

249208

JPRS-UMA-84-047

9 July 1984

19981016 104

# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A  
Approved for public release  
Distribution Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

5  
91  
A05

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

9 July 1984

USSR REPORT  
MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

Favoritism Evident in Alcoholic Officer's Advancement  
(V. Chupakhin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 Apr 84)..... 1

ARMED FORCES

Combined Forces Air Defense Training Exercise Reviewed  
(I. Polyakov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 4, Apr 84)..... 5

Essence, Nature of Contemporary Combined-Arms Warfare  
(P. Seredin; ZNAMENOSETS, No 2, Feb 84)..... 9

Reports, Speeches From Warrant Officers' Meeting  
(ZNAMENOSETS, No 2, Feb 84)..... 13

- First Warrant Officers' Meeting, Editorial
- GSFG Commander-in-Chief's Report, by M. M. Zaytsev
- GSFG Political Chief's Speech, by A. D. Lizichev
- Combat Readiness Stressed, by E. Nurlubayev
- Combat as a Measure, by Yu. Fomin
- Force of Personal Example, by A. Tokovoy
- Warrant Officer Means Master, by M. Grudinskiy
- Path to Heart, by V. Voytsekhov
- Initiators' Line of Duty, by S. Suanov
- Required by Rank, by G. Dubovik
- Rest -- A Great Help to Duty
- Traditions Call, by N. Yelizarov
- With Care for People, by A. Voronkov

Letters to ZNAMENOSETS Editor, Responses  
(V. Rusov; ZNAMENOSETS, No 2, Feb 84)..... 41

Military Problems With Religious Fanatics Described (Ye. Sorokin; PATRIOT BAT'KIVSHCHYNY, 22 Apr 84).....	47
Table of Contents: VOYENNY VESTNIK, No 4, April 1984 (VOYENNY VESTNIK, No 4, Apr 84).....	50
Table of Contents: TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE, No 4, April 1984 (TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE, No 4, Apr 84).....	53
<b>GROUND FORCES</b>	
Tank Division Succeeds in Economizing Material Technical Means (V. Bespalov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Apr 84).....	55
Radio Communication in Mountain Areas Discussed (A. Kondrashov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 4, Apr 84).....	58
Small Supporting Tank Exercise Reviewed (V. Zadubrovsky; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 4, Apr 84).....	61
Enhancing Sergeants' Role in Reconnaissance Discussed (A. Chirkov, V. Khoreshko; ZNAMENOSETS, No 2, Feb 84).....	64
<b>AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES</b>	
Maj Gen Sechkin Discusses Air Defense Readiness (N. Sechkin; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 4, Apr 84).....	68
<b>NAVAL FORCES</b>	
Kirov's Training Innovations, Problems Discussed (Yu. Timoshchuk; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 Apr 84).....	71
Torpedomen's Training Discussed (N. Pavlov; SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, No 4, Apr 84).....	74
Table of Contents: MORSKOY SBORNIK No 4, 1984 (MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 4, Apr 84).....	77
<b>MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES</b>	
Military Schools Listed According to Specialties (NOORTE HAAL, 21 Apr 84).....	79

MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

FAVORITISM EVIDENT IN ALCOHOLIC OFFICER'S ADVANCEMENT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Apr 84 p 2

[Captain 3rd Rank V. Chupakhin: "At A Dangerous Brink"]

[Text] The echoing chamber of a garrison guardhouse, dim lattice windows under the ceiling, a door bound in iron... Frankly speaking, this was a place poorly suited for candid talk. It just doesn't work. My interlocutor, Senior Lieutenant of Quartermaster Service Vladimir Antipov is acting very strangely; at times he indulges in confidences, then shrinks within himself, then runs off in bombastic demagoguery.

The letter to the editor which he wrote was just as strange. From time to time the most unusual and unexpected questions, thoughts and requests turn up in the editorial mail, but the one that Antipov wrote was simply perplexing. You will agree that you seldom meet a man who uses facts to prove convincingly that his poor service and drunkenness are only harmful, that the state is spending a lot, including the money spent on clothing, footwear and wages, on him totally in vain, and that it would be best in general for him to leave the navy.

Antipov wrote almost nothing about the reasons for his awkward service and, while traveling on temporary duty, I was lost in thought. For all that, who is this man who wrote this letter? Is he a man broken by some misfortune? Or possibly hurt by someone's callousness or inattention? There is some type of drama behind these few lines and its source must be investigated carefully. So there I was in Sevastopol. I met with the commander of the unit to which Senior Lieutenant of Quartermaster Service Antipov was assigned and with other officers and I met with Antipov himself. And the history, which in fact can be called a drama, is evident. True, the character is somewhat different than I initially thought.

"Why did I decide to go to a military academy after school?" After repeating my question, Antipov faltered a little. "What can I tell you? I thought that the service was romantic and so forth. My father was a soldier in his day. Even after he was released to the reserves he began to work at one of the sanatoria in Sochi. And then...Did you know that at school I had certain "support." Yes, yes, I did. What is that? All of us people, we all know that without support it is difficult now..."

"Support," or more exactly paternal connections and friendships, proved useful very soon. It is now difficult to say whether his family spoiled Antipov, if school fell short of its mark or if the influence of the environment where he grew up impacted on him, but Vladimir didn't understand what great changes were taking place in his life as soon as he donned the cadet uniform, didn't understand that a formation is no place for games or entertainment, that for him, a military man, such concepts as discipline and duty are constants. Antipov began his service with binges and absences without leave. Who knows how his service would have developed in the future if the academy chiefs had not made it clear to him through their severe demandingness that no one was going to wet nurse him. Military service is wonderful medicine for infantilism. It quickly makes the most spoiled "mama's darlings" into men. However, Antipov had "support" and he got away with all his delinquencies.

Former Secretary of the cadet Komsomol organization and now Captain of Quartermaster Service N. Voropayev remembers, "We Komsomol members raised the question of expelling Cadet Antipov from the Komsomol three times and three times the matter was left undone. We would prepare for a meeting and Antipov would dare to say, 'You're wasting your time.'"

True, once Antipov did such a serious deed that even his "support" couldn't help. He had to exchange his cadet uniform for a soldier's. But not even a year passed before his friendships and connections helped the "unsinkable" Antipov get reinstated in the academy. He graduated with a brilliant recommendation which had not a hint of a break in his cadet biography and in general not even a single critical word.

Well, and later, although he wasn't a gold medalist, he had a very rich selection of assignments and got an excellent posting to Sevastopol. And his appetite grew. Antipov demanded quarters out of turn and demanded other indulgences.

Some people put their hopes on talent, others on diligence. In the opinion of people like Antipov, these are eccentrics. Why waste the effort and fret?

Have the necessary "support," "cover" and "insurance" (what comfortable symbols we invent to mask patronage with improper goals) and you will be successful, living freely and without cares.

I am not naming Antipov's patrons because this is not about them. I want to look at something else, the psychology of a man who accepts undeserved privileges and illegal indulgences with satisfaction and without any spiritual resistance. And what did he rely on? On the fact that it would always be that way? In his opinion he would get away with drinking bouts and absences from duty because at the necessary time the telephone would ring in the chiefs' office and "so-and-so is with you; show him more consideration."

Only these were naive calculations. Sooner or later something will go wrong in the "support" mechanism and it will turn out that the protection was a disservice to the individual who relied only on it. How does he live? He has not been taught honesty and no one will tolerate dishonesty any longer. Those same eccentrics who relied on work and talent keep advancing, but it turns out that he cannot make it one step without the usual support.

And this is what happened to Antipov. The friendships and connections weren't eternal. He found himself in the position of the "naked king." The fact that he doesn't fit the post he holds and that he behaves in a manner unbefitting an officer came to light. The "unsinkable" Antipov, left without "support," began suddenly to sink quickly into the sea of everyday life. He was dismissed from his post for careless use of his duties, thrown out of the Komsomol and had an officers comrades court of honor for his latest delinquencies. I can already hear the question. Antipov had connections and everybody forgave him, but as soon as he lost them, the whole world fell in on him? Where were his commander's and unit communists' party principles? Yes, certainly some people in the unit didn't have enough real principle and skill at the time to hold off the obsessive patron. They should have been indignant and they were, but they tolerated things. But why should they endure things further? No one made up for past problems with the undisciplined officer. His service simply began to receive an objective evaluation.

And Antipov began to rush around. He rushed about searching for some kind of loop-hole and began to actively petition for a transfer to another garrison. He also began to write letters to various places hoping to succeed in getting some sort of easy time for himself. He even wrote to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for this reason.

During our meeting in the guardhouse where he was serving a sentence for his latest delinquency Antipov declared, "Service began to be a burden for me. The uselessness of my present conditions torments me. Why must I, a specialist with an advanced economic degree, pace around the parade ground for hours and busy myself with cartridge pouches and gas masks... The best thing for me now would be to be discharged to the reserves. I would go, let's say, to my home in Sochi and I would be eagerly picked up to work at any sanatorium. There I would be able to contribute to society."

There is no denying that Sochi is a pleasant city to live in. But what is this "contribute to society"? Surprising logic: If you can no longer be hidden behind that, hide behind lofty words and demagoguery. Suddenly this will deceive somebody.

No, it isn't the "uselessness of conditions" that now worries Antipov. What worries, gnaws and tempts him is the whole illusion of an easy, carefree, health resort life. He is simply afraid to look truth in the eye, the truth that, like it or not, he henceforth must honestly do his duty and serve like everyone else, without relying on any "support" and "insurance." How do you explain to him that one can become a man useful to society only by walking the steep, difficult and straight road?

Antipov's peers, those young people like him in shoulder boards, are cruising in nuclear submarines, serving in high, mountainous areas and in taiga garrisons, meeting their international duty in Afghanistan. Their difficulties are incommensurable with those which Antipov now suffers. But they are not afraid of them and bravely meet them head-on for they have the real support that is more reliable and powerful than the phone calls from patrons. They have the shoulders of comrades-in-arms and are conscious of their responsibility to the Motherland and the peoples.

I don't know what the fate of Senior Lieutenant of Quartermaster Service Antipov will be. His commanders will decide that. In discussions with me, officers P. Ivanov, S. Koryavov and others have said that they will fight for him to the end and will reach for the last possibility to train him to be a man worthy of the rank of the Soviet officer. But no one intended to give him any quarter. The following significant document signed by the garrison military prosecutor specifically testifies to that.

"Through examination and personal discussion, it was established that you, Senior Lieutenant of Quartermaster Service V.P. Antipov, have taken the path of drunkenness and have deviated from fulfilling the responsibilities of your military service. You have been punished for this. However, such conduct cannot be tolerated henceforth. In this regard, I caution you that the indicated violations of law are not allowed and in the event they are repeated, you will be held legally responsible."

Here it is, the brink on which Antipov now finds himself. A dangerous brink... Is it possible that this history will have a bitter outcome?

12511

CSO: 1801/313

ARMED FORCES

COMBINED FORCES AIR DEFENSE TRAINING EXERCISE REVIEWED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 84 pp 14-15

[Article by Colonel I. Polyakov: "Battalion Beats Off Air Attack"]

[Text]

At a tactical exercise a Mts Inf Bn reinforced with a Tk Coy, a Mort Bty and an AD Msl-Arty Bty disposed in the departure area in the dark.

Major A. Pilipenko, the Bn CO, appraised the situation, taking into consideration the fact that at dawn the activity of the "enemy" aviation would sufficiently increase. With air attacks the "enemy" would try to stop the advance of the subunits launching an offensive and not allow them to be committed to action in an organized manner. Therefore the Bn CO took energetic measures to finish equipping the occupied area with engineer works before dawn and to prepare for repulsing the "enemy" air raids. Combat equipment was camouflaged with due account for the accidents of the terrain and its protective features.

The Bty took positions in the centre of the Bn's disposition so as to cover its main forces from attacks by the air "enemy." The AD gunners disposed in the outpost, and that promoted the increase of the zone of detection and fire at the low-flying targets.

At the established time the Bn together with other subunits began to advance towards the FEBA. The advancement took place during the daytime, and this undoubtedly increased the probability of an "enemy" air attack.

The "enemy" had an opportunity to deliver an aimed fire at tanks and APCs which could be easily detected from the air. Besides, counterair reconnaissance of the suddenly appearing planes on the move is more difficult, while the AD weapons fire is less effective.

In these conditions the Bn CO received information about the air situation from the regimental air defence commander who constantly transmitted the data on the air "enemy." This helped the Bn CO to assign missions to the crews in good time.


The AD self-propelled mounts were distributed in the column at distances of 500-700 m, so that they and the AD gunners would be able to protect the main forces of the battalion from the air blows. All AD mounts moved with their apparatus switched on and were ready to open fire immediately. The AD gunners were distributed inside the column of one company. They were assigned the critical sectors along the course of movement so that the entire air space would be under observation. Besides, duty platoons were detailed in companies for firing at air targets.

The warning and target designation were carried out in the column by microphone and with the aid of jet signal rounds. The AD self-propelled mounts delivered fire at the suddenly appearing targets on the move with a sighting telescope. More often fire was opened by the decision of the commanders of self-propelled mounts and seldom by the AD Bty CO's commands. Fire with small arms is usually opened by the duty platoon commanders and in case of suddenly appearing planes, by commands of section leaders.

In the offensive the Bn assumed a two-echelon formation. When passing over to the offensive tanks and motorised infantry subunits of the first echelon concentrated fire on the "enemy" ground fire weapons, while the struggle against the aircraft was mainly assigned to the AD gunners and partially to the duty platoon detailed by a company of the second echelon. In this case the battery deployed in line, and its mounts followed the attacking tanks and infantry. This made it possible to move the fire line in front of the tanks and infantry, and to open fire at the low-flying "enemy" planes. After the dismounting of the protected company the AD gunners moved directly after the skirmish line not far from the company commander who controlled their fire.

From the line of passing over to the offensive the threat of a strike by the "enemy" helicopters increased. The Bn CO fully understood that the helicopter attacks, unless an effective anti-helicopter struggle were organised, could lead to heavy losses particularly in tanks and APCs. Therefore, in order to repel the attacks of helicopters he specially detailed two AD mounts from the attached AD Msl-Arty Bty, having brought their positions to the first line tanks. A section of AD gunners in full strength, tanks' AD machine guns, the Mts Inf Coy of the second echelon and the platoons from companies of the first echelon were also drawn in to deliver fire at the helicopters. Owing to this a continuous zone of effective fire was organised in the limits of the zone of the Bn's offensive on the probable lines of attacks of combat helicopters. Field firing at helicopter targets carried out at exercises showed high efficiency of the anti-helicopter struggle.

After the "enemy" defence was broken through the Bn was assigned the mission to operate in the advance guard. Its AD system was organised on the same principles as during the advance.



Symbols:

- ▲ Mts Inf Coy sector of fire at aerial targets
- Mort Bty sector of fire at aerial targets
- ◇ AD Bty sector of fire at aerial targets
- △ Air Observation Post

Taking into consideration the fact that during the offensive battle the Bn suffered considerable "losses" in manpower and equipment, the Bn CO at nightfall organised a replacement of attrition.

The AD subunits restored combat efficiency (control, first of all) continuing to protect subunits from air attacks. At the battery CP and at AD mounts communication equipment was put in order and replenished. The section leader of AD gunners received a new wireless set instead of the one "put out of action." Communication was reliably established.

According to the narrative of the exercise director, the commander of the 1st platoon assumed the command of the Bty. It was not a new role for him because during the training exercises on fire control this variant of actions was repeatedly worked up.

In the Bty constant attention is paid to exchange in related specialities. Therefore despite the fact that the exercise director "put out of the game" a number of crews, a composite combat crew for the AD vehicle was formed from them.

The arrived specialists carried out maintenance and alignment of radars and computers installed on the AD mounts. During the night ammunition and missiles, fuel and food-stuffs were delivered by the regimental transport.

At dawn of the second day the AD gunners continued to cover the battalion which was successfully fulfilling its mission.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," 1984

CSO: 1812/216

## ARMED FORCES

### ESSENCE, NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY COMBINED-ARMS WARFARE

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84), p 24

[Article by Major General P. Seredin, Main Directorate for Ground Forces Combat Training: "Fundamentals of Combined-Arms Combat"]

[Text] The material published here is recommended for the preparation of warrant officers' independent studies within the training system for commanders on the subject of "Fundamentals of Combat Utilization of Subunits of the Ground Forces of the Soviet Army."

In the army sometimes one hears warrant officers (commanders of artillery and air defense missile subunits, combat engineer and other service subunits) give the opinion that for them, as specialists in narrow fields, there is no point in knowing the details of combined-arms combat. This is, according to them, a matter for commanders of the "empress of battlefields" [i.e., artillery].

Such an opinion, frankly speaking, is grossly wrong. After all, modern combat is conducted by the combined efforts of all participating forces, using tanks, infantry combat vehicles (armored transports), artillery, air defense weapons, aircraft, helicopters and other combat arms and equipment. This is exactly why it is called combined-arms. Naturally, any commander, no matter what kind of subunit he is in charge of, is required to do everything he is supposed to do to insure overall success and to achieve victory over the enemy.

Very often in the course of battle, especially if the enemy uses highly accurate nuclear weapons or landing forces, commanders of small subunits, including special subunits, may find themselves in a situation in which they would have to act independently and defend themselves. Obviously, if they do not have a firm grasp of how combined-arms combat is conducted, they cannot count on success.

In their independent study to prepare for the first training seminar on how to become commanders, warrant officers should first of all clearly understand the essence and characteristics of modern combined-arms combat and be clear about the most important principles of conducting this kind of combat.

Historically, the concept of "combat" has changed with the development of weapons and equipment. When soldiers were armed only with cold steel, combat consisted of hand-to-hand fighting. With the emergence of firearms, combat became spatial in scope. Mass equipment of troops with machine guns, artillery, the use of tanks and aviation (as was the case in both World War I and II) led to success on the battlefield when all branches and services coordinated their efforts. Now when armies are armed with nuclear weapons and missiles, the nature of combined-arms combat has changed significantly. Its basic characteristics are maneuverability, dynamism, quick and radical changes in the situation, unequal development along the front and in rear areas, diverse methods of conducting the combat, an increased moral-psychological and physical pressure on personnel and an increase in the loss of manpower and equipment. Combat, as a basic form of tactical actions, consists of fire and maneuver that are coordinated as to goal, place and time of strikes, for the purpose of destroying or defeating the enemy.

Soviet military art has formulated an orderly system of scientific views for preparing and conducting modern combat, using the maximum possible variations in new equipment for armed combat. Let us examine the basic positions (principles) of conducting combined-arms combat. The main principle consists of having a constant high state of readiness of units and subunits; that is, they should have the capability, under any condition or in any situation, to initiate combat action within the given time and successfully accomplish the given mission. We remind you that in the report at the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations (in 1982), USSR Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov stressed that combat readiness is the main indicator of the qualitative status of the troops and of the navy. He also stated the requirements that have to be met by the commanders of all ranks in order to support combat readiness at the required level.

Another important principle is that of continuity, a high degree of activity in getting things done, achieved by a constant drive to totally defeat the enemy. The decision to crush the enemy should be firm and carried out to the end.

Adhering to the principle of surprise can cause panic in the ranks of the enemy, sharply decrease his combat capability and create favorable conditions for achieving victory even over a numerically superior enemy.

The next principles are: Concentration of main forces along the main axis at a given time, and maneuvers by subunits and artillery. Maneuver is a component part of modern combat. It provides the opportunity for seizing and holding the initiative, disrupt enemy intentions, and successfully conduct combat operations in a changed situation. Thus, with the aid of maneuver during an offensive, the emphasis can be shifted in another direction, and the enemy can be surrounded by going around him and seizing his flanks; in a defensive situation, threatened directions can be reinforced, counter-strike (counterattack) groups can be formed, troops can be led away from the strikes of a numerically superior enemy force by withdrawal to a new line of defense, etc.

Firepower maneuver consists of shifting the fire of a subunit along the front and depth during the battle from given targets, positions and sectors to others without changing firing positions.

Let us list the remaining principles: Comprehensive consideration and use of moral-political and psychological factors in the interests of accomplishing the given mission; comprehensive combat support; support and timely restoration of the troops' combat capability; firm and continuous troop control and steadfastness in achieving given goals, carrying out orders and accomplishing the given missions.

In studying these principles, the warrant officers should imbue them with specific meaning and apply them to problems which face the subunits under their command.

Let us pose a question: In combat, how can one achieve a knowledgeable application of all weapons, combat and special equipment, a high degree of mobility and organization, an steadfast determination to win, an iron discipline and cohesion in combat. First, through a high degree of training accomplished by both the commander and his subordinates; second, through a conscientious accomplishment of his military duty, steadfastness, bravery, courage and readiness of every soldier under any condition to achieve total victory over the enemy; third, through knowing your subordinates, personally interacting with them and being attentive to their everyday combat lives and needs, as well as being highly demanding of them; and fourth, through instilling in subordinates faith in the idea that what we are doing is right, and devotion to our socialist Motherland and the Soviet government.

The most important requirements for achieving success in battle are: Loyalty to the military oath and international duty, high political consciousness, outstanding combat training and psychological preparedness, strong military discipline, physical toughness, and combat cohesion.

Problems relevant to organization, weapons, and combat capability and missions that might have to be resolved by subunits during combat are solved by warrant officers divided into groups according to their specialities. However, the basic rules of how a motorized infantry platoon conducts combat should be known by everyone without exception.

