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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 2076



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17 November 1982

EAST EUROPE REPORT
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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

MILOVAN DJILAS DISCUSSES SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

Vienna PROFIL in German 25 Oct 82 pp 56-59

[Milovan Djilas interview by Wolfgang Libal of PROFIL: "Eastern Europe Will Find No Rest Anymore."]

[Text][Question] Economic difficulties and crises there are in West and East. But what is it that turns the situation politically so explosive in the countries of the so-called real socialism, in Eastern Europe?

[Answer] We must be clear about the essential difference of the crisis in West and East. In the West, it is an economic crisis, not a crisis of the political system or a social crisis. In Eastern Europe the political and social causes of the crisis are the crucial ones because, to quote Marx, the productive forces are in conflict with the production conditions. That means the political structures in the East European countries, mainly the party bureaucracy, but also the other bureaucracies linked with it, in the machinery of state, the economy and so forth, with their monopolistic exercise of power, have proven incapable and helpless in facing the social and economic problems that have arisen.

[Question] And if the Western world comes to cope with its economic difficulties . . .

[Answer] . . . then there will be no way out in the East without penetrating social and political changes. There may be temporary improvements, one country or another may be given assistance, one may do some political patchwork here or there--but without changing the political structure nothing can be done. That means, without abolishing the monopoly on the means of production and the productive forces. And that means not only the monopoly on the machines but also that on men because men, according to Marx, are the most important productive force.

[Question] In talking of the monopoly, do you refer to the monopoly of communist party rule?

[Answer] More specifically: the monopoly of the party bureaucracies sitting on the decision-making bodies and controlling the entire machinery of state.

This then is a monopoly on power or, if you wish, a monopoly on ruling over the whole system. Since Stalin's death, something has changed in this respect in the sense that some other bureaucracies have sprouted forth from the ruling party bureaucracy. Formally, they belong to the party but actually they are tied in with the system for material reasons. For instance the high economic bureaucracy which hardly any longer knows any ideological motivation, sometimes even takes a critical view on the system but in a material sense is comfortable with the system and is of course also entwined with the party bureaucracy. There are then also the bureaucracies in the military and police apparatus. A broad privileged stratum has evolved there, the members of which are linked up with one another. They do not necessarily enjoy the same social status because in the final analysis it is always the professionals of the political party apparatus who make the decisions, but they still have their own monopoly of interests and know how to protect it.

[Question] Nonetheless, under such a monopolist and centralistically governed system regional power centers may form. That one has seen in Poland, let alone the superfederalist Yugoslavia going off on its own, but even from the Soviet Union tendencies of this sort have been reported.

[Answer] Yes, indeed. For there is something in that system that reminds of feudalism. Each local bureaucratic apparatus seeks its own type of autonomy to gain political weight and secure its material position, its privileges. To the Eastern economic system one has usually applied the concept "state capitalism." I have done that, too. But I think this is rather an industrial feudalism in modern shape. Like all other formulas this is not quite accurate, but it provides an approximately correct picture of the current situation in the countries we are talking about. There also are diverse designations for the strata in power there: new class, partocracy, nomenclature, and they are all more or less pertinent.

[Question] You coined the concept of "new class" for those who wield the power in communist countries 30 years ago. If you look back, did you correctly assess that class and its development?

[Answer] In principle, I believe, I was right. By and large it did develop in the way I had expected. In its structure, in any event, there has been no significant change. Perhaps the concept of "new class" was not all that good. Nor did that term originate with me. Berdyaev and Bukharin and later also Bertrand Russell had used the term before I did for the same phenomenon, only I did not know it then.

[Question] In Poland this "new class" has failed completely, not only in its economic policy. It even had to resort to the military to stay on top, it being doubtful whether it actually still holds the exercise of power.

[Answer] But there, mind you, the military are part of the "new class." This in the sense of Lenin's definition to the effect that the military are the armed section of the new class. But in the case of Poland, that is a side issue. What has happened and is happening there is actually a crisis of the system, in contrast to Hungary in 1956 and the CSSR in 1968. In the CSSR it was a crisis in the party or, if you wish, in the leading strata of the party.

In Hungary it was a melange of a party crisis and anti-Soviet national resistance. But in Poland we have a classical crisis of the system. That is a revolution with all the characteristics of a revolution. What is a revolution? A change of power and property relations. The rest, after all, remains unchanged in most revolutions. The Russians remained Russians after the October Revolution, the French, French in all Republics. Only power and property did not remain what they had been in revolutions. That is the phenomenon we see in Poland. Armed collisions to any larger extent we have not had there as yet. But they may come too if the government persists in its unyielding course. Because the conflict has to be resolved. Either by the most brutal terror or a reform or a revolution. A fourth alternative does not exist. What the present government evidently is after is this: it wants to dodge a reform and cheat and outmaneuver the people much as they want to outmaneuver the Soviets to keep things as they were. But there can be no way out of that situation, there can only be total confusion. But because the events in Poland are a crisis of the system, the Polish case is more serious than the previous upheavals in the East have been, Berlin in 1953, Hungary and Poland, in 1956, and the CSSR, in 1968.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] The events in Poland, I think, have not yet entered their sharpest, their critical, phase. A phase that will have tremendous reverberations through all of Eastern Europe and cause enormous convulsions there. And that also is the reason why developments in Poland are not yet finished and will continue, because what is going on there is a revolutionary process, a process that changes the entire society.

[Question] But where is there an indication in Poland that tends to change the property relations?

[Answer] Via the various demands for the introduction of autonomous administration. The regime has the tendency to grant the workers certain rights, under strict party control and that of the state apparatus in enterprises, to be sure. The workers' demand aims at their own administration not controlled by the party and the state but by the workers themselves. Yet that comes down to a change of the ownership in the means of production. In practical terms, it concerns the distribution of the labor product, which has thus far been under government control everywhere, even in Yugoslavia. If this distribution now were to fall into the hands of the workers, it would change property relations even if theoretically the ownership in the means of production would continue to remain socialized, i.e., in the hands of the nation or society.

[Question] As to the power system, did Solidarity not recognize the leadership role of the communist party before the military imposed martial law?

[Answer] The trade union congress a year ago, however, expressed demands for free elections. And that is a demand for political pluralism which would necessarily bring a change in the political power structure. I think events in Poland can no longer be stopped. They do not reflect a temporary crisis situation such as in Hungary and the CSSR way back, but are the consequence of a social state of affairs. In addition to that there is then still as a special

national trait the nation's discontent with the relations between the Polish state and the Soviet Union. Poland today is subordinate to the Soviet government. The social and national element are here inseparable. Which is pre-eminent at any time depends on the current situation.

[Question] When will there be a "revolution" in Poland?

[Answer] I think events in Poland will last long. They have already weakened the cohesion of Eastern Europe, including the military one. No longer can the Soviet leaders count on the Polish Army as they could prior to the military coup. They must adopt themselves to a crisis situation in Poland over the long haul. I believe Poland will ultimately prevail; when, I do not want to predict because much is going to depend on the international situation and also on developments in the Soviet Union.

[Question] But can the Soviet Union even allow a different model of socialism, with political pluralism, in its power sphere?

[Answer] If the international situation develops unfavorably for the Soviet Union and the Polish events generate similar crisis situations in other East Bloc countries, even perhaps in the Soviet Union itself, such a possibility should not be precluded. As things stand today, however, I think the Soviet leaders would tolerate no such change.

[Question] In his new book, "The Communist World Movement at the Crossroads," the Polish Marxist philosopher and sociologist Adam Schaff has taken a very dim view of the possibilities to reform the system from within in the East Bloc.

[Answer] The prospects for it are indeed not very bright, but a protracted revolutionary process as in Poland also is disastrous for the Soviet system. Therefore, I think, the Western statesmen are right who insist on the Soviet Union's nonintervention in Polish affairs. Thereby they aid the revolutionary process in Poland. I believe Schaff need not be right with his skepticism under all circumstances. I would not preclude such a possibility entirely. Much in this will depend on the international power ratio. For the Soviet Union it is not easy either to intervene by force of arms in a revolutionary Poland. In an exceedingly tense international situation that would mean a very serious war. If the international situation would permit it, undoubtedly it would do it, finding no question of morality in it, mind you. But if the international situation looks dangerous, it would probably think twice.

[Question] A new phenomenon has appeared in Poland and in Romania and Yugoslavia as well: the workers demonstrate their opposition to party policy by not working.

[Answer] Many theoreticians evidently have underrated the role of the workers class in communism. They have seen it as a passive, faceless mass, deideologized, with no organization, and so unable to play a political role. That theory must be abandoned by now. Because another interesting fact has come into play: the bond between intellectuals, theoreticians, who have a new vision of society, and the workers. That creates a new social force strong enough to enforce changes.

[Question] Do you see any prerequisites for that in any East European countries?

[Answer] Here one has to look at each East European country separately, even though the system is in principle identical everywhere. The process of changes will take different forms in those countries. For, despite the Soviet hegemony, intellectual autonomy increases in all those countries. They are no longer Soviet satellites or provinces but rather, as in feudalist times, tributary states, one more so and another less so, depending on how much inner strength of resistance they have. This independence, looked at historically, keeps getting stronger. The Soviet Union will not be able to elude the tempests in Eastern Europe which are approaching inescapably. I do not foresee changes soon in the Soviet Union itself, however. The Soviet Union is an empire, a military empire, and the new class we have talked about is imperial in character. Its privileges in the country, over against the society, the nation, are tied up with the imperial expansionism of the Soviet Union. The West, confronted with that, can do nothing but remain strong, and this for a long time. There is no other alternative because I do not believe Soviet expansionism will come to a halt by itself. Never in history has an expansionism by a military empire come to a halt by itself. It keeps going until it gets stopped by someone stronger. Expansion is the consequence of internal impulses. Take the penetration of Afghanistan, an undertaking that has not paid off either politically or economically. Only in terms of military expansion has it paid off, in the sense of pushing Soviet military power toward the important Persian Gulf, the Near East and the strategically important Indian Ocean. Which changes the power ratio in that region. The logic of a military empire like the Soviet Union is different from that of the classical empires of western type. Western imperialism had mainly economic objectives, the Soviet type is not an instrument of the economic policy of the ruling class, it is part and parcel of that class. And so it is unrealistic to expect a conflict between the party and the military circles in the Soviet Union. They are, after all, one and the same organism, only by their functions are the party bureaucracy and the military hierarchy separate. For these reasons I do not believe there are internal forces in the Soviet Union that could bring internal changes and halt the military expansion.

[Question] But aren't there also opposition groups in the Soviet Union?

[Answer] There are manifestations of opposition in the Soviet Union which are very important but not in the sense that they could start political movements. Brave individual personalities are shattering the ideological unity, and the weaknesses of the system are revealed and some of the intellectuals become doubtful about the stability of the system and the conviction is strengthened that the system by no means leads to a developed, but rather to a crisis-ridden, society. But looked at in its entirety, the Soviet system cannot change through internal reforms but only through internal convulsions or revolt or an international conflict. Reforms can at best be expected in the far distant future. Yet if the rest of the world can order a halt to Soviet expansion and the unrest in Eastern Europe continues, the crisis in the Soviet Union will also be speeded up. The system in the Soviet Union, it seems to me, already is undermined, and that is going to continue.

[Question] To get back once more to Adam Schaff: he believes that eventually a pluralistic socialism model established by the Euro-Communists and a democratization within the Western communist parties will in time also affect the structures in the East Bloc.

[Answer] That seems wishful thinking to me that does not proceed from real social givens. This Euro-Communism is already a sort of a new model, but not for the East, only for the West, in that it provides the communists with the possibility to take part in governing Western countries without, however, making any essential changes in the Western system. This Euro-Communism means a departure from the Eastern, the Leninist, model, not a revision of it. This Euro-Communism can of course affect the Eastern system and does it already by criticism and by opposition to Moscow's foreign policy, yet it cannot change the East European model. That can only be changed on the basis of national givens in any country and on the basis of international conditions. That can be grasped from the example of Poland, where the crisis is most advanced. There the Euro-Communism plays no big role even though to some extent it was of some help.

[Question] In the West it is sometimes said that a gradual economic recovery in the East European countries in the long run might also lead to political changes. And then one thinks of Hungary. What do you think of that?

