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'KYODO' INTERVIEWS PLO'S TOKYO REPRESENTATIVE

OW091257 Tokyo KYODO in English 1244 GMT 9 Sep 82

[Text] Tokyo, 9 Sep (KYODO)--PLO representative in Tokyo Fathi Abdul Hamid Thursday called U.S. President Ronald Reagan's proposal for self-government of Palestinians a "basic change" in U.S. policy toward the Middle East.

"For a long time America considered the security of Israel is the main question (in the region)," Hamid said in an interview with KYODO News Service. "But, now it is not."

"In the past, the Palestinian question was considered a refugee question," Hamid said.

Reagan's peace initiative taken last week was the first U.S. recognition of the Palestinian question, the chief PLO spokesman in Tokyo said.

The Palestine Liberation Organization has a representative office in Tokyo but is denied diplomatic status by the Japanese Government.

Hamid said the Mideast peace proposal, immediately rejected by Israel, signaled a change in U.S. policy toward the troubled spot.

"Now America has changed," Hamid said. "America is dealing with the Middle East question on the basis that the right of the Palestinians is its root, and not the security of Israel."

"It (the Reagan proposal) is different from all previous U.S. (Middle East) policies," Hamid added.

It is also a departure from the 1979 Camp David accord which, he said, treated the Palestinian question as a refugee question.

"The root of the Middle East question," he went on, "is the Palestinian national rights whether America interprets this way or not.

"This is the basic change. America came to see this fact after Israel's invasion of Lebanon," Hamid said.

"If the Palestinians had been killed and eliminated (during the Lebanon war), do you think America would have changed (its Middle East policy)?" he asked and answered himself: "No."

CSO: 4400/485

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PALESTINIANS NEED TIME TO DECIDE

JN151744 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 7 Sep 82

[Palestine broadcast: "Talk of the Return"]

[Text] This week's edition of AL-TALA'I' magazine, the Al-Sa'iqah and PLO magazine, was published in Damascus today. The magazine's editorial was entitled "Let Us Not Hurry, the Question Is Premature."

In its editorial, AL-TALA'I' says: Before the departure of the first Palestinian revolutionary from Beirut, a question exploded like a cluster bomb: What are you doing? What will you do to Palestinian revolutionaries? Using the phrase exploding cluster bombs to describe these questions is not in vain; it is a fact. At this stage this question is more painful to the Palestinian revolution, its revolutionaries and people than 200 air raids a day against Beirut.

The question is reasonable and relevant and has to be asked. We do not deny that, but it is a premature question. The revolution and revolutionaries need a rest. We mean rest, not slackness, and we realize what we are saying. The revolution needs physical and psychological rest. It is not secret that some of the revolution's leaders need rest and recuperation and some even need treatment. They lived during days no one else has ever experienced. It could be said that they were martyred a thousand times, even though they are still alive and carrying out their tasks. The revolution and revolutionaries are still breathless, they have not yet buried some of their martyrs, they have not yet gathered their homeless women and children, they have not yet patched up their wounds and they do not yet know who is missing and who is not. Despite all that, people come forward and ask them the impudent question: What are you doing?

There are two categories of people who ask that question. The first is a rancorous one that includes Arabs and non-Arabs, non-Arabs such as the Americans and others who say they spent 3 months trying to convince Israel to stop its air raids against Beirut and yet they want the Palestinian revolution to decide on the destiny of the homeland, the people and the revolution itself in a single minute. Those people are excused because they ask the question believing mistakenly that the revolution is dead and will accept anything. The Arabs from the first category ask the question and want an immediate answer.

Until 2 weeks ago, those Arabs could not even meet in any conference, at any level and yet they want the Palestinian revolution to decide on everything even while on board ships in the middle of the sea. Unfortunately, their question stems from liquidation schemes and that explains their urgency for an answer.

There is another category, the good category which includes all the brave Arab masses, their leaders and their national and pan-Arab and alert institutions. To all those we say: You have the right to ask the question, but rest assured, the revolutionaries are not despondent and they are not endangered. We base that on the following: First, the Palestinian Arab homeland will stay where it is on this globe. Second, the Palestinian Arab people will remain on their national Palestinian soil. Third, the national Palestinian charter and the resolutions of consecutive municipal councils flow through the veins of the Palestinian people. Fourth, the immortal victory of Beirut is not a mere moral achievement. The military and political experience which procured this victory will give birth to the Palestinian fighting rifles. These prerequisites are more realistic than even the existence of Israel itself and they are the answer to the question. These prerequisites will enable the Palestinian revolution to answer this question in a way that satisfies every Arab citizen and assures him of the Palestinian and Arab future.

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ISLAMIC BANKING MEETING IN DUBAI

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 3 Aug 82 p 2

[Article by 'Ali Lashin: "The Resolutions Made by the Islamic Banks' Meeting in Dubai Include Coordination of Investments, Exchange of Liquid Capital Surpluses, and the Holding of an Emergency Session by the Federation in Dubai in November"]

[Text] Yesterday in Dubai the International Federation of Islamic Banks concluded the 2 days of meetings which it had been holding at the Dubai Islamic Bank. A number of decisions were made at the meetings, and they included the following:

1. To strive to encourage cooperation, transfer of surplus liquidity, exchange of information and expertise, and coordination of banks' investment operations and business activities among the Islamic banks which are members of the federation.
2. To work toward standardization of bodies involved in making religious-legal rulings [fatwas], bodies responsible for assuring compliance with Islamic law, informational organizations, bodies responsible for developing scientific research, and training organizations in order to increase the efficiency of Islamic business establishments and banks.
3. To endeavor to urge governments and business leaders in Muslim nations to establish more banks and financial establishments which conduct their business according to Islamic law.
4. To speedily implement the financial, administrative, and organizational decisions reached at the previous nine meetings of the federation's administrative board. The aim of these decisions has been to strengthen relations between Islamic banks and financial establishments in all parts of the world, to bring about coordination between them, and to have them take a united position vis-a-vis banks of the regular type.
5. To adopt the working paper submitted by Sa'id Lutih, the head of the Dubai Islamic Bank--the pioneer of Islamic banks. This working paper includes a framework for cooperation and integration among these banks as well as a plan for giving support to the apparatus of the federation's secretariat general in Cairo.

The meetings were chaired by Mu'azzam 'Ali, vice-president of the federation and economic adviser to the president of Pakistan.

The meetings were attended by the following persons: Sa'id Ahmad Lutah, chairman of the board of the Dubai Islamic Bank; Dr Muhammad Fu'ad al-Sarraf, governor of the Faysal Islamic Egyptian Bank; Dr al-Baqir Yusuf Mu'dawi, director general of the Faysal Islamic Bank in Sudan; Muhammad Faruqi, director general of the Pakistani Islamic Real Estate Finance Bank; Mr al-Sayyid Ja'fari, director general of the National Islamic Investment Corporation in Pakistan; Dr Ahmad al-Najjar, the secretary general of the International Federation of Islamic Banks; Yusuf al-Hajji, former minister of awqaf and Islamic affairs in Kuwait and member of the board of the Dubai Islamic Bank; Mr H. A. Shaykh, director general of the Pakistani Islamic Financial Corporation; and Musa Ya'qub Musa, the federation's informational and media adviser.

Those attending the meetings as observers were the following: 'Abd al-Rahman Manna'i, delegated member of the board of the Islamic Bank in Qatar; Musa Shahadah, of the Jordan Islamic Bank; Khalaf Sa'id al-Ghayth, director general in the Ministry of Finance and Industry in the UAE; and Dr Husayn Shahatah, professor at the UAE University. The next meeting of the federation's board will also be held in Dubai, next 14 November, and it will be an emergency meeting. The purpose of the meeting will be to discuss the results of the work done by the subcommittees which the federation has entrusted with the job of setting up executive work plans for achieving the federation's objectives.

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GCC INFORMATION UNDER SECRETARIES' PROPOSALS

GF151247 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 15 Sep 82 pp 1, 20

[Article by Dara Kadva]

[Excerpt] The member states of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council have called for the establishment of a joint Gulf TV channel, radio station and a news agency to cover the audio-visual programmes of all the Gulf states.

Mr 'Abdallah al-Nuways, under-secretary of the UAE Ministry of Information and the host of the conference of the AGCC information under-secretaries, announced this while briefing newsmen on the proceedings of the first day's conference in Abu Dhabi yesterday.

He said "Some delegations also called for the formation of a joint programme for the promotion of Gulf artists and their human, social and financial welfare" and greater coordination and cooperation between the Ministries of Information and Foreign Affairs in the AGCC countries for "countering all types of adverse propaganda and campaigns abroad against the Arab and the Gulf states."

"There was also stress on the unification of information policy and complete coordination and consultation to ensure or divergencies among the AGCC countries in their information campaigns abroad," he told newsmen outside the conference hall at the Abu Dhabi Inter-Continental Hotel.

"All these proposals have been referred for further study and ascertaining their feasibility," Mr al-Nuways said. "These studies will involve consideration of these proposals from the practical, operational, policy-wise, and financial and human angles," he added.

"These proposals stemmed from the desire of the delegations to encourage national media and also offer prizes, incentives and inducements for the growth of talent in a competitive way," the under-secretary added.

The committee of information experts of the AGCC countries will meet in Abu Dhabi next February to consider these and various other issues connected with them, he added.

A meeting of responsible officials of the censorship departments in the AGCC countries will also meet in Abu Dhabi within one month, he said.

Mr al-Nuways said another proposal called for the convening of a special meeting to consider security of information in the Gulf region.

Yesterday's proceedings ended with a demand by a delegation calling on the concerned government ministries and public establishments in the AGCC countries to support these moves and also fully participate in their deliberations during the study, Mr al-Nuways said.

Speaking to reporters at the end of the morning session, Mr Abdallah Ya'oub Bisharah, secretary-general of the AGCC, said the 2-day conference "represents a new role for the organisation in the field of information in presenting our point of view in the different direction which has acquired a new responsibility after the success of the Arab summit at Fes."

Mr Bisharah said the information field had so far not received the needed attention from the AGCC Secretariat-General because the organisation had given priority to the economic issues in the 1 year since its existence.

Mr Bisharah added that the delegations attending the conference "are agreed that the presentation of this new Arab point of view in different world directions now requires joint cooperation in the information field by all the AGCC member countries."

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HISTORY, ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL CULTURE REVIEWED

Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French 29 Jul-4 Aug 82 pp 20-21

[Article by Liess Boukra, assistant professor in the Institute of Social Sciences, Algiers: "On National Culture (Critique of Certain Theses)--For a Nurturing and Combative Culture"]

[Text] By national culture we mean a general system of assimilation and transmission of material and spiritual acquirements, characterized by a specific sum of common and stable traits on the material, intellectual, linguistic and socio-psychological levels (covering both the rational and the emotional), as well as by self-awareness (that is, awareness of being distinct from other similar national formations). Every national culture is therefore made up of a combination of many elements, these elements being characterized by a certain variability from era to era as well as within an era, from one region to another and as between the different social groups. Study of a national culture is confronted at the outset by the formidable question of its constituent historical sources. The task is to examine the historical circumstances in which and by which this particular combination, this necessarily diversified unit, was formed.

However, while there are no doubts about the existence of certain national cultures belonging to certain nations of recent formation, matters are quite different for the Algerian national culture, for the following reasons:

- 1) As from the 14th and 15th centuries, a set of historical factors retarded the process of centralization and national formation;
- 2) The particular characteristics of the colonization of Algeria (the colonizing country populated the country, there was an intense assimilation policy, and the colonizing country was nearby) conditioned a set of emotive attitudes within the national movement. In other terms, the priority of the struggle for national independence relegated to a lower level a set of cultural facts whose true dimension was necessarily restored with independence, but without their being taken as such; and these cultural facts underlie contradictions which were not long in coming to maturity;
- 3) Likewise because of the fact of the particularities of colonization in Algeria, the national process of cultural integration continued to a great extent

during and after the appearance of a national state. It developed, so to speak, under its direction and in a context objectively marked by shifts, ruptures, conflicts and crises.

In this essay we shall analyze the different views on the content of the Algerian national culture so as to see that the basic differences on this question arise from the constantly renewed differences within the national movement and pit against one another different approaches to the national fact itself.

What are the constituent historical sources of our national culture? What is its content? The controversy starts with two contradictory answers to these two questions:

- 1) The Algerian national culture is an exclusively Arab-Muslim culture;
- 2) The Algerian national culture is an exclusively Berber culture.

Position 1: the Algerian National Culture Is an Exclusively Arab-Muslim Culture

This position proceeds from the very widespread idea that Algeria had no positive historical individuality before the 7th century. We find a condensation of this thesis in an article in EL MOUDJAHID of 3 March 1980 entitled "Arabization: an Historical Exigency." "The Algerian nation," the author writes, "does not date from 1962. Its birth is lost in the night of time, and it acquired its definitive visage only from the time that the Algerians adopted Islam with enthusiasm.... Other peoples, other civilizations, had spread over the Maghreb, though. What traces have they left in our country? Grand ruins, perhaps, but inert ones. Practically no trace in the country's language, in its beliefs, in its way of life, in its civilization."

This is the thesis that identifies the Algerian nation with a sacred, original, Arab-Muslim determination. Initially, this position was the expression of the doctrinal opposition of the different components of the national movement--more specifically, of the Association of Ulemas--to:

- 1) the assimilationist colonial policy:

The science of Maghrebian antiquity was the science of the colonial administration and the work of historians, officers and publicists in the service of the residents and governors general. The thesis most widespread at that time regarding the origin of the Berbers connected them with Europe. It was thought that if the Berbers had a common origin with the Europeans, assimilation, thereby becoming a veritable return to the sources, could not help but succeed. Here was the colonial purpose, expressed in the name of a certain historical legitimacy! The title of General E. Bremont's work--"Berberes et Arabes: La Berberie est un pays europeen" [Berbers and Arabs: North Africa Is a European Country] (1938)--is quite revealing.

- 2) to the movement of the Elect, led by F. Abbas:

This movement was basically antinationalist, and more particularly, against the ulemas, by virtue of its acculturated modernism, its laicism and its aversion

to Islamism (and not to Islam). "If I had discovered the Algerian nation," writes F. Abbas, "I would be a nationalist, and I would not blush for it as if I were guilty of a crime. But I would not die for the Algerian fatherland, because no such fatherland exists. I have asked questions of history, I have questioned the living and the dead, I have visited the cemeteries, and people have talked to me about this. I have found the Arab empire, to be sure, the Muslim empire, which honor Islam and our race, but the empires have disappeared.... One does not build empires on wind. We have therefore thrown out all the clouds and chimeras once and for all, to tie our future definitively to that of the French work in this country" (in L'ENTENTE of 23 February 1936).

In the context of national oppression, a form of self-awareness pierced the wall of ongoing resignation and crystallized under the inductive influence of national feeling and in the furrows of a dialogue imposed by the other side--an awareness that was to be added to the individuality of a "self" in relation to the other side (the colonizer), for it was the other side that harnessed to its cause our supposed negative historical personality accompanied by a congenital inaptitude for independence, the better to bolster the legitimacy of its colonial undertaking and the inanity of our fight for freedom.

"It would therefore be in the obscure millenia of prehistory," the colonial historian writes, "that the countries of the Maghreb, welded to Africa and the Orient but capable of opening to Europe, took on this character that has en-chained them during all this time that they have not been able to make for themselves a civilization of which they would have been the home" (L. Balout, "Some North African Problems of Prehistoric Chronology," LA REVUE AFRICAINE, Vol XIII, 1948, p 262).

Thenceforth, decimated, expropriated, denied, it was necessary to respond, and the responses were diverse and varied but connected with the extent of the manifold character of the national movement itself.