The platoon functions, as a rule, within the structure of a company. However, in reconnaissance, in an assault group or in combat, march or sentry security duty, the platoon can function independently. Depending on its mission, a platoon may be augmented by a machine gun, grenade, flamethrower, anti-aircraft, and sometimes combat engineer subunits, chemical reconnaissance and a tank.

The firepower of a platoon is the basic means of destroying an enemy when accomplishing combat missions.

In combat, the commander organizes continuous and efficient cooperation that consists of an agreement on how to use forces in missions, positions and schedules for squads within the platoon, as well as for augmented forces and neighboring subunits. To do this, the platoon commander must know the mission of his subunit well and how he can accomplish this mission, as well as the missions of the neighboring subunits, orientation points, and signals for recognition, control and coordination that have been designated by the senior commander. And he must have communications in his platoon. Coordination is organized and supported throughout the entire battle.

In the interest of supporting a high state of combat readiness and preserving combat capability, as well as creating favorable conditions for successful and timely accomplishment of assigned missions, the platoon commander organizes and constantly implements combat support in all types of combat, including reconnaissance, defense against weapons of mass destruction, camouflage, engineer and chemical support, and security.

The commander carries full and sole responsibility for combat readiness, the readiness of the platoon, weapons, and combat equipment for battle, as well as political work, education, military discipline, psychological preparedness and the political-moral status of personnel. The platoon commander should always know the situation, make timely decisions, give tasks to his subordinates and strive to have these tasks accomplished without any deviation.

It should be fully understood that the study of the fundamentals of combined-arms combat must be conducted systematically throughout the entire academic year. At the same time, the primary method of study should consist of independent work. Experience shows that warrant officers who assimilate well the essence and nature of modern combat are a great deal more successful in fulfilling their responsibility not only in the course of tactical training, but also in any kind of training of their subordinates and in instilling in them a sense of discipline and organization.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets," 1984.

11350

CSO: 1801/257

ARMED FORCES

REPORTS, SPEECHES FROM WARRANT OFFICERS' MEETING

First Warrant Officers' Meeting

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84) p 2

[Editorial Introduction, p 2]

[Text] Warrant Officers Are Officers' Closest Assistants. --How should their role be enlarged in training and educating servicemen? This was the central question at the first meeting of warrant officers -- commanders of outstanding subunits, masters of military affairs and Komsomol workers from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSFG]. This meeting was conducted by the military council of the GSFG and the editorial office of the journal ZNAMENOSSETS. Participating in the meeting were members of the military council of the Group, generals and officers of the political directorate, the command staff and other directorates, as well as commanders and political workers of units and formations of the GSFG.

Participants of the meeting heard reports on "Warrant Officers are the Officers' Closest Assistants in Training and Educating Personnel" and "The Warrant Officer is an Example of Ideological Conviction, Discipline and Communist Morality." These reports were presented by the Commander-in-Chief of the GSFG, Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army Mikhail Mitrofanovich Zaytsev and by the Chief of the GSFG Political Directorate, Colonel General Aleksey Dmitriyevich Lizichev, respectively. The warrant officers then discussed the reports and exchanged views on raising the quality of training and education of personnel, increasing the amount of individual work with personnel and improving their own professional training and ideological strengthening.

Participants of the meeting visited the Proskurov Red Banner and Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Motorized Infantry Regiment where, under the leadership of the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the GSFG Colonel General V.M. Gordiyenko, a special tactical group training exercise was conducted on the subject: "Support of Troop Combat Actions." The best artillerymen of the regiment from among the sergeants and warrant officers fired submachine guns, hand and regimental machine guns, grenade launchers and mortars, and tossed combat hand grenades, all this under the command of officers. On the regiment's drill field was demonstrated the method for conducting squad,

platoon and company drill. The warrant officers also familiarized themselves with the work of senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of the outstanding company, Senior Warrant Officer D. Tkach in preparing daily detail schedules and organizing prescribed duties in the barracks.

For a report on the work of this meeting, read pp 2-15 [of this journal].

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

GSEFG Commander-in-Chief's Report

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84), pp 2-5

[Excerpts from report by CPSU Central Committee member, the Commander-in-Chief of Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSEFG], Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army M.M. Zaytsev: "To Be on Guard," ]

[Text] "Our great Motherland -- the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- the Soviet people, brothers of the same class, brothers in arms, and our multitude of friends abroad are preparing to appropriately mark the 40th anniversary of our Victory in the Great Fatherland War," began General of the Army M. Zaytsev in his report. "Today the eyes of all honorable people of the world are fixed on the Land of the Soviets, which headed the struggle for peace. The words of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, comrade Yu. V. Andropov, that 'the Soviet Union is convinced that peace can be strengthened and the security of peoples guaranteed ...' instill confidence in people and give them strength and optimism to act against the imperialist instigators of war."

"The US and NATO imperialists," he continued, "are hurrying with the deployment of new American medium range nuclear weapons in Western Europe. We are fully aware that this is not a simple increase of several hundred of the latest US missiles to the already huge arsenal of weapons of mass destruction that has already been accumulated by the West. These missiles constitute a qualitatively new threat to the security of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. These missiles are weapons designated for carrying out a first nuclear strike. Only the highest vigilance of the people and the army, and their readiness to decisively repel the aggressor provide a guarantee that the plunderers will not activate these missiles."

"The high degree of constant combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces provide an invincible barrier against which all vain attempts of the aggressor will crash. This is why the party has placed this task before us: Be on Guard! Do not allow imperialism to throw mankind into the abyss of nuclear catastrophe. An immense role in improving combat readiness belongs to the military cadres. The 26th Congress of Lenin's party and the November (1982) and June (1983) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee set forth exceedingly high requirements for leaders of cadres."

"You warrant officers comprise an active detachment of military cadres and you are the direct creators of combat readiness in the Armed Forces in general and in our Group of Forces in particular. Many of you hold responsible positions as platoon commanders, company and battery senior NCO's. You personally train and educate your subordinates and make certain of the combat readiness of our first class equipment and weapons. In the

past training year every third warrant officer in our Group earned the title of expert in combat and political training, and every third team led by them has received an outstanding rating, with many receiving ratings of masters of combat professions. The military work of the closest assistants to officers has been assessed highly by our Motherland, and state awards have been conferred on the best men."

Further on, the commander-in-chief announced that meetings of warrant officers have been conducted in all units and formations of the GSFG. Much has been accomplished to generalize the latest training and educating experience of warrant officers and their work with soldiers and sergeants. The first group meeting of warrant officers will also help accomplish this.

"Among those participating in the meeting," continued the speaker, "is Warrant Officer Mikhail Fomich Kalyuzhnyuk. In 10 years of service in this capacity he has become master of military affairs and the teacher of highly qualified specialists. A communist and a public-spirited person, he gives himself entirely to his service; he seeks and finds new efficient methods for training, education and improving combat readiness. He excels in any situation and under the most complex conditions. I have no doubt that in real combat he will fulfill his patriotic and international duty with honor."

"Senior Warrant Officer Kamil' Garifovich Gafiatullin commands a mortar platoon. A skillful specialist and an excellent mortar man, he, as well as Senior Warrant Officer Mikhail Fomich Kalyushnyuk, in 17 years of duty as platoon commander, trained many outstanding specialists and educated true patriots and internationalists. He has had all kinds of soldiers. Among them were also those with whom he had to work a lot, stubbornly and painstakingly. But Kamil' Garifovich did not compromise once; he did not deviate from the requirements of the oath and the regulations; he did not exhibit a poor attitude and did not abandon the struggle to win a man over to the right way. And he always won and he is still winning today."

"A high professional mastery, excellent knowledge of the equipment and weapons entrusted to his care, initiative and the ability to accomplish his service duties distinguish Warrant Officer Yu. Fomin, a participant in the meeting. Before arriving in the Group of Forces he had been fulfilling his international duty as a member of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in the Afghanistan Democratic Republic. He has been awarded the order of the Red Star. Now Warrant Officer Fomin, with his inherent qualities of good faith and persistence, is imparting his combat experience to young servicemen."

"Such persons as Klyushnyuk, Gafiatullin and Fomin are our pride. And it must be said today from this stage that we have many such warrant officers in our Group of Forces; they constitute a majority. They cement the military collectives and increase the combat readiness of subunits and units."

"By every right we should also list among the best men the following participants in this meeting: Senior Warrant Officers: tankers I. Leukhin, V. Yaremchuk, S. Kostylev and V. Akhomedov; air defense man G. Dubovik; Warrant Officers: pontoneer V. Paronyan, missilemen N. Oleksenko and V. Tabunchik, communications specialist A. Tokovoy, aviation specialist M. Grudinskiy and others."

"In a word, the warrant officers of our Group have someone they can emulate and someone whose example they can follow."

"Women warrant officers are also participating in the meeting. They are our dependable comrades and companions in the struggle for high combat readiness. It is with the kindest feelings that today I can name guards Warrant Officers S. Klishina, S. Al'bova, T. Gorlenko, L. Sikorskaya and N. Krupka."

"I think it is not necessary to explain the importance of the mission that we are accomplishing here in the center of Europe, on the border of the two worlds of socialism and capitalism."

Having characterized the role and missions of the GSFSG that have resulted from the deterioration of the international situation, General of the Army Zaytsev dwelt in detail on problems that need to be resolved in 1984.

"We must increase," he continued, "and this is our sacred duty, the duty of sentries of the forward area, the combat readiness and combat capability of the Group even more. We shall continue to master the use of modern combat equipment. Combat firing practice will take place, including night practice. We must master the procedures in every detail for conducting night combat, purposefully conduct marches, energetically conduct offensive and defensive actions, use weapons effectively, and quickly hit various targets from the first shot and from a maximum distance."

"In all this broad and multifaceted work the most important role belongs to you, comrade warrant officers. You are in key positions to improve combat readiness. You are the fighters, you are the commanders, you are the specialists. This means that first of all you have to improve your own special knowledge and sharpen your skills. Only a true master of combat skills who has ideological and moral-psychological strength will perform his work efficiently and come out a winner from an armed skirmish. Do not allow any weakness in yourselves or in your subordinates; use every minute for improving your mastery. In military matters there is nothing more dangerous than oversimplification, standardization of situations, stereotyping and indifference. Do not ever create these patterns yourselves and lead a decisive struggle with those who create them."

"In this regard, the experience accumulated by initiators of competition deserves to be approved. Every warrant officer has specific deadlines for improving skills up to the master level. With the participation of party and Komsomol organizations, socialist competition has started. More experienced warrant officers have been detailed to assist in training younger warrant officers. In a number of units, technical groups and lecture sessions have been established and are functioning successfully."

"For example, Warrant Officers S. Stinenko, A. Tsipishev, V. Prokof'yev, V. Fillipov and A. Mordovskiy, and Senior Warrant Officer P. Pastukhov have become true masters of military affairs."

"In order to thoroughly master combat equipment and weapons, a high quality training and material base has been established in the Group. Senior Warrant Officers I. Sushinskiy, V. Korendovich, V. Ivanov and many others actively participated in establishing it."

"But it is not enough to be only a good specialist. Increasingly important is the rapid evolution of warrant officers who are becoming commanders."

"What do we mean by commanders' qualities? First of all, they are organizational skills and the ability to direct subordinates in any situation and to correctly resolve problems relevant to their education and training. This ability to convince and to conduct explanatory and organizational work, the ability to prepare and conduct exemplary training of subordinates, and always to maintain even-handed and correct interrelations with them is the result of a wise combination of being demanding and caring. "

"There are many formations and units in the Group of Forces where strict attention is paid to these problems. Take, for example, the four-time order bearing Zaporozh Guards Tank Division. The command staff, political section and the staff are persistent in striving to improve the organization and substance of commanders' training for warrant officers. Regularly scheduled training methodology sessions are held with them, as well as seminars and demonstration exercises. During this training the warrant officers add to their methodological and pedagogical knowledge, using as examples the leading platoon and detachment commanders. They learn about organizational and educational work and the correct application of servicemen's rights, in accordance with regulations. In formations, where there is an increased requirement for warrant officers to act as direct chiefs, there is a stricter evaluation of their work in forming and developing commanders' qualities in subordinates. This kind of work bears fruit. In the division, every third serviceman has been rated outstanding; those who earned it have the rating of class specialists. In many tank companies crews are completely interchangeable, and the time to fulfill norms has been decreased by 10-12 per cent."

"Unfortunately not all commanders or party and Komsomol organizations are as demanding as necessary toward warrant officers to make them better commanders. As a result, some of them do not grow in a methodological sense and lose their skills for training subordinates. In a number of units not enough attention is paid to instilling warrant officers with the need to conduct political indoctrination work with personnel, and warrant officers are not encouraged to use educational methods."

"These shortcomings have to be corrected, and they must be corrected decisively."

"More attention must be devoted to increasing warrant officers' military, political and technical knowledge by preparing them for taking intermediate military school examinations through correspondence."

"We have a certain amount of experience in this. Group air force units have the best system in this regard. There, commanders and political workers convincingly and correctly conduct explanatory work, select the best warrant officers for correspondence schools and establish the parameters, as well as control their work. This method and experience should be disseminated."

"An extremely important role in forming your communist convictions, comrade warrant officers, is played by political training. You learn the history of

the Communist Party. No other party in the history of mankind has performed such great service to the workers of our Motherland and the entire world. There is no other party on the entire planet which has achieved such outstanding success."

"This is what our party of communists is all about! It is the mind, the honor and the conscience of our epoch! And its history is the fount of wisdom and the source of optimism. Master the history of the party thoughtfully and thoroughly."

"It is difficult to travel the thorny path of knowledge, but it is even more difficult to have your subordinates follow you. Study the works of the great educator K. Ushinskiy, the rich heritage of A. Makarenko and our contemporary V. Sukhomlinskiy. Turn constantly to textbooks on military pedagogy and psychology. Without a theoretical basis or pedagogical experience you will not achieve success in educating people."

"Enrich yourselves with knowledge and experience; learn from life; analyze, compare and forecast; seek and find correct solutions and the right approach. Here success is achieved through constant work by the heart and mind, through patience and love for man, and through elevating your own souls, because the personal example of the educator has the most effective influence on the person being trained."

"Comrades! Our Leninist party attributes great significance to the further strengthening of discipline. The November (1982) and June (1983) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee noted that the importance of discipline today -- strict discipline that is multi-faceted and that encompasses all areas of our activities -- is such that without strengthening it persistently, we shall not be able to move ahead quickly. Discipline in the army has always been a determining factor and the foundation of combat readiness. But now its importance has grown as never before. Without discipline there is no combat readiness. A person begins to be a soldier through discipline; the army is strong because of discipline. The Group of Forces has achieved specific results, and a qualitative step has been taken to strengthen order and organization. But we still have a great deal to do. And in this respect, I think, first priority should be given to working personally with each serviceman. This is one area where we have a huge amount of unutilized resources, and where substantive results can be achieved if properly set up. Work with every individual presupposes an effective influence on every single person. But in order to influence effectively, one must know his subordinates, not only their biographies, but also their unique characteristics, proclivities, and strengths and weaknesses. And all this should be done intelligently and knowledgeably, and be used with great pedagogical tact in your educational work. It is also important to know how to use discipline. Both reward and punishment should be used to educate."

"Cohesion of military collectives and correct military interrelations between them are taking on added significance. And here, your role as commanders of subunits and senior NCO's of companies cannot be overestimated. You should be the soul of the collectives. You have to rely on the activist organizations, analyze the processes in subunits, coordinate everything with officers and with subunit party and Komsomol organizations, or more precisely

with platoons and companies -- those collectives where soldiers become military specialists and fighters having a whole range of moral-political, combat and psychological qualities, citizens of the Land of the Soviets, patriots and internationalists, and true members of collectives. Companies, batteries, squadrons and similar subunits have always been the centers of political-educational work. And each of us has to find his own place here in order to actively influence the process of training and educating soldiers."

"In conclusion I would like to look back eleven years. Then, in January 1973, there was an All-Army Meeting of Warrant Officers and Naval Warrant Officers that became an important landmark on the path of improving a new contingent of military cadres. Participants of that meeting called on all Army and Navy warrant officers to respond to the concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government for military cadres by being even more persistent in raising combat mastery and in forming high moral-political and combat qualities in their subordinates."

"Many of you have been entrusted with the training and education of servicemen and with complex modern combat equipment and weapons. To possess mastery of this hardware, to teach personnel to know what to do on the field of battle, and to successfully accomplish combat training missions is a noble and responsible duty! This is why it is necessary to act responsibly toward your duty, your work and your actions! You should always remember: If your Motherland orders you to do so, you will also have to lead your subordinates into battle. After all, it was for this reason that you voluntarily took upon yourselves these great responsibilities. And it was also in your name, comrade warrant officers, that this oath rang out in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses: All Soviet servicemen, from soldier to marshal, solemnly promise the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, our beloved Leninist party and the heroic Soviet people that we are always on guard."

"Your military rank of warrant officer is a proud one! It is an honor to wear it!" -- said the speaker in conclusion. "One must always and everywhere feel the responsibility that goes with being a warrant officer in the Soviet Armed Forces and being a warrant officer in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany -- the combat outpost for defending the achievements of socialism."

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

GSFG Political Chief's Speech

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84), pp 6-7

[Excerpts from the report by member of the Military Council and Chief of the GSFG Political Directorate Colonel General A.D. Lizichev: "To Selflessly Serve the Motherland."]

[Text] At the beginning of his report, Col Gen A. Lizichev described the international situation in detail and called the warrant officers' attention to the Statements of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, comrade Yu.V. Andropov, told about the achievements of the national economy, and emphasized the fact that the worldwide historical achievements of our people is above all evidence of the invincible and living affirmation of the strength of Marxism-Leninism.

"The moving force that determines the relationship of the Soviet man to his Motherland, to the world of socialism, to fulfilling his duty to his socialist Fatherland, the force which emanates as a life-giving source of optimism, inspiration and drive to finish what has been begun and with the best results -- it is this force which is the motivator of the life of the Soviet man," continued the speaker. "This outlook on life manifests itself and becomes stronger in the struggle for communism and it presupposes a high degree of political consciousness, utter devotion to our Motherland and loyalty to our international duty. This outlook on life is embodied in the purposeful struggle to implement the plans of the party and the people. At its foundation lies a great ideological conviction."

"The 26th CPSU Congress, the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and comrade Yu.V. Andropov in his speech formulated a specific program for ideological strengthening of the Soviet people. We approved it and are implementing it. All ideological work in the Group is devoted to one main task -- to instill vigilance, support combat readiness for repelling an aggressor, and form communist conviction and readiness in our personnel to perform heroic deeds on the battlefield."

"It is to you, comrades, together with the officers, that our Motherland has entrusted something most precious: First, to protect its interests and, second, it entrusted you with a large contingent of youth whose education and training you are also obligated to undertake and in severe times of war to lead them into battle and defeat the enemy."

"The basis for successfully accomplishing these tasks lies in a high degree of ideological strengthening and in your active outlook on life. Formulating these tasks is a great labor of the mind and heart; it is daily practice; it is our life -- ours and yours -- which places before us multiple and sometimes very complex problems that require purposeful, knowledgeable and honest solutions."

"Goal-directed work for comprehensive study of the heroic path of the CPSU, the Leninist ideological-theoretical heritage, the decisions of the November (1982), June and December (1983) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, speeches of comrade Yu.V. Andropov and other party and government leaders facilitates the development of increased responsibility for fulfilling one's service obligation and has a positive influence on discipline and behavior."

"The first months of the academic year have shown that definite positive improvements have also occurred in your political training. Most of the warrant officers' political training groups that were tested were given a high evaluation. Many of them are outstanding."

"An example of deep personal commitment for raising their ideological-theoretical level is provided for groups of military missilemen. Here every second warrant officer has received an excellent rating. There is not a single "satisfactory" rating. The most precise and best knowledge was demonstrated by the senior NCO of the battery, Sr Warrant Officer N. Kuz'menko, Warrant Officer A. Vorotilov, Technical Warrant Officer A. Satonkin who is a participant in our meeting, and many others."

"It is significant that deep ideological conviction and a good knowledge of the political training program have a positive influence on the combat training and discipline of warrant officers in that unit."

"Present here is a communist, secretary of the party bureau and senior NCO of a company that belongs to the separate repair and reconstruction battalion, Warrant Officer Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Kadyinin."

"He is an interesting man in every respect. His spiritual world is bright and varied. He knows the history of our party well and has mastered Marxist-Leninist methodology. His knowledge extends far beyond the framework of the training program, because having worked out his own need for perfection he works hard and systematically, and uses additional sources to broaden his political horizon: memoirs, reminiscences of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's comrades, photo albums devoted to the history of the CPSU; he visits museums regularly and attends plays devoted to the revolution, and goes to exhibits of paintings by Soviet artists. He uses his leave time to do these things."

"Anatoliy Mikhaylovich has his own library with well selected books both for the mind and the heart. Nonetheless, he is a frequent visitor to the unit library."

"He is interested in many other areas of human activity: Technology and urban development, music and art, genetics and space...."

"Warrant Officer Kadyinin's active life, his substantive contribution to the improvement of combat readiness, his fervent drive to impart to soldiers of his subunit not only his deep and varied knowledge, but also to kindle in each one of them a bright, live spark of creativity and to motivate each communist to work creatively with people -- all this is convincing confirmation of the high degree of his communist ideological beliefs."