[Answer] That opinion, I think, is naive. Economic cooperation surely also has positive consequences, but it also may have negative effects in that it contributes to the consolidation of the ruling bureaucracy. The West, it seems to me, often overrates the success of the Hungarian model. That is a temporary success much as in Yugoslavia in the late 1960's and early 1970's with the seeming prospect of economic growth, consolidation and prosperity. But all that stood on shaky social grounds. In its basic features, the question of the monopoly of the ruling party and the bureaucracy, the Hungarian does not differ from the Soviet system. And besides, there is the control by the Soviet Union. A certain prosperity in Hungary is attributable to foreign credits or the sensible use made of them and to the encouragement the private sector of the economy has received. However, the general difficulties of the system in Eastern Europe will not bypass Hungary either. Nor do I believe an economic consolidation of the East European system possible altogether. Even through immense credits. They could at best make things temporarily a bit easier. Yet that changes nothing in the system. The economic system in Eastern Europe is an instrument of the political system, not vice-versa as in the West. The superstructure has to be changed because the political-social superstructure is behind everything.

[Question] What then, based on all this, do you expect of further developments in Eastern Europe?

[Answer] It is hard to predict what forms the changes in those countries might take. For some of them a democratic socialism, a pluralistic society in which democratic-socialist elements predominate, is conceivable. In others, events might become very stormy, with the danger that they will slip from one dictatorship into another. But changes, in the light of today, are conceivable only if things also change in the Soviet Union. But that won't happen very fast. Therefore, I think, Eastern Europe will be plagued with revolt, crises and conflicts for a long time, at least as long as international relations do not change.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CZECHOSLOVAK UNDERGROUND CHURCH DESCRIBED

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 16/17 Oct 82 p 5

[Unattributed article: "The Struggle of the Church on the Other Side of the Thaya and Moravia--The System, Methods and Victims of Religious Suppression in Czechoslovakia"]

[Text] The Austrian enjoys all freedom and security the constitutional state guarantees. He has his back against his neighbor and takes for granted what elsewhere, in Brno, Bratislava or Banska Bystrica perhaps, might put his health or life in danger. For decades, an implacable struggle against Christianity and the church has been raging in the CSSR, in the deceptive hope to secure the party's omnipotence also thereby over men's hearts and minds. More and more--and particularly since there has been a Pope from Poland--the Roman Church is the principal target of this policy of repression. It has the purpose to paralyze the church from within, its clergy and institutions, and suspend it between total exhaustion and suffocation. Still there is always something left to be shown to foreign countries. Much like the treatment given the Charter 77 people, this church persecution has all the more led to thousands of victims. The following report is based on broad and tested evidence. It offers a glance at a reality which--being of our neighbor's house--also is our own. Ignoring it would make us accomplices, and turning one's eyes away does not help, as our elders fully know.

The Vatican pronouncement of 6 March, which barred priests from politically oriented organizations, as much as the Pope's speech before the residual hierarchy of the CSSR while visiting on the border, where the critical situation of the church was pointed out bluntly, have led to a trial of strength with the Prague government. That could be expected because the clerical society, "Pacem in terris," rates as the classical tool of communist church policy seeking to paralyze the church from within through cleavage and mistrust. Prague is determined to resist the instruction from John Paul II, and so there has been a tug-of-war since last spring, with the government and its power apparatus pulling on one end and the clergy and people who are loyal to Rome, on the other end. One thing is sure: the outcome of this bitter struggle will profoundly change the church in Czechoslovakia.

Foreign observers must find it strange. For what reasons would an atheistic government party take a clerical society under its protection? As it is, an utterance by Deputy Premier Matej Lucan in Banska Bystrica last year gives one

He asserted "Pacem in terris" was under "legal protection." Anyone attacking the society should have to know that thereby he also indirectly attacked the "socialist society." Which, however, indirectly also paraphrases the purpose of that undertaking.

The state of relations between the government and the church has a most complicated prehistory, into which have entered the in principle militant atheism of Marxism-Leninism as well as the destinies of these lands and peoples, from Hussite times and the Battle on White Mountain (1620) to the Czech "Habsburg Complex," the love-hate relationship with Austria, and a figure like the Good Soldier Schweik. To understand the present situation, some preliminaries are needed:

1. Since 1948--earlier still in Slovakia--the government has sought to paralyze the hierarchical structure of the Church of Rome by convicting and interning bishops or keeping their offices vacant.
2. In 1950 they decreed the disbandment of all monasteries and introduced labor camps, or "concentration monasteries" for members of orders, aiming to have those members, separate from society, gradually die out.
3. In the same year all seminaries for priests were abolished, except one for the Czech lands and one for Slovakia. In the course of time they virtually became "nationalized." Only one bishop is left for the consecration, but where they are then sent and how they are deployed depends solely on the authorities.
4. In 1949 all publishing houses were nationalized and religious literature was proscribed. Importing religious books or printing them secretly at home are criminal offenses and are punished.
5. All church institutions such as schools, boarding homes, houses of devotion, kindergartens, or old-age homes have been banned for more than three decades. Any kind of assembly of believers outside of church services--which includes those purely spiritual in nature such as days of devotion or Bible study meetings--is prohibited and a criminal offense.
6. By these and other measures the Catholic Church has been pushed out of public life, and religion is confined to the altar and to one's conscience--turned into a private concern, that is.
7. The clergy is constantly being decimated, age playing a role in this, and the state determines how a priest is to be used and can cancel that at any time. Not only does it control the numerus clausus in the admission of priests to the seminaries, it furthermore seeks to promote on its own negative selections from the many applications.
8. Pastoral activities of the residue church are under the control of church secretaries dispatched by the party and are maneuvered in such a way that successful ministerial work gets blocked. Priests who become conspicuous under such conditions get into trouble fast.

9. The state, subjected to the party, has a total monopoly on education, teachers found religiously susceptible in any grades are removed, instruction is strictly Marxist-atheistic in character.

10. Observant Christians run into a rigorous "apartheid" policy. For the sorely tested rest there is no place in the official administration, in culture and in jurisprudence. There is an all-round discrimination against citizens who come to notice for attending mass or receiving sacraments. Everyone has the right to attend church, it is said, only that he then would have to bear the consequences himself.

These few points explain why the Christians in Czechoslovakia are among the new proletariat under socialism--disfranchised have-nots without any prospects. The religious freedom under such a regime is much like the famous Potemkin villages. When one knows all this, the paradox in the defense for the priests' society "Pacem in terris" becomes all the sharper. Some explanation is offered by a secret document published in Bratislava by the government of the Slovak part of the republic in 1970. This is the way how that document describes the banning of Plojhar's "peace priests" movement in 1968: The Vatican had attacked that organization and accused it of collaboration and treason. "The peace priests movement which in the past had done much positive work among Catholic priests by paralyzing the influence of the Vatican-run hierarchy was not prepared for that attack. . . . It worked according to the guidelines of our domestic and foreign policy. . . . One should have to activate the clergy and start with a reorganization of that priests' movement, but should do it more smartly."

The idea Prague has about "Pacem in terris," which plainly is that new instrument, is not so much to gather clergy together willing to do the propaganda bidding in the West and the Third World, but directly to undermine the hierarchical structure of the church. What atheistic propaganda did not achieve now is to succeed by means of willing, and often dependent, elements of the episcopate and the clergy: at least cause confusion. Undeniably, this attempted organizational subversion has not been without success. It supplements the already achieved alienation of the masses from the church and from religion, especially in Bohemia and Moravia.

Names of the Most Recent Persecution Wave

The decree from Rome, referred to above, which forbade the clergy to take part in such societies, has created a new situation, if belatedly. The question is whether John Paul II--the Pope from Poland Prague despises--can still help with it the church in distress in the CSSR. There is no doubt about whom it is addressed to. The date of publication coincides with the ad limina visit in Rome. Moreover, the archbishop of Prague, the aged Cardinal Tomasek, addressed two questions to the clerical assembly in Rome, the answer to which was to dispel even the last doubt. One question is whether the societies referred to include "Pacem in terris" and whether the obligation imposed by the Roman pronouncement pertained to all ordained, even those no longer bishops. Rome answered both questions with a laconic "yes."

A tough struggle awaited the residual episcopate in the CSSR after returning from the ad limina visit. The one who stood up best was the Prague Cardinal, and almost all Czech ordinaries followed his example, even Olomouc Bishop Vrana. But the bishops and ordinaries of Slovakia put up a weak showing, especially Bishop Feranec and the capitular vicars Belak and Onderko. It is being said they were victims of blackmail, to the effect that all clergy above the age of 60 would be dismissed from their pastoral duties if they published the Vatican pronouncement on "Pacem in terris." How much pressure that is one can imagine if one remembers that the average age of clergy in Slovakia precisely lies around 60.

Disunity among the ordinaries was used by the state for a counter-attack. KATOLICKE NOVINY, the only information organ of the church, in its Czech and Slovak editions on 25 July published a big frontpage article signed by the Czech and Slovak church secretaries and putting the "Pacem in terris" priest under protection against Rome. Two weeks later in TVORBA, the Czech party paper, Karel Hruza, chief of the church secretariat at the federal government, repeated the argumentation. Well informed circles, by the way, insist they know that Deputy Premier Lucan, referred to above, had announced there would be no more negotiations with the Vatican until the issue about the priests' society was settled the way the regime wanted it, in other words, retracted. The common denominator for this counter-attack of propaganda and repression is the thesis that the top leadership of the Catholic Church, absurdly, did not want the priests' commitment to peace, the saving of life and the preservation of order in the world.

Irrespective of the UN Charter on human rights and religious freedom, all the way to the Helsinki Final Act with the so-called "Basket Three," reality under which the church is forced to live among our northern neighbors provides us with a small topical selection of priests and faithful under arrest. Generally speaking, official repression in Slovakia is still stiffer than in the Czech lands where the Catholic elements, for reasons mentioned above, is not rated as politically so risky. But now, some concrete examples:

Anton Zlatohlavy (30), pastor in Radoma, East Slovakia, was convicted on 24 April last year in Kosice for 2 years on grounds of his unafraid stance as a minister.

On 17 September 1981, in Spisska Nova Ves, also in East Slovakia, the Salesian Stefan Javorsky (58) got a 2-year prison sentence because he had been "indirectly" engaged in pastoral activities in his native village of Spissky Stvrtok. Back in March 1976 he was first sentenced to 2 years for ministerial work with youth.

The Jesuit Gabriel Povala (65), seriously sick, got an 8-month prison term for working with sick and old people; on the way he got a heart attack.

The pastor of Nemcinany, Central Slovakia, Jozef Labuda (33), got a 6-month term on 22 April this year in Banska Bystrica for presumably offering devotions to young people.

Emilia Kesegova (30), with the Bratislava municipal library, also got a 4-month prison term in Banska Bystrica on 22 April for purportedly having organized youth meetings.

At Plzen, the Dominican Josef Duka, before Christmas 1981, was put in prison for 15 months because he had read a mass in private without official permission.

Radim Hlozanka (59), the pastor of Hostka, got a 20-month prison sentence in Litomerice on 30 March this year on grounds of producing religious literature.

In the Bohemian Liberec, the ill Franciscan Josef Barta (61) was sentenced to 18 months in prison on 6 April this year on grounds of having held theological courses.

On 13 August, this year also, an employee in the technical department of the Bratislava telecommunications center, Helena Gondova, was arrested for owning and distributing religious literature.

Jesuit Frantisek Lizna (40), the Salesian Rudolf Smahel (31), Jan Krumpholtz (54), Josef Adamek (67) and Josef Vlcek (61) were sentenced on 29 September 1981, in Moravian Olomouc, to prison for 20 months, 2 years, 3 years, 20 months and 20 months, respectively, for printing and disseminating religious literature.

On 21 January this year, the already mentioned Jesuit Lizna got an extra 7 months in prison.

This summer, on 7 July, chaplain Josef Dolista, Melnik near Prague, was arrested for giving religious instruction to young people in the apartment of Frantisek Padoura.

Construction worker Frantisek Novajevsky (26) was arrested in Bratislava on 30 August under the suspicion of having engaged in lay apostolate.