Among these multiple responses, the thesis of identification of the Algerian nation with an Arab-Muslim origin, that of the "clerk"--the expression of a traditional bourgeoisie based on landholding and established in the cities--that was to initiate a quest reducing everything to dogma and to Arab-Muslim origin [as published].

Under the conditions of national oppression, the oppressed peoples therefore took refuge in a cultural implantation while waiting to resume the fight one day on another battlefield. The national political awakening and the cultural awakening therefore consolidated one another.

Our task now is to see and examine the question of why, in Algeria, the national political awakening was accompanied by a cultural awakening of a particular character: Arab-Islamism, of which the Ulemas were the spokesmen.

The explanatory key to this phenomenon does not lie in people's awareness but in the objective needs of the historical process of national formation. There are certain differences between the economic and social situation and the superstructures.

At that time, the problem of taking on a national culture had not yet arisen, it was not felt as a need or an exigency. It was objectively a matter of taking on a culture of universalist or racial essence evoking a prestigious past, in the face of the overall condemnation made by the colonizer.

"In Africa, the approach of the man of culture is a Negro-African or Arab-Muslim approach. It is not specifically national. Culture is more and more cut off from immediate reality. It finds refuge in a passionately incandescent center of focus and has difficulty finding concrete pathways, though only such pathways could achieve for it the attributes of fecundity, homogeneity and density" (Fanon, "Les damnés de la terre" [The Damned of the Earth], Maspero, 1974, pp 149-150). While on the one hand it is necessary to stress the positive historical role that this thesis played during the colonial period as a factor of national unity from one end of the country to the other, it also has to be made clear that once independence was achieved, it became more necessary to take on a national culture. National culture requires a break with the tendency to define oneself and to grasp things through and in relation to the other, for culture is going to take its place more and more in current affairs and daily life.

And we are also going to become increasingly aware of the fact that this historic obligation--the necessity of responding to the occupier's lies--that our elders had of taking on a culture of universalist essence, sinking its roots into the past of the Arab-Muslim culture of which one can be legitimately proud, was to lead them into a blind alley. For this thesis-response falls within the framework of an emotive reaction grafted onto a cultural and idealistic conception of the nation and its history. (We find the same limitations in Al Afghani and Muhammad Abdou.)

This conception keeps up the colonizer-colonized opposition within the framework of the West-East, Christianity-Islam opposition. They keep current the age-old tradition of the visceral conflict between the Crescent and the Cross. Thus, the dimension of history is resolved into the relations of humankind with God. Colonialism is now only the instrument of the "k'dar," a punishment. A dichotomy is surreptitiously introduced between "revealed Islam" and "historical Islam." The former is beyond question, spotless and immaculate, while the real history of the Muslim peoples is now only the turmoil of the avatars of a betrayed revelation.

The resurrection of our lost greatness, power and glory is still possible if we agree to return to the pure sources of the faith, "to the wise Muslim tradition" (Sheikh Brahim; see C. Collot and J.R. Henry, "Le mouvement national algérien" [The Algerian National Movement], Texts 1912-1954, p 178).

While on the one hand this thesis rests on an unscientific and erroneous conception of the nation and of history as we have just viewed it, on the other hand, it also snubs the most salient obvious historical facts.

1) While the problem of the origins of the Berbers remains unsolved (despite the proliferation of more or less wildly imaginative theses), the idea that is tending to take hold is that the majority of the population is composed of a

mixture that stabilized in the Neolithic, and everything leads one to think that the populations that occupy the Maghreb today are--with certain cross-breeding taken into account--the same that have occupied it since that time. The Romans designated the non-Romanized indigenous populations as "Barbari." This term was conserved through the Arabic language; the Arab writers transformed the word into "barbari" (for the singular) and "barbar" (for the plural), from which the French word "Berbere" comes. The tendency that the Arab writers had to Arabize Berber names leads one to believe that tribes, dynasties and scholars having Arabic-sounding names are consequently Arab, whereas they are actually authentic Berbers. These confusions, sometimes kept up purposely, entirely falsify the view of the past.

2) We are not going to attempt to present here the history of our country before the 7th century in order to demonstrate that the Berbers had advanced political and social forms of organization and that the national territory began to take shape as of that period. Massinissa, Jugurtha, Tacfarinas, the Gircoucellions, Axido, Fasir, Gidon, Kahena, Ibn Rostem, Abdel-Moumin, Ibn Toumert, El Mokrani, Abdelkader, Larbi Ben M'hidi and Didouche Mourad, who rose out of our soil one after the other, are only the successive and uninterrupted incarnation of a single and unique reality: our national history.

To neglect this first part of our national history, extending from the Berber kingdoms of antiquity to the 7th century, is to cast a veil over a fundamental constant of our national culture: from the origins, the struggle for land and social justice has gone hand in hand with the struggle for liberty and national independence, in the same single battle. It is this permanent reality (the backbone of our national culture) that was to find a natural and logical prolongation in the choice of the socialist option.

3) It must also be emphasized that this thesis is often the expression of a certain inferiority complex vis-a-vis the Orientals. This feeling of inferiority is caused by the fact that a large number of writers of the Mashrek, imbued with their historical anteriority, harbor a profound scorn for the inhabitants and culture of the Maghreb.

This value judgment is explained by historical reasons that are actually class reasons: "Quite often, of course, refined Oriental persons, imbued with their historical anteriority in both the religious and intellectual domains, did not think to mask their condescension toward the culture of the 'distant Maghreb,' which they judged to be crude and quite barbaric. This value judgment is explained partly by the participation of all the elements of the North African population in the political life of the states and the activity of the cities, and in particular by the role of the still relatively un-Arabized Berber populations, who frequently furnished sovereigns and conquerors. In contrast, a large part of the countries of the Orient were characterized by the weakness of the rural populations' participation in political and city life, which was often dominated by foreign masters in the country." (Yves Lacoste, "The Sources of Algerian Culture," LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE, No 112, January 1960, p 9). Let us therefore be, without complexes, what we are: an Arab-Berber and Muslim people.

4) Another important historical fact that this thesis obscures: if our country does objectively belong to the Arab-Muslim world, it has proved capable, notably from the Middle Ages on, of developing an indisputable cultural originality. Very early, the Maghreb freed itself from the grip of the central power (Damascus and Baghdad), and Islamization and Arabization came about gradually within the framework of an independent society whose leaders and dominant social groups were indigenous. This cultural originality was to grow stronger over the centuries and reach its zenith in the 12th and 13th centuries. It was with the Almohade dynasty that the Maghreb's Arab-Berber cultural identity imposed itself, in a break with the dominant ideologies of the Mashrek.

"It was he (Ibn Toumert) who was the first Maghrebian and--let us say it--the first Berber, who, having done all the schools of the Arab Mashrek and possessing a profound knowledge of the problems of the peoples of the Maghreb, was capable of conceiving and practicing a synthesis between Arabism and Berberism" (A. Bouzida, "Ideologies and Knowledge," *ALGERIE-ACTUALITE*, No 784, 23-29 October 1980).

Position 2--The Algerian National Culture Is an Exclusively Berber Culture

This second position derives from the thesis of the supposed opposition between a race of Berbers and an Arab race, invaders commonly depicted with the traits of pillaging nomads who destroyed the social structures of the ancient Berber culture. This thesis rests on two erroneous postulates:

- 1) It considers the linguistic division between Arabic-speakers and Berber-speakers as the expression of an ethnic division (some go so far as to say a racial division) between Berbers (indigenous) and Arabs (invaders);
- 2) It corroborates the Berber-Arab distinction, taking into consideration only populations (still speaking of the Berber dialects) kept in a traditional economic and social state (agricultural economy), predominance of direct farming operations, social structures of community aspect, etc) [as published] by geographic isolation (mountainous zones away from the main roads) and other historical factors. Starting from this, they reduce the Berber fact to these surviving groups only (a few regions), so as to set it apart from the rest of the population.

It should be stressed that this thesis can be presented in different variants, ranging from the claim of a regional specificity elevated into an absolute (it is on that grounds that the claim becomes false) to the challenging of the idea of national unity. Between these two extreme positions is a group of intermediate positions. It is important to be attentive to these nuances, which make all the difference between the people of good faith who adopt certain positions out of misunderstanding and often subjectively (it has to be admitted that very little has been done by us Algerians to avoid these shiftings) and those whose conscious and organized purpose is to call national unity into question.

We find the traces of this thesis in colonial and neocolonial ideology and within the nationalist movement.

Colonial historiography was to impose the image of an ethnic dualism of Algerian society.

"France is reproached for its policy of peopling the country, and so be it; but what is one to say of the invasion, in the 11th century, by the Beni-Hillal and the Beni-Slaym...who broke the attempt at Maghreb unification that the Sanhadji Berbers were on the point of achieving and implanted more than a million foreign bedouins in the Maghreb? It was this frightful catastrophe that favored Arabization, then Islamization, but at the cost of ruin from which it did not recover" (C.A. Julien, "L'Afrique du Nord en marche" [North Africa on the March], 1953, p 291).

This is the most widespread image, the thesis of the "leap into the unknown." Arabization and Islamization are presented as an enormous and unequalled catastrophe for the Maghreb. Behind this thesis, it is always the same exclamation that sticks out: what a shame the Arabization and Islamization of North Africa was! The reaction of an occupier constrained by the force of things to bow powerless in the face of "a taut people, constantly rising up against the invader." This thesis was a response to a political concern. For the colonial administration, it was a matter of demonstrating the foreign character of what was the backbone (Islam and Arabism) of the popular resistance for more than a century.

Within the national movement, this thesis takes the form of a particular political tendency known by the name of the Berberist tendency. However, it should be stressed, so as to avoid confusion, that the Berberist is not one who demands that the Berber fact (past and present) be taken into account as a component of our national patrimony--which is a correct position--but one who puts this fact (which is a national one) into a regional and/or ethnic dimension in order to pit it against the national fact. This tendency was explicitly manifested for the first time within the national movement in 1948.

We now go on to criticism of the postulates on which this thesis rests:

I) the problem of linguistic division:

According to this thesis, the linguistic division between Arabic-speakers and Berber-speakers corresponds to an ethnic division (Arabs/Berbers). What is the truth about this?

Berber continues to be spoken in the Aures, in Kabylia, on the peaks of the Ouarsenis and of the Blida Atlas, the Chenoua mountains, the Hoggar and in the M'Zab. The different types of Arabic speech (sedentary Arabic speech, nomad speech, etc) cover the rest of the national territory.

The Arabic speech varieties occupy the big urban centers, the valleys, the plains, etc, while the varieties of Berber speech have essentially survived in the mountain massifs of very difficult access (Aures, Kabylia, etc), or in isolated, out-of-the-way regions (the M'Zab valley, etc).

There was originally a single language. North Africa constituted a uniform linguistic domain.

After the 7th century, with the exception of the mountainous zones of difficult access and the isolated regions distant from the main paths of communication, Arabic was to supplant Berber more and more. In order for a new language to impose itself, certain conditions (linguistic, ideological and material) are necessary. It is out of the question to do a complete analysis here; we shall be content with making certain points.

1) The linguistic reasons:

Arabic gradually imposed itself in the Islamized countries, essentially in the related linguistic domains. The relationship factor played its part and facilitated the assimilation and extension of a new language. Arabic (a Semitic language) was implanted both in the Semitic domain (southern Arabic, Aramaic) and in the domain of Hamitic-Semitic languages (Berber, Egypto-Coptic); while in the various linguistic domains, it neither supplanted nor eliminated the languages that it encountered (Persian, Turkish). This linguistic kinship between Arabic (a Semitic language) and Berber (a Hamitic-Semitic language) is one of the facts that explain the Arabization of the Maghreb.

2) the ideological reasons: Arabic is the language of the Koran and of the Hadith. The extension of Arabic occurred in parallel with Islamization. This factor has played a very great role in the extension of Arabic.

3) the material reasons: This is the decisive level. The relationship between signifier (the word) and signified (the object designated) is a means of evaluating the degree of evolution of a language. The correspondence between signifier and signified is all the closer as a language has evolved.

The transformations of the material base give rise to a set of new objects (and activity). This phenomenon necessarily entails modifications in the local language. Schematically, we can cite three types of modification (in the case of a language that has not evolved):

a) The local language will designate the new object by an old local term designating an object of similar usage but less evolved;

b) The language can also borrow. It will import the word (in order to designate the new object) from another, more highly evolved language (example of contemporary French in relation to English);

c) It can happen that because of the scope of the material transformations and the weakness of the language, it proves, on the one hand, incapable of falling back on its own lexical stock, and on the other hand, impermeable to the introduction of new terms. In such case, the language yields ground to a language that is more evolved and more adequate in relation to the new material, political and ideological context. (Consider the case of Latin from the 17th century on with the development of capitalism in Europe.)

The Arabic language was a more elaborated, more highly evolved language. It was the expression of a city-dwelling and mercantile civilization that was subsequently to spread from Spain to the borders of China.

The Arabs brought to the Maghreb not only a new faith but also a new political-administrative apparatus, a new organization of class relationships, and especially, a new economic order, thus making possible a new development of productive forces.

It is this development of productive forces and its consequences on the social, cultural levels, etc, that also explains the adoption of the Arabic language in the big urban centers, along the pathways of communication, etc; whereas in the mountainous zones that for geographic, historical and political reasons remained removed from this socioeconomic transformation, certain cultural traits, certain social structures, as well as the old speech (Berber), were to be preserved. Nevertheless, the situation changed, the historical milieu was transformed, the various mountain zones were to evolve in a manner separate and isolated from one another (the Kabylia mountains, the Aures, the Dahra, etc), separated by vast Arabized territories. The Berber language, a common language at the outset, was to break up into different regional dialects more or less different from one another. We see that this linguistic division does not at all correspond to an ethnic or racial division between Arabs and Berbers. These two segments of the national population, differentiated on the linguistic level, are the expression of one and the same historical reality.

2) [as published] the problem of Arabization and of Islamization:

We have seen why the Arabic-speaking/Berber-speaking linguistic division could not correspond to an Arab-Berber ethnic division. Nevertheless, the upholders of the Berberist thesis reduce the Berber fact to certain regions only, and put it in opposition to the rest of the national population.

For centuries, different populations have established themselves in the Maghreb (Phoenicians, Jews of Palestine, Romans, Vandals, Greeks, etc). According to this thesis, it is the Arab immigration that seems to have caused a considerable upheaval by affecting the ethnic composition of ancient North Africa.

The arrival of the Arabs in the Maghreb took place on different occasions and over the course of several centuries, but we can distinguish two important stages:

(1) during "El-Foutouhete" on the 7th and 8th centuries;

(2) in the middle of the 11th century, with the arrival in the central Maghreb of the Beni-Hillal, the Beni-Solaym and the Beni-Korra, designated by the generic term of the Hillalians). [as published]

With regard to the first wave of immigrants, the historians are unanimous, the population inflow was not very large at all, being spread over time and scattered in space, this inflow was hardly capable of causing ruptures or transformations in the ethnic composition of the country. [as published]

The second wave of new arrivals seems to have had a far deeper impact. Some speak of a million persons. The thesis of the distinction between a Berber race and an Arab race of invaders is based essentially on this mass of new ar-

rivals. The upholders of this thesis make reference both to the celebrated work of Ibn Khaldoun ("History of the Berbers") and to the work of the French historians, who in turn refer to Ibn Khaldoun.

Despite the authority of Ibn Khaldoun (who, for that matter, should be "desacralized," in the happy expression of an Algerian sociologist), his description of the arrival of the Hillalians in the Maghreb borders on the improbable and gets bogged down in hyperbolic style. We refer the reader to the excellent critique of him made by Muhammad C. Sahli in his book "Decolonizer l'histoire" [Decolonizing History] (Maspero, 1965; see Chapter 5, entitled "Sociological Determinism," pp 73-86).

