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INTRABLOC

Polish, Soviet Envoys Evaluate CSCE Prospects

AU0408101788 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German

4 Aug 88 p 2

[Burkhard Bischof report: "CSCE Conclusion Possible in Early Fall; East Bloc Envoys Assess Vienna Conference"]

[Text] The CSCE envoys of Poland and the Soviet Union, Wlodzimierz Konarski and Yuriy Kashlev, are optimistic with regard to a positive conclusion of the Vienna follow-up meeting. Said Konarski in a talk with DIE PRESSE: "If everything proceeds well, the 35 foreign ministers will come to Vienna in early fall to approve the final document." Kashlev thinks that it will be possible to reduce the questions that are still open to a minimum by the end of this week, so that the work can be concluded in September.

There are only two contentious issues left in the sphere of principles: the protection of minorities and the role of groups and institutions that monitor the observance of the CSCE regulations ("Helsinki monitors"). Concerning both contentious issues, the East Bloc states have not yet accepted the formulations contained in the final document draft that was drawn up by the neutral and nonaligned (N and N) states.

But, Konarski stresses, it is not only the East that has expressed wishes to amend the neutral draft: "In fact, the NATO states do not accept the entire draft either. They have a number of essential objections to the military part of the document." Moreover, Poland has not demanded one single amendment to the N and N paper. Konarski calls the additions to humanitarian questions demanded by other East Bloc states "very limited, both in quantity and quality."

Concerning the military part of the N and N draft, Kashlev supports the neutral states: The Warsaw Pact states, too, are in favor of strong links between the negotiations of the 35 countries on further confidence-building measures and the disarmament forum of the 23 states on conventional disarmament. With regard to these talks of the 23 members of the two military alliances, Konarski thinks that a mandate is just around the corner.

The Polish CSCE envoy says that this is mainly due to the favorable East-West climate: "At no time after World War II have the East and the West come so close in their views. Never has the political will to reduce conventional armaments and forces been so visible." Konarski and Kashlev concur that there are still two important problems to be solved: First, the question relating to the exact geographical zones, whereby it is still unclear which areas in Turkey will be included.

The second problem concerns those weapons that can be used both as nuclear weapons and as non-nuclear weapons ("dual capable systems"). Says Konarski: "I hope that this question will soon be solved, now that the innovative proposals of the Soviet Union were submitted to the West during Genscher's visit to Moscow. Of course, we cannot exclude a priori the dual capable systems, just because they have some additional technical capabilities, be they nuclear or chemical. For us they remain conventional weapons and as such they have to be covered by the mandate for the future negotiations. Which of them will first be included in an agreement that results from these talks is a question to be answered by the consensus of the 23 participants."

Konarski expects the first agreements resulting from the two parallel security negotiations in Vienna to be concluded within the next 3 to 4 years.

Exercises With Soviet Forces Begin in GDR

LD0808125588 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1226 GMT 8 Aug 88

[Text] Berlin, 8 Aug (ADN)—The announced troop exercise of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSFG] and of the National People's Army of the GDR in the Burg, Jessen, Luebbenau, Teupitz, and Luckenwalde region started on Monday. The exercise, which is led by Lt Gen Aleksandr Kozlov, deputy commander in chief of the GSFG, involves up to 14,500 members of the two fraternal armies.

The objective of the troop exercise is to further improve the leadership of the troops and the cooperation of the component forces, branches, and services in defense operations.

BULGARIA

Commentary on Carlucci Visit to USSR

AU0908105788 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in
Bulgarian 8 Aug 88 p 4

[Commentary by Ivan Undzhiev in "Weekly International Survey" column]

[Text] "Unprecedented" was the description given to the visit that U.S. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci made to the Soviet Union at the invitation of Army Gen Dimitur Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and minister of defense of the USSR.

We ascribe to this assessment because this really was the first official visit of its kind, one that for the first time provided an opportunity to discuss subjects previously considered taboo—the military budgets of the two countries, their military doctrines, secret military installations, and so on.

The Pentagon chief arrived in Moscow at the same time numerous commentaries appeared in the Western press that forecast in a pessimistic tone that one should not expect any important agreements to result from this visit. Even if this did in fact turn out to be true, in the final analysis one should not underestimate the simple fact that this visit did take place, which is in itself an event of great importance for the development of Soviet-American relations. It proves that the two sides are trying to make the maximum use of the favorable opportunities created by the summit dialogue for developing contacts in the military field.

In fact, this was the third meeting between the Soviet and U.S. military leaders. The first one took place in Bern in March this year. It marked the start of a frank and useful dialogue that was continued during the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting in Moscow, when Carlucci was a member of the official delegation and met with his Soviet colleague. In the meantime, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, was on a visit to the United States. It was precisely then that a plan was adopted for contacts between the Soviet and U.S. Armed Forces for the period until 1990, providing for mutual visits by the military leaders. In addition to the defense ministers, visits will be exchanged between the commanders of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, by navy vessels, and delegations of military men, historians, medical men, and sportsmen. All of this suggests a mutual desire to expand contacts in the military field as well, in order to achieve better mutual understanding, built upon the basis of trust.

Of course, no one is under the illusion that the favorable effect that the Carlucci visit to Moscow and the official visits following it will exert will be enough to resolve the main contradictions that really exist between the two superpowers in the military field, especially with regard to disarmament issues. This is primarily a task for the politicians. However, a frank exchange of opinions is never a waste, because it contributes to strengthening trust and also helps to further the official negotiations being conducted, without replacing them. In the last event, it is on these negotiations that the resolution of the main problem of the modern day depends, namely, the prevention of nuclear war and the halting of the arms race.

In this sense we would like to believe that Carlucci was sincere when he declared in Moscow (and we should not forget that the two ministers agreed in advance to dispense with diplomatic pleasantries and protocol formalities, which would hinder a businesslike dialogue): "We must continue to act together to find a way to prevent military incidents that might lead to a confrontation neither of us wants. We must continue to work for arms agreements for establishing stability at lower levels, for both nuclear and conventional forces." Well said, it remains for the words to be supported by deeds.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

NATO Hesitation About Disarmament Proposals Impugned

AU0108143788 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 1 Aug 88 p 2

["He." commentary: "This Is Also True for Disarmament: Where There's a Will, There's a Way..."]

[Text] Certain NATO circles respond with a drawn-out "yes" to the proposals for a reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, made by the states participating in the Warsaw Pact, and then immediately continue with a "but": First we want action. Others say: The new initiative has taken the West by surprise. It cannot respond so quickly.

Let us first look at the matter of action. What does one expect? That the allied socialist countries unilaterally implement their proposals, which—of course—were made for both sides? Only reduce armed forces and arms in the East, so to speak, while the West retains its arsenals, which—according to an FRG weekly—do not consist only of blank cartridges?

No; it takes both sides for disarmament. And, if there are reservations as to existing imbalances, by abolishing such imbalances, equal, lower ceilings are to be achieved, from which further reductions can be made to the level of an exclusively defensive capability. Zones of reduced arms level, exchange of information, and mutual checks would forestall the danger of surprise attacks.

What action is really required? To sit down at the negotiation table. Exactly as we have proposed, and in 1988. And to get started.

A few words about "surprise." Let us not speculate with people's forgetfulness. As early as June 1986, in Budapest, the Political Consultative Committee presented a large-scale proposal for the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms. NATO did not respond. The Berlin summit in May 1987 launched a new initiative in this respect. NATO did not respond. Now, after Warsaw, NATO pretends to be so surprised that it cannot react quickly? How often does a constructive proposal have been repeated and newly specified before one is able to respond?

This sterile position is gradually even embarrassing many politicians in the West. There are calls from all corners: NATO badly needs an outline for disarmament talks. Even if only for "not staring at the 'Warsaw Pact serpent' like a detente rabbit, a serpent, which has considerably more proposals to offer"—according to Walter Kolbow, deputy chairman of the FRG Bundestag Defense Committee. Even NATO Secretary General Woerner believes that one can "no longer wait until the West's complete plan for disarmament is finally drawn up," but that proposals are still required this year.

Of course, disarmament is not something that can be achieved overnight. It is a complicated issue. But were things not complicated with intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, too? And action followed, nevertheless. As to the USSR-U.S. treaty: After thorough mutual inspection and checks on location by each side, the destruction of the first of these missiles is already under way. After all, where there's a will, there's a way.

Nuclear Weapons Test Ban Advocated

AU0808125988 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 5 Aug 88 p 1

[Text] East Berlin (ADN)—The Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water was concluded on 5 August 1963 as the result of trilateral negotiations between the USSR, Great Britain, and the United States, and since 8 August 1963 all countries have been invited to sign it. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Moscow treaty, Ambassador Wolfgang Meyer, spokesman of the GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared in Berlin:

As the first nuclear arms limitation treaty, the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water was an important milestone on the road toward disarmament. For a quarter of a century it has helped reduce radioactive pollution of the earth and strengthen the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear arms.

The GDR was one of the first countries to join the Moscow treaty. The GDR has always been guided by the conviction that the cessation of nuclear weapons tests would contribute decisively to end the nuclear arms race, and to prevent its extension to space. As it newly emphasized at the Warsaw Pact meeting of the Political Consultative Committee last July, the GDR, together with the other Warsaw Pact countries, considers the complete and general ban of nuclear weapons tests of primary importance. The GDR proceeds on the assumption that negotiations between the USSR and the United States concerning nuclear weapons tests can be conducive to achieving this objective.

A comprehensive test ban requires the efforts of all countries. Together with the large majority of states, the GDR supports the establishment of multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban at the Geneva disarmament conference. The "basic rules of a treaty on the complete and general ban of nuclear weapons tests," presented by the socialist countries in 1987, are a good starting point for such a move. Proposals such as the Six State Initiative for monitoring a halt to nuclear weapons tests, and the project of the nonaligned countries to transform the 1963 Moscow treaty into a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban treaty are important contributions to the worldwide struggle for disarmament and security. Special responsibility must be attributed to those states that have nuclear arms. The GDR considers

the USSR's willingness to return to its moratorium if the United States, for its part, puts an end to nuclear explosions, to be a step based on reason and realism to end the nuclear arms race, and a step toward achieving a nuclear-free world.

POLAND

U.S. Military Inspectors Leave on 27 July

AU0108140088 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI
in Polish 28 Jul 88 pp 1, 2

[Report by Maj Jerzy Markowski: "We Are Grateful for the Hospitality"]

[Text] The news about the arrival of American military inspectors in Poland has aroused great interest. And no wonder, for this is something completely new in contacts with representatives of Western forces. The visit by the American officers proceeded in accordance with the final document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe. During their 48-hour visit, the inspectors—Col Don Owen Stovall, Lt Col Warren Wagner, Maj Timothy Thomas, and Maj Thomas Wood—observed exercises by units of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces and the Polish People's Army at a training area of the Pomeranian Military District.

What were the Polish side's commitments? In accordance with the relevant decisions, all essential means had been prepared to enable the inspections to be carried out, including use of a helicopter. The American officers were not only able to acquaint themselves with the exercise's tactical-operational scenario and the military material deployed in it, but were also able to talk freely to the soldiers taking part.

At the end of the inspection, a special ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI correspondent asked the head of the American inspection group, Col Don Owen Stovall, for an appraisal of the conditions under which they had accomplished their mission. Warning that he was not authorized to make any official statements, Col Stovall emphasized that the Polish side had received his group very pleasantly and amiably. "Everything we encountered in your country was very good," he said. "We spent this time in a very good atmosphere. We are grateful for the hospitality given to us."

[Question] "Were you able to talk to soldiers taking part in the exercise?"

[Stovall] "Yes, we spoke to Soviet and Polish soldiers many times. They gave us exhaustive replies. That satisfied us."

Thus, apart from information which is essential for the accomplishment of the inspectors' mission, the

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inspectors are taking with them an impression of the hospitality and openness which they have experienced on Polish soil, something on which special emphasis was laid.

