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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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West German Journal's Discussion

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German Vol 36 No 25, 21 Jun 82 pp 40, 42, 45

[Unattributed feature article: "Treated Badly—Many Visitors in the GDR Feel They Are Unjustly Punished by People's Police for Minor Offenses. Complaints Only Rarely Meet With Success"]

[Text] It was on account of a box of "Leibniz" butter cookies that a retired woman from Bavaria got into trouble. The lady had stood at the open window of the train opening her package of cookies when a tiny piece of paper dropped down—onto the territory of the GDR.

Moments later, two armed Vopos gruffly asked the woman to whom the message she had just dropped out of the window was addressed.

When the woman assured them that she was not an agent and that the wind had simply blown the piece of paper out of the train, the Vopos at length let her off with a reprimand. Still, the woman had to pay a DM 10 (West) fine for environmental pollution.

The incident which took place on the Munich-Berlin train on 3 June is merely one small part of bureaucratic German-German everyday life. Western border officials say that their GDR counterparts are unrelenting in their treatment of FRG citizens. Legal infractions, however minor, are rigorously punished with heavy fines.

Dropping a cigarette butt on the floor of the Magdeburg railroad station, for example, will cost the offender DM 10 (West). A 44 year-old Hamburg woman was fined the same amount for deviating from the "prescribed transit route" for the purpose of "an urgent visit to the toilet" as Vopo officials at the Hagenow kreis office duly noted on the ticket they gave her.

Thanks to 158,000 voluntary police auxiliaries—most of them inconspicuous pensioners who cast a watchful eye on practically everything—such minimal offenses can be punished even in the most remote corner of the GDR. Since this May, these auxiliaries are also entitled to check passenger cars, registration papers and drivers' licenses. Any observations and/or infractions are passed on to police.

Thus, drivers who take a nap in some remote rest area along the transit routes rarely go unpunished. Harald Lehmann of the Central Reporting and Advisory Office of West Berlin's Senator for the Interior tells of people being fined up to DM 150 for unlawful activities in parking areas—which includes taking a nap somewhere along the F 5 between Lauenburg and Berlin.

The fines can come out quite differently for the same offense, since the Vopos are not bound to an exact schedule. Internal service instructions merely give them approximate figures for the determination of fines.

The GDR summary offense law, for example, states that "the personal situation of the offender" is to be taken into account when giving a traffic ticket-- which means that the driver of a Mercedes will invariably be harder hit as he travels between the two Germanys than the driver of a Citroen 2 CV.

Just recently, former RIAS news announcer Heinz Petruo complained in BERLINER MORGENPOST, an Axel Springer paper, that he was stopped by a Vopo patrol in the vicinity of Dessau while on his way from Berlin to Hirschberg. Since he had driven 12 kilometers over the speed limit in his Rover, he had to pay a fine of DM 50.

At this juncture, a drive along the transit Autobahn between Eisenach and the Hermsdorf interchange can run into even more money. There are several spots along the way where the road surface has buckled due to the past heat wave. Anyone unable to get his speed down from 80 to 20 kilometers per hour within a very short distance will be stopped by a Vopo radar vehicle hidden behind a blind right after the last traffic sign.

Officials of the Ministry for Inner-German Relations do not think that all the things the Vopo do along the transit routes are instances of chicanery pure and simple. They have found that the number of traffic violations has increased over the past several years along with the traffic along the routes leading from and to Berlin. In 1981, there were almost 20 million travelers.

"People are getting more and more careless," one ministry official says. "This amounts to normalization in a negative sense."

Complaints lodged against the Vopo rarely meet with success. In the case of serious speeding violations, the GDR authorities turn over the appropriate photographic evidence to members of the transit commission of the FRG transportation ministry. If the speeding violation can be manifestly proven and if the Vopo in question has stayed within the DM 10 to DM 1,000 fine limit, it will do absolutely no good to lodge a complaint.

Petruo's statement that the Vopo patrol in question singled out and fined only drivers of "more expensive Western automobiles" in no way runs counter to existing GDR regulations, either.

If caught in a radar speed trap, FRG citizens must pay their fine on the spot or remit the amount within 2 weeks, if they do not have it on them. GDR citizens receive their ticket by mail. As opposed to the West Germans, their punishment may not consist in a fine but in an entry on their driver's license.

Because of a rise in the number of accidents, the GDR has started clamping down on drunken driving. Even if there are only small amounts of alcohol in their blood, drivers from the West may be arrested on the spot, since the GDR has instituted a zero blood alcohol standard. To get free on bail can cost anywhere from DM 20,000 to DM 50,000.

More and more complaints are being lodged in the West by FRG citizens who feel that such stern measures are unjustified. The respective West Berlin Senate office receives several thousand such complaints annually--mostly from West Berliners. Particularly serious cases are handled in discussions between the officials responsible for visits among the two German states.

"The GDR examines the cases presented to them quite objectively and with great care," says West Berlin's Harald Lehmann. Still, in most cases those concerned rarely get anything back. As a rule, the East Germans stick with their original decisions, according to an official of the inner-German ministry.

The fact that Bonn rarely is in a position to help irate travelers to the GDR is due not in the least to jurisdictional confusion at the Western end. Depending on the complaint involved, the West German representative on the German-German commission may come from the inner-German ministry, the transportation ministry, from the permanent FRG mission in East Berlin or from the West Berlin Senate.

The travelers themselves often are in the dark as to who has jurisdiction over whom and over what. There is no such thing as a central registry or a systematic procedure for evaluating all the incidents, complaints and petitions by travelers to the GDR; nor are there any statistics on the number and type of incidents reported. Last July, the CDU/CSU Bundestag fraction vainly tried to set things in order by calling for the establishment of a "central advisory office for inner-German travel and postal relations."

By making this proposal, they hoped among other things that "a comprehensive registry of all incidents would help the FRG government make earnest representations to the GDR at any time so as to work for better compliance with existing agreements."

But the CDU/CSU overlooked one important detail in proposing the measure. There is a certain aspect to German-German travel relations that has never been covered by any agreement whatever: West Germans and foreigners visiting the GDR on a one-day visa cannot cite any agreement or treaty, if they lodge a complaint against the GDR authorities. "In these cases," says Harald Lehmann, "we have a sort of common law situation; that is all."

If such a foreign one-day visitor gets into trouble with the Vopo, his own diplomatic mission is responsible for him--and in most cases incapable of doing anything for him. West German one-day visitors are taken care of by the permanent mission which in each individual case must hope the GDR authorities will be lenient.

The Vopo has declared open season above all on guest workers from Southern Europe who live in West Berlin. "The foreign bumpkins are our main customers," is what Vopo patrolmen are told once they start their training.

Turks and Arabs from West Berlin are not well liked in the GDR capital because they help keep prostitution under real existent socialism going even if it is officially outlawed. The guest workers, who rarely have a chance to meet anyone in West Berlin, use foreign money or goods bought at the Inter-shop in less expensive East Berlin to have relations with GDR women.

A former Vopo who fled to the FRG says that the young Vopo patrolmen of the Berlin center city precinct are instructed to deal with foreigners according to the following rule of thumb: "Fine them DM 10 too many rather than DM 1 too little."

"Unter den Linden is a no-stopping zone," the former Vopo adds. "We used to hide behind a tree and as soon as one of those foreigners pulled the key out of the ignition, we slapped a DM 10 fine on him."

The lack of public toilets in East Berlin also serves as a welcome pretext for making the unwanted visitors pay dearly. Particularly successful policemen or radio car crews may get as much as a DM 200 to DM 300 (East) premium each quarter for this. Some of the policemen do not feel that is enough. They resort to all sorts of tricks which in some instances makes the fine wind up in their own pocket.

Now and again, the East Berlin policemen have been known to overshoot the target. "I remember one time," the former Vopo says, "one of those foreigners was standing on Weidendamm Bridge urinating against a phone booth. A radio patrol picked him up and drove him to Monbijou Park where they gave him a pretty rough going-over."

On that occasion, the precinct captain did not cover for them for once because the men had beaten up a foreign visitor of the SED central committee.

Former GDR Policeman's Story

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German Vol 36 No 25, 21 Jun 82 p 43

["The Clientele Consisted Mainly of Foreign Bumpkins"—A Former People's Policeman Tells About His Service in East Berlin"]

[Text] The 1st precinct is the most difficult one in all of Berlin because of the heavy Western traffic. Among other things, it includes the Checkpoint Charlie area and the Friedrichstrasse station. My superiors at the precinct taught me to deal as matter-of-factly as possible with visitors from the West. The basic formula was: no discussions and no concessions.

When I was first assigned as a patrolman, I was told that the foreigners would be my main customers--in other words, all the exotic types that come over on a one-day visa looking for girls on the cheap.

We were most energetic in collecting fines from the Turks, Arabs and Africans. On that subject we even had a special meeting at the precinct one time. There was a danger, you see, that the foreigners would come over, meet a girl and before you knew it she was pregnant and right then and there we would have another petition for an exit visa on our hands. They were interested in stopping things like that, of course. So this is what the precinct captain told us: "I would rather you fined these foreigners DM 10 too much rather than DM 1 too little. We will back you up to the hilt on that."

There is this lawn in front of the Friedrichstrasse station. The foreigners just had to set foot on it and we would nab them and give them a DM 10 fine. Another favorite trap of ours was the no stopping zone in front of the "Lindencorso" on Unter den Linden. The foreigners like to park there, just like in front of the "Adria" and the "Operncafé." They no sooner locked their car than we slapped a DM 10 fine on them for violation of paragraph 19--for parking in a no stopping zone.

The Turks often gave us a hard time. Sometimes, they would throw the money for the fine down on the sidewalk and then we would of course make them bend down and pick it up again. Frequently, we would note down the DM 10 on the receipt but report only DM 1 when we got back to the precinct. It was up to us, after all, to set the fine--up to DM 10. The DM 9 difference was our profit margin.

The late shift on Saturday between 3 pm and 11 pm was the most lucrative. On a good weekend, some of us would make a profit of DM 100 (West). But there were some who went too far. Although they could not collect more than a DM 10 fine, they would take in DM 20 or DM 30. That is how they were caught.

The radio patrols made even more money because they are entitled to collect fines of up to DM 1,000. For example, if they would see a foreigner--preferably a Turk who does not speak German well--making up to a German girl on the street, they would pick the two up and talk to them--separately.

It would not take much to intimidate the girl. They might threaten to call her place of work and ask people there whether they knew that Miss Soandso was earning money on the side nights by having intimate relations with men from the West.

And as for the man, they would tell him the girl had admitted that he solicited prostitution which is a criminal offense in the GDR calling for a 5-year prison term. Now his fine, they would tell him, was DM 200, say. In most cases, the man did not want to raise a fuss or get in trouble but simply paid up even if the complaint against him was unwarranted.

Now people from the West are really quite scared of Vopo uniforms and as a Vopo, you have a feeling in such a situation just how far you can go. The would-be swain would get a receipt for his DM 200 but the radio patrol later reported in with a DM 50 fine collected for an entirely different offense. That was by no means an isolated instance.

After 1975, however, it got more difficult to pocket the fines because they introduced tickets with the amounts printed right on them. What we did then was that we would hand these tickets made out in East Marks to foreigners who could hardly read and collect the fines in West Marks--and at the precinct, we turned in the appropriate amounts in East Marks.

In the case of small amounts, this was not noticed at all. Most of us at our precinct--at least the younger members of the force--enhanced their earnings in this manner. Of course, we never talked about any of this openly. The only important thing was that you and the man who went with you on patrol were of one mind.

But since we, being Vopo members, were not supposed to have any contacts with the West and thus did not receive any foreign currency either, we had to spend the Western monies we collected illegally somewhere outside of Berlin so we would not attract attention. So we went and bought things at the Inter-shop in Potsdam which was our gate to the West, in a manner of speaking.

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CSO: 2300/397

TOTH ADDRESSES ECONOMIC LEADERS' CONFERENCE

Budapest MUSZAKI ELET in Hungarian 24 Jun 82 p 3

[Report on the Second Experience-Exchanging Conference of Economic and Personnel Leaders]

[Text] Eloquent Numbers

Half of the leaders were replaced in the past five-year plan period. In the technical area 33.7 percent of the leaders are graduates of university, college or higher technical schools; 32.3 percent of the guidance personnel are graduates of technical technikums and 15.7 percent are graduates of other technikums; 7.5 percent are graduates of secondary schools. Foremen make up 22 percent of the leaders, most of them having come from the ranks of good skilled workers. Graduates of higher education make up 26 percent of all intellectual employees and 63.2 percent of enterprise directors, technical directors and higher leaders. In the administrative staffs, considerably fewer (19.5 percent) are graduates of higher education.

Some 8,000 to 9,000 people work in personnel jobs; 20 percent of them have graduated from higher level schools. More than 40 percent of them do not have even secondary school degrees.

By international standards the supply of technical and economic experts for the national economy is adequate--largely corresponding to that of countries whose economic development is similar to ours. But in regard to the number and ratio of students participating in higher education we are among those in last place among the European countries. Among 28 European countries, we were in 10th place in 1965, in 18th place in 1970, and had fallen to 25th place in 1975.

Replacement?

How much depends on the personnel officers? The Second

Experience-Exchanging Conference of Economic and Personnel Leaders seemed to confirm the very widespread view: not much. One-fifth of the participants were not even economic leaders, although the invitation spoke of a dialog of personnel officers and economic leaders. How much might depend on personnel officers? It is difficult to give an exaggerated answer to the question when policy positions regard raising the level of leadership as crucial in solving the problems of the national economy.

The conference was opened by Dr Janos Toth, first secretary of the MTESZ [Federation of Technical and Scientific Associations]. Debate initiating presentations were then given at the plenary session by Dr Andras Dunajski, director general of the Ganz-MAVAG Locomotive, Car and Machine Factory, and by Dr Kalman Kulcsar, director of the Sociological Research Institute of the MTA [Hungarian Academy of Sciences].

With Proprietary Responsibility

"We expect, the MTESZ expects, much from your present meeting," said Janos Toth, first secretary of the MTESZ, in his opening speech. "There is a more general and more specific reason for our interest. The more general one is interdependent with the fact that every society is measured, and finally, by how it selects those into whose hands it gives its values, its economic assets, power, trust, authority and tasks, and how it prepares them to be able to live with this. This is a great test of a society, and especially so in our day when, in addition to sticking to and being committed to our fundamental political principles and convictions (I stress, in addition to this and together with it) we are improving and reordering much into the economy and society which hitherto we did not believe could be changed. We are reordering things--in the interest of our future--even if this is accompanied by no little social and human conflict. Because it will be accompanied by this.

"The other reason for the interest and expectation of the MTESZ is that the MTESZ--presuming that your opinion is similar--regards an ever fuller utilization of the knowledge and creativity of the real intelligentsia, which can be called a national treasure, as its task also. Much is said today about how to use this national treasure. The MTESZ was one of the initiators for putting on the agenda the efficiency of intellectual capital in our public life. I would like to note that for our part we are not entirely happy with those newspaper articles and colorful reports which deal with the problems and troubles of our experts--now already exposed enough--endlessly repeating the same complaints.

"We would consider it more important and more necessary, in place of the constant mentioning of it, for creative work and respect for technical-scientific work to find a place in life, in everyday practice, for the realization of the simple principle of "to each according to his work," for

us to have the courage (I stress, the courage) to recognize--materially and morally--valuable work done for society, above the average.

"Speaking of this, it is important to emphasize that the question of pay and incentive for the technical intelligentsia (speaking now of industry) must be solved within the factory. It is fruitless to wait for central wage measures, to wait even for years; the extra income of the country--if there is to be any--will be produced in the factories. The central sources are drying up. If, on the other hand, the leadership in one factory, making use of, let us say, a nominal 5 percent wage increase should the wages of about 5 percent of the factory workers--the intellectual stratum most deserving of it--by even 15-20 percent, then 95 percent of the workers would hardly feel it.

"A clever factory leadership still has many internal possibilities for creating greater incentive for its engineers to stay and--more important--to identify with the cause of the factory, in the form of income or awards but chiefly in the form of intelligent, attractive work and the possibility of promotion. Selection, testing, rewards, promotion--this is what personnel work is! Within the factory, if possible within the factory, and the leader should have the right to put together his own team himself, because that is how he wins or falls (and one must fall also!).

"When talking about leaders and the judgment of leaders we frequently meet with a defensive attitude: 'Let us protect the present leaders against the rising demagoguery, because they have been tested much and have suffered much and we should not expect miracles from them, for who will come to work in a factory today?' We must face a shortage of cadres, a shortage of experts, a shortage of those willing to undertake leadership. The arguments are understandable. Despite this, we do not believe that we should now permit ourselves generally defensive behavior.

"We need aggressive behavior. Not against the leaders of today, not against the past--because many could become exhausted in that--but rather against the existing state of affairs, against the economic stagnation, the slowing of technical development, the decrease in international market competitiveness; and this aggressive behavior is today the chief question of the economic balance and political stability of the country. We certainly do not need leaders who do not feel that guiding an enterprise and carrying it to victory is a beautiful, enchanting life goal. Nor do we need those who do not feel that today they must meet many requirements which were not so important formerly. Language knowledge, for example. Only a small fraction of the industrial leaders know any foreign language, in a country where nearly half of the national income is realized in international contacts and where keeping up with international technical progress is one of the most important questions in the interest of creating a foreign-trade balance.

"Agriculture was able to produce a leading stratum capable of quickly mastering new production methods, capable of negotiating and carrying its people into battle. There is talent and entrepreneurial spirit in this country. We in industry must be able to create an atmosphere where this spirit will feel at home.

"The replacement of leaders is dictated for demographic reasons also-- independent of all else. Unfortunately, the generation, worthy of all respect, which undertook great sacrifices in the heroic age of socialist industrial organization is passing. They are passing not only from the leadership but slowly also from life--it is a law of nature. In the past five-year plan period half of the leaders in industry were replaced; now we can also reckon with a similar ratio. What is involved is not only, or even primarily, who should be removed but rather who should be sent in. What sort of man is it, in each leading post, with proprietary responsibility, who will amass, in his own place, the several hundred billions of forints worth of national property-- under difficult conditions? If we give the beginning engineer independence, if we let him grow, and help him too--then amassing national property will be more attractive to him than some small undertaking.

"The MTESZ and the associations can give important aid in recognizing such people--and I would like to emphasize this before the personnel leaders. Professional public opinion, in general, is a good measure of men, and one can find this professional public opinion in the associations of the MTESZ less dependent and less influenced by local interests."

The Role of Politics

Academician Kalman Kulcsar, director of the Sociological Research Institute of the MTA, talked in his plenary address about how the results of sociology can be used in personnel work, especially in leader selection. After a brief historical survey he drew the conclusion that to no small degree the improvement of the ability to renew the economy depends in our society on a similar ability of the political system. Thus the title of his lecture to the general assembly of the MTA 2 years ago, "Economic Challenge, Social Response," reflects a real phenomenon.

Of crucial importance is the ability of the political system to adapt, to renew itself, especially in the socialist societies of central Eastern Europe, in which politics pervades virtually every sphere of society. Thus the concrete manifestation of personnel policy depends on the relationships of the political system, on how the significance of the power element is evaluated in its content, composition and ratios, on what properties are considered important in leadership or even expert work.

If there is not sufficient expertise in an organization based on expertise, or if quasi-expertise takes the place of true expertise, while it is still hypothesized that the organization is operating on the basis of true expertise, then it is virtually certain that the appropriate response, the necessary organizational or action renewal, will not take place.

We must see that the organizational frameworks in themselves and due to their internal inherent peculiarities are inclined toward "leveling," toward preference for average behavior, and thus toward conservatism and opposition to change.

One frequently hears today that the knowledge of the technical intelligentsia is not exploited at many enterprises, that promotion depends less on actual expertise and work than on incidental factors. We must also admit that the wage level of the intelligentsia--especially of the technical intelligentsia--is quite backward. For example, the average wages of MTA researchers in 1981 were more than 10 percent lower than the average wages of intellectual workers who had graduated from secondary school.

What has been said is well-known--in various details and at various levels. But in sum more is involved that the status of one or another social stratum or even the place of expertise in an organization based on expertise. It is not only the functioning of the organization which requires the presence of real expertise; the place and value of expertise in society must be changed for the further development of our society.

Where Should We Begin?

In the recess following the plenary addresses, a shockingly large number held the argument of Kalman Kulcsar to be extreme. According to them, it could lead to trespasses if expertise were given such priority in leader selection. And a misgiving arose of itself in others: If society urges and desires in cadre policy essential changes at every level of production, then should not this process begin first of all among those doing personnel work?

The conference could give only an indirect answer to the question. Nor was it the purpose of the conference to prepare a general and sociologically profound analysis concerning the cadre-policy activity of the enterprises and concerning those who carry out this task. Still, listening to the reports about the section meetings it appears that one cannot expect in this area any worthy or pervasive change within a short time--although the required style of work is already developing at more and more enterprises.

Of course--as is usual at such times--everyone heard from the lectures only as much as would justify his own methods. For example, in regard to leader selection based on sociological, psychological and ergonomic studies, it was the opinion of one camp that these were not humane enough while according to another camp it was in the interest of individual and community alike that objective methods be used to judge leadership suitability.

How? In some developed countries independent entrepreneurs make a living out of managing good leaders. This method of management has developed in Hungary only via indirect channels. For example, by requesting from time to time, semiofficially and in a friendly way, the advice of the SZVT [Scientific Society of Organization and Management]: Make a suggestion for filling this or that position.

And if someone was trying to concentrate all his attention at the conference on getting as much new information as possible for his work, he was not in an easy situation. Those invited were divided into sections according to branch and not according to theme groups so that only a very distant link could be discerned among the lectures as a whole. In one of them, for example, Valeria

Bozsik reported on several decades of research--describing the "universal" model on the basis of which--capable of being evaluated by a computer--one could classify talents and abilities and thus create an interest system more objective than any earlier one. Only a few minutes separated this lecture from one the pillars of which were such statements as: Man is the most important reserve; He must be treated with great understanding; Man is the most sensitive element in production; and so forth....

The attacks against the competition system did not have to struggle with counterarguments--in a joint section of industry and the construction industry, before an audience of almost 500, there could be no worthy verbal exchange. A narrower circle would have made possible a more precise determination of the shading of many new considerations and views. For example, in connection with creating role opportunities for those aspiring to leadership or concerning the spread of democratic methods of selection or concerning the relationship of experience in the problems of personnel work and of the enterprise.

There was mention of all these at the conference. The more inventive speakers even referred to those who had been heard earlier. But a worthy debate could not develop. Too bad. One can only hope that the majority did not misunderstand the experience of a designing enterprise in southern Trans-Dunubia. They experimented with leader selection using sociological and psychological methods and the deviation from the earlier plan--prepared in the traditional way--was only 10 percent.

But the original plan was prepared by people who did not stand far from the scientific methodology. It is probable that there will be more such people--perhaps thanks even to this conference.

8984
CSO: 2500/357

TWO WESTERN EVANGELISTS TAKEN TO TASK ON USSR VIEWS

Paris KULTURA in Polish 7/8, 1982 pp 68-73

[Article by Leopold Unger: "Seen from Brussels. Two Evangelists from the West"; passages enclosed in slantlines appear in italics]

[Text] Motto: /"Hiding his head in the sand has never yet protected an ostrich from getting a kick in the ..."./ Read somewhere...

The First Evangelist

Mr Billy Graham very modestly calls himself an "evangelist", but he is regarded by others as the most famous Baptist preacher in the world. Of late, he has also been admired by the USSR. Mr Graham has gone through a colossal metamorphosis. During the 1950's he spread his gospel in a spirit that was totally anti-communistic, and in tones so strident that in comparison McCarthy's tirades sounded like Sunday psalms. Recently he accepted an invitation to an organized (officially) by the Moscow metropolitan (a deep breath here): "World Conference of People of Religion for the Protection of the Holy Gift of Life Against an Atomic Catastrophe."

Nothing was able to shake Graham's faith in the honesty of the intentions of the organizers: not the censorship of the speeches, nor the fact that the places of worship--in which the evangelist was to preach--were encircled by a double cordon of police (to say nothing of the "faithful" in plainclothes), nor the automobile rides in the "Czajka" (convertible-type) designed for Kremlin dignitaries, while other "people of religion" were hauled in masses or groups in ordinary buses, nor the large portions of caviar which he received at each meal, which, as the evangelist remarked, "in the United States only millionaires can afford" (as if in the USSR any working woman...).

Billy Graham invited the accredited journalists in Moscow to a press conference to share these impressions with him. He said that the freedom of religion in the USSR is much greater than he had expected to find, that there were more people in the Moscow church than in his home town of Charlotte, and he confirmed that he had called upon one of his apostles to appeal to the soviet faithful to obey the authorities. Asked what he thought about the arrest of a young girl who tried to display a placard saying that "150 Baptists, Graham's brothers, are in prison" because of their religious practices, the evangelist replied that in the United States, too, people are arrested even in church if they do not behave properly. Mr Graham

reported with pride that he was received in the Kremlin by high government representatives, Messrs Ponomarev and Arbatov. "Despite the fact", said Graham, "that I am not a specialist in soviet affairs, I am convinced that the people I talked with were completely sincere." Graham--not a specialist--added in parting that just as the United States and the USSR were allies during World War II in the struggle against a common enemy, so today, too, they should jointly resist the threat of a nuclear war.

Mr Graham went straight from the Kremlin to Buckingham Palace, where Prince Philip handed him a check for \$200,000. This was an award for "spreading the faith", the highest religious award in the world. Mr Graham indeed should have received the award. But not for spreading the faith, but for sowing confusion, and not in London, but in Moscow. And he should immediately have allocated it, on the one hand, for aid to the persecuted Baptists in the USSR, and, on the other hand, for the prevention of the spread of "grahamism disease", a peculiar form of pacifism, blindness, and stupidity, which assumes a moral symmetry between the USSR and the United States, and between democracy and sovietism.

The Second Evangelist

/--For 10 years now you have been publishing your ZESZYTY SAMIZDATU [self-published material]. There have been already 85 issues, but not one copy has yet been sent to Graham. And, after all, Graham is not the only example of deception or manipulation. Every issue of ZESZYTY represents a good number of the "witnesses for the prosecution" of the soviet system. It was your goal to open the eyes of the people of the West to the soviet reality. And yet after 10 years, even someone like Graham does not see, to say nothing of the so-called ordinary people. Detente, also, is approximately 10 years old, just as your ZESZYTY, but the behavior of the West as regards the invasion of Afghanistan, to say nothing about the coup d'etat in Poland, does not indicate that the West reads ZESZYTY and understands the reality of soviet totalitarianism./

--Indeed, but any kind of measurable evaluation of the influence of a publication of the ZESZYTY SAMIZDATU type is really not possible. Graham is not the only example of blindness, naturally, but I could cite a good number of examples of the opposite. I believe that to a certain degree despite our modest means and in spite of Moscow's enormous propaganda and disinformation work, in giving this public a certain dose of information on soviet reality we have been able to influence the consciousness of the West. Since you are coupling 10 years of detente and our ZESZYTY, then let me say that when, in 1972, three years before the Helsinki conference, our first issue appeared, on poor paper, badly printed, etc., not very many people coupled the concept of international relations and human rights. If, however, today--also, for example, in the Polish context--the West is now more aware that there will be no political detente without human detente, then we, too, have made some slight contribution... Perhaps it is inappropriate to mention this in KULTURA, but since you ask...

What are we talking about? What does an ostrich have to do with Graham, and what is in KULTURA as seen from Brussels?

One of the few periodicals of soviet opposition, published regularly 10 times a year, completely legally and without the least censorship, on good paper, delivered normally by mail to the home, edited by people whose names and addresses are known to the police and who, despite everything, work without the risk of deportation to prison camps or confinement to a hospital for the mentally ill, has been published in Brussels for 10 years already, in French, under the editorship of a 50-year-old Belgian aristocrat, who for five days a week is an official in a certain nongovernment international organization having nothing to do with politics, and who during weekends, holidays, and often during his vacations, is the publisher, editor, secretary, and administrator of a periodical called LES CAHIERS DU SAMIZDAT, or ZESZYTY SAMIZDATU.

We do not have to explain to the readers of KULTURA what a "samizdat" is. We should, however, explain to them who Antony de Meeus is, and why, although he could quietly tend his garden, and on Saturdays, wash his automobile like every other Belgian, he has become the first non-Russian to be truly dedicated to the task of opening the eyes of all kinds of Grahams and other tricksters and simply ordinary uninformed people in the West. Journalists and intellectuals, instead of simply helping him, every once in a while pay this "weirdo" a so-called "tribute" and compete with each other in thinking up such allegorical names as "archeologist of truth about the soviet empire", etc. As a matter of fact, he himself is extremely modest, is surprised when someone pays him a compliment, and is really concerned only that his ZESZYTY should reach the maximum number of people. He admires KULTURA, despite the fact that it is not a model for him, and regrets that he cannot read it in the original. "I learned Russian", he says, "but let us not exaggerate, I do not know Polish."

/--Well, good, but why should you, a person from a good home and good social origin, be concerned about all this?/

--Human fate interests me--perhaps that is my nature. In any case, I understood that there is still another world, a terrible world, that people are suffering, that we must talk about this, for because of callousness we risk a similar fate. With a small group of people--I do not really know how they were selected--there was a former general from the Belgian resistance movement, there was a Dutch professor, several Brussels Catholic intellectuals, etc.--we decided to talk about what is going on in the East, -- not on the basis of third-hand stories, even those of journalists, but on the basis of documents. That is how the idea of ZESZYTY SAMIZDATU, which was then entering upon its most fruitful years, was born. The CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS was being published, similar publications arose in Lithuania and in the Ukraine, the Helsinki conference was taking place and with it the "Human Rights Groups" began to be born, and after Tarsis new evidences of the activities of "KGB'ers in white [doctors'] coats" began to come in. There was plenty to choose from, there was--unfortunately--much to talk about. In 1972 we published the first issue of ZESZYTY, then I published a larger, separate study on the subject of psychiatry, and that is how it began. The "samizdat" documents and testimonies would, after all, have remained unknown if they had not been translated, prepared, and made available to the Western reader... Today the problem is selection. So much is coming in, and this despite the fact that we have decided to print only sociopolitical documents, and to not consider the samizdat literary works at all.

We also decided to draw our materials only from original documents, i.e., from documents that first appeared in the USSR, and not to use the intermediary materials that we receive from emigrants, although this is, of course, a potentially enormous source...

/--I just read in a friendly, serious periodical that the promotion of Andropov as the most likely candidate to succeed Brezhnev is the best news to come out of Moscow in many years. Andropov presumably is, according to the professor from Washington, a reformer and a liberal. But is it not this liberal who eliminated the entire opposition, all the dissidents, and caused all your sources to dry up?/

--The professor from Washington probably does not read ZESZYTY, because if he did he would know that Andropov is a "liberal" who, instead of mass terror and executions, applies a terror that is selective. But you, too, do not read ZESZYTY either, although you receive it, for you would know that in spite of this "liberal", our sources have not dried up. Today it is not enough to lock up a few dissidents in order to take away the opposition's voice. Besides, all things being equal, in Poland it is the same. The entire leadership of Solidarity is sitting in jail, but the independent press is still publishing, and they even have radio broadcasts, I believe. Thus in the USSR--and this is an extremely important phenomenon--in place of the arrested activists of the Helsinki, psychiatric or religious groups, new ones immediately appear. Today they no longer give their names and addresses, but they are there and they are active. Documents appear there, and they are again reaching us. The human resource, after all, is inexhaustible, and the rest is a matter of courage. In any case, I assure you, and this is an important assertion, that your stereotypical view of soviet society as an amorphous mass, without spirit, without aspirations, and without courage, does not correspond with reality. In your paper you recently announced the final extermination of the Helsinki group and the committee concerned with psychiatric abuses. You were mistaken. We have received a new SMOT bulletin, although you have already buried it, and a new issue of KRONIKA [Chronicle] from Moscow. KRONIKA in Lithuania just observed its 10th anniversary. Late in 1981 it carried a study on the subject of "Cultural Genocide in Lithuania". This text reached the West, several months after its author, Vytuas Skoudis, was sentenced to 12 years in a prison camp.

/--That sounds like an obituary. All you have to do is publish a name, and KGB goes into action. This is extremely risky. And what a responsibility. Do you know what you are doing?/

--Yes. It is not from ZESZYTY that the KGB gets its names of dissidents. It is, I believe, the other way round. Publicity in the West may sometimes be something of a protective wall. This, of course, was not due to ZESZYTY, but the Sakharov case is the best example of this. He won his hunger strike against the Kremlin on the matter of a passport for Lisa only because of the interest that it aroused in the Western press. The Kremlin capitulated, for it was not worthwhile to increase the scandal. A year ago an Estonian professor, Uiri Kukk, went on a hunger strike in the camp at Wologda, but he lies in grave number 2774 because the Western press no longer had the time to be properly concerned about him.

/--Are you blaming us for that?/

--No. And that is not what matters. The Western print media has, of course, many

worries. Besides, let us not exaggerate, clamor is not always enough to save people. If it were so, life would be easier. But it is a fact that the West is not accurately and properly informed on what is going on in the USSR. And, after all, pressure cannot be effectively applied on soviet authorities if the Western society is not suitably aroused, and it cannot be suitably aroused if it is not informed in a proper way. That, specifically, is the purpose of our work, what we are concerned with, and therefore it is what you, too, should be concerned with.

/--Why do you speak only about the press? What about the authorities, the governments? The authorities do not give a hoot about ZESZYTY. For 10 years now you have been publishing your periodical in French, and here the French "spacionaut" (the French, naturally, do not like either "astronaut" or "cosmonaut") will go up (at the time this is being written he has not gone up yet) into space on board the Salyut in the company of soviet colonels. Where is the arousal? Could it be that the French government has not been informed in a proper way on the relationship of liberals of the Andropov type to human and civil rights in a country which is sending up Salyut and Soyuz?/

--I beg your pardon. You are confusing the concepts. We in ZESZYTY have no illusions as to our ability to influence Western governments. That is your problem--the big press, and not our modest little periodical. We direct ourselves to public opinion. We want to be a bridge, to facilitate contacts not between governments--they do not need us for this--but between societies...

/--Those, really, are illusions. You only think that it is easier to establish contacts between societies than between governments. In actuality, it is much more difficult.../

--And yet this is happening. I do not want to draw up a balance sheet. In any case, in comparison with KULTURA this is not even appropriate. But I would like to remind you that we have "exposed" in ZESZYTY several important matters which will not easily be removed from the Western soul and memory. And perhaps from the Western consciousness, also. ZESZYTY was the first to seriously concern itself with the abuses in soviet psychiatry. It revealed the tragedies of some of the national minorities that are less known than the Tartars, the Germans from above the Volga, or the Jews, or, for example, the mass deportation of the Tajikistan mountaineers late in the 1960's, the prison camps for the disabled (a special committee in France is already concerned with this), the "confiscation" of children from families of believers, primarily Baptists..."

/--...Graham did not see this, either.../

--Apparently. Well, and finally--and probably most of all--we published in French the entire report by Prof Juri Orlov, who was sentenced to 12 years in a prison camp for his activity in a Helsinki group in Moscow, on the world of soviet concentration camps.

/--Liberal Andropov sent two percent of the USSR's population there, but Orlov's name is constantly being mentioned among them. The world, which learned from Orlov about this two percent, was not even able to save one promise out of a promise, i.e., Orlov himself. And yet the world was informed and according to your thesis, should have been aroused./

--Should have been. Despite everything, we are still counting on this. One of our large dossiers was the case of the work of political prisoners on the so-called large constructions of socialism, e.g., the Amur-Baikal main line. We have now learned that prisoners are also working on the new pipelines through which the life-giving gas is to flow from Siberia to Western Europe.

/--Do you really believe that such a trifling detail might arouse someone today, that the Ruhrgas firm, or Manesmann, or Mr Hammer, or even Mr Mauroy, the one who compared Poland's tragedy with the tragedy of French gas subscribers--that all of these will refuse to "diversify" the supply of energy simply because the delivery will cost several soviet-prisoner lives?/

--No, they will not be moved, but I know people who are concerned about this. That is why we are seeking Western engineers--and there are those who know something on this subject, to come out into the open...

/--Of what do you want to convince the West? After all, Bukowski, for a long time, and also your co-worker, Liubarski, also a former prison-camp inmate, delivered a mass of proof on the existence of "export" prison production. You do not want to acknowledge the power of the Western rejection of soviet reality. They call you an "archeologist of truth about the USSR". This is very touching, but you know that archeology does not move the masses. Now, not too long ago, the Greenpeace pacifists' ship cast its anchor in the port of Leningrad, from which it had to be towed by force. The official soviet peace committee promised only that it would forward their message to Brezhnev, but it condemned the sending of diversionary balloons with the provocative lettering "peace". Several weeks earlier, the Italian deputy to the European parliament, Marco Panella, a folk figure but an evangelist even more honest than Graham, organized a simultaneous campaign in several Western capitals. He was more concerned with the millions dying of hunger in various Sahelas than about pacifism, but even so his "commando" demonstration lasted, for example, on Red Square, only 100 seconds, which even for the KGB was a rather efficient operation. And yet those same people, despite this type of experience, demonstrated against Reagan and against American missiles both during and after the extremely amusing circus arranged by the French socialists in the Louis the Fourteenth Palace, but without the royal style, and especially without Louis's women. As long as Western Europe, and particularly its youth, does not learn to distinguish the soviet danger from the American, as long as it continues to put these two civilizations on the same plane, that is how long all of the ZESZYTY will not be very effective./

--And how do you convince them? Have you, and the big press, been able to do this? Actually, Western society does not so much lack documents confirming the atrocities of the soviet system--which is really the task of ZESZYTY--as it lacks a basic political orientation, i.e., precisely that which your press should give it, and without which no interest in the dry documents of truth can be aroused.

/--The big press does what it can, but it cannot force the reader to read, or even to listen. Recently we both took part in an ostensibly important international function. Theoretically each of us was supposed to have an audience of 40 representatives of 15 countries. At my place, I counted only 14, of whom several talked among themselves, and several quietly slept. But the worst of all were those who did not sleep. The questions that they asked you proved that they, too, do not read ZESZYTY./

--Indeed, but at least I was asked a few questions.

/--I understand you have a new idea. You want to publish still another periodical./

--I do not necessarily have to be the one to publish it, but I think that there should be a periodical edited by West Europeans for Russians, in Russian, telling them not about the soviet reality, but about the West European reality.

/--What for?/

--I said--for you this is not a revelation--that the strength of the soviet system depends on disinformation and lies. We do not know the soviets well, or we know them incorrectly, but they do not know us at all. That is why, for example, the most aberrational soviet slogans about Western imperialism or the hell that is capitalism, still are successful, if not in Moscow, then in Kiev or Pskov. One of my neighbors told me that a friend of his in Russia asked whether he could send him something because he had heard that in Belgium there is so much poverty that there is a shortage of potatoes. Because all of the Russians cannot come here (fortunately) to see for themselves, I think it is worth trying to send them the truth about how we live and about our institutions. Disinformation can only be countered by truthful and reliable information.

10 June 1982

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FRENCH REPORTER DISCUSSES MODERNIZATION EFFORTS, CRISES

Paris LE FIGARO in French 4, 5, 6 Aug 82

[Article by Bernard Margueritte]

[4 Aug 82 p 4]

[Text] Bucharest--When the plane from Warsaw lands at Otopeni Airport, 20 kilometers from the Romanian capital, one does not really feel that things are much different. Armed soldiers guard the runways and check the aircraft. Has a state of war been decreed in Romania? The fact is that it was done long ago. It is part of the life and customs here. On looking over my passport, which clearly states that I am a reporter by occupation, the Romanian border police officer was visibly upset and asked me to step aside. A superior showed up shortly afterward to certify amiably that all the regular authorizations had indeed been granted.

To tell the truth, the Romanian "state of war" is more severe in some respects than the one in Poland. It is very difficult, for example, for a Romanian citizen to get inside certain Western embassies. And a decree forbidding Romanians to meet Westerners without reporting to the police is still in effect.

The political police--the "Securitate"--are omnipresent. A Western diplomat told me that between 15 and 20 percent of the population either belongs to it or cooperates with it. A Romanian friend considered that estimate exaggerated, and he added with a smile: "In any case, it is nothing compared to what we had before the war."

Impressive Progress

That remark is worth thinking about. It would be futile or mistaken to pass judgment on Romanian realities on the basis of values or notions which are ours but which are totally foreign to this country. It is not only because President Ceausescu occasionally shows the good taste to tickle the Soviet bear that we should make an effort to understand his country. Romania's history and traditions must be taken into account. After all, the brutality of Romanian-style socialism is often tempered by the Latin spirit, and a number of draconian laws and decrees are fortunately not enforced.

Compared to what Poland is experiencing, Romania could seem a real Eldorado. I had not been in Bucharest for 10 years, and I must say that the progress is visible. All along Magheru and Balcescu Boulevards, one now sees numerous elegant shops offering a great variety of clothing, shoes, and miscellaneous manufactured goods that are sorely lacking in Poland.

Regardless of the present difficulties, one quite obviously cannot forget that from 1961 to 1979, Romania's national income rose at the highest rate in the world--ahead of Japan's. National income is 3.5 times what it was in 1965, and industrial production is five times greater. The inhabitants own seven times as many television sets and refrigerators and consume twice as much meat. Romania's great leap forward under President Nicolae Ceausescu is therefore undeniable.

Paradoxically, it is even one of the causes of the current crisis. The director of the State Planning Committee admitted in my presence: "Our investment plan (an annual increase of 11 percent in industrial investments) may have been too ambitious, but we wanted to reduce the gap separating us from the developed countries as quickly as possible. We had to proceed by forced marches."

Minea Georghiu, the likable and brilliant chairman of the Academy of Sciences, explains that policy by two factors: the need to exploit natural resources (Romania, for example, has an abundance of raw materials and energy resources) and follow the ideology in force, but also the will to insure the country's economic--and therefore political--independence. My interlocutor recalled that in 1963 and 1964, Khrushchev had assigned Romania the role of supplier of food products to CEMA, thus limiting its possibilities for industrial development. The policy of national independence was in large measure a reaction to those Soviet plans.

Serious Disproportions

The country's frenzied development was very costly and led to serious disproportions. Agriculture in particular was neglected, and an effort is therefore being made now to overcome that problem. The 1981-1985 5-year plan has been declared the plan "of agrarian revolution."

The chairman of the Academy of Sciences emphasized: "We have been cut to the quick by the international crisis, which has made the shortcomings of rapid development show up clearly." Constantin Parvutsoiu, general director of foreign trade, chimed in: "The world crisis has closed many markets for our products, especially in France, whose cantankerous protectionism leads us to call it the 'mother-in-law of the Common Market.'" Fortunately, he said it with a smile, and the fact is that Franco-Romanian trade is not doing so badly, since it grew by 44 percent in 1981. Another consequence of the world crisis being felt in Romania is the rapid rise in interest rates, which are now approaching 20 percent. A developing country like Romania feels as though a gun is being held to its head.

Romania's foreign debt has therefore assumed disturbing proportions. It is in the process of passing the \$14-billion mark and represents the value of 3 years

of exports to the capitalist countries. Romania should repay \$4 billion over the next 18 months, but it has already had difficulties and fallen behind in its payments.

But the situation is not as catastrophic as it is in Poland. For one thing, the debt structure is better (there is less commercial credit), and there are more long-term credits. For another, Romania continues to be the Eastern country most favored by the United States, and it benefits above all from its membership in the World Bank and the IMF. The IMF has just restored a line of credit totaling \$1.25 billion to Romania, and that should provide the country with the oxygen bottle it so badly needs. The IMF was encouraged by the fact that for the first time in a long time, Romania's trade balance showed a surplus of \$300 million in 1981, a trend that appears to be growing stronger this year.

Galloping Inflation

The fact remains that those problems have caused an abrupt drop in economic growth, real difficulties with supplies, and sharp price rises. Industrial production was supposed to rise by 9 percent in 1981, but in fact it rose by only 4 percent.

The objectives of the 1976-1980 plan were not achieved. The new 1981-1985 plan (which incidentally was drawn up 6 months late) therefore shows a clear retreat in comparison with previous plans. What is more, the results for the first quarter of 1982--which according to the Party Executive Committee were not consistent with the existing possibilities--suggest that there will be further downward corrections in the annual plan.

Because of the foreign debt, it was necessary to sharply reduce imports (at the risk of hampering production in many factories) and to export everything possible (including meat for U.S. troops stationed in Europe). At the same time, agricultural production declined by 5 percent in 1980 and by a further 1 percent in 1981. One consequence was the appearance in 1981 of difficulties with supplies. Long lines formed in front of the stores.

In October 1981, President Ceausescu signed two decrees. The first was concerned with the fight against speculation and provided prison terms ranging from 6 months to 5 years for anyone storing more products in his home than his family would require for 1 month. The second regulated the consumption of certain items (for example, 1 liter of oil and 1 kilogram of sugar per person per month) and the regionalization of supplies (each county being required to feed its inhabitants from its own resources). Lastly, prices rose by an average of 35 percent at the start of this year (but rice went up by 90 percent, veal by 80 percent, margarine by 80 percent, and sugar by 55 percent).

Today the situation is much better than it was a few months ago. Most of the lines have disappeared. Supplies are almost adequate. But it is true that in comparison with wages, prices seem very high. Here are a few examples noted last July: beefsteak: 35 francs per kilogram; chicken: 17 francs per kilogram; potatoes: 1.60 francs per kilogram; and oranges or grapefruit: 11 francs per

kilogram. A dress costs an average of 810 francs, a pair of shoes 180 francs, a black-and-white television set 2,200 francs, and a refrigerator 2,600 francs. And all of that on an average wage of 2,400 lei, or 1,400 francs.

The economic situation has certainly not favored the Romanians. In the 1960's, they undertook to build a vast refining capacity of 35 million tons per year. To keep it operating (and not even at full capacity), they must import very expensive crude oil, whereas refining does not bring in much profit. And the production of 13 million tons of steel in 1981 is also a heavy burden. All the more since Romanian industry is a great devourer of raw materials and energy. The result is that power cuts are necessary, and they, too, are extremely expensive for industry.

When all is said and done, the chief culprit behind the crisis is of course the system itself, with its excessive centralization, its administrative sluggishness, its waste and chaos, and, above all, the fact that it acts as a brake on the expression of talent and the taking of initiative. Romania has already achieved a stage of development in which all of that makes itself felt to a terrible degree. So the system must be reformed. But is that possible?

[5 Aug 82 p 4]

[Text] Bucharest--The first consequence of the economic crisis against which Romania is struggling is a general discontent that shows itself simultaneously in a degree of agitation in intellectual circles, latent discontent among the people, and visible nervousness on the part of the government. This has just been reflected in major cabinet shuffles due in part to serious waste in connection with the policy for investments abroad.

That nervousness has also just expressed itself in the tragicomic incident involving "Transcendental Meditation," which was christened a "mystical sect" for the occasion (see LE FIGARO, 22 June) and which provided the pretext for eliminating some 250 high officials, among them Mrs Spornic, the minister of education and instruction.

Perhaps it was not simply coincidence that two of them had just openly criticized the government's education policy by condemning its tendency to eliminate elites in favor of the mediocre.

Deputy Chairman Milcu of the Academy of Sciences wrote: "Without elites chosen by merit, a nation loses its identity." And Director Radilian of the Institute of History expressed the opinion that reducing exceptional students to the average level constituted in fact "inequality of opportunity, an undesired egalitarianism, and standardization of their development."

More generally, Romanian literary circles have become increasingly involved in a conflict which has been going for years but which has now become sharper between the "traditionalists" close to the government and the liberals. The latter have just carried out a new offensive against the "July Theses," by which President Ceausescu introduced his "little cultural revolution" in 1971.

Abuse of Power

The open nature of the controversy shows, incidentally--when one takes a close look--that the Romanian regime is less rigid than it seems. A young critic wrote in a magazine published in Iasi that the July Theses established "a new and much harsher framework for the cultural movement: ideological leadership has been intensified." For his part, writer Norman Manea stated: "Since politics is becoming a restrictive and intimidating force deforming a nation's creative potential, this is also felt, and with the greatest intensity, by the artist."

Those opinions were naturally denounced, notably by the party organ SCINTEIA, which spoke of "serious errors," "subjectivism," "arbitrariness," and "intolerance," but that did not lead the liberals to make amends. They continue to head the Writers Association and its organ ROMANIA LITERARA.

That no doubt explains why sharp attacks have just been made on that association's structures for permitting, it is said, "a monopoly and abuse of power in the field of artistic creation." As for the association's leaders, they are reproached for "having had and still having the intention of transforming the Writers Association into a sort of launch pad for all kinds of base and questionable influences and knowingly placing it at the disposal of people who are seeking their social, but also political, revenge." Lastly--and curiously, considering that the Romanian Writers Association was one of the first of its kind in Europe at the beginning of the century--the government's supporters advance the idea that the association is a "foreign"--that is, Soviet--structure rather than being genuinely Romanian. It can therefore be wondered whether the government is preparing to suppress, in one way or another, the Writers Association and a few other associations of creative people.

Are those confrontations likely to escape the government's control? There is really nothing to indicate that they will, since it is also true, as one Western diplomat said, that "Romania is the country in the [socialist] camp with the fewest dissidents and the one where their repression is most determined."

It is not likely, therefore, that Romania will become another Poland. There are indeed scattered reports of workers demonstration due to shortages of supplies, but none of it is very serious.

As far as union freedoms are concerned, SLOMER (Free Union of Romanian Workers), which was established in February 1979, was torn to pieces after attracting nearly 2,000 members. The strike by 30,000 miners in the Jiu Valley in August 1977 was followed by harsh repressive measures. Two of the strike leaders even died following very odd accidents. Most of SLOMER's leaders were arrested, but two of them--Dr Cana and Mr Brasoveanu--were recently released, and Nicolas Dascalu was given permission to emigrate in March 1981.

Last February, our colleague Bernard Poulet, who was trying to contact another dissident in Ploesti--Vasile Paraschiv--was attacked and injured in circumstances that were too obviously obscure.

During a discussion of human rights at the party academy, one participant stated that "in socialist Romania, these rights must be in direct proportion to society's level of development."

Minea Georghiu, chairman of the Academy of Sciences, also explained to me the need for an authoritarian policy on the government's part: "It must not be forgotten that we are a Latin and Balkan people at the same time. Our workers have a Neapolitan mentality. Moreover, we have no worker tradition. Without discipline and firmness, we would never have been able to carry out our great leap forward."

Basically, the reasoning is as follows: rapid industrialization was essential to insure the country's independence and enable it to avoid the fate of being the socialist camp's granary, which is what the Soviets wanted it to be, but that could not be done without a firm domestic policy.

One intellectual told me: "It is not our fault if we are where we are." And he added through clenched teeth: "Roosevelt and Churchill--those heroes of Yalta--should be taken from their graves and hanged."

The famous writer Eugen Barbu, who is close to President Ceausescu, welcomed me in his magnificent villa in the company of his wife, a celebrated actress who speaks impeccable French. He told me: "You know, it is better to shout 'long live Ceausescu' twice than to be forced to shout 'long live Brezhnev' once." And he continued by emphasizing that of all the forms of domination suffered by Romania in the course of its history, "the Soviet was the worst, because it attacked both our resources and our soul."

A journalist confided to me: "Liberalize? You must be joking. If we allowed the formation of something like Solidarity here, there is no doubt that we would have the Red Army in Bucharest the next day."

Key to Change

That being said, everyone agrees that the system must evolve. But how? The party magazine ERA SOCIALISTA agrees in fact that the socialist countries must face new problems that are "sometimes even more difficult and more complicated than those they encountered in introducing the socialist system."

Minea Georghiu recognizes that "the key to changing the system has not yet been found." He admits that as it exists today, "it acts as a brake on free competition among talents and abilities. The demagogues have the upper hand, but it is our ideology itself (Marxism-Leninism is not mentioned in Romania) which must conquer them." The chairman of the Academy of Sciences sees the existence of an antagonism between the apparatus and the "managers": the young generation of ambitious technocrats who are champing at the bit and finding it increasingly difficult to bear the restraints of the system. That is undoubtedly a more serious problem than the problem of dissidents.

In the meantime, a quiet attempt is being made to introduce a "new economic mechanism." A director of the Planning Committee explained to me that it

consists of replacing excessive development with intensive development and quantity with quality. Economic considerations must be respected. The enterprises will be given greater powers. And above all, the workers councils, self-management, and self-administration must be developed.

Specifically, special attention is being paid to reducing the consumption of energy and raw materials, and there is renewed talk of the managers, whose responsibilities, according to Ceausescu himself, are to be increased.

That is all very well, but how can it be reconciled with the continued existence of a system that is strongly centralized, bureaucratic, administrative, and authoritarian? Moreover, at the same time that there is renewed talk of reforms, a group of party "instructors" has just been formed. They will function somewhat as superinspectors, being responsible for insuring good management and compliance with directives throughout the country.

That being the case, how can one talk at the same time about workers councils, increased power for the enterprises, and appeals for initiative? It seems that here we have touched on a basic contradiction in the system, which knows that it will not avoid economic disaster without decentralization, a return to the laws of the marketplace, and democratization, but which, for reasons that are political as well as ideological or social, is totally incapable of making real progress in that direction.

In any case, our little Latin sister, lost in that socialist ocean to the East, deserves our friendship and, at the very least, our indulgence for having managed to develop its economic potential and above all for having preserved its national identity against all odds. Besides, how can we not show our friendship to a nation where so many people, even today, speak our language? An example was the young customs officer who, on checking my passport, gave me an exaggerated smile and made this final and revealing remark: "You poor man, you are going to Poland. How brave you are!"

[6 Aug 82 p 3]

[Text] Bucharest--Somewhere between the capital and Ploesti, Dr Dinescu, surrounded by his team, greeted me in an attractive little palace housing the offices of the stockbreeding center he heads. It is a very sizable pilot enterprise: 2,500 hectares producing forage for 3,200 head of livestock, including 800 milk cows that supply between 4,500 and 4,600 liters of milk per day (although the record is 11,000 liters).

Attached to the center are an artificial insemination center--the only one in the country, with 200 bulls--and "seven stations" scattered throughout Romania with a total of 10,000 calves. The center's original feature is that it combines research and production. The laboratory concerns itself with genetics, immunology, reproduction, and nutrition technology. But Dr Dinescu points out that here "we are not interested in art for art's sake. Our work must yield practical results. Basic research accounts for only 20 percent of our activities." The center's cows are not supposed to set milk production records. The basic objective is reproduction. There is no specialization in breeds: all of them must produce both milk and meat.

Red Factory

Thanks to the new system that was recently introduced, the institute is self-financed. Economic self-management is very advanced, and that includes social investments and the development fund. The decree adopted at the start of the year authorizes the use of 15 percent of the profits for employee bonuses. If profits exceed the amount called for in the plan, 50 percent of the surplus can be added to the bonus fund. On the other hand, if the objectives are not achieved, the bonus fund is reduced by 1 percent for each percentage point below the plan to a maximum of 25 percent. The lowest wage for a skilled worker is 1,235 francs, and the highest wage is 3,240 francs.

The institute's members are particularly pleased by the increase in producer prices for agricultural foodstuffs that took effect at the start of the year. A liter of milk, for example, used to go for 1.20 francs (the same as mineral water), but it now sells for 2.05 francs, which makes milk production profitable.

I then visited the Sempest artificial insemination center a few kilometers away. Calves 2.5 years old from elite farms and of selected breeds from all over the world come here. The firm is really impressive, ultramodern, and amazingly clean. Sempest engages in wide international cooperation and uses in particular the French technology for artificial insemination that was developed by the L'Aigle firm.

Agrarian Revolution

All of this shows that the government's basic intention is to make this 5-year plan the plan of "agrarian revolution." But in that area, the country has a long way to go. President Ceausescu has admitted that his government has neglected the agricultural sector in favor of rapid industrialization employing 29 percent of the workers. During the 1970's, agriculture received only 14.3 percent of the investments and accounted for only 15 percent of the national income. The use of artificial fertilizer is very low (146 kilograms per hectare), and undermechanization is obvious (75 hectares per tractor). So it is not surprising that production has declined over the past 2 years. The plan now calls for an annual increase of between 4.5 and 5 percent: 86,000 tractors are to be made available to the peasants during this 5-year period.

The authorities are striving especially to increase self-management and self-financing in the rural areas and to strengthen profit sharing for farmworkers. As is often the case in Romania, however, the authorities are waving both the carrot and the stick: to combat absenteeism in the cooperatives, the plan compels peasants in cooperatives to work at least 300 days for the common good, otherwise they may lose, temporarily or even permanently, their private plots of land. Other severe penalties are provided in case of unsatisfactory work.

Paradoxically, considering that the socialization of Romanian agriculture was completed in 1962, much will depend on what happens on the private farms, because while the latter account for only 3 percent of the total land (including the individual plots worked by members of cooperatives), they nevertheless

include 2.5 million cows, compared to 4 million in the socialized sector; 3.2 million swine, compared to 8.3 million; and 6.8 million sheep, compared to 9 million.

Romania's ability to win the fight against its economic crisis now depends to a large extent on the development of agriculture.

There are definitely more things going on in this country than is generally believed. Many attempts--some of them bold ones--are being made to reform the agricultural or the industrial system. I had new proof of this during a visit to "Grivita Rosie" in Bucharest's suburbs--the red factory, as its name indicates, still wreathed in the memory of the big strikes in February 1933.

Until 1961, that enterprise, which is almost 100 years old, produced rolling stock for the railroads. Today it produces the equipment and complete plants for the chemical industry and refining. Turnkey chemical plants are sold to Syria, Pakistan, Jordan (refineries), Egypt, Turkey, and Iraq (caustic soda). In Romania itself, Grivita Rosie has put up 30 large petrochemical complexes.

It is therefore a giant which has its own budget and employs 5,000 workers, including 800 women. The average age ranges from 28 to 30. The average wage is 1,680 francs, with the lowest wage being 1,120 francs. There is a 46-hour workweek, and the workers have one Saturday off each month (they are hoping to have a second Saturday soon). Eight hundred workers have had some higher education, and 80 percent of the workers have completed their secondary schooling.

The enterprise has a cafeteria that can seat 1,500. It also has a polyclinic, day nurseries, a school with 3,000 students, hotels reserved for the workers, and a house of culture.

New Economic Mechanism

But I came here primarily to get a firsthand look at the operation of the "new economic mechanism" and the workers councils set up alongside the unions.

The plant manager explained that the new economic mechanism considerably strengthens worker self-management and economic self-management. It places the emphasis on respect for economic considerations (with the possibility of obtaining bank loans), the reduction of production costs (notably through savings in energy and raw materials), an improvement in quality and quantity, and lastly, profit sharing for the workers. If, for example, a plant is not profitable, the first step calls for altering its production schedule.

My interlocutor added: "Of our profits, 60 percent goes to the state and 40 percent remains at our disposal. Half of that is used for the development fund, and another portion goes into the fund for worker bonuses." That bonus fund is more or less the equivalent of a "13th month" of pay and is added to the bonuses for fulfilling the plan, representing about 3 months' pay.

The manager also told us: "Profit sharing for the workers enabled us to exceed the plan by 7.8 percent in 1981, whereas our surplus used to total only 4 or

5 percent. Labor productivity at Grivita Rosie has also increased by 10 percent, compared to the national average of 7 percent. Lastly, cost reduction has gone farther than called for in the plan, and most important is the fact that while production was rising, the consumption of energy and raw materials was declining by 7 percent."

The chairman of the workers council, who as a rule is also first secretary of the party, participates in the council's discussions, as does the deputy chairman of the unions, who for his part does not belong to the party. Incidentally, there are fewer party members in the unions than there are on the workers council. The allocation of duties is specific: the unions concern themselves basically with social issues, while the workers council looks after management and economics. The result, I was told by its chairman, is that "thanks to this reform, we have passed from single leadership to collective leadership."

As can be seen, all of that is quite original. Very gently and without a sound, Romania is stirring. At Grivita Rosie the system, based both on a strengthening of central control and authority and on increased power and responsibility for the enterprises and their workers, is working well. But will what works in one enterprise also be possible in enterprises that are on a smaller scale? There is certainly reason to have doubts about it. But it is nevertheless on that that Romania's economic future will depend.

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CSO: 3100/917

MIGRATION TRENDS WITHIN COUNTRY EXPLORED

Statistician Provides Material

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1650, 15 Aug 82
pp 19-23

[Article by Svetislav Spasojevic based on interview with demographer Miroslav Lalovic: "Perpetual Unrest"]

[Text] Migrations within Yugoslavia, across the borders of the republics and provinces, from the large postwar displacement from the poorer to the richer regions of the country, are not only not ceasing, but have even been increasing from one population census to the other. In 1961, on the day of the census, 1,316,950 people were found in republics and provinces in which they had not been permanent residents up to that time. Ten years later this number increased to 1,585,592.

The motives and reasons why people move from one area to another and the consequences which this has have been and are today highly variable and diverse, just as the geographic patterns of migration are variable and diverse.

NIN had the opportunity, as it was put by Miroslav Lalovic, M.A., well-known demographer in the Center for Demographic Research of the Social Sciences Institute in Belgrade, whom it interviewed, to publish data especially prepared on the movement of population between republics and provinces cross-tabulated by ethnic background. This means that we will learn where the Montenegrins, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes have gone within Yugoslavia.... This article contains only a part of the facts and assessments of the future book which Lalovic has been preparing for several years. The study was written on the basis of data obtained in the 1961 and 1971 population censuses. The figures obtained in the last census, in 1981, have not yet been worked up, and, at least for the present, it is not possible to speak about migrations of the nationalities and ethnic minorities from one republic or province to another over the last several years. To be sure, as Lalovic mentions, with a bit of prior knowledge and figures on the previous two censuses, one can easily arrive at certain estimates relating even to current movements which, as far as the main directions are concerned, differ hardly at all from previous ones. But these are still hypotheses rather than scientifically established facts, and we will not be concerned with them.

Montenegrins First

Way back in 1690 about 40,000 Serb families left central parts of medieval Serbia and moved to Hungary. Only 250 years after that large migration, immediately at the end of World War II, at the time of the colonization, almost the same number of households with 246,000 members, moved in "unscheduled trains." And this migration, like the previous one, followed the traditional direction: south to north. Once again the settlers went into the fertile plains of Banat, Backa and Srem. These two large migrations, as well as other considerably smaller ones, though they were also important, have altered considerably the country's ethnic map.

"According to the figures of the 1961 Population Census, only Vojvodina and Serbia proper showed a net gain from migration," Lalovic says. "That means that they were the only ones where more people moved into than out of. Ten years later they were joined by Croatia and Slovenia. More people are continuing to move out of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo than are moving in. Later we will see which nationalities and ethnic minorities have moved from which republic and province and which one they have moved into."

Table 1 eloquently says that in Yugoslavia, according to the 1961 census, the nationalities and ethnic minorities crossed republic and provincial boundaries in the following order: Serbs--733,891, Croats--250,059, Montenegrins--81,537, Slovenes--69,231 and Macedonians--41,237. Ten years later the order was almost the same. In both these cases absolute numbers were taken as the criterion. However, when we take the percentage of the total size of the nationality or minority as the criterion for comparison, the order is somewhat different. Montenegrins take first place, and they are followed by the Serbs, the Croats....

Perpetual Proximity

Even before World War I, and indeed considerably earlier than that, Montenegrins were moving to other regions of Yugoslavia. (See Table 2 for all the figures on the migrations of Montenegrins.) That migration, compared to the total number of Montenegrins, has always been large. Judging by Lalovic's analysis, in migrations within Yugoslavia Montenegrins have occupied a convincing first place. That is, according to the 1961 census, there were 513,832 Montenegrins, or 2.8 percent of Yugoslavia's total population, and 81,537 were involved in migration.

"Ten years later, according to the 1971 census, Montenegrins were not only continuing, but intensifying their migrations out of Montenegro," Miroslav Lalovic says. "All of 17.1 percent of all Montenegrins moved out according to the 1971 census, as compared to the 15.9 percent in 1961. How important a figure that is is best seen when these figures are compared with those for Serbs or any other nationality or ethnic minority."

Table 1. Total Population of Yugoslavia by Ethnic Background and the Migrant Population by Ethnic Background Moving From One Republic or Province to Another

Population Census as of 31 March 1961

<u>Ethnic Background</u>	<u>Total Population</u>	<u>Distribution, %</u>	<u>Migrated From Our Republic or Province to Another</u>	<u>% of Migrant Population to Total Population</u>	<u>Distribution of Total Migrant Population, %</u>
Montenegrins	513,832	2.8	81,537	15.9	6.2
Croats	4,293,798	23.2	250,059	5.8	19.0
Macedonians	1,045,527	5.6	41,237	3.9	3.1
Moslems (as nationality)	972,954	5.3	19,024	2.0	1.5
Slovenes	1,589,197	8.6	69,231	4.4	5.3
Serbs	7,806,145	42.1	733,891	9.4	55.7
Albanians	914,731	4.9	34,176	3.7	2.6
Hungarians	504,369	2.7	21,216	4.2	1.6
Yugoslavs	317,124	1.7	18,286	5.8	1.4
Other nationalities	572,425	3.1	43,654	7.6	3.3
Unknown	<u>19,033</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>3,639</u>	<u>19.1</u>	<u>0.3</u>
Total	18,549,135	100.0	1,316,950	7.1	100.0

Population Census as of 31 March 1971

Montenegrins	508,843	2.5	87,182	17.1	5.5
Croats	4,526,782	22.1	284,092	6.3	17.9
Macedonians	1,194,784	5.8	48,078	4.0	3.0
Moslems (as nationality)	1,729,932	8.4	59,278	3.4	3.7
Slovenes	1,678,032	8.2	61,755	3.7	3.9
Serbs	8,143,246	39.7	842,744	10.4	53.2
Albanians	1,309,523	6.4	52,628	4.0	3.3
Hungarians	477,374	2.3	19,475	4.1	1.2
Yugoslavs	320,853	1.6	81,834	25.5	5.2
Other nationalities	566,465	2.8	42,422	7.5	2.7
Unknown	<u>67,138</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>6,104</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Total	20,527,972	100.0	1,585,592	7.7	100.0

The main reason why Montenegrins have been moving out of their republic is that it has little arable land. And the natural population growth in Montenegro has been high. The solution, then, is to move out. The reasons why Montenegrins predominantly settle in Serbia should be sought in the similarity between Serbs and Montenegrins.

Table 2. Migration of Montenegrins. Migrations of Montenegrins From One Republic or Province to Another, as of the Date of the 1961 and 1971 Population Censuses and in the Period 1968-1971

Republic or Province	1961			1971		
	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result
Bosnia-Hercegovina	7,540	5,796	+ 1,744	6,904	6,776	+ 128
Montenegro	13,439	46,031	-32,592	16,062	42,620	-26,558
Croatia	3,897	3,354	+ 543	4,785	4,184	+ 601
Macedonia	2,123	2,333	- 210	1,698	2,390	- 692
Slovenia	750	1,305	- 555	977	1,409	- 432
Serbia proper	19,127	9,940	+ 9,187	30,828	9,676	+21,152
Vojvodina	21,235	5,491	+15,744	18,136	7,797	+10,339
Kosovo	<u>13,426</u>	<u>7,287</u>	<u>+ 6,139</u>	<u>7,792</u>	<u>12,330</u>	<u>- 4,538</u>
Total	81,537	81,537	±33,357	87,182	87,182	±32,220

	1968-1971		
	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result
Bosnia-Hercegovina	1,414	1,567	- 153
Montenegro	3,113	5,830	-2,717
Croatia	955	820	- 135
Macedonia	246	451	- 205
Slovenia	260	226	+ 34
Serbia proper	7,138	1,814	+5,324
Vojvodina	1,479	1,327	+ 152
Kosovo	<u>712</u>	<u>3,282</u>	<u>-2,570</u>
Total	15,317	15,317	±5,645

Lalovic then told us that according to the 1971 Population Census, there were 355,362 Montenegrins in Montenegro, or about 70 percent of all the Montenegrins in Yugoslavia. So, 30 percent of them were living at that time in other republics or provinces. The largest group of those who have moved out is in Serbia--125,260. Within Serbia as a whole most of them were in Serbia proper--57,289, and then 36,416 in Vojvodina and there were the fewest in Kosovo--31,555 Montenegrins.

"Ten years earlier, the pattern is altogether different for Montenegrins in SR [Socialist Republic] Serbia," Lalovic, demographer and independent researcher, mentions. "In 1961 most of them were in Kosovo--37,588, and then in Vojvodina--34,782, and fewest in Serbia proper--32,383. One can easily suppose that those differences are still greater today, that is, that there are fewer Montenegrins in Kosovo and considerably more in Serbia proper and Vojvodina. That is, in 1948 Vojvodina was in first place in its number of Montenegrins living outside Montenegro. This is logical, since colonization in which Montenegrins had an important place, had a great influence on this."

Kosovo was in first place in the 1953 and 1961 censuses. This is natural, since colonization toward Vojvodina ended about 1948, and a certain number of Montenegrins have been living since time immemorial in Kosovo, and thus the migrational currents between the native area and immediately neighboring area became quite considerable. However, the 1961 figures and especially those for 1971 show that the number of Montenegrins increased considerably in Serbia proper. Serbia proper is a traditional area for immigration toward which, as we see, the Montenegrins also gravitated. The intensified movements of Montenegrins, not only from Montenegro, but also from Vojvodina and Kosovo, were mostly responsible for the fact that in 1971 there were about 25,000 more Montenegrins in Serbia proper than there were in 1961.

It is true, as we have already said in the part of the text which speaks about Montenegrins, that they hold first place in the migrations. The criterion for this table, if it can be called that, is the percentage of those migrating in the total number of members of the particular nationality or ethnic minority. Serbs represented 9.4 percent of the total number according to the 1961 census and 10.4 percent according to the census published 10 years later, putting them in second place. In terms of absolute numbers the Serbs are convincingly in first place.

"According to the figures of the 1961 census, 1,316,950 inhabitants of Yugoslavia took part in migrations from one republic or province to another," Miroslav Lalovic says. "More than half of that number, precisely 733,891, are Serbs. The figures indicate that all the republics and the Province of Kosovo had a net loss in migration with Serbia proper. This means that more people moved out of all the republics and the Province of Kosovo to Serbia proper than moved out of the latter. Vojvodina, then, had a net gain with Serbia proper and with all the republics and Kosovo.

Endless Migrations

The figures presented in Table 3, which should be used concerning migration of Serbs, indicate that as of the date of the 1961 census most of the migrating Serbs were from Bosnia-Hercegovina. That is, 187,973 Serbs moved out of that republic and 51,590 moved in. Which means that 136,383 more Serbs moved out than moved in. Croatia also had a net loss, since 83,301 more Serbs moved out than moved in.... The Serbs who moved out of all the republics and from Kosovo--and mostly from Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia--moved above all into Vojvodina--163,396 and into Serbia proper--93,254 Serbs.

"Migrations of Serbs from Bosnia-Hercegovina, according to the 1971 census, into Serbia proper and Vojvodina, have not only continued, but have been considerably augmented," Lalovic adds. "The migrational flows of Serbs are especially intense toward Serbia proper. This is indicative of an unusual migration. The departure of Serbs from Croatia, compared with the figures for 1961, are slightly lower--60,338, though even that number contrasts sharply with the base--'customary migration.'"

Particular attention, NIN's interviewee mentioned, is drawn to the figures on migration from Kosovo. Whereas on the date of the 1961 census 17,903 more Serbs had moved out of Kosovo than had moved into the province, 10 years later that figure had risen to 44,394 Serbs. Lalovic then spoke very cautiously, almost delicately, about the figures illustrating the present exodus. He is aware that by contrast with past migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo, the present exodus is much larger, but he could not back up that assertion with any sort of figures, since they are not available.

Table 3. Migration of Serbs. Migrations of Serbs From One Republic or Province to Another, as of the Date of the 1961 and 1971 Population Censuses and in the Period 1968-1971

Republic of Province	1961			1971		
	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result
Bosnia-Hercegovina	51,590	187,973	-136,383	52,344	250,858	-198,514
Montenegro	6,450	13,987	- 7,537	10,054	18,608	- 8,554
Croatia	61,687	144,988	- 83,301	85,917	146,255	- 60,338
Macedonia	21,067	28,629	- 7,562	21,487	29,840	- 8,353
Slovenia	7,424	11,388	- 3,964	13,066	11,878	+ 1,188
Serbia proper	276,292	183,038	+ 93,254	334,569	187,781	+146,788
Vojvodina	286,426	123,030	+163,396	307,529	135,362	+172,167
Kosovo	22,955	40,858	- 17,903	17,778	62,162	- 44,384
Total	733,891	733,891	±256,650	842,744	842,744	±320,143

	1968-1971		
	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result
Bosnia-Hercegovina	11,654	41,365	-29,711
Montenegro	3,408	2,831	+ 577
Croatia	19,890	15,506	+ 4,384
Macedonia	3,678	4,062	- 384
Slovenia	4,841	2,310	+ 2,531
Serbia proper	53,594	29,079	+24,515
Vojvodina	32,096	21,006	+11,090
Kosovo	2,588	15,590	-13,002
Total	131,749	131,749	±43,097

"In the period from 1968 to 1971, in which I look at migration as a current movement, the figures show that Serbs have been moving out of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo at a fast rate," Lalovic especially emphasizes. "They have been moving into Serbia proper and Vojvodina particularly."

In migrations within Yugoslavia, in the moves people make into and out of republics and provinces, Croats are in second place (Table 4). They convincingly come after the Serbs, who are first. This conclusion follows from two premises--figures: as of the date of the 1961 census there were 250,059 Croats

who had crossed the republic border in both directions, and 10 years later the figure was 284,092.

Table 4. Migration of Croats. Migrations of Croats From One Republic or Province to Another, as of the Date of the 1961 and 1971 Population Censuses and in the Period 1968-1971

Republic or Province	1961			1971		
	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result
Bosnia-Hercegovina	30,036	95,724	-65,688	28,053	132,821	-104,768
Montenegro	3,126	5,146	- 2,020	2,762	5,568	- 2,806
Croatia	132,326	86,569	+48,757	168,846	81,465	+ 87,381
Macedonia	2,560	3,542	- 982	2,486	3,577	- 1,091
Slovenia	21,437	14,121	+ 7,616	28,650	13,416	+ 15,234
Serbia proper	30,418	23,456	+ 6,962	25,281	21,534	+ 4,747
Vojvodina	30,083	22,997	+ 7,086	27,170	23,892	+ 3,278
Kosovo	1,073	2,504	- 1,431	844	2,819	- 1,975
Total	251,059	251,059	±70,121	284,092	284,092	±110,640

	1968-1971		
	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result
Bosnia-Hercegovina	4,621	21,064	-16,443
Montenegro	658	729	- 71
Croatia	24,634	11,680	+12,954
Macedonia	426	594	- 168
Slovenia	5,884	1,641	+ 4,243
Serbia proper	2,983	2,606	+ 377
Vojvodina	2,463	2,902	- 439
Kosovo	190	643	- 453
Total	41,859	41,859	±17,574

Enough for the Truth

To be sure, if the percentage of those moving from one republic or province to another in the total number of Croats is taken as the criterion, then this nationality takes third place. First, as we have already recorded, are the Montenegrins, second are the Serbs, and the Croats are third.

"Aside from Croatia, as far as the Croats are concerned, Slovenia, Vojvodina and Serbia proper also have a net gain," Lalovic mentions. "This means that more Croats moved into those republics and that province than moved out of it. It is particularly interesting that considerably more Croats moved out of Bosnia-Hercegovina than moved in, which, as we have already seen, was also the case with the Serbs: on the date of the 1961 census 95,724 Croats had moved out and 30,036 had moved in. The difference, then, is 65,688. Is this the customary migration? Ten years later there was a considerably larger net loss

to migration by Bosnia-Hercegovina. We are referring to 132,821 Croats who moved out of Bosnia-Hercegovina, while only 28,053 moved into that republic. The so-called net gain of 104,768 Croats is a large one. This is a topic for political scientists, sociologists.... We have no reason to suppose that the emigration of Croats from Bosnia-Hercegovina has decreased to any considerable extent since 1971.

"If we examine the current migration between 1968 and 1971," Lalovic says, explaining his findings in detail, "the figures show a tendency of Croats to move out of Bosnia-Hercegovina. This emigration is predominantly in the direction of Croatia."

The migration of Slovenes is almost specific. In 1961 slightly more than 69,000 Slovenes made a move over republic or provincial boundaries, but 10 years later the figure was 8,000 fewer. In spite of this small number of Slovenes involved in migration, they take fourth place according to the 1961 census. Ten years later they were surpassed by the Hungarians, Macedonians and Albanians (figures given in Table 1).

"In 1961 all the republics and provinces except Serbia proper and Croatia had a net loss in migration with Slovenia," Lalovic continues. "That is, more Slovenes moved to Croatia and Serbia than moved out of them. Ten years later more Slovenes also moved out of Serbia proper than moved in. Only Croatia at that time had a net gain, which it was later to lose in the period from 1968 to 1971."

All the roads which Slovenes have traveled within Yugoslavia, then, have led northward, that is, toward SR Slovenia.

If this is not the only one, then it is certainly one of the rarest attempts to analyze the migration of the nationalities and ethnic minorities over republic and provincial borders in Yugoslavia. As we have already said, NIN is publishing only a small portion of what Lalovic, whom we interviewed, has been painstakingly assembling for years. But we hope that even this is altogether sufficient to arrive at certain truths concerning the migrations.

Additional Data

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1651, 22 Aug 82
pp 19-21

[Article by Svetislav Spasojevic based on interview with demographer Miroslav Lalovic: "Perpetual Unrest (II)"]

[Text] In this and its previous issue NIN has been concerned with migrations of the nationalities and minorities within Yugoslavia in its collaboration with the demographer Miroslav Lalovic. The reader will probably note, and rightfully so, that this concern with emigration is based on their figures and facts. There is no human destiny, emotion, and certainly no human drama, then, which have accompanied migrations from time immemorial.

In the previous issue we spoke about migrations of Montenegrins, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes over republic borders. On this occasion we will be concerned with migrations of Macedonians, Moslems, Albanians and Hungarians.

According to the figures of the 1961 Population Census, the nationalities and ethnic minorities moved across republic and provincial borders in the following order: Serbs--733,811 persons involved in migration; Croats--250,059; Montenegrins--81,537; Slovenes--69,231; Macedonians--41,237; Albanians--34,176; Hungarians--21,216; Moslems--19,024.... Ten years later this order was somewhat different. The Serbs were still convincingly the most mobile, but they were followed by the Croats, the Montenegrins, the Slovenes, the Moslems, the Albanians and the Macedonians....

A "Scattering" of Montenegrins

Although all the necessary figures are not yet available on the 1981 Population Census, Lalovic feels that Yugoslavia's internal migrations have retained almost all their most essential features.

If we take the absolute number as the criterion, Serbs are far ahead of the others in migration. But if we use as the criterion of comparison the percentage of persons involved in migration within the total number of the particular nationality or minority, the order changes: Montenegrins, for example, are first, Serbs second, and behind them come the Croats, the Slovenes, the Macedonians....

So that this continuation of the article on migration will be clearer to the reader, we have been compelled to repeat some of the figures published in the previous issue. One needs to know, for example, that according to the 1971 census about 30 percent of all the Montenegrins lived outside Montenegro and that the largest number of emigre Montenegrins--125,260--were living in Serbia proper.

As of the date of the 1961 census the largest group of emigrating Serbs were from Bosnia-Hercegovina. That republic lost 187,973 Serbs, and 51,590 Serbs moved there. This means that 136,383 more Serbs moved away than moved in. Croatia also had a net loss of 83,301 Serbs! Serbs moved out of all the republics and from Kosovo--but in the largest numbers from Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, and they moved above all into Vojvodina--163,396 and into Serbia proper--93,254....

The figures 10 and especially 20 years later are different, but the roads which the nationalities and minorities followed in migration within the borders of Yugoslavia are almost the same. There are reasons, then, as many feel, to believe Dr Stipe Suvar's assertion that Serbs have been moving mostly toward Belgrade, the Croats toward Zagreb and the Moslems in relatively greatest numbers toward Sarajevo. To be sure, there is no evidence that "only the Montenegrins are continuing to 'scatter,' since they get along well everywhere.

Table 1. Migration of Macedonians. Migrations of Macedonians From One Republic or Province to Another, Status as of the Date of the 1961 and 1971 Censuses and Over the Period 1968-1971

Republic or Province	1961			1971		
	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result
Bosnia-Hercegovina	1,434	1,243	+ 191	1,098	1,967	- 869
Montenegro	422	474	- 52	438	629	- 191
Croatia	2,668	1,660	+ 1,008	3,373	2,594	+ 779
Macedonia	12,132	24,489	-12,357	15,674	26,628	-10,954
Slovenia	567	649	- 82	973	878	+ 95
Serbia proper	14,131	7,126	+ 7,005	16,825	8,753	+ 8,072
Vojvodina	9,067	4,153	+ 4,914	8,987	4,824	+ 4,163
Kosovo	816	1,443	- 627	710	1,805	- 1,095
Total	41,237	41,237	±13,118	48,078	48,078	±13,109

	1968-1971		
	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result
Bosnia-Hercegovina	286	531	- 245
Montenegro	146	107	+ 39
Croatia	778	602	+ 176
Macedonia	2,067	4,056	-1,989
Slovenia	356	216	+ 140
Serbia proper	2,859	1,210	+1,649
Vojvodina	1,011	634	+ 377
Kosovo	189	336	- 147
Total	7,692	7,692	±2,381

When it comes to migrations of Macedonians over republic and provincial borders, 41,237 persons were involved in 1961. Ten years later this number had risen slightly--48,078 Macedonians. It should also be stated that in 1961 12,132 Macedonians had moved into Macedonia, while 24,489 had moved out. This means that 12,357 more Macedonians had moved out of Macedonia than had moved into it from other republics and provinces. The situation according to the 1971 census is almost the same: more Macedonians were still leaving their republic than were moving into it (see Table 1).

"This net loss of Macedonians," the demographer Lalovic says, "moved primarily toward Serbia proper, Vojvodina and to a somewhat lesser extent toward Croatia. On the basis of figures and current moves from one republic or province to another, that is, between 1968 and 1971, Macedonians were following the same directions of migration. On the basis of all these figures, it can be confidently concluded that in the period from 1971 to 1981 very similar migrations of Macedonians occurred.

Table 2. Migration of Moslems. Migrations of Moslems (as an Ethnic Group) From One Republic or Province to Another, Status as of the Date of the 1961 and 1971 Censuses and Over the Period 1968-1971

Republic or Province	1961			1971		
	Moved	Moved	Net	Moved	Moved	Net
	In	Out	Result	In	Out	Result
Bosnia-Hercegovina	5,740	5,603	+ 137	21,451	19,935	+ 1,516
Montenegro	1,651	3,880	-2,229	3,425	14,207	-10,782
Croatia	2,251	1,244	+1,007	12,930	3,963	+ 8,967
Macedonia	1,049	1,399	- 350	774	3,059	- 2,285
Slovenia	383	302	+ 81	2,486	935	+ 1,551
Serbia proper	4,911	4,125	+ 786	10,513	10,317	+ 196
Vojvodina	996	523	+ 473	1,899	1,650	+ 249
Kosovo	2,043	1,948	+ 95	5,800	5,212	+ 588
Total	19,024	19,024	+2,579	59,278	59,278	±13,067

	1968-1971		
	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result
Bosnia-Hercegovina	4,472	6,709	-2,237
Montenegro	840	2,258	-1,418
Croatia	4,085	1,073	+3,012
Macedonia	140	683	- 543
Slovenia	1,137	300	+ 837
Serbia proper	2,503	2,194	+ 309
Vojvodina	376	329	+ 47
Kosovo	1,097	1,104	- 7
Total	14,650	14,650	±4,205

An Immobile Grouping

Moslems belong to that ethnic grouping which has had a very small share in migrations between republics and provinces up to 1961. Whereas Montenegrins had a share of 15.9 percent of the total number involved in those migrations, and Serbs 9.4 percent, the share of the Moslems was only 2 percent! Ten years later the total number of Moslems migrating had increased about threefold. Compared to other nationalities and minorities, in spite of this increase, the Moslems still remained at the bottom of the table when it comes to migrations (see Table 2).

If we look at the figures on migrations of Moslems, Lalovic mentions, it is particularly interesting that a majority of the Moslems had moved out of Montenegro in 1961, and not, as one would otherwise have expected, out of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Alongside Montenegro, only Macedonia has a net loss. This means that more Moslems moved out of it than moved in. More of them moved into all the other republics and into the two provinces than moved out. Croatia stands out the leader in this respect, and not Bosnia-Hercegovina. We should

remember, however, that incomparably more Serbs and Croats moved out of Bosnia-Hercegovina than moved into it. On this basis we might normally anticipate that more Moslems would move out of Bosnia-Hercegovina to the other republics and provinces. The figures contradict this.

The figures on migrations between 1968 and 1971 indicate that only at that time did a process begin of somewhat greater--but to be sure quite modest--migration of Moslems from Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Table 3. Migration of Albanians. Migrations of Albanians From One Republic or Province to Another, Status as of the Date of the 1961 and 1971 Censuses and Over the Period 1968-1971

Republic or Province	1961			1971		
	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result
Bosnia-Hercegovina	2,456	1,353	+ 1,103	2,296	4,215	- 1,919
Montenegro	765	1,368	- 603	1,132	2,940	- 1,808
Croatia	1,529	537	+ 992	2,840	875	+ 1,965
Macedonia	11,258	5,298	+ 5,960	19,256	7,371	+11,885
Slovenia	175	104	+ 71	812	189	+ 623
Serbia proper	9,717	5,788	+ 3,929	10,554	10,589	- 35
Vojvodina	1,388	334	+ 1,054	1,904	608	+ 1,296
Kosovo	<u>6,888</u>	<u>19,394</u>	<u>-12,506</u>	<u>13,834</u>	<u>25,841</u>	<u>-12,007</u>
Total	34,176	34,176	±13,109	52,628	52,628	±15,769

	1968-1971		
	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result
Bosnia-Hercegovina	541	856	- 315
Montenegro	381	577	- 191
Croatia	985	253	+ 732
Macedonia	2,543	2,302	+ 241
Slovenia	426	47	+ 379
Serbia proper	2,562	2,076	+ 486
Vojvodina	545	178	+ 367
Kosovo	<u>3,360</u>	<u>5,054</u>	<u>-1,694</u>
Total	11,343	11,343	±2,205

"And also the Albanians, just like the Moslems, belong to an ethnic grouping which has moved little over republic and provincial borders," Lalovic adds. "According to the figures of the 1961 Population Census, the largest number of Albanians moved into Macedonia and then into Serbia proper, Vojvodina, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Croatia.... The figures for 1971 give a somewhat different picture. That is, the enormous majority of Albanians moved into Macedonia, and a considerably smaller number into Croatia and Vojvodina."

All the figures which we are publishing in Table 3 actually indicate an ever greater migration of Albanians toward Macedonia. This assessment, however, should always be taken with a qualification; by comparison with the Montenegrins or Serbs, for example, Albanians migrate very little.

Table 4. Migration of Hungarians. Migrations of Hungarians From One Republic or Province to Another, Status as of the Date of the 1961 and 1971 Censuses and Over the Period 1968-1971

Republic or Province	1961			1971		
	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result
Bosnia-Hercegovina	864	1,209	-345	850	1,185	- 335
Montenegro	202	159	+ 43	240	247	- 7
Croatia	5,173	5,128	+ 45	4,840	4,591	+ 249
Macedonia	172	279	-107	182	267	- 85
Slovenia	374	607	-233	448	507	- 59
Serbia proper	4,711	4,020	+691	4,298	3,344	+ 954
Vojvodina	9,548	9,636	- 88	8,500	9,212	- 712
Kosovo	172	178	- 6	117	122	- 5
Total	21,216	21,216	±779	19,475	19,475	±1,203

	1968-1971		
	Moved In	Moved Out	Net Result
Bosnia-Hercegovina	154	170	- 16
Montenegro	59	61	- 2
Croatia	671	424	+247
Macedonia	27	49	- 22
Slovenia	84	45	+ 39
Serbia proper	570	432	+138
Vojvodina	879	1,264	-385
Kosovo	31	30	+ 1
Total	2,475	2,475	±425

Eloquent Numbers

All the figures in Table 4 on the migration of Hungarians support the assertion that they are more mobile than the Moslems and Albanians. It is interesting, however, that their share in migration from one republic or province to another is dropping. According to the 1961 census 21,212 Hungarians had crossed republic or provincial borders, and 10 years later--19,475! The target of migrations for the Hungarians, as it has been for certain other nationalities and ethnic minorities, was Serbia proper.

"It is most typical of Hungarians to move out of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia and Vojvodina and to move into Serbia proper, Croatia and Montenegro," Lalovic says. "When we analyzed the figures of the 1971 census, Hungarians were again

moving in the largest numbers out of Vojvodina and Bosnia-Hercegovina, and they were moving primarily into Serbia proper and Croatia. All of these characteristics also apply to the period from 1968 to 1971."

The subject of NIN's interview, Miroslav Lalovic, and also the writer who has signed his name to these two articles on the migration of Yugoslavia's nationalities and minorities over republic and provincial borders, have taken pains to talk about this topic, which has to be acknowledged as an extremely interesting one, exclusively on the basis of numbers. Although those figures might among other things serve for framing premises, they have not drawn any conclusions whatsoever.

Comments From Croatian Official

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1650, 15 Aug 82
pp 20-21

[Article by S. S. (Svetislav Spasojevic) based on an article by Dr Stipe Suvar published in the Rijeka youth newspaper VAL: "Journeying Toward One's Own"]

[Text] The Rijeka youth newspaper VAL [WAVE] published in its double number for this May an interview with Dr Stipe Suvar in which he spoke among other things about the migration of Yugoslavia's nationalities and ethnic minorities:

"... In general the mobility of our people is low. One-fourth of employed American workers change jobs every year. And they move from city to city. To them that seems as simple and as easy as it is for us, say, to go away for a vacation. We still have marked ethnic, nationality, religious and other distances: everyone seeks his own element and the people of his own mentality; he prefers to live without having to make a move or without being forced to it by some particular cause in his life. Second, we have a tradition of a peasant society, of a society which did not rise up from scratch when the Indians were eradicated. In and of itself this peasant society, throughout its entire cultural mentality, is still rather immobile. If you move, then you move from your village to the opstina seat or to the regional center, to Split or to Rijeka, just as everyone from Prague, say, comes to Rijeka. If you absolutely have to go further, then you go possibly to Slovenia, since that is nearby, or possibly to Zagreb. But for someone from here to go and live in Nis, Kosovska Mitrovica, Subotica or Novi Sad--that is a true rarity. This low mobility is related, to be sure, to the housing situation, to difficulties with employment, to adaptation, but this is also a trait of our culture. Although we have become highly urbanized and industrialized, there are certain specific features which make it difficult even for young people to obtain a job more easily. After all, they ought to move about more freely. I think that today this is an especially sensitive problem with young people born in the large cities and by the nature of things, and this is quite normal, they have no other conception of life than living in that large city of theirs....

"... There are many things we ought to talk about, say, about relations between the advanced and the underdeveloped, about how nationality influences

the directions of migration and so on. The population census shows that when the Serbs, our largest nationality, scattered over Yugoslavia, the largest number moved toward Belgrade, that most of the Croats moved toward Zagreb, and that the largest number of Moslems moved toward Sarajevo. (Only the Montenegrins are continuing to 'scatter,' since they get along well everywhere.)

"We encounter the nationalistic and irredentist slogan about ethnically pure Kosovo. And to be sure, the percentage of Albanians is higher and higher in Kosovo. After the Liberation Albanians comprised about 60 percent of Kosovo's population, and today 78 percent. This is also a result of their moving in from parts of Macedonia, Montenegro, southern Serbia, and not only a result of the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins because of the well-known circumstances.

"It has been shown that people still feel a deep sense of national identity, and this is not in and of itself nationalistic and unwholesome, and so when they come to move, they feel a greater pull of the homogeneous ethnic environment. This should be regarded as a normal human situation and problems should not be made of it. Everywhere a man should be received not according to the ethnic group he belongs to, but according to the qualities as a worker and a human being...."

Interview With Statistician

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1650, 15 Aug 82
p 23

[Interview with demographer Miroslav Lalovic by S. S. (Svetislav Spasojevic): "Migrations of Ethnic Groups on the Basis of the 1981 Census"; date and place not given]

[Text] All the figures on the population census as of last March are not yet known. This is also the real reason why we cannot speak in detail about the present migrations in Yugoslavia cross-tabulated with nationality. However, we have been compelled to call upon M. Lalovic, the subject of our interview, to comment for us on the data of the recent census which are known at the moment and to answer a basic question: Do the features of the migrations in 1961 and 1971 also apply to present ones?

[Question] Although the figures are not complete on the 1981 Population Census, is it possible on the basis of what is now known to conclude that the basic features of migrations of population are continuing?

[Answer] Intensive economic development requires in the broadest sense appropriate manpower, and it also encourages migration toward industrial centers or cities (Lalovic said). This process is under way, although it might be said that it is gradually dying down. On the basis of the rate of decrease of the surplus manpower in agriculture, it is expected that this form of general geographic mobility will come to an end toward the end of the century. Even now, however, there are migrations which have altogether different causes, characteristics, consequences, and indeed directions of migration. These are

migrations of population from one industrial center or city to another. They are becoming increasingly pronounced, and it is logical to expect that toward the end of the century they will be dominant, just as is now the case in the advanced Western countries.

If we examine the migrations of particular population groups typified by certain features such as ethnic background, for example, we note that political, psychological and cultural factors are involved to quite a great extent. We find examples of intensified influences of these factors not only in the organized migrations (colonizations) in the distant and recent past, but also in the secular migrational averages, all the way up to the most recent migrations of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. It is well known that ethnic groups are very sensitive to the effect of these factors, and migrations of ethnic groups do occur as a reaction to them. This has been the case with our Serbs, Montenegrins, Croats, Macedonians and others.

[Question] A reduction in the absolute number of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo has been recorded, of Croats and Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina, of Slovenes in Serbia and Croatia, and of Serbs in Croatia.... Will this process continue?

[Answer] The drop in the absolute number of particular nationalities in our country is influenced by the natural and migrational components of growth. As for the natural component, this has to do with a low or very low rate of reproduction, which for certain nationalities is already below unity (Croats and Serbs). Renewal is not occurring, and that is why there is a reduction in the absolute number. Aside from this, emigration from one republic and immigration into another republic can be important to a reduction occurring in the area where the emigration originated or to an increase in the area with immigration. In view of migrational processes up to now, we can expect a reduction in the total number of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo because of the well-known events and because of the processes which those events have initiated. The emigration of Serbs and Croats from Bosnia-Hercegovina could also continue, and that would reduce their absolute number. The circumstances, causes and factors for this more intensive emigration of Serbs and Croats from Bosnia-Hercegovina, of Serbs from Croatia, of Slovenes from Serbia and Croatia, and so on, have to be investigated and explained with the precise methods of sociology, political science and other disciplines.

Aside from what we have mentioned, the last census demonstrated that even a subjective commitment to an ethnic group, as an expression and reflection of the momentary disposition of the population, can bring about a reduction in the total number of certain nationalities. The census showed an unexpected increase in that group of people who refer to themselves as Yugoslavs, which brought about an appreciable reduction in the total number of certain nationalities and minorities, for example, of Croats and Serbs, who probably refer to themselves as Yugoslavs in greater numbers.

[Question] Dr Stipe Suvar says that it is an ordinary and almost normal thing for the directions of migration of nationalities and minorities to tend toward those parts of the country where a particular nationality is more homogeneous. What do you think about that?

[Answer] The directions and characteristics of the migration of nationalities and minorities can be viewed from the aspect of differing geographic types of movement: for example, local and interregional within the limits of the given republic and province, or from one republic or province to another. It is obvious that the motivations and causes and consequences of migration of ethnic groups are different for the spatial types of migration, even very different. If the migrations of nationalities and minorities are examined within the limits of a republic, then the conclusion Dr Suvar refers to might be drawn. This applies in the greatest degree to communities which are homogeneous in the ethnic respect, as is the case with the Slovenes, for whom the boundary of the sociopolitical community coincides to the greatest degree with the ethnic boundary (excepting those Slovenes located outside the national territory of Yugoslavia). The few Slovenes in the other republics and provinces are mainly migrants from Slovenia, so that it is logical for them to decide to go back to their native region after a shorter or longer stay in the other republic or province.

In republics and provinces which have several nationalities and minorities, this is no longer the case. Take, for example, the Serbs, who are numerous in other republics and provinces, but not as migrant population, but as native population. As is evident from the survey of figures in this issue of NIN, migrations of Serbs do not confirm Dr Suvar's opinion. Our knowledge in this regard indicates that the problems concerning emigration of ethnic groups is far more complicated than is usually thought in view of the complexity of the ethnic composition, the characteristics of movement, the degree of concentration and dispersion, and so on, and also the social environment and climate in which the migrational processes occur along with other processes. That is why Dr Suvar is altogether correct when he observes that on many aspects of this topic we not only should, but must speak on the basis of research results.

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