

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California



THESIS

**KOSOVO:
THE ETHNO-NATIONAL DILEMMA AND POLICY
OPTIONS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

by

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December 1998

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19981207 040

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEForm Approved OMB No.
0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 1998	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Kosovo: The Ethno-National Dilemma and Policy Options For Conflict Resolution			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Rapp, Christopher G.			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>Fearful of large refugee flows, and the possible spillover of ethnic violence into other Balkan countries, the international community has become increasingly involved in trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement in the Kosovo crisis. Thus far, however, the lack of international community resolve to present a common position, and the intransigence of both the Serbian and Kosovar parties, has enabled the belligerent leaders to manipulate the situation.</p> <p>This thesis will explore Serbian and Kosovar historical national identities and their development, and the modern nationalist movements in the region and their leaders. Finally, the utility of the current leaders and levers that may be used by the international community to pressure or influence them will be evaluated. Presenting policy options and analysis for conflict resolution without the use of peacekeeping military forces, this thesis highlights the most feasible options which allow for U.S. and international community involvement, while enabling the Serbs and Kosovars to solve the crisis in a way that is amenable to both parties and will bring long-term stability to the region.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Kosovo, Balkans, Serbia, Milosevic, Rugova, Kosovo Liberation Army, national identity, ethno-nationalism, Albania, United States, Former Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 98	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified			16. PRICE CODE	
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified		19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified		20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 298-102

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**KOSOVO: THE ETHNO-NATIONAL DILEMMA
AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the


**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1998**

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
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ABSTRACT

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This thesis will explore Serbian and Kosovar historical national identities and their development, and the modern nationalist movements in the region and their leaders. Finally, the utility of the current leaders and levers that may be used by the international community to pressure or influence them will be evaluated. Presenting policy options and analysis for conflict resolution without the use of peacekeeping military forces, this thesis highlights the most feasible options which allow for U.S. and international community involvement, while enabling the Serbs and Kosovars to solve the crisis in a way that is amenable to both parties and will bring long-term stability to the region.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The recent outbreak of violence in the Kosovo region between the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians has caused the international community to become increasingly involved in trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The possibility of the conflict expanding beyond the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia threatens to destabilize the entire Balkan peninsula and jeopardize U.S. leadership and NATO alliance credibility in the region. After presenting the dynamics of the parties' ethnic construction, this thesis urges a more assertive U.S. role in an effort to shape the conflict and provides policy options for conflict resolution without the use of peacekeeping forces.

Tracing the historical national identity and development, and the current nationalist movements of the Serbs and the Kosovars, is imperative to understanding the current ethno-national conflict in Kosovo. The Serbs, having begun to develop a national identity in the 12th century, only to have it quashed by Ottoman Turk domination, developed a national identity and history that was primarily protected by the Orthodox church. Distorted facts and mythologies of Serbian history were evoked during the Serbian nationalist movement of the 19th century, many

of which surrounded Kosovo and the conflict between Serbs and Muslims. The inadequacy of Yugoslav governments during the inter-war years and World War II, and lack of international community commitment to the region, further served to exacerbate ethnic and religious animosity and stereotypes in the region.

Using his position as the communist party leader of Yugoslavia, and playing on the people's fears, Slobodan Milosevic maneuvered his way into power in the 1980's. With the help of the Serbian media and the Yugoslav army, Milosevic started a nationalist war in the Former Yugoslavia based primarily on manipulated "ancient ethnic hatreds".

While Milosevic has been able, in many cases, to outmaneuver the international community, several years of war and economic sanctions have begun to take their toll on his country. His power base is slowly eroding, and the Kosovo conflict has once again focused the attention of the international community on his repressive regime. As in the past, when he senses that he may be losing power, Milosevic may become more malleable to international community demands.

The Kosovars, in contrast to the Serbs, did not develop a national identity until the late 19th century. Foreign domination, clan structures, and geographical limitations kept the Albanians from forming any cultural homogeneity or political power.