On Wednesday [27 July] afternoon, the American inspectors left Poland in an American military aircraft bound for Stuttgart, FRG.

Palyonykh Comments on Joint Nuclear Testing
LD0508154988 Moscow TASS in English
1538 GMT 5 Aug 88

[Text] A TASS correspondent writes:

The USSR and the USA have already accumulated very positive experience in the area of nuclear testing, including the exchange of experts on nuclear armaments and on nuclear tests, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway said in Washington yesterday. She made this statement in connection with the fact that intensive preparations for joint experiments for verification of nuclear explosions are now conducted at proving grounds in the USSR and the USA.

The opinion of the representative of the U.S. Department of State attests to the growing attention of the U.S. side to the joint experiment. The process of preparation for the experiment is viewed in the Soviet Union as a good experience of openness and interaction. Head of the Soviet delegation to the Soviet-American full-scale talks on the limitation and termination of nuclear testing Igor Palyonykh said at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists at the Press Centre of the USSR Foreign Ministry on Thursday that as a result of the experiment the Soviet Union hopes to achieve mutually-acceptable solutions related not only to the existing Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear testing but also to further agreements in this area.

The task of the joint Soviet-American experiment is to establish in practice what perfected measures of verification should be used for the control over the observance of the 1974 Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests. "A joint experiment will make it possible to switch the discussion of the problem from the area of theoretical debates to a practical plane," holds the head of the Soviet group of specialists for the experiment on verification at the range in Nevada, Viktor Mikhaylov.

Two explosions will be set off in the framework of the experiment: one at the range in Nevada, USA, on August 17, the other at the range in Semipalatinsk in the USSR in mid-September. Their yield should approach 150 kilotons, and in any case be no less than 100 kilotons. Both sides will get an opportunity on the basis of complete reciprocity to measure the yield of explosions by a teleseismic way as the Soviet side proposed at the talks, and by a hydrodynamic method proposed by the U.S. side. The drilling and measurement of a satellite hole at the Nevada range is being made under the observance of Soviet specialists, and at the Semipalatinsk range in the presence of American experts. After the explosions the sides will process the results of measurements, make an analysis and exchange seismic data. Then on the basis of the results of the experiment they will embark upon working out measures of verification.

The ultimate aim of the joint experiment is a complete ban on nuclear testing, which should only be welcomed.

Physicians Urge New Nuclear Test Moratorium
PM1208083588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Aug 88 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "End Nuclear Tests!"]

[Text] The Soviet "Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War" committee has issued a statement. It says: "The date 6 August has gone down in the history of mankind forever as one of the most tragic dates of all—43 years ago on this day the sinister mushroom of a nuclear explosion rose above the Japanese city of Hiroshima as the most inhuman of all nuclear arms tests was carried out.

"However, next to this day in the calendar of historical events there is another, which inspires hope for the triumph of common sense and the victory of mankind over nuclear death: 5 August 1988 saw the 25th anniversary of the signing of the historic treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. The parties signatory to the treaty pledged to strive to reach an agreement on a complete and general ban on nuclear testing.

"Twenty-five years have passed and this aim has not been achieved—despite appeals from the broad public and despite the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests observed for more than 1 and ½ years.

"For a number of years the international movement 'International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War' has made the issue of banning nuclear tests the focus of its activity. The reasons for this are quite clear: Ending nuclear tests will mean ending the process of improving these weapons of universal destruction. Since the beginning of this year, physicians have launched an extensive international campaign, 'Cease-Fire 88,' with the aim of forcing an end to all nuclear explosions once and for all. The Soviet 'Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War' committee fully supports this campaign as it appreciates that each new nuclear explosion—irrespective of where it is carried out—represents a blow to the interests and aspirations of those in favor of full nuclear disarmament. We are, of course, aware of the Soviet-American phased talks on the problems of nuclear testing that are currently in progress. At the same time, however, we feel that this problem will tolerate no delay and that we must look for new ways to end all nuclear explosions as soon as possible.

"In this connection we appeal to our country's government to once again demonstrate goodwill and announce a moratorium on nuclear tests in August 1988, while urging the U.S. President to do the same."

Correspondent Views Balance-of-Forces Talks

LD0508184088 Moscow TASS in English
1621 GMT 5 Aug 88

[Text] By TASS diplomatic correspondent:

The current international situation is characterised by a lessening of East-West confrontation which creates favourable prerequisites for the disarmament process in Europe. This is evidenced by the statements of a number of political and public leaders. In this context the opinion of the defense minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Rupert Scholz, expressed in an interview with the newspaper EXPRESS, is of some interest. He said that the position of the Warsaw Treaty was coming closer to the NATO position on the question of troop reductions in Europe.

For quite a long time disbalances and asymmetries in the structure of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO were the main sticking point in drafting the Vienna conference mandate for the talks on reducing the armed forces and armaments in Europe. At the recent Warsaw meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member countries, its participants advanced the idea that the final aim of the first stage of the talks must be achieving roughly equal (balanced) collective levels in terms of the numerical strength of the armed forces and the amount of conventional weapons of the two military political alliances. Admittedly, the balanced levels must be lower than the current levels of the two sides.

This would create conditions for making a 25-percent reduction (roughly by 500,000 men) in the armed forces of each of the sides at the second stage. At the third stage it is planned to go ahead with the reductions of the armed forces and conventional armaments to impart defensive character to the armed forces of the two countries. The proposal of the Warsaw Treaty countries to take account of the disbalances and asymmetries is an important step in bringing closer their position with that of the NATO countries.

To determine the real balance of forces and the true size of disbalances and asymmetries in the field of armed forces and conventional armaments, the Warsaw Treaty countries propose to conduct an exchange of initial data. Importantly, it should be done before the start of the talks. This measure, coupled with the effective verification system, will make it possible to foster confidence among the two contracting blocs in the legitimacy of their actions.

The proposals of socialist countries to have substantive cuts in the armed forces and armaments in Europe are marked by realism and embody the striving to search for mutually advantageous solutions to the most complex international issues. The Soviet Union believes that these proposals provide a serious chance for making headway in the stalled process of European disarmament.

'Substantial Differences' Noted in Nuclear, Space Arms Talks

LD0508194188 Moscow TASS in English
1916 GMT 5 Aug 88

[Text] Geneva August 5 TASS—Meetings and debates in the framework of the two groups—on strategic offensive arms and on outer space—continued last week at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms.

There are substantial differences so far in the approaches of the two sides to the questions of space. While the Soviet side consistently conducts the line at reflecting precisely and completely the Washington formula of December 10, 1987 in the separate agreement being drafted (the delegations have the task of creating a joint project of this agreement), the U.S. side continues striving to making "supplements" to it, aimed at altering the essence of the arrangements in the spirit of a "broader" interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

During the meetings, the Soviet side set out additional considerations aimed at coordinating in full volume the draft protocol to the agreement being prepared on questions of the ABM Treaty. The protocol is called upon to ensure the confidence that the ABM Treaty will be strictly observed, and envisages a complex of measures for verification, confidence-building, and enhancement of predictability.

In the group on strategic offensive arms, the USSR delegation continued making proposals aimed at the implementation of the arrangements reached during the Soviet-American summit in Moscow, on the question of control over mobile launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Soviet delegation expects a constructive response of the U.S. side to these proposals.

The U.S. delegation, toward the implementation of the Moscow agreements, proposed some wordings on the limitation of long-range air-launched cruise missiles and heavy bombers. The United States proposals are being studied. But it is already apparent that they have substantial drawbacks. Thus the U.S. approach shows a tendency toward weakening the regime of monitoring and inspections with regard to air-launched cruise missiles and heavy bombers. According to the U.S. proposals, some heavy bombers, besides that, would not be counted in the total ceiling for strategic delivery vehicles set at 1,600 units. The U.S. side also continues insisting on such an order of counting long-range nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles that would lead to the fact that not all such missiles on heavy bombers be counted.

During the discussions the Soviet side resolutely declared for active work in the subgroup on questions of verification in order to work out measures ensuring effective verification of the restrictions on all kinds of strategic offensive arms to which the future agreement on strategic offensive arms applies.

The Soviet delegation has also tabled a number of proposals making it possible to reach advance [as received] in agreeing on a draft protocol on reequipment and elimination implemented for the achievement and maintenance of sharply lowered total quantitative levels of strategic offensive arms to be set under the treaty.

Call on Hiroshima Anniversary for Test Ban
LD0508191688 Moscow TASS in English
1750 GMT 5 Aug 88

[Text] Moscow August 5 TASS—TASS political news analyst Askold Biryukov writes:

Tomorrow, mankind—by the tolling of the bells over Hiroshima's Peace Park, mass rallies, meetings and demonstrations in Japan and many other countries—will for the 43rd time mark the infamous anniversary of the first use against humans of atomic weapons, when U.S. war planes dropped atom bombs first on Hiroshima and then Nagasaki. With renewed force and a growing hope for the eventual advent of a world without nuclear arms, the participants in the massive manifestations will make heard their resolve to have these weapons outlawed, to achieve a nuclear disarmament.

The dropping of the first atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked a sharp turn in the international life of the postwar period towards the arms race, greater fear and suspicion, and the "cold war" which was to rage for several decades. The road to the INF Treaty, the first agreement to destroy two classes of weapons, was complex and by far not straight.

Now 25 years old, the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in space and under water, signed in Moscow by the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain, became an important component of the system of measures designed to restrain the deadly race of nuclear weapons and to pave the way to a safer world, to disarmament. Our day raises the acute need for a total and universal ban on nuclear weapons tests—a goal which the first three signatories to the Moscow treaty pledged themselves to strive for. The requisite conditions are there. It is not only because over a hundred states which have adhered to the treaty, it is not because, as has shown us the example of the Soviet Union which observed for over one and a half years its unilateral moratorium, announced on an anniversary of the tragedy of Hiroshima, that a complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests is possible. It is also because today, unlike 1963, the problem of verifying the test ban no longer exists. The INF Treaty has demonstrated the possibility of an effective verification of nuclear disarmament.

On the eve of the Hiroshima anniversary, or, better said, of the universal tragedy, the Soviet committee "Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War", issued a statement stressing that a halt to nuclear tests would

mean an end to a further sophistication of these doomsday weapons. Every nuclear blast, regardless of the place or intended uses, the Soviet physicians say, is a blow to the interests and aspirations of the adherents of a complete nuclear disarmament. "We are naturally aware of the Soviet-American stage-by-stage negotiations now in progress on problems of nuclear tests. At the same time we think that this question admits of no postponements, and there is a need to seek new ways for an early cessation of all nuclear explosions." For their part, Soviet physicians appeal to the Government of the USSR to display once again an act of goodwill and to declare in August 1988 a moratorium on nuclear tests, calling on the President of the United States of America to join in.

In fact, the question of an immediate and unqualified cessation of nuclear tests does not admit of any procrastination. This is attested to by decisions adopted by international conferences held in the capital of Japan and in Hiroshima, attended by representatives of several scores of countries and international organizations, and this is demanded by all the peoples of the planet. The Soviet Union stands ready to contribute again to this humane undertaking. I assume that the Soviet Union will also have no problems with the imposition of a moratorium on nuclear tests on the basis of mutuality with the United States. The tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki require all states and peoples to comport themselves in today's world in a manner which will make the absence of nuclear weapons tests a norm of civilized behaviour.

Karpov Looks Back at Arms Control Treaties
PM1108102788 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Aug 88 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with V.P. Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Directorate for Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament, by correspondent L. Kostanyan: "Looking Back and Thinking of the Future"; date and place not given—first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] It is 25 years since the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain signed, in Moscow, the treaty on banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in space, and under water. At the request of IZVESTIYA correspondent L. Kostanyan, Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Administration for Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament, describes the importance of this document.

"The 1963 treaty was essentially the first agreement in the nuclear arms limitation sphere," V.P. Karpov begins the conversation. "The Soviet Union, as on other questions of the limitation and elimination of nuclear weapons, acted as an initiator here too.

[Kostanyan] Perhaps you could touch on the problem's prehistory?

