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Marshal Ogarkov Elected Chairman of Veterans' Council

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[Editorial Report] Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 12, dated 19-25 March 1990 announces on page one the election of Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay Vasilyevich Ogarkov as chairman of the All-Union Army and Labor Veterans Council. The election took place in Moscow on 16 March during a plenum meeting of the Council.

Ogarkov, Kulikov, Others Protest Film

90UM0359A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Mar 90 p 8

[“Letter To The Editors: About The Film “Disciplinary Units“]

[Text] We Great Patriotic War veterans, after seeing producer Lev Danilov's documentary film “Disciplinary Units” (screenplay by Ye. Shved) and reading Vyacheslav Kondratyev's rapturous review of it, entitled “Pariahs of War,” in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA for January 31, 1990, can only view them as malicious libel against the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, which routed the main groupings of the armies of fascist Germany and its satellites, secured our great victory, and hoisted its banner over the Reichstag in Berlin.

We have heard, read, and seen many falsifications and falsehoods of various kinds about the Great Patriotic War, but Lev Danilov, in assembling footage from Goebbels' newsreels and certain, primarily somber, episodes from our own documentary makers (such as O. Reyzman and others), has concentrated in them so much hostility toward the Soviet people and their army that there's really nothing for our adversaries to add to this.

Not even fascist propaganda could go so far as to portray the Soviet Army as a semi-barbarian horde that fought only under the machine-guns of retreat-blocking units or gave themselves up. Some documentary footage of a typical offensive, with tanks in front, followed by infantry, and supported by artillery and machine-gun fire, is presented in the accompanying narrative in such a way as to suggest that the attack is being carried out by disciplinary units, with the machine-gunner of a retreat-blocking detachment prepared to shoot them. This is false!

In the first place, tank and artillery crews were never staffed with troops from disciplinary units.

Second, it is impossible to ascertain from the footage who the infantry are encircling: All we see are the backs of the attackers, and from a distance at that.

This so-called documentary is easy to see through.

The clear lack of authenticity is offset with the narrative's detective-story tone. Several conversations with Budnichuk, who was twice convicted and sent to disciplinary subunits, are accompanied by such arbitrarily

inserted footage as a herd of cows, for example. Likewise, conversations with former front procurator General B. I. Alekseyev are unconvincing. For the sake of greater “objectivity,” the filmmaker enlists a respected and honored figure, Colonel General I. A. Kuzovkov, the late Hero of the Soviet Union. But how cleverly the conversation is set up! The general tells his questioner that disciplinary-unit soldiers who were placed under his command were sent to the regiments, so that they would take part in the overall combat formation, and he is immediately asked this question: What mission was the disciplinary battalion given?

The narrative presents as all but fact the assertion that the enemy's Stalingrad grouping was surrounded and Manshteyn's group prevented from breaking through to it primarily by disciplinary battalions and companies, and that such units carried out primary missions in the Battle of Kursk, on the Dnepr, in Belorussia, and even in the Berlin operation. Yet such units did not even account for half of 1 percent of those who fought.

An attempt is made to create the impression that disciplinary troops would break through defenses, spouting vile profanity, as a rule, to be followed by the regular rifleman subunits, tank and artillery crews, and others, as if the latter were taking some kind of stroll. Now that's a novel idea! We don't think there's any need to try to convince anyone that this is the fruit of Lev Danilov's soaring imagination. But what can you do—this is the aim he set himself: If you're to fling mud, you might as well do a good job of it.

People might ask: But were there disciplinary battalions and companies? No one denies that there were. But they did not decide the outcome of battles and operations, as Lev Danilov tries to argue in his film “Disciplinary Units.”

And was there Order No. 227 of USSR People's Commissar of Defense I. V. Stalin? Yes, there was. That's true. But one can't help putting the following question to the producer: What did you expect of the war against the Hitlerite hordes and their satellites, whose aim was to destroy a sizable part of our people and to make slaves out of the rest? As we know, people don't fight wars in white gloves and smoking jackets.

The Great Patriotic War was bloody and brutal, but the enemy failed to break our people's will and morale. And it is dishonorable to try to break it today with such falsifications as the film “Disciplinary Units” and the article “Pariahs of War.”

Incidentally, as for the retreat-blocking detachments, they were disbanded in November 1944, as the need for them had passed. But Lev Danilov makes no mention of this.

Vyacheslav Kondratyev repeats the loss figures cited by Yu. Geller in the journal DRUZHBA NARODOV, No 9 for 1989. According to the calculations of some mythical scholars, Soviet losses amounted to 46 million people, 22 million of them soldiers, while the Germans lost only 1.5

million soldiers on the Eastern Front (against Poland and the USSR). And the "statistics" are tailored to fit the same objective—to discredit and compromise our victory. But these are lies! Moreover, efforts to clarify losses have yet to be completed. Still, the author of the review should have a sense of responsibility.

It's no accident that the film's release was timed to coincide with the 45th anniversary of our victory in the Great Patriotic War. It is, so to speak, an "anniversary" film. But it would be hard to conceive of a greater profanation of that victory. Producer Lev Danilov's intent is quite clear to us, no matter how he camouflages it behind a screen of exposing Stalinism. It is clearly discernible: to cloud and slander our victory, and to encourage a skeptical attitude toward it and toward veterans' services in people who didn't experience the war, which is to say the overwhelming majority of the Soviet people.

In conclusion, Lev Danilov urges people to ask for forgiveness—true, he doesn't say whose forgiveness. That of Vlasov and his accomplices, who, incidentally, are portrayed in "Disciplinary Units" as handsome hussars? From the Polizei who served in the Gestapo? From deserters? No, we will not ask their forgiveness! But from those who suffered wrongfully, who fell honorably in battle, we asked forgiveness long ago: we bow our heads before them to this day, and we are compiling an all-Union memorial book. But we say a flat "no" to the libelous film and to its published review.

[signed] Hero of the Soviet Union and Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Kulikov; Hero of the Soviet Union and Army General I. Shkadov; Hero of the Soviet Union and Marshal of Armored Tank Forces O. Losik; Army General N. Lyashchenko; Thrice Hero of the Soviet Union and Marshal of Aviation I. Kozhedub; Hero of the Soviet Union and Marshal of Aviation I. Pstygo; Hero of the Soviet Union and Marshal of the Soviet Union N. Ogarkov; Hero of the Soviet Union and Army General I. Pavlovskiy; Marshal of Engineer Troops S. Aganov; Army General I. Shavrov; Army General I. Yakovlev; Twice Hero of the Soviet Union and Marshal of Aviation N. Skomorokhov; Marshal of Aviation G. Skorikov; Hero of the Soviet Union and Army General P. Ivashutin; Hero of the Soviet Union and Army General A. Shcheglov; Fleet Admiral A. Sorokin; Army General M. Kozlov; and Fleet Admiral N. Sergeyev.

From LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's Arts Department: We wanted very much to cut out the words from the critical lexicon of past years—libel, falsehood, profanation, and others. But we left them as written. The veteran military leaders have the right to express their impressions of the film "Disciplinary Units." Just as writer Vyacheslav Kondratyev, a sergeant in the Great Patriotic War, had the right to do so.

In publishing his thoughts, we were aware of the mixed reaction the film would elicit and of the diverse opinions that would pour in. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's

mail confirmed this, and we intend to return to it. That war, which has lived on in the people's memory for almost half a century, has so many faces, and so much has been said and has yet to be said about it, that no one can claim to have the truth in the final instance.

Times are changing. Not very long ago, such a concentrated volley from our generals would have long knocked out of commission both the filmmakers and those who took a favorable view of the film. Today, we hope, no such thing will happen. Once they are aware of the differing viewpoints, people will see and compare them.

Maj Gen Sein Response on Number of Troops in Baltic MD

90UM0172B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 3 Dec 89 pp 6-7

[Article by Maj Gen V. Sein, First Deputy Chief, Political Directorate of the Baltic Military District: "The People and the Army: Who Benefits From the Opposition? Notes on the Demilitarization of Estonia and Certain Aspects of the NFE Electoral Platform".]

[Text] The report by Tynis Avikson in the republic newspaper RAHVA HAAL (organ of the Central Committee, Communist Party of Estonia) on 29 October was some dozens of lines long, but, I believe, did not pass unnoticed. The author comments on information given to TASS by General of the Army M. Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff, USSR Armed Forces. It concerns the reduction in the numerical strength of the forces in the Leningrad and Baltic military districts by 40,000 men and 1,200 tanks, planned by 1991. The justification given for this was quite clear-cut: In recent years relations in the world have warmed markedly, and there has come greater trust in the relations between the USSR and the northern countries. Then Tynis Avikson, citing anonymous Western sources, states that, first, the changes in the army are associated not with external, but with internal factors, particularly with the demands of the people's fronts of the Baltic area about demilitarization of the region. Second, Gen Moiseyev's information, he says, does not correspond to reality, since the number of forces in Estonia alone has already reached 120,000-150,000.

Such a small paragraph. And how many questions arise! And not only in me, as a military man. No doubt this is because in it are intertwined in the most amazing way many of the signs of our time: the claims of some social organizations in the Baltic area to a role as political leaders, the syndrome of distrust toward official sources of information, and the calculation that any falsehood from abroad will be "swallowed." And what if one pays attention to the unproven, frequently unsubstantiated accusations levied at the Soviet Army? The desire to render judgement about it, without wanting to hear anything about the changes that are taking place, both in the Armed Forces as a whole, and in the psychology and consciousness of each serviceman, can be seen even with the naked eye.

One can see this most recently by opening up the issue of the newspaper NOORTE HAAL of 31 October 89. That about which Tynis Avikson spoke in general is here specified. The newspaper gives the reader "accurate" information about where, how many, and what kind of forces are stationed in the republic. Obviously, the official data given by the chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces did not suit the press organ. Preference is given to "Westerners."

The divergence of the data cited from the truth is striking (it is hard to expect another reaction from a competent person). In some places there are up to three, four and even five instances of misinformation! It is stated, for example, that 4,500 military personnel are stationed in Khaapsalu. In fact there are 4.5 times fewer. The information about the presence of personnel in Kokhtla-Yarve is inflated by more than 2,500 men. It is also reported that there are 25,000 military specialists in Paldiski, while according to the information of the local soviet of people's deputies, there are a total of only 10,000 people residing in this town.

As we see, facts and evidence refuting the fabrication of "well-wishers" of all stripes are more than sufficient. They will also be discussed below. But the deed, as the saying goes, has been done: the freshly cooked "goose" is walking not only about the Estonian SSR, but also beyond the boundaries of the republic. It is not difficult to imagine the subscribers to NOORTE HAAL the publication excitedly. And, of course, it is difficult to expect a loyal attitude toward the army from them.

Judging by everything, the Estonian People's Front[NFE] fully shares this position. For the umpteenth time it has advanced the slogan of full demilitarization of the republic and the entire Baltic area, as is graphically indicated by one of its most recent documents, the NFE election platform. Is this not the chief essence of such publications and statements, in which is contained the common thread: everyone who is not with us is against us? Obviously the time has come to remember that the ostracism of the "man with a gun," in which certain informal organizations and publications have had success, may have far-reaching consequences: A people that does not respect its army, speaking in the words of a prominent military authority of the past, is doomed to feed the army of its enemy.

Attempting by dubious methods to form public opinion favorable to itself, the NFE is committing, in my view, a major political error. Mixing up cause and effect, it is attempting to ensure so-called demilitarization by unseemly activity, directed against the army of its own state. But, under conditions of the existence of different socio-political systems, we must not go to extremes, and reduce the slogan of demilitarization to complete disarmament on a unilateral basis, without taking into account the political, economic and military realities that exist in the world. Do not these factors dictate to us

the level of our current military capability, and find embodiment in the principle of reasonable defense sufficiency?

Yes, today we have the right to speak about the triumph of the new political thinking, about a certain "thaw" in international relations, in short, about everything that is associated with perestroyka. But, this in no way means that the threat of a nuclear war has been eliminated completely and finally. Military conflict is a harsh reality of our day. It is enough to say that the NATO bloc in the European region has 3,660,000 men, more than 7,000 combat aircraft, 5,300 combat helicopters, approximately 30,000 tanks, and 500 major surface ships. Of this huge grouping there are numerous forces quite near Estonia, in direct firing range, if it can be so expressed. The question arises, what is the real basis for the slogan of demilitarization, put forth by the NFE and certain other social organizations?

We also, I believe, must not fail to take into account political realities. Say, Mrs. M. Thatcher, speaking in Guild Hall, emphasized that "times of changes entail especially great uncertainty and even danger." In this connection, she calls for a strengthening of the military-political alliance of the Western states in every way possible, including of the NATO bloc. Since any opinion of a military man evokes distrust in a number of Estonians, and not only in them, why then not listen to Mrs. Thatcher?

We are not hypocrites, and in a period of a warming situation, we believe in further relaxation. Who is against curbing the arms race or reducing the Armed Forces? But, on an intelligent basis, taking into account the interests of the security of our borders. So that the citizens of the USSR, including Estonians, may quietly engage in peaceful, creative labor. We do not believe in aggression (and did the Baltic believe that Hitler would attack?), but we believe in the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces, still so needed by the people, and capable of crushing any aggression.

We military people know well the combat capabilities of the U. S. strike carrier task forces, and the NATO naval forces, which are superior to the forces of the USSR Navy many times over. We also consider the disposition of first strike weapons, say, cruise missiles, the flight time of which to the borders of the Baltic area is only a few minutes. Can we really close our eyes to all this and "stack arms," as the NFE calls upon us to do?

This is far from an idle question. Here is something for us all to think seriously about, without fussiness, haste, or unfounded accusations.

Of course, we can only welcome the interest of society, awakened by perestroyka and glasnost, toward such an important aspect of our lives as the organization of the country's defense and the organizational development of its armed forces. However, the discussion, I believe,

should be conducted on a sufficiently high and responsible level, and proposals should be well-justified, businesslike and constructive. It is hard to count on this when entire production collectives, scientific establishments, informal associations, etc., are frequently drawn into the orbit of disputes, larded with an anti-army syndrome.

This, unfortunately, is the totality of many public statements and utterances about the Soviet Army. Those writing about it frequently adhere to a discursive, and frequently simply hysterical note, which is far from true democratism. Nor did the NFE avoid this. It wrote in one of the sections of its electoral platform: "In the Estonia in which we live the number of Soviet troops is such that it seriously threatens the interests of the permanent residents, and creates the soil for social, economic and national conflicts."

And what is the truth of the matter? There cannot be two truths, and we want the residents of Estonia to know the truth. First, this year callup into the Soviet Army was reduced by eight percent. Personnel in the forces decreased by four percent. Approximately a thousand students, 85 percent of whom were junior commanders and experienced specialists, were discharged from the Armed Forces and left Estonian territory. One asks on what the "truth-mongers," who are confusing the people, base their remarks?

The number of weapons and amount of military equipment are also declining. Estonia was "relieved" of intermediate and shorter range missiles, or, more precisely, all the missiles provided for by the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles have been destroyed. Units of missile troops have been disbanded and their personnel have returned to their homes.

In connection with the reorganization of forces in a number of garrisons, the number of tanks within Estonia has sharply declined. In some aviation garrisons the number of aircraft has been reduced by almost 10 percent. Also a reality is the fact that this year not a single offensive tactical exercise has been held on Estonian territory. The number of trips to the field by units has been reduced in half.

And here, despite all these serious reorganizational measures, there are those who continue to shout hysterically about the "dominance of the military," and deliberately wish to undermine the authority of the Soviet Army, and drive a wedge between the Estonian people and the military personnel.

Who benefits from this?

Frequently we hear that national self-consciousness has awakened in Estonia, and that Estonia is a republic of high education and culture. But, the attitude toward the army is itself an indicator of the level of civilization of a people. In no civilized state is its own army called an occupation army.

Let us clarify this question as well.

So, what is an occupation, and who are occupiers? In the Soviet country? Where did so many "democratic occupiers" come from, who allow themselves to be insulted and demeaned, and put up with anti-occupation slogans and demands? True occupiers, as history bears witness, conduct themselves differently. They unleash repressions against a people, introduce harsh procedures, take power fully into their hands, and prohibit the activities of all formal and informal social and political organizations. And what is the case in Estonia, and in the Baltic area as a whole? Five thousand such organizations exist. Do the "seers" prophesying about the "occupation regime" of the Soviet Army really not know about this?

Perhaps the Soviet Army limited the political and civil rights of Estonians, and of the entire native population? It is exactly the opposite. Substantial infringement of the rights of military personnel is evident, including one of the main rights, that to vote and be elected. And no occupation power would allow such discrimination.

They say that facts are a stubborn thing. And they indicate precisely that it is namely the Soviet soldiers who are first to rush to the aid of the population if a calamity occurs. In the last five years alone more than 32,000 explosive articles left over from the times of World War II have been disarmed on the territory of the Estonian SSR. And recently in one of the areas of the republic a man was killed—a mine clearing group immediately went out to conduct its difficult and dangerous work. I can imagine vividly how all of this took place, and think with bitterness: It is they who are called occupiers!

No less dangerous in this planned and purposeful action is the second aspect, the moral aspect.

There is nothing more absurd than when a people considers its own sons to be occupiers. This inflicts a wound that will not heal, not only upon the army, but also upon the people. There is nothing more unnatural than when mothers give hostile sendoffs to their sons, and even in general push them into crime, calling upon them to refuse to serve in the Armed Forces. And the "inspirers" of the refusals will not answer to anyone or in any way. Do they really not think about how their sons will grow up? And what authority will the parents have in the eyes of their children?

It is not for nothing that the people say: The echo responds to the call. After this is there any reason to complain about the disrespect of young people toward their parents, family, the law, and the state? And this is dangerous.

So, whom does this benefit in such a difficult political situation?

I believe that local party and soviet organs could give a balanced and constructive assessment of such attacks against the Soviet Army. The desire to not notice these

attacks, and to close one's eyes to how the authority of the USSR Armed Forces is being undermined, and their historical role distorted, is also a position. And, to be frank, it is a troubling position.

By manipulating public consciousness, some figures, intentionally or unintentionally, are creating a picture of the army as the enemy of perestroika, and an organization that exists solely owing to force and in the name of suppressing the individual. The thesis about the creation of national-territorial military formations in the Baltic area is being insistently exaggerated. It has also been advanced in the NFE electoral platform, where, amidst the final goals of the activity of this organization, the following is also defined: **"...To ensure the defense of the state border of the USSR on the territory of Estonia on the basis of national-territorial military formations."**

What can be said about this? In the 70 years of its existence, our army has passed through the territorial militia system, extraterritorial and inter-ethnic (mixed) manning, and through national formations within the framework of a single army. Having experienced everything, frequently through trial and error, it began to be structured on the existing cadre military organizational system, developed by the party. This system withstood testing in both the Civil and the Great Patriotic wars. This is the main argument in its defense. Needless to say, the currently existing system of military organizational development needs improvement. This work is being carried out on the basis of precise calculations and sober assessments. Let us recall the heated debates and discussions at the USSR Supreme Soviet session. And how do the NFE leaders see the material basis of the national-territorial military formations?

Let us imagine that the 8th Guards Estonian Rifle Corps is reconstituted, a question that is being raised sharply at this time at various levels. Immediately a mass of questions arises. For example, who will serve in this corps? Since we are talking about a national formation, to all appearances it will be Estonians. But where, in this case, are command cadres to be obtained? If one gathers together all of the officers of Estonian nationality now serving in the USSR Armed Forces, this corps will be manned by only seven percent of the required number of officer cadres. It is also no secret that time, and no small amount, is required for their training. One can only deplore the fact that last year only 21 Estonians entered military schools, and this year even fewer—only 15.

This is, so to speak, about the leadership element. And where are the personnel to be obtained? Today all of the military commissariates in the republic can call up (full annual callup) enough compulsory service personnel to satisfy only 25 percent of the requirements of a modern corps. If it is taken into account that among those called up there are many who have convictions (8.4 percent), and another 25 percent are not suitable for service for reasons of health, the picture becomes still more painful. But that is the truth.

At times we apprehend badly everything that is spent on defense. And this is correct. It is necessary to save funds, and this is being done today on a countrywide scale. And what would the Estonian Republic spend to maintain this national division, taking into account its modern technical equipment, and solving social, everyday living, and cultural questions? Without getting into details I will say that Estonia would have to put into the defense fund amounts significantly surpassing those that the entire republic puts into the state fund today. As the saying goes, there is no need for comment.

Moreover, it must be taken into account that there are different population densities in various regions of the country. That is, in some places (including Estonia) callup resources are very limited. This means that their redistribution to maintain a reliable defense of the homeland is simply inevitable. This is true despite the fact that, as is known, the USSR Ministry of Defense has met halfway the numerous wishes of the Baltic republics, and today more than 20 percent of the inductees from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania remain to serve in the Baltic Military District. I believe that a categorical demand that all youth of the indigenous nationality carry out military service on the territory of "their own republic" is unacceptable. This is in essence a proposal against the extraterritorial manning principle that is accepted in all civilized countries in the world. Imagine that the U. S. split its army into 50 parts, the activities of which were regulated not so much by the interests of state defense, as by the plans of local authorities. It is absurd! It is entirely obvious that decentralizing the management of the Armed Forces will have a fatal effect on their combat might.

For this very reason, I believe, the point in the NFE electoral program cannot be approved that speaks about creating effective monitoring by the government organs of the activity of military commissariats and troop units, deriving from the program provisions of the NF and the Estonian constitution. Essentially we are talking about the same thing, about the resubordination of the army. A willfull attempt is being made to remove from the USSR a function that belongs to it. Meanwhile the army, as before, is doing everything to see that not only in wartime, but also in years of peace, people feel that the Armed Forces of the country are a part of the people, living its pains and hopes.

A great number of examples of the advisability of such cooperation can be cited. Take only conversion. The troops of the Baltic Military District have transferred to the economy, as well as to cooperatives in the Baltic region, equipment, facilities and material valuables in the amount of 4,081,000 rubles. Motor vehicles of various makes alone have been transferred valued at 1,392,000 rubles, engineer equipment at 920,000 rubles, and communications property and equipment at 300,000 rubles. Moreover, equipment and property valued at 640,000 rubles has been sold through the

district material funds department. A significant portion of these valuables is being used today for the benefit of Estonia.

I am concluding these remarks on an optimistic note not accidentally. The more rapidly the anti-army moods in the republic are blown away, and the unjustified attacks on military persons halted, the sooner we will find mutual understanding, and the more effective, I believe, will be Estonia's steps on the path of perestroyka.

Latvian Resolution on Military, Environment

90UN0845C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
14 Jan 90 p 3

[Resolution issued by Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet in Riga on 12 January: "On the Work of the Working Group Formed by the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet to Study the Effects to the Republic Environment Caused by the Activities of Military Units".]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the LaSSR [Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic] resolves:

1. To take into consideration the information presented by the leader of the working group, Comrade A.K. Chepanis, deputy chairman of the LaSSR Council of Ministers, on the group's work in studying the effects caused by the activities of military units to the surrounding environment of the republic.

2. To charge the working group jointly with the Baltic Military District and local soviets of people's deputies with developing proposals on eliminating the effects caused to the republic's environment by the activities of military units, and to present these proposals prior to 15 April 1990 for examination and decision by the LaSSR Council of Ministers; proposals requiring amendments to existing republic law will be presented to the Presidium of the LaSSR Supreme Soviet.

To conduct in 1990 an inspection of all territories located in the republic and falling under the disposition of the USSR Ministry of Defense, LaSSR KGB, and LaSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, including the depths of the earth, to determine usage regulations and the feasibility of their further use for military purposes, especially in resort areas and places of rest and recreation for the population.

3. To charge the LaSSR Council of Ministers jointly with the Baltic Military District and local soviets of people's deputies with preparing proposals regarding the further use of military forest areas, and developing a system for managing these areas.

4. To take into consideration the fact that the Baltic Military District continues to develop and accomplish measures to improve environmental protection, coordinating these with local organs of authority.

5. To hold that, under conditions of a sovereign republic and implementation of the law on economic independence, the requirements of the Constitution and other laws of the republic extend to military units located on LaSSR territory.

6. To charge the LaSSR State Committee on the Protection of Nature with exercising supervision of the execution of this resolution.

[signed] A. Gorbunov, chairman of the Presidium of the LaSSR Supreme Soviet

I. Daudish, secretary of the Presidium of the LaSSR Supreme Soviet

Riga, 12 January 1990.

Damage to Latvian Environment by Armed Forces

90UN0845B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
14 Jan 90 p 3

[Unattributed report on report by Deputy A.K. Chepanis, working group leader, and the ensuing discussion by deputies at the 14th Session of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet 11th Convocation in Riga on 11-12 January: "On Work Accomplished to Study the Consequences to the Latvian Environment of the Activities of Military Units"]

[Text] Dear deputies! The working group formed in accordance with the 24 August 1989 resolution of the Presidium of the LaSSR [Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet has conducted an analysis over this period of violations and consequences caused to the surrounding environment of the republic by the activities of military units. Materials used include those obtained by the working group from the People's Control Committee, State Committee on the Protection of Nature, Ministry of Health, the production association "Latvijas Mezhs," Society for the Protection of Nature and Monuments of the LaSSR, and rayon ispolkoms [executive committees]. It must be noted, however—and all inhabitants of the republic should be aware—that the ispolkoms of Balvskiy, Bauskiy, Gulbenskiy, Limbazhskiy, Ludzenskiy, and Talsinskiy Rayons did not consider it necessary, unfortunately, to provide the working group with materials requested from them. In our view, this alone attests to their attitude toward the condition of their territory.

Analysis of the materials shows that violations of the law governing the protection of nature by military units have been verified in almost all rayons of the republic. Upon a proposal of the working group, rayon committees have been established in those rayons where military unit activity has been especially intense to conduct comprehensive inspections of the territories where regimental-size military units are located. These comprehensive checks have been conducted mainly in Dobelskiy, Liyepayskiy, and Salduskiy Rayons.

The air training range of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Salduskiy Rayon is located on land suitable for

meeting agricultural needs. The range has a detrimental effect on the ecological environment of the region, and on the health and safety of its inhabitants. Routine bombing runs conducted against targets greatly increase the level of noise and vibration in the city of Saldus and its suburbs, and have introduced a real danger in this respect. In 1988, a powerful explosion of heavy charges knocked out the windows in the Saldus department store, High School No. 2, and several residences. Losses incurred by the LaSSR economy as a result of the presence of the air training range—approximate calculations, of course—amount to the following: gross agricultural production losses total more than 700 million rubles [R]; over R40 million would be necessary to restore neglected land which could be used for agriculture. Taking these factors into consideration, the inhabitants of Salduskiy Rayon, as certified by more than 7,000 signatures, and the rayon ispolkom find it necessary to do away with the test center, thus providing for their safety and obtaining about 18,000 hectares of land for agricultural use.

Our working group has received a great many letters from residents of Saldus and its rayon, and also supports this proposal. It is true that several days prior to the session, the leadership of the Air Force Baltic Military District spoke with the leadership of the LaSSR Council of Ministers and expressed a readiness to discuss with the republic leadership and local organs of authority the question of organizing further use of territory under the disposition of military units.

A commission formed in Liyepayskiy Rayon conducted a detailed examination of all military units in the rayon and delivered its proposals to the working group with respect to each. It was ascertained that in a majority of these units there is no clarification as to what land that contains radar and radio communications equipment is under their authority. There are no disease-control specifications, no sanitary zones determined by appropriate contemporary requirements. The use of radar equipment located at certain military units has resulted in manyfold increases above the norm in electromagnetic field strength in Vaynede, Rutsava, Perkone, Grobine, Pape, Nitse, and Tsiyemupe—the increase in Vaynede is actually elevenfold.

During the period 1976 through 1988, a Baltic Fleet unit regularly destroyed ammunition, including phosphorous bombs used by aircraft, at the Pape training range in Liyepayskiy Rayon. This was a gross violation of laws on the protection of nature. As a result, 14 people in the republic picked up pieces of phosphorous, mistaking them for amber, and received chemical burns. Comrade Lantsers, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, reported this back on 29 July of last year. I can inform the deputies of the Supreme Soviet that the Baltic Fleet Procuracy took until December to complete its investigation. Former officers Kashtanov, Parfedenko, and Abrosimov were held criminally responsible for negligence of official duty. We still do not know the results of court proceedings in this matter.

Last summer a session of the Soviet of People's Deputies of Liyepayskiy Rayon adopted a resolution on the need to close the Pape test area. Asked about this matter by the LaSSR Council of Ministers, USSR Minister of Defense Yazov replied that the ministry was prepared to consider the question of moving the Pape training range to another part of the republic to conform with the requirements pertaining to air training centers, but this would be done using republic resources.

Relations between local residents and a military unit in Yurmaltsiyems settlement, Liyepayskiy Rayon, have become greatly aggravated because of illegal construction in the 300-meter coastal zone. The working group considers unacceptable the construction of new facilities in the one-km zone of the protective belt along the coasts of the Baltic Sea and Gulf of Riga. Construction and remodeling projects for all facilities absolutely must be coordinated with the Committee on the Protection of Nature. It is necessary in our view to reinforce the rights of inspectors of the LaSSR State Committee on the Protection of Nature with respect to monitoring protection of the environment and observance of the law over all territory on which USSR Armed Forces units are situated. In this regard, it is necessary to register all military units and enterprises, economic, construction, and other facilities of the USSR Armed Forces located in the republic with the LaSSR State Committee on the Protection of Nature as potential sources of pollution, so as to be able to conduct further environmental protection supervision.

The working group verified the commission of various violations of the laws protecting nature in other regions as well. There is hardly a single housing complex in which waste collection is properly managed; unauthorized auxiliary structures are often erected which present the environs in an aesthetically unpleasant light and create unsanitary conditions; there are not the simplest structures for sewage purification, no system for protecting against atmospheric pollution. The available water purification facilities operate ineffectively almost everywhere; authorization is not obtained for special use of water; and in most instances there is no authorization for discharging pollutants into the atmosphere. The rayon ispolkom has no land charts, materials, or registration data for areas occupied by military units. The working group proposes, in connection with the republic's transition to economic independence and the introduction of payment for natural resources, to also establish a financing procedure for the use of those lands which are turned over to the Armed Forces.

Certain military units use and squander minerals and forest resources which belong to the republic. Military forest management facilities on republic territory do not observe the LaSSR forestry code. Trees are felled illegally and there is no systematic forest restoration. Nor is there any appropriate accounting or registration of this activity. For example, in the Inchukalnskiy section of the Baltic Fleet forest management facility, the "Komfort" cooperative illegally cut down 450 pine and spruce trees,

amounting to 230 cubic meters, thus causing R27,000 in damage. What happened with the lumber, how much the "Komfort" cooperative received for it, and how much the military forestry people received for giving their permission; we do not know today. Materials regarding the illegal felling of these trees have been handed over to the procuracy. In this regard, the working group proposes that the conduct of forestry in all forest regions of Latvia—including those in military areas—be transferred to a single manager, which could be the republic production association "Latvijas Mezhs."

It must be noted that, in spite of the above-mentioned violations, the Baltic Military District procuracy stated in response to the inquiry of the working group that criminal proceedings were not instituted regarding violations in the sphere of environmental protection; in other words, nothing happened. The Baltic Fleet procuracy instituted criminal proceedings only in connection with the above-mentioned Pape training range in Liyepayskiy Rayon.

Violations of the law on the part of representatives of military units have become more frequent during the past two years. Information from the production association "Latvijas Mezhs" indicates there have been 15 incidents of illegal hunting. State inspectors for protection of fish and water resources uncovered 16 violations. This is evidence, in my view, of the all-permissiveness syndrome which is seen, unfortunately, in certain military units.

The arrogant attitude shown by the Armed Forces toward territory in which military units are situated can also be seen in the fact on 28 November last year, at the first general meeting of our working group, group members from the Baltic Military District and Baltic Fleet failed to attend. Only a representative of the border district troops participated, whose activity, at least in our view, has been least harmful to the environment of the republic, and whose record in this sphere should be imitated by other military units.

Again I refer to the military radar units and radio communications equipment located in the republic. We must get the Ministry of Defense to provide the LaSSR Council of Ministers reference data on the zone in which the influence of an electromagnetic field is perceptible in the health of the population. Such data are quite necessary in the development of an integrated plan for protecting environment in the republic. The working group recommends that all rayon ispolkoms form rayon commissions and conduct an examination of all military facilities located in their areas, that they report the results of their inspections to the Latvian Council of Ministers prior to 15 March of this year.

Taking under consideration the proposal of the deputies, we believe the LaSSR Council of Ministers should prepare an appropriate government resolution on these matters. Regarding those matters which fall under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet, proposals must be

introduced in the Supreme Soviet providing for the necessary changes in legislation.

There has been no opportunity to summarize what has been accomplished, due to the tremendous quantity of materials and great work volume. The working group therefore requests permission from the Supreme Soviet to continue this effort. We propose to discuss this report today and adopt the draft resolution in the version in which it was introduced by the working group to today's session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet.

Discussion of Information Provided by A. Chepanis

The bombs continue to fall deep in the very heart of Kurzeme even today, 45 years after the war; these were the bitter words of A. Brigmanis, first secretary of Saldusskiy Raykom [Rayon Party Committee]. It is taking place on the territory of the former Zvartsкая Volost, where the so-called Saldus training ground is located on about 24,000 hectares.

In 1939, the population of this volost numbered more than 3,000. There were 501 peasant farms here. Almost 80 percent of the land was used for agriculture and accounted annually for the production of 8,200 tons of grain, 8,700 tons of milk, and 850 tons of meat. Today with such an amount of food production we would be able to feed half the inhabitants of the region.

Today these lands are overgrown with weeds and shrubbery. But no extent of material damages can compare with the barbarism committed by the military, Brigmanis emphasized. A cemetery is located on the training ground land. Local residents shudder in horror when they hear a new roar of aircraft, knowing that these machines will be bombing the remains of their relatives. The question arises—who has given the command to fix a cemetery as a direct bomb target? Incidentally, the Soviet Army also drops explosives on the graves of Soviet rule activists in Ladskaya Volost, shot by "Ayzsargi" forest guards in the Brotsenskiy Forest on 25 June 1941....

People want to recover the land of their ancestors and their true history, the speaker continued. The signatures of almost 8,000 people provide confirmation of this, and they are supported by the rayon leadership and those who have stood during these two days on the street near the building of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

I should say that there are people who feel otherwise, who assert that you won't find anybody who wants to work in Zvartsкая Volost. On this very territory, on the land of their ancestors, almost 40 families have already expressed the desire to start farms. I think you would also find a place there for horticultural cooperatives, especially since Zvarta is a very picturesque section. Therefore, in my view, we should consider seriously what is more important—to be contented or well-armed.

The speaker went on to say that Kurzeme, one of the prettiest and richest regions of the republic, is practically closed to foreigners because of the military bases.

M. Raman, deputy chairman of the LaSSR Council of Ministers, noted that the Baltic Military District would get involved in republic plans for economic and social development only when it was necessary to relocate one military facility or another, or approve the construction of a new facility in Riga where, as we know, a number of military schools have been constructed. The deputy cited the example of the "Rumbul" airfield, relocated in the seventies, for which the USSR Ministry of Defense did not object to using resources and capital investments allocated to the military. The airfield was actually relocated without involving use of republic funds. The deputy categorically objected to relocating the Pape facility at the sole expense of the republic, condemning the formula "If you need it—then you do it." Such demands are entirely without justification.

Today when USSR defense doctrine is changing, the speaker emphasized, when we are reducing the Armed Forces, we must categorically demand that the military observe ecological regulations in exemplary fashion. Raman proposed that stronger wording be used in the draft resolution, establishing, for example, that under conditions of the republic's economic independence, all military subunits, 100 percent, will be subordinate to republic jurisdiction. Certification should also be issued for all facilities, even if they are secret. People have to know about radiation doses and other factors detrimental to their health. Not only the working group, but the Baltic Military District and appropriate subunits as well must participate in developing proposals.

The floor was then turned over to V. Romanenko, Baltic Military District environmental protection inspector. Romanenko noted the work of the commission in gathering and analyzing materials related to the influence of military units on the Latvian environment, and felt it necessary to comment that in the past two years a great deal more attention in the military district was being devoted to matters of environmental protection. A specific ecological program through the year 2005 has been determined. Environmental-protection inspectors have been appointed on orders in all major units and official duty positions for such inspectors have been introduced at Defense Ministry enterprises in Riga. Specific deadlines have been set for establishing norms to regulate harmful discharges into the atmosphere. Toxic-waste inventory is being conducted in military units, district establishments, and enterprises jointly with the

During 1988-1989, 10 purification complexes were constructed in the military district and put into operation, and major overhaul was conducted on six. Decisions were made last year on the elimination and relocation of a number of military facilities. Execution of one of these moves is being hindered by Gosplan [State Planning Committee] failure to execute the appropriate resolution

of the Council of Ministers. Last year alone, 42 individuals were held liable and subject to disciplinary, financial, and party measures for violations of environmental protection legislation. Over R4,000 were exacted directly from the guilty parties.

The speaker stated that negligence in previous years on the part of certain leaders, including military leaders, and sometimes at a criminal level, has led to petroleum-product pollution in those rayons where civilian and military airfields are located. And although there was some degree of success last year in regulating the storage and issue of aviation fuel, the problem of eliminating the aftereffects of prior activity remains. It will be difficult to accomplish this without the help of local organs, since the military district lacks the necessary personnel, resources, instrumentation, equipment, and technology.

Touching on matters regarding the Saldus training area, the speaker stressed that this test area was established based on instructions from the LaSSR Council of Ministers dated 25 May 1955. Its boundaries were selected as the optimal variant of that day which would result in the least amount of damage to the economy, nature, and the people of Latvia. Addressing the inadvisability of eliminating the training ground, the speaker cited the view of the Air Force Command, arguing the assertion that existing borders provide safety and security to the local population, and that work at the site is done under the supervision of inspectors, officials, and command personnel of the military district. In addition, the Saldus training ground is the only air center where combat training is developed and perfected for units located in Baltic Military District territory within the combat training system of all USSR Air Forces.

V. Romanenko went on to express his interest in developing closer contacts with the working group appointed by the Presidium of the LaSSR Supreme Soviet than existed previously. Referring to Comrade Chepanis' claim that representatives of the Baltic Military District failed to attend the group session, he stated that as a member of the group he was only informed of the 28 November meeting on 1 December. And there was only one meeting.

In Romanenko's opinion, the fact that Baltic Military District representatives were detached from the working group has led to the presence of many inaccuracies and errors in the information presented. It was indicated in the group's materials on the troop unit in Ventspils, for example, that biological purification facilities of 200 cubic-meter capacity were not providing purification of the 800 cubic meters of sewage entering the system. In actuality, these purification facilities, rebuilt in 1988, have a capacity of about 1,000 cubic meters per day. Also, it is stated in the group's materials that biological purification facilities at the Dobele unit are not functioning satisfactorily—but there is no indication that they are operating at overload, due to the fact that a rubber-engineering components plant, bakery, and other city facilities are switched on as well.

The speaker labeled as groundless assertions to the effect that there is no legal documentation to support the military's use of lands for forestry. Land-use documents with precise boundary indications for the land sections are classified secret and kept in the billing and operations administration of the military district. They may be produced upon request.

Makashov Addresses Party Congress

90US0308X Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Dec 89
Morning Edition pp 4-5

[Speech by A.M. Makashov, Colonel-General, Commander of the Volga-Ural Military District, Kuybyshev (Irbitskiy territorial electoral okrug, Sverdlovsk Oblast) at meeting of section of Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] **M. Makashov**, colonel-general, commander of the Volga-Ural Military District, Kuybyshev (Irbitskiy territorial electoral okrug, Sverdlovsk Oblast): Comrade Deputies! Engels had the party nickname "General." Under our conditions I think he would reject this nickname because everyone sees red when they look at the stripes on a general's trousers. To be honest, I, like all my colleagues who are generals, wear this uniform with honor, I am not ashamed of it, and I want the people to support us.

According to Engels, to continue the allusion, nothing depends on the economy so much as the army and navy. And this explains my speech.

There are several military sovkhoses in the Volga-Ural Military District. All of them are profitable, they all produce a profit. Why? Unlike the deputies who once defended dissertations on the subject of how unpromising the rural nonchernozem zone is, my colleagues and I, who have no professional knowledge of agriculture, do not try to interfere with it at all. I think that is one of the reasons why all our sovkhoses are profitable. I think this position can also be an example for other leaders, since it is the greatest kind of immorality to stick your nose into things you know nothing about.

Engels also said that every ignorant boor can see himself as a military strategist. Military affairs are complicated. And not everyone has had a chance to serve in the Army—some because of their health and others for other reasons. I repeat, military affairs are complicated. But in our day people who have devoted all of their life or their best years to the Army are now hearing people say that they are loafers, that they are not needed. This is a tragedy for the people. No nation and no government can act like that. They send people off to their deserved rest and pension with music—approximately the way we said farewell to Rodnina and Zaytsev. But we send our protectors off with reproaches. And, I repeat, they have given the Army the best years of their life.

In order to cut back the Army it is not necessary to cast slurs upon it first. We understand quite well, Comrades, who wants to say what about our Army.

I do not think that the party, under whose leadership we became a great power and won the cruelest war against fascism, can relinquish its leading role to those who remained in the rear during the war. And, I repeat, nothing depends on the economy as much as the Army and Navy.

Why are we always hurrying? Why are we always the first to disarm and then, breaking our backs, we restore what we have destroyed? This is the way it was in 1957 and in the sixties. For some reason we do not take the history of our country into account. Our neighbor has not sunk a single one of its aircraft carriers yet. And us? What we can make in a five-year plan they can make in a year.

People never lie so much as after a hunt and before a war. Let us compare the military budgets: Our neighbor has \$305 billion and we have 70 billion rubles. Not dollars, not pounds sterling, but rubles. There is already a joke going around that one pound of rubles is equal to one pound sterling. You simply compare this economy and you will see who is preparing for war. We military servicemen and cadre have to hustle to keep up.

Our government did the right thing when it refused to disarm unilaterally. We, comrades, cannot shame our neighbors through our unilateral actions.

It takes years and millions to set a division up in a new place. Our government must take a more cautious approach to military affairs and weigh everything because the supplies, the technical equipment, the people, and the families—all these are part of the military economy.

We show indecisiveness in places where we should have used force long ago. It is good to consider all this while sitting in an armchair in this warm hall. But put yourselves in the place of a man in uniform on the pass trying to separate people of two nationalities engaged in conflict, each of them calling themselves the greatest, the most ancient, and the most cultured.

I served for 10 years on the southern border and I know about this not from the newspapers, for I walked over all these territories on foot when I was young and then again when I was older. Why must a man from Sverdlovsk or Saratov die under a hail of stones or bullets without having the opportunity to take advantage of the law against a criminal? I sympathize with Comrade Volskiy, who had a Bible in one hand and the Koran in the other and was trying to appeal to the consciences of both peoples. We should still probably use power there because there is no response to any of our persuasion or any of our wishes in this hall, in the other hall, or there in the local areas, Comrades. We must observe the law but we must also use power.

Perhaps our government has no rights? Then we should probably give it these rights in order to bring law and order into the country. Or perhaps we should withdraw the troops and let them straighten the mess out for themselves as best they can. We see how you, the people's deputies, argue over every letter of the new laws. But they will not be fulfilled either because neither the existing Constitution nor the existing laws are being fulfilled. And this will be the case until the government and we deputies say: Enough!

What is "enough"? I shall explain. Since we are the ruling party we must demand of all leaders and party committees that they impose order, right down to the point of expelling people from the Communist Party. It is no secret that in resolving ethnic issues the leadership overtly or covertly allows negligence, and everything that happens is done with its consent.

Second. It is probably necessary to fire all leaders in a rayon or at an enterprise on whose territory the first stone might be cast or even one shot might be fired.

Third. We must immediately take state subsidies away from all rayons and oblasts where disturbances begin.

Fourth. Local measures should be taken against enterprises where strikes begin on ethnic grounds.

Those who wish to abandon our union must submit the bill without being ashamed: Plants, factories, and ports have been constructed with gold, gas, petroleum, and timber from the Urals and Siberia. And it would be desirable to know the number of subsidies that each republic will receive from the state budget, even in 1990. We are all living as one family and it is too soon to get up from the table without having paid. And here shyness is like stupidity.

Before deciding whether to fight or give up we must evaluate the situation, make calculations, and listen to specialists. This did not happen when the Supreme Soviet made the decision to release the students early. The 173,000 who were sent to the reserve undermined the combat readiness of the Soviet Army because all of them had undergone training in training subdivisions and were in positions of specialists and junior commanders. More than 700 tanks and 900 infantry vehicles were left without crews in the troop groups alone. In order to send one destroyer into battle its crew must be augmented with enough crew for five battleships. In the missile units it was necessary to organize combat duty for two shifts instead of three. The early dismissal of the students caused a sharp segmentation and stratification of men in the Army. Many doubted the fairness of the new laws and the decisions that were made. More than 14,500 of the students who were released early for training in VUZ's [higher educational institutions] did not return but joined the ranks of the trade and purchasing cooperatives. When inspected before discharge, more than 2,500 students had false documents. Here I would like to say: "Greetings to the newspaper PRAVDA which accused the USSR Ministry of Defense

of having a penchant for bureaucracy. The Army and Navy are experiencing all of the aforementioned difficulties because the commanders are overworked. But, Comrade Deputies, is it worth it to risk the country's defense capability for even one day?

And in conclusion. The 45th anniversary of our victory is approaching. We can adopt a regular decree, we can construct a regular monument, but, Comrades, look at yourselves. Even those who are over 60 and look so good must recall our veterans. And you must not stop at a decree or monument but really help them. Thank you. (Applause) [passage omitted]

Interview With People's Deputy, Col V.A. Pisarenko

90UM0190A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Dec 89 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel V.A. Pisarenko, people's deputy, first deputy chief Political Department of the Siberian Military District Air Force, under the rubric "Main Actors": "Deputy Pisarenko"]

[Text] Those voters who believe that a deputy's activity and adherence to principle are defined solely by the number of speeches he makes at the congress are mistaken. Colonel Viktor Andreyevich Pisarenko is a deputy from the Kamenskiy voting district of Altay Kray and first deputy chief of the Air Force political department of the Siberian Military District. And in fact he is not often at the rostrum. But he is nonetheless one of the main actors at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. And the resolutions adopted these days, so vitally important to the country, depend to a significant degree on him and on people like him.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Viktor Andreyevich, the congress is already on the home stretch. How would you characterize as a whole its work and the resolutions it has passed?

[Pisarenko] You can see that the discussion we are conducting is not very productive for the moment. I have 14 rayons in my district, I have been in each one, and I see and know what the people need. We need an emergency program to repair the economy, and we should do all we can to feed the country. If I were given the rostrum of the congress—and I have signed up to speak more than once already—I would propose that the government work out a program to rebuild, protect, and recondition agricultural production. We do not need to increase its production today. Why not? Because we produce enough potatoes to feed 1 1/2 billion people. But we do not have enough of them to feed 290 million people because we let them all rot.

Deputy A.F. Veprev, chairman of the Committee on Agrarian Issues and Production, asked me and three other deputies to drive down to the Moscow Railroad. Some 355 wagons full of meat have been sitting in Moscow for more than one week already. And no one is

unloading them. Does Moscow not need meat? It is all our mismanagement. And as a result I would like to propose the development of an emergency program.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What is most important to you in your capacity as a military deputy? What would you talk about at the congress' rostrum if you were given the opportunity to speak?

[Pisarenko] I have something to say about each of the issues being discussed. Just today I sent a note with a request to speak. I had several concrete proposals. I consider one of them extremely important—that the government develop a formal position regarding military reform. What do I have in mind? We are now moving toward a law-governed state. But our officers and our servicemen in general are, in my opinion, very poorly defended on social matters. Take Estonia for example. They are getting ready to pass a law requiring an officer to give up his living quarters after finishing his service and to return to where he was called up for service. I just discussed the matter with the Estonian deputies and tried to convince them of the absurdity of such a requirement.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And you would like to propose that the Supreme Soviet somehow express its attitude toward that?

[Pisarenko] Of course. And not just in any fashion, but in a formal position on military reform. If we are going to pass a law on defense, then we must certainly not design that law without a common position on military reform. We need to know what we are envisioning for the long term.

The state has changed our thinking on the level of a defense initiative. Today we affirm that the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces are not an aggressor and that our Army and Navy exist only to defend our own borders. This too should be expressed in a position on military reform so that the whole world knows.

If we are going to talk in general about the long-term development of the Armed Forces, then we need to decide once and for all not to build the Army and the Navy according to numbers of personnel but instead according to the quality of the military equipment and weapons and the readiness of the personnel to make use of those weapons to defend the Homeland.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] A few days ago you had a very interesting, important meeting with N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers...

[Pisarenko] In the course of 2 ½ hours we, the military deputies, had a conversation with him about the need for reform in the Army. We talked about everything, including service conditions and the lives of officers. That conversation was very necessary.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Did all the military deputies take part in that conversation?

[Pisarenko] No, just the officers. The conversation was highly confidential. Nikolay Ivanovich promised that measures will be adopted which will, we hope, help resolve the problems facing the Armed Forces.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] One last question. Some military deputies are complaining even from the rostrum of the congress that there are attempts to discharge this one, to oppress that one...

[Pisarenko] There has been no pressure on me. The command of the district has been meeting me halfway. Although, of course, such instances do occur. And the reaction of some military commanders to the work of the deputies leaves a lot to be desired, putting it mildly. Some are not taking it well that, for the first time, there are officers acting as people's deputies and that suddenly a senior lieutenant, a captain, or a major is asking some commander a question. The commander has never heard such questions, and now he must not only listen, but answer. This stereotype has been around for decades and must now disappear. Our leaders must see in the officer or general acting as people's deputy not their subordinate, but the people's representative, their accomplice in resolving the state's problems.

Baltic Fleet's Vice Adm Korniyenko on CC Plenum

90UM0201A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Dec 89 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Vice Admiral A. Korniyenko, Chief of the Political Directorate for the Baltic Fleet, conducted by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 3rd Rank V. Yermolin, under the rubric "Actual Interview": "On Positions of Unity"]

[Text] Vice Admiral A. Korniyenko, Chief of the Political Directorate for the Baltic Fleet and a member of the military council, participated in the work of the CPSU Central Committee Special Plenum and delivered a speech to the Plenum. Our correspondent, Captain 3rd Rank V. Yermolin met with him.

[Yermolin] Anatoliy Ivanovich, what ideas and sentiments did you bring to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum?

[Korniyenko] I was a delegate to the recently concluded 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. Naturally, today it is impossible not to think about what took place at that Congress. This is not a question of separate problems concerning only the republic's Party organization. Self-determination, which was proclaimed by the majority of the delegates to the Lithuanian Communist Party Congress, affects the fate of thousands of communists in the republic and, to a certain extent, the fate of every communist in the country as well. We, the military delegates to the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress, declared our positions unambiguously—to continue perestroika within the ranks of the CPSU. It must be stated that the atmosphere of the congress was tense

and nerve-racking. The chamber was very noisy and the opponents of the idea of self-determination had a difficult time at the rostrum. One had the feeling that the policy of separation from the CPSU was being carried out rigidly and energetically. I know that many delegates sensed a certain pressure being exerted on them. It seems to me that individual members of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee were led on by the right extremist wing of the "Sayudis" group. And, in essence, there wasn't even detailed counsel with communists nor discussion of this issue in the local Party organizations. The Party cannot be completely responsible for those who have chosen a policy of appeasement and endless concessions instead of a principled struggle against ideologues of secessionism and the separatists. As M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, noted in his address, "an organizational and political paralysis" has seized the leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party. In the end, as is generally known, the 20th Congress essentially carried out the instructions of the "Sayudis" group as far back as April by adopting a resolution on the independence of the Lithuanian Communist Party. I think that a frank and much needed discussion of the Party's fortunes took place at the Plenum. The situation is very crucial and the keynote of General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev's speech could serve as a slogan for this situation: "the fate of perestrojka is in Party unity".

[Yermolin] Today, the existence of two Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committees within the boundaries of the republic is a fact. Under these circumstances how will the Baltic Fleet's political officers and Party organizations organize their work?

[Korniyenko] The 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress itself has already repudiated the military delegates' attempts to draw attention to this question. We appealed to the presidium, but we did not receive an answer. The ties between Party organizations in the military units and local Party organizations did not just begin to unravel today and this has happened through no fault of our own. A significant portion of the Lithuanian Party members chose a policy of estrangement quite a while ago. Not to mention the Komsomol. The former patronal ties are gone. For example, Lithuanian youths have stopped coming to the patrol combatant "Komsomolets Litvy" on Komsomol vouchers. On the other hand, young people are frequently in the front ranks of those who are carrying out abusive actions against the Soviet Armed Forces... But everything that has been said above does not mean that we have broken off ties with the local population, including ties with the communist rank and file. We have good relations with the labor collectives and with the workers and collective farmers. Lithuania's working people treat people in military uniform with respect and goodwill. From this time forward, we, in alliance with the republic's workers and with all the healthy forces of the Lithuanian Communist Party, will stand on guard of socialism, while maintaining our defensive might at the necessary level.

[Yermolin] Did you also discuss this on the rostrum at the Plenum?

[Korniyenko] Yes, I shared my anxiety with the Party Central Committee members and related to them under what circumstances we, military people, are forced to carry out our military duty to the homeland.

[Yermolin] Anatoliy Ivanovich, the Plenum interrupted your own work. What is the reason for this?

[Korniyenko] First and foremost, the reason for this was the necessity to talk things over with the Lithuanian communists, to listen to the opinion in the provinces—in the labor collectives, and to state our views on the resolutions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress in an open discussion; as they say, to inform the broadest masses of the republic's communists of the CPSU Central Committee's position and of its uneasiness.

Glavpu: Military Communists "Against Federalization of CPSU"

In the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy

*90UM0201B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Dec 89 First Edition p 1*

[Unattributed article: "So That Perestrojka May Unite Us"]

[Text] An expanded session of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate Buro was held, at which practical measures were defined for getting CPSU Central Committee Plenum materials (M. S. Gorbachev's speech and Plenum resolutions) to all communists and Soviet Armed Forces personnel and for rallying servicemen, members of their families, and Army and Navy civilian workers and employees around the CPSU, its Central Committee, and the Soviet government in support of the concepts of perestrojka and revolutionary renewal of socialism.

The Buro noted that communists in the Soviet Army and Navy are vigorously opposed to the federalization of the CPSU. The federalization of the CPSU will inevitably undermine the organizational and ideological unity of its rank and file and its policy for consolidating society and strengthening the country's defense capability at a crucial stage of perestrojka.

Communists in the Army and Navy fully approve of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum resolutions dated 26 December 1989 and the appraisals and conclusions, which are contained in M. S. Gorbachev's address to the Plenum; and they urge the communists of Lithuania to wisely and comprehensively reassess the results of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress and to renounce the resolutions adopted at it, which are leading to separatism in the CPSU rank and file.

In letters and telegrams, which give a principled appraisal of the situation in the Lithuanian Communist

Party, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers expressed their attitudes toward the CPSU Central Committee Special Plenum resolutions. Party unity is the guarantor of perestroika and the revolutionary renewal of society. That is the position of the majority of the readers and the leitmotif of their letters to the editorial staff.

Preserve the Purity of the Springs

90UM0201B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Dec First Edition p 1

[Article by Mikola Upenik, member of the USSR Writers Union]

[Text] I support and approve of, and at the same time, am very worried about the fate of the CPSU Central Committee Special Plenum resolutions. I have a burning thought: do we not delay principled appraisals at times? Are we not mistaken, that we thereby grant freedom to the forces of nationalism and separatism, and afterwards, we adopt resolutions and attempt to rectify a situation in the Party and society that is anything but simple?

I would like to believe that the communists of Lithuania will correctly understand the concern of all of us over the fate of our multinational motherland.

I have been a member of the USSR Writers' Union since 1940. I have been a Party member for 57 years. Pavel Tychina, Konstantin Simonov, Arkadiy Kulyeshov, and Mirvarid Dilbazi were my teachers and friends...

On 22 June 1941, our company participated in the first attack encountering enemy fire and bayonets. And my comrades-in-arms—sons of fourteen fraternal nations—were with me.

I speak as a soldier and the Party organizer of a company in the Tarashcha Rifle Regiment, where I learned the power of brotherhood. And to this day I have a sacred belief in brotherhood. During the war years, the strength of our Union was tempered on the battlefields, in heated and bloody combat. Now it is peacetime. And the enemy did not penetrate our cordons. But, in my opinion, both brotherhood and friendship have been subjected to just as great a test of survival. One must clearly realize this, calling speculating on the most sacred feelings of ordinary people jobbery and calling hypocrisy—pharisaism.

I hope we do not muddy the pure springs.

Let the People Decide

90UM0201B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Dec 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by I Savelyev, Chita]

[Text] I became a member of the Communist Party in 1943. I do not think it is necessary to explain what kind of time this was for the country. It was a very grave time, in the literal sense of the word—a fateful time, for the future existence of our Soviet State was at stake. One

day, Private Revaz Gogishvili, a Georgian, Sergeant Ivan Panchenko, a Ukrainian, Private Gavriil Klyuchnikoy, a Yakut, and I received our Party membership cards...

A sense of responsibility for the fate of our motherland brought us into the Party ranks. In the Party we saw a rallying force, which was devoting all of its efforts to defeating the enemy and to victory.

Forty-six years have passed since that time. It is a different time now. But history loves parallels. It is peacetime, but the time, according to the responsibility it requires, is like wartime. Perestroika and the revolutionary renewal of society demand unity and purposeful actions from the Soviet people. And here the example of the Party, our political and moral leader, is important. Only the unity of its rank and file can ensure the success of perestroika. The news of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress's resolution to leave the CPSU caused much grief in my heart. I think it also grieved my sworn brothers in the Party from 1943. In the Ukraine and in Georgia, in Yakutiya and Russia...

I think they expected, as I did, that the CPSU Central Committee would react in some manner to this, that the Central Committee Special Plenum would reach some kind of decision.

I admit that I believed, as many other people did, that it was necessary to bang one's fist with a little more force and everything would fall into place. In my opinion, the Plenum acted much more wisely. The Congress did not include all the Party members in the republic. It is quite possible that the tone at the Congress was set by functionaries, who decided to use the country's temporary economic difficulties (I am sure that these difficulties are temporary) and the interethnic tension for the achievement of their own political ambitions. For this purpose, they have even resorted to splitting the Party. But what do Lithuania's communist rank and file and the people themselves think?

That is why the Plenum's decision to talk things over with the Lithuanian people and the communists and to send a number of Central Committee and Politburo members to the republic seems to be judicious, democratic, and the most reasonable in the present situation.

Lt Gen Kotov Interviewed as Candidate for People's Deputy

90UM0209A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Lt Gen Kotov, military construction engineer, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; date and place not given.]

[Text] Lieutenant-General L. Kotov has been nominated as a Candidate for RSFSR People's Deputy by a research institute collective. He is trained as a military construction engineer. He has served in the Northern Fleet, in the

Baltic, and in the Carpathian area. Since 1987 he has held the position of Chief of the Main Military Construction Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The following are Lieutenant-General L. N. Kotov's comments in response to questions put to him by our correspondent.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Lev Nikolayevich, before we start discussing the pre-election struggle—the fever heat of which you undoubtedly felt in your first meetings with the voters—I would like to ask you about matters pertaining to the past year. That year was special as far as your department was concerned, since Glavvoenstroy construction organizations and industrial enterprises underwent a change in the way they are managed.

[Kotov] Yes, in January of 1989 Glavvoenstroy elements made a smooth change to full economic accountability and self-financing. The change was smooth, because as early as 1988 all organizations and enterprises were reorganized along the lines of the collective contract. This kind of organization of labor took hold in our area and made it possible to take up the new form of economic management without incurring losses.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The most urgent problem on the minds of military personnel was and still is housing.

[Kotov] The Ministry of Defense has developed its own program within the guidelines of the well-known government program calling for the provision of either an apartment or house for every family by the year 2000. GVSU [Main Military Construction Directorate] organizations are to accomplish at least two-thirds of this program. In 1989 we had already completed construction of 500 apartments over and above the number planned. We believe that in two or three years we will actually be in a position to increase construction of housing in the western areas of the country (where the housing shortage is especially acutely felt) by 4,000 to 4,500 apartments a year. We can do this only on the condition of a steady supply of construction materials and equipment. The trend of a change to a wholesale basis in an environment of materials shortages and operating at the bidding of producers can seriously affect our plans.

I believe that this is a case requiring limited distribution by way of state order.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Last year military builders also provided "turnkey" housing in the area struck by earthquakes.

[Kotov] Yes, in that year we essentially built a temporary base for builders from the ground up, and we erected settlements consisting of modular apartment buildings of four to 12 units each, totalling more than 1,600 square meters. We completed 11 buildings consisting of 484 apartments. By 1 September we had completed two schools.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Lev Nikolayevich, what questions are you asked most often in your meetings with voters?

[Kotov] Many people are interested in how we are countering hazing of new recruits in construction units and what we are generally doing to strengthen discipline in subunits. My honest answer is that the time for optimism is still far off. We have quite a few problems. Especially disturbing is the fact that the ethnic conflicts in the Baltic, the Transcaucasus republics, and Moldavia are affecting relationships between military collectives.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Could it be said that the voters are also interested in your views on political events taking place in the life of the country?

[Kotov] There is no doubt about that, since voters are primarily interested in a politician that offers his own views on fundamental problems relating to future development of our society. Many people harbor concerns over Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, for example. I tell them that present conditions are such that the party's role cannot be specified in the Constitution. This role must be demonstrated by means of everyday deeds. The basic problem here is not Article 6 proper, but understanding the term "democracy." It is sometimes forgotten that democracy should be constructive. It should create, not destroy. Also, the constructive aspect of democracy has much to do with the functioning of a people's deputy. In addition, since I am a candidate for RSFSR people's deputy, I am asked: "What are your thoughts on the development of Russia's statehood?" I believe that Russia's equality with other republics in this regard must be established. There still is more talk than reality. I hope that the new membership of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet will resolve this problem.

Military Under-Represented in Kirghiz Local Elections

*90UM0221B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 12 Jan 90 First Edition p 1*

[Report by Col A. Ladin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Frunze, under the rubric "We Prepare for the Elections": "Missed Opportunities"]

[Text] **The registration of candidates for republic people's deputies and for the local soviets has been completed in Kirghizia. A total of 1,032 people have been recommended for people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR from 350 electoral districts. They represent 12 ethnic groups. Workers make up 84% of them; kolkhoz workers, 9%.**

Lt Col V. Karasev, member of the republic electoral commission for the election of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR and chief of the political section of the Kirghiz Military Commissariat, has reported to me that 11 army candidates have been registered for people's deputies of the republic. A total of 109 military personnel have been registered for the local soviets.

Is that a lot or is it few?

In answer to this question, B. Ishimov, head of the State-Legal Section of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee, said that, in his opinion, the military collectives, including the military commissariats and civil defense subunits were not capable of taking full advantage of the opportunities provided by election laws of the Kirghiz SSR for nominating their candidates. The members of servicemen's families residing at military posts were not noticeably active at the garrisons. As a result candidates from among the servicemen were not promoted at their place of residence.

"There are many worthy reserve officers and warrant officers who could become deputies at a number of garrisons located within our republic," B. Ishimov stressed. "For some reason, however, they did not receive the attention of the military collectives. The latter attempted to promote only those who are presently serving on active military duty. It seems to me that the army veterans could defend the interests of the popular masses in the soviets just as well, including representing those military collectives which could recommend them."

"I would sincerely like to see more representatives in the uniform among the candidates for deputy," Beksultan Bekmoldoyevich went on to say. "After all, the preelection campaign provides broad possibilities for publicizing the best people, of which the units, subunits and installations have many. Along with telling about the individual nominated by the military collective for deputy, so many good things could also be said about the army itself, about its glorious traditions, told truthfully, out of the mouths of candidates and trusted individuals, rebuffing the attacks which still continue now from one direction, now from another. And frequently, without any grounds.

"The pre-election fight for the mandates is beginning. I would like very much to see the army candidates set an example of how to conduct it openly and honorably, respecting the honor and dignity of their rivals. It should be admitted that some candidates take advantage of their service situation and try in front of the entire people to make their meetings with the electors as attractive as possible.

"I just held some pamphlets printed by the district newspaper about one of the military candidates. They are graphic and attractive. The efficiency is worthy of praise, of course. It would be a good thing, however, if all the army candidates for people's deputy received the same sort of support within the weeks immediately prior to the elections, both from the political directorate of the Turkestan Military District and from the command element, the political organs and the local party organizations. I do not want those who do not have the opportunity to take advantage of their high service position to be left in isolation.

"It is very important today, at a time when a struggle for power is underway locally, for the commanders and political organs of those units and installations which have advanced their candidates to interact with local party and soviet organizations and labor collectives. Civilian and military candidates should hold as many group and individual meetings as possible with their electors. They should include meetings of the military on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, at the plants and at the place of residence of civilians; and by civilians, in the military collectives.

"At the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee I heard that it is the candidates from among the military who are including in their preelection programs issues pertaining to the social problems of Great Patriotic War veterans, the former "Afghan" fighters and the families of those who died. I heard that in their speeches at the meetings they are raising issues pertaining to the preparation of the youth to serve in the army, the patriotic indoctrination of the population and the further unification of our multinational Union based on the principles of unity, friendship and cooperation.

"Let us hope that the electors will fittingly evaluate these programs."

Lt Gen Popov Comments on Republic Local Elections

*90UM0221A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Jan 90 First Edition p 1*

[Interview with Lt Gen Ye Popov, deputy chief of the Organizational Party Work Directorate of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, by Capt 3rd Rank V. Yermolin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "We Prepare for the Elections": "On the Restructuring Platform"]

[Text] Lt Gen Ye. Popov, deputy chief of the Party Organizational Work Directorate of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, answers questions posed by Capt 3rd Rank V. Yermolin, our correspondent.

[Correspondent] Yevgeniy Vasilyevich, elections of local soviets of people's deputies have been held in Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and elections of republic and local soviets in Turkmenia. The nomination of candidates for people's deputies of the supreme soviets of a number of Union republics has been completed and registration is underway. It is too early to talk about the final results, but could you at least give us your opinion about how the military candidates appeared in the current pre-election campaign?

[Popov] There is indeed no point in rushing with any kind of comprehensive assessments. One can already say with certainty, however, that the servicemen entered into the preelection fight actively and in most cases without any warm-up. The political organs and party organizations of military units are organizing their work

in the masses considerably more efficiently and flexibly and with greater initiative than during the elections of people's deputies of the USSR. For example, draft pre-election platforms of political organs and party organizations were published in the local press in many districts and fleets. The platforms were discussed in the military collectives, at meetings.... One could say that we are seeing the birth of a new form of collective counsel of the Communists on important political issues. It involves a free and open exchange of opinions and a joint search for solutions. It is also important that the residents of rayons, oblasts and republics are learning about the position of the political organs. Most of the platforms demonstrate concern by the servicemen for the political, economic and other problems of the areas in which they serve. A good knowledge of local problems and a goal-oriented program of action based on this cannot but win people over and generate trust in the electors.

The more extensively the election campaign is waged, the more significant its role appears in the fate of the nation and of the restructuring and the greater the interest of the people in what Soviet power will be like locally. It will either go into the hands of irresponsible demagogues and political extremists who want to discredit the restructuring and drive a wedge into the unity of the people, or the most prestigious and most active representatives of the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and the servicemen will enter the soviets.

[Correspondent] Do we have any sort of unified pre-election political platform on the part of the military candidates?

[Popov] In my opinion, the unity of the platforms lies in their adherence to the concepts of the restructuring, the building of real, humane socialism, radical reforms in the economy and further democratization of the society. I would add that the military candidates and the blue- and white-collar workers of the Soviet Army are active champions of discipline and order in all areas of the society's life. With respect to the individual programs of the candidates, they naturally reflect the views primarily of the candidates themselves. The present pre-election campaign has in most cases brought to the fore precisely prestigious individuals and people with their own principled opinions on the most diverse issues. The intensity of the debate during the recommendation of candidates for people's deputies is borne out by the fact that an average of three-four candidates were discussed at the meetings. The political activeness of the electors today is such that elections without alternative candidates are out of the question. I shall cite just a few figures describing the activeness of military electors of the RSFSR. More than 250 servicemen were nominated as candidates for deputies of the Supreme Soviet from the national-territorial and territorial electoral districts, with an average of six-eight candidates for one mandate. Remember that there are 29 military deputies in the current membership of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

[Correspondent] Does this mean that the deputies in the shoulderboards are guaranteed a certain number of slots in the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR?

[Popov] Of course not. There are no quotas today. The electors have the final say. And it should be mentioned that in the complex situation of the pre-election campaign most of the military candidates have proved themselves to be competent and vigorous people standing firmly on the platform of the CPSU. A difficult situation has been developing for us in the Baltic area, for example, but elections of local soviets have been held. In Latvia 172 mandates were entrusted to military personnel; 64 in Estonia. A total of 539 servicemen were elected to local soviets in the Kazakh SSR. The political organs and the candidates themselves are learning a great deal in the pre-election campaign. The most important thing, however, is the fact that people are mastering methods of public debate. The firmness of ideological positions, the clarity of assessments, stamina, tact and candor are being thoroughly evaluated. I am confident that gambling on pseudoradical views will attract and deceive few people. The people expect real changes, practical action and results.

[Correspondent] Yevgeniy Vasilyevich, you are a member of the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. Do you have to deal with any "purely military" aspects of the pre-election campaign? Do the military personnel have their own, specific problems?

[Popov] First of all I want to recall and stress this fact: "Servicemen enjoy the same electoral rights as all citizens." This is stated in the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. I would therefore not single out "purely military" issues, as you put it, from the general issues which our committee has to deal with. With respect to the difficulties most frequently encountered, they ordinarily result from an inadequately careful reading of the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR. Specifically, Article 32, which describes the procedure for recommending candidates for people's deputies of the RSFSR. One complaint about an alleged, deliberate violation of the Law for purposes of "eliminating" a candidate "unsuitable" to the command element from the pre-election campaign was reviewed on 9 January of this year by a working group of the Central Electoral Commission on Elections of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. The Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense has been ordered to review the grounds for officer N. Moskovchenko's advancement in the service and to inform the Central Electoral Committee and the complainant on the matter. In general, diversions in the evaluations of candidates for deputies are a normal thing. Few people receive the famous unanimity today even at meetings for recommending candidates for deputy. It is important strictly to observe the standards specified in the Law in this matter. These functions are carried out by the electoral commissions.

[Correspondent] The registration of candidates for people's deputies ends on 22 January, but preelection meetings with the electors are already increasing. This raises the question of whether some of the military candidates will not "be overwhelmed" by service duties and good conditions for preelection campaigning be created for others.

[Popov] The command element and the political organs are required to give the military candidate the opportunity to take part in the preelection campaigning on an equal basis. Meetings of the candidates with the electors strengthens the army's ties with the people and its prestige. Every person in charge must therefore not only provide the conditions for the military candidates for deputy specified by law but must also demonstrate a personal interest in expanding contacts with the population. The district electoral commissions are also required to provide equal opportunities for all the registered candidates for deputy. The commissions have the necessary funds and, together with the labor collectives and public organizations, they arrange meetings between the candidates for deputy and the electors and provide for the printing of leaflets and posters.

A crucial and extremely intense stage of the election campaign lies ahead. The results of the elections will depend in great part upon how constructive the program presented by the candidate deputies to their electors is and how well they convince the latter of the sincerity of their intent to work for the good of their homeland.

Referendum on Servicemen's Voting Rights

90UN0839C Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
17 Jan 90 p 2

[Report by P. Kuris, deputy of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet and Lithuanian SSR minister of justice, to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet in Vilnius; date not given]

[Text] At the behest of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium I notify you of the situation that has taken shape in connection with the calling of a referendum.

In accordance with the Lithuanian SSR Constitution, the solution of most important questions of the republic's state and public life and the enactment of Lithuanian SSR laws are possible by way of a referendum.

The Lithuanian SSR Referendum Act accorded republic Supreme Soviet deputies and the people the right to initiate the calling of a referendum. The act determines that public initiative regarding the calling of a referendum is expressed by a proposal of 300,000 citizens of the republic eligible to vote. On 15 November 1989 a group of 10 people eligible to vote registered in the Vilnius Notary's Office as the sponsor of the calling of a referendum. On 16 November the group began the collection of signatures of citizens of the republic to the following piece of text:

"I demand notice of a referendum, in the course of which citizens of the Lithuanian SSR will express their opinion as to whether servicemen who are not permanent residents of the Lithuanian SSR have the right to participate in the ballot for the election of deputies to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet or not. The referendum should be held prior to the elections to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet." The collection of signatures was conducted from 16 November through 10 December 1989, without infringement on the month's time frame determined by the Referendum Act. On 11 December, the sponsoring group of citizens handed the Supreme Soviet Presidium a proposal-petition from 422,411 citizens and a final act on the announcement of a referendum. Having received these documents, the Supreme Soviet Presidium verified the documents submitted by the sponsoring group in accordance with Article 11 of the act. The Presidium determined that 296,783 of the proposal-petitions had been filled in incorrectly, and it was decided on 18 December to suggest that the sponsors remove these shortcomings within 15 days. On 27 December the sponsoring group returned the former documents, but additionally submitted 31,357 citizens' proposal-petitions. The commission formed for determining the validity of the signatures to the referendum announcement reported that the documents submitted by the sponsoring group were in keeping with the requirements of Article 9 of the Lithuanian SSR Referendum Act.

On 8 January of this year the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium acknowledged that the documents submitted by the sponsoring group for the calling of a referendum were in keeping with the requirements of the act and that the final act could be handed to the Supreme Soviet.

The Referendum Act determines what actions can and should be performed by the Supreme Soviet upon the receipt of material from the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Article 12 of the act proclaims that upon receipt of a properly registered proposal the Supreme Soviet must issue a decree on the calling of a referendum, and Article 13 indicates the content of the decree on the announcement of a referendum. In other words, unless the Presidium establishes infringements of the law, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet on the question of the calling of a referendum is basically of a procedural nature, that is, determination of the date of the referendum. The Supreme Soviet is not accorded the right to waive notice of a referendum on any grounds other than those associated with infringements of the Referendum Act. In this case the public initiative is of higher legal force than the deputies' opinion. With regard to the authority accorded the Supreme Soviet by the act, the Presidium has prepared the draft Supreme Soviet decree "Notice of a Referendum". Wording of the decree of the following content is suggested:

1. In accordance with Article 5 of the Lithuanian SSR Constitution (Basic Law), to decide by way of referendum the question of the granting of servicemen who are not permanent residents of the republic the right to

participate in the balloting for the election of deputies of the Supreme Soviet and deputies of the local soviets of people's deputies of the Lithuanian SSR.

2. To hold a referendum on this issue on 11 February of the current year.

3. To instruct the republic Electoral Commission for the election of deputies of the 12th Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet to also exercise the functions of republic referendum commission, and the rayon and city (cities of republic jurisdiction) electoral commissions for the election of deputies of the corresponding soviets of people's deputies, the functions of rayon and city referendum commissions.

4. To determine that the electoral precincts formed for the election of deputies of the 12th Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet be identical to the precincts for the ballot for the referendum. To instruct the precinct electoral commissions to exercise the functions of precinct referendum commissions. I have to tell you that a different opinion has been made known at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet Presidium also. The deputies of the Supreme Soviet may themselves revise their decrees of 29 September 1989 and 7 December 1989 regulating the procedure of the entry into force of the laws on the elections of people's deputies of the Supreme Soviet and deputies of the local soviets of people's deputies. These decrees determine that prior to the realization of the Lithuanian SSR Citizenship Act, full suffrage is granted not only to permanent residents with the right to republic citizenship, but also nonpermanent residents in the person of servicemen of military units stationed on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR. In the opinion of the supporters of this position, the path of referendum is too costly a method of settling the conflict between the deputies and the electorate since it would cost the republic more than R1 million.

The sponsors of the referendum who took part in the meeting of the Presidium told the Supreme Soviet Presidium that they aspire not to the holding of a referendum, but to a change in the Election Act. Given the appropriate changes by the Supreme Soviet, they would forgo the demand for a referendum. Consequently, if the deputies themselves decide to alter the decisions which they made earlier, it would be sufficient to vote for the revocation of Clauses 2 of both decrees (of 29 September 1989 and 7 December 1989) according nonpermanent residents of Lithuania who are not citizens of the Lithuanian SSR the right to participate in elections. But the Referendum Act did not accord the Supreme Soviet the right not to call a referendum even in the event of the sponsoring group waiving this demand. The expression of the wishes of 300,000 voters is deemed more important in this case. Such an obvious miscalculation in the act could be eliminated at this session, the Referendum Act having been supplemented by the following provision: "The sponsors of a referendum have the right to waive the proposal they have submitted for the announcement of a referendum before the Supreme

Soviet has issued a decree on the announcement of a referendum." Such wording could be inserted in Article 12 of the Referendum Act.

Another version of the addition to Article 12 of the Referendum Act is possible also. Thus given the establishment of the right of the Supreme Soviet not to call a referendum on an issue in respect of which an initiative of the electorate concerning a referendum has been expressed if this issue has already been resolved by another method or other path. In this case the adoption of an amendment to the Referendum Act and a change in the Supreme Soviet decrees on election laws would preclude the need for a referendum.

Lithuanian Report of March 89 Attacks on Units, Convoys

90UM0326D Moscow TRUD in Russian 23 Feb 90 p 3

[Report by TASS correspondent, Vilnius, 22 Feb: "Acts of Provocation Against Soldiers"]

[Text] The republic press has published a report from the press bureau of the State Security Committee of the Lithuanian SSR confirming a report previously published in the republic newspaper RESPUBLIKA that a military convoy was fired upon in the area of Alitus. Three shots were fired from a passing VAZ-2106 (the state [license] numbers were not identified).

The report also stated that other such incidents have been registered in the republic. The guard post for the depots of a military unit stationed at Kalvariya was attacked in March 1989. A group of soldiers was also fired upon from a motor vehicle there in August. The depot of a military unit stationed at Panevezhis was fired upon on 19 August. In September a group of intoxicated young people threw rocks at the sentry of a military unit at Ukmerge.

It was noted that the insulting of servicemen and their families have become more frequent in the republic. All of this was bound to affect the mental climate in the military collectives. Tensions are mounting in them. There have been cases in which the fire has been returned. Fortunately, there have not yet been any casualties.

The State Security Committee of the Lithuanian SSR, together with the leadership of the military units, internal affairs organs and the republic procuracy, are investigating the circumstances surrounding such incidents, their causes and objectives. Several of the guilty parties have been brought to administrative accountability. The report stresses the fact that due to the complex political situation in the republic, such acts of provocation can have serious consequences. The hope is expressed that the mass media, public organizations and movements and citizens will condemn such acts and their perpetrators.

Platform of Candidate Maj Gen Just Yu. Arkhipov

90UM0326B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Feb 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Maj Gen Just Yu. Arkhipov by Lt Col V. Kaushanskiy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "We Prepare for the Elections": "The Spirit and Letter of the Law"]

[Text] The nomination of candidates for people's deputies of the Georgian SSR has been completed. According to members of the republic's Central Electoral Commission, the degree of political activity in the republic surpassed all expectations. There were 2,947 nominations for the 300 seats in the deputy corps. We would also mention the fact that 14 of the candidates are military men, twice as many as in the previous elections.

Today we are giving Maj Gen Just Yu. Arkhipov, candidate for people's deputy of the GSSR and chairman of the Military Tribunal of the Transcaucasus Military District, an opportunity to speak in an interview by our correspondent.

[Correspondent] Yuriy Georgiyevich, you have registered as a candidate for deputy from the 38th Metrostroy Electoral District in Tbilisi. It should be noted that this is a fairly diversified district with respect to both social and ethnic makeup. In addition to Georgians and Russians, it has a substantial representation of Armenians, Kurds and Greeks. Did you give any thought to whether these exclusively civilian people would prefer a man in shoulder-boards, a general and military legal expert to the other contestants?

[Arkhipov] In the first place, I was nominated as a candidate by the collective of a military unit. And secondly.... You know that from the earliest times it has been a tradition of our people for a person to go to a military man when he needs help. Both when the elements run rampant and when human passions go amok.

[Correspondent] The platform of a candidate for deputy in one way or another reflects his professional interests. Whatever is troubling him, as they say....

[Arkhipov] I based my platform precisely on the problem areas of our contemporary existence. People are tired of constant fear and inter-ethnic reprisals. It is my goal to return tranquility to the people, to normalize relations between the military and the local population, to promote to the maximum the protection of the rights and interests of citizens against extremist elements. I shall therefore strive to develop further the legislative work of the soviets. But that is not all. The problem areas include the social and legal protection of servicemen and their families and the improvement of their housing and general living conditions. There are still plenty of obstacles in this area.

I would like to single out for special attention the rehabilitation of Soviet people repressed from the '30s to

the beginning of the '50s. None of this can be put off. A new generation is entering life, who consider themselves morally aggrieved until family and relatives have been given back their good name.

[Correspondent] The inter-ethnic situations in the region sometimes remind one of a labyrinth from which there is no escape. This image is created by the inaction of law-enforcement agencies. How do we get out of this predicament?

[Arkhipov] By taking a course toward active dialog with those forces which are capable of soberly assessing the situation and meeting one halfway.

[Correspondent] And if there is no dialog? Those who intimidate the people with threats and manipulate their minds by proclaiming priority for narrow national interests now even want kings and create evil in a situation of impunity.

[Arkhipov] But do you know why there is impunity? To this very day there is no legislative act which would precisely regulate the functioning of what we call unofficial formations. As a deputy I will strive to see that the law is applied to people who use threats, blackmail and calls for violence in their arsenals. Why is it that if you yell at the top of your lungs in the midnight quiet of a street, your actions are considered to be violations of public order, but if you bring a couple of dozen bellowing people to a state establishment in the light of day and threaten Soviet authority, the response is silence on the part of law-enforcement agencies? Or take the desecration of state symbols—the state emblem and flag—which is becoming a vile trend. Just try to do something like that on the streets of American cities.

I see an entire array of crimes in the actions of certain unofficial groups. First, however, the USSR Supreme Soviet must pass a legislative act forbidding actions incompatible with the law. Incidentally, are these groups actually so unofficial when they assume the functions of state organs: the checking of papers on the roads and the inspection of personal possessions and vehicles, as occurred on routes linking Armenia and Azerbaijan. Since we are moving toward a law-based state and focusing on political methods of resolving conflicts, however, our opponents too must be subject to the law, thereby halting their slide toward open extremism.

[Correspondent] And we are obviously not going to get around the alarming fact that thousands of weapons have been collected in the hands of the population. According to the reports, people are not rushing to relinquish them....

[Arkhipov] So long as there are weapons in the hands of the extremists, tensions will not abate in the region. That is clear to me. The thing that bothers me most, however, is the fact that most of the people steal the weapons with impunity despite the severity of the law. Criminal charges have been made, it is true, but that is only a drop in the bucket. I believe that there are two paths for the

deputy. The first involves explaining and persuading people of the danger posed by the passion for keeping an arsenal in the home; the second, precisely applying the laws. I believe that these laws should be strengthened somewhat. We need severely to punish not only actual theft but even attempted theft. Some local organs actually regard an attempt to disarm the military department at an institute, as an example, as a childish "prank." The "pranksters" did a good job at the VUZs in Yerevan, but no one has been punished.

[Correspondent] And what about the theft of weapons by military personnel themselves? How is such a thing possible? Incidentally, if there are cases of this, please give us some statistics.

[Arkhipov] The military tribunal convicted more servicemen of stealing weapons and ammunition in the district last year than the year before. So that the number is increasing. Why is this possible? The demand creates the supply, and impunity creates hopes of getting by with it because of our exasperating obliviousness.

[Correspondent] Unfortunately, privately held weapons are not the only bane in the Transcaucasus. On the squares of three Transcaucasus capitals I saw "run-aways" from the army. They have now calmly taken their place in the ranks of the militants.

[Arkhipov] What you are talking about is included in my deputy's platform. The evasion of military service is indeed assuming serious proportions. And it should be candidly admitted that in some places the influence of unofficial organizations has proven more powerful than the work performed with inductees by official, so to speak, institutions. The former went into the masses, while the latter busied themselves writing reports. Add to this the anti-army articles in the press. Also the connivance of local authorities. Previously some individuals went "unwillingly" into the service, they still went, but today they prefer to be "dissenters" or "run-aways." We convicted 94 people of evading service last year (87 in 1988). The military construction workers alone "ran up" more than 2,000 days.

[Correspondent] What lies ahead? Are the screws going to be tightened?

[Arkhipov] That depends upon what you mean. If we find 100 dissenters, do we put them all behind bars? Of course not. We have to delve deeply into it all. We have to perform specific work and begin with the schools, the induction centers and the mass media. I believe that we must restore the institution of deferments from military service for students at a VUZ. There is no reason to create an elite for whom service and duty to the homeland remain just an expression, an ineffectual article of the Constitution.

[Correspondent] Are you not afraid that after what you have said is published, your potential electors among the youth will reject your candidacy?

[Arkhipov] But do you really think that a legal expert can conduct a preelection campaign "with his cards concealed," counting on aces up his sleeve in case of a favorable outcome?

Electoral Platform of Lt Gen Boyko

90UM0339A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Lieutenant-General N. Boyko by Colonel A. Yurkin: "We Prepare for the Elections: The Supporting Edge of Power"]

[Text] Lieutenant-General N. M. Boyko, member of the Military Council and chief of the USSR Air Defense Forces Political Directorate, is registered to run as a candidate for RSFSR Peoples' Deputy in the Perm National-territorial Electoral District Number 63. The son of a front-line soldier, he began his career as an officer in an surface-to-air missile regiment in the Urals. This supporting edge of power, where worker and soldier are always in service to the Fatherland, has become his home.

Here is what Nikolay Makarovich had to say to our correspondent:

[Boyko] I have a special relationship with the Western Urals and its workers. I have spent a third of my life here—my best years, my youth. I have many friends here. My schoolmates from the Perm State University, where I completed my education in the history department, are here. My wife, Galina Mikhaylovna, is descended from a family of Ural workers. All their lives they have worked at the Zlatoust Plant. In meetings with voters at the nationally prominent, award-winning Lenin Machine-building Plant, I have found people I have known for a long time. It is true that this did not prevent us from speaking frankly, without cutting corners.

[Yurkin] Within the district there are fourteen candidates for the deputy position. A heated battle is underway and it is important that voters know the constructive positions of the platform. What are the special features of the platform?

[Boyko] My platform is based on the concept: "to actively influence the solution of Russia's social-economic and ecological problems and to take care of man." This platform derives from the pressing reality of our Republic and the industrial Urals. It is necessary to do everything possible to make the environment in which man lives healthy. Then it will be a pleasure both to live and work. In Perm and in the seven rayons of the oblast which make up the electoral district we see the same problems everywhere. Water, air, medicine, transportation, and commerce—everything requires the most careful attention. If urgent measures are not taken, Russia will lose golden cadres of skilled workers from the Urals.

Many industrial enterprises in the district are slated for conversion. The retrofitting of production lines is proceeding at full speed; and this is where one can encounter the extremes that are characteristic of us. For example, at one of the plants they are planning to manufacture washing machines on production lines that once turned out military hardware. Moreover, washing machines will be put into production at another one hundred defense industrial enterprises. But the most amazing thing is that these units already are not market-competitive due to their limited consumer parameters. Who will need these washing machines in another year or so and of what profits can the Urals workers dream? What funds will they use to build houses and polyclinics and where will they find money for ecological measures?

The workers are asking me: 'How can this be?' I respond, relying upon precise data, such as; only at National Air Defense repair enterprises is it presently possible to realize an eight-fold increase in the production of consumer goods over what was done previously. What is more, this can be done without major outlays for retrofitting and without loss of production processes and skilled workers and engineers. Conversion questions require careful study and Deputies of the Russian Parliament cannot avoid them.

[Yurkin] Your assertion that you will do what you can to 'keep from disarming the army from the rear' is finding support among the plant workers; but surely you cannot forget about military people?

[Boyko] Conversion as it is proceeding today is a painful process both for workers and for the military. Some are compelled to look for work while others must hunt for spare parts for military hardware. There are many disconnects and not just in regards to these questions. For example, road-building battalions are at work within my electoral district. The Urals, as in other regions of Russia, are literally choking from the lack of roads. This was a good idea and the military road builders are

working diligently and giving little thought to their own needs. They are living as if they were on the front! The officers and warrant officers do not have quarters. This means that future deputies must worry about improving social and living conditions and helping in the financing and fitting out of the military garrisons. For the time being the soldiers and officers are building roads which are in essence bringing a new life to remote areas of the Urals; but they themselves are suffering. One cannot help some people while forcing others—who happen to be in military uniforms—to barely scrape by.

The veterans, with whom I met in Perm, have advised me that they have criticized the fact that my program does not give special attention to their problems. I have taken their criticism into consideration, but I explained that I am not accustomed to making empty promises. These front-line soldiers and I have agreed that through joint efforts we will speed up the construction of the hospital and will establish an active rather than a formal leadership of the garrison units; they can do a great deal for the veterans. In turn I asked those who had served in World War II to assist in the training of the residents of the Urals for military service. We must not permit the quality of the soldier from the Urals and Siberia to be lost.

[Yurkin] What are your impressions from your meetings with the people of the Urals?

[Boyko] The people of the Urals are remarkable and the Urals district is truly crucial to power. It is a pity that we had forgotten this for so many years. The people have grown weary of their burdens and of half-truth. One finds joy in the fact that the workers' sharpness has not failed and that they are interested in the business of the government. The workers love their army and they are worried about its authority. I do not know if I will manage to become a deputy—the voters of the district will make that decision. But it is no shame to give heart and soul to the Urals.

Historical Lithuanian Republic Military Doctrine Reexamined

90UM0219A Vilnius SOBYTIYA I VREMYA
in Russian No 22, 1989 pp 21-23

[Article by Virgiliyus Lyaushka in the column: "Documents": "Military Doctrine of the Lithuanian Republic"; first paragraph is SOBYTIYA I VREMYA introduction]

[Text] The first order issued by the Army of the Lithuanian Republic was signed on 23 November 1918. That is considered to be the day of its founding. The battles for independence ended in the latter part of 1920, after an international commission established a 10-kilometer neutral zone between the Lithuanian and Polish armies. What was next? What kind of army was Lithuania to maintain in peacetime? Did a small country have need for an expensive army? Answers to these questions were sought by the originators of the military doctrine.

First Experiences

In the beginning of 1922, the Operations Department of Army Headquarters presented the government with a weighty document: "On the New Military Doctrine Adopted by the Lithuanian Army" (Central State Archives, Book 929, List 3, File 445). The principal statement was: "Every properly organized army is provided with a definite military doctrine... A doctrine is the principal trust that creates a military-state system and that is set forth in a number of definite rules, such as those pertaining to how the soldier is to be trained and how he is to fight." It is further noted that the Lithuanian Army arose from the "chaos of the Russian Revolution and victory over the Germans, and that it was nourished by the remnants of the army of the time of the Russian emperor." The causes of this disorder were found in the technical backwardness of the czarist army and the birch-rod discipline, the "agony in the trenches." The army of the emerging Lithuanian state was to be made up of people who were "morally and physically fit, mentally alert and possessing the necessary military-technical training." Technical rearmament of the army was consistently stressed. In practical terms, what kind of army should the Lithuanian Army be? Three choices were proposed: a standing army; a militia; and a transitional type of army. Which version was the best? "Based on general considerations and bearing Lithuania in mind specifically, the conclusion is reached that the work of its state enlightenment and educational institutions are still inadequate relative to producing a trained citizen-soldier... This work should be carried out in an army that also exists in peacetime. That is, although Lithuania as yet cannot adopt a militia system, it should, the same as other European countries, temporarily adopt a system that is transitional between a standing army and a militia." (Same source) It was proposed to establish for this purpose two-year compulsory military service; while higher officer courses would be provided for by a general staff department. (Such a department was established in 1932.) The army was to be organized as follows: combat

group (10 to 15 men); platoon (three or four combat groups); company (three platoons); battalion (three rifle companies, one heavy machinegun company, one light mortar platoon); regiment; division. The Polish and French armies were to be used as models. It was considered that the main branch of the army would be the infantry, since "only it was capable of defeating an enemy with its fire and maneuver." The authors of the document were definitely impressed by the automatic weapon, which had been employed in infantry engagements on the battlefields of World War I. Since aircraft and tanks had not proved themselves to be independent branches of the army, they rated only a slight reference: "Tanks facilitate movement of infantry but do not accomplish independent missions." The problem of interaction between army branches took on added importance with the subsequent development of the Lithuanian military doctrine, especially after Poland was defeated in the war with Germany.

In a congress of division commanders and other high-ranking officers held in Kaunas on 26-27 April 1922, it was resolved to adopt a transitional army as the basis of the military system. There was an acute shortage of educated commanders in the Lithuanian Army, especially in line units. For this reason, the officer corps became the focus of attention. Since it was necessary to attract capable village youths to service in the officer corps, it was decided to petition the government for provision of lands to officers and their families, grant officers' children free education in secondary schools, establish pensions, and "in general improve the material situation of officers." (CSA, Book 929, List 3, File 445) The congress resolved to consider as the basis of the army organization not the combat group (known as the "combat detachment"), but rather the smaller "element." The ensuing request was essentially approved. A company of commissioned instructors assembled in the fall of that year to test the new field and line principles.

May of 1925 saw the issuance of the new journal for Lithuanian officers KARDAS (SWORD). It did not analyze the organization of the Lithuanian Army; instead, it presented an appeal to look critically at the military doctrines of the Western countries, while keeping in mind the wide borders of Lithuania. Number 19 for the same year contained an interview with Latvian War Minister Bangerskis that had been published in the Latvian press; it presented a more modern view of such matters. For example, aviation, which was not mentioned in the Lithuanian military doctrine, should be assigned a position of great esteem, since, in the opinion of the Latvian minister, "... in a future war the air force of a country will attempt to demoralize the air force of another country and paralyze the country's rear, bombing the most significant transportation and strategic points." The armies of the large European countries were already provided with hundreds of combat aircraft, while the Soviet Union had more than a thousand. However, the Lithuanian High Command did not take note of this pivotal point in military affairs.

Shkirpa's Involvement with Military Bureaucrats

In July of 1926, Lieutenant Colonel K. Shkirpa, who had just acquired a military education abroad, was appointed Army chief of staff. At that time the Lithuanian Army consisted of three understrength divisions; a separate infantry regiment in Klaypeda; four artillery regiments and a training battery; two cavalry regiments and a training troop; an equipment regiment; a small group of armored vehicles (about a dozen light tanks); six understrength aviation squadrons and a training squadron. There was a total of 11,700 men in the Army. Manpower was at about the 50-percent level. The term of service was down to a year to 18 months. Singularly impressive was the corps of higher-ranking officers: Serving in the Lithuanian Army were three generals possessing the authority of corps commanders; one corps commander; one military district commander; 12 division commanders; 13 brigade commanders; and 63 regimental commanders. K. Shkirpa in a letter to the war minister noted ironically that "Regarding awarding of ranks, we have overextended ourselves. We have only about 12,000 men, i.e. the strength of one division, but so many high ranks that we could staff four corps." (CSA, Book 929, List 3, File 536) In his opinion, Lithuanian Army organization was not responsive to the problem of protecting the territory politically. The organization was not economic, for there were too many headquarters; housekeeping, administrative, and other service apparatuses. He points out relative amounts paid out in salaries for one month: in June of 1926, staff officers received 4.96 million lits, while line officers were paid almost 1.5 million lits less. That is why the number of soldiers was insufficient to hold tactical battalion and regimental exercises. It was K. Shkirpa's opinion that there was "no possibility to organize a more serious mobilization, which, it must be stressed, was of major importance to Lithuania's situation." (The first mobilization plan—directive "L"—was completed on 29 November 1935.) He gave a poor rating to virtually the entire military organization and all the armament. For example, the artillery pieces were of various calibers; technical units were reorganized into a single regiment; armored trains were not suitable for modern warfare. (A lesson could be learned from the battles for independence, wherein the armored train "Gediminas" was disabled by the Poles as early as the first battle for the Varena Rail Center.) "Defense of the territory is at the learning level," concluded K. Shkirpa. "I was not given any war plan. I suspect that one never existed in headquarters."

K. Shkirpa, the intellectual officer, evidently was dissatisfied with the route of political compromise—particularly as it pertained to Vilnius—foisted on Lithuanians by the politicians. A clear military policy was out of the question until the Vilnius problem could be resolved. In addition, after J. Pilsudski seized power in Poland in 1926, military slogans were directed at "Kovno Lithuania" from there. At that time, a corps of 28,000 men was stationed in Grodno; a division of legionnaires in Vilnius; and a cavalry brigade in the suburbs. Due to its military helplessness, Lithuania

could have become an easy prey in three or four days. Therefore, K. Shkirpa proposed strengthening the border and organizing protection of the most dangerous approach routes on an urgent basis, thus gaining time for possible mobilization, which would require three or four days to bring Army strength up to four divisions. Were it not for the time wasted examining this plan, it is possible that it would not have been necessary to accept the disgraceful Warsaw ultimatum in 1938. Other concessions followed. If a more advantageous political time had been awaited, it would have been possible to recover Vilnius—and Klaypeda as well—by means of Lithuanian forces alone. Once again we see K. Shkirpa's opinion at play, whereby he was not far from the truth, with the consequences of the political ambiguity descending upon Lithuania in 1939, a time when we received not only Vilnius, but also a Trojan horse.

Legal Basis of the Military System

For 16 years the military organization of Lithuania was managed on a spontaneous basis. The first congress of division commanders established a mere loose organizational framework; not a single statute, not a single military directive possessed the force of law. High-sounding words about the "heroic spirit" were meaningless, of course. After the nearly successful putsch by the Voldemarasites in the first part of June of 1934, once more it became necessary to state that: "In the area of protection of the territory, preference was given to the will of God." (KARDAS; No 1, 1935) The new Army chief of staff (subsequently Army commander), S. Rashtikis, initiated reform by introducing regulations and legalizing the leadership. The year 1934 saw the passage of a law on the military high command, which provided for the subsequent military hierarchy: the commander in chief of the Armed Forces (the President, who would call for mobilization and order the Army Commander to initiate military action); the minister of war (in charge of the Army; chief of military supplies; military procurator; legal adviser to the ministry); the Army Commander (who was immediately above the Army chief of staff, commanders and inspectors of divisions and of branches of the Army, chiefs of military schools, and the commander of the Shaulyu sayunga (Union of Riflemen); he approves mobilization and operations plans; decides on troop location; and reviews the mobilization plan of all institutions and departments). In 1935 the Shaulyu sayunga was militarized and various organizations were created to render assistance to the Army. The Army was included in the celebration of annual social holidays in Kaunas and the districts. S. Rashtikis understood well that the new generation had not experienced the odor of gunpowder in the battles for independence and knew nothing about the Army. Skillful propaganda and competent commanders were certain to produce an educated, not an illiterate, youth who would defend the Motherland.

Efforts were finally initiated to put the military organization in step with politics. The "Little Entente" agreement signed in Geneva in 1934 was supplemented by

military contacts in Riga, and military expenditure began to rise. In 1935 there were appointments of young commanders to positions of commanders of divisions, commanders of branches of the Army, and chief inspectors: General E. Adamkavichyus; Colonels P. Pundzyavichus, M. Reklaitis, V. Zhilis, V. Vitkauskas, V. Karvyalis; and others. In a year or two, having hardly attained the age of 40, they were awarded their generalcy. In 1938, after the higher military school was established, cadre rotation was initiated. In the middle of the 1930s, after the collapse of the concept of European collective security, they and the politicians were assigned the task of completing the development of the Lithuanian military doctrine, while bearing in mind the principles of neutrality and security. Finland, which maintained a peacetime army of about the same strength as Lithuania (25,000), dealt successfully with the problem. Lithuania did not take advantage of the opportunity.

A Question of Major Importance

Lithuania's military doctrine continued on its course and overcame a multitude of problems. A general consideration of the problem would encompass military education and military training; the defense industry; and the activity of the Army's brain trust—its staff; development and interaction of the individual divisions and branches of the Army; external politics; and effect of ideology on military construction. In conclusion, we shall discuss an outline of a—to use K. Shkirpa's expression—"problem of major importance": mobilization and protection.

The first protection plan "L" ("lyankay" - Poles), as it was called, was completed in 1935. In the first part of 1938, a protection plan consisting of three parts was completed: "V" ("vokechay" - Germans); "L"; and "V" + "L" (Poles and Germans). It became clear after Poland's defeat that even if large units were transferred from the borders (as assumed by K. Shkirpa as early as 1926), a surprise invasion would result in a situation whereby it would be impossible to prevent encirclement and loss of entire units, with attendant disintegration and military catastrophe. For that reason the military press and orders issued by Army Headquarters started to stress the need to base protection not so much on force as on erection of obstacles, with the participation of the militarized Shaulya sayunga organization. Suggestions were made to expand military collaboration with the Latvians. As early as 1934, at the time when Germany was increasing its military might, the military press focussed its attention on the Baltic countries as a corridor for Germany's possible eastward expansion, specifically toward Leningrad. For that reason, it was repeatedly emphasized that the borders of Estonia and Latvia "originate in the lower reaches of the Niemen River."

In preparing the mobilization directive in 1940, the Army Operations Department proposed a plan involving Latvia intended to defend northern Lithuania: "The elongated territory of Latvia, if invaded from the south by a powerful and mobile enemy, leaves no hopes for defending units to

gain sufficient time... The Latvian Army, in dealing with its own mobilization and the possibilities of concentration, should take into account the small forces available for our defense in the Taurage- Shyaulyay direction and the narrow space in the area most dangerous relative to Latvia (Latvia's 70-kilometer border between Ionishkis and Riga), to attempt to transfer its country's defense to our territory, at least in the first phase of the war." (CSA, Book 929, List 3, File 1152) It was proposed that the Latvians protect Shyaulyay by adding to their sector the defense of Dubisa and Venta in the north-western direction. However, these provisions were not included in the mobilization directive of 1940; in the defense plan assigned to the 3d Infantry Division (north-western zone, with headquarters in Shyaulyay, General M. Reklaitis) dated 16 March 1940, admittedly referred to as "temporary instructions," there was also no mention of a defense to be executed jointly with the Latvians. The same situation obtained in the case of collaboration with garrisons of the Red Army, although Lithuanian Army Headquarters considered this possibility after an agreement was signed on 10 October 1939 and the Red Army was said to be an "ally." M. Reklaitis' division was assigned the unequivocal mission of occupying the following within 48 hours after the announcement of general mobilization: Telshyay-Ionapole-Varnyay-Laukuva-Kaltinenay-Nemakshyay. Some of the division's defense units were moved closer to the border: Taurage, Plunge, and Varnyay. The 2nd Division covered Kaunas, while the 1st Division defended south-eastern Lithuania. This mission was especially difficult in the Vilnius territory—the area from Vilnius to the USSR border—a distance of about a mere 20 kilometers. This was evidently the reason why priority was given to the mobilization plan for 1st Division. The wartime schedule called for the immediate formation of new units in Vilnius and Ukmerge. It appears that directive "R" ("rusay" - Russians) was implemented in this manner before possible invasion by the Red Army. Our archives contain only excerpts from this plan. In accordance with the 1940 Directive, infantry regiments located in Panevezhis and Kedaynyay were to be reformed into the 4th and 5th divisions. To implement the directive, it was necessary to relocate some units; prepare supply depots for the mobilization and quarters for the new units; refine the lists of tens of thousands of persons subject to call-up; draw up an inventory of transportation vehicles; and synthesize all of this in Army Headquarters. An enormous amount of work was accomplished in four months, and in the first part of June the directive took effect.

The rebirth of Lithuania was associated with that of the concept of national units. That was natural. For statehood requires everything that goes with it, including an army. The time has come to provide youth with a military-patriotic education and a modern spirit; and dust off the history of the Army of the Lithuanian Republic, just as we are doing in the case of graves and monuments to participants of the battles for independence.

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Tadzhik Supreme Soviet on State of Pre-Draft Training

90UM0214A Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA* in Russian 10 Nov 89 p 1

["In the Presidium of the Tadzhik SSR Supreme Soviet"—Tadzhik News Agency headline]

[Text] As previously reported, the Presidium of the Tadzhik SSR Supreme Soviet has considered the issue of Republic accomplishment of legal requirements pertaining to preparing pre-draft and draft-age youth for active duty in the USSR Armed Forces.

It the ensuing decree the point is made that there are serious shortcomings and omissions in the activity of the Tadzhik SSR Education, Health, and Internal Affairs ministries; in the Military Commissariats, Ispolkoms of local Soviets of People's Deputies; and in other republic departments having an interest in training pre-draft and draft-age youth for active duty in the USSR Armed Forces.

Not all youths are given pre-induction training, with the quality of the latter often wanting in a number of secondary schools and vocational and technical schools in Khatlonskaya Oblast; Khodzentskiy, Proletarskiy, Ganchinskiy, Ayninskiy rayons of Leninabad Oblast; in Rushanskiy, Vanchskiy, Murgabskiy, and Kalai-Khumbskiy rayons of GBAO [Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast]; and in a number of rayons that come under republic jurisdiction.

Equipment availability is extremely poor in many schools. Only 237—14 percent—of the republic's schools are provided with the full complement of instruction materials and equipment required to engage in pre-induction activities.

This poor state of affairs also applies to availability of basic military training facilities for working youths in republic enterprises, institutions, organizations and kolkhozes. Of 22 training facilities existing in republic enterprises and organizations, only 15 are operating. Specialists are not being trained in schools of DOSAAF organizations. In two rayons of Leninabad Oblast, five rayons of Khatlonskaya Oblast, and three rayons of GBAO, there is a complete absence of DOSAAF sports and adolescent technical sports clubs.

As before, a considerable number of young people called to military service have a poor knowledge of the Russian language. The situation is especially poor in this regard in rural areas of the republic. Of the 1,663 military training officers, 142 have not seen active military service.

The republic's medical institutions fail to call all youths of pre-draft age for medical examination. Internal affairs organs, in violation of the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation, are still unjustifiably passive in their search for persons attempting to evade their military obligation. As a result, last year a draft notice was not delivered to 260 persons in Khatlonskaya Oblast, 37 in Leninabad Oblast, and 249 in Leninskiy Rayon.

Military commissariats are not always in possession of accurate information on the number of draft-age youths.

Local soviets of people's deputies and their executive committees still have not taken all measures essential to fundamental improvement of military training for youth; they rarely hear reports by training officers from subordinate organs; and exhibit little interest in creating conditions conducive to improving this work.

The Tadzhik SSR Council of Ministers is lax in its supervision of measures dealing with the training of pre-draft age and draft-age youth for active duty in the USSR Armed Forces.

The Presidium of the Tadzhik SSR Supreme Soviet makes it incumbent upon local soviets of people's deputies and their executive committees to conduct exhaustive investigations into the true state of affairs in localities relative to observance of the law on training of youth for active duty in the USSR Armed Forces; to regularly review these problems in sessions and meetings of ispolkoms; and to raise the personal responsibility of managers and officials responsible for this area of activity.

The Presidium requires the republic ministries of Education, Health, and Internal Affairs; the DOSAAF Central Committee and the Military Commissariat of the Tadzhik SSR; and the ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies to eliminate all shortcomings that they discover and effect fundamental improvement in training offered youth in preparation for military service.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Tadzhik SSR and the Procurator of the Tadzhik SSR are tasked with taking exhaustive measures for the purpose of preventing violation of the law among draft-age youth; and with intensifying their monitoring and supervision of observance of the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation on the part of citizens and officials.

The decree directs the attention of the Council of Ministers of the Tadzhik SSR to the lack of supervision exerted over subordinate ministries, departments, and ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies in the implementation of the basic measures for training youth of pre-draft and draft age for active duty in the USSR Armed Forces.

Obituary: Lt Gen (Ret) N.G. Makeko

90UM0200B Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian 28 Dec 89 First Edition p 4

[Obituary: "N.G. Makeko"]

[Text] Lieutenant-General (Retired) Nikolay Grigoryevich Makeko, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War and honored builder of the RSFSR died suddenly. He devoted his entire conscious life to selfless service to the Soviet people and the Communist Party of which he was a member since 1945.

N.G. Makeko was born 12 January 1924 near the Berezanskaya railway station in the Krasnodarskiy kray. In September 1941 he entered the Higher Engineering and Technical Institute and advanced in his career from cadet to Lieutenant-General. Beginning in July 1943 he fought as part of the regular army of the Southern, 4th, and 3d Ukrainian fronts.

In the years following the war N.G. Makeko served in the field and in the central apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In each assignment entrusted to him, he firmly pursued the policies of the party and demonstrated a high level of organizational ability, exceptional diligence and adherence to principles. He was distinguished by modesty, his respectful consideration towards people and his constant concern about them.

The Soviet Motherland highly valued the accomplishments of N.G. Makeko. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, the Order of the Great Patriotic War First Class, two Orders of the Red Star as well as numerous medals. He was honored with awards from a number of socialist countries.

A fond memory of Nikolay Grigoryevich Makeko will remain forever in our hearts.

V.I. Varennikov, N.V. Chekov, V.N. Mikhaylov, V.I. Gerasimov, I.Ya. Solodilov, V.I. Korotkov, E.P. Maslin, N.P. Semenov, S.A. Zelentsov, B.N. Baranov, V.A. Myasnikov, E.V. Boychuk, V.M. Yegorov, I.F. Sviridov, B.V. Zamyshlyayev.

Volkogonov Interviewed on His Vision of Armed Forces in Year 2000

90UM0214B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 1 Jan 90 p 4

[Interview with Colonel-General D. Volkogonov, chief, Institute of Military History, USSR Ministry of Defense, by N. Panyukov; date and place not given]

[Text]

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] How do you envision the Soviet Army of the year 2000?

(The above question is answered by Col Gen D. Volkogonov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and chief of the Institute of Military History, USSR Ministry of Defense.)

[VOLKOGONOV] I can answer your question very briefly by saying that the Army will continue to exist. I am convinced of that, even though some hotheads feel that there no longer is any need for it. The Army will continue to exist as long as the world is split and as long as the world remains polarized. Even if the world becomes multipolar by the year 2000, the Army will stay.

The fact that the Army apparently will continue to evolve into a professional corps is another matter. We have already taken definite steps in this regard: In the

submarine service and the missile troops, for example, the majority of specialists are officers and warrant officers—and they are real professionals.

By the year 2000, it must be assumed, the Army will become considerably smaller. Perhaps it will be half or a third of its present size. This is largely dependent on the successes attained in talks dealing with further reductions in nuclear weapons.

As banal as it may seem, I also think that as the reduction progresses the Army should undergo qualitative improvement and take on a more scientific structure.

I am a "utopian" to a certain extent, in the sense that I sincerely believe that the times can be good and kind. I even dream that on one fine day all the nuclear powers will agree to leave only one missile apiece in their respective arsenals, such that it will be possible to organize a unique worldwide holiday during which even the remaining monsters will be eliminated. The places of elimination—in the USA, Soviet Union, China, France, and England—will be marked by special plaques that symbolize the enlightenment of mankind, which did away with the "sword of Damocles" that for so many years threatened the life of our planet.

It is a dream, of course. However, in principle there is nothing that is unattainable. If the new thinking takes hold, I would say—speaking in a planetary manner—that this can become a reality. Then we would be able to approach the year 2000 with a small Army, the mission of which would be mere localization of some kinds of random conflicts.

Many outstanding thinkers of the past spoke of the need for general disarmament. For example, Immanuel Kant's thought of perpetual peace is beautiful. He stepped ahead 100 years into the future, into the 21st century. Remarkable thoughts of a world without weapons and wars have also been expressed by many other scholars. Their dreams were not to come true, however. It seems that mankind is approaching this point only now, a time when the chance to realize them is at hand.

The use of force today is fraught with total destruction. At various stages of mankind's existence there always were leaders and forces of extremist inclination who could not resist taking up the sword to resolve problems of the times. This is a very dangerous trend, one which still cannot be eliminated entirely. That is why the year 2000 will still see an army.

Evacuation of Military Dependents from Caucasus

90UM0258A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "Evacuation of Servicemen's Families"]

[Text] MOSCOW. Major General L. Kuznetsov, chief of staff of the Moscow Military District, relates the following:

The evacuation from Baku to Moscow and to a number of other cities of the Soviet Union is being carried out by means of military transport aircraft of the Air Force. A special operations group has been organized to work with the families of our comrades in arms. Each aircraft arriving from Baku is given a welcome, after which special buses carry the servicemen's families to temporary living quarters. Unfortunately, many wives and children, having been subjected to violence and intimidation on the part of militant nationalists, are suffering from emotional distress.

Each family is provided with cost-free meals, financial assistance in the form of a lump sum of 100 rubles, and cost-free issuance of travel documents to its final destination. The families are offered the opportunity of telephoning or sending a telegram, at no cost to them, to any city of the Soviet Union.

As of 1200 hours, 23 January, more than 7,000 members of servicemen's families have been brought from Baku and Gyandzhi (Kirovabad).

A. Oliynik, Colonel

ROSTOV-ON-DON. Refugees are arriving from Azerbaijan via military transport aircraft. They are taken directly from the aircraft to a communications troop post, where they are looked after by a specially- formed operations group headed by Colonel V. Tsatenko.

"Most of the refugees are wives and children of servicemen," he said. "Each family is given financial assistance in accordance with a government decree. We provide them with hot meals and help them with plans to join their parents and friends."

The people are being housed in troop barracks. Women with babes in arms are staying in what apparently had been an office. I spoke with one of them. Her name is Marina Grishko.

"My husband," said Marina, "is an interior troop platoon leader. For 48 hours we sat in a unit that was surrounded by extremists. It was a very trying time. We were taken to the airfield in combat vehicles."

N. Astashkin, Major

Obituary: Lt Gen Yu.G. Yerokhin

90UM0258B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 90 First Edition p 4

["Yu.G. Yerokhin"—KRASNAYA ZVEZDA headline]

[Text] After suffering a serious illness, Lieutenant General Yuriy Gavrilovich Yerokhin, doctor of technical sciences and professor, has passed away. He made a large contribution to construction of the USSR Armed Forces.

We have lost a man who gave all of his energy and knowledge in service to the Motherland, to the affairs of the Communist Party, which he joined in 1956.

Yu.G. Yerokhin was born on 18 December 1934 in Kharkov into a serviceman's family. He served in the ranks of the Soviet Army, rising from cadet at the Artillery Radiotechnical Academy to general; from test engineer at a proving ground to chief of the Scientific Research Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In all his positions he exhibited extraordinary industry, high professional competence, and adherence to principles in the resolution of tasks associated with testing and implementation of new military equipment. He did not spare his broad knowledge, rich experience, and organizational abilities in the matter of training and educating scientific cadres.

Yu.G. Yerokhin was actively involved in social and political life; he was elected a number of times to serve as deputy in a local soviet of people's deputies. He was a member of a rayon committee of the CPSU; a member of the Scientific Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and a member of the editorial council of the periodical **RADIO I SVYAZ**.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state hold in high esteem the services rendered by Lieutenant General Yu.G. Yerokhin. He was awarded the Red Star Order and the Order for Services to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces, 3rd Class; and many medals.

The memory of Yuriy Gavrilovich Yerokhin will live forever in our hearts.

M.A. Moiseyev, I.M. Tretyak, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.M. Shabanov, V.V. Litvinov, I.M. Maltsev, S.S. Saepgin, V.M. Kraskovskiy, V.V. Korobushin, A.G. Basistov, B.V. Bunkin, P.D. Grushin, A.I. Savin, O.P. Sidorov, Ye.B. Tarasov, V.M. Shtepa, N.K. Strelnikov, A.I. Volkov, B.I. Strelchenko, A.S. Sumin, E.V. Alekseyev, Yu.A. Nikolayev, G.S. Batyr, I.D. Krupenin.

Effects of Cuts on Leningrad Military District

90UM0305A Moscow TRUD in Russian 13 Feb 90 p 4

[Interview with Leningrad Military District Deputy Commander Major General I. Ryabchenko by correspondent Ye. Druzhinina, entitled: "This Information Is Not Secret".]

[Text] The command of the Leningrad Military District and the Leningrad Naval Base met with the city public in the Leningrad department of the Soviet Committee for Protection of Peace. Leningrad Military District Deputy Commander Major General I. Ryabchenko replied to questions from this TRUD correspondent.

[Druzhinina] Had a reduction occurred in the numbers of troops and combat equipment on the district's territory in recent years?

[Ryabchenko] The numbers of troops were reduced by approximately 5,000 persons, and there are now 700 fewer tanks. In addition not a single medium-range missile is serving combat duty in the district any longer.

[Druzhinina] Are there any nuclear and chemical weapons on the district's territory?

[Ryabchenko] Nuclear—yes, chemical—no.

[Druzhinina] Soviet troops are leaving the countries of Eastern Europe. Might they "settle" in the Leningrad district?

[Ryabchenko] Around 500,000 soldiers have been recalled and around 5,000 tanks have been withdrawn from Eastern Europe as of this day. Most of the formations have been disbanded, and some of them have been transferred to the country's internal districts. The Leningrad district has not received any new soldiers. The

USSR Ministry of Defense will let us know what will happen with any further troop withdrawals.

[Druzhinina] Is there a nuclear fleet on the Baltic Sea?

[Ryabchenko] According to information from the Leningrad Naval Base, there is no nuclear fleet. The Baltic Sea, after all, is a nuclear-free zone.

[Druzhinina] How many generals are there in the Leningrad Military District?

[Ryabchenko] I don't have the information for the whole district.

Air Defense Pilot Describes Complete Instrument Failure

90UM0217B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Usoltsev: "Silence on the Airwaves: An Extreme Situation"]

[Text] Senior Lieutenant Oleg Maltsev, a graduate of the Kachinsk Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots imeni A. F. Myasnikov, was the first military pilot to be awarded the prize of the Aviation Safety Fund (FAB). The prize's presentation was reported by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 6 January 1990.

Our permanent correspondent for the Far Eastern Military District visited the air defense fighter regiment in which Senior Lieutenant O. Maltsev serves.

"That night," the officer said, "I was intercepting a fast maneuvering target in the stratosphere. After 'hitting' the airplane flown by a simulated adversary, I received permission from the command post to descend to 8,000 meters. These were the last words I heard from the ground. Even while I was descending I noticed the strange silence on the airwaves. And when I leveled off at the prescribed altitude I saw that the cockpit had immersed itself in darkness: Not one of the piloting and navigating instruments was working. The situation was made more complicated by the fact that the terrain over which I was flying was practically featureless—there was nothing below but taiga and rolling hills. To be honest, I lost my composure, but only for a second or two. I soon realized that the power source had failed, and so I began flipping switches in the hope of turning on reserve power. But all in vain."

Imagine what it's like in the cockpit of a fighter rushing forward in darkness at an altitude of 8,000 meters. Not one instrument is working. The location of the home airfield is unknown. The situation is practically impossible. That is what pilots serving with Oleg said when I talked with them. Many specialists on the ground had doubts that the flight would end without incident. Senior Lieutenant Maltsev was also ready to eject, though in his mind he had firmly resolved to abandon the aircraft only as a last resort.

"It was a moonlit night," the senior lieutenant continued his story, "I could see the horizon well enough, and this allowed me to keep the airplane's position in space correct relative to the ground. But I had to find my own airfield. The problem with this was that there was no landmark that I could hang onto. And then I remembered that when I took off, the moon was to the left of the airfield. That meant that I had to fly with the moon to the right of my course.

"I began my descent to the next flight level. And all the time I kept hoping that at least one instrument would kick back in, or I would hear something on the radio. When I noticed a city in the distance I was able to relax a little—familiar points of light began appearing, and a

civilian airfield at which I could land came into view. Now I was completely certain that everything would be all right. I skirted the city and turned toward my own airfield.

"On reaching it, I descended to circling altitude and flew a trial run over the airstrip. Then I came in for a landing. True, the glide path was a little too high, but the landing was 'clean.' I was surprised to see a lot of people running toward my airplane. It turned out that smoke was billowing out of the back of the fuselage where the faulty generator was located."

I need only add that Oleg Maltsev has now started flying in the military pilot 1st class training program, and he is successfully fulfilling his responsibilities as chief of staff of an air squadron.

Decision to Make Test Range into Combined Tactical Center

90UM0217C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Dokuchayev, Air Defense Forces: "The Practice Range"]

[Text] Islands of gray wormwood hugging the ground against the blizzards, scattered shrubs on the wide, desolate plain.... That is all that there is to see. This is the practice range, the center for tactical performance of anti-aircraft missile troops, located in the boundless desert, called a hungry desert here, although geographers had given it an official name long ago. It is quiet here now. But during the days of temporary duty scheduled for the last firing practice prior to the winter break, it popped and sputtered like an enormous vat of boiling water.

The day began early for Military Pilot 1st Class Captain Igor Musatov. Reveille, farewells to sleepy daughters and a wife, and then a ride to the airfield aboard the "chugunka" (that's what the airmen call the tiny little train). He rides with other members of the crew—Captain Petr Bryantsev, Senior Lieutenant Oleg Zavaluyev, Warrant Officer Yuriy Shumelnyy. Will flying be permitted? A mist hovers over the airstrip. The Tu-16 must take off at precisely the appointed time, fly to its prescribed point and launch its practice targets—otherwise the visiting missilemen would not experience the full intensity of a raid.

The crews manning the ground target missile complexes are anxious as well. The targets must be launched synchronously, at the command of the exercise leader. For this to pass, dozens of officers had spent an entire week at the launching points, deep within the practice range, far away from the town and their families. The instructors monitoring the actions of the missilemen and the specialists responsible for processing the firing practice results are tense as well. Any minute now, each of them was going to have to perform.

The men of the practice range....

A monument to fallen military aviators stands by the lakeside in the garrison. The names of pilots who had given their lives at the practice range are etched upon it. We read the inscriptions: Guards captains B. Shanov, V. Volodin—1960, Guards Captain F. Sergeev—1971, Guards Private V. Sobolev, Guards Junior Sergeant V. Markelov....

Flights involving the launching of practice targets and the testing of new equipment are a daily risk. It is not only the pilots that risk their lives. Alarming news spread through the garrison during the days of temporary duty—four men of a combat engineering company were killed. A lieutenant and three soldiers. They were destroying the warheads of outdated rockets. Extremely dangerous work.

"How could a warhead have exploded?" Officer Ye. Latin, the garrison procurator, asked over and over again. "A committee of experts is going to look into this. Prior to this, the demolition experts had already destroyed hundreds of them, they were highly experienced...."

Such are the realities. The practice range requires exertion of effort, valor and maximum caution from the personnel.

Colonel V. Gamov, chief of the center for tactical performance of the anti-aircraft missile troops, listed off the names of those who are giving everything of themselves to the practice range. Major Anatoliy Zayakin, Captain Rais Garifulin, majors Igor Lents, Ivan Yegorov, Ivan Komarov.

"Our work is interesting; it is in support of field firing, you see—something very necessary for a missileman. And what sort of job are we doing? A conscientious one, we feel, but things do not depend entirely upon us alone."

The problems of the practice range.... Their origins lie in the fact that for practical purposes an integral conception of development of the training base had not existed for a long time.

