

JPRS-TAC-91-017
15 JULY 1991

Foreign
Broadcast
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JPRS Report

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U.S. Chemical Weapons Position Talks Analyzed

HK2106070591 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese
10 Jun 91 p 4

[Article by Wei Xing (5898 2502): "Why Is the United States Altering Its Position on Chemical Weapons Negotiations"]

[Text] On 16 May, according to President Bush's instructions, the U.S. ambassador for disarmament forwarded the new U.S. position on banning chemical weapons at a meeting of the Geneva disarmament talks, indicating that in order to expedite the conclusion of an international treaty on banning chemical weapons at an earlier date, the United States will give up the right to use chemical weapons as a means of retaliation and will promise to unconditionally destroy all its chemical weapons within 10 years after the treaty comes into force.

Up to this spring, the United States still stubbornly claimed that it had the right to use chemical weapons as a means of retaliation against an enemy who first uses such weapons for offensive purposes, and insisted that it would maintain 2 percent (about 500 tons) of its chemical weapons until all nations who possess chemical weapons and the capacity to produce chemical weapons sign the treaty on banning chemical weapons. The U.S. 180-degree about-face was noticeable.

It is held that the United States changed its position on the chemical weapons issue because: first, the Gulf war which had just ended made some U.S. military officials feel that in modern warfare the United States, by relying on its advanced weaponry, could deter its enemies from rashly using chemical weapons. Moreover, chemical weapons are not useful under all weather conditions. Those who use chemical weapons will face severe condemnation from the international community. So the value of such weapons has declined.

Second, the original U.S. position was always the target of criticism in the international community. In early June last year, the United States concluded an "Agreement on Destroying and Stopping Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures for Promoting the Conclusion of a Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons" with the Soviet Union, and dished out its position of maintaining 2 percent of its chemical weapons. This was criticized by many other countries. Many nonaligned countries denounced the U.S. position as discriminative, varying from the fundamental goal of completely destroying chemical weapons and adding a new obstacle to the ongoing talks on a treaty for a complete ban and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. Some people in the United States were also opposed to the government position. The strong political pressure inside and outside the United States made the U.S. Government eventually come around.

In addition, President Bush himself has also continuously advocated the banning of chemical weapons. In

1984, when he was still vice president, he personally attended a Geneva disarmament talks meeting and forwarded a draft of the treaty on banning chemical weapons. When campaigning for the presidency, he also promised to conclude and sign an international treaty on banning chemical weapons within his office tenure. Now, in order to fulfill his promise and achieve the political target, he had to adopt a more positive posture.

The disarmament talks on the treaty to ban chemical weapons are still going on intensively. People need to further observe what concrete action the United States will take to honor its new position, and what impact this will have on the multilateral talks.

CSCE Role in European Security Analyzed

HK2806112391 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
23 Jun 91 p 6

["News Analysis" by staff reporters Xu Hongzhi (6079 1347 3112), Jiang Jianguo (3068 1696 0948): "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Takes First Step Toward 'Action Capability'"]

[Text] Berlin, 21 June (RENMIN RIBAO)—The two-day foreign ministerial session of the CSCE ended in Berlin on 20 June. The meeting decided to admit Albania as the 35th official member of the CSCE, thereby making all European countries part of the CSCE process. It also reached an agreement on the establishment of a "mechanism for consultation and cooperation in case of crisis situations." German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, chairman of the meeting, declared that this was a step taken by the CSCE toward "action capability."

The "Paris Charter for a New Europe," adopted at last November's CSCE heads of government conference in Paris, provided for the creation of a commission of foreign ministers which has become the central forum for political consultation within the CSCE.

In the six months since the CSCE heads of government conference in Paris, the situation in Europe has continued to change. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact was officially proclaimed. After the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] talks expanded from the 22 countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO to include the 34 member-states of the CSCE, the second phase of the talks became stalemated. Following the disintegration of the old European structure, the new structure remains ambiguous. It is the common hope of all relevant parties to enlarge the role of the CSCE, but the question of how this role is to be played is one that has to be resolved.

This foreign ministerial session took a small step forward in this area. The biggest result of the conference was the definition by the foreign ministers of a mechanism for consultation and cooperation under crisis situations. Its main provisions are as follows: In the case of a crisis situation in a member-state, that member-state may be asked to give an explanation. If the problem remains

unresolved the member-state in question may ask the chairman of a committee of top-level officials to convene an emergency session of the CSCE. As long as more than 12 member-states support such a request, the chairman may immediately notify the conference membership and convene the meeting within 48 to 72 hours.

Since the formation of the CSCE, its structure has always been loose. Since every member-state has veto power, it is difficult to arrive at decisions. The new crisis mechanism established in this session broke the principle of "unanimous consent" for the first time, and represented the first concrete step in the transformation of the CSCE from a forum for empty talk to a functioning organ.

However, judging from the communique issued at the end of the meeting, the meeting did not achieve any substantial results on some of the major issues concerning European security. On the question of the disarmament talks, the participating countries only indicated that unofficial consultations would be carried out by their delegates to the Conflict Prevention Center, based in Vienna, in preparation for the new disarmament, confidence- and security-boosting talks to be held after the 1992 Helsinki heads of government summit. On relations between the CSCE and other European organizations, they only expressed a wish to "exchange information" between the CSCE and the EEC, and among the European Commission, NATO and the Western European Union. It appears that a real break to the stalemate and the attainment of a breakthrough concerning disarmament will not be an easy thing. The new "European security structure" is far from reaching its desired position.

Meanwhile, some countries remain skeptical about the future of Europe. Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski expressed concern that because a demarcation line separates East and West Europe in terms of living standards, economic development, environmental protection, and other aspects, social unrest in some countries could jeopardize those countries' domestic political stability and international relations. A number of other countries aired the same view. Foreign Minister Genscher summed it up by saying: As far as Europe is concerned, stability refers not only to military aspects, but it also concerns more and more economic, social, ecological, and other aspects. The SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG

published an editorial saying: If there is unanimity of views among the large countries, then the CSCE will become an arbitration tribunal for the smaller states. But if the large countries are "belligerent toward each other," can they be managed by the CSCE?

The people of Europe hope "collective security" can be established through the CSCE process, but they still have a long way to go before peace and stability can be truly achieved in Europe.

Spokesman on Hopes for Mideast Arms Control Conference

*OW2706082391 Beijing XINHUA in English
0811 GMT 27 Jun 91*

[Text] Beijing, June 27 (XINHUA)—China hopes that the United Nations Security Council perm-five conference on arms control in the Middle East, to be held soon in Paris, will contribute to the realization of peace and security in the Middle East region, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Wu Jianmin said at a weekly press conference here today.

In response to the questions on whom China will send to the conference, what China's position is on arms control and what China expects from the meeting, Wu said that China will send Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu to attend the conference.

"This conference is a very important one," Wu said, adding, "In order to make it a success, we would like to explore with all the parties on the basic principles of arms control in the Middle East so as to promote stability in the region with a lower level of armament."

"The prolonged absence of a settlement of the Middle East issue is the root cause of tension and the basic reason of arms race in that region," he said.

The spokesman said, "the issue of arms control in the Middle East is closely linked with the political settlement of the Middle East issue, and its realization will be an integral part of the political settlement."

"We hope that this conference will contribute to the realization of peace and security in the Middle East region so as to create conditions for an early settlement of the long-drawn-out Middle East issue," Wu concluded.

AUSTRALIA

Government Disappointed With Latest French Test

*BK0607090591 Hong Kong AFP in English 0655 GMT
6 Jul 91*

[Text] Sydney, July 6 (AFP)—Australia expressed disappointment Saturday over the latest nuclear explosion by France at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific.

An Australian Foreign Affairs department spokesman said the government, like most other Pacific states, opposed nuclear test bases in the region.

He said Australia was "disappointed" about the latest blast, announced by military authorities in Paris on Friday.

The latest test came just a day after reports that France had made Rainbow Warrior saboteur Alain Mafart a knight in the national order of merit.

The energy released by the explosion at Mururoa was less than 10 kilotonnes (10,000 tonnes of TNT), a relatively small blast in comparison with the rest of France's testing program.

NORTH KOREA

Commentary on U.S. Conditions for Improving Ties

*SK2806040491 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 0020 GMT 27 Jun 91*

[NODONG SINMUN 27 June commentary: "It Is Not the Attitude for Settlement of Problems"]

[Text] The United States is continuing to set barriers in improving the DPRK-U.S. relations. The remarks made by U.S. State Department spokesman Boucher some time ago also show such an aim. He made several demands on us, describing them as conditions for upgrading and improving the DPRK-U.S. relations. These demands include acceptance of nuclear inspection, constructive North-South dialogue, renunciation of terrorism, and cooperation in returning the remains of U.S. soldiers.

Boucher said that only when we act positively on the U.S. demands would the United States be equally positive.

This is a high-handed attitude to force us to unilaterally accept the U.S. unjust demands and an expression of the position of strength.

What has caused the DPRK-U.S. relations to be extremely abnormal as today is the U.S. imperialists' policy of aggression and hostility against our Republic and the Korean people.

The United States not only illegally occupied South Korea by violently trampling underfoot the Korean people's national sovereignty but also provoked the aggressive Korean war and perpetrated various brutal acts. Even after signing the Armistice Agreement, the United States did not comply with it but persistently implemented the line of division and war while continuously remaining in South Korea.

The responsibility for failure in normalizing the DPRK-U.S. relations entirely rests on the United States. If the United States withdraws from South Korea even now and renounces its policy of aggression against our Republic, the DPRK-U.S. relations can enter the road of normalization.

However, the United States, refusing this, made so-called conditions for normalizing relations. This clearly shows the imperialists' endless ambition for aggression and the tyranny of the U.S. imperialists, who are only seeking their own interests by sacrificing other countries and other people.

The DPRK has no nuclear weapons, and has neither the will nor the ability to produce them. The DPRK is not opposed to nuclear inspection but is ready to sign the nuclear safeguard accord. It is not the DPRK but the United States, which has deployed more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons in South Korea and created the danger of nuclear war, that must undergo nuclear inspection on the Korean peninsula.

The United States must open the nuclear bases in South Korea to the public, accept their inspection, withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea, and commit itself not to attack us with nuclear weapons before urging us to accept nuclear inspection. Doing this is reasonable and accords with principle.

If the United States wants to improve relations with us, it should do first what must be done. The United States demands a so-called constructive North-South dialogue of us. But it is the United States and the South Korean authorities who brought the North-South high-level talks to a rupture by staging the Team Spirit joint military exercise, a test nuclear war against us, and created the danger of nuclear war. They are not in the position of demanding a constructive dialogue of someone else.

It is not the attitude for just solutions of problems to slander us by overturning what is right and what is wrong. As for the delivery of the remains of U.S. soldiers, we made every possible effort for this, but the United States laid hurdles in the way and delayed it. This is clearly known to the world. The U.S. demand that we renounce terrorism is an act of a thief yelling "stop thief!"

The organizer and commander of terrorist acts at home and abroad and the ringleader who is instigating barbarous fascist terrorist rule in South Korea is the United States. However, the United States talks about someone else's terrorism. Is this not indeed a ridiculous act?

The United States is attempting to spoil our international prestige by this crafty and despicable method, to divert elsewhere the attention of the world people from its criminal violations of human rights, and to gain something by putting unjust pressure on us.

The so-called conditions for the improvement of relations that the United States is going to enforce on us are an interference in our domestic affairs, are an infringement upon international laws, international practices, and rules on the relations between the states, and are a preposterous obstinacy which can convince no one.

The United States does not want the settlement of the Korean issue but lays obstacles in improving the DPRK-U.S. relations while pursuing an aggressive anti-DPRK, anti-socialist strategy. The so-called conditions are being used in this strategy. This is a criminal act against the Korean people.

For upgrading and improving the DPRK-U.S. relations, the United States should first act in conformity with ways to do this. One cannot settle the problem from the position of strength.

It is high time that the United States reexamines its Korean policy. The United States should renounce the ambition for aggression on Korea, should stop maneuvers against us for division and confrontation, and should discard the policy of nuclear menace. It should, above all, withdraw U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea. The United States should affirmatively respond to our peace proposals and initiatives for turning the Korean Armistice Agreement into a peace agreement, for adopting a nonaggression declaration between the North and the South, and for making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free peace zone. This is the basic method for improving and normalizing the DPRK-U.S. relations.

NODONG SINMUN on Nuclear Weapons Issue

*SK2806060291 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0453 GMT 28 Jun 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, June 28 (KCNA)—The U.S. imperialists, far from lending an ear to the unbiased world opinion that if “nuclear inspection” is to be made on the DPRK, the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea must undergo the inspection simultaneously, are trying to evade the responsibility for removing the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula with the argument that “inspection” of the “nuclear facilities” in the North and inspection of their nuclear weapons are separate issues.

Commenting on this, NODONG SINMUN today says: This is a petty trick of those driven into a tight corner to find a way out of it.

The news analyst continues:

Nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula comes not from the North which has no nuclear weapons but from the South where more than 1,000 pieces of U.S. nuclear

weapons are deployed and nuclear war exercises against the North are staged almost every day.

The U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea are the very source of the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and the most serious threat to the Korean people and Asian people.

Therefore, the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea must undergo inspection before anything else.

The U.S. authorities' talk about “separate issues” is a clumsy excuse of those in the hell of fix under the pressure of public opinion at home and abroad.

This shows that the United States intends to keep nuclear weapons in South Korea and intensive threat and blackmail against the DPRK and other Asian countries with them and, on the other hand, seeks a sinister purpose of isolating the DPRK with the fiction of “nuclear weapon development” by the DPRK.

“Inspection” of the so-called “nuclear facilities” of the DPRK and inspection of the U.S. nuclear weapons and “nuclear facilities” in South Korea are not separate issues.

If the United States truly wants to remove nuclear threat and preserve peace and security on the Korean peninsula, it must open of its own accord its nuclear weapons in South Korea to the public and undergo nuclear inspection, instead of demanding a unilateral “nuclear inspection” of the DPRK.

This would be a most fair deed which deserves welcome at home and abroad.

The United States must not make a fuss over the fictitious “nuclear problem” of the DPRK.

Journalist Union Leader on Nuclear Issue

*SK2806065191 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0516 GMT 28 Jun 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, June 28 (KCNA)—Hyon Chun-kuk, chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Journalists Union, appealed to the progressive journalists and men of the press of the world to join voices of justice in the righteous struggle to get the U.S. nuclear weapons withdrawn from South Korea and convert the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

In his statement to the press issued on June 27 clarifying the justness of our stand set out in the joint statement of the political parties and public organizations of the DPRK, he said that the United States is now acting foolishly to keep the nuclear weapons in South Korea, taking issue with us, like a thief crying “stop thief”, turning a deaf ear to the unbiased public opinion at home and abroad urging it to withdraw its forces and nuclear weapons from South Korea. He stressed:

The U.S. authorities and the South Korean puppets are resorting to all sorts of fabrications, loudly crying for "nuclear inspection" of our area. This is intended to cover up the policy of nuclear war they are pursuing in Asia with the Korean peninsula as the stronghold and divert elsewhere the attention of the world from the danger of the nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea.

Stressing that the Korean and Asian people cannot be safe as long as the United States keeps its nuclear weapons in South Korea, he strongly demanded that the United States give up at once all slanders and intrigues against the DPRK and withdraw all its troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea without delay.

If a nuclear war broke out on the Korean peninsula, it would spell great disasters to the Korean and Asian peoples, he said, adding: to get the U.S. nuclear weapons withdrawn from South Korea and prevent the danger of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula in advance is a vital task of the Korean people, journalists and men of the press and, at the same time, an important task of the world progressive journalists and men of the press, particularly, of the people, journalists and men of the press of Asian countries.

South's View of Nuclear Inspection Criticized

*SK2906073191 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0505 GMT 29 Jun 91*

["Boloney of Nuclear War Servants"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, June 29 (KCNA)—The South Korean authorities, acting on the script written by their master, U.S. imperialists, are now claiming that "nuclear inspection" of the North by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and simultaneous inspection of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea which is demanded by the North are "separate issues" and if the North "signed the international nuclear safeguards accord" and accepted an international "nuclear inspection," "security would be guaranteed by nuclear states."

Commenting on this jargon, a NODONG SINMUN analyst today brands this as an absolute boloney that could be uttered only by such despicable colonial puppets as the No Tae-u group, a nuclear war servant of U.S. imperialism, which betrayed the country and the nation.

The news analyst says:

Nuclear inspection by the IAEA is aimed at removing nuclear threat.

What matters in reality is to remove the U.S. nuclear threat to our Republic and Asia.

To remove nuclear threat to our Republic is an unavoidable obligation of the United States, a nuclear state, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

It is a legitimate right of a non-nuclear state for us to demand that the United States remove the threat of nuclear attack on us.

This notwithstanding, the South Korean authorities argue that "nuclear inspection" of the North and simultaneous inspection of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea are "separate issues." This is, indeed, a shameful, brigandish logic.

Their argument that if the North "signed the international nuclear safeguards accord" and accepted an international "nuclear inspection," its "security would be guaranteed" by nuclear states is also a nonsense.

As long as the U.S. imperialists keep deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea and continue to threaten and blackmail us with them, peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in Asia can never be guaranteed.

The fact itself that the United States takes exception to a simultaneous inspection of its nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea reveals its criminal intention to threaten and invade the North, a non-nuclear state, with nuclear weapons.

Nobody can vouch that the U.S. imperialists who make no scruples about any brigandish act of aggression if it is for their interests will not mount a nuclear attack on the North.

It is really exasperating and an intolerable challenge for the South Korean authorities to take issue with us who have no nuclear arms, while keeping mum about the more than 1,000 pieces of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea.

Christian Leader's Statement on Nuclear Issue

*SK2906044091 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0419 GMT 29 Jun 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, June 29 (KCNA)—It is a touchstone proving sincerity toward "detente" and "peace" whether the United States withdraws its nuclear weapons and aggression troops from South Korea or not.

Kang Yong-sop, chairman of the central committee of the Korean Christians Federation, said this in a statement issued to the press on June 28 in reference to the validity of our stand made clear in the joint statement of the political parties and public organisations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The peace and stability of our nation and Asian peoples are being seriously threatened under the present situation in which over 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons in South Korea may burst any moment, he said, and went on:

Without the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea, therefore, the peace and

peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula can neither be achieved nor human security be expected in all cases.

The United States is now making a poor excuse that it cannot allow simultaneous inspection of its nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea as they are "deterrent" to "protect" somebody, while forcing unilateral "inspection" of our non-existing "nuclear facilities".

The U.S. imperialists must know that however hard they may try to spread a false propaganda and disguise themselves as an "envoy of peace", the Korean nation and the peaceloving people of the world clearly see with heightened vigilance their dirty nature as a devil of aggression and war and a strangler of peace and security.

Kang Yong-sop expressed the hope that Christian organisations, churches and believers of different countries will extend positive support and encouragement to the Korean people and Christians in their struggle to remove nuclear threat from the Korean peninsula and the Asian region and secure a peaceful guarantee.

U.S. Authorities' 'Nuclear Umbrella' Viewed

*SK3006120691 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0911 GMT 30 Jun 91*

["Nuclear Clouds Must Be Dispelled"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, June 30 (KCNA)—The U.S. authorities claim that the 1,000 odd nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea are a "nuclear umbrella" to "protect" the "security" of South Korea from someone's "threat". But this ridiculous argument can deceive no one. NODONG SINMUN declares this in a commentary today.

The news analyst says:

The doctrine of "deterrent to downward thrust" of the Soviet Union peddled by the United States when deploying nuclear weapon in South Korea went busted with the thaw in the U.S.-Soviet relations. At the same time, the outcry over "threat from the North" tenaciously propagandised by the United States turned out to be false when we made fair peace overtures one after another including conclusion of a peace agreement, adoption of a non-aggression declaration, denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and arms reduction in the North and the South and took a positive step of unilateral drastic cut of our armed forces.

The "threat" from somebody is a sheer lie. Therefore, the United States must fold the "nuclear umbrella" in South Korea and immediately withdraw nuclear weapons from there.

The nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula and in Asia comes from South Korea where a large stock of U.S. nuclear arms are deployed and nuclear war exercises staged frequently.

The nuclear clouds hanging heavily over South Korea might send a nuclear rain on the Korean peninsula and Asia any moment.

The skies of the Korean peninsula and Asia cannot be clear without removing these nuclear clouds.

It is natural that the peaceloving peoples in Asia and the world as well as those in the North and the South of the Korean peninsula strongly urge the United States to quit South Korea, taking along the wornout "nuclear umbrella."

The U.S. authorities, upset by such development of the state of affairs, are spreading a false rumour about "development of nuclear weapons" by the DPRK and trying to use this as an excuse for keeping the "nuclear umbrella" spread. The "nuclear umbrella" doctrine is, in essence, a doctrine of nuclear threat and a policy of nuclear blackmail.

The U.S. imperialists must immediately withdraw their troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea as demanded by unbiased public opinion at home and abroad, giving up their attempt to deceive the people with preposterous excuse and sophism.

Chondoist Party Gives Statement on Nuclear Issue

*SK3006095791 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0840 GMT 30 Jun 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, June 30 (KCNA)—To remove the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula is an urgent problem that cannot be overlooked by the Korean people and by the entire Asian people, says Yu Mi-yong, adviser to the central guidance committee of the Korean Chondoists' Association.

In her statement to the press on June 29 clarifying the justness of our stand set out in the joint statement of the political parties and public organisations of the DPRK she said that more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea including neutron bombs called "weapon of the devil" in the 20th century are a constant danger which might plunge the Korean peninsula and Asia into a nuclear scourge.

If the U.S. imperialists unleash another war on the Korean peninsula, it will be a nuclear war and its flame will easily spread to the whole region of Asia, she warned, and continued:

The South Korean rulers are singing duet with the U.S. imperialists in nuclear blackmail, not uttering a word about the withdrawal of the great number of U.S. nuclear weapons. This is an anti-peace and anti-national act of driving the Korean peninsula and nation into a nuclear holocaust.

In case of Japan which was the first victim to the nuclear weapons in the world, she must not try to capitalize on the U.S. policy of nuclear weapon, crying over our

non-existent "nuclear facilities" but must look squarely at the actual danger of the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea and act with discretion.

The Chondoists who valiantly fought against foreign aggressors in accordance with the idea of "promotion of national interests and welfare of the people" and the slogan of "Rejecting the West and Japan" must pool their strength in the nationwide struggle to resolutely frustrate the moves of nuclear war provocation of the U.S. imperialists and their stooges.

Seminar in Japan Urges Nuclear-Free Zones

SK0107110391 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1048 GMT 1 Jul 91

[Text] Pyongyang, July 1 (KCNA)—The appeal adopted at a seminar on "Peace in Asia and Women's Role" recently held in Tokyo called for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Japan and on the Korean peninsula to dispel nuclear weapons in all parts of Asia.

Urging the Asian women to concentrate efforts on the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea, the appeal said:

The Japanese women know better than anyone else that Japan must sincerely repent of its past colonial domination over Korea.

The Asians hope for Korea's reunification to remove the seed of war from Asia.

We expect a new climate will be created for Korea's reunification through free meeting and expansion of dialogues, exchange and cooperation between women and people of the North and the South of Korea and an early normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Lawyers Association Statement on Nuclear Issue

SK0407043991 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
0418 GMT 4 Jul 91

[Text] Pyongyang, July 4 (KCNA)—If nuclear inspection is to be made, it should not be made only of us who have no nuclear weapons, but the U.S. nuclear bases in South Korea be opened to the public and international inspection of them be made simultaneously under the condition that more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons have been deployed in South Korea, actually posing nuclear danger on the Korean peninsula, says Choe Chang-hon, chairman of the Korean Democratic Lawyers' Association, in a statement issued to the press July 3 in reference to the justness of our stand clarified in the joint statement of the political parties and public organizations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Under the present situation that the U.S. nuclear threat against us is growing graver day by day, it is a basic requirement for the removal of the danger of a nuclear

war to get the U.S. nuclear weapons withdrawn from South Korea and make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone, he said, adding:

The deployment of more than 1,000 nuclear weapons in South Korea by the United States is to dominate the whole of Korea and Asia and threaten and control any country of Asia with nuclear weapons in case what happens in this region goes against the U.S. "interests" and "grain".

It is unreasonable that the United States, having deployed huge amounts of nuclear weapons in South Korea, has raised the question of unilateral "nuclear inspection" of us, while frequently staging nuclear war exercises against our Republic.

Chairman Choe Chang-hon demanded the United States to break off its habit of forcing its will upon others from the stand of strength.

SOUTH KOREA

President No Urges World Free of Nuclear Weapons

SK2706084691 *Seoul YONHAP in English* 0828 GMT
27 Jun 91

[Text] Seoul, June 27 (YONHAP)—South Korean President No Tae-u, calling for a world without nuclear arsenals, said Thursday it was "meaningless" to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone if atomic weapons remained in the Soviet Union and China.

"What is the meaning of creating a nuclear-free zone in Korea while leaving nuclear weapons in China and the Soviet Union, from where Korea is well within effective range," he said.

"A genuine nuclear-free zone should cover the entire world and the countries that already possess nuclear weapons should adopt a position on this matter," he said. No expressed the same view in a recent interview with THE LOS ANGELES TIMES.

No said that the next two or three years were crucial for the unification of Korea and his trip to Canada and the United States in July was related to this. He will visit the United States July 1-3 and Canada July 3-5.

International inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities is expected to be on the agenda with U.S. President George Bush.

It was important to remove the danger of North Korea making nuclear weapons, as commonly acknowledged by the United States, the Soviet Union and China, No said.

On domestic politics, he reiterated that the ruling party would nominate a presidential candidate democratically and in accordance with the party charter about one year before his term in office ended.

Asked whether the nomination would take place before or after the next general elections, No said it would be around one year before his five-year term ends in February 1993. The elections are expected in late 1991 or early 1992.

The president said a Westminster-like parliamentary government could not be adopted if the people did not want it, though he still believed it was the best system.

The perennial issue resurfaced after No's party scored a landslide victory in the local elections last week.

South, North Physicians Agree on Nuclear Issue

SK2906043091 Seoul YONHAP in English 0155 GMT 29 Jun 91

[Text] Seoul, June 29 (OANA-YONHAP)—South and North Korean doctors have agreed in Stockholm to cooperate in preventing nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and turning the Asia-Pacific region into a nuclear-free zone.

Meeting during a conference of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) in Stockholm, they agreed to make common efforts to prevent nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region, Yi Chu-kol, chairman of IPPNW's Korean branch, told YONHAP by telephone from Sweden.

The IPPNW meeting opened Tuesday and delegates from the two Koreas met on Wednesday and Thursday, Yi said.

The 11 South Korean and three North Korean doctors agreed to make joint efforts so that nuclear war victims living in both Koreas and Japan receive proper compensation from the Japanese Government.

The physicians agreed to meet frequently to exchange medical information and the North Koreans said they were willing to attend an IPPNW meeting in Seoul if one were held there.

Yi identified the North Koreans as Kang Won-uk, 66, head of the Pyongyang Red Cross Hospital, Yi Tae-hwan, 62, director of the Pyongyang Health Management Research Institute, and Pae Chang-kyu, 42, a medical manager.

The doctors agreed to use IPPNW's headquarters in Boston, Massachusetts, for future communications.

IPPNW, founded in 1980, has 200,000 members in 79 countries, including 300 in South Korea. The organization was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985 for spreading authoritative information and creating an awareness of the catastrophic consequences of atomic warfare.

The North Koreans took part this year for the first time as observers after the IPPNW headquarters, at the request of the South Korean branch, asked Ho Chong,

head of North Korea's observer mission to the United Nations, to send a delegation to Stockholm.

Seoul To Make 'Epochal Disarmament Proposal'

SK0607031991 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean 6 Jul 91 p 2

[Text] It has been learned that the government is developing an epochal disarmament proposal and its implementation plan to practically halt the arms race between the North and the South.

This new arms reduction plan of the government will include a mutual arms reduction between the North and the South and a method for its phased implementation. It appears that the general outline of this plan will be revealed through the address that President No Tae-u will give at the UN General Assembly in late September or during the fourth North-South high-level talks that are expected to take place after October.

During the North-South high-level talks held three times in the past, the government offered such steps for building military trust as giving prior notice of military training, installing an emergency direct telephone line (hot line) between the military authorities, and mutual exchanges of military personnel. It was learned on 5 July that beside these steps, the government began to develop a plan to designate the upper limit of armed forces (troops and equipment) of the North and the South, as well as its implementation plan.

It was also learned that through this new disarmament plan, the government will propose that the armed forces be redeployed from offensive positions to defensive, and that offensive weapons, including tanks, offensive helicopters, fighters, and missiles, be drastically reduced by both sides. To implement this plan, the government will call for negotiations between the North and the South.

The important contents of this plan are known to be as follows: Freezing the North's and the South's level of armed forces and phased reduction through negotiations; freezing amount of military equipment and prohibiting their qualitative improvement; abolishing lethal weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; and providing a systematic inspection mechanism for practical arms reduction.

However, it appears that the detailed plan to designate the ultimate upper limit of the level of armed forces will not be offered due to the need for readjusting views among the relevant authorities and to the flexible situation.

Basically, the government's disarmament proposal can be construed as a counterproposal for the North's previous proposal for a three-phase arms reduction and the retention of a 100,000-man standing army. However, with gradual reduction of cold war confrontation on the Korean peninsula, this proposal will foresee full-scale

discussions for practical disarmament that will be inevitably raised between the North and the South. Thus, this proposal is of great significance.

A high-ranking government official said that "with the entry of the North and the South into the United Nations, North Korea's expression of willingness to accept nuclear inspection, and with the anticipated establishment of ROK-China diplomatic relations, the peace structure on the Korean peninsula has now entered a stage of settlement. As a result, conditions for practical disarmament between the North and the South are being created." He noted that "there is the great possibility that North Korea will sincerely respond to disarmament negotiations to solve its economic problems."

NEW ZEALAND

Foreign Minister: Antinuclear Ship Calls Law Not To Be Evaded

BK2106062791 Hong Kong AFP in English 0611 GMT
21 Jun 91

[Text] Wellington, June 21 (AFP)—New Zealand is not trying to find a way around its own antinuclear laws, passed by a previous government, in order to foster new defence links with the United States, Foreign Affairs Minister Don McKinnon said Friday.

Speaking at a press conference on his return from Canberra, he said this was the message he gave Australia, which had seemed to believe the New Zealand Government was "trying to breach the wall" in a de facto way.

"I believe the Australian Government is now satisfied that the position we have taken is very clear—that the no-go areas in terms of military and defence are an impregnable barrier.

"We are not trying to climb over it or go round it and therefore we are constrained in our foreign and defence policy as a result," he said.

The Labour Government in 1986 passed antinuclear laws which the United States saw as an effective ban on visits of their ships to New Zealand ports.

Washington, which refuses to confirm or deny whether its naval vessels carry nuclear weapons, suspended military ties under the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and U.S.) Pact.

The current government, while affirming the antinuclear law, has sought closer ties with the United States.

Mr. McKinnon said Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke and Foreign Minister Gareth Evans now understood New Zealand's position. "We are clearly putting ourselves in a different position but we are still determined to markedly improve our relationship with the U.S. In a variety of other ways without this issue impeding other factors."

BULGARIA**Socialist Party Official: SS-23 Missiles Vital for Security***AU1806135391 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
14 Jun 91 p 1*

[DUMA report: "SS-23 Missiles Are Necessary for National Security"]

[Text] Possessing SS-23 missiles, or any other kind of weapon, is necessary for national security and is Bulgaria's right. NATO does not view Bulgaria as a source of aggression or as a threat to the countries of NATO. Dimitur Yonchev said this when he put the question of Bulgaria's national security and SS-23 missiles to Manfred Woerner, at talks between the NATO secretary general and legislative groups on 13 June.

I want to stress Mr. Woerner's words since I believe that what was said about the SS-23 missiles affects our concept of national security—the right to decide ourselves by what means and weapons our sovereignty will be defended, and in addition, that Bulgaria represents no real danger to its neighbors.

Dimitur Yonchev pointed out that the request to dismantle the missiles is quite a serious encroachment on our eventual independence because it makes us vulnerable.

The SS-23 missiles are modern conventional weapons with cassette [kasetuchni] warheads, which are used for strikes from the air against populated areas prior to the beginning of active combat. Dimitur Yonchev stressed that the missiles are a mandatory element of any defense strategy.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA**Preparations Made for Passage of Soviet Troops***AU2406160791 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
22 Jun 91 p 1*

["tk"-signed report: "An Intricate Return"]

[Text] Prague—In its last session, the Federal Government entrusted the minister of transport with the task of arranging with foreign partners the details of the transport of Soviet troops from Germany through our territory.

According to the preliminary schedule, four Soviet military trains should pass through Czechoslovakia in 24 hours, and no more than eight trains could be in the Czechoslovak territory at the same time. Although we have not been approached officially regarding the transport, the government gave its advanced approval. The general staff has worked for some time already on the preparations of security for the entire procedure. There will be some limitations imposed, for instance, on the

transport of ammunition. According to the staff of the Central Directorate of the Czechoslovak State Railway, the transport of the Soviet troops could be an order that would help to deal with their currently sad financial shape. Further negotiations will take place next week.

Dubcek Welcomes Departure of USSR Troops*LD2306185991 Prague CTK in English 1658 GMT
23 Jun 91*

[Text] Bratislava, June 23 (CTK)—Chairman of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (Parliament) Alexander Dubcek told CTK today he welcomed the departure of the Soviet soldier from Czechoslovakia as any other Czechoslovak citizen of the country.

"Neither armed force can for long suppress people's desire to decide about their own destiny", he said.

The last Soviet transport left the Czechoslovak territory via the Cierna nad Tisou, East Slovakia, border crossing on Friday June 21.

Dubcek said that the presence of the Soviet troops gave support to the internal militant policy of the "normalisers", i.e. those who were in power after the Soviet-led invasion of five Warsaw Pact crushed the communist-led reform movement in Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

Dubcek was a leading figure of the movement known as "Prague Spring" and was one of the signatories of the Moscow agreement on the "temporary" stay of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.

He told CTK in this connection that "if a state is forcibly occupied, the 'winner' dictates his terms. The suppressed 'accepts' them because he has no other possibility if he does not want to risk an encounter between the people and the aggressor."

Dubcek added that were it not for the reform policy of Mikhail Gorbachev, the treaty on the Soviet troop departure could not have been signed.

The treaty was signed in February 1990 when 73,500 Soviet soldiers were in Czechoslovakia.

Soviet General Discusses Troop Withdrawal*LD2606023291 Prague CTK in English 1342 GMT
25 Jun 91*

[Text] Prague, June 25 (CTK)—The commissioner for the Soviet withdrawal from Czechoslovakia, General Eduard Vorobyev, said here today that the Soviet Army left Czechoslovakia on schedule and without major problems.

The last Soviet troops left Czechoslovakia last Friday [21 June].

Vorobyev, commander of the Central Group of Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia for the past 22 years, told a news conference that the Soviet leadership had

earlier acknowledged that the 1968 decision to send Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia was a mistake and had described it as groundless.

Vorobyev, who is the last serving Soviet soldier still in Czechoslovakia, expressed surprise at the fact that Czechs and Slovaks identified the Soviet soldiers as "occupiers", as the troops had never disregarded or violated Czechoslovak laws, he said. On November 17, 1989, and the days which followed, leading up to the collapse of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Army maintained a neutral stand and refrained from interfering in Czechoslovak affairs, Vorobyev said.

He said he was also surprised by the abrupt disruption of contacts between the Czechoslovak and Soviet Armies after the November 1989. In speaking about the construction of a common European house, cooperation in all areas, including the military one, is necessary, Vorobyev said.

Chemical weapons have never been stored in Czechoslovakia, he said in response to a question on whether weapons of mass destruction were kept in the country. However, he confirmed that some nuclear warheads had been stationed in Czechoslovakia. All the warheads were removed in the first transports, he said.

Vorobyev said that whether or not Czechoslovakia joins NATO is the country's internal affair.

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"The whole nation feels enormously relieved because our country is again completely free and sovereign", the chairman of the parliamentary commission for Soviet withdrawal from Czechoslovakia, Michael Kocab, told the news conference.

"I am very glad we have been able to complete this not very pleasant matter in such a friendly way", Kocab added.

He said the commission's original intention that the Federal Assembly (parliament) meet at a special session at Prague Castle on June 30 will not be realised.

On meeting Czechoslovak and Soviet Government commissioners in charge of the Soviet troops withdrawal, Czechoslovak parliament Chairman Alexander Dubcek rejected Monday's statement by Soviet Defence Minister Dmitry Yazov in the Czechoslovak independent paper "LIDOVE NOVINY" that the "entry" of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 took place at the invitation of Czechoslovak leaders. Dubcek, who was Czechoslovak Communist Party leader at the time of the invasion, said documentary evidence contradicted Yazov's assertion and the invasion represented a violation of international law by the Soviet Union.

Regarding current relations with the Soviet Union, Dubcek emphasised the need to look towards the future and build relations on common links. He added that the

process of European integration is impossible without the Soviet Union both for economic and security reasons.

Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Boris Pankin described the Soviet pullout from Czechoslovakia as a historic moment and a joint victory.

Protocol on Soviet Troop Withdrawal Signed

*LD2506104691 Prague Ceskoslovenskiy Rozhlas
Radio Network in Czech 0900 GMT 25 Jun 91*

[Text] The protocol on the completion of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia was signed in Prague this morning. Lieutenant General (Rudolf Duchacek) signed on behalf of Czechoslovakia and General Eduard Vorobyev on behalf of the Soviet Union. By signing the document they legally confirmed that to date two thirds of the Czechoslovak-Soviet intergovernmental agreement on Soviet troop withdrawal has been fulfilled, and that the withdrawal of the Soviet Army, stationed in Czechoslovakia for almost 23 years since its invasion on 21 August 1968, has been completed. The part of the agreement which still remains to be fulfilled concerns compensation for the material, ecological, and other damage caused by the Soviet Army's presence. Experts have estimated the damage at 4 to 5 billion korunas. After the signing of the protocol today, not a single Soviet soldier should be present on our territory. General Vorobyev and his entourage are due to leave on Thursday 27 June.

Soviet Central Group of Forces Commander Departs

*LD2706125991 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio
Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 27 Jun 91*

[Lubomir Zummar report from Prague's Kebely Military Airport]

[Text] At 1222 today a Soviet AN-26 plane took off with the last Soviet soldier on the territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic—the former commander of the Central Group of Soviet Forces, Colonel General Eduard Vorobyev.

Before his departure, General Vorobyev told Federal Assembly Deputy Michael Kocab that he says goodbye to him as to a diplomat and feels at the same time that he is a good soldier.

A big surprise for General Vorobyev but also for journalists who were present was a meeting with the Soviet military deserter, Private Aleksey Kuzevanov, who was awarded the status of political refugee by Czechoslovakia last January. Despite the fact that the main political motive of his deed—the occupation of Czechoslovakia—has ended, he has decided not to return to the Soviet Union for fear of persecution and imprisonment.

Foreign Minister on New European Security Structure*LD2806220291 Prague CTK in English 1820 GMT
28 June 91*

[Text] Prague, June 28 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier said today that security in Europe must be built on the existing institutions such as NATO, the EC, the Western European Union, the Council of Europe and the newly established institution of 35 countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

In an interview for CTK, Dienstbier said that if developments in Europe continue to take a positive course, pan-European security structures with a trans-Atlantic dimension will be created. The significance of military aspects will decline, while the importance of environmental and economic cooperation will grow, he said.

Referring to the planned abolition of the Warsaw Pact at a meeting in Prague on July 1, Dienstbier said that the member states' governments must agree on its dissolution and their decision must be ratified by the parliaments. He said it was unlikely that any country would refuse to ratify the decision.

Dienstbier said the Warsaw Pact was designed to ensure the permanent existence of the Stalinist system in central and Eastern Europe and to create a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. The Warsaw Pact was misused against Czechoslovakia in 1968 though the invasion of Czechoslovakia ran counter to the letter of the Pact.

HUNGARY**Former Foreign Minister Horn on Troop Withdrawal***AU2106084191 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 19 Jun 91 p 6*

["M.G."- signed interview with Gyula Horn, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party and chairman of the Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee; place and date not given: "Horn: We Have Been Telling Them To Leave Since 1985"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] Why are the Soviet troops leaving just now?—We asked Gyula Horn, who, as Hungarian foreign minister, signed the agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Moscow on 10 March 1990.

[Horn] The time has come to say that the former Hungarian political leadership urged the Soviet troops to leave Hungary for years. The negotiations themselves were quite slow and took several months to conclude. Quite a few problems hindered the agreement, such as

the pace of withdrawal. We even consulted the CSFR on this matter, and we finally agreed on the date of 30 June 1990.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Does that mean that this issue was also on the agenda in the Kadar era? Hungarian society did not know anything about it.

[Horn] We repeatedly brought this matter up at meetings of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact since 1985. According to the Hungarian position, the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary was a matter between our two countries; however, the Soviets kept saying that the deployment of Soviet troops in Hungary was connected to the general East-West balance of power. Our reply to this was that the Americans were present in Western Europe in order to counterbalance the general Soviet power superiority, as an element of NATO's strategy in Europe, and not in order to deter the Soviet troops stationed in Central Europe. Only restructuring has brought a change in this, too. However, one should know that, before Gorbachev, military decisions always preceded military policy decisions.

[NEPSZABADSAG] On the Hungarian side, what hindered an earlier withdrawal?

[Horn] The Soviet position, rather than domestic factors, was the reason behind this delay. It is not by accident that, in his speech at the signing ceremony held on 10 March 1990, [former Soviet foreign minister] Shevardnadze even exercised a sort of self-criticism by saying that such a decision could have been made earlier. However, in the Hungarian political leadership there were some who felt that the departure of Soviet troops could negatively affect Hungary's security.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Were they afraid of a Western threat?

[Horn] No.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Did the presence of Soviet troops represent an element of Hungarian domestic policy?

[Horn] This was no longer an issue in recent years. Let me quote myself. In a speech I gave in Hamburg in November 1988, I said that the deployment of Soviet troops in Hungary was an anachronism.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Many people said at the time that there were election considerations behind the timing of the agreement.

[Horn] This is not true. These negotiations were so long and tough that, on 7 March, we did not yet know whether we would sign the agreement on 10 March.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What will happen now, without the Soviets?

[Horn] The withdrawal of Soviet troops symbolizes our independence but, as one can see, mutual dependence is so great in the world today that even the big powers

cannot boast full independence. The Soviet Union remains here in our neighborhood. Nor should one forget this in the middle of the big festivities. Therefore, the socialists think that we must bid farewell to the Soviet troops in a friendly manner. We should tell them the following: "Peace be with you, Soviet soldiers."

Troop Withdrawal Compensation Talks Continue

Defense Ministry Report

*LD2206214391 Budapest MTI in English 2020 GMT
22 Jun 91*

[Text] Budapest, June 22 (MTI)—There are only formal changes in the attitude of the Soviet delegation which is holding talks on the financial implications of the troops pull-out: the flat refusals were replaced by diplomatic expressions. However, the gap between the positions of the negotiating parties has not narrowed, Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman of the Ministry of Defence, said after the Saturday round of talks.

The Soviet delegation invariably opposes that the closing protocol should contain the differences, which are mainly connected with the assessment of environmental damage and with the buildings, having an estimated value of 30,000 million forints, which are of no use for the Hungarians (pillboxes, concrete air-raid shelters). As a consequence, the biggest Hungarian claims would not be fixed in any document. General Shilov insists that the Hungarian side should lay down its standpoint in a separate document which would not be signed by the Soviet delegation.

The protocol compiled that way would only include technical matters and the Soviet claims, Keleti said. A protocol of this kind would not provide an appropriate basis for the subsequent, eventually political talks.

Since the Soviet delegation has not worked out a position based on calculations made under the mutually accepted methods, it is very difficult to collate their claims with the detailed Hungarian calculations. Furthermore, the Soviet delegation does not include appropriate experts, for instance environmental specialists. The Saturday talks were attended by two experts only. The Soviet side has now promised that seven experts would arrive from the Soviet Union on Sunday, Keleti said.

The talks are to resume on Sunday.

Military Official on Talks

*LD2106203191 Budapest MTI in English 1318 GMT
21 Jun 91*

[Text] Budapest, June 21 (MTI)—The Thursday session of the Hungarian Government was also attended by Lieutenant General Antal Annus, state secretary of defence and Hungarian Government commissioner in charge of the Soviet troops pull-out, who proceeded to read out the list of establishments constructed with

Hungarian funding and used up until now by the Soviet Army. From now on, these buildings will be used for public purposes.

Concerning the rumour that perhaps Lieutenant General Viktor Shilov was not the last Soviet soldier on Hungarian territory, Antal Annus told journalists at the government spokesman's briefing on Friday that the Hungarian authorities concerned had been led to believe that the one-time commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group was the last who left. Nevertheless, an investigation will be carried out into the substance of the rumour. Annus said he had no information of any desertion by Soviet soldiers in Hungary.

Annus expressed the hope that the sides would review the entire range of controversial issues in the financial talks on the Soviet troops pull-out. He said the Hungarian side was discontented with the Soviet approach to negotiations. Despite a previous promise, the Soviet delegation is yet to include an expert on environmental protection. There are some indications that the Soviet side does not take seriously the ecological damage it has caused, and is displaying an almost total indifference to the matter. For this reason, the Hungarian Government commissioner has not ruled out the possibility of involving foreign experts, should the two delegations fail to reach an agreement. Hungary is of the view that the sides should agree on compromise solutions to the debated issues. This far though, the Soviet Union has shown no signs of any preparedness to reach compromises, Annus said.

Comment on Deadlock

*LD2206160791 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1000 GMT 22 Jun 91*

[Text] At the compensation talks in Budapest yesterday related to the Soviet troop withdrawal, the Hungarian and Soviet positions became completely inflexible. The Soviets are not willing to concede the Hungarian demand for environmental damages, and General Shilov did not even assent to the inclusion of those topics on which agreement was not reached in the closing protocol planned for the 25th [June]. Shilov said that otherwise the document would amount to several volumes. From Moscow, Gabor Izbeki tries to shed light on the background to the attitude of the Soviet negotiating delegation:

[Izbeki] The Soviet military and political leadership, not only in the case of Hungary but also of Czechoslovakia and Poland, holds the view that the successors of their former allies are asking for what they believe to be unrealistic sums as compensation for the environmental damage caused by the Soviet Army.

However, there is scarcely mention of this in the press. The newspapers did not even carry the brief TASS report on the new Soviet-Hungarian round of talks, from which it might have emerged that the Soviet Union had raised its demand to 100 billion forints in exchange for the

transfer of the built installations. A problem for the officers and the Army is that those who return home have no dwellings, since the civilian population is also preoccupied with not having any. Therefore, why should an exception be made for the officers?

However, it emerges from the articles that the Soviets regard this topic as a prestige issue. Since they pulled out punctually, in return they expect the countries concerned, thus Hungary, not to take action that is overly disadvantageous for the Soviet Union on this issue. There are also opinions that these Hungarians are unreasonable. Due to the compensation dispute, they will leave thorns in the Soviets that will cost a much higher price in the cooling of relations than what they might possibly gain now.

However, in practice, the Soviet Union's current economic situation, completely rules out their paying even one dollar to the Hungarians. Proof is, for example, that they doubled the sum of their demand.

Soldiers Staying 'Illegally'

*LD2306212791 Budapest MTV Television Network
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 23 Jun 91*

[Text] [Announcer] In the regions of Rackeve and Szigetszentmiklos [south of Budapest], County Pest police headquarters investigators have found Soviets staying illegally. We telephoned two responsible official:

[Unidentified correspondent] Is the report true that Soviet soldiers who are staying here illegally have been taken to the transit camp in (Kerepestarcsa)?

[Unidentified official] What I can say in connection with this report is that it is true. In the course of the control procedure, it was established that four Soviet citizens are staying in this area without valid travel documents. It was also established that one of these is a professional soldier, a sergeant major. The others are civilians. Contrary to reports, they have no weapons. We will expel them from the country within 24 hours. This is now in progress.

We also established that four Soviet citizens are in the Dunavarsany area [south of Budapest]. They likewise did not have valid travel permits. They had a car with them and a large amount of cash and foreign currency. At present an identity check has not yet been completed, but we continue to follow with attention the movements of Soviet citizens staying here.

Talks With USSR on Troop Withdrawal End

No Protocol Signed

*LD2506134291 Budapest MTI in English 1313 GMT
25 Jun 91*

[Text] Budapest, June 25, 1991 (MTI-Econews)—Following several weeks of negotiations, the talks on the

Soviet troop pull-out from Hungary ended here today with no closing protocol having been signed.

The deadline for signing is June 30, Ministry of Defence Spokesman Gyorgy Keleti told Econews today.

The Soviet side refused to accept Hungary's proposal that the protocol should lay down that relevant clauses of Hungarian-Soviet documents concluded in 1957, 1958 and 1990 should be taken as decisive starting points at further talks.

In the absence of this, these agreements would be regarded as null and void once the troops withdrawal is complete.

These articles are of determining importance for reaching an agreement on the legal aspects of ownership and financial accounting.

The Soviets do not acknowledge Hungary's claim for 98 billion forints, 60 billion of which is for serious environmental damage.

The Soviet side also argues that Hungary's claim for over 5 billion forints for damage done to historic buildings is unjustified.

Until June 18, the Soviets were demanding 50 billion forints from the Hungarians, 27 billion of which was for more than 2,000 installations the Soviets built here illegally.

Most of these buildings are unsuitable for civilian purposes.

Then, suddenly, on June 18, the Soviets doubled their claim without any justification, and would only accept Hungarian environmental damage claims up to 2 billion forints which they recognized as having been caused during the actual pull-out.

Talks on the financial and legal implications of ownership are now likely to continue on a higher level, and it is imaginable that independent international experts will be called in to judge the controversial claims.

Antall, Fur on Talks

*LD2506232191 Budapest MTV Television Network
in Hungarian 1915 GMT 25 Jun 91*

[Studio interview with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall and Defense Minister Lajos Fur by Laszo Rapcsanyi: "Cabinet Questions"—live]

[Excerpts] [Rapcsanyi] Greetings to the prime minister and the defense minister, and I thank you for accepting the invitation for this live program at such a late hour since today you had quite enough on your plate. However, let us start with the most important thing: The result is no. Mr. Defense Minister.

[Fur] Indeed, signing that certain document that would have closed the circle of questions on the Soviet troop

withdrawal did not take place. However, it is an historic fact that the Soviet troop withdrawal is completed, and this pullout had another side that created a series of negotiations lasting for months between the two parties. Namely, the settlement of questions of an economic and financial nature took place parallel with the very precisely kept pullout schedule of the Soviet troops. Here the negotiations understandably showed the most varied fluctuations, since serious financial questions—I could also say that a calling to account—was in the cards. The various values left behind by the Soviet troops had to be assessed, and the damage had to be evaluated. The Hungarian party claimed this right from the beginning of the negotiations.

The Soviet parties did not represent the same stance all the way through in these matters. Their approach varied. Sometimes they showed greater readiness for agreement, or the preparations for an agreement—for this was only a preparation by experts here—and sometimes their stances went rigid. Thus, today also ended with the positions not nearing each other.

There are two issues here to lay down, two questions in one document—first to state partly the mere fact that the withdrawal of the Soviet troops has finished, and on the other hand, to summarize the financial questions debated at the experts' negotiations that will be finalized during intergovernmental negotiations.

[Rapcsanyi] How long was this agreement proposal?

[Fur] The agreement was not long, a text of one and a half pages. So we should not have to talk too long about this. However, views differed. This text of one and a half pages was our proposal. The Soviet party did not except this. Thus, the whole issue will be transferred now to the level of intergovernmental negotiations.

[Rapcsanyi] How did you part? Was it a cool parting?

[Fur] Perhaps not too cool. However, on the substance of the question, the expert talks, due to a very rigid approach, did not result in an agreement.

[Rapcsanyi] Mr. Prime Minister, was this surprising?

[Antall] I am not easily surprised. This could be expected. Naturally, we strived and still strive to achieve an agreement, but these are very serious and difficult questions. [passage omitted]

The fact that today we did not succeed in signing these minutes that Minister Fur discussed just now, in fact, does not mean some sort of catastrophic ending to the affair. It is only that the government representatives did not manage to come to an agreement regarding accounts.

I would like to mention here that, in principle, the actual accounting, referring to the whole pullout based on the intergovernmental agreement concluded in March 1990, has to be completed by 30 June. Well, so far, this was not successful. I think that the Hungarian government and the Hungarian government representative made every

effort so that the experts' investigations and assessments could be completed. We have rather missed seeing and also objected to the fact that the Soviet environmental experts have not arrived. Thus, the professional materials prepared by the Hungarian experts on environmental protection could not be examined. This is more than 10,000 pages, so to plow through this is rather a big job.

I would like to mention that the Soviet troops' stay in Hungary is based on various bilateral and international legal agreements. Until 1947, that is, until the Paris peace treaty, the Soviet Army stayed in Hungary as a warring party. [passage omitted]

Debates were carried out for months, and on 8 April 1991, an agreement was signed settling the method of accounting. This was also signed by Lieutenant General Shilov and Lieutenant General Annus, and an assessment of the damages was made on the basis of this agreement. This method, in fact, gave the sum that is the basis of the Hungarian demand.

The Soviet party calculates the costs on the basis of the establishments left behind here; thus, the Hungarian party acknowledges those buildings that are built according to Hungarian standards on areas where they can be used, etc. The value of these we take as a base, and naturally we consider them when we make out the inventory.

[Rapcsanyi] But the money is with them?

[Antall] At present, on one side this is a matter of accounting. There are certain items on one side, and on the other side there are the Hungarian claims for damages, usage, and other debts. So this is the financial settlement, the accounting in connection with the withdrawal of the troops.

We have to say that, by the 19th, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops had been completed, so the Soviet partner fulfilled the terms of the agreement concerning the withdrawal of the troops correctly. On the other side, however, we have not yet completed the financial settlements.

[Rapcsanyi] [passage omitted] Is it possible that when the troops of a large and proud country withdraw, the attitude of the nation is also present? Do you not think so Mr. Prime Minister?

[Antall] Obviously, there are a variety of interests in the Soviet Union, and it is also obvious that the army, on the one side, is putting its own interests and problems into the foreground. The location of the withdrawing soldiers, officers, and their families without doubt presents very great problems in the Soviet Union. Here it is simply a problem of existence for the Soviet Army, including the troops being withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and Germany as well.

In addition, it is also obvious that a withdrawal is a very difficult question. I meant it, not perhaps as a consolation but rather as a moral satisfaction, when I said at the farewell to Lt. Gen. Shilov that with this step the Soviet Union has increased its moral standing in world politics, its prestige. This, by the way, was quoted by the progressive papers in the Soviet Union as well.

[Rapcsanyi] And what did the Soviet Lt. Gen. say to this?

[Antall] The soldiers can keep quiet in a disciplined military manner.

So, apart from this, this is one side. On the other side are President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze [as heard]. Without trying to react to this, and certainly I do not think it is my task to defend now former Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and I would certainly not like to do him any harm. So obviously Soviet politics is not united in approving the withdrawal from the eastern central European region. We have to recognize that this at the end, in addition to international politics and the attitude of these people, is also a Soviet decision.

[Rapcsanyi] What kinds of diplomatic opportunities are available for us?

[Antall] We have to continue the negotiations persistently. Earlier you referred to the question of money. Clearly, we have with the Soviet Union a net positive balance of around 1.5 billion dollars. This means that the Soviet Union owes us 1.5 billion dollars for goods delivered until now. This is one side of the question. We have outstanding funds from the Soviet Union, about which we have to discuss on what terms and how they can repay this to us.

On the other hand we want to continue our trading relations with the Soviet Union. It is important that in Hungarian foreign trade the Soviet share has been reduced to below 20 percent. This is a significant decrease and means at the same time that the Hungarian economy can change its geographical direction, but it would be madness...

[Rapcsanyi, interrupts] Can you give up?

[Antall] We have not the slightest intention of giving up the Soviet market, or cooperation, and even less would we consider it right to have bad relations with the Soviet Union, which is a great power, a great nuclear power. So we have to view these questions together.

I think that the Soviet government honors international law and other considerations and will not mix foreign trade with the question of the financial settlement on the withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

[Rapcsanyi] Experts should read the detailed submission about the claims.

[Fur] They should already have read it earlier, and we should have worked together, cooperated with these experts, because these claims not only concern environmental damages, but the neglect of buildings, and whether these are still fit for use or not. So these questions are complex and many-sided, perhaps historic buildings, for example the Grassalkovics manor in Goe-dello. [passage omitted]

[Rapcsanyi] The Defense Ministry has, for the time being, virtually completed these talks. Is that not so? It cannot do anything else.

[Fur] It was not the ministry, as such, that was involved, but rather, the administrative state secretary of the ministry was the government commissioner who from the outset held talks with the Soviet side on the withdrawal and on the issue of economic accounts. Of course, it does not know what to do. However, allow me to stress what the prime minister emphasized just now: how important cooperation in the future is for us from the viewpoint not only of trade but also because of other considerations, especially because of security policy considerations in the new situation that has developed in the region. It is necessary to find the important points and possibilities of cooperation that can guarantee the region's security in this situation, the transitional stage, until a firmer European security system comes about. For example, we want to cooperate in the military (?sphere).

[Rapcsanyi] This has not happened, but irrespective of this, the Soviet troops have withdrawn, and I do not know what kind of atmosphere this now generates in the country's public opinion. However, the truth is that they have gone.

[Antall] I believe that the whole question should be handled thus. The Soviet troops have withdrawn; part of the agreement has been fulfilled. I believe that this is an historic turning point and an event of historic significance, that foreign troops are not stationed on Hungary's territory, and that Hungary has regained its sovereignty. Everyone should take note of this with dignity, without being taken in by demagoguery, because this is what the country's interest, the country's people, expects of us, and this is what the world expects of us: that we should take note of this with the appropriate dignity.

It is necessary to be aware that much, except for politicizing, can be done vis-a-vis geography, and geography does not change. Thus, this must be taken into consideration on the one hand, and on the other hand, we must very firmly represent Hungarian national interests. It is also natural that such statements [as heard] are expressed in the Soviet Union, since it obviously has not caused pleasure for everyone.

On the other hand, there has been no sort of catastrophe with this no. Let there be no misunderstanding. Czechoslovakia, for example, has not even concluded the agreement on methodological issues that we concluded

on 8 April, and Czechoslovakia still faces these tasks. Soviet troops have pulled out from there too, but talks continue on these issues.

When Minister Katushev was here, and I received him, we agreed that, on the one hand, Lt. Gen. Shilov would return in civilian clothes and continue the talks. That would be one of the levels, that of experts. On the other hand, the talks at the ministerial level would continue. Therefore, these talks will continue in the coming period. Here there are naturally arguments over whether the agreements that we concluded earlier, or rather that were concluded on behalf of Hungary in 1957, 1958, and whether the requirements contained in them have changed, because of the fact that 30 June (?has passed).

The legal basis on which we must hold talks at government level remains, and I imagine the Soviet Government will, in the end, judge this in a similar manner to us, and we will both strive for this. In international politics it would not be in the interest of either the Soviet Union or any other country for such focal points of tension to remain in this region.

[Rapcsanyi] On 30 June there will be various celebrations, large and small, and there will obviously be enthusiasm. Let the fact that there has been no signing now not disturb anything, and let the country, the nation, be aware that it has happened, with the appropriate dignity. I imagine this is what the prime minister was referring to. Thank God.

[Antall] The withdrawal of the Soviet Troops has taken place; the dissolution of CMEA will take place in Budapest; a similar gesture in connection with the Warsaw Pact will take place in Prague. Thus, they will be historic processes. This will all take place in connection with that. I believe that the main thing is that these things have happened, and the two sides in the end will resolve these economic, financial accounts, since it is in the interest of both of us that this should happen.

The Hungarian Government represents with full responsibility and resolve the intention for agreement, but we wish to draw up the balance on the basis of really calculated and well-definable sums, naturally not on the basis of guesses. We are striving to come to agreement, and we are striving to have a good relationship with the Soviet Union. The Hungarian people obviously must be aware of what the Soviet Union means as a trade partner, what it means as a neighbor, and it must be aware that this historic gesture must be made with decency and as befits Hungarian national dignity. Obviously such a decision is not easy for the Soviet Union, just as it is not easy for any major country to withdraw from territories or to relinquish territories, of which there have been examples in the past decades on the part of other major countries and empires. This, properly speaking, worked to the benefit of these countries regarding their international reputation.

[Rapcsanyi] Prime Minister and Defense Minister, thank you for the late evening conversation.

Dear viewers, we will meet in the fall with the program, "Cabinet Questions," and with similar programs. Goodbye.

Gonczi Letter to Gorbachev

LD2406192391 Budapest MTI in English 1442 GMT
24 Jun 91

[Text] Budapest, June 24 (MTI)—To mark the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, Arpad Gonczi, president of the Republic of Hungary, has sent a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the Soviet Union, saying among other things:

Now that the Soviet Union has withdrawn its army from Hungary by its own volition within the framework of a bilateral agreement resulting in the restoration in full of the country's sovereignty, allow me to express my sincere gratitude to you.

The period between the end of the war and your decisive political activity was marked in Europe by immobility, a cold war, a nuclear ban and nuclear peace. However, now a country on the way to democracy is bidding farewell to the troops of another newly democratizing country. I very much hope that the years lying ahead of us will issue in a period of genuine peace to the peoples of both countries, the period of a single Europe and democracy.

The Soviet people are justly proud of their army and their role in the Great Patriotic War, and have reason to mourn their heroes, many of whom are resting in Hungarian soil. The least I can promise today is that we shall respect and look after their graves.

In expressing my thanks to you for the disciplined and planned pull-out of the Soviet Army, I would also like to believe that your recollections of Hungary are favourable. I am hopeful that in the future the two countries will be struggling side by side for the common goal, a single and peaceful Europe.

Antall on Sovereignty

AU2506101291 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 22 Jun 91 p 6

[Interview with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall by Attila Kristof; place and date not given: "Our Sovereignty Is Guaranteed by Our Domestic Stability"]

[Text] [Kristof] The pace of the Soviet troop withdrawal proves that our country's independence can hardly be linked to a specific day or moment. This is clearly a longer process. What stage have we reached now?

[Antall] According to the treaty, as of 1 July 1991, Hungary will be a country where no foreign troops will be stationed (not even formally). Our country will be

freed of all alliance constraints that used to affect Hungarian sovereignty. However, during our period of government, Hungary already operated totally independently of the Soviet Union. I can calmly state that since the inauguration of our government, Soviet policy, the Soviet Government, and the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary have not affected our functioning in the least. They did not force their will upon us either directly or indirectly.

[Kristof] When did you first feel that this stage had been reached?

[Antall] I clearly felt it when the treaty was signed. However, in 1988, we could already feel that we were at the beginning of a process that would lead to the present stage. That is what Viktor Orban [parliamentary faction leader of the Federation of Young Democrats] spoke about at the funeral of Imre Nagy and his followers. It was mentioned in the by-election program of parliamentary representative Gabor Rozsik. At the second national congress of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] in October 1989, I said that if they took the handcuffs off our wrists, we would lend them a friendly hand. At that point, I was already convinced that the Soviet troops could withdraw.

[Kristof] Can this emerging independence be realized and sustained in the immediate proximity of a superpower?

[Antall] From a constitutional and international legal point of view, our independence and sovereignty definitely come into force after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. However, it is also true that a country's geographical position automatically implies the acknowledgement of certain duties and geopolitical factors. The Soviet Union and Russia have been great powers (even superpowers) for centuries; the Soviet Union has even been a nuclear world power. That is one thing that has to be borne in mind. The other thing to remember is that the EC is the basis for stability in the whole of Europe, and a united Germany clearly plays—and will continue to play—a very important role in this community. I definitely think that the presence of NATO and the United States in Europe is very important. The fates of North America and Europe are indivisible. The Atlantic alliance and the Atlantic concept date back to centuries ago, and from the point of view of European security, the two World Wars prove the indivisibility of the United States and Europe. America's presence is quite simply a fundamental guarantee for European security. European unity and the Atlantic alliance are the two elements that I consider to be fundamentally important for Hungary's foreign policy. We have to find the guarantees that will secure Hungary's independence and the independence of other countries that do not belong to NATO and have not yet been accepted into the EC.

[Kristof] The unification of Western Europe cannot take place again without Hungary's participation....

[Antall] I do not think that unification can be limited to Western Europe any more. The EC will take a step forward at some stage. Following the customs union and the creation of a common currency in 1993, Sweden and Austria will be the two countries to have easiest access to the EC. During the second half of the decade, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe will have a chance of gaining full membership in the community. The question is: How will we be able to guarantee the security of this region over the next five or six years when destabilizing problems may emerge in the Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe, from the Baltics to the Balkans? Nevertheless, I think that Hungary's independence and sovereignty are guaranteed in principle if the country maintains its domestic stability. In the present international situation, this country can really only be ruined from the inside.

[Kristof] Does our economic reliance on the Soviet Union not imply further dependency?

[Antall] I think that the former dependency between the Soviet Union and Hungary can be turned into good-neighborly cooperation, a cooperation that is based on sovereignty. The Soviet Union's internal transformation and the Soviet crisis forced the Hungarian economy to change directions, to emerge on the "hard markets," and to present quality goods that it could sell. Hungary's economy and know-how can be very proud of the fact that they succeeded in doing this. Hungary's economy was able to change directions. The drop in Soviet-Hungarian economic relations represented an enormous loss for us, but at the same time, we underwent a positive change: Hungary is now less and less dependent on Soviet raw materials and the Soviet market.

[Kristof] What does that imply in the long term?

[Antall] I think that we have accomplished some long-term changes. Naturally, we would not like to lose the Soviet Union as a significant trade partner: It would be extremely stupid to lose the Soviet market. The question is primarily how we will cope with the interim period until the Soviet Union and the individual Republics become solvent. We could develop long-term cooperation agreements based on mutual interests.

[Kristof] Do our debts to the West not represent another limitation in our independence?

[Antall] Naturally, our moves and our situation are made more difficult by Hungary's debt, which totals \$21 billion, and particularly by the fact that our country has to pay \$4 billion in interest and capital repayments this year. This clearly represents dependency. Almost 40 percent of our debt is owed to Germany, approximately another 40 percent is due to Japan, and at the same time, half the working capital invested in Hungary comes from the United States. These factors influence our steps and our behavior, but we try to maintain our independence in all circumstances. We have to stick to our fundamental values, such as national independence, national sovereignty, a constitutional state, and a market

economy; we have to remain faithful to the European system of values that developed during the 19th century. Nevertheless, at the end of the 20th century, we cannot interpret all this in the spirit of the 19th century. European integration acknowledges mutual dependence on the basis of national sovereignty and voluntary decisions. Our indebtedness is a fact, as are the very strict requirements that we are fulfilling in connection with this indebtedness. We cannot harbor any illusions: Big multinational enterprises, banks, and governments are trying to represent their own interests in Hungary (as well as in other countries), they are trying to increase their own economic influence. This is not as simple or straightforward as many people think. Competition is very tough. Governments and heads of government might be on good terms, but U.S. and German (or French and Japanese) enterprises still fight to kill on the market. Hungary has not been left out of this competition. That is one of the advantages of a market economy, but these governments and countries also express their influencing efforts in very loud and clear terms. "Total economic independence"—the possibility of autonomous decisions and a situation where we are the only ones to decide with our 10 million-strong population and our order of magnitude—is a naive concept. It is either naive or demagogic.

[Kristof] To what extent would our possible accession to the Western European Union [WEU] or our EC membership influence all this?

[Antall] As far as our EC membership is concerned, we are currently talking about an association that could lead to full accession. Hopefully, this association will come into force on 1 January 1992. The most critical points are our agricultural imports and the textile issue. Those are the two points where negotiations are the toughest. Rich countries have a great surplus of agricultural products and poor countries are insolvent. In answer to the other part of your question, I have to say that in 1990, in Helsinki, I pointed out that I did not think it was inconceivable to examine the possibility of the WEU (as a European union) providing a certain security framework for those European countries that are not members of NATO or the EC; these countries could join the WEU through the intermediary of European countries like the "Visegrad three" [Hungary, Poland, and the CSFR]. We spoke at length about this when I delivered my speech in Helsinki, and since then it has been stated repeatedly that the WEU could be revived, that it could represent a link that would connect the EC and European countries to NATO. The argument against a broadening of the WEU (as a union for European military security) is the fact that it arouses the mistrust of the United States, as though it were aimed against NATO. That would be out of the question. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, might not be too thrilled about this kind of rapprochement either. These questions are slowly coming to the fore.

[Kristof] What role could the Hexagonale play in the defense of Hungarian independence?

[Antall] The Hexagonale—the successor of the Pentagonale—is, in fact, only just emerging. Hungary greatly contributed to Poland's accession to this organization, and this is something that the Poles greatly appreciate. With Poland's accession, the Hexagonale will represent a regional union that stretches geographically from the Baltics to the Mediterranean. It is important that the Hexagonale includes a NATO member (Italy), a neutral country (Austria), a non-aligned country (the SFRY), and three former Warsaw Pact countries (with Poland's accession). The Hexagonale is therefore a very heterogeneous organization with a mixed structure. It cannot be said that in the Hexagonale, "the blind lead the blind." Indeed, there are some blooming market economies in the Hexagonale (Italy and Austria). The Hexagonale is primarily a political organization. Secondly, it can further economic cooperation. The development of a transport infrastructure is of key importance to economic cooperation—that is to say, the building of big European transport roads on a north-south axis. Italy's Foreign Minister de Michelis was one of the initiators in this area; the whole idea, in fact, stems from Italy, and it shows that Italy is undertaking an increasingly big role in Central Europe. Otto von Habsburg once said that this organization might seem anti-German. That is incorrect. The Hexagonale is absolutely not directed against Germany—on the contrary, it has close links with Germany. With the inclusion of Poland, Hungary has come to the center of the Hexagonale; the road south from Poland goes through Hungary. This is also important for Slovakia, and the Slovak Government appreciates this. Poland's presence excludes any possibility of a north-south transport road avoiding Hungary or the Carpathian Basin....

[Kristof] We have talked about independence and stability. Is Hungary's situation more stable or better than it was six months ago, when you last granted MAGYAR NEMZET an interview?

[Antall] It is difficult to answer that question. I think that as far as the future and real developments are concerned, Hungary's economic situation has improved. There are facts to prove this point: Hungary's hard currency reserves have tripled over the last year, our economy was able to turn toward hard markets in the West, we survived the winter, and we survived the collapse of the Soviet market. If we compare our situation to the situation of other former Communist countries, we have to say that the recent period has in fact been successful. However, let us consider what all this has meant for the Hungarian population: The last few months have represented a drop or a stagnation in living standards for large parts of the population, domestic social tensions have grown, people have become increasingly dissatisfied, the settlement of the property issue has been dragged out in time, and we have not passed certain economic bills—we can hardly be satisfied with all this. Despite all that, whilst acknowledging and taking all difficult points into account, I can still say that we are on the right track.

POLAND**Soviet Troop Withdrawal on Schedule**

*LD0607214591 Warsaw PAP in English 1512 GMT
5 Jul 91*

[Text] Warsaw, July 5— The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, and the transit of Soviet forces from Germany and Czecho-Slovakia, which began in April, proceeded according to the agreed plan in the second quarter of 1991, the office of the plenipotentiary at the Polish Ministry of National Defence for the withdrawal and transit of Soviet forces announced on Friday [5 July].

The withdrawals have been limited chiefly to headquarters security units and technical support services from the Soviet Air Force, with a small number of military units. In all, 38 rail transports have been employed in the exercise.

In addition, 104 transport and passenger flights have been made across Polish airspace.

The transit of Soviet forces from Germany has so far involved 680 rail transports, comprising 4,737 wagons. Transit from Czecho-Slovakia was completed by the end of May.

IRAN

Ayatollah Assails U.S. Mideast Disarmament Plan

*LD2806123291 Tehran IRNA in English 1052 GMT
28 Jun 91*

[Text] Tehran, 28 June (IRNA)—The United States came under attack today for its policy of disarming the Muslim states in the Middle East. "Take the initiative yourself if you are really committed to the principle (of arms control) you are propagating," a senior cleric urged Washington.

"Arrogant powers who chant disarmament slogans should evacuate their own arsenals first," Ayatollah Mohammad Emami-Kashani said in his Friday prayers sermons at the Tehran University. By putting forth this issue, he said, the oppressive powers do not mean to

restore peace and tranquility in the region, "because they themselves continue mass arms production, and spill various types of weaponry to the occupied Palestine."

Ayatollah Emami-Kashani, a member of the Council of Guardians, also hailed the "appropriate conducting" of the hajj ceremonies this year, and thanked God the "Disavowal of Pagans" rally was held properly.

He elsewhere recalled the anniversary of the martyrdom of the late Ayatollah Mohammad Hoseyni Beheshti (former chief justice) and 72 of his aides in the 28 June 1981 blast at the headquarters of the (now dissolved) Islamic Republic Party. Their martyrdom further unmasked the nature of the enemies of the Islamic revolution and the vassals of foreigners who intended to undermine the pillars of the Islamic Republic system in Iran, he remarked.

GENERAL

Mitterrand Plan for Disarmament Assessed

*PM0107153791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Jun 91 Second Edition p 5*

[PRAVDA correspondent V. Bolshakov report: "The Mitterrand Plan. France and the Problem of Disarmament"]

[Text] Paris, June—President F. Mitterrand's "peace plan" was announced at a joint news conference given by the French president and FRG Chancellor Kohl following their meeting in Lille. But the plan itself was made public a few days later. The Elysee Palace decided to time the publication of the presidential peace initiative with the next, 37th, session of the WEU Assembly.

The "Mitterrand Plan" considers the problem of arms reduction and disarmament in three aspects—specific [vidovoy], regional, and global.

France advocates the elimination of chemical weapons and in this connection urges all states to subscribe to the 1989 Paris Convention. It advocated banning production of bacteriological weapons, as envisaged by the 1972 treaty, and proposed holding a conference to monitor fulfillment of this treaty. The president's plan aims to reduce nuclear weapons arsenals to the lowest possible level ensuring deterrence. But, while backing Moscow's and Washington's nuclear disarmament efforts, Paris has once again reiterated that it will only be able to subscribe to this process when the USSR, the United States, and the other nuclear powers reduce their nuclear arsenals to a level comparable to the French.

I must point out that France has pledged to sign and ratify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, whose provisions it has observed without being a party to it. It has urged all other states to follow its example. This plan envisages strict verification in order to prevent the use of missile hardware for aggressive purposes. At the same time France advocated international cooperation in the peaceful conquest and study of space. All interested states have also been instructed to formulate a "code of conduct" in space.

In the conventional weapons sphere the Paris plan envisages establishing a balance of forces in terms of regions, with every state's right to security being observed, plus strict controls over arms exports. To this end France proposes a conference involving the five great powers in order to formulate arms trade regulations and set up an international arms trade register under the auspices of the UN secretary general.

In a regional context France draws the attention of all peoples and governments to the experience of Europe, which, it stresses, has moved away from "cold war" to peaceful coexistence and cooperation within the CSCE framework.

The United Nations and its Security Council are assigned the global role of coordinating and at the same time exercising vigilant control over the arms reduction and disarmament process.

Commenting on this plan, even the French press noted that it is above all of a political nature and reflects the French approach to security and disarmament under the new conditions—after the "Iron Curtain" has come down and the Gulf war has ended, as a result of which the strategic landscape has changed totally.

Domestic French reaction to the "Mitterrand Plan" was by and large favorable right across the political spectrum. France's accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was welcomed to an equal degree by a French Communist Party Central Committee Plenum (4-5 June this year) and by J. Chirac, a right-wing opposition leader and former prime minister. Admittedly, there was the sole difference that both the Communists and the other supporters of peace stressed that it is necessary to go further and, in particular, impose a ban on French nuclear testing. While right-wingers demanded advances in improving the French nuclear arsenal and under no circumstances cutting back appropriations for these purposes. There are no great differences between right-wingers and Socialists on this point, incidentally. By and large the French president's plan met with a fairly restrained response in the West, while the United States greeted it with considerable irritation. This is not only due to the existence of the well-known "Bush plan." The French plan does not in principle run counter to the latter as regards the Near and Middle East. But differences—evidently, serious differences—are emerging as regards regional security, above all in Europe.

As is well known, France left the NATO military organization under De Gaulle although it is still a member of the Atlantic alliance to this day. De Gaulle was afraid that Washington would be able to involve France in a nuclear conflict against its will and without even informing it about this in advance. He had grounds for misgivings of this kind. And these have not disappeared for any of his presidential successors, F. Mitterrand included. Suffice it to recall the lengthy debates within the NATO leadership about a "preemptive nuclear strike," Washington's reluctance to renounce the "right" to strike first, the whole saga of siting Pershing-2's in Western Europe, the raid on Libya, etc.

Under Mitterrand France has reacted keenly to the changes in Eastern Europe, above all in the USSR, the establishment of military cooperation within the framework of the Helsinki process, the burial of the "cold war," and the elimination of the Warsaw Pact. Paris has set about seeking ways of creating a fundamentally new system of collective European security in which France could play a more active and undoubtedly autonomous role. This system did not preclude but even presupposed partnership with the United States. But only partnership, not NATO-style automatic Atlantic subordination to Washington.

Hence the idea of creating a system of "European security" of which British-French nuclear forces would be the backbone. The idea of setting up a joint French-West German military brigade sprang from the same root. Most recently there has been the creation of a committee of chiefs of staff of WEU countries' armed forces to coordinate the allies' actions during the crisis in the Persian Gulf, where the WEU countries sent 75 percent of all the warships stationed there during the blockade. Lastly, 11 April this year F. Mitterrand directly proposed creating a defensive organization, leadership of which would be effected within the WEU framework.

Everything—and French Foreign Minister R. Dumas confirmed this in particular when addressing the Paris session of the WEU Assembly—indicates that in the Elysee Palace's plans this union has been given the role of NATO's successor in a future European confederation, the creation of which was first proposed by F. Mitterrand last year. The WEU's increasingly close contacts with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and the emergent points of contact with Bulgaria and Romania confirm that people in France, whose influence within the WEU has increased extraordinarily of late, do not rule out but rather presuppose granting all these former Warsaw Pact members the status of full-fledged members of the WEU. They are making virtually no secret of this now.

France has pinned considerable hopes on the prospect of creating some kind of European armed forces that would in one form or another come under WEU jurisdiction. For instance, the idea was voiced of setting up solely European military transport aviation to perform operations similar to those undertaken during the Gulf crisis. Other ideas have also been floated. This has seriously worried Atlanticists, above all in Washington. They have acted to counter the plans.

Within the framework of the radical reorganization of armed forces a decision was adopted 29 May in Brussels to set up European rapid-response forces. F. Mitterrand said in Lille 30 May that France has no intention of participating. It is becoming known that the new NATO rapid-response forces will consist mainly of British troops and that they will be commanded by a British general. That comes as a fresh blow to France.

The Elysee Palace is indicating to journalists and diplomats that the president was simply infuriated by NATO's decision on the rapid-response forces. And not only by that decision. The U.S. desire to politicize the North Atlantic alliance and impart to the NATO Council the functions that the Council of Europe performs has threatened to deprive Paris of its traditional leading role in European affairs. The least of Mitterrand's expectations was that even H. Kohl would tag along with the Americans.

France objectively found itself isolated. The "Mitterrand Plan" has enabled it to partially retrieve the initiative.

Apart from global recommendations it has given Paris an opportunity to present its concept for pan-European security—a concept which, in Paris' view, is more conducive to regional cooperation within the framework of the Helsinki process without any transatlantic diktat.

The next battle over this issue unfolded at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Copenhagen, where they discussed new NATO strategy. France partially took revenge for Brussels, but it was unable to extricate NATO from Washington's diktat this time either.

The saga of the president's plan is extremely instructive. Since it shows how complex any processes of change are on our continent freed from the ice floes of the "cold war."

Proponent of Limited Nuclear War Ridiculed

PM0307103891 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Jun 91 Union Edition p 8

[Commentary by A. Ostalskiy: "Not Obligatory To Destroy Moscow and New York.' Atomic Bomb Advocate Goes on the Offensive"]

[Text] Why do politicians spend so much time and effort on complex talks, why do experts develop arms limitation and monitoring concepts, and why does the public get obsessed with some sort of detente and "new thinking"? What is the point of all this fuss when, as can be ascertained from primary sources, nuclear war is not such a bad thing and need not be feared too much.

Evidently these are the conclusions a reader is supposed to reach after reading an interview in the USSR Union of Writers newspaper DEN [The Day] (No. 12) with "one of the most secret people" in our country, who has been studying the development and construction of nuclear weapons for 32 years—that is how the newspaper introduces him. In this interview V.Z. Nechay, Lenin Prize and State Prize laureate and director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics, criticizes the policy of "unilateral concessions" to the West (which is how, in his opinion, the Americans understand "new political thinking") and refutes a "30-year-old delusion"—the concept of the atomic bomb as a weapon of mass destruction. "In actual fact nuclear weapons are primarily designed (and secondarily?!—A.O.) to destroy military targets," he states. And further: "There is no need whatever to destroy New York or Moscow. To begin with (and afterward?—A.O.) strikes will be made on launch silos, military bases, and command centers."

By all accounts we are talking about the concept of a so-called "limited nuclear war," with which certain Western strategists were at one time obsessed and which our journalists so convincingly debunked. This doctrine is, of course, very convenient for drumming up additional weapons appropriations and for calming the public, but it does not withstand any criticism from the common sense viewpoint. Why should we assume that, being under threat of extinction, this or that state will

suddenly humanely refrain from utilizing all the nuclear potential at its disposal and will not start using megaton bombs which can wipe cities of millions of people from the face of the Earth? Moreover, all this has at best a theoretical point only in the case of a sudden, preemptive strike being launched. Only then would it be possible to cherish any hope that the destruction of launch silos and command centers could "disarm" the enemy and save us from a retaliatory strike and a nuclear Armageddon... So then, maybe we really will lull the Americans with talks about "new political thinking" and transition to the market, while we ourselves one quiet night... wham!

But all the same, what can be done against the effects of even a limited nuclear war?—after all, many scientists think that the Earth would not survive even that. Nechay does not believe these warnings—and urges us not to believe them. "If we can get by with 100 detonations... nothing particularly terrible will happen.... I believe that our homegrown ecologists have caused more harm to people's health than all the nuclear tests carried out in the country put together."

I admit that until now I have taken a rather skeptical view of efforts to depict the "captains" of our military-industrial complex as such crackpots—like the amoral villains brought to life in the characters of S. Kubrick's well-known film satire "Dr. Strangelove, or How I Stopped Worrying and Learned To Love the Bomb." People did not believe that it could be these very people, involved in high military policy, who would so threaten perestroika and democratization in our country. But when figures who are fully conversant with our economy's catastrophic situation demand the maintenance of or else an increase in expenditure on "instruments of death," it becomes really terrifying.

Surely Nechay doesn't really believe that the very "weakening of the country's military potential will inevitably bring in its wake a decline in the economy and the degradation of science and industry"? But we innocents were supposing that all these terrors were already happening before our eyes—and primarily because of inordinate and unprecedented expenditure on the "military machine" which is literally gobbling up the country.

...But it is nevertheless comforting that at least New York and Moscow do not necessarily have to be destroyed. Somehow that just makes you glad and lifts the spirit.

Gorbachev Sends Message to IPPNW Congress

PM2806154391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Jun 91 Second Edition p 1

[President Gorbachev message "To the 10th Congress of 'International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War'; date not given]

[Text] Greetings to the representatives of one of the most influential and authoritative public movements of modern times.

You have played an outstanding part in making the world community aware of the deadly nature of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has shared your movement's ideas from the outset. We highly value its contribution to the shaping of the new, humanitarian thinking.

In recent years the threat of nuclear war has significantly receded as a result of the efforts of politicians, scientists, and public figures. Entire classes of nuclear weapons have been destroyed. We are hoping to see the conclusion in the very near future of a treaty between the USSR and the United States on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive armaments.

