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MILITARY AFFAIRS

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6 April 1982

USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS

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ARMED FORCES

LETTER AND COMMENTS ABOUT MILITARY DRAFT PROCEEDURES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Oct 81 p 2

[Letter from K. Filonenko of Khar'kov, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, with comments by Maj Gen D. Tsarapkin, deputy chief of staff for the Red Banner Kiev Military District: "Our Common Cause. A Letter of Commentary"]

[Text] The regular conscription into military service is in progress. In connection with this, I would like to share some painful memories.

... A young man will always remember the day he left to join the army. His relatives and friends will also remember the event. But, it sometimes happens that seeing the young man off turns into a difficult ordeal both for the draftee and for his relatives and friends.

That is precisely what happened when my wife and I saw our son Igor off to the army. The scene still irritates our hearts: a sea of people is agitated and seethes around the assembly point at the Khar'kov Oblast Military Commissariat. That was us, seeing our sons off. However, information about our sons filtered down to us with a great deal of difficulty and with major distortions. So you have anxiety, guessing where your son will be sent.

At the rayon conscription commission, Igor was asked which troops he wanted to serve in. But at the oblast military commissariat, it suddenly became clear that the young man's opinion was not taken into consideration. Once again we were upset.

Why can't parents seeing their sons off be allowed to spend some time with them alone prior to departure to their unit? Also, I think that relatives could be notified in a timely manner about the departure time for a detachment of draftees. An information table could be set up to answer questions of interest to the relatives. After the detachment has been organized, it would not be a bad idea to bring parents and sons together so that representatives from the troops could briefly tell about the combat traditions of their units. After all, all parents want their sons to be in reliable and good hands. Consideration should also be given to providing amenities at the oblast assembly point, so that everything connected with seeing a son off will leave only pleasant memories. [Signed] K. Filonenko, veteran of the Great Patriotic War. Khar'kov.

At the request of the editors, Maj Gen D. Tsarapkin, deputy chief of staff for the Red Banner Kiev Military District, offers his comments about this letter.

The sentiments of parents seeing their sons off to military service are near and understandable to each of us. As Konstantin Trofimovich Filonenko writes, every father and mother wants their son to be in reliable and good hands, to master military matters in an excellent manner and serve well. That is our common concern. We are grateful to those who propose improvements in organizing conscription in their letters and during meetings with officers from the military district's staff and military commissariats. I would like to say that K. Filonenko's letter also helped us analyze more thoroughly the work of the Khar'kov Oblast Military Commissariat and uncover shortcomings in its operations. I am happy to inform you that construction of a comfortable and spacious oblast assembly point meeting contemporary demands is planned to begin next year in Khar'kov.

Nonetheless, I must say that I cannot agree with all the tenets in the letter. For instance, there is no way to justify the fact that some parents spend all day and night, as they say, near military commissariats, trying to remain with their sons right up to the time of the detachment's departure. Putting it bluntly, this creates considerable difficulties for the staff at the military commissariats, who are not in a position to satisfy all the parents' desires. This leads to insults and chagrin. Here is something else to think about: aren't such parents putting their sons in an awkward position? After all, they are already soldiers and do not need such guardianship.

The rule has been established that seeing draftees off takes place basically in the rayons. Let me remind you that the Commission on Soviet Traditions, Holidays and Ceremonies, organized under the UKSSR Council of Ministers, developed recommendations 2 years ago about a ceremony connected with seeing draftees off to the armed forces. It includes seeing draftees off from their work group, from their paternal homes and from the rayon (or city) center to the oblast assembly point. These recommendations are being carried out everywhere. In that very Khar'kov, in Frunzenskiy Rayon, whence Igor Filonenko was inducted into the army, the draftees laid wreathes at the monument to V.I. Lenin, and at the memorial to the soldiers who perished during the Great Patriotic War. They also participated in a meeting at which representatives of the workers, party and soviet organs, war veterans and staff members from the rayon military commissariat gave speeches. Of course, the parents of the future soldiers were also present at these festivities.

After the draftees were finished with the medical examination and the conscription commission, the appropriate documents were drawn up and the draftees departed from the rayon military commissariats for the oblast assembly point at the prescribed time. Let us emphasize that from that moment, the young man is already considered to have been conscripted into active military service.

The new recruit has various concerns at the assembly point and often, he really does not have the time to talk with his relatives and friends. Let's

see what would happen if relatives continued to accompany a young man to the oblast assembly point. There really is no one there with the time to assist these people. The officials at the assembly point work day and night.

At the assembly point, the decisions of the rayon conscription commissions are elaborated and corrected, if necessary. That is what happened, for example, with Igor Filonenko. I was informed that the young man was sent to serve where he was more urgently needed.

Some parents try to learn for certain which areas of the country their son is being sent to. Once they learn this, they decide by themselves if the area of assignment is good or bad for the draftee and besiege the appropriate officials in the military commissariat, urging and demanding that their son remain in, say, Khar'kov or some other area. Naturally, the staff at the military commissariat can not satisfy such requests. Setting up an information table, as Konstantin Trofimovich proposes, would only make matters worse.

Now Konstantin Trofimovich Filonenko's son is in the combat ranks of the motherland's defenders. He has matured, grown stronger and learned a great deal. I would like to wish him great success in military service, so he can be a soldier worthy of his front-line veteran father.

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ARMED FORCES

WARRANT OFFICER INDOCTRINATION ON VIGILANCE

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 22 Oct 81) pp 22-24

[Article by Major General N. Shapalin: "Demonstrate Continuous Political Vigilance"]

[Text] Thanks to the CPSU's consistent pursuit of its Leninist course, our country has been able to create conditions for high levels of mass-scale political and labor activity; it is successfully implementing the historic decisions of the 26th Party Congress, and the USSR is enjoying an increasing international authority. The successes of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist commonwealth are frightening imperialist circles. They are attempting to check their advance and weaken the attractive force of the ideas of socialism. The ideological struggle is now being waged on a substantially broader scale. As was stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, the class enemy's propaganda agencies have become more active; he has intensified his attempts to exercise a disintegrative effect on the consciousness of the Soviet people.

All this dictates the urgency of a study as part of the warrant officers [praporshchiki i michmany] political indoctrination program of the topics /"The 26th CPSU Congress on the Intensification of the Ideological Struggle. Basic Directions, Forms and Methods of Developing High Political Vigilance in Military Personnel."/ [in boldface] Study of these topics is intended to help audiences develop a better understanding of the causes underlying the intensification of the ideological struggle and of the basics of the 26th Party Congress message concerning the need to intensify the struggle with bourgeois and Maoist ideology and to define more clearly both their own position and specific directions in which to orient efforts to develop in subordinates a class-inspired implacability and a high level of political vigilance.

Six hours should be devoted to study of this topic, of which it is recommended that four be devoted to seminar discussion. In the course of the lecture and during the seminar it would be to advantage to cover the following questions:

- /1. The 26th CPSU Congress on the intensification of the ideological struggle.
2. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on political vigilance and class implacability toward bourgeois ideology.
3. Primary directions in which to orient efforts to develop in subordinates a class-inspired implacability toward bourgeois ideology and high levels of political vigilance./ [in boldface]

1. The formation of a communist world view in the Soviet people and members of the armed forces, says the CPSU Central Committee decree "Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrinational Work," is taking place under conditions in which

"imperialist propaganda, with which the propaganda of the Beijing chauvinists and aggressors is now openly cooperating, is waging a furious sustained offensive against the minds of the Soviet people and striving by means of the most refined methods and modern technical means to poison their consciousness by slandering Soviet actions, to blacken socialism and to embellish imperialism and its predatory, inhuman policies and practices." Under these conditions the problems of the ideological struggle come increasingly to the fore.

What is the concept of "ideological struggle?" Ideological struggle is the form of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism in the intellectual sphere. It has to do with world view and, accordingly, involves the world view of the individual, of classes and of social groups. In other words, this is a struggle of two ideologies, bourgeois and socialist. In speaking of the ideological struggle as a form of class conflict, V. I. Lenin wrote in his "What Is To Be Done?": "Engels recognizes /not two/ [in boldface] forms of the great struggle Social Democracy is waging (political and economic), as is the fashion among us, /but three, adding to the first two the theoretical struggle as well."/ [in boldface]

The ideological struggle has its own characteristics, which are unique to it alone. The most important of these is implacability, which constitutes the basis of the actions of the Communist Party in the course of the ideological struggle with bourgeois ideology and in the process of elaborating strategic and tactical tasks in the sphere of the indoctrination of the Soviet people. Underlining the essential nature of this methodological requirement, V. I. Lenin wrote: "How can there be any 'accommodation' here...? It's ridiculous even to speak of it. Conflict is /absolutely/ [in boldface] inevitable.... On this issue there can be and will be no neutral position." At the basis of this Leninist demand lies the fundamental opposition of the interests of the bourgeoisie and the toiling people. Another characteristic feature of the ideological struggle is the absence of a spirit of compromise, although in any other mode of the class struggle our party does go for intelligent compromises.

From this implacability and refusal to compromise follow such specific characteristics of the ideological struggle as its sharpness. This, to use Lenin's words, stems from the fact that the ideological resistance of the bourgeoisie is the most deep-seated and the strongest.

What are the causes of the intensification of the ideological conflict under present-day conditions? The primary and basic cause has been and remains the continued deepening of the general crisis of capitalism and an integral component of this crisis--the crisis in world view. Unable to weaken socialism by political and economic means, the bourgeoisie and its propaganda apparatus are launching desperate efforts to check the advance of the socialist countries by ideological means. By means of ideological diversions the imperialists are striving to shake loose the spiritual foundations of socialism, to inject ideas alien to us into the consciousness of politically immature people and to engender in them notions of private property and nationalism inimical to the socialist system. When a real threat to its domination arises, imperialism goes all out, discarding any semblance of democracy or legality. Its arsenal for struggle with the ideas and practice of socialism contains economic blockade, sabotage, bribery, threats, terror, murder of political figures, fascist pogroms, slander and falsification.

These conditions permit us the clearest view of the operation of one of the regular mechanisms of the ideological struggle V. I. Lenin has pointed out. In his article "The Bourgeois Intelligentsia's Methods of Struggle Against the Workers" he wrote: "When the bourgeoisie begins to lose its ideological influence over the workers, when it is undermined and weakened, the bourgeoisie /everywhere and always/ [in boldface] has resorted and will resort to the most desperate lies and slander."

Further elaboration of a peace program by the 26th CPSU Congress, the economic and political renaissance of the USSR and the socialist commonwealth and an intensification of the contradictions within the capitalist camp as well as between labor and capital have not brought any letup in the battle of ideas, but rather have given it added new impetus. In analyzing the current international situation, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed in the CPSU Central Committee report the fact that recent years have seen a "marked intensification of the ideological struggle. For the West it does not come down to any battle of ideas pure and simple. It is putting into motion an entire system of means intended to undermine and disintegrate the socialist world."

A violent anticommunism is the main political-ideological weapon imperialist reaction has turned on socialism. Slander of the socialist system and falsification of the policies and objectives of the communist parties and of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism constitute its basic content. In our day anticommunism determines the overall class orientation of bourgeois ideology in its struggle against the theory and practice of true socialism.

Our class enemy is waging "psychological war" in all directions against the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries. His many campaigns and actions, varying in subject content and with the cause or occasion used, seem to be merged into a single slimy stream of lies and slander against socialism. The propaganda hue and cry in the West, which is trying to discredit the socialist system on any grounds, does not let up for even a single day.

To achieve their purpose the ideological and intelligence centers in the West are employing technical means of transmitting information; tourism (almost 25 million foreigners from 162 countries have visited the USSR over the past five years); trade, scientific and cultural exchange; sports and the activities of institutions establishing cultural ties. Functioning in the US alone are some 150 "centers" and "institutes" working on problems associated with the ideological war effort against the Soviet Union and the communist movement; there are more than 100 specialized "centers" in the FRG and dozens more in other capitalist countries.

The powerful radio-broadcasting apparatus of imperialism has been put at the service of diversionary propaganda: the Voice of America, Liberty, Free Europe, the BBC etc. Radio Free Europe, for example, has been the mouthpiece of the antisocialist forces in Poland for more than a year now. Specialists in ideological diversion are directing their efforts not only at the consciousness of the people, but toward their mind and will as well and resorting in the process to lies and slander, which are aimed at citizens with a low level of political consciousness. The objective is the destruction of socialism through ideological influence upon the people of the socialist commonwealth.

The intensification of imperialism's attempts at an ideological counteroffensive against socialism is closely associated with its strategic and tactical lines in the spheres of economics, politics and military preparations.

Two objectives which imperialism is consistently striving to achieve in its foreign political propaganda are clearly to be seen: first, to provide ideological and propaganda cover for the arms race unleashed and gross interference in the affairs of other countries and, second, to undermine the unity of the countries of the socialist commonwealth, the international workers' and communist movement and the unity of world socialism and the national struggle of the peoples. Its primary objective is to turn people away from socialism.

