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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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22 October 1985

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

TERSE GREETINGS BY HUNGARIANS TO ROMANIANS ON NATIONAL DAY

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 23 Aug 85 p 3

[Text] On the occasion of Romania's national day the 41st anniversary of the country's liberation, Janos Kadar, chief secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Pal Lozonczi, President of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic, and Gyorgy Lazar, President of the Council of Ministers yesterday sent the following telegram to Bucharest to Nicolae Ceausescu, Chief Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the Romanian Socialist Republic and to Constantin Dascalescu, first minister of the government of the Romanian Socialist Republic:

In the name of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, of the Presidential Council and of the government of the Hungarian People's Republic, of the Hungarian people and of ourselves we are sending our greetings and good wishes to you, to the working people of Romania on the occasion of your national day, the 41st anniversary of the liberation of your country.

It is the sincere and steadfast striving of our party and government that the cooperation of our two countries, on the basis of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and of internationalist solidarity, should develop in all areas of life for the benefit of our countries and peoples, of the universal cause of socialism, of societal progress and of peace.

On your national day we wish you, the people of Romania, continued success in the building of socialism, in the common fight for strengthening international security and for protecting peace.

*

Istvan Sarlos, president of the National Assembly, greeted on the occasion of Romania's national day Nicolae Giosan, president of the Great National Assembly, and the KISZ Central Committee, the SZOT, the National Council of the Patriotic People's Front, the National Council of Hungarian Women, and the National Peace Council greeted their respective Romanian counterparts.
(MTI)

The Romanian Socialist Republic commemorates on August 23rd its national day, the anniversary of its liberation. It was on this day, 41 years ago, that fascist dictatorship was toppled by the people's armed uprising directed by the communists. In the period still left from the war the Romanian troops fought on the side of the anti-fascist coalition. In this historical about-face a decisive role was played by the operations of the Soviet army, which in the summer of 1944 opened a road toward liberating the southeastern part of Europe. The Soviet victories made unambiguously clear to the Romanian military leadership and even to the more realistically thinking groups of the ruling class that the alliance between the country and Hitler's coalition threatened Romania's very existence. It had become obvious that Romania's true national interests were served by alliance and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

The historical turning-point of August 23, 1944 made possible the comprehensive economic-political transformation of the country, and it opened up a road toward socialist building. In the more than 4 decades since that time they have, with the leadership of the communist party, done away with the historical backwardness of the country and they have accomplished significant results in creating and developing socialist mass industry and agriculture. The economic and cultural accomplishments were greatly helped by the connections between Romania and the socialist countries, by their cooperation within COMECON.

Certain internal problems of national economy and the unfavorable effects of the crisis in world economy are generating worries in Romania also. In November of last year, at the 13th congress of the Romanian Communist Party, evaluating the work of the last 40 years and designating the tasks of the coming period, Nicolae Ceausescu, Chief Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the Romanian Socialist Republic, stated that there is a need for concerted, sacrificing work in order to create conditions for more efficient production, to ensure the continued development of the country, to get rid of the economic difficulties. The party put up as a goal improving the balance of the national economy, increasing the productivity of industry and agriculture, and accomplishing the balanced supply of the population.

An important factor of Hungarian-Romanian cooperation based on the unity of our socialist goals and on the Marxist-Leninist and proletarian-internationalist ideas is the participation of our countries in COMECON and in the organization of the Warsaw Pact. Developing the bilateral connections in a mutually advantageous manner, exploiting the possibilities better does, in our opinion, serve both countries and helps to consolidate the unity of the socialist community. Both countries would only benefit if in these connections Hungary's Romanian and Romania's Hungarian national minorities were to fulfill their mediating role.

We greet from the depths of our hearts our brother, Romania, on its national day. We wish its people continued success in making their country prosper, in developing the socialist societal system, in strengthening peace and security, the cooperation of the socialist community.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ALBANIANS REFUTE YUGOSLAV VIEWS ON KOSOVO OF MIDDLE AGES

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 3 Jul 85 pp 3, 4

[Article by Selami Pulaha: "On the Demographic and Ethnical Situation of Albanian Regions in Middle Ages"]

[Text] During the centuries in the Middle Ages, the Albanians confronted many difficult situations created by foreign occupations that had come one after the other and, because of their resistance, they maintained their existence as a people and their ethnic and cultural identity. They were, on the eve of the Ottoman occupation in the 15th Century, a nation historically established many centuries before by the ancient Illyrian elements, based on the unity of language, of territory and cultural unity with an economic and social level of development similar to that of the neighboring people of the Balkans. The historical Middle Ages sources recently published, especially the Ottoman land registry books of the 15th and 16th centuries, cast light, among other things, on the demographic and ethnic situation of the Albanian regions as a whole.

The Ottoman occupation in the 15th Century brought important demographic changes for the Albanian regions, such as the destruction of many inhabited areas, the depopulation of many areas and cities, a great emigration of people to Italy and Balmatia and so forth. Consequently, the human forces suffered a great blow. In the Albanian regions there were 3608 inhabited areas with 82,210 houses. After 100 years, at the end of the 16th Century, the number of inhabited areas had increased to 5315, while the number of houses had doubled to 173,421.

The demographic development of the Albanians in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries is characterized by the same traits as those of the other Balkans people, because they were at the same level of development and the Ottoman occupation had created about the same economic, social and political conditions for all people. In fact, the human potential of the Albanian regions was limited, therefore, the movements of people were also few and mainly within the Albanian territory.

The distribution of the population had not been identical. It had been more dense in the regions with agricultural-livestock units, such as the southern and southeastern areas of Albania, Kosovo, the lowlands in Shkoder and Central Albania. Whereas, in the mountainous regions of Northern Albania and Kurvelesh in the South with agricultural and livestock units, it was much smaller and scattered. Together, they had about three percent of the total number of the population. As a result, they could not serve as the main source for increasing the

Albanian population in general. Their small human potential, based on economic, social and geographical factors, shows that the demographic role of mountainous areas had been unimportant, because they did not have opportunities to develop great inter-regional movements, especially outside the Albanian regions. Thus, for example, the population of the mountainous regions of Northern Albania with 3201 houses in 156 villages at the end of the 16th Century could not fill Kosovo with inhabitants, where [in Kosovo], in the same period, there were 35,844 houses in 1758 residential areas; therefore, a population about 11 times as great. The movements of population from the northern mountainous areas to the eastern and western areas affected a small number of people who occupied an unimportant place in the total number of the population. In regard to this issue, in the bourgeois-revisionist historiography there still exist views which portray the Albanian population as a relic left in the remote niches of the northern highlands which were submitted not to the general laws of social development, but only to the laws of biological development, the "demographic explosions" and geographical determinism. According to these views, the highlands of Northern Albania had been the hotbeds of the formation of Albanian nationality, the areas of gathering of Albanians from where they had moved and had gone to populate their own regions of central Albania, southern Albania and Kosovo. These theses without scientific bases are the result of not knowing the real demographic situation of the Albanian regions in general and of the erroneous methodological treatment of the historical statistics of their authors. The latter, giving priority to biological and geographical factors, in social development have expanded the demographic and socio-economic role of the remote highlands in the process of forming and consolidating the Albanian people, attributing in a simplified and mechanical manner to the emigration of their inhabitants, the role which the socio-economic and politico-cultural factors have played in the affirmation of the Albanian people in their regions.

This erroneous treatment also lies at the roots of the Yugoslav historiographical thesis that the Albanians had come in Kosovo from the highlands of Northern Albania following the so-called great displacement of the Serbs at the end of the 17th Century, as a result of the Austrian-Ottoman War.

The land registry books of the 15th and 16th centuries provide information that reveals the real ethnic situation in Kosovo before the so-called great displacement of the Serbs, and tells about some phenomena that had taken place there before the Ottoman occupation. Their information completely destroy the myth about the "permanent Serbian character of the population of Kosovo" and about the Kosovo identification with the "Old Serbia," affirming that the presence of the autochthonous Albanian population in Kosovo is more massive and prevailing compared to the Slavic minority which had come during the Serbian occupation, composed mainly of people of the state, church and military apparatuses and of trade colonists and so forth. The new element they introduced is the fact that the majority of inhabitants in the Plateau of Dukagjin, in many villages in the plains of Kosovo and in areas more peripheral had Albanian names, such as Gjin, Gjon and so forth, names which are mainly from Catholic traditions, whereas the other part of the Albanian population, especially in the plains of Kosovo, was of the Orthodox faith and, consequently, of the political and religious predominance of the Serbian State and Church, and had mainly Byzantine and Slavic names. Many villages with Slavic names and inhabitants with Byzantine and Slavic names are considered as Albanian in the land registry books. Here there is no

identification of Orthodox with Serbian. The Albanian population, during the oppression of the Serbian State and Church had been forced to convert to the Orthodox Faith from the Catholic Faith. The substance of historical statistics on Albanians in Kosovo in the 15th Century was also enriched by some Yugoslav historians such as A. Haxhiq, A. Stojanovski and M. Dinic with their publications of Ottoman documents and documents from Ragusa [Dubrovnik].

A number of new socio-economic and politico-cultural phenomena were manifested in Kosovo in the 15th to 17th centuries. First, after the Ottoman occupation in 1455, the Ottoman State and Religious Administration was established and strengthened; it was followed by the destruction of the Serbian State Apparatus and the dominant position of the Serbian Church. After this event and, especially after the abandonment of the Orthodox faith and the embracing of the Islamic faith, the Albanian population gradually abandoned the Byzantine and Slavic names and adopted Islamic names along the Albanian names. The presence of this Albanian Moslem population is proven by many sources with different derivatives, such as the testimonies of visitors from the Curia in Rome who used to penetrate these regions regularly since the beginning of the 17th Century, the direct evidence of the Turkish scholars E. Celebi and H. Kallfa who testify about the Albanian character of the inhabitants of Kosovo cities such as Vucitern and Prizren and the Slavic Bosnian A. Hyrremovic (1688) who included these territories under Albania. Along with this, there are registry books which often note with eloquence the names of Islamized Albanians or which separate the Turkish Moslem elements from the Slavic elements. In these circumstances, to deny the presence of the Albanian Moslem population in Kosovo, stating that there were only a few Albanian Catholics in Kosovo, as a great number of Yugoslav authors are doing today, means to ignore the historical facts and to make a completely absurd affirmation.

The new factors, which appeared and took action with the Ottoman occupation, did not change the physiognomy of the ethnic and cultural structure of the Albanian population in these regions. This occupation eliminated the former feudal class, of Serbian majority, as an independent political and economic force and its place was taken by the new Ottoman class. In the 15th Century, this class was composed mainly of Turkish Moslem spahis and, during the 16th and 17th centuries, of Albanian ethnic elements. This occurred because the popular masses here [in Kosovo] were Albanian and because the new occupiers, in order to insure a social support, were obliged to open the doors of the Ottoman feudal class to the elements born in the bosom of this population, as it happened in other Albanian regions.

In this way, in the 16th and 17th centuries, the ethnic difference that had existed in a marked manner until the 15th Century, between the feudal class ethnically alien in majority--Serbian--and the population composed almost of the lower strata of the Albanian population, vanished in its greater part.

The new phenomena of the 15th to 17th centuries, such as the destruction of the Serbian religious economic and political domination and Islamization weakened or eliminated the conditions which previously had favored the Slavism of the Albanians. In these circumstances, the common Orthodox Faith and cultural relations between Albanians and Serbians, once dominating, were not working with the intensity of the period before the 15th Century is regard to the Slavish

cultural and ethnic assimilation of the Albanians. Islamization opposed the process of Slavism and further distanced the Albanians from the Slavs, although it created favorable conditions for the Ottoman cultural and political assimilation of the Albanians. However, historical circumstances and the great armed conflicts of the Albanians against the Ottomans did not allow these processes to advance beyond a superficial varnishing of this consolidated nationality. Both Islamization and Orthodoxy during the Serbian domination did not manage to assimilate the Albanians, because here they met a mass population with national characteristics that had distinguished them for centuries before. As a result of its resistance, this population maintained its language, traditions, customs and individuality untouched as a component part of the Albanian nationality.

The lack of "demographic explosions" from the Northern Highlands and the presence of the Albanians as a predominant population in Kosovo in the 15th and 16th centuries, along with the many records in the Serbian sources of the 13th and 14th centuries, are documents which destroy the myth of the filling of this region with Albanians after "the great movement" of the Serbs at the end of the 17th Century. Not only this, but also the documentation of this phase, especially of the Command of the Austrian Army which entered Kosovo, on the eve of the so-called movement (1689-1690), reveals this falsity. This documentation proves that Kosovo was inhabited mainly by Albanians before the outbreak of the uprising (1689). The Austrian Command included these areas within Albania, whose capital was considered to be Prizren. The Albanian insurgents from Kosovo joined the Austrian Army in mass; they were led by Pjeter Pogdani (5000 insurgents from Prishtina, 6000 from Prizren and 3000 from Peje); they fought beside the Serbian fighters from the areas which were crossed by the Austrian forces on their way from Sava to Kosovo. It is clear that such a great number of Albanian insurgents could come only from the Albanian region.

The displacement of elements from the Serbian minority in Kosovo, which took place on the occasion of the withdrawal of the Austrian Army, has been purposely exaggerated by historiographers who were interested to give it such a dimension that it could explain the "deserbianization" of this area. Besides this, we must not forget that on this occasion the Albanian insurgents also withdrew; the last footprints of these Albanian insurgents are also found today in Slovenia.

Kosovo never remained a region bereft of population, a vacuum, during the Ottoman domination. The mass presence of the Albanians in Kosovo in the 15th and 16th centuries, appearing in a more expressive manner in the Ottoman documentation, because of the political, social and religious changes that took place, has forced scholars to examine with objectivity some facts of the period of the Serbian domination, as well as the study method in general that has been executed until now. In this framework, the mention of Serbian kings and the existence of Serbian state and religious institutions, churches and monasteries of the 13th to 15th centuries cannot constitute absolute documents on the Serbian ethnic character of these territories, as is the case in the Serbian historiography; similarly, one cannot use as evidence the existence of mosques and of Moslem state and religious institutions during the centuries of the Ottoman occupation to prove that here we have had a Turkish population. Their presence is linked with political, social, ideological and religious changes and not

with the ethnic character of the population. The temporary establishment of the state and church center and of a feudal class with a majority of Serbs, in the situation where the mass population was Albanian, does not mean that this region was ethnically Serbian. This is neither the first nor the only case in the history of the Middle Ages in the Balkans and Europe, when there was an ethnic change between the ruling class, the state and religious apparatus --ethnically alien--and the autochthonous population composed of lower strata of the population, in this case Albanian. The names of the Albanians in the Middle Ages must also be studied and closely linked with the concrete historical conditions that had created them. Being completely the result of foreign political, social and religious pressure, the name lost from place to place its distinct Albanian ethnic character. Consequently, Albanians have kept Byzantine, Slavic, Islamic and other names. For this reason, there can be no comparison between the name and the ethnicity of its bearers, as is being made by a number of Slavic scholars. This has happened both with the Albanians who still have today Byzantine, Slavic, Islamic, Arab and other names from the Middle Ages and with all the people who lived and still live under the condition of foreign political, social and religious domination.

Recently, a number of works from Yugoslav historians, first of all, Serbians, continue to advertise in the daily Yugoslav press and keep as eternal and inviolable, like a "taboo" that nothing can be detached from or added to, the above-mentioned theses inherited from the nationalist historiography of the Great Serbia of the 19th Century.

History has proven the role that those have played as "historical documents" in favor of the Great Serbian chauvinism in order to justify the annexation of Albanian regions and, also after the occupation, to deny the Albanians their legitimate national rights and to continue against them a policy of oppression and genocide.

However, these dogmas do not respond to the historical reality which the recent results of historical studies reveal, scholars not only from Albania, but also from other countries and even from Yugoslavia can be listed in this.

To maintain this today, in the conditions where the knowledge of sources of information on the Middle Ages has been greatly expanded and the methodological level of historical research at the international level has been improved, and not to see in the history of the Albanian people the activity of the general objective laws of social development, but only of the geographical and demographic determinism and of emigrations, as is being done, in general, by the Yugoslav historians, means to treat historical phenomena with the same methodology that characterized romantic nationalism in the Great Serbian historiography of the 19th Century.

Such dogmas are deeply in contradiction with the results of science. Not only this; they become more dangerous when they are kept untouchable and made compulsory in the treatment of history and, as a myth, they become the leading and guiding elements of politics.

HUNGARY

PARTY FINDS ADJUSTMENT TO NEW REALITIES DIFFICULT

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 22 Jul 85 p 3

[Interview by Sandor Gali with Lajos Krasznai, first secretary of the Pest County party committee: "We Are Looking for New Answers To Solve New Problems"]

[Text] First of all, let me briefly introduce Lajos Krasznai to the readers. He belongs to the younger generation, he is 47 years old. He comes from a poor rural background, his parents were agricultural servants. After studying to be a machine-tool operator, he obtained diplomas from the Institute of Higher Political Studies and from the Zrinyi Academy. For a long time he worked in the youth movement, then for 8 years he was first secretary of the Buda District party committee. For a while he worked as chief of a sub-department in the Party's central office, then in October 1983, he was elected to be the first secretary of the Pest County party committee. During the 13th Party Congress he was selected to be a member of the Central Control Committee (KEB).

[Question] You have not experienced the capitalist past directly. Your outlook on life was shaped by the new society. Now you are leading a county that had a great involvement in the Communist Movement, and after the liberation, too, were always leading in the struggle for changing socio-economic relations. Are you comfortable leading such a county?

[Answer] To a certain degree, I am. I believe that this feeling is shared by anyone who feels a sense of responsibility for his actions. This feeling of responsibility is only heightened by the circumstances and facts implied by the second half of the question. Pest county's past and present, its political, social, economic rank and importance, as well as its future keep this feeling alive in all of us who are ready to act on the county's behalf. Such a sense of responsibility, however, cannot exceed an allowable limit, beyond which it would become paralyzing, instead of stimulating. In this optimistic struggle, the party's functionary receives the greatest support from the confidence he enjoyed at the time of his election, and which--if he does his work well--he continues to receive in the course of his functioning. This is best expressed through active support by the people who elected him. Naturally, we try to utilize in all areas of our activity those experiences which have been accumulated by our predecessors

in political work, party leadership, and economic life. This makes continuity and innovation a unified process.

Anyway--since the past and my age have been mentioned--I would like to mention here that, even though my experiences have been shaped and developed under the new order, I still have bitter memories of capitalism. I acquired these when I was a child. Working as a water-carrier or gleaner at harvest time, or as a hungry herding boy, I recall those years that have been realistically described in [Zsigmond] Moricz's short stories. such as "Seven Pennies."

Multi-Faceted County

[Question] It is frequently said that Pest County differs from the others; it has its own characteristics, and its situation is determined by the fact that it surrounds the nation's capital city; in other words, it is a "central county." How do you see this?

[Answer] Our county is no different from the others, it is not a central county, but in many respects it has its own specific characteristics. At the present time it has almost 1 million inhabitants, thus it is the largest county in Hungary. It does not have a county seat that exercises its influence throughout or exerts a centripetal force. On the other hand, around Budapest there exists a peculiar ring of settlements that contains numerous varying social layers and is in constant flux, the commonly known Budapest agglomeration. Centuries old or recently established settlements, communities with tens of thousands or just a few hundred people can be found in the county. One of its main characteristics is its dynamic population growth, and the constant migration of people. Old local patriots, new settlers and recent immigrants live side by side in large numbers. One could symbolically refer to this county as a "battlefield," which can present one with many daily surprises. It borders on six other counties and 12 of Budapest's 22 districts. It is crisscrossed by Hungary's major highways, much of its area is favored for sightseeing and recreational purposes and is frequented by tourists.

Eyes are frequently "on us," while at other times they look "over and beyond" the county; and I could continue listing the factors making Pest county appear different. After all, every county differs somewhat, in its size or the structure of its economy and settlements. They resemble each other, however, in that each of them has its own characteristics.

[Question] Similarities and differences--as you have just described them. Still, as far as economics, how is Pest County different from the others?

[Answer] Pest County has developed industries and agriculture. Its industrial significance is indicated by the fact that only Budapest and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County surpass it in value of industrial production. Employing six percent of Hungary's labor force and utilizing seven percent of Hungary's industrial output. Industry makes up 70 percent, while agriculture 24 percent of the county's production; 3 percent is

provided by the construction industry, and the rest is divided by miscellaneous branches. The county's industrial structure is multi-faceted; nearly every specialty can be found here: modern chemical, electric-energy production, machine and vehicle manufacturing, light, construction and building material producing industries, as well as others. In addition to state-operated enterprises, there are well-developed industrial shops managed by local councils and cooperatives. The county's construction industry is second on the national scale.

The other large productive branch, agriculture, is also many-faceted and specialized; being located close to the nation's capital, it is organized to supply the urban dwellers. The cultivation of cereals, vegetables, and livestock fodder are primary agricultural activities. Animal breeding is also relatively well developed. Various production systems became important in the county's agricultural activities. More than 4,000 university-trained agricultural specialists are employed by the farms within the county.

Economy on the Move

[Question] The entire economy of the nation is on the move. Structural transformation can be observed in industry and agriculture alike. Are these, in fact, signs of renewal, or merely those of administrative restructuring, economic adjustments? How do you see this in Pest County?

The new management forms touch primarily the internal organizational makeup of industry, the structure of enterprises, but even the state-operated farms will be affected.

To the outsider, these changes may create the impression that they are--as you said in your question--merely administrative re-organizations, aimed at providing certain economic corrections. However, I would like to point out that these organizational transformations should not be considered by themselves, but rather examined and analyzed together with those substantive economic changes that are included in the modernization of our system of economic management. Substance and form are united in this instance, and the two can only be evaluated together.

As in everything else, here too one can detect contradictions and doubts of practical implementation. This plan is executed by human beings, too. Thus, one must take into consideration subjective elements. The political leadership should be particularly insistent on creating harmony between the various interests during the process of transformation. Obviously, if a presently unified enterprise is going to be reorganized into several independent units, it is not irrelevant whether this happens in the interests of national economy, or because, shall we say, it is fashionable, or because of pressure originating from internal factions. In other words, the party cells should support innovation, but always by keeping in mind how and with what methods they can assist in increasing production and commercial distribution.

[Question] The agriculture of Pest County used to be famous for the greatest involvement in auxiliary [non-agrarian] activities, and this benefited the cooperative movement and agricultural production as well. According to my information, these auxiliary activities have been significantly reduced during the past few years, and in the course of one year, 12,000 people left agriculture. How do you evaluate all this?

[Answer] The production profile of the county's agriculture was shaped by objective possibilities during the past few years. The reason for the intensive auxiliary and industrial activities in the county--which indeed contributed to the improvement of agricultural production--are primarily attributable to the fact that a large proportion of the cooperatives operated under unfavorable conditions. In the given economic circumstances, most of our cooperatives thought that by participating in the above-mentioned auxiliary and industrial activities, they would benefit in two ways: on the one hand they would provide meaningful and proper employment opportunities, while, using the income derived from these activities, they would also upgrade their basic agrarian activities. Many of our agricultural enterprises cultivate land that is graded at only 9, 10 or 15 golden crowns. [This is a traditional manner of indicating the quality of arable land, with no equivalent in English.] Anyone can understand that in working tens of thousands of hectares of land like that, the profitability of crop production and animal breeding, as related to the investments involved, will fall below the average.

We must agree, without reservations, with all regulations that enforce organization and tight management in the enterprises. However, we must also keep in mind that during recent years the leaders of enterprises have learned to "read," and even to count, between the lines of the regulations, and that they make their economic decisions accordingly. Basically, their decisions are influenced by their involvement in industrial and service activities, and change their structures, which also resulted in significant reduction in employment. Or, for example, this is the reason why they cannot undertake developments in their basic activities. Thus the number of dairy cows is gradually diminishing, and less and less of the county's area is devoted to vegetable cultivation.

What do we wish to do? We cannot use administrative measures in this area, and we do not want to do that. The best we can do is to use political means, keeping in mind the economic circumstances and the interests of our national economy, in order to bring out the best in our enterprises.

Meeting the Challenges

[Question] Has the party organization been able to meet the new challenges in the exploitation of innovational opportunities, in the renewal of political activity?

[Answer] The requirements of political leadership always demanded that the party organizations and party committees develop in accordance with the most timely conditions. In this respect, there has not been any change:

We strive to have the party organizations at the county and local level, the apparatus of the supervisory party committees to prepare to meet the new tasks derived from the above-mentioned demands. Of course, this does not happen overnight. It is also true, on the other hand, that the "preparation period" is minimal, since it follows from the theory and practice of party supervision of enterprises that the party organizations, the elected bodies be familiar with the theoretical connections within the innovations of our economic system, otherwise they would not be able to implement the theoretical leadership we demand of them.

We must also figure on the necessity of changing the agenda and methods of the party in order to renew our political work, because old attitudes and old methods simply will not provide responses to new challenges. At this time, in the course of acquiring the theoretical knowledge and organizing its application into practice, we are seeking out new methods that may be necessary at the various levels of party organizations and local cells. I want to mention only one example: The new practice of selecting directors for industrial or agricultural enterprises prohibits the use of old methods in the preparation of cadres or the implementation of party authority by the responsible party organs.

[Question] Finally, how do the party organizations of the county measure up to these--far from insignificant--challenges? To what degree are they able to act in unison in order to solve the new problems?

