

THE FUTURE OF WAR: IS OPERATIONAL ART NOW IMPOSSIBLE?

**A MONOGRAPH
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
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
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
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Abstract

The Future of War: Is Operational Art Now Impossible?

By Major Richard E. Wiersema, USA

This monograph examines the impact of future trends in warfare on operational art, the key concept in the U.S. Army's current fighting doctrine. Operational art, which translates the effects of battles and engagements into the attainment of strategic objectives, is the focus of the current and draft editions of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, yet it is not mentioned in the Army's strategic vision for the 21st Century, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*. As its origins in American doctrine lie in the conventional war paradigm that shaped Army doctrine in the 1980s, operational art's usefulness as a practical concept for the military planner appears to be in doubt.

The monograph discusses the origins of operational art's current prominence in doctrine and uses James J. Schneider's *Theory of Operational Art* as a basis for determining if future trends will permit its practice. *Force XXI Operations* provides a summary of projected trends in war. The monograph then analyzes the arguments of noted writers whose works address these trends. The analysis focuses on three dominant trends: the decline of the nation-state and the rise of the non-state warrior, the prevalence of unconventional forms of war, and the replacement of ideological conflict with inter-ethnic and civilizational competition as a cause of future wars.

The monograph concludes that operational art, far from being an outdated concept, is sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes in war. The monograph demonstrates that claims about the imminent demise of the nation-state, the decisiveness of unconventional war, and the rise of inter-ethnic conflict are potentially misleading. Forms of war are increasing, but not replacing one another. The possibility of conventional war remains. The imperative now is to understand these changes and ensure that the U.S. Army does not, at the outset of conflict, allow the enemy to choose the forms of war. Operational art remains a valid concept in meeting the challenges posed by emerging threats.

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I. Introduction

*Doctrine does not predict the future but sets in motion that which will produce conditions for success. Doctrine integrates principles and fundamentals and describes how to meet operational challenges. Therefore, one of the most critical challenges confronting today's Army is continuing development of relevant doctrine.*¹

Force XXI Operations, August 1994

Less than a generation after its introduction into the U.S. Army's lexicon, the practice of operational art is now the focus of its fighting doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*. This resulted from a fundamental shift in doctrinal thinking in the early 1980s that was sustained by the Army's experience in the Gulf War in 1991.² The new doctrine added a third level of war, the operational, between the two previous levels, tactical and strategic, around which Army planners are taught to organize their thinking. It required planners to consider battles and engagements, those activities that take place at the tactical level, in the context of national objectives at the strategic level. Operational art is the ability to translate the effects of the former into the attainment of the latter. If the focus of tactics is battle, and of strategy on war, then operational art is concerned with campaigns.

Battles, campaigns and wars are characteristics of the conventional conflict paradigm. The convention is that wars take place between or among the armed forces of nation-states over political objectives. It lies behind Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz's statement that war is "a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."³ Yet many trends indicate that the future of war, as envisioned by theorists and by the Army itself,

implies a geo-political environment potentially unsuited for the practice of conventional war and, therefore, operational art.

This future is described succinctly in *Force XXI Operations*, the document which establishes the conceptual foundations for the strategic army of the early 21st Century. In contrast to the rigid, bipolar confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States that shaped the strategic environment of the Cold War, the future appears to have multiple potential and constantly changing sources of conflict. Many of the accepted conventions of the past fifty years are breaking down or becoming irrelevant. *Force XXI Operations* identifies nine trends as elements of instability:⁴

- Shifting balances of power
- Resurgent nationalism
- Rejection of Western political and cultural values
- Competition for power between state and non-state groups
- Population growth, particularly in under-developed countries
- Inability of many nation-states to govern their territories
- Accelerating technological development
- Increased environmental risks
- Rapid advances in information technology

While the writings of many contemporary theorists and analysts are distilled in these trends, four stand out as having addressed in detail factors that may mitigate against the future practice of operational art. In 1991, Martin van Creveld⁵ published *The Transformation of War*, in which he states,

"conventional war- war as understood by today's principal military powers - may indeed be at its last gasp."⁶ He believes that the decisive type of war is now the unconventional form adopted by insurgent movements over the last half century. In his view, the professional armies of the developed world are rendered insignificant by their adherence to the conventional paradigm and 19th Century theories of war, particularly those of Clausewitz. War is not finished, but conventional armies are. In a related article published in 1996, van Creveld foresees violent, anarchic, inter-ethnic feuding that will cause the disintegration of that fundamental requirement for conventional war: the nation-state.⁷

Historian John Keegan⁸ published *A History of Warfare* in 1993, and continued the intellectual attack on Clausewitzian assumptions about war. He argues from a moral standpoint that, while politics must continue, war must not. He foresees a vital role for professional warriors in the defense of developed states, but argues that "the style in which they fight...cannot derive from the Western model of warmaking alone."⁹ After surveying the history of war, predominantly from a cultural viewpoint, he concluded that war is largely useless as a tool of state policy. This conclusion appears consistent with his earlier work, *The Face of Battle*, where he proposed that, primarily because of the human cost and therefore the moral impact of modern conventional combat, "battle has already abolished itself."¹⁰

In his controversial article, "The Clash of Civilizations?" published in 1993, Samuel P. Huntington¹¹ proposed a future strategic environment

characterized by violent rivalries among seven or eight principal civilizations. As he is one of the earliest and most influential theorists to describe a possible post-Cold War world order, his work is especially relevant in assessing the future value of operational art, a product of doctrinal thinking influenced by the Cold War. Huntington's subsequent book, *The Clash of Civilizations*, published in 1996, addresses in detail many of the same trends identified as sources of future conflict in *Force XXI Operations*, particularly those of resurgent nationalism, population growth, and the rejection of the West.

U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters¹², now retired, attempted in a series of provocative, if eccentric, articles published over the last five years to synthesize these trends and interpret them from a military standpoint. Peters sees U.S. Army doctrine and thinking as inadequate to meet the challenges of a rapidly approaching, violent and chaotic future. Taking up the theme of war as a culturally-based phenomenon, he argues that the last ten years have seen a resurgence of warrior societies. These are groups of men motivated by violence and power, do not serve any recognized state and who do not accept the values of Western Civilization or its professional soldiers. Peters also regards the increasingly rapid development of military technology, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), as a distraction from "brutal, intractable issues"¹³ such as the rise of wealthy, well-armed transnational criminal syndicates and mass emigration from failed nation-states. Like van Creveld and Keegan, he too predicts an increasing irrelevance for the conventional forces of developed nations.

Given that operational art's place in U.S. Army has its origins in the Cold War, and that these futurists clearly depict a world radically changed from that paradigm, sufficient grounds exist to justify an inquiry into the future of operational art. The purpose of this monograph is to conduct such an inquiry and determine if these trends imply the end of operational art as a practical tool for the military planner. First, it describes operational art itself, its definitions, theoretical foundations, and recent history as a doctrinal term within the U.S. Army. In particular, it uses James J. Schneider's *Theory of Operational Art* which proposes "seven necessary and sufficient contextual conditions that must exist if operational art is to flourish and sustain itself."¹⁴ Operational art is subject to broad and varied interpretations. Schneider's work, which remains influential within the U.S. Army,¹⁵ provides a structure around which to make comparisons. His theory is the basis for determining if the future would enable the practice of operational art.

Second, the paper considers the impact of three dominant themes that emerge from the writings of van Creveld, Keegan, Huntington and Peters: the decline of the nation-state and of war based on Clausewitzian theory, unconventional war as the more decisive and prevalent form of war, and the rise of inter-ethnic, cultural conflicts. The monograph also presents alternative views and counter-arguments from other contemporary futurists. Third, using Schneider's necessary conditions as the primary criteria, the monograph judges how well each condition could be met given a synthesis of these future trends. It also will consider at what point the term "operational art" becomes so

general as to become meaningless. If the term is to retain any validity for planning military operations, it must have a distinctive definition that is commonly understood, and applied, across the Army and the other services. It also must provide its practitioners with advantages that portend victory against the forms of war practiced by potential opponents.

II. Operational Art: The Thing Itself

At the operational level...the battle is a building block, not an end in itself. The operational commander must be skilled at using battles (whether won, lost or avoided altogether)...to structure a winning campaign. Hence, operational art provides the justification for a battle.¹⁶

Robert R. Leonhard

Among the various doctrinal definitions of operational art, there is general agreement as to its place in the spectrum of war but much less concerning what it is, exactly. In the view of U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Leonhard, author of *The Art of Maneuver*, a critique of the Army's doctrine in the 1980s, there always has been more consensus on *where* it is - "between tactics and strategy" - and far less about *what* it is.¹⁷ Leonhard's observation is born out in the comparison of the contemporary definitions of the term and an examination of its origins.

First, the current FM 100-5, *Operations*, published in 1993, simply states that operational art is the means by which battle is translated into strategic objectives. The glossary contains a more detailed definition:

The employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organization, integration and execution of

battles and engagements into campaigns and major operations. In war, operational art determines when, where and for what purpose major forces will fight over time.¹⁸

The more recent Joint Publication 1-02, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* reflects the growing emphasis on a common professional language among the armed services. It retains the first part of the Army doctrinal definition, but operational art is now the prerogative of the joint force commander. Again, the focus is on the levels of war and what level of command is involved:

Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war.¹⁹

Part of the continuing emphasis on defining operational art using the levels of war and command results from what a former Army War College instructor, Colonel Ralph Allen calls "frustrating intellectual exercises"²⁰ intended to define activities associated with its practice. The literature on the subject is large, international, and often inconclusive and contradictory.²¹ Defining the "what" of operational art has been the focus of military theorist James J. Schneider at the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies. In two studies, *The Theory of Operational Art* and *Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art*, Schneider proposes both a theory and a set of conditions necessary for its practice. According to Schneider, "operational art is the creative use of distributed operations for the purposes of strategy."²² He introduces the term *distributed maneuver*, or

a coherent system of spatially and temporally extended relational movements and distributed battles, whether actual or threatened, that seek to seize, retain, or deny freedom of action.²³

Schneider links the phenomenon of distributed maneuver to the growth of armies in the 19th Century, from multiple corps composed of divisions, a development of the Napoleonic period, to the multiple field armies composed of corps that fought the First World War one hundred years later. His analogy is that the advent of distributed maneuver makes it necessary for planners and commanders to think in terms of not one but several chess boards, each with its own king.²⁴ Armies capable of distributed maneuver fight not one decisive battle, but many battles, simultaneously and in sequence. It is the effective combination of these type battles, and the distributed maneuver of each corps or army-level command from one battle to the next, that is the essence of operational art.