The brunt of imperialist propaganda attacks is directed primarily against our country. The enemy attacks virtually all aspects of our socialist social system: its economy, social-political relationships, culture and most of all--the leading role of the party. Antisovietism has become the primary weapon imperialist reaction has turned on socialism.

An object of particular attention in imperialist propaganda is the members of our armed forces and of the armies of the fraternal socialist countries. Bourgeois ideologues have set themselves the task of distorting the objective and purpose of the socialist armies and the essential nature of the activities of our political organs and party and Komsomol organizations, discrediting military service, sowing disbelief among our youth in the rightness of our cause, blunting its political vigilance and inflaming national prejudices and chauvinistic attitudes. In the process the class enemies of socialism distort in every conceivable way our armed forces' heroic history and slander their glorious military traditions.

The strategists of imperialism and Maoism see the primary objective of their ideological diversions against our armed forces to lie in weakening the political and moral strength of their personnel through the employment of subversive methods and means of exercising ideological influence and thereby reducing the combat readiness and effectiveness of their units and subunits.

Bourgeois and Maoist propaganda, however, have been unable to shake the Soviet soldier in his world view and in his belief in the inevitable triumph of the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

It would at the same time be wrong, given the conditions of a sharp intensification of the ideological struggle, to show complacency, to minimize the danger of bourgeois influence, not to take drastic measures against the ideological actions of the class enemy. The greatest danger lies precisely in underestimating the possible consequences of the influence of bourgeois ideology on the consciousness of individual military service personnel. It occurs as no coincidence that in its decree of 26 April 1979 the Central Committee stressed that "our duty lies in opposing the subversive political and ideological activities of the class enemy and his malicious slanders of socialism with the unshakeable solidarity and strong ideological unity of its ranks and the deep conviction and political vigilance of each Soviet citizen and his readiness to defend the motherland and the revolutionary gains of socialism."

2. At all stages in the building of communism the CPSU has continuously devoted and is still devoting the most concentrated attention to the development in the Soviet people and members of the armed forces of a high level of political vigilance and an implacability toward bourgeois ideology.

The vigilance of the Soviet people springs from the revolutionary vigilance of the Russian proletariat and its Bolshevik Party. It has always been a reliable weapon for the toiling masses in their struggle with class enemies.

The difficult years of the young Soviet Republic's struggle against counterrevolution and the military intervention of the imperialist states heard the passionate call for political vigilance ring through in such of Lenin's articles and appeals as "The Socialist Fatherland in Danger!," "Everything into the Struggle against Denikin!" and "Watch Out for Spies!"

V. I. Lenin raised the question of the preservation of military secrets in a particularly pointed way. "We find ourselves in a situation," Vladimir Il'ich pointed out, "in which military secrets have become very important questions for the Russian Republic...." He emphasized repeatedly that struggle against the enemy "requires military discipline and military vigilance developed to the utmost degree."

These directions and instructions from V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party formed the basis of the political indoctrination effort following the civil war and during the period of Red Army reorganization and military reform. The decree of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] Central Committee of 25 February 1929 "Officers and Political Personnel of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] declared that "...under conditions prevailing in the present period continue with particular consistency the indoctrination of the Red Army, its officers and its rank-and-file personnel, in a spirit of selfless devotion to Soviet power and of the utmost vigilance and class-inspired implacability."

And then, with the increasing military danger and intensifying ideological struggle at the beginning of the 1940's, the reorganization of the party's entire political effort found the question of indoctrination in class implacability and high political vigilance at the center of party and Central Committee attention. During the Great Patriotic War Lenin's behests proved an unfailing guide for the officers, political staff, all members, of the Armed Forces.

Now in the postwar period, the intensification of the arms race and the preparations of the capitalist countries for a new war have led the party once again to call upon the Soviet people to be continuously on the alert and strive unceasingly to increase the defensive strength of the Land of Soviets.

The current ideological struggle is closely bound up with a political struggle; it accordingly does not permit of any underestimation of theory. Indoctrination of our warrant officers in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism makes it possible for them to develop a deep and thorough understanding of the variety of factors comprising and generates creative initiative in the drive for combat readiness and in efforts to insure strict adherence to regulation procedures. A measure of the success, the effectiveness, of political indoctrination, the party teaches, is concrete performance. It is therefore very important that every military service member increase his knowledge, deepen it and transform it into convictions, and then transform his convictions into practical guidance for daily living.

It should be stressed that political vigilance does not manifest itself as alertness pure and simple alone. Political vigilance is as well the most critical factor of

combat readiness. It is linked in the most intimate and essential way with all its aspects. Skillful mastery by personnel of their weapons and equipment, troop tactical training, coordination and teamwork in action, any level of troop control and high morale and fighting efficiency would all be impossible without high political vigilance.

What are the factors comprising this concept? Political vigilance is the result of deep ideological conviction, an understanding on the part of members of the armed forces, of each individual soldier, of his responsibility to society for defending his motherland, an awareness of personal involvement in the building of communism, constant readiness to stand in defense of the revolutionary achievements of the motherland of October and an ability to analyze all phenomena of social life from a class point of view and draw the proper conclusions from this analysis and to struggle uncompromisingly against bourgeois ideology. High political vigilance is based upon a scientific world view and political consciousness and manifests itself in military conduct and in the attitudes personnel display toward performance of their military duties. Political vigilance shows itself as well in troop discipline, strict execution of orders and instructions from officers and superiors and in unwavering compliance with the requirements and obligations imposed by the military oath and regulations.

Indoctrination of military personnel in a spirit of high political vigilance is one of the difficult and challenging spheres of the ideological and political-education effort undertaken by commanders, political organs and party and Komsomol organizations. It requires good knowledge of the personnel involved and an ability to exercise an influence upon each individual as well as a deep understanding of the objectives, the essential content and the forms and methods of developing high political vigilance.

3. We take, and will take, an active, aggressive approach in our struggle against bourgeois ideology. The sharp intensification of the ideological struggle and the increased attention bourgeois ideologues are giving to personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces require a new approach to the development of political vigilance and class feeling in armed forces personnel.

We may identify a number of directions in this important effort. The basic way to enhance the effectiveness of the struggle against the influence of enemy propaganda is above all to insure high quality in ideological and indoctrinational work. This means that the process of tempering each soldier ideologically and uncompromisingness toward the enemies of socialism always rest upon clear and concise class positions expressed in specific Marxist-Leninist theoretical formulations. A thorough command of solid information and a high level of political development are precisely what constitute the fundamental basis upon which rest a serviceman's ability to neutralize any ideological diversions quickly, effectively and certainly.

Only after developing the ability to undertake an independent analysis of important theoretical and political questions and the laws governing the class struggle will it be possible, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, to consider oneself adequately firm in one's convictions and with reasonable success to defend them wherever and against whomever an occasion demands. It is important always to remember, and this is the key point, what our strong point is, what it is that makes our position in the ideological

struggle a truly active one, and that is the great truth of historical development, which is on our side and what it is that precisely we ourselves and our socialist system represent.

An active, aggressive struggle against hostile ideology means, secondly, a decisive, well-argued exposure of the hypocrisy and mendacity of bourgeois, revisionist and Maoist propaganda and of the reactionary nature of imperialism. Constant alertness to ideological diversions is demonstrated concretely in each individual soldier's ability and readiness to stand in defense of the point of view that is correct in principle, in an intolerance of enemy slander and distorted information, in negative attitudes shown to various rumors and immature judgements and, finally, in regular social activity. This uncompromising spirit and militance toward enemy sallies develops the qualities of a true political fighter and instills hatred of the enemies of socialism. "Taking as a basis the mobilizing force of communist ideas and successes achieved in the building of communism," points out Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Defense, "party organizations in the armed forces must decisively expose the ideological machinations of the class enemy, temper the Soviet fighting man ideologically and politically and increase the activeness and effectiveness of all party political work."

In the third place, a refusal to compromise with bourgeois ideology as an expression of a high level of consciousness and political vigilance is not limited solely to criticism and exposure of bourgeois schemes and theories and views alien to us in the course of training, meetings and conversations with fellow servicemen. These qualities must be demonstrated daily in the practical activities of each serviceman, in exemplary performance of military duties and an ability to subject an event to the proper political analysis and demonstrate an uncompromising attitude toward amoral conduct on the part of fellow service members.

The duty of the warrant officer lies in eradicating the antipodes of communist morality not only at the level of dealing with illegalities but also in doing everything possible to eliminate anything conducive to them in the form of social passivity, philistinism in views and attitudes, indifference, egoism and individualism, which are frequently the causes of negligence, complacency, carelessness, poor organization and indiscipline.

Fourthly, the development of high levels of political vigilance is inconceivable without efforts to insure tight military discipline. "...Where the discipline is the tightest and the greatest care and thought go into political work with the troops...is where there will be no laxness in an army, there is where its spirit and organization will be the best and there is where the most victories will be won," wrote V. I. Lenin. This is why it is so important and so necessary to strive consistently, as called for at the 26th CPSU Congress, to tighten party, military and state discipline and intensify military and moral indoctrination and the fight against violations of the norms of communist morality, law and order and the rules of socialist social life. This is a point at which it is important for warrant officers to bring their forces to bear.

Finally, and in the fifth place, vigilance, loyalty and devotion to the ideals of communism find their most critical manifestation in army life to occur in connection with attitudes toward the actual performance of military duties and in the realization on the part of each defender of the motherland of his individual responsibility

for the combat readiness of his subunit. This finds confirmation in the initiative, creativity and persistence a soldier demonstrates in his combat training, in the performance of his military duties and fulfillment of socialist obligations, in his constant readiness at any time to carry out his mission in defense of the fatherland and in his ability in both routine and critical situations, those situations requiring the exertion of maximum energies, to retain the high fighting qualities of steadfastness, courage and will to victory.

To heighten political vigilance and strengthen attitudes of uncompromisingness toward any manifestations of ideology and morality alien to us is thus now both the most important task of our entire ideological-indoctrinational effort and the most critical area in which to strive for high levels of troop combat readiness.

The behests of V. I. Lenin and the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress require of the Soviet fighting man that he be always on the alert, not tolerate complacency and negligence and remain in continuous readiness to defend the socialist fatherland and the peaceful labors of the Soviet people and their allies.

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ARMED FORCES

WARRANT OFFICER INDOCTRINATION ON MORALITY

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 22 Oct 81) pp 25-27

[Article by Colonel V. Khrobostov, Candidate of Historical Sciences: "Indoctrination on Moral Qualities, Discipline and Efficiency"]

[Text] Instruction on the topic "The Role of Warrant Officers and Extended-Service Personnel in the Indoctrination of Rank-and-File on High Moral Qualities and Personal Discipline and Efficiency" calls for comprehensive study of CPSU requirements in connection with the development of high moral qualities in armed forces personnel and thorough understanding of the essential nature and importance of discipline under present-day conditions and of the basic directions, forms and methods of developing efficiency in rank-and-file personnel and of maintaining strict adherence to regulation procedures.

Six hours are to be devoted to instruction on this topic. Of this time it is recommended that 2 hours be devoted to lecture, 4 to seminar discussion. It is suggested that trainee attention be focused on the following basic questions:

- /1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the development of a communist morality in the Soviet people and the need to instill high moral qualities.
2. The essential nature and meaning of communist morality and the importance of discipline under present-day conditions.
3. Basic directions in the indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of strict adherence to the norms of communist morality and personal discipline and efficiency./ [in boldface]

1. Indoctrination of the Soviet people, to include members of the Armed Forces, in the spirit of communist morality and the development in them of high moral qualities constitute component and integral parts of communist indoctrination. The objectives and tasks involved are varied. They are to strengthen the Soviet people in their Marxist-Leninist world view and communist attitude toward labor, transform the norms of communist morality into their personal convictions and rules for daily conduct, the development of intellectual and physical capacities and the cultivation of refined aesthetic tastes and feelings. The ultimate goal of communist indoctrination is the development of a new man, an active and stalwart fighter for communism.

V. I. Lenin inextricably linked the building of communism with the development of new relationships between people in production and daily life, in all spheres of social

life and with the development in the Soviet people of devotion to the ideals of communism, socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, a communist attitude toward labor and socialist property, discipline and a sense of responsibility for the tasks with which they are charged, comradely solidarity and mutual assistance and such personal qualities as sincerity, integrity, honesty and optimism.

V. I. Lenin stressed that communist morality serves the effort to consolidate and complete the building of communism. That is why, Vladimir Il'ich emphasized, everything associated with the indoctrination, education and instruction of young people must be an indoctrination of these young people in communist morality.

