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NEW ZEALAND

Foreign Minister Lauds INF Treaty, Chides Disarmament Record Elsewhere

UN Address Reported

52004304 Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD
in English 6 Jun 88 p 4

[Text] NZPA New York—The international community's record of disarmament in the past decade was "lamentable" the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Marshall, told the United Nations.

That was in stark contrast to the record of earlier decades when major achievements such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention were recorded.

The one multilateral arms control measure that stood out since 1978 was the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty which was of itself a significant measure, he said in a speech to the United Nations special session on disarmament.

Mr Marshall said that unless there was reform of the way the international community dealt with disarmament, "the multilateral process will slide into irrelevance."

He contrasted the lack of international progress on disarmament with recent developments in bilateral accords, specifically the historic INF treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union which bans land-based intermediate range weapons, and the momentum which has been generated in those countries' strategic arms negotiations.

"All of this is to be greatly welcomed," said Mr Marshall.

He said the INF accord represented substantial and badly needed progress towards promoting global stability and helping to ensure international peace and security.

"We join gladly in the tribute to the achievements of General-Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan in recent years and recent days, achievements born of goodwill and political courage. It is a good beginning."

Like others at the special session Mr Marshall made a plea for the major powers to involve other countries in their steps to reduce nuclear arms.

"Global security—that is to say, global stability and the avoidance of nuclear war—is the legitimate concern of us all," he said.

"We all have the right to follow the negotiations, not simply through the media, but by first-hand account of the negotiators."

Earlier, the French Foreign Minister, Mr Dumas, argued that a nuclear test ban could come only as a result of arms negotiations and not act as a spur to them.

But Mr Marshall said there was no substitute for a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTB) as a catalyst for nuclear disarmament.

"To place a CTB at the end of that process, to make it consequential upon arms reductions themselves, to defer it into the indefinite future, is to render it important as a disarmament measure.

"We have listened carefully to the arguments in favour of nuclear testing. We do not accept them," he said.

Mr Marshall said a CTB, which New Zealand and Australia among other countries have promoted through the United Nations without success for a number of years, would not only curb the arms race but halt the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.

"If ever there were an example of a multilateral dimension to arms control, it is this. A bilateral agreement in itself is inadequate.

Editorial Criticizes Marshall

52004304 Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD
in English 7 Jun 88 p 8

[Editorial: "NZ Crows Over Treaty"]

[Text] The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Marshall, chides the international community for a "lamentable" record of disarmament during the past decade. His reference appears to be in distinction to the progress made in bilateral accords, specifically those between the United States and the Soviet Union, which he has the diplomatic good sense to say are "greatly welcomed."

Speaking to the United Nations about what he sees as a poor international record of disarmament, Mr Marshall modestly offers the view that the one multilateral arms control measure that stands out since 1978 is the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which he describes as a significant measure. But it is merely an expression of intent, or more likely hope, by some nations that the area can be nuclear-free.

One of its dangers remains the probability that it may raise false or unrealistic hopes among people who may think that it can achieve what its title suggests. It cannot stop nuclear-armed ships or aircraft coming into the region, and New Zealand could not even deny passage to a nuclear-armed ship sailing through Cook Strait.

Least of all would this paper-sunshade of a treaty shield us from the heat of nuclear weapons started to fly and the nuclear combatants perceived an (admittedly unlikely) interest in sending some of them to the South Pacific. As

Mr Lange graphically told an American television audience, if someone fires a nuclear weapon at us, "we burn." Mr Marshall's claim that the treaty is significant and outstanding can scarcely impress nations that deal in reality.

Mr Marshall makes a fair point when he says that global stability and the avoidance of nuclear war are legitimate concerns of us all. But at whom does he dig when he says: "We all have the right to follow the negotiations not simply through the media but by first-hand account of

the negotiations?" Why does he think New Zealand has recently been dropped from the list of those getting first-hand accounts from the Americans?

In a related remark, Mr Dukakis, the Democrat front-runner in the presidential race, says that if elected he would improve non-military relations with New Zealand but would continue to exclude this country from the ANZUS alliance while the nuclear-ship ban remains. With those words, any lingering belief that a Democratic Administration would soften the Republican stance on ANZUS should finally be laid to rest.

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INTRABLOC

Press Views Warsaw Pact Summit Resolutions *AU1907094088 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0505 GMT 18 Jul 88*

[From the press review]

[Text] Commentators and editorialists today broadly cover the disarmament proposals of the Warsaw Pact summit meeting that ended after 2 days' duration in the Polish capital on Saturday [16 July].

The Konstanz daily SCHWARZWAELDER BOTE writes: The disarmament initiatives from the East have been rattling down on NATO in rapid succession, and the Western alliance is having a hard time keeping up with all that has been dictated by Kremlin head Gorbachev. Obviously, many politicians are unable to make enemy images that have been cultivated for decades disappear in the drawers of history as quickly as is now necessary. That is also illustrated by Bonn's actually quite favorable reaction to the Warsaw Pact's recent initiative on conventional disarmament in Europe. Distrust of Moscow and its allies clearly characterizes its rather reserved attitude. The Western governments are apparently uncertain. Instead of trying to rapidly find logical common answers, they study Gorbachev's proposals thoroughly. However, time is pressing, because the Kremlin chief needs successes. What complicates matters is the fact that the United States, the leading Western power, has a largely paralyzed foreign policy because of the presidential election campaign. But that, too, should not lead to missing the unique chance for a better and more peaceful togetherness in Europe, says SCHWARZWAELDER BOTE.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE states on the same subject: After all, it should be noted—and this explains the cautious and friendly reaction in Bonn—that the word about asymmetrical disarmament for conventional weapons has at least been taken up on principle, while the war-deterrent effect of intercontinental missiles has not been doubted. At any rate, the Warsaw Pact has indicated that conventional imbalances possibly exist. However, where these imbalances lie—and here is a burden created by Soviet armament that is tangible for the Soviet people—will be a subject of discussion for a long time to come. The result depends, first of all, on Soviet domestic policy. After having recovered from the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference well, Gorbachev at least did not suffer a setback at the Warsaw Pact meeting. The suggestion to create reduced armament zones should put the West on guard; these could easily become areas of vulnerability and hotbeds of crisis, stresses FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG notes: The Warsaw Pact made only a summary statement on how to deal with tactical nuclear weapons. It is not clear at all what is to be done with chemical weapons. Here the NATO experts

who are in default have an opportunity to submit proposals. It is clear, however, that the Eastern concept can only be upheld and connected with a Western concept if the current political high in the East is not troubled by any lows—from the trans-Caucasian or Baltic areas, or from other regions with critical internal developments. In addition, we may assume that, regarding his reform policy, Gorbachev will also meet with difficulties after the party conference, believes SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG.

The Freiburg daily BADISCHE ZEITUNG comments: NATO's dilemma is that, for want of a comprehensive concept for the next 2 decades, it is unable to react adequately to the Eastern alliance's initiatives, let alone submit further ideas of its own on arms reduction and control. Thus, a fatal impression of Western helplessness has often been created after the East's diplomatic offensives. The Warsaw Pact, which has become flexible under Gorbachev's leadership, uses this weakness purposefully to cultivate its own image. Yet the Eastern attempt at reorientation should be used, and in particular the proposals on environmental affairs should be taken up quickly and constructively, says BADISCHE ZEITUNG.

ALBANIA

Superpowers Collaborate To Protect Interests *AU1807164588 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 14 Jul 88 p 4*

[Arben Karapici article: "The United States and the USSR Strengthen Military Cooperation"]

[Text] The first official visit of the chief of staff of the Soviet Army, Akhromeyev, to the United States of America, which ended on 12 July, was accompanied by great commotion on both sides. Akhromeyev's tour of the United States, which began on 5 July, was considered "a new phase" in Soviet-American contacts. Like Washington, Moscow is also extremely interested in raising the level of relations of all kinds, and is convinced that the significant strengthening of military relations which this visit inaugurated represents a higher level of cooperation between the two superpowers.

During the visit, the Soviet marshal met and held talks with his American colleague, Admiral William Crowe, and President Reagan. He visited many American Army training facilities and other specialized military institutions in the United States. In a joint communique issued at the end of his visit, Akhromeyev and Crowe assessed their talks about cooperation between the Soviet and American military staffs, and emphasized that the two countries will create a joint working group for "the prevention of military incidents" between them. "We understand that our methods of troop exercises worry the West and, bearing this concern in mind, we covered

it in our talks," Akhromeyev said. The chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army stressed that it is in the interest of their policies to coordinate their military strategies.

As emerged from the communique, the Soviet-American cooperation program in the military field is an intensive and concentrated one. It includes reciprocal visits of military officials of all ranks, visits of the warships of the two countries to each other's ports, the observation of nuclear tests at their respective test sites, and so forth. The increase of major Soviet-American cooperation in the military field emerges clearly from what was said in Washington during Akhromeyev's visit, and from the agreements that have been reached and will be reached in the future. It is clear that this increase of bilateral cooperation occurs at a time when problems of the turnover of weaponry, of existing military structures, regional conflicts, and so forth, have become very acute in the relations between the superpowers. For this purpose, Washington and Moscow are seeking to keep step in such a way as not to encroach upon, but rather to guarantee, their interests within and beyond their respective zones of influence. The Washington communique expresses these common American and Soviet aims, hidden behind its phrases about the so-called "defensive nature of the military doctrines of the United States and the USSR."

What kind of defense the military doctrines of the two superpowers involves is obvious from the bilateral talks on recent developments in the Persian Gulf region, in which the Soviet marshal maintained silence over the criminal American attack on the Iranian civil airliner, confining himself to saying that he was "not aware of the full details of the incident." By this it may be understood that the Soviet Union and the United States accept each other's intervention and open military activity to the extent of criminal attacks in other regions, when their interests as superpowers demand them. With the great commotion raised in Washington about the "defensive nature" of their military doctrines and the coordination of staffs in this field, Washington and Moscow seek to distract the attention of the peoples of Europe and the world at large from the grave dangers posed by hegemonist American and Soviet policies. They also seek to conceal the other major fact that superpower interventions are increasing, and are fanning the flames of war, in the Middle East, Central America, Southeast Asia, and central Africa.

It is not by chance that Sergey Akhromeyev and William Crowe advertise their so-called constructive military dialogue as a way of solving severe international problems and maintaining peace. It is a question of attracting the support of international public opinion to the open and secret military and political haggling they are involved in, or are thinking of embarking on in the future. The United States and the USSR aim at obtaining not only the support of the peoples of the world for this bargaining, but their acceptance of the decisions that

emerge from bilateral Soviet-American treaties. The talks of a military nature organized by the United States and the Soviet Union at all levels are accompanied in practice by militaristic measures, and neither deceive nor scare the people, who from their experience of life understand ever more clearly the necessity of opposing the superpowers' militaristic and warmongering plans.

BULGARIA

Ernst Krabatsch Interviewed on Disarmament
AU1307163088 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 12 Jul 88 p 5

[Interview with Ernst Krabatsch, GDR deputy minister of foreign affairs, by Vladimir Prodanov, RABOTNICHESKO DELO correspondent in Berlin: "Great Responsibility for the Future"—date not given]

[Text] Ernst Krabatsch, GDR deputy minister of foreign affairs, gave the following interview to Vladimir Prodanov, RABOTNICHESKO DELO correspondent in Berlin:

[Prodanov] Comrade Krabatsch, can you describe the contribution of the GDR to the policy of dialogue and disarmament in East-West relations?

[Krabatsch] At the beginning of the eighties, when the international situation was particularly tense, Erich Honecker declared that it is necessary for "all political forces which are sincerely striving for peace, regardless of their political and ideological differences, regardless of the religious and class affiliations which divide them, to contribute to rescuing the peoples from nuclear disaster." Only 5 years later, the fruitful dialogue between the USSR and the United States became an inseparable component part of world politics. Within the framework of the coordinated, peace-loving policy conducted by the Warsaw Pact member states, the GDR is actively contributing to this development.

In the first place, we should point out the political talks, at high and at the highest levels, with those forces which are politically responsible for the defense of common interests on questions of peace and disarmament. The multifarious activities of the GDR at international forums, such as the United Nations and the Vienna meeting, are well known. We should also point out the efforts of the GDR toward the signing and implementing of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, the proposals for the establishment of a nuclear-free corridor and a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons in central Europe. A considerable contribution in this respect was made by the Berlin International Meeting on Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones in which Bulgarian delegates also participated.

[Prodanov] How do you evaluate the results of this meeting?

[Krabatsch] The importance of this meeting will increase along with the development of the disarmament process. During its proceedings it became evident that the discussion about a change in the NATO conception of a nuclear threat is exacerbating in Western Europe. The dangerous consequences of this concept, which does not exclude the waging of nuclear war and which further promotes the arms race, are becoming increasingly evident.

The Berlin meeting gave new impetus to the forces of peace and confidence. The wide and open dialogue based on equal rights made it possible to exchange experience and ideas aimed at searching for the most rational solutions for the consolidation of peace.

[Prodanov] Can you describe the new opportunities opening for the further coordination of the foreign policy of the allied states under the present international situation?

[Krabatsch] The main question today, following the coming into force of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, is the necessity for the disarmament process to be extended to other spheres, without being obstructed by artificial barriers. The Warsaw Pact member-states have submitted specific proposals in this respect.

The socialist countries are striving for a complete ban on nuclear tests, and to ban and eliminate chemical weapons. A priority question for socialist diplomacy is the prompt beginning of negotiations for the reduction of troops and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals. The question of including tactical nuclear weapons in the disarmament process is also on the agenda. The idea of establishing zones with a reduced military presence along the lines dividing the two military blocks in Europe, which is to contribute to a consolidation of confidence and security, is increasingly gaining support.

The Warsaw Pact member states will not deviate from their basic line in favor of peaceful coexistence. I think that this will be confirmed at the forthcoming session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Chnoupek Writes on Disarmament
LD1507215788 Prague CTK in English
0858 GMT 15 Jul 88

[Text] Prague July 15 (CTK)—At present, in fact for the first time in the whole post-war period, the majority of states begin to take steps towards easing tension or at least stabilizing international relations, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek wrote in the latest issue of the Czechoslovak monthly MEZINARODNI VZTAHY (International Relations).

The foreign minister underlined that this means that there exist prerequisites for disarmament and the strengthening of peace. It can be said that all states—large and small, advanced and developing, associated in blocs and neutral—show interest in the peace process. Czechoslovakia's active contribution to these efforts is the proposal for establishing a zone of confidence, cooperation and good-neighbour relations on the line dividing the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states, put forward by Czechoslovak Communist Party General Secretary Milos Jakes last February. The proposal has been fully supported by the socialist countries. Representatives of the NATO states, though they remain reserved so far, regard the proposal as a 'goodwill experiment' orientated on the future. The proposal has met with positive response in the neutral and nonaligned countries of Europe as well as in a number of developing states which are of the opinion that some of its aspects could be applied in settling regional conflicts, the minister wrote.

It is essential that the broad public as well as the political circles adopt the ideas of the proposal as only in such case the Czechoslovak initiative will become a material force, the Czechoslovak foreign minister stressed.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

U.S. INF Teams Begin Inspections

Inspection Team Arrives in GDR
LD1807125288 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1200 GMT 18 Jul 88

[Text] Berlin, 18 Jul (ADN)—Two groups of inspectors from the United States arrived in the GDR on 17 July. They intend to check the fulfillment of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles at locations where they are stationed in the GDR. The total of 20 inspectors were received at Leipzig's Schkeuditz Airport by representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the National People's Army, and the Soviet Army.

In accordance with the agreement between the GDR, the USSR the CSSR on inspections in connection with the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, the GDR is fulfilling its obligation to support the United States during its inspections on the territory of the GDR.

Two Soviet Bases Inspected
LD1907164788 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1511 GMT 19 Jul 88

[Text] Berlin, 19 Jul (ADN)—On the evening of 18 July 1988, U.S. inspectors started their checks at the former Soviet Army missile site in Waren.