[Answer] The creation of party unity calls for numerous important preconditions and relationships. In this respect, we consider it most crucial--and this is in perfect accord with the decision of the 13th Congress--that the discriminating ability of our politics, and specifically our economic policies, be improved. In my opinion, it is impossible to apply general schematic solutions to the more complex economic circumstances and conditions. We expect more from those who are able to offer more; we assist and stimulate those who are worth it; and we reprimand those who deserve it. But we can do any of this only if we take the objective conditions into consideration.

12588

CSO: 2500/526

22 October 1985

HUNGARY

BORDER GUARD UNIT ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 28 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by Major General Imre Toth, National Commander of the Interior Ministry's Border Guards: "Service At the Border"]

[Text] Many people can still vividly recall it: The cement sparkles in the heat, and the line of cars appears nearly endless at the border crossing. We are living in the age of visiting and expecting visitors, and the "Indian Summer," which promises to be pleasant, further lengthens the tourist season.

Presently 65 border crossing facilities handle the millions of passengers and vehicles coming and going, most of them staying open around the clock. The majority of personal documents are handled by about one-fifth of these facilities. Some of them, such as Hegyeshalom, Rajka, Sopron, Biharkeresztes, Parassapuszta, or Budapest-Ferihegy, handled nearly 2 million crossings by 1 August, and Komarom has passed 3 million. Our crossings along the main roads handed out 250,000 visas during the first 7 months of the year, and the swift handling of the cases--of which we can be proud without modesty--is praised by foreigners visiting Hungary.

Interest of the State

We know that the first and last meetings with the representatives of a country, the border guards, leave a lasting impression.

These meetings can cheer up the anxious passengers, but they can also sadden those who arrive in a happy mood. The growth of tourism is paralleled by the increasing volume of opinions concerning the work of the border guards. There are those among these opinions that ignore important facts and find the passport and customs controls at the borders too strict; they refer to their experiences elsewhere and forget the goals we want to accomplish in Hungary, and about the peculiarities of our economic and political situation. Of course, we should listen to critical opinions and make use of good advice. It is my view, however, that guarding our borders, and more specifically the control of border crossings, can be flexible or "tight" only to the degree that it serves our societal and national goals, our security and our public order.

I would like to emphasize that it is in the interest of the state to have border traffic controlled securely, swiftly, within the limits of law, and in a civilized manner. We should follow a consistent practice that would hurt neither the citizens of this country, nor those who come to visit us or traverse our country, and that are in harmony with the treaties signed with our neighbors.

There are three complimentary factors making up the activities of our organization. They are obviously interconnected, because the appropriate control of border crossings is not possible without firmly guarding the borders, which in turn depends on the maintenance of lawful order within the border zone. It would be difficult to say which of the above are the most important, even if one or the other may be emphasized, depending on the development of our state or its external relations. Without a doubt, the border of a state is like a sensitive instrument, reflecting the domestic situation as well as changes in international politics.

Based upon these considerations, we can state that during the past decade the civilized manner of controlling the border traffic received increased attention. The number of passengers crossing our borders and coming under our control first exceeded the annual figure of ten million around the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, and subsequent years were also characterized by growth. In 1978 we counted almost 48 million entering or exiting passengers. As a result of the global economic crisis, several economic and political measures, as well as the increased tension in the international situation, tourist traffic increased somewhat during the subsequent years.

40 Million Passengers, 12 Million Vehicles

It is well known that the tourist and emigration policies of Hungary are flexible, and that we are open in our economic, scientific-technological and cultural contacts. This promotes travel by millions of Hungarian citizens, their meetings with foreigners and their cooperation in many areas. Consequently, during the recent past approximately 40 million passengers and 12 million vehicles have crossed the borders of the Hungarian People's Republic each year. This is how many "cases" the employees of the border guard and customs and duty authorities had to deal with. The statistics are influenced by the fact that each passenger is encountered by the people working at the borders twice, and one must also take into consideration the transit passengers.

The border guards had to adjust to the increase in the tourist and transit traffic. To use a military expression, we had to re-deploy our forces and, as much as this was possible, we placed most of our men at the points controlling the traffic. In previous times, only officers or non-commissioned officers were allowed to handle passports, but now gradually we have trained our enlisted personnel for this task. They had to be fully responsible for making decisions as to who can enter the country or who can leave it. They had to become familiar with the passports of various countries, and with the various permits and annotations entered into them. And, since the length of military service has been reduced to 18 months, we had to make our training more intensive.

In my opinion, the border guards have met the challenge dictated by the circumstances. Year after year the control of the border traffic has become more secure, swift and expeditious. This observation remains valid, even if we consider the difficult side of the border guards' work. Perhaps most Hungarians do not even suspect that there are more than a few tricky individuals who try to cross the border illegally, especially during the summer peak season. There have also been violent attempts to cross the border, threatening the safety and life of peaceful passengers, primarily committed by individuals who have already had their conflicts with the law. The man on the street probably does not see the direct relationship between the internal order of our country and the security of border control, which keeps violent crime out of Hungary. Many people who demand even swifter, even more flexible border control procedures, thus hoping to increase the efficiency of the border crossing points, do so because they fail to realize the above connection.

Reliable Guarding of Borders

We, border guards, realize that it is in the interests of our state to complete the control procedures as swiftly and in as civilized a manner as possible. Tourists departing from Hungary or arriving to the country want to relax and enjoy the sights, and not spend an hour, hour-and-a-half, or occasionally more, nervously waiting in line at our border crossing points. In cooperation with the Ministry of Interior, the customs and duty authorities, and the tourist organizations, we have implemented several measures to eliminate factors that slow down our work. For example, along our western border we receive Austrian citizens, who can enter Hungary without a visa, in a separate lane. Wherever it is possible, we separate passenger traffic from trucks. We have also increased the number of crossing points that are open around the clock.

Here I must mention the individual efforts of our personnel. During the summer peak period, officers and non-commissioned officers attached to border crossing points seldom are allowed to take leaves, and only receive a portion of their days off. At times like that, the work week of the enlisted personnel also approaches its permissible limit. At the same time, however, we realize that we must continue our efforts to speed the process of control.

This has objective difficulties, too, much of it derived from practice: 70 percent of border crossings take place during the three summer months, and within this, the height of traffic occurs on weekends, early mornings and late afternoons. The uneven distribution is related to traveling customs, the climate, and we could name other factors; in any event, the difficulties caused by this are not entirely preventable. An additional factor is that most of our border-crossing points were built to accommodate much less traffic than what prevails today. Some of the problems were eased after one of Europe's largest border crossing stations was constructed at Hegyeshalom. New crossing facilities were built at Parassapuszta, Berzence, Vamosszabadi, and Kophaza. Many others have been enlarged and modernized, but at Sopron, for example, the crowded conditions have been

a problem for years. The only solution there would be the building of a new crossing station.

The increase in tourism has brought about demands for more disciplined and intensive work in the other activities of the Border Guard, for example, in the so-called "green border," which falls under the authority of border guard districts, supervised by unit commanders. As a result, continuous, reliable guarding of the border is achieved without increasing the number of personnel.

The number of attempts at crossing the border illegally is not high, but it is high enough to be worth mentioning. Generally, we are talking about wanted criminals or repeat offenders, who try to escape being called to account and are desperate. Our border guards meet them decisively and forcefully, and indeed this requires bravery and at times even sacrifice.

I could discuss at length the difficulties and varieties of service along the border. In sum, I think that we accomplish our assigned tasks with honor, and, what is most important, there is law and order along the border. Our personnel take care to assure the peace and safety of citizens and passengers alike. The residents of the border regions assist significantly in this: more than 9,000 volunteers participate in the work of the border guards, and more than 100 communities bear the designation "Border Guard Community." We should also mention the enthusiastic efforts of the young, including the several thousand Youth and Pioneer Guards, as well.

Without Increasing Personnel, With More Preparation

The good relationship is mutual; our soldiers and border guards often assist the communities in solving their everyday problems. In many places, the guard units are represented in the work of the local councils. The residents of these communities reinforce this confidence: a stranger cannot walk around near them without being asked what business he has there. If someone is suspicious, the people working in the fields report this to the local guard post. Not infrequently, the capture of dangerous criminals attempting to evade justice is accomplished with the help of the populace. By the way, we have ten "Border Guard Cities," such as Sopron, Koszeg, Gyula, and Satoraljaujhely, in addition to "Border Guard Villages." We appreciate the help of the local people greatly; without it, our task would be more difficult. Let me convey here and now the sincere appreciation and respect of the communists and of the personnel of the border guard, for the sacrifices and devoted work of the people living along the border.

We also owe gratitude to the parents of our enlisted personnel, to the schools, the youth organizations and the work places, for educating future border guards for honorable steadfastness and the manly fulfillment of their duties. We, on the other hand, strive to provide second homes for these youths within our units, and a chance for them to strengthen their character during their service and thus return to their families and again take their places in constructive work.

The border guards can look back at energetic development during the past decade. Dynamic reaction to changes has become an everyday part of our activities, the basis of effective service. In accordance with the principles of guarding the border, we modernized our methods and strived to explore our reserves in the areas of education and intellectual energies. Without increasing its size, but with more educated personnel, today's border guards are ready to take on bigger tasks than ten years ago, and we feel that they measure up to the growing challenges, fulfilling their obligations effectively.

12588

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HUNGARY

EAST BLOC FIRST: BUDAPEST TO HOST FORMULA I GRAND PRIX

Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 16 Sep 85 p 15

[Article by Peter Serenyi: "Next August: Formula I World Championship Race in Budapest! Simultaneous Press Conferences in Budapest and in Francorchamps"]

[Text] The world's first automobile race, covering 126 kilometers and with the participation of 21 racers, was held on 22 July 1894 between Paris and Rouen... The first world championship took place in Monza on 6 September 1925... The first Formula I Grand Prix was run at Silverston, England on 13 May 1950... In August 1986 Budapest will be the site of the first Formula I race to take place in a socialist country...

The latter announcement above was the gist of the press conference held yesterday at the Hungarian Auto Club. The executive secretary, Tibor Balogh, presented the details of the commercial contract signed on 10 September and of the preparations already under way. The three-day delay in the official announcement was due to an agreement between the economic association--consisting of the Hungarian Auto Club, the Asphalt Road Building Trust, Cooptourist, IBUSZ, and the Volan Frieght Transport Company--created for the purpose of facilitating the race and its partner, the Association of Formula I Designers and Manufacturers (FOCA), represented by its president, Bernie Ecclestone. They agreed that at ten o'clock in the morning on Friday a simultaneous press conference would be held in Budapest and in Francorchamps, Belgium, and the extraordinary decision would be released simultaneously to the Hungarian and international press.

"Now we must satisfy the second precondition for the race, the building of the course," emphasized Tibor Balogh. "According to plans, the work will begin in October, about 18 kilometers from Budapest, near the M-3 Highway, in one of the valleys between Mogyorod and Kerepestarcsa. The length of the course is 3,895 meters, the tribunes will accommodate 25,000, and about 120-15,000 people will be able to enjoy the race from around the course, under comfortable and civilized circumstances. The contract will be in effect for five years.

Istvan Papp, designer at the Asphalt Road Building Trust, which will build the course, also claimed that the facility will be perfectly suitable for all kinds of motorized races.

"We would like to complete the course by next May, because there is a minor race planned for 1 May, which does not require that all of the service facilities be operating."

Many people inquired about the potential costs, the probable profits (or losses), and in connection with this, the secretary told us that negotiations concerning a construction loan are underway and that the course will become profitable after about its third year...

At last! Three years of confusion are ended. The guessing has stopped, the unfounded speculations have lost their effectiveness. Everyone is certain! "Now "only" the course has to be built, and in such a manner that it satisfies the exceptionally strict and detailed specifications. The somewhat malicious remark at the press conference was justified: We must not try to save by cutting corners now, because shortcomings can only be made up later at a much higher cost. Of course, there was talk about the strict sport aspect of the project, the organizing and managing of the race. The answer put everyone's mind at ease: The training of race officials will begin at the same time as the construction. In connection with this, we have a modest proposal: All previous personal animosities should be set aside, and the one-time executive secretary of the Hungarian Association for Auto and Motor Sports, Istvan Nador, should be urgently mobilized. He has been collecting his experiences about Formula I racing for many long years, and it can be said without exaggeration that he knows most about the sport, and it would be a sin not to utilize his talents. For the most important consideration at the moment, because time is so pressing: the maximized utilization of resources...

12588

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HUNGARY

PARENTS VIEW MILITARY AS REHABILITATION FOR WAYWARD YOUTH

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 29 Aug 85 p 1

[Article by Laszlo Szabo: "Backstairs Influence Needed to be Drafted?"]

[Text] Nowadays many young men with the crewcuts recently coming into style are spending their evenings with friends. The draft letter is in the their hands--this is another reason why their hair is cut so short. The first requirement for the service is fulfilled. They are taking leave of those companions who already have their mandatory service behind them and of those who have not yet been called in.

Every year at this time the end of the summer draft letters arrive. Therefore, all those who throw going-away parties have been counting on having to go. It's useless to dwell on whether they go gladly. At any rate: they know that they fulfill their constitutional duty, and it is better to get it over with. They tease each other "how good it would be to creep out of the military uniform," but still all are a little proud, albeit in a well disguised way, of being drafted, of being found fit. They are proud of their strength, and of their physical ability.

Experience tells us that today more and more youths want to be ex-servicemen as soon as possible--they don't wait around for a draft notice gladly. The definitive reason for this is that it is easier to serve 18 months as a single man than when one has a family to take into consideration. This is despite the fact that married men in the service receive special treatment--not just financially, for example by placing them first in the building corps which ensures income, but also concerning leave, time to be spent at home, vacation. It is the established experience of the leaders of the national defense that there is much less trouble with the single conscript on a holiday or nameday than with married men and with men with families. The single men don't long for home as strongly. Thus when the draft letters are being planned, they take pains to draft as many single men of military age as possible. But many other aspects must be taken into consideration when planning the replacement for an army equipped with enormously complicated technical--including electronic--instruments and weapons systems. Single men are called in as long as there are appropriate numbers of well trained chefs, mechanics and computer programmers. It is true that the army itself offers many types of training, a first or second profession, i.e. further instruction in 18 months.

Of course, the drafted youths think of this less these days. It is only after their discharge that they can appreciate how much richer they have grown in knowledge, how much stronger they are physically, and how much stronger they have grown in character. At any rate, it is well thought out when and at what age men are drafted. And if time flies by the young man and he has not been called in at age 22-23, he surely is looking for the opportunity to be next in line to serve, so that he need not pay his public dues at age 25-26. In that case he even tries to profit by the influence of an army officer acquaintance or such. And there are parents who will search high and low for special patronage. No, their goal is not exemption, as was the case more than before--they are pleading for call-up in large numbers. It is extraordinary, isn't it? But then again, maybe it is not so extraordinary. There is a very plain reason for this. Parents familiar with the readiness of the people's army to instill human values wait for their son to be drafted in hopes that the army will discipline their uncontrollable child.

And it is true, the army has straightened out many youths with whom neither parent, school or workplace could cope. This is because the disciplined condition has not only a temporary, but usually a lasting, morally disciplining influence. This, of course, by no means exempts the parents from educating them. No matter how we look at it, it is a favorable phenomena that today a call-up brings not only a soldier bearing arms to the parents' mind, even though the bearing of arms is a natural trait of the national defense forces, but also the disciplined youth of strong character. This is favorable because, after all, it is the joint effort of the military and the parents which is capable of raising talented young soldiers and turning them into honest, productive citizens.

12823

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HUNGARY

BRIEFS

NATIONAL AGITATION , PROPAGANDA CONFERENCE--On Monday at the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party a 2-day, nationwide agitation and propaganda conference started with the participation of the central party institutions, of the managers of television, radio and the press, and of the directors of the county party committees and mass organizations who are responsible for this sector. After the opening speech of Erno Lakatos, section chief of the Central Committee, Janos Berecz, secretary of the Central Committee gave a lecture on the decision of the 13th Congress, on the national program of the continued building of socialism, and Istvan Horvath, secretary of the Central Committee, gave a lecture on developing the social and political relationships and on the tasks of propaganda concerning this. (MTI) [Text] [Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 27 Aug 85 p 5] 12772

CSO: 2500/525

22 October 1985

POLAND

'DEMOCRACY IN CULTURE' ISSUE SPURS DISCUSSION

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 22 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by Prof Andrzej Kwilecki: "A Difficult Subject: Democracy" under the rubric "Concerning Cultural Policy"; passages in slantlines rendered in boldface in original text]

[Text] /When speaking of democracy in culture the broadening of the social base for cultural policy is worth noting. First, I perceive the phenomenon of the social dialogue on the subject of culture. This dialogue occurs within the framework of various structures and at various levels. Those taking part in it are artists, performers, activists, publicists, critics, researchers, representatives of the administration and decisionmakers/.

The multiplicity of the bodies within which cultural matters are discussed is striking. This reflects the contemporary strong politicization of culture and at the same time the strong response of cultural bodies to the needs of politics, bodies such as the National Council for Culture; the bodies formed by the PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth]; the councils under certain province governors and mayors; the cultural commissions under province, gmina [parish] and city-gmina people's councils; the cultural departments and commissions operating within the framework of the party and its allied political parties; and the councils under certain cultural institutions (museums, theatres). Of a certainty, some of these bodies engage in make-believe activities, although this need not be and is not a rule. /It is of certainty a problem for them all to feel convinced about the importance of the matters they deal with and to become aware of the responsibility for the state of culture in their communities/.

A Dialogue is Possible and Needed

At the same time we observe a revival of cultural activities at churches. The impression arises that part of the regional sociocultural movement, until recently firmly linked to regional societies, urban culture associations, etc., has moved under the aegis of churches. Artists, writers, scientists and theatre groups are making specific offers to the churches. This also reflects the extraordinary politicization of culture. Here too operate groups of individuals programming forms of activity and discussing cultural matters.

/The question arises: would a dialogue between individuals and groups of extremely diverse political orientation be possible and needed nowadays. Or would it be merely a dialogue of the deaf? I believe that precisely culture is the domain in which genuine dialogue and discussion are always needed and possible, with the proviso that persons who believe that they are always right, that they are always best-informed, that they alone know what the society needs, not take part in them. If this proviso cannot be carried out, this means that we are no longer dealing with culture but with politics alone/.

The exploration of prospects for broadening the social base of cultural policy should not be confined to expanding bodies consisting of consultants, experts or social activists and organizing substantive discussion within that framework, although I do regard this form of democracy as important and needed. /As in the economy so in culture new ways of democratization should be explored. They should correspond to the higher educational level of the society, the development of cultural institutions, the mass participation in culture and the growth of interest in new directions and currents/. This concerns increasing the actual participation of the public in programming, decisions, control.

What the Public Wishes

In the democratizing measures so far emphasis has been placed on activating experts and organizing groups consisting of eminent artists and performers. Now attention should also be paid to the personal, intimate factor of participation in culture, so as to utilize it in the process of democratization. /The point is that cultural policy, which is concerned with solutions, choices, general decisions, should not overlook the mass of culture users, the lovers of art or music, each and everyone of whom experiences in his own personal manner his participation and each and everyone may have his own opinion on that policy or offer a pertinent recommendation/.

In my view, an interesting opportunity for the democratization of culture is harbored in spurring the activism of the participants (concert and theatre audiences, spectators at exhibitions, etc.), affording them the conditions for expressing their opinions or wishes and for exerting an influence on, e.g., the choice of repertoires or performers, as well as involving them in social control over the activities of the institutions of interest to them.

Were it possible to implement such a model of a culture-spreading institution in which the public (spectators, audiences, amateurs) would play a role as a factor influencing its activities side by side with its governing board (management), the competent council, the group of animators and the employee self-government, we would then be able to speak of further progress in the democratization of culture.

The Principle of Selection

In conclusion, /a word about democracy in the sphere of creativity. Freedom of the exploration of new roads, of the voicing and pursuit of different artistic and literary concepts, as well as respect for continuators of traditions and

authors of original solutions are elements of democratic relations in cultural activity/.

The matter looks more difficult when we consider the sociological problem of democracy within and among particular artistic communities. And when we find that democracy is quite improperly interpreted. Does every composer, sculptor or writer have an equal right to present or publish his work regardless of quality? Should the relatively large sculptor community have privileges similar to those of the smaller composer community?

/The application of the principle of selection and prioritization appears to be an obvious task of cultural policy. There can be no equal treatment of works of art representing disparate levels. That would be a denial of democracy and disregard of the importance of professional criticism or public response/. In theory the matter looks simple. In practice it is complicated; great mistakes in this domain have been committed in the past and surely are still being committed at present. Only time proves the validity of the principles of selection and prioritization followed in the past and the decisions made on their basis.

1386

CSO: 2600/1052

POLAND

CRITICAL RESPONSE TO J. WIATR'S 'CLASS STRATIFICATION' THEORIES

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 10 Aug 85 p 11

[Article by Jacek Tittenbrun: "Without Dogma?" under the rubric "Polemics"]

[Text] /The article by J. Wiatr (POLITYKA, 23) [see JPRS, EPS-85-082, 9 Aug 85 pp 99-107] dealt with, among other subjects, the views presented in my works on aspects of sociopolitical crises in postwar Poland. Incidentally, the writer based his discussion on a text that is a considerably abridged version of the treatise included in the anthology "Kryzysy społeczno-polityczne w Polsce Ludowej" [Sociopolitical Crises in People's Poland], of which he himself is one of the coauthors/.

J. Wiatr's critique of the general thesis of my works, according to which demonstrations by the working class were directed not simply against the "apparatus of power" but against its "embourgeoisement" and "petit-embourgeoisement," as well as against the corresponding non-proworker policy reflecting these processes, reduces to two fundamental criticisms.

The first assertion by J. Wiatr, according to which, "...as described by Tittenbrun, the forms of the transformation of the bureaucrat into a petty bourgeois or a capitalist... do not necessarily require the existence of private ownership by the capitalist and petty-bourgeois classes," is rather infelicitously phrased. For it suggests that the petty bourgeois or the capitalist can exist in the absence of private ownership, which is evident nonsense. The context makes it clear, however, that the above assertion presupposes a not too accurate statement of the position he criticizes, as well as an oversimplified and restricted interpretation of ownership. Of course, it is not the possession itself of a high income that turns someone into a capitalist; it is rather the possession of income transformed into ownership of some or other form of capital. One form of capital is, as known, financial capital or lending capital. Therefore, J. Wiatr is inaccurate in regarding interest paid on money as something separate from private ownership. Of course, one form of interest is not the same as another: the interest paid on capital should be distinguished from the interest paid on savings. The dividing line between these two forms of interest can be indicated only by a specific economic analysis that also answers such questions as whether the income derived in the form of interest suffices to open a workshop, a little

factory or a store, or whether it is of a size to be regarded solely as a supplement to a worker's wage that might compensate for the difference between prices and the value of labor but that never enables its possessor to free himself from the necessity of selling his labor as a means of living.

J. Wiatr very clearly accepts the colloquial interpretation of private ownership: according to him, trade in private land plots is not a mode of private ownership, whereas I am trying to clarify that a private land plot, a passenger car, an apartment, etc., insofar as it becomes an object of sale, is an object of private (and not only personal) ownership. Of course, the presence of this kind of modes of exchange is based on a commodity-money economy, and it also is true that that economy "also persists in a mature socialist society." But for all that my works do not contain any thesis ascribing to a "developed" or "mature" socialist society the ability to eliminate all forms of private ownership.

Besides, it is not appropriate either to regard the forms of private ownership existing in, e.g., Poland as mere postcapitalist "relics." In Poland at present the classes linked to private ownership of labor relations do not represent a conventional relic of the previous bourgeois society, just as slavery in the United States had been the product of capitalist rather than conventional ancient modes. Our private-ownership classes flourish owing to, among other things, certain gaps and shortcomings in the socialist mode of production and derive from its existence certain nonequivalent advantages.

The above remarks are pertinent insofar as they impede ascribing to their author the belief -- of which he might be suspected by those who read only J. Wiatr's article -- in the necessity of an immediate "termination of the process of socialist transformations," in the sense of implementing collectivization, waging yet another "battle for trade," abruptly shutting down private workshops, etc., as an infallible prescription for ending the crises.

The other argument by J. Wiatr presupposes in its turn a more general methodological perspective conflicting with the "dialectical view" to which he himself refers elsewhere in his article. Wiatr believes that "the essence of the problem" of the crises is to be found not in the class struggle -- which, nota bene is something else than my polemical adversary's definition of it as "social inequalities and injustices" or "deformation of the class structure" -- because "the principal cause of the crises was the collapse of the economy, the inability of the economic and political system to meet social needs."

I wish to protest against such an interpretation of my position, from which it would follow that I supposedly regard "the class factor" as "a more important cause" of the crises than "the economic factor". In my works I have been attempting to demonstrate -- as best as I could, depending of course on the quantity of the available empirical data, but that is another story -- that particular processes occurring in the economy and particular economic activities do not remain unaffected by class divisions, forces and interests. Viewed from that position, the question of whether the causes of the crises are traceable to economic relations or to class relations is thus a poorly

posed question. Economic relations are not relations among things but relations among people that are mediated by things. Economic processes do not occur somewhere outside human relations, and economic activities are undertaken and carried out by human beings and each time produce particular economic consequences, etc.

Viewed from the same standpoint, it is not enough simply to speak of an "increase in population incomes," as if the population did not consist of, among other things, classes which hardly benefit equally from that increase. In its turn, referring to another expression used by J. Wiatr, "the growth of [foreign] indebtedness," this is nothing else than the process of the transformation of certain segments of the financial world big bourgeoisie into actual coowners of our national capital. As to whether the causes underlying to process can be defined by the pat formula of "irresponsible politics," I leave it to the reader to decide.

The society does not consist of compartmented boxes labeled "the economy," "the classes" and "the authorities." A fundamental tenet of historical materialism is that no phenomenon of social life can be scientifically investigated unless allowance is made for its relationship to the means and modes of production, to the ownership-and-class structure. This is not, contrary to J. Wiatr's assertion, a "one-dimensional" view, because it does not presume that only the economy exists in the society, or that the classes account for the entirety of societal life. Why should it be one-dimensional to consider the class-conditioned nature and meaning of the processes and phenomena occurring in the economy? In my works I have been precisely attempting to demonstrate that the specific nature and direction of the policies of the 1970's derived not only from the mistakes, insufficient Marxist or economic knowledge and other similar personal characteristics of the decisionmakers but also from certain class-conditioned processes consisting in, to put it succinctly, the degeneration of part of the apparatus of power into petty-bourgeois and bourgeois classes.

J. Wiatr's polemical inferences culminate in the concluding assertion that, "as presented in terms of class categories by Tittenbrun, the analysis of the sources of social conflicts and crises, may be in many respects valuable and interesting but is too schematic in the sense that it attempts to bend too many factors in order to fit them into an abstract formula." I believe that bending not just "too many" but any number of facts whatsoever to fit them into an "abstract formula" fully deserves criticism. But, like any other accusation, the accusation of dogmatism or schematicism has to be proved. As for terming the class struggle in postwar Poland an "abstract formula," I do not think that J. Wiatr has proved this.

His accusation is unconvincing for yet another reason. If the conclusions and theses of the works criticized by Wiatr are indeed mere products of dogmatic thinking, how to account for the postulate of my polemical adversary that sociological studies should be reoriented precisely in the direction of "the classes owning the means of production -- the capitalists and the petty bourgeoisie --in particular from the standpoint of discovering the mechanisms leading to a rebirth of capitalist modes, and also from the standpoint of the

effect of these modes on the sphere of state power," "the inequalities of the class-stratum situation" and "problems of social injustice"?

Since we are speaking of dogmatism, traces of schematic and dogmatic thinking can be perceived in J. Wiatr's treatment of the question of class rule. He states that in a society with our type of social structure "the category of class rule... acquires a new content and becomes not quite the same as that meant in the classical Marxist analyses of capitalist societies." As if the content of the category of "class rule" were not individually determined by the particular conditions of a given society but is a cut-and-dried formula ensuing from some a priori assumptions relating to a socialist system of society or some earlier system. That "dialectical view" mentioned by Prof Wiatr commands, among other things, distinguishing between the class and its political representation, which apparently is omitted in the statement by J. Hochfeld as cited by the author.

Likewise, conservatism of thinking burdens J. Wiatr's view that "there is no reason for revising... the fundamental concept of the class-stratum structure which Polish sociology has worked out in previous years. "Revising" (read: a better adaptation to reality) that traditional theory is necessary, if only in view of the existence of not one but several working classes (linked to different types of ownership) as well as of several different peasant, petty-bourgeois and bourgeois classes (as demonstrated by S. Kozyr-Kowalski on using capitalism as an example). The traditional notion of class structure affords no room, moreover, for the conceptual class (formed by the producers of ideal means of production -- designers, programmers, technologists, etc.), as well as for directorial or managerial classes. It also overlooks the fact that the employees of trade, transportation and finance essentially represent distinct social classes from the standpoint of the economic-sociological theory of ownership, including ownership of labor. Lastly, the traditional concept of class structure unjustifiably glosses over the existence of classes of household service personnel and "lumpenclasses," as, according to S. Kozyr-Kowalski, the "marginal world of the society" can be defined. On the other hand, the nonproduction groups, traditionally termed "strata" or, much worse, "the intelligentsia," are in my view social estates that are, like classes, based on modes of ownership but, unlike classes, of a kind of noneconomic ownership.

Development of theory does not necessarily mean pursuit of novelty for its own sake and "aping the fashion." The creation of a new conceptual apparatus can be accomplished precisely in the interest of that "pursuit of truth" which, as J. Wiatr justly offers the reminder, is the principal task of science. Criticism of the deficiencies of Polish social sciences should reach their radical and innermost causes, which include a conceptual apparatus that is too poor and oversimplifies if not mythicizes the reality.

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POLAND

CRITIC TOEPLITZ REFLECTS ON ACTUALIZATION OF AUGUST 80 ACCORDS

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 24 Aug 85 p 1

[Article by Krzysztof Teodor Toeplitz: "How Far From August?"]

[Text] The fifth anniversary of the signing of agreements in Gdansk, Szczecin and Jastrzebie, the agreements which put an end to the wave of strikes which had swept the whole country, is an opportunity for reflection. Official government declarations list carefully those things in these agreements which have been put into practice, which have become paramount elements in public life and have been included in the legal system.

This list is quite long and looking at it from the 5-year perspective, i.e., the perspective of the time when the agreements were signed, one has to admit that many systemic changes have indeed taken place in the basic functionings of socialism in Poland and that these have been changes which were apparently unthinkable 5 years ago. First and foremost this applies to the legal position of trade unions in Poland and to their rights, such as the right to strike; also, to the system of worker self-management with its guaranteed position as an institution in the system of management of the national economy. The above statement is also true of many legal acts concerning the economic reform, and the system of citizens' representation from local self-governments to the Sejm.

Listing these changes is necessary not only to repel the occasional complaints that the August agreements have been shelved but also to realize that the fact that socialist democracy in Poland has not yet produced the expected social effects and has not satisfied all expectations, does not only result from a shortage of adequate legal and systemic forms, but also from them being put into practice too slowly. Socialist democracy is not a magic formula which guarantees general prosperity once it is proclaimed. This democracy creates an opportunity which may either be used successfully or wasted, which may be benefited from or overlooked. Whether the first or the second comes true depends on both formal and systemic regulations and on the spiritual, emotional and political contents with which these are filled.

In a serious discussion one must not forget that between the moment the agreements were signed and the present day there was the day of 13 December 1981. We will not argue here how unnecessary it [martial law] was and what historical

reasons dictated it. Perhaps future historians, having richer data at their disposal, will consider that day as the date on which Polish statehood was saved and an international conflict in Europe prevented. But seeing it from our perspective we must not overlook the fact that the imposition of martial law halted certain changes deriving from the August agreements, delayed them or changed their shape. Some laws serving these changes were suspended temporarily and fears were aroused which slowed down the process of renewal. All these matters should be remembered when one looks back over the past 5 years.

Looking back at the August agreements from this perspective one would do well to try to realize what social, economic and emotional mechanisms they inaugurated and in what way these are functioning today.

Every Protest Was Different

I believe that from this point of view we must not disregard the fact that the conviction is strengthening that the attitude towards the agreements and, more generally, towards the protest by workers of 1980 which lay at their roots, has become in the Polish circumstances the measure of the authorities' legitimacy, their ability to decide Poland's destiny and to meet public expectations connected with it. From the 9th PZPR Congress resolutions, through the government leaders' declarations that there must be no return to the situation prior to August 1980, to the recent electoral declarations of the Patriotic Movement of National Revival there has always been present the conviction of the irrevocability of changes which began at the end of 1980. I believe that there is even more to it, namely the conviction that the protest by workers was a product of the correct recognition by the working class and working people in general of the situation in Poland and an expression of justified discontent and authentic social needs. This conviction opened a new stage of Polish socialism and produced a new style of thinking about the socialist state. Irrespective of historical developments, among which 13 December 1981 appears to be a dramatic turning point, one must not consider Polish socialist doctrine in isolation from the experience and axioms illustrated by August 1980. This perspective is also relevant today, 5 years after the agreements were signed and, which is even more important, it is relevant objectively irrespective of whether one likes it or not. Simply, public mentality, the system of social reactions and people's attitudes have changed irrevocably and every dialogue, including the dialogue between the authorities and society, must now look different from 5 years ago.

This fact abounds in consequences. August 1980 was not the first protest by workers during the 4 decades of socialist Poland's history. It was preceded by the events of 1956, 1970 and 1976. With the exception of the 1976 events, those powerful workers' protests, manifest mainly in the form of strikes, always produced radical changes in the ruling apparatus and in the ruling methods. It remains an open question whether these successive protests were identical in nature and were caused by the same or similar situations and if the same mistakes in the exercise of power led to the repeated conflicts. There are many people who believe that the answer to this question is positive and, in this sense, they have the opinion that the system is irreformable, maintaining that we have plunged into a vicious circle of events and

like a scratched record keep repeating the same lines. Personally, I believe that the situation is different. In spite of misleading external traits (such as inflation, caused by disequilibrium between the investments policy and the efforts to meet current consumer needs, and the problem of meat and its prices which triggered all the conflicts) each protest was qualitatively different in nature and each of them was a reaction to different social needs.

In 1956, the national element seemed to be the dominating one. Its significance was deepened by changes in the policy pursued by the socialist camp following the 20th CPSU Congress (the fact that the 1956 protest was, more than any other, associated with Marxism, should be attributed to this fact).

The year 1970 was dominated by "civilization" demands, directed against stagnation and the "economical" policy pursued by the then leadership who preferred very slow development to quick progress.

What dominated August 1980 were the motives of democracy, freedom and equality.

The differences in all these protests indicate not only the fact that the periods between them witnessed development which changed the social and economic situation in Poland, that each successive conflict broke out on a higher qualitative level as far as achievements and social needs were concerned but also that successive leaderships were to a smaller or greater extent drawing conclusions from mistakes committed by their predecessors, which of course did not protect them from making new, equally drastic mistakes. Quite frequently these new mistakes resulted from the concentrating of attention on past situations, from protecting oneself against that which had caused previous conflicts without making a proper assessment of the new, previously unknown situations.

Doubtlessly, the repeated socioeconomic crises culminating in the form of workers' protest, gave way to conclusions about the permanent inefficiency of those mechanisms which would not only aggregate the growing crisis and reveal and ease public discontent or disapproval the moment they arose but would also produce an effective change in political line, reforms and changes in the composition of power through a democratic process contained within the limits of socialist democracy. In other words, it is a question of social dialogue which in Poland's political history has far too often become definite and produced important results only after the sides faced one another in extreme situations and the stability of the state and its policy was undermined. August 1980 was the most dangerous and far-reaching example of such a situation.

It thus becomes clear that the principle of conducting a daily social dialogue must not only be a verbal one, one so formalized and decorative that in fact the effects of the dialogue become practically insignificant, "harmless" and incapable of correcting the economic, social or political line to any significant degree. One can be sure that when vital subjects are handled less through normal channels serving such dialogue, i.e. through trades union movement, self-management bodies, parliamentary structures, the internal structures of the party in power and of the political alliances, more remain present

in the unformalized areas of public consciousness and subconsciousness and among different occupational groups or generations, thus posing a threat to a harmonious development of the socialist system in Poland, to the state and to its economy. Characteristically, all periods preceding the repeated crises witnessed a certain formalizing of the forms of dialogue, an increase in the value of loyalty and restrictions imposed on criticism, all of which means that the suffocating social organism--instead of breathing in as much fresh air as possible--closed itself up, thus limiting the supply of life-giving oxygen. This instructive past experience should provide us with definite conclusions for the future.

Dialogue With Eyes Open

August 1980 opened many people's eyes to the real picture of Polish society and the internal tensions and divisions. This picture contrasted strongly with the officially propagated version about the moral and political unity of the nation which already in August and particularly after was far-reaching fiction. One can ask, however, whether the disclosure of this fiction should be considered a bitter disappointment or even a catastrophe or a valuable experience which should well serve the development of socialist democracy in Poland. I believe that the latter is true. Looking at the structure of Polish society is one sufficient reason for rejecting the presumption that the interests of the working class from huge industrial plants are completely identical to those of the huge stratum of petty landowners--whose role in Poland is played by peasants--or with the interests of various managerial elites in the economy, administration, science and intellectual life. One should neither underestimate the importance of changes in social attitudes caused by the changing generations, which let themselves be felt strongly in August and later on and can also be felt today as dividing horizontally all social strata and groups. Taking these divisions lightly or ignoring them altogether only testifies to a complete departure from the style of thinking proposed by Marxism, the style which may prove of great advantage in our current situation too.

The divisions resulting from social differences should be seen together with traditional philosophical and ideological divisions. These divisions are very deeply rooted in Polish society. Apart from the important division into believers and nonbelievers or, to be more exact, into the people who subordinate themselves to Catholic church instruction (which does not always mean that they believe in God) and these who have no sense of such subordination, August 1980 revealed many ideological differences ranging from unadapted, archaic reminiscences of the ideology practiced by the right wing before World War II to socially progressive attitudes which had been rejected by the doctrinary political practice of the previous years. It became clear that the slogan about the moral and political unity of nations was a coverup for a lot of attitudes with which no one ever argued seriously, and to which the simplified propaganda, which frequently embraced also the presentation of history, only provided good justification. This situation did not disappear after August and has continued until now. The socialist ideology has to make its way through a host of contradictory but also relevant attitudes. In this situation the demand for social dialogue, agreement and, what should be clearly put, compromise between contradicting interests of various social

groups has become a condition for preventing the emergence of new crises and conflicts and a condition for effective exercise of power. This fact throws completely new light on the principle of the leading role of the workers' party, the principle which since August has had to be implemented differently to before. The slogan of the return to sources, i.e., to the period when the prestige and strength of the Polish Workers Party were founded not on the exercise of administrative power but on the power of conviction and on the activity of party members employed in different sectors of production and of social workers, seems to be the right direction.

A year ago in connection with the fourth anniversary of the signing of the agreements, Polish television broadcast a discussion in which I said that in August 1980 the authorities were prepared to accept the economic demands while they were absolutely unprepared for, if not astonished by, the demands concerning civic rights and dignity, the demand for the recognition of the autonomy of individuals and of groups making up the nation. This fact also reflected to a certain extent the change in the hierarchy of values which the protest of workers contributed to public life. Many people were surprised by the accentuating of the demands concerning culture, freedom of speech, scientific and artistic research and the importance of historical truth. There were attempts to treat these demands as only "attached" to the protest of workers by people or groups outside the working class who wanted to protect their own interests. I believe that such an interpretation was wrong. The new working class and particularly its younger generation consider these demands as their own since they were connected with their own striving for autonomy and the acceptance of these demands would be a part of respect for this class' civic ambitions. This throws new light on the issue of social dialogue, the indispensability of which was reflected by August 1980. Quite frequently, thinking about social agreement or national conciliation we tend to identify them with approval and support for the currently pursued policy.

In fact, the problem is far more complex and agreement most frequently means taking into account the partner's option which creates a very different psychological situation. Without the understanding of this fact as a permanent element of the attitude manifested in 1980 it would be difficult, for instance, to comprehend the patience with which the majority of Poles endured the catastrophe, a catastrophe which was worse than in 1979 and perhaps worse than anything since the war, which hit the market in 1980 or 1981. But many Poles felt that the shortages were compensated by the recognition of the autonomous role of working people in general, the role which was of decisive importance for many definite matters.

A Severe Lesson of Economics

At this point it seems necessary to devote a few words to the economic crisis which lay at the roots of the protest. This subject, called "the economic roots of the crisis" was discussed very widely and many conclusions from this discussion were reflected by documents concerning the economic reform or by the reform as such. It remains interesting and for many people unclear why such a strong movement, a movement which had so strongly been

motivated by the country's economic situation--or at least that part of this movement represented by Solidarity--was unable to come out with a comprehensive and coherent program for economic reforms, one that would match the economic situation in Poland.

On the contrary, what was discouraging in Solidarity's activity was the devastating attitude to the national economy, the nonchalant treatment of the state's economic interests and the strike mania which went in pair with ruthless demands and thoughtless plundering of the state treasury which had become practically empty by then. One can understand this paradox only when one realizes that economic consciousness of a major part of the participants in this movement was shaped at a school or vulgarized "socialist" pedagogics which said that the socialist state could afford all sorts of social benefits for working people, that its economy was not subjected to economic laws and would always be safe from bankruptcy or crisis, and that the state was the giver and society was the "taker" of consumer goods. This primitive interpretation, supported by the famous "propaganda of success" gave rise to the conviction about the unlimited assets and the ever stable character of the economy and about the fact that giving or refusing goods to society depended only on the decisionmakers.

This situation gave rise to the escalation of economically egalitarian attitudes which considered "justice" as more important than productivity and equality as more important than prosperity. We have to admit that such an attitude was characteristic of the majority of the masses including the working class. I believe, however, that it was a product of many years of false propaganda and social pedagogics which produced illusions instead of realistic pictures and facts. This attitude, which allowed us to interpret the attitude of the people attacking fiercely the principle of the socialist economy as degenerate children of socialist pedagogics, was additionally agitated by the demands forwarded by both sides with regard to individual people and the fortunes which they had allegedly accumulated.

Little has been said so far about the real meaning of this agitation over the "settling of accounts." Today, in perspective, some elements of this problem are quite visible. Its economic absurdity is clear: all the "fortunes" or pseudo-fortunes of even the most crooked VIP's taken together would not, of course, be sufficient to improve the material situation of the most needed people even by one percent. However, the excitement over this issue was in practice of a tactical nature: for some, who were reluctant to draw the fundamental conclusions from the working class protest, it was a convenient way of channeling society's emotions into a blind alley and onto the sidelines of the really important developments, and for others, especially after the political elements gained the upper hand in Solidarity, bent on a confrontation with the party and government, this was a convenient method of keeping up the simmering temperature and the anger of the masses, which was needed all the more badly as the slogan of making another Japan out of Poland sounded more and more grotesque in the context of strikes, economic anarchy and a 5-day week.

But let us return to the main line of reasoning. It was evident nonsense to base the program of economic recovery at a time of shortages of practically

everything on wage claims and egalitarian slogans. The doubling of leisure time in conditions of extreme scarcity of goods was interpreted by foreign observers as a sign of mental aberration and loss of the elementary survival instinct. What Poland's economy needed was discipline, order, the introduction of a genuine dependence between work and wages, the introduction of market mechanisms, increasing the profitability of farming (i.e., increasing farmer incomes), using the private sector as a source of marketables and services, a differentiation of incomes within the reform, i.e., a system of moves that can roughly be described as anti-egalitarian, heading rather in the managerial direction, connected with a system of genuine self-management of workers.

It is not possible that there were no people in the Solidarity leadership or among its advisors who were not aware of that. However, they were not willing to present this conviction in their programs for fear of losing their popularity with the masses of members. On the other hand, it would not only be illogical but also politically inconvenient--because of Western reactions--to articulate the egalitarian demands in an economic program. The West wanted to see Solidarity as a force that would eventually Westernize Poland, introducing economic rules peculiar to free competition economies in conflict with the socialist state. Therefore, it could not show itself to the West as an egalitarian movement, extremely syndicalistic, moving farther than any trade union movement dares to in any capitalist country, as a movement opposed to any differences in affluence and bent on introducing anarchy to production, or it would produce an undesirable reaction in those people in the West or whose sympathy and support Solidarity counted. As a result, Solidarity never produced a coherent economic program and was content to change slogans every once in a while, leading in practice to economic anarchy.

In the end, it was the government side that adopted a program of reform and of tidying up the economy.

How Should the Distance Be Measured?

I am mentioning all this because as we analyze the historical distance separating us now from August 1980, we might try to define that distance on two complementary scales. On the one hand, this will be a measure of the depth of experience of the social motives relating to the mechanisms of holding power, the authenticity of social dialogue, the realization of the multiplicity of attitudes actually existing in Poland, in brief, the broadly conceived subjectivity of groups and individuals in shaping the Polish reality.

It is essential to digest these contents and--putting it bluntly--to uproot the excesses and practices aimed at treating them only superficially in order to genuinely put in motion the mechanisms of socialist democracy in Poland. At the same time, the distance from that August must be measured by the authenticity of experiencing the economic problems revealed by the working class protest in August and the subsequent months. Today, through an escalation of prices, which was caused by the inflationary overhang, we are giving back everything that was not deserved in the great tide of wage rises

inundating the country at the end of 1981, as well as a large part of the money that was not earned but drawn on the national income from before August 1980 which was assisted by foreign credit. This was an extremely harsh lesson in economics.

As a matter of fact, I'm afraid we have not learned this lesson fully yet. We still have not tackled those chapters which deal with rational employment or those which require the incomes of individuals to depend on the social value of their work, not only its quantity or just the membership of one vocational group or another. We still have not seriously begun to look at the private sector of the economy as a factor in revitalizing the market or the question of collective consumption as a means of improving the quality of each individual. All of this is still ahead of us. It can also be expected that among these problems there are new situations, unknown to our experience, which should be approached openly and boldly, in a way characterized by foresight and social imagination.

Ox-Bow Lakes

The August protest became a catalyst of change in Poland's life. These are both factual changes regarding management structures and state structures, and changes of consciousness. Obviously, the latter are more difficult to gauge than the former, the ripening process takes longer and it is also easier to misinterpret the situation. However, without much risk of an error, it can be said that whereas it is hard to judge the depth of the main stream, the one for which the experience from 5 years ago is invariably an object of constant reflection and concern, in its ox-bow lakes it is hard not to notice the accumulation of sediment made up of those who have learnt nothing and do not want to learn either.

These are small groups, objectively speaking, but they are rabid and delay the process of changes. For them, waiting for a fresh crisis is an article of faith.

The so-called underground opposition has in reality no better ideas than to wait for a failure of the attempts to reconstruct and reform the economy or for the flaws in the democratic mechanisms to block the channels of social dialogue. Of course, I leave aside as lunatic the hopes for a global armed conflict, which would take care of all the problems discussed here together with their proponents.

Hailing from the circles which tried to hijack the working class protest to use it for a political confrontation with the socialist system, those people fail to see their defeat. As a matter of fact, their activity delayed the positive consequences of this protest as they managed to divert a part of the movement born of this protest onto an adventurist course that threatened to cause a national disaster. Today they cannot accept the obvious truth that "you can't step twice into the same river." Everything in their actions that testified to a loss of a sense of reality, the inability to formulate positive tasks, the lack of logic in their thinking, is now, with the growing social isolation resulting from underground activity increasingly becoming a

collective of uncoordinated emotional reflexes and a travesty of political action.

However, in the ox-box lake off the main current there are also those for whom the experience of August 1980 and the subsequent developments, especially the ones connected with martial law, became a catchword for reviving the kind of relations, methods and postures which had led to the legitimate working class protest in the first place. They try to pretend that nothing has happened or, at best, "we have repulsed an enemy attack," after which everything can be returned to previous places. This approach is a sign of not only egoism and the search for a comfortable life but also shortsightedness. They often tend to take the appearances they create themselves for reality or interpret the lack of clearly negative phenomena, such as the absence of large-scale industrial action, as tokens of full approval. These people also find it very easy to pass judgments and appraisals, while being themselves convinced about their infallibility which engenders proud arrogance. However, infallibility of political action can only stem from a constant union with reality, from a system of social life and of government that imparts a lasting, inviolable form to this union. This system is called democracy.

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POLAND

EDUCATOR, SEJM CANDIDATE ON YOUTH, CHURCH, POLITICS

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 7-8 Sep 85 p 1

[Interview with Professor Aleksander Legatowicz of Lodz University by Wladyslaw Tybura: "I Will Help Every Good Cause"]

[Text] [Question] Professor, you are a university lecturer. What made you take up an educator's career? Did your life force you to do so or did you choose it deliberately?

[Answer] Both. I [...] first got a degree in electrical engineering. At Warsaw University I later got my M.Sc. degree in theoretical physics, and then the doctor's degree at the Nuclear Research Institute [of Swierk near Warsaw]. At Lodz University I became professor of economics. Ever since I graduated from university, I have always, apart from brief interruptions, been working with college students. When I received an interesting offer from Lodz University, I simply accepted it. This is as far as life forced me. Now I head a foreign trade economics section of the Economic and Social Policy Faculty of Lodz University. This is where I combine research with teaching activities.

[Question] How would you describe Poland's students today? They are said to be frustrated young people having no public aspirations and turning their backs on political issues to confine themselves to their private lives.... Briefly, they are a future generation of the intelligentsia who are lost to public life. This is what is usually said about our youth.

[Answer] I don't think they're a lost generation, but they doubtless are in danger of becoming so. In their reflexes, reactions, as well as public aspirations, this youth are quite normal, only they have abnormal conditions for self-realization. It's not just a matter of material conditions. Other things are involved too, maybe even those which are yet more important as inducements for the young to get involved in public life. I specially mean the possibility for making choices. The young have a strong desire for self-determination, for being allowed to decide their own future, and also to choose freely their world outlook. I'm no sociologist. I've never studied these matters, but from what I observe, the young don't quite feel they really have a free choice. And this is a frustrating awareness, one which turns them off the idea of getting involved in public life, makes them lack any beliefs, and occasionally even makes them misfits.

[Question] You said the young want the right to choose and that this is their condition for committing themselves to public issues. But do the young always know just what it is they want to achieve?

[Answer] Indeed, sometimes they don't. But whenever there is a choice, they want to make it on their own. Occasionally, of course, their choices are erroneous, but then that's the best way for them to learn to live independently. Autonomy, self-determination, also as far as ideological and political views are concerned, are very powerful wants of the human being. Young people are more strongly susceptible to it than others. Another quality of the young is that they don't like pretense. Naturally, there are also those who feel all right in roles imposed upon them and who know how to exploit those, yet can you imagine the consequences this may have? But we are talking about the majority. These want to be their real selves. When they can't be that, they shut themselves in to live private lives, and stay away from public affairs.

[Question] This means they also stay away from actions conducted for other people's benefit. As a Catholic activist, what do you have to say on this, considering the church's educational doctrine which urges educating people for a life in society, for a life for others?

[Answer] First allow me to make a reservation: I'm not a professional Catholic activist, I've got no right to describe myself as one. I'm in no organization, and hence I represent no one. For many years I used to be an activist in a Club of Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK), and until a short time ago also a member of the Polish Union of Lay Catholics (PZKS) but at present I'm free from any affiliations. I am representative of those Catholic groups who feel close to the ideas propounded by Cardinal Wyszyński and to Cardinal Glemp's own attitude. If I speak out, it is only as a Catholic, as a member of the community of believers, but only on my own behalf.

Now to come to your point, you wonder just how the church's doctrine is related to the passiveness of the young, to their escape from involvement in public life. The church teaches and educates people for work, for sacrifice on behalf of others. The church also desires us to know the human person, to understand the motives which make people act the way they do.

[Question] Do you think the church in its teachings is outspoken enough to promote this particular need, and does it put its own moral prestige behind such causes?

[Answer] It's difficult to say, maybe the church could do still more. But you will certainly notice that all this is taking place within a different pattern of relations, one on which it has little influence. You can't overcome evil unless the causes are removed. I believe this is one of the matters which should be a subject of dialogue and cooperation between the church and the state authorities, a concern common to both sides. Preparing the young generation for life in society is a great national cause. However, only those can cooperate who have some common goal while also retaining their right to keep their own identities, their right to different views of affairs and their

assessment. Without that there will be no dialogue only mutual recriminations and grievances. We must try to organize our public life in such a way as to make everybody feel equal in it, whatever their respective world outlooks, views or doctrines which they regard as their own. It is only on this foundation that we can develop a culture of coexistence and the virtue of understanding the respective partner and his arguments, which is a precondition for any dialogue and cooperation.

[Question] You're a candidate for Sejm deputy. What were your motives when you accepted that proposal?

[Answer] Among other things, I needed a sense of participation in working in and through the Sejm to create conditions in all areas of public life for equal dialogue and cooperation on the grounds of respect for the respective identities of all participants, of respect for all the different opinions or positions. I'm positive that this is of paramount importance for our future as a nation. And I'm sure the Sejm can become a forum for such a dialogue.

I also have another, more pragmatic motive for my acceptance. As an economist I'm deeply worried about the shape of our national economy. I'm interested primarily in the economy-wide models applied in the organization of business activity. I think I could have something to say on this. That's why I want to give my knowledge, observations and conclusions to this great cause. I think the Sejm is the proper institution to discuss such matters systematically. If I notice possibilities for me joining in this kind of activity, then I'll do so.

[Question] But the Sejm sometimes has to make difficult decisions, and choices often put deputies before hard dilemmas....

[Answer] I am aware of this and I understand it. The problem is, how to make sure the best of all feasible solutions is picked. The only way to do this is to conduct penetrating, honest discussions in which nobody is assumed to be in the right beforehand. Naturally, it could happen that I'll be unable to give my vote to some Sejm decision, but I want this to be regarded as something quite ordinary, as an expression of one's inalienable right to stick to one's own opinion and to remain true to oneself. I can hardly imagine a different kind of Sejm.

[Question] Differences come naturally in all dialogue. Polish society isn't homogeneous, internal differences do exist. They will probably also emerge in the Sejm, which after all is a representative sample of Polish people. Yet there are matters which should be considered jointly, over and above various differences and divisions. This is one responsibility of the Sejm. How can those differences be reduced and the divisions allayed?

[Answer] True, our society is divided even today. This has been confirmed several times with deep concern by Cardinal Glemp. But I think those differences by themselves are not the worst thing that could happen to us. They only become really dangerous when they trigger serious conflicts. It is therefore imperative to create a social system in which there will be room for

differences and no room for destructive conflicts. A lot, maybe even everything, depends on whether or not system-wide decisions take account of what society thinks is right and what is its true interest, and on whether or not decisions are made with a view to the human being's indigenous rights. This is very important in the exercise of authority.

[Question] Exactly, a coalition-type model of government is developing in Poland. This is already visible in the central bodies, say in the government. Do you think coalition-type government has already established itself at local levels?

[Answer] I don't have a full view of the situation in Poland, yet I think this particular form of government isn't yet prevalent at the lower levels of management of community affairs. There is coexistence, there is tolerance, but I think there's little cooperation in government, especially when it comes to the executive administration. I, for one, know of no case of, say, a Catholic activist being a deputy voivod or city president. But I repeat I don't know the situation all over Poland, so maybe I'm wrong.

[Question] As for participation in the exercise of executive or legislative power, do you think it involves any dilemma for a committed member of the Catholic community?

[Answer] For me, running as candidate in the general election presents something of a dilemma, but there are certain calls which must be heeded. I think Catholic opinion, including the church itself, will understand my decision. This will also depend on how I act in the Sejm forum. I want this verification to turn out as well as can be, and I'm willing to help push through every good cause.

Note: Mr Legatowicz was proposed as a candidate for Sejm deputy by the Warsaw Electoral Council; on 6 September, the PRON National Council Executive Presidium proposed his name should be included in the national list by the National Electoral Council.

CSO: 2020/1

POLAND

REACTION TO CATHOLIC JOURNAL'S DESCRIPTION OF 'POLITICAL CENTER'

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 9 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by Zdzislaw Morawski: "The Political 'Center's' Winding Roads"]

[Text] I do not know if it was the upcoming general election or some other long-term and deep-reaching political processes that kindled widespread interest recently in the question of the political "center" in Poland. This political "center" is mentioned both on television and in the Catholic press, both in reports on official opinion polls and in Western news reports from Poland.

If everyone suddenly speaks about that "center," and if this is being done by people of such diverse opinions, then it seems to be quite an important question. I think this interest in the political center in Poland is a positive development showing that a growing number of people are able, with the necessary objectivity, growing impartiality, and, most importantly, with a realistic eye, to examine the past 5 years, and the lessons to be learned from this stormy period. They do so not just to dissect the past, nor to weigh each actual or imagined merit and sin, but to outline various concepts for activating the passive segment of Polish society, concepts that are realistic enough to be put into effect or, at least, to bring them to the public consciousness.

Signals about precisely such an attitude are coming in from various sources. One of them, which doubtless deserves a response, appeared in the latest edition of the weekly NIEDZIELA published by the diocese curia of Czetochowa. I refer to an article by Andrzej Micewski, a Catholic communist who also serves as adviser to the Primate of Poland.

Let me say right away that this isn't an article written in a tone of Francis-can sweetness toward the author's ideological adversaries. Micewski lashes out both at Marxists and at some Catholics who disagree with him, and he does so with the fury of a man who is profoundly sure of his convictions. Micewski is also very critical of the authorities, and he even explains his reluctance to speak out in what he calls the official media by his own (and other people's) disenchantment with the progress of political reconciliation in Poland.

Writes Micewski, "I do believe that national reconciliation in Poland is still a very valid matter, but it is inconceivable that the same thing should be repeated over and over again while it is not being implemented more widely in

a manner acceptable to a broad spectrum of opinion in Poland," I am quoting this opinion, which I regard as exaggerated, to say the least, only to give readers an idea of the tone of this article. While Micewski wrote his article as a critical, and occasionally downright malicious, commentary on a discussion between Catholics and Marxists published a short time ago in the Crakow monthly ZDANIE, he actually speaks about the matter of the political "center" in Poland.

Pointing out that "the church is careful not to become the object of political manipulation or of instrumental use" (Micewski perhaps means the state administration, but I mean the political opposition and the emigres), Micewski concludes, "The ancient Romans, among them Horace, gave us the formula for the aurea mediocritas, the golden mean, the golden moderation. In theory, there is a lot of it in Poland. Many people say they are prudent and moderate, some even make a plea for a 'center' in public life and against extremities in it, but when it comes to moments of choice, when public decisions have to be made, then, because their orientations and attitudes are not institutionalized in any self-contained organization, those same people align themselves either on the official side or with independent groups, to put it mildly. In short, due to the lack of any organized 'center' after the great shake-ups of the early 1980's, the political polarization of society persists and, sometimes, grows even more tense."

Micewski believes "an ambivalent attitude toward an organized political center" is held not only by the authorities but also by that large segment of the public he euphemistically calls "independent" while clearly meaning the political opposition. He rightly concludes that as moderate attitudes gain ground, extremists lose it, and this applies also to extremists whose attitude implies that "the worse the situation becomes, the better it is."

Summing up, Micewski says, "All depends on whether or not such a centrist orientation would also be independent and authentic, whether or not it could rally to its ranks people enjoying considerable public prestige, courageous and independently-minded people remote from any doctrinaire bigotry. In my view, their foremost political quality should be their political predictability, with respect not only to ideology but to realism in the face of facts, and, eschewing all extremism, to prudence and judgment, and, finally, to what Cardinal Glemp has described as the ideal motherland, a Poland which would be the mother of all Poles, one organized as a lawful, just, democratic, and tolerant state, respecting the past and the national cultural heritage and which is also open to the future and to friendly relations with all nations, especially with the neighbors of Poland."

Micewski underscores the importance of these words at the same time, he does not interpret the concept of predictability in ideological terms, although, this is an interpretation quite popular in official circles.

This brings us to Micewski's opinions concerning the dialogue of Marxists with Catholics. As mentioned before, with reference to the dialogue in general, Micewski says he doesn't want to speak out in the official media at present, but he also points out that, despite what Professor Andrzej

Grzegorzczak said in the ZDANIE discussion, the church isn't interfering in such discussions or trying to thwart them. To prove his point this well-known Catholic columnist says, "In December 1982 I gave an interview to ZDANIE, and before the Pope's second trip to Poland in June of 1983 I was interviewed--without any qualms at that time--by the weekly POLITYKA; finally, on the 40th anniversary of the Warsaw uprising I was part of a discussion panel brought together by POLITYKA. I met with the holy father during his stay in Poland and he recalled his warm memories of my book about the late Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski. The Primate (Glemp [ZYCIE WARSZAWY note]) showed great trust by entrusting me with such an honorable duty, and nobody in the church circles said one word of complaint."

Micewski further castigates Professor Grzegorzczak for his call to Catholics to engage in an ideological dialogue with Marxists, and he is probably right on this issue. The outlook of the Christian world, which is essentially fideistic, is incompatible with a world outlook that arises from a refutation of supernatural phenomena. In this sense, dialogue would certainly make little sense. "We have no intention of reaching agreement on the question of the existence or nonexistence of God," says Micewski. He believes, and will probably find solid support for this belief on the other side of the ideological divisions, that "dialogue solely between Marxists and Catholics is tantamount to diverting attention from the social and national reality, from the Polish public's diversity and pluralism."

While not wanting to put words into his mouth, I understand his view to be that political divisions in Poland do not conform with divisions according to world outlook. Certainly, nothing like this happens elsewhere in the world.

Micewski's observation with regard to Poland seems important to me primarily because for some long time, and not always for pious reasons, people tried to exploit the church's undeniable prestige for political goals having nothing in common with the church's own doctrine. This is political and ideological manipulation which is undertaken not--to use Micewski's own term--by official circles, but by those of the extreme political opposition, I am sure Micewski is well aware of this, and hence it is regrettable that he should have failed to say so openly. But this is just an aside. Let us now return to the main drift of the argument in Micewski's article, which is the concept of organizing that mythical political "center."

The author of that article, and even his staunchest enemies and most implacable polemicists cannot charge him with defying the church and the church authorities, points out that extremist forces on Poland's political scene will oppose any "idea of a middle road or of a political center." He thinks this is one reason for the many "disgraceful slanders" being hurled at the church in Poland, and in this connection--emphasizing that nobody in his right mind can hope for a change of system in Poland--Micewski formulates certain guidelines and rules for what he believes is a possible, as well as necessary, political dialogue for the eventual political and public activation of a moderate yet vacillating political "center."

Such a dialogue, Micewski argues, must be political rather than ideological. The dialogue on this matter must involve discussions of social and political realities, and thus center on the program for overcoming the crisis, for drawing up new laws, for promoting democracy, and so on.

It is difficult to take any definite position on the matter of institutionalizing the "center," though Micewski's complaints about the dangers involved in single-handed political or public actions outside any organizational frame are understandable. Many such structures do exist, to mention PRON, the political parties, lay Catholic associations, or those countless organizations in which people can be active regardless of their world outlooks (trade unions, creative societies, and hundreds of other associations such as Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia [KIKs]). Reading the article one gets the impression the author is very nervous about the center's "independence." While I don't share such fears, I can well understand them. Such fears arise both from unhappy experiences and from still extant grievances dating back further than the last 5 years.

Micewski's article is aggressive, debatable in many of the points the author makes, and even tendentious now and then, but nevertheless it merits attention. It is like a tentative signal concerning the possibility and need for expanding dialogue on an honest basis. This is what we need. The only condition is political realism, that predictability the author mentions. Everything else is debatable, and much can be sorted out.

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POLAND

TWO VIEWS ON LACK OF OSMANCZYK CANDIDACY PRESENTED

Opole TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish 31 Aug-1 Sep 85 p 3

[Text] Edmund Osmanczyk's absence from the lists of candidates for deputies to the new Sejm is a recurrent topic at election campaign meetings and in the calls citizens make to the [Opole] Voivodship Electoral Council.

Many other names as popular and famous, are also missing on lists of candidates, but Osmanczyk's case has resulted in many comments and opinions in this voivodship, because he served as deputy for the Opole region for a great many years.

Some regard his absence as something normal, natural and self-evident, while others are baffled at this giving up a person who has unquestionable experience as well as a record of merit as member of parliament. By publishing two articles on the "Osmanczyk affair" we want to give public expression to what we regard as normal differences of view, as we have always been guided by the rule "We write about that which you talk about."

"The Snag" by Marian Buchowski

"Are we really a politically superstitious nation? [Do we seriously believe that] what isn't being openly said in the media doesn't exist?" This question was asked by Edmund Osmanczyk of the Polish parliament on 6 July 1982, in what was his reaction to the silence of the official media on a matter which was vividly debated by many ordinary citizens at that time. Today, for reasons I fail to understand, Osmanczyk himself or, more precisely, his absence on lists of candidates, is a topic which hardly ever turns up, if at all, in the official media. Osmanczyk was a deputy, now he won't be one, and that's that. However, this is misleading silence. People are wondering, "Just what's going on? How come deputy Osmanczyk all of a sudden stops being one?"

This fact is being discussed at social occasions (also by comrades among themselves) and it recurs at public meetings held in the course of the election campaign. Members of the Voivodship Electoral Council then reply, Osmanczyk's name hasn't been proposed in Opole voivodship. Those unfamiliar with electoral rules may construe this as meaning that all people in the region must now have rejected--in what was something like a show of unanimous silence--their long-standing spokesman in the Polish parliament. But the truth is this (as far as

candidates for the Opole and the Kedzierzyn-Kozle constituencies are concerned). The two constituencies, in proportion to the number of potential voters living there, were given altogether 11 seats in the 9th Sejm. But this time we (as a voivodship) did not get a seat for a nonaffiliated candidate. So even if the Voivodship Electoral Council had received Osmanczyk's name as a proposal, formal requirements would have prevented that body from passing the matter on for further consideration.

However, Osmanczyk's name does not appear on the national list either, even though in this case no formal requirements came into play. Evidently, there must have been some other obstacles there. If not obstacles, then at least some reasons. Just what were the reasons, I'd be happy to learn. Or, to put it more accurately, I'd be happy to hear--without having to look for a new job later--from official sources just what those reasons were.

The national list of candidates was compiled by the PRON National Council. Did this distinguished body perhaps regard Osmanczyk as being of too advanced age? Certainly not, for as many as four people older than Osmanczyk are on that list.

Or is Osmanczyk regarded as having become too used to the office of Sejm deputy and hence ought perhaps to give way to new people making their debut as members of parliament? Again, this is not what the PRON National Council can have envisaged, because the national list includes as many as 14 candidates who have served as deputies in more than one Sejm to date, that is, people who sat in the Sejm not only in its proudest periods (6 candidates were deputies in 5 or more Sejms).

Or was Osmanczyk perhaps increasingly inactive on the Sejm forum, confining himself to saying just "Yes, sir" or similar things, whereas what we need is active deputies not shying away from any responsibility?

No more questions, let me change the tone. I do think it is regrettable that Osmanczyk is not a candidate. As parliamentary reporter for my paper I have had ample opportunity to watch personally the Sejm at work and I well recall Osmanczyk's many battles for causes of fundamental significance. Even a cursory perusal through the matters this deputy raised on the forum of the 8th Sejm provides enough evidence of this.

His opinions, views, positions or proposals weren't always acceptable, but his contributions were always significant, calling forth wide repercussions, and were well substantiated by solid arguments. His contributions were useful in the decisionmaking process, if only because they provided authentic credibility to the work parliamentary commissions did to assess this or that draft bill. Osmanczyk is said to have been mistaken sometimes. Certainly he was. So there were polemics, to mention only the most recent one with the government minister in charge of Poland's higher education system. Deputy Osmanczyk presented his case, Minister Miskiewicz outlined the government's position, while the Sejm gave expression to its position in the ensuing ballot on the bill concerned. That was the right thing. Nobody, as General Wojciech Jaruzelski has repeatedly underlined, holds a monopoly for being right all the time.

This is why Osmanczyk (otherwise an advocate of a strong, efficient and lawful state government) said on 8 October 1982, when challenging one government official in the Sejm forum, "This gets us to the heart of what has already become a historic dispute--namely, who embodies the state above all, the government or the Sejm? I say it's the Sejm."

Osmanczyk's attitude and actions have an ingredient of something I believe is very valuable, especially in a member of parliament. That something is difficult to pinpoint, it is easier to indicate the reaction which it calls forth. It causes a hail of recriminations from different corners. His attitude is one of "straddling both sides of the fence." What I have in mind is the difficult art of articulating one's own views and opinions without bothering whether somebody may choose to feel offended. Osmanczyk as a Sejm deputy had precisely such an attitude. He once said this directly (on 8 October 1982 at the Sejm), "If I'm barred from presenting this earnest civic concern to the public as an old hand in the columnist trade in socialist Poland, then what can I do as a long-standing deputy representing the Opole region? The only thing I'm doing now and which I'm going to do in the future is--warning persistently from this rostrum both the governed and the governors against what are exclusively internal dangers of our own making."

That is what happened more than once. True, Osmanczyk had his "regular hobby-horses" (e.g., making the Polish zloty a convertible currency, or allowing citizens to keep their passports at home), but whenever he climbed the stairs to the speaker's rostrum at the Sejm nobody could predict who would be clapping their hands after his speech and who would prefer to use their hands for anything else but applause. Osmanczyk infuriated "liberals" and "hardliners" of all shades and colors, he was frowned upon both by the party and by Solidarity, and he never bothered to glance first at the political weather-glass before launching any of his attacks. When the Paris daily LE MATIN published an interview with [oppositionist] Adam Michnik entitled "Poles Are Ready To Die for Gdansk," Osmanczyk told the Sejm on 10 April 1981, "I, for one, don't think any Pole now has the right to tell the world that the Polish people are today incorrigible desperadoes always eager to die, the way they were during the time of subjugation. That's a lie." During the same sitting (mind you, 8 months before martial law imposition) he also said, "No Pole in his right mind will seek to weaken the party, because the party's future has been the nation's future for 36 years now." As for the embarrassing things which Osmanczyk said with a view to the "government side," everybody remembers them well, some people even painfully so.

Finally, there is a professional reason for me to regret that Osmanczyk no longer stands for parliament. Few deputies outdid him as the stubborn and courageous champion of the right of every journalist to perform his or her duties honestly, he lashed out at heavy-handed propaganda ploys (although unnecessarily also at some authors, such as one essay-writing government minister), never tired of underlining the public significance of the proper functioning of the media, and deplored inadequate systems of priorities held onto by journalists. He once told the Sejm, "Pardon me for being so adamant about this. But all my life I've been fighting for the reputation of the

trade which I have been in all along. Of course, I am aware how disastrous this system has been for journalism in Poland, how many spineless characters it has produced who are ready to tailor any news, article or report to fit instructions from their bosses, politicians or officials alike, defying the truth and compromising their professional integrity, people who think no holds are barred."

I know Osmanczyk is not without his own faults and yet, I'm painting him here with all but a halo around his head. But for the time being all I see is not a halo but a thumbs-down sign for Osmanczyk, the Sejm deputy. I also know that being a member of parliament is not an inherited dignity or benefit for life.

But then, Osmanczyk was a deputy who was widely known, a popular figure who was being watched closely, also by a broad section of the general public. That is the same section we have long been trying to convince of the need to be courageous, to speak one's mind. Such an attitude, our argument goes, is a valuable civic virtue, something all of us should value and appreciate.

I do believe that even if Osmanczyk had dozed all through the 8th Sejm's sittings, waking up only to nod his "yes" to what the authorities were saying, he wouldn't have been put on the list of candidates this time. The snag is, not everybody is as gullible as I am.

"The Myth" by Bernard Walenski

In line with the electoral law governing parliamentary elections, a law for which deputy Edmund Osmanczyk also voted apart from having made a plea for it from the Sejm rostrum, the right of proposing candidates for Sejm deputies pertains to political, occupational and other public organizations of nationwide operation. Naturally, these organizations proposed only their members and activists. But Osmanczyk told the Sejm on 18 December 1982, "I am not and will remain so from cradle to grave affiliated to any political party, I am a man dependent on nobody."

This explains away almost all the mystery about the "Osmanczyk affair." I say "almost all" because nonaffiliated persons can be proposed to the National Electoral Council for inclusion in the national list by the PRON National Council. Indeed, this body did this for several people. Why was Osmanczyk then not included? I don't know for sure but perhaps Osmanczyk's public expressions of his skepticism toward this movement has played a part?

There is another possibility. Following the death of Karol Malcuzyński, Osmanczyk was elected president of ZAiKS, a nationwide association of authors, composers and artists. It beats me why this organization also failed to propose its president as candidate.

That much about the formal aspect of the affair. But Osmanczyk is a popular figure, whose case can't easily be dismissed if you just mention some formal considerations. His merits, of which I am aware as well as appreciative, are widely known so there is no need for me to recall them here. However,

apart from his undeniable merits there are very many myths about his person, some of which he himself helped to create.

One such myth is his belonging to the Opole region. He is commonly referred to as "a son of Opole," and in a letter recently published by POLITYKA he spoke about "voters in my own region of Opole." But he is not of this land, either by birth or by choice. He was born in Lower Silesia, till 1939 he lived and worked in Berlin and if he came to Opole, then only on business. It was during one such trip that he wrote the widely-quoted and fine poem called "In Opole" with the words saying "My city, Opole, how very true you are." The circumstances in which that poem was written are described by Osmanczyk in the article "In Opole, Years Later" in KALENDARZ OPOLSKI of 1970, where Osmanczyk also presents his contacts with Opole in general--an article I recommend to readers.

Osmanczyk's contacts with the Opole region once used to be part of his activity as an official of the Union of Poles in Germany, and now the tradition of that work of his is very much alive. But then, the same kind of ties connects him with the regions of Warmia or Mazury, of Zlotow or Babimost or the Vistula Delta, all those lands which were ZPN strongholds.

A second myth is of Osmanczyk's own making. It can be illustrated by the following words from his interview for TRYBUNA OPOLSKA of 20-22 July this year, "Following the parliamentary elections (of March 1980) or, more properly, the plebiscite which gave the elite in power 90 percent of the vote," "the Sejm they handpicked has mostly remained what it was," "that particular system of picking candidates for Sejm deputies," and with words from the aforementioned letter to POLITYKA, "voters in my own region of Opole, who elected me to the parliament several times since 1957." Just what do these words imply? They imply that up to now deputies used to be picked by the group in power at the time and only a few deputies, among them Osmanczyk himself, were elected by the electorate. True, the previous elections were plebiscites, but then they all embraced "handpicked" candidates to an equal extent. Yet even under such plebiscites one was usually struck off the ballot by more voters than another. In the 1980 election, of the top seven candidates running for seven seats in the Kedzierzyn constituency, the highest number of votes was received by Stefan Markowski, a worker of Nysa, who was followed by Maria Prus, a specialist in animal husbandry at Aedowice, and by Dorota Simonides, who is professor at the Opole Normal School. Osmanczyk came only fourth. Does that mean that the three people in front of him were not elected by voters? Or that the fourth person was not handpicked?

Let me proceed to another myth. In statements he made after August 1980, as well as in interviews (such as the one for TRYBUNA OPOLSKA, where he says "since somebody wanted to get rid of me..."), Osmanczyk gave to understand that he lived a hard life under the Gierek regime. But the truth is different. Here is some evidence along with a reminder that nonconformists in that era were done away with quickly and without much fuss. In what is known as the Gierek era, Osmanczyk was elected ("picked") as Sejm deputy three times in a row; toward the end of that era he even achieved the post of Council of

State member, was given the Order of Builder of People's Poland, was given an honorary doctor's degree by what was then regarded as the most zealously pro-Gierek college, namely the Silesian University, had immediate access to publishers and press editors, coauthored--with Ryszard Frelek, a PZPR Central Committee secretary at the time--television documentaries....

