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
10 August 1982

USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 4, Oct-Dec. 1981

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10 August 1982

USSR REPORT
PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST
No. 4, Oct-Dec 1981

Translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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U.S., PRC THREATS TO PEACE IN ASIA SURVEYED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 82 pp 3-16

[Text]

The Soviet Union is both a European and an Asian country. "Geographically, economically and historically Russia belongs not only to Europe, but also to Asia", wrote Lenin.¹ Therefore everything that has a bearing on the destiny of Asia cannot but be of interest and concern to the Soviet people.

In setting forth the foreign policy goals of the land of Soviets Lenin wrote that in Asia these goals are "the same as in Europe: peaceful coexistence with all peoples..."² From Lenin's Decree on Peace adopted immediately after the Great October Socialist Revolution to the Peace Programme for the 1980s put forward at the 26th Congress of the CPSU and implemented now, Soviet foreign policy in Asia has invariably pursued the goals of peace and security.

Leonid Brezhnev is a staunch champion of the cause of peace and security in Asia. "It is becoming increasingly clear," he said "that the real path to security in Asia is not the path of military blocs and groupings, not the path of confrontation of some states with others, but the path of goodneighbour cooperation between all countries that are interested in such cooperation."³

The Soviet Union believes that security in Asia should rest on such principles as refrainment from the use of force in relations between states, respect for sovereignty and inviolability of borders, non-interference in other states' affairs, broad development of economic and other forms of cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit.

The USSR is not a member of any military blocs in Asia and has proposed the disbanding of all blocs, the withdrawal of all troops from foreign territories, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the rejection of any foreign interference in the affairs of Asian states. The Soviet leadership believes that security in Asia should be based on the recognition and observance of such principles as the right of each nation to be master of its destiny, the inadmissibility of aggression, and the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means. Each people must enjoy the right to sovereignty over their natural resources and to socio-economic changes.

Leonid Brezhnev has reiterated: the Soviet position is that all interested states in Asia without exception should play a part in such a crucial matter as the promotion of peace and security in Asia. Notably, the USSR would welcome the participation of the People's Republic of China in any moves to strengthen security in the region.⁴

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 251.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 30, p. 365.

³ L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles (1972-1975)*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 31.

⁴ See in L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles (1972-1975)*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 315.

It is absurd to allege, as some people do, that appeals to ensure security in Asia are Soviet intrigues. The Soviet Union sincerely desires peace in Asia. It however, does not impose on others its remedies to the ills that plague Asia. The Soviet proposals are merely a general concept, whose further elaboration should preferably involve all Asian countries. As Leonid Brezhnev has said, "We call for an active, broad and constructive discussion which would help to deepen the understanding of urgent issues. The time has already come for this, the current situation in Asia affords adequate conditions for this. Asia can and must become a continent of peace, friendship and cooperation."⁵

The unswerving and consistent policy line of the CPSU aimed at safeguarding and consolidating peace in Asia has been set forth in the documents and proceedings of the 24th, 25th and 26th Party congresses. The Peace Programme endorsed by the 24th CPSU Congress mapped out a number of important security-building measures in Asia. The 25th Party Congress approved a programme of further struggle for peace and international cooperation which included the following task: "Work for ensuring Asian security based on joint efforts by the states of that continent."⁶ A number of further initiatives aimed at improving the climate in Asia were put forward at the 26th Party Congress.

Recent developments have highlighted the importance and urgency of the struggle for peace in Asia today.

The late 1970s saw fresh impressive victories scored by the progressive forces over imperialism and internal reaction in a number of Asian countries.

The further consolidation of world socialism was the main upshot of the signal successes scored by the peoples of Indochina in their revolutionary struggle. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, proclaimed on July 2, 1976, is one of the more populous countries (over 50 million people) in the community of socialist states. The Lao People's Democratic Republic, established in December 1975, has also joined the family of socialist countries. Proclaimed on January 7, 1979, in the wake of the people's revolution which toppled the reactionary pro-Peking regime, the People's Republic of Kampuchea has also embarked upon the road toward genuine socialism.

On April 27, 1978, a popular-democratic revolution triumphed in Afghanistan. In December 1979 the Afghan working masses dealt a crushing blow to the anti-popular clique which had sought to frustrate the gains of the April Revolution. Today they are firmly repulsing the attacks of the foreign-backed counterrevolutionaries against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The revolution in Iran which brought down the Shah and proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Iran on April 1, 1979 is of a special nature. However complex and contradictory, this revolution is essentially anti-imperialist, although the internal and external reaction seeks to alter its character.

An increasingly important role is being played by the independent, peaceable foreign policy of India which stands in the way of imperialist designs in South Asia. A stronger voice of protest against imperialist *diktat* is being raised in the Arab East, in the countries of the Indian Ocean, by the democratic forces in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and many other countries.

⁵ L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles, (1972-1975)*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 359.

⁶ *The 25th Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1976, p. 32.

The imperialists are losing ground in Asia. Alarmed by this process, they are making frantic efforts to slow down and arrest their downfall, and retrieve at least some of the lost positions.

Unable to oppose single-handedly the current positive changes in Asia and throughout the world, the imperialists badly needed allies to oppose the forces of progress and peace. They have found such allies in the right-wing nationalist and pro-imperialist faction in the Chinese leadership.

The Reagan Administration has gone much farther than its predecessors in its policy of rapprochement with China. The visit of US Secretary of State A. Haig to Peking in June 1981 marked a new phase in US-China relations, with increased emphasis put on the military aspects of their partnership. While as recently as a year ago the United States suggested selling China "dual-purpose" technology which could be put to civilian and military use, now A. Haig told the Chinese that the US was ready to sell China modern offensive weapons.

The talks between A. Haig and the Chinese leaders also covered the problems of "military planning", which included above all plans of "containing" the Soviet Union, coordination of Washington and Peking moves in the undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and their joint aid to the Pol Pot gangs and Khmer reactionaries in their struggle against the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

All this offers convincing proof that the more aggressive quarters in the US and the pragmatic right wing in the Chinese leadership are pursuing a common cause in opposing detente, whipping up the militarist psychosis and fanning hotbeds of armed conflicts. This was noted by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in his address at the 36th UN General Assembly session. "A closer allying of Washington and Peking is becoming obvious," he stressed. "It has been announced all over the world that the US intends to sell China weapons and help build up its war potential. This is being done at a time when Peking is conducting a policy that runs counter to the interests of peace, a policy of hegemonism and aggression." Andrei Gromyko also emphasised that the Sino-US alliance rests on a foundation that is frankly hostile to many states, above all to the Soviet Union, and to the cause of detente.

Some people in Washington make no secret of this. Alexander Haig said, for instance, that closer links between the US and China was a "strategic necessity". Echoing him, Deputy Premier of the PRC State Council, Foreign Minister Huang Hua said that Peking "attached great importance to relations between China and the United States in the strategic field".

The US and world press have assessed the current stage in US-China rapprochement as amounting to formation of a military-political alliance. The *Washington Post* wrote on June 19, 1981, that according to Haig, China was a friendly non-aligned country that cooperated with the United States rather than a US ally. However, the paper noted, the unusual scale and scope of the planned cooperation and mutual dependence suggested that practically it was an alliance. This view was shared by the *US News and World Report*, which wrote that the United States was moving towards establishing relations with China that had all the typical features of an alliance. The Japanese *Asahi* noted that the talks between the US Secretary of State and the Chinese leaders "represent one more step in the direction of setting up a military alliance spearheaded against the USSR".

Some government officials in Washington and Peking are quite frank about their intention to join forces on an anti-Soviet platform. No other

than Haig said that in relations with the Chinese it was imperative to work for broad strategic consensus directed against the Russians. A "united front" against the Soviet Union, including China, the US, the West European NATO powers and Japan has for several years now been advocated by Deputy Chairman of the CPC Central Committee Deng Xiaoping, who last year also became Chairman of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee. Similar statements have been made by Premier of the State Council Zhao Ziyang.

The results of talks between Haig and the Peking leaders were regarded in the Soviet Union as an escalation of the reckless policy, while the plans to supply China with advanced US weapons, military hardware and knowhow were qualified as hostile to the USSR.

"Government quarters in the US and China," *Pravda* wrote on June 27, 1981, "must realise that the US-Chinese collusion on an anti-Soviet basis will be duly taken into account in the USSR in the overall context of Soviet-US and Soviet-Chinese relations. The Soviet Union will take such measures as will be dictated by the obtaining situation. No one should have any doubts that the Soviet people, who have a staunch will and powerful means of curbing aggression, will not allow themselves to be provoked and will stand up for themselves and defend the interests of its friends and allies."

The arming of China by the US and other Western countries poses a threat not so much to the Soviet Union, who can crush any attack against it, as to China's other neighbours. It is absolutely clear that the military buildup of the present Chinese regime stepping up armed provocations against the countries of Indochina and laying territorial claims to practically all adjacent states, amounts to connivance with the Chinese expansionism and poses a threat to peace and stability in Asia.

Small wonder, then, that voices of concern over the US promotion of China's militarisation programme are being raised in India, Japan, and Southeast Asian countries. The Japanese newspaper *Mainichi* wrote in an editorial titled "Dangerous Character of US-Chinese Military Cooperation", that a militarily-strong China posed a threat to all the neighbouring countries of Southeast and Southwest Asia. Concern over US arms supplies to China was expressed by Japan's ministry of foreign affairs.

The US-aided rearming of China evokes apprehension in the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member states. Washington's policy was censured by the ASEAN foreign ministers at their meeting with the US Secretary of State in Manila held after Haig's visit to Peking. What the ASEAN ministers resented was the US taking decisions affecting the situation in the region without consulting them and, moreover, acting against their interests.

According to the French newspaper *Le Figaro*, Indonesian diplomats thought the Peking decisions were highly regrettable and even "foolish" and stressed that they ran counter to ASEAN policy. Their Malaysian colleagues expressed regret over the US failure to comprehend the dangers of Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia where Peking, they recalled, had laid claims since time immemorial.

A similar, if more restrained, opinion has been voiced in Manila, which does not want China to increase its influence in Southeast Asia. It is recalled in Singapore that China is a potential threat and that it would be imprudent to indiscriminately supply it with arms.

In summation, the four ASEAN countries fear, though in varying degrees, that US sales of offensive weapons to China may trigger off an

escalation of the arms race in Asia and increase the threat posed by Peking to Southeast Asia.

The US and China have been trying to pressure Japan into adopting an anti-Soviet stand. In 1960 the so-called "security treaty" was concluded between the US and Japan which provides the basis for their military alliance spearheaded above all against the Soviet Union, the forces of democracy and progress in the Far East and Southeast Asia. The treaty makes Japan a willy-nilly accomplice of the US aggressive policy.

Japan is linked to China through the 1978 "treaty of peace and friendship". In negotiating this treaty Peking succeeded in inserting an "anti-hegemonic" article which the Chinese leadership interprets in an anti-Soviet way. In keeping with the spirit of this article, Peking has repeatedly called on Japan's government to take joint actions against the USSR.

Japan's treaty obligations to the US and China have provided a skeleton for a tripartite anti-Soviet alliance, that has been sought, and actually put in practice, by Washington and Peking. Member of the CPSU Central Committee Political Bureau, USSR Defence Minister Dmitri Ustinov wrote in *Pravda* on June 22, 1981: "The US Administration has not ceased its attempts to set up new aggressive military-political blocs and alliances, in addition to the old ones. The Washington-Peking-Tokyo triangle has recently acquired increasingly clearer outlines of an aggressive alliance in the Far East."

On the one hand, the government in Tokyo wants to see Japan a powerful state pursuing an independent foreign policy consonant above all with the national interests, and, on the other, it yields to pressure from Washington and Peking. This explains the meanders in Japan's foreign policy, which now shows some signs of independence, now toes the line of external forces.

Although Japan apparently should be interested in maintaining normal, friendly relations with the Soviet Union, it increasingly allows itself to be drawn into the anti-Soviet strategy of the US and China. In 1980 the Japanese government under pressure from abroad joined in Washington's "sanctions" against the Soviet Union and took arbitrary and unilateral steps to restrict contacts with the Soviet Union in various fields.

To fan anti-Soviet sentiments in the country the Japanese government has inspired a campaign for "the return of the northern territories" as the Japanese revenge-seekers call several southern islands in the Kurils which belong to the Soviet Union.

On February 7, 1981, a "day of northern territories" was even observed in Japan, instituted by the government. Anti-Sovietism was thus elevated to a state policy. A Soviet Foreign Ministry statement to the Japanese ambassador on February 16, 1981 stressed that "such steps can only be qualified as deliberately aimed at worsening Soviet-Japanese relations".⁷

On September 9-10, 1981 Japan's Prime Minister Z. Suzuki made a show of flying in a military helicopter along the Soviet border, near the South Kuril islands which belong to the Soviet Union. After this "inspection of the northern territories" the Prime Minister publicly stated Tokyo's claims to Soviet territory.

Japan's revanchist demands for a revision of the outcome of the Second World War stand in the way of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan. Tokyo uses territorial claims to the USSR as a pretext for

⁷ *Pravda*, Feb. 17, 1981.

refusing to sign and even to consider the treaty on goodneighbourliness and cooperation proposed by the Soviet Union.

Japan's "friends" in the US and China seek to interfere with the former's independent peaceful development and are at pains to encourage the revival of militarism in Japan arguing that Japan should increase its political and military weight in the world to match its economic potential.

Yielding to Washington's demands, the Japanese government had to approve its biggest postwar defence budget for 1981 to the tune of 2,400,000 million yen. The Japanese armed forces, called the "self-defence forces", today number 270,000 men, half of whom are officers and warrant officers. This enables Japan any time to deploy a bigger army. The "self-defence forces" are armed with the latest weaponry and hardware, including tactical missiles, long-range artillery, airplanes and helicopters, surface ships and submarines. Experts estimate that as far as fire power goes, Japan's armed forces today are far superior to the multimillion-strong imperial army at the time of the Second World War.

Japan bears the growing financial burden of supporting over 140 US military bases and installations manned by almost 50,000 US servicemen stationed on its territory. In 1981 US military presence cost the Japanese tax-payers over 41,000 million yen which is 12 per cent above the 1980 figure.

Japan's state budget provides for special allocations for military exercises and manoeuvres carried out on a regular basis jointly with the US to improve coordination among different types of armed forces and arms of the service. As the buildup of the US forces in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf has involved a redeployment of US naval forces, the Pentagon wants the Japanese "self-defence forces" to take over some of the functions of the US 7th Fleet in the Pacific.

During the US-Japanese talks in Washington in the summer of 1981 US Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger urged the chief of Japan's Defence Agency D. Omura to assume the responsibility for military patrolling in a large area of the Western part of the Pacific. Japan is also charged with the task of mining a number of straits.

Japan is carrying on its war preparations on the pretext of a "Soviet threat". But the "Soviet threat" is non-existent and this is what the Japanese themselves have pointed out. In November-December 1980 Japan's biggest newspaper *Asahi*, carried a series of articles under a general title "Is There a Soviet Threat?" Citing numerous facts the paper led its readers to a negative answer to this question.

That the "Soviet threat" is a lie was shown in Ukio Murai's book *"The Threat from the North" Is Born in Tokyo. Testimony of a Hokkaido Resident* put out in Japan early in 1981. The author writes that "most Hokkaido people do not believe in the myth of a Soviet threat".⁸ The more massive anti-Soviet propaganda becomes the more it is resented by the people.

A mass movement against the country's militarisation is gaining momentum in Japan. A peaceful foreign policy for Japan is actively advocated by the communist and the socialist parties, by trade unions, prominent public figures of different political affiliations.

In his report at the 26th Congress of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union did not believe that Japan's current playing into the hands of the dangerous plans of Washington and Peking was Tokyo's last word; the USSR hoped that farsightedness and an awareness of

⁸ See *Izvestia*, Jan. 17, 1981.

Japan's own interests would prevail there. At the Congress it was reaffirmed that the USSR still aspired for stable, truly goodneighbourly relations with Japan.

In pooling their efforts, the US, China and Japan also seek to draw the ASEAN countries—Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia—into the orbit of their policies. Aspiring for control over Southeast Asia, the imperialists and Chinese hegemonists plan to make it a stronghold of their struggle against the forces of socialism and the national liberation, a bridgehead for their expansionist ambitions in other parts of the world: the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, etc.

Notwithstanding the fact that Washington, Peking and Tokyo pursue different goals in Southeast Asia in keeping with their separate interests and that their contradictions are bound to aggravate, at this stage they are joining forces in bringing pressure to bear on the countries of the Southern Seas. Through political and economic pressure the US, China and Japan are trying to get the ASEAN countries abandon their neutral and nonaligned stand and make ASEAN a military bloc opposed to the countries of Indochina which have opted for socialism.

In an effort to justify US interference in the affairs of the region, Secretary of State Haig said that Southeast Asia is as vital for the United States as, for instance, the Persian Gulf area, and therefore cannot be left to its own designs.

With Peking's approval, Washington has been stepping up its military presence in Southeast Asia. The US has five military bases in the Philippines, including the Clarkfield air base, the biggest outside the US, and the naval base Subic Bay, which caters to the US 7th Fleet, the largest in the US Navy. More than 16,000 US servicemen are stationed at these bases, but the Pentagon has plans to expand its military facilities in the Philippines. Notably, Subic Bay is planned to become the port of hail for a new US fleet being formed now, whose area of operations will cover the Indian Ocean, while the Clarkfield base may accommodate the core of the so-called "rapid deployment force" that can be airlifted to the Middle East and other parts of the world. Ronald Reagan proposes to increase US aid to the Philippines by \$100 million in exchange for the latter's consent to extend the US use of the Subic Bay and Clarkfield facilities till 1991.

According to US Deputy Secretary of State J. Buckley, the US administration plans in the near future to increase by 25 per cent arms supplies and expand other forms of military assistance to the ASEAN countries. In 1981 the Pentagon was to give \$80 million in aid to Thailand, \$45 million to Indonesia, and \$12.5 million to Malaysia.⁹

The US *Defence and Foreign Affairs* journal has estimated that since 1975 the ASEAN countries have more than doubled their military spending; in 1980 alone their war expenditures increased by 47 per cent as against those of 1979.

Like Washington, Peking seeks to spurt the arms race in the ASEAN countries. On August 6, 1981, *Renmin ribao* called on these countries to "strengthen their mutual cooperation... build up their military might". Last August Zhao Ziyang made a manifestly provocative tour of the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore with a short stopover in Thailand on his way home. While in these countries he made openly war-mongering

⁹ See *Za rubezhom*, No. 34, 1981, p. 8.

statements aimed at setting the ASEAN members against their neighbours in Indochina.

This visit came shortly after the failure of the so-called "international conference on Kampuchea" masterminded by Peking and Washington. No matter how hard the Chinese and American producers of this show put up in New York in July 13 to 17 tried to use the occasion for interfering in the internal affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, exerting pressure on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, disrupting the incipient dialogue between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN and aggravating the situation in Southeast Asia, their efforts failed to win any substantial backing. About half of the UN members, including the socialist and many nonaligned countries, refused to take part in this ignominious farce, while some of those who did participate voiced scepticism about this "conference", questioning both its legality and capacity to resolve a particular issue.

Washington and Peking made no secret of their aim to reinstate the murderous Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea. The organisers invited Ieng Sari, one of the leaders of the toppled regime, sentenced to death at home for his numerous crimes, to address the "conference". However, the prospect of a Pol Pot regime being restored in Kampuchea did not delight the participants. Delegates of Sweden, Canada, Italy and other countries including some ASEAN members, strongly condemned the crimes perpetrated by the Pol Pot clique and squarely dismissed any possibility of its coming back to power.

Peking did not like the ASEAN countries coming forward with their own proposals at the "conference" which, in contrast to those of China, were marked by a measure of restraint. On July 17 *Renmin ribao* carried a commentary written in a preaching tone in which it assailed the ASEAN draft resolution.

The policies of the ASEAN countries in general and their stand on the "Kampuchean issue" in particular display two tendencies. On the one hand, they align with US imperialism and Peking hegemonism in whipping up tensions in the region, follow the line of confrontation with Vietnam and seek to impose an anti-socialist regime on Kampuchea, which tendency is particularly pronounced in certain quarters in Thailand and Singapore. On the other hand, the ASEAN countries wish to avoid a military confrontation with Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea; they are seeking a compromise accommodation with the Indochinese states on the basis of a dialogue with them and are taking steps to reduce their dependence on the US, China, Japan and other states outside the region; these policies are followed by Indonesia and Malaysia; the Philippines are also seeking a greater degree of independence in shaping its policy.

The latter tendency clearly goes against the grain with Peking and its imperialist partners, who keep bringing up the nonexistent "Kampuchean issue" as a basis for unity between the ASEAN members and the imperialists and hegemonists. Speaking at a press-conference in Manila, Zhao Ziyang called the "Kampuchean problem" an "important link in the common struggle waged by China, Japan, the US, Australia, New Zealand and the ASEAN countries against Soviet global expansion".¹⁰

The Chinese Premier's statement in fact echoes the appeals of Washington and Tokyo to form a "Pacific community" conceived as a Pacific equivalent of NATO. The new aggressive alliance is expected to include above all the members of the ANZUS imperialist military bloc (the US,

¹⁰ See *Pravda*, Aug. 16, 1981.

Australia and New Zealand), and the countries linked to the US through various military agreements (Canada, Japan, South Korea). These countries already coordinate the operations of their warships, aircraft, paratroopers and marine units within the framework of the Rimpac ("Pacific Ring") annual naval exercises held under the command of US generals and admirals. The US has been persistently inviting the ASEAN countries (Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia) to join their war games and become members of a militarist alliance in the Pacific with the US as its leader. As evident from the statement of Zhao Ziyang, China not only supports the idea of setting up such an alliance but has offered to join it.

It goes without saying that Washington will call the tune in the proposed alliance, in case it materialises, while the ASEAN countries will become an instrument in foreign hands for realising imperialist and hegemonic plans hostile to their interests. However, this role does not suit the ASEAN members who cherish their independence and wish to decide their own problems and those of the region for themselves.

Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, which have embarked on the path of building socialism, have emerged today as an important factor of peace in Southeast Asia. Having defended their freedom and independence, their right to build a new life in the struggle against imperialism and Chinese hegemonism, the countries of Indochina are now consolidating their socio-political system, cementing the moral and political unity of their peoples and laying stress on the advance of the economy, culture and people's well-being. However, they have to tackle these constructive tasks in a complex international situation aggravated by mounting external pressure from the imperialists, their Peking accomplices and the bellicose elements in some ASEAN countries who follow in the wake of Washington and Peking.

The United States stubbornly refuses to recognise the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Instead, it calls for political isolation and economic blockade of Vietnam and even threatens to apply military sanctions. Speaking in the American club in Peking, US Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke said that the US would look for ways of stepping up political, economic and military pressure on Vietnam in cooperation with other countries, so as to effect a change in Hanoi's stand.¹¹

The US anti-Vietnamese policy has found followers in Peking. In its anti-Vietnamese policy, Washington joined hands with the Chinese leaders who are using a wide range of tactics including propaganda attacks, diplomatic intrigues, economic sanctions and armed provocations on the border with Vietnam. Still toying with the idea of a wide-scale aggression, Peking threatens to "teach a new lesson" to Vietnam, it has repeatedly refused to resume negotiations with the SRV, demanding as a "precondition" the renunciation by Vietnam of its independent policy, of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

The US imperialists and the Chinese expansionists have been trying to hamper the building of socialism in the Lao People's Democratic Republic. According to the newspaper *Xieng Pasason*, Peking and Washington are pursuing the ignoble venture of forming a "united front" of the enemies of the Lao people who fled the country and were trained and armed in China or who found refuge in Thailand.¹² The idea behind this "front" is to conduct subversive acts against the LPDR.

¹¹ See *Washington Post*, June 26, 1981.

¹² See *Pravda*, Aug. 8, 1981.

Government quarters in the US and the PRC continue to scheme against the People's Republic of Kampuchea. They have put the Pol Pot gangs, thrown out of the country, the counterrevolutionary bands of Son Sann and supporters of the politically bankrupt Prince Norodom Sihanouk on their payroll, and are trying to bring them together in a "coalition government" to fight the legitimate government of the PRK. To this end a meeting of the leaders of the Khmer counterrevolution was held in Singapore in September 1981, which, however, produced no results because of contradictions and differences among the enemies of the people's power.¹³

The Pol Pot gangsters and other reactionaries of every stripe based on Thailand receive arms, uniforms and food supplies from China and the West. From their bases in Thailand they carry out raids into Kampuchea with the backing of the Thai military: Thai artillery bombards Kampuchean territory, Thai air force planes violate PRK air space, and Thai warships make incursions in the territorial waters of Kampuchea. Peking and Washington are encouraging these activities in a bid to stir up a new military flashpoint on the Thai-Kampuchean border.

The people's revolutionary army of Kampuchea and the Vietnamese people's army units stationed in Kampuchea are firmly repulsing the provocateurs. Imperialist and Peking propaganda blame tensions in the region on the "Vietnamese and Soviet threat", pointing to the presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. However, the Vietnamese forces are in the PRK in the first place because the revolutionary gains of the Kampuchean people must be defended against hostile forces incited by imperialism and international reaction. They are in Kampuchea in keeping with the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between the SRV and the PRK and in no way violate the UN Charter.

The leaders of Kampuchea and Vietnam have reiterated that the Vietnamese forces will be withdrawn from Kampuchea as soon as foreign interference in its internal affairs has been stopped.

It is absurd to allege that the problems of Southeast Asia have been caused by the policy of the Soviet Union and the nature of its relations with Vietnam and other countries of Indochina. As *Công Sản*, journal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, wrote, "the USSR or the Vietnamese-Soviet relations cannot be the cause of instability in Southeast Asia. Of the UN Security Council's five permanent members, the Soviet Union is the only country that was not involved in aggressive wars against the peoples of Southeast Asia. It was with the enormous aid from the USSR that the peoples of Indochina were able to defeat the aggressors, win independence and eliminate a dangerous hotbed of war. That is why Soviet relations with Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea cannot pose a threat to any one; on the contrary, they promote peace and stability in the region."

The real cause of the unstable and explosive situation in Southeast Asia lies in the deepening US-Chinese military-political alliance, which poses a grave threat to peace and security in the region. Both Washington and Peking have committed appalling crimes in Indochina and today seek revenge for their humiliating defeat. At the same time, mindful of the failure of their aggressive ventures against the peoples of Indochina, they expect this time Thailand and other ASEAN countries to be their cat's paw. The Washington and Peking geopoliticians are nurturing ominous plans of provoking a confrontation between the ASEAN countries and the socialist states of Indochina.

¹³ See *Pravda*, Sept. 7, 1981.

Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea are countering the policy of aggravating tensions and provoking an armed confrontation with their constructive initiatives which provide for the Southeast Asian countries to resolve the problems of their region themselves through negotiations without any foreign interference, and in the interests of peace, stability, goodneighbourliness and cooperation.

At their 4th conference in Phnompenh on June 13-14, 1981, the Foreign Ministers of the SRV, LPDR and PRK reaffirmed and elaborated the proposals made at their earlier meetings on the convocation of a regional conference of the three Indochinese and the five ASEAN countries. If the ASEAN countries were not prepared for such a conference, the Indochina states proposed continuing multilateral and bilateral consultations on all problems of common interest.

Favouring the earliest possible accommodation with China, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea once again declared their readiness to sign bilateral treaties of non-aggression and peaceful coexistence with China.

Broad sections of world public opinion acclaimed the reasonable proposals of the three Indochina states. These proposals also met with a favourable response on the part of some prominent figures and periodicals in the ASEAN countries. The Philippines newspaper *Times Journal*, wrote, for example, that these proposals could lay a sound basis for peace, stability friendship and cooperation in the region.

However, the governments of the ASEAN countries did not respond to the gesture of goodwill from their neighbours. The peaceful initiative of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea were roundly rejected by Peking. The reactionary forces seek to impede the positive processes unfolding in the region, interfere with the progress of the socialist states of Indochina, torpedo the dialogue between the three Indochina and five ASEAN countries, and obstruct the development of relations among the Southeast Asian countries by raising insuperable barriers between them.

But no matter how hard the enemies of peace and security in Southeast Asia may try, the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea are continuing their confident advance along the path they have chosen. They enjoy support from the fraternal Soviet Union, other socialist countries, all progressive and peaceable forces.

During a friendly meeting in the Kremlin on September 9, 1981, Leonid Brezhnev told the visiting General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, Chairman of the PRK Council of Ministers that the Soviet Union strongly supported the peaceful initiatives of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, notably their proposal on convening a regional conference of the Indochina and ASEAN countries, whose realisation would unquestionably serve the cause of peace and a healthier climate in Southeast Asia.¹⁴

In the Middle East, the main source of tensions is armed and other forms of interference in the affairs of Afghanistan by imperialists, Peking hegemonists and Islam reactionaries. World reaction was unsettled and disturbed by the success of the Afghan revolution; it resents the peaceful foreign policy of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan which is based on the principles of nonalignment.

Disturbed by the Afghan developments Washington, Peking, Islamabad and their partners in some other capitals have mounted a massive subversive campaign against democratic Afghanistan which virtually amounts to an undeclared war against that country. They are training and arming

¹⁴ See *Pravda*, Sept. 10, 1981.

mercenary gangs infiltrating into the DRA, chiefly from Pakistan territory, to perpetrate acts of sabotage and terrorism. Gangs of hired killers from among Afghan *dushmans* undergo training in over 70 camps and special bases operated inside Pakistan by American and Chinese "advisers".¹⁵ According to estimates of the Internal Affairs Ministry of Afghanistan about 40,000 rebels are being trained in sabotage techniques in China.¹⁶

High-ranking US and Chinese officials have been visiting Pakistan's training centres for counterrevolutionary gangs sent into Afghanistan. In early June 1981 Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, accompanied by the leader of the Pakistan military regime, General Zia-ul-Haq, paid a visit to a training camp of mercenaries who terrorise the peaceful population in the border regions of Afghanistan. He made a public gesture of handing over to the gangsters' chiefs 500,000 yuan as another of China's contributions to financing their crimes against the DRA. Even more generous aid comes to the bandits from the US Administration. In the second month of his stay in the White House Ronald Reagan ordered the beefing up of military aid programmes for Afghan counterrevolutionaries which have already exceeded \$100 million.

The so-called "Afghan problem" fabricated in effect in certain Western quarters and Peking is used by them as an instrument of rousing anti-Afghan and anti-Soviet hysteria, of rupturing detente and worsening the international situation. The enemies of international cooperation blame the Soviet Union for creating the "Afghan problem", pointing to the presence of a limited Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan. It will be recalled, however, that Soviet troops were sent into Afghanistan, at the request of the Afghan government, to defend the country from external aggression in keeping with the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Goodneighbourliness and Cooperation signed between the USSR and the DRA on December 5, 1978, and in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. If acts of hostility against Afghanistan from abroad are stopped, the need for the presence of Soviet forces there will no longer exist.

In his report to the 26th CPSU Congress Leonid Brezhnev said: "As for the Soviet military contingent, we will be prepared to withdraw it with the agreement of the Afghan government. Before this is done, the infiltration of counterrevolutionary gangs into Afghanistan must be completely stopped. This must be secured in accords between Afghanistan and its neighbours. Dependable guarantees are required that there will be no new intervention. Such is the fundamental position of the Soviet Union, and we adhere to it firmly."¹⁷

On May 14, 1980, the Afghan government put forward a programme for the settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. It was prepared to open bilateral talks with Pakistan and Iran to work out specific agreements to prevent armed and other hostile activities between these countries. However, the authorities in Pakistan and Iran did not respond in any way.

On August 24, 1981, the Afghan government issued a new statement elaborating and specifying its earlier proposals.¹⁸ While giving preference to bilateral talks with Pakistan and Iran, it expressed readiness to open tripartite negotiations with Pakistan and Iran. If either country were unwilling to negotiate, this should not be an obstacle to a dialogue between Afghanistan and the other country with a view to reaching relevant

¹⁵ See *Pravda*, March 31, 1981.

¹⁶ See *Izvestia*, Jan. 5, 1981.

¹⁷ *The 26th Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1981, p. 18.

¹⁸ See *Pravda*, Aug. 26, 1981.

accords. The Afghan government does not object to the UN Secretary General or his representative taking part in the Afghan talks with Pakistan and Iran, whether on a bilateral or trilateral basis.

As to the international guarantees of agreements with Pakistan and Iran, Kabul does not specify the full list of guarantor states, but thinks it should include the USSR and USA as well as other states acceptable to Afghanistan and its neighbours.

Accords on the cessation and prevention in future of armed or any other interference in the affairs of Afghanistan would remove the causes that compelled Afghanistan to request the Soviet limited military contingent. This would open the way for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the defusing of a crisis created by imperialism in Southwest Asia, which would undoubtedly have a wholesome effect on the overall international situation.

The independent peaceful foreign policy of India presents a serious obstacle to the expansionist plans of the US and China in Asia and is the reason behind the pressure Washington and Peking seek to exert on India. The US and Chinese policy of arming Pakistan and encouraging provocative activities near the Pakistan-India border generate understandable concern on the part of the government and public opinion in India. They cannot fail to note that China, far from being prepared to withdraw from the occupied Indian territory, is engaged in war preparations in neighbouring Tibet, moving troops and setting up new missile-launching bases there. In conjunction with the US, China commits acts of subversion against India, arming and training separatists in India's Northeastern states and inciting them to acts against the Indian government.

Faced with the intrigues of international reaction, India remains faithful to its policy of peace, playing a key role in the nonaligned movement and in the efforts to bring security to peoples. The Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, the 10th anniversary of which was marked last August, is an added factor in strengthening India's international positions.

The visit of Leonid Brezhnev to India in late 1980 was a milestone in consolidating friendly relations between the USSR and India. The joint Soviet-Indian declaration signed in Delhi on December 10, 1980 by Leonid Brezhnev and Indira Gandhi called for the elimination of tensions in Southwest Asia and a peaceful settlement of Indian Ocean problems.

The Soviet Union and India made a plea for dismantling all foreign air and naval bases in the Indian Ocean, such as the one on Diego Garcia, and for preventing the establishment of new bases in the future. They condemned all moves to beef up foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean, on whatever pretext. Indian public opinion greeted with profound satisfaction Leonid Brezhnev's statement to the effect that the Indian Ocean was and remains the sphere of vital interests of none other than the littoral states.

"Joint action with peaceful and independent India will continue to be one of the important areas of Soviet foreign policy", said the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress.¹⁹

As an expression of its concern over the explosive situation in different regions of Asia, the 26th CPSU Congress made constructive proposals for a settlement in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf area and proposed talks on confidence-building measures in the Far East with all interested countries. The Congress voiced solidarity with the efforts of the

¹⁹ *The 26th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1981, p. 19.*

Democratic People's Republic of Korea toward peaceful reunification without foreign interference. It was noted at the Congress that the policy of the Soviet Union was consonant with the wishes of countries and peoples to establish peace zones in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and other parts of the world.

Guided by the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the Soviet Union is further developing and strengthening fraternal relations with the socialist countries of Asia; is promoting friendship and cooperation with India and diversifying its ties with the newly-free nations. The Congress reaffirmed the Soviet proposals for normalising relations with China, stated Soviet readiness to develop cooperation with Indonesia and other ASEAN countries and hoped that relations with Japan would improve.

The Soviet policy of seeking friendship and cooperation in Asia enjoys the full support of the socialist countries, as was shown by the Crimean meetings of Leonid Brezhnev in July-August 1981 with the leaders of socialist countries. The socialist community countries voiced concern over the situation in Asia, where Washington has dramatically intensified its aggressive policy, encouraging the rearmament of Japan and seeking a military-political alliance with China. They declared their firm support for Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, who are subjected to gross pressure from Washington and Peking, and strongly condemned any manifestations of the policy of imperialism and hegemonism.

During the meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Chairman of the Presidium of the Great People's Khural Y. Tsendenbal, it was noted that the realisation of the Soviet proposal on confidence-building measures in the Far East, which is fully shared by Mongolia, would help strengthen the foundations of universal peace. Such measures are possible either on a collective basis involving all interested countries or on a bilateral basis.

Leonid Brezhnev supported the proposal of the 18th Congress of the MPRP to conclude a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force in relations between the countries of Asia and the Pacific.²⁰ To this end the Congress proposed convening a conference of the Asian and Pacific countries to which all permanent members of the UN Security Council could be invited.

During the visit of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam Le Duan to Moscow in September 1981, Leonid Brezhnev said: "Asia more than any other region is in dire need of peace... Contrary to Peking, many Asian states favour friendly relations. They refuse to toe Washington's line. They want to live independently. This stand can only earn them respect. The peace- and freedom-loving Asian peoples alone can be the masters of Asia." It was stated at a meeting of the CPSU and CPV leaders that "The leaders of the USSR and the SRV are convinced that the strengthening of security in Asia must become the common goal of the Asian states".²¹

Unlike to policy of imperialism and hegemonism aimed at aggravating the international situation, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries pursue a policy of detente, disarmament, elimination of the flash-points of tension and settlement of disputed issues through negotiations. This policy is appreciated and supported by advanced sections of public opinion in various countries and provides a dependable guarantee of peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world.

²⁰ See *Pravda*, Aug. 12, 1981.

²¹ *Pravda*, Aug. 12, 1981.

INSTITUTE STUDIES DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MAOISM, MARXISM-LENINISM

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[Text]

The early 1960s thrust a new pressing task on Marxist sinology—that of unmasking and scientifically criticising the ideology of Maoism. The “special course” espoused by the Chinese leadership at that time and the “cultural revolution” unleashed in China later posed before sinologists a number of scientifically and politically complex and exacting problems keyed by an analysis of the class roots of the Maoist platform and its ideological and political goals. In order to place the policies of China’s Maoist leadership in a correct perspective one had to probe its ideological foundations, theoretical and social sources, trace the emergence and evolution of Maoism, establish its actual role in the revolutionary struggles of the Chinese people for their national and social liberation and, finally, to ascertain its true attitude to the socialist reforms launched in China in the mid-1950s. Another set of fundamental ideological problems was raised by the Maoists’ foreign policy, their stand on the issues of war, peace and revolution, and their subversive, divisive activities in the international communist movement and the world revolutionary process as a whole.

Marxist sinologists were therefore confronted by a wide range of ideological, social and political problems of China’s current history which called for a comprehensive, systematic study of Maoism as a new subject.

The research into Maoism undertaken at the Institute of the Far East (IFE) has been based on a fundamental evaluation of the class nature of the ideological and political platform of the Maoist leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) contained in the resolutions of the July 1963 and February 1964 Plenary Meetings of the CPSU Central Committee, the July 14, 1963 Open Letter of the CPSU Central Committee to the Party organisations and all communists of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev’s report to the December 1966 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the documents of the 24th, 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses, Leonid Brezhnev’s speech at the 1969 International Meeting of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, and speeches and reports by other CPSU leaders. These party documents and materials have pointed to the petty-bourgeois, anti-socialist nature of Maoist ideology and policies, which are hostile to Marxism-Leninism, and have unveiled the great-power, chauvinistic and militaristic aspects of the Maoist domestic and foreign policies.

Since a comprehensive study of Maoism had to cut across different social sciences—philosophy, sociology, economics and history—the Institute of the Far East pooled efforts with colleagues at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee, the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Institute of the State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a number of other institutions.

Several critical studies on Maoism were conducted jointly with sinologists and sociologists in the socialist countries.¹ The IFE fundamental critiques of Maoism are based on the latest research into Marxist social sciences, notably the works of prominent Soviet scholars which contain assessments of the ideological course followed by the Maoist leadership of the CPC. These include works by P. Fedoseyev, A. Rummyantsev, O. Borisov, M. Altaisky, A. Sobolev, F. Burlatsky, M. Ilyin, M. Kapitsa, B. Koslovskov to name a few.

The dynamics of the critical studies of Maoism conducted at the IFE over the past 15 years is marked by a gradual generalisation of the accumulated material, advance from particular to general studies covering the entire subject and by a more probing analysis and improved formulation of conclusions. Starting out with collections of articles dealing with separate aspects of Maoism,² the IFE lay the foundations for future monograph-type comprehensive research. The first such monograph, *A Critique of Mao Zedong's Theoretical Concepts* (1970), was a collective product of the IFE and the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences. It identified the key problems in the critical study of Maoism, ranging from its ideological roots to separate crucial issues of an ideological, political and social nature. This set the pattern for the subsequent study of Maoism at the IFE on a comprehensive, systematic basis, which in turn required that research should branch out into new problems of Soviet sinology. To begin with, sinologist-philosophers were faced with a number of fundamental problems related to the evaluation of the Maoist methodology and its relation to Marxist-Leninist philosophy. It is obvious that unless this crucial problem were resolved it would be impossible to correctly evaluate other aspects of Maoism, establish its inner logic and its theoretical foundations. This aspect of the critique of Maoism was successfully dealt with in a monograph by the noted Soviet sinologist-philosophers M. Altaisky and V. Georgiyev, *The Anti-Marxist Essence of Mao Zedong's Philosophical Views* (Moscow, 1969). It was in effect the first Soviet specialised study of Maoist philosophy to show that Maoist views were irreconcilable with Marxist-Leninist methodology and Maoist philosophy had a subjective-idealistic nature and an anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist import. This fundamental conclusion provided a methodological basis for the Institute's further study of various aspects of Maoism—political, economic, social and ideological.

The central task of subsequent research was to evolve a Marxist concept of Maoism as a petty-bourgeois, nationalistic ideological and political school. Such a concept was developed by leading IFE scholars, above all by M. Sladkovsky, V. Krivtsov, V. Feoktistov, L. Gudoshnikov, Ye. Konovalov and A. Yakovlev. Other contributions to the study of separate problems involved in the scientific critique of Maoism came from Ye. Kovalyov,

¹ See, for instance, *Maoism: Ideological and Political Adversary of Marxism-Leninism*, Moscow, 1974; *Maoism Without Mao*, Moscow, 1979 (in Russian).

² *The Anti-Marxist Essence of the Views and Policies of Mao Zedong*, Moscow, 1969; *Lenin and Problems of Modern China*, Moscow, 1971 (in Russian).

L. Perelomov, T. Rakhimov, V. Sorokin, S. Markova, V. Sidikhmenov and A. Bulkin. The ideological roots of the Maoists' disruptive activities within various world revolutionary movements were analysed by B. Pospelov and R. Aslanov.

This comprehensive study carried out in conjunction with other scientific institutions produced a scientific concept of Maoism summed up in the Institute's study *The Ideological and Political Essence of Maoism* (1977).

This study set out to prove that Maoism is a petty-bourgeois, great-power chauvinistic school of ideological and political thought, which displays both general traits common to all petty-bourgeois teachings and specific features conditioned by the concrete historical and national environment. The study identified the following basic aspects of Maoism:—bellicose hegemonism permeating all areas of the Maoists' domestic and foreign policies geared to the main strategic goal of making China a strong military state, a militaristic superpower capable of securing world hegemony for the Maoist leadership;

—ideology and practice of despotic power that took shape as a military-bureaucratic anti-popular dictatorship by a small group of leaders suppressing the working people;

—militarism manifested in the advocacy of war as a universal instrument for resolving all social problems, in the militarisation of all areas of public life in China and in the gearing of socio-economic policies to the task of an allout buildup of the war potential at the expense of the vital interests of the working people;

—shameless speculation on Marxism-Leninism in a bid to use Marxist-Leninist terminology to veil the actual falsification of scientific communism and thereby present Maoism as "Marxism-Leninism of the modern age";

—fierce hostility towards scientific socialism displayed in the form of anti-Sovietism; it is based on the rejection of the international experience of socialist construction and the effort to pit China and its "road" against the entire socialist community;

—alignment with the most reactionary forces in the capitalist world on the common ground of anti-Sovietism and struggle against the international communist and revolutionary-democratic movement.³

The chief feature of Maoism is its great-power chauvinism, which is translated into a hegemonic militarist policy. It is chauvinism and hegemonism that condition Maoism's stand on the main problems of today and ultimately motivate its hostility to scientific communism and real socialism, the hostility manifested in its rabid anti-Sovietism and consummated in a military-political alliance with imperialism and extreme reaction. By aligning itself with the most reactionary forces of our day Maoism has evolved into a specific form of anti-communism, posing a grave threat to peace, socialism, democracy and progress.