OTR-22 missiles were stationed there until February 1988. Their early removal was agreed on between the USSR and the GDR. As is known, these missiles were

withdrawn before the ratification of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. This step was acknowledged worldwide as an example of the will for peace.

A second group of U.S. inspectors started work today at the Koenigsbrueck Soviet missile site.

Both groups of inspectors from the U.S. have visited the GDR Ministry for National Defense and the Moscow Center for the Reduction of Nuclear Risks at the staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

POLAND

Ambassador Konarski Addresses Vienna CSCE
LD1907125388 Warsaw PAP in English
1137 GMT 19 Jul 88

[By PAP special correspondent Wlodzimierz Korzycki]

[Text] Vienna, July 19—Chairman of a Polish delegation, Ambassador Wlodzimierz Konarski took the floor at a plenary session of the Vienna CSCE meeting today to present the results of the Warsaw conference of the Political Consultative Committee of states—parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

He stated that the contents of the documents adopted in Warsaw directly referred to CSCE debates and pointed to the importance of the appeal to promptly and successfully end the meeting. Poland's representative appealed to make special efforts, eliminate the still existing divergencies and adopt a balanced final document.

What Konarski termed as particularly significant for CSCE negotiations was the statement by states—parties to the Warsaw Treaty on reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments which constituted an expanded manifestation of those states' stand taken in advance of all-European disarmament negotiations within the CSCE to start still this year.

The Polish delegation conveyed the full texts of the documents of the Political Consultative Committee to participants in the CSCE meeting.

YUGOSLAVIA

Hungarian Defense Minister Gives 'Exclusive' Interview

AU1707151188 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian No 334, 12 Jul 88 pp 49-52

[Interview with Ferenc Karpati, Hungarian defense minister, by special correspondent Miroslav Lazanski in Budapest; date not given]

[Text] Budapest—The building of the Defense Ministry of the Hungarian People's Republic is so to speak in the center of Pest, close to the Bank of the Danube. Only a

military sentry, wearing a white police helmet, indicates that an important military institution is right here, where many pedestrians pass. Two military policemen wearing white gloves stand at attention by the entrance door. In the lobby, there are two red lamps in the shape of candles next to the plaques in memory of distinguished Hungarian military leaders. All the rooms in the Defense Ministry have numbers, except the minister's private office. Exactly at 0800, the padded door opens, and Colonel General Ferenc Karpati, defense minister of the Hungarian People's Republic, smiles in a friendly way. Major General Egon Szabo, of the Defense Ministry Press Department, is with him.

Col Gen Ferenc Karpati was born on 16 October 1926 in Putnokon, district of Borsod. He comes from a worker's family, and his father participated in the October Revolution in the USSR as a fighter in the Red Army and member of the Bolshevik Party. The entire Karpati family joined the ranks of the Hungarian Communist Party in 1945, and the young Ferenc was at the head of the local youth organization. Three years later he enrolled in the central party school in Budapest and after graduation, he became a political officer of the Hungarian People's Army. From 1951 to 1953 he studied at the Military Political Academy, and from 1955 onward he stayed in the USSR studying at the Lenin Military Political Academy. Because of the events in his homeland, he returned on 30 October 1956. Two years later, the Central Committee appointed him secretary of the party commission in the Hungarian People's Army. Later, he became head of the Army Political Administration, and in 1986, defense minister. He is a member of the MSZMP Central Committee, and he is a people's deputy at the same time. He was married in 1954. His wife is a teacher (a party member since 1954). Col Gen Ferenc Karpati has two sons: Ferenc Junior is a civil engineer, and Laszlo is a journalist.

Although his entire military career shows that he is a skilled politician, the defense minister of the Hungarian People's Republic does not like to give interviews. His exclusive interview to DANAS is his first interview to a foreign journalist; he had refused interviews to American and West German journalists.

DANAS: Comrade General, the interest in Hungary has been great in the world and in Yugoslavia lately. Your experiences, reforms, and political life in general are at the center of world media attention. Where is the place of the Hungarian People's Army in all this, how does the Army look on the reforms and democratization of society?

Karpati: The Army personnel are almost 80 percent party members, and undoubtedly the Army is in favor of reforms. Our officers know their party task, and the recent party conference provides evidence. Both party members and nonparty members support consistent reforms in the economic and political fields. But we must not regard reform as if everybody thinks the same on

every detail. There will be diversity, there will be different discussions of the reforms, but this is a natural thing. Much has changed within the Army ranks and will further change. We are much more open. You see, we did not use to answer such questions. What used to be taboo now no longer is.

DANAS: Can it be said that the Hungarian People's Army is now entering a stage of openness and perestroika [Russian word for restructuring used]?

Karpati: Our perestroika did not begin now, it goes back to the end of the fifties. Crude errors occurred earlier, which all led to the events of 1956. We have learned a great deal from all that. We have reorganized both the party and the Army; new people have come. We have realized the mistake of taking over some things automatically from other countries, which is not sound. It is essential for us that the citizens should consider the Army their own. Of course, the Army also has its place in the political life of the country, and we have adopted new decisions on the further development of the Armed Forces.

DANAS: Have you taken your military doctrine from other countries? Hungary is a member of the Warsaw Pact. Can one speak about a Hungarian defense doctrine, and what is original in your concept of a defense war?

Karpati: As a sovereign country, our country naturally has its national military doctrine. This fully reflects the efforts that we wish to realize within the Warsaw Pact. This is possible because the political side of doctrine within the Pact is uniform, and the elements of the military side do not oppose the strategic perceptions in the Warsaw Pact. The fundamental element of this doctrine is to prevent aggression, avoid war, and protect the borders and the air space of our state. Otherwise, the guidelines of our military doctrine are manifested in the organization of our Armed Forces, the military training, equipment, deployment of troops, the legal position of national defense.... It is certain that the content and the concept of the doctrine is essentially defined by our geostrategic position, political links, and economic, demographic, and other national factors.

DANAS: How does Hungary assess the Warsaw Pact's initiatives for reducing military budgets and a simultaneous dissolution of the two military alliances?

Karpati: Our position does not differ from the position of our allies: The increase in Army expenditure could be stopped as the political climate becomes more favorable and steps are made toward disarmament. Our side supports the mutual reduction of defense costs. We think that all the European countries, nonaligned and neutral, have an important interest in the abolition of military alliances, the organizational forms of military confrontation. This would have positive consequences for the process of disarmament and for greater confidence. Therefore, it is our united, allied position that the

dissolution of the two military alliances would be an important factor in reducing tension. Unfortunately, this is not yet a reality. Greater confidence is also achieved through an expansion of contacts, and military meetings are also important. The dialogue has started. The comparison of the military doctrines of the two military alliances may reduce the danger of mutual military confrontation. We have always actively participated in such initiatives. In comparison with other European countries, Hungary does not spend too much on its Army. In the committee sessions before the fall session of the parliament, I invoked the fact that our direct expenditure is 35 million forints. Considering the economic situation in the country, we know that we could well use this money for other purposes.

DANAS: Does this mean that you have any problems in parliament when the military budget is voted on?

Karpati: Where are there no problems? Surely you have them, too. Just as the work of the parliament changes, so changes occur in the Army, too. Representatives of commissions pose serious questions to ministers and specific answers must be provided, and all these answers must be well supported with arguments. Now that we have a considerable amount of economic problems, parliament must consider: Will it allocate these funds and for what will it allocate them? I can tell you that on several occasions ministers do not get votes for their proposals. Parliament performs its duties responsibly.

DANAS: Has it happened to you as defense minister that you were opposed in parliament and that your proposal was not accepted?

Karpati: No. I have not been in my office for long. I have not yet made any proposals to amend laws. Parliament begins its session tomorrow; you will have an opportunity to see how this is. Questions concerning last year's budget are on the agenda.

DANAS: The intermediate- and shorter-range missiles will be eliminated in Europe. What is the Hungarian position on this, and do you think that a certain relaxation is occurring in Europe? Will you, for instance, reduce the numerical strength of your Army? Will there be a reduction in the numerical strength of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary? Janos Kadar, former MSZMP general secretary, told ASSOCIATED PRESS 2 months ago "that a withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary since 1956 is possible in the foreseeable future, but that an appropriate level of relaxation should first be reached in East-West relations in Europe."

Karpati: There have been no intermediate range missiles on our state's territory. We think that the American-Soviet agreement is very important. A move has been made toward nuclear disarmament, and two classes of nuclear weapons—which in fact were "European weapons"—are being abolished. The danger to the security of

our country has also been reduced. This agreement should not be underestimated by saying that it refers to only 3 to 4 percent of the nuclear weapons. It is important that something specific has been achieved and the process must continue. Hungary believes that attention must now be directed to a reduction of conventional forces [konvencionalni potenciali], an abolition of the disequilibrium [ukidanje asimetrije] through reductions, and a change of military doctrines from an offensive to a defensive nature. We think that the size of the Army may be reduced. In this context and process, one realistically thinks of a withdrawal and reduction of the Soviet units that are in our country. How and when? As Comrade Kadar said: in the foreseeable future. The condition is that the United States must also reduce the number of its soldiers in Europe. We have already presented all this in our proposals at the UN session.

DANAS: Will the Hungarian People's Army make any changes in the short-range ground-to-ground missiles? What will be the essence of modernization, especially as regards the Western doctrine of FOFA (Follow-on Forces Attack)? What will be the substitute?

Karpati: As I have stressed, we are in favor of freezing and reducing conventional weapons, as well as changing the doctrine from offensive to defensive. I think that nuclear forces and offensive weapons must be reduced first. This, of course, includes launchers with which tactical-operative nuclear weapons may be launched. In addition, we are against the so-called parity, as well as against additional armaments, both in the qualitative and the quantitative sense. There is a trend in NATO circles to modernize the conventional forces in the direction of high technology; they strive for new generations of conventional weapons that would substitute for the nuclear missiles to be withdrawn as envisaged by the latest American-Soviet agreement. We are against such modernization and Hungary does not plan any such steps, for they are opposed to our concept of security. But we do not wish to be inactive. We conceive our defense doctrine and the nature of our Armed Forces on the basis of the present hardware, without any new "secret weapons" to repel a possible attack. Of course, this does not exclude modernization and improvement of military equipment that we now possess, and possibly an introduction of some innovations.

DANAS: In Yugoslavia we now possess MiG-29's. Do you plan a similar modernization of your Air Force? Your ground forces possess T-72 tanks. To what extent have you modernized these tanks (with laser rangefinders, target selection computers, suitable ammunition)? Has the Hungarian People's Army obtained the latest Soviet tanks, the T-84 type? Will you change the caliber of your infantry weapons to 5.48 mm? Will Hungarian soldiers get armored vests to protect them from bullets and shrapnel?

Karpati: The technical modernization of our People's Army is a process in which obsolete military hardware is replaced with new and modern types. The military

industry of the socialist countries can supply us with weapons which we want when we want them. We have never had a tendency to procure every new type, or rather to procure the very latest combat means in large quantities. Specifically, as regards the T-72 and T-84 tanks, MiG-29 planes, the 5.48 mm caliber weapons, and armored vests, their appearance or lack of appearance cannot be the basis for any speculation, or rather, we do not yet possess MiG-29 planes or T-84 tanks. At the moment we do not plan to introduce small-caliber infantry weapons, or to apply armor vests. It is possible, when the time comes for such things, that we will not adopt these solutions, but others that will be more economical and suitable for us. Our essential principle is to keep expensive combat means for as long as possible, with a consideration for our military budget, and when supplying our units with new hardware we strive to procure those items that comply best with our principles. All this also depends on our financial situation.

DANAS: NATO is strengthening its forces in the south European theater. Will Hungary be able to maintain appropriate modernization in every field (infantry, artillery, armored units, aviation, air defense)?

Karpati: The strivings of the Western military alliance are known to us, both in general and as regards the south European theater. We also know that the measures and the pace of strengthening differ from one region of Europe to another. We look at NATO and we assess it from the viewpoint of the overall system of Warsaw Pact defense. Therefore, we look at the problem of NATO modernization as our possible answer within the common modernization of the Warsaw Pact forces. [sentence as published] Of course, a part of this business of modernization also concerns our Army in all respects. At what pace we will advance and what financial means we will have has been determined by our party and our government at the level that was deemed necessary. I am convinced that we will continue to obtain everything that is necessary so that our Army may fulfill its tasks in conformity with its allied obligations and as regards the country's defense. We will take all the necessary measures against such moves as the transfer of U.S. F-16 planes from Spain to Italy so that we will not be caught by surprise.

DANAS: Two routes exist for splitting up the south European theater and for breaking into the Plain of Lombardy: through Austria and through Yugoslavia. What are your Army's obligations toward the Warsaw Pact in this respect?

Karpati: The possibilities of an outcome as stated in your question are certainly realistic from a military point of view. However, the basic intention of our Army, emanating from the military doctrine of a defensive nature, is the defense of our country from aggression of any kind. We are preparing for the defense of our borders and in

this way for the defense of the Warsaw Pact member countries. We do not want to fight on the territory of other countries. Our obligations are clear and they are reduced to defense.

DANAS: Do you, as minister of defense, consider that these routes can be leaped over with the aid of airborne attacks?

Karpati: In a modern war, with modern means, well-trained soldiers may leap over these routes. However, we have no such plans, we possess no means for anything of the kind, and we do not train our soldiers for it.

DANAS: The changes in the NATO doctrine have also caused a reorganization of the armed forces within the Warsaw Pact. Where does the Hungarian People's Army stand in this respect? Has it also carried out a reorganization?

Karpati: We consider changes in the organization normal; they are a sign of constant development of the Army. In our case, it involves changes in the systematization of the combat means, and innovations in matters of doctrine. We do not hide; at the "Bazalt-87" military exercise at the end of last year, a spokesman of the national Defense Ministry informed Hungarian press correspondents that the military exercise was conducted after a reorganization of the Army and that brigades participated according to their new organization, and we published this in the Hungarian press. After all, we consider the reorganization a process that reached a high level last year. Recently, we put under a joint command our civil defense and the rear defense of our country. It may be expected that a certain reorganization will also take place in the Defense Ministry.

DANAS: Marshal Viktor Kulikov, supreme commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces, visited Hungary three times in a short while. General Lushev, USSR deputy defense minister, was also here. Did they come to study your experience in Army reorganization?

Karpati: These visits are two different things. Marshal Kulikov visited as the commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces in connection with the preparations for the council meeting in Moscow. He also inspected the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. General Lushev came on a friendly visit to our Army. I liked his words, his praise of our Army and economy. General Lushev told me that he regretted that it was the first time he had come to Budapest. Let me conclude: The visits by Marshal Kulikov and General Lushev are two different things.

DANAS: The Warsaw Pact has a new doctrine on the use of armed forces according to which the employment of operative-maneuver groups has a very important place. Are there any changes in the concept of the Hungarian forces considering this new Warsaw Pact doctrine?

Karpati: Last year, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact adopted a document on the basic principles of the member countries' military doctrine, and this was published. This document also mentions the use of the operative-maneuver groups. But the use of these groups has never been the main strategy of the Warsaw Pact. In view of developments in military science and the study of tactical-strategic analyses, all this is still in an experimental stage. We are concentrating, as we have already said several times, on an efficient strategic defense which would deter or, if need be, halt the aggressor and create conditions for resistance.

DANAS: How long does the training of soldiers last in your Army? What is the manning situation and do you have problems with recruiting people for the military service? Is there interest in a professional career in the Hungarian forces?

Karpati: The training lasts 18 months, since 1980, when we reduced the military service from 24 months. This time is divided into three 6-month periods and the training is based on this division. As far as the manning is concerned, it is according to our plan and real needs, which is to say that we also have units that are deliberately undermanned. This corresponds to our concept of training and our tasks, and helps us to keep the costs down. Soldiers know what their duties to the country are, and the great majority of them conscientiously carries out their duties. Interest in a professional military career is, like in many other countries, on a decline. This does not, however, mean that the number of those who want to attend military schools is small, but only that it is smaller than we expected it to be for a good selection of candidates. The officers and NCO's that have been conferred are fully capable of meeting the demands of their military profession.

DANAS: Do you have problems with peace movements or with the faithful refusing to do their military service?

Karpati: In our view, the peace movement which is administered by the World Peace Council does not differ from our wishes, and regarding this, we stand on the same platform. Although we introduced some form of alternative military service without arms about 10 years ago, we have still not found a proper answer to this problem. We enabled the Nazarenes and Jehovah's Witnesses to reconcile their faith with citizen duties, but many among the Jehovah's Witnesses still regard this as unacceptable. We still favor general military service as long as this is demanded by international relations. Our Constitution and laws sanction this. But, I repeat, we still do not have proper answers. We are unable to find a suitable legal framework for those who claim that they cannot do their military service for personal reasons. Who can? Both the Nazarenes and Jehovah's Witnesses wear uniforms and I can tell you that the Nazarenes are

particularly good soldiers. We must bear in mind that all these things concerning alternative military service must be strictly controlled in order not to endanger the country's defense.

DANAS: Has the Army been publicly insulted by the media in your country?

Karpati: No, this has not happened. Mistakes are criticized, but there are no insults. The Army's general activities are not criticized. I would not like to see insults.

DANAS: Who in Hungary is in charge of pronouncing sentences for the criminal act of divulging military secrets, and do you have a military judiciary?

Karpati: Of course we have military courts, and it is these courts that deal with the criminal acts of divulging military secrets, regardless of whether this is done by a military or civilian person. If civilians breach military regulations, then they are always prosecuted by military courts.

DANAS: Are any of your officers educated abroad, and where? To what extent are foreign languages learned in your forces, and do your officers also learn Serbo-Croatian?

Karpati: Our military schools provide both basic and expert training for officers, but there are some fields in which our officers cannot acquire expertise at home, only in foreign schools. Therefore, we have Hungarian officers being trained in the USSR, the CSSR, and Poland. We feel that the learning of foreign languages is inadequate. We think that Russian, as a language of cooperation within the Warsaw Pact, should be spoken by every officer, and we regard this as a very important issue. Serbo-Croatian is not studied by Hungarian officers in schools, but if somebody wants to learn the language for personal reasons there are no obstacles to this.

DANAS: Recently we witnessed the intensification of relations between Hungary and Romania. What kind of military cooperation do you have with Romania?

Karpati: We have good military cooperation. We often hold land and air exercises. In fact, this cooperation is based on continuity, we exchange military cadres. Personally speaking, I have good relations with General Milea, Romanian defense minister. We get along well. Problems exist in other areas. You saw the spontaneous demonstrations in Budapest. In our country, demonstrations are allowed by law, and we are trying to restrain ourselves. We do not want our relations with Romania to deteriorate, and we hope that in the future the problems will be resolved in a civilized manner.

DANAS: How would Hungary react if Yugoslavia were attacked by NATO forces?

Karpati: This is a hypothetical question, and I can only give you a hypothetical answer. We are a socialist country, a member of the Warsaw Pact, and we condemn all forms of aggression. Our position in Europe, our good and increasingly improving connections, our good neighborly relations, they all point to the fact that in a possible crisis situation we would hold a firm view and that in the political and diplomatic fields we would undertake the necessary measure for the halting and condemning this aggression, and the total elimination of its consequences. We would not be the only country in the Warsaw Pact with this view. Aggression against Yugoslavia, our non-aligned neighbor, would also threaten us. This means that we would undertake certain military measures that would be joint and in accord with the measures of our allies. These military measures would ensure the protection of our border and the self-protection of Yugoslavia. Our aid would depend on the political leadership of fraternal, Socialist Yugoslavia, on the LCY, the Yugoslav Government, and on what kind and to what extent our help was requested. The Hungarian troops, our military potential is adapted for the defense of our territory and therefore we could provide only this kind of aid. Of course, in agreement with our Yugoslav comrades and our allies. But the Yugoslav People's Army is strong, its units are capable of independently and successfully opposing any aggression on your territory.

DANAS: Finally, do you have mountain units, and where would you use them in a possible war?

Karpati: No, we do not have special mountain troops because we do not have high mountains. True, in regular training we teach some aspects of mountain combat, of forest and mountain combat, above all for defense purposes. But this is not special training, this is only training to meet the geographical conditions in Hungary. This training is for defense because our main concern is the defense of our country. We will not attack anybody....

SFRY Delegate Speaks at Geneva Disarmament Conference

*LD1907134288 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1117 GMT 19 Jul 88*

[Text] Geneva, July 19 (TANJUG)—The drafting of a universal convention banning chemical weapons is a priority task, Yugoslav ambassador Marko Kosin told today's plenary session of the disarmament conference.

Kosin is Yugoslavia's permanent U.N. representative in Geneva.

Under the Yugoslav proposal, the existing level of agreement enables work on the convention to be speeded up. It could be signed next year at a special conference under U.N. auspices.

Kosin urged a comprehensive view on disarmament, including all its forms—nuclear, conventional, chemical and radiological, cosmic and others.

He said that conventional disarmament must be discussed with greater determination at the conference. This is not a question of balancing conventional arms, but of the fact that conventional weapons are used every day, that their destructive power is increased constantly as well as offensive potentials.

Kosin said it was not realistic to expect a reduction of nuclear weapons along with a standstill in conventional disarmament.

New possibilities have appeared in Europe for reducing conventional armaments which would contribute to further progress in nuclear disarmament.

Kosin expressed hope that the representatives of all 40 countries would invest efforts to prevent the arms race from spreading to space.

Outer space cannot be reserved solely for countries which have the technology to conquer it since it must be preserved for peaceful use and cooperation.

Kosin pointed out the need for agreement on measures to protect outer space from being further militarised with the introduction of new weapons.

Kosin reiterated Yugoslavia's proposal on introducing a moratorium on nuclear tests from August 5 this year, on the 25th anniversary of the signing of a partial nuclear test ban.

He said the outcome of the third special U.N. General Assembly session on disarmament, which ended without a final document, increases and does not decrease the role of the conference as the international community's sole negotiation organ made up of representatives of 40 countries, including five nuclear powers.

The role is all the more important bearing in mind that funds for military research are growing to alarming proportions and that existing systems are being improved constantly and new ones created.

INDIA

India Proposes Steps To Ban New Weapons Development

52004705 New Delhi PATRIOT in English
13 Jun 88 p 7

[Text] United Nations, 12 June (PTI)—India has proposed a ban on technological missions aimed at developing new weapons and means of warfare, warning that such weapons would give "hegemonistic capabilities" to the two super powers and increase their "pre-disposition to engage in coercive diplomacy."

In a paper submitted to the UN General Assembly's special session on disarmament, India voiced its concern at the technological arms race, pointing out that a number of technologies that have the potential of transforming completely the methods of war-fighting and the nature of warfare are in an advanced stage of development.

Creation of "third generation" nuclear weapons with an ability to pick and choose specific effects of such weapons and enhance them, while suppressing the unwanted ones, is mentioned in the Indian paper as one of the areas in which new and emerging technologies with far-reaching military applications are taking shape.

A number of "third generation" nuclear weapons are being explored, the paper says, adding that these included the X-Ray laser in which the energy of nuclear explosion is channelled into focussed beams of intense X-Ray radiation. Concurrently more accurate and precise modes of delivery of nuclear warheads are being explored to avoid large collateral damage.

The Indian document states that new directions in the use of nuclear energy for military purposes are also evident and plans to deploy compact and powerful nuclear reactors in space are in advanced stages of development. Increased use of nuclear power in space could have dangerous ecological consequences, it adds.

About conventional weapons, it says that with increasing accuracy, lethality and range of conventional weapon systems, the words "conventional weapons" could already be a misnomer. In this connection, it recalls that the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles was being contemplated with conventional weapons.

India states that the new weapon capabilities are likely to be available only to the two super powers and their allies for a long time to come. "It would, therefore, provide them with hegemonistic capabilities, increasing their pre-disposition to engage in coercive diplomacy," [the] paper adds.

Other new technologies in arms race mentioned in the paper include kinetic energy weapons which derive their destructive energy from the momentum of propelled objects, chemical and biological weapons, electronics, computers and artificial intelligence.

The new technologies pose a serious threat to the existing arms control and disarmament agreement by offering technological and strategic incentives to nations for breaking out of the current restrictions, it says.

A proposal to have negotiations for banning those technological missions which are clearly designed for developing new weapons and means of warfare is made in the Indian paper.

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Gorbachev Speech on European Disarmament Noted

*OW1607062088 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1050 GMT 13 Jul 88*

[From "The World Today" program, presented by Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] A great deal of material on Comrade Gorbachev's visit to the Polish People's Republic shows that the socialist countries are engaged in solving problems that are common to all of them. However, this material also contains many aspects that are outside the framework of the socialist commonwealth. In the first place, it deals with the question of strengthening peace and security in our common European house. Numerous responses to Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in the Polish Sejm reflect a preoccupation with this question.

Let me remind you that this speech contained proposals directed at resolutely beginning the process of reducing troops and armaments in Europe. What is being discussed here is holding a second, but this time all-European, Reykjavik—a meeting of all the European countries to discuss just one question: How to break the vicious cycle and ensure that something is done about conventional arms reduction in continental Europe, rather than just talking about it.

French President Francois Mitterrand called the proposal interesting, noting that he regards the question of the reduction of conventional weapons as a matter of importance.

The FRG Government's official representative also expressed the hope that talks on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe will begin as early as this year.

However, there is something else that needs to be mentioned: Many NATO leaders, including its new general secretary, the former FRG defense minister Woerner, still stubbornly adhere to old stereotypes—such stereotypes as the military superiority of Warsaw Pact or demanding compensation and modernization for NATO.

However, Comrade Gorbachev's speech in the Sejm contains the elimination of this imbalance between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact military forces as the first step toward reduction of military personnel and armaments in Europe.

There are also those in NATO who are attempting to say that supposedly, the goal of the new Soviet initiatives is to separate Western Europe from the United States. Nothing could be further from the truth: Our country proposes to hold talks on the question of disarmament with both the European countries and the United States.

Let me remind you that on the very first meeting of the just resumed Soviet- U.S. nuclear and space disarmament talks in Geneva, our delegation made a new constructive step: It introduced a draft protocol on the future strategic offensive weapons reduction agreement. This pertains to the total launch mass of the ICBM, as well as ballistic missiles deployed on submarines. This proposal of ours takes into account the thoughts expressed earlier by the American delegation, and thus creates the necessary basis for reaching agreement on this question. Our delegation in Geneva is expecting constructive proposals in reply from the American side.

'Major Progress' in INF Commission Meeting

*LD1507163388 Moscow TASS in English
1617 GMT 15 Jul 88*

[Text] Geneva July 15 TASS—The special verification commission, set up in accordance with the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, completed its first meeting here today.

The meeting achieved major progress in elaborating measures to facilitate the effective implementation of INF Treaty provisions, a joint statement said.

The commission came to the mutual understanding that the agreed upon provisions related to inspection equipment and methods of its use would be applied on a temporary basis until the sides concluded a memorandum on the agreement regarding the application of treaty provisions on verification.

The sides expressed their resolve to complete in the near future work on measures on which no agreement had as yet been reached.

The next meeting of the commission can be held at the request of either side.

NATO Response to Arms Initiatives Criticized

*PM2007154988 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Jul 88 First Edition p 3*

["Military-Political Review" by Captain First Rank V. Kuzar: "Confidence- and Security-Building in Europe"]

[Excerpt] From the rostrum of the Polish Sejm M. S. Gorbachev called on the leaders of all European countries to hold a meeting to discuss a single question: the practical reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe. Yes, an all-European Reykjavik is needed; a breakthrough is needed on this key element of European security. Substantial progress in the political, economic, and other spheres can hardly be expected without achieving concrete results here. Why? A "European home" cannot be built on weapons arsenals, which are constantly being restocked with new, more powerful, and more accurate varieties. Especially with a continent that is saturated with nuclear power stations,

conventional weapons are now, figuratively speaking, being turned into nuclear weapons. One missile carrying a conventional warhead or even a powerful artillery shell is enough to throw a death-dealing radioactive cloud over a nuclear power station. This danger is extremely real and, naturally, cannot fail to undermine trust between European countries.

Soviet proposals on the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces and confidence-building measures on an all-European scale were once again voiced in Warsaw. The USSR proposes that this process be implemented in three stages. In the first stage it proposes the disclosure and elimination of all the imbalances and asymmetries between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in both the numerical strength of troops and basic arms and individual regions of the continent. It proposes that talks begin with an exchange and thorough verification [proverka] of initial data, including by on-site inspections. In the second phase it proposes that the NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces be reduced by 500,000 men on each side by disbanding formations and units and eliminating their standard-issue arms. The third phase is to continue the reduction in armed forces in order to eventually impart an exclusively defensive character to them. The Soviet Union is prepared from the very start of reductions to come to an agreement on priority reductions in tactical nuclear weapons, aircraft, and tanks. In an effort to seek balance in every specific case by reducing military confrontation, the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to withdraw its comparable aircraft systems from forward-based sites in Eastern Europe if NATO does not deploy in Italy the 72 U.S. fighter-bombers which Spain has rejected. The implementation of another Soviet proposal—the creation of a unified center to lessen the military danger as an area for NATO-Warsaw Pact cooperation—would also promote the reduction of tension on the European Continent. Poland is ready to site such a center on its territory.

The new Soviet initiatives are consonant with the proposals from other socialist countries aimed at ensuring security in our "European home." They also include the comprehensive Polish plan for arms reduction and confidence-building in central Europe, a plan that is well known as the "Jaruzelski Plan," and the initiative on the creation of a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the line where the Warsaw Pact and NATO meet, which was put forward by M. Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee.

The new initiatives put forward in the course of M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Poland and in the course of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee session have aroused a broad wave of interest and approval. Everyone who shows sincere concern for the fate of both the European Continent and the entire planet sees them and supports them. They are at the center of attention for politicians, public figures, and foreign countries' mass media.

In this connection, the following question is quite natural: What is the reaction of the people to whom these initiatives are primarily addressed—the NATO military-political leadership—to these initiatives? All the indications are that it is negative. This conclusion is self-evident when you acquaint yourself with the first statements made by official NATO spokesmen and Western newspapers' commentaries on this subject.

Thus France's LE MONDE, in reference to the USSR's new proposals, says that NATO "has shown no interest either in holding a meeting between the leaders of the European states or in reducing conventional arms, or in symmetrically withdrawing combat aircraft from the continent." A NATO Headquarters communique indicates that the Soviet initiatives were noted, but there was soon a rush to reject them. The Atlanticists have not even taken the trouble to attentively and comprehensively study the new proposals or think about seeking mutually acceptable options in the interests of reducing the number of modern warfare systems sited in Europe and reducing military confrontation on the continent.

What is the worth, for instance, of the statement concerning the Soviet initiatives made by M. Woerner, recently appointed NATO secretary general. While hypocritically stating that the West is interested in creating stable equilibrium at the lowest possible level, he asserts without foundation that this is being impeded by Soviet superiority in Europe. Or take the pseudo argument used by people within NATO in their quest to justify their nonacceptance of the Soviet proposals. People there claim that air forces do not lend themselves to reductions owing to the verification [proverka] difficulties which allegedly crop up when aircraft base sites are changed rapidly. This approach to the proposals from one side unequivocally illustrates the other side's unwillingness to display common sense and conduct constructive talks.

The NATO military-political leadership is still a slave to the stereotypes of the prenuclear age. It is increasingly endeavoring to rattle the saber, and is every time adamantly opposed to any attempt to secure arms reduction. Clearly expressing the will of the NATO leaders, London's FINANCIAL TIMES hastened to silence Italian Prime Minister C. de Mita, stating that his support for the reciprocal withdrawal of aircraft is allegedly premature. Corresponding words of warning are also heard from across the ocean. R. Lehman, U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, recently formulated the essence of these warnings: "The Soviet Union under Gorbachev challenges U.S. and Western interests and this requires that we be vigilant.... We must not reduce the military potential of the United States and its allies on the basis of Soviet public statements.... As for NATO, we must continue to implement our initiative to perfect conventional arms and the programs arising from the resolution adopted in Montebello in 1983...."

Decisions are being adopted in NATO under pressure from the opponents of a secure and nonviolent world and in complete accordance with their views aimed at further building up military preparations and improving strategy and tactics for use of troops. Thus, General J. Galvin, NATO supreme allied commander Europe, stated that he will continue to strive to ensure that the alliance has an opportunity to maneuver and destroy enemy forces even before they enter into combat operations. The general spoke positively of the "follow-on forces attack" concept, which, as is well known, is of a clearly aggressive character.

NATO is creating a multinational operational formation for operations on the bloc's northern flank. It is made up of U.S., Canadian, and West German troops. There is no need to particularly stress the danger of this decision and its obvious thrust against the well-known Soviet proposals on reducing the level of military confrontation in the north of Europe and transforming this region into a peace zone.

France is holding back from participating in the process of East-West disarmament and detente, L'HUMANITE notes. The newspaper draws this conclusion on the basis of recent statements made by Defense Minister J.-P. Chevenement, confirming that a law recently adopted on military programs for the years 1987-1991 will not be revised. Thus, the orientation toward building up nuclear, chemical, and conventional systems remains in force. New nuclear-powered submarines carrying a new type of missile and Mirage 2000-N's equipped with ASMP [air-to-surface] nuclear cruise missiles are to come into service.

Nonetheless I would like to hope that NATO's first negative reaction to the latest Warsaw Pact proposals will not be the last, and that reason will prevail. At any rate the statements by the leaders of certain NATO countries give definite grounds for such hopes.

"We see a Europe in the future where West and East no longer bristle with weapons directed against one another but, on the contrary, derive unprecedented benefit from exchanging goods and values, skills and knowledge, people and ideals." Everyone who values the cause of peace on earth is prepared to subscribe to these words uttered by M. S. Gorbachev in the Polish Sejm. Only mutual trust and the restriction of armed forces to exclusively defensive purposes can ensure universal security. The swords that have not yet been beaten into ploughshares must remain sheathed.

Second U.S.-Soviet Disarmament Conference Begins

Retired Generals, Admirals Meet

*LD1807200488 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1100 GMT 18 Jul 88*

[Text] The second Soviet-U.S. Conference of Retired Generals and Admirals on Disarmament Problems began work in Moscow today. Those taking part will

examine topical issues relating to averting the nuclear threat, have conversations with prominent Soviet state, party, military, and public figures, and have a roundtable meeting with leading specialists in the sphere of disarmament. The conference was organized by the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, and the public group Soviet Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament, set up under its auspices at the end of 1986. Taking part in the conference on the U.S. side will be a delegation from the public organization, the Central for Defense Information, led by its director, Rear Admiral Larocque. The first such conference was held last year in the United States.

Further on Meeting

*LD1807221288 Moscow TASS in English
2156 GMT 18 Jul 88*

[Text] Moscow July 18 TASS—The need for new political and military thinking in the area of disarmament is the main theme of the second Soviet-American meeting of retired generals and admirals that opened here today. Its participants stated this at a news conference that was held today at the Soviet Peace Committee.

Retired military from the two countries are to discuss prospects for radical strategic offensive arms reductions, limitation and ending of nuclear testing, deep cuts in conventional forces and armaments. Among the main themes on the agenda are the limitation of the sales of arms to developing countries, reduction of naval forces and limitation of naval activity, as well as confidence-building measures and the problem of glasnost in the military area. The first such meeting of Soviet and American retired military was held in Washington in April 1987.

"We would like to contribute to the deepening of Soviet-American dialogue, for stereotypes of hostility and distrust have been reigning over many years in the traditionally-conservative military area", head of the Soviet delegation, Retired Lieutenant-General Mikhail Milshstein said at the news conference. He presented members of the public group "Soviet Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament" that was formed at the Soviet Peace Committee in 1986.

Retired Rear Admiral Gene Larocque, the founder and director of the U.S. Center for Defense Information told Soviet journalists that the arrival of retired American military in Moscow is another evidence of the growing interest in the USA for the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. He is of the opinion that confidence-building measures are one of the key aspects of the development of relations between the two countries in the military-political area. Acting in this direction, the center is prepared to help in bringing about the release of more than 300 Soviet servicemen who have been taken prisoner in Afghanistan.

The difference of the approaches of the participants in the Soviet-American meeting to a number of problems was manifested during the debate. "But the striving for a constructive dialogue, for the strengthening of trust between the two countries is stronger than differences," Mikhail Milshtein said. "For just as in the years of the Second World War when Soviet and American soldiers were fighting together against Nazism we now have a no less horrible enemy, the threat of nuclear catastrophe".

U.S. Inspectors Visit Sverdlovsk Plant

*LD1807181488 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1430 GMT 18 Jul 88*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] In accordance with the U.S.-USSR Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed in Washington on 8 December 1987, an inspection group of U.S. experts stayed in Sverdlovsk on 16 and 17 July. Correspondent E. Erkomayshvili reports:

[Erkomayshvili] Representatives from the scientific and production association works of the Kalinin scientific engineering plant met the U.S. inspection group at Koltsovo Airport. The experimental works figures in the memorandum to the treaty as a facility for the assembly of RK-55 launchers, the production of which is to be terminated. Welcoming the group, (Moiseyev), the works director, expressed his readiness to render all help required in their responsible work. Working premises have been made available for the U.S. inspectors. A group of specialists from the works accompanied the group on their tour of the enterprise.

[Begin recording] [Krayniy, identified by caption as E.I. Krayniy, engineer] The U.S. inspectors carried out an inspection of the territory and the installations of the experimental works, and they established that production of the RK-55 launchers had been stopped at the enterprise. Thus, all conditions of the treaty have been complied with. After completion of their work, we signed a relevant protocol.

[Nelson, identified by caption as Paul Nelson, head of the U.S. inspection group, speaking in English fading into Russian translation] I am pleased to be here today, to have inspected the Sverdlovsk launcher production facility, and with the work of the group in carrying out their mission. It gives us pleasure to see that our professional ties with the USSR are developing. We hope to continue cooperating, and we look forward to working together in the future. [end recording]

U.S. Military Inspectors Arrive in GDR

*LD1807164688 Moscow TASS in English
1605 GMT 18 Jul 88*

[Text] Berlin July 18 TASS—Two groups of U.S. military inspectors have arrived in the German Democratic Republic, ADN news agency reported.

The 20 inspectors will visit missile bases in the GDR where they are going to verify the realization of the Soviet-American INF Treaty.

In keeping with an agreement with the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, demonstrating a gesture of good will, has begun unilaterally withdrawing its missiles even before the treaty's ratification and been scrupulously honoring its commitments.

The U.S. inspectors were welcomed at Leipzig Airport by representatives of the GDR Foreign Ministry, the National People's Army and the Soviet Army.

Missile Inspectors' Trip to UK Reviewed

LD1907223888 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 19 Jul 88

[Text] [Announcer] Soviet experts have arrived in Britain to inspect American cruise missile facilities under the provisions of the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty. Nikolay Gorshkov has the details:

[Gorshkov] Would you expect an (?Aeroflot) Ilyushin jet to land at Greenham Common missile base? Well, today it happened. The 20-member Soviet team comprising inspectors and the air crew have begun their tour of duty with the Greenham Common Air Base, which earlier was opened up for a group of Soviet journalists. As you will remember, Greenham Common was the first American base in Europe to receive cruise missiles, on 14 November 1983.

[Announcer] No. Soviet teams have already visited missile sites in the United States and West Germany. But under the terms of the INF Treaty, each side has the right to choose its own sequence of inspections. And it is only required to give 16 hours notice of an inspection. So in this particular case the British Ministry of Defense was informed of Soviet intentions only late on Monday.

[Announcer] And what's the point of such mysteries?

[Gorshkov] To exclude any possibility of cheating on either side. The current inspections are part of a 60-day period of so-called base-line inspections, aimed at determining the accuracy of the data exchanged by the two sides. The 60-day period began on 3d July, and while the Soviet side [word indistinct] 30 bases in the United States and Western Europe, the American experts may visit 133 Soviet sites. As for base-line inspections, each side can make random unannounced visits during the following 3 years to check the destruction of missiles as required by the INF Treaty. And after that each side will be allowed further inspections for 10 years. Thus far no violations have been discovered, and the base-line inspections are about 25 percent complete.

[Announcer] The memorandum of understanding signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev as an attachment to the INF Treaty listed 101 Tomahawk cruise missiles at Greenham Common and 18 at Molesworth. According to the British Defense Ministry, of the 101 missiles at Greenham Common, 96 are operational and 5 are what the ministry calls spares. It said the Soviet inspectors would additionally be able to see the five training launches and four training missile (?cannisters) kept at Greenham Common. They may enter any building they think is capable of housing missiles or their launch missiles, and they will be allowed to place security men at all entry and exit roads to ensure no missiles are surreptitiously moved out.

[Announcer] Nikolay, you've been at a Soviet SS-20 missile base and reported on preparations to accommodate American inspectors there. But do you have any idea of what the accommodation of the Soviet inspectors at Greenham Common could be like?

[Gorshkov] The Soviet team will be accommodate in three rooms of a new school building and will eat whatever is on the menu of the day at American airmen's canteen. The Soviet inspectors will be allowed to stay in Britain for up to 4 and 1/2 days, and will be subject to immigration and customs procedures. All their equipment will be checked by American officials. Meanwhile, the Soviet team leader Vyacheslav Lebedev said upon arriving at Greenham Common that the INF Treaty marks the beginning of an unprecedented stage in the history of mankind. Its implementation paves the way for a denuclearized world and makes our lives safer and happier. We highly appreciate the contribution on the part of Great Britain and other European nations, the Soviet expert said, in making this step possible.

Karpov on Dismantling of Krasnoyarsk Radar
LD1907130788 Moscow TASS in English
1248 GMT 19 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow July 19 TASS—Claims have been made in Washington that the Soviet Union is violating the ABM Treaty by building a radar station outside Krasnoyarsk, but the radar is meant for tracking space objects and can by no means be seen as connected with the ABM Treaty in any way, a senior Soviet official said today.

Viktor Karpov, chief of the Foreign Ministry's Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate, added that the Soviet side has repeated these explanations about the facility many times.

Moreover, the Soviet Union, "demonstrating good will and concern in connection with such charges, discontinued all work on the Krasnoyarsk radar way back last October and that moratorium is still in effect," he said.

The USSR, he declared, is for strict and unfailing adherence to the ABM Treaty as being essential to 50-percent cuts in strategic offensive arms.

At the talks in Geneva, according to him, the Soviet delegation is actively discussing the possibility of signing a relevant agreement which would reiterate the commitment by both sides to observe the ABM Treaty for at least another nine to ten years.

"In this framework we are prepared also for a radical solution to the Krasnoyarsk radar issue raised by the Americans.

"If an understanding to abide by the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, is reached, the Soviet Union will be ready to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar in a verifiable way that would leave no doubts on the part of the United States," Karpov said.

Kashlev Outlines Progress at Vienna Talks
LD1907175388 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 19 Jul 88

[Text] The documents of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee Conference have aroused increased interest in Vienna, where a meeting of representatives of CSCE signatory states is continuing its work. Here is what Ambassador Kashlev, head of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna meeting, told our correspondent about this:

[Begin Kashlev recording] It was noted in Warsaw that the work is nearing completion, that there is a chance to conclude the Vienna meeting with balanced, important results and to complete the preparation of a mandate for negotiations on reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. That is a highly correct assessment. It was received here very seriously.

We are, indeed, having very hot days now at the Vienna meeting, because the meeting has entered the final outcome stage, as they put it here. Both we and the Western countries have proposals and corrections to the text of the final draft submitted by the neutral and nonaligned countries. (?There are not many) although some of them are of principal importance, and if we make every effort, it would be possible to find solutions to these questions within a few weeks.

The problem consists in whether we will manage to do it by the end of July, as planned, or if the Vienna meeting may have to be extended for a limited period in September. At least at the moment, the majority of the delegations are in favor of working at maximum capacity and efficiently in order to resolve, or presolve if I may put it so, all these questions now, then get together for a short time in the second half of September to finalize the

documents for final acceptance. Then, in the fall, let's say, a (?high- profile) meeting with the participation of the foreign ministers of 35 countries would be held.

There is also some progress at the negotiations between the 23 countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO where the mandate is being prepared. Over the past few weeks, we have completed agreements on the organizational conditions and procedure for these negotiations. It is a fairly substantial document, consisting of 5 pages, in which all organizational conditions are envisioned, that is, on what basis the negotiations are going to work—on the basis of the principles of equality and consensus. That is, it includes many of the things that have already become established in the pan-European process, and now they are going to be introduced also as the basis of these new negotiations on conventional weapons.

So, in both instances, there is progress. But we have to exert ourselves in order to find solutions to the remaining questions. For us the main substance of these issues, our objective, remains unaltered: to conclude the Vienna meeting this year with (?initialled) substantial results and to begin this year negotiations on reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe, to begin the second stage of the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security and Disarmament in Europe. Thus, a very extensive, full, and interesting agenda for Europe lies ahead of us. [end recording]

CSCE Meeting

Tentative Agreement Reached

LD2007134588 Moscow TASS in English
1340 GMT 20 Jul 88

[Text] Vienna July 20 TASS—Tentative agreement has been reached at the consultations of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO members here, which are aimed at working out a mandate for talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, on the negotiations' organization and procedures.

The agreement is based on provisions already accepted in the CSCE process, such as the sovereign equality of nations, the principle of consensus in taking decisions, and the use of all the six official CSCE languages, including Russian, at the talks.

The agreement means that organizational groundwork has been laid for the negotiations which are to open, as agreed before, as early as this year.

Deryabin Answers Questions

LD2007110388 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1100 GMT 19 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow, 19 July (TASS)—At the third Vienna meeting of states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the foreign ministers of France and the FRG pointed out the need to make

every effort to finish the work of that forum by the end of July. That viewpoint is fully justified—carrying the conference over to the fall could result not only in slackening the pace of agreements but also missing the very chance of completing the meeting within a reasonable time span, at any rate this year. In this connection Yuriy Deryabin, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry department for questions of European security and cooperation, answered questions from Vadim Biryukov, TASS diplomatic correspondent.

Question: How do you assess the prospects for completion of the Vienna meeting?

Answer: The main thing, of course, is not the completion time, but the results: acceptable to all, weighty, and balanced, which would bring a fresh quality to the Helsinki process—in all directions, moreover.

But the time factor is also of no small significance. For instance, it is on the earliest completion of the Vienna forum that the possibility directly depends of starting this year such major talks as the talks on reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Rapid progress is needed in two directions: completion of agreeing on the mandate of the future talks on conventional weapons in Europe—above all, the subject of reductions—and finding mutually acceptable accords on the "third basket," taking into account the proposals put forward by neutral and nonaligned countries back in May. There are opportunities for this. To carry out these tasks, political will on the part of the participants in the talks is needed.

Question: But what is preventing accord on the subject of the talks on conventional weapons?

Answer: The position of our Western partners at the consultations of the 23 member-states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on dual-purpose weapons. It would seem that mutual understanding was reached long ago that these weapons, now comprising up to 60-70 percent of conventional weapons, should not be left outside the scope of the future talks. In order to take into consideration the West's concern regarding the so-called "third zero," that is, tactical nuclear weapons, we proposed that at these talks only the means of delivery of dual-purpose weapons would be examined, while the weapons' nuclear components would be the subject of separate talks.

It would seem that all that remains is to agree on suitable formulations that reflect the understanding reached. Work was conducted in this area, for example, during the Soviet-U.S. summit in Moscow in May. Of course, it was intended that the final formulations should be a matter for the consultations of the 23 states.

But what are we dealing with in Vienna now? The latest proposals by the NATO countries on this matter again put into question the inclusion in the future talks of dual-purpose weapons, and virtually postpone the resolving of this central problem, that is, until the talks themselves. Thus, the subject of the talks is devalued, and a new knot is tied in the way of concluding the Vienna forum. And, as we know, it is easier to tie a knot than it is to unravel one.

Question: Has progress been made in Vienna on humanitarian problems?

Answer: These questions occupy a very significant place in the draft of the final document, presented by the neutral countries. Far from everything in this draft suits us and our allies, or, for that matter, the Western partners. But this is a serious and business-like attempt to reach compromises. Therefore, we have agreed to adopt the draft of the neutral countries as a basis for the agreement of a final document of the Vienna meeting, including on issues of human rights and humanitarian cooperation. What is more, the Soviet delegation has called for a minimum of amendments and for unrealistic, maximalist counter-proposals not to be put forward. We have shown willingness to examine the formulations put forward by the neutral states on such complex questions as rights protection and religious activity.

I would especially like to emphasize that accords that go significantly further than Helsinki and Madrid both in volume and nature have already begun to take shape in Vienna.

Question: It is now often claimed in the West that the proposal put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in Warsaw about "European Reykjavik" is allegedly to replace the future talks in Vienna on problems of reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe, is it not?

Answer: Of course this is not so. The all-European meeting which Mikhail Gorbachev proposed is called upon to examine the main question: how to get out of the present vicious circle, to ensure the transition from words to deeds in the sphere of reduction of conventional weapons. In other words, to give a real political impulse to future talks, to real disarmament in Europe.

And the experience of Reykjavik itself, just like the follow-up Soviet-U.S. summit meetings and the experience of Helsinki, where in 1975 leaders of 35 European states, the United States, and Canada accelerated greatly the all-European process, speak here for themselves. Incidentally, there is no question this time about the United States and Canada being kept apart from European affairs, about any attempts to isolate Western Europe from its trans-Atlantic allies. Realistic prospects for European disarmament are being taken into account fully in Moscow.

This relates to our other proposal—the creation of a European center for the reduction of military threat. It is sometimes said that we are allegedly striving to implement this idea on a bloc basis, leaving out neutral and nonaligned states which represent almost a third of Europe. We see the issue in the following way: that formation of a new structure which would increase the reliability of peace on the continent can win only if all 35 states participants in the all-European process are engaged in it.

Terms for Dismantling Krasnoyarsk Radar Named
PM2007142988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Jul 88 Second Edition p 5

[“USSR Foreign Ministry Spokesman’s Statement”—*PRAVDA* headline; place, date not given]

[Text] Washington has recently once again raised the question of the Soviet Union’s violating the ABM Treaty by building a radar station in the Krasnoyarsk region.

In this connection, it must be borne in mind that, as our side has already declared repeatedly, the radar station in the Krasnoyarsk region is designed to track objects in space and so can in no way be viewed in connection with the ABM Treaty. At the same time, the Soviet Union, displaying goodwill and concern in connection with accusations of this kind, stopped all work on the Krasnoyarsk radar station as long ago as last October, and that moratorium still remains in force.

The Soviet Union advocates precise and strict observance of the ABM Treaty. We regard the preservation of this treaty as a necessary element for implementing 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms. At the Geneva talks, the USSR delegation is actively discussing the possibility of concluding a corresponding agreement in this regard, which would confirm the two sides’ pledges to observe the ABM Treaty for at least the next 9-10 years. Within this framework, we are also ready for a radical solution to the question of the Krasnoyarsk radar station raised by the U.S. side. If an accord is reached on observance of the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972, the Soviet Union will be prepared to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station’s equipment in such a way that this will be verifiable and give rise to no doubts in the United States.

Geneva Talks on Nuclear, Space Arms Continue

Obukhov Interviewed
PM2107095288 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Jul 88 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with Special Ambassador A. Obukhov, leader of the Soviet delegation at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms, by own correspondent B. Dubrovin in Geneva: “Geneva After Moscow: Latest Round of Soviet-American Talks Opens”—date of interview not given]

[Text] Geneva, July—It is just over 6 weeks since the fourth Soviet-American summit meeting in 3 years ended in Moscow. The political dialogue between the

leaders of the great powers has acquired a dynamism that began in Geneva in November 1985 and was then built up in Reykjavik and Washington.

The meeting was assessed positively in statements by Eastern and Western politicians and public figures and many articles in the world press. It is generally acknowledged that the meeting marked an advance toward realism in understanding the most important problems of war and peace. This is confirmed, in particular, by the completion of the process of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. In this way a notable step was taken in a very difficult matter—in the disarmament sphere.

The latest round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms opened in Geneva on 12 July. The significance of this round was explained to PRAVDA's correspondent by the leader of the Soviet delegation, Special Ambassador A. Obukhov.

[Dubrovin] What can you tell us about the initial contacts between the delegations?

[Obukhov] Work has only just begun. I have had two detailed conversations with Ambassador M. Kampelman, leader of the U.S. delegation. A plenary session of the delegations was held on 12 July. In general terms, these initial contacts made a favorable impression. Both sides expressed a firm desire to make progress and tackle the remaining questions in both groups at the talks—on space and on strategic offensive arms. Mutual understanding may be noted to the effect that in the course of the round that has now opened, we should work with the utmost energy and purposefulness in the interests of completing the preparation of the documents—a draft treaty on 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms, and a separate agreement on questions of the ABM Treaty. Those are the instructions given to the delegations by the USSR and U.S. leaders as a result of their meeting in Moscow.

So the talks have begun on a constructive note. But it is also clear that statements of willingness for constructive work should be backed up by concrete action. A gulf between word and deed cannot be tolerated. Major, extensive work lies ahead. It is important not to lose momentum, and to make progress on the whole range of as yet unresolved questions.

I must say that at the very first session, the USSR delegation put forward an important initiative—we submitted a draft protocol on the question of the total throw-weight of ICBM's and SLBM's, which will be an integral part of the treaty that is being prepared on 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms.

What is the meaning of this document? It is well known that a consensus was reached between the sides to the effect that as a result of the strategic offensive arms reductions the total throw-weight of the Soviet Union's

ICBM's and SLBM's will be reduced to a level amounting to approximately 50 percent of the present level, and that this level will not be exceeded. It will not be exceeded by either side. The Soviet draft protocol contains provisions dealing with questions of verification of the limitation in question. Our draft takes account of the wishes expressed earlier by the American side and provides a good basis for achieving an accord. Thus we have made our claim for accelerated development of the talks.

No concrete new ideas aimed at ensuring progress at the talks have yet been put forward by the American side. We will see what the subsequent discussions will show. Work has begun in the groups. Positive results can be achieved at the talks only on the basis of efforts on both sides.

[Dubrovin] What, in your view, are the main problems to be resolved at the talks?

[Obukhov] Much has already been done at the talks. There are a whole series of joint draft documents formulating agreed propositions and the differences that still remain.

An important part was played in achieving progress on the problems under discussion by the decisions adopted during the summit meetings and during talks between the foreign ministers. They form the basis on which the delegations in Geneva find it possible to make progress in their work.

But there remain a great many unresolved problems—minor, medium, and major—on which work has to be done. Let me take those that are most important as of today. First and foremost, there are the questions connected with the ABM Treaty. The task is to prepare a draft separate agreement on compliance with the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972 and on nonwithdrawal from it for an agreed term.

In our view everything necessary and sufficient for such an agreement already exists. There is the formula enshrined in the Washington joint statement of 10 December last year, which was reaffirmed during the Moscow summit meeting. It is this formula which should be reflected in its full and integral form in the agreement, formulated in the appropriate legal terms. And the protocol to the agreement should reflect questions of verification and predictability in such a way as to ensure that the sides are confident that the ABM Treaty will be strictly fulfilled. After all, compliance with this treaty is a necessary prerequisite for strategic stability without which radical reductions in strategic offensive arms would be impossible. The paths for the spread of the arms race to space must be closed.

Another major question awaiting resolution is that of limitations on the deployment of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles. SLCM's are a new and dangerous form of strategic offensive arms. Their effective

limitation, with appropriate verification, is necessary in order to ensure the stability of a future treaty and preclude the possibility of bypassing it. We are told that at present there are no reliable means of monitoring compliance with limitations in this sphere. True, the problem is not an easy one. But it is our conviction that it can be overcome if the matter is approached comprehensively, with the desire and readiness to block this channel for the buildup of nuclear arms too.

The Soviet side has submitted a whole program of far-reaching measures on this score: from monitoring [kontrol] of the production of SLCM's to inspections on a reciprocal basis on any warship on either side. Verification must not be an obstacle to the setting of limitations in the strategic offensive arms sphere. In the course of the present round, we will try to persuade the American side to consent to the comprehensive and radical system of verification of SLCM's that we propose.

I would also like to say this. It is well known that in the course of the Moscow meeting it proved possible to considerably extend the area of consensus on long-range air-launched cruise missiles, as well as verification with regard to mobile ICBM launchers. The new areas of consensus are given concrete form in documents exchanged by the sides. The delegations must enshrine these mutual understandings in the joint draft text of the treaty and seek the full resolution of these two questions.

[Dubrovin] Do you think it is possible to complete work on drafting the treaty on 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms in the conditions of strict compliance with the ABM Treaty in 1988, that is, under the present American Administration?

[Obukhov] We believe in that possibility. There should be no unjustified delays in drafting the accord on strategic offensive arms and the agreement on questions of the ABM Treaty. The leadership's instructions and our sense of responsibility for the task in hand orient us in precisely this way. But as I have already said, in order to achieve an accord, will and efforts on both sides are needed. We are counting on their being displayed by the American side too—in concrete actions and proposals at the talks.

Further Reportage on U.S. Inspectors in USSR

Tour of Kazakhstan Plant

*LD2107125388 Moscow TASS in English
1244 GMT 21 Jul 88*

[Text] Alma-Ata July 21 TASS—A group of American inspectors has visited a Soviet heavy engineering works in Petropavlovsk, Kazakhstan, to see how the Soviet-American INF Treaty is being implemented.

Within the time limit set by the treaty, the group toured the plant's shops and territory and visited the city.

The group's head Colonel Edward Cabaniss told TASS that the American inspectors had been given a chance of visiting all places they thought it was necessary to visit and of seeing everything they wanted to see. He said there was mutual understanding with the Soviet side.

According to Cabaniss, the group carried out its mission successfully.

Petropavlovsk produced a favourable impression on Colonel Cabaniss. He said the American inspectors had had all the necessary conditions not only for work but also for recreation and added that he would like to come to Petropavlovsk as a tourist.

The American colonel noted that perestroika and glasnost had produced great changes in the Soviet Union since the time of his first visit there ten years ago.

Far East Missile Base Visited

*LD2207121288 Moscow TASS in English
1144 GMT 22 Jul 88*

[Text] Moscow July 22 TASS—U.S. inspectors have arrived at the Soviet missile operating base Novosyoyevka in the spurs of the Sikhote-Alin mountain range in the Far East, a Soviet newspaper reported today.

The daily STROITELNAYA GAZETA said the missiles stationed at the base are shorter-range OTR-22's (known as SS-12's in the West) which are among the first to be destroyed under the Soviet-American INF Treaty. The paper said the aim of the "baseline" inspection will be to specify the missiles' whereabouts, verify their class and number, and check other data.

Such inspections are to be completed by September 1, after which prime attention will be paid to verifying missile elimination procedures, the article explained.

It added that inspectors are allowed 24 hours per base for their checks.

At the Novosyoyevka base the U.S. inspectors were provided with copies of its layout, given a possibility to take a close look at facilities and equipment, including missile launch sites, and received exhaustive answers to their questions.

A hotel had been built at the base in time for the Americans' visit, STROITELNAYA GAZETA said. It will later be used for other monitor groups as well.

All in all, the paper noted, inspectors are to make spot checks on 133 facilities in the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia and 26 facilities in the United States and Western Europe.

The facilities include missile factories, weapons storages and missile bases.

U.S. 'Accusation' on Krasnoyarsk Radar Denied
LD2107115788 Moscow TASS in English
1133 GMT 21 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow July 21 TASS—TASS correspondent on diplomatic affairs reports:

The United States is again launching a campaign whose aim is to prove the unprovable: The Soviet Union allegedly violates the ABM Treaty. Yesterday this accusation was voiced at least twice. Marlin Fitzwater, White House press secretary, at a briefing in Santa Barbara (California) where President Reagan is now holiday making and Phyllis Oakley, U.S. Department of State spokeswoman, at a regular briefing in Washington, alleged in unison that the construction of a radar station in the area of Krasnoyarsk was a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The Soviet side has repeatedly stated that the radar station in the area of Krasnoyarsk was designed for tracking space objects and, therefore, cannot be considered in the context of the ABM Treaty. This was shown, for instance, to U.S. congressmen who visited the station early last September and familiarized themselves on the spot with its technical characteristics, equipment and the state of construction work. The visit was, incidently,

organized at the initiative of the Soviet side. The Soviet side surely would not have invited there U.S. representatives if the project had been an antimissile defence facility.

Moreover, the USSR stopped all work at the Krasnoyarsk radar station last October to strengthen the atmosphere of trust and to stop all talk of the Soviet Union's "violations" of the ABM Treaty. This moratorium is in force up to this time.

The Soviet Union is for precise and strict observance of the ABM Treaty, regarding it as a necessary element for implementing a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive weapons. At the Geneva talks the Soviet delegation is engaged in active discussion of a possibility of concluding an appropriate agreement on this score, which would confirm obligations of the two sides concerning observance of the ABM Treaty at least for the next 9-10 years.

Soviet diplomatic quarters point out that under these conditions the USSR is ready even for a radical solution of the question on the Krasnoyarsk station raised by the American side. If an understanding is reached to observe the ABM Treaty as it was signed in 1972, the Soviet Union agrees to carry out dismantling of equipment at the Krasnoyarsk radar station in such a way that it will be verifiable and will raise no doubts in the United States.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Soviets Criticize U.S. Inspection Regulations

AU0807092688 Bonn *DIE WELT* in German
8 Jul 88 p 4

["RMC" article: "Soviet Inspectors Criticize United States"]

[Text] The first inspection of U.S. nuclear weapons sites in the FRG, carried out by 19 Soviet experts, has led to differences between Soviets and Americans. The Soviets showed considerable lack of understanding for the fact that the United States kept them from leaving the premises of the barracks during the inspection. The crew of the plane that brought the inspectors to Frankfurt also had to spend the 3-day waiting period at the Frankfurt air base. The Soviet visitors said that this narrow interpretation of the INF Treaty was in contrast to the treatment of U.S. inspectors in Moscow.

Kohl, Thatcher Meet; Discuss East-West Relations

LD0907173688 Hamburg *DPA* in German
1457 GMT 9 Jul 88

[Excerpt] London/Bonn (DPA)—Bonn government spokesman Friedhelm Ost said the talk focused on East-West relations, especially their prospects after the CPSU Conference in Moscow. Federal Chancellor Kohl stressed that the Soviet Union's further opening toward the West through the policy of party leader Mikhail Gorbachev will result in opportunities for improved cooperation at all levels. In this, more progress in disarmament and arms control policy should be made, primarily in the establishment of a stable equilibrium from the Atlantic to the Urals in the sphere of conventional arms.

Scholz Views Western Disarmament Policy

AU1207092288 Hamburg *DER SPIEGEL* in German
11 Jul 88 pp 24-29

[Interview with Defense Minister Rupert Scholz by *DER SPIEGEL* journalists Alexander Szandar and Dirk Koch in Bonn: "Giving Political Credit to Gorbachev"—date not given]

[Text] *SPIEGEL*: Mr Scholz, what are you, a hawk or a dove?

Scholz: Neither. I do not let myself be pinned down to one thing or another - not even politically.

SPIEGEL: Are you perhaps a heavily armed dove?

Scholz: Rather a duck. Recently someone told me that the true symbol of the military among the birds is the duck because it is the only bird that has qualities of all three military services. It is able to fly, run, and swim.

SPIEGEL: A fattened goose would fit even better. Money is practically crammed down the throat of the Bundeswehr. The 1989 defense budget is to be raised by about DM2 billion and about DM1.8 billion are to be cut in unemployment benefits, even though disarmament—in the conventional area, too—is the topic at present.

Scholz: Armament and defense are always long-term processes or at least medium-term processes, because their effectiveness and their specific situation depend on many factors. If you consider that the German defense budget has increasingly gone down over the past few years, that, above all, its investment ratio and its potential for shaping the future has increasingly been reduced, a change in the financial trend was necessary now at the latest. You also know that the Soviets, that the Warsaw Pact, continue their massive armament, particularly in the conventional area.

SPIEGEL: That is what you say.

Scholz: It is not only what I say, we also know this from well-founded information. Therefore, we have to adapt to this. On the other hand, this knowledge of the unchanging, continuing military, and thus also political, threat exerted by the Warsaw Pact does not destroy our hope that there will be further effective disarmament steps between East and West, and that, in particular, there will soon be a conference on conventional arms control.

SPIEGEL: First the money is spent on armament even though it is believed that disarmament will come.

Scholz: I do not neglect the fact that the defense budget also has to face and adjust to the overall political, and thus to the general, budget situation. Therefore, I always define the defense budget in terms of security and whether it is appropriate to the available resources. Any defense budget cannot guarantee absolute security but only a certain degree of relative security. But this degree has to be guaranteed effectively.

Therefore, in our present situation we must not delay or stop expenditures for personnel and material that have been necessary for years. I do, indeed, know that in a welfare society, in particular, some people do not easily understand that the asset of external security that has to be guaranteed also costs money, that it stands side by side with the many other distributive justices of the developed social state, and that sometimes it has to clearly compete with them.

SPIEGEL: Does it have to be more and more? Your liberal coalition partners—your colleague in the Cabinet, Moellemann, for instance—want to cut the defense budget. They say that DM250 million more should be enough to provide for the social issues of the soldiers and that armament programs can be stretched out for the benefit of the social budget and the unemployment institution.

Scholz: The defense budget is absolutely balanced with the other parts of the budget.

SPIEGEL: Could you not perhaps give up a bit?

Scholz: No.

SPIEGEL: Gorbachev has declared a "reasonable minimum of defense" to be the guideline of Soviet armament. How do you understand this?

Scholz: If a "reasonable minimum" means the renunciation of the Warsaw Pact's existing capability for invasion, if it means renunciation of the existing offensive potentials, and, above all, if it means a turning away of the current Soviet military doctrine of waging war on the enemy's territory, that is, of attacking,—thus, if the Soviet Union should be willing to restrict itself to pure defense, as has always been a matter of course for NATO—then the term "reasonable minimum" would be a term with which I could live very well.

SPIEGEL: These are a lot of "if's."

Scholz: Yes, but the formula would then correspond to that which I demand and understand as the precondition of mutual security between the two military blocs in Europe. For us mutual security still means safety from the military possibilities and options of the other side, but, on the other hand, it requires that we continue unchangedly to renounce any offensive military potential or option.

SPIEGEL: Why has the West still not responded to Gorbachev's disarmament proposals?

Scholz: The FRG Government will present its concept in the near future. I cannot name the specific day when the concept that is valid for the alliance as a whole will be presented, because this needs coordination with all partners in the Western alliance. We have to develop an effective strategy of mutual security and thus a concept that ensures the necessary degree of asymmetrical disarmament, in the area of conventional armament in particular, and thus reduces the supremacy that has been admitted even by the Soviet side in the meantime. You can be sure that I will try with all my strength to accelerate this process.

SPIEGEL: Do you think that you will manage this by the fall?

Scholz: It would be nice if it were possible by the fall.

SPIEGEL: What would have to be in this concept?

Scholz: First, any agreement on conventional disarmament must be valid regionally from the Atlantic to the Urals. With its targets for disarmament and arms control it must set down upper and lower limits for the strengths of the respective arms and troops. The goal must be

levels of armament of both sides that definitely only ensure defense capability. These have to be guaranteed by means of functioning verification mechanisms. Finally, corresponding disarmament agreements must be contained in an overall framework of an effective policy of detente. Because any disarmament first presupposes political detente; mere disarmament without the elimination of political tensions cannot guarantee security. Therefore, there will not be any real progress in disarmament and arms control so long as we do not make progress in the process of political detente. The Western alliance must decide very quickly what it wants to achieve in Europe in terms of the policy of detente and what it is trying to directly promote with priority in East-West relations.

SPIEGEL: Are you sure that Paris, London, or Washington will agree with this model?

Scholz: I think that there is a basic consensus. But all alliance partners still have a number of questions. This is legitimate.

SPIEGEL: In reality, the FRG Government and also NATO have already committed themselves: First, the East has to disarm strongly while NATO is not going to do a thing at first. The goal is for East and West then only to have 95 percent each of the present NATO troop strength.

Scholz: First of all, NATO has good reason to demand disarmament of the other side since there are imbalances that have even been admitted by the Soviet Union. For me it is still an open question whether one thinks of 95 percent of present NATO strength as a target or whether this target may also be lower. Therefore, I do not consider this 95-percent clause a dogma. We have to discuss all these details with mutual frankness.

SPIEGEL: Is it also possible to go down even more, for instance to 85 percent of present NATO strength?

Scholz: I do not want to exclude this, but at present I cannot commit myself with regard to this question. The final decision must be made in future negotiations.

SPIEGEL: What would be the lower limit for the Bundeswehr; 200,000 men or 300,000 men instead of the present 495,000?

Scholz: I do not want to say either yes or no to this question. Because any answer to this would already imply a commitment to some percentage or partial percentage. In all this one has to consider the overall conditions, that is, not only the number of soldiers or troops but also equipment, quality and quantity of weapons, strategic options, military doctrines, and geopolitical conditions. However, in this connection I think that particularly in the area of conventional armament and its individual components one has to be ready to talk about compatibility.

SPIEGEL: What does this mean?

Scholz: Compatibility means that the different factors existing on both sides have to be brought into relationship with each other and have to be measured against each other in an overall survey with regard to their military importance. The Soviets argue in this direction when they say: Well, we have more tanks and more artillery but you in the West have more planes—but we have to point out that this calculation of Western planes is not correct. But if, for once, I say that this Soviet calculation is correct, then I also have to discuss the following question: What is the contribution of planes, tanks, and artillery to the overall complex of military options? I cannot and will not restrict myself in my respective opportunities for discussion and negotiations to merely counting individual components, such tanks versus tanks, artillery versus artillery, and planes versus planes. One has to consider the real situation of armament and the options for using it in general. Thus one also must be willing to discuss appropriate compatibility.

SPIEGEL: What do you think about Moscow's proposals for conventional stability?

Scholz: The original three-stage model, which was presented by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, contains quite a lot of incipient plausibility, but on the other hand it also harbors the danger that one will discuss the coordination of data envisaged in phase one for years in a more or less fruitless way—as at the Vienna MBFR talks. Such dangers have to be precluded. On the other hand, any coordination of data is useful if it conveys more reliable factual knowledge. The second phase of asymmetrical disarmament is aimed at establishing equal scopes of armament, that is, it corresponds to the oldest and most important demand of the West. The reduction of military strength that will be equal on both sides and is envisaged for stage three is also useful.

SPIEGEL: But?

Scholz: But if one wants to be successful quickly, there is much in favor of not putting these three stages one behind each other but of starting parallel processes where this is possible. Here I absolutely agree with Foreign Minister Genscher. If, for instance, one can achieve in asymmetrical disarmament, that is in phase two, that symmetrical scopes are reached in the fields where Soviet supremacy is really striking—such as in tanks and artillery—before phase one of general data coordination is concluded, this would be extremely positive and would also be a significant confidence-building measure, which could be of utmost importance for the entire further development.

SPIEGEL: Mr Scholz, in Washington you said that the Soviets are developing four new types of short-range missiles. Do you want to get the audience in the right frame of mind for the necessity of new missile rearmament under the slogan of "modernization"?

Scholz: This is not the point. The question of modernization is not topical. At the appropriate time one will have to discuss where modernization is necessary.

SPIEGEL: Up to now the CDU/CSU has said that the decision of whether and how many short-range missiles NATO needs has to be made within the framework of the overall NATO concept. You want to accelerate the process. But this certainly means that the U.S. "Lance" short-range missile will soon be replaced by a new, farther-reaching missile.

Scholz: This decision can be made only after the approval of the overall concept for security, disarmament, and arms control by the alliance.

SPIEGEL: What, then, is the "appropriate time" for you?

Scholz: First, we have to come to a clear situation in the conventional area because this cannot be separated from the nuclear field. For me it is particularly clear that a denuclearization of Europe and a third zero-option are not under discussion. Nuclear weapons are political weapons that make wars impossible, that expose the attacker to a risk that he cannot accept because he would also certainly succumb to the nuclear inferno. Conventional weapons, on the other hand, are weapons that make wars possible because they make victories in the classical sense possible. Therefore nuclear deterrence must always remain in existence in addition to conventional security.

SPIEGEL: Like the East, NATO is developing increasingly smaller, increasingly accurate nuclear ammunition; conventional and nuclear weapons are becoming increasingly similar. Is this the right way toward disarmament?

Scholz: The political effect of nuclear weapons—no matter which category—cannot be compared in any way, not even slightly, with that of conventional weapons. I consider nuclear battlefield weapons to be of a very limited importance. More important for deterrence are nuclear weapons that have a longer range. Depending on their number, shorter-range nuclear weapons could then be again reduced in numbers.

SPIEGEL: Gorbachev said that the policy of strength has become "historically obsolete in all its forms and phenomena." The danger of war has receded, the axis of international life has shifted from confrontation to cooperation. Are you willing to offer some premature trust?

Scholz: It is a valid principle that Gorbachev and the Soviets have to be measured by their deeds. I note, however, Gorbachev's statements and the Soviet discussion about them with great attention. Because the policy of strength has always been a policy that the Soviet Union has reproached the West for but has pursued itself. Gorbachev also said that the policy of strong

armament has thrown the Soviet Union into great economic and social problems and that this policy has to be reformed. This analysis and this postulate are extraordinarily important and justify giving political credit on a discussable scope. If the Soviet Union continues to arm itself in spite of Gorbachev's words, one may give Gorbachev—in particular in view of the incredibly ossified systems in the Soviet Union, which certainly also include the military bureaucracy—still more credit, at least in terms of time—credit that must not be disappointed if the Soviets are really willing to disarm.

SPIEGEL: Is your skepticism with regard to Gorbachev's success declining? Or do you think that the Soviet system is not capable of reforms?

Scholz: If one takes Gorbachev and his goals—more democratization, more humanization, more economic capacity, and more modernity, up to a modern industrial society—seriously—and I do take him seriously with respect to these goals—in the long run considerable conflicts may turn up with regard to the absolute claim to ideology, the ideological primacy of Marxism-Leninism. Because if one gives more freedom and democracy to people, if people are permitted, above all, to think more freely, pluralistic structures of opinion and society will develop quickly, which will hardly be compatible with the one-sidedness of this ideological primacy. Therefore, if the Soviet Union really wants to implement Gorbachev's reforms, it will have to permit a certain degree of pluralism. In spite of the large amount of sympathetic feelings which this process of reforms deserves, it is to be observed with a certain amount of skepticism whether this tightrope walk will be crowned with success.

SPIEGEL: Should the West help Gorbachev?

Scholz: The West has to represent its interests, in particular its values, with regard to the human rights question. Both things fit this reform process to a certain degree. In this respect, support is not only legitimate, it is also necessary—at least as far as Western support is suitable to promote the process of political detente and the enforcement of human rights.

SPIEGEL: Are you also in favor of massive economic support?

Scholz: The Soviet Union and the entire East Bloc will need economic support from the West for the modernization of their economies. On the other hand, it cannot be our priority goal to make the Soviet Union economically more efficient. For us it must be important, above all, to support the people in the Soviet Union and in the other East Bloc states on their way toward a modern, more humane society. In this connection, economic support might be useful, too. If we help the Soviet

Union, for instance, to establish modern economic management, this would certainly be of considerable economic benefit to the USSR, but, on the other hand, it would also promote the way toward a more open society that we wish for the people there.

SPIEGEL: In 1975 your party friends, the Christian Democrats, rejected the CSCE Final Document, the basis of all further detente in Europe. Do you regret this today?

Scholz: This is not a topic under discussion. Let us rather discuss what has been achieved with the help of the CDU. Let us just take the degree of human alleviations in Germany. Under this FRG Government more has been achieved in inner-German relations than under all FRG governments before. This is CSCE policy put into practice.

SPIEGEL: Which the CDU/CSU rejected at first.

Scholz: The CDU/CSU is pursuing the right policy, this is the decisive thing.

SPIEGEL: Foreign Minister Genscher has demanded a "basic change" in the relations between the two alliance systems. Do you agree with this?

Scholz: The most important thing for me is opening up—opening up for the benefit of more detente and cooperation and for the benefit of more mutual security. I want peaceful competition that opens up the systems, but, on the other hand, I presuppose sober realism as long as the current military threat exists.

SPIEGEL: Something seems to be wrong when in the meantime the Soviets stress the stabilizing effect of NATO and want it to continue.

Scholz: Such statements by the Soviets are, indeed, interesting. What is behind them is obviously the interest in cementing the status quo in Europe, which still dominates Soviet foreign policy, that is, the continuing interest in the division of Europe.

SPIEGEL: How does this fit the idea of the common European house, which Gorbachev has brought up and which is now even discussed by Helmut Kohl. The chancellor is going to Moscow in the fall; are there any plans by Bonn with regard to the building of this house?

Scholz: The picture of the common European house has many facets and is fascinating for many people. It can express both a true vision of an all-European future and also mere propaganda goals. But if it proceeds from the traditional goals of Soviet policy, that is, cutting Europe's relations with the United States, it would, in the end, only be a term of a political struggle, which is not acceptable to us.

SPIEGEL: And if not?

Scholz: One has to see the facets and differentiate among them. If a common European house means the preservation and further development of the historically determined all-European identity, if it proceeds from the community of fate that has developed among the Europeans over centuries, it is an important and future-oriented approach.

SPIEGEL: Do you define Europe as reaching only to the Urals, or do you include the entire Soviet Union.

Scholz: In my view, the approach has to reach beyond the borders of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals in many ways. It has to reach toward America, it has to comprise the transatlantic dimension because Europe and America are inseparably linked. For America, too, Europe remains the unchanged and unmistakable root that gives it identity. And if you look at the Soviet Union, also beyond the Urals, I think that this basic European identity is actually the most important precondition for the continued existence of this enormous country.

SPIEGEL: Why?

Scholz: The Soviet Union, a country with about 400 languages with many non-European peoples, with Asian and Oriental structures, with many colonial origins, has always had great problems with its nationalities and thus also with their national identity. Under Stalin the term of a "socialist nation" was coined in order to found the identity of the entire Soviet state on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. This attempt at integration has failed. It is not a coincidence that the problems of the nationalities are erupting again just now. This also reveals an element of political pluralism—with long-term centrifugal tendencies. If the Soviet Union wants to preserve its national, and thus also its territorial, integrity, it will have to remember more intensively its historically dominating basic European identity and its power of integration. Therefore, the Soviet Union needs Europe, and, perhaps, it really needs a common European house.

SPIEGEL: What should this look like in detail?

Scholz: It must be a Europe that is open with regard to its territory and its politics and which no longer moves within borders that are fixed by ideology and power-politics. It must be a Europe that can literally develop its own variety, its own great cultural traditions and thus its own identity across and through any borders.

SPIEGEL: This is not very specific. Can you imagine a united East and West Germany in this European house?

Scholz: I can, indeed. Because it is, in particular, the unity of the German nation that is one of the most important elements and treasures of Europe and its identity. Therefore, one has to ask whether Gorbachev—when in Moscow he spoke about the "free development

of every nation," about the "freedom of choice" of every state—wanted to deny or recognize this German unity. On the other hand, if Gorbachev is a realist—and I think he is—he must know about the unity of the German nation and also about the importance of just this German unity for an open, peaceful, and integrated common European house.

SPIEGEL: Can you imagine Moscow broaching the German question anew, perhaps to disturb the process of West European unification?