For centuries, there was an intermixing of the new arrivals with the indigenous population; and while the number of the former cannot be evaluated, certain facts make it possible to conclude that the inflow was not so high as to cause ruptures in the ethnic composition of the country.

Therefore, nothing is more erroneous than to think that the linguistic division between Arabic-speakers and Berber-speakers corresponds to an ethnic division between Arabs and Berbers. This division signifies simply that the Berber dialects were maintained in the mountainous and isolated zones while in the regions integrated with urban life, in the political-administrative centers, in the main commercial and intellectual milieus, they yielded before the Arabic language, which was more highly evolved and better-adapted to the new social, economic and cultural necessities.

We can conclude from this set of observations that the Algerians, by their origin and by their common cultural base, are Arab-Berbers. Consequently, the Berber fact is not a regional and/or ethnic fact. It is a national fact, a component of our national patrimony, and it is up to the Algerian people as a whole (and not to one group) to take it into account. Identification of the Berber fact with a mere regional and/or ethnic dimension is a false and erroneous position from the scientific point of view and illegitimate from the historical point of view.

By its sources, the Algerian national culture is an Arab-Berber culture in its main part and Muslim in its essence. Nevertheless it should be made clear that two permanent basic facts have constantly our masses' efforts in quest of this nourishing culture:

- 1) a rooting, both generous and fierce, in the land, that of a community deeply implanted in the space of a certain soil, enduring against their will the vicissitudes of a hard existence subjected to the whims of a capricious nature;

- 2) an immeasurable devotion to liberty; independence was threatened for centuries, and once regained, it has constantly been challenged anew: the safeguarding of it has been a major and permanent preoccupation in the course of our history, enriching culture and taking nourishment from it in turn.

It is precisely because of the fact that our national culture is a culture of resistance and combat that it can blossom and be maintained only within the

framework of the socialist option, which is only the historical consecration of the age-old battle waged by our people against oppression and injustice. It is from this basis that the debate on the Algerian national culture should commence. This correct position is clearly expressed in the National Charter.

"Algeria is not a recent creation. As early as under Massinissa, founder of the first Numidian state, and Jugurtha, initiator of the resistance to Roman imperialism, the geographic map had been drawn and the national character began to be formed, both of which were to assert their permanence through the historical development of Algeria for more than two millenia. To these two principal characteristics were gradually added, from the 7th century on, the other constituent elements of the Algerian nation--that is, its cultural, linguistic and spiritual unity, and the centralization of its economy, subtended by an unusually great desire for independence and an indefatigable devotion to liberty" (National Charter, pp 19-20).

11267
CSO: 4519/276

KHOMAYNI DECREE SEEN PARALYZING JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 31 Aug 82 pp 1-3

[Text] On Aug. 22, Imam Khomeyni, in a major and unexpected speech, completely brought down the very basis of work of the current judicial system of the country, and, as the Press later announced, acted to bring about a "Judicial Revolution" the need for which was being felt following the inception of the political revolution and the cultural revolution. However, due to the complicated problems that existed in the way of its implementation anticipation of a specific date for it was not possible.

In his historical speech, the Imam declared: "I hereby announce it to all the judges in the country, to all those responsible for dispensing justice, as well as to all persons who are with the Justice Ministry to abolish all the laws of the satanic times and the ones contrary to Islamic laws. You should discard all of them at my responsibility, and enact laws of Islam in their place" (KEYHAN, August 23). The Imam took personal responsibility for the effects of this move and categorically ordered them to "slap hard" anyone who doesn't act in accordance with the Holy Qoran, and not to care for any person. He also said explicitly "these former laws are against the divine laws and hence shouldn't be implemented. Anyone who carries them out is guilty and should be tried judicially...." (same source).

As a result of this decree, the country's justice organisation came to a virtual standstill since August 23. Although Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebilli, head of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), tried to prevent this shutdown the very next day and said: "Release of this modification isn't tantamount to the closure of the Justice Organisation, and it shouldn't be negligent in taking charge of criminals (KEYHAN, Aug. 25), but the prosecutors and judges of the Justice Ministry are virtually carrying out no work since early last week.

There isn't any doubt that Imam Khomeyni himself is aware of the vast dimensions which the Aug. 22 decree can take, and as such, some important factors would have necessarily compelled him to issue such an order. As to the reasons and factors, There are being expressed different views none of which is authentic or documented. Among them, it is rumoured that the fundamentalist groups, in recent weeks, initiated a vast-ranging propaganda against the Government and the SJC, and even worrisome reports were sent to the Imam in this respect. Based on these reports, the Justice Ministry and its various courts, without paying any heed to Islamic laws, are continuing to follow the former laws, and the Islamic government has no say in their work. The SJC, which has

been assigned the task of changing the laws and Islamising the Justice Organisation, is devoid of the necessary efficiency and power, and is reflecting its duties. Public opinion of the "Muslim Ummah" is extremely unhappy at this situation and it might show its open reactions. Other reports say that there were plans to stage big demonstrations as a token of protest on Aug. 19 which were to begin in front of the Justice Ministry Building and to be continued up to the Majlis Building. However, the Interior Ministry banned these rallies by issuing an announcement.

The SJC which, following the issuance of the Imam's decree, is still a target of attacks and criticism, announced that it has devised some major laws in line with the Islamic principles, sent them to the Majlis, and is awaiting their approval. It requested the Majlis and the Guardians' Council of the Constitution to decide, within a maximum period of 10 days, the fate of these laws which have been pending with the legislature since last May. It also urged various theological schools to introduce one thousand theology students and religious persons for judicial work in various courts of the Justice Ministry. Meanwhile, the SJC, in an announcement issued Aug. 28, asked the court officials of the Justice Ministry to directly contact it by telephone in case they face any problem bringing the existing laws in conformity with the Islamic laws. It is, however, not known how hundreds of courts would be able to resolve their problems with the help of only two phone lines, set aside for this purpose.

In his historic speech, Imam Khomeyni also referred to the Amendment Law to the previous constitution, and said that many of the earlier laws already stand rejected under that very constitution. In the Amendment Law to the previous constitution, which was approved in the first decade of this century, and was being implemented until before the ratification of the Islamic constitution, it has been explicitly said that Iranian laws should not be in conflict with the principles of Islamic canons. The clergy leaders, who had played an effective role in bringing about Iran's constitutional revolution at the onset of this century, had, in this way, sought to make principles govern the legislature. Even it was provided for in that law that a group of clergymen should be elected to supervise over the country's laws in Islamic terms. However, with the coming into power of the Pahlavi regime and with the subsequent weakening of the clergy, these principles could never be executed.

Problems faced by the "Judicial Revolution" are many in number. Most significant among them can be mentioned as under: 1. To undertake a study of the existing laws and to bring them in conformity with the Islamic principles needs time. Efforts made in this sphere during the space of four years since the inception of the Revolution, which produced limited results, and hence determination of the fact as to which law is in favour of and which one against Islam is, at present, not possible. 2. Conformity of these laws with the Islamic principles requires access to in-depth religious and judicial information. The present judges, all of whom are the product of the Pahlavi era having got their education at Tehran University or abroad, are devoid of this information, barring a few ones, and hence they can, in practice, not check the laws contrary to the Islamic canons. 3. The individuals that religious centers and theological school can introduce to the Justice Ministry are initially limited in number, and secondly they are unfamiliar with the current civil and penal laws.

To train them in a way that they could prove to be efficacious would require a few years of education and professional experience. 4. Some of the Islamic laws, including the 'Qisas' (Retribution) Law are incompatible with the current penal laws, and in case it were planned to enact the same without any regard to the present laws and only by giving significance to the conditions of time and place, these would cause a host of difficulties. 5. Islamic laws, while being rich in some aspects, like marriage, and prevention of prostitution and social relations, are not exhaustive and accurate in some other aspects such as commercial exchanges, taxation, and worker-employee relationship, and should, therefore, be studied and interpreted by Islamic specialists and scholars. This task needs time as well as a considerable group of experts that are scarce at present. 6. Religious scholars are not unanimous in making inferences from Islamic laws and Qoranic instructions. Besides that, many of the laws are reliant upon reports and prophetic traditions all of whom are not acceptable to all Islamic scholars.

With all these details, it is not logical to be optimistic about resolving the existing problems within a space of 10 days, ten weeks or even ten months. Moreover, the country's Justice Organisation cannot be closed down, similar to the universities, even for a limited period. Necessarily, an urgent solution must be found out for these problems.

Until before the issuance of the Imam's edict, Islamic laws were being implemented in revolutionary courts alone, and these courts which, at the outset used to deal with all affairs, gradually limited their work in recent years, to handling the cases of antirevolutionaries, and handed over other tasks to the Justice Ministry. Now these courts must either be expanded to also deal with the litigation work belonging to the Justice Ministry which is beyond their capacity, or there should be put to work a religious official as an adviser along side every judge and prosecutor of the Justice Ministry, which too is not possible in the light of the small number of the deserving and competent individuals possessing necessary conditions. In this way, it is not known how and in what period would the Imam's order on the judicial revolution, be implemented.

Majlis Deputy and Member of the Judicial Commission in the Majlis, Zavarei, while referring to the Imam's recent decree, said at a news conference in Shiraz: "It is but natural that when the implementation of non-Islamic laws is stopped, Islamic laws should take their place. Since law is the means of work of a judge, he should immediately be provided with it in order not to delay the disposal of court files. He advised S.J.C. to set enough time for Majlis to review and approve the relevant bills." He added: "Since the basis of Civil laws rests on Islamic jurisprudence, the Justice Ministry would come across no major anti-Islamic laws during the course of their implementation. The main problem of the Ministry lies in the penal laws which have mostly been extracted from the Belgian, French and other European countries' law." (KEYHAN, August 28, 1982).

CSO: 4600/759

CLERGYMAN DISCUSSES TUDEH POSITION ON IMAM'S LINE

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 31 Aug 82 pp 4-5

[Text] Following the detailed interview of Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Musavi Khoeiniha (refer to "Profile"), it appears that the currents in favour and opposed to the Imam's line are further showing themselves up, and the Press and Majlis deputies, that had thus far remained silent under the pressure of the opponents, are now gradually speaking out. Among them, there were mentioned, in recent weeks, some comments in the Persian Dailies KEYHAN and SOB-E-AZADEGAN that make interesting reading. In this respect, KEYHAN writes: "Dogmatism which once strived hard, for instance, to hit out at Dr Shariati and Ayatollah Montazeri, is now happy to totally forget about them. The common point in all these poundings was the hostility of dogmatism towards analysis, thought, innovations, criticism and exit from the dogmatic framework. If the Islamic thinking of Taleghani, Montazeri and Shariati was questionable in the eyes of dogmatism until yesterday, these are Hashemi Rafsanjani, Musavi Khoeiniha and...that are being put to question today.... Dogmatism is very strict in economic issues, and thinks that even the smallest reference to plunder and looting by capitalists and oppressors, as well as any talk about the reality behind Para C, state control over foreign trade, dispossession of feudal lords, reliance upon the oppressed masses, and rejection of the oppressors amounts to an indication of material and atheistic thoughts.... It is tragic and pitiful that such dogmatic approaches are being justified in the name of religion, Islam and Revolution. It can be easily discerned that dogmatism would sooner or later use the tactic of force to impose its viewpoints, and no sooner that thought, tolerance and liberality are eliminated, there would, by intention or otherwise, come in their place, imposition and compulsion. Imposition too has its own specific implements, and among them are force and power. There are being observed, in the society and in the nuclei the preliminaries to attaining monopolistic power by dogmatic individuals.... It is a devastative phenomenon which is being witnessed in different forms in the political and administrative setups of the Islamic Revolution, and it is a serious danger that should be treated in a more serious manner."

The Tudeh Party too, which introduces itself as a staunch supporter of the Imam's line has, in its internal bulletin this week along with extending support to Khoeiniha's views, announced that the outcome of the clash of the "two favourable and opposing lines" would go to determine the fate of the Iranian Revolution. In the opinion of the party, this clash is presently

observed mostly in economic fields. It has, in this respect, been said in the internal bulletin of the party: "Another example of the rightists' attack is the shelving of 'Para C' of the Law on bringing factories under state control (it shouldn't be mistaken with 'Para C' of the Land Reforms Law) which checked the nationalisation of a section of the industries that could have proved beneficial to national economy and to the country's independence. Yet another example of the rightists' attack is the act of entrusting the fate of the Foreign Trade Nationalisation Law, after its being vetoed by the Guardians' Council and some of its articles being termed as contrary to Islamic laws, to a special commission in the Majlis where, as per comments of Mr Musavi, the government wants to declare its views. Some of the ratified laws, after all that battle, have again fallen at the mercy of the Special Commission, that is, at the altar. The rightists have succeeded in presently throwing the crucial Foreign Trade Law into that very ditch. However, it is indisputable that the exponents of the Imam's line within these special commissions won't remain silent, especially when our toiling people, while pinning their hopes on these laws, are awaiting an action by them to decisively confront the pretexts and attacks of the opposing current" (Aug. 22).

It must be noted that this grouping (formed and being duly followed by the Tudeh Party), that is, the adherents to the Imam's line on the one hand and the Hojjatis on the other, is not acceptable to all political observers. In their opinion, undoubtedly there does exist a radical trend in the Islamic government whose leader can be taken to be the Majlis Speaker and whose supporters are the Prime Minister, most of the young members of the cabinet and active clergymen such as Khoeihina. Within the Majlis too, a 60-member group of deputies supports it. On the other side, there exists a conservative group which considers the reformative moves of the former group to be contrary to the Islamic principles. At the head of this group, there exist some of the clergy leaders both in the Majlis and the Cabinet that mainly support it. However, it can't be said that these two groups are separate entities which are getting ready for a combat. It shouldn't be imagined either that individuals of one group enjoy an identity of views with their colleagues on all issues. Very often it happens that some of the supporters of the first group join hands with the members of the other group in special cases. (Elections to the Majlis Presidium as a result of which Khoeihina was sidelined was a good example of this current). On the contrary, some of the individuals, now among the ranks of the conservatives, don't approve of all actions and moves taken by that group.

According to the grouping brought in vogue by the Tudeh Party in the Majlis, some of the Ministers such as Tavakoli (Labour Minister), Velayati (Foreign Minister), Parvaresh (Education Minister), and Asgar Dyladi (commerce Minister), are from the conservative group. But there exists no evidence to show that this group has any basic difference with the Prime Minister and other members of this cabinet on major issues.

Circles close to the government too don't confirm the above groupings. However, they accept that there does exist some difference of opinion on certain basic issues, especially on the mode of implementation of some of the reforms. Nevertheless, all the members of the cabinet and Majlis are adherents to the Imam and they never carry out tasks that go against his views and guidelines.

CSO: 4600/759

CONSEQUENCES OF QOTBZADEH CASE DISCUSSED

London THE ECONOMIST in English 18 Sep 82 p 37

/Text/

The Iranian revolution claimed another prominent victim on September 15th when a former foreign minister, 46-year-old Mr Sadegh Qotbzadeh, went before a firing squad. He had been convicted of conspiring to kill Ayatollah Khomeini for whom he had worked during his exile in France. Some 70 army and air force officers who were allegedly implicated in the same plot were executed earlier in Teheran's Evin jail. The other alleged leader of the conspiracy, Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, Ayatollah Khomeini's main clerical rival, is under house arrest.

Mass arrests and executions bought a few months of calm for the ruling mullahs in Teheran this summer. But now the left-wing guerrillas in the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq are on the offensive again. They are gunning for revolutionary guards rather than the senior mullahs who are well protected and stay off the streets.