As a distinct ideological and political trend and a historical reality Maoism must necessarily have both objective and subjective roots. Identifying these roots is a major scientific problem which, if solved, can provide the key to comprehending the socio-political nature of Maoism, its genesis, evolution and outlook for the future. This problem was tackled by V. Krivtsov, whose works traced Maoism's social, ideological and psy-

³ See in *The Ideological and Political Essence of Maoism*, Moscow, 1977, p. 6 (in Russian).

chological sources.⁴ Of paramount importance was his idea that Maoism "emerged and struck root in China in a petty-bourgeois environment, although its social links, of course, are not confined to the petty bourgeoisie, but extend to the Chinese middle-class bourgeoisie... This is largely responsible for the dual nature of Maoism, with its 'left-wing', revolutionary form and its right-wing, opportunist content."⁵ V. Krivtsov established the relationship of Maoism to different ideological movements, both traditionally Chinese and modern Western. The scholar stressed that Maoism is related to these ideological movements indirectly and should not be identified with any of them.⁶ Exposed to the influence of different ideological currents Maoism has digested them in its own social chauvinistic doctrine which draws on Chinese reactionary nationalism and Great-Han chauvinism as its principal ideological source.

The above conclusion paved the way to a scientific analysis of another major problem, that of the emergence and evolution of Maoism as a distinct ideological and political trend in the CPC. This problem was taken up in a number of IFE studies⁷ which traced the tortuous and erratic progress of Maoism affected by objective and subjective factors, the relationship between the Maoists' political activities and their ideological theories, etc. The study showed that Maoism as an ideological trend had originated in a definite objective historical environment and was ultimately an upshot of China's economic, social and intellectual backwardness. However, the principal, decisive factor behind the rise and evolution of Maoism was the political activities and theoretical "contributions" made by Mao Zedong and his faction within the CPC, i. e., a purely subjective phenomenon. As a matter of fact, the traditional nationalist and other non-Marxist concepts which shaped Mao's views could doubtlessly have been overcome in the process of a deeper study of Marxism-Leninism and the revolutionary (including theoretical) experience of other communist parties, and the international communist movement as a whole, which, to quote V. I. Lenin, "is in its very essence an international movement. This means not only that we must combat national chauvinism, but that an incipient movement in a young country can be successful only if it makes use of the experiences of other countries".⁸ However, Mao Zedong began and continued his career as a political leader and theoretician as a petty-bourgeois nationalist who deliberately scorned the international experience of the working-class and communist movement, the Marxist-Leninist theoretical legacy.

The IFE scholars have ascertained several stages in the evolution of Maoism motivated above all by nationalism which eventually developed into Great-Han social chauvinism. An offspring and "heir" of a petty-bourgeois nationalist deviation of the 1920s, Maoism developed into a distinct ideological movement in the early 1940s. Mao attempted to concoct his "special", "sinicised Marxist" platform from which he led his theoretical and political attack on scientific socialism.

Mao Zedong, who started out as a petty-bourgeois revolutionary of a

⁴ See V. Krivtsov, *Maoism: Origins and Essence*, Moscow, 1976; *Maoism and Chinese Ideological and Socio-Psychological Tradition*, in *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 8, 1976, pp. 95-107; "On One Reactionary Ideological-Political Anachronism of the 20th Century", in *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 1, 1972, pp. 104-115.

⁵ *The Ideological and Political Essence of Maoism*, p. 38.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁷ See, for instance, V. Feoktistov, "Stages in the Ideological Evolution of Maoism" in *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 4, 1974; "Maoism and Destiny of Socialism in China" by the same author in *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 4, 1979.

⁸ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5 p. 370.

nationalist variety, in later years not only failed to overcome this bias and prejudices but consciously developed them into a system of great-power chauvinistic views with a logic of its own, which can be described as a peculiar brand of "sinicised" social chauvinism. The pivotal idea of this "system" was always the concept of China as a "centre of the world", cast by history for global hegemony, to reign over the destinies of humanity. Hence the social ideal Maoism tried to thrust on the Chinese people: a militarised society of "barracks communism". Subject to modifications, this ideal has persisted throughout the evolution of Maoism. The idea of turning China into "one military camp", into a militarist superpower dominated all the theoretical and political activities of Mao Zedong and his associates.

Studying the evolution of Maoism the IFE researchers have noted its characteristic quality of political and theoretical pragmatism and tendentious use of philosophical phraseology to provide a "theoretical" basis for political practice. Inasmuch as Maoism evolved within the communist movement it manipulated with Marxist concepts and categories in an effort to lend a "Marxist" appearance to its doctrine and practices. Political pragmatism was therefore reinforced with unbridled exploitation of Marxism, which Maoism invoked to disguise its own political ideology. This quality of Maoism left an imprint on its evolution and largely determined its tactics at different stages of its development.

The Institute identified the following four principal stages in the evolution of Maoism during the lifetime of Mao Zedong:

1917-1939—prehistory of Maoism, the period of the germination and crystallisation of Mao Zedong's views on a petty-bourgeois, chauvinistic basis;

1940-1949—the period when the "thought of Mao Zedong" took shape as a special ideological doctrine with the notorious "new democracy" concept as its political platform;

1949-1957—the formation of special Maoist views on the problems of China's development in the context of far-reaching socio-economic reforms and the evolution of Maoism from the "new democracy" concept to attempts to adapt socialist ideas to great-power chauvinistic policies;

1958-1976—the concluding stage of the crystallisation of Mao Zedong's "thought" into a great-power, chauvinistic, militaristic doctrine. During this period, particularly from the 1960s onwards, Maoism fully bared its reactionary nationalist essence, taking an open stand in opposition to the theory and practice of scientific communism, the international communist and working-class movement and overtly forming an alliance with imperialism.⁹

An impartial scientific analysis of the ideological and political platform of the Chinese leadership following Mao's death in 1976 led the IFE researchers to the important conclusion that the chief traits of Maoism, such as social chauvinism, militarism and anti-Sovietism as a form of its global anti-socialism have persisted as the ideological foundation of all domestic and foreign policies of the current leadership of the CPC and China. At the same time, faced with widespread popular discontent provoked by Maoism during the life of Mao Zedong and with an ailing economy crippled by the Maoist economic policies, China's present leaders have attempted to pull Maoism out of the crisis, refurbish and trim some of its "ideas" to enable it more effectively than before to serve the chau-

⁹ See more about this in *The Ideological and Political Essence of Maoism*, pp. 16-24.

vinistic hegemonistic goals. In other words, the effort involved the development of a modernised version of Maoism. In an article written by IFE staff members jointly with colleagues at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee, "Maoism: Ideology and Policies Inimical to Marxism-Leninism", this new stage in the evolution of Maoism "without Mao" is characterised by the following features:

- the consolidation of the ideas of great-power chauvinism and hegemonism as a theory and their more active pursuance in practice;
- a toughening of anti-socialism and anti-Sovietism as a manifestation of Maoism's ingrained hostility to scientific communism;
- a further shift in politics to the right, towards direct alignment with world imperialism on an anti-Soviet platform; the "development" of the "Three Worlds concept" to provide a theoretical justification to the pro-imperialist course;
- the activation of political efforts to torpedo detente and trigger off a new world war;
- a new policy towards the international working class aimed at prodding it into an alliance with the world bourgeoisie to oppose the USSR and other countries of the socialist community;
- efforts to present Maoism as a basically "new" theory and practice of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism;
- increased speculation on the prestige of Marxism-Leninism;
- aggravating contradictions in the Chinese leadership's economic policies; continued adherence to Maoism in theory and a pragmatic approach to practice;
- the continuation of the militarisation policies;
- lingering political instability and the power struggle in the Chinese leadership.

Subsequent developments have corroborated this description of Maoism "without Mao", given by the IFE in 1979. They brought out the deep allround crisis of Maoism, which the present leaders of China seek to overcome by refurbishing and embellishing the old, basically Maoist, "thought" and by selecting among them postulates and tenets that could effectively serve China's militarist "modernisation". As an eclectic and contradictory doctrine Maoism easily lends itself to a reshuffling of its components.

This process unfolded and is still unfolding in the context of a fierce struggle between two main tendencies, two groups in the Chinese leadership: those inclined towards the "orthodox", leftist variety of Maoism led by Hua Guofeng and the "pure" pragmatics embracing the right-wing nationalist variety of the "thought of Mao Zedong" led by Deng Xiaoping. While the two groups agree on the main issue, i. e., on the need to preserve and further develop Maoism's great-power militarist thrust, they differ only in the choice of specific roads to achieve their common strategic goals.

The common platform of China's present leaders is to play up and develop Maoism's original anti-Soviet reactionary-nationalist and militarist bias in politics and ideology. It is this purpose that has been served by Peking's official ideological moves over these years. Anti-Sovietism and the militarist-nationalist ideal have left their stamp on the resolutions of the 11th CPC Congress held in August 1977, the subsequent plenary meetings of the CPC Central Committee, and the three sessions of the National People's Congress. A particularly hostile attitude to the Soviet Union, the CPSU, and the entire socialist community was displayed by *Renmin ribao* in its editorial on the Maoist theory of the "Three Worlds" of

November 1, 1977. The newspaper bluntly stated the Peking leaders' readiness openly to align themselves with the world imperialist reactionaries in their confrontation with real socialism, the communist, working-class and national liberation movements. Later this bellicose anti-Sovietism invariably entered Peking's official documents in one form or another.

The present Chinese leadership has fully inherited Maoist militarism as well. The "four modernisations" programme endorsed by the 11th CPC Congress and adopted at the 1st session of the Fifth National People's Congress in February-March 1978 is geared in effect to the priority development of the military industrial complex in order to make China by the end of the century a powerful militarist state capable of realising Mao's "strategic thought" of attaining world hegemony.

While retaining and shifting further to the right the chauvinistic, militarist, anti-Soviet "core" of Maoism, China's leaders seek to substantially modify some of Mao's "thought" and altogether drop those openly voluntaristic and stridently leftist postulates that have become especially unpopular and impede the implementation of Peking's strategic designs.

The struggle within China's leadership as to what version of Maoism to adopt as an ideological and theoretical basis of the party and state policies in future has passed through two stages. The first stage began with the campaign against the "four" in September 1976 and ended with the 11th CPC Congress in August 1977. In the process the Hua Guofeng group of "orthodox" Maoists produced the first modified version of Maoism, from which they sought to remove its extreme leftist aberrations, adapt it to the task of a rapid military-economic buildup and make it a more efficient lever of economic development, while leaving intact its basic tenets as a concept of "barracks communism". This "version" of Maoism was set forth in the documents of the 11th CPC Congress held under the slogan of continuing the "revolutionary line" of Mao Zedong. The principal ideological components of this "version" of Maoism comprised Mao's three "theories": the "theory of the new democratic revolution", the "great theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat", and the "theory of the division of the world into three worlds". These "theories" provided the theoretical basis of the PRC's anti-socialist, pro-imperialist policy in the international arena. It may be noted that "class struggle" in this "version" of Maoism was interpreted as a part of the economic policy.

The second stage of struggle around Mao's ideological legacy began in May 1978 and is still going on within China's leadership. It is associated with the return to political activity of Deng Xiaoping who had been disgraced in April 1976. This stage has been marked by a tendency to further revise certain elements of Maoism along right-wing pragmatic lines, not only abandoning its "left-wing" revolutionist extremism but also replacing its "left-wing" version with a right-wing, opportunist one.

After the 11th CPC Congress the Chinese leadership set its sights on the "four modernisations". However, it was found that the modified version of Maoism propounded in the Congress resolutions hampered the rapid and effective implementation of the adopted plans and had to be further substantially modified to adapt the "thought of Mao Zedong" to the "four modernisations" practice. The principal figure behind the elaboration of yet another time-serving "version" of Maoism was Deng Xiaoping, whose "reformist" activity was aimed at gaining a free hand for himself to pursue manifestly pro-bourgeois, right-wing policies at home and abroad. Taking China further along the road of alliance with world imperialism, with the capitalist West, Deng Xiaoping has sought

to evolve his own brand of social chauvinism from the "thought of Mao Zedong".

These ideas have been reviewed to select those that allow for a pragmatic approach to theory in general, such as Mao's postulate on the need to adopt a "realistic approach" which he had advanced to facilitate a revision of Marxism in the CPC. This was the purpose behind the campaign launched by Deng Xiaoping in May 1978 under the slogan "practice is the sole criterion of truth". Injecting a relativist meaning into this Marxist proposition, Chinese propagandists argued that all theories, the "thought of Mao Zedong" included, require constant "correction" and "trial by practice", in this case by the practice of the "four modernisations". The underlying purpose was to rewrite the "thought of Mao Zedong" that was at variance with the "four modernisations" policies, while leaving the spirit and strategic goals of Maoism intact. When the "left-wing" version of Maoism was found to be not effective enough for the purposes of the militarist policy which envisaged a direct military-political alliance with world imperialism, the right-wing pragmatics in the Chinese leadership set out to "modernise" Maoism restoring to it its original right-wing substance. This aim particularly came to the fore in the resolutions of the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee in December 1978, which announced "the shifting of emphasis in all party work to the four modernisation", while the postulate on the need of waging a "class struggle" in the country was virtually discarded.

The policy of developing economic and political ties with the West on an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist basis dictated the need to China's leaders for readjusting the ideological and political doctrine. This can account for the fact that within a short time "left-wing" slogans were supplanted by right-wing, manifestly pro-bourgeois ideas. Mao's bourgeois-nationalist concept of "new democracy" was revived, whereas the "theory of the aggravation of class struggle" under socialism was replaced in the mass media by "Mao's great teaching on the united front", which was declared to constitute a political foundation of state in China. In the heyday of the "left-wing", orthodox Maoism the main contradictions were stated to be between the bourgeoisie and the working class, while now the press emphatically denied any social or class contradictions in China where the bourgeoisie had allegedly mended its ways and become the "new working people".

To support this thesis official Peking propaganda once again invoked Mao's words, notably his speech "On the Question of Correctly Resolving Contradictions Among the People" of February 1957. In this speech Mao put forward a revisionist postulate on the "non-antagonistic character" of contradictions between the working class and the bourgeoisie in China, which has been widely quoted to justify the economic and political steps being taken to encourage the "local" and overseas "national" bourgeoisie to contribute to China's militarisation programme. It is not accidental, therefore, that the "left-wing" Maoist slogan of the aggravating class struggle under socialism and the persisting "division" of socialist society into the working class and the "new bourgeoisie" has been replaced by the idea of the "social homogeneity" and the disappearance of antagonistic classes in Chinese society. In accordance with this "basic premise", the main contradiction in Chinese society was declared between the champions and opponents of the "four modernisations", rather than between the working class and the bourgeoisie.

The above, however, does not mean that the Maoist policy of carrying on the "class struggle" under socialism has been completely scuttled. In

fact it has been only modified, with the target of the "class struggle" shifted from the bourgeoisie to the opponents of the "four modernisations", against whom the Chinese leadership has vowed to continue the "class struggle". Characteristically, the Chinese leaders have departed from the "left-wing" interpretation of "Mao's idea" about the main contradiction under socialism by relying on his other "ideas". Notably, they have drawn on Mao's thesis of the "mutual conversion" of two dissimilar types of contradictions under socialism—non-antagonistic "contradictions within the people" and "antagonistic contradictions between our enemies and us". According to Mao's "teaching", these contradictions under "certain conditions" can "change places", i. e., antagonistic contradictions can turn into non-antagonistic and vice versa. By playing up this "discovery" of the 1950s by Mao, the present leaders of China let it be understood that contradictions arising from their socio-economic programme may also be declared a "class struggle" and antagonistic ones. In other words, today, as in Mao's time, a "theoretical" foundation is being laid to justify current and future reprisals against those who oppose China's militarisation and its becoming an active ally of world imperialism. Consequently, the Chinese leaders have set out to select right-wing revisionist, pro-bourgeois postulates from the "ideas" bequeathed by the late "helmsman".

As IFE studies have shown, the rewriting of Mao's concept of "class struggle" is closely linked with the revival of Mao's "united front" idea which the Chinese leaders have added to their ideological arsenal, and of Mao's policy of "mutual control" of activity by the CPC and the bourgeois parties. In October 1979, Deng Xiaoping disclosed the aim of reviving a "united patriotic front" in China today by stating that at a "new historical stage" the Chinese leadership had developed an "interest" in the "rich practical experience and knowledge" of members of "democratic parties" and in their "administrative skills" that is essential for carrying through the "four modernisations" programme. Therefore, according to Deng, "sustained coexistence and mutual control" would be the "undeviating policy for a long time to come" in relations between the CPC and other parties. Characteristically, in reviving Mao's "united front theory", the Peking leaders avoid any reference either to the class nature of this organisation or to the leading role of the working class in it. At the same time they have assigned to the "front" the precise political task of making a "still bigger contribution to expanding the international united front of confrontation with hegemonism". What this boils down to is that the "front" is designed to become one more active instrument in the Chinese leaders' anti-Soviet, anti-socialist policies.

This ideological shift to the right could not but affect the propaganda of "socialism" in China, which continues to brandish demagogically the slogans of the "creative development of Marxism" and quests for an "original" Chinese version of socialism. Beginning in early 1980, Chinese propaganda has been intensively publicising the idea that scientific socialism as an ideological and theoretical basis for building socialism does not exist in practice. The theory of socialism developed by the classics of Marxism-Leninism has been reduced in Peking to merely a "science of the general laws governing social development" which is supposedly useless in the "practice" of building socialism, since "socialism must be built not in general but in a concrete country" with its specific features which "scientific socialism as a 'general theory' could not take into account". By contrast, it is argued in Peking, "an insight into socialism which more or less corresponds to reality" has been given in "the major documents of the CPC and the works of Comrade Mao Zedong", such as *On*

Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. On Ten Major Relationships, and On the Question of Correctly Resolving Contradictions Among the People. The Chinese leaders in fact refuse to recognise Marxism as the scientific basis of "practice" in China and continue to cling to the skimpy and heavily edited "thought of Mao Zedong" as the theoretical foundation of their policies. Small wonder that enhancing the pragmatism of China's ideology has become a characteristic aspect of Peking's official propaganda. It was also the main purpose behind the campaign to "free the mentality".

It is in the same vein that the "concepts" and the consequences of the "cultural revolution" are being reappraised today. While at the 11th CPC Congress the "cultural revolution" was declared a historically inevitable, logical phase in Chinese evolution, today this assessment has been discarded. Moreover, the "cultural revolution" has been conceded a "mistake" with grave consequences for economic, social and cultural life.

Objectively, the revision and "corrections" of Maoism undermine the prestige of the "thought of Mao Zedong". However, the authors of the latest "versions" of Maoism do not mean to discredit it. On the contrary, the present Peking leaders, irrespective of their factional differences, are unanimous in working to preserve Maoism and assert its "new version" as the ideological and political basis for the party and state activities. Although each successive version of Maoism is born in the confrontation of clashing tendencies and attitudes in the Chinese leadership, they all have one common element—the desire to strengthen the principal features of "Mao's thought" as a militarist ideology of social chauvinism. The Peking leadership continues to regard Maoism as a "scientific system" and the "theoretical basis" of the party's policies. The only new element in the evaluation of Maoism has been its recent description as the "product of the party's collective wisdom", "summed up by Mao Zedong and his associates". In other words, Maoism is presented not as the work of Mao alone but as "the sum total of the theoretical and practical experience of the Chinese revolution", the credit for which Mao shares with other CPC leaders. The Chinese leaders have revived the view that "Mao's thought" is, to quote from the resolutions of the 6th plenary session of the CPC Central Committee in 1981, the "fusion of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution".

The IFE scholars have shown that the criticism currently levelled in Peking against some aspects of Mao's policies and the public admission of his mistakes do not affect the fundamental principles of Maoism as a social-chauvinistic militarist ideology. An analysis of "corrections" of Maoism shows that the Peking leadership is out to "relieve" Maoism of inessentials and postulates that have been discredited theoretically and practically. At the same time they select and "digest" whatever there is in Maoism that serves the needs of the current military buildup, the all-out militarisation of the country and the policy of a military and political alliance with imperialism, and the forces of reaction and war.

Maoism today is generally moving to the right, following its inherent right-wing nationalist tendency. This is in keeping with the logic of the evolution of the reactionary petty-bourgeois nationalism, whose social, class character can manifest itself both in a leftist and a right-wing form.

A scholarly Marxist analysis of the evolution of Maoism today with all its "neo"-and "post"-Maoist modifications remains an important task facing sinologists, including researchers of the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences. They are committed to this task by the decisions of the historic 26th Congress of the CPSU.

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U.S., PRC SEEK TO USE EACH OTHER AGAINST USSR

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 82 pp 27-38

[Article by V. Lomykin, Cand. Sc. (Econ.): "PRC-USA: Some Results and Problems of Rapprochement"]

[Text]

Recently US officials have been making more and more statements on the strategic significance of Sino-American relations. The speeches by President Reagan and Secretary of State Haig which emphasise that Washington's policy vis-à-vis China is based on a "global concept" and meets the "strategic interests" of the USA are a case in point. There have also been plenty of similar pronouncements by Chinese leaders, particularly by Deputy Chairman of the CC CPC Deng Xiaoping, who noted more than once the "long-term, strategic" character of PRC-USA rapprochement.

It is common knowledge that the strategic importance of Sino-American relations is evaluated in Peking and Washington from the viewpoint of their being spearheaded against the USSR. Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, admitted in his memoirs that this was precisely the point of departure for the USA's rapprochement with China. The military provocations by the Maoists on Soviet-Chinese border in 1969 decisively influenced the change of the White House's attitude towards China.¹ Peking's anti-Sovietism became the cornerstone of the "triangle diplomacy", formulated by the Nixon-Kissinger Administration, and later of the "Carter doctrine" with its overtly one-sided orientation toward rapprochement with China. The new US Administration is intent on continuing the "Chinese" policy of Nixon, Ford and Carter, known as a "normalisation of relations".² Gerald Ford, the former US President, who visited Peking last March bringing a secret message from Reagan, declared that the White House would consolidate US-Chinese ties for the purpose of taking joint measures against the USSR. According to the American press, the first visit to China by US Secretary of State Alexander Haig in June 1981 confirmed the "firm determination" of the Reagan Administration to develop "strategic" relations with Peking.³

As for the Chinese leaders, each new step in their flirtation with Washington which they started late in the 1960s was invariably accompanied by an escalation of anti-Sovietism. Peking does not conceal the fact that it links the further development of relations with the USA with the formation of a "united front" against the USSR. The line towards setting up an anti-Soviet front, which would include the USA, was officially proclaimed by Hua Guofeng at the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress held in February 1978. Since then each meeting of the PRC leaders, Deng Xiaoping in particular, with US representatives proceeds

¹ See H. Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston, 1979, p. 171.

² See *New York Times*, April 1, 1981.

³ See *Washington Post*, June 14, 1981.

amid appeals to set up an alliance between the USA and China and to "form a strategic structure of joint counteraction" to the Soviet Union.⁴

Thus, instead of seeking ways to ensure equal security to all Asian countries, Sino-American rapprochement is directed at establishing, on an anti-Soviet basis, an international balance of forces favourable to Washington and Peking and detrimental to the USSR. As a result, the situation in Asia has noticeably deteriorated in recent years, there appearing new dangerous trends toward the exacerbation of the crisis in the Asian-Pacific region.

NEW STAGE IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

During the past two years Sino-American rapprochement entered a new stage marked by the vigorous development of their military-political ties with the objective of intensifying their struggle against the Soviet Union, the socialist community and the national liberation movement. This is manifested in their moving toward parallel and joint actions on the international scene, in Asia above all, in their developing various forms of military cooperation—from information exchanges and mutual familiarisation with "defence planning" to the elaboration of plans to render military aid to China.

The qualitative shift in the relations between the PRC and the USA became possible due to Washington's departure from the policy of detente and dialogue with the Soviet Union. The motives which impelled the White House to worsen US-Soviet relations, are, first and foremost, the desire to secure its superiority over the USSR, to impose its *diktat* upon socialist countries, to place the resources of the newly-free countries under its control, and to strengthen its leadership of the Western world. The Chinese factor has an important part to play here.

Washington intends to have China throw its weight behind US efforts to pressurise the USSR, its allies, and developing countries, and to force West European countries and Japan to discard detente which helped them consolidate their independence and play a greater role in world politics. The USA attaches much importance to China in both current and long-term policy. It regards the development of military-political cooperation with China as another form of drawing it into the capitalist orbit, seeking, among other things, to intensify the deformation of the PRC's socio-political system towards capitalism.

Back in the 1970s, the Peking leaders used the pretext of a "threat from the North" as a prod to egg the USA, West European countries and Japan on toward developing military ties with China in order to organise joint "counteraction" to the USSR. Peking views a new stage of rapprochement with US imperialism it has entered as an opportunity to exacerbate the confrontation between the USA and the USSR up to provoking a military conflict, to step up its expansion in Southeast Asia, and to use the economic potential of the West for the modernisation of the PRC's military-industrial base.

There is nothing new in Peking's tactics of provoking a military conflict between the two socio-political systems. At the juncture of the 1950s and the 1960s, the Chinese leaders, who were already striving for hegemony in the world communist movement, sought to impose upon the Soviet Union and other socialist countries the tactics of "spear against spear" struggle and of provoking military conflicts with the USA. Suffice

⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, June 23, 1981.

it to recall the Taiwan crisis (1958) and the instigating stand taken by Peking during the Caribbean crisis (1962). The firm position of the Soviet Union, a champion of peace and security, prevented the Chinese leaders from unleashing a new world war at that time.

In teaming up with US imperialism, Peking leaders attempt to employ the same tactics of the "spear against spear" struggle, only now against the Soviet Union,⁵ acting as the organiser of a "united" anti-Soviet front and provoking the USA into starting a war against the USSR. For many years now, the Chinese leaders have been posing as "theorists", their "theories" centring on the contention that the third world war is inevitable. In 1980 alone, at meetings with foreign pressmen, Deng Xiaoping stated twice (in April and August) that "sooner or later" war would break out. The US "new nuclear strategy", as enunciated in Jimmy Carter's Directive 59, provides for a "limited" nuclear war and dovetails with Peking's plans, since these, like the decision of the Reagan Administration on the manufacture of the neutron bomb, are designed to increase the risk of a nuclear conflict.

In this connection the security of Europe is in grave danger.

From Peking's viewpoint, Europe is the most suitable area for provoking a military clash between the two opposite social systems. The following three factors are decisive here. First, Europe is the centre of confrontation between the two military-political systems, and it is here that most impressive results have been achieved in detente and the implementation of the Peace Programme advanced and pursued by the Soviet Union. Second, China being far away from Europe, it makes the possibility of its involvement in conflicts less probable. Third, in view of the fact that Asia is the principal sphere of China's expansionist activities, Europe and the European policy of the Chinese leaders are becoming a diverting factor.

As early as 1974, Deng Xiaoping declared that a war in Europe is "inevitable", and negotiations on disarmament and other agreements between East and West are pointless. When Washington began its departure from detente and imposed its new nuclear and conventional armaments programme on its West European allies, Peking openly sided with the Pentagon and the NATO quarters which led the campaign to whip up tensions in Europe. The Chinese leaders immediately supported US initiative on an annual three per cent increase in military spending and the stationing, in conformity with the NATO decision of December 1979, of new US medium-range nuclear missiles. The visit of the former Chairman of the CC CPC Hua Guofeng to Western Europe in the autumn of 1979 and his meeting with Henry Kissinger, which became an unambiguous demonstration of Peking's support of Washington, was used to achieve these ends. It is highly indicative that the Chinese leaders backed the USA, the only state at the Madrid meeting of the participants in the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which came out against the proposal on the convocation of a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe tabled by the Polish People's Republic on behalf of the Warsaw Treaty countries. No wonder Peking was among the first opponents to the new Soviet proposals concerning further steps towards confidence-building in the military field, towards establishing a moratorium on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles of NATO and the USSR, and also to other proposals⁶ put forward by the 26th CPSU Congress.

⁵ See *Renmin ribao*, March 27, 1980.

⁶ See *Ibid.*, March 15, 1981.

Of late Peking has been sparing no propaganda and diplomatic effort to give its backing to the US plans for "modernising the nuclear weapons" of the NATO countries and expanding that imperialist bloc's sphere of action.⁷ Apart from the large-scale propaganda campaign in the press, which is full of instigating statements and threats against the Soviet Union,⁸ the Chinese leaders sought to use for the same purpose the visits to Peking by British Foreign Secretary Carrington, Prime Minister Fälldin, of Sweden, the leader of the French Socialist Party Mitterand and other West European politicians. In provoking a military clash in Europe, Peking actually acts as the Pentagon's accomplice, since the latter, in view of the "new nuclear strategy", regards Europe as a possible theatre of military operations involving nuclear weapons.

The collaboration of China and the USA in international arena has already resulted in the intensification of expansionist and adventuristic trends in their policies, and with them the emergence of fresh flash-points in the world.

The conflict in Indochina which was inaugurated by China's armed aggression against Vietnam in February-March 1979 is a case in point. The aggression itself and the subsequent policy of diplomatic isolation, economic boycott and military provocations staged by Peking against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos enjoy the full support of the United States. Moreover, Washington and Peking are acting hand-in-glove in masterminding subversive activities against countries of Indochina. They also act in unison in the UN which is being used to impose on the world community a debate on the so-called Kampuchean issue.⁹ US diplomacy is exerting every effort to help Peking marshal motley reactionary forces—from Pol Pot to Sihanouk—into a "united political force" to be used for interfering in Kampuchea's home affairs.¹⁰

Taking refuge in verbiage about "Vietnamese threat", Peking and Washington are further exacerbating tensions in Southeast Asia. They are bringing pressure to bear on the ASEAN countries to worsen their relations with Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos, and are seeking to convert ASEAN into a military bloc opposing the three states of Indochina. This was the purpose behind the August 1981 visit to the ASEAN countries paid by Premier of the PRC State Council Zhao Ziyang, with the Chinese leader taking every opportunity to scare these states with the non-existent "Soviet and Vietnamese threat". Deliveries of US weapons to those countries tripled during the past three years. Thailand is supposed to play a special role in this connection. It is being intensely armed and stirred up against Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos. In February 1981, during his trip to Bangkok, Premier of the PRC State Council Zhao Ziyang spoke out in support of the US intention to frustrate peaceful initiatives of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, in particular, on holding a regional conference to stabilise the situation in Southeast Asia. At the same time, he called on the Thai government to step up its support of the Pol Pot forces.

The growing adventurism of Peking's foreign policy, the repeated pronouncements of its leaders about the possibility of "teaching a lesson" to Vietnam again, which are concomitant with incessant military provocations on the Vietnamese-Chinese border, and also the support given by Washington to these actions of Peking's show that the "parallel" efforts

⁷ See *Renmin ribao*, April 4, 1981.

⁸ See *Honqi*, No. 24, 1980; *Renmin ribao*, March 29, 1981.

⁹ See *Za rubezhom*, No. 22, 1981.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

by China and the USA undoubtedly lead to greater destabilisation of the situation in Southeast Asia.

No less dangerous are such actions in the Middle East where the USA and China are actively backing regimes in some Moslem countries waging an undeclared war against democratic Afghanistan. According to the American press, Peking and Washington follow a line of rational division of labour in the "Afghan crisis" which could be applied everywhere.¹¹ The gist of such a "division of labour" consists in the Peking leaders expressing a readiness, during the visit to the PRC of Harold Brown, US Secretary of Defence in January 1980, to increase the deliveries of small arms to Afghan counterrevolutionaries, with the USA taking upon itself the setting up of a "consortium" to provide Pakistan with more powerful weapons. The cooperation between Peking and Washington encompasses the formation of gangs on the territory of Pakistan, arms deliveries, and the training of Afghan counterrevolutionaries by Chinese and American instructors. The USA is seeking to turn Pakistan into an outpost of imperialism in the Middle East, a base for provocations against Afghanistan and for pressuring India. Here they are actively supported by Peking. In June 1980, Chinese leaders signed a secret agreement on arms deliveries to the Zia-ul-Haq regime. In pursuance of this agreement, the First Deputy Chief of the PRC Navy Liu Daosheng was dispatched to Islamabad to conduct negotiations. During the US visit in April 1981 of Aga Shahi, Pakistani Foreign Minister, the USA in its turn proposed a five-year programme of US-Pakistani military cooperation, under which Islamabad was to be paid \$3 billion. Pakistan's neighbours feel legitimate anxiety over its rearmament programme, and the USA's and China's plans to convert it into a strike force to be used against the national liberation movement and independent states of the Middle East. This was pointed out more than once by the Indian leaders, including Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Defence Minister Shivraj Patil. During his June 1981 visit to Delhi PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua encountered India's firm deprecation of the Pakistani rearmament effort. Almost simultaneously India lodged a protest with the United States in connection with the latter's decision to sell highly sophisticated weaponry to Pakistan. The apprehensions felt by India and other countries of the region in connection with Pakistan's rapid militarisation are quite understandable in the light of its military rulers' plans to make an early breakthrough in creating national nuclear weapons, in which Peking and some Western powers are playing a tangible role, supplying Pakistan with the necessary knowhow, equipment and raw materials.

The allout support given by the Chinese leaders to the US policy from the position of strength is an important aspect of the collaboration between Peking and Washington. It is not by chance that Peking's very first official response to the election of Ronald Reagan as US President marked with satisfaction the desire of the US Administration to secure its foreign policy objectives by "relying on force" and "attaining military superiority over the USSR".¹² The Chinese leaders welcomed Washington's intentions to increase considerably its defence expenditures, make vigorous use of the "rapid deployment force", and expand US military presence in Asia and elsewhere.¹³ At the end of 1980, Deng Xiaoping openly called on the White House to expand US presence in the Pacific.¹⁴

¹¹ See *The New York Times*, Jan. 17, 1980.

¹² *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 6, 1980.

¹³ *Ibid.*, March 7, 14, 1981.

¹⁴ See *Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 3, 1980.

Peking gave a friendly welcome to former US President Gerald Ford who was touring Southeast Asia in March 1981 as Ronald Reagan's emissary presenting the five-year programme of the US military buildup. Enjoying Peking's support, the Pentagon intends to equip with new nuclear missile systems its entire network of bases in the Far East, Southeast Asia and even the Indian Ocean. In an interview to the Japanese-based newspaper *Asahi Evening News* in April 1981, Commander of the US armed forces in the Pacific and the Far East Admiral R. Long made a statement to this effect.

The development of diverse forms of military cooperation between China and the United States has become a characteristic feature of the rapprochement between the two countries. The visit by former US Defence Secretary Harold Brown in January 1980, and the return visit by the present Defence Minister of the PRC Geng Biao in May 1980, marked the start of stable contacts between the defence ministries of the two countries. In July 1980, an agreement was reached between the PRC Foreign Minister and the US Under-Secretary of State on regular consultations at the deputy-defence-minister level. Within the framework of this agreement, in response to a similar visit by a Chinese delegation of the PLA Chief Logistics Department, Peking was visited by a US military-political delegation headed by Under-Secretary of Defence William Perry, and also by a delegation of the logistics service of the US Department of Defence led by an Assistant Secretary of Defence. On his way to the USA Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin visited the headquarters of the Commander of the US Armed Forces in the Pacific in Hawaii.¹⁵

The statement made by Harold Brown during his stay in China in January 1980 highlighted the purposes and nature of the military contacts between Peking and Washington. It contained a proposal on the setting up of a system of direct communications to coordinate "independent but parallel" response by the two countries in the international arena, particularly in connection with the developments in Afghanistan.¹⁶ Since then, as the American press noted, the USA and the PRC began holding consultations, and launched cooperation in military and in intelligence matters, and, in conformity with an unofficial secret agreement, the USA is sending to China communications equipment and technical experts in exchange for intelligence on the USSR's actions, collected by means of radio electronic bases installed near the Soviet border. The Institute of International Strategic Research has been set up in Peking to "hold consultations and conduct studies together with specialists from Japan and the USA". As was pointed out in the Japanese press, this was in effect "another step towards closer cooperation between the two countries".¹⁷

However, the plans for the West's rendering China military and economic aid should be regarded as a most important and dangerous component in the development of military cooperation between Peking and Washington.

THE STRATEGY OF MAKING CHINA "STRONGER": ESSENCE AND CONSEQUENCES

The concept of making China "strategically stronger" appeared in the West back in the early 1970s. In particular, it could be clearly seen in the work by Professor V. R. de Dubnic *Europe and the United States New Policy Toward China*. It stressed that the USA and Western Europe

¹⁵ See *Newsweek*, August. 5, 1980.

¹⁶ See *Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 15, 1980.

¹⁷ *Akahata* Dec. 2, 1979.

are interested in a militarily stronger China, which would force the USSR to act on "two fronts".¹⁸ Later on, this concept was adopted by US political leaders. Representatives of the right conservative circles connected with the military-industrial complex increasingly talk of the expediency of creating a strong China as a counterbalance to the USSR. For example, Senator Henry Jackson said during his stay in Peking in February 1978 that in view of Washington and Peking having "parallel interests" the USA needs a "strong China". Similar statements were made by the former Presidential National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski during his visit to China in May 1978,¹⁹ as well as by Vice-President Walter Mondale in August 1979.

The concept of a "stronger" China which has been nurtured in the West is fully in accord with the plans of the Chinese leaders who give priority to the accelerated buildup of the PRC's military and economic potential as the main tool in attaining political hegemony in the world. The 11th CPC Congress held in August 1977 endorsed the ambitious policy providing for the conversion of the PRC into a "powerful modern state" by the year 2000. In his report to the Congress the then Chairman of the CC CPC Hua Guofeng defined this task as a "historic mission". Addressing 10,000 cadre workers on January 16, 1980, Deputy Chairman of the CC CPC Deng Xiaoping called the "acceleration of the four modernisations" a "major prerequisite" for the solution of "external and internal problems", linking it with the necessity to increase China's might and its international role. In an editorial devoted to the 29th anniversary of the formation of the PRC, *Honqi* magazine formulated the task of modernisation in an even more straightforward manner. It said that the "modernisation in the four spheres is the best preparation for the war".²⁰

Chinese leaders make no secret of the fact that they assign an important role to the USA and its allies in the militarisation of China. In September 1979, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA Wu Xiuquan admitted that China is lagging from 10 to 20 years behind the "superpowers" in the sphere of armaments, and is planning for the next decade to bridge somewhat this gap with the help of the West, and by the end of the current century to catch up with the USA and the USSR in the development of military technology and armed forces.²¹ Such statements make it clear that the real objective of Peking's "four modernisations" is the accelerated militarisation and the winning of time necessary for the buildup of China's nuclear missile potential, rather than the solution of the country's vital socio-economic problems.

The "four modernisations" policy with its graphically expressed militarist thrust was supported in Washington, and giving China aid in implementing these modernisations was raised to the plane of one of the components of "world strategy" directed at "counteracting the Soviet Union" by all possible means. It is precisely in this context that Harold Brown explained to his Japanese colleague G. Yamashita the importance for the West of China's greater military-industrial potential.²²

Proceeding from the concept of a stronger China, the United States and its allies—West European countries and Japan—agreed to grant about \$30 billion worth of credits to Peking for the development of the

¹⁸ V. R. de Dubnic, *Europe and the New United States Policy Toward China*, Bruxelles, 1972, pp. 60-62.

¹⁹ See *Renmin ribao*, May 21, 1978.

²⁰ *Honqi*, No. 19, 1978.

²¹ See *Dagens Nyheter*, Sept. 17, 1979.

²² See *Mainichi*, Aug. 25, 1979.

basic industries contributing to China's military buildup. In view of the considerable lag in technology in the war industries, much attention has been given to the development of scientific and technological ties of the PRC with the USA and other capitalist countries. This primarily applied to space and nuclear research, high-energy physics and electronics. According to a Pentagon "secret" report, Washington realised that within the framework of accelerated modernisation, Peking placed special emphasis on the war industry, in particular the nuclear branch, while the development of scientific and technological ties with the USA gave China access to American knowhow and military technology.²³

Beginning in 1978, Washington removed, step by step, the barriers to giving China military technology. First the USA lifted restrictions on the deliveries of "defensive weapons" to China by West European countries and the corresponding knowhow; then, after Brown's visit to Peking, Washington allowed US companies to sell to Peking "auxiliary military hardware": radars, military transport aircraft, helicopters, communication equipment, and so on.²⁴ In connection with the trip to the PRC of US Under-Secretary of Defence on Scientific and Technological Research William Perry in September 1980, it became known that by that time the Carter Administration had endorsed over 400 licences for exporting to China auxiliary military hardware and modern electronic equipment.²⁵ In November 1980, the NATO coordinating committee on the control over exports decided to lift restrictions on the sale of military hardware to China, including offensive weapons. After the Peking trip of US ex-President Ford and his discussions with the Chinese leaders of the supplies of US weapons, the proponents of the arming of China became much more vocal. Finally, in June 1981, US Secretary of State Alexander Haig who was in Peking for negotiations with Chinese leaders, informed them that the Reagan Administration had given the go-ahead for the sale of offensive weapons to China. It would not be inappropriate to call to mind the fact that deliveries to Peking of most diverse types of offensive weapons—\$41-63 billion worth—were already discussed in Washington.²⁶ The deliveries to the PRC of US weapons were also the centerpiece of the negotiations in Washington during the visit by the PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua in October 1981.

It is self-evident that the implementation of the concept of "making China strategically stronger" is fraught with highly negative consequences for security and peace in Eastern Asia.

First, the growth of China's military potential is prompting Japan to militarise, giving a convenient pretext for producing nuclear armaments to its influential quarters interested in the restoration of "great Japan". Japan is witnessing the resurgence of militarism: its military expenditures are growing, the "self-defence forces" are being bolstered, and plans for creating a nuclear potential are being secretly elaborated.

The current policies of Peking and Washington actually encourage the aforementioned trend. Talking to Y. Nakasone of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan in April 1980, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA Wu Xiuquan stated that Peking deems Japan's military expenditures inadequate and would take an understanding view of it becoming a great military power. The Reagan Administration also made a step forward

²³ See *Washington Post*, June 15, 1979.

²⁴ See *New York Daily News*, Jan. 26, 1980.

²⁵ See *Washington Post*, Sept. 11, 1980.

²⁶ See *The New York Times*, Jan. 8, 1980.

towards getting Japan involved in the arms race. In May 1981, Tokyo was granted the status of US "ally" with all the ensuing consequences in the military field which are typical of NATO members. The adoption by the Japanese government of the abovementioned status places upon Japan the obligation of stepping up its military potential and increasing its role in the US military and political strategy in the Far East. It is quite obvious that the militarisation of Japan will aggravate the situation in Asia and the Pacific even more.

Second, the promotion of plans to develop China's military-industrial potential creates problems for the United States itself. Even now Washington cannot be sure about how the Chinese leaders are going to use the country's growing military potential in future. For example, the creation and testing by Peking of an intercontinental ballistic missile was accepted by US military experts with no trace of enthusiasm. They marked the PRC's ability to deliver strikes at targets on the US territory. Moreover, it became known from the American press that the secret part of Carter Directive 59 on the "new nuclear strategy" provides for delivering nuclear strikes at 100 targets in China. It can be assumed that, as the Chinese military potential grows, Washington will experience ever greater apprehensions as regards Peking's policy. It is no accident that from time to time the voices of the opponents of China's militarisation can be heard in the USA. Reflecting their opinion, *The New York Times* stressed three years ago that economic development aid is one thing, but the strengthening of China as an adversary of the Soviet Union is quite another. This can hardly contribute to security in Asia, to say nothing of world security.²⁷

Third, the implementation of the "strategy of making China stronger" is causing great concern in all countries neighbouring on China, which, of course, cannot remain indifferent to such dangerous manoeuvring by US imperialism and Chinese hegemonism.

Finally, militarisation incurs the greatest damage on China itself: it has already resulted in a sharp exacerbation of socio-economic problems. The implementation of the ambitious line of China's modernisation has been substantially slowed down. In April 1981, talking to a delegation of the Association of MPs for Japanese-Chinese Friendship, Deng Xiaoping admitted that China would be unable to join the ranks of industrialised countries by the end of the 20th century. Peking does not conceal the fact that its economy is facing the danger of a "serious financial and economic crisis".²⁸ Capital construction has been curtailed till 1982, projects of economic cooperation with capitalist states frozen, and a decision has been taken to discontinue the imports of complete plant for a "definite period of time".²⁹ Unemployment is on the rise, according to official estimates there are over 26 million jobless in China. Inflation, which has reached 15 per cent, a figure unprecedented for China throughout the entire period of the PRC's existence, is growing. The food problem has worsened. All this compelled Chinese leaders to take urgent measures to normalise the economy, and, according to most optimistic forecasts, this process will take four or five years. The intensification of the internal political struggle and the development of processes which in the past, too, often pushed Chinese leaders on the false road of resorting to provocative foreign policy methods are the result of economic upheavals. All this

²⁷ *The New York Times*, June 30, 1973.

²⁸ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 1, 1981.

²⁹ See *Ibid.* Feb. 25, 1981.

leads, in the final analysis, to the growth of China's destabilising influence and makes its policy in the international arena, above all in Asia, still more unpredictable.

PROBLEMS AND ALTERNATIVES

The rapprochement between China and the USA on an anti-socialist, anti-Soviet basis and their attempts to secure advantages in the struggle for influence in Asia through a military-political alliance have destabilised the situation in the region. Sino-American rapprochement today, far from solving all old problems (in particular the Taiwan issue)³⁰ gives rise to new, even more complicated international problems.

Accelerating the establishment of a military alliance with the USA, Peking has been insistently trying to use the mechanism of close ties with Washington for pushing the latter towards even greater hostility to the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. Although one of the main tasks—the aggravation of US-Soviet confrontation up to a military conflict—is hardly attainable for the Chinese leaders, they still cherish hopes of achieving it under what they believe to be more favourable conditions of forming “allied” relations with the USA. Peking's new tactics becomes especially dangerous due to its camouflaging the true objectives of teaming up with US imperialism. Of late, the PRC leaders actively resort to verbiage about peacefulness, concern for “security” in Asia and the Pacific, and the need to fight “hegemonism”, which they do in a bid to lull the vigilance of Asian peoples and conceal from them the essence of their provocative policy.

Making use of American support, Peking is escalating its interference in Indochina under the false pretext of fighting “Vietnamese hegemonism”. Of course, US monopolies and their allies have no intention whatsoever of recognising Indochina as Peking's potential sphere of influence and of giving up their own imperialist interests in that region which, according to the classification of the White House, is “vital” to the USA. Nevertheless, Washington is not averse to extract some benefits from the conflict with Vietnam and other countries of Indochina, which might be provoked by the Chinese leaders. Neither is it against using Peking's subversive activities to undermine the positions of socialism in Asia. Washington and Peking having common anti-socialist interests, which implies changing the status quo in Indochina, has given rise to a permanent state of tension in the region, and is fraught with the danger of fresh conflicts.

The lifting by the White House of restrictions on the sale of armaments, including offensive weapons, to China, which became known during the Peking visit of US Secretary of State Haig and the Washington visit of PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua marked the beginning of a new stage in the development of military cooperation between the PRC and the USA. According to American press reports, in pursuance of the agreements which Haig reached with Chinese leaders in Peking, the Reagan Administration has prepared a vast list of weapons, military hardware and dual-purpose equipment to be sold to China.³¹ Thus, the present US Administration, first, violated the commitments by President Carter not to sell armaments to China (Carter admitted this fact in an interview given to editors-in-chief of US provincial newspapers in January 1979) and, second, demonstrated the intention to promote the growth of China's military potential and encourage its hegemonistic ambitions.

³⁰ *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 2, 1981.

³¹ See *The Los Angeles Times*, Oct. 11, 1981.

In examining the causes which impelled Washington to embark on a road so dangerous to peace, one should take into account the following factors.

First of all, it became quite evident of late that the hopes of US ruling circles to play the "Chinese card" proved a failure. Anti-Sovietism as the inspiration behind the Sino-American rapprochement was used to the maximum for "parallel" actions on the international scene. Nonetheless, the tactics of bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries did not yield the desired results, inasmuch as they encountered a firm rebuff from the socialist community.

On the other hand, the instability in China itself which is manifested in the aggravation of socio-economic problems and the infighting within the Chinese leadership stimulated Washington's search for means to influence the political struggle in Peking. According to Western observers, one of these was giving support to the Deng Xiaoping group which is accused of "concessions to imperialism" in the economic sphere, and also on the Taiwan issue.³²

By its decision to give Peking possibilities to purchase US armaments, the Reagan Administration hopes to impart a fresh impetus to its military-political cooperation with China, trying to strengthen its anti-Soviet bias, and also to support the pro-imperialist line of the Deng Xiaoping group to take it through another round of the power struggle within the Peking leadership.

Ignoring the warnings about the danger of a military alliance with Peking issuing from within its own political camp, the White House is playing a risky game. In this connection, suffice it to call to mind the appeals by former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance for "caution" in developing military relations with China.³³ US Senator Cranston³⁴ regards the sale of weapons to China as "unreasonable". The viewpoint of Japan's military department which believes that the "urgent" decision by Washington was adopted "without a sufficient analysis of the consequences which this step may bring in future"³⁵ is eloquent enough.

As for Peking, it is also distrustful of Washington's policy. Proceeding from the tactics of traditional diplomacy of imperial China based on pitting one "barbarian" against another, Peking, at this stage, is banking on the USA in its struggle against the USSR. While claiming that the rapprochement with the USA is of a "long-term, strategic character", the Chinese leaders explain in their behind-closed-doors speeches that it has been called to life by tactical considerations aimed at weakening the main "enemy"—the Soviet Union—with the help of the USA. It was precisely in this way that Deputy Premier of the PRC State Council Geng Biao interpreted the role of the USA in China's policy at a secret meeting with career diplomats in Peking in August 1976. He stressed that as soon as China deems that time has come, it will say to Uncle Sam: "Kindly, pack your bags."³⁶

Thus, it is becoming increasingly evident that anti-Sovietism proves a shaky foundation of the Sino-US rapprochement for the sake of which the settlement of the complicated problems of their bilateral relations has been postponed indefinitely. This is creating tensions in Asia, which runs counter to the interests of security of Asian states.

³² See *Pravda*, Feb. 9, 1981.

³³ See *The New York Times*, Dec. 3, 1980.

³⁴ From his speech in ABC broadcast, June 18, 1981.

³⁵ *Mainichi*, June 19, 1981.

³⁶ *International Affairs*, No. 10, 1978.

China is going through a complex period in its history. It needs to be ensured peace and security to solve its difficult and acute socio-political and economic problems, rather than to gain time to build up its military potential and militarise its economy. China needs external aid for genuine modernisation, not a pretended one. Pushing Peking onto the road of militarisation, the United States and its Western allies are actually contributing to further destabilisation of China's domestic situation.

The PRC's national interests demand that it actively participate in the solution of global problems of ensuring peace and security, disarmament, and expansion of cooperation between countries with different socio-political systems. This also fully accords with the national interests of the USA.

The historical specifically European, experience shows that the search for ways towards collective security and equal security for each country is the only alternative to the policy from the position of strength based on setting up new military blocs and solving political problems by military means. Of course, this is not a smooth way, considering the highly complicated situation that has taken shape in Asia. However, there is no other way out. It is said in China that each road, even the longest one, begins with the first step. The elaboration and implementation of confidence-building measures, as proposed by the 26th Congress of the CPSU, can and should be this first step.

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PRC TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST NEIGHBORS LACK HISTORIC BASIS

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[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences L. S. Perelomov, S. N. Goncharov and E. V. Nikogosov: "The Great-Han Essence of the Concept of the 'Eternally Unified Multinational China'"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] People in the PRC have recently displayed more interest in the interrelations of ethnic groups in the history of China's formation. Several theoretical articles and concrete historical studies have been published. On the theoretical level, it seems to us that these works fall into two categories in terms of the trends they reflect.

The first category consists of works by scholars who employ facts as a point of departure for the construction of a scientific model of the formation of today's "unified multinational China." They are distinguished primarily by the acknowledgment that today's "unified multinational China" took shape as a result of a lengthy and complex process of historical development. These writers try to take historical facts into account and make theoretical generalizations based on these facts.

In the second group of works, the authors are obviously trying to place history at the service of the Beijing leadership's great-Han chauvinistic and hegemonistic policy. They proceed from the false thesis that China always existed in history as a single multinational state. The territory of today's China is projected, as it were, centuries back into the distant past. This approach leads to the monstrous falsification of Chinese history: All of the states established by the ancestors of non-Han peoples who now inhabit the PRC or once lived within its present boundaries are regarded as "crown domains within a single motherland." In line with this, the wars between these states are called "internecine conflicts" within the boundaries of the "eternally unified multinational China."

The supporters of this theory are not reluctant to make verbal statements about the importance of the class approach. They invest this term with a far from Marxist meaning, however. The "class approach" means nothing other than an allegation that, despite all of the intrigues of dominant classes, the Han and non-Han laboring masses always had a prevailing desire for "cooperation, solidarity and unity." This kind of pseudo-class approach is only an ideological screen for great-Han chauvinism and hegemonism.

It is quite significant that the supporters of the first theory strive to take a fairly dialectical approach to the formation of the "unified multinational China," admitting that it is the result of a lengthy and contradictory process of national development. This presupposes the evolution of China's boundaries during the course of its history. The supporters of the theory about the "eternally unified multinational China" on the other hand, take a metaphysical approach. Their non-historical approach causes them to disregard past events or confuse them with present circumstances, refuse to acknowledge the evolution of China's boundaries during the course of its history and, on this basis, try to lay a "historical foundation" for the Beijing leadership's territorial claims. It is extremely important to expose the unscientific and unsound nature of these views because, as KOMMUNIST magazine recently remarked, this policy line "is one of the factors undermining the cause of peace and detente and endangering the security of neighboring countries."¹

In essence, the thesis about the "eternally unified multinational China" has two main political facets. Firstly, by including a priori all of the non-Han ethnic groups involved in the country's history as part of the "great family of peoples of the motherland," by defining the states established by China's neighbors as "crown domains of China" and by denying their sovereignty, this theory virtually deprives all of the various nationalities in China of their own history under the banner of "unity and solidarity on the basis of class." This domestic political facet of the theory is supposed to serve as theoretical reinforcement, so to speak, of the great-Han policy on nationalities. Secondly, in the foreign policy sphere this theory is supposed to justify Beijing's hegemonistic behavior and, in particular, serve as "historical substantiation" for Beijing's claims to the territory of its present neighbors.

It should be stressed that the authors who try to establish "historical grounds" for these territorial claims take the boundaries of China during the period of its largest dimensions as a standard. They usually state, either directly or indirectly, that the "real" and "natural" boundaries of China are the boundaries of the Ch'ing Dynasty prior to the "Opium Wars" (in the middle of the 19th century). There is no point in even mentioning how far many of today's states could extend their claims if they began to base them on their territorial dimensions during the period of their greatest strength. The authors of these articles suggest to their readers that all of the events that ever took place within the Ch'ing boundaries were the "domestic affairs" of the Chinese nation.

According to their views, since China was always a unified and multinational state, the territory inhabited by any people connected in any way with the history of the Hans should be regarded as territory of the PRC. In other words, the recognition of the history of any non-Han people as part of the history of China is tantamount to the inclusion of the people's territory as part of the territory of the PRC. The implication is that all changes (including territorial ones) took place only within this eternal unity. The metaphysical and anti-historical nature of these beliefs is self-evident.

For this reason, it should be immediately stressed that the theory of the "eternally unified multinational China" was never scientific and was never based on a comprehensive study of the facts. For this reason, it is important to demonstrate the falsity of the axioms that are now being used by some individuals in the PRC for the "adjustment" of historical facts.

Now let us take a closer look at the views of the representatives of each of the currents described above.

The discussion of the theory of the "eternally unified multinational China" has a prehistory that cannot be ignored. Kuomintang ideologists were already expounding this idea in the guise of the "trunk and branches" theory, in which the Hans were the "trunk" and all of the non-Hans involved in China's history were the "branches." In the PRC this debate began in the late 1950's and early 1960's. It was at that time that Mao Zedong and his followers began to actively urge the party and state to pursue a great-Han policy within the country and hegemonism in relations with other countries. The formation of the great-Han, chauvinistic policy within the country can probably be dated from Zhou Enlai's speech in Qingdao in 1957.² The speech presented by Mao Zedong, as the head of the CCP delegation, at the Moscow conference of communist and workers parties in 1957 was probably one of the first signs of great-power hegemonism.

As we know, Mao urged the world communist movement to adopt an adventuristic plan for the resolution of conflicts between the capitalist world and socialism by means of war.³

The fact that the year of 1957 was probably a definite turning point in the spread of great-Han concepts is corroborated by a comparison of works written in different years by the same historian--Lu Zhenyu. In a 1951 work about the history of the peoples of China, Lu said nothing about the "eternally unified multinational China" in the introduction or the conclusion. He stressed that his main purpose was to put an end to the great-Han, chauvinistic approach to Chinese history. Furthermore, he frequently mentioned "invasions of China" by Jurchens, Khitans and Mongols and calls Youe Fei, the hero of the anti-Chin war, a national hero,⁴ which is totally inconsistent with the theory of the "eternally unified multinational China."

After 1957 Lu began to single out new facets of the history of Han and non-Han interrelations. In a 1959 article, for example, he expresses delight with the impending merger of nationalities under socialism⁵ and tries to lay a historical foundation under this idea. Here he is already stressing: "Our state has been a multinational state since ancient times and a centralized unified state since the Ch'in and Han eras."⁶ Further on in the article, Lu implies to the reader that "merger" was the main tendency in the history of the various "fraternal nationalities" within this "eternally unified multinational state."⁷

Finally, Lu begins a 1962 article with the allegation that "Xinjiang was part of the motherland since the early Han Dynasty."⁸ Further on, proceeding from this assumption about China's "eternally unified" state, the author moves on to barely disguised "historical grounds" for claims to the territory of many countries bordering on the PRC.⁹ It is certainly no coincidence that this article was published at the time when the Maoist leaders in the PRC were vigorously stirring up nationalism and anti-Sovietism.¹⁰

The changes in Lu Zhenyu's views illustrate how the concept of the "eternally unified multinational China," which first came to light after the Chinese leadership's departure from basic Marxist-Leninist principles in 1957, was first used for intra-governmental, great-Han chauvinistic purposes during the period of the "Great Leap

Forward." As the hegemonistic and anti-Soviet aspects of Beijing's policy line became more evident, the foreign policy facet of this concept acquired more distinct outlines. This tendency is characteristic of all Maoist historical studies of the PRC, and not just of Lu Zhenyu's works.

At the beginning of the 1960's science was set the task of justifying great-Han chauvinism within the country and hegemonism beyond its boundaries under the guise of the concept of the "eternally unified multinational China." When we analyze the views of the historians who have opposed this theory, we must realize that they were fully aware of the direct connection between this thesis and the policy line of the Maoist leadership in the CCP. This is the reason for their somewhat inconsistent criticism of the thesis, their inclination to make compromises and their obvious desire to limit their criticism to the methodological aspects of the evolution of China's territorial boundaries.

At the beginning of the 1960's the promoters of the thesis about the "eternally unified multinational China" could not stress its foreign policy aspect as yet and had to concentrate on the establishment of a "historical basis" for propaganda about the "merger of PRC nationalities"--and, of course, a great-Han Maoist basis. In line with this political premise, it was suggested that China had been a single multinational state since antiquity and that the Hans and many non-Han ethnic groups had been "members of a single large family of peoples" (WENHUEI BAO, 1 July 1962).¹¹ It was stressed that "interrelations on an equal basis were the main tendency in the relations between nationalities" and that "peace treaties based on kinship were the best way of maintaining relations between nationalities."¹² The states founded by China's neighbors were supposed to be regarded as Han possessions and the wars and diplomatic contacts between these states were supposedly "internal affairs."¹³

Famous historians Jiang Bozan,¹⁴ Sun Zuomin and others opposed these views at that time. They said that it was wrong to assume the equality of ethnic groups in history or, in other words, to mechanically extend the socialist principle of equality to the nationalities of antiquity and the Middle Ages, because this caused historians to distort the facts and ignore ethnic wars and ethnic oppression. Sun Zuomin also asserted that the states founded by China's neighbors could not be categorized along with the Han dynasties of that time as "crown domains of a single country." Sun said that these states, "China's neighbors," should be regarded as "foreigners" or, if they had undertaken any wars of conquest against Han dynasties, as aggressors.

In 1962 prominent historian Fan Wenlan presented a series of lectures on the interrelations between ethnic groups in Chinese history. In summer 1962 he wrote an article based on these lectures and submitted it to the editorial office of LISHI YANJIU, where it lay unpublished until the beginning of 1980.¹⁵ An analysis of the article will help us understand the reason for its sorry fate.

In this article, Fan Wenlan examines the formation of the "unified multinational China" as a historical process, distinguishing between the following basic stages in the "merger of ethnic groups" according to the dialectical principle: 1) the period of Chunqiu-Zhanguo; 2) the period of the Southern and Northern dynasties and Sixteen Kingdoms; 3) the period of the T'ang Dynasty and, finally, the Liao, Chin,

Yuan and Ch'ing periods.¹⁶ Fan examines the merger of ethnic groups in Chinese history as a historically progressive phenomenon. He notes that this merger could be accompanied by fierce struggle and even states that, "dominated by exploitative classes, peoples and states opposed one another and relied wholly on military strength. There was essentially nothing like 'peace,' 'coexistence,' 'equality,' 'alliance' and so forth among big and small or strong and weak states." Fan equates the intergovernmental relations of that time with the "law of the jungle," according to which weaker animals are devoured by stronger ones.¹⁷

There is no question that Fan Wenlan's theses were directed against the tendency to describe the relations between Han and non-Han peoples in Chinese history in idyllic terms, as relations of "equality and peace." His criticism was inconsistent, however. He says, for example, that any exploitative state performs the functions of regulating public life and repulsing foreign aggression in addition to serving as the instrument of the oppression of the laboring masses. The "barbarians" were always numerically inferior to the Chinese and whenever they were able to conquer China in spite of this inferiority, it was because the Han state of that time had completely lost the ability to perform the function of repulsing foreign enemies and had been transformed exclusively into an instrument for the exploitation of the laborers or, in Fan's words, into a "living corpse" undeserving of our sympathy. On this basis, Fan proposes a reassessment of such historical events as, for example, the conquest of the Northern Sung Dynasty by the Jurchens, the conquest of all China by the Mongols and the submission of the Ming Dynasty to the Manchurians. In this connection, he writes: "From today's vantage point, these were nothing more than squabbles between younger and older brothers or family quarrels. When a younger brother is able to overthrow a feeble and cruel older brother with the aid of military force and take over the management of family affairs, the success or failure of this management requires special assessment, but the very fact that the strong one overthrows the feeble one and takes over is always a good thing."¹⁸

Proceeding from this basis, Fan Wenlan proposes in his discussion of the conquests of China by its neighbors (or "younger brothers") that China's rulers should be condemned for their inability to resist and that the aggressors should not be blamed. He stresses that this approach should aid in eliminating great-Han chauvinism from historical analyses and thereby promote the "merger of nationalities" in the PRC.¹⁹

The ideas of Fan Wenlan, who was striving to justify all types of expansion as something that supposedly met the needs of historical progress, are similar to the views expressed at the conference (October 1961) held to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution. Conference speakers frankly tried to justify Chinese expansion in the past.²⁰

In his article, therefore, Fan Wenlan was trying to strike a compromise or take a position midway between the two viewpoints mentioned above. On the one hand, as a historian who is fully aware of the facts, he acknowledges that the "merger of ethnic groups" in the country's history was a lengthy and contradictory process and writes about the "struggle" between ethnic groups and their "hostility" toward one another. On the other hand, he immediately reduces this to nothing more than "a family quarrel between brothers."

According to Sun Zuomin, the idea of the "eternally unified multinational China" and, consequently, the idea of the "unity and solidarity" of all ethnic groups during the country's entire history became an "iron-clad rule" in Chinese propaganda in the early 1960's and during the period of "Cultural Revolution" in particular.²¹ It is possible that their statements against this thesis incriminated Sun Zuomin and Jiang Bozan, who were defamed during the Cultural Revolution. In the foreword to his article, Fan Wenlan noted that he had made certain corrections during the editing process under the influence of remarks made by his lecture audience.²² It is possible that these "corrections" were precisely the attempt to somehow reconcile the concept of the "eternally unified multinational China" with the facts. Even this compromise viewpoint, however, was apparently unacceptable at that time.

The publication of his article at the beginning of 1980 was evidently no coincidence because it was at this time that some PRC scholars became increasingly dissatisfied with the unscientific theory about the "eternally unified multinational China."

The article in which Sun Zuomin developed and questioned some of the statements made in Fan Wenlan's article was also published in 1980. For Sun, this was apparently something like a continuation of the debate he had led against the theory in the early 1960's.

Sun Zuomin quite correctly states that the main defect of the methodology of authors of this theory is their tendency to ignore the historical process that led to the formation of China's present boundaries. By viewing the PRC boundaries as something eternally immutable, they confuse the "yesterday" of history with the present state of affairs. He writes: "Everyone knows that any state or people has its own history of formation and development and that these are not and cannot be immutable or 'fixed quantities.' Now, in particular, after hundreds and thousands of years, /today's territorial boundaries cannot take in the territories of dynasties that existed hundreds and thousands of years ago during different eras"/ (emphasis ours--author).²³ Here Sun Zuomin draws the completely natural and historically accurate conclusion that the PRC's present boundaries are the result of development and evolution.

Further on, Sun correctly stresses that the states founded by the Hans' neighbors who fought with the Han dynasties and maintained contact with them must be unconditionally regarded as part of China's history. But this is no reason to call them part of the "eternally unified multinational state." He writes: "It is obvious that the ethnic groups and states like the Hsiung-nu, Turoks, Khitans, Jurchens, Mongols and others cannot be included among the Han, T'ang, Sung, Ming and other dynasties existing at a time when the historical process of the formation of a single multinational state was not yet complete in our country and it cannot be said that all of them belonged to one state or that all of them were members of one big family."²⁴

Adhering precisely and consistently to the historical principle and separating the country's past history from the present state of affairs, Sun Zuomin demonstrates the negative effect the concept of the "eternally unified multinational China" has had on historical studies. Roughly speaking, his view is that if the present boundaries of the PRC are projected into the past and if all the events that occurred within these boundaries are regarded as "internal affairs of state," then: a) The

independent states founded by the Hans' neighbors within the bounds of the PRC's present territory will have to be divested of their sovereignty and "forcefully put under the jurisdiction of Han dynasties" and b) all events that occurred outside the PRC's present boundaries will have to be excluded from China's history.²⁵

This idea must be examined in connection with Sun Zuomin's thesis that the boundaries of the PRC were the result of historical evolution, expanding and contracting during different eras. Sun Zuomin does not draw any political conclusions from this and limits his analysis to a discussion of historical methodology. It is quite obvious, however, that if the historical principle is adhered to consistently and the present boundaries of the PRC are acknowledged to be the result of evolution--and this is the only possible dialectical approach--then all of the "historical grounds" for territorial claims become meaningless. In short, /whatever is part of the history of a particular country is not necessarily part of this country's territory today/.

After acknowledging the sovereignty of the states founded by the Hans' neighbors, Sun Zuomin goes on to underscore the accuracy of calling their attacks on the Hans "aggression" and calling the commanders who repulsed these attacks Chinese "national heroes." Sun does not agree with Fan Wenlan's statement that aggressors should not be condemned because Sun believes that any war of territorial conquest deserves condemnation.²⁶

Now let us take a look at the views of those who supported the concept of the "eternally unified multinational China."

As we have already mentioned, the idea of China's "eternal unity" became an established part of propaganda during the Cultural Revolution. Claims to Soviet territory were reiterated at the Ninth CCP Congress in 1969 and "more announcements were made about 'unfair treaties' and 'seizures of Chinese territory' by our country."²⁷ We have already pointed out that the thesis regarding the "eternally unified multinational China" had nothing in common with science from the very beginning and served to substantiate the great-Han chauvinistic policy on nationalities within the country and the great-power hegemonistic policy of the Beijing leaders outside the country. These two facets of the thesis were indissolubly connected. Both of these facets were particularly distinct during the Cultural Revolution.

After Mao Zedong's death, the Beijing leaders tried to convey the impression that they were truly concerned about the status of the non-Han peoples and were striving to put an end to great-Han chauvinism. This tactical maneuver was reflected in the views expressed by the supporters of the theory about the "eternally unified China." They essentially deprived many non-Han peoples in China of their own history in the attempt to stress that all of the peoples of China had "contributed to the history of the motherland" (that is, to the history of China, and not to their own history). This was done to cover up the great-Han attitude of Beijing (and of the authors of the official theory) toward the non-Han peoples. An example of this can be found in an article by Chen Liankai.²⁸

The foreign policy, hegemonistic aspect of the concept of the "eternally unified multinational China" is quite directly and frankly set forth in Chen Liankai's article. The author says, for example, that "after dismembering the history of

China," the "gang of four" proceeded to "fall into the embraces of the imperialists" who, in their preparations for aggression against China, had also always "dismembered its history." Chen goes on to say: "For the last 100 years, the imperialists have maliciously evicted small ethnic groups from the history of China and have invented various absurd statements and allegations. In short, they have implied that only the Hans are Chinese, that only dynasties founded by Hans can be called Chinese dynasties, that the small ethnic groups in China are not Chinese and that the national regions of China are therefore not Chinese territory."²⁹ Chen's logic is typical of the supporters of the theory about the "eternally unified multinational China." On the one hand, he projects the territory of the People's Republic of China into the past and makes all of the "small ethnic groups" living within this territory members of "one big family" forever. Confusing the present with the past, he uses the same method to declare all of the territories inhabited by ethnic groups encountered anywhere in the history of the PRC part of the present-day People's Republic of China. In general, we repeat, the basic "methodological principles" of the entire theory about the "eternally multinational China" are metaphysical and unscientific.

We have already listed the theoretical premises of the representatives of the two currents described above. It is extremely important to stress, however, that the two positions have not had the same effect on historical science or on public opinion. Whereas the opponents of the theory of the "eternally unified multinational China" could make only theoretical statements, and even these had to be of a compromisory nature, the supporters of this official concept "set the stage" by developing false beliefs on various levels of public opinion. These views are even inserted into the "academic papers" of various academic institutions influencing the opinions of students and the intelligentsia and are insinuated in central newspapers meant for the general reading public and in dictionaries intended to develop standard stereotypes in the reading public's train of thought.

In 1979 the sixth volume of the "General History of China" was published in Beijing. It was a continuation of Fan Wenlan's unfinished "Short General History of China." This lengthy collective work, which presents the history of the Liao, Hsi Hsia and Chin states, is the most massive of the general histories published in the PRC.

Without discussing the content of this work in detail, we must say that its authors discuss the Liao, Hsi Hsia and Chin states as sovereign entities, separate from the Han-founded Sung Dynasty. It is from this vantage point that their history is narrated, and this is certainly to the authors' credit. Of course, this is totally inconsistent with the concept of the "eternally unified multinational China."

One thing is quite striking, however: In the discussion of the West Liao state, the authors declare that "West Liao existed in our country's northwest for 90 years or so."³⁰ On the map of West Liao³¹ in this book, its territory extends to Lake Balkhash and the Aral Sea. In other words, the authors regard these lands as the "northwest" of present-day China! In this instance, they are confusing history with the present day, which is typical of the supporters of the theory of an "eternally unified multinational China."

Within this context, there is a completely specific reason why the map of the Liao empire³² lists the tribes inhabiting what is now Khabarovskiy Kray, Lake Balkhash

and the upper reaches of the Yenisey as part of this empire, and the map of the Chin empire³³ shows the province of this dynasty's upper capital extending far into the territory of Khabarovskiy Kray.

The authors write: "The Khitans, Tanguts and Jurchens explored and settled vast regions in the north of our country along with the Hans."³⁴ Consequently, in the authors' opinion, the territory depicted on the maps is "North China." Here the metaphysical identification of history with the present day again leads to the incorrect confusion of two issues: the issue of the interrelations between the non-Han state and China and the issue of the correspondence of this state's lands to the present territory of the PRC.

Therefore, what we are dealing with here are not simply historical maps. If this were the case, we could argue with them on the basis of fact. What we have here are the old and defective "grounds" for Beijing's territorial claims. The groundlessness of these claims is made all the more apparent by the fact that the information in the text regarding the spread of Liao and Chin influence to the north³⁵ does not agree with the vast dimensions depicted on the maps of these empires.

In this work, which is supposed to be scientific and contains many statements that contradict the concept of an "eternally unified multinational China," we see evidence that historical "grounds" for Beijing's territorial claims are now being included even in scientific works.

Chinese authors have recently stressed one of the fundamental theses of the doctrine of an "eternally unified multinational China" in specific studies--namely, that all of the states existing within the bounds of the PRC's present boundaries were supposedly "part of a single motherland." Liu Dan, for example, underscores the fact that the relations of Manchurian ruler Nurhachi with the Ming Dynasty constituted a problem within the framework of the "united multinational China" and cannot in any sense be described as relations between China and a foreign state.³⁶

Chinese authors use any mention, even the most dubious references, of contacts between a particular ethnic group and China as grounds for including this group in the "one big family." An example of this can be found in Feng Junshi's article about the origins of the Orochons. He writes, for example, that when he asked them (the Orochons) how long they had been paying tribute to Chinese emperors, the old men of the tribe supposedly answered that, according to their forbears, it had been paid since the time of the T'ang Dynasty. On this basis, Feng asserts that "the ancestors of the Orochons, who belonged to one of the tribes of the northern Shihwei, had already become one of the members of the family of small ethnic groups of the unified multinational feudal state by the time of the T'ang Dynasty at the latest."³⁷ Using this approach, it would be possible, in general, to extend the "boundaries of China" to include all of the peoples who ever had any contact with the Hans!

All present descriptions of the Chinese national heroes Liu Xianzhao and Wei Shiming are also consistent with the theory of an "eternally unified multinational state." Historians allege, for example, that the ancestors of the Jurchens were already "part of the single family" by the time of the T'ang Dynasty.³⁸ The Chin state founded by the Jurchens, in their opinion, was within China and cannot be

considered foreign. Relations between the Chin and Sung states were essentially identical to the relations between purely Han states during periods of fragmentation, such as the era of the Three Kingdoms or the Five Dynasties. Since both the Chinese and Jurchens were of the Chinese nationality (zhonghua minzu), these authors state, Youe Fei, who fought against the Jurchens, cannot properly be called a national hero. The authors propose that the popular radio programs about Youe Fei be re-edited to remove all negative references to non-Han peoples ("barbarians") so that the "merger of nationalities" will not be undermined in the PRC. This last thesis reflected the desire of Chinese authors to camouflage the great-Han domestic policy aspect of the theory of an "eternally unified multinational China."

In connection with this, as we mentioned above, Chinese authors are trying to compensate the PRC's "small ethnic groups" for the loss of their history by stressing the "contribution" these groups made to the history of the "eternally unified multinational China." Many articles have directed attention to this. As a rule, the progressive influence of the Hans' "feudal culture" on these small ethnic groups is also stressed. The "contribution" of these groups to national history might consist, for example, in their "injection of new blood into the Chinese national body"³⁹ or their assistance, despite aristocratic opposition, in the preservation of national unity.⁴⁰ In general, Chinese authors strive to underscore the fact that various "small ethnic groups" have desired "unity and solidarity," despite all of the efforts of the dominant classes to create ethnic obstacles and exacerbate ethnic relations.⁴¹

The progressive nature and leading role of peaceful relations in the interaction of various ethnic groups in China's history are underscored in several articles in line with the theory of an "eternally unified multinational China." For example, Sui and T'ang rulers are commended for promoting the convergence of ethnic groups in Yunnan Province with China. The policy of the T'ang Hsuan-tsung (Li Longji), however, of "attacking barbarians with the help of barbarians" is called reactionary because it "aroused ethnic disagreements and had a negative effect on national unity."⁴² The peace treaty concluded by Emperor Wen-di with the Hsiung-nu in the second century B.C. is called "a valuable experiment in the smooth management of relations between ethnic groups" within the country.⁴³ Cao Yu's play "Wen Zhaojun," about the peace ("based on kinship") established between the Han empire and the Hsiung-nu by giving the Hsiung-nu leader the hand of a Chinese princess, is praised as an example of the reconciliation of relations between ethnic groups within the country.⁴⁴ In this respect, it was also no coincidence that an article by Liu Jingfu was published on a subject that had been virtually ignored by Chinese writers up to that time--the peaceful contacts between the Northern Wei state of the Hsien-pi with the Han dynasties of southern China during the Nanbeichao period.⁴⁵

All manner of praise is heaped upon the rulers of "barbarian states" who eagerly adopted the "progressive feudal Han system of government and culture." Kubilai Khan, for example, is highly appreciated in this respect.⁴⁶

Stressing the "contribution" of "small ethnic groups" to the history of the "eternally unified multinational China," the "peaceful relations" between ethnic groups throughout history and the "harmony between the Hans and their conquerors," Chinese try to muffle the great-Han domestic policy aspect of the concept of an "eternally unified multinational China." In contrast to this, the hegemonistic foreign policy

aspect of this theory is being given more emphasis. This is the main distinction between the present interpretation of this theory and its interpretation in the early 1960's.

Using the premises of the theory of an "eternally unified multinational China" as support, Chinese authors are creating various "historical grounds" for the current Beijing leaders' territorial claims. They assert, for example, that such states as Bohai, Liao, Chin and others were "local political regimes" in China's history, that the Jurchen culture was not independent, that the Jurchen nationality was always one of the minor ethnic groups in China's history and that the territory it inhabited was part of China. They try to prove that the Sushen, the ancestors of the Jurchens, were closely connected with the Central Valley since the most ancient times, and the idea of Soviet scholars about the cultural independence of the Manchurians is denied as a "reactionary imperialist" notion. They assert unequivocally that the Heilongjiang (Amur) region was an "ancient territory of China"⁴⁷ and that the city of Ussuriysk was "the location of the provincial government during the Chin era of our state." The annexation of part of Central Asia by the T'ang Dynasty is called "the result of the fervent desire for unification that was inherent in the people of these lands."⁴⁸ All of these anti-historical, hegemonism-serving conclusions are the result of the application of the concept of an "eternally unified multinational China" to history.

The same tendency to muffle the great-Han domestic political aspect and stress the hegemonistic foreign political aspect of this theory is characteristic of dictionaries published in the PRC. The characters "yi," "man," "rong," "di," "hu," "mo" and combinations of these characters were constantly used for many centuries in the texts of myths, legends and historical documents of ancient and medieval China along with ethnonyms of later origin ("Sushen," "Wuchi," "Mohe," "Hsiung-nu," "Ch'i-tan," "Hsien-pei," "Nuchen," "T'ieh-le," "Tingling," "Huei-ho" and others) in reference to people from other tribes or foreign lands--peoples and states with a real or imaginary, direct or indirect association with the Chinese race and with the Middle Kingdom ("Zhongguo"). Let us take a look at the characteristic changes in the interpretation of these important "ethnic" terms in Chinese dictionaries over the last 45 years. This will provide a better idea of the "workings" of chauvinistic and hegemonistic ideas on the level of the mass Chinese mentality of our day.

The simplest and relatively most consistent explanations of these characters and ethnonyms can be found in the three editions (1920, 1930, 1937) of the "Complete Chinese-English Dictionary" of Zhang Pengyun (Tsang). In his dictionary the character "yi" denoted "barbarian" or "barbarian tribe"; the character "man" was "southern barbarians"; "rong" was "savage western tribes"; "di" was "belligerent northern tribes"; "hu" was "northern tribes"; and "mo" was "savage northern tribes."⁴⁹ The respective interpretations of the ethnonyms "Hsiung-nu," "Ch'i-tan" and "Huei-ho" were "Huns," "Khitans" and "Uighurs." And the combination of characters "Hu-jen" was interpreted as "Mongol" and "Tatar."⁵⁰ Zhang Pengyun also cited some other combinations of characters (binomes): "nan-man"--"southern barbarians"; "di-jung" and "hsi-jung"--"savage western tribes"; "yi-di"--"eastern and northern barbarians"; "ch'iang-hu" and "jung-ch'iang"--"ancient tribes in West China."⁵¹

These ethnographic interpretations were based on the traditional view of China as the center of the world, or the Middle Kingdom, surrounded on all sides by

uncivilized peoples ("barbarians" or "savages"). This belief was recorded in many written documents--in "Liji," "Zhouli," "Lunyu," "Mengzi" and "Erya"--and in dynastic histories. It was also reflected in the encyclopaedic dictionaries "Cihai" ("Sea of Words") and "Ciyuan" ("Spring of Words"), published in continental China in the last years of Kuomintang rule: It is not surprising that the combination "ssu-yi" was interpreted as "the common term for barbarians in all four corners of the world outside China--'yi' in the east, 'rong' in the west, 'man' in the south and 'di' in the north," and the combination "wu-fang" (five sides) was defined as "China (the Middle Kingdom) and barbarians in all four corners of the world."⁵² The ethnonyms "Sushen," "Wuchi," "Ch'i-tan," "Tingling" and "Huei-ho" were defined as the names of independent ancient states having various contacts with Han kingdoms and empires that once existed within the territory of present-day China;⁵³ "Hsiung-nu," "Mohe," "Hsien-pei," "Nuchen" and "T'ieh-le" were interpreted as the names of independent peoples.⁵⁴

In the Chinese explanatory dictionaries and foreign-language dictionaries published during the first decade after the establishment of the PRC, the characters "yi," "man," "rong," "di," "hu," "mo" and combinations of these characters generally had either no "ethnic" meaning at all or an ethnic meaning accompanied by the following explanations: "yi"--"this was the term used in antiquity to denote the peoples of the east, and later to refer to all foreigners in general; the term is rooted in great-Han chauvinism and is no longer in use."⁵⁵ Most of the ethnonyms listed above were ignored, and the ethnonym "Hsiung-nu" was defined as "the name of the ancient northern people living within the territory of present-day Mongolia."⁵⁶ The tendency to say nothing about the "ethnic" meanings of the characters and, consequently, the majority of ethnonyms stemmed not only from the realization of the unscientific nature of contemporary Sinocentrism, but also the realization of the unresolved nature of such problems in China's history as the distinct separation of mythology from historical science, the determination of the temporal framework of the formation of the Chinese nationality and the Chinese state and the assessment of the evolution of this state's boundaries during different periods of its history.

These problems are still unresolved and some of the characters on the list have retained their negative connotations. For example, the meanings of the character "yi" still include "to destroy, devastate, torture, slaughter or execute"; the character "man" means "insolence or the most shameless impertinence"; the combination "rong-shou" means "warmonger"; the combination "hu-hua" means "delirium."⁵⁷

This, however, did not keep the compilers of the 1961 encyclopaedic dictionary "Cihai," which was edited, according to the testimony of the editors of ZHONGGUO YUWEN, in accordance with Mao Zedong's personal suggestions, to declare that the combination "ssu-yi," which was denoted "barbarians in all four corners of the world," was "the common term for ethnic minorities in all four corners of the world."⁵⁸ New interpretations were also given to terms which once denoted uncivilized peoples living outside China (the Middle Kingdom): "yi"--"the ancient term for peoples in the eastern part of our country; once used to denote foreign lands or foreigners"; "man"--"the ancient term for peoples in the southern part of our country"; "rong"--"the ancient term for peoples in the western part of our country"; "di"--"the common term for ethnic minorities living in the north of our country in antiquity"; "hu"--"the ancient term for peoples in the north of our country"; "mo"--"the ancient term for people (peoples?) in the northeast of our country."⁵⁹ New interpretations were also acquired by many traditional ethnonyms: "Hsiung-nu"

(Huns), "Ch'i-tan" (Khitans), "Xianbei" (Hsien-pei), "Nuchen" (Jurchens), "Mohe" (ancestors of the Manchurians) and "Huei-ho" (Uighurs) were all called "ancient nationalities in China" or "ancient peoples of our country."⁶⁰

An analysis of the descriptions of "ssu-yi" ("barbarians in all four corners of the world") presented in the texts of the dynastic histories "Hanshu," "Hou Hanshu," "Jinshu," "Jiu Tangshu" and "Songshu" testifies that this kind of great-Han interpretation of several important terms in China's ethnic and political history, which are now widely used in the PRC, were not engendered by a discerning reassessment of historical documents from the vantage point of Marxist-Leninist historical science, but on the orders of the Maoist leadership, which decided at the end of the 1950's that national dictionaries could be used to instill public opinion with chauvinistic and hegemonistic ideas.

If we accept the definition of "ssu-yi" by the compilers of the 1961 "Cihai" encyclopaedic dictionary and agree that this combination of characters is the "common name for ethnic minorities" and if we agree with the arbitrary definitions of traditional ethnonyms in the latest Chinese dictionaries ("Han-ying cidian," 1978; "Xiandai hanyu cidian," 1979; "Cihai," 1979), it turns out that the ethnic minorities in China, judging by the texts of dynastic histories, include not only the peoples of states adjacent to China, such as the USSR, MPR, Kampuchea, SRV, DPRK, Nepal, Bhutan, Japan and the Philippines, but also the populations of India, Iran, Iraq, Greece, Afghanistan and even Egypt, Spain, Italy and Germany: After all, they are all mentioned in dynastic histories. For example, Nepal ("Nipolo"), India ("Tianzhu"), Persia ("Possu"), the East Roman Empire ("Folin") and the Arab caliphates ("Dashi") are all listed among the "western rong" in "Jiu Tangshu."⁶¹ The "southern and southwestern yi" listed in "Songshu" include "the inhabitants of islands in the Great Sea to the south and southwest of Jiaozhou (Cochin), 3,000-5,000 li from the shore (of China) and the more distant ones--20,000-30,000 li away."⁶²

The new interpretation of the traditional ethnonym "Hsiung-nu" as "an ancient nationality in China" means that even Attila, who once "laid seige to Rome and led raids on German tribes,"⁶³ can be called a representative of the "unified multinational feudal-patriarchal Chinese state."

The theory we are examining is vigorously introduced into the consciousness of the younger generation in the PRC even before children reach school age. For example, the present 10-year school program in the PRC proposes that the Ch'in empire be called "a single multinational centralized feudal state."⁶⁴ One of the new discussion topics is "the development of the regions of minor ethnic groups during the period of the T'ang Dynasty," and what is more, the "regions of minor ethnic groups" are supposed to include the regions inhabited by Turks, Uighurs and Mohe,⁶⁵ who were supposedly "members of the family of minor ethnic groups in the unified multinational China." The Ming and Ch'ing dynasties (prior to the "Opium Wars") are already being viewed as stages in the "consolidation of the unified multinational state."⁶⁶

The concept of the "eternally unified multinational China" also affects the compilation of maps for history textbooks. Cartographers suggest that all of the states founded by various ethnic groups within the boundaries of the Ch'ing empire just before the Opium Wars should be regarded as "local political regimes" founded by

various "fraternal Chinese peoples."⁶⁷ This approach ultimately leads to the virtual denial of the evolution of "eternal China's" boundaries. According to its authors, this evolution took place only within the "eternal" Ch'ing boundaries.⁶⁸ This is the kind of map that had to be added to earlier works: "The new textbook gives a relatively detailed description of the situation in the northeastern and northwestern border territories throughout China's history. For this reason, the historical maps have been supplemented with maps of the Duhufu of the T'ang Dynasty in Anxi, the Duhufu in Beiting and Heishui, the Dussu of the Ming Dynasty in Nuergan, the northeastern and northwestern Chinese territories seized by tsarist Russia at the time of the Ch'ing Dynasty and tsarist Russia's invasion of northeast China."⁶⁹ This list of the maps added to the new textbook obviously requires no further comment.

Zhu Wenli, a secondary school teacher from Shanghai, spoke of his experience in using this kind of map of the T'ang Dynasty during a history lesson.⁷⁰ At first Zhu pointed out the T'ang boundaries in the textbook map, which supposedly stretched to Lake Balkhash in the west and to the Khinggang range beyond the Amur in the north. Then he told his students about the T'ang and Ch'ing territories, stressing that the history of all the ethnic groups within these territories was an "internal Chinese affair." Then Zhu called a student up to the blackboard and asked him to compare the territory of the present-day PRC with the T'ang boundaries. The student should have noticed that the T'ang Dynasty had more territory than the PRC. The teacher also used the map of the T'ang Dynasty when he began to relate the history of the Ch'ing state. He first had to remind his students that the Ch'ing territory had been "native Chinese territory" since the time of the T'ang Dynasty, and would then point out the territories "seized" by tsarist Russia on the T'ang map.

"Recently in Shanghai," IZVESTIYA remarked, "a map of territories supposedly 'taken away from China by tsarist Russia' was reissued in a huge edition as a 'teaching aid' (!). It clearly illustrates the dimensions of Beijing's claims to Soviet territory. The 'Chinese territories' supposedly 'seized' by Russia on the map include Primorskiy Kray, the island of Sakhalin, Amurskaya Oblast, Khabarovskiy Kray and a large part of the land east of Lake Balkhash's western shore in the Kazakh, Tajik and Kirghiz SSR's, including Pamir and the region in which the capital of Soviet Kazakhstan, Alma Ata, is located. The cartographers have even given new Chinese names to Soviet cities."⁷¹ In summation, we can say with complete justification that the concept of an "eternally unified multinational China" essentially has nothing in common with the real history of the Chinese people and is supposed to serve the strictly pragmatic, great-power goals of the present PRC leadership.