Lenin's teaching on communist morality and the moral education of working people is of exceptional importance in our time as well, a time witnessing the continuously growing role of moral principles in the life of society and an expansion of the effective sphere of the moral factor. The moral code of the builder of communism formulated in the CPSU Program constitutes the theoretical and practical basis for the moral improvement of the Soviet people in accordance with the great Lenin's behests.

In the moral principles contained in this code are to be found the ethical requirements of our society and a description of the moral characteristics of the new Soviet man. The tasks of moral education consist in insuring that the principles contained in the moral code of the builder of communism come to constitute norms for the conduct of all Soviet people and that they are adhered to consciously and voluntarily.

High moral qualities do not develop spontaneously, but rather under the guiding influence of the organizational and ideological efforts of the Communist Party. Given present-day conditions, the CPSU is focusing its attention primarily on the development of a high political consciousness and a communist attitude toward labor and social property and on the indoctrination of youth and working people in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, proletarian internationalism, uncompromisingness toward bourgeois ideology and readiness to stand in defense of the gains of socialism.

Through communist indoctrination the party is arming the fighting man with a knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, taking care in the process to see that this knowledge becomes his inner conviction and a guide in practical activity. The primary objective of ideological indoctrination in the Armed Forces consists in achieving a steady rise in the consciousness of the soldier and insuring through the influence of ideology the satisfaction of the party's requirements in connection with further strengthening of the armed forces and increasing their readiness to destroy any enemy.

At the 26th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, underlined the fact that the fighting potential of the Soviet Armed Forces consists in a strong alloy of a high level of technical equipment, military skill and an invincible moral spirit. Ideological tempering has always been a powerful weapon in the effort to increase the combat readiness of our Armed Forces. And now, when the army and navy have been equipped with nuclear missiles of unprecedented power, their role is growing still greater. It is in the ideological conviction of the man combined with military skill and first-rate mastery of modern means of armed combat that lie the strength and invincibility of the Soviet fighting man.

2. Communist morality and Soviet military discipline.... These concepts are intimately interrelated with respect to both ideological content and objective--to insure

a high level of combat readiness on the part of the defenders of the motherland for decisive destruction of any aggressor.

Confirmation of this is to be found in the spiritual fortitude the Soviet people have demonstrated in the wars they have had to wage in defense of the freedom and independence of the socialist motherland.

Speaking at a meeting of senior armed forces officers and political personnel, General of the Army A. A. Yepishev, chief of the Armed Forces' Main Political Administration, emphasized the importance of efforts oriented toward making sure that armed forces personnel develop a clear picture of the growing social role played by the Armed Forces, thoroughly familiarize themselves with party conclusions concerning the current alignment of political and military forces in the world and on this basis develop their views on the military danger as a stern reality of our time. We should show the full extent of the danger hidden in the aggressiveness of the present course of certain US circles, as well as in the hegemonist policy of the rulers in Beijing. We need by a whole range of indoctrinational measures to develop in our personnel a strong moral-political and psychological steadfastness and determination to endure the severest tests should the situation demand it.

Loyalty to motherland, party, people and his patriotic and international duty; readiness to discharge his constitutional responsibilities with honor and the high moral principles of the Soviet fighting man--all this has been embodied in the requirements contained in the military oath and general service regulations. The fact that regardless of military rank, position or age members of the armed forces call one another "comrade" underlines their spiritual kinship and reflects their moral and legal equality. Hence logically follow the requirements that comradeship in arms be prized, that fellow service members be assisted by both word and deed, that they be restrained from unbecoming conduct and that they be rescued from danger with no thought of one's own life. Living up to their oath and in accordance with provisions of the regulations, Soviet fighting men are honorably discharging their patriotic and international duty, that is, they are acting in the highest degree morally.

Clear confirmation of this is to be found in the feats performed by Soviet soldiers during the Great Patriotic War and then in peacetime and in the international assistance of a limited contingent of Soviet forces to the people of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in defending their revolutionary gains against foreign aggression.

Political consciousness is the primary factor in the morality and discipline of our people. Understanding of the tasks the Communist Party has set the Armed Forces insures the development in the soldier of deep feelings and sensitivities and of that spiritual uplift which leads him to perform the great deed, conscientious mastery of his military specialty and to strict adherence to regulation procedures.

From the very beginning of the formation of the Soviet Armed Forces, V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party saw conscious military discipline as constituting the basis of the fighting efficiency of the armed forces and successes in daily troop combat training. "The Red Army," V. I. Lenin pointed out, "established an unprecedentedly strict discipline not under the lash, but rather on the basis of the consciousness, devotion and selflessness of the workers and peasants themselves."

Soviet military discipline is a special type of state discipline appropriate to the function of the Armed Forces and the nature and conditions of their functioning. Its

social-political orientation is dictated by public ownership of the means of production, the moral and political unity and friendship between the peoples of the USSR and Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism.

The discipline in our Armed Forces is fundamentally different from the discipline in the armies of imperialist states. There it is based upon blind subordination and fear of punishment and is maintained by regimentation, stirring up national differences among military service personnel, developing beastly instincts in them and bamboozling soldiers and seamen with mendacious imperialist, anticommunist and religious propaganda. Discipline in bourgeois armies is a tool for maintaining the domination of the exploiting classes.

The discipline of the Soviet fighting man, however, is his conscious attitude toward Soviet laws and the military system shaped by his communist convictions; his inner conviction of the necessity of satisfying the requirements imposed by the military oath and regulations and the norms of communist morality and his personal habits and practices in controlling his conduct in any situation.

We all know the clear and precisely formulated lines in the regulations about what it is that military discipline demands of a serviceman. They clearly describe the moral features of the defender of the land of socialism. These are at the same time vitally necessary requirements, to comply with which is both a duty and a matter of honor for each soldier.

Discipline permeates all aspects of a Soviet soldier's life in the service and constitutes the basis of the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. The least departure from the demands of discipline do harm to society. Failure to comply with the requirements of regulations dictated by the interests of the people are looked upon in the armed forces as a manifestation of an individualism alien to our society, as an attempt to put one's own mercenary interests above those of society.

The high moral qualities of a defender of the motherland may be seen continuously manifested in his duty performance and everyday conduct. We see them today in the fact that members of the armed forces are filled with determination to mark the year of the 26th Party Congress with new successes in their military performance and are participating actively in competition under the slogan "For high combat readiness and a strict military order!" Our people look with pride and esteem upon the Soviet fighting man; they see in him a model of culture, modesty and readiness at any time to come to the assistance of another. This has been demonstrated once again by the Zapad-81 exercise recently completed by troops and naval forces of the USSR Armed Forces and directed by Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense.

Playing an important role in the development of discipline is the inculcation of self-discipline in the troops--the ability to control themselves and their behavior and to demonstrate endurance, self-control and an ability in good time to identify one's own mistakes, inaccuracies and deficiencies and remedy them. To perform their military duties many specialists must remain entirely alone. Self-discipline alone guides their conduct and drives them to put forth their full energies and utilize their full capacities to accomplish their assigned tasks.

Present-day conditions have seen a growing role for such most important factors of fighting efficiency and combat readiness as time discipline, the discipline of personal and collective responsibility for the accomplishment of combat missions, the discipline of exemplary operation of military weapons and equipment with strictest compliance with the applicable manuals, instructions, technical specifications and norms. Now we have the discipline of operational readiness, which requires of people great physical exertion and moral strength and the concentration of all their skills and abilities. Of increasing importance have become such moral and volitional qualities as integrity, honesty, courage, selflessness and consciousness of one's civil and military duties.

The armed forces place particularly high value upon the feeling of comradeship and mutual assistance, that friendship so celebrated in song with which a soldier fears no danger or misfortune. Iron cohesion, mutual assistance, readiness ability to take a comrade's place at the weapon, the missile, the ship's machinery, readiness to endure any hardship for the good of the common cause--these are the critical moral factors of a solid military discipline.

3. To demonstrate concern for the strengthening of discipline and the development of efficiency and organization in personnel constitutes a key task of commanders, political personnel and unit and ship party and Komsomol organizations.

An important role in the accomplishment of this task rests with our warrant officers. They will be able to play this role only if they continuously increase their military and political knowledge, strive to become true masters at their work and set personal examples of compliance with the laws and the requirements imposed by the military oath and regulations and the moral code of the builder of communism, as do, for example, Senior Warrant Officers S. Shchennikov and D. Zaguzov, delegates to the 26th CPSU Congress. Their performance, disciplinary practice and their personal conduct and attitude toward the discharge of official duties set an example to be emulated; it inspires a respectful attitude toward regulation requirements and creates favorable moral preconditions for raising the level of discipline and establishing stricter adherence to proper procedures. The personal example of the commander constitutes the most important means of indoctrinating rank and file in the spirit of discipline and efficiency.

An active effort to explain the requirements imposed by the military oath and regulations occupies an important place in the development of faultless personnel discipline. Our best warrant officers help their men develop an understanding of the essential nature of military duty and ways to discharge it in an exemplary manner and strive to insure that they not only know precisely what they are to do and how they are to do it, but also that they understand why it has to be done precisely this way and not that, that they develop a conviction of the necessity and validity of the requirements imposed by the regulations and that they become thoroughly familiar with and profoundly aware of the fact that the regulations constitute the law governing life in the armed forces. The depth and firmness of this knowledge is found to be directly dependent upon the organization of propaganda on the oath and regulations.

At the basis of the commander's efforts to insure tight discipline lies the strict obligation to establish and maintain a rigorous adherence to required internal unit procedures and to deal decisively with the slightest departure from them.

One of the conditions for insuring this tight discipline is rigid adherence to established military procedures, that is, to a particular system of rules and regulations governing the life and work of military service personnel organized in full accordance with the requirements of military regulations and directives from the USSR Ministry of Defense. The most important components of a regulation regime are accomplishment of the daily routine, combat training, the performance of daily details, the organization and discharge of guard and garrison duty, the procedures involved in storing and issuing weapons, organization of vehicle and equipment servicing and pass-and-control operations, adherence by personnel to regulations governing appearance and the wear of the uniform, personal conduct and the rendering of military courtesies and the maintenance of cleanliness in quarters and on base grounds.

His exactingness is one of the warrant officer's important qualities. The nature of military service requires that personnel perform with maximum exertion of their spiritual and physical energies and in the strictest possible manner comply with certain standards of conduct. Exactingness must be impartial, even-handed and based upon thorough knowledge of the laws, the regulations, one's responsibilities and of one's subordinates. Rudeness, foul language and humiliation are absolutely not to be tolerated. The responsible commander should be closer to people, mix with them more frequently, share with them the joy of successes and the bitterness of failures and steadfastly shoulder together with them the burdens and deprivations of military service.

The experience of Senior Warrant Officer G. Sultanov, Warrant Officers N. Proshin, N. Dunayev, Yu. Trofimov and many others provides convincing evidence of the exceptional developmental and educational importance of continuously combining high exactingness with daily demonstrations of concern for subordinates. Accomplishment of combat and political training tasks would be impossible without the provision of personnel with uniforms and equipment, food, timely medical support and good conditions for rest and relaxation and without the organization of leisure time cultural and sports activities.

Painstaking individual work with all subordinates is one of the most effective methods of developing ideologically well tempered, well disciplined and thoroughly trained and prepared defenders of the motherland. The essence of this effort consists in exercising a purposeful and systematic influence upon the consciousness and feelings of each man taking into account his own personal capacities: general educational background, character traits, vocational education and others. It is very important for warrant officers to know the needs and attitudes of their men and always to remain abreast of the course of barracks life, particularly at night. In the interests of the service they have to be able to shift from an official relationship to a confidential, comradely relationship. "We have to create a situation," Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, has declared, "in which, in organizing the training and indoctrination of our rank and file, each commander and political officer has a clear understanding of the new moral, physical and psychological challenges our fighting man will encounter and with what reserves of strength--fighting strength, ideological strength and moral strength--we will now have to prepare the motherland's defenders" (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 July 1976).

Warrant officers will be able to accomplish their assigned tasks successfully if they always skillfully rely upon their assistants--their sergeants and petty officers, if they build up their authority, confide in them, show respect in dealings with them

and in no instance usurp their position and authority. They should assist them in their work, take note of their diligence, analyze their failures, show them ways to overcome them, demonstrate continuous concern that they add to their fund of knowledge and experience and be attentive to their needs and requests.

Warrant officers will be able with greater success to accomplish the great and important tasks involved in the political and military indoctrination of their rank and file only if they come to place continuous reliance upon the communists and Komsomol members in their squad, team or crew and they themselves actively participate in party and Komsomol life and public work.

An important factor in improvement of the warrant officer's style of work is the rise in his overall level of learning and culture. The reading of belletristic works and articles on military theory, visits to the theater and the cinema and indulging a passion for music and poetry constitute a gymnastics of a sort, training of a kind contributing to the development of the mind and flexibility and breadth of thought.