[Karpov] Back in 1955 we proposed banning nuclear weapons tests. Unfortunately, our call met with no response. Our opponents cited mainly the alleged impossibility of verification. And inasmuch as verification is impossible, the Westerners said, there is no point in agreeing on a ban: Each side, they said, could cheat. Additional efforts and meetings of experts were needed to establish that verification of the ending of nuclear tests was possible in principle and on the practical plane. Then debates began as to how far it was possible with respect to all nuclear tests. What objections did we not hear! For instance, the Americans claimed that it was possible to carry out nuclear tests concealed from verification... beyond the Sun. To this day such arguments cause at least a smile.

In seeking their set goal the USSR representatives were, however, obliged to divide the problem into two parts and to resolve that part which is most susceptible to verification, that is the banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space, and under water, while, as we see, leaving aside underground explosions for the time being. This ensured a breakthrough in concluding the treaty. It was signed 5 August 1963 and this document is in operation to this day. Moreover, 114 full members have already acceded to it. A further 14 countries have signed the treaty, but not yet ratified it. So the overwhelming majority of our planet's states are taking part in this alliance.

[Kostanyan] There are not that many nuclear powers, why is the range of the treaty's signatories so broad?

[Karpov] The point of the treaty was also to prevent nuclear tests by any state which could acquire the potential for creating nuclear weapons. Or perhaps not even weapons but simply a nuclear charge or device, or a state could make its territory available for tests to another power. The 1963 treaty, together with the 1968 treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, is thus an effective means of containing this proliferation. I would say more: The composition of the treaty's signatories could and should be even broader. We cannot keep quiet about the fact that neither France nor China has acceded to it. France in fact stopped carrying out nuclear tests in the atmosphere only in 1975 and China after 1980. So the pollution of the atmosphere with radioactive fall-out as a result of French and Chinese nuclear explosions continued.

[Kostanyan] It is time to touch on questions of an ecological order...

[Karpov] If tests had not been halted in 1963 the results for the earth's ecology could have been tragic. Even in those years scientists had reached sorry conclusions regarding our planet's future. But we probably did not even foresee many consequences.

[Kostanyan] Nuclear explosions are continuing meanwhile, albeit only underground. So the threat to man's safety is not removed in either the military or the ecological respect.

[Karpov] Putting an end to underground tests is an urgent task. Our attempts on this plane were made repeatedly after the conclusion of the 1963 treaty. We also tried to resolve this problem on a bilateral, at least partial, basis. In 1974 the treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear explosions with a yield of over 150 kilotons was concluded between the USSR and the United States. In 1976 another treaty was concluded on the conditions for carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions, providing for a specific verification system. But these two documents remained unratified. The United States shelved them. Nonetheless the two sides are in practice adhering to the stipulated ceiling for underground nuclear weapons tests.

[Kostanyan] Verification, monitoring... Again and again we return to this barrier. But now both we and the Americans are becoming convinced that reliable verification is entirely realistic and feasible

[Karpov] The ice has undoubtedly broken. But it must be admitted that in the past we too were unprepared for acting on the road of greater openness as we are acting now under the conditions of restructuring. Other reasons also stood behind the differences. The continuation of nuclear tests was also dictated by considerations of the arms race inasmuch as rivalry in the military field was not ending.

Nonetheless we did believe and continue to believe that radical steps are needed which would lead to a total ban on nuclear tests and in the future on nuclear arms as well. That is why in August 1985 the Soviet Union embarked on a unilateral moratorium. We suspended all nuclear explosions for both military and civilian purposes and did not carry them out for 18 months. Unfortunately, having failed to meet with support from the United States, we were obliged to resume underground tests.

[Kostanyan] How to explain the behavior of the U.S. Administration?

[Karpov] The opinion obviously prevailed in the United States that with a view to urging on the program for creating new types of weapons it was more convenient for the United States to carry out tests than to set about ending them.

[Kostanyan] Then what advances can we speak of? And, finally, what does the world have the right to count on tomorrow?

[Karpov] A new breakthrough in resolving the set goal was nonetheless effected in September 1987. During the meeting between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state in Washington, an accord was reached

that full-scale talks on ending nuclear tests will begin and will proceed in three stages. The first stage is the preparation of an improved system of verification which will make it possible to ratify the 1974 and 1976 treaties. Then a direct transition, without even waiting for the ratification of these treaties, to a reduction in the number of tests and their yield in order as a result to transfer gradually to a complete ban on nuclear tests.

The first stage is now making successful headway. The Soviet and U.S. teams are working on, respectively, the Nevada testing range in the United States and the Semipalatinsk testing range in our country and are preparing a joint experiment on monitoring the yield of nuclear explosions.

We have overcome the barrier which had constantly attended any talks on the total ban of nuclear tests: Until a reliable system of verification had been ensured there could be no talk of a total ban on nuclear tests. Now we are close not simply to providing theoretical substantiation for such a system but also to proving that it is possible in practice.

Right now we can scarcely predict to the month or even to the year when we will switch from the 1963 treaty to an all-embracing accord. But as the 1974 and 1976 treaties are ratified and progress is ensured in further reducing the number of explosions and reducing their yield, the attainment of the ultimate goal—a total ban on nuclear tests—will also become realistic.

I want to stress once again that the Soviet Union is prepared at any moment, on a reciprocal basis, to halt the holding of nuclear explosions and to do everything to achieve a complete ban on nuclear tests. Now that the practical implementation of the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles has begun, that is, now that the first steps have been taken to destroy nuclear weapons and to reach an accord on banning nuclear tests, a favorable atmosphere is in my view being created.

Analyst Views Prospects for Nuclear Reductions
PM1208131988 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Aug 88 First Edition p 3

[Observer Vasilii Pustov "Military-Political Review": "From Hiroshima to Saryozek"]

[Excerpts] The week ending today is rich in memorable dates and events which are diametrically opposed in terms of their importance for people's destinies. Yesterday, 6 August, was the 43d anniversary of the day the U.S. Air Force used nuclear weapons for the first time in human history, as a result of which the Japanese city of Hiroshima was wiped off the face of the earth. On the other hand, the first act of destroying these weapons was carried out on 1 August: The destruction by detonation of the first batch of Soviet OTR-22 operational-tactical missiles was carried out in Saryozek (Kazakh SSR) in

accordance with the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles in the presence of representatives of the world community. Thus, we are talking about two explosions, separated by an interval of many years, which reverberated around the world: one of them to destroy, the other one to preserve life.

Despite official disclaimers, according to THE WASHINGTON POST secret plans for delivering a first ("disarming" or "decapitating") strike were being hatched by U.S. strategists both during J. Carter's presidency and under the present administration, especially during its first few years. These dangerous goals are pursued through the continuing buildup of the latest strategic offensive weapons: MX ICBM's, highly accurate Midgetman mobile ICBM's, Trident-2 (D-5) submarine-launched ballistic missiles, new B1-B strategic bombers, and strategic cruise missiles. Preparations for production of the fundamentally new B-2 strategic bomber are being accelerated. This aircraft, according to its designers, would be undetectable by modern air defense systems and this would guarantee its first-strike capability.

This is tangible evidence of the continuing desire by certain influential circles on the other side of the Atlantic to disrupt the strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the United States which was established in the early seventies. Our country cannot allow this to happen. We are, after all, talking about equilibrium which, in contemporary conditions, is the decisive factor for preventing a war, about an equilibrium whose maintenance is of interest to all who are concerned about the fate of peace.

Saryozek and 1 August 1988 will go down in history as the place and the date marking the start of the epoch of nuclear disarmament. True enough, this is just a start. After all, under the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles there are about 2,600 nuclear intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (about 1,750 Soviet and more than 850 U.S.) due to be destroyed. Skeptics point out that intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles make up less than 5 percent of all Soviet and U.S. nuclear arms. Be that as it may, there is something else that should not be forgotten. First, it is impossible to underrate the importance of this quantity of even less than 5 percent, because it represents hundreds and even thousands of potential "Hiroshimas" with the possible loss of many millions of human lives. Second, the implementation of the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles will represent the first real destruction of two classes of nuclear weapons in world history, which will reduce the risk of a nuclear apocalypse. And last but by no means least: The reaching of accord on the destruction of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles paves the way for further and even more significant actions in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, and specifically for talks on a 50-percent reduction of Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive arms. Mankind now faces the real prospect of ridding our planet of

approximately 13,000 nuclear combat charges, each one of which is many times more powerful than the bomb which destroyed Hiroshima.

Accord has been reached on such a reduction in principle, but the talks are progressing slowly. So far, for example, there has been no success in reaching accord with the Americans on questions of air-launched and especially sea-launched long-range cruise missiles. Referring to the obviously imaginary lack of effective verification systems, they essentially propose the exclusion of sea-launched long-range cruise missiles from the treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive arms. This would turn such a treaty into a work of fiction.

The SDI program which, as many U.S. experts admit, contradicts the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty, remains an obstacle to concluding a treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms. In this context the 1 August speech by U.S. Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy was hardly constructive. Soviet generals and officers could not believe his words that the SDI program is purely defensive and designed simply to destroy ballistic missiles in flight, or that its implementation would, as he said, help to stabilize the world situation.

Such arguments turn many points upside down, as it were. This could not fail to be noticed in the United States itself. The extraordinary danger of this space venture was figuratively described by E.P. Thompson, vice president of the U.S. Committee for Nuclear Disarmament. The "Star Wars" plan, he noted, is "an attempt by U.S. ruling circles to revert to the dark days of Hiroshima"; in the opinion of these circles, "America must once again be in a position to threaten a world which would be unable to deliver a counterstrike."

Camouflaged as defensive for propaganda purposes, SDI is a program for creating an offensive system involving the launching of the latest types of weapons into space in order to guarantee the United States an opportunity to deliver a first disarming strike from space. The transfer of the arms race to space would mean the destabilization of the situation all over the world by jeopardizing the security of peoples in all countries. This would raise doubts about the expediency of curbing strategic offensive arms on earth.

The way out of the prevailing situation, as the July conference of the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee noted, is through the conclusion of a treaty on a 50-percent reduction of Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive arms with strict observance of the ABM Treaty in the form it was signed in 1972 and nonwithdrawal from it for an agreed period of time.

Another memorable anniversary was marked this week: the 25th anniversary of the day when the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer

Space, and Under Water in Moscow, fell on 5 August. The treaty, aptly described by U.S. Senator E. Kennedy as "a source of hope for all peoples," has been joined by 114 states, representing the overwhelming majority of states on our planet. A further 14 countries have signed but not yet ratified it.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the Soviet Union expresses the will and aspirations of literally all mankind by its persistent striving over the years to achieve the prohibition and cessation of nuclear tests in the last remaining environment—underground. Our country even went as far as observing a unilateral moratorium on such explosions for 18 months.

Even though the United States failed to follow the Soviet example, there is now what I would call cautious optimism on this issue. An agreement on conducting a joint experiment to monitor underground nuclear explosions was signed at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Moscow. For this purpose a group of Soviet experts are now at the Nevada test site, while a group of U.S. scientists are in the Semipalatinsk region. It is planned to conduct experiments in both places to confirm the possibility of using existing instruments to establish reliable monitoring of underground nuclear explosions. It is intended to move on to discussions on limiting the number and yield of nuclear tests in the future.

A total and universal ban on such tests, which the USSR has been tirelessly pursuing, is a necessary condition for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons the world over. This would also be a most important measure for curbing the nuclear arms race.

As we can see, there are certain incipient positive changes in the world. But even so, we cannot talk about them being irreversible. Because we can sense the effect produced by forces which yearn for the exacerbation of international tension as in the past.

But an awareness of the danger of relying on strength is growing even in the West. Resolute rejection of such reliance, of the fatal course of escalating the nuclear and other arms race, and of the idea of gaining military superiority, and a joint quest for ways to a better future for all mankind—this is the commandment of the time. This is indeed the goal of Soviet foreign policy based on the new thinking.