"Or take the secretary of the Komsomol bureau, tank battalion Warrant Officer Gennadiy Pavlovich Sych. His systematic and persistent work to raise his ideological-theoretical level, his constant reference to works of V.I. Lenin and the speeches of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, comrade Yu.V. Andropov and other party and government leaders, his active interest in the development of military affairs and problems of education -- all facilitate the knowledgeable organization and conduct of Komsomol and public work, and allow him to actively mobilize personnel to successfully accomplish combat training tasks."

Dwelling in detail on shortcomings in the ideological-moral education of warrant officers, Col Gen Lizichev continued:

"The CPSU Central Committee, espousing the main direction in education and practice, has formulated the slogan: 'Build not on words but on deeds.' After all, if a person acts in accordance with communist convictions, he will of course honestly and creatively fulfill his duty to his Motherland and will show his true colors through his deeds and the ultimate results that he achieves."

"Life's experience and military practice abound in numerous examples. Within the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, good words have been spread about warrant officers with different specialties: platoon commanders Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Koval'skiy and Nikolay Yakovlevich Ivashchuk; Senior NCO's of outstanding subunits Vasilii Stepanovich Prykin, Yura Sagidovich Bishtov and Petr Parfenovich Devyatnikov; technicians of the group for air armament Vladimir Yevgen'yevich Lykov; senior company technician Stepan Aleksandrovich Furduy; chief of the rocket and artillery armament warehouse Vladimir Ivanovich Lychkovski; deputy commander for political affairs of the repair company Nikolay Andreyevich Shestakov; Komsomol workers Andrey Andreyevich Movchan and Petr Mikhaylovich Krechetov, and many others. It can be said about each of them that they are men of action."

"We can see that unity of word and deed becomes an everyday moral standard only when one has a conscientious attitude toward fulfilling his duty. This is why at the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee the General Secretary of the Central Committee, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, comrade Yu.V. Andropov placed a most important task before us: '...to reach the point where words would never be at variance with deeds, and the essence of the deed would not be replaced by form.' And this is one of our greatest strengths in raising the combat readiness of the Group and strengthening military discipline."

In addition, Col Gen Lizichev spoke about the role which warrant officers have to play in improving individual work with subordinates in uniting military collectives and in strengthening interrelationships and order in companies and batteries, as required by regulations.

"More attention must be paid to education following combat tradition," emphasized the speaker, "especially the traditions of your own units. We should always remember that here we are not simply representatives of the Soviet Armed Forces, but ambassadors of the first socialist state in the world. We are looked at intently and we are examples for others. It is necessary to constantly develop in ourselves patriotic and international qualities, and always be ready to go to the aid of our class brothers and strengthen our combat and class unity."

"We have many examples of unselfish assistance to the workers of the GDR. For example, in the summer of last year danger loomed over a wheat field of one of the state farms; a fire had started. And it was thanks only to the selfless struggle of our soldiers, headed by Warrant Officers Andrey Petrovich Brovkin and Nikolay Fedorovich Ishchuk, that the wheat field was saved. Local inhabitants, in a letter to the commander, noted that the willingness to help is the best proof of the nobleness of Soviet soldiers and their devotion to friendship with the workers of the GDR."

"It is from similar examples that we gain the image of the Soviet soldier as a patriot and internationalist."

"There is much to be learned, for example, from education based on combat traditions in our illustrious Proskurovsk-Berlin, Order of Lenin, Red Banner, Order of Kutuzov guards tank regiment imeni G.I. Kotovski. Its history

begins with the armored detachment and the armored car from which V.I. Lenin gave his famous speech in April 1917. In this regiment, very popular are the evenings devoted to combat glory, meetings with former front line fighters, evenings devoted to various themes and oral history, talks with soldiers in front of displays in the room of combat glory where there are portraits of the 19 Heroes of the Soviet Union, past members of this regiment."

"And it is noteworthy that warrant officers participate actively in propagandizing the traditions of the regiment, especially those warrant officers who have subordinates. For example, this work is organized and conducted in a knowledgeable manner by Warrant Officers V. Yeremchuk and V. Lychkovskiy. They can always be seen with the men. Just in the last six months they participated directly and completely in conducting lessons on courage and oral history on the following themes: 'Take a hero as your example,' 'Combat banners speak,' and 'Veterans speak and write.' This kind of work is being done by many warrant officers in other units and formations in the Group."

"You are supervising the training and education of men; you are supervising the entire life and every single action of primary military collectives. And this presupposes that every supervisor has, in the words of V.I. Lenin, 'special qualities,' above all, absolute competence, love of work, strictness with one's self, incorruptible honesty and irreproachable self-discipline."

"Unfortunately, some warrant officers consider it unnecessary to fulfill the obligations they demand of their subordinates. Also we still have warrant officers who regularly abuse the system for the sake of enriching themselves."

"There was a time when some warrant officers in the guards tank regiment caused a lot of problems, did not fulfill their obligations conscientiously and violated military discipline. Lt Col Ye. Mel'yanenkov and Maj V. Zezetko and the staff looked closely at the reasons for various shortcomings and analyzed work performance by warrant officers. Additional measures were planned and implemented for improving the political and military education of warrant officers and for raising the level of their responsibility for the purpose of fulfilling their service duties. Various kinds of work became solidly imbedded here, including individual talks between the commander and his deputies and warrant officers, monthly assessments of their work, participation in public life, holding of meetings where problems concerning moral-ethical standards of behavior were discussed, as well as problems of increasing political, military and technical knowledge. The council of warrant officers provides active assistance to the command staff in educating warrant officers. The party committee concerns itself with giving duties to warrant officers who are communists and seeing to it that they participate in public work and show a good example to non-party members in both duty and discipline."

"This kind of attitude toward training and educating warrant officers brings good results. For more than three years the unit has not had any incidents, the number of misdemeanors committed by soldiers has noticeably diminished, and firm military discipline according to regulations is enforced. This unit received an evaluation of 'excellent' at the end of the academic year."

"In your work to strengthen discipline, as probably in no other type of activity that warrant officers engage in, of great importance are your live contacts with the masses of servicemen and your closeness to people. Look carefully at your subordinates and you will see that each soldier has his own personality: Each one has a different experience in life and in work, each has his own problems and interests, and each one has his own character, one that is inherent to him. But they are all wonderful people."

"Unfortunately, many warrant officers do not take these characteristics into consideration when working with subordinates."

"I would like to discuss one other problem," said the speaker, "the solution of which has a great influence on the level of combat readiness, combat training and military discipline. This problem is that of socialist competition."

"In 1984 socialist competition began under the slogan, 'Be on guard and in constant readiness to defend the achievements of socialism!' Participating in this competition, each warrant officer is obliged to show his best personal example in combat training. You, comrades, are all regular military personnel and for this reason you are required to have a classification rating and an advanced one at that, and you are expected to have a perfect knowledge of the weapons and equipment in your subunit."

"In organizing the competition in subunits that are subordinate to you, it is necessary to eliminate unclear thinking, especially in competition during combat training. You must also observe ethical standards of behavior, an exemplary appearance and a military bearing."

"Comrades," said Col Gen Lizichev in conclusion, "personal example has always been a powerful and most efficient weapon of Soviet military cadres. And it is up to all of us to continue this splendid tradition and add new ideas to it. In all this there is no higher honor than to be worthy of the old generations of defenders of the socialist Fatherland. There is no greater happiness than through honest and unselfish fulfillment of your patriotic and international duty to guarantee a reliable protection of our beloved Motherland."

"Allow me to wish you success in this endeavor!"

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

#### Combat Readiness Stressed

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84), p 8

[Excerpts from a speech by Warrant Officer E. Nurlubayev, commander of an outstanding platoon: "Combat Readiness -- Always"]

[Text] "The first commandment of our policy and the first lesson ... that all workers and peasants must learn is to be on guard." This Leninist precept is still valid in our day. For us warrant officers of the radio-technical troops this means to be sharp in carrying out our combat watch duty and not miss a single target. And a combat watch is the fulfillment of a combat mission even in peacetime. In this duty, one is faced with the highest requirements for training and for moral-political and psychological

qualities. And I am pleased to report: Our subunit, having taken undisputed first place for quality combat watch duty and for accomplishing its duty, has won the title of outstanding subunit.

A great deal of work to achieve this result has also been done by my comrades: Warrant Officers I. Donets, O. Dem'yanovich, G. Karevin and S. Yeremin. They are masters of military affairs, and the teams which they head have been rated "good" and "excellent" for their combat watch duty.

Of course, military expertise does not come by itself. It is acquired in a process of persistent combat training.

Characteristic in this respect is the example of Senior Warrant Officer I. Donets. He came to us from another assignment and as it turned out everything was new to him initially -- people, equipment and requirements. Where does one begin? The communist made the correct decision: One must begin with one's self. He studied persistently. He learned the work sequence at the station, as required by regulations. If a breakdown occurred somewhere, he tried to discover it and fix it himself. And of course, his more experienced comrades did not ignore this newcomer.

Persistence and effort always evoke a feeling in others to want to help and support someone who works so hard. And first-class specialist Sr Lt A. Lisiyankov did everything he could so that Donets would master his duties in a short period of time. And Ivan Vladimirovich himself was not embarrassed to borrow from the experience of his seniors and even his subordinates. There were times when he would turn for advice to one of the best operators, Corporal S. Denisenko.

The senior warrant officer mastered the work of the station and the responsibilities of an ASU [automated control system] operator in the shortest possible time. Along the way he mastered the related specialty of electrical technician.

At this point, incidentally, I should note that the majority of the warrant officers in our unit can trade places with any member of the team and accomplish the combat mission with excellent results.

The struggle for complete interchangeability is one of the main directions of socialist competition among the teams. The ability to replace a comrade in combat has always been valued highly. And now this is simply a necessity, especially for us PVO troops, who have to sit for several hours in front of flickering screens and who are under constant and tremendous mental and physical pressure.

We pay particular attention to knowing our probable enemy, his combat equipment and the expert ways in which he uses it.

Naturally, the excellent results we attain in training and duty make us happy and give us strength and energy. But combat mastery has no limits. So our slogan remains the same: What was achieved yesterday is today a step to greater heights. This is how the warrant officers of our subunit respond to the Leninist legacy.

## Combat As A Measure

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84) p 9

[From the speech by Guards Warrant Officer Yu. Fomin]

[Text] I came just recently to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Before I served in units of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan. There I became convinced through personal experience that it is important to put into daily and persistent practice the requirements of the Minister of Defense: to learn what is needed in modern combat. To learn without simplifying and without indulgences.

I remember a tactical exercise in the mountains at the very beginning of my tour in Afghanistan. Our platoon was assigned the mission of deep penetration of "enemy" defenses, of finding out about his security system and of taking some high ground that was important from a tactical standpoint. The mission did not seem to be a difficult one. So we prepared for it, but I must honestly confess, not too carefully.

We lined up the soldiers, quickly checked their weapons and equipment and asked: "Did you take everything?" And when they answered "yes," we set out.

We went at night, along the cliffs, carefully, so that we would not make the slightest noise to give ourselves away to the "enemy" or cause a rock slide. Even for myself who had gone through training, it was not simple, so how was it for the young soldiers in the platoon?

After an hour or an hour and a half I noticed that a few soldiers were lagging behind and our group was getting stretched out. It turned out that Privates Maksimov, Lapin and others were drinking water on the sly, and this was categorically forbidden. Moreover, water would be needed during the day when the temperature reaches 40-50 degrees.

We decided to collect all the water. We got less than a canteen full. Later, in the heat, I gave orders by waving little flags, because my throat had dried out and it was impossible to speak.

Toward morning we arrived at the position marked out for us, but to climb only 300-400 meters to the commanding height was more than we could take.

Actually, I "felt sorry" for the soldiers and decided that we could do it after our rest just as well. But while we were resting, the "enemy" occupied the top and hit the platoon from there.

From that time on I vowed never to allow weakness or simplification in combat training, and no superficiality during preparations for study. Everything should be as in real combat, well thought out, planned and tested. In our subunit, Warrant Officers S. Rychkov and N. Bobryashov also observe this rule. This is why combat equipment which is the responsibility of Warrant Officer I. Volkov never fails. Warrant Officer N. Ryazanov is effective in conducting special tactical training and Sr Warrant Officer V. Zhevnenko in engineering. Soldiers and sergeants who trained with us distinguished themselves through military mastery at a high level.

I have not forgotten to this day the lessons of my comrades and my training in the mountains. I structure each segment of training in such a way that it responds maximally to conditions of modern combat. For example, I take out our subunit fully loaded with gear every time we go to a training area. Every time I select a different route in order to train my subordinates to deal with slides, ravines and other obstacles. I change the "broken" rate of march to a movement that affords protection to each individual and use maneuvers that approximate those of close combat. In a word, I try to develop endurance in the soldiers, something that was at one time lacking among my service colleagues and did not culminate in success.

I consider simulated methods mandatory and use them. This fosters combat watchfulness and sensitiveness. Before, I would throw an explosive packet, for example, but the soldiers would not react and would keep going as if nothing happened. But now they understand that this is an "enemy" attack and immediately prepare to repulse the attack, find and occupy tactically advantageous positions and take action depending upon the situation that I create. Here is one such case:

"Sergeant Tereshchuk has been wounded in the leg."

Before, this meant only that someone in the squad had to replace the sergeant. Now, Tereshchuk's leg is bandaged (one also has to know how to do this) and people take turns carrying him for several kilometers. Real combat will be like this. You cannot escape it.

All this strengthens the soldiers physically and morally, and forces them to develop a definite psychological readiness to face the difficulties of modern combat.

Speaking of difficulties, it was not easy for me from a pure psychological standpoint to rid my subordinates of their habitual weaknesses. I remember how Sergeants V. Samokhin and A. Fedorov had their doubts.

"Why do we have this cross-country race before practice submachine gun firing? One guy is short of breath, another has trembling arms and a third one has his eyes glazed over; he cannot see the targets and the results are terribly bad. We are not doing our duty. What will people say about us?!"

It is true that the target practice results with personal weapons fell sharply the first time around. But I convinced the soldiers that we are not learning for the sake of points, but for combat, for victory. And my main argument was my personal example. I ran two kilometers with the soldiers and then hit all the targets.

Now, Sergeants Samokhin, Fedorov and Tereshchuk, Privates Gaydichuk, Lipkan', Uzhachenko and, yes, others as well, show consistently high results in firing practice even after heavy physical exertion. We are fulfilling our obligations with honor. The most important aspect of our combat training now is to develop a method that will comprehensively cover problems of tactical, artillery, engineering and physical training for protection against weapons of mass destruction.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

## Force of Personal Example

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84) pp 0-10

[From the speech by Warrant Officer A. Tokovoy, chief of a radio station]

[Text] On the eve of this meeting I received a letter from Dagestan, signed by Naurbiyev. I remembered that there was a soldier by that name on our radio station team three years ago. He was a difficult person. Could it be the same one?

"I served for two years in your exemplary collective," writes Naurbiyev, "even though I was not a good example myself. If you can, forgive me for all the discomfiture I caused by my behavior. You did a great deal for me, but I only now understand that. I am working as a crane operator and am a shock worker of communist labor. I am married and have a son. I often think of you and talk about you to my wife and to the brigade in which I work. My family and I would always welcome you to our home. Thank you for everything."

What can I say, except that it is always nice to receive such letters. I know that many warrant officers receive similar letters. And this is the best evidence that our efforts were not in vain. I still remember my first senior NCO, a regular army NCO, N. Bereznyy. I followed his example and have dedicated my life to the army. And now, four of my former subordinates have already become warrant officers and crew commanders. One of them, Warrant Officer Vasilii Zyuba, is in the same subunit with me.

How do you get close to people, find a common language and direct their energy and initiative into the right channel? I am convinced that the basis for everything is personal example. In the army there are a number of sayings, such as: "Tell me what your subordinates are like and I'll tell you what you are like." Let us take the chief of the radio section, Warrant Officer Durnev. Rare is the person who can match him in speed and quality of radio receiving and transmitting radiograms. Still Vasilii Vasil'yevich trains regularly on radio equipment and he can be seen in radio classes no less often than a beginning radioman. Looking at him, his subordinates also persevere in mastering combat specialties.

But one cannot say the same about Warrant Officer A. Pokhov. He is not distinguished by any special exertion toward his military training and has been known to violate discipline for which, incidentally, he has been punished more than once. It follows naturally that the necessary order is lacking in the team commanded by this warrant officer.

We are always visible to our subordinates. Thus the conclusion is that every warrant officer must be an example in discipline.

But how can this be achieved? The command staff and party and Komsomol organizations thoughtfully work with warrant officers, and primarily with young ones, with those who have not yet immersed themselves into the rhythm of army life and for whom strong discipline has not yet become a habit. A practical method of educating them is to bring together their more experienced comrades to assist with those who have a proclivity for violating regulations.

In this connection, the experience of Senior Warrant Officer V. Tsarapora is useful. He was entrusted with being a sponsor for Warrant Officer S. Amelevich, who would leave his subunit without finishing his work, without telling anyone and without bothering about his subordinates. The senior comrade established strict controls over him. He required notification of every single step. He taught him to see the consequences of every action. No, this was not an insignificant guardian duty. It was simply a case of the communist influencing him from the very start by personal example and forcing Amelevich to analyze his behavior. And the young commander soon began to assimilate the essence of such concepts as discipline and performance. And this means that he was becoming a mature, conscientious and responsible person.

Here is an amazing bit of detail. The platoon commanded by the senior warrant officer is the best one in the unit. But he has "difficult" soldiers under him, soldiers which other subunits "got rid of." Moreover, many soldiers are asking to be taken into his subunit, although he does not indulge them. On the contrary, he is strict as can be and demanding. But his whole secret lies in the fact that this exactingness does not go beyond the parameters of military regulations and first starts with himself. And personal example, as is well known, is a great force.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

#### Warrant Officer Means Master

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84), pp 10-11

[From the speech by Guards Warrant Officer M. Grudinskiy, technician of a repair works group]

[Text] Over the years of service I have become convinced that with every day technology is improving and at the same time is becoming more complex. At present it is not enough any longer to be a narrow specialist to be able to cope successfully with one's duties. One has to have knowledge of many different fields and skills and have a broad technical outlook. In other words, one has to be master of combat skills. Or, as M.V. Frunze noted: "The decisive role does not belong to technology, for behind technology there is always a live person without whom technology is dead."

The technicians and mechanics of our guards regiment understand this full well. It is for this reason that 57 % of warrant officers of the TECH [Technical Repair Unit] in which I serve have master's skill levels and 23 % are specialists first class.

The best ones are Guards Warrant Officers V. Vorobets, A. Abbasov, V. Kurganskiy and P. Khodomaka. It is to their credit that during the last training year the TECH personnel did not allow a single error that could cause a flying accident. All types of service, repair, periodic maintenance and preventive work, even under the most complex conditions are done well and on time. In addition, time for labor intensive work such as engine replacement has been decreased by 25-30 %, thanks to suggestions for more efficient methods submitted by Guards Warrant Officers V. Lysenko, G. Alikin and A. Ovdin.

The facts and figures that I have cited eloquently speak of the great role played by the highly qualified personnel for increasing combat readiness.

Here, naturally, a question may arise: How was it possible to achieve such a high level of skill qualification?

First of all, I would like to note that the struggle for high qualification levels for warrant officers of our collective is one of the main directions of socialist competition. The TECH has established a clear system of raising and maintaining class skill levels. At its basis lies the order of the USSR Minister of Defense that sets deadlines for taking class level qualification examinations. And when duties are assigned for a particular training year, we look around to see who is due to go up one step further in combat training. This year, Guards Warrant Officers I. Boyarshchinov and A. Ragulin are due to become masters in the combat skill qualification. And I am convinced that they will achieve these goals because of our experience.

Our technical training has been set up well. Training is conducted weekly. At the same time, we often study directly in our parts unit where we thoroughly work out various operations, not only in our basic specialty, but in related specialties as well. We are led by commanders who are well-informed and knowledgeable specialists and highly educated officers. Among them is Guards Major V. Khachetlov, an engineer in aviation equipment and Guards Captain Ch. Gretskiy, deputy TECH commander.

And on days when we have commanders' training, the regiment engineer gives lectures to the warrant officers, and so do the deputy commander for aviation engineering services and other specialists.

The advantage of this kind of goal-directed training can be seen from Guards Warrant Officer P. Konovalenko. Just a little over two years ago he arrived at our TECH as a specialist second class. Before this he worked on other types of machines. Here he was faced simultaneously with both training and relearning. Konovalenko took this matter seriously. His comrades, of course, helped him, especially Guards Warrant Officers Kulesh and Alikin, but basically, the guardsman obtained his knowledge at study sessions. Recently he passed the examinations for the master's level.

We have, for example, the following method of joint study: Two specialists are assigned to the same work section. In this way, there is simultaneous servicing of equipment and study. When Guards Warrant Officer Yu. Mazur arrived in the repair work group for aircraft and engines, he had only a third-class rating. This rating was, of course, a low one for our TECH, and for this reason Mazur received special attention from the first day. We saw that he was having difficulties. We assigned him to Guards Warrant Officer V. Kulesh, who has the rating of master of combat skills, so they could work as a pair. I remember how one time they were doing repair work on a landing gear. Mazur had to repeat some operations several times before he learned to do them independently. As they worked, Guards Warrant Officer Kulesh would explain things to Mazur. A year passed and Mazur decided to become a first-class specialist.