The role our warrant officers play in the organization of the ideological indoctrinational effort is a great one. It consists in insuring maximum and vigorous participation of their subordinates in all activities organized by senior officers and political personnel and in their influence upon the growth of unit cohesion and in the tightening of discipline and improvement of organization and procedures.

To develop in our rank and file a thorough understanding and an undeviating adherence to the norms of communist morality and comprehension of the requirements imposed by the military oath and regulations, to work consistently to strengthen military discipline, to develop in their men the habits and skills required in modern-day warfare and to prepare conscious, skilled and selfless defenders of the socialist motherland--these constitute our warrant officers' most important responsibility.

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ARMED FORCES

COMPLAINT ABOUT SHORTAGES IN MILITARY TRADE STORES

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 22 Oct 81) p 27

[References to Letter and Comments: "Service Has Improved..."]

[Text] The editors of this magazine received a letter from Warrant Officer Vladimir Kryzhanovskiy, who reported, among other things, the following: "I am turning to you because for the past several months I have been unable to buy such military items as insignia, stripes, braid, overcoat buttons etc. in our local exchange. They're on display in the window, but you can't buy them; I'm told that they're not available just now. Why?

What's the situation in other exchanges in our district?..."

We acquainted the chief of the trade directorate of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District, Colonel Viktor Andreyevich Tsyplakov with this letter and asked him to comment on it. Here is what he told us:

"First I'll make some general comments. Military trade in the district overall is continuously improving and being steadily enriched with new modes of operation in light of the requirements imposed by the 26th CPSU Congress.

"Launching a widespread socialist competition for realization of the decisions of the party congress, our personnel have not made a bad start on the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. For its performance during the first quarter of this year, the directorate of trade was awarded the Red Challenge Banner of the USSR Minister of Defense and the Central Committee of the State Trade and Consumer Cooperative Workers' Union. All military exchanges and facilities achieved their established targets.

"But there's more to this than plan fulfillment percentages pure and simple. The military trade system has become an important component part of army life. And I cannot fail to mention that the district military council and political directorate, commanders, political organs and party organizations are now devoting a great deal of attention to it.

"For confirmation of this we could point to the recent opening in one of our garrisons of an exchange, which in its equipment, facilities, design, layout, organization of trade operations and standards of service fully measures up to the very highest requirements.

"We have recently seen an appreciable improvement in the level of military exchange operations, at the basis of which lies thorough study of consumer demand, close links with industry, skillful and timely compilation of requests for military items and the introduction of forms and methods of marketing goods which are most in line with the interests of consumers. The home days exchanges are putting on occupy a special place among these. More than 60 have been held this year.

"We are also now seeing the successful introduction of such innovating methods as self-service, sales on the basis of orders placed beforehand from one's place of work or residence, supplies to the exchange system in packaged form and others reducing the time required to pick up the items one needs. And for military people, who frequently find free time a thing hard to come by, this is of considerable importance. We have opened new cafes, tea houses and vendorless shops for our troops.

"In a word, our exchange system has become more efficient; it's taken a step in the direction of the rank-and-file soldier, the warrant officer and the officer. It is improving the life and raising the spirits of the people. Nevertheless, we have as yet been unable to make these improvements everywhere, as we can see from Warrant Officer Kryzhanovsky's letter.

"When we learned of his complaint we organized a commission to look into the situation directly on the spot. It turned out that the deficiencies in the operation of the exchange he had pointed to in his letter indeed existed. They proved to be the consequence of inefficiency on the part of the manager, comrade A. Kuripko, and not of any shortage of insignia, stripes, buttons and things like that. Part of the merchandise there was still packed up in storage in an annex facility and had not yet been brought out for sale; the exchange facility itself was inadequately equipped.

"There is no doubt that the responsible parties in this instance are not only the manager and his assistant, but higher-level exchange officials as well, comrade V. Fridmender in particular, who have failed to exercise proper supervision of exchange operations and to provide adequate assistance at the local-exchange level.

"For negligence in the discharge of their official responsibilities, the manager, comrade A. Kuripko, comrade I. Fadeyeva, an exchange commodity researcher, and a number of other exchange officials have been disciplined. There are now no more complaints about the operation of the exchange there, and customer services have improved.

"This incident has been a subject of discussion within the trade directorate and has served as a lesson for the future for us. We have outlined steps directed toward further improvement of the military exchange system, among other things to improve the supply of military items to our local exchange facilities, and decided to exercise greater supervision and give greater attention to providing assistance to individual local operations. Our public inspectors have an important role to play in this overall effort as well. As is generally known, a public control commission has been formed at each exchange facility, and it is the duty of commanders, political organs and party organizations to insure that these commissions discharge their responsibilities in an efficient, well-planned manner.

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EDITORIAL COMMENT ABOUT INVALID COMPLAINT LETTERS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 22 Oct 81) p 30

[Editorial comment about invalid complaints: "Lay the Blame Elsewhere...!"]

[Text] Each day brings dozens of letters in the editors' mail. They provide a graphic demonstration of the elevation of the spiritual level of the magazine's readers--warrant officers and NCOs--of how they have expanded their horizons. About anything that touches upon combat training or military service in general they write from the point of view of people who know what they are talking about, from the point of view of people with a personal interest in the matters at hand. They also criticize specific deficiencies, which makes it possible to eliminate them. But this is sometimes not the case.

...Warrant Officer N. Baturin had, in his opinion, served well, and when the end of the period of his service obligation was approaching he submitted his application for discharge into the reserves. But for reasons he cannot understand, his unit (chast') command for one reason or another recommended him for discharge for offences discrediting a member of the armed forces. Baturin himself reported this in his letter.

This was a fairly unusual case, so the editors were naturally concerned with this turn of events. And for good reason. For the fact, as we all know, is that units and ships create an atmosphere of attentiveness and consideration for their warrant officers so they can be of the greatest benefit in the performance of their honored service. And then suddenly--discharge, and with a formula like this to boot.

An entirely different picture emerged, however, when at the request of the editors the political directorate of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District inquired into the circumstances surrounding Warrant Officer Baturin's letter. The reply, over the signature of Colonel V. Voronin, chief of the district aviation personnel office, reported that Warrant Officer Baturin had not overly troubled himself in discharging his service responsibilities; he had ignored social activities; he had not distinguished himself by any efficiency in his overall performance and had been guilty of gross breaches of discipline. He had not, moreover, not demonstrated any concern for increasing his political or specialized knowledge.

Baturin had been called before a warrant officers' comradely court of honor for all this. But as we can see, he did not profit from the lesson. Hence the logical conclusion to the story: the command decided to discharge Warrant Officer Baturin into

the reserves for conduct bringing discredit upon a member of the armed forces. But then he started to worry and so sat right down and immediately wrote to the editors about the injustice he had been done.

So this is the true picture of what had happened. It turns out that Baturin has only himself to blame for all that has happened.

If this were an isolated case it might not be worth writing about. But unfortunately we have other people as well who like to pass their wishes off as reality.

In a similar situation, Warrant Officer S. Samoylovskiy had twice addressed himself to the editors with a persistence worthy of better application. On each occasion, all the facts set forth in his letter were carefully checked by responsible officials. From reports the editors received from Major General of Aviation A. Tarakanov and Major General of Aviation Polunin it became known that Samoylovskiy had been transferred to the reserves ahead of schedule and after all indoctrinational and educational measures had failed to produce any positive results.

The editors' mail brings in letters from other writers as well which, upon examination, have, to put it mildly, no basis in fact.

So there arises the legitimate question of why it was that Baturin, Samoylovskiy and all the others felt it necessary to cover up their own failures and, as the saying has it, to shift the blame onto someone else. The fact is that this practice is improper, if not to say harmful, since it diverts no little of the time and energies of many people to the investigation of groundless complaints.

There is another negative aspect to this kind of activity--it abuses the close attention given in our country and within the Armed Forces to suggestions, requests and complaints and demonstrates a narrowly practical attitude toward this important matter. Others look at it something like this: once I've written them they've got to answer me. Each letter the editors receive is indeed studied attentively and considered in a timely and well-intentioned manner. They show a desire not only to respond to it and to clear up any problem that might be disturbing a reader, but to help solve it as well. Each letter and every fact contained in it is naturally checked on the spot carefully and in all detail. So it's of no use to distort the facts. To lay them out truthfully and objectively is all that's required. It will then be easier for the editors to help readers find answers to well-founded requests and complaints.

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FOLLOW-UP REPORTS ON PREVIOUSLY REPORTED CRITICISMS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 22 Oct 81) p 30

[Follow-up reports on previously reported criticisms: "All Related" and "Undecided"]

[Text] Correspondence printed under the title "All Related" in No. 7 (July) of the magazine for this year contained criticism of personnel of X-unit who had failed to follow proper procedures in quarters assignments. As reported to the editors by the political directorate of the Red Banner North Caucasian Military District and the special-unit political department, this criticism has been recognized as justified. An on-the-spot investigation established that Warrant Officer V. Khlebnikov had been assigned quarters in consequence of pressure exerted on the housing board by officer V. Nesvetaylov. The latter was guilty of creating obstacles in the path of efforts to improve living conditions for the family of Warrant Officer G. Rybalko. A special-unit political department party commission called communist Nesvetaylov to account before the party. For deviating from established procedures for assigning quarters and failure to take steps to eliminate deficiencies he was dealt party punishment in the form of a reprimand.

Lieutenant Colonel Engineer V. Oskalenko, chief of the regional billeting and maintenance section, has been issued a strict warning. The political department has required that he more closely monitor the decisions of unit commanders and housing boards in connection with quarters assignments.

This correspondence has been discussed within the special-unit political department at a meeting of commanders and their deputies for political affairs and within the regional billeting and maintenance section with the chairmen of unit and garrison housing commissions. The billeting and maintenance section party organization held a meeting devoted to discussion of "Communist Efforts to Eliminate Deficiencies Pointed to in the 'All Related' Correspondence." The meeting heard engineer V. Mikhaylyants discuss shortcomings in his own work and efforts being made to remedy them.

A session was held for members of X-unit's housing board to explain their rights and responsibilities. In June Warrant Officer Rybalko left for further service with the Central Group of Forces. His wife said in the course of a conversation that she would not now be raising the question of improved living conditions. She had reserved the quarters in which she was then living and was soon leaving with her children to join her husband at his new post.

A letter from the special-unit political department also declared that "the political department is drawing its own conclusions from the 'All Related' correspondence and will in the future be adopting a more principled position with respect to the work of commanders and housing commissions in connection with the accounting and distribution of housing space."

"Undecided"

In its third (March) issue under the title "Undecided" ZNAMENOSETS published a letter from Colonel V. Devin, which described deficiencies in X-unit's work with warrant officers. It mentioned, for example, the inadequate attention given to the development of their command capacities, the low quality of the political training and the lax attention given the warrant officer's professional development.

As the chief of the political department reported to the editors, the shortcomings pointed out in the letter did in fact exist. The magazine's story had been discussed at a meeting of commanders and political personnel. Warrant officers have received methods training in which have been discussed questions connected with the planning and record-keeping for combat and political training. A meeting has been held of the unit's warrant officers. They discussed ways of further improving ideological and theoretical training for warrant officers.

It has also been reported that officer P. Teleshenko, a political training group leader, has been called to account before the party. Officers V. Golikov and F. Iski have had their attention drawn to deficiencies in educational work with warrant officers.

Steps have also been taken to improve command training for warrant officers.

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NAVAL FORCES

MANY SUBMARINERS REPORTED SUFFERING FROM RADIATION SICKNESS

Stockholm GNISTAN in Swedish 11 Mar 82 p 1

[Article by Stig Hansen: "Seaman Dies of Radiation Sickness Following Soviet Naval Maneuvers"]

[Text] After the large Soviet naval maneuvers the military hospitals in Riga and Klaipeda in Lithuania were overflowing with sailors injured by radiation. "The radiation came from a reactor on a nuclear submarine," said author Alex Milits to GNISTAN.

"A month ago I first heard the rumor that the military hospital in Riga was overflowing with seamen who were injured by radiation," said Alex Milits. "But then there was not much evidence that it was true."

Shortly thereafter Alex Milits met a Latvian whom he knows well. This individual had sojourned in Riga for a long time. The people with whom he lived had a son whom they visited at the Riga military hospital just before he died. They said that the hospital was overflowing with seamen injured by radiation.

"Dying in Large Numbers"

Alex Milits often meets Soviet seamen. A while ago a ship came from Riga to Stockholm and Alex Milits conversed with some of the crew. He asked them if they had heard the rumors about radiation sickness in Riga.

"The seamen then told me that it was the same in Klaipeda, and the hospital there was also overflowing."

The seamen said, "The authorities are calling it an epidemic, but it is a strange epidemic which only hits seamen, and just during naval maneuvers. They are dying in large numbers."

"They also attested that the seamen who died from radiation sickness were from a submarine on which the reactor had broken down, releasing radiation as a result."