FOOTNOTES

1. O. Borisov, "Some Aspects of Chinese Policy," KOMMUNIST, 1981, No 6, p 117.
2. RENMIN RIBAO, 31 December 1979.
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MIXED ECONOMY LATEST OF PRC'S 'VOLUNTARIST' ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS

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[Article by Prof E. Konovalov, Dr. Sc. (Econ.): "Gross Distortions of Social Reproduction in China"]

[Text]

Quantitative characteristics alone, such as growth rates, volume of output, production personnel, number of employed and so on prove insufficient in analysing the Chinese economy. It is very important to see the qualitative aspects—production efficiency, the relationship between accumulation and consumption, between departments I and II, between production and consumption—in the final analysis it is necessary to study the social labour productivity. The present article attempts to discuss the specifics of Chinese social reproduction and to show its contradictory, disproportionate and spasmodic nature and the impact of the Peking leaders' economic policy on social reproduction in general.

The old forms of ownership were replaced in China by other, formally more progressive forms against the background of invariably poorly developed productive forces, scattered production, preponderant barter relations, and the underdeveloped market and infrastructure. The victorious people's power only envisioned actual socialisation in the future. It was planned to raise immediately the level of production and exchange to bring them in accord with modern forms of property. A temporary gap of that type is permissible, provided it steadily narrows rather than widens. Otherwise the new forms of social relations will not demonstrate their advantages. In China, on the contrary, this bridging of the gap between the forms of property and the development level of the productive forces was interrupted at the end of the first five-year period as a result of reckless experiments, including the "great leap forward", "people's communes" and of placing the handicrafts and the local village markets under state control. This had an adverse effect on all economic processes, social reproduction included.

An analysis of the PRC's economic development will reveal the contradictory, sporadic and uneven character of reproduction: certain spells of expanded reproduction give way to protracted periods of simple reproduction in the major sectors of production; there is a profound disproportion between individual phases of reproduction, the quantitative expansion of production fails to boost the working people's consumption; there are no stable organic interrelations between the two departments and the individual sectors of production, between town and country, and among the country's economic regions, which undermines the very foundations of reproduction; the state uses distribution relations above all to ensure the maximum increase of the accumulation fund and to pool the financial and material resources for militarist purposes; distribution exercises practically no stimulating effect upon production and consumption in the Chinese economy.

Reproduction in the PRC is also characterised by a discordance between the trends and the intensity of the reproduction of production relations, between the social product and manpower. The sporadic growth

of the productive forces is accompanied by "leaps" and relapses in the forms of property, stagnation in the development of aggregate manpower and sharp fluctuations in the amount of manpower used in large- and small-scale production, construction and the services.

All this corroborates the idea that in its economic policy the Peking leadership has foresaken the fundamental principles of building a planned socialist economy, that it violates objective economic laws and ignores the long-term class interests of the working people.

After the popular revolution triumphed in China in 1949, domestic conditions were indeed quite limited and unfavourable for expanded reproduction. The country had, not only to rehabilitate, but even create anew a national economic complex capable of effectively functioning on its own economic base. Pre-revolutionary China had an extremely poor accumulation base, and surplus product was generated in only a few production sectors and centres which already knew to varying extents commodity production and foreign capital. The country had on the whole subsistence or semi-subsistence agriculture, and product and labour were reproduced on a simple rather than on an enlarged scale.

Reproduction of production relations. Production relations indeed had to be radically changed in China. The democratic transformations carried out in town and country (confiscation of bureaucracy capital, development of different forms of state capitalism, agrarian reform and incipient forms of cooperating peasants and handicraftsmen) definitely had a stimulating effect: the forms of property, the social structure and position of the toiling classes and strata had undergone a certain change. The Soviet Union's political, economic and military aid to China had a tremendous role to play. However, all these and subsequent socio-economic transformations were carried out within the framework of a backward technical and economic base, with the exception of those branches and regions where the war-ravaged economy was rehabilitated with Soviet aid and on a fundamentally different technological foundation. The latter included primarily Northeastern China and also some regions in Northern and Northwestern China and new key sectors of industry and transport. The material aid of the socialist countries was the revolutionising element which was to shatter the archaic and stagnant technical and economic base.

The social and economic transformations carried out during the first five-year period were aimed at evolving forms of property and distribution, and a management system suitable for the country's specific conditions, the state and level of productive forces. The hurried cooperation of the peasants in 1956 and later on the formation of the people's communes in 1958 and 1959 along with the placing of private industrial and trade enterprises and handicraft shops under state control formally "eliminated" the mixed economy of the transition period while producing in practice a dramatic gap between the production relations and the state of the productive forces. All that, together with the consolidation of the military-bureaucratic regime during the "cultural revolution" and the stepped up militarisation, drastically undermined China's burgeoning socio-economic structure in the transition period.

Although, according to the Maoists, all those transformations were revolutionary and progressive and allegedly signified an "immediate transition to socialism and communism", in actual fact, that bypassing of entire stages and the "ascent of the ladder of communism" boiled down to voluntarist socialisation and the introduction of military-barrack methods into the economy. This abolition of the mixed economy, the

conversion of all the communes into state units, the elimination of individual plots and handicrafts and also the levelling out of distribution reflected a voluntarist approach to the problems of economic construction, discredited scientific socialism in China and amounted to a departure from fundamental Marxist-Leninist principles.

After Mao Zedong's death the Chinese leaders have been trying to do away with the "leftist deviation" and to revise the more odious maxims put into practice since the "great leap forward". To quote Chinese economists, today it is imperative to "slacken" extremely tough production relations, to grant "small freedoms" and to allow the "socialist, semi-socialist and non-socialist" elements to coexist in the country's economy. Evidently, what is meant here is a deep strategic retreat along the entire socio-economic front, which rolls society back to the initial stage of the transition period in China, rather than the restoration of rational forms and methods of a socialist economy to meet the requirements of today's China. This retreat is forced by the failure of harmful experiments and the policy of the "four modernisations" and "regulation". The revival of the mixed economy presupposes the development of the market economy, the granting of independence to enterprises, the transfer of land to the peasants, and the encouragement of private initiative and state capitalism with the participation of foreign capital. The first years of the experimental "regulation" of the economy give ample reason to speak of the emergence of new problems and contradictions. Inflation, the state budget deficit, unrestrained price rises, mounting unemployment, smuggling and obvious disproportions in the economy are primarily caused by the fact that the country's leaders seek to carry out social reforms and transformations amidst social and political instability and in response to the "ultra-left" mistakes of the past rather than on the basis of a scientific development strategy. As a reaction to "leftist deviation", the present-day socio-economic policy soon transcended the rational and realistic measures and evolved into a "right-wing deviation" threatening the future of socialism in China. Though there is as yet no reason to speak of the direct restoration of capitalism in China on a domestic basis, its alliance with the West and all sorts of inducements to foreign capital (in the form of credits, mixed enterprises and "free economic zones" on the country's territory) pose a real danger of China being drawn into the world capitalist economy and experiencing a greater economic influence of big monopoly groups. At present more than 400 mixed enterprises operate in China, relying on capital from more than 20 capitalist countries; upwards of 1,000,000 private enterprises have been allowed to be set up and the "collective sector" already employs more than 24 million factory and office workers; the partial transfer of land to the peasants has in fact weakened collective ownership and made it possible to lease and sell land to individuals and enterprises.

All these phenomena show that reproduction of socialist production relations and forms of ownership is being distorted and exposed to considerable pressure by non-socialist economic forms. Social reproduction is largely affected by the economic management system. Expanded reproduction is shaped and regulated through economic policy measures which should unite and harmonise the individual phases of reproduction, mould its types and combine correctly the intensive and extensive forms of reproduction. The experience of the past quarter century in China shows that economic management has been dramatically at variance with what the laws of socialist reproduction require. The planned development of social production was replaced by bureaucratic voluntarism

and interminable campaigns and experiments, though it is well known that any experiment in the economy (especially the Chinese economy) may prove quite costly. To this day the Peking experimenters in charge of the economic policy engage in dangerous and expensive operations which undermine the foundations of socialism, unstable as they are, for the sake of temporarily boosting "economic efficiency". At the same time many essential things remain unchanged. No economic reforms are possible without changes in the system of planned indices, the structure of the wholesale prices and taxes and without strict cost accounting. All this remains essentially unchanged, hence low social production efficiency, the gap between the rise of real production cost and that of the existing prices, duplicate production and rivalry among large and small enterprises, rising prices and inflation, underemployment and joblessness, and many other problems.

In the years of the rehabilitation period and the first five-year plan *reproduction of social product* in the PRC was effected on the basis of agricultural advance and the reconstruction and building of 1,000 industrial projects, with more than 200 major modern Soviet-aid mills and factories forming their backbone. During that period great attention was also paid to such important economic development aspects as the stabilisation and strengthening of the financial and monetary system, the development of the transportation system and the establishment of the state control over the domestic market and foreign trade. Economic activity was fully centralised within the state sector, and private capitalist enterprise was subjected to effective control, constraints and indirect planning. Relations between town and country were primarily based on trade and exchange between industry and agriculture. This created necessary conditions for the accumulation of funds to accomplish the mighty social and economic tasks set in keeping with the party general line in the transition period and the resolutions of the 8th CPC Congress. The achievements of the five-year-plan period were quite impressive and promised a good development outlook. During these five years economic development was both rapid and well-balanced. The optimal or required relationships were maintained between production development and the growth of the working people's living standards, between industry and agriculture, and between the accumulation and consumption funds in the national income. The latter proportion averaged 25 to 75, which was of paramount importance for the healthy development of social reproduction. For all the extensive economic aid rendered to China by other socialist countries, it was impossible to boost accumulation because of the low level of surplus product in agriculture (3-6 per cent) and the need to introduce material incentives to raise labour productivity. The first attempt to "skyrocket" the rates and norms of accumulation was made in 1956, but the results of the year proved so detrimental to the country's budget and food balance that the next year witnessed attempts to stabilise the relationships of the past years.

Nevertheless, beginning in 1958, Mao Zedong who headed the nationalist part of the party leadership, imposed on the CPC the "new general line of building socialism according to the principle: more, faster, better and more thriftily", as a result of which the country was plunged into a period of planless chaos, reckless voluntarist experiments, of tribulations for the Chinese people.

Economically, the "great leap forward" of 1958-1960 squandered funds on the construction of millions of small-scale and tiny enterprises of traditional production and enlisted an enormous labour army (70 mil-

lion in industry and 100 million in agriculture) to accomplish the ambitious task of doubling the steel output. The main economic proportions were quickly destroyed: capital investments in the group A industries exceeded 90 per cent of the total industrial investments, and accumulation in the national income reached up to 40 per cent in 1958 and continued growing alarmingly in the next two years. This led to an enormous state budget deficit which could not be covered for many years to come. As far as reproduction was concerned, the "great leap forward" resulted in disproportions between individual phases of reproduction. Production growth was aimed exclusively at doubling the steel output in industry and grain production in agriculture. Financial, material and manpower resources were used to attain that goal to the detriment of other economic sectors. It was production for production's sake. Coal, power, raw materials and manpower inputs to produce steel were not taken into consideration; major economic concepts, such as "efficiency" and "payback", were branded in that period as "revisionism" and "a hang-over of bourgeois theories"; payment by results and material incentives, as "a sharp knife killing without blood".

That was not merely a period of different economic methods and "experiments" but the beginning of Maoism's general onslaught on the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and on the collective experience of the socialist countries. The PRC also saw the introduction of the regime of barracks communism at that time. Leftist trends persisted among the Maoist leadership and continued to grow in the two decades that followed. The great-power ambitions of the Chinese leaders became clearly manifest in their militarist, anti-Soviet and anti-socialist foreign policy.

The "great leap forward" dealt a tremendous economic and moral blow to the cause of socialism in China: Chinese economists estimated that in three years direct losses exceeded 100,000 million yuan.¹ Production efficiency dropped by 75 per cent, material expenditures per unit of finished products rose by 300-500 per cent and expenditures of direct labour by 100-700 per cent. If account is also taken of the inevitable drop in agricultural production and subsequent crop-failures and hunger (the 1960 death-rate was 16.7 million² as against 7 million in 1957—a nearly 10 million increase, which equals the total death toll of the liberation wars), it becomes abundantly clear what the Maoist experiments cost Chinese society.

Following the "regulation" period (1961-1965) during which capital construction was sharply cut, a host of small enterprises built in 1958 and 1959 were abandoned and the accumulation rate was reduced to 10 per cent,³ the Chinese economy, pushed to the hilt by the Maoists' militarist and great-power ambitions, again began experiencing "overloading". This time militarisation served to destabilise production. Military expenditures began growing speedily in the mid-1960s and still account for 40 per cent of the budget expenditures. This was not merely an impediment to raising the working people's living standards, it also determined new relationships in the economy. Just as was the case in the years of

¹ See *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 19, 1981.

² See *Jingji yanjiu*, No. 3, 1981, p. 19.

³ This "respite" after the "great leap forward" campaign had a baleful effect on social and economic development. In the course of two years the number of factory and office workers dwindled by 20 million; the urban population was forcibly cut by 28 million from January 1961 to June 1963. The volume of state capital investments fell from 38,400 million to 5,600 million yuan. The three years saw the closing of 44,500 state-owned industrial enterprises under central and regional control. See *Renmin ribao*, July 14, 1981.

the "great leap forward", the accumulation quota was raised, the overwhelming majority of capital investments was channelled into new construction projects (primarily poorly equipped small-scale and medium enterprises), and production growth was spurred by employing tens of millions of new people rather than by boosting labour productivity. During the 1960s the number of those employed in agriculture increased from 210 to 310 million and grain production rose by less than 100 million tons,⁴ that is, labour productivity per worker far from rising showed a downward trend, in spite of growing chemicalisation, mechanisation and expansion of the water system during that period. The two-fold growth of industrial personnel during the period was also accompanied by a fall in labour productivity in the key industries (coal, mining and transport). In the period from 1966 to 1976 the fixed assets grew by 179,000 million yuan, an increase equalling that over the entire preceding period of the PRC's existence. As a result, a mere 1,570 out of the 150,000 new industrial enterprises, or a little over one per cent, could be considered large or medium-sized projects of a modern type.⁵ The same period witnessed the resumption (after a ten-year period) of the building of enterprises with imported equipment. On the whole, the quality of the assets newly put to use was much lower than during the first five-year plan period, as a result of which production efficiency and labour productivity continued declining.

By the late 1970s the Chinese economy had an exceedingly inflated, low-efficiency and archaic structure. The country had 350,000 industrial enterprises (only 6,600 of which can be regarded as modern large-scale projects) with 50 million employees. There were 50,000 people's communes (more than 5 million production teams) in rural areas with the total workforce exceeding 300 million. In addition, nearly 30 million were employed at 1.5 million industrial enterprises built in rural areas.

Production figures in the PRC looked quite impressive. For instance, the country produced more than 600 million tons of coal, more than 100 million tons of oil, 600 million tons of cement and 300 million tons of grain (including batatas and soya beans). The tractor fleet in agriculture (including small tractors) exceeded 2 million, while the number of machine-tools in industry surpassed that of Japan.

A detailed analysis of the Chinese economy, nevertheless, will show that as regards the qualitative indices and the rates and proportions of reproduction, the national economy (both in general and as regards its key sectors) is a cumbersome and decrepit organism, with the biggest part of the resources used either for military purposes or merely to increase the number of jobs, to put into operation new capacities with outdated equipment or to maintain millions of enterprises and tens of millions of jobs that consume fuel, raw materials and power resources.

There are dramatic disproportions between production and consumption among different economic sectors and between the economic regions and industrial centres. While the extracting industries were severely lagging behind, surplus production capacities were, on the contrary, growing in mechanical engineering and ferrous metallurgy. While many types of machines, equipment and metal were in short supply, there was a surprising overstocking of metal—as much as 30 million tons—lying waste for years and of electric engineering industry output to the tune of 60,000 million yuan. Against the background of the ostensible construc-

⁴ See *Jingji yanjiu*, No. 1, 1981, p. 41.

⁵ See *Renmin ribao*, July 17, 1981.

tion of new strategic railway lines in the outlying and sparsely populated regions, it is puzzling to see that the rolling stock is exceedingly overloaded, with jams at railway junctions and stations which deliver coal and export and import goods. And finally, despite high growth rates and enormous accumulation, the output of finished products increased minimally, while material expenditures skyrocketed. The Chinese say: "The more we produce the more products are locked up in storehouses, and the more grain we take in the more we lose."

It is also hard to understand why with such high production growth rates the working people's living standards fail to rise. What can account for the rampant unemployment in towns and lack of jobs for more than 100 million women in agriculture despite the fact that since the foundation of the PRC the number of employed workers jumped from 7 million to 100 million and of those employed in the countryside from 100 million to 330 million? The answer to these and many other problems should be sought in Peking's economic policy and, in particular, in the state of its reproduction.

After Mao's death the new leaders put forth another ambitious course, the programme of "four modernisations", despite the crisis situation in the economy. In the first ten years it was planned to retool production and introduce modern equipment, including imported machinery. Several dozen large and expensive projects were constructed simultaneously, consuming enormous capital investments, building materials, metalwork, power and coal. In this way capital construction was excessively expanded by capital-intensive projects, such as the Baoshan complex and also by the continued construction of a growing number of small-scale enterprises with backward technology. In two years (1976-1977) the number of industrial enterprises increased by 54,000.⁶ In fact, economic development after Mao's death can essentially be viewed as a revival of the "great leap forward" or, to quote the Chinese press, as a "repetition of old mistakes in a new form". Practically all capital investments went to the construction of new projects, though it lacked the most essential materials. In the course of ten years capital construction received only 70 per cent of the metalwork, 40 per cent of the timber and 60 per cent of the cement it needed.⁷ The enterprises already in operation had neither raw materials nor power nor finances to modernise equipment. As a result, tens of thousands of enterprises stood idle or operated at one third or one half of their capacity, while the quality and assortment of output was constantly worsening. In effect, that group of enterprises hardly ensured simple reproduction, to say nothing of expanded one. Profound discrepancy emerged between production and consumption: on the one hand, the bulk of equipment (conventional machine-tools, agricultural machinery, electrical engineering equipment and so on) had no market and, on the other, the domestic market was acutely short of basic implements, which began to be imported at high costs. During that period the country imported tens of thousands of cars, a large amount of electronic technology (including computers), colour TV sets, commercial refrigerators, and chemical raw materials—a policy soon found to be "thoughtless haste".

The balance between production and circulation was also upset. Industry was increasingly putting out finished products to be used by that

⁶ See *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 15, 1981.

⁷ See *Qiye guanli*, No. 2, 1981, p. 12.

same closed-cycle industrial structure. Strictly speaking, heavy industry generally developed, "producing for itself". In this way tens of thousands of enterprises dropped out of circulation and the reproduction cycle because their products could be sold within the framework of that very branch, a given city, or even an individual enterprise. Exchange was paralysed between town and country, between group A and group B industries and between the country's economic regions. The protracted freeze of the working people's living standards impeded the normal development of reproduction. It could be said that the 1970s in general were characterised by high quantitative production growth rates which were achieved at enormous cost and with dramatically low qualitative characteristics of production (labour productivity, utilisation factor and return on investment). Monetary outlays in production, end products and especially the mass of taxes and revenue dwindled with every passing year.

After the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee in 1978 the short-lived euphoria of the "four modernisations" was sharply criticised and branded as another manifestation of "leftist deviation". Criticism was levelled above all at the "stupid venture" of building the Baoshan steel works, which exemplified "thoughtlessness and blind copying of everything foreign". Fantastic capital investment, the ill-chosen construction site, the lack of economic substantiation in designing and many other aspects of the "Baoshan contract" were severely censured. It was not until a year and a half later that China resumed talks on continuing work on the project, with the scale of construction cut and the deadline for putting it into operation postponed. The "regulation" period was hastily proclaimed to offset the miscalculations of the late 1970s.

It aims above all at resolving as soon as possible such economic problems as the budgetary deficit, the hard currency debt, unemployment, intersectoral discrepancies, and so on. The methods used to lead the country out of the crisis included the emergency halting of some capital construction, reduction of the accumulation quotas, stopping of large and expensive equipment purchases abroad, the alleviation of unemployment in towns and a shift from a capital-intensive to a labour-intensive production structure.

In two years (1979-1980) the advocates of "regulation" resorted to tough measures to slice centralised capital investments from 50,000 million to 35,000 million yuan, but their total volume, nevertheless, grew because of growing local budgetary expenditures and outlays to build industrial enterprises in people's communes. Throughout the PRC's history sharp increases in capital investments were repeatedly accompanied by just as sharp reductions. These fluctuations in the share of capital investments in the national income (from 7.3 per cent to 31.5 per cent)^{*} had a most pernicious effect on reproduction: in the years of investment slumps the resources for expanded reproduction dwindled while excessive capital investment and large-scale capital construction adversely affected current production and personal consumption. In the course of more than 30 years the Chinese economy has been thrown into disarray at least three times.

So far the government has been orienting many group A industries to cutting capital construction dramatically. Construction work on major in-

^{*} See *Qiye guanli*, No. 2, 1981, p. 10.

dustrial projects has been frozen, while there have mushroomed small-scale duplicate enterprises that are poorly equipped, lack specialisation, consume critical raw materials and turn out second-rate or altogether worthless products. Investments in modern facilities are increasingly becoming dead assets. It is not until 1982 that a boost in heavy industry is planned at the expense of enterprises catering for agriculture and consumer industries.

The unfavourable demographic and economic situation laid bare unemployment in towns. It has so far been veiled by the eviction of the literate urban youth to the rural areas and by the inflated development of small-scale production. These were emergency and yet ineffective measures that exacerbated social and economic contradictions. Now that 15 out of 20 million young people who had been sent to outlying rural areas returned to cities and towns to join millions of urbanites who had been waiting for jobs for years on end, there is a huge army of the unemployed. To do away with it on a nationwide scale, the country would have to spend 120,000 million yuan to expand fixed assets and 75,000 million yuan to expand the current assets, in other words, to use the entire capital investment in the course of four years. This circumstance was **used as an argument in favour of reviving the mixed economy which** (apart from the state sector) could supposedly absorb spare manpower. In the course of four years all means and ways were used to provide jobs to 26 million, but as tremendous number of young people joins the ranks of the able-bodied population, unemployment is slow to decrease and the number of unemployed still stands at 26 million. What is more, the Chinese youth are unwilling to reconcile themselves to having to start work at outdated and unpromising enterprises where from the outset they receive unemployment benefits rather than wages.

Changes in the production structure are other emergency steps within the "regulation" process. In the four years the share of group A industries went down from 69 to 50 per cent while the share of group B industries jumped from 31 to 50 per cent. This unheard-of shift in the history of world industrial development was effected at incredible costs. Tens of thousands of unprofitable and ineffective enterprises had to be closed down, while the existing enterprises had to be sharply reoriented to producing consumer goods. Needless to say, tens of thousands of industrial enterprises received no orders as a result, and tens of millions of factory and office workers in group A industries, including 10 million builders, remained out of work. Hopes that labour-intensive branches would be expanded and millions of jobless would be absorbed by enterprises of the collective and private sectors, and that the services would also expand, proved illusory because group B (the textile, consumer and food industries) could absorb the mass of direct labour only as long as the existing capacities got enough raw materials, power and orders. Under the circumstances, the production of most popular goods, including bicycles, TV sets, radio-sets, sewing machines and wrist watches was hampered by acute shortages of metal and sophisticated specialised equipment. As a result, enormous difficulties emerged in the reorientation process, and the problem of employing people who had worked at the existing capacities was further aggravated.

Another characteristic of reproduction in China is the speedy quantitative expansion of the fixed assets, the biggest part of which consists of technologically backward, low-productive and obsolescent machine-tools and equipment. Save for the imported equipment which accounts

for a mere 2 per cent of the fixed assets⁹ and also a small part of the home-made machine-tools, the fixed assets grow primarily as a result of the mere reproduction of technological designs of the 1940s and the 1950s. It should be also kept in mind that, first, they are used with poor effect because of insufficient raw materials, power supplies and orders, and that, second, these enterprises are usually staffed with unskilled and uneducated workers. While the scope of China's machine-tool fleet is bigger than that of Japan, its output is a mere one-fourth of that of the latter. Compared to the rest of the industries, only those catering for military production are relatively well-equipped (they use 10 per cent of the entire machine-tools and 70 per cent of the most up-to-date specialised precision machine-tools available in the country).¹⁰

The merely quantitative expansion of the fixed assets is absolutely insufficient to ensure industrial progress, especially when equipment is chronically underused, production spasmodic, the output substandard, the market anonymous, the goal undefined and development economically pointless. The simple expansion of the fixed assets gives a one-sided picture of the entire process of expanded reproduction. This is but one, extensive, trend in reproduction. Nevertheless, even this trend fails to materialise: the disruption of the sectoral structure revealed a tremendous overproduction of many types of equipment (conventional machine-tools, tractors, electrical appliances and so on) that are either idle or underused. This reorientation of industry is having an adverse effect on the country's economy. The shift itself can be characterised as that from "ultra-industrialisation" to "pseudo-industrialisation". Both approaches are proving taxable for Chinese society.

The reproduction of workforce is still another decisive factor of the process of reproduction. At all the stages of building socialism expanded reproduction of workforce is sine qua non and prerequisite for the normal functioning of reproduction in general. In China with its enormous population that invariably affects growth rates and the structure of production, this factor has an exceptionally important part to play in economic development.

It should be pointed out that the economic strategy of Mao Zedong and his supporters for more than a quarter century was based precisely on using colossal manpower resources. They were viewed as a purely quantitative potential and the belief was that the more people were involved in production the better the effect on its growth. The qualitative aspect of these resources was completely ignored. "It is good to have many people!" Mao Zedong used to say. He considered the "great leap forward" a new development strategy that allegedly took into account the country's specific conditions, in particular, its numerous population, and that could serve as an example to other backward countries in this sense. The maximum, allout enlistment of everyone who can work, including children and old people, in the mass-scale steel making, "deep ploughing" and water reservoir building was advertised as "the release of the productive forces formerly bound by the narrow limits of production relations". According to the Maoists' plans, the enormous armies of labour

⁹ It should be kept in mind that imported equipment is concentrated at few industrial enterprises, primarily in the military production branches. Even in the outlying Yunnan Province, from one-third to one-half of the machine-tool fleet of the military enterprises are imported (*Jingji wenti tansuo*, No. 3, 1981, p. 21). This means that more than 350,000 industrial enterprises (minus 400 enterprises in military production) are fitted with home-made equipment of low technological quality.

¹⁰ See *Jingji guanli*, No. 6, 1980, p. 17.

used in the decisive sectors of production were to "compensate" for the lack of material conditions for the development of large-scale socialised production. This squandering of workforce, sporadic transfer of armies of labour from one enterprise to another, and the reduction of wages to the subsistence level, all constituted the fundamental mistake of the "great leap" strategy. The sharp "explosion" in employment in 1958 (an increase by 20 million in industry and 100 million in agriculture) was followed in 1961 and 1962 by a forced slump to the 1957 level.

Beginning with the early 1980s there has been much talk in China about the "quality of population", the need to raise a "healthy and educated" nation, and "search for talent". The reappraisal is under way of Mao's idea of boundless labour resources as a factor stimulating production growth. Criticism is levelled against the practice of supplementing the working class with the youth whose educational level has dropped dramatically since the late 1960s, skill requirements lowered and the workers' living conditions barely reproduced. Sober opinions are being voiced to the effect that "economising" on the upkeep of the working people, on their education and vocational training perpetuates low labour productivity and is harmful to output quality and to production efficiency. Many recognised the fact that expanded employment on the basis of small-scale production with its outdated technology and no high demands on the quality of labour provides no stimulus to creativity. Some statements point out that as a result of the former policy the young working class (workers under 30 account for 60 per cent of the total workforce and amount to 50 million people) is socially passive and lacking initiative.

The reproduction of labour envisages, not only the provision of workers with the means of sustenance they themselves can produce in the course of their life, but also the reproduction of their family to ensure replacement of labour. For many years China was concerned exclusively with satisfying the most basic needs of the working people, providing them with food, clothes and housing. However, even these problems were dealt with at an extremely low level. The consumption of staple consumer goods and services had been practically frozen for twenty years. But even this astoundingly low level of consumption was reproduced by the worker over an extremely long span—17 years of painstaking efforts in agriculture and 7 years in industry.

Economic development depends to a large extent on the constant growth of the workers' educational level and skills, which ensure a steady growth of labour productivity. The fallacy of the Maoists' economic strategy, among other things, lay in their plans to "economise" not only on modern means of production but also on allocations for education, technical training and science. If we also take into account the bringing to nought of spending on medical care and the development of culture, profound contradictions come to light between the militarist policy of the Peking leaders and the main goal of production under socialism.

Despite the tremendous inputs into the implements and objects of labour and despite the relatively high average capital-labour ratio in present-day industry (10,000 yuan per worker in heavy industry and 5,000 yuan in consumer industry), the technological level of social production remains rather low on the whole.

In making optimal use of the human and material resources, it is of paramount importance to ensure their well-balanced distribution between production sectors and the services. In view of the inadequate flexibility of the Chinese workforce structure, its excessive concentration

in production should be mentioned. In 1978 those employed in the services accounted for only 6.4 per cent of the total workforce, with a mere 4.6 per cent catering for passenger transport, communal services, health care and education.¹¹ This is due not only to a neglect of the problems of the people's living standards and raising their educational and cultural levels but also to an underestimation of the part the services play in expanded reproduction. Beginning in 1958 capital investments in the non-productive field accounted on the average for less than 20 per cent, and dropped to 6.5 per cent by 1970.¹²

The large share of those engaged in agriculture is an invariable feature of the intersectoral distribution of labour in the PRC. At present more than 300 million, or two-thirds of the entire gainfully employed population, work in agriculture. It is difficult to move from agriculture to other sectors because jobs are limited in towns and there is disguised and undisguised unemployment. In the 1980s the inflow of people of working age will amount to 230-250 million, with four-fifths of them inevitably settling in the densely populated countryside where land is in great demand, as it is. Three of the country's provinces (Zhejiang, Guangdong and Hunan) have on the average less than one mu (one-fifteenth of a hectare) of arable land per capita, while Shantou Region (Guangdong Province) has as little as one-eighth of a mu per person.

The group A industries in China employ many more people than the group B industries. Out of the 54 million industrial workers, 33 million are employed in heavy industry and 21 million in light industry.¹³ Rational redistribution of labour in the country's industrial sectors and regions is carried out practically only among the cadre workers and an insignificant portion of the intelligentsia. Factory and office workers are hired, moved from one place to another, dismissed and so on under the strict control of labour agencies that are guided by the desire to provide at least some jobs to the huge mass of the people, rather than by the needs of production or the workers' skills. Especially damaging is the system of "inheriting" jobs from retiring parents. As a result, enterprises and departments (including schools and research centres) are forced to hire people whose profession, the education level and sex often run counter to the nature and current needs of production. To sum up, the working class' relative inflexibility and stagnant sectoral structure, which only changes numerically, determine the conservative role of manpower. The aggregate workforce fails to demonstrate its creative potential in full measure.

These are in the main specific or, to be more precise, deformed features of reproduction in China. This is an inevitable consequence of the Peking leaders' pernicious economic policy, the absence of an integral scientifically substantiated economic strategy. Chinese society has wasted decades on ambitious experiments and lost the advantages it had for planned economic management. It should be pointed out in this connection that Chinese economists have published several articles of late on some aspects of the theory and practice of enlarged reproduction.¹⁴ The-

¹¹ See *Renmin ribao*, April 27, 1981.

¹² *Ididem*.

¹³ See *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, No. 3, 1980, p. 10.

¹⁴ See Wang Yonghai, "Once More on the Problem of Accumulation as the Only Source of Expanded Reproduction", *Jingji yanjiu*, No. 4, 1981; Lin Zili, "Some Problems of Expanded Reproduction", *Hongqi*, No. 9, 1981; Liu Jingbo and He Zuoxiu, "The Role of Science and Education in Social Reproduction", *Hongqi*, No. 7, 1981; Yang Bo, "On the Study of Relationships Between Accumulation and Consumption", *Hongqi*, No. 6, 1981.

se articles raise some topical theoretical problems whose solution, however, is impossible in view of the present-day economic policy of the leaders. For example, the authors of these articles urge that acute disproportions (between accumulation and consumption, between material production and the services, and between capital-intensive and labour-intensive enterprises) be eliminated, the distribution of capital investments be changed in favour of science and education, that technological progress be accelerated and labour productivity raised. All this is obviously not feasible without any radical change in Peking's economic strategy and in the country's entire home and foreign policy.

At the moment the Chinese leaders are seeking to build a society of the mixed economy in the form of a monstrous hybrid of planned and market economies. Instead of drawing on "everything useful in socialism and capitalism" as is professed in Peking, the country may again be merely accumulating negative experience in voluntarist experimentation on the basis of socialised means of production further aggravated by the desire to introduce private property economic forms.

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DPRK ECONOMIC TIES WITH USSR, EAST EUROPE DETAILED

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[Article by V. Andreyev, Cand. Sc. (Econ.) and V. Osipov, Cand. Sc. (Law):
"Relations of the USSR and the European Socialist Countries With the DPRK
in the 1970s"]

[Text]

The Soviet Union and the European socialist countries strive to maintain relations of close cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This applies both to the solution of the DPRK's economic tasks and the Korean people's struggle for the peaceful and democratic reunification of Korea and the consolidation of the Republic on the international scene. The DPRK's international ties have grown noticeably in the 1970s under the influence of the constructive foreign policy of the countries of the socialist community. While early in the 1970s the DPRK had diplomatic relations with 37 countries, this figure had already exceeded 100 by 1980. The Republic maintains active trade and has cultural ties with many countries on all the five continents. It is represented in more than 150 international organisations. Socialist countries invariably side with the Korean people's struggle for an end to imperialist interference in its internal affairs and the country's reunification on a peaceful, democratic basis.

The debate on the "Korean question" at the United Nations ended in a diplomatic victory for socialist countries in the past decade. In 1973, a DPRK delegation took part for the first time in the debate on this issue at the 28th Session of the United Nations General Assembly which on the basis of a consensus decided to dissolve the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which for more than 20 years had served as an instrument of imperialist interference in the Korean people's domestic affairs. At the 30th UN General Assembly the socialist countries and a number of developing states submitted a draft resolution "On the creation of favourable conditions for turning the armistice in Korea into a lasting peace and accelerating the independent and peaceful unification of Korea". This resolution, providing for the disbandment of the UN military command and the withdrawal from South Korea of all foreign troops stationed there under the UN flag, and also for the replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace agreement, was endorsed by the General Assembly at its plenary meeting.

Soviet-Korean relations are the most important link in the system of the DPRK's relations with socialist countries. They originated during Korea's liberation by the Soviet Army from the Japanese colonial yoke and are now an example of unselfish cooperation and mutual assistance. These relations are invariably based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The USSR was the first to recognise the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which was proclaimed on September 9, 1948, and established diplomatic relations with it.

The signing on July 6, 1961, of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was a big contribution to the consolidation of Soviet-Korean relations. The Treaty, whose 20th anniversary was marked last year, embodied the desire of the peoples of both countries to consolidate political, economic and cultural contacts, and has become an important vehicle for ensuring peace and security in the Far East. Article 1 of the Treaty reads that the two sides "will take part in all international actions seeking to ensure peace and security in the Far East and the whole world, and will make their contribution to the attainment of these lofty aims". The USSR and the DPRK undertook "to consult each other on all important international issues concerning the interests of both states and to base their actions on the desire to facilitate the strengthening of peace and universal security".¹ The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the DPRK is of historic importance for the two nations. Speaking of it, Kim Il Sung noted: "Tested by history and made still stronger by the bonds of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Korean-Soviet friendship is eternal and inviolable".²

In the past decade, Soviet-Korean relations have been further developed in the political, economic, cultural and scientific spheres. Ties between the CPSU and the WPK, between the USSR and the DPRK have developed vigorously. The meeting in Belgrade in May 1980 between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Leonid Brezhnev and General Secretary of the WPK Central Committee, President of the DPRK Kim Il Sung was a milestone in Soviet-Korean relations. The two leaders exchanged views on Soviet-Korean relations and cooperation and discussed topical international problems.³

Talks on the international situation and the mounting of the struggle against the aggressive actions of imperialist forces were held during the 1979 visit to the USSR of a WPK delegation headed by Member of the Political Committee, Secretary of the WPK Central Committee Kim Yong Nam. Both sides noted the need for vigorous efforts to deepen and expand detente and to end the arms race and effect disarmament. The Soviet delegation stated its support for the initiatives on the part of the WPK and the DPRK government, directed at the peaceful and democratic reunification of Korea.

A CPSU delegation headed by Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee Viktor Grishin took part in the proceedings of the 6th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea and in meetings devoted to the 35th anniversary of the party (October 1980). The CPSU delegation held talks with a delegation of the WPK, headed by Member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee, Secretary of the WPK CC Kim Yong Nam. It was pointed out in a joint communique that these Soviet-Korean talks, just as the June 1979 talks between the delegations of the CPSU and the WPK in Moscow, facilitated the consolidation of friendship and cooperation between the two parties and two nations.

The CPSU delegation was also received by General Secretary of the WPK Central Committee, President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Kim Il Sung. The sides expressed satisfaction that friendship is strengthening between the CPSU and the WPK, that multifarious mutual cooperation is expanding and deepening on the basis of the principles of

¹ *Pravda*, July 7, 1961.

² Supplement to the magazine *New Korea*, No. 15, 1961, p. 13.

³ See *Pravda*, May 5, 1980.

Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.⁴ A WPK delegation headed by member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the WPK CC, Premier of the Administrative Council of the DPRK Li Jong Ok, took part in the proceedings of the 26th Congress of the CPSU. Speaking at the Congress, Li Jong Ok expressed deep gratitude to the CPSU and the Soviet people for their vigorous support of the Korean people's struggle for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea and for the country's reunification.⁵ The General Secretary of the CPSU CC, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Leonid Brezhnev reiterated in his Report that "the Soviet Union supports the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in its struggle for the country's peaceful democratic unification without outside interference, and strives to extend and enrich ties with it".⁶

Trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation on a long-term basis features prominently in Soviet-Korean relations. The Intergovernmental Soviet-Korean Consultative Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technological Questions founded in 1967 explores possibilities of utilising new, more effective forms of cooperation and of creating new economic branches in the DPRK. The Commission's 16th meeting, held in October 1980, studied the fulfilment of mutual commitments to expand and build industrial enterprises and other facilities in the DPRK, and the implementation of the protocol on trade and payments between the two countries in 1980.

Direct contacts have been set up between the State Planning Committee of the USSR and the State Planning Committee of the DPRK. In 1975 and 1980, these two agencies conducted consultations on economic cooperation in the 1976-1980 and 1981-1985 periods. Such consultations provide for better coordination of trade and economic ties for five-year periods.

At the present stage, Soviet-Korean cooperation is effected on the basis of a fundamentally new economic mechanism employing most effective forms. The compensation (buy-back) form of cooperation has become widespread. This means that the giving of credits and technical assistance can be repaid with the output of the enterprise built with their aid. Thus, after the commissioning of the Kim Chak iron-and-steel works and the plants producing car batteries and micro-electric motors, a part of their output will be supplied to the USSR. Production cooperation on the compensation basis ensures the expansion of nomenclature of Korean goods exported to the Soviet Union and provides conditions for the DPRK's more active participation in the international socialist division of labour.

In the 1970s, the Soviet Union helped the DPRK in the construction of big projects in various branches of the economy. In power generation, for instance, the USSR assisted socialist Korea in building the Pukchong thermal power station with a capacity of 1.2 million kilowatts (to be expanded to 1.6 kilowatts), the Unggi thermal power plant of 100,000 kilowatts, and helps construct the Chongjin 150,000-kilowatt thermal power station. The Soviet Union helped build a converter plant with an annual capacity of one million tons of steel at the Kim Chak iron-and-steel works, and a hot rolling plant. The construction of a cold rolling plant is in progress.

⁴ See *Pravda*, Oct. 17, 1980.

⁵ See *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1981.

⁶ *The XXVIth CPSU Congress, Documents and Resolutions*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981, p. 15.

In the 1970s, the firstling of the DPRK's petrochemical industry, the Unggi oil refinery was built with Soviet assistance, as well as a plant for the production of enamelled cable and car batteries. The coal basin in the Anju area is being expanded with the aid of Soviet equipment and documentation. The construction of plants to produce micro-electric motors, ammonia, bearings, aluminium, and of other facilities is under way. Our estimates show that the commissioning of enterprises and installations built in the DPRK in the 1970s with Soviet assistance made it possible during the decade to increase the output of steel by 30 per cent, rolled stock by 40 per cent, coal by 30 per cent, electricity by 40 per cent, nitric fertilizers by 25 per cent. Twelve enterprises are under construction, with some of them to go into operation in 1981. The enterprises were designed with due account for the latest scientific and technological achievements and are being fitted with up-to-date Soviet equipment. The share of enterprises built with Soviet assistance in the total national output is as follows: electricity—about 60 per cent, steel—30 per cent, rolled stock—34 per cent, oil products—45 per cent, fabrics—20 per cent and iron ore—40 per cent.⁷ The Soviet Union is taking part in the fulfilment of the programme for developing the DPRK's transport. It has provided it with powerful diesel locomotives, rendered assistance in designing and equipping the Pyongyang subway and in modernising the Rachgien port to handle Soviet cargoes, including the reconstruction of the railway from the Tumachan border station to Rachgien.

Cooperation in the field of timber felling is growing with every coming year. The timber is felled by Korean workers in areas of Eastern Siberia for the needs of the national economies of the DPRK and the USSR. Several Korean timber-felling enterprises are operating on the territory of Khabarovsk Territory and Amur Region, and they also engage in processing timber on the basis of partnership. Soviet-Korean cooperation in the fishing industry is also progressing well.

Scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries is of exceptional importance. This form of ties enables the DPRK to master the output of new products, to use sophisticated modern machinery and equipment and introduce the achievements of modern science at minimum expenditure and within the shortest period of time. The USSR and the DPRK are engaged in joint research, and Soviet and Korean specialists are fruitfully cooperating at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research in Dubna. Cooperation in tracking space vehicles has become a new step in Soviet-Korean scientific contacts. Joint research highly important for the fulfilment of major economic tasks is being conducted at the satellite tracking station that was built near Pyongyang with the assistance of Soviet specialists.

Being the DPRK's main trade partner, the Soviet Union accounts for about a third of its entire foreign trade. The USSR supplies to the Republic complete sets of equipment for the iron-and-steel industry, farm machinery, railway rolling stock, oil, coke and coking coal, cotton and other industrial products and raw materials, while importing mineral raw materials, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, cement, magnesite clinker, chemicals, machine tools, consumer goods and farm produce. Although the DPRK's share in Soviet foreign trade is less than one per cent, the proportion of deliveries from People's Korea to meet the USSR's import needs in 1979 was, in terms of value, as follows: cast iron—21 per cent, cement—56, rice—25, fresh tomatoes—3, fresh apples—2.3 and sports

⁷ See *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 33, 1980.

footwear—35 per cent.⁸ It should be borne in mind that a considerable part of these deliveries goes to Siberia and the Far East, this making it possible to substantially reduce transportation costs and to ensure supply of these goods to rapidly developing areas of the Soviet Union.

Soviet-Korean trade is being conducted on a long-term basis. During the past decade trade agreements were concluded twice, for the periods of 1971-1975 and 1976-1980. The following figures (mln roubles in current prices) * illustrate the state of trade between the USSR and the DPRK.

	1960	1970	1975	1978	1979
Turnover	102.7	336	338.2	378.1	491.8
Export	35.5	207	186.8	176.5	235.4
Import	67.2	129	151.4	201.6	256.4

* Drawn up on the basis of statistical reviews of the years in question given in *Foreign Trade of the USSR*.

Cultural and sports exchanges between the two countries are expanding, and cooperation is growing in the field of public health and between public organisations and professional associations. The March 1949 agreement on economic and cultural cooperation, as well as the September 1956 agreement on cultural cooperation provide the juridical basis for cultural ties between the Soviet Union and People's Korea. Biannual plans for cultural exchange are drawn in pursuance of these agreements, with the emphasis being placed on activities connected with national holidays and other red-letter days in the life of the two nations. There are also exchanges of groups of performers, delegations of writers, film-makers, scientists and architects. The exchange of delegations exceeds a hundred visits per year.

Much useful work in promoting friendship between the two countries is done by the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society and the Korean-Soviet Friendship Society. The former takes an active part in the months of solidarity with the Korean people's struggle for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea, which are held annually in the USSR. It acquaints the Soviet public with the successes scored by the DPRK's working people in building socialism. The Korean-Soviet Friendship Society annually sponsors various activities, including ten-day festivals of Soviet films and photo exhibitions devoted to the Soviet people's successes in building developed socialism. In 1975, the Korean-Soviet Friendship Society was awarded the Order of Peoples' Friendship. The message of greetings from General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev praises the work done by the Society. It says: "The activities of the Korean-Soviet Friendship Society directed at developing and strengthening the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of our countries are valued highly in the Soviet Union."⁹

Relations between the DPRK and the People's Republic of Bulgaria developed vigorously in the 1970s. A Bulgarian party and government delegation headed by Todor Zhivkov visited Pyongyang in 1973, while two years later, in 1975, a party and government delegation of the DPRK

⁸ See *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 33, 1980.

⁹ *Pravda*, Nov. 11, 1975.

headed by Kim Il Sung returned the visit. During these visits the sides noted that "political and cultural relations between the two countries are increasingly expanding on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism".¹⁰

People's Korea supports the Bulgarian government's foreign policy directed at establishing goodneighbourly relations in the Balkans and strengthening peace and security in Europe and the rest of the world.¹¹ Bulgaria sides with the DPRK's constructive initiatives aimed at Korea's peaceful and democratic reunification without interference from outside. The importance of the cohesion of socialist countries on the immutable principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism was noted during the summit visits.

Trade and economic ties are successfully developing between the two countries. Bulgaria helped the DPRK in the construction of hothouses and a fruit-processing plant, supplied equipment for a flour mill and provided technical assistance in the construction of a soft drink plant. The DPRK is developing bilateral cooperation with the People's Republic of Bulgaria in the manufacture of electric loaders, in ship-building and also in the production of semiconductors and electronic computers. Trade between the two states is developing on the long-term basis. The government of the two countries signed such an agreement for 1976-1980 in December 1975. In 1979, trade between them amounted to about 12 million roubles.

Bulgarian-Korean ties are also developing in the field of culture, sports and public health services. There are agreements on cooperation between the Academies of Sciences, and in radio and television broadcasting. A consular convention was signed in 1977. The two states actively exchange delegations. In 1979 alone, the DPRK was visited by five Bulgarian delegations and Bulgaria hosted six Korean delegations.

Korean-Hungarian relations demonstrate a tendency to expand in political, economic, scientific, technological and other spheres. Much credit for this goes to contacts at a high party and state level.

In the 1970s, the DPRK and Hungary exchanged visits by ministers of foreign affairs. In 1976, the HPR was visited by the DPRK Foreign Minister Ho Dam while Hungarian Foreign Minister Frigyes Puja went to Pyongyang in 1977. The talks held between them demonstrated the striving of both countries to promote bilateral relations. The DPRK stated its solidarity with socialist Hungary's efforts to ensure European security, while the Hungarian side supported the DPRK's constructive initiatives concerning the independent peaceful reunification of Korea. A WPK delegation headed by Member of the Political Committee of the WPK Central Committee, Secretary of the WPK Central Committee Kim Yong Nam visited Hungary in 1979. The sides' mutual desire to further develop party ties at various levels was confirmed during the talks.

People's Korea and Hungary are developing mutually advantageous trade and economic ties. Thus, Hungary is assisting the DPRK in creating its mining and electronics industries and transport. Hungary granted the DPRK a credit for the purchase of a large consignment of Ikarus buses. It also supplies the DPRK with medical instruments and electronic measuring equipment.

In 1978-1979, the trade turnover between the DPRK and the HPR was about six million roubles. Korea's main export items to Hungary are magnesite clinker, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, tools, steel pipes,

¹⁰ *Nodon Sinmun*, June 7, 1975.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

consumer goods and other products. The DPRK imports from Hungary machinery, medical instruments, transport and communications equipment, chemicals and products of the pharmaceutical industry.

Cooperation is effected between the two countries' Academies of Sciences, banks, news agencies, television and radio broadcasting and medical services. Cultural exchange plans are signed every two years and provide for mutual exchanges of art groups, delegations of journalists, filmmakers and members of friendship societies.

Close contacts exist between the DPRK and the GDR. Both states advocate the further development of bilateral relations in various fields, and the strengthening of ties between socialist countries. The visit to People's Korea by a GDR party and government delegation in 1977 headed by General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Chairman of the GDR State Council Erich Honecker was instrumental for promoting relations between the WPK and the SUPG, between the DPRK and the GDR. During the talks with a DPRK delegation headed by Kim Il Sung the sides discussed in detail the state and future of relations between the WPK and the SUPG, between the DPRK and the GDR, and also examined a number of international problems. A communique published after the visit emphasised the two sides' interest in further developing friendship and cooperation on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and agreement was reached on stronger economic, scientific and technological cooperation and on exchanges in the field of culture, medical services, education and sports. In furtherance of these accords, a new consular convention and an agreement on economic, scientific and technological cooperation were signed.

When discussing international problems the delegations of the two countries noted the positive impact of the results of the Conference on Security in Europe and stressed the need for new efforts to ensure security and detente.

The DPRK delegation gave a high assessment to the GDR's contribution to the strengthening of European security and voiced full support for the efforts of the German socialist state in the struggle for peace and security in Europe. The DPRK stressed the great importance of the establishment of relations of peaceful coexistence between the GDR and the FRG and the need to observe the treaty of the basic principles of relations between the GDR and West Germany and the September 3, 1971 quadripartite agreement on West Berlin. The DPRK noted its full support for the stand taken by the socialist countries of Europe that West Berlin is not a part of the FRG.¹²

For its part the GDR stated full support for the DPRK government's peaceable course on the Korean question. Solidarity with the WPK's efforts to ensure a peaceful, democratic reunification of Korea is a component of the GDR's foreign policy. During the 1972 visit to the GDR of DPRK Foreign Minister Ho Dam, German officials stressed the invariable nature of their support for the WPK's programme on the Korean issue. In its reply letter to the Standing Council of the DPRK's Supreme People's Assembly in 1976, the People's Chamber of the GDR expressed solidarity with the struggle waged by the working people of socialist Korea for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the south of the Korean Peninsula and the creation of favourable conditions for a peaceful reunification of the Korean nation. During the summit talks in Pyongyang in 1977 the

¹² See *Nodon Sinmun*, Dec. 12, 1977.

GDR reaffirmed its support for the DPRK's peaceable course in Korean affairs.

Being one of the developed states of the socialist system, the German Democratic Republic renders multifaceted assistance to the DPRK. In the 1970s, the GDR rendered People's Korea technical assistance in the development of the textile and printing industries, in starting the output of electronic computers, ship and communications equipment. A plant to manufacture measuring instruments and means of automation is under construction in Pyongyang with the GDR's assistance. The two countries are also cooperating in agriculture.

Trade features prominently in the economic relations between the DPRK and the GDR. The latter exports to the GDR ferrous and non-ferrous metals, calcium carbide, cement, magnesite clinker, farm and fisheries produce and also products of the manufacturing industry: metal-cutting machine tools, electric motors, tools, etc. The GDR in turn exports to People's Korea machinery and equipment, instruments, communications equipment and chemicals. Trade between the two countries is steadily expanding, and the two sides are intent on its further development. The amount of trade was about 90 million roubles in 1979.

Scientific exchange is effected in accordance with a plan of cultural and scientific exchanges and a plan of scientific cooperation between the Academies of Sciences of the DPRK and the GDR. In 1978, the two countries signed an agreement on air communications. Collaboration between them also includes culture, medical services, public education, cinematography, radio and television, and journalism. The exchange of delegations is constantly growing. Seven Korean delegations visited the GDR in 1979 while 13 delegations from the GDR travelled to People's Korea.

The relations between socialist Korea and Poland are characterised by a mutual desire to vigorously develop political, trade and economic contacts and exchanges of delegations in culture, science, public health and sports.

In the 1970s, contacts on a high party and state level were held between the two states, contributing to the development of bilateral relations. In 1975, a WPK delegation took part in the proceedings of the 7th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party. There are regular inter-party ties and exchanges along the line of the party press. Talks on foreign policy matters were held in Pyongyang during the June 1977 visit there by the Polish Foreign Minister. The sides noted the positive changes in Europe and throughout the world under the impact of the struggle by the socialist countries and all the progressive anti-imperialist forces of our time. Poland voiced support for the DPRK's efforts toward the independent peaceful reunification of Korea.

During the past decade, the two countries placed the emphasis on the expansion of trade, which is conducted on the basis of five-year agreements and annually signed protocols. The DPRK exports to Poland caustic magnesium, talcum, volatile oil, hops, porcelain, machine tools and footwear. The PPR for its part exports to the DPRK machines, ship engines, electronic and medical equipment, coke and sulphur. Trade between the two countries in 1979 amounted to about 47 million roubles.

Poland is extending technical assistance in the construction of a glass works in Namp'o. A bilateral agreement on air travel was signed in 1979. The DPRK and Poland have accumulated much experience in collaborating in the field of shipping. They founded the Cho-Pol joint stock shipping company which plays a noticeable role in the expansion of bilateral trade.

Relations between the DPRK and Czechoslovakia are based on the

principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. This was noted in a joint communique on the results of the visit to the DPRK in 1973 of a Czechoslovak party and government delegation headed by General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, President of Czechoslovakia Gustav Husak.¹³

The summit talks held in Pyongyang in 1973 made a palpable contribution to Korean-Czechoslovak relations. The delegations of the DPRK and Czechoslovakia voiced support for the initiatives of socialist countries directed at ensuring European security, and confirmed the necessity for the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from South Korea—the main obstacle to the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea. The DPRK backed the attainment of accords between Czechoslovakia and the FRG on the Munich treaty being invalid from the outset.

In 1973 and 1976, the DPRK and Czechoslovakia exchanged visits by foreign ministers who reaffirmed the concurrence of the sides' positions in respect of European affairs and the Korean issue, and expressed their resolve to consolidate the unity of socialist countries on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. They voiced support for the struggle of the peoples against imperialism and neocolonialism, for freedom and social progress. Ties were further developed in other fields as well. Thus, the DPRK and Czechoslovakia are co-operating in culture, science, television and radio broadcasting, medical services and sport.

Trade and economic cooperation between the DPRK and Czechoslovakia is carried out on a long-term basis. In 1976, the governments of the two countries signed an agreement (1976-1980) providing for a growth in trade turnover. In 1979, the volume of trade between the two states was about 20 million roubles.

Korean-Romanian relations are developing dynamically along all lines. In the 1970s, bilateral cooperation in politics, economics and other fields was placed on the basis of international law and a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in Bucharest in May 1975.

The prime purpose of the treaty is spelled out in the preamble. The two sides proceed from desire to strengthen the cohesion of socialist countries on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, "militant solidarity with the international communist and working-class movement, with all the revolutionary, progressive forces coming out against imperialism and colonialism".¹⁴ The treaty formalises the fundamental principles of bilateral relations. These are first of all the maximal development of trade and economic cooperation, and ties in the field of science, culture, the press, radio and television broadcasting, etc.

Under the treaty the Romanian side gives its utmost support to the DPRK on the Korean issue, the demands for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea and the reunification of Korea by democratic means without interference from outside. The DPRK and the SRR agreed to hold regular consultations on questions of mutual interest with the aim of ensuring security.

In 1978, a joint document, "On the Deepening of Friendship and Cohesion and the Development of Fraternal Cooperation Between the WPK and the RCP, the DPRK and the SRR", was adopted in furtherance of the provisions of the treaty. The centrepiece of the document is the decla-

¹³ See *Nodon Sinmun*, June 26, 1973.

¹⁴ *Nodon Sinmun*, May 28, 1975.

ration of the sides' desire to expand bilateral relations. The sections devoted to international problems note the necessity to end the arms race, effect disarmament and ensure peace in Europe and other areas of the world. The sides condemned Israel's aggressive policy and supported the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to the creation of their own state, and expressed solidarity with the struggle of anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist forces.¹⁵

In the 1970s, the sides twice exchanged summit visits. In 1971 and 1978, a Romanian party and government delegation headed by Nicolae Ceaușescu visited the DPRK. A delegation of People's Korea headed by Kim Il Sung visited Bucharest in 1975. In May 1980, a DPRK party and state delegation led by Kim Il Sung paid another visit to the Socialist Republic of Romania.

The DPRK and the SRR maintain extensive trade and economic relations. In recent years the Romanian side granted the DPRK a credit to finance seven construction projects: a plant to produce orlon fibre, a wood-working plant, a plant to manufacture TV sets (it is already in operation), two enterprises to produce pulp, a plant for the output of vitamin C and production shops for the manufacture of wallpaper and linoleum. Besides, the SRR agreed to supply the DPRK with a rig to drill wells to a depth of 4,000 metres. Romania also helps the DPRK in fitting out the Musan mine (it supplies mining equipment and dump trucks) and in the construction of asbestos and cement enterprises.¹⁶ The volume of trade between the two countries is constantly growing. The DPRK exports to Romania ferrous and non-ferrous metals, calcium carbide and building materials, as well as products of the manufacturing industry, while importing from Romania machinery, equipment and chemicals. The trade turnover between the two countries in 1979 was about 52 million roubles. The long-term agreement signed by the two countries for 1976-1980 provides for a further growth in mutual trade.

In the 1970s, the DPRK and the SRR signed a number of agreements in the field of culture, public health, tourism, and radio and television broadcasting. Both sides are actively exchanging delegations, including party delegations and delegations of public organisations. Eighteen Romanian delegations visited the DPRK in 1979 and 12 Korean delegations visited Romania.

Korean-Yugoslav relations were normalised in 1971 after a break of many years. The joint statement of the Korean and Yugoslav governments noted that "proceeding from the former agreement on mutual recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations and wishing to further develop friendly relations between the two countries, the two sides have agreed on the exchange of diplomatic representatives at the level of ambassadors".¹⁷ Relations between the two countries noticeably developed in the 1970s. In 1972, Belgrade was visited by the DPRK Foreign Minister Ho Dam. The Yugoslav side voiced support for the DPRK's efforts toward the peaceful reunification of the country. Inter-party ties are being developed. A delegation of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia visited Pyongyang in 1974.

The visit to Yugoslavia by a DPRK party and government delegation headed by Kim Il Sung in 1975 was instrumental in the further development of bilateral relations. Talks were held in which the sides noted that "principles of full equality and independence, mutual respect and non-

¹⁵ See *Nodon Sinmun*, Jan. 24, 1978; May 14, 1980.

¹⁶ See M. Y. Trigubenko. *Thirty Years of People's Korea*, Moscow, 1975, p. 44.

¹⁷ *Nodon Sinmun*, Sept. 3, 1971.

interference in each other's internal affairs"¹⁸ will be the main principles on which their relations will be based. The DPRK and Yugoslavia stressed that "the forces of peace, democracy and socialism are exerting an ever greater influence on the course of social development and international relations".¹⁹

The sides' desire to further develop bilateral relations was reiterated during the visit to the DPRK in 1977 of a Yugoslav party and government delegation headed by President Tito. A DPRK delegation led by Kim Il Sung attended Tito's funeral in May 1980 and held talks with Yugoslav leaders.

On the whole, the 1970s witnessed the further development of the DPRK's relations with the Soviet Union and European socialist countries. There was fruitful cooperation in the field of economy, science, technology, culture and public health. The support given to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the Soviet Union and other socialist states prevented the imperialist forces from undertaking aggressive actions against the Korean people which would have jeopardised the independence of the DPRK and the socialist gains of the Korean working people, and would have endangered peace and security in the Far East and in Asia. "The peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union, our friendship and cooperation with fraternal socialist states—Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, with the People's Democratic Republic of Korea—are the key factor of peace and security in Asia", stressed General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Leonid Brezhnev.²⁰ The expansion and deepening of the DPRK's all-round cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist community countries constitute the key factor behind the Korean people's successful struggle for socialism, for the peaceful democratic unification of their country, and for the strengthening of socialism's positions in Asia and the rest of the world.

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PRC INVESTMENT POLICY DISCRIMINATES AGAINST OUTLYING, NON-HAN AREAS

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[Article by N. Furmanov, Cand. Sc. (Econ.): "Problems of China's Regional Development"]

[Text]

The profound and protracted economic crisis in China and the deepened disproportions in its economy have again aggravated the problems of rationally distributing the country's productive forces. Incidentally, these problems are not due merely to the pernicious legacy of the old regime, but are the product of 20 years of voluntaristic economic experimentation by the leadership of the People's Republic of China. The new problems arose in the attempts to carry out the policy of "four modernisations", as well as in the process of "regulating" the Chinese economy. And so the question of shaping a rational territorial structure for China's economy remains one of the most acute and difficult.

At the time of the establishment of the PRC the territorial structure of its economy was distinguished by profound disproportions. The distribution of industry was extremely uneven. The maritime provinces (including the cities of Shanghai, Tianjin and Peking) accounted for about 75 per cent of China's industrial output. Moreover, practically the whole of modern industry was concentrated in a few big cities and in Northeast China. This territory, a narrow strip stretching along the coast (about 10 per cent of China's area), was inhabited by 40 per cent of the population of the country. The maritime industrial centres oriented themselves on the world market in their economic relations. Their manufacturing industry did not use national raw material sources. Figuratively speaking, these cities stood "with their back" to the country. Large unused natural and manpower resources remained outside the maritime part of China.

Soil and climatic conditions were not taken sufficiently into account in siting farm production. In the Chinese maritime areas agriculture was a monocrop one and produced for export. A semi-natural economy predominated in the country's hinterland. Industry in the maritime areas depended on imported agricultural raw materials and was thus isolated from the potential agricultural raw material bases in the hinterland.

Many Chinese regions in the maritime areas were also economically exclusive, with a semi-natural economy, isolated from the country's economic centres. The places where modern forms of commodity production were concentrated were essentially islets in a sea of backward forms of production.

The development of cities was an acute problem, for the bulk of the urban population were the unemployed people driven to cities by rural overpopulation and the decline of agriculture. Housing conditions were extremely difficult, too. The overwhelming majority of people lived in city slums. Industry in the cities did not occupy the place it deserved. The cities' basic economic functions were often merely to distribute, consume and administer. And so, economically and socially, the solution of urban problems was an urgent and complex task linked with the deve-

lopment of industry, elimination of its irrational distribution and of unemployment in the cities, building up of housing facilities. etc.

Thus, in 1949 the young republic was faced with the difficult task of distributing industry rationally and more evenly, promoting the economy in the hinterland, developing ties between districts, involving the large potential resources in the hinterland in the economic development, organising the local economies, creating new economic centres, and substantially expanding the transport system.

Adequate attention was paid to the abovementioned problems in the 1950s. The rich economic experience of the Soviet Union was taken into account. In the period of the first five-year plan regional development problems were generally solved on a planned centralised basis, which made it possible considerably to mitigate the acuteness of many territorial disproportions. It was intended to pay much attention to regional development in the future, too. A great deal was said about it at the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1956.¹ The main tasks in the 1950s and 1960s were the following: gradual transfer of the centre of gravity of capital construction from the maritime areas to the hinterland, rational combination of industry in the maritime areas and that in the hinterland, fuller use of the industrial base in the maritime areas for the development of the country's inland provinces, improvement of the economic structure of the old big cities, and buildup of the economy of the national outskirts.

The scale of capital construction and its geographical boundaries extended sharply thanks to the broad assistance given the PRC by the USSR and other socialist countries. Special stress was laid on the development of heavy industry (85 per cent of all investments in industry in China in 1953-1957),² i. e., branches exerting the strongest influence on the establishment of economic areas in the country. The main bases were chosen to form the foundation for the establishment of large territorial production complexes.

In distributing new capital construction, account was taken, not only of the economic expediency of siting enterprises in certain places, but also of the need to build up the economy of the backward national outskirts and enhance the defence capability of the country, and of the prospects of growth of China's economic ties with neighbouring countries. When new enterprises were sited, the proximity of the northern provinces and a number of autonomous districts to the USSR was regarded as a favourable factor.

Much attention was paid to the industrial development of China's hinterland. In 1950-1955 the share of the capital put into industry in the inner areas came to 54.2 per cent of the total invested in the country's industry in general.³ In the years of the first five-year plan these areas accounted for more than two-thirds of all the industrial projects it was intended to build over and above the plan.⁴ In the maritime areas the stress was on the reconstruction of the enterprises in operation. Only 26 per cent of the sum appropriated for new construction was spent in the maritime provinces and 74 per cent in the inland provinces.⁵ Heavy

¹ *Documents of the Eighth CPC Congress*, Moscow, 1956 (In Russian).

² *The Great Decade*, Peking, 1959, p. 52 (In Chinese).

³ *Tongji gongzuo tongxun*, 1956, No. 21.

⁴ See *People's China*, 1955, No. 17, p. 23 (Supplement).

⁵ *Development of the Economy and Foreign Economic Ties of the PRC*, Moscow, 1959, p. 107 (In Russian).

industry in the inland provinces was developed only where the raw materials base was prepared best, the transport system was adequate, etc. Such bases of development were created in the first place in the areas of the middle reaches of the Huanghe and Yangzi rivers (Lanzhou, Baotou, Xian, Wuhan, etc.).⁶

As a result, the share of the maritime areas of industrial production declined noticeably: from 69.5 per cent in 1952 to 64.9 per cent in 1957.⁷ The share of the autonomous regions rose from 2 per cent in 1952 to 2.6 per cent in 1957, and of the border areas from 12.5 to 13.3 per cent.

At the same time definite shortcomings were discovered in regional policy. In the years of the first five-year plan too little attention was paid to economic development in the southern maritime areas. The development potentialities of old industrial bases—Shanghai and the Shandong and Jiangsu provinces—were underestimated. Production capacities there were used by far not fully. Their share of industrial production dropped from 32.9 per cent in 1952 to 27.4 per cent in 1957.

These shortcomings began to be sharply felt towards the end of the first five-year-plan period. That is why in his speech at the Third Session of the National People's Congress the Chairman of the State Planning Committee, Li Fuchun, warned against underestimating the importance of fully using the industrial base of the maritime areas.⁸

The successes achieved towards the end of the 1950s in the establishment of new industrial bases, particularly in the hinterland, had to be consolidated. They were not yet sufficiently comprehensive and so still depended in their development on the large old industrial bases of China and on substantial economic assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It was this assistance that made it possible to weaken the influence of territorial disproportions with deliveries of the required equipment, fuel, raw and other materials.

In the second five-year-plan period it was intended to preserve the siting of new capital construction in general. The plan was further to enhance the role of the country's inland and border areas. In 1958-1962 it was planned to raise the significance of the main industrial bases in Hebei Province, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Hubei Province, the Longhai railway area, and Sichuan Province. It was planned further to develop the northeastern industrial base, the oil industry and the nonferrous metal industry in Xinjiang and also develop to a certain extent industry in East and South China.⁹

With a view to siting the productive forces more rationally, it was planned to oppose overconcentration of production in big cities and stimulate the establishment of new towns and the development of the old small ones. Considerable stress in the second five-year plan was made on fuller and more rational exploitation of the country's natural resources. The growth of industrial bases in the maritime areas was regarded as the key to still greater growth of industry in the hinterland.

The failure of the "great leap forward" and the subsequent sharp curtailment of economic ties with the USSR and other European socialist countries led to the wrecking of the regional development plans. Mo-

⁶ *Dili zhishi*, 1958, No. 1.

⁷ The share of all districts and administrative units of provincial level of the country's industrial production in 1952-1975 here and further has been calculated on the basis of data contained in R. M. Field, N. R. Lardy and J. Ph. Emerson, *Provincial Industrial Output in the PRC: 1949-1975*, Washington, 1976.

⁸ *People's China on the Way to Socialism*, Peking, 1956, p. 107.

⁹ *Documents of the Eighth CPC Congress*, pp. 138-139.

reover, the Maoist views on the distribution of production began to exert an ever-increasing negative influence on the formation of the territorial structure of the country's economy. Economic management was decentralised in the years of the "great leap forward". Eighty per cent of industrial enterprises were already placed under local control in 1958. As a result, the state was no longer able to carry out regional development projects in a planned way. The planned establishment of economic cooperation regions proceeded in the conditions of decentralisation of economic management and was already aimed at establishing exclusive economic complexes. In each region it was planned to establish a complete industrial system with the development of all the branches and dependence on local resources.

Extension of the rights in the provinces with a sharp reduction of the sphere of centralised planned management impaired production ties, isolated the country's areas from one another, and diverted attention from the solution of tasks of countrywide importance.

Capital construction in the PRC declined sharply in the first half of the 1960s. With the expansion in the period of "adjustment" of centralised economic management and the strengthening of the industrial principle of management there appeared a possibility of returning in the future to the realisation of the regional development plans drawn up earlier. Publicity was given in the country to the "country is a chessboard" policy which envisaged the territorial division of labour within different areas and on a countrywide scale.¹⁰

To restore the economy disorganised by the "great leap forward" the maximum possible stress was laid on the use of the most developed multibranch economic base of the country's maritime areas. What is more, in view of greater attention to the development of agriculture in these same areas, which are the main agricultural bases of the country, chemical, machine-building and other industrial enterprises were built. Among those to be developed were Nanking, Shanghai, Guangzhou and other coastal cities. And so the link became stronger between industrial development and the establishment of large agricultural commodity bases in the deltas and valleys of the Yangzi, Zhujiang and Huanghe rivers.

But from the end of the 1960s (from the times of the "cultural revolution") the Maoist views on economic development again began to exert a baneful influence on the economy. Among other things, the authorities began to implement the policy of the so-called wide socialist cooperation which again laid stress on the limited territorial division of labour in the country and the establishment of a multibranch structure of the economy in different parts of China, even smaller than the provinces.¹¹ The outlying areas were urged to find themselves the means for establishing such economic systems.

The growing process of militarisation of the economy also had an adverse effect on the formation of territorial structure. The task was set, for instance, to make the economic complex maximally invulnerable in war conditions. This isolated all the more the different areas of the country from one another, increased the output of small enterprises and led to irrational employment of manpower and material resources which further deepened territorial disproportions. What is more, the economy became more divided on provincial and district scale, too. In proof of the propaganda claims of the "threat from the North" more economic pro-

¹⁰ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1963, No. 11.

¹¹ *Hongqi*, 1969, No. 10.

jects were being built in the central parts of the country to the detriment of the development interests of the backward national outskirts. Put into operation at the end of the 1960s was the strategy of "echeloned" distribution of industry, notably war industry. The rapid, mass-scale and, moreover, frequently economically unjustified reorientation in the distribution of industry had a negative effect on the formation of the territorial structure of production.

China began to develop both modern forms of economic activity and economic centres of purely local significance. While the former grew largely thanks to state investments, construction of modern industrial projects and infrastructure, and increase of labour productivity, the development of the latter was linked with the employment of chiefly unqualified manpower, backward techniques, isolation from large seats of economic life, and reliance mainly on local, often meagre material and financial resources. The division of China's economy into two systems—central and local—became increasingly discernible towards the 1970s.

As in the years of the "great leap forward", the solution of the problem of evenly and rationally siting industry and building up the economy in the backward parts of the country was again linked with the considerable growth of small-scale industry. In 1976 it already accounted for about half of the country's gross industrial production.¹² In the mid-1970s cooperative enterprises produced on the average one-third of local output.¹³ Small-scale industry plays an especially important role in the production of chemical fertilisers (60 per cent), building materials (60 per cent), farm machines and tools (67 per cent), pig iron and steel (10 per cent), and coal (30 per cent). Its development did not contribute to the country's economic integration and development of inter-provincial ties. For the abovementioned products were consumed by the districts, counties and communes making them. At the end of the 1970s the Chinese press admitted that all this resulted in the dismemberment of the economy.¹⁴

Local small-scale industry would have played a much more important role in the economic growth of various parts of China if the basic aims of its development had not been changed. That such industry is indispensable for the economic growth of a backward country at a certain stage of its economic development was taken into account in building up the economy of the Soviet Union. Lenin thought highly of small-scale industry "which does not demand of the state machines, large stocks of raw material, fuel and food, and which can immediately render some assistance to peasant farming and increase its productive forces right away."¹⁵

In China, the development of local small-scale industry was regarded as a long-term programme of the country's industrialisation and not as a temporary method of solving regional economic problems. Massive construction of small enterprises in China did not take local conditions and possibilities into account. For instance, the well-known directive that every county must have metal, cement, mineral fertiliser, coal and power industries points to the fact that the development of local industry was

¹² *China Reconstructs*, 1977, No. 7.

¹³ In the mid-1970s China had over one million enterprises in the people's communes. They employed 17 million people and accounted for 14 per cent of China's industrial output. See *Renmin ribao*, April 1, 1975.

¹⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 6, 1978.

¹⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 343.

conceived as a campaign without taking into account the peculiarities of the local economy, its resources and needs.

Analysing the principles of distribution of industrial enterprises, Peking theoreticians focussed attention on bringing them as closely as possible to the raw material sources and the markets for their products, which inevitably justified widespread development of small-scale industry, saving on transport expenses, and consideration of local interests only. That, however, was only a particular case of the principle of maximum economy which the Chinese began to absolutise.

The establishment of numerous local "comprehensive" economic systems led to the contraction of the territorial division of labour, disruption of production ties, and reduction of the overall level of concentration of production and of the general level of effectiveness of social production. The lopsided approach to the principle of complexity in the development of territorially big and small economic units in fact ignored the need of expanding the specialisation of districts. This exerted a negative influence on the solution of the tasks of rationally siting and developing productive forces.

A new reform of management was carried out in China in 1971-1975 and it further deepened the process of decentralisation of economic management. Most of the enterprises and organisations earlier directly subordinated to ministries were placed under the control of the local authorities. Their power in the sphere of planning were thus expanded and their financial and material resources increased.¹⁶ There was an especially big increase in the number of industrial enterprises of double subordination.

This reform complicated purposeful formation of the rational territorial structure of the country's economy. Autarchic tendencies again grew stronger and formation of territorial proportions became increasingly spontaneous. In Jiangsu Province, for instance, the administrative bodies stopped occupying themselves directly with running industry. Capital construction was put under the control of regional, district, county, city, street and other administrative bodies.¹⁷ The economically most developed provinces of China found themselves in a more privileged position. This reform led, by the mid-1970s, to nationwide chaos.

It is generally known that Maoist experiments brought the country's economy to the brink of disaster. At one of the meetings of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in 1977, Deputy Premier Yu Qiuli admitted that "in the past few years the national economy has been developing semi-anarchically. A substantial part of economic activity was not incorporated in the plans, and what was incorporated was not carried out."¹⁸ As for the distribution of industry, the territorial problems facing the country at the end of the 1970s were the same as those in the 1950s. China's economy remained divided among various territories with undeveloped branch structure and economic ties.¹⁹ Development of transport constantly lagged behind the growth of the economic complex. The distribution of agriculture was even more irrational. Many production ties between industry and agriculture were disrupted.

¹⁶ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1978, No. 2, p. 28.

¹⁷ *Hongqi*, 1977, No. 2.

¹⁸ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 25, 1977.

¹⁹ In his speech at the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on August 30, 1980, Deputy Premier and Chairman of the State Planning Committee Yao Yilin said it was necessary to "break through regional barriers". *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 12, 1980.

The task of speeding up the economic development of the inland areas had lost none of its significance. What is more, their share of the country's industrial output continued to decline after 1957. That is why in one of his speeches Deputy Premier Ye Jianying again spoke of the need to accelerate the industrial buildup of the country's hinterland.²⁰

Table 1
Change in the Inland and Maritime Areas'
Share of Industrial Production in 1952-1975
(in per cent)

	1952	1957	1965	1971	1975
Maritime areas*	69.5	64.9	64.0	64.7	65.9
Inland areas	30.5	35.1	36.0	35.3	34.1

* Including the Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Area.

While in the years of the first five-year plan nearly 55 per cent of all the funds allocated for capital construction in the country went into the development of industry in the inland areas, in all the 30 years of the existence of the PRC the amount came to only 40 per cent.²¹ Consequently, the inland areas' part in capital construction declined sharply in the 1960s and 1970s. This is confirmed by figures. For instance, of the 34 large industrial plants purchased in 1972-1975, it was planned to install 20, or two-thirds of them, in the coastal areas. And so the maritime areas' share of industrial production even tends to grow.

Another problem that is unresolved is the buildup of the economy of the border territories and national minority areas. Despite the accelerated development of the national outskirts and other border areas, their share of China's industrial output rose insignificantly from 1957 to 1975, and has remained unchanged since 1965.

Addressing the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in 1980, State Planning Committee Chairman Yao Yilin admitted that for a long time the economy in the remote and national areas developed slowly and that their "population are still having a hard time".

Tibet is illustrative in this connection. Despite Peking's bombastic claims of unprecedented economic and cultural successes, per capita industrial production there dropped from 87 yuan in 1960 to 81 yuan in 1980.²²

Although a policy of speeding up the development of the hinterland was adopted in the 1950s, nine of the 18 inland provinces and autonomous areas developed industrially at a rate below the average for the country (Shanxi, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Hunan, and Xinjiang).

As a result, China, in fact, remained divided, by the mid-1970s, into two groups of areas that sharply differed in the level of economic development.

²⁰ *Renmin ribao*, May 10, 1977.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Sept. 25, 1979.

²² *Christian Science Monitor*, Jan. 17, 1981.

Table 2

**Share of Border Provinces and Autonomous
Areas of Industrial Production
in 1952-1975 (in per cent)**

	1952	1957	1965	1971	1975
Autonomous areas	2.0	2.6	3.5	3.8	3.6
All border areas (autonomous areas, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Yunnan, Gansu)	12.5	13.3	15.0	14.3	14.2

Especially backward, it is admitted by the Chinese press, are the country's five autonomous areas and Yunnan, Guizhou, Qinghai and Gansu provinces, i. e., practically the whole of the territory most densely populated by non-Han nationalities. That territory, accounting for 62.8 per cent of the country's area, is inhabited by 15.7 per cent of the total population and produces only 8 per cent of the industrial goods, which comes merely to 63.3 per cent of the industrial output of Shanghai alone.²³

The problem of the growth and location of cities as centres of China's economic life has become still sharper. Despite the Chinese leaders' efforts to restrain the growth of big cities and develop small and medium-size cities more actively, they have been unable to do it.²⁴

Table 3

**Share of Economic Cooperation Regions
of Industrial Production in 1952-1975
(in per cent)**

Area	1952	1957	1965	1971	1975	Per capita Industrial Pro- duction PRC=100	
						1957	1975
Eastern	41.3	35.6	34.1	34.5	34.2	116	114
Northeastern	23.0	22.8	22.6	19.8	19.3	289	193
Northern	14.0	15.6	17.7	19.4	20.2	137	180
Southwestern	7.1	8.3	7.6	6.3	6.8	49	44
Central-South	12.6	14.2	13.9	14.6	14.8	53	55
Northwestern	2.0	3.5	4.1	5.4	4.7	56	71

Large-scale modern industry is concentrated more than ever in old big cities, complicating the process of distributing productive forces more evenly and building up the local economy. There were seven cities in China with a population of more than one million and nine with a population of 500,000 to one million in the early 1950s,²⁵ and 21 and 43 respec-

²³ *Guangming ribao*, Jan. 31, 1981.

²⁴ As the Xinhua Agency reported on October 4, 1976, "planned building of small and medium-size towns is important for the rational distribution of industry and accelerated economic development in general".

²⁵ *China*, Moscow, 1954, p. 51 (In Russian).

tively at the beginning of the 1970s.²⁶ While in 1953 the cities with a population of more than one million accounted for about a third of the urban population, in 1980 they did so for more than half.²⁷ Together with the cities of more than 500,000, their share would be much greater than in 1953.

The policy of building large modern industrial enterprises in provincial capitals and large cities leads to the further chaotic growth of the latter. In 1952 the country's three biggest cities—Shanghai, Peking and Tianjin—accounted for 26.7 per cent of total industrial production, and both in 1957 and 1975 it remained practically at the same level—24.9 per cent. What is more, small-scale industry is being developed there along with large-scale industry.²⁸ Every effort is being made in China to squeeze all the advantages created by these cities' economic and geographic position and transport facilities and make use of their infrastructure, skilled manpower and industrial base. As a result of this, the Chinese press admits, there is an acute shortage of housing in big and medium-size cities, the living conditions are exceedingly bad, and many problems arise in providing enterprises with raw materials, fuel, and electrical energy. At present, there are only 3.6 square metres of floor space per urban resident in China, which is a great deal less than at the beginning of the 1950s.²⁹

* * *

With the advent of new leaders to power after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, attention was again focussed on the allround modernisation of China by the year 2000. The tasks of regional development were to occupy a prominent place in the country's economic development plans for the period ending in 2000. In 1976-1985 it was planned to create a relatively integral system of industry and the whole national economy, and to complete its technical reorganisation. In the sphere of capital construction it was intended to build 120 large projects, including ten iron-and-steel mills, nine nonferrous metal bases, eight coal bases, ten oil and gas fields, 30 power stations, six railway lines, and five seaports. Also planned were 12 commodity grain bases, diversion of the Yangzi River waters into the northern areas, and other measures. Relatively powerful industrial bases were to be created in 14 geographically convenient areas.³⁰ The third plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee discussed the question of drawing up regional plans for the development of soil cultivation, forestry and stock raising. The changes in the country's economy were to lay the groundwork for the creation in 1986-2000 of the "economic system of six regions (Northeastern, Northern, Eastern, Central-South, Southwestern and Northwestern China) differing in the level of development and specific peculiarities, and capable of looking after themselves in war conditions, of cooperating in all spheres and of harmoniously developing agriculture and light and heavy industries. The regions must provide themselves with fuel, electric energy, metal,

²⁶ *People's Republic of China: Political and Economic Development in 1973*, Moscow, 1975, p. 39 (In Russian).

²⁷ *Hongqi*, 1980, No. 2.

²⁸ In Shanghai, for instance, small enterprises accounted for 90 per cent of its enterprises and for about 42.7 per cent of their output. See *Peking Review*, 1976, No. 4, p. 55.

²⁹ *Hongqi*, 1980, No. 2.

³⁰ Xinhua report of Dec. 24, 1978.

basic types of industrial equipment and weaponry, and light industry goods."³¹

Such a plan of dividing China into economic cooperation regions was first drawn up on the basis of the State Planning Committee scheme and was approved by the CPC Central Committee back in 1958. It followed from the decision of the All-China Conference on the Popularisation of Daqing's Experience in Industry, held in May 1977, that this was an attempt to return to the realisation of that plan.

These plans, however, will have to be given up, at least for the time being. China's economy found itself in the protracted period of "regulation" which cannot but affect regional development, too. The pernicious legacy of two decades of Maoist experiments in the economy, absence of development plans in general and the plans of regional development in particular, intensification of spontaneous market trends, absence of clear-cut ideas about the distribution of productive forces, and disregard of the experience accumulated in this field by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries hamper the realisation of a purposeful regional policy and this naturally leads to major economic errors in siting enterprises and upsets the ecological balance.

A characteristic example in this respect is Shanghai, China's biggest city and industrial centre which accounts for one-eighth of its industrial output. The city's development was adversely affected by the urge to create an "all-embracing" industrial system. Having no sources of raw materials and fuel close by, Shanghai has for years been developing material- and energy-intensive industries. Moreover, a large part of the goods produced in the city is sold far beyond its boundaries. The orientation on the all-possible use of the propitious economic and geographic situation and the potential of the old industrial bases has resulted in Shanghai having 30-40 enterprises and over 400,000 people per square kilometre.³² Moreover, no long-term plan of the city's development has so far been drawn up. And Shanghai is not alone in this respect.

Renmin ribao admitted on September 5, 1980, that the more than 80 large enterprises built in the country in the twenty years before that had proved to be inefficient, half of them because of incorrect siting. In siting new enterprises, no account was taken of such basic factors as their proximity to the sources of raw materials and fuel and to the consumers of their goods. The most "vivid" example in this respect is the construction of the Baoshan Steel Mill near Shanghai. It is to work on Australian iron ore and imported fuel. The selection of its site was not successful either. In expanding a steel mill in Wuhan, errors were committed in calculating its requirements of electric energy and raw materials, with the result that the mill cannot be used to full capacity. Collie-

Table 4

Area and Population of China's Economic Cooperation Regions

Regions	Area in Per Cent of PRC Total	Population in Per Cent of PRC Total	Density of Population PRC=100
Northeastern	13	10	77
Northern	8	10	122
Northwestern	35	7	20
Eastern	8	31	378
Central-South	11	26	244
Southwestern	25	16	63

³¹ *Renmin ribao*, May 8, 1977.

³² *Ibid.*, April 14, 1980.

ries were built where there is little coal. A gas pipeline was built from Sichuan Province to the country's eastern areas, and there was not enough gas to be piped. One could continue citing such examples.

For a long time insufficient account was taken in the country of the influence exerted by the soil and climatic conditions on the distribution of agriculture. The accent was placed on grain production, while the area under industrial crops was reduced. For instance, in Hebei Province, which held first place in China in the 1950s in sown area and cotton harvest, the area under cotton was reduced by more than 50 per cent in 1957-1977. In the Northeast one notes the reduction of the area sown to soya, in South China the picture is the same in the case of sugar cane, etc. This led to the impairment of the specialisation of production which was taking shape in the 1950s, caused tangible damage to the environment and was conducive to the development of multibranch unproductive farms. Interprovincial ties grew weaker and some parts of the country became economically still more isolated. No work was done to zone agriculture and there were consequently no strict scientific notions about the geographic orientation of agricultural development.

China's growing economic ties with developed capitalist countries and the latter's participation in its economic construction are a new factor that seriously complicates the task of optimally siting the economy. Such cooperation increases concentration of economic life in the maritime areas that are most convenient for the economic activity of the imperialist powers, primarily Japan. Enterprises of countrywide importance are being built there with their assistance, which will produce mostly export commodities. The infrastructure taking shape in the maritime areas is also designed largely for the export of goods. As a result, the growing tendencies are similar to those prevailing in old China, which finally led to serious territorial disproportions in its economy.

The definite reorganisation of the economic management system, aimed at making enterprises economically more independent, and the combination of plan principles with the market mechanism in the highly complicated economic situation, when the country has embarked upon a long-term policy of economic "regulation", are stimulating the decentralisation of the economy, growth of localistic tendencies, irrational distribution of resources, dissipation of capital investments, contraction of the role of the state plan, and intensification of market regulation.

Thus, the problem of eliminating the acute territorial disproportions in China's economy remains acute and, what is more, the leaders of the country still have no clear idea of how to cope with them.

Only by putting an end to militarisation and returning to the methods of socialist economic management on the basis of a single economic plan, concentration of resources and means in the hands of the state, and consideration of the Chinese people's vital interests can China gradually solve the problem of forming a rational territorial structure for its economy.

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DENG SEEKS REHABILITATION OF PURGED CADRES TO STRENGTHEN OWN POLITICAL BASE

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 82 pp 87-97

[Article by K. Yegorov, Cand. Sc. (Law): "The Policy of Rehabilitation of Cadres and Certain Aspects of the Political Struggle in China"]

[Text]

The examination of the question of rehabilitation of the cadres repressed in the Peoples Republic of China at various times is linked with the analysis of the basic tendencies of its innerpolitical development. The allround Marxist-Leninist analysis of the class content of the events in China and of the sources of the political course of the Peking leaders, who are jeopardising the socialist revolutionary gains of the Chinese people, remains a major and serious task for Sinologists.

Delivering the CC Report to the 26th CPSU Congress, Leonid Brezhnev said: "The experience of the social and economic development of the PRC over the past twenty years is a painful lesson showing what any distortion of the principles and essence of socialism in home and foreign policy leads to."¹ Renunciation of scientific socialism and pursuance of the pragmatic Maoist line created conditions for the aggravation of the socio-political situation in the PRC, mass reprisals, and clashes between groups striving for power. These tendencies developed most in the period of the "cultural revolution", at the time of the establishment of a regime which is now called even officially "a most cruel feudal-fascist dictatorship."

As Leonid Brezhnev pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress, "at present, changes are under way in China's internal policy. Time will show what they actually mean. It will show to what extent the present Chinese leadership will manage to overcome the Maoist legacy."² But it is already clear that the Chinese leaders, generally remaining on the positions of Maoism, are clinging in every way to the Maoist principles on the concrete questions of party construction and ideological and political work. This is evidenced, for instance, by the official documents of the Communist Party of China (CPC) published in China in connection with the party's 60th anniversary: "The Resolution on Certain Aspects of CPC History Since the Establishment of the PRC" (adopted by the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee on June 27, 1981),³ and the speech made by Hu Yaobang (appointed CPC CC Chairman by the plenary meeting) at the meeting dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the CPC.⁴

The CPC leaders declare that the "thought of Mao Zedong" is "the greatest wealth he has left behind" and that CPC activity will "for a long time" be guided by the "thought of Mao Zedong" which has been proclaimed

¹ *The 26th CPSU Congress. Documents and Resolutions*, Moscow, 1981, p. 15.

² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

³ *Renmin ribao*, July 1, 1981.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 2, 1981.

mea "universally recognised thought guiding the party". They include above all Mao's concept of "continuous class struggle under socialism" which must be aggravated from time to time. As is known, Mao Zedong advanced the thesis about the "aggravation of the class struggle" a few years before the "cultural revolution", in 1962.

Now, Mao Zedong's "theory about the continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" is being refuted by word of mouth, and the "cultural revolution" itself is called a "grave mistake". However, Mao's successors have no wish at all to discard the convenient concept of class struggle, which is being used to justify mass violence against, and repression of, the political and ideological opposition, particularly its Marxist-Leninist, internationalist part.

The Peking leaders regard as "class enemies" of the first category the communist-internationalists who are against cooperation with world imperialism and reaction and for friendship with the Soviet Union and the countries of existing socialism. To substantiate the concept of class struggle against them, the present leaders of China use the shopworn Maoist thesis that China is a "besieged fortress". Speaking of the international situation, Hu Yaobang affirmed: "We are threatened with aggression and sabotage from without." Consequently, to "win a victory", he said, it is necessary to "develop a revolutionary spirit"⁵ in the country. It should be noted that in the past, too, "revolutionism" was a slogan used to cover up many acts of Maoist lawlessness and arbitrariness, and hostility towards the USSR and its friends in China. It is not fortuitous that the present CPC leaders refuse to rehabilitate the prominent communist-internationalists Gao Gang and Rao Shushi who are again accused of having "plotted" allegedly to "seize supreme power in the party and the state", as is stated in "The Resolution on Certain Aspects of CPC History".

Included in the second category of "class enemies" are about 20 million party members, former activists of the "cultural revolution" who, to quote Deng Xiaoping, are not averse to starting a similar campaign again. The present CPC leaders, fearing a repetition of the excesses of the "cultural revolution", particularly its destructive effect on the country's economy, reject such forms of struggle and employ other methods to achieve their ends.

One of such methods is the systematic organisation of limited reprisals and purges in combination with the pragmatically balanced policy of rehabilitating formerly repressed cadres, a policy designed to strengthen the power of the present Chinese leadership and employ the rehabilitated cadres as tools for the pursuance of a definite policy. Formally, rehabilitation implied, firstly, deliverance from punishment or persecution in any form; secondly, reinstatement in the former office or appointment to a similar post; thirdly, recognition of the charges levelled earlier as erroneous, far-fetched or false.

Although the policy of rehabilitation is on the whole characteristic of the post-Mao period, it was also pursued in Mao Zedong's lifetime, though as a rule it was incomplete and assumed somewhat different forms. If one traces China's political history back twenty years, one will see that rehabilitation usually followed in the wake of the failure of another Maoist ideological-political campaign accompanied by mass reprisals.

⁵ *Renmin ribao*, July 2, 1981.

Thus, in the spring of 1957 Mao Zedong stated that "correct resolution of contradictions among the people should be regarded as the main objective of the state's political life". As a result of a mass campaign, many intellectuals, members of democratic parties and organisations, and CPC functionaries were classified as "rightist elements". As pointed out now in "The Resolution on Certain Aspects of CPC History", this "led to sorry consequences".

The struggle against the "rightists" was linked with preparations for the fulfilment of Maoist directives concerning the "great leap forward". Consequently, the failure of this adventurist experiment and the transition to the policy of "regulation" were attended by the rehabilitation of many party cadres listed as "rightists". A relevant decision was adopted at an enlarged working meeting of the CPC Central Committee in January 1962. Moreover, the rehabilitation was not complete because, although the "right element" label was taken off most of those "rehabilitated", there was no guarantee that they would not be persecuted again or would be reinstated.

Nevertheless, rehabilitation was not a purely formal act. It was effectuated on the initiative of the pragmatic part of the CPC leadership, and its political purport was to make use of the experience and knowledge of many repressed leading cadres in order successfully to restore and develop the economy in 1962-1966. In addition, the rehabilitation of the cadres who had opposed the "great leap forward" was in fact a step recognising that this policy did not accord with the needs of national development and, consequently, was a blow to Maoism. But rehabilitation extended by far not to all the repressed people, but only to those who had proved to be loyal to the leadership headed by Mao Zedong. Among those who were not rehabilitated were Peng Dehuai and a large group of his associates who were condemned at the Lushan conference of the CPC Central Committee in 1959. Politically, it was pointed out in "The Resolution on Certain Aspects of CPC History", the struggle against "right-wing deviation" launched on Mao's instructions on a party-wide scale "caused serious damage to democracy within the party, from the highest to the lowest bodies".⁶

Even more limited was rehabilitation during the "cultural revolution"—essentially, it was selection of Maoist cadres. When "revolutionary committees" were formed through the "union of three sides" (1967-1968), included among the "revolutionary" cadres were those who had been criticised or defamed at the initial stage of the "cultural revolution" but later managed to prove their "revolutionism" and escaped repression. Such rehabilitation was dictated by the need to employ experienced cadres to strengthen the military-bureaucratic dictatorship and did not guarantee that these people would not be persecuted in the future.

Maoist-type rehabilitation was also effected during the formation of local party bodies. The question of rehabilitating "good people who have committed mistakes" was raised at the Ninth CPC Congress in 1969. It was then proposed to take into account their "conduct" and efficiency primarily during the "cultural revolution". Such people were included in the leadership of the Maoist CPC.

The process of rehabilitation was adapted to the conditions of party construction carried on from top to bottom. In 1969-1971 the executive bodies of the Maoist CPC appointed special people to deal with the rehabilitation cases and these people "consulted with the masses".

⁶ *Renmin ribao*, July 1, 1981.

The first to be rehabilitated were the cadres whose experience and knowledge were indispensable for normalising the work of the central and provincial government bodies. The pragmatic part of the CPC leadership headed by Zhou Enlai strove for the rehabilitation of former administrative executives, taking into account their abilities. The "leftists" from Mao Zedong's immediate entourage (including Jiang Qing and Lin Biao) sought appointments for their own cadres who were truly devoted to the ideals of the "cultural revolution". The growing conflict between the two main groups in the Peking leadership predetermined the content and rate of rehabilitation in that period, which continued until the Tenth CPC Congress in August 1973.

After the removal of Lin Biao in September 1971 and the Tenth CPC Congress the pragmatic group secured the expansion of the scale of rehabilitation of the victims of the "cultural revolution" and the opponents of Lin Biao. But control over the process of rehabilitation remained in the hands of those advanced to the fore by the "cultural revolution". It was pointed out at the working meeting held to explain the CPC leadership's policy in this sphere that only three categories of people were to be rehabilitated (or "released" from punishment): victims of opposition to Lin Biao and his followers, persons repressed for "mistakes" committed in "supporting the leftists" during the "cultural revolution", and people who did not display "enough revolutionary ardour".⁷

Thus, incomplete rehabilitation extended only to those who had in one way or another acceded to the "cultural revolution" and taken part in it, but had committed "mistakes". This kind of rehabilitation was used by the people advanced to the fore by the "cultural revolution" to take up executive posts in the party bodies dealing with the questions of rehabilitation. What is more, county party committees and party committees of corresponding level began to play a big role, having been given the right to set up rehabilitation departments. The latter directed the inspection groups formed to check up on the proper employment of cadres at the lowest level.

In 1973-1976 the "leftists" conducted an active campaign for the appointment of Mao's "revolutionary followers" to executive posts at all levels. Their campaigns met with the persevering attempts from Zhou Enlai and his followers to rehabilitate the experienced cadres of the older generation who had suffered from the "cultural revolution" and to reinstate them in the executive posts. In 1974 the pragmatic part of the CPC leadership managed to get the CPC Central Committee to adopt a special resolution on the rehabilitation of cadres of the older generation, and at the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975 succeeded in getting the leading posts in the Chinese government. In the provinces, however, the people advanced to the fore by the "cultural revolution" retained their noticeably predominant position.

This predominance became all the greater in the course of the campaign against "right-wing deviationism" unleashed by Mao Zedong and actively conducted by the "leftists" in March-October 1976. The rehabilitation of the cadres of the older generation practically came to a stop during this campaign, and this was due to the following two events: Zhou Enlai died in January 1976, and in April of that same year Deng Xiaoping was declared leader of "right-wing deviationism" and removed "from all posts". Both of them had striven for the rehabilitation of the victims of the "cultural revolution".

⁷ *Asian Survey*, 1978, No. 9, p. 943.

It is not fortuitous that the rehabilitation of the people of the above-mentioned category was stepped up sharply after Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation and reinstatement in leading party and government posts. This naturally happened after the death of Mao Zedong and the removal of the group of CPC leaders close to him (the "gang of four"), the foremost figures among those advanced to the fore by the "cultural revolution". A new stage of rehabilitation began in October 1976.

This stage may be divided into two periods: the first from the removal of the "gang of four" in October 1976 to the Third Plenary Meeting of the 11th CPC Central Committee in December 1978, and the second, after the Third Plenary Meeting. Politically, the first period was characterised by extremely serious ideological and political disorder caused by the "cultural revolution" and endless Maoist ideological and political campaigns in the preceding ten years. Moreover, according to the documents of the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee (1981), "the left-wing guiding ideas have also played their role". They were still adhered to by Hua Guofeng and millions of other people advanced to the fore by the "cultural revolution" who still held executive posts at different levels. As pointed out in "The Resolution on Certain Aspects of CPC History", Hua Guofeng "deferred the rehabilitation period and hampered reinstatement of old cadres and implementation of measures to reexamine cases based on far-fetched, false and erroneous charges."⁸

The first stage was preceded by lengthy ideological-political preparations. As is known, the decision on the final rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, i. e., cancellation of all former decisions on his persecution, and his reinstatement as a member of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Political Bureau, Deputy Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, Deputy Premier, and Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, was adopted by the Third Plenary Meeting of the Tenth CPC Central Committee in July 1977, although it was actually adopted at the CC "working meeting" in March of that year. After that work was done to condition public opinion for his rehabilitation. Thus, two letters from Deng Xiaoping to Hua Guofeng (then Chairman of the CPC Central Committee) and Ye Jianying (Deputy Chairman) were sent to the provinces on May 3, 1977. In the process of ideological persuasion of the cadres and the population the blame for the persecution of Deng was placed entirely on the "gang of four" who allegedly acted in contravention of Mao Zedong's instructions.

It ought to be said that after Mao's death the process of rehabilitation proceeded in an atmosphere of struggle within the CPC. The situation was complicated by the need to solve the none-too-easy problem of choosing his successor. From the beginning of 1978 on, the Chinese press published a series of articles analysing the Chinese leadership's cadres policy.

At present, credit for speeding up rehabilitation is given to Hu Yaobang who was appointed head of the CPC Central Committee's Organising Department in December 1977.⁹ And the ideological preparations for mass rehabilitation are linked with the erroneous demands that all of Mao Zedong's decisions must be observed and that all his instructions must serve as guidance. So it is, in fact, admitted that blind devotion of the Chinese leadership to Maoism is the actual cause of the difficulties met with in pursuing the policy of rehabilitation. Moreover, the blame is put directly on Hua Guofeng who allegedly followed an "erroneous cour-

⁸ *Renmin ribao*, July 1, 1981.

⁹ *Ibid.*, July 21, 1981.

se". And so only "part of the work of reexamining cases" was done in 1977-1978, while attention was mainly concentrated on ideological preparations for that work. An attempt to get the cadres policy changed was made at the Second Plenary Meeting of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee in February 1978. On the day it opened, *Renmin ribao* published a comment under the heading of "The Important Question of Implementing the Cadres Policy" and a number of items on the fate of the relatives of victims of repression.¹⁰ The newspaper said that the children of people convicted for "major crimes" should not be held responsible for their parents and should not be discriminated against when they were enrolling in educational institutions, joining the CPC or the Young Communist League, enlisting in the army, and applying for work.

Judging by publications in the Peking press, there were serious differences among the Chinese leaders over the question of speeding up the "reexamination of the cases" of the repressed cadres needed to set right the country's economic mechanism. The pragmatic part of the CPC leaders sought to use the countrywide campaign against the "gang of four" to settle the question as quickly as possible. In those days the blame for procrastination in reexamining the cases of the cadres of the older generation and rehabilitating them was put exclusively on the "followers of the 'gang of four'".¹¹ And here all possible credit was given to Deng Xiaoping who had "dealt a blow" at the "secret plans of the 'gang of four'" on the question of cadres in 1975.¹² In this particular case the reference was to the party document "On the General Programme of Work by the Party and the Whole Country", drawn up, it is now officially affirmed, on the initiative of Deng Xiaoping. It outlined his programme of solving the cadres problems. Among other things, the document stressed the need to appoint to the leading posts the cadres of the older generation who had at least 20 years of working experience and allround experience in leading the party, the government and the army, as well as "the people, science, and the eastern, western, southern, northern and central areas of the country". It also spoke of the expediency of "sending all the young cadres without exception to the lower organisations for reeducation", and to employ old workers and experienced cadres in leading jobs.

It is quite understandable that such a radical programme of ousting the people advanced to the fore by the "cultural revolution" from command posts met with serious opposition. In the course of the political struggle a number of interim compromises were reached, including some on the cadres problem. They included the decision of the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (February-March 1978) based on Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic line. But it also became clear then that the success of every one of the opposing groups depended in the final analysis on the possibility of relying on the leading local cadres. That is why the struggle for the local apparatus, notably the provincial as the most important politically, was a factor of development of the political situation in China in the period under review.

"Restoration of order in the leading bodies" of the local apparatus was used as a cover-up for a total purge, for which purpose a use was made of the sessions of local people's congresses which formed new "revolutionary committees" by ousting many of the people advanced to the fore by the "cultural revolution" from the old ones. The purges and the

¹⁰ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 18, 1978.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Jan. 19, 1978.

¹² *Ibid.*, Jan. 22, 1978.

selection of new leading cadres were entrusted to special "working groups" or "working detachments" and to "responsible persons" from provincial party bodies.¹³

Besides ideologically shaping public opinion, the purge was also a means for preparing a large-scale rehabilitation campaign. In the course of the purge and the "restoration of order in the leading bodies", people who had been "unjustly accused" during the "cultural revolution" and subjected to "far-fetched accusations and persecution" by the "gang of four", were cleared of all charges. These were above all representatives of the technical intelligentsia, who were given jobs in their line and many were again appointed to managerial posts.¹⁴ At the same time prominent cultural workers and party and government leaders not associated with the "Liu Shaoqi affair" were rehabilitated posthumously. Among those vindicated in June 1978 were the well-known writer Lao She, who perished in August 1966, and Cao Diqu, former secretary of the Shanghai CPC City Committee and Mayor of Shanghai, who died in February 1976.¹⁵

In August 1978, for the first time ever, the Peking press raised the question of the need fully to rehabilitate the participants in the 1976 "April events" in Peking and other cities. The Peking City Committee of the Young Communist League organised a meeting, inspired by Deng Xiaoping's group, which adopted a resolution demanding the reexamination of the cases of the participants in the "April events", particularly those who criticised the "gang of four" for their attacks on Deng Xiaoping.¹⁶ At the same time it was announced at a meeting in Guiyang (Guizhou Province) that the nine persons who put up, in March and April 1976, wall newspapers and slogans condemning the "gang of four" for attacks on Deng Xiaoping, had been rehabilitated. Meetings to rehabilitate individual persons and whole groups of people were held in many other parts of China, notably in Sichuan, Gansu, Liaoning and Henan provinces and in the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. Sichuan Province was said by the Chinese press to be "in the van of the present movement for the rehabilitation of party functionaries unjustly dismissed during the 'cultural revolution'".¹⁷

The last factor had a definite political meaning. At that time the post of first secretary of the party committee and chairman of the "revolutionary committee" in Sichuan Province was held by Zhao Ziyang, who is well-known for his close political association with Deng Xiaoping (in September 1980 he was appointed Premier). Deng and his followers strove for the rehabilitation of the people with whose aid they could strengthen their position in the provinces because the strength of the position in the ruling top crust depended on the existence of reliable local support. The means they used to speed up rehabilitation was a mass movement reminiscent of the Maoist "mass-line" campaigns. As had happened time and again in the past, the initiators of such campaigns used them to bring pressure to bear upon their opponents and to achieve their own political ends.

The present CPC leaders call the Third Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee in December 1978 "the great turning point of far-reaching importance" because, the party document says, it "put an end to vacilla-

¹³ *Ibid.*, May 2, 13 and 31, 1978.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, June 10 and 26, 1978.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, June 4 and 29, 1978.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Aug. 29, 1978.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Aug. 7, 1978.

tion" which attended the "movement ahead". As was said in the communique, the plenary meeting "discussed and resolved a number of important problems inherited from the past, as well as the question of the merits and errors of a group of important executives".¹⁸ The plenary meeting mapped out measures for the rehabilitation of the leading cadres who suffered in 1976 as a result of the struggle waged by the "leftists" against the "right deviationist whirlpool of revising correct conclusions about the cultural revolution", as well as the participants in the 1976 "April events", characterised in the documents of the plenary meeting as a "wholly and fully revolutionary action of the masses".

The Third Plenary Meeting "reexamined and rectified" all the "erroneous practical conclusions" arrived at in the end of the 1950s with regard to Peng Dehuai, Tao Zhu, Bo Yibo, Yang Shangkun and others, and demanded a "decisive reexamination of all cases fabricated on false, erroneous and far-fetched charges", as well as rehabilitation of "all innocent victims".

This decision was essentially a compromise between the right-wing pragmatic group and the group of people advanced to the fore by the "cultural revolution". The former agreed to record in the documents of the plenary meeting the conclusion that "the large-scale mass movement for the exposure and criticism of Lin Biao and the 'gang of four' has on the whole ended victoriously throughout the country". This meant that the followers of Hua Guofeng would be left alone (at least for the time being). The latter apparently pretended that it would not hamper "completion" of the work done to rehabilitate "all the innocent victims".

Deng Xiaoping's right-wing pragmatic group hoped to employ the rehabilitated cadres to deal a new blow at the group of people advanced to the fore by the "cultural revolution" (and this was done at the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee in February 1980); and the latter in their turn counted on retaining the key posts acquired in Mao Zedong's lifetime.

After the Third Plenary Meeting the position of Deng Xiaoping's group turned out to be much stronger than that of its opponents. This is evidenced, firstly, by the additional election to the CPC Central Committee of nine party functionaries of the older generation who were formerly associated in one way or another with Deng Xiaoping (Huang Kecheng, Song Renqiong, Hu Qiaomu, Xi Zhongxun, Wang Renzhong, Huang Huoqing, Chen Zaidao, Han Guang, and Zhou Hui) and who were hostile towards the "cultural revolution" group from which they had suffered. Secondly, the plenary meeting established a special mechanism to implement a policy of rehabilitation and purges, appointing a 100-man Disciplinary Commission of the CPC Central Committee headed by Chen Yun who opposed Mao Zedong's adventurist economic policy at the beginning of the 1960s and was persecuted during the "cultural revolution".

The first political result of the establishment of such a commission was the renunciation of the line approved (by way of compromise) by the Third Plenary Meeting "concerning the timely and resolute completion of a broad nationwide mass movement for the exposure and criticism of Lin Biao and the 'gang of four'". The Fourth Plenary Meeting (September 1979), which coopted another 12 former "cultural revolution" victims (including Peng Zhen, An Ziwen, Zhou Yang, Bo Yibo and Yang Shangkun) into the CPC Central Committee, resolved "to continue thoroughly

¹⁸ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 24, 1978.

to criticise the crimes of the counterrevolutionary conspiratorial cliques of Lin Biao and the 'gang of four', and closely link criticism with the realities of today",¹⁹ i. e., with the policy of the CPC leadership headed by Hua Guofeng.

A new period in the post-Mao stage of implementation of the policy of rehabilitation set in after the December 1978 Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee. The plenary meeting decided to concentrate the activities of the party and the people on the realisation of the policy of "four modernisations". This served as a basis for the extension of measures to rehabilitate the cadres repressed, not only during the "cultural revolution" but before it, too.

At the end of January 1979 the CPC Central Committee decided to take the "harmful element" label off the former landowners and rich peasants who, the party document said, had gone through "labour reeducation" for 20-30 years and become "toilers living by their own labour".²⁰ This CC decision spoke also of taking labels off former capitalists who, it was pointed out, "had already become working people", but were again receiving interest on their former capital.

This does not at all mean, however, that such labels will not be tagged on people in the future. As is stressed in "The Resolution on Certain Aspects of CPC History", there still exist "elements hostile to socialism" who engage in "subversive activities in the political, economic, ideological and cultural spheres, as well as in public life".²¹ China's criminal code (1979) has a special chapter on "counterrevolutionary crimes", which include deeds for which people were formerly labelled "harmful elements".

The procedure of rehabilitation consisted in the "masses" formally discussing the question of whether the rehabilitated man abided by state laws, carried out political directive, displayed a proper attitude to work, etc. The decision adopted by the "masses" was subject to approval by relevant party bodies. When the label was taken off parents, their children were not to be discriminated against when enrolling in educational institutions, applying for jobs, being recruited into the army, joining the CPC and YCL.

A special notification of the Ministry of Public Security said the taking off of labels was one of the series of important measures adopted by the CPC Central Committee in line with the policy of concentrating on China's "modernisation". It was, moreover, plainly stated that rehabilitation work was directed towards the employment of "all factors" in the interest of "four modernisations".²² It was thus admitted that the policy of rehabilitation was of a pragmatic character rather than that of principle.

In November 1978, on the eve of the Third Plenary Meeting, it was announced that the CPC Central Committee had decided to take the labels of "rightists" off a large group of "reformed persons".²³ As in other instances, the Chinese mass media prepared public opinion in advance for the adoption of such a decision. Thus, in August 1978, the Chinese press spoke of the need of reappraising the activities of people who were labelled "rightists" in 1957, stressing that "the overwhelming majority

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1979.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, July 1, 1981.

²¹ *Ibidem.*

²² *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 29, 1979.

²³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1978.

of them had undergone a change and reformed in the course of prolonged reeducation".²⁴

In this particular case the reference was not to the party functionaries listed as "rightist", but to the bourgeois elements who planned to make a right-wing turn in the country's development in the 1950s. The rehabilitation of such persons was in effect an act of loyalty towards the Chinese bourgeoisie on the part of the Deng Xiaoping grouping. That is how, too, one can regard the rehabilitation, in February 1979, of the authors of the Li Yire *dazibao* (wall newspaper), which was published in 1974 and which purportedly criticised Lin Biao while really publicised bourgeois-democratic and anarchic views.

It should be noted that this was when Deng Xiaoping personally established ties of close cooperation with the United States by going there on a "friendly" visit. It is very likely that flirting with liberal-bourgeois quarters was resorted to in order to win the favour of the overseas partner in the military-political alliance then taking shape.

The results of the rehabilitation campaign that took place after Deng Xiaoping's reinstatement in the key posts (July 1977) were summed up in his speech at the Peking conference of party cadres on January 16, 1980. According to "incomplete" data, he said, the number of people rehabilitated by then came to 2.9 million, and there were considerably more people rehabilitated whose cases had not been registered in documents and who had been repressed without trial.

The main content of Deng Xiaoping's speech found expression in the decision of the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee (February 1980) on the rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi.²⁵ The plenary meeting resolved to annul all the accusations levelled against him at the 12th Plenary Meeting of the Eighth CPC Central Committee (1968) and cancelled the "erroneous decision" on the expulsion of Liu Shaoqi from the party for all time and his removal from all posts within and without the party. True, despite the historical facts, the blame for the persecution of Liu Shaoqi was put, not on Mao Zedong, but on Lin Biao and the "gang of four" who, the decision said, had framed up Liu Shaoqi, slanderously listing a large number of party, administrative and military leaders as his "agents", and toppled them all down, and this fact "had extremely serious consequences".

The posthumous rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi was a component part of an almost four-year-long campaign in the course of which nearly all the Chinese leaders removed during the "cultural revolution" were rehabilitated. Moreover, the present Peking leaders tried to prop up their political course with the name of Liu Shaoqi as one of the authors of "Simplified Marxism". It is not fortuitous that everything relevant to the foreign policy platform of the Eighth CPC Congress (1956), which was of an anti-imperialist and internationalist character, was omitted deliberately in the publications about Liu Shaoqi.

After the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee the rehabilitation campaign entered its final stage. Its preliminary results on a nationwide scale were summed up by the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (August 30-September 10, 1980). As Jiang Hua, President of the Supreme People's Court, said in his report to the session, by the end of June 1980 the people's courts of different instances had reexamined 1,130,000 cases heard in the period of the "ten years of

²⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 25, 1978.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, March, 1, 1980.

chaos" (1966-1976), which made up 94 per cent of all cases heard in that period. According to Jiang Hua, 175,000 of the more than 270,000 cases concerning "counterrevolutionary" crimes were annulled because 184,000 people, including 26,000 linked with the "Liu Shaoqi case",²⁶ were convicted on far-fetched, false and erroneous charges.

Although the work of "reexamining" the cases on trumped-up charges was "in the main completed" within two years, Jiang Hua said, less than 65 per cent of all those repressed or convicted were subject to political rehabilitation, judging by the figures he cited. It followed from his speech that "the reexamination of cases based on far-fetched, erroneous and false charges" was aimed at "exposing and condemning the feudal-fascist dictatorship of Lin Biao" and also at "healing the serious wounds" inflicted on the country during ten years, creating conditions of "stability and unity", and mobilising all the active factors in promoting "modernisations".

The policy of rehabilitation was thus subordinated to the pragmatic aims of the party and administrative upper crust in which an ever bigger role was played by the right-wing-pragmatic group headed by Deng Xiaoping. It was opposed by the forces seeking to retard the process of rehabilitation or alter its character. Frictions within the Chinese leadership made it impossible to pursue consistently a pragmatic line in the sphere of rehabilitation. As admitted at the National People's Congress session in September 1980, in a number of instances the work done in "reexamining the cases" was in general condemned as a manifestation of "right-wing deviation", and so no rehabilitation work was done. The session said it was necessary to "complete the reexamination of cases within a brief period",²⁷ admitted that the process of rehabilitation had not been completed, and summed up only the preliminary results.

The process had not been completed because the struggle between the different political groups within the CPC was still going on. The pragmatic policy of rehabilitation was a kind of means of political struggle between groups, while the real aim of rehabilitation was not to restore justice in Chinese society's political life. That is precisely why the rehabilitation of some cadres was accompanied by the "purge" of others and these two processes turned out to be closely linked.

Both the "purges" and rehabilitation are in the final analysis directed at subordinating the state and party apparatus to the present Chinese leadership's basic strategic line and political ends. Consequently, at the present stage, as in Mao Zedong's time, rehabilitation is by no means always linked with the reinstatement of cadres in key positions. Moreover, bearing in mind the pragmatic character of rehabilitation, it may definitely be said that it extends above all to "useful people", and not to all the cadres repressed by the Maoists in the past.

Rehabilitation of cadres is part of a complex of measures adopted by the Peking leaders in order to "stabilise" and "unite" Chinese society. These are indispensable for the pursuance of the policy imposed by the successors of Mao Zedong—a policy of turning China into a mighty militaristic power destined to carry out the hegemonistic plans of present-day great-Han chauvinists. The strategy of militarism and hegemonism, however, runs counter to the vital interests of the Chinese people and poses a real threat to other nations. No solid unity and cohesion of Chinese society can be achieved on the basis of such a strategy, to which all the political measures of the Chinese leadership are subordinated.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1980.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1980.

LABOR RELATIONS IN JAPAN BECOMING LESS TRADITIONAL, MORE EXPLOITATIVE

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[Article by A. Orfenov: "Labour and Capital in Japan"]

[Text]

Relations between labour and capital has always been a subject of acute ideological struggle between Marxist researchers and apologists of capitalism. The Marxists have no doubts that relations between the capitalists and hired labour are pronouncedly antagonistic because they are based on exploitation of the working people at large by a handful of monopolies. Bourgeois scholars are of a different opinion. There is a host of theories that deny any antagonism between the two main classes in modern capitalist society and claim they have "common interests". Relations between capitalists and workers in Japan are often cited as an example of "harmony between the interests of labour and capital". For instance, a special research project done by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) pointed out that "the Japanese enterprise is viewed not merely as a profit-making instrument but as a society of people".¹ Special emphasis is laid at the same time on specific relations between labour and capital in Japan which are viewed by the authors of the research as the basis of "class peace".

Soviet scholars attach much importance to analysing present-day relations between labour and capital in Japan.² Nevertheless, the substantial changes in this field in recent years have not been adequately studied in Soviet literature.

Relations between labour and capital in Japan have retained to the present day crucial peculiarities which are explained, in particular, by the comparatively late emergence of capitalism in the country with the resultant superimposition of feudal institutions on capitalist relations.

The familial clan, *ie*, was the primary cell of Japanese feudal society, and the head of the family held complete sway over the rest of its members. The economic basis of the *ie* was its indivisible property which was inherited by the eldest son in keeping with the primogeniture system. The younger members of the *ie* (to say nothing of its head, the owner of the property) strove to augment the familial property because it ensured the prosperity of all the members. Marriage was viewed primarily as the movement of an able-bodied member from one *ie* to another rather than as a relationship between two individuals. The head of the *ie* determined its entire economic activity, and this meant in practice the complete subordination of the younger members of the family to him. This system of feudal paternalism was transplanted into the sphere of labour relations when capitalism came into being in Japan, though naturally in a slightly modified form to suit the capitalists' interests.

The employer (at a small-scale enterprise) or the foreman (at a large-scale enterprise) acted as a "patron". As small-scale businessmen led a life that differed little from that of their hired workers, the latter saw themselves as members of their owners' families and as the coowners of

¹ *The Development of Industrial Relations Systems: Some Implications of Japanese Experience*, Paris, 1977, p. 10.

² See, for instance, V. N. Khlynov, *Japan's Working Class in the Scientific and Technological Revolution*, Moscow, 1978.

the enterprises because they worked side by side with the owner, doing the same or similar jobs, lived under the same roof and even took part in decision making. They were hired only on recommendation and, naturally, sought to live up to expectations. Their well-being depended entirely on the owners' prosperity, which led to the formation of a microgroup with common interests.

At large enterprises with their complex and multi-level management structure workers were denied even a deliberative voice in resolving not only strategic but also tactical problems of production. The *ringi* system made an exception, enabling workers to offer practical recommendations to improve the production process and employers to select what profited them the most. Therefore, other means were used to make workers believe that they had a vital stake in raising efficiency of production and made part of the employers ("families" whose way of life little resembled that of workers). It was impressed upon workers that owners accorded them a great "honour" by bringing them to their "families". Indeed, in spite of subtler exploitation, big business provided better working conditions and higher wages to its workers than small- and medium-scale enterprises did and for this reason workers did their best to stay put.

As is evident, Japanese society proved divided not only horizontally into classes but also vertically into pseudo-family groups. Japanese scholars use all this to assert that in their country hired workers tend to identify their own interests with those of the enterprise they work at. For example, a leading bourgeois sociologist, Y. Ito writes: "Western Europe and Japan chose different ways of industrialisation, the former in keeping with the principle of individualism, the latter in keeping with the community principle. Japanese enterprises developed in an absolutely special way as 'communities' of people with a pronounced sense of loyalty to those above them and a sense of their unity".³

Japanese paternalism, which rests on traditional feudal institutions is nurtured in the country by special relations between labour and capital. These include the system of lifetime employment, the system of automatic pay rises based on age and the record of uninterrupted work for one and the same company, and also the specific organisation of trade unions.

The system of lifetime employment provides for an exceptionally stable utilisation of labour. Ideally, in keeping with this system shopfloor and office workers hired directly after graduating from some educational establishment work at enterprises of one and the same company for as long as they are capable of working. The system encompasses about 90 per cent of the Japanese workers, who are called "permanent workers". The remaining ten per cent are the so-called temporary workers, day-labourers and non-staff personnel to whom the employers do not guarantee employment. This system also envisages compulsory retirement, usually at the age of 55.

The system of automatic pay rises pegged to age and work record applies exclusively to permanent workers and ties pay rates to the workers' age and record of work at a given enterprise rather than to personal abilities or labour productivity. As a result, there is an enormous gap in salaries for young and elderly workers: in the mid-fifties, for example, workers under 19 got one seventh of what those aged 50 to 55 received.⁴

The majority of Japanese trade unions are structured according to the principle "a trade union at every enterprise" rather than on a sectoral or

³ Quoted from B. V. Pospelov, *Some Trends in Modern Japanese Sociology.—Japan, 1974. Yearbook*, Moscow, 1975, p. 207 (in Russian).

⁴ See *Economisuto*, No. 9, 1980, p. 83.

vocational basis as is the case with other developed capitalist countries. About 90 per cent of the organised workers are members of these trade unions.⁵ Though the grassroots trade unions are incorporated into sectoral federations and national trade union centres, they enjoy vast autonomy in concluding labour agreements and settling labour disputes with the management.

The systems of lifetime employment and of automatic pay raises (they are interrelated so closely that both can be called the traditional Japanese system of employment and payment) originated when capitalism was taking shape in Japan and became widespread in the 1920s. The trade union movement began developing only after the Second World War, because the trade unions had previously been banned. At present about one-third of the workers are trade union members.⁶

The traditional Japanese system of employment and payment contributed to the country's accelerated economic development in the period of the so-called "Japanese economic miracle" (mid-1950s-early 1970s) when Japan emerged as the second biggest industrial power in the capitalist world and a centre of rivalry among the imperialist states.

With the extensive reproduction of the population, the system of making payment dependent on age and work record enabled employers to keep wages down. In the period from 1955 to 1970 the lowest paid section of the proletariat (under 30 years of age) accounted for from 41.4 to 34.6 per cent of the total, while the highest paid workers (over 45 years of age) constituted only 27.4-26.8 per cent.⁷ The two groups received payment in the ratio of approximately 1:3, while if we compare the lowest and the highest paid categories the ratio will be 1:7.⁸ This economy on wages allowed Japanese employers to funnel sizeable extra funds into capital investment.

Furthermore, the lifetime employment system "tied" workers to a given enterprise. Amidst intense economic growth rates the demand for labour chronically exceeded supply, as is evidenced, for instance, by the dynamics of employment ratio expressed through the proportion of vacancies to the number of people actively looking for jobs. The shortage of skilled labour was especially acute and in certain years amounted to 2 million.⁹ This helped to keep unemployment at a low level—throughout the period under review it accounted for not more than one per cent of the economically active population and was basically of a technological nature.

As the newly employed were primarily yesterday's school graduates, the employers had to invest heavily in on-the-job vocational training. Under the circumstances the Japanese employers found it suitable to always have on hand a contingent of highly skilled workers. During unfavourable economic periods they would discharge temporary workers, day-labourers or non-staff personnel to whom they had not guaranteed employment. These categories of workers were usually employed to do jobs that required no skills, and the Japanese reserve labour market had always had a surplus of such workers. The system of automatic pay hikes also strengthened the "bonds" between workers and their enterprises because with the passage of time they received higher wages.

The trade unions organised according to the principle "a trade union

⁵ See T. Hanami, *Japan*, 1978, p. 40.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ See *Rodo tokei yoran* (Statistical Reference Book on Employment). Tokyo, 1958, p. 18; 1977, p. 23.

⁸ See *Ibid.*, pp. 82, 97.

⁹ See *Rodo hakusho 1970* (The White Paper on Labour), Tokyo, 1971, p. 25.

at every enterprise" are in the majority of cases united in national trade union centres: 36.5 per cent of the organised workers are members of the General Council of the Japanese Trade Unions (Sohyo), a progressive trade union centre, 17.6 per cent of the right-wing and reformist All-Japanese Labour Confederation (Domei), 10.7 per cent of the Churitsu roren and 0.5 per cent of the Shinsambetsu, which supports Sohyo (1976).¹⁰ The remaining, so-called independent trade unions are usually associations organised on the employers' initiative to instill an atmosphere of "class cooperation". In other words, they are "yellow trade unions". Trade unions that are members of progressive trade union centres (to say nothing of Domei) also display sentiments of their "belonging" to a given enterprise and a noticeable desire to promote the company's prosperity with the aim of working towards the "prosperity of all the members of the company". These sentiments are supported by the theory of "ambivalent relations between labour and capital" widely publicised by the ruling class. I. Nakayama, a prominent Japanese bourgeois economist and sociologist, wrote: "The making of the pie is a matter of the common interests of labour and capital, while the sharing of it is the sphere of their conflicting interests".¹¹ All this leads to mass-scale class struggle when it comes to "sharing the pie" (everybody knows about the "spring offensive" and widespread strikes), but the trade unions remain quite loyal to management in "making the pie".

The first half of the seventies saw a tendency to modify the traditional Japanese system of employment and remuneration, an essential element in the system of relations between labour and capital. Its abovementioned characteristics which capital found so attractive have evolved into their opposite. The underlying reasons for this include the changed economic setup in general, higher educational standards of the Japanese working people and also the overall "aging" of Japanese society.

In late 1973 the Japanese economy was hit by a crisis that for the first time since 1955 led to an absolute drop in the GNP and national income figures. It produced an especially painful effect on the situation in industry: in 1974 industrial production dropped by 9.2 per cent from the 1973 level and in 1975 by 3.2 per cent from 1974.¹² This entailed a big number of bankruptcies—11,681 in 1974, 12,606 in 1975 and 15,641 in 1976¹³—which in their turn swelled the reserve labour market. The total number of the completely unemployed, if official data alone are anything to go by, soared to 730,000 in 1974 and to 1,000,000 in 1975 (according to trade union statistics, the number of the unemployed was much higher because official figures do not include those who work at least one hour a week).¹⁴ What is more, most of the enterprises began discharging temporary workers, day-labourers and non-staff members on an unheard-of scale, and about 10 per cent of the enterprises even dismissed their permanent workers.

In some cases companies preferred to fire their permanent workers and keep on temporary workers¹⁵ because, faced with economic adversities, the employers economise on labour and pay temporary workers an average

¹⁰ See *Japanese Industrial Relations Series*, Ser. 2, Tokyo, 1980, p. 13.

¹¹ I. Nakayama, *The Economic Sociology of Relations Between Labour and Capital*, Tokyo, 1976, p. 220 (in Japanese).

¹² Calculated on the basis of *Keizai yoran*, (Economic Reference Book), Tokyo, 1977, p. 141.

¹³ See *Japan Economic Yearbook, 1977/1978*, Tokyo, 1977, p. 171.

¹⁴ See *Rodo tokei yoran* (Statistical Reference Book on Employment), Tokyo, 1977, p. 10.

¹⁵ See *Japan Quarterly*, Tokyo, 1980, Vol. 27, No. 1, p. 31.

of about 60 per cent of what their permanent workers receive. Though most of the companies did not resort to the final measure of dismissing their permanent workers, many of them were put on a shorter working week and correspondingly lower wages, while others were forced to take months-long unpaid leaves. All this brought about sharp changes in the reserve labour market. Whereas formerly there had been a frantic search for additional labour whenever production was expanded, now it was no problem. Besides, most of the Japanese unemployed have certain production skills, which makes prolonged training unnecessary. In 1977 the unemployed over 30 years of age (that is to say, those who had certain job skills) accounted for 59.1 per cent of the total number of the unemployed.¹⁶

Even Japanese bourgeois economists admit that the period of the "crisis-free" development of the Japanese economy (strictly speaking, crises were observed even during the years of the "Japanese economic miracle", though they did not lead to declines in the absolute indices of the GNP and the national income) was over, and enterprises have to be more responsive to economic change and capable of expanding or curtailing production. For this reason they view lifetime employment, in keeping with which the employers are committed to give workers jobs regardless of the economic situation, as a system which "adversely affects Japanese economic development."¹⁷ In actuality, however, in the new circumstances the Japanese system of employment not so much impedes economic development as prevents the capitalists from maximising their profits.

A dramatic rise in the educational standards of the Japanese is another factor largely affecting the modification of the traditional system of employment and remuneration. Education, especially at higher schools, is usually viewed as a way of "joining the elite". Even direct heirs of the owners of capital cannot hope to get important managerial posts without university diplomas.¹⁸ This accounts for the great striving not so much for knowledge as for a diploma that is observed among the Japanese. The Japanese school consists of three levels—a 6-year primary school, a 3-year incomplete secondary school and a 3-year complete secondary school. A university course of study usually lasts four years. In 1960, only 77.4 per cent of the primary school graduates continued their studies at incomplete secondary schools, 84.8 per cent of the incomplete secondary school graduates went on to complete secondary schools and 15.9 per cent of the complete secondary school graduates enrolled at universities.¹⁹ At present the situation has changed radically. Practically all Japanese now go through not only primary school but also incomplete secondary school. In 1976, 92.6 per cent of the primary school graduates entered complete secondary school and 38.6 per cent of the complete secondary school graduates enrolled at universities.²⁰ The Ministry of Labour estimated that in 1985 all the Japanese will take 12 years of schooling and 50 per cent of them will proceed to universities.²¹ As a result, young people join social production much later in life and the number of the lowest-paid workers aged from 15 to 19 is diminishing. Given the traditional system of payment, this leads to growing spending on labour.

¹⁶ Calculated on the basis of *Japanese Industrial Relations Series*, Ser. I, Tokyo, 1980, p. 11.

¹⁷ *Nihon keizai kenkyu senta kaiho* (the Bulletin Issued by the Centre Studying Japan's Economy), No. 355, 1979, p. 22.

¹⁸ See *Toyo keizai* (Eastern Economy), 1977, No. 4012, p. 57.

¹⁹ Calculated on the basis of *Nihon tokei nenkan* (Yearbook of Statistics), Tokyo, 1961, p. 457; 1964, p. 461; 1965, p. 517.

²⁰ See *Economisuto*, No. 38, 1977, p. 10.

²¹ See *Ibid.*, p. 11.

The changed demographic situation in Japan is producing a similar effect. The country's population is rapidly "aging". In 1965, people in the 15-30 age group accounted for 35.9 per cent of the economically active population and those over 40 years of age for 39.6 per cent. In 1978 the figures were 26.4 per cent and 48.5 per cent respectively.²² The proportion of the elderly people among the economically active population is expected to grow till 2025.

In the changed circumstances the traditional Japanese system of employment and payment, on the one hand, leads to growing spending on labour rather than to decreased expenditure, and, on the other, it guarantees the working people stable employment and prevents the companies from reacting swiftly to changes in the economic situation by expanding or curtailing up production accordingly. For this reason Japanese bourgeois authors animatedly discuss ways of modernising the traditional systems, as they are unlikely to survive in their pure form. The trade unions are opposed to changes in the existing system of employment and payment in the justified belief that they are geared to resolving economic troubles to the detriment of the working class. Scuttling the system of automatic pay hikes will inevitably result in reduced payment in general, while the abrogation of the lifetime employment system is bound to increase unemployment. While the discussion on ways to reconcile the interests of capital and the demands of the working class continues, employers are seeking to neutralise the effect of specific relations between labour and capital they now find disadvantageous to them. Modernisation is proceeding chiefly in the following directions.

First, fewer and fewer enterprises use the traditional system of payment. In 1970, 17.8 per cent of all the enterprises with not less than 30 employees based payment on age and work record and 27.9 per cent on the output rate, while in 1977 these figures were 11.5 per cent and 43.6 per cent respectively. The number of enterprises using a mixed system of payment decreased during the same period from 52.7 per cent to 45.9 per cent.²³

Second, the analytic portion of wages is growing, while the traditional part is diminishing correspondingly. Yearly earnings are made up of monthly salaries and summer and winter bonuses. Monthly salaries consist of standard wages and overtime payment. Standard wages in turn are subdivided into basic wages and extra pay. Basic wages consist of three components—1) "personal pay", fixed depending on the worker's age; 2) "combined pay", fixed depending on the uninterrupted work record and educational standard; 3) "service pay" or "work pay", calculated on the basis of analytic rating. In the period from 1967 to 1977 the traditional part—"personal pay" and "combined pay"—decreased from 67.5 to 47.3 per cent of monthly pay, while the up-to-date portion—"service pay"—went up from 9.5 per cent to 29.4 per cent.²⁴

Furthermore, pay is continually raised today not till the maximum service age, as is envisioned under the traditional system, but till an earlier age. Workers in the 45-49 age group now receive the highest wages rather than those in the 50-55 age group, as was the case before.