The Mujaheddin claims to have killed some 100 revolutionary guards throughout the country in the first week of September. Among them, it says, was Hamid Behnood, a senior commander of the guard in Teheran. The government has confirmed that some 20 people were killed in bomb explosions last week and it has summoned mourners to the guards' funerals. The Mujaheddin denies responsibility for the biggest blast on September 6th. The guerrillas claim that the mullahs had the bomb planted in order to deflect the attention of an inter-parliamentary conference in Italy from human rights violations in Iran.

The guerrilla offensive seems to have provoked a further tightening of the screw of repression by the government. The mullahs have stopped issuing details of executions which the Mujaheddin claims to have totalled 20,000 in the past year. Iranian newspapers have listed 12 people executed so far this month. The Mujaheddin says that the real rate is 100 a week. Many victims are said to have been shot in Evin prison and their bodies buried secretly at night.

Iran's supreme court decided last month to scrap all laws that predate the Islamic republic—which strips most Iranians of most of their rights. The Kurds have long been pressing for more. Hundreds of Kurds are reported to have been shot recently in the part of Kurdistan under the government's control and villagers suspected of harbouring guerrillas are said to have been resettled.

JORDAN

DAILY URGES ACTION AGAINST ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

JN151014 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 15 Sep 82 pp 1, 23

[Article in the "Opinion column by "Hakim" entitled: "Save the Land, or It Will Be Farewell to Peace"]

[Excerpts] Amid the current arguments over the various Middle East peace plans, the Arabs and the Americans seem to ignore one basic point; namely, that the "Palestinian land," which is the bone of contention, is being swallowed bit by bit by the Israeli dragon, so that it could be said that once the parties concerned agree on a formula for negotiations on the basis of "exchanging land for peace," as President Reagan said, there will be no land left worth negotiating.

We raise our voice high from this rostrum, so it can be heard by all the Arab leaders, and utter one simple sentence: Forget everything and save the land, if you can, before it is lost.

We ask them frankly: What value will "the state" have if the land is lost? What value will "the representation" have if the land is lost? Will the people remain if the land is lost?

Therefore, all Arab and international efforts must be directed toward one objective; namely, stopping the building of settlements, after that we can talk about other things. For without the land, talk about anything else becomes meaningless and a waste of time.

If we were to suggest a quick action to the Arab states, we would ask them to convene an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution putting an immediate halt to the building of settlements, before any talk of peace. If Israel refused to heed this resolution, then all nations would withhold any financial or military aid to Israel until it heeds the resolution.

Is this not one way of testing President Reagan's seriousness on the subject of the settlements?

CSO: 4400/485

FINANCE MINISTER INTERVIEWED

GF150857 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Sep 82 p 5

[Report on interview with Kuwaiti Finance and Planning Minister Yusuf 'Abd al-Latif Yusuf al-Hamad by Altaf Guahar--date and place not given]

[Text] Kuwait's finance minister, Abd al-Latif al-Hamad, is a slim, intense looking man; one who seems ready to argue a point to the bitter end. Last year in Berlin where members of the Brandt Commission assembled to review the results of their report, he clashed with Helmut Schmidt who declared that oil prices were the root of all the economic ills of the West. "Nonsense" retorted Al-Hamad. The West he said, had developed all the symptoms of recession, inflation and unemployment well before 1974 when oil prices were revised upward.

Toward the end of April Al-Hamad caused a stir by announcing a deficit budget, not a familiar phenomenon in the oil-producing Arab countries. He did this because the Arabs did not seem to realise that there was not enough oil under the ground to satisfy their soaring needs and fantasies. Projected expenditure for the fiscal year 1982-83 was U.S.\$12.3 billion against a revenue estimate of U.S.\$11.2 billion. The deficit of U.S.\$1 billion will be covered from the general reserve. A slight decline in the oil revenue (which represents 92 percent of the country's income) was forecast and a considerable rise in returns from other investments.

A few days before the budget Al-Hamad warned that Kuwait could go "totally bankrupt" in the next 4 years if state expenditure continued to grow with no corresponding rise in income from oil and other resources. Al-Hamad noted that there had been a steady rise in expenditure from KD538 million (U.S.\$1 is equal to KD0.56) in 1974 to KD1.74 billion in 1979, an average of 23 percent per annum. If this trend continued Kuwait would have to produce 2.25 million barrels of oil per year to cope with this level of expenditure. "This kind of thinking is far from practical" Al-Hamad said, "and therefore, Kuwait has to plan in advance to meet any extreme situation." The government could live for a few years by drawing on its financial reserves, "but the reserves will soon dry up and we will stay where we are right now." Al-Hamad advised, "it is better to have the projects already in hand completed rather than embarking on any new ambitious plans."

Was this budget a calculated move to prepare public opinion in the country for a period of stringency? He said: "It was necessary to make an adjustment in the existing policies." The long term oil-price trends had been obvious for some time but many in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) failed to recognise them. "Some OPEC members were inclined to treat temporary increases as a permanent feature."

Why did OPEC not evolve a coordinated production policy in the first place? "Because OPEC is not a cartel," replied Al-Hamad. "It is a club where every member adopts policies suited to its own national interests." But the West still treats OPEC as a cartel. Al-Hamad pointed out that OPEC was a young organisation; people who criticize it forget that it only came into its own in 1973-74 even though it was established in the early 60's. It was the oil revolution of 1973-74 which helped OPEC to acquire sufficient strength and confidence to exercise sovereignty over its resources. The organisation had still to develop cohesion of thought.

Al-Hamad felt that the recent fall in oil prices had served as a clear example of the cohesion that is developing within OPEC. "You must have noticed that we did not panic." OPEC members were able to agree on a realistic production programme and came to Nigeria's assistance not only by putting the oil companies on notice but also by providing financial support. "OPEC has matured," Al-Hamad said.

The present level of oil prices, according to Al-Hamad should help the oil-producing countries to adopt more realistic developments.

Al-Hamad was a little impatient with those who criticised OPEC. He pointed out that many OPEC members did not have much in common except that they produced the same commodity: "What is common between Nigeria and Kuwait? We have our own development priorities. They have their own priorities. Considering all the constraints, we have not done too badly in 8 years."

But the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is as adverse and still manages to act in a cohesive and united manner on every issue. "Sure, but we are developing and we have not had as much time and experience as OECD. We are now beginning to develop a common approach and purposes. We must take a leaf from Japan's book. If Japan can live with a non-oil situation we, too, can live with low production and low prices."

But for OPEC, Al-Hamad said, things would have been very different from some of the oil-producing countries. Before 1973, countries like Yemen and Jordan were not even treated as viable. It was OPEC which gave member countries collective strength and put them on the road to development.

Turning to foreign policy Al-Hamad said he did not share the U.S. administration's view of a Soviet military threat to the Gulf states. "The only threat we face is from Israel," stated Al-Hamad. For Kuwait, Alexander Haig's "strategic consensus" was "not sacred." It was possible that the next U.S. administration might develop a totally different doctrine. "We cannot follow

American fashions or base our long-term policies on their doctrines." Kuwait did not face a Soviet threat any more than it faced a threat from the United States. Kuwait preferred to stay nonaligned and not get involved in the superpower conflict.

Al-Hamad was enthusiastic about the Brandt report: "We are keeping the issues alive." He was not disappointed by the results of the Cancun summit. "It was a useful get-together where leaders rubbed shoulders with one another and President Reagan sat eyeball to eyeball to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi." But how had this eyeballing and shoulder-rubbing helped the Third World? Al-Hamad thought that Cancun had its impact on U.S. attitude, certainly in respect of the financial institutions." He did not elaborate.

The finance minister was not enamoured of the global round of negotiations. Resolutions and communiques, according to him, did not achieve much. He thought that the most important thing was for the South to get together but not by imposing tariffs to encourage South-South trade: "We should fight protectionism by breaking tariff walls."

He said Kuwait's investments in the South had been quite substantial and were growing, though not every country in the South offered sufficiently attractive opportunities for investment. The Gulf Cooperation Council had established its secretariat and its financial arms were being quickly developed.

When pressed on Kuwait's defence expenditure, especially the rate at which it has risen in the last few years compared to Sweden or Switzerland he commented that if Kuwait's military expenditure had risen fivefold in the last 10 years so had Kuwait's expenditure on health and social security. "We are proud of our record in the social sector" he said, offering the details of budget allocations and the actual spending from the year 1971 to 1979 to substantiate his claim.

Al-Hamad is happy with his country's experiment in democracy. "It is working well. We have the freest press in the region and our parliament has full powers to call ministers to account." The government had put up the price of petrol for the motorists by nearly 300 percent and this had affected the price of several other commodities. There was much criticism but "there have been no riots," said Al-Hamad "and the government has not fallen."

CSO: 4400/485

CONCERNS OVER REGIONAL INSTABILITY ANALYZED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1344, 6 Aug 82 p 24

[Article by 'Adil Malik]

[Text] Along with the natural burning heat wave that usually devastates the Gulf region, especially these days...there has been raging for some time an exceptional heat wave that arose from keen psychological pressure.

The political heat that has been coming to the Gulf since the outbreak of the Khomeyni revolution and the spreading of the tide that the revolution created in the Arab region in general has become more intense since the military confrontation between Iraq and Iran. At a time when the war is nearing the end of its second year, the Gulf states find themselves more than at any other time in the past compelled to search for a position for themselves...to find "secure ways of limiting" this war which has been imposed on them.

Kuwait is a leading Gulf state. It is directly concerned with every detail of what happens in this war. Kuwait was well aware of the delicacy, sensitivity, and importance of its political and geographic position from the time the war broke out. It was therefore the first to wish for the war to end as soon as possible because it knew the war would have many troubling complications domestically and in the region as a whole.

Kuwait tried at first to follow a middle course in the Gulf region, in the Arab World, and internationally. It wanted to retain freedom of action for itself while preserving a balance. But events swept away the neutrals; it forced those who didn't want to take a position to do so.

With Iran's insistence on continuing the war...and crossing the Iraqi borders... and trying to move deep into Iraq, the war has acquired new goals of greater importance than in previous months. This has placed the region again on a difficult road, spurring officials in and outside the Gulf region to draw new conclusions. Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, deputy prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, and minister of information in Kuwait clearly expressed the fear "that some big world power is planning to blow up the entire Arab region in order to gain control over it." The reason underlying these fears is the link between all elements of the war zone which embraces the region from Lebanon to Iran and passes through many spheres of danger in which sometimes declared wars and at other times secret wars are waged.

There is more than an indicator in Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad's warning, that is to say, the oldest Arab and world (after Gromyko) minister of foreign affairs knows well the labyrinthine nature of the Gulf situation and fully appreciates the repercussions of events in the Gulf arena. It goes without saying that he fully understands the intricacies of the situation in Kuwait.

During the "Gulf war" Kuwait dealt with the situation by means of diplomacy, but circumstances changed as did a number of givens, which made it necessary to change many equations and alter the manner of conciliation. Kuwait found itself inclined to rely on the principle of "self-security" at least to defend itself. Despite its desire for neutrality, it cannot remain aloof from the "situation" which some of the "influential parties" in the region chose for it. Nor can it prevent others from "classifying" its role. Kuwait is therefore compelled to take a stand on the Gulf war. Reliance on "self-security" springs from Kuwait's conviction that it must keep foreign intervention out of the region, be it from the East or from the West. Kuwait has implemented this policy by maintaining good relations with the West while establishing relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. In doing so, it was, and still is, the only Gulf state to build such a bridge with Moscow, despite the criticism it received from the conservative states of the region.

However, realism demands recognition of the fact that the plea for prudence in Kuwait is not sufficient to confront or ward off the dangers, internal or external. Indeed, that can be regarded as a "posture" of self-assurance...and a defensive behavior when the need calls for it and awareness of a danger whose hour may be coming. A number of events directly related to the Iraqi-Iranian war occurred in Kuwait and the authorities acted promptly to cope with them, now with determination, now with persuasion and amicability. But these solutions were temporary, necessary and ongoing with uncomfortable repercussions over the long term regardless of approaching events, especially since Kuwait well understands that several domestic considerations largely dominate the Kuwaiti position, especially in the main crises that arise.

Kuwait's relations with Iran, like those with most of the states of the region, are a mixture of popular attitudes...and mood. Therefore, they encounter two extremes, although of a different kind. This is what has made these relations oscillate between a degree of high tension, with the issuance of verbal and written warnings after charges that Kuwait is helping Iraq in the war with Iran...and a degree of relative moderation with an exchange of communications "about the general situation in the region"...and the sending of an Iranian envoy to Kuwait and several other states in the region to consult on many matters, including the improvement of relations.

Perhaps the Gulf state that at present enjoys a "favored position" with Iran is the United Arab Emirates whose leader Shaykh Zayd ibn Sultan received a telegram of congratulations from Imam Khomeyni on the occasion of the blessed month of Ramadan. The state was visited a few days ago by the Iranian minister of Islamic guidance to discuss with officials the strengthening of bilateral relations. There is the readiness of one of the ministers to return the visit in the near future.

There is a controversy in the Gulf over this "favoritism" in relations with Iran. Those opposed to it criticize the Emirate's standing alone and apart from the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] in opening channels of communication with Tehran. They consider it an Iranian disruption of the collective Gulf stand. Some Dubai officials reply by saying that wisdom requires preserving the "lines of communication with Iran regardless of how circumstances and conditions change."

Whether the preservers have preserved the principled positions they took out of conviction or others have prepared themselves for the "coming peace," the fact remains that the Gulf situation, like the Arab situation (in general), has no "fixed stars." The winds of change blow through more than one door and in more than one direction.

Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad has urged the people of the Gulf and the Arabs to be "alert and aware of the plots being hatched against them, plots aimed at maintaining a state of backwardness and fragmentation by keeping the region unstable."

Modern war is notorious for its knowledge of disease...but not for guidance to a knowledge of a cure.

5214

CSO: 4404/627

LEBANESE CITIZENS INTERVIEWED ON EFFECTS OF WAR

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1345, 13 Aug 82 pp 57-58

[Article by Amin Saba'i]

[Text] The areas occupied by Israeli forces have turned into fields of political, social, economic, and media research.

In addition to the continuous inflow of Israeli troops and machines into the occupied areas of Lebanon, there is also a continuous, daily "research" inflow, if this expression is correct, as manifested by a select group of leading experts in psychology, political science, economics, and sociology and specialists in field research representing Israeli, American, and some European universities and study centers.

The task of those who are traveling about the occupied Lebanese areas without any official Israeli supervision and receiving facilities in the way of transport and contacts and Arabic-speaking escorts embraces all fields relating to their political, social, economic, and media interests.

Through their steady and wide-ranging travels these experts are trying to determine the extent to which Lebanese citizens, with all their class and sectarian differences, are accepting such Israeli proposals as the call for peace and bilateral cooperation. They record the attitude of the Lebanese toward the occupation and the soldiers' behavior as well as making exact counts of all the injuries suffered by civilians during the military operations, the scope of the damage done to residential buildings, business establishments, agricultural lands, and factories and comparing them with the information presented in army communiques put out by Israel after every destructive operation, occupation, or limited clash.

Within this framework, a team of Israeli and American university people and some American media personnel toured the most important places in southern Lebanon, the mountains, and part of East Beirut where the individual members reunited to concentrate strictly on select classes of Lebanese and question them on the general Lebanese reaction to the circumstances and results of the devastation. They obtained Lebanese data on the true scale of the physical damage.

The team stayed a long time in the city of Sidon where they recorded the true scale of the damage. It then stopped over in the city of Jazzin and recorded the results of its contacts with the inhabitants and details of the circumstances that led to the Israeli forces bombing buildings and woodlands before gaining control over the entire area.

