey and M. Smith, American colleagues of the Canadian continentalists, who assert that "a Canadian-American zone of free trade offers a promising opportunity to create a more efficient, flexible and reoriented Canadian...economy, which will secure a higher standard of living and employment for the overwhelming majority of Canadians."¹¹ The National Business Council, an influential lobbyist organization representing the interests of the country's top 150 corporations, expressed support for continentalism. The prestigious Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Future Development of Canada¹² became, through the efforts of its chairman, D. MacDonald, the center of the national debates on free trade, and MacDonald himself declared in early 1985 that he was "in favor of a free-trade agreement with the United States" and that "independence and changes in Canada's domestic policy are a suitable price" for access to the American market.¹³ Half a year after this statement, the commission officially recommended that the government open the border for the free exchange of goods, and B. Mulroney did not conceal his joy. In 1983 the Canadian Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution requesting the federal government to work with the business community and provincial authorities toward a free-trade pact with the United States before 1987 (while Reagan is still in office). For the first time in its history, the chamber surmounted the split which had excluded the possibility of this kind of continentalist resolution in the past.

The Canadian bourgeoisie's shift in the direction of continentalism at a time of economic crisis forced the Trudeau government to depart from the "third alternative." First the offices of minister of international trade and minister of regional industrial expansion were turned over to men sympathizing with continentalism (E. Lumley and G. Regan) and discussions of the "third alternative" gave way to talk about the development of trade with overseas states on a bilateral basis, whereas the objective in the 1970's was the creation of counterbalances to the American market in the form of entire regions. Later, in fall 1983, a government "green paper" on foreign trade was published to popularize the idea of specialized, sectorial agreements with the United States on free trade. The implementation of this idea, its authors asserted, would help to solve the problem of access to the U.S.

market without the substantial losses and acute sociopolitical conflicts that might result from a comprehensive agreement on free trade.¹⁴ They tried to conceal their compromise with the continentalists with touching reminders of the "third alternative," calling it the logical continuation of continental integration, although it was officially contrasted to the policy of integration with the United States in the 1970's.

Apparently, after the Trudeau government had received a favorable response to the "green paper" from the business community, it asked the Reagan Administration to negotiate the elimination of trade barriers in some sectors. According to W. Brock, then the U.S. representative in the GATT, this proposal "delighted" the United States.¹⁵ For Washington, which was trying to hasten the start of the new round of GATT talks because it was dissatisfied with the results of the previous Tokyo round, the initiative of its principal trade partner was most welcome. By accepting the Canadian proposal, the U.S. administration could show Japan and Western Europe that it was willing to proceed with bilateral liberalization if the GATT mechanism did not start working soon.

The Canadian-American trade talks began in February 1984, but they were broken off in September when the liberals lost the parliamentary elections. As subsequent events demonstrated, the new Progressive Conservative government took a turn in the development of commercial-political relations with the United States that was even more dangerous for Canada's independence. In the economic declaration prepared by Minister of Finance M. Wilson, the new government mentioned "sweeping bilateral agreements with the United States" and promised to thoroughly analyze the "options for the liberalization of bilateral trade with the United States in light of various proposals from the private sector."¹⁶ By June 1985, a law was passed on investments in Canada, marking the beginning of the Canadian Government's move toward an "open-door policy" with regard to foreign capital. In September of the same year--that is, within the 6 months stipulated at the Quebec meeting for "planning all of the possible ways of lowering and eliminating trade barriers"--it invited the U.S. Government to begin talks on the establishment of free trade between the two countries, a proposal which received a warm welcome from Ronald Reagan.

Assessing the move toward continentalism in Ottawa's foreign economic policy, leftist forces in the country have stressed that this line will doom Canada to the role of a raw material outpost of the United States. Since Canada does not have any special advantages over its southern neighbor in the processing industry, the elimination of trade barriers will be followed by the reduction of this sector under the influence of American competition, and the dependence on imported manufactured goods from the United States will increase. Canadians who lose their jobs as a result of production efficiency measures will have to emigrate or, what is even more likely, will join the army of unemployed in their own country. The structure of the Canadian economy will be less progressive from the standpoint of the needs of the world economy: The excessive growth of resource sectors at the expense of the processing industry at a time of a global tendency toward the conservation of resources in production will slow down the rates of scientific and technical progress and of economic growth in general in Canada and will mean the loss of hundreds of thousands of potential jobs.

Defending themselves against the leftist criticism, the continentalists maintain that economic merger with the United States will not violate Canada's sovereign rights or disrupt its personal cultural development--that is, they are camouflaging their pro-Americanism with what V. I. Lenin called the petty bourgeois utopia of "peaceful competition by independent nations under capitalism."¹⁷ In reality, continentalism is the enemy of Canada's independence and national uniqueness. The most odious of its supporters believe that it would be better from the commercial standpoint to have congressmen in Washington from the "state of Canada" than to maintain an independent Canadian state.

Conservative Alternatives

The official revision of Canada's foreign trade policy began with the publication of another "green paper" on foreign trade, especially exports, in January 1985. It examined four ways of solving the problem of access to the American market.

First of all, there is adherence to the previous line--that is, "creeping" continentalism (the use of GATT rights plus the usual practice of settling trade conflicts with the United States). The author of the "green paper," Canadian Minister of International Trade J. Kelleher, suggested, however, that this option does not meet the conditions of fierce competition in the world market.

The second option envisages the conclusion of sectorial and functional--that is, freeing bilateral trade of some specific non-tariff restrictions--agreements with the United States on free trade. But this, in the opinion of the minister, would offer no opportunity for compromises on other sectors or trade barriers and would thereby restrict the scales of the entire bargain and the negotiating ability of both countries.

Kelleher went on to suggest a comprehensive agreement with the United States on the elimination of all trade barriers. The very discussion of this option in an official document represents a challenge to the patriotism of Canadians in view of the frequency with which their sovereignty and national development have been threatened by their southern neighbor. But Kelleher went even further: The document clearly indicates that the conservatives prefer this option. "Only the comprehensive approach," the "green paper" said, "will bring about the substantial reorganization of the economy.... The comprehensive approach will affect only the barriers in Canadian-American trade and will not apply to trade barriers against other countries. It will not require the free flow of capital and manpower or the institution of a common currency and monetary circulation system. This agreement will not necessarily lead to changes in other areas of policy influencing trade, such as credit and monetary regulation, taxation, labor policy, regional development, investments or anti-trust legislation."¹⁸

The fourth variety of conservative foreign trade strategy also fits the continentalist pattern--the conclusion of an agreement with the United States on the goals and principles of bilateral economic relations and the creation of a

joint mechanism for their regulation. This agreement, which would be essentially declarative, would not secure reliable and broad access to the American market in itself, but the conservatives believe that it could lay a good foundation for concrete talks on the lowering of trade barriers in line with the second or third options, and a Canadian-American consultative committee on trade would be useful in the compilation of detailed programs of bilateral liberalization. The "green paper" did not propose any options allowing for the relaxation of the continentalist tendency.