Nor is it true that he disagreed with official policies then. I had ample opportunity to listen to deputy Osmanczyk's speeches then, the last one I remember was held at the Chemik club in Kedzierzyn on 10 March 1980. Osmanczyk then said, "The Poland of today is the first normal, truly Polish state in centuries. Support for the party's program and the electoral platform put forward by the Front of National Unity is therefore a patriotic right and duty for us." Admittedly, everybody said that at the time, but only few people made a show of it with tears, and this is what I am sure the several hundred people in the audience then remember to this day. Deputy Osmanczyk began to voice other opinions only months later, but of course he was not the only or the first one to do so. What was really bad was that in his views and proposals he came very close to Jacek Kuron's (oppositionist) KOR platform. Here is one example. In the autumn of 1981, Kuron wrote in the (unofficial) journal ROBOTNIK, "The best thing which could happen would be for the Episcopate, Solidarity and the PZPR leadership to appoint a national government, that is, a cabinet of experts over and above the party..." while Osmanczyk told the Sejm on 18 December 1982, "why shouldn't we risk a government which includes the largest possible number of specialists beyond the so-called party key" (party-controlled nominations of candidates). Was that just a coincidence?

But deputy Osmanczyk became known mostly for his commitment to causes such as a "hard" (freely convertible) zloty and a "soft" (easily available) passport for every citizen. Yet, the economic intuition upon which he builds his economic ideas proves fallible. Partly owing to his efforts, passports became very easy to get in 1981. Several hundred thousand Poles, mostly young people, went abroad at that time. Many of them remain there to this day, having not brought into Poland any of those dollars which were expected to boost and strengthen the Polish economy, but instead deprived the economy of qualified employees. This is the ultimate effect of his miraculous prescription. Another prescription was "to strengthen our currency," which I believe is a precondition for putting our national economy back on its feet. Other economists say, however, exactly the opposite is true, that is, it is imperative to make the economy healthy first because this is a condition of "hardening" the Polish currency, an order of undertakings which is confirmed by Yugoslavia's inflationary plight (whereas the hard Yugoslav currency enabled motorists to buy 8 liters of petrol for 100 dinars in 1979, today you have to pay 132 dinars for 1 liter).

Still, all this reflects everybody's right to hold his own views about policies, economic measures or his personal career. But one thing goes beyond this frame. Deputy Osmanczyk's name brings to mind an attitude of patriotism and his relentless struggle for Poland's right to own the lands along the Oder River and the Baltic coast. I have read and listened to many of his

statements in which he sharply reacted to revanchist bids made by people like Herbert Czaja or Herbert Hupka. It was from Osmanczyk, among others, that I learned how to recognize German dangers to Poland. But in 1981 a KOR activist and Solidarity official, Jan Jozef Lipski, published in the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG a fiercely anti-Polish pamphlet which became notorious all over Europe under the title, "The Myth of a Perpetual German Eastward Drive Is Our Alibi," which challenged everything we have up to then known about Polish-German relations, including things Osmanczyk himself had once written in his excellent "Polish Affairs." I expected him to react instantly and sharply. He had many opportunities to do so, because the Sejm convened frequently and deputy Osmanczyk was among those who climbed the rostrum more often than others. There were other possibilities too. I am sure that a speech from him on this matter--after all, his authority on it has been growing--might have stopped students in Szczecin from painting maps of Poland without Szczecin, Wroclaw or Opole and might have nipped in the bud attempts by politicians and "historians" from KOR, KPN or Solidarity to correct Yalta and Potsdam. But no such speech was heard. The reason was certainly not that Osmanczyk has meanwhile changed his position concerning the Germans or the Oder-Neisse border. The only reason which remains to account for his silence is this: he feared having to forfeit the favors of the new movement. And this is what undermines the greatest myth about Edmund Osmanczyk--the myth about the courageous, honest and intrepid fighter for the truth, which is the main argument advanced by those who wanted to see Osmanczyk's name on the list of candidates for Sejm deputies.

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POLAND

KWIATKOWSKI SURVEY ON POLITICAL INTEREST, AWARENESS

Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY in Polish 7 Sep 85 pp 1, 4

[Article by Stanislaw Kwiatkowski: "The Center and the Poles"]

[Text] Today people are less interested in politics than they were a few years ago. Five years ago politics filled social life completely, in one way or another it was referred to at every social event which began and took place around politics. Then, in the latter part of that "political carnival" many people felt tired of the daily political pressure.

The mass flight from politics began in 1982 under martial law. The number of people willing to demonstrate their political views declined from day to day. An increasing number of people withdrew into private life, while certain other people, who had earlier been very committed to the Solidarity cause, chose "internal emigration." Many people felt disappointed when they began to assess coolly their recent emotions. They felt cheated. You could write a dissertation on this subject from the point of view of social psychology.

The years 1982 and 1983 were years of clear disinclination for politics and of outright aversion to political declarations. People's withdrawal into their own problems and their flight into privacy are well illustrated by the relevant increase in the habit of reading books and papers, especially the ones not having much to do with politics. This increase was particularly strong among blue-collar workers, because as many as 71 percent of the large enterprise workers read books and papers regularly. Compared with the GUS (Central Statistical Office) 1979 data, that was a 61.5 percent increase. Of the respondents, 94.4 percent had their own libraries while 32 percent went to public libraries.¹

Since spring 1984, interest in politics has begun gradually to grow. In the face of the people's councils elections, the celebration of the 40th anniversary of People's Poland and the general pardon, social moods began to improve. In general, last year abounded in significant political events such as an argument between trade unionists and the government, the PZPR National Delegate Conference and the 16th plenum where the workers' voices were particularly well heard.

Meanwhile, the murder of Fr. Jerzy Popieluszko and the announced price increases induced bitter feelings and a definite stir and activity. Of the respondents, 31.5 percent were giving particular attention to reports about the priest's abduction and murder, while 53 percent of those polled "listened to the running commentaries or read written accounts with moderate attention." No other political incident, even of national importance, has ever attracted so many people's interest. (Usually nearly 60 percent of the public remain ignorant of a given event.)

Nearly half of those polled in October 1984 were interested in the country's political life. Out of this number, 13.7 percent were very much interested and 34.8 percent were quite interested in it. A mere 12.8 percent of the respondents answered that "they were not interested in these problems at all." In the last days of December 1984, interest in politics clearly declined and has remained more or less the same in every questionnaire distributed since then. All in all, it is now greater than under martial law, nevertheless it is slightly less intense than in 1983. It seems to be too slight for citizens of a socialist country.

Over one-third of adult Poles say they are not interested in Politics (Table 1).

Table 1

How do you assess your interest in politics?	December 1984	March-April 1985	June-July 1985
1. Great--I follow carefully and in detail almost everything that takes place in politics	3.2	5.5	3.3
2. Considerable--I quite carefully follow what is going on in politics	14.3	16.5	12.8
3. Moderate--I follow only the most important events	41.3	43.9	40.1
4. Slight, inconsiderable--even important events often escape my notice	21.5	18.3	17.2
5. None--such things are of no interest to me	17.4	15.2	23.2
6. Other descriptions	11.9	0.6	1.0

Only a few percent (16-17) of the citizens carefully follow what is going on in the political arena and say that they are very much or considerably interested in this sphere of life. Over 40 percent notice only the most important events and say they are fairly interested in politics.

Meanwhile, in Common Market countries in June 1983, every eighth respondent said he had considerable interest in politics, every third, only to some extent, another third said not much, and every fourth said that he was not very fond of political affairs. A considerable part of the Belgian, Greek, Italian and French respondents (20-30 percent) answered that they never read political columns.

What does it mean when someone is socially or politically active? To the overwhelming majority² these words have a positive connotation, meaning that the citizen thus described contributes to the common good, settles things for others, seeks mutual understanding and strives toward friendly coexistence (27.6 percent); works for the good of others, disinterestedly sacrifices himself to the good of others (20.7 percent); is an activist willingly participating in public life (20.4 percent); or participates in meetings, congresses and conferences (7.8 percent).

Only a small part of respondents associate social or political activity with negative characteristics, describing activists as hustlers who care only for their own interests (2.7 percent) or as imposters who talk a lot but do little and whom you will find here, there and everywhere (2.1 percent).

The study made before the Sejm elections (1,500 interviewers in March this year) confirmed the positive associations with sociopolitical activity. When asked "Who should become a Sejm deputy?" 68 percent of the respondents answered that citizens of unimpeachable integrity and of very exceptional, mainly moral, attributes, who are respected on account of their attitude and character and who are popular in their respective environment. What is important is that the list of those distinctive features of candidates for deputies' positions is by no means specific to their political role. The Sejm deputy should be of "crystal-pure" character. Only 23 percent of those polled concentrated on other attributes, saying that he should be competent in his particular line or profession, should represent his social group, community or region well and that he should be able to perform his political functions well.³

Of the electorate, i.e., adult Poles, 13.4 percent consider themselves politically active. One-third of them are even ready to devote more time and energies to political activity.

Out of the inactive (85.4 percent), only an inconsiderable part (18.5 percent) would like to become politically active, yet they cannot because of other excessive duties, lack of spare time, etc. Only 3 percent of the politically inactive mentioned political causes for their inactivity (lack of belief in the sense of such activity and distrust of the political authorities), and disillusionment and bad experiences in the past (1 percent).

In the same questionnaire, 71.3 percent of the respondents wrote that they have never been active either socially or politically. The people who had been engaged in such activity (28 percent) were usually active in the 1970's or 1980's. The majority of them even today feel satisfied on this account, however, one-third of the former activists feel disillusioned.

Only a few percent of the citizens consider themselves competent in politics, the rest admit that they simply know nothing about it and fail to understand many problems because they are so complex that it is difficult to grasp what is going on (Table 2).

Table 2.

Can you say about yourself that	December 1984	March-April 1985	June-July 1985
1. Politics is not too complicated for me, I usually (nearly always) understand the majority of political events	13.5	14.4	10.8
2. In politics there are as many issues I understand as those I can't comprehend	49.4	50.5	38.4
3. Politics is so complicated that I can't grasp what is going on	26.9	28.2	44.4
4. Other descriptions	9.9	6.7	6.6

Final grade comprehensive and vocational school students consider themselves politically more committed.⁴ The breakdown of their answers to the question whether they have formed any political opinions is as follows:

Definitely yes:	11.5 percent
Rather yes:	39.2 percent
Rather not:	29.3 percent
Definitely not:	4.8 percent

However, their interest in politics is similar to that shown by adults: great and considerable: 14.5 percent; moderate: 62.3 percent; slight: 13 percent; and none whatsoever: 6.7 percent.

The students polled also assessed the respective interest shown by other young people of the same age. According to 65.4 percent of those young respondents, the Polish youth are interested in political problems, such as armaments and disarmament (28.5 percent), the international situation and East-West relations (22.2 percent), problems of peace (21 percent), Poland's economic problems (16.5 percent), Poland's international position (10 percent) and general political questions (13.5 percent).

Of the young, 22.5 percent thought their generation were not interested in politics, attributing this lack of interest to the lack of commitment, indifference, apathy and bad experiences (18.6 percent); withdrawal into spheres of one's own, personal problems, preoccupation with everyday hardships (16.5 percent); disposition to develop their own interests (14.7 percent); and lack of reliable information and distrust of the authorities (12 percent).

The nationwide questionnaire distributed in July² asked the question, "Should a person like you be interested in politics?" Only 42.7 percent of the respondents answered affirmatively, 35.6 negatively, while 21.6 percent had no opinion on this subject. Justifying their ignorance of politics, people wrote "that's not my line," "politics are other people's business," or "let everyone do what he can" (19.6 percent); that they were burdened with other everyday duties (10.4 percent); that they had other interests and needs (8.1 percent); that they were old and sick (8.8 percent); that politics were useless ("it is useless, I have no use for it") (3.7 percent); that they had little influence on events and on what is going on in politics (4.8 percent); that they did not feel like getting themselves into trouble ("politics are too dangerous") (1.3 percent); while 0.4 percent of the people polled were disillusioned and tired of what had happened before.

Needless to say, surveying citizens' interest in politics and their social and political commitment is just a necessary introduction to the political geography of society and to the existing political divisions. The next step involves finding out what part of the public declares itself to be on the side of socialism and the government, and how many people oppose the present political reality.

People's declarations on how they are going to behave during the Sejm elections provide the easiest way to determine the respective size of the opposing social extremes. In every questionnaire respondents are divided into those who from the very beginning of the electoral campaign are ready to vote for PRON candidates, which means that they support the political line of the party and the organizations identifying themselves with the movement for (national) agreement, into those who most certainly will not go to the polls, and into those who are still undecided and uncertain of other behavior during the elections ("I don't know yet, but I am likely to go to the polls," "I don't know yet, but I'm not likely to go to the polls").

In the three questionnaires preceding the people's councils elections last year and in the two distributed this year (before the Sejm elections), the percentage of people ready to go to the polls ("definitely yes") was always between 50 and 60 percent. Last year, 11 percent of the respondents were sure they would "definitely not" go to the polls, this year, 7.4 percent are. All the rest, i.e. the undecided, always constitutes between 32 percent and 42 percent of the electorate. However, they are more likely to go to the polls than not.

The figures above are only approximate estimates, not giving the actual social polarization. Going to the polls does not necessarily result from a political decision or is a conscious participation in the political life (of the country). To a great extent, it results from tradition, the customary line of behavior and the habit of observing regulations. Certain significant and unpredicted circumstance would have to happen to induce one not to go to the polls, which would be a result of his/her individual decision, consideration, or an act of protest, etc.

If from those who are not going to the polls we deduct the people who decide on purely personal grounds such as old age, poor health or total lack of interest in politics, we arrive at the rest, i.e., those who boycott the elections on political grounds. The last CBOS (Public Opinion Research Center) questionnaire indicates that these people constitute about 3.5 percent of the electorate.

For example, the answer to the question, "What should be done first of all in order to improve the situation in the country?" allows you to find out "who is who." Out of several proposed answers, the respondents pointed to the two or three most important. Table 3 shows the percentage of particular answers chosen.

Table 3.

What should be done first of all to improve the situation in Poland? (Underline the three most important answers.)	December 1983 (adult population of towns above 5,000 residents)	December 1984 (total adult population)	July 1985 (random sample from electoral rolls)
1. To induce people to work better	50.8	55.9	60.9
2. To reform the economy	57.0	40.5	48.4
3. To improve the performance of offices and institutions	--	30.2	43.4
4. To reform the political system according to the rule, "Socialism without deviations"	--	29.5	21.6
5. To obtain deferment of foreign debt payments	17.2	10.4	14.3
6. To obtain lifting of American sanctions	18.2	14.8	17.7
7. To change the government	17.0	8.4	5.5
8. To change the political system	14.8	8.2	4.5
9. To increase the range and regularity of social consultations	--	13.6	15.4
10. To encourage people to be socially and politically more active	--	9.0	14.6
11. To debar the military from posts of authority	9.8	9.1	9.3
12. To increase the military's share in the authorities and administration	9.4	2.9	5.6
13. Something else (what?)	--	4.7	5.8
14. Nothing can be done	6.2	0.3	2.5

What is important for us, is the fact that those who chose only the oppositional categories, such as "to change the government" or "to change the political system," numbered 8.1 percent (of the urban population) in 1983, 0.6 percent (of the total adult population) in 1984, and 0.8 percent in 1985.

No matter how we count the size of the opposing social extremes, there always remains a sizeable center, which is not easy either to measure or to describe. It is easier to determine the center of Poland, because this has been determined several times before, than to describe society's "center." Beginning with the French Revolution, a lot has been said about the "center," "the silent majority," in time of social conflicts. It is well known that such sociological phenomenon takes place as a result of yawning divisions, when the sharp social differences are being settled in public. Undoubtedly, it is difficult to grasp the relevant statistics, because estimates do not yield easily to measuring, they are liquid and changing.

What is this "center," if there is one at all, in Poland A.D. 1985? Does it embrace only hesitant people, or those politically passive as well? Is it something that arises as a result of axiological differentiation of the social space between the citizens supporting socialism and the government and those opposing the system and the party? Does the "center" comprise all those who represent neither of the two extremes, or only those who cannot make up their mind whether to approve of or stand in opposition to reality?

It is easiest to count and isolate people of a firmly negative attitude toward the socialist social and political reality, political enemies, illegal opposition in particular, because they are positive in their negation, saying "no" to practically every political proposal. I believe that the above-quoted percentages determine the numerical force of their extremism precisely.

However, to determine and estimate the extreme representing a firmly positive attitude toward the systemic reality, belonging to the party, backing the government and identifying themselves with the country's policy and the decisions of the political leadership is much more difficult. Certainly they always constituted a quarter, then one-third and currently as much as half of Poland's adult population.

In reality, there are no lines dividing the extremes and the center, they are of a conventional and liquid category. It is only on concrete issues where those positive in their attitudes and the hesitating ones, the moderates and those indifferent stand apart. For example, the poll concerning the amnesty law passed on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of socialist Poland on 20-21 July 1984, embraced a sample of 330 people from Warsaw, Gdansk, Katowice, Cracow and Wroclaw. Of the respondents, 71 percent accepted the idea of a general pardon, 22 percent opposed it, while the rest had no opinion on that subject. The number of skeptics was the largest among people with college education. A few percent of those opposing the amnesty were "hard-liners" who never yield to their political opponents and who are ready to fight until the very end. They unmistakably divide society into their friends and enemies. They are uncompromising as regards the latter.

What can be said about the views, moods, opinions or political orientations of the people from the "center?" Is the "center" "nobody's land?" It has to be remembered that the "center" comprises people politically irresolute and those who simply shun politics and "hold no opinion." It is scarcely possible to speak about the "center" if you pass over in silence all those who are not interested in politics and are politically passive. After all, passivity can be just a temporary relinquishing (not always conscious and purposeful) of one's civil rights. In certain periods those silent, undecided people from the "center" are carried away by the emotions felt by large groups, thus making the latter into a majority, tipping the scales and making their own attitude decide on concrete issues.

It has to be added here that avoiding unequivocal "yes" or "no" answers, choosing cautious, middle-paths of the "I hold no opinion" sort can conceal different motivations. This indecision does not always result from ignorance, sometimes it has not much to do with the concrete question itself, but is the effect of the respondent's disinclination to the very situation where he/she has to make a choice between two alternatives. The people from the "center" believe that they have the right both to evaluate things and other people as well as to stand aside and watch, they want to be treated as partners although they themselves are not eager to establish such partnership (with the authorities).

The "center" comprises above all undecided and passive people who consciously keep away from politics, political declarations and this kind of problems, and are not interested in political events in general. In any case, in Poland the "center" has never been a "silent majority."

It either backed up something, assenting to something rather mechanically without making decisions or consciously settled upon protest. At the moment, the "center" is composed of disoriented people, discouraged by the social convulsions of the past years, sunk in apathy and disbelief in the sense of any social action, inclined toward passive behavior and ambivalent attitudes, skeptical and critical. They have many doubts and reservations. They fear a recurrence of outdated practices. This fear gives rise to their oversensitivity and suspicions. They treat the authorities' intentions and the activities of state institutions with aloofness, but at the same time with hope and assent as regards government reforms and measures aimed at putting the economy and the market in order and disciplining society in the name of "how things should be" or rather in uniformity of views as to "how things should not be."

It is quite the thing to be of the "center." It is convenient, too. Today people of very different political orientations are nestling down in the center. Even the once radical Solidarity leaders also describe themselves as people of the "center," willing to play the role of the one who cools the hotheads and urges them to be careful. (Cf. E. Bourne in THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR of 6 August 1985.) Although all in all the "center is vague, it is unanimous about "what it is against" but it doesn't quite know "what it is for." It is on the revaluations "within the center" that the pace and stability of the Polish transformations depend.

FOOTNOTES

1. Participation of Large Industrial Enterprise Workers in Culture. CBOS report on its March 1984 study on a national sample of blue-collar workers from large industrial enterprises.
2. Representative studies of the adult population in Poland, carried out on a sample of 2,300 people randomly selected from the electoral rolls.
3. Who should become a Sejm deputy? CBOS report from August 1985.
4. Representative data concerning final grade comprehensive and vocational school students in 1985 (poll carried out in April 1985).

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POLAND

PARTY REACTIVATED AT HUTA BIERUTA IN CZESTOCHOWA

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 14 Sep 85 p 6

[Article by Josef Grabowicz: "The Political Map of One Factory"]

[Text] "More than a thousand people left us, but now several are asking to be accepted again. I can well recall that in January of 1980, shortly before the stormy events of that August in Poland, our party organization had 3,298 members. Today it has 1,915 members," says Stanislaw Starczynski, PZPR secretary at the Huta Bieruta works in Czestochowa (HBB).

Although the requirements for admission are now tougher than before, the party organization grew by 54 candidates in the first half of the present term, 46 of whom were workers. The chances of winning back many of those who quit are good. "They come to see me discreetly, often looking embarrassed. They sit down, remain silent for a while, then they remember the difficult period and ask if their old decisions can ever be forgotten? Some bring applications to renew their party membership." And a special study group appointed 2 years ago to establish why people were leaving the party has not yet completed its work.

"That was one of the most important jobs we had to do," says Starczynski. "Following August 1980 many ties were cut, previously united bodies disintegrated, and worker groups crumbled. It is in a worker group, where informal ties predominate, that people know who is and who is not a party member. Empty words are of no use in the face of reality. Although there is still much to be achieved in 55 base-level and department party organizations, the 116 revitalized party groups are all foci of activity."

Party group heads--many of them foremen and highly respected people--testify by their attitudes what it means to be a party member. The group forum is also the best venue for task allocation and control. At every monthly meeting, two or three members are asked to account for the tasks they had been entrusted to carry out. It is at the group level that every party member can best be asked to say exactly how he or she fulfills the factory organization's stipulation that every party member should work in some public organization. Groups are the most severe judges of the 600 people who hold posts within the party authorities--in the 3 main commissions (for social and economic matters, for organization, and for (ideology) and in the dozen or so special groups.

The social and economic commission, which is composed of 39 people, has done a particularly fine job. It organized a session of the Czesochowa Voivodship PZPR Committee Executive Council at HBB, with the metallurgy and engineering minister as guest. As the biggest supplier of rolled steel to shipyards and of pipes for coalmines, power stations and engineering plants, HBB wants to know exactly what prospects it has for the future.

The commission also helped streamline the overall organizational pattern at HBB. It brought to light many unnecessary posts, especially clerical ones. The resulting savings, to the tune of more than Z1.2 million, will be included in the wage fund.

Self-management is another major area of interest for the commission. As early as April 1983, a self-management body was elected at the initiative of the factory organization. Of the 124 elected members of the Worker Delegates Conference, 74 are PZPR members, and 17 party members sit on the Worker Council of 25.

The group of party members in the council does not impose its opinion on the others. It tries to get the council to make decisions in keeping with the party line through discussions, disputes and polemics. The extent to which industrial relations have become democratic inside HBB could be seen from the conferences called before the election of the worker self-management body for its second term and from the course of the election itself. Altogether 143 delegates were elected (1 delegate per 80 employees) and 29 Worker Council members (1 per 400 employees). As a rule, as many as three candidates were nominated for every seat on the list drawn up by the Factory Electoral Commission.

In part fulfillment of the statutes approved in 1984, not only a self-management body representing the entire workforce was elected but also self-management bodies at HBB guarantee full participation in the running of the works for self-management bodies and worker groups. "If you count self-management body members at factory and department levels, you can see that there are some 400 of them. Briefly, 1 in 30 HBB employees is member of some self-management body," says the HBB newsheet GLOS HUTNIKA.

"Party courts" is the colloquial term denoting the party control commissions which were created in the report-back and election campaign leading up to the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress. They were created at a time of hard struggle against deformations, when the requirements put to party members were particularly tough.

Says Stefan Wazia, a locksmith of the working and assembly department who heads the Factory Party Control Commission, "the past 4 years of work as 'judge' has involved me in working for two consecutive terms, considering dozens of appeals, watching that party verdicts are legitimate, and taking up even the most conflicting and controversial human problems."

The party judges work without gowns or caps, shying away from the majestic style of high tribunals, but in direct contact with the people concerned.

Their decisions are constantly watched by party bodies and by all the workforce and compared to the common-sense idea of fairness.

"An open-stage style of party work is a fact at HBB, not just lip service," says Wazia. "Party activists are constantly facing the dilemma of how to be true to the principles and serve the common good while also being popular with and respected by their colleagues, which makes their role as judges particularly difficult. This perhaps explains why in the last report-back and election campaign held a year ago it was primarily party control commission chairmen who were voted out in secret ballots. Those who dispense internal party justice expose themselves to danger most often and are rarely loved. I was returned to my job, and I am presiding over our commission for the 5th year running now. This is something of a surprise for me, because in our work we concentrate primarily on strengthening party discipline.

"Appeals against decisions give us more work than other things. The case of one comrade was under consideration for 4 years. At first there was a draconic decision to suspend him from party membership, then he was expelled for the bad things done by his wife in a different factory, a decision made as part of a witch-hunt. On top of this, an attempt was made to finish off this man completely, by sacking him from his job. His case was considered several times at different levels by different bodies. We sat down to consider scrupulously and without emotion the arguments brought before us by those who voted for his expulsion. Then came a new vote by which the department party organization restored his party membership. Earlier, the unfounded attempts to degrade him in his job were invalidated.