²² Calculated on the basis of *Rodo tokei yoran* (Statistical Reference Book on Employment), Tokyo, 1970, p. 36; 1979, p. 21.

²³ See *Rodo tokei yoran* (Statistical Reference Book on Employment), Tokyo, 1972, 1979.

²⁴ Calculated on the basis of *Rodo tokei yoran* (Statistical Reference Book on Employment), Tokyo, 1969, p. 146; 1979, p. 152.

The dramatic gap between wages for workers of different age groups has narrowed as a result. In 1960, workers under 17 were paid 15.4 per cent of what workers in the 40-49 age bracket got, whereas in 1977 the figure grew to 37 per cent. At present Japanese workers under 40 receive frequent pay rises, while pay rates for those in the 40-50 age group increase slowly, decrease slightly for those aged from 50 to 55 and show a sharply downward trend in the over-55 age group.

Last but not least, employers pursue a policy of "early retirement with a severance grant". When Japanese workers reach the marginal working age, they are given a severance grant which is fixed according to the principle "the monthly salary for every year of work." This amounts to a sum approximately equal to the three-year earnings of workers aged 55. The system of severance grants has gained wide currency primarily because of the extremely underdeveloped system of pensions. The new practice enables workers to retire, getting a severance grant (though not in full), before they are 55 and in some instances even at 45. Some of the workers are taken in by the bait, without giving due thought to where they would work tomorrow, while the firms get rid of "superfluous" highly-paid labour.

Such in the main are the methods Japanese employers use to offset the consequences of the traditional system of employment they find adverse under the new circumstances. Characteristically enough, they normally succeed and make a good profit. Such a "rationalisation" of the system of employment and payment signifies monopolist capital's encroachment on the rights of the working class and the elimination of the economic difficulties of the new period at the expense of the broad sections of the working people. It should be kept in mind, however, that it is the systems of lifetime employment and of automatic pay rises that underlie Japanese paternalism. Therefore the employers do not fully reject the principles of the traditional systems but merely mollify their impact. Nevertheless, in their present form the systems of employment and payment fail to act to the full extent as an instrument of instilling the "harmonious interests of labour and capital". This accounts for the exceptional interest displayed by government institutions, business organisations and certain bourgeois scholars in determining the main trends in the further modernisation of relations between labour and capital in Japan.

They criticise above all the lifetime employment system. As a matter of fact, in the past employment could indeed be regarded for life: in 1933 the marginal working age was 52.03, while the average life expectancy among men was as low as 46.92 years. In 1978, the figures were 58.05 and 72.4 respectively. The pension system in Japan is rather poorly developed: there is no national system whatsoever and only companies have some pension funds. As a rule, the size of pensions is even less than a subsistence wage and this forces workers to look for jobs after they retire. The so-called "secondary employment" is quite widespread, and after reaching the marginal working age, people stay on at their enterprises, often keeping their old jobs, though now in the capacity of temporary workers. Their wages are reduced dramatically and employment is no longer guaranteed.

In view of the abovementioned rapid "aging" of labour, a fairly large group of permanent workers (employees in the 50-55 age group were estimated to account for nearly a quarter of the entire workforce in 1980) are soon to be transferred to the category of temporary workers, which adversely affects the traditional "loyalty" of elderly workers to their enterprise. The bulk of them will join the ranks of the unemployed—in 1977 men over 55 accounted for almost a quarter of men unemployed in Japan and their

number is steadily growing. That is why the Association of the Japanese Employers (Nikkeiren) has suggested that the marginal working age be extended to 60. At the same time Nikkeiren experts insist on revamping the traditional method of payment. According to their recommendations, age and work record should be given priority in fixing the pay rates only for the under 45 age group, whereas for those past that age, wages should be either frozen or calculated on the basis of analytic rating. By somehow stabilising employment the employers intend to lower outlays on labour and at the same time prop up the paternalism that is going to pieces.

Some people set forth the idea that the present-day level of "participation" in Japan—for the most part through the system of joint consultations of labour and capital—is insufficient to ensure an atmosphere of "cooperation" at enterprises, and consequently this "participation" should be promoted in every way possible. Specific proposals vary to a large extent from expanding and assigning new functions to the system of joint consultations, introducing the system of worker managers and inspectors, and on-the-spot "participation" to participation in bodies planning sectoral and even national economic policies. A mere 1.5 per cent of enterprises have worker representatives on the companies' boards of directors and almost always their trade unions are set up on the initiative of the managers and support everything they propose. The system of worker inspectors in general was constricted by certain legislative restrictions. "Participation" at the level of a sector or the national economy is even more "illusory". Consultative councils existing in different branches and ministries have more than ten people reflecting the interests of monopoly capital per every trade union representative. It is symptomatic that although there is a host of "recipes for employee participation", the employers take their time in putting them into practice. For all the multiplicity of forms, the capitalist theory and practice of "participation" have two aspects in common, namely, a desire, on the one hand, to produce the illusion of "employee participation" in settling those issues that have to do with the situation of the workers and, on the other, to ensure real participation where it boosts labour productivity and raises profits. At the same time bourgeois scholars warn against overdoing "employee participation" because, in their opinion, "participation in management, by going beyond the framework planned by employers, ... can become revolutionary by nature."²⁵

As is evident, in the late seventies and early eighties relations between labour and capital in Japan have been undergoing intensive modernisation. Though Japanese employers are forced to discard the now economically ineffective systems of employment and payment, they seek to maintain the fairly "peaceful" nature of relations between labour and capital. So far these relations have been characterised by a fierce economic struggle of the proletariat and the relative immaturity of general political demands, which the ruling class finds permissible. The bourgeoisie is frantically looking for new ways of allaying and camouflaging antagonisms in relations between the main classes of modern capitalist society. Certain steps in this direction have already been made. At the same time it is impossible to deny that conflicting relations between labour and capital can worsen even further and this will depend on the stand the Japanese working class, its political parties, trade unions and other organisations are going to adopt—whether they will pursue the "co-prosperity of the nation" or consistently defend their interests from positions of class struggle.

²⁵ *The Concept and Trends of Participation in Management*, Tokyo, 1979, p. 117.

U.S. BOOK ON CHINESE AID TO AFRICA SCORED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 82 pp 127-131

[Article by M. Mikhailova, Cand. Sc. (Econ.): "A US Justification of Peking's Hegemonistic Strategy in Africa"]

[Text]

The political partnership of the US imperialists and the Chinese hegemons, a dangerous new factor in international politics which emerged in the late 70s-early 80s, is becoming increasingly evident in the African policies of the two countries. Their common political objectives in a number of key areas are increasingly reflected not only in the practical steps of the two governments in Africa, but also in books by politologists, US scholars, in particular. An example is a book published in New York in 1980 and entitled *Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations*, edited by two authorities on the subject: Professor W. Weinstein, Director of the Administration Council on Afro-Asian and National Problems, and African specialist Thomas Henriksen, a senior researcher at Stanford University's Hoover Institute.*

The foreword written by the authors makes it clear that this publication was prompted by "fears" of the growing "Soviet influence" in Africa and that the book is a "reaction" to the setbacks the imperialist forces met with Angola and Ethiopia. The developments in these two countries are represented by the US scholars exclusively as a result of "Soviet (and Cuban) direct intervention" or as a "Soviet démarche" in Africa.¹

The book under review consists of eight chapters written by different authors including, along with specialists on Africa and Sinologists, a number of dyed-in-the-wool anti-Soviets such as Richard E. Bissell, Boris Ipatov and J. P. Smaldone.

The first four chapters are primarily devoted to the Soviet policy on Africa and aid to African states represented in a patently biased cold-war manner. Chapter Five is an attempt at a comparative analysis of the USSR and China's military and economic aid to Africa, also made from an extremely biased standpoint vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The last three chapters contain an exposition and justification of Peking's diplomacy and economic policies in Africa.

The authors and the editors do not conceal their anti-Sovietism, pointing out that the Chinese presence in Africa and China's aid to the independent countries of the continent acts as a check or counterbalance to the Soviet presence there. In other words, Peking, with its anti-socialist policies is called upon to become a counterforce to the Soviet Union in Africa and the strike force of world imperialism in its struggle against the countries of socialism and forces of peace and democracy. The idea of using Peking as a sort of counterbalance is the conceptual mainstay of the book.

* *Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations*, Ed. by W. Weinstein, T. H. Henriksen, New York, Praeger, 1980, 184 pp. The title of the book is reminiscent of the work *Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa* also edited by W. Weinstein and published in New York in 1975. It is not, however, a new edition, but an independent work.

¹ *Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations*, p. VIII.

Stressing the usefulness of the Chinese presence in Africa for US strategy, in the foreword, the authors recall that back in the late 60s-early 70s, the West felt reassured by the Soviet-Chinese rivalry in Africa, since it greatly reduced Western fears of a possible communisation of the young states by a single monolithic force. It is also noted that the events in Angola and Ethiopia resulted in a sharp cooling of Soviet-American relations and a warming of US-Chinese ties (pp. VII-VIII).

These frank pronouncements are followed by hackneyed phrases about the mythical Soviet "hegemonism designs in Africa", the "export of revolution" from the USSR to Africa, plans to set up a "Soviet empire" to the south of the equator, and the Soviet desire to obtain "bases" in the Red and the Mediterranean Seas, as well as in the Indian Ocean, and to win political and ideological allies in its struggle against imperialism (pp. 2-3, 7, 31, 92).

The desire of the authors—out to protect the interests of US monopolies—to confuse the issue and to camouflage the aggressive global policies of the United States, first and foremost in Africa and the Middle East, is quite apparent. It is not the Soviet Union but the US and its allies that is actively deploying its armed forces on the approaches to the Persian Gulf, in the Indian Ocean, on Diego Garcia, and on bases provided by Egypt, Morocco, Somalia and Kenya and in a number of such strategically important states for it as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Turkey. According to *Afrique-Asie* magazine, it is Washington, pushing ahead with the creation of its rapid deployment force, that is ready to intervene wherever its interests or those of the West may be "threatened". Such "threats" include any attempt by a people to rid itself of neo-colonialism and imperialism.²

The Soviet policy towards the developing countries was aptly described by Leonid Brezhnev during his February 1980 meeting with the electorate, when he stated that the Soviet Union's good relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with dozens of Asian, African and Latin American countries are developing on the basis of strict respect for their sovereignty, the rights of the peoples, and of equitable international relations. "We value the relations with all these states", Leonid Brezhnev stressed, "respect their rights, we do not hanker after their wealth, do not look for military bases... we do not try to teach them what policy they should pursue... we never use our assistance to bring pressure to bear on those whom we give it."³

This even-handed and firm stand of the Soviet Union was reaffirmed in the new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the People's Republic of the Congo, signed in May 1981 (following similar agreements with Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Sao Tome and Principe)—a treaty which is called on to become an important factor contributing to independent Africa's growing prestige in the international arena. The resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress provide another proof of the USSR's consistent line of broadening cooperation with the newly-independent states and of forging an alliance with them.

In a bid to prevent this cooperation, to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the newly-free states of Africa, bourgeois scholars, more specifically, T. Henriksen, are trying to slander the USSR and Cuba, to distort their African policies, and to show the events in Angola and the policy of Mozambique's leadership in a false light. In contrast, China's

² See *Afrique-Asie*, Paris, March 16, 1981.

³ *Kommunist*, 1980, No. 4, p. 7 (in Russian).

aid to Mozambique in the 1960s is represented favourably, although the author goes on to say that China's attempts to impose its "cultural revolution" model and Maoist ideology in the late 1960s "was unfavourably received by the FRELIMO leaders" and "China's support of the South African-backed, anti-MPLA forces in the Angolan civil war appeared to weaken Maputo's relations with Peking" (p. 62).

In the final analysis, the author is compelled to note the development of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Angola and Mozambique, but then he attempts to detract from them, maintaining that they are of a "temporary nature", that the MPLA and the FRELIMO have no common ground for cooperation with the USSR, and that the West should "hope for the better", i. e., that in the near future Angola and Mozambique will become direct "opponents" of the Soviet Union (naturally, not without support from the USA, Peking, and the reactionary Arab regimes) (pp. 69, 110).

The author's unscientific approach to the problem in question manifests itself in their highly contradictory conclusions. For example, Joseph P. Smaldone, an associate professor at Maryland University cooperating with the Foreign Policy Research Bureau of the State Department notes that one of Peking's primary objectives is to gain a leading position among "Third-World" countries, that Africa has played an important role in Peking's claim to world recognition, and that China views Africa as the "main scene" of its global strategy (p. 102).

At the same time, Smaldone tries to convince the reader that Peking has no immediate strategic interests in Africa and that China's economic and military aid to Africa should be viewed in a strictly "political context". He also seeks to whitewash China's political designs in Africa, referring to them as "revolutionary" or "revolutionary-pragmatic".

Smaldone commends Peking's economic aid to the African nations, putting it in opposition to Soviet aid. He holds, for example, that "poor" China is very generous to Africa, that Peking's aid to this continent accounts for more than 50 per cent of its aid to the "Third World", while Soviet aid to Africa total only 14 per cent of the total USSR's aid to the developing countries (p. 103).

However, the author's calculations are unfair. For example, he maintains that in 1967-1976 Africa was the main recipient of Chinese weapons. The reservation that this does not include countries bordering on China effectively nullifies his reasoning. To be sure, Smaldone himself, perfectly aware that China's military aid is infinitesimal, adds that for all intents and purposes it has no effect on the local [i. e., African.—M. M.] military and strategic balance. This suits him perfectly well, because Chinese aid in such dimensions holds practically no threat for the Western world. China only supplements Western arms shipments, acting as a junior partner of American imperialism.

Another analyst, George T. Yu, professor of political science at the University of Illinois, a prominent expert on Sino-African relations in the 1970s and author of a number of articles and a monograph on China's policy in Africa (using Tanzania as an example), draws the diametrically opposite conclusion of massive Chinese aid to Africa, trying to uncover in it (to no avail) the "spirit of proletarian internationalism" (p. 118).

At the same time, analysing the aims of China's economic policy in Africa, the author rightly establishes the direct link between Peking's aid and its foreign policy objectives: the desire to increase its influence on the African peoples, to oust its enemies, to win support as the "leader of the Third-World countries", and to gain "revolutionary prestige" among

them (pp. 118-119). Leaving the word "revolutionary" on the author's conscience, this conclusion corresponds to the real state of affairs.

Yu takes particular note of China's assistance in the construction of the Tanzam railway, feeling that this was a great success for China demonstrating the country's strength and abilities; that Tanzam is a symbol of China's "leading role" in the "Third World" (p. 122). True, the author admits that during the construction of the railway, China ran into many complex economic and financial problems, neglecting to mention that it solved them at the expense of Tanzania and Zambia.

In describing the manner in which China financed the railway construction, the author avoided the strings attached to the aid rendered, whereby income from the sales of Chinese goods sold on credit is used to defray local expenses and the salaries of the Chinese specialists. As a result, Tanzania and Zambia each had to buy \$121 million worth of Chinese goods (p. 131). Yu passes over in silence the negative effect of such a policy on the development of a number of local industries. The author seems to approve of the Chinese principle of attaining one's objectives at any cost, noting that, despite all, the "project had secured financial support" and became a reality (p. 131).

The same ambivalence is typical of the author when he reports that as the construction of the railway picked up momentum, so did China's dependence on the deliveries of non-Chinese equipment for the Tanzam such as Japanese bulldozers, British and Swedish tractors, British earth-moving machinery, Finnish stone-crushers, German minibuses, etc., and that the project proved an enormous burden on China's material resources (p. 135). The author was forced to admit that by the end of the 1970s, Tanzam was still not fully operative; it did not live up to its full potential, and that overall, China's economic aid on the railway construction project was the exception rather than the rule, that it had no precedent in the "Third World" and would hardly be repeated (p. 141).

Indeed, the construction of the Tanzam was one of the many causes of strain on China's economic resources which immediately affected that country's aid to Africa in the second half of the 1970s in spite of the statements of China's leaders.

Weinstein notes that China's activity in Central Africa grew in the 1970s in response to "Soviet efforts to consolidate its influence in the region". At the same time, he added, that China was effectively backing the West in its efforts to shore up President Mobutu of Zaire against domestic and external dissidents (p. 145). The author does not conceal the fact that Peking had a stake in the political survival of Mobutu, whose help it needed in supplying and supporting UNITA against MPLA and the People's Republic of Angola (p. 163). Simultaneously, Weinstein warns the Chinese seeking to beef up China's global role that in subsequent decades China may lose its ground in Africa (p. 165).

The most realistic assessment of China's African policy is made by Eugene K. Lawson, a specialist in international affairs at Georgetown University. Discussing the situation in Angola and Ethiopia in the 1970s in what amounts to an indictment of Peking's policy towards these two countries, the author tries to prove that China's actions in Africa were not always a "simple reaction" to Soviet moves and that Peking's policies should be viewed in the light of that country's drive to win a leading role in the "Third World", to which it feels it belongs. In addition, Lawson emphasises that China's moves were never haphazard or disconnected: they were always a part of Peking's "global foreign policy scheme" (p. 168).

Lawson goes on to say that the Chinese formulas for strengthening African unity and for self-reliance, which Peking publicised so noisily in the 1970s pursued two objectives: first, Peking wanted to assuage Africa's fears that its "new initiatives" were not aimed at seizing control over Africa, and, secondly, it wanted to "warn" African radicals not to expect broad material aid from China (p. 172).

But subsequently Lawson loses his grip on reality, and his reasoning, albeit in a camouflaged form, draws closer to the keynote of the book which was dictated by political expediency.

This and similar works published in the United States over the past few years have the sole objective of checking the propagation of the ideas of scientific socialism in Africa and other national liberation areas and to prevent the newly-free states from cooperating with the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

Trying to offset their ideological bankruptcy with increased propaganda efforts, US politicians are increasingly making use of the "Chinese card", praising the most hopeless aspects of Peking's African policy to the skies. This is also the primary objective of the book under review. Lauding China's infinitesimal economic aid to Africa under the guise of objectivity, and coordinating their propaganda effort with that of Peking, US politologists and politicians are trying to use it as a counterbalance in their policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union and to wrench the developing countries away from the socialist world—their natural ally in anti-imperialist struggle.

The inevitable conclusion is that US historiography of the early 1980s is almost a mirror image of Washington's official assessment of China's policy and role in Africa.

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U.S. PSYCHO-HISTORIC APPROACHES TO STUDY OF MAO CRITICIZED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 82 pp 132-143

[Article by Y. Yakimova: "Socio-Psychological Concepts of Maoism in US Sinology"]

[Text]

Assessing Maoism's ideological and political substance has been a subject of acute controversy between Marxist scholars and a number of bourgeois schools of Sinology. Non-Marxist Sinology of the 1960-1970s is a motley array of "conceptions" of Maoism which, nevertheless, have one thing in common—a politically biased assessment of Maoism and a desire to discredit Marxism by equating it with Maoist ideology and political practice. Whereas the political sympathies of the leftist-apologetic, liberal-objectivist and blatantly anti-communist schools of Western Sinology are transparent, the main thrust of the socio-psychological conceptions of Maoism is less apparent.

The Maoist phenomenon interests bourgeois social psychologists primarily as a method of brainwashing the masses and channeling their social energy in directions useful to the ruling elite. Representatives of this school are concerned with studying the stable socio-psychologic stereotypes of the Chinese and following the development of traditional political culture in Maoist China. Soviet scholars have shown that the main features of the existing socio-psychological theories—their rigid conceptual framework, exaggeration of the role of tradition in China's social and political development, the postulation of direct "genetic" links between the political culture of feudal China and today's social and psychological atmosphere—inevitably lead bourgeois scholars to the conclusion that the Chinese people allegedly cannot overcome their daily routine, thus laying bare the politically expedient essence of these socio-psychological predictions.¹

In the 1960-1970s the socio-psychological school of US Sinology produced several so-called psycho-historical conceptions of Maoism. Their proponents saw the secret of Maoism asserting itself in China in the peculiar psychological features of Mao Zedong's personality.² Using a "new", "psycho-historical" method of social analysis, psycho-historians L. Pye and R. Lifton concerned themselves with studying the subjective factors in Maoism from the standpoint of Freudism. Whereas a critique of bourgeois socio-psychological conceptions has already been offered in Soviet literature,³ the psycho-historical interpretations of Maoism have not yet been sufficiently discussed. Such a discussion is all the more necessary because the link between subjective and objective factors in Maoism highlighted by the psycho-historians is central to a proper understanding of the destiny of socialism in China. It is well known that Marx-

¹ See *Modern China in Foreign Studies*, Moscow, 1979, p. 113 (in Russian).

² See L. W. Pye, *Mao Tse-tung. The Man in the Leader*, New York, 1976; R. J. Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality. Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, New York, 1968.

³ See *Modern China in Foreign Studies*, pp. 98-115; G. F. Saltykov, *Working Class and Peasantry of the PRC in Chinese Leadership's Policy. 1969-1976. Socio-Psychological Aspects, Synopsis of a Theses*, Moscow, 1978.

ism does not deny the role of personality in history, but places it on a firm scientific basis of materialism: the nature and limitations of a historical personality's activities are determined by the objective conditions of its existence. Therefore, in its studies of the objective conditions of the emergence of Maoism, Soviet Sinology did not neglect providing psychological background to Mao Zedong's ideological work. For example, it was pointed out that "apart from objective sources and conditions, the formation and evolution of Maoism depended to an immense extent on a subjective factor, in other words, on the personality of Mao Tse-tung as the principal subject and exponent of Maoist ideology".⁴ In the light of these considerations, a critical analysis of the psycho-historical conceptions of Maoism is of definite scientific interest.

Without claiming to be a substitute for a traditional historical analysis, psycho-history proclaimed its intention to be the study of the unconscious motives of individuals and social groups on the basis of Sigmund Freud's theory of the unconscious as the primary psychic structure which is inimical to the conscious, and which serves as a reservoir of instinctive biological attractions. It also uses the Freudian theory of group psychology.

A classical subject of psycho-historical research is the so-called psychobiography.⁵ Psycho-historians are primarily interested in the link between a historical personality and the masses through the unconscious structures and mechanisms of spiritual life. The correlation between the leader's ideology and socio-psychological stereotypes of behaviour and world outlook typical of an epoch, is, unquestionably, a real scientific problem. Freudism, however, with its absolutisation of the psychological in social processes and the irrational in the human psyche, with its arbitrary extrapolation of an individual's psychological features upon the domain of political history, cannot be used as a suitable theoretical and methodological basis for tackling this problem. Historical materialism alone can provide a proper scientific foundation in any historical and socio-psychological mutual-enrichment study.

The study of the role of socio-psychological stereotypes in social life and of the mechanisms of formation and functioning of the unconscious elements of social psychology has a direct bearing on China's modern political history. According to L. S. Perelomov, "In studying the causes which brought about the degeneration of the revolutionary power in China, it is not enough to analyse Maoism's class roots alone", for an important role was played by socio-psychological factors.⁶ Soviet Sinology has paid considerable attention to the influence of traditional socio-psychological attitudes on the political behaviour of the Chinese working people. It repeatedly stressed the connections between Maoism and Confucianism, Legism and traditional Sinocentrism through social psychology, and examined the Maoists' use of the social sentiments and traditional attitudes of the masses of peasants.⁷ Such a comprehensive approach has

⁴ V. P. Feoktistov, "Phases of Maoism's Ideological Evolution", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1975, No. 2, pp. 85-86.

⁵ Western psycho-historical science is generally recognised as having originated in 1958, when E. H. Erikson's *Young Man Luther* was published in New York.

⁶ L. S. Perelomov, "On the Essence of Legism", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1973, No. 2, p. 77 (in Russian).

⁷ See G. F. Saltykov, "Tradition: Its Mechanism of Action and Some Peculiarities in China", *The Role of Traditions in China's History and Culture*, Moscow, 1972; G. F. Saltykov, "Clannishness and Political Struggle in the Chinese Village (1970-1972)", *China: Traditions and Modernity*, Moscow, 1976. A. N. Zhelokhovtsev, "The Role of Traditions in the Formation of Mental and Behavioral Stereotypes in Modern China", *The Role of Tra-*

made it possible to recreate the real spiritual atmosphere in the People's Republic of China, without an understanding of which it is impossible to account for the temporary reign of Maoism in that country. These studies by Soviet scholars provide a wealth of material for comparative analysis of R. Lifton's and L. W. Pye's psycho-historical interpretation of Maoism.

The underlying logic of these two authors is that social processes in the People's Republic of China can be elucidated only through an understanding of the psychological features of Mao Zedong including his emotional evolution. R. Lifton concentrates on "certain features of Mao's psychological and revolutionary style as these come to bear upon a series of personal and historical exigencies, of his and China's situation".⁸ L. Pye even contends that Mao's character "has shaped the manner and style of the Chinese revolution", the events and processes of which "...time and again... took on decisive form in direct response to the personality of Mao Tse-tung".⁹ The two authors thus lay claim to a "non-trivial" approach to China's latest history, the essence of which is the elucidation of links between the leader's personality, social cataclysms and social psychology.

R. Lifton, a professor of psychology at Yale University, is widely known in the US as a theoretician in the field of psycho-history and as the author of the conception of symbolic forms of human immortality. He is also interested in the modern political history of Japan and China. R. Lifton is breaking new ground in the study of mankind *in extremis*—instances such as the tragedy of Hiroshima and the "cultural revolution" in China. His *Revolutionary Immortality* is an attempt to apply his psycho-historical theory to an analysis of the Maoist "cultural revolution" and to test the heuristic possibilities of this theory on concrete historical material. The underlying conceptual framework is that of Freudian theory combined with some elements of existential analysis.

Unlike R. Lifton, L. Pye, a professor of political science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is neither an original psycho-historian, nor a professional psychologist. His primary interest as a political scientist is the study of the political aspects of socio-psychological processes in Southeast Asia and China. In writing his book on Mao Zedong, L. Pye drew for theoretical groundwork on E. Erikson's book mentioned above as well as on works by experts on "political psychology" (H. Lasswell, A. Kardiner and M. Mead).

It would be best to begin this analysis of psycho-historical conceptions of Maoism with L. Pye's book *Mao Tse-tung. The Man in the Leader* as a typical attempt at a "psycho-biography". It closely follows the dicta of the genre: a heightened interest in the role played in later life by the experiences and frustrations of childhood, a detailed analysis of the leader's interpersonal relationships at all stages of socialisation and a psychoanalytical study of reminiscences and autobiographies with a view to penetrating the leader's unconscious motives. L. Pye applies the Freu-

ditions in China's History and Culture; V. A. Krivtsov, "Maoism and Confucianism", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1973, No 3 (in Russian); V. A. Krivtsov, Maoism and Great-Han Chauvinism of China's Bourgeoisie", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1974, No. 1 (in Russian); V. A. Krivtsov, "Maoism and Chinese Ideological and Socio-Psychological Tradition", *Voprosy filosofii*, 1976, No. 8; *Maoism — Ideological and Political Enemy of Marxism-Leninism*, Moscow, 1974; G. F. Saltykov, "Socio-Psychological Aspects of China's Political Life", *The Working Class and Today's World*, 1975, No. 3; M. G. Stepanov, "Maoist Propaganda: Some Social and Psychological Aspects", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1975, No. 2, etc.

⁸ R. Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality*, p. XV.

⁹ L. W. Pye, *Mao Tse-tung. The Man in the Leader*, pp. 3, 8. In further references to L. Pye's and R. Lifton's works pages are given in parenthesis in the text.

dian technique to the well-known facts about the "great helmsman's" childhood and adolescence, his discussions with Edgar Snow, his sayings collected in the notorious "little red book", and even his poetry.

The central problem of L. Pye's book is "the mystery of Mao's greatness", the solution to which the author sees in the "great helmsman's" uncanny ability to understand, awaken and direct human emotions and to use his own personality to control the sentiments and passions of others (pp. 6, 7). These traits are interpreted by L. Pye as a capacity, typical of most political leaders, to meet the needs of one's own personality development through public action or, in other words, to find solutions to personal problems in the resolution of social conflicts (pp. 10, 11). In this, he is making use of E. Erikson's noteworthy idea of the leader-ideologist and the masses he leads having common socio-psychological world outlook, and of the leader's ability to channel the creative and emotional energy of the people by invoking ideology which absorbed the essential elements of the "psychology of the epoch". On the one hand, L. Pye is seeking to reveal the essence of the socio-psychological situation in China on the eve of the popular revolution "divined" by Mao, and on the other, to recreate the picture of the "great helmsman's" emotional and psychological formation, stressing those landmarks of his "spiritual biography" which were consonant with the demands of the moment.

L. Pye concentrates on the second aspect of his analysis—Mao Zedong's personal life—at the expense of the socio-psychological climate in pre-1949 China, which is outlined only briefly. He identifies, in effect, only one typical feature of the social psychology of the period—an acute feeling of national humiliation—and proclaims Mao Zedong a herald of Chinese nationalism (p. 239). In doing this, he grossly distorts the essence of social sentiment in China at the time, disregarding the revolutionary-democratic feeling of the masses and their striving for social liberation. This amounts to reducing the task of China's social renovation to that of liberating the country from semi-colonial dependence. However, it is a well-known fact that the Chinese revolution pursued two objectives: an anti-imperialist (national) one and a democratic (social) one, a fact that was reflected in the interlacing of anti-colonial and anti-feudal elements in the sentiments of the masses. It is a different matter altogether that these objectives were perceived by the masses first and foremost as the necessity to struggle against the foreign exploiters and their stooges. The country's economic backwardness, the persisting survivals of feudalism, the continuing influence of Confucian socio-psychological stereotypes, traditional clannishness and the weakness of class antagonisms combined to spearhead the protest of the Chinese workers and peasants against national, not class, enemies.¹⁰

Consequently, the striving for national liberation could, indeed, become (but only for some time) the focus of social sentiments in China. That is why one can agree with L. Pye's remark that Mao appealed to the nationalist sentiments of the Chinese people and used the prevailing socio-psychological climate to attain his ends. "Mao Zedong's strength," wrote P. P. Vladimirov, "lies in his intimate knowledge of the psychology of the Chinese peasant and petty bourgeois, and of the people's customs and ways. Mao is whipping up national sentiment aching from years of foreign oppression."¹¹

¹⁰ *Maoism's Ideological and Political Essence*, Moscow, 1977, p. 34 (in Russian).

¹¹ P. P. Vladimirov, *China's Special Region*, Moscow, 1973 (in Russian).

But, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, nationalism of any oppressed nation contains both progressive, anti-imperialist elements and conservative, chauvinistic ones.¹² Unlike the Chinese communists-internationalists, Mao Zedong always played on the reactionary features of Chinese nationalism, exploiting the nationalistic prejudice of the people. In this respect, one can agree with L. Pye that Mao indeed was a herald of Chinese nationalism. It is noteworthy that he sees the secret of Maoism's "charm" in its consonance with the nationalistic feeling, practically disregarding Maoist "socialist" demagoguery. Although such an approach largely simplifies the elucidation of the reasons for the influence of Maoism which always sponged on the prestige of communist ideas, it is, in effect, an involuntary confirmation of the Marxist conclusion about the chauvinistic nature of Mao Zedong's ideology. By equating Maoism and nationalism, L. Pye unwittingly stresses that in the "thought of Mao Zedong" there is not a grain of Marxism.

Having proclaimed the "great helmsman" a "mouthpiece of the times" and a "visionary of a new society", he chose not to notice the fact that Mao Zedong used certain trends in the public sentiment for purposes not only leading away from a "social revival", but, in fact, running counter to the people's interests and, therefore, doomed to historical bankruptcy. In addition to this "short-sightedness" of the author and his obvious political bias, this stand is due to the lack of a class approach to the problem. Only a class analysis of socio-psychological processes makes it possible to differentiate between historically progressive leaders whose socially nurtured ideology truly meets the demands of the times, and those who make political capital on popular sentiment, leading the masses into blind alleys of history. A Marxist class approach to the analysis of Maoist ideology has shown that the "thought of Mao Zedong" is the quintessence of the social psychology of the Chinese multi-million petty bourgeoisie which is characterised by a heightened responsiveness to chauvinistic slogans. This is the "secret" of Maoism's temporary reign in China and, simultaneously, the cause of its historical sterility.

Since the stability of nationalist sentiments in China is a fact too well known already to be used as the only explanation of Maoism's influence on the masses, Pye tries to beef up his conception by turning to the "unconscious" impulses of social psychology. Eclectically combining Erikson's theory with Freud's conception of "narcissism", Pye suggests his own version of the secret of "Mao Tse-tung's charisma".¹³ Pye contends that charismatic leadership is based on the universal human phenomenon of "secondary narcissism". According to Freud, infantile narcissism is the infant's simultaneous feeling of its helplessness and of its hold on the world which is at its beck and call. Under the psychoanalytical typology of characters, excessive infantile narcissism may produce a "narcissistic personality" characterised by extreme coldness, reserve in interpersonal relationships, a feeling of superiority, self-confidence and a desire to assert his ego. Freud also admitted the possibility of the existence of "secondary

¹² See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 35.

¹³ For the first time the term "charisma" (spiritual grace) was used in sociology by Max Weber who borrowed it from early Christian literature. Weber's interpretation of charisma was a certain quality of a personality which makes it stand out from a crowd of common people and which gives it supernatural, superhuman or at least exceptional powers or capacities. Of decisive importance to the action of charisma is its recognition by those who are in the leader's power. See Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, New York, 1974, p. 341. Modern Western sociologists make broad use of the notion of "charismatic leadership".

narcissism"—an adult's unconscious desire to bring back the illusions of his individual hold on the world and of the value of his own ego.

Proceeding from these Freudian ideas, Pye holds that in the heart of every adult there lives an unconscious longing for the lost benefits of primary narcissism, which is mirrored in the relationship between the charismatic leader and the masses (pp. 12-13). A narcissistic leader constantly strives to assert his ego and unconsciously attempts to bring back his childhood feeling of omnipotence. At the same time, he is dependent on the attitude of the masses toward him. The masses who know of this Achilles' heel of the leader, Pye goes on, are, nevertheless, also dependent on the narcissistic hero, since they unconsciously hope to return to the childhood feeling of well-being through absolute submission to the leader. In addition, having come to appreciate the leader's genius, the people, according to Pye, stand a chance of again becoming the masters of their own lives and reasserting their dignity.

In terms of this theory, Pye gives the following explanation of Mao Zedong's charisma. Mao Zedong is a strong narcissistic personality whose childhood experience included both positive emotions of authentic narcissism (Mao, the first-born, was the object of his mother's particular pride and care) and profound frustrations. The latter were due to the birth of a second child, with whom two-year-old Mao had, from then on, to share mother's love and affection. As a result, the acute feeling of the value of his ego, which had once had a real foundation in his mother's exceptional love, became, according to Pye, closely intertwined in Mao's psyche with a feeling of being abandoned and neglected (pp. 85, 306). These profound and painful personal experiences which forced Mao to assert his "narcissism" made him particularly sensitive to the nationalistic sentiments of the masses. Nationalism itself is explained by Pye as the longing of the Chinese people for the past glory of the empire, typical of secondary narcissism, and their unconscious striving to revive the unjustly downtrodden national ego (pp. 238-239, 250-251).

Pye's conception of charismatic leadership, with its "explanation" of Maoism's hold on China is a typical example of Freudian myth-building devoid of any scientific foundation. From the point of view of scientific psychology unconscious psychological regression to one's previous experiences (secondary narcissism) and the overemphasis of the role of childhood experience in the life of an adult is untenable. Marxist sociology is categorically opposed to the author's tendency to reduce the explanation of complex social phenomena solely to socio-psychological analysis. Pye's attempts to derive the phenomenon of Chinese nationalism from the peculiarities of the human psyche are, in effect, an extrapolation of misconceived laws of the psychological development of the individual to the social domain, i. e. psychological reductionism.

It is highly symptomatic that Pye's "explanation" tends to be no more than a veiled apologia for Maoist brainwashing. By raising to the absolute the role of the unconscious aspects in the relationships between the leader and the people, the US political scientist belittles the masses' capacity for history-making activity. A people blindly following a charismatic personality ceases to be the subject of history. "Most Chinese," asserts Pye, "sensed that there need be no clear distinction between Mao's personal greatness and the restoration of national greatness" (pp. 250-251). In other words, the masses' absolute devotion to the "thought of Mao Zedong" is in Pye's opinion a promise of the future greatness of China. In proclaiming their total conformity to the charismatic leader, Pye, in effect, is giving a "scientific" psychological foundation

to the Maoists' notorious slogan that all people must become "clean sheets of paper" and "Chairman Mao's rust-resisting screws" whose self-expression is attainable only through the personality of "the great helmsman".

It is not surprising, therefore, that Mao's personality and the minutest details of his life are at the centre of the American researcher's attention. It must be admitted that the pages of Pye's book devoted to a psychological portrait of Mao and the description of those traits which served him in good stead in his struggle for power are not devoid of interest. Pye highlights such traits as a feeling of historical chosenness, a claim to pre-eminence, inflated pride, fear of remaining in the shadow or of being slighted by those around him (pp. 93, 238). Also interesting are Pye's remarks on the "great helmsman's inability to maintain stable interpersonal relationships and prolonged emotional contacts (both in his personal and political life), as well as on the "political" nature of the spells of illness which usually coincided with purges in the CPC (pp. 85, 262, 310). Mao Zedong is also shown to possess a great deal of narcissistic traits.

The usefulness of these observations is reduced by the Freudian interpretation he then gives them: the author thinks these personality traits of Mao were due to the after-effects of childhood shock. Pye reasons that, having once become the victim of excessive emotional attachment, Mao Zedong renounced prolonged interpersonal contacts forever, substituting an affective attitude toward abstractions for them: hence his attachment to revolution, ideological "purity", idealised "brotherhood", etc. (pp. 306-307). The tenuousness of this "central hypothesis" of the author and its lack of scientific substantiation has been pointed out even by those bourgeois scholars who generally agree with the Freudian postulate of the crucial role of childhood experiences. L. Dittmer, for example, notes that Pye failed to take into account the effect of changes in social realities upon the moulding of Mao's personality.¹⁴

Mao Zedong's character traits, classified by Pye, were due to more patent causes. "Mao does not have affections, nor can he have any... his only all-consuming passion is power! This passion does not leave room for affections. It demoralises Mao Zedong making him a dangerous and aggressive personality devoid of natural human emotions," was the explanation of the "great helmsman's narcissism" given by P. P. Vladimirov, a conclusion he arrived at without any recourse to the Freudian mystique.¹⁵

Mao Zedong's personal psychological experience proved an inexhaustible source of material for Pye's theorising. Of course, it would be wrong to deny outright the individual psychological sources of some of the Maoist campaigns. For example, the rural way of life and the barrack-room spirit were always very close to the "great helmsman's" heart. It is also very likely that the negative experiences of the humble assistant librarian at Peking University had a certain effect on the attitude of the future CPC Chairman to intellectuals. Nevertheless, "scorn for intellectuals is not only a psychological trait, it is ideology".¹⁶ It is precisely the ideology of petty-bourgeois revolutionarism that breeds disdain of culture, science and intellectuals, that sustains the cult of libertarianism, anarchy, and chaos.

Maoism is not an offshoot of Mao's emotions and psyche, though the subjective factor did play an important part in its temporary reign in

¹⁴ See L. Dittmer, "Mao Tse-tung: the Man and Symbol", *China Quarterly*, 1976, No. 68, p. 827.

¹⁵ P. P. Vladimirov, *China's Special Region*, pp. 411-412 (in Russian).

¹⁶ F. Burlatsky, *Mao Tse-tung*, Moscow, 1976, p. 19.

China. Maoism is an ideology born out of the class and socio-psychological features of Chinese petty bourgeoisie. Consequently, the principal defect of Pye's psycho-historical conception is its tendency to subordinate Maoism's anti-popular policies to the logic of emotional and psychological evolution of Mao.

R. Lifton provides a slightly different psycho-historical interpretation of Maoism. Whereas Pye's psycho-biographical approach highlights the uniqueness of Mao's subjective psychological experience as a primary cause of Maoism's political zigzags, Lifton bases his study of the sources of the "cultural revolution" on broad generalisations and highly abstract ideas. Viewing "the Chinese situation as a paradigm for revolutions in general" (p. XVI), the American psychologist looks for a key to the understanding of the nature of the Maoist "cultural revolution" in extreme generalisation of socio-psychological aspects of periods of revolutionary upheaval. Like Pye, Lifton views Mao's personality as a major target of psycho-historical analysis in the discussion of social processes in China, particularly those in the "grey zone" between the leader's individual psychological style and social psychology. Lifton comes up with a concept of "symbolic immortality" which, he claims, can account for these processes and phenomena. He defines "symbols of immortality" as inner psychic structures ensuring human immortality. The revitalisation of these symbols, which underlie all cultures, is the motive force of social renovation and historical creativity.

Applying his theoretical tool to the analysis of events in China, Lifton puts to the fore the concept of "revolutionary immortality"—"transcending individual death by 'living on' indefinitely within this continuing revolution" (p. 7). Lifton argues that a "revolutionary" asserts the immutability of his revolutionary views and deeds (symbols of immortality) to defeat the finite nature of human existence. From this point of view, the "cultural revolution" was nothing but an expression of the desire of "the ageing revolutionary", Mao Zedong, to reassert the immutability and strength of his vision of China's revolutionary immortality. "The death of the revolution," i. e., the triumph of alternative symbols of immortality, was considered by "the great helmsman" as a greater danger than his own physical death, for it would have put an end to the posthumous existence of the "thought of Mao Zedong" (pp. 14-15). In addition to subjective causes, such as the ageing Mao's psychological state, Lifton notes the objective basis of Mao Zedong's fears on the eve of the "cultural revolution"—his apprehension that China would "change its colour". This basis was the continuing power struggle between orthodox Maoists and the "pragmatists", as well as the weakening of Mao's position after the fiasco of the "great leap forward". The "cultural revolution" is consequently treated by the author as a result of Mao Zedong's fear of a possible de-Maoisation of China after his death, as an attempt by the ageing leader to perpetuate the authority of his own modus of revolutionary immortality.

Leaving aside the extravagant philosophical wording of Lifton's conclusion, the concept of symbolic forms of immortality, his central idea, deserves attention. What is in question, in effect, is that the "cultural revolution" was conceived and carried out as an assertion of the "thought of Mao Zedong" and of the country's eternal subjugation to the Maoist regime. There is also some truth in the speculations of the American psychologist that the "great helmsman" feared for the posthumous prestige of his "legacy". However, these facts must still be substantiated, whereas, in general, Lifton's theory not only fails to reveal the true essen-

ce of the events in the period of the "cultural revolution", but even distorts their nature and leads one away from a scientific understanding of their causes.

To begin with, the author's initial premise—equating the Chinese "cultural revolution" with revolution in general—is theoretically unsound and politically biased. A social revolution is the revolution of objective contradictions that have come to a head within a mode of production, it is performed by the masses and is a motive force of historical progress. As to the "great proletarian cultural revolution" in China, it was nothing but a political coup prompted chiefly by political reasons—the desire of Mao Zedong and his group to impose a Maoist political regime on the country from above and to assert Maoist ideology. What is believed by Lifton to be an example of historical revolutionary events was, in effect, a counter-revolutionary coup tantamount to a step backward in China's social and political development.

The source of Lifton's "error" lies in his idealistic view of socio-psychological phenomena (moduses of immortality) as something eternally fixed in the human psyche and due, not to the sum total of social relationships, but to the finiteness of human existence. Not the least important here are the political sympathies of the author himself. Explaining the developments in China by some universal socio-psychological mechanisms, Lifton adds respectability to the Maoists' social experiments. Lifton's negative assessment of the Chinese "cultural revolution" as a false road to immortality does not change the picture which is one of making the Maoist "revolution" presentable—a favourite exercise of bourgeois Sino-logy. This is borne out, for example, by Lifton's "psychological" justification of Maoist "theory of continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat." Arguing that the Trotskyist concept of "permanent revolution" is rooted in the universal psychological need for symbols of immortality (p. 7), Lifton transplants the analysis of this "theoretical foundation" of the "cultural revolution" from the domain of ideology and politics, where a substantive discussion is possible, to one of psychology. As a result, the question of the truth or falsehood of the theory is made redundant by references to "human nature".

Consequently, too much socio-psychological generalisation and the treatment of the events in China as a collective quest for forms of immortality made Lifton disregard the real aims and objectives pursued by Mao Zedong and his closest followers in this earthly political life.

This does not mean that the "great helmsman's" fear of the "triumph of the anti-Mao policy"¹⁷ was of no account in his political moves. This fear was, indeed, psychologically dominant in Mao Zedong's life, but it was not due to any universal existentialist causes; it was due first and foremost to Maoism's lack of a future. Maoist ideology is inimical not only to the interests of the Chinese working class; it is also alien to the aspirations of China's peasantry which was its mass social base. This is why "Mao feared working people, and communists in whom he justly saw potential enemies of his ideal of a social system."¹⁸

Regarding the "cultural revolution" as a realisation of the leader's psychological needs in the face of death, Lifton comes up with his own version of the "charismatic leader" concept. Since, according to Lifton, the theme of death is an overriding one in human existence, he postulates a "survival" figure as the true "hero-innovator" in history. This is a per-

¹⁷ See F. M. Burlatsky, *Op. cit.*, p. 135.

¹⁸ *Modern China in Foreign Studies*, p. 45.

son who had had a narrow escape of the death and saw crumbing his previous immortality moduses. Feeling the "guilt of having survived", Lifton goes on to say, the hero seeks to justify his existence by creating new cultural symbols of immortality (pp. 78, 81-82). Lifton feels that Mao Zedong was just such a survival who gave the Chinese people a new "existential absolute" or the Maoist "code of immortality".¹⁹ However, Lifton feels that the ageing of the hero may result in a "weakening of the charisma" and the leader's acute anxiety about the symbolic immortality of his ego. The campaign to boost Mao's image during the years of the "cultural revolution" is attributed by Lifton to this "weakening of Mao's charisma" and his transformation from a hero into a despot (pp. 93-94).

Lifton's interpretation of Mao as a charismatic hero succeeds even less than Pye's pronouncements on "narcissism" in explaining the Maoist phenomenon. Whereas Pye made an effort to establish a link between the principal concepts of his theory and a specific analysis of developments in China, Lifton confines himself to a statement of universal psychological potentialities, deriving "the logic" of the Maoist political zigzags from the transitory nature of human existence. His explanation of the emergence of Mao's personality cult by subjective psychological reasons is absolutely insufficient. The cult was due to the overall backwardness of the country, the immaturity of the people's political consciousness, deeply rooted Confucian tradition of deifying the leader, petty-bourgeois socio-psychological attitudes in the CPC and the masses.

In linking the Maoists' political inconsistencies with the "great helmsman's" ageing, Lifton himself is guilty of inconsistency, because he says that Maoism's "most spectacular setbacks" include not only "the cultural revolution" imposed on the country by the ageing Chairman, but also the communisation and the "great leap forward" inspired by the still sprightly "leader" (p. 83). Thus, Lifton's contention that Mao Zedong's "charismatic potentialities" underwent a tragic metamorphosis is completely groundless.

Of much greater interest is the author's attempt to analyse the Maoist "code of immortality" and its socio-psychological limits. Lifton defines the "code of immortality" (or the "existentialist absolute") as the "thought of Mao Zedong" collected in the "little red book" in combination with the "great helmsman's" personality cult (p. 71). The initiation of an individual into Mao Zedong's existential absolute, i. e., absolute loyalty of every ego to the Maoist regime was, in Lifton's view, to be crowned by the individual's symbolic overcoming of his or her physical death. Therefore, Mao Zedong's calls "not to be afraid of difficulties, not to be afraid of death" amounted, according to Lifton, to a promise of symbolic transcendence to all "loyal soldiers of Chairman Mao".

In Lifton's view, central to the Maoist "code of immortality" was Mao Zedong's firm belief in the unlimited nature of two human capacities—the infinite pliancy of man's inner world and the omnipotence of man's will to transform the outside world (p. 70). This, according to Lifton, stands behind the innumerable ideological campaigns in China to brainwash the public in the spirit of the "thought of Mao Zedong", unprecedented voluntarism in the Maoists' economic policies and their treating practical activities as a realisation of the "great helmsman's" subjective

¹⁹ To prove Mao Zedong's "choseness", the author refers to biographical data: the death of the wife, brothers and the son of the "great helmsman" before whom Mao felt the "guilt of having survived", as well as his frequent discourses on death and his own "invulnerability".

commandments. Lifton sees the root of these features of the Maoist existentialist absolute in the so-called "psychism", i. e., hypertrophied will and the desire to win dominion over the outside world through inner, psychological manipulations (p. XVII, 32). Lifton believes that one of the primary reasons for the utopianism of the Maoist "code of immortality" is in the disregard for the "principle of reality" and the substitution of the "thought of Mao Zedong" for the laws of the outside world. However, the concept of "psychism" can hardly be accepted as an adequate explanation for the Maoists' adventurism and subjectivism. While the term "voluntarism", rejected by Lifton due to its "specificity", reveals the objective causes, the idealistic essence, and class sources of the Maoist distortion of the dialectics of the objective and the subjective, the concept of "psychism" is reduced to a statement of the subjective psychological nature of Mao Zedong's "existential absolute". Thus, Lifton, like Pye, tries to squeeze Maoism's ideology and political practice into the straight-jacket of the "great helmsman's" psychological portrait.

In his quest for broad generalisations, Lifton tends to view the Maoist social and economic experiments as an answer to the questions of the epoch, treating the Maoist hypertrophy of will as a utopian variant of the solution of the modern problem of interaction between man and technology. The author's "generalising" approach does not take into account the limited bourgeois nature of the man-technology alternative, or the fact that the present-day level of China's economic and social development excludes the possibility of Western technophobia.

Stressing the utopianism of Mao Zedong's "existential absolute", Lifton makes some interesting observations about the socio-psychological limitations of the Maoist "revolutionary vision". Contrary to Mao Zedong's assertions of the infinite elasticity of human consciousness, the unending ideological campaigns, the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere of violence and cruelty and the fomenting of suspicion and enmity in interpersonal relationships have produced, as the US psychologist rightly notes, considerable changes in the social psychology of China. These changes, Lifton feels, hinder the Maoist "ideological conversion" of the masses, thus showing the psychological limits of "psychism". As Soviet Sinologists pointed out, "the Maoist attempts to 'fool' the objective laws of economics and history have run into powerful resistance from the people's psychological activity",²⁰ resulting in political apathy, passivity, withdrawal from social life, and the splitting of individual and mass consciousness.

At first glance, Lifton's negative assessment of the Maoist "code of immortality" seems diametrically opposed to Pye who describes the "thought of Mao Zedong" as an adequate expression of the Chinese people's interests. Nevertheless, the two psycho-historical interpretations of Maoism are equally removed from a scientific analysis of the essence of and the reasons for the temporary reign of the anti-popular military-bureaucratic dictatorship in China. Although Lifton's conclusion shows that he was close to understanding the historical deadlock of Maoism, his "generalising" theory is guilty of the same methodological defects and political bias as Pye's "psycho-biographical" conception.

The main methodological deficiency of Pye's and Lifton's psycho-historical theories, which prevented the two authors from reaching the goal they set themselves—elucidating the role of objective and subjective

²⁰ G. F. Saltykov, *The Working Class and Peasantry of the PRC in the Chinese Leadership's Policy*, p. 15 (in Russian).

factors in the genesis of Maoism—is their psychological reductionism. The reduction of the social to the psychic, along with the idealistic exaggeration of the role of the personality in history, has brought the American psycho-historians to an absolutisation of Mao Zedong's subjective psychological experience, which was not only torn away from the objective conditions in which his personality was forming, but also deprived of an intellectual aspect. Having separated the subjective side of the "thought of Mao Zedong" and its emergence and evolution from objective causes, which brought about the temporary hold of Maoism on China, Lifton and Pye attempted to account for Maoism's ideology and political practice in terms of Chairman Mao's emotional experiences. All attempts to "build a bridge" between the objective and subjective aspects of Maoism with the aid of the Chairman's influence on social psychology and his links with mass sentiment have failed as a result of the idealistic approach to the treatment of socio-psychological phenomena and as a result of the disregard for the class substance of Maoism.

The psychologisation of the social processes in China by Lifton and Pye is evidence not only of the theoretical unsoundness of psycho-historical interpretations of Maoism, but also of the authors' political sympathies. Arguing that Maoism is an offshoot of Mao Zedong's psychological traits, Lifton and Pye treat this petty-bourgeois ideological and political movement, which has its own social base and class roots, as a psychological phenomenon *par excellence*. This deprives the social and class aspects of a critique of Maoism of any significance and rules out any problem of "Marxism Chinese style" being true or false. In other words, the subjective psychological interpretation of the Maoist experiments is an attempt to find a historical justification for Peking's anti-socialist and anti-popular policies.

The absolute unsoundness of the psycho-historical treatment of Maoism as a realisation of the "great helmsman's" psychological potentialities is borne out by the developments in China after Mao's death. A look at the events shows that it is wrong to speak of a far-reaching and thorough de-Maoisation of the country's foreign and domestic policies. The present-day Peking leaders want to rid themselves of only the most odious and compromised aspects of the Maoist doctrine, leaving intact its core—Chinese-style social chauvinism in ideology and hegemonism in foreign policy. The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress pointed out that Peking's foreign policy "as before is aimed at aggravating the international situation, and is aligned with the policy of the imperialist powers."²¹ This attitude of the latter-day "updaters" of the "thoughts of Mao Zedong" is graphic proof that Maoism remains inimical to socialism and the vital interests of the Chinese people; it is an ideological and political trend stemming from both subjective and objective causes. This is why a critique of Maoism as an ideology and a policy inimical to Marxism-Leninism remains a central scientific and political task which can be carried out only through consistently Marxist class analysis of its ideological and social sources.

²¹ *The 26th CPSU Congress, Documents and Resolutions*, Moscow, 1981, p. 15.

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YURKOV BOOK ON PRC EXPANSIONISM REVIEWED

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[Review by V. Gusachenko of book "Asia in Peking's Plans" by S.G. Yurkov]

[Text]

The provocative policy of the Chinese leaders in the international arena is causing growing alarm among the peoples, especially China's neighbours. Aggressiveness, interference in the affairs of other peoples, and plans of conquest—such are the specific manifestations of China's present foreign policy, which has become a serious destructive factor in the present international situation. The concrete directions of this policy in the Asian continent are shown very well in the book under review by Professor S. G. Yurkov, a prominent Soviet specialist on international affairs.

In his richly documented book, Professor Yurkov analyses the road that brought Mao Zedong and his followers to the policy and practices of open chauvinism and territorial expansion. It was back in 1935 that Mao admitted in a conversation with his American biographer Edgar Snow that "during my school years I read a book about the partitioning of China. It mentioned Japan's occupation of Korea and Formosa [Taiwan.—S. Y.], the loss of suzerainty over Indochina, Burma and other countries. When I read all this, I felt oppressed and dismayed". In 1936, Mao bluntly told Snow that "it is China's immediate task not only to protect its sovereignty along this side of the Wall [the Great Chinese Wall.—S. Y.] but to recover all the lost areas" (pp. 10-11). It is on the basis of such views that China's present leaders have developed their enormous appetites and, to quote Professor Yurkov, are trying to provide a "historical substantiation" for their claims to the lands of neighbouring countries with a total area of more than ten million square kilometres,

that is, a territory exceeding China proper (9,6 mln sq km). The next step evidently is to aspire to global hegemony. "We must conquer the world. The entire globe should be our goal... In my opinion our planet is most important and we will create a mighty power on it. It is imperative to develop such a resolve", Mao urged in a speech at an enlarged meeting of the Military Council of the CC CPC on September 11, 1959 (p. 3).

The author cites testimonies according to which Peking intends to achieve world supremacy first of all by "acquiring" Southeast Asia. Referring to an authoritative Vietnamese source, the author quotes a remark made by Mao in 1963: "I will be the chairman of 500 million poor peasants and my armies will march into Southeast Asia." He also expressed the thought that some countries of that area supposedly have a small population and that Chinese should be resettled there (pp. 78, 79). Incidentally, the Pol-Potists, Peking's bloody puppets tried to carry out precisely this idea when they planned to settle a million Chinese in Kampuchea. In the less than four years that they were in power they destroyed 3 out of 7 million their fellow-countrymen. The example of this much-suffering country showed the peoples of Southeast Asia once again the real meaning of the consistent implementation of the "ideas of Mao Zedong" in this region.

The author shows that at different stages Peking used different methods of infiltrating Southeast Asia and consolidating its positions there. When giving assistance to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the struggle

against the colonialists it pursued its self-seeking aims in a bid to set up a bridgehead for its expansion to the south. "At that time the Chinese leaders did not want to take the risk of clashing with the imperialists and did not want Vietnam to be united and strong, and the three states of Indochina to be bound by ties of friendship and alliance", Yurkov stresses (p. 60). That is why the Chinese delegation at the 1954 Geneva conference was prepared to make concessions at the expense of the DRV, going even so far as leaving French garrisons in Hanoi and Haiphong or placing them under joint control. For the same reason, when the US aggression in Vietnam began Peking used various channels to inform Washington of its intention to remain on the sidelines.

The victory of the Vietnamese people and the unification of the country, the pursuance by the SRV of an independent foreign policy and its course of strengthening the unity of the socialist community infuriated Peking, which viewed this as a threat to its expansionist ambitions in Southeast Asia. The decision to "punish" Vietnam was made in Peking. Chinese troops invaded the SRV on February 17, 1979. It is known that the aggressor was resolutely repulsed by the Vietnamese people. "The venture cost the lives of tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers. Peking also lost large quantities of materiel. But it is impossible to estimate the loss suffered by China in the eyes of the peoples of the world who got a better inkling of the methods of its rulers and condemned the abominable aggression" (pp. 71-72).

Peking uses a wide range of ways and means of interfering in the internal affairs of neighbouring states in order to penetrate Southeast Asia. They include the constant pressure put on these states in the form of support for the "rebel detachments" in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, and the use of the "fifth column" of more than 20 million Chinese emigres who live in that area. The purpose of the attack on Vietnam and the present tough stand towards the countries of Indochina is to show other countries of Southeast Asia that Peking will teach any of them "a lesson" if they act contrary to the Chinese leadership's interests. "On the other hand," Yurkov writes, "everything is being done to set ASEAN countries (Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia) and also Burma against Vietnam, to instigate a protracted confrontation and thereby split the coun-

tries of Southeast Asia and weaken their ability to resist China's subversion and expansion" (p. 78).

The sovereign Mongolian People's Republic also continues to be an object of Peking's expansionist plans, the book says. It was in the 1930s that Mao expressed the thought that in time the MPR "will become a part of the Chinese federation" (p. 11). After 1949, Yurkov writes, "the Chinese leaders returned to this subject on a number of occasions and each time got a uniform answer: the Mongolian people has won its independence, confirmed it in the course of the nationwide plebiscite on October 20, 1945, cherishes it and will never sacrifice it" (pp. 51-52).

Nevertheless, Peking does not leave Mongolia in peace. The author cites many examples of this. Peking is crudely interfering in the MPR's internal affairs. Roads leading to its borders are being built and various military installations are under construction. Between 1969 and 1979 alone, Peking held more than 250 military exercises near the Sino-Mongolian border. There were instances of the violations of the MPR's borders by Chinese soldiers. Again various Chinese publications list Mongolia among the "lost territories" (pp. 56-57). When qualifying Peking's "cartographic aggression", Mongolian scientists rightly note that the gross exaggeration of China's place in mankind's history is designed to serve the chauvinistic and hegemonistic ambitions of old and new Chinese rulers. The idea that Chinese civilisation is exclusive and exceptionally ancient and is superior to the culture of the northern "barbarians" is used by the Maoists as one of their main "historic justifications" of their right to make territorial claims to neighbouring countries.¹

The author shows the true aims of Peking's policy in respect of other areas of the continent (South Asia, the Near and Middle East)—the establishment there of its influence and control. "But standing in the way here is India, a big developing country, which is known for its peaceloving policy; it is a country with tremendous possibilities and prospects" (p. 92).

The author shows that since the late 1950s the Peking leaders have been trying

¹ See Sh. Bira, N. Ishzhamtz, Sh. Sandag, *Maoist Falsification of the MPR's History and Historical Truth*, Ulan Bator, 1980, pp. 4, 9.

in every way to compromise India in the international arena, to cause internal difficulties. Failing to achieve this, the Chinese "strategists" started "encircling" India with the aim of entrenching themselves in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The emphasis is placed on Pakistan. Peking is making a tre-

mendous effort to stoke contradictions between Islamabad and Delhi. In the course of talks with former US Secretary of Defence Harold Brown in January 1980 the Chinese leaders tried to persuade the American Administration "not to glance back" at India, and advised it to boost its aid to Pakistan to the maximum. This, the author writes, reflects the hopes of Chinese hegemomists and American imperialists to turn Pakistan into their shock force in Southwest Asia (p. 104). Both Peking and Washington would like India to lose its northwestern area, so that one or several puppet states be formed there. Indira Gandhi stated in January 1980 that the Sino-American alliance will pose a danger for India and the entire region, and that China has expansionist intentions from which India has already suffered (pp. 102, 104).

At the same time, while not burdening themselves with principles and basing their policy on opportunism, the Peking leaders pretend from time to time, Professor Yurkov writes, that China is supposedly in favour of the normalisation and development of goodneighbourly relations with the states of South Asia. Huang Hua in April 1980 and Hua Guofeng in May 1980 assured Indira Gandhi, one in Salisbury and the other in Belgrade, that China is ready to improve relations with India. But soon afterwards the real worth of such statements became clear. In an interview in June 1980, Deng Xiaoping, speaking about the possible ways of solving the territorial issue between the two countries, proposed a package deal: China would recognise the McMahon line if India agrees to China's keeping of the territory occupied by it in Aksaichin. "In other words," the book under review rightly points out, "it was proposed to swap Indian territory, after declaring it to be Chinese, for... Indian territory. This cynical proposal evoked protests in India. As to Peking, it failed to remain for long in the position of the side offering an armistice" (p. 105).

India's recognition of the People's Republic of Kampuchea caused deep dissatisfaction in the Chinese capital. The Chinese press described this step as "foolish", while

Huang Hua, to "punish" India, cancelled a visit which he himself had long eagerly sought (p. 105). But Peking is especially infuriated by the strengthening Soviet-In-

dian ties which are developing on the basis of the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. The strength of this friendship was patently demonstrated once again during Leonid Brezhnev's visit to India in December 1980. The results of this visit were received in Peking with great antagonism.²

In his book Yurkov shows the PRC leadership's designs vis-à-vis other countries of the South Asian subcontinent. The aggravation of the situation around Afghanistan in 1980, the author points out, was used to tether Pakistan still closer to China (p. 107). Zia-ul-Haq's visit to the PRC in May 1980 signified a further cohesion of Peking and Islamabad on an adventurist basis. In the Chinese capital appeals were addressed to Pakistan to show a "get-tough approach" to the USSR and to intensify the aggression against the DRA, and promises of "utmost support" were made.

The author shows the inner workings of Peking's policy in respect of the Republic of Bangladesh, the very origination of which was described in China as a result of "intrigues" by India and the USSR (p. 110). The PRC's tactics changed abruptly after the coup in that country and the murder of Mujibur Rahman. Peking, which prior to that had refused to recognise Bangladesh, quickly established diplomatic relations with it and, acting parallel with the CIA, started fomenting anti-Indian sentiments in every way. At the very same time Maoist elements became much more active in Bangladesh. "The leftist pro-Peking groupings," the author notes, "often align themselves with extreme right-wing groupings with the aim of counteracting the government" (p. 111).

Peking is speculating on some difficulties existing in relations between Nepal and India, and intimates that in the event these relations sour, Nepal can rely on China. "Chinese aid to Nepal," Yurkov writes, "is subordinated to military-political considerations" (p. 114).

Peking is doing everything in its power to weaken Burma. "Liberated areas" have been set up on Burmese territory by rebels who are instigated by Peking. An Indian weekly, in describing the PRC's actions as

² See *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 8-11, 13, 1980.

an "undeclared war" against Burma, wrote in March 1981 that about 15,000 pro-Chinese rebels are conducting military operations against the Burmese government. They are armed with Chinese weapons, including artillery. The Burmese leadership has sufficient evidence that Chinese soldiers are taking part in the hostilities against government troops.³

The author thoroughly exposes the PRC leadership's manoeuvres in respect of the Middle East, especially after the revolutions in Afghanistan and Iran and the improvement of Soviet-Turkish relations. "Peking received the April revolution in Afghanistan with mistrust and irritation, and it was only on the 11th day that the PRC recognised the DRA", Yurkov writes (p. 116). As to the bringing in of the Soviet limited military contingent into Afghanistan to protect the republic from intervention, it caused a bout of anti-Soviet hysteria in Peking. The Chinese leadership now is taking a big effort to present the events around Afghanistan as a "threat to peace" in Asia and the rest of the world, as well-nigh the foremost source of tension in international relations. Jointly with the US imperialists Peking is not ceasing its aggressive intrigues against the DRA, using various methods of struggle—political, diplomatic, economic and military. So as to aggravate the situation to the maximum it resists any idea of a political settlement of the situation connected with Afghanistan on the basis of a complete termination of outside intervention.

Peking, the book says, was also alarmed about the revolution in Iran, its withdrawal from military blocs, renunciation of the former pro-imperialist orientation and transition to positions of nonalignment. Peking justified Washington's severance of relations with Iran. China's position in respect of the Iranian-American conflict showed how low its leaders can sink in their desire to curry favour with imperialism (p. 129).

On the basis of numerous, often little-known facts, the author demonstrates Peking's double-dealing position on the Middle East crisis. Peking approved Egypt's cancellation of the treaty of friendship between the USSR and that country, and then the

Camp David collusion. Right-wing regimes in the Arab East are more to Peking's liking than progressive ones. The author arrives at the logical conclusion that "China's present Middle East policy is a part of its general course of reconciling developing countries with imperialist states and inciting the Third World against the socialist community. This policy is at loggerheads with the interests of Arab countries" (p. 136).

A special section of the book is devoted to relations between China and Japan and the influence of their rapprochement on the situation in Asia. The Chinese side hopes, the author stresses, that closer relations with Japan and the United States will consolidate China's international positions, increase its diplomatic possibilities in the world arena, slow down the development of Japan's relations with the Soviet Union and also make it possible to influence Washington into softening its attitudes to the PRC (p. 145).

Factors facilitating the development of contacts between Tokyo and Peking and the causes restricting Japanese-Chinese rapprochement are thoroughly examined in the book. Mention is also made of the shock experienced by Japanese industrialists when Peking unilaterally terminated agreements on economic cooperation.

In the concluding chapters Professor Yurkov exposes Peking's provocative role in ensuring security in Asia and in the Indian Ocean zone. He stresses that the Chinese leadership wants to retain a free hand for aggression, intervention and blackmail, and for this reason pursues a destructive policy in Asia. The emphasis is made on strong-arming and war. During the past 30 years not a single country has made recourse to arms as often as China (pp. 188-189).

In this context one clearly realises why the Chinese leaders are not interested in reaching international agreement on the Indian Ocean and turning it into a zone of peace, although this idea was set forth by littoral states and supported by countries of the socialist community. In furtherance of its obstructionist position Peking sharply attacked the proposals to ensure security in the Persian Gulf area that were made during the Soviet summit visit to India in De-

³ *New Wave*, March 15, 1981.

ember 1980.⁴ The foreign policy initiatives of the 26th Congress of the CPSU to strengthen the mainstays of universal peace, including confidence-building measures in the Far East, were received with irritation by Peking.

The Chinese leaders, the author sums up, are persistently continuing their course in international affairs, which has turned their country into a junior partner of imperialism and brought it into reaction's camp (p. 188). The people in Zhongnanhai are prepared to go to any lengths to fulfil

their great-power ambitions. "Of course, the plans of the 'architects' of Chinese policy are not destined to come true", the author writes in conclusion. "Events in the world are not developing the way Peking would want. But its maniacal adherence to such plans is capable of violating yet more than once the peaceful life of China's neighbours and creating a real threat to tranquility and security in the world" (pp. 189-190).

There is no doubt that Yurkov's book is of interest not only to specialists studying problems of modern international relations but also to the general reading public in the Soviet Union and abroad.

V. GUSACHENKO

⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 21, 24, 27, 1980.

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BOOK ON POLITICAL ROLE OF PRC ARMY REVIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 1, Jan-Mar 82 pp 171-173

[Review by R. Neronov, Cand. Sc. (Hist), of book "The Socio-Political Role of the Chinese Army" by B.N. Gorbachev]

[Text]

Soviet sinologists are closely following the militaristic tendencies in present-day China and studying, in particular, the socio-economic and socio-political role of the army in Chinese society. Its role is tremendous and it is very revealing that at the June 1981 Plenary Meeting of the CC CPC Deng Xiaoping did not claim the post of party chairman but tried to seize the post of chairman of the Military Council of the CC CPC. The fact is that in China he who has "command of the gun" wins in the fierce factional infighting. The possibility to impose one's political course on the country and the party is created with the help of the army.

This book by B. N. Gorbachev, Cand, Sc. (Hist.), studies the use of the army the Maoist upper crust made in its domestic and foreign policy aims. An analysis of the situation inside the Chinese army is also made.

The author rightly points out that the army in China possesses tremendous political power. It is not only an armed force but also an organisation possessing trained personnel that sends its people to party and state posts at all levels. The army has its own state farms, factories, a system of supply and of training personnel. The Chinese science and the civilian branches of industry are subordinated to military needs. The army has numerous channels through which to influence various aspects of Chinese life, including the alignment of forces in the Peking leadership.

The Chinese army's political power has deep historical roots. The struggle of the nationalistic wing in the CPC for undivided power in the Party and army resulted in a situation where reliance on military strength in political strategy became permanent, while the guiding role of the party was pushed to the background. In these conditions the army began to play a role unusual for it in socialist society. The analysis of the military factor made in the book gives a deeper insight into the nature of the complex socio-political processes that have taken place and are continuing in China, into the essence of the Peking leadership's military policy.

In his book Gorbachev analyses the role of the army, starting with the implementation of Mao Zedong's course of the "three red banners"; he shows the negative impact of the "great leap forward" on the army, and characterises the process of de-

limitation of forces among the military and the measures taken by the PRC leadership to tighten control over the army. He describes in detail the role of the military in organising the movement of hongweibings during the "cultural revolution" and describes the army's participation in the creation of "revolutionary committees", in the activities of party and state bodies of various levels and the concrete forms and methods of establishing military control over China's economic and socio-political life. A thorough analysis has also been made of the use of the army as a punitive instrument. The author identifies the specifics of the struggle

between various forces inside the army and for control over the army as a whole.

1969 is the last year of the period under review, and is considered to be the year when the results of the "cultural revolution" were formalised and the army began to fulfil the unusual function of governing the entire life of the country, having established military control over it. Subsequently, in the report on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the PRC, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Ye Jianguo noted that in the period of the "cultural revolution" there was in China "actually a dictatorship of a totally corrupt and most sinister fascism with an admixture of feudalism", and that the country was split and plunged into chaos, into an "atmosphere of bloody terror", and had been "put on the brink of economic catastrophe".

Some general questions of the evolution of the Chinese leadership's military policy are also examined in the book. Analysed in this connection are problems involving the use by the Chinese leadership of armed forces for foreign policy aims. Arming itself at a rapid pace and taking advantage of the assistance of imperialist powers for this purpose, China has become one of the most dangerous sources of international tension. In their attempt to put together an anti-Soviet bloc Mao's successors are openly aligning themselves with the most reactionary regimes in all continents.

The aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam finally exposed before the entire world the perfidious militaristic essence of Peking's great-power hegemonistic policy. China's attack on Vietnam demonstrated the utterly irresponsible attitude in Peking to the future of peace and the criminal ease with which Chinese leaders send their armed forces into action. Today this policy poses a serious threat to peace because Peking has also subordinated the PRC's military construction to its political aims.

The analysis of the foreign policy function of the Chinese army enabled the author to identify the nature of the Chinese army's military ties with the armed forces of other countries and to trace the changes both in Soviet-Chinese relations and in the PRC's relations with other states. The study of China's military-political activities in developing countries sheds light on the forms and methods of the imposition of Chinese military experience on these coun-

tries and to evaluate the extent of the influence of Peking's policy on the Chinese leadership's policy both to the revolutionary, anti-imperialist forces and to peace in general.

Having revised the Marxist-Leninist thesis on the designation of the armed forces of a socialist state, the Peking leaders have turned the People's Liberation Army of China into an instrument of the Peking leadership's anti-popular policy, into a policeman protecting the Chinese leadership's interests not only inside the country but also in the international arena. The transformation of the army into some semblance of a political party and representatives of the military command into "statesmen", just as the direct interference of the military in domestic policy, culture, education, etc., in important foreign policy matters have imparted an extremely militaristic nature to state administration in China.

Failing to secure support for their course among the Party members and the broad masses of China's working people, the Peking ruling upper crust is taking, as in the past, on the army. For this reason the presence of the military in the party and state apparatus has become a permanent factor.

The social character of an army is determined by the class that uses it as an instrument of its policy, by the social forces which interests it ensures and by the political aims that it serves. As a result of the anti-socialist essence of the regime esta-

lished in China, the army has become a means by which the Chinese leadership pursues its nationalistic aims. Gorbachev writes in detail about this in his book, which will be useful reading not only for specialists, scholars and propagandists, but also for the general public. In this connection I would like to draw their attention to the book's extensive reference material containing tables, diagrams as well as personalia of the PRC's army over the period from 1954 to 1978.

On the whole, there is no doubt that Gorbachev conducted his study competently and this helps the reader correctly orient himself in the present political situation in China. The fact is that the struggle around the army and for unlimited control of it is far from over in present-day China. Prominent sinologists believe that there is deep-seated dissatisfaction among the Chinese military with the political and economic measures carried out by the Deng Xiaoping

grouping. The public trial of the members of the "counterrevolutionary groupings of Lin Biao and Liang Qing", most of whom were high-ranking members of the armed forces, the tarnished prestige of the People's

Liberation Army of China as a result of the discrowning of the "cultural revolution" and the purge of the army's command and political cadres—all this goes against the grain of the military. Friction between local civilian personnel and representatives of the army has intensified. Most of the servicemen are of peasant stock and they are most concerned with the agrarian policy of the present Chinese leaders because it offers great benefits to the richer sections of the peasantry.

The new Peking leadership is very much alarmed by the negative sentiments in the army. In the opinion of specialists Deng Xiaoping in the post of Chairman of the Military Council of the CC CPC which he got in June 1981 faces a tough job of suppressing dissatisfaction in the army. New purges should be expected which, in turn, will cause new strife on the various rungs of the Chinese ladder of power. The book under review will help the reader understand the tendencies of political processes in China.

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BOOK TIES CHINESE PHILOSOPHY TO POLITICAL STRUGGLES

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[Review by V. Feoktistov, Cand. Sc. (Philos.) of book "Modern Chinese Philosophy" by V.G. Burov]

[Text]

A thorough study of modern Chinese history made by Marxist Sinologists in the past decade has greatly expanded our knowledge of China of today and understanding of political, economic, social, and intellectual processes going on there. The problems of ideology, of intellectual life in modern Chinese society loom large in this research. The scientific criticism of the chauvinist, anti-Marxist ideology of Maoism has naturally generated heightened interest among Soviet Sinologists in the general problems of the development of so-

cial thought in China of recent times, specifically, in the People's Republic of China. The scholars were faced with the task of establishing not only the social sources of Maoism (intellectual among others) but of its social role and functions in the life of present-day China. This, in turn, has entailed a serious study of the entire evolution of philosophical thought in China, an analysis of the correlation between general laws and specifics of this process.

The urgency of this task becomes more evident if one remembers that the long years of domination of Maoist ideology resulted in distorted ideas among western Sinologists as regards intellectual progress of the Chinese society following the victory of the people's revolution in 1949. Wingsit Chan, a prominent US Sinologist, gave a definition of these ideas in his *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*.¹ He writes that philosophy in communist China

may be characterised by one word only—Maoism. The US scholar reduced all the diversified ideologic processes in the PRC to a single component, Maoism, "depriving" the ideologic evolution of post-1949 Chinese society of other components, Marxism-Leninism among them.

¹ *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, translated and compiled by Wingsit Chan, Princeton, 1973, pp. 773.

The monograph under review provides an adequate notion of the progress of the philosophic and socio-political thought in the PRC. It is the result of long years of work, the first study by Soviet historians and philosophers on Chinese philosophy. Certain aspects of ideologic life in the PRC were touched upon in the books by L. Kyuzajan, S. Markova, G. Yashchenko and the monograph by a team of authors, *Contemporary History of China*.² However, these works did not contain an allround analysis of China's spiritual development after 1949. The same is true of the Soviet works that criticised Maoism from a scientific point of view, because, as a rule, they dealt with a single aspect of Chinese ideology, namely the views and policy of Mao Zedong and his associates. It is just as difficult to find an analogue to Burov's book in foreign sinology.

The author's choice of a method for presenting his material was his first stumbling block. The chronological presentation of the struggle between various ideologic trends is the most popular method of writing books of this kind. It was extremely difficult to use it this time, however, since the complexity of the ideologic process itself in China, the intertwining of different, sometimes opposite (from Marxist to bourgeois) trends within it made strictly "dosed out" presentation of material in most cases inadequate to historic facts. The ideologic struggle between the Marxists and Maoists in the PRC had a peculiar impact on the development of philosophy in China, its typical feature being the duality and inconsistency of views of some leading philosophers who were compelled to camouflage their genuine ideas to please the official propaganda.

² See L. Kyuzajan, *Ideologic Campaigns in the PRC, 1948-1966*, Moscow, 1970; S. Markova, "Maoism and Intellectuals", *Problems and Developments (1956-1973)*, Moscow, 1975; G. Yashchenko, *Ideologic Struggle in the PRC (1957-1964)*, Moscow, 1977; *A History of Modern China*, Moscow, 1972.

Nevertheless, a real struggle between different ideologies and world views was taking place in this contradictory, "secret" atmosphere, and quite a new method was needed to reveal it, that of portraying problems against a historical background. This is exactly what was chosen by the author. On the one hand, it enabled him to avoid vulgarisation and straightforwardness and, on the other, helped to show organic

ties between the state of philosophy in China and the ideological struggle among scholars. In this connection, one could agree with the author that the book could well have been entitled *Modern Chinese Philosophy and Ideological Struggle*.

The truly complex, multifaceted development of philosophical, social and political thought is analysed in detail by the author against an extensive background of the ideological and political struggle in the PRC. Chinese philosophy and social thought are shown as a component of this struggle giving rise to specific features of intellectual evolution of Chinese society. Of course, the general laws governing the progress of philosophy in China were determined by the general historic processes and profound revolutionary changes that began following the 1949 people's revolution. Nonetheless, they were accompanied by the struggle between Marxists and petty-bourgeois Maoist forces in the Communist Party of China, that were bound to influence the process. As Burov justly observed, ideological dualism was typical of the situation in the CPC following the 7th Congress (p. 9). This phenomenon, one unusual for a communist movement indeed, led to the whole subsequent development of philosophy in China being most emphatically influenced by this factor which resulted, on the one hand, in open ideological and political mimicry (adaptation of certain prominent philosophers to the official line) and, on the other, in political and ideological campaigns which became the basic means of indoctrinating Chinese public opinion with Maoism and its methods (p. 25). These campaigns called "discussions" were the backbone of the entire intellectual activities in the PRC, and the author has, quite correctly, focussed on them. He analyses the struggle between various trends in the Chinese philosophy of that period through the prism of these "discussions" and the problems on their agenda.

The introductory chapter devoted to the ideological and political situation in the PRC between 1949 and 1976 is concise but exhaustive. The author does not confine himself to repeating the Marxist evaluation of China's historical development of that period known from other Soviet sources; he acquaints the reader with the subject by describing the political reality in which Chinese social thought was progressing, his attention centred on the ideological course of the CPC leadership and the fight, within it of the two trends—Marxist and Maoist. He shows the contradictory policy of the CPC vis-à-vis intellectuals, philosophers among them. In this chapter, Bu-

rov consistently traces the formation of a hegemonistic, chauvinistic platform of the Maoist wing in the CPC which made itself felt in the mid- and late 1950s (p. 13). That anti-Marxist platform hostile to the scientific socialism exerted, while its posi-

tions in the CPC consolidated, a negative influence on the Chinese philosophical thought, imposing on it anti-scientific, Maoist methods and the problems substantiating Maoism's anti-socialist course. As a result, philosophical thought in the PRC had found itself in a deep crisis (p. 39).

Before launching into a specific analysis of the present state of the social thought in the PRC, the author dwells on Chinese philosophy during the 1930s and 1940s, prior to the formation of the Republic. He devotes a whole chapter to the views of most prominent bourgeois and feudal philosophers, such as Hu Shi, Feng Youlan, He Lin, Liang Shuming, Chen Lifu, Chiang Kaishek and to the works of Marxist philosophers. The author succeeded in showing the main methodologic shortcomings of the historical concepts of philosophers propagating the ideological rapprochement of China with the West (Hu Shi) and those who favoured either the synthesis of the Western (bourgeois) and Chinese traditional ideologies (Feng Youlan, He Lin) or the rebirth of the Confucian-type Chinese "original spirit" (Liang Shuming, Chiang Kaishek). What all these theories had in common was an idealistic approach to history, the notion that the progress of civilisation was determined by "the way of human thinking" (Hu Shi) or by the content (type) of the spiritual culture (He Lin, Liang Shuming, Chiang Kaishek). In spite of all their differences, these theories had one thing in common: their hostility to Marxism-Leninism, to scientific socialism. Burov provides a profound and interesting analysis of Feng Youlan's "philosophic concept", his theory of "neo-Confucianism" advocating a fusion of the Western (practical) and Chinese (moral) philosophies. The chapter is concluded with a section outlining the development of Marxist thought during the 1930s and the 1940s. The specifics of that development are quite correctly defined by the author as a small number of professional Marxist philosophers, the scarcity of problems they dealt with, their poor knowledge of the original works by the classics of Marxism, the negative impact of Mao's "thought" on them, which was especially felt after the movement for "rectifying the style of work" in the 1940s. Citing a number of facts, the author shows, however, that Marxist thought had scored certain successes in those years in disseminating Marxist ideas, specifically the fundamentals of dialectic and historical materialism. Works were published of the first Chinese Marxist historians Hou Wailu, Lu Zhenyu, Du Guoxiang, dealing with the history of Chinese philosophy. As Burov justly notes, "the work of the Chinese Marxist philosophers in the 1930s and the 1940s played a great positive role in

acquainting the Chinese scholars with Marxist methodology and disseminating Marxist-Leninist teaching" (p. 84). On the

whole, in this part of the book the author deserves due credit for his analysis of the complex intellectual life in China of that period from a Marxist standpoint. The monograph's shortcoming is that the author failed to analyse the work of all the prominent bourgeois philosophers in China of the 1930s and the 1940s. It seems, the author should have considered the views of such original philosophers as Zhang Dun-sun and Xiong Shili who had played no small part in the country's intellectual life. He might have explored socio-political thought in greater detail, examining the views of the Guomindang ideologists other than Chiang Kaishek and Chen Lifu as well as of the "third force", the proponents of "state socialism" and others. This material would have made the chapter much more comprehensive.

The two abovementioned chapters are to be regarded, however, only as introductory to the basic material presented in the next three chapters in which the author analyses the complicated process of the evolution of the philosophic thought and science in the PRC from 1949 to 1976. Here the author reveals his profound erudition not only in purely Chinese problems but in general methodologic questions usually arising when modern Chinese philosophy is analysed. I would like to praise the author especially for giving his own solution to a number of basic problems, both methodologic and socio-political, instead of simply narrating the subject. This applies to the nature of the basis in the transitional period, the connection between and "continuity" of idealism and materialism, to methods in historical and philosophic research, etc. All this puts the book on a much higher level than the usual essays and makes it possible to rank it as an independent scholarly writing containing a successful attempt at giving the author's own answers to the foremost philosophic questions of that time.

In his book, Burov makes use of a great number of sources, considering from a critical angle practically all the major phenomena of Chinese ideology, such as discussions, campaigns, and the principal works of Chinese authors of that time. The material is portioned strictly according to certain periods, the author analyses it in the context of the ideological struggle between the Marxists and Maoists in the CPC. Such an approach enabled him to single out the range of problems that Chinese philosophers were tackling and to objectively present their ideological stand and world outlook. It was difficult to do it objectively because of the ideological dualism in the CPC at the dawn of People's China, when the adherents of both Marxism and Maoism "often concealed their genuine views with maxims borrowed from their ideological opponents. Marxists were compelled to do so because of Mao's rank in the party and

government; Maoists did so to smokescreen their anti-Marxist concepts" (p. 85). This comment by the author is of great importance for examining the views of the Chinese philosophers of the period as it averts any simplification in assessments of their ideological orientations. The remark remains valid for the subsequent years, when Maoism became the predominant, official ideology of the CPC and the state.

The contradictory process of the evolution of philosophic and socio-political thought in the PRC, which was actually the struggle between the two basic trends, Marxism and Maoism, is analysed in a detailed, step-by-step manner. Burov describes "purely" bourgeois philosophers such as Feng Youlan, He Lin, Zhu Qianzhi, Ma Inchu, Jin Yuelin, and Zhang Dainian who sided with Marxism only in word, but in deed were Mao's allies. The author's conclusion about the existence in the PRC of bourgeois philosophy and its proponents is well grounded and is a matter of principle for defining Chinese ideology of the 1950s. The only thing the so-called reeducation of these philosophers, effected in the Maoist spirit, brought about was a series of "self-criticism" campaigns to the liking of the Maoist leadership, as it gave it a chance to use these philosophers later—in the 1960 and the 1970s—to fight Marxism-Leninism. That was the case with Feng Youlan, whose theory eventually became an apologia of Maoism. Some of the Marxist philosophers (Ai Siqu, Guan Feng, Wu Chuanqi, Ren Jiyu) were also under the influence of Maoism and its methods.

Numerous philosophical discussions took place in the PRC in this complicated atmosphere, and Burov makes them central in his narrative. Indeed, the course of the discussions, their nature and standard reflected the state of philosophy in the country and the struggle between various trends. The author shows how these discussions, truly scientific in the mid-1950s, gradually lost that feature and became a tool in the hands of Maoists to fight Marxism and its adherents. While in the 1950s the philosophers discussed such truly urgent problems as, say, the nature of the basis and superstructure in the transitional period, or methods of history and philosophy, the issues of logic, aesthetics, beginning in the late 1950s the discussions became purely political and "Maoists, pretending to discuss theoretical problems, strove to inculcate in the mind of scholars, intellectuals, cadre workers, their anti-Marxist point of view on the ways and means of constructing a new society, their petty-bourgeois

notion of socialism and, in addition, to find out the real principal orientation of certain Chinese philosophers" (p. 208).

Ideological activity in the PRC, including the development of philosophical and socio-political thought, can be divided into two periods: the first one from 1949 to 1958, when the struggle against bourgeois and Maoist philosophy for disseminating

and propagating Marxist views was the dominant trend; and the other period following 1958 when petty-bourgeois philosophy was gathering momentum and ultimately got the upper hand. The process is shown in the book convincingly and comprehensively.

Apart from philosophical discussions in the PRC, the author thoroughly analyses the major Chinese philosophic works of the 1950s-1970s, paying special attention to the Marxist works of the 1950s that played a positive role in propagating Marxist knowledge, namely those by Ai Siqi, Feng Ding, Li Da and others.

At the same time, many pages are given over to criticising philosophical and socio-political views of Mao Zedong and to the methods of propagating them in China. That criticism is marked by a principled, party approach by the author to Mao's views; he analyses in detail his "concept of the common character of contradictions", epistemology and socio-historic concept. Proceeding from the achievements of the Marxist criticism of Maoism, the author has managed

to convincingly show the anti-Marxist core of Mao's thought on dialectics, the process of cognition, to disclose the idealism of his sociological "concept". Burov has justly emphasised the political pragmatism of the Maoist philosophy that gave rise to its eclecticism and contradictoriness (p. 109).

The monograph under review is a major study in the philosophy of the People's Republic of China, greatly widening and deepening the reader's knowledge of modern China and enabling him to fathom deeply the difficult process of the spread of Marxism in the PRC, the gradual change in the country's intellectual life and its suppression by Maoism. The book shows a tremendous harm the "thought" of Mao and his policy did to the progress of the social sciences in China, which turned philosophy into an obedient servant of anti-popular, anti-socialist course. Herein lies the topical and political importance of this new work by V. Burov.

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