Achieving independence after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Kosovo's independence was short lived. Continually subjugated to Yugoslav or communist rule since World War I, with a only a brief period during World War II under which they belonged to a Greater Albania, the Kosovars have retained a national identity and continually caused problems for the governments by which they have been subjugated. Repressed by most of the governments, the Kosovars under Yugoslavia's 1974 constitution were allowed to become an autonomous province and hold influence within the communist government. The revocation of this status by Milosevic in 1989, and repressive measures aimed at the Kosovars since then, have caused the Kosovars to develop a parallel government and institutions. Since 1989, the Democratic League of Kosovo, led by Ibrahim Rugova, has advocated passive resistance to the Milosevic regime in order to have their autonomy reinstated, and since February 1998, their independence.

However, Rugova's ineffectiveness in achieving results, compounded by the lack of support from the international community as evidenced by not addressing the Kosovo issue at the Dayton Accords, has led to the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Having waged limited attacks in previous years, the KLA in December 1998 began an offensive against Serb forces. Armed with rifles that came from Albania after the fall of the government and loss of control of military facilities in 1996, the KLA has waged an effective guerrilla war against the Serbs. The violence, atrocities, and human rights violations have focused the international community's attention on Kosovo.

While the U.S. has been involved in the conflict resolution process, Milosevic has continued to manipulate the situation and use repressive tactics for over nine months and for the most part, achieving his goals. When the U.S. has taken the lead with military threats, Milosevic has been willing to listen to demands.

Milosevic's current political and economic weaknesses can be exploited by the international community to coincide with military threats. Using financial levers that will impact his patronage network and control of the media should make him willing to negotiate. Using the financial

lever against the LDK will also moderate their stance, and empower the moderate leadership over the more radical KLA.

Suggesting several options for conflict resolution, this thesis analyzes each, and prescribes the "autonomy" option, as being the best for both parties and the international community. Employing leverage at the proper time and place is critical for making the Serb and Kosovar leaders feel that they are losing power and bring them to the negotiating table. While the autonomy option is a short to medium term fix for crisis resolution, confidence building measures will need to be put in place in order for the Serbs and Kosovars to build the necessary trust between ethnicities and have an effective government in the long-term.

I. INTRODUCTION

Within every fruitful solution in the Balkans, there are the seeds of a larger intractable problem.¹

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

In light of the recent outbreak of violence in the Kosovo region, the international community has become increasingly involved in trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement between the Serbian and Kosovar Albanian parties. This thesis will explore the short and long-term outlook for the Kosovo region – the most intractable of all the political conflicts of the Balkans.

In the short-term, the international community is concerned that the current Kosovo situation will explode, causing problems both inside, and more importantly, outside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's (FRY) borders with the possibility of destabilizing the entire Balkan peninsula. The way the current situation is handled, however, will in the long-term determine whether the Kosovo question can be solved in a way amenable to both sides, whether the situation degenerates into a low intensity guerrilla war, or whether it sparks a war that could involve other

¹ Jaque Grinberg, Political Analyst for the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, interview by author; Vukovar, Croatia; 16 October 1996.

nations, including the pitting of one NATO ally against another.

Ethno-nationalism has been increasing, especially with the fall of the Soviet Union, and has become a growing threat to the political stability of many states. Walker Conner believes that,

Rather than witnessing an evolution of stable state or suprastate communities, the observer of global politics has viewed a succession of situations involving competing allegiances in which people have illustrated that an intuitive bond felt toward an informal and unstructured subdivision of humankind is far more profound and potent than are the ties that bind them to the formal and legalistic state structure in which they find themselves.²

He cites several third world instances, which amply testify to the widespread failure of governments to induce a substantial segment of their citizenry to transfer their primary loyalty from a human grouping to the state. While believing that common kinship, homeland, and "shared blood" are factors in ethno-nationalism, ultimately what matters is not "what is" but "what people believe is."