A high quality training and materiel base helps us conduct training on a high level and to work out many practical operations. This base receives constant attention from all TECH specialists. A large contribution for improving it has been made by our rationalizers headed by Guards Warrant Officers V. Kuleshenko and N. Loginov.

Perhaps some persons may think that these warrant officers of the TECH who increase their specialty ratings without any outside pressure are really great. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Some comrades have to be handled strictly. At one of the meetings of the party bureau, for example, Guards Warrant Officer N. Shitov was called on the carpet. The activists asked him a direct question: Why isn't he improving and why has he been a specialist 1st class for such a long time if he should have a master's rating by now? They did not announce a reprimand for Shitov, but warned him and set a specific deadline. It worked. The warrant officer is preparing diligently for the examinations for the higher rating under the supervision of Guards Sr Lt N. Titenko.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

### Path to Heart

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84) p 11

[From the speech of Warrant Officer V. Voytsekhov, senior NCO of a tank company]

[Text] My father, a front-line soldier taught me:

"You will have to work with people, Viktor. If you learn to see in each subordinate a person who is unique, it means that you have picked the right job; but if all the people look alike to you, then you had better change your profession."

And I remembered these words because I am completely convinced that without an individual approach to the soldier or sergeant it is impossible to educate a disciplined and purposeful fighter.

Thus, Junior Sergeant V. Ternovskiy, graduate of a training subunit, was assigned squad commander in the third platoon. I asked him to finish some housekeeping work, but by evening I saw that nothing was done the way I had told him. In my anger I read the young commander the riot act in front of the formation and made him re-do everything.

A couple of days later I noticed that Ternovskiy was completely flustered. I asked him what was the matter. And he answered: "How can I command the soldiers, comrade warrant officer, if they all keep asking me: Did you receive the senior NCO's approval for this, so that we will not have to re-do it?"

I understood my error. One cannot express distrust of a sergeant in front of subordinates. Let him feel the trust in himself. Without this, there can be no commander. I had to fix the situation.

I gave the junior sergeant the job of furnishing the day room. I showed him how it had been done in a neighboring company and did not interfere after that. And my trust inspired him. Ternovskiy did a good job of spreading the workload throughout the squad, made a precise work schedule, and selected the carpenter and the artist-decorator himself. In a word, it was not long before I was already thanking him in front of the formation for his initiative and leadership. And to this day he has remained a commander who exhibits initiative, knowledge and responsibility.

But trust will inspire some and discourage others. For this reason, trust, too, must be handled with care.

Sergeant V. Ulanov serves in our company. My relationship with him is the following: Trust him, but check him. If you let him go just a tiny bit without controlling him, the soldiers will not change their shirt collars or polish their boots. And Jr Sgt A. Mazur likes to leave everything for later. Of course, I have a special approach to him, too. I will give him extra reminders and then reprimand him more strictly.

Usually I study people in a training environment: I observe their behavior and give them various problems which require not only specific skills, but character, will and persistence.

I also have meetings with my sergeants every evening. At one of these meetings I remember how Sergeant G. Trunin complained about Private N. Steblevskiy, who allegedly makes his bed worse than anyone else, and neither talks nor reprimands have any effect on him.

I took a good look at this soldier. He was really vain beyond measure and reacted oversensitively to my criticism. He would pout, and no one could approach him.

But I was able to approach him. I called him into the sleeping quarters when no one else was there. I showed him how his comrades made their beds and showed him the neatness of their nightstands; that is, I gave him a chance to compare without touching his pride. And there were no witnesses. This method worked. After that, no one could accuse Steblevskiy of messiness.

At the same meeting I noticed that Sergeant V. Makoveyev had not said a word for several days. I let the squad commanders go and asked Makoveyev: "What's the matter, Volodya? Did something happen at home?"

How do we speak to our subordinates ordinarily? "Comrade sergeant. Comrade Makoveyev." This is essential for the formation. But alone, you can call him by his first name and even talk about home. A warm interest will really touch a person. He told me how he got married before entering the army, brought his young bride home, and how she and his mother did not get along from the very first day. Now his young wife is pregnant and wrote him that she wants to leave his family.

He and I wrote a letter to his parents and I appended a note from myself. Then, he and I nervously waited together for an answer.

And just recently, Makoveyev came up to me, smiling.

"Our letter helped, comrade warrant officer. Everything is normal at home. And here is a snapshot of my son ...."

Regulations require us to know our soldiers and sergeants well. That is not a just a formality. By learning about a soldier and finding a path to his heart we not only teach discipline, but also create an atmosphere of sensitiveness and mutual respect in the subunit, as well as cohesion in the collective. We elevate the collective so that it can perform great deeds.

## Initiators' Line of Duty

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84) p 12.

[From the speech by Lt Col S. Suanov]

[Text] The personnel of our Proskurovsk Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov, motorized rifle regiment became the initiators of competition in the Ground Forces under the slogan: "Be On Guard and in Constant Readiness to Defend the Achievements of Socialism!" This competition will be a worthy celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Fatherland War.

To be a lead singer on the march is not simple. One needs both a firm step and a ringing voice. Authority is also needed. We have all this. During the past training year we won the title "excellent regiment." In front are communists and Komsomol members, among whom are many warrant officers. Every second one has earned the rating of "excellent," and over 80 % of subunits commanded by warrant officers accomplished all their requirements.

But what has been accomplished is only a foundation for further success. In order to move ahead with confidence we decided to concentrate our main efforts on upholding constant readiness in order to immediately accomplish combat missions.

A substantive contribution toward realizing this objective is being made by warrant officers. Every third one of them is directly connected with personnel training and education. The command staff, as well as the party and Komsomol organizations are devoting very close attention to this detachment of the officers' closest assistants. The regiment has established a well-functioning system for preparing warrant officers to be commanders. The training is directed by the best qualified officers: LtCol V. Ivanov, LtCol A. Vasilenko, Maj A. Dem'yanov and others. They attentively study the situation in platoons commanded by warrant officers and analyze how subjects that were studied are being applied on the job. And of course they give whatever assistance is necessary right on the spot.

One who has earned a good reputation in the regiment, for example, is Warrant Officer V. Senchishin, a communist. The platoon he has commanded for several years has been rated excellent.

What is the secret of his success? First, it lies in the commander's high degree of mastery of methodology and in his drive to teach the soldiers exactly what is needed in modern combat; his ability to create scenarios in the classroom and out in the field that are as close to real combat as possible. The warrant officer conducts most of his training in the field and on the firing range, much of it at night.

There are many commanders in our regiment who are like communist Senchishin. They realize full well the duties facing the initiators of socialist competition in the Ground Forces and their responsibilities, and they try to perform their duties in such a way as to win a leading role in the competition for high achievements in combat training. Among them is also Senior Warrant Officer Sushinskiy, commander of an excellent platoon.

Recently, Warrant Officer Plyashechnik came to him for training -- to learn the latest methodology and to assimilate his experience. And the senior warrant officer not only showed his comrade everything he knows, but asked him about any difficulties he may be having, gave some advice on using diagrams and visual aids, and gave him some examples of methodological problems that, when solved, would help soldiers reinforce what they had learned through self-study.

We are initiators and we will apply all our strength to fulfill with honor these responsibilities and to keep our word to our beloved Native Land.

COPYRIGHT: "ZNAMENOSETS", 1984

Required by Rank

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84) p 12

[From the speech by Senior Warrant Officer G. Dubovik, secretary of a battery party organization,]

[Text] Every military collective has a number of examples of selfless accomplishment of military duty. We have such examples, too. Take, for example, the chief of the construction detachment, Warrant Officer V. Shul'ga. He has not been in the army long, but already has a reputation for being a competent specialist, a good educator and a reliable comrade. Within a short period of time the warrant officer has received a master's rating in a combat specialty. In many projects, due to his industriousness and persistence, personnel of his battery achieved excellent results in fulfilling their norms, saving up to 20 % of the time formerly required. Communists have elected Shul'ga to a unit party bureau position.

We are trying to make certain that all sergeants and warrant officers find out about people like this and learn from them. The party bureau summarized the experiences of these detachment commanders, Warrant Officers V. Shul'ga, P. Uvarov and others. This increases the authority of warrant officers and motivates them to serve with even greater efficiency. They know that their everyday work is noticed and valued.

Especially important is this kind of attitude here, abroad. Konstantin Paustovskiy wrote that without having a feeling that your country is special, very dear and wonderful in every little detail, we cannot be real human beings. This feeling is unselfish and it gives us pride in our military rank, the high honor of being a warrant officer and a son of the Soviet land.

But this honor must be justified above all by good deeds. Unfortunately, many do not act like this. A year ago Warrant Officer S. Lisovskiy arrived, having been assigned chief of a detachment. He began his duty in a slipshod manner. He did not improve himself, did not increase his knowledge and conducted training on a low level. And understandably, he had no authority.

Communists in the battery could not reconcile themselves to this situation. By decision of the party bureau, Warrant Officer V. Chernyshev took Lisovskiy under his control in order to train him personally; this good tradition -- sponsorship of a new man -- has existed for a long time in our collective. In half a year Warrant Officer Lisovskiy was already working on the level of a senior comrade. And during a final test, Sergey successfully handled the

responsibilities of a platoon commander, his combat work was evaluated as "excellent" and he became specialist 2nd class. In all these achievements of Lisovskiy, a substantive role was played by the assistance of communist Chernyshev and by our party organization.

In general, I believe this: Once you have put on the shoulderboards of a warrant officer it means you should serve conscientiously. After all, we all chose army service voluntarily, that is, after full deliberation. And if that is how it was, then each man should be demanding of himself to the greatest possible extent. This is done by Warrant Officers S. Ryaguzov, P. Uvarov, S. Korniyuk, V. Kravchuk, M. Tsybisov and many others.

I am assigned as senior NCO of the battery. There are many duties. The communists have also elected me as secretary of the party organization. The workload here is also heavy. But others do not have it easier either. People are out in the field for two-three nights, in rain and cold; they catch a little sleep when they can, but work with a great deal of diligence and persistence.

How can I, as senior NCO of the battery, not be concerned about my men always being fed, clothed and provided with shoes, and given an opportunity for a good rest? In addition, I have to find time to cheer up those who are tired and praise those who distinguished themselves. To do this is my responsibility, as well as that of the service and the party.

All warrant officers of our subunit make a solid contribution to increasing our combat readiness. As a result, our battery has again reaffirmed its excellent rating, and all young soldiers, in a period of six months of service, have mastered not only their own regular specialty, but also a related one.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

Rest - - A Great Help to Duty

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84)  
[page number not given]

[Text] Subunit NCO, Warrant Officer N. Kravchenko, is occupied all day with different duties: He is present at reveille, he conducts morning inspection, makes certain that everyone has the necessary training assignments, assigns duty details, inspects the buildings.... But when evening comes, Nikolay hurries to the rehearsal of the volunteer band in which he is a soloist. His fingers run over the keyboard and the music streams out. It is an expansive and great melody of our beloved Soviet land. And the soldiers' hearts beat fast with emotion. It is wonderful to hear a favorite song here, far away from our Motherland. One understands even more his duty as a patriot and internationalist, and treasures his high calling as a citizen of the Land of Soviets, as its son and as its fighting man. And this means that you give yourself to your work with all your heart and soul.

Yes, it is truly said that a good rest is a great help to duty. Many warrant officers of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany know how to relax well. And Warrant Officer Kravchenko is only one of them.

The officers' closest assistants are also in charge of various groups in the Officers' Club that cater to different interests, such as music lovers'

concerts, films, libraries with abundant riches in books, and sports sections. One remembers trips and excursions to museums and famous places of the Republic, meetings with class brothers and comrades in arms, warrant officers of the National People's Army of the GDR.

A strong friendship binds the fighting men of the N-unit with soldiers of the National People's Army. They are together not only on the fields of combat training, but also during their minutes of rest. It is easier to work if a reliable and true friend stands next to you.

Photo Captions, p 13: N. Kravchenko, soloist of the band; an excursion with friends.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

### Traditions Call

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84) pp 14-15

[From a speech by Warrant Officer N. Yelizarov, Komsomol bureau secretary of a motorized rifle battalion]

[Text] I remember someone once saying that combat traditions are like a pure water stream. And the more you partake of it, the more strength and moral health it gives you. We became convinced of the truthfulness of these words through our own experience. On the eve of tactical combat firing training the battalion Komsomol bureau disseminated a questionnaire among the motorized riflemen. It included, among others, this question: "Whose life and deeds serve as an example to you of unselfish duty to our Motherland?" The overwhelming majority of soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers and officers answered: "Hero of the Soviet Union, Master Sergeant Gennadiy Turunov."

This was a natural answer. "Turunovites," is how the soldiers of the first motorized company call themselves, and their Hero is forever listed on the company honor roll. But not only the company goes by that name, the entire battalion does. And it is the proud recognition of the fact that you are heir to the glorious traditions of front-line fighters, which is an inspiration to you. Because of our good training scores we were honored by thanks from the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army M. Zaytsev, who had observed our training.

I am happy to acknowledge that the overall success is due in no small part to the battalion Komsomol bureau, which today -- in preparation for the All-Army Conference -- has the job of instilling glorious combat traditions in soldiers. This is one of the bureau's most important jobs. We are conducting this work under the direction of Deputy Commander for Political Affairs, Major A. Filippov and Party Bureau Secretary, Captain A. Zhadobin. The significance of this work was discussed at a meeting in the USSR Ministry of Defense with veterans of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Heroic-patriotic education, education based on combat traditions, is looked upon by the party as an indivisible and integral part of communist education and as one of the current tasks necessary to increase the defensive capability of the Soviet state. Traditions of the party, the Soviet people,

the Armed Forces and military units constitute an immense wealth. They are passed like a baton from older generations to the younger. They are a powerful source of our high moral spirit and our invincibility.

"It is very important," said member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, "to devote even more attention to the military-patriotic education of youth, to the moulding of steadfast and confirmed fighters for communist ideals who have a deep feeling of personal responsibility for the fate of our socialist Fatherland...."

This is especially important now when US imperialism and its NATO allies have strained the international situation to the limit and are threatening us with war. And, in order to increase the vigilance of our soldiers and their readiness to immediately repel the aggressor, the best thing, it seems to me, is to tell about the exploits of our front-line fighters who fought for their beloved Motherland and about their glorious combat traditions.

We have a rule: As soon as new men arrive in our subunit they are taken to the room of combat glory where they are told about the regiment's history and its heroes. And we have eleven of them. It is mandatory for them to visit the room dedicated to Hero of the Soviet Union G. Turunov, where a display is telling about his exploits and where the master sergeant's personal effects are located. He died on the Seelov heights, near Berlin. The machine gun squad which he commanded was repelling a fascist attack. The machine gunners had already cut down a good many enemy soldiers when suddenly tanks burst through to their position. A shell exploded and only Turunov was left at the machine gun. Heavily wounded, he gathered the last of his strength and, clutching a bundle of grenades in his hand, he crawled to meet the enemy tank....

He was the same age as the soldiers, sergeants and warrant officers of our battalion are now, and the memory of this Hero lives and educates.

We became convinced of the great power of tradition because of a young commander of a mortar platoon, Warrant Officer I. Vasil'yev. He began his duty in the battalion, frankly speaking, rather so-so. His attitude toward his own training and studies was coolish, and he was not beyond violating discipline. Members of the Komsomol bureau kept reminding the warrant officer that it was an honor to serve in the subunit where he was and told him how we value the title Turonovites.

The break came after Vasil'yev was given a letter to read that was from Turunov's brother who was also a front-line soldier, and with whom we correspond. Aleksandr Sergeyeovich wrote specifically asking: "Let me know what results you have had and how the soldiers of the battalion keep the memory of my brother."

"And what are you going to answer?" we asked Vasil'yev.

The warrant officer kept silent, hanging his head. But recently he came up to me and said:

"If you are going to write to Turunov's brother in Moscow, tell him also about me: The platoon has fulfilled its obligations."

Letters from front-line soldiers, our correspondence with fellow-officer, Hero of the Soviet Union Georgiy Semenovich Boltayev and with students from Kostroma Oblast where a school is named for G. Turunov, as well as with senior classmen from Dnepropetrovsk who are conducting a search for veterans from our unit -- are all preserved in a special album. We use them in discussions with party propagandists, during evenings devoted to the theme, "Take a hero as your example," at Komsomol meetings, and during political-educational work. In these days when we are preparing to mark the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Fatherland War and are looking to the All-Army Conference of secretaries of Komsomol organizations, we are devoting special attention to instilling in our soldiers the combat traditions of front-line fighters.

Taking on his duties on the eve of the new training year, Sergeant A. Filatov announced:

"We don't have the right to do our jobs in only a satisfactory manner in a battalion with such traditions."

And the sergeant is keeping his word with honor. His BMP [Armored Personnel Carrier] has the following sign in bright letters: "This is the Crew imeni Hero of the Soviet Union G. Turunov." It is not easy to earn this title. And in this case, of great help to the soldiers is the competition for the right to fire for the Hero. It is given only to the person who is highly disciplined and who has shown the best results in training. Also, the amount of ammunition saved and firing accuracy during training are taken into consideration.

The ones who earned the right to fire in honor of the Hero more than anyone else were section commanders, Sergeants Aleksandr Filatov and Vladimir Movchan, and machine gunner and driver Private Nikolay Goloshapov.

A great contribution to augmenting combat traditions also belongs to battalion warrant officers. Among them we can single out the best specialists, such as company senior technician Warrant Officer V. Kolotov and company senior NCO's, Warrant Officers A. Muradyan, F. Ayupov and others.

Nikolay Kolotov has dozens of commendations from the command staff to his credit. A specialist 1st class, he knows his vehicle down to the last little bolt. In accordance with a Komsomol bureau decision, he is conducting a technical circle in his subunit and organizes monthly competitions for the title of best specialist. And in large part due to his efforts, the company is the best one in the battalion for technical training and has been named "excellent" more than once. Recently, giving a speech at a Komsomol meeting, Vasily said:

"I am proud that I am serving in such an illustrious subunit, and I shall continue trying to emulate our heroes in the future and follow their examples."

These words would be subscribed to by all Turunovite motorized riflemen.

## With Care for People

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2 (signed to press 23 Jan 84) p. 15

[From a speech by Warrant Officer A. Voronkov, chief of the dining room]

[Text] The popular proverb, "A cottage is beautiful not for its furnishings, but for its cooking," is, I think somewhat outdated. Come visit us and you will be convinced when you see how our soldiers' dining room has been furnished now. But two years ago, when I took this position, everything looked different and in addition, the quality of cooking was low.

I decided to change everything. The command staff and the party and Komsomol organizations supported me. They supplied me with materials and specialists. And furious work began. And after a while you could not recognize the dining rooms: Everything was whitewashed and painted. The dining rooms are cozy. Each one has small decorative grottos and aquariums. They look beautiful against a background of photographic murals of forests. It is as if you were sitting out in a meadow. And the windows have curtains. Each table seats six. In a word, it is a pleasure to eat here and to rest.

But the main thing was to raise the quality of the food. And here, my primary concern was with products; how to get to the point where not a single gram would be lost on its way from the warehouse to the soldiers' table. First of all, strict control was needed. And a Komsomol patrol, together with persons authorized by regulation, set off for the warehouse to obtain the products.

What is a Komsomol patrol? It is one of the activist groups that is included in the table of manning for the dining room. This was done at my request, because without the participation of a large number of people it would be impossible to take care of this problem.

Not only that, but we made it a rule that regularly, no less than once a month, we would conduct control-demonstration cooking, so that everyone assigned to the dining room would know how portions are prepared from the products received from the warehouse. All cooks, duty personnel and a representative of the people's control group attend these sessions.

The next step was to prepare quality food. The cooks had to be taught. This task fell on my shoulders. I made up a study plan. We studied theory in class and practiced right at our work places. The soldiers studied diligently. Many of them became good specialists, for example, Privates S. Gruzdev and S. Alyab'yev.

We also introduced innovations in making up menus. Now the products are apportioned depending upon upcoming schedules. For example, if people are going to go out in the field in the morning, for breakfast we prepare high caloric food: Buckwheat porridge, macaroni, rice with meat, etc. When the subunit is working on the military post, they have a lighter load, and the higher caloric foods can be left for dinner. In a word, the apportionment is done in such a way that the soldier receives the necessary number of calories daily.

The greenhouses and garden are a great help to us. Last year, for example, every person who ate in the dining room received 11 kgs of fresh vegetables and greens.

And we also bake pies on the most special occasions. Of course, this is an additional duty. But do you really think of the extra work when you make people happy?

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets," 1984

11350

CSO: 1301/257

ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO ZNAMENOSETS EDITOR, RESPONSES

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84), pp 18-19

[Letter from Lt Col V. Rusov: "Involuntary Trip"]

[Text] There is no far away corner in our country where one cannot find a military man on duty. But comes the time to take leave and he hurries to his native region, hundreds and sometimes thousands of kilometers away. Sometimes he just barely gets home, barely has time to talk with his parents and already has to prepare for the long journey back. He goes to the district center to let the military registration and enlistment office know that he has arrived at his duty post. He has to register no later than one day after his arrival, and when he departs he has to let them know on the eve or on the day of departure.