Soviet Missile Inspectors in Belgium

Inspectors Arrive

*LD0808193788 Moscow TASS in English
1908 GMT 8 Aug 88*

[Text] Brussels August 8 TASS—Two teams of Soviet inspectors arrived in Brussels by Aeroflot TU-134 plane to conduct checks at American military bases in Belgium, in compliance with the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

The checks will be held at the U.S. base in Florennes, where 20 cruise missiles and 12 launchers have been stationed as of June 1 this year, and at the European centre for servicing American cruise missiles in the town of Gosselies, which has 55 cruise missiles.

The Soviet teams were welcomed at the airport by William Nartus, a counsellor of the Belgium Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Belgium will do everything possible to help the Soviet inspectors and the American officials accompanying them accomplish their tasks. This will be our contribution to strengthening stability of East-West relations, especially in Europe. The INF Treaty, signed by the USSR and USA, is also our treaty, William Nartus said. It marks an important stage and gives hope for considerable progress at the disarmament talks as well.

Inspections Begin

LD0908100088 Moscow TASS in English
0928 GMT 9 Aug 88

[Text] Brussels August 9 TASS—The two teams of Soviet inspectors, who arrived in Brussels on Monday evening, left in the morning today for the U.S. Air Force base in Florennes and the European centre for the technical servicing of cruise missiles in the city of Gosselies, official spokesmen for the U.S. and Belgian Armed Forces said today.

Twenty Soviet military experts, who broke into two groups, started inspecting these facilities in which a total of 75 cruise missiles and 12 launchers are deployed or stored, according to the state of things for June 1 this year.

The inspections are being held on the basis of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missiles.

[Passage indistinct] told newsmen that inspections would be carried out in strict conformity with the demands of the INF Treaty. On its part, plenipotentiary representatives of the U.S. Armed Forces in Belgium and the Belgian Government assured the Soviet representatives that they would get every possible assistance in implementing the task set to them.

The current Soviet inspection is the first in the U.S. missile facilities in Belgium. The Soviet experts are expected to spend in Florennes and Gosselies at least 24 hours—at most 32 hours.

Removal of Missile Complex Begins in Ukraine

LD0808160388 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1505 GMT 8 Aug 88

[Text] Kiev, 8 Aug (TASS)—TASS correspondent Viktor Mazanyy writes:

The elimination of launching installations and transporters for the delivery and transshipment of the missiles dubbed SS-20's in the West began today at a base near

the town of Sarny in Rovno Oblast (western Ukraine). Taking part in the operation are inspectors who have arrived here from the United States. It is to be recalled that, in accordance with the treaty, not only the missiles themselves are being eliminated but also the launching installations.

The U.S. specialists acquainted themselves with the 18 launching installations that are to be destroyed this August. Here they became convinced that this was precisely the technology that is the subject of the INF Treaty.

The occasion of the elimination of the first launching installation was registered in protocols exchanged by the Soviet and U.S. servicemen. There were, of course, sincere handshakes. The experts from the two countries stood face to face, not as rivals but as partners.

"I have been putting the No 10 intermediate-range missile complex on alert duty right from the start," said Soviet Col Yevgeniy Kozlov, one of the dismantlement managers. "We are parting with it today without regret. It is evidence of changes for the better."

In a conversation with a TASS correspondent, Terry Cornail, leader of the U.S. group, noted that this was the eighth Soviet base he had visited. "Now that we are faced with a single goal—implementation of the treaty—I am sure that our work will be accompanied by total mutual understanding. This is the basis of success," he said.

U.S. To Begin Destruction of Pershings in September

LD0908090088 Moscow TASS in English
0819 GMT 9 Aug 88

[Text] Washington August 9 TASS—On September 8 the U.S. Army plans to start operations on destruction of Pershing missile engines. These intermediate-range missiles are to be eliminated under the terms of the Soviet-American INF Treaty.

A memorandum for journalists circulated by the U.S. Defense Department on Monday points out that under appropriate weather conditions static firing of one or more Pershing missile engines will be made at the Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant near the city of Marshall (Texas state). The document points out further on that in the static firing the missile engine is encased in a special concrete-and-steel construction and then switched on. The engine, depending on the type, will run for 40-60 seconds till fuel burns out. Then its body will be destroyed and buried at a special plot of land within the ammunition plant's grounds.

The memorandum points out that the United States sent a notification to the Soviet Union, and, under the provisions of the INF Treaty, Soviet inspectors have the right to be present at the process of destruction.

TRUD Reports From Missile Destruction Site
PM1108100988 Moscow TRUD in Russian
9 Aug 88 p 1

[TASS Correspondent V. Mazanyy report: "Launchers—Destroyed!"]

[Text] Sarny (Rostov Oblast), Aug 8—The destruction of launchers and transporters for the delivery and shipment of SS-20 missiles began today at the base for the elimination of the RSD-10 support equipment situated near this town in the Ukraine. A U.S. inspection group has been observing the progress of this elimination.

The U.S. specialists were shown a consignment of 18 launchers due to be destroyed this month.

The first dismantling operation is the destruction of the erector-launcher mechanism by the gas cutting method. Then the instrumentation compartments are removed and the hydraulics control system is detached from the unit and destroyed. With each stage it is as though a heavy load is being lifted from the launcher. But when the Soviet servicemen using a plasma gun developed at the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Arc Welding named for Ye.O. Paton cut off the leveling supports and part of the chassis launcher mount the previously awesome missile launcher was transformed into an ordinary truck tractor. This machine will continue to serve the national economy.

The occasion of the elimination of the first RSD-10 launcher was enshrined in the protocols which the Soviet and U.S. sides exchanged.

"We military men understand better than others the danger of nuclear confrontation," Colonel Ye. Kozlov, one of the leaders of the dismantling operation, told your TASS correspondent. "I have 30 years' 'missile' experience behind me. I had occasion to put the first RSD-10 complexes on combat duty. Today I am bidding them farewell without regret."

Terry Cornail, the leader of the U.S. inspection group, noted: "This is the eighth Soviet military base that I have visited. We have seen for ourselves that the Soviet servicemen are not only hospitable hosts but also excellent specialists.

"Today we have come one step closer to the goal of the complete elimination of intermediate-range missiles. I am sure that there will be complete mutual understanding between us in this important work in the future."

My interlocutors and I looked at the calendar. It was on 9 August 43 years ago that a deadly atomic storm broke over the Japanese city of Nagasaki. But now August is also a month whose first days have strengthened the hopes of the world's people for a nuclear-free peace.

Chernyshev on Eliminating Missiles, NATO Policy

LD0908151288 Moscow TASS in English
1358 GMT 9 Aug 88

[Text] Follows commentary by TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The scrapping of intermediate-range missiles started in the populated locality of Lesnaya (Brest region) in the Soviet Union on August 8. As is known, the start was made in our country a week ago of the process of scrapping the shorter-range missiles. The U.S. Defense Department has notified the USSR that it is planning to start the elimination of engines of Pershing missiles on September 8 this year.

The Soviet program for a nuclear-free world proclaimed in January 1986 has helped to give a boost to the disarmament process. The bringing into effect of the Soviet-American INF Treaty is the first major step towards real nuclear disarmament. Certain progress has been made at the Soviet-American talks on a 50 percent cut in the strategic offensive weapons in a linkage with the observance of the ABM Treaty in the course of a period agreed upon. Persevering struggle is under way for a ban on chemical weapons and an end to nuclear tests. A coordination is being completed of the mandate of the talks on a cut in the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

Disarmament, and the USSR is firmly convinced of that, is the main road to strengthening security for all. It is necessary to lend to the disarmament process a continuous, steadily growing and deepening character, use the favorable opportunities for making fresh gains in that effort.

Yet in connection with the stand of definite circles in the West the alarming question arises: whether a pause in the process of arms cut starts and whether the reverse movement may start.

Such a concern is determined, above all, by the commitment of some Western capitals to nuclear arms, to "nuclear deterrence." Contrary to all logic they continue presenting that weapon of general destruction as a "guarantor of peace" and claiming that the third world war has not broken out due to that. Yet it would make more sense to assume a different thing: Had there been no nuclear weapons, humanity would not find itself in the past decades on the brink of a catastrophe at certain moments. At the same time, without the nuclear weapons there would be a better chance for implementing the provisions of the U.N. Charter on creating a comprehensive system of international security, as a result of which

the world would be far more durable than it is now. If no world conflagration has broken out until now in the world, who can be sure that this is not going to happen in the future, at least as a result of a technical error or incorrect appraisal of the intentions of one of the sides?

The Soviet military-political leadership is sure that a non-nuclear ensuring of security is possible. It can be achieved on the basis of sensible sufficiency providing for as few weapons as possible, sufficient for defense, but by no means sufficient for attack. The nuclear components and chemical weapons should be totally excluded from the general security equations.

They in the West often try to justify the "need" for preserving nuclear weapons by the claim that it allows for a "compensation" of the advantages of the Warsaw Treaty in the field of conventional weapons. First, there is no such an advantage, there is a balance of forces. Second, there are disbalances or asymmetries in separate types of conventional weapons which shaped by some categories of weapons in favour of the East, by others—in favour of the West, but they do not set up the equilibrium. But even with the existing general balance of forces the Soviet Union and its allies persistently propose an exchange of data on the conventional weapons determining the disbalances and asymmetries and eliminate these partial inequalities and then sharply reduce the level of military confrontation by joint efforts.

It might seem that such proposals of the Warsaw Treaty states, which take into account the concern of our Western partners, should be immediately and enthusiastically accepted by NATO. Unfortunately, this does not happen. Such vagueness on the part of the North Atlantic alliance is, to put it mildly, a source of perplexity that further increases, while all sorts of concepts are put forward in the West on "additional armament" and compensation for the INF being eliminated now. It must be noted, for that matter, that NATO has no integral concept of disarmament in general. Yet there are more than enough concepts of a diametrically opposite character.

It is believed that the revision of the strategic concepts drawn up in the cold war period and the development of an integral concept of disarmament have become urgent for the North Atlantic alliance. This is highly important politically.

Yazov, UK's Younger on European Security

*PM0908154188 Moscow TRUD in Russian
9 Aug 88 p 3*

[Under the rubric "Intersection of Opinions" UK Defense Secretary George Younger answers a question put by TRUD's London correspondent A. Burmistenko; Army Gen Dmitriy Yazov, USSR defense minister, answers the same question put by TRUD's editorial office: "Is a Europe Without Nuclear Weapons Possible?"—boldface as published]

[Text] Is a Europe without nuclear weapons possible? British Defense Secretary George Younger answers that

question at the request of TRUD's London correspondent A. Burmistenko:

[Younger] Nothing has demonstrated the improvement of East-West relations more convincingly than the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, which bans the relevant Soviet and U.S. ground-based nuclear missiles. This was an outstanding achievement. And now, as I write these lines, we are hoping for similar progress in the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union aimed at producing a treaty on the substantial reduction of the arsenals of strategic nuclear weapons.

But we must not stop here. We must try to make progress in other areas of arms control with the aim of creating a more secure world with a reduced number of armaments in the two sides' arsenals. The question is that of the precise goals that we should now set ourselves. I know the Soviet viewpoint that we should try to remove all nuclear weapons from Europe. But we must ask ourselves: Will that make Europe a safer place or not? I must honestly say that I do not believe in greater European security without nuclear weapons.

For us in Western Europe, as for our North American allies, the grim reality is that our conventional troops in Europe (including French and Spanish troops) are considerably outnumbered by the Warsaw Pact's troops. For example, in Europe as a whole the Warsaw Pact has about 51,000 tanks to 17,000 NATO tanks, 37,500 artillery pieces to 10,600 on the NATO side, and 7,700 tactical aircraft to 4,300 for NATO.

The picture does not differ much if we take central Europe alone, where the NATO countries are potentially most vulnerable. In this region the Warsaw Pact exceeds NATO by a ratio of more than 2 to 1 in terms of tanks and more than 3 to 1 in artillery. Tanks and artillery are the crucial types of arms from the viewpoint of capturing and retaining territory. In addition, the Soviet Union has the largest, most diverse, and most sophisticated potential in the world for waging chemical warfare.