There are six nuclear submarines in the Baltic alone, and these participated in the large naval maneuvers. GNISTAN was unable to determine how many took part in the maneuvers altogether.

Alex Milits said, "Furthermore I recently received the same information on radiation sickness from a Latvian who has friends in Riga. Therefore from four independent resident sources altogether."

GNISTAN passed the information on to FOA [The Research Institute of the Swedish National Defense], where they had heard nothing about it. On the other hand, Bertil Lagerwall, chief of information at the Swedish Defense Staff, had heard the rumor of radiation sickness in Lithuania, but had not yet been able to confirm this information.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

DOSAAF: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Conference of DOSAAF Enterprise Directors

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 8 Apr 81 p 3

[Article by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT Special Correspondent M. Mashinskiy: "Something New Is Brewing in the Shops"]

[Text] It has now become the rule for DOSAAF enterprise directors to get together each year to discuss the work results of the collectives and the accumulated experience, and to make plans for the future. And so it was this time. But at the same time a special mood could be sensed at the conference in Leningrad. This is understandable. After all, the conference was held in the shadow of the 26th CPSU Congress and its decisions, which awaited their implementation.

The main thing in the work of DOSAAF enterprises is to strengthen the material-technical base of the defense society's organizations. As we know the 26th CPSU Congress thoroughly discussed the country's economic and social development and improvement of its material-technical base in the conditions of developed socialism, and it made plans for prolonging the all-out campaign to raise production effectiveness, intensify all production sectors, and in this connection improve the effectiveness and quality of all work, of all management units. "...there are problems which affect all spheres of the national economy, the main one being," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress, "to complete the transition to a predominantly intensive path of development." No matter what area of work of the DOSAAF enterprise collectives you might look at, this goal is fully relevant to all of them.

Concern for raising the quality of management with a consideration for the achievements of modern science and technology was the obvious theme running through the reports given by A. Ilyushchenko, the chief of the Administration of Production Enterprises, USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, and by V. Kendzya, the administration's engineer, through the discussions of advanced skills, and through what may seem to have been incidentally dropped statements, remarks and wishes.

As in the 10th Five-Year Plan as a whole, the results of the concluding year of the five-year plan were not bad. The overwhelming majority of the DOSAAF enterprises and associations met the five-year plan's targets in relation to the principal technical-economic indicators.

Last year the collectives of the DOSAAF enterprises and design organizations completed their production volume plan ahead of schedule--on 20 December. This meant that the product sales plan was exceeded by 2.8 million rubles. In comparison with last year production volume increased by 6.4 percent while labor productivity grew by 2.5 percent. In terms of the five-year plan as a whole, its targets were met ahead of schedule, production volume increased by 1.5 times, profit increased by 29 percent and labor productivity increased by 22.4 percent.

At the same time the volume of articles produced was increased, and their assortment was expanded.

Certain steps have been taken to introduce new equipment and progressive production processes. It was pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress that "scientific research, planning and design must be associated more intimately--economically and organizationally--with production." It was with this goal in mind that production improvements were made. The design organizations--the Central Design Technical Office (in Leningrad) and the Khar'kov Design Technical Office (in Khar'kov)--took form, and they grew qualitatively and quantitatively. They are now doing the main work of designing new articles, and on the whole the amount of work they do increased by 80 percent in the five-year plan. The new statutes on incentives for creating and introducing new equipment and on forming the new equipment assimilation fund and other guidelines have played a major role. And here are the results: Forty-one new articles and 34 production processes were introduced and 10 scientific research projects were completed during the five-year plan.

Inventors and efficiency experts have become more active at the enterprises. Thus the economic impact from introducing 657 efficiency proposals was 110,000 rubles. Author's certificates were awarded to 13 efficiency proposals treated as inventions.

In accordance with the plans written for the 10th Five-Year Plan the production areas underwent construction, expansion and reconstruction, which made it possible to outfit the shops better and create more favorable working conditions.

Many useful things were done in the social development of the collectives. A number of DOSAAF enterprises now have their own vacation bases, support to them by children's institutions is improving, and conditions promoting productive labor, study and leisure time for young people are being created. And the enterprise collectives are responding to all of this with shock labor, with successful fulfillment of socialist pledges.

And so, it was noted at the conference, a good foundation has been laid for further growth and improvement, for implementation of new reserves for economy. And they are truly large and diverse.

The discussion centered first of all on fully implementing the USSR Council of Ministers and CPSU Central Committee decree "On Improving Planning and Strengthening the Influence of the Economic Mechanism on Increasing Production Efficiency and Work Quality."

The new stage in production improvements requires that we not only expand the rights of managers but also raise their responsibility for production effectiveness. In this connection the role of introducing new equipment and progressive production processes is increasing. All of this is directly related with scientific organization of labor (NOT). A new standard method of developing technical, industrial and financial plans has been introduced. Five NOT indicators have been introduced into it. However, a number of enterprises are deriving the figures for these indicators arbitrarily, while enterprises of the Lithuanian DOSAAF Central Committee and of the Astrakhanskaya Oblast DOSAAF Committee made no effort at all to derive them.

Introducing new articles of better quality is one of the most important directions. I am referring to manufacturing things which the consumer is especially interested in. Despite this importance, frequently the time it takes for an article to go from technical development to production is still too great. Thus introduction of "MU-50" and "running boar" targets at the Kropotkin DOSAAF Plant has dragged on for 5 years. And the shortfall in the plan was compensated by, of all things, furniture production. It took two carloads of furniture to compensate for one target assembly not produced. One can easily understand why the plant collective had to work so frantically.

On the other hand the design organizations have violated the deadlines for developing new articles in a number of cases.

There are still many complaints about article quality. The Krasnodarskiy Kray DOSAAF Committee Combine sent 30 electronic targets to the Georgian SSR DOSAAF Committee. None of them worked. On occasion incomplete products have been sent to consumers without the required technical documents, instructions and certificates. This happened at the Kiev Experimental Plant, the Dnepropetrovsk "Ukrprom DOSAAF" Combine and the Leningrad "Patriot" Production Association.

To solve this problem we need to not only intensify our control and introduce quality control systems, but we must also certify the products and comply with the requirements of the standards. There are many shortcomings in this area as well. Here is one example. Last year the Ukrainian Republic Center for Standardization and Metrology imposed sanctions totaling 60,200 rubles on the Kiev Experimental Plant for producing "Shkol'naya" radios that did not meet the technical specifications.

Executive discipline is still sometimes low. As an example Gosstandart organs inspected the DOSAAF Gomel' Sports Model and Training Aid Plant twice in 1980. Reports were written on the basis of the results. And the same shortcomings were noted in both occasions. Incidentally things are not going so good with capital construction at the plant either (director, Yu. Khankevich). Last year only 44 percent of the construction plan was completed, with no output capacities being placed into operation.

Cooperation is very important under the new conditions. There are many unsolved problems here as well. The DOSAAF Donetsk Combine, the Estonian DOSAAF Central Committee "Vikhur" Production Combine, and other enterprises sometimes fail to supply each other with needed parts.

The question of economy was examined critically as well. Although much has been done in this respect (just in 1980 alone we saved 62.6 tons of metal, 222 cubic meters of lumber, 21 tons of light petroleum products and 387,000 kilowatt-hours of electric power), control and accounting must be intensified. Mismanagement and a careless attitude toward maintenance of public property must be fought soundly.

About 50 new articles are to be developed and introduced at the DOSAAF enterprises in the new five-year plan. These include "Pioner" racing carts and motocross vehicles, scooters and target assemblies, trainers and programmed learning classrooms, radio sets and new automatic Morse code instruments and many other articles of improved design.

To work with a high payoff, to make fuller use of the reserves of economy, to open a broad avenue for production of new and progressive articles: Such is the unanimous desire of the collectives of the DOSAAF enterprises, which are making a great contribution to strengthening the society's activities.

Improvement of Training Facilities

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 26 Apr 81 p 3

[Article by A. Bogachkin, Deputy Chief, Administration of Military-Technical Training, USSR DOSAAF Central Committee: "The Training Classroom Today and Tomorrow"]

[Text] Many of our schools attained many successes in the last few years. While in 1975 only 47 percent of the schools had a good training material base and 61 percent of the auto driving ranges were fully outfitted, by the day the 26th CPSU Congress convened the number of training organizations with a good training base doubled, and almost all schools possessed auto driving ranges. One out of every eight schools has a dormitory.

In the last 5 years 130 training facilities of different kinds were built for the schools. Among them, the complexes of the Shyaulay, Taganrog and Khabarovsk DOSAAF combined technical schools, the Omsk and Yerevan DOSAAF motor vehicle schools and the training organizations of Moscow, the Ukraine and Belorussia deserve special attention. A large quantity of training facilities are to be built during the 11th Five-Year Plan.

Analyzing the evolution of improvements in classrooms intended for theoretical lessons, mention should be made of the common desire of DOSAAF training organizations to raise the visuality of training by making equipment easier to inspect visually, by employing working cutaway machine units and electrified stands and by making broader use of various technical training resources.

Demonstration cabinets are enjoying greater application in motor vehicle layout and operation classrooms. But even they are experiencing some changes. More accurately, changes are being made in the upper part of these cabinets. Instead of four permanently installed and removable boxes partitioned into small sections, they now have just two permanent boxes of the same dimensions with smaller niches. Each niche is intended to house a removable outfit of electrified stands or panels displaying units, parts and instruments, grouped together for specific study subjects.

Some motor vehicle schools set up their demonstration cabinets not flush against the wall but some distance away from it, thus creating a training aids storage area.

Among the technical training resources found in motor vehicle layout and operation classrooms, basically all of the motion picture projection resources are finding uses. This can be explained by the fact that movies make it possible to study moving objects and development of the processes within them, to reveal their essence and laws and to create the illusion of a real situation in the classroom. Training films allow us to show such processes at any scale, speed and space, irrespective of whether they take fractions of a second to occur or last for hours.

For the sake of raising visuality, everything an instructor uses, always or most often, is located on the front wall of traffic safety rules and fundamentals classrooms: blackboard, road signs, an outfit of road intersections used to set up and study traffic situations and a map showing the route taken by training vehicles.

In addition to streets and roads the route map shows the locations of road signs, light signals, urban transport stops and areas with hazardous driving conditions. Such a map will make it possible for the instructor to tie in the material he presents with the real situation awaiting the students in vehicle driving lessons.

Models, plotting boards, diagrams and other visual training aids promoting successful assimilation of the rules and fundamentals of traffic safety are secured to the other walls of the classroom.

Traffic safety rules and fundamentals classrooms are now being equipped more and more often with demonstration cabinets in which large quantities of visual training aids and materials for practical first-aid lessons can be concentrated.

All forms of technical training resources are being used successfully in the traffic safety rules and fundamentals classrooms. Thus movie projectors are used to show films such as "Road Signs," "External Forces Acting on a Motor Vehicle," "Violations of Right-Of-Way at Intersections and Their Consequences" and so on. Slide projectors, film strip viewers and overhead projectors are being used more and more often together with programmed learning resources to show traffic problems on the screen.

The experience of motor vehicle schools in Novosibirskaya Oblast showed that students studying certain mechanisms, units and parts in practical laboratory lessons on motor vehicle layout do not always clearly understand their location and the way they are secured to the engine. To correct this problem the classrooms are now being equipped with engines having all of these parts mounted on. This forces students to first remove a certain mechanism (unit) from the engine before studying it, and then to put it back in place.

In order to raise visuality some schools have started setting up large machine units and parts not around the edges of work tables but in a row as follows: front axle, water radiator, engine, gear box, distributor box, universal, rear axle.

Fully outfitted demonstration vehicles with engines that can be tuned while running are now furnished to classrooms intended for practical laboratory lessons in technical maintenance.

Instructors are experiencing some difficulties in introducing malfunctions into a vehicle to exercise students in seeking and correcting them. This is why there are plans for creating an instructor console from which such malfunctions could be introduced automatically. It would be desirable to use technical resources to project instructions at each training place, and to have individual screens for each student.

Highly simple inertial sensors or switches are now being installed on bumpers to make it easier for instructors to monitor the correctness with which students surmount obstacles at driving ranges. When such bumpers strike an object, local sound and light signals turn on.

Various light signals, changeable road signs and stress-creating situations--to include pedestrians and vehicles appearing suddenly in the traffic lane, intense blinding lights and water spray--are enjoying broad use.

The driving ranges are now being outfitted with--in addition to obstacles--classrooms for lessons with students not yet permitted to drive, and towers with control consoles.

Training organizations have started making broad use of various trainers to teach driving skills, especially for passenger cars. During the five-year plan 240 motor vehicle trainers were sent to just the motor vehicle and technical schools alone. More than 80 percent of these trainers were manufactured at enterprises of our society. The Khar'kov Design Technical Office has now prepared a new variant of the AT-1A motor vehicle trainer, which is significantly superior to all trainers previously produced.

As time goes on, the requirements on organizing training and indoctrination change, new training programs are introduced, obsolete vehicle models are replaced by modern ones, and improved technical training and testing resources appear. Without a doubt this obligates the collectives of the motor vehicle schools to not be satisfied with their achievements and to constantly seek ways to improve the training material base so that every lesson would be effective and its quality would be high.

Editorial on Educational Role of Sports

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 26 Apr 81 p 1

Editorial

[Text] Physical education and sports, the 26th CPSU Congress emphasized, must be an active part of the daily life of broad strata of the population, especially young adults and children. The party has always devoted and continues to devote great attention to these areas, purposefully capitalizing on the physical education movement to physically and morally educate the Soviet people and to prepare young adults for highly productive labor and for defense of the motherland. The CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" states the need for taking additional steps to spur on the mass physical education movement, to raise athletic skills and to improve educational work among physical education specialists and athletes.

DOSAAF organizations are doing a great deal of work with conscript and preconscrip youth. These organizations acquaint the future defenders of the motherland with the technical and military applied forms of sports, they organize tests on the norms of the GTO ["Ready for Labor and Defense of the USSR"] physical education complex, and they organize mass competition. It is indicative that sports work is competently combined with indoctrination of young people in the spirit of patriotism and internationalism, a love for the motherland and preparedness for its defense. Ranked sportsmen and GTO badge-holders brought up in DOSAAF organizations are now serving well, and they are respected at work.

Technical and military applied forms of sports help to nurture boldness and resourcefulness, endurance and self-control, will and persistence in attaining a goal in the young people. These forms of sports impart extensive technical skills to young men and women. Participating in the training and in competitions, the athlete is able to recognize and evaluate the significance of the sense of comradeship and mutual aid better.

It stands to reason that raising the educational role of physical education and sports depends in many ways on the trainer and on the circle or section leader. The role played by a senior comrade and a mentor is invaluable, since he teaches and indoctrinates, he comes to the rescue at a difficult moment, he shares the joy of victory with his ward in the hour of triumph, and at the same time he teaches him not to become satisfied with his present level, not to stagnate, to critically evaluate his achievements.

Competitions in technical and military applied forms of sports for prizes commemorating famous people in the country, heroes of war and labor and champions and record-holders are being held in the most diverse corners of our motherland. Competitions are held for prizes commemorating K. Voroshilov, S. Budenny, V. Chkalov, Yu. Gagarin, E. Krenkel', Ts. Kunikov, N. Kuznetsov, L. Pavlichenko, A. Martem'yanov and many others. The educational role of these competitions lies in the fact that not only the participants of the competitions but also the hundreds and thousands of spectators measure themselves up against the heroes and their deeds. And this is the best way to develop patriots ready to defend the motherland.

Participation in competitions nurtures proficiency and courage. Thus for example shortwave radio operators of Stalingradskaya Oblast hold a traditional "Activity Week" each year at the anniversary of the battle of the Volga. Radio sportsmen from the most remote corners of the Soviet Union, from Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Italy, Sweden and other countries congratulate Volgograd amateur radio operators, their friends and acquaintances on the anniversary of the defeat of fascist troops at Stalingrad. Exhibits of sports equipment and athletic gear organized during public holidays have no lesser significance to indoctrination. It is no secret that the path of many young men and women in technical and military applied forms of sports begins namely with their first acquaintance with sports equipment.

Consider for example the exhibitions of projects completed by amateur radio sportsmen. As an example more than 200 of their projects representing 30 oblasts and autonomous republics of the Russian Federation were shown this year at such an exhibition in Kuybyshev. The educational significance of this exhibition is difficult to exaggerate: In 13 days about 400,000 persons visited the exhibition.

The decisions of the Eighth All-Union DOSAAF Congress require that we persistently raise the quality and effectiveness of defense and sports work. Mainly in the primary DOSAAF organizations. This requirement is also contained in directives of the recently held Sixth Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, which emphasized that we must develop technical and military applied forms of sports, expand their geography to the entire country and increase public participation in them. It is important to take effective steps to encourage more primary DOSAAF organizations to participate in defense and sports work, to raise its quantitative and qualitative characteristics and to encourage more children and adolescents to participate in technical and military applied forms of sports, especially at their places of residence. And it stands to reason that we must make better use of the educational influence of sports and achieve an organic combination of general physical development, technical proficiency and high moral-volitional qualities in the sportsmen, and raise their preparedness to defend the motherland.

Sports competitions conducted in shops and--in rural areas--in work teams, as well as in primary and city DOSAAF organizations have a great educational influence upon young people. An example is the Magnitogorsk City DOSAAF Organization. It sponsored a large number of mass competitions during a competitive review of Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations and examination of preconscrip and conscript youth in military-technical training. Sports propaganda was organized as well. On the initiative of the DOSAAF City Committee and workers of the city's movie theater network and the administrations of the A. M. Gor'kiy, "Sovremennik," "Komsomolets" and "Mir" movie theaters, thousands of young patriots saw films on technical and military applied forms of sports: "Radio Sports is Interesting," "Neptune Awaits You," "The Starts and Finishes of the Fearless" (a film about motor vehicle sports) and "Conquerors of the Fifth Ocean" (a film about air sports). These and other films discussed the work experience of the best organizations preparing young people for service in the armed forces. They also discussed the will to win, as manifested by sportsmen at competitions.

Meetings with veterans of military-technical forms of sports, with champions and record-holders who have risen many times to the pedestal of honor have a serious educational influence upon young people. The path traveled by veterans in the big leagues and the way they developed the moral-volitional qualities without which victory is impossible serve as examples for the beginners. Stories told by distinguished sportsmen and their advice and suggestions penetrate deep into the hearts of the young. In turn, champions and record-holders must know how to transmit their knowledge and experience to novices competently. It is their honorable duty to be the mentors, instructors and trainers of young sportsmen.

It would be difficult to overstate their role in organizing mass physical education and sports work, especially at their places of residence, and in organizing GTO tests for young men and women. After all, the name itself of this training complex, "Ready for Labor and Defense of the USSR," inspires a patriotic desire in the young person to be useful to his country, to be prepared to labor in its behalf, and if necessary to defend it with honor and merit.

We must do everything we can to promote expansion of the sports movement in the country, making competent use of military-patriotic indoctrination of young people and the spiritual and physical development of the growing generation for this purpose.

Inculcation of Loyalty Discussed

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 20 May 81 p 1

[Article by Georgian SSR Communist Party Central Committee Secretary K. Kolbin:
"Nurturing Faithfulness to the Motherland and Party"]

[Text] Soviet Georgia, the recipient of four orders, is celebrating its anniversary these days. Once a retarded backwater of Tsarist Russia which had suffered the yoke of foreign oppressors many times, today's Georgia is one of the leaders of the fraternal republics of the Soviet Union. For 8 years in a row its successes in the all-union socialist competition have earned the perpetual Red Banners of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee. Its achievements in the 10th Five-Year Plan are especially significant.

Celebrating the anniversary of the Georgian SSR, the laborers are simultaneously commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Georgian Communist Party. All of the republic's life and each of its victories are organically associated with the heroic history of its party organization.

"Things are humming right along in Georgia," said CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "and it is a good thing that the Georgian Communist Party is getting set for new achievements in the 11th Five-Year Plan." This high evaluation of the activities of the Georgian SSR's party organization obliges us to multiply our effort to hasten the rate of economic, social and cultural development.

The republic's successes are primarily the result of consistently following a course toward development of scientific-technical progress, improvement of labor organization and growth in the effectiveness and quality of management. At the same time the purposeful, persistent work of party organizations to indoctrinate the laborers ideologically and morally is playing an enormous role.

One of the leading directions of the Georgian party organization's ideological work is military-patriotic and international indoctrination of the population, especially the young people, and preparation of the latter for service in the Soviet Armed Forces. Speaking at the 26th Georgian Communist Party Congress, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Candidate Member, 1st Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Comrade E. A. Shevardnadze emphasized that military patriotic indoctrination of the laborers and especially the young is an urgent, pressing task of the party, state and social organizations. He focused the attention of communists on the need for improving this work, for carrying it on "...in such a way as to reinforce the consciousness and self-discipline of each inhabitant, to prepare young people for service in the army in all ways--spiritually and physically, and to teach them Russian language and applied military specialties--in a word, to prepare them for their civic, patriotic and international duty."

The results of the armed forces draft and comments by unit and subunit commanders are evidence of the fruitful work being done with conscript youth by party and soviet organs, the Komsomol, DOSAAF and other organizations and departments of the

republic. Valuable experience in working with conscript youth has been accumulated in Tbilisi, Rustavi, Makharadze, Sukhumi, Zestafoni, Signakhi and other cities and rayons of the republic.

However, far from all possibilities are being used to raise the quality with which technical specialists are trained for the army and navy or to promote military-patriotic indoctrination of the young generation. This is why we have now taken on the task of making military-patriotic indoctrination of young people and their preparation for the armed forces the most important part of all party-political and organizational activity of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, party organs and local organs. We are concentrating our attention in this case mainly on developing the young people's love and respect for the heroic past of the Soviet people, on nurturing their sense of patriotism and internationalism more effectively and on awakening the desire of the young to serve in the military and to become officers.

Delegates to the 26th Georgian Communist Party Congress were formed into 15 working groups to discuss the basic directions of the party's activities. One of them dealt with the problems of military-patriotic indoctrination of laborers. We assigned implementation of its recommendations to the Coordination Council for Military-Patriotic Indoctrination, headed by Central Committee Secretary G. Yenukidze and created previously under the Secretariat of the Communist Party Central Committee. Similar councils are now operating under the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms.

The party Central Committee Bureau approved a five-year plan of joint measures to be implemented by divisions of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District and the Political Division of the Red Banner Transcaucasian Border District in satisfaction of the requirements of the 26th CPSU Congress and recommendations of the working group of delegates to the 26th Georgian Communist Party Congress for military-patriotic and international indoctrination. This plan contains many measures. Some of them have already been implemented.

We believe the priority task to be that of raising the effectiveness of indoctrination of the young. We try to see that every military-patriotic measure would make its impression upon the young and help shape ideologically persuaded patriots ready, if necessary, to repeat the immortal deeds of Viktor Talalikhin and Bichiko Bendeliani, Aleksandr Matrosov and Zoya Rukhadze, and thousands of other heroes who had sacrificed their lives in behalf of the socialist motherland.

Three sections were formed within the coordination council: fundamentals of military-patriotic indoctrination, cultural sponsorship ties with military units and border guards, and preparation of young people for military service.

Special mention should be made of the work of the third section, headed by the director of the Propaganda and Agitation Division of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, Zh. Shartav. During its meetings, in which the deputy ministers of education and public health, the Komsomol Central Committee secretaries, representatives of the republic's DOSAAF Central Committee and workers of the State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education are allowed to participate, reports

are given on preparation of young people for service in the army by secretaries of the party gorkom's and raykom's, chairmen of the executive committees of soviets of peoples' deputies, public education and public health department directors, Komsomol committee secretaries and DOSAAF committee chairmen.

Reports have already been given in the sections by the directors of Tsiteltskaroykiy and Sachkherkiy rayons and the city of Chiatury. The discussion of the reports was frank and business-like. These comrades have little with which to be pleased; we would hope that they have made the appropriate conclusions for themselves.

Joint work by party and soviet organs, the Komsomol, the DOSAAF and the military commissariat in Rustavi is producing good fruits. It was here that the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and the command of the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District recently held a conference with the participation of the first secretaries of the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms on problems of organizing work with conscripts and improving military-patriotic indoctrination of young people. Joint contacts have also been organized reasonably well in Zestafonskiy and Signakhski rayons.

Military service is a qualitatively new step in the life of yesterday's schoolchild, vocational-technical school student and college student. The first acquaintance with it in initial military training has important significance. This work is being conducted successfully in secondary schools and vocational-technical schools of the city of Tbilisi, the Abkhaz ASSR, Rustavi, Makharadze, Samtredia and in the military departments of institutions of higher education.

Considering today's requirements, it is very important for the first military teacher of the future soldier to be a politically competent person possessing profound professional knowledge and the skills of an indoctrinator. We are, however, experiencing some difficulties with school military instructors. Departments offering the specialty "Beginning Military Training" are now operating at the Tbilisi Pedagogical Institute imeni Pushkin and the Telavi Pedagogical Institute with the purpose of solving this problem. Reserve sergeants and officers are being accepted by these departments.

It is pleasant to see that in the republic as a whole, the level of training afforded to the conscript contingent has risen significantly. Now one out of every three Georgian conscripts enters the army with a military-technical specialty. Great credit for this belongs to the Georgian republic DOSAAF organization, which has earned the perpetual Red Banner of the AUCCTU, the Komsomol Central Committee and the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee three times for victory in the all-union socialist competition. In this holiday I would like to make special mention of the personal contribution made to these successes by the chairman of the Georgian DOSAAF Central Committee--Hero of the Soviet Union V. Dzhandzhgavy, a famous wartime general--and the collective he has now led continually for two decades.

DOSAAF schools and clubs are making a substantial contribution to military-patriotic indoctrination and technical training of the Georgian young.

A nine-story building housing the republic DOSAAF Palace has now been placed into operation. The republic's museum of combat glory will open within it.

DOSAAF training organizations of Rustavi, Sukhumi, Kutaisi, Makharadze, Samtredia, Gali and other cities have achieved significant successes in recent years. What is very valuable is that in addition to teaching technical specialties to students, DOSAAF schools outfitted with modern technical resources and employing experienced specialists as instructors are devoting much attention to the political, moral-psychological and physical preparation of future soldiers.

The Georgian Communist Party Central Committee exercises constant leadership over the republic's DOSAAF activities. In just the last 2 years problems associated with the work of the defense organization were discussed three times by the Central Committee Bureau. Unfortunately a number of requirements of this bureau are being implemented too slowly by party organs of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region, Kvareli, Mestia, Kaspi and some other cities and rayons. Certain rayon party committees, for example those of Akhmetskiy, Dmaniskiy, Lagodekhskiy and Tsalkskiy rayons, are not displaying adequate attention to the placement of DOSAAF executives. Local party and soviet organs must exercise concrete leadership over DOSAAF collectives.

Soviet Georgia is celebrating its jubilee. For 60 years it has been living and laboring in the united family of the fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union. Faithful to the ideals of communism, the laborers of Georgia will continue to untiringly work toward the goal promised by the great Lenin to the party and people, and invest all of their strength and energy into implementing the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

Editorial on Flight Safety

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 27 May 81 p 1

[Editorial: "In Behalf of Flight Safety"]

[Text] The time of intensive flying in DOSAAF aviation organizations has come. The defense society's aviation is now flying on a mass scale. Each day swift craft--modern airplanes, helicopters and gliders--take off for the skies. Our sportsmen and conscript youth are persistently mastering the complex equipment and learning to fly confidently and make parachute jumps.

No, the appeal of the wartime motto "Komsomol Member--Take to Your Airplane" has not faded over the years. As with all Soviet people inspired by the decisions of the historic 26th CPSU Congress, DOSAAF members are applying maximum effort to promote reinforcement of the socialist motherland's defensive power and to honorably defend its place of honor in international sports competitions.

Last week the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet published an ukase on awarding orders and medals to engineers, technicians and white collar workers of DOSAAF organizations and institutions. The remarkable successes of our airmen have been commemorated by high state awards. The Order of Friendship of Peoples was awarded to the chief of the Kaunas Aviation-Sports Club, A. Yonushas. The Order of the "Badge of Honor" was awarded to flight commanders of the Volchansk DOSAAF Pilot Aviation School I. Goncharenko, of the Zaporozhets Aeroclub A. Volkov and of the Voronezh Aeroclub V. Andre shchev. The motherland also made an appropriate evaluation of the

work done in the 10th Five-Year Plan by many other commanders, teachers, flight instructors, aviation engineers and technicians. Owing to the enthusiasm and professional maturity of these people and of others like them, training and indoctrination has improved noticeably in the aviation organizations, the quality of technical flight training has risen, and flying and parachute jumping safety has improved.

Most of the society's aviation organizations have been working for many years without flying accidents and major near-accidents. One example is the Volchansk DOSAAF Pilot Aviation School. Its chief--G. Krutilin--and its teachers, commanders and flight instructors are doing a great deal of accident prevention work. A competition for the outstanding crew and flight has assumed broad scope in the school. Preparation of equipment and crews for flying is monitored strictly here, and flying rules are complied with to the letter.

The Kinel'-Cherkasskiy Aeroclub of Kuybyshevskaya Oblast, which initiated the socialist competition among aviation organizations to raise the effectiveness and quality of training, is working well, without accidents. It was awarded the perpetual Air Force Red Banner for its outstanding successes in flight training. The Zaporozhets, Kemerovo, Rostov and Saratov aeroclubs are among the leaders. The experience of these aviation organizations was generalized and discussed thoroughly in the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee at a flight safety conference for technical flight personnel.

But accidents and near-accidents still occur in the defense society. This is an indication that not all union republic DOSAAF central committees and kray and oblast committees having aviation organizations subordinated to them have reorganized their work in compliance with the requirements of documents regulating flight safety.

The worst state of affairs in terms of accidents last year was in the aviation sports organizations of the Ukraine and Lithuania. As before, a number of the flying accidents are the fault of personnel due to shortcomings in flight organization and leadership, mistakes in piloting techniques, incompetent operation of aviation equipment and lack of discipline on the part of individual pilots. We cannot condone such shortcomings. We must fight them decisively right now, in a time when students and sportsmen are undertaking mass solo flights, when the volume and complexity of their tasks have increased. All of this requires careful planning of the flights, improvement of their organization and better support.

Unfortunately flying is not being managed adequately at a number of aeroclubs. This has been the case even in the Central Aeroclub imeni V. P. Chkalov, where a near-accident occurred owing to the flight leader's careless attitude toward his functional responsibilities. He failed to maintain surveillance of the air situation, as he was supposed to, as a result of which one of the airplanes landed with its landing gear up. And yet this aviation organization is supposed to be the model of sports flying.

Near-accidents due to lack of discipline are a special danger, as was the case in the Yegor'yevsk and Lipetsk aeroclubs. Analysis of near-accidents associated with violations of flying rules persuades us that certain aviation organization executives do not feel responsible for their work and tend to understate the significance of indoctrination work with permanent flight personnel.

Flight success depends on a complex of many factors, and particularly on efficient technical support. Many remarkable engineers, technicians and other specialists are working in DOSAAF aviation, contributing all of their knowledge and abilities, and all of their spirit to organizing accident-free flying. Nevertheless cases of the grossest violations of the rules of preparing aircraft for flight have been noted in certain aviation organizations, such as in Ufa and Yerevan. For example a screwdriver forgotten in an airplane by a technician at the Yerevan Aeroclub jammed the airplane's rudder controls in the air. It was only owing to the correct actions of the flight leader and the crew that grave consequences were avoided.

If flight safety is to be ensured, executives of the union republic DOSAAF central committees and of the kray and oblast committees must persistently continue their organizational and educational work in aviation organizations, aimed at complete and unquestioning fulfillment of the requirements associated with reducing the accident rate in the defense society's aviation, and they must achieve an integrated approach to military-patriotic indoctrination of students and staff. Accident-free flying must be thought of as a task of state importance.

We know that teachers and flight instructors play the leading role in teaching flying skills. "The main thing today," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "is to raise the quality of training and of labor and moral indoctrination in the school, and to do away with formalism in evaluations of the results of the labor of teachers and students."

These directives pertain wholly and fully to the aviation organizations of the society. They sound especially important today, now that DOSAAF airmen have climbed to a higher level in the training of aviation specialists for the armed forces and aviation sportsmen. The quality of this work is directly associated with the struggle to ensure the safety of flying and parachute jumping.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

FRENCH SOURCE ON SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

Paris EST & OUEST in French Feb 82 pp 6-10

[Article by Jean-Pierre Brule: "Soviet Military Strategy"]

[Text] In the USSR, military strategy is taught in 23 military academies and institutes¹ whose admission requirements include college level credits because student officers are awarded university degrees upon graduation. The most prestigious of these schools are the General Staff Academy and the Frunze Academy. Both academies have close ties with the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and with various institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, notably the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, and the Institute for Study of the U.S.A. and Canada.

In addition, Soviet views on military strategy are also outlined in books, manuals, reviews, and newspapers, all written with constant reference to Marxist-Leninist doctrine and buttressed with abundant quotations from Marx, Engels, and Lenin. As a result, Soviet military literature is unusually heavy reading! Inasmuch as military strategy is thus explained to anybody and everybody, Marshal A.A. Grechko was right when, as defense minister, he wrote: "The Soviets have never concealed the essential points and principles of their military doctrine as very clearly expressed by CPSU and Soviet state policy, by the armed forces themselves." "Armed Forces of the Soviet State," Moscow, 1975, p 345.

Yet, despite this abundance of sources, the USSR's military strategy is almost unknown to Europeans, even though it is singularly revealing.² Within the limited scope of this article we cannot possibly offer an exhaustive survey of the strategy pursued by the Soviets. Consequently we shall simply highlight a few reference points as a means of calling attention to certain Soviet strategic concepts likely to have a direct impact on the fate of Europe and world peace, because war--the means of imposing the victor's policy--is the political basis of Soviet military doctrine which defines victory as destruction of the opposing system, with a view to establishing Soviet imperial rule over the entire globe.

Messianic Concept

In an article published by the military review VOENNAYA MYSL, Colonel S.N Kozlov described as follows the goal of the military strategy implemented by the

USSR: "The objective of military strategy is to create those conditions in which policy is able to achieve the aims it pursues." The message is very clear! Thus strategy, in the USSR's view, is not limited solely to the way troops are employed in a conflict. It is also a political conditioning of the armed forces, because the Soviets believe the "objective rules" of warfare are determined by the scientific character of Marxism-Leninism and, therefore, the decision to start a war is not based exclusively on the quantitative ratio of opposing military forces. It is based also--and above all--on the Kremlin's political, economic, and social objectives.

The fact is that the USSR is not a nation like any other. Because the USSR employs the means of a state (diplomacy, trade, etc.), Roosevelt, Churchill, De Gaulle, and Kissinger--who had no peer in his ability to spout platitudes in a prophetic tone, and who today says and writes the opposite of what he said and wrote as U.S. secretary of state--all made the fatal mistake of believing the USSR was a nation like any other and allowed it to enter the concert of nations even though communism is the negator of traditional international order. The combination of militarism and ideology thus makes the USSR a permanent threat to the West.

The USSR's perception of today's world consists essentially of competition between two systems--socialism and capitalism--competition which can never be settled by compromise and whose inevitable outcome can only be the victory of socialism. This messianic concept of establishing socialism as a universal system in the wake of the Soviet Army--a national army, of course, but also a political army³--was clearly described by Marshal A.A. Grechko: "The historic function of the Soviet armed forces is not limited merely to defense of the mother country and other socialist countries. In foreign policy matters, the Soviet state actively and knowingly opposes the exportation of counterrevolution and the policy of oppression. It supports struggles for national liberation and resolutely opposes imperialist aggression wherever it appears, in any region of the globe. Our armed forces and those of other socialist countries have thus received a new mission." "Problems of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," Moscow 1974.

This world-wide concept stems from the "Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty," the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine." It was first formulated in the Joint ["Warsaw"] Letter (15 July 1968) of the communist parties of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria, a letter addressed to the general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party: "We will never allow socialism's historic gains and the independence and security of all our peoples to be threatened. We will never allow imperialism, peacefully or not, to breach the socialist system, from inside or outside, and change in its favor the ratio of forces in Europe....Each one of our parties is responsible not solely to its own working class but also to the international working class and to the world communist movement. And each party cannot shirk its obligations stemming from this responsibility."⁴

The declaration signed by the six communist parties--East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR--at the Bratislava conference is

even more explicit: "Imperialism's attempt to undermine socialism and the peace and security of peoples requires that countries in the socialist system maintain their cohesiveness....All conferees expressed their unshakable determination to expand and defend socialism's gains in their countries, to achieve new successes in building socialism....The unyielding struggle against all antisocialist forces is the assurance of success in strengthening socialism's positions and in countering imperialism's underhanded maneuvers" (TASS, 3 August 1968). This "internationalist solidarity" is also officially reaffirmed in the Soviet Constitution of 7 October 1977 (Chapter 4, Articles 28 to 30).

As underscored by the CPSU's monthly ideological journal, "regardless of the progress made in normalization and peaceful coexistence, on the historical level, the Soviet Union's relations with the U.S.A. and other capitalist countries remain adversary relations" (KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1975). With such a corpus of doctrine, war--as a potentiality--has not finished playing its part! While in the West we have altogether different ways of thinking, in the USSR, war is far from being a chimera. Quite the contrary, it is very seriously considered a possibility. Everything in Soviet military literature proves this. At a time when the strategic situation in the world is more specific, more European than ever, it is important to heed the very clear warnings emanating from the Kremlin. It would be a serious error in judgement to think that the Soviets will never do what they have prepared themselves to do at the cost of so many sacrifices by their people.

A Nuclear Blitzkrieg

The advent of nuclear weapons revolutionized the characteristics of warfare, dictated a radical revision of military thinking, and consequently brought about a profound change in the Soviet armed forces. The "combat tool" has thus been organized and trained on the basis of the priority assumption of a nuclear conflict. Hence the new type of ground forces maintained in a constant state of operational readiness, namely the strategic rocket units established in 1961 as a separate service with its own commander-in-chief. Designated the Strategic Rocket Troops,⁵ it is considered the leading service of the armed forces. With a total strength of 385,000 men drafted for a 3-year tour of active duty, these rocket units are trained under actual combat conditions. For instance, they are trained and equipped to move through areas contaminated by radioactive or chemical materials. In his book, "The Armed Forces of the Soviet State," Marshal A.A. Grechko warned that "all known weapons will be used and new weapons may be developed."

The fact is that the Soviets consider nuclear weapons to be instruments of war and thus weapons like any other which--regardless of their destructive effects--are not meant to make war impossible but rather to increase the amount of firepower and thereby make it possible not merely to defeat the enemy but destroy him. And that is why Soviet strategists do not consider nuclear war suicidal.⁶ Having declared the struggle between socialism and capitalism to be implacable, there can be no limit to violence. Soviet strategists, therefore, advocate swift and massive use of nuclear weapons. They even stress the importance of the war's initial phase by underscoring the necessity of a first strike designed to create a fait accompli. Victims

of a surprise attack in June 1941, the Soviets are fully cognizant of how such an attack can benefit forces exploiting its effects! Nuclear weapons tailored to the size and nature of their assigned targets have made a selective attack possible and aggression "profitable." Soviets describe their strategy as "offensive"--a strategy of action seeking to conquer--as opposed to Western strategy--a strategy of deterrence seeking to avoid a test of strength--and yet the Soviets denounce this latter strategy as "aggressive!"

For the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons are not a "last resort." In his book, "Marxism-Leninism, War, and the Army," published in Moscow in 1974, B. Byely categorically stated: "Massive nuclear strikes against the enemy's armed forces and upon key economic and political targets can determine the victory of one side and the defeat of the other at the war's very beginning. Hence a correct evaluation of the elements of supremacy over the enemy and the capability of employing those elements before he does are the keys to victory in such a war." In his book, "The Offensive," published in 1980, A.A. Sidorenko, a former professor at the Frunze Academy, wrote: "The nuclear attack is a simultaneous attack in depth throughout the entire disposition of enemy forces. Its objectives are: 1. destroy the enemy's military capabilities; 2. destroy combat units and their command and control systems; 3. isolate the battlefield; 4. break the main line of resistance and mark the main corridor or axes of attack."

These statements are unquestionably clear. They constitute warnings akin to those issued by Guderian who in 1939 had so thoroughly forewarned Europe of the conventional Blitzkrieg then in preparation! But these statements also run counter to Western strategic thinking by rejecting the concept of deterrence which is somewhat too readily accepted in the West. This concept assumes that the enemy subscribes to the same doctrine, has a similar perception of the risks involved, and shapes his military establishment to such a perception. As for the "mutual deterrence" theory which Americans once considered mutually desirable and permanent but now seem to question, Soviet strategists reject it because they view it as a passive attitude which lets a threat hang over the potential enemy, the threat of punishment administered only after that enemy's strike! The word "deterrence" does not exist in Russian, so the Soviets use the term "ustrachení" (policy of intimidation by terror) which faithfully translates their perception of deterrence. Soviet strategists consider the Western concept of deterrence to be devoid of credibility. Inasmuch as the next conflict is expected to escalate into nuclear war right away, it is self-evident that denying oneself the nuclear initiative means leaving that initiative to the enemy. Where military matters are concerned, one must reason with dispassion and lucidity, and not in an emotion-charged atmosphere. In the armed forces' monthly theoretical journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, General N.A. Lomov urged Westerners to reason with such dispassion: "In a world war, the possibility of armed combat without use of nuclear weapons has become an abstraction."

Military strategy, the "daughter" of politics, is both an art and science, and also a dialectic of wills. And that is why Soviet strategy is based on the use of nuclear weapons and on the concept of action designed to achieve victory. Soviet strategists believe not in deterrence, but in war, not in

retaliatory attacks, but in the offensive. The present stature of the Soviet armed forces is such that if the USSR were to engage in war, it would certainly do so not to lose but definitely to win. And by any and every means.

As supporters of the nuclear Blitzkrieg, Soviet strategists also realize that the USSR is less vulnerable to a "city-busting" nuclear attack than European countries (and even the U.S.A.). In fact, civil defense has been incorporated into Soviet military strategy. It has been an integral part of the Soviet defense system since 1961. It is a tangible and institutionalized reality. The same is true in other Warsaw Pact countries. In the USSR, the civil defense organization is attached directly to the Ministry of Defense. It is headed by a deputy minister of defense, a member of the Higher Military Council (General A.A. Altunin), who is assisted by a special civil defense staff. Approximately 2 percent of the total defense budget is allocated to civil defense. The USSR views civil defense as a means of protecting the maximum number of cadres and technicians required to get industry and the economy going again and to direct operations after the nuclear exchange.

To protect its population against the direct or indirect effects of nuclear weapons, the USSR has built shelters for decision-making and command centers (capacity: 100,000 persons), for essential workers in key industrial plants (capacity: 2 million persons), and for those people obliged to remain in place (capacity: 15 million persons). In addition, the Soviets have a very advanced and large-scale industrial passive defense program (underground plants, etc.). Hospital facilities are also underground, and so are strategic stockpiles (raw materials, machinery, food, etc.). Civilian evacuation exercises are conducted regularly. The magnitude of the Soviet civil defense effort appears to be incompatible not only with Western doctrine which views nuclear weapons as the negation of war, but also with Western leaders who consider any civil defense effort as destabilizing! If the measures taken do indeed ensure protection of the people in major population centers, then the decrease in risks incurred may prompt the Soviets to consider that losses in the event of a nuclear exchange would be at an acceptable level. But this civil defense program may also lead the Kremlin to believe that it can launch a nuclear attack with relative impunity.

Conventional Option

Even though, according to Soviet concepts, nuclear forces will be the decisive factor in a future war--the accuracy of SS-20 missiles will limit damage solely to targeted objectives: the USSR has no intention of ruling over territory reduced to ashes--Soviet strategists have not thereby neglected their theater or general purpose forces consisting of all forces and weapons other than strategic. The Soviet Army, for example, has the capability of waging war either in a nuclear environment or by conducting conventional operations in various theaters of operations. Conventional forces are not a substitute for the Strategic Rocket Forces but their natural complement. The combined arms team concept is integrated with the operational context: "Combat Regulations" (1962) and the commentary published by TAKTIKA (1965) call for the use of nuclear weapons at the outbreak of a war, with the combined arms team then operating as the exploitation echelon.

The Soviet armed forces are most certainly capable of operating in a conventional environment from the very outset. Furthermore, to the Soviets the word "conventional: implies being able to adjust to a nuclear environment at any time. The Soviets have thus managed to overcome the difficult problems of shifting from one mode of warfare to another. General Zavylov explained this capability as follows in his article "New Weapons and the Art of Warfare" published in the 30 October 1970 issue of the armed forces daily newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA [Red Star]: "The art of military operations with nuclear weapons and the art of military operations with conventional weapons have many basic differences. But they are not at variance with one another. Nor are they naturally exclusive or isolated from one another. On the contrary, they closely overlap and develop, thus forming a whole."

Soviet strategists maintain that victory is consolidated by occupying the enemy's territory. Soviet conventional forces are designed specifically to occupy enemy terrain, a mission that is evident in their deployment. Some 80 percent of the Soviet field forces, and not merely a fraction of the conventional forces, is deployed opposite NATO. These forces are full-strength armies operationally ready to take the field immediately, and so deployed as to be extremely mobile. Armored units--the USSR has 50,000 tanks--are not designed to make a massive and rapid frontal breakthrough as Hitler's generals did 43 years ago. They are meant to be employed in occupying conquered countries. It stands to reason that the USSR is not going to get itself involved in a conventional confrontation likely to degenerate into a nuclear conflict when it has the means of eliminating the European--and even American⁷--nuclear retaliation forces through a selective and preemptive strike.

In his book, "Military Strategy," Marshal Sokolovskiy left no room for doubt on this score. After having emphasized the decisive importance of initiative combined with surprise in the initial phase of the conflict, he added: "Nuclear missile warfare makes it possible to resolve the strategic question in a matter of hours or days." But since the selective strike cannot settle the conflict, Sokolovskiy explained the missions then developing upon the main ground and tactical air forces: "Their primary mission will be to exploit the nuclear attack launched by the Strategic Rocket Troops and the air forces, with the objective of bringing about the ultimate defeat of enemy formations within the theater of operations, rapidly seizing and occupying enemy territory, and achieving a victorious end to the war on the continent." Even though the marshal did not specify the continent in question, it is obviously the European continent. Europeans can always try to brush aside the awkward strategic "questions," but tomorrow they will find these questions in their way!

Of course, Soviet strategists have not overlooked the naval forces: the navy is likewise one of the instruments of the Kremlin's military power. The build-up, modernization, and deployment of the naval forces are particularly noteworthy because they now make the USSR a world power in the fullest sense of the term, i.e. both a continental and maritime power. Soviet military strategists realized that in our modern world, which is increasingly becoming a maritime world, only a powerful navy could implement a "global" strategy with any chance of success. The sea is the one place in the world where

nuclear weapons can best assert themselves. In the nuclear age, a nation must be prepared to operate upon and under all the seas of the world by destructive strikes against both naval and land targets. The military threat is no longer solely land-based or airborne. It is now a multiform threat.

The Soviet Navy's impressive and spectacular build-up has quietly altered the balance of forces and the international military situation. Never in world history has a continental power had such a naval force: more than 300 submarines and more than 1,000 surface combatant vessels. Such a force might appear surprising because while the sea is vital to the West, it is but of marginal importance to the USSR. The Soviet Navy actually constitutes a real and growing threat to Western naval power because of the great importance of sea lines of communication so essential to America's support of the European theater and its northern and Mediterranean flanks. The Soviet Navy is very well prepared to fight a nuclear war, whereas the U.S. Navy's basic weakness in this respect seriously worries the Pentagon. Because of their extreme vulnerability--aircraft carriers can withstand damage caused by conventional weapons but not a direct hit by a nuclear weapon--U.S. naval forces are liable to be quickly cut off from Europe. And the airlift capacity of the MAC [Military Airlift Command] will not be able to offset the resultant loss of sea transport capability.

Furthermore, in addition to a land and air front, Europeans now have a maritime front inasmuch as no point on the Old Continent is beyond the range of sea-launched Soviet nuclear weapons.

With its submarine fleet, the USSR currently has the means of rapidly upsetting international stability, either by submarine warfare or, without even firing a single missile, by a selective embargo interrupting imports of energy, food, and fuels, a move that would have a crushing effect on the peoples and economies of European countries. But the North Atlantic Treaty is geographically limited to the area north of the Tropic of Cancer and to the Mediterranean. Hence it does not cover the sea lanes over which vital supplies of oil and raw materials are shipped to Europe. Hence the West's increasing vulnerability to Soviet direct and indirect strategies. In short, the USSR's naval power enables Soviet strategists, who have prepared themselves to handle the major contingency of a limited nuclear war on European territory, to seek at the same time--through an indirect strategy--a political solution: suffocate Europe so as to force it to surrender--without invasion of the Old Continent being necessary--or else start a war.

FOOTNOTES

1. In addition to these institutions, the Soviet military educational system has 125 institutions of higher learning and 13 intermediate level schools. In other words, 13 percent of the Soviet institutions of higher learning are military. "Voennyi akademii i uchilichtcha," Moscow, 1974, pp 100 et. seq.
2. By analyzing and interpreting the books in the series called the Officer's

Library, two experts of the Rand Corporation, R. Garthoff--in "Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age," 1958--and H.S. Dinerstein--in "The Soviet Image of the Future War," 1959--were able to make accurate forecasts of Soviet military policy in the 1960's and 1970's.

3. Though the army in the USSR has not been a class army--the Red Army of Workers and Peasants--since 27 February 1947 when it became a national army called the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, it is still a political army, the party's army. In this connection, see articles 65 to 67 of the CPSU Statutes.
4. See Jean-Pierre Brule, "Vingt ans apres le second coup de Prague" [Twenty Years After the Second Coup of Prague], Paris, Atlas, 1981.
5. The Soviet armed forces are organized into five force "categories:" Strategic Rocket Forces, National Air Defense Service, Army, Air Force, and Navy. A total of 3,673,000 operationally-ready troops to which must be added the Border Troops (300,000 men of the KGB) and the Security Troops (260,000 men of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). The USSR thus has an active military force of 4,233,000 men at the present time.
6. Professor P.M.S. Blackett, 1948 Nobel physics prize laureate, has calculated that American-British bombings of Germany, converted into nuclear terms, were equivalent to 400 Hiroshima-type bombs and yet were not able to break the German people's will to resist.
7. The USSR is currently capable of launching a first strike that could eliminate a large part (90 to 95 percent) of the American Minuteman ICBM's.

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