Some readers may wonder why a serviceman on leave has to travel so many miles away from home. Appendix 14 to Articles 28 and 33 of the Regulations for Garrison and Guard Duty of the USSR Military Forces states: "When a serviceman is on leave and the headquarters or military commissariat is over 10 kms away, the serviceman may report for duty to (or be taken off duty by) the local Council of People's Deputies." In fact, this same point is printed on the reverse side of the leave slip that every serviceman has in his possession when he goes on leave. Thus it would appear that there is no problem here and that there could not possibly be any problems. However, let us not jump to any conclusions.

Our editorial office has received letters the authors of which inform us that this regulation is ignored in some places. Here, for example, is how Warrant Officer V. Novik described his misadventure. Having arrived for a short leave (only 5 days) to take care of a family matter in the village of Levki in Minsk Oblast, he immediately went to the appropriate office to sign in. But it was not to be! In the Shchitkovich rural council, which is 5 kms from his home, they refused to sign him in, citing the decision of the district military commissariat. The warrant officer was forced to go 37 kms to the district center, to which there is transportation only a few times a day. And so he lost a day.

Similar "involuntary traveler" status was experienced by Warrant Officers A. Ukrainets, Yu. Boyko, I. Zemyanikin, V. Gorbat and others.

Warrant Officer A. Romanenko received the following explanation from the Ilovinskiy district military commissariat: Allegedly reports of arrival of servicemen on leave are often late when they come from local councils. For this reason the military commander made the decision to register servicemen on leave only in the district center.

Thus, the Ilovinskiy and the other named military commissariats decided on their own to implement a new rule for signing in and controlling arriving or departing servicemen.

Let us call things by their real names. This kind of innovation is nothing more than a gross violation of the Regulations for Garrison and Guard Duty. People have to be reminded that this regulation, like other general military regulations, was approved by a Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and is therefore a law, both for military commissariats and for local Councils of People's Deputies.

LtCol V. Rusov

But the Problem is Not Taken Care of

Dear Editor: Some time ago I was assigned to quarters in a small Finnish house which belongs to our garrison. I have been living in it for 18 years already. This house and other buildings were built in 1953. Since that time, there has not been a single repair done on it. The roof is leaking, the ceiling is ruined. The facing of the exterior walls is peeling off and cracking. In short, a major repair job is needed on the house. And the heating system is in disrepair. The water was recently turned off. All this adds up to inconvenience in everyday living.

I have seen the command staff of my unit and the Billeting Operations Unit about this problem several times, but so far nothing has been done.

Warrant Officer G. Vasil'chenko

#### Discrepancies

Naval Warrant Officer [michman] V. Chirkin (Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet) validated his "master" class skill level. He was congratulated on this achievement by the commander and his coworkers. The warrant officer was happy. And this is understandable, for he had not worked in vain and was now in the ranks of the masters of military affairs.

But ... a month passed, then another month, and the monetary award he was to have received for qualifying for his master's level had not been paid to him. The warrant officer went to the finance chief, who said:

"I cannot pay you. Your name is not on the list."

Chirkin went to headquarters. An officer, shrugging his shoulders, replied: "You understand, there is a discrepancy. Go see the commander."

Having heard his subordinate's story, the officer recommended that Chirkin go to the next higher chief. The warrant officer visited him as well, and the chief promised to untangle the problem. Several more months passed, but with no results.

Not having received any answer, Warrant Officer Chirkin wrote a letter to the editor of the journal ZNAMENOSSETS. "I validated the master skill level," the letter says, "back in December 1982 and I still have not received the monetary award that goes with it. My numerous appeals to responsible officials have not produced any results, even though the necessary documents on this matter were forwarded in time."

The editorial office sent Chirkin's letter of May 31, 1983 to the finance office of the fleet and asked that Chirkin's letter be read carefully, and to let the author of the letter and the editorial office know the outcome. They did not hurry with the answer. In September we sent a reminder. While they were thinking about how the error in the documents should be rectified, the editorial office received a second letter from Chirkin. He wrote: "My unit already has the orders awarding me the level of 'master,' but ... there is another discrepancy. In connection with the delay in confirming my class skill level, the monetary award will be paid me not from December 1982, but from July 1983, and not as a master, but only for the second class. This is what the finance section explained to me. Why is this? After all, the delay was not caused through any fault of mine...."

Not having received an answer to our inquiry, we sent Chirkin's second letter to the finance service of the Baltic Fleet with a request to take appropriate measures. On October 24, 1983, nearly five months later, the long-awaited answer arrived on the editor's desk, signed by Major General A. Plenkin of the Quartermaster Service. In it he said that by order of the commander-in-chief of the fleet, changes have been made in the documents awarding Warrant Officer V.V. Chirkin the "master" skill level as of 31 December 1982. "Accordingly," the letter continues, "instructions have been given to the commander of his unit to pay him the monetary award from that date."

Well, finally everything had fallen into place. The warrant officer has received everything he is entitled to and is proudly wearing on his chest the badge with the letter "M." But why is it that it took so long to resolve this problem? This editorial office was interested in finding out who caused the document error which created a morale as well as a financial problem for the warrant office, and what punishment was meted out. The above letter did not indicate this. Two lines of printed text on the letterhead paper said the following: "Persons who were guilty of causing the document errors are being held responsible for their actions." That is all. From this information we reached the inescapable conclusion that some comrades have forgotten the instructions of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee which require that leaders of all ranks must give substantive answers to questions from the press and provide timely responses to editorial offices about measures taken. This is why we again asked Major General A. Plenkin of the Quartermaster Service to inform the editor about the person who was specifically guilty of the red tape in this matter and what measures were taken.

After two weeks we were informed that by order of the commander, headquarters officers Captain 2nd Rank B. Kazachuk and Captain 2nd Rank I. Ponamarenko have been called in for disciplinary action. They have been reprimanded. Officers G. Astratov and V. Reunkov have been admonished.

F. Kryuchkov

#### A Good Name Restored

Under the headline "Scratch," the August 1983 issue of this journal published a critical article which told about the unlawful detention of Warrant Officer V. Balobanov in the guardhouse.

Political Officer Colonel A. Shcherbo and Military Prosecutor of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, Colonel B. Saygin of the Legal Section, informed the editorial office that this article was discussed by the political section of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet Air Force, as well as at an operational meeting of officers of the fleet military prosecutors' office. Unit commanders and military investigators conducted meetings with the staffs of military prosecutors' offices at which the rights and the obligations of responsible officials and investigative offices were studied.

It was admitted that the decision on selecting the method of punishment of comrade Balobanov was made in haste and was unjustified. Based on this, A. Kuznetsov, the garrison deputy military prosecutor was told that it was not permissible to ignore the facts of the case.

By order of the commander-in-chief of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet Air Force, officer A. Kazakov was given a strict warning for his weak control of military investigators and for his hasty decision to incarcerate Warrant Officer V. Balobanov.

The editorial office has been informed that the garrison chief and the chief of the unit political section have given public apologies to Warrant Officer V. Balobanov.

(No signature)

#### The Documents Have Been Sent

A military construction specialist, Private V. Krasnokhod, upon leaving the army called Lt A. Trufanov (Red Banner Siberian Military District) for a personal recommendation and a recommendation for admission to an institute at which he wanted to study. His request was not honored there, so he turned to our editorial office.

We sent his letter to the unit where the former military construction specialist had served. We soon received a response signed by Lt Col Vistunov. It turned out that the delay in sending the documents was the fault of officer Trufanov, who could not decide what to do and did not present the case to higher headquarters. The necessary documents have now been sent to the institute. Lt Trufanov has been reprimanded for his callous attitude toward requests and complaints of his subordinates.

## Only a Promise

"Dear Editor: T. Kirillova, N. Yefimova and others who are living in one of the garrisons of the Red Banner Volga Military District are writing you this letter. Three years ago construction began on a gas pipeline to our homes and it is not yet finished. But according to documents, the gas pipeline became operational back in December of last year. Our problems are known by the people in charge, but they have not done anything to correct the situation."

We sent this letter to the political directorate of the military district. From the answer received by the editorial office, signed by officer G. Oleynik, it turns out that the delay in providing gas to quarters was caused by the refusal of the subcontracting organization to complete the required work. At present, measures are being taken to provide gas to all quarters. The estimated time of completion and start of operations for the gas pipeline is the end of December 1983.

It would seem that this project moved from dead center. But, as can be seen from the second letter from the same persons, welding work is progressing very slowly. "When, at last, will this work be completed and our homes will start getting gas?" they ask.

Really, when?

## A Reputation Has Been Made

The wife of Warrant Officer V. Tokmakov has written to the editorial office about her family being overcharged for staying in officers' communal housing.

In response to the editor's inquiry, we received answers from the Order of Lenin Leningrad military District Billeting Directorate and the communal housing section, signed by Col D. Yarmak and comrades V. Nechkin and P. Prudnikov. The letters state that such cases have occurred during the last three months. In the future, charges for staying in the communal housing will be made in the correct amount. M. Gordeyeva, the person in charge of communal housing for the Soviet Army has been told that such errors will not be tolerated in the future, and it was suggested that she make a recomputation for all the families.

The communal billeting section of the military district billeting directorate conducts training sessions, using instructors and inspectors who control the work of communal housing in the entire district. These lessons cover violations that have occurred in computing charges, and the Regulation on Paying for Living in Communal Housing is studied.

You Asked and We Answer

To Warrant Officer V. Kisera:

You were interested in knowing whether a correspondence course student is authorized to be paid when taking rated skill level examination for an intermediate military school.

Your letter on this problem was looked at by the financial service of the Red Banner Odessa Military District, which answered that time spent in school is considered a service assignment. Consequently, in accordance with existing regulations, compensation for having passed the rated skill level qualification examination should be paid for the entire period of duty up to a maximum of two months.

To Warrant Officer A. Baglay:

"In what cases is money withheld for the cost of military clothing that I received?" -- you ask.

Army and navy warrant officers who are discharged from active military duty prior to the expiration of their active military duty enlistment due to being convicted (including probation) for crimes committed and for actions discrediting the service, have the cost of military clothing issued to them withheld, calculated by depreciating and prorating the time remaining for the "useful life" of the clothing.

To Senior Warrant Officer S. Piskunenko:

Upon being transferred from the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, you were assigned to the same place you were before your foreign tour of duty. Upon arrival to your unit you went to the chief of finance and gave him the appropriate documents, but he turned down your request for an additional monetary allowance. You want to know if the chief of finance did the right thing.

In accordance with existing regulations on monetary allowances for servicemen, officers, warrant officers and enlisted men who are serving beyond their first enlistment, upon arrival in the USSR from duty with forces that are temporarily stationed on foreign soil, if they will be serving in a place where they or their families have living quarters, no matter to whom those quarters belong (i.e., the state, cooperative, or private), are not entitled to receive a monetary allowance.

To Warrant Officer D. Kurzenkov:

You are being assigned for duty abroad and would like to know who could occupy the quarters that are reserved for you.

Living quarters reserved for servicemen sent for duty abroad to areas of the Far North and to areas equivalent to Far North areas, can be occupied by another serviceman by agreement with the person for whom the quarters are reserved. This serviceman must serve in the same military unit or garrison and be in need of housing. If no such agreement is concluded, the quarters are given over to the billeting office of the district to make a similar arrangements.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets," 1984.

11350  
CSO: 1801/257

## ARMED FORCES

### MILITARY PROBLEMS WITH RELIGIOUS FANATICS DESCRIBED

Kiev PATRIOT BAT'KIVSHCHYNY in Ukrainian 22 Apr 84 p 3

[Article, published under the heading "On Atheist Topics," by Ye. Sorokin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Press Office: "Path to Enlightenment"]

[Text] The following bit of news quickly made the rounds of the subunit: Aleksandr Krivenkov, one of the new conscripts, was a member of one of the most fanatical religious sects -- the Pentecostalists. They tried to talk with him, but he either refused to reply to their questions or would answer with words from the Bible.

He would not associate with any of the other men, keeping apart. Krivenkov even went so far as to shut his eyes and cover his ears at political instruction classes, where various visual aids would be used and films shown, including films on atheist topics.

Unfortunately military personnel did not immediately establish a proper relationship with him. Some of the men at first simply made fun of him -- and in addition kept their distance from him both at training classes and during off-duty hours.

The political worker, officer Aleksandr Semenovich Legkiy, observed all this. He realized that such an attitude toward this soldier could strengthen to an even greater extent his desire "to suffer for his faith." He spoke about this with the company Komsomol members. It was obvious that it was necessary to find the right approach to Krivenkov.

Soon it was learned by chance in the subunit that relatives of Krivenkov -- an aunt and her husband -- lived in a small town not far from the unit. At the political worker's request, Nina Nikolayevna and Vladimir Alekseyevich visited their nephew. Both were quite embarrassed upon learning of his behavior.

Nina Nikolayevna broke out crying. She could not understand what had happened to her sister, Aleksandr's mother, why she had suddenly become a religious believer, and why she had drawn her children into the sect. They had not seen one another for quite some time, and her sister's letters contained nothing about this development. And now.... Nina Nikolayevna works for the city department of public education, her husband is a teacher, while her sister is a religious fanatic. She was able to learn little by talking with Aleksandr.

Vladimir Alekseyevich frowned and kept silent. Nina Nikolayevna suddenly could stand it no longer: "Just what are you doing, Sasha? You are essentially refusing to defend your own mother and your little sisters!"

Realizing that she could not talk to him this way, she regained control of herself. She stroked Aleksandr's head as if he were a little boy, and quietly said: "Forgive me, Sasha, but what has happened to you is awful...."

The relatives' conversation was long and painful. They left the unit on the following day. It was evident, however, that the encounter had not been entirely in vain. It had affected Krivenkov deep down inside.

The men began noticing changes in his conduct from that time forward. For example, when on the advice of officer Legkiy they asked Aleksandr to help put the Lenin Room in order, he did not refuse. And he was making less of an effort to keep aloof from his comrades. And the latter began taking him along when they were given a pass, and they began helping him master a military occupational specialty.

Krivenkov no longer sat at political instruction classes with an absent gaze. He thought, and reflected. And it is thought, intelligence which is the very first antidote to religion. The Komsomol members carefully watched the spiritual convalescence of their fellow serviceman. Once Krivenkov stated with some embarrassment to the subunit commanding officer and political worker that he wanted to serve the same as everybody else, to carry out his military duty together with his comrades.

Enlightenment of a religious believer. This is a very complicated process. Religion, which appeals to a person's feelings, not infrequently firmly ensnares that person. And patience, tactfulness, and spiritual sensitivity are needed in order to help a person escape its clutches.

Religious faith and religious prejudices kill a person's volition and destroy one's initiative -- that is, those very qualities which are essential to a fighting man, an armed defender of the homeland. While perceiving military service as "divine punishment" and "suffering for one's faith," some religious believers are not as primitive as it might seem at first glance. Taught by their spiritual shepherds, they often consciously proceed with the aim of assuming the role of "sufferers." Let the others think: "What a stalwart individual...." And this too in fact propagandizes religion.

I recall an encounter with three Evangelical Christian-Baptists. They had just reported for duty in the subunit -- Pvts S. Chvorun, S. Shepet'ko, and Ye. Barannyk. Interestingly enough, however, they were immediately visited by a pastor from the nearby city. After talking with him, all three immediately held themselves aloof from the other soldiers and declared that they refused to take part in cultural and other activities. They even flaunted their "daring."

In this instance their religiosity proved to be not that deep. The political worker and their fellow soldiers spoke with them. This was enough to prevail upon Stepan Shepet'ko to take the military oath and become an active member of the military collective.

His "coreligionists" threatened him: if you reject your faith, your large family will receive no assistance. Stepan was the fifth child in a family of 10 children. The people in the subunit convinced this serviceman: genuine assistance to the large Shepetko family is provided not by the Baptists but by the Soviet Government. That same government which Stepan has been called upon to protect and defend.

It was not long before the two other religious-believer soldiers followed Shepet'ko's example.

Religious prejudices, in whatever form they appear, must be answered with appropriate counteraction. And countermeasures should be taken in a skilled and qualified manner. An individual approach to religious believers and well-conceived selection of means of combating relics of the past -- all this requires study. Contemporary religion proceeds in a subtle and leisurely fashion, while sometimes it also employs crude pressure. This means that it must be combated with methods of persuasion, knowledgeably, and avoiding unoriginal, predictable ploys.

3024

CSO: 1811/56

ARMED FORCES

TABLE OF CONTENTS: VOYENNY VESTNIK, NO 4, APRIL 1984

Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK in Russian No 4, Apr 84 (signed to press 4 Mar 84)  
p 1

[Text] Contents

M. Khomulo. Put Commanders' Preparation on a Level of Contemporary Demands...2  
A Subunit Aktiv.....6

DECISIONS OF THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS--INTO PRACTICE

N. Koshelev. All-Army Review of the VLKSM (All-Union Lenin Young  
Communist League) Organization.....9

PEOPLE. EXPLOITS. REFLECTIONS

N. Smelyakov. For the Front, For Victory.....13  
S. Skryabin. "I Called for Fire on Myself".....17  
V. Roshchupkin. On the Right Flank--Red Army Man V. I. Lenin.....19

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMBINED ARMS WARFARE

Yu. Zarudin. Cooperation in a Tactical Section.....23  
Do You Know.....27

Problems of Safeguarding Military Operations

B. Shubin, V. Belyayev. With a View to Perserving Fighting Efficiency...28  
P. Timofeyev. Outposts.....32

AIRBORNE FORCES

Ye. Chunosov, V. Kopytin, V. Sokolov, V. Pakhomov, Yu. Gromov. On  
Afghanistan Soil.....34

TRAINING AND MILITARY EDUCATION

High Effectiveness to Competition

- V. Yegorshin, A. Sladkov. When There is no Discipline in the Training Process.....41
- V. Polyashenko. We are Increasing the Love for Equipment.....44

Young Officers: The First Year

- V. Kodenets. There is No Bad Soldier.....45

Assistance to the Platoon Leader in Drill

- A. Melikhov, P. Moskvich. Methods of Movement on the Battlefield.....47

EXHIBITION OF ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE USSR--A SCHOOL OF FOREMOST EXPERIENCE

- L. Rashchupkina. An Active Propagandist of Foremost Experience.....49
- From the Exhibition of Economic Achievements of the USSR Into Practice of the Troops.....52

ROCKETS AND ARTILLERY

- K. Konyushko, A. Bondarenko. Artillery Training of the Combined Arms Officer.....54
- N. Golovach. Officers are Competing.....57

Assistance to Those Studying Firing Principles

- V. Zakharov, Yu. Maksimenko. Utilization of Ranging Gun Data in the Mountains.....60
- G. Litvinovich. Registration of Observed Targets According to Measured Deflection.....61
- V. Kondrat'yev. Planning Artillery Displacement With the Help of Special Lines.....63

PVO FORCES

- B. Zhdanovich. Sergeants' Preparation.....66

FIRE AND WEAPONS

- V. Nikandrov. Great Attention to Practical Skills.....70
- A. Tkachenko. Simply, Cheaply, Comfortably.....72
- Solve These Tasks.....74

SPECIAL FORCES

- G. Cheykin. We are Improving the Means of Bridge Building.....75
- Yu. Churkin. Up to Active Operations.....78

For Foremost Methods

A. Bychkov. From Teaching-Training Maps to the Simulators.....80  
G. Bondarenko. A Group Exercise with Students.....83

IN THE FOREIGN ARMIES

M. Belov. Helicopters in Combined Arms Warfare.....87  
N. Nikitin. New Equipment, New Organization.....92  
Foreign Military Information.....92

CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

N. Ablyasov. Tactical Maneuver.....93  
In District and Group Forces.....95

CHESS.....96

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenny vestnik," 1984.

12198  
CSO: 1801/316

ARMED FORCES

TABLE OF CONTENTS: TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE, NO 4, APRIL 1984

Moscow TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 84 (signed to press  
14 Mar 84) pp 44

[Text] Contents

Leninism--Our Banner and Weapon.....	1
A Short Chronicle of War.....	3
L. Klyachko. Hard Alloys.....	4

STATUS, PROBLEMS, PERSPECTIVES

Yu. Sizov, Ye. Koslov, Y. Liz'ko. The Computer in Antiaircraft Complexes.....	6
B. Alekseyevskiy. Accumulators: Prospective Developments.....	8
V. Gureyev. Assembly for Air-Free Dispersion of Enamels.....	9

STUDY, EXPLOITATION

Yu. Chesnokov. To Exploit Weapons Skillfully.....	10
A. Shipunov. Repair and Examination of Containers.....	12
M. Belokur. Checking the Sights Before Firing.....	13
T and V Consultation.....	14
Into Your Notebook.....	15
V. Fursov, Ye. Bervingas. Seasonal Maintenance of Wheeled Chassis.....	16
N. Pan'kov. Operating the KamAZ Truck.....	18
V. Vorob'yev, V. Trifonov. Technical Analysis in an Aviation Unit.....	20
T. Sorokina. Mosin, Sergey Ivanovich.....	21
B. Tyurin. Fedorov, Vladimir Grigor'yevich.....	-
A. Bashindzhogian. Grendal', Vladimir Davydovich.....	-
E. Dmitriyev. MiG-23 Aircraft: Replacing an Engine.....	24
K. Galkin. Care of Target Mounts.....	25
Ye. Pateyuk, V. Revuka. In an Excellent Regiment.....	26
A. Golovkin. Testing Cable Lines.....	28
A. Stepan'kov. Utilize Foremost Experience.....	-
A. Mikhaylova, N. Nemchenko. Chromeplating with Titanium.....	29
V. Bogolyubov, Yu. Tarasov, A. Dorofeyev. Information Aims.....	30
O. Cherepnev. The VAI (Military Automotive Inspection Service) in the Grain Harvest.....	31

INVENTION, RATIONALIZATION

A. Burdenko. Declaration for an Efficiency Expert's Suggestion.....32  
Recommended for Introduction.....33  
The Innovators' Relay Race.....34

IN THE ARMIES OF CAPITALIST STATES

Yu. Zhitnov. Guided Missiles of the "Air-to-Air Class.....36  
Equipment and Weapons.....38  
V. Sinegubov, M. Dobrov. Small Caliber Naval Artillery.....40

Check Your Knowledge.....43

On the 1st Page of the Cover. Photo by V. Revuk

On the 3d Page of the Cover. Article by B. Klopov and A. Cherpak, "Devices for Potentiometer Analysis of GSM (Fuel and Lubricants)"

On the 4th Page of the Cover. Drawing by O. Shmelev

COPYRIGHT: "Tekhnika i vooruzheniye", 1984.