Schneider further hypothesizes that, "in order for operational art to flourish and sustain itself, seven necessary and sufficient contextual conditions must first exist."²⁵ The necessary conditions are:

- Weapons lethality extended beyond that of the smoothbore musket.
- Logistics capable of supporting successive movement and sustainment.
- Instantaneous communications.
- Operationally durable formations.
- Operational vision in the command structure.
- The enemy must be operationally minded.

- Nations involved have a distributed capacity to wage war.

He adds an eighth condition, the distributed deployment of forces to protect and attack resource and production areas, in connection with the last.

Clearly, Schneider sees the mature form of operational art as a phenomenon of Western Civilization. The increased firepower of small arms and artillery that scattered armies and forced distributed, inter-battlefield maneuver was made possible by the advanced, and rapidly advancing, weapons technologies of Europe and North America in the 19th Century. Continuous logistics is possible only through robust production and distribution systems that require not only developments such as the railroad, as Schneider observes, but organizations adequate to their control and management.²⁶ Instantaneous communication is possible only by means that operate at the speed of light: wireless or wired, the requirement is still for an advanced understanding and application of electronics. Operationally durable formations obviously depend on continuous logistics, but also on flexible organizations that permit the optimum mixing of the fighting arms and a mobilization base that can supply enough soldiers, in quality, quantity and time, to replace losses.

Operationally-minded commanders are the products of professional military education systems that arose concurrently with the Industrial Revolution. Finally, the distributed capacity to wage war, the mobilization of resources within a nation and subsequent requirement to attack throughout an opponent's strategic depth, obviously had its "highest expression," to use Schneider's term, during the Second World War, a war dominated by Western-

type power struggles, industrial systems, and imperial rivalries. John Keegan, tracing the origins of that war, summed up the result:

For the truth of twentieth-century European civilization was that the world it dominated was pregnant with war. The enormous wealth, energy, population increase released by Europe's industrial revolution in the 19th century had transformed the world...Above all, and in dramatic and menacing counterpoint to the century's works of hope and promise, it had created *armies*.²⁷

Schneider posits that operational art was practiced first by Union commanders during the American Civil War.²⁸ Yet it was part of U.S. Army doctrine then or even during the Second World War; the term entered the U.S. Army's lexicon with the 1982 edition of FM 100-5. The emphasis on levels of war and of command, as opposed to activity or function, began here.

General Glenn K. Otis, then commander of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), defined the term and its use this way in a 1981 article:

The operational art of war is practiced by large field, air and fleet units of the services. It involves joint, combined, and coalition forces that maneuver with the objective of defeating the enemy and achieving strategic objectives within a theater of operations...Operational art is primarily the planning and conduct of campaigns. The commander's perspective is of a theater of operations, rather than a battlefield.²⁹

TRADOC historian John Romjue summarized the introduction of operational art in 1982 by identifying its three characteristics as the Army understood the term. It required a third level of war, the operational, it was associated with the corps and field army level of command, and its focus was on the campaign rather than the battle.

Doctrine in the U.S. Army had acquired by the early 1980s a connotation beyond its encompassing generic meaning. Army doctrine connoted, at its heart and center, the operational level and vision of war -- the operational art. That expansion of its *Operations* doctrine by the U.S. Army into the realm of corps and large units lifted the vision of commanders from the tactical battle alone to the battle's context and larger purpose.³⁰

This shift from thinking in terms of battles, which had been the focus of the 1976 version of FM 100-5, to thinking in terms of campaigns that were linked to national strategy, resulted from two separate but related causes. The first was the doctrinal requirement to coordinate operations in depth against a potential massed attack by Soviet armor in Western Europe. The operational level of war, and its companion, the operational art of war, provided the necessary intellectual structure to accommodate the coordination of division and brigade-level defenses with deep strikes on uncommitted Soviet formations by tactical aircraft, corps-level artillery and attack helicopters.³¹

The operational level of war was "new" only in the sense that the U.S. Army had not included its theory and practice in its doctrine. Other armies, notably those of Germany and the Soviet Union, had long accepted the existence of the operational, or "grand tactical" level of war. Prior to its destruction at the end of the Second World War, the German Army in particular valued highly the ability to practice war at this level.

Operativ is an adjective which does not translate exactly into the English military vocabulary. Lying somewhere between 'strategic' and 'tactical', it describes the process of transforming paper plans into battlefield practice...Taught, insofar as it can be taught, in...staff college courses, its traits were eagerly looked for in the performance of general staff candidates and its manifestation...was rewarded with swift promotion.³²

The Soviet Army's doctrine, which already included the term, began to re-emphasize the operational level of war in the 1970s as a result of exhaustively studying their campaigns against the *operativ*-minded *Wehrmacht* during the Second World War. Part of the U.S. Army's interest in the operational level of war stemmed from the Soviet Army's new doctrinal developments at this level, such as the Operational Maneuver Group.³³ As then-TRADOC Commander, General Glenn K. Otis pointed out, the U.S. Army often had employed forces at the operational level, and practiced operational art, but had never thought in those terms.³⁴ Yet, while the U.S. Army's operational thinking in 1982 owed much to the imperatives of fighting the Soviet Union in Europe, it also had much to do with the legacy of the Vietnam War.

As Richard M. Swain observed in his study, *Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army*, "it was the shattering experience of the loss of the War in Vietnam that conditioned the doctrinal revolution in the U.S. Army in the seventies and eighties."³⁵ The renewed concern about fighting a potential land war with the Soviet Union in Western Europe was not entirely the result of a national security imperative. Rather, the Army as an institution was attempting to revive itself after the loss of the Vietnam War and focused on the defense of Europe as the mission which would assist in this capacity. Paul H. Herbert, in his study of the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, *Deciding What Has to Be Done*, supported this view by observing that post-Vietnam War doctrine was intended to "play a major role in expunging the bitter Vietnam War experience."³⁶ A focus on conventional war against the Soviet Union led in turn to the

recognition that within U.S. Army doctrine there existed a gap between strategic and the tactical thinking. In this idiosyncratic way, the loss of an undeclared, unconventional war in Asia caused the U.S. Army to build a new concept into its doctrine, in anticipation of fighting a conventional war in Europe.

The *discovery*, perhaps the *rediscovery*, of operational art, the creative activity practiced at the operational level, must be seen therefore, as much as a reaction to the loss of the war in Vietnam, and the intellectual pursuit of understanding that loss, as was any other aspect of the immediate post war years.³⁷

The Vietnam War experience is significant to understanding how and why the Army adopted operational art into its doctrine for another reason. Andrew F. Krepinevich argues in *The Army and Vietnam* that, rather than learning from the bitter and unsuccessful war in Vietnam, the Army chose to develop doctrines and adopt practices that would prevent its ever fighting in similar circumstances ever again. Citing as evidence the Weinberger Doctrine of the mid-1980s, claimed by both its namesake, then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and the armed services, to be the result of lessons learned from Vietnam, Krepinevich concludes that the criterion of "vital national interests" as the primary basis for going to war prevents the development of anything other than conventional war doctrine.

Committing U.S. combat forces only to areas of "vital" interest is yet another vague prescription reflecting a lesson unlearned from the Army's Vietnam experience. Indeed, the only two areas that can claim a clear consensus as representing vital U.S. interests - Western Europe and Japan - are sites for future mid- or high-intensity conflict. If the service defines low intensity conflict

contingencies in this manner, it is essentially defining away the need to address this form of warfare.³⁸

Krepinevich's argument is compelling in light of the *Force XXI Operations* conclusions about future war and the works of van Creveld, Keegan, Huntington and Peters. The U.S. Army may be on the verge of a new paradigm in war, one characterized by failed nation states, non-state warriors, unconventional operations and conflict among rival civilizations. Understanding that contemporary Army doctrine has its origins as much in avoiding one form of war, that is, unconventional war, as preparing to fight the next war, is crucial. Operational art as a theory has its origins in conventional war, the kind of war that Krepinevich argues is the only kind the U.S. Army wants to fight. *Force XXI Operations* states plainly, "the greatest intellectual challenge confronting the army today is doctrinal relevance."³⁹ A survey of those forms of war, and of projected strategic environments in which a doctrine based on the practice of operational art would have to be applied, follows.

III. Dark Visions

*From fighting cholera in eastern Zaire to blocking our coastal waters against economic migrations, from fighting forest fires in the American West to evacuating our citizens from Liberia to impounding nuclear materials in Kazakhstan and on to attempting to alter the patterns of Haitian collective behavior, our military future is visible all around us. There are few conventional heroes. No wonder we yearn to refight the battle of Gettysburg.*⁴⁰

Ralph Peters, referring to the interest in the Civil War found among many U.S. Army officers, artfully raises the same issue Krepinevich does. The

assumption he challenges is that large-scale, conventional battles and campaigns are the true components of war. Troublesome security issues of the type Peters raises are not war, and therefore not the proper focus for a professional army. Swain argues that "the U.S. Army coming out of Vietnam was overcome by a sort of professional nostalgia, a yearning for the simpler days of Napoleon or Grant and Lee."⁴¹ Whether or not Grant's world really was in any meaningful sense simpler than ours is beyond the scope of this paper. The meaningful issue is whether or not the Army's stated intent to maintain doctrinal relevance is supported by what evidence of future trends is available. Three dominant trends identified in *Force XXI Operations* challenge the future of operational art: the decline of the nation-state, the decisiveness of unconventional war, and the rise of inter-ethnic conflict.

