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
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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1748

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TASKS FOR NEW TRAINING YEAR OUTLINED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 83 (signed to press 21 Dec 82) pp 17-22

[Lead Article: "Toward New Goals of Combat Proficiency"]

[Text] The Land of Soviets entered a new year--the third and central year of the 11th Five-Year Plan--full of creative forces and optimism. Celebration of the USSR's 60th anniversary was further graphic proof of grandiose achievements, the indestructible moral-political unity of a society of developed socialism, and the Soviet people's monolithic solidarity about the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee.

Soviet citizens greeted resolutions of the November 1982 Party Central Committee Plenum, the provisions and conclusions of the speech by CPSU CC General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov at the Plenum, and documents and materials of the joint ceremonial session of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet with fervent approval and as their own vital cause and a guide to action. They are working with inspiration and selflessness to implement the historic plans of the 26th CPSU Congress and to fulfill the plan for the country's economic and social development for 1983.

Soviet military personnel live with the same thoughts and aspirations as the builders of communism. Undividedly supporting the peaceloving foreign policy course and domestic policy of the party and government, Army and Navy personnel see their patriotic and international duty in reliably protecting the people's creative work and the achievements of socialism.

"We know well that you cannot get peace from the imperialists," emphasized Comrade Yu. V. Andropov. "It can be defended only by relying on the indomitable might of the Soviet Armed Forces." The Motherland's defenders deeply realize that in the face of real military danger on the part of aggressive circles of imperialism, and the United States above all, this obligates them to be constantly on guard and improve combat readiness comprehensively. They are giving all their strength and energy to fulfilling the party's requirements and missions assigned by the USSR Minister of Defense for the new training year. Personnel are persistently mastering weapons and equipment and the art of modern combat, and they are improving field, air and naval schooling. Socialist competition with the motto "Improve vigilance and reliably ensure the Motherland's security!" has unfolded broadly in the Army and Navy.

Military collectives of a missile unit (commanded by Lt Col A. Pavlov), the Proskurov-Berlin Order of Lenin, Red Banner, Order of Kutuzov Guards Tank Regiment imeni G. I. Kotovskiy (commanded by Gds Lt Col B. Dyukov), the Smolensk, Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Guards Air Defense Surface-to-Air Missile Regiment (commanded by Gds Lt Col V. Nechayev), a guards bomber regiment (commanded by Gds Lt Col V. Tatarchenko) and a nuclear-powered strategic submarine (commanded by Capt 1st Rank A. Samokhvalov) came out with a call to raise the banner of this competition even higher.

Military personnel begin the ascent to new heights of military proficiency by relying on the experience of the past training year. It became a step forward in improving the level of combat schooling and combat readiness of Army and Navy personnel. Many subunits, units and ships moved to the level of outstanding and there was an increase in the number of persons outstanding in combat and political training, rated specialists, and masters of military affairs.

Experience of specific, effective party-political work has been built up in the leading military collectives which attained success in military proficiency. The core of this experience is constant, purposeful concern for the high level and effectiveness of every class, for deepening knowledge and for reinforcing skills of every officer, warrant officer [praporshchik and michman], sergeant, petty officer, private and seaman in military affairs. Lenin's behest "to learn military affairs in a genuine manner" is a guide to action here. In the work of improving the quality of training and indoctrination, the commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organizations devote primary attention to an explanation and implementation of resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the November 1982 Party Central Committee Plenum; to the ideological-political, military and moral indoctrination of personnel; and to establishing allegiance to military duty in people's awareness and acts.

Troop practice persuades us that perceptible results in combat schooling are achieved by those subunits, units, ships and combined units which display persistence and consistency in improving the professional and methods proficiency of the immediate organizers of the training and indoctrination process and which ensure that they set a personal example in mastery and employment of modern weapons and combat equipment and in the performance of official duties. Progressive movement in tactical improvement is ensured where the efforts of commanders, political officers, staffs, and the party and Komsomol organizations at all levels of the Army and Navy organism are closely united and specifically coordinated for these purposes.

While consolidating everything positive, at the same time we also have to take account of omissions and the unused reserves which were discovered in the training of a number of subunits and units in the training year which concluded. Final inspections showed that there were irregularities in officers' command training in some of them, there were instances of poor effectiveness in accomplishing some combat training missions, and pledges to increase the number of persons outstanding in training, rated specialists, and ranking athletes were not completely fulfilled. These deficiencies were a result of

certain omissions in the planning and organization of combat training, a let-up in the fight against conditionalities and oversimplification in the training of subunits, units and ships, and slow realignment of ideological-indoctrinational and organizational-party work in light of new party demands. In some military collectives disciplinary infractions and the absence of proper organization and order hindered planned and successful combat training. All these deficiencies have to be corrected decisively.

The primary task for military councils, commanders, political entities, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations in the new training year is a further build-up of efforts in the detailed study and practical implementation of resolutions of the 26th party congress and demands of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense for maintaining high vigilance and constant readiness of the Army and Navy to defend the state interests of our Motherland and its allies under conditions of the aggravated world military-political situation.

The political and labor enthusiasm of Army and Navy personnel generated by resolutions of the November 1982 CPSU CC Plenum and the 7th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and by celebration of the USSR's 60th anniversary must be directed at an even closer solidarity of servicemen around the Leninist Party, development of a class hatred for the enemies of peace and socialism, and a further increase in the intensity and effectiveness of the training process, in the quality of tactical, weapons and special training and field, air and naval schooling and, in the final account, in the readiness of Army and Navy forces to repulse possible aggression immediately.

There is nothing trivial in this matter of state importance, since any miscalculation and any delay in acting in a combat situation is fraught with serious consequences. No matter what post he occupies, every soldier has to be concerned constantly with the question of whether or not he is ready to execute an operation order and perform his duties precisely and in a qualified manner at any moment. High vigilance, strenuous military work and a concrete contribution toward increasing combat readiness--that is the demand of the time. It must be explained to personnel persistently and purposefully that now as never before the interests of protecting socialism's achievements require of every serviceman supreme vigilance, faultless performance of official duty, and real readiness for bold, resolute and skilled actions in modern combat.

Along what basic directions is it best to accomplish the task of further improving the combat proficiency of Army and Navy personnel and what should be taken into account in party-political work?

Above make an improvement in the organizational work of command-political cadres to improve combat and political training. Take full account of and steadfastly fulfill the specific requirements of the USSR Minister of Defense for the combat training of branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms for the new training year. As before, primary emphasis must be placed on a further improvement in the quality of tactical, special-tactical and weapons training, mastery of the most effective methods of tactical employment of weapons and new equipment, and assurance of high schooling and tactical teamwork of every subunit, unit and ship.

The careful attention of commanders, political entities, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations must be devoted to mobilizing personnel for a thorough mastery of T/O&E weapons and combat equipment and a search for ways for maximum use of their tactical capabilities. It is also necessary to achieve planned, goal-oriented work in every unit and aboard every ship in training rated specialists and improving the skills of all categories of servicemen, especially officers, warrant officers and leading specialists.

This is the more important to do because concern for training rated specialists, especially those with a higher rating, was accomplished in some units in the past training year without a differentiated approach and without reliance on those categories of servicemen on whom success in accomplishing missions inherent to the subunit, unit or ship depends above all. For example, in the tank unit where Officer N. Gorokhov serves, although there was an overall high percentage of first and second class specialists among the driver-mechanics and operators, their numbers were considerably lower than envisaged in the pledges. Specialists of the third and fourth periods of training also did not stand out better. This example unfortunately is no exception.

The interests of combat readiness demand daily, thorough attention to improving the technical training of all categories of servicemen. This task must be the subject of constant analysis in the subunits, staffs and directorates, and it has to be discussed regularly in political entities and the party and Komsomol organizations. In addition to the commanders, officers of the technical service also have to give an accounting for accomplishment of this task. Those military collectives act properly where the increase in class rating is included among necessary indicators in evaluating the optimal nature of pledges in competition and their fulfillment, where military-technical propaganda is improved in every way and where they hold days or nights honoring masters of military affairs and revealing their experience, and contests for the title of best subunit, regiment or ship specialist. It is important to make fuller use of all the mass media for propagandizing foremost experience and to disseminate widely and adopt progressive techniques of working on the equipment.

One of the most important tasks of commanders, political entities, staffs and party organizations is to improve the quality of command and methods training of officer personnel and overcome the lag of some officers behind the development of military affairs and heightened demands on troop schooling. It is a question of the need to achieve concreteness in the work of all categories of command personnel, chiefs of staff, political entities and directorate party organizations aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of every class held with officers, their detailed assimilation of command training programs, and development of firm practical skills in organizing combat actions. Officers also have to master more persistently modern kinds of weapons and combat equipment, the latest methodology and foremost experience of training and indoctrinating subordinates, and an ability to rely in all their work on the active assistance of party and Komsomol organizations.

Successful resolution of this problem depends on an improvement in the personal contribution of leading command and political cadres and the chiefs of combat arms and services in officer training, passing on to them the foremost

experience already gained, and showing particular concern for the development of military educational institution graduates and the commanders and chiefs advanced to new positions. Party organizations and experienced party members can and are intended to play a more active role in this work. They are capable of explaining and showing young officers the most effective techniques of training and indoctrinating personnel and helping them feel at home in what are new conditions for many of them, establishing their moral authority in the collective, and finding a path to subordinates' hearts.

The preparation and conduct of every exercise, field problem, flight or naval deployment and their maximum approximation of the conditions of actual combat actions demand the most thorough attention of commanders, political entities, staffs and party organizations. Being a unique test of the schooling of sub-unit, unit, ship and combined unit personnel, each exercise, if it is conducted in a difficult situation, becomes a school of combat, moral-political and psychological conditioning of the personnel, a school of tactical teamwork for military collectives, and a school for making staffs and directorates cohesive; and it prompts them to act vigorously and with initiative.

It is the duty of commanders and chiefs of all ranks and of political entities and party organizations to make fuller use of the favorable opportunities of exercises and deployments for improving the level of combat schooling of Army and Navy personnel, to demand a more strict accounting for instances of oversimplification and indulgences in their preparation and conduct, and to saturate them to the maximum with elements of reality which require skill, independence, boldness and decisiveness of the personnel. In conducting exercises it is important to be persistent in improving the forms and methods of party-political work and make fuller use here of the experience of the Great Patriotic War and the troop exercises "Zapad-81" and "Shchit-82."

It is difficult to count on high effectiveness and results of combat training without a further development of socialist competition and the introduction of elements of competitiveness in the training process and in the performance of every task and the combat norms. In the new training year military councils, commanders, political entities, staffs, and the party and Komsomol organizations will have to give greater scope to competition among specialists, sub-units, regiments and ships and enrich the movement for foremost combined units with practical experience. It should be remembered that the chief element in directing competition is to orient the soldiers' creative initiative each day on fulfilling their pledges and the training plans and programs and on achieving new heights in combat and political training, in field, air and naval schooling, in the mastery of equipment and weapons, in reinforcement of military discipline and in improving combat readiness.

Having approved the patriotic initiative of units which were the initiators of socialist competition in the new training year, the USSR Ministry of Defense and Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy demanded that commanders, political entities and staffs concentrate efforts of competitors on the key directions for strengthening combat readiness, to introduce competitiveness persistently into the training process, to achieve an increase in the number of outstanding persons, subunits, units and ships, to develop the

movement for thrift and economy, to develop rationalization and invention work, to improve the training facility, to see that Leninist principles of organizing competition are carried out in practice, and to struggle resolutely against the slightest manifestations of formalism in this lively, creative matter.

The complexity and responsibility of the tasks of training Army and Navy personnel in 1983 place higher demands on the content, forms and methods of ideological and political indoctrination work and on its vital link with combat training and with the tactical improvement of the unit, ship or combined unit.

Instances still are encountered where means of ideological influence on people are not fully used in party-political work, bottlenecks in combat training are not taken into account, and the party word is not addressed to a specific person or to leading categories of specialists of the unit or ship. It should be remembered that the guarantee of improving the efficiency of all ideological and political indoctrination activities lies in eliminating the thin coating of enlightenment, getting rid of general appeals in working with people and having close ties with combat training missions and a knowledge of the features of every military collective, service conditions and the tactical missions.

The effectiveness of combat training depends to a significant extent on the level of organization and planning in work, and on the discipline and execution of trainees and trainers. It is difficult to count on success or on the productiveness of a class, exercise or deployment which is poorly organized, which begins with a violation of established deadlines and which is not supported logistically. The responsible attitude of every soldier toward a class hardly can be achieved in a collective where crudeness and nonregulation relationships exist and where not everyone strictly observes military order and the standards of communist morality.

Without discipline there is no combat readiness, and progress in training Army and Navy personnel is inconceivable. For this reason military councils, commanders, political entities, staffs, and the party and Komsomol organizations are called upon to work daily and objectively on strengthening conscious military discipline and law and order. All forms and methods of political and organizational work must be used to arouse the command-political and engineer-technical personnel, all party and Komsomol members and Army and Navy personnel in general for an active and concrete struggle to maintain firm regulation order in every subunit and unit and aboard every ship, and to conduct it with party fervency and offensive spirit. The combined-arms regulations, daily routine and class schedule must be fulfilled strictly in every military collective by every serviceman no matter what post he holds.

It is difficult to overestimate the role of the political nucleus of military collectives--the party organizations--in the work to improve the level of the personnel's combat proficiency. The ways of increasing their activeness and sense of principle in all spheres of endeavor are clearly defined in resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress. The 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries developed recommendations for implementing party

lines. Party influence on combat training of subunits, units and ships must be reinforced, and this can be achieved with more persistent assurance of party members' example and sociopolitical activeness, a reinforcement of their ties with the soldier masses, their knowledge of the true state of affairs in combat training, and with the prompt assistance of commanders in remedying deficiencies.

Komsomol organizations make a concrete contribution toward augmenting successes in combat training under constant party direction. With the initiative, imagination and zeal inherent to young people, Army and Navy Komsomol members set examples of a zealous attitude toward training and strive to master modern combat equipment and weapons to perfection in the shortest possible time, to be in the front ranks of competitors for improving class ratings and bettering the combat norms, and to reinforce friendship, mutual help and troop comradeship on a healthy moral basis.

Party and Komsomol organizations act as reliable assistants of commanders and political entities in the struggle for high training quality, for persistent and successful improvement of the personnel's schooling, and for keeping Army and Navy forces in constant and high combat readiness. The effectiveness of their work is directly proportional to their level of direction by political entities and to the commanders' ability to rely on them and arouse party and Komsomol members for an active struggle for high military proficiency.

The daily concern of commanders of all levels, and of political entities, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations for the people is an important condition for mobilizing personnel for conscientious work. An attentive attitude toward a person and toward satisfaction of his needs and wants must permeate the work style of every leader. There can be no place for instances of callousness or a formal bureaucratic attitude toward the life and routine of servicemen or members of their families. Matters concerning material-technical support, the cultural, medical and trade services for military personnel, and creation of necessary conditions for productive training and leisure time are matters directly affecting the mood and working capacity of people. Consequently we must approach their resolution with all responsibility, taking into account their direct influence on an improvement in combat readiness, military proficiency and discipline.

The training year has made a good start. Each day of training brings reports of the first confident steps toward the new goals of combat maturity. In close cooperation with personnel of armies of Warsaw Pact member nations, Soviet soldiers stand vigilantly on guard over socialism's achievements without stinting on strength or energy, and they are honing their proficiency. All their thoughts are directed at accomplishing the task of the next training year successfully and making their concrete contribution toward fulfilling requirements of the 26th party congress and the November 1982 CPSU CC Plenum on strengthening national defense and the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces and raising their combat readiness.

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ARMED FORCES

WORK OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN MILITARY DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 83 (signed to press 21 Dec 82) pp 29-36

[Article by Lt Gen V. Lukinykh, chief of organizational-party work directorate of Main Political Directorate of Soviet Army and Navy: "At the Level of New Tasks"]

[Text] Report-election party meetings have ended in Army and Navy party organizations. They became an important stage in a further implementation of 26th CPSU Congress guidelines for strengthening the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces, developing the activeness, initiative and principle of Army party organizations, and improving methods of party leadership. The deep and comprehensive influence of congress resolutions determined the high political and organizational level of the meetings.

The 26th party congress emphasized that the party meeting is the place where all burning issues must be discussed thoroughly and seriously. This was the kind of detailed, interested and fundamental discussion about the state of affairs in party organizations and the work of party committees and bureaus that took place at an absolute majority of report-election meetings. The fact that almost all comrades attending the meetings in party groups and company party organizations, over 70 percent of party members and candidate members in battalion and equivalent organizations, and every third party member in primary organizations took part in discussing the reports indicates the high activeness of the party members. Many suggestions were made aimed at improving the effectiveness of party work. All this is proof of the heightened maturity of party members, their sociopolitical activeness, and their understanding of the need for a further reinforcement of party influence on all aspects of unit and ship life.

Resolutions of the regular November 1982 CPSU CC Plenum and provisions and conclusions contained in the speech by CPSU CC General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov became a full-scale program of action for party organizations. Army and Navy party members spoke with unanimous approval about the purposeful and creative work of our party and its Leninist Central Committee to implement the course set by the 26th CPSU Congress in the area of domestic and foreign policy, for strengthening the economic and defense might of the country, and for mobilizing the masses for heroic labor achievements for the prosperity of our socialist Motherland. Note was taken everywhere of the party's enormous

concern for reinforcing the Army and Navy and indoctrinating their personnel. The high sense of responsibility of Army party members for maintaining the vigilance and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces was emphasized.

The meetings convincingly demonstrated that by relying on general party experience, the Army and Navy party organizations grew even stronger in the organizational sense and became enriched with new experience, and their ideological and intraparty life became more meaningful. The majority of party organizations actively manifest themselves as a leading force in military collectives, as the collectives' political nucleus, and as the center of daily ideological indoctrination activity. They ensure effective party influence on all aspects of subunit, unit and ship life.

In an air of exactingness and under the badge of self-critical evaluation of achievements, report-election meetings thoroughly analyzed the work of elective party entities and determined the concrete directions for their further work in light of directions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the November Party Central Committee Plenum, recommendations of the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, and tasks assigned by the USSR Minister of Defense. Resolutions made by party organizations focus the attention and efforts of party members on resolving key tasks of combat readiness, personnel schooling and indoctrination, an improvement in efficiency and reinforcement of discipline.

The contribution of party organizations to the job of ensuring high combat readiness and combat schooling of subunits, units and ships was analyzed during reports and elections from the position of high demands of the Communist Party and its 26th Congress. Both the accountability reports and speeches by party members emphasized the need for a more effective resolution of the tasks of combat readiness and improving the personnel's military proficiency under conditions of a sharp aggravation in the present international situation and stepped-up military danger from reactionary aggressive circles headed by the United States.

In their estimate of party work directed at increasing vigilance and combat readiness, the party members proceeded from statements of USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov that combat readiness is the chief index of the qualitative state of Army and Navy forces. The state of the Army and Navy's combat readiness determines their capability to perform their basic mission of defending socialist achievements and the Soviet people's peaceful labor reliably and ensuring the security of our country and that of its friends and allies. Participants at the meetings stressed that maintaining high combat readiness is the main direction along which party organizations must display activeness, initiative, principle and a leading role in the work of military collectives. The briefings and speeches discussed the need to ensure that every party organization and every party member was doing everything in the assigned sector to give servicemen a thorough understanding of the complexity and acuteness of the world military-political situation, the increased danger of imperialism unleashing a new world war, and the need for maintaining high vigilance and readiness for resolute defeat of the aggressor.

Party organizations of all branches of the Armed Forces have gained considerable experience of party work in fulfilling concrete tasks of combat readiness,

operational readiness duty, and field, air and naval schooling. Party work practice under near-combat conditions is enriched during maneuvers, exercises, flights and long naval deployments. The experience of party work in military educational institutions, staffs and control entities saw further development. Party organizations take an active part in developing socialist competition. They have begun to show more concern for the example set by party members and for ensuring their vanguard role in combat training and service and in the struggle for strict, regulation order. The report-election meetings showed that the absolute majority of party members and candidate members are performing their party and military duty worthily. Party members solidify the personnel and lead them toward the attainment of new goals in combat training.

The party organization of the guards tank regiment where Maj V. Pavlov is party committee secretary proved itself to be an active organizer of party members and all servicemen in the regiment in accomplishing combat training tasks. The personnel's expert mastery of weapons and combat equipment, the development of socialist competition and improvement in combat schooling constantly are the focus of its attention. With the party organization's active participation, competition has unfolded for best specialist, best crew and best subunit, and schools of technical knowledge and technical circles function during nontraining time. The regiment's party members are in the front ranks, with 65 percent of them completing the past training year with outstanding results and with 79 percent having a higher rating.