The team studied the information-gathering operation thoroughly. Individuals appeared very eager both to learn the causes of the killing of two civilians and the wounding of more than 20 before gaining control of the city and to count the exact number of houses and stores that were burned or destroyed, in whole or in part, by the bombardment.

Some individuals kept comparing the figures and information they got from the inhabitants with the information from Israel.

In a restaurant in Jazzin, an American field researcher talked with one of the local citizens to try to get answers to a number of political questions, such as:

- (1) The attitude of civilians toward the Israeli military presence in Lebanon.
- (2) The attitude of civilians toward the possibility of bilateral peace and economic cooperation.
- (3) Possible reactions in case the Israeli Army storms West Beirut and drives the Palestinians out of Lebanon.
- (4) Normalization of relations and the extent to which Lebanese citizens will accept them, with due regard for the difference in attitudes of the working classes, intellectuals, and capitalists.
- (5) The opinion of the ordinary man on the presidential elections and on the person whose election could lead to change in the internal situation.

The team observed that the majority of those interviewed pointed to the house of John 'Aziz, which is situated on a hill in Jazzin, and told them the man might be a candidate with political, social, and intellectual qualifications that would help everyone emerge from the ordeal through Lebanon is passing--this without any intention of slighting other strong candidates whose names are brought up on various occasions.

It was noted that the American members of the team were clearer than their associates in regarding as unlikely the possibility of the Israeli Army storming Beirut. One of them, a man in his 60's who writes political articles for a group of American newspapers, said the military calculations made in connection with the plan for storming West Beirut acknowledged that the Israeli Army would suffer enormous casualties while the government would suffer political losses because the situation of Beirut as the Lebanese capital naturally differs greatly from the situation of other Lebanese cities that the Israeli Army has occupied, e.g., Tyre, Sidon, and Nabatiya. And what is all right and acceptable here is not all right and acceptable there.

The old American disagreed with the opinion of an Israeli who said the Israeli Army would end the Beirut problem in 3 days. The passage of time proved the American writer was right.

One day last week an Israeli group had an important discussion on the above-mentioned points with John 'Aziz. The group included a professor at the Hebrew University in Tel Aviv who teaches and does research in various sociological sciences and the humanities, an influential Israeli Army officer, and a correspondent for some of the leading newspapers in Western Europe.

At the beginning of the dialogue the Israelis put to John 'Aziz some sharp questions regarding the storming of West Beirut and the difficulties involved, reactions to it and the possibility of achieving decisive results.

As usual, John 'Aziz was very frank in his answers, just as he was when he spoke at a political and economics meeting attended by a group of leaders in the South and a number of high-ranking Israeli officers. Israeli leaders, he said, must realize that the Lebanese insist on exercising their right to manage their affairs by themselves freely and democratically, with no agents working for the Israelis or anyone else.

Said John 'Aziz to the Israeli university professor: "You are embarking on a difficult war, if not an impossible one, over Beirut. Storming the city will be a costly operation with substantial losses. Your leaders are aware of that. Moreover, your ally America will not support such an invasion and neither will the European states. And what is more, "Israeli public opinion is divided on the matter. The best proof of this division is the huge demonstrations that took place in Tel Aviv. Among those who participated were elements of the Israeli group that carried out the Entebbe Airport operation in Uganda several years ago. In the light of these circumstances, how can your army undertake to storm Beirut?"

The Israeli said to 'Aziz: "But you declare you don't want foreign forces on your soil. So how can you accomplish that as long as West Beirut and other places are not subject to your will?"

John 'Aziz said: "When we declare that we meant it because we are striving to gain the freedom to make our own national and political decisions. This is one of our basic rights. But we are not in favor of any action that strikes at or destroys our national unity."

The Israeli professor said: "How does the occupation of West Beirut and expulsion of the Palestinians destroy your national unity?"

John 'Aziz answered: "Imagine the state of national unity when one part of the city of Beirut with its own distinctive political and sectarian coloring is bombarded by planes, tanks, and patrol boats, and deaths in the thousands, while the other part of Beirut with its different political and sectarian coloring is facing annihilation and destruction. What kind of national unity will remain after that?"

The Israeli writer and correspondent for several Israeli newspapers asked about an alternative to invasion. John 'Aziz answered: "The PLO received a painful military blow. This is a truth not even the Palestinians deny and today, after all that has happened, the atmosphere has become favorable for you and your allies in America to propose an initiative for a radical solution that rests on recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and on the need to reach a just and comprehensive political settlement of the Middle East crisis. You can be sure this opportunity will not come again. Losing it means pushing the region and the world into a wilderness and endless disasters. You know what the situation is now in Lebanon, in the region, and in the Gulf and you are aware, rather you ought to be aware, that throughout history there was never an operation of annihilation that managed to wipe out the rights of any people however weak they may have been. The Jewish people cherished their hope for 1900 years and Titus who destroyed Jerusalem could not put an end to what you were striving for. This is the situation of the Palestinian people and that of any other people."

The discussion branched out to various aspects of the current situation, and John 'Aziz told the Israeli group that Lebanon will not rise again or continue to exist without its national unity and freedom of decision.

He then asked the Israeli professor: "When the Treaty of Versailles was signed, you spoke about the borders of the state of Israel extending to the Sidon coast without defining whether this coast is north of the city of Sidon or south of it. Does stationing troops on the Nahr Awali bridge mean your borders will extend to this bridge after the occupation is ended?"

The Israeli professor said: "I can assure you that this matter has not come up and that your notion is unrealistic."

The dialogue ended with the Israelis expressing the desire to return and continue the discussion on another occasion.

It is the impression of some Lebanese leaders, especially those who have talked with the Israeli field research team, that Israel is building, or trying to build, on Lebanese territory through this kind of contact, far from military garb and guns, a base that can properly serve as the foundation of a structure of normal relations between Israel and Lebanon and that they are trying by this approach to study points of entry into Lebanese society in order to choose the opening that will lead to the desired normalization no matter how long it may take.

Thus, these circles believe Israel is relying on patience and quiet perseverance to reach this goal. It finds in the operation of opening the gates of the Lebanese area an opportunity, which may not come again, to sow the seeds of normalization by a method it deems appropriate. It is therefore concentrating on intellectuals, politicians, and economists in addition to showing interest in the lower classes because it believes its dialogue with the political and intellectual classes plus economic activities will complete the normalization process as a firmer and more enduring basis.

The significant thing in this process is that all the attempts are being made in the absence of the legal Lebanese authority, which is either occupied with attempts to bring Lebanon out of its present ordeal or knows it cannot resist what is happening on Lebanese territory.

A little while ago a group of Israeli economists visited Sidon to study the consumer market and make arrangements for organizing an exhibition of Israeli agricultural products in Sidon. The group presented to some officials the idea of organizing exports from Israel to Lebanese markets and supplying Lebanon with the gasoline products it needs. The officials told the Israelis official Lebanon considers the borders with Israel closed and, moreover, the state is not involved in the import business. Although it wants to import gasoline, it will not do so from Israel for more than one known reason in addition to the fact that gasoline is sold in Israel at double the price in Lebanon.

Nevertheless, the Israeli economists did not lose their enthusiasm and the markets of the regions controlled by the Israeli Army are being flooded with all kinds of Israeli agricultural products.

A prominent Lebanese politician said in a private conversation: "The occupation will be long and attempts at normalization longer. What is concealed is more dangerous than what is known. The journey of Lebanon over its paths of agony cannot end until it regains its freedom."

Many indicators are now pointing to the fact that the Lebanese and the Arabs will have to prepare to adapt to a new kind of Lebanon, one different from any previously known, and get used to a different map of the Middle East.

5214

CSO: 4404/627

AID TO INDUSTRY SOUGHT

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1348, 3 Sep 82 p 51

[Article: "1.5 Billion Dollars Needed for the Progress of the Economy"]

[Text] Dr Fu'ad Abu Salih, president of the Society of Manufacturers has asked for 200 million pounds in urgent financial aid for industrial organizations in Lebanon that were affected by the Israeli incursion. The aid would be used to pay workers' wages for 6 months only. During this period these organizations would be able to resume operations.

Dr Abu Salih says, "If what is required is that we push the wheel of the industrial economy [forward], and do justice by those who have been affected by the crisis, the financial assistance must not be less than 1.5 billion dollars. This compensation may be guaranteed directly and indirectly since money usually produces money. Accordingly, compensation for other sectors may be provided from industrial production. When the state becomes strong and has large financial capabilities that are attributed to the presence of this economic thrust, the state can then help those who deserve help."

It is known that scores of factories have been damaged. Some of them have been turned into rubble as a result of the Israeli shelling. These factories had furloughed their workers and paid them part of their compensation. Experts say that the figures for industrial losses are now approximate but may double when a comprehensive survey is conducted.

8592

CSO: 4404/668

COUNTRY'S TROUBLES EXPLOITED FOR GAIN

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1348, 3 Sep 82 p 51

[Article by 'Adnan Karimah: "A Point of View: Private Property in the War between the Right and the Left"]

[Text] People in Lebanon are wealthy, but the state is poor.

This is one of the characteristics used by some economists to describe Lebanon. This [description] became firmly established during the painful events more than 7 years ago. Some Lebanese citizens increased their wealth, and new millionaires emerged. While the number of wealthy people doubled, the poverty of the state grew, and its accumulated debts were in excess of 8 billion Lebanese pounds.

There is no doubt that one of the most important factors of "wealth" in Lebanon is the state's emphasis on and encouragement of individual initiative in the context of a free economic system and its protection of private property.

During the 1975-1976 Two Years' War a large part of the capabilities of the national economy was destroyed, and private property was violated by killing, plundering, looting, planting explosives and other such means. Economists and businessmen feared for the free economic system. They feared that individual initiative may be lost especially after leftists were accused of carrying out these actions since they have been the traditional enemies of the capitalist system.

After the war, specifically on 23 September 1976, President Sarkis affirmed in his inaugural address [his emphasis on] a free economic system, his encouragement for individual initiative and his protection for private property. This revived the hopes of economists and businessmen that the Lebanese economy would be rebuilt. They even withdrew their request for compensation for their institutions which had been damaged. They asked only for easy bank terms because freedom was "most precious;" it was "the basis" on which a Lebanese citizen could launch any prosperous business.

The Lebanese people worked hard at their businesses, scoring remarkable progress that enabled the Lebanese economy in 1977 to regain about 70 percent of its activity before the war. President Sarkis then did not hide his wariness when he told some principal figures in economic organizations, "Reconstruction of the economy is proceeding more rapidly than political reconstruction. I am afraid that a new blow will be dealt to this progress."

Despite all the blows that were dealt to the Lebanese economy during the following years, economists worked hard and were able to obtain new Arab and foreign investments, especially in the banking sector. This was done to protect the basic constituents of their country's economy.

Finally, the Israeli incursion came, and the invaders carried out their first attempt to break the confidentiality for which Lebanon's banks have foremost recognition, guarding that confidentiality even better than banks in Switzerland, which is the country of freedoms. However, their attempt failed as a result of the steadfastness of Lebanese bankers and the intervention of U.S. envoy Philip Habib with Israeli officials. The invaders' second attempt was to strike at private property. They broke into warehouses and commercial stores and looted them. It was estimated that the contents of these warehouses and stores were worth several million pounds. The Israeli excuse was that these warehouses and stores were owned by Palestinians.

Leaders of economic organizations resisted this attempt, and the U.S. envoy intervened again to stop these actions which basically contradict the principles which are called for by the United States and which Lebanon applies.

All this indicates the extent of Lebanese steadfastness opposite attempts by the left and the right to strike at economic freedom for which the Lebanese people will accept no alternative. They are continuing to defend that principle. Therefore, leaders of economic organizations have recently called for a president who would preserve a free economy, encourage individual initiative and protect private property.

After he is elected president, al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil is being asked to affirm this in his inaugural address, just as his predecessor, President Ilyas Sarkis had done. The hopes economists have for the future of their country can thus be revived.

If these principles increased the wealth of the Lebanese people, it is inevitable that a "modern" state will receive its share of this wealth by interacting with the activities of the Lebanese people in various areas of these activities.

Those who do business with wealthy people are bound to become wealthy.

8592

CSO: 4404/668

LEBANON

BANK DIRECTOR RESIGNS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1348, 3 Sep 82 p 51

[Article: "Pressure Applied to al-Wazzan Makes al-Khuri Resign"]

[Text] The resignation of the director of the Bank of Lebanon, al-Shaykh Mishal al-Khuri has created an uproar in banking circles that urged him to reconsider his resignation. Throughout the period of his tenure cooperation between him and the Banking Society to ensure the interests of the banking sector in particular and the interests of the national economy in general had been extensive.

Because of the resignation, it will be up to the Council of Ministers to appoint Dr Walid Naja, the director general of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Beirut, chairman of the committee that supervises banks in the Central Bank after the services of former committee chairman, Dr Fu'ad al-Sanyurah, are terminated.

Al-Shaykh Mishal defended his position. Some people had faulted him for linking his resignation with the fact that Dr al-Sanyurah's term was not renewed.

Al-Shaykh Mishal said, "My decision goes beyond persons, particularly the past chairman of the committee and the new chairman of the committee. My decision is based only on my conviction that after losing a main assistant and being deprived of a suitable atmosphere to facilitate productivity in managing the organization and to strengthen that organization, I will not be able to perform my duties in the manner dictated by my sense of responsibility."

It is worth noting that replacing the chairman of the committee that supervises banks took place under political pressure from Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan who was under considerable pressure himself from some Muslim leaders.

8592

CSO: 4404/668

CURRENCY FLUCTUATION ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 289, 4 Sep 82 p 37

[Article: "The Lebanese Pound: Holding Its Ground until Further Notice"]

[Text] The rate at which Lebanese pounds can be exchanged for dollars fell last July by 0.2 percent.

What is new about this decline is not that it is the first time the Lebanese pound declines in relation to U.S. currency, but that it happened during a period when the value of other main currencies showed an improvement in relation to the dollar. Thus, the Lebanese pound would have deviated for the first time from the course it had kept all through this year. Until June at least the Lebanese pound had declined less than other currencies had in relation to the dollar.

Figures issued by the Bank of Lebanon indicate that currency fluctuation in relation to the dollar last July was as follows:

The pound sterling rose 0.6 percent in relation to the dollar; the Deutschemark, rose 0.9 percent; the Swiss franc rose 0.9 percent; the Japanese yen rose 0.6 percent; and the French franc, 0.4 percent. At the same time, the Lebanese pound fell 0.2 percent in relation to the dollar.

Until the end of last June changes in these currencies indicated that the Lebanese pound was following the same pattern of other currencies.

Between the beginning of the year and the end of June, the decline in the value of currencies in relation to the dollar was as follows: the pound sterling fell 9.79 percent; the Deutschemark fell 8.890 percent; the Swiss franc fell 16.89 percent; the Japanese yen, 16.27 percent; the French franc, 19.67 percent; and the Lebanese pound, 11.7 percent.

If the decline of the Lebanese pound in relation to the dollar--11.71 percent--is not an adequate indication of the absolute value of the Lebanese pound, that decline provides evidence of the relative value of the Lebanese pound, compared with other currencies. Besides, one is to take into consideration the exceptional conditions under which Lebanon has been living for the past 8 years.

Despite the fact that recent events in Lebanon harbor dangers that are more serious and more calamitous than past events, the rate of exchange for the

Lebanese pound continued to be relatively satisfactory for the following considerations:

1. The conditions experienced by the banking sector and under which it has been operating have stood in the way of maintaining a normal foreign currency market that would allow supply and demand [factors] to emerge in a normal fashion and determine the rate of exchange. Demand sometimes becomes extremely pressing, while supply is below normal; and the opposite of that occurs as well. As a result of this situation, artificial rates ensue; people speculate and take advantage of opportunities; and there is an unbelievable gap between the sale price and the purchase price. This is what happened during the first month of the Israeli invasion.

