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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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4 DECEMBER 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: PENTAGON DEFIES CONGRESS' BUDGETARY POWER ON ASAT TEST

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by Col. I. Voinov, under rubric "Notes to the Point": "For Whom are Laws Written in the United States?"]

[Text] In approving legislation on the U.S. military budget for the 1986 fiscal year, Congress adopted a decision to ban the testing of antisatellite systems against actual targets in space. This also pertained to tests of the existing ASAT complex. Congressional staff members responsible for the observance of parliamentary procedures have even stated that this measure is of the nature of a permanent law and does not automatically expire at the end of the 1986 fiscal year but requires a special revocation. The ban ruled out the possibility of the administration's using money allocated back under the budget for the 1985 fiscal year for tests against artificial earth satellites already deployed in space without congressional consent.

This would seem to have been a rational decision that need only to have been carried out. And at first spokesmen for the U.S. administration gave to understand that they "did not intend to circumvent that ban." However, the Pentagon hastened to make the qualification that neither it nor the administration had formulated its position on that issue yet.

It wasn't necessary to wait long for the Pentagon's "formulation." On 5 September 1986, without waiting for any "special revocation" or the natural end of the fiscal year, the Pentagon, together with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), conducted secret experiments related to the 'star wars' program, in the course of which the possibility of using a rocket in an antisatellite variant was, in effect, tested. As the American press reports, on that day a Delta booster rocket was used to launch from the NASA range at Cape Canaveral (Florida) two space objects, one of which (the second stage of the booster rocket) served as a target and the other of which performed the function of an interceptor. In the course of the experiment the following operations were carried out: detection of the target, the tracking of it with the use of on-board sensors, the maneuvering of the interceptor and the striking of the target by means of the detonation of an explosive charge.

At the same time, another rocket, an Aries, was launched from the White Sands range. The Washington Post newspaper writes that infrared sensors, which were

already located in space on the Delta rocket, were able to observe its trail and relay the data to earth.

Thus, the Pentagon did that which the Congress's ban had been directed against. And there is nothing surprising about this. The U.S. military department has long since demonstrated, to put it bluntly, a contemptuous attitude toward the decisions of American legislators. As for the financing of the test, out of the generosity of that same Congress, which has allocated astronomical sums for military needs in the past few decades, the Pentagon had managed to put together a so-called "balance of unspent funds." According to comes to the round figure of about \$250 billion. So finding the trivial sum of \$150 million for an experiment with the Delta and Aries rockets was nothing. The damage to the Pentagon's financial reserves was like the damage to an elephant from a mosquito bite.

The Pentagon's actions can only be called a deception of Congress and the public, especially since they involved a de facto testing of means of detecting and intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles within the context of the 'star wars' program. The fact that this is precisely the case is indisputably indicated, in the first place, by the ignition of the second stage's engines for the purpose of detecting it with sensors installed on the interceptor and, in the second place, by the simultaneous presence in space of the interceptor and the Aries rocket.

Now every attempt is being made to blur these facts. Numerous Pentagon experts who have been appearing at press conferences, on television and radio and in the U.S. press and breathlessly lauding the "experiment's" results have been supplying their speeches with technical details the gist of which comes down to one thing: the experiment supposedly does not contradict a single international agreement in that area. People overseas are now saying that the speed was not what was required for striking a missile, that the gases used were supposedly hot rather than cold, that the target was not a realistic one but only a rocket stage, and that the sensors' potential was so limited that they could not be used against "real" missiles or warheads. And furthermore, such a component of a "pure" ASAT system as an airplane was missing.

All these details cannot refute the main result of the experiment with the Delta and Aries rockets: the Pentagon has crossed a technological threshold in the realm of testing under conditions of space basing. This, as many American observers point out with good reason, has raised a point-blank question concerning violations by the United States of the 1972 Soviet-American treaty restricting antiballistic missile systems. It is impossible not to agree with that view: the tests, which to all intents and purposes included a component of a space-based ABM system--an orbiting interceptor--violate the ABM Treaty, which directly forbids the creation [sozdaniye], testing and deployment of space-based antiballistic missile systems or components.

The dangerousness for the cause of peace of such "experiments" by the Pentagon is well understood by all people on the planet. American scientists have very clearly formulated their attitude toward space weapons: "The development [razrabotka] of antisatellite weapons and space-based antiballistic missile

systems would increase the danger of nuclear war and stimulate a dangerous competition in the area of offensive nuclear arms. An arms race in space represents a serious threat to the national security of the United States."

It would be hard to add anything to this just appraisal.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW: ORGANIZATION, OPERATION OF U.S. 'SPY SATELLITES' PROGRAM

PM240957 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 2 Oct 86 p 3

[Article by G. Polskoy: "Behind Triple Doors"]

[Text] All office doors in the Pentagon are numbered and indicate who works there. For example, one of these doors has the number 4c-956, below which there is a plate which reads: "Colonel Paul Fowlie, Jimmy D. Hill."

But do not be deceived, for behind this door there is another, second door with two locks: a concealed lock and a combination lock. However, let us try to imagine that we nevertheless succeed in surmounting this double barrier. And then, behind the second door, you will quite unexpectedly find yourself in a long corridor leading to a top secret organization which virtually no one has heard of even in the United States itself: the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).

Retired Admiral Stansfield Turner, former CIA director, gave the following answer to questions put by persistent correspondents regarding the reality of this secret institution's existence: "I cannot admit that we have a National Reconnaissance Office — even if we do." But official government representatives totally deny its existence. It does exist nevertheless and, as the NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE claims, it has "The largest budget of all(!) the reconnaissance organs." What is this mysterious organization?

-- In August 1960, Air Force Captain Harold Mitchell took off in a fighter plane from an airfield in the Hawaiian Islands on an unusual, top-secret mission; to pick up a capsule calling "from the sky" containing photographic film. It had been dropped by one of the first American spy satellites, "Discoverer." With the aid of a special triangular net the pilot succeeded in picking up the capsule. Several days later CIA director Allen Dulles called in his new assistant Richard Bissell. "It is time," he said, "to make administration of the American space reconnaissance program official, albeit secret." On 25 August 1960 the so-called "unannounced" decision was taken to organize the National Reconnaissance Office, which was made responsible for directing all spy-satellite flights. General control over the activities of the NRO was given to the CIA director and the defense secretary.

As for as Paul Fowlie and Jimmy D. Hill, they are real people. They are with the Pentagon but work in the NRO: the former in charge of its staff and the latter managing its budget.

The pattern of NRO work has also crystallized. first the so-called Commirex (Committee for Requirements and Exploitation) examines requests made by the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Department of Defense, certain categories of troops, and the State Department regarding reconnaissance operations and decides the choice of objective and order of priority. Then the request formulated by Commirex is sent to the NRO. Here specialists decide, for example, when and where to use the powerful cameras on the spy satellites, at which altitude to conduct the reconnaissance operation, and so forth.

All this information is sent to a spy-satellite control station at Sunnyvale (California). Here, at the intersection of Highways 101 and 237, there is a vast cubic building well known among U.S. intelligence workers as the "blue cube." It houses the "nerve center" which directs the entire fleet of spy satellites flying at different altitudes above the earth and on different orbits. The process of directing them is done with the aid of eight tracking stations scattered across the whole world. The "blue cube" also receives information from the space spies. In 1984 alone the "cube" received 160,000 reports from spy satellites. It has a staff of more than 2,000. However, since feverish work began in the United States to create [sozdaniye] SDI with space-based elements, new people have appeared in the "blue cube" who are now engaged in creating [sozdaniye] killer satellites...

But let us return to the organization of NRO work. And so, one copy of the assignment from Commirex, indicating the list of objectives to be spied on from space and their order and priority, is sent, as we have already said, to the "blue cube."

A second copy is sent to a vast concrete building, which is also virtually without windows, situated in one of Washington's quiet areas -- the Navy Yard. This houses another important subdivision of the NRO, the so-called National Center for the Interpretation of Photographs. And it is here that the capsules from space containing photographic film are sent. After the film has been developed it is shown on huge screens to reconnaissance specialists who are trying to pinpoint objectives requested by Commirex. If, for example, a successful shot has been taken of a tank with a new gun that interests the military, the reconnaissance specialist presses the corresponding button and the computer-controlled lens enlarges the detail still further...

The photographic reconnaissance program under the code name "Key Hole" consists of three separate satellite systems. There is the short range KH-8 satellite which photographs targets on earth from altitudes of 145-400 kilometers and then drops a capsule containing the photographic material. The KH-11 flies in a polar orbit. The photographs obtained are less clear-cut than those produced by the KH-8, but on the other hand -- thanks to a multispectral scanning device -- the photograph of the target is immediately transmitted to earth. And finally, the largest satellites, KH-12, are intended for flying at high altitudes but, if necessary, they can drop to a lower altitude to take photographs. The length of time the spy satellites can remain in space varies -- from 8-9 months up to several years. The images of the targets sent from space are received in a large concrete building in Fort Belvoir, near Washington, officially known as the "Center for the Analysis and Testing of Electronic Defense Communications." Another seven stations are located in various parts of the world. In particular, the largest of these stations -- Pine Gap -- is located in central Australia, close to Alice Springs. This station, like another -- in (Narrangar) -- a desert in the state of South Australia -- receives signals from spy satellites in outer space.

The spy satellites are launched into space with the aid of "Titan-2" and "Titan-34d" rockets and reusable space craft like the "Shuttle." After the "Challenger" space craft disaster and the explosion of the "Titan-34d" rocket (together with a KH-11 spy satellite worth \$800 million), an extremely tense situation has taken shape in the NRO. The unfavorable state of affairs in American space equipment has not only unseated SDI propagandists but has also cast doubt on the whole idea of its creation [sozdaniye], because equipment far more complex than the "Shuttle" or "Titan" will be required to put this idea into practice.

But why create this cumbersome "Key Hole" system at all? Does the USSR really pose a threat to anyone? [paragraph continues]

Has the Soviet Union not pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons? Has the USSR not demonstrated time and again its peaceable nature and respect for international norms? No; all these "key holes" are necessary to the American military not at all for the purpose of defense but in order to prepare for a first strike against the USSR.

And so, the U.S. NRO has developed into a powerful subdivision of the gigantic U.S. espionage department which ensures the implementation of the imperialist policy of neoglobalism. Former U.S. President Lyndon Johnson once said: "The British ruled the seas and led the world. We have ruled the air and been the leaders of the free world since we established this supremacy. Now the position will be taken by whoever rules in space."

In full accordance with this theory, so dangerous to the cause of peace, the Pentagon aspires to a "position of strength" in space, having lost hope of gaining this position on earth. However, there is no doubt that reason, the progressive forces of mankind, and the USSR's successes in the peaceful development of space will create a strong barrier in the path of the space knights of the cloak and dagger.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET ARMY PAPER ATTACKS U.S. ARGUMENTS FOR SDI

PM301421 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Oct 86 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel (Reserve) V. Chernyshev: "'Star' Stories and Chasing Rainbows"]

[Text] U.S. Administration spokesmen are now trying to suggest that the USSR and the United States are moving toward an agreement on eliminating the nuclear threat. They do this despite the fact that official Washington intends to retain SDI and the "Star Wars" program, which, as is well known, is the main obstacle to a possible accord on establishing a nuclear-free world.

Aiming to enhance the "prestige" of SDI and camouflage its true aim, Washington has invented a whole series of stories clearly designed for uninformed people. These sometimes fantastic fabrications include, in particular, the following.

First: Even after the complete elimination of nuclear weapons the U.S. need for SDI will not diminish since an antimissile "shield" is allegedly a "guarantee" that the Soviet Union will fulfill the agreement. This statement is at the very least not to be taken seriously.

For in order to ensure total certainty that adopted commitments will be fulfilled, complete clarity is needed with regard to verification [kontrol]. That is logical. And the Soviet leader firmly stated in Reykjavik that verification [kontrol] should be tightened up in connection with the readiness to make deep cuts in nuclear arms and with the beginning of the specific stage of the elimination of nuclear weapons. The USSR has reaffirmed its readiness for any forms of verification [kontrol] which would ensure total assurance for each side that it would not find itself in a trap. But to propose the accumulation of mountains of weapons in space and presenting those mountains as a kind of "verification [kontrol] system" is simply ludicrous.

Second: Even if there were no nuclear weapons in the world, Washington claims that SDI would be a kind of "insurance policy" for the United States, since it will defend it if "some madman" acquires a nuclear missile and decides to "subjugate" the nonnuclear United States. This scenario about a "madman" clearly comes from Hollywood. To be serious, Washington hardly took account of a "mythical individual" when hatching its plans to create [sozdaniye] a large-scale space-based ABM system. Such a system will cost it several trillion dollars -- the amount needed to fill near-earth space with strike space complexes -- and an additional \$200 billion per year to service them.

Third: It is allegedly the U.S. SDI that brought the Russians to the negotiating table. Clearly some people in Washington seriously think that the Soviet Union can be addressed in the language of the "position-of-strength" policy and fail to realize that the other side is guided by lofty political responsibility and concern for universal security. The Reykjavik meeting confirmed that SDI is by no means a "trump card" at the talks which will bring its players success but, on the contrary, a mine which will torpedo any accords.

Fourth: There is no reason for the Soviet Union to oppose SDI, since "magnanimous America" is prepared to "share" the results of its work on the program. This thesis just cannot be taken seriously at all.

How can one be sure of the sincerity of this promise if the United States currently does not want to share with the Soviet Union even oil equipment or equipment for dairy plants? Moreover, even in the United States this verbal "generosity" prompts only sarcastic smiles. "Can the President be serious in saying this?" THE NEW YORK TIMES asks. "Does he mean to say that we will knock ourselves out creating [sozdavaya] a space shield, spending innumerable billions of dollars, and using secrets which you can get locked up for even thinking about, and then share that technology with Moscow?" A high-ranking spokesman for the military-industrial complex stated bluntly: "I simply do not understand this. It seems to run counter to everything else we are doing. It is simply senseless."

That statement is indeed extremely frank: Official Washington's current peace-loving rhetoric clearly runs counter to its practical actions. Evidence of that is provided not only by the fact that in Reykjavik the U.S. Administration put a "Star" barrier in the way of nuclear disarmament. In recent days the White House has also taken action which bluntly attests to the absence of any desire on its part to even maintain the atmosphere needed for continuing the dialogue.

Clearly the U.S. "hawks" scared of Reykjavik are now rubbing their hands in satisfaction. You get the impression that the White House is sacrificing the vital interests of its own people, its allies, and international security as a whole to the arms manufacturers. In calling black white it is clearly hoping to get its own way by maintaining the pace of military preparations, expediting the "Star Wars" program, and stepping up pressure in all directions.

Now clothing SDI in propaganda garb, official Washington is keeping silent about the official documents and statements which clearly set out its aggressive intentions. Take, for instance, the "1984-1988 Defense Guidance," which nobody has refuted or rescinded. This fundamental Pentagon document for military building envisages the "development [razrabotka] of space-based systems" including means of destroying Soviet satellites, and the expedited creation [sozdaniye] of ABM systems to protect U.S. territory. One of the aims of these "measures" is also clearly proclaimed: "We must direct military rivalry with the USSR into new spheres and thereby make all preceding Soviet defense spending senseless and all Soviet weapons obsolete." The U.S. President himself confirmed this expenditure on 22 May 1984 -- that is, a year after he had announced SDI -- by stating: "They (the russians, that is) cannot compete with us and win in the sphere of building up arms."

The main tasks of the strategy of "direct confrontation" between the United States and the USSR announced in June 1981 by the Pentagon chief are: to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union and ensure U.S. readiness to wage a war in order to "make the USSR end hostilities as soon as possible on U.S. terms." The Pentagon is instructed to be prepared to "effectively wage a war" using space means. And it is pointed out that the United States should not sign any treaties which would prevent the creation [sozdavat] of a weapons system in space that "adds weight to our existing potential," since in opening up "new spheres of military rivalry," these weapons systems could alter the correlation of forces to the advantage of the United States.

This "philosophy" and these directives to executive organs reflect the real policy and practice of the current U.S. Administration. All this confirms that SDI is part and parcel of U.S. military doctrine, whose essence is to chase the rainbow of military superiority.

Official Washington clearly does not want to recognize the reality of the nuclear space age and learn the lessons of history. Nobody in Washington wants to realize that it is impossible to return to the fifties, that the dreams about an era of military-strategic superiority are nothing but illusions, and that the price of a mistake in such calculations could be the death of human civilization. The plain truth is that the Soviet Union will not sit idly by but will do everything to wreck the transatlantic figures' adventurist plans. This has already happened with the "nuclear blackmail" attempt, to which the USSR responded by creating [sozdat] its own nuclear shield. This will also be the case if any attempt is made to wreck military-strategic parity. Our country does not intend to copy the U.S. SDI. But there will be a response to it -- an asymmetrical but certainly effective response.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA: SDI SEEN AS INSTRUMENT OF 'MILITARY-ECONOMIC DIKTAT'

PM061529 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[Academician V. Avduyevskiy article under the "Echo of Reykjavik" rubric:
"SDI: U.S. Military-technological Imperialism"]

[Text] Mankind's security has reached an intolerably low level. It is being maintained thanks to the approximate balance of USSR and U.S. strategic forces. In a desire to upset this balance Washington is attempting an unprecedented mobilization of the Western countries' material resources and scientific and technical potential to bring about a new leap forward in the arms creation sphere. The "strategic defense initiative (SDI) program is designed to promote this.

Despite the illusion of this program's professed aims, its danger is all the greater for the fact that it is not simply a new arms buildup plan. SDI is conceived as a program for the creation of global space weapons capable in a fraction of a second of hitting targets in space and on earth from space. The U.S. military hopes that by using strike space means located above the earth it will be able to terrorize the population of all states and dictate its will to them. Another dangerous feature of the SDI program is that the system under development [razrabatyvayemaya sistema] is to be controlled by computers, which would take decisions on the destruction of targets both in space and on earth.

To divert attention from its aggressive aims, the U.S. Administration is acting out a farce. Playing the part of the greatest deceiver of the peoples in history, it promises the elimination of the nuclear threat and a "hopeful future." And all this by creating even more lethal forms of weapons!

For the creation [sozdaniye] of this weaponry it is proposed to utilize physical principles which have yet to be fully mastered or to make new discoveries enabling a fundamental technological advance to be made.

With the aim of resolving the tasks arising in the course of work on the SDI program the United States is carrying out a thorough militarization of the main spheres of the national economy, scientific institutions, and universities. However, the militarization of the country and the diversion of manpower into

the development [razrabotka] of new weapons are leading to a lowering of the standard of fundamental research and developments of new technology in the civil sectors, which threatens to reduce the competitiveness of U.S. goods on the world market. As a result, Washington has begun to forfeit the leadership of its allies in the economic sphere.

The U.S. military-industrial complex, seeking to establish American dominance in the world, sees the solution to this situation in subordinating to itself research into the creation of new technology and scientific and technical work being conducted in other capitalist countries. Especially since some Western countries are considerably outstripping the United States on a number of problems to do with the creation [sozdaniye] of powerful lasers, computers, optical electronic systems, optics, and control systems which are regarded as crucial to SDI.

SDI, or the "star wars" program, was also an important instrument of this economic and technological expansion. Promising the creation of a "space umbrella" for "protection against Soviet missiles," the United States has begun concluding thousands of contracts relating to work under the new program.

The British, FRG, Italian, and Israeli governments have already signed agreements on their countries' involvement in research in the "star wars" program. Talks on this are now being conducted with Japan, too.

Some NATO countries are developing missile-destruction systems using laser weapons, systems for waging electronic warfare, and studies in other areas. Japan, which far outstrips the Western countries in the sphere of creating microcomputers, optical electronics systems, and robotics, has agreed to hand over its top-secret military technology to the United States. In West European countries which have refused to take part in SDI Pentagon representatives are concluding multimillion contracts with individual firms.

The governments of the relevant Western countries explain their participation in SDI by the desire to gain access to new technology and at the same time increase their role in international affairs. In actual fact, by joining the "SDI club," they are getting into direct economic and technological dependence on the United States. I repeat: The hopes that the United States pins on SDI are illusory. However, work within this program may lead to a quite real and colossal merging of the imperialist monopolies which, in view of the existing pooling of military forces, would result in the complete subordination of the NATO countries and Japan to U.S. military-economic diktat and their transformation into part of the military-technological empire cobbled together and headed by Washington. The attempt by a number of West European states to create their own independent space program "Eureka" is hardly capable of changing the situation. In my view, this program will for a number of reasons become a constituent of the U.S. SDI program instead.

The major capitalist countries' leaders indubitably have quite full information on the doubts about the technical feasibility of SDI and its true purpose and they understand the point of the U.S. imperialist policy of expansion in the technological and economic sphere. However, some of them consciously support America's imperial ambitions. To preserve their class privileges, the capitalist countries' right-wing circles, which see the United States as the mainstay of the reactionary forces, are prepared to waive their own peoples' interests. It is no coincidence that after the Reykjavik summit some Western leaders opposed the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The contradictory nature of the actions of the United States and its allies on international issues and the desire to avoid anything specific at the disarmament talks demonstrate that the political positions of the opponents of detente are precarious and that the militarist circles' aggressive designs are doomed to failure.

The imperialist forces' aggressive schemes are countered by the calm and confident peace policy of the USSR and the other socialist community countries, a policy aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons and preventing the militarization of space. This policy finds increasingly broad understanding and increasingly firm support from all the peace-loving forces of the planet, including realistically-minded Western figures. By uniting they can and must doom the U.S. ruling circles' hegemonist schemes to defeat. Scientific and technical achievements must and will be used for good of all mankind.

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CSO: 5200/1078

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA: SDI SPENDING STARVES CIVILIAN PROJECTS

PM281535 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Oct 86 First Edition p 5

[Commentary by Andrey Tolkunov: "Dismal Prospects"]

[Text] In the search for additional means for the U.S. Administration's various programs, the President of that country was recently forced to raise the ceiling of the state debt to astronomical heights -- \$2.3 trillion. Therefore, during the years the present master of the White House has been in power, it has more than doubled! And the federal budget deficit has reached record proportions, now standing in excess of \$200 billion.

Economic indicators also fail to offer any comfort, showing, as they do, that the American economy is creeping into a stagnation phase -- the herald of crisis. According to figures just released in Washington, the country's gross national product only increased by 2.4 percent in the third quarter in annual terms. The number of bankruptcies and of farmers being ruined is growing with breathtaking speed.

So the last propaganda illusions of "Reaganomics" -- the White house socioeconomic policy which was supposedly going to bring prosperity to the American people -- are evaporating. The main reason it failed to work was that its authors tried to do two incompatible things: improve the country's economic life and, through forcing the pace of militarization, sharply increase unproductive military expenditure. Thus, since 1980 appropriations for arms purchases have doubled, while outlays on military research work have increased by 80 percent and on expanding bases and other similar installations, by 95 percent.

Programs to modernize civilian sectors and develop cities have literally been pared down to the bare bones, not to mention aid for the poor and the aged -- all to please the military and industrial complex. The buildup in military expenditure has caused the loss of a million jobs in civilian industrial sectors -- this is the conclusion reached by a report prepared by the consultative firm "Employment Research Associates."

Orienting the economy and science toward the Pentagon in this one-sided way is not only leading to crisis phenomena within the country but also to the loss of American competitiveness in the world capitalist market. Thus, the U.S. deficit in foreign trade in civilian goods created on the basis of the latest technology will soon reach \$2 billion.

This is why many specialists are warning the administration against the next hasty militarist step -- the development [razvertyvaniye] of large-scale programs within the

framework of the President's "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI). "SDI will do a great disservice to American industry. it will channel our energy and abilities into the military sphere at a time when civilian industry is so in need of them," economist L. Thurow warns.

The White House, however, clearly has no intention of heeding the voice of common sense. Despite the fact that entire regions are falling into a socioeconomic decline and one enterprise after another is closing down, the administration has nevertheless refused to give \$15 million in aid to the steel industry, which is in a very serious condition. But as part of the SDI program various electronic and aerospace companies and scientific centers are to receive up to \$30 billion in the near future for research for exclusively military purposes.

Where will these allocations come from? Naturally, in the search for means for new nuclear-space programs the state debt will once again increase, the federal budget deficit will once again soar, and yet another aid program for a Pennsylvanian steel worker or a farmer from Iowa will be cut.

These are fairly dismal prospects for the American people, when SDI -- by no means ready to "save" Americans from a nuclear strike -- is already today killing people's hopes on earth for a better.

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CSO: 5200/1080

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: UK COMPUTER SNAFU SHOWS SDI DISASTER POTENTIAL

LD280319 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1505 GMT 27 Oct 86

["SDI Computer Error Is Fraught With Disaster"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 27 Oct (TASS) -- TASS observer Leonid Ponomarev writes:

Today was an instructive day at the London stock exchange. For the first time U.S. and other foreign shareholders have been given the opportunity to participate directly in stock trading in London through a most-up-to-date computer system. But the start of the red-letter day was rather spoiled: The computer system failed and brokers could not comprehend what was appearing on terminal screens. The atmosphere at the stock exchange became nervous. The minutes ticked by, millions of pounds sterling and dollars disappeared into the distance.

Now, let us imagine a similar situation with the computer system controlling the notorious SDI, the "Star Wars" program which, according to White House representatives, is supposed to act as a "guarantor of peace." Seventy minutes of computer system failures at the London stock exchange have perhaps turned into lost profits for someone. But what if SDI computers were to provide incorrect data not for 70 minutes but just for 70 seconds?

It is difficult to even imagine what might happen on our planet in such a situation, if SDI is developed and its space-based nuclear components are to be constantly circling in orbit. For, however hard the current representatives of the U.S. Administration tries to camouflage the true essence of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" its aims are to guarantee the United States impunity in inflicting a first nuclear strike. This program was thought up and is being implemented as a militarist one, combining strategic offensive nuclear weapons and an antimissile defense deployed in space. Such a system makes peace even more fragile.

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CSO: 5200/1080

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: ITALIANS SUBMIT WEST EUROPE SDI PLAN TO PENTAGON

LD310658 Moscow TASS in English 0651 GMT 31 Oct 86

["ITALIA News Agency--Report About 'European Space Shield'"--TASS headline]

[Text] Rome, 31 Oct (TASS)--According to the news agency ITALIA, the Italian consortium cites, set up specially for participating in the implementation of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) submitted to the Pentagon its project for a "European space shield." It did so on the insistence of General Abrahamson who is in charge of SDI research and development.

Similar projects, the agency reported, were prepared and sent to Washington by military-industrial companies in other Western European countries which would like to get their share of the lucrative order.