These few examples readily document that even the exercise of normal pastoral care is subject to prosecution and that whatever a foreigner can discover in church facilities and affairs is just for show: an ostentation for the hard currency from tourists. Every religious sentiment comes under the stiffest police pressure, and the machinery of justice catches them all, the young and the old, men and women, priests and laymen. It is spying on the tiniest prayer circles and seeks to prevent any sort of religious education, even in private and on one's own. Like chasing a phantom, the power machinery--and people in the know maintain that the Soviet KGB initiated it in its struggle against religion--seeks to catch an "underground church" and eliminate purported "secret priests," the most recent example being civil engineer Premysl Coufal (49), known as Pater Stefan, whose assassination was meant to be covered up by the secret police--seeks to control stringently whatever is left of church organization or have it penetrated by compliant elements.

Signs of a religious renaissance, mainly in the young generation and the intellectuals, have now alarmed the authorities. In party circles one can hear the slogan the church should learn again to be afraid. Among Christians in the CSSR--mainly the Catholics but others as well--arbitrary arrests, searches of apartments in the absence of the one who lives there, threats at the place of work, reassignments, removal from schools, interrogations lasting for days, and hunting after religious literature are ordinary events. Of this reality of the ordinary day the Western public hears only on occasion, and the wall of silence it is too that assists that campaign of repression.

New Life Behind the Curtain of Silence

Anyone who frankly confesses his faith and practices religion with his family need not do much else to get watched and get into all sorts of difficulties. The "socialist state" does what it can to prevent religious instruction for youth so as to still uproot Christianity and make it perish. Recent observations indicate, however, that the repressive campaign here and there begins to become counterproductive. Yet events in Poland, Prague and Bratislava urge a relentless use of all means of power.

The secret police use the most up-to-date electronics. With highly sensitive bugging devices they come down the streets, with telescopic cameras they photograph houses where meetings are suspected. Police and party agents mix with church attendants, take down their names, and pursue young people for hundreds of kilometers to catch them still at some sort of meetings.

A smart CSSR citizen knows well enough what to think if in a train or in a bus someone takes the trouble to question him about religious literature, expresses ties with the church and such, to make contact and enter such circles. "Anti-socialist" elements in the enterprise are shown photos identifying them at church service or even while receiving communion. They are putting forged samizdat literature of religious content into their pockets so as to hand them over to the law. Parents receive letters threatening the lives of their children, anonymous ones of course, if they fail to thwart their religious interests. All opportunities for blackmailing priests and activists are brought into play by the power apparatus, methods last known in Austria and Germany in the Hitler era.

Ever since Pope Paul VI, the Vatican has been making various attempts at granting the church in the CSSR a *modus vivendi*--all in vain. The latest persecution wave rather indicates that the regime is after a *modus moriendi*, a systematic strangulation of Christian life. The secret police successes, the indifference of so many fellow-believers in Western Europe, and the indoctrination and fatigue of the young generation justify little hope for the immediate future. The church struggle over there, isolated from the environment, can nonetheless pave the way for a religious rebirth in the more distant future. That could lead beyond the conflicts and passions of recent centuries and surmount them through suffering and introversion.

No one any longer in the CSSR reproaches the Catholic Church for having been a pillar of the Habsburg Empire, no one talks of its having been immensely rich once, in fact it would be difficult even to start talking about such a reproach. Everyone can see that the church and all the faithful servants it has kept have become miserably poor. Sure enough, it still owns some church buildings, yet under the heading of "nationalization" everything was taken away that is needed to maintain the clergy, the orders, and even those buildings themselves. The state does pay some indemnities for the expropriation of the priests, but those payments are so small that they hardly suffice for their subsistence. A pastor's income is far below average. The result is that priests no longer permitted ministerial duties, who have to make a living wage as workers, are better off than their fellows still permitted to serve the church. A Franciscan life-style has thus formed, under duress.

Who can tell whether Marxism-Leninism with its militant atheism has not been of the greatest service to the church and Christianity in those countries, looked at it that way. Is there anybody left who still talks of the Roman Catholic Church as having once condemned Jan Hus and having him burned by the imperial law in force at that time? Hardly anybody is any longer interested in Hus--once a symbolic figure for the Czech anti-Catholic and anti-Habsburg emancipation, instead this great homo religiosus is becoming unpopular with the population because party propaganda would like to preempt him as a crown witness for the "socialist revolution."

Also blaming the Roman Church for outlawing spiritual freedom within its walls has become obsolete. On the contrary, the church and Christianity are the only ones now to have inherited the role of standing up for freedom and human rights, merely by being there.

Also the accusations that the church has no heart for the poor and the disadvantaged are done with. The young students in the only two seminaries for priests, in Litomerice and Bratislava, almost all come out of workers' families. The selection authorized by the authorities is appropriately strict, and yet this development illustrates what results the compulsory instruction in Marxism-Leninism has produced.

Even if an observer can have no illusion about the condition of the church in the CSSR and the renewed interference by party and police power, to the current situation there might once apply, when looked back at from a far distant future what they sometimes say over there among our neighbors in Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia: God simply was still writing straight on crooked lines. And among the satiated in the West, does he therefore write crooked on seemingly straight ones?

5885

CSO: 2300/33

DISSIDENT COMMENTS ON NEW DOMESTIC TRADE LAW

Paris SVEDECTVI in Czech No 67/1982 pp 425, 426

[Article: "Paid Services"]

[Text] It was not too long ago that there blazed across the sky, briefly glowed and then dimmed one of the comets which had become a part of the campaign-riddled management of the Czechoslovak economy. This particular campaign was accompanied by two new measures, a new law on domestic trade which in a few paragraphs touched on the service sector and directed the national committees to care for services more efficiently and more cheerfully. Then there was a small addendum which went a bit beyond tradition, namely, authorization for private individuals to perform, at their own expense, certain services, obviously those which the state cooperative sector in a given locality is unable to handle. Such individuals who may be otherwise employed are now permitted to serve others at their own expense and after their normal working hours, in other words, to engage in a sort of legalized moonlighting which, however, is taxable. In exceptional cases and only after careful consideration, the national committees may allow a full-time commitment for retirees. To this bold addendum was quickly appended an equally bold warning, namely, private persons active in the service sector must in no way herald the return to capitalism. As if such an unsubtle warning were needed! The ideological overseers at the national committee level and even more so those in the party secretariats who are overseeing the overseers, will certainly make sure that the entrepreneurial weed does not spread unduly.

What are the conditions in the services sector really like with respect to the overall economic situation? In 1980, 179 communal service enterprises brought in almost 11 billion Kcs, of which only 4.5 billion came from the population. Most of the services were "purchased" by other state or communal enterprises, thus an individual did not reap much benefit from them. In 1970, there were still 12,000 people engaged in furnishing independent, i.e., private services. In 1980, this number had shrunk to only 8,000. During the "normalization" decade, the party and government thus achieved a drop of exactly one-third. The remaining 8,000 entrepreneurs represent about six-hundredths of 1 percent of the population. We anticipate no turn for the better in this respect, even if another 8,000 enthusiasts applied for the new rigidly controlled permit.

The problem called "paid services to the population," however, is broader and more serious than it might appear. It is true that for most people the term services means primarily the barbershop, plumbing, tailor, auto repair or other shops, as well as dry cleaning establishments and various workshops from where one may, in an emergency, expect to unearth a locksmith or glazier. In developed economies, however, everyone knows that repair and maintenance are only a part of a vast national economic sector which includes many other types of activity, for example, what under socialism is called catering, i.e., restaurants, cafeterias, various types of pubs and bars, fast food kiosks, in short, everything that a person eats or drinks. In addition, it includes a large portion of the retail sales network, plus a wide variety of cultural, educational, sports, recreational, entertainment, hobbies, travel, information and many other types of services. In societies where the basic human needs, i.e., food, clothing and shelter, are satisfied without too many problems, demand constantly rises for such broadly conceived services. It is not without good reason that Western economists adhere to, if only for strategic considerations of economic structures, the traditional division of human labor into three so-called spheres: The primary - agriculture, the secondary - industry, and the tertiary which includes everything else, i.e., if we choose the term, services.

The Obsolete Tertiary Sphere

It is precisely the tertiary sphere linked with growing leisure time which in advanced economies has for a long time had the greatest growth rates. Considered in our national economic terms, the service sector cannot be understood merely as something the national committees will improve by graciously allowing a retiree to repair public toilets. We realize that, given the conditions in Czechoslovakia today, such a national committee, and even more so the retired person, will receive sincere appreciation from users of faulty flushing mechanisms. However, economically speaking, the problem is much more serious than that.

Services considered as the tertiary sphere of economic activity constitute a structural problem, a macroproblem. In Czechoslovakia, it is not only repair and maintenance which are lagging behind, it is the entire tertiary sphere which is obsolete and sorely undernourished. The policy of all our communist governments since 1948, with a brief intermezzo in 1968, had led to totally new dimensions in the secondary sphere in which there was a swelling of precisely those industrial branches which have no direct connection with the tertiary sphere. The swelling occurred in heavy industry based on black metals, at the cost of light industry based on human labor and skill, as one might say in a slightly simplified fashion. Stalin built up heavy industry at the cost of agriculture and with the help of forced labor. In Czechoslovakia the needed capital and labor for heavy industry was provided not only by agriculture but by the entire tertiary sphere.

When we compute the share of the tertiary sphere in Czechoslovakia in total employment and capital investment, we find the seemingly respectable figure of 35 percent, but even this is too little compared to industry. The achieved level of development would merit 50 percent as in the capitalist states. If we consider the notoriously low level of labor productivity and automation which even in this sphere are far below average, its obsolete nature becomes quite apparent. Let us add that people in Czechoslovakia spend some 12-13 percent of their income on the performance of the tertiary sphere, while in the West it is more than a third.

If Czechoslovakia really wanted to improve the obsolete nature of its tertiary sphere, it would have to transfer about a million people from industry, notably the heavy sector, and about 20 billion Kcs annually in the capital investment list of priorities. This, however, is hard to do, since the party intends to allot as much as half of available capital investment funds to three categories only, namely, fuels and energy, general engineering (which includes the armaments industry) and electrotechnology. Under these circumstances, where would it find 20 billion Kcs?

9496

CSO: 2400/36

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

CULTURE TO BE DEFINED OUTSIDE 'ECONOMIC, POLITICAL RELATIONS'

East Berlin WEIMARER BEITRAEGE in German Vol 28 No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 19 May 82) pp 62-87

[Article by Prof Dr Lothar Parade, Leipzig: "Intellectual-Cultural Life As Object of Cultural-Theoretical Research"]

[Text] In its program on the continued shaping of the developed socialist society, the SED grants a critical spot to the working people's intellectual-cultural life even under the more complicated external and internal conditions of the 1980's. In his SED Central Committee report to the 10th party congress, Erich Honecker affirmed the importance of raising the cultural in harmony with the material standard of living, the further improvement everywhere of the intellectual-cultural prerequisites for a higher performance and, in particular, the promotion of the cultural level of the workers class.¹

Wholly in that sense, Kurt Hager had already discussed the importance of intellectual-cultural life at the social science conference in December 1980, in saying: "For promoting the idea or urge for performance more can also be done through cultural efforts if the mass media and the arts and the educational and cultural institutions, with the active participation by literary and art historians, foster a diversified and stimulating intellectual life, assist in the search for novel and more pioneering solutions in production and our way of life, reinforce the sense of being needed, of social contentment, and pay heed to the interaction between physical and mental work."² The Marxist-Leninist theory of culture owes a long-term commitment to that cultural policy requirement. Thereby it then also faces a whole set of problems in theory, methodology and methods concerning its own development and cognitive capacity, the further elaboration of its conceptual tools and so forth. However certain it is that the intellectual-cultural life of our society's working people constitutes a significant subject in cultural-theoretical research for today and for the future, under cultural policy as well as scientific³ aspects, its being defined as a research object seems to lack certainty.