Scholz: In view of Moscow's currently dominant policy of status quo, I do not think that this question is topical now. But I am absolutely convinced that the German question will become topical in the not too distant future.

SPIEGEL: Do you think that a neutral Germany is possible in the European house?

Scholz: Under today's conditions there cannot be a neutral Germany.

SPIEGEL: Not today, but one day you can very well imagine a neutral Germany under appropriate conditions?

Scholz: The term neutrality is attached to the existence of differences in systems. As long as such differences characterize the political landscape in Europe, neutrality is not a topic for political discussion.

SPIEGEL: Your ideas do not seem to be far from the concepts of Bonn's foreign minister. Are you a "Genscherist"?

Scholz: If you really want to work with such clichés, then first I am a "Scholzist" and, in addition, a "Kohlist"—as is a matter of course for all Cabinet members of a government led by Chancellor Kohl.

SPIEGEL: Mr Scholz, thank you for this interview.

CDU/CSU Statement

LD1207205488 Hamburg DPA in German
1123 GMT 12 Jul 88

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal for an all-European summit conference is rejected by the CDU/CSU. Michaela Geiger (CSU), foreign affairs spokeswoman for the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, said in Bonn on Tuesday one would not allow oneself to be uncoupled from the United States. In any case the proposal is virtually identical to the ideas of the SPD and the SED concerning a so-called zone of confidence in Europe.

While the deputy welcomed the fact that in Warsaw Gorbachev, dealt in detail with issues of conventional disarmament in Europe, she rejected the Kremlin leader's demand that the Americans not station in Italy their F-16 fighter aircraft that have to be withdrawn from Spain. The proposed reduction of the two pact's armed forces by 500,000 men is also unacceptable because this would perpetuate the imbalance to the West's disadvantage.

Genscher Calls for Speeding CSCE Process

*LD1307114788 Hamburg DPA In German
0915 GMT 13 Jul 88*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher hopes for "strong impetus for the continued development of cooperation" from the weekend summit of the seven Warsaw Pact States in Warsaw. In a statement which the minister sent to Bonn today from his holiday in Greece, he also proposes a "high-level political" meeting which should initiate negotiations on conventional arms control.

Diplomatic sources in Bonn explained that by this Genscher meant a conference of the foreign ministers of the 35 CSCE states. According to Genscher, the current CSCE round in Vienna should be concluded with a "balanced final document." At the same time the CSCE follow-up conference should issue a mandate for arms control negotiations. In the view of the diplomatic sources the most important precondition for the conclusion of the Vienna talks now is overcoming Romanian resistance to the planned final document stressing human rights.

Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's disarmament proposals of 11 July in Warsaw were generally welcomed by Genscher "like all steps which create a favorable starting position for future negotiations." However, the Federal foreign minister did not leave any doubt about the priority assigned to asymmetrical disarmament of those conventional forces in which the East has great superiorities. Genscher cited combat tanks, armored tanks, and artillery.

Gorbachev's proposal for a pan-European disarmament conference was not mentioned by Genscher. In the opinion of Bonn circles this would be superfluous as there was the Vienna forum. Genscher wrote that it is urgent to clear the way for future negotiations on conventional arms control with a final document there. The foreign minister again mentioned the confirmation of Gorbachev's reforms by the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. The priority which the Federal Government gives East-West relations is important to the whole of Europe.

Gorbachev Disarmament Proposals Cause Reaction

Government Reserving Judgment

*LD1307151288 Hamburg DPA in German
1355 GMT 13 Jul 88*

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—The Federal Government is hoping for "strong impetus" from the Warsaw Pact summit over the weekend but is reserving judgment on Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev's latest disarmament proposals. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) expressed this hope from his vacation stop and signalled Western agreement to a high-ranking conference to initiate a round of conventional disarmament. Meanwhile, government spokesman Friedhelm Ost today warned the press "not to shoot from the hip now".

Ost and Foreign Ministry spokesman Juergen Chrobog stressed complete agreement within the Federal Government. They were also not prepared to admit differences of opinion with the United States, which had already rejected the Soviet general secretary's proposals for a more closely defined European summit. Thus Washington, in contrast to Bonn, seems to have renounced a further examination.

Ost stated that Bonn bears a particular European responsibility. So far there is no official text of Gorbachev's proposals available. Therefore, an examination was possible neither in Bonn nor within the framework of the alliance. Chrobog pointed out that it was not yet known whether Gorbachev had meant the CSCE forum with its 35 signatory states of the Helsinki Final Act, including the United States and Canada. There would be no reservations about this.

Genscher had consciously left the rank of the conference open. As in earlier cases of opening important conferences it could be initiated by the foreign ministers of "a still more important body." According to Chrobog, the communique of the Warsaw Pact summit over the weekend in Warsaw will probably contain more pointers.

Federal Defense Minister Rupert Scholz has taken "note" of Gorbachev's proposal "with attention." "Every constructive proposal which is suitable for advancing the process of detente and disarmament on the basis of mutual security is in our interest," said Scholz in a statement released in Bonn today. According to the defense minister, a disarmament summit could "be useful if the United States and Canada are included." However, a summit, cannot replace negotiations.

Press Commentaries

AU1307090188 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0505 GMT 13 Jul 88

[From the press review]

[Text] Our next topic is Gorbachev's Warsaw proposals. The HESSISCHE-NIEDERSAECHSISCHE ALLGEMEINE writes: The general secretary always has new

ideas for disarmament. The Soviet party chief knows how to present them in a skillful, popular, and effective way so that the West is, at first, forced into a defensive position. Gorbachev gives the impression that the Soviet Union is ready for all possible steps toward disarmament and that it is only NATO that has to implement them. If the West then reacts skeptically, it is suspected of wanting to brake the disarmament process. In fact, however, Gorbachev often links his proposals with conditions which he himself knows are unacceptable.

The RHEINPFALZ in Ludwigshafen writes: One has to ask what Gorbachev's Warsaw initiative is really about. It is probably not more than some well-known, old things in a new wrapper. Conventional disarmament has been the focal point of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna since the beginning of the 1970's. In accordance with their unanimously decided mandate, the MBFR talks are intended to reduce the troops in central Europe on both sides of the East-West border by 900,000 men. So far the Soviet side has mainly stalled in this respect. If Gorbachev is really serious now, he has to demonstrate this. As in the INF negotiations, here, too, he has to concede asymmetrical disarmament—because with regard to combat tanks alone the Warsaw Pact has a supremacy of 3:1 over the West.

The SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG notes: Gorbachev will not be able to sell to NATO a reduction of troops on both sides by 500,000 men each as long as he cannot credibly affirm that the Warsaw Pact does not have more armed soldiers than NATO. Tackling the topic of asymmetries first with regard to combat planes is not convincing either. NATO would prefer to talk first about tanks and artillery. It considers its supremacy in the air as compensation for its inferiority on the ground.

The FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU reads: With his peace offensives, Gorbachev makes life difficult for all those in the West who really want East-West disarmament. So far, he has not proposed or announced and then implemented anything that might reduce the West's impression that it is being threatened. NATO circles now fear that during Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit to Moscow in October, the Soviet party chief will aim one of his offers at the heart of the West German links to the West and thus at the heart of the Western alliance. After the CPSU general secretary's appearance in Warsaw, Brussels wonders whether Gorbachev basically is a prisoner of his own military men, who so far seem to see any specific arms limitation only in light of Moscow's almost lost competition with the United States.

The FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE says that Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev has become more agile, flexible, and imaginative, and then states: The gross results are a great number of changes, but the net results, the gain in security, are zero at present. This is also the case with regard to the current proposal at the Polish parliament. The term pan-European has a nice ring. It implies togetherness and cooperation, but it suggests—

like the term common European house—a Europe without Americans and Canadians. The proposal for a summit on European conventional disarmament is pure propaganda. It is aimed at a sentimental concept of politics: Let the heads of government get along with one another.

Genscher: 'Important Progress'

*LD1407092288 Hamburg DPA in German
0829 GMT 14 Jul 88*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has today emphasized the Soviet disarmament offers as important progress. In an interview with Deutschlandfunk, Genscher named as prominent points first, Moscow's readiness for asymmetrical reductions ("Whoever has more must disarm more"); second, the offer of an exchange of data on conventional armed forces; and third, the readiness for this data to be checked on the spot.

Genscher again explained his view about a high-level disarmament conference, which must of course tally with the participants in CSCE. This could be convened both to end the Vienna CSCE conference and also to introduce the desired negotiations on conventional arms control. There are enough examples of this in CSCE history.

The important thing now was for there "at last" to be a round on conventional arms control. New impetus on this is important and is expected from the Warsaw Pact summit in Warsaw at the weekend. Impetus is necessary to achieve a prior conclusion to the Vienna conference.

Scholz Urges East Bloc To Make New Proposals

*LD1507075088 Hamburg DPA in German
2315 GMT 14 Jul 88*

[Excerpt] Osnabrueck (DPA)—Federal Defense Minister Rupert Scholz (CDU) has invited the Warsaw Pact to make new disarmament proposals. In an interview with NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG appearing today, Scholz said that he hoped the Eastern military alliance will present at its summit meeting beginning today proposals "which will really help us on." It is not enough to propose balanced reductions. One must come to a fundamental agreement to eliminate the present disparities as the next step.

Frankfurt Daily Comments

*AU1407100988 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 14 Jul 88 pp 1, 2*

["C.G." report: "Bonn Does Not Want to React 'Precipitously' to Gorbachev's Disarmament Proposal"]

[Text] Bonn, 13 July—Only after coordination between the individual departments and after talks with the Western alliance partners, does the FRG Government

intend to deal in detail with Soviet party chief Gorbachev's proposals on conventional disarmament. On Wednesday [13 July] government spokesman Ost said in Bonn that the government does not want to react "precipitously." Horst Teltschik, foreign policy adviser to the chancellor, told this newspaper that the priority issue now is for the CSCE conference in Vienna to issue a mandate for starting conventional negotiations. Then the negotiations "could be opened at a high level." First, it must be examined whether Gorbachev's proposal for a European summit referred to the "framework of the CSCE or to a new forum." The framework of the CSCE with all available circles of negotiations should be used. The Foreign Ministry stated that the Western alliance has to decide on "which level" conventional negotiations are to be opened; in this connection, the meeting of the heads of state and government to sign the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and later meetings of the foreign ministers were recalled.

FRG Foreign Minister Genscher welcomed changes in the Soviet domestic and foreign policy under party leader Gorbachev and expressed the hope that the forthcoming Warsaw Pact meeting next weekend will "give a strong new impetus for the further development of cooperation between West and East." On Wednesday the Bonn Foreign Ministry published a statement which had been written by Genscher at his holiday resort in Greece the day before. It says that on Monday [11 July] in Warsaw the Soviet party chief affirmed Moscow's agreement that the negotiations on conventional stability are to eliminate existing imbalances during the first stage. Genscher wrote: "This readiness for asymmetrical reductions—in the fields where one side is superior—as a first step is thus an approach to central Western positions and encourages the view that the East, too, is interested in establishing conventional stability and disarmament." According to Genscher, it is also significant that Gorbachev affirmed the readiness that had already been stated by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to exchange a sufficient amount of basic data for the respective subject of negotiations and to have this data verified on site.

Genscher did not mention Gorbachev's proposal for a European summit on conventional disarmament. On the other hand, the FRG foreign minister advocated a "high-level political meeting," which should open the negotiations on conventional arms control. Genscher applied this to the states participating in the CSCE. The United States and Canada are also CSCE members. With his reference to the CSCE and in anticipation of its still pending resolutions, Genscher made it clear that Washington must not be excluded. The foreign minister wrote: "The successful conclusion of the CSCE follow-up meeting frees the way for negotiations on conventional stability and on further confidence-building and security measures; it seems to be useful to start the negotiations on conventional arms control—after a mandate has been issued by the CSCE follow-up conference—with a high-level political meeting in order to give this difficult negotiating process guiding stimuli."

Foreign Ministry circles assume that, given his ministry responsibility, Genscher is speaking for the FRG Government; there has not been any formal coordination with the Chancellor's Office. The concurrence of Genscher's statements with the views of Kohl and of FRG Defense Minister Scholz is obvious. The foreign minister did not note the reservations of CDU/CSU politicians Ruehe and Geiger, who expressed restraint or even refusal with regard to Gorbachev's proposals. Genscher did not deal with Gorbachev's wish that America forego the deployment of the F-16 planes that are to be withdrawn from Spain in Italy and that troops be reduced by 500,000 soldiers each, because these are individual issues.

The climate in Europe and in the world has changed in a hope-inspiring way, Genscher wrote. The path of reforms that has been embarked upon by the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was confirmed by the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. The course and results of this conference are not only "of guiding and historic importance" for the Soviet Union but also for Moscow's relations with other countries. Gorbachev has received a wide-ranging mandate to continue the restructuring that is aimed at opening up at home and abroad. This also means a "welcome opening up of Soviet society." New approaches in Soviet foreign policy are becoming increasingly clear, which contributes to strengthening trust between West and East. Genscher argued: "Such a development is in our interest, it deserves that we respond with a constructive basic attitude." A Western policy consisting of waiting and scepticism could only damage the West's own interests. "The FRG will use the relations with the Soviet Union, which it considers of central importance, for a constructive development and deepening of West-East relations," stressed Genscher, who will have talks with Shevardnadze in Moscow on 1 and 2 August.

Genscher recommended the following as building blocks for the "European House": implementation of human rights; open borders; economic, cultural, and scientific-technological cooperation; tourist traffic and possibilities to leave the country; exchange of young people and students. The Helsinki Final Act determines the direction of how the division of Europe can be overcome, Genscher wrote. Therefore, the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna has to "be turned into an example of the new way of thinking and acting." Soviet foreign policy is now visibly aimed at placing Moscow's foreign relations on a secure and lasting base. The negotiations on the "central problem of security in Europe"—conventional stability—have to be started before the end of this year. Therefore a balanced final document of the Vienna CSCE meeting is now urgently necessary.

The SPD Presidium approved Gorbachev's proposals. At a meeting in Birnbach, Lower Bavaria, which was chaired by Hans-Jochen Vogel, the party leadership passed a resolution which says that the idea of a European summit has been "in the air." It would have been

suitable for the FRG Government to make a "corresponding proposal." The SPD supports the efforts of the two superpowers to push ahead with disarmament. The SPD also welcomed the fact that conventional disarmament in Europe was made a subject of discussion in Reagan's meetings with Gorbachev in Moscow. It is now all the more important "that the Europeans directly deal with the topic of Europe." The SPD considers Gorbachev's suggestion as a proposal for a European summit in which all heads of state and government of the 35 CSCE states should participate—"including the United States and Canada." This should give an essential impetus to conventional disarmament in Europe. If in Vienna the CSCE diplomats were able to agree on a basic mandate by the end of this month, "a subsequent European summit would be appropriate to provide direction and goal to the negotiations." No one can reject the principle: "If Europe is being discussed, the Europeans have to be at the negotiating table and have to participate in the decisions."

Genscher's USSR Visit To Focus on Disarmament
LD1507113488 Hamburg DPA in German
1047 GMT 15 Jul 88

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—The 2 days of German-Soviet consultations on 1 August, to which Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has invited his German counterpart, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, will focus on possible conferences on European disarmament and the expansion of economic relations. The date for the meeting, which has been known for a while, could not be confirmed by the Foreign Ministry on Friday since Moscow has reserved the announcement for a later date; however diplomats in Bonn regard it as certain.

In Bonn, important indications are expected from the meeting about the extent and depth of current and future Soviet disarmament plans. It is assumed that the urgency of a decision at the CSCE conference in Vienna and the opening of a resultant round of European disarmament talks will be even greater by 1 August.

Bonn also stressed on Friday that Genscher would also like to discuss an expansion of economic relations in Moscow. The Foreign Ministry also expects information about the extent of restructuring. Preparations for federal chancellor helmut Kohl's trip to the USSR in the last week of October are also likely to be discussed.

Genscher arranged the series of regular consultations on the basis of half-yearly meetings in February, when Shevardnadze paid his first visit to Bonn.