The Soviet Union will continue to work hard to achieve an accord on a total and general ban on nuclear tests.

I wish your congress fruitful work for the sake of people's lives and health. I am counting on our future cooperation in moving toward the great goal—a nuclear-free world.

[Signed] USSR President M. Gorbachev.

START TALKS

'Considerable Progress' in Arms Talks

LD2006220991 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 1930 GMT 20 Jun 91

[Telephone report by correspondent Viktor Levin from Berlin]

[Summary From Poor Reception] Viktor Levin introduces a voice excerpt of USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh speaking to reporters.

"We have been discussing precisely the basic problems with which this summit will be filled. Therefore, progress, from the point of view of moving toward the summit, is predetermined by our accords on these issues. We have made considerable progress with regard to the problems of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons, although several technical questions remain. I think that during the remaining week we will be able to close certain—and perhaps all—of the existing problems, and by this token ensure the timely holding of the summit between the leaders of the USSR and the United States."

Levin quotes Aleksandr Bessmertnykh as saying that work on the strategic offensive nuclear weapons treaty could be finished in a few weeks, and makes general comments on the content of their conversation. Levin concludes that "useful, good work has been done."

Bessmertnykh on Conversation With Baker

*OW2506023991 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1830 GMT 24 Jun 91*

["Diplomatic Panorama—Aleksandr Bessmertnykh: Both Sides Wish To Complete Work on START As Soon as Possible"; INTERFAX headline; following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] This is the text of a conversation the Soviet Foreign Minister, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, had with a group of journalists, Pavel Vasilyev amongst them, on his way from Berlin to Moscow. In Berlin, Bessmertnykh took part in the first meeting of the council of foreign ministers on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, had meetings with James Baker, the U.S. Secretary of State, and some other politicians.

Actually, there were two meetings with James Baker. The first one had been planned before and was followed by a press conference, and the second one, which lasted a quarter of an hour, took place on the morning of Bessmertnykh's last day in Berlin at Baker's request. Bessmertnykh explained that "a question had arisen which we had failed to solve, but we didn't want to do this by phone."

When asked by the INTERFAX correspondent whether it was true that Baker had given him a message from President Bush to be passed to President Gorbachev, Bessmertnykh replied, "you can put it that way."

"My meeting with the Secretary of State had been planned before," the minister said. When we are together in a place, we always reserve some time for a meeting. Lately we have been particularly eager on such meetings, because we have to speed up our work on START. Our second task is to carry on with our work on the convocation of a peace conference on the Middle East."

As regards START, Bessmertnykh said that there were three purely technical problems that were yet to be solved.

"Whenever any such problems remain unsolved at the end of negotiations, one moves forward by millimetres, or by centimetres at best," said Bessmertnykh.

"Above all, it is the problem of telemetry, namely we will no longer be ciphering information on any new types of ballistic missiles that are being tested. What remains to be done now is a purely technical matter: In what way is the information to be recorded from a missile that has been launched, and what parameters are to be used."

In explaining the Soviet approach to the issue, Bessmertnykh said further on that "we are trying to compare everybody's positions in order to resolve the issue." "I believe it would make sense to solve large-scale technical problems which can be solved at the moment, and leave the finer points to the experts, who will finish the work when the treaty is ready to be signed."

Another problem the Soviet Union is concerned about is, according to Bessmertnykh, is the number of warheads to be taken into account during the reductions. There are missiles which were tested with a certain number of warheads; for example one type of ballistic missile on Soviet nuclear submarines was tested with eight warheads. But, later on, the number of warheads for those type of missiles was for technical reasons reduced to four. All missiles of this type carry the new number of warheads. But the treaty requires that one take account of the number of warheads the missile had when it was being tested. "Now we are trying to come to terms," Bessmertnykh went on, "on which number is to be taken into account. We would like to find a solution that would suit both sides."

The third problem, Bessmertnykh said, are the parameters according to which a missile is to be considered new. There is a whole set of parameters: the length of the missile, the size of its first stage, etc. There are two parameters we still have to come to an agreement on.

The main difficulty is to develop a mathematical formula in order to determine the proper ratio, namely what increase in some parameter or other can warrant considering the missile as belonging to a new type.

We have an agreement whereby the treaty has to be signed as a whole. It cannot be signed before all problems have been solved.

Bessmertnykh said, "We are moving by centimetres. The final stage of any negotiations is their most difficult stage: there is nowhere to retreat, there is no time to make any changes, and getting to any compromises is very difficult."

He added that all the problems would be solved within the next few weeks, and the work on START would be completed.

Bessmertnykh was asked whether both sides were willing to finish the work, and, if so, why no deadline had been set. He answered, "Both the Americans and ourselves have a kind of deadline in our heads. This is good in a way, because it has a certain disciplining effect on us. But it has a negative effect as well: when you are short of time, you begin to hurry and can make rash agreements. Therefore we have agreed to work as fast as possible, and that was, you might say, a political decision."

The Americans, he said, had at the very last moment produced some new considerations, which, of course, is holding up the work. "This is not the only reason for the delay, of course, there are other unresolved issues as well."

Bessmertnykh emphasised that neither side was trying to slow down the negotiations. "I got the impression from my conversations with Baker that the American side is also interested in speeding up the process."

This week, a second group of experts is getting together, at a higher level. "I think we shall be able to solve one

and a half, and possibly two, of the three problems," said Bessmertnykh. "If we reach agreement on the formula for the solution of the more complicated problems, the remaining problem may be solved in a week."

In assessing the results of his Berlin meetings with Baker, he said, "We have moved ahead about one and a half centimetres on each of the three problems."

On the Middle East issue he said, "We are in permanent contact at the moment. The situation is constantly changing, different countries are taking different steps, which have both positive and negative effects."

And, although the convocation of a conference has practically been decided on, there are still a lot of problems, caused above all by the stand taken by Israel. Yitzhay Shamir, for example, has sent a message to President Bush, basically negative in content. "We should have regular meetings with each other in order to work out proper measures to take."

"I am shortly going to have a meeting with some Palestinians in Moscow," said Bessmertnykh. "We are trying to take advantage of one of the opportunities to settle the Middle East crisis."

Reporters Tour 'Secret' Nuclear Arms Development Site

PM0107134191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jun 91 pp 1,4

[Special correspondent A. Khokhlov article: "The Emperor Bomb. First Ever Reportage From a City Which Held Mankind's Future in Its Hands"]

[Text] The Americans spent more than three decades fruitlessly looking for this Soviet city. It was only a few years ago that CIA analysts succeeded in identifying the object of their quest among the multitude of "post office boxes" and even to obtain photographs of it taken from space. As a matter of fact, even this scant information about the city where the majority of our nuclear charges are conceived and designed was not released to the U.S. public at large, let alone the world public. This is why we can only describe as an unexpected gift the suggestion, received from Professor V. Mikhaylov, USSR deputy minister of atomic power and industry, that we visit Chelyabinsk-70 and the Technical Physics All-Union Scientific Research Institute [VNIITF] located there. We succeeded in visiting a place where access to outsiders is prohibited, and to see that which to this day has been a state secret of the highest classification—the Soviet nuclear bomb.

Beyond the Atomgrad Fence

...Closed cities begin at checkpoints and strips of no-man's land reminiscent of border zones, with their several rows of barbed wire fencing. Life goes on as normal beyond the border separating this Soviet city

from the rest of the country. The only difference being that children here play out in the streets until late at night, and adults leave the keys to their apartments underneath the doormats. Another difference from the "outside world"—people work from dawn till dusk and even later, and even when they go to bed they tend to tuck their slide rules or microcalculators underneath their pillows.

Chelyabinsk-70 is similar to Arzamas-16, which our newspaper described in November 1990, while the VNIITF is the twin brother and competitor of the Experimental Physics All-Union Scientific Research Institute in Arzamas. There are fewer than 10 such unique scientific centers in the world.

The city and the institute came into being simultaneously in 1955. At that time the top political circles in the country believed that war with the United States was inevitable, even though this was not widely publicized. Evidently, the Americans held the same belief. Arzamas-16 was one of the first installations on a list of targets due to be destroyed, contained in plans for the nuclear bombing of the USSR which were obtained by Soviet intelligence. It was decided to build another center in the Urals so as to disperse the scientific potential of this leading sector of science. War with the United States did not materialize, but an important "side" effect was achieved. Nuclear physics in the state of supermonopolism started developing on the basis of tough competitive struggle between two most powerful scientific groups. This may be the chief reason why the USSR achieved parity in strategic arms with the United States, which the Americans themselves still perceive as the most important guarantee of peace and stability on earth.

The city started with Site No. 21. Even before the war this site housed a "sharashka" [Gulag-administered scientific research facility staffed by camp inmates], where biologists conducted radiological experiments in a building next to a hut-dacha occupied by "All-Union Elder" M.I. Kalinin. Work on an even broader scale was launched there after the war. The institute's buildings and housing blocks shot up next to hothouses and open garden plots where test plants were being watered with radioactive "juice," and only later did the city "spill over" along the banks of beautiful Lake Sinara.

The institute did not develop from scratch, either. K. Shchelkin, Ye. Zababakhin, M. Yangel, D. Vasilyev, B. Ledenev, and G. Lominskiy all worked in the VNIITF. It will probably take quite some time before we find out what these people did and what contribution they made to science.

But the bulk of the city's residents were not wise old men. Talented young people arrived in Chelyabinsk-70 straight from university. The country's scientific potential was being rigorously selected. Not on the basis of personnel files and questionnaires as one might imagine, but on the basis of brains and talent.

"We went behind the 'barbed wire' without regrets and without emotions," VNIITF Chief Engineer Valentin Grigoryevich Rukavishnikov recalls. "We knew that we would be engaged on work of the greatest importance for the country—its defense. We worked like men possessed. 'Workaholism' was universal and was considered a natural phenomenon. Meanwhile we led a merry and open life..."

Of course, the times when summertime scientific seminars were conducted... in the lake—the audience in the water and the speaker on a sunbed so that he could concentrate on the topic—are long past. Only old-timers recall the times when the whole city would go out "in nature" for communal campfire sing songs. Nowadays the doctors and candidates of sciences spend their days off working hard on garden plots. The dacha settlement, known for three decades as the "Hill of Fools," has been renamed—in the spirit of the times—the "Field of Miracles." The city's residents—half-scornfully and half-enviously dubbed by all their low-income neighbors in the Urals as "softies" because of their comparatively higher standards of living—have discovered the meaning of lines, coupons, and the impossibility of managing from one payday to the next. The city has grown up and life in it has become tougher.

Just like everywhere else.

But even this special city has its own special worries. The majority of people are not perturbed by coupon and ration card worries. Today the greatest worry of people who have prided themselves all their lives for actually working in the defense industry is that the country no longer needs their labor.

If You Want Peace—Prepare for War?

Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Avrorin, scientific leader of the VNIITF and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences:

"Today we may be taking the first steps toward World War III. Peace can be preserved only under parity of the superpowers' nuclear forces. And yet we are disarming. Most of the initiatives in recent years concerning the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and cutbacks in budget finance for defense science are just unilateral disarmament concealed beneath ringing phraseology. Just think, is anyone else in the world likely to defend our interests if we do not do it ourselves? Why should anyone conquer us, you may ask? Well, simply in order to set up harmful production processes on our territory or to extract our natural wealth."

This may sound somewhat unusual or unpleasant to some people, but we did not encounter a single pacifist among the scientists in the city of nuclear physicists. But we did not encounter any inveterate villains either, we talked to people who are convinced that the opinions they expressed were correct. Yes, of course, the nuclear bomb is something evil, we were told. But until the world changes, it is a necessary evil as a guarantor of stability.

Professor Boris Vasilyevich Litvinov, doctor of technical sciences and VNIITF chief designer:

"How can anyone talk about 'qualitative parameters' for the strengthening of defense if tomorrow our numbers and our 'skills' will be inadequate to surpass our geopolitical rivals? Maybe we should reduce the quantity of excessive 'stockpiles' of nuclear combat ammunition and tanks. In exchange for 100 existing ones, however, we scientists ought to develop [skonstruirivat] one single new warhead which would make it possible to maintain parity. The government is not giving us an opportunity to do this."

On the other hand, it has given the military-industrial complex scientists an opportunity to help the starving and exhausted country. A correct decision, and the only right one. But the institute (and how many more like it?) has been dropped into conversion like a puppy in deep water. Unaccustomed to such shocks, having received money from the state's hands all through its existence, how does it manage to keep afloat?

The VNIITF's uniqueness is not rooted in the fact that it makes nuclear bombs. People here can make whatever they like. This is no exaggeration. Chelyabinsk-70 has always been self-reliant. If the manufacture of the next "product" required the development [sozdaniye] of new technology, it was developed. This applied to alloys of certain metals with predetermined specifications, all sorts of composite materials, and the mathematical elaboration of problems. All this was done and is being done. But will it be done tomorrow?

It would probably be easier to manufacture pans or videotape recorders. Our defense industry is nowadays virtually 100-percent committed to this kind of conversion—swift, convenient, profitable.

But let us roam the realm of imagination, the scientists suggested. Say that in 5 to 10 years' time everyone has a colander made of rocket alloy and a "video." The appetite, which comes with eating, will demand more and more science-intensive "dishes." Maybe we ought to borrow the Japanese experience? After all, following their defeat in World War II, the Japanese also got down to purchasing plants and technologies. But they came to their senses and, using mass infusions of finance, they got their own science on its own feet and it is now renown all over the world...

Buying Scrap From COCOM?

I think that the main mistake committed by our military-industrial complex was that our military technologies were "classified" and not channeled into the national economy. U.S. nuclear physicists are working on a 50-50 basis: One-half of developments [razrabotka] are for the Pentagon, the other half for the country. This is what we should have done as well. But in our country, compared with the developed West and East, expenditure on science has always been and still remains scant. Nuclear parity was probably achieved by our scientists only

thanks to the "law of compensation," according to which the poor and the hungry are always more quick-witted and sharper than the well-fed and the rich...

The VNIITF is also unique because conversion was actually approached the smart way. A competition was announced for the most science-intensive conversion elaborations [razrabotka]. More than 100 applications were submitted, just 20 were selected.

One of the most interesting avenues that is extremely necessary for the country during transition to the market is the "turnkey" development [sozdaniye] of fiber-optic communications lines. Their development worldwide has been going on for about 20 years. The last 7-8 years have seen a headlong process of introduction. Several scientific research institutes have struggled over this in our country, 1.5 billion rubles [R] have been spent, but... The VNIITF started work on fiber-optic communications lines in 1988. In just three years (!), A. Barulin's group has arrived at the point which the Americans reached after 10-12 years at the cost of \$2 billion. Just a single fiber in the cable, with a diameter of 125 microns and costing R1 per meter, can simultaneously carry 7,000-8,000 telephone conversations and several cable television and stereo radio programs. When coupled to an electronic computer, "productivity" can increase at least fivefold. In 1993, following the prototype design tests, series-production plants could be manufacturing up to 40,000-50,000 km of fiber-optic cable. But they probably will not.

The final stages of the fiber-optic communications lines program, which has now acquired the status of state program, will require R60 million. The Cabinet of Ministers has allocated R10 million. Will we ever attain world standards?

Alas, the outside world will not help us here. Last May's Paris meeting of member states of the Coordinating Committee for Control of Exports to Socialist Countries [as published] (COCOM) decided to supply the USSR only with technology dating back to the early eighties. U.S. delegation head Allan Wendt made a peculiar statement concerning the sale of fiber-optic communications lines to us:

"During the Persian Gulf war we were convinced that such systems are virtually invulnerable. All the Russians need to meet their requirements are simple old-fashioned telephones instead of state-of-the-art equipment with numerous attachments..."

We were shown many conversion elaborations [razrabotka] in the institute. All the "excursions" started and finished in exactly the same way. Enthusiasm and smiles when talking about science and technological breakthroughs. Skepticism and depression when talking about money...

Conversion—always and everywhere—starts with costs: The state today is investing in the military-industrial complex the money required for conversion, and

tomorrow will reap fabulous profits. We Soviets really take a strange pride in taking everything and dividing it equally, each one receiving his share of compensation. But before that happens, the Committee for Poor Peasants rules are applied and everything is confiscated.

Genghis Khan used to collect a 10-percent levy. Otherwise, he believed, the taxpayers would not survive. The Biblical Pharaoh skimmed off one-fifth of the people's incomes—the Jews ran away from him into the desert. Pavlov's cabinet is grabbing a great deal more from enterprises and scientific research institutes...

"We cannot engage in price hooliganism like other enterprises, we have the state's interests at heart," G. Morozov, deputy chief engineer for conversion matters, reflected. "We have a full order book, and we can fulfill these orders quickly and properly. But how can this be done when the clients themselves are as poor as 'church mice,' capable of scraping together the money for finished products but have nothing to spare for research and development?"

The Americans are also busy converting. If the journal *NEW SCIENTIST* is to be believed, the 1991 appropriations for research and development for switching military science and industry onto civilian tracks have increased 12 percent compared with 1990. This is against a 4-percent increase of finances for defense-related research and development.

In our country, if official statistics are to be believed, defense finances as a whole have been reduced by 18 percent, finances for the Army's weapons procurement have been reduced by 18 percent, and finances for research and development for military and conversion programs have been reduced by 30 percent.

The salaries of VNIITF scientific associates today are much lower than the wages of trolleybus drivers in Moscow. Defense industry scientists are an elite group only by reputation and work regime. It is difficult, but there is nowhere else for them to go.

Physicists and mathematicians in Chelyabinsk-70 like comparing their institute with Los Alamos and Livermore. There is probably no need to specify who comes out better from such comparisons. Nevertheless, having the state's interests at heart, they still think along state lines.

Doctor of Sciences Petr Ivanovich Koblov, deputy chief designer:

"The USSR has already cut back its Navy and Air Force in the past. A packet of money was spent on that. The situation was later restored. And how much did that cost? The antialcohol campaign was the same—people were reduced to glue-sniffing. But the vineyards that were dug up will grow back again in 10 years' time. But if the nuclear physics sector were to be disbanded today—and this is where we are going—it may never be revived again. It could happen—paradoxical though it

may sound—that we would be able to join the world's civilized society only by hanging on to our missile warheads, without losing our own self-respect and other people's respect for us in the world and by switching the state-of-the-art military technologies into the civilian sector."

...Contrary to all expectations, we rarely heard the word "cannot" in Chelyabinsk-70. We were taken to all the secret projects and were shown everything that we asked to see. The most-favored status in this special-status city did not apply in just one single case: When we asked to be shown a nuclear bomb.

But we wanted to see it so much... Not a single journalist in the world has ever succeeded in this—to see, let alone to photograph, a model of Soviet nuclear weapons. Professor Viktor Nikitovich Mikhaylov, USSR deputy minister of atomic power and industry, came to our help again.

There were two bombs. One was obviously a more "ancient" model. Huge, with "horns." Was that the one with which Khrushchev threatened the "foes" from the UN rostrum? The other one was smaller. Looked like an ordinary aviation bomb. The canvass screen which sectioned off the huge hall reliably concealed from us the other exhibits housed in what could be either the country's sole museum or an ordinary warehouse for "product" models which can blow up and destroy the earth...

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Soviet Nuclear Weapons Reported Removed From Baltics

91WC0126A Tallinn THE ESTONIAN INDEPENDENT in English No 60, 30 May-5 Jun 91 p 2

[Unattributed item: "Nuclear Arms May Go East"]

[Text] The Soviet Union has removed part of its tactical nuclear weapons from the Baltics, said Pierre Schori, secretary of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, on May 25 at a Conference of Labour Movements of countries bordering the Baltic Sea.

Mr. Schori said the Soviets have removed weapons that must be destroyed according to the US-Soviet armament reduction treaty. Moscow is also planning to transfer the remaining nuclear weapons from the Baltic region, so they cannot be used against the central Soviet power, the Norwegian News Agency NTB reported.

Ecological Effects of INF Elimination

91WC0118A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jun 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by Col V. Kharlamov, staff member with the Elimination-Management Center, in response to a reader's inquiry: "Missiles Eliminated. What About the Environment?"]

[Text] As we know, in accordance with the Soviet-American Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, our missiles were destroyed by being exploded. There were several hundred explosions. Didn't they disturb the environmental situation in the regions where the missiles were eliminated?

Maj V. Ridosh.

Col V. Kharlamov, staff member with the Elimination-Management Center:

This 12 May we completed work on eliminating missiles by exploding them in connection with the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Medium-Range Missiles. This method was dictated by the short time allotted for elimination, the number and structure of the missiles to be destroyed, and the need to save money.

The related environmental problems were studied by the Typhoon Research and Production Association, the USSR Ministry of Health's Biophysics Institute, the State Environmental Protection Committee and other organizations. The total amount of atmospheric pollutants released in destroying the missiles amounted to about 1.5 percent of the ordinary discharge of industrial enterprises in Astrakhan and Volgograd oblasts. The concentration of the aforementioned pollutants in the areas where the missiles were destroyed did not exceed the permissible level.

It is symbolic that before the last missiles were exploded, our specialists found a bird's nest in the crater left by the previous explosion!

FRG Plans for SS-23 Destruction in East

91WC0118B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jun 91 Union Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Missiles Will Be Destroyed"]

[Text] Germany's government has reported that 24 Soviet intermediate-range SS-23's, which belonged to the former GDR army, continue to be deployed in the eastern part of Germany but will be destroyed over the course of three years. A spokesman for the defense ministry stated that these missiles are not outfitted with nuclear warheads and have no launchers. He denied reports in the newspaper BILD AM SONTAG that they were in operating condition.

Plans for Post-Elimination Inspections

91WC0118C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jun 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by V. Alekseyev, officer with the Center for Missile Elimination, in response to a reader's inquiry: "To America With Inspections"]

[Text] I read in your newspaper that the elimination of missiles called for by the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles had been completed. But the same item also spoke about

reciprocal inspections all the way until the year 2001. I do not understand what can be inspected, if neither we nor the Americans any longer have any intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. And I would like to know, in general, about the inspectors' work.

Lt Col V. Zverev.

The editors asked V. Alekseyev, an officer with the Center for Missile Elimination, to answer the reader's questions.

It is true that the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles has been carried out. There are no more intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. But the plants at which they were produced remain. Certain missile bases also remain where units armed with new missiles are now deployed. Therefore, verification of treaty observance is not being stopped.

And now a word about just what the inspectors—both ours and the Americans—are doing. Their work is defined by a special protocol on inspections, and therefore the work of each side is analogous. Let me cite my own experience working in the United States of America.

The treaty documents name the place of our inspectors' work as Magna [as transliterated], Plant No 1. It is a suburb of Salt Lake City, the capital of the state of Utah, which has a population of nearly two million. The holdings of the Hercules company are spread out over the base of some relatively low mountains, as a huge plaque on the water tower announces.

Plant No 1 is surrounded by a two-row metal chain-link fence, between the rows of which a car could freely pass. Along the perimeter are two passageways and one so-called portal, which is a central vehicle entrance through which trucks carrying the plant's products depart. It is at those passageways that our inspectors keep watch. Two of them at each of the secondary passageways, and one of them at the portal. That is the makeup of the duty shift, which is changed every other day.

The inspectors' duty includes the inspection of cargo being transported away from the plant. If it includes no stages of the Pershing-2 missile, which is subject to elimination under the treaty, an operator turns on a green signal light.

Magnetic sensors closely monitor departing trucks. If they turn on, the tune "Moscow Summer Nights" starts playing in the operator's cab. Sometimes during a 24-hour watch, "Not even a rustle is to be heard in the garden" plays some 200 times.

The inspectors do not need to go out to check every vehicle. All that is needed is for them to glance at a monitor in order to make a decision. Incidentally, all the monitoring equipment used there is Soviet-made, which was stipulated in the provision for inspections.

In the event that missile stages are being hauled out, the American side usually gives our inspectors a notification 30 minutes in advance. During that time the shift chief determines a group for making the inspection. A video

tape recorder is set up for work. The Americans bring special clothing and conduct mandatory instructions on safety procedures. What is the clothing? White coveralls made of a light-weight disposable fabric. They are exclusively for the safety of the workers. This clothing is combined with molded shoes and protective eyewear. Thus garbed, we take attache cases containing the necessary instruments (which include rulers, measuring tapes and scales), and Polaroid cameras for taking photographs, and head for the facility. It is a special installation to which the van carrying the cargo is driven. We look over the missile stage and measure its length and diameter. Every measurement, with an indication of the time, is entered in a report, and then it is made official with signatures of both sides.

What is the frequency of such inspections? No two days are alike. It sometimes happens that during a watch you will put on the white garments 10 times. You take turns getting sleep. Food is prepared at the location. Everything is prosaic and routine.

But you only get in that sort of mood after you have become completely acclimated in Magna. When you get there for the first time, you can get thin. I lost about 10 kilograms, for example. And not because I was badly fed. The reason was psychological tension. There is probably not a minute when you are out of sight of the accompanying Americans. Even when you are sleeping, they have the right to enter the lounge.

Now, after three years of work have passed, of course, there is more trust. Both the inspectors (despite the fact that the makeup of the group changes monthly) and the accompanying Americans have adapted to one another, but for both sides, work remains work.

Those who become inspectors are officers who have numerous missile complexes and hundreds of days of combat duty behind them. Moreover, they must complete special courses. Our officers V. Bitskiy, A. Gusakovskiy, and Lt Col A. Bogdanov are handling the duties of inspector well.

My story would be incomplete without my impressions of the Americans. We have had numerous meetings with them, both veterans and young people. They asked many questions about life in our country. They were various questions, but on the whole their attitude toward us has been well-disposed.

I might add to what I have said the observation that the Americans carry out similar inspection activity in our country, at the plant in Votkinsk, for example. In addition, over the next 10 years there are plans for so-called quota inspections by both sides. They will consist of 10-15 inspections each in a calendar year, if there is any point in them.

Displayed SS-20's Said To Be Not Operational

91WC0126B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Jun 91 First Edition p 4

[Response by Colonel A. Gutnikov, Elimination Center chief, to reader's query: "The Missiles Are Exhibits. And That Is All." Item is accompanied by a photograph of a missile canister marked "The Last RSD-10 Missile."]

[Text] The mass information media have reported that after the elimination of our missiles in connection with the Soviet-American INF Treaty some of the them will be kept as exhibits. Where are they and can they not be used as combat weapons?

Lieutenant Colonel V. Shestobayev

[Response by] Colonel A. Gutnikov, chief of the Elimination Center:

There are in all seven such missiles and eight launchers. They are in Moscow, Kiev, Kaluga, Baranovichi, and at the Kapustin Yar test site. There is a similar exhibit-missile in Cuba: a representative of the first generations of this type of the R-12 [SS-4] forces, whose history is connected with the Caribbean crisis. In the United States one of our peaceful missiles is also being kept—an RSD-10 [SS-20].

Not a shadow of a doubt is possible: All those displayed in museums and display areas have no combat function. They are no more than exhibits, without any of the necessary "stuffings."

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

West Urged To Finance East Europe Pullout

91WC0120A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian
No 22, May 91 p 28

[Article by Viktor Kemenyuk, doctor of historical sciences: "A Million for Security"]

[Text] Here is an idea for the West: Give us money for the pullout of Soviet forces from Central and East Europe also.

The Soviet Union is withdrawing its forces from Central and East Europe. They arrived there in accordance with agreements with the competent governments of the corresponding countries in the atmosphere of the "cold war." This measure was seen as necessary protection not only of Soviet territory but also the territory of the allied countries against the threat the NATO military grouping represented for all of them. Such was the objective reality of that time, in whatever way we might now like to revise our attitude toward both the "cold war" as such and the motives and sources of Soviet foreign policy of the preceding period.

The profound changes in the USSR's foreign policy of recent years have made it possible to take a broader look at problems of security in Europe, questions of the

safeguarding of the security of the USSR included. These changes have also made possible the implementation of democratic transformations in the East European countries and the achievement with some of them of agreements on a withdrawal of Soviet forces and an accord concerning the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact military structure. These measures were adopted in parallel with the completion of negotiations on a mutual reduction in conventional arms and armed forces in Europe and also negotiations with Germany on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from its territory prior to 1994.

Such a development of events suits everyone, it might have seemed. The security of the continent is being strengthened on a new basis, the threat of outside confrontation is disappearing, and the injured pride of the peoples of the countries in which the Soviet forces have been stationed is finally to be soothed.

But there is one extraordinarily important aspect of this question: expenditure on the troop withdrawal operations. The Soviet forces in the East European countries are not only leaving their military facilities and residential premises, on whose construction enormous sums were spent. It is necessary in addition to mobilize a tremendous amount of railroad, motor, sea, and air transport, allocate fuel and lubricants for it, transfer it to the areas where the forces are stationed, and embark these forces and bring them home. And housing also will cost a pretty penny: There are no barracks, no premises, no housing, no proving grounds for these forces. All this will have to be built up. I would recall also that Poland has demanded of the USSR payment of the transit costs across its territory of the forces being withdrawn, and Hungary has made claims on the Soviet side in connection with damage to the environment.

Thus the withdrawal of Soviet forces being undertaken in the interests of the security of the European peoples is proving to be a heavy burden for the ailing economy of the USSR. In addition to the inevitable political battles surrounding the agreements in accordance with which the forces will depart, the prospect of new unproductive expenditure can only complicate the solution of such problems as a reduction in the budget deficit and support for government programs in the sphere of control of the money supply and certain others. Not to mention the fact that the exacerbation of social issues in the country will be accompanied by a growth of the malaise of the servicemen and their families.

What is to be done? Revise the timetable of the troops' withdrawal in order to harmonize it with the diminishing possibilities of the Soviet economy? Delay the question of ratification of the agreements and thereby afford the USSR budget a breathing space in order finally to balance it if only approximately? After all, expenditure pertaining to foreign commitments cannot ultimately be borne at the expense of the population's living standard. Whereas earlier such questions were decided quite simply, at Politburo level, there now has to be a procedure of ratification in parliament, and there

could be very strong doubts there as to the expediency of all the expenditure connected with realization of the agreements which have been reached.

But here is one consideration to think about. In taking military action against Iraq in the interests of the world community within the framework of UN Security Council resolutions, Washington won the commitments of a number of allies and Arab countries to defray some of the United States' costs. The press is citing figures in the \$42-50 billion range to which the U.S. Administration can look forward when totaling expenditure on the use of its armed forces in the Persian Gulf. Ultimately this is right: The United States was, after all, acting not only in its own interests and not only in the interests of Kuwait but of all countries exporting oil from the Persian Gulf.

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Europe is not only a unilateral action of the USSR undertaken in its own interests. All European countries have an interest in this withdrawal taking place as quickly as possible and in an opportunity for the creation of a new structure of security not on a bipolar military-bloc basis emerging. In this case it would be logical and right to expect that they also, like Germany, might take on some of the USSR's expenditure since the withdrawal of Soviet forces seems to them so important and decisive a condition of the achievement of a secure existence.

CFE Compliance Move Not 'Concession'

PM2806155891 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 23, 9-16 Jun 91 p 13

[Dmitriy Yakushkin article: "Last-Minute Soviet Concession?"]

[Text] MN [Moscow News] has been watching the dispute between Moscow and the West over the treaty to cut conventional weapons for several months now. The meeting in Lisbon between Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and James Baker has finally put an end to the debate.

Claims against the USSR as regards the Paris agreements stalled the talks on strategic offensive weapons and have held back the summit. Thus a favourable chance was lost to open talks on operational nuclear weapons in Europe. The talks were planned to take place after the Paris meeting and on the crest of the wave of the positive expectations generated by the Paris talks. There were signs that NATO took a tougher strategy. The discussion of military questions in Vienna made no progress despite the expectation that the talks would quickly move over to problems pertaining to the Paris agreement. Finally, the debate sapped faith not so much in the nature of Soviet intentions (they remain infinitely noble) but in the hope that obligations the Soviet Union assumed would be honoured without reservation and that the people who assumed them would have enough power to keep the political situation in the country under control.

The debate gave rise to widely circulated allegations that the Soviet Union had made some concessions to get the deadlocked talks moving. This gives the impression that the Soviet side is weak and susceptible to pressure. The allegation and the impressions are wrong. If Moscow made any concession, it consisted in reverting to the original wording of the treaty agreed upon by the countries that signed it, including the USSR. All references to pressure are irrelevant. Right after the violations were discovered, the West took a tough stance but quite in line with the treaty: if there is a treaty its terms should be honoured.

Reports, Comments on Troop Pullout From Hungary

Hungarian Leaders Cited

PM2406110191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jun 91 Moscow Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent F. Lukyanov: "Hungary: Solemn Farewell"]

[Text] Budapest—The day is approaching when the last Soviet soldier will leave the territory of the Hungarian Republic. To all appearances this will happen next week, 19 June. On that day Lieutenant General V. Shilov, commander of the Southern group of Forces, will be the last of our military men to cross the Hungarian-Soviet border.

In connection with the completion of the withdrawal of troops from Hungary the commander of the Southern Group of Forces was received for a solemn farewell by the Hungarian leadership—President A. Goncz, Prime Minister J. Antall, and Defense Minister L. Fur. Members of the Hungarian Government and leaders of the parliamentary factions and the country's leading political parties took part in all three meetings.

"The day when the last Soviet soldier leaves Hungarian territory will be a special day for us nationally and politically," Prime Minister J. Antall said at a meeting with Soviet representatives. For the Soviet Union the withdrawal of troops from Hungary is also a significant event which will increase its political prestige throughout the world. The head of the Hungarian parliament thanked the commander for the high degree of organization ensured during the troop withdrawal. Saying that the Hungarian side is abreast of all the problems which are accompanying the withdrawal of the Southern Group of Forces from Hungary, J. Antall promised that the Soviet graves from the World War II era left on Hungarian territory will be properly tended and also voiced the hope that in the future good-neighborly friendly relations will be maintained between our countries.

The same hope was voiced at the meeting with the Soviet commander and USSR ambassador by president A. Goncz, who also highly assessed the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw its troops from Hungary.

"The Soviet Army set foot on Hungarian territory in pursuit of the units of Nazi Germany," the president said in his brief speech. "It is well known that it was not the Soviet Union which declared war on Hungary and Hungarian soldiers were the first to set foot on Soviet territory. The Soviet Army's battles on Hungarian territory marked the final phase of the war in which, at the price of enormous sacrifices by the USSR, Europe received the opportunity for free self-determination."

The Hungarian president also noted the enormous aid which the Soviet units rendered to the Hungarian population in the period of their stay in the country. "We should like," the president said in conclusion, "the soldiers returning home to retain good memories of Hungary."

For his part the commander of the Southern Group of Forces thanked the prime minister and president for their aid in organizing the troops' withdrawal but at the same time voiced regret that questions of mutual settlement for the immovable property left behind by the Southern Group of Forces have not yet been settled. Yet an agreement on this score should be signed before the end of the troops' withdrawal.

The commander's interlocutors from the prime minister to the defense minister assured him that an agreement on settlements will be signed in the very near future and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary will thus end in full accordance with the 1990 intergovernment agreement.

Problems Cited

PM2106092191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Jun 91 Union Edition p 4

[Report by correspondents F. Lukyanov and V. Litovkin: "Signed Over the Tisza"]

[Text] Budapest—On 19 June 1991 at 1600 hours local time an event which was without the slightest exaggeration historic took place on the bridge across the Tisza between the Hungarian city of Zahony and the Soviet city of Chop. Lieutenant General A. Annush [name as transliterated], the fully empowered representative of the Hungarian Government, and Lieutenant General V. Shilov, the fully empowered representative of the USSR Government, signed a document on the definitive completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory.

Over the course of 15 months over 1,300 echelons and about 100,000 people, nearly half of them servicemen, have been sent home. In addition over 27,000 units of arms and military equipment and ammunition, including nuclear ammunition, have left Hungary. During the Soviet troops' withdrawal the Hungarian side was presented with 181 military townships including 5,732 establishments of which 3,783 were constructed with USSR Defense Ministry funds.

The command of the Southern Group of Forces has succeeded in selling scrap metal, fuel and lubricants and property by means of which construction materials have been acquired to the sum of 4.7 million foreign currency rubles. Over 3 million bricks, about 3,00 tonnes of cement, and 197 prefabricated storehouses have been dispatched from Hungary to the new billeting regions, but in terms of cost this is only a small proportion of what remains in Hungary. The main thing which must be noted, and this was emphasized by all officials, is that the withdrawal of the Soviet troops has proceeded precisely, in an organized manner, without serious violations.

Lieutenant General V. Shilov said that the size of the Soviet troops' redeployment is comparable with their transfer from Europe to the Far East in 1945, although at the time there were 900 kg of material and technical facilities per serviceman, while now the figure is over 10 tonnes.

There's no denying that the deadline for our troops' withdrawal from Hungary was quite tight. Even now they seem unjustifiably tight to many military men. If they had been in the reserve for just a few months, six months, longer, many of the problems of providing amenities at their new place of residence—in the Ukraine, Belorussia, or Russia—would have been successfully resolved. But the decision on the deadline for the withdrawal was taken in a specific political situation, and by no means an ideal one, which, however, does not spare the local authorities of the need to display a sensitive attitude toward the problems of the people called on to defend the Motherland.

It is also true that, again unfortunately, before the very last day of our troops' withdrawal from Hungary we had not succeeded in settling all property, financial, and economic questions connected with the immovable property left behind by our people. Considering the complexity of the problem and the fact that only slightly more than a week remains until 30 June—the deadline set by the 1990 intergovernment agreement for the final withdrawal of the troops and the settlement of all questions—one can note even today that the seventh point of the agreement will hardly be fulfilled on time. That is why, crossing the bridge over the Tisza, Lieutenant General V. Shilov having removed his uniform, will return to Hungary in civilian clothes as the Soviet Government's fully empowered representative to complete the talks.

"On the question of the fate of the immovable property left by the Soviet troops we have encountered very many problems," Lieutenant General A. Annush, the head of the Hungarian delegation, said in a talk with IZVESTIYA correspondents. "First, we believe that the greater part of this immovable property is in general unsuited for any use and therefore we suggest removing that part from mutual accounts. Judge for yourselves—what are we to do, for instance, with underground

command posts or former nuclear munition storehouses? In addition, a large part of the buildings was constructed without the Hungarian side's permission or with gross violations of construction technology and is totally unsafe. The proportion of these edifices is very high—over half of them in cost terms."

But the most complex problem is the ecological damage caused by the Soviet units during their stay in Hungary, damage whose sum total, in the assessment of our Hungarian interlocutor, covers all the Soviet side's financial demands. It includes the pollution of soil and water, damage to parks and forests, and much, much else.

"We have had 1,200 specialists studying questions of economic damage," A. Annush said. "We have prepared a substantial document of 10,000 typewritten pages. But the Soviet side has so far not even translated it into Russian. Nature conservation experts have not yet traveled to Hungary to assess the damage caused together with our leading specialists."

Of course, one can understand the arguments and position of the Hungarian side, for the activity of any army in any country as is well known does not take place under sterile conditions.

But in this connection Yu. Grishin, deputy minister of foreign economic relations, speaks of the tough stance of the Hungarian side and its excessive ecological claims, settlement for which, incidentally, do not legally stem from the intergovernment agreement on the withdrawal of troops.

"But nonetheless," Yu. Grishin notes, "there is still a basis for completing mutual settlements. We believe that the Hungarian side will go halfway to meet our proposals. We must recall that we must continue to live in a neighborly way and to cooperate."

As we can see, the sides' positions are still a long way from each other, but one wants to hope that the completion of the troops' withdrawal will not delay but on the contrary accelerate the finding of a compromise solution acceptable to both sides.

Claims Settled; Withdrawal Continues

*OW2106063191 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1500 GMT 20 Jun 91*

[From 'Diplomatic Panorama'—"Give Constructive Approaches, USSR and Hungary Can Settle Withdrawal-Related Questions on Time"—INTERFAX headline—following item Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] As DP's [Diplomatic Panorama] reporter has been told at the Third European Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, the Soviet Union and Hungary may have settled all property, financial and economic claims related to the recently concluded stay of Soviet troops on Hungarian territory by June 30, the deadline agreed upon by the two governments last year, if they

deal with the existing problems constructively. Foreign Ministry experts do not, however, rule out the possibility of delaying the final discussion of these issues till a later date.

According to them, the pullout of Soviet troops from Hungary proceeded "decently and normally," with only separate outbursts of anti-Soviet sentiments registered on the part of "extremist elements who exist in any country." Incidents of this kind could not be regarded as a reflection of the actual feelings of the Hungarian nation, the less so as a manifestation of the official policy. As regards the desecration of the tombs of Soviet soldiers who died during World War II, the Soviet Union drew Hungary's attention to the inadmissibility of such practices, and was told appropriate measures would be taken.

Soviet diplomats believe the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungary is more than an illustration of Moscow's intention to end any kind of military presence on other countries' territories by the year 2000; it is a factor that may exert a most favorable effect on the progress and nature of Soviet-Hungarian talks on all issues, including a new bilateral treaty on cooperation. The two countries should pay due attention to both the positive and the negative experience of the past, maintain a balance of interests, and give each other reliable security guarantees.

SGF Dissolved on 27 Jun

*PM3006184991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Jun 91 Union Edition p 1*

[Interview with Army General A. Betekhtin, first deputy commander in chief of Ground Forces, by special correspondent V. Litovkin in Krasnodar; date not given; first paragraph is introduction: "Southern Group of Forces Is No More"]

[Text] The act on dissolving the Southern Group of Forces [SGF], which until recently was stationed on the Hungarian Republic's territory, was signed 27 June in Krasnodar in a businesslike and workaday atmosphere. This document concludes the existence of one of our Army's structures. At our correspondent's request Army General A. Betekhtin, first deputy commander in chief of Ground Forces, comments on the event.

[Betekhtin] There is not a single military unit in Hungary now. But the Southern Group of Forces is not just tanks, guns, and aircraft. It is also 165 military installations with a developed infrastructure and 5,732 accommodation, administrative, and technical buildings, of which 3,783 were constructed with USSR Ministry of Defense money and 1,969 were leased from the Hungarian side.

But I could go on and on quoting figures. I will just say that all this was constructed for our people and is worth, according to a joint Soviet-Hungarian valuation, over 53 billion forints or 2.5 billion foreign currency rubles...

[Litovkin] At the Soviet-Hungarian talks in Budapest I also heard another figure—100 billion forints.

[Betekhtin] This is the difference between the basic price and market value of these facilities.

[Litovkin] I can imagine how useful all this would be to the families of our officers and warrant officers on their native country's territory. But what sums have we managed to obtain for what has been left in Hungary?

[Betekhtin] Very little, actually. Questions of selling the Southern Group of Forces real estate are now being discussed by an intergovernmental committee to which our country's Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and Defense Ministry belong. It has to be borne in mind that the Hungarian side has presented us with substantial claims for damage to the environment in regions where Soviet military units were stationed and at range facilities, tank training areas, and vehicle testing areas...

[Litovkin] Unfortunately, the environment is not the only problem in our mutual relations. There are also divergences regarding other settlements.

[Betekhtin] Yes. Although the methods for mutual settlements for losses incurred were worked out by us and coordinated and signed by a joint Soviet-Hungarian commission, they have been constantly infringed by our partners during the work and are causing unnecessary disputes and groundless claims. The protocol on the completion of our troop withdrawal from Hungary has still not been signed. I attribute this to a desire to reduce our settlements to the "zero option," which in my view would be unfair and contrary to law.

[Litovkin] Why contrary to law? After all, everything that has been constructed on Hungarian soil belongs to Hungary.

[Betekhtin] That's as may be. But our interests also have to be considered. I have already cited the figure for what construction has cost us. Especially as currently there is an extreme lack of this kind of money for erecting housing for the very same officers' families who have left Hungary. There are no fewer than 13,000 families. Multiply that by three-four people, and you will grasp the huge number of people waiting for elementary human living conditions... After all, they are not guilty of anything.

[Litovkin] So who is guilty?

[Betekhtin] I think our shortsightedness, our naive perception that we would stay on other people's territory forever, and the extremely limited times for withdrawal.

Of course, one can and must understand the Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, and other East European peoples. We must leave. But look, the Americans intend to leave Europe over 10 years. First they are creating the social conditions for this. They value their people, but do we value ours?

Gorbachev, Goncz Exchange Telegrams

LD0107164491 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1515 GMT 1 Jul 91

[Text] Moscow, 1 July (TASS)—Arpad Goncz, president of the Hungarian Republic, has expressed sincere gratitude to Mikhail Gorbachev in connection with the completion of the Soviet troop withdrawal from the territory of this country. "The period between the end of the war and the start of your activity, which is determined political processes, meant years of stagnation, cold war, atomic silence, and nuclear peace," states the telegram circulated here today. "But today one country that has taken the path of democracy is saying farewell to the soldiers of the army of another country that has taken the path of democracy." The Hungarian president expressed the hope that "the forthcoming years will be for the peoples of both countries years of genuine peace, of European unity and democracy."

Mikhail Gorbachev, expressing sincere gratitude to the Hungarian president for his thanks, noted in a return telegram that "now that the last Soviet soldier has returned home, we can state with satisfaction that an immense and most difficult task has been carried out. It needs to be completed by reaching agreement on a fair sale of the property of Soviet troops left in Hungary."

Mikhail Gorbachev again stressed that "the Soviet leadership firmly intends to build relations and develop cooperation between our countries on the basis of trust, good-neighborliness, equality, and mutual benefit for the purpose of strengthening stability and peace on the continent, and of consolidating international security."

Reports, Comments on Troop Pullout From Czechoslovakia

Final Units Leave

PM2106152591 Moscow Central Television
First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 19 Jun 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report by S. Andreyev and V. Lebedev, identified by caption]

[Text] [Announcer] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from two East European countries—Hungary and Czechoslovakia—is nearing completion. We have received a report from Prague.

[Andreyev] The last units, which have been guarding Central Group of Forces property and have transferred it to the Czechoslovak Army's care, are leaving today. The combat equipment—1,260 tanks, 2,505 infantry vehicles, 1,218 artillery pieces, 77 aircraft, and 146 helicopters—was sent home long ago. The Central Group of Forces stationed in Czechoslovakia numbered 73,500 men. A most complex operation which has gone strictly to schedule is drawing to a close in a well organized and worthy manner. Individual incidents do not count. Judging by the tone of their articles, this has been realized by our Czechoslovak journalist colleagues who

were today clustering around Colonel General Vorobyev, commander of the Central Group of Forces. The talk was about building new relations between our countries—specifically, about the use of the buildings left behind after the Army's withdrawal. A Soviet-Czechoslovak intergovernmental agreement on settling property and financial issues related to the troop withdrawal will be signed soon.

[I.F. Panteleyev, USSR trade representative in the CSFR, identified by caption] Under the agreement between the sides we are devoting attention to forms such as the creation of joint ventures based on facilities belonging to the Central Group of Forces. In my view, this is a very promising approach. It ensures the sale of property and it provides employment for the Czechoslovak population.

Last USSR Soldier Leaves

*PM2006151991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Jun 91 First Edition p 1*

[Report by correspondent Colonel P. Chernenko: "Last Train"]

[Text] Our last military train left Czechoslovakia for the motherland with hardware and personnel yesterday, 19 June. Thus, the plan for the troop withdrawal from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic has been fulfilled. And now there is not a single one of our soldiers on Czechoslovak territory.

"From the Czechoslovak side," Colonel General E. Vorobyev, the Soviet Government's plenipotentiary for the Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia, said, "there are and can be no complaints against us: The withdrawal schedule was observed strictly. And, just as planned, the Central Group of Forces ceased to exist in June of this year. We are leaving with a sense of a military duty fulfilled and of fraternal gratitude to the Czechoslovak people, with many of whom we have formed very good relations over these years. I am sure that the friendship between the Czechoslovak and Soviet peoples will remain, and joint cooperation in many spheres will still be of considerable benefit to us."

Soviet Ambassador Comments

*LD2206154791 Prague CTK in English 1120 GMT
22 Jun 91*

[Text] Prague, June 22 (CTK)—Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Boris Pankin told CTK last night that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia is "a victory of new political thinking, which breaks with the bitter chapter in mutual relations and creates a firm basis for building new ones".

The last transport of Soviet soldiers and rear equipment left Czechoslovakia via the Cierna nad Tisou railway crossing last night.

Pankin stressed that the withdrawal was proceeding according to the timetable set by the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement of February 1990 thanks to the cooperation of relevant bodies of both countries.

Pankin believes that the withdrawal will be beneficial also to the building of a new system of European security and equal cooperation of all participants in the Helsinki process

Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel and Czechoslovak parliament chairman Alexander Dubcek, asked to comment on the completion of the withdrawal, told CTK last night they will do so later.

Soviet troops were in Czechoslovakia from the Soviet-led invasion of the country by five Warsaw Pact armies on August 21, 1968, which crushed the Communist-led reform movement.

In February 1990, when the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement on the Soviet withdrawal was signed, there were 73,500 Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.

Withdrawal Protocol Signed

*LD2506133691 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1205 GMT 25 Jun 91*

[By correspondent Anatoliy Shapovalov]

[Text] Prague, 25 June (TASS)—A protocol on the completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was signed in Prague today. It was authenticated with the signatures of Lieutenant-General Rudolf Duchacek and Colonel-General Eduard Vorobyev, commander of the Central Group of troops, the authorized representatives of the governments of the CSFR and the USSR for ensuring the withdrawal of the troops.

The presence of all Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia comes to an end with the day of the signing of the present protocol, the document says. The sides recognize that the fulfilment of the obligations flowing from the intergovernmental agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the CSFR, concluded in February 1990, will promote the development of mutual relations between the two states.

Jiri Dienstbier, CSFR deputy prime minister and foreign minister; Lubos Dobrovsky, CSFR defense minister, and Boris Pankin, USSR ambassador in the CSFR, attended.

Soviet Representative Interviewed

*LD2506220991 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Jun 91*

[Video report from Prague by correspondent S. Andreyev—from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A protocol on the completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from CSFR territory was signed in Prague today.

[Andreyev] The document was signed by Army Colonel General Vorobyev and Lieutenant General Duchacek, the plenipotentiaries of the governments of our countries. The measures which took place in the morning set the tone for all the meetings which took place today. The Soviet delegation was received by Aleksandr Dubcek, chairman of the country's Federal Assembly. The desire to build new relations between our countries was expressed during the meeting with Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel.

[Vorobyev] I must point out two positive factors. The first is that not one of the Czechoslovak representatives, nobody from the Czechoslovak side, raised in an acute manner the question of 1968. The opinion was voiced that this should not be excluded from the history of the Czechoslovak people. I am very impressed by the fact that everyone expressed good hopes in connection with the future mutual relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. I have a very good impression of all the meetings, and it seems to me that by the timely withdrawal of our troops from Czechoslovak territory we have accomplished a very big thing which is aimed toward the future of our peoples and the future of our generations—our children and our grandchildren, that's what I would say. [Video shows protocol being signed and interview with Vorobyev]

Temporary Halt to Troop Withdrawal From Germany Considered

Delay in Housing Construction Cited

*LD2606135391 Berlin ADN in Germany
1314 GMT 26 Jun 91*

[Text] Zossen (ADN)—The Supreme Command of the Western Group of the Soviet Army in Wuensdorf, Zossen region, is considering temporarily halting the planned withdrawal from Germany. From July of this year, the speed of the troops return is to be reduced. In a statement from the press center of the Soviet troops given to ADN today, the reason for this decision is given as the fact that the German side has not yet begun the housing construction.

"If the special program for the construction of civilian dwellings is not fulfilled, and consequently no dwellings are available for the families of the officers who are withdrawing, then the Supreme Command of the Western Group of Armed Forces feels it is forced to put the question of a temporary stop to the planned withdrawal of the troops from the territory of the FRG", the statement says. A spokesperson for the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, in reply to an enquiry, told ADN that the Supreme Command of the Soviet Armed Forces' account does not correspond with the facts. The housing project has already begun, and there is no reason to delay troop withdrawal.

In accordance with the treaty between the USSR and the FRG on the conditions of the temporary stay and

scheduled withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the FRG, the Western Group of Armed Forces is fulfilling "the obligations to observe the plan and the time limits for the withdrawal of troops from Germany, strictly and completely". "Nevertheless, the Soviet side is forced to reduce the speed of the withdrawal of USSR troops from July this year because the majority of officers' families, who are returning in the second half of 1991, are to get apartments which, in accordance with Article 3 of the agreement between the governments of the USSR and FRG of 9 October 1990 on several transitional measures, are to be built by the German side in 1991", the Supreme Command confirmed.

Reason for Suspension Given

*LD2606184191 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1741 GMT 26 Jun 91*

[Report by correspondent Vyacheslav Katayev]

[Text] Berlin, 26 June (TASS)—A statement by the press center of the Western Group of Forces has been circulated here which states that in accordance with the treaty between the USSR and the FRG on the conditions for the temporary stay and planned withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the FRG, the command of the Western Group of Forces has striven in 1991 strictly and rigorously to fulfill the obligations which they had taken on themselves on observing the plan and schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany. However, at the present time, the command will be forced to raise the issue of a temporary suspension or a reduction in the pace of the planned withdrawal of troops from the territory of the FRG, starting in July. This is explained by the fact that the majority of officers and their families who are due to return home in the second half of this year have no housing. This should be built by the German side in 1991 in keeping with Article 3 of the 9 October 1990 agreement between the Governments of the USSR and the FRG, the statement stresses.

WGF Press Statement

*PM0307114091 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Jun 91 Second Edition p 3*

[Report by TASS correspondent V. Katayev from Berlin plus Colonel V. Markushin report from Bonn: "Western Group of Forces Press Center Statement..."]

[Text] [Katayev report] Berlin, 27 Jun—A statement has been issued here by the Western Group of Forces [WGF] Press Center, saying that in accordance with the USSR-FRG treaty on the terms for the temporary presence and systematic withdrawal of Soviet forces from FRG territory, the WGF command has sought in 1991 strictly and unconditionally to fulfill its commitments as regards observing the plan and timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany. However, it will now be forced to raise the question of a temporary suspension or slowing of the pace of the planned withdrawal of forces from FRG territory beginning in July.

This is due to the fact that the majority of the officers and their families due to return home in the second half of this year have no housing. This housing is supposed to be built in 1991 by the German side under Article 3 of the 9 October 1990 agreement between the USSR and FRG Governments, the statement stresses.

[Markushin report] ...Bonn's Reaction

This statement provoked a wide reaction in FRG political circles. In particular, it is reported that V. Terekhov, USSR ambassador to Bonn, was summoned to the Foreign Ministry, where his attention was drawn to the timetable enshrined in bilateral agreements for the final withdrawal of the forces and the pace specified, which is said not to be linked to the progress in implementing the housing construction program.

Troop Withdrawal From Szczecin, Poland Reported

LD3006125191 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1824 GMT 29 Jun 91

[By TASS correspondent Igor Galkin]

[Text] Warsaw, 29 June (TASS)—A engineer battalion of the northern group of troops left Szczecin for the USSR today. There are no more Soviet troops in the city now. "We are saying farewell to you as friends, and still like you," M. Talasiewicz, governor of Szczecin, said at the seeing-off ceremony.

The Soviet units have handed over their hospital to the Szczecin health service their hospital, their barracks to the local police, and their depots to the rural bodies of self-government.

Soviet military units and military freight are continuing to return to the USSR, although a treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland has not been signed yet. Colonel General V.P. Dubynin, commander of the northern group of troops, reported that over 1,500 cars carrying military freight had been dispatched to the USSR in the last month alone.

Troop Withdrawal From Hungary, Czechoslovakia Completed

PM0307084991 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 2057 GMT 30 Jun 91

[From the "Television News Service" newscast: Report by Aleksandr Goryachev, identified by caption]

[Text] [Goryachev] The Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia and Hungary was completed today. A tremendous saga. On 27 May 1957 Foreign Minister Gromyko and his Hungarian counterpart Imre Horvath signed an agreement between the USSR and Hungarian Governments on the legal status of Soviet troops on Hungarian territory. And 16 October 1968 a similar agreement was signed by Kosygin, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Cernik, premier of the CSSR

Government. Let us recall that these treaties were concluded within the framework of the Warsaw Pact Organization, but Soviet troops did not always do their immediate job. You only have to recall the well-known events in Hungary and the suppression of the Czechoslovak uprising.

Today computers linked to the TASS system saw on their screens eight [as heard] terse sentences: The USSR Defense Ministry announces that the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from the CSFR and Hungary was completed 30 June. It was carried out on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement.

It is now the experts' turn. They are to resolve the problems of property and funding like those that arose during our Army's withdrawal from Poland. Bielecki's government presented us with a bill for \$4.5 billion for environmental damage and is pressing for urgent talks with Moscow. [Item ends approximately 10 minutes and 41 seconds into the broadcast]

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Tactical Nuclear Arms Control Issues Viewed

PM0107081791 Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA
in Russian No 24, Jun 91 p 26-27

[Unattributed interview with Sergey Kortunov, consultant with USSR Foreign Ministry's Arms Limitation and Disarmament Problems Administration, under "Disarmament Problems" rubric; date and place not given: "In Search of a 'Third Zero.' Why Have Soviet-American Talks on Tactical Nuclear Arms Not Yet Started?"]

[Text] Sergey Kortunov, consultant with the USSR Foreign Ministry's Arms Limitation and Disarmament Problems Administration, replies to questions put to him by NOVOYE VREMYA.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] Talks on tactical nuclear arms in Europe are the next step in Soviet-American relations. The prospect of these talks was welcomed in the Joint Declaration of 22 states 19 November 1990 in Paris. Mikhail Gorbachev said at the time that the USSR was ready to open talks one to two months after the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The treaty has been signed, yet there is no indication of talks on tactical nuclear arms beginning...

[Kortunov] The United States is not ready. It claims that coordination of positions on the upcoming talks is still under way in NATO. The reason for this delay, in my opinion, lies not only in the complex and highly sensitive nature of the "negotiation material," but also in the fact that the West has of late been questioning the USSR's readiness strictly to observe the letter and the spirit of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Until we restore the West's confidence, it is futile to hope for an early opening of the new talks.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] Does this mean that the talks on tactical nuclear arms have lost their topicality?

[Kortunov] Until recently NATO countries were categorically rejecting the very idea of such talks and planning to modernize both the air and ground components of tactical nuclear arms. Now the situation has radically changed. NATO countries have come to the conclusion that the role of tactical nuclear arms has been substantially reduced in conditions of the new military-political situation on the continent, and have decided to eliminate all nuclear artillery shells on a reciprocal basis with the USSR after the opening of the talks. At present active elaboration of the positions at the upcoming talks is under way in NATO. And I have no doubt that the talks will open sooner or later.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] As the prospect of the new talks began to emerge, doubts about the need for these talks as such began to appear in military specialist circles both in the West and in the USSR.

[Kortunov] At first glance such doubts seem to be fully justified. After all, tactical nuclear arms cuts in Europe are essentially predetermined by the development of the political situation on the continent. The complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Germany will be accompanied by the withdrawal and subsequent reduction of Soviet tactical missile complexes, and also the elimination of nuclear munition dumps from these countries. The unification of Germany has rendered the preservation on FRG territory of battlefield nuclear weapons—nuclear artillery and the tactical missiles, and also the deployment there of the new Lance-2 missiles, impossible politically, and senseless from a military viewpoint. These missiles' respective ranges of 120 and up to 500 kilometers make it possible to use them for hitting targets located exclusively on the territory of East European countries. The elimination of the imbalances and asymmetries in conventional armed forces in Europe renders pointless the well-known NATO thesis that the NATO tactical nuclear potential is needed to compensate for the Warsaw Pact's "superiority" in conventional forces in Europe. In addition, insistence on keeping tactical nuclear arms in Europe intact in the new political conditions, not to mention plans for their modernization, would involve major political costs for the government of any European country.

At the same time most European countries evidently have an objective interest in enshrining these more or less predetermined cuts in a treaty. Furthermore, agreement can be reached at the talks not just about the withdrawal of tactical nuclear arms from Central Europe, for example, but also about their elimination. In addition, it is preferable to effect tactical nuclear arms cuts with monitoring rather than without it.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] What is the Soviet Union's interest in these talks?

[Kortunov] Maximum nuclear arms cuts would be in keeping with the interests of ensuring stability on the continent and building a new system of all-European

security. In addition, it would be desirable to enshrine NATO's abandonment of the deployment of the Lance-2 missiles in treaty form. A key element of modernization is now the TASM [Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile] program aimed at equipping NATO weapon-platform aircraft with the new guided SRAM-T [tactical short-range attack missile] with a range of up to 500 km both in its conventional and nuclear versions. Maximum limitation of this missile would be in the USSR's interests.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] Is it possible to expect a revival of the well-known concept of a "third nuclear zero" in the runup to the talks?

[Kortunov] In the foreseeable future a "zero option" in tactical nuclear arms will continue to be unacceptable to most European NATO countries. They are interested in retaining a "minimum nuclear deterrence" potential to ensure the "transatlantic link" with the U.S. strategic nuclear forces. In turn, the United States is interested in retaining in Europe, albeit at a minimum, tactical nuclear systems to "provide cover" for the ground forces deployed there. NATO countries would like to use the talks to "legitimize" the "minimum nuclear deterrence" potential in Europe. At the upcoming talks the United States will, in all likelihood, lay stress on the complete elimination of the ground components of these arms in Europe while retaining and modernizing airborne systems.

The revival of the demand for an immediate "zero option" in tactical nuclear arms would, in all likelihood, not be in Soviet interests either, in the present conditions. Let us not forget that under the "third zero" NATO sea-launched tactical nuclear arms would be outside the framework of the talks.

It would be in the USSR's interests at the upcoming talks to seek radical cuts to reduce ground and airborne forces to a minimum level which would at the same time allow us to maintain the general nuclear balance in Europe. Aviation is the main element of the tactical "nuclear triad" capable of compensating for the tactical nuclear potential of the NATO naval forces in the European zone. Consequently, in this sphere the USSR's interests in respect of the topic of the future talks coincide with NATO interests up to a point. As for ground-launched tactical systems, including missile systems, they not only cannot in principle, by dint of their potential and deployment, counter NATO naval forces, this would also conflict with our pledge not to be the first to use nuclear arms. In conditions of actual military operations they can be used only in the early stages of a conflict, otherwise they fall into the hand of the attacking side even if it uses only conventional armed forces.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] What will happen with the nuclear potential of "third" nuclear powers?

[Kortunov] It will probably be difficult for a long time to come to involve other nuclear powers in the talks. France, for example, views its short-range nuclear systems not as tactical systems, but as "prestrategic" systems (final warning systems). As a result of this, and also

by dint of the fact that France is not a member of the NATO military organization, the French are stressing in every possible way that the tactical nuclear arms problem does not concern them. According to their logic, even after the elimination of the imbalances and asymmetries between the USSR and NATO in the sphere of conventional arms, France's need to possess "prestrategic systems" will persist. At the same time the achievement of a swift agreement on tactical nuclear arms without France's participation may affect the dynamics of its military building in this sphere, complicating its plans for the modernization of tactical nuclear arms (specifically the replacement of the Pluton missiles with Hades missiles), and, in the longer term, act as an incentive for joining the talks.

Bearing this in mind, the talks could be bilateral—Soviet-American—during the initial stage, as envisaged in the Paris Declaration of the 22 states. Other NATO nuclear powers, and possibly also countries possessing "dual purpose" systems, could join them later. However, Britain and France would of course have to show restraint regarding their nuclear systems. As for China, its participation in the talks would be possible only at the stage when global decisions are elaborated.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] Will the concept of minimal nuclear deterrence be discussed at the talks?

[Kortunov] Unquestionably. The readiness, confirmed by the USSR president at the summit in Paris, to discuss at the level of nuclear powers' experts the concept of "minimal deterrence" and the level beyond which nuclear retaliation potential changes into attack potential, reflects the Soviet Union's determination to keep advancing in stages toward the elimination of tactical nuclear arms in Europe, bearing in mind the views of Western partners and avoiding dramatizing differences with NATO in the question of the role of nuclear arms in the cause of ensuring security.

As for the level of "minimal deterrence" which could be achieved as a result of the first stage of the cuts in tactical nuclear arms, it should not be viewed as some kind of a constant quantity. It will decrease in step with the radical cuts in conventional armed forces in Europe and with the solution of other disarmament problems, and will depend on the evolution of East-West relations in general.

[NOVOYE VREMYA] What about sea-launched tactical nuclear arms?

[Kortunov] If there are no cuts in sea-launched nuclear arms, the efforts in the other spheres of nuclear disarmament will most probably be devalued. This would create broad scope for an intensive "transfer" of military rivalry to this sphere of the nuclear arms race, and for "outflanking" future accords. Nuclear arms at sea are of great importance for the USSR in terms of deterrence. Despite this we have proposed to the United States to open separate talks on the phased reduction and elimination of nonstrategic sea-launched nuclear arms. During their first stage the question of the elimination of all such arms from surface vessels could be discussed.

At the same time a fundamental solution must be found to the question of nuclear-tipped long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, which should also be eliminated. Clearly this would result in the establishment of a "minimal nuclear deterrent" at sea.

I believe that nonstrategic nuclear arms can be completely eliminated in the future. Mutual deterrence can be entirely ensured by strategic forces alone. In my opinion, their possible minimum level is more likely to be determined by political rather than military considerations.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Two Nuclear Tests at Semipalatinsk Scheduled

LD0707084591 *Moscow Radio Rossii Network*
in Russian 1230 GMT 6 Jul 91

[Text] Kazakh President Nazarbayev has stated that the nuclear site in the town of Semipalatinsk will be closed down before the end of this year. Until then, two nuclear tests will be carried out there. But these will be the last weapons tests in this southern republic.

Semipalatinsk Facility To Close at Year's End

LD0607123191 *Moscow Central Television First Program Network* in Russian 1200 GMT 6 Jul 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The nuclear testing ground in Semipalatinsk will be closed down at the end of the year, Kazakh President Nazarbayev has stated.

NAVAL ARMS LIMITATIONS

Comment on U.S. Naval Presence in Baltic

PM2106114191 *Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*
in Russian 20 Jun 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Captain First Rank S. Pakatin: "To Whom Is the United States 'Showing the Flag' in the Baltic?"]

[Text] For many years now the United States and a number of other NATO countries have been stubbornly turning down Soviet proposals to reduce naval arms. And the main reason here is evidently the fact that, despite positive changes in the world, for many Western leaders military might is still an effective means of international communication.

Like no other branch of the armed forces, the navy can be used for these purposes in peacetime too. In accordance with the so-called U.S. "forward sea strategy," U.S. ships "show the flag" in very remote areas, in crisis "spots," close to the territorial waters of other countries. In peacetime ships of the U.S. Navy are deployed on a permanent basis far from their own territory in all the main areas of the world ocean.

The increasing role of naval forces under modern conditions is also confirmed by the experience of their involvement in the combat operations in the Persian Gulf during the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict. They showed themselves to be the most universal and mobile branch of the armed forces, capable of resolving a wide range of tasks at sea, on the land, and in the air.

The permanent presence of ships of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and their periodic visits to the Baltic have become commonplace. Thus, a detachment of U.S. Navy warships has been in the Baltic since 11 June this year. It includes the guided missile cruiser H.E. Yarnell, the guided missile frigate J. Hall, and the frigate Connable. Despite the fact that the guided missile cruiser H.E. Yarnell and the frigate Connable were commissioned into the Atlantic Fleet in the sixties, they have been modernized and equipped with the latest weapons and electronic facilities. Incidentally, this is not the first time the guided missile cruiser H.E. Yarnell has

been in the Baltic. It spent three weeks there at the head of a detachment of U.S. Navy ships in June 1990.

What are the U.S. ships doing and what will they do in the Baltic? After fulfilling representational functions—visiting Stockholm and Helsinki—the detachment of ships is starting to tackle the main tasks: participation in comprehensive joint combat training with ships of the FRG and Danish Navies, reconnaissance, and familiarization with the theater of military operations. On the completion of the joint exercises the U.S. ships will put into Kiel, the chief FRG naval base on the Baltic, where they will participate from 23 through 28 June in the annual FRG Navy Days.

As can be seen, the considerable changes in the international situation and the strengthening of the climate of trust on the planet have not yet, by all accounts, altered the course of strong-arm politics and the demonstration of military might which the U.S. Navy is continuing to follow today.

FRANCE

Greenpeace Warns of Pacific Nuclear Pollution*AU2406131691 Paris AFP in English 1235 GMT
24 Jun 91*

[Text] Brussels, June 24 (AFP)—The ecological organisation Greenpeace said here Monday [24 June] that radioactive elements were leaking from French underground nuclear testing sites in the South Pacific, and called for an independent probe.

It called on the European Commission, executive arm of the European Community (EC), to back its demand for an independent study of the effects of nuclear testing on two coral atolls in French Polynesia.

Greenpeace official Jean-Luc Thierry told a press conference: "The tests and the concealment must stop." "The environmental consequences of damage to the coral atolls (of Mururoa and Fangatau) and marine environment from France's nuclear tests are far too serious to be hidden behind military secrecy."

Greenpeace said plankton samples it collected in December in the ocean near the testing area contained cesium-134, which results from nuclear testing. It said this indicated radioactive contamination from the testing site.

But the organisation said it had been unable to obtain final proof because the French military had barred access to its military exclusion zone around Mururoa, and had arrested five Greenpeace researchers venturing inside it.

"Greenpeace is concerned that radioactivity may already be leaking from the French underground nuclear tests at Mururoa and Fangatau, despite official French assurances that no leakage will occur for hundreds of years," it said.

It said the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the EC's nuclear energy arm, had the legal right to demand French cooperation in an independent investigation, and should enforce this right.

Greenpeace also released a copy of a letter to French Prime Minister Edith Cresson, signed by 15 scientists, calling for an independent probe of what it called a "potentially grave environmental threat."

The scientists, from France, Britain, Germany, the United States, Japan, New Zealand and Fiji, rejected a recent French offer of an investigation by scientists at nuclear institutions because they said it lacked independence.

Ministry Reports Nuclear Test in South Pacific*AU0507190691 Paris AFP in English 1840 GMT
5 Jul 91*

[Text] Paris, July 5 (AFP)—France carried out a nuclear test at the Pacific Ocean island of Mururoa, in French Polynesia, on Friday [5 July] at 1800 GMT, the French Defence Ministry said.

The force of the blast was less than 10 kilotonnes, the ministry said.

Parliamentary Report on START Negotiations*PM0507102691 Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Jul 91
p 6*

[Unattributed report: "American-Soviet Discussions Do Not Imply Any Change in France's Defense"]

[Text] At the present stage, the START negotiations on strategic arms limitation between the United States and the Soviet Union should not involve any change in France's security policy. This is the viewpoint expressed by Daniel Colin, Union for French Democracy deputy for Var, in a report which he has just published on behalf of the National Assembly Defense and Armed Forces Commission. If there is agreement between the two countries, according to the deputy, the treaty will not be signed before the end of 1991.

"It is clear," Mr. Colin writes, "that the objective of a 50-percent reduction in American and Soviet nuclear arsenals will not be achieved. This reduction might be an average of 30 to 35 percent depending on the category of armaments." According to the report's author, these thresholds are now even maximum objectives to be achieved by the agreement's two signatories.

The START negotiations began between Moscow and Washington in 1982. They were characterized by a series of stops and starts, notably between 1983 and 1985. So far the treaty has not been officially signed, even if the two countries are envisaging a new stage in nuclear disarmament.

"This is a far cry from the 50-percent reductions announced at the start of the negotiations and the reduction percentages which will be effective at the end of the period covered by the treaty," the deputy notes. "For instance, it is clear that the total number of nuclear warheads will only be reduced by 11.8 percent for the United States and 23.7 percent for the Soviet Union, which will take the total number of warheads held by the two countries to 10,936 and 8,546 respectively. For some categories of weapons, the situation is paradoxical, because the authorized ceilings are higher than the quantities currently held by the two superpowers" involved in the START talks.

A New Stage

Mr. Colin cites the case of the submarine-launched cruise missiles and air-launched cruise missiles. "For the submarine-launched cruise missiles, of which the United States now has 350, the proposed ceiling of 880 will make an increase of 151 percent possible," the author of the parliamentary report writes. "With regard to the Soviets, who seem to have no (or few) weapons of this kind, the politically binding agreement reached in conjunction with the treaty should enable them to obtain such weapons! The same situation prevails for the air-launched cruise missiles, the number of which can increase by 16.2 percent for the United States and 170 percent for the USSR."

The deputy mentioned the Soviets' desire to involve the United Kingdom and France in a new phase of the START negotiations.

"In our view," Mr. Colin writes, reiterating the conditions set by Francois Mitterrand for any French participation in this debate, "at the present stage, the negotiations do not imply a change in France's security policy or a revision of its decision not to participate in the talks (START 1 or START 2) on strategic disarmament. Even if the reductions announced (around 30 percent of current stocks) are made, the U.S. and Soviet arsenals will continue to be out of all proportion to the French arsenal."

The author of the parliamentary report expresses the hope that France will strive to maintain the credibility of its strategic forces, in view of the new challenges presented by the constant technological improvements in the arsenals.

From this viewpoint, he remarked, the French nuclear force is likely to be destabilized by the revival of SDI research—otherwise known as "Star Wars" in the United States. "Everybody is aware," Mr. Colin noted, "that SDI is no longer a technical problem but a problem of political and, of course, financial choice." The recent reorientation of the SDI program toward the establishment of protection against the limited threats of ballistic missiles "could destabilize our deterrence strategy by reviving the ABM systems race" between the United States and the Soviet Union.

GERMANY

Pros, Cons of CSCE as Security Instrument

91GE0347A Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 19 Jun 91 p 4

[Commentary by Josef Joffe: "What the CSCE Can and Cannot Do"]

[Text] The dream is an old one, the reality like the current summer weather: "unsettled." From Immanuel Kant to the League of Nations, Europe has dreamed of "eternal peace," secured by an alliance of nations that

smooths out conflicts and holds wrongdoers accountable for their misdeeds. As time went by, war was even solemnly banned, as it was by the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. Eleven years later, that pact was unable to prevent the largest of all wars, and the lofty principle of "collective security," the keystone of the League of Nations, crumbled just at the moment when it was to have been tested. To be sure, the nations had sworn to uphold the motto "one for all, all for one" through the creation of an international defense force to confront any and all aggressors, but when Mussolini attacked Abyssinia in 1935, the League of Nations had all it could do to muster the strength to pass some watered-down sanctions. Abyssinia remained Italian; the emperor went into exile.

Since the disintegration of the postwar order, since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the thought of "collective security" has been experiencing something of a revival. Today and tomorrow, the 34 member nations of the "Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe" (CSCE) are convening at the Reichstag in Berlin to discuss practical matters about institutional mechanisms that could prevent conflicts, smooth them out, enclose them (in more recent parlance, manage them). In point of fact, conditions have never been so favorable as they are at the present. Unlike the situation that prevailed in the 1930's, today there are no deep-seated conflicts between the major powers. Italy is not longing for new empires, Germany is not questioning any of its borders, the Soviet Union has abandoned its defensive front in the West. The United States has not withdrawn across the Atlantic, but it is, together with Canada, a distinguished member of the CSCE.

Further, an association of this type is urgently needed. The Eastern Europeans have lost their "homestead" in the Warsaw Pact, which was, like the Council for Economic Cooperation, nothing more than an instrument of Moscow's imperial power. This is true, but at the same time it was also a kind of community. Eastern Europeans are not yet welcome in the European Community [EC], and their fervent wish to be included under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] is at odds with a particular brand of German diplomacy that does not want to add the humiliation of waiting outside the door to the embarrassment of the Soviet capitulation in the Cold War. For this reason, the club of the 34 affords a marvelous alternative, a place where anyone between Washington and Moscow can be a member.

The thorny issues that the Berlin conference can merely touch upon, turn up in other quarters: which institutions, for what purpose? Can the CSCE, unlike the misguided League of Nations, guarantee collective security? It is correct that today—unlike in the 1930's—everyone wants peace, for which reason this task will not be so difficult to master. But this mode of interpretation overlooks the critical difference between a condition and a mechanism. If everyone wants peace, the mechanism is of no consequence. One way or the other, quiet will prevail. But an effective security mechanism demands

more. It must intervene whenever danger lurks in delay—whenever anyone disrupts the status quo in a cold-blooded manner.

That might work if the disruption comes from a country like Albania, but what if an atomic superpower, like the Soviet Union rattles its saber? Will the other 33 members, like a single man, turn to sanctions, or even to weapons? Or will they, as England and France once did in the face of Mussolini, their potential partner against Hitler, obey their own self-interest, and, for the time being, do precious little? Besides, if every nation has a veto, as is the case with the CSCE, collective action will be as frequent an occurrence as Halley's comet. An aggressor can maneuver beautifully within the niches of such an uncertainty. Saddam Husayn would have had second and even third thoughts about attacking Kuwait if he had had to deal with a firm alliance, and not with a loose federation of Arab states that was always good for a chin-wag and little else. The stability of the last 45 years shows that European security demands certainty: the certainty that the fire department functions, that it is well equipped and trained, and that it can act. At the present time, there is only one organization that meets these criteria—the Atlantic Alliance. The fact that Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia are knocking on NATO's door also shows that this institution has not lost the justification for its existence.

Security in a collective entity that covers so large an area is a dream that is not borne out by history or realism, but what can the CSCE do in this area in any case? It can, as long as there is a consensus among the major powers, function as a court of arbitration for the smaller powers. If, for example, Hungary and Romania are embroiled in a dispute, either party would be more willing to submit to a European verdict than to pressure from the opposing party. At all events, the CSCE can become a treasure trove of commonly shared European law. What is legitimate, and what is forbidden in dealings among nations—whether the issue is over a conflict pertaining to ecological issues that transcend borders and national industries, or whether the issue is over the migration of peoples from the east to west, or from south to north, which is, at the present time, an issue more greatly feared than the invasion of armies. Whatever is decided at the conference in Berlin, however, wisdom demands modesty. The ability to act depends upon the consensus (that is, the lowest common denominator), and no institution is ever stronger than the national interests that shore it up.

Reports, Comments on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

Agreement on Troop Return by Sea

LD2606124691 Berlin ADN in German 1100 GMT
26 Jun 91

[Text] Bergen (ADN)—An agreement on the return of Soviet troops from Germany by sea has been signed in

Mukran (Ruegen Island). The aim is to reduce transportation costs as the troops withdraw.

The agreement was reached by the German Reichsbahn Mukran ferry network, the Lithuanian shipping company Klaipeda, the German shipping company Rostock GMBH, and the Soviet Western Group of Forces.

On the basis of the agreement, the movement, which has already been in effect since November of last year, could be better planned. Approximately 2,200 freight wagons per month are to be transported back by sea.

The agreement is valid until 31 December 1993.

Housing Issue, Delay in Withdrawal

LD2606191891 Hamburg DPA in German 1824 GMT
26 Jun 91

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—In Bonn today the Foreign Ministry urged treaty adherence in response to a Soviet threat to delay troop withdrawal from eastern Germany if the FRG does not begin construction of housing for soldiers. A ministry spokesman said this evening that the Soviet ambassador was summoned. It was made clear to him that the Federal Government expects the Soviet Union to fulfill its treaty obligations. [passage omitted]

According to the Foreign Ministry, it was pointed out to the Soviet ambassador that the Soviet Union committed itself in the two-plus-four treaty and in the German-Soviet treaty on the remaining stay and withdrawal to withdraw its troops by the end of 1994. In the German-Soviet transitional agreement of 1990 the Federal Government agreed to support Moscow's housing construction program to the tune of 7.8 billion marks. Its implementation is a matter for the Soviets. The Federal Government did not have to assume this responsibility. The treaty does not specify any synchronization of Soviet troop withdrawal and the housing construction program.

'No Doubt' on Withdrawal

LD2606170191 Hamburg DPA in German 1623 GMT
26 Jun 91

[Text] [No dateline as received] The Foreign Ministry intends to take up the matter [the slowdown in the Soviet troop withdrawal] immediately and talk to the Soviet side, according to a spokesman. There was no doubt at the Foreign Ministry that the withdrawal would proceed in accordance with the treaty.

Soviet Threats To Halt Withdrawal 'Unauthorized'

AU2806105991 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 28 Jun 91 p 2

["cas." report: "Unauthorized Actions by the Soviet Military"]

[Text] On 28 June the Federal Government reacted with marked calmness to differences in opinion with Soviet generals on the pace of the withdrawal of their soldiers from eastern Germany. The government will not allow itself to be irritated by the new "disruptive fire" and the obvious "solo performance" of the military, government circles in Bonn stated. Moreover, the Moscow government itself is very anxious to ensure that the approximately 320,000 remaining men of the Armed Forces are withdrawn according to schedule by the end of 1994.

The previous night the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, Vladislav Terekhov, was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and urged to abide by the treaty. It was obviously only then that Terekhov learned about the letter that the Supreme Commander of the Soviet Western Group, General Burlakov, had sent to the German liaison officer General Foertsch on Monday. The letter and a public statement made by the Soviet Western Group on Wednesday had caused indignation in Bonn and led to the ambassador being summoned. According to that letter, the Soviet Army wants to slow down the troop withdrawal. Moreover, it is considering halting the withdrawal temporarily "if the special program for the construction of civilian homes is not fulfilled, and thus there are no apartments for the returning officers and their families."

In Bonn's view such statements are all the more incomprehensible in view of the fact that the withdrawal has so far been carried out smoothly. The Soviets are even ahead of their schedule, it was stated: Some 98,000 soldiers are scheduled to return to the USSR this year, 50,000 of whom had already left the new laender by 24 June. The Economics Ministry has stated that the first apartments will be completed by the end of the year. The Federal Government has said it is ready to build 36,000 so-called housing units, for which it is providing 7.8 billion marks. A Foreign Ministry spokesman added that the beginning of the housing construction program—which has been delayed as a result of controversies over orders for German companies—cannot be legally, but only politically—if at all—linked to the withdrawal agreement between the two governments.

By making calm statements, the government in Bonn obviously wanted to prevent tension in its relationship with the government in Moscow. This is probably why political circles again recalled the recent visit of Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and the prevailing circumstances. Shortly before Bessmertnykh's arrival, it was learned that the USSR still has nuclear arms in depots in eastern Germany. This fact, which was obviously also a surprise for Bessmertnykh, was commented on by Bessmertnykh with the assurance that relations between Bonn and Moscow must not be allowed to suffer.

Meanwhile, sources in Bonn also see a connection between General Burlakov's letter and a surprise visit by Soviet Deputy Defense Minister General Kochinov to the Western Group last week. Among other things, the deputy minister is also responsible for soldiers' housing; the Foreign Ministry protested against his visit to the Wismar region during a telephone conversation with the Soviet envoy in Bonn, because Kochinov had come to eastern Germany (just like Defense Minister Marshal Yazov in March) without informing the Federal Government. Thus, he formally violated German sovereignty.

Defense Minister: Withdrawal on Schedule

*LD0307084991 Hamburg DPA in German 0812 GMT
3 Jul 91*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, of the Christian Democratic Union, is convinced that the Soviets will withdraw their troops from eastern Germany by the scheduled date, the end of 1994. In an interview with the Cologne newspaper "EXPRESS," Stoltenberg today announced that the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Western Group of Forces, General Matvey Burlakov, has told him the Soviet Government and forces were prepared to keep to the schedule. Doubts were raised last week when Burlakov threatened to stop the withdrawal if the Federal Republic did not start construction of apartments for Soviet soldiers.

On the question of environmental damage caused by the Soviet forces in Germany, Stoltenberg said there would still be a discussion about what claims the Soviets will make for investments in buildings, and about "our claims for damage that fall under their responsibility," Stoltenberg explained. This would have to "lead to compensation."

Cabinet Approves Conventional Forces Treaty

*LD2606152191 Hamburg DPA in German 1349 GMT
26 Jun 91*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The first and most comprehensive international treaty on the reduction of conventional weapons was passed by the Federal Cabinet today, and passed to the Bundestag. This marks the beginning of the ratification process for the treaty, which was worked out on the instructions of the Vienna CSCE follow-up conference in 1989 by the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and concluded in November 1990. It plans the reduction of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, helicopter gunships, and fighter aircraft, and after added Soviet assurances, can be ratified by the treaty states.

In a second round of negotiations, personnel capacities are to be reduced. The Federal Republic has already voluntarily made an advance concession by setting up upper limits of 370,000 men by the end of 1984.