Not a few publications⁵ deal with questions concerning the intellectual-cultural life. By no means smaller is the number of still inadequately discussed or undefined problems right in this subject field. The topic allows a compilation of most diversified aspects and approaches, commits many different disciplines, requires interdisciplinary efforts and, hence, all the more provokes the question

how it might become subject to cultural-theoretical research or what opportunities are adequate to cultural theory and should have to be extracted from it in cultural policy and scientific terms. If it is still generally agreed that cultural theory has to make its own characteristic and specific contribution, it is already no longer so when the intellectual-cultural life of socialist society is chosen as a special research task.⁶ Is not a cultural-theoretical investigation oriented to intellectual-cultural processes itself an amputation of the Marxist-Leninist concept of culture? Is it at all sensible to distinguish between material and intellectual culture? These and similar questions announce doubts about the legitimacy of such a requirement.

These questions, to be sure, readily make clear, and properly so, that intellectual-cultural life cannot be object of cultural-theoretical research without drawing the appropriate inferences, in methodology and methods, from the Marxist-Leninist concept of culture. That must be drawn on for the research focus. A scholastic dispute on the culture concept is not likely to be necessary,⁷ yet our cultural-theoretical literature on the whole offers the picture of a still only weakly developed opinion exchange on the consequences, in methods and methodology, resulting from the definition of what we mean by culture. The socioanalytic use of the culture concept calls for more precision through research and scientific debate.

While their subject matter is more inclusive, the extremely interesting studies by Juergen Kuczynski on the history of the German people's quotidian life⁸ touch especially that problem most acutely. Especially Wolfgang Heise's review of the first two volumes of that history and the letter in response by Juergen Kuczynski make a great deal of that problem.⁹ It turns out that an adequately clear understanding of culture, based on Marxism-Leninism, plays an essential, not only a secondary, role for presenting and judging the normal mode of living of working people in the antagonistic class society and elsewhere. Juergen Kuczynski points to the considerable importance this problem has when he asks, with reference to the broad culture concept, whether "one must affirm that the working people's being deprived of culture by the ruling classes disappears and their situation appears in a, in principle, better light than by using the narrower culture concept?"¹⁰

This is what Wolfgang Heise had said in his review: "If we accept that the peasants--granted all the differences among them--in their activity and their social, spatial and time arrangements are bound to form their own way of life which essentially differs from that of the nobility, the urban middle-class and the clergy, it necessarily forms a totality of attitudes, values, norms, communal rules and common customs, which amount to a culture of their own."¹¹ One cannot fail to see that Juergen Kuczynski and Wolfgang Heise in contradicting each other on whether the peasants' masses in the antagonistic class society have a culture or are excluded from culture, have differing conceptions of culture. Can such a conception be arbitrarily established? Or are possibly both correct in but emphasizing diverse aspects of a general state of affairs which the general culture concept as object of research is aimed at?

Is it not the case that the peasants' masses (a) are mainly integrated into a prevailing culture via the church, (b) due to their way of life form elements of a culture of their own, and (c) at the same time are excluded from essential areas of culture which the rulers develop by deforming the mass of exploited individuals? Is it to be left to one's discrimination, or should we not gain a greater certitude in our socioanalytic use of the culture concept?

The Marxist-Leninist culture concept with its general definitions evidently cannot portray these differentiations in the cultural situation of the peasants' masses in the antagonistic class society at all because its task is to formulate with sufficient specificity the object under examination without, however, explaining, ad hoc, the historic-concrete type of any culture in question. It seems to me that, by analogy, here applies what Marx said about the scientific value of general definitions with respect to production: "All production levels have definitions in common which thought sets down as general ones; but the so-called general conditions for all production are nothing but these abstractions by which no real production level is understood."¹² If such general determinations are more clearly, i.e. more specifically, defined with respect to culture, does that then not do away with the presumption that any random, subjective understanding has the last word about there being or not being a culture? Does that not prove to us the considerable value we have to attach to an adequately specific general definition of culture? Does this not also confirm that otherwise it would not at all be possible to comprehend the repressive function the ruling culture exercises against the exploited in the antagonistic class society as conditioned by the system? At the fourth conference of the Moscow trade unions and enterprise committees (June/July 1918), Lenin is known to have pointed to that aspect in cultural development when he said: "The toughness of the Russian revolution lies in that it was much easier for the Russian revolutionary working class than for the West European workers class to start the revolution but much harder for us to continue it. In the West European countries it is harder to start the revolution because there the high stage of culture works against the revolutionary proletariat, the working class finding itself in cultural slavery."¹³

Repression from the ruling minority in the antagonistic class society can of course also be achieved through largely excluding the working people from certain domains of culture, through demoralizing these domains of life. But what all these problems only show is that research itself places the need for a clearer determination of those common definitions on the agenda which in the culture concept denote the general traits marking the cultural.¹⁴ In the following I therefore wish to present some ideas on aspects of the Marxist-Leninist culture concept which, it seems to me, are essential for using it socioanalytically and appear important to us especially for exploring intellectual-cultural life in developed socialism.

The culture of a society, in essence, embodies a relatively independent living social organism constituted both by essential and specific social conditions and owning essential general features.¹⁵ That complexity, undoubtedly, gives rise to the need for cultural-theoretical research as an overall view which, within all the social relations, examines specific social relations. Harald Schliwa, under the holistic aspect of the socialist society, asserts this independent importance of culture and the need for a specific conceptual reflection.¹⁶ What seems to be in need of further precision to me, however, merely

the attributes used to define culture, e.g., as "expression, outcome and embodiment of man's creative capacities having become historic."¹⁷ That definition leaves out, among other things, what amounts to the existence of a live culture because it no doubt also applies to the cultural achievement passed on through history which either are in fact extant or are wrested from history in the form of a consciousness of the tradition.

Whether and how they help constitute the new culture is a question that points to the need to conceive of culture more clearly as a relatively independent complex of specific social relations the individuals in a society enter into. And this precisely also is involved when one talks of intellectual culture, of intellectual-cultural life. On the one hand we have the task to comprehend this complexity of intellectual-cultural life in its relative cohesiveness and, on the other, its diversified mode of empiric existence expressing its character. And then there comes the question about the sociotypical features of socialist culture, especially also of its intellectual culture, its class character, without a sufficiently research-oriented definition the necessary historic concreteness would be missed. From the vantage point of cultural policy, the importance of these problems is underlined by the remark in the SED Program that the SED promotes socialist culture in all material domains and intellectual spheres of socialist society.¹⁸ The 10th party congress confirmed this cultural policy action orientation.¹⁹

How can we now through cultural theory do justice to this dialectics between essence and appearance in our cultural development? How come that culture in its phenomena is so multiform that it spans a range from labor culture to the arts? How can one explain that objects and attitudes can gain, but also lose, culture?

Many positive and worthwhile efforts that lead us further have already been made to clarify that problem.²⁰ Yet the question about the specificity of culture or the cultural continues to be a teasing requirement. That is also shown by the research on the proletarian way of life. Kaspar Maase thinks it necessary to explore the question to what extent it is possible to distill the cultural aspects of the proletarian way of life and for the time being defines it as follows: "Provisionally, one might find it in the question as to how certain elements, forms and functions of the way of life affect the capabilities and knowledge, values and goals, pleasure capability and environmental relations of the individuals: how far and in what forms are in the activities of practical (material, intellectual, sensual, emotional) life the richness and productivity of personality--awareness, variety, pleasure intensity, individual and collective self-determination--brought to realization?"²¹

In any event, that is a question which must be seriously pursued and answered accurately through research. Otherwise the socioanalytical value of the Marxist-Leninist culture concept shrinks into zero and the emphasis on its range, closely looked at, turns out to be a meagerly or pompously presented vagueness or a contention to which the specifics of culture and the cultural policy of the theory of culture have become irrelevant. For this very reason there is so much importance attached to the question about the nature of culture and the given empirical phenomena of its existence because it aims at the connection between range and specificity, at the "embedding" of culture within

society at large, at the specificity of the elements that make up its essence and empirical phenomenality, the sociopolitical affects and the manageability and planability of these processes.

So we shall not be able to solve these key issues satisfactorily if we discount the experiences of the what and wherefore in cultural activity and the historically generated organs and institutions endeavoring to promote socialist cultural development, if, in other words, we ignore the real state of affairs to the effect that specific social efforts are undertaken to promote socialist culture, better satisfy cultural needs, and enhance the ideological efficacy of cultural processes with their positive and negative experiences.

The premises set for a historic-materialistic understanding of culture by Marx, Engels and Lenin²² as well as the history of our cultural revolution and its analysis in the documents of the Marxist-Leninist party define culture in its interrelation with politics, economics and the social, in the ideological class conflict, under the aspect of the advantages of socialism and the spreading of its impulses and so forth. We face the task, above and beyond the insights gained, to get a clearer idea of the interrelation between economic and cultural development, carry further the research about the connections between scientific-technical and cultural progress, trace the interaction between social structure and cultural development, define socialist culture more precisely as an important factor in political stability, and so forth. That then gives the culture concept an important function in exploring the holistic development of socialism within the dialectics of its essential relations, processes, aspects and areas.

None of that can be done without adequately and clearly defining culture as differentiated from the political, the economic and the social. And so we need, to make the culture concept more precise, a theoretical handle that takes account of it. If we ignore the differentiations among social relations, we undoubtedly are talking about other essential phenomena but no longer about those of culture. That, it seems to me, applies to the inferences drawn by Irene Doelling and Matthias Goldschmidt from the theoretical approach discussed in their research paper, "The Theory of the Social/Historic Forms of Individuality--Their State of Development and Their Methodological Importance for Marxist Cultural Theory/Cultural History."²³ As long as one does not ask about the specific place of a culture within the dialectics of social relations, forms of individuality and individual development, the cultural-theoretical angle is lost. A level of abstraction is introduced that makes culture invisible because it is then no longer a matter to find out how the socioeconomic relations determine the character, substance and structure of a culture through forms of individuality, which function and operational possibilities a culture has with respect to bringing to realization the given forms of individuality in individual life, but what one rather does is that one ultimately imputes a so-called culture to the interrelation process between forms of individuality and individual development affecting all society. This is the way the authors put it: "The theory and history of culture are interested in the level that can be formed in the individual subjectivity of members of social classes and groups in concrete societies and in what is actually evolved by individuals in their life activities, and in how the individuals with the subjectivity they have developed are able, through common action, to reproduce, modify or change revolutionarily their conditions of life and the transcending social context."²⁴

Significant as the context is which is here defined, it still remains too wide-meshed to get hold of the specificity of culture and the real efforts in cultural policy that must be of concern to cultural theory. Granted, cultural theory is interested in the level of individual subjectivity members of social classes and groups can develop in various social orders but only with respect to the share and function culture has in it. This is so because first of all we must undeniably proceed from that forms of individuality are determined, though basically yet not exclusively, by economic relations and rather by all social relations in their entirety. Secondly, realizing forms of individuality in individual life can as little be related to living conditions as such because the differentiation of social relations includes those in living conditions as well. And thirdly, which has already been pointed out, the socioanalytic value of the culture concept evaporates even before it has been established if an adequately clear distinction from the political, the economic, the social and so forth does not at the same time permit us to portray the interaction typifying any given form of society or a developmental phase of a society and actually existing between social relations. If cultural theory renounces looking at these matters in a specific fashion, it gives itself up because it then deals with matters in the realm of other science disciplines. There should of course not have to be a problem as long as insight is gained. Only that one area then fails to be explored which happens to be the very one of concern to cultural theory and of high relevance to an angle to which cultural policy is committed.