2. The conditions of general trade, especially foreign trade prevented the creation of a commercial demand for dollars that would cause a reduction in the price of the Lebanese pound. Because of the conditions and perils of war, not to mention the dangers of sabotage, merchants refrained from and are still refraining from importing goods. Therefore, trade is practically restricted to very limited quantities of food and essential consumer goods.

3. The fact that Beirut International Airport has been closed and the fact that it is difficult to travel by other means has effected a considerable reduction in personal demand for dollars. Consequently, this has protected the Lebanese pound against the possibility of a reduction in its rate of exchange.

4. The fact that banking operations have continued despite all these conditions and the fact that banks often go out of their way to ensure services to their customers through their branch banks inside Lebanon and abroad gave more confidence in Lebanon's currency and kept people from converting their holdings [in Lebanese pounds] to other currencies, except in rare cases.

5. There is another factor that helped curb the decline in the value of the Lebanese pound. This is the existing wager on the future of Lebanon and on the fact that what is happening now is the end of the road and the end of the dark tunnel inside which the land, the people and the economy of Lebanon had been.

However, the [recent] decline which only the Lebanese pound experienced in relation to the dollar has brought up a question about whether [confidence in] that wager was beginning to wane and to be replaced by fear and apprehension. There is actually some truth, if not all the truth, in that conclusion. This is because the continued complications of the crisis, the fact that Israel is continuing to reveal its expansionist intentions and the continued fragmentation of Lebanese groups, have forced many people to express their fears about the future of the country and their doubts that it will survive as a united, independent country. Until political and military matters become clear, reference must be made to the fact that the high interest rate on the Lebanese pound--15 percent, the highest interest paid at the present time among other currencies--has helped prevent further decline in the rate of exchange of the Lebanese pound.

8592

CSO: 4404/668

CHARTER OF THE MASS ORGANIZATIONS FOR PEOPLE'S EDUCATION, MOBILIZATION

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 27-31 Jul, 2-3 Aug 82 p 2

[Text] The Military Committee for National Salvation:

Considering the Constitutional Charter of the Military Committee for National Salvation, dated 25 April 1981;

Considering the deliberations of the Military Committee of National Salvation of 14-16 August 1981;

Considering Ordinance No 82.092 of 23 July 1982, amending and implementing Article 6 of the Constitutional Charter of 25 April 1981;

Considering Discussion Memorandum No 005/CMSN of 11 November 1981 on the statutes and the internal regulations of the mass education programs;

has considered and adopted the following:

Article 1 - The statutes and regulations whose texts follow are hereby adopted:

Preamble - Considering the profound aspirations of our people to peace, justice, and social well-being;

Considering the unshakeable will of our people to build a united, sovereign, and prosperous Mauritania;

Considering the objectives sought by the national uprising of 10 July 1978, that is, an end to the war, economic recovery, and the establishment of democratic institutions;

Conscious of the absence of programs making it possible for our people to participate in the work of national development;

Conscious of the political vacuum prejudicial to the achievement of the objectives of 10 July 1978 and which constitutes a favorable climate for the activity of the domestic and foreign enemies of our country;

Concerned with educating and mobilizing our masses to combat illiteracy and underdevelopment;

Concerned with organizing them in order to prepare them for the effective and responsible exercise of national political life.

Chapter I - Establishment, Objectives, Resources

Article 1 - Mass education programs are hereby established and will be put in place throughout the territory of our nation.

Article 2 - The mass education programs aim to:

--Bring the Mauritanian people to participate in national development;

--Prepare them for effective and responsible participation in the political life of the country.

Article 3 - The mass education programs involve all Mauritanian citizens.

Article 4 - The resources available to the mass education programs are provided by state grants in the form of gifts, appropriations, subscriptions, and other income drawn from the activities of these programs. Financial regulations will determine the rules for the management of these resources.

Chapter II - Organization

1 - At the National Level

Article 6 - The mass education programs are an integral part of the permanent structure of the Military Committee for National Salvation. They are led and controlled by an executive committee composed as follows:

President - the permanent secretary of the Military Committee for National Salvation [CMSN],

Vice President - the deputy permanent secretary of the CMSN,

Members - the CMSN secretaries for orientation, organization, economy and voluntary action, culture, Islamic morality, and social action.

In the absence of the permanent secretary and his deputy and acting president of the committee will be one of the secretaries in the order listed above.

Article 6 - The executive committee is authorized to organize any form of activity within the framework of the mass education programs (lectures, seminars, meetings, etc).

Article 7 - The executive committee may provide, if necessary, for one or several committees to assist its work. These committees will be designated by the permanent structure of the Military Committee for National Salvation, on the nomination of its president.

- a) The premanent secretary of the CMSN is responsible for the activities of the permanent structure of the CMSN and coordinates the activity of the different secretaries placed under his authority. The permanent secretary of the CMSN is responsible for control and coordination of the mass education programs.
- b) The secretary for orientation is responsible for research, mass education programs, and foreign relations activity.
- c) The secretary for organization is responsible for the organization, establishment, and periodic replacement of the governing bodies of the mass education programs. He is also responsible for providing the initiative, the follow-up, and the implementation of the programs for mass education.
- d) The secretary for economy and voluntary action is responsible for economic education, preparation and follow-up on the implementation of the national programs for voluntary action, and the preparation of programs in the economic sector and their follow-up. He advises and assists the appropriate national and local government offices in the field of production and supply.
- e) The secretary for culture, Islamic morality, and social action is responsible, in collaboration with the appropriate national government offices, for the preparation and follow-up on Islamic education and morality, the people's well-being and social progress, the application and follow-up of programs relative to cultural independence and development. He will arrange for liaison with other offices in the social field.

II - At the Reginal or District Level

Article 9 - At the level of each region and district a regional committee will be formed, composed of the following: a president, a vice president, a member for encouraging initiative, a member in charge of vigilance, a member in charge of mass action, a member in charge of finance, a member in charge of supply, a member in charge of youth affairs. The members of the regional committee are listed above in the order of replacement for the president in all matters concerning the mass education programs.

Article 10 - The president of the regional committee will be the commander of the military region or, if there is no commander, the governor of the region. In case the regional committee is presided over by the commander of the military region, the governor is vice president. In case the regional committee is presided over by the governor, the deputy to the governor who acts for him and his absence is the vice president. All other members of the regional committees are appointed by a simple majority by the departmental committees.

Article 11 - The term of members appointed to the regional committees is 2 years.

Article 12 - The regional committee is responsible for following and applying national policy in all fields, applying the directives of the permanent secretariat of the Military Committee of National Salvation, preparing and

applying mass education programs in the framework of the regional action plan, coordinating and organizing the activity of the committees, preparing and organizing regional conferences. To do this, the various duties of the members of the regional committee are divided as follows:

a) The president of the regional committee supervises and coordinates the activity of the members of the regional committee, presides over the activity of the members of the regional committee, presides over its meetings and signs correspondence addressed to the permanent secretary of the CMSN. He sends a bi-monthly report on the activity of the regional committee to the CMSN secretariat.

b) The vice president of the regional committee assists the president and replaces him in case of absence or his inability to function.

c) The member in charge of encouraging initiative is responsible for following and applying national programs for the encouragement of initiative and preparing and executing, after receiving the approval of the regional committee, programs for regional encouragement of initiative, notably in the fields of culture, economic education, and health education.

d) The member in charge of vigilance is responsible for working toward strengthening the security of the country in general and of the region in particular, watching over the application of national decisions in the political, economic, and social fields and in the field of Islamic morality.

e) The member in charge of action is responsible for following up on the execution of the national program for voluntary action as far as his region is concerned, preparing and applying regional programs with the approval of the regional committee, and coordinating regional voluntary action.

f) The member in charge of finance is responsible for the management of property and resources belonging to or placed at the disposition of the mass education programs.

g) The member in charge of supply is responsible for defining policy for the supply of food and products of basic necessity in the region, in collaboration with regional authorities; following up on the implementation of this policy and reporting regularly on it to the regional committee; studying and proposing to the committee a policy aimed at the development and pricing of regional production.

h) The member in charge of youth affairs is responsible for following up on the implementation of regional programs for youth, preparing and implementing regional programs approved by the regional committee, and studying and proposing solutions for the social problems of youth.

Article 13 - The regional committee may create one or several committees to assist it, provided the purpose and composition of these committees are submitted to the permanent secretariat of the Military Committee of National Salvation.

Article 14 - The regional committee can organize any form of activity within the framework of the mass education programs.

III - At the Departmental Level

Article 15 - At the level of each department a departmental committee, composed as follows, will be established: a president, a member in charge of encouraging initiative, a member in charge of vigilance, a member in charge of mass action, a member in charge of finance, a member in charge of supply, a member in charge of youth affairs. The members of the departmental committee are listed in the order of replacement for the president in all matters concerning the mass education programs.

Article 16 - The president of the departmental committee is the perfect of the department. All other members of the departmental committees are appointed by a simple majority of the zonal bureaus.

Article 17 - The term of members appointed to the departmental committee is 2 years.

Article 18 - The departmental committee has the same prerogatives as the regional committee, at the departmental level. The members of the departmental committees have the same duties as their opposite members in the regional committees, at the departmental level.

Article 19 - The departmental committee may create one or several committees to assist it, provided the purpose and composition of these committees are submitted to the regional committee.

IV - In the Case of a Region Having a Single Department

Article 20 - In a region having a single department the departmental committee is abolished. Only the regional committee will remain, with the tasks and prerogatives set forth in Articles 10, 12, 13, and 14.

Article 21 - In a region having a single department the central prefect is second vice president of the regional committee if the latter is presided over by the governor and third vice president if the regional committee is presided over by a military region commandant. All the other members are designated with the same titles as the members of a departmental committee.

V - At the Zone Level

Article 22 - The zone is a regrouping for an evident purpose of all of the people situated in a given geographic area. In the countryside the rural zone may correspond either to an officially constituted administrative unit (a sub-division [arrondissement]) or to a geographic or human entity having certain criteria in common: location, activities, centers of interest, etc. An urban zone is the term used to designate a regrouping of the population, on the same basis as in the case of a rural zone, in a certain number of residential areas of a single city or town and its immediate vicinity.

Article 23 - The designation of zones and the choice of the centers to which they are attached will be decided on by the established regional committees and approved by the executive committee of the CMSN.

Article 24 - Every administrative sub-division [arrondissement] corresponds to at least a zone. Every residential area is required to be attached to one zone and one zone only.

Article 25 - At the level of each zone a zonal bureau will be formed, composed as follows: a coordinator and his deputy, a member in charge of the encouragement of initiative and his deputy, a member in charge of vigilance and his deputy, a member in charge of supply and his deputy, a member in charge of public health and his deputy.

Article 26 - The zonal bureau, excepting the coordinator if he is the chief of the sub-division, will be appointed by the members of the bureaus in the residential areas belonging to the zone. When the zone contains no more than a single residential area, the zonal bureau shall be the only office in it. Its members are designated by the chiefs of cells.

[No Article 27 appears in the text]

Article 28 - The term of members appointed to the zonal bureau is 2 years.

Article 29 - The zonal bureau is responsible for directing and coordinating the activity of the bureaus in residential areas, distributing and explaining the instructions of higher echelons, proposing and following up on the implementation of the programs designated for the zone. When the zone contains no more than a single residential area, the zonal bureau will also have duties and prerogatives of a residential area bureau.

VI - At the Residential Area Level

Article 30 - The residential area is composed to 10 cells. On an exceptional basis it may contain up to 13 cells and a minimum of seven cells.

Article 31 - The members of the residential area bureau are chiefs of cells holding the following positions: a coordinator and his deputy, a member in charge of encouragement of initiative and his deputy, a member in charge of vigilance and his deputy, a member in charge of supply and his deputy, and a member in charge of public health in the residential area and his deputy.

Article 32 - The residential area bureau has the role of organization, education, and mobilization. The coordinator or his deputy shall direct and coordinate the activity of the bureau members and shall preside over its meetings. The member responsible for encouragement of initiative or his deputy will be charged with cultural activity and morale. They will organize and supervise events having a cultural and sporting character. They will give life to the meetings and organize other functions to explain and distribute national instructions and programs. The member in charge of supply or his deputy will be responsible for fighting against speculation

and shortages of goods and work toward the end of ensuring regular supplies for the people. They will supervise the occasional or regular distribution of gifts, assistance, and help. The member in charge of public health or his deputy will be responsible for ensuring the cleanliness and proper sanitation of the residential area and for meetings and education programs on health matters.

VII - At the Cell Level

Article 33 - The cell shall be composed of 10 families. On an exceptional basis it may contain up to 13 families and a minimum of seven families. The heads of the 10 families appoint a cell leader.

Article 34 - The cell leader is its spokesman. He assists the different members and helps them in the performance of their civic and moral duties.

Article 35 - The term of a cell leader is 2 years.

Section A - Conference and General Assemblies

I - National Conference

Article 36 - The national conference is an important element in the mass education programs. In principle it meets once a year. Extraordinary meetings of the national conference are decided on by the Permanent Committee of the CMSN, at the proposal of the permanent secretary. The date of the national conference and the agenda are decided on by the Permanent Committee at the proposal of the permanent secretary.

Article 37 - The national conference studies and gives its views on the general orientation of the programs, the report of the prime minister on government action, the report of the permanent secretary of the CMSN on the activity of the mass education programs. In addition, the national conference makes suggestions on future prospects. The conclusions of the national conference are submitted to the Military Committee of National Salvation for decision.

Article 38 - The members attending the national conference are: the president, the permanent secretary of the CMSN; the vice president, the deputy permanent secretary; the members, the presidents of the regional committees, the members of the cabinet, high officials having ministerial rank, the secretary in charge of orientation, the secretary in charge of organization, the secretary in charge of the economy and voluntary action, the secretary in charge of culture, Islamic morality, and social action, the vice presidents of the regional committees, the members in charge of the encouragement of initiative in the regional committees, the members in charge of the encouragement of initiative in the departmental committees, a delegate for each 20 residential areas.

Article 39 - The president of the Military Committee for National Salvation shall solemnly open and close the national conference.

Article 40 - The costs of transportation and lodging for the members of the national conference shall be chargeable to the permanent secretariat of the Military Committee of National Salvation.

II - Regional Conferences

Article 41 - The regional conference is a hierarchical body in the mass education program. It meets once a year. Extraordinary meetings will be decided on by the regional committee after obtaining the views of the permanent secretary of the CMSN. Its agenda shall be prepared and transmitted by the regional committee at least 1 month before the date provided for when an ordinary meeting is involved.

Article 42 - The regional conference shall study and give its views on:

- 1) The report of the president of the regional committee on the activity of the mass education programs at the regional level;
- 2) Government activity at the regional level, as presented by the governor of the region;
- 3) The difficulties and potentialities of action to be carried out at the regional level, preparing a regional action plan which includes departmental programs. The regional action plan will be submitted for the approval of the permanent secretary of the CMSN.

Article 43 - The members of the regional conference are: the members of the regional committee and the members of the departmental committees. For the regions having a single department the members of zonal bureaus are members of the regional conference. Observers at the regional conference include the representative of the permanent secretariat of the CMSN and the chiefs of regional service offices.

Article 44 - The regional conference is presided over by the regional committee. Every 2 years, when the regional conference is held, the members of the departmental committees shall designate the new regional committee. [Text as published is incomplete; text of Article 49 as published indicates what probable text of Article 44 should be].