What is meant by the "European space shield" is the deployment of a land-based system in Western Europe consisting mainly of "Patriot" surface-to-air missiles. It is hoped that the "European space shield" will protect Western Europe from missiles with ranges of less than 1,000 kilometers.

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CSO: 5200/1080

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA VIEWS U.S. PUBLIC MOOD AFTER REYKJAVIK

PM281410 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Oct 86 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Gan report: "America at a Crossroads"]

[Text] Washington--The other day two Washington people, (T. Giyer) and (Dzh. Kelli), wrote to THE WASHINGTON POST. Both letters contain perplexity, disappointment, and criticism. How, they ask indignantly, could President Reagan sacrifice a real opportunity to eliminate strategic offensive arms to the "star wars" program? "It is irresponsible to regard SDI as a program which could stop nuclear rivalry or eliminate the nuclear threat. SDI will never bring peace and stability, it will lead to exactly the opposite results," (T. Giyer) writes. "What could prevent such a system being used for offensive purposes?" (Dzh. Kelli) sums up.

That is what many other Americans think too. Nearly 7,000 scientists across the country have already signed a petition protesting against the program and refusing to take part in its elaboration. This, one feels, is evidence of common sense on the part of the Americans, who recognize the danger of the militarization of space and the dishonesty of those who pass it off as a good thing for not only national, but universal security.

That is undoubtedly so. But there are instances of another kind too, which cannot but cause concern. Thus in the wake of the Soviet-American talks in Reykjavik three major U.S. television companies, in cooperation with leading newspapers, carried out public opinion polls, the results of which had a sweet sound to White House ears. According to all three polls, the majority of Americans supported SDI and approved the U.S. delegation's actions in Reykjavik, pinning the blame for the lack of results onto... the Soviet side. At the same time some 60 percent of those polled came out in support of unrestricted work on SDI. The number who declared their opposition to the White House line and regarded its actions as a frank obstruction to the cause of peace did not exceed 20 percent.

It is quite obvious that the results were affected considerably by the exceptionally intensive, large-scale propaganda campaign by the White House, which seeks to whitewash its own behavior in Reykjavik by means of anti-Soviet calumnies. Matters have even gone as far as outright falsification, cheating, and unseemly propaganda methods involving claiming the credit for

other people's proposals and outright deception. All three intrigues in official Washington were exposed in the speech by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on Soviet television, in which the world was once again told the truth about Reykjavik.

That truth is, albeit with difficulty, penetrating America too. According to those same polls, the majority of Americans think the White House did not make "enough efforts" to curb the arms race. They are also in favor of securing radical agreements with the Soviet Union in that sphere, strengthening peace, and normalizing relations. The need for progress in these directions is regarded as axiomatic. The desire for an improvement in Soviet-American ties is also clearly manifested at present in the tremendous interest in our country which has marked the tours by Soviet artists here, the festival of our cinema which is currently under way, and the art exhibitions.

In other words, the picture is diverse and far from uniform. But all this can be explained. Whatever the apologists of war may say in the attempt to demonstrate man's "innate aggressiveness," peace is the natural condition of man. The desire for peace, for a cloudless future sky, and concern for your children and grandchildren unite not only the peoples of the two great powers, but all people on earth. And since that is so, it is quite natural that there should be a desire to look closely at another country and try to learn more about it and understand its people better. To this end, the American people must know the truth about what is happening in the Soviet Union, about the real content of Soviet foreign policy, about our real intentions, and also the truth about the situation in the world as a whole.

This is fundamental, and it is in conflict with the alien elements which have accumulated over the years of ideological warfare against the Soviet state and with the distrust and arrogance which are constantly exacerbated by the manipulators. A great deal is currently being said and written here about this artificially cultivated distrust. Recalling the "cold war" period, the old hands in Washington conclude that in recent decades no other administration has been so stubborn in instilling in the country the idea of communism and the Soviet Union as a "sworn enemy," while painting the world in only two colors--black and white. "This is a world of allies and enemies, patriots and villains, loyal friends and untrustworthy enemies," the NEW YORK TIMES magazine writes.

In the United States, the post of president is traditionally regarded as the most authoritative. It ought to follow from this that in the light of nuclear realities the White House incumbent has, as one leading American newspaper writes, a "special responsibility not to exploit his popularity in order to involve the American people in his own 'holy war' through deception, incitement and intimidation."

Nobody is likely to deny that the administration, fostered by bellicose right-wing circles, has "achieved much." The astronomical Pentagon budgets, the acceleration of old arms programs and the commencement of fundamentally new ones on the utterly false pretext of "lagging behind the Soviets," the adoption of the doctrines of "limited" and other kinds of warfare, the

expansion of neoglobalist gendarme functions, armed interference in the affairs of independent states--that is far from a complete track record of Washington's activities in recent years. And the stream of propaganda unleashed on people is increasing proportionately. Indeed, one can hardly deal seriously with an administration which, immediately after Reykjavik, perpetrates a gross provocation by expelling 55 Soviet embassy and consulate staffers from the country.

In the administration's favored WASHINGTON TIMES newspaper, you will find these lines: "By virtue of the nature of the Soviet regime, it will probably take at least one more generation before the USSR follows the West's path. But since we have already waited for the second generation after World War II, we can allow ourselves to wait a little longer." Some people intend to "wait," or rather, to get their own way, by means of piling up mountains of weapons, taking laser and other superguns into space, and ordering other people around from there.

The so-called "strategic defense initiative" has already become a "feeding trough in the sky" for the military-industrial complex corporations, to quite the metaphor used by (R. Nimrudi), a staffer of the Council for Economic Priorities. Hundreds of companies are already making a profit out of it. While scientific research firms in the region of the U.S. capital have been assigned Pentagon contracts to the tune of 230.6 million dollars under this program, in such strongholds of the military-industrial complex as Silicon Valley, southern California, and Huntsville, Alabama, the reckoning already runs to billions of dollars. "SDI has become a very important part of our future. Much depends on it," (E.) Williams, leader of one local coeperation, VDM International says, showing his hand.

The political managers of the right and the military industrial complex, who hold key positions in the administration, take great care to ensure that work under SDI continues to increase. Here, naturally, they are eager to prevent any agreement on control over nuclear space arms. The very idea of the possibility of such an agreement is speedily declared by them to be "treason." And, conversely, any arms program, even the most costly and destabilizing, is lauded as a gift from God. Here, for instance, are some of the sophistries indulged in by U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary R. Perle: "The Reykjavik meeting showed clearly that SDI is of fundamental significance for the entire process of talks with the USSR on arms control agreements. SDI is the locomotive which pulls the entire arms control train." Of course, Perle is very well aware, but will never say, that the "locomotive" is pulling along a track laid by the military-industrial complex, leading to the total wrecking of any chance of securing accords and the ultimate collapse of the fragile structure of agreements which still exist. It was no accident that in Reykjavik, as WASHINGTON POST observer D. Broder noted, "the glimmer of hope for deep reductions in nuclear arms went out of the window as fast as you could say "SDI.'"

The influence of the military business lobby affected the White House's position even during the period of preparation for Reykjavik. Even then, for its consent to the Soviet proposal to meet and discuss the possibility of making progress at the Geneva talks, which were at a standstill (after all, you have to take account of the voters' feelings in mid-term election year, and moreover you do not want to go down in history as an administration which was incapable of concluding a single arms limitation agreement), the White House came under a hail of criticism from "hawks" of every color and hue. It was literally forced to defend itself. Therefore, after initially preparing the public for the possibility of real progress in Soviet-American relations, the leaders of the administration started to change their tone as the Reykjavik meeting drew nearer. Tough statements emanated from the White House, with public oaths of loyalty to the stagnant old positions on all spheres of arms control without exception, and with exaggerated importance attached to secondary and invented questions. "The President wants to assure the right wing of the Republican Party that he will not let it down in Reykjavik"--that was ABC television's comment on this political chameleonism. The White House, the NEW YORK TIMES wrote, "is torn between anti-Soviet convictions and hopes for peace."

Thus the opportunity was lost for accords which could have radically changed the world of the late 20th century. But nobody in the United States can now say with any authority that the American side's position in Reykjavik is America's position. That position has not yet really been defined. It will have to be defined, it is inevitable. The clock of the nuclear age tells the same time for everyone, and if too much time is wasted, time might run out.

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CSO: 5200/1076

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA EDITORIAL ON DISARMAMENT ACTION WEEK, REYKJAVIK

PM271642 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Oct 86 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "The Peoples of the World and the Cause of Peace Demand Action"]

[Text] Disarmament Action Week is getting under way across the planet. The peoples' declaration of their will for peace is taking place at a particularly important, crucial moment. Everyone's attention is centered on the results of Reykjavik. Everyone can see that this was a major political event. It made it possible to take the struggle against nuclear weapons to a fundamentally new level. Mankind became convinced that the elimination of the nuclear threat is realistic and possible. But at the same time the Reykjavik meeting highlighted the major difficulties on the path to a nuclear-free world and the dramatic nature of a situation in which the adoption of historic decisions, to which the USSR's far-reaching, interconnected proposals led, was thwarted.

These proposals make up an integral package. Their basis is the program announced on 15 January for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. This program was defined by the 27th CPSU Congress as the central avenue of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. The peoples are equally encouraged by the bold, innovative approach and the inexhaustible energy and good will displayed by our country and its leadership for the sake of a change for the better in world affairs, the ending of the arms race, and the safeguarding of comprehensive international security.

If the world community is to grasp the real situation which emerged in Reykjavik and after, paramount importance is attached to openness [glasnost] in international policy. The Soviet Union is true to Lenin's view of secret diplomacy--we do not accept it. Here it is apposite to note the desirability of renouncing the strictly closed nature of talks with the Americans, which they insist on. The press conference given by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in Reykjavik and his speeches on Soviet television were acts of great political force. It is no accident that direct, frank talking, a constructive spirit, depth of analysis, and comprehensible logic meet with such a heartfelt response of good will throughout the world.

The peoples want to know the truth, and should know it. This is all the more necessary in that a campaign has been launched on an unprecedented scale across the ocean to feed the American and international public disinformation about the Reykjavik meeting.

The orgy of propaganda accidentally betrays the terrible fear which the manufacturers of death have of losing their many billions of superprofits, and which the Pentagon and NATO generals have of losing their beloved nuclear big stick. This at a time when the real moment of truth has come for militarists of every hue and for those who support the senseless but dangerous "policy of strength"! And in the eyes of all mankind, they have failed to pass the test of realism and farsightedness, political courage and honesty.

In that great country whose leaders hypocritically boast on every occasion of the "openness" ["otkrytost"] of capitalist society, in fact the truth about Reykjavik is being concealed from the American people by every possible means. The mirage of SDI is foisted on them again and again, although that program unequivocally leads only to fatal consequences: a new stage in the arms race, the destabilization of the strategic situation, an increase in the danger of war. And let Washington not attempt to deceive its own people and the world public by assuring them that matters are moving toward agreement. Reykjavik showed clearly that the "star wars" plans were the main obstacle to an accord on eliminating the nuclear threat.

The essence of our position and our proposals has been defined extremely clearly and precisely by M.S. Gorbachev.

"We are in favor," he said in his 22 October speech on Soviet television, "of the reduction and subsequently the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and we are resolutely opposed to a new stage in the arms race and its transfer into space.

"Thus we are against SDI and for the strengthening of the ABM Treaty."

That is logical, understandable route for progress toward the resolution of the very important problems on which mankind's very future depends. And its practical implementation is made possible by the package of Soviet proposals submitted in Reykjavik. This package envisages, in an organic interrelationship, the elimination of all strategic offensive arms by 1996, Europe's complete liberation from the heavy burden of medium-range missiles, and the strengthening of the ABM Treaty. The maximum good will is invested in this "triad." The Soviet Union has not withdrawn its proposals. That is an important factor in the situation. The constructiveness of the USSR's foreign policy, its emphasis on concrete actions, as is clearly evidenced by the silence at our nuclear testing ranges, and our readiness to make major concessions for the sake of a turn toward a nuclear-free world are becoming increasingly obvious to the world community. As the World Peace Congress which ended in Copenhagen the other day showed, our package of proposals is consonant with the mood and aspirations of the mass antiwar movement. The new prospects in the struggle to prevent nuclear catastrophe and ensure true security and a peaceful future for the peoples also inspire the present Disarmament Action Week.

Today more than ever before, the title of this traditional event, held every year under a UN decision, is symbolic. The time for action has indeed come. There must be an increase in the joint efforts of peoples and political and public circles with the aim of realizing the potential which opened up at the Reykjavik meeting. Everything possible must be done to make use of the historic opportunity for a radical solution to the problems of war and peace.

The Soviet people are active participants in this struggle. PRAVDA's mail every day and the rallies and meetings in the country testify to the people's ardent, unanimous support for the principles, restrained, and constructive foreign policy course of the CPSU and the Soviet Government and their firmness in upholding the interests of our national security, which is inseparable from the security of our friends and allies and all the world's peoples. By augmenting their labor efforts and strengthening the country's economic potential and defense potential, the Soviet people make a real, decisive contribution to realizing the prospects for a nuclear-free world. They are rightly proud of the policy of socialism--the policy of peace and disarmament. Their thoughts and aspirations are reflected in the CPSU Central Committee October slogans:

Peoples of all countries! Come out resolutely against the buildup of lethal arms and for the ending of nuclear tests and the total elimination of nuclear weapons!

Let us prevent the militarization of space!

Long live the Soviet Union's Leninist foreign policy--a policy of peace and the peoples' security, of broad international cooperation!

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CSO: 5200/1076

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TEXT OF SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES STATEMENT ON REYKJAVIK

PM240837 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Oct 86 First Edition p 3

["Statement by the Participants in the USSR Academy of Sciences General Meeting"--PRAVDA headline]

[Text] We, Soviet scientists, wholly and fully support the Soviet leadership's realistic, constructive, honest, and open position expressed at the meeting between CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev and U.S. President R. Reagan in Reykjavik. The position is dictated by an awareness of historic responsibility and concern for the fate of peace and to save civilization from nuclear destruction.

Our country has put forward an exceedingly bold program enabling a breakthrough to be effected in the matter of not only halting the arms race but for the first time ensuring deep cuts in nuclear weapons. The real prospect was opened up of the elimination of all Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons in the course of the next few decades.

The USSR's compromise proposals fully accord with the genuine interests of the Soviet and American peoples and the peoples of the whole world. They are an outstanding example of the new political thinking in international relations.

We deeply regret the fact that once again the positions of the U.S. Administration did not provide an opportunity to take advantage of the historic chance of a cardinal solution of the problems of war and peace. So far it has not been possible to master the dangerous trends leading to the accumulation and improvement of monstrous means of mass destruction. But for all that, the Reykjavik summit was a very important event in international life. A qualitatively different situation has been created in the world, which no one can now ignore.

We appeal to the people at the helm of U.S. policy to acknowledge their responsibility to history, draw sober conclusions and take the path leading to the deliverance of mankind from the terrible threat of a devastating war. We call for the utilization of scientific and technological achievements for exclusively peaceful purposes, for the benefit of a countries and peoples.

We are sure that the scientists of the world and all people of goodwill will continue to increase their efforts in the struggle for a radical improvement of the international situation, in the struggle for life on earth.

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CSO: 5200/1076

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES VICE PRESIDENT ON REYKJAVIK

LD180355 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Oct 86

[Article from the "Vremya" newscast; video report]

[Text] To preserve peace is the command of time; it would be wrong to miss a historic chance of finding a radical solution to the problems of war and peace. These are the principal thoughts expressed in the Soviet people's and foreign public's responses to the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik:

[Begin recording by Academician Ye. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; identified by screen caption] The Soviet Union took to the Reykjavik meeting historic and completely new proposals which embody our 15 January plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons. These proposals are underpinned by the Soviet moratorium--the moratorium on nuclear tests and the moratorium on the testing of space weapons, which the Soviet Union has actually been adhering to since 1983.

These proposals--deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons; the reduction to zero of medium-range missiles in Europe with a certain agreement regarding Asia and the United States; and finally the proposal to reinforce the conditions of the 1972 ABM treaty, which is, so to speak, the foundation stone of the entire potential nuclear arms reduction process--are fundamental proposals which, I would say, are comprehensible to everyone in the world and which the majority of people certainly support.

The fact that today we have not managed to come to an agreement with the U.S. Administration shows that the latter is indeed under the very profound influence of right-wing circles--what is known as the iron triangle of the military-industrial complex, in which a number of commissions also participate. There is a group of right-wing forces there that are still entertaining thoughts of the possibility of hegemony and superiority.

However, I have to say that I am sure that spring is close, so to speak. The proposals are now so strong, they are so clear and specific, genuinely enjoying support of all the peoples of the world, that in one way or another the administration will have to respond. Naturally it is difficult to talk of dates at the moment, or to forecast anything, but a very powerful process has been put into motion and it will be impossible to stop it. [end recording]
[video shows Velikhov standing in a corridor]

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CSO: 5200/1076

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR ACADEMICIAN COMMENTS ON REYKJAVIK MEETING

LD210902 Moscow TASS in English 0758 GMT 21 Oct 86

[Text] Moscow, 21 Oct (TASS)--Any attempts of the U.S. Administration to explain the SDI as a defensive shield are untenable from the viewpoint of both science and common sense, a TASS correspondent has been told by vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences Academician Aleksandr Yanshin.

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, the scientist stressed, are above all offensive weapons, first-strike weapons. The U.S. Administration which did not agree to the Soviet proposals, was upholding in Reykjavik its right to a new twist in the arms spiral, the right to world leadership and hegemony. The peoples of the world became convinced once again through whose fault tension is persisting in the world.

The Soviet Union which invariably advocates peace and nuclear disarmament hasn't so far been able to stop the dangerous tendencies leading to stockpiling and perfecting the monstrous systems of mass destruction, the scientist said. But nevertheless the Reykjavik meeting is a very important event in international life. It is obvious that a qualitatively different situation has now developed in the world and this situation cannot be ignored any longer. I am confident that sooner or later the U.S. Administration will have to come to terms with the USSR, said Alexander Yanshin.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW PANEL DISCUSSION VIEWS REYKJAVIK

LD160025 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 15 Oct 86

["Top Priority" panel discussion program, hosted by Radio Moscow correspondent Vladimir Pozner, with "doctors" Radomir Bogdanov and Igor (Moloshenko)--live or recorded]

[Text] [Pozner] How do you do ladies and gentlemen? This is Vladimir Pozner presenting Top Priority. With me on the panel today are doctors Radomir Bogdanov and Igor (Moloshenko). Obviously we're going to be speaking about Reykjavik. Very briefly, let's remind our listeners that during the meeting between the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, and President Ronald Reagan, the Soviet side offered a package deal which included: One, a 50 percent reduction in offensive nuclear weapons across the board; virtually an acceptance of the zero option on intermediate-range missiles that would destroy all Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and all American missiles out of Europe, but not pay any attention, not count, the British or the French missiles, the forward-based weapons that the United States has. And also we would be freezing our intermediate-range missiles in Asia to 100 warheads, and also without counting what was going on in Japan and elsewhere.

The one request that the Soviets had in this package was that a 10 year period would be imposed on any nonlaboratory development, deployment, testing of SDI. That is that SDI, all of it, be limited for 10 years to laboratory research, laboratory testing. And that is what the United States turned down. Now if you agree with what I have briefly recapitulated--do you? You agree with that, then let us look at the, [at] President Reagan's address to the nation that was made on Monday evening in which he says, and I would like to underline this, that this SDI limit, or limitation, that the Soviet Union wanted to impose was something that the United States could not, could not accept. I quote: I told him, meaning Mr Gorbachev, I had pledged to the American people that I would not trade away SDI: there was no way I could tell our people their government would not protect them against nuclear destruction. I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except two things: our freedom and our future. Now let's begin with that one.

[Bogdanov] Well I have very mixed feelings about the President's address to the nation. I find out in that address some negative sides and some positive sides, you know. Let me start with the positive side. Well, I have a feeling that you may find out in that speech some, you know, indications that the American side still keep in mind Soviet proposals. They are not rejecting them, they're ready to, as the President put it--they're to negotiate at the Geneva table and we will have to see really what will happen to that. And the negative side of my reaction to the President's speech is SDI. You know, I really cannot digest the President's logic, if any, about SDI. We suggested to the Americans that if we reduce nuclear arsenals of both sides by 50 percent within the first 5 years, then another 50 [percent] we reduce within another 5 years. In the way that by the end of this century, within 10 years, we will get rid of all nuclear might of both sides, and the most threatening, you know, missiles, will be destroyed. Offensive strategic missiles will be destroyed. Now if it is true the major human question you know is: what do you need SDI for if within the 10 year period you destroy all the missiles?

[Pozner] Yes, the President stated that for insurance.

[Bogdanov] Yes, that's exactly what I would like to...

[Pozner, interrupting] Insurance against what?

[Bogdanov] Insurance against what, and the meaning of it is that we cannot trust those bloody Russians because they can cheat us; it's a very, very old American tune. We cannot trust them. We should have our insurance. Now my point is that we cannot trust those bloody Americans. We should have our insurance, too and our insurance is exactly that within 10 years they strengthen the regime [as heard] of ABM treaty.

[Pozner] For a 10 years period.

[Bogdanov] Yes, that in such a way that we are guaranteed from any surprises from the American side. Let me add to that that we have suggested to the American side triple control--triple, mine you--triple control of the process of the destruction of the elimination of the nuclear arms. Now, I'm very sorry but we have to deal in that case with the usual American arrogance you know. I mean what is American is absolutely right; what is American is absolutely true; what is Russian, it's evil; it's another, you know you have to deal with another ill. If you base your relations in the nuclear era on that, you know, approach to your adversary, as your enemy, in that very hostile way because what is, what is behind insurance, it's the anti-Soviet, you know, hostility. I'm sorry to say that. How can you strike a deal with this, you know, mood against the Soviet Union? And I believe that by our package, which is, you know, that's the unique case in the history of the Soviet-American strategic relations when our positions on strategic arms were so close that we had maybe less than a step to strike a deal with the Americans. But they denied us this deal because of this American arrogance.

[Pozner] Let me interrupt you for a minute. Dr (Moloshenko), I'd like to ask you to look at this part of the equation, if I might call it that. Why are the Americans insisting on SDI, even in the acceptance of the idea that there will not be any strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union should we get this agreement? Why do they need SDI in the theoretical absence of missiles?

[Moloshenko] Well, I would say that, strictly speaking, there is only one logical explanation for this fact, because you know, having in mind that we made several, frankly speaking, concessions to the United States; and to my point of view maybe the most important one is the program of heavy missiles, because we've heard for many years from the United States that they are concerned about our heavy landbased missiles. Now we are ready to cut them 50 percent and to 10 in 10 years [as heard] just to eliminate them completely. And this is, of course, from our point of view, and I think from the point of view of any reasonable person, is the best insurance against any nuclear threat. There is only one, yes, only one logical explanation--that it's just a desire, a bid for military superiority because offense and defense, they're infinitely connected as a shield and sword. And in this respect, you know, this desire to have by all means SDI, this tough shield could be explained only by a desire still to have some kind of military superiority.

[Pozner] Let me ask you to be a little bit more concrete on this one. Are you saying that SDI is not completely defensive? Are you saying that it has an offensive capacity?

[Moloshenko] Yes, exactly. And you know we can talk about offensive capacity of SDI in two sentences. First, nobody knows what kind of attack systems could be created under SDI, but even much more important, you know if you regard the combination of offensive and defensive systems, such as SDI, it creates very dangerous offensive mix and one simply could regard this mix as a part of the American first strike potential.

[Pozner] I'm still going to keep going at this one. I think it's very important that we clarify it.

[Moloshenko] It's very easy. In a nutshell, let me put it in the simplest way. You know, unfortunately there is very little trust in U.S.-Soviet relations. And there is a suspicion, there is a fear of the first strike. Now both our societies are very vulnerable, and this is unfortunately an insurance against this kind of strike. But you know with SDI, with the defense of the territory of the United States, you know we would have another concern, that maybe after the first strike from the United States against the Soviet society, against the Soviet military forces, the United States would have the capacity to deny our retaliation.

[Pozner] Here, wait a minute. You're talking in contexts of missiles still existing in both countries. We're talking, or at least my question is, in the context of an agreement where after a 5-year period 50 percent of the missiles are cut, and then in a 10 year period there are no more missiles.

And my question to you is: Why do the Americans need SDI when there will be no more American missiles and no more Soviet missiles?

[Moloshenko] Well, you know...

[Pozner, interrupting] What is the idea there? I think there should be some idea.

[Moloshenko] I think--I have very strong suspicions that in this case, the Americans are not ready to have no missiles. They can imagine only a future with ballistic missiles.

[Pozner] Dr Bogdanov, can you agree with that, or do you think there is something else?

[Bogdanov] Yes, I do, I do agree with that, because you have so many conceptions of SDI in USA now. But they're, all of them, they're different, you know. All depends on in which quarters of the American society you are talking about. But basically, basically SDI is a very complex system which includes missiles in it with so-called defensive purposes. You know of them...

[Pozner, interrupting] It includes particle rays.

[Bogdanov] Particle rays.

[Pozner] Cannons, laser--whatever.

[Bogdanov] Whatever it is. And you know, in the present age, it's a very thin, you know, frontier between defensive and offensive.

[Pozner] So what you're saying is that they can be used offensively.

[Bogdanov] Exactly. They can be used offensively. And the other side is out of that suit, you know. We have none, and they have their defenses. So...

[Pozner, interrupting] They have no missiles and we have no missiles but they have SDI, which might be used.

[Bogdanov] Oh yes, exactly, that's my point. That's my point and that's our worry. That's our worry. Then, you know, there is another American argument, that in case they come to the conclusion that SDI is possible, will share and the President put that in many times.

[Pozner] That they would share the technology with us?

[Bogdanov] Yes. They'll share the technology with us. How we can believe the American side if they even don't share an oil technology with us, a very simple, you know, civil technology with us? They believe it is dangerous for the U.S. How can we trust them that at one stage or the other they will

share with us military technology? Unfortunately, it's not to be, you know, bought in the Soviet Union those kind of arguments, and the Americans should understand that.

[Pozner] In his statements, President Reagan said that SDI, and I quote him, is what brought the Soviets back to arms control talks in Geneva and Iceland. SDI is the key to a world without nuclear weapons. Is SDI what brought the Soviets back to the negotiations table?

[Bogdanov] You know, in this presidential address to the nation, you have a number of arguments, very old arguments used already in the American rhetorical campaign. And that one you have mentioned just now is one of them, that SDI brought the Soviet Union to the negotiation table. But let me cite just one very simple example. SDI was brought up by the U.S. President to the world's attention in March 1983. And we, you know, started our negotiation in December, just in December 1982. So I don't feel any link between all that, you know; and I'm afraid that they are just using, you know, uninformed--what we call uninformed--public opinion and just tried to present SDI as a tool of pressure on the Soviet Union.

[Pozner] Dr (Moloshenko)?

[Moloshenko] Well, I think that the underlying idea for these words of the American President is an American understanding of the political will. Obviously, you should have political will in order to negotiate and to have some kind [of] an agreement. And you know, it reminds me [of] a conversation with one American professor who said in America, political will is when you are forced to do something. Well, and unfortunately, it's very true when we are talking about this administration. Because, you know, we don't need this kind of pressure. We have very different understanding of political will, and I think that we demonstrated it very clearly, not only in Reykjavik, but also during negotiations in Geneva. And unfortunately the administration still regards arms control and disarmament as a problem which you should be forced to solve. And you are not going, you know, to any concessions just in order to have more security, just in order to take into account legitimate interests of the security of the other side.

[Pozner] Do you think the Americans consider our readiness to make concessions as a weakness?

[Bogdanov] I'm afraid, Vladimir, that you are unfortunately right that the nature of American politicians, you know, [is] to look at the concessions of the other side as a weakness, you know. That, if you like, is American political culture, and you have to take [it] into consideration. You may not agree with that, but that's the fact, that's our difficulty in our relations with the American side. You make concessions with a full heart and the other side reacts to that: Aha! It's a weakness. Let's pressurize them; they will make another concession.

[Pozner] Don't you think that that reflects one of the most basic differences between what Mikhail Gorbachev has called the new way of thinking and the old way of thinking?

[Bogdanov] Oh yes, that's one major component of the new way of thinking when you look at your concessions as an invitation to the other side to be more, you know, cooperative, more compromising, and you respond to the compromises of the other.

[Pozner] Don't you think that...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] Instead of, you know, looking at the other side as a target for pressure, for pressure trying to, you know, to get out of concessions by force.

[Pozner] Don't you think that the ability to propose a compromise and to make concessions is more of a reflection actually of strength rather than of weakness?

[Bogdanov] Oh yes, that's very, very interesting point of yours, and I would like to emphasize that point, that in the nuclear age, you know, what is the difference, qualitative difference? Your strength is not in number of missiles or warheads. Your strength is the ability to deal politically with that problem, you know. Not by force, but politically. And what is the politics? It's the art of compromises. You know, if you are a real great politician in the nuclear age, you should know the art of compromise, the art of cooperation.

[Moloshenko] I think that it's very important that right now we try very hard to translate the ideas about new political thinking into some very specific proposals, because, well, I would remind you just--Gorbachev at his conference, when he was saying, and I agree with him completely--that new everybody is tired of this arms control arithmetic, which is so difficult to comprehend, and only some experts can really understand what they are talking about. And it's necessary to make some dramatic breakthrough just to demonstrate your new way of thinking, not in adding some number of ceilings or subceilings of some very subtle ramification to the arms control treaties. I think that it's necessary to make dramatic breakthroughs.

[Pozner] Dr (Moloshenko), tell me, please, is SDI the way to a nuclear-free world, and if it isn't, what is?

[Moloshenko] No, I think that it's a way just to have nuclear weapons for many decades to come, because I tend to agree with the American President that you shouldn't gamble on your freedom and future. But SDI unfortunately isn't a way to protect and ensure the future. As one Englishman said, SDI could be translated as self-destruct, incorporated and on whose...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] You know, there's another danger in SDI. It's a source of another spiral of the arms race. You know, if the other side had a feeling or suspicions about the ominous designs of the American side, of course you will have to respond; we will not stay idle, you know, waiting until they cut your head. And there's only one way of responding, that's another spiral of the very dangerous, unpredictable arms race. That's our word.

[Pozner] All right, time to wind up, close, and I'd like to ask you both very briefly to give me your views on the following. Reykjavik did not produce agreement. As a matter of fact, it was disappointing to many. Are you pessimistic? Is it all over? Are we going to have no more relations with the United States until maybe there is a new administration? How should we look at the foreseeable future?

[Bogdanov] Vladimir, that's a very rare case when I do not agree with you. Reykjavik produced two very important agreements. They were not accepted by the American side because they couldn't accommodate us with our very simple, you know, requirement on SDI. But it's very, you know, sounds very optimistic because we have demonstrated to ourselves, first of all, and then to American and Soviet sides [as heard] that major agreements are possible. That's what makes me very optimistic.

[Moloshenko] Yes, I would say it's not the end; it's the beginning, maybe of the very long road, but still it's the beginning, it's an opening. And it showed that the problems of arms control and disarmament are not technological, but political, and it's necessary to have political will to solve them.

[Pozner] Thank you, Dr (Moloshenko); thank you, Dr Bogdanov. Vladimir Pozner saying goodbye to our listeners of Top Priority. We'll be back a week from today at the same time.

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CSO: 5200/1076

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: SOVIET 'EXPERTS' ASSESS REYKJAVIK TALKS

LD161549 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 16 Oct 86

[Excerpt] [Announcer] Next you'll hear the view of Soviet experts on the Reykjavik summit. Director of the Moscow-based Institute for United States and Canada Studies, Georgiy Arbatov, was in Reykjavik with a Soviet team of experts. Here's what he told a Radio Moscow correspondent.

[Arbatov] Well, you know I think that actually more often than not, politicians do something when they simply have no ways to avert, especially if they have to do something which they initially didn't like. And therefore, I as a student of the United States, I am not speaking on behalf of Mr Gorbachev, but this present government will do something good only in case it will be impossible for them to go on with that policy. And this is a moment of truth.

I think it was very important in this sense what happened in Reykjavik because from now on I think a lot of fig leaves have been shed and a lot of things are absolutely American in all their ugliness. What are the Americans really up to? How do they care even about the security of their own people and survival, about security, and survival of their allies, about all this, because now they have to put out, they have to deliver. And this, you know, nonsense, this is nice, absolutely incoherent dream, about astrodomes, you know astrodome impenetrable shield, I think even Dr Teller doesn't believe in it any more.

The only one who believes is President Reagan. But if the whole nation cannot persuade the President that its security and avoidance of nuclear war is more important than his dream, which he won't be able to do anyway, you know, to fulfill, because he has only two years remaining in power. And he speaks now about the next 10 years.

[Announcer] And here's what Georgiy Arbatov said on the political meeting of the summit.

[Arbatov] I think this meeting was tremendously important. I think it was tremendously important. You know you cannot expect anything important to happen just in one move. It can be a result of political process only,

and this, I think, will come in history. And you know it will be a milestone in history of the struggle against nuclear threat. I think in this sense it made a lot of things clear. I think it will make people think and this is the most important thing now that the government and the people think really serious about the situation in which we are living.

[Announcer] That was Georgiy Arbatov, director of the Moscow-based Institute for United States and Canada Studies. Our reporter has also met with a military analyst Lev Semeyko, who said the following:

[Begin Semeyko recording in Russian fading into English translation] The Reykjavik meeting of the Soviet and American leaders will certainly remain an object of analysis by experts for a long time. What I'd like to say here is that it has proved amazing as far as results are concerned. On the one hand as it turned out, two days was enough to solve problems the two sides couldn't solve for years, including at the Geneva talks. The Soviet Union brought to Reykjavik a whole number of major proposals which, if accepted, might have led to progress in all the areas of work for disarmament and pave the way to a nuclear-free world. The Soviet Union suggested reducing strategic missiles by 50 percent, which is what the United States has pressed for. And also scrapping all the American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. This proposal takes into account the interests of the American side. We reached agreements on these matters and these might be signed during the coming meeting in Washington.

In short the Soviet Union and the United States were on the verge of adopting major historic decisions. On the other hand the meeting has shown that while the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to make concessions for the sake of a common goal, President Reagan failed to use the opportunity and make a move toward agreement. He refused to give up the idea of militarizing space.
[end recording]

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET GENERAL WARNS ARMS RACE MAY GO 'OUT OF CONTROL'

AU211522 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 20 Oct 86 p 4

[Report on Statement by Lieutenant General Professor Mikhail Milsteyn, doctor of historical sciences, "to a NOVOSTI correspondent" "specially for NARODNA ARMIYA": "Illusory Hopes"--date and place not given]

[Text] The U.S. Administration, as shown by the meeting in Reykjavik, is still unable to give up its dead-end and hopelessly outdated conceptions, first and foremost its aspirations for achieving military supremacy over the USSR, stated Lieutenant General Professor Milshteyn, doctor of historical sciences, an expert on military-political problems and scientific adviser to the Palme Commission, to a NOVOSTI correspondent.

The meeting in Iceland will go down in history as a meeting at which a unique historic chance was missed--to move toward the real reduction and, in the final event, the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is clear from all the signs that Reagan and those around him cannot break themselves away from their former dogmas and stereotypes--the illusory hopes of the United States of achieving military supremacy over the USSR.

The Soviet scientist pointed out that despite the Geneva accords of November 1985 concerning the fact that the two sides will not strive toward achieving military supremacy, the Pentagon is actually implementing in the form of the new nuclear systems the "first strike" concept and is preparing to open a new channel in the space arms race. It is precisely through the strategic defense initiative [SDI] that the U.S. leadership is counting on gaining military supremacy.

Mikhail Milshteyn drew attention to the fact that the U.S. leadership rejected in Reykjavik the Soviet proposal that no strike space weapons systems should be deployed and tested in space for a 10-year period, that the antimissile defense treaty should be strengthened, and that the strategic weapons of both sides should be eliminated during the next 10 years. There is no need to be a specialist in order to understand that if the strategic weapons are destroyed, there will be no further need to create a "space shield" above the destroyed nuclear missiles. This is clear. But the U.S.

side obstinately insists on developing space weapons. Why? one asks. SDI is essential to the Pentagon in order to give it the capacity of making the first nuclear strike. Apart from this, it should also be taken into account that due to new forms of weapons of mass destruction created within the SDI framework, outer space will become a source of global danger for mankind even more terrible than today's nuclear weapons.

The supporters of SDI are evidently consciously ignoring the warnings that the space weapons systems, irrespective of their physical properties, are destabilizing the military-political situation in the world and are accelerating the arms race to such a degree that it is likely to go out of control.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET GENERAL INSISTS ON TOTAL PACKAGE FOR ARMS DEAL

PM281519 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Oct 86 p 5

[Lars Christiansson report: "United States Must Accept the Package"]

[Text] Reductions in and the withdrawal of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe are linked with a U.S. agreement to confine SDI research and development to the laboratory. A separate agreement on medium-range nuclear arms is not possible.

This was the message of Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, who is responsible for disarmament questions in the Soviet General Staff, in a speech at Stockholm's Foreign Policy Institute yesterday. [paragraph continues]

Chervov made it clear that the Soviet position is that the proposals from the Reykjavik summit are still on the table at the disarmament talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva but that they are still linked with the demand that the United States yield on the question of SDI.

In the weeks since President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in the Icelandic capital various representatives of the Soviet Union have said different things on this subject. During a visit to London a few days ago disarmament negotiator Viktor Karpov gave the impression that there was a still a chance of a separate agreement on medium-range nuclear arms.

Chervov dismissed any such suggestion. He stressed that the key to success and an agreement on both strategic nuclear arms as well as medium-range arms is to be found in the ABM Treaty, which regulates the two superpower's right to build defense systems against the other side's strategic weapons.

Chervov took the view that at the summit Reagan, through his promise to "formally" bind himself to the ABM Treaty for a further 10 years, was hoping to continue to build his space defenses with the blessing of the Soviet Union at the same time as 50-percent reductions were made in strategic arms. Such a settlement, Chervov said, would simply lead to a situation in which Reagan would be creating a better start for SDI reliability.

"We cannot contribute to helping the United States by disarming ourselves. If it is given the right to carry out tests in space the ABM Treaty's significance will be reduced to that of a meaningless piece of paper," Chervov said.

The general claimed that strict observance of the ABM Treaty is the foundation of stability and that the Soviet Union will adopt countermeasures if the United States starts to deploy SDI in space. He was very vague about what these countermeasures would be, but said that one approach would be to "increase the Soviet Union's strategic offensive potential."

Chervov referred to the possibility of equipping the missiles carried on board submarines with an additional number of warheads. Today each missile has 10 warheads. Chervov talked of equipping every missile with 20 or 30 warheads in such a case.

He also said that the Soviet Union has been engaged in research "in various directions" which shows that there are other alternative responses to SDI. But, he said, the Soviet Union also has the economic, intellectual, and technological resources to cope with producing a system of the same type as SDI.

General Chervov's stance in Stockholm was in line with a commentary made public by TASS yesterday. The commentary said that the U.S. hints that the two superpowers might be able to reach an agreement on medium-range nuclear arms are baseless. The only possibility is for the United States to accept the "package" which Gorbachev put forward in Reykjavik. Various agreements could be prepared in the ongoing talks between the superpowers. But all these agreements must form part of the package for the Soviet Union to agree to a settlement.

Chervov also claimed that there is today approximate parity between the superpowers. He also thought that this parity extends to conventional forces in Europe.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: ARMY DAILY VIEWS OUTCOME OF REYKJAVIK SUMMIT

PM211405 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Oct 86 Second Edition p 3

[Observer A. Golts "Military-Political Review": "To Utilize a Historic Chance"]

[Text] On the eve of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik the British newspaper THE FINANCIAL TIMES analyzed the forecasts of its possible results. The newspaper singled out three groups of forecasts coming from optimists, skeptics, and "ophthalmologists." The "ophthalmologists" are what THE FINANCIAL TIMES ironically called representatives of extreme right-wing U.S. circles who, despising the very idea of the meeting, concentrated all attention on a distorted interpretation of the concept of national prestige and on the problem of "who will blink first." Now, without bothering to analyze what happened in the Icelandic capital, they are lavishing praise upon the American President for the "firmness" he displayed. "The President did not blink," one of that flock of "hawks" declared in all seriousness, as it were.

As for the skeptics and optimists, after Reykjavik both acquired new arguments to substantiate their position. As we know, the results of that meeting are ambiguous. On the one hand, tremendous work was done, and the Soviet and U.S. leaders got close to agreements on a decisive reduction in nuclear arms, right down to their elimination. But, on the other hand, that historic step was not taken.

Thanks to the press conference which M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, held in Reykjavik and his appearance on Soviet television, Soviet people and the whole world were granted an excellent opportunity to familiarize themselves in detail with how events developed at that meeting. We have something to be proud of here: The Soviet delegation placed on the negotiating table a most carefully elaborated package of major measures which, if adopted, would usher in a new epoch in the life of mankind--a nuclear-free epoch. As is known, the USSR has advocated a 50-percent reduction in strategic weapons on the ground, in the air, and on water during the first 5 years and their total elimination during the next 5 years. The total destruction of medium-range missiles in Europe has also been proposed.

The third question included in the Soviet package of proposals is linked very directly with problems of nuclear disarmament. It is the question of the 1972 ABM Treaty and also of a nuclear test ban. The logic here is obvious. By renouncing nuclear weapons the sides must resolutely rule out any possibility of undermining equality in the course of disarmament and rule out the possibility of creating [sozdaniye] weapons of a new type ensuring military superiority.

This was why the need was stated for strict observance of the ABM Treaty and for the adoption of a mutual pledge not to pull out of it over the 10 years during which the elimination of strategic nuclear arms will be completed. Taking into account how earnestly Washington has tied itself to the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative," which is known throughout the world as the "star wars" program, and displaying realism, the USSR did not ask the United States to cease work in that sphere. It merely considered it necessary that all research within the SDI framework not go outside laboratories.

Thus, displaying a sincere desire to reach accords, the Soviet Union made compromise proposals. They were based on the principles of equality and identical security and took into account the interests of both countries, their allies, and the peoples of all states.

Unfortunately, Washington was unable to display the necessary political realism in Reykjavik. The American President stubbornly declared that SDI is a defensive system, and the United States cannot abandon full-scale tests in the sphere of this program. But why then, one wonders, does Washington need deployed in space a defense against nuclear weapons if agreed accords on eliminating these weapons lay on the table in front of the President? Against whom or what do they intend to defend themselves in this case?

D. Regan, who is a key administration figure, tried to explain this question to journalists with the help of an example. After World War I, he pointed out, the use of toxins was prohibited. However, gas masks are kept at the disposal of the American Armed Forces. That was so as to be on the safe side. An opportunity to praise an official Washington spokesman for accuracy seldom presents itself. But I simply cannot refrain here. Mr Regan drew a surprisingly correct analogy. Just one observation is needed. The U.S. Army has gas masks not "to be on the safe side" but to conduct combat operations involving the use of chemical weapons. The United States possesses a very large arsenal of these weapons and intends to replenish it with binary chemical ammunition.

Like the gas masks, which are to ensure the effectiveness of American chemical attacks, the "star wars" program is to ensure U.S. impunity if Washington undertakes aggression. American strategists propose to deploy in near-earth space a multiechelon system consisting of space strike complexes. Moreover, to judge from American press articles, it is proposed to deploy on the majority of these complexes third-generation nuclear weapons which will be more destructive than those already in existence.

"Nuclear bombs for a space laser are the same energy source as an electrical wall socket," (Dzh.) Miller, one of the leaders of the program for creating [sozdaniye] space weapons, declares. And a large part of the tests on the Nevada range have been devoted to the purpose of developing [razrabotka] superpowerful lasers utilizing the energy of a nuclear explosion. According to the data of American public organizations, the explosion that has just been carried out (the 22d since the Soviet unilateral moratorium was introduced) also marked the next stage in the practical development [otrabotka] of space weapons.

The eminent American scientist R. Garwin believes that such weapons could be widely used in the course of combat operations to destroy not only missiles but also, for example, enemy aircraft. And in the opinion of a number of Belgian physicists, if space weapons with directed energy are created [sozdat], they will prove capable of destroying even entire cities.

Now let us ponder on what would happen if the USSR agreed, as Washington demands, to the continuation of full-scale tests within the SDI framework in the United States. According to the American position in Reykjavik, over the next 10 years they should not pull out of the ABM Treaty but during all that time conduct research and tests of a new weapons system, that is, prepare it in such a way as to begin deploying new arms the day after the 10-year period expires. In other words, the elimination of nuclear weapons would proceed simultaneously with the creation [sozdaniye] of new space means comparable with nuclear weapons or even surpassing them. A new channel of the arms race would be opened up, but this time based on different technology.

"The idea was dished up," USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze emphasized at a press conference in Bucharest, "that we should not disarm but be disarmed, while they replace one type of arms with another and thereby leave us defenseless in the sights of laser devices and electromagnetic guns."

The desire for military superiority over the USSR is closely linked also with U.S. imperial ambitions with regard to other countries. It is, in point of fact, a question of establishing a military-space vassalage over sovereign states. And these plans are being realized with regard to its allies in Washington's decision to unite them with SDI's help in a single trans-continental superbloc. This is why, in addition to NATO countries, Japan and Israel are being involved in the "star wars" program.

Washington's attachment to SDI and the "star wars" programs has once again demonstrated to the whole world that what the U.S. Administration has in mind is the same as the American military-industrial complex. It is significant that the idea of the "star wars" program was put to the administration as soon as the greater part of the orders for various kinds of weapons whose deployment was proposed within the framework of the notorious program for the "rearmament of America" had been placed. Reagan had come to the White House with that program. Having calculated the possible profits, the bosses of the military-industrial complex at once concerned themselves with the long term: It was "vitally important" for them to ensure for themselves the guaranteed possibility of making profits even when the program for the modernization of the American Armed Forces had been completed. And SDI provided that possibility.

In the opinion of the West German magazine DER SPIEGEL, SDI enables the major military corporations, such as General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed, Boeing, and others, to make profits for three decades. And what profits! Former U.S. Defense Secretary Brown believes that the cost of SDI will run to figures with 12 (!) zeroes. And his forecast is considered rather modest.

The military-industrial complex fully determines Washington's general foreign policy course. It was no coincidence that, as has now become known, before his trip to Reykjavik Reagan received a letter containing a recommendation to begin implementing SDI immediately, without waiting even for the results of research. The letter was signed by those whom the WASHINGTON POST called "a clan of SDI supporters in the form of weapons manufacturers, members of Congress, and military figures." And the President proved incapable of resisting the pressure from that sinister clan. Washington is now trying to put a brave face on a more than bad business. Speculating on the peoples' desire for peace, it is seeking to prove that everything positive done in Reykjavik was thanks to the United States and that they have only to "haggle" a bit more and the USSR will agree to SDI and, thus, to U.S. military superiority too.

But it is in vain that Washington is reckoning on making a technological breakthrough with SDI's help "haggling," forging ahead and upsetting the the military-strategic parity in its favor. The Soviet Union will find a worthy response to the threat from space. The attempts to exhaust the Soviet Union economically with the help of the "star wars" program are also doomed to failure.

At the same time, the implementation of the "star wars" program could entail very serious consequences for all mankind.

In Reykjavik the U.S. Administration sacrificed the security of millions to the interests of a narrow handful of representatives of the military-industrial complex. But does this mean that the meeting produced no positive results? Of course not.

The Soviet-American summit talks created a qualitatively new situation and prepared a possible step forward, toward a real change for the better, if the United States switches finally to realistic positions and abandons chimeras in its assessments. This is recognized by all people of good will.

As was pointed out at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo session which analyzed the results of the meeting everything must be done to utilize a historic chance for the cardinal resolution of the problems of war and peace.

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CSO: 5200/1076

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: U.S. OFFICIALS' VOLTE-FACE ON REYKJAVIK NOTED

PM230825 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 18 Oct 86 p 3

[Political observer Sergey Losev "Review of Events": "After the Reykjavik Meeting"]

[Excerpts] "Reagan Must Justify Himself to Public Opinion"--this headline in the influential French bourgeois newspaper LE MONDE describes extremely accurately the situation prevailing in the world after the Reykjavik meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the U.S. President.

The Soviet side's stance at that meeting was honest and open. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo noted that it was based on the principles of equality and observance of equal security, took into account the interests of both sides, their allies, and the peoples of all states, and was a specific expression of the new approach and new thinking, the need for which is dictated by the realities of the nuclear missile age.

The USSR's new compromise proposals created a possibility for accord on such most important questions as a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons during the first 5 years, followed by their total elimination by the end of this century. The Soviet initiative on medium-range missiles created an opportunity for agreement on the complete destruction of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and a sharp reduction of these missiles in Asia down to 100 charges [boyezaryad] for the USSR in the East and a corresponding number for the Americans on U.S. territory.

It is natural that, by blocking the existing channels of the arms race, the Soviet Union is striving, for the sake of ensuring its own national security and international security as a whole, to prevent without fail the opening up of even more dangerous avenues of the arms race--in space. This is why the radical Soviet proposals on the liquidation of strategic offensive weapons and the destruction of medium-range missiles in Europe were submitted as an indissoluble interconnected whole, "in a single package" as the saying goes, with the proposal which virtually [fakticheski] rules out--at least over the next 10 years--the creation [sozdaniye] of strike space weapons and the extension of the arms race to space with all the dangerous

consequences stemming from this. As M.S. Gorbachev stressed at the press conference in the Icelandic capital, "...the problem stemming from the fact that we are embarking on the practical liquidation of nuclear weapons is this: Each side must have guarantees that during this period neither one of them would start pursuing military superiority... I think that this is perfectly understandable to a politician, a military man, and an ordinary person plain and simple--once we sign such major accords, it is necessary to ensure that nothing happens to wreck this difficult process in whose direction we have been moving for decades... The U.S. side has been intriguing against the ABM [Treaty] for a long time now. It had already called SALT II into question, and was now wanting to organize the funeral of the ABM [Treaty] in Reykjavik and moreover, with the participation of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev. This will not come to pass."

The SDI program will require an expenditure of approximately 2 trillion dollars, and it is by no means an accident that colossal profits have been promised to military-industrial corporations by the Reagan Administration, whose key figures have been closely linked throughout their careers with aerospace, missile, and electronic concerns on the West Coast.

At the same time, the U.S. ruling circles would like to exhaust the Soviet Union economically and inveigle it into a race in costly space weapons in order to thwart our plans for the acceleration of socioeconomic development and improvement of the Soviet people's life.

The phrase "Whoever dominates in space will also dominate on Earth," which has become the slogan of the U.S. military-industrial complex, was coined way back at the dawn of the space age not by some irresponsible politician but by a U.S. president. And so, for the sake of implementing these insane plans and in pursuit of unattainable military superiority, the White House neoglobalists thwarted in Reykjavik the achievement of an historic accord which was only a handshake away. R. Reagan rejected the considered Soviet proposals not to extend the SDI program beyond the framework of laboratory research, and consequently not to conduct tests or deploy strike space weapons. The U.S. President turned down the text of an accord, proposed by M.S. Gorbachev, under which "the USSR and the United States would pledge, over a 10-year period, not to take advantage of their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty of unlimited duration, and to rigorously observe all its provisions throughout this period. Tests of all space-based elements of ABM defense in space are banned, apart from research and tests carried out in laboratories.

"During the first 5 years of this 10-year period (up to and including 1991), the sides' strategic offensive weapons will be reduced by 50 percent.

"During the next 5 years of this period, the sides' remaining 50 percent of strategic offensive weapons will be reduced.

"Thus, by the start of 1996, strategic offensive weapons in the USSR and the United States will be completely liquidated."

Speaking (this time after the Reykjavik meeting) at the U.S. Air Force Base in Keflavik (Iceland), the U.S. President declared: "The Soviet Union insisted that we sign an accord which would deprive me and future presidents over a 10-year period of the right to develop [razrabatyvat], test, and deploy the SDI system. We could not and will not do this."

The United States is continuing the tests program for the further improvement of nuclear warheads and the development [razrabotka] of weapons for "star wars."

The U.S. Department of Energy confirmed that yet another underground nuclear explosion was conducted at the Nevada testing range 16 October, the 22d test conducted by the Pentagon since the Soviet Union introduced the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests.

The world has already unconditionally condemned the pernicious stance of the U.S. Administration. "In West Europe," former U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger noted, "the outcome of the meeting is perceived as a disaster, because the West Europeans were told that it is possible to withdraw from the continent all medium-range nuclear facilities threatening West Europe. But this failed through the Americans' stubbornness on SDI which, one way or another, is disliked by the majority of Europeans."

Finding themselves under fire of fierce criticism, the U.S. ruling circles are now conducting sophisticated maneuvers. Within just the one day immediately following the conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik, the pessimistic assessments of its results were changed beyond recognition by administration spokesmen. Now they are being described as "an important step forward" along the path of peace, while the President himself has even launched the term "the spirit of Reykjavik." But the peoples now expect not such propaganda tricks but real steps aimed at averting the nuclear threat from mankind.