Undoubtedly it will always be unsuitable to confine culture in its essence attributively or as a characteristic context to one and only one denominator. As far as that goes, many of the extant Marxist-Leninist attempts at defining culture do not preclude but complement each other through emphasizing various aspects in defining culture. This in consequence of the fact that culture is a complex of specific social relations among individuals that empirically exists in qualitative aspects of objects and activities. Culture forms a relatively independent complex of social relations typified by a specific personality-forming efficacy potential. That view in looking at things also has been suggested by the recent discussion of the basic material and ideational relations that constitute a society as a whole.²⁵

While cultural-theoretical publications in recent years have clearly demonstrated that culture cannot be identified with society as such,²⁶ and yet has to be understood as a phenomenon that pervades society, the explanation for how this pervasion is to be understood sociostructurally has remained rather obscure. Irene Doelling and Matthias Goldschmidt point that out too in their research paper in observing: "The connection between a given mode of production and the key process of cultural-historical development is affirmed only in general terms but not dealt with in detail; the enumeration of living conditions, attitudes, personality structures that belong to this key process makes a casual impression; and the question is not even raised why they precisely are the ones that make up the key process and how all this hangs together."²⁷ That the problem presumably was not seen at all seems slightly exaggerated to me. It does by no means minimize, however, the central theoretical and methodological importance attached to this question now as before. This is greatly due to the fact that the empirically given character and specificity of culture as a social relation

have but inadequately been acknowledged. A more differentiated conception of the totality of social relations under the philosophic discussion of the interaction between material and intellectual relations releases handles for a socioanalytically more circumspect determination of culture within the overall social development process. And here it is especially important that the Marxist-Leninist theory of culture pursue more consistently the aspect which had, e.g., already been set down in 1976 in the work "Principles of Historical Materialism" as follows: "Men express their real interests resulting from their social position within the mode of material production in political, legal, cultural and moral ideas and desires, and they develop in those fields of social life activities to make something of their interests and enforce them. Also in those areas of their sociohistoric activity--and not only in the material production process--they take up social connections, enter into social relations with one another."²⁸

Culture constitutes such a specific social relation. It embodies relations men enter into through objects and activities which serve their personality formation directly or by which they as personalities reproduce themselves in a specific way. These are objects and activities or aspects of objects and activities that exercise a specific function in realizing the historically given forms of individuality in individual human life. Culture constitutes a social relation among individuals because via the appropriated objects or activities engaged in the individuals turn themselves or others into an object of development or, in other words, enter typical relationships. In interaction with the economic,²⁹ political,³⁰ social,³¹ and ideological relations,³² culture, a specific social relation, is part of the totality of social relations. This includes culture in a specific class of social phenomena which, despite their substantive, functional and structural differences, also own very definite general characteristics according with them, as it were, in their empirical existence. They consist in the fact that this class of social relations is given objectively and in modes of conduct and is reinforced by appropriate institutions. The remark by Marx that society is not made up of individuals but of the sum total of relations expressing how the individuals relate to one another³³ includes the characteristic typical of social relations of more or less pervading the various sectors of society to which any given characteristic types of objects and activities belong. This penetration of social domains applies not only to cultural relations, nor can it be shaped arbitrarily.³⁴

And this precisely is an essential handle for cogently defining the dialectics between the range and specificity of culture. Political, economic, social, ideological and cultural relations are by no means identifiable in their substance, essence and functionality but are always specific social relations³⁵ that may, empirically, exist uniquely as social relation in objects and attitudes, predominantly, peripherally or not at all. The dialectic in this connection is essential because it calls attention to the objective conditions for broadening or narrowing cultural relations in our society and equally clearly underscores that with regard to cultural attitudes educational conditions are of an analogous importance. In our cultural mass activity these problems in various forms play a not insignificant role day after day. Today, on the territories of the socialist society not a few politically representative buildings are also being used for cultural affairs. Traditional buildings not used for their original purpose now serve as locations for sociability,

club activities and so forth. At the same time, however, it is impossible to overlook that narrow-minded practices however also obstruct the broadening of cultural relations in a territory where one insists, in a one-sided fashion, on a political-administrative or official use of historic buildings or on confining the use to gastronomic interests. There is no denying that this whole set of problems has to be studied in the light of improving the intellectual-cultural conditions for our performance improvements the 10th SED Congress has asked for.

This also applies by analogy to extending the subjective conditions for the use of the not inconsiderable cultural wealth of our society. We only have to remember the many points of concentration where our objective cultural legacy is virtually piled up. It is typical of socialist cultural development that the tapping and cultivation of our cultural heritage on the one hand and its being conveyed on behalf of a richer intellectual-cultural life for all working people, on the other, are equally important. Even though the conveyance mechanisms must receive still more attention in research and clearer conveyance strategies ought to make possible a meaningful integration of annual commemorative days in a process of continuity, the fact still is that the appropriation of our cultural legacy on behalf of a richer intellectual-cultural life always calls for a certain degree of information and education. For that reason there attaches a crucial importance to the propaganda and popular science activity of territorial cultural institutions, the mass media, the mass organizations and relevant official organs which, through unobtrusively conveying the appropriate knowledge and information, must make the appropriation of our legacy possible at a broad range. It is perfectly clear that the effectiveness with which this educational and enlightening potential is used largely controls the range to which our cultural legacy contributes to enriching our intellectual-cultural life.

What the progress in socialist cultural development involves then in the final analysis is to achieve, via objective conditions and attitudes, a greater density of cultural relations among the classes, strata and groups in socialist society. And these are relations through which individuals develop their ability for producing and appropriating our social wealth, experience their own value, their significance to the commonweal, reproduce their "inner world," their personal capacity for shaping the social relations of socialism and also develop their capacity for pleasure. If for those reasons we insist on differentiating the cultural from the political, economic and social and other relations, we also must consider that solely on the basis of the socioeconomic society Marx discovered such differentiation makes sense.

The interaction among political, economic, social and cultural relations abstractly defined reveals nothing specific about the form of any given culture. Only the disclosure of its characteristic nature based on corresponding historic-concrete socioeconomic relations also reveals the sociotypical traits of a culture, which remain hidden as long as the historic-concrete interactions between the essential social relations with the cultural relations are disregarded. Thus socialist cultural development undoubtedly can only be understood if two fundamental criteria of the socialist relations of socialism are taken into account. For one thing, the workers class is the first class in the history of humanity which, in alliance with all other working people, to a large extent

exercises its political rule by simultaneously remaining society's decisive material productive force. The transformation of political and economic relations in socialism thereby produces new qualitative features in their interaction. Secondly, the workers class, as the proprietor and producer, realizes production relations that for the first time in the history of humanity are determined by the dialectics between overall social, collective and individual interests. The extension of these production relations over all society brings it about that personal or collective performance in the social interest becomes the crucial objective regulator in the shaping of all social relations.

The workers class and the working classes and strata allied with it, which determine their own standard of living through their performance, maintaining themselves and not letting themselves being maintained by others, whose national pride and internationalism can rely only on what they have achieved themselves and on their own capacity, cannot enter into any cultural relations outside this crucial historic turnabout which starts with the liquidation of the capitalist exploiter class. Through a protracted historic process these cultural relations of socialism evolve, conditioned by that historic revolution and conditioning it. So socialist culture to a large extent owes its sociotypical features to the fact that it is a culture for social, collective and personal interests and the members of the workers class, the cooperative farmers, the intelligentsia and so forth who bear the political responsibility for it. To all of them the efficiency of material production objectively owns the rank of a key issue so as to obtain permanent advances in the shaping of the developed socialist society. Even though the reference between cultural relations and the efficiency of material production definitely is specific and not all too apparent, it does by that token exist no less effectively.

Socialist culture is a working culture in the social and personal interest³⁶ and so also in the enjoyment of the socially and personally produced results of labor. This dialectical unity between labor performance and enjoyment in the production and appropriation of social wealth forms a cornerstone in those specific social relations among the individuals which directly affect their personality formation. This places in the center of socialist cultural relations the development of a facility for exercising a socially necessary occupation and the awareness of the personal worth combined with it, the forming of a moral capacity to do work as it conforms to both the society and oneself, the reproduction of an appropriate physical and psychological capacity to form a diversified requirement structure for the objects and services produced through a division of labor, whereby to produce mutual dependence, respect and solidarity. From this, essentially, identical situation the individuals in socialist society find themselves in with respect to the possibility and need to provide for their individual subsistence through their own work and thereby to augment social and collective property, arises the controlling unified ideological foundation for socialist cultural development given its expression by Marxism-Leninism. From this, however, also grows the typical contradictoriness in ideas and moral concepts in socialist cultural development as the assumption of overall social responsibility by the collectives' and individuals' work and public activity is not subject to evolution but runs into diverse realization opportunities that are bound to create attitudes of differentiated moral worthiness. From that socialist culture--especially intellectual culture--

derives one of its essential functions of building up an ideational-moral potential that stimulates the ongoing realization of action possibilities given through occupational and public activity. All that underscores how necessary it is clearly enough to distinguish the cultural from the economic, political, social and other relations. That differentiation alone permits us to comprehend the interactions existing among them more accurately and to analyze the peculiarity in the historic change of cultural relations, which are ultimately controlled by the economic relations. Objections that this would abandon the range of the Marxist-Leninist definition of culture, would exclude politics, economics, technology and so forth from culture, and would bestow on culture the rank of a neutralized place of refuge, are not valid. If political and cultural relations are not identical, they do reside all the more emphatically in their reciprocal significance and effect.

The meaning of this differentiation to the Marxist-Leninist theory of culture lies precisely in disclosing any given historic-concrete interaction, and not in any isolated consideration of cultural relations. And now the fact that culture is to be defined as a specific social relation vis-a-vis political, economic and other relations, in clear differentiation, must not be confused with the fact that objects and living conditions on the one hand and activities and attitudes, on the other, as the empirically given mode in which social relations exist, are more or less pervaded by them all, and more or less express them all. That is the very reason that confronts us with the fact that cultural worthiness can be a secondary or predominant aspect of the various objects and attitudes as they exist a millionfold. This is the point, as we have already said, where the problem of expanding culture and promoting it in all empirically given domains of life can be meaningfully posed and it can be avoided that the socioanalytical value of the culture concept becomes amputated by a vast vagueness.

This then is valid: to the extent that objects and living conditions, on the one hand, and attitudes and activities, on the other, express social relations that directly serve the formation of personality, culture exists within a web of diversified given empirical culture-bound sectors. It means that a particular object or an attitude taken by itself can show different degrees of political, economic, social and other worthiness. Classifying them in relation to how predominant they are leads to different areas of culture subject to historic change. That concerns the existence of these areas for the various social classes and strata, their scope of development, and the degree to which the political, economic, social and ideological relations are expressed in them. Thomas Metscher's proposal³⁷ to set down an empirically given cultural structure while proceeding from cultural key areas, reflects this problem and offers an alternative for solving it. The fact remains that cultural objects or attitudes always also more or less suggest political, economic, social and other aspects, and vice versa. Thus, based on individual objects or attitudes, culture cannot be examined; random work may create intrinsic values but not culture, Marx writes in his "Critique of the Gotha Program."³⁸

Cultural relations form through the dialectics between the embodiment and appropriation of the capacities of the human species, insofar as thereby processes are released or reproduced that directly serve the personality formation.

These are processes through which the historically grown and currently produced or appropriated social wealth directly contributes to the individuals' personality formation. From that vantage point, differentiating between material and intellectual culture becomes perfectly sensible. This constitutes no manner of mechanically applying the basic problem in philosophy to the social processes in culture³⁹ but the first concretization of cultural relations in society. Evidently there are not only essential differences in the processes between material and intellectual culture serving the personality formation but also in the web of determinants that controls their development. The culture of the natural environment as realizing a natural potential in the process of the transformation of nature by man serving personality formation directly and conveying scientific knowledge serving personality formation directly cannot be measured by the same yardstick. They rather suggest that the specific sectors in material and intellectual culture can be developed while being by no means uniform and equal.

To this applies the basic requirements of methods which Gottfried Stiehler, in his study, "The Basic Problem of Philosophy and Distinguishing Between Material and Ideological Relations," calls an inquiry into abstractions to bring back the highly abstract expression of categories and statements to his richly stratified and structurally complex content.⁴⁰ Even the distinction between material and intellectual culture betokens a richer definition of cultural relations and by no means an abandoning of the wide Marxist-Leninist culture concept. A closer look at material or intellectual culture in turn leads to sectors that offer a more concrete and richer definition of cultural relations.⁴¹ In their empirical expression the cultural relations are given through a more abundant amplitude of distinguishable concrete objects and attitudes.

In principle, cultural relations are formed through the process of a given historic-concrete production and appropriation of social wealth for the satisfaction of material and intellectual needs. This entwining essentially determines the cultural structure as it empirically exists, conceivable in different sectors of material and intellectual culture which in a summary manner are expressed in the cultural wealth of society existing in embodied and live forms. Cultural relations thus are realized in the natural and spatial-embodied environment, the labor process, and all processes in the satisfaction of material needs as well as in the arts, the sciences, the educational system, i.e. in the processes that satisfy intellectual needs as far as they directly serve the individuals' personality formation.⁴²

So we are not confronted simply with a pragmatic, conventional, or makeshift paraphrase when the SED specifically orients toward the development of intellectual-cultural life and makes the point that the cultural policy course of the eighth party congress is aimed at a rich intellectual-cultural life with a high ideological efficacy, that it is important to broaden the conditions for intellectual-cultural life, and that the citizens' active participation in intellectual-cultural life is to be promoted.⁴³ The special regard for intellectual-cultural life by no means contradicts the range of the Marxist-Leninist culture concept but subsumes its richly structured and differentiated content which makes possible and, in fact, necessary the emphasizing of certain aspects of culture. Apart from that, as already pointed out, the Marxist-Leninist

culture concept must be made the basis for exploring intellectual-cultural life if we want to break through the additive use made of that concept and the corresponding purely additive understanding of intellectual culture and intellectual-cultural life. And that use must be broken through if the development of intellectual-cultural life is truly to be subjected to cultural-theoretical analysis.

An additive breakdown of intellectual culture into the sciences, training and education, political culture, ideology and morality, aesthetic culture and social psychology offers no insights into the way the intellectual-cultural life functions, its structure and so forth. That way, those specific social relations are not disclosed that constitute intellectual culture as a relatively independent essential sphere of life. What we get instead is a listing of diverse phenomena without reflecting on their actual integration within intellectual culture. Division of labor, institutional and attributive designations of intellectual culture are thrown into one and the same pot unexamined. Morality and ideology, e.g., point to attributive designations of intellectual culture as well as to essential domains in which they take effect socially. The sciences and arts, by contrast, in their being included in intellectual culture, raise questions about the division of labor production of the personality forming potential, its differentiations and so forth.

In the training and educational system, again, thought is given to the role and specificity of the institutions of intellectual-cultural life, i.e. a specific way of preserving, conveying and appropriating intellectual-cultural wealth. These aspects of intellectual culture, belonging to it in certain ways, and not in other ways, while they also function most unevenly within intellectual culture, cannot simply be lined up one after another. The problem is obvious: the Marxist-Leninist theory of culture must carry out an examination of intellectual culture that explains the essential internal connections in the intellectual-cultural working potential through which the political, economic, social and technical determinants of the development of this working potential are clearly accounted for and, at the same time, the not insignificant role of intellectual-cultural life in the promotion and reproduction of political and social activity can be explored with discrimination and in depth.

In its complex structure, intellectual-cultural life must be defined theoretically and logically as well as historically. The need for its sociotypical definition identifying it as the intellectual-cultural life in the shaping of the socialist society in the GDR and the countries of the socialist community exists as much as the fact that the intellectual-cultural relations have to be examined as to the empirical mode of their existence in certain sets of objects (embodied intellectual-cultural wealth) and attitudes (activities that produce and appropriate the embodied intellectual-cultural wealth). Thus it is not a matter of abstracting from the arts, the sciences, morality, political culture, social psychology, the educational system, the houses of culture, the press, TV and so forth as constitutive elements of intellectual culture. The problem is to disclose those interconnections and aspects of intellectual-cultural life which exhibit its historically determined mode of functioning as a relatively independent complex working potential on any given developmental level of socialism. How can one for that purpose approach the wealth of phenomena and manifestations in intellectual-cultural life? How can intellectual-cultural life be tapped for sound scientific inferences for management activity in a more penetrating sense?

Cultural-theoretical research must be governed by exhibiting from the flux of phenomenality those sides and interconnections of intellectual-cultural life which attest to its complexity, its nature as a specific social relation among individuals. Equal attention has to be given to theoretical-methodological and to practical cultural aspects. The question as to which sides of the intellectual-cultural life are to be examined must be determined by the cultural-theoretical concern to account for a relatively independent complex phenomenon in its interaction with other social relations and domains and by the cultural policy concern to gain insights essential for the SED's overall strategy in shaping the developed socialist society. The Leninist idea that Marxism-Leninism gains its definitive form only through being linked with a revolutionary mass movement⁴⁴ applies to the Marxist-Leninist theory of culture predominantly, and also in a special way. Especially the exploration of intellectual-cultural life in socialism is unthinkable apart from and beyond the political-ideological activity of the Marxist-Leninist party by which it orients, motivates and organizes the society-shaping capacity of the workers class and all other classes and strata. This is no *deus ex machina* activity, itself unexposed to historic conditions for action, unaffected by them. The development of the Marxist-Leninist party is closely interlinked with socialism's historic degree of maturation, attained and to be attained, and with the inevitabilities and contradictions controlling socialism nationally and internationally in its developmental tempo and development opportunities. In every phase of socialist construction it remains a crucial task of the Marxist-Leninist party, which ever again has to be resolved, to produce the kind of awareness and organization in its ranks that will make possible for it under the prevailing historic conditions to unite and activate the various classes and strata for the preservation and progress of socialism. This basic process of socialist society formation shapes the intellectual-cultural life in an essential manner, investing it with significant sociotypical features.

The Marxist-Leninist party itself through the political-ideological activity of its basic organizations and of all party members shapes essential aspects of intellectual-cultural life. Arbitrarily, it cannot do it either, as far as intellectual-cultural life is concerned. Its ideological unity and cohesion, the reproduction of which is a constant task, assign to it also the leadership role in intellectual-cultural life. There is, however, nothing automatic in its implementation; with respect to the conditions, contradictions and inevitabilities that govern intellectual-cultural life in general, it must be regained always anew. From this precisely results the cultural policy obligation of the Marxist-Leninist theory of culture to examine its specificity and opportunities with respect to intellectual-cultural life in such a way that insights can be gained about implementing the leadership role of the Marxist-Leninist party on behalf of a rich intellectual-cultural life. That is an essential point of departure in setting down the research strategy to be followed. And it also is a point of departure of direct interest to the Marxist-Leninist theory of culture and its development as a science discipline.

The concept of culture and what is meant by intellectual-cultural life can be discussed endlessly, sagaciously and indefatigably.⁴⁵ And there may be perfectly realistic circumstances grouped under those concepts--possibly accompanied by protests from another discipline that its own field of endeavor had been seized

upon. There is one thing, therefore, that seems to me exceptionally important; it has to do with the Leninist idea already referred to. Our efforts to define culture, intellectual-cultural life and these things more accurately must conform with the requirements and needs of our practical cultural movement. Gaining insights and revelations on its behalf is possible only if the subject matter and the research directions taken are oriented to practice and to the organizations, institutions, various groups of working people and so forth in such a way that the structure of intellectual-cultural life in all the ways in which it is conditioned becomes as intelligible as the most important possibilities for its development as historically provided in every instance. But this, in turn, is possible only if the Marxist-Leninist theory of culture makes more specific and develops further its conceptual apparatus, develops more discriminating considerations and, above all, combines theoretical and empirical research more intimately.

Intellectual-cultural life can only be understood if essential connections are selected at any time and turned into the object of research. What matters, in other words, is to set down diverse research models relevant to the specificity of the phenomena to be explored and oriented to practical requirements.

Here one must first of all focus on the most essential, empirically given diverse areas via which relations of personality formation among the individuals are established. Intellectual-cultural life, so differentiated, is made up essentially by five areas or levels in interaction with one another but basically distinct due to the quiddity of their personality-forming potential. Those areas, which at the same time also are subject to management policy activities in intellectual-cultural life, may be set down as follows:

1. The area of intellectual-cultural life in which cognition and the dispensation and appropriation of knowledge contribute to forming the world-outlook, social conception and identity of the socialist personality, the consolidation and development of the Marxist-Leninist world-outlook being its centerpiece;
2. the area of intellectual-cultural life which is predominantly determined via the arts by the forming of socialist moral values and value orientations and a differentiated world of sentiments and is generally left to the arts to deal with;
3. the area of intellectual-cultural life that embraces the exercise of various relaxation-oriented craft, artistic, horticultural, technical and other non-professional activities, the exercise of which is marked by free options on the part of the socialist personality;
4. the area where forms of sociability are engaged in and the activities serving gaiety and relaxation, the gaming instinct, pastime amusement, leisure and the forming of contacts and so forth; and
5. the area that fosters the consciousness of the tradition and of history through the cultivation of customs and mores, the organization of traditional holidays and celebrations, and the contact with monuments, and which in a particular way strengthens the bond with the historic growth of the GDR as a socialist nation.

Intellectual-cultural life exists empirically in terms of those areas. Each area is typified by specific sets of objects and activities which all together, even though differing from one another, constitute personality-forming relations among individuals. While this provides for intellectual-cultural life as object of cultural-theoretical research, it does so also to some extent, as already pointed out, as an object of management policy activities within the overall conception on the shaping of the developed socialist society.

This means that in all the many different research trends one may engage in, the primacy no doubt goes to those that can most clearly illuminate the decisive and, at the same time, specific role of intellectual-cultural life in the further shaping of the developed socialist society. That applies particularly to sides and connections combining cultural life with the overall social development process, which would have to be regarded as essential, relatively independent cultural-theoretical research complexes. The following, among others, are included in that:

1. With the continued shaping of the developed socialist society there evidently arise closer, modified and, at the same time, more differentiated interactions between politics and intellectual-cultural life. With regard to the 1970's as well as to ongoing processes in the 1980's, these interactions are of interest under several aspects. First of all there is the role the various areas of intellectual-cultural life play in consolidating political relations, especially the leadership role of the workers class. And then there is the responsibility political organizations in socialist society have in fostering the various areas of intellectual-cultural life, especially with regard to an increased working people involvement in the shaping of territorial intellectual-cultural life. Finally, intellectual-cultural life deserves interest in this connection because individual life experiences is the basis for gaining and producing political judgment and producing party-minded standpoints.

2. Of equal interest is the dialectic between economic development and intellectual-cultural life. That applies to a more detailed description of that interaction in the 1970's as well as to marking the most important current and future relations. We have already referred to the crucial interrelationship that was emphasized at the 10th party congress.⁴⁶ Improving the intellectual-cultural premises for performance improvements contains a whole bunch of questions, from the cultural-theoretical point of view, relating mainly to the function of intellectual-cultural life in producing and reproducing a new work consciousness and socialist labor ethics. Work done on behalf of society as an important measure for fulfilment in individual life is as indisputably a characteristic of intellectual-cultural life in socialism as a value, always to be acquired anew in ideas and ethics, for gaining the identity and the conduct of millions of people. Sure as it is that doing nothing, which does not produce a substantive urge for work, produces no leisure, but lost and wasted life,⁴⁷ equally sure is that the contradictory nature of producing joy in work, dedication and efficiency in socialist society's intellectual-cultural life goes a long way toward defining it in its social type. How, by what, and to what a degree of independence intellectual-cultural life can form this potential in ideas and ethics largely still remains a field for further cultural-theoretical research.

3. That, in my opinion, applies also to the influence the processes of social rapprochement and differentiation exercise on the shaping of intellectual-cultural life. As present studies on this set of problems indicate,⁴⁸ the processes in social rapprochement and differentiation influence the intellectual-cultural life in many ways and permanently, but certainly not in the sense simply of cause and effect. And so, though the social structure is of indispensable and authoritative importance to an analysis of intellectual-cultural life, it would still be a mistake to differentiate mechanically in the developed socialist society the intellectual-cultural life of the workers class from that of the cooperative farmers and the intelligentsia, detaching them from one another as unrelated. That would also give the lie to the real process of social rapprochement and differentiation, for one thing with regard to its consequences for the intellectual-cultural life and then also with regard to its relative autonomy and ramifications for the social processes.⁴⁹ Furthermore, this set of problems must not be confused with the problem of the class interests of the ruling workers class in intellectual-cultural life, which concerns its ideological function⁵⁰ and for which the classes, strata and groups, or that which ties them together, is the essential point.

Intellectual-cultural life therefore is an important object of cultural-theoretical research in various respects--and not only with regard to the aspects referred to. Dealing intensively with this subject matter is of equal interest to cultural policy and cultural theory.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Bericht des ZK der SED an den X. Parteitag der SED" (SED Central Committee Report to the 10th SED Congress), Berlin, 1981, pp 104-106.
2. "Die Gesellschaftswissenschaften vor neuen Aufgaben" (The Social Sciences Facing New Tasks), Berlin, 1981, p 35.
3. "Die geistige Kultur der sozialistischen Gesellschaft" (The Intellectual Culture of Socialist Society), Berlin, 1976.
4. Dieter Muehlberg, "On Topical Problems in the Cultural History of the German Workers Class," MITTEILUNGEN AUS DER KULTURWISSENSCHAFTLICHEN FORSCHUNG, No 4, Part I, p 76, Humboldt University, Berlin, chair in cultural theory, section of aesthetics and art history, 1979.
5. Joachim Streisand, "Kultur in der DDR," Berlin, 1981, pp 109 ff; Authors' Collective headed by Erhard John, "Kultur--Kunst--Lebensweise" (Culture--Art-- Way of Life), Berlin, 1980; Leo Fiege, "Erlebnis Kultur" (Cultural Experience), Berlin, 1981, and others.
6. Gisela Mueller, "Colloquy on the Contribution of Culture and Art to the Socialist Way of Life," WEIMARER BEITRAEGE, No 7, 1980, p 169.
7. In the theses for the working conference of the chair for Marxist-Leninist cultural theory on 12 December 1979, I had put it like this: "Socialist culture constitutes itself and develops as that sphere in society in which

the individuals deal with objects, exercise activities and enter into relationships through which they can reproduce their inner world, their capabilities in such a way that their disposition for social activity is invigorated within them. This also applies to intellectual culture, the difference of which from material culture is pertinent only in the point that intellectual culture is not part of the reproduction of material life of a society. That statement of course suggests in no way that intellectual culture is immaterial to the reproduction of the material life of a society. It rather suggests the existence of other frames of reference and operational mechanisms." --In the report on the working conference, Gisela Mueller remarked: "Even the assigned first thesis suggests that the concept 'intellectual culture' blocks further ideas if intellectual culture is defined as not belonging to the 'reproduction of the material life of society'" (WEIMARER BEITRAEGE, No 7, 1980, p 169). That remark, it seems to me, could be the start for that sort of scholastic quarrel because the concern to uncover interactions between the material life process and intellectual-cultural life--whereby to distinguish between them--is misunderstood and reduced to a matter of classification. What is specific to the cultural or to intellectual-cultural life is annulled.

8. Juergen Kuczynski, "Geschichte des Alltags des deutschen Volkes," Vol I, Berlin, 1980, pp 21 ff; Vol II, Berlin, 1981, pp 149 ff; Vol III, Berlin, 1981, pp 172 ff.
9. WEIMARER BEITRAEGE, No 3, 1982, pp 157 ff, pp 170 ff.
10. Ibid., p 173.
11. Ibid., p 167.
12. Karl Marx, "Principles of the Critique of Political Economy," Berlin, 1953, p 10.
13. V. I. Lenin, "Werke" (Works), Vol 27, Berlin, 1960, p 464.
14. In "Zur Theorie der sozialistischen Kultur," Berlin, 1982, p 9, Hans Koch writes: "Outside the overall historic context, detached from the general laws of cultural development, even the specific inevitable forms of motion of socialist culture become hard to understand."
15. Cf. Juergen Marten and Holger Martin, "Wie ist Kultur planbar? (How Is Culture Plannable?)," Berlin, 1981, pp 31 ff. In "Zur Theorie der sozialistischen Kultur," Hans Koch writes: "Culture as a social phenomenon consists of a complicated web of interacting material and intellectual values, relations, processes and attitudes, the essence and internal connection of which are what amounts to the specific, the characteristic of culture as a social phenomenon" (p 8). -- Juergen Marten and Holger Martin point to culture as a social relation (op. cit., p 31). -- Hans Koch emphasizes that the inner connection is crucial to what is specific and characteristic in a culture.

16. Harald Schliwa, "Wholistic Development and Interaction Among Sectors in the Developed Socialist Society," DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE, No 3/4, 1981, p 317.
17. Ibid., p 317.
18. "Protokoll des IX. Parteitages der SED" (Ninth SED Congress Proceedings), Vol II, Berlin, 1976, p 246.
19. "Bericht des ZK der SED . . . , op. cit., pp 104-107.
20. Cf. Helmut Hanke, "On Questions of the Socialist Way of Life and Culture," WEIMARER BEITRAEGE, No 8, 1978, pp 5 ff; Werner Geidel, "On the Methodology for Exploring the Socialist Culture and Way of Life," Ibid., pp 57 ff; Dieter Struetzel, "The Role of Working Culture in the Overall Cultural Development of Socialism," Ibid., pp 81 ff; Irene Doelling, "On the Dialectics Between Individual and Society," DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE, No 8, 1978, pp 970 ff; Dietrich Muehlberg and Isolde Dietrich, "The Proletarian Way of Life as a Cultural Tradition of Socialism," WEIMARER BEITRAEGE, No 11, 1980; Dieter Struetzel review of "Kulturpolitisches Woerterbuch," Ibid., pp 160 ff.
21. Kaspar Maase, "Between the Private and the Public," WEIMARER BEITRAEGE, No 11, 1980, p 109.
22. Lothar Parade, "The Historic Mission of the Workers Class and the Marxist-Leninist Conception of Culture," WEIMARER BEITRAEGE, No 4, 1976, pp 102 ff; Lothar Parade, "Culture and Conceptual-Moral Impulses in the Construction of the Developed Socialist Society," WISSENSCHAFTLICHE ZEITSCHRIFT DER KARL-MARX-UNIVERSITAET (CG), No 6, 1979.
23. "Materialien des X. Kulturtheoretischen Kolloquiums des Bereichs Kulturtheorie der Humboldt-Universitaet vom 19. und 20. 11. 1981" (Materials of the 10th Cultural-Theoretical Colloquy in the Cultural Theory Area of Humboldt University, 19 and 20 November 1981) [unpublished manuscript]; cf. also Irene Doelling, "On Passing On the Social and Individual Life Process," WEIMARER BEITRAEGE, No 10, 1981, pp 94 ff.
24. "Materialien . . . , op. cit., p 32.
25. Gottfried Stiehler, "The Basic Problem in Philosophy and the Distinction Between Material and Ideological Relations," DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE, No 8, 1980, pp 950 ff.
26. Cf., e.g., Thomas Metscher, "Culture and Humanity--Footnotes on a Dialectical Culture Concept," Institut fuer Marxistische Studien und Forschungen, Frankfurt/Main, ed., "Kulturelle Beduerfnisse der Arbeiterklasse" (Cultural Needs of the Workers Class); "Kuerbiskern und Tendenzen" (Pumpkin Pit and Tendencies), 1978; Joachim Streisand, "Kultur in der DDR," Berlin, 1981, pp 213ff.
27. "Materialien . . . , op. cit., p 5.

28. Erich Hahn, ed., "Grundlagen des historischen Materialismus" (Principles of Historical Materialism), Berlin, 1976, p 217.
29. Cf. Horst Friedrich, "Die Produktionsverhaeltnisse" (The Production Relations), Berlin, 1981, pp 7-50.
30. Cf. Robert Weiss, "Problems in Determining Political Relations," DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE, No 6, 1979, p 763.
31. M. Rutkevich and F. Filipov, eds., "Klassen und Schichten in der Soviet-union" (Classes and Strata in the Soviet Union), Berlin, 1979, pp 13-46, 229-245.
32. Werner Mueller, ed., "Gesellschaft und Bewusstsein" (Society and Consciousness), Dieter Uhlig, Berlin, 1980, pp 83ff, pp 251 ff.
33. Karl Marx, "Economic Manuscripts 1857/58," MEGA, II, Vol 1.1, Berlin, 1976 p 188.
34. Werner Roehr, "Aneignung und Persoenlichkeit" (Appropriation and Personality), Berlin, 1979, pp 87 ff.
35. Horst Friedrich, op. cit., pp 10 ff; Panajot Gindev, "Philosophisch-methodologische Probleme der Erkenntnis sozialer Prozesse" (Philosophic-Methodological Cognition Problems in Social Processes), Berlin, 1978, pp 129 ff.
36. V. I. Lenin, "Werke," Vol 33, Berlin, 1962, pp 53 ff, 453 ff.
37. Thomas Metscher, op. cit., pp 72 ff.
38. Marx/Engels Works, Vol 19, Berlin, 1962, p 17.
39. In the article cited above [footnote 25], Gottfried Stiehler writes:
 "As explained in detail above, the only compelling standpoint is that material as well as ideological relations are objective social relations among classes (and ultimately among individuals) in their practical process of life. Material relations are primary, the ideological relations are secondary; the latter reflect the former due to the coconstitutive role of consciousness. This distinction is a concrete application of the material principle to the richly structured social life which is by no means satisfied in its epistemological formulation by the conceptual coupling between the material and the intellectual" (p 962). The material and intellectual culture are specific social relations each realized in the material and intellectual life processes of society and thereby gaining additional specificity.
40. Ibid., p 961.
41. "Chapter 5--The Structure of Intellectual Culture," "Kul'tura v svete filozofii," Tiflis, 1979, pp 134 ff.

42. In their article, "The Socialist Personality--Goal, Requirement and Achievement," Frank Adler and Albrecht Kretzschmar, e.g., distinguish processes directly connected with personality development with others that are related to personality development (EINHEIT, No 1, 1978, p 26). In our context we are ultimately concerned with determining more precisely in its historic-concrete nature and its empirical mode of existence the specific function of personality formation that must be attributed to culture.
43. "Beratung Erich Honeckers mit Kultur- und Kunstschaaffenden der DDR am 22. Juni 1979 in Berlin" (Erich Honecker's Conference with Creators of Culture and Art of the GDR on 22 June 1979 in Berlin), Berlin, 1979, p 51.
44. V. I. Lenin, "Werke," Vol 31, p 9.
45. One must undoubtedly agree with Helmut Hanke who said it was not very sensible "always again to engage in lengthy methodological discussion on the relation between the way of life and culture such as asking, what belongs to what and what is subordinate to which and so forth" (Helmut Hanke, "Cultural Development Problems in the Way of Life," WEIMARER BEITRAEGE, No 11, 1980, p 9). -- That is likely to apply to any kind of thought ending up in the drawer. It no longer, however, applies, as attested to by Helmut Hanke's own remarks about the relations between the way of life and culture, to disclosing the real interaction between, e.g., economic and cultural development on the one side and the forming of a socialist way of life, on the other. A clean distinction here also is a methodological condition for being able to comprehend the various interlinkages and tendencies. As far as that is concerned, it appears to me, the Marxist-Leninist theory of culture can by no means complain about lengthy methodological discussions in the GDR.
46. "Bericht . . .," op. cit., pp 105-106.
47. Lothar Kuehne, "Gegenstand und Raum" (Subject and Space), Dresden, 1981, p 15.
48. Authors' Collective headed by Erhard John, "Kultur, Kunst, Lebensweise" (Culture--Art--Way of Life), Berlin, 1980, pp 182 ff.
49. L. N. Kogan writes about this set of problems: "Cultural differences are conditioned by socioeconomic differences but still have a certain relative autonomy. Cultural differences are not firmly chained to social differences in the developed socialist society. They greatly depend on the level of education, the cultural environment in any given type of settlement, and the intensity of the cultural-educational activity of the party, state and social organizations" (Rutkevich and Filipov, eds, op. cit., p 230).
50. Hans Koch, editor in chief, "Zur Theorie der sozialistischen Kultur" (On the Theory of Socialist Culture), Berlin, 1982, pp 65 ff, 284 ff, 333 ff.

PRC UN SPEECH DESCRIBED AS 'DIFFERENT FROM ALL PREVIOUS' ONES

AU081455 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 5 Oct 82 p 7

[PAP report: "Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China"]

[Text] PAP correspondent Jerzy Gorski writes: The speech by PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua during the general debate of the UN General Assembly's 37th session was considerably different from all previous speeches by representatives of China.

Unlike during previous sessions, the speech by the representative of China stressed the need to maintain peace and improve the international situation, and expressed the PRC's readiness to act jointly with all countries on the principle of equality and noninterference in domestic affairs.