It is significant that after 1911, when the liberal government of W. Laurier suffered a crushing election defeat as a result of its intention to push the draft of a broad agreement on free trade with the United States through the Parliament, no Canadian government took the risk of openly siding with the supporters of free trade, although marketing presented an acute problem more than once and although much was done in the sphere of commercial convergence with the United States. The publication of J. Kelleher's "green paper" signified that the conservatives had not only begun the national debates on free trade they had first suggested in 1979, but were also participating in these debates as the pioneers of continentalism in its most reactionary form. Of course, the new government was thereby carrying out the social orders of the bourgeoisie in the Western and Atlantic provinces, intimidated by American protectionism. But the description of the circumstances leading up to Ottawa's abrupt turn toward continentalism would be incomplete without a discussion of B. Mulroney's own political views and personality. Renowned Canadian political analyst S. Clarkson wrote this about him: "Mister Mulroney has only one great friend in the world, the United States, and all of his foreign policy decisions stem from this.... He grew up with the continentalist conviction that Canada's prosperity is the direct result of American enterprise.... It is not surprising that the established view of the world in the office of the prime minister is confined to North America.... Mister Mulroney began by abolishing the Foreign Investment Review Agency and making cuts in the National Energy Program, thereby displaying a comprador willingness to define Canadian national interests to Washington's satisfaction.... Under this new prime minister, the Canadian Government has returned to the historically more convenient but less dignified state of continental dependence as the primary principle of its international activity."¹⁹

It was also guided by this principle during the preparations for the Canadian-American summit meeting in Quebec in March 1985. After promising each other to fight against protectionism, B. Mulroney and R. Reagan signed a trade declaration and an operational program on trade, which were wholly continentalist in spirit if not in letter: The fear of Canadian public indignation precluded the use of the term "free trade" at the talks and in the resulting documents. The trade declaration, which does not bind the leaders of the two countries to any specific commitments, expressed their "political will" to expand mutual trade. For the continentalists, this would mean the elimination of some trade barriers at worst, but at best--that is, in the continued presence of "political will"--it would provide strong momentum for the conclusion of a comprehensive free-trade agreement.

The 1-year operational program on trade envisages the elimination of discrimination against the suppliers of the other side in government purchases and

project financing; the standardization and simplification of the administrative legal framework of commercial transactions; the elimination of obstacles for competition in air traffic; the relaxation of restrictions in the trade in energy resources; the lowering of regular import duties; the elimination of obstacles for business trips; the elimination of barriers in the trade in high-technology products; cooperation in copyright protection and in the struggle against the sale of counterfeit goods. The conclusion of Canadian-American agreements on at least some of these points will provide considerable momentum for bilateral trade, and the completion of the entire program will mean that Canada has adapted its trade and transport infrastructure to the "deregulated" U.S. economy.

Decisions were made as early as the Quebec meeting to eliminate such irritants in mutual trade as the demand that all steel pipe sent to the United States be marked with the country of origin; the restrictions on imports of alloy steels, fish and some other goods from Canada; the Canadian tax on the sale of American literature intended for Canadian tourists. Therefore, the meeting cannot be seen as anything other than the first joint step of the two conservative governments toward the creation of a Canadian-American "common market."

The Business Community's Reaction

In the United States there was a positive reaction to the results of the talks. In the first place, agreements with Canada on any point in the operational program on trade could be used in the massive commercial-political game Washington was playing in other parts of the world. For example, the program envisages agreements on free trade in high-technology items and on joint actions against the sale of counterfeit goods. The first could serve as a model for a similar agreement with Japan, which the United States wants, and the second could serve the interests of the U.S. struggle against the infiltration of the American market by goods from developing countries. For this reason, the Reagan Administration was hoping for the quickest possible implementation of the program. In the second place, people in Washington apparently had no doubt that American business had nothing to lose from the mutual elimination of trade barriers. The U.S. monopolies have a tremendous technical advantage over their Canadian competitors and have a broad network of branches and licensees in Canada and see no particular danger in free trade with Canada. In any case, as one government report stated, a free-trade agreement with Canada will have a "significant negative effect" on only 2 of the 35 commodity groups studied by the U.S. International Trade Commission.²⁰ Besides this, the American business community made it known that if Canada wants this kind of agreement, it will have to cancel its programs of regional development and scientific and technical progress. If the Canadian Government agrees to satisfy this demand, it will lose important means of influencing the industrial development of the country, and this will probably weaken the already ineffective processing sector.

The Quebec agreements evoked a unanimous positive reaction in Canadian continentalist circles and provided a pretext for new attacks on patriotic forces. Political correspondent J. Simpson wrote that "Canada may have lost part of its independence in the sphere of foreign policy, but the summit meeting

represents perceptible and important advances on many fronts."²¹ Nevertheless, some segments of the Canadian business community voiced stronger appeals for caution and protectionism.

Within the framework of bourgeois ideology and policy, economic nationalism holds the line of defense against continentalism. Its supporters believe that the problem of augmenting exports is closely connected with the structural crisis in the Canadian economy, the symptoms of which are the low level of R & D, the excessive dependence on imported technology, high-tech products and manufactured goods, the low rates of labor productivity growth, the insufficient processing of raw materials in Canada, etc. Furthermore, this crisis is justifiably associated with the domination of Canadian industry by foreign, especially American, capital. According to nationalist segments of the Canadian bourgeoisie, Canada should reorganize its economy and rely primarily on its own strength. It should be used for the maximal acceleration of scientific and technical progress, the maximization of its national economic impact, the reduction of Canada's technological dependence on the United States and the guarantee of Canada's "technological sovereignty." With this kind of sovereignty--that is, strong scientific and technical potential--Canada could, the nationalists maintain, offer the world not only its natural resources but also the products of their intensive processing and manufactured goods with high competitive potential due to their unique consumer features.

The Canadian Labour Congress, the country's largest labor organization, with over 2 million members, was also resolutely opposed to free trade with the United States. Correctly assuming that free trade would reduce employment and real wages and lead to the loss of sovereignty in the economy and other spheres, the congress advocates a foreign trade policy "designed to weaken Canada's general dependence on the foreign market and diversify its foreign trade contacts."²²

In comparison to the continentalists' free-trade program, what the nationalists are proposing seems completely constructive from the standpoint of the defense of Canada's sovereign rights and from the standpoint of the structural reorganization of its economy. It includes the subordination of monetary policy and other elements of economic strategy to the objectives of export stimulation and industrialization; the integration of the resource base with secondary branches of the processing industry; the dramatic augmentation of labor productivity on the basis of scientific and technical progress; the stimulation of an increase in the number of innovator firms; the reinforcement of national control and government ownership in the economy; the enlargement of the domestic market through the development of interregional ties; resolute advances in scientific and technical fields offering the greatest promise from the standpoint of economic growth and direct commercial advantage.²³ It is easy to see that this program reflects the interests of businessmen in the processing sector, who are gathering strength to seize the dominant position in the most profitable and dynamic sectors and who are relying on government assistance in this battle with American monopolies.

It is significant that when the creation of the Canadian-American zone of free trade was suddenly made a completely attainable goal by the presence of

the "political will" of the leaders of both countries, the traditional division of the Canadian bourgeoisie into the protectionist faction of the industrial center (Ontario and Quebec) and the free-trade faction of the agricultural and raw material periphery (the Western and Atlantic provinces) became the main obstacle in the government's free-trade plans. For example, in the beginning of 1985 the distinct prospect of the rapid elimination of all barriers in trade with the United States frightened industrialists in the two central provinces, Ontario and Quebec, where the least competitive branches and the branches most dependent on the foreign market are concentrated. J. Kelleher sensed this during his consultations with the private sector on the matters he discussed in his "green paper" with regard to the development of trade with the United States. "No one has expressed a desire for completely free trade," he said. "What they (the businessmen--B. A.) need is reliable access to existing markets and the gradual expansion of trade."²⁴

At a national economic conference in March 1985, representatives of industrial circles in Ontario and Quebec fought a genuine battle against the continentalists, but this was a battle against a stronger adversary. The federal government had the firm support of the provinces, the banks and the military-industrial, oil and mining monopolies--that is, the segments of Canadian capital most closely interrelated with American business. Furthermore, public opinion polls indicated that the state of affairs in the country favored the onset of continentalism.²⁵ Under the conditions of colossal unemployment (10-12 percent), the commotion the continentalists and their American friends stirred up over the protectionist moves of the American Congress gave Canadians the impression that the employment problem could be solved by opening the border for the free exchange of goods with the United States.²⁶ Finally, although protectionist feelings in the Congress grew stronger in 1985, largely due to the conflict over shipments of Canadian wood to the United States,²⁷ the American Government was morally and legally prepared for a free-trade accord with Ottawa: The October 1984 act on trade and tariffs mentioned Canada along with Israel and Egypt as a possible partner in free-trade agreements.