But a new step forward has now been made in this direction. A decision was made—to create a possibility in the future for not only anti-aircraft missilemen but also pilots flying in air units of the Air Defense Forces and radio engineering subunits to use their equipment and armament here. An administration to coordinate this work has been created. But has everything really been thought out completely in this instance as well?

A department for combat use of aviation is being organized. What sort of department will this be? Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Romanko speaks:

"The department is being organized. But what about equipment? What we have are MIG-21s and MIG-23s, but the fighter pilots coming here for their combat

training missions have learned to fly MIG-31s and Su-27s.... Will we be able to provide training for the pilots? Will we be able to simulate the enemy adequately?"

These questions generate others. Why make half-baked decisions? Wouldn't it be better to do today what tomorrow will force us to do anyway? Everyone knows, after all, that the tightwad ends up paying twice. Wouldn't it be more sensible to create not a department but a center for tactical performance of aviation similar to the missilemen's center? Then we would acquire the appropriate specialist training staff, equipment and material base. It would of course be more expensive, but combat training isn't where we should be trying to save money.

"I have argued for a long time now that what we need is a center, and not a department," said Colonel Ye. Bondarev, an officer of the Combat Training Directorate of the Air Defense Forces. "We need to think about tomorrow."

I have addressed only one of the points of the conception for the development of the training base, which is already being criticized. But what if we look at the entire program more attentively? One would think that whoever is directly involved in improving the practice range should compare it with the best examples of our Soviet training base and that of foreign armies. I asked specialists at both the practice range and at the main headquarters: In what way is the experience of facilities presently existing in the world being utilized? My question essentially went unanswered.

In a word, even today we have to doubt that a well conceived conception for development of this training facility of the Air Defense Forces, one intended for the long term, exists. And what about social problems? Is their solution tied in with solution of the main problems?

Life marches on, and it demands that the practice range satisfy the requirements of the times. And the people are striving to solve the arising problems with all the strength at their command. One such person was mentioned earlier—Vladimir Makarovich Gamov. He has been serving at the practice range for over seven years, he's an old-timer now.

When the officer began work in this garrison in the steppes, the center was completely different. What was it like? It was less suited to troop training. Now it is saturated with computer technology. There is a training complex that makes use of high-speed computers, and a display classroom. Innovations came to fruition under Vladimir Makarovich owing in many ways to his energy and persistence. New practice missiles with flying characteristics of greater complexity were placed into operation during his tenure. The practice missile complexes began to be used much more effectively also because the number of launching pads was increased, though even today they are few in number.

"And consider what it means to set up a target launching site," said Vladimir Makarovich. "The practice range is a lifeless desert—there's good reason why it's called the hungry desert. There's no housing, there's no water, and last of all, there are no roads. And so we have to be resourceful. We have no choice. The equipment is improving, and consequently we cannot fall behind."

There is a practice missile launching site on the practice range which for some reason has been graced with the name Jupiter. No, it has no relationship to the ruler of the gods and men, nor to the planet itself. Officers and soldiers serve here. They live in mobile homes, they eat in a mess hall which they fashioned together with their own hands, and they use a field kitchen and trucked-in water.

"According to the tables of equipment our stations are supposed to be mobile," said Lieutenant Colonel V. Nechin. "The plan was that the crews would live in one developed location, and at the needed moments they would drive to the various launching pads to launch their targets. But while things looked good on paper, things are different in reality. Could you imagine trying to move these complexes on our roads? And so the range operators have to live where their work requires. In unofficial, makeshift buildings. In unenviable conditions. It is especially painful to see officers toiling five out of seven days away from their families, and sometimes even in two week stretches.... And this goes on for years, and sometimes even decades."

Everyone has his own nook in the dormitory at the launching site on the practice range. The officers refer to their rooms as flop-houses. To say that they look squalid is an understatement, and when it comes to comfort, there is absolutely nothing to say. It is here in these flop-houses that they must live all of their off-duty life.

I had the occasion to observe the officers of one of the launching sites when they assembled for transportation to the post for their days off. It was not until they were formed up that motor transportation was brought up for them. There were not enough buses. Many had to satisfy themselves with a ride in a truck, while some even had to take service vehicles.

"But where am I supposed to get buses?" Lieutenant Colonel A. Parshin, the center's deputy chief, retorted. "There simply aren't enough of them. And considering the kind of roads we have, they break down frequently. And how are we supposed to get around in winter? In Siberia for example, many ministries operate specially equipped buses designed for the season. For some reason we don't qualify for them. And yet we spend five out of seven days in the grim desert in winter as well. Moreover the motor vehicle equipment they generally do supply is indescribably bad."

In a word, officers will continue to live apart from their families in the future, in cadet conditions, so to speak, and officers serve at the launching sites 5, 10 and even 20 years. It's not too bad for those who sail on through in

the mainstream. Majors S. Krivenkov and A. Kapayev and Lieutenant Colonel A. Aslaliyev have gone to other regions of the country with promotions.

But what about the others? I was introduced to Captain V. Kharitonov at the practice range. He came here as a young officer after graduating from the Engels Surface-to-Air Missile Military School, and he has now spent 19 years of his life at the practice range. He got married here, and he is raising a son and a daughter here. Though the word "raising" should not be taken literally.

"What I'm really doing is just helping my wife," Valeriy Aleksandrovich said with a note of sadness. "You can imagine what sort of husbands we are.... Even on days off we can't always get away. In our younger years, many of us laid plans to serve somewhere in other regions, and then we came to understand that our entire careers would pass here. Our region has now introduced a rotation system of manning, but who would want us anywhere else?"

Yes, the labor of a practice range officer is not valued very highly. Apparently Kharitonov will retire as a captain, and he will retire without housing. He will have to start much of his life over from scratch. And he is not the only one awaiting such a future. Such is the strange sort of gratitude expressed for 20 years of service in the most difficult conditions—both climatic and personal.

It is said that around 15 years ago the Ministry of Defense built a residential building in a certain oblast center for practice range operators. The idea was that officers discharged into the reserves would have apartments waiting for them. But then this construction project was abandoned.

Difficulties.... The people at the practice range have become accustomed to them, they have learned to live with them, and they are not what determine the mood of the people today.

"We do use computers, but to what extent?" complains Lieutenant Colonel S. Sudnik, the chief of one of the departments. "What we need now is automated processing of the results. This would be efficient and objective. And then the gunners wouldn't have to argue with the instructors about their scores. Where are we to find an organization which would take on the task of developing the appropriate instruments?"

There is also a great desire at the practice range to implement this idea: The training level of the instructors is inconsistent. A lieutenant just out of school recently assumed a vacant position. Can he productively teach the visiting missilemen? Understandably, no. Colonel Gamov has suggested that visiting unit commanders send their best specialists here for three or four years. They could serve out their term, gain some experience and then go back to their units. Missilemen of this sort would be priceless. But the support for the idea is weak as yet.

A memorial service was held in the garrison on the day of my departure from the practice range. Privates, NCOs, warrant officers and officers—those who forge the combat readiness of the Air Defense Forces—said their farewells to the deceased combat engineers—the lieutenant and three soldiers.

Obstacles to Raising Pilots' Qualification Levels

90UM0217A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Avn N. Posrednikov, Western Group of Forces: "Class and Proficiency Rating".]

[Text] The thoughts I am about to express have been troubling me for a long time now, since the level of pilot professional preparedness and the effectiveness of tactical performance of aviation equipment are problems of priority importance, and the meaning of the entire process of airman combat training ultimately hinges upon their successful solution.

I am not going to hide the fact that we have become accustomed to judging a pilot's professionalism primarily on the basis of the number on the insignia he wears on his chest—that is, on the basis of his proficiency rating. But are proficiency rating and class—that is, the official rating and the actual level of preparedness—always really equivalent?

One of the main criteria for a military pilot's proficiency should be his ability to accurately hit ground and aerial targets in various weather conditions and in a tactical situation. And I mean precisely in that sequence: First the ability, and then the conditions. In fact, however, according to the present system of determining the proficiency rating of pilots, everything is turned upside-down; that is, we make weather conditions—flying in clouds, landing during limited visibility and so forth—the dominant criteria. And the ability to use one's onboard armament, which attests to the true level of combat proficiency, is relegated simply to the rating sheet column impersonally titled "Flights for Tactical Performance." There is even no discussion of the quality and the results of such flights, because the grade a pilot receives for a flight for tactical performance does not influence the level of his proficiency rating in any way. Now isn't that a paradox?

The principle of determining proficiency rating on the basis of only flying in adverse weather leads to negative consequences of the following sort. In Central Asia, for example, the weather conditions needed for obtaining a proficiency rating do not occur, and so it happens that pilots can never attain the top rating there, no matter how masterfully they are able to hit all kinds of aerial targets. Then there is the other side of the coin: In order to boost the number of pilots with higher ratings, which is such an important indicator of the combat readiness of the units, some commanders resort to all sorts of tricks, including artificially "complicating" the weather conditions. (On paper, of course, just for reporting purposes).

And this is a direct threat to pilot safety, since after all, when such pilots make a career move to other areas in which the weather conditions often are truly complex without stretching the facts, while they "theoretically" possess a 1st or 2d class rating, they actually cannot fulfill their assignments in conditions corresponding to their proficiency rating.

One need not look far for examples. Major A. Slavetskiy came to us from the Far East with a 1st class rating. Judging from his documents he could be entrusted with any assignment, and he should have been able to carry it out. But in one of the first sorties, in weather conditions that were not at all complex, he made a mistake during his landing approach. He passed the outer compass locator at too high a speed, and he did not correct his mistake, even though he had sufficient time to do so. At the moment of landing his speed remained excessively high; moreover the pilot became confused, he failed to reduce his engine rpm, and when he released his brake chute, it tore apart. The result was an aircraft accident.

Then there is the other extreme: When it comes to fulfilling important assignments involving combat use of onboard weapons at a practice range, we far from always select the best pilots, ones who are able to land proficiently in the presence of low clouds and poor visibility, since success is measured in this case by qualities other than these. Comparing the results of sorties flown for tactical performance by 1st, 2d and 3d class pilots, we come to the conclusion that the difference between them we might have expected does not exist, even though a military pilot 1st class should be a head above a pilot 2d class in training level. And when it comes to 3d class, there should be no comparison at all. In fact, however, we find that the difference is but one or two tenths of a point.

I am not going to discuss the problem any further or present any more examples—I am certain that the essence of the problem is clear. I think that it would be much more useful to discuss the ways of solving it, the ways in which everything could be brought into correspondence from my point of view. First of all when it comes to determining the proficiency rating of military pilots—I am referring to those who fly warplanes—we need to place emphasis on their combat proficiency, to include the ability to hit a target without fail and to competently organize a tactical maneuver so as to avoid enemy fire. In a word, the main criterion of the quality of a combat pilot should be his ability to fulfill a combat mission, and airfield weather conditions under which a pilot may realize his potentials should be only of second priority.

Evaluating the professionalism of a pilot on the basis of the end result means raising his personal exactingness toward himself, toward the quality of preparation of the combat equipment and armament, toward the clarity, competency and dependability of control of his actions in the air, and toward improvement of the scoring system and results of firing and bombing practices, aerial

photography and missile launchings. Under such conditions the pilot would be fundamentally interested in improving his tactical skills.

As we know, flight crews will be receiving an additional allowance totaling 30 percent of base pay for working in special conditions, irrespective of proficiency rating and experience. But in no case should we do away with proficiency rating pay, which is a stimulus for raising proficiency. However, the effectiveness of this stimulus should be raised by rejecting leveling practices: The amount of the reward should be directly dependent on the number of hits and misses in flights for tactical performance, and on the complexity of assignments and the quality with which they are fulfilled. Then no pilot would take off for the practice range with a faulty sight, in the manner described by Major I. Petrakov on 25 August in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

Promotions are one of the stimuli for pilots. Of course, not every good pilot can become a good commander; however, things must be set up in such a way that an outstanding air warrior would not feel himself lacking in comparison with those who rise above him on the career ladder. Raising his rank one or two levels above the official category and paying him for the quantity and complexity of assignments and the quality of their fulfillment may serve as such compensation.

There has recently been more discussion on developing the creative possibilities of every pilot. But appeals and demands to develop independent tactical thinking in every warrior and the ability to calculate, work out and implement new, original combat techniques very often collide with all kinds of limitations and constraints. For example, is it really possible "to create, to think up new things, to try things out" when the layout of training targets stays the same for years on end, and when the target approach course is always the same? Moreover even the altitudes of target approach are limited both above and below. There is little room for creativity when a pilot flies many years in succession along the same standard route.

This could be understood when the airspace is limited by some objective conditions over which the command has no power. But from my point of view we can and must increase the effectiveness with which we use the inland practice ranges that are reserved as a rule for readiness inspections. As an example we could allow a unit commander to fly such a practice range not for the inspectors but in order to perfect the creative concepts and developments conceived in the regiment.

The present four-point scoring system is obsolete; it is not in keeping with modern requirements, and most importantly, it is hardly objective.

It is my deep conviction that proficiency ratings not only can and should accurately reflect the professional skills of pilots but also constantly stimulate their desire to improve, so that at any moment in time both every commander and every serviceman could clearly see what

you can do, what your capabilities are today, right now, this minute. Such a situation can be achieved only when we strictly and precisely consider the end result—hitting or missing a target, and the effectiveness of using ammunition allocated for the given encounter.

Col Gen Litvinov On Computerization Of Air Defense Training

90UM0224A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Col. A. Yurkin: "A Computer Becomes...An Umpire"]

[Text] The new academic year in the air defense forces has been marked by a wide application of computer technology. Local and multiprofile computer networks allow us to save time and electrical energy as well as to improve the quality of training.

At the request of our correspondent First Deputy Commander of Air Defense Troops General Colonel V. Litvinov commented on this news:

"We struggled for a long time with the problem of how to most closely approximate actual conditions at the battle front in combat employment centers. Computer networks have been a tremendous help in solving that problem. For the first time past conflicts in the evaluation of missile firing exercises and the combat employment of air defense aviation can be eliminated. Computer technology has taken on the role of umpire. It allows for a highly accurate evaluation of the actions of those who are firing as well as those who are conducting support operations. The machine provides final results in a matter of minutes and one has the opportunity later to closely analyze mistakes and to create a data base by unit as well as by gun crews and shifts.

"Firing exercises now are conducted only under adverse conditions, at anytime of the day and year. In the past, as you remember, firing in winter was the exception. Now the method of determining results has undergone changes in the direction of making demands harsher. Before a firing session each specialist and the crew take mandatory exams. Modern computer technology has begun to be widely used in this as well.

During the new academic year the troops have discarded much of that which used to be a hindrance. In particular, the planning process has been simplified. Commanders and headquarters have been given greater independence. The amount of paperwork has been greatly reduced although the paper stream is still quite large. However, both in planning and records keeping computerization has conquered territory. True, even though the computer possesses a phenomenal memory, it cannot "know" ahead of time when exercises in the combat employment center will take place. They are all unexpected. Besides, both regiments and individual duty shifts can participate in the firing exercises.

"Much has been done on the eve of the new academic year. Our military scientists, engineers and programmers have accomplished a great deal but the entire question rests on the availability of computers. There are not enough and the prospects are far from encouraging. This is holding back the very necessary process of computerization."

Risk Seen in Dismantling Krasnoyarsk Radar

90UI0309A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 4, 24 Jan 90 p 11

[Article by Aviation Major-General (Retired) B. Surikov, Candidate of Technical Sciences: "Will the World Be Safer...If the Krasnoyarsk Radar Is Dismantled?"]

[Text] It would seem it is a paradox: By reducing armaments, we are increasing the danger of nuclear war. But the whole point is the kind of armaments we are cutting!

We, I am speaking of our government, as is well-known, have agreed to dismantle the superpowerful Krasnoyarsk radar. We agreed in the hope of setting an infectious good example, and, of course, under the strong pressure of the administration of the United States. It attributed the start of a new upward turn in the arms race—the development of the so-called "Star Wars"—directly to construction in the USSR of this now regrettably well-known radar.

The decision by the Soviet Government was preceded by long negotiations with the Americans. The United States insisted that the construction of a radar with such power is a violation of the ABM treaty—anti-ballistic missile defense. They had their own reasons, inasmuch as such radars, according to the treaty, could only be located on the periphery of one's national territory, with the antenna systems oriented outwardly. And we built it, it can be said, right in the center of the country.

But we also had our own reasons. "Nuclear deterrence," which is still an operative strategy in the United States, in contrast to the USSR, allows the employment of a nuclear first strike. Defense Secretary R. Cheney announced on 13 September 1989 at the Hudson Institute that the United States and its allies have no reasons for changing the currently operative strategy. Naturally, in such a situation, a missile attack warning system has special significance for us. And it consists, it will be recalled, of space- and ground-based information systems.

The space echelon is several on-watch artificial earth satellites (ESV) [earth satellite vehicle] that provide continuous monitoring of all ground-based and naval-based missile threat areas. However, detection is possible from space only of missile movement in the boost phase, owing to the thermal emanations of the jet engines, and, moreover, the ESV's quite often produce false alarms.

The principal means of detecting a nuclear missile attack today are considered to be radars that can detect a strategic missile at distances of thousands of kilometers and the modeling of their flight trajectories. American specialists know that the radars located in Murmansk, Riga, Mukachevo, Sevastopol, Mingeaur, and at Balkhash and Pechora, provide monitoring of all missile threat axes. **With the exception of the northeast!**

For the purpose of creating a 360-degree radar warning field and of insuring monitoring of the northeastern missile threat axis, research was completed in 1979 on the creation of a radar in the Far North in strict conformity to the ABM treaty. At the same time, draft work was also performed on construction in the Krasnoyarsk area. And it turned out that this variant would be three times cheaper than the deployment of a radar in the Far North.

It was decided not to coordinate the construction at Krasnoyarsk with the American side, inasmuch as the new radar, which was informational in nature, would be deployed at a distance of more than 3,000 km from the center of Europe and could not be considered to be a part of the ABM territorial radar system of the country. In addition, the radar does not have an independent power supply and works in the meter waveband, and such radars, and this is known to the American specialists, are "blinded" for one to two minutes by a nuclear explosion and, for this reason also, could not be considered to be full-fledged ABM equipment.

No one surmised at that time that, within four years, U.S. President Reagan would come out with the SDI program, and that the Krasnoyarsk radar would become a trump card of the American administration in disarmament negotiations. Despite all of our efforts to explain, in the final analysis we were compelled to agree to its dismantlement. It would seem that justice triumphed. We removed one more obstruction on the road to the development of normal relations between the USSR and the United States. But has this made it easier for us and the Americans to live?

Alas, as a result of the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar, the danger of a nuclear catastrophe is not being decreased, but it is being increased!!!

At no time during the elaboration of the ABM treaty now in force did any one of the experts suppose that near-earth space would be so densely filled with nonfunctioning artificial satellites and other space objects that it would be difficult for an astronomer to observe the starry sky. From space, our Earth resembles a stirred-up beehive, around which bees are swarming in a solid ring. There are more than 17,000 space objects of an artificial origin, and they are continuously leaving orbit and entering the dense layers of the atmosphere, and...they can be interpreted as ballistic missiles that are attacking us.

This is the kind of data that Lynn Sennot, professor of mathematics at Illinois State University, cites in his work: For the period 1977 to 1984, the United States

registered 1,152 false alarms of average seriousness concerning Soviet ICBM attacks on the United States. It is not known how many such alarms there were in the Soviet Union; we did not publicize this kind of information, but even if there were just as many as in the United States, then, through error, we were on the brink of a third world war many times. Fortunately, warning systems and the art, I would say, and the talent of officers working with extremely complicated equipment in the Soviet Union and the United States, saved us from a nuclear catastrophe.

I will cite the opinion of Doctor John Steinbrunner, director of foreign policy research programs at the Brookings Institute, which he expressed recently. He reported that analysis shows: If the space- and ground-based echelons of the warning system are functioning normally, then the officers of the combat control center, even in extreme danger, correctly estimate the situation with a probability of 0.95. That is, almost error free.

However, disablement of the space- or ground-based echelon of the warning system reduces the probability of a correct decision to 0.6. But, you see, also not excluded are some kind of malfunctions and interference with the warning optics, at which time the probability of a correct estimate would fall to 0.2. This is a very dangerous level!

What is the conclusion? Essentially, after the Krasnoyarsk radar is dismantled, which will cost R50 million, we in the Soviet Union will not have a ground-based warning system against a nuclear missile attack from a northeastern direction in a sector of 120 degrees on the horizon. Of course, it can be replaced with two warning radars in the Far North. Which is permitted by the ABM treaty. But here again there are expenditures—not less than R1 billion. And, also, it is hardly likely that the sites could be put into operation before the year 2000.

When I expressed my fears relating to the dismantlement of the Krasnoyarsk radar to S. Kinney, an American ABM expert, he asked me: "Why were explanations regarding the actual role of the Krasnoyarsk radar not made known to the American public in a timely way? And how come the technical problem was turned into a political one?"

I had no answer to his question.

In the summer of 1989, the USSR and the United States signed an agreement about avoiding dangerous military activity, which should lessen the danger of an outbreak of armed incidents resulting from an incorrect estimate of the intentions of one of the sides. The agreement went into effect on 1 January 1990, and it will promote greater stability and the security of both sides. However...

Can the Americans today experience a feeling of satisfaction from the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which, in fact, insured their own security by preventing an error in reaching a decision concerning the initiation of an ICBM attack?

It is always easier to ask questions. Therefore, I would like to conclude with a proposal for real steps, as it seems to me, that are directed at reducing the danger of the start of a war "by mistake." It is necessary to establish permanent direct communications between command posts of the missile attack warning system and to arrange the exchange of data on deorbiting space objects to ensure joint express-analysis of false alarm signals... And may God help us not to become hostages to our own arrogance!

PVO Appeal to Azerbaijan Regarding Attacks on Personnel, Facilities

90UM0369A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 90 First Edition p 6

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col A. Yurkin in the column: "An Alarming Report": "Under Extremists' Fire"]

[Text] The Military Council of the Air Defense Forces has appealed to A. N. Mutalibov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, and E. M. Kafarova, president, Supreme Soviet Presidium, Azerbaijan SSR, to render the necessary assistance in normalizing the situation involving the units and sub-units of the PVO [Air Defense Forces] stationed on the territory of the republic. The appeal points out that, in the period starting 11 January and ending with 5 March of this year, operational sites and residential facilities were attacked 18 times. There were victims.

An armed attack inflicted at 23:40 on 4 March resulted in the death of Private V. Kizin. Careful preparations were made before commission of the crime: Just before the attack, the electrical system protecting the area was disabled, and the installation was subjected to automatic weapons fire. This and other planned provocations were intended to aggravate the tensions between the Army and people and provoke a reaction. Also, threats have been levelled at servicemen's dependents, a development that led to the evacuation of 1,700 persons. Many military personnel of Azerbaijani origin are leaving their unit without authorization; they refuse to serve and master their combat specialties. This causes a breakdown in traditions of friendship, leads to exacerbation of tensions, and hinders the Air Defense Forces in their mission of protecting the skies over the Azerbaijan SSR and guarding the USSR state border.

I had an opportunity to speak by telephone with Lieutenant Colonel V. Zolotukhin, unit chief of staff, who told me how Private Kizin lost his life.

"On duty at the time as a member of a guard detail," said Vladimir Vitalyevich, "Vladimir Kizin was guarding the living quarters area of a radar unit. When the lighting was cut off, two bullets struck him in a thigh as he attempted to take up an entrenched position. An MVD platoon rushed in to offer assistance,

after which a firefight ensued and continued for 35 minutes. Kizin was taken to a local hospital when the gunfire stopped, but the power was also cut off in the city, with the result that efforts to save his life were unsuccessful. That marked the end of the life of a soldier who dreamed of becoming a warrant officer. Surviving him are a family, including a small child, in

Kishinev. There was a reason for the attack on the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Pozdnyakov: Extremists acting in name of the People's Front are demanding that the radar troops vacate the area by 14 March. This means that there may be other provocations, the same as in locations in Azerbaijan. It is clear that the troops are standing in their way."

Chernavin Hosts Commemoration Of Gorshkov's Birth

90UM0337A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by Correspondent Captain Third Rank Yu. Gladkevich: "A Life Devoted To the Navy"]

[Text] Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov, who would have turned 80 these past few days, was one of a glorious pleiad of naval leaders reared in our Soviet period.

A commemorative evening devoted to twice Hero of the Soviet Union and Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov was held in the Navy central directorates club. Fleet Admiral V. Chernavin, Navy Commander in Chief, who recounted the prominent military leader and naval officer's biography, stressed that Sergey Georgiyevich's fate reflected many important events for the state and the navy. As a first-year student at Leningrad University's physics and mathematics department, he went to the M. V. Frunze Higher Navy School on a Communist Youth League pass. After graduation, he served for several years as a watch chief and navigation officer on surface ships in the Black Sea. Then he took command of a patrol ship, and later, at the age of 30, headed a brigade of cruisers. It is now common knowledge that it was largely the repressions that emptied our ships' command bridges. But even in those tragic times, a stern navy rule law was observed: Only a worthy man could step onto the command bridge.

Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov was undoubtedly worthy of such a choice. The ships of his brigade heroically defended besieged Odessa and successfully carried out the first landing operation on the Black Sea, in the area of Grigoryevki. And the brigade commander himself, when a critical situation arose in the course of the operation, took a bold and, as it subsequently became clear, optimal decision that helped accomplish the objective.

Then came the command of the Azov flotilla and participation in the Kerch-Feodosiiskaya operation, during which the flotilla's ships ferried nearly 6,000 men and a large quantity of combat hardware and ammunition to the northern shore of the Kerch Peninsula.

In 1942, after the Azov fleet was disbanded, S. Gorshkov was named deputy commander of the Novorossiysk Defense District. Military setbacks and errors in planning and the command and control of forces that were sometimes committed by superior staffs were often blamed on the battles' immediate participants. But even in this oppressive situation, Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov did everything he could.

Subsequently, when S. Gorshkov held key posts in the Black Sea Fleet and in the Navy, the experience he had acquired in battle stood him personally and the fleet as a whole in good stead. An expert at his craft and a leader who was capable of long-term prognoses and foresight, he put the interests of the fleet and the state above all else. He had special need of these qualities when Fleet Admiral of

the Soviet Union Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, the Naval Commander in Chief, was hastily removed from his post. Gorshkov, who succeeded him, displayed great energy, persistence and soldierly qualities in preventing certain theoreticians from implementing a foolhardy idea at the time: that the fleet should not have any independent significance, but that its mission should be to assist the ground and strategic rocket forces.

But for all its costs, an understanding of the fleet's role in strengthening the country's defense capability and attaining military-strategic parity was acknowledged by the USSR's politico-military leadership. And Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov made full use of his talent as an organizer and naval leader to promote this process. Under his direct supervision, the fleet assumed a qualitatively new state and became a nuclear-missile equipped, ocean-going force. Needless to say, as Fleet Admiral V. Chernavin, Fleet Admirals N. Sergeev and G. Yegorov, and Admirals V. Mikhailin and P. Kotov emphasized in their speeches, the country as a whole worked to accomplish the task of reorganizing the fleet, balancing it, turning it into an ocean-going force, devising new approaches to its basing, searching for new combat techniques, and providing and training its personnel. But the special services of S. G. gorshkov in all these things are indisputable.

As we know, in past years any anniversary was replete with eulogies. But one would be hard pressed to find any empty eulogizing in what the speakers said at the commemorative evening in honor of S. G. Gorshkov. The Navy, which is believed—and not without grounds—to be especially committed to tradition and which could not imagine its existence without its zeal for continuity, a zeal that has been elevated into a principle, has always observed a firm rule: Nothing good and useful that predecessors have left behind should sink into oblivion, not one name of a committed person who did much for the fleet should be forgotten. It is in this context that one should view everything that was said during the commemorative evening.

Yet another confirmation of the sailors' fidelity to tradition and ability to pay their debt of respect was an appeal, read by Admiral V. Mikhaylin, from fleet veterans to the naval commander in chief, in which they asked him to petition the Soviet government to confer the name of twice Hero of the Soviet Union and Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov on a naval warship under construction. The naval command had already made such a petition to the government and received an answer: There will be such a ship.

Admiral V. Panin, a member of the Military Council and Chief of the Navy Political Directorate, who spoke in conclusion, said:

"This evening is the first attempt to take a close-up look at a man who commanded the Navy for more than 30 years, and to assess his activity as a military leader, major organizer, and trainer. There will be more attempts, after

which, obviously, the image of Sergey Georgiyevich Gorchkov—an ambiguous figure—will become more understandable and closer to us. And we will then be able, with considerable grounds, to assess both the full measure of his contribution to the fate of the fleet and the state and the full measure of his delusions and mistakes.”

These words confirm once more that the fleet does not intend to disown its past. A critical conceptualization of the past does not rule out but, on the contrary, presupposes the utmost respect for the services of people who faithfully did their duty to the motherland.

List of U.S., Soviet 'Operational Missile Bases'

90UM0300A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 2

[Report by L. Kolpakov under the rubric "Glasnost-90":
"The Secret Costs a Ruble"]

[Text] This information was until recently kept in strictest secrecy, and probably none of our readers would have believed that VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA could precisely name the **operational missile bases of the USSR**. But now, here they are: Postavy, Vetrino, Polotsk, Smorgon, Lida, Gezgaly, Slonim, Ruzhany, Zasimovichi, Mozyr, Petrikov, Zhitkovichi, Rechitsa, Slutsk, Lutsk, Brody, Chervonograd, Slavuta, Belokorovich, Lipniki, Vysokaya Pech, Korosten, Lebedin, Glukhov, Akhtyrka, Sovetsk, Gusev, Malorita, Pinsk, Vyru, Aluksne, Ostrov, Karmelava, Ukmerge, Taurage, Kilomyya, Stryy, Skala-Podolskaya, Lapichi, Katakurgan, Stankovo, Tsel, Slobudka, Bayram-Ali.

We direct your attention to the fact that VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA is the first to publish this information in the open press. And if you are interested in auxiliary missile installations in the USA, we can name those too: Martin Marietta at Middle River, Maryland; Redstone Arsenal at Huntsville, Alabama; Fort Sill at Fort Sill,

Oklahoma; Complex 16 at Cape Canaveral, Florida; the Longhorn Munitions Plant for the U.S. ground forces at Marshall, Texas.

We hope that you, dear readers, are significantly intrigued about where VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA obtained these top secret items. We shall reveal an editorial secret and report the source of our information.

If you carefully read the evening issue of our newspaper, you noticed the article "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Reveals Secrets." V. Milyayev, its author and chief editor of the magazine VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA INOSTRANNYKH DEL SSSR, told how glasnost is becoming the law also for diplomats.

And yesterday Vitaliy Leonidovich sent us an advance copy of the magazine for this year, which will go on sale tomorrow. All of the information cited at the beginning of this article was derived from it.

Believe me, the official material, boring at first glance, sometimes reads like a detective novel. And these secrets and sensations cost only a ruble. Look for them at VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA INOSTRANNYKH DEL newsstands.

People's Control Inspection of Military Trade System

90UM0203A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Dec 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Plotnikov under the rubric "In the USSR Committee of People's Control": "Military Trade: Changes Are Needed"]

[Text] Preparations for discussion of the results of the inspection of military trade were long and thorough. The inspectors of the USSR KNK [Committee of People's Control] together with officials of the kray and republic organs of the BKhSS [Struggle Against the Misappropriation of Socialist Property and Speculation], the inspectorates of state trade, and the Ministry of Finance inspected the condition of trade and consumer services for servicemen and their families in the Siberia and Leningrad Military Districts, the Moscow Air Defense District, and a number of military units, organizations and institutions subordinate to the central authority.

It must be said at this point that the USSR KNK has devoted special attention in recent years to social and economic problems in the Army and Navy. Over the last two years, according to A. Romantsov, deputy chairman of the USSR Committee of People's Control, the committee has examined questions of housing for officers and warrant officers, including those discharged into the reserves in the 1989-1990 reduction of the USSR Armed Forces, of organizing production in military state farms and farms attached to military units, and of the progress of transferring property and military equipment to the national economy through the organs of Gosnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply].

G. Smirnov, inspector with the USSR KNK, reported on the results of the inspection. He noted that the military trade system on the whole has the necessary resources to satisfy the requirements of servicemen and their families. The plans for retail-trade turnover are being fulfilled annually. However, many serious shortages in the trade and consumer services are hidden behind the favorable indicators in the report.

As a result of mismanagement and lack of initiative of individual leaders of military trade and of nonfulfillment of contractual obligations by oblast, kray, and republic trade organizations, a significant portion of the funds for the goods do not go out, and interruptions in their sale often arise. For example, last year the Yaroslavl post exchange received 33 tons of fish, 48 tons of confectionery, and about five tons of vegetable oil less than what it was supposed to receive. A shortage of fabrics and threads developed in a number of military districts just at the time when there was a surplus of these items on the bases and in the warehouses of other districts and fleets.

Serious deficiencies also turned up in the distribution of funds for the products. Because of the arbitrariness of officials and the absence of glasnost, some military units

do not receive the goods intended for them. This excites justifiable resentment on the part of the servicemen and their families. Instances of this were discovered in the Siberia Military District and the Moscow Air Defense District.

Or, let us say, the funds for a store serving Air Force officers in the Siberia Military District turned out to be significantly less per customer than for a store serving the staff of the district. The store for one of the air defense staffs, for instance, received four times more meat products than the store for the military unit. In Leningrad a number of Navy organizations and institutions were not even included on lists for distribution of automobiles for several years.

When goods are in short supply, people are especially sensitive to any deviation from the principles of social justice in their distribution. The role of the public is substantial here. However, the committees of people's control of the districts, groups of forces, fleets, associations, and units have paid practically no attention to issues concerning the distribution of allotted funds and goods. They provide little direction for the work of the commissions and groups of social control in trade. Many social controllers do not know the existing system of trade for goods in short supply. The regulations on the commissions and groups for social control over the work of the enterprises of military trade have obviously fallen out of date and need reworking.

The interests of trade and consumer services lie with the fulfillment of the plan for commodity circulation, and not with the satisfaction of people's demands. The system for awarding bonuses is also directed to this end. In the course of the inspection it also turned out that a person and his needs have not yet become the main concern in the majority of the stores and enterprises of military trade that were inspected. As a result, the quality of trade services does not improve and there is little knowledge of the basics. Spot-checks by the inspectors of the USSR KNK showed that military department stores have never become centers for out-of-town trade. For instance, over a 6-month period the Krasnoyarsk department store served only 25 percent of the garrisons for which it was planned. In addition, 80 percent of the documents for goods taken from the store had not been signed by officials of the military units. One had to believe their word.

Ten military department stores in the Siberia Military District provide only 20 percent of the planned commodity circulation for trade in the district. They are very weakly oriented toward serving servicemen and members of their family. For example, the plan sets commodity circulation for the military department store in Novosibirsk at R20 million per year, but the store sells only R0.4 million of goods for servicemen. In the interest of improving trade and consumer services and eliminating lines, little use is made of prolonged work conditions at the enterprises for trade, sliding schedules, and work in 1.5-2 shifts.

The organizations for public catering are not very different in this respect. Over recent years the quality of service in many mess halls, tea-rooms, cafes, and canteens for trade has clearly declined. In practically half of the mess halls inspected, there were instances of the sale, bypassing the kitchen, of products in short supply, of substitution or the short measure of products, and of increased prices.

Trade and consumer services are especially poorly organized at remote, isolated, or restricted garrisons. By the way, in the course of the inspection it turned out that at 20 garrisons in Siberia there are no stores or enterprises of military trade at all. Most often these were so-called "tochki" [airfields], where air defense troops serve.

Rarely in any of these garrisons do servicemen and the members of their families have the opportunity to have their clothes dry cleaned, their linen laundered, or their shoes and appliances repaired, or to be photographed or have their hair cut. Reckoning per single inhabitant, there are a third fewer services there than at the local rayon centers.

For the sake of justice one must admit that the workers and leaders of the post exchange are not at fault in everything, by far. One of the reasons for the situation is a serious lag in the development of a material and technical base. In general, according to the Main Administration for Trade, we are short of commercial and warehousing facilities, refrigeration capacity, and storage for fruits and vegetables by one third.

To a significant degree this results from the fact that, from one year to the next over a period of many years, plans for the construction, reconstruction, and repair of military trade facilities have miscarried. In the last 5-year-plan they were only fulfilled by half. In the current plan, no more than 80 facilities have been introduced in the established time limit. Since 1982, we have not succeeded in maintaining five consumer service establishments in the plan and beginning construction on them, the Garrison Club of military trade in Baltiysk is still being restored after 12 years, and a mess hall at the Irkutsk higher aviation school is still under reconstruction after 10 years. And these examples are not isolated ones.

There is an especially great lag in the development of trade and consumer spheres at Air Force garrisons. To this day more than a third of them do not have even tea-rooms, and construction on many of them has been underway for years.

In general the inspection showed that the process of perestroyka in the military trade system is moving slowly, that the system's organization and structure are unwieldy and ineffective, and that it does not answer contemporary needs. For example, four directorates of the post exchange function on the territory of the Moscow Military District. The stores and enterprises of 2-3 post exchanges operate at each individual garrison.

All of this hampers administration, supply, and control over their work and requires additional funds for their maintenance.

In the meantime the loss of material resources increases from one year to the next. G. Smirnov, inspector of the USSR KNK, reported that according to the results of the inspection the losses comprised R14 million. About a third of that amount is due to missing funds, embezzlement, and misappropriation on a large scale. For instance, a group of workers at a public catering establishment in the Baltic Military District embezzled R250,000. A deficit of R90,000 was discovered at a Novosibirsk military department store and another of R60,000 was discovered at an automobile store in the Leningrad Military District.

According to data from the organs of the BKhSS, over the first 10 months of this year various violations of the rules of trade were discovered in a third of all the stores that were inspected in the military trade system: Cheating the customers, selling goods directly from the bases, warehouses, and secondary locations, and direct misappropriation.

Lieutenant General N. Sadovnikov, commander of the Main Trade Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, also spoke at the meeting. He stressed that this was the first time the military trade system had undergone such a thorough inspection. Where deficits and dereliction of duty had been discovered, concrete measures had been taken to eliminate them and the guilty had been called to account.

Lieutenant General Sadovnikov emphasized that the Main Trade Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense is taking additional measures to improve the material and technical base and the work with cadres and that it is trying to combine the efforts of commanders, political workers, and the society of the Army and Navy in order to try to raise the quality of trade and consumer services for servicemen and the members of their families.

Interview with Design Bureau Engineer on Conversion

*90UM0203C Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Dec 89
Second Edition p 2*

[Interview with A.F. Nazarenko, USSR people's deputy, chief engineer at the "Yuzhnoye" Design Bureau, by N. Mironov: "Swords Into Ploughshares"]

[Text] **Conversion—it is a new word in our dictionary. But now we hear it more and more often. The defense industry crosses over into the civilian sector and we, speaking figuratively, are beating swords into ploughshares. The conversion encompasses 420 enterprises of the defense industry. One hundred enterprises will be refitted for the manufacture of new products in 1990 alone. This data was introduced at the second USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Debate on the report also began with the**

question of conversion. It is a complex process. And it is not as quick as we would like. Our correspondent talks about this subject with A.F. Nazarenko, USSR people's deputy, chief engineer at the "Yuzhnoye" Design Bureau.

[Mironov] Arnold Filippovich, the amount spent on defense was named for the first time at the Congress of People's Deputies—77.3 billion rubles. The reduction of these expenditures by a third has already had a palpable result. However, the changeover of defense enterprises to civilian production must also cost a great deal of money.

[Nazarenko] I would like to begin by saying that the figure for defense expenditures is apparently higher still. First, a number of civilian ministries should be attributed to the defense industry: The Ministry of the Aviation Industry, the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, and even the Ministry of Light Industry. Second, if we consider that one ruble is really worth 20 cents, it means that we spend only about 34-40 billion dollars on defense. One asks how, with parity in the primary types of strategic weapons, with the same number of armies, and with equal numbers of conventional weapons, we have managed to spend 10-15 times less than the Americans, under conditions of lower labor productivity.

Of course one must make allowances for the lower wages in our branches of defense production than, let us say, in the leading American firms engaged in the production of weapons—"Martin Marietta," "Lockheed," "North American," and others. In general one must hope that the appropriate commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet will examine all these facets of defense expenditures. The main thing is to provide the needed defense at the lowest valid cost.

It is no secret that the money earned with such labor in the national economy is not spent in the best manner. Proof of this is provided even by such an instance as the following: In accordance with the Treaty on the Reduction of Intermediate-Range Missiles we destroyed four times more of these missiles than the Americans. And each of them, in conjunction with the technological equipment for launching, costs a round sum of 5-10 million rubles. As a result the commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Congresses of People's Deputies must carefully examine the plans of the Ministry of Defense and the size of the appropriations for their maintenance.

[Mironov] How do you envision changing the defense industry over to a civilian basis?

[Nazarenko] We know that the branches of the defense industry are the most developed and organized portion of our productive forces. Therefore, in the restructuring of the economy they should play the role of a source not only of funds but also of the most advanced technologies which are able to guarantee production of consumer goods at the level of the world's best models. There is also another possibility: Transfer these technologies to other branches of the national economy.

[Mironov] In what manner?

[Nazarenko] Some possible ways of doing this are to move formerly restricted patents into general use, to apply those scientific and technical methods utilized in the defense branches, to use those technical resources under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense for the needs of the national economy, and finally to convert a portion of the defense branches and enterprises.

[Mironov] But does it not seem to you that we expect more from the defense enterprises than they are able to offer, owing to their particular nature? Many people are sure that the defense people can do anything. Of course your cadres have a high level of qualification and you have the most modern equipment. But an enterprise that manufactures rockets for space travel was unable for a whole year to set up a production line to manufacture common sausages.

[Nazarenko] True, the process of conversion will not go smoothly. Although the Congress of People's Deputies has passed a resolution charging the USSR Council of Ministers to complete organization of the conversion by the end of this year.

There are many problems. Some we simply cannot foresee, and we will make mistakes when we try to solve a certain number of the rest. One thing that already has us on our guard is that individual managers want to carry out the conversion by simply curtailing the volume of defense production—without changing the enterprises over to the production of goods for the national economy, with a reduction in the number of workers. Others, on the contrary, undertake to solve the issue of conversion without changing the structure of the enterprises. The latter case especially pertains to the scientific research institutes and some design organizations.

The matter is made more difficult because not all managers of defense enterprises clearly understand the market situation. They have not learned to consider the money. They consider the national economy programs secondary, and they believe that they need not fear the stick and will not benefit from the carrot.

The problems which I have enumerated so far are only, one might say, the "children's diseases" of conversion. But there exist other problems which do not depend on the will of people. First of all, the converted enterprises are not prepared to change over from limited to mass production, which requires additional capital investments. Furthermore, and even more troublesome, sometimes it is simply impossible to transfer the new technology utilized by the defense enterprises over to the branches producing civilian goods because a gap in technological level of production of 10-15 years sometimes exists between them. For instance, the Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building is not in a position to make use of titanium and aluminum alloys, some types of plastics, and technologies requiring special means of processing without capital restructuring and refitting of its enterprises.

Under these conditions the new materials and technological processes which were discovered, let us say, in the process of building the "Energiya-Buran" system cannot be adopted by other branches any time soon. Of course they could be used, for example, in medicine, electronics, and the radio industry, but... In a word, the contour of the defense enterprise should not be changed under any circumstance. The new nomenclature should adjust to meet the old.

[Mironov] If I have understood you correctly, conversion requires serious scientific study. It cannot be carried out in an offhand manner, as often happens with us. Perhaps it is worth discussing the matter seriously in the Supreme Soviet. There is the means of planning, the administrative mechanism, and the sources of funding—all it all requires legislative consolidation!

[Nazarenko] Apparently we do need that. Organizational questions present a special complexity. In particular, the presence of a converted portion of production inside a defense enterprise means that the articles for the national economy automatically share the overhead expenses for the defense production. And this makes them unprofitable or uncompetitive. On the other hand, separating the converted factories from the defense enterprises can mean that they lose their ties to the other enterprises that supply them with parts. And that may put the very possibility of their existence into question.

For this reason the most tempting possibility seems to be the creation of branch enterprises on complete economic accountability, "independent" in terms of organization and finances from the enterprise producing the defense product. Cadres released from the basic production should work at such an enterprise. It seems possible for both enterprises to preserve their independence of production, forming in the final analysis a concern or firm which can produce supersonic aircraft and agricultural equipment as well as consumer goods of all types. An example for such firms could be the well-known company "Fiat" in Italy or "General Motors" in the United States.

[Mironov] And the issue of cadres—is it a matter for concern?

[Nazarenko] Absolutely! I am not going to repeat here the well-known truism that the cadres should be trained. But who knows how much money we have thrown away for nothing because we artificially create the conditions for a forced migration of a labor force? Especially of young engineers and highly qualified specialists.

In the country today we have a great number of people without fixed places of residence—the homeless. They are people without rights and with no prospect of receiving housing. And who knows, perhaps the regulations on registration played an important role in the fate of so many people by forcing them to wander about the country without steady work, which means without experience.

In order to put an end to the nightmare of innocent victims, I believe that we must immediately, without waiting for repeal of the regulations on the passport system, introduce a number of amendments to them, severing the connection between the right to work and registration for a place of residence. With this goal in mind, I suggest that when a citizen without his own housing and registration starts a new job, he should complete a declaration containing information about himself, his wish to enjoy his right to work, and the proposed place of residence (at the home of the parents, in a dormitory, in the private sector). Both parties will sign the declaration, and it will become a legal document giving a man the right to work where he wishes, in the field where he was trained. And the enterprise should help in the solution of his housing problems. Paragraph 36 of chapter 4 of the regulations on registration should be stricken. I have submitted these proposals in one form or another to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

You see how many problems—both public and private—conversion has. If you look at it closely, it touches everything. And if we wish to get the quickest return from it, we must not rely on chance.

Conversion; Complete Switchover at Yuryuzan Mechanical Plant

*90UM0203B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
1 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 3*

[Commentary by V. Konstantinov, deputy chairman of the Chelyabinsk Oblast soviet executive committee, reported by G. Shcherbina under the rubric "Fact and Commentary": "Conversion: An Arsenal—for the Kitchen"]

[Text] As opposed to other years, the mechanical plant in the town of Yuryuzan in the southern Urals will this coming year meet with a "voluntary" slowdown: On 1 January it is switching over completely to the production of goods that it had earlier produced alongside defense goods—"Yuryuzan" refrigerators and leaf chains for agricultural machines.

V. Konstantinov is deputy chairman of the Chelyabinsk Oblast soviet executive committee. The struggle to increase production of consumer goods is one of the planks of his election campaign. The city's workers nominated him candidate for RSFSR people's deputy.

The Yuryuzan factory is only one of numerous subjects for conversion at enterprises of the defense complex in the oblast. Back in June of this year the oblast soviet executive committee attentively examined the proposals of the labor collectives of defense complex enterprises in the southern Urals concerning conversion for 1990-1995. On the basis of this examination, the main directorate for planning and economics introduced the appropriate calculations into the plan for the social and economic development of the oblast.

The plan stipulates that production of consumer goods at enterprises of the defense industry will increase this year by one-third or 162 million rubles in comparison with 1989. The conversion will contribute 60 million of this sum. This policy corresponds with the spirit of the tasks set by the government and approved by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies concerning the improvement of the economy.

I would like to single out the "Factory imeni S. Ordzhonikidze" production association from among the enterprises assuming the main burden of the conversion. Here they planned to boost the volume of output of consumer goods by a factor of 1 1/2. The Kopeysk plastics factory, the Kaslinskiy engineering works, the "Elektromekhanika" scientific production association, and other enterprises are increasing production of civilian goods by 20-30 percent.

It is important to stress that the number of different types of consumer goods also increases as the volume of production grows. Only by dividing up the technology for complex consumer goods will they master production of 25 categories of products, including, for example, microwave ovens for cooking food, washing machines, video recorders, pacemakers, and compact woodworking lathes.

Many enterprises have concluded agreements on cooperation. For example the Kaslinskiy engineering works, known for its decorative cast-iron pouring and its meat grinders, and the Chelyabinsk "Pribor" factory concluded an agreement on deliveries and, using electric motors from the "Elektroapparat" factory in Miass, already produced tens of thousands of universal cooking machines last year. Thanks to cooperation with foreign firms, the above-mentioned "Factory imeni S. Ordzhonikidze" production association has mastered the production of soft furniture and washing machines.

During this holiday season I do not wish to ruin the mood for myself or anyone else. But unfortunately not all of the enterprises of the defense complex intend to make a worthy contribution to an increase in the wellbeing of the oblast's workers. Some of them plan to boost production of non-food consumer goods only about 8-15 percent, which is significantly lower than the average for this industry. I place the blame, for instance, on the leaders of the "Elektromashina" production association who could produce vacuum cleaners, which remain in short supply, using the design of its electric motors; or the "Polet" production association (radio-controlled toys), the Ust-Katav automotive factory (training bicycles and sporting equipment), the Kyshtym radio factory (electric lighting), etc. However, I understand that, perhaps, it is not so much their fault as their misfortune. Planning from below, from the labor collectives, has been legalized on paper, but in practice the staffs of the branches make arbitrary changes as before: Either they cross whole items off the plans altogether, or they leave everything alone but do not allot the material resources for them. And so we still wait to establish a market...