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CSO: 5200/1076

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITORIAL ON SUMMIT RESULTS

PM291517 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Oct 86 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "In the Interests of All Mankind"]

[Text] The results of the Soviet-American summit meeting held this month in the Icelandic capital are at the center of the attention of the world's peoples. The Reykjavik meeting was an important event in international life, in the struggle against the arms race, for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, and for the removal of the threat of war from the whole world.

But, at the same time, the days that have passed since the Reykjavik meeting have once again vividly spotlighted the antipopular stance of those Western circles which are closely linked with militarism and with profits from the arms race. These circles are trying to quench the desire of the world's progressive public for peace and to prevent governments from taking a clear stand at this decisive historical moment. A new regrouping of forces has begun in the camp of opponents of detente and disarmament, and feverish efforts are being made to line up obstacles to bog down the process begun in Reykjavik.

After Reykjavik what was previously carefully disguised is becoming clearer: there are powerful forces in American and West European circles which are seeking to wreck the process of nuclear disarmament, and some people have again begun maintaining that nuclear weapons are almost a blessing. It is precisely their fault, the fault of those who are trying to put spokes in the wheels of historical progress, that a nuclear threat hangs over the world today and that the danger of an outbreak of war is increasing. This is a result of the buildup of militarist preparations and adventurist actions by the United States and NATO, which refuse to embark on the path of curbing the arms race, preventing its spread into space, and ending nuclear tests. This is why the CPSU Central Committee slogan for the 69th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution sounds so topical today:

"Peoples of all countries! Resolutely oppose the buildup of lethal arms and advocate the ending of nuclear tests and the total elimination of nuclear weapons!

"Let us not permit the militarization of space!"

The Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries counter the imperialist powers' policy of aggression and dictate with a policy of peace and friendship among peoples. The first decree of the victorious Great October Socialist Revolution was the Decree on Peace. All history since October convincingly confirms that precisely socialism was and still is the staunchest defender of healthy principles in international relations, the strongest bastion of peace, and its most reliable guard. The 27th CPSU Congress advanced a program for the creation of an all-embracing system of international security.

The Soviet side's position at the Reykjavik meeting was honest and open. It was based on the principles of equality and identical security, took into account the interests of both countries, their allies, and the peoples of all states, and was a concrete expression of the new approach and the new thinking, the need for which is dictated by the realities of the nuclear missile age. In Reykjavik the Soviet Union made constructive proposals, the most radical proposals in the entire history of Soviet-American talks, for reducing arms. Far-reaching and interconnected, they comprise an integral package and are based on the Soviet program announced 15 January for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

The constructive Soviet position in Reykjavik was unanimously supported by the fraternal socialist community countries. All the world's peace-loving peoples enthusiastically greeted the large-scale and far-reaching Soviet proposals, whose implementation would make it possible to begin moving toward a nuclear-free world. The words of the CPSU Central Committee slogan sound like a reflection of the innermost aspirations and hopes of all who strive for lasting peace on earth:

"Long live the Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union--the policy of peace and security of the peoples and of broad international cooperation!"

At the Reykjavik meeting the consensus that had practically been reached on very important questions of the peoples' security was not, however, embodied in accords binding on the sides. The only reason for this was the U.S. Administration's stubborn reluctance to create conditions for realizing those accords by strengthening the ABM regime and adopting corresponding pledges identical for both sides. The U.S. leadership's dependence on the country's military-industrial complex and on monopoly groups, which have turned the race for nuclear and other arms into a business, into a means of making profits, and into the purpose of their existence and the reason for their activity, told.

But those who believe that the Soviet Union will sooner or later resign itself to the attempts to revive American strategic diktat and will agree to the limitation only of Soviet arms and to the reduction only of Soviet arms are seriously mistaken. It is in vain that people on the other side of

the ocean are reckoning on exhausting the Soviet Union economically through the race for the latest and costliest space arms. The Soviet Union is strong today because of its cohesion, the people's political activeness, and its dynamism. "The Soviet Union," M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, pointed out, "has the wherewithal to respond to any challenge, if necessary. The Soviet people know this, and this must be known throughout the world. But we do not want to play at power games. That is an extremely dangerous occupation in the nuclear missile age."

While pursuing a peace-loving policy, at the same time the USSR cannot forget that the perfidy of the forces of reaction and militarism obliges it to display unremitting vigilance. While the danger exists that imperialism might unleash wars and military conflicts and until imperialism renounces its desire to upset the established equilibrium of forces and to secure military superiority, the CPSU and the Soviet state are taking proper measures to ensure the security of the USSR and of its allies and friends. The Soviet Armed Forces play a tremendous role in this. Side by side with the servicemen of the other Warsaw Pact states' armies, Soviet servicemen are firmly standing guard over their peoples' revolutionary gains.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: 'NUCLEAR, SPACE MILITARISTS' PREVENTED SUMMIT ACCORD

PM211417 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Oct 86 First Edition p 3

[Ernst Genri commentary: "Who Is Answerable?"]

[Text] Who is to blame for the fact that a unique, historic opportunity to put an end to the threat of a terrible war and at last get down to building lasting peace on earth was not taken at the meeting in Reykjavik? This question is now being asked not only by ordinary people the world over, people wondering whether they and their families will survive the eighties. It will also certainly be asked by people of the 21st century, if they live that long.

Sooner or later no one will be able to evade an answer or run away from the truth, whoever he is, whatever his nationality, whatever post he may hold. You cannot cast off your responsibility. In one way or another history will pass its own judgement, such as it has never done before. Who has disappointed mankind's expectations?

Those politicians across the ocean who decided at the critical moment that it was worth trying to be devious, worth trying to force the other side to double and treble the concessions it had made as a compromise? They obviously believe that this will help their reputation, that this kind of gamble must be taken precisely at a time when everyone around them is extremely worried and when an unprecedented abyss threatens to open up before people the world over.

Such politicians, who are playing with the destiny of billions of people, including the destiny of their own compatriots in the capitalist world in the eighties, undoubtedly exist. But do they alone really decide everything? Their careers depend on those who really rule their country and control its ruling parties. What will these parties answer in the future?

"We know," M.S. Gorbachev said in his speech on Soviet television on 14 October this year, while discussing the United States, "how changeable the domestic political weather is in that country and how powerful and influential the opponents of peace across the ocean really are. This is no news and no surprise to us." He also said: "The Soviet Union has the means to respond to any challenge if necessary. Soviet people know this and the whole world must know this. But we have no wish to play at games of strength." One would think this warning has been heard across the ocean.

Or is it in actual fact mainly a question of the military-industrial complex? Of several dozen gigantic firms which have never before in their entire history grown so rich so quickly?

Of those who are not interested as to how the world will look in the very first minutes of a nuclear war but only have thoughts for how many times their share rates will go up if the arms race continues and how much their next annual dividend will be? Of those who are simply incapable of seeing that in the event of a nuclear war there would no longer be any shares or dividends and that death would reign supreme?

Or, finally, does the responsibility rest with those people in the United States who for almost 7 decades have tried to orient all State Department policy and all Pentagon plans toward their one main aim--anticommunism?

Is it possible to believe that today's militarists across the ocean are now playing the same role in the Western world as that played at the beginning of the century by the criminal German military which aspired to seize the whole of Europe and then the entire world? The same military which unleashed World War I?

But surely today's American generals remember what happened to Hitler's generals when they decided to attack the Soviet Union? The Nazi militarists, who also believed themselves to be invincible, brilliant strategists, are not likely to ever forget what happened with their Blitzkrieg. Could not something similar happen to the United States--the FRG's senior NATO ally--which obviously also fails to understand a very simple fact: It is not superaggressive military plans but peoples' strength that will ultimately move history.

Who is to blame for what happened and what did not happen in Reykjavik? One thing is clear. It was not the American people who had the final say those 2 days. What is more, it is no secret that even the best minds in the American bourgeoisie are now decisively in favor of protracted, lasting, secure peace rather than monstrous military adventures. More than 10 years ago the formidable American Army suffered a serious defeat when it invaded Vietnamese territory and came up against ordinary people who had just broken free of colonial bondage. Do the Pentagon thinkers really believe that winning "star wars" will be any easier?

No, these thinkers cannot be called far-sighted strategists. It is more than likely that all these nuclear and space imperialists will one day penitently curse themselves for their really terrible mistakes. It is they who are to blame for what was not achieved in Reykjavik.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW COMMENTATOR ON POST-REYKJAVIK 'CONFUSION' IN BONN

LD050806 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1830 GMT 4 Nov 86

[Text] The West German magazine STERN has concluded that since Reykjavik, where serious debates on the idea of liberating the world from nuclear weapons took place, confusion has been reigning in Bonn. The Kohl government, the magazine writes, has perceived a danger in the plans to liquidate medium-range missiles. Here is a commentary by Viktor Levin:

The conclusion reached by the STERN magazine is being echoed in the pages of other newspapers and weeklies, and it is being discussed on radio and television. The confusion is obvious. But why, much of the mass media in the FRG is reasonably asking, does the government -- which has more than once proclaimed that the task is to ensure peace with as few weapons as possible and has said that the deployment of U.S. missiles on the country's territory is a move apparently forced upon it as a result of the emergence of the Soviet SS-20 missiles -- now, when the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to remove all its missiles together with other moves toward a sharp reduction in the threat of a nuclear war -- try to convince one that the FRG is doomed to destruction without American missiles?

Yes, evidently the two ends of Bonn's official propaganda do not meet. Why should we believe? Many of those who quite recently were repeating the government's platitudinous policy, are now asking. It is the truth that should be believed. The crux of the matter is that the deployment of the American first-strike nuclear missiles in Western Europe was in fact not a response, but a challenge.

It is well known that the plans to deploy Pershing-2's and cruise missiles in West Europe were worked out at the NATO headquarters long before the appearance of the Soviet SS-20S. That is why it is perfectly logical that now, when the Soviet Union has proposed the scrapping of all medium-range missiles together with other measures to limit nuclear armaments, they are becoming alarmed in the NATO countries -- alarmed because they are obviously not ready for a basic solution to the issues. At Reykjavik, the Soviet Union made very substantial concessions in order to open up a real path to understanding. We declined to take account of the British and French nuclear forces; we are prepared to freeze missiles with a range of up to 1,000 km and start talks immediately on their future. Our position clearly points to a sincere desire to immediately begin the process of limitation nuclear armaments, and if new demands are now being put forward it turns out that Bonn, ignoring the interests of national policy, is blindly following Washington's course, the realism of which is greatly in doubt.

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IZVESTIYA EDITOR YEFIMOV WRITES ON REYKJAVIK

PM051129 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Nov 86 p 3

[IZVESTIYA First Deputy Chief Editor Nikolay Yefimov "Focus" article: "The Soviet Union Wanted To Abolish All Nuclear Arms"]

[Text] In a 19 October editorial after the meeting in Reykjavik SVENSKA DAGBLADET wrote that "both sides are uncertain about what was said when the great men met."

"The first reaction," the newspaper continued, "after the final meeting was that the summit was a dangerous fiasco." Yes, that was the assessment that Secretary of State George Shultz made of the meeting at a briefing in Reykjavik.

But this is hardly true of "the other side." I was present myself at the press conference Mikhail Gorbachev gave about an hour after the end of the meeting. He made what was essentially a different assessment that did not bear the stamp of panic and described the meetings as interesting, important, and promising.

"I think that it is true that what happened in Reykjavik -- despite the fact that we ended our meeting without reaching agreement on questions where we had, it seemed, found lines of progress -- is regrettable and a disappointment, but I would nevertheless not describe the meeting as fruitless. On the contrary, it was yet another step on the ladder in the complicated and difficult dialogue in the search for solutions. It is after all the case that we are looking for difficult solutions to difficult questions."

Surely this does not sound like "a dangerous fiasco."

Since Reykjavik Mikhail Gorbachev has twice spoken on Soviet television, and no matter how carefully you analyze what he said it is impossible to find even a hint of deviation from the assessment he made at the press conference in Reykjavik.

The abrupt reverses that there have been on the U.S. side are a different matter. The press in the United States has reported in detail how on the aircraft leaving Reykjavik Ronald Reagan and his closest advisers were already deciding to do a turnabout in the interpretation of the meeting. As if by a miracle it was transformed from a "fiasco" to a "success."

But this does not make it correct to assert that "both sides" have revised their initial assessments. The Soviet side has had no reason it change its assessment. As far as the U.S. side is concerned, it must speak for itself -- but it seems to be unable to do so: One person says one thing, another another, and a third something else.

When SVENSKA DAGBLADET's editorial writers assert that "nor is Moscow showing a united front," I have to disappoint them, or perhaps, on the contrary, make them happy. I dare to assert that "the front is united"! The CPSU Central Committee Politburo has approved the work of the Soviet delegation in Reykjavik and the new compromise proposals which it put forward and which made it possible to reach an understanding on important questions such as reductions in and later the total abolition of offensive strategic arms and the abolition of the medium-range missiles in Europe.

The Politburo also stressed: "It would be a disastrous step to miss the historic chance of a cardinal solution to the problems of war and peace."

The idea that the two state leaders in an almost improvisatory way -- "without any experts" -- tried to solve their own countries' as well as their allies' security problems, that they were tempted to "take bold initiatives" as if they were playing some kind of poker, seems to me to be far from the truth.

I cannot say anything about the Americans, but the expert working group was led on the Soviet side by Chief of General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev, who for 1 hour and 20 minutes discussed what was and what was not acceptable with the U.S. experts before a compromise solution was reached. There can be no doubt that in his capacity as chief of General Staff he is competent and that his recommendations were well founded.

Meetings and negotiations at this level are also of course preceded by careful "home preparation," by repeated analyses of the two sides' interests and possibilities, and by a determination of the limits for compromise. Here too I am unable to say how the U.S. delegation prepared itself.

But as far as the Soviet side is concerned, it prepared itself responsibly, seriously, and thoroughly.

It is ridiculous to believe that the Soviet side put forward its significant proposals without giving them thorough consideration in advance, that the experts did not understand or did not have time to analyze what was happening. The proposals were not something improvised during the face-to-face talks between the two leaders. The Soviet leadership had made careful preparations in which, in addition to the Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat, the Foreign and Defense Ministries, many other ministries, researchers, military experts, and specialists from various branches of industry were involved.

In addition wide-ranging discussions had taken place with the leaders of the socialist countries. It should also be said that the Soviet side, when it went through its "package" prior to Reykjavik, took as its point of departure the comprehensive program for the total abolition of nuclear arms before the year 2000 which Mikhail Gorbachev put forward as long ago as 15 January. At that time some people thought that this -- the total abolition of nuclear arms -- was a dream, a utopia.

The Reykjavik meeting showed that this program was realistic and feasible. This is undoubtedly one of the pluses of the meeting.

When I sometimes encounter assertions in the West European press which give a distorted picture of reality I try to understand where all this comes from. Is it due to an exaggerated trust in U.S. information sources? Or to an uncritical attitude to them?

Disinformation about Libya -- where the United States was, as it were, caught red-handed -- does not seem to have worried many people. What President Reagan's closest staff do with Reykjavik after Reykjavik and what is taken up in the U.S. right-wing press should worry everyone.

It is amazing that the understanding the two sides reached in Iceland -- the agreement to abolish all offensive strategic arms and to abolish all medium-range missiles in Europe -- is now being distorted in such a way that people are now, as it were, denying the level of agreement that was reached. It is as if these questions had not even been discussed in Reykjavik, as if no understanding on them had been expressed.

This applies of course to both sides' agreement to bring about a radical solution to the problem of strategic arms, that is, to abolish not only ballistic missiles but also other types of dangerous weapons. "Okay, if that is what you want!" President Reagan said. Was there something he did not take in, did he not understand everything?

Do not think that he did not take in and understand everything! He did not give his support to something "in general," he gave his support to a concrete, clear proposal -- that before 1996 the superpowers should abolish all nuclear explosive devices, including bomber aircraft, all battlefield weapons, cruise missiles, submarine-based arms, and medium-range weapons.

He said to Mikhail Gorbachev: "If we are agreed that by the end of the 10-year period we will abolish all nuclear arms, we can give this agreement to our delegations in Geneva for them to work out a treaty which you can sign on your visit to the United States." What is unclear and incomprehensible about that?

It is astonishing that the world without nuclear arms whose contours began to emerge in Reykjavik has frightened influential circles in a number of countries, especially the United States. Suddenly we have seen attempts being made to halt the progress begun in Reykjavik, to play down the level of agreement reached, "reinterpret" the words your own side used, draw a line under what was said, and write in things that were not said at all.

To cap it all, people are introducing in retrospect conditions which, as a Russian proverb puts it, are beyond the pale. Presidential adviser Admiral Poindexter has demanded neither more nor less than that Washington, before it agrees to nuclear disarmament, "must see changes in the political climate in the Soviet Union."

This is yet another reinterpretation of the Reykjavik meeting -- a reinterpretation which smells old and stale. Another Presidential adviser, Richard Pipes, presented the Soviet Union with a "choice" 5 years ago: either voluntary changes to everything Soviet in the direction of the American way of life or World War III.

The Soviet delegation came to Reykjavik with the most radical proposals for reductions in and the abolition of armaments in the whole history of Soviet-U.S. negotiations. Our position is clear and unambiguous. It is our deepest conviction that it accords with the Soviet people's interests.

Here I can see as my point of departure, for example, the 2,000 letters from readers which IZVESTIYA receives every day. It is difficult to imagine that these interests conflict totally with the interests of other peoples. We do not intend to alter our position.

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CSO: 5200/1076

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PORTUGUESE EXPRESS SURPRISE AT RESULTS OF REYKJAVIK SUMMIT

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 14 Oct 86 p 6

[Editorial: "The Final Disagreement"]

[Text] Two days of talks between Reagan and Gorbachev, during which disarmament agreements of "historic importance" were reportedly within sight, have ended as a colossal flop that may jeopardize the already slow-moving Geneva talks for a few more months. And all, if we are to believe the two leaders, because of Star Wars.

That explanation is somewhat surprising to anyone who remembers the more or less unshakable stands that both sides have always taken on that notorious bone of contention. Was Reagan really convinced that the Soviets would yield to that extent? And did Gorbachev suppose that the Americans would not go beyond the research stage with a project that the U.S. President has backed so fully? Strange as it may seem, there is reason to think that while neither man was expecting complete success, they both went to Reykjavik with some degree of optimism.

The Soviet leader did not have much to lose. On the contrary, the potential agreements that actually could have been expected would have been of tremendous help to his foreign and domestic policy. For one thing, a 50-percent reduction in long-range missiles would have brought significant relief to an economy like the Soviet Union's, which is faced with serious difficulties. For another, the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, even though accompanied by a significant neutralization of warheads in Asia, would have been a defeat for Reagan and a number of European leaders who were insisting on nuclear deployment in Europe, besides dealing a hard blow to the unity of the Atlantic Alliance. Despite that, Gorbachev regarded as inadequate the moratorium being proposed by Reagan with respect to the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the outcome of the negotiations was compromised as a result. The fact is that no matter how important the announced steps were, the most crucial was yet to come. The Soviets are aware of their indisputable superiority in conventional weapons, not to mention the degree of social and political cohesion existing in the Eastern bloc. They also know that only a project like Star Wars can reverse that situation.

Hence the great skillfulness they showed at the summit meeting by yielding on secondary issues while being intransigent on essentials.

For his part, Reagan seems to need a success like the one expected in Reykjavik in order to transform what has so far been only an attitude toward the Soviets into a concrete result that would be seen as marking decisive progress on the road to peace. The fact is that the shift in foreign policy that occurred after he arrived in the White House is in danger of not producing any outstanding changes by the time he ends his second term. Until recently, the philosophy characterizing that policy was that besides being consistent in its positions, the West, and the United States in particular, would have to demonstrate not only firmness in countering the opponent anywhere on the globe but also the consequent military capability. It was that principle which dictated the deployment of missiles in Europe and the current policy on Afghanistan and Nicaragua. For a time, success seemed to be in sight.

The Soviets were compelled to return to the negotiating table after announcing that they were leaving it and would not return until the Pershing missiles had left European territory. Despite disagreements over details, the chief allies backed the attitude adopted toward the Kremlin, thus strengthening NATO's structures. Compelled by the economic crisis, the USSR eventually seemed interested in reducing armaments, if only to the extent of introducing into the system the modifications planned by Gorbachev's government. But the failures have not seemed minor. Nicaragua continues to be a thorny problem for the White House and a source of permanent friction with Congress, and the same could be said of South Africa. The crusade against al-Qadhdhafi is threatening to turn against its promoter following the scandal of the "disinformation plan" recently revealed by the press. And above all, the very arguments used to justify the policy in question, based entirely on the defense of freedoms and assertion of the superiority of the free-enterprise system, are beginning to sag at unforeseeable levels, with the result that it seemed to play only a secondary role at Reykjavik. And it certainly was far from dictating sine qua non conditions for the progress of dialogue. This was so true that shortly before Reagan left for the summit meeting, Republican leaders were issuing various statements to the press suggesting that there was a danger of a return to the theses of detente which had prevailed under the Carter administration.

In those conditions, the success of the summit meeting may indeed have been desired by both parties, but the chances for such success remained no less problematical. Reagan may have overestimated the opponent's interest in obtaining an agreement and gambled everything in an effort to show a result at the end of his term that would no doubt be remarkable. His interest in doing so would be all the greater in view of the interim elections next 4 November that will determine the position of the Republicans in Congress. And Gorbachev, although aware of the restrictions that the U.S. President was bringing to the negotiating table--as he himself confessed at the end--was losing nothing by making one more attempt to achieve his chief strategic objective: to delay or abolish the Strategic Defense Initiative. His great advantage is that he is negotiating with a President who will be in office for

only 2 more years and whose image and leadership ability have recently suffered serious erosion. It is not by chance that the one who immediately mentioned the need for a new summit meeting was Gorbachev, whereas the most total silence on that subject prevails on the American side.

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CSO: 5200/2424

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CANADA: VANCOUVER SUN EDITORIAL ON REYKJAVIK

Vancouver THE SUN in English 14 Oct 86 p B4

[Text] History was made at Reykjavik, but what the world does not yet know is whether the making of it was for good or ill.

Real nuclear disarmament was sacrificed for President Ronald Reagan's dream — more politely the word ought to be vision — of the strategic defence initiative, or Star Wars.

But no one had expected the superpowers to come so close to making that disarmament agreement. The objective in Iceland, so we thought, was only to help the process along and to pave the way for a full-scale summit meeting in Washington.

So has the process been helped? Yes, perhaps. At least there is real meat on the table for the professional negotiators once they return to work at Geneva, if they are not psyched out. And has the way been paved to the real summit? Perhaps not. There is no indication that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan want to meet again this year. Indeed it seems highly unlikely that they could.

Mr. Gorbachev went to Reykjavik with a much bolder plan than anyone in the West dreamed of. Partly because of its boldness it failed. The United States and the Soviet Union remain distrustful and suspicious of each other. On the Soviet side there is distrust and suspicion of the motivation for and ultimate outcome of Star Wars. On the U.S. side, as Mr. Reagan plainly conveyed, there is distrust and suspicion that the Soviets would cheat on their agreement.

In such a climate any agreement seems far away. And yet Mr. Gorbachev came to deal. Did Mr. Reagan?

Perhaps it must remain for the professional negotiators to do better than their leaders.

The opportunity for eliminating superpower nuclear weapons in Europe is too good to let slip away. For Europeans, despite a brave front by some of their leaders, it must be especially galling to see Mr. Reagan dealing away their security for a paper scheme that might or might not

knock out every missile fired at the United States. Star Wars is fantasy. The nuclear terror in Europe is all too real. Europeans are being asked to accept a tremendous vow of faith.

So is the rest of the world, for that matter. But having come so close, can the superpowers abandon the concept of arms control? That is what would happen if Star Wars were pursued at all costs, as Mr. Reagan may desire, or if the hawks ascend in Moscow.

The existing alternative to arms reduction is mutual assured destruction. Mr. Reagan envisions Star Wars as the insurance that would prevent the use of nuclear weapons. But if the weapons did not exist, what would be the point of Star Wars? And even if the insurance were desirable to prevent cheating, why does it have to be bought before the weapons are eliminated?

Surely arms control must remain the primary goal. That is why there must be hope that negotiations will continue and even achieve success of some sort at Geneva. The will must be found for it. Otherwise the world will have to hold its breath until 1989, when the next president moves into the White House.

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CSO: 5220/9

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S BEGLOV ON REYKJAVIK 'LESSON': 'TIME TO NEGOTIATE'

AU201520 East Berlin DER MORGEN in German 18-19 Oct 86 pp 1-2

[NOVOSTI commentator Spartak Beglov: "What Is the Development After Reykjavik?"]

[Text] Last Sunday afternoon, when the additional, fourth round of talks in Reykjavik was over and Mikhail Gorbachev bade farewell to the U.S. President, both politicians' faces told more than words. No agreement had been achieved.

Mikhail Gorbachev had come to Reykjavik with proposals, with which even the biggest problem of ending the arms race and of disarmament could have been solved. This historic chance has been wasted. And not through any fault of the Soviets! In order to facilitate the situation of the partners in the talk, the Soviet side had made concessions to the American side in all questions which were said to be a cause of particular concern for Washington and its allies.

In the interest of far-reaching agreements on strategic armaments, the Soviet precondition to include all nuclear arms that can reach the territory of the opposite side--American intermediate-range missiles and nuclear arms of forward based deployment--was renounced. The problem of the British and French nuclear arms was excluded in favor of the "zero solution" for intermediate-range missiles in Europe, which was proposed by the United States itself. In addition to that, the Soviet Union also made concessions to the opposite side on the question of intermediate-range missiles in the Asian part of the USSR and declared its readiness to limit their number to 100 warheads and to immediately make this the subject of special negotiations.

Regarding the missile defense treaty, the so-called ABM Treaty, it was proposed that, in accordance with this agreement, both the testing and deployment of space arms should be banned and the SDI research should be limited to the laboratory.

But it was precisely on this point that the American leadership was not able to stand the acid test. The American side insisted on the right to develop and test the SDI-arms not only in the laboratory but also in space.

One can conclude that the American side is above all interested in a carte blanche for work in the new armament sector, whereas the Soviet side would essentially weaken its deterrence potential by keeping to its obligations.

For years the Americans have blown out of proportion the "danger" emanating from Soviet intercontinental surface missiles. As long as these weapons exist, America cannot enjoy a good night's sleep, so to speak. Now the United States had the opportunity to eliminate these missiles through negotiations. But they say they need SDI more than having the Soviet missiles practically eliminated through negotiations. What logic! As Mikhail Gorbachev said at the press conferences in Reykjavik and on Soviet television, this is a case of a mania for military superiority on the part of the United States.

For the sake of truth, one must say: The USSR is concerned about the SDI program not because of its military aspects. Efficient countermeasures can be found for any arms. The reason is that one must not confront mankind with the fact of the development of a new generation of arms which, once out of control can destroy the basic foundations of the trust between the USSR and the United States and can risk the security of the entire world.

The Soviet Union is far from giving in to pessimism after Reykjavik. The chance has been wasted but the search will be continued. As earlier, we take the view that for the USSR, for the United States, and for all peoples it is time to negotiate. All people of the world must unite in the struggle to end the arms race. This is the lesson of Reykjavik.

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CSO: 5200/1076

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S BOVIN INTERVIEWED ON REYKJAVIK, SDI

LD051005 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 2110 GMT 4 Nov
86

[Interview with IZVESTIYA correspondent Aleksandr Bovin by correspondent Wolfgang Grosse; time and place not given; Bovin remarks in Russian with superimposed German translation -- recorded]

[Text] [Grosse] Aleksandr Bovin, Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals in Reykjavik have created a completely new situation in the struggle for nuclear disarmament. These proposals are now on the table of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva. How do you assess the position which the U.S. delegation has been adopting so far at the Geneva negotiations since the talks in Reykjavik? Are they not seeking, possibly, even to go back on the results which were achieved in Reykjavik?

[Bovin] You see, very little time has passed so far and, therefore, it is difficult to talk in detail about the American position in Geneva. It is not yet sufficiently clear. If I am to express my personal opinion, then I believe that the Americans will maneuver, that they will put the brakes on the agreements which we reached in Geneva [as heard]. They will [words indistinct] pretexts and excuses in order to curb the solution of the problems on which agreement was attained in Reykjavik. That is, in my view, particularly [words indistinct]. When Comrade Gorbachev spoke of new conditions, he meant that a new level of agreements was reached in Reykjavik, and now the experts want to carry on from where things ended in Reykjavik. That is our new situation. But, I repeat once more, I should like to be wrong -- one of the rare cases in which a journalist would like to be wrong. But, nonetheless, I believe that the Americans, I repeat, will put the brakes on that which was agreed in Reykjavik.

[Grosse] The American perseverance with President Reagan's so-called Strategic Defense Initiative prevented a result to the negotiations, a breakthrough, in Reykjavik. Is no compromise possible with SDI?

[Bovin] I would like to hope that a compromise is possible, for in the end, that which we proposed to the Americans is in no way the complete renunciation of SDI of which they sometimes write in America. There they say: Gorbachev wants to torpedo SDI. That is not wholly precise. We understand the importance which the Americans attach to this program. Therefore, our proposals have a different character. We put strict adherence to all stipulations of the treaty on the limitation of missile defense systems at the center of attention. Our main thesis ran: The duration of the validity of this treaty should be fixed at 10 years, so that no weapon can (?emerge) within 10 years. In these 10 years research work on this program is to be permitted, and tests are to be permitted, but only under laboratory conditions. That means: such systems may not be tested in space, as the Americans want.

Our position here is absolutely, precisely in accordance with Article 5 of the treaty.

It says there that it is forbidden to construct, test, or expand antimissile systems or their components on the sea, in the air, in space or in mobile form on earth. That is Article 5, and we have proposed that this be specified, in strict accordance with this article. But the Americans want to broaden the framework of the treaty, they want to break through this framework and test their weapons in outer space. The situation here [words indistinct] possibilities that the Americans will return to common sense and declare themselves in agreement with restricting research to laboratory work. There are bitter arguments on this in the United States. There are active political forces there which advocate it. We hope that it is not yet the evening of all days, as we say. We shall fight. We shall fight, supported by our friends and by the world public. We shall fight for it. One does not achieve anything without a struggle.

[Grosse] Do you believe that the West European countries can play a larger role than hitherto in the struggle for agreements?

[Bovin] Yes, definitely, definitely. The wave of neoconservatism which has arisen not only in America, but also in Western Europe, is contributing to a certain degree to the fact that Europe is, in part, losing its own face. The tendencies of Atlanticism are fairly strong; the tendencies to hide behind the Americans are fairly strong; the tendencies to view the world through the eyes of the Americans are fairly strong. This is, of course, not absolute; it is relative. But, nonetheless, all this exists, although there are political forces, movements and parties in Western Europe, I am convinced, which advocate a more independent European policy, a more independent role for Europe in NATO, incidentally, as well, and in world policy generally.

Our position, Moscow's position -- and we have never made a secret of it -- consists in supporting Europe in this respect, in contributing toward Western Europe, and toward Europe as a whole, becoming a factor in world politics. No damage emerges from this, but it brings only benefits -- both for Europe and for us, and for the Americans. We want good relations with America and Western Europe.

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CSO: 5200/1076

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

GANDHI, HAWKE URGE CONTINUATION OF DIALOGUE

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 15 Oct 86 p 1

[Excerpts]

Canberra, Oct 14 (UNI, PTI)

India and Australia today agreed to launch a joint initiative to bring about nuclear disarmament and persuade the two super powers to continue their dialogue on arms control.

Speaking at the banquet hosted by Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke in honour of his visiting Indian counterpart Rajiv Gandhi, both the leaders expressed their deep dismay at the failure of the Reykjavik summit and urged the United States and the Soviet Union to explore the possibility of another summit to arrive at some kind of an agreement.

While Mr Gandhi called for an immediate global moratorium by all nuclear weapons states, Mr Hawke joined him in underlining the urgent need for creation of conditions conducive to 'meaningful' arms control.

Welcoming the support extended by Australia to the six-nation five-continent peace initiative, Mr Gandhi said technology had equipped man with awesome devices of destruction.

He called for an immediate global moratorium involving all nuclear weapon states, which the six nations were prepared to verify as non-partisan observers with the required technological skills and global reach. The unilateral Soviet moratorium, he said, was now more than a year old.

The others must follow suit. "We do not believe there are any significant technological gaps to be bridged".

Human passions, often expressive of perceptions of an earlier era, have yet to be conditioned to responsibilities imposed by technology, he said.

Mr Gandhi said that by a strange twist of logic, the powerful presumed that the use of nuclear weapons could be prevented by escalating their destructive power, stocking them in larger number, and deploying them eye to eye. This they called "deterrence".

Human survival, he said, was far too important to be left in the hands only of those who have the power to destroy the world "this may have a monopoly of power, but they do not have

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CSO: 5250/0004

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

INDIAN DEFENSE EXPERT QUESTIONS PURPOSE OF SDI

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 14 Oct 86 p 8

[Article by K. Subrahmanyam, director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi]

[Text]

THE Reagan-Gorbachov talks at Reykjavik have failed on account of the U.S. President's adamant refusal to restrict the space defence initiative (Star Wars) research to laboratories for the next ten years. Most people will be puzzled by this stand of the U.S. president.

Along with Mr. Gorbachov, President Reagan declared in Geneva last year that a nuclear war was not winnable. This was a major move forward for him. In Reykjavik the two sides came very close to agreement on reducing the strategic arsenals by 50 per cent and the medium range missiles to 100. Even those were not to be deployed in Europe. Why then should the U.S. president refuse to postpone field testing of SDI subsystems, especially when he is agreeable at the same time not to deploy it for the next ten years?

Why this insistence on field testing of a system which is not meant to be deployed for the next ten years and which is intended to serve as a shield against nuclear weapons which both sides agree are unusable to win wars and are prepared to slash by half? Why did Reagan throw away a historic opportunity to go down in history as a peacemaker?

Favourable Deal

The puzzle may be resolved if we take into account the possibility that the SDI's goal may not be to erect a shield against nuclear weapons. Nor

need it be regarded as a bargaining chip which may finally be given away to secure a favourable deal. One has to seriously look at the U.S. insistence that it will press on with SDI R & D, including testing of component systems and investigate whether the SDI is what it is projected to be. In our view the purpose of the SDI could be very different from what it is advertised to be.

The SDI involves highly sophisticated technologies in lasers, other sensors, propulsion systems, particle beams, high speed computers, data links, communication systems and optical fibre technology with a host of supporting materials technologies. Ultimately it involves an extensive exploitation of the potentialities of outer space. Very often it has been said that SDI represents several Manhattan projects put together. Those who have urged the U.S.A. to go in for 'high frontiers' technology have also highlighted the expected technological and economic fall-out from such an effort and made no secret of their view that in this effort the U.S. can leave the Soviet Union far behind. Technology and harnessing technology for civilian industry are considered as trump cards in the American hand.

The United States is militarily not as untrammelled a power as it was in the forties, fifties and early sixties. The USSR provides a significant countervailing balance. In manufac-

turing, production and trade in manufactured goods, the U.S. has to face increasing competition from West Germany and Japan. In agricultural production, the EEC is a competitor and leading developing countries are nearing self-sufficiency. From a creditor nation the U.S. has become a debtor nation. As an industrial nation the U.S. has lost its competitive edge in productivity. The problem facing the U.S. leadership is not merely the countervailing military power of the USSR but also the growing industrial, technological, financial and trade challenges from its own allies, West Germany and Japan. The U.S. therefore needed a strategy that will put it ahead of all other nations in terms of new technologies, give it an image of power and restore its primacy in the global structure. If in the process it acquires new weapon technologies which will augment its capability for conducting a coercive diplomacy, so much the better.

This strategy of taking a technological leap forward cannot be presented as a civilian programme to the American people and the world for many reasons. First, Congress will go along more readily with financing the project if it is represented as a programme to free the country of the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union. Secondly, since the SDI is really meant to enable the U.S. to carry out a technological leap forward vis-a-vis

its own allies, it has to be presented to them as a military programme against a Soviet threat. Thirdly, by making it an integrated military programme, the U.S. is able to repeat its Manhattan performance — to tap the best brains in the world for component parts of various technologies with systems integration and production methodologies securely in U.S. hands centred mostly in the giant U.S. corporations which lead in both military and civilian technologies and which are well versed in applying military R and D results for civilian technologies.

Harnessing Brains

The SDI programme will ensure that some of the best brains in Germany, Japan, Israel, Italy, Britain and elsewhere will be harnessed to U.S. purposes and foreclosed from national R and D effort. In due course many of them can be made U.S. citizens, at the end of it all, as happened in respect of the Manhattan project under the McMahon Act, the U.S. could deny total system technologies to the countries concerned and race ahead without any real competitor. That appears to be the hope as it was in 1945 when too the assessment was that other countries would take decades to reach nuclear weapon capability.

The Americans turned out to have been wrong then. But that does not necessarily mean they are bound to be wrong in their calculations this time too. They could rely on the fact that this project will be many times the size and scope of the Manhattan one. And though other nations achieved nuclear weapons capability they could not match the U.S. in the civilian nuclear technology capability. But for the Challenger disaster the

same held good even in respect of civil applications of space technology as well. In nuclear and space technologies the main competition came from the USSR and France. This time the main competitors in civil high technology applications, Japan and West Germany will have difficulties in competing with the U.S. if the project is labelled military.

The SDI may therefore have dimensions apart from the military ones. Its major thrust may well be the development of highly sophisticated new technologies as military technologies first and then carry out technology transfer to the civil side within the major U.S. corporations which will be getting all the production contracts. This may explain the U.S. refusal to stop the testing and development of the SDI but willingness to discuss deployment since that may not be the ultimate goal. The label is the SDI but the real game is a technological leap forward which can give the U.S. technological hegemony over the rest of the world, particularly over its own allies. Therefore while not overlooking the military and strategic implications of the SDI, one should also take into account its impact on the future stratification of high technology industrial power among the leading developed countries and its political and economic implications.

One may well ask why West Germany and Japan collaborate in a project which is likely to give the U.S. technological hegemony over them. In a sense it is a damage limitation exercise for them. In any case the U.S. is determined to push ahead with the SDI. They want to get into it to keep in touch with what is going on and possibly to get some R and D contracts, though if one goes by the experience the U.K. has had so far, there are not going to be big

handouts.

The Americans may also be banking on the assessment that the USSR will be put to great strain in matching the SDI effort and counting on a larger R and D establishment, including those of the U.K., West Germany, Italy, Israel and Japan. In the U.S. perception the Soviet ability for technological transfer from the military to the civilian sector is limited since military and civil technologies in that country are not integrated in the way in which they have been integrated in Boeing, Lockheed, General Dynamics and so on. They may therefore feel convinced that they are in a 'no lose' situation. If the SDI R and D effort can produce a reliable, efficient and impermeable shield against nuclear weapons, well and good. If it does not, the overall technological spin-offs would enable the U.S. to achieve a technological leap forward.

Cost Factor

One could argue that it would be less costly if the relevant R and D is pursued as a civilian programme. That would not however give the kind of advantages which a military R and D programme does vis-a-vis their own allies. That is why the SDI advocates may well consider the additional costs of a military R and D programme worthwhile.

Only the extraordinary stakes the U.S. has in the SDI for making a technological leap forward to regain supremacy over the rest of the world would make it logical for President Reagan to throw away what the Soviet general secretary offered him. We are compelled to fall back on one of the maxims of Sherlock Holmes. If all alternative explanations do not fit in with logic, then the remaining one has to be accepted, however implausible it may appear at first glance.

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CSO: 5250/0003

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

INDIAN NEWSPAPERS COMMENT ON REYKJAVIK OUTCOME

Polarization of Public Opinion

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 14 Oct 86 p 4

[Editorial: "Reagan Wrecks Summit"]

[Text]

Mr Ronald Reagan let the opportunity to bring mankind back from the brink of nuclear disaster pass at Reykjavik. So enamoured is he with his Strategic Defence Initiative or Star Wars programme which will place nuclear weapons in space, the final frontier, and unleash, as Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachyov has pointed out, a new and unpredictable arms race that he refused to barter it for a massive reduction in existing nuclear stockpiles and open the way for their total elimination. He told US strategic forces posted in Iceland just before returning to Washington that Mr Gorbachyov's proposals would "deny to me and to future Presidents for 10 years the right to develop, test and deploy a defence against nuclear missiles for the people of the Free World, this we could not and will not do". What Free World? What right? The right to destroy mankind and irreversibly damage the ecology and thereby also the very "Free World" for which he wants to arrogate so dubious a right? What kind of a Free World is it that it has to be sustained on regular doses of lies and disinformation from a leader who has shown not the slightest awareness of the dangers that he creates for the world at large by his crass adventurism? He seeks a right for himself and future Presidents of the US which a large segment of the very Free World he professes to speak for is vetoing by demanding an end to nuclear weapons let alone the creation of new ones.

President Reagan is trying to dig a niche for himself in history by putting at the disposal of future heads of Government in the US a weapons system which will stoke the fires of the military-industrial complex and provide the so-called Free World the benefits of the

horrendous technological revolution which President Reagan has invited like-minded hawkish Governments to share. There is thus a deep economic reason for his insistence on keeping alive the concept of Star Wars even in the teeth of opposition from peoples not only in the allied countries in Europe but also in the Americas as well. But what happened at Reykjavik cannot be wished away. The concessions which include some which were beyond the US negotiators' wildest dreams made by Mr Gorbachyov in Iceland cover the entire spectrum of the nuclear issue and Mr Reagan has admitted that "in several critical areas we made more progress than we anticipated..." It was only because of Star Wars that the people of the world were disappointed.

Yet there is hope that there will be a fallout of Reykjavik that could prove to be benign. President Reagan's tough posture on Star Wars is polarising public opinion even within the US. It will be an issue of sharp debate in the forthcoming Congressional elections. The people of America are not as willing to let their President indulge himself as they did when he first appeared on the scene with a loud yodel and "Ya ain't seen nothin yet" swashbuckling. This is evident in the bipartisan responses to world concerns over racism in South Africa on Capitol Hill where Reagan's efforts to bypass sanctions were outvoted recently. So it is not only lucre that will sway concerns in the US. The people there may yet prove that they can free themselves from the cloying persuasiveness of the logic of the military-industrial complex.

Gorbachev's 'Stunning Performance'

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 14 Oct 86 p 8

[Editorial: "Stunning Performance"]

[Text]

Mr. Gorbachov has given a stunning performance at Reykjavik. This will not be the immediate or conventional western interpretation of the result of the summit meeting. That naturally enough will focus on the failure to reach what could have been a remarkable arms control package, indeed, the most significant in decades, far outstripping SALT I or II. But a more careful evaluation will confirm that Mr. Gorbachov has pulled off a propaganda coup. The Russians knew all along that the Reagan administration would not give up the SDI (star wars) research, that in effect this was non-negotiable at Reykjavik. So by linking truly astonishing Soviet concessions on strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces with at least a ten-year stoppage of non-

laboratory research on the star wars, he has managed to focus world, above all American public opinion on this issue in a most dramatic fashion and he will do his best to sustain it. The terms of the debate on arms control are now clear. In order to put an end to the star wars project the Soviets are prepared to offer concessions more enticing than anything the U.S. Congress or the public have seen. Mr. Gorbachov's offer at Reykjavik did not only have the American negotiators present there in mind. It was also calculated to arouse sustained domestic pressure within the U.S. against the star warriors in the administration, a pressure which the Kremlin hopes will prove effective at some time in the future.

Mr. Gorbachov has offered concessions which are dramatic and unprecedented. Indeed, Mr. Gorbachov could not have dared to propose such a package if he had ever allowed himself to become a prisoner of the kind of military mind-set which has held sway for so long in both Washington and Moscow. Mr. Gorbachov has grasped a fundamental truth about the nuclear arms race. Which is that even sizeable increases in the nuclear arsenals of the opponent, or changes in their mode of deployment do not provide significant military advantage in this era of nuclear overkill. That is why he has made an offer which no previous Soviet leader has even come close to conceiving. Soviet nuclear strategists have argued that because of the more "balanced" character (land, air and sea) of the American deployment of strategic missiles, an equal, across-the-board and major reduction of such missiles for both sides would make the USSR more "vulnerable" to the U.S. strategic force. By offering a mutual fifty per cent cut in each component of the superpower nuclear arsenals, Mr. Gorbachov has literally thumbed his nose at such strategic thinking. What is more, he is prepared to ignore American forward-based missile systems which can hit the Soviet mainland and are in that sense "strategic". In Europe he has, in effect, accepted the "zero option" Mr. Reagan had himself proposed years earlier in full confidence then that no soviet leader would accept such an "unequal" proposal, and that the anticipated Soviet rejection would thereby help to justify the desired deployment of Pershing and Cruises.

Similarly, Mr. Gorbachov has expressed willingness to limit missile deployment in the Asian part of the USSR and shorter-range missiles of the Warsaw Pact. He has, in effect, made it impossible for the U.S. to reject such a package in part or whole, if it were not linked to the star wars project. Research on star wars outside the laboratory will violate the spirit of the 1972 ABM treaty. Mr. Gorbachov wants to adjust the letter of that treaty to bring it in line with its intention, and he is right to want to do so. The sole purpose of the star wars programme is to establish America's overwhelming superiority in the nuclear arms race which Mr. Gorbachov cannot accept.

Mr. Gorbachov's insistence on linking his package of concessions to the U.S. abandonment of the star wars programme is no doubt a brilliant political thrust. But would not a piece-meal process of disarmament, beginning with intermediate and strategic nuclear weapons, itself

create a momentum conducive to stopping the star wars project later? Mr. Gorbachov may have ruled out such an option for the moment. But this does not necessarily mean he may not revive this offer later, de-linked from the question of the star wars. He retains flexibility in this regard. For the moment, Mr. Gorbachov and his entourage will wait and watch patiently, perhaps for a post-Reagan administration to emerge in the U.S. Meanwhile it is clear that Mr. Gorbachov is determined to reduce the military burden on the Soviet economy if he can and that to this end he will pursue a brand of nuclear diplomacy that has not yet been practised in Moscow before he appeared on the scene.

Attempts Must Continue

Madras THE HINDU in English 14 Oct 86 p 8

[Editorial: "Failure in Arms Control Is Unacceptable"]

[Text]

DESPITE FOUR ROUNDS of talks between the U.S. President, Mr. Ronald Reagan, and the top leader of the Soviet Union, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, the interim summit at Reykjavik, Iceland did not result in any tangible agreement on the question of the reduction of nuclear weapons. Although American officials tried to play down suggestions that the two countries might reach an accord on medium-range missiles, such an expectation was certainly nursed in many quarters. In the course of the recent parleys, the United States and the Soviet Union have indeed covered substantial ground on the broader aspects of nuclear weapons. What stood in the way of the two sides coming to an understanding was their unwillingness to relent from their deeply conflicting stands on the Strategic Defence Initiative or the Star Wars project. Arguing hawkishly that he could neither deny himself nor his successors the right to develop, test and deploy a 'defence' against missiles, Mr. Reagan went only as far as to offer to put off deployment of the SDI by ten years, provided that the two countries showed good faith in destroying their missiles every year. To Mr. Gorbachev, however, this stance was quite unacceptable as the Soviet Union had all along said that the research on the SDI should be confined to the laboratory. Noting that he would have to be a "mad man" to agree to the deployment of space weapons while his country is being divested of its nuclear weapons. Mr. Gorbachev sees the American insistence on proceeding full steam on the SDI as coming at a

time when Moscow is finding ways to strengthen the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with a view to preventing either side from obtaining military superiority in a surreptitious manner. At this stage, it is clear that the hawkishness and 'hard-line' of the conservative U.S. administration has stood in the way of any give (not to mention a breakthrough) in the field of arms control.

The mini-summit has not only not produced the expected result but has even generated the fear that through its failure it might have signalled a return to the cold war era. The conservatives as well as the hawks in the American foreign policy establishment will undoubtedly be elated at Mr. Reagan holding the line on the SDI but the general consensus will be that the Star Wars project is indeed a major stumbling block in the road to a fresh arms limitation agreement. The Reagan administration claims that 'research' on the SDI is permissible under the ABM treaty and that it is in the legitimate U.S. national interest to go ahead with the programme. As a matter of fact there are those in the administration who reckon that it is the SDI that has brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table and hence it should not be dispensed with. However, since the fantasy-like idea surfaced in 1983, Moscow has always viewed it as a potential first strike weapon. And if the latest stance of the Soviet Union is any indication, it is looking for a comprehensive accord covering long-range, medium-range and space based weapons. Even if the latest talks have floundered on account of the SDI, it is imperative that the two countries

should persist with their talking effort—especially on areas where they seem to have found common ground—so that the Washington summit comes off later this year as agreed. If the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, has indicated that both Washington and Moscow could reach satisfactory agreements on the question of a moratorium on nuclear testing, regional issues and human rights, Moscow's positive stance on deep cuts in nuclear arsenals, which includes dropping its insistence on counting the British and French arsenals in and agreeing to restrict its medium range missiles in Asia holds

out no small peace prospect which needs to be worked upon. If there has been understandable disappointment in various parts of the world, including India, over the somewhat negative tone that issued from Reykjavik, it must be remembered that on the vital question of checking the nuclear arms race it won't do to accept any sense of helplessness or failure. Despite the considerable differences and the setbacks to the peace process, the hard work of finding some common ground and of expanding the areas of agreement must go on.

Sympathies With Gorbachev

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 15 Oct 86 p 8

[Editorial: "No Thaw in Iceland"]

[Text]

One of the abiding ironies of our times is that humanity survives on this planet at the pleasure of just two men: the top leaders of the two superpowers. Thus the world was thankful when President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachyov agreed last month to meet on the soil of a third country to resolve outstanding differences between themselves, essentially on arms control. Hopes soared when it was reported last weekend in the course of the summit that they were close to reaching a comprehensive agreement on the subject. And now that the meet has failed it is back to despondency and a state of hoping for the best but expecting worse. Who do we blame for the failure of the meeting? (It cannot even be called a summit as on that point also there were differences.) Since neither leader was prepared to budge from his position on the pivotal issue of the "star wars" programme, *prima facie* both have to be held responsible. After all, if Mr Reagan refused to confine his SDI experiments to the laboratory, then Mr Gorbachyov must have been insisting on the opposite. Even so, it cannot be denied that there is little logic in agreeing to disarm while refusing to renounce the right to go ahead with the militarisation of space.

But logic there is in Mr Reagan's determination to treat "star wars" as a class apart. He has told his countrymen that he has been able to negotiate from a position of strength. That strength presumably comes from the nascent "star wars" programme: in fact, he has said, and Mrs Thatcher has dutifully repeated the same argument, that it was SDI that had prompted Mr Gorbachyov to come and talk in Iceland. It is the same SDI that has stymied near-accords on such wideranging issues as the elimination of intermediate range nuclear weapons from Europe, deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons and a ban on nuclear tests. Thus Mr Reagan can give away on all points but not the freedom to go ahead with the "star wars" programme and Mr Gorbachyov can do likewise from the opposite direction. It may well be that the Soviets wish to stop the Americans from building up an unassailable lead on "star wars" while they themselves catch up. But this does not negate the fact that it is Mr Gorbachyov today who is calling for less expenditure on guns and more on

butter and it is Mr Reagan who is resisting. What is more, the Soviet leader has a high personal stake in the process as he has also been trying to sell the idea of disarmament to the Soviet leadership against the wishes of the military establishment in Moscow. Thus stated, there is no question as to who deserves world sympathy and support.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

CANADIAN ARMS CONTROL CENTER DIRECTOR ON CRUISE DEPLOYMENT

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 10 Nov 86 p A5

[Article by Gordon Barthos]

[Text]

EDMONTON — The federal government is courting a costly military nightmare by failing to challenge American plans to deploy thousands of cruise missiles in the next decade, an arms-control expert has warned.

And the peace movement is missing the boat by continuing to harp on the testing of first-generation cruise missiles in Alberta instead of focusing on the coming threat, warns John Lamb, executive director of the Ottawa-based Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament.

Ottawa should press for a ban on sea-launched cruise missiles, Lamb argued in one of the few new practical proposals offered at a weekend conference on Canada's defence policy. His centre is a non-partisan research organization.

Since neither side has yet deployed such weapons in any numbers, a ban should be easier to negotiate, he said.

The government should also push for tougher limits on the current generation of air-launched cruise missiles — the kind we've been testing in Alberta for several years, he said.

"We can wait for the threat to materialize and then be forced to engage in an expensive defence

buildup," Lamb said. "Or we can begin to address it now through arms control.

"Canada's European allies have not . . . hesitated to press the U.S. to take their interests into account in the development of U.S. arms control policies."

The Reagan administration's proposed buildup in cruise missiles would soon be matched by the Soviets, Lamb told the conference.

That would lead to a proliferation of thousands of the slow-moving but mobile, easily-concealed and hard-to-track weapons, he added.

Dodging issue

That in turn would pose a major problem for the Canadian military, which would have to have the radar, bases and interceptors to shoot down such missiles before they could reach their targets. And we'd need extra anti-submarine forces to meet the threat from sea-launched weapons.

The cruise threat will be the 1990s equivalent of the Soviet bomber threat of the 1950s.

The government has sidestepped the issue — tacitly supporting the U.S. plans to deploy more air- and sea-launched cruise missiles despite their not being in our best defence interests, Lamb said.

If the Soviets and Americans

agree to cut their fast-moving, long-range ballistic missiles in half — each side now has about 12,000 — then cruise weapons will assume that much more importance in the strategic balance, he added.

The U.S. proposes allowing 1,200 air-launched cruise weapons on each side, and proposes no ceiling on sea-launched cruise missiles. It's expected the Soviets could deploy as many as 1,500 of the latter in the next decade.

The Soviets, for their part, have proposed a ban on all long-range cruise missiles, although their position has grown less clear in recent months.

Unless tight restraints are negotiated, Canada will have to spend huge amounts trying to defend against thousands of cruise missiles or leave the job entirely to the Americans — a course of action that would mean a major erosion of our sovereignty, Lamb warned.

U.S. Star wars plans to erect a "leakproof" defence around North America will complicate Canadian air defence plans, because they would require the shooting down of every cruise missile.

For 30 years Canadian policy has been to mount only a partial defence against bombers, denying them a "free ride" into the North American heartland.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG PAPER POINTS OUT DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS OF ZERO OPTION

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 26 Sep 86 p 1

[Editorial by Karl Feldmeyer: "Dangerous Zero Option"]

[Text] The U.S.-Soviet arms reduction talks have entered the sixth round of negotiations. Included in the matters under negotiation in Geneva is a proposal to eliminate long-range intermediate nuclear weapons, especially the SS-20 and Pershing II rockets. Zero option is the name of the game. The Soviet Union would limit it to Europe; the United States and its allies demand it for the entire world. In view of increasing Soviet flexibility, an accord on this point appears possible.

Such an agreement would be welcomed by both East and West; it would stimulate hope for progress in other areas of policy as well. Fewer rockets, and instead more contacts, freedom of movement and cooperation--a natural desire. It takes courage and insight to educate a public, which wants nothing so much as peace and release from tension, to the difference between its desires, on the one hand, and the implications of a zero option for security policies on the other.

To NATO, the pursuit of a security policy means assuring peace by making war an intolerable risk. This is the most important task for its nuclear weapons. The long-range intermediate weapons (IRBM's) therefore, have a special significance here because they could reach the Soviet Union from England, Belgium or the FRG. An attack by the Warsaw Pact on these countries would then also be an attack on weapons systems whose use could trigger the firing of America's intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons. The IRBM's draw the West European allies more closely under the protection of America's strategic nuclear arms than has ever been the case since the departure from the strategy of "massive retaliation." This deprives the Soviet Union of maneuvering room for a military threat to Western Europe and limits its opportunities for exploiting its military potential for political gain. NATO as a whole profits, but especially its European members.

What, then, would change with the elimination of these weapons? For the Soviet Union, the risk involved in a regional conflict in Europe would be substantially diminished, and its maneuvering room enlarged, at least for the political exploitation of its own military power. But for the West

European NATO countries, the protective effect of the United States would decrease. Zones of differing security would result, all the more since the short-range nuclear weapons already present in Europe would lose in significance. Even if U.S. efforts were successful in including, along with the long-range IRBM's--whose operating radius lies between 5500 and 1000 km--also missiles with a range of only up to 500 km, a serious situation would arise for its allies. There would still remain the nuclear weapons and short-range missiles; the power relationship between the Warsaw Pact and NATO is 600 to 0.

All these nuclear weapons belong in a category from which danger is most likely to come in a crisis. That danger results from the fact that these weapons can be used without directly endangering the power that decides to use them. A Soviet "Scud-B" nuclear missile with its 300-km range is as little able to hit an American city as an American "Lance" missile a Soviet city. For Munich and Dresden, Frankfurt and Leipzig, London and Brussels, on the other hand, their ranges are sufficient. The public would become aware of this aspect at the latest when the medium-range missiles, which until then would have claimed its attention, had disappeared. The demand for a zero option would then be transferred to the short-range missiles and battlefield weapons.

This political development would then lead to a demand for a Europe free of nuclear weapons, a Europe that would have to give up America's protective guarantee and its presence. For all these reasons a zero option for the long-range IRBM's would lead the Western Alliance astray. That the nuclear arsenals of the two world powers can be reduced it beyond dispute even among experts. The assumption, however, that the relationship between East and West would necessarily improve thereby is just as unfounded as the belief that peace would become more secure. Peace is the result of accommodation of interests. The two sides are far away from that. Until that goal is reached, the task is to avoid war. To do so NATO needs, for the future as in the past, a credible deterrent. It would be considerably weakened if the continuum of the atomic weapons heretofore necessary were interrupted.

Certain inferences must be drawn. NATO urgently needs a concept that combines a readiness to reduce the nuclear potential of the two sides to the dimensions necessary for security policy, with the need to maintain the deterrent capability.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE'S HADES PROJECT REPORTEDLY TO BE SCALED BACK

Paris LE MONDE in French 26 Sep 86 p 16

[Article by Jacques Isnard: "In the Army: The Hades Nuclear Program Challenged"]

[Text] The program for prestrategic nuclear weapons intended for the army--known as Hades missiles--may be affected. Influential deputies of the majority party already consider it to be partially condemned. Before the defense commission of the National Assembly, the army chief of staff gave the impression that the Hades program would be cut back. At the Ministry of Defense, it was declared that no decision has been reached yet. It was, however, added that several hypotheses are currently under consideration within the framework of current thinking on the new law for 1987-1991 military program planning.

Prepared in 1982, the Hades project concerns the development of a missile with a nuclear warhead, two of which are to be mounted on general purpose trucks, from which it will be launched distances of up to approximately 350 kilometers. The Hades missile replaces the Pluton weapons system, currently in use, which is composed of a missile mounted on the chassis of an AMX-30 tank from which it is launched toward enemy targets at a range of 120 kilometers.

Originally, the Hades program was to be organized into 4 or 5 regiments having the same number of launchers as the Pluton regiments (approximately 40). Armed with a nuclear bomb, the explosive power of which can be quite varied, with the option of including enhanced-ray neutron bombs, the Hades missiles could be launched in the army activity zone, or independently, in retreat, from French territory.

According to previous ministers of defense, Charles Hernu and Paul Quiles, the head of state should be the only person authorized to implement Hades missiles when the missiles are not intended to be used as nuclear artillery involved in supporting deployment of conventional units on the ground. Along with ASMP (air-ground mid-range) missiles, equipment on the Mirage-IV, which will, in the future be on the Mirage 2000 and Super-Etandard aircraft, they make up a force delivering to the enemy an ultimate political deterrent before engagement of strategic nuclear weapons. The Hades regiment would release a large autonomous unit (a division) separate from the army corps, placed under the command of the French Army chief of staff.

A reduction by one-half

The organization of this prestrategic force is currently being challenged for several reasons.

Beginning last July, the president of the defense commission at Palais-Bourbon, Mr Fracois Fillon, RPR deputy for Sarthe, concluded from his discussions with Mr Andre Giraud that the minister of defense did not consider the Hades program to be intangible. The vice-president of the commission, Mr Jacques Baumel, RPR deputy for Hauts-de-Seine, declared his conviction that the program would be reduced by one-half and that the Hades units would be made available to land forces and not attached to a particular division. General Maurice Schmitt, army chief of staff, recently expressed to the deputies his hope that the program would be brought to a conclusion.

At the Ministry of Defense, it is admitted that all theories are being considered. This boils down to not formally denying the information from the parliamentary source, according to which there will be three Hades regiments and a new operational link to be defined at the level of the Army.

General Schmitt told the deputies he anticipated that the defense budget law for 1987 would reserve credits at the beginning for the creation of the first Hades regiment. According to the initial plans, this panoply would be ready in 1992. Thus the next military planning program law, which covers the 5 years from 1987 to 1991, will distribute the budgetary effort according to the terms and conditions accepted by Mr Chirac's government. At Palais-Bourbon, it is not being concealed that discussions between the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Finance on this 5-year law have led to roadblocks which will make it difficult for Mr Giraud to present in mid-October a preliminary document giving a sufficiently precise idea on the financial orientation in favor of the army. At the end of the military planning program, the minister of defense would like to have approximately 4 percent of the PIBm (gross national product) devoted to the army budget. This perspective is far from being unanimously accepted at the Treasury.

A new shift in doctrine

Because the constitution of a Hades division depends on organizing around it significant means of support and protection, the project of Hernu and Quiles will have its funding decreased.

The current opposition, especially the socialists on the defense commission, are attentively following the debate which threatens to open on the army's prestrategic nuclear force. They are actually looking beyond the budgetary difficulties which may lead the government to question the Hades program, the beginning of a new shift in the national doctrine of nuclear discussion.

Last 12 September, at the Institute for National Defense Higher Studies (IHEDN), the prime minister stated, "Deterrence in Europe, whether we want it or not, will occur through a combination of deployment of conventional forces and the threat of the use of nuclear weapons." This apparently means that the

army's possessing its own nuclear weapons increases the standing of the power of these conventional units in the eyes of the allies and potential adversaries, and by contrast, their dissociation would weaken the army engaged on the ground.

This theory is not the one that directed the planning of an autonomous nuclear division, combining all the Hades regiments outside the army. At the time, Hernu and Quiles emphasized the necessity of a strict linkage between prestrategic armament and strategic armament, to prevent the chiefs of staff from considering prestrategic weapons, such as HADES or ASMP, as battlefield weapons capable of compensating for conventional inferiority. The threat of their use would have deterrent value under these conditions.

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: GOLTS ON U.S. PLANS FOR CHEMICAL, BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by A. Golts, under rubric "Notes to the Point": "Reviving a Fraud"]

[Text] An unusual exhibit is currently being held in Washington. It features forgeries of paintings by famous artists. It's too bad, though, that the exhibits' organizers restricted themselves to frauds in the area of painting. After all, a good many counterfeits are also produced in other areas in the United States. Take international affairs. The frauds manufactured by the CIA, the Pentagon and the State Department would fill a whole museum. The numerous insinuations concerning "Soviet yellow rain" could lay claim to a special place in it.

This malicious lie surfaced most recently in a speech by the U.S. representative at the second conference, which is currently being held in Geneva, to examine the effect of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on the Destruction of Them.

Why was it necessary to revive this old bit of slander? The whole point lies in a candid attempt to shift the blame from the guilty party to the innocent one. Under the aegis of the Pentagon, numerous laboratories and research centers have long been operating in the United States with the ostensible task of developing methods for protecting troops against bacteriological weapons. In reality, however, they have been conducting experiments on new types of pathogenic microorganisms. This year alone the Pentagon has allocated \$4.3 million for the establishment of a special center for the study of toxins at Jefferson University. At the same time, a laboratory is being set up at the

Moreover, there is considerable evidence that the United States has already used the "noiseless death" in its subversive operations against sovereign states. The epidemic of dengue fever with which thousands of Cubans fell ill in 1981 was the result of an American act of sabotage. This has been proven both by extensive scientific data and by the testimony of mercenaries who carried out the crime. E. Arosen, a leader of the Omega 7 counterrevolutionary organization, testified concerning his participation in this sinister action when he was tried on murder charges in New York. In that same year, 1981, the American biologist Nalin, who had been conducting

ominous experiments in Pakistan with mosquitoes infected with viruses, was expelled from that country under circumstances of a scandal.

But now research in the area of preparations for biological warfare is reaching a new level in the United States. The prominent Pentagon official [Faight] came right out and stated this in an appearance before Congress. "It is now perfectly clear," he announced, "that bacteriological weaponry manufactured with the use of the latest technology can acquire an extremely important military significance. We have changed our opinion concerning the military use of bacteriological weapons. . . . Bacteriological weaponry can become truly great." Granted, the Pentagon official gave assurances that the United States was not yet planning to produce bacteriological weapons. In [Faight's] words, Washington is concerned lest others start to produce these weapons.

If that is the case, Washington ought to put all of its efforts into strengthening the convention banning the production and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons. But no! One article after another has appeared in the American press in which unnamed U. S. spokesmen have made statements to the effect that the convention is "useless." According the newspaper the WASHINGTON TIMES, one of them even stated that "it is impossible to ensure effective verification of the observance of that convention."

And to prove this point, the old fraud about "yellow rain" is dragged out. The logic is in the highest degree characteristic of Washington: "If we can prove that Russian toxin weapons are being used in Southeast Asia or Afghanistan, that means the convention is ineffectual."

Largely this sort of ruse has been resorted to repeatedly in the United States. At first, for example, there was talk about the "flawed nature" of the SALT II Treaty, then fictitious accusations were made that the USSR was violating this treaty. And it soon turned out that Washington itself had decided to violate the treaty. From every indication, this is the purpose for which an attempt to undermine the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons has now been begun.

And this is extremely instructive. Washington is attempting to discredit a document that, to all intents and purposes, bans an entire class of extremely dangerous weapons of mass destruction. A document that might serve as an example of the successful solution of complex security problems.

The Soviet representative, speaking at the conference, stressed that the USSR does not possess any bacteriological weapons. Our country unswervingly fulfills every article of the convention and strives to strengthen it. Moreover, demonstrating its readiness to seek mutually acceptable solutions, the USSR delegation submitted a proposal to draw up and adopt an additional protocol to the convention that would provide measures for strengthening the system of verification.

As for the fraud about "yellow rain," exhaustive remarks on this matter were made by [J. Leonard], leader of the American delegation at the negotiations that preceded conclusion of the convention. He characterized U.S. behavior as

shameful. "Our duty as parties to the convention," he stressed, "consists in not making any unprovable accusations." It's time for Washington to listen to sober views of this sort.

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR JOURNAL DISCUSSES U.S. BINARY WEAPONS PROGRAM

AU310611 Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 10, Oct 86 (signed)
to press 19 Sep 97) pp 36-44

[Article by Major General A. Kuntsevich, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "What Lies Behind the Binary Program?"]

[Text] The decision by the political and military organs of NATO to support the development of U.S. production of a new generation of mass destruction weapons--binary chemical weapons--has given rise to exceptionally deep concern among the European and world public. In essence a start has been made to the next spiral in the chemical arms race, the scale and danger of which are of a truly global nature. The United States plans to raise the existing arsenal of chemical munitions, now standing at 3 million units and already more than sufficient to annihilate every living thing on earth, to 5 million units, and this in qualitatively new combat equipment.

Washington links implementation of the U.S. plans for binary weapons production directly to the subsequent siting of these weapons in Western Europe, and later on in other regions of the world. Such actions by the U.S. Administration run directly counter to the Soviet-American accords reached in Geneva on the conclusion of an effective and verifiable international convention on a general and total ban on chemical weapons, and on their destruction. The wide-scale and consistent program advanced by the Soviet Union to rid mankind of all types of mass destruction weapons by the end of the 20th century is ignored and undermined.

In this way, by placing an open reliance on brute force in international relations, Washington, in addition to building up the nuclear arms race, intends to develop such a barbaric type of mass destruction weapon as chemical weapons, and in their most refined--binary--form, contrary to the demands of the peace-loving public.

Chemical weapons first became the subject of discussion as weapons of mass destruction more than 70 years ago, in spring 1915, when a massive cylinder-chlorine gas attack was carried out in the region of the Belgian town of Ypres on the order of the military command of the Kaiser's Germany. As a result, about 15,000 people were poisoned within several minutes, 5,000 of whom died in the next 2 days. It is customary to consider this attack as the start of the first chemical war on our planet.

U.S. troops were subjected to chemical attack in World War I on 25 February 1918, when phosgene-filled shells were dropped on them. In response the Americans also began to use chemical munitions.

In the course of World War I alone, no fewer than 45 types of toxic agents were used, 18 of them lethal and 27 irritants. Among the lethal agents were the choking agents chlorine, phosgene, diphosgene, and others; agents with a generally poisonous effect, such as hydrocyanic acid and cyanogen chloride, and those with a blistering effect--mustard gas and so on. Benzyl bromide, bromacetone, and ethyliodoacetate were used as irritant toxic agents.

Mustard gas was recognized as the supertoxic agent of the World War I period. It was used in droplet, mist, and vaporous states, and had a destructive effect not only on the eyes and lungs, but also on the skin. As a result total losses from mustard gas use were substantial. The task of protecting the skin surface of man and animals from the effect of this toxic agent took on the shape of a complex scientific-technological problem.

Altogether in World War I about 9 million shells filled with mustard gas were expended, as well as approximately 50 billion charged with conventional explosives. The effectiveness of chemical shells in World War I was no less than 5 times greater than that of conventional ones.

This circumstance sharply changed the attitude to chemical weapons taken by the fighting sides' commands, which was manifest immediately in the volume of orders for chemical munitions. By the end of the war more than half of the shells produced by the Germans were chemical. In 1918 the Americans in fact increased their orders for chemical munitions to 20-30 percent of the total amount of shells.

Such enormous orders for chemical munitions called for the creation of a powerful specialized industry. And this was created. Its main components were the plants in Edgewood, Hastings-on-Hudson, and Buffalo. By the end of 1918 their daily output of mustard gas alone had raised to 155 metric tons.

The general results of the use of chemical weapons in World War I were these: The amount of toxic agents used came to about 125,000 metric tons (approximately 58,000 tons used by the Entente countries and about 1,100 tons by U.S. troops); about 1.3 million people were contaminated, for almost 100,000 of whom the outcome was fatal.

The exceptionally high kill properties of chemical weapons gave no rest to the U.S. military and politicians after World War I, and gave rise to intensive development of them in subsequent years. What this led to is well known today.

Today the Pentagon regards chemical weapons as one of the most "promising" and rapidly developing types of mass destruction weapon, to the improvement of which there are virtually no limits, just as there are no limits to revelation of the secrets of the living organism. That is why the aggressive plans of

the United States have constantly placed reliance, and continue to do so, on this barbaric means of destroying people. Eloquent evidence of this is provided by the history of American chemical weapons, and above all by the practice of their use by U.S. troops in various wars and conflicts.

As is known, these weapons were widely used by the United States in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea, and have been and are being supplied to the counterrevolutionary bands in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and other countries. The U.S. chemical war against the people and biosphere of Vietnam was undoubtedly on the greatest scale. In Indochina the Pentagon mainly used toxic agents aimed directly at people: CS, chloracetophenone, adamsite, chloropicrin, and bromacetone, which in large concentrations (doses) have a lethal effect.

Apart from the toxic agents which affect people and animals, the Americans were the first in the world to use preparations for the destruction of vegetation, which they did in Vietnam. In the course of operation "Ranch Hand" in the south of the country the Americans tested 15 different chemical substances and mixtures for the destruction of harvests, crop plantations, and forest and undergrowth vegetation. The total amount of chemical substances for the destruction of vegetation which the U.S. Armed Forces expended between 1961 and 1971 came to 90,000 metric tons, or 72.4 million liters.

As a result of the effects on vegetation, the mangrove forests (500,000 hectares) were almost completely cleared, while 60 percent of the jungle (about 4 million hectares) and 30 percent of lowland forests were contaminated. The yield from rubber plantations fell by 75 percent as compared with 1960. Between 40 and 100 percent of the harvests of bananas, rice, sweet potatoes, papaya, and tomatoes were destroyed, as were 70 percent of coconut plantations, and 60 percent of hevea.

The destruction of vegetation had a serious effect on Vietnam's ecological balance. In the affected areas only 18 out of 150 species of bird survived, while amphibians and even insects almost completely disappeared. The number of fish in the rivers decreased and the composition of species changed. Toxic chemicals upset the microbiological composition of the soil. The composition of species of tick was deformed, and to be specific, ticks which are vectors of dangerous diseases appeared. The species of mosquito changed, and mosquitos typical of coastal forests of the mangrove type appeared in regions far from the sea in place of the harmless endemic mosquitos. These are the main vectors of malaria in Vietnam and neighboring countries. The disturbance in the stable ecological balance of the tropical forest which was caused by the use of toxic chemicals intensifies the danger that other animals which are vectors and carriers of epidemic diseases will penetrate this region.

Chemical substances were directed not only against nature, but also against people. Especially destructive was the use of dioxin, which was contained "by mistake," as the Americans asserted, as an additive in "Agent Orange," and which is poisonous to man even in doses of a milligram. The U.S. specialists could not but know about its lethal properties (there were sufficiently well-known cases of people being contaminated at the enterprises of chemical firms, including the accident at a chemical plant in Amsterdam in 1963).

As it is a persistent substance, dioxin is still found in Vietnam in regions where "Agent Orange" was used, in soil samples taken from the surface and from deeper down (up to 2 meters). This poison, which enters the human organism in water and food products gives rise to cancerous illnesses, especially of the liver and blood, massive congenital deformities in children, and numerous disruptions of the normal course of pregnancy. The medical and statistical data obtained by Vietnamese doctors is evidence that the consequences of the U.S. chemical war will be manifest in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for many years to come.

The results of herbicide use were subjected to careful study. To this end, over the entire 10-year period of the chemical war the Pentagon created numerous commissions which as a rule included the specialists who had developed these agents. In its conclusions in 1968, the interdepartmental commission to assess the combat effectiveness of chemical means of plant destruction, which was created in 1967 at the American military mission in Saigon, noted that the program of application of these agents had been successfully carried out.

At the first international scientific conference on the consequences of the chemical war in Vietnam, held in 1970 in Paris, the following words rung out like a sentence of guilty passed on the United States: "This state has quite evidently placed a delayed-action ecological explosive in Vietnam. It will influence the chain of life by widespread destruction of life forms of the plant, animal, and aquatic worlds which can never be replaced, and it will also do the people living there harm which cannot be assessed until a long time has passed."

By testing individual types of chemical weapon in South Vietnam, U.S. imperialist circles were nurturing plans for further intensive improvement and utilization of these weapons, and they are continuing to do so.

What, then, is the chemical potential of the United States and its NATO allies today?

The foundations of the U.S. chemical armament comprise toxic agents and chemical munitions for the corresponding delivery systems of ground, air, and naval forces. At present the American Army is armed with three groups of toxic agents: lethal, temporarily incapacitating, and irritant. Pentagon military specialists place this last type in the so-called group of "policing toxic agents," attempting to represent them merely as agents which, although

they are issued to the troops, are intended for the imposition of order. It must be emphasized that a concentration of between several tenths and several thousandths of a milligram of these standard toxic agents leads to loss of combat capability within minutes. The experience of the American chemical war in Indochina makes it possible to speak with full certainty about a fourth group of toxic agents: the chemical agents for the destruction of vegetation.

The United States has developed various types of chemical ammunition for the application of toxic agents. The basic arsenal of offensive weapons is composed of about 100 types of chemical charges for the ground and air forces. Thus, chemical warheads for missiles, chemical shells for tube and rocket artillery, chemical mines and landmines, as well as smoke dischargers [shashka] and grenades, have been developed for the ground troops. The effectiveness and reliability of this type of weapon depends to a considerable extent on the means of delivering the ammunition.

In the sixties, three types of sarin-filled canister-type warhead, capable of delivering between 30 and 200 kilograms of sarin over a distance of 20-140 kilometers, were created for the U.S. Army's tactical missiles. Multiple launch rocket systems, tube artillery, and mortars can be used to carry out strikes against scattered targets; these weapons are capable of delivering between 1 and 7 kilograms of toxic agents such as sarin, mustard gas, and CS gas, in one unit of ammunition.

The U.S. Air Force also possesses various means of chemical attack: aerial bombs, chemical aerial canisters, and spray tanks, which contain between 200 and 800 kilograms of toxic agents. Some of these can also be used by naval aviation and the Marine Corps.

The U.S. Ground Forces are armed with a large range of chemical grenades, aerosol sprayers, chemical rounds [patron], and smoke dischargers, which are filled both with toxic agents for temporarily incapacitating the adversary and with those which are irritants.

About 90 state and private enterprises in the United States are engaged in matters of chemical weapon development and production, of which 20 plants specialize in toxic agent production, 10 enterprises in the output of herbicides and defoliants for military purposes, and 9 plants produce chemical ammunition. The United States' mobilization capacity for toxic chemical output amounts to 127,000 metric tons: 50,000 tons of sarin, 5,000 tons of VX, 62,000 tons of mustard gas, and so on. The potential capacity for arming chemical ammunition amounts to 50 million units per annum.

Data on the U.S. chemical arsenal is, of course, kept top secret. However, according to the estimates of foreign specialists and international organizations, the Pentagon now has 55 metric tons of toxic nerve agents. These stocks are enough to annihilate mankind several times over.

Every tenth unit of ammunition in the U.S. arsenal is situated in Europe, largely in depots in the FRG. Alongside the town of Fischbach, Khanum [as transliterated] and Mannheim are most frequently mentioned in the press in connection with American chemical weapon stores here. There are also chemical weapons at U.S. military bases in Great Britain and on aircraft carriers in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. There are grounds for supposing that there are still American chemical weapons in Japan, too, despite the Pentagon's official claim that they have been completely removed to the Johnstone Islands after the well-known incidents in 1969 in connection with the leak of nerve gases on the U.S. military base situated on Okinawa.

In addition, the press in many countries cites facts about the United States nurturing plans to site chemical weapons in Spain, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, in South Korea, and in the Philippines. The implementation of such schemes arises organically out of the U.S. policy of arbitrarily declaring any region in the world to be "its sphere of vital interests."

In order to achieve a substantial and qualitative leap forward in the effectiveness of its military chemical arsenal, the United States makes active use of the scientific-technological industrial capacity of its NATO allies.

The United States' main partner in chemical weapon development is Great Britain, the government of which does everything to stimulate work to seek new and more effective toxic agents. It has been reported in the press that Thatcher's government is very interested in the most rapid development of highly effective chemical weapons. The main scientific-technological center for the study and production of these weapons is the Chemical Defense Center at Porton Down. It was there in fact that VX was created. The research conducted at Porton Down is closely coordinated with development projects being carried out in the United States.

In spite of official statements by the FRG denying the development of chemical weapons, material appears in the press on the conduct of research in the toxic agents sphere in that country. The Bayer AG firm, known for its developments in the chemical weapons sphere since the World War II period, is continuing its research into organophosphoric toxic agents.

However, NATO's existing military-chemical potential no longer satisfies the growing demands of the American military. Contrary to the clear facts, a powerful campaign is being blown up in the United States to prove the supposed "total obsolescence" of chemical weapon stocks and the "lag behind the Soviet Union." In 1982, on the initiative of the American Administration, new impetus was given to the wide-scale race to produce chemical mass destruction weapons. In the implementation of the new "chemical rearmament" program, which cost about \$10 million, the main accent is placed on plans to create binary toxic agents.

The history of binary chemical munitions has its beginning at the end of the thirties, when the U.S. Air Force set about developing a binary aerial bomb using arsine. Due to its high volatility, this toxic agent rapidly evaporated and did not achieve the required combat effect when it was used in conventional chemical munitions. The task was set of creating munitions with a regulated speed of formation of this toxic agent. Despite numerous efforts, it was not possible to obtain the desired result. For a long time the problem of binary chemical weapons was assigned a secondary position. The Americans were accelerating the armament of their army with new toxic nerve agents which were tens and hundreds of times more effective than the toxic agents of World War I. An industrial base was created for the production of these agents, and stocks of chemical munitions were built up at accelerated rates in the United States and Europe.

However, at the beginning of the sixties the American specialists returned to the idea of creating binary chemical munitions. They were forced to do this by a number of circumstances, the most important of which was the lack of substantial progress in the search for toxic agents with ultra-high, that is, third-generation toxic agents. In 1962 the Pentagon developed a special program to develop binary chemical weapons, and this was given priority status along with other state strategic programs. It envisaged a thorough search for chemical components of binary systems which, while sufficiently stable in storage, would be capable of reacting with each other to form a highly toxic agent in a short space of time.

The idea of binary chemical munitions is that they are charged with two or more initial components, each of which may be of relatively low toxicity. During the munition's flight to its target, its constituent elements are mixed, the final product of the chemical reaction being the formation of a highly toxic combat agent capable of destroying every living thing.

Initially this program envisaged the development of binary compositions of VX and sarin. By the end of the sixties the work to create a binary sarin had been crowned with success. Acid difluoride [diisopropyl phosphorochloridite] and isopropyl alcohol were used as the initial ingredients for the formation of this toxic agent. Soon afterward the development of a binary synthesis reaction for VX was concluded. The Americans describe one of the promising reactions for obtaining this toxic agent as the reaction between ethyl-2-di-isopropylamino-ethylphosphonite and dimethylpolysulfide.

A great deal of attention was devoted to the search for binary toxic agent preparations of so-called intermediate volatility. Experiments were conducted on a large number of compounds, including soman. Intensive work is being carried out on substances for genetic and ethnic chemical weapons. As a whole, work on the binary program is of a top secret nature, and it is possible only to guess at its results.

A crucial stage in the preparation of binary munitions is the actual design and development of projectiles, mines, bombs, missile warheads, and other means of delivery. The basic task in their creation is to ensure that the

components are mixed swiftly and fully, if possible without the use of mechanisms, which substantially complicate the construction design and decrease the usable volume left for the initial components. In artillery shells the mix is achieved through the high speed at which the shell resolves in flight, whereas in bombs and spray equipment a mixing device is still required.

The first item of binary ammunition with which the U.S. Army was armed, in 1977, was the 155-millimeter howitzer shell (M687) filled with binary sarin. At present the final work is being completed on the "Bigeye" aerial bomb, filled with binary VX. As has become known, the military-chemical arsenal's plant in the town of Pine Bluff (Arkansas) is already ready for the production of binary munitions--artillery shells and aerial bombs. It is planned to produce these projectiles at other enterprises, too, in the future.

What, then are the new military-political aspects which arise in connection with the reality of the appearance of binary chemical weapons?

First, the binary program is aimed at increasing the existing stocks of chemical weapons in the coming years. As a result of the relatively lower toxicity of binary system components, the transport and storage conditions of these munitions will be substantially simplified, which will sharply expand the opportunities for the United States to site chemical weapons near the European borders of the USSR and its allies, and which will enable them if necessary to conceal from the population of West European states the very fact that chemical munitions are sited on their territory, and ultimately this will make the process of saturation of the Old World with chemical weapons virtually uncontrollable. It is also necessary to take account of the fact that binary charges will make it possible to broaden the possibilities for deploying chemical weapons on U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, warships, and submarines. As a result the threat will arise of the American military unleashing a chemical war in any region of the planet, which is in full accordance with the goals of the "neoglobalism" doctrine which the present U.S. Administration has recently taken on board.

Second, the binary principle of chemical weapons substantially complicates matters of identifying the toxic agent being used, and consequently also the problems of medical assistance, treatment, and elimination of the consequences. In addition, by varying the components of binary systems it is possible to sharply reduce the effectiveness of such protection measures as the taking of prophylactic antidotes. Thus, in certain conditions the entire system of protection from chemical weapons may turn out to be of little effectiveness, which ultimately will sharply increase the scale of losses if they are used, and therefore the "safety" of binary weapons which is widely advertised in the West turns out to be the extreme danger which they pose to millions of people.

The notorious "safety" of binary chemical weapons seems doubtful for other reasons, too. To be specific, account must be taken of the fact that the design of these munitions is considerably more complex and there is thus an

increased probability that something will go wrong with one of the constituent elements. This could lead to an accident in which either the formation and release of toxic agents is initiated or the components of the binary system are released, the toxicity of these elements being at the level of toxic agents of the World War II period. If accidents arise in such ultra-reliable systems as, for instance, the "Challenger" spaceship, then one cannot count on the reliability of each one of millions of binary munition units. One can judge the consequences of such an accident by the scale of the Bhopal tragedy, in which one of the semifinished products for pesticide production, a product of relatively low toxicity, was released into the atmosphere. If one bears in mind here the high population density on the European continent, where it is planned to site these weapons, then it becomes clear what kind of "safety" the United States has prepared for its West European NATO allies.

Third, it is necessary to take into account the fact that while contemporary large-scale production of sarin, soman, and VX requires a high level of development of the chemical industry, specific experience, and a high standard of safety, the production of binary system components can be carried out in simpler conditions. This creates the conditions for an uncontrollable "creeping spread" of chemical weapons all over the planet and for unsanctioned use of them by any country, particularly in local conflicts, with all the unforeseeable consequences which such actions would entail.

And finally, a great danger which binary weapons present for the cause of peace lies in the fact that they open a loophole for evading future conventions banning chemical weapons. If spheres of application for peaceful industrial ends can be found for the components of binary chemical systems, then an opportunity will arise to produce and accumulate them in sufficiently large quantities under the guise of commercial production, although in essence they will be chemical weapon stocks. In this way, the creation of binary chemical weapons sharply increases the complexity of questions of verification [kontrol]. The U.S. delegation is constantly speculating on these questions, thus justifying its passivity in movement along the path of banning nuclear weapons.

In addition, the binary program makes it possible to deploy [razmeshchat] the components of charges without asking its allies' permission, and to bring munitions onto various states' territories as a binary package, under the guise of smoke or other projectiles, that is, to maximally disguise the preparations for unleashing a chemical war.

There can only be one conclusion here--binary weapons sharply increase the danger of chemical annihilation. It is significant that with the assistance of a number of other NATO members, and above all the FRG, the U.S. Administration has forced through a decision to start production of binary chemical weapons precisely at a time when real prospects have started to appear for concluding a convention on a chemical weapons ban and on their destruction.

Steadfastly pursuing a policy of peace and disarmament and adhering to the Soviet-American accords reached in Geneva on the conclusion of an effective and verifiable convention banning chemical weapons, the Soviet Union has advanced a number of major initiatives, which were set out in the statement of 15 January 1986 and later--in April this year--submitted in developed form at the Conference on Disarmament. These initiatives envisage that the destruction of chemical weapon stocks by each participant state should be begun no later than six months (the United States is given 1 year for this), and the destruction and dismantling of installations no later than one year, after the convention comes into force. Moreover, 30 days after this treaty acquires the force of law, the precise situation of every installation for the production of chemical weapons, including binary weapon components, must be declared. This applies to all installations, irrespective of whether they are under state or private ownership.

Since it is interested in a rapid ban on chemical weapons and is striving to shift the negotiations from a standstill, the Soviet Union has put forward bold, far-reaching proposals on verification [kontrol]. The USSR has proposed that a half to the functioning of each chemical weapon production installation be ensured by means of strict verification [kontrol], including systematic international on-site inspection [inspektsiya na mestakh]. Here the correctness of statements would be checked, the inspectors would place seals on the closed installation, and they would periodically check that these seals remained intact until the start of the destruction or dismantling of the installation.

In the interests of effective verification of this process, the Soviet Union has proposed that provision be made for the conduct of systematic on-site inspection [proverka na mestakh] and that procedure be developed for international inspectors' visits to an installation so that their presence at all important operations in its destruction or dismantling is ensured.

As M.S. Gorbachev's 18th August statement on Soviet television stressed, these proposals "make it possible by as early as the end of this year or next, to sign a convention banning chemical weapons and eliminating the stocks of them as well as their industrial production base."

The USSR has always come out in support--and continues to do so--of the proposals by fraternal socialist countries to create chemical weapon-free zones in Central Europe and the Balkans, since it regards such steps as intermediate ones on the road to achieving a complete and all-embracing ban on chemical weapons.

By coming out actively in favor of nonproliferation of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union has unilaterally adopted a regulation [polozheniye] on the export of chemicals which have a peaceful purpose but which can be used to produce chemical weapons.

The concrete and constructive proposals which have been enumerated graphically demonstrate that the Soviet Union's words do not differ from its deeds, which can in no way be said of the United States and its NATO allies. Comprehensive analysis of the binary program leads one to the unambiguous conclusion that the American plans for binary chemical rearmament are aimed at achieving the United States' aggressive military-strategic and political goals, and that they whip up the arms race in a new direction and at a qualitatively higher level. This program is a component part in Washington's general efforts to change the established balance of forces in the world and to achieve military-technological superiority over the USSR. The danger of this aggressive U.S. course is obvious, and its consequences could be of a catastrophic nature.

That is why the peoples of the entire world actively support the Soviet Union's peace initiatives and are coming out more and more resolutely against Washington's recklessness, which is fraught with the threat of chemical annihilation of every living thing on earth.

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS: U.S. USES 'BRAZEN LIES' TO STEP UP CHEMICAL ARMS RACE

LD021200 Moscow TASS in English 1120 GMT 2 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 2 TASS--In a signed article, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA analyzes the positions of the USSR and the USA on problems of chemical weapons.

The newspaper points out that the principled proposals advanced in Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of January 15 envisage the complete elimination of not only chemical weapons stockpiles but also of the industrial base for their manufacture. The Soviet Union's detailed proposals with regard to chemical weapons were set out at the Geneva conference on disarmament. They have a compromise nature and promote the removal of existing differences.

But the U.S. militaristic circles are determined to preserve the programme of America's chemical rearming. The U.S. Congress recently allocated funds for the manufacture of chemical ammunition of the new generation--binary ammunition.

The entire propaganda apparatus has been brought into play in an effort to prove that only this "programme" can protect the USA and also Europe against "chemical attacks by Warsaw Treaty countries".

Writing in "WALL STREET JOURNAL", U.S. permanent representative in NATO David Abshire tried to substantiate the need for the production of binary ammunition, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA writes. According to him, the production of such armaments will enhance considerably "the policy of deterrence" by the United States and NAO. He went so far as to assert that the modernization of the U.S. chemical arsenal will help raise considerably the threshold of possible use of nuclear weapons. It is only the threat of a retaliatory strike that can keep the USSR from using chemical weapons in armed conflicts, that "strategist" said.

It is obvious that Washington resorts to brazen lies in order to start the production of binary ammunition, to step up the chemical arms race.

The Soviet proposals on banning chemical weapons are on the negotiating table, the newspaper writes in conclusion. If the United States and its allies are really interested in destroying those weapons, and they talked about this a lot, what they should do now is to take practical steps to confirm such statements.

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

MOSCOW: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA REJECTS ARGUMENTS AGAINST CW BAN

PM041401 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Nov 86 Second Edition p 3

[O. Georgiyev article: "No Room on Earth"]

[Text] This is the Soviet Union's unambiguous and realistic reply to the question: Should there be any chemical weapons in states' military arsenals? The principled proposals put forward in M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January statement provide for the complete liquidation of not just the stockpiles of chemical weapons but also of the actual industrial base for their manufacture. The USSR's detailed initiatives regarding chemical weapons were presented at the Geneva disarmament conference. They are in the nature of a compromise and help to eliminate the differences that have existed hitherto.

What is the essence of the Soviet Union's stance? In the USSR's opinion it is necessary to embark -- virtually simultaneously with the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, which must begin no later than 6 months following the convention's coming into force -- also on the liquidation of enterprises for their production (6 months after the start of the destruction of stockpiles of these weapons).

The states which sign the convention must be confident that these enterprises will not produce any chemical weapons in the period up to the start of their liquidation. For this purpose, and not later than 30 days after the convention comes into force, each signatory of the convention must notify whether it has or had any production installations on its own territory or on the territory of other countries falling within the convention's scope and must report the number of such installations regardless of whose property (state or private) they may be, and the exact location of each installation.

The Soviet stance envisages, immediately following the convention's coming into force, the prompt termination of all activity at installations for the production of chemical weapons, apart from any activity that may be necessary for their closure and for the maintenance of their nonproduction status until the time for their liquidation. This means a prohibition on the occupation of premises, dismantling and disconnection of all mains services, and the sealing and closure of all gates and passages. It is also proposed that any verification [proverka] of the implementation of these procedures be effected under international control. The Soviet stance also provides -- should it become necessary -- for the permanent presence of international inspectors at the most important operations.

The Soviet Union's new proposals, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, declared, "make it possible to sign -- even before the year's end or next year -- a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the liquidation of their stockpiles and also of the industrial base for their production."

But U.S. militarist circles are unwilling to accept the fact that someone is raising a hand against their brainchild -- the "program for the chemical rearmament" of America. The U.S. Congress recently appropriated funds for the production of a new generation of chemical combat ammunition -- binary weapons.

The entire propaganda machinery has been set in motion in order to prove that only this "program" is capable of "protecting" America, and Europe at the same time, from "chemical attacks by Warsaw Pact countries." For example, D. Abshire, U.S. permanent representative to NATO, made an attempt in THE WALL STREET JOURNAL to substantiate the need for the mandatory production of binary combat ammunition. In his view, the production of these weapons would considerably reinforce the U.S. and NATO "policy of deterrence." He even went so far as to say that the modernization of the U.S. chemical arsenal would supposedly make a substantial contribution to raising the threshold of a potential use of nuclear weapons. "Only the threat of a counterstrike could restrain the USSR from using chemical weapons in armed conflicts," this -- if one can use the expression -- strategist declared.

As we can see, Washington resorts without any second thought to lies in order to launch the production of binary weapons and release the flywheel of a chemical arms race.

The Soviet proposals on the problem of banning chemical weapons are on the negotiating table. If the United States and its allies are really interested in the destruction of these weapons -- and there have been more than enough statements to this effect by them -- they must confirm it by their practical deeds.

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

MOSCOW COMMENTARY OUTLINES CBW PROPOSALS SUBMITTED AT UN

LD081548 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0350 GMT 8 Nov 86

[Text] The USSR delegation to the 42d session of the UN General Assembly has set forth important new initiatives in the area of banning chemical weapons. Here is a Mayak commentary. At the microphone is Grigoriy Bakhradze, international affairs journalist: The year 1986 has been a year of a peace offensive by the Soviet Union in absolutely all areas of arms-race limitation and disarmament. The negotiations to draft and conclude a convention banning the manufacture, stockpiling, (?and supply) of all forms of chemical weaponry are no exception. A few days ago the USSR again undertook practical steps to foster a successful resolution of this problem as early as 1987. What is the essence of our country's new initiatives? In order to totally exclude the manufacture of chemical weapons by the civilian, or, one might say, commercial chemical industry, the Soviet Union proposes reaching accord on dividing all chemicals into four categories, and establishing differing regimes of restriction and monitoring for them. The point here is that the manufacture of certain chemicals, particularly of those which are components of binary chemical (?systems), may be reorientated to produce armaments.

It is therefore already necessary to agree to rigorous monitoring procedures. Guided by these considerations, the Soviet Union is prepared to accept as basis the proposal introduced by Great Britain last summer at the disarmament conference. Furthermore, our country is also expressing readiness to reach agreement on the introduction of a mutual moratorium with the United States on the manufacture and deployment of chemical weapons. The new Soviet proposals are an organic component of the complex of initiatives set forth in the field of chemical disarmament, initially in the statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 15 January, and submitted in specific form by the USSR delegation to the disarmament conference. These initiatives make provision for measures to make a start as soon as possible on the destruction of chemical arsenals; [words indistinct] (?and run down installations for) the manufacture of chemical weapons; and on ending their operations and destroying them, under reliable international monitoring procedures.

Negotiations on banning chemical weapons are making (considerably) faster progress than those in other areas of arms race limitation. However, implementation of U.S. plans to manufacture binary chemical weapons and site them in West Europe would have a most negative effect on the negotiations. One would like to hope that the West will remove unnecessary obstacles to chemical disarmament.

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CSO: 5200/1085

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS: ISRAELYAN ADDRESSES MEETING ON CBW AGREEMENT

LD040955 Moscow TASS in English 0823 GMT 4 Nov 86

[Text] New York November 4 TASS -- At the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly a big group of delegations including those of Argentina, Vietnam, GDR, Greece, Spain, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, Sweden, have stated that priority attention should be paid to invigorating the negotiations on a convention on complete and efficient prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The need of successful completion of negotiations on prohibition of chemical weapons is noted in the draft resolution submitted by the group. This is one of the main questions in the package of disarmament problems at the 41st session of the U.N. General Assembly. Many delegations touch upon this question in their speeches.

The Soviet Union's task is to successfully complete the current negotiations in 1987, said on Monday the USSR's representative Viktor Israelyan. In line with the fundamentals provisions of the January 15 statement, our country in April put forward broad-scale proposals on elimination of the production facilities for making chemical weapons. It is now essential to give a fresh impetus to the negotiations, above all in the areas where there was no sight for an accord yet until recently. What is at issue is non-production of weapons in the commercial (civil) chemical industry and coordination of procedures of requested verifications.

The USSR's representative proposed that agreement be reached on dividing all chemicals into four categories with different limitation and verification regimes. International inspection could be of various forms: permanent presence of international inspectors, systematic verifications, single requested verifications.

As to requested verification procedures, the USSR, guided by the desire to have the convention concluded as soon as possible, proposed that it should be based on a proposal which was submitted by Britain at the disarmament conference in summer, provided its finalising [as received]. If such an approach proves to be acceptable to the United States and other parties to the negotiations, the way to an accord will be open. The USSR will also be ready to agree, as the first step towards elimination of nuclear weapons, on introduction of moratorium, mutually with the USA, on the production and deployment of chemical weapons, for the moratorium to be comprehensive and to cover also binary weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1074

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

CANADA: TORONTO STAR ON VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP SESSION

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 3 Nov 86 p A14

[Text] Arms-control talks between the Americans and the Soviets, especially in the glare of publicity that accompanies summit meetings between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev, focus public attention on the need to reduce nuclear arsenals. But as External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said recently in the House of Commons, and NATO defence ministers noted following their meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland, eliminating nuclear weapons, though vital, is only part of a comprehensive East-West disarmament deal.

Beginning tomorrow in Vienna, when delegations from all the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries arrive for a new series of meetings of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the focus will be on many of these other aspects of disarmament.

Heading the list is the worry among western European leaders that a reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons will leave them exposed to the conventional armed might of the Soviet Union which, numerically at least, far outstrips that of NATO on the ground in Europe. International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates are that the Warsaw Pact countries have 2.7 million troops deployed in Europe, 52,600 main battle tanks and 5,736 aircraft. Comparable figures for NATO forces are: 2 million troops, 20,333 tanks and 3,218 aircraft. If the elimination of nuclear weapons isn't done in tandem with cuts in conventional forces, western Europe and its North American allies might find themselves having to beef up their own conventional forces to match the Soviet strength. That's hardly the way to end the arms race.

Delegates at the Vienna conference do have a foundation to build on. Earlier this year, at East-West security talks in Stockholm, there was vital agreement on procedures for verifying disarmament deals by allowing each side to conduct air and ground on-site inspections in the other's territory. As Clark has said, "Arms control agreements alone do not produce security; confidence in compliance produces security."

Arms control isn't the only item on the agenda at Vienna; human rights issues, cultural and scientific co-operation, and East-West economics and trade will also be discussed. Clark, in a speech to the opening plenary session Wednesday, is expected to enunciate Canadian priorities: family visits, family reunification and disarmament. Given the momentum toward arms control established at Stockholm and between the superpowers in Geneva, and taking Soviet proposals for deep cuts at face value, the first priority at Vienna should definitely be disarmament. And the focus should be on the foot soldier as well as on the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.

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CSO: 5220/8

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

NEED FOR NUCLEAR FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE SEEN

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 6 Oct 86 pp 10-11

[Article by Jens Maigård, Folketing candidate, Social Democratic Party:
"The Hope from the North"]

[Text] The question of a nuclear-free zone in the North must be extended in NATO to a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. It at the same time involves the question of the short-range tactical nuclear weapons which are found first and foremost in the zone which should rather become nuclear-free.

The proposal concerning making the North a nuclear-weapons-free zone has become a central political question in all the Nordic countries. And just as well. But it is a difficult goal to realize. The Nordic countries' security policy situation is very varied. It is not easy to put such variety into a common formula in a sensitive security policy question. For this reason it is inspiring that the efforts to realize the zone have come so splendidly from the start.

Norway's Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland assessed the time scope in this question in an interview which in every sense of the word was gigantic. Gro Harlem Brundtland, who wants the zone to be seen in a broader, European, context, and therefore to have to be discussed in close contact with NATO, makes this offer for the timing: "We must do a lot of work over a number of years in order to achieve a common position."

Therefore there is reason to ask whether we, in order to achieve practical results in this area in the foreseeable future, ought to raise the nuclear question over a broader front than the Nordic. The answer in my opinion is affirmative. The nuclear question ought to be raised also in NATO and to our allies.

NATO's strategy in the nuclear area is, as we know, the "flexible response strategy." The strategy is ostensibly to the affect of possessing such strength that, regardless of the situation, one decides oneself the response to the challenge one is confronted with. Naturally, the response must be tailored to the situation; therefore, the name "flexible." The possibility of using nuclear weapons is kept open. The same holds true for the possibility of using nuclear weapons first. In NATO they feel inferior in the area of

conventional armed forces, and therefore they want to have an opportunity to use nuclear weapons as a kind of substitute for conventional weapons and conventional forces.

The distinction is drawn between three kinds of nuclear weapons now in NATO: tactical, which are used on the battlefield and which have a range of up to 125 to 150 km; medium-range weapons with a range of between 5000 and 6000 km; and intercontinental missiles with a range of from continent to continent.

To begin with we should concentrate on tactical nuclear weapons. They are the least difficult to go to, and at the same time it is they for which there is the risk of being used first. For these reasons they have already been subjected to massive criticism in NATO, criticism which at any rate is understood by the alliance's leadership. (This, as we know, is not the case with the proposals regarding the North as a nuclear-weapons-free zone.) At the same time it is the tactical nuclear weapons which directly concern Denmark. This is not the case for either medium-range weapons or intercontinental missiles.

In light of this, a number of questions ought to be raised: The nuclear strategy must be taken up in NATO on the general plane. The dependence on nuclear weapons must be reduced and the nuclear threshold correspondingly must be raised. This can take place by strengthening the effort which has already been made in NATO to remove small tactical weapons. And this can take place by a gradual change in the nuclear strategy so that the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons is gradually abandoned.

The more these viewpoints become generally accepted in NATO, the easier it will be to solve the particular problems which apply to Denmark. If NATO conducted a policy with a high nuclear threshold there would not be particular problems in Denmark. Some very general problems would undeniably remain. But we have great difficulty in gaining influence on them.

The question of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central Europe is an important problem for NATO. It to a great extent involves the question of tactical nuclear weapons, for it is first and foremost they which are found in the zone which should rather become nuclear-weapons-free. NATO has--directly contrary to its stated philosophy--unilaterally and without the slightest quid pro quo removed a number of tactical nuclear weapons from the area up toward the FRG's eastern border. It was contrary to NATO's own well understood self interest to have this kind of weapon deployed so far forward. For this reason the idea of a nuclear-weapons-free zone, such as it has been advanced from Adam Rapacki to Olof Palme, lies just below the surface. We in NATO ought to help a breakthrough to get under way.

Then there is reason to discuss the reinforcements policy with the allies. The reinforcements constitute a completely decisive element of Denmark's security policy. They should be maintained. But there is reason to believe that especially the American airplanes which have been stipulated for Denmark can carry tactical nuclear weapons in a crisis situation. And this is not desirable.

The wording for further reflections concerning this question was put tersely and clearly by Prime Minister Poul Schlüter: "In connection with entering into bilateral reinforcements agreements, on Denmark's part it has been expressly emphasized that the conveyance of nuclear weapons to Denmark at any time will depend on prior Danish acceptance." (FOLKETINGSTIDENDE, 2 Jul 86).

It is obvious that no Danish government--regardless of party color--will like to send for reinforcements with nuclear weapons. Any Danish government will postpone as long as possible the time when reinforcements will be sent for, in order to get around the nuclear weapons question. This is due, among other things, to the fact that sending for reinforcements comes under those questions in which the government must be obliged to consult the Foreign Policy Tribunal. For this reason, if it is clear in advance that the reinforcements are not carrying nuclear weapons, Danish authorities will have more freedom in their choice of the time. Especially if the weak points of the reinforcements policy are counteracted at the same time: the stockpiling of materiel and the very long period there will be in certain cases from the time when the reinforcements are sent for until they arrive.

The same way with the question of calls of allied warships at Danish ports. This should also be discussed in NATO. In Norway they have for a great number of years had nothing to do with visits of friendly warships if they carried nuclear weapons. The line was drawn with a more than 10-year-old government proclamation to the Storting. We should have a similar arrangement for us.

Finally, the question of the Jutland Division's deployment in the integrated defense system should be considered. In a crisis situation, the Jutland Division is to advance down to Holstein and there, together with the German 6th Armored Division, is to defend Jutland's root. The idea is that the two units together are to be able to counteract a Soviet tank attack to the mouth of the Elbe and further up along the northern side of the Elbe into Jutland.

By being in operational solidarity with the German division, Danish forces come even very close to the nuclear question, for the German units are outfitted with tactical nuclear weapons under a double-lock system. (The double lock is to say that the Americans have nuclear shells which are at an ammunition dump, for one thing, in Meyn, 4 km south of the Danish border, while the Germans have the delivery vehicles. The sides must agree before they act.) In addition, the arrangement is to be directed by a Danish officer, i.e., the united command's chief, who, should the situation arise, is to requisition the nuclear weapons and have the operational responsibility for them.

At the moment it is being discussed whether one of the Jutland Division's three brigades, instead of advancing to Holstein, ought to remain in Jutland in order to defend the airports there. I do not think that this question is decisive in connection with the division's participation in the integrated defense system. The decisive thing is that the Jutland Division through the integrated defense system come into operational solidarity with units of the FRG's armed forces, which can use nuclear weapons if necessary.

CANADA: 'PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES' URGES TEST-BAN TREATY

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 28 Oct 86 p A10

[Text]

OTTAWA (CP) — Canada should "take the initiative" and publicly push the United States to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban with the Soviet Union, says a coalition of 20 churches and anti-nuclear groups.

Project Ploughshares' political affairs co-ordinator Simon Rosenblum said yesterday there has been "some lessening" of traditional Canadian support for such a ban, and that the government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney has been "a little bit soft" on concrete action.

Liberal external affairs critic Donald Johnston and New Democrat Pauline Jewett, in letters released yesterday by Project Ploughshares, reiterated their parties' support for an immediate moratorium on nuclear tests by both superpowers, and an eventual comprehensive ban.

BANGLADESH ENVOY TO UN SPEAKS IN DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 15 Oct 86 p 8

[Text]

UNITED NATIONS Oct. 14.—Bangladesh yesterday called for objuring the arms race toward a total disarmament and urged the world body to adopt a seven-point formula to achieve that purpose, reports BSS.

Bangladesh permanent representative to the United Nations Mr Justice B A Siddiky told the first committee on disarmament here that his country shares the deep concern of others in this nuclear age that "this planet might be suddenly through accident or design become an armageddon of horror and destruction."

To avoid that eventuality, Justice Siddiky said: we must intelligently accept the fact that acquisition of nuclear weapons enhances the risk of war.

We must support and implement the creation of nuclear free comprehensive test ban treaty zones we must cease to proliferate nuclear weaponry both vertically and horizontally, we must stop forthwith the production of all weapons of mass destruction.

The budgets for procurement of weaponry must be reduced and the saving diverted to development.

Elaborating his proposals Justice Siddiky said establishment of nuclear-free zones constitutes a very important disarmament measure. It is our firm belief, he said, that the creation of circles of nuclear-free zones in Latin America, Africa, Middle East, South Asia Indian Ocean, the Pacific and in other places would enhance the prospects of global security.

Stressing that a comprehensive test ban treaty is urgently required, the Bangladesh permanent representative said this would be a significant leap toward ending proliferation and also a major disincentive to the development and qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons.

He said nuclear weapons proliferation expands the destructive potentials of regional conflicts of which there are many. It complicates defence planning and arms control negotiations.

Demanding adequate sureties to the non-nuclear states against the use or the threat of use of such weapons against them by those who possess them, Justice Siddiky reminded the nuclear powers that in accordance with Article vi of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) they are committed to pursue arms reduction.

He said Bangladesh herself is a signatory to the NPT and added: but how can recalcitrant be persuaded to accede and end horizontal proliferation if some are seen to be relentlessly pursuing vertical expansion.

He said as modern technology has been used to develop arsenals like radiological weapons electro-magnetic weapons chemical and bacteriological weapons and conventional armaments steps must be taken to prevent manufacture and acquisition of such weaponry.

He also demanded early holding of the postponed conference on disarmament and development.

/13046

CSO: 5250/0006

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

DHAKA PAPERS COMMENT ON REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING

Resumption of Talks Urged

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 15 Oct 86 p 5

[Editorial: "Between Peace & War"]

[Text]

The US-Soviet talks in Iceland have reportedly ended in failure. If the beginning of the mini-summit following the first summit a year ago was more routine, the audible bang with which it closed was the last thing expected of the two world leaders. They were talking about a most serious global issue, namely, control of arms with a view to lessening the mounting horror of a future nuclear war. Although expectations about the outcome of the Iceland summit were scarcely too high, the breakdown is a disappointment out of all proportion to the expectations.

The reasons are simple : one, the small summit, not necessarily occupied with small talk, was a prelude to bigger summits at the two capitals of Washington and Moscow. The world audience, with all its reservations, was hoping for the talks holding through the scheduled future meetings of the two super-powers and setting the stage for agreed arrangements to achieve some of the seminal objectives of world peace; two, if the failure marked a dead end reached in the negotiations—and relations—between the super-powers the most likely result is a renewed acceleration of the arms race. And this would be the tragic paradox following a summit move towards arms control. This is also a prospect which can be contemplated only with horror against the background of a world already menaced with the twin spectres of nuclear proliferation and the eventual use of weapons so produced in the most destructive war in history.

The sticking point in the talks, as had long been surmised by analysts in both blocs, was the SDI or Star Wars: The ten-year moratorium on the deployment of SDI deterrents proposed by Mr. Reagan was not acceptable to Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Reagan making it clear that he would go ahead with his Star Wars programme—research and deployment. But the proposition for the reduction of their armouries of medium-range warheads as the first step, let us hope, to a progressive reduction in long-range ones could predictably be stretched into one for an eventual agreement on the destruction of the nuclear arsenals. Once this were made to happen, in response to what millions of anti nuclear demonstrators around the world have demanded and in keeping with the professed intentions of the super-power leaders themselves (the consummation being achievable within 10 years), the necessity for the deployment of the SDI-produced anti-missile shield might not arise at all.

This seems to be the unmixed logical course that any genuine effort toward peace is bound to follow, either, globally, between the super-powers or, separately, among other nations. In any case, you cannot have peace on a durable basis in the world even after agreed reductions carried out of nuclear arms. The residue would be enough to destroy the world a few times over. To say nothing of the huge stockpile of conventional weapons in their improved modern varieties and deadliness. Peace, taken seriously, should mean a measure of disarmament, not stopping short at qualified controls, that would really ensure it. The stake that both super-powers have, in formal talks or outside of them, is indeed too great to allow any permanent break in the arms control negotiation.

One would, therefore, hope that the failure at Reykjavik (Iceland) could not be end of the journey. As deducible from the reaction of both the leaders following the talks—tempered as it is with a mixture of relative pessimism and optimism about the future—there is likely to be a continuation of the effort to work toward arms control goals. This could be kept up more effectually through the resumption of summit level super-power talks. Historically, after the two great wars fought with conventional weapons and in view of a future war whose destruction potential is unlimited, there is no other choice left for the super-powers, if they are seriously committed to peace in the world. If, on the other hand, they have come to accept that they are “so far steeped in blood”, like a Shakespearean hero, “that returning was as tedious as go-over”, it will be all over with this planet.

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 16 Oct 86 p 5

[Editorial: "Reykjavik--and After"]

[Text]

The alacrity with which the pre-summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev was arranged at Reykjavik succeeded in convincing a great number of people the world over that something positive was afoot in the area of East-West relations. That hope, however, has been belied—at least for now—by the note of anti-climax on which the two leaders took leave of each other. The conclusion is essentially the truth that for all the expectations aroused at Reykjavik, the talks have failed to produce anything substantive in the way of reviving or even sustaining hope that progress is yet possible in such vital areas as disarmament. Mr. Gorbachev has already spoken of a world that is approaching a point of no return because of the standstill at Geneva and, after Reykjavik, where the Soviet leader feels that President Reagan came with empty hands, the Kremlin feels there is for now a dead end. On his part, the US President has reaffirmed his intention not to abandon the much-publicised Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI)—or Star Wars project—on the issue of reaching an arms agreement with Moscow.

The disappointment, though not necessarily despair, that the Reykjavik meeting has produced is to be noted in circles ranging from US congressional figures to international observers. Senators Sam Nunn and Claiborne Pell have expressed their dismay, the latter going to the extent of calling the final day of the Reykjavik talks a sad day for mankind. There is, however, the fact that Mr. Reagan's allies in Congress have welcomed his tough attitude over SDI particularly for the reason that he has not given anything away that could affect America's security at home and abroad. The upshot of it all is that though Reykjavik has not been able to offer anything substantive to the world, it has manifested rather clearly and strongly the serious attitudes of both the Americans and the Soviets

towards arms control. The manifestation could be stretched further in the sense that both Washington and Moscow realise, for the first time in years, that the idea of a peaceful world is ultimately one they have to assure. And that entails the continuity of contacts; and contact is something that neither Gorbachev nor Reagan has ruled out in spite of Reykjavik.

It is yet too early to predict whether the projected US-Soviet summit in Washington will take place this year; but reason and the facts dictate that it should. Mr. Reagan's problem is one of time and in the little over two years that remain before he leaves the White House, he needs to leave behind an enduring legacy of security and strength for the United States in the future. Away in the Kremlin, Mr. Gorbachev too may be running against time in a different way in that any arms deal that he strikes with President Reagan will not only calm the hawks in Moscow but will also remove the element of uncertainty that would inevitably be associated in his dealings with any future US administration. The stakes are high—and so are the risks. But a certain degree of encouragement could be derived from the fact that the Reykjavik meeting has, in spite of the deadlock it produced, not refreshingly created any bitterness. Shall we, therefore, hope that there is now no way to go but ahead—meaning a Washington summit before the year ends?

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CSO: 5250/0005

CANADIAN PEACE MEET TAKES UP NUCLEAR, ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

8 November Meeting

Toronto THE SUNDAY STAR in English 9 Nov 86 pp A1, A15

[Article by Gordon Barthos]

[Text]

EDMONTON — Canada's peace movement must launch a crusade to "get nuclear weapons and nuclear-related junk" out of the country, Toronto peace activist Bob Penner told 5,000 people here yesterday.

"This country and our leaders are keeping quiet (about Canada's tie-ins with the U.S. nuclear arsenal) at the very moment they should be shouting," Penner said to enthusiastic applause.

"They're dabbling when they should be leading. They're studying when they should be acting and they're acquiescing when they should be rebelling."

Penner called on Ottawa to stop allowing the testing of U.S. cruise missiles over Canada immediately.

He also urged Ottawa to "take a risk" and publicly support Soviet proposals in Geneva to cut ballistic missiles by between 30 and 50 per cent, to shore up existing arms control treaties, and to get U.S. support for a moratorium on nuclear tests.

Penner is co-ordinator of the Canadian Peace Alliance, a grouping of 300 organizations. He was the most warmly received speaker

yesterday at the *True North Strong and Free?* conference on Canadian sovereignty and defence policy.

Conference organizer Mel Hurtig, chairman of the Council of Canadians, was delighted by the turnout.

People had to brave brave snow, -18 C (0 F) temperatures and frigid winds to attend the conference, held at the University of Alberta's "Butterdome" sports complex.

The huge turnout will show Ottawa politicians just how much public interest there is in ending the arms race and in seeing Canada develop a more independent stance on defence issues, Hurtig told reporters yesterday.

That sentiment was echoed repeatedly at yesterday's conference.

□ Disarmament Ambassador Doug Roche set the tone of the meeting by saying that no country is better suited than Canada to "give leadership to the world" by promoting arms control.

□ Dorothy Goresky, past-president of Physicians for Social Responsibility added a warning to Roche's comment.

"We seek security in the very thing that will destroy us," by rely-

ing on nuclear weapons to keep the peace, she said.

The challenge for peace activists, she added, is to "choose leaders who will effect change in the way we believe it should go."

□ Geoffrey Pearson, executive director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and security, called attention to a growing problem for the Mulroney government: The "gap between what governments think and what a lot of people think" about the likelihood of a nuclear war breaking out. The politicians don't expect one, but many voters do, he said.

Throughout yesterday's sessions, speakers and members of the audience repeatedly criticized the Mulroney government for its defence and arms-control policies.

The criticism comes as Defence Minister Perrin Beatty prepares Canada's first major review of defence policy since 1971.

Ottawa was described as being too timid to criticize the U.S. military buildup, Star Wars missile defence research and lack of interest in negotiating arms control agreements.

Ottawa was also censured for being too secretive in its defence agreements with the United States, including the recent renewal of our major defence pact.

Finally, the federal government was criticized for playing too active a role in the U.S. military machine.

Canada has phased out the last of its own nuclear weapons, yet we continue to help the U.S. test its unarmed cruise missiles here, Penner said.

We also allow nuclear-armed U.S. warships into our ports, accept U.S. plans to disperse bombers here in time of crisis, and help test numerous U.S. nuclear-capable weapons, Penner said.

Penner's remarks did not go unchallenged.

"Declaratory proposals and quick fixes proliferate in public debates such as this one," said Ralph Lysyshyn, a key spokesman for the Mulroney government on arms control.

"But experience has shown us that that no meaningful arms control measures have been achieved and sustained outside the negotiating framework" at places like Geneva, where progress is slow and often elusive.

"Megaphone diplomacy," of the sort advocated by many critics of the government, he warned, can be "dismissed out of hand," by the superpowers.

Lysyshyn, who was peppered with hostile questions, is director of the arms control division of the external affairs department.

Brig.-Gen. Don Macnamara, meanwhile, defended Canada's role within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North American Aerospace Defence command as vital to our security and national sovereignty.

The Canadian Forces, Macnamara said, are "Canada's oldest and largest peace movement."

In a world where no fewer than 43 wars are being fought, Canadians should recognize that our defensive alliances have helped to preserve the peace between the superpowers for more than 40 years.

Macnamara was accompanied by a number of senior officers who mingled with the civilian audience answering questions about military policy.

9 November Session

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 10 Nov 86 pp A1, A 5

[Article by Gordon Barthos]

[Text]

EDMONTON — Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's government has been urged to cancel its limited support for U.S. Star Wars research.

The call yesterday came from 3,000 delegates attending a conference here on Canada's defence policies and national sovereignty.

They also urged the Progressive Conservative government to:

☐ Weigh the benefits of turning Canada into a "neutral" or non-aligned country;

☐ Halt cruise missile tests if the U.S. breaks current arms-control deals; and

☐ Lean on Washington to embrace a Soviet nuclear test moratorium.

Delegates also voted down a double-barrelled motion to support Ottawa in maintaining "an adequate defence capability" and in continuing to work within traditional Western alliances to promote nuclear and conventional arms control.

Arctic submarines

The votes, carried to hearty applause, were among 11 appeals and messages directed to the Tory government to mark the end of a two-day debate on Canada's defence policy and national sovereignty.

In total, more than 5,000 people attended the unprecedented meeting, organized by the Council of Canadians and the Edmonton chapter of Physicians for Social Responsibility. Initially, 500 were expected.

Before refusing to endorse an "adequate" defence for the country, participants complained that the term "adequate" was too vague to be meaningful. They

noted that a major thrust of the meeting had been to question our traditional military links with other Western countries, including the United States.

The meeting also voted down a proposal that Canada acquire submarines capable of operating in Arctic waters and safeguarding our sovereignty. Questions were raised about whether the subs would have to be nuclear-powered, something many participants rejected.

"People strongly want alternative policies," Edmonton publisher Mel Hurtig said as the meeting ended. Hurtig is chairman of the Council of Canadians.

The public is worried about the nuclear arms race, Canada's geographic position between the superpowers and the federal government's policies on defence and arms control, Hurtig said.

"People like the idea of being involved in important matters," instead of being shut out of government defence decisions, he added.

Hurtig predicted that the Edmonton meeting will spur similar meetings in other communities, and said that they would play an important role in shaping public opinion before the next federal election.

Other meeting resolutions included:

☐ That Ottawa stop testing cruise missiles here if the United States exceeds the limits on missiles contained in current arms-control agreements. The U.S. has served notice that it may exceed those limits later this month.

This resolution, too, proved controversial. Many at the meeting wanted cruise tests banned outright, and were unhappy that a more moderate resolution had found its way on to the agenda;

□ Ottawa should establish an arms-length commission to explore "alternate security possibilities" for Canada, including non-alignment and neutrality. The commission would hold public hearings and report to Parliament;

□ Ottawa should endorse the Soviet nuclear test moratorium, and urge the U.S. to respond in kind;

□ Ottawa should actively press both superpowers to negotiate upper limits on all categories of cruise missiles, which at present are largely unconstrained by arms control pacts;

□ External affairs should be required to report to Parliament on the nature, quantity and destina-

tion of all Canadian arms exports;

□ Ottawa should set up an international "crisis management centre" with a view to reducing the risk of accidental nuclear war;

□ Ottawa should participate more actively in future conferences;

□ Ottawa should restore the Canadian Broadcasting Corp.'s full funding to allow the CBC to upgrade its world coverage and to provide "clear windows on the world."

Earlier yesterday, George Ignatieff, former chancellor of the University of Toronto, received a standing ovation when he argued that Canada needs to develop a "strategy of survival" instead of relying on the threat of nuclear reprisals to keep the peace.

Canada can't realistically opt for neutrality, as military historian Gwynne Dyer proposed Saturday, Ignatieff said.

In a three-party political debate that followed Ignatieff's remarks, participants to the conference heard sharply conflicting views on Canadian defence policy.

Further Details

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 10 Nov 86 p A4

[Article by Matthew Fisher]

[Text] The 4,000 participants at a week-end conference on peace voted to ask the federal Government to establish an independent commission to examine alternative security policies, including the possibility of non-alignment.

The two-day meeting, entitled *The True North Strong and Free?*, adopted a resolution calling on Canada to endorse the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests and to ask the United States to respond in kind. It also urged that Canada rescind its cruise missile test agreement with the United States and seek an arms-control pact that would regulate all

categories of cruise missiles.

The delegates also concluded Canada should withhold all support for the U.S. strategic defence initiative, known as Star Wars. Motions to "maintain an adequate defence capability" to protect Canadian sovereignty and to acquire submarines and other forms of underwater surveillance for the Arctic were defeated.

Brig.-Gen. Donald Macnamara, of the National Defence College in Kingston, Ont., was one of five senior officers who attended the meeting, as did a representative from External Affairs and members of Parliament from the three political parties.

Many speakers objected to U.S. influence over Canadian foreign policy, including Canadian Labor

Congress president Shirley Carr, Robert Penner, co-ordinator of the Canadian Peace Alliance, and William Arkin, of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C.

For the most part, the two-day debate, organized by publisher Mel Hurtig, was civil — although Ralph Lysyshyn, director of the arms control division of External Affairs, was jeered for not replying to a question equating North Atlantic Treaty Organization policy on a nuclear first strike with Nazi concentration camp ovens.

At a news conference later, Mr. Lysyshyn said that "some people wanted an inquisition," and he had expected it.

"A lot of people are here because they disagree with the Canadian approach to defence," he said, adding that the conference was worthwhile, which was why External Affairs had contributed to it financially.

In his speech on Saturday, Mr. Lysyshyn defended Canada's position in NATO and NORAD, as well as its voting record on nuclear disarmament and other military issues at the United Nations and other international gatherings. He said that if there is "a fairly strong congruence (with) U.S. votes, it is largely because we share many of the same values."

Gen. Macnamara described the strong military presence at the meeting as a departure for the Canadian Forces. "What you're seeing is an incremental process. A change in our participation is being encouraged."

He told delegates that Canada is, for practical purposes, a nuclear-free zone, while the Soviets have nuclear bases in its North.

Unilateral declarations are meaningless, he said. By belonging to

military alliances, Canada has a voice when important military discussions are held.

George Ignatieff, University of Toronto chancellor and a former Canadian ambassador, was applauded when he urged that organizations such as the North American Aerospace Defence Command be changed so that civilians control decision-making processes.

"There should be no incineration without representation," he said.

Scientist David Suzuki, who resolutely opposes the SDI project, said that a major problem is "scientific illiteracy on the part of politicians," of which President Ronald Reagan is a classic example.

"Here is a man who grew up in a time long before there were computers, television, jets, rockets, satellites or nuclear bombs," Dr. Suzuki said. "He is making major commitments to SDI because he was nurtured on Buck Rogers comics."

Geoffrey Pearson, executive director of the Canadian Institute for Peace and Security and a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, said that a public inquiry into defence matters could not be held in Moscow but that there is evidence the Soviet Union is becoming more open.

4 December 1986

RELATED ISSUES

CANADIAN ROLE IN ARMS RACE SUBJECT OF RADIO ADS

Vancouver THE WEEKEND SUN in English 25 Oct 86 p D14

[Text] TORONTO — "Peace," an earnest voice explains over a swelling background of flute music, "it's everyone's responsibility."

Canadians in 60 communities across the country, from St. John's, Nfld., to Salmon Arm, started hearing this and similar messages on the radio Friday. It's part of a two-week public education blitz being run by a non-profit group called Peace Productions.

"We're beginning an on-going campaign using radio ads to end Canada's role in the arms race," Doug Mohr, a peace activist and a spokesman for Peace Productions, said at a recent news conference.

"The ads will encourage individuals to call in to find out how they can become active," Mohr added. There are seven different commercials, each with a slightly different message and a toll-free telephone number to call for more information.

Local peace groups across the country will pay the costs for running the ads, which were funded by Peace Productions, through private donations. Mohr estimated the total cost to peace groups nationwide at about \$150,000.

RELATED ISSUES

PRC URGES U.S., USSR TO TAKE LEAD IN DISARMAMENT

Draft Resolutions Submitted to UN

OW310832 Beijing XINHUA in English 0816 GMT 31 Oct 86

[Text] United Nations, October 30 (XINHUA) -- China has appealed to the Soviet Union and the United States to assume their "special responsibility" for disarmament and reduce their nuclear and conventional arsenals.

The appeal was made in two draft resolutions submitted today to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly by Chinese representative Fan Guoxiang.

The first draft, on nuclear disarmament, notes that the Soviet Union and the United States, which possess "the most important nuclear arsenals", should take the lead in halting the nuclear arms race and reach early agreement on drastic cuts in nuclear weapons.

The other draft deals with conventional disarmament, and urges the countries with "the largest military arsenals" and the member states of the two major military alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact, to continue negotiations on reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons.

The First Committee of the General Assembly deals with political and security affairs.

Explanation of Drafts

OW051100 Beijing XINHUA in English 1044 GMT 5 Nov 86

[Text] United Nations, November 4 (XINHUA) -- The Soviet Union and the United States should take the lead in disarmament since together they control more than 95 percent of the world's nuclear weaponry, a Chinese delegate said at the United Nations today.

Fan Guoxiang, Chinese ambassador in charge of disarmament, told the U.N.'s First Committee on Security Affairs that China's call for U.S. and Soviet action is based in fact and expresses the wishes of small and medium-sized nations. He noted that between them the U.S. and Soviet Union hold 50,000 nuclear warheads.

Fan was elaborating on draft resolutions covering nuclear and covering nuclear and conventional disarmament submitted to the United Nations General Assembly October 30.

China's draft Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament, Fan said, stresses the special responsibilities of the U.S. and Soviet Union but does not ignore the responsibility of other nuclear-weapon states, including China.

China feels that after the Soviet Union and the United States have drastically cut their nuclear arsenals then China and other nuclear-weapon states should also begin to disarm.

Speaking about the draft Resolution on Conventional Disarmament, Fan said that the two superpowers and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact occupied the largest part of the world's conventional arms and forces.

The tension and conflicts between them, he added, had directly threatened world peace and the security of various countries.

Ambassador Fan said that many small and medium-sized countries needed to defend themselves but should also exercise self-restraint when building those defenses.

Fan also spoke about a series of Chinese moves to reduce its conventional forces and said it has been restrained in building nuclear arms.

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CSO: 5200/4016

RELATED ISSUES

PRC RESEARCH FORUM FOCUSES ON DISARMAMENT

HK310655 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 28 Oct 86 p 7

[Report: "Chinese Scholars Hold Symposium To Extensively Discuss Questions of Disarmament"]

[Text] A symposium on the question of disarmament was held in Beidaihe in early October under the auspices of the Research Institute on Modern International Relations. More than 50 scholars and experts from concerned central departments, research units and institutes of higher studies held extensive discussion on the present state and future development trends of the disarmament issue, the role of the struggle for disarmament as well as our country's position and proposals on the disarmament question.

The participating scholars believed that as the present struggle for disarmament entered an important phase, new conditions unlike those in the past had appeared. The symposium deliberated that in the last year, the superpowers had each made varying degrees of compromise on arms control, negotiations had made progress, and agreements may be reached in some areas. However, the bilateral talks on major issues did not proceed smoothly. Some scholars deemed that the U.S.-USSR arms control talks must be seen from a larger context. The strategies of both the United States and the USSR have undergone changes, with greater emphasis on the development of the economy, science and technology as well as the improvement of overall national strength, focusing notably on the next 15 years and the next century. [paragraph continues]

With its favorable position in economy, science and technology, the United States is intent on pursuing the strategic defense programme to spur on new technology and enhance its strength. On the other hand, the USSR stresses accelerating the development of the economy, science and technology, and strives to maintain the current equilibrium. Hence, while both sides have the need to arrive at certain arms control agreements, they have difficulty reaching agreement on crucial issues. With talks to continue, struggle is inevitable.

Some scholars considered that the development of new technology would produce a great impact on the superpowers' arms race and arms control. New levels of escalations may appear in arms race in space and other spheres, such as the study and implementation of space defense system, offensive nuclear power becoming more mobile and sophisticated, conventional arms, direction and logistics becoming more technical, and others. At the same time, new conditions may also emerge on arms control. Due to development of technology, the nature of U.S.-USSR contention on offensive nuclear power has gone from quantitative to qualitative; thus, the reduction in quantity does not affect actual strength, and so an agreement may be reached. Also because of the development of

technology, armaments have created a heavier economic burden and brought about the inacceptability of war consequences -- these would produce direct and indirect repercussion on arms control. Therefore, this is an aspect that should be given great attention in the study of the disarmament issue. The participants pointed out that on the question of disarmament, medium and small-sized countries are exerting greater influence and attention must be paid to the role they play. This is favorable to pushing forward international talks on disarmaments and to maintenance of world peace.

As for the effects of the struggle for disarmament, the participating scholars believed that the disarmament struggle not only plays a positive role in easing international tension and safeguarding world peace, it is also of enormous significance to the attainment of a peaceful world environment for our country's realization of the four modernizations. As a socialist state, it is correct that our country is currently putting the disarmament issue in a proper position and paying great attention to it. They pointed out that our country pursues a peaceful foreign policy based on independence and self initiative, and opposition to arms race is an important aspect of our country's peaceful foreign policy. According to the development of situations, we should pay greater attention to the study of the disarmament question, treat the disarmament issue according to the peaceful foreign policy based on independence and self-initiative, and make our own contributions to propel the progress of international disarmament.

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