As long as Canada has existed as an independent state, ruling circles in this country have tried repeatedly to conclude a comprehensive agreement on free trade with the United States. The attempt was last made in 1948. At that time, Prime Minister M. King of Canada, a zealous continentalist, also began negotiations with the United States which promised a rapid transition to free trade, but the Canadian leader suddenly refused to continue the talks, much to the surprise of those who were in on the secret negotiations. King's biographers believe that he did not want a repetition of the events of 1911, when the Liberal Party lost the parliamentary elections because it was planning to conclude a free-trade pact with the United States. And this was not the only time the people of Canada inflicted a defeat on the continentalists. Will history repeat itself or will Canada open the border for free trade with the United States and, as prominent Canadian public spokesman E. Goodman put it, thereby commit "political hara-kiri"?²⁸ The answer to this question will depend ultimately on the cohesion and strength of the resistance of forces for continentalism by patriotic Canadians. Assessing the prospects of the Canadian-American commercial dialogue, we must not forget that two tendencies

recorded by V. I. Lenin are present in the relations between capitalist countries: "One making the alliance of all imperialists inevitable, and the other setting some imperialists in opposition to others."²⁹ This second tendency could make serious changes in the free-trade plans of the two conservative governments.

FOOTNOTES

1. "The Road Ahead. Documents from the 26th Convention of the Communist Party of Canada, April 5-8, 1985," Toronto, 1985, p 26.
2. "Summary of External Trade," Ottawa, December 1984, p 40.
3. Calculated according to "National Income and Expenditure Accounts, Fourth Quarter 1984," Ottawa, 1985, pp 29, 30.
4. THE FINANCIAL POST, 11 February 1984.
5. TORONTO STAR, 7 October 1981.
6. FINANCIAL TIMES OF CANADA, 15 November 1982.
7. Ibid.
8. REPORT ON BUSINESS MAGAZINE, March 1985, p 120.
9. THE FINANCIAL POST, 22 October 1983.
10. "The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. Canada-United States Relations, vol III: Canada's Trade Relations with the United States," Ottawa, 1982.
11. R. Lipsey and M. Smith, "Taking the Initiative: Canada's Trade Options in a Turbulent World," Montreal, 1985, pp 179, 183.
12. The institution of royal commissions is a characteristic feature of government economic policymaking in Canada. These commissions are formed during the most difficult periods for Canadian capitalism, when the government has to change its economic policy line. With the aid of a panel of experts, the royal commissions analyze the country's current difficulties and recommend changes in government economic policy. This has been done three times in the past half-century. The Royal Commission on Federal-Provincial Relations did its work immediately following the economic crisis of 1929-1932. In 1957, when another crisis of overproduction broke out, the report of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects was published. The MacDonald Commission was formed at the height of the economic crisis of 1980-1982 and published its final report in September 1985.
13. THE FINANCIAL POST, 29 December 1984.

14. "Department of External Affairs. Canadian Trade Policy for the 1980's. A Discussion Paper," Ottawa, 1983.
15. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 18 February 1984.
16. "Department of Finance. A New Direction for Canada. An Agenda for Economic Renewal," Ottawa, 1984, p 33.
17. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 27, p 63.
18. "Government of Canada. How To Secure and Enhance Canadian Access to Export Markets. A Discussion Paper," Ottawa, 1985, p 27.
19. THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 24 May 1985.
20. Ibid., 23 March 1985.
21. Ibid., 21 March 1985.
22. THE FINANCIAL POST, 20 July 1985.
23. J. Shepherd, "The Transition to Reality: Directions for Canadian Industrial Strategy," Toronto, 1980, p 8; A. Rotstein, "Rebuilding from Within. Remedies for Canada's Ailing Economy," Toronto, 1984, p 62.
24. FINANCIAL TIMES OF CANADA, 8 April 1985.
25. According to a survey conducted in September 1984 by the Desima Research firm at the government's request, 68 percent of the Canadians supported the line of commercial convergence with the United States in the belief that this would increase employment and stimulate economic growth. A survey conducted by the Quebec Public Opinion Research Center in November 1984 indicated that 65 percent believed that free trade with the United States in some sectors would benefit Canada, and 77 percent said that it was extremely important to maintain a good relationship with the United States (THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 6 May 1985).
26. The author's calculations show, however, that the "net" effect of free trade on employment in Canada (the number of jobs created by the growth of exports to the United States, minus the number of jobs lost as a result of production cuts in Canada) would be negative. Since the expansion of production for export will be accomplished with the same level, or an even lower one, of labor-intensiveness (primarily through more intense specialization on the enterprise level), Canada will lose more jobs than it gains.
27. When American lumber companies were unable to compete with Canadian firms--primarily due to the lower felling tax in Canada--they organized the introduction of a bill in Congress to limit the proportional amount of Canadian wood on the American market to 25 percent instead of the previous 30 percent for the next 5 years. "Opposition to imports from

Canada...has reached the level at which even lobbying cannot help" (THE FINANCIAL POST, 6 July 1985).

28. THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 30 October 1984.

29. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 36, p 332.

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U.S. REACTION TO RESULTS OF GENEVA SUMMIT VIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 86 (signed to press 20 Dec 85) pp 61-66

[Article by N. D. Turkatenko: "After Geneva (A Letter from Washington)"]

[Text] The reaction in the U.S. capital to the Soviet-American summit meeting in November is complex and ambiguous and provides strong new evidence of the severity of the largely irreconcilable conflicts in Washington's corridors of power. Of course, these conflicts existed and their severity was apparent even before the Geneva meeting, including conflicts within the groups with extremely strong influence behind the scenes on the policy of the administration in general and on President R. Reagan in particular. As the President of the United States, he naturally has tremendous powers and, consequently, the general policy of Washington depends to a certain extent on his personal decisions.

The current Republican administration and the forces which put it in a position of power once took advantage of the widespread American fear resulting from the United States' loss of the now obsolete belief in the invulnerability of its territory, separated from the turbulent rest of the world by two oceans.

It was in this atmosphere that the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), put forth by Ronald Reagan in his speech in March 1983, was invented by the military-industrial complex and the scientific-technical and academic circles serving it. The idea of the SDI served its purpose. It became a concrete expression of Washington strategists' hopes of securing the invulnerability of the United States and of achieving decisive military superiority to the Soviet Union. Washington strategists also hoped that, by imposing an arms race in space on the Soviet Union and simultaneously intensifying it on earth, the United States would attain the long-cherished goal of undermining the Soviet economy and thereby nullifying the constantly increasing influence of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community in international affairs.