From the Western viewpoint, such a large preponderance can only be viewed as a serious potential threat to our security. The Warsaw Pact leaders assure us that they have no aggressive intentions. So long as that ability to conduct offensive actions exists, however, the West is obliged to protect itself as a precautionary measure.

NATO is a defensive alliance. We will never be first to use weapons, but if we are attacked we shall be ready to take any actions we deem necessary for self-defense. This, of course, may include the use of nuclear weapons. The removal of this type of weapon from the European Continent will mean that the West European countries will be dangerously vulnerable in the face of the Warsaw Pact's considerably superior conventional forces.

For that reason Great Britain considers that the priority areas in the arms control sphere—in addition to the limitation of the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals on which talks are now being held—must be agreements on the complete elimination of chemical weapons in the world and the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces in Europe. We believe that only after the solution of these problems will it be possible to hold talks on the further reduction of nuclear armaments in Europe.

But even then we do not consider the removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe desirable. Equality in conventional arms will bring important gains but it will not free us from the need to have a nuclear component in our preparations for ensuring security.

First of all, we proceed from the practical consideration that, even if nuclear weapons are removed from Europe, both the East and the West will still have a great many types of nuclear weapons in other regions capable of hitting targets on the European Continent.

Even more significant is the fact that nuclear weapons make a unique contribution to the maintenance of peace. Before these weapons appeared Europe was ravaged and devastated by successive "conventional" wars, in the last of which the Soviet Union alone lost 20 million dead. It is patently obvious that conventional armaments could not prevent those wars, even when the two warring sides' forces were equal.

It is a different matter nowadays when aggression entails the risk of nuclear retaliation and is not the more rational choice. We must ask ourselves the question: Will we not be making Europe vulnerable again to conventional war—but this time the kind of war that will be waged using modern weapon systems many times more destructive than their predecessors?

This does not mean that the security of East and West cannot be ensured or even consolidated with lower levels of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles is an example of what can be achieved. NATO has always sought to keep the number of units of its nuclear weapons at the **minimum** level necessary for our defense. For example, since 1979 NATO has reduced the number of its nuclear warheads in Europe by 2,400. Even after the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles is implemented, the Soviet Union will still have far more systems in Europe capable of carrying nuclear weapons than NATO.

When we in the West express these ideas, the Soviet Union accuses us of "stubbornly defending nuclear deterrence" and "old methods of thinking." But our Soviet neighbors must understand that the Warsaw Pact's advantages in conventional and chemical weapons as well as in geography mean that, for the foreseeable future, West European security will be partially based on

nuclear deterrence. Therefore, the Soviet efforts aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons in Europe threaten our security more than they strengthen confidence on the continent. If the Soviet Union wants to reduce the excessive dependence on nuclear weapons, why does it not unilaterally reduce its tactical nuclear systems (battlefield nuclear weapons), where, in the sphere of short-range missiles, for example, it has a 14 to 1 superiority?

We must take account of the realities of the modern world. We will not achieve greater security in Europe if we return to the prenuclear era, when Europe was a far more dangerous place than it is now in terms of lives lost and countries devastated. Nor will we achieve this by waiting for the ideal world, which at present is out of reach. Before abandoning the security that nuclear deterrence provides, we must convincingly show that there is another, better means of preserving peace. That alternative has still to be found.

Army Gen Dmitriy Yazov, USSR defense minister, puts forth the Soviet viewpoint at the request of the TRUD editorial office:

[Yazov] The entry into force of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles opens the way to a more secure world—one free of nuclear weapons and violence. We in the Soviet Union see this treaty as the beginning of the implementation of the program for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons before the end of this century as put forward in the 15 January 1986 Statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

But the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles is only the first step, and its significance greatly depends on whether it is followed by second, third, and other steps, and on what kind of steps they are. What are the prospects after the Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles: Will there be a reduction, a lessening of confrontation? Will there be a pause in the arms reduction process, or will there even be a regression?

It is not easy to answer those questions. Nevertheless, we look to the future with optimism. First, because the trend of the positive development of Soviet-U.S. relations (Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow) sets the guidelines for the future and will influence the all-European process, particularly the earliest successful completion of the Vienna meeting on security and cooperation in Europe. Second, averting the threat of war has the inevitable result that the world's countries will have greater need of one another in their development than they do now. In that context it is obvious that the idea of partnership in the sphere of creating an all-embracing system of international security must ultimately prevail.

As for the prospects for security after the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, in our opinion the key to a secure future is to be

found in the strengthening of confidence and predictability in East-West relations. This can be achieved only on the basis of constructive dialogue between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. The arms race cannot be won now. Neither side will permit the other to gain military superiority over it.

The strengthening of security must be sought through disarmament. The disarmament process must be an inalienable feature of East-West relations. That is why all concepts of "arms upgrading" and "compensation" are unacceptable. They are contrary to the situation and the vital interests of the NATO countries themselves.

The new political thinking in the USSR is based on a new dynamic line capable of leading to mutually acceptable solutions of complex problems. That is confirmed by our flexible compromise stance on all disarmament questions: the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and constructive actions in the solution of regional problems. The USSR and the allied socialist countries are ready for talks on all matters and offer concrete proposals. We have set out our programs for the elimination of nuclear weapons and the radical reduction of conventional arms in Europe and have proclaimed a military doctrine aimed at ensuring European security on defensive principles.

We believe that the West must respond more promptly to our initiatives and seek ways for more active collaboration. At the moment we do not see a clear program (concept) of disarmament from the West. With good reason. It is clear that certain difficulties persist here.

The main obstacle seems to be political in character. It is the question of political will, the question of intentions.

The concepts and doctrines produced during the cold war (the forties and fifties) are also visibly influencing the West's position. They were founded on the delusions of the short-lived period of atomic monopoly. The West cannot free itself of the myth that nuclear weapons guarantee peace. However, this "guarantee" has the capacity to destroy all life on earth.

Western representatives say that the nuclear deterrent is irreplaceable. But the concept of "nuclear deterrence" was obsolete long ago. It goes back to the cold war period, and by its nature is internally contradictory and dangerous. After all, one cannot state that nuclear conflict will mean catastrophe for all and at the same time advocate the retention of nuclear weapons as a means of safeguarding peace. No one has yet proved, and indeed no one can prove, that a third world war would necessarily have broken out had there been no nuclear weapons. There is another more logical assumption: it is that conversely, had there been no nuclear weapons, mankind, including the population of Europe, would not have been on the brink of catastrophe at certain times. And such moments have occurred. At the same time,

without nuclear weapons there would be a far greater chance of implementing the provisions of the UN Charter on the creation of a system of collective security, and, as a result, peace would be much more durable than it is now.

If a third world war has not yet broken out, no one today can guarantee that this will not happen in the future and that nuclear weapons will not be used, especially since the United States and NATO do not rule out their first use. Can one tolerate any, even the slightest degree of the probability of mankind's self-destruction?

"Nuclear deterrence" does not permit a search for a solution to the nuclear problem. It encourages the arms race, leads to the further stockpiling of deadly weapons, upsets the military equilibrium, and increases the risk of nuclear war. The offensive thrust of this concept is clearly visible in the field manuals and regulations, and in all the fundamental directive documents on building the armed forces of the United States and NATO.

The "nuclear deterrence" concept encourages some of our negotiating partners to strengthen their security at the expense of others. Hence the endless fuss over tactics, the attempts to immerse accords in linkages and conditions, and to haggle for one-sided advantages.

There are obstacles of a psychological order that are expressed in the cultivation of the image of other peoples as the enemy and in maximizing the differences between states' political systems. Weapons and fear, weapons and distrust—these are the communicating vessels that feed one another.

In these conditions it is logical to ask the question—is the goal of building a nuclear-free world, which the Soviet Union supports, at all realistic? We answer that question in the affirmative. It is possible to safeguard security by nonnuclear means. It is possible on the principles of reasonable sufficiency, by which we mean not only a certain level of armaments but also a certain state of mind and a psychological and political inclination toward the smallest possible quantity of weapons—sufficient for defense but insufficient for aggression.

Much is said in the West about the Warsaw Pact's so-called superiority in conventional armaments because of which, it is claimed, nuclear weapons must be retained. Such statements do not stand up to criticism. NATO specialists try to emphasize the Warsaw Pact's superiority in certain elements of ground forces' conventional arms. But they do not agree to a bilateral in-depth analysis of the real capabilities of the sides' armed forces and a comparative examination of the military potentials as a whole. They refuse to take account of the navies and air forces. Why? Why do they emphasize only tanks and artillery? Is it really possible to break up the armed

forces when analyzing the correlation of military potentials? Clearly, the fact is that this NATO line is aimed at weakening the USSR and at maintaining the strongest U.S. and NATO components (their navies and air forces).

Our approach to the solution of the problem of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe is based on the existence of approximate military equilibrium between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The historically formed imbalances in the structure of the sides' armed forces does not upset that equilibrium. And we propose to the West that we jointly take the path of asymmetrical reductions: Let the West make the appropriate reductions in those sorts of weapons of which it has more and we will unhesitatingly eliminate the "surplus" in those types where we have superiority.

We also offer a constructive approach to the solution of the problem of banning chemical weapons. We have made public our stocks of chemical weapons and have ceased production. Unfortunately, the other side is concealing its stocks while at the same time stating for propaganda purposes that we have superiority in this kind of weaponry. Instead of ceasing production it has even begun manufacturing a new kind of chemical weapon—binary weapons. The question is, hasn't the time come to switch from propaganda to the serious examination of this problem, too?

When talking about a readiness to eliminate the imbalances and asymmetry in conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction, the Warsaw Pact states propose to the NATO countries that the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles be reinforced by new efforts to reduce the military arsenals, that the disarmament process be made continuous, and that its irreversibility be guaranteed. This would make it possible to take yet another most important step on the path of reducing military confrontation and moving toward a nuclear-free, safe, and nonviolent world.

Experts End Inspection of Missiles in Belgium

*LD1008095588 Moscow TASS in English
0939 GMT 10 Aug 88*

[Text] Brussels August 10 TASS—Soviet experts staying here under the provisions of the Soviet-American Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, completed this morning inspection of U.S. missile facilities in Belgium, said the spokesman of the U.S. Armed Forces in Belgium.

In less than 24 hours Soviet inspectors made an inventory of cruise missiles at the facilities, as well as of their components, launchers and other equipment which is to be destroyed under the INF Treaty.

Inspection took place at the U.S. air base in Florennes and at the European centre for technical servicing of cruises in the city of Gosselies. Both cities are situated 50-60 kilometres south-west of Brussels.

In Florennes there were 20 U.S. cruises and 12 launchers, as of last June 1, and in the Gosselies centre—55 cruise missiles.

Today Soviet experts will return to Brussels after compiling a report on the inspections.

Army Paper Comments on Missile Destruction *PM1108102388 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Aug 88 First Edition p 3*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col V. Polezhayev under the rubric "The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles in Action": "At 0930 in Lesnaya on 8 August the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles Began"]

[Text] It cannot be denied that our R-12's have fully discharged their mission and made a worthy contribution to the exhaustingly long, mortally dangerous confrontation between good and evil to the benefit of the former. They have ensured us decades of creative labor. The new political thinking has made its presence very strongly felt: The fatal gravitation toward a buildup of military strength—which seemed as insuperable as the pull of gravity—has relaxed its grip. A long-awaited, truly historic hour has struck.

We flew to the site where the missiles are to be destroyed in the same aircraft as a group of U.S. inspectors led by U.S. Air Force Colonel Karl Redel [name as published]. The fields and forests of Belorussia swam past below. Belorussia, the land of the partisan! Were Colonel Redel and his companions aware of what this land and its people experienced, suffered, and endured during the war years? Were they familiar with the names Khatyn and Brest Fortress? Did they know that one in four Belorussians died in the war? Unfortunately, their ideas on all this proved very remote. On the other hand, the corner of Belorussia that was our destination—the population center of Lesnaya—pleased them immediately. What is more, it delighted them by its beauty.

The missile elimination site is located in Brest Oblast. Well established missile operators told us how many beautiful, crystal clear reservoirs there are here and how rich the surrounding forests are in mushrooms, berries, and game. Now this will also be the site of work to destroy the R-12 missiles, their transport means, installations, launchers, and warheads (minus the nuclear charges).

The question may arise: Will the elimination process not have a harmful effect on the environment? There is every reason to say: No, it will not. Allow me to remind you that the R-12 missiles operate on liquid fuel and are

stored without this fuel. Consequently, in this case it will be possible to use the method of elimination based on air-plasma and contact-arc metal cutting. It is totally harmless.

The residential area for the U.S. inspectors consists of two two-story cottages and dining rooms—beautiful, bright, and spacious. All the conditions for fruitful work and leisure have been created here. The dining facilities comprise a dining hall and a bar. In addition to the ordinary telephones, telephones offering a direct line to Moscow are provided in the cottages' work rooms. The inspectors have also been given six channels for use with national communication systems.

Pre-inspection procedures were carried out on the day of our arrival. Colonel V. Kozlov, chief of department of the USSR National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, presented the officers responsible for the elimination process to the U.S. inspectors and Colonel Karl Redel presented his nine assistants. This was followed by a discussion of the joint plan of action and clarification of the details and features initially unclear to the inspectors. Colonel V. Garanin, representative of the elimination control center, Colonel Ye. Avdeyenko, Lieutenant Colonel V. Shestakov, and Major V. Shlyakhto gave exhaustive answers to all their questions.

Then the start of the real elimination of R-12 missiles.

0930. The first two R-12 missiles appear. This is it, the most exciting, tense moment! A powerful tow truck brings the 22-meter bulk of the missile to the dismantling area, where it is laid in a special container with the help of hoists, carefully, as if it were a sleeping child. The glass cabin of the tow truck twinkles, like a dimmed eye filled with sorrow. The missiles are sentenced, doomed, and they seem to feel this.

Alongside the missiles is the weapon crew formation from Major A. Barutkin's subunit, which will be engaged throughout the day in dismantling the electronic equipment. Here they are, the servicemen in this unusual weapon crew: Senior Lieutenant S. Zheltov, Junior Sergeant M. Dadashev, Private V. Lysyuk, Private E. Melnikov, and Lance Corporal A. Khamborod.... It cannot be denied that this is something new. The command rings out from Senior Lieutenant Zheltov and the dismantling work begins....

I must admit that the thoughts thrown into sharp relief from the depths of my consciousness by the plasma explosion did not leave me for a long time. I remembered a comparatively recent visit by a large group of representatives of television and radio companies from a number of Western countries to watch the elimination of missile equipment (RSD-10's) in the city of Sarny, when the elimination of launch installations and transport facilities was beginning. The faces of our missile servicemen appeared before millions of television viewers in the United States, Britain, and the FRG. What had they

thought as they watched our young men destroying their terrible weapons? I very much hope that the burden of stereotyped ideas about our country did not prevent them from looking to the heart of the matter and seeing the reality and the truth. Only a bad, stupid person would accuse our missile servicemen of aggressive intentions and evil designs. Their thoughts are imbued with filial concern for the defense of the fatherland. Their contribution to the treaty is just as real as that of political leaders, scientists, and publicists.

In a conversation with us Colonel Redel said: "On my arrival in the States I will tell my pilots that missiles are not only destroyed from aircraft but also by the hands of Soviet soldiers."

INF Inspectors Leave Following Belgian Mission
LD1108142988 Moscow TASS in English
1343 GMT 11 Aug 88

[Text] Brussels August 11 TASS—20 Soviet experts left here for home today upon completion of their mission of inspection carried out at American structures in Belgium.

In accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, they took stock of the available cruise missiles, missile components and spares, launchers and other equipment, which are to be destroyed, at the U.S. airbase in Florennes and the European cruise missile repairs and technical maintenance centre in Gosselies. It took two groups less than 24 hours to complete the mission.

A total of 20 cruise missiles and 12 launchers were deployed in Florennes by June 1, this year, whereas the number of cruise missiles in Gosselies was 55.

That was the first inspection mission at the U.S. military structures in Belgium.

Joint Soviet-U.S. Monitoring Experiment Planned
LD1208023588 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2020 GMT 11 Aug 88

[Text] Washington, 12 Aug (TASS)—Next Wednesday, 17 August, at the testing ground in Nevada, it is planned to carry out the first stage in a joint Soviet-U.S. experiment on monitoring and verification in pursuit of effective methods of qualitatively monitoring observance of two important Soviet-U.S. treaties—the treaty of 1974 on limiting underground tests of nuclear weapons, and the treaty of 1976 on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The fundamental accord on such an experiment was reached during the Washington summit meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the

CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan and was enshrined during the subsequent meetings of the U.S. secretary of state and the USSR minister of foreign affairs.

"Measures to strengthen trust linked with this experiment are perhaps the sphere in which the greatest progress has been attained," Paul Robinson, head of the U.S. delegation to the Geneva talks on limiting nuclear weapons tests, stated Thursday, speaking on the Worldnet television network of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). "I think that neither of the sides, especially people involved with organizations developing nuclear weapons, could even imagine that such a thing was possible."

In accordance with the accord, on 17 August an underground nuclear explosion will be carried out at the testing ground in Nevada, and on 14 September at the Soviet testing ground in Semipalatinsk. In keeping with the accord reached by the sides, the yield of the nuclear charges should be no less than 100 kilotons and no more than 150 kilotons. The types of nuclear devices being subjected to detonation will be secret. After the experiment there will be an exchange of data and a comparative analysis.

Robinson stated that 45 experts from the USSR are already in the United States, and a large amount of equipment has been delivered. Approximately the same number of specialists from the U.S. side are engaged in preparing for the experiment in the USSR.

"The first practical problem is that we have never before done anything like this," Victor Alessi, the director of arms control in the U.S. Department of Energy, pointed out in the same program. He is aware of the problems of developing equipment for monitoring and verification. "The United States and the USSR are now making history. For the first time we are sending a large group of U.S. scientists to a remote region of the USSR, along with scientific equipment to take measurements. Soviet experts have come up against a similar problem. All this will, in my opinion, become a guarantee of a sound experiment, from which we can expect success."

Solton on Violation of 'Spirit' of INF Treaty
LD1108184988 Moscow World Service in English
1110 GMT 11 Aug 88

[Text] NATO is carrying out military exercises on the territory of West Germany. It would be just an ordinary type of exercises but for one thing: (?prime movers) carrying three Pershing-2 nuclear missiles left the American base in Mutlangen on Wednesday morning. More from Yuriy Solton:

The missiles were put in combat readiness in a (?ward) about 2 miles to the northeast of the city of Wueschheim. It was the medium nuclear missiles to be scrapped under the Soviet-American INF Treaty, which came into force on 1st June. Under its provisions the two sides pledged to stop

the production of these missiles and their tests. Formally, the involvement of Pershing-2 missiles at the military maneuvers in West Germany does not run counter to the letter of the treaty. The missiles are to be scrapped within 3 years. But there is not the slightest doubt that this action violates the spirit of the agreement. The exercises are aimed at testing the missiles in combat action. The question is: Why do we make NATO soldiers deal with the missiles which, according to the Pentagon, the United States begins to eliminate as of 8th September? Is it military bureaucracy following blindly old instructions? I don't think it is, writes Yuriy Solton. It looks like somebody doesn't want to give up Pershings and is in a hurry to demonstrate their power and possibilities.

I don't think, writes Yuriy Solton, that the military want to prevent the realization of the Soviet-American INF Treaty. I believe there is something else to this. They want to show it is necessary to make up for the missiles to be scrapped and promote plans of modernization of other kinds of weapons.

Nazarkin Sees Relaxation in East-West Contacts
LD1208015088 Moscow TASS in English
0143 GMT 12 Aug 88

[Text] Geneva August 11 TASS—One cannot fail to notice definite favourable tendencies which are manifest in international affairs now, said Yuriy Nazarkin, ambassador and head of the Soviet delegation, addressing a plenary meeting of the conference on disarmament. This is seen in the relaxation of the confrontation, that has begun, in the development of contacts between the states of the East and the West, this is also manifest in the creation of more propitious pre-conditions for containing the arms race and settling regional conflicts. However, a breakthrough for the better has not occurred as yet, the situation in the world is still complex and contradictory.

In these circumstances, the overriding issue of our time is to avert war, stop the arms race and switch over decisively toward disarmament, first and foremost, nuclear disarmament.

Characterising the state of matters at the negotiations on banning chemical weapons, the Soviet representative noted that they resumed in highly favourable political conditions. The joint statement on the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Moscow underscored the need to conclude a convention on a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban of chemical weapons. Great interest in the negotiations on this important problem was also shown at the third U.N. General Assembly special session on disarmament. It is important now to realize these favourable prerequisites and turn them into the language of specific understandings on those issues which remain outstanding for the present.

This need has ripened especially as the spread of chemical weapons and the tragic consequences of this spark increasing concern and anxiety in the world, the denunciation by participants in the conference on disarmament, whom the Soviet delegation also joins. The earliest conclusion of the convention to include firm guarantees of the non-proliferation and non-use of chemical weapons is the sole right stance in this situation.

Recalling the history of the question of banning nuclear tests, which has been on the agenda of the multilateral negotiations on disarmament for well over 25 years now, the head of the Soviet delegation stated with regret that essentially they were never begun within the framework of the conference on disarmament. The USSR delegation remains an advocate of a radical solution—an immediate and comprehensive ban of nuclear testing. However, we do not hold maximalist positions: everything or nothing, but, considering the real conditions and the degree of preparedness of other nuclear powers, primarily the United States, we come out for a gradual, stage-by-stage, solution to this important problem.

The Soviet Union treats with understanding the proposal by Mexico, Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and also Venezuela for an amendment to the 1963 treaty on banning nuclear weapons tests in three media and has already stated its support for the idea concerning the inclusion in the Moscow treaty of a ban also on underground nuclear explosions.

The Soviet delegation at the conference on disarmament is fully determined to do everything depending on it for the results of the current session of this international forum to appear to be as weighty as possible, Nazarkin said in conclusion.

Foreign Ministry Statement on ABM Treaty
LD1208092788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Aug 88 Second Edition p 5

["Foreign Ministry Spokesman's Statement"—
PRAVDA headline]

[Text] Following a White House statement, various sorts of accusations have begun to appear in the U.S. media against the Soviet Union in anticipation of the forthcoming Geneva meeting between the representatives of the USSR and the United States to consider the ABM Treaty. In this connection, we would like to clarify this question.

In accordance with an agreement, a meeting will start between representatives of the USSR and the United States in Geneva on 24 August to consider how the treaty on limiting ABM systems is working. The ABM Treaty has been reviewed jointly every 5 years since it came into force in 1972. In the past two such reviews have been made: in 1977 and in 1982. In 1977 the USSR and the

United States agreed that the treaty is operating effectively. They confirmed their mutual commitment to the aims and provisions of the treaty and their determination to support it further, enhancing its viability and effectiveness.

At the same time, the USSR and the United States confirmed their intention to abide by the provisional agreement on some measures in the field of strategic offensive weapons limitation. However, the U.S. attitude toward the agreements concluded on the limitation of strategic defensive and offensive weapons has begun to change sharply since the adoption and the beginning of the implementation in the United States of the "comprehensive strategic program" for the eighties, unprecedented in its scale, which envisions a speedy deployment of new systems of strategic forces. In these circumstances, the U.S. Administration began searching for pretexts to subvert or generally renounce the accords that have been attained on SALT. At the same time, Washington launched an active propaganda campaign about the USSR allegedly perpetrating "infractions" of its international pledges.