Scholz: Results 'Encouraging'
LD1607161288 Hamburg DPA in German
1513 GMT 16 Jul 88

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—FRG Defense Minister Rupert Scholz has described the results of the Warsaw Pact meeting as "quite encouraging". However, they still need

careful examination within the alliance, Scholz said in Bonn today. He expressly welcomed the plan to reduce strategic nuclear weapons by half, to negotiate a global destruction of chemical weapons, and to start talks on conventional arms control from the Atlantic to the Urals before the end of this year. Thus the Warsaw Pact is taking up a demand often raised by the FRG.

In the defense minister's view, a precondition for the onset of negotiations on conventional arms control is a successful conclusion to the Vienna CSCE conference. The primary aim of the negotiations would first have to be the removal of the USSR's admitted superiority in the conventional sphere. After that there would have to be talks on balanced reductions. Zones of reduced arms concentration would bring no more security, nor would they answer the security needs of the FRG and NATO. The Warsaw Pact's proposed settlement in the first phase of negotiations on questions relating to exchange of data and verification procedures should not be allowed to delay substantial results, Scholz went on to say.

Officials Comment on Warsaw Pact Summit

Genscher: Positive Contribution
LD1607193488 Hamburg DPA in German
1838 GMT 16 Jul 88

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has described the results of the Warsaw Pact summit as a positive contribution to East-West relations and to the disarmament debate. The summit resolutions will be carefully and seriously examined by the Federal Government and the Western alliance, according to the minister's initial statement issued Saturday evening by the Foreign Ministry.

Genscher welcomed the fact that the Warsaw Pact spoke in favor of the earliest possible conclusion of the Vienna CSCE meeting with a substantial and balanced document. What matters now is that the Warsaw Pact does all it can to solve the remaining issues through constructive behavior. Referring to the proposals on conventional disarmament, Genscher said that they confirm the move—which has become noticeable recently—by the Warsaw Pact toward the positions of the Western alliance. This especially applies to the urgency of the start of the talks on conventional stability even before the end of the year. The goal of the first stage has to be to establish equal maximum limits below the present level by means of asymmetrical disarmament measures.

Kohl Speaks on USSR Relations
LD1607180288 Hamburg DPA in German
1344 GMT 16 Jul 88

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—According to the chancellor, Gorbachev's latest disarmament proposals must be carefully examined. However, he warned against allowing oneself to be put under pressure of time by this. This should not

be misunderstood as NATO being evasive. Even if the new NATO strategy for disarmament and arms control could only be finalized after the U.S. elections because the views of the new U.S. President would have to be taken into account, the proposals on conventional disarmament will nevertheless be very carefully examined: "We must look at everything very carefully, since it remains true that disarmament only makes sense when it results in security gradually increasing rather than decreasing," the chancellor stressed.

Kohl said that there is little point in holding a pan-European conference on the start of conventional disarmament negotiations while "we have not yet tried out the old forums or fully explored what is, and what is not, possible." But for him this is not a question of prestige. Nevertheless, what is vital is that in all disarmament measures, human rights must not be left out of consideration. This is why the pan-European house, which has so often been cited recently, can be achieved only if all its occupants can enter and leave it freely, and there is "no porter" downstairs watching over them.

Spokesman Ost Comments

*LD1707122788 Hamburg DPA in German
1143 GMT 17 Jul 88*

[Text] Bonn, (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has noted with satisfaction that with the resolutions of the Warsaw Pact the positions of East and West continue to move closer together. Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost said in Bonn on Sunday that the chancellor has ordered that the Warsaw proposals be carefully examined. In particular the chancellor hopes that the willingness of the Pact states for a "maximum of constructive efforts" will be in evidence at the Vienna CSCE review conference. The Federal Government and its allies are, for their part, prepared for that.

Ost emphasized that the Warsaw Pact assessed as favorable the state and prospects of East-West relations. This corresponds to the West's willingness as affirmed at the Toronto and Hannover summit meetings. Furthermore, the demand to begin this year the negotiations on conventional arms control between the Atlantic and Urals is identical to NATO's objectives. The proposal for increased joint efforts concerning environmental protection is likewise shared by the Federal Government.

DPA on Scholz Statement

*LD1707091088 Hamburg DPA in German
0638 GMT 17 Jul 88*

[Text] Stuttgart (DPA)—The Federal Government is pressing emphatically for the completion of an overall NATO concept to enable an entry into the negotiations on conventional arms control in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Work on this disarmament concept now is being carried out at full speed in the Western defense alliance, Federal Defense Minister Rupert Scholz said Sunday on South German radio in a further reaction to

the proposals of the weekend Warsaw summit conference. Scholz described the results of the meeting as "quite encouraging" on Saturday.

Scholz did not want to be pinned down in the interview to forecasts on when this concept would be completed. He said he hopes that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Vienna will end as soon as possible with a mandate for the commencement of new negotiations. With regard to the NATO concept, Scholz is "certain that we will come very quickly to a good result, which can be used offensively." The level of such a conference is purely a question of expediency. The minister affirmed, however, that disarmament negotiations in Europe are completely out of the question without the participation of the United States and Canada. On the prospects of conventional arms control, Scholz said: "We are in a phase in which possibilities can arise to achieve greater security through and with disarmament."

Kohl, Rocard—Cautious Optimism

*LD1807142288 Hamburg DPA in German
1341 GMT 18 Jul 88*

[Text] Bonn, (DPA)—Speaking to journalists, Kohl and Rocard both regarded the latest proposals from the Warsaw Pact on the continuation of the East-West dialogue and on disarmament with cautious optimism. Kohl spoke of interesting proposals which the FRG and its NATO partners are examining. The crucial test for the Germans, however, because of the special situation of the FRG, lies in the conventional sphere. What matters now is to investigate the proposals of the Soviet general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, with regard to whether they can be implemented. "Deeds are the decisive factor," Kohl stressed that he agrees with the French assessment. Rocard described it as "cautious in a positive way."

SPD's Bahr on East's Disarmament Ideas

*LD1807131188 Hamburg DPA in German
1130 GMT 18 Jul 88*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The disarmament proposals from the East demand a political answer from the West, preferably at a NATO summit or a CSCE conference, SPD Presidium member Egon Bahr said in Bonn Monday. He demanded from the Federal Government a swift introduction of soundings for such a summit. Bahr referred "with satisfaction" to the elements in the SPD-SED negotiations which have now found their way into the Warsaw Pact's disarmament proposals.

Bahr accepted the East's proposed separation of the negotiations on conventional reductions and on short-range missiles, although the SPD had until now rejected this separation. "It is realistic, and we have to accept that," Bahr said, even if it should be regretted that, as a result, only the nuclear powers would be negotiating at the nuclear negotiating table.

In all, the Eastern military pact had put forward a political package that could end confrontation in Europe, thus changing postwar history, said the SPD politician. Bahr admitted that the Pact proposals were not new in principle. But their form did not offer an adequate basis for negotiations. Over and above that, Bahr also sees scope for the taking up of Western proposals.

NETHERLANDS

Role of Common Security in Arms Negotiations Advocated

52002446 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch
24 May 88 p 8

[Article by former Ambassador E. Korthals Altes and Erasmus University Professor-Emeritus of Economics J. Tinbergen: "Common Security Demands a Common Authority: Towards Good Administration of Our Planet"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The ultimate goal of all peace policy is "common security," but the exact meaning of the term, to say nothing of how it should be achieved, remains unclear. Some sort of "world authority" could define this security and give it concrete form, but, leaving aside the question of whether there is sufficient political will, there is another problem: There is not (yet) any decision-making structure for reaching the necessary decisions. A first move in that direction.

The spectacular scientific and technological developments in recent decades and the large-scale production of weapons of destruction—nuclear, chemical and conventional—have brought the possibility of actually destroying practically all life on earth within our grasp. However, there is a strange and disturbing phenomenon in the sense that man, who is equipped not only with an instinct for self-preservation but also with a sense of responsibility and fantasy, has thus far been unable to satisfactorily answer the central question of his survival.

Particularly for the countries belonging to NATO and the Warsaw Pact, war can no longer used as a political instrument. Because of the danger of escalation, nuclear as well as chemical and conventional weapons have ceased to be practical instruments of political negotiation. Among the hopeful developments experienced in recent times is the fact that this basic truth is being realized more and more by politically responsible figures.

In Geneva, Reykjavik, and now in Washington, this has been acknowledged with growing clarity. But outlawing war is of major significance in other parts of the world as well. The ultimate goal of any peace policy is thus common security.

Little by little, people are coming to realize that the governments can no longer guarantee the security of their citizens in the unilateral way that has been pursued thus far, by investing in more resources and weapons. In fact, the opposite is true, even for the superpowers. The feverish pursuit of a technologically decisive lead is counterproductive, because of the action-reaction mechanism and the destabilizing character of new weapons systems.

"Security"

Common security is a relatively new term. The latest revised edition of Roling's (1985) "International Law and Peace" does not contain a clear definition, and the term appears neither in the table of contents nor in the subject index. Indeed, even the term "security" is far removed from a generally accepted definition. Roling himself sees it as a "multidimensional" concept, while others have nothing to say about the number of dimensions. Very few address measurability (cf. Tinbergen and Fischer, 1987).

In the Palme Report (1982), common security is envisaged as the ultimate goal of optimal policy, although a clear definition is lacking. (Footnote) (In the prologue, the American member of the Palme Commission, Cyrus Vance, says that "security in the nuclear age means common security." On page 204, it is noted that "regional conferences on security and cooperation could give new meaning to the concept of common security." Even this passage does not indicate the existence of a definition of the term. At its last meeting in Delhi in January 1986, similarly little attention was given to defining common security.) The end of the first chapter, where one expects to find a definition, contains only the following:

"In the present age, security cannot be ensured unilaterally. In economic, political, cultural and—most importantly—military terms, we live in a world in which interdependency is increasing. The security of one nation cannot be bought at the expense of that of another. The danger of nuclear war alone supports this position. But this argument is strengthened significantly by the striking multilateral relations between the various nations and parts of the world in the economic and political domain. Peace cannot be achieved by military confrontation. It must be gained in an indefatigable pursuit of negotiations, rapprochement and normalization, the goal being to clear away reciprocal insinuations and fears. We are dealing with common dangers and must thus promote our common security together."

Decision-Making

Recognition of the fact that common security in fact depends on the organization of decision-making on a global level would itself represent a major gain. In

particular, it is possible to speak of common security only if there is a "world authority" making decisions on security and wielding the power to enforce those decisions.

However, such a decision-making organization does not exist. There is a choice between various structures, and whether that choice seems to be "the best one" depends on whether decisions are necessary for the short or long term. The extremes of conceivable organizational structures are on the one hand the superpowers together and on the other hand an empowered Security Council. Between these two, there are still other alternatives.

Pursuing this train of thought, common security can thus only be realized through a "world authority" or "world government," bearing responsibility for the security of the world's population. The national governments would have to transfer their sovereignty to such an institution, both in the realm of security and in areas such as environmental protection.

There are significant differences of opinion on the question of what is the preferred organization for decision-making on the global level. This comes as no surprise, given the complexity and difficulty of the issues at stake.

Many, including the secretary of the Dutch Pugwash movement, Professor Ph.B. Smith, regard decision-making by a small number of powerful states as the best solution. Others, who expect a moderating influence on extreme viewpoints through joint decision-making by a richly variegated group, prefer decision-making by representatives of a larger number of countries. As argued above, the term for which a decision must be made plays a role in that decision.

Many experts and politicians regard a series of treaties between sovereign bodies as the best way to achieve common security, be it agreements between the two superpowers or between the two alliances of which they are the leading powers, NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

This latter alternative is not possible without a fundamental improvement in relations between the superpowers and acceptance of a new, more realistic security concept: "mutually assured security" (MAS). The recently concluded INF treaty represents a good starting point for this, all the more so since the justified doubt concerning the policy that has been pursued thus far has resulted in concessions on both sides. Of primary importance here is the willingness to accept certain forms of on-site inspection.

At its meeting in Delhi in January 1986, the Palme Commission also applauded the statement by the secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which resulted in important new possibilities for improving relations with the United States—possibilities that were regarded as out of the question only a few years ago, and the limits of which are still unclear today.

Other experts and politicians concerned with longer-term issues regard decision-making by the superpowers and their allies as acceptable only as a temporary arrangement, not as the ultimate "world structure for decision-making."

A number of countries that are not members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, such as Third World countries—however one chooses to define the term—but also other industrialized nations that are important to the world order, will seek a way to manage our global household that is more meaningful. This is scarcely possible in any way other than through a reorganized United Nations.

In the meantime, the positions of the two superpowers remain so much at odds that the goal of common security will not be realized in one step.

Intermediate Station

But in order to move from the grim present-day reality to the desired common security—whereby so much research on both sides continues to be devoted to developing new, even more efficient systems of destruction—an intermediate stage is first necessary. After all, we are still a long ways off from a jointly accepted responsibility for what is "common" in the most profound sense of the word.

An initial, feasible step by the superpowers could be to accept in principle a more realistic security concept than the current, sharply unilateral notion. This concept, mutually assured security (MAS) is based in part on the obvious fact that "security" today can only be achieved jointly within decision-making structures other than those currently in existence.

It is also possible in the form of a gradual process, between East and West, for example, by giving the MAS concept a concrete shape in a number of measures in the area of arms control and reduction. The following means are available to us for achieving this more limited goal:

1. negotiations aimed at concluding new agreements;
2. informal, confidential consultations, supported by the political will to arrive at mutually assured security;
3. unilateral steps, such as a halt on the testing of new weapons.

Of these options, the first requires the most time and the third is applicable to only a few areas, so that in the short term the second is the most important one.

It is clear that unilateral steps could help accelerate the entire process. Such steps could not only have a beneficial effect on the entire climate, but also be advantageous

to both the initiator and the other party. After all, it is in everyone's interest to move as quickly as possible to rid the world of those weapons that the adversary feels are the most threatening.

Besides agreements of a military nature, other steps for promoting "MAS" include economic and technological cooperation (grain deliveries, new technology for peaceful purposes) and the study of possibilities for verification.

The INF treaty inspires hope, but will be historically significant only if it is followed by treaties on a sharp reduction in the number of strategic missiles, on balancing and reducing conventional arms in Europe and on eliminating strategic nuclear weapons and abolishing chemical weapons.

Such a process means resisting the strong tendencies towards filling in the "gap" that has emerged as a result of the double zero option through modernizing and expanding the arms arsenal. The appeal to legal arguments borrowed from previous NATO agreements (Montebello) sounds somewhat hollow. In fact, it means contradicting the spirit of a treaty that complies with the deepest yearnings of the vast majority of the population in the East and in the West.

"World Authority"

Too little is still being written and spoken about the basic need to create a "world authority." It is conceivable that the exchange of ideas about this could take place other than by way of the debate on "mutually assured security." This discussion then loses the character of an "intermediate station" and in that case is better characterized as a "temporary arrangement," which tests and

helps promote the willingness of the two superpowers to cooperate. However, it is clear that the creation of a world authority must be put on the agenda.

The question is: on what agenda. There seem to be three alternatives:

1. on the agenda of future summits between the two superpowers;
2. on the agenda of a larger group of powerful nations;
3. on the agenda of an independent commission (the Palme, Brandt or Brundtland Commissions), the goal being to submit the resulting report to the secretary-general and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Some short-term thinkers tend to feel that the time is not yet ripe for "optimal management of the planet Earth." We feel that the matter is urgent. Besides the security issue, there are other problems that will get out of hand if possible solutions are not sought right away.

This is true in particular of the environment, but among the older economic issues there are also a couple that demand greater authority for supranational bodies. The continual presence of world unemployment, of inequities in the distribution of income and of the debts of developing countries are three issues that can be tackled forcefully only if the authority to do so is given to supranational bodies such as the World Bank, IMF and several other specialized bodies of the United Nations, or, if necessary, to regional groups such as the EC. If one objects that the activities to be set in motion take too much time, then that is all the more reason to begin as soon as possible.

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