The party organization of the submarine headed by Engr-Capt-Lt V. Kolychev is widely known for its active work. Its high moral authority in the crew also is based on the party members' leading role. They set the tone in training, take an active part in ideological work and exert an influence on every seaman's combat schooling. Ninety-four percent of the party members and candidate members here are outstanding in training and 85 percent are first or second class specialists. The submarine's crew is fighting for new goals in combat improvement in the training year which has begun.

At the same time, as noted during the report-election meetings, a number of party collectives still make insufficient use of the many-sided organizational and political opportunities for improving the effectiveness of party influence on high-quality accomplishment of the tasks of combat readiness and combat schooling. Some party committees, party bureaus and party organization secretaries ignore deficiencies in the organization of combat training and in the mastery of weapons and combat equipment. Instances of a poor quality of training activities do not receive fundamental party evaluation everywhere and at times there is a conciliatory attitude toward indulgences and oversimplifications in training and toward an unobjective assessment of results. Some party organizations delve little into the organization of command training for officer cadres and are not always exacting toward party members and candidate members for keeping combat readiness at a proper level, for their personal training and for the schooling of subordinate subunits, units and ships. Deficiencies in socialist competition and in the use of its indoctrinational and mobilizing capabilities still are being eradicated slowly. The meetings which were held were distinguished by the heightened level of criticism of party members guilty of the deficiencies which occurred.

For example, the party committee of the motorized rifle regiment where Maj V. Veremennikov is secretary was subjected to sharp criticism at a meeting. This elective entity had not delved deeply into the progress of combat training, had not demonstrated persistence in remedying deficiencies in subunit training, and had exerted weak influence on the training and service of personnel in leading specialties as well as of officers. The party committee had shown insufficient concern for improving the role of subunit party organizations and had not placed exacting demands on party members for strict performance of official and party duty. Many of them demonstrated poor personal training.

The task is to ensure that guidelines of the 26th CPSU Congress on activeness, initiative and principle in party work and recommendations of the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries in these matters are implemented even more persistently in the work of each party organization and are embodied in the concrete contribution of party members toward improving the combat readiness of units and ships and the personnel's combat schooling.

Life insistently demands that party organizations strive to conduct party work in a differentiated manner, take fuller account of all the diversity of combat training tasks in this work, influence the accomplishment of such tasks on a timely basis, and do this by their inherent techniques and methods. Mobilization of servicemen for faultless performance of operational readiness tasks and for improving the level of tactical, tactical-weapons and special training and the struggle to master equipment must be a subject of special concern for party organizations. It is the duty of party organizations to struggle persistently for high quality of every class, for effective use of training time and for improving the personal professional training of officers who are party members; and to develop socialist competition under the motto "Improve vigilance and reliably ensure the Motherland's security!" Staff party organizations have an important role to play here. Party collectives are called upon to show more initiative in improving the organization of classes and raising their quality. Comrade Yu. V. Andropov remarked at the November CPSU CC Plenum that we cannot get things moving by slogans alone. Much organizational work by party organizations is needed.

It is also important for party committees and bureaus to examine in a businesslike manner together with commanders and political entities the suggestions of party members aimed at improving combat readiness and the quality of the training process, to ensure proper supervision over their implementation with the first months of the new training year, and to take an active part in remedying deficiencies.

The effectiveness of party influence on the life and combat training of subunits, units and ships and on their combat readiness is linked inseparably with the ideological and political-indoctrination work of party organizations and with their ability to mobilize servicemen for conscientious accomplishment of tasks. The past report-election meetings showed convincingly by their entire content, by the level of party members' activeness and by the acuteness of issues examined in their speeches that a profound, productive process of enrichment of the ideological life of Army and Navy party organizations and a strengthening of the ties between the ideological indoctrination work they are

performing and the accomplishment of missions facing the subunits, units and ships is going on under the influence of 26th CPSU Congress resolutions and in the course of implementation of the Party Central Committee's directions and recommendations on ideological matters. The need was emphasized for a detailed explanation to soldiers of resolutions of the regular November 1982 CPSU CC Plenum, the speech there by Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, and issues examined by the 7th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Numerous examples indicate that over half of all party members and candidate members are performing permanent assignments of an ideological nature given by their organizations. Party members play a determining part in all the most important areas of ideological life of military collectives and in developing the personnel's high moral-political qualities. The content and effectiveness of ideological indoctrination work of party organizations and participation in it of every party member were the subject of a comprehensive and exacting discussion at the past report-election meetings and were evaluated from a position of higher demands. This was typical, for example, of the report-election meetings in party organizations where comrades A. Chugunov, S. Sergeyev, Yu. Vasin and M. Khanyukov are members of party committees and party bureaus.

Meanwhile, as the report-election meetings showed, some party organizations still are slow in overcoming substantial deficiencies in the personnel's ideological-political indoctrination. The party committees and bureaus here are not showing the necessary concern for a constant improvement in ideological indoctrination work or for increasing its quality, effectiveness and close ties with life and with specific tasks of combat readiness, training, a strengthening of military discipline and the imposition of regulation order. Matters which trouble the personnel sometimes are not fully taken into account. A number of party organizations do not attach necessary importance to including every party member in active participation in indoctrinational work among the personnel, the work of party members in a particular ideological area is rarely examined, and not all accountability reports uncovered the reasons for some comrades' passiveness in ideological life.

In light of guidelines of the 26th CPSU Congress, decrees of the Party Central Committee as well as recommendations of the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, a very important duty of every party organization is to continue to implement imaginatively and vigorously the requirement for a constant improvement in ideological work and a further increase in its effectiveness and quality.

The focus of party organizations' ideological indoctrination activities must continue to be matters of developing the personnel's scientific outlook and utter devotion to the party cause and communist ideals. It is important for party organizations to show daily concern for the detailed study and assimilation of Lenin's ideological-theoretical heritage, resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent Party Central Committee plenums, and materials of the joint ceremonial session of the CPSU CC, USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet devoted to the USSR's 60th anniversary by all party members and all servicemen. Well-reasoned, intelligible propaganda about successes of Lenin's policy of nationalities, the historic advantages of real socialism and

achievements of our party and people; the offensive struggle against bourgeois ideology; and prompt opposition to imperialism's ideological subversion are of urgent importance.

The soldiers must be given an explanation daily of the acuteness of the present international and military-political situation in the world and they must be indoctrinated in revolutionary vigilance and a readiness to worthily perform their military duty on the basis of concrete examples. The ideological work of party organizations is intended to provide soldiers with a clear understanding of Leninist ideas about defense of the socialist homeland and to develop in them a conviction as to the rightness and invincibility of socialism, high moral-political qualities, and irreconcilability toward shortcomings. There must be more active use of the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the Communist Party, Soviet people and the Soviet Armed Forces; celebration of the 40th anniversaries of outstanding battles in the Great Patriotic War; examples of the mass heroism of Soviet military personnel; and models of their selfless performance of military duty in postwar time for achieving these goals. The indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of combat friendship with armies of socialism's fraternal countries also is an important task.

Party organizations' successful accomplishment of the increased tasks of ideological indoctrination work and reinforcement of ideological influence on servicemen presume constant concern for the ideological conditioning of every CPSU member and candidate member, an increase in the effectiveness of party members' political and party training, and an increase in demands that every one of them take a personal part in indoctrinational work among the masses and be concerned for improving the selection, training and indoctrination of propaganda cadres.

Proper actions are taken by those party committees and bureaus which regularly analyze party members' work in their assigned ideological sectors, in hearing their reports on these matters, in popularizing the experience of those who work imaginatively and with initiative, and in viewing the indoctrination of personnel as an inalienable part of their official and party work.

At the same time in the report-election meetings some party organizations took a narrow look at these important matters, which determine the effectiveness of fulfilling the Party Central Committee's requirements that every party organization in fact be a center of daily ideological indoctrination activity. Speakers at times limited themselves merely to citing data on party members' personal political training and did not analyze the organizing role of secretaries, party committees and bureaus in this area. It is especially important to elevate the level of ideological work in party groups and party organizations of subunits where there is a lively daily contact of party members with the personnel and daily political influence on them.

Questions of reinforcing party influence on a further strengthening of military discipline and regulation order were examined during report-election meetings in a close tie with the accomplishment of tasks for raising combat readiness and training effectiveness and developing the personnel's high moral-combat qualities. This is because the basis of military discipline as a political

category consists of the personnel's ideological conviction and the mental maturity of military collectives, in the formation of which party organizations play a very important role. The generalization of the experience of party work gained in this area in accountability reports and speeches by party members was of no small importance.

Along with this, in a large number of examples of daily life, including facts uncovered during the past report-election meetings, it is impossible not to see certain flaws in party work aimed at reinforcing military discipline, ensuring the organization of combat training and life strictly by the regulations, and eradicating deviations from their requirements. In some instances the party members and candidate members themselves not only are not ensuring firm discipline in the assigned area, but also are not serving as a model of behavior. Some report-election meetings unfortunately examined these important matters with insufficient acuteness, an analysis was lacking as to the reasons for disruptions of scheduled training, infractions of established order and undignified acts, and there was no assessment of the contribution by each party member and candidate member to the struggle against negative phenomena.

The fate of military discipline is decided in the unit, aboard the ship and in the subunit. Just as very thin capillaries permeate the living body, so do lower party levels permeate the entire structure of the military organism. By their daily organizing and indoctrinating activity they are capable of exerting an active influence on the solidarity of collectives, improvement of a healthy moral climate in them and creation of an atmosphere of friendship and troop comradeship; and they are capable of mobilizing personnel for establishing firm regulation order and eradicating deviations from disciplinary requirements. We must strive persistently to see that every party organization is well informed about everything being done in the military collective, that it knows the people's moods and needs, and that it is concerned for satisfying material-personal and cultural wants. The role of every party member as an organizer and indoctrinator and the role of his personal contribution toward overall efforts of the party organization unquestionably rise in this matter.

The most important practical task of newly elected secretaries of party organizations, party committees and bureaus is the organization of more determined and purposeful work aimed at mobilizing party members and all servicemen for further fulfillment of directions of the Party Central Committee and tasks stemming from demands of the USSR Minister of Defense for strengthening military discipline as an important component of combat readiness. It is a question of the need for using methods of political influence to ensure accomplishment of the entire set of organizational and indoctrinational measures in the interests of strengthening regulation order, increasing the role of the training and indoctrination process for these purposes, and improving organization of guard and interior services and the personnel's everyday routine and leisure. There must be an elevation of the role of Komsomol organizations in accomplishing this task of primary importance. Life demands insistently that every party organization display in fact a more thorough understanding of its high role and responsibility in strengthening military discipline.

In generalizing the results of past reports and elections of party entities it is impossible to ignore the fact that a prominent place in the meetings was

held by matters of observing Leninist standards of party life and principles of party leadership and improving intraparty relations. The experience of many party organizations indicates that their life has been enriched with new experience of ideological-indoctrination and party-organizational work. Principles of collective leadership and the supervision and check of execution have begun to be implemented more fully and the presentation of party information is being improved. Party members noted in their speeches that the ties of party organizations with service masses have strengthened and have become more diversified, and that more concern is being shown for the quality of party replacements and for indoctrination of young party members in practical work.

But the accomplishment of new and even more difficult tasks presented by development of the Armed Forces insistently demand a further increase in the activeness and spirit of party organizations. This was emphasized in the CPSU CC Greeting to the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries. Questions of initiative, activeness and principle in the work of party organizations to fulfill Army and Navy training tasks were the focus of the conference's attention, and the initial results from implementation of its recommendations were examined at the report-election meetings.

In the discussion of accountability reports party members focused their attention on a self-critical examination of the reasons for a weak tie of party work with the performance of concrete tasks facing units, ships and control entities, and they spoke of the need to elevate the role of meetings and sessions of party committees and party bureaus, improve the organization of execution of the decisions which are made, and develop criticism. Facts were cited where some party members and candidate members are not completely fulfilling demands of the CPSU Bylaws and are displaying passiveness in service and public life.

Many of the comrades who spoke emphasized that there must be an improvement in party leadership over Komsomol organizations. Their initiative has to be developed comprehensively in the indoctrination of young soldiers and responsibility raised for ensuring the personal example of Komsomol members in training and service.

In light of resolutions of the 26th party congress, CPSU CC decrees and recommendations of the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, there must be a further consistent improvement in intraparty work and a comprehensive elevation of the role of party organizations as the political nucleus of military collectives. Every organization will perform this mission assigned it successfully when it begins to show objective concern for implementing demands of the CPSU Bylaws and Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy and when it knowledgeably exerts active influence on all aspects of the life and work of subunits, units and ships and improves political, organizational and ideological-indoctrination work in the masses aimed at increasing the combat readiness of units and ships and strengthening military discipline.

It should be emphasized in particular that the party members' vanguard role in military service and sociopolitical life, their close ties with nonparty

masses, and the highly moral example set in their attitude toward work and personal conduct is the basis for success in the work of any party organization. The party always proceeded from the assumption that the party member is a political fighter and organizer of the masses. This is why it is impossible to agree with the somewhat narrowed opinion which was heard in some accountability reports at the meetings that good work and conduct is sufficient for a party member's example. The party member has to take an active part in the life of his organization and his military collective and feel a personal responsibility for the state of affairs in the unit and aboard the ship as a whole.

In summing up the party report-election meetings it should be emphasized that they permitted a generalization of the experience gained by committees and bureaus and showed the need to elevate their role even more as entities of collective leadership over the status and quality of party work and develop the initiative, activeness and efficiency of every member of the elective entity and his responsibility for performing his duties. The practice of leadership of battalion and company party organizations as well as party groups and the practice of indoctrinating and training the party aktiv also requires further improvement. Inattention to these important matters leads to serious deficiencies in party work and weakens its influence on the life and training of military personnel. Such facts were subjected to sharp criticism in the past meetings. For example, former secretary Lt Col N. Suslo was not elected to the regimental party committee at the report-election meeting. The party committee here had weak ties with subunit party organizations, engaged little in lively organizational work, and committee members gave insufficient daily assistance to the party aktiv in accomplishing the most difficult tasks.

A new make-up of leading party entities was elected at the meetings. As an analysis shows, this included the most worthy party members having extensive party and service experience and capable of exerting party influence in a qualified and knowledgeable manner on the accomplishment of tasks facing the units and ships. Political directorates and political departments in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, in the Far East, Leningrad and Volga military districts and in the Pacific Fleet promptly arranged for a briefing of newly elected activists and in a number of places there were seminars for secretaries of party committees and bureaus of units and ships and for organizational-party work instructors of political entities. Party group organizers and party organization secretaries joined actively and in a businesslike manner in the work, focusing their efforts on fulfilling tasks of the new training year, the resolutions adopted at report-election meetings, and the party members' critical remarks and suggestions.

Of great importance for a further improvement in the level of party work, in the activeness and spirit of party organizations and in their influence on all aspects of the life and work of units and ships will be an improvement of their direction on the part of political entities.

It is necessary for political entities to have a detailed knowledge of the life of party organizations, give help in assuring a vanguard role of party members, thoughtfully teach the party aktiv the art of organizational and indoctrinational work, improve its ideological-theoretical preparation, and

enrich it with knowledge about matters of party organizational development. The practice of political entities examining their conclusions from the study of party work at sessions of party committees and party bureaus and at general meetings of party members justifies itself.

It is a matter of honor and the invariable duty of party organizations to use the experience gained during the accountability period to direct the increased political, organizational and ideological potential of party collectives at a further implementation of resolutions of the 26th party congress and the November 1982 CPSU CC Plenum, and tasks assigned by the USSR Minister of Defense.

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ARMED FORCES

OUTLINE FOR POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION LECTURE ON ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 83 (signed to press 21 Dec 82) pp 44-54

[Article by Maj Gen S. Tyushkevich, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "For Classes in the Officer Marxist-Leninist Training System: Ideological Opposition on Problems of War and Peace";* passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The question of war and peace is the chief question of modern times. It is not by chance that it is the center of ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism and between the forces of progress and reaction. The exacerbation of this struggle in our days reflects the clash of two opposite directions in world politics. On the one hand, it is the firm and consistent course of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community toward curbing the arms race, strengthening peace, ensuring the security of all countries and nations, and developing their equitable cooperation. On the other hand it is the preparation for war of the United States and its NATO partners, American imperialism's pretensions toward world hegemony, and its conduct of a policy of threats, intervention in the affairs of sovereign states, and suppression of the liberation struggle of nations.

Ideology is the most complex sphere of struggle by the states of the two opposite social systems. V. I. Lenin stated that the ideological opposition of capitalists is "deepest and most powerful" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy [Complete Collected Works], XLI, 406). A special danger is presented by "psychological warfare" and refined ideological subversion conducted by imperialism against socialism. This is why the explanation of the goals and content of our party's foreign policy strategy, a comparison of Marxist-Leninist and pseudoscientific views on problems of war and peace, well-reasoned criticism of militarism's ideology, and the exposure of fabrications spread by bourgeois propaganda concerning CPSU policy in the area of protecting peace and socialism and strengthening the Soviet state's defensive capability and the might of its Armed Forces have unquestioned urgency and are of enormous theoretical and practical significance.

*The article is recommended for use in study of the topic "Ideological opposition on problems of war and peace under present-day conditions."

The chief element in the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and peace is a consistent and uncompromising affirmation of the idea of an organic link between peace and socialism; a link stemming from the fact that the new society does not need war, that war contradicts all its interests and ideals and all aspirations of working people. While capitalism imposed its domination by fire and sword, socialism does not need wars to spread its ideals. Superiority over the old order in organizing society, in the state system and in elevating the standard of living and spiritual culture--these are its weapons.

As before, imperialism is a source of military danger. We recall Lenin's behest that the revolution must be able to defend itself. Following this behest, our party and the Soviet people created powerful armed forces and indestructible defensive might.

At the same time the Soviet Union never proceeded from an assumption that firm peace can be ensured only by military force and a policy built thereon. Such a policy would lead not to peace, but to an arms race, confrontations and, in the final account, to war. This is why our party and the Soviet state are so purposeful in defending the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and why they are so steadfastly following the course of peace and international cooperation.

In counterbalance to the aggressive concepts and subversive actions of forces conducting a course toward recreating the "cold war," the 26th CPSU Congress advanced a specific platform for the defense of peace. "THERE NOW IS NO MORE IMPORTANT TASK ON AN INTERNATIONAL PLANE FOR OUR PARTY, OUR PEOPLE AND FOR ALL NATIONS OF THE PLANET THAN TO DEFEND THE PEACE," it was stressed in the CPSU CC Report to the 26th Congress ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 31).

Any nuclear clash would bring mankind innumerable disasters. This cannot be allowed! That is the essence of the CPSU's approach to the most burning issue of modern times. That is the basis for creating a truly worldwide coalition of antiwar forces. "The peoples are emerging onto the proscenium of history now as never before," said Comrade Yu. V. Andropov in a speech at the November 1982 CPSU CC Plenum. "They have acquired the right of suffrage which no one can stifle. They are capable of eliminating the threat of nuclear war and preserving peace, which means life on our planet, by active and purposeful actions, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Soviet state will do everything to see that that is how it is."

Imperialism and its ideologues approach the problems of war and peace from different positions. Not wishing to be reconciled with the results of World War II and with the relative strengths which took shape in the world arena in postwar years, and especially with the fact of an approximate equality of military-strategic forces of the USSR and United States and of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, they truly have set the goal of attaining the unattainable--achieving military superiority and securing for themselves the role of rulers of the destinies of nations.

Various forms of ideological camouflage are used to justify and implement such a course. Political and military doctrines dangerous to the cause of peace

are advanced so as to make it possible to deceive the peoples, camouflage imperialist expansion and the struggle against social progress, and pass off the class horror with which the monopolistic bourgeoisie views a revolutionary renewal of the world as some kind of feeling common to all mankind.

In cultivating fear, prejudice, lies and hatred, imperialist reaction usually relies on a system of myths fabricated by its ideological underlings intended to "glorify" capitalism and besmirch socialism as its chief enemy.

One such myth newly dragged to light is the legend of the "American era," which allegedly set in after World War II, and of the so-called new "civilizing mission" of the United States. Immediately after Japan's surrender in 1945 then U.S. President H. Truman declared: "Whether we wish it or not, we have to recognize that the victory we won placed a burden of responsibility on the American people for further world leadership." Several years later another president, D. Eisenhower, asserted that the United States must "assume a high role in world affairs--a role of energetic leadership..." U.S. claims to world leadership have become unprecedented in recent years, and they are cloaked by an imaginary concern for preserving general peace. While the United States surpassed everyone in the economic and military sense, states President R. Reagan, nothing threatens the peace, and therefore the guarantee of peace for the future lies in a "restoration of American might."