Article 45 - Transportation costs for the members of the regional conference shall be taken care of by the regional administrative office.

III - Departmental Conference

Article 46 - The departmental conference is a hierarchical body in the mass education program. It shall be held once a year. Extraordinary meetings shall be decided on by the departmental committee with the advice of the regional committee. The agenda shall be prepared and submitted by the departmental committee at least 2 weeks before the date fixed, when it concerns an ordinary meeting.

Article 47 - The departmental conference shall study and give its views on the report of the president of the departmental committee on the activity of the mass education programs at the departmental level and the government's action at the departmental level as presented by the prefect. The departmental conference shall prepare its programs as constituted by activities concerning the department. These programs shall be submitted for decision to the regional conference.

Article 48 - The members of the departmental conference shall include the members of the departmental committee and the members of zonal bureaus. Attending as observers shall be a representative of the permanent secretariat of the CMSN, a representative of the regional committee, and the chiefs of departmental service offices.

Article 49 - The departmental conference shall be presided over by the departmental committee. Every 2 years, when the departmental conference is held, the delegates of the zonal bureaus shall designate the new departmental committee.

Article 50 - The transportation and living costs of participants in the departmental conference shall be chargeable to the department.

IV - General Assemblies

Article 51 - The zonal bureaus shall hold general assemblies in which all the members of residential area bureaus shall participate. These general assemblies take place when important decisions or communications are disseminated. The participants are informed of the holding of a general assembly 1 week in advance. The general assembly shall designate the presiding officers of the zone.


Article 53 - The residential area bureaus shall hold general assemblies in which all families living in the residential area and administratively registered by the competent authority shall take part. These general assemblies take place on the occasion of the redesignation of officers in the residential area bureaus or when important communications are transmitted. In the course of these general assemblies the families participating shall designate their representatives.

V - Participation in the Hierarchy

Article 53 - Participation in the mass education programs is open to every man or woman who is a Mauritanian citizen.

Article 54 - The criteria for accession to any political or administrative responsibility are: an unconditional commitment to the choices and programs selected by the national leadership, the availability to serve the people, patriotism, competence and the knowledge of how to do things, moral integrity, moral and intellectual honesty.

Article 55 - The hierarchical organization of the mass education programs is determined as follows:



KEY:

1. Military Committee for National Salvation
2. National Conference
3. Permanent Secretariat, Military Committee for National Salvation
4. Regional Conference
5. Regional Committee
6. Departmental Conference
7. Departmental Committee
8. General Assembly
9. Zonal Bureau
10. General Assembly
11. Residential Area Bureau
12. Cell

Article 56 - Each leadership body is collectively and individually responsible to the immediately higher body. All bodies in the mass education programs are collectively and individually responsible to the permanent secretariat of the CMSN.

Article 57 - Respect for superiors and for the hierarchical chain of authority is obligatory.

Chapter IV - Eligibility [sic; logically should be Chapter VI]

Article 58 - Except as provided in Articles 5, 10, 16, 21 and 26 candidacy to all bodies in the mass education programs is freely open.

Article 59 - Candidates to the regional or departmental committees, to the zonal bureaus, and to the residential area bureaus must be local residents.

Article 60 - Administrative and territorial authorities (chiefs of subdivisions, prefects, governors, and commanders of military regions) are not eligible for election or to elect others to office.

Article 61 - Except as provided in Articles 56, 57, and 58 above, every Mauritanian citizen enjoying his civic rights may vote and is eligible to hold elective office.

Article 62 - Simultaneously holding more than one function within the mass education programs is prohibited. Any person appointed to a higher level office will be automatically replaced in a lower level office. The conditions for replacement of an official are the same as those for appointment.

Chapter V [sic; logically should be Chapter VII] - Dissolution and Replacements

Article 63 - The dissolution and use of funds and property of the mass education programs may be determined by the CMSN on the initiative of its president.

Article 64 - The permanent committee of the CMSN on the initiative of the permanent secretary may decide the dissolution of any office which is not playing its role appropriately in the framework of the mass education programs.

Article 65 - No change in the composition of a regional or departmental committee may be made without the agreement of the permanent secretary of the CMSN. In the case of resignation or prolonged inability to serve of a committee member the permanent secretary may decide on his replacement. On the initiative of the permanent secretary of the CMSN the permanent committee of the CMSN may decide on the dissolution of a departmental committee which is not properly carrying out its mission.

Article 66 - No change in the composition of a residential area of zonal bureau may take place without the agreement of the departmental committee. In the case of resignation or prolonged inability to serve of a bureau member the departmental committee may decide on his replacement. The permanent secretary of the CMSN may decide on the dissolution of any bureau that is not performing properly, on the proposition of the departmental committee.

Article 67 - The appointment of officers of a previously-dissolved office shall take place under the same conditions as the original appointment.

Article 68 - Mauritian groups living abroad should be organized in the framework of the mass education programs. The provisions for the integration of such groups in the mass education programs will be the object of a special law and regulation.

Chapter VI [sic; logically should be Chapter VIII] - Amendment Process

Article 69 - The initiative for the amendment of the present statutes belongs to the Military Committee of National Salvation. The permanent secretary of the Military Committee of National Salvation may make proposals in this sense.

Article 70 - The present statutes are applicable after the date of their approval by the Military Committee of National Salvation.

Section B - Regulations for the Functioning of the Mass Education Programs

Preamble - The regulations, the statutes, the decisions of the Military Committee of National Salvation, the recommendations of the national conference, and the instructions of the executive committee constitute the compilation of documents having the force of law which every responsible leader must know and apply. In the application of these laws the responsible leader should constantly and in all circumstances recognize the spirit and the profound thought in the mass education programs which constitute a political frame of reference, a framework of work and of participation, and a springboard to normal democratic life.

Chapter I - Meetings and Correspondence

Article 1 - The executive committee shall meet once every 2 weeks with the permanent secretary or his deputy presiding.

Article 2 - The secretaries of the various services who are members of the executive committee shall meet once a week with the president or the acting president of the committee presiding, as provided in Article 5 of the statutes.

Article 3 - The regional committee shall meet in ordinary session once every 2 months. It may hold extraordinary meetings at the request of its president or two-thirds of the elected members. The quorum necessary for the meetings to be valid is two-thirds of the members. Decisions shall be taken by a simple majority of those present.

Article 4 - The president of the regional committee shall transmit a bimonthly report on the activity of the regional committee to the executive committee.

Article 5 - The departmental committee shall meet in ordinary session once a month. It may hold extraordinary meetings at the request of its president or of two-thirds of the elected members. The quorum required for the meetings to be valid is two-thirds of the members. Decisions shall be taken by a simple majority of those present.

Article 6 - The president of the departmental committee shall transmit a bimonthly report of the activity of the departmental committee to the regional committee and to the executive committee.

Article 7 - The zonal bureau shall meet once every 2 weeks. It may hold extraordinary meetings at the request of its coordinator or of two-thirds of the elected members. The quorum required for the meetings to be valid is two-thirds of the members. Decisions shall be taken by a simple majority of those present.

Article 8 - The quorum required for the validity of conferences and general assemblies is three-fifths of the members.

Article 9 - The results of regional and departmental conferences shall be sent to the executive committee within 10 days after the closing of the regional or departmental conference.

Article 10 - All correspondence addressed to a bureau or to a committee shall be sent to the address of the highest-ranking official.

Article 11 - Any office which does not receive a response to its correspondence or its requests from the next higher level after 2 weeks may directly contact the executive committee.

Chapter III - Discipline and Punishment

Article 12 - Any assembly or taking of an individual or collective position on a racial, tribal, or regional basis is prohibited. Any propaganda making a cult out of the ideology of individuals or states is prohibited. Any irresponsible criticism should be opposed. Every citizen and every civilian or military leader should accept the decisions made by the national leadership. Within the framework of the mass education programs every citizen shall respect and carry out the decisions of the majority.

Article 13 - Those persons contravening the principles stated in the previous article and in the present regulations are liable to the following punishments: warning, a finding of blame, temporary suspension from all activity within the program, or definitive suspension.

Article 14 - No punishment or proposed punishment may be approved except on the basis of a detailed and precise statement of the case relating the circumstances and the seriousness of the error committed.

Article 15 - All offices within the mass education program are authorized to apply the following punishments: warning and a finding of blame. The departmental committee may order a suspension for up to 2 months. The regional committee may order a suspension for up to 5 months. The executive committee may order a suspension for up to 1 year. Definitive suspension shall be ordered by the permanent committee of the CMSN on the proposal of the national conference. The zonal bureau shall inform the departmental committee and the general assembly of any punishment ordered and the reasons for it. The departmental committee and the regional committee shall do the same by informing the executive committee and the national conference. The executive committee shall report in the same circumstances to the Military Committee of National Salvation and the national conference.

Article 16 - For a punishment to be decided on at least a two-thirds majority of the office considering the matter shall be required.

Article 17 - If an office is not authorized to order a given punishment, it shall propose the punishment to the next higher office, which shall decide the matter or which, after having given its advice, shall pass it to the next higher office.

Article 18 - Any citizen whose punishment has been ordered by a given office may appeal to the next higher office, which shall pronounce judgment.

Chapter III - Manner of Appointment

Article 19 - The appointment of officials must respect the principles of eligibility set forth in Chapter IV of the statutes of the mass education programs.

Article 20 - The allocation of delegates to the national conference shall be decided on by the executive committee in accordance with Article 38 of the statutes of the mass education programs.

Article 21 - The delegates to the national conference and the members of regional and departmental committees, zonal bureaus, and residential area bureaus shall be elected by the competent conference or general assembly.

Article 22 - Voting members of the regional or departmental conference shall propose for each office which they are empowered to elect a list of candidates equal to at least twice the number established for that office. This list

must reach the executive committee 2 months before the elections. The lists which are definitively decided on shall be published by the permanent secretariat of the CMSN 1 month before the holding of each conference.

Article 23 - The regional or departmental conference shall choose, on proposal of the representative of the executive committee, an appointments committee. This committee shall choose from the officially approved list the members of the future office which it will submit for the approval of the conference. The appointments committee may, in case there are not enough candidates, take the initiative to propose other candidates.

Article 24 - Delegates of the zonal bureaus who elect the departmental committee are designated on the basis of one to three per bureau by the coordinators of the residential area bureaus meeting in the general assembly. They have as many votes as there are residential areas attached to the zone. The allocation of votes among the different delegates shall be made following the vote. A zone having only one residential area shall have a single delegate from the zonal bureau who shall have a single vote.

Article 25 - The zonal bureau and the eventual delegate or delegates to the national conference shall be elected on the nomination of an appointments committee chosen from among the members of the residential area bureaus of the same zone, meeting as the general assembly.

Article 26 - The residential area bureau shall be made up of 10 cell representatives. The allocation of responsibilities shall be made among the members of the bureau and submitted for the approval of the general assembly in the presence of a supervisory committee designated by the permanent secretariat of the Military Committee of National Salvation.

Article 27 - The designation of cell leaders shall take place in the presence of a supervisory committee by a general assembly composed of heads of families. Family identification cards shall be distributed to the families living in the residential area, based on the administrative registers. Each family shall complete its card and register on it the name of its cell leader, who will accept and countersign it. Information from completed cards shall be held in a special register which shall be maintained at the departmental level. The completed cards shall be held by the residential area coordinators. Blank cards shall be held by the member for finance of the regional committee.

Article 28 - In case a regular office of the mass education programs has not been established or is not functioning normally any representative of the executive committee or any committee designated by the executive committee may be substituted for the missing office and direct all of the work concerned.

Article 29 - All reports on the establishment and re-election of officers of the various programs shall be sent to the executive committee and to other offices in the hierarchical order.

Article 30 - In the case of a temporary or permanent change of residence the family head is required to present himself to the cell leader in the temporary or permanent place of residence, bearing his family identification card. However, participation in voting cannot be accomplished unless the date of the last registration was more than 6 months before the date of the vote.

Article 31 - Specific arrangements affecting the application of time periods and procedures can be taken on the occasion of the first establishment of the office by the executive committee.

Chapter IV - Inspections and Controls

Article 32 - In accordance with Article 6 of the statutes the executive committee may organize missions of inspection or of control. The program and purpose of each mission shall be determined in each particular case.

Article 33 - The reports which the missions of inspection or of control are required to prepare shall be handled by the executive committee, which will direct the decisions to be taken.

Article 2 - The present document will be published according to the urgency procedure in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL.

Nouakchott, 24 July 1982

For the Military Committee of National Salvation

The president, Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla

5170
CSO: 4519/301

RESTRICTIONS ON DIPLOMATIC PUBLICATIONS

Doha AL-'AHD in Arabic No 380, 20 Jul 82 p 5

[Article: "Regulation of the Publication and Distribution of Diplomatic Printed Materials in Qatar"]

[Text] His Highness Shaykh Khalifah ibn Hamad Al Thani, the Amir and prime minister of Qatar, has issued a decree concerning regulation of the publication and distribution of printed materials and publications by diplomatic and consular missions and bodies accredited to the government of Qatar.

The decree stipulates that these missions and bodies are not permitted to publish or distribute any printed materials or publications unless they have received prior written approval from the Office of Printing and Publishing in the Ministry of Information, on the basis of a recommendation made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is to be on the basis of the principle of reciprocity.

The decree also stipulates that the written request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs be accompanied by ten copies of each publication or body of printed matter.

The decree also stipulates that diplomatic and consular missions and bodies accredited to the government of Qatar be exempt from censorship of films, slides, and other such presentations if they are intended to be shown at their official headquarters and intended to be shown only to diplomatic and administrative officials who work there. The condition is that this be on the basis of the principle of reciprocity.

It is also stipulated that if such a presentation is intended to be shown to people other than members of the mission or body or at a place other than the official headquarters, then it will be necessary to obtain permission from the appropriate censorship committee at the Office of Printing and Publishing.

One of the articles of the decree stipulates that, if the provisions of the decree are violated, the Office of Printing and Publishing, after taking into consideration the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will be permitted to stop the publication or distribution of any publication or body of printed material or cancel permission to show a presentation.

The final article of this decree stipulates that the decree be in effect as of the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.

9468

CSO: 4404/609

CONTINUING DETERIORATION OF OLD SECTION IN AL-DAMMAM CRITICIZED

Al-Dammam AL-YAWM in Arabic 29 Jun 82 p 7

[Article by Muhammad al-Ghadir: "The Old Section of al-Dumman Is Half Abandoned and Half Inhabited!"]

[Text] The abandoned homes have come to constantly cause the inhabitants to be afraid!

The inhabitants are demanding that the municipality either tear down the abandoned homes or eliminate the danger to them caused by these homes.

The old section of al-Dammam is a section which witnessed the first beginnings of the city of al-Dammam, but right now it is in a state which could be described as one of advanced old age. Its homes, streets, alleys, and marketplaces have become old, tired, and worn. They are not in keeping with the old section's prominent location in the center of the city.

For this reason the government has thought of expropriating many locations in the old section of al-Dammam. In fact, some places have been expropriated and their owners have been compensated. However, the problem has remained in existence. The inhabitants have abandoned their homes, and their former homes have become crumbling and abandoned structures which are open on all sides.

But not all of the homes have been expropriated. Some of the abandoned homes are right next door to homes which are full of people living in them, and this makes the problem even more complicated.

This section's inhabitants have complained about this situation, have gotten in touch with us several times, and have unloaded on us their bitterness about it. We often promised them that we would bring up this problem. However, we preferred to wait and see whether or not the municipality would take action and either tear down these houses or at least do something about them. But our wait became a long one--more than 6 months--and the complaints began to multiply.