"There were also appeals against some hasty or even thoughtless decisions, as in the case of another person who was struck off the list of party members for failing to report to the local party organization while on maternity leave. It turned out that in that period she had had to move from one apartment to another several times. Finally, we had to intervene in matters of top importance, when we had to react strongly to the conduct of people holding managerial posts at HBB on the recommendation of the party, who tended to behave arrogantly.

"Our commission, which includes 11 members, has won considerable prestige among the workforce. Best evidence of this is that we are invited to sit on commissions the PZPR factory organization has appointed for holding preliminary talks with candidates for top posts. We also work in a special body appointed to tell candidates why they are refused party recommendations."

During the most recent report-back conference participants were told, "One alarming fact is that only some 75 percent of party members of HBB have registered with local party work bodies." But, is this 75 percent a little or a lot? Before the local elections (of 17 June 1984) when what were called "maps of political geography" were drawn, party activists were ubiquitous. With their knowledge of Marxist theory and method of work "brushed up" in Schools for Worker Activists--an initiative of the Czesochowa Voivodship Party Organization--those activists did quite a good job. By means of that project for drawing up maps of political geography, the voivodship and local

organizations hoped to find out the exact distribution of the forces of the party and the allied parties in varying workplaces and local communities. The idea was to establish who could be relied upon, who would resist the boycott of the local elections which the opposition was staging.

The local groups were mostly headed by experienced activists from large working-class communities in the leading industrial plants. Those groups answered many questions asked by the people. Many people heard for the first time how the party was consistently following the line of reconciliation and struggle, the policy line established by the Ninth Congress.

The election returns gratified HBB activists. In Czestochowa voivodship, the turnout in the elections was 80.4 percent. This turnout was amongst the highest nationwide, and it testified to the increasing stability. No remarkable demonstrations against voting were recorded on the day of the elections. Nor did the clergy stage any major negative action.

Several months ago, the first bookshop inside a factory in Czestochowa voivodship was set up at HBB. It works in a small room close to the management's building.

"The workforce's demand for books, which was voiced at many conferences and meetings, still outweighs supply," says Jerzy Szeps, party secretary with the factory organization, urging us to visit the bookstore. "Whenever a new shipment of books arrives, a line forms instantly in front of the shop. We are happy to see people so strongly interested in reading books, but sometimes we are also worried because we can't approve of them leaving their workplaces. The bookstore was set up at the initiative of the HBB branch of the Association of Engineers and Technicians. Wladyslaw Gruszczynski, who heads the Czestochowa voivodship branch of the national Dom Ksiazki bookseller company, has assured us our bookstore would be supplied with the most interesting titles and not books which stick on shelves. This promptly invited criticism from outside HBB, that perhaps this is something like an illegal privilege, because people are nowadays particularly sensitive to such things. However, somebody with a lot of common sense cut short the debate by saying that if the working class is, according to Marxist scholars, the demiurge that rules the historical process, then let it also benefit from this. The dispute was thus closed, and indeed the bookstore is now receiving several copies of every book for which there is a strong demand."

I listened to this waiting in a line in front of the shop, because I had heard somebody saying they would sell Gunter Grass's "Tin Drum." My waiting in the line proved futile. The five copies of the book were sold within 15 minutes, long before it was my turn.

Says Szeps, "Don't forget we also have a vigorous Creative Workers circle at HBB. Names such as Zbigniew Kolba or Jozef Zatonski, writers as well as party activists, have appeared in print not only at HBB but even outside Czestochowa. Even if they lag behind professional writers in artistic quality, their creative aspirations are of value in themselves and something we strongly encourage."

Back in the secretary's office, we return to some more general matters the party activists have, for some months now, been bringing up at conferences at HBB and elsewhere in the voivodship. Secular ceremonies are one such topic.

"Already at the report-back voivodship conference in December of 1983 we called for the approved program for speeding up the building of a wedding palace, for drawing up scenarios for various ceremonies, building a funeral house, setting up a municipal cemetery in Czestochowa and hiring a master of funeral ceremonies. It is strange that even now we have to bring such a person over from Katowice."

Lobbying by the special task force in charge of secular ceremonies has resulted in including in the current plan the building of these facilities. Maybe at long last it will be possible to find builders in Czestochowa who will carry out these jobs, at a time when the church is building 11 of its own facilities in that city. This widespread demand was brought up by Ryszard Wolniak, party secretary at HBB's department of thick steel-sheet department. "We must have the basic facilities for being with people on festive occasions--both joyous and sad. It is our duty to take leave of our comrades. Obituaries are not enough."

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POLAND

SEJM ADDRESS BY DEPUTY M. BUDZANOWSKA ON ECONOMICS, SELF-MANAGEMENT

Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 36, 8 Sep 85 p 2

[Address to Sejm on 31 July 1985]

[Text] Honorable Mr Speaker, Esteemed Chamber,

It is not my intention to examine the economic prerequisites for economic reform, but I wish to add a humanist's opinion to the debate on the economy. We have begun to implement the thesis that it is necessary to subordinate the economy to social targets. The change from technocratic to social thinking, however, cannot be described as satisfactory. Socialism is more than an idea--it is a system for the people.

Although the stage of thinking only in terms of figures---in terms of tons of steel manufactured or numbers of locomotives produced---is now behind us, the stage dominated by examination of how much is being given to people is going on too long, and I emphasize the word: given. After all, we are a country of manufacturers and not of people who are given things. It is necessary to promote thinking in terms of the conditions set for the employees' conscious and effective participation in good and efficient work. The human factor, human psychology, is as important as economic parameters. We are underestimating the motivation connected with good payment for good work, and even less the numerous other factors involved, factors stemming from human psychology which is determined by:

--awareness of the importance and purpose of the work done;

--a sense of satisfying one's professional and social aspirations;

--awareness of the possibility of improving one's standard of living, and a sense of financial security for the future, i.e., those qualities of work which make life creative and useful.

Without a full, cohesive motivation system, the reform is threatened by routine. We must never forget that the economic reform is a part--and a very important one--of reforms in state functioning.

Concern is raised about the incomplete implementation of the reform, incohesion and contradictions in its legal provisions, and occasional violations of its laws. The effect of these factors on public attitudes must be borne in mind, as confidence in the intentions is thereby weakened. Political rationalism orders that public sensitivity, or even hypersensitivity, should be reckoned with. Difficult conditions for implementing the reform during the crisis are not a satisfactory explanation.

The past Sejm debate gave the public a full and honest picture of the difficult state of the Polish economy. Today, it is time to talk openly about the contradictions in the economy-improving methods included in the reform, and about ways to overcome them. In this connection, I shall discuss two sets of tasks:

- 1) a reform of the economic center,
- 2) the role of self-management in the economic reform.

The report on the implementation of the reform cautiously points to the emergence of "some progressive changes in the methods and ways of functioning of the central administration," but asserts that "several deficiencies in their operation persist."

The change in the role of central economic bodies is apparent in the sphere of planning and activating some economic measures. The state's economic policy cannot be coherent unless the reform is also a reform of the center's competence adapted to reforming targets, the center's functioning, and also, I think, reform in the organization of the central economic administration. Partial changes limited the ways in which the central administration functions are not sufficient to improve economic efficiency. The old system of industrial ministries divided along sectoral lines is inconsistent with the economic reform, and its usefulness in implementing the social targets of the economic policy is insufficient.

My conception of economic decisions places them more closely with the government, and not split between various ministries. This should also have an influence on genuine enterprise self-management. We have, however, stopped short of a law on the Council of Ministers' competence, and the economy does not stand to gain by this situation. The law defining the rights, duties and responsibility of the central administration management has not been completed either, while the reform has, not without good reason, indicated a need to define legally the new roles of all supreme and central state administration bodies.

Conservatism persisting in sectoral ministries also raises many objections, as does a lack of genuine involvement in implementing the laws on state-owned enterprises and employees' self-management.

I see proof of this in judicial verdicts pertaining to violations of the law by parent organizations, in the establishment of enterprise associations resembling industry boards, in the nomination of directors without holding

competitions, in delays in work on bills within ministries, and also in the occasionally proposed amendments to the law on state enterprises and workers' self-management. After all, these laws are the basic element and foundation of the economic changes, and they have not been fully activated so far, while the conditions for their implementation are not normal. It has not yet been possible, therefore, to test these laws fully in practice.

Is there a remedy for this clearly emerging line of retreat? Yes, it rests in speedy work on the laws announced in the reform, in reforming the central economic administration, not prolonging the provisional period when special legal regulations are in force, systematic limitations of rationing, and also the workforce's full participation in implementing the constitutional principle which states, "State enterprises manage a part of national property, while the workers take part in management."

This principle was developed in the law on state enterprises and workers' self-management. The interdependence between the state of socioeconomic reform and workers' self-management autonomy and efficiency is very strong and bilateral. Weak self-management bodies deprive the reform of its social base, which is necessary when it comes to dealing with the existing bureaucratic resistance. On the other hand, deficiencies in reform implementation deprive workers' self-management of their economic base in enterprise autonomy and self-financing.

Self-government is not something gained by any law; however, it must be striven for, shaped in public awareness over years of operation, pursued in practice. Resistance is not limited to the administration. Another obstacle is the passivity, of some workers, still lacking confidence in their genuine say in enterprise management. This approach can best be changed by courageous self-management bodies which enjoy real confidence, because they have been elected directly by the whole workforce, and also from their legally defined activities. The process of workers' growing self-management awareness is perceivable, and self-management bodies are improving their managerial skills. This should have a positive effect on management efficiency.

Good and efficient work does not stem from slogans and appeals. Its sources rest to an equal extent in good pay for good work and in socioprofessional satisfaction at the place of employment.

Workers' self-management bodies have experienced a difficult start and have proceeded along a difficult road. They have frequently fought for their rights as decisionmakers--the rights that in practice have often been disrespected--for the application of the law on self-management and for its correct interpretation. The Sejm supported self-management bodies with its resolutions, with the interpretation of the law prepared by the Self-management Commission and with the activity of voivodship deputy groups. I have my own experience in this work and I know that the front of struggle of the enemies of the law has kept changing constantly. Today too one meets with opinions close to extreme ones, the opinions which reject laws for having been passed in a "special political situation." But we must not forget that in that

difficult situation these laws were beginning the process of economic reform. They were a proof of wise compromise.

Today they remain the bridgeheads of national agreement which can best be implemented in the basic, natural structure of the enterprise through the involvement of all people whose views, convictions and outlooks may differ and who may belong to different organizations, in the process of work which unites them all.

The importance of this matter cannot be overestimated. In this context one notes with concern those decisions concerning enterprises which do not mention the rights of self-management bodies to participate in decisionmaking. Let me refer at this point to the principles of working hours and to enterprise wage systems. The Sejm should extend its protection--and possibly provide an adequate interpretation--over one problem which is disturbing self-management bodies at present, namely the overlapping of their and trade unions' rights with regard to welfare problems. The rights of self-management bodies to participate in decisionmaking in this field must be fully respected. The situation where laws become the source of conflicts in enterprises is inadmissible.

Limitations of economic development expected during the coming quinquennium, a decrease in workforce expansion, capital shortages and lack of resources for modernization and for the prevention of disinvestment on the one hand, and the vital question of production and consumption growth to be achieved through an increase in labor productivity and the halting of real wage growth on the other, can be reconciled only through incentives shaping workers' attitudes.

In the present situation, in which it may be necessary to ask workers for sacrifice, the role of self-management bodies is not only an ideological but also a pragmatic one.

The people must be paid. If they cannot be paid with the money with which one can buy increasingly more on the market then they should be paid with material assets such as [sic] a more important role for workers, and participation in management and responsibility for their enterprise.

We have developed a crisis of prospects. It is more painful than the economic crisis and the current difficulties. So far the authorities' efforts have concentrated on economic problems, which was necessary. Today it has become equally important to reach out for incentives to stimulate civic activity.

The ways to do so include the creation of political and legal conditions for civic self-education through self-management and conviction about the durability of the legal and economic base of the reform, through guaranteeing the optimum participation of workers in the management of production and through taking advantage of their initiative and energy. These are the ways to eliminate lack of confidence in the money and in the future.

It is only in such conditions that the ethos of a decent worker, a decent man and a decent citizen can develop. These factors, which are connected with

man's psychology, are capable of guaranteeing the economy as much profit as economic factors. They can also shape permanent social transformations.

I have recounted these best intentions and also the shortcomings in deputies' work as a message to the next Sejm.

CSO: 2020/1

POLAND

PARTY ACTIVITIES CALENDARS

Calendar 22 July - 4 Aug 85

Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish 14 Aug 85 p 21

[Unsigned article: "Party Chronicle: 22 July--4 Aug 1985"]

[Text] 21st PZPR Central Committee Plenum:

3 August

The 21st PZPR Central Committee Plenum deliberated in Warsaw with the participation of the Caucus of PZPR Deputies to the Sejm. A Politburo Report on "The Party's Tasks in the PRL Sejm Election Campaign" was presented by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Tadeusz Porebski. Next, Politburo Member, Central Committee Secretary and Chairman of the Caucus of PZPR Deputies to the Sejm Kazimierz Barcikowski presented a report on the work of that caucus during the 8th Session of the Sejm.

Following plenary discussion during which seven comrades took the floor, a resolution on the party's tasks in the PRL Sejm election campaign was passed.

Concluding the deliberations, First Central Committee Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski delivered an address.

Sessions of the Central Committee Politburo:

23 July

The Politburo:

-- examined a report on the activities of workforce self-governments and evaluated positively their development and accomplishments so far;

-- evaluated the implementation of the tasks contained in the resolutions of the 16th and 18th Central Committee plenums as based on studies conducted within party organizations at larger plants by inspection teams from the CKR [Central Audit Commission] and certain Central Committee departments;

-- considered a report on the implementation of the resolution specifying measures intended to enhance the effectiveness of intra-party and intra-state

control;

-- was briefed about the implementation of proposals submitted at the 20th Central Committee Plenum.

Conferences and Meetings:

22 July

-- On the 41st anniversary of the Holiday of Poland's Rebirth a solemn trooping of guards was held at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw in the presence of First Central Committee Secretary Premier Army Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski and Chairman of the Council of State Henryk Jablonski, along with the ceremony of placing wreaths.

23 July

-- A meeting was held between First Central Committee Secretary Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski and a group of 49 chairmen of worker councils and workforce self-governments from state enterprises in all provinces. The topic of the meeting was the principal issues facing the economy, industrial plants and enterprise self-governments. The meeting was attended by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Kazimierz Barcikowski, Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Wlodzimierz Mokrzenszczak, Vice Premier Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski and Director of the Economic Department under the Central Committee Marek Holdakowski.

24 July

-- First Central Committee Secretary Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski received at the seat of the Central Committee a youth group representing the 600-member Polish delegation to the 12th World Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow. Together with the 50-member group of delegates the meeting was attended by Central Committee Secretary Waldemar Swirgon, GZP [GPZ WP -- Main Political Directorate of the Polish Army] Chief and Vice Minister of National Defense Gen of Arms Jozef Baryla and Director of the Youth Department under the Central Committee Leszek Miller.

-- Central Committee Secretary Henryk Bednarski met at Radom with a 600-member group of youth staying at a joint camp prior to starting higher studies at the USSR, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the GDR.

-- The Director of the Ideological Department under the Central Committee Wladyslaw Loranc took part in the work of the central summer training session for the aktiv of the Society for the Propagation of Secular Culture, organized in Piotrkow Trybunalski.

25 July

-- The Presidium of the Central Party Control Commission (CKKP) considered a report on the performance of province party control commissions during the first half of this year, evaluated the handling of complaints addressed to

party control commissions and assessed the performance of the province party control commissions in Bydgoszcz, Gorzow Wielkopolski and Ostroleka. The deliberations were chaired by CKKP Chairman Tadeusz Nowicki.

-- Under the chairmanship of Politburo Member and PZPR Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek and Secretary of the Bulgarian CP Central Committee Dmitri Stanishev a session of the Interparty Commission for Interparty and Interstate Cooperation between Poland and Bulgaria was held in Warsaw.

26 July

-- First PZPR Central Committee Secretary Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski received Chudomir Aleksandrov, member of the Politburo of the Bulgarian CP Central Committee and deputy prime minister of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, as well as Dmitri Stanishev, secretary of the Bulgarian CP Central Committee. Their talks were attended by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek and Director of the Foreign Department under the Central Committee Wlodzimierz Natorf.

29 July

-- TRYBUNA LUDU published the text of an interview with Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Kazimierz Barcikowski concerning the accomplishments of the Caucus of PZPR Deputies to the 8th Session of the Sejm.

30 July

-- The Sejm Building was the site of a meeting of the Caucus of PZPR Deputies to the Sejm, attended by First Central Committee Secretary Premier Army Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski, Chairman of the Council of State Henryk Jablonski and Speaker of the Sejm Stanislaw Gucwa. The meeting was devoted to discussing the activities of the Caucus during the 8th session of the Sejm. These activities were summed up by the Chairman of the Caucus of PZPR Deputies to the Sejm Kazimierz Barcikowski, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee. In his speech Wojciech Jaruzelski thanked the members of the Caucus for their active participation in the 8th session of the Sejm.

31 July

-- Following the 70th and last assembly of the 8th session of the Sejm, a meeting of deputies with the nation's political and state leadership was held in the Hall of Columns. The meeting was attended by: First Central Committee Secretary Premier Army Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski, Chairman of the Council of State Henryk Jablonski, Chairman of the ZSL [United Peasant Party] Supreme Committee Roman Malinowski, Chairman of the SD [Democratic Party] Central Committee Tadeusz W. Mlynczak and Speaker of the Sejm Stanislaw Gucwa. Wojciech Jaruzelski stressed the Sejm's accomplishments and thanked the caucuses and circles of deputies as well as all deputies for their constructive collaboration with the government of the PRL.

-- On the eve of the 41st anniversary of the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising a commemorative meeting was held in Warsaw. Those attending the ceremony

included Politburo Member and First Secretary of the Warsaw PZPR Committee Marian Wozniak and Central Committee Secretary Henryk Bednarski.

1 August

-- A regular session of the Commission for Resolutions and Recommendations established by the 19th Central Committee Plenum was held. The commission discussed a draft plan for implementing the plenum's resolution. Its deliberations were chaired by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek.

-- Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek received the Director of the Department for International Politics under the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak CP Michal Stefaniak. Their talks were attended by the Director of the Foreign Department under the PZPR Central Committee Wlodzimierz Natorf.

2 August

-- The Sejm Building was the site of a session of the PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth] National Council. Following discussion the council adopted a 50-mandate national list of candidates. Its deliberations were attended by First Central Committee Secretary Premier Army Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski and Chairman of the Council of State Henryk Jablonski.

-- Members of central party authorities met with the personnel of the most senior unit of People's Polish Army -- the First Praga Motorized Regiment imienia Capt Wladyslaw Wysocki in Wesola near Warsaw, as well as with a unit of the National Antiaircraft Defense Troops. The guests -- members and candidate members of the Central Committee as well as members of the Central Audit Commission and the Central Party Control Commission -- were accompanied by Deputy GZP WP Chief Brig Gen Tadeusz Kojder.

At Party Echelons and Organizations:

25 July

-- Politburo Member and Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Olszowski discussed problems of foreign policy at a meeting with political and economic aktiv in Bielsko-Biala.

-- Politburo members Stefan Olszowski and Albin Siwak met with ZSMP [Union of Polish Socialist Youth] youth at a summer camp in Sielpia, Kielce Province. The nation's economic problems and the international position of Poland were discussed.

Calendar 5 - 18 Aug 85

Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish 28 Aug 85 p 21

[Unsigned article: "Party Chronicle: 5 -- 18 August 1985"]

[Text] Sessions of Central Committee Politburo:

6 August

The Politburo:

-- considered draft theses for the 22nd plenary session of the Central Committee, which shall evaluate the status of schooling and higher education in our country, outline directions of improving national education and discuss the conditions indispensable for their implementation;

-- examined the report on the implementation of the resolution of the 17th Central Committee Plenum;

-- evaluated the implementation of the program for celebrating the 40th anniversary of People's Poland, the return of Western and Northern Territories to the Motherland and V-Day;

-- jointly with the chairmen of youth organizations, discussed the participation of the Polish delegation in the 12th World Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow;

-- received a report on the first session of the joint interparty commission of the PZPR and the Bulgarian CP and recommended to the PZPR that it implement the provisions contained therein.

13 August

The Politburo:

-- considered the progress so far of harvesting operations and the current problems of agriculture;

-- stressed the importance of the commencing broad public discussion prior to elections to the Sejm;

-- examined a report on the implementation of its decisions of April of last year concerning the implementation of the resolution of the 9th Central Committee Plenum on youth matters;

-- was briefed on the course of the summer vacations of children and youth.

Conferences and Meetings:

9 August

-- Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Jozef Czyrek received Boris Averchenko, member of the collegial board of PRAVDA, the daily newspaper of the CPSU Central Committee, and director of the Department for Socialist Countries. Their meeting was attended by Editor-in-Chief of TRYBUNA LUDU Wieslaw Bek.

-- Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Wlodzimierz Mokrzyaszczak met at the PZPR Central Committee with the press attaches of the embassies of the socialist countries and the press, radio and television correspondents from these countries accredited in Warsaw. The topic of the meeting was the course and results of the 21st Central Committee Plenum and the role and tasks of the party in the preparatory campaign for elections to the PRL Sejm.

12 August

-- Politburo Member Albin Siwak and Div Gen Wacław Czyżewski, chairman of the Committee for Erecting the Monument to the Fallen in the Service and Defense of People's Poland, conveyed a miniature statuette of the monument to the PZPR District Committee of the Warsaw Railway Hub in Warsaw. This statuette honors the special contribution of the Warsaw railroader community to erecting the monument.

14 August

-- First Central Committee Secretary and Supreme Commander of the PRL Armed Forces Army Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski attended a meeting of the basic party organization at the First Warsaw Motorized Division of which he is a member. During the meeting W. Jaruzelski discussed the international and domestic situation and the immediate and longrange tasks facing PZPR members and party organizations within the troops.

-- Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Tadeusz Porebski met with Central Committee lecturers in order to discuss the political-propaganda purposes and tasks of the campaign for elections to the PRL Sejm. The meeting was attended by Bogdan Jachacz, director of the Press, Radio and Television Department under the Central Committee.

15 August

-- First Central Committee Secretary Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski toured Elbląg Province. The first secretary, who was accompanied by Central Committee Secretary Zbigniew Michalek and Vice Minister of Agriculture and the Food Economy Kazimierz Grzesiak, toured the AGROMET Agricultural Machinery Plant in Malbork and the base of AGROMA. He also familiarized himself with the progress of harvesting operations and the performance of agricultural service stations. W. Jaruzelski visited troops strengthening flood barricades and was hosted by the lads of the OHF [Volunteer Labor Brigades].

-- A conference of the agricultural secretaries of province party committees was held at which the directions of party work in the countryside and the production situation in agriculture, and especially the course of harvesting operations, were discussed. The deliberations were chaired by Stefan Zawodziniski, director of the Department of Agriculture and the Food Economy under the Central Committee.

16 August

-- A conference of the propaganda secretaries of province party committees was held with the participation of editors-in-chief of province weeklies. It dealt with the tasks of political work, upon special consideration of the campaign for elections to the PRL Sejm. The conference was chaired by Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Jan Glowczyk, and attended by Central Committee Secretary Henryk Bednarski.

18 August

-- Central Committee Secretary Waldemar Swirgon met in Augustow-Borki with the participants in an "Osak-85" camp meeting of the cultural aktiv of the ZSMP [Union of Polish Socialist Youth].

At Party Echelons and Organizations:

5 August

-- Plenary sessions of province party committees were held with the object of outlining tasks for party members in the campaign for elections to the PRL Sejm. They were attended by representatives of party leadership and party deputies to the 8th session of the Sejm. At the sessions, lists of candidates for deputies recommended by the PZPR were accepted.

-- The Warsaw PZPR Committee evaluated the preparations so far for elections to the Sejm, accepted a list of PZPR members nominated as candidates for deputies and resolved upon an appeal concerning the elections. Its deliberations were chaired by Politburo Member and First Secretary of the Warsaw PZPR Committee Marian Wozniak and attended by Politburo Member Albin Siwak.

-- The Lodz Province PZPR Committee discussed the implementation of the decree on the system of people's councils and territorial self-government. Its deliberations were chaired by Politburo Member and First Secretary of the Lodz Province PZPR Committee Tadeusz Czechowicz.

-- The Krakow Province PZPR Committee discussed aspects of the coming elections to the Sejm in the presence of Politburo Member Hieronim Kubiak and Secretary General of the PRON National Council Jerzy Jaskiernia.

-- The Bialystok Province PZPR Committee discussed, in addition to aspects of elections to the Sejm, the role of party training in the system of social education. Its deliberations were attended by Central Committee Secretary Henryk Bednarski.

-- The Opole Province PZPR Committee evaluated the activism of party organizations in face of the coming elections to the Sejm and preparations for the 10th PZPR Congress. Its deliberations were attended by Central Committee Secretary Zbigniew Michalek.

-- The Bydgoszcz Province PZPR Committee discussed the role and tasks of the intelligentsia in rearing youth and shaping its socialist attitudes and awareness.

-- The Zamosc Province PZPR Committee evaluated the implementation of the recommendations offered during the reports-elections and reports campaigns withi the party.

-- The Radom Province PZPR Committee attended to evaluating the performance of party echelons and basic party organizations in strengthening and promoting activism in rural communities.