Of course, within the country and beyond its borders, the SDI was and is being served up by its initiators under a different sauce, namely as a panacea against the nuclear threat for the territory and population of the United

States and its allies. According to these allegations, the SDI will bring about a radical reversal in the world, which is tired of living under the nuclear sword of Damocles, and it will allow for the abandonment of the "amoral" strategy of "mutual assured destruction," in the place of which another strategy will reign, a strategy based on a "highly moral" principle of defense: The SDI, they allege, will be aimed against weapons, and not against people.

But experts here are well aware of the essence of the SDI. The most prominent scientists, including Nobel Prize winners H. Bethe and G. Seaborg, Director W. Weisskopf of the Federation of American Scientists, famous physicist and one of the leaders of the Union of Concerned Scientists G. Kendall, several prominent political and public figures who once occupied high-level positions in the U.S. Government, including former secretaries of defense R. McNamara, H. Brown and J. Schlesinger, historian and diplomat G. Kennan, former Secretary of State D. Rusk, heads of the U.S. SALT I and SALT II delegations G. Smith and P. Warnke, and many others, are constantly pointing out the fact that a new U.S. antisatellite weapons system with space-based elements would lead to the dramatic disruption of strategic stability in the world. Their explanations essentially consist in the following. The defense of the entire nation with the aid of the SDI is virtually impracticable, but the defense of missile launchers with its aid could be attempted. This is precisely what the initiators of the SDI want to do. They would like to create a situation distinguished by at least the theoretical possibility of delivering a first strike in the expectation that a retaliatory strike, which would be aimed primarily at sites of still unutilized missiles, would not reach its targets. In this way, the side delivering the first strike will retain most of its strategic potential and will be able to dictate terms to the victim of the aggression.

It must be said that the overwhelming majority of Americans are far from aware of the real purpose of the SDI and therefore, as public opinion polls indicate, support it. Taking advantage of this, the military-industrial complex is pressuring the administration and Congress through its strong lobby in Washington and in electoral districts for more and more billion-dollar allocations for SDI-related projects.

For a long time, the U.S. campaign to build up "superior strength" was conducted in an atmosphere of constantly fueled fear and hatred of the Soviet Union. Official propaganda and the "Christian New Right" movement were operating in full swing. The campaign reached the point of sermons from church pulpits, television screens and the pages of publications about the "inevitability of Armageddon," as a result of which the "Satanic power," which is how the Soviet Union was portrayed to Americans, would be defeated.

Preachers of every variety advised people to prepare for the great confrontation between "good" (the United States) and "evil" (the USSR) within the lifetime of the current generation. Every opportunity was taken to make use of the biblical "prophecy" that the northern ruler Gog would appear but would be overthrown by "God's loyal subjects" with the aid of fire and brimstone--that is, nuclear weapons. Nonsense of this kind was proclaimed by the extraordinarily energetic and eloquent leaders of the "New Christian Right," such as the well-known J. Falwell, and even by some members of the administration.

To a considerable extent, all of this served as grounds for the new theory that it was possible to fight a nuclear war and even to survive and win it.

Some worded these allegations in an absolutely primitive form. Others resorted to the use of more complex material, passing off "scientifically sound" doctrines such as that of "limited nuclear war" as "reasonable and mutually incumbent rules of warfare," which many Americans took at face value.

But during the process of Washington's new flurry of activity in the buildup of weapons, during the campaign to fuel anti-Soviet hysteria, a group of factors took shape and created a situation in which people began to realize not only the futility, but also the danger for the United States itself, of the further escalation of the arms race. There was a backlash against the sermons about the "need to prepare for Armageddon." The country was tired of living in an atmosphere of fear and hatred. There was increasing alarm among American allies, who were fully aware that a nuclear catastrophe would not pass them by either. Such Soviet initiatives as the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions until the end of 1985, the unilateral cessation of the deployment of additional intermediate-range Soviet missiles on European territory, the proposal that the USSR and United States jointly reduce their nuclear missiles capable of reaching each other's territories by 50 percent, the proposal of a total nuclear test ban treaty and others have made a tremendous impression on Americans and their allies. Americans have also grown increasingly aware of the potential danger of the extension of the arms race into outer space.

Members of the groups responsible for Washington policymaking have concluded that the chosen line did not produce the anticipated results, it did not weaken the Soviet Union and, besides this, it not only failed to strengthen U.S. security but even made it less stable. The Soviet leadership's institution of a broad program for the rapid buildup of the country's economic, scientific and technical potential has also made a great impression here.

Greater efforts have been demanded from the huge "think tanks" supplying the political and military establishment here with analyses of information about the Soviet Union and forecasts of its development. Judging by discussions, debates and personal conversations, those who are seeking answers to new questions with a view to reality cannot ignore the prospect of an even stronger Soviet Union in the military and economic sense in the near future on the basis of this tremendous potential. If it must be taken into consideration now, it will be even harder to ignore in the future.

This was the reason for the decision to make substantial revisions in the policy line based on escalating confrontation. A search began for ways of creating a new situation in which it would be possible to relax tension and curb the arms race, especially now that the burden of this race is being felt more and more by its initiators. This was accompanied by the growth of the mountain of problems in whose resolution the United States has as much interest as the Soviet Union.

Even before the final agreement on the summit meeting had been reached, Washington began sending out signals in the form of fierce battles in Congress

over budget priorities. Although the legislators essentially satisfied the administration's requests for new weapons systems by cutting allocations for social needs and retaining the large federal budget deficit, the approval of the program still entailed considerable difficulties: For example, during the discussion of the MX missile program the administration was unable to receive funds for the development of 100 such missiles and had to be satisfied with 50, but even the money for these has not been completely released yet.

Allocations for the SDI were not granted without complications either, although few members of Congress have openly opposed it. The amount Congress allocated for the "Star Wars" program in fiscal year 1986 is a billion dollars lower than the requested 3.7 billion, despite the personal intervention of President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger. The administration's attempts to gain the tentative consent of the majority of legislators to the allocation of 26 billion dollars for the program up to the end of 1989 are still inconclusive. And in general, there have been louder appeals in Congress for a struggle against the federal budget deficit, now in excess of 200 billion dollars, because it is undermining American economic prospects.

These were the conditions at the time of the summit meeting in Geneva, described by Ronald Reagan as a "new beginning" in Soviet-American relations. What exactly, in the opinion of Americans, did Geneva produce and what might it produce in the future?

No unanimous opinion, as I mentioned previously, has been expressed here. The average American is naturally quite pleased with the meeting itself and its results. All of the main television channels carried reports from Geneva several times a day. Instead of seeing the "Satanic images" with which they have been frightened for so long, television viewers saw human and communicative, according to the description of American reporters and commentators, Soviet officials. They had a chance to see with their own eyes that the Soviet delegation arrived in Geneva with the intention of working seriously and earnestly toward the reinforcement of international security, the reduction of the danger of nuclear war and the improvement of Soviet-American relations. And the overwhelming majority of Americans, judging by the results of public opinion polls conducted after the meeting, are in favor of this course of events.

President R. Reagan set the tone for the semiofficial U.S. reaction to the Geneva meeting when he addressed Congress on the evening of the same day he returned to Washington. "We met with General Secretary Gorbachev because," he said, "we had to meet. I cannot say that our views agreed on such fundamental issues as the ideology or national objectives of our countries, but we now understand each other better. This is the key to peace.... This was a constructive meeting. So constructive that I expect to invite and welcome M. S. Gorbachev to the United States in the coming year. And I accepted his invitation to visit Moscow the year after. We are still far apart on an entire group of issues, and this was to be expected. But we reached agreement on some matters, and as I already said, we agreed to continue meeting, and this is very important and very good. There is always room for movement, action and progress when people talk to each other instead of about each other."

At the same time, the President resorted to the banal thesis that U.S. military strength had contributed to the success of the meeting in Geneva and asked Congress to continue supporting his, the President's, efforts to "keep America strong." This appeal was interpreted here as confirmation of the administration's desire to continue pressuring Congress for larger military allocations for the sake of policy from a position of strength.

The results of the Geneva meeting won the approval of Congress as a whole. As members of Congress stressed, no one expected any concrete decisions from a 2-day meeting.

Commenting on the results of the Geneva meeting, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, a magazine close to official Washington, printed an eloquent selection of photographs of the meeting and provided the following summary of what the magazine regards as its concrete and positive results: The members of the USSR and U.S. delegations at the talks on nuclear and space arms were instructed to step up the negotiations; an agreement was reached on new summit meetings; an agreement was reached on the opening of a USSR consulate in New York and a U.S. consulate in Kiev; a general agreement on exchanges and contacts in science, education and culture was signed; an agreement was reached on the development of commercial ties; the bases were laid for the resumption of Aeroflot and Pan American flights to the United States and USSR; in conjunction with the Government of Japan, an agreement was reached on several measures to heighten the safety of flights in the North Pacific. As for the question of opportunities within the near future for concrete and far-reaching accords and treaties on arms limitation and reduction between the USSR and United States, the magazine expressed an extremely skeptical attitude, underscoring the substantial differences in approaches to the specific elements of this issue.

Many officials favoring a constructive approach, one meeting the interests of both powers, to the issue of arms limitation openly expressed their disillusionment with the American side's position at the Geneva meeting. For example, former head of the U.S. SALT I delegation G. Smith and head of the U.S. SALT II delegation P. Warnke stressed during a press conference on the results of the meeting that the American side's position had precluded the declaration of the vital need to adhere to the provisions of the ABM and SALT II treaties (the latter will expire on 31 December 1985): After all, these treaties, they stated, set limits on the arms race, and public confirmation of adherence to them would be all the more important since no new agreements have been concluded yet. In addition, Smith and Warnke pointedly criticized the U.S. reluctance to reconsider its position with regard to the SDI, which represents, in their opinion, a virtually insurmountable obstacle to the conclusion of offensive nuclear arms reduction agreements.

An extremely positive view of the Geneva meeting was expressed, however, by a man known for his serious approach to problems in Soviet-American relations and arms control, former Secretary of Defense R. McNamara. He took part in a discussion of the results of the Geneva meeting, broadcast on the Washington channel of the ABC network, with Academician G. A. Arbatov and several American experts. McNamara had the following to say about the summit meeting:

A great advance has been made; for the first time the two sides are discussing a 50-percent reduction in nuclear weapons, and the discussion of this topic is an important step forward. The negotiations could take months or even years, but they must be undertaken in earnest. For the success of the talks, McNamara stressed, it will be absolutely essential for the SDI not to go beyond the research stage.

However paradoxical it might seem at first, many people with reactionary views or, as they prefer to describe themselves, "neoconservatives" advocating a "tough line" in relations with the Soviet Union, also expressed satisfaction with the results of the Geneva meeting. They are now blowing their own horn, alleging that the meeting provided proof of the effectiveness of the "tough line." Incidentally, they also immediately launched a campaign to obliterate the "spirit of Geneva" and the "new beginning."

Some anxiety is also obvious in the post-Geneva mood of the "neoconservatives" here: They are worried that R. Reagan, who had a friendly conversation, much to their indignation, with M. S. Gorbachev and announced that he would welcome new meetings with the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, will assume the responsibility for stepping up the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons. They immediately fell upon Reagan's passing comment that "the SDI question was left open in Geneva," something he said in response to a newsman's question. In this phrase, they discerned the hint of a possible departure from the hard line on the "Star Wars" program.

The extreme uneasiness of "neoconservative circles" with the very fact of the meeting in Geneva and its atmosphere was quite frankly expressed by a man of some renown in the United States, R. Viguary, the publisher of several extreme rightwing publications and a man with broad contacts and considerable influence among the "neoconservatives." The meeting in Geneva and the general circumstances of the meeting, he told a UPI correspondent, are having a calming effect on people and arousing a sense of security. Viguary does not like this. The same uneasiness was displayed by lobbyists of the military-industrial complex on Capitol Hill.

The prevailing feelings of members of the Washington administration were expressed by the President's special adviser J. Matlock. Appearing on a CNN television program, he said: "One of our aims was to adhere to a realistic position and put this meeting within the proper context of what can be expected. It seems to me that we succeeded. What I mean is that this marked the beginning of a process allowing us to examine problems directly and work toward their resolution.... It seems to me that this meeting differed in some respects from some previous meetings. In particular, neither side wanted to assert the accomplishment of more than had actually been done. In the past, there was sometimes the direct or indirect creation of the impression that a meeting of top leaders signified a radical change in policy, almost the merger of the policies of the two sides. This impression always gave rise to disillusionment. It seems to me that the President began this meeting by making it clear that serious differences of opinion do exist. Many of these differences will continue to exist. And we must strive to establish the kind of relationship that will allow us to eliminate these differences in time,

after a great deal of patient effort. You see how much we can accomplish if we acknowledge that we base our policy on the assumption that our countries differ from one another considerably and that they will continue to differ in many respects."

The responses and arguments cited here testify that a fierce struggle can be anticipated in Washington's corridors of power. Its outcome will decide the future course of the U.S. administration.

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U.S. BOOK ON ASSESSING STRATEGIC DEFENSE REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 86 (signed to press 20 Dec 85) pp 108-111

[Review by I. Ya. Kobrinskaya of book "Assessing Strategic Defense. Six Roundtable Discussions," edited by W. Weinrod, Washington, Heritage Foundation, 1985, VIII + 170 pages: "Hawks Sitting at the 'Round Table'"]

[Text] The "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), put forth by President Reagan in his speech on 23 March 1983, laid the basis for intense U.S. preparations for a new phase of the arms race, this time entailing the development of space attack weapons. The SDI program is a matter of public interest in the United States and the rest of the world. This is not surprising: The "strategic defense" program is a monstrous prospect for the future of the planet because it signifies the dramatic augmentation of the danger of nuclear cataclysm.

The book under review analyzes the implications of this program. It is based on transcripts of discussions organized by the well-known Heritage Foundation. We must frankly admit that the competence of the scientists and experts who took part in the discussions is unquestionable. The authors of the book include L. Wood, physicist and head of the x-ray laser research program in the Livermore Laboratory in California; C. Gray and K. Payne, renowned experts on military policy and the president and vice president of the National Institute of Government Policy; R. Pfaltzgraff, president and director of the Cambridge Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis and professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; and others.

First we should say a few words about the Heritage Foundation. This organization literally showers the administration and Congress with its reports. The Heritage Foundation has recently paid considerable attention to "Star Wars." It was under the auspices of this center that General D. Graham's group compiled the plan for the echeloned "High Frontiers" space defense system. The stamp "Published by the Heritage Foundation" attests to two indisputable facts--an extremely conservative, belligerent anti-Soviet approach to foreign and military policy issues and the definite influence of expressed opinions and recommendations on Washington policy. This book is no exception to the rule.