Recent events show that reactionary circles of the bourgeois world, and the United States above all, are ignoring historic lessons and are again trying to think in categories of diktat and force. The exposure of reactionary views on the sources and causes of wars, on their essence, and on their social character and role in the life of society gains special meaning in this connection.

In examining these matters from the standpoint of their own class interests, bourgeois ideologists use the basic postulates of "classical" teachings on war and they produce new, more refined concepts. We will note that in this case it is not only the most reactionary theories which are antiscientific and harmful, but also the so-called "liberal" theories, since the latter most often confuse people who are not versed in politics.

Western theorists and ideologists above all try to "remove" entirely the question of some kind of responsibility of imperialism for the wars it engenders and shift this responsibility to individuals, depicting their activity as something independent of economic and social-political relations. For example, a number of works devoted to the history of World War II perceive its reasons in the acts of state leaders and diplomats, in mistakes of intelligence personnel and in other secondary, random circumstances ((V. Rut), D. Toland and others). Most often the responsibility for unleashing a war is placed wholly on Hitler and his entourage (M. Freund, J. Fest, P. Yang and others). There are also authors, however, who try to shield the fascist clique, galvanize its legend about a "preventive" war and depict the Soviet Union and the communist movement as the culprits of the world conflict (L. Fischer, W. (Valend) and others).

A scientific appraisal of the causes and character of World War II is provided in documents of the CPSU and other communist parties and in Marxist-Leninist historiography. The 12-volume "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939--1945" [History of World War II 1939-1945], publication of which has been completed in the USSR, reveals, for example, the close link of the origin and consequences of war with the content of the contemporary era. Imperialism as a whole was the source of World War II. Its causes are rooted in the politics and economics of monopoly capitalism. As the shock force of imperialist reaction, fascism became the chief tool for preparing and unleashing this war.

So-called psychological theories have become rather widespread in the West. According to them, the deepest roots of wars lie in man's "aggressive nature," in his militant psychology, his "striving for death" on the battlefield and so on. Assertions that wars are programmed in human genes are very popular. The West German psychoanalyst A. Macherlich, American philosopher-anthropologist R. Ardrey, American sociologist A. (Meyerlo) and others are the spokesmen for this trend.

Other views also exist on the origin of wars. Representatives of the so-called "sociological theory of factors" believe that the causes of wars cannot be reduced to a single fundamental social-economic source. For example, G. Blainey identifies 33 causes for the outbreak of wars and R. Bigler numbers them in the "thousands and millions." Ignoring the class essence of politics and production relationships, some bourgeois ideologists view the growth of industry and the development of science and technology as a self-sufficing force which fatalistically generates military conflicts. French sociologist R. Aron, for example, actively spreads such views.

Also presenting a serious danger are concepts which falsify the essence and social character of modern wars and which on this antiscientific basis foster the monstrous idea of the "acceptability" and even "expediency" of using nuclear missile weapons as a "supreme arbitrator" in resolving interstate contradictions. Today's U.S. leaders undertake to assert that a nuclear war against countries of socialism "can be won." It is apropos to recall in this connection the stern warning of the Soviet leadership that only a person who has decided to commit suicide can begin a nuclear war in the hope of emerging from it a winner. No matter what might an attacker has and no matter what method of unleashing nuclear war he chooses, he will not attain his goals. Retribution will follow inevitably.

The wild idea of the "destruction of socialism as a sociopolitical system" gives the nuclear maniacs no rest. That is how Carter's concept of the admissibility and possibility of a "limited" nuclear war, presented in the well-known Presidential Directive No 59, appeared several years ago. An assessment of this concept was given at the 26th CPSU Congress, where note was taken of its adventuristic nature and extreme danger to all nations, including the Americans.

Despite the fact that all progressive mankind condemned this concept, the Reagan administration not only joined it, but even supplemented it with a line of conducting a "protracted" nuclear war and winning victory over the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries in such a war.

The concepts of "limited" and "protracted" nuclear war, which make up an important element of the politics and ideology of ruling U.S. circles and of their military plans are rightly evaluated by the progressive world public as foolhardy and dangerous to the cause of peace and social progress. First of all, because they serve the policy of whipping up international tension. By stockpiling arms the American ruling circles wish to break the approximate equality of military forces between the United States and USSR and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Secondly, because these and similar concepts are used by reactionary circles of imperialism to deceive the masses of people as a means of "psychological warfare" unleashed against the USSR and other peace-loving forces.

Views aimed at justifying the imperialist policy of unleashing local wars have seen no small amount of dissemination among bourgeois ideologists. It is believed that in a local war violence comprises an unessential feature, and that politics decides everything (R. Osgood). In the face of historic truth, imperialism's politics is depicted as peaceloving and just.

In examining military violence as a deciding factor in preserving the position of imperialist powers and suppressing the social protest of the exploited and oppressed, bourgeois ideologists distort in every way possible the Marxist-Leninist criteria of the moral-legal evaluation of wars and their division into just and unjust.

Truly just wars--in defense of socialist homelands and the achievements of proletarian and national liberation revolutions--are subjected to especially refined falsification. Some western theorists categorically state that "an amoral character is organically inherent to revolutionary war" and that during such a war allegedly "the end justifies any means" (D. Collins). At the same time they state with aplomb that a war which is prepared and planned by the United States and other NATO countries is legitimate and just in all instances inasmuch as it is a question of the defense of the "free world," "democracy" and so on. These apologists of imperialism are not even interested in the question of how a system built on violence and the exploitation and oppression of man by man and of certain classes by others can struggle for justice.

Marxism-Leninism proved theoretically and social reality did so practically that the just nature of wars is determined by the politics of leading, revolutionary classes which are taking up arms only when reactionary forces of society compel them to do so. And to the contrary, the politics of reactionary classes which defend relationships of exploitation and which struggle against social progress determines the unjust nature of wars.

Communists act resolutely against unjust, reactionary wars, struggle for a restriction and prevention of all kinds of aggressive actions of imperialism and at the same time support the just actions of oppressed classes and nations against their oppressors with guns in hand, and armed defense of freedom and independence of nations.

Attention should be directed in this regard at the intensifying attempts by imperialist reaction to depict the liberation struggle as a manifestation of "terrorism," to disorient the antiwar movement, to knock the enemies of a

world nuclear war from their positions, and to attune them against the Soviet Union, which allegedly is aggravating the world situation by its support of liberating wars.

Ever greater importance is being assumed now by exposure of the myth of the "Soviet military threat," which has been turned by imperialism's politicians and ideologists into a "psychological warfare" tool and an instrument for supporting reactionary movements and trends both inside and outside capitalist society.

Aggressive circles of imperialism are trying to accomplish several interrelated tasks while screening themselves with this myth. First of all, they want to undermine the relaxation in international tension and hinder implementation of the Peace Program for the 1980's developed by the 26th CPSU Congress. Secondly, the military-industrial complex needs the myth of the "Soviet military threat" to preserve and increase the superprofits and strengthen their influence both in their own countries and in the international arena. Thirdly, this myth is used by reactionary forces to justify the arms race and create new weapon systems. Fourthly, it permits reactionary circles of imperialism to conduct a more active offensive against the rights of workers, restrict bourgeois-democratic freedoms and simultaneously intervene in the internal affairs of other countries and accomplish the "export of counterrevolution." Fifthly, by using this myth imperialism strives to undermine the authority of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community and discredit their peaceloving aspirations, including activities aimed at keeping the defensive capability of the Warsaw Pact Organization at the necessary level.

Even the most inveterate anticommunists and antisoviets do not believe in the monstrous lie about the "Soviet military threat." Nevertheless the West does not wish to place this decrepit bugbear outside the door of serious politics. By brandishing this bugbear, imperialist reaction tries to depict the arms race being conducted in the United States and other NATO countries as a certain "response" to the "build-up in military might" by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations.

In addition, for purposes of direct ideological influence on Soviet citizens imperialist propaganda asserts that the USSR is striving for military supremacy and so is spending enormously more on defense than necessary for its security. The pamphlet entitled "Soviet Military Might" published in late 1981 by the Pentagon and the pamphlet "NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Relative Strengths" later published by the United States in the name of the North Atlantic Alliance serve as an example of this. These pamphlets depict the Soviet Armed Forces and their weapons in a false light and advance the thesis of the alleged "overwhelming" military superiority of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact Organization. The idea is pursued at the same time that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact have no right at all to parity. What can be said in this regard?

The socialist community really does have significant military might, but this might has an exclusively defensive orientation and serves as a factor for strengthening peace and stopping aggression.

The world public knows that there are convincing arguments confirming the presence of a military-strategic equilibrium between the USSR and United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This equilibrium objectively serves to preserve peace on our planet. We have not strived for, nor are we striving for, military superiority over another side, but the Soviet people also will not allow military superiority to be created over our country. Such attempts are absolutely hopeless!

A military threat really does exist, but its source is not the Soviet Union or its mythical military superiority. Its source is the arms race being carried on by the imperialist countries, and the international tension preserved through their fault. In the face of this irrefutable fact, bourgeois ideologists continue to try to drag out the idea that militarization of the social life of many capitalist states presents no danger to the cause of peace. No matter what motives are used to substantiate it--economic, political or ideological--the arms race unleashed and whipped up by imperialism is doing mankind colossal damage.

Can we really reconcile ourselves with the fact that each year some \$500 billion is spent to create new weapon models and maintain armies in the world? This is a sum which if used for peaceful purposes would produce exceptional results even now. It is quite obvious that every new and increasingly costly round in the arms race increases instability in international relations, is dangerous because of a return to "cold war" times, and serves as a stimulus for fabrication of various aggressive doctrines and concepts and all kinds of provocative myths being spread by bourgeois means of propaganda and poisoning the international atmosphere. Finally, the higher the level of military opposition and the more "combustible material" is stockpiled, the more realistic is the threat of a world conflagration.

The USSR and other countries of the socialist community cannot help but reckon with such a state of affairs. While conducting a peaceloving policy they are forced to show thorough concern for their defense. The Soviet state's peaceful foreign policy and its readiness to offer a rebuff to aggressors merge as one in the activity of the Communist Party and people. The present-day world situation compels the Soviet state to show steadfast concern for keeping its defense potential at a level sufficient to ensure that no one risks disrupting our people's peaceful life. As emphasized by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, the Soviet Union never has waived and never will waive its security and that of its allies. It spends as much as necessary for military purposes to ensure its reliable defense and for joint defense of the achievements of socialism together with fraternal countries.

Forces hostile to the new society distort the nature of the Soviet state's economic, social-political and strictly military measures accomplished in the interests of assuring its self-protection. Bourgeois ideologists, with

representatives of the military-industrial complex and the most aggressive circles of imperialism functioning in their front ranks, are distorting the social nature of Soviet military organizational development and the historical purpose of our Armed Forces. It is typical that these efforts not only have not weakened over time, but are constantly growing. The reason is that the ideological enemies of socialism are striving above all to weaken its military organization.

The version of the "export of revolution," permeated through and through by anticommunism and antisovietism, is the basis of the diverse techniques and methods for falsifying the social nature of the Soviet military organization and the historic purpose of the USSR Armed Forces being used by our ideological enemies. U.S. bourgeois historians and sociologists--L. Fischer, R. Kolkowicz, (K. Kolgrouv) and others--have held a noticeable place in its dissemination for many years. The political direction of their "works" consists of an unsubstantiated, slanderous accusation against the Soviet Union of aggression and a desire to seize other states.

The combat path covered by the Soviet Armed Forces also has been falsified for a long while from such positions. J. Erickson, (K. Khouv) and certain other British, American, West German and French "memoirists" distort the Soviet Army's liberating mission in World War II, falsely asserting that the "Red Army used all its forces, arms and material resources to establish Soviet authority." Such a crude falsification is intended to sow doubt regarding the liberating mission of the Soviet Armed Forces.

During World War II our troops really were on the territory of a number of countries, but they were there because this was caused by the military necessity of the struggle against and total defeat of the aggressor. Soviet troops never violated the sovereignty of states and did not encroach on the independence of peoples. Popular democratic and socialist revolutions occurred in those countries where necessary internal prerequisites had formed for this. Revolutions did not occur where such prerequisites were absent even though Soviet troops were on the territory of these countries (Norway, Austria, Iran). At the same time there were no Soviet forces in Albania, Vietnam and Cuba, and revolutions nevertheless occurred there.

Leninist ideas about the historic missions of the Soviet Armed Forces saw further development in the concise, laconic articles of the USSR Constitution. Nevertheless, their social nature and functions continue to be an object of constant forays by bourgeois ideologists. They are silent about the fact that this is a new type of army with its inherent patterns of development and functioning. Bourgeois ideologists use as "arguments" for distorting the Soviet Army's social nature fabricated statements about its "similarity" with the Czarist Army and even its "identity" with the war machine of the United States and other developed capitalist countries. False documents are fabricated about the alleged "caste" character of the Soviet officer corps.

The character and principles of relationships between the USSR Armed Forces and other state entities, with the people, and with the Communist Party also are subjected to furious attacks and open falsification. A distortion of the party's leading role in Soviet military organizational development is the main

direction of ideological subversion of many bourgeois theorists (L. Shapiro, R. Garthoff, N. Galai and others). They accuse the CPSU of allegedly creating the Red Army to establish dictatorship in society and then establishing a dictatorship in the Army itself. The thesis of the CPSU's growing role in leadership of the Armed Forces, which is an objective pattern of military organizational development, is distorted in every way.

Fabrications by western ideologists who falsify the nature of the Soviet Armed Forces and the CPSU's leading role in military organizational development, are refuted by the very practice of socialism and by organization of its defense. Social relationships established as a result of the building of mature socialism assure a consistent implementation of Leninist ideas about defense of the socialist homeland and implementation in practice of scientifically grounded principles of military organizational development. They permit a most proper determination of ways to strengthen and improve our state's defenses.

Taking advantage of nationalism, some bourgeois ideologists attempt to distort the social nature and historic purpose of armies of countries of the socialist community and present relationships among them in a false light. Reality refutes the malicious fabrications by enemies of socialism. It is well known that the Warsaw Pact Organization is a defensive alliance of sovereign socialist states with equal rights. Relations among armies in this alliance are based on principles of socialist internationalism and rest on a firm foundation of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.

The military-political defensive alliance of countries of socialism faithfully serves the cause of peace. It has everything necessary to defend socialist achievements of the peoples reliably.

The problems of war and peace, of political and military detente, and of stopping the aggressive actions of reactionary forces are the focus of ideological struggle. Imperialists and their accomplices systematically conduct hostile campaigns against socialist countries, and function more and more in a more and more refined and crafty manner. This requires Soviet citizens and Army and Navy personnel to have high political vigilance and an ability to offer a resolute rebuff to the class enemy's propaganda actions.

Recommendations for Seminar Study

The seminar study on the topic "IDEOLOGICAL OPPOSITION ON PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE UNDER PRESENT-DAY CONDITIONS" will help students gain a thorough and comprehensive understanding of the struggle of the two opposite ideologies--socialist, which serves to strengthen general peace and develop a mutually advantageous cooperation of states with different social systems; and bourgeois, which undermines this cooperation and places the world on the brink of a precipice; and it will help them examine class roots and the essence of antiscientific concepts of war and peace, the aggressive direction of capitalist armies, and the essence of imperialism's bloc politics.

The following primary issues are recommended for discussion: 1. Anticommunism is the main ideological-political weapon of imperialism and of the enemies of peace and detente. 2. Contemporary bourgeois concepts of war and peace are a reflection of imperialism's reactionary interests. 3. The ideology of militarism at the service of reaction and war.

After introductory remarks it is advisable for the seminar leader to hear the paper "IMPORTANCE OF THE MARXIST-LENINIST TEACHING ON WAR AND THE ARMY FOR DEVELOPING THE PERSONNEL'S IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTION AND CONSTANT READINESS TO DEFEND THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SOCIALISM."

IN DISCUSSING THE FIRST QUESTION it is necessary above all to clarify that anticommunism is called upon to conceal the historic doom of the last exploiting system and the spiritual bankruptcy of the bourgeoisie. Its content is slander of the socialist system and falsification of the politics and goals of communist parties and the teaching of Marxism-Leninism.

In analyzing contemporary anticommunism it must be borne in mind that the discordant and contradictory chorus of anticommunists is united by one feature. Not being capable of accomplishing the tasks set for them in open theoretical polemics with Marxism-Leninism, all of them strive to shift the field of struggle into the sphere of ordinary consciousness and resort to refined methods of ideological conditioning of the masses and to waging a "psychological war" against real socialism. It has come down to a situation where now practically all elements of the U.S. governmental apparatus and that of a number of other capitalist countries are involved in the "psychological war" being waged against the USSR, fraternal countries of socialism, and communist and working parties. It is directed by the president of the United States of America and his closest assistants and it is conducted by special subversive services. Numerous institutions specializing in a struggle against communism work for it. There are over 150 of them in the United States alone.

Generous appropriations are made for all this subversive work. For example, just the budget of the U.S. Information Agency--the main department of official foreign policy propaganda--exceeds \$640 million annually. Enormous funds are spent for maintaining the Voice of America as well as the Liberty and Free Europe radio stations, the piratic (in the full sense of the word) activity of which is programmed by the CIA.

It is of no small importance to note that head-on, double-dyed anticommunism designed for the man in the street and for layers of the population most backward in the political and spiritual sense, not only has not left the scene of late, but to the contrary, has become more active. A turn from "flexible" more or less artfully camouflaged anticommunism to a head-on attack against Marxism-Leninism and real socialism has appeared with all definiteness at the borderline of the 1970's and 1980's. Washington has even gotten to the point of saying that socialism is a "chance outcome of history" doomed to disappear.

At the same time it must be borne in mind that all this in no way indicates a rejection of subtle anticommunism speculating on the "democratic" phrase, on a showy "objectivity" of information, or on a more adroit embellishment of capitalism.

Apologetics of capitalism should be named above all in the seminar as among the basic directions of contemporary anticommunist and antisoviet propaganda. Describing the "advantages" of so-called free enterprise and political pluralism in all ways, it is silent about such vices of capitalism as poverty and unemployment in the very citadels of imperialism. It is also silent about the particularly terrible position of workers in dozens of economically weakly developed countries which are in the orbit of capitalism and mercilessly exploited by monopolies.

Anticommunists of all stripes also are focusing their chief efforts on besmirching the achievements of real socialism and distorting its essence. Hostile propaganda attempts to introduce the thought that the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist Party allegedly is "incompatible" with sovereignty of the people and socialism is "incompatible" with democracy. It does everything to discredit the Soviet Union's peaceloving foreign policy, to arouse nationalistic sentiments and religious prejudices, and infect the young generation above all with a spirit of consumerism.

In completing a discussion of the first issue it must be noted that our party will continue to offer a resolute rebuff to anticommunism and antisovietism, mercilessly expose the class enemy and disrupt his ideological subversion. At the same time, as Comrade Yu. V. Andropov pointed out at the November 1982 CPSU CC Plenum, the Communist Party is against having a controversy of ideas turning into a confrontation between states and nations or for weapons and a readiness to resort to them becoming the yardstick of potentials of social systems.

Discussion of the SECOND ISSUE is best begun with a clarification of the fact that ideological struggle is not conducted generally or abstractly, but around very concrete and burning problems. The problem of war and peace today is such a problem. It is here that the most important sector of the ideological front passes and where responsible tasks of exposing bourgeois and revisionist falsifications are accomplished.

In problems of war and peace the efforts of anticommunists are focused on preventing the broad masses of people from understanding the real essence of peaceful coexistence and detente as the most important conditions for preventing a world nuclear missile war representing catastrophic danger to mankind. They depict matters in such a way that allegedly detente is advantageous only to socialism and the Soviet Union is using it for "conquering the West" and so on.

It must be noted that ideological struggle in problems of war and peace was conducted earlier as well, but it became especially exacerbated at the borderline of the 1970's and 1980's when the Reagan administration, with a course set for undermining detente, came to power in the United States. In this situation the tone in bourgeois ideology is set by the heralds of the doctrines of "limited" and "protracted" nuclear war and adherents of the "first strike strategy."