The State in Decline?

In 1989, political scientist Francis Fukuyama opened post-Cold War predictions of the future with an optimistic chord, "And yet, good news has come,"⁴² arguing it was possible that the world was witnessing the universal triumph of liberal democracy. Fukuyama saw inherent weaknesses in authoritarian states, whether Right or Left, that would cause their collapse, and cited evidence that even in Third World countries greatly divorced from Western Civilization, a common political value set built around liberty and human rights was emerging.⁴³

Fukuyama's work is *not* listed in the bibliography of sources that contributed to the future threats summary in *Force XXI Operations*. Instead,

the concept of failed authoritarian states emerges in a mutated form: *all* nation-states are threatened with decline and may be overcome by future trends. From this general premise is derived the more specific thesis that conventional war is becoming more unlikely because the states required to practice it are failing and disappearing.

At the heart of conventional war theory is the 19th Century work of Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz. Though frequently the source of controversy and debate, his theory is prominent in the canon of military thought. As recently as 1997, the translation of his *On War* by Peter Paret and Michael Howard was listed in *Foreign Affairs* as "one of the most influential works of the last 75 years."⁴⁴ *On War* focuses on wars among states because, "Clausewitz regarded the growth of the modern state as the most significant process in history."⁴⁵ It was the state that practiced war to achieve political objectives. Clausewitz himself wrote,

When whole communities go to war - whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples - the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object.⁴⁶

He adds later, "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, *and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose,*"⁴⁷ (emphasis mine). A second, relevant component of Clausewitz's theory is his discussion of

the paradoxical trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.⁴⁸

If the nation-state fails, clearly it is the aspect of subordination that is absent from the trinity. In the absence of subordination, primordial violence and the play of chance are not in the service of the state.

Martin van Creveld sees the imminent end of the nation state and with it the irrelevance of Clausewitzian theory and conventional war.⁴⁹ The linkage between the rise of the state and war itself is very clear to van Creveld.

The principal function of the state, as that of all previous forms of government, has always been to fight other states, whether defensively in an attempt to defend its interests or offensively to extend them.⁵⁰

Van Creveld sees states dying everywhere in the world today, some violently as a result of their inability to control their own people, some gradually under the weight of their own expense and inertia. He cites as evidence four general problems plaguing modern states. First, the advent of nuclear weapons has made war between first class states impossible, thus depriving them of, in his view, their "principal function." Second, he sees the state's internal functions, of education, welfare and public works, as having been invalidated by more efficient and desirable non-state agencies. Third, modern information technology has invalidated the state's ability to control and manipulate their populations. Lastly, as a result of the irrelevance of the state's weaponry, the lessened need for its services by its citizens, and the free exchange of information, the state is losing the ability to control its people or compel them to act on its behalf.⁵¹

Van Creveld also sees as irrelevant the large, expensive and, in his view, impotent conventional forces of the developed world. "The military power fielded by the principal developed societies in both 'West' and 'East' is hardly relevant to the task at hand."⁵² The notion that developed states have fielded modern, highly capable military forces is a "myth" he argues, and the ideas about war that these forces are founded upon have come to a "dead end."⁵³ Those ideas, of course, belong to Clausewitz, and he attacks the U.S. Army in particular for a myopic adherence to 19th Century thinking. To understand future war, dispense with the idea of the state: "Over the long run, the place of the state will be taken by warmaking organizations of a different type."⁵⁴

Van Creveld further argues that the U.S. Army cannot understand the world it will have to fight in because it is steeped in notions of a "Trinitarian" relationship among the government, the army, and the people, or, what he sees as the core theory in *On War*. Trinitarian War theory is inadequate to explain modern wars because it assumes the existence of states to practice it. Therefore, non-state warfare is beyond the comprehension of the U.S. Army because its intellectual field of vision is obscured by Clausewitz's assumptions about what is and is not war.

Journalist Robert Kaplan saw a similar trend of broken states in his travels around the world during the first half of the 1990s. Echoing van Creveld's claim that only a few states are legitimate, he believes maps depicting the world's 190+ nations distort our perceptions, create an "artificial, inflexible reality"⁵⁵ and give shapes to countries that really exist

only as names and flags. Collapsing states create violent, chaotic regions where, in Kaplan's view, Fukuyama's Last Man, the liberal democratic product of the Western Enlightenment, is an impossibility, and is replaced by Thomas Hobbes's, "First Man, condemned to live a life that is 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.'"⁵⁶ The military challenge arising from this chaotic world of brutish men is that of the non-state warrior.

John Keegan sees this as the great oversight in Clausewitz's theory of war: that he does not address non-state warriors. Keegan maintains that Clausewitz's fundamental mistake was in not understanding that war preceded the existence of state. War is a phenomenon not of politics but of culture. The anti-state warrior societies Keegan describes in *A History of Warfare* are very similar to the late 20th Century warriors Ralph Peters believes now number in the tens of millions across the globe.⁵⁷ There is, he argues, an emerging threat from small, stateless groups determined to obtain their goals, whether political, economic or even cultural, through their willingness to inflict enough pain and suffering on the developed world. The threat is especially difficult to meet because of the legal and ethical restraints implicit in Western culture.

Euro-American soldiers in general learn a highly stylized, ritualized form of warfare, with both written and customary rules. We are at our best fighting organized soldieries who attempt a symmetrical response.⁵⁸

In their purest form, these non-state warriors see fighting its own justification. Kaplan observed men fighting for the sheer sake of fighting during his travels across regions as varied as West Africa, the Balkans, and Central Asia. He notes, "In places where the Western Enlightenment has not

penetrated and where there has always been mass poverty, people find liberation in violence.”⁵⁹ Van Creveld, in analyzing the reasons why men will fight in future wars, summed up the phenomenon as deeply rooted in human nature.

It is simply not true that war is solely a means to an end, nor do people necessarily fight in order to attain this objective or that...One very important way in which men can attain joy, freedom, happiness, even delirium and ecstasy, is by *not* staying home with wife and family, even to the point where, often enough, they are only too happy to give up their nearest and dearest in favor of - war!⁶⁰

His conclusion is startlingly similar to Homer’s observation about Bronze Age warriors on the plain before Troy, “Men grow tired of sleep, love, singing and dancing sooner than of war.”

As compelling, and even dramatic, as these arguments are, the evidence is not conclusive that the nation-state is failing or that Clausewitzian theory is irrelevant in understanding the phenomenon of future war. Kaplan’s wanderings through failed governments and ruined civilizations are good reading, but his conclusion, even supported as it is by van Creveld, that the world will dissolve in anarchy is one-sided and slightly hysterical. Alternative views exist and have considerable merit.

Oxford University historian Felipe Fernández-Armesto argues in his 1995 work *Millenium: A History of the Last Thousand Years*, that insecurity, chaos and terror will produce a far more dangerous result than anarchic violence, in the form of resurgent fascism expressed as stronger, totalitarian governments. *Force XXI Operations* does not address the possibility of new, powerful

totalitarian governments in its threat summary. Yet Fernández-Armesto's argument benefits from a much longer historical view than van Creveld's or Peters'. As quality of life advances in the liberal democracies, the benefits of comfort and security may in the minds of their citizens come to outweigh the costs of personal liberty. He writes, "In increasingly complex societies...order and social control will come to be more highly valued than freedom."⁶¹ Fernández-Armesto sees this as particularly likely in the rising Asian societies where the liberal traditions of the West are often viewed with suspicion or contempt.

Rather than existing states becoming totalitarian in response to chaos, or dissolving, there is a third alternative. They may organize into meta-states dependent upon one another through a dense network of interconnected functions that contribute to stability and order. Anne-Marie Slaughter, a professor of international law at Harvard University, is impatient with what she describes as the "new medievalists," who foresee a return to the pre-state world the preceded the Western state system. She rebuts the notion of the state's inability to adapt to the chaotic anarchy of a rapidly changing world.

The state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts. These parts...are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order. Today's international problems - terrorism, organized crime, environmental degradation, money laundering, bank failure, and securities fraud - created and sustained these relations.⁶²

Nations make firm contacts with other nations, not with transnational groups, warrior societies or individuals. Bureaucracy in its own implacable way

deters devolution: "Networks of bureaucrats responding to international crises and planning to prevent future problems are more flexible than international institutions."⁶³ Ultimately, Slaughter sees these networks as strengthening the state, in her view "the primary player in the international system," because they let states retain cohesion and respond collectively to global problems.⁶⁴

Alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are crucial networks. Josef Joffe, an editor and columnist with the German newspaper *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* and an associate at Harvard University, believes that the United States maintains an unchallenged position and is expanding its alliance systems principally because other states see this type of network as essential to their own survival. American power is the guarantor of global free trade, viable collective security and effective international cooperation.⁶⁵ If the nation-state were irrelevant, it is hard to see how the United States could exercise power like this. Successful states exist, and they link with each other.

Clearly, there are failed states in this world, but successful states always have been rare. It is unlikely that failed states pass on some fatal disease to others, as though victims of a plague. Rather, some states maintain their health and strength while others never had much of either to begin with. As Peter Drucker, a social sciences professor at Claremont Graduate University points out, predictions of the state's demise are nothing new.

Actually, the best and the brightest have been predicting the nation-state's demise for 200 years, beginning with Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay "Perpetual Peace," through Karl Marx in "Withering Away of the State," to Bertrand Russell's speeches in the 1950s and 1960s...Despite all its shortcomings, the nation-state has shown amazing resilience.⁶⁶

Furthermore, it is worth considering how much Kaplan, Peters and van Creveld are pessimistic because of their dissatisfaction with politics at home. In a review of Kaplan's *The Ends of the Earth*, tartly entitled, "The Occidental Tourist," Nader Mousavizadeh writes,

But beneath much of this fatalism about the prospects for the non-Western world lies a disillusionment with politics itself, a belief that primordial forces are now the decisive forces, an impatience with the fitful modernizing processes that have brought about democratic capitalism...⁶⁷

He concludes that collapsing nations come from the West's failure to maintain its own value system at a time when enlightened leadership from Western states is needed world-wide. Kaplan, seeing only trends of doom, has overlooked the significance of one of his own observations.

The state, recall, is a purely Western notion, one that until the twentieth century applied to countries covering only three percent of the earth's land area. Nor is the evidence compelling that the state, as a governing ideal, can be successfully transported to areas outside the industrialized world.⁶⁸

Possibly, it is the state system's inability to flourish in unstable environments that is in evidence, not the end of the state itself. Firmly established states appear viable enough over the next twenty years at least, and therefore their armies maintain an inherent relevance. Non-state warriors remain a threat, however, and Van Creveld, Keegan, Kaplan and Peters all see these men as a dangerous threat requiring a savage response. Yet this culture-based view of future war is not conclusive either.

In a 1994 review of both van Creveld's and Keegan's attacks on Clausewitz for *The Marxist Review*, Kirsten Cale, a London journalist, points out the consequences of a too-culturally focused interpretation of war.

The loss of rational principle in war...enables the military thinkers to present war - at least the wars of which they disapprove - as the activity of crazies governed by deep-seated atavistic impulses. This is especially true since the end of the political divide of East and West that used to suggest at least a semblance of ideological differences. Today, wars are invariably seen in anthropological terms. Conflicts which have been spawned by Great Power *realpolitik* are redefined as wars caused by ancient tribal and ethnic animosities. Culture, not politics, is taken to be the well-spring of militarism.⁶⁹

In Cale's view, the debate over the future of the nation-state is a smokescreen for the meddling of strong states in the affairs of the weak. To regard men in under-developed nations as incapable of rational acts, specifically, the ability to subordinate violence to the service of policy, justifies ruthless military intervention. Cale's reluctance to accept irrational explanations for war has support among mainstream historians. Sir Michael Howard, in his 1983 work, *The Causes of War* states,

However inchoate or disreputable the motives for war may be, its initiation is almost by definition a deliberate and carefully considered act...a matter of very precise central control. If history shows any ... accidental wars, I have yet to find them.⁷⁰

Viewing wars as irrational and the warriors of less-developed cultures as fierce in battle and irrational in motivation is an old practice. The conclusions that inevitably arise out of such premises are disturbing. Peters' implied solution to the challenge of non-state warriors is that professional soldiers be prepared to kill them to a man.⁷¹ True, violent, stateless men take fighting

seriously and a bloody single-mindedness on the behalf of their civilized opponents may be necessary from time to time.⁷² Still, extermination as the solution for defeating warrior bands is a late 20th Century echo of a 19th Century idea practiced in North America, against the warrior tribes of the Great Plains and Africa, and against Zulu, Ashanti and Dervish challengers to European encroachment.⁷³ Peters acknowledges what fighting this way means: "We are not going to get off easily in the conscience department."⁷⁴ The arguments about the future of the state, and of the prevalence of non-state warriors come full circle, because the wars that achieved the Great Plains for the United States and South Africa and the Sudan for Great Britain, unquestionably were acts of policy. War as an act of policy, whether practiced by states against warrior-clans or other states, returns us to Clausewitz.

Here, dissatisfaction with van Creveld's interpretation of Clausewitz arises when it becomes apparent that there is far more to the latter's work than a narrow analysis of nation-state violence in pursuit of policy objectives. Clausewitz is not advocating but describing war and his Trinitarian theory wholly accommodates the ruthless violence and deep hatred van Creveld sees as dominant features of future war. However, Clausewitz believes that it is possible to subordinate such violence and hatred, the existence of which he fully acknowledges in his world view. Van Creveld, Kaplan, and to some extent, Peters, dismiss this possibility; the warrior tide of anarchic violence will wash over us all. History suggests they are overstating their claim.

Violent, non-state warriors have been falling before the ranks of disciplined soldiers acting for their governments at least since the *Pax Romana*.⁷⁵

It is arguable whether there is any true connection between the resurgence of a ruthless warrior ethos and the decline of the state. The very sort of warrior-ethic that Kaplan, Peters and van Creveld regard as corrosive to the existence of the nation-state sustained two of the most terrifyingly unified nation-states in recent history: Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. In a similar way, within the last ten years, the ruthless expansionism of Serbian nationalists after Yugoslavia's collapse has had a unifying effect in Serbia proper.⁷⁶

These latter examples are evidence that armies themselves, so often seen as agents of destruction in the 20th Century, can act as agents of order. They need not act as agents of totalitarianism, either. As Colonel Douglas MacGregor points out in his book, *Breaking the Phalanx*, "the transformation of Germany and Japan into modern democratic states was achieved behind a defensive line drawn on the ground by American landpower."⁷⁷ The slender hope that the former provinces of Yugoslavia may emerge as viable, secure states peacefully integrated into the European family of nations is, as of this writing, sustained principally by the presence of the American Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In contrast, van Creveld, Kaplan and Peters have proposed a world of zero-sum trends, where the presence of chaos means the absence of order, where the presence of passion and hatred means the absence of reason and tolerance and where the death of the weaker states foretells the death of all. By dismissing the power of conventional forces, accepting uncritically that

the state is a doomed concept, and seeing the rise of non-state warriors as a cause of that doom, these futurists imply that professional soldiers must let the enemies of order choose the forms of war. This is not necessarily the behavior of successful armies; the injunction is to know thy enemy, not emulate him.

Unconventional War

Van Creveld makes the case for unconventional war's dominance early in *The Transformation of War*: "Assuming that politics is what wars are all about, then LICs [Low-Intensity Conflicts, or unconventional wars] have been politically the by far the most significant form of war waged since 1945."⁷⁸ He observes that despite the apparent material and organizational superiority of western-style forces used in the wars of de-colonization, the practitioners of irregular forms of war were successful 100% of the time.⁷⁹ The conventional armies of the developed are therefore completely irrelevant because the combination of numerous, non-military opponents, coupled with the absence of legitimate governments directing them, renders makes them obsolete. These are the large, standing armies equipped with high-lethality weapons and instant communications, organized and officered by carefully trained professionals and backed by robust national economies that, according to Schneider, alone make the practice of operational art possible.

Van Creveld's catalogue of success for the guerillas is long and hard to challenge. He states that the political changes resulting from essentially unconventional wars such as those fought in Vietnam (1945-75) or Algeria

(1954-62) have proven more lasting than, for example, Israel's occupation of the Sinai following the Six Day War. Decisive conventional campaigns since the Second World War for the most part have been successful in maintaining the status quo. Such campaigns have preserved Israel and rescued Kuwait but significant changes resulting from conventional campaigns are few. The 1980-87 Iran-Iraq War merely proved that it is still possible to fight costly, indecisive stalemates akin to the western front experience of the First World War.⁸⁰

In place of the conventional paradigm, van Creveld sees war taking the following form:

Judging by the experience of the last two decades, the visions of long-range, computerized, high-tech warfare so dear to the military-industrial complex will never come to pass. Armed conflict will have more in common with the struggles of primitive tribes than with large scale conventional war...War will not take place in the open field...It will be a war of listening devices and of car-bombs, of men killing each other at close quarters...It will be protracted, bloody and horrible.⁸¹

Likewise, Peters stressed the disbelief that accompanies warning calls of the dangers posed by unconventional forms of war:

It is hard to bring this point home, since traditionalists can dismissively ask whether one foresees a radical Islamic fundamentalist invasion of Missouri or a Rwandan raid on Wall Street, knowing that like-minded readers will nod approvingly...But ours is a world in which fringe Islamists bomb the World Trade Center...⁸²

Peters further notes that the emphasis on advanced technology weapons is misplaced; B-2 bombers are of little value in combating insurgents. In many articles, he points out an American fascination with technical solutions to human problems, and a refusal to recognize unconventional forms of war.⁸³

Like the imminent demise of the nation-state, the idea that unconventional war has demonstrated a decisive superiority over conventional war is not without major flaws. The war in Northern Ireland, a war of terrorist bombings, sudden ambushes and roadblocks, has gone on considerably longer than the conventional deadlock of the Iran-Iraq War. Even given the recent agreements signed in March, 1998, sporadic violence could break out among the civilian populations in Ulster or Great Britain at any time. Peace is now possible, but the compromises in the current plan imply that neither side got the objectives for which it fought. Ultimately, the objective became peace, not a unified Ireland or a British Ulster. The most optimistic forecasts for a permanent settlement do not envision either Catholic separatists or Protestant unionists obtaining their objectives.⁸⁴ Unconventional war appears no more immune to protraction and stalemate than conventional war. States which arose from successful unconventional campaigns, such as Vietnam and Algeria, now field considerable conventional armies. Once legitimate, states discard their guerillas and acquire conventional armies.

Like Kaplan's vision of a future populated by the brutish inhabitants of broken states, van Creveld's view of unconventional war is overwrought. His attempt to impress his readers with its awful reality strikes an oddly discordant note: "bloody and horrible" compared to *what?* On February 13, 1945, Allied bombers killed 50,000 German civilians during an air raid on Dresden. Horrifying though the Oklahoma City bombing was, no Western state has endured an unconventional attack worthy of comparison with the devastation

resulting from the major aerial attacks of the Second World War. Perhaps it is the fifty year absence of full-scale conventional war that has caused some memories to fade regarding just how truly horrible it, too, can be.⁸⁵

His observations concerning the complete irrelevance of conventional forces are even less compelling. To paraphrase mathematician David Berlinski, van Creveld's eagerness to make the fact of conventional war a fiction is almost certainly a sign of bad faith.⁸⁶ Unconventional war has shown its decisive power in the last 45 years. Conventional war showed all it needed to in the first half of the century. The threat of a global war remains and no lurid fascination with the suffering inherent in irregular operations should blind futurists to this fact. The Canadian military theorist John A. English warns, "To draw the conclusion that the days of great conventional wars between powers of the first rank have finally passed would...be premature."⁸⁷

Michael Howard dismisses outright van Creveld's predictions about conventional war: "Historians are as liable as anyone else to seize upon an ephemeral trend and project it into the future, and Dr. van Creveld seems to have fallen into that trap."⁸⁸ The flaw, and therefore the danger, in van Creveld's logic is obvious. The proof of unconventional war's decisiveness does not, in and of itself, render irrelevant those forces prepared to practice it conventional war. If both threats exist, both must be accommodated in the scope of fighting doctrine. Arguments that standing professional armies such as that of the United States have ignored the significance of unconventional wars,

perhaps willfully, have merit. Arguments that the one form has rendered the other obsolete are not conclusive. To again quote English:

Although God has not always been on the side of the big battalions, highly mobile, hard-hitting big armies are as likely as ever to defeat highly mobile hard-hitting small ones...The end of the compartmentalization of war, often exemplified by the myth that guerrilla warfare is somehow an exotic thing apart, should additionally encourage more creative military thinking. The unbridled extremes of warrior cults and the excesses of the Thirty Years' War will meanwhile continue to bear ghostly witness to war as a primitive phenomenon.⁸⁹

As Clausewitz himself recognized, the first step in preparing for war is to recognize the kind of war in which one is about to engage.⁹⁰ For Eliot Cohen, a professor of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins University, the question is not whether conventional forces, lavishly equipped with high technology weapons, are inferior or superior to unconventionally configured opponents. What matters is that a state has a clear concept of what its military forces exist to accomplish, something which he believes the United States lacks.⁹¹ Seeing the problem this way removes the intractable issue of what constitutes a conventional as opposed to an unconventional war and frames it squarely in terms of objectives, capabilities and costs. Advances in technology mean that smaller states, far from breaking up or dissolving at the hands of renegade warriors, may achieve the ability to defy the forces of greater powers and therefore find a practical use for war as an instrument of policy.

Future technologies may create pockets of military capability that will allow very small states to hold off larger ones, however, much as companies of Swiss pikemen could stop armies sweeping through their mountain passes...Herein lies a potential challenge even for the United States, which will find itself

attempting to project military power for limited purposes at a low cost in materiel and lives.⁹²

Limited wars are not necessarily conventional or unconventional, and it is possible to comprehend their nature with or without Clausewitz or van Creveld. Of the two, however, Clausewitz seems more useful as a guide. His concept of war includes the real and the absolute, with a continuum of violence lying between them. Within this continuum, many forms and kinds of wars were possible, and, even more important, desirable, depending on the political purpose of the war. Therefore, limited wars for limited aims emerge from his theory as potential "ideal forms," according to the political objectives established for the war. One biographer regards this, "the theoretical acceptance of gradations of violence," as his supreme achievement.

Instead of a single absolute, he now posited a pair of absolutes. Reality, the limitations of violence, need no longer be an imperfect vision of the ideal. Depending on the purpose of the particular war, and on the manner in which it was waged, reality might closely reflect the ideal - even more closely in a limited war than in an absolute conflict.⁹³

Edward Luttwak, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, also regards Clausewitz's theory as relevant, even "unsurpassed" in teaching about the nature of war, but sees a different problem than unconventional opponents or the high-technology equivalent of Swiss Pikemen confronting U.S. military forces. The political risk resulting from combat casualties haunts any U.S. deployment into a potential hostile fire area. It is "routinely the decisive constraint"⁹⁴ on military operations. He advocates a departure from what he views as war for high purposes, Clausewitzian war, entailing a potentially

higher expenditure of human life, and adoption of protracted, less immediately decisive military doctrines of the type he labels "post-heroic."⁹⁵ The imperatives of the offensive, decisive battle and quick results have to be replaced with the patient application of military power, and greater attention to minimizing friendly casualties. The point is not whether Luttwak has a viable doctrine but that his concerns, along with Cohen's, address issues larger than the conventional war versus unconventional war debate.

A further argument in favor of abandoning what appears to be an empty distinction between forms of war is the emergence of new technologies which may alter our understanding of conflict between nations. "Cyberwar" already has a vast literature of its own, and few conclusions about its nature are widely accepted. Yet its potential impact is great. Cyberwar may involve attacks through the dense networks of interconnected information systems that encircle the world, with the intent of disrupting the complex control systems that make advanced societies function.

The revolutionary forces of the future may consist increasingly of wide-spread multi-organizational networks that have no particular national identity, claim to arise from civil society, and include aggressive groups and individuals who are keenly adept at using advanced technology for communications, as well as munitions.⁹⁶

Another form of high-technology attack is "Bio-war," where genetic engineering goes beyond the biological agents developed during the Cold War and creates new forms of organically "grown" weapons and equipment that could inflict crippling attacks without the employment of traditional military forces at all. Variations of such attacks abound. In one scenario, "antimaterial

microorganisms selectively target and destroy the adversary's silicon devices: they eat the insides of their computers."⁹⁷

Wired magazine, the printed text voice of the paperless information revolution, published a scenario where invisible network-based attackers strike at systems that control American transportation networks, banking, news media and military command centers.⁹⁸ While the scenario obviously is intended to be more flashy than substantive, it is likely that more future enemies of the United States read and have access to the ideas expressed in *Wired* than in van Creveld or even Kaplan simply because of the lure of the ongoing information technology revolution. Such attacks may create an entirely different form of coercion that transcends any meaningful definition of war, as for example, they imply a complete breakdown of the dramatic imperatives of time, place and action that define the concept of "a battle."

These last two trends are more significant than the debate about a conventional-to-unconventional paradigm shift. It is the enemy's ability to employ high-technology weapons, whether digital upgrades of traditional systems or elaborate cyber- or bio-weapons, and the ability to inflict high U.S. casualties, at home or on expeditionary military forces, that appear to have the greatest potential impact on future military operations.

War Between Cultures

The most influential, and controversial, theorist whose work appears in the *Force XXI Operations* bibliography is Samuel Huntington. His new paradigm

for the post-Cold War world, "the clash of civilizations," generated the most discussion in *Foreign Affairs* since George Kennan published his famous "Mr X" article on the containment of the Soviet Union there in 1947.⁹⁹ Huntington maps the new world in seven, possibly eight, colors, each representing a civilization potentially in conflict with the others: Western, Eastern Orthodox, Latin American, Islamic, Japanese, Chinese, Hindu and, possibly, African.

Central to his thesis is the notion that there is no international identity toward which all the world's people would strive. Rather, each type civilization "is civilized in its own way."¹⁰⁰ Most defining characteristics of each civilization are religious or derived religious heritage. Each of these civilizations is a human tectonic plate, and the fault lines predict coming cataclysms. "The most dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance and Sinic assertiveness."¹⁰¹

The fractured quasi-state of Bosnia-Herzegovina provides perhaps the example *par excellence* of Huntington's model, where, like the San Andreas system of multiple shifting plates, Catholic Croats, Muslim Bosniaks and Orthodox Serbs have clashed repeatedly over the same territory for centuries. Fault line wars breed intractable, fanatical passion in their indigenous warriors.¹⁰² The theory allows for state and non-state involvement in these type wars; Huntington fully recognizes that nation-states are fighting other nation-states, as well as fighting and supporting non-state groups, along the various fault lines, and that this trend is likely to continue.

Huntington identifies "kin countries" and "diasporas" that influence the fault lines. The chauvinism of peoples who feel kinship with distant homelands often exceeds that of those who, for whatever reason, stayed home. In return, the homelands, or kin countries, provide moral, material and political support to their distant kin. While relationships like this exist in Europe, for example between Bosnian Croats and Croatia proper, or North America, between the Quebecois and France, Muslims most frequently adhere to the model.

The most active [kin countries] have been the governments of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Libya, who together, at time with other Muslim states, have contributed varying degrees of support to Muslims fighting non-Muslims in Palestine, Lebanon, Bosnia, Chechnya, the Transcaucasus, Tajikstan, Kashmir, Sudan and the Philippines.¹⁰³

In a memorable summation, Huntington states, "Fault line wars are intermittent; fault line conflicts are interminable."¹⁰⁴ Open war stops when participants are exhausted and stronger outside powers intervene. The implications for the U.S. Army are obvious and already in evidence with the open-ended deployments of ground forces in Bosnia and the Sinai Peninsula.

Huntington's vision invokes images of barbarians at the gates; in his model, each of the contenders regards its opponents as the barbarians. All civilizations are not equal in value, however, and he closes with an assessment of Western Civilization's future dominance. As the strongest nation-state and a component of the Western community, the United States obviously has the most crucial roll. Here he sees two trends which affect American capability to wage war effectively. First, he sees as dangerous and divisive the domestic American academic and social movement commonly referred to as

"multiculturalism." Failure of the United States to maintain its identity with the West means a decline in the power and influence of Western Civilization. Second, he sees the need to reject closer American identification with Asia; economic ties are inevitable, but the gap between Western and Sinic, Japanese and Hindu civilizations would prevent the establishment of common cultural ground. As a result, the United States would find itself marginalized.

Behind the complexity of civilizations in conflict, disturbing numbers lurk that sharpen Huntington's theory and make it offensive to many. Of a projected 7.2 billion people in the world by the year 2010, fewer than 800 million will belong to Western Civilization, which will control 24% of the earth's surface.¹⁰⁵ Emigration flows from the under-developed to the developed world. The West faces a human tidal wave from incompatible cultures just as surely as the Roman Empire did prior to the Battle of Adrianople in 376 AD which opened the way for the Gothic takeover of the Western Empire 100 years later.¹⁰⁶ The cultural nightmares inherent in the displacement, or replacement, of one people by another are the tinderboxes of brutal, uncompromising wars. Also, the pressures of immigration will continue to inspire repugnant politics in the democracies. The combination makes it difficult for the United States in particular to conduct public debates on this issue, let alone propose solutions. The clash of civilizations also has the potential to ignite a major global war. While Huntington accepts that a major war between the Muslim and non-Muslim world is possible, he sees as far more likely a war between rapidly rising China and the United States. This war has the potential to assume a form

within the large-scale conventional paradigm, yet obviously it would be tempered by both powers' possession of nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁷

Huntington's theory is not universally accepted and two critical approaches have emerged. One emphasizes the power of state interests over cultural identities, while the other resists a self-fulfilling prophecy where, by declaring other cultures hostile, the West would make them so. Stephen Walt, a political science professor at the University of Chicago, believes Huntington has underestimated nationalism by positing a system in which wars break out because of allegiance to one of seven or eight established civilizations.

This neglect of nationalism is the Achilles' heel of the civilizational paradigm. As Huntington himself points out, "civilizations" do not make decisions; they are an abstract cultural category rather than a concrete political agency. States ... have defined borders, designated leaders, established decision-making procedures, and direct control over political resources.¹⁰⁸

Walt effectively demolishes the notion that we are witnessing an unequivocal realignment of state interests based on cultural affinities. He cites the on-going Western-led peace enforcement mission to protect Muslim Bosniaks and the presence of Arab military formations from various states in the predominantly Western coalition that drove Saddam Hussein (whose foreign minister is a Christian) from Kuwait in 1991.¹⁰⁹ He further notes that, by treating nations outside Huntington's civilizational groupings as hostile, "we are likely to create enemies that might otherwise be neutral or friendly."¹¹⁰

Along these same lines, Fouad Ajami, professor of Middle Eastern studies at Johns Hopkins University makes the opposite case for state power: Civilizations do not control states, but states control civilizations. Western

Civilization's dominance comes from the combined power of Europe and the United States, not the other way around. His long vision extends to the Peloponnesian War, and the brutal Athenian attack on the Melians, civilizational kinsmen who trusted that their common blood would save them.¹¹¹ Ajami questions fault line theory and rejects the understanding of Serbian and Croatian attacks on Bosnia as manifestations of cultures in conflict. The sanguinary quarrel between Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia should not, in his view, be "made into a fight of the inheritors of Rome, Byzantium and Islam."¹¹² To do so obscures causality, and therefore, responsibility. If the human agency of Croat leader Tujman and Serb leader Milosevic, who used cultural histories to justify their aggression, is overlooked, the war in the former Yugoslavia seems inevitable, and not the result of deliberate acts of policy.

Kishore Mahbubani, an academic and former diplomat from Singapore, believes Huntington underestimates the degree to which the rest of the world seeks Western leadership, and does not welcome the introduction of a model that draws sharp lines between "us" and "them." However, his critique, more than most, and perhaps unintentionally, sharpens the perception of conflict Huntington posit between the dominant West and the other civilizations. While Mahbubani says East Asia and Japan are "more comfortable" associating with the West, and rejects the notion that there is inherent conflict between them, he also supports Huntington's fears of a declining, and vulnerable, Western Civilization.¹¹³ He is wary of a theory that supports Western disengagement from the developing world, on the grounds that conflicts there are intractably

tied into long established conflicts among incompatible civilizations, and fears this would be replaced by sporadic, purely military interventions.

Huntington's theory introduces some new concerns for doctrine. The protracted nature of Fault Line wars -- whether one accepts his explanation of their causes or not, the wars are a matter of record -- coupled with the role of outside powers as mitigating forces, implies that decisive military operations may be unsuitable in this context. However, the United States' dominance within Western Civilization implies the continuing need for U.S. military participation in the form of expeditionary operations. These would involve combat operations in remote areas or within enormous conurbations populated by rival members of warring civilizations.

Yet Huntington does not imply a fundamental shift in the nature of future war. As his critics rightly point out, the evident points to the continued power of states, not their replacement by cultures. State power implies state interests, which imply wars conducted as instruments of policy, not as acts of trans-state affiliation on behalf of emotional causes or deep-seated cultural identities. *All* of Huntington's critics agree that the demonstrated power of Western science and state organizations is studied in every civilization he mentions. Whether or not these civilizations embrace liberal democracy, the industrial, technological and organizational power of Western ways is compelling. Ideas, patterns of organization and technical capabilities will move into civilizations that did not invent them or do not embrace the values that led to their development. Whatever the clash of civilizations may turn out

to be, the forms of future war appear not to be culturally based. Nations want to fight with the best weapons obtainable, using to the most suitable force structures, regardless of where the systems or the doctrine originated.

IV. The Future of Operational Art

*The implications are that neither war nor the course that war may take can ever be predicted with any more accuracy than the stock market. It is within such a province of chaos, however, that armies have always been expected to march.*¹¹⁴

Perhaps it was by design that the term "operational art" was not included anywhere in *Force XXI Operations*. The combination of a new world order, new technologies, and new threats may have led to the conclusion that there is no longer a need to build Army doctrine around a concept introduced twenty years ago in order to prepare for a large - scale conventional war with the Soviet Union. If the omission was unintentional, it was a remarkable oversight, given the prominence of operational art in the current edition of FM 100-5. In the context of the Army's preparations for the 21st Century, the role of operational art is either not clear or overlooked. Schneider's seven necessary conditions provide criteria for attempting to judge its utility. Given the conditions described in Chapter III, each criterion can be assessed as present or not present. From this assessment, a general judgement is possible regarding the future utility of operational art for military planners.

The first condition, that of weapons lethality extended beyond the range of the smoothbore musket, is easily and obviously met by every futurist

discussed. Some "weaponry," for cyber- or biowar attacks, is also advancing beyond the need for military formations of any kind. Generally, however, the need for the extended deployment of tactical units, and their organization into bodies capable of executing distributed maneuver, is implied.

The second condition, that of logistics systems capable of supporting successive movement and sustainment, is neither explicitly confirmed as present or identified as absent. Certainly the U.S. Army meets this criteria; its strategic mobility is second to none in the world today. Protracted wars, of the type envisioned by van Creveld, imply the need for protracted sustainment, but not necessarily successive movement. The capability exists worldwide; some armies may lack the money or organizational skill to take advantage of it.

The third criteria, of instantaneous communications, is easily met by the rapidly developing communications and information technologies now spread worldwide. This capability cannot safely be assumed to be exclusively a feature of first world armies.

The fourth criteria, operationally durable formations, raises the first serious challenge to operational art's future viability. The political constraints of low, or no, casualties, and no perceived setbacks in the field, imply that U.S. land combat formations, no matter how well designed or supported in the field, will not be operationally durable. They will not be able to fight battles, take casualties, possibly suffer tactical reverses, and continue to maneuver in support of an overall campaign plan. Battle deaths, and unfavorable tactical outcomes recorded by the news media, could halt any operation or drastically

curtail its scope and intent. At a far more fundamental level, the U.S. Army's opponents may not have formations of any kind. The enemy may be non-state warriors operating in ad hoc groups, or "cyber-warriors" collaborating against U.S. information systems from geographically separate locations.

The *theoretical* capability to field operationally durable formations remains with both the U.S. Army and its potential opponents, however. As English, Huntington and Cohen point out, there are no guarantees that a general conventional war is impossible. Nothing that has been predicted eliminates the capacity of nations to field operationally durable formations. The need for them to do so is becoming a matter of choice, given the advent of scenarios such as Cohen's advanced technology stand-off or cyber-war attacks. The forms of war are expanding in number, not replacing one another.

Non-state warriors may form operationally durable formations capable of sustained campaigning. Their desire to fight continuously and the absence of political pressure associated with high casualties may mean that our potential enemies could field formations with higher levels of operational durability than we possess. Overall, this criterion seems less in evidence in the U.S. Army, because of the casualty issue, than in our opponents.

The fifth criterion, operational vision in the command structure, clearly exists in current American doctrine. Its presence in the doctrines of others is confirmed by the unlikely source of van Creveld, who notes with displeasure the presence of American and European military assistance officers in capitals all over the developing world teaching what he regards as useless and outdated

methods of war. As the analysis of van Creveld demonstrated, his argument regarding the uselessness of conventional war is exaggerated. The information imparted by Western officers to developing nations is likely to be greeted with a fair amount of respect, given the arguments of Ajami and Mahbuhbani. It is therefore likely that the leadership of potential opponents will possess the necessary military knowledge to think in operational terms.

It is the sixth criterion, that the enemy must be operationally minded as well, to provide a suitable medium against which to practice operational art, that is mathematically the least likely to be present in future wars. Even given that conventional war is not obsolete, and that these nations may have officers taught to think operationally, most conflicts in the world will assume unconventional forms. The U.S. Army's opponents may have no campaign plan at all, other than to survive the onslaught of American weaponry. It is also possible that their "campaign plans" may assume the forms of media offensives or attempts to influence American and allied democratic political processes.

This criterion itself is questionable, however, given the structure of the theory. The ability to practice operational art should confer an advantage regardless of the enemy's mind-set. An enemy wedded to the classical strategy of the single point, and not thinking in larger, broader terms - many chess boards as opposed to only one - should be inherently at a disadvantage when opposed by a friendly force thinking operationally. Furthermore, this criterion implies a surrender of the initiative at the outset, as it ties the practice of operational art to what form of war the enemy chooses. It also

leaves open the question of what response is possible from the friendly force if the enemy is not operationally minded. The possibility that the friendly force would simply cease thinking operationally as well is faintly ludicrous.

The seventh and final criterion, that the nations involved have a distributed capacity to wage war, appeared most vulnerable to the futurists predictions, because of the theory of the declining nation state and the rise of non-state warriors. The counter-arguments indicate that what van Creveld, Kaplan and Peters describe is additional, it does not replace existing orders. Failed states certainly exist, yet the developed nations, and those emerging over the next ten to twenty years, certainly will have the robust financial and industrial infrastructure needed for the distributed capacity to wage war. The United States, the dominant power over this same period, a hypothesis which none of the futurists challenged, unquestionably will retain this capacity.

Schneider lists in relation to this last criterion the ability of a nation to defend its war making capacity. The U.S., and every other developed nation, may lose this capability altogether. Wars of the future, especially those that may feature cyber-attacks or terrorist strikes employing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons pose a direct and, at this time, unanswerable threat to the industrial bases required to wage war. The increasing interdependence among nation-states, identified by Slaughter as the primary reason they will not fail, also implies that the ability of one nation to achieve the necessary economic and political independence to wage war on another nation state may be becoming a thing of the past.

All of these criteria form the basic conditions for the practice of Schneider's basic definition of operational art, the "creative use of distributed operations for the purposes of strategy,"¹¹⁵ Distributed maneuver is,

a coherent system of spatially and temporally extended relational movements and distributed battles, whether actual or threatened, that seek to seize, retain, or deny freedom of action.¹¹⁶

Schneider rightly maintains that theory does not "describe," it "suggests." The comparisons above suggest the following conclusions.

First, that operational art remains a vital component of conventional warfighting doctrine and that conventional war is not a thing of the past. The possibility remains that the U.S. Army will fight the armies of rival nation-states engaged in a war that is the pursuit of a stated policy. It is possible that non-state armies, funded and organized by criminal syndicates, trans-national religious movements, or kin states as in the Huntington model, may engage in protracted, distributed military operations that take on the characteristics of a campaign. In this situation, the ability to link battles or engagements to the strategic aims of the United States would require operational art.

Second, that the new features of the post-Cold War world described by the futurists imply additions to the forms of war the U.S. Army must be prepared to practice, but do not replace the existing conventional paradigm. The significance for operational art is two-fold. It is obvious that forms of war are emerging, such as cyber-war, that are not best described in terms of battles, engagements or campaigns and are not likely to be fought by enemies assuming formations against which the U.S. Army could operate or having

commanders who are operationally-minded. In such cases, assuming that the prosecution of such wars would become an Army mission, thinking operationally, that is, within the outlines of Schneider's theory, is neither possible nor practical because of the absence of formations and hierarchies.

Third, a potential oversight in American understanding of operational art lies in its application to so-called unconventional wars. As English makes clear, and as supported by Luttwak and Cohen, the line between what is conventional and unconventional war is fuzzy and perhaps meaningless. All three see expeditionary operations against armed enemies as necessary components of future American military strategy. The employment of military forces, whether in corps or in teams, clearly benefits from an understanding of how the planning of battles is linked to a sequence of operations designed to attain a national objective. If, as *Force XXI Operations* states, future U.S. Army missions will be characterized by overwhelming power that is not necessarily combat power - the example given is the delivery of vital food supplies during a relief mission in an unconventional environment- then Schneider's basic definition, of creatively using distributed operations to effect strategy, is both useful and practical. Seeing engagements in their strategic context is vital in a politically-charged, controversial counter-guerilla war, for example.

The Army's continued reliance on Clausewitzian concepts of war as a form of policy practiced by nation-states is not a handicap or source of myopia. Even if our opponents are stateless and well-armed, the U.S. Army remains the instrument of an established nation-state, it can be nothing else, and that

essential subordination of violence to state control makes *our* actions subject to interpretation in Clausewitzian terms, regardless of the actions of our opponents. That the U.S. Army can act as an instrument of order in that capacity is important, given the rise of chaotic political environments around the world. Chaos is not insurmountable; to abandon theories of control over "primordial violence" as we enter the violent, chaotic world of the 21st Century is folly.

Finally, the presence or absence of operationally-minded enemies should not, by itself, dictate whether or not the U.S. Army will think operationally. To do otherwise would allow the enemy to choose the form of war in every military confrontation. Operational art is a sufficiently flexible concept that *every* military operation undertaken against armed enemies can be envisioned in terms of battles or engagements, linked sequentially or by effects, to strategic objectives. The creative solution of the problems posed by expeditionary operations against the wide variety of threats portrayed in *Force XXI Operations* demands nothing less.

Endnotes

¹ Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet (TRADOC PAM) 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*, (Fort Monroe, VA: 1994), p. 1-3.

² See John L. Romjue, *American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War* (Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1997), pp. 6-8.

³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated by Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.87.

⁴ *Force XXI Operations*, p. 2-1 - 2-2.

⁵ Van Creveld ranks as one of the most influential military historians and theorists of the late 20th Century. His works include *Command in War*, *Supplying War* and *Technology in War*, commonly found on the reading lists of staff colleges throughout the Western world. In addition, he authored widely acclaimed studies of the German Army's command and staff system during the Second World War, and is a frequent contributor to professional military journals such as *Parameters*. He is now a professor of history at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

⁶ Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, (New York: Free Press, 1991), p. 2.

⁷ See Van Creveld, "The Fate of the State" in *Parameters*, Spring, 1996.

⁸ Keegan is possibly the best known professional military historian in the English - speaking world. His most famous work remains *The Face of Battle*, published in 1976, an imaginative one-volume collection of battle narratives and a thorough critique of military history itself. His other books include *The Mask of Command*, *The Price of Admiralty*, *Six Armies in Normandy* and *The Nature of War*. More recently he has published *A History of War*, which opens with his critique of von Clausewitz, and *Fields of Battle*, more of a meditation than a history, on famous campaigns fought in North America. A former senior lecturer at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK, he is now Defense Correspondent for *The Daily Telegraph*.

⁹ John Keegan, *A History of War*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), pp. 391-2.

¹⁰ Keegan, *The Face of Battle*, (New York: Dorset Press, 1976), p. 336.

¹¹ Samuel P. Huntington, now a professor at Harvard University and director of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, is one of the most prominent political scientist in the United States for the last 40 years; his ideas helped shape foreign policy and strategic theory during the Cold War. His classic, *The Soldier and the State*, remains a standard work for the study of civil-military relations within democratic nations. He was director of security planning for the National Security Council during the Carter Administration. *The Clash of Civilizations* is no less influential because it is written from the perspective of a man intimately familiar with the security challenges to the West during the Cold War and who recognized early on that new thinking is required to understand the new, post-Cold War paradigm.

¹² A best-selling novelist and controversial intelligence officer, Ralph Peters' personal accomplishments are many and varied. He recently was selected as one of "100 Americans to watch" by *Newsweek* magazine. He also is among the most widely-traveled U.S. Army officers, having visited, in the course of official duties, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Ossetia, Abkhazia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Turkey, and most of Latin America as well as various West European countries. He has mastered many languages and is an outspoken advocate for the need to develop and maintain an understanding of the changing world from a human perspective, as opposed to one focused on technology or economics.

¹³ Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class" in *Parameters*, Summer, 1994.

¹⁴ James J. Schneider, *Vulcan's Anvil, The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 16 June 1991), p. 65-67.

¹⁵ See Romjue, *American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War*, p.8, note 4, which provides a summary of the theoretical work and general officer decisions that led to the term's inclusion in US Army doctrine. Schneider's theory also is used as a point of departure for the study of operational art at the US Army's School of Advanced Military Studies. See Advanced Military Studies Program Course 1, *Foundation of Military Theory*, (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997-8), p. 50.

¹⁶ Robert R. Leonhard, *The Art of Maneuver* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991), p. 11.

¹⁷ Leonhard, personal email to the author, 16 April 1998. LTC Leonhard was responding to a series of questions I had asked of LTC William Hix regarding the Army After Next program's position on the future of operational art. In their responses, both officers, assigned as of this writing to the Training and

Doctrine Command, addressed the term's ambiguity and the Army's tendency to focus on what command level, as well as what level of war, operational art is best suited for. Both also saw a continuing need for operational art, even though the term is not addressed in *Force XXI Operations*. Neither's comments reflect official view of the US Army.

¹⁸ Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1993), Introduction, p. V and Glossary, p. 6. A different definition of the term is offered in the Final Coordinating Draft of the 1997 FM 100-5, which, as of this writing, has not yet been released for publication.

¹⁹ Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 23 March 1994), p. 300.

²⁰ Ralph Allen, "Piercing the Veil of Operational Art," *Parameters*, Winter, 1986, p. 111.

²¹ As an example, Lieutenant Colonel Leonhard provided me with a slide depicting three common uses of the term inside and outside the US Army. One, that it is synonymous with grand tactics, holds that it is the process which facilitates battlefield victory through maneuver. Another, more in line with the contemporary joint and Army definitions, links it to the prosecution of military campaigns. A third links it directly to strategy and holds that it seeks to obviate battle and instead apply military power directly to achieve a desired political end state.

²² James J. Schneider, *Theoretical Paper Number 4. Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 16 June 1991), p. 64.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Schneider, *Theoretical Paper Number 3, The Theory of Operational Art*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, March, 1988), p. 11.

²⁵ Schneider, *Vulcan's Anvil*, p. 65-67. The list of seven provided is derived from Schneider's itemization and description of them at the conclusion of *Theoretical Paper Number 4*.

²⁶ James R. Beniger, *The Control Revolution*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 226-255 discusses the impact of new technologies such as the railroad and machine production on the organizations seeking to exploit them.

²⁷ John Keegan, *The Second World War*. (New York: Viking Penguin, 1989), p. 12. The figure of 50 million deaths from the war also is quoted from this same work and page.

²⁸ The debate over *when* operational art first appeared, during the US Civil War or the Napoleonic Wars, appears to be a favorite topic at the School for Advanced Military Studies. From the author's viewpoint, these arguments, while entertaining, are distractions from the far more important requirement to define what operational art is. Schneider's thesis appears stronger, as it considers developments from the Industrial Revolution.

²⁹ Glenn K. Otis, "Doctrinal Perspectives of War" reprinted in John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-82* (Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, June 1984), Appendix C, Document 7, p. 111.

³⁰ Romjue, *American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War*, p. 8.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16-20, *passim*.

³² Keegan, *Six Armies in Normandy*, (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 243.

³³ See C.N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group: A New Challenge for NATO," in *Military Review*, March, 1983, reprinted from *International Defense Review*, November 1982.

³⁴ Otis, p. 109.

³⁵ Richard M. Swain, *Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the US Army*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, undated), p. 4.

³⁶ Paul H. Herbert, *Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), p. 1. While Herbert's history does not include the introduction of the operational level of war to US Army doctrine, he does describe the change in doctrine's importance within the Army in 1974-76 that led to operational art six years later.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

³⁸ Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 270.

³⁹ *Force XXI Operations*, p. 4-2.

⁴⁰ Ralph Peters, "After the Revolution" in *Parameters*, Summer 1995, p. 10.

⁴¹ Swain, *Filling the Void*, p.42

⁴² Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (New York: MacMillan, 1992), p. xiii.

⁴³ See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992). Fukuyama's thesis was neither universally embraced nor derided. What it did accomplish was to touch off a debate about the future of liberal states that seems, in 1998, to have confirmed many of Fukuyama's observations about political discourse in America recorded in the subchapter entitled *Our Pessimism in The End of History and the Last Man*. Although his work was not cited *Force XXI Operations*, Fukuyama is now consulting on the development of the Army's post-2010 doctrine, *Army After Next*.

⁴⁴ The reviewer, Eliot Cohen, regards *On War* as the "most profound nonfiction work on war ever written." *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1997, p. 219.

⁴⁵ Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), p.3.

⁴⁶ Clausewitz, p. 86-87.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

⁴⁹ See van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* for a discussion of the trends that make conventional war unlikely. For a detailed treatment of the future irrelevance of the state system, see "The Fate of the State," in *Parameters*, Spring, 1996.

⁵⁰ Van Creveld, "The Fate of the State," p.4.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4-12, *passim*.

⁵² Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, (New York: Free Press, 1991), p. ix.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. x.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

⁵⁵ Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1994, pp. 69-70. See also his subsequent book detailing all of his travels, *The Ends of the Earth*, (New York: Random House, 1996), where, in chapter one, he expands on his perception of the state as an artificial construction that has already failed, conceptually, in much of the world.

⁵⁶ Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," p. 60. The quote is from Thomas Hobbes's 17th Century treatise, *Leviathan*, (Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books, 1980), p. 186.

⁵⁷ John Keegan, *A History of War*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), pp. 7-9 passim, and Ralph Peters, "Winning Against Warriors" p.21-24, passim.

⁵⁸ Ralph Peters, "Winning Against Warriors" in *Parameters*, Summer, 1994.

⁵⁹ Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," p. 72

⁶⁰ Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, p. 227.

⁶¹ Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *Millenium, A History of the Last Thousand Years*, (New York: Scribner, 1995), p. 726.

⁶² Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Real New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October, 1997, p. 184. The alphabet soup of acronyms that follows any nation's entry in the Central Intelligence Agency's *World Fact Book*, indicating to which organizations and treaties the state in question is a member or signatory, provides convincing visual evidence that Slaughter's thesis that modern states seek more and more elaborate ties, is sound.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

⁶⁵ See Josef Joffe, "How America Does It" in *Foreign Affairs*, September/October, 1997, p. 26-27.

⁶⁶ Peter F. Drucker, "The Global Economy and the Nation-State." *Foreign Affairs*, September/October, 1997, p. 159.

⁶⁷ Nader Mousavizadeh, "The Occidental Tourist," *The New Republic*, April 15, 1996, p. 32.

⁶⁸ Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy" p. 69

⁶⁹ Kirsten Cale, "Cultural Wars," *Marxist Review of Books*, November, 1994.

⁷⁰ Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars*, (New York: Random House, 1983), p.12

⁷¹ Peters, "The New Warrior Class", p. 12.

⁷² The surrender of the modern, well-equipped Dutch peacekeeping battalion, part of the United Nations peacekeeping force at Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, which resulted in thousands of deaths among the Muslim population there, illustrates Peters' point. See David W. Rohde, *Endgame* (Farrar-Straus & Geroux, 1998).

⁷³ For an unconventional view, almost a polemic, regarding 19th Century attitudes toward killing non-Europeans, see John Ellis, *The Social History of the Machine Gun* (London: Pimlico Books, 1976). Keegan offers what amounts to an apologist's view of the American conquest of the Plains Indians in his *Fields of Battle: The Wars for North America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997). Given his bias in favor of things American, and Ellis's extreme pessimism regarding the ethics of Euro-American civilization, reading the two together provides a startling contrast in views over essentially the same issue: how do powerful states respond to armed resistance by weaker peoples when pursuing "vital national interests"?

⁷⁴ Peters, "The Culture of Future Wars," *Parameters*, Winter 1995/6, p. 16

⁷⁵ Trevor N. and R. Ernest Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp 115-116. Even as conflicts with organized opponents faded and the *Pax Romana* began, Roman armies were fighting the first in a 400 year-long series of wars with German tribes, in Pannonia, 1-20 AD.

⁷⁶ Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, (London: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 15.

⁷⁷ Douglas Macgregor, *Breaking the Phalanx*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), p. 25.

⁷⁸ Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, p.21. Van Creveld prefers to use a now outdated military term, Low Intensity Conflict, to describe insurgent or guerrilla wars. I have chose to use "unconventional war" simply because the term itself seems more logical for describing a concept in opposition to conventional war.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Chapter 1, Contemporary War, *passim*.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.212.

⁸² Peters, "After the Revolution," in *Parameters*, Summer, 1995, p. 13.

⁸³ See Peters, "The Future of Armor," "The Culture of Future Wars" and "After the Revolution" for examples.

⁸⁴ "Peace comes dropping slow" in *The Economist: The World In 1998*, p. 49. *The Economist* argues that while hopes for a settlement appear brighter than they have for some time, these rest upon the devolution model being tested in Scotland and Wales, where Northern Ireland would be accepted into the EU as a quasi-independent state. In this case, neither the Catholic Irish Republic nor Protestant Great Britain would have sovereignty.

⁸⁵ *The Oxford Companion to World War Two*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 311. The curious notion that conventional war is somehow a higher form of violence is not confined to academics. With a clear intent to establish the tough, challenging nature of his subject, one US Marine Corps general entitled his 1995 article on Operations Other Than War, then the latest incomprehensible American military term for any military action short of conventional war, "It's Not Nice and Neat." This begs the question, how nice were things on Iwo Jima or at Chosin? See Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, "It's Not Nice and Neat," in *Proceedings*, September, 1995, pp. 26-30.

⁸⁶ David Berlinski, *A Tour of the Calculus*, (New York: Vintage, 1995), p. 38.

⁸⁷ John A. English, *Marching Through Chaos: The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996), p. 197.

⁸⁸ Michael Howard, "Famous Last Screams", *London Review of Books* (5 Dec 1991), as cited in English, *Marching Through Chaos*, p.203, note 39.

⁸⁹ English, p. 198.

⁹⁰ Clausewitz, p. 104.

⁹¹ Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996, p. 54.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁹³ Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 380-381.

⁹⁴ Edward Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June, 1995, p. 122.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, *passim*.

⁹⁶ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Cyberwar is Coming!," International Policy Department, RAND, 1993, p.

⁹⁷ Ed Regis, "BioWar" in *Wired*, November, 1996, p. 146.

⁹⁸ See John Arquilla, "The Great Cyberwar of 2002", in *Wired*, February, 1998.

⁹⁹ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), jacket flap. The original article appeared, like George Kennan's article outlining the proposal for containment, in *Foreign Affairs*.

¹⁰⁰ Huntington, p. 41.

¹⁰¹ Huntington, p. 183.

¹⁰² It is this characteristic, among others, that endears Huntington to Peters, who finds his theory "a brilliant, courageous analysis." See Peters, "The New Warrior Class", p. 21.

¹⁰³ Huntington, p. 273. The discussion of kin countries and diasporas is detailed in Chapter 11, *The Dynamics of Fault Line Wars*, *passim*.

¹⁰⁴ Huntington, p.291.

¹⁰⁵ Huntington, p.85

¹⁰⁶ See Michael Grant, *The Fall of the Roman Empire*, (New York: Touchstone Books, 1990), Chapter 9, *Race Against Race*, *passim*.

¹⁰⁷ Huntington, pp.312-318.

¹⁰⁸ Stephen M. Walt, "Building Up New Bogeymen," in *Foreign Policy*, Spring, 1997, p. 187.

¹⁰⁹ Walt, p. 185. The author's own military experience bears out Walt's assessment: of the three times I have drawn hazardous duty pay in the US Army, all three have been during operations undertaken in defense of non-Western states: Turkey, Kuwait and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

¹¹⁰ Walt, p. 188.

¹¹¹ Fouad Ajami, "The Summoning" in *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1993, p. 9.

¹¹² Ajami, p. 7.

¹¹³ Kishore Mahbubani, "Dangers of Decadence", *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1993, p. 12. Mahbubani's argument rests in part on the greater growth of East Asia in comparison with the west in 1993. His confident critique of American government and fiscal policy makes interesting reading in light of the East Asian financial crisis that has developed since October, 1997.

¹¹⁴ English, p. 5.

¹¹⁵ James J. Schneider, *Theoretical Paper Number 4. Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 16 June 1991), p. 64.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

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