There is another facet that causes trouble. As you know, on 25 May 1989 the USSR Council of Ministers published order No. 911-R, which is intended to increase production of consumer goods. At first glance the document seems correct and well thought out. Unfortunately, it stipulates such deductions from the state budget that the local soviets lose all incentive to get involved in raising the output of non-food products. It is necessary to reexamine this document and ensure that, for 1990 and for the 30th 5-year-plan, the local soviets will have at their disposal for sale to the population the entire amount of the increase in goods, in comparison with the preceding year, produced by defense enterprises located on their territories (rather than 50 percent, as it is currently written). If I can talk about the ideal situation, then it would be useful for about two years running to leave the increase at the disposal of the regions—for building up the base and switching over from administrative methods of direction to economic and market relations. This is extremely important for our oblast because 92 percent of the industrial potential concentrated on its territory is property of the Soviet Union, which means the local soviets receive only crumbs during the distribution of the increase.

One more remark in conclusion. Despite a series of resolutions by the union and republic governments concerning the assignment of priorities when allotting material and technical resources for the production of consumer goods, the majority of enterprises, including those mentioned here, are still not guaranteed a plan that fully balances the production of goods with material resources. And we do not want to drag all these discrepancies that plague everyone into the new economic year.

Low Quality of Some Military Produced Goods

90UM0250A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Lt-Col V. Zhilyakov, entitled: "The Military Representative Under Dual Control: What Compels Him to Close His Eyes to Waste".]

More and more frequently I read reports in the newspapers about extraordinary occurrences in the Army and Navy (at times with tragic consequences) due to the low quality of military technology delivered by industry. Although every accident has its own causes, as a serviceman, my heart aches—I know that the concrete reasons are only a consequence of more deep-seated and natural phenomena.

Believe an officer who has worked in the military representatives office for two decades. The activity of this specially created organ of military control over the development, fabrication, and acceptance of technology and equipment from industry is not sufficiently effective. It is not at all because careless, dishonest people work there. The overwhelming majority of them are degreed specialists and conscientious employees. However, the status on the basis of which we interact with

industry has a number of imperfections, as a result of which the effectiveness of our control is diminished, and at times is lacking entirely.

The corresponding statute on military acceptance was established by the Council of Ministers of the USSR in the 1960s, when first place was given to the quantity and not the quality of goods. In accordance with this document, military representatives were given housing not on the account of garrisons (as it was in the preceding years), but as an apportionment of the enterprises where they performed their military representation. Furthermore, military representatives-Communists were listed on the Party register in the factory.

At first glance, there is nothing criminal going on here as such. But in practice... The main part of my officer duty did not take place in the capital but on the periphery, and there the military representative waited three-four years on the average for an apartment. The enterprise management frequently decided whether we would get an apartment or not depending upon our loyalty.

As a result, the chief of military representation at times was forced to resort to doubtful compromises of conscience and accept production, let us say, with unclear results from so-called periodic testing, categorically forbidden by normative documents; or at the end of the month would agree to shortening the established technical cycle of production fabrication or a reduction in the volume or weakening of the testing regimen, which were also spelled out in normative documents, because... the plan is to run without a hitch.

One might say that he is committing a deed close to a crime. I will not argue with this. But he was forced into such indulgences or face not having housing built for his subordinates, and at times for himself.

When a military representative decides to show principled and uncompromising behavior, some enterprise directors also have in their arsenal the method of party influence. They begin with phone calls to the Party Committee with demands for explanations, and then with threats to investigate personnel matters and to enlist party responsibility. It sometimes happens that they even do investigate and enlist.

Indeed, perfectly aware of how far fetched these pretenses are, the commanders in military representation only throw up their hands and express sympathy, but are unable to help anyone, though, in matters like solving the housing problem.

It only gets worse. It is when you, an officer, oppose a worker, who supposedly is not given an award or earnings on your account, and when an enterprise director begins to gather together, and sometimes even organize, a "industrial materials committee" [KOMPRMAT] on the military representative, enlisting a work conditions

subdivision for this purpose. I myself have found myself in just such a situation and know full well, how and what will come out of it.

I write about this not to settle scores. Cardinal changes are needed in all the conditions in the life and work of military representatives. They need to be freed from a "fortress"-like dependence on enterprise management. How? The answer is simple—apartments should be obtained from the Ministry of Defense, and Party Records should be kept in the political section of the garrison—that is, they are to be both de jure and de facto independent. Then, I am sure, many extraordinary occurrences in military technology and weaponry will sharply decrease.

Transbaykal Plant Converts To Consumer Microelectronics

90UM0352A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Mar 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by I. Tsurik: "Shop in a Former Barracks"]

[Text] The first industrial lot of electronic desk clocks has been turned out at the Transbaykal Mining and Chemical Combine [GKhK] in a village of the First of May Chitinskaya oblast. Until now such items were not produced in the region.

Even a year ago few in the oblast knew about the existence of this enterprise—it was a defense plant and was classified. The beginning conversion "declassified" the combine. A year ago, consumer wares, plastic dishes, buckets, and basins, produced in the shops of the GKhK, appeared on store shelves in Transbaykal. Then production of more serious goods was organized—equipment for milk processing. And now they have taken another step: the combine has begun to produce electronic clocks.

The new plant was set up...in a former barracks. Military construction troops and security guards use to live here. After refitting and repair, new residents appeared in the spacious four-story building—microelectronics workers.

"Our shop is still in the developmental stage," says the deputy chief of the plant, V. Gazaryan. "We have managed to set up, organize, and test only a part of the equipment, the rest is still coming. Our manning is still not complete either. Three groups of specialists are being retrained in Novosibirsk. However the job is started, and the shop is already operating. We assemble clocks from parts provided on a contract basis by the "Adron" production association in Novosibirsk. Soon however, we will begin producing the microcircuits and casting the housings ourselves. Besides clocks, we plan to make parts for computer equipment. If everything goes as planned, we hope to produce goods worth at least four million rubles a year within a few years."

Editorial Reply on Changes in Pre-Draft Training

90UM0336A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by V. Sinyutin, Chief Editor of the journal VOENNYE ZNANIYA: "The Cart Before the Horse?"]

[Text] On 15 February I listened to the radio broadcast "Attention, to the Starting Point." The broadcast started with an assessment of the USSR Ministry of Defense's proposals to change basic military training into a defense/physical training program. As reported, the broadcasters had learned about this in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The lead story declared its total disagreement with the planned measures and accused the military of robbing school children of twenty hours of physical training, for which little time is thus allocated. In general, the commentator asked, why do we need a "militarized" training program, if the time has come for comprehensive disarmament and global peace?

Do not be offended, respected colleagues, but saying that journalism has reached its conclusions after thoroughly familiarizing itself with the document calling for a reexamination of the training of young people to serve in the army, seems to me not to be totally well grounded.

If the authors of the broadcast had actually acquainted themselves with the military's proposals and discussed the matter with them, they would have learned much of interest for themselves. For example, children in the defense/physical training program will play sports. And not just twenty hours, but a full fifty-two hours. The

program includes running, exercises with a ball, pushups, grenade throwing, obstacle course training, and weight lifting. The studies will be conducted in a comprehensive manner. All of this will make it possible for the future soldiers to become physically strong.

The broadcast posed the question of whether or not there is any need at all to train for service in the army. I think that if the journalists, who prepared the broadcast "Attention, to the Starting Point", had carefully studied the documents of the February Plenum of the CPSU CC, which were published literally just a few days ago, such a question would not have arisen. At the Plenum it was clearly stated: we need a well trained and equipped armed forces. This conclusion was reached on the basis of a deep analysis of the international situation, which remains contradictory; the strong continue to impose their will upon the weak. An example of this are the events in Panama.

Another fact. From 6 to 10 February in Moscow there was an international seminar on naval disarmament. The proposals of the Soviet representatives on arms reductions met with stiff resistance from the Americans. Even their NATO allies commented on the non-constructive nature of their position.

Isn't it turning out that some journalists today are trying "to put the cart before the horse," prematurely disavowing the need to train young people for military service? And what is the reason for this?—that same lack of competence. And another reason might be that these are popular notions. After all it is quite fashionable today to criticize the military.

McNamara Quoted on U.S. Military Budget, Arms Control

90WC0023A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 1, 3 Jan 90 p 9

[Article by Edgar Cheporov, APN correspondent (New York): "Robert McNamara: 'A Supermarket Instead of a Super-Fighter Plane'"]

[Text] "For 40 years," says John O'Brien, chairman of the board of directors of the Grumman company, "the Soviet Union presented us with an extremely reliable enemy. These days are almost over...." Grumman, one of the most famous Pentagon contractors in the United States, produces fighter planes and other military equipment. The firm is still working on military contracts, but its financial status is shaky and its income has begun to decrease. The prospects for new large deals with the military establishment are inconsequential—the Pentagon is reducing military expenditures. For this reason, Grumman took an extraordinary step a few days ago: Bulldozers leveled several of its plants and a runway. A hotel, office buildings, and a shopping center will take their place. The cost of the project—over a billion dollars—proves that the firm's intentions are serious.

The American press has recently had much to say about companies like Grumman and about the first signs of the reorientation of the military business. This tendency is still just barely apparent and has not revealed its exact dimensions yet, but it is quite indicative of the political climate in the United States today.

It is an absolutely unique situation. The Washington administration has never discussed cuts in military spending in recent decades. The Pentagon planned to request 311 billion dollars for the coming fiscal year. The White House decided that 295 billion would be enough. The administration also announced that expenditures on defense would continue to decline and would drop to 180 billion dollars by the middle of the 1990's.

Therefore, the reordering of priorities in defense spending and the planning of new approaches to this spending have begun in the United States. Of course, there is also no shortage of warnings against hasty cuts. Admiral William Crowe, who was just recently the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is certain that the "instability in Eastern Europe and the USSR" precludes such decisive moves by the United States. These warnings, however, do not reflect the prevailing mood. The first of what has been predicted as a long series of hearings on defense spending cuts were conducted in the U.S. Senate Budget Committee. One of the speakers, Robert McNamara, the former secretary of defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, spoke of the need to cut Pentagon expenditures in half during the next decade.

"Why do you feel," I asked McNamara, "that there are valid grounds for this kind of serious move?"

"Because I believe that agreements on strategic nuclear arms and on conventional arms will be signed by the end of 1990. The discussion of this issue, according to Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, will be one purpose of their summit meetings. They are certain to be followed by new agreements and further cuts. I also believe that in the next few months the Soviet Union and the United States, the East and West, will be discussing the proposal that our nations should not intervene unilaterally in regional conflicts. If this should be the case, then neither will need to have the strength required today for the Pacific zone and other parts of the world. In addition, of course, the level of naval forces and the prospects for their reduction should also be discussed at the upcoming summit meeting. I feel that the military potential of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, especially the military forces of the USSR and United States, could be far below the level being debated today at the talks on strategic nuclear and conventional arms."

"Will cuts in military appropriations hurt U.S. national security?"

"No, they will not. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe now pose less of a threat. The reduction of Pentagon expenditures will aid in achieving global stability, reinforcing our own security, and making resources available for the reconstruction of American industry."

"Is the administration prepared to accept your 'ceiling' on defense spending?"

"It seems to me that it is not ready to do this yet. It is being held back by the unfinished talks on nuclear and conventional arms and by the fact that the dialogue on these issues has not even entered a new phase yet. I understand this, but I suggest that it look ahead—beyond the agreements being considered today. It is already time to think about a new international policy which will not, I repeat, allow anyone to intervene unilaterally in regional conflicts. These conflicts should be resolved with the help of the United Nations and regional organizations such as the Organization of American States. Under these conditions—and they are attainable—the 50-percent reduction of U.S. military expenditures I have proposed will be justified."

"But what about the military-industrial complex? What role is it playing in current events?"

"The military-industrial complex is naturally against defense budget cuts, but I think that its members will ultimately realize the need for the current changes. This is a reality they will have to accept. Newspapers are already reporting that General Dynamics, one of the largest military firms and a firm more dependent on Pentagon contracts than others, has been discussing the need to reduce its income from the military establishment. Refusing to accept this is like beating your head against a stone wall."

"Would it be fair to say that the Soviet perestroika created the necessary conditions for the current discussion of defense spending cuts in the United States?"

"Yes, absolutely. Your perestroika is aimed at improving the state of domestic affairs in the USSR so that you can produce more goods for your own use and enter the world market. To this end, you have to move resources from the military to the civilian sphere, but to do this without weakening your defense, you must reduce the danger of political confrontation and the risk of a potential conflict with the West. I am certain that these are the goals M. Gorbachev is pursuing, and by doing this he is also giving the West, and the United States in particular, a historic opportunity to reduce the defense budget."

French Armed Forces Reorganization

90UM0212A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA response to letter to the editors:
"Under the Same Concept: Reorganization of French
Armed Forces"]

[Text] Dear Editors! The Soviet press has reported on the existence of a plan for reorganizing the French Army. Known as "Armed Forces—2000," it was developed by French Minister of Defense J-P. Chevenement. Could you provide more details?

Senior Lieutenant S. Novitskiy, Belorussian Military District

According to statements made by official representatives of the French Ministry of Defense, the "Armed Forces - 2000" program is intended to bring national defense "into conformity with the concept of nuclear containment." It is all-embracing in nature. The forthcoming changes will have some effect on all components of the French Armed Forces: the Ground Troops, Air Force, Navy, and Military Gendarmerie.

The program consists of three major measures. First, it is planned to strengthen the corps that constitute the 1st Army and transfer this Army's headquarters to Metz so that it will be closer to the tactical air command and also to the underground protected command post in Rochonvillers (department of Moselle). Six territorial military regions and 22 territorial districts will be strengthened at the same time. In addition, 23 headquarters units will be either eliminated or severely reduced.

Since 1984, the French Army's operational structure has consisted of three army corps (with headquarters located in Metz, Baden, and Lille) and "rapid deployment forces" (Maisons-Laffitte) made up of five divisions.

Under the "Armed Forces - 2000" plan, the new operational structure of the French troops will consist of two army corps: II Corps (Baden) and III Corps (Lille), and the "rapid deployment forces." The I Corps headquarters located in Metz will be abolished. Fifteen logistic support units, nine of which are full-strength regiments, will be inactivated.

In the new structure, II Army Corps will consist of the 1st Armored Division (Trier, FRG); 5th Armored Division (Landau, FRG); 3d Armored Division (Freiburg, FRG); and the 15th Infantry Division (Limoges). The III Army Corps will undergo considerable reinforcement. It will include the 2d Armored Division (Versailles); 10th Armored Division (Chalons-sur-Marne); 7th Armored Division (Besancon); and the 8th Infantry Division (Amiens).

The composition of the "rapid deployment forces" remains the same. It will include the 4th Airmobile Division (Nancy); 9th Infantry (Marine) Division (Nantes); 27th Alpine Division (Grenoble); 11th Airborne Division (Toulouse); and the 6th Armored Cavalry Division (Nimes).

Thus, 1st Army will consist of two reinforced army corps of four divisions each, with three of the latter armored.

The Army and Gendarmerie will regroup into three territorial military regions: the Atlantic, North-Eastern, and the Mediterranean, with headquarters located in Bordeaux, Metz, and Lyons. The Atlantic Military Region will be divided into three military districts (Rennes, Limoges, Toulouse); the North-Eastern, into four (Strasbourg, Amiens, Chalons-sur-Marne, Besancon). Finally, the Mediterranean Region will consist of two districts: Lyons and Marseille. Paris will become an independent military district.

Instead of four zonal commands of the Air Force, there will be three, with the centers located in Villacoublay, Metz, and Aix-en-Provence. The military district headquarters located in Bordeaux will be abolished.

The Navy will have two instead of three command bases—in Brest and Toulon. The functions of the Cherbourg Naval Base will be transferred to the military district headquarters that is responsible for observation of navigation in the English Channel.

The plan calls for completing the above operational and territorial changes in 1991. In the words of French Minister of Defense J-P. Chevenement, the "Armed Forces - 2000" plan is "in tune with the spirit of defense: an attempt to utilize to maximum advantage of the country's security and resolution of future problems the extremely limited forces available (to the Ministry of Defense)."

Foreign Weapon Developments: French Missile, Israeli AWACS

90UM0212B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "In Arsenals and Proving Grounds"]

[Text]

Underwater Launch

The French firm of Aerospatiale and the West German MBB are developing the Polyphem SM surface-to-air guided missile for employment by submarines. The proposed missile is designed to destroy fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters flying at altitudes up to 5,000 meters at a distance of 10 km from a submarine.

It is intended to employ a special guidance system capable of homing in when the target position is not known exactly. Upon breaking the ocean surface, the missile is to fly a circular path of 1 km radius at an altitude of 500 meters, during which time the target coordinates are to be defined.

The Polyphem SM missile is housed in a capsule that is launched through a torpedo tube. After the launch, the capsule assumes a horizontal position and travels under water on a programmed trajectory at speeds up to 15 m/s. It can be launched at various depths, from periscope level to 300 meters. After the capsule carrying the missile travels a distance of about one kilometer from the submarine, the capsule assumes a vertical position and surfaces. The capsule then opens, the booster ignites, and then the sustainer is initiated.

After the missile surfaces, control is by means of a fiber optic cable. Launch weight of the missile system is 106 kg, with the missile proper constituting 43 kg of that. The HE warhead weighs 3 kg.

Airborne Warning System

According to information supplied by the foreign press, the Israeli firm of Israel Aircraft Industries is developing an Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft equipped with the Falcon radar. This aircraft, a modification of the Boeing 707, will be fitted with a conformal phased-array radar. A model of this craft was exhibited at last year's Paris Air and Space Show.

Featured in this model are radar antennas located in the nose fairing, fuselage sides, underneath the tail section, and in the wing tips. The press states that this makes it possible to perform circular scanning, without serious effect on aircraft aerodynamics. The use of the phased-array antennas makes it possible to accomplish faster scanning and target location as compared with similar existing aircraft, such as the E-3A Sentry or the E-2C Hawkeye, in which the rotating antenna is positioned on top of the fuselage.

The Falcon system has been under development for about 3 years. Flight testing should start in the latter part of 1991, with initial deliveries to be made a year later.

Reader Asks About Union in FRG Armed Forces

90UM0212C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA response to reader's letter: "Bundeswehr Union"]

[Text] Dear Editors: I have heard that a union exists in the FRG Armed Forces. Is that true?

Signed Captain I. Lapin. Western Group of Forces

Indeed, a social organization—in reality a union—does exist in the Armed Forces of the FRG. Its purpose is to protect the interests of military personnel. The "Bundeswehr Union" was organized in 1956. Its charter specifies that the "Union" is to represent and protect the professional interests of military personnel, reservists, and members of their families, while maintaining neutrality with respect to political parties and without interfering with the service activity of command authorities. The "Bundeswehr Union," being an independent social organization, also exerts an influence on drafting of legislation pertaining to servicemen's careers, finances, material benefits, and a number of other matters.

All members of the "Union" have equal rights, regardless of their military rank and length of service. All categories of active duty and reserve military personnel are represented in the elected bodies. Leadership is in the form of a congress that convenes once every four years; it elects a federal board of 28 members to serve as its executive body during the intervals between congresses.

The Bundeswehr Union publishes a monthly periodical called the BUNDESWEHR. In addition, interim information is published in a bulletin, the INFO newspaper, and leaflets. The purpose of all the publications is to disseminate information on service in the Army and provide ideological education to active duty and reserve personnel. The "Bundeswehr Union" is actively involved with the country's social life, primarily youth of pre-draft age.

(Above information was published in BUNDESWEHR.)

Reduced Presence at Cam Ranh Bay

90UM0260B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Jan 90 p 6

[Article by G. Deyev: "USSR Reduces Presence in Cam Ranh Port"]

[Text] A regular briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists was given by V.P. Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the Information Administration, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He delivered the following statement:

"Within the framework of previous announcements relative to reducing the size of the Soviet Armed Forces in the eastern part of the country and their conversion to a strictly defensive structure, to include the Asian-Pacific area, the Soviet Union, acting with the agreement of the Vietnam side, has undertaken the reduction of its presence in the port of Cam Ranh. Mig-23 and Tu-16 aircraft were removed from there in the latter part of 1989. Remaining on the Cam Ranh airfield is an air detachment (six to 10 aircraft) on temporary duty.

"The Soviet side hopes that these actions will serve to diminish military and political tensions and improve the climate of mutual trust in the Asian-Pacific area."

The briefer further stated that the news of the release of a group of ill and wounded prisoners-of-war by Iraq and Iran has been greeted in the Soviet Union with satisfaction and hope.

"Although this event may not be large in scale," he stressed, "it is in our opinion highly significant and symbolic in the sense that it can become a kind of acceleration factor for the entire process of settling the Iran-Iraq situation. Of importance is the fact that the statements made by both sides on numerous occasions relative to their peaceful intentions have finally been translated into an affirmative, practical step, one that is deeply humane. We can only hope that this step will be continued and further developed."

Khronopulo Port Call in Greece

*90UM0260A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jan 90 First Edition p 3*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin: "Port Call in Piraeus"]

[Text] A detachment of Soviet warships under the flag of Admiral M. Kkronopulo, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, paid the Greek port of Piraeus an official visit. Included in the detachment were the large antisubmarine vessel "Azov" and the escort vessel "Pytlivyy." Our seamen can look forward to trips, receptions, and sports matches with Greek seamen.

On the first day of landing on the Greek shore, the commander also visited Minister of National Defense T. Tzannetakis. In the evening the Soviet detachment band presented a concert on the Greek shore.

M60A1 Armor Upgrade Noted

*90UM0356A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Mar 90 First Edition p 3*

["In the Arsenals and On the Test Ranges: with Reactive Armor"]

[Text] As the American magazine ARMED FORCES reports, the U.S. Department of Defense has decided to upgrade the defenses of the Marines' M60A1 tank by mounting sets of reactive armor on them (see photo).

The set consists of 49 metal M1 boxes [korobki] and 42 M2 boxes (the latter are somewhat longer) that are filled with an explosive substance that detonates when the plates are hit by an armor-piercing shell. The shock wave from the detonation substantially weakens the destructive impact of the shaped [charge's molecular] flow on the tank's main armor. Moreover, detonation does not occur when the explosive container is hit by shrapnel, bullets, or 20-23 mm shells.

The set of boxes is bolted to protruding stubs [bonki] welded onto to the chassis and turret. In peacetime the tank is fitted with boxes containing an inert filler.

According to the press, plans call for mounting the reactive armor on 170 of the American Marines' 716 M60A1 tanks; the rest will be replaced gradually by M1A1 Abrams tanks. It is also reported that U.S. specialists are developing reactive armor sets for the Bradley M2 infantry fighting vehicle and for the M3 reconnaissance fighting vehicle.

According to the views of foreign specialist the main shortcoming of this means of enhancing armor protection is its rather high cost (the total cost of equipping one combat vehicle with reactive armor is nearly \$100,000) and the vehicles' reduced mobility owing to their increased combat mass. For example, the mass of a M60A1 tank is increased by 1.8 tons.

Dutch Reconnaissance Aircraft Purchase

*90UM0356B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Mar 90 First Edition p 3*

["In Arsenals and On Test Ranges: Superlight-Weight Aircraft"]

[Text] As the weekly JANE'S DEFENSE reports, the Dutch ground forces have purchased four superlight-weight Omega aircraft (maximum useful load: 180 kilograms) from the West German firm VPM. They will be tested for reconnaissance and special operations.

What attracts specialists to this aircraft? First of all, its very low radar visibility, low noise, and comparative large flight range, which reaches 1,000 kilometers (when an extra fuel tank is mounted under the pilot's seat).

Austrian Choice Of Bofors Missile Noted

*90UM0356C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Mar 90 First Edition p 3*

[Unattributed article: "New Missile Complex"]

[Text] The magazine SOLDAT UND TECHNIK reports the Austrian Ministry of Defense, after a six-month competitive test of the "Milan" transportable antitank missile system, of French-West German manufacture, and the RBS-56 "Bill" transportable antitank missile system, made by the Swedish firm Bofors, has chosen the "Bill" antitank missile system (see photo) [not reproduced]. According to the views of Austrian specialists,

the "Bill's" chief advantage is that the missile flies one meter above the line of sight, reducing the chance that the missile will encounter (collide with) undergrowth and uneven terrain. In addition, the shaped charge is mounted in the warhead with a downward tilt (toward the ground) of 30 degrees from the missile's longitudinal axis, allowing better piercing of a tank's frontal armor plates.

The "Bill's" basic tactical and technical specifications are as follows: launcher and sight weight, 11 kilograms; weight of the transport-launcher container with missile, 16 kilograms; missile length, .9 m; shell diameter, .15 m;

maximum firing range, 2,000 m; minimum firing range, 150 m (at stationary targets) and 300 m (at moving targets); maximum missile flight speed, 200 m per second; armor piercing capability, 800 mm.

The Austrian Defense Ministry has accepted the PAL 2000 make of the "Bill" antitank missile complex and given the Bofors firm a 500-million-krona (\$78 million) contract to supply its ground forces with 1,000 antitank missile systems and 160 launchers and infrared sights for them.

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