12198  
CSO: 1801/315

## GROUND FORCES

### TANK DIVISION SUCCEEDS IN ECONOMIZING MATERIAL TECHNICAL MEANS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Apr 84 p 2

[Guards Colonel V. Bepalov, Commander of the Dneiper Guards Tank Division, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "With Minimal Expenditure"]

[Text] Among the socialist commitments made by personnel of the Dneiper Guards Tank Division, fighting for the rank of outstanding in its branch of the Armed Forces, is the commitment to economize on material-technical means. Today the division commander relates how tankers are reaching high field training with minimal expenditures.

I will begin by digressing into the past. At the end of the past training year while summing up competition among regiments, we became convinced that the number of outstanding subunits, personnel outstanding in military and political training, and specialists with high ratings were roughly equal in the units. But the costs of attaining these indicators were different. The regiment where Guards Major A. Bol'shakov commands one of the battalions saved 3500 roubles in fuel and petroleum products and 6000 roubles in electricity and lengthened equipment time between repairs. The neighboring regiment which Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Grachevskiy then commanded did not economize. On the contrary, an over-expenditure of fuel and transportation resources was allowed.

What is the point of this? Primarily, to find a rational, economic route to the goal in the training method and the skill of exercise leaders. It is important for commanders, political workers, and staff specialists to have the ability to think using economic categories and to constantly compare expenses with the attained results. It is exactly this work style that the 26th CPSU Congress decisions and the subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums demand from us. And it is impossible not to note that the struggle for economy is becoming all the more specific. For example, in our division a comprehensive economic fuel and energy resources plan was developed. It is proving its worth as enough fuel was saved in the division for one of the regimental subunit's exercises for a month. We devoted party meetings and service conferences to the issue of economizing and we are improving forms of officer and warrant officer methodological training. Competition to attain outstanding indicators with a minimum expenditure of material resources in exercises has become more lively.

In my opinion, however, not all reserves are being used. One can still meet an officer who thinks that economizing is the prerogative of special services and the rear echelons. His concern is training subordinates to shoot, drive and complete the assigned exercises and norms without worrying about economic calculations.

Here is an example. Last year one of the divisional regiments intended to train 70 percent of its specialists primarily in driver-mechanic areas to the 1st and 2nd class. To meet this commitment, it goes without saying that they had to thoughtfully combine exercises on equipment and trainers. Here they stressed actual driving. The commander more than once requested that I authorize him supplemental fuel. Otherwise, he said, we will not reach our planned level. He had to grasp the character of the training and get his people into the trainers.

Other commanders ask if it is possible not to give a subunit what it is authorized and to economize to the detriment of training and fitness? This is certainly forbidden, but we're talking about something else.

Let's say that driver training is taking place. The vehicles return to the starting point and the commander immediately analyses the crews' completion of the exercise. Some did all right, others meet the assignment, he critiques errors, determines the best and the worst. The discussion goes on five, ten minutes and longer. And all this time tank and combat vehicles stand with engines running. And what kind of economizing is this! And how is this reflected in the indoctrinational work with personnel?

When servicing equipment it is possible to see amateurs who wash parts with fuel and wipe vehicle joints with it. The commander and his deputy for technical affairs don't always evaluate these instances properly. Fuel is being wasted and drops become tons in the end.

There are many ways to economizing. One must look around with a thrifty eye, experiment and not neglect the little things. The regiment where Guards Major N. Ustenko is the deputy for rear support has made significant savings by turning in used oils and ideal procedures to depots and filling stations. Not a drop of fuel is wasted in the regiment where Guards Major N. Zharikov serves either.

It seems to me that ammunition economy deserves a special word. This also has its nuances. One must set things up so that every gunner gets good practice in the use of his weapon and shoots skillfully with regular rounds. But one does not get this skill by the number of artillery rounds expended. A lot also depends on the skill of the chief instructor, the ability to vary tank firing and marksmanship training and to destroy the target with the first shot.

I will again give an example. The tank company commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Grudey is noted for its high marksmanship training. The tankers confidently complete the exercise under any circumstance. Moreover, the subunit has expended less ammunition than others. I picked up some documents for several months and was convinced that the ammunition saved by the company is enough to organize field firing training.

There is also good marksmanship training in the company commanded by Guards Captain A. Belyakov, an experienced officer who knows the secrets of outstanding methodology. But he is one of those who strives to expend a little more ammunition and relies on practical firing. This company's tankers spend half as much time on trainers as Senior Lieutenant Grudey's company. And the result is that the subordinates of Guards Senior Lieutenant Grudey took first place in competition.

The specific struggle for economizing material-technical means is impossible without indoctrinating people. Division headquarters and political sections studied and summarized the experience of the foremost subunit commander, Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Loginov. We taught officers his experiences at demonstrations and in the commanding officer training system. Many people quickly assimilated the information. Many, but not all. For example, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Grachevskiy maintained that this knowledge wasn't right for his regiment. Simulators in the unit were under the deputy commander and they train gunners by field firing. I had to step in and convince him with figures, facts and achievement comparisons and show him where unnecessary transportation resource expenditures were allowed and firing was planned for which personnel weren't ready.

We do a significant amount of tank fire training using rifle rounds, saving not only regular rounds but also ammunition for subcaliber tubes. It has become better and more efficient to use simulators and other technical training means.

The very fact that more and more officers, warrant officers, party and Komsomol activists are beginning to think about how to make the training process more economical and are finding the means of getting high combat training with minimal expenditures causes me joy. A detailed and thorough discussion about chief instructor methodological skills and the thrifty use of every kilogram of fuel, every artillery round and every kilowatt of electricity is also taking place in divisional subunits during the review of winter training.

12511

CSO: 1801/313

## GROUND FORCES

### RADIO COMMUNICATION IN MOUNTAIN AREAS DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 84 pp 22-23

[Article by Captain A. Kondrashov: "Call Signs in Mountainous Areas"]

[Text]

**The signal platoon commanded by Lieutenant V. Bobrov serves in a mountainous locality. The men work hard to raise their combat skills and proficiency. The subunit has been the best in the unit for the past three years in a row. The signallers are focussing on radio-exchange in mountainous conditions.**

#### **NIGHT "SURPRISES"**

Night was approaching, the twilight over the mountains giving way to darkness. The special training exercise was coming to a close. Sergeant A. Kuznetsov was already glancing at his watch, expecting the command to pack up the radio station to come any minute now. Suddenly the order came:

"Contact the distant station."

The chief of the radio station switched to the assigned frequency to try and establish contact. But all that could be heard in the headphones was crackling, and the correspondent's signal was not audible. Kuznetsov initially thought that the mountainous relief was the problem. The sergeant wanted to ask the platoon commander's permission to have the radio station moved, but he had his doubts: "Perhaps it's not the relief after all?"

Kuznetsov recalled the specifics of wave propagation in mountainous locales. They had studied this topic before setting out for the mountains. The platoon commander had talked in detail about the shielding properties of cliffs and the trickiness of the mountain relief. But this was something else apparently. They were working in a short-wave range, and direct visibility was not imperative for short-wave stations, the commander said. Sky waves would find the distant station even in a deep gorge.

So it wasn't necessary to move the radio station. The antenna had to be replaced only. The best thing would be to lay out a directional aerial, say, a symmetrical vibrator.

That's exactly what the radio station chief did. But audibility did

not improve. They had to ask the platoon commander for help.

Lieutenant Bobrov put on the headphones. There was cacophony on the air. The interference exceeded the useful signal level. It was several times greater than usual.

The experienced radio operator quickly figured out what the problem was. It was not the mountain relief per se, but the atmosphere. The officer knew from experience that at high altitudes atmospheric conditions frequently change so much in the second half of the day that radio contact is extremely difficult in the short-wave range. The radio operator had to catch the signals being relayed in the short intervals between electrical charges. This greatly slows down communication, making it necessary to repeat radiograms several times. Of course, it is very difficult to work in such conditions. Difficult, but possible. True, this is within the abilities of only a top-flight specialist. It is hard, after all, to maintain radio communication amidst strong atmospheric interference. And only a well-trained ear is capable of catching the necessary signal from the chaos of sounds.

The platoon commander established contact at that exercise. But after a number of training sessions Sergeant Kuznetsov, too, learned to overcome the interference. The other specialists as well adapted to mountain conditions.

### ON A CLOSED TRACK

Radio communication in the ultra-short wave range is particularly dependent on the relief. Propagating in a straight line, ultra-short waves can connect stations separated by many dozens of kilometres. But this is only provided there is direct visibility between the radio stations. But what if the stations are separated by a mountain range or huge cliff? Even the most experienced radio operators are powerless in this case.

That is why Lieutenant Bobrov considers teaching his subordinates correctly to choose places for setting up stations to be an important aspect of tactical and special training. Naturally, it is hard to pick a better place than the top of a commanding height over the surrounding locality. But the requirements of camouflage should not be forgotten. Each of the opposing sides is constantly engaged in reconnaissance from both land and air. Therefore, when selecting a mountain to be the site of a radio station one should take into account its camouflage properties as well as its height. Furthermore, it is not always easy to use the relief to the best advantage. Frequently mountain slopes are so steep that motor vehicles cannot negotiate them. The solution in this case is to use another communication means — operating radio stations by remote control. For example, infantry radio operators can set up such a station as the R-107 in difficult-of-access places. Two problems are thus solved: first, the range of direct communication is increased, and second, the entire guidance post is reliably camouflaged.

Experienced radio operators often find solutions to seemingly impossible situations. This could definitely be said of the crew of Sergeant S. Yakubovsky.

Once this crew was ordered to establish contact with a distant station located on the other end of the gorge. There was no direct visibility. The radio station could be relocated, but that would take a great deal of time. It was then that Sergeant Yakubovsky decided to establish contact on a closed track. He figured that the gorge would in this instance be a sort of wave conductor, directing the propagation of electromagnetic energy. He was right: when the call signs went in the air the distant station's reply was not long in coming. After the exercises were over their director

noted with satisfaction that the communications were excellent.

This was not the only instance when the subordinates of Lieutenant V. Bobrov, making skilful use of the mountain relief, established contact on a closed track. For example, Private B. Pyatnitsky utilised the reflecting capacity of radio waves.

When we received the order to establish contact with a radio station hidden beyond the reverse slopes of a height, the radio operator took a seemingly strange decision. He pointed the antenna to the reverse side from the distant station, to the cliff. Private Pyatnitsky had figured correctly. Reflecting off the cliff, as sunlight from a mirror, the radiowaves reached the distant station.

Of course, steady radio communication can far from always be conducted on a closed track. It should be remembered, however, that in certain instances even a mountain relief can be turned from an "enemy" into an ally.

### **EXCHANGING FOREFRONT EXPERIENCE**

As experience has shown, it is much more difficult to provide stable radio contact in mountains than on level land. But the diffi-

culties grow into an unresolvable problem only for those poorly equipped to handle high-altitude conditions. Such is the view of Lieutenant Bobrov. For this reason he always sees to it that his platoon is well prepared for work in complicated circumstances.

Classes are held before each departure for the mountains. At practical sessions the signallers learn the specifics of radio communications in the mountains. The platoon commander reminds his subordinates of examples of resourceful actions in mountain conditions, as well as mistakes made at previous exercises. It should be pointed at the experience of the top specialists carefully generalised and spread: the experienced signallers help the young radio operators. Everything is done here to put the achievements of the best at the disposal of all.

Modelling complex situations is a great help in training personnel for action on mountainous terrain. Incidentally, this does not apply to radio operators alone. For example, the platoon commander describes the following situation to radio vehicle driver Private V. Khokhlov:

"At an altitude of 2,000 metres the engine ceases to pull. What do you do?"

Private Khokhlov thought for a second, and answered:

"Adjust the ignition timing with the octane-selector."

Lieutenant Bobrov was satisfied with his subordinate's answer.

The preparations in the subunit for work in mountain conditions are not confined to theory alone. Much attention here is focussed on the use of equipment at high altitudes. The signallers take into consideration the fact that in rarefied air motors cannot develop maximum power, and storage batteries lose part of their capacity. How can these losses be reduced to a minimum? The platoon does the following. In order to maintain battery capacity, insulator covers are put on all the batteries used at high altitudes. Given earthing equipment, when several equipment vehicles are working together, they are always connected by an earthing wire.

The platoon commander devotes a great deal of attention to training the personnel in the mountains. When working at high altitudes, especially during equipping of retransmission posts, the signallers need mountain-climbing skills. After all, not everyone is capable of lugging a radio station to a difficult-of-access height.

...Once again the signallers of the platoon of Lieutenant V. Bobrov are in the mountains. Call signs fly to distant stations, and clear-cut replies follow. The radio communications apparatus are working reliably and uninterruptedly.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," 1984

CSO: 1812/216

GROUND FORCES

SMALL SUPPORTING TANK EXERCISE REVIEWED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 84 pp 26-27

[Article by Captain V. Zadubrovsky: "The Correct Decision"]

[Text]

The 3rd Tk Coy under Lieutenant A. Glushchenko with an attached Mts Inf Pl comprising a reserve secretly followed the subunits of the first echelon of a Tk Bn. It was ready to exploit a success in the direction of the flank, beat off counterattacks, replace subunits of the first echelon and also to destroy small "enemy" groups remaining in the attackers' rear. In an emergency it was to be committed to action from behind the flank of a company of the first echelon.

The Bn broke through the FEBA but met stubborn resistance from the "enemy" group occupying the organised and tactically advantageous line on the left flank. Without destruction of this "enemy" group which was ready to launch a counterattack the Bn was unable to fulfil the initial mission at the appointed time. The Bn CO decided to commit the reserve to action.

After receiving the latest data on the "enemy," the position of subunits of the first echelon of the attackers, the line of commitment of the reserve to action and the direction of the further advance, Lieutenant Glushchenko gave the warning order to his subordinates. To attack the "enemy" from the front was dangerous, since he occupied advantageous defensive positions on a hill. Therefore the Coy commander decided to carry out manoeuvre with fire and a subunit and to deliver a blow at a flank.

At first glance this decision arose instantly as if by itself. But that was not so. The decision to carry out manoeuvre was a result of Lieutenant Glushchenko's well-considered work which began prior to the battle, while studying the "enemy" and terrain.

As is known, after receiving a mission every commander specifies it, estimates the situation and takes a decision. It is not fortuitous that these points stand side by side because sizing up the mission and appraising the situation is a single process of analysis and calculations in working

out a decision. How did Lieutenant Glushchenko think, consider and analyse? It is interesting to trace how his decision was born and crystallised.

The battalion was breaking through the "enemy" FEBA. Glushchenko supposed that the reserve would be committed to action in case of an "enemy" counterattack in the depth of the defences. Especially since the terrain was conducive to this. He had already estimated the probable lines of committing the company to action and the time of approaching them.


Having been ordered to enter battle, Lieutenant A. Glushchenko had already necessary information for taking a decision. But once again he weighed the pros and cons, for he had sized up the situation in general outlines without going into the details of the situation. The company was to catch up to the first echelon of the battalion and at the appointed time to reach the indicated line of commitment to action. But what route should he take? At what speed should he move?

While the company moved to the line, Lieutenant Glushchenko continued to analyse and compare. He attentively studied the map. Here was the attacking battalion. Here was the height held by the "enemy." In order to approach the indicated area it was necessary to increase the speed.

Having ordered the speed increased, Glushchenko again studied the map: he hasn't seen the "enemy" yet. When his company would go out from the flank of the 1st Coy the height would be on the left. Perhaps during the deployment into a combat line he should immediately open up at the right flank where antitank weapons have been detected and then lift fire to the centre? Simultaneously two crews of IFVs of the attached platoon would deliver a blow at the position of an infantry section where a heavy grenade launcher was located. Such a manoeuvre, which boiled down to a successive fire concentration on the major "enemy" objectives, would be rather effective.

However, as the company was approaching the commitment line Glushchenko understood more and more distinctly that his plan should be amended somewhat. Though the "enemy" occupied an advantageous position the terrain made it possible to get positioned for a flank attack and if not to destroy completely then, at least to deprive him of the possibility to deliver a blow at the flank of the attacking battalion.

Lieutenant Glushchenko decided to deploy one platoon into battle formation and ordered it to attack from the front. The rest of the tanks, making use of the accidents of the terrain, were to continue movement in the column, then to deploy into a combat line and, delivering fire on the move, to strike a flank blow at the "enemy" from the shrubs.



After having approved the last variant, the Bn CO informed Lieutenant Glushchenko that during manoeuvre the supporting battery and the left-flank Tk Coy would be delivering fire at the "enemy" positions. Glushchenko was only to specify missions to his subordinates.

The further course of the tactical exercises proved the correctness of these calculations and the plan of Lieutenant Glushchenko. A deep analysis of the situation and the decision taken on its basis determined to a great extent a success of the company as a whole.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," 1984

CSQ: 1812/216

## GROUND FORCES

### ENHANCING SERGEANTS' ROLE IN RECONNAISSANCE DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 2, Feb 84 (signed to press 23 Jan 84), p 23

[Article by Col A. Chirkov, senior officer of the Main Directorate for Ground Forces Combat Training and LtCol V. Khoreshko, ZNAMENOSETS correspondent: "Reconnaissance .... And Where are the Sergeants?"]

[Text] In organizing combat operations, sergeants sometimes have the role of being supernumeraries only. How, then, can their role be enhanced to make them active assistants of commanders in this important work? -- This is the subject of the article that follows.

\* \* \*

At a battalion command post Capt A. Ganchuk, commander of a motorized infantry company, asked the commander of the mortar battery, Sr Lt V. Shulakov, to "loan" him a sergeant, any sergeant, for the reconnaissance phase. Ganchuk was worried that the exercise monitor would ask why there was no third company commander, whose functions during the exercise were being fulfilled by Sgt A. Shakhpazyan. But the company commander did not take him on reconnaissance and was forced to find a substitute on the spot.

Regulations do not specify exactly who should go into a reconnaissance group in any given situation. Depending upon a specific situation, the assigned mission and the time involved, the commander determines the composition of the group. Unfortunately, not every officer by far considers it mandatory to involve sergeants in reconnaissance.

Capt Ganchuk is also of this opinion. He announced that sergeants of his company would be asked to participate in this group at a later time. But then, how will they be able to clarify their missions?

"I shall show them everything on the map," assured the officer.

"How much can sergeants see on a map?" asked the monitor, which was a reasonable question.

Actually, the area of action for the company was shown on the map in just a few millimeters. Here, no matter how hard they would try, the sergeants would not be able to assess all the details of the combat situation for their squads.

Of course, the situation is not hopeless. Combat regulations provide for cases where a subunit commander does not have the opportunity to organize combat operations right on the spot or to assign combat missions to squads, using a map. In such cases, the commander gives combat orders on the basis of a model of the terrain. Undoubtedly, Capt Ganchuk also knows this. If, however, there is no time to set up a terrain model, he could -- using his working map -- make an enlarged sketch of the area, which would allow him to explain the situation to his subordinates. However, judging from everything, the squad made plans solely on the basis of the soldiers' good knowledge of the area. After all, the training area was their own and they were familiar with it.

Reconnaissance is not an isolated operation within the system of preparations for combat operations. More often than not, an assessment of the area, and assignment of missions and organization of coordination is a single process.

Taking all the work on himself in the training area and not giving sergeants the opportunity to assess the situation, make decisions and personally give combat orders to their subordinates, any officer will later, in the assembly area -- and sometimes during the combat action, too -- waste an inordinate amount of time in explaining the sequence of actions. At the same time, not immersing themselves into the situation as they should, junior commanders commit serious errors in trying to accomplish their missions.

Here are some examples. After prolonged rains, a low-lying area that is usually easy to cross became a "trap" for attacking vehicles when the troops began their attack phase. First an infantry combat vehicle [BMP], driven by Private R. Dzurayev, got stuck; then another BMP, the driver of which was Priv K. Allashukurov.

Could this foul-up, which occurred during the attack, have been avoided? Of course. Everything would have been different if the commander had organized, together with his sergeants and driver mechanics, study of the route to take in approaching the forward edge of the "enemy" defense and had marked the routes for by-passing the obstacles.

The afore-mentioned exercise also had errors made by Sgt A. Shakhpazyan. They occurred because the leader varied the target situation and changed the building of "enemy defenses" and the directions of the counterattacks. Without a preliminary study of advantageous approaches, movement conditions, observation and firing, it was difficult for subordinates to drive during combat operations. Because of this, the platoon could not avoid stops and back-ups, especially when they had to be re-formed.

"Had I known the situation everything would have been different," said a deputy platoon commander after the exercise.

By the way, during his service as deputy platoon commander, Shakhpazyan had participated in four exercises of different magnitude, but let us note that he did not participate in reconnaissance a single time.

Now, let us ask a question: Where and when can a young commander improve his skill in studying the locale and working in it during the organization of combat operations?

One would think that he would have many opportunities to do this. For example, during tactical formation exercises, there is study of the area in which training problems are worked out. This is also reconnaissance of a sort. But this study is conducted for purely methodological purposes, and sergeants will not get practice here in assessing a combat situation. Often, a certain problem will also fall by the wayside in the course of tactical exercises and studies. This happens because all attention is focused on solving the dynamics of combat operations.

Problems of organizing combat operations are also often developed only in passing, that is, during studies held within the system of commander's training for sergeants. According to his record journal for combat training, Capt A. Ganchuk's company devoted four hours to practical training on the subject, "Separation and Advance" and two hours for on-site orientation problems in the first two months of the training year for commanders' studies. But the sergeants' outstanding and good grades still do not tell the whole story. We became convinced that sergeants do not know how to make out firing range cards and do not know conventional tactical signs. Thus, the BMP and various types of weapons in the chain were depicted by Sgt Shakhpazyan as different sized little ovals. One had the impression that junior commanders here had heard for the first time about the existence of standards for making schematics of an area or for orientating themselves with a map. All this testifies to a break between the sergeants' theoretical knowledge and practical applications by them in a specific tactical situation. Let us also note that this kind of organization of the training process is not very effective in instilling discipline in junior commanders or a feeling of personal responsibility for combat training and conducting combat operations.

How, then, can the existing deficiency in commanders' training for sergeants be corrected? There are ways to do this. Sergeants A. Shakhpazyan, M. Shakhov and T. Sakandelidze say that in their training subunit the sandtable has helped them a great deal. They used it to learn how to conduct tactical and topographic orientation, to assess a situation, make decisions and formulate combat missions. And in the company, all problems related to organizing combat operations can be developed in full during independent study hours, using mock-ups of the area, relief maps, ordinary maps, posters and schematics. The opportunities for field exercises in this plan have also not been fully utilized. Unfortunately, all these methods of training have been forgotten in Capt Ganchuk's company. The following rule has also been forgotten: An officer should devote more time to training commanders subordinate to him in combat operations and leave less time for himself.

In connection with the above, an incident that transpired during one of the exercises comes to mind.

A senior commander had arrived at the assembly area for the offensive. This area was occupied by a motorized rifle battalion commanded by Maj V. Ivashchenko. Having familiarized himself with the mock-up of the area in which combat operations were to take place, he remarked that one shortcoming was that only company and platoon commanders could visually perceive the

of the attached tanks to clearly picture the combat situation and the nature of the "enemy" defense for the full depth of the operation. Taking this comment into consideration, the mock-up was redone. Sergeants and driver-mechanics received the opportunity to take in at a glance the entire battlefield, including the reverse slope of hills and depressions and ravines that would have been difficult to see even through a direct visual method on the spot. According to exercise participants, squad commanders, Sgts Yu. Azel', V. Kochan and others, work with the mock-up helped them use the terrain features better during the attack and to act decisively and forcefully.

Determining the enemy's situation and the nature of his operations through personal observation, as well as by other means, is not a goal in itself, but is a necessary step that permits sergeants to clearly visualize the development of combat operations and their own role. Thus, reconnaissance, just as any other measure for preparing for an offensive or defensive operation, should not under any circumstance turn into a formal act in which sergeants are given the roles of supernumeraries. The junior commander should be an active organizer of combat operations and a knowledgeable leader to his subordinates in tactical training and exercises.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenezets," 1984

11,350  
CSO: 1801/257

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

MAJ GEN SECHKIN DISCUSSES AIR DEFENSE READINESS

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 84 pp 16-19

[Article by Major-General N. Sechkin, chief of staff, Radio-Radar Troops, Air Defence Forces: "For Higher Combat Readiness"]

[Text]

**THE AIR DEFENCE FORCES ARE A FIGHTING SERVICE WHICH IS IN A STATE OF COMBAT READINESS AT ALL TIMES. IN PERFORMING COMBAT ALERT DUTY THE PERSONNEL OF THIS SERVICE ARE SOLVING A TASK OF STATE IMPORTANCE, ALWAYS READY TO REPULSE UNEXPECTED STRIKES BY A STRONG AND WELL EQUIPPED ENEMY.**

**THE AD ROCKET FORCES, WHICH ARE PART OF THE AIR DEFENCE FORCES, POSSESS FORMIDABLE STRIKING POWER. IN COOPERATION WITH THE FIGHTER AVIATION THEY RELIABLY PROTECT THE SOVIET MOTHERLAND'S AIR FRONTIERS.**

**THE AIR DEFENCE FORCES' AIR ARM IS EQUIPPED WITH SUPERSONIC ALL-WEATHER INTERCEPTOR FIGHTERS CARRYING POWERFUL ARMAMENT, WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF DESTROYING ENEMY AIRCRAFT AT FAR APPROACHES TO THE OBJECTIVES BEING PROTECTED.**

**A GREAT ROLE IN THE SYSTEM OF THE AIR DEFENCE FORCES IS PLAYED BY THE RADIO-RADAR TROOPS. PROVIDED WITH MODERN RADARS, THEY CAN CONDUCT RADAR RECONNAISSANCE OF THE ENEMY AIR ATTACK WEAPONS AND SUPPORT COMBAT OPERATIONS OF THE ROCKET SYSTEMS AND FIGHTER AVIATION.**

**THE ARTICLE BELOW IS ABOUT THE COMPLICATED AND IMPORTANT MISSIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE RADIO-RADAR TROOPS.**

The main indicator of the radio-radar troops' qualitative status is their combat readiness, which is characterised essentially by the personnel's proficiency and their ability competently to carry out missions in any air or ground situation.

Today the role of the commander as the predominant factor in maintaining subunits' combat readiness at a high level has considerably

enhanced. The great scope, fluidity and intensity of combat operations require that the commander be able quickly to collect and process data on the enemy, react instantly to any change in the situation, take prompt and optimal decisions, assign missions to crews, and organise control over their execution.

A tactically competent commander of a radio-radar subunit is distinguished for his ability correctly to assess and foresee the air enemy's actions, and for firm knowledge of combat capabilities of organic weapons and equipment and of their strong and weak points. Moreover, the commander must be able to visualise likely turns of events and to use to the best advantage the peculiarities of the position occupied.

As the assessment of a probable air enemy is a highly complicated aspect in preparing for a practice mission, we shall consider it in greater detail.

It is very important for the commander to determine probable lines or areas for performing manoeuvres and for launching anti-radar shells, and also expected directions of the air enemy approach to deal a strike at the subunit.

All this requires that officers spare no pains to upgrade their tactical training standard and to develop solid troop control skills in any air or ground situation.

An officer is unlikely to take a competent and resolute decision unless he is sufficiently familiar with the fun-

damentals of troop control or fully realises the combat capabilities of weapons and equipment organic to the subunit. Failure to master the basic troop control principles and methods makes it impossible for the commander to foresee the likely changes in the situation and take a well-grounded decision which would ensure successful fulfilment of the assigned missions.

On the other hand, knowledge of the theory alone is powerless to develop the officer's initiative, independence and confidence in the success of the mission. Along with theoretical training, developing troop control skills is also of great importance. These skills are acquired mainly during special drills and tactical exercises.

The training is normally carried out with a reduced or complete crew of a given subunit taking part. This is precisely how things stand in the radio-radar subunit under Lieutenant-Colonel Soinikov. Proceeding from the set of methods worked out in the subunit, the training process is divided into several stages. The method used depends on the nature of the missions to be carried out at each training session and on the men's proficiency. To choose the method used depends on the nature of the missions to be carried out at each training session and on the men's proficiency. To choose the method most favourable for the given situation, the battalion has compiled special handbooks which show typical instances of air raids simulating strikes by an air enemy's attack weapons (low-altitude, manoeuvring, and high

speed high-altitude pinpoint targets) with intensive jamming employed. To simulate a complicated and instructive situation during the training, the battalion's innovators have developed special equipment.

During the lesson the subunit commander controls the crew and conducts radar reconnaissance with the aid of his remote indicator.

Using the remote indicator to control the crew enables the commander to acquire the necessary skills in assessing the air enemy, taking the decision on the basis of the obtaining air situation, assigning missions to radar crews, and directing the work to ensure combat-training actions.

Vast practical experience is gained at tactical exercises, which allow subunit commanders' and crews' training conditions to be approximated to real battle in a maximum degree. Furthermore, the exercises help the personnel to work out stable skills in handling weapons and combat equipment, to take prompt decisions and to develop initiative and creative tactical thinking.

Radio-radar units and subunits have accumulated rich experience in enhancing officers' proficiency and extending their general outlook. This is borne out by the example of the battalion commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Yavorsky, who has risen from radar chief to radio-radar battalion commander, and who is now an expert in his field.

It has become traditional in the battalion to have talks

with young officers, recent military school graduates, with a view to find out how they plan to upgrade their professional level. If need be, an experienced officer is instructed to help a newcomer perform his service duties and pass examinations to become a rated specialist. At the end of each month young officers take examinations on the radar equipment entrusted to them, the combat potentialities of the probable enemy, the mission assigned to the subunit, and the sequence of steps to be taken to carry it out.

Lieutenant-Colonel Yavorsky also sees to it that alongside independent training young officers take an active part in day-to-day combat activities, because technical and special training sessions held in the battalion on a high methodical level are the principal means for an inexperienced commander to upgrade his theoretical knowledge and practical skills.

In order to be well posted on the progress of young officers' preparation for the combat rating examinations, the Bn CO organises regular checkup drills, at which specific tasks and combat training standards are worked up.

Besides checkup drills, weekly talks with officers on specific items of the indepen-

dent preparation plan are also practised. These talks concern matters which are the most difficult for the trainees to comprehend. Not infrequently such topics are made the subject of general discussions, and special lessons are held to study them.

Another reason crews' team-work is a major criterion of radio-radar subunits' combat readiness is that these subunits are provided with crew-served combat equipment, which calls for the personnel's concerted and competent actions and for their perfect organisation and efficiency. Each crew member of a control centre, radar or radio station performs strictly specific individual duties, which are generally not duplicated. It is no wonder then that even the slightest negligence or omission on the part of a single specialist can complicate for the whole crew the fulfilment of the mission assigned.

Therefore, the system of drills and tactical exercises promotes, irrespective of the season, constant maintenance of the subunit's readiness to carry out the mission, with the maximum number of targets dealt with according to the combat training standards.

Maximum effect is yielded by so-called combined drills, during which radio-radar sub-

units and CP crews simultaneously work up combat training missions in compliance with a common plan and concept. Combined drills are planned and carried out with due account taken of the nature of modern warfare, i. e., in complicated air and jamming situations, with enemy aviation making massed raids. Special attention in such cases is paid to working up the main missions generally fulfilled by a radio-radar subunit.

The high level of development of the art of warfare in our day and the ever increasing demands made of combat readiness require most imperatively that commanders constantly improve their knowledge of military theory and their practical skills in controlling the crews, which are the components of their professional and tactical training level.

Tactical training of radio-radar subunit commanders is a complicated and multi-faceted process, necessitating a creative approach to selecting and using methods and means of its improvement in order to ensure constant strengthening of subunits' combat readiness.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," 1984

CSO: 1812/216

## NAVAL FORCES

### KIROV'S TRAINING INNOVATIONS, PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Apr 84 p 2

[Captain 2nd Rank Yu. Timoshchuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Northern Fleet: "Learned At Sea"]

[Text] Not long ago, after completing a long, difficult cruise, the nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser Kirov returned to its home port. The crew had completed all assigned missions with honor and had attained the planned levels in mastering and using modern technology and weapons. They thus proved that there is no difference between the VMF [Naval] world on competition initiatives and the facts themselves.

Every long cruise is a serious and responsible test for sailors, but the Kirov cruise can truly be called a special kind of test, for this was one of our Navy's first ocean cruises of a surface ship with a nuclear power plant. This is why many of even the most ordinary, everyday things for Kirov sailors began with the words "for the first time." This is why the ship's commander, Captain 1st rank A. Koval'chuk, the other officers and party and Komsomol organizations were especially concerned that an atmosphere of creative search constantly reign at the battle stations and bunk rooms.

Any new activity has difficulties and problems. Naturally the Kirov's sailors ran into them. For example, all the officers in the engineering department who were entrusted to stand watch, figuratively speaking, at the heart of the cruiser, the nuclear reactor, had come to the Kirov from ships equipped with steam or gas-turbine powerplants. Is it necessary to say how much they had to master and reinterpret in order to learn how to reliably service the complicated atomic equipment? And they had to do this in a short time. Competition in this case was a great help for it permeated every watch, every day and hour of the cruise. How the watch engineer-mechanics were increasing their professional outlook and mastering advanced methods of equipment operations was constantly evaluated in an exacting manner and was publicized daily. And as a result all of them increased their skills during the cruise. The successes of S. Sobolev, declared by the results of the cruise as the best watch engineer-mechanic on the cruise, were especially significant. He is now a master of military affairs and he succeeded in mastering the duties 2 levels above the post he holds.

This story is characteristic. During one of the exercises in cruiser anti-submarine defense the ship's captain decided to develop a new tactic. Preliminary calculations indicated that it was possible, but the first attempts to confirm theoretical calculations by practical use were unsuccessful. Sailors began to look for the reasons for this. Initially the sonar operator complex headed by Captain-Lieutenant A. Obrezkov and the specialists in the mine-torpedo section which Captain-Lieutenant V. Zhukov commands took part in the search. During joint training they developed clearer target designation transmission and they tried to find a way to reduce some of the operation and thus save the valuable seconds necessary to accomplish tactical detection. Then the aviators headed by Captain A. Khistyayev, able to look at the capabilities of the ship's helicopters in a new way, made their contribution to the total effort. During the next exercise the planned tactical detection was accomplished. It would seem that this would have ended it. But there are no people who rest on their laurels on the Kirov. The sailors reasoned that doing the difficult tactical detection once was not enough. They had to learn to apply it equally in any situation. The search was continued. The engineering department commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Engineer N. Shipilov now made their contribution. They developed and put into operation a whole series of innovations which allowed them to improve operating conditions and decrease the time for readying equipment for combat use.

The Kirov sailors, advancing as VMF competition initiators, outlined developing and introducing more than 40 rationalization proposals in their commitments. Today, at the end of the winter training period, one can already say that this aspect of the commitment is being completed successfully.

Many training method innovations are being introduced on the Kirov. Modern equipment demands a modern training base and the cruiser has one. But this base must also be mastered. The Kirov's best methodologists have had many successes in this area. For example, the experience of Captain-Lieutenant S. Mikhalev deserves attention. A chemist, at the beginning of the cruise he had the mission of quickly training new replacements who had literally arrived on the cruiser on the eve of its departure on how to use their personnel protection gear. Aren't such exercises usually conducted by unit or section? A lot of time could have been spent on this so Mikhalev decided to use the ship's television system to train the novices. Demonstration exercises and training were organized right in the television studio. From here they were broadcast to all shipboard television sets and sailors at these sets mastered the training material completely and in such a way that it would be retained. This was also confirmed during review of the course mission. Cruise staff officers who had taken it noted the high level of personnel training in the area of combating after-effects of mass destruction weapons use.

In talking about the successes of the Kirov's sailors and the experience they gained on the cruise, I in no way want to give the impression that everything the pioneers did went, as they say, without a hitch. No, there are untapped reserves in the crew and there are deficiencies. For example, during one of the preparatory training courses the gunners headed by Captain-Lieutenant A. Nikoshin and A. Gusev had mediocre results. And why? A strict analysis showed that the artillerymen had totally relied on automation and electronics and hadn't troubled themselves with strenuous work on the material aspects.

Some people fell into this trap. They say, we have smart, reliable equipment and our job is to push buttons. This was the cause for serious discussion at a party meeting. Shipboard artillerymen, yes, and many others learned a lesson from this and drew conclusions for the future. But it is easy to put the problem into the archives nonetheless. How does one get to the point where no malfunctions come up in the complicated "man-machine" system so that each person thoroughly understands his personal responsibility? The Kirov sailors are still faced with working on this a lot.

The long cruise is completed. Ahead of the Kirov sailors are new cruises and new, more complicated missions.

12511

CSO: 1801/313

## NAVAL FORCES

### TORPEDOMEN'S TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 84 pp 20-21

[Article by Captain 1st Rank N. Pavlov: "Torpedomen's Training"]

[Text] Today all ships are increasingly using the combined method of torpedo crew training which is essentially geared to parallel acquisition of theoretical knowledge and practical skills, i.e., studying the design and combat use of weapons both at special lessons and during performance of service duties. Familiarising themselves with the performance characteristics of the materiel, the seamen simultaneously have training in measuring the parameters of various units, in checking them, in synchronising the functioning of input data lines and stations, and in feeding these data to instruments and weapons.

The chief advantage of the combined method consists in that it allows perfect team-work to be attained and the time of preparation for a torpedo attack to be reduced without affecting the quality of performing different operations.

The acquaintance of young torpedomen with an assembly or unit begins with the examination of its functional and block diagrams, which is followed by studying the equipment proper. The trainees' attention at this stage is focussed on various controls and their correct handling when preparing the materiel for switching on and combat use, and also on compliance with safety regulations.

At lessons the instructor tells the trainees about the effects which the mistakes made in preparing the equipment for work are likely to have on its functioning and on the results of firing. This is especially beneficial at the initial training stage, for it helps young seamen develop a conscientious attitude to work and thoroughly to familiarise themselves with their service duties and operating instructions.

Pleading shortage of time, certain instructors reduce the number of operations on preparing the weapons for firing, confining the training to visual inspection, manual cranking, measuring insulation resistance and, ultimately, to supplying power to a system or assembly. In other words,

they fail to pay due attention to the serviceability of the equipment as a whole, to its adjustment in different operating conditions, and to strict conformity to methods of monitoring individual firing data input channels. The seeming gain in time may entail equipment failure in combat situations, i. e., loss of precious seconds, and may consequently lower the attack's effectiveness. And this is not surprising at all, for in a critical situation it is not so easy to find out the cause of the trouble straightaway.

There are many ways of enhancing the accuracy of torpedo attacks, improving the crews' team-work and speeding up the formation of every crew member, these ways always depending on the obtaining situation. In any case the effectiveness of the seamen's instruction and education process is higher provided each trainee's individual proficiency is taken as the starting point for training.

To make first-rate specialists out of young torpedomen, the instructor himself must be highly proficient and competent in many matters. For instance, it is not sufficient for him to have a sound knowledge of engineering in general or know the sequence of the motions making up an operation; he must also be capable of analysing the trainees' actions and developing in them the ability to visualise the physical processes occurring in the equipment each time a tumbler switch or a lever is changed over. In the event of equipment malfunctioning the instructor must also be able promptly to eliminate the fault or correct the mistake made.

Of great importance for improving torpedo crews' combat training standard and for higher effectiveness of attacks and fire strikes are drills and exercises carried out in complicated situations closely approximating real battle. These normally include brushing up of the previous elements and practising new operations, e. g. preparing instruments for work, changing them over to standby modes, controlling the ship's systems from reserve stations, and working up the crew's actions in darkness, with the ship enveloped in smoke, or in other emergency situations.

When deciding what narratives to give and in what sequence and on what level of difficulty, the instructor takes into account seamen's practical experience, and their moral and psychological readiness. Each torpedoman's performance is supervised and assessed by the crew commander. Every training session ends in a thorough analysis of the operations fulfilled. The crew commander keeps a combat training record. The analysis and the record make it possible to establish the

dependence of the effectiveness of the operations performed on the number of drills carried out both by individual crew members and by the crew as a whole. Charts drawn up with due regard for the data obtained enable the commander better to determine the torpedomen's readiness for independent work and ascertain the optimal number of drills for each crew member. On the basis of such a chart it is now possible for the whole crew to get down to training. The chart also makes for more efficient planning of lessons and more strict monitoring of the seamen's preparedness for training.

During exercises with different target attack methods employed and with the "enemy" offering strong resistance, the instructor confronts the trainees with situations requiring mobilisation of all their physical and moral strength and maximum use of the knowledge and skills acquired during the preceding training. When, for instance, the narrative "Electric system de-energised" is issued, the crew must change over to reserve power supply without delay. This command may be promptly followed by the "Switch over to emergency power sources" narrative. The crew may hardly fulfil it when another narrative, e.g. "Torpedo tube jammed" is likely to be given.

Such an approach is fully justified, for in actual warfare such situations occur rather frequently. Complicating the narratives, the instructor closely observes the crew's performance: execution of the commands, switching of instruments and motors, and cooperation between action stations and crew members.

Exercises like those just described make the training more intensive. Methods used in carrying them out are essentially constant, while their content changes frequently. Much time is allotted to fulfilling unexpected narratives and actions in emergency situations. The advantage of such an approach is that seamen have the opportunity to start developing the necessary skills right at the initial training stage.

Another efficient means for raising torpedo crews' combat training standard is periodic assemblies of torpedo crews' personnel. Lessons, drills and exercises carried out during such assemblies consolidate the knowledge and skills acquired in the course of day-to-day combat training.