The malicious antisoviet and anticommunist goals are reflected with greatest openness in the "direct confrontation" strategy adopted by Washington in the

1980's. It envisages a fierce confrontation against the Soviet Union and use of U.S. military might to impose its will on any state in any part of the world, to oppose the struggle of popular masses for social and national liberation, and to block the establishment of countries freed from the colonial yoke which have chosen the progressive path of development.

The primary goal of militant imperialist reaction is to eliminate the approximate equality in military-strategic forces which has formed between the United States and USSR and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the striving to surpass the Soviet Union in the military respect and dictate its own conditions on it.

The fact that primary emphasis in military preparations is placed on the development of strategic offensive forces and nuclear arms of all kinds also eloquently indicates the ominous nature of the "direct confrontation" strategy. New weapon systems are being created and conventional systems are being perfected, and extensive use of weapons for mass destruction of people, including neutron, chemical, beam and other weapons, is envisaged. U.S. politicians and strategists are showing particular concern for creating the potential for a nuclear first strike and making their own territory safe against nuclear war.

Contemporary bourgeois concepts of war and peace represent a complicated and motley picture, but they are united by the similarity of the statement that war remains an eternal, absolute category and peace is merely a rare, random phenomenon in the life of society.

Contemporary bourgeois concepts of war and peace which justify the aggressive U.S. foreign policy course cannot have a future. The Soviet Union's foreign policy and the ideology substantiating it are struggling for the only sensible path of world development--the path of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Communists assert that there is no fatal inevitability of nuclear war.

This conclusion is based on a scientific analysis of the content and essence of the new historical era opened by the Great October Socialist Revolution and is confirmed by years of international detente. The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community use the course toward curbing the arms race, strengthening peace and detente and defending sovereign rights and freedom of nations to oppose the course of the United States and its allies toward undermining detente and exciting the arms race, the course of threats and intervention in others' affairs and suppression of liberation struggle.

Expressing the Soviet people's unbending will for peace, our party confirmed the invariable foreign policy course of the Soviet state aimed at the defense of life on our planet at the November 1982 CPSU CC Plenum. This course reflects the aspirations of all peaceloving mankind.

"We believe that the difficulties and tension which characterize today's international situation can and must be overcome. Mankind cannot be endlessly reconciled with the arms race and with wars if it does not wish to gamble on its future." These words of our Party CC General Secretary Comrade Yu. V.

Andropov spoken at the November 1982 CPSU CC Plenum contain the deep concern of Soviet party members for the destiny of generations now living and of the future. And these words contain a firm belief and conviction that it is not weapons and force, but the peoples' reason and will that are of decisive importance.

In order to fight for peace successfully, it is necessary to know its enemies well. An analysis of the problem of contemporary militarism acquires particular urgency in this regard.

In discussing the THIRD ISSUE it is necessary to take account of the internal structure of militarism, its ties with other components of capitalist society and its influence on the basic aspects of foreign policy, the economic system and the state apparatus for attaining those goals which are pursued by the most aggressive and reactionary imperialist circles within the country and in the international arena.

It is important to identify in the seminar how deeply militarism has "rooted" itself in capitalist society and what broad opportunities it has today to influence the formation and practical realization of the official leadership's political course and for slowing up the relaxation in international tension.

In order to reveal more deeply the class nature and practical direction of militarism and its offspring, the military-industrial complex, it is best to turn to concrete facts showing the interrelationship of state-monopoly capitalism and modern militarism in their attempts to continue the "cold war" against peace and socialism, to preserve international tension and halt the course of social progress and the national-liberation movement.

Lenin's thesis that in a bourgeois society "militarism is the chief tool of class oppression" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XVI, 73) not only retains its significance, but also receives more and more confirmation. It is sufficient to cite data on the increase in military expenditures per capita to be convinced of this. As early as the mid-1970's they were five times higher in the United States than before World War II. In the next five years the American ruling circles plan to spend the astronomical sum of over \$1.6 trillion on the arms race.

With reliance on military might, the United States is making efforts to activate present aggressive military-political alliances and create new ones. New military bases are being added to those already existing thousands of kilometers from the United States and directed against the USSR and its allies. There is a build-up in American presence abroad in such strategically important areas as the Near and Middle East and the Indian Ocean basin. In weaving an ominous web of bases, the United States is attempting to envelop an ever increasing number of countries in it. We are speaking above all about Kenya, Somalia and Oman, bases of which already are being used by the Americans. The cultivation of a number of other nonaligned states is proceeding for the very same purpose. All means are being set in motion--political blackmail, intimidation with the mythical "Soviet threat," and promises of economic and military "assistance."

Pentagon plans to create new aggressive blocs indicate global U.S. military preparations. No small role in such blocs is given to the association of Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN), members of which are Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, which occupy key positions on routes from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. In Washington's opinion, in addition to the ASEAN "five," Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and Chile also should become possible participants of the new anticommunist bloc being knocked together under U.S. aegis. This composition in itself eloquently indicates that Washington intends to impose the fulfillment of many gendarme functions in the Pacific Ocean basin on the allies, above all on Japan, linked with the United States by a "security treaty; Australia, an ally in the ANZUS military bloc; as well as the ASEAN countries, which are planned for inclusion in the orbit of imperialist adventures.

The granting of generous military assistance to reactionary and antipopular regimes in exchange for their inclusion in implementation of American imperialism's global and regional plans also is in the channel of militarism's ominous ideology. Acts of open aggression and international banditism committed by such states as Israel and the Republic of South Africa are encouraged.

In concluding an analysis of contemporary militarism it is necessary to provide an evaluation of the powerful forces of historic progress headed by the Soviet Union which oppose it. "We are resolutely and invariably on the side of those who even today are forced to fight for freedom, independence and the very existence of their peoples and who are forced to repulse the aggressor's onslaught or are subjected to the threat of aggression," declared CPSU CC General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov in the report "The USSR's 60th Anniversary." "And this our position is inseparable from that struggle for a firm peace on earth which the Soviet Union is conducting consistently and steadfastly."

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ARMED FORCES

REPORT MATERIALS FOR 65TH ANNIVERSARY OF SOVIET ARMY AND NAVY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 83 (signed to press 21 Dec 82) pp 55-60

[Article: "Our Calendar: Powerful Guardian of Socialism and Peace (Materials for Reports and Discussions about the 65th Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy)"]

[Text] The heroic history of the Soviet Armed Forces began on 23 February of the menacing year of 1918. Created by the will of the Communist Party and the genius of V. I. Lenin for defending achievements of the Great October, they covered a grand combat path and became a powerful guardian over socialism and peace.

The present 65th anniversary of the Army and Navy is being celebrated in an atmosphere where Soviet citizens, inspired by resolutions of the November 1982 CPSU CC Plenum and materials of the joint ceremonial sessions of the CPSU CC, USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet devoted to the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation, are working selflessly to fulfill and overfulfill the plan for the third and central year of the 11th Five-Year Plan.

The Soviet people's armed defenders are living with the same thoughts and deeds. Solidifying their ranks about the Communist Party and unanimously supporting its domestic and foreign policy, personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces see as their duty to stand vigilantly and reliably on guard over our people's great achievements and reinforce the Motherland's defensive might by selfless military labor.

The birth, establishment and development of the Soviet Armed Forces is linked inseparably with the name of V. I. Lenin and with the work of the Communist Party. Lenin's historic service is that he substantiated the objective need for defending the workers' revolutionary achievements and elaborated a military program of proletarian revolution and the teaching on defense of the socialist homeland.

Lenin revealed the class character and features of the new type of army; determined the principles of its organizational development--social-political, organizational, training and indoctrination; and substantiated that party

leadership of the Armed Forces is the chief source of their might and invincibility. Lenin's ideas and statements about defense of the socialist homeland, which saw imaginative development in CPSU documents and the USSR Constitution, comprise the basis of party policy in military organizational development.

The Great October's victory generated malice and hatred in the internal counterrevolution and international imperialism. They acted as a single front against the Soviet Union. The question was whether or not there was to be a power of the workers in Russia. Having no necessary practical experience, the party began creating a mass, regular, strictly disciplined army under the exceptionally difficult conditions of the Civil War and foreign intervention.

The first revolutionary regiments were activated in the February days of 1918 on the basis of Lenin's decrees about organizing the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Navy (signed on 28 January and 11 February 1918 respectively). The Army and Navy matured, their combat effectiveness strengthened and their size rose in the struggle against the enemies. In the flame of three years of Civil War battles they crushed the hordes of White Guards and interventionists and defended the achievements of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The transition to peaceful construction was made in a complicated international and internal situation. Having lost the war against the Land of Soviets, the world bourgeoisie did not give up plans to destroy the socialist system. The danger of a military attack against our Motherland rose especially during the 1930's. Reared on billions of American dollars, German imperialism restored its economic might and attempted not only to return everything lost in World War I, but also fundamentally redivide the world in its favor. This was a course toward war, and it began to be conducted at frantic rates by Hitler fascism, placed in power in the country by the leading hierarchy of German imperialism.

Fascist leadership conducted the preparations for war to redivide the world under the cloak of appeals for a crusade against communism. Ruling circles of imperialist countries acquired a force in the person of fascist Germany by which they hoped to destroy world communism and eliminate the Soviet Union. Therefore the largest western monopolies gave Hitler the broadest financial and military-technical assistance.

The Communist Party and Soviet state clearly saw the increased military threat on the part of imperialism, they displayed high vigilance, and they skillfully combined peaceful socialist construction with a strengthening of national defense. In so doing they strictly followed Lenin's directions to accompany our steps toward peace by a girding of all our military readiness, to be on guard, and to safeguard the defensive capability of our country and our Red Army as the apple of our eye (see "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XL, 248; XLIV, 300).

The fulfillment of Lenin's plan for building socialism--conduct of socialist industrialization, collectivization of agriculture and a cultural revolution; and a just solution to the problem of nationalities--turned the Soviet Union into a mighty socialist power. A powerful defense industry was created on the

basis of the socialist economy and, on the eve of war, it developed three times faster than other sectors of industry.

The Communist Party carried out a system of measures for direct strengthening of the Armed Forces. From 1939 through June 1941 their size almost trebled and a technical refitting of the Army and Navy was accomplished. The personnel's combat schooling and ideological-political indoctrination was improved and the work of political entities and party organizations was activated. The number of party members in the Army and Navy rose a little over threefold during the 2½ prewar years. All this facilitated an increase in the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces.

Fascist Germany's piratic attack on our country on 22 June 1941 disrupted the Soviet people's peaceful creative labor. This aggression was prepared by the entire international imperialist reaction and signified the largest action by shock forces of imperialism against socialism. Hitler's clique counted on crushing the Soviet Union by a blitzkrieg and clearing the path for itself to win world supremacy.

The enemy threw the main mass of his forces against our country: 190 divisions, over 4,000 tanks and around 5,000 aircraft. The aggressor surpassed Soviet troops in the border districts by almost twofold in size, and surpassed them considerably in artillery and in outfitting with new models of tanks and aircraft. The Hitlerites' surprise attack placed the Red Army in an extremely difficult position. Shock groupings of fascist forces were rushing toward Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. The Red Army was forced to retreat with heavy fighting.

Mortal danger hovered over our country. It was a question of the fate of the first socialist state in the world. The destinies of the nations of Europe and all world civilization and all mankind's salvation from the threat of fascist enslavement also depended on this state's steadfastness and ability to halt and crush the aggressor.

In this extraordinary situation, guided by Lenin's ideas about defense of the socialist homeland, the Communist Party lifted up all nations of the Land of Soviets for a resolute rebuff to the aggressor and for a sacred Great Patriotic War. The Directive of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] CC and USSR Sovnarkom [Council of People's Commissars] adopted on 29 June 1941 was a program for realigning the country's entire life on a war-time footing, for turning it into a single combat camp, and for mobilizing all forces and means to defeat the enemy. The main idea of this party document was "everything for the front, everything for victory!"

Inspired and led by the Leninist Party, the Soviet Armed Forces withstood the enemy's powerful attacks in the course of determined and fierce engagements. The Red Army's resistance rose. The Battle of Smolensk, in which the Soviet Guards wereborn, lasted two months. More and more often our troops would move into an offensive from the defensive. At Yel'nya they crushed eight enemy divisions. By delaying fascist troops on defensive lines the Red Army

provided the time to conduct mobilization, activate new units and combined units, and reorganize the national economy on a wartime footing. All this permitted Soviet troops to shift into a counteroffensive at Moscow in early December 1941 and inflict a major defeat on the enemy.

The defeat of the more than million-man strategic grouping of fascist German forces in the Battle of Moscow and the Red Army's successful offensive in the winter of 1941/1942 were of enormous military-political and international significance. These victories demonstrated to the entire world the inexhaustible strength and might of the Soviet state and its famed Armed Forces.

The fascists' defeat at Moscow became the decisive military-political event of the first year of the Patriotic War and marked the beginning of its fundamental turning point. This was the first major defeat of the Hitlerites in World War II. Our forces once and for all disrupted the fascist plan of blitzkrieg and dispelled the myth of the invincibility of the German Wehrmacht.

Trying to get revenge for the defeat at Moscow and continuing to count on winning victory in the war, the Hitlerite command prepared a new major offensive on the Eastern Front. Taking advantage of the fact that our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, England and the United States, had not carried out their promise to open up a second front in Europe in 1942, Hitler continued to send more and more troops to the east. By the fall of 1942 266 enemy divisions were concentrated at the Soviet-German Front, of which there were 193 German divisions--almost $1\frac{1}{2}$ times more than in the year the war began. But still Hitler's clique did not dare conduct an offensive across the entire front. It concentrated the best troops on the southern wing, creating a preponderance of forces in their favor here.

The Battle of Stalingrad which unfolded in the latter half of 1942 (the 40th anniversary of which is being widely celebrated by the Soviet people) had no equal in world military history in the scope, intensity and numbers of troops and combat equipment involved. More than two million persons and greater than 25,000 guns and mortars, and thousands of aircraft, tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts on both sides took part in it.

The unprecedented engagement of Soviet and fascist German armies went on for $6\frac{1}{2}$ months over vast expanses of the area between the Volga and Don rivers. It became a stern test of the strength and vitality of opposing sociopolitical systems--socialist and capitalist. In early February 1943 the great battle on the Volga ended in a brilliant victory of the Soviet system and Soviet weapons. The history of warfare had never before known an example where such large enemy forces--more than 330,000 officers and men--were fully surrounded and then defeated and captured. The fascist bloc lost a total of around 1.5 million persons between the Volga and the Don.

The victory at Stalingrad changed not only the strategic situation at the Soviet-German Front, but also the distribution of forces throughout the world. Hitler's plans of winning world domination crumbled once and for all. The Battle of Stalingrad marked the beginning of a fundamental turning point in the Great Patriotic War and in World War II as a whole.

The powerful offensive by Soviet Armed Forces in the winter of 1942/1943 in the North Caucasus, on the Upper and Lower Don, at Voronezh, in the vicinity of Rzhev and Demyansk and at Stalingrad permitted throwing the enemy back to the west up to 600-700 km in some parts of the front and liberating a territory of 480,000 km². Millions of Soviet citizens were liberated from fascist slavery and the mass expulsion of the enemy from Soviet soil began.

But Hitler Germany still possessed great military might. Striving to get revenge this time for Stalingrad, Hitler and his entourage decided to undertake a new major offensive in the summer of 1943 in the vicinity of the Kursk Bulge. The fascist command scrupulously and carefully prepared Operation Citadel. More than 50 fully manned and well trained enemy divisions, including 20 panzer and motorized divisions, concentrated at the base of the Kursk Bulge in the vicinity of Orel and Belgorod in readiness to fall on our forces.

The Soviet command carefully followed the enemy's actions and, after uncovering his plans thoroughly and in detail, it decided to greet the offensive by fascist German forces with a strong deliberate defense, the mission of which was to exhaust and bleed the enemy dry, then complete the rout of his attack groupings by moving into a counteroffensive.

The Battle of Kursk, the 40th anniversary of which the Soviet people and their Armed Forces are preparing to celebrate, took place according to plans of the Soviet and not the Hitlerite command. The Red Army halted the attack by fascist troops through heroic efforts and then moved into a decisive counteroffensive. On 5 August our troops liberated Orel and Belgorod, and on 23 August they liberated Khar'kov. During 50 days of fighting in the "Fiery Bulge," Soviet troops routed 30 enemy divisions, including seven panzer divisions, and destroyed up to 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns, more than 3,500 aircraft and much other enemy equipment. The victory at Kursk marked the beginning of a grandiose offensive which unfolded across a front from Taman' to Velikiye Luki. Soviet forces rushed forward irresistibly to liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine and Donbass, to make an assault crossing of the Dnepr and seize bridgeheads on its right bank.

By the end of September the Red Army had won the battle for the "All-Union Stoker," the Donbass; liberated many areas of the Left-Bank Ukraine; and moved onto a 750-kilometer front from Loyev to the Zaporozh'ye and the Dnepr. The Hitlerites hoped to drag out the war and reinforce the crumbling fascist bloc by a defense on the Dnepr, but they miscalculated. Soviet troops began the assault crossing of the Dnepr without any pause in many sectors simultaneously and took bridgeheads on its right bank. The enemy was driven out of Kiev on 6 November.

The Battle of Kursk and the Red Army's move to the Dnepr completed the radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War and all of World War II. The Soviet Union was able to achieve outstanding successes in the war against fascist Germany. The Red Army's victory in the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge, the Soviet forces' move to the Dnepr and its assault crossing were very important stages along the path to total defeat of the fascist German Army.

Now and until the end of the war the strategic initiative was held firmly by the Soviet Armed Forces. The Korsun'-Shevchenkivskiy Operation, Operation Bagration in Belorussia, the battle for the Soviet Baltic, liberation of peoples of Europe enslaved by fascism and, finally, the assault on Berlin are only some of the milestones of the Red Army's grand victories on the very difficult roads of the concluding period of the Great Patriotic War. The fascist German state crumbled under the blows of Soviet troops. Fascism was crushed in its lair. Hitler Germany surrendered unconditionally on 8 May 1945.

Carrying out its allied obligation precisely, the Soviet Union declared war on militarist Japan on 8 August 1945. The Mongolian People's Republic also entered the war against Japan and the People's Liberation Army of China headed by communists moved into an offensive against the Japanese invaders.

In the course of 25 days the Red Army routed the Kwantung Army of over a million men and liberated Northeast China with its population of 40 million under difficult conditions of the Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations. Militarist Japan signed the unconditional surrender document on 2 September 1945.

During the war the Soviet Armed Forces, multinational in composition and socialist in essence and built on Leninist social-political and organizational principles, defeated the strongest armies of the capitalist world which had great combat experience. Soviet military science and military art proved their full superiority over bourgeois military theory and practice. The strategic offensive was the chief form of our forces' combat actions. Thirty-five out of the 51 strategic operations they conducted during the war were offensive. Many of them rightly are considered brilliant models of military art. Even at the present time the Great Patriotic War combat experience is of great importance for training and indoctrinating soldiers and for successful accomplishment of missions facing the Army and Navy.

The Communist Party was the inspirer and organizer of the victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces after having ensured unity of political, economic and military-strategic leadership. The party's supreme service is that it was able to implement in practice the capabilities and advantages of the socialist system and mobilize and channel the energy and force of a powerful community of USSR nations to defeat German fascism and Japanese militarism.

The Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War led to serious changes for the better in the correlation of class forces in the world arena. It immeasurably accelerated and deepened the world revolutionary process. Even at the present time the effects of the great victory on world development are being manifested, reflected above all in a further strengthening of world socialism, the communist, working and national liberation movement, and all anti-imperialist forces; and in a weakening of the positions and narrowing of the sphere of action of imperialism. The results of the war, which confirmed the indestructibility of socialism, serve as a formidable warning to any latter-day pretenders to world domination. It is useful for lovers of military adventures to remember the words, full of very deep meaning and already confirmed more than once by history: "Whoever comes to us with the sword, will die by the sword."

Our party and people's will for peace and the steadfast struggle to strengthen peace always merge as one with the high political vigilance of Soviet citizens and their constant concern for defending the socialist homeland. This position was displayed with new vigor in postwar times when the Soviet Union unfolded a vigorous struggle for strengthening peace, for the security of nations and for international cooperation. In implementing this policy, however, the CPSU and Soviet state could not help but reckon with the increase in international tension resulting from the aggressive course of American imperialism, which had atomic weapons. The party took account of the Patriotic War's lessons and realized the serious consequences to which a surprise attack by imperialist aggressors could lead under these conditions. Despite the difficulties of recreating the national economy, the Soviet state spared no means on strengthening defensive capability, increasing the combat might of the Armed Forces and outfitting them with modern weapons.