Drawing attention to the growing desire for peace in the world, the representative of China said that the PRC's modernization program may be implemented under conditions of lasting peace and stabilization. Minister Huang Hua said that in its relations with the outside world, China will be guided by the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Although China's modernization program, adopted at the 12th CCP Congress, is based on the principle of dependence on all forces, China will remain faithful to the open policy toward the entire world.

Discussing the international situation, Huang Hua drew attention to the areas of tension in the world which, according to him, present the greatest threat to peace today. He said that the flagrant and uninhibited Israeli aggression against Lebanon and the Palestinian nation is a great threat to peace, and that the United States will bear the responsibility for the latest events in Lebanon, since it harbors and supports Tel Aviv's genocidal policy economically and militarily. Huang Hua supported the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to their own state.

The representative of China maintained that the presence of Soviet armies in Afghanistan and of Vietnamese armies in Kampuchea is serving to increase tension in the world. He expressed support for the DPRK's proposal concerning the setting up of a democratic confederation of states with South Korea.

Speaking about the causes of tension in the world, the Chinese foreign minister ascertained that the arms race is assuming more and more threatening proportions, as is the "rivalry between the great powers." Minister Huang Hua said that the existing economic order in the world is anachronistic and he spoke in favor of the commencement of worldwide negotiations aimed at the reconstruction of international economic relations.

CSO: 2600/72

BRIEFS

ILLEGAL PUBLICATIONS UNCOVERED--The press spokesman for the Citizens' Militia Voivodship Headquarters in Lublin has announced that functionaries of the Security Service have recently uncovered illegal publications and leaflets, including a bulletin from the so-called Interschool Resistance Committee of the Independent Association of Students [NZS], and the periodical ENKLAWA, the content of which attacks the political system of the Polish People's Republic. These publications had for some time been circulated within the Lublin student community, and also in student hostels. In connection with this, three students who have engaged in hostile activity have been detained at the disposition of the Military Public Prosecutor. [By sna] [Excerpt] [Lublin SZTANDAR LUDU in Polish 29-30-31 Oct 82 p 2]

YOUNG INVENTORS COMPETITION--The latest (15th) edition of the Young Masters of Technology Competition [TMMT], organized by the Union of Socialist Polish Youth [ZSMP], has been completed. Journalists were informed of the course of the competition and of its specifics at a press conference held at the ZSMP Main Board. From the projects presented [at the competition], it is evident that their authors have in mind the elimination of imported parts, subassemblies and even entire systems, especially in the machine engineering industry. Many improvements consist in finding raw materials substitutes, mainly for the chemical industry. [By Marek Rudnicki] [Excerpts] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 27 Sep 82 p 5]

CSO: 2600/71

ROMANIA

APPOINTMENT OF PEOPLES COUNCILS OFFICIALS IN ARAD, ALBA, CALARASI

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 88, 6 Oct 82 p 5

[Presidential decree on the delegation of some persons to positions]

[Text] On the basis of Article 97 of Law No 57/1968 on the organization and operation of the peoples councils, the president of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article 1--Comrade Trifon Darie is delegated to fill the position of first deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Arad County People's Council.

Article 2--Comrade Aurel Duca is delegated to fill the position of first deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Alba County People's Council.

Article 3--Comrade Dumitru Bejan is delegated to fill the position of first deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Calarasi County People's Council.

Nicolae Ceausescu
President of the Socialist Republic of Romania

Bucharest, 5 October 1982
No 274

CSO: 2700/18

ROMANIA

EMPLOYMENT OF RETIREES IN SUGAR BEET PROCESSING ENTERPRISES

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 86, 4 Oct 82 p 2

[Council of Ministers resolution on the temporary employment of retirees in the enterprises for the industrialization of sugar beets]

[Text] The Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Romania resolves:

Sole article--The enterprises for the industrialization of sugar beets, subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry-Department of the Food Industry, can employ, in 1982 and 1983, up to 1,200 skilled workers, foremen, technicians, engineers and other technical personnel engaged in production, from the ranks of the retirees, under the conditions of Decree No 445/1978.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

Prime Minister, Constantin Dascalescu

Bucharest, 25 September 1982
No 144

CSO: 2700/18

ROMANIA

BRIEFS

BRASOV APPOINTMENT--On the basis of Article 97 of Law No/1968 on the organization and operation of the peoples councils, the president of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Marin Enache is delegated to fill the position of chairman of the executive committee of the Brasov County People's Council. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 86, 4 Oct 82 p 1]

BUCHAREST MUNICIPALITY APPOINTMENT--On the basis of Article 97 of Law No 57/1968 on the organization and operation of the peoples councils, the president of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Constantin Radu is delegated to fill the position of first deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Bucharest Municipality People's Council. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romania Part I No 86, 4 Oct 82 p 2]

RELEASE OF OFFICIAL--The president of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Aurel Duca is relieved of his position as deputy chairman of the Council for Socialist Culture and Education. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 88, 6 Oct 82 p 4)

OFFICIAL APPOINTMENT--The president of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Marin Enache is relieved of his position as chairman of the Central Council for Worker Control of Economic and Social Activity and Comrade Ilie Verdet is appointed chairman of the Central Council for Worker Control of Economic and Social Activity. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 88, 6 Oct 82 p 4]

CSO: 2700/18

FEW YOUTH IN DELEGATE SYSTEM REPORTED

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Oct 82 p 2

[Excerpt] The recent meeting on youth held in Kumrovec [discussed] the whole spectrum [of problems] regarding the social position of young people, beginning with the fact that they are at the top of the unemployment lists (accounting for two-thirds of the total) and...the fact that today they are, in fact, on the periphery of social power and influence. There are many reasons for this, but the basic one is the inferior economic position of young people. According to studies, young people do not hold an important place in the delegate system. Following the third delegate elections, held this spring, they now account for only 16.65 percent of all delegates in the country. The smallest number are [young delegates] from associated labor and work communities of sociopolitical organs (15.49 percent of the total). In local community delegations they account for 15.84 percent, while among the delegates from sociopolitical organizations [opstinas, republics, provinces, the federation], they account for 26.53 percent. Studies on the representation of youth in assemblies of sociopolitical communities show that their number declines as the level of social organization and decision-making increases. Of the total number of delegates only 1.95 percent are under 27 years of age (in the previous two elections the percentages were 2.28 and 2.90). Their participation in self-management of the organizations of associated work also show a situation which is not heartening. In workers councils of complex organizations of associated work young people account for only 7.3 percent, while in [workers councils of] basic organizations of associated work they account for about 14 percent. The proportion of young people in the self-management of self-management interest communities is especially low; while the number of delegates has fallen.

CSO: 2800/32

MORE UNIFIED EDITORIAL POLICY URGED FOR 'KOMUNIST'

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 19 Oct 82 p 4

[Excerpt] KOMUNIST must be, much more than heretofore, the organ of the LC, it must seek answers to questions which arise in everyday life, must hold to its view, know what it is fighting for, and not permit readers to remain indifferent. A higher journalistic professional level must be the aim, and gatherings of party forums and organs should not be the main source of information for it.

The above demands were heard at a meeting on Monday of the commission for information and propaganda of the Serbian LC CC in discussing the work of the Serbian republic edition of KOMUNIST. Especially pointed out were the differences in the concept of KOMUNIST and its orientation, although these [differences] are expressed sporadically and in individual cases. Tendencies toward encapsulation and autarky have made their way in a specific way also to the pages of this paper. As a result, it happens that [some] articles are not published in all editions, because of differences in concept, although it is obligatory for all editions [to publish all articles], and it is also possible that in the same issue two articles on the same problem appear from different areas with entirely different orientation.

In mentioning that insufficient unity of editorial policy is unfavorably reflected in the quality of the newspaper, it was pointed out that this question must be examined and straightened out as soon as possible. Several participants in the discussion advocated strengthening of cadres which will ensure better and more professional commitment and a creative and critical relationship toward the problems of social practice. It was said that KOMUNIST is often lagging behind LC organs in this regard.

CSO: 2800/32

BRIEFS

NOVI PAZAR JUDGES REMOVED--In order to overcome the existing situation in the Novi Pazar Opstina court, the presidium of the LC opstina committee unanimously decided to give Zdravko Roglic, president of the opstina court, a last warning and proposed to the opstina assembly that he be removed from his function. A last warning was also given to judge Ismet Pelak and it was suggested that he be removed from his position as opstina court judge. Warnings were given to six other [named] judges of this court. The LC opstina presidium also decided that Mariljob Marinkovic be removed from his function as secretary to the basic LC organization [in the court] and that all members of the secretariat of the basic LC organization be replaced. This was decided after the report of a work group was examined which showed that in the past few years the interpersonal and internationality relations in the court had been disrupted which had had a negative affect on the reputation of the court. [Excerpt] [Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 4 Oct 82 p 10]

SENTENCED FOR HOSTILE PROPAGANDA--The Sarajevo district court yesterday sentenced Mati Gazilj (1959), student from Hrasnica near Gornji Vakuf, temporarily residing in Srajevo, to 3 years in prison based on Article 133, paragraph I, of the SFRY Criminal Code. It was proved that during 1978, 1981 and 1982 in Gornji Vakuf and in Sarajevo Gazilj, in writing and speaking, called for the overthrow of the government of the working class and working people, for change in the socialist self-management order, and the break-up of brotherhood and unity of the peoples and nationalities. He maliciously and untruthfully presented the sociopolitical conditions in our country. [Excerpt] [Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 12 Oct 82 p 20]

RELIGIOUS 'MARTYRS' IN BOSNIA--In the activities of religious communities an escalation has been noticed recently in the number of individuals and groups acting from clericalist positions and attacking the basic values of self-management socialist society and the established constitutional and legal positions of religious communities. These forces are present in all religious communities from the lowest to the highest ranks. This was stated at an 8 October meeting of the coordinating council of the SAWP republic conference of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Last year increased pressure was felt from organs of religious communities and actions of religious officials on citizens who are members of religious faiths; under the slogan of "religious renewal," [these religious communities and officials] offer the forms and content of action based on religious rites and activity but with strong politicalization of religious life, i.e., they misuse religion for political purposes. The clericalist

approach to the national question, to the cultural and historical past, its insistence on the saving role of religion and the church from the "dangers" of socialism, "systematic atheism," and the "atheistic environment" is more and more often the preoccupation of religious communities. Also, the intention is to represent as "martyrs" certain religious officials who have been sentenced because of their openly hostile action against our system (Janjic, Zofko, Vlastic, Pasanbegovic, and others); this is done allegedly because of their nationalist and religious commitment. [Excerpt] [Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Oct 82 p 4]

LC EXPULSION AT KOSOVO UNIVERSITY--The party organization of the mathematics section of the Natural Science-Mathematics Faculty in Pristina expelled Dr Rasid Alidema for various abuses in the past 5 to 6 years and issued a party warning in Idriz Beranij, instructor, for insufficient commitment following the counterrevolution and for showing a certain amount of nationalism. Alidema, it was said, did not hold even one class during the last school year in the fall semester but accepted his personal income, nevertheless. He also went to the USSR from 30 April to 11 May this year without permission or knowledge of the dean. [Excerpt] [Pristina JEDINSTVO in Serbo-Croatian 24 Sep 82 p 6]

OUSTERS IN KOSOVO POLJE--Action to repair the situation in the Kosovo Polje railroad transport organization began in mid-July this year and was started by the Pristina opstina LC committee which coincided with the arrival of the new president of the business council of the transport organization. At yesterday's meeting of the workers council the director of the basic organization of associated work for transport technical work was removed, as well as the technical director, the secretary and others [named]. This was the ending to unfortunate, disrupted self-management and interpersonal relations in which the leading group carried on their own policy and in which idleness, negligence, and bureaucratic behavior flourished for a long time...resulting in increased losses, the free transport of passengers, and the loss of 9 passenger cars. Workers who violated the law were often returned to their old job, as for instance Miftar Haziri who was station chief in Pristina although he had been removed from the work organization because of falsification. He was also responsible for the loss of a carload of cement for which he was "awarded" by being sent to transport school in Belgrade. Nepotism was also a factor, unqualified family members hired, and workers were often transferred from one job to another. [Excerpt] [Pristina JEDINSTVO in Serbo-Croatian 1 Oct 82 p 3]

CSO: 2800/32

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