The matter of the construction of a radar station in the Krasnoyarsk area has been put by the United States at the center of its allegations; it tries to attribute to the station missile attack warning functions and ABM functions, although, as has been stated by the USSR many times, the radar station is designed for tracking space objects. There are no restrictions concerning such radar stations in the ABM Treaty. Data has been handed over to the U.S. side concerning the designation and nature of the radar station. They show that the Krasnoyarsk radar station cannot be used either for tackling the task of giving warnings about a missile attack or in the capacity of an ABM radar station. In particular, the range of the radar station's wavelength is in meters, something which means that this station is not adjusted to tackling the tasks which are attributed to it by the U.S. side.

In spite of this, the United States is continuing in a categorical manner to raise the matter of this Soviet radar evidently in order to distract attention from its own violations of the ABM Treaty. This assessment is confirmed by the fact that the United States is bringing accusations under conditions in which the Soviet Union, evincing its goodwill, as long ago as October 1987 stopped all work on the Krasnoyarsk radar and expressed its readiness for a radical solution to the issue. We have stated that "if an accord is reached to observe the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972, the Soviet Union will be prepared to dismantle the equipment of the Krasnoyarsk radar in such a way that it is subject to verification and arouses no doubts whatsoever on the part of the United States."

Under the cover of talk about the USSR's noncompliance with its treaty obligations, the United States is implementing the deployment on its territory and beyond its borders of large-scale radars of the Pave Paws

type, of which the parameters are in effect no different from those of the ABM radar stations. These stations are capable of being used to set up an antimissile defense of U.S. territory.

As an example of U.S. actions flouting the provisions of the ABM Treaty, the deployment of a major phased radar in Greenland can be cited, along with the start of construction work on a similar radar in Great Britain. Such construction work is unequivocally banned by the ABM Treaty. In spite of numerous representations to the U.S. side in connection with the deployment of the radars indicated, the latter is taking no measures whatsoever to enable the concern of the Soviet Union to be removed. Testing of multiple warhead independently targetted front ends destined for ABM interceptors, the creation of mobile ABM radars, including air-based ones, and the testing of a mobile ABM interceptor, are also among U.S. activities that violate the ABM Treaty.

All this reflects the U.S. line toward undermining the ABM Treaty. One of the manifestations of this line is the fact that the United States declined to carry out a regular examination of the operation of the ABM Treaty in 1987 in the framework of the Soviet-U.S. Standing Consultative Commission [SCC], as has happened twice already in the past. Nor, evidently, are the U.S. attempts to withdraw from complying with the provisions of a memorandum of agreement regarding the SCC of 21 December 1972—in which the parties pledged to hold sessions of the commission at least twice a year—coincidental.

For the first time since the SCC was set up, the U.S. side is declining to hold a regular session of the commission, despite the fact that the Soviet side proposed that the session begin its proceedings on 4 October this year in Geneva. Firmly declaring its commitment to the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union unvaryingly advocates precise and rigorous compliance with treaty obligations and the preservation and strengthening of the treaty's regime. Specific proposals to preserve and strengthen the regime of the ABM Treaty were tabled by the Soviet side at the talks on nuclear and space arms during the Soviet-U.S. summit held in Washington in December 1987 and confirmed during the meeting of the leaders of the USSR and United States in May-June 1988 in Moscow.

The significance of the ABM Treaty for implementing subsequent deep cuts in strategic offensive armaments and for strengthening strategic stability and international security makes it incumbent on the sides to show a solicitous attitude toward this document. For more than 15 years the ABM Treaty has been demonstrating its effectiveness and viability. It reliably serves the security interests of the two sides, reduces the danger of nuclear war breaking out, and promotes progress in the further limitation of nuclear armaments. The preservation of the ABM Treaty is an indispensable element for the implementation of 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive armaments.

At the Geneva talks, the USSR delegation is carrying out active discussion of the possibility of concluding an appropriate agreement on this score, an agreement that would confirm both sides' obligations with regard to compliance with the ABM Treaty within an agreed period.

Proceeding from the above, we believe that the forthcoming meeting in Geneva of representatives of the USSR and United States to consider the ABM Treaty must confirm the sides' commitment to this treaty and promote the earliest achievement of progress at talks on nuclear and space armaments.

Scientists Prepare for Joint Monitoring Experiment

*LD1208194688 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1430 GMT 12 Aug 88*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Preparations for conducting a joint Soviet-U.S. experiment on monitoring [kontrol] nuclear weapons tests are continuing at one of Tajikistan's mountain seismic stations.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent M. Nikulin] The mountain valley of Surkhob River: A small strip stretches along the mighty foothills of the Karategin range and the Petr Pervyy range. This region is one of the most seismically active. It is precisely for this reason that for almost 40 years a seismological expedition from the Shmidt Terrestrial Physics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences has been operating here. The instruments installed in the expedition's 16 seismic stations and 3 observatories register up to 3,000 earthquakes per annum. Large-scale research work on studying the nature of earthquakes and forecasting them is being carried out here.

Today Soviet scientists are working along with their U.S. colleagues at the expedition's seismic stations, some of which are more than 2,000 meters above sea level.

[Expedition Director I.L. Nersekov] We are conducting joint Soviet-U.S. work to develop methods of detecting weak signals emitted by nuclear explosions. Work with the Americans is now taking place here, in one of the five centers which will be operating in the Soviet Union—including Kislovodsk, Obninsk, Sverdlovsk, and Irkutsk—to install a (?seismic) data station which will register low-capacity nuclear explosions. We are the first station to begin work. The remaining stations will be started up this month. The main efforts are now aimed at starting up the apparatus which is intended to detect explosions—U.S. explosions in August, and ours in September.

[Nikulin] Our explosions?

[Nersekov] This will be a calibrating explosion which is being carried out jointly on U.S. territory by Soviet and U.S. specialists and on our territory by Soviet and also U.S. specialists.

[Nikulin] And all data obtained will be...

[Nersekov, interrupting] ...joint and will be accessible to all countries interested in this matter. We believe that working for peace, together with U.S. specialists, is one of the most important tasks declared by our government at all levels, international and domestic. [end recording]

Soviet Official Views Test

LD1508083688 Moscow TASS in English
0814 GMT 15 Aug 88

[Text] Moscow August 15 TASS—TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev reports:

"I am going in good working spirits to the state of Nevada to participate in a joint nuclear test control experiment", said Igor Palenykh, head of the USSR delegation to the Soviet-American full-scale negotiations on limitation and termination of nuclear tests, which are being held in Geneva.

"Our specialists, who are already at the Nevada test range, report that everything is ready for a nuclear explosion to be held at 10.00 local time, on August 17. The task of the joint experiment is to determine in practice what perfected measures of verification should be used for control over the Soviet-American treaty dated 1974 on the limitation on underground nuclear weapon tests," Igor Palenykh said in an interview to the TASS correspondent.

Two explosions will be held within the framework of the experiment: one in the United States, at the Nevada test range, on August 17, and the other—in the USSR, at the Semipalatinsk test range, in mid-September. The blast power should be not above 150 kilotonnes and in any case not less than 100 kilotonnes. Both sides will have a possibility to measure on the basis of complete reciprocity the power of the blasts both by the teleseismic means, proposed at the negotiations by the Soviet side and the hydrodynamic method proposed by the American side.

"The Soviet Union hopes that the joint experiment will help find mutually acceptable decisions concerning not only the existing Soviet-American treaties on the limitation on underground nuclear weapon tests, but also further agreements in this area. Our aim is complete and universal prohibition of nuclear tests," Igor Palenykh said.

Commentator on Experiment

LD1208214088 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 1800 GMT 12 Aug 88

[Text] The head of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks on limiting nuclear weapons tests, Robinson, has spoken highly of the progress of preparations for the joint Soviet-U.S. verification [proverka] and monitoring [kontrol] experiment at the test sites in the two countries. Speaking on Thursday on the television network of the U.S. Worldnet news agency, he declared that the confidence-building measures connected with this experiment are the area where the greatest progress has been achieved. People connected with organizations developing nuclear armaments, he said, could not have imagined that this would be possible. Here is our commentator, Vladimir Pasko:

[Pasko] The first stage of the joint Soviet-U.S. experiment to verify [proverka] the yield of nuclear blasts, carried out by the Soviet Union and the United States on their territories, is planned for next Wednesday at the test site in Nevada. The aim of the experiment is to work out effective methods of high-quality verification [kontrol] of compliance with two important Soviet-U.S. treaties: the 1974 treaty limiting underground nuclear weapons tests and the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear blasts for peaceful purposes.

These treaties, which put a 150-kiloton threshold on the yield of blasts, never came into force. The U.S. Administration considered the verification [kontrol] measures they contained inadequate. I will not go into how justified this refusal was. The arguments put forward were criticized by U.S. scientists themselves. They were the co-architects of the initiative aimed at proving that reliable monitoring [kontrol] of nuclear blasts is possible. They began a program of joint experiments last year in Kazakhstan, at the test range near Semipalatinsk, on the basis of an agreement between the U.S. Natural Resource Defense Council and the USSR Academy of Sciences. Subsequently, the initiative of the scientists received support at an international level. A group of U.S. experts is currently preparing an experiment in Semipalatinsk. It is scheduled for September. On 17 August our experts will carry out the experiment in Nevada.

The purpose of the experiment is to see in practice what improved verification [proverka] methods it is desirable to utilize for the purposes of verifying [kontrol] compliance with the treaty. In the view of the Soviet side, the teleseismic method, which does not require the presence at the test site of the personnel carrying out measurements, is fully effective and sufficient. The United States is insisting on the so-called hydrodynamic method, which is based on the taking of measurements at the actual test site. The joint experiment will enable the discussion of this problem to be transferred from the sphere of theoretical debate to a practical level. But this matter, as I think everyone must realize, goes beyond the

framework of purely scientific research. At the Moscow summit the sides declared that agreement on effective verification [kontrol] measures that enable the threshold treaties of 1974 and 1976 to be ratified, will be a first stage, after which both countries will begin drawing up further interim limitations on nuclear tests on the way to the ultimate goal of ending them completely. This is the reason for the significance of the experiment that is getting under way. The words of the head of the U.S. delegation about the greatest progress already having been achieved in the area of confidence-building gives grounds for optimism. They give us hope that after many years of arguments, verification [kontrol] measures that satisfy the sides will be drawn up and that a step leading to a complete ban on nuclear tests will finally be taken.

Soviet INF Inspectors Continue Activities

Visit Bases in Belgium

LD1208223588 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1700 GMT 12 Aug 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] As already reported, Soviet experts have inspected military bases in Belgium in accordance with the INF Treaty.

[K. Mazheyka] Never before have I witnessed such a scene in the capital of a NATO country. The gates of a secret NATO facility—the Sabca aeroequipment plant—were open to our military experts. The atmosphere for the visit of the Soviet inspectors—10 of them—was extremely businesslike. For here, in Gosselies, rests ultimate control over all the cruise missiles deployed in Western Europe. If plant director Gerard Masson is to be believed, by the end of 1989 the plant will have had to change its production angle. The 50 units of first-strike weapons now stored in a concealed place will have been destroyed.

This same fate awaits the 16 cruise missiles already deployed at the U.S. Air Force base in Florennes. On the same day and at the same time, a second group of Soviet inspectors visited it. Handshakes and souvenirs—all the trappings of hospitality.

The Belgian newspapers have published a statement by the National Action Committee for Peace and Development, a representative of which was present at Saryozek during the elimination of the first batch of Soviet missiles. This document expresses a fervent welcome for the start of the implementation of the Soviet-U.S. accords. The hope is voiced that both sides will, in the not too distant future, manage to achieve agreement on reducing strategic and conventional weapons and completely destroying chemical weapon arsenals.

Arrive in FRG

LD1208164188 Moscow TASS in English
1627 GMT 12 Aug 88

[Text] Bonn August 12 TASS—Today four Soviet inspection groups arrived in the FRG at the U.S. air base near Frankfurt am Main. They will conduct inspections to verify initial data under the Soviet-American Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. They will also inspect other U.S. bases in the FRG.