History and other facts may not prove common kinship or ethnic unity, but what is perceived by the people, their

² Walker Conner, *A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a ...*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, Routledge Journals (October 1987): 377.

mythically unfactual history, may be more believable. It is with this overlying principal in mind, that global leaders should be concerned with the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and now Kosovo. Understanding the underlying histories, myths, and perceptions of the Kosovo question are essential for finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

The Kosovo question is political. The tensions and conflicts in the area have been created and exacerbated by nationalist political leaders, namely Slobodan Milosevic and Ibrahim Rugova. The Kosovo question is similar to the Bosnia-Herzegovina problem in that religion and ethnicity have themselves not been the causes for war. The cultural mythology and propaganda of "ancient ethnic hatreds," "ethnic kinship," and ties to the land, exuded by recent political leaders in the region have brought these ethno-national issues to the forefront in an effort to promote their nationalist aims.

While the end-state for the United States and the international community will remain the same - stop the killing, but above all contain the problem - solutions to the Kosovo problem will involve different considerations from those applied to the Bosnia-Herzegovina case. Bosnia-

Herzegovina was a geopolitical entity which had enjoyed an almost continuous history, during which three different ethnicities continually lived and intermingled together. Kosovo, by contrast, is characterized by two parties (Serbians and Kosovars) that have a fractured history, neither of which can claim extended historical possession of the area. While Bosnian lands were populated with different ethnicities, Kosovo is largely ethnically homogenous. While this state of affairs is neither a necessary nor sufficient reason for statehood, it has in fact been treated as a natural starting point for many modern states.³ Kosovo is also different because one of the parties now involved, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), calls for a "Greater Albania" and extension beyond the established, modern geographic boundaries in the area. This is a clear declaration for other ethnic Albanians in neighboring countries, specifically Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, to unite in this nationalist movement.

³ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), xxxiii.

B. RELEVANCE FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Five-and-half years ago, during the height of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, President George Bush warned Serbian President Milosevic via cable, that in the event of conflict in Kosovo, the United States would use military force against the Serbs. When asked if President Bush's "Christmas Warning" of 1992 was still in effect under the Clinton Administration with respect to the latest fighting in the Kosovo region, Special Envoy Richard Gelbard said, "U.S. policy has not changed.. we have warned Milosevic appropriately."⁴ This warning can also be found in U.S. House of Representatives Resolution 4115, the Kosovo Peace and Democracy Act of 1994, which specifically warns Serbia that the United States will not tolerate the expansion of the conflict in Kosovo. However, the intent of the resolution of late, has not been followed by the United States government as is evidenced by the lifting of sanctions against Serbia without them complying with the conditions of the resolution stipulated as:

- There is substantial progress toward restoration of Kosovo's independent identity.

⁴ International Crisis Group, *Kosovo Spring*, accessed 30 March 1998; available from <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/kosovo/reports/kosrep2a.html>; Internet.

- There is substantial improvement in the human rights situation in Kosovo.
- The elected government of Kosovo is allowed to meet.⁵

Having already invested millions of dollars and valuable military resources in building peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, though, the United States and NATO is determined to maintain regional stability both to give the 1995 Dayton peace process a chance of success, and to eliminate the need for another costly reconstruction program in the Balkans. In an effort to shape and contain the crisis, the United States has told both sides that their ultimate goals will not be supported. Secretary of State Albright has said that,

We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia... the time to stop the killing is now, before it spreads.⁶

On the other hand, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke has stated,

Kosovo is not Bosnia. It is not an independent country, and the international community cannot support the desire of the people, no matter how heartfelt, to be independent... Although I have total sympathy for their goals, if they were to achieve them by force, as they are

⁵ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Situation in Kosovo, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 103rd Congress, 2nd session, 5 October 1994, 62.*

⁶ ICG, *Kosovo Spring*.

now seeking to do, they would create a general war in the region.⁷

Several leaders and factions within Kosovo have called for a "Greater Albania," which would include Albania, Kosovo, and Western Macedonia. Many countries and institutions, including the United States⁸, Greece⁹, and NATO¹⁰, have opposed such thinking. With the possibility of a new war based on nationalist driven "ethnic and religious" issues, large refugee flows and war crimes would be the norm. Expansