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ANGOLA

UNITA Accused of Using 'Toxic Substances' Against Civilians

Doctor Cited on Attack

*MB2704135891 Luanda Domestic Service
in Portuguese 1200 GMT 27 Apr 91*

[Excerpt] A total of 50 cases have been detected of people who have been hospitalized suffering from the effects of the toxic substances that UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] has been using in its shelling of Luena city. This was reported today by Dr. Pedro [not further identified], who added that was the result of UNITA's shelling of Luena city's Cuenha ward with B-12 guns and 81-mm mortars. Civilians have sought refugee in Cuenha ward.

Dr. Pedro said that after exploding, the shells emitted a whitish smoke which immediately made people suffer respiratory problems. People also coughed, and their eyes teared.

As in previous incidents reported in Capango and [name indistinct] wards, the present case is a continuation of

the crimes that UNITA has been committing ever since it mounted the offensive against Luena city residents. [passage omitted]

Doctor Discusses Symptoms

*MB2804082491 Luanda Domestic Service
in Portuguese 0710 GMT 28 Apr 91*

[Text] UNITA is shelling Luena city and its outskirts with missiles containing toxic substances. Dr. Pedro Carvalho, who has been treating some of the victims at the Moxico Central Hospital, has commented on the matter.

[Begin Carvalho recording] The hospital has admitted some 180 patients because of the symptoms they displayed. The missiles that recently fell over Luena city contain [word indistinct] chemical substances. The symptoms displayed by the victims include (?skin rashes), salivation, (?diarrhea), and [word indistinct].

Regarding the effects on heartbeat frequency and blood pressure, the victims have displayed high blood pressure. Thus, in light of this clinical data, we have concluded that those are [word indistinct] substances. [end recording]

Medium-Range Missile Sale to Pakistan Denied*HK2504133291 Beijing ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE in Chinese 1103 GMT 25 Apr 91*

[Text] Beijing, 25 April (ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE)—When taking questions raised by reporters today, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin said: The report claiming that China provides medium-range missiles for Pakistan is absolutely groundless. China does not stand for, encourage, or engage itself in, nuclear proliferation and does not aid other countries in developing nuclear weapons.

He said: There is some research-oriented, small-scale cooperation on nuclear development between China and Algeria. This is purely for the purpose of peace.

When asked "What attitude does China hold concerning nuclear installations in Korea, and does China agree to the international community's inspection of its nuclear installations," Wu Jianmin replied: Korea's signing this agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency is a matter within the scope of the "Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons." But China is not a party to this treaty. This matter should be settled through negotiations among all parties concerned so as to facilitate the detente and stability on the Korean peninsula.

U.S., Soviet INF Treaty Compliance Reported*OW2604051891 Beijing XINHUA in English 0145 GMT 26 Apr 91*

[Text] Moscow, April 25 (XINHUA)—The last group of Soviet RSD-10 intermediate-range missiles is to be destroyed before May 12 this year, Soviet TASS news agency today quoted sources from the Soviet Defense Ministry as saying.

According to the Soviet-U.S. Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty signed in Washington at the end of 1987, the two sides are to destroy all their medium-and short-range missiles by May, 1991.

TASS reported that under the treaty, the Soviet side should destroy 1,846 missiles, while the U.S. side will only have to destroy 846 missiles.

Indonesian Minister Cited on Gorbachev Security Plan*OW2604034791 Beijing XINHUA in English 0059 GMT 26 Apr 91*

[Excerpt] Vienna, April 25 (XINHUA)—Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said that it was too early to hold a conference on Asian security and cooperation in the pattern of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as proposed by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

During his talks with Austrian President Kurt Waldheim, Alatas said the conditions for such kind of cooperation are immature [as received] because Asia faces a series of regional crisis.

Alatas ended his three-day visit to Austria today and left for Italy to continue his European trip. [passage omitted]

UN Envoy Urges Major Powers To Release Military Information*OW2704004891 Beijing XINHUA in English 0037 GMT 27 Apr 91*

[Text] United Nations, April 26 (XINHUA)—China today in a working paper called on the states with the largest arsenals to take lead in making public information concerning their military matters and enhance the sense of security of other countries and regions by halting their arms race and drastically reducing their armaments.

The document entitled "China's Basic Position on Objective Information on Military Matters" was presented this morning by Ambassador Hou Zhitong, head of the Chinese delegation to the 1991 session of the Disarmament Commission which is currently considering the item of "The Objective Information on Military Matters."

The four-part document points out that the exchange of objective information on military matters among U.N. member states in the light of their specific circumstances is conducive to greater openness and transparency, enhanced mutual trust, and the relaxation of tensions, thus contributing to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of peace and security. But, it must be carried out on the basis of strictly abiding by the U.N. Charter and the five principles of mutual respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, and opposing and eliminating the use or threat of use of force in international affairs. [sentence as received]

"As states vary in their military strength and policy, their impact on the security of other countries is not the same," the document says.

"At the international level," the document emphasizes, "states with the largest and most sophisticated nuclear and conventional arsenals and the military alliance have the obligation to take the lead in making public information concerning their military matters, and under the current circumstances should start with publicizing information on their offensive military forces, such as their long-range fighting capable naval and air forces. They should also enhance the sense of other countries and regions by halting their arms race and drastically reducing their armaments, thereby promoting international peace and security."

The document says there is "no universally applicable formula" for the exchange of objective information on military matters. States can formulate through consultations at their own initiative practicable measures in this regard.

Concerning the scope of the exchange, the document says that states can formulate through consultations bilateral confidence-building measures in the military sphere, such as the refrain from any military exercise directed against each other along the border, limit and inform the [as received] scale, frequency and geographical scope of military exercises at border areas, invite each other to observe military exercises, and exchange annual plans on relevant military activities.

"These measures may create conditions for possible further regional arrangements" the document says.

It urges the United Nations to examine and formulate by consensus guidelines and recommendations concerning the exchange of objective information on military matters as well as encourage and promote the exchange activities.

France To Continue S. Pacific Nuclear Testing

*OW2904094591 Beijing XINHUA in English
0936 GMT 29 Apr 91*

[Text] Wellington, April 29 (XINHUA)—French Prime Minister Michel Rocard has ruled out today the possibility of stopping the country's nuclear testing in the South Pacific, saying that was "beyond the country's reach."

Rocard made the statement at a news conference jointly given by him and New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger this afternoon.

Both in answering questions during the conference and in his toast at the luncheon given in his honor by Jim Bolger, Rocard said France remained convinced that the nuclear deterrent has played an essential role in maintaining peace in the world in the last forty years.

"It will continue to do so until a significant change is brought about in the international situation, which one can now reasonably hope may not be long," Rocard noted. "We consider it necessary to maintain the level of our own deterrent capability," he said, arguing that the tests present no particular threat to New Zealand, or even to the islands closest to the testing venue.

More than a dozen of nuclear tests have been recorded in the South Pacific area annually over the past few years, according to local sources.

Referring to the strong opposition to the nuclear testing in the South Pacific by New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger at the luncheon, Rocard called for "looking beyond this disagreement"—which he said the two countries must accept and then overcome.

France's nuclear testing and its military presence in the South Pacific were also attacked by a group of protesters just 20 metres off the official welcoming ceremony accorded to Rocard in front of the parliament building early this morning. The protesters holding models of

rocket and missiles also performed farce amid the shouting "Mr. Rocard—French military out of South Pacific."

Editorial Criticizes U.S. Star Wars Program

*HK3004050191 Hong Kong WEN WEI PO in Chinese
30 Apr 91 p 2*

[Editorial: "Perils of U.S. Star Wars Program"]

[Text] The United States launched a space shuttle on Sunday, to serve as a test flight for future Star Wars activities. This shows that the U.S. Star Wars program is still in progress.

At the beginning of the 1980's, the United States worked out a plan for the development of Star Wars weapons. According to the plan, it will use lasers to destroy the Soviet Union's ballistic rockets or launch laser weapons into space to destroy the cities of the enemy side. The one who masters laser weapons first will possess technology which supersedes both H-bombs and A-bombs.

While talking glibly about establishing a "new world order," the United States has continued to carry out its Star Wars program. This shows that the U.S. idea about the establishment of a "new world order" is, in reality, to allow a superpower to dominate the world through military power. A country with the strongest military power can decide what is right and what is wrong in international affairs and make regulations for the world order. This runs counter to the norms of international relations and peaceful coexistence of various countries.

All peace-loving countries hold that mankind should not use wars to solve international disputes, and all countries should live together in peace and deal with their disputes through consultations on an equal basis and in line with the spirit of the United Nations Charter. All countries, large and small, strong and weak, and rich and poor, are equal. They should respect and cooperate with one another and, in accordance with their own wishes and in light of their own conditions, seek subsistence and development. No country should impose its own will on any other countries.

Power politics and hegemonism, both built on the basis of force, have blurred the prospects of handling international affairs through equal consultations, however. Over the past year or so, as a result of power politics and hegemonic politics, some weak and small nations have almost been turned into drill grounds of a certain military power.

Built on the basis of force, power politics and hegemonism are the catalytic agents in the international arms race. Reversely, the expanding arms race also encourages power politics and hegemonism. Over the past few years, thanks to the growth of peace forces in the world, peace and development have become the main concept of our times, and the two superpowers have exercised certain restraint in their arms race. It is by no means easy to

make them truly abandon an arms race, however. The emergence of the U.S. Star Wars program reminds mankind to maintain vigilance against the danger that a military superpower may attempt to dominate the world.

Within the U.S. Congress, there are also forces opposing the Star Wars program, which have tried to restrict the allocation of funds. The restriction on the allocation of funds for carrying out the Star Wars program was not aimed at preserving peace for mankind or establishing a more rational international order, however. It was actually because some people believe the laser Star Wars program is inapplicable and may result in a big waste of military expenses, as lasers may possibly become scattered rays or be distorted when going through the atmospheric layer. It seems that these opposition forces are actually very weak. Through uninterrupted research on

Star Wars weapons, the problem of focusing laser beams can be solved. In White Sands, New Mexico, and Maui Island, Hawaii, the U.S. military has succeeded in reflecting to earth the light of a space mirror launched by a low-power laser. The current subject for study is to use lasers to accurately trace the flying space objects, which are flying at three times the speed of sound. It seems that the U.S. Congress will eventually increase the allocation of funds for the Star Wars program.

The Star Wars program, which will spend hundreds of billions of dollars, will certainly stimulate the development of the military industry in the United States. When the military industrial enterprises are further developed, they will also try to find their political agents to represent their interests. Then, will the U.S. global policy become more expansive by that time? This merits our attention.

NORTH KOREA

Nuclear-Free Peninsula Said 'Urgent Task'

SK3004110491 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
0959 GMT 30 Apr 91

["Urgent Task To Convert Korean Peninsula Into Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, April 30 (KCNA)—Turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone is a most pressing and important task to remove the danger of a nuclear war and achieve a durable peace in Korea and guarantee peace in Asia and the rest of the world, says NODONG SINMUN today in a by-lined article headlined "Urgent Task To Convert Korean Peninsula Into Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone".

It is not accidental that the world is focusing attention on the Korean peninsula today when the prevention of a nuclear war is a vital matter of mankind, it says, and continues:

The reason is that South Korea has turned into a nuclear base, the largest in the Far East and the Korean peninsula is a most dangerous hotbed of a nuclear war.

It is known to the world that there are more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons of various types in South Korea. The United States has recognised this and voices that there are 1,120 nuclear warheads in South Korea rang out from the "National Assembly" of South Korea.

The United States is to blame for the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a most perilous hotbed of a nuclear war.

Originally, the U.S. policy of turning South Korea into a nuclear base has been started from 30 odd years ago.

There are deployed in South Korea nuclear arms of nearly all kinds the United States has so far developed and produced, from "nuclear weapons of the first generation" including planes capable of carrying nuclear bombs, nuclear shells and nuclear warheads and various kinds of missiles to neutron bombs, "nuclear weapon of the third generation".

It is known that more than one nuclear weapon per one hundred square kilometres is deployed in South Korea, four times the NATO area which has one nuclear weapon per four hundred square kilometres in terms of the density of deployment. Its threat is far greater.

Disarmament is being realised and nuclear weapons cut in some parts of the world in the global trend of disarmament and detente, but only in South Korea more war means including nuclear weapons are being deployed and nuclear bases built on an extensive scale

It is clear that if a war breaks out in the Korean peninsula where more than 1,000 nuclear weapons are deployed, it will easily become a total nuclear war.

All facts clearly show that the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone is a pressing task to remove the danger of a nuclear war from Korea and, furthermore, guarantee peace in Asia and the rest of the world.

NEW ZEALAND

French Prime Minister Rocard Arrives for Visit

Discusses Nuclear Testing Program

BK2904003491 *Hong Kong AFP in English* 2219 GMT
28 Apr 91

[Text] Wellington, April 29 (AFP)—French Prime Minister Michel Rocard arrived here Monday on a visit designed to create a new era in relations between France and New Zealand.

Mr. Rocard was welcomed at Auckland Airport by New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger.

The two planned to hold lengthy talks later in the day to put behind them the 1985 sinking by French agents of the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour.

Speaking Sunday night Mr. Bolger said the affair was unfortunate and a "sad component of the relationship between New Zealand and France but we mustn't dwell on it endlessly."

Mr. Rocard is scheduled to meet members of Greenpeace in Christchurch Tuesday. He is also due to sign an agreement establishing a friendship fund recommended by a United Nations Arbitration Panel, for which Paris will provide two million U.S. dollars.

Mr. Bolger and Mr. Rocard were also to discuss French policy in the Pacific and the possibility of increased cooperation, the progress of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations on liberalising world agricultural trade, opportunities for import-export initiatives and the future of the Antarctic.

French nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia is also on the agenda.

In an interview with the DOMINION newspaper published Monday, Mr. Rocard defended the French nuclear deterrent and could not give a firm indication of when nuclear testing in the Pacific would end.

"I can swear that when international conditions are such that disarmament can be achieved by the major military powers and we have peace and security throughout the planet, France will not waste one minute in beginning to stop its nuclear capacity," he said.

"Are you sure it is intelligent to renounce the weapons that create the fear of war and to go back to the level of armaments that politicians and generals have never hesitated to use?" He was quoted as asking.

Mr. Rocard said Iraqi President Saddam Husayn "had no nuclear weapons and could not fear any, and there you had war...", the DOMINION reported.

He said of France's nuclear deterrent: "We feel at peace because no one can touch us, and through this peace yours is guaranteed too."

Admits Rainbow Warrior Error

BK2904025291 Hong Kong AFP in English 0225 GMT 29 Apr 91

[Text] Wellington, April 29 (AFP)—French Prime Minister Michel Rocard Monday toasted a new era in relations between France and New Zealand admitting France had done wrong over the 1985 bombing of a Greenpeace ship here.

Mr. Rocard arrived earlier Monday in New Zealand on a two day visit prior to flying onto South Korea.

New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger and Mr. Rocard signed a friendship agreement between the two countries. In speeches both men declared a new era in relations and promised increased regional co-operation.

At a luncheon Mr. Rocard proposed a toast, saying: "France has done wrong. I have said so publicly and I am saying so again here."

French spies blew up the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour six years ago, just before it was due to sail to the French nuclear test site at Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia.

Mr. Rocard said it was his wish that his visit—the first by a French premier to New Zealand—would open a new era in relations and give a "renewed boost to co-operation between our countries."

Mr. Bolger responded by saying Mr. Rocard's visit was an historic occasion.

"We close a sad and thankfully short chapter in our shared history, and we move forward to address the challenges of our times in a positive and cooperative fashion," Mr. Bolger said.

Mr. Bolger said New Zealand would continue to express "strong opposition" to France's nuclear tests.

Mr. Rocard is scheduled to meet members of Greenpeace in Christchurch Tuesday. He is also due sign an agreement establishing a friendship fund recommended by a United Nations arbitration panel, for which Paris will provide two million U.S. dollars.

Earlier in an interview with Wellington's DOMINION newspaper Mr. Rocard said France respected New Zealand's position but Paris remained convinced that nuclear deterrence had played an essential role in keeping world peace for 40 years.

"It will continue to do so until a significant change is brought about in the international situation ... We consider it necessary to maintain the level of our deterrent capability."

"Are you sure it is intelligent to renounce the weapons that create the fear of war and to go back to the level of armaments that politicians and generals have never hesitated to use?" he was quoted as asking.

French Nuclear Testing 'Poses Little Danger'

BK3004041491 Hong Kong AFP in English 0400 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] Wellington, April 30 (AFP)—Radioactivity from French nuclear tests at Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia poses little danger, an official of New Zealand's National Radiation Laboratory, Murray Matthews, said Tuesday.

More than 100 underground tests have been held at Mururoa, but even if all the radioactivity was released into the Pacific it would not be harmful, Mr. Matthews said in an interview. "The effect of any dispersion from Mururoa would be very small and probably unmeasurable in the longer term, and certainly not measurable at New Zealand and other island sites remote from Mururoa," he said.

The issue of nuclear test safety has been spotlighted this week with the visit here of French Prime Minister Michel Rocard, who said at a press conference Monday that testing was safe. Mr. Rocard was due to meet later Tuesday with members of the environmental organisation Greenpeace who argue that any leak of radiation from the atoll would be harmful.

Mr. Matthews disputed Greenpeace's stance. "It would be impossible for a marine organism to take up enough strontium-90 or caesium-137, for example, to do it any damage, because of the relatively large amount of stable strontium and caesium in seawater," he said.

For any radioactive materials without close stable analogues in sea water, such as plutonium-239, ordinary dilution would soon disperse them to very low concentrations.

He claimed ocean fish would also be unlikely to remain in any short-lived radioactive "hot pool" long enough to pick up a significant amount of radioactive contamination through the food chain.

Greenpeace nuclear test ban campaigner Stephanie Mills said little was understood about how radioactivity was diluted and dispersed in the sea, and the effects of low-level radiation on human health were poorly understood. "It is therefore irresponsible and complacent of the National Radiation Laboratory to contend that leakage from Mururoa would have no human or environmental impact," she said.

The laboratory is state-run.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Conference on European Security Held in Prague

Havel Advocates Treaty System

LD2504103991 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
0900 GMT 25 Apr 91

[Excerpt] President of the Republic Vaclav Havel opened in Cernin Palace in Prague this morning a two-day conference on the future of European security. He emphasized that security issues in Europe are not a regional matter but a matter concerning the entire world. He pointed out that Czechoslovakia pins high hopes on the Helsinki process in this respect. According to Vaclav Havel, a system of collective treaties should be formed, which would bind together NATO-member countries, nonaligned, and the so-called postcommunist countries. In this connection, the president praised the role of NATO as a well-tried democratic institution, on the one hand, and as a link with the United States and Canada, on the other. He also spoke in favor of new bilateral agreements between European countries that should become a basis for a future security network.

When opening the Prague conference on the future of European security today, Vaclav Havel also highlighted the role of the Soviet Union without whose participation the future of security in Europe is inconceivable. [passage omitted]

NATO's Woerner Addresses Conference

LD2504121791 Prague CTK in English 0714 GMT
25 Apr 91

[Text] Prague, April 25 (CTK)—NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner said at the conference on "The Future of European Security" here today that though "the security premises of Europe have dramatically changed", "the existing potentials are still too high, and the danger of reversals has not yet been exorcised".

Woerner hailed the conference as "an impressive testimony to the new Europe in which there are no more adversaries, no more blocs, no more antagonisms, but where democratic countries, nourished by the same cultural and historical sources, recreate their partnerships and shape their common future".

"I need not recall the achievements of the past year, the advent of freedom and democracy in this part of Europe, the strategic retreat of the Soviet Union and the determined Soviet effort to contribute its vital share to a more cooperative and peaceful continent," Woerner said.

But "we have not yet removed the uncertainties and risks of this difficult period of transition. The enormity of the challenge and the gravity of the political and economic situation in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe stand in stark contrast with our initial joy and relief," Woerner said.

Speaking about the need of "more tangible" support for systemic changes in the countries of central and eastern Europe, Woerner said that "our duty is now to consolidate the progress of reforms so far undertaken, to avert new perils, to master the process of change, to overcome obstacles, and in the domain of security...further to limit the offensive capability of the remaining armed forces in Europe, and to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power on the continent".

"We are about to overcome the tragic division of the continent along ideological and military lines. We no longer fear the overwhelming onslaught of huge military potentials," Woerner said.

He went on to say that "there is good reason to be confident that the spectre of overwhelming great power war has been exorcised in Europe, for our time. But it would be rash to conclude that the risks have receded entirely".

Speaking about the Soviet Union, Woerner said it has been and will continue to be the biggest power of Europe "because of its geostrategic location, its sheer size, its military might and its world power aspirations. Today we look to a more constructive and cooperative Soviet Union, which must shoulder new responsibilities, notwithstanding significant internal difficulties, for Europe's peace and well-being. The challenge for us as Europeans is to draw the Soviet Union into our common endeavour, to dispel any temptations to isolate it. We at NATO maintain the transatlantic link, fettering the North American democracies as closely as we can to Europe's destiny. From the viewpoint of security policy, our reference system reaches from the shores of the Pacific to Vladivostok."

Woerner mentioned the three major sessions which will be held within the conference on "The Future of European Security", each focusing on a vital aspect of the overall topic. "Let me suggest three lines of inquiry which, to some extent, cut across the plan for the three sessions," Woerner said.

"The first inquiry should attempt to define a new, modern and comprehensive concept of security. A second major inquiry should explore the institutions which Europe will need to consecrate its new, undivided status...my third inquiry finally—and understandably—concerns NATO's role," Woerner said.

As regards security, Woerner said "We must seek to understand the conditions that need to be fulfilled to make security last: the societal, economic and mental underpinnings of security...support for the reform policies of the countries in eastern and central Europe, including the Soviet Union, will be our best long-term security policy."

Saying that it will now be necessary "to explore how military roles have changed," Woerner said that "vigilance and military effectiveness will need to be preserved to offset existing military capabilities".

"We must make sure that our future strategies are truly defence-dominant and are more clearly and more visibly adapted to the real spectrum of crises and risks of the future. In this respect I am happy to see Soviet participation at a high level in this conference. Soviet developments in the domain of security and strategy will remain of overriding importance for all of us," Woerner said.

"As regards the future institutions of Europe I believe we have made some progress," Woerner said and added that "NATO's ministers have recently spoken of the need for a framework of interlocking institutions which, in their future operations, will be meshed through complementarity and mutual support".

"That important conceptual insight dismisses the idea of a sole plan-European institution in which all others—including the North Atlantic Alliance—should graciously fuse," Woerner said. The interlocking institutions concept "is a more realistic approach as it allows a much smoother integration of the central and east European countries, including the Soviet Union, into a structural framework in which the security interest of all European states can be fully accommodated," Woerner said.

"We at NATO are intensively interested in providing an adequate response to the security needs of the new democracies. They must be part and parcel of a common security and they must be convinced that such is to be their role," Woerner said.

Speaking about the role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Woerner said the CSCE process "should be upgraded and better equipped to deal with future scenarios of concern, both in a mode of crisis prevention and crisis management".

Speaking about NATO's future role, Woerner said that "NATO has undergone, and is still involved in, a fundamental transformation, adjusting to the changing security premises of a new Europe".

This embraces "three areas: We are revising our strategy, reducing our active forces and changing our force structures to adapt to the new military situation. We are developing a cooperative relationship with our former adversaries to create the conditions for a new and lasting all-European order of security. We are reinforcing the European pillar inside our alliance to adjust to the creation of a European political union," Woerner said.

Saying that "NATO's core function has always been defence", he added that "the tendencies (now) are clear. Risk replaces threat, vigilance replaces combat readiness. Prudent provision for future security replaces instant defence."

Stressing "the overriding task of safeguarding the transatlantic relationship", Woerner said that "the firm commitment of the North American democracies to the destiny of Europe has preserved the peace and will continue to be our guarantee for a stable world".

Referring to the central Europe, Woerner said "nobody at NATO takes the issue of the security status of the new central European democracies lightly. We are in no way indifferent to their security. We see their needs, we want to cater to them. We can undertake this endeavour, confident that none of us is threatened immediately, none of us is in a precarious military situation."

"NATO member states, it is true, enjoy a formal security guarantee, of which non-members do not partake," Woerner said. He added that central and east European states "neither want to be neutral nor components of a buffer zone, and nor do we. We want them to be constructive partners.... At the moment, what NATO can offer is a multiple and intensive web of relations which does not exclude the Soviet Union, but wants it to be a constructive and creative partner as well".

"A lot will depend on the future of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy, i.e. its behaviour in its relations with its neighbours. Our alliance will show flexibility, including in our institutional manifestations during this evolution," Woerner said.

CSFR Deputy Minister on Pact, NATO

*LD2504165191 Prague CTK in English 1522 GMT
25 Apr 91*

[Text] Prague, April 25 (CTK)—The Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee is scheduled to meet here at the beginning of June and "Czechoslovakia is not hiding its hopes that this meeting could also be the last", said Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Zdenek Matejka today.

In a speech entitled "Potentials and Limitations of the Existing Security Mechanism in a Pan-European Framework", Matejka warned that "as a result of the last two years Eastern Europe is now in a certain strategic isolation". He was addressing a two-day conference here on "The Future of European Security".

Matejka said the present standing of Central and Eastern Europe is influenced by the following facts: 1) the Warsaw Pact will be dissolved, 2) NATO has serious limitations as far as non-member states are concerned and 3) the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is not sufficiently developed from a security standpoint.

Czechoslovakia is placing high hopes in the formation of pan-European security structures within the CSCE or Helsinki process, Matejka said, and would welcome negotiations on the creation of a permanent CSCE political body at the next CSCE summit in 1992.

Matejka said it would be desirable for the summit to accept binding documents that would pave the way for the establishment of a regional or international organisation similar to the United Nations charter. Matejka then went one step further with a proposal for a pan-European system for monitoring adherence to arms control agreements, measures for the supervision of

conventional arms sales and the gradual formation of multinational European forces.

U.S., Soviet, Romanian Delegates Speak

*LD2504180791 Prague CTK in English 1625 GMT
25 Apr 91*

[Text] Prague, April 25 (CTK)—Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. under secretary of defence for policy told the conference on "The Future of European Security" today that Europe's security requires that the Berlin Wall not be replaced by a new line dividing the poor from the rich.

Wolfowitz stressed the U.S. commitment to democracy, independence and progress in Central and Eastern Europe. It is evident, however, that a new European security order will not emerge overnight, he said. While NATO is necessary for European security, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is a complementary organisation which shares with NATO the role of strengthening and improving stability. In the same way, NATO could complement the CSCE. NATO serves European security by being the most reliable counterbalance to the possibility of renewed Soviet aggressivity and by firmly anchoring a united Germany, Wolfowitz said.

He noted that if the present trend continues, the U.S. will cut its troop strength by one-quarter by 1995. The number of troops on active duty will be reduced by more than half a million, which is slightly higher than the number of troops sent by the U.S. to the Persian Gulf to liberate Kuwait.

In 1995 U.S. military spendings will be the lowest in relation to the gross national product since the Second World War, Wolfowitz said and he urged the Soviet Union to follow suit.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Kvitsinskiy said the present instability in Eastern and Central Europe is just as dangerous as the West's passive inaction.

Whilst the Paris Charter for a new Europe declared the period of confrontation over, it is clear that a new European security order is far away, he said. It is a monumental task for decades.

Kvitsinskiy noted that the contrasts of contemporary European development, with the East occupied with destruction and the West with construction, can hardly serve as a good basis for a future balance. He said the German proposal to set up some kind of security council for Europe deserves careful thought and support.

As far as relations between the Soviet Union and its former allies are concerned, Kvitsinskiy said, Moscow considers it most productive to establish bilateral mutually advantageous agreements with them.

Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase proposed a union of Central and East European countries, which he described as an open organisation that should act as a

catalyst of change in the Warsaw Pact. It should oversee development in the region and set up contacts with Western Europe.

Romania Urges Central European Security Structure

*AU2504203891 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
2024 GMT 25 Apr 91*

[Text] Bucharest, April 25 (ROMPRES)—A union of Central and Eastern Europe would fill, even temporarily, the "void of representation" of the common security interests of the countries in that region, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Nastase stated at the Prague conference devoted to the future of European security.

This new structure is to prove its utility, the Romanian foreign minister added, in promoting confidence, the measures to strengthen security through consultations, exchanges of information, actions conducive to growing transparency of the member-countries' military activities, meant to avoid a distorted understanding of the acts in that domain, as well as through coordinated efforts meant to prevent and remove the negative consequences of non-military threats to security, as well as of ecological threats or of threats deriving from terrorist actions or from drugs traffic.

By increasing the mutual confidence among the member states, the mechanism could favor the harmonization of the respective countries' foreign policy, the Romanian dignitary opined, the coherent promotion of their mutual interests within the CSCE structures. At the same time, it could encourage the gradual integration of the participant countries into the already existing European structures and the coordination of their efforts. The political wish of cooperation of the countries participant in the proposed union could materialize by establishing a minimum number of structures to facilitate regular consultations and the implementation of goals.

Such structures could include the setting up of a political consultations mechanism (maybe at a foreign ministers' level) and of a military consultations mechanism which should include or be correlated with mechanism meant to avoid the distorted perception in the military domain, Romania's representative emphasized. This union would be open to all countries considered as belonging to Central and Eastern Europe. To render the security-questions measures more important it would be necessary for the Soviet Union, the United States, the European communities or the Western European Union to participate in the meetings of all special-status structures as permanent observers for the time being their consensus being a condition necessary for any decision in the respective problems, Adrian Nastase also specified.

Hungary Critical of Romanian Proposal*LD2504220291 Budapest MTI in English 2044 GMT
25 Apr 91*

[Text] Prague, April 25 (MTI)—The international security policy conference in Prague is being attended by Tamas Katona, secretary of state at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In his Thursday contribution, Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase proposed setting up a union of the Eastern and Central European countries. He said this would be an open organization designed to act as a 'catalyser' in the transformation of the Warsaw Treaty. According to the Romanian minister, the union in question could also monitor the processes under way in the region and ensure a link with Western Europe.

Speaking to MTI's Prague correspondent, Tamas Katona pointed out that the otherwise well-intentioned Romanian concept carried the danger of missing the opportunity for integration into Europe for several decades ahead.

Katona drew attention to the fact that adopting the proposal would amount to the revival of the old COMECON and Warsaw Treaty. Should such a union be called into existence, we would lose the chance of joining the Common Market, said Katona. However, he admitted that the Romanian proposal had several sensible elements, such as the need to look for a way out from the crisis of trade between the region's countries.

The Hungarian state secretary for foreign affairs said that in the view of Hungary, in the near future the Western European Union might provide the best organizational background for guaranteeing the security of the continent.

Arbatov, Others Address Conference*LD2604151491 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1330 GMT 26 Apr 91*

[Text] A two-day conference on European security ended in Prague's Cernin Palace today. Sir Michael Alexander from Great Britain rejected the call of Soviet participants that after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the West too, should think about the future of the North Atlantic Alliance. He emphasized that the dissolution of NATO is neither in the interest of the West, nor is it in the interest of the East. Soviet Academician Georgiy Arbatov opposed this argument by saying that NATO, like the Warsaw Pact, represents a symbol of the militarization of Europe and is a remnant of the Cold War.

In a winding-up speech, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier emphasized that European security is indivisible, and that it is based on democracy and the observance of human rights. He expressed the need to prevent the Soviet Union's isolation.

After the conference, NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner addressed a news conference in Cernin Palace.

According to him, the participants in the conference agreed that European security must incorporate all of Europe, including the Soviet Union, that it must be based on cooperation, and that the guarantee of European security cannot be provided by only one system but by a structure of mutual, complementary institutions.

Woerner on Status of USSR*LD2604175291 Prague CTK in English 1459 GMT
26 Apr 91*

[Text] Prague, April 26 (CTK)—Participants in the international conference "The Future of European Security", which ended here today, agreed that European security must be indivisible and must include Europe as a whole, including the Soviet Union.

NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner and Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier told journalists after the conference that a new European security structure must be based on mutual cooperation between the Conference on Security and cooperation in Europe, NATO, the Council of Europe, the West European Union and the European Community.

The participants in the conference agreed on getting over the economic division of Europe by, for instance, creating conditions for exports from the former Soviet bloc countries. All aspects, i.e. military, humanitarian, political, economic, etc, must be taken into consideration on the path towards economic integration, Dienstbier said. The participants agreed the iron curtain must be abolished, not moved to the East, Dienstbier said.

Woerner said the conference agreed to intensify ties between Central and East European countries and NATO, as all possibilities have not yet been exhausted. All participants agreed Europe is only at the beginning of the process of building a free continent although the first achievements are already evident, Woerner said. It will, however, take a long time to achieve eventual objectives.

Woerner described the two-day conference, attended by some 100 political, economic and military experts from Europe, the U.S. and Canada, as another step bringing NATO and Central and East European countries closer to one another. The fact that it took place in Prague proves that the old dividing lines in Europe are being removed. Woerner said Central and East Europe "better understands our attitude".

The Soviet Union must become aware that NATO members and the Central and East European countries are willing to build a new Europe together with the Soviet Union, Woerner told the press conference.

A pan-European security system cannot exist without the Soviet Union but much will depend on the Soviet foreign policy, the country's internal development and its attitude to the Central and East European states. The Soviet Union must be aware that "we are not indifferent" to these countries' security, he said.

NATO plays an irreplaceable role in building the future Europe. It ensures a counter-balance to the Soviet armed forces, is a valuable community with a firm basis on which cooperative security in Europe can be built. NATO strives for cooperation, being an exclusively defensive institution and a democratic organization. The Soviet Union has to accept these aspects and change its stand on NATO concept. "We are not enemies," Woerner said.

Dienstbier told journalists some political forces in the Soviet Union consider their country's security in an isolated way, fearing NATO as a super-power.

Woerner confirmed the invitation for Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to visit Brussels. He highlighted the diplomatic relations between NATO and the Soviet Union and voiced NATO willingness to develop them.

Dienstbier said that a new Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty is being prepared with the aim to harmonically supplement the creation of a security network in Europe.

Woerner called for the strengthening of the CSCE institutions and said the development of the whole structure must be accompanied by good bilateral relations.

HUNGARY

Grosz: Soviet Nuclear Arms 'Had Been Stored' in Country

*LD2204075191 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0700 GMT 22 Apr 91*

[Text] [Former Prime Minister] Karoly Grosz has told NEPSZABADSAG that Soviet nuclear weapons had been stored in Hungary. In answer to a question from the newspaper, the former prime minister pointed out that he had received official information from the Hungarian military leadership and the Soviet military leadership in Hungary some weeks after his appointment that nuclear warheads had been stored in a military base in Hungary. Soon after that he traveled to Moscow and personally asked Mikhail Gorbachev to withdraw the warheads from Hungary. The Soviet leader promised this, and about a year later Karoly Grosz was informed that the warheads had been removed from there. Karoly Grosz also said that this presence of the weapons was treated as top secret and he saw Janos Kadar's signature on the document that permitted the weapons to be delivered here.

USSR Confirms Past Presence of Nuclear Arms

*LD2404165291 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1500 GMT 24 Apr 91*

[Text] A spokesman for the Moscow Ministry of Defense has confirmed that, within the framework of Warsaw Pact activities, Soviet nuclear weapons were stored in Hungary earlier, although only in small quantities.

Because a new Hungarian military leadership was appointed last summer, and by this time there were no

longer any Soviet nuclear weapons in our country, Moscow did not consider it expedient to inform the Hungarian military leadership about the matter, the spokesman added.

Defense Ministry Spokesman Details Soviet Equipment Removal

*AU2904112691 Budapest MTI in English 0658 GMT
24 Apr 91*

[Text] Budapest, 24 April (MTI)—The issue of the withdrawal of Soviet armaments and technical devices from Hungary is in the centre of an interview with spokesman of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, carried by the Hungarian daily NEPSZAVA on April 24.

"According to a report of April 21, 1991, of the 27,146 Soviet technical devices, 21,109 have been removed from Hungarian territory by midnight on April 21. 98 percent of caterpillar vehicles have already been withdrawn and so have 17,185 of the 21,726 wheeled vehicles.

"As regards tanks, there are a mere 41 of them on Hungarian soil, compared to the original number of 860. From the 622 artillery devices, only 503 have remained. All of the 196 missile launch pads have been removed."

Speaking about the date when launch pads were removed, Colonel Keleti said:

"According to our records, the majority of the launch pads were those of anti-aircraft missiles. The launch pads of tactical missiles were removed from Hungary last year, one type of it by April 29, 1990, the other by June 27. These two types of missiles are capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. The last three anti-aircraft missile launch pads were removed in February 1991.

"From the 560,912 tonnes of clothing, food, technical, and other equipment, 293,352 tonnes have been removed by midnight April 21, so more than half of the equipment is out of the country now.

"86,118 of the 100,380 Soviet citizens staying in Hungary have also left the country", Colonel Keleti concluded.

No Soviet Reply Received on Nuclear Arms Storage

*LD2504165291 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1500 GMT 25 Apr 91*

[Text] The Ministry of Defense no longer has authoritative information on how long the Soviets stored nuclear warheads in Hungary and when they were removed. The spokesman for the ministry has said that the ministry asked the Soviet chief-of-staff for information about the matter, but so far no reply has been received.

Gyorgy Keleti also stated that at the installations taken over after the withdrawal of Soviet troops no radiation pollution was found anywhere.

Editorial Calls For 'Truth' on Soviet Warheads

*AU2904125191 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 25 Apr 91 p 3*

[Editorial by Peter Vajda: "Nuclear"]

[Text] We have suddenly seen the light. What we have found out about nuclear affairs is a lot, but at the same time, it is too little.

We know that Soviet nuclear warheads, together with their missiles, were stored in Hungary until 1990. Nobody was informed of this, except Janos Kadar (and his successor, Karoly Grosz, as well as Grosz' successor as prime minister, Miklos Nemeth.) Hungary's successive defense ministers, and perhaps one or two other military leaders. However, other people were not aware of this presence, including Gyorgy Lazar—Hungary's long-time prime minister—and our successive foreign ministers. Parliament knew nothing about it, and the country did not have the slightest idea. For example, people in the area around Tata did not know anything, despite the launching pad and the fairly large storage facilities located in that area. Likewise, of course, Budapest citizens could not have suspected that a mere 70 km from the Ostapenko statue, rows of nuclear weapons were being stored in the silence of a deep bunker.

It was the Soviets who requested the stationing of these nuclear weapons, and it would appear that Janos Kadar made the decision on his own. The narrow Hungarian circle that was informed of the presence of the weapons did not even know exactly what kind of weapons they were, how many there were of them, and where they were being stored. They did not know exactly where these nuclear weapon storage facilities had been built within our closed military areas, despite the fact that, in principle, any kind of construction should have been subject to authorization. To put it mildly, our sovereignty was marked by large-scale (self-)restraint. Hungarian leaders only learned further details when military facilities were handed back.

That is what we know today and this knowledge shocks us. We were similarly shocked when, following Gorbachev's basic acquiescence to the withdrawal of troops, for several long months, Soviet military leaders refused to hold real troop withdrawal talks with their Hungarian partners.

We have found out quite a lot, yet this knowledge is little compared to what we do not know. Why was the request

made to transport these nuclear weapons here? What was the excuse? And when exactly was the request made? What kind of warheads were stored in Hungary? When were they delivered, and when were they taken back? What plans had been made for the use of these weapons? Why did the Soviet chief of staff in October 1990—without consulting a single Hungarian leader—suddenly mention the withdrawal of these weapons of mass destruction from Hungary, weapons that had officially never been delivered here? Why did Hungarian military officials choose to deny this news, saying that, yes, there were Soviet missiles in Hungary, but that they were only equipped with conventional warheads?

It is a good thing that the Soviet Defense Ministry now admits that these weapons were here. It is a good thing, even if the ministry leaves more questions unanswered than answered. Every little step counts. Nevertheless, questions should be answered, as completely and as soon as possible. Our new system of relations—which we so desperately need—can only be fundamentally different to the former obsolete one if we know the truth about yesterday. Sooner or later, they will probably show us a nuclear bunker. "Hungarian nuclear secrets" also need to be prized open.

POLAND

Experts Find No Chemical Weapons in Soviet Units

*LD1904193391 Warsaw PAP in English 1638 GMT
19 Apr 91*

[Text] Warsaw, April 19—Polish experts found no chemical weapons or means or equipment for their use during an inspection carried out on April 17 and 18 in two Soviet Army units stationed in this country, a press spokesman of the Ministry of National Defence (MON) reported today. During the inspection, the Polish team controlled depots of artillery ammunition and chemical equipment chosen by the Polish side.

Journalists were told at a press conference today that the principal aim of the inspection was to confirm previous declarations of the Soviet side that chemical weapons had not been stored in Poland and checking in practice the verification procedures of the convention on chemical weapons ban negotiated by 39 states at the disarmament conference in Geneva.

The objects were selected for inspection by the Polish side, and the command of the Soviet Army in Poland was only notified a dozen or so hours before the Polish inspectors turned up.

So far [as received] Polish experts and officers have had no access to this type of Soviet objects. The inspection was very thorough, director of the department for the

U.N. system in the Polish Foreign Ministry Jan Woroniewicz stressed. The Foreign Ministry representative said the inspection was credible and he ruled out any scenery making.

The fact that the inspection was carried out and its results should be seen in the context of confidence reconstruction in the Polish-Soviet relations, Woroniewicz said. He recalled that the inspection had been planned for last February but then commander of the Soviet Army in Poland General Viktor Dubynin refused to agree.

The inspection results will be presented to the disarmament conference in Geneva in a form of a joint Polish-Soviet communique.

Soviet Withdrawal Underway Despite Lack of Treaty

*LD2504185891 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 1730 GMT 25 Apr 91*

[Text] There is no treaty, but the [Soviet] Army is pulling out. Since 15 April, three transports have already left Legnica; this time not to Swidnica but to Smolensk for good. They are traveling through Wroclaw, Warsaw, and Brzesc. About 100 soldiers and officers are transporting a considerable amount of equipment. The headquarters of the northern group of the Soviet Armed Forces has ordered two 120-axle trains for April in the Lower Silesian District Directorate of State Railways. The railmen assure that they can provide any number of trains for this particular purpose.

ARGENTINA**Government 'Suspects' Condor-2 Used in Gulf War***PY1904024891 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0020 GMT
19 Apr 91*

[Excerpts] Buenos Aires, 18 April (EFE)—Argentine Vice President Eduardo Duhalde pointed out today that his government "suspects" that the locally developed Condor-2 missile "was used" in the Persian Gulf war.

Duhalde reported to the press that Argentine-U.S. relations and the "definitive" position to be adopted by Argentina on the missile project were analyzed during a meeting between the cabinet of ministers and President Carlos Menem. Duhalde added that the cabinet also discussed "the government's willingness to end discussions on this issue, which has been creating problems for a long time."

He said that "the previous administration decided to destroy" the missile and that, "although the original intent was to use the Condor-2 for peaceful objectives, it was used—or, at least, it is believed that it was used"—during the Persian Gulf War. [passage omitted]

Military sources have told EFE that high-ranking Air Force officers have expressed their "concern" to Menem over the investment of about \$200 million in research and design of the missile, mostly because its cost will be added to other Air Force losses when the project is suspended. Air Force Commander in Chief Brigadier Jose Julio held a meeting with the highest-ranking Air Force officers on 16 April. Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella and Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo were also invited to the meeting.

A military spokesman said Cavallo urged the military to "put a definitive end" to the manufacture of Condor-2 missiles because "international pressure is still being exerted on the Argentine Government on basis of the belief that the Condor-2 is still being manufactured in Argentina." The Condor-2 is approximately six meters long and can carry a 150 kilo "payload" some 300 kilometers.

Government Asked To Continue Condor Project**Radicals: 'Reject Foreign Pressure'***PY2504011691 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS
ARGENTINAS in Spanish 2210 GMT 24 Apr 91*

[Text] Buenos Aires, 24 April (NA)—The bloc of Radical Civic Union (UCR) national deputies has asked the government to continue developing the Condor-2 and to "reject foreign pressures to dismantle it." This decision was announced at a news conference held by Cordoba Deputy Conrado Storani, Jr., UCR bloc leader Cesar Jaroslavsky, and other opposition legislators, including Simon Lazara (Unified Socialism).

Storani summarized the history of the Condor-2 project, saying that "for some years our country has been developing missile technology, which has aided our access to high technology and has given us the possibility of manufacturing our own rocket to place satellites into orbit for peaceful purposes and of joining a market that until now has been reserved for very few."

Storani said charges against the country over the eventual military use of the missile are senseless, adding that "fifteen Third World countries are working on the project."

Storani added: "It is not fair to link the project with Iraq because Iraq had plenty of war materiel supplied by the same countries which would later condemn it at the United Nations for invading Kuwait."

Storani said the Argentine Government "has given in to pressure" and that "the UCR condemns national policies on the issue and urges the government to continue the project, which has cost the country so much human and material resources."

Condor in 'National Interest'*PY2504024091 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS
ARGENTINAS in Spanish 2235 GMT 24 Apr 91*

[Text] Buenos Aires, 24 April (NA)—Senator Ricardo Lafferriere of the Radical Civic Union [UCR] today proposed that the Condor-2 project be declared "in the national interest" and that development be continued under "strategic congressional control."

Lafferriere said in a draft resolution that "the decision to discontinue the project is not right, much less so if it means destroying the studies, research, and prototypes produced in developing it." The government has announced that the Condor-2 has been deactivated.

The Entre Rios legislator said that the Defense, Science and Technology, and Communications Committees from each chamber of Congress "must be the forums for debate on a project that is extremely important for the nation."

Lafferriere said: "The Condor project has become a product of advanced technology for peaceful purposes linked to the development of satellites and computer sciences."

Lafferriere criticized U.S. Government pressure to dismantle the project even though he admitted that "mistrust of Argentina derives from past irresponsible attitudes. We must, however, stress to the world that we introduced democratic changes in 1983."

Former President Alfonsin Backs Continuation of Condor Project

*PY2604011091 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS
ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1710 GMT 25 Apr 91*

[Text] Buenos Aires, 25 April (NA)—Former President Raul Alfonsin today “categorically rejected” the suspension of the Condor-2 missile project, which he called a strategic study “linked to the decision to put an Argentine satellite into orbit.”

Alfonsin, head of the Radical Civic Union [UCR], said: “Not only has the project been suspended, but there are rumors that the Falda del Carmen-based factory in Cordoba Province will be dismantled.” He said the government must continue the project “in defense of our sovereignty” and must not accept the suggestions of the United States.

In a program aired by Radio Rivadavia, Alfonsin also denied that the project may have been financed with funds originating from Iraq, as “a morning newspaper continues to affirm.” He added: “We categorically reject” the government’s attitude on the Condor missile.

Alfonsin noted that he advocates “a mature relationship” with the United States “in which common, different, and contradictory interests prevail.” He said that

the idea of a “special relationship” with the United States is regarded as “repetitive” in Argentina and other Latin American countries.

The UCR leader pointed out that “the current government has ruled out any principle, position, or reservation that could be seen as an obstacle to or deviation from Argentina’s full support for U.S. policy.” He cited as an example “the payment of the foreign debt, in which priority treatment was given to the request made by creditor banks.”

He said that as far as foreign policy is concerned, Argentina “runs the risk of giving up everything for nothing.”

Alfonsin said that this alignment with U.S. policy weakens links with Latin American countries. He cited as an example the country’s participation in the Persian Gulf war without previously consulting with the countries in the region. He pointed out that “this overexertion” in foreign policy “is isolating the country from the rest of the region.”

He said the vote against Cuba at the UN Human Rights Commission was a “vote against a declaration upheld by Argentina and other Latin American countries.” “A phone call was all that was needed to make Argentina vote against its own project,” Alfonsin stressed.

PAKISTAN**Gorbachev Asia-Pacific Forum Idea Too 'Selective'**

*BK2304092291 Islamabad THE PAKISTAN TIMES
in English 23 Apr 91 p 1*

[Text] Islamabad, April 22—Commenting on President Gorbachev's recent remarks to the Japanese Diet regarding the need for a multilateral forum for Asia and the Pacific on security and cooperation, a Foreign Office spokesman while welcoming the concept, stated that Pakistan did not favour a selective approach to the issue.

It would be recalled that President Gorbachev had suggested the holding of a Summit Conference to be

attended by the Soviet Union, the United States, China, India and Japan to discuss security and cooperation in Asia and the Pacific.

The Spokesman emphasised that problems of security and cooperation in Asia and the Pacific are the shared concern of all countries of the region, and their full participation in the formalation and implementation of security and cooperation measures was an essential prerequisite to their success.

A non-discriminatory and open approach ensuring the participation of all Asia-Pacific countries to address the problems of their region would also be in conformity with the tide of democratic transformation that characterises our times.

NUCLEAR & SPACE ARMS TALKS

New U.S. SIOP Said Meant To 'Pressure' USSR in Talks

PM2504202091 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Captain S. Sidorov under the "Observer's Column" rubric: "Attracted by the Cold?.."]

[Text] That war—the "cold" war—about whose end journalists were constantly speaking seems to be reluctant to "end." It is hard otherwise to explain the birth deep inside the Pentagon of a new plan for waging nuclear war against the Soviet Union. And it is even harder to explain why they are trying to persuade the U.S. public that such a plan is necessary. At any rate such an attempt can be seen in the introduction of this question to the pages of the U.S. press.

The plan reported recently by THE WASHINGTON POST citing a high-ranking administration official should soon be approved by President G. Bush. Subsequently it will probably replace or be integrated into the present "Strategic Integrated Operations Plan" (SIOP-7) which provides for nuclear strikes against vitally important targets on the territory of the USSR in the event of a global conflict between our countries.

The details of the new plan have not yet been made public. It is only known that it provides for a reduction of the total number (by approximately 1,000) of the targets in the Soviet Union and East Europe. It emerges from the words of a spokesman for the administration quoted by THE WASHINGTON POST that this is connected mainly with the reduction of the USSR Armed Forces and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territories of their former Warsaw Pact allies.

As for the other motives cited in the interview—"important changes in the Soviet Union" and the sacramental "end of the 'cold war'"—they may be pleasant to hear but in no way fit in with the thrust of the plan. And its thrust has remained the same: Like all similar documents in the past the plan allows the possibility of a nuclear conflict with the USSR and consequently reflects the hope of the U.S. military-political leadership for victory in it.

How far this accords with the widely proclaimed spirit of present Soviet-U.S. relations is for the reader himself to judge. I shall merely recall that in 1985 in Geneva the U.S. president for the first time agreed that there should never be nuclear war and that there would be no victors in it. Twice—in Malta and in Paris—the present White House incumbent confirmed that the United States no longer considers the Soviet Union its adversary. So what is the worth of these assurances today?

People may object: There is a certain inertia in global matters like relations between the two nuclear superpowers. Especially if for many years these relations were

built (and are still built) on the basis of the odious formula of "mutual assured destruction." And here, people say, there is a reduction of 1,000 in the number of targets... Although that is so, one cannot bring oneself to assess the amended "end of the world" scenario as "a step in the right direction."

There is one more factor. In the context of the talks under way between the USSR and the United States on nuclear and space weapons, the plan becomes an element in a political and diplomatic game. It performs the function of pressure on the Soviet side: If you do not want to "cooperate" with us in implementing a strictly "nonoffensive" strategic defense program, you will have the prospect of a disarming and decapitating nuclear strike.

The whole point, however, is that a realistic path toward eliminating the nuclear threat consists in the consistent reduction of the strategic offensive potential and the building of confidence and not in the creation of a new system of weapons and by no means in the militarization of space. For that reason Washington's unchanged logic today cannot fail to give rise to an oppressive feeling.

Of course, the "cold war" will no longer be resurrected in the form customary for past years. But you would have to be a consummate idealist to think that Soviet-U.S. relations are guaranteed a brilliant future; or you would have to work in the Pentagon to suppose that playing at nuclear confrontation will at some time lead us to good.

START TALKS

SS-24 Production Allegations Denied

PM2504105591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major General G. Kashuba of the USSR Defense Ministry press center under the "Rejoinder" rubric: "Mr Hertz Has Many Hats..."]

[Text] "How many hats has Mr Hertz got?"—that was the title of a rejoinder published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 9 April. It emerged from its content that this question was by no means the fruit of someone's idle curiosity with regard to the wardrobe of the WASHINGTON TIMES staffer. It mentioned that in England they say of someone caught out lying: "He should eat his hat." And it was of brazen lying that Mr Hertz was guilty.

One more proof of this was his recent article, again in THE WASHINGTON TIMES, on the development of a new model Soviet ICBM model—the rail-mobile SS-24. The article even names the specific plant producing it—in Pavlograd, where the tests of the engine for the improved model of this missile have allegedly begun. The number of missiles already produced is also cited—about 400 which, Hertz writes, is considerably in excess of the limit set for them—250.

It was announced at the main staff of the Strategic Missile Forces that the figure of 400 has nothing in common with the truth. It is the fruit of the author's imagination, of his creative fantasy, so to speak, but of a far from innocuous fantasy. It is also appropriate to note that in accordance with the draft strategic offensive arms treaty, and it is that treaty which provides for the limit of 250 missiles mentioned in THE WASHINGTON TIMES (and this figure does not appear again anywhere else) it is not the number of missiles produced which is restricted but the number of undeployed missiles for mobile launchers. Here the restrictions will begin to operate when the treaty enters into force.

Nor does the draft treaty provide for the establishment of a ban on the modernization of existing types of missiles. As for the tests at the Pavlograd plant, it was only tests on regular engine installations for the SS-24 missile in accordance with the requirements of the production process. There have been no tests of models of new arms.

Here it is perhaps appropriate to recall the well known saying: "He doesn't know the score." Perhaps even Mr Hertz would not protest about that: After all sometimes it is advantageous to cite the lack of adequate information. But everyone familiar with his work has been persuaded that he knows "the score" very well and who is scoring and why. That is also confirmed in part by his article.

The emergence of a new ICBM model for the USSR, the article says, could have an adverse effect on the completion of work on the Strategic Offensive Arms treaty. What the author wants is visible to the naked eye, as they say. It is no accident that the article is timed for the start of the resumption in Geneva of the talks on nuclear and space arms. The aim here is obvious—to galvanize a question already frequently puffed up by certain circles—the question of "the difficulties of doing business" with the Soviet Union, which allegedly has "an incorrect attitude" toward the fulfillment of the commitments it has assumed.

And here is another thing that draws the attention. Hertz cites sources in the U.S. intelligence services. It is well known that these services do not issue any information to anyone "just like that." But from time to time a "leak" of information occurs or to be more precise is organized. And, as has already frequently been confirmed, this happens precisely when the need arises to direct the movement of public opinion into a specific channel, in the interests, inter alia, of "extracting" appropriations for the implementation of military programs. And there is the following coincidence here: Hertz' article appears at precisely the moment when the U.S. Congress intends to examine the Defense Department budget for fiscal 1992-1993. And if you consider that the U.S. Administration is having problems in obtaining the funds to implement its strategic programs, it will become clear why Mr Hertz has seized on the missile theme. He who

pays orders the "score" or the music. And since the client is unstinting, obviously Hertz is convinced that he can even eat his hat.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

U.S. Announcement of ABM System Plans Noted
PM2204154791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Apr 91 First Edition p 5

["Own Information-TASS" report under the "Foreign Military News" rubric: "Washington's Plans"]

[Text] The United States is planning to develop a new satellite warning system with a view to detecting ballistic missile launches in any region of the globe, D. Atwood, first deputy defense secretary, has said. Speaking in Colorado Springs (Colorado) at a national symposium devoted to space problems, he announced that the Pentagon will begin developing individual components of the new system next year.

The system, which it is planned to deploy in space within the current decade, will make it possible, according to D. Atwood, to increase the accuracy of the information collected and provide the U.S. Armed Forces with more timely warnings. It will also make it possible to counter the threat of an intermediate-range missile attack.

U.S. Plans Said To Violate ABM Treaty
LD2104124691 Moscow TASS in English 1236 GMT
21 Apr 91

[By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, April 21 (TASS)—Even after the U.S. Administration has reconsidered the objectives of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI) programme, reorienting it to ensuring defence against limited missile strikes, the Star Wars programme still envisages the development of anti-missile defence weapons banned by the 1972 Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.

The leaders of the U.S. SDI organisation maintain that the renewed SDI programme still presupposes the use of space-based interceptors banned by the 1972 treaty. The development of air- and sea-launched ABM systems is under study, although they are also outlawed by the treaty.

Under the 1974 Soviet-U.S. protocol, each party has the right to deploy not more than 100 anti-ballistic missiles in one area with a radius of 150 kilometres. Under the "smaller-scale and not so costly" SDI project, as it is referred to in Washington, there will be about 1,000 space-based ABM systems alone.

The Soviet Union and the United States undertook not to deploy missiles outside their national territories. However, the U.S. Administration now plans to deploy a

system for the anti-missile defence of U.S. troops as well as of "friends and allies of the United States" abroad.

Some three years ago U.S. Administration spokesmen tried to somehow justify planned violations of the ABM treaty. Even a commission was set up at one time. It came up with the concept of a "broad and narrow interpretation of the treaty", making it possible to deploy ABM systems based on new physical principles worked out after 1972.

It appears that Washington has now abandoned attempts at legal justification of the violations of its obligations under the ABM treaty. Even SDI programme director Mr Cooper acknowledges that the "implementation of some elements" of the planned ABM system would be a breach of the treaty. He now argues about the need to go ahead with the Star Wars programme by pleading "instability in the Soviet Union".

The 1972 Soviet-U.S. ABM treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate and retains its legal force up to now. However, Washington is apparently steering matters towards violating the treaty, this time in an overt manner already.

At one time U.S. adepts of the philosophy of political realism referred to arms control treaties as "mere pieces of paper", maintaining that the gun muzzle was the only reliable arbiter in international relations.

Such evaluations of international accords, it seems, have re-gained currency in Washington.

TASS Criticizes Discovery's 'Star Wars' Mission

*LD3004102491 Moscow TASS in English 1000 GMT
30 Apr 91*

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshov]

[Text] Moscow, April 30 (TASS)—The United States' launching the Discovery spaceship is a prominent event in science and engineering. The NBC TV company said in its news programme that the launching is another step forward in the attempt to show that the Star Wars systems are operable.

With deep respect for the bravery of American astronauts, we should like to pose the following question: Is their present mission so honourable? The step forward is, in real fact, a dash backward to the arms race which Washington and Moscow seemed seriously to try to end.

Moreover, deploying Star Wars systems and testing their elements will involve shifting weapons to near-earth space. Consequently, this will mean the creation of a lethal sphere around our mother earth.

The Star Wars programme is a Cold War relic. This is especially clear now that the USSR and the United States have turned to cooperation. The two sides are completing a Soviet-American treaty on the reduction of

strategic offensive weapons, and Moscow and Washington are seeking to jointly build collective security.

The SDI programme was a long-standing barrier to reaching mutually acceptable decisions at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva.

Although a year ago the Soviet Union decided not to link the non-militarisation of space with the conclusion of the START treaty (which gave new impetus to the negotiations), the shadow of Star Wars continues to darken the dialogue, questioning one side's implementation of the ABM treaty.

Expressing various opinions about SDI, Soviet and American specialists agree that the deployment of such a system would upset the strategic balance between the USSR and the United States.

On the other hand, its military effectiveness is strongly doubted.

Nevertheless, the U.S. Administration does not want to take a reasonable step that would conform to the realities of our times: to shake off the old dogmas of "star warriors".

It is high time to send programmes of the SDI type to the archives. Let us hope that realism will take the upper hand in Washington.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Defense Ministry: Elimination To Be Completed in May

*LD2504145491 Moscow TASS in English
1420 GMT 25 Apr 91*

[Text] Moscow, April 25 (TASS)—Under the Soviet-U.S. treaty to eliminate intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the destruction of Soviet and U.S. missiles, to which this treaty applies, should be completed in May 1991, the Soviet Defence Ministry reports.

In fulfilling the provisions of the treaty, the Soviet Union destroyed its OTR-22 and OTR-23 shorter-range missiles, the RK-55 land-based cruise missiles and the R-12 and R-14 medium-range missiles in 1988-1990.

The last Soviet RSD-10 medium-range missiles will be eliminated in Kapustin Yar on May 12.

The Soviet Union and the United States are thus completing the programme to eliminate two classes of missiles—medium and shorter-range. As many as 1,846 Soviet and 846 U.S. Missiles will be destroyed in the three years of the implementation of the treaty.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE**USSR Offers Compromise in Vienna on Naval Divisions***LD1904192191 Moscow World Service in English
1810 GMT 19 Apr 91*

[Commentary by Colonel Vadim Solovyev]

[Text] You'll remember that when the Paris agreement was signed last November to reduce conventional armed forces, the United States and later its NATO partners raised the issue of trust. The Soviet General Staff was accused of attaching some of the forces to other armed services, in particular three divisions guarding the sea coast. Another question raised was the redeployment of many tanks to the Asian region of the Soviet Union. The American side accepted explanations concerning the tanks as in keeping with the treaty. The three divisions proved a more delicate matter. The Soviet side explained that all three divisions had been formed before the talks. The American side knew it. This was a natural response to the American flat refusal to negotiate a naval forces reduction. But the United States has left this country so far behind in this armed service that the three marine divisions cannot possibly upset the correlation.

The talks have come to a standstill. The Soviet Union, in trying to find a solution, has suggested to its detriment to include the armament of these three marine divisions into the general quota to conform this agreement to the Paris agreement. As a result the two sides have seemed to become closer together. As for trust, this country is actively trying to stimulate it. Take its latest proposal for stability building measures. Under this proposal no European nation must carry out any military activity with an overall total of more than 40,000 men. Other ceilings suggested are not more than 800 tanks, 1,500 armored vehicles, and 400 war planes. The proposal also suggests that not more than six military exercises or other measures must be held within a year and not more than 13,000 servicemen involved. In short, the Soviet Union has suggested far-reaching moves to scale-down the armed confrontation in Europe. It hopes for reciprocity at the talks. This alone can keep disarmament dynamic.

Polish Troops Commander Views Army Withdrawal*LD2004180191 Moscow All-Union Radio First
Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1515 GMT
20 Apr 91*

[Interview with Colonel General Viktor Petrovich Dubynin, commander of the Northern Troops Group in Poland, by Vyacheslav Rusinov; place and date not given—recorded; from the "I Serve the Soviet Union" program, introduced by Kim Kukholev]

[Text] [Kukholev] Recently, public attention has been focused on the countries of Eastern Europe, whence the

withdrawal of Soviet troops is continuing. Here is an interview with Colonel General Viktor Petrovich Dubynin, commander of the Northern Troops Group in Poland, gave to our correspondent Vyacheslav Rusinov.

[Dubynin] I evaluate the actual withdrawal of Soviet troops as none other than an example of good will on the part of the Soviet Government, in withdrawing the troops before a treaty between the Soviet Union and the Polish Republic has been signed. We must return to our motherland and build the defense of our Soviet state and I consider that according to many indices it is also economically disadvantageous for Soviet troops to be situated on Polish territory.

[Rusinov] Viktor Petrovich, tell me please, the material relations between the Soviet and Polish sides—how are they being or how will they be resolved?

[Dubynin] I will tell you that to date we have no agreement whatsoever with the Polish side regarding the transfer of sites which were leased by us in 1956 and for which we are now paying money and for those establishments which we built, according to the estimate of the Ministry of defense, in the course of 45 years. I will tell you that we have built establishments approximately to the value of 3 billion rubles, and, of course, we do not want to give them up just like that. These questions are not agreed.

I will give you an example. You have seen our buildings. Residential housing, headquarters, equipment stores, and barracks built by us. Now we have to give them up. Well, can you really abandon these establishments, the material expenses that we have had, leave them here? We have to sell them somehow. Now we are taking measures to turn immovable property into movable property; that is, to take it apart and sell and convert that building material which was in use into money.

Of course, we are in a difficult situation. How exactly are we to recoup the investments that we made there earlier and return them to our state, so that with this money we may acquire some building materials and acquire goods for those same military units which are (?arriving) on the territory of the Soviet Union, and create conditions for resolving (?housing and personal) problems?

Polish Position on Troop Withdrawal Criticized*PM2604085091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
22 Apr 91 Second Edition p 7*

[Interview with Colonel General V.P. Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of Forces, by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov, attributed to USSR Defense Ministry Press Center, under the rubric "On the Soviet Troop Withdrawal From Poland"; date, place not given; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction: "Bill for... Liberation?"]

[Text] The number of Soviet troops stationed in central Europe is diminishing daily. Units and subunits of the

Central, Southern, and Western Groups of Forces are returning to the motherland from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Germany in accordance with the schedule and sometimes even ahead of it. It is now the turn of the Northern Group of Forces, stationed in Poland. The first train carrying the missile guards' brigade headed east from that country last week, thereby initiating the systematic withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces. Colonel General V.P. Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of Forces and the Soviet Government's plenipotentiary with regard to matters of the Soviet troops' presence in Poland, speaks about the complex problems directly associated with this event.

[Nikanorov] As is known, the Soviet and Polish Governments recently reached an accord to begin the systematic withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Polish territory 9 April this year. However, despite the fact that this withdrawal has already begun in practice, there is still no confirmed schedule for returning the group's units and subunits to the motherland. Could you explain the situation, Viktor Petrovich?

[Dubynin] Indeed, there is no schedule as yet. The thing is that the final deadline for the complete withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces has not been agreed. Six rounds of Soviet-Polish talks on this problem have not yet resulted in a decisive breakthrough. We consider it reasonable and valid from the military, economic, and social viewpoints to complete the withdrawal in 1993. The Polish side is insisting on reducing this time. It is proposed that this question will finally be resolved during the Soviet-Polish top-level meeting due in the very near future.

I would like to emphasize once again that the time proposed by us was not picked out of thin air. It has been carefully thought out, reckoned up scrupulously, and compressed to the utmost. No one is disputing the fact that we must return to the motherland and build the protection and defense of the Soviet state inside our borders. In addition, in terms of many indicators it is simply economically ruinous for Soviet troops to be on the territory of modern Poland. It is time to lift this burden from the Soviet people.

But the troop withdrawal must be systematic. It must not look like a flight—something some people would like to push us into. We cannot abandon the considerable stocks of physical assets accumulated here. I will tell you that over the past 45 years we have constructed apartment blocks, barracks, equipment storehouses, and other structures here with a value of approximately 3 billion rubles. This is all the people's money, and of course we cannot give it up just like that.

[Nikanorov] Does the Polish side wish to receive all this as a gift?

[Dubynin] Unfortunately, it very much seems so. The negotiations over the transfer of the installations constructed and leased by us are proceeding with very, very great difficulty. The Polish side advances demands

which are sometimes totally unacceptable to us. For example, this argument is used: Everything constructed on Polish soil is Polish property. In Swidnica, for example, they are refusing to accept 61 installations, evidently counting on ultimately getting everything for free. This is why it is very important to sign a treaty on the final deadline for the troop withdrawal simultaneously and in indispensable linkage with an agreement on settling property and financial questions. Otherwise we could find ourselves in a situation where a pledge to leave within a certain time will compel us to leave behind considerable material assets without any compensation.

I must point out that we are trying to find the way out of a complex situation. For example, to turn immovable into movable property and realize it on the spot. However, the Polish authorities have virtually prohibited such trade. And yet the money made on the sale of used construction material, for example, could be used to equip subunits and units being withdrawn to our country's territory, sometimes almost to a bare site. I will remind you that tens of thousands of families of officers and ensigns in the Northern Group of Forces do not have apartments in the Soviet Union.

Incidentally, this is also a factor of considerable importance in determining the final troop withdrawal deadline. In what way, pray tell me, are our servicemen worse than British or French ones? And yet the British, in preparing to withdraw one division of approximately 10,000 men from Germany, plan to take two years to prepare the material base in their homeland and five years for the actual withdrawal. Is that sensible? Of course. Then neither combat readiness nor people will suffer. They will be able to calmly get on with their immediate work—questions of combat training.

[Nikanorov] Does it turn out that some people in Poland are reckoning on making a pretty packet out of our troop withdrawal?

[Dubynin] Judge for yourself. The Polish side is now trying hard to raise for discussion the question of changing the status of our troops' stay in the country. At the same time it is maintained that the activities of our troops have caused tremendous harm to the environment during more than 45 postwar years. According to their plans, we must pay compensation for this detriment—during the whole time of the group's stay in the country, moreover. I will cite an example. We currently pay to lease buildings, many of which used to belong to the Germans, we pay for municipal services, and we buy food and other material items. We settle up in full. But now they are demanding that we pay also for the land on which are sited military camps, airfields, test ranges, etc.

At the same time we must, apparently, pay for the harvest not gathered from these lands in conformity with the average yield in the country (Last year this stood at approximately 37 quintals per hectare for grain crops). And they propose to levy payment not as of this year but

from 1945. It is proposed that we pay for the use of roads over the same period, for the coal burned in boiler houses, and even for every person living in a military camp. The list of points on which they would like to exact payment from us—in hard currency, of course—is very extensive. The amounts would be expressed in figures with nine zeroes. To make things clear, I have made these calculations: If we agreed to such terms, then Belorussia, for example, would have to work for 10-15 years just for Poland.

[Nikanorov] In advancing such frankly excessive demands with regard to both the timing of the withdrawal and material settlements, the Polish side frequently refers to colossal pressure from public opinion in the country.

[Dubynin] I do not believe that there are any real grounds for these references. As far as I know, no more than 3 percent of the country's population espouses the extremely tough demands being made on us. We are not occupiers here, who have turned up because of someone's ill will. We came here as liberators. More than 600,000 Soviet servicemen fell fighting the Hitlerites on Polish soil. People remember that the territories on which the group is mainly stationed today were part of the fascist Reich before the war. But now almost one-third of Poland's population lives here. Someone today would very much like to expunge this from human memory.

We are now leaving Poland. We are leaving with a sense of a duty fulfilled, we are leaving with head held high and unfurled banners. We have nothing to be ashamed of.

General on Withdrawal From Eastern Europe

*LD2404230891 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 24 Apr 91*

[Text] The Soviet Union continues pulling out its troops from East European countries. This fact poses quite a few questions. Our reporter has turned with some of them to the first deputy head of the Chief Military and Political Department of the Soviet Armed Forces [title as heard], General Aleksandr Ovchinnikov. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from East European countries proceeds in accordance with plan. The pulling out of troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary is drawing to a close. The first combat units are being moved out of Poland; the issue is under review concerning a total withdrawal of troops from that country. The most powerful Soviet Army grouping stationed in Germany is expected to be withdrawn from that country by the end of 1994. When asked if the Soviet Army Command felt that the withdrawal of troops could destabilize the situation and undermine the Soviet Union's security, Gen Ovchinnikov explained:

[Begin Ovchinnikov recording in Russian fading to English translation] I think, Gen. Ovchinnikov said, we should develop a well-guarded and calm attitude to the return of Soviet troops back home. This is no tragedy at

all. The long-standing presence of Soviet troops was not the best way of stabilizing the situation in Europe and all over the world. When troops are stationed on foreign territory, this is always unreasonable. The fact that they are now returning home is the right thing.

But it also has its negative aspects. Two of them can be singled out: material and technical, and political and military. As far as the material and technical aspect is concerned, Gen. Ovchinnikov said, we are not prepared for the deployment of the troops coming back from Eastern Europe. To deploy hundreds of thousands of people; provide them with housing; and build other infrastructures, such as schools, kindergartens, sports facilities, and shops—that's all what is needed for normal existence—is not an easy thing. But all these difficulties can be overcome.

The political and military aspect of the withdrawal is much more complicated, the general said, and he continued: We would like, the first deputy head of the Soviet Chief Military and Political Department said, other countries to begin along with us a steady and simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from Europe. I mean the United States, for example. The general believes that since the military organization of the Warsaw Treaty ceased to exist, NATO could do the same with its corresponding structure. It's time, Gen. Ovchinnikov said in conclusion, to bring the policy of confrontation to a stop and embark on a dialogue. It's time to expand economic and cultural contacts. The Soviet Armed Forces engaged in the planned withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe have every right to count on reciprocal actions of the countries—members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. [end recording]

'Doubts' Expressed on Soviet Stance on Naval Divisions

*LD2904173791 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 29 Apr 91*

[Text] There is an ongoing exchange of views between Moscow and Washington about resolving the protracted disputes over the different interpretation of points in the treaty signed last November to reduce conventional forces in Europe. What is the present state of affairs? An opinion from our commentator Yuriy Solton.

I may remind you of the essence of the matter. The United States accuses the Soviet Union of trying to remove from the effect of the treaty some of the armaments that had to be eliminated as the USSR has put three motorized infantry divisions into a [as heard] coastal defence forces. The United States regards it not only as a violation of the treaty but also as a dangerous precedent for other countries, undermining trust which is so much needed on issues of disarmament. The White House has decided so far not to submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification, despite the fact that leaders of Senate committees voiced readiness to consider it.

I must say in all fairness that the doubts about the Soviet interpretation of the treaty are aired by other signatories. Completion of work on another important document about reducing strategic offensive armaments of the Soviet Union and the United States is made dependent on the solution of these Soviet-American disputes.

The disputed issues have been discussed at many different levels. President Gorbachev and President Bush have exchanged letters on this score. The latest attempt to resolve the differences was made last week at the talks in Kislovodsk between the Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and the United States Secretary of State James Baker. There are indications that the attempt was successful, it has been disclosed by competent Soviet sources that noticeable progress has been made. Americans also confirm that. According to an American diplomat who asked not to reveal his name, it has become possible to solve a considerable part of the disputed points. Out of the three stumbling blocks, the diplomat said, there actually remains one, least of all essential, following the Kislovodsk talks. Well, that's gratifying news.

I am far from justifying the Soviet military who, for the sake of strengthening national security, interpreted the treaty in their own way, having put the diplomats in a difficult position. I also don't accept the original stand taken by the United States, amounting to an ultimatum. It is important that the two sides were not unyielding and began to patiently look for a way out to solve their differences. They seem to have found the way. That makes it possible to speak of sufficient durability of the Soviet-American dialogue over the past year [sentence as heard]

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Issue of Hungary-Based Nuclear Arms Considered
*LD2804123391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 0730 GMT 28 Apr 91*

[Text] The USSR Defense Ministry published a statement this week confirming that nuclear weapons had for several years been at the disposal of the southern group of Soviet forces stationed on Hungarian soil. This admission followed a clamorous campaign in the Hungarian press, started by NEPSZABADSAG. Here is a report by Sergey Shalygin, our Budapest correspondent.

[Shalygin] Last Monday the newspaper carried an interview with Karoly Grosz, former prime minister of the Hungarian People's Republic. He recalled that he had seen a document signed by Janos Kadar agreeing to the stationing of Soviet nuclear warheads in the territory of Hungary. During his first official visit to Moscow, Karoly Grosz requested the Soviet leadership to withdraw the nuclear weapons there. A few months later this was done. True, Miklos Nemeth, who succeeded Grosz as head of government, claims that the Soviet Union was fulfilling his request and not the promise given his predecessor.

However, this verbal skirmish in the struggle to be the first in no way alters the fact that Hungary, as a country on whose territory nuclear weapons were sited, had naturally been a target for NATO missiles and bombers equipped with armaments to neutralize weapons of mass destruction. Even finding out about this after the event, any Hungarian will sigh with relief when he calls to mind the withdrawal of Soviet troops from his country, which is nearing completion.

Incidentally, Hungarian specialists and my journalistic colleagues have examined the presumed nuclear weapons storage facilities which have been given up. It has been ascertained that there has been no radiation there previously or now.

The only thing that remains unknown is when these weapons might have been introduced into the country. One of the heroes of the 1956 revolution, Lieutenant General Bela Kiraly, who is now a deputy of Hungary's state assembly, considers that 35 years ago the Soviet troops did not want to leave the country precisely because they would thereby have to be deprived of one of the locations for the forward basing of nuclear weapons in Europe. But that is a thing of the past. At the present time Bela Kiraly expresses some perplexity over why Karoly Grosz, a former leader of the Socialist Workers' Party and the government, needed to make a fact that was known to the whole world the subject of such broad discussion. The country will derive no benefit from this, the general stressed. We are keeping an open door to the West, but this does not mean that we are closing it to the East.

NUCLEAR TESTING

More Openness on Nuclear Testing Urged
*91WC0096A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 16, Apr 91 p 6*

[Letter from O. Suleymenov and V. Yakimets: "From Whom Are We Hiding?"]

[Text] The usual arguments used by those who support the continuation of nuclear tests in our country are quite simple and convincing: "They" (the United States) started testing earlier and have exploded more devices, and are leaving the USSR behind in terms of nuclear potential.

However, the figures on the numbers and yields of explosions of nuclear devices carried out by the countries are not published here. Have we really fallen that far behind?

We do not know where or when nuclear devices are exploded in the USSR, or what their yields are, or what the purpose of exploding them is. Just recently scrappy reports have started to appear in the press. Thus, in the September 1989 issue of the journal ATOMNAYA ENERGETIKA an article was published containing descriptions of 96 explosions that took place between

1965 and 1972 at the Semipalatinsk test site. The yields of 22 underground explosions were reported. But that test site was "working" right through October 1989. We could find no figures at all in the Soviet press on tests at the Novaya Zemlya test sites. Hiding defense-related information from the people probably makes sense only when a potential enemy does not know about it.

In the United States, however, they regularly publish and widely disseminate figures on the place, date, yield, and purpose of the nuclear tests conducted on the territory of the United States, and of the USSR.

The uninitiated character of our readers enables the departments involved to manipulate in an uncontrolled way the concept of "military threat" in the dialogue with the government and the legislators, and this helps to maintain the high level of militarization in the economy.

Meanwhile, the USSR has seriously outstripped the United States in terms of aggregate of explosions conducted. We can imagine what kind of shock these tests have been to the planet's biosphere and to the health of its population.

The Soviet person learned only comparatively recently about the areas where the main nuclear test sites are located: near Semipalatinsk and on Novaya Zemlya. But foreign experts have recorded more than 50 places in the USSR where nuclear devices have been exploded. The overwhelming majority are on the territory of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

In publishing the accompanying map [not reproduced] (declassified in the United States) showing the sites of nuclear explosions we are pursuing but one goal, namely, to bring to the attention of the public what is known throughout the world except by citizens of the USSR.

Readers can themselves study the information on this map. The dots mark the sites where so-called "explosions for peaceful purposes" have occurred, which strictly speaking create just as much danger to the environment and people's health as do "weapons" explosions, and during the course of which nothing prevents anyone from obtaining information "useful" for military purposes.

Editor's note: In publishing this letter and the map from the American book "Soviet Nuclear Weapons" we hope that interested departments will clarify or refute the information presented there, which is not secret in the West.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Chemical Troops Dispute Kireyev on Weapons Destruction

91UM0606A Moscow MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS
in Russian No 6, 7 Feb 91 p 21

[Article by Professor I.B. Yevstafyev, a leading specialist in the USSR Ministry of Defense on the issue of chemical weapons destruction: "The Duty of the Servicemen Is to Preserve Weapons"]

[Text] **Doctor of Technical Sciences Major General Igor Yevstafyev, a directorate chief in the USSR Ministry of Defense Chemical Troops, does not agree that the destruction of chemical weapons is the army's concern.**

[The following reproduction of a letter on the letterhead of the chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Chemical Troops, appears at the beginning of the article]

USSR Ministry of Defense

Chief of Chemical Troops

22 January 1991

No. 566/7/72

City of Moscow, K-150

Incoming 056, 22 January 1991
[handwritten in the upper right-hand corner]

Editor in chief

newspaper MEGAPOLIS
EXPRESS

Comrade V.P. Volin,

City of Moscow, 17/9 Ogarev
Street

Esteemed Vladimir Petrovich!

The weekly MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS (No. 2, 1991) published the article "The Chemical Decline" by Doctor of Economic Sciences Aleksey Kireyev. The USSR Ministry of Defense welcomes the fact that your weekly raised the politically important and economically and technically complex issue of destroying the stocks of chemical weapons in keeping with international agreements signed by the USSR. We are interested in an extensive discussion of these issues by the public.

At the same time, the issue is reviewed in a lopsided and, as we see it, somewhat biased manner in the article by Aleksey Kireyev. We hope that the weekly MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS is interested in outlining various points of view on current events; after all, truth is born in debate. I am sending you an article by Professor I.B. Yevstafyev, a leading specialist in the USSR Ministry of Defense on the issue of the destruction of chemical weapons "The Truth About the Chemical Decline." I hope to see this article published in the forthcoming issue of your weekly.

Respectfully,

[Signed] S. Petrov

The article "The Chemical Decline" by Doctor of Economic Sciences Aleksey Kireyev in the weekly MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS (No. 2, 1991) ends with the following words: "Disarmament has not only a political, but also an economic dimension. As a result of the signing of the Soviet-American agreement on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons on 1 June 1990, an ominous chemical decline is looming for our economy, which is sick to begin with."

Military chemical scientists could agree with these words. However, at the same time we cannot agree with the many theses of the article which, instead of analyzing the problem objectively, once again casts slurs upon the army, accuses military scientists of sluggishness, erroneous scientific-technical policy, departmental thinking,

and the desire "to put their hand in the coffers of the state budget." The article strives to create the impression that only the army needs the destruction of chemical weapons, and in the process the army strives to accomplish this in the worst way possible. Everything is turned upside down.

I would like to attempt to restore the truth.

First, the agreement dated 1 June 1990 was signed by the USSR president. Therefore, the decision to destroy chemical weapons is a state decision. The USSR Ministry of Defense is merely one of the possible executors of the political decisions made.

Let me note several purely technical aspects.

Long before the signing of the bilateral Soviet-American agreement, the Americans embarked on a program for destroying their chemical weapons and provided funding for it. By 1990, the United States had already spent more than \$2 billion to destroy chemical weapons. The United States did not merely turn this technical problem of its own into a Soviet-American one, but it also foisted on us expenditures going into billions at precisely the time when the state should be thrifty with every ruble.

Our stocks of chemical weapons were manufactured 20 years later than the U.S. stocks. Our munitions have a number of design peculiarities that predetermine longer times and greater safety in storage.

However, expenditures to solve the problems of improving the safety of long-term storage of chemical weapons are approximately 50 times smaller than the expected expenditures to destroy them.

This is why at this time there is no technical need to urgently destroy our chemical weapons.

Studies have shown that destruction of the chemical weapons will be a complex and costly problem, and will call for resolving a set of sociopolitical, organizational, cadre, scientific-technical, financial, and other issues.

It will be necessary to build full-scale industrial enterprises; the cost of their industrial zones alone goes into hundreds of millions of rubles, and that of their operation into billions. Such construction will call for concentrating material, human, and technical resources over four to five years with the annual use of more than 100 million rubles [R] in capital investment. Up to 3,000 or 4,000 specialists will work at these enterprises; creating and maintaining conditions for their life is a separate multimillion problem.

Someone is vigorously trying to have the USSR Ministry of Defense shoulder the burden of creating facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons. Apparently, in the course of this, they fail to take into account the fact that the volume of housing construction by the Ministry of Defense increases considerably beginning in 1991 in keeping with the Target Program for Social Welfare of

the Servicemen, Their Families, and Individuals Discharged From Active Military Service.

Also, if we take into account the extremely complex condition of the economy of our country, restrictions on the capital investment resources allocated to the USSR Ministry of Defense, a considerable labor shortage, and the absence of necessary production facilities, it will become understandable that the performance of work involving the construction of facilities for destroying chemical weapons by the organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense appears to be a quite complex additional task which is hardly gratifying.

I would like to address one more aspect that is important in principle.

It is hard to understand the echelons that assign to the army the task of destroying weapons, be this the destruction of missiles, tanks, or chemical weapons. This is tantamount to a doctor being made to kill people rather than cure them, making a builder destroy homes and bridges, or making a peasant plow under the harvest he has grown. The sacred duty of servicemen is to love their weapons, preserve them, and keep them continuously ready to accomplish the tasks of ensuring the defense capability of the country.

In our country, it is considered absolutely normal for the army to harvest crops and build roads, work at the enterprises of civilian ministries and settle interethnic conflicts, and in addition to all of this, destroy its own weapons. Even so, all of us wonder in unison: Why has the prestige of military service declined?

The second issue is that of technologies. By a decision of the Council of Ministers, the USSR Ministry of Defense has been designated as the contracting agency for the technologies of destroying chemical weapons in our country.

The generation of considerable amounts of various wastes, which themselves need to be destroyed or buried, in the course of applying the technologies offered to us for the destruction of chemical weapons is one of the main peculiarities of these technologies. In addition, the technologies offered are costly and energy-intensive; they call for sophisticated equipment and highly skilled personnel to service them.

The natural striving is to develop and implement the methods and technologies which will either make it possible to destroy chemical weapons before the required deadlines at minimal expenditures and with a minimum of ecological burden on the environment, or to carry out the conversion of the stocks of chemical weapons and develop technologies that provide for the processing of toxic agents into raw and other materials for the production of national-economic output. Such is our principled position on the issue of technologies.

Toxic agents that are subject to destruction may be classified into two groups. First, there is lewisite; second, there are phosphororganic toxic agents: sarin, soman, and VX.

Let us begin with the issue of destroying lewisite. The USSR Ministry of Defense rejected the technologies of lewisite destruction offered to us which generate stocks, the volume of which exceeds the volume of destroyed lewisite by almost one order of magnitude. We believe that these technologies are not only cost-ineffective, but ecologically criminal because they put serious ecological pressure on the natural environment.

In our opinion, technologies which make it possible to obtain high-purity arsenic from lewisite are the most feasible.

Arsenic is used in the production of semiconductor materials and integrated circuits, special glass and fiber optics, growing monocrystals for lasers, for the needs of film electronics, and for producing the alloys of nonferrous metals with specific properties.

Since all arsenic compounds are extremely toxic and highly biologically active, they are also used in agriculture to control pests and for medical purposes; they are added to paints, which is supposed to prevent marine growth on the bottoms of vessels.

The USSR Ministry of Defense has fully supported research into the conversion of the available stocks of lewisite, taking economic and ecological aspects into account.

The issue of perfecting technologies for processing lewisite into high-purity arsenic figures prominently in the scientific and research work currently under way. Several scientific collectives of the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry, the USSR Ministry of Health, the USSR Ministry of Geology, and scientists from the Saratov State University imeni N.G. Chernyshevskiy are being used for this work.

Now about the issues of destroying sarin, soman, and VX.

It is suggested that we conduct the destruction of phosphororganic toxic agents using a technology which presupposes the disassembling [rassnaryazhenie] of munitions, chemical detoxication of the toxic agents, destruction of the stocks generated, and the burial of solid waste.

The technology of direct incineration of phosphororganic toxic agents implemented in the United States is advantageous in that this method may be used to destroy not only toxic agents but also toxic industrial wastes, substandard pesticides and herbicides, that is, the conversion of such facilities themselves for use in the national economy is possible.

The issue of waste destruction is very acute indeed in our country. Even now between 40,000 and 45,000 tons of

pesticides and herbicides whose storage life has expired, including about 12,000 tons of phosphororganic and chloroorganic compounds, qualify for destruction.

After this task is accomplished, it will be necessary to destroy annually between 1,000 and 1,500 tons of newly produced compounds, mainly phosphororganic, and sulfur and nitrogen compounds.

However, the most lucrative attempt is to find a way to convert phosphororganic compounds directly into products for the national economy.

I would like to note repeated presentations by Deputy Chief of the Chemical Troops Academician A. Kuntsevich containing proposals for extensive work by industry on technologies for the conversion of sarin and soman. It is hard to name an echelon to which such proposals have not been submitted. On the initiative of A. Kuntsevich, a competition was held at the USSR Academy of Sciences in search of alternative technologies. Despite the lack of support, the USSR Ministry of Defense has ordered several scientific-research projects in search of technologies for the conversion of phosphororganic compounds for 1990 and 1991.

In the course of the discussion of the USSR budget for 1991, it was announced at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet that R55 million were allocated for conducting research and development work on the issue of destroying chemical weapons. The USSR Ministry of Defense proposes to allocate up to R16 million from the above for alternative technologies, including those supporting conversion.

Nonetheless, the main problem with regard to the issue of utilizing phosphororganic compounds is psychological rather than technical. This is the problem of a psychological barrier to using national economic products obtained from highly toxic compounds in everyday life. Will consumers buy these products even in the environment of our all-encompassing shortages?

A sector of the national economy needs to be found in which the products from the conversion of phosphororganic compounds would be used precisely as toxic compounds, for example, as a formulation for impregnating wood in order to protect it from rotting.

Glasnost with regard to the issue of destruction facilitated the receipt by the USSR Ministry of Defense of quite a number of proposals regarding destruction technologies from scientific collectives which have never worked on this before.

Original, unconventional approaches to the problem are the most interesting, for example, the use of liquid-propellant rocket engines, the energy of a nuclear explosion, microbiological methods, and the utilization of stocks by injecting them into deep geological structures.

It may be asserted that if adequate financing is available original methods for the destruction of chemical weapons may be developed which will make it possible

for the country to save hundreds of thousands of rubles in the future. A miser pays twice. Saving funds on scientific research and studies at present and the monopolization of such work will unavoidably bring about serious economic outlays in the future.

We have no doubt that the issue of the conversion of chemical weapons will finally be resolved from the technical point of view. However, the following issue will arise—where are such plants to be built? We believe that neither the USSR Ministry of Defense, nor any other ministry or department is able, or has the right, to resolve the issue of siting such facilities. This is an issue for the government; prior to this, it is necessary to set forth the legal foundation for siting such particularly dangerous installations in our country and to adopt a pertinent law.

Such laws exist throughout the civilized world. Thus, the U.S. Congress adopted a law on the destruction of obsolete chemical weapons as early as 1985. In September 1988, the U.S. Congress set by law 30 April 1997 as the date for completing the destruction of chemical weapons in the United States. The issue of coordinating the sites for the destruction of chemical weapons with environmental-protection organs is also regulated by legislation.

In our country, there is no legal foundation of any kind for such serious measures. We will not succeed in resolving the issue of the destruction of chemical weapons on a large scale until legislative problems are solved; everything will be reduced to yet another cycle of blaming the army for undermining the state economically.

A lot depends in this matter on the position of Russia. After all, all stocks of chemical weapons are located within the territory of Russia, and these weapons will have to be destroyed within the territory of Russia. Unfortunately, the undertaking has not advanced past the stage of general discussions in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] State Committee for Public Security and Cooperation With the USSR Ministry of Defense. It is a pity, because an opportunity to arrive at quite unconventional ways to solve this problem opened up in the course of these discussions.

In summation, I would like to stress once again how complex the problem is with which our country was presented after the signing of the bilateral Soviet-American agreement on 1 June 1990. It is becoming clear that superficially spectacular political decisions in the sphere of disarmament call for corresponding legislative and organizational economic measures, as well as outlays going into billions. If the USSR Supreme Soviet approves the agreement signed, these measures will have to be implemented against the background of the current sociopolitical and economic problems of our state.

EDITORIAL NOTE. MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS is prepared to offer its pages to specialists, officials, and all concerned persons to take part in a discussion concerning the issue of chemical disarmament.

Poles Check USSR Units for Chemical Weapons

*PM2204145191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Apr 91 First Edition p 3*

[Lieutenant Colonel A. Bugay report: "Goodwill Gesture"]

[Text] A group of Polish Army inspectors is conducting an inspection of two Northern Group of Forces military units. The objective is to confirm the absence of chemical weapons and their components at specific military installations. Our correspondent has asked Lieutenant Colonel N. Afonin, chief of the section for ensuring the implementation of arms reduction treaties by the Northern Group of Forces:

The inspection of Soviet military installations is being carried out at the request of the Polish Government. I would like to stress that it is not a consequence of the signing of any kind of intergovernmental documents or international treaties. It is a goodwill gesture on the part of the Soviet Government extended to the Polish public. It is generally known that of late the Polish news media have published a number of articles in which the absence of chemical weapons in Northern Group of Forces units is called into question. I believe that the inspection will put an end to this campaign. During the inspection provisions and procedures on the conduct of inspections on request which were elaborated at the Geneva Disarmament Conference will be applied, and this will make it possible not only to verify the absence of chemical weapons, but also to test in practice the relevant verification provisions elaborated at multilateral talks.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Third Round of Sino-Soviet Border Troop Reduction Talks

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Comments

*LD1804170291 Moscow TASS in English 1604 GMT
18 Apr 91*

[By TASS correspondents Sergey Postanogov, Sergey Ryabikin, and Sergey Nikishov]

[Text] Moscow, April 18 (TASS)—The third round of Soviet-Chinese talks on a mutual reduction of troops and military confidence-building in the border area were held in Moscow between April 4 and 18, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh said at a briefing here today.

The exchange of views, held, as usual, in an atmosphere of constructive cooperation, made it possible to consolidate mutual understanding between the two states and promoted the expansion of the spheres of agreement.

The sides agreed that they would start soon the development, on the basis of an intergovernmental guidelines agreement, of a common document on a whole package of problems dealing with the reduction of the armed forces.

According to Gremitskikh, the Chinese delegation was received by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev. It also visited the Belorussian military district.

'Official Announcement' on Talks

*PM2504145391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Apr 91 Moscow Edition p 4*

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Announcements"]

[Text] The third round of Sino-Soviet talks on reciprocal cuts in armed forces and military confidence-building measures in the border zone was held in Moscow 4-18 April.

The exchange of opinions, which took place, as usual, in a spirit of constructive cooperation, has made it possible to deepen mutual understanding and helped extend areas of agreement.

Commentary on Gorbachev Asian Security Proposal

*OW2704144991 Moscow in Japanese to Japan
1200 GMT 18 Apr 91*

[Kalinin commentary]

[Text] Soviet President Gorbachev delivered a speech at the Japanese Diet on 17 April and in the speech referred to the issue of security in the Asian and Pacific region. Regarding it, military commentator Kalinin of Moscow Radio commented as follows:

With regard to the question of strengthening security and easing military tensions in the Asian and Pacific region, about which President Gorbachev spoke in his speech, I would like to note three basic points.

First is the need to remove the idea that there is an enemy. I would like you to recall that the Soviet Union and the United States have already made it clear that they will no longer regard each other as the enemy, not only in Europe but also in Asia.

The next point is Soviet-Japanese relations. As President Gorbachev pointed out, even in the Cold War days, the Soviet Union and Japan never raised the question of exercising force on each other. The present-day situation makes the raising of such a question even more inappropriate. It is no coincidence that President Gorbachev formally declared that the scenario of the Soviet Union attacking Japan could never happen.

In this connection there is another important point in the President's speech. This is that the Soviet military policy on Japan and other countries in the Asian and Pacific region is based on a new military doctrine—the doctrine which stands on the principle of the military being exclusively for defensive purposes. There are many examples showing this. The abolition of 590 nuclear missiles in the Soviet Union's Asian area carried out in

accordance with the INF abolition treaty, will be completed in the next two months.

In the past almost four years, the Soviet Union has not increased the number of nuclear launchers in its Asian area. In the Far East including the Soviet area, the unilateral reduction of Soviet troops has been implemented. And that is not all. President Gorbachev said that he intends to continue to lower the level of the Soviet military presence in the Asian and Pacific region, even though the scope of the future reduction and the duration, over which it will be carried out, have not been made clear.

But what I want to emphasize is that in many respects this process will depend on [words indistinct] reciprocity of other countries in the Asian and Pacific region. This reciprocity in efforts for the security of Asia is a particularly important point. And this is the third point.

The point is that existing problems cannot be resolved by one country alone. Bilateral contacts need to be promoted into multiple contacts. Besides, this matter cannot be solved by taking the experiences of Europe nor by creating a cooperative organization by law.

I think that it should be completely acceptable to discuss various issues for the first time—if this prevents common dangers in a timely manner. [word indistinct] that can be cited here are various. The president proposed beginning talks among the three nations of the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States. He also presented the idea of holding talks among five nations—the Soviet Union, the United States, China, India, and Japan. He also iterated his proposal on holding talks among foreign ministers of all nations in the Asian and Pacific region to discuss security in 1993.

I would like to note here that the Soviet Union is taking initiatives, but of course, the Soviet Union has no intention of pushing this on others. The Soviet Union is willing to give a constructive review of pertinent proposals of all nations concerned. As President Gorbachev said in a welcome dinner hosted by [words indistinct], the cold war is over. The time to work and build a house of trust and sincere neighborliness might have arrived.

Observer Ponders Asian Security Questions

*PM2204161591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Apr 91 First Edition p 3*

[Observer Aleksandr Golts article under the rubric "The World Today: Problems and Views": "Asia: Restocking the Potential of Trust"]

[Text] So, contrary to the assumptions of many experts, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev did not advance any major initiatives in Tokyo in the sphere of ensuring security in the Asia and Pacific region. However, does this mean that Britain's DAILY TELEGRAPH is mistaken in its assumption that a new era of detente is coming in Asia? I think not. Addressing not only legislators but also the entire people of Japan in his speech to

the Japanese Parliament, the Soviet president revealed the significance of our military doctrine, whose exclusively defensive nature extends also to the "eastern salient." He described in detail how, in accordance with its pledges, our country is eliminating nuclear missile weapons and reducing other arms. An important place in this speech was devoted also to the reduction of the grouping of Soviet troops in the east of the country by 200,000 servicemen and the reduction of the Soviet military presence in the Asia and Pacific region.

I believe that it was very important to draw the attention precisely of the Japanese public to these actions by the USSR. For people in that country had for decades been stubbornly going on about the Soviet military threat. And politicians there still consider it possible to talk of some "Soviet troop buildup east of the Urals."

But it was no coincidence that M.S. Gorbachev pointed out that far more would have been done in the matter of disarmament if other powers had responded to the Soviet Union's proposals. Unfortunately, it has to be stated that not all our partners realized that security must not be divided into time zones. And the principles by which the new security is being established on the European continent may be applied to resolving analogous tasks in the Asia and Pacific region. However, the considerable superiority which the United States and its allies possess in the Pacific prevents them from taking an unbiased view of the measures of military detente and military trust which have already been approved in Europe and which can perfectly well be realized in Asia.

"Regardless of what happens in the Kremlin, the well-armed Soviets remain a potential threat to Japan's security," U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary D. Atwood says, intimidating Tokyo. And literally on the eve of the Soviet president's arrival the newspaper MAINICHI reported: According to a spokesman for the Japanese military department, any program proposed by the Soviet president to ensure security in the region "would be unacceptable, regardless of its substance." Note, "regardless of its substance"!

Thus we can only rejoice at the fact that we have abandoned the ostentatious practice of advancing new initiatives regardless of the real situation. After all, a principled program for the restructuring of relations in Asia was formulated in Vladivostok five years ago. Be that as it may, this program is being realized, albeit with difficulty. The USSR and the United States have declared that they do not regard each other as enemies in the Asia and Pacific region either. Soviet-Chinese relations have also been normalized. At the same time the USSR and China were the first in Asia to take practical steps for the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in the border region.

Finally, M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Japan is one more step in the realization of the Vladivostok program. So the fact that the Soviet proposals on military detente have still not been taken up should hardly be dramatized. This certainly does

not mean that they are bad and need to be modified. It is simply that the time to realize them has not yet come.

In this connection note should also be taken of the rather complex situation in which Asian and Pacific states find themselves after the end of the war in the Persian Gulf. The point is that this war has very badly shaken the idea, which had only just begun to get established, that security and prosperity can be guaranteed not only and not so much with the help of military force as with the help of mutual trust and mutual control. An idea, I will point out, which was taking root far more slowly in Asia—a continent where there are constant military conflicts—than in Europe.

All the more so because the United States—a country which has an obvious military superiority in the Pacific—now aspires quite frankly to becoming the sole guarantor of security in that region. Washington declares that the time has come to establish a new order in the world and in Asia. "The United States has, incontestably, received the unofficial title of world policeman," Philippine Foreign Minister R. Manglapus states. "There are people who maintain that, if such a policeman did not exist, he would have to be invented." However, far from everyone shares this viewpoint. "Bush's call for the introduction of a new world order will mean the establishment of U.S. supremacy," Dr. N. Prudente, rector of a polytechnical institute in Manila, declares in alarm.

In fact, it would be naive in the extreme to believe that Washington would selflessly guard the peace and security of countries, of a rapidly developing economic region. A region which is already a serious rival of the United States on this plane.

Japan, an ally and rival of Washington, has already felt that the cost of U.S. protection certainly is not confined to the billions which it allocated to the anti-Iraq coalition and which it allocates annually for the upkeep of thousands of U.S. servicemen on its territory. Taking advantage of the events in the Gulf and accusing Japan of being passive, Washington bluntly demanded of Tokyo economic concessions which, so it seems, will be made in the present situation. So there are no guarantees that the United States will not present other Asian countries too with a bill for "ensuring security."

There is another solution—also no better, in my view. Namely: to build up the military might of Asian countries themselves. This option is particularly tempting for Japan with its huge economic potential, part of which it would not be that hard to put on a military footing. The Pentagon has just concluded a contract with a U.S.-Japanese consortium to conduct "conceptual research work" on the deployment of SDI programs in the West Pacific. And the consortium is headed by the Japanese industrial giant Mitsubishi.

At the same time many people in Tokyo are saying that military might is certainly not needed now for defense against the "Soviet military threat," in which people there do not seem to have too much faith. No, might is

needed today, rather, for their own feeling of independence. And I believe that it was not without prompting from his partners in the talks that Philippine Defense Minister F. Ramos, who was visiting Tokyo, started talking of the need for Japan to play a more significant military role in Asia.

People are thinking of this not only in Tokyo. The recent unprecedented contract from South Korea, which ordered 120 F-16 fighter-bombers at once from the United States, is merely the first sign of purchases of this kind. Even though it is possible that Asian states will appreciate such an error, the path of ensuring security with the help of either one's own or someone else's military force cannot be considered promising.

No, the states of the region are not ready to create a collective security system today. But this is no reason to abandon the search for paths to security. It is necessary to develop relations of mutual trust on a bilateral basis. And this is an inevitable and positive stage in the process which will lead also to a multilateral examination of problems both of the economy and of security. At the same time the Soviet Union is not yet talking of creating multilateral cooperation mechanisms. It is a question of consultations, including with a wide range of participants, of the joint ascertainment and discussion of problems in common, and of the timely comprehension of dangers in common.

It was in just this sense that M.S. Gorbachev spoke of the expediency of a five-way conference of the USSR, the United States, the PRC, India, and Japan. Just such consultative meaning is also vested in the Soviet proposal to hold a meeting of the foreign ministers of all the countries of the Asia and Pacific region in 1993.

Strictly speaking, M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Japan has demonstrated how such bilateral ties may be built. For not only questions of Soviet-Japanese relations were touched on in the top-level talks. Attention was focused on problems of settling regional conflicts, particularly in Cambodia and on the Korean Peninsula. Constructive proposals have been advanced recently in Japan on precisely these problems.

Finally, as regards the military sphere, here too the Soviet Union is ready to begin a specific dialogue in order to eliminate mutual concerns. Proposals in this regard have already been forwarded to the Japanese Government.

Well, M.S. Gorbachev's visit has demonstrated that detente in Asia is real and possible. But the potential of mutual trust has to be accumulated patiently.

Commentary Views Asia-Pacific Policy

*LD2604094891 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1312 GMT 25 Apr 91*

[By TASS political observer Askold Biryukov]

[Excerpt] Moscow, 25 April (TASS)—During talks with ROK Foreign Minister Yi Sang-ok, Japanese Foreign

Minister Taro Nakayama demonstrated a negative attitude to the proposals on ensuring security and confidence-building measures in the Asia-Pacific region set forth in Tokyo by the USSR president recently. According to the minister, they do not take into account the specific nature and complexity of the situation in the region as being different from the situation in Europe. The region's problems should be solved separately from one another, starting with the tension in the Korean peninsula, the territorial dispute between Japan and the USSR about four islands, and the Cambodian conflict, he said. The minister's ideas boil down to the fact that the Asia-Pacific region "is not ripe yet" for implementing the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union.

I am not going to argue with the minister about the fact that the situation in Europe and that in the Asia-Pacific region differ substantially. This is indeed so, and to apply the European blueprint to this region would be not only unrealistic but also unreasonable. But even leaving Europe aside, is it reasonable to distance oneself from the purposes of Soviet proposals? Let us recall the recent events in the Persian Gulf, to where Japan is now sending minesweepers. This armed conflict, in my view, has persuaded many people that regional security structures in today's situation are especially necessary. The situation in the region remains quite volatile. The configuration of security is changing, and in these conditions the need to have an instrument capable of putting out possible dangerous situations is obvious.