-- The province PZPR committees in Chelm, Torun, Wloclawek and Zielona Gora discussed the tasks of party echelons and organizations in implementing the resolutions of the 20th Central Committee Plenum.

-- The province PZPR Committees in Lublin, Lomza, Kielce, Krosno, Ostroleka, Pila, Przemysl, Rzeszow, Suwalki and Tarnow discussed problems relating to the campaign for elections to the PRL Sejm.

6 August

-- Plenary sessions of the new province PZPR committees were held to discuss the campaign for elections to the Sejm and, against that background, the tasks of the members of party echelons and organizations.

-- The Gdansk Province PZPR Committee focused its attention on detailing the tasks ensuing from the resolutions of the 20th and 21st plenums of the Central Committee.

-- The Wroclaw Province PZPR Committee outlined the principal tasks relating to the province's socioeconomic development for the years 1986-1990.

-- The province PZPR Committees in Siedlce, Koszalin, Szczecin, Legnica, Walbrzych, Gorzow Wielkopolski, Biala Podlaska, Ciechanow, Piotrkow Trybunalski, Slupsk, Jelenia Gora, Bielsko-Biala, Czestochowa, Kalisz, Elblag, Olsztyn and Konin outlined the tasks for party organizations and party members as regards the campaign of elections to the Sejm.

7 August

-- The tasks of party echelons and party members were discussed at plenary sessions of the new province party committees. In addition to the electoral topic, the deliberations dealt with the possibility of enhancing the effectiveness of the political and organizational activities of province party organizations following the 20th Central Committee Plenum.

-- The Katowice Province PZPR Committee pointed to the need to provide maximum assistance and support to PRON elements and unmask the slogans and aims of the political enemy. Its deliberations were attended by Politburo member Jerzy Romanik.

-- The Poznan Province PZPR Committee discussed, in addition to electoral topics, tasks of enhancing the effectivenesss of political and organizational activities of the province party organization following the 20th Central

Committee Plenum.

-- The province PZPR committees in Nowy Sacz, Skierniewice, Sieradz and Tarnobrzeg focused their attention on the tasks of party members during the coming elections to the PRL Sejm.

-- The Gdansk Coast was toured by Politburo Member and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Worker Party Miklos Ovari. The Hungarian guest, who was accompanied by representatives of the province's party and administrative authorities, toured Gdynia and Gdansk and its architectural landmarks.

8 August

-- Central Committee Secretary Henryk Bednarski familiarized himself at the Plock Province PZPR Committee with the preparations of the region's party organization for the elections to the Sejm as well as with the implementation of the province's socioeconomic tasks. H. Bednarski also toured the Mazowsze Refinery and Petrochemical Works and the Harvesting Machinery Plant, familiarizing himself with the production problems and social conditions of the workforces of these plants.

9 August

-- Candidate Member of the Politburo and Member of the Presidium of the National Council of the PRON Marian Orzechowski met with aktiv of the PRON and representatives of factories and youth and social organizations in Bialystok. M. Orzechowski also met with the presidiums of the province and city councils of the PRON in Bialystok as well as with the aktiv of Bielsko-Podlaska.

-- Central Committee Secretary Zbigniew Michalek and Director of the Agricultural Department under the Central Committee Stefan Zawodzinski familiarized themselves with the principal research findings of the Institute for the Breeding and Acclimatization of Plants in Radzikowo near Warsaw.

10 August

-- Central Committee Secretary Henryk Bednarski took part in a session of the Worker Council at the Furniture Accessories Factory in Chelmno, Torun Province. H. Bednarski also toured the municipal library in Chelmno and met with personnel of the administration of justice and agencies of law enforcement in the region.

13 August

-- Central Committee Secretary Zbigniew Michalek met with a 170-member group of youth working under the aegis of the OHP at the HORTEX Textile Plant in Przysusza, Radom Province.

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CSO: 2600/1051

POLAND

PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH CENTER PROFILED

Polling Methodology, Institution

Warsaw STRAZAK in Polish No 2, Feb 85 pp 4-5

[Article by Bogdan Mis: "The Government Already Knows: What Do Poles think?"]

[Text] Sometime in probably 1983 certain newspapers published a characteristic announcement making it clear to those who keep track of the government's decisions that: "The Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), the Polish 'Gallup,' is in operation. Resolution No 195 of 3 September 1985 of the Council of Ministers began to bear fruit."

What is that CBOS, properly speaking, and what does it do? As wise men say, "the guns have already been counted and the soldiers, too. Machines also are not difficult to count; nowadays he rules who is informed about much more subtle matters: the public's moods." And precisely this purpose -- as turned out, among other things, but that will be considered later -- is served by the Center: research into the moods and opinions of the society and keeping the right people, that is, primarily, the authorities, but properly speaking the public, correspondingly informed. I was simply amazed by the unusual ease of access to the seemingly ordinary building of the Office of the Council of Ministers and by the Center's openness toward the press, which can readily avail itself of it.

And there is plenty of information to utilize. The Center conducts several dozen extensive studies each year. To illustrate its operating procedure and the manner in which it processes the findings, I selected a recent poll dated "December 1984." It should be of particular interest to our readers, because it deals with

The Opinions of Private Farmers on the Decisions of the Authorities

-- of course, decisions concerning agriculture.

For the following procedure was carried out. A so-called representative sample, that is, in this case, 1,000 farms from all provinces, was chosen at random, upon basing the selection on the maintenance of adequate and realistic proportions for each province: the more, e.g., there are private farmers in a

given province, the more of them are included in the sample. This sample is termed representative, because it /represents/ all Polish farmers in the sense that if, e.g., every 20th farmer among that 1,000 views a particular problem in a certain manner, then there is a very great likelihood that this also is how every 20th farmer throughout Poland views it.

Next, the farms selected at random were reached by emissaries of the CBOS bearing special questionnaires asking specific questions; it should be known that the CBOS has "its people" in every province, along with special "regional coordinators." These people interviewed the farmers, filled out the questionnaires and transmitted them to the Center. As it turned out, altogether 967 questionnaires were returned. This means that 33 farmers refused to talk with the polltakers.

Next, after special processing, the overall results were collated on a computer. The findings were that, in nearly five cases out of every six, the "heads" of households are males; that nearly three out of every 100 respondents have incomplete elementary education, 60 have completed elementary education, 24 have supraelementary agricultural education (of whom one out of every 100 incomplete or completed higher education) and 14 supraelementary nonagricultural education. It also turned out that generally the better-educated farmer has a larger farm. Roughly every 10th farmer was a member of the PZPR and every fifth a member of the ZSL [United Peasant Party].

The first question asked in the questionnaire was: "Have the decisions made [by the authorities] in recent years been favorable to the operation of private peasant farms?" The response is surprising to city dwellers, who often are convinced that, properly speaking, the government is constantly "stuffing the wallets" of farmers in view of the Sejm decree safeguarding private ownership of land, the corresponding amendments to the Constitution, the old-age pensions granted to farmers, the constant raising of procurement prices, the extension of social security to farmers, etc.: only about every fifth farmer (to be more exact, two out of every nine) answered yes, while more than every third farmer claimed that he was not aware of any decision favorable to him.

It is characteristic that the better educated a farmer is, and the greater his civic activism as well, the more he is aware of the positive decisions of the authorities.

What do farmers consider to be decisions unfavorable to them? First, the decline in operating profits (without giving details). Second, the excessively low livestock procurement prices. Third, the high prices of machinery, building materials and agricultural services. Next, in that order, on the "black list of complaints" are: the high tax, the high interest rate on loans, the introduction of allocations of machinery and the raising of retirement-pension premiums.

As can thus be seen, the Polish peasant views the reality chiefly through the prism of his own wallet. And it has to be clearly stated that it is chiefly his low level of knowledge, education and information in general that prevents him from properly perceiving his "place in the phalanx." Thus it turns out

that a substantial majority of the respondents (more than 55 out of every 100) are completely unaware of the social benefits other than old-age pensions to which farmers are entitled, while the remainder know very little about them. The revised decree on social benefits for farmers has been effective for more than 2 years now, yet 94 percent of the farmers have not availed themselves of all the allowances that they are entitled to!

How then can the decisions of the authorities be welcomed when one is simply unaware of them?

But let us return to interesting findings of the poll. Farmers were asked about profitability of production and the validity of the price ratios relating to foodstuffs. It turned out that the Polish peasant considers the production of potatoes, milk and cattle to be most profitable, followed by the production of rye and other grains in that order. Only every sixth farmer thought that raising hogs is profitable.

The comments on price ratios were decidedly negative, except for the milk-grain and potatoes-grain systems. It turns out that peasants are not well-disposed to farm supports, as demonstrated by the general claim that the price of livestock is too low in relation to grain and potatoes.

The next question dealt with the possibility that farm incomes might rise. It is consoling to know that as many as 11 out of every 20 farmers admit this possibility, although this finding is somewhat surprising in view of the relatively large proportion of those who perceive nothing positive in the decisions of the state.... Here too a characteristic pattern prevails: the greatest optimists are found among the better-educated farmers as well as those owning larger farms (the latter is quite understandable!).

What plans for their own future and that of their children are entertained by farmers? More than three-fourths wish their children to remain on the farm. A definite minority claim that farm work is too heavy, no changes for the better are in the offing and the state's policy toward agriculture is not stable enough. Thus, in sum, farmers view their occupation positively, but their children see it somewhat less positively and have plans that do not fully coincide with those of their fathers; only slightly more than 56 percent of the parents were certain that their children would continue to work their farms.

The questionnaire also asked about any eventual intention to enlarge the farm. A definite majority, three out of every five farmers, desire no changes. Here again it is the better-educated and more enlightened farmers that more often (nearly twice as often) plan to enlarge their farms!.... In this connection, it is not true that wealth engenders the desire to amass further wealth, as the common belief is. On the contrary, it is chiefly the middle-income farmers who want to enlarge their farms, while neither the poorer nor the richer farmers are keen about it.

Also very characteristic are the opinions of farmers on the proposed new agricultural tax. As surely known to our readers (we assume that they are among the most enlightened farmers), this proposal assumes a tax burden

equivalent to the procurement price of 2-2.5 quintals of rye per adjusted farm hectare.

As it turns out, one-half of the respondents are totally unaware of this matter, so vitally important to farmers, which was trumpeted about on television and radio and publicized in the press as well as in special brochures and through the mediation of the agricultural service! Among those, however, who have heard something about the new tax, the younger and better-educated ones believe that it will result in intensification of farming and enlargement of farms. The overall tendency, however, is opposite: most of those who in general want to augment their output and farms are inclined to abandon their plans owing to this tax.

As pointed out by the Public Opinion Research Center, "If the state's decisions on agricultural policies are to stimulate the rise of appropriate systems of economic incentives and rational conduct, care should above all be taken to keep the farmers informed about them smoothly and so as to obviate any misconceptions, that is, in accordance with the intent of the lawmakers or ordinator.... Unfamiliarity with the basic assumptions of the new tax and of the criterion for calculating it demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the system for keeping farmers informed...."

In this place let us end discussion of the findings of this one particular survey. We will utilize other findings, omitted here, at some other time. But here, to end this part of the article, I wish merely to put forward the following idea: education and its spread represent a tremendously important investment in agriculture and a tremendously important task in the domain of strengthening trust in the state! In view of this, the educational and cultural activities of the volunteer fire brigades acquire an important new dimension! This is worth considering when drafting the plans of activities for both the short term and the long term periods.

But to Return to the Center

Dozens of similar surveys, providing unusually valuable information to the government, are being conducted by about 25 salaried personnel. The average processing time per survey is short, lasting about 3 months, but there also are polls that are completed within a week.

The Center is formally subordinated to the Office of the Council of Ministers. Actually, however, it is directed by the Sociopolitical Committee under the Council of Ministers which, as known, is headed by Vice Premier M. F. Rakowski. This is an institution with numerous associates and consultants, enlightened individuals who represent the nation's intellectual elite. They are persons of the most diverse views and outlook. One thing unites them: goodwill and the desire to serve their country, as well as surely interest in the results of this work and the hope that they will not be wasted. Such an openness to diversity of opinions is not to the taste of many "hardliners" or, as Jerzy Urban [the government press spokesman] once called them "possessors of the truth" (because they always loudly proclaim that they are the "sole true Marxists"). Besides, the Center's activities also are not to the taste of the other extreme side of the barricade: the Center's chief Col Stanislaw

Kwiatkowski is among the individuals most often attacked by the diversionary radio stations of people in Poland....

Incidentally, the Colonel is an extremely interesting person. He is young, demanding, dynamic and... outspoken: he is in the habit of saying and writing what he thinks, without considering whether any one in particular might not like it.

And I must admit that it was precisely my interest in Col Kwiatkowski that prompted me to visit the Center. For sometimes I experience a twinge of professional envy: I read another's text and think: hell, why didn't I write it myself? After all, I think exactly like he does....

That's how the Colonel's articles strike me,... every time, damn it!

Thus you can see for yourselves that I had to go to that Center, to see what they were doing there under the direction of that strange man. And they are doing various things in addition to ordinary polltaking; for example, at one time they began to ponder the actual meaning of an expression liked so much by our activists and publicists, "the big-industry working class." And it turned out that it is... not understood very well. For example, an iron and steel plant which employs directly in production only fewer than 30 percent of its 11,000 employees is regarded as a standard plant in which works that "big-industry working class," yet a "less substantial" plant that manufactures shirts employs directly in production as many as 4,300 members of that class out of the plant's total workforce of 4,500; thus perhaps the opinions of the personnel of that "less substantial" plant are socially more important. In the end, after many features of hundreds of industrial enterprises were considered, the consensus was that "big-industry working class" is present at any plant where 3,001 or more people are employed directly in production.

This is just one of many other similar examples of competence at posing questions and ability to view with a fresh eye phenomena that seemingly are well-understood. There are very few people with such abilities. It is good that they are creating an institution. And it is very good that this institution is working for the government.

Center Publication Reviewed

Warsaw WOJSKO LUDOWE in Polish No 6, Jun 85 p 36

[Article by (M.K.): "The Public Opinion Research Center" under the rubric "Vademecum: Ideology, Politics, Economy"]

[Text] In March 1945 appeared the "firstling," BIULETYN CENTRUM BADANIA OPINII SPOLECZNEJ, No 1. Its creator is, as observed by the Director of the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) Col Dr Doc Hab Stanislaw Kwiatkowski in his witty prefatory note, also young but already carries out major and responsible tasks. According to the resolution establishing the Center, it was founded "with the object of obtaining information on social opinions concerning the social and economic tasks undertaken and implemented by the government."

The Center's principal duties include: inspiring, organizing and conducting research into public opinion on subjects of interest to the government; cooperating with other institutions engaging in public opinion research; commissioning studies and participating in auditing their conduct; processing the findings ensuing from the materials and the information available to state institutions and the mass media; and conducting other studies relating to public opinion research, whether commissioned or undertaken on its own initiative.

In its conduct of social research the CBOS employs three teams, one for long-range research, the other for short-range research, and the third for special studies. A separate implementing team works on behalf of these three teams. The implementing team includes a section for cooperation and coordination, which supervises local research and organizes the work of district and regional coordinators as well as a network of polltakers and a laboratory focusing on, among other things, the statistical side of the research.

The analysis department includes the following sections: scientific analyses, press analyses, a manned telephone at the Center and a forecasting laboratory.

For an entire year the CBOS has been carrying out the recommendations of its principal decisionmaker, the government, for "operating in the presence of an open curtain." Now that the first issue of the BIULETYN has been made available to the public, they both have emerged from the shadow zone. The articles published in the first issue of this quarterly presage good and conscientious work.

The BIULETYN opens with a distinctive declaration or manifesto titled "From the Editors." Next, five sections are identified. The first (though not numbered) section titled "Studies, Syntheses, Discussion," and it is followed by "Research, Interpretations, Methods," "Opinions, Signals, Responses," "Observations, Reflections" and "Reviews and Highlights."

The individual sections contain interesting articles that deserve broader publicity. Prefacing the presentation of materials on their own merit with a discussion of the CBOS appears valid. This is followed by the article by Jan Kurowicki, "The Purposes of Public Opinion," whose topic is elaborated in greater depth by the discussion titled "Categories of Public Opinion," coauthored by Halina Holajkiewicz and Edward Nowak.

This is coupled to the article by Wanda Sokolewicz, "An Examination of Intervention [Indicators] and Research Into Social Opinion," published in the section "Opinions, Signals, Responses." Its author analyzes intervention indicators as represented by the totality of individual responses and subjective assessments engendered by feelings of injustice which can, following their appropriate analytic processing, provide a valuable source of information on issues of concern to the society.

The most interesting article appears to be the one by Doc Dr Hab Stanislaw Kwiatkowski published in the section "Research, Interpretations, Methods." On the basis of a poll on Polish socialism, conducted among several dozen

scientists, journalists and other representatives of opinionmaking circles, members of the PZPR (a majority), as well as of the Democratic Party, the PAX Catholic Association and the PKZS [expansion unknown] as well as nonparty members, the author presents a report in which he distinguishes among four questions.

The first question reflects the /attitude of the respondents toward the ideas of Polish socialism/. Nearly one-half supported exploring a specifically Polish road to socialism, upon considering both the universal and the particular features of that road; 12 percent opposed it, while the remainder offered wide-ranging comments but at the same time avoided declaring their position on this topic.

The second question presents the /causes of Poland's failures/. It perceives them chiefly in the faulty practice and misadaptation of theory to the changes that occurred in the development of social productive forces. Not one of the responses -- we emphasize, following the report's author -- identifies the crisis in Poland with the crisis of Marxism in general, contrary to what is sometimes said. On the other hand, two opposed positions have emerged: the first and traditional position is that the causes of the Polish crises are traceable to subjective factors. That is, the respondents believe that the misfortunes ensued from mistakes made by party and state leaderships and were a result of deviations from the principle of socialism in social practice. The opposed approach delves deeper into the sphere of objective conditions.

In the third question the author presents /a diagnosis of the present situation/ and in the fourth /an exploration of possible solutions/. In the opinion of the respondents there is no simple prescription for curing Poland, although resolute measures are needed. Only complex and long-range solutions can be effective.

An attempt to present a brief survey of the contents of such a quarterly is necessarily abridged and selective. Hence also I refer interested readers to reading the "firstling" themselves, and I on my part wish the editors that the subsequent issues be as interesting. They should be read profitably by both scientists as well as by practitioners and political, economic and social activists.

1386

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POLAND

PRE-ELECTION ACTIVITIES COVERAGE

'Candidates for Candidature' Meetings Begin

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 15 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] August 15 marks the beginning of an unusually important stage in the election campaign for the Polish Sejm: consultative meetings between citizens and prospective candidates for the Sejm.

Under Article 56 of the election law, "a discussion of the PRON election declaration takes place at these meetings, candidates for the Sejm are presented to voters, as well as information about all candidates to the Sejm for the given district and from the national electoral list. Voters may express opinions and make comments in the presence of all candidates." The meetings are thus, on the one hand, a citizen's pre-election discussion of the problems of the state, and on the other hand they give citizens the opportunity to participate directly in drawing up the list of candidates, from among which the members of the 9th Sejm will be chosen on 13 October.

Let us recall that there is no list of candidates for the Sejm yet, there are only lists of candidates for candidacy to the parliament. Authorized parties and organizations have transmitted to the provincial conventions several thousand candidates. From among these the conventions, after careful consideration, chose those whose names were ultimately published in each province. The list of candidates presented to voters in each of the 74 electoral districts contains many more names than the number of places on the final list of candidates, not to mention the number of vacant seats in the Sejm.

The example of Warsaw Province is typical. For 27 seats 232 names were proposed to the electoral convention, of which 100 appeared on the list presented to the voters, i.e. almost four times as many candidates as seats.

The election law for the Sejm requires the conventions to present candidates for the Sejm to the voters in order to become familiar with them and to collect opinions and comments. That is what consultative meetings are for. Candidates can also be presented to the citizens in the mass media, to which, just as to electoral conventions and to every state institution, opinions, comments and conclusions can be submitted. Every organ, every institution or

organization must communicate comments on candidates to its own electoral conventions. Only after considering citizens' opinions of candidates proposed in the lists can the electoral conventions, according to the law, draw up and publish the final electoral lists.

Implementation and consolidation of the system of public consultation in the process of elections to the Sejm in 1985 is among the most essential and characteristic evidence of the consistent implementation of the bases of democracy and the policy of socialist renewal put forward by the 9th Congress of the PZPR in 1981. It is a manifestation of the search for effective ways of reconciling citizens of differing views and beliefs, of realizing the idea of national understanding for the good of the country, to expand the field for dialogue.

We are going into the Sejm elections with a joint program contained in the Electoral Declaration of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON). The contents of that declaration are fairly well known, but let us recall how important they are in that they affect all the key concerns of the state and its socioeconomic development, and thus the people's material and spiritual standard of living. The exchange of views on the content of the declaration, on the provisions for national socioeconomic development for the next 5 years and beyond, which the public is familiar with, and on questions related to our culture, our attitudes toward work and life, and everything else which constitutes the unquestioned portion of the nation's strength and prosperity, this is something the importance of which cannot be overestimated. Citizens' consultative meetings are an excellent forum for such an exchange of views, for promoting a frank and constructive discussion of what concerns all of us, what should be done and how to mobilize people and funds for that purpose.

The importance of the citizens' consultative meetings is thus enormous. Hence the need for comments which they are supposed to receive. The organizer and sponsor of these meetings is the PRON, but it must be assisted by local and national administrative organs, agencies and organizations. The meetings must be prepared and conducted in such a way that nobody can say that he found out about the meeting in his locality too late or not at all. Or that the largest possible number of prospective candidates was not present at the meeting, or those representatives of the government who are responsible for monitoring the discussion, collecting opinions and comments, and later consider them carefully.

The important thing is that the consultative meetings should be open, frank, constructive exchanges of views between voters and those who aspire to public office. This dialogue must not take place in limbo, its conclusions must reach those at whom they are directed. That includes conclusions on future deputies and work of the Sejm. The link between the deputy and the voters, and mutual cooperation begin at the electoral meeting.

District Voting Begins

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 21 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] For several days in cities and villages throughout the country one can see announcements of the establishment of voting precincts. The announcements contain the street names and house numbers (in the cities) and the names of villages within the various voting precincts, and also the locations of the precinct electoral commissions.

Thus the provision of the election law requiring the posting of such announcements "no later than 55 days before election day" has been fulfilled. The deadline passed on 19 August.

Let us recall that according to the election law, voting precincts are set up under a resolution of the people's council on the basic level (community, neighborhood, city). The precinct should include from 1,000 to 3,000 inhabitants. In special cases smaller precincts may be created.

The place of residence (except in special cases) determines in which precinct we will cast our votes on 13 October.

District Election Committees Meet

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 27 Aug 85 pp 1, 2

[Text] Under the election timetable, 29 August is the deadline for convening district election committees. This requirement has been fulfilled by all presidia of the people's councils, some of which carried out this task long before the deadline.

The tasks of the district election committees include publicizing a list of voters, conducting voting in the district, supervising voting on election day, counting the results of the vote and transmitting them to the okreg election committee. The district election committees consist of: chairman, deputy chairman, secretary and 4 to 8 members.

The district election committees were convened in the neighborhoods, communities and cities by the presidia of the basic level people's councils, and in military units by the presidia of the military people's councils.

According to a decree of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, heads of diplomatic offices and consulates have convened election committees in electoral districts abroad. As for district election committees on Polish seagoing ships, according to a decree of the head of the Office of Maritime Economy, they will be convened no later than 5 days before the elections.

22 October 1985

National Election Committee Meets

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 28 Aug 85 pp 1,2

[Text] On 27 August the National Election Committee met, chaired by Adam Zielinski.

The NEC, using its authorization to supervise the close observance of voting, heard testimony from the okreg election committee chairmen: Stanislaw Soche of No 21, Katowice; Piotre Pytka of No 39, Lublin; Bogdan Matalyga of No 64, Szczecin; and Czeslaw Czulkowski of No 66, Tarnow.

The testimony was devoted to preparations for the elections in those okregs, especially as relates to establishing election districts, preparations for training election committee members, and the effectiveness of assistance rendered by the local administrative authorities to the okreg and district election committees. The NEC noted that work planned is proceeding according to schedule.

In addition the committee considered testimony from the State Inspection Office of the Election Committee on the progress of pre-election work throughout the country under the supervision of the National Election Committee.

Self-Management, Representative Agencies

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 29 Aug 85 pp 1,2

[Text] A meeting of the Committee on Representative and Self-Management Organs of the CC PZPR took place in Warsaw on 28 August. The meeting was chaired by alternate member of the Politburo, CC Secretary Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak.

Committee members acquainted themselves with the progress of consultative meetings between voters and candidates to the Sejm. The testimony presented at the meeting indicated that growing public interest in the consultative meetings is manifested not only in high turnout, but also in active participation to the public in a dialogue with candidates. Local and regional problems were also raised at the meetings, as well as questions of national and international importance. In their statements citizens referred to the provisions of the "PRON Election Declaration."

Participants in the meetings, city and country dwellers, as well as representatives of all socioprofessional groups, also ask many questions and openly share their doubts and ideas on every area of sociopolitical and economic affairs of the country. They try to get candidates to take a firm stand on the issues. In this genuine social dialogue the voters have shown particular interest in such questions as housing construction, supply of goods for agriculture and the countryside, environmental protection, social welfare, and the fight against crime and symptoms of social pathology.

