

215109

JPRS 81007

9 June 1982

# West Europe Report

No. 1977

19980914 067

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

7  
91  
A05

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

9 June 1982

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1977

## CONTENTS

## THEATER FORCES

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

|                                                                                              |   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|
| CDU Presents Paper on Conventional, Nuclear Arms<br>(FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 22 May 82)..... | 1 |
| DGB Congress Against New Medium-Range Missiles<br>(FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 21 May 82).....   | 3 |

## ECONOMIC

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

|                                                                                                                         |   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|
| ETUC's Debunne on Economic Measures, Union Policies<br>(George Debunne Interview; ELSEVIERS WEEKBLAD,<br>1 May 82)..... | 5 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|

## TURKEY

|                                                                                          |    |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Denizcier Delineates Workers' Constitutional Status<br>(CUMHURIYET, 5 May 82).....       | 10 |
| Mumcu Differs With TISK Labor Assessment<br>(Ugur Mumcu; CUMHURIYET, 3 Apr 82).....      | 12 |
| Free Economic Zone Bill Finalized<br>(Nursun Alev; TERCUMAN, 2 Apr 82).....              | 15 |
| Law Delimits Strike, Lockout Participation<br>(Erbil Tusalp; CUMHURIYET, 13 Apr 82)..... | 17 |
| Land Reform Bill Encounters Difficulties<br>(CUMHURIYET, 2 Apr 82).....                  | 20 |

## POLITICAL

### CYPRUS

|                                                                                 |    |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| TFSC Coalition Cabinet Members, Protocol Examined<br>(OLAY, 27, 22 Mar 82)..... | 22 |
| Photos, Biographies<br>Coalition Protocol                                       |    |

### FRANCE

|                                                                                                 |    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Mitterrand Foreign Policy Examined After One Year<br>(Maurice Delarue; LE MONDE, 4 May 82)..... | 44 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|

### NETHERLANDS

|                                                                                                                       |    |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Van der Stoel on U.S. - Netherlands Relations<br>(Max Van der Stoel Interview; ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE,<br>17 Apr 82)..... | 48 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|

### PORTUGAL

|                                                                                                               |    |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Military Unprepared To Accept Unquestioned Civilian Control<br>(Augusto de Carvalho; EXPRESSO, 1 May 82)..... | 56 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|

### TURKEY

|                                                                                                 |    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Ozyoruk Assays Potential Role of President<br>(Mukbil Ozyoruk; TERCUMAN, 23 Mar 82).....        | 61 |
| Union of Chambers Voices Views on Constitution<br>(CUMHURIYET, 19 Apr 82).....                  | 63 |
| Proposals Ventured on Discussion of Constitution<br>(CUMHURIYET, 20 Apr 82).....                | 65 |
| Ozyoruk Calls for Continued Aid to Threatened Iraq<br>(Mukbil Ozyoruk; TERCUMAN, 5 May 82)..... | 67 |

## MILITARY

### GREECE

|                                                                                           |    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Bases Negotiations Seen Entering Final Phase<br>(Panos Loulakov; TO VIMA, 25 Apr 82)..... | 69 |
| Arms Diversification Existed Under ND Government<br>(I. KATHIMERINI, 29 Apr 82).....      | 71 |

|                                                                                           |    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Papandreou Presence Noted at Air Force Maneuvers<br>(TO VIMA, 25 Apr 82).....             | 72 |
| Reported Merger of Gendarmerie-Police Studied<br>(ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS, 23 Apr 82).....      | 74 |
| Paper Denounces Purchase of 'Antiquated' 'Leopard' Tanks<br>(RIZOSPASTIS, 25 Apr 82)..... | 75 |

#### ITALY

|                                                                                                       |    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Commentary on Lagorio's Attempts To Sabotage Elections<br>(Salvatore Corallo; L'UNITA, 7 May 82)..... | 77 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|

#### GENERAL

#### GREECE

|                                                                                                                      |    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Reaction to Disturbances Caused by U.S. Sailors<br>(RIZOSPASTIS, 25 Apr 82, TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS,<br>25 Apr 82)..... | 80 |
| Disturbances Termed Provocation<br>Superiors' Responsibility                                                         |    |
| Newsman Appointed Deputy Foreign Minister<br>(TA NEA, 23 Apr 82).....                                                | 82 |
| Church-State Conflict on Church Land Holdings<br>(Sp. Karatzaferis; ELEVTHEROTYPIA, 28 Apr 82).....                  | 84 |

## CDU PRESENTS PAPER ON CONVENTIONAL, NUCLEAR ARMS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 22 May 82 p5

[Article by "fy": "Precision Weapons in Place of Old Nuclear Arms"]

[Text] Bonn, 21 May—A program for "actively securing peace" was made public in Bonn last Friday by the CDU. It contains proposals on how NATO might strengthen its conventional defense capabilities without increasing troop strength. CDU Deputy Fraction Chairman Woerner said it was not a matter of renouncing the NATO Flexible Response strategy but instead of overcoming the shortcomings which make it less and less credible.

As a result of the continuing arms buildup by the Warsaw Pact, he said, the power relationship has shifted to the West's disadvantage to such an extent that NATO would have to use nuclear weapons against an aggressor "at a very early stage" of a war in order to be able to defend itself. This is "unacceptable" because on the one hand it impairs the chances for effective defense and, on the other hand, undermines the credibility of deterrence, since deterrence turns into self-deterrence more and more under these circumstances.

The self-deterrent effect has its origin primarily in those American nuclear weapons which have a reach of only 15 or 30 kilometers, Woerner said, which make up some 60 percent of all American nuclear weapons stored in Europe at present. These could be replaced by precision weapons with conventional warheads which have either already been developed or are still in the development stage.

One reason why NATO cannot renounce the threat of first use of nuclear weapons is that it would be faced by an adversary in case of attack who himself has nuclear weapons at his disposal. For all that, as a defensive alliance NATO not only renounces the first use of nuclear weapons but the first use of weapons of all types. It is a threat to no one and does not attack anyone.

Going into particulars, Woerner said that the plan worked out by his party was not a "cureall" to do away with every weak spot, nor was it designed to bring about an immediate overhaul of existing defense structures but a medium-term and long-term reorientation in arms procurement. It might be concluded with the next generation of weapons within 8 or 10 years. It was impossible, he said, to come up with firm budget figures at this point, since some of the new systems have not even gone into production as yet. A large part of the higher costs could be offset by making cuts in other weapons systems, Woerner said while refusing to name the systems to which he was referring.

"Real" additional costs "ought" not to be more than DM 1 billion annually over the next decade, he said without divulging on what he was basing this estimate. In calling these supplemental efforts "imperative," Woerner characterized the present defense potential as insufficient for lending the necessary weight to a real Flexible Response strategy which he would like to see retained and for which there is no usable alternative in his view. Any return to massive (nuclear) retaliation was just as much out of the question as a defense based of purely conventional means. In view of the Soviet arms buildup, Woerner said, the establishment of a conventional balance would lead to total militarization. This would call for increasing the number of NATO divisions from 26 to 45 which would add up to doubling the size of the Bundeswehr. The CDU is categorically opposed to that, Woerner said.

The CDU/CSU fraction's defense expert Wuerzbach added an explanatory note of his own, pointing out that the plan was designed to provide NATO with the capability of not merely being able to mount a conventional defense against the first of the three Soviet echelons which make up the attack forces in Central and Eastern Europe, as is the case at present.

9478

CSO: 3103/482

## DGB CONGRESS AGAINST NEW MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 May 82 p4

[Article by "Klr": "Peace, Disarmament Are Lively Issues at DGB Congress"]

[Text] Berlin, 20 May—As expected, peace, detente and disarmament were lively issues at the DGB national congress in Berlin. The activities reports, the politicians' speeches, even the elections—postal union head Breit was chosen as new DGB chairman by a large majority—and the "Neue Heimat" scandal had not caused much of a stir. Some of the delegates were not in agreement with the DGB presidium guidelines on peace policy because it studiously left out the NATO double-track resolution. The opposition to the guidelines was concentrated in two camps. One of these was in favor of a resolution by the metal workers union passed at that union's latest congress which "specifically condemns the NATO Ministerial Council resolution to station medium-range missiles in Western Europe" and at the same time calls on the Soviet Union to dismantle its missiles. Those in favor of the resolution further called for a nuclear-free zone throughout Europe and for the zero option with regard to all ABC weapons. The other group was merely asking that the NATO resolution be mentioned in the guidelines. When it became clear that the debate might last all day, it was agreed that the platform committee should submit a compromise resolution during the course of the day.

The presidium guidelines, as amended, were at length adopted without further debate and with only one abstention. The text now reads: "No new medium-range weapons are to be stationed in Europe." The spokesman for the platform committee specifically referred to this as the decisive compromise language with regard to the NATO modernization resolution. A stand had now been taken against armaments, he said; how this was to be achieved was still open.

Prior to this, the chemical workers union president Hauenschild had criticized the presidium guidelines for leaving out the NATO resolution. It was a case of self-aggrandizement to think, he said, that this labor union congress would have greater weight and exert more influence on global politics than the resolution adopted by the SPD congress by a large majority. The basic question for him was "What is our justification for taking a different position from the political parties who received the votes of millions of working men and women and that includes the SPD, the CDU and the FDP." To be sure, there were some in all these parties who opposed the NATO double-track resolution—but "can it be our job at this congress to speak for these minorities in the political parties or to help Erhard Eppler or Oskar Lafontaine—to name two—taste success after the fact? I don't think that this is what we are here for."

Soon thereafter, when the debate turned to the question of the DGB national committee ban on participating in signature campaigns, civil service union chief Kluncker and metal workers union presidium member Benz met headon. In Kluncker's view, it was inadmissible for some unionists—and he was referring specifically to Benz—to distance themselves from positions only recently adopted by the DGB. To be sure, every union member was free to voice his opinion but it was a matter of self-discipline on the part of Bundestag members to depart from DGB positions by citing their legislative title. The whole thing started, he said, with a recent memorandum in which some economists were attempting to fashion an alternative economic policy which attained a semi-official cast when union members of parliament lent their name to it.

For his part, Benz called for revoking the ban after he and his supporters were unable to prevail in the national committee. He criticized the union, asking what it had done in the way of standing up for its own basic ideas on economic policy and of developing them further. It had been "one long series of missed opportunities," he said. Another participant concluded that the resolution was passed at this particular time in order to point the finger at the signers of the "Krefeld appeal." When the vice president of the food workers union Herrmann then said that Benz had departed from the official DGB line after he and his supporters had lost out in the national committee, the way was open for a "very large majority" (of the presidium) to uphold the ban on signatures. "It is not intent that decides," Kluncker said, "but the ultimate outcome."

Then a resolution was adopted calling for a ban on fascist and neo-fascist organizations. Among other things, the resolution calls on the unions to communicate and disseminate information "linking fascism and war with industry" and to pay more attention in union educational programs to pointing out the "connections between fascism and industry." A resolution by the metal workers union on political extremism provided for more balance in that it was directed against extremism both of the left and right. This resolution (which was adopted) called on all members and functionaries to combat all efforts by political extremists directed against the democratic form of government and against labor unions. The experience of the past few years has shown, the resolution said that "strict adherence to our incompatibility resolutions on political extremism is imperative." The extremists, it was said, have increasingly adopted tactics of concealment so as to hide their political aims.

A police union resolution calls on the politicians to devote more time to the solution of social conflicts rather than to wage an "alibi war of words" which only helps escalate matters further. The police would much rather "improve the protection and safety of the citizenry both in the interest of the population and that of the police itself instead of increasingly having to function as the last resort in the resolution of social conflict."

9478

CSO: 3103/482

## ETUC'S DEBUNNE ON ECONOMIC MEASURES, UNION POLICIES

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS WEEKBLAD in Dutch 1 May 82 p 11

[Interview with George Debunne by Wim Brummelman: "New chairman European Labor Union: "We must stand united against the councils of ministers."]

[Text] Last week during the EVV [European Labor Union]'s fourth congress it became very clear that the labor movement is having great difficulties in these gloomy times of cutbacks and unemployment. Deeply felt slogans for work, peace, and solidarity were at the order of the day. The EVV elected a new chairman, the Belgian socialist George Debunne, who wants to give the solidarity of the European labor movement concrete shape. "If we continue to act individually we will be at each other's throats."

Man lives by hope; in his opening speech CVN Chairman Harm van der Meulen spoke wisely of a "congress of hope." That is probably the most sensible description imaginable, no matter what type of European congress, to avoid loss of credibility. Is there a better caption? Congress of "a new start"?

The economic crisis is caused by a complexity of causes; there is not just one solution to the problem. There are many medicines and everybody selects from Pandora's box what seems to be most advantageous, or is the least painful. This also applies to The Hague.

The EVV list of preferences appears mainly as follows:

Governments following a monetary type of retrenchment policy should abandon their erroneous course of action and follow a policy of selective economic stimulation.

Investments in key industries should be stimulated and the workers' purchasing power should no longer be under attack to prevent that smaller expenditures lead to further deterioration of employment opportunities.

To improve the distribution of still existing jobs, i.e. to help the unemployed find work, it is necessary to begin with large-scale cuts in working hours. Opinions differ as to how this can be achieved: a 35-hour workweek, longer vacations, accelerated pensions, etc., etc.

The desires are not new, for they have been formulated before by the labor movement, also on a European level--so far without much success and it is only natural to ask why they should meet with success after the meeting in The Hague. At any rate, it is not because the finances are now available as the labor unions did not indicate that they are willing to pay for the desired steps out of their own pockets or those of the workers. However, it would have been very naive to expect clear statements on this subject.

No, the only prospect of success the European labor unions are presenting themselves can be found in their solemn promise to exercise more discipline regarding united action. In labor union jargon this is called solidarity. According to the new man at the EVV top, the 64-year-old Belgian socialist union chairman George Debunne, it will depend on the degree of solidarity the movement will be able to bring up, whether attacks on the purchasing power of the workers and the labor movement's freedom to bargain can be beaten back. "I do not want to call this the congress of hope. It should be the congress of resolve. Resolve to turn the tables, because things can be and should be done differently. The trade unions are facing an enormous responsibility. If we fail we will go down into the abyss."

Clearly stated by the amiable Debunne who knows full well that a labor movement with no other message except "surrender" will no longer appeal to employees.

#### No Guarantee

ELSEVIERS WEEKBLAD: The big problem is of course that in reality the demands for freedom to bargain and more employment opportunities are clashing. The governments are executing cutback policies to create room for new investments and consequently employment opportunities. The trade unions also want better employment opportunities but are, on the other hand, anxious to save their lives; they are fighting cutbacks.

Debunne: "Yes, you present the situation the way the government sees it, but I am against this point of view. I maintain that less purchasing power will certainly not produce employment opportunities. There is no guarantee against it. A policy of deflation will certainly result in more unemployment. It entails namely that people will be buying less, this results in less production and therefore less work."

"This does not mean that I advocate an inflationary policy, but I believe that we should arrive at a system whereby the purchasing power of employees remains at least the same. This is a part of what it takes to get the economy going again. Look, if all governments are playing the same game and some are asking 3 percent cutbacks while other nations ask 4 percent, what progress will be achieved? To become competitive one would be forced to increase cutbacks and that would lead to a catastrophe. That is certainly not the solution. One of the things we should assign priority is therefore to safeguard our purchasing power in general terms."

Question: You did not succeed in the past years.

Debunne: "No, indeed not. A look at the results of our previous congresses shows that we failed."

Question: At any rate, it was not the fault of your own Belgian organization. Belgium is nearly bankrupt but this spring the members of your labor union took to the streets in massive numbers.

Debunne: "But we did not succeed in maintaining purchasing power because the labor movement is divided in Belgium. The ACV did not want to join."

Question: However, in other countries there are also labor unions which assume a softer attitude than your ABVV. Do you hold that against them?

Debunne: "Hold that against them? It means: We either decide together what we accept or do not accept, or, if we act on our own, we will destroy each other. If, for instance, the Germans must accede to one percentage point there will certainly be many countries where employees will be forced to accede to 2 or 3 percentage points."

Question: The EVV wants the government to stimulate investments. We must have an investment fund. Should that be a European fund?

Debunne: "Well, I do not believe that we can establish a European investment fund in just one step. I believe that on the basis of our demands separate funds can be established in each country. And I believe that selectivity in these matters ought to be the first necessity. One cannot give all enterprises. All branches of industry the same treatment. That is not happening in Belgium and it is unacceptable. Investments in the area of research should be stimulated in the first place."

Question: Investments in so-called key industries, promotion of high caliber technological developments. That is being done in every country.

Debunne: "It is exactly on this point that European coordination is required."

Question: Do you believe that the Netherlands, or any country for that matter, would be willing to give up certain key industries on behalf of other countries?

Debunne: "That is of course the big difficulty: allocation of production. This also concerns developing countries. It is clear that a discussion of this entire subject is very difficult. But if we do not take any steps on a national level we will all be in deep trouble. I believe that we should ask for stimulation on a national level; coordination on a European level should follow."

Question: Can you see it happen?

Debunne: "I am only optimistic when I see the hard determination of the trade unions. Today everybody has reached the conclusion that we are in trouble, and that we may not retreat any further. Indeed, now is the time to show

that we can deliver, on a national level and on a European level. We must stand united against the councils of ministers. And if the labor movement in one of the member nations is losing out, solidarity should immediately come into action."

Question: We may therefore not exclude the possibility of a European strike?

Debunne, laughing: "Well as far as I am concerned there are no objections at all."

#### Negative Spirit

Question: Are you such a hard-boiled trade union official?

Debunne: "Well I have that reputation at any rate in Belgium. Of course... if they never want to discuss our proposals, if the other side immediately refuses... I cannot be forced to accept a policy I find bad. That is the way it is at this moment."

Question: All measures to fight unemployment cost money. To get that money the labor movement is always eyeing the profits of oil companies, higher incomes, etc. Do you exclude the possibility that employees will also sacrifice in the coming years?

Debunne: "No, I also never mentioned that. I maintain that there are various ways to obtain funds. For instance, by sharing honestly, also incomes. The poor should be less poor and the rich less rich. That is an important point. It is very well possible that there should be sacrifices to a certain extent, but that should be honestly arranged. One condition is that there ought to be guarantees. Such guarantees are now nowhere to be found."

#### Sacrifices

Question: For instance, would shorter work days with proportionately smaller wages be considered an honest sacrifice?

Debunne: "That is not at all the right way to say it. Shorter work days by one hour per week will not amount to any sacrifice because the shorter working hours will be offset by increased productivity. It is senseless to ask us to sacrifice for one hour work less per week. However, if there is a desire to talk about radically shorter work days, for instance, in one or two phases to a 35-hour workweek, we would be willing to discuss sharing this sacrifice. However, in that case I would like to remind everybody of the gigantic sums of money which will be saved on unemployment benefit payments. They should also be taken into account."

Question: That is not allowed because the government's debts must be cut back.

Debunne: "Anyhow, those amounts of money are now already being paid. I do not want to say therefore that the entire amount should be taken into account. However, it should also not be said that so many tens of billions of francs do not have to be paid any longer because of a shorter workweek, we just leave that the way it is."

Question: Let us go back to the investment fund for a moment. Should the labor movement participate in its management?

Debunne: "Indeed, the trade unions should have a finger in the pie. It also depends on who contributes to such a fund."

Question: If employees in a certain industry decide to put 1 percent of their wages in such a fund, should they also become a part of management?

Debunne: "Yes, but be careful. You are now talking about some sort of investment compensation, a form of participation in the enterprise. I believe that it would not solve a thing. I am more in favor of a general intertrade fund which supports all those who seriously pursue a policy of employment."

Question: What are your objections to investment compensation?

Debunne: "It is a form of participation. One becomes part of the capitalist system. That means participation in management and that fills me immediately with a deadly fear that we are heading for corporative management. And that means that the interests of the workers will no longer receive proper attention."

10319

CSO: 3105/173

## DENIZCIER DELINEATES WORKERS' CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 5 May 82 pp 1, 9

[Text] Ankara (TURKISH NEWS AGENCY)--The TURK-IS [Turkish Confederation of Labor] briefing scheduled for some government members headed by the prime minister was postponed because Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu is in Istanbul. The briefing will reportedly be given later this week.

A report was prepared by TURK-IS for the briefing which is to be given to the government by members of the Executive Board headed by President Ibrahim Denizcier. The report contains views and proposals for the solution of problems related to the new constitution, revision of labor laws, unemployment, firing, wages, the minimum wage, the Supreme Arbitration Council and collective labor contracts, general economic and social problems and relations with international labor organizations.

Matters that TURK-IS would like to see in the constitution are explained in the report. "Our Constitution should embody the principle of 'worker participation in management,' which is adopted by the constitutions of the free democratic nations of our time and which has contributed largely where it has been applied to the development of the nation, increased production and fair distribution of national income," it says.

The report notes that "TURK-IS considers the absence of sanctions in the existing Constitution a significant omission and, for this reason, degrees of authority and responsibility must be taken as basic and effective sanctions adopted against any undertaking that would hinder implementation of the Constitution." The report also calls for institution of a barrier system for the representation of political parties in parliament.

The report says that the low income groups form a broad base of the pyramid of income groups in Turkey and expresses these views:

"Our workers, whom some are trying to describe as the 'happy minority' in Turkey, get very little of the average income per capita when counted together with their families."

On the minimum wage, the report says that it must be revised, expressing the following view:

"The minimum wage affects the lives of 2 million people and their families, and it has reached the point where it must be redesignated.

"We as TURK-IS believe that a tax deduction from the minimum wage would be more useful than a 'gross increase.'

"The important thing for the worker is not a gross increase in the minimum wage, but whether his take-home pay and purchasing power are positive."

The conclusion and proposals section of the TURK-IS report reads as follows:

"Earned worker rights must be preserved and developed in the new constitution. The deliberate abuse of rights by certain circles, converting them into a tool against our country, is inadmissible as a rationale for gutting the basic rights.

"Gutting such basic rights as the right to strike and collective bargaining is risky in our view. The right to strike and collective bargaining must be preserved in our constitution and must not be disemboweled."

8349

CSO: 4654/317

## MUMCU DIFFERS WITH TISK LABOR ASSESSMENT

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 3 Apr 82 pp 1,9

[Article by Ugur Mumcu]

[Text] A TISK [Turkish Confederation of Employer Unions] labor report states, "Claims that the worker is being crushed and exploited are no longer valid. The level attained by workers today is much higher than that ensured civil servants. In addition, taking into consideration the fact that there are close to 3 million unemployed persons, it can be said that workers who are employed in our country constitute a fortunate minority."

Who, according to whom, is the "fortunate minority"? Of course, to the unemployed, the worker who labors at minimum wage is lucky; and, to the worker earning the minimum wage, the worker who makes a high salary is fortunate. It is also true that the worker has more broad benefits than the civil servant. The worker, to the civil servant, qualifies as "a fortunate minority" in a sense.

Well, then, what is the employer to the worker, to the civil servant? "An unfortunate minority"? His sector is looked upon as "a fortunate minority," as the one which receives the greatest share of the national income. Don't our employer friends know this?

It is necessary to set the standards properly. If this standard confuses someone once, there is no telling where it will lead. God forbid that anyone should be confused!

After declaring "workers a fortunate minority," the labor report reaches the judgment that, "when approaching social problems, criteria interpreted as favorable to the worker must be abandoned, and benefit to the nation must be sought." A mistake in logic has been made here. The opposite of "criteria interpreted as favorable to the worker" is not "benefit to the nation," but "criteria interpreted as favorable to the employer." What else could it be?

Stop. Let us explain!

Workers unions will interpret social politics to benefit the worker; employers unions, to benefit the employer. And if there are unions for civil

servants, they will work to have the weight of civil servants felt in social politics. This is what we call the western form of democracy. Democracy is similar to a piece of music for many voices. The worker may speak. So may the employer, the civil servant, and the villager. The name for the systems of government in which the worker comes to power, silences the employer by force, and eliminates him as a social class is "Marxism-Leninism." Well then, what is the name for the systems in which the employer speaks and silences the worker by force?

Our criminal law says, "It is forbidden to establish sovereignty of one social class over other social classes." In other words, both of the above are prohibited. Is anyone objecting? No.

In that case, just as the "criteria interpreted as favorable to the worker must be abandoned," insistence upon "always trying to have one's own way" must be given up. The workers union will defend the right of the worker and the employers union, the right of the employer, and that will be the end of that. What is there that cannot be understood in this?

While TISK says, "The right of employers to employ and not to employ has been considered as sacred as the right of workers to work and not to work," it seeks to have lifted the ban on ousting workers, which was established as just following the 12 September 1980 change in government, and to reduce further the number of employed workers that it calls "a fortunate minority."

If it will allow us to do so, we will turn around the standard used by the employers confederation and say that "criteria interpreted as favorable to the employer must be abandoned." We do so, because, for employers to oust workers during a period when strikes are abandoned is "to the employers' benefit." This certainly is not "to the benefit of the nation."

How does the concept, "All forms of union activity at businesses must be banned," which is included in the labor report, conform to the collective-bargaining system? Where will the right to strike be used? If "union activity" is prohibited at businesses, where will it be allowed?

TISK also wants unions to be banned from establishing relations with political parties. It, for example, wants unions to be prohibited from supporting specific political parties or giving these parties financial assistance.

Doesn't it appear appropriate to the "principle of equality" for these interdictions to be valid as well for employers who gather under the name of "union" and who organize within various associations? Equality between the worker and employer will be ensured if the "prohibition policy" applied to workers' unions also applies to unions and associations of the employers' sector.

The employers confederation seeks to have union officials not hold offices in political parties' administrative bodies. One wonders how it would be received if a similar prohibition stating, "Those who hold posts in employers' unions cannot accept duties in political parties," were considered for employers?

And, yes, there are also several employers union officials who have given financial support to political parties that are being charged today with capital crimes.

What shall we do about this? Which interdiction against "union activity" shall we enforce because of this financial assistance?

11673

CSO: 4654/283

## FREE ECONOMIC ZONE BILL FINALIZED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 2 Apr 82 pp 1,8

[Article by Nursun Alev]

[Text] Ankara--A law bill drafted by the Council of Ministers that proposes "the establishment of commercial centers located at borders and in coastal areas of Turkey that have convenient connections with foreign countries and that are exempt from customs taxes, fees, and duties and independent from all aspects and restrictions of the domestic trade regime" has been put into its final form.

Under the bill, which gives the Council of Ministers the authority to establish free economic zones, centers that are declared "free economic zones" will be nationalized, and permission will be given to domestic and foreign investors to set up "banking and insurance corporations along with tourist facilities and industrial investments" at these centers. In these zones, export and import operations in connection with foreign countries will be carried out completely independently from the domestic trade regime and without being subject to any registration whatsoever. Procedures at these centers will be exempt from all sorts of customs taxes and fees.

## Entry-Exit Permits

In accordance with the bill, which proposes the requirement of permits for entry-exit operations, regional committees will be established to define and implement working principles for these centers. These committees, which will be composed of representatives from the trade, customs, and monopolies ministries as well as from related organizations, will serve in affiliation with the prime minister's office.

## Ties with Turkey

The trade regime currently in force will be applied in importation to Turkey from the free economic zones, which "will be left completely outside the jurisdiction of customs," and in exportation from Turkey to these centers.

Officials reported that through application of the bill, which is expected to be submitted to the Advisory Assembly shortly, "Turkey's opportunities to

obtain foreign exchange will increase to a great extent, and the volume of exportation and importation will rise due to the simplification of procedures." They stated that "implementation of a free economic zone, from the standpoint of encouraging foreign investment in Turkey, will be the beginning of an extremely significant development."

#### Advantages

Officials spoke of the advantages to be ensured by the free economic zone, saying:

"As things stand today, a firm that perceives a need to import a product must wait 3 to 6 months before it actually is able to obtain it. During this period, scarce foreign-exchange resources are unnecessarily tied up through the letter of credit, and the firm is still uncertain as to whether or not it will be able to obtain the import product. For this reason, it stockpiles imported goods if it has the financial resources to do so. This, too, ties up foreign exchange.

"With the establishment of free economic zones, because needed imports will have been brought to the region and placed in depots there, the long period between placement of an order and procurement of the goods will have been eliminated.

"Although there will be no reduction whatsoever in customs and similar taxes and fees in importation that will be carried out from the free economic zone to our country, firms will have lower customs expenses with the importation of smaller consignments as they will not need to stockpile as many import goods. This, in turn, will lower production costs. Speed and ease in obtaining needed import goods will provide assurances to firms when making production decisions.

"With the establishment of the free economic zone, the opportunities for our industries, whose production costs will be lowered, to compete, on the basis of price, on foreign markets will be improved, and this will encourage exportation. With the creation of the free economic zone, firms will be able to place, by actually engaging in exportation, a portion of the goods they wish to export in depots in the free economic zone without needing foreign orders. This will make it possible to speed up exportation. Furthermore, because packaging can be carried out in the free economic zones, our products' prospects on foreign markets will also be increased."

11673

CSO: 4654/283

## LAW DELIMITS STRIKE, LOCKOUT PARTICIPATION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Apr 82 p 7

[Article by Erbil Tusalp]

[Text] Ankara--In the section of the collective-bargaining agreements, strikes, and lockouts law that regulates strikes, the employer is prohibited from paying wages for the duration of the strike. It is emphasized that no article conflicting with this may be placed in bargaining contracts. Furthermore, it is proposed that, if it is determined that a worker holds another job during a strike, his labor contract will be canceled without notification or compensation.

We include the sections of the law that regulates strikes that we did not publish previously.

This is what is said in the bill on the topic of workers who are not to participate in a legal strike or lockout:

"Article 25-1. With the stipulation that they not be directed toward production or sales in any form whatsoever,

"a. For maintenance of activities at businesses where it is technically necessary to have continuity from the standpoint of quality,

"b. And, if it is not possible to ensure protection for the prevention of destruction of the machinery, the fixtures and equipment, tools, raw materials, semi-manufactured goods, and manufactured goods; for the protection of animals and their feed; for the prevention of the ruination of the business,

"The employer is required to keep a sufficient number of workers who will not join the strike or lockout to ensure this for the duration of the strike.

"2. The number and qualifications of workers who will not be part of the strike or lockout in accordance with Paragraph 1 will be posted in writing by the employer or his representative at the business within 12 working days from the beginning of labor negotiations. A copy of this notice will be sent to the labor union that is taking part in the negotiations.

"If no objection is raised by the labor union in writing before the arbitration council within 6 working days of the announcement of the notice, it will become final. If an objection is raised, the provincial arbitration council will reach a decision within 6 working days. Its decision will be final.

"3. If it is not established for any reason whatsoever within the period set by law which workers will not participate in a strike or lockout, the employer or labor union may request the regional labor directorate to determine the number of employees that will work. The regional labor directorate will make this determination within the shortest time possible and will relay its conclusions to the parties involved. When necessary, the regional labor directorate will be able to make this determination on its own initiative.

"Any of the parties may raise objections to this determination before the provincial arbitration council under the principles set down in Paragraph 2.

"4. When a strike or lockout is called at a place of business, information as to which employees will continue to work at the business in accordance with statutes of these articles will be established by the regional labor directorate on its own initiative within 2 days after being informed of the decision to strike or hold a lockout. The information will be relayed in writing to the related employer and workers. This statute does not apply to the chairman of a labor union or members of its administrative council who work at the business and are a party in collective-bargaining negotiations.

"5. An employer may obtain written permission from the regional labor directorate to hire new workers to replace workers who are not allowed to participate in the strike or lockout who do not work and in order to carry out the functions cited in previous paragraphs.

"6. In disagreements related to operations contracts, the provincial arbitration council has jurisdiction over corporate headquarters; and each regional labor directorate, over the businesses located in its area."

The bill takes this approach toward guaranteeing the rights to strike and hold lockouts:

"Article 26-1. Statutes that are set down in service contracts that negate the right to strike or hold lockouts or that restrict these rights will be invalid.

"2. Statutes may be set down in collective-bargaining contracts to solve disagreements that arise during negotiations through the use of special arbitrators. In these cases, the referee may solve the disagreement at the request of one of the parties. In collective bargaining for businesses within the public sector, however, it may be decided that the Supreme Arbitration Council will serve as the special arbitrator."

The bill includes these views on the effect of a legal strike or lockout on service contracts:

"Article 27-1. A worker's service contract cannot be canceled because he takes part in a decision to hold a legal strike, encourages the making of such a decision, participates in such a strike, or encourages participation in such a strike.

"Those who participate in a legal strike and who ask to work at the business in accordance with Article 24, Paragraph 2 and are not employed by the employee will have the rights and obligations stemming from their service contracts suspended until the end of the strike. Workers who are not put to work even though they request this may take advantage of Article 16, Paragraph 3 and Article 34 of the labor law.

"Workers affected by a legal lockout will have the rights and obligations stemming from their service contracts suspended until the end of the lockout.

"Employers must pay on the regular pay day wages and supplementary benefits that were earned prior to the onset of a strike or lockout to workers whose contract relations have been suspended due to a strike or lockout. Personnel who make these payments must also work on this topic. If they do not, Article 25, Paragraph 5 will be implemented.

"2. An employer cannot employ other workers in any manner whatsoever on a permanent or temporary basis to replace workers during the course of a legal strike or lockout whose rights and obligations stemming from their service contracts have been suspended in accordance with the paragraphs cited. The possibility of hiring new workers is reserved for the replacement of workers whose service contracts are canceled by legal means.

"Employers may put to work those workers who do not participate in the strike or who cease participating in the strike in accordance with Article 24, but only at their own jobs. These workers cannot perform the work of striking employees.

"3. A worker whose rights and obligations stemming from his service contract have been suspended because of a legal strike or lockout may not take another job. If he does, his service contract can be canceled by the employer without notification and without requiring payment of any indemnification whatsoever.

"4. During the course of a strike or lockout, wages or social assistance cannot be paid by employees to workers whose service contracts have been suspended. No statute stating otherwise may be inserted in collective-bargaining contracts."

11673

CSO: 4654/284

## LAND REFORM BILL ENCOUNTERS DIFFICULTIES

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 2 Apr 82 pp 1,11

[Text] Ankara--While the land and agricultural reform law bill is being called back to the temporary commission, a report prepared by the DPT [State Planning Organization] claims that changes are aimed against several groups in regard to land ownership.

At yesterday's session of the Advisory Assembly General Council, it was announced that the temporary commission bill, which proposes a law bill adding temporary articles to Land and Agricultural Reform Preliminary Measures Law No 1617, was withdrawn. Acting Chairman Refik Kitapcigil, who presided at the session, read the proposal of temporary commission Chairman Turgut Yegenaga requesting the return of the bill and reported that the bill is being sent back to the commission.

In the meantime, the DPT asserted that land and agricultural reform is an undertaking that foreign powers seek to apply in nations in which the quality of a national state has been destroyed and which aims at changes against various groups in the ownership of land.

The DPT report on the topic of land and agricultural reform has this to say about the "legal framework" for reform:

"The term, agricultural reform, is a name given for events that are applied by force by foreign powers in countries that lost the quality of being national due to the changing political geography following World War II, that bring about significant changes in the social and economic structure of the community, and that aim to make changes, on a wide scope, in the favor of several groups in the forms of land ownership and usage.

"When studying the meaning of the word, reform, one encounters the term, amelioration. In this respect, one cannot help but recall the interference behind the term, amelioration, of foreign powers from time to time in the last years of the Ottoman Empire and their meddling in our internal affairs under the pretext of protecting the non-Islamic minorities."

The DPT report calls attention to the fact that "laws passed for various sectors are never termed, 'reform laws,' but are designed as laws of a national,

democratic state." It claims that a law enacted for the agricultural sector that is based on land alone conflicts with the term, reform.

On the topic of "calculating payments for nationalized land," the report speaks of the debate over "tax value" and "market value." It states, "Tax value will serve the state, but destroy the farmer."

The DPT report also puts forth these views:

"This approach is used by totalitarian regimes. In democratic systems with balanced social and economic development and a market economy, a multifaceted approach is essential.

"Our wish to become united from the political and economic standpoint using an approach that eliminates large operations, nationalizes land, assigns land to small and moderate-sized operations, and feeds the population of those living on the land using the principle of an annual income of 120,000 Turkish liras at 1950 prices does not conform with the western democratic system."

"It is realized from the fall in production and the fact that nearly all of the countries in the communist bloc are faced with the danger of starvation that the changes in social structure that are sought by the land and agricultural system cannot be achieved in this bloc.

"There remains the fact that the model to be applied in Turkey will not be a socialist land reform model. Turkey's system of government is democratic. Its economic system is a market economy. Turkey has pursued an economic strategy directed toward the goal of increasing production. It is objectionable to introduce into a country whose basic structures is different models that have proven unsuccessful." The DPT report notes that the large land holdings that are hoped to be reduced in size are smaller than the Common Market standard. It points out that, in EEC countries, operations of 30,000 to 50,000 donems and more are defined as large operations and are defended and urges that the law bill be examined again.

It is stated in the DPT report that the number of farming families with no land or insufficient amounts of land has reached 3.5 million. The report asks that the bill on the agenda be amended and that 2 million forest-village families be included in the bill as well.

The report speaks on this subject, saying:

"Using rough estimates based on the bill, between 15,000 and 40,000 families will be able to become landowners through the nationalization and distribution of land. The fact that there is no need for a law that will not solve the problem completely must be evaluated as a separate issue."

11673  
CSO: 4654/284

## TFSC COALITION CABINET MEMBERS, PROTOCOL EXAMINED

## Photos, Biographies


Nicosia OLAY in Turkish No 173, 22 Mar 82 pp 16, 17

[Text] The first coalition government of the TFSC [Turkish Cypriot Federated State] officially took office last week. This form of government, which is being tested for the first time, emerged following a long period of temporary government.

With the exception of two of the ministers in the cabinet, all have previously served in various ministries. The cabinet, which is composed of 11 persons including the prime minister, has 7 ministers and the prime minister from the NUP [National Unity Party]; 2 ministers from the DHP [Democratic People's Party]; and 1 minister from the TBP [Turkish Unity Party].

Ahmet Y. Atamsoy and Ismail Tezer are the two who have never served on a cabinet. Atamsoy, in addition, bears the distinction of being a minister brought to the cabinet from outside the assembly.

Mustafa Cagatay (prime minister)




Born in 1937 in Limassol. After completing Nicosia Boys Lycee in 1955, held a civil service post for 4 years. Studied law in London from 1959-1963. Returned to Cyprus in 1963 and began to practice law. Elected to the assembly as a member of the Turkish Community Assembly from Limassol in the 1970 elections. Elected NUP deputy from Kyrenia in the 1976 elections. Became minister of finance at the end of 1976. Upon Osman Orek's departure from the office of prime minister, Cagatay became the third prime minister of the TFSC. Was returned to the post of prime minister by the state chairman after being reelected deputy in the June 1981 elections, but was unseated when the minority

government based on the NUP was voted out by the opposition parties.

Cagatay is the third prime minister of the TFSC and its first coalition prime minister.

Kenan Atakol (minister of foreign affairs and defense)



Born in 1937 in the village of Yayla is the Paphos administrative district. After completing his secondary education, graduated from the Middle East Technical University Faculty of Construction Engineering in Ankara with a B.S. degree. Later received his masters and doctorate degrees in America. Was named minister of energy and natural resources in 1974. Was elected deputy in 1976 and continued to hold this post. Later served as minister of education and, after a while, was appointed minister of tourism.

Ismet Kotak (minister of industry and cooperatives)



Born in 1939 in Famagusta. After graduating from Namik Kemal Lycee, received a degree from the Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences Department of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations in 1962. Served for years in the area of cooperatives and was the first to implement a social housing project on the island.

Served as minister of labor, cooperatives, social affairs, and housing beginning in February 1969. Elected deputy in Famagusta in the 1970, 1976, and 1981 elections. Is the chairman general of the DHP. Married and the father of three children. Speaks English and Russian.

Irsen Kucuk (minister of agriculture, natural resources, and energy)



Born in 1940 in Nicosia. Graduate of the Ankara University Faculty of Agriculture. Founder of the Kokkina Freedom Fighters Association. After being involved in public services for a long period of time, was elected NUP deputy in the 1976 and 1981 elections. Held the same ministry post for many years previously.

Kucuk last week left his post as secretary general of his party in order to assume this position in the government.

Esber Serakinci (minister of interior and housing)



Born in 1942 in Famagusta. Graduate of the Ankara University Faculty of Language, History, and Geography Department of History. After teaching for 10 years, he joined the Personnel Office. Worked as senior office civil servant in this office until 1976. Was appointed ministerial director of the Ministry of Reconstruction and Housing in 1976. Later served as the Housing Office directorate representative for this ministry.


While working in this position, was elected NUP Famagusta deputy in the 1981 elections.

Salih Cosar (minister of economy and finance)



Born in 1938 in the town of Paphos. After graduating from the Istanbul University Faculty of Science, took a "teachers' training" course in America. Later worked in various educational institutions and public services. Was named undersecretary for the Ministry of Reconstruction and Housing in 1977. Was elected NUP Nicosia deputy in the last elections. Served as a minister in the same post for the first time during the Cagatay government.

Nazif Borman (minister of trade and tourism)



Born in 1940 in the village of Aydin in the Paphos administrative district. Graduated in 1963 from the Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences Department of Finance and Economics. Has held various positions and has served as undersecretary in the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Cooperatives and as registrar for the Cooperatives Unions.

Was elected for the first time in the 1981 elections as Nicosia deputy from the NUP. Prior to the formation of the coalition government, was minister of agriculture, natural resources, and cooperatives in the last cabinet.

Ahmet T. Atamsoy (minister of education, youth, and sports)




Born in 1936 in Leivadia in the district of Famagusta. After completing Nicosia Boys Lycee, he graduated from Teachers' College in 1958. Worked as a teacher until 1962. Began working in the cooperatives that year. Following the 1963 incidents, took part in the founding of Bayrak Radio. Served as radio director for 4 years. Was trade director for the Cooperative Central Bank from 1970 to 1978. At the same time, was a member of the Constituent Assembly. Played soccer on the school team when a student and on the Centinkaya Club for many years.

In the 1981 elections, ran as a DHP Famagusta candidate, but lost by a narrow margin.

Is the only minister brought to the coalition cabinet from outside the assembly.


Ismail Tezer (minister of state and social affairs)



Born in 1917 in the province of Aydin in Turkey. Graduated from the Military College in 1940 and from the Air Force War School in 1942. Served as commander of the Adana Incirli Military Base in 1958 and 1959. Graduated from the University of Southern California "Flight Security" Department in 1959-60. Retired from the Turkish Armed Forces as an air force pilot. Is chairman general of the TBP. Received TFSC citizenship. First fellow citizen originally a citizen of the Republic of Turkey to be elected deputy and named minister.

Widowed and the father of two. Speaks English and French.

Ozel Tahsin (minister of health and labor)



Born in 1945. Is the youngest member of the cabinet. After graduating from the Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences in 1970, held various unionist posts. Entered politics by participating in the Constituent Assembly as Turk-Sen [Turkish Cypriot Trade Unions Federation] representative. Was elected NUP deputy in the 1976 and 1981 elections. Served as minister from August 1980 until the last elections and again later.

Mehmet Bayram (minister of communications and transportation)



Born in 1944 in the village of Platanissos in Famagusta district. Graduated from the Istanbul University Faculty of Pharmacy. Worked as an independent pharmacist from 1969-1976. Was one of the founders of the NUP. Was elected Famagusta deputy in the 1976 and 1981 elections. Has served at various levels within the party and as minister.

#### Coalition Protocol

Nicosia OLAY in Turkish No 173 22 Mar 82 pp 18-24

[Text] NUP-DHP Coalition Charter Dealing with Government, Assembly

(This protocol, together with the NUP [National Unity Party]-DHP [Democratic People's Party] Coalition Government Cooperation Protocol, qualifies as a unit.)

I. Titles of ministries, apportionment among the parties.

A. The government will consist of 10 ministries in addition to the prime minister.

The ministries will be named as follows:

1. Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs.
2. Ministry of Industry and Cooperatives.
3. Ministry of Economy and Finance.
4. Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth, and Sports.
5. Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Energy.
6. Ministry of Trade and Tourism.
7. Ministry of Public Works and Communications.
8. Ministry of Health and Labor.
9. Ministry of Interior and Housing.
10. Ministry of State and Social Services.

B. The apportionment of the ministries among the parties that make up the coalition will be as follows:

1. DHP

- a. Ministry of Industry and Cooperatives.
- b. Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth, and Sports.

2. TBP [Turkish Unity Party]

- a. Ministry of State and Social Services.

3. NUP

- a. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
- b. Ministry of Economy and Finance.
- c. Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Energy.
- d. Ministry of Trade and Tourism.
- e. Ministry of Public Works and Communications.
- f. Ministry of Health and Labor.
- g. Ministry of Interior and Housing.

II. Council of Ministers.

Each party in the coalition has the authority to name from within its own internal structure ministers to the ministries delegated to it and to change them as it deems necessary during the term of the coalition.

Acting from the principle of exclusivity, the areas of ministries' functions are as follows:

A. The ministries assigned the DHP will carry out the following functions. The Industrial Office, organizations affiliated by law to the Industrial Office (the Industrial Holding Company, the free port, tobacco processors, and so forth), and organizations included within the framework of the cooperatives law will be bound to the Ministry of Industry and Cooperatives. Furthermore, organizations included in the NUP-DHP protocol and that were foreseen to act within the structure of this ministry will also be part of the ministry.

B. Functions such as all services related to the Social Services Office, children's homes, the Home for the Destitute, and the families of martyrs and victims of incidents, the determination of refugees' problems, and coordination with related ministries concerning those areas listed will be the responsibility of the Ministry of State and Social Services, which has been given to the TBP.

### III. Election of Mr N. Konuk to the post of assembly chairman.

Acting upon the requirement that 21 assembly votes are needed from all the parties within the coalition,

1. Mr Nejat Konuk will be the only candidate nominated for the assembly chairman position.
2. If the government resigns or if the coalition breaks up for any reason whatsoever, the resignation guarantee that Mr Konuk has given to Mr Cagatay will be put into force and will ensure Konuk's resignation from the post of assembly chairman.
3. Konuk will use his vote in assembly affairs to implement Council of Ministers' decisions. He will take part in voting that qualifies in the categorical securing of a vote of confidence for the coalition.

### IV. Principles related to the functioning of the government.

- A. Decisions Law No 3 will be amended. When modifying this law, a statute will be included that states that, if the state chairman does not approve a ministerial decision and returns it and if it is submitted to him a second time, the state chairman will sign it.
- B. For the purpose of taking advantage of their experience, the necessary legal modification will be made to include in Decision No 3 retirees who did not retire due to age with the stipulation that they return any indemnification they received.
- C. Each ministry has authority, in compliance with the reorganization stated previously, in appointments that will be made in accordance with Decisions Law No 3.
- D. Appointment of the chairman and members of the Public Service Commission, to the KIT [Public Economic Enterprises] directorates general and their administrative assemblies, and to the directorates of organizations with circulating capital and to their administrative councils will be approved by the Council of Ministers.
- E. If the DHP has any objection whatsoever in the appointments that are made to foreign delegations, the posts of district head officials, to KIT's, or to the administrative councils of organizations with circulating capital, the conflict will be resolved between the DHP chairman general and the prime minister.

### V. Assembly affairs.

- A. Care will be taken to have the assembly work in accordance with the full working-day principle.
- B. Proposals submitted to the assembly will be evaluated carefully in the Council of Ministers.

C. Assembly groups will be protected within the current system and will be ensured that they work toward implementing Council of Ministers' decisions.

D. All the commissions in the assembly will be reevaluated. They will be newly formed, taking into consideration the mathematical makeup of the coalition.

#### VI. Foreign contacts made as delegations.

In foreign contacts made as an assembly or government delegation, a DHP chairman will be included in the delegation.

[signed] M. Cagatay, chairman general in behalf of the NUP.

[signed] I. Kotak, chairman general in behalf of the DHP.

15 March 1982, Nicosia.

#### NUP-DHP Coalition Government Cooperation Protocol

Principles to be applied and work to be given priority during the term of the coalition government will be examined by the related parties, and points agreed upon will be attached to this protocol in the form of Appendix No 1 and Appendix No 2.

The parties will contract with one another to comply with the statutes of the articles of this protocol.

[signed] Mustafa Cagatay, chairman general in behalf of the NUP.

[signed] Ismet Kotak, chairman general in behalf of the DHP.

11 March 1982, Nicosia.

#### General Principles

1. Details and basic principles of requests of other parties of the coalition will not conflict with the principles of this agreement reached between the NUP and the DHP.

2. Legal amendments and applications that will be made in accordance with principles set down in Appendix No 1 and Appendix No 2 will have been completely purged of "partisan" thinking and will be undertaken with an approach that views the community as a whole.

3. If subjects bearing financial responsibility within the framework of this protocol signed by the parties have no legal basis, legal support will be promptly ensured, and, in conjunction with this, the necessary changes will be made immediately in the budget.

Supplement No 1. Items to be completed within 60 days.

I. Minimum wage.

1. Amendment of the minimum wage law will be made quickly, and the opportunity will be created to set a separate minimum wage for apprentices, shop assistants, and persons in similar professions.
2. The current minimum wage will be determined in accordance with indices and data of the State Planning Organization and the Ministry of Trade with the condition that the goal be to "set minimum wages" by various professions.

II. Social insurance.

1. The "amendment proposal" that is currently in the assembly committee and that was designed to eliminate irregularities in the law will be examined and will be modified to meet present-day conditions.
2. Each time premiums in the law are increased, an automatic and concomitant increase in the monthly pension of retirees will be made by law.
3. Premiums of self-employed persons will be regulated in a separate and special manner in the law.
4. From the standpoint of those who pay premiums, retirees' monthly pensions will be set at a minimum of 10,000 Turkish liras and a maximum of 15,000 liras. With this in mind, the necessary appropriations will be placed in the budget, and the necessary changes will be made in the social security law.

III. Reorganization of the reserve fund-seniority compensation.

The parties have embraced the principle that a general "social security law" will be enacted that will regard our community as a unit and will not accord privileges. This law will include the topics of retirement, social insurance, reserve fund-seniority compensation, special leave, and health insurance. For this purpose, the reserve fund and seniority compensation will be converted to a bonus fund. Until this is done, a tax exemption from the seniority compensation within the tax law will be ensured.

IV. Income tax.

With the goal of eliminating problems associated with irregularities resulting from current application of the income tax law, exemptions, and tax schedules and bearing in mind the principle that low-income workers today "pay taxes in advance":

- a. Amendment of the law will
  - i. Exempt the minimum wage from taxation.

ii. Be designed using the principle of progressive taxation, in which the income tax schedules "increase the taxpayer's obligation as his income rises."

b. Absolutely no occupational group will be accorded special treatment in the taxation of income. Income from every source will be taxed without consideration to the source within the economy of the income.

c. The money paid as seniority compensation will be partially exempt from taxation in the amount equal to the product of the monthly salary and the number of years of service. However, this monthly salary cannot exceed three times the minimum wage.

d. In order to obtain revenue from the agricultural sector and to ensure stability, general agricultural insurance will be dealt with promptly, and the future of the agricultural producer will be secured.

#### V. Drought.

The parties have adopted the principle of giving reparations for losses suffered because of drought in the agricultural sector. For this purpose:

a. When it becomes clear that there has been a reduction of agricultural income due to drought, supplementary resources to make reparations will be found, and, if necessary, a supplementary budget will be passed by the assembly. With this in mind, the placing of a specific total appropriation in the budget through the addition of one entry has been approved.

b. With the purpose of assisting animal producers who are affected by drought, the principle of indemnification for loss of revenues has been accepted. Animal feed will be ensured through subvention, or an assistance fund will be developed.

#### VI. Social assistance allowances.

Allowances for the families of martyrs, the parents of martyrs, and those who receive social assistance will be increased and readjusted in the light of cost-of-living developments.

All necessary measures in this direction will be taken.

#### VII. Renters.

The rental law will be reexamined. However, in order to be able to place more emphasis on social housing, this law will be designed to regulate the issuance of construction permits for rental housing, the advertising of rental units, and the rental system.

#### VIII. Topic of the Cypriot pound.

The principle of indemnifying those who suffered losses due to the transition from the Cypriot pound to the Turkish lira has been accepted.

For this purpose, the amount of this indemnification will be determined and will be paid within the framework of a law that will be passed.

#### IX. Currency and exchange operations.

Foreign-exchange revenues from exportation must be brought onto the island, it has been agreed. For this purpose:

- a. The currency and exchange law will be reevaluated immediately.
- b. All legal loopholes will be eliminated so that foreign exchange derived from exportation that has not come into the country in past years will. Legal action will be taken against those who do not bring in this foreign exchange.

#### X. Preventing smuggling.

It has been approved by the parties that:

- a. An effective customs law will be enacted.
- b. A customs organization law will be passed.
- c. Inspection and investigation officials (financial inspectors) will come under an effective law.
- d. The list of prohibited goods that applies to foreign trade (all types of electronic apparatus, automobiles, color television sets, videotape machines, and similar goods) will be lifted.
- e. A "coast guard" law will be enacted, and such an organization will be established and equipped.

#### XI. Freedom fighters' rights.

- a. Freedom fighters' salaries and benefits will be issued without deductions.
- b. Legal modifications will be made and the necessary decisions will be passed in order to ensure social housing for those who have participated in and have given service in the national struggle that began in 1958. These people will be provided arable land or property on which to build housing or housing will be constructed by the state.

#### XII. BRT [Press and Radio Organization].

Starting from the principle of the autonomy of the BRT, a charter law will be acted upon promptly.

#### XIII. Amnesty law.

An amnesty law that includes the points and bears the qualities agreed upon by the parties will be enacted.

Appendix No 2. Subjects that will be acted upon by the coalition government during the term of the government.

#### Financial Topics

[1.] The customs and organizations tax laws will be studied. Tax schedules will be designed in a manner to benefit tradesmen and low-income citizens. Measures regarding customs limits appropriate to the EEC-Cyprus agreements will be taken.

[2.] A detailed study will be begun immediately to decide what various legal measures will be taken for the purpose of developing investment opportunities that have been exhausted in the past on Cyprus and of working toward renewed concentration of resources. As part of this study, the views of experts, which include alternatives related to the status of the Cypriot pound, will also be sought.

[3.] A TFSC [Turkish Cypriot Federated State] currency and exchange law will be enacted within a period of time not to exceed 2 months. This law will include enforceable statutes dealing with foreign exchange obtained from exportation that has not been brought into the country to date and foreign exchange obtained from exportation that is carried out in the future.

[4.] A central bank law will be enacted promptly for the purpose of carrying out the functions of the central bank. A development bank will be established immediately in order to direct investments and provide financing.

#### Economy

Measures will be taken regarding services the state is obligated to provide in economic applications. The government will take broad-based measures to foster an increase in the success of that part of the public sector that is the "people's sector together with the private sector" and the success of the co-operatives sector.

#### Trade

[1.] Price and quality control will be begun immediately and intensively. The necessary domestic revision of existing laws and regulations will be carried out so as to expedite foreign sales. Sensitivity will be shown in the enforcement of existing laws against stockpiling, smuggling, and black marketeering. Legal loopholes will be closed immediately.

[2.] Acting upon the principle of the protection and encouragement of domestic production, amendments in the laws will be carried out in order to reduce to the minimum customs taxes on basic consumer goods that are imported.

[3.] A law that covers the principles of foreign trade will be studied immediately and passed by the assembly.

## Industry

[1.] The necessary measures will be taken to operate our industrial facilities belonging to the public at full capacity and to continue activities aimed at exportation. All legal measures will also be taken to deal with and encourage facilities belonging to the private sector within the same framework.

[2.] Bureaucratic obstacles will be eliminated for the purpose of encouraging new industrial investments. Necessary legal modifications will be made promptly to channel a significant portion of the public's investment resources into investments geared toward exportation.

[3.] Necessary plans will be drafted and needed land will be nationalized quickly in order to create organized industrial complexes in densely populated areas.

[4.] The government, through the KIT's, will always be open to means to meet community needs.

## Tourism

[1.] A tourism law and a tourism encouragement law will be enacted promptly.

[2.] Price policies in sectors related with tourism will be set in accordance with international competition and existing political and economic conditions. While doing so, the common view of organizations such as KITSAB [Turkish Cypriot Travel Agents Association] and the Hotel Council will be sought.

[3.] The development of tourism in our country will be accelerated.

## Communications

[1.] Existing resources will be used so that air communications will be handled in an orderly manner. If necessary, opportunities to cooperate with various international corporations will be studied.

[2.] From the standpoint of the foreign ties of the KTHY [Turkish Cypriot Airlines] to the community, the topic of forming a new airlines corporation outside Cyprus which is tied to the KTHY will be studied promptly for the purpose of providing necessary services.

## KIT's

The KIT's will be subject to reorganization in a manner such that production will meet the needs of the community and so that the KIT's will be able to help solve our export and employment problems. Necessary legal modifications will be made immediately to solve administrative and supervisory problems. Financing inadequacies will be given priority and will be solved through the Development Bank. The Turkey-TFSC partnership percentages will be taken up immediately so that the corporation administration can gain effectiveness.

## Domestic Affairs

[1.] The department of interior in the capital, district capitals, and central villages will be developed within the framework of the law and will carry out its supervision and functions without conflict with other official bodies. District offices will serve the public without demonstrating partisanship.

[2.] Using the central villages system, state services will be brought to citizens.

[3.] Keeping in mind the hierarchy system in state service, equal pay will be given for equal work.

[4.] Anomalies in the system of classification and advancement of state officials will be eliminated, and the principles of equal opportunities in promotions will be borne in mind.

[5.] Necessary measures will be taken in order to reprimand any public employee regardless of rank who is rude to a citizen, who leaves his work undone, who gives preferential treatment, or who accepts gifts or bribes.

[6.] Measures will be determined and implemented promptly in order to apply the principles of independence, nonpartisanship, and justice in the appointment, promotion, transfer, and similar operations of public employees and to ensure that the Public Services Commission, which supervises these affairs, is nonpartisan and independent.

## Communications and Public Works

[1.] Air and sea communications will be dealt with promptly.

[2.] A dockyard will be built at Famagusta.

[3.] The Karavostasi port will be developed.

[4.] Roads between towns will be repaired in a more orderly manner.

## Social Services

[1.] The social housing law will be rewritten to make it more effective.

[2.] It will be ensured that unfinished structures will be worked on quickly to be used as social housing.

[3.] State land in villages and towns will be made suitable for the construction of social housing.

[4.] Other necessary measures will be taken to prevent land speculation.

[5.] Necessary planning will be conducted in order to open up new residential areas that stretch to the sea in Lefke and Yeni Iskele.

#### Education, Culture, Youth, and Sports

[1.] The major goal of our education-culture policy is to raise national education to a contemporary level within the framework of Kemalism.

[2.] With the goal of ensuring our children education on Cyprus at every level beginning with nursery school, work will begin immediately to establish a Turkish Cypriot university that will make it possible for students and teachers from abroad to work and study in the TFSC.

[3.] Measures to ensure equal opportunity in education will be taken.

[4.] Necessary measures will be taken to create the opportunity for capable children of low-income citizens to study and receive free room and board at schools at every level of education.

[5.] Efforts will be made to increase opportunities for training in technology.

[6.] Emphasis will be placed on redesigning education in a manner befitting "the goals of planned development." With this in mind, work will be directed toward methods that develop, beginning with secondary education, educated manpower to meet needs for planned development.

[7.] Teachers' occupational problems will be solved quickly in cooperation with related unions. Teachers will be accorded the high value they deserve in the community. Their work will be conducted in an atmosphere of material and moral security. Opportunities will be made for teachers to take refresher courses and advanced professional training.

[8.] The state will ensure every child an education. If the number of children between the ages of 3 and 6 is great enough, nursery and preschools will be established. They will be equipped with all sorts of contemporary educational tools and materials, and those who work in these schools will have taken special courses on the subject.

[9.] In order to extend education to all segments of the population, practical, occupational-training courses will be set up in villages and towns. Among the major goals of our educational policy will be to initiate training for the public and to make it available throughout the TFSC quickly on subjects such as:

a. Agriculture, animal husbandry, and greenhouse gardening.

b. Engine repairing, the repair of electrical appliances, welding, and plumbing.

c. Tailoring, home economics, family budgeting, healthful living, and child care.

d. Basic accounting, methods of keeping books, foreign languages, the reading and writing of Turkish, and general culture.

[10.] In "central villages," children's libraries and public educational centers will be established.

[11.] Legal and administrative measures will be taken to ensure that use is made of teachers, inspectors, agriculturalists, and civil servants in public education courses.

[12.] The educational council will be made effective.

[13.] The history and geography of Cyprus will be placed in the school curricula in a more extensive and scholarly manner.

[14.] By applying the educational rule of "doing and living" in schools, it will be ensured that children are prepared, while of school age, for community life and productive work.

[15.] Care will be taken to channel students toward research and to broaden their general culture at every level and branch of education.

[16.] Necessary measures will be put into effect immediately in order to be able to deal closely with the financial and educational problems of our students who are receiving higher educations abroad and to be able to guide them.

[17.] Work will be undertaken to assist our fellow citizens in foreign countries with all sorts of educational and cultural problems; to ensure them support and opportunity to practice and develop their Turkish language, culture, and traditions; and to effect an increase in sustained relations with those countries and a familiarization with our state.

[18.] The opportunity will be created to introduce and critique Turkish Cypriot written, cultural, and art works in textbooks and courses.

[19.] Work will be undertaken so that art and cultural endeavors will have a more broad effect and so that they reach all levels of the community.

[20.] All conditions for a free environment for art and culture will be met. The state will help to develop Turkish Cypriot culture and art within its own characteristics and to open it to the world.

[21.] Social security will be provided to artists, philosophers, and writers.

[22.] The state will provide leadership, using its resources, for the distribution and exhibition of cultural and art works and for other cultural activities.

[23.] A "state exhibition, museum, and conference center" will be constructed to be used for cultural, art, and international conferences.

[24.] Necessary measures will be taken so that inspectors can give classes in leadership in their own fields and so that their examinations of schools are conducted in a more frequent and orderly manner. The balance between teaching and supervision will be made more functional and effective.

[25.] Work will be conducted so that youth become productive within the democratic system and participate in the economic development mobilization effort.

[26.] Work will be conducted to foster love and cement brotherhood among youths rather than divisiveness stemming from differences in political and social views.

[27.] Necessary changes will be made in the structures of related ministries for the purpose of developing areas of employment, housing, and agencies to aid youths.

[28.] Recognizing the great importance of physical education and sports in the development of personal character, health, and international relations, care will be taken so that the public can participate in sports in an effective and broad manner and can benefit from sports organizations.

[29.] Priority will be given to developing present facilities for youth and public amateur sports and physical education, constructing new facilities, and making all facilities open to the public.

[30.] Care will be taken to ensure participation in international sports competitions and to use sports as an effective means of introducing our nation.

#### Press and Communications

[1.] Acting upon the principle of autonomy, a BRT charter law will be drawn up and passed immediately.

[2.] A TAK [Turkish Cypriot News Agency] law will be enacted, and necessary measures will be taken to equip the new agency with modern equipment and facilities.

[3.] The necessary protection will be provided members of the press to allow them to perform their duties with freedom and security. With this in mind, a press law appropriate to freedom of the press will be enacted immediately.

#### Religion and Religious Freedom

[1.] Care will be taken to remain bound to the principles of secularism and freedom of belief.

[2.] Freedom of belief together with freedom of thought will be protected.

[3.] It will be ensured that our religious leaders are stimuli for and supporters of our development.

[4.] Training of our religious leaders will include social and economic subjects as well as religious.

[5.] The necessary measures will be taken to provide material and spiritual comforts for our religious leaders.

[6.] Needs for prayer leaders in villages will be met promptly.

#### Benevolent Foundations

The law dealing with supplementary donations will be reorganized.

#### Housing

Necessary legal modifications will be made to change the housing, land distribution, and equivalent value property law to meet conditions of the day and to give title deeds to rightful owners.

#### Foreign Politics

[1.] Cooperation with the motherland will be pursued.

[2.] In regard to the principle of coming to a solution to the problem through a continuation of talks between the communities and of opposing efforts to internationalize the problem, we believe that peace and a resolution will be realized within the framework of the following tenets:

a. The attainment by the Turkish Cypriot community in the north of a powerful state and its not allowing any concessions whatsoever on the subjects of security or economic self-sufficiency.

b. Opposition to all United Nations' decisions brought to the discussion table that do not match the realities that exist on Cyprus and that oppose the national cause.

c. The maintenance of Turkey in the role of guarantor.

d. The elimination of foreign military bases on Cyprus.

[3.] With a further increase in and development of our foreign representatives and with the appointment of truly qualified personnel, it will be ensured that the duty of informing the people of the world about our cause will be carried out more effectively.

[4.] For the purpose of being more closely involved in the social and cultural problems of fellow citizens living abroad and of giving direction to and facilitating activities of those able to assist the economy of the TFSC, a "foreign Turkish Cypriot solidarity and information" unit will be established. Interest will be shown and solutions will be sought for all sorts of problems.

## Health

- [1.] Legal deficiencies in health services will be eliminated, and more effective health services will be brought to villages.
- [2.] Care will be taken to provide more effective health services to those who seek treatment at hospitals.
- [3.] The topics of doctors' working hours and special rights and the concept of good service will be revised for the purpose of making the full-day law workable.
- [4.] Health services will be included when a national insurance system is developed.
- [5.] Drugs and medical equipment will be provided by the state and will be available at all units at all times. The necessary work to manufacture pharmaceuticals will be completed.

## Agriculture and Natural Resources

- [1.] An entry will be included in the 1982 budget dealing with drought, and a special appropriation will be included.
- [2.] Animal husbandry will be protected. For this purpose, aid will be provided promptly to animal producers that are affected by drought.
- [3.] Factors that cause shortages of mixed feed will be eliminated.
- [4.] Milk purchases will become widespread to include all regions of the TFSC.
- [5.] A meat combine charter law will be passed immediately and put into effect. For this purpose, measures will be taken in the 1982 budget to ensure the necessary state fiscal resources.
- [6.] The duties of the Soil Products Organization will be reexamined and will be subject to revision.
- [7.] A policy to protect producers will be pursued in wool purchases.
- [8.] The protection of the consumer and the producer in the marketing of meat will be ensured.
- [9.] The battle against animal diseases will continue without pause.
- [10.] Through production planning, the relationship between the producer and the state will not be ignored until it is too late.
- [11.] Seed production operations will be reexamined. Necessary changes will be made, and seeds will be improved.

[12.] Emphasis on and prompt solutions to problems will be sought in order to protect citrus orchards. It will be ensured that Cypfruvex [Cyprus Vegetable and Fruit Processing and Exporting Corporation] becomes a cooperative organization within a period of time.

[13.] A systematic plan will be used for the planting of vineyards. All necessary measures will be taken to develop technology to aid in the marketing of vineyard products.

[14.] The sowing of tobacco will be ensured. All necessary improvements will be made for the marketing and processing of tobacco.

#### Natural Resources

Ground water and underground water will be protected from wastefulness. In this respect, irrigation projects and pond construction projects will be examined promptly and will be put into the implementation phase.

Related studies on underground water resources, gypsum, dyes, minerals, and similar subjects will be completed and will make it possible for new operations to be started.

#### Cooperatives

[1.] Measures will be taken to ensure the development of cooperatives.

[2.] A law will be enacted by the assembly that will ensure that cooperatives utilize and are operated by democratic principles.

[3.] Education and supervision of cooperatives will be placed in the preliminary plan.

[4.] In the implementation of the TFSC's development plan, cooperatives will have the greatest voice in investments in agriculture and investments related to agriculture.

[5.] Factors that affect cooperatives negatively will be eliminated.

[6.] A Turkish Cypriot cooperatives charter law will be passed immediately.

[7.] The law will be designed such that those working in cooperatives will participate in the administration of the cooperatives in order to ensure their contribution in productivity.

[8.] The state will bear the financial responsibility in functions given cooperatives by the state.

Law and legal amendments foreseen within the framework of the government program.

1. Charter laws for the ministries and the offices and organizations affiliated with the ministries.

2. Income tax law.
3. Customs tax law.
4. Investment incentives law.
5. Foreign exchange, currency, and exchange office law.
6. Necessary legal modifications in order to make needed changes to maintain the development fund and to form an investment bank.
7. Passage of a TFSC central bank charter law.
8. A change in the law in order to provide tax exemptions for the minimum wage and for seniority compensation.
9. Charter law for the seniority compensation reserve fund.
10. Legal amendment in order to render price and quality control effective.
11. Legal amendment to simplify foreign sales.
12. Reorganization to prevent hoarding, smuggling, and black marketeering.
13. Necessary legal amendments in order to reduce to a minimum customs taxes on all consumer goods and raw materials.
14. Law to define principles for foreign trade.
15. Reorganization to encourage the foreign sale of industrial products.
16. Tourism law.
17. Charter and operations law for a corporation that will be affiliated with the Turkish Cypriot Airlines abroad and that will engage in the transporting of passengers and cargo.
18. Modification of the law related to supplementary donations.
19. A law to unite, within a "national insurance system," the reserve fund, seniority compensation, and social insurance.
20. Amendment of the housing, land distribution, and equivalent value property law to comply with conditions of the day and to attain workability.
21. Law amendments or legal changes related to the establishment of a unit that will work toward more effective results in our campaign to advertise, encourage, and ensure investments in the TFSC of Turkish Cypriots living abroad and organization amongst themselves.

Immediate passage of the

22. Law to establish a meat combine.
23. General agriculture insurance law.
24. Cooperatives law.
25. Insurance law.
26. Social insurance law that is in committee.
27. Basic law regarding education.
28. Law dealing with the establishment and functioning of KIT's.
29. Law regulating vineyards, wineries, and liquor factories.
30. Cooperatives organization law.
31. DHP law proposals that are currently on the assembly agenda.
32. Coast Guard law.
33. All other laws proposed by the constitution.

11673

CSO: 4654/250

## MITTERRAND FOREIGN POLICY EXAMINED AFTER ONE YEAR

Paris LE MONDE in French 4 May 82 p 12

[Article by Maurice Delarue: "10 May, One Year Later: The Old Ways Are Being Followed, but With More Risks"]

[Text] Mr Cheysson, who, when he arrived at the Quai d'Orsay called for change and proclaimed the "socialist" nature of the new foreign policy, recently stated that, although "the image" of France in the world is "clearer" and "better" than it was before 10 May 1981, "it is basically no different." "France," said the minister of Foreign Relations, "has a continuity that transcends majorities."\*

International policy tolerates neither discontinuity nor repudiations. France's change of majority on 10 May was not enough to assure that, in a world which had not changed at all, its place and its interests would be different. The new leaders are expected to assume the commitments, whether good or bad, of their predecessors. The necessary changes can only be negotiated and gradual. They could not be dictated by domestic policy without some risks.

Because the new French diplomacy is too open to confusing the roles of the government and the PS, a successful mission conducted by Mr Cheysson in Ethiopia turned into a failure and Mr Patasse's failed coup d'etat in Bangui exacerbated the African chaos. Would not Mr Mitterrand's trip to Jerusalem have been less damaging to Franco-Arab relations and consequently more useful for a settlement in the Near East if it had been programed in terms of more diplomatic and less electoral considerations? Conversely, whatever one thinks of Great Britain's European policy, one cannot help admiring the superb indifference of its diplomacy toward the rotation of parties, and the consistency of its strategy for the last 25 years in relation to the community system, for example.

Mr Mitterrand has not appreciably modified the mechanism of France's foreign activities. Policy is still being made at the Elysee (where a special cell for Africa has been maintained) and set in motion at the Quai d'Orsay, in Mr Cheysson's own style,

\*Interview published in PARIS-MATCH on 16 April (LE MONDE, 9 April).

\*The date of the trip was officially announced, contrary to promises, without waiting for the conclusion of the Security Council debate on the Golan but two days before the 17 January by-elections, and it was set for 3 March, that is to say without waiting for the evacuation of the Sinai, which might have justified it in the minds of the Arabs, but 11 days before the cantonal elections.

of course, which is more "square" than that of his predecessors. On paper, the coherence of this activity has been strengthened and the Quai has been invested with responsibility for all foreign relations. The windows of the diplomatic service have been opened wide, the better to integrate the nation, but the recruiting current is running chiefly from outside to inside, which is provoking some grumbling.

As it did during the preceding term, direct contact diplomacy is being accentuated. It remains to be seen whether this frenzy of trips which is being universally practiced, by the way, has more advantages or more inconveniences than classic diplomacy. Mr Mitterrand has supported the regular bilateral summits (French-German, French-British, French-Quebecois at the prime minister level) and the quasi-institutional multilateral summits invented by Giscard d'Estaing: the European Council, the summits of the seven industrialized nations, the French-African summits.

### Europe and Security

European affairs are still the pillar of French policy. Like his predecessors, Mr Mitterrand is attempting a "revival," but he is putting real determination into it and, in particular, is focusing his attention on a terrain that is as essential as it is unexplored, social Europe, at the risk of incurring charges of protectionism.

Mr Mitterrand came to power at a crucial time for the Community. Past and future expansions, permanent challenges to basic principles by the British, concessions agreed to by Giscard d'Estaing, make a reexamination of the mechanisms inevitable. Even though her partners' solidarity in the Falkland Islands crisis gives some hope that Mrs Thatcher will one day be moved by the European grace, the French leaders will need a Gaullian firmness to protect their country's vital interests.

After several fruitless advances in the direction of London last summer and a hand that was extended in as friendly a fashion as it was grasped in Rome, Mr Mitterrand wasted no time in becoming aware that the "privileged relations" with West Germany are still the required foundation of French policy and European construction. It matters little that Helmut and Francois cannot address each other terms in English, their planetary views are sufficiently close to assure the solidity of their entente. The French-German couple's weakness lies elsewhere: in the lack of cohesion in their economic policies, which in the long run may stir up tensions.

Security and East-West relations constitute the field in which Mr Mitterrand has shifted French policy the most. Four meetings with Mr Reagan in one year are a lot; none with Mr Brezhnev is not very many. The aggravated tension means something, and the "13 December coup" in Warsaw smashed whatever hopes the French left might have been nourishing for reviving detente, but Mr Mitterrand's personal convictions means even more. It is no paradox that the Communists' arrival in the government coincides with a French hardening toward Moscow. It is because the Communists are useful to him at home that the president deems it necessary not to lend the slightest suspicion of a reversal of the alliances.

The basic postulate of French security is unchanged: it rests on an independent defense--nuclear and classic--within the Atlantic Alliance. French participation in the next NATO summit in June will be inspired by the 1974 and 1975 precedents.

But Mr Mitterrand has publicly approved NATO's policy on the Euromissiles, which Giscard d'Estaing did not do. Far from going to see Mr Brezhnev in questionable circumstances, Mr Mitterrand and Mr Cheysson (except for one meeting with Mr Gromyko at the UN) have suspended the man-to-man dialogue with the Soviets, this with all the more presumptuousness because they are continuing it, insofar as possible, with the other Eastern leaders. Mr Cheysson went to Warsaw (before 31 December), he went to Sofia from 5 to 7 May, and Mr Mitterrand is scheduled to go to Budapest in July without having set foot in Moscow, which none of their predecessors permitted himself to do.

Less explainable is the dichotomy between these political relations with the USSR, which are virtually nil, and active economic relations (with the largest contract for gas ever concluded between the two countries). Mr Cheysson answers that we must not "penalize ourselves," language that is understood by men like Barre or Couve de Murville, not to mention the American cereal producers.

### Moralizing Policy

Undoubtedly the "moralization" of French policy, so heavily advocated during the election campaign, caused some friction with Washington, but since the elections in Salvador a certain French discretion prevails in Central America, and arms sales to Nicaragua have been slowed down. In any case, the protection of human rights is more prejudicial to the USSR than to the United States. At the Madrid conference, Mr Mitterrand precisely followed Mr Giscard d'Estaing's footsteps, even while preparing a few disarmament initiatives of his own devising. Curiously, however, he has declined to participate personally in the UN session that will be dedicated to him. As for "revision"--a very big word--of French arms sales, so far Chile is the only country to have suffered from it. Customers, old or new, are still welcome.

North-South cooperation is another of Mr Mitterrand's big themes which Giscard d'Estaing had previously worked on. The results of Cancun are, for the moment, no more promising than those, for example, of the 1976-1977 Paris conference, and for the same reasons: American incomprehension.

The president of the Republic is certainly convinced that on this terrain, less than on any other, it is not necessary to succeed in order to persevere. For his part, he is increasing French aid for development, but his means are limited. It remains for him to convince Washington that the troubles and conflicts of the Third World are specific and that the West would commit an irreparable error if it were to assimilate the North-South dialogue into the East-West confrontation.

The risk of this is obvious in Africa. Nothing has changed in the last year, unless it is that conflicts are established and chaos is exacerbated. The new French leaders, in any case, have understood that there is no miracle recipe, that ideologies are impotent, that it is impossible for France to disengage, and that the only practicable African policy is an intelligent pragmatism.

The risk is no less obvious in the Near East, where Mr Mitterrand has truly innovated, not in substance but in method. As regards substance, he repeats what Giscard d'Estaing was saying during his trip to the Gulf and the European Community in the Venice statement: peace can only result from the simultaneous recognition of Israel's right to existence and the Palestinians' right to self-determination, the

latter being capable of leading (new preciseness) to a Palestinian "state." It was audacious of Mr Mitterrand to give expression to this axiom in Jerusalem, where no French president had ever gone, while supporting it with demonstrations of friendship, such as French participation in the Sinai force.

The beneficial effects of the trip are so far not apparent [see second footnote]. Despite sincere overtures (toward Algeria at the price of a very burdensome gas contract, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq), the whole Arab world believes that Mr Mitterrand is aligned with Washington and that, especially in his votes in the UN, he "is doing too much" for Israel, while the Jewish state, although it actually evacuated the Sinai, is accentuating its repression and its ascendancy over the other occupied territories. In fact, French diplomats believe the cards will be redealt (having recovered the Sinai, Egypt will sooner or later reintegrate the Arab world), which will again give a role to the "honest broker."

In Asia, Mr Mitterrand's diplomacy is in its infancy. After a trip to Tokyo which is long-awaited and intended especially to strengthen the Western world (before the summit to be held in Versailles from 4 to 6 June), and one contact with Hanoi, there will probably be other initiatives, especially toward China and both Koreas (by coming out in favor of simultaneous international recognition).

#### A Real Change

A "clearer" image of France, says Mr Cheysson. This is not always true, but it often is. Relations with the USSR are firmly drawn. Mr Mitterrand says aloud what Giscard d'Estaing was thinking or whispering softly to Mr Brezhnev. "Mitterrandist" France is taking more risks: the trip to Jerusalem, the military contribution to the Sinai accord, the offer to reinforce the peacekeeping force in Lebanon, active support for Great Britain in the Falkland Islands crisis with key sanctions against Argentina, etc. But over the long term, firmness is only practicable if it is applied by a strong France.

Economically strong: it is not by reproaching Mr Reagan for his interest rates or the Japanese for their commercial dynamism that France will assure the solidity of its currency and consolidate Europe, but by sane management of its own economy.

Politically strong: Mr Mitterrand's great foreign objectives not being in question, why is he not obtaining the agreement of the whole country in executing his policy? In most democracies, in the United States, in Great Britain and elsewhere, the bipartite national consensus is always sought before decisions are taken having to do with the country's vital interests and committing its future. Why is not the quest for such a consensus the rule in France as well? Since it holds the levers of control, the government has everything to gain by it, while appropriating to itself the ideas it deems good and by somehow including the opposition in its own decisions. In this would lie a true change.

8946

CSO: 3100/617

## VAN DER STOEL ON U.S. - NETHERLANDS RELATIONS

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 17 Apr 82 pp 94-100

[Interview with Max Van der Stoel, minister of foreign affairs, by ELSEVIER editor-in-chief D.M. van Rosmalen: "Friendship Also Expresses Itself Through Criticism"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] The celebration of the 200th anniversary of the existence of relations between the Netherlands and the United States will take place at a time when understanding between the two countries leaves a great deal to be desired. Could you speak of a low point in these relations?

[Answer] I wouldn't want to speak of a low point. We have numerous and regular contacts with one another. You cannot say that we disagree on everything. Take, for example, the position of both governments on the situation in Afghanistan. We are following the same line on this issue of foreign policy. In the area of European security and cooperation -- the conference in Madrid -- we have also found a way, sometimes very easily, sometimes less so, to arrive at the same position. Hence, we are not opposed over the whole line. We agree on one basic point, specifically that it would be positively alarming if the sphere of control of communism were to be further expanded. Where we do have a difference of opinion is about the manner in which this is to take place. America puts a strong emphasis on building up military strength. For our part, we don't deny the need for an effective collective defense, but we add to this: you should not prevent the power expansion of communism through the building up of military capacity alone. I am thinking, for example, about the whole set of problems relating to Latin America, and specifically Central America. I believe that extensive programs to fight poverty in Latin America could be more significant than arms supplies, especially as in this respect these regimes are often considered to be oppressive regimes by large parts of the population.

[Question] In this context, do you believe that when the United States talks about power, that we understand something quite different by that power? That they translate power more in military terms and that we are more mindful of certain moral aspects of that power?

[Answer] With the notation that we do not deny the need for collective defense. We are not neutralists. We don't say: let us forget the armament of Western Europe. What we are saying is that other means besides military means

should be used within the global strategy to prevent the expansion of the power of communism. We are also saying that you will reach wrong conclusions if you see everything in terms of the opposition between communism and anti-communism. Of course, there is an opposition between the communist world and the Western world. But you should not consider this to be so absolute that you no longer see any other dimensions. For example, the whole North-South dimension, or the risk of the spread of nuclear weapons. Totally aside from the East-West opposition, this is a terrifying problem. Therefore, once again: we agree with the United States in terms of the desire to prevent the expansion of the power of communism; we don't always agree about the best ways to do this.

[Question] Could you also indicate which of their ways we do not agree with in terms of defense?

[Answer] I assume that we say yes to the collective system of NATO. I would also say that, however horrible nuclear arms may be, within the framework of deterrence we, in the Western world, cannot make do without nuclear arms in the current situation. I would say, however, that nuclear armament as an element in the strategy of deterrence is increasingly creating problems in a democratic society, not only in our country but also in other countries around us. It is a question which also arouses a great deal of discussion in the United States these days. Now, this does not lead to the conclusion: hence, we are simply going to get rid of nuclear arms unilaterally. It does, however, lead to the question of whether we, as a Western alliance, should not once again thoroughly consider whether our dependence on nuclear arms cannot be reduced. In this respect, new technological possibilities in the conventional area apply. Have we used conventional defense to the limit? Wouldn't it be possible to replace certain nuclear weapons systems with conventional ones during the eighties and nineties? This same approach includes the Dutch conception that we should do everything possible, however difficult this may often be, to really give the disarmament dialogue content and to strive for results. We cannot indiscriminately accept what the Soviet Union offers us. Naturally, we should also make sure that we achieve a good understanding about the verification of the agreements to be concluded. But at the same time, we should not take the road -- for which a tendency exists in America -- where, as punishment for what the Soviets did in Poland and Afghanistan, we would say: now we'll have to see whether we still can continue the dialogue on arms control. I think that this is a wrong point of departure, because it is based on the assumption that such a dialogue is a favor being conferred upon the Soviet Union.

[Question] Isn't this and other differences of opinion, for example, concerning Latin America, based on a very fundamental fact: a difference of opinion about morality in politics?

[Answer] That is a difficult question. I would not in the least want to posit that only Dutch foreign policy is moral. But totally aside from moral considerations, on purely pragmatical grounds, I can easily imagine a position like mine. But if the Dutch position also includes an urge to examine the possibilities of reducing dependence on nuclear arms, then this is partly due to the fact that we have experienced in discussions in our own country how much resistance nuclear armament encounters on purely moral grounds.

[Question] Does the same apply to El Salvador, for example?

[Answer] If you are saying that ethical considerations relating to principles play a very strong role in the debate on Dutch foreign policy, then I completely agree with you. That is very evident. Furthermore, I believe that you can reach a similar position on the basis of a cool and sober analysis of the question of how best to promote stabilization in the Caribbean. But it is certain that Dutch foreign policy and the discussions surrounding it are very strongly marked by ethical motives. Without implying that other countries do not have that ethical component, I do believe that it is much more predominant in the Netherlands than in many other countries.

[Question] In this context, something curious is taking place. When I think back to 30 years ago, at that time our reproach addressed to the United States was precisely that their position concerning the decolonization process in the Netherlands Indies was too ethical. Who has changed: we or the Americans?

[Answer] I have listened to Dutch indignation about this in discussions. The Americans posited that colonialism was out of date, whereas in discussions here the question was very seriously raised as to whether they were really ready for independence. I am not saying that the Americans were not at times guilty of a certain naivety with their insistence on rapid decolonization. But it is a fact that they recognized the urge for independence earlier and better than we did in Western Europe. When you say then: who has changed? We or the Americans? Then the answer lies in the fact that the Americans see communism as the greatest threat to the independence and self-development of peoples. When this communism takes over a country or a people, then the Americans see this as the worst that could happen to them. That is actually the predominant American philosophy. My reaction to this is: I abhor communism. I have always abhorred it and I don't feel any different about it now than I did 25 years ago. But at the same time I am of the opinion that the appearance of revolutionary movements in Central America cannot be equated with the advent of communism. It may be that, for their own purposes, communist countries try to jump in and to harness the revolutionary movements to their wagon. But the question is whether it wouldn't be better to look for positive forms of cooperation with the revolutionary movements, precisely to prevent communist countries from using these movements for their own purposes.

[Question] Do you believe then that when the United States indirectly interferes in these kinds of countries, as it is doing now, that to a certain extent then it is partly responsible for the atrocities which occur there?

[Answer] I had hoped that in the case of El Salvador the United States would have tried more vigorously than it did to look for opportunities for a political dialogue. Perhaps a shift will occur in this respect in the upcoming weeks: that regime is anticommunist and hence it is friendly to us, because the enemies of our enemy are our friends. May I illustrate this with a European example? On the American side, a great deal was condoned relative to the regime of the former Greek colonels, but even today we are still paying the price for this. NATO and America are not popular concepts in Greece. This was different during the years prior to the regime of the colonels. That is a clear warning. Besides, the Americans have not been completely silent about what is wrong in El Salvador.

[Question] Another complaint in the United States concerns the peace movement in the Netherlands which, according to the Americans, underestimates the Soviet threat. Do you believe that this American complaint is well-founded?

[Answer] People talk so often about "the " peace movement. There are all kinds of peace movements. When I think about the demonstration of 21 November when 400,000 Dutchmen were afoot to demonstrate for peace and against the danger of nuclear weapons, I cannot say that all of those 400,000 were demonstrating exclusively against American nuclear armament; many of them were also demonstrating against the SS-20. I would in any case object to the assumption that the Netherlands is now in the grip of pacifism and neutralism. I do believe, and I have also tried to explain this to my American discussion partners, that there is a tremendous aversion to nuclear armament in the Netherlands and that there is also fear about the continuing escalation of nuclear armament. People are afraid that, if these arms continue to be stockpiled, a moment may arise when these weapons are put into action somewhere, with all the unimaginable consequences of such a move.

[Question] Do you yourself have trouble making this clear in conversations with the Americans?

[Answer] This depends somewhat on the person I am talking to. One of my American interlocutors, whom I actually do not consider to be representative of all the others, once told me: it is clear that you in the Netherlands should be made to understand clearly what the military relationships between NATO and the Warsaw Pact really are; you have not succeeded in this up to now. To such an interlocutor I would say: but then I have apparently not succeeded in explaining to you what is going on here in the Netherlands either. Even if the fact concerning the level of armament were known everywhere and were undisputed, even then there would still be the question of whether we are really giving the right response to this arms build-up on the Soviet side. And then people in the Netherlands come up with formulas which I often cannot share. /Nuclear arms out of the world, beginning with the Netherlands/ [printed in italics] is not a slogan which appeals to me because it immeasurably underestimates the "Brezhnev doctrine" -- especially toward the East. I also find the tendency to write off arms control talks as something which will never succeed anyhow, questionable. But I also think that it is essential to make it clear to the Americans how much anxiety, fear, aversion there is here relative to the nuclear arms race, and also what moral objections play a role here. All of this is felt so strongly that we have to keep this in mind within the alliance, all the more so as this is not a specifically Dutch phenomenon. We are witnessing the same phenomenon in the FRG, in England. We are also witnessing the first signs of it in America. It is a problem which we must face. And when I bring that up, then I don't feel like someone who is in the process of undermining the alliance. On the contrary. The alliance is only rendered a service when we try to focuss the attention of the alliance on these problems. In the future we will be able to get this system of collective defense adequately accepted by our population only if these problems are very clearly brought out in the policy.

[Question] When we talk about the difficulties in our relations with the United States, we cannot forget that there were also high points in the not

too distant past. I am thinking then of our common struggle against Hitler and of the Marshall plan through which America enabled us after the war to put our economy back on its feet. Does the memory of this still play an active role in your policy and in this country?

[Answer] Of course, this memory plays a part. They are things which have definitely not disappeared from my memory. I do believe that it would be true to say that this will apply to a much lesser extent to the younger generation. Generally speaking, I would like to say that friendship can also express itself through criticism if one is really convinced that a friend seems to be taking the wrong path. We don't have the right to take a moralizing, nitpicking stand toward America. That would be ridiculous. But I do believe that in an alliance of partners of different weight, and yet in principle equal partners, critical comments can be made, and that it would actually be a lack of respect for good relations which have existed for so many years if one were afraid to express this criticism. But the expression of criticism does imply that one is also willing to accept criticism and to practice self-criticism. This cannot be a one way street. We should also take stock of the considerations behind the American policy and honestly ascertain whether there are elements in it, the significance of which we may have underestimated. I see the relationship between the Netherlands and the United States as one of two partners: critical but at the same time loyal. We are not breaking off the alliance; neither are we avoiding it; we do believe that it is ultimately in the interest of the alliance if differences of opinion are talked about rather than hidden away. It is precisely in moments when diverging opinions are held, that the need for more intensive talks grows. In short, a very intensive Atlantic dialogue is of the utmost importance. In this respect, I also adhere to such ideas, for example, as the one recently brought up by Minister Genscher of the FRG, specifically that in addition to the formal meeting of the NATO Council, where a certain agenda must be followed and which must produce a joint statement, the NATO ministers -- like the EC ministers -- should get together twice a year on an informal basis, without the constraint and pressure of having to make decisions, but purely to get to know each other's considerations better and to be able to understand better the backgrounds of one another's policy. I believe that this kind of meeting has proven its usefulness within the framework of the European Community. It would also be possible within the framework of the NATO alliance.

[Question] Speaking about that future -- in the very near future, the Netherlands will have to decide whether it will be willing to deploy modern medium range missiles on its territory. It is known that America sets great store by such a decision because the government of the FRG has already sent word that it would be willing to deploy such missiles on German territory only if other countries do likewise. As a few West European countries are not willing to do this, the Netherlands is faced with a heavy responsibility. According to the Americans, the position of the Netherlands could well be decisive for the whole plan to deploy modern missiles in Western Europe. Is this American view correct?

[Answer] Let me emphasize that not only in Washington, but also in Bonn, a great deal of significance is attached to what the Dutch government and the Dutch parliament will decide in this matter. I don't know whether the Dutch

decision would actually be determining for the ultimate position of the Federal Republic of Germany. You could imagine a situation in which the FRG would deploy anyhow; even if the Netherlands does not participate. I am well aware that the Germans set great store by an ultimately positive decision from the Netherlands, even though the government of the FRG -- just as we do -- would first like to examine whether it would be possible to achieve a so-called zero option. The difference between the German and the Dutch positions lies in the fact that, if negotiations do not meanwhile produce the zero option result, the German side will in any case proceed with the deployment of modern missiles according to a certain plan. The Netherlands, on the other hand, will, at a time to be determined later and in the light of the results of the negotiations, decide whether or not it will proceed with the deployment.

[Question] Doesn't an important domestic political factor enter into the dialogue concerning what will or will not happen in the area of defense? Specifically, that a worsening economic situation would have much more serious economic consequences in the Netherlands than in America? To clarify my question: in Western Europe, the economic crisis of the thirties led to political extremes such as fascism, national socialism, and communism. This was not the case in America. Do you believe that people in America may well underestimate the domestic political dangers which would exist if we were to accede to all the American wishes relative to our defense?

[Answer] I am inclined to say yes to that. I would like to say in general terms that the United States underestimates what we do. Our Dutch contribution is not only qualitatively good; moreover, relatively speaking and taking into account the size of the population, it is in no way inferior to that of the Germans, for example. Americans sometimes forget that the Netherlands has a system of compulsory military service, which the Americans have abolished; a system which after all entails heavy sacrifices for many young people in the Netherlands. Those are elements which are sometimes underestimated on the American side.

[Question] Is it your experience that in terms of their wishes relative to our defense, the Americans also understand the objections arising from our geography and from the density of our population?

[Answer] I have sometimes used the image of the reaction of the American people if cruise missiles were to be deployed on Long Island, right in the heart of a densely populated area. This example was immediately noted in the NEW YORK TIMES. That is certainly an aspect which is sometimes underestimated in America. In America, geography hardly enters into it. There are the deserts of Nevada and Utah where nuclear missiles could be deployed.

[Question] Other areas of tension are Poland and Turkey -- and specifically, what we can or cannot do about the situations in those countries. I understand that with regard to Poland we have reached a high level of agreement. Do you think that it will soon be possible to be on the same level with the United States with regard to Turkey?

[Answer] As far as Poland is concerned, we are equivalent in terms of the premises of our policy. We are asking Poland to put an end to martial law,

to free the political prisoners, and to restore the dialogue between Solidarity, the church and the government. It definitely does not look as if these points of departure will be achieved. On the contrary, the Solidarity union has been systematically destroyed. The political prisoners are still locked up and martial law has barely been softened. But I only mentioned this to illustrate that our premises are the same. We are now faced with the difficult question of what else we should do in the economic area with regard to Poland and the Soviet Union. Here again, I would note a few points of agreement: no new credits for Poland, and certain restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union. But the question is: how far do you go? As a matter of fact, the Americans themselves decided on a rather modest package in terms of their economic measures toward Poland. They are leaving grain deliveries untouched, as well as large fertilizer deliveries. Should Europe make greater sacrifices within the framework of economic restrictions than America? I would be inclined to answer this negatively.

[Question] Turkey, that is a very difficult issue...

[Answer] To do full justice to the American position, it should be said that, on the American side, the hope exists that there will really be a return to a democratic parliamentary system. And, naturally, I hope so too. Only then I do ask a number of questions about the nature of that future democratic parliamentary regime: whether it will indeed be a system which deserves that name, or whether the power of the executive body will be such that parliament will only play a modest role. In the final analysis, only the new constitution will be able to answer that question. In addition, a very important element is our concern about all kinds of phenomena which are contrary to the obligations contracted by Turkey within the framework of the European Human Rights Conference. In which context I have the impression that the line in Turkey is getting tougher while terrorism has precisely been significantly reduced lately. Fully recognizing the fact that in 1980, when the generals took over power, the country was on the verge of a civil war and was being ravaged by terrorism from both the extreme left and the extreme right, fully recognizing those factors while terrorism has decreased so much now, I am wondering why it is necessary to maintain such strict press censorship; why it is necessary, now that terrorism has virtually disappeared, to prohibit the members of the latest parliament to participate in the elections and to stand as candidate; why it is necessary to disband political parties; why it is necessary, during the union trials in Istanbul, to arrest the senior lawyer; why it is necessary to put a former minister and president who, in an interview with a foreign newspaper, showed evidence of not being in complete agreement with the government line in jail for a while? These are all matters which cause concern and which have led to the idea of lodging a complaint against Turkey within the framework of the European Convention on Human Rights. As a matter of fact, this treaty includes ample provisions for Turkey to respond and to argue that perhaps certain Dutch concerns are groundless. What the Americans underestimate is the fact that the existence of a non-democratic system within NATO affects the credibility of NATO as an alliance of democratic states and of states which uphold human rights. And that is an aspect which the American side should after all also pay attention to.

[Question] May I draw your attention to a positive point in our relations? Do you believe that the fact that we contribute to the peace forces in the Sinai desert is appreciated by America?

[Answer] I think that our participation is definitely appreciated from the American side as an attempt, in an area which has so often been the scene of fighting, to make provisions which should prevent a renewal of the fighting. This was perceived as very positive. I believe that it also established the conviction that we are not only interested in criticizing but that we also want, wherever possible, to do something concrete to safeguard peace and stability in the world.

[Question] Finally, do you have certain wishes with regard to future relations with the United States?

[Answer] What I would like to stress is that I consider good cooperation between Europe and the United States as essential to peace and stability in the world, and that everything possible should be done especially when the relationship is somewhat strained, to bridge the differences of opinion. The significance of Europe and America working together in the same direction should not be underestimated. This can be an enormous positive force for good. And I would definitely consider it a disaster if we were to become estranged from one another. I believe that we in Europe should make an effort to avoid this. But the other way round, we should also expect this from our American friends. They should also make the necessary effort to understand the European position and not proceed unilaterally, in the sense that they would go over the heads of the Europeans in matters of common interest to follow a line which could run into European objections. This approach would create a cleavage which, precisely in the interest of peace and stability, we would do better to avoid. And I consider it a task for the Netherlands to ensure in all possible ways that the European-American dialogue be continued as intensively as possible in the future. At the same time, I believe that as intense an exchange of ideas as possible between the Netherlands and America is in the interest of both countries. As far as that goes, the openness and self-criticism of American society are phenomena which are sometimes not sufficiently recognized in the Netherlands, but which I do consider to be positive elements. I myself was one of the critics of the American Vietnam policy. But at the same time, I was impressed by the fact that in the final analysis it was primarily the opposition at home which caused America to withdraw from Vietnam. In a word, even though we have differences of opinion, I express the hope that the Netherlands and America will repeatedly find each other again in the future.

8463

CSO: 3105/167

## MILITARY UNPREPARED TO ACCEPT UNQUESTIONED CIVILIAN CONTROL

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 1 May 82 pp 12, 13

[Article by Augusto de Carvalho: "Military Are Not Entering the Political Reserves"]

[Text] With 8 years elapsed, and after some vicissitudes, several events which are significant from a politico-military standpoint appeared on the scene this 25 April, just prior to the end of the constitutional transition period. It is worthwhile taking more than a mere note of them.

In fact, the Council of the Revolution is about to be abolished through the express desire of the texts which gave it existence. The military who left the barracks to overthrow the fascist regime will be confined to them, on the assumption that the democratic institutions resulting from the voicing of the people's wishes will operate without guidance of any kind.

But if this is so in theory, is it also such in fact? What were we told by the military on this 25 April, and what are we told by the facts and incidents underlying all those statements? This is what we shall attempt to analyze in the text which follows.

## Pluralism and Criticism of the Government

In the first place, it was evident from all the speeches that pluralistic democracy is indisputable. The opposition, from a political standpoint, of the military speakers to the present government was also clear in all of them. It was not spared serious criticism, both in the strictly military aspects (relating to the type of dependence of the commanders on the civilian authority), and in the more universal aspect of directing the destiny of the Portuguese people; ranging from the categorical speech, as has been customary, given by council member Vasco Lourenco, to the populism of Costa Neves, and including the moderation of Vitor Crespo.

Vasco Lourenco declared: "However, we admit that the prospects that appear to us upon analyzing the signs of the present time are not encouraging, and it has even become legitimate to ask ourselves what type of democracy it is being attempted to practice when the holders of the executive power, while simultaneously doing nothing to put an end to the widespread corruption, and while simultaneously proving themselves to be incompetent and losing credibility among the populace, are increasing their provocation and exploitation of the workers, and attempting

to create conditions leading to repressive intervention, not even hesitating to contrive spurious states of social disorder."

In this context, and speaking parenthetically, Vasco Lourenco stressed: "I would by no means be surprised if the strategist of anti-subversion were to see in this coexistence of ours another one of his fancied insurrections and hastened to seek the aid of foreign specialists. While it is disturbing that an attempt should be made to show that democracy is defended with the cudgel, the situation becomes worse when there is no hesitation to manipulate the leading news media in a scandalous fashion for this purpose."

Commenting on the potential qualities of pluralistic democracy ("a conscious option of the Portuguese people"), council member Costa Neves, in turn, emphasized: "Hence, the rulers must understand it and practice it as a way of serving the people, and never, as has been occurring, to be served by the people." Also stigmatizing the "assaults" on the news media, he defended the workers against a certain type of politics that is underway:

"With a view toward the reestablishment of the large estates that have been lost and the easy profits accrued through the exploitation of human beings, they accuse the rural workers and the farmers of not producing sufficient food, while they do everything to prevent them from receiving the essential technical and financial support, and put their adherents into action for the purpose of dismantling the most prosperous cooperative units of the agrarian reform area."

Vitor Crespo, for his part, expressed regret over the fact that, "We must conclude that we have failed, in both degree and extent, to accomplish the goals which we proposed for the Armed Forces on 25 April."

In brief, and from an overall political standpoint, the criticism of the government was a dominant theme, both in the speeches delivered by the military and in the street demonstrations.

With regard to the latter type of action, the joint participation of the PS [Socialist Party] and PC [Communist Party] in Lisbon, with the exclusion of AD [Democratic Alliance], was noteworthy. In our opinion, however, this was a merely incidental event. It is not legitimate to draw hasty conclusions from it concerning a united leftist platform that would include Communists and Socialists in the future. They joined together only under the banner of the libertarian ideas (in the broad sense) of April.

Where Are the Military Heading?

Where will the military go after the revision of the Constitution? What fate has been devised for them? The answer to these questions involves another one: What fate do the military of April accept for themselves?

Insofar as this point is concerned, the meeting in Santarem was truly significant. The luncheon included the largest number of officers of the Permanent Cadre (and particularly from the younger strata) ever to meet thus far. Present there were 1,587 officers in all, to whom we must add another 150 who, as usual, met in Guimaraes.

Unprecedented, however, was the presence of Gen Ramalho Eanes, which was kept secret until the last minute. If his participation had been publicized, the number of those present would unquestionably have increased greatly.

#### Eanes' Presence

The presence of the president of the republic was to officially sanction these April meetings (on the very eve of the end of the transition period wherein the Council of the Revolution will disappear and the participation of the military in active politics will cease to be institutionalized).

Eanes at Santarem is all the more significant inasmuch as, in the past, there were actually military chiefs who went so far as to try to ban these luncheons, thus deactivating the participation of more or less undecided officers. In the future, they will acquire the status of virtually institutional forums, and it will no longer be the politico-military of the Council of the Revolution who will take the floor, a fact to be emphasized. This will stem from the military organism itself, with the mingling of the various positions, and it will become more difficult later to distinguish between the "political" and the "operational" types. With the end of the Council of the Revolution, and with what has been termed the return of the military to the barracks, they will end up assuming positions based more on political objectives, which they will not fail to air and which they will even intensify at their longer meetings.

Strange as it may seem, the disappearance of the CR will politicize the military more.

Eanes wanted to affirm this very fact by showing up "unexpectedly" at Santarem. In terms of a constitutional revision, in a sea of controversy, when the government has not missed an opportunity to attack the president of the republic, he went there to say clearly: Beyond the popular vote which elected me, I am on the side of those who made April, and they are on my side. Moreover, his remarks left no room for doubt: "The comrade of comrades is present at this function, although he has not left the president of the republic either in the car or at home."

On the other hand, it should be made quite clear that the theme of April in the speeches was of pluralistic democracy, supported by the popular vote. Therefore, if there was any discouragement implicit or even explicit on that occasion, it was from the totalitarian extremists. Conversely, the personage of Ramalho Eanes, in a political crescendo based on the national viewpoint and enhancing prestige abroad (to which his relations with the former Portuguese colonies has contributed greatly), reaped the greatest dividends, so that he appears to be in a position to continue directing the course of the Armed Forces and securing their political quality.

#### Strength and Weakness of the April Military Association

Perhaps for this reason the April Military Association (faltering a short time ago) can face the public with a certain amount of vitality, appearing as a kind of heir of the spirit of the MFA [Armed Forces Movement]. This was established at Santarem, when the enlistments were numerous and the adherence even more so.

From the relative obscurity of the past, it came to light on a great day. And it began to brand the chief executive for, as it was claimed on this occasion, attempting to implement the Armed Forces, according to a rather unfortunate remark by the prime minister, Francisco Balsemao.

For example, Vitor Crespo made the comment: "We cannot allow this situation to be capitalized on, so as to use the Armed Forces, through subordination to the government, as a tool for the attainment of class objectives contrary to the national interest." "We shall not give up the values of April and their defense, because we are certain that it is only on the basis thereof that we shall serve the progress of the Portuguese people.

"At this point I should like to discuss the revival of the April Military Association announced today, to which I call everyone's attention. The April Military Association is not meant to be a political association nor a corporative association. It is meant to be a meeting point for all the military identified with 25 April, a place of constant, demanding and critical reflection for ourselves and also on our role in Portuguese society; a patriotic, national perspective, which is the only one we have; and we do not know, nor shall we adopt another."

There is no doubt that Vasco Lourenco is one of the first great dynamizers of the April Military Association. This is why it was he who announced it at the joint luncheon in Santarem, claiming that it was already set up by the Installing Commission, and that it had the "firm promise from the Army Chief of Staff to provide decent facilities for the headquarters (...)."

He added: "Its inclusion in the democratic society will thereby create for the military an area of participation for the defense of 25 April. In this way, its spirit will be kept alive and active in the society in general, and among the military in particular."

MFA Has Not Ended

Nevertheless, these remarks must be combined with others delivered in the same context:

"Those who think that MFA has ended and has been dissolved should not be deceived. MFA cannot be dissolved, because it was not, is not and will not be a formal organization that can be dissolved. MFA was, is and will continue to be a political, social and moral attitude of a vast group of military citizens toward one idee force: to restore to the Portuguese people the full exercise of sovereignty and to guarantee that it will not be taken from them again. MFA was, is and will continue to be a spirit of action concerning that idea. MFA was, is and will continue to be an informal, automatic association."

The April Military Association was, precisely, registered on this occasion.

Moreover, this is not the only military association. There already exists the Commandos Association, although the April objectives are of national scope and political depth.

However, all the military who share the April objectives may be affiliated with it and, on that basis, the gamut could be enormous, possibly including as many political options as fit into those ideas, which are identified, political speaking, with pluralistic democracy.

This association could (in time, from a military standpoint) assume the role of a conscience of the Armed Forces and, from an overall political standpoint, serve the purpose of a counterbalance lent them by the force of arms, outside of the institutional channels, that would enable them to act directly and on every occasion, on the legislative activity of the organs legitimately elected for that purpose.

It is still too soon to theorize regarding their future development, and hence regarding how the inflexible military hierarchy will be penetrable to them. The hierarchy has scored points for the present, and it will be necessary to note the reciprocal interaction.

It is also possible that the April Military Association will become so absorbed by the hierarchical network that it will be converted into a romantic guardian of the ideas that it defends. After all, it was this politico-military April that brought to Santarem three generations of the most prominent graphic artists whom no other banner succeeded in gathering, and who produced a collective work regarded as being of undeniable value. There were, in all, 65 painters and sculptors, in addition to others who were in solidarity with the initiative, and also a coexistence of poetry, song, folklore, drama and music.

Hence, the Organizing Commission did not fail to underscore, explicitly, "the perfect link between the military and culture."

2909

CSO: 3101/39

## OZYORUK ASSAYS POTENTIAL ROLE OF PRESIDENT

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 23 Mar 82 p 6

["Your Decision" column by Mukbil Ozyoruk: "Whatever It Is Called"]

[Text] It seems that the Presidency will certainly have broad and powerful functions in the new Constitution. There is a clear need for such an arrangement. It is frequently said that our problems have always stemmed from the "human factor" and that "although our laws and institutions were perfect, we were driven into crisis because of inadequacies in the human factor." Since this is the problem, we can take the "most effective course of remedy" by installing the most deserving person among us as the President and by authorizing him "to find other competent people."

This is not mere "sophistry." When we examine the past 20 years under a powerful microscope, we see why strengthening the Presidency is a necessity.

A "powerful President" must have broad and effective powers to meet the requirements of his mandate. If there is agreement on this wish and necessity, the President must be given certain practical powers over all three branches of government and their functions. The famous so-called "symbolism" must be set aside. This way not only will the Presidency stop being a "symbolic" post, but also the election of the President will no longer be a "formality" and those electing him will feel the gravity of their responsibilities and will move accordingly.

A "powerful President" will no doubt supervise the overall "conduct" of the government. If he sees any illegalities or improprieties in the "conduct" of the government he will not only be able to make warnings, but also he will be able to use some of the effective powers that must be given to him by the Constitution.

Naturally, such a President will need the services and assistance of certain institutions affiliated with his office. Therefore, the President must have a powerful staff around him. Since the President will have political, administrative as well as "legal" supervision powers, he will be able to appoint "experts of various specializations" for "consultative" work to prepare the groundwork for his executive decisions. He will also be able to gather around him a group which will have functions along the lines proposed by the YENI FORUM magazine.

What will this group--which will function as a permanent institution and which will regularly provide the President with ideas and thoughts--be called? That is an issue that can be debated. In our opinion, such a group must consist of a maximum of 40 to 50--certainly less than 75 to 100--members. We do not favor membership for life. We also think that it would be an unnecessarily heavy burden for this group, whatever it will be called, to study and review each and every draft bill and regulation and every single development plan. We do not think that opening up new questions for the government or doing work similar to parliamentary research conforms with the proposed "consultative nature" of this group. The study of draft regulations, for example, is too technical, too detailed and not sufficiently important to be discussed by this group. The President must be able to refer only those draft bills which he finds important to this group for remarks, but the primary function of this group must be to report to the President whether proposed laws are in accordance with the Constitution.

One may then ask: "What will the Constitutional Court do?" Let us openly state that we, personally, do not believe that a Constitutional Court is necessary. This proposal of ours may or may not be liked; everyone has an idea that must be respected. I cannot know whether everyone thinks the way we do, but this is definitely what we think.

A high-level group which will be formed around the President, which will bring together the highest-level dignitaries of the country and which will be strengthened by the technical expertise of the best specialists in the land can also decide whether proposed laws are in accordance with the Constitution. Acting upon that decision, the President can make his own decision on whether to return a given draft bill to the legislative branch "to amend it to conform with the Constitution," or to approve it thus taking "joint responsibility" for the bill with the legislative branch. This procedure insures that "the Constitution is interpreted at the highest level."

The proposed group will, naturally, not have the capacity of a superior court. However, I would like to point out that the issue of conformity of laws with the Constitution is not a simple "objective legal matter" and that it cannot be denied that the issue, by its nature, "involves a fundamental political factor." Both the legislative and the executive branches of government are primarily "political organs," and there is no method of supervision over these branches that will not involve "political factors." The involvement of this political factor through a "nonpolitical" organ is not better than a group studying the issue from a political as well as a legal viewpoint. Experience has proven this fact.

9588

CSO: 4654/262

## UNION OF CHAMBERS VOICES VIEWS ON CONSTITUTION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 19 Apr 82 pp 1, 11

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU)--The Union of Turkish Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Maritime Trade and Stock Exchanges [Union of Chambers] contends, in the views it drew up on the new constitution and sent to the Constitutional Commission, that the framework of the new constitution must be that of a parliamentary system, not a "presidential" system.

Maintaining that the social order under the 1961 Constitution became paralyzed for various reasons, the view expresses the need to prevent the arbitrary and independent disposition of power by labor unions, associations and political parties from reaching the dimension of irresponsibility to threaten society and says:

## Autonomy Not Lack of Oversight

"These bodies, essential institutions of democracy, devastate democracy within themselves and think of autonomy as lack of oversight and irresponsibility, and this must be brought to an end. It is among the duties of parliament and the other organs which govern on behalf of the people to check, in the areas in which the unions, associations and political parties are granted powers by law, whether they abide by these rules, to examine their financial resources, to check whether the democratic methods and procedures are observed internally and to try to ensure that complaints not go unanswered.

"For these reasons, an end must be put to the rules and practices which sap the power of the executive, restrict its powers and make it difficult for it to act in foreign interventions and on behalf of society. Powers should not be dispersed more than necessary and executive power should be strengthened."

## Land Reform

The Union of Chambers view noted that private enterprise is a right and freedom realized through the free exercise of the right of possession and, criticizing article 37 of the constitution on land reform, called for its repeal. It reads in summary:

"This article, which encumbers the state with taking measures for the purpose of providing land to the landless farmer or those lacking sufficient land and intended to realize productive management of the land, has laid the groundwork for arbitrary intervention in freehold rights that threatens the orderly and productively-employed farmers and has created negative effects on agriculture."

The Union of Chambers proposed for the new constitution a structure based on a parliamentary system, not a presidential system, while calling for increased presidential powers enabling this person to declare a state of "emergency" when deemed necessary and to suspend the constitution for a specific period of time.

#### Organizations Reproached

The report reproaches certain organizations, charging the Constitutional Court, the Council of State, the Supreme Council of Judges, the universities, unions and associations with demonstrating extremely harmful and dangerous trends over the past 20 years.

The Union of Chambers report proposes the formation of a new body to be called the "Constitutional Divan" to replace the Constitutional Court and that this council serve in an advisory capacity to the Head of State. The report for a unicameral parliament and a separate extraparlimentary "Republican Council" comprised of 450 members which would serve as a Supreme Consultative Council and be composed of former presidents, prime ministers and chiefs of staff and certain representatives of the economic sectors.

#### Unions

The Union of Chambers report on the constitution calls for a constitutional ban on politically-oriented actions by the labor unions and makes the following proposals in summary on other topics:

"A high court composed of experts should be formed to oversee the organizations which perform functions concerned with the public order such as associations, unions, political parties and foundations and to provide speedy trial and punishment of crimes committed against the state and democratic regime and acts of violence carried out in an organized manner.

"The State Security Courts should by all means be included in our judiciary system."

8349

CSO: 4654/300

## PROPOSALS VENTURED ON DISCUSSION OF CONSTITUTION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 20 Apr 82 pp 1, 11

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET BUREAU)--Consultative Assembly quota member Nuri Ozgoker presented proposals on the form and method of discussion of the draft constitution in the assembly and on the program to be followed.

Consultative Assembly Speaker Sadi Irmak, criticized by Ozgoker, responded: "I did not set a date anywhere."

Speaking off the agenda at yesterday's joint session of the Consultative Assembly, Ozgoker said that their primary duty was to draft the new constitution and proposed that the draft constitution be discussed in the Consultative Assembly in the following manner:

"The various views identified by the Constitutional Commission should be evaluated and the results presented to the general session in rough outlines. These rough drafts should be discussed and a final draft devised as the assembly sees fit. Then the Constitutional Commission should take that draft and rework it, bringing it back to the Consultative Assembly where the draft text would be concluded."

Noting that the Constitutional Commission's work is in the form of detailed research, investigation and study, Ozgoker said he had learned outside the assembly that a draft constitution based on the information gathered by the commission would soon come to the general session.

It was Ozgoker's contention that no results could be obtained by discussing the draft constitution by following the standard rules of parliamentary procedure and he made the following comments:

"In fact, the need was felt to revise the standing orders and a new committee was formed and activated. This is unthinkable for the constitution. It is possible for the Constitutional Commission to put the views and information it has gathered so far in connection with preparation of the new constitution into several basic categories. The commission should bring these to the assembly, let them be discussed and then go into detail after the fundamentals have been decided."

Ozgoker said that a constitution written without adequate discussion would satisfy no one and would be unresponsive to the problems. He spoke of the drafting of the 1961 Constitution and said that the state had not been this disrupted then, that political cadres had existed and "that constitution, drafted in 10 months, is what brought us to the point where we are today."

Citing the head of state's comments on drafting the constitution, Ozgoker indicated that the Assembly speaker had made some injudicious remarks. "It would be better to be careful," he said. Pointing out that the press had made it look as though all the problems would be over when the constitution came out, Ozgoker said that activities were being promoted in certain circles relating to a call for this administration to end as soon as possible.

Consultative Assembly Speaker Sadi Irmak took the floor after Ozgoker to say that he agreed with the proposals and supported the commission's efforts. He said: "There is one thing that I always tell the local and foreign press. 'The constitution and the other two laws will come out when the Head of State says,' I tell them. I did not set a date anywhere."

8349

CSO: 4654/305

## OZYORUK CALLS FOR CONTINUED AID TO THREATENED IRAQ

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5 May 82 p 6

[Article by Mukbil Ozyoruk: "Aid to Iraq Must Continue"]

[Text] Everyone knows that the foundation stone of Turkey's foreign policy is to get on well with all neighbors, with no exceptions, and that Ataturk laid this foundation stone with his own hands. Indeed, Papandreou knows it, too, no matter how much he pretends not to. The "whole, wide world" knows it as well as he does, and this is why Papandreou will not get anyone to believe him...in fact, is not getting anyone to do so.

Turkey, by dint of this policy then, is concerned over the Iran-Iraq war, and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey has spent his very precious "time," which he obviously must take from the resolution of some vital national problem, in mediation between the two nations in order that this war might be ended. Certainly he will be willing to do so again if necessary.

Turkey wants the good neighborly relations that it cultivates so assiduously with its neighbors to be preserved and maintained likewise among the neighbors themselves. This is because Turkey has never been an adventurer and has never sought adventure. What we need is peace at home, abroad and "among our neighbors." We are once again demonstrating this principle in the Iran-Iraq war.

In this war, we have not been content with merely taking an "impartial road"--which certainly we must do--but have continued our commerce with both sides. We have not preferred one over the other, but have acted in consideration of the needs of the people of both nations. If we were to go off on an "adventurist policy," we would shift this commerce from nonmilitary items and find ourselves offering assistance in strategic items for them to use against each other. As Papandreou would do, for instance.

We have not sought a "guilty party" in the Iraq-Iran war. We have not asked who is at fault. And even though it would be in no capacity other than as a writer, we are not going to dissect this problem now. However, if I may say so, there are a few things which may be said.

But now we see that our other, third neighbor Syria, following some gains which we learned were made by the Iranian side on the Iraqi front, has begun to punish Iraq as if it were a sort of "ally" of Iran. Syria has turned off the Iraqi pipeline, hobbling Iraq's already limited exports. This same Syria has also prevented commercial shipping to Iraq from Turkey or through Turkey via Syrian territory. The purpose is to beseege the Iraqi people, depriving them of food and other vital necessities, and to leave Iraq, weakened and perhaps dissatisfied with the Saddam Husayn regime, an easy prey for Iran.

We will remain outside the quarrels and clashes which this behavior may cause between Syria and Iraq. But there is one thing, and that is: that we not cut off or allow to be cut off the commercial shipments from Turkey to Iraq, whether of Turkish or foreign goods. To do that would be to deny Iraq succor in the presence of her adversaries and make a travesty of the "equal treatment and impartiality principle." Just as we are continuing our commerce with Iran, we are obligated to do the same with Iraq and, in fact, we are now doing this through our Habur bordergate without crossing Syrian territory.

War is a bad thing. And the tendency of the armed clashes to refuse to remain localized and spread Westward is worse. But this "bad thing," alongside its evils, also has the quality of a good opportunity for us in that we have demonstrated our policy principle as to peaceful coexistence with our neighbors and the desire that they not mistreat one another to be mistreated vis-a-vis one another. For us, the "individual existence and independence" of each of our neighbors is important.

8349

CSO: 4654/318

## BASES NEGOTIATIONS SEEN ENTERING FINAL PHASE

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 25 Apr 82 p 1

[Article by Panos Loulakos]

[Text] The Greek Government's views on the future course of Greek-American relations are already being examined by the State Department and Pentagon; it is very possible that, some time in May, the Greek side will know Washington's first reactions.

The U.S. ambassador in Athens, Mr. Sterns, who is a "bearer" of Greek views, is already in Washington where he is participating in planning American policy toward Greece. On his return to Athens, in approximately two weeks, he will brief the Greek Government on the State Department's new positions as regards the development of Greek-American relations, and primarily the immediate and "burning" issue of the defense agreement on the bases.

Any forecast about the whole issue is certainly risky, as the matter is under development. But if one judges from certain first indications, the general climate in Greek-American relations is not--at least, at the moment--negative, nor are the viewpoints on either side, as they have been expressed at the start, leading to an impasse.

This is due to the fact that the Greek side has already stated four specific conditions, upon which the government will firmly insist, and which, from another standpoint, cannot be considered "prohibitive" for the United States. These conditions are:

1. A specific length of time for the bases agreement which could, in total, cover a ten or twenty-year period. But after the first three years following signing of the agreement, this will be subject to yearly review.
2. Supplying guarantees that the United States is opposed to any change in the present borders between Greece and Turkey.
3. Maintenance of the present balance of powers in the Aegean, not so much from a quantitative standpoint (seven-to-ten ratio) as a qualitative one, which means that the Greek Government will be able to select the armament and weapons systems which will be supplied by the American side.

4. Missions of any type with "targets" on friendly Arab countries will not be able to set out from the American bases operating in Greece.

Of these four conditions, only one--that referring to selection of armaments--appears to meet with objections from the U.S. Government and so it will very probably be the main object of the Greek-American negotiations. It seems that the other conditions made by the Greek Government have been accepted from the beginning by the State Department, without, of course (in view of, and because of, negotiations) this being said officially by the American side. Similarly, there also seems to be acceptance of the general political framework for operation of the American bases here, according to which the Greek Government will be able to discontinue their activity in case of a "flare-up" in the area.

It is, in fact, very possible (though something "unexpected" cannot be excluded) that, after Reagan and Papandreou meet in Bonn on 10 June, the issue of the bases agreement will enter its final phase. It is equally possible that, after the summit talks in Bonn, where the general political framework will be agreed upon, U.S. Secretary of State Haig will come to Athens for "more specific talks" so that negotiations can then begin between experts on various technical matters.

9247

CSO: 4621/326

## ARMS DIVERSIFICATION EXISTED UNDER ND GOVERNMENT

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 29 Apr 82 p 1

[Text] The principle of equipping Greece with defensive armament from various countries had been developed by New Democracy governments. This is stressed in the statements of the former deputy minister of national defense, Andr. Zaimis. Referring to Deputy Minister of National Defense G. Petsos' statement, during signing of the Greek-French agreement, that "a basic target of the Greek Government was to diversify the sources of our armament in such a way that our armed forces will not be armed by only one country," Zaimis stressed that: "With this statement, the deputy minister is deliberately falsifying reality. I say deliberately, because in his position he knows very well what are our sources for supply of either primary or secondary defensive armament."

Zaimis also reported that, in addition to U.S. materiel, Greece also has defensive armament from France, West Germany, Romania, Belgium, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, and that which was constructed in Greece.

## Procurement of 110 Tanks

In February, 1983, 110 completely new combat tanks, which were ordered from West Germany, will be delivered to the Greek Armed Forces.

This was announced on 28 April by Deputy Minister of National Defense G. Petsos, who will go on 2 May to Germany where he will have talks about defensive aid (in money and materiel), and, more particularly, procuring radar systems and expanding the Small Armament Industry's production of anti-tank weapons (specifically, the antitank "Artemis 30").

Petsos will also discuss provision of another 100 combat tanks, but by joint production, and he will ask for delivery of the 110 tanks to be accelerated.

9247

CSO: 4621/326

## PAPANDREOU PRESENCE NOTED AT AIR FORCE MANEUVERS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 25 Apr 82 p 1

[Text] The prime minister and minister of national defense, Andreas Papandreou, attended a very successful air force readiness exercise on 24 April on Skyros.

The fact that half of the time allowed by regulations was required to execute the maneuvers on the program is characteristic of the success of the exercise, which evolved on a demonstration of a high level of war capability. The prime minister did not fail to warmly congratulate those contributing to this remarkable demonstration.

As regards the maneuvers, the Prime Minister's Office issued the following statement:

"The prime minister and minister of national defense, A.G. Papandreou, accompanied by the deputy minister of national defense, A. Drosogiannis, the deputy minister to the prime minister, D. Maroudas, the chief of GEETHA [National Defense General Staff], Admiral Degiannis, the air force chief, Lieutenant General Kouris, the general secretary for press and information, S. Kostopoulos, and the director of the diplomatic office, Khr. Makhairitsas, visited the air force airfield on the Aegean island.

"The prime minister attended an aircraft readiness exercise which included, among other things, simulated bombings, precision maneuvers, feigned air battles, etc.; they lasted three hours and were directed by the commander of the 28th TAD [Tactical Air Force], Lieutenant General Khatziris.

"The maneuvers were absolutely successful and were executed in record time, half of that provided for in emergency cases.

"After the maneuvers, the chief of the Air Force General Staff, Lieutenant General Kouris, gave a luncheon to which senior air force officers, pilots, technicians, airmen and others were invited.

"Finally, the prime minister warmly congratulated the air force leaders, officers and men who took part in the maneuvers and he assured them that the government and the Greek people, with every sacrifice, will supply them with all the matériel and technical support they need so they can, at any moment, successfully defend our sovereign rights and our country's borders.

"In the briefing which he gave to Prime Minister A.G. Papandreou, the air force chief, Lieutenant General Kouris, assured him that our air force is in a position to protect Greek territory at all times and that the air force men are at their stations day and night, ready to defend the country."

9247

CSO: 4621/326

## REPORTED MERGER OF GENDARMERY-POLICE STUDIED

Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 23 Apr 82 pp 1,6

[Excerpt] After it was verified that those serving in the gendarmery and police are displeased by the plan for merging the two corps, the appropriate minister tried to justify the government's aims on 22 April.

The existence of two police bodies--the gendarmery and the cities police--is, at present, creating a multitude of problems, such as difficulties in policing, high expenses, overlapping of various services and an unutilized force on the order of 6,000 men, which is due mainly to the fact that the same men are employed in similar services in the two corps.

Minister of Public Order Io. Skoularikis, referring to the issue of consolidating the two corps, said that this is under study. Skoularikis added that it is too early to say anything, and he stressed that the whole issue is being examined and studied. We have not yet come to specific decisions or conclusions, but if the merger is advantageous, said Skoularikis, then it will happen and nothing will be able to keep the government from doing it.

Answering a related question, Skoularikis said that, on the question of trade unions, there will be no change with the possible merger; either the new corps will remain militarized or it will not, since trade unions are allowed, though strikes in the military corps are prohibited by the constitution.

The minister of public order, referring to the Municipal Police, which is under formation, said that it will not interfere in the jurisdictions of the security corps since its work will be defined, and it will assist the corps without causing "confusion," as had been written.

Finally, indirectly supporting the merger, Skoularikis said that, as things have developed from the standpoint of population, the inhabitants of the areas policed by the gendarmery--particularly the Athens area--have increased by 46 percent, while the inhabitants in the areas policed by the cities police--these islets, as the minister called them--have increased by only two percent.

9247

CSO: 4621/326

## PAPER DENOUNCES PURCHASE OF 'ANTIQUATED' 'LEOPARD' TANKS

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 25 Apr 82 p 1

[Text] Brussels (by our correspondent)--The government is preparing to give more than 25 billion drachmas to the tank manufacturer for Hitler's army, to buy from it 100 antiquated "Leopard 1" tanks! According to RIZOSPASTIS' exclusive information, the government is preparing to give this commission, worth 400 million dollars, to the West German monopoly Kraus-Maffy, which was the tank manufacturer for Nazi Germany. The government of the Right had given comparable commissions to the same monopoly, a fact which RIZOSPASTIS uncovered and denounced a year ago, in April 1981.

It should be pointed out that the present commission will have the same degrading characteristics as that given by the Right in 1981. More specifically, the Kraus-Maffy monopoly is requiring that 60 percent of the total price of the tanks be prepaid before it even begins their production! This means that the Greek public will have to prepay around 240 million dollars (approximately 15 billion drachmas). This is--in reality--an interest-free loan which is being given to the West German multinational.

Our qualified sources informed us that the "Leopard 1" tank is an antiquated model from the 1960's which no one orders anymore. It is considered "junk."

According to the same sources, Kraus-Maffy has been shown to be inconsistent in its contracts with the Greek public--and, in fact, in the very recent past. Its inconsistency has cost the Greek side millions. The following is cited as a typical case: The Greek side had commissioned it to change the old engines in 60 combat tanks. Instead of putting in new engines, as the contract specified, Kraus-Maffy put in repaired engines which disintegrated in the first test!

After this, the ND government not only did not ask to be indemnified, it went ahead with the 1981 commission for 100 tanks, which we referred to above. It is expected that these tanks will begin to be delivered next August. And now the new government is preparing to order another 100.

This development--in combination with the plans being hatched for "cooperation" with the Austrian multinational "Stagier," for "cooperation on an equal basis" with France, etc.--shows that, in government circles, there prevails a desire for Greece to begin to participate in carrying out the imperialist programs for more actively producing and selling war materiel.

Something like this is in accordance with the plans of the EEC staffs. The viewpoint of those in Brussels, as it is expressed in the latest issue of the EEC Committee's monthly publication, is characteristic. In the related publication which is entitled "Toward A European Defense," it is reported that the member-countries' governments will have to exert "assiduous efforts on two fronts: the political front, and that of the weapons industry. As for the latter, we could say that Europe has need of a government market for military armament analogous to that existing in the United States." Expressed in the same article is the viewpoint that "without the United States, however, Europe is not defensible"--which clearly shows what the goal is.... As is known, there are plans for Deputy Minister of Defense Petsos to visit the United States on 23 May to discuss issues related to a war industry. The NEW YORK TIMES has written that the possibility of purchasing and "jointly producing" war materiel will be examined.

9247

CSO: 4621/326

## COMMENTARY ON LAGORIO'S ATTEMPTS TO SABOTAGE ELECTIONS

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 7 May 82 p 5

[Article by Salvatore Corallo: "Unrest Among the Soldiers: Elective Bodies Still Sabotaged. Participate in the Elections Underway."]

[Text] Symptoms of serious unrest within the armed forces have reappeared, while general pessimism surrounds the electoral operations underway for renewal of the representative bodies, because of a widespread tendency to refrain from voting. We consider that failing to vote is without any doubt a serious error. We are likewise convinced that depriving the new democratic bodies, called for in the law on the principles of military discipline, of a real representation weakens them and thus favors the aims of those who have opposed them and their operation with an ill-concealed hostility and, occasionally, a headstrong resistance. But we cannot ignore the fact that the irresponsible calls for failing to vote are finding a fertile terrain, made so by the blunt conservatism of part of the top military leadership and by the stupidity of the Defense ministers.

The first one to try to rid the representative bodies of their potential force for renewal and democratization of the archaic military structures, was Minister Ruffini who, through the regulations governing the subject matter, and ignoring the unanimously expressed views of Parliament, in effect denied any possibility of giving life to a solid and vigorous democratic relationship between representatives and the represented. When an elective body has been denied, as it has been denied, the right to establish a periodic relation with the electors to receive their requests and report on their activities, they become bureaucratized and their prestige is diminished in the eyes of both the command and the base. When their creation of relationships with institutions, and in particular with local agencies, is hindered in every way, their function is degraded and any capacity for initiative is stifled.

Yet, minister and command should not have forgotten that the law itself on the principles of military discipline, and the commitment for renewal contained in it, had placated the impatience and bitter dispute within the armed forces, and particularly the air force, where quite scandalous incidents had undermined every concept of discipline and authority. Instead, it was preferred to pretend not to understand that in the 1980's there are still very many soldiers who are ready to do their duty completely, and calmly except the

necessary sacrifices but there are very few of them who are ready to accept the destruction of their personality to "obey in silence."

The arrival of a Socialist minister at Defense rekindled the hope that the way to renewal traced by Parliament would be followed courageously. How could one mistrust the representative of a party that had voted against the law on the principles of military discipline because it was considered too timid and outdated?

But Lagorio had quite different aims to pursue, certainly not the more modest aim of being the promoter and the guarantor of the democratization of the armed forces. Thus, we had Comiso and Sinai, and the dizzying increase in armament expenses, but we are still waiting for the new disciplinary regulations, for reform of the penal code, and for the self-governing body of the military magistrature. And after all the democratic parliamentary groups of the Chamber and the Senate presented the proposal in Parliament to provide for eligibility for re-election of members of the representational bodies, in order to prevent a complete renewal's causing a sudden stoppage of the work painfully undertaken by the COCER [Central Council of Representatives] after a long breaking-in period, the minister could only register an obstinate and imprudent "no," which violated the will of Parliament. It was vainly attempted to make the minister understand that it was senseless to call elections under these circumstances; with a disappointing budget and a complete renewal of the bodies, there would surely be a new paralysis. In the minister's view, or at least according to the undersecretary who served as his spokesman, there are some "bores" in the representational bodies who should be eliminated as soon as possible by means of the principle of noneligibility for re-election. This and this alone was the concern.

Now that there seems likely to be massive abstentions they are looking around confusedly and asking with concern if we are on the eve of another explosion of unrest among privates, noncommissioned officers, and junior officers. Nor can the geometric progression in the number of young conscientious objectors (1979: 2,000; 1980: 4,000; 1982: 7,000) be considered extraneous to the discontent which smoulders in the armed forces.

Perhaps the minister of defense is unaware that, while 50 billion is being spent for every "Tornado" aircraft, no thought has yet been given to enriching the young soldiers' equipment by a wool beret and by a pair of winter gloves. Young soldiers who fall ill are confined to a prison-hospital called a military hospital, lacking any real medical facility and where one can even die because clinical analyses are either not done or are erroneous.

On the other hand the career military have the well-founded impression of not yet succeeding in effectively influencing the solution of questions directly affecting them, such as reorganizing the career service, economic compensation, working conditions, their right to be citizens besides being soldiers. This is because the minister has neither the time nor the interest to meet with the COCER, and also in order to avoid having to meet with the "bores." It is also because General Santini is very much concerned over the ill-humor of a few generals who would seek greater political influence, going beyond

constitutional regulations, while he does not notice the gloomy grumbling which rises from most of the armed forces. They simply want to have the chance to have a say whenever decisions are made likely to have an effect on their life and on the lives of their families.

We hope that good sense will prevail among all concerned in the next few days. The battle of democratization will not be won by abstaining from voting; in fact, that is the way one ends up aiding the objectives of those who during the years of national solidarity had to submit to reform and who today are waiting for the chance to eliminate it. We hope that the soldiers will know how to give the representational bodies a greater negotiating power by a mass support that can overcome any stubborn resistance.

But the minister and general staff must show by their actions their wish to defend reform from attacks by the most retrograde sectors of the armed forces, and to prevent any attempt to restore the past, which would aggravate already existing tensions and cause another explosion of episodes of resistance to authority which would end by undermining the very operating effectiveness of the armed forces. Parliament has declared itself convinced that, if responsible participation of each citizen soldier in the life of the military institution is lacking, discipline and authority no longer suffice to make an army. It is time the minister and the general staff were also convinced of that.

9772

CSO: 3104/200

## REACTION TO DISTURBANCES CAUSED BY U.S. SAILORS

## Disturbances Termed Provocation

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 25 Apr 82 p 16

[Text] After the destructions and shop lootings--a customary phenomenon whenever they set foot in cities and ports--the Yankees this time took aim at the most sensitive chords of the national dignity. They "hit" and destroyed a demotic school in Skiathos, with a primitiveness which revived the horror and barbarity of periods of national persecution. In essence, the instruments of Americanocracy put the national consciousness in their fire sight, with the "air" and audacity of a suzerain. Their new provocation exceeds all limits of toleration. The angry reactions of the Skiathos residents, and the new wave of indignation which is spreading throughout Greece, are justified. Only the government was silent in the beginning; then it called the provocation a "common episode." Government officials had disappeared when journalists repeatedly sought to talk with them about the issue. What does this conduct mean? Where is the sensitivity demanded by such a provocation, at least that sensitivity shown many times by PASOK until October? What expediciencies impeded an immediate government reaction? The official silence, unacceptable in any case, and harmful, inevitably generated these questions. Respect for the national dignity, and national sovereignty and independence are not matters "under negotiation." They have no price and nothing to be given in exchange. Let those who might still nurture delusions understand well that "appeasement" and bargainings can "benefit" the American encroacher. And let us act according to what the Greek people demand. Americanocracy and national sovereignty are mutually incompatible.

## Superiors' Responsibility

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 25 Apr 82 p 4

[Text] The heads of every military section or unit, from the platoon to the army group, are always considered responsible for the behavior and general image of their men outside of camp. The rude behavior of the latter reflects on their own person and their own leadership abilities. This is even more so when they are on foreign soil, in fact in a friendly country, as visitors or on authorized duty. In this case, rude behavior also reflects unfavorably, as is natural, on the prestige of the country from which they come.

It seems that these facts escape the comprehension of those at the head of the various U.S. military services in Greece, transient or not. Using drunkenness as an excuse, their men often misbehave in roads and public squares and stir up the "native" population. Sometimes they attack without good reason and beat up various unsuspecting people; sometimes they pull down Greek flags. Other times they cause damages to private property, and, sometimes, like day before yesterday, in Skiathos, they break down school doors, go inside and destroy everything.

The Skiathos residents did the best and hurled the two fearless American sailors, drunk or not, into the Aegean. But as for their bosses, ranking officers, who do not lead disciplined men, but a rabble, "who will judge them?"

9247

CSO: 4621/323

GENERAL

GREECE

NEWSMAN APPOINTED DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

Athens TA NEA in Greek 23 Apr 82 p 1

[Excerpts] Giannis P. Kapsis, who until 22 April was director of TA NEA, will be sworn in as deputy foreign minister at 1000 this morning, in front of the president of the republic, K. Karamanlis, and Prime Minister Andreas G. Papandreou.

L.V. Karapanagiotis, who in recent years, and until today, was director of TO VIMA, took over as director of TA NEA this morning.

The announcement of Giannis Kapsis' appointment as deputy foreign minister was made last evening, 22 April, by Deputy Minister for Press Maroudas, who stressed that Mr. Kapsis' being made a minister is a special honor for journalism.

Who Is G. Kapsis

On 22 April, the General Press Secretariat issued the following biographical data on Giannis P. Kapsis:

"He was born in 1929 in Athens. He studied law and received a law diploma from Athens University. Since 1947, he has worked as a journalist on Greek and foreign newspapers and periodicals. In 1970, as editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Ethnos," he was sentenced by the junta's military court to five-years imprisonment and he remained in prison for one and one-half years. For the Polytechnic events, he was sought by ESA [Greek Military Police] and he fled to England. When the junta was overthrown, he took over as director of TA NEA, the job he kept until 22 April, when he submitted a pension application.

"From the time he was a young student, he was a member of Liberal Youth and, later, general secretary. On the day Andreas Papandreou appeared on our country's political scene, he joined his movement. During all the difficult years which followed, particularly the seven years of the junta, he remained faithful and consistent to his positions and ideas and struggled with all his powers for predominance of the Movement of Change.

"He is a member of the Editors' Union and the Association of Greek Writers, the International Press Institute, The Association of Political Scientists and

the International Journalists' Union. He has published "Lost Homelands" (1960, three editions), "Untamed Seas" (1968, two editions), "Let Democracy Be Born" (1972), "Law and Censorship in the Press" (1979, a reprint of his speech to the Salonica University Aristotelian Law School), "Chatting at the Kremlin" (1981) and "Chatting in Poland" (1982)."

9247

CSO: 4621/323

## CHURCH-STATE CONFLICT ON CHURCH LAND HOLDINGS

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 28 Apr 82 p 9

[Report by Sp. Karatzaferis]

[Text] In his 26 April meeting with Prime Minister A. Papandreou, Archbishop Serafeim haggled over alleged church property: Take, Mr. Prime Minister, whatever you want from the monasterial estate, but I want things in exchange. Let the state take whatever properties it wants, but we must get something for this offering of ours, said the archbishop to the prime minister when the latter asked that the alleged church property be made available to the people, in order to "rehabilitate the landless and supplement the small lot."

The discussion about "church property" occurred in the presence of the minister of national education and religions, L. Veryvakis, the advisor to the prime minister, Mr. Kasimatis, and the church's legal councilor, Mr. Lilaïos.

The archbishop insisted upon extorting a promise from the prime minister that there will be things given in exchange for the property granted because he knows that the Ministry of Agriculture has collected data which show that the church does not have titles for the holdings it claims as its own. Most have been usurped, and they belong to the state. It is contesting the church's ownership and considers it a holder.

Papandreou, in response to the archbishop's insistence on receiving things in exchange, said: "Try to find them and if you have problems, come to me again so we can find a solution."

Then the archbishop reminded the prime minister: The final decision on the church property will be made by the Prelature, not me. I believe, however, that this decision will be favorable if there are things given in exchange.

What the church administration is asking to be given in exchange is:

1. If, for example, there is a property of 100 stremmas, for 60 to be assigned to the state and for the church to acquire valid titles for the other 40.
2. To hold all the Pendeli Monastery properties, which will go into the city plan.

3. That the Ministry of Agriculture do no checking on the report which the church administration submitted to the state regarding its landed property.

It wants this because, as the Ministry of Agriculture has ascertained, inaccurate data are recorded in the report; they show more acreage in order to acquire bigger things in exchange.

If the government accepts the church administration's demands, then the alleged church land holdings will be multiplied in value. It should be remembered that, according to rough estimates, the "church property" presently amounts to 500 billion drachmas!

9247

CSO: 4621/323

END