The development of our country's own nuclear missile weaponry knocked the "atomic club"--the chief means of blackmail--from the militarists' hands. This was a retaliatory measure which cancelled the calculations of aggressive U.S. circles as to the invulnerability of their territory and impunity in case a war was begun against the USSR. Other qualitative changes in the Soviet state's defense potential and that of our Armed Forces also had a sobering effect on the lovers of military adventures. This included an improvement in conventional weapons, in the troop organizational structure and in the system of personnel training and indoctrination.

The defensive organization of Warsaw Pact nations was a powerful counterweight to the NATO bloc created by the imperialists. During the 27 years of its existence the nations of fraternal countries and all progressive mankind have seen how timely and far-sighted this measure was, having assured the security of states of the socialist community and preservation of general peace.

The building of a developed socialist society in our country created a firm basis for further strengthening of the USSR's defensive capability and for increasing the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. The modern make-up of our Army and Navy reflects like a mirror the dynamic development of the economy, the flourishing of science and culture, a strengthening of society's social homogeneity, and the constant improvement of socialist social relations.

The Soviet people's progress toward the cherished goal of communism is characterized by an increase in the CPSU's leadership role and a strengthening of its organizing and indoctrinating activity. This is a natural process which permeates all walks of life of our society, including military organizational development. The basis of this process is the Soviet people's supreme trust in the party and its scientifically grounded policy, and conviction as to the triumph of this policy, the supreme goal of which is the people's welfare.

In exercising direction over the building of communism, the party is forced to show constant concern for strengthening national defense. This is because adventurism and a readiness to gamble mankind's vital interests for the sake of its narrowly selfish goals are showing up especially nakedly now in the politics of imperialism just as before World War II.

In fanning the myth of the "Soviet military threat" U.S. ruling circles stepped up political, ideological and economic pressure on socialism and on the national liberation movement. They are making mass attacks on detente in order to disrupt it and are trying to assume the "right" to command some and "punish" others. They substitute normal interstate contact with "sanctions," a "blockade" and so on. U.S. ruling circles see the Soviet Union and socialist community above all as the main obstacle in this adventuristic path. This is why the Soviet Union has been declared "enemy number one" of the United States and this is why President Reagan proclaimed a "crusade" against the USSR and other socialist states.

The malicious antisoviet and anticommunist goals of imperialist reaction were reflected with greatest frankness in the strategy of "direct confrontation" adopted by Washington for the 1980's. The primary objective of this aggressive strategy is an elimination of the approximate equality in military-strategic forces existing between the United States and USSR and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the attempt to surpass the Soviet Union in the military respect and dictate their own conditions on it.

U.S. claims to world hegemony rely on an unprecedented arms race and a comprehensive build-up of its war machine as a whole. Even at the present time the American Armed Forces number more than three million officers and men and one million civilian employees. The Reagan administration developed and has begun implementing a long-term program for building up strategic offensive arms. In just the next five years (1983-1987) Pentagon expenditures will be over \$1.6 trillion. This is six times more than U.S. military expenditures during all of World War II.

U.S. European allies in the NATO bloc also are following the path of the arms race. Particularly dangerous is the decision made by NATO to station some 600 new American medium-range missiles in Europe. Its implementation would disrupt not only the existing balance of forces in Europe, but also the balance of USSR and U.S. strategic forces. Japan is conducting large-scale militaristic preparations. Its government also is providing the territory of its country for stationing American offensive arms and is kindling revanchist demands on the Soviet Union, which is leading to an increase in tension in the Far East.

Imperialism's intentional aggravation of the international situation and Washington's attempts to speak with us in "cold war" language again, just as decades ago, clearly is a hopeless undertaking. No one succeeded in frightening the Soviet Union in the past and, moreover, they will not succeed now. It has the proper self-control and reliable defensive might. "The Politburo considered before and considers now that giving everything necessary to the Army and Navy is mandatory, especially in the present international situation," remarked CPSU CC General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov in a speech at the November 1982 Party CC Plenum.

Thanks to concern of the Communist Party and Soviet people, all branches of the Armed Forces are outfitted with the most up-to-date combat equipment. In strengthening their physical base the party takes into the account that the United States and other NATO countries are relying in the arms race on a qualitative improvement of weapons and combat equipment. The struggle in the

military-technical area has become more acute and a lag in it is inadmissible. The party is concerned with seeing that the Armed Forces continue to have the most up-to-date military-technical outfitting.

The Army and Navy are manned with remarkable personnel. Almost all of our military personnel have received a higher, secondary or incomplete secondary education. Some 70 percent of the officers have a higher military or military-special education. Over 90 percent of officers are party or Komsomol members. The party constantly devotes attention to a further improvement in party-political work, to improving the ideological-political, combat and professional qualities of the personnel, to the everyday routine of soldiers and the outfitting of troops.

The role of Army and Navy party organizations which are practically implementing the CPSU's military policy rises steadily in accomplishing the responsible missions facing the Armed Forces. As noted at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, they function in the very thick of service masses, are the political nucleus of military collectives, and by all their work ensure unremitting party influence on all aspects of soldiers' lives.

The Soviet Armed Forces are greeting their 65th anniversary as a powerful factor of peace and security and a reliable means for curbing aggressors. Equipped with the most up-to-date weapons and combat equipment and utterly dedicated to the cause of the Communist Party, they worthily safeguard Soviet citizens' peaceful labor and the great achievements of socialism while constantly improving in their development. The training year which ended was productive for them. Its results confirm that there are unquestioned successes in the combat readiness and training of the Armed Forces. Major operational, technical and organizational measures have been conducted which increased the Army and Navy's combat might. The personnel's field, air and naval schooling rose. But time demands that we go further and achieve more.

In the training year which has begun Soviet military personnel are accomplishing new, difficult and responsible missions of ensuring our Motherland's reliable security with consideration of the acute, tense world situation. Their efforts are focused on further implementation of 26th CPSU Congress resolutions and its guidelines on defense matters, on maintaining constant combat readiness and on improving efficiency and discipline.

Socialist competition is a powerful factor for improving combat readiness and the quality and effectiveness of the training and indoctrination process. Its initiators in the training year which has begun have been the personnel of foremost units and a nuclear-powered strategic submarine, who appeal to all personnel of their branches of the Armed Forces with a call to raise even higher the banner of competition, unfolding it under the motto "Improve vigilance and reliably ensure the Motherland's security!"

The patriotic call of competition initiators found a broad response among Army and Navy personnel, who joined actively in socialist competition for a further increase in combat proficiency and combat readiness of subunits, units and ships and focused their efforts on raising class ratings, expert mastery of weapons and combat equipment, and maintaining firm regulation order and strong military discipline in every military collective.

Particular attention is given to mastering new models of equipment. "A higher level of mastery for new equipment!" is the motto which each participant of competition is called upon to follow steadfastly.

Created by the great Lenin and the Communist Party 65 years ago, the Soviet Armed Forces always have justified their purpose honorably. "Soviet soldiers deeply realize the full complexity of the present international situation and the danger of the unceasing arms race," noted the greeting of USSR Armed Forces personnel to the joint ceremonial session of the CPSU CC, USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation. "They realize well that you will not get peace from the imperialists; it has to be defended. Therefore the Soviet Armed Forces display supreme vigilance, reliably assure our Motherland's security and that of countries of the socialist community together with the allied armies, and always are ready to offer a crushing rebuff to the aggressor."

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ARMED FORCES

PAST, PRESENT IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL WORKERS IN TRAINING, COMBAT STATED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1 Jan 83 (signed to press 21 Dec 82) pp 68-72

[Article by Maj Gen M. Belov, chief of operational-tactical training chair of Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin, doctor of military sciences, professor: "The Officer's Pedagogic Proficiency: Experience, Problems, Opinions: The Training Process and Demands of Modern Combat"]

[Text] As a participant of the past war I remember a great deal from past combat experience during training and indoctrination work. Involuntary associations, comparisons with modern times and reflections arise concerning the path which should be followed in training military political cadres in order to provide them with that level of military-theoretical knowledge and skills which meets the ever growing demands. It is natural that I speak first about political workers at the unit level with whom I had occasion to cover the difficult path from Rostov to Budapest, from battle to battle, and about the improvement in their military-professional qualities with consideration of frontline experience.

I would like to mention above all how important the political worker's tactical and military-technical competency, his capability to delve knowledgeably into the practice of subunit combat training and his ability to organize party-political activities with consideration of concrete conditions (nature of the combat mission, capabilities of friendly and enemy forces, availability of time, level of troop preparedness and their support) were for successful preparation for combat. It stands to reason that the political worker also needed qualities of an ideological fighter who is master of the fervent word and has the ability to mobilize and lead people in the most critical minutes of combat.

It is generally known that on the early morning of 17 July 1943 penetration of Hitler's "Mius Front" began with a devastating assault on the deeply echeloned enemy defense. The author of these lines had occasion to participate in the operation, which was called the "Mius," as commander of a machinegun platoon in the Southern Front's 5th Shock Army. As it now appears, the significance of our attack on the enemy was determined chiefly by the need to pin down as many forces as possible which might be shifted against our troops operating in the Kursk Bulge. The objective assigned to us was fully attainable. The fascist command sent a panzer division to the breakthrough sector, returning it while en route to the vicinity of Khar'kov, as well as a motorized and infantry

division. Later the Hitlerites shifted an SS panzer corps and a panzer division to eliminate the bridgehead captured by Soviet troops on the west bank of the Mius.

How did unit political workers prove out during this operation? Great Patriotic War history indicates that it was in the very best way. I personally recall well their steadfast organizing work, especially in the preparatory period, when they did not leave the subunits without attention for a single hour. Each time they would proceed on training problems and exercises together with the commanders and rank-and-file beneath actual shellbursts, i.e., they prepared to attack real enemy positions following a moving barrage. They conditioned the personnel psychologically. They went through the process of being driven over by tanks together with everyone else: They strove to get rid of the "fear of tanks" and they developed a readiness to enter boldly into a clash against the Tigers and Ferdinands, and an ability to hit them in vulnerable spots. They conscientiously dug foxholes and trenches and tried out how best to take cover in them from the tracks of an enemy tank and how to greet it with fire.

During breaks between classes and exercises as well as in specially allocated time the political workers would hold rallies and meetings, arrange for talks by experienced soldiers and read statements addressed to them by workers and kolkhoz members and by personnel of adjacent units. Extensive work was done to explain the role of our attack for other fronts and for liberation of all native soil. Soldiers who had distinguished themselves in preceding fighting were popularized in operational newssheets and in the Army and division newspapers.

The preparation of subunits for immediate performance of combat missions is especially memorable. The day before the breakthrough, regimental political workers went around to all subunits to see how well the personnel knew the combat missions and whether or not they had everything for combat. They spoke with almost all the people who had made ready for the attack.

"Show me, Lieutenant, how the rifle platoons will go into the attack, where you will direct the machinegun fire at this time, and when you will change firing positions."

"Show me, Private, the direction in which you will attack and against which target you will fire on the move. Who will be on your right and left?"

"Open your pack, Comrade. I would like to see how you are ready for combat."

That kind of businesslike and objective discussion was held with the fighting men. A check was made of the presence of the authorized number of cartridges, grenades, the first aid kit and dry rations.

There are no matters for the political worker which would not concern him in performing the mission. The fact is that he organizes for combat together with the commander and staff, he takes all steps to achieve victory and, if necessary, he assumes control. In this regard I would like to recreate two combat episodes relating to the Nikol'sk-Krivoy Rog Operation of 1944.

After repulsing furious enemy counterattacks near the rail junction of Apostolovo, our units began vigorous combat actions to take the populated points situated to the west. In order to hold them the fascists set up weapon emplacements in barns and other buildings, and tanks and self-propelled guns were placed there. Destroying them by artillery meant hitting the residents as well. We looked for other ways. Special groups were formed which made their way to the objectives at night and hit them with grenades and Molotov cocktails. Regimental political deputy Maj Yurchenko was the initiator in organizing such groups and their chief inspiration.

In spring our division went around Krivoy Rog. Together with the tank brigade which arrived we took Kazanka and Novyy Bug from the move. We hurried to make an assault crossing of the Ingul River. Battalion commander Capt Sergeyev was seriously wounded at Novyy Bug. In performing his duties, I arranged for the crossing of subunits on a small local ferry. Things were going slowly. A "frame"--a fascist scout plane--flew over.

"Yurchenko soon will be with you and will help..." announced regimental commander Maj Shcherbak by radio.

Yurchenko arrived with a platoon of regimental combat engineers. He estimated what was occurring knowledgeably and gave praise for the fact that the subunits were not bunched up at the river, but were under cover and moved to the ferry one after the other. He himself selected a site for a new crossing and directed the erection of a rather narrow assault foot bridge across the Ingul. He worked as if he had commanded combat engineer subunits his entire life.

Examples of this sort were not isolated. Victory was achieved in each fight by means of the art of ideological-indoctrination and organizational work, by the military expertise of commanders and political workers, and by the heroism of all personnel. It should be borne in mind, however, that conditions of present-day combat actions may differ radically from all those preceding. The most essential element in this difference is determined by the possibility of the enemy's surprise use of the latest means of armed struggle. Consequently stern reality requires military educational institutions of any profile, including political institutions, to train those specialists who, in addition to a high level of ideological-theoretical knowledge and the specialized knowledge inherent to a specific profession, would have the ability to organize for combat in the most difficult situation. The stability of such practical skills is directly proportionate to the effectiveness of training classes above all in operational-tactical and military-technical disciplines. By virtue of this it is very important to make capable use of traditional ways for intensifying the training process and seek new ways which take account of the specific features and profile of a given military educational institution. Under our conditions, for example, it seems expedient during lectures and seminars in operational-tactical training, along with a deepening of theoretical knowledge, to practice more often the performance of operational-tactical calculations and practice skills in substantiating normative provisions and issuing various instructions using technical means of control. And with respect to practical classes which contribute to the greatest extent to the acquisition and reinforcement of military-professional abilities and skills, it is necessary to be bolder in making "returns" to the demands of regulation documents and to contemporary

provisions of military theory so as not only to deepen and reinforce them, but also get from trainees the skilled, imaginative application of these provisions in a concrete combat situation.

Great Patriotic War experience shows that the guarantee of victory is both efficiency in the actions of appointed persons and timeliness in their decision-making. Under conditions of exceptionally fast and frequent changes typical of modern combat, late actions by an appointed person can be the cause not only of a particular failure, but also of a serious defeat. Consequently it is necessary to teach students and cadets of military educational institutions of any profile to perform the full extent of necessary work in minimum time periods. Also of importance is the completeness and correctness of their actions in the situation at hand, which is contingent on the overall military-theoretical outlook of the performers and their preparedness and ability for imaginative accomplishment of missions with initiative. The frontline examples given at the beginning of the article indicate this rather eloquently. I will mention one other which confirms the importance for students and cadets of military educational institutions to master the parallel method of work to organize for combat.

It did not have that designation during the Great Patriotic War, although it was practiced rather often. Missions often were updated for units or completely new ones were assigned during combat actions. As a rule the unit commander would immediately make them known to headquarters and staff officers and would immediately issue instructions to the subunits for preparing for combat. Thus preparations for the personnel to perform specific combat missions were accomplished simultaneously with the development of a final decision. Updating of these missions often was done when the subunits were moving to the designated lines or to attack positions, and because of this there was an expansion in the timeframe for good-quality preparation of personnel, weapons and equipment for combat.

This method has become a basic one under present-day conditions of organizing combat actions characterized by greater time restrictions. Students master it already on the basis of using enormously more effective means and methods for data collection and processing with the employment of varied technical means of control, including automated systems. This also indicates that any combat experience has to be evaluated through the prism of time and used imaginatively, i.e., with consideration of the changed means of armed warfare and conditions for their employment.

At the present time emphasis in the practical training of students and cadets rightly is placed on their field schooling. I deem it necessary to draw attention to the instructive practice of those instructors of classes on the terrain who are able to orient themselves quickly in the situation, "take root" in it as it were, and gain a graphic idea of the scope and picture of combat. That is just how Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent Col I. Prasolov, a Great Patriotic War veteran, appears before the students in field problems in tactics. I have attended many of them and each time have seen that each class is distinguished by high dynamism and intensity and by good-quality practice of all lessons. After orienting students on the terrain the instructor invariably "draws" the panorama of combat actions: He demonstrates the fire of friendly and opposing batteries, air strikes, the bursts of bombs and shells, and burning

objects. . . . In so doing he creates an impression as if what is occurring around him is combat reality itself. It seems shots really are heard, shells burst, and one even smells the smoke, burning things and powder.

Such a variant of beginning a class or working a specific lesson under field conditions undoubtedly is effective not just in the sense of training students in the art of conducting combat actions, but also for developing in them high moral-combat qualities, self-control, decisiveness and psychological stability. This conclusion is confirmed by the practical experience of many similar classes on the terrain during which, after a dynamically "drawn" picture of "combat," some students initially became confused, but their actions became more and more confident from class to class. They gained good practical skills of controlling subordinates in the most difficult conditions of contemporary combined-arms combat.

Unfortunately, due to time restrictions not all students have an opportunity to spend sufficient time in the field in the role of a specific appointment, and not every one of them acquires the necessary skill in actions in a short time period. In this case it is very important for the teacher-instructor to have the ability to demonstrate the most expedient variants of actions and instructions in a particular situation by personal example. That is how the best trained organizers of field problems proceed.

But what is the most rational way to conclude the practice of a lesson? Experienced instructors, including the aforementioned Col I. Prasolov, invariably evaluate the class. In so doing they give a reminder of just what provision or requirement of a regulation document was practiced in a given situation, what must be the uniform understanding of the subject of the class, whose actions should be considered most successful and why, and what might be the negative consequences of certain incompetent and tardy decisions.

The forms of conducting training activities often become a subject of discussion during training methods work. In particular, doubts sometimes are expressed concerning the expediency of using command and staff exercises (KShU) in non-command academies inasmuch as in the exercises too many students work in "secondary" positions not corresponding to the profile of the military educational institution, and only a few work in the primary positions. For this reason it is proposed that efforts be concentrated on group exercises. There also are adherents of the point of view that the only thing necessary are KShU conducted invariably on the terrain and in the field.

The following can be said with regard to the first viewpoint. As a matter of fact in group exercises students all can work in one position, the primary one for a given specialty. The majority of classes in tactics in the military educational institutions are of this kind.

Command and staff exercises, however, especially those held in the field, also are necessary for the students. Here the trainees are given an opportunity to work in a near-combat situation, to test their abilities and reinforce skills in working with people and in functioning as part of T/O&E control entities using actual functioning communications and employing various means of warfare under normative time conditions. Giving consideration to the graduates' future

professional work, we also make it a practice to accomplish narrative problems in party-political work in KShU's.

KShU's conducted in the field, however, require substantial expenditures of supplies and involve restrictions in actions on the terrain. At the same time the KShU's held on maps in auditoriums are more economical in the expenditure of personnel and means for their support. A special advantage of them is the fact that this form of classes allows use of cartographic materials of any terrain, which is important both for expanding the trainees' overall military-theoretical outlook and for their understanding of various conditions for conducting combat actions. In summing up what has been said, I would like to emphasize that in order to improve the quality of training and indoctrination work it is important not to set some forms of classes in opposition to others, but to see the advantages and disadvantages of each of them and, with consideration of this, to improve their methodology as applied to the profile of the specific military educational institution.

It should be emphasized once again in conclusion that thoughtful use of the combat experience already gained, the latest achievements of military theory and practice and conclusions of Soviet military science is a necessary condition for successful preparation of all military cadres, including political officers, for skilled conduct of modern combat. It is difficult to overestimate the role played by the faculty of military educational institutions in this matter. Their art--to teach what is necessary in war--is a determining factor of the appropriate combat schooling of students and cadets. It is a matter of honor for every military pedagogue to enrich this art with creative exploration contributing to an increase in the effectiveness of the training and indoctrination process.

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ARMED FORCES

LECTURE ON 'INDISSOLUBLE UNION OF WORKERS, PEASANTS, INTELLIGENTSIA' OUTLINED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1. Jan 83 (signed to press 21 Dec 82) pp 85-91

[Article by Capt 1st Rank N. Minayev, doctor of historical sciences, professor: "For Political Study Group Instructors: Indissoluble Union of Workers, Peasants and the Intelligentsia";* passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] In conducting classes on this topic propagandists are called upon to explain to students thoroughly and intelligibly V. I. Lenin's ideas about the essence and importance of the union of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia in the struggle for victory of the socialist revolution and for building a new society, and the CPSU's statements on ways for strengthening this union in the stage of developed socialism and its role in further improving national defense and increasing the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Six hours are set aside for study of the topic, of which two hours must be planned for the lecture (narrative), two for students' independent work and two hours for the seminar (discussion).

IN THE LECTURE (NARRATIVE), it is advisable to examine the following issues:

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the role and importance of the union of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia in the struggle for victory of the socialist revolution and for building a new society. 2. The 26th CPSU Congress on a further strengthening of the union of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia in the period of developed socialism. 3. The significance of the indissoluble union of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia in improving national defense and increasing the Army and Navy's combat might.

It should be emphasized IN A BRIEF INTRODUCTION that our people and their military personnel entered the new year of 1983 in an atmosphere of great political and job enthusiasm. Nationwide celebrations in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation were a vivid display of Soviet society's monolithic unity

*Material for political studies on the topic "Indissoluble union of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia is a powerful force for building communism and strengthening national defense."

and the close solidarity of our people, including the Motherland's armed defenders, about the native Communist Party. "Looking back on the path covered by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 60 years," remarked CPSU CC General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov in a report at the joint ceremonial session of the CPSU CC, USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation, "we clearly see that all our achievements and victories are connected inseparably with the work of the Leninist party of communists. It is the party that has been and remains the powerful creative, mobilizing force which ensures continuous forward movement on all avenues of social progress."

The outstanding successes achieved by the Soviet people in building a new society under the wise leadership of the Communist Party became possible largely thanks to the union of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry and popular intelligentsia.

1. V. I. LENIN AND THE CPSU ON THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE UNION OF THE WORKING CLASS, PEASANTRY AND INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE STRUGGLE FOR VICTORY OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND FOR BUILDING A NEW SOCIETY

In presenting the first question one should explain to the students that the teaching about the union of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia is an important component of Marxist-Leninist theory. K. Marx and F. Engels advanced for the first time the idea of the need for unifying efforts of workers and peasants in their struggle against the yoke of capital. The founders of scientific communism saw in the peasantry a revolutionary force and assumed that its liberation as well as the liberation of all workers from capitalist oppression and injustice is possible only under the leadership of the proletariat and the fighting proletarian vanguard--the Communist Party--through socialist revolution. "Only the fall of capital," stated Marx, "can lift up the peasant; only an anticapitalist, proletarian government can put an end to his economic poverty and social degradation" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], VII, 86).

Having thoroughly developed the views of Marx and Engels on the revolutionary union of the working class and peasantry, Lenin created an orderly teaching about the hegemony of the proletariat in bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolutions and about its dictatorship as a special form of class cooperation with nonproletarian working masses. On the basis of a detailed study of concrete conditions of Russia's social-economic and political development, he revealed objective preconditions for shaping a union of the working class and peasantry during revolutionary struggle and indicated the Communist Party's leading role in this. According to Vladimir Il'ich's idea, such a union contains the main force and support of Soviet power and a guarantee that the cause of socialist transformation, the cause of victory over capital, the cause of eliminating any exploitation will be taken by us to a victorious conclusion (see "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XXXVIII, 237).

Thus Lenin saw in a union of the working class and peasantry specifically that great sociopolitical force which is capable of withstanding any tests in the sharpest class battles against landowners and capitalists and which is called upon to play a deciding role in reconstruction of society. The students should be

reminded in this connection that the Leninist course toward a firm union of the proletariat and poorest peasantry and toward bringing all workers to the side of the Bolsheviks led to victory of the socialist revolution in Russia in October 1917.

It should be emphasized further that Soviet power became a true protector of the people's interests, including the interests of the working peasantry. One of its first legislative acts was the Land Decree. This historic document abolished the right of private ownership of land and all land in the country was declared nationalized. The peasants received more than 150 million hectares of land gratis from the state for their use. In addition, they were freed of annual payments for land amounting to 700 million rubles in gold. The new power also cancelled their debts to the peasant bank in an amount of 1.5 billion rubles. The peasants received at their disposal an overall total of 97 percent of nationalized lands, 90 percent of the cattle of the former large landowners, and agricultural tools valued at 350 million gold rubles.

Implementation of these measures contributed to a consolidation of the multi-million peasant masses about Soviet power. Life itself insistently demanded a further strengthening of the class solidarity of workers and peasants and their fighting, revolutionary union for building and defending socialism. Attracting the middle peasantry to the side of the new power in the years of foreign military intervention and civil war was a fact of supreme political importance. By that time the greater part of the peasant farm, which had received land and tools from the Soviet state, had risen to the level of middle peasants. The middle peasant became the largest village layer, providing the main mass of agricultural products. This is why it was extremely important to arouse him to defend the revolution's achievements and strengthen the Red Army and mobilize him for active participation in building socialism. The party coped with this very difficult task brilliantly.

The question of the attitude toward the middle peasant was discussed at the 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress, held in March 1919. Lenin's idea about the transition to politics of a strong union of the working class with the middle peasantry was thoroughly substantiated in congress documents. This politics played a deciding role in the successful outcome of the Civil War and further reinforcement of Soviet power.

After utterly defeating the foreign interventionists and White Guards, our people began implementing the Leninist plan for building socialism in the USSR. The party proceeded from the fact that the country had everything necessary and sufficient for a victory of the new order. "In our Soviet Republic," stated V. I. Lenin, "the social order is based on the cooperation of two classes: workers and peasants. . . . In the final account our republic's destiny will depend on whether or not the peasant mass will go with the working class, preserving allegiance to the union with it" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XLV, 387).

It must be emphasized that the joint struggle for a new life and the joint work for the sake of a bright future brought the workers and peasants even closer together and gave their union special strength. The working class came out as the leading force in building socialism. Soviet workers displayed

supreme awareness and heroism during the country's industrialization. Labor exploits of the best representatives of the working class served as a powerful motor, as it were, advancing the entire cause of building an industrial base of socialism.

Our country's working class played a prominent role in the victory of the kolkhoz system in the village as well. It supplied the peasants with tractors, combines, motor vehicles and other agricultural equipment. Its best representatives, sent by the party into the village, became the organizers of the first kolkhozes and helped the peasants arrange a new life. United in collective farms, the peasantry became a powerful support for Soviet power in the village. This meant that the village irrevocably had taken the path of socialism.

The problem of creating a new Soviet intelligentsia in the country also was solved successfully. Hundreds of thousands of young specialists, yesterday's workers and kolkhoz members, joined its ranks. By the beginning of 1941 2.4 million persons with a higher or secondary specialized education already were working in our national economy. The intelligentsia became a broad social layer of the country's population close in nature and related to the working class and peasantry. Brought up on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, it gave all effort and knowledge to the cause of building socialism.

The victory of socialism in our country, secured in the 1936 Constitution, led to profound changes in the class make-up of the population: Workers and employees comprised 45.7 percent of its number, the kolkhoz peasantry and cooperative handicraftsmen represented 48.8 percent and the noncooperative handicraftsmen comprised 5.5 percent. All exploiting classes thus were eliminated in the USSR. Workers and peasants as well as the labor intelligentsia now were included in the new social structure. Their fraternal fighting and labor union, forged by the Leninist party of communists, was one of the most important factors of the Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War and became a deciding force in restoring the postwar economy and building a developed socialist society.

The USSR has reached the highest stage of mankind's social progress as of today thanks to the selfless labor of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry and popular intelligentsia. A mature socialist society has been built and is being perfected comprehensively in the country. The need for a fuller, more coordinated cooperation and mutual assistance of all classes, social layers and groups of the population, and all nations and nationalities of our society is being felt more and more sharply in the stage of developed socialism. This is determined by the exceptional complexity and enormous scope of tasks which the Soviet people are accomplishing in building communism. This is why the party wrote in its Program: "The CPSU proceeds from the fact that further strengthening OF THE INDISSOLUBLE UNION OF THE WORKING CLASS AND KOLKHOZ PEASANTRY is of decisive political and social-economic importance for the building of communism in the USSR."

At the same time mature socialism also expands the objective opportunities for a further comprehensive improvement of the union of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry and popular intelligentsia. The leading position of the working

class is being strengthened in socialist cooperation with the peasantry and intelligentsia. The CPSU's leading role in our society's life is growing. A strengthening of the union of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia is viewed in the Constitution of developed socialism as one of the most important tasks of our party and state in the social-economic and political development of the country. It states that "the state contributes to a reinforcement of the social homogeneity of society--the erasing of class differences and essential differences between the city and village and between mental and physical labor, and the comprehensive development and rapprochement of all nations and nationalities of the USSR."

In completing presentation of the first question, it should be noted that our country's move to new goals of social-economic progress permits the party and people to carry out the tasks of creating a material-technical base of communism and further improving the workers' welfare and culture--tasks that are ever growing in scope and complexity. A rapprochement of all classes and social groups of Soviet society leading to the establishment by and large of a classless structure of this society within the historic framework of mature socialism is continuing under present-day conditions.

2. THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS ON FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE UNION OF WORKING CLASS, PEASANTRY AND INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE PERIOD OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM

In beginning presentation of the second question it is necessary to stress that under socialism the process of erasing class distinctions is determined by objective factors, the most important of which are the changes occurring in production relationships, including the forms of ownership and the nature of labor. Changes in the social-class structure cannot, however, automatically flow in the direction necessary to society. "This is an objective, but far from a spontaneous process," it was emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress. "The social policy of the party and state plays an important role in it" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 52).

After analyzing the changes occurring in the social-class structure of Soviet society, the congress pointed out that at its center is the working class--the leading force in our building of communism. Today Soviet workers comprise two-thirds of the country's employed population--over 80 million persons. Our working class has become not simply the largest class, but also the majority of the toiling people.

The leading role of the working class in building communism is rising steadily. Workers have been and remain the main productive force of society. There is a steady growth in their ideological-political maturity, education and professional qualification. While 10 years ago only a little more than half of them had a secondary (complete or incomplete) or higher education, now it is already three-fourths of them. The professional training of the young working class replacements also has improved and is being perfected. While in the 1960's only a third of the young boys and girls acquired specialties in the system of vocational-technical training, this number has increased to 12.5 million persons in just the 10th Five-Year Plan, i.e., two-thirds of the workers coming into production.

Significant changes also are occurring today in the social make-up of the kolkhoz peasantry. As a result of a growth in productive forces in agriculture as well as the gradual conversion of agricultural labor into a variety of industrial labor, the peasant's work gradually is coming close in its character to that of the worker. The peasantry is steadily approaching the working class in its social-economic position. The peasants' way of life largely has become similar to that of the urban population.

The number of machine operators, who have become the main force of kolkhoz production, is growing at high rates in the village. The number of other categories of educated, qualified workers is steadily increasing in the make-up of kolkhoz members. Progressive changes also are occurring in the social awareness of the kolkhoz peasantry, and their ideological maturity and political activeness are growing.

New important steps in the development of agriculture and a further erasure of social-economic distinctions between the working class and peasantry were outlined by our party in the USSR Food Program adopted by the May 1982 CPSU CC Plenum and calculated for the period up to 1990. Today the Food Program is an increase in yield and an increase in production of fertilizers and agricultural machinery. It is an upswing in animal husbandry and development of a combined fodder industry and the entire fodder base. It is outstanding organization of the processing of agricultural products at enterprises in the city and village. It is a fight against losses on the entire food conveyor from the field and farm to the plant shop and sales counter. It is the creation of necessary conditions for the work and everyday life of young people and for keeping them in agriculture.

The requirements for building communism determined an increase in the role of mental labor in society's life and led to high rates of growth of our intelligentsia. Now every fourth worker in the country is connected basically with mental labor. The intelligentsia is playing an increasingly important role not only in science, education and culture, but also in physical production and in the entire life of society.

In evaluating the experience of developing Soviet society over the last decades, the 26th CPSU Congress substantiated ways for a further erasure of social-class distinctions between the city and village and between mental and physical labor. The most important of them is a rapprochement of the working class and kolkhoz peasantry in their relationship to the means of production. The basis of this process is a further development of city and village productive forces and the convergence of the two forms of socialist ownership--state and kolkhoz-cooperative. The 26th party congress noted that an important role is played here by the development of interfarm organizations in which kolkhozes and state enterprises take part. Interfarm cooperation and agro-industrial integration lead to the merging of both forms of socialist ownership, which has a decisive significance for the final erasure of social-class distinctions in our society.

Another path is the convergence of classes and all social groups and layers of the population based on the nature of labor. It must be said that the party is resolving two interrelated tasks here. The first is to connect mental and

physical labor organically in the production activity of the members of society. In this connection the 26th CPSU Congress planned profound transformations for the purpose of a comprehensive reduction in manual, unskilled and heavy physical labor. The second task is the transformation of agrarian labor into a variety of industrial labor. To achieve this it is necessary to raise the level of mechanization of agricultural work and increase the power-labor and capital-labor ratio in kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

The next path is an overcoming of distinctions between classes and between social groups and layers of the population in the area of distribution. In this regard the 26th CPSU Congress took note of the great significance of a change in forms of organization and payment of the work of kolkhoz members and the extension to them of the system of social security established for workers and employees. Thus the upswing in the material standard of living of the people and leveling of workers' incomes will continue in the 11th Five-Year Plan. During the period 1981-1985 the average monthly wages of workers and employees will rise 14.5 percent, while wages of kolkhoz members will increase 20 percent. And if we consider the addition from the private subsidiary farm, the incomes of kolkhoz members will approach those of workers and employees very closely.

One other way is the convergence of classes and all social groups and layers of Soviet society based on cultural-everyday living conditions. Much has been done in our country to eliminate substantial distinctions in the cultural-everyday urban and rural living conditions. "Even today it is pleasant to visit many kolkhozes and sovkhozes," it was said at the 26th CPSU Congress. "It is pleasing to enter spacious, light homes where city conveniences are combined with the features and needs of rural life. The new character of labor and the modern conditions and appearance of such villages are . . . the good fruit of our social policy!" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 53).

In the 11th Five-Year Plan it is planned to build well-arranged residences in the villages at outstripping rates, with farm buildings for keeping cattle and poultry, children's preschool establishments, clubs and other cultural-everyday services facilities. Capital investments for such purposes will increase 39 percent. Thus conditions are being created for the village to come closer and closer to the city in the level of cultural-everyday services. It will be proper for the propagandist to cite concrete examples of these tasks being accomplished in kolkhozes and sovkhozes where personnel of the subunit or unit (ship) worked before service in the Army (or Navy).

The 26th CPSU Congress assigned the task of bringing up workers in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and a proud feeling for belonging to the unified and great Soviet Motherland; and comprehensively strengthening in the future the social foundation of our state--the indissoluble union of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia. In elaborating these congress provisions the November 1982 CPSU CC Plenum expressed the firm assurance that workers, kolkhoz members, the intelligentsia and all toilers of our multinational socialist Motherland, rallied closely about the Communist Party, will mark the year of 1983 with new achievements in economic and cultural development and will ensure the country's further successful advance along the Leninist path to communism.

3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INDISSOLUBLE UNION OF THE WORKING CLASS, PEASANTRY AND INTELLIGENTSIA IN IMPROVING NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INCREASING THE ARMY AND NAVY'S COMBAT MIGHT

In beginning presentation of the third question one should state that the union of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia went through a stern test in the armed struggle in defense of the socialist homeland. In the years of foreign military intervention and civil war this union bore a military-political character. It was subordinated to the chief goal of winning victory in the fierce, lengthy, bloody war which enemies imposed on the Soviet Republic. The victory did not come easy. And each time, in moments of greatest intensity of the struggle, the Communist Party and Soviet government called on the country's workers and peasants to rally even closer, to organize and to allocate new forces and means for the front and for victory.

Our Red Army rightly was called a workers' and peasants' army. Up to the fall of 1918 it consisted primarily of workers and poor peasants. Beginning in late 1918 the number of peasants in the Army exceeded the number of workers, and a significant portion of the new recruits already consisted of middle peasants. In 1920 more than three-fourths of Red Army men were peasants by birth.

The Red Army's backbone in the Civil War consisted of representatives of the working class, and above all Russian workers from Moscow, Petrograd and other industrial cities of Central Russia, and from the Urals and the Volga area. By war's end the working layer in the Army (not counting the Navy) numbered 630,000-760,000 persons. Red Army men from among the workers cemented the soldier masses and were the commanders' support in the struggle to reinforce discipline and increase the personnel's political awareness. Speaking about the sources of the Soviet land's victory in the Civil War, Lenin emphasized: "Everything we achieved shows that we rely on the most marvelous force in the world--the force of workers and peasants" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XLIV, 234).

The Great Patriotic War was a thorough test of the strength of the new social and state system based on the union of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry and popular intelligentsia. The indissolubility of this union was manifested in the steadfastness of privates, seamen, sergeants, petty officers, officers, generals and admirals of our Armed Forces in the struggle against the fascist invaders, in our people's high patriotism, and in the inseparable unity of the front and rear. The war's outcome was decided both on the battlefield and in the shops of plants and factories, in kolkhozes and sovkhozes, in scientific establishments and in design bureaus.

The selfless labor of the working class and peasantry in close cooperation with the work of engineers, technicians and employees played a deciding role in the increase in arms production. Despite the fact that every seventh industrial worker died here in the war years, the USSR during this time produced almost 500,000 artillery pieces, over 100,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, and almost 140,000 aircraft. In the war years the kolkhoz peasantry procured 4,312,000,000 poods of grain--three times greater than in prerevolutionary Russia during World War I, when only 1,399,000,000 poods were

procured. Thus the indissoluble union of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry and popular intelligentsia in the fight against the fascist German invaders began to shine with new facets. The war once again demonstrated persuasively that this is the chief and deciding force of Soviet society and a reliable guarantee and source of all the Soviet people's victories.

Then it is important to focus the personnel's attention on the role of the union of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia in strengthening national defense under conditions of the present-day international situation, which has been aggravated sharply through the fault of the most aggressive circles of imperialism, and the United States above all. "We know well," states CPSU CC General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "that you can't beg peace from the imperialists. It can be defended only by relying on the indestructible might of the Soviet Armed Forces." This is why our party and state have not ignored and do not ignore for a single day questions of strengthening the country's defensive might and that of its Armed Forces. As noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, we are obligated to do this by the international situation. The congress emphasized that all spheres and aspects of the life of Soviet society saw dynamic development and the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces rose as a result of practical implementation of the 10th Five-Year Plan.

The development of the social-class structure and national relationships of Soviet society exerts a great influence on the further improvement of our Army and Navy. The strengthening of national defense and increase in Armed Forces combat might, notes CPSU CC Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, is linked inseparably with those fundamental social-political transformations which are occurring in the USSR.

The increase in the degree of maturity of the social-class and national structure of developed socialist society has a beneficial effect on the development of healthy comradely relations among military personnel who come from various classes and social groups and who represent various nationalities. A unity of views on the attitude toward military service is reinforced in privates and seamen on the basis of social equality and a commonality of interests and goals. All this strengthens the monolithic nature of the Soviet Armed Forces and their internal social solidarity.

It should be emphasized further that the improvement of sociopolitical relationships in the USSR under conditions of developed socialism led to a substantial expansion in the Armed Forces social base. The systematic growth of the working class and the increase in its proportion in the total size of the country's population has a beneficial effect on them. The increase in the number of representatives of the working class in the Army and Navy strengthens efficiency and order in units and aboard ships, and improves the soldiers' morale, combat readiness and combat effectiveness. At the same time the rapprochement of classes and social groups of our society means that now it is already difficult to distinguish the worker, peasant or representative of the intelligentsia in any military collective based on general educational level, political development and culture. The country's transition to universal secondary education and implementation of resolutions of the 26th party congress in the area of higher, secondary and vocational-technical education will

provide the Armed Forces with replacements having an even higher level of ideological-political preparation and intellectual and physical development.

The technical outfitting of the Army and Navy and of this most important component of the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces was reinforced thanks to successes in development of the economic system and scientific-technical progress and thanks to the further adoption of the achievements of science and technology in practical military affairs. "The Politburo considered it a mandatory matter, especially in the present international situation, to provide everything necessary to the Army and Navy, and continues to consider it as such," stated CPSU CC General Secretary, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov at the November 1982 Party Central Committee Plenum.

The propagandist can cite concrete examples of the increase in technical outfitting of the subunit, unit or ship where the group's students are serving.

It must be pointed out further that the personnel's military proficiency is an important component of the Soviet Armed Forces' combat potential. The increase in educational and technical level and the high moral and physical training permit the privates and seamen to master a military specialty, weapons and combat equipment in shorter periods of time.