As was emphasized at the committee meetings, experience in the election campaign so far has confirmed the social and political viability of the new Sejm election law, the principles of which meet public expectations and further promote the active participation of citizens.

Summarizing the discussion, W. Mokrzyzszak emphasized that the testimony presented to the committee, as well as the discussions, showed that the Sejm election campaign is proceeding on the whole correctly, and represents an extremely important and socially appreciated element of the political renewal of the country. This puts an even greater obligation on party members, on whose attitudes, commitment and skill in conducting a social dialogue the results of the election campaign depend.

9970
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POLAND

PZPR ORGAN NOTES PREPARATION FOR 27TH CONGRESS CPSU

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 11 Jul 85 p 6

[Article by: Jerzy Kraszewski, TRYBUNA LUDU correspondent in Moscow]

[Text] The deliberations of the July KPZR [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Plenum, the speeches of Mikhail Gorbachev in Leningrad, Dniepropetrovsk and at a session of the Supreme Council and the recently published program documents of the Central Committee again have turned the attention of political observers to the phenomena taking place in the Soviet Union.

The plenum resolutions and the ideas contained in the addresses of the KC general secretary are treated in Moscow as important elements of preparations for the 27th Congress. Moreover, I believe that they define not only the directions of the pre-congress campaign, but also the outlines of the developmental concepts that will be presented during the deliberations of the highest party forum.

Continuation and Change

These documents, and especially the addresses of M. Gorbachev, expand and deepend the assumptions of the strategic course adopted at the plenary meetings of the KC held in March and April 1985. Unquestionably, this course continues the line of the 26th Congress and ensures the continuity of KPZR policy. However, it also represents the beginning of deep qualitative changes dictated by new internal and external conditions.

Conceived of in this manner, the phenomena taking place in the USSR are not even apparently contradictory. As M. Gorbachev said, "According to Lenin, continuity means a constant march forward, the identification and solution of new problems and the elimination of everything that hampers development. We ought to observe this Leninist tradition scrupulously, enriching and developing our party policy and our general line for improving developed socialism."

Very briefly, the essence of the changes taking place at present in the USSR may be represented in the following way: the scientific-technological

modernization of production and the raising of labor productivity to the highest worldwide level; the improvement of social relations, above all economic relations; changes in the sphere of labor and in the field of the material and spiritual living conditions of the people; the activation of the system of political and social institutions; the deepening of socialist democracy, the development of self-government and an increase in discipline and responsibility.

The most important thing in the methodology of programming the changes is that the discussions, the formulation of concepts and the revitalization of theoretical ideas be accompanied by practical efforts implemented in a parallel manner.

The secretary general of the KPZR KC frequently has noted the need for such an approach to tasks. In Dnepropetrovsk, he again called to mind the party's demand: "We cannot permit real, concrete issues to drown in loud vociferations about the validity of planned moves. It would be inadmissible for us to wallow in the expectations of some sort of new advice and instructions from the top. We must act today, now...."

Undoubtedly, the recent deliberations on the issue of scientific-technological progress, essentially the issue of party economic strategy (for the deliberations encompassed a broad spectrum of problems and issues) should be placed within this conceptual current.

The Strategy of Progress

Preparations for the deliberations were lengthy and painstaking. They were preceded by an analysis of the state of economic affairs. The remarks and proposals of works, scholars and activists were gathered together. Open, honest assessments, sometimes sharp and severe, were presented. The discussion was open and sincere. The concepts developed at this meeting are of a long-term nature. Surely they will represent a composite part of the directions of USSR socioeconomic development from 1986 to 1990 and up through the year 2000 to be presented to the congress. However, the Politburo already has examined the recommendations from the deliberations. It has approved them and it has passed a special resolution, in this way lending the results of the deliberations the force of a binding party document. The stage of implementation has begun.

The tasks that have been assigned are difficult. This is partly due to the scale and scope of the planned modernization and reconstruction of the production apparatus. However, it is also due to the fact that a qualitative change must be made in economic growth, the rapid shift of the economy to the path of intensive development must be ensured and the efficiency of the economy must be increased. We are dealing with a new and different approach to developmental concepts than existed in the past, although the goals remain unchanged.

The Premises of the Turn

Mikhail Gorbachev said in Dniepropetrovsk: "It may be asked whether we are not making too radical a turn. No. This is something we have discussed many times in the Central Committee. We do not favor another, quieter approach. Time dictates that we act in this way."

Thus, it is time to hasten--and in many directions. Practically speaking, it is time to step things up in all fields of social life and economic life.

The need for a sharp turn is determined by many factors, of which the external, the international are by no means secondary. However, it is not merely a question of external factors. The nature of the changes to be made precludes sluggishness. Letting change evolve would impede the effectiveness of the implemented tasks. "It is necessary to make basic changes in the economy and the entire system of social relations, to ensure a decisive turn, a qualitative and revolutionary leap in social development," wrote Prof. V. Semjonov in VOPROSY FILOZOFII. "Improvement should be implemented as the accelerated development of society, as warranted scientifically and generalized in the program of action, a planned, comprehensive and well-prepared process."

The decisions of the highest party and state authorities made recently regarding the capital spending structure, the structure of changes in the system of planning and management, the methods of putting technological achievements into practice, cadre policy, discipline and responsibility show that the process of improvement is taking place at a rapid rate.

Changes really are taking place at the same time in many fields. Actions are being embarked upon that promote the activation of workforces and an increase in their role in solving production-economic problems. The status and importance of central planning is growing and the autonomy and responsibility of enterprises are also expanding. The role of local councils at all levels is increasing. The implementation of the food program is being stepped up.

Addressing a session of the USSR Supreme Council, the KPZR KC secretary general defined the essence of these endeavors in the following way: "Now, when we see our prospects better, organizational work becomes primary--the activation of the work of all elements of the Soviet political system, the mobilization of the masses to implement our assigned tasks. All this assumes the further strengthening of the party's leadership role in society; it demands an increase in the intensity of Central Committee and Politburo work."

8536

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POLAND

NATIONAL BALLOT NOMINATIONS GOING SLOW

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 11 Jul 85 pp 1, 5

[Text] For the first time in the history of the Polish legislative system, the term "national electoral list" has appeared. This is a new thing, unknown in previous electoral laws. It means that some of the candidates will compete for the deputy's mandate not within a specific electoral district, but nationwide, in all districts. Thus, each voter will receive two lists from which to vote: the national list and the district list.

According to the new PRL electoral law, not more than 69 deputies may be elected from the national list, or 15 percent of the makeup of the future Sejm. However, the Council of State determines the final number of candidates and it has decided that only 11 percent of the mandates, or 50 names, will be placed on the national list in the current election. The task of announcing the names on this list has been entrusted to the PRON [Patriotic Committee for National Rebirth] National Council. As the PAP reporter has learned, work on setting up the list continues. However, Jadwiga Tkaczowa, director of the PRON RK [National Council] Office, explains that to date only a small number of names has been announced, since the major political parties and nationwide social organizations have left themselves time for further consideration. There also are misunderstandings that emanate from the improper reading of the electoral law. Hence, some mass organizations are announcing candidates to the National Council that they ought to submit to local provincial councils. Meanwhile, other organizations are violating their own internal regulations by proposing candidates without consulting with their own higher echelons. We are explaining these matters to the interested parties. Of course, we are accepting candidates, and if they receive the approval of their own organizations from within, they will be examined by the PRON National Council.

It is expected that the Presidium of the RK Executive Committee will meet on 1 August 1985 for preliminary discussion of the future national list. On the following day, this will be the subject of RK plenum deliberations. Following the approval of the National Council, the national list will be submitted to the National Election Council. It should be noted that on the district lists, two candidates will compete for each mandate, while on the national list, there is one candidate per mandate.

8536
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POLAND

MIODOWICZ MEETS SOCIALIST YOUTH UNION

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 29 Aug 85 p 2

/Article by Wincenty Zgiet/

/Text/ "We do not have a lot of time for great diplomacy, since matters which are not taken care of now may be even more complicated in a year's time," said Alfred Miodowicz, president of the National Association of Trade Unions (OPZZ) at a meeting with young people of the ZSMP from Katowice province at a summer camp in Wilkasy near Suwalki. The conversation lasted for more than 3 hours, and took place in a lively, somewhat leisurely atmosphere, since the OPZZ president also spends his vacation in those parts.

The proverbial "stick in the anthill" was shoved in by a young miner from Jastrzeb, Marian Michalski, who broached the matter of miners' pay, about which is legendary. "So what," he said, "if I make 40,000 a month, if I work long and hard for it, 7 days a week? True, there is talk of a new pay scale for miners, but so far it has not had any effect on us."

"I agree with you there," answered A. Miodowicz. "The OPZZ has been listening carefully to discussions on this matter between the miners' federation and the ministry. The pay system has to be brought into line with the whole economy, since we have not had such chaos in pay that we have now for 40 years. First of all, there is no hierarchy of professions, and preference should be given to those areas of the economy which do the most for helping the country out of its crisis, i.e., copper, sulfur and coal. As union members," emphasized A. Miodowicz, "if we find ourselves in the new Sejm after the elections, we will work to make a law on general collective bargaining one of the first. For that is the backbone of trade unions, enabling them to effectively defend the interests of the workers."

"There are fears that in time the OPZZ may change into a CRZZ," doubted Wieslaw Podgorski, adding that some union organizations in enterprises are weak, and nobody takes the weak into account, and thus they risk being manipulated by the administration, e.g., through financial allocations.

"There is no threat of turning into a CRZZ," answered A. Miodowicz. "The OPZZ is only a national representative organization, and not a directing authority for enterprise union organizations, which act totally independently. Neither the OPZZ, nor the federations, nor individual unions receive allocations, they are supported exclusively by dues; in the case of the OPZZ, in addition to about 1 percent of the property of the previous unions. As for union-management relations, here I favor long, peaceful, not destructive, but creative conflict. Because only that can enable us to win improvements in the enterprises. And I see a chance to strengthen enterprise union organizations expanded youth participation in running the unions, an opportunity for which is provided by the upcoming legislative election campaign."

At the request of participants in the meeting, the OPZZ president formulated the most important tasks of the union movement, among which he included reforms, increased housing construction, environmental protection, health care for workers and an improvement in health and safety conditions at the workplace.

9970

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POLAND

RECAP OF AUGUST 1980 EVENTS DEFENDS, PRAISES PZPR ROLE

Warsaw PERSPEKTYWY in Polish No 35, 30 Aug 85 p 5

/Article by Ryszard Weldziski: "From a Distance of 5 Years" /

/Text / The truth about August 1980 cannot be told in a single sentence, for the causes and sources from which that most difficult social conflict in the postwar history of Poland arose are complex. Its consequences were also varied, from protest strikes and tensions through a lengthy social crisis to the universally awaited stabilization and renewal. Virtually from the beginning, however, certain elements of the diagnosis did give rise to greater controversies: the conflict arose due to the state's mistakes in governing, abandoning the ideals of socialism, then due to restrictions on society's democratic aspirations, as well as due to arrogance and depravity. The workers' protest was thus in its mainstream a voice calling for changes in the methods of government and for a rejection of practices which distort socialist ideals.

It was thus a defense of socialism, although on its sidelines, as always in great mass movements, various assorted political gameplayers, mainly from KOR or outright anarchist and asocial scum, tried to grind their own axes. But when we speak of social conflict, the most important thing was to listen to that most important and authentic voice of the workers, and 5 years later we can say that it was listened to correctly and responsibly. This led to the rise of a new fact in the life of People's Poland, the historic significance of negotiating and initialing social agreements. It prevented the use of force and opened the path to a patient solution of the conflict situation.

The years pass, a new generation of Poles grows and comes of age, memory also sometimes deceives, and since there is no shortage of liars and lovers of falsification, let us recall the most essential features of the texts of those agreements. None of those texts anywhere expressed any ideas antagonistic from the class point of view, i.e., they were not aimed at the bases of the socialist system. And no wonder--the signatories were on the one hand representatives of the people's rule, who represented, albeit not without mistakes and distortions, the historic interests of the workers, and on the other hand representatives of the striking workers.

I emphasize: representatives of the workers. It was on their behalf, and not on behalf of "Solidarity," which at that time still did not exist, that they signed those agreements. Those texts, with which "Solidarity" activists soon tried to identify themselves, and which extremists of that group tried to falsify or interpret in their own way, began to be manipulated by the antisocialist ringleaders of the political opposition.

An important element in that conflict situation was the fact that the basis of the workers' protest was recognized by the party, before the 9th Congress and after it, before martial law and during it. This did not change throughout those stormy months and years. It remains true 5 years later. At the latest, 21st Plenum of the CC PZPR, Wojciech Jaruzelski said, "We supported everything in the protest of the summer of 1980 which was justified, correct and healthy. We even showed understanding to what turned out as a result of the upheaval to be exaggerated, imprecise, and unconstructive."

The view is quite common that the agreements dealt with matters which should not and cannot be the subject of discussions. Perhaps. But ultimately that is not what is important. To my mind, from the point of view of long-range sociopolitical goals, two questions are of the greatest importance: the first is important, the second is crucial and decisive. The first is the fact that the majority of the provisions signed at Gdansk, Dzczecin and Jastrzeb, as was stated at the plenum, "were implemented by the party and the state authorities, which in some matters went even farther and acted even more boldly." The second is the truth that the path chosen then did not lead simply to meeting the large number of immediate needs, which in Wojciech Jaruzelski's words, "could have been used as a tactical smokescreen to rebuild the old, compromised order." A strategy of renewal and profound reforms was adopted, the features of were dealt with in those agreements for the most part in a partial and inconsistent way, which they could not even have provided for. And those very changes, together with a determination to reach a national understanding, ensure that while an intense political struggle continues on the sideline, the main trend is toward greater cooperation and national consensus. They also insure that the words of the leader of the party and state, though optimistic, were fully justified, when he said that "people who often only yesterday were separated by deep divisions from the early 1980's and attitudes left over from that time, will participate in the elections."

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22 October 1985

POLAND

LABOR CONTESTS WITH BLOC COUNTRIES ENCOURAGED

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 26 Aug 85 pp 1,2

/Article by Stanislaw Zielinski: "Getting To Know Friends, Competing With Each Other"/

/Text/ Is it enough just to hear or read about the ties of cooperation, about what really links and unites us with friends from other socialist countries? In the party organization of the Kosciuszko steelworks in Chorzow they think that that is definitely not enough to find out just how much we can do together, without miracles and without becoming dependent on the richer countries of the West.

"Why should the Polish steelworker not learn about the conditions under which the Soviet, GDR, Czechoslovak or Hungarian steelworker works and lives?", asks Fraciszek Tlolka, first secretary of the PZPR factory committee. "Why should we not get to know each other better, learn from each other, compete against each other in work?"

These questions have not gone unanswered. The Kosciuszko steelworks have already had some experience in cooperation with the Trinec steelworks in the CSSR, which was not only an exchange of party and professional experience, but also competition between the workers of selected blast furnaces of the two enterprises.

The signing of agreements on further cooperation in the political, economic, scientific and cultural spheres between the Katowice provincial party committee and the local SEPD committee in Halle inspired the Kosciuszko party organization to strengthen direct contacts with the Thale steelworks in the town of the same name in the GDR.

Mutual contacts, at first only between the two party organizations, have expanded considerably. They have led, for example, to an annual bilateral exchanger of steel rolling workers who spend two weeks working at the workplace of their colleagues.

There also continues to be competition between the two enterprises, carefully calculated according to output, quality, improved health and safety conditions and lower production costs. In 1983 Kosciuszko won.

Last year the workers of Thale proved to be better. The victors win more than just a trophy cup. The losers of the competition provide the winners with 2-week vacations at their vacation resorts for six people.

"Is there a better way," Franciszek Tlolk again asks, "than working together and vacationing together? Why should we rack our brains trying to think of how others do this or that, why they have more of this or that than we do? The best thing is to go there and see for yourself. There are no miracle workers anywhere. Everywhere how much people have, the standard of living depends on people's work."

The party organization has shown the way. Now in both enterprises both the youth organizations and the unions are successfully cooperating on a daily basis, which promotes lively and frequent cultural and athletic exchange. And it goes beyond the limits set by the agreement between the governments of Poland and the GDR to include sending children to each other's summer camps.

Great are the benefits from these contacts. Especially valuable for Kosciuszko is that they are getting to know first hand how others handle, for example, the introduction of automation, the use of heating and cooling systems in furnaces, gas-shielded arc welding, new technologies for rail production and new types of steel.

This experience has so far been so successful that since 1984 the Chorzow steelworkers have been cooperating on a similar basis with the Riesa steel pipe factory in the GDR. An initial agreement has been signed with Azovstal' in Zhdanov, USSR. They are confident that they will also find a partner in Hungary.

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POLAND

PAY SCALES UNEVEN, CRITICIZED

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 23 Aug 85 p 3

/Article by Aleksandr Chmura: "On the Better Side of the Street"/

/Text/ "I do not envy the high pay of a miner who works underground or of a steelworker who works near an open hearth furnace. But should a doorman working on one side of a street make several thousand zlotys more per month than one who guards the entrance to a factory literally on the other side of the street? Simply because one entrance leads to a steel mill and the other leads to the Konstal?" bitterly remarked the workers of the Chorzow Steel Construction Plant.

This is just the first example from a long list of jobs for which the pay is unjust and inconsistent with the spirit of the reform, and depends exclusively on /words illegible/ and has nothing to do with efficiency or management or output. It leads to a costly circulation of workers in search of better paid work and, in short, to colossal waste of labor resources.

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POLAND

METHOD OF SELECTING DIRECTORS-MANAGERS CRITICIZED

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 23 Aug 85 p 3

/Article by Marek Mazurczak: "Even Competition Is not Best for Everything"/

/Text/ They were supposed to be a panacea for one of the most serious ills of our economy--incompetent management. For the "job merry-go-round," for the so called "parachutists," i.e., managers who disorganize in turn each of the enterprises they direct. Competitions for management positions were supposed to single out the best candidates, people who would be capable of raising the economy out of the depths of the crisis.

Now there is not much optimism in the debate over a bill on state enterprises. Malicious voices say that the only important thing in many competitions is that they start and finish on time.

Unfortunately these opinions are confirmed by the results of a poll conducted by the Institute of Management Organization and Personnel Training. It often happens that the choice of a chief is a matter of guesswork. Members of the selection committees reluctantly seek expert opinion, resort to decision games and psychological tests. Competitions are often a formality whose purpose is to legitimize the person already carrying out management duties.

Who has the best chance of winning a competition? First of all, engineers aged 45 to 55. Thus many of today's directors grew up in a totally different economic era. Have they all rid themselves of the authoritarian-command way of thinking? Do all of them have the appropriate professional training, since in programs of polytechnical studies little attention has been and is given to economics and organization and management theory?

Preference to older candidates, however, is not a sign of generational conflict. Age and experience, in the opinion of many workers' councils, should lead to better contacts and connections, which under centralized distribution of many raw materials and the struggle for advantages, is always welcome.

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POLAND

COUNCIL OF FAMILY AFFAIRS MEETS

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 29 Aug 85 p 5

/Unattributed article: "The Family's Condition Depends not Only on the Family"/

/Text/ According to data of the Main Statistical Administration (GUS) in 1984 there was a certain improvement in the situation of families, but at the same time food cost rose, and differences between different types of families increased. The causes of these inequalities, especially those not due to the family itself, are of intense interest to social policy.

The social policy program of action to ease growing problems and assist families in fulfilling all their functions was discussed on 28 August by the Presidium of the Council of Family Affairs, presided over by Deputy Premier Zenon Komender. The starting point for the discussion was a document prepared by the Ministry of Labor, Wages and Social Affairs together with the Institute of Labor and Social Affairs, which discusses the place of the family in the social policy program and the system of social allocations, taking into account the professional activization of women.

The situation of the family depends not only on the incomes of its members, but also in its size, resourcefulness and social efficiency, and also on the range and availability of social allocations and services to which it is entitled. Because of the country's economic situation, any changes in the system of money allocations must be carried out very carefully, weighing the economic and social consequences. We should therefore not count on an increase in money allocations, but as was emphasized during the discussion, family social services must be made considerably more efficient. Above all what is needed are more child care centers and reactivation of cheap food service outlets.

The provisions of the salary policy and the situation in the labor market have led to an opportunity for the family to increase its income, for example, by part time work for women. But that is often impossible due to the lack of child care centers. Content with the institution of educational vacations, we have neglected the already very weak network of nurseries and kindergartens.

The members of the council emphasized that local authorities must be urgently sensitized to the need for such institutions. In this matter the council appealed to the administrative authorities of all the provinces. The council also considered it appropriate to expand the system of trade union preschool institutions. The trade unions intend to make fundamental changes in the management of social and housing funds.

The Presidium of the Council of Family Affairs will transmit to the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers its conclusions on including in plans the socioeconomic solutions and requirements resulting from the influence of the professional activization of women on the situation of the family.

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POLAND

NEW RULES, QUALIFICATIONS FOR SECRET POLICE, MILITIA

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 11 Jul 85 p 4

[Text] On 10 July, directly following the conclusion of the plenary meeting of the Sejm, the Commission for Internal Affairs and the Administration of Justice and the Commission for Legislative Work held a meeting to discuss the draft law on the service of officers of the Security Service [SB] and the Citizens' Militia [MO]. This code of regulations would replace the previous, 1959 law, which is quite obsolete. The new regulations take into consideration the need for the more effective protection of security and public order and the necessity of combating crime.

The principles of the performance of service by SB and MO officers would be standardized; the service of candidates and preparatory service performed in units subject to the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] would be regulated. The draft law increases considerably requirements made of persons competing for acceptance to serve in MO and SB organs and expands their duties. The criteria for promotion to higher positions and service levels are being stiffened. The new code aims at improving further the professional training of officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It promotes the stabilization of cadres and ensures their ability for performing official tasks.

The draft includes provisions for ministerial training and for passing judgment on officers. In the chapter concerning their duties, the obligation to protect the socialist homeland and its system was stressed. The possibility of creating officers' councils to represent their professional and social interests to the heads of ministerial organizational units is anticipated. The current system of distinctions and disciplinary measures in the service is expanded.

The commissions have accepted the assumptions of the proposed law. A new subcommission under the chairmanship of deputy Henryk Kostecki (PZPR) will continue legislative work on the draft.

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POLAND

PEDIATRIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES DECRIED

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 24-25 Aug 85 p 8

/Article by Ewa Nowakowska: "Children Can Wait?"

/Text/ Maternity hospitals are as crowded as streetcars in rush hour, and they are also old. For years many have not been able to be remodeled because there is no place to put the patients. The service areas--kitchens, sanitary facilities, laundry rooms, do not even meet the most elementary standards. Basic facilities medical equipment, here also regress is evident.

Not enough funds are invested in maternity and pediatric hospitals. In practice, if new buildings are added or old hospitals remodeled the best ones are always occupied by adult patients. The children's sections can wait, and they do wait.

Meanwhile children are getting sick ever more often. Doctors consider that Poland needs four modern pediatric hospitals for surgery alone to replace those which have long been unable to fulfill their functions, neither rapid diagnosis nor maintenance of sanitary and hygienic conditions is possible there. And the greater the lack of preventive care, the greater the burden on hospitals.

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POLAND

CONFERENCE ON LACK OF MEDICINES

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 11 Jul 85 p 6

[Article by: (ewd)]

[Text] (Own Service). The procurement of medicines was the subject of a press conference held on 10 July at the headquarters of the Government Press Office. Deputy Minister of the Health Industry Zdzislaw Szamborski and Deputy Minister of the Chemical Industry Marian Skowerski, who participated in the meeting, presented the situation on the medicines market.

The value of medicines consumed has risen by more than 26 percent over the value of medicine consumption in 1982 and 1983. On the other hand, it has risen more than 50 percent by comparison with its value in 1980. (In the 1970's, the increase in value reached 10 to 12 percent annually). At the same time, however, the volume of medications supplied to pharmacies is declining. The shortages are more and more evident; both the health ministry and the pharmaceuticals industry realize this.

The reason for this situation is undoubtedly the demographic situation of Poland and the health condition of society. More than 700,000 new citizens arrive each year, many of whom need medical care. The treatment of illnesses that represent a serious health threat, primarily diseases of the circulatory system, tumors, accidents and injuries also contribute to the increase in demand for medicines, particularly those that have no Polish equivalents and are imported from the second payments area. Last year, the difference between the needs of medicine and the production potential of our pharmaceuticals industry reached 9 billion zlotys.

In order to improve the procurement of medicines, the government passed a series of decisions that should yield results in the next few years. However, patients are interested in what they can get at the pharmacy today. Additional allotments of foreign exchange have enabled the supplementary import of the Yugoslavian-made circulatory preparation "Corinfar" that is much sought-after today. The medication for high blood pressure "Brinardin" also will be available for purchase. Cefarm stores already are receiving their first shipments of this medication. However, there will continue to be problems with the procurement of "Curantyl." The producer of the medication, a GDR firm, has cut back deliveries of this item to our market by one-half (in accordance with the terms of the related agreement).

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ROMANIA

BRIEFS

NEW PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELLOR--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Ion Licu is appointed counsellor to the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania with the rank of deputy minister. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 44, 5 Sep 85 p 2]

REMOVAL OF OFFICIALS--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Constantin Gheorghescu is relieved of his position as deputy minister of light industry. Comrade Iuliana Bucur is relieved of her position as state secretary in the Ministry of Light Industry. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I, No 39, 9 Aug 85 p 12]

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