For example, participants in the roundtable discussions proposed that the concept of the "period of transition" lie at the basis of SDI preparations and publicity. It presupposes a combination of intense R & D in this sphere with the modernization of the U.S. strategic triad. As we know, this is precisely the policy official Washington chose when it was seeking new allocations for the SDI from Congress and simultaneously calming the American and West European public worries about the "Star Wars" plans. Some other ideas and recommendations of the Heritage Foundation roundtable participants have also already been implemented in administration policy. This applies, for example, to the "justification" for the projected U.S. violation of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems. This "justification" is the far-fetched allegation that President Reagan's initiative in the sphere of strategic defense was "a response to what the Russians have been doing for the last 10 or 15 years" (p 60).

Without any arguments or facts to corroborate these accusations, the authors put the question of Soviet "violations" on the level of theoretical hypotheses. For example, they suggest that the Soviet Union did not violate the ABM treaty but "bypassed" it, violating the spirit of the treaty but not the letter (pp 57, 70-71). In this same section, the authors contradict their own allegations about previous violations by writing that the Soviet Union will certainly violate the ABM treaty in the future. Here is an indicative statement by the authors: "Within the not so distant future, the Soviets could decide that the ABM treaty no longer serves their national interests and violate it by secretly deploying elements of an ABM system, or simply renounce it after giving the 6 months' notice stipulated in the treaty" (p 69).

In fact, the SDI was not at all a response to the notorious Soviet "violations" of the ABM treaty, but merely an attempt to achieve military superiority, a goal gleaming in the distance, by means of a technical breakthrough.

According to L. Wood, the revival of the very idea of creating antimissile defense, which was discussed in the United States at the end of the 1960's, is the result of technological achievements in four fields in the 1970's--in directed energy weapons, securing the destructive capabilities of strategic defense systems; computers; communications; semiconductor gauges. "It is precisely in these four technological fields that colossal progress was made, and they...will allow for the creation of the technology for various strategic defense systems," L. Wood states (pp 12-13).

It must be said, however, that the experts lavish praise on various technologies and say nothing about their shortcomings, both those connected with insufficient development (which does not signify the certainty that their "perfection" is possible) and with inherent features. For example, zealous SDI apologist A. Codevilla, Senator M. Wallop's aide, discusses the technology of the chemical laser in detail. Describing three programs for the development of separate laser components (the laser device itself, the telescope and the reflecting mirrors)--"Alpha," "Talon Gold" and "Load"--in which such corporations as Rocketdyne, TRW and Eastman Kodak are involved, the author asserts that strategic defense based on chemical lasers can be established within the near future. It must be said that Senator Wallop once proposed an

amendment on the establishment of an Air Force chemical laser program and pushed it through the Congress. It was precisely on the basis of the "feasibility" of this technology that Wallop strongly advised President Reagan to adopt the "strategic defense" program. In his discussion, however, Codevilla does not say a word about the problems of putting the huge mirrors, a major component of the chemical laser, in orbit and securing their "invulnerability,"¹ but more objective experts believe that these problems are not likely to be solved in the foreseeable future.

Wood makes every effort to advertise the x-ray laser, which has, in his words, an extremely long range and which allegedly promises to be effective from the economic standpoint in the future. While he is advertising the "merits" of space defense based on x-ray lasers, however, Wood forgets that it presupposes the emplacement of nuclear weapons in space because the x-ray laser operates on the energy of a nuclear explosion. And is the declared main goal of the SDI not a "transition to a non-nuclear world," a world "without nuclear weapons"? Is it not this "humane" consideration the apologists of "Star Wars" are employing as the basis for their appeals to the world public, the American people and the Congress?

The absent-mindedness of the participants in the Heritage Foundation round-table discussions is certainly quite understandable. The reason is the colossal stake the U.S. military-industrial and scientific-industrial complex has in the SDI.²

One of the central topics of discussion was the effect of the development and subsequent implementation of the "Star Wars" plans on strategic stability. This matter was discussed by C. Gray and R. Pfaltzgraff, who believe that stability will be strengthened because "limited strategic defense" will raise the level of uncertainty in the adversary's strategic planning to the point at which a first strike will be virtually impracticable (p 101). Here the two cabinet strategists deliberately misrepresent the essence of Soviet military doctrine, which excludes the possibility of delivering a first strike, and "forget" about the Soviet Union's unilateral pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. They also ignore the fact that the ability of the "space shield" to repulse a deliberate first strike is extremely indefinite. On the contrary, according to many experts, it could be more effective for defense against a diluted or weakened retaliatory strike. This means that the country which first creates (or believes that it has created) this kind of shield--and this is precisely what the United States is trying to do--will have a greater temptation to deliver a first strike in the expectation of impunity. This can only undermine strategic stability.

As participants in the discussions asserted, "strategic defense" will also have a positive effect on stability in times of crisis. Even "limited strategic defense," in their opinion, will considerably diminish the incentive to use nuclear weapons and increase the possibility of limiting the escalation of a conflict. "If stability in times of crisis and the survivability of arsenals are closely interrelated, this means that strategic defense can play an important role in crisis management, including the deterrence and limitation of escalation. In international crises growing to nuclear proportions, strategic defense could serve to limit losses from the limited use of nuclear weapons" (p 103).

In this interpretation, the SDI program is most compatible with the fallacious doctrine of "limited" nuclear war and the possibility of winning such a war--that is, a concept which C. Gray and K. Payne have actively popularized in recent years and which has definitely influenced official U.S. military doctrine. Ignoring the objections of sensible experts inside and outside the United States who feel that it would be impossible to control a nuclear conflict, the authors of the book project the theory of escalation to a new set of circumstances, distinguished by different quantitative and qualitative armament levels. The appearance of the space strike weapon, in their opinion, will make these theories even more valid.

Although C. Gray and R. Pfaltzgraff agree that the SDI will certainly stimulate the arms race under the conditions of partial or complete development, they view this as a normal development, calling nuclear freeze proposals unrealistic and ineffective. They also reject the idea of total nuclear disarmament.

Assessing the SDI program from the standpoint of the possibility of concluding new strategic nuclear arms limitation and reduction agreements, the participants in the roundtable discussions view "strategic defense" as another "incentive" for the Soviet Union, which, in their opinion, will be motivated by its "fear" of falling behind to conclude an agreement on terms satisfactory to the United States.

What are these terms and what does Washington want from the talks with the Soviet Union? The question is answered quite precisely in the book: Since the "space shield" will protect American ICBM's and other fortified point targets, "the further buildup of Soviet heavy ICBM's will be pointless.... In this case, the United States can attain a goal of long standing: It can force the Soviet Union to reduce the number of its ICBM's" (p 87). This actually refers to the repeatedly rejected groundless demand for the unilateral disarmament of the USSR, as this, according to the participants in these discussions, will not be accompanied by any kind of equivalent concessions on the part of the United States.

The authors are obviously disturbed by the attitude of the United States' allies, especially in Western Europe, toward the SDI. In their opinion, it is of cardinal importance to the Europeans that the SDI program will sabotage the arms control process, and this worries the United States' allies. Besides this, there is a strong tendency in Western Europe to regard "strategic defense" as a program designed to put the United States in a more secure position in comparison to Western Europe. This only compounds the Western Europeans' long-standing suspicions about the so-called "nuclear guarantees" of the United States--suspicions aroused by the adoption of the "Rogers Plan," limiting the theater of military operations to Europe alone. Up to the present time, speakers noted in these discussions, the SDI has been regarded in Europe as a unilateral escalation of the arms race by the United States, as a program destabilizing and preventing arms control. For the Western Europeans, the only argument in support of the SDI program, at least during its preliminary research stage, is, according to the authors, the explanation that "effective strategic defense" will ultimately "depend on the limitation,

by the terms of a treaty or without one, of offensive weapons.... In other words, that arms control is an essential condition for strategic defense, although it cannot replace it." It is precisely this argument, in the authors' opinion, that should be addressed to Western Europe (p 149).