The military proficiency of Army and Navy personnel was demonstrated persuasively during exercises held in recent years. The heightened march speeds, rate of deployment into combat formation, daring and swiftness of attacks and counterattacks, competent and confident actions in air and naval "combat," and successful firings and missile launches graphically indicate the high combat schooling of privates and seamen, sergeants and petty officers, warrant officers and officers, and the professional expertise of the command-political personnel. It is necessary to dwell in detail during the lecture (narrative) on how questions of further improving military proficiency in the unit or aboard ship are being resolved.

It is well known that the monolithic solidarity of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry and popular intelligentsia, and the commonality of their fundamental interests and goals represent the basis of the indomitable morale of the Army and Navy, which is the third component of the Soviet Armed Forces combat potential. Inherent to our Army and Navy personnel is a high political awareness, fiery Soviet patriotism, socialist internationalism, strict discipline, deep knowledge and an ability to master sophisticated modern equipment. It was noted proudly of Soviet soldiers at the 26th CPSU Congress: "Now it is the sons and grandsons of Great Patriotic War heroes who stand in the ranks of the Motherland's defenders. They did not go through the stern ordeals which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers, but they are true to the heroic traditions of our Army and our people. And each time it is required by interests of national security and the defense of peace, when it is necessary to help the victims of aggression, the Soviet soldier stands before the world as a selfless and courageous patriot and internationalist ready to overcome all difficulties" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 66).

In completing presentation of the topic, one should emphasize that the indissoluble unity of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia represents a

great achievement of socialism. This union and its strength are a most important factor in the improvement of developed socialism and the building of communism. It also acts as a necessary condition for further reinforcing national defense and increasing the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. As noted at the November 1982 Party Central Committee Plenum, the aggressive intrigues of imperialism force us along with the fraternal socialist states to be concerned, and seriously concerned, with maintaining the defensive capability at a proper level. CPSU CC Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal D. F. Ustinov noted in this regard in answers to questions from a TASS correspondent that the Soviet Union is drawing appropriate conclusions both from the increasing antisoviet propaganda and attempts to distort our peace initiatives, and from the prospect of an increase in a real threat to our country. The American administration will not succeed in intimidating the USSR by creating "superhardened" strategic MX missiles or by stationing Pershing-2's and cruise missiles in Western Europe. It should not hypnotize itself over the possibility of achieving military superiority over the USSR. Nothing will come of this. Should the present White House leadership cast us a challenge in the face of common sense and, scorning the people's will for peace, begin deploying the MX missiles, then in response to this the Soviet Union will deploy a new intercontinental ballistic missile of the very same class, and its characteristics will concede nothing to the MX missile. Should it be necessary the USSR also will manage to respond to other threats by Washington effectively and promptly.

Unanimously approving and comprehensively supporting the party's concern for a further growth in the USSR's economic and defense might, Soviet military personnel, who are true sons of their people and representatives of workers, peasants and intelligentsia and of all nations and nationalities of our great multinational Motherland, always are ready to perform their patriotic and international duty of defending the cause of peace and socialism honorably.

DURING THE HOURS OF INDEPENDENT WORK it is recommended that students study the most important provisions from Lenin's works "Address to the Red Army" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXVIII, 234-235), "Letter to Workers and Peasants on Occasion of the Victory over Kolchak" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," XXXIX, 152, 155, 156); "CPSU Central Committee Report to the 26th CPSU Congress and Upcoming Party Tasks in Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," pp 52-56, 66-67); and Comrade Andropov's speech at the November 1982 CPSU CC Plenum (PRAVDA, 23 November 1982).

IN THE SEMINAR (DISCUSSION) it is desirable to discuss the following questions:

1. How did Lenin describe the need for a union of the working class and peasantry for the overthrow of capitalism and the victory of the socialist revolution?
2. What is the role of the union of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry and popular intelligentsia in building a new society?
3. What tasks were assigned by the 26th CPSU Congress for further strengthening of the union of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia and for a rapprochement of all classes and social groups of Soviet society?
4. What is the significance of the indissoluble union of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry and popular intelligentsia for reinforcing national defense and the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces?

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CSO: 1801/133

ARMED FORCES

'KRASNAYA ZVEZDA' ON STALINGRAD

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 January 1983 Second edition carries on page 2 a 2,400-word article entitled "That January, on the Volga..." by Col A. Sgibnev, who describes aspects of the battle of Stalingrad. The article cites criticisms of the Nazi conduct of the battle, particularly those expressed by L. Steidle, a participant in the fighting and subsequently GDR health minister, who praises the Soviet army's "humanism and nobility" in the battle. Sgibnev rejects the German command's claims of Russian ruthlessness toward prisoners and declares that the "Soviet army made every effort to prevent the tragedy."

CSO: 1801/148

GROUND FORCES

TANK UNITS: IMPORTANCE OF SOCIALIST COMPETITION IN TRAINING

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 83 (signed to press 21 Dec 82) pp 61-67

[Interview with regimental commander Lt Col V. Dudinov by Capt 1st Rank V. Tkachev: "Problems of Training and Military Indoctrination: With Concern for Tomorrow"]

[Text] The greatest joy is that of duty performed honestly. Such joy was deservedly experienced by personnel of the tank regiment commanded by Lt Col V. Dudinov. They successfully completed the past training year (which for a number of reasons and circumstances was difficult and strenuous for the collective) having completely fulfilled their socialist pledges, and they celebrated the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation with increased combat proficiency. As shown by the final inspection there was a noticeable rise in the level of field schooling and tactical weapons training of the personnel. In a tactical exercise the tankmen demonstrated an ability to accomplish missions of modern combat in a difficult situation with good quality day or night. The regiment was declared outstanding based on results of combat and political training and socialist competition.

In short the personnel toiled fruitfully. Nevertheless, there is neither admiration for what has been achieved nor self-complacency in the collective. Having begun the new training year in an organized manner and having set the next high goals in competition for perfecting military proficiency, the tankmen are striving to use every day and hour with maximum return for a further improvement in the native regiment's combat readiness. As before, party members are in the vanguard of the struggle for effectiveness and quality of combat training.

Our correspondent met with regimental commander Lt Col Dudinov, the commander's political deputy, and the party committee secretary and requested them to tell how the collective attained success, what part of the experience gained the command element and party organization intends to

use in the new training year, and what they are planning to reject and eliminate. There follows a recording of this discussion.

Correspondent: Judging from the tankmen's mood and the pledges they made, a striving for high end results has become traditional in the unit. In this regard I would like to learn your opinion about the following. It is customarily believed that a major goal generates great energy and inspires and solidifies people. Did your experience of competition for the title of outstanding regiment confirm this? Did it affect the moral climate in the collective and increase the personnel's enthusiasm, initiative and sense of responsibility for the regiment's honor?

Commander: It unquestionably had an effect, but not spontaneously. It is people who arrange any matter. It is very important here to explain to them persuasively that they have to understand and feel in their heart what the supreme interests are for which they must voluntarily assume a heavier burden.

The competition for the title of outstanding regiment was not an end in itself for the collective, but a means of achieving the main task set for defenders of the Motherland by the USSR Constitution and the 26th party congress, in which I had the good fortune to participate. To be a reliable guardian of the Soviet people's peaceful labor and to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor is, in the present sharply aggravated international situation and under the conditions of an increase in the real military danger, both a primary duty and the task of tasks and, consequently, the chief objective in military work not only of the Armed Forces as a whole, but of every military collective.

The regiment's command element and party organization proceeded from that standpoint in attuning the personnel to make optimum socialist pledges both in the past training year and in the new one which began recently.

Political deputy: In my view the indoctrinational and mobilizing role of competition unquestionably is higher, the more important the goal planned in it. At any rate training was more effective in battalions and companies where the personnel pledged to take them into the ranks of outstanding or to win the right to be called subunits of sniperlike fire and expert driving. It is fully natural that they also achieved more in comparison with the collectives where preference was given to a quieter life and more modest goals were planned. We used this to persuade the officers in unfolding competition for the new training year: not to be afraid to orient subordinates on the maximum, but of course after soberly weighing the subunit's real capabilities.

I wholly support and share the thought expressed by the commander: Nothing happens by itself. Any indoctrinational factor including competition consists only of possibilities which are fulfilled by the commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organizations in the process of daily work with the people.

Correspondent: What main starting points would you highlight in this many-sided work?

Commander: We have placed and will place in the foreground the personnel's development of a clear understanding of the state importance and vital necessity for conscientious military work and the development of each person's actual and not declarative responsibility for uniformity of word and deed; above all development of officers' responsibility and example.

Party committee secretary: I will add development of the party members' responsibility and example as well. By the way, these concepts are almost indivisible for us. The overwhelming majority of regimental officers are members or candidate members of the party, so that the task was accomplished by the mutual efforts of the command element and party organization.

Commander: An essential and correct addition, since administrative and party influence merged as one not only in accomplishing the aforementioned problem, but in literally everything, whether it was a matter of creating conditions for the personnel to fulfill pledges, adoption of foremost experience, or development of public opinion around those who worked halfheartedly.

Correspondent: Valentin Anatol'yevich, could you decipher what "create conditions for fulfilling pledges" means? What is the viewpoint of the one-man commander here, so to speak?

Commander: Above all to arrange an intensive and effective training process and a lively, interested rivalry among privates, NCO's, officers, teams and subunits for achievement of best results in every class and exercise. It means to sum up results regularly and objectively, publicizing and comparing results and making the experience of foremost persons attractive to others. It means valuing people's initiative and zeal and not being stingy with a good word or encouragement, as well as carefully looking into the reasons for a lag and demanding a strict account for carelessness or negligence... In short, much has to be considered.

Correspondent: Judging from results achieved by the regiment, all this was done in practice, but I would like to hear specifically how, for example, a spirit of competitiveness was developed among the personnel.

Commander: First of all we tried to ensure that the officers were permeated with a spirit of healthy rivalry. To this end I always singled out and set as an example in command training classes those who showed the deepest knowledge. In exercises I would assign the primary mission to the one who functioned more competently and resolutely and with more initiative. For example, tank battalion commander Maj A. Chirkov received that right in one of the tactical exercises in making a march over unfamiliar swampy woodland. Later he made a mistake, however, and I changed my mind and moved Capt B. Pakholyuk's battalion forward. Subsequently, when officers and many soldiers in Chirkov's subunit displayed bold initiative and resourcefulness in an extreme situation, this battalion again was given an opportunity to operate on the main axis.

We make it a practice to have parallel performance of driving and firings by competing platoons and companies. In critiques and when results are summarized we thoroughly weigh all pluses and minuses to ensure that the grade is objective and that first place in competition is deserved. It is important

not simply to wound someone's self-esteem and arouse a healthy ambition in a subunit commander, but also to show what it is useful for him to adopt from a rival.

Political deputy: Prompt motivation of conscientious work and the personnel's tactical proficiency produced a good effect. The regimental commander immediately would announce commendations after exercises or contests for the title of best specialist or best subunit in weapons and tactical training, or in the performance of firing exercises if the crews fired excellently. When challenge pennants are presented hot on the heels of events or a soldier receives written commendation, a certificate or a short leave, this not only elevates the foremost persons in their comrades' eyes, but also sparks their desire to achieve the very same success. Having seen the effectiveness of such an indoctrinational measure, battalion and company commanders began to make better use of the rights granted them by the Code of Disciplinary Punishment for encouraging subordinates' zeal and initiative.

Commander: I'm afraid the journal's readers will form the opinion that everything went smoothly and came easily in the regiment, which of course is not so. We had disruptions in the training process and serious deficiencies in the organization of competition, especially at the beginning of the training year. The precise rhythm was disrupted for a time and people cooled because of various kinds of discrepancies and overlaps in the planning of combat training and in use of the training facility arising both through the fault of the regimental headquarters and due to incomplete work by some combined unit staff officers. For this reason two of our foremost companies demonstrated poor results in driving and firing in a surprise inspection. Such disruptions also occurred because at times we did not know the true state of affairs in a particular collective. For example, we continued to praise commanders, political officers and party organizations of the 2d Tank Battalion and 6th Tank Company in the old way at official conferences and party meetings, not knowing that the quality of tank gunnery practices had dropped there and that symptoms of self-complacency had appeared in some people.

Why am I telling all this? To emphasize that both the planning of training and check of execution has to be persistently improved by the regimental staff in the new training year and that developing a sense of responsibility in officers and all personnel for the assigned job is a permanent task.

Correspondent: Which of the steps taken along official and party lines to solve this problem were most effective? What produced the greatest return in indoctrinational work?

Commander: Inasmuch as the sources of responsibility lie in a person's ideological and moral maturity, I assume that my political deputy and party committee secretary have the first say here.

Political deputy: We work on developing the personnel's ideological conviction and high moral qualities constantly, using the entire arsenal of means: political training, agitprop and individual work, party influence and the force of public opinion.

In implementing party demands we are concerned above all with increasing the quality and effectiveness of political indoctrination and the persuasiveness and intelligibility of party propaganda. To this end we use the best prepared officers of regimental headquarters, of subunits, and Great Patriotic War veterans for explaining resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and Central Committee plenums, for explaining party policy, for giving lectures and briefings and for holding talks, Lenin lessons, theme nights and other activities, and we strive to conduct them in the battalions and companies.

We use varied forms of indoctrination with consideration of the interests of the youthful audience, such as the sociopolitical readings "Moral Ideal of the Motherland's Young Defenders," the thematic series of talks entitled "Bear on High the Honor and Dignity of the Soviet Soldier," and the debates entitled "Are You Ready to Perform an Exploit?" and "What Does it Mean to Show Revolutionary Vigilance?"

We attach primary importance to the authority of the party word. It is one thing, let's say, when a person speaks about an exploit who only has a theoretical understanding of this high concept. One gets quite a different perception of its interpretation, for example, from the words of Col (Ret) P. Davydov, former commander of our native regiment, and other countrymen-heroes who went down the stern war roads and forged the unit's combat glory, or from the words of motorized rifle company commander Capt N. Akramov, who was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and the orders of Lenin and Red Star in our days for exemplary performance of military duty for courage and valor. Nabi Makhmadzhanovich spoke in all the regiment's subunits and everywhere his words found a response in the soldiers' hearts and minds. To improve ideological work by activating real opportunities is the rule to which we adhere.

Let's take political classes. You can speak as much as you like about their importance and call on the officers to conduct them meaningfully and in an interesting manner but if you do not give the group instructors time for preparation, if you do not monitor how they regard the work, if you do not check the level of their knowledge and methods store, and if you do not teach them from foremost experience there will be little benefit. In our work with them we try to get rid of this particle "not." At the beginning of the training year we suggested to regimental propagandist Maj V. Yalovtsev at a party committee session how to enrich the content and improve the link with life of instructional methods seminars for group instructors. In response to my assignment and that of the secretary the officers of the regimental headquarters and party committee members attend political classes, take note of and generalize everything that is valuable, uncover deficiencies and assist propagandists in remedying them.

Correspondent: Vladimir Fedorovich, could you show how this is done in practice using a concrete example?

Political deputy: Well take the following example. The political study groups headed by captains V. Omel'chenko and S. Tyurin were considered the best in the regiment. Here the personnel really were enriched with knowledge, which developed into conviction and action. It is no accident that the subunits of these

officers are foremost in combat training and competition. But political study group instructor Sr Lt V. Sveshnikov often prepared hastily for them and conducted them in a formal manner just to put in his turn. It is understandable that the students also regarded the training in the same manner, and things were considerably worse in his company.

At a conference of the officers we compared these facts, showing that in both cases there was a direct relationship between the quality of political studies and the state of affairs. It stands to reason that it is no simple relationship. It also was affected by the different attitudes of party members Omel'chenko, Tyurin and Sveshnikov toward service and toward working with subordinates, and their unequal level of organizing abilities and responsibility. The officers' work style was revealed in detail. Then captains Omel'chenko and Tyurin shared the methodology and techniques of preparing for political studies and their conduct for comrades at a seminar of non-T/O&E propagandists. An official and party accounting was demanded of Sr Lt Sveshnikov for irresponsibility. None of this failed to leave a trace, and it served as a lesson for him and other officers.

Correspondent: Everything you have said apparently does not at all mean that the task of improving the quality and effectiveness of ideological work in the regiment has been accomplished fully.

Political deputy: I never had that in mind. It still has many weak elements and unused reserves. Some officers still shun live contact with the people. In particular party members majors N. Matsyuk and I. Glushich were justly criticized for this at the party meeting. Some activities are separated from life. The ideological and emotional level of those conducted in the subunits often leave much to be desired. At times an individual who needs attention and the participation of senior comrades more than others slips out of the field of view of commanders, political officers, and the party and Komsomol aktiv.

In short, we have to work and work in the new training year in order to eliminate negative points and improve the entire matter of indoctrination.

Party committee secretary: The party members adhere to the very same opinion. This was confirmed by the regiment's party report-election meeting. It analyzed the work of the party committee, party organizations and many CPSU members exactly and fundamentally. It stands to reason that positive experience also was generalized and everything that must be taken along for tomorrow was evaluated on its merits.

What specifically received approval? For example, the party committee's work to improve the fighting spirit of party organizations. We constantly worked on matters of selection and acceptance into the party and indoctrination of young party members. Thanks to this all battalions have full-fledged primary party organizations and all companies have subunit organizations or party groups. The party committee instructed the local aktiv and helped it improve intraparty work and maintain a healthy moral atmosphere in every party collective: an atmosphere where party members are not afraid to tell each other the truth face to face, where criticism bears a friendly character and where after

criticism and self-criticism comes a correction of mistakes and deficiencies. Such a moral climate was established in particular in party organizations of the 1st and 2d tank battalions and the 1st, 2d, 6th, 8th and 9th companies. As a result their work now has an inherent fighting spirit, activeness and principle. The very fact that these were the subunits which completed the past training year with the best indicators and moved into the ranks of outstanding and foremost indicates the influence of party members of these party organizations on the personnel. We will continue the work in this direction, guided by demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and recommendations of the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries.

Correspondent: Vladimir Grigor'yevich, how do things stand with the personal example set by party members in training and discipline? Based on the experience already gained, what are the ways and possibilities which you as secretary see for a further improvement in their vanguard role in competition?

Party committee secretary: An overwhelming majority of CPSU members and candidate members perform their party and military duty honestly. The majority, but unfortunately, not everyone. It has happened where even experienced party members made mistakes and had omissions in service. The party committee and party organizations corrected such comrades by placing strict demands on them and giving them help.

In particular the party committee worked with CPSU members officers A. Basov, I. Bazarov and V. Rubanik, who received low grades in weapon training in the spring inspection. It turned out that they demonstrated poor results in firing from the tank because they missed night practices for various objective and subjective reasons. We pointed out to them the inadmissibility of such an attitude toward combat training. To the honor of the aforementioned party members, they drew correct conclusions and made up for lost time in the summer period.

Party committee members also learned a lesson for themselves from this incident and similar ones. Because of miscalculations in individual work we at times did not prevent deficiencies, but would begin to take steps after they already had appeared. We were correctly criticized for this by party members at the party report-election meeting. With consideration of the criticism we are making corrections in the party committee's work.

Commander: An improvement in individual work is our main reserve in developing each serviceman's high sense of responsibility for the regiment's combat readiness. I want to be understood correctly: In no way am I belittling the role and importance of mass forms of work. I will say moreover that they are necessary and produce real benefit. For example, general meetings of the regiment's officers discussing the personal example as applied to various aspects of service--combat schooling, strengthening of discipline and solidifying the collective--produced no small amount of indoctrinational return. Each time we tried to give the discussion the nature of a collective reflection and a frank exchange of opinions about the Soviet officer's duty, honor and dignity. It stands to reason that this is in connection with the participants' actions, conduct and deeds. Many commanders and political officers looked at themselves from one side as it were, with the eyes of their comrades, and saw where they had to draw themselves up.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to get by without individual work, but in my opinion it cannot be taken in too narrow or oversimplified a manner, like a face-to-face discussion. I recall a recent but typical incident. One of the inspectors kept trying to find out how many undisciplined soldiers the regimental commander personally had talked with. But really isn't careful attention to an officer's service, increased supervision over his activities, heightened demands on one and support and approval of another based on a person's character and, finally, the inclusion of comrades and the collective to help the one who stumbled all related to the area of individual work? It would appear that its essence lies in the ability to find an approach to a person and the means to influence him, to show patience and not be hasty with conclusions or shoot from the hip. I will refer to an example.