Two groups of Soviet experts had visited the FRG in the first half of July. They inspected deployment places of U.S. missiles at the bases in Wueschheim and Mutlangen.

According to the DPA agency, the present inspections will be carried out at the bases in Neu Ulm and Heilbronn where Pershing-2 missiles are stationed. Soviet experts will also visit a missile depot in Weilerbach (Rheinland-Pfalz State) and the centre for technical servicing of missiles in the area of Frankfurt-Hausen. They will inspect missiles and launchers as well as other facilities.

Check Missile Facilities

LD1308120088 Moscow TASS in English
1145 GMT 13 Aug 88

[Text] Bonn August 13 TASS—Four Soviet inspection teams, who arrived in the Federal Republic of Germany for inspections to check the initial data under the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles, started their work today. In accordance with the INF Treaty they started checking missiles, launchers and other related facilities at the American bases in Neu-Ulm and Heilbronn, where Pershing-2 missiles are situated, at the missile depot in Weilerbach, Rheinland-Pfalz, and at the missile repair shop in the area of Frankfurt-Hausen.

The Soviet experts are escorted by the representatives of the United States and the FRG Armed Forces, on whose territory American missiles are located. The inspections will end on Sunday.

Complete Tour on 14 Aug

LD1408114088 Moscow TASS in English
1128 GMT 14 Aug 88

[Text] Bonn August 14 TASS—Four Soviet inspection teams, which arrived in West Germany to check the initial data under the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on Eliminating Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, finalised their job Sunday. In accordance with the treaty, they inspected missiles, launchers and several other facilities at the U.S. Neu Ulm and Heilbronn bases which house Pershing-2 missiles, at the missile storage site in Weilerbach, Rheinland-Pfalz, and at the missile maintenance center in the area of Frankfurt-Hausen.

The Soviet experts were accompanied by representatives of U.S. troops and also of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, the country in whose territory American missiles are deployed. A unanimous view was expressed that mutual on-site inspections help build up confidence between the USSR and the United States, the East and the West on the whole, and promote peace in Europe.

U.S. INF Inspectors Visit Latvia
LD1308171888 Moscow TASS in English
1651 GMT 13 Aug 88

[Text] Riga August 13 TASS—A group of inspectors from the United States visited Soviet Latvia, in the Baltic region, on August 12-13 to verify compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty providing for scrapping medium- and shorter-range missiles.

The group inspected the military installation in the city of Jelgava.

Back in Riga, the U.S. inspectors were received by Nikolay Neiland, Latvia's deputy foreign minister.

The trip to the installation was an opportunity to check the data provided by the Soviet side, group leader John Williams told TASS.

Williams added that the group's mission in the USSR had taken six weeks to complete. He credited the atmosphere of glasnost (openness) for the close contacts the group had managed to establish with Soviet representatives during the visit.

The closer both sides were getting to know each other, the better the results, according to the American inspector. He compared the situation with a train that had begun moving and was gaining speed.

Gennadiy Komogortsev, who headed the Soviet side during the inspection, reported strict abidance by the jointly-agreed-upon procedure. Solid-propellant missiles are eliminated by blasting or burning-through, while the RK-55 liquid-propellant cruise missiles (there are some in Jelgava) are scrapped by cutting.

"Missiles at other installations in Latvian territory," Komogortsev added, "will be removed from stand-by alert according to the treaty and will be taken to designated sites beyond Latvia to be scrapped there".

PRAVDA on Proposals at Geneva Session
LD1508102388 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Aug 88 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "At the Geneva Talks"]

[Text] Geneva, 13 Aug—The delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons held a plenary

meeting last week at the request of the Soviet side. During the meeting, the Soviet side gave a substantial assessment of the situation at the talks, both in the strategic arms group and in the space weapons group. The Soviet delegation resolutely favored imparting greater dynamism to work and focusing the sides' efforts on solving outstanding problems, thus ensuring the maximum possible progress at the talks.

The Soviet side took a new, constructive step and made a number of concrete proposals for inclusion in the draft protocol on inspections. The Soviet proposals build upon considerations expressed earlier by the U.S. delegation, and thereby ensure a mutually acceptable solution to a number of issues, including such an important aspect of verification as permanent observation on the perimeter and at the portals of facilities manufacturing strategic offensive weapons. [This and following additions and variations are reported by Moscow TASS in English at 1131 GMT on 13 August in a similar item on the Geneva meeting. The TASS version renders the preceding sentence: "The Soviet proposals build upon considerations, expressed earlier by the U.S. delegation, including such an important aspect of verification as permanent observation on the perimeter and at the portals of facilities manufacturing strategic offensive weapons."]

The Soviet delegation is in favor of strict verification measures being applied to all types of strategic offensive weapons that will be covered by the future treaty, including ICBM's, SLBM's, heavy bombers, and air- and sea-launched long-range cruise missiles. Naturally, in coordinating verification measures, the specifics of weapons involved and limitations to be put on them must be taken into account. The Soviet delegation again urged the American side to make full use of the potential of experts to find a solution to the relevant issues within the framework of a special working subgroup on verification, set up at the previous round of talks. [The TASS version adds: "In this connection the Soviet side expressed readiness to continue considering—in the context of obligations taken—the range of initial data, which the sides would exchange to verify compliance with the treaty, which is being currently drafted. The need was stressed again for the American side finally to enter into businesslike discussion of the far-reaching and thoroughly drafted Soviet proposals on the verification of limitations of long-range SLCMs.

["Discussions continued within the framework of the strategic offensive weapons group of the sides's formulas—as part of efforts to implement Moscow accords—on the questions of long-range ALCMS and heavy bombers."]

Regrettably, no progress has been made at the Geneva talks on the question of working out a draft treaty on observance and nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Progress here is still hampered by the position of the American side, which seeks to modify the well-known Washington formula in the spirit of the so-called broad

interpretation of the ABM Treaty, but which in actuality amounts to undermining this treaty. [The TASS version adds: "At the same time, the preservation of the ABM Treaty is a necessary element for a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive weapons."]

'Clash' Approaching in U.S. on ABM Treaty
PM1508140888 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
15 Aug 88 Second Edition p 5

[Vitaliy Gan article under the rubric "Comment From a Correspondent": "The Clash Approaches"]

[Text] Washington, 14 Aug—A letter has arrived at the White House, signed by 42 senators, indicating clearly that in Washington's corridors of power a head-on clash is approaching between the opponents and supporters of arms control. If this clash actually occurs, it will be over the stepping up of attempts by the "hawks" in the U.S. Administration to derail the Soviet-American ABM Treaty.

The attempt to undermine this key element in the overall structure of measures to curb the arms race has been under way for a long time here. Although people on the Potomac never tire of trying to convince the world that SDI is "humane" in nature, these arguments can only be intended for the gullible. After all, since the ABM Treaty categorically bans the militarization of space, why seek its annulment, one wonders? Is not this an acknowledgement that the "peaceful" "Strategic Defense Initiative" will in fact mean the militarist exploitation of the vast reaches of space?

Approximately 2 years ago the ideologists and apologists of "Star Wars" hinted that going into battle with an open visor is a risky thing to do. They decided to put the blame for "undermining" the ABM Treaty onto... the Soviet Union.

No sooner said than done. Ignoring the USSR's most authoritative statements and the testimonies of America's own officials, they set about blackening the Soviet Union for building a radar installation in the Krasnoyarsk region for tracking objects in space. Much has already been written about this.

It is well known that a special Soviet-American commission exists to settle mutual complaints with regard to the treaty, and it is to hold a session on 24 August. Anticipating its results, the White House decided to carry out psychological indoctrination of the public beforehand. In the first instance it approached this in a roundabout way, reporting that U.S. military experts still regard the construction of the radar as a "material violation" of the ABM Treaty. Then the press started writing about "fierce disputes"—whether or not to accept the Pentagon's arguments. Finally it declared that the White House has shown

prudence and does not want to put the question point-blank for the time being. As its spokesman, M. Fitzwater, announced, President Reagan has sent a personal message to M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, once again emphasizing the "antitreaty nature" of the Krasnoyarsk radar.

The 42 senators who sent the letter to the White House, grasping the meaning of the game being played, called on the President "to take no steps to freeze or cease compliance with the ABM Treaty." Advising Reagan to "reject" this course of action, the 37 Democrats and 5 Republicans stated: "Now that the first missiles are being destroyed in accordance with the recently ratified Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles and progress has occurred at the strategic arms talks, this is no time to change course on arms control."

The moment to step up the attack on the ABM Treaty was not chosen by chance. As the rule of the present administration—the "zealous friend" of SDI—draws to a close, lobbyists for the program would like to present the next administration with a fait accompli in the form of the removal of all restraints on the military penetration of space. The motives are plain to see—not only crazy money, but also the annihilation of all possibility of alleviating the nuclear burden.

PRAVDA on Missile Site Inspections in FRG
PM1608093188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Aug 88 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Inspections Completed"]

[Text] Bonn, 15 Aug—The four Soviet inspection groups that arrived in the FRG to conduct inspections in accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles completed their work on Sunday. They inspected missiles, launchers, and a number of other installations on the U.S. bases at Neu-Ulm and Heilbronn, where Pershing-2 missiles are sited, as well as at the missile store at Weilerbach and the missile technical servicing center in the region of Frankfurt-Hausen.

The Soviet experts were accompanied by representatives of U.S. troops, as well as of the FRG Armed Forces. The unanimous opinion was expressed that mutual on-site inspections help strengthen trust between the USSR and the United States and between East and West in general, as well as help strengthen peace in Europe.

These inspections have concluded the first stage of the inspections in the FRG provided for in the Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. Two groups of experts from the USSR had already been to the FRG in July, visiting military installations at Wiesbaden and Mutlangen.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Kessler Proposes East-West Defense Meeting
*AU0908130788 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 1100 GMT 9 Aug 88*

[Text] The GDR has suggested meetings between defense ministers from NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. In an article for the communist SED central organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, GDR Defense Minister Kessler says that such a dialogue, which would also include talks between the two German states, would be useful and important for a better knowledge and understanding of each other as well as for finding promising negotiation positions. He says that, despite some reservations, FRG Defense Minister Scholz has indicated readiness to discuss basic problems of the two alliances' military doctrines and strategies.

Kessler stresses that partners for a policy of common security in the West not only include leftist organizations and trade unions, but also conservative government parties. Yet the GDR does not fail to see influential circles in the West striving for military superiority. He warned emphatically about the modernization of NATO's nuclear and conventional weapon systems. He stressed that the Warsaw Pact does not strive for military superiority. However, as long as the West has an offensive potential and plans to build it up by the nineties, the Eastern alliance has to maintain an adequate defense potential, GDR Defense Minister Kessler said in his article for NEUES DEUTSCHLAND.

TURKEY

Kurds Claim Iraq Using Chemical Weapons
*NC1208071188 Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish
10 Aug 88 pp 1, 11*

[Excerpts] Semdinli (A.A.)—The Iraqi Armed Forces, who opened a new front in the Iran-Iraq war after Iran agreed to a cease-fire, are currently engaged in violent clashes in "mopping up" operations against separatist forces in northern Iraq. Kurdish peshmerga affiliated with Mas'ud Barzani are reportedly under siege in the Gimo and "Beruc" [name as published] regions. Meanwhile, Iraq has reportedly used chemical weapons during the clashes.

Twenty-two peshmerga have crossed into Turkey from Iraq, together with 21 women and 16 children, seeking protection from the gendarmerie guard post in Samanli village. It has been determined that the peshmerga are Turkish citizens who had lived in peshmerga camps in northern Iraq for a long time.

The clandestine Voice of the Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan, which broadcasts from northern Iraq and is heard clearly in the border areas, has claimed that Iraqi Government forces have been using chemical weapons in the clashes. The radio called on the separatist forces in various parts of northern Iraq to help the Kurds in the "Beruc" region, which has become the scene of intensified clashes.

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