Our correspondent has made some inspection tours in the old sections of al-Dammam, and this is his report that we are publishing. The purpose of the report is not to slander the municipality's achievements, concern, and desire [to do more such achievements]. We are publishing the report because we feel that if these homes are allowed to remain in this state, they will constitute a danger for the inhabitants and will cause them a great deal of inconvenience. The old section of al-Dammam suffers from a great problem which is felt only by its inhabitants whose property, unlike the property of their neighbors, has not been expropriated. The homes which have been expropriated have ended up becoming crumbling structures and have become a favorite haunt for stray dogs and insects. Both their doors and windows are wide open. They also have become a playing area for children who spend their spare time there and who nowadays have a lot of such spare time because of their summer vacation.

The thing that has impelled us to bring up this problem is the fact that many complaints are being voiced by the inhabitants of the old sections of al-Dammam whose property has not been expropriated. The result has been that the abandoned homes which are next to their homes have become a plague to them. So far about 6 months have gone by, and the municipality so far has not made a single move in the direction of tearing down these expropriated dwellings. I am afraid that the situation will go on like this. Why should these homes be allowed to remain open for any humans or animals to come and go as they please? We are therefore demanding, as the inhabitants of the old section of al-Dammam are demanding, that these homes be immediately torn down or that solutions be found to this problem which will guarantee that the abandoned homes will not be used improperly.

When our wise and judicious government expropriated these dwellings, the purpose of this action was to promote the peace of mind and happiness of our citizens by establishing parks, marketplaces, and parking areas [where the abandoned homes now are]. Such facilities would no doubt prove to be of benefit to our citizens. This is why we have high hopes that our authorities will either agree to tear down these abandoned homes or at least board them up. During my tour in some of the old sections of al-Dammam, I interviewed a number of persons living there and they told me what problems they are having because of these abandoned homes. Here is what Mr Sharidah Khalifah al-Dawsari said about it: "We are faced with many problems because of these abandoned homes. Many children run around and play inside them. Because of this--God forbid--some accidents could happen because these homes are very old. I hope that the authorities will bear in mind these dangers which threaten our children and will undertake to tear down the homes as soon as possible." We also talked to Mr Samir Yusuf, who said: "The existence of these homes, after being expropriated this way, constitutes a great danger for us and causes us to constantly be afraid, especially at night. For this reason I demand that the authorities hurry up and tear them down."

Another of our citizens, Mr Du'ayj Khalifah al-Dawsari, talked about the condition of these abandoned homes and said: "The condition of these homes, which have no inhabitants, constitutes a great disadvantage to us--the inhabitants who live next door to these abandoned homes. I urge that the authorities hurry up and tear them down because they have been in this state for about 6 months now."

Mr Muhammad Rashid al-'Idan had bitter words to say about these abandoned homes: "These abandoned homes have ended up giving us rates and insects. In addition to this, some of the people in this section--may God forbid them--have used these homes as a garbage dump. We find them throwing garbage and trash inside these homes. In fact, the workers employed by the Municipality of al-Dammam [to pick up trash and garbage] have also used these abandoned homes as a place to dump the trash and garbage which they have collected from the homes which are still inhabited. I have seen this with my own eyes. For this reason I demand that those responsible for municipal and village affairs speedily tear down these abandoned homes. Frankly my family members have become afraid of these abandoned homes, especially because the nature of my work demands that I travel alot. I have high hopes that the authorities will do something."

Mr Ibrahim Salim had the following to say: "I had 1,500 riyals stolen from me, and these abandoned homes were the reason why this happend. I believe that the person who broke into my house did so via one of these abandoned homes. The reason I think this is that I was at work [when this happened], and when I returned I found the doors to my home ina damaged condition. We hope that the authorities will take quick action and tear down these homes."

Mr Husayn Muhammad al-Dawsari said: "These homes have become a haven for harmful insects and rats. Are strangers and outsiders entering these abandoned homes? Furthermore, these abandoned homes have come to cause us to constantly be afraid, especially at night. People passing by these abandoned homes have the feeling that they are being approached or followed by strangers. For this reason, we demand that the authorities tear them down, especially since they have been in this state for 6 months now."

9468

CSO: 4404/589

NATURE OF PRINCE 'ABDALLAH'S RECENT SHUTTLE REVIEWED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 712, 4-10 Aug 82 pp 36, 37

/Article by Muhammad Jum'ah: "'Abdallah in Baghdad and Damascus: Patching up the Eastern Front"/

/Text/ It happened that neither the press nor the radio services gave any details on the important conversations the "man of difficult missions" held with Presidents Saddam Husayn and Hafiz al-Asad.

The new agencies just recorded the news of the visit to the two fraternal countries, as well as his highness' statement denying that his visit was aimed at "mediating" between the Two Arab countries, since no one had asked him to do so.

It was not strange that this important visit should be surrounded with such deliberate media silence, because the kingdom's moves in the political context, at the outset, proceed in accordance with a plan for "quiet diplomacy" which was aimed at deeds, not words and actions, not propaganda. This was one point. The other was that the turbulent moment of history the Arab nation is passing through required that one turn to any remedy that would heal Arab rifts, rather than aiming at the goal of achieving individual acts of heroism or personal leadership.

Therefore one can say that it was perhaps deliberate that this rapid shuttle trip was surrounded by such media secrecy. Its objective was to provide a climate which would make Prince 'Abdallah's mission a total success, without noise or dramatic gestures.

In spite of all this, Prince 'Abdallah's rounds at this time specifically, attain a national and Arab significance which cannot be lost on any political analyst, because the fact that His Royal Highness Prince 'Abdallah is going on them himself, at this decisive stage in both the course and destiny of Arab action, means that the kingdom is performing an active Arab "deed" as part of its efforts to contain the current Arab crisis and resolve it.

One can understand the dimensions of Prince 'Abdallah's visit to Baghdad and Damascus in the light of a group of important considerations which show the significance of rounds, which have been both rapid and important. These considerations are:

First, his royal highness' movements lies within a more comprehensive context which is embodied in a number of intensified efforts the kingdom has been making in the Arab and international arenas since the start of the Zionist invasion of Lebanon. In the course of these grave events, the kingdom acted from the position of its Arab and national responsibilities, bringing all its diplomatic weight to bear to contain the crisis, evict the Israeli enemy from Lebanon and save the Palestinian resistance first of all and Arab honor secondly. The kingdom left no method or approach to this end untested.

His Majesty King Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz made historic efforts which will be taken into account in the entire balance of Arab action.

His majesty the king expressed this role the kingdom has played and is playing in his important statement 2 weeks ago when he said "We have exerted, and still are exerting, intensified efforts, and are making real attempts, without letup, in all international contexts and in all political fields, to work to stifle Israel and its arrogance, to put a limit to its criminal aggression, and to make it draw its forces back beyond its borders. All we hope is that God will take us by the hand and crown our efforts and endeavors with success."

Prince 'Abdallah's movement is therefore a very important part of the more comprehensive activity the kingdom is carrying out in the Arab and international contexts both.

Second, the value and the dimensions of this visit lie in the fact that it is an expression of the will of the kingdom and of its brothers in the Gulf region along with it. The rapid shuttle carries with it the weight of the whole Gulf Cooperation Council, as it is close to a reflection of its will, and herein lie both its value and its importance.

Third, the artificial contradiction between Damascus and Baghdad must be eliminated now through a deliberate mutual act on the part of brethren and kin, because this contradiction has prompted the enemies of the Arab nation to have designs on both.

Iran, on the one hand, has the goal of humiliating and weakening Iraq. It is Iran which violated all international laws by invading Iraqi territory, although Iraq withdrew all its forces from Iran and called on international organizations to investigate this matter, and although Iran, along with some Arabs, declared that Iranian forces would stop at the international borders if Iraq withdrew its forces. It is the Iranian war machine which invaded Iraq 3 weeks ago and is threatening to reach Baghdad itself. That is, the peripheral contradiction between Damascus and Baghdad, which has been transformed into a radical one, has caused the Iranian military to have designs on one of the most important of Arab capitals, Baghdad.

In another area, while this contradiction has had its negative effects, its most important and serious effect has been to weaken the eastern front. This prompted Israel to have designs on the countries in this front. In a single year, Israel attacked the Iraqi nuclear reactor in Baghdad, then after that incorporated the Golan Heights in Syria, and is now encircling Beirut and attacking and destroying the Syrian missiles in the al-Biqa' plain. That is, through these military

operations, Israel has had the objective of crushing the Palestinian resistance militarily on the one hand, of weakening Syria on another, and thirdly of dictating its conditions to Lebanon in full. Israel would not have aspired to strike out at the resistance, weaken Damascus and cripple the Syrian war machine as it did had it not been for the fabricated contradiction between Damascus and Baghdad, which caused the weakening of the whole eastern front.

This means that Prince 'Abdallah's visit to these two Arab capitals specifically is fraught with special importance, in this grim moment of history, because it might constitute a ray of rapprochement between views on the Tigris and the Barada which could lead to the most significant results in the future. Among these results could be:

1. Stopping the Iranian military invasion of Iraq, out of respect for neighborly rights on the one hand and in response to the Islamic appeal to stop the war, in which there is neither victor nor vanquished.
2. Containing the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and saving the Palestinian resistance by supporting Damascus morally and militarily, on grounds that it is one of the most important confrontation states.
3. Giving promise of the formation of Arab "weight" on three axes, first the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, second the Damascus-Baghdad axis, and third Egypt. If Prince 'Abdallah's important rounds lead to a rapprochement in views in the future, so that it will be possible to hold an Arab meeting bringing Riyadh, Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo together, the Arab future, which is being threatened, will be saved, and the entire Palestine resistance will also be saved.

This means that the "diplomacy of solidarity" which the kingdom is embracing and applying in actual circumstances through a quiet, moderate, responsible policy, which is assuming one of its most important forms in Prince 'Abdallah's recent rounds, could produce common Arab action which would prepare for a successful Arab summit that would confront destiny and rescue the future.

Thus, one significant dimension of this trip is that it is a positive, effective step along the road toward solidarity at a time when Arab fragmentation has reached one of its worst stages.

His Highness Prince 'Abdallah stated this truth when he said "The sad situation the Arab world is going through at the present time and the designs it is confronting on account of its weakness are the cause of all the tragedies to which we see the Arab nation exposed. The cause of these tragedies is impulsiveness, which has turned side disputes into central ones, has made personal whims into national goals, and has turned personal moods into a platform for the people and a constitution for the nation, which has as a result overturned all balances and caused history to deviate from its proper path and the nation from the correct road."

This abrupt visit, about which sufficient notice has on purpose not been given, will in the near future produce "a different Arab format for a discourse of reason

between Baghdad and Damascus and will lay out the foundations for a broader dialogue which will include the kingdom, Iraq, Syria and Egypt, in order to save Lebanon, first of all, the Palestine resistance second of all, and all the Arabs before and after that."

If this happens--it will, God willing--it will be because of the policy of reason which the people in power in these countries are adopting--a policy which places Arab interests above all disputes, slogans and real or manufactured contradictions.

Israel today is roaming about Beirut at will. This is a dangerous precedent which had not happened before. Iran is threatening to go into Baghdad itself, and there is nothing to prevent Israel from attacking Amman or Damascus tomorrow or the day after, since it has given itself license to enter Beirut.

Therefore it is necessary to revive the eastern front today, not tomorrow, through responsible Arab action, because the countries and capitals are more threatened in this front than any place else.

Therefore it is necessary to have a discourse of reason among the capitals in this front, a profound study of the front's conditions, and a rapprochement of views among its leaders, and to set the national interests themselves above all transitory or permanent personal disputes.

This is the long-range goal of the rapid rounds which His Royal Highness Prince 'Abdallah has made. In the light of this goal, one can comprehend the "dimensions" of the kingdom's movement in this direction at this specific time.

Prince 'Abdallah remains the man of "the difficult mission" and his mission continues to have deeper Arab and national dimensions than it may seem to now. The near future will reveal the truth about the effort which this silent man who embodies quiet diplomacy in its deepest and at the same time most distinct form has made.

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TUNISIA

BRIEFS

WORLD BANK LOAN--\$30.5 million for a water supply project. The World Bank has granted Tunisia a loan of \$30.5 million for financing a sixth water supply project within the framework of the VI Development Plan (1982-1986). The overall cost of the project, which has to do with the creation, improvement or extension of water supply systems in 150 rural or semi-urban centers, is estimated at \$64 million. It is to be noted that the World Bank has contributed as much as \$95 million for financing 5 previous water supply projects in Tunisia. [Text] [Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 416, 23 Aug 82 p 40] 9772

PROSPHORIC ACID COMPLEX--A phosphoric acid complex at Skhirat. The Phosphoric Acid and Fertilizer Manufacturing Company (SIAPE) has already invited 6 foreign firms or groups to present bids to it, before last 30 June, for construction of a phosphoric acid complex for \$150 million, complete and ready to operate, probably in the vicinity of the oil port of Skhirat in the Sfax governorate. The project involves the completion of one unit for 1,000 gross tons of phosphoric acid; 2 units for 1,500 gross tons of sulphuric acid; 2 units for 500 gross tons of phosphoric acid; 2 sea-water desalinizing units; an electricity plant and an underwater pipeline from 4 to 5 kilometers long with a capacity of 20,000 cubic meters per hour. [20,000 m³/h] [Text] [Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 416, 23 Aug 82 p 40] 9772

NEW FACILITIES FOR RADES POWER STATION--Construction of installations for the Rades station. The Tunisian Gas and Electric Company (STEG) has just issued an invitation for bids for the construction of installations for the unloading and transport of heavy fuel oil intended to supply the new thermal power station of Rades. The transport will be done beginning at the port of La Goulette, located about 10 kilometers from the plant. [Text] [Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 416, 23 Aug 82 p 40] 9772

SEWAGE SYSTEMS PLANNED--Completion of sewage systems in 17 cities. The National Public Sanitation Office (ONAS) recently issued an invitation for bids on the completion of sewer systems in 17 cities of the country. These invitations for bids, which involve the completion of civil engineering work, the laying of pipes, and the supplying of equipment, involve 9 contracts: --Supply of pipes and related equipment for the sewage systems of the cities of Jemmel, Hammamet, Nabeul, Kasserine, Kairouan, and Tozeur; --Supply of installations of electromagnetic equipment for the systems of Kairouan, Tozeur, Hammamet, Mahdia,

Monastir, Sousse, Kalaa Kebira, and Akouda;--Supply of casts for the systems in Mahdia, Monastir, Sousse, Kalaa Kebira, and Akouda; --The construction of a purification plant at Tozeur, in a stabilization pond over an area of 10 hectares. The work includes general excavation, waterproofing, the supply and assembly of related material and still other projects for the same cities. [Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 416, 23 Aug 82 p 40]

TUNISIAN-FRENCH COOPERATION--New prospects for Tunisian-French cooperation. At Paris recently the Tunisian prime minister and his French opposite number signed a series of agreements on important subjects which had been discussed last February during the official visit of the French prime minister in Tunisia. The agreements signed deal with French interests in the tripartite Tunisian-French-Qatar Bank, for which only the procedural details remain to work out, and the creation of a French language television network, financed in large part by France. The two heads of government also examined the new prospects for Tunisian-French cooperation, particularly in the fields of energy, environment, and technical training. It should be noted that working groups for each sector, subordinate to the overall Tunisian-French mixed commission, are to be established for the study of these projects. [Text] [Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 416, 23 Aug 82 p 40] 9772

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN BDET--French share in the capital issue. Last 26 April, the Central Fund for French Economic Cooperation acquired a share in the capital issue of the Tunisian Economic Development Bank (BDET) where, after this increase, its share will be maintained at 6 percent. The French share in the BDET capital issue amounts to 4.25 million French francs. [Text] [Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 416, 23 Aug 82 p 40] 9772

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