Capt Tyurin rightly is considered the best gunner not only in our regiment, but in the combined unit as well. But there was a time when he could in no way rise above a satisfactory grade for weapons training. The young officer heard many reproaches and critical remarks addressed to him and the party organization even raised the question of holding him liable for party responsibility. It was well that we kept his superiors and colleagues from abrupt measures in time (it doesn't take long to break a person that way) and helped Tyurin believe in himself and cross the obstacle course of failures. He became one of the best company commanders and, what is also noteworthy, he worked very patiently with subordinates, helping them draw up weak spots in combat schooling and correct mistakes.

I and the political deputy also had to work a great deal with 1st Battalion commander Capt Pakholyuk. He is a young battalion commander, diligent and giving his all to service but at times he was too hot-tempered and hasty in decisions, and at times he forgot to orient the party and Komsomol organizations on accomplishing a particular task. We corrected, taught and restrained him and gradually the officer altered his work style. As a result he took the battalion into the ranks of outstanding.

I will say the following: For the most part the officers as well as the warrant officers, NCO's and privates serve well. Those who do things negligently, cast words to the wind and violate discipline are isolated units in a large and healthy regimental family. They are the ones who need more careful attention to ensure that they do not get the entire formation out of step. It happens that even conscientious servicemen make mistakes--some because of inexperience and others through negligence--and take the incorrect path. Here it is important to help them promptly. It is well known that it is easier to treat any illness in the initial stage. If you lose time you will pay later. That is how it is in indoctrination as well. Our predecessors as well as we ourselves did not correct Capt A. Kolomojets or Sr Lt I. Yankov in time. And when these officers' irresponsibility, if it can be thus expressed, acquired a chronic nature, a heap of time and effort had to be spent to free them of it. It is still early to speak of full success.

In short, we have to adhere to a tested rule: In training and indoctrinating everyone, see every person. We will try to follow it more firmly in the new training year.

Correspondent: Were one to try to generalize everything you have said, then what main conclusion do you draw for the future with consideration of the experience gained and lessons of the past training year?

Commander: I would word it as follows: Steadily follow Lenin's behest--take both the previous experience and previous deficiencies as a step, as a lesson so as to proceed more confidently. Difficult and responsible tasks lie ahead of us. We are obligated to accomplish them not worse, but better than in the past training year. We have to work for this, as the party teaches us, better today than yesterday and better tomorrow than today.

Regimental personnel understand the party's demands and remember the USSR Minister of Defense's statements that combat readiness cannot bear a temporal, seasonal nature or be frozen at some level. It must be improved and perfected constantly. The efforts of the command element, the party and Komsomol organizations and all our unit's personnel are aimed at this.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

LT GEN MOSYAYKIN ON DOSAAF ACTIVITIES, ACHIEVEMENTS, SHORTCOMINGS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 83 (signed to press 21 Dec 82) pp 37-43

[Article by Lt Gen V. Mosyaykin, deputy chairman of USSR DOSAAF CC: "Indoctrinate Fiery Patriots"]

[Text] The country's life these days is full of great events and deeds. The second year of the five-year plan was marked by new successes in implementing the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress. The grandiose tasks of building communism set by the party generated a high upsurge of political and labor activeness of the Soviet citizens. Socialist competition for successful fulfillment and overfulfillment of quotas of the second year of the five-year plan and for improving work efficiency and quality, taking place under the motto "A worthy greeting to the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation!" reached an enormous scope. It took in practically all our country's toilers and Soviet Armed Forces personnel. The welfare of the Soviet people is improving steadfastly and our state's economic and scientific-technical potential is growing.

The CPSU Central Committee and Soviet government are consistently implementing the Peace Program for the 1980's advanced by the 26th party congress and are actively implementing a Leninist policy of peaceful cooperation and equality in international relations. As noted, however, in the report at the ceremonial session devoted to the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation by CPSU CC General Secretary, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "each step along the path toward strengthening peace has come and is coming with difficulty and requires a strenuous struggle against the imperialist 'hawks.' It has become especially keen now, when the most militant groupings have been activated in the West with a class hatred for socialism which prevails over a feeling of reality, and at times simply over common sense."

Under these conditions the CPSU, Soviet government and all the Soviet people, coming out resolutely for reducing the threat of war and curbing the arms race, are doing everything necessary to strengthen national defense and improve the Army and Navy's combat readiness.

Our country's multimillion-member Defense Society, the USSR DOSAAF, also is making a certain contribution toward a further reinforcement of the Army and Navy's combat might. It is preparing to give a worthy greeting to its next 9th congress, to be held in February of this year.

For a half-century now the USSR DOSAAF has been honorably justifying its high purpose of being the combat reserve of the Soviet Armed Forces and a school of courage and patriotism.

In fulfilling demands of the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree dated 7 May 1966, the Defense Society achieved new success on the main avenues of its patriotic work. The tasks advanced at the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress basically have been fulfilled. There was an increase in the size of DOSAAF ranks, its organizations grew stronger and were enriched with new experience, and their popularity and authority among the country's toilers and youth rose.

DOSAAF organizations of Moscow, Leningrad, the Ukrainian, Belorussian and Uzbek SSR's, the Bashkir and Tatar ASSR's, and Kuybyshev, Moscow, Omsk and Rostov oblasts have stably held a leading position in the Society in recent years.

Work of the defense organizations has become an inalienable part of the socio-political life of labor collectives in accomplishing social-economic and defense tasks. Many of the Society's rayon and city organizations have begun to work more actively under the direction of party entities. Thousands of foremost DOSAAF collectives have become genuine centers of military-patriotic indoctrination and are performing active mass defense work.

Guided by provisions set forth in the CPSU CC Decree "On a Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" and implementing directions of the 26th party congress on ideological matters, many DOSAAF organizations noticeably improved their work of military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth and carried out specific steps to reorganize certain spheres of military-patriotic work. Elements of an integrated approach toward accomplishing indoctrinational tasks can be seen more and more clearly in the work. For example, there was a noticeable improvement in the coordination between DOSAAF organizations and trade unions, the Komsomol, the "Znaniye" Society, commanders and political entities of military units, ships and combined units, military commissariats, Civil Defense staffs, the Soviet War Veterans' Committee, and other state and public organizations. A number of important joint documents have been adopted in recent times, which permitted a further improvement in the coordination of personnel and means in military-patriotic work among workers and the youth and assurance of a close interconnection of labor, ideological-political and moral indoctrination of representatives of all the USSR's nations and nationalities.

The practice of conducting such interesting activities as months and weeks of mass defense work is improving thanks to the creative initiative of committees and the public aktiv. There was a significant contribution to the organization of the All-Union Tour of Komsomol Members and the Youth to Places of Revolutionary, Combat and Labor Glory of the CPSU and Soviet People, the All-Union Memorial Watch and the Revolutionary Glory Week, the All-Union "Great Patriotic Annals" Exploratory Expedition, and the "Zarnitsa" and "Orlenok" military sports games.

The network of permanently functioning forms of military-patriotic propaganda is expanding: faculties, clubs, lecture bureaus and film lecture bureaus on military-patriotic problems, and future soldier clubs. DOSAAF's role is becoming stronger in the patriotic movement to gather materials on frontline veterans and help veterans and war invalids; in military-patriotic holidays; and in creating monumental complexes, memorial monuments and signs perpetuating the heroic exploit of nations in the struggle for our country's freedom and independence.

The indoctrinational importance of these activities is especially valuable. They help young boys and girls come in contact with the Motherland's glorious past, as it were, and uncover unknown pages of the heroic annals of military and labor exploits of older generations. They prompt young people to make a concrete contribution toward strengthening the homeland's economic and defense might. The growth of the Defense Society's popularity among the people, the wide participation of DOSAAF members in activities conducted by the Society's organizations, and the desire of young people to master military-technical specialties are unique indicators of the effectiveness of military-patriotic work. The USSR DOSAAF is proud of the fact that hundreds of its students have been given state awards in peacetime for courage, heroism and military valor. Among them are HSU Maj V. Shcherbakov, HSU USSR Pilot-Cosmonaut S. Savitskaya, Order of Lenin wearer A. Novak and many others.

Preparation of young people for Army and Navy service is one of the main directions in the Defense Society's work and an important contribution by DOSAAF toward shaping the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. This work is conducted with consideration of the constantly growing demands determined by the scientific-technical revolution in military affairs and by the continuous perfection of the troops' combat and political training.

The USSR Ministry of Defense, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and the command element and political entities of branches of the Armed Forces, military districts and fleets give constant attention and assistance to the Defense Society in arranging an effective process of preparing technically trained replacements for military units and combatants.

As a result of the joint work necessary conditions have been created at the present time for a further improvement in the quality of specialist training for the Army and Navy in a spirit of modern demands.

Practical experience has shown that the work of DOSAAF organizations is carried out most productively and successfully specifically where Society activists rely on the assistance and support of Army and Navy political entities and party organizations. With their help we have succeeded in creating more than a thousand training organizations in which draftees receive one of 46 military-technical specialties. The majority of DOSAAF schools now are located in well-arranged buildings. They have at their disposal vehicle test areas, radio and radar ranges, specialized and programmed training classrooms, laboratories for practical work, garages, maintenance points and workshops.

The pool of training vehicles and sets of electronic and radio equipment were renewed to a considerable extent with the help of commanders and political

entities of the Armed Forces. Cadet training in a majority of air clubs is conducted on modern equipment and extensive use is made of simulator systems and first-rate training equipment. The Society now has many training organizations which approach secondary specialized educational institutions in their technical outfitting and level of the training and indoctrination process. These include the 3d Moscow Air Club, the Taganrog and Alma-Ata motor vehicle schools, the Kiev, Vladivostok and Volgograd naval schools, and the Krasnodar and Kuybykhsev radiotechnical schools. The honorary title of Model has been given to 137 training organizations.

All this permits the timely and qualitative performance of assignments to prepare driver-mechanics, drivers of transport and specialized vehicles, electricians, naval and radio specialists, parachutists and divers for the Armed Forces. A majority of the cadets successfully pass graduation exams and, as practical experience has shown, honorably perform military duties in units and aboard ships. According to the data of military examination commissions, in recent years over 95 percent of draftees completed training with good or outstanding grades, over 94 percent passed norms of the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] complex, and over 75 percent received sports categories in technical and applied military sports.

DOSAAF organizations of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Armenia, Lithuania, the Tatar ASSR, the city-hero of Moscow, and Omsk, Tula and Volgograd oblasts attain the highest and, of special importance, the most stable results in preparing specialists for the Armed Forces.

A further improvement in political indoctrination work in DOSAAF schools and clubs is of great importance in accomplishing the important task of preparing young people for Army and Navy service. The important element is to assure in fact an organic unity of cadet training and indoctrination. Political classes, political briefings, and mass military-patriotic activities must be used skillfully in military-patriotic indoctrination, and sponsorship ties with military units and ships must be strengthened. The Defense Society's organizations try to reveal thoroughly to draftees the missions of the Armed Forces and the social meaning and significance of military service, and to prepare them in advance for the tenor of Army and Navy service.

The role of school deputy chiefs for training and indoctrination has become more important in connection with the importance of the tasks. In the majority of cases the people selected to these positions have appropriate training, no small amount of life and professional experience, and have gone through the school of Army and Navy conditioning. The Defense Society's training organizations make extensive use of the very abundant arsenal of forms of political indoctrination work. Political classes, political briefings, lectures, discussions and talks about Lenin's behests, requirements of the USSR Constitution on defense of the socialist homeland, and the CPSU's tireless work to strengthen national defense are arranged regularly for the cadets. There are meetings with Great Patriotic War and Armed Forces veterans and theme nights, and military-patriotic films are shown. The councils of reading rooms and agitators of training groups work actively. Each DOSAAF school puts out wall newspapers and photo newspapers, and operational newssheets are published. DOSAAF propagandists emphasize with special vigor the importance of military

service in the patriotic and international indoctrination of the Soviet youth. All indoctrinational work in DOSAAF training organizations is directed at developing future soldiers' feeling of love for the Motherland, pride in belonging to the Soviet Armed Forces and readiness to perform their patriotic and international duty with honor.

This work is producing good results. In his book entitled "Sluzhim rodine, delu kommunizma" [We Serve the Motherland and the Cause of Communism], USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov notes: "The USSR DOSAAF performs extensive mass defense work. Over a third of draftees receive good training in its training organizations and they study specialties needed both for the Armed Forces and for the national economy. DOSAAF is rightly called a preparatory classroom for that great school of life which is service in the ranks of the Armed Forces."

A generalization and analysis of responses from troop units about the training level of DOSAAF school and club graduates permits drawing the conclusion that the training of draftees in Defense Society organizations helps them join the military formation and the strenuous rhythm of military service faster. For example, many graduates of DOSAAF naval schools come to serve in the Navy. One of them is Petty Officer 1st Class Vladimir Yermolko from the guided-missile cruiser "Vladivostok." He completed the Vladivostok DOSAAF Naval School. The knowledge he received in school permitted him to learn naval affairs and the specifics of fleet service aboard ship quickly and endure its hardships more easily. He took tests ahead of schedule for control of his area of responsibility, began to stand watch independently and received the qualification of 2d class specialist, and that of 1st class specialist six months later. It can be said confidently that this example is typical.

DOSAAF organizations also take an active part in technical training of the population. They prepare cadres of mass technical trades in 60 specialties with an applied military significance for the national economy. During the time period since 1977 12.1 million persons underwent professional training in DOSAAF, of whom 7.7 million were motor transport drivers. This work by DOSAAF organizations will continue to build up and improve qualitatively.

At the same time there still are many deficiencies and unresolved problems in preparing specialists for the Armed Forces. This relates particularly to their level of practical training. It is a question of having not simply technically trained people coming from DOSAAF schools and clubs, but specialists of various profiles--soldiers capable of performing their duties under difficult, near-combat conditions. They not only must have a good knowledge of their entrusted equipment and operate it skillfully, but also handle small arms and be politically mature, physically fit, courageous soldiers. The level of political indoctrination work in Society schools and clubs is not yet always high enough.

The reason for this state of affairs is that there are still frequent instances where some DOSAAF committees are isolated from life and perform military-patriotic work formally, taking in an insignificant part of the young people. In a number of places schoolchildren and the rural youth drop from the field of view of the Defense Society. Some activities are held at a low level and produce no practical return. The fact is, however, that the USSR DOSAAF is called

a school of patriots and a combat reserve of the Armed Forces by the people. In order to justify the trust of the party and people, all of our Society's workers and activists consider the elimination of such deficiencies and an improvement in quality of all defense and military-patriotic work to be one of their chief tasks.

In addition to elaborating a program for the country's economic and sociopolitical development, the 26th CPSU Congress devoted much attention to matters of developing a new person and indoctrinating harmoniously developed, spiritually rich and physically fit fighters for communism. The recent CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On a Further Upswing in Mass Physical Culture and Sport" was aimed specifically at resolving this problem.

In carrying out the Communist Party's directions, Defense Society organizations improved defense-sports work and took another step in developing technical and applied military sports and improving the proficiency of athletes. DOSAAF's international sports ties, especially with countries of the socialist community, continue to expand.

Over the last five years the number of athletes in DOSAAF rose from 29.3 million in 1977 to 32 million. During this period 326 international masters of sport, 7,714 USSR masters of sport and 22.5 million ranking athletes were trained, including 357,000 candidates for master of sport and 1st category athletes. Trade unions, the Komsomol, sports societies and the Ministry of Defense Sports Committee give the Defense Society much help and support in developing technical and applied military sports. Commanders and political entities of Army and Navy units and combined units help develop these kinds of sports locally.

The best motorcycle racers on an ice track--Sergey Taraban'ko, Anatoliy Gladyshev, Vladimir Sukhov and Vladimir Lyubich--wrote many bright pages in the annals of victories by Defense Society athletes. Masters of underwater sport racing renewed a number of world records and now all the highest world achievements belong to Soviet athletes. Our motorcycle soccer players won the European Cup for the 11th time. Galina Petrachkova and Vladimir Chistyakov were awarded gold medals of the first world championship in sports radio direction-finding. Valentina Yaikova and Viktor Smolin became overall European champions in aerobatic flying. Soviet athlete Nikolay Ushmayev is the overall world champion in parachuting sport. In 1981 alone representatives of aviation sports set 115 records, including 89 world records. Our ship model builders brought back seven medals of the highest standard from the world championship. Several awards of the European championship are in the aktiv of our automobile model builders.

The CPSU CC Decree "On a Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" speaks of the need for combining sports work with indoctrination of the youth in a spirit of patriotism and internationalism, love for the Motherland and readiness for its defense. Ranking athletes and GTO badge wearers who have been brought up in DOSAAF organizations perform military service well and enjoy respect in production, which is natural.

Competitions in technical and applied military sports for prizes of war and labor heroes, prominent people of the country and famed sports champions are held in various corners of our Motherland. Competitions for prizes named for K. Ye. Voroshilov, S. M. Budenny, V. Chkalov, Yu. Gagarin, E. Krenkel', Ts. Kunikov, N. Kuznetsov, L. Pavlichenko, A. Martem'yanov and many others are very popular. Such competitions help propagandize heroism, courage and high patriotism among all the numerous participants of these mass military-patriotic activities.

At the same time the status of defense-sports work, the scope of development and certain qualitative characteristics of technical and applied military sports still do not meet the high demands of our time. Many Society committees give attention only to all-star teams and forget the need for mass inclusion of young people in aviation, motor vehicle, motorcycle, radiotechnical, motorboat, underwater and shooting sports activities. Various kinds of applied military combined games and model building are not widely developed in places, and there are serious shortcomings in sports work with draftees and the student youth.

The Defense Society sees its task in elevating technical and applied military sports to the level of demands of the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers in the next few years. The recent USSR DOSAAF CC plenum elaborated specific ways for implementing party and government directions for an upsurge in the mass nature of physical culture and sports. To this end it was decided to shift the center of gravity of defense-sports work directly into DOSAAF primary organizations and at the place of residence of young people, and at the same time continue to strengthen sports facilities in primary collectives and technical sports clubs.

We are counting on the help of the Komsomol, including the Army Komsomol, with which DOSAAF works hand in hand, in performing this important task.

The Leninist Komsomol always has been and remains a powerful reserve of the Armed Forces. Businesslike cooperation of the Komsomol and DOSAAF is a guarantee that our Army and Navy always can count on well trained, ideologically conditioned, competent, steadfast replacements. On the threshold of a great event--the 9th All-Union DOSAAF Congress--we must multiply joint efforts aimed at reinforcing the defense might of this great socialist power.

The All-Union Competitive Review for Best Organization of Military-Patriotic and Mass Defense Work in Primary DOSAAF Organizations devoted to the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation took place successfully in the country.

Many DOSAAF organizations took an effective part in work performed locally under the direction of party entities to prepare for the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation and in propaganda of the historical advantages and achievements of socialism in working out the most complex social-political, economic and national problems and in propagandizing the course of the 26th CPSU Congress for a further strengthening of the friendship of USSR nations. There was an improvement in the work of patriotic and international indoctrination of the youth and in propaganda of the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the CPSU and the Soviet people and of heroic achievements of the

USSR Armed Forces, and in the work of developing Soviet citizens' conviction as to the correctness and invincibility of socialism, their political conviction and readiness for defense of the Motherland and the achievements of socialism.

DOSAAF committees and organizations now have entered the final stage in preparing for their upcoming 9th congress. A mass patriotic movement is widespread among DOSAAF members and collectives under the motto "A worthy greeting for the 9th All-Union DOSAAF Congress!" aimed at a further improvement of all the Defense Society's work. DOSAAF committees arranged and conducted a businesslike report-election campaign during which leadership entities of the defense collectives of societies were formed. They received the main burden of organizational and indoctrinational work. Therefore DOSAAF committees gave very careful attention to the matter of personnel selection, particularly at the level of chairmen of primary organizations. The attitude toward Armed Forces veterans--reserve officers and soldiers recently released from the Army and Navy and working actively in DOSAAF--has been and remains especially solicitous. The knowledge and conditioning which they received in the Armed Forces greatly help enliven mass defense work, make military-patriotic indoctrination effective, elevate the quality of preparing replacements for the Army and Navy, and achieve a mass nature of youth activities in technical and applied military sports.

The 26th CPSU Congress emphasized that the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces represents a firm alloy of high technical outfitting, military proficiency and indomitable morale. "Each time it is required by the interests of national security and the defense of peace, when it is necessary to help the victims of aggression, the Soviet soldier stands before the world as a selfless and courageous patriot and internationalist ready to overcome all difficulties." All these qualities, important for every Soviet soldier, largely are laid down in draft-age youth in primary, training and sports organizations of DOSAAF. This obligates all workers and activists of our Defense Society to a great deal. We see our main task to be preparing competent specialists for the Armed Forces and at the same time preparing fiery patriots of their Motherland.

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