The Soviet Union is reducing its armed forces and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States, too, intends to carry out certain reductions. On the other hand, a striving toward building up arms, which could turn into another round of military rivalry, is noticeable in individual countries in the region. Various multilateral alliances, which give rise to new apprehensions, are being discussed. How are they to be removed? How to solve other problems which are already acquiring global importance today?

If one proceeds along the path of solving one problem after the other, we will hardly go very far. It is not excluded that instead of one problem another will arise and there will be no end to them. As the USSR president's proposals show, the Soviet Union has a flexible enough position on this account. We propose two-, three-, five-sided, and multilateral consultations. There is a wide choice, as the saying goes. And Moscow is not proposing to break the structures that have already taken shape of what it is sometimes suspected. Especially as these structures ensure stability, in a certain sense. But, naturally, we, and, after all, not we alone, would like, perhaps, that this stability should be in the interests of all the countries in the region. [passage omitted]

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

NATO's Woerner Comments on European Defense

AU2404102791 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
24 Apr 91 p 3

["Exclusive" interview with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner by DIE PRESSE correspondent Otmar Lahodynsky; place and date not given: "We Do Not Want To Isolate the USSR"]

[Text] [Lahodynsky] The EC is considering developing its own defense policy. Martin Bangemann, vice president of the EC Commission, has even mentioned an EC army. Do you not see the possibility of a European competitor to the Atlantic Alliance?

[Woerner] The Americans will remain indispensable for European security for a long time to come. The Atlantic Alliance cannot be replaced by a European defense identity. Besides, it would not make any sense to set up a rival military organization. The money necessary to do this is not available. What has to be done is to strengthen the European pillar within NATO.

[Lahodynsky] And what will become of the Western European Union (WEU)?

[Woerner] The WEU might play a fine bridging role between the EC and NATO. To me, a European army is conceivable only for use outside the NATO area. Such a European task force would be largely made up of units that are assigned to NATO anyway. Nevertheless, the use of such a force would require consultations with and a decision by the NATO Council.

Anyway, these are still dreams of the future. The Europeans have not reached that stage yet. Our conditions are clear: NATO remains the decisive forum for European security, and it will make all final decisions. None of NATO's European member states must be marginalized. Double structures in the sphere of defense have to be avoided.

[Lahodynsky] This week you are going to attend a conference on European security in Prague. Netherlands Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek has demanded that the WEU be open to countries from Eastern Europe. Does this not imply that it does indeed compete with NATO, which rules out membership for such countries for the time being?

[Woerner] I cannot imagine the WEU's position being different from NATO's. We have good relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and we are ready to develop them further. We are seeking a new European security structure that would provide these countries with a greater degree of security. I cannot imagine what the WEU could do beyond that, particularly since it does not have the means to provide any security guarantee. Hence, the WEU will do what we are

doing, and that is to assume relations with these countries. Membership, associated membership or security guarantees are out of the question both for the WEU and NATO.

[Lahodynsky] NATO's London Declaration states that NATO wants to ensure lasting peace on the continent. Yet, it cannot become active outside the alliance area. You cannot and you do not want to do anything to solve the crisis in Yugoslavia.

[Woerner] Our members are actually doing something: they are trying to use their influence to stabilize Yugoslavia. Within the framework of NATO we are carrying out political consultations regarding this crisis-stricken country. Still, you are right: NATO has little inclination to pursue military activities outside the treaty area. Although such activities are not ruled out by our Constitution, they require unanimity, which is only conceivable in the most dramatic cases.

[Lahodynsky] An improved CSCE security structure would certainly be most valuable in this connection.

[Woerner] That is right, and this is why we want to do everything we can to breathe life into the new institutions of the CSCE process, give them more importance and substance. This applies in particular to the Vienna Conflict Prevention Center. One should create a body to deal permanently with such issues.

We are anxious to ensure that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not left alone in a no-man's-land, but that they find a new place where they belong, also in terms of security. The objective has to be cooperative security, including the USSR. We do not want to isolate the USSR.

[Lahodynsky] Would neutrality constitute a way out of this no-man's-land for these countries, at least for a transition period?

[Woerner] What I have heard from these countries is that they reject neutrality. They are interested in good relations with the USSR and NATO, and they want to join the EC—objectives that are difficult to reconcile with the concept of neutrality.

[Lahodynsky] Austria has so far quite successfully managed to do it.

[Woerner] I am only repeating what I have heard from these countries. As far as Austria is concerned I do not want to comment.

[Lahodynsky] Would the status of neutrality for these countries not at least be preferable to the current situation?

[Woerner] Not at all. What would be better is if they were firmly embedded in the new, emerging structures and get closer to the EC.

[Lahodinsky] Let me come back to NATO's European pillar. Can you imagine NATO's next supreme commander for Europe not automatically being an American?

[Woerner] In principle it is conceivable, particularly if the European pillar is strengthened and the presence of U.S. troops in Europe is reduced. At the moment, however, I do not see that this is what people want.

[Lahodinsky] Will France soon find its way back to NATO's military structure?

[Woerner] Right now, we are seeking a new strategy and structure for our armed forces, which we will adopt this year. I am most satisfied to say that France is participating in these efforts, and I expect France to get even closer to NATO, even in the military sphere.

[Lahodinsky] Can you outline the new NATO strategy?

[Woerner] It is aimed at reducing troops, changing the sites of deployment, and creating smaller and more mobile units. It is also aimed at strengthening our flanks and at reconstruction, that is to say, at placing greater emphasis on our reserve units. Greater importance will certainly be given to its function as a body for crisis management.

In the future, the armed forces must not only be regarded as instruments for war but they must be seen, above all, as instruments for preventing crises or for de-escalation. A classic example was the dispatch of our air task force to Turkey as a political signal. It worked, because Turkey was not attacked.

The danger is no longer a great war, an East-West conflict, although we have to make the necessary preparations for it. The alliance will have to prepare its military structures for crises that have not yet been exactly defined. The danger may originate anywhere, as one could see from the Gulf war, for example.

[Lahodinsky] As far as crisis management is concerned, NATO does not always come first. Should you not have exercised greater pressure on your alliance partner, Turkey, to open its borders to the Kurdish refugees?

[Woerner] NATO dealt with this problem in an internal discussion. It is not NATO's task to intervene there, because this is exactly what our alliance partners—the Americans, British, French, and Turks—are doing there. The criticism of Turkey is unjustified. In the past it had to bear a greater burden than any other European state now criticizing Turkey. Out of the 60,000 Kurdish refugees who were offered refuge in Turkey during the first Gulf war, only 400 were accepted by other countries. Still, the situation of these refugees is a great human tragedy, which means that we have to do all we can to help them.

In an unprecedented action, the allies have now decided to set up refugee camps in Iraq and provide military protection. Still, this cannot be a lasting solution. It has to be ensured that these people are given the right to

return to their ancestral homes, from which they were driven away. The dictator must accept that. If he fails to understand it, he has to be forced to do so through international pressure.

AUSTRIA

Austria Joins Missile Technology Control Regime

AU1804123191 Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG
in German 18 Apr 91 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Austria Participates in MTCR"]

[Text] In February 1991 Austria, as the 16th member country, gave notification of its participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The goal of this group is to prevent the proliferation of carriers that can be used to transport nuclear warheads and of the corresponding technology.

The members are obligated to inform each other about applications for exports and goods movements of missile systems and unmanned carriers with a range of more than 300 km and a load capacity of more than 500 kg (category 1). Information concerning goods of category 2 (engine elements and equipment) is optional.

The other members of the group are Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Canada, Luxembourg, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the United States.

The group does not have any permanent institutions, the members meet for regular consultations. At the most recent meeting in Tokyo in March, Austria was for the first time represented by a delegation.

At this meeting a joint appeal to all states was passed to apply the guidelines of the MTCR. In addition, a consensus was reached to adjust the regime to the current requirements concerning the categories of the goods and to tighten export controls. The members also agreed on the view that after the experiences of the Gulf war, stricter verification is of particular importance.

The next meeting of MTCR members will take place in autumn 1991.

GERMANY

Defense Minister, USSR Commander Discuss Withdrawal

Relations 'Going Well'

LD2604174791 Hamburg DPA in German 1636 GMT
26 Apr 91

[Excerpt] Wuensdorf (DPA)—Gerhard Stoltenberg today visited the Supreme Command of the Western Group of Soviet Forces in Germany at Wuensdorf. This first visit by an FRG defense minister was overshadowed

by the shots fired at Bundeswehr soldiers at Altengrabow, near Genthin. Stoltenberg spoke with Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces, about implementing the stationing and withdrawal treaty, and about the incident at Altengrabow last week, in which a Bundeswehr major was shot and wounded by Soviet soldiers while on an observation mission.

Stoltenberg stressed to correspondents that the Federal Government wants a "dignified and orderly" withdrawal of Soviet troops. Cooperation between the Germans and the Soviets is going well. The leadership of the Soviet forces is showing that everything is being done to fulfill the stationing treaty. Sources close to Stoltenberg said on the other hand that the only thing beyond question is the Soviets "meticulous adherence to the treaty". All other problems are fully open.

Stoltenberg, too, hinted that there are differences in the legal interpretation with regard to the Altengrabow incident. He said that further talks on the incident have been agreed upon with the Soviets.

Colonel General Burlakov said that the guarding of Soviet property is based on Soviet regulations. "All guard work is consistent with Soviet law". Each side must observe its laws. Despite the incident there is a readiness on the Soviet side for constructive cooperation. The Soviet Supreme Command is prepared to make any information available, Burlakov said. He also appealed to the population of the new laender to show more patience and perseverance with regard to the problems that troop training brings with it.

Burlakov said that so far, 35,000 Soviet soldiers and relatives have been posted back home. In addition, 1,900 armored personnel carriers, 430 battle tanks, 480 artillery pieces, 5,000 vehicles of all kinds, and 250,000 tonnes of equipment have been withdrawn to the Soviet Union. Burlakov admitted that due to adverse weather conditions it has not been possible to keep fully to the withdrawal plan. He said that 117 deserters are still missing. [passage omitted]

Stoltenberg Comments

LD2604171591 Berlin ADN in German 1541 GMT
26 Apr 91

[Text] Zossen (ADN)—In the view of Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, the Soviet Union has made an important contribution to making "the unification of our country in peace and freedom" possible for the Germans after a long period of division. That will always be remembered, he said today at a meeting with officers and their families from Wuensdorf near Zossen. It was attended by the parliamentary state secretary Willy Wimmer and Lieutenant General Joerg Schoenbohm, the commander of the Bundeswehr Command East.

Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, the Commander in Chief of the Western Group of Soviet Forces, had earlier

warmly welcomed the guests who he met this morning for a talk on future cooperation and the return of the Soviet troops to the USSR.

The German-Soviet system of treaties of 1990 has laid the foundation stone "for positive new relations and good cooperation between our two peoples," said Stoltenberg. They have thus resumed a long historical tradition "which we want to continue to expand and develop together for the future." Until the withdrawal of Soviet troops by 1994 they are "our guests." "It is our express wish that you feel at home here in that period and return to your homeland as ambassadors of good relations between our two peoples," said the Christian Democratic Union politician.

He appealed to the Soviet side to continue to expand human contacts and relations in numerous meetings with the German people, for example in open-door meetings.

Stoltenberg pointed out that the temporary stay and preparation and organization of the withdrawal of the Western Group "created many kinds of problems." In spite of this the overwhelming majority of Germans understand the situation of the German soldiers in the new laender. Where difficulties have become apparant they want to help overcome them in the spirit of cooperation based on partnership and mutual trust.

Referring to this second meeting with Colonel General Burlakov, Stoltenberg said that it focused on "aspects important for both sides for implementing the stationing and withdrawal treaty and the generally positive development of our cooperation."

Moellemann Weapons Export Report Criticized

AU2604132791 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
26 Apr 91 p 25

[Wolfgang Hoffmann report: "What Did the Government Know?"]

[Text] For Deputies Vera Wollenberger and Gerd Poppe of the Alliance 90/Greens it is clear: Only a Bundestag investigation committee will be able to completely clarify the kind, scope, and background of German weapons exports to Iraq, because the report about exports to Iraq between 1981 and 1990 that Economics Minister Juergen Moellemann sent to the parliament has too many gaps.

The two deputies now hope that the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] will join them: At least 165 deputies—one-quarter of the members of the parliament—must vote for the establishment of an investigating committee. In order to make the decision easier for the hesitant Social Democrats, Wollenberger and Poppe reminded Party Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel of his statement of 13 March: "No one should be deceived: These things will not be forgotten. And if you (he addressed the government) do not put all the facts on the

table yourselves and will not take the necessary personal and material steps yourselves, it will be done by an investigating committee."

The report that was presented by Moellemann does not put all the facts on the table by far, as was demanded even by the coalition groups. In the question hour, which took place at the request of Alliance 90/Greens last week, Vera Wollenberger announced: "We will not give up until the inglorious role of the FRG Government in permitting and implicitly condoning the weapons deals with Iraq is cleared up completely." Deputy SPD Group Chairman Norbert Gansel also thinks that further investigations will "move very closely along the line of an investigating committee, in any case, or might even cross the line."

Moellemann's Iraq report, filename AZ V B4-296-92-VS, is still confidential and is, therefore, known only to a few parliamentarians. However, those who know the report find that too many questions remain unanswered. That will remain so even when the secret report is published, as announced, in a purified version.

In 64 pages, officials of the Economics Ministry have summarized long known information, enriched it with a few pieces of newer information, and revealed a few—so far unknown—details. It is precisely these details that now provide material for an investigation committee.

On the report itself: It lists weapons exports—including those that were not approved; in addition, it mentions various exports that did not require getting permission, but still strengthened the Iraqi military potential. Already the volume of the approved exports—about 1.3 billion German marks [DM]—makes one pause to think, in particular since the deliveries continued during the entire Iraqi-Iranian war and thus fall into the terms of office of three economics ministers from the Free Democratic Party of Germany: Otto Count Lambsdorff, Martin Bangemann, Helmut Haussmann.

The approved exports in detail, at least in excerpts: 111 trucks that can be used for military purposes (value: DM48,761,848); electronic equipment, such as computers, radar instruments, and coding equipment (value: about DM500 million); pistols, hunting weapons, and ammunition, allegedly only for sports (value: DM1,969,414); and 320 (!) ambulance cars (value: DM228 million).

The report indirectly refutes Economics Minister Moellemann's assurances that the government did not approve any export of military weapons to Iraq between 1981 and 1990. On page 19 of the report it says: "In line with the arms export policy principles, the FRG Government has given priority to interest in cooperation (with France) concerning the granting of permits for subcontractor deliveries to the partner country (France)."

In the interest of the government in Paris, the Munich arms factory Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm [MBB] was

permitted to deliver subcontractor parts for guided missiles to France. The Euromissile company, which has its seat in France and 50 percent of which belongs to MBB, then shipped the completed weapons systems to Iraq. The go-ahead was given for the following exports via France: 133 Roland antiaircraft missile systems with 4,250 missiles; 262 launch pads for the HOT antitank missile with 10,953 missiles; and 372 launch pads for the Milan antitank missile with 12,386 missiles. One cannot clearly see from the Iraq dossier whether all the systems were in fact delivered. For SPD Deputy Hermann Bachmaier, cooperation in weapons production is the biggest export problem: "Practically everything can be done that way."

It is still unclear whether the government's Federal Security Council—some sort of reduced secret Cabinet for politically sensitive actions—dealt with those and other exports. Moellemann suggested that during the question hour, but he did not give any details.

The new element in the overview on page 22 of the report about the participation of the Kolb company in the development of Iraq's production of chemical weapons is that the government received the first general clues to Baghdad's chemical weapons program as early as in 1982. In 1984 the clues became more specific. However, there was only a rather insufficient foreign trade investigation and some talks with representatives of the company, whom the government asked in vain to stop deliveries. Even though Kolb was not granted any export permits as of August 1984, deliveries continued. Moellemann's dossier says: "The United States and Israel remained convinced of the participation by German companies in Iraq's poison gas production and repeatedly reported on their findings." However, only one year after the start of chemical weapons production in the Iraqi town of Samarra the public prosecutor started investigations of Kolb in November 1987. As late as in December 1987 Economics Minister Bangemann claimed that the facilities delivered by Kolb are "not suitable for the production of chemical weapons."

How insufficient Bonn's countermeasures were is shown by the Iraq report on page 29 with the information that as late as in 1988/89 Kolb started to participate in the construction of a factory in Al-Fallujah, which was, according to the report, another chemical weapons producer that was more modern and had a greater capacity than Samarra.

The part of the dossier on chemical weapons (page 26) also notes that the Federal Office for Military Technology and Procurement was unable to give official help to the Darmstadt public prosecutor in 1989, because it "did not have scientists or experts to assess such chemical facilities or production facilities." Now the authorities suddenly do have experts, whom they offer for checking the disarmament of chemical weapons in Iraq.

Where Kolb is, the Hamburg W.E.T. company cannot be far away; people who know the field also know the

company. The dossier says that "according to available findings," W.E.T. was involved in biotechnical exports to Iraq in the mid-1980's. Since March 1990 the Economics Ministry has had more information about the participation of Germans in the development of bacteriological weapons. The toxins botulin A and B are mentioned. The bacillus botulinum can lead to death quickly. The report leaves open what kind of "findings" are available to Bonn. It also does not discuss the suspicions that employees of the Federal Intelligence Service also participated in W.E.T. activities.

However, the dossier officially confirms that Iraq was able, with German help, to shorten the development periods for nuclear weapons from 10 to five years.

It is necessary to investigate why the Gildemeister company was permitted to participate in the completion of the SAAD 16 military project in the Iraqi town of Al-Mawsil until 1989, even though the Economics Ministry in Bonn had had vague clues about a military missile center in Al-Mawsil since 1981 and specific clues about such a center since 1982. The federal office responsible for export permits did not have that information when it gave Gildemeister the go-ahead for exports.

The Havert company even received a DM2.4-million loan guarantee from the FRG Government for exports to Iraq. Only later was it discovered that the parts of the deal that were covered by the export guarantees were specially constructed parts of missiles. Bonn was obviously deceived in the application for the guarantee. For Deputy Poppe, this case, "in addition to other illogical things, is a classic case for a parliamentary investigation committee."

How actively Bonn participated in the Iraqi weapons business is shown by a case that was presented by SPD Deputy Uta Zapf in her first speech at the Bundestag: Moellemann's report keeps silent about the fact "that the Bundeswehr itself conducted training programs for Iraqi officers until very recently, namely from 1983 to 1990." Because her time to speak was over, the deputy was not able to show how she was deceived by the Bonn Defense Ministry. When she inquired of Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg whether Iraqi officers received practical training at the Dornier company, which is also involved in weapons production, State Secretary Ottfried Hennig answered at the beginning of April: "No practical training for the Iraqi students was held at the Dornier company."

Uta Zapf, however, has a letter in which the Dornier company is advised on 21 October 1983 of the arrival of 25 Iraqi students "for Aviation Engineering Study" [name in English]. The letter is signed by Colonel Basam A.K. Askar, defense attache of the Iraqi Embassy in Bonn, Lennestrasse 1. The sender of the list of names of the new arrivals from Iraq is the Iraq Air Force.

Iraq Reports on Arms Supplies to Baghdad

*AU3004083491 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
29 Apr 91 pp 66-67*

[Unattributed report: "Perfect Camouflage"]

[Text] A report that Iraq has supplied to the United Nations organization has given the investigators new information about illegal arms supplies to Baghdad.

Heinrich Weiss, the president of the Federation of German Industry, has tried to play things down. He said that the claim that German companies had supplied 90 percent of Iraq's poison gas weapons was "an invention." He was entirely sure: "German companies did not supply poison gas weapons."

Specialized periodicals like the Bonn publication WEHRTECHNIK backed him. The periodical said that possibly, the "Iraqis did not even produce any poison gas." The illustrated business periodical FORBES, published by Burda, suggested that it was all just a defamatory campaign mounted by other countries. Its headline: "The Poison Gas Lie."

Now other experts, who must really know, have joined in the discussion on the involvement of German firms in illegal deals with Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn.

The week before last, the Baghdad Government handed UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar a list giving the sites, types, and quantities of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Thereby, Saddam Husayn met one of the demands contained in UN Security Council Resolution 687 on the cease-fire.

The list contains many strange things and is far from complete. Some data were apparently falsified. For instance, the production sites were incorrectly reported. The regime is still trying to camouflage things and deceive people.

However, what Saddam does reveal on his nerve gas weapons and missiles, is conclusive for German investigators. Much of the information on the UN list corresponds to what the investigators have found out. The Iraqis incriminate former suppliers in Germany who have so far denied any responsibility.

Helmut Maier, a partner in the Hessian company Karl Kolb GmbH producing laboratory equipment, said that he would "drop down dead" if the facilities supplied by his firm were poison gas factories. He sees the "lying press" at work and cites an experts' report exonerating the company.

According to the Iraqis, they had a huge poison gas complex "70 kilometers west of Baghdad" which prior to the bomb raids consisted of six factories. An equal number of factories formed part of the poison gas center at Samarra northwest of Baghdad. For those two centers, the Kolb company had supplied its allegedly harmless facilities. Its managers will be put on trial this fall.

The Iraqis admit in their paper for the United Nations that they produced the internationally banned mustard gas and sarin chemical weapons, and that in addition, they had 650 tonnes of raw material to produce tabun nerve gas. According to the investigations carried out by the Swiss scientist Werner Richarz, whose report is one of the bases for the indictment in the forthcoming trial of 12 managers from different firms, mustard gas, tabun, and hydrogen cyanide were produced in Iraq.

The investigators have also been confirmed on another important point. According to the Iraqi report, the poison gas facility included filling stations for artillery shells, bombs, and small missiles.

Such a station had been supplied to Samarra by the Hamburg-based Water Engineering Trading company, which also supplied a pipe screwing device. According to the investigations of the German Customs Institute of Criminal Investigation, mortar shells (120mm) and 122mm rockets were filled with poison gas at Samarra.

Baghdad has now admitted that it has 6,920 120mm shells filled with nerve gas. It also reports that an additional number of 2,500 poison gas warheads are buried under the ruins of bombed storehouses. They are ammunition for the 122mm Saqr rocket launcher.

According to Baghdad, 200 Iraqi aircraft bombs are also buried under the ruins of military buildings. The Darmstadt prosecutors have found out that they were also made in Germany. According to the indictment, they were reportedly produced by the firm Schwender in the Muenster region.

According to the Iraqi data on the UN list, the inner walls of poison gas grenades had to be sealed with special plastic. What a coincidence: A plastic-lamination facility worth 1.746 million German marks [DM] was supplied to Iraq by the Hessian firm Lab Consult. Its director was Kolb manager Maier. In the spring of 1989, long after the public prosecutors had started investigations, Lab Consult supplied parts to Iraq.

The Iraqis do not give the site of the complex in their report. The project leader is the Muthana State Establishment. That, too, fits into the picture: It is the successor of Kolb's Iraqi partner, the State Establishment for Pesticide Production. In order to complicate investigations, Baghdad has frequently changed the names of such firms.

Another Iraqi arms center was in the town of Al-Taji where there is not only a gun factory which was supplied by the Essen-based Ferrostaal company. According to the list supplied by Saddam Husayn, the dreaded Scud-B missiles in their modified Al-Husayn version (range: 600 kilometers) were apparently also stored in Al-Taji. As many as 52 Scuds survived the war there.

This lead is also important for the German investigators: Firms that are suspected of having been involved in the Iraqi Scud-B program shipped their products to Al-Taji.

Their contracts were concluded with the Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries which is based in Al-Taji. Al-Taji partners were firms like ABC Contor in Stutensee near Karlsruhe, Havert + Consult Project Engineering, or H + H Metalform in Drensteinfurt in the Muenster region.

Nonetheless, many things on Saddam's list of weapons remain a mystery. Iraq claims, for instance, that it still has 30 warheads filled with poison gas for the Al-Husayn missile.

The question why Iraq did not use its poison gas missiles in the Gulf war against Israel or the Allies, even though it threatened repeatedly to do so, is left unanswered by the report for the United Nations. Possibly Saddam Husayn's generals were deterred by the Allies' threats of revenge, possibly the war came too early for Baghdad. Experts have doubted that the Iraqi Army had the necessary radio altimeters or barometric fuses.

In any case, arms experts do not consider Baghdad's claim credible that Iraq has neither developable material nor facilities to produce an atomic bomb.

What is not in doubt is the fact that Baghdad has tried for years to obtain gas ultracentrifuges that are used for uranium enrichment. In addition, Iraq was trying worldwide to get crytons, tiny electronic elements, with which the bomb can be exploded. Early last year, a shipment of 40 special fuses was seized by the authorities in London.

Nor does the Iraqi report to the United Nations state where the 12.3 kilograms of highly enriched bomb-grade uranium metal are. What has also disappeared are 10 kilograms of enriched uranium oxide. It would be possible to build a primitive atomic bomb from both materials, which are usually controlled by the International Atomic Energy Organization.

The Washington-based Institute for Nuclear Control suspects that Saddam is using the war damage as a "perfect camouflage" to hide weapons material. For instance, Iraq flatly disputes that it has worked on the development of biological weapons, even though Saddam's emissaries have for years purchased highly toxic materials for bacteriological weapons on international markets.

A UN special commission of between 20 and 25 men, which will travel to Iraq on an inspection mission in the next few months, is supposed to clarify things. The Foreign Ministry in Bonn is trying to have German experts take part.

In Baghdad, they will presumably meet with a military official who knows Iraq's German trading partners particularly well—Lieutenant General 'Amir Al-Sa'adi, who is considered the driving force of Iraq's missile and poison gas projects and was therefore awarded a doctor's degree. Al-Sa'adi, who studied in the Federal Republic in the sixties, is married to a German, and got German firms into the country, has made a career following the

Gulf war. Saddam Husayn appointed the true friend of German business and industry minister of industry and military industrialization.

There is a lot of work for him to do now.

New Evidence on Launcher Exports to Iraq Reported

*AU3004100891 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
29 Apr 91 pp 120-122*

[Unattributed report: "Take Pressure Off Daimler"]

[Text] The state prosecutors in Stuttgart are treating Germany's leading industrial concern very leniently. Still, for Daimler-Benz the affair involving arms exports to Iraq and other countries is far from being over. According to recent findings, the management knew more than it has so far admitted.

Toward the outside everything is clear: the managing board of Daimler-Benz is in full control of the affair regarding the allegedly shady armament deals. With great emphasis, Daimler-Benz spokesman Matthias Kleinert announced that the "constantly raised accusations are null and void." The spokesman said that he wondered who would undo the damage that had been done on a national and international scale.

Nevertheless, within the Daimler-Benz company not everything is completely clear. People there think that the shady armament transactions and the possible payment of illegal commissions to Mercedes employees, which was why 120 investigators carried out a search at Daimler-Benz, might indeed have taken place. Leading managers, including Edzard Reuter, the head of Daimler concern, noted that they could not put their hands into the fire even for high-ranking employees.

Doing that would certainly be careless. The suspicions, which so irritated company spokesman Kleinert, are not at all without any foundation; on the contrary: they are even substantiated by new findings of the investigators and by inconsistencies in the statements made by company sources.

Company spokesmen were even unable to dispel the severest suspicion, namely that Germany's leading enterprise allegedly supplied mobile launchers for Scud missiles to Iraq. Kleinert stated in public that in its business contacts with Iraq, Mercedes never spotted anything that hinted at missiles.

Meanwhile, however, managers and members of the Mercedes supervisory board know better. In an internal note, Reuter concedes that Iraq obviously wanted to buy missile transporters from Daimler-Benz.

Independent of the previously mentioned order, talks were held in March 1990 between representatives of the companies Marrel and Mercedes-Benz on construction requirements following a request made by SOTI [State Organization for Technical Industry], talks from which

one can conclude that one was speaking of a vehicle able to transport missiles. Yet, these talks did not go beyond an initial stage, although it is possible that technical sketches were made, and did not lead to a purchase. Early August 1990 these talks were stopped, maybe because it became clear that it was a touchy issue.

SOTI is the Iraqi State Organization for Technical Industries, which was also involved in the 1989 agreement on the supply of 26 tractor trucks and flat-bed tractor trailers, and which was the partner of Mercedes and Marrel.

Meanwhile, the Federal Intelligence Service has pointed out to the FRG Government that this deal, which was concluded and carried out, was particularly sensible. In its warning, the Pullach-based authority has noted that the transporters might be "used as launching platforms for surface-to-surface missiles."

This claim was immediately denied by Mercedes: The transporters were strictly intended for the transportation of crane retrievers. Because of their civilian use it was necessary to apply for an export permit.

The agreements, which are available to DER SPIEGEL, prove that the tractor trucks were suitable for military use. In internal talks, Mercedes managers have even conceded this possibility. According to a paper drawn up by the board of directors, Mercedes "equipped the trucks for military purposes." However, they were not specially "constructed," so that their export may not have required an export permit.

In terms of criminal law this constitutes an important aspect. The investigators must prove that the changes on the trucks were made deliberately to suit military purposes. Only this would constitute an infringement on export regulations that were in force at the time.

The state prosecutors of Wuppertal are of the opinion that they are able to prove it; they are the competent authority for the Marrel company, which is based in the Rhineland. The documents that were confiscated at Marrel include a notice that hints of the Iraqi Project 144—the code number for the Scud-B program.

Bonn repeatedly warned the German industry against participating in Program 144 and against contacts with SOTI, which, as it stated, was nothing else but a department of the Iraqi Defense Ministry. Statements made by Daimler-Benz sources hint that the concern knew nothing of it.

Yet the truth is that the Daimler subsidiary German Aerospace did receive such warnings from Bonn, but these warnings obviously never reached Mercedes itself.

Even the upper management levels and the supervisory board continue to be kept in the dark about certain things. Documents concerning the transporter deal only speak of SOTI, while the other partner to the negotiations, the Technical Corps for Special Projects (Teco), is not mentioned.

Yet, internationally, Teco has acquired an infamous reputation because of its notorious activities. For years the Israelis have issued warnings against Teco, which has been entrusted with the control of the cannon and missile program by the Baghdad regime.

Saddam's son-in-law, Husayn Karmil, who has now been named new defense minister, was the head of Teco. It was people from the Teco agency who signed the contract that made Mercedes the general contractor on 4 July 1989, a contract worth 12,837,146 German marks.

The deal with Iraq was so controversial that the Stuttgart Office of the State Prosecutor finally studied the possibility of opening investigations against Daimler-Benz. State Prosecutor Klaus Bieneck had all files on the Scud case sent to him. His colleagues from Wuppertal as well as the customs investigators from Duesseldorf carried out investigations against the Marrel company at the end of January, which also brought to light some material against Mercedes.

On Thursday, 21 March, the Office of the Stuttgart State Prosecutor received the Mercedes-Marrel files. The documents filled two large boxes. Yet even one day later, Bieneck hinted that he had doubts about the accusations against Daimler.

The following Monday, after new details regarding the Iraq deal had become public, Bieneck acquitted the powerful concern at record speed after consultations with the controversial leading state prosecutor Dieter Jung: There is "no concrete evidence that employees of Mercedes Benz are involved."

Bieneck's colleagues from Rhineland, however, did not simply accept the decision made in Stuttgart. Senior Public Prosecutor Horst Rosenbaum of Wuppertal stated that for he and his colleagues this case is certainly not closed yet. The suspicion about Mercedes is still on the table.

People in Stuttgart increasingly get the impression that the acquittal of Mercedes was partly a political decision. Said a source close to Baden Wuerttemberg Justice Minister Helmut Ohnewald: "We had to take pressure off Daimler."

Military experts now have to solve controversial issues. If the suspicions against Daimler were to be substantiated, Baden Wuerttemberg would have to open preliminary proceedings after all.

Investigators in France and Belgium are also to be involved. The flat-bed tractor trailers were fitted with special devices at the Marrel plant in Belgium. On the site of the parent company Bennes Marrel, in St. Etienne, France, five Iraqis were instructed in the secrets of the transporters in the summer of 1989.

Quite a lot of expenses for simple trucks. Obviously, the men from Baghdad were not normal truck drivers, but technicians and engineers of Teco.

The Stuttgart-based concern was informed about all details, which can be concluded from a protocol of a three-day session in June 1989. The Marrel works were part of these talks. Two managers of Mercedes also participated in the meeting. Moreover, the work done by Marrel is included in Mercedes Benz's general contractor treaty.

Alterations to the body of the trucks raise doubts about the version provided by Mercedes, according to which the tractor trucks were destined for the transportation of crane retrievers. Experts also became suspicious considering the total length of the vehicles of some 18 meters, which is too long for crane retrievers or tanks. Besides, intelligence agencies have emphasized that the Iraqis were looking for a long time for the latest and longest version of the Scud, the El Abbas-type missile (some 14 meters long).

Experts noticed long ago that the Mercedes-Marrel transporter is surprisingly similar to the vehicles used by Iraq in the Gulf war as mobile Scud-B launching platforms. In the opinion of experts, the tractors were produced by the Saab-Scania company. The Swedes' reaction is identical to that of their colleagues of Mercedes: They strictly deny having supplied mobile launching platforms.

UNITED KINGDOM

Major Discusses Preventing Arms Buildups

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[Report by Chris Moncrieff, political editor]

[Text] The United Nations should consider setting up an early warning system to prevent countries like Saddam Husayn's Iraq building up massive military arsenals, Prime Minister John Major said today.

It was astonishing that the Baghdad regime had been able to amass a war machine far in excess of anything that could conceivably have been necessary to defend Iraq, he said. "What I think we have to do—although this is an area where there is often cheating and far from transparency—is to try to set up a mechanism so that the UN and the international community generally can see when countries are building up a wholly disproportionate supply of armaments." This would give a much earlier warning system of potential trouble, he told David Frost in an interview on Sky News. "It is something we will have to consider in the United Nations."

Mr. Major also suggested that arms suppliers would have to register their sales.

"It isn't a perfect solution, but it is better than having no solution at all. And it will focus minds on the difficulties that arise when there are too many armaments in too confined a space and in unsafe hands," he added.

Mr. Major also said any attempts by the allies to get Saddam out of Baghdad after the Gulf war would have involved "a lot of bloodshed". But he added: "If Saddam Husayn falls into the hands of people who can try him, then I think he should certainly be tried." "What is a different proposition is actually sending troops into Baghdad to bring him out." He said that to go into Baghdad to get Saddam out would have meant a lot of people being killed—"not only innocent Iraqi civilians, but also Iraqi soldiers and no doubt British troops as well.

"I think there would have been a lot of bloodshed in order to get Saddam Husayn out. The concept that he would willingly have come out, and willingly surrendered himself in the interests of the Iraqi people and a ceasefire seems to be very unlikely."

The prime minister said he agreed with President Bush's decision to end the fighting when he did. "It was the view of the military commanders," said Mr. Major. "We were in a position where the Iraqi troops were no longer in a position to fight back. I do not think it would have been a tolerable military or political proposition to have gone on fighting against Iraqi troops who were no longer in a position to fight back. On that basis, I do not think we would have had the support of the United Nations or anybody else if the war had continued.

"The decision that President Bush took, and that others joined him in, was absolutely the right decision, and the criticism of that is very much hindsight knowledge."