Of course, all of the participants in these discussions, representing the most militarist segments of the U.S. academic, political and military communities, support the SDI program. They disagree only on minor points and details. In this context, the book under review provides a clear idea of the way in which the doctrinal and propaganda foundations were laid for the Reagan Administration's "new initiative." In addition, the book reveals with maximum clarity the real purpose of the SDI program--military superiority to the Soviet Union. This means that the "Strategic Defense Initiative" pursues far from "peaceful" goals, as official American propaganda maintains; on the contrary, it is pushing the world into a new round of the arms race.

FOOTNOTES

1. As P. Nitze, President Reagan's adviser on arms control, has stated repeatedly, the criterion of guaranteed "invulnerability" is an essential condition of the SDI program.
2. Research consortia are now being created in the United States for the SDI program. One includes the State University of New York, the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory and the General Electric Corporation. According to Pentagon spokesmen, this consortium will develop semiconductor materials, laser and beam weapon components, etc. Four such consortia have already been created in the United States.

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CHRONICLE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1985

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 86 (signed to press 20 Dec 85) pp 123-127

[Text] September

2-3 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium M. S. Gorbachev received U.S. Senate Democratic Minority Leader R. Byrd, Senate President Pro Tempore S. Thurmond and senators C. Pell, S. Nunn, D. DeConcini, P. Sarbanes, J. Warner and G. Mitchell in the Kremlin when they were in the Soviet Union as the guests of the USSR Parliamentary Group. The attention of the American senators was directed to the important peace initiatives the Soviet Union had recently put forth, including the moratorium declared by the Soviet side on nuclear explosions, with an appeal to the United States to follow this example, and the Soviet proposal in the United Nations on international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of space under the conditions of its non-militarization.

The American senators were received by USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade N. D. Komarov and spoke with the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

5 -- A TASS statement was published in connection with Washington's officially announced intention to test the American ASAT antisatellite system against a real target in space in the near future. The statement stressed: "TASS has been authorized to inform the United States that if it should test an anti-satellite weapon on a target in space, the Soviet Union will be released from its unilateral pledge not to emplace antisatellite weapons in space."

4-9 -- The fourth Soviet-American meeting of public spokesmen from the two countries was held in the United States. The final document says that any steps to strengthen the peace are of special importance at a time of international tension.

11-13 -- A delegation representing the USSR Parliamentary Group and headed by Chairman L. N. Tolkunov of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of the Union visited the United States as the guests of Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives T. O'Neill. The delegation met and spoke with members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and of the U.S. Senate.

13 -- The United States tested the ASAT antisatellite system.

President of the United States R. Reagan met with the heads of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva.

A U.S. law was amended to restrict the movements of UN Secretariat staffers from six countries, including the USSR. Now they can travel freely only 25 miles (around 40 kilometers) from the center of New York.

16 -- M. S. Gorbachev held a conference to discuss questions connected with the latest round of Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons. The conference was attended by A. A. Gromyko, V. M. Chebrikov, E. A. Shevardnadze and S. L. Sokolov and by the heads of the USSR delegation at the talks, V. P. Karpov, Yu. A. Kvitsinskiy and A. A. Obukhov. The Soviet delegation received the necessary instructions.

16-17 -- The fourth session of the joint Soviet-American commission on cooperation in housing and other construction was held in Moscow.

19-30 -- The following meetings were held in Geneva as part of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons:

19, 30 -- plenary;

24, 30 -- the group on space weapons;

25 -- the group on strategic weapons;

26 -- the group on intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

19 -- The mother of Samantha Smith, J. Smith, wrote to M. S. Gorbachev to thank him for the sympathy expressed in connection with the loss of her daughter and husband.

23, 24 -- American congressmen E. Markey and R. Mrazek, who were in the USSR as guests of the USSR Supreme Soviet, spoke with Chairman L. N. Tolkunov of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of the Union and Chairman B. N. Ponomarev of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities.

26, 28 -- E. A. Shevardnadze spoke with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz in New York and Washington.

27 -- E. A. Shevardnadze met with U.S. President R. Reagan and delivered a message to him from General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev, stating his ideas and suggestions in connection with the Soviet-American summit meeting planned for November in Geneva.

The United States conducted its 11th underground nuclear test of the year. The force of the blast on a testing ground in Nevada was around 20 kilotons.

October

1 -- A plenary meeting of the USSR and U.S. delegations at the talks on nuclear and space weapons was held in Geneva. The Soviet side's new proposals were the focus of attention.

The following meetings were held as part of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons:

2, 9, 15, 23, 30 -- the group on strategic weapons;

4, 10, 17, 24 -- the group on intermediate-range nuclear weapons;

8, 15, 22, 30 -- the group on space weapons.

3 -- Addressing French parliamentarians, M. S. Gorbachev informed them of the Soviet Union's new peace initiatives. In particular, the USSR requested the U.S. Government to negotiate a complete ban for both sides on offensive space weapons and a 50-percent reduction of nuclear weapons capable of reaching one another's territories. To facilitate the negotiation of intermediate-range nuclear arms reduction in Europe, the Soviet Union also proposed that this kind of agreement be concluded separately, with no direct relationship to the issue of space and strategic weapons.

8 -- Appearing on the NBC TV program "Meet the Press," National Security Adviser R. McFarlane flagrantly misrepresented the substance of the Soviet-American ABM treaty of 1972. In particular, he alleged that the provisions of this treaty permit the testing and development of new weapons in space.

10 -- American Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger announced that the United States "should consider the possibility of breaking the ABM treaty."

11 -- The United States conducted underground tests of two nuclear devices in Nevada. The force of the blasts was close to 20 kilotons.

The Nobel Peace Prize for 1985 was awarded to Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War, an international movement co-chaired by Academician Ye. I. Chazov of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and American Professor B. Lawn.

16 -- The United States conducted a new underground nuclear explosion with a force of 20-150 kilotons.

17 -- Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology G. I. Marchuk received Litton Industries Chairman of the Board F. O'Green (United States). They discussed prospects for scientific and technical cooperation in various fields.

The Pentagon conducted another test of a land laser device intended to destroy targets in space.

18-23 -- The latest round of Soviet-American consultations on nuclear non-proliferation took place.

18 -- Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze received U.S. Ambassador A. Hartman at his request.

23 -- The statement adopted by the Warsaw Pact states at a conference of the Political Consultative Committee in Sofia contains a proposal that the Soviet Union and United States assume a mutual commitment to refrain from the deployment of any kind of nuclear weapons on the territory of states having no such weapons, to stop stockpiling nuclear weapons and to stop replacing older weapons with new ones in countries where they have already been deployed; to not develop or produce new types of conventional weapons comparable to weapons of mass destruction in terms of destructive capabilities. They also proposed a freeze on the number of USSR and U.S. armed forces personnel as of 1 January 1986, including personnel outside their national territories. The mutual non-augmentation of USSR and U.S. military budgets starting with the latest fiscal year was also proposed.

There was a meeting of the heads of the USSR and U.S. delegations at the talks on nuclear and space weapons. Questions connected with the final stage of the current round of negotiations were discussed.

24 -- Addressing the anniversary meeting of the 40th Session of the UN General Assembly, E. A. Shevardnadze stated: "The Soviet Union proposes a world in which the USSR and United States will set an example for other nuclear powers and stop all nuclear tests. The Soviet Union proposes a world in which the USSR and United States stop developing new nuclear weapons, put a freeze on their arsenals and prohibit and destroy antisatellite systems."

25 -- In his speech at the anniversary meeting of the 40th Session of the UN General Assembly, U.S. President R. Reagan dealt mainly with "regional problems," suggesting that this issue be one of the central items on the Geneva summit meeting agenda.

25 -- E. A. Shevardnadze had a meeting with U.S. President R. Reagan in New York. They discussed the state of Soviet-American relations and the state of affairs in the world.

26 -- In response to the Club of Rome's appeal to the USSR and United States to set an example in the cessation of the international arms trade, especially in developing countries, M. S. Gorbachev stressed: "The Soviet Union favors the limitation of international sales and deliveries of conventional weapons, the resumption of the corresponding Soviet-American talks and progress in these talks."

E. A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz met in New York and discussed current international issues, including the situation in a number of regions, and some aspects of Soviet-American bilateral relations. The two sides described the conversation as a useful discussion and arranged to continue the preparations for the meeting of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S.

Gorbachev and U.S. President R. Reagan. In connection with this, the secretary of state accepted an invitation to visit Moscow in early November 1985.

29 -- A delegation from the Committee of Soviet Women visiting the United States as the guests of Peace Links, an American public organization, left the United States.

30 -- A joint message from the heads of state and government of Argentina, India, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden and Greece to General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. President R. Reagan was published. The message appeals to the USSR and United States to stop all nuclear tests for a year.

31 -- A Soviet-American exchange of opinions by experts on the situation in Central America was held in Washington.

November

1 -- E. A. Shevardnadze received U.S. Ambassador A. Hartman in Moscow at his request. The ambassador delivered a letter to M. S. Gorbachev from President R. Reagan. Preparations for the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva were discussed during the conversation.

At a plenary session of the USSR and U.S. delegations at the talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva, the American delegation put forth its counter-proposals, capable, according to the White House, of representing a response to the Soviet proposals made in early October. In the opinion of the Soviet side, these proposals are halfhearted and largely unfair.

4 -- The text of an interview U.S. President R. Reagan granted to four Soviet journalists in the White House was printed in IZVESTIYA.

The Soviet Embassy in the United States issued a resolute protest to the State Department in connection with the American authorities' treatment of Soviet citizen V. S. Yurchenko, who was kidnapped in Rome at the beginning of August 1985 and was then transported to the United States while he was unconscious. The Soviet note called this behavior unlawful.

4-5 -- American Secretary of State G. Shultz was in Moscow on an official visit as the guest of the Soviet Government. E. A. Shevardnadze spoke with G. Shultz that same day. On 5 November M. S. Gorbachev received G. Shultz in the Kremlin.

4-6 -- Meetings of the group on space weapons, the group on intermediate-range nuclear weapons and the group on strategic weapons were held in Geneva as part of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons.

5 -- The latest session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission, created to aid in the implementation of the goals and provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and the Provisional Agreement on Some Measures To Limit Strategic Offensive Arms, concluded on 26 May 1972, and the 30 September 1971 Agreement on Measures To Reduce the Danger of Nuclear War, came to an end.

7 -- A plenary session of the delegations ended the latest, third round of Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva. The continuation of the talks was tentatively scheduled for 16 January 1986.

13 -- M. S. Gorbachev received a delegation representing the Congress of Nobel Peace Prize Winners in the Kremlin, at which time the delegation delivered the congress' appeal to General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. President R. Reagan. In his response, M. S. Gorbachev stressed that the Soviet Union wants the meeting in Geneva "to aid effectively in the resolution of the central problems of our day--to consolidate international peace and security, to establish healthier relations between the USSR and United States, to curb the arms race and to prevent its transfer to outer space."

14 -- E. A. Shevardnadze received U.S. Ambassador A. Hartman at his request.

15 -- Richardson and Stairman, an American publishing firm, published General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev's book "Mir--veleniye vremeni" [Peace Is the Dictate of the Times]. The book contains M. S. Gorbachev's speeches since March 1985.

Administrator Lee Thomas of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency was received in Moscow by Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology G. I. Marchuk. They discussed broader cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection.

16 -- A group of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies appealed to members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives to use all of their authority to give effective assistance to the native population of the United States in the exercise of its civil and political rights and liberties.

17 -- In the international press center in Geneva, a group of prominent Soviet scientists and experts met with representatives of the mass media from many countries who had arrived in Geneva to cover the Soviet-American summit meeting.

The ceremonial delivery of letters from more than 5,000 children in 37 countries to M. S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan was organized in the permanent mission of the USSR to the United Nations and other international organizations in Geneva.

19 -- M. S. Gorbachev, who had arrived in Geneva for the Soviet-American summit meeting, received a delegation of the heads of the largest U.S. peace movements and organizations at their request. The delegation was headed by J. Jackson. The prominent American public spokesmen expressed their wishes for the success of the meeting and delivered a peace petition. It had been signed by 1.5 million Americans supporting a nuclear freeze and wanting the United States to follow the USSR's example in stopping all nuclear tests. In the conversation with this delegation, M. S. Gorbachev remarked that the wishes of the American supporters of peace coincide with the thoughts and desires of Soviet people.

19-21 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. President R. Reagan met in Geneva for a thorough discussion of the main issues in Soviet-American relations and the current international situation.

The results of the Geneva meeting were reflected in a joint Soviet-American statement agreed upon by the two sides. Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz signed a general agreement on exchanges and contacts between the USSR and the United States in science, education and culture.

21 -- M. S. Gorbachev held a press conference in the Soviet press center in Geneva for journalists covering the Soviet-American summit meeting. In his statement, M. S. Gorbachev specifically said: "We would like to regard the meeting as the beginning of a dialogue for the purpose of making changes for the better in Soviet-American relations and in the world in general."

22 -- American President R. Reagan addressed a joint session of both houses of Congress on the results of the summit meeting. Reagan announced that, although he could not say that there had been agreement on such fundamental matters as the ideology or national objectives of the two countries, he felt that mutual understanding had been improved.

24 -- The Soviet-American talks on the resumption of regular air traffic between the USSR and United States came to an end in Moscow. An agreement was reached on the resumption of regular flights by Aeroflot and Pan American planes up to four times a week in April 1986.

25 -- After discussing the results of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev's meeting with U.S. President R. Reagan in Geneva, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo gave its complete approval to the work M. S. Gorbachev had performed and the negotiated agreements and joint statement. The meeting in Geneva was called a major political event in international affairs.

The Politburo resolved that the decisive factor in Soviet-American relations would continue to be the sphere of security, with its nucleus consisting of the prevention of the militarization of space and the reduction of nuclear weapons in an organic combination. The results of the meeting should be used to step up the talks on nuclear and space weapons on the basis of the joint Soviet-American statement of 8 January 1985, now reaffirmed on the summit level.

27 -- M. S. Gorbachev presented a report on the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva and the international situation at the Fourth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation.

The decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On the Results of the Soviet-American Summit Meeting in Geneva and the International Situation," expressing complete approval of "the activities of Comrade Gorbachev, M. S., general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, to implement the Soviet Union's Leninist peaceful foreign policy at the meeting with U.S. President R. Reagan," was unanimously adopted.

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