COPYRIGHT: "Soviet Military Review," 1984

CSO: 1812/216

NAVAL FORCES

TABLE OF CONTENTS: MORSKOY SBORNIK NO 4, 1984

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 4, Apr 84 (signed to press 10 Apr 84)  
pp 1-2

[Text] In This Issue

V. I. Lenin on Military Discipline, Socialist Law and Personal  
Responsibility..... 3

Steadfastly Improve Commanders' Preparation..... 8

DECISIONS OF THE CPSU 26TH CONGRESS--INTO PRACTICE!

A. Danilin. Strength of Ideological-Educational Work--In Unity  
of Word and Action..... 14

Naval Chronicle..... 19

NAVAL ART

B. Makeyev. Joint Operations of the Navy with Ground Forces  
Troops..... 21

PARTY-POLITICAL WORK AND TROOP EDUCATION

L. Titov. Towards New Heights of Military Skill..... 27

COMBAT PREPARATION

V. Mikhaylin. The Commander's Will..... 30

A. Yermakov. Strictness of Evaluations..... 34

V. Sinegubov. The Crew Starts From the Commander..... 37

G. Banny. On the Training Airfield..... 41

V. Mayevskiy, V. Kovtun. Physical Exercises of Submariners  
on Shore..... 44

PAGES OF HISTORY

1944, April..... 47

A. Selyanichev. According to the Leader's Order..... 49

V. Voronov. In the Battles for Sevastopol.....	53
V. Protsenko. By the Courses of Victory.....	58
Military Sailors--Heroes of the Soviet Union.....	64

#### ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

M. Korotkov. Organization of Examination Compartments.....	66
B. Sakharov. Remote Controlled Underwater Apparatus.....	68
V. Volkov, B. Azarov. Radioelectronic Equipment of Italian Naval Service Ships.....	72
A. Basikhin. Exhibition of Economic Achievements of the USSR: Recommended for Introduction.....	75

#### ACCORDING TO FOREIGN NAVIES

N. Kabalin. Naval Communications and NATO.....	77
Shipbuilding News.....	83

#### CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

S. Yashin. "Roaring Serpeant" in the Ocean.....	84
Chronicle of Aggression and Piracy.....	86
What to Read of USA Naval Policy.....	87
V. Arsen'yev. Moscow, Sadovaya-Spasskaya, Z.....	88
L. Chernavin, M. Zapol'skiy. The Theory of Risk in Naval Practice.....	91
According to Pages of the Journals.....	92

#### LITERARY PAGES

Aleksandr Zharov. To You, Comrade Naval Sailor.....	93
New Books.....	96
On the 1st Page of the Cover. Captain 3d Rank L. Popov Conducts Preparation for Readings of Lenin (Photo by Yu. Pakhomov).	

COPYRIGHT: "Morskoy sbornik", 1984.

12198

CSO: 1801/317

## MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

### MILITARY SCHOOLS LISTED ACCORDING TO SPECIALTIES

Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian 21 Apr 84 p 3

[Unsigned article: "For Those Who Want to Continue Studies in Military Schools"]

[Text] Thousands of young men are facing the need to choose their occupations, and many dream of the officer profession, so as to be in the forefront of those improving the combat readiness of our armed forces. The training and education of officers for the army and navy are objects of particular attention of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. It is one of the most important questions of our military system.

There are many military schools in our country training specialists for the army, navy, and air force. Pilots and navigators, artillery and rocket forces, engineers and political activists--this is a far from complete listing of military specialties.

Along with the special subjects trainees study Marxist-Leninist theory, pedagogics and psychology; they acquire practical experiences in training and become physically hardy. In a word, a young man who has decided to become an officer acquires in the military school everything needed to honorably fulfill his duties as a soldier.

But not everything depends on training management in the military school, on training facilities and instructors. Study in a military school depends primarily on every young man's desire to become an officer, it also requires hard work and personal responsibility to improve one's skills. After all, today's candidate wears tomorrow a lieutenant's shoulder boards. Dear young friends! If you have a firm desire to join an officer's manly profession, go to your local military commissariat. We have here a list of military schools that could accept you this year:

#### Political Military Schools

Donestk Higher Engineer and Signal Political School;  
Kiev Higher Naval Political School;  
Kurgan Higher Air Force Political School;  
Leningrad Higher Air Defense Political School;  
Lvov Order of the Red Star Higher Political Military School;  
Minsk Higher General Forces Political School;

Novosibirsk Higher General Forces Political School imeni Great October's 60th Anniversary;  
Riga Order of the Red Banner Higher Political School imeni Marshal of the USSR S. Biryuzov;  
Sverdlovsk Higher Tank and Artillery Political School;  
Simferopol Higher Military Construction Political School;  
Tallinn Higher Military Construction Political School.

Political military schools train officer-political workers with higher specialist training for all services and branches of the armed forces. The Lvov military schools gives officers a higher educational level in journalism and cultural education.

Political military schools accept applicants on the basis of rayon or city Komsomol committee recommendations. The course of study in all military schools is four years.

#### General Forces Schools

Alma Ata Higher General Forces Leading Cadres School imeni Marshal of the USSR I. Konev;  
Baku Higher General Forces Leading Cadres School imeni Supreme Soviet AzSSR;  
Far East Higher General Forces Leading Cadres School imeni Marshal of the USSR K. Rokossovskiy;  
Kiev Double Order of the Red Banner General Forces Leading Cadres School imeni M. Frunze;  
Leningrad Double Order of the Red Banner General Forces Leading Cadres School imeni S. Kirov;  
Moscow Order of Lenin, October Revolution, and Red Banner Higher General Forces Leading Cadres School imeni Supreme Soviet RSFSR;  
Omsk Double Order of the Red Banner General Forces Leading Cadres School imeni M. Frunze;  
Ordzhonikidze Double Order of the Red Banner General Forces Leading Cadres School imeni Marshal of the USSR A. Yeromenko;  
Tashkent Order of the Red Banner and Red Star Higher General Forces Leading Cadres School imeni V. Lenin.

Leading cadres schools of the general forces train officers for motorized rifle units. The course of study in the officer schools lasts four years.

Graduates of the general forces officer schools are classed as officers with higher military specialty education, and as exploitation engineers for tracked and wheeled vehicles.

#### Tank Force Schools

Blagoveschshensk Order of the Red Banner Higher Tank Forces Leading Cadres School imeni Marshal of the USSR K. Meretskov;  
Kazan Order of the Red Banner Higher Tank Forces Leading Cadres School imeni Presidium, Tatar ASSR Supreme Soviet;  
Kiev Higher Tank Forces Engineer School imeni Marshal of the USSR I. Yakubovskiy;  
Omsk Order of the Red Star Higher Tank Forces Engineer School imeni Marshal of the USSR P. Kotchevoy;

Tashkent Order of Lenin Higher Tank Forces Leading Cadres School imeni Marshal of Tank Forces P. Rybalko, twice Hero of the Soviet Union;  
Ulyanovsk Double Order of the Red Banner and Red Star Order Higher Guard Tank Forces Leading Cadres School imeni V. Lenin;  
Kharkov Order of the Red Star Higher Guard Tank Forces Leading Cadres School imeni Supreme Soviet UkSSR;  
Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Forces Leading Cadres School imeni Great October's 50th Anniversary.

Tank force schools train officers for armored units. The course of study in the officer schools last four years, five years in the Kiev and Omsk tank force engineer schools.

Graduates of the armored forces officer schools are classed as officer with higher specialized military education and as exploitation engineers for tracked and wheeled vehicles. Graduates of the tank force engineer schools become qualified as engineers within their specialties.

#### Artillery Schools

Kolomna Order of Lenin and Red Banner Higher Artillery Leading Cadres School imeni October Revolution;  
Leningrad Order of Lenin and Red Banner Higher Artillery Leading Cadres School imeni Red October;  
Odessa Order of Lenin Higher Artillery Leading Cadres School imeni M. Frunze;  
Penza Order of the Red Star Higher Artillery Engineer School imeni Chief Marshal of Artillery N. Voronov;  
Sumy Twice Order of the Red Banner Higher Artillery Leading Cadres School imeni M. Frunze;  
Tbilisi Order of the Red Banner and Red Star Higher Artillery Leading Cadres School;  
Tula Order of Lenin and October Revolution Higher Artillery Engineer School imeni Tula Proletariat;  
Khmelnitskiy Higher Artillery Leading Cadres School.

The course of study at the Penza and Tula artillery engineer schools lasts 5 years, 4 years in the rest. Graduates of the schools are certified as military engineers in their respective specialties.

#### Naval schools

Order of Lenin, Red Banner, and Ushakov Higher Naval School imeni M. Frunze;  
Higher Submarine School imeni Leninist Komsomol;  
Higher Naval Engineer School imeni F. Dzherzhinskiy;  
Higher Naval Radio-electronic School imeni A. Popov;  
Kaliningrad Higher Naval School;  
Caspian Order of the Red Banner Higher Naval School imeni S. Kirov;  
Leningrad Higher Naval Engineer School imeni V. Lenin;  
Sevastopol Higher Naval Engineer School;  
Pacific Ocean Higher Naval School imeni S. Makarov;  
Black Sea Order of the Red Banner Higher Naval School imeni P. Nakhimov.

Studies in all naval schools last five years. Graduates receive degrees as naval engineers in their respective specialties.

#### Signal schools

Voronezh Higher Military Radio-electronic Engineer School;  
Kemerovo Higher Signal Leading Cadres School;  
Kiev Twice Order of the Red Banner Higher Military Signal Engineer School imeni M. Kalinin;  
Leningrad Higher Military Signal Engineer School;  
Novocherkassk Order of the Red Banner Higher Signal Leading Cadres School imeni Marshal of the USSR V. Sokolovskiy;  
Orel Higher Signal Leading Orders School imeni M. Kalinin;  
Poltava Higher Signal Leading Cadres School;  
Ryazan Higher Signal Leading Cadres School imeni Marshal of the USSR M. Sakharov;  
Stavropol Higher Military Signal Engineer School imeni Great October's 60th Anniversary;  
Tomsk Order of the Red Banner Higher Signal Leading Cadres School;  
Ulyanovsk Higher Signal Leading Cadres School imeni G. Ordzhonikidze;  
Cherepovets Higher Military Radio-electronic Engineer School.

The course of study in all the leading cadres schools is four years, in engineer school five years. Graduates are assigned to all the branches of Soviet armed forces.

#### Air defense schools

Vilnius Higher Air Defense Leading Cadres Radio-electronic School;  
Gorky Higher Air Defense Rocket Forces Leading Cadres School;  
Dnepropetrovsk Higher Air Defense Rocket Forces Leading Cadres School;  
Zhitomir Order of the October Revolution and Red Banner Higher Radio-electronic School imeni Leninist Komsomol;  
Kiev Order of Lenin and Red Banner Higher Air Defense Forces Radioengineering School;  
Krayonarsk Higher Air Defense Leading Cadres Radio-electronic School;  
Leningrad Order of the Red Star Higher Air Defense Rocket Forces Leading Cadres School imeni Great October's 60th Anniversary;  
Minsk Higher Air Defense Rocket Forces Engineer School;  
Ordzhonikidze Higher Air Defense Rocket Forces Leading Cadres School imeni Army General I. Pliyev;  
Orenburg Red Banner Order Higher Rocket Forces Leading Cadres School imeni G. Ordzhonikidze;  
Poltava Red Banner Order Higher Rocket Forces Leading Cadres School imeni Army General N. Vatutin;  
Pushkin Red Star Order Higher Air Defense Radio-electronic School;  
Smolensk Higher Rocket Engineer School;  
Stavropol Higher Military Pilot School imeni Marshal of Aviation V. Sudets;  
Engels Higher Air Defense Rocket Forces Leading Cadres School;  
Yaroslavl Higher Air Defense Rocket Forces Leading Cadres School imeni Great October's 60th Anniversary.

Schools of the air defense forces train officers for all the branches of air defense. The course of study in the engineer schools and the engineering departments of the Zhitomir and Pushkin schools lasts five years, it is four years in the rest of the schools.

Graduates receive degrees as officers with higher military speciality training, and also as radio, radioelectronics, or aviation engineers.

#### Air Force Schools

Armavir Order of the Red Banner Higher Military Pilot School;  
Balashov Higher Military Pilot School imeni Chief Marshal of Aviation A. Novikov;  
Barnaul Higher Military Pilot School imeni Chief Marshal of Aviation K. Vershinin;  
Borisoglebsk Lenin and Red Banner Order Higher Military Pilot School imeni V. Chkalov;  
Voronezh Higher Air Force Engineer School;  
Vorshevolgrad Higher Military Navigation School imeni Donbas Proletariat;  
Daugavpils Higher Air Force Engineer School imeni J. Fabricius;  
Yeysk Order of Lenin Higher Military Pilot School imeni Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, USSR Cosmonaut V. Komarov;  
Irkutsk Order of the Red Banner Higher Air Force Engineer imeni All-Union Komsomol's 50th Anniversary;  
Katsha Order of Lenin and Red Banner Higher Military Pilot School imeni A. Myasnikov;  
Kiev Higher Air Force Engineer School;  
Orenburg Order of the Red Banner Higher Military Pilot School imeni I. Polbin;  
Riga Higher Air Force Engineer School imeni J. Alksnis;  
Saratov Higher Military Pilot School;  
Syzran Higher Military Pilot School;  
Tambov Order of Lenin and Red Banner Higher Air Force Engineer School imeni F. Dzerzhinskiy;  
Tambov Higher Military Pilot School imeni M. Raskova;  
Kharkov Order of the Red Banner Higher Air Force Engineer School;  
Kharkov Higher Air Force School imeni Ukrainian Leninist Komsomol;  
Kharkov Order of the Red Banner Higher Military Pilot School imeni Twice Hero of the Soviet Union S. Gristsevets;  
Chelyabinsk Order of the Red Banner Military Navigation School imeni All-Union Komsomol's 50th Anniversary;  
Chernigov Higher Military Pilot School imeni Leninist Komsomol.

The course of study in the higher pilot and navigator schools, the Kharkov air force school and the Voronezh engineering school last four years, in other higher engineering schools and the meteorological department of the Voronezh engineering school it is five years. The graduates are classified as flight engineers, navigation engineers, or engineers of their respective specialties.

Young men may receive military education also in the air force's secondary schools. Graduates of those schools receive the rank of "Lieutenant of technical services" and a diploma attesting to their education according to all-Union norms in the fields of "technician-machinist," "technician-electro-machinist," or "technician-electrician."

Applicants are accepted by the following technical air force schools:  
Ashinsk Air Force Technical School imeni All-Union Komsomol's 60th Anniversary;

Vassilkov Air Force Technical School imeni Ukrainian Leninist Komsomol's  
50th Anniversary;  
Kaliningrad Air Force Technical School;  
Kirov Air Force Technical School;  
Perm Air Force Technical School imeni Leninist Komsomol.

The course of study in the technical air force schools is three years. In that time students receive theoretical knowledge of higher mathematics, material strengths, technical design, theory of aviation, etc.

#### Leading Engineer Schools

Kazan Higher Military Engineer School imeni Marshal of Artillery M. Chityakov;  
Krasnodar Higher Military Leading Engineer School;  
Perm Order of Red Banner Higher Military Leading Engineer School imeni Marshal of the USSR V. [Tshuikov];  
Rostov Higher Military Leading Engineer School imeni Chief Marshal of Artillery M. Nedelin;  
Saratov Order of the Red Banner and Red Star Higher Military Leading Engineering School imeni Hero of the Soviet Union Major General A. Lizyukov;  
Serupukhov Higher Military Leading Engineer School imeni Leninist Komsomol;  
Kharkov Higher Military Leading Engineer School imeni Marshal of the USSR N. Krylov.

The course of study in all the leading engineer schools is five years. Graduates receive higher military specialist training.

#### Engineer schools

Kaliningrad Order of Lenin and Red Banner Higher Engineer Force School imeni A. Zhdanov;  
Kamenets-Podolsk Higher Engineer Force Leading Cadres School imeni Marshal of Engineers V. Hartshenko;  
Tyumen Higher Engineer Force Leading Cadres School imeni Marshal of Engineers A. Proshlyakov.

The course of study in all the engineer force schools is five years. Graduates are classified as military engineers.

#### Rear service schools

Volsk Order of Red Banner Higher Rear Services School.  
Course of study--four years. Graduates are classified as economic engineers.

#### Gorkiy Higher Rear Services School.

The course of study lasts, depending on specialty, from four to five years. The four year program leads to classification as economic engineers, the five year program as engineer-mechanic or engineer-technologist.

Leningrad Order of Lenin and Red Banner Railway School imeni M. Frunze.  
Course of study in leading cadres course last four years, in the engineering department five years.

Ulyanovsk Higher Technical Military School imeni Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy.  
Trains specialists in liquid fuel use, storage, and transportation. The course of study varies, depending on speciality, from four to five years.

Yaroslavl Order of Red Banner Higher Financial Services School imeni Army General A. Khrulyov.

The school gives military specialist education to officers of the financial services in all the branches of the USSR Armed Forces. The course of study lasts four years.

#### Military construction schools

Leningrad Order of the Red Banner Higher Construction Engineer School imeni Army General A. Komarovskiy;

Pushkin Higher Construction Engineer School;

Kamyshin Higher Military Construction Leading Cadres School;

Gorkiy Higher Military Construction Leading Cadres School;

Togliatti Higher Military Construction Leading Cadres School.

The course of study in the engineering schools is five years, in the leading cadres school four years. Graduates of the schools are classified as construction engineers.

#### Wheeled Vehicle Schools

Ryazan Order of Red Banner Higher Military Automotive Engineer School;

Samarkand Higher Truck Service Leading Cadres School imeni Supreme Soviet UsSSR;

Ussurisk Higher Truck Service Leading Cadres School;

Chelyabinsk Higher Military Automotive Engineer School imeni Chief Marshal of Armored Forces P. Rotmistrov.

The course of study in the engineer schools is five years, in the leading cadres schools four years.

#### Military institutes

Military Engineer Institute Order of the Red Banner imeni A. Mozhaiskiy (in Leningrad).

Trains military engineers. Graduates are classified as mechanical, electrical, hydro-meteorological, construction, radio, radioelectronic military engineers. The course of study in the institute is five years.

Order of the Red Banner Military Institute (in Moscow).

Admission is into interpreter, politico-military, and legal departments.

Course of study in the translation and politico-military departments is five years, four years in the legal department.

Twice Red Banner Order Military Physical Education Institute (in Leningrad).

Course of study is four years. Graduates receive higher training in military physical education and sports.

All the training institutions of our armed forces accept males whose health permits them to continue studies in military schools and who pass the required entrance exams. The age of entrants: 17-21 years.

Those interested in military schools must submit an application to their local military commissariat by 30 April. The application must include family name, first name, and patronymic, date of birth, home address, and the name of the institution one wishes to attend. Attached to the application is a curriculum vitae, letters of reference from job or school and the Komsomol, copies of documents pertaining to secondary education (students attending final secondary school classes must submit a certificate showing continued progress in studies), copy of the birth certificate, and three certified photographs (without headcover, 4.5x6 cm.)

All-Union Komsomol members entering military schools with a recommendation of an ESSR Komsomol rayon or town committee include with their application Komsomol reassignment orders, drafted according to the All-Union format. All documents must be in Russian.

Passport, military draft card or certificate of registration, original high school transcripts and birth certificate will be presented to the examining committee.

Military school entrance examinations include the following subjects within the scope of secondary school programs:

For higher political military schools: Russian language and literature (written), mathematics, history, and geography (oral);  
Higher leading cadres and engineer schools, military aviator and navigator schools, naval schools, the Military Engineer Institute imeni A. Mozhaiskiy and other institutions: Russian language and literature, mathematics (written), mathematics and physics (oral);  
Military specialized secondary schools: Russian language and literature (written) and mathematics (oral).

Those seeking admission to the Lvov Higher Political Military School must pass an oral examination in Russian language and literature instead of mathematics, those applying to rear services schools must pass an exam in chemistry. Applicants to the Yaroslavl Higher Financial Service School imeni Army General A. Khrulyov must pass an oral exam in geography in lieu of one in physics.

Applicants to the Military Institute must pass entrance examinations in Russian language and literature (written and oral), USSR history, and foreign languages; those for the military physical education institute are examined in Russian language and literature (written), biology and chemistry, and physical education.

All candidates undergo a physical examination, those applying to the higher military aviator and naval schools take additional professional-psychological tests.

To ensure the candidates' physical condition, all of them must pass the All-Union test complex "Prepared for work and USSR defense!"

Persons who have been decorated for personal bravery or for distinction in combat-political training with USSR orders and medals, and who pass the entrance exams, are admitted without further competition.

Candidates who have graduated from secondary schools with a medal, or from a specialized secondary institution with a letter of commendation, are admitted to military specialized secondary institutions without examinations; when they apply for higher military schools they take an examination in only one subject that will be announced to them at the same time they receive their call to the examinations. If that examination is passed with a grade of "excellent" the candidate is excused from other exams; grades of "good" and "satisfactory" mean that all examinations must be taken.

Entrance examinations take place from 1 July to 15 July. Everyone travels free to the military institution; after arrival subsistence and communal living quarters are furnished free.

Detailed information about entrance requirements may be obtained from rayon or town military commissariats.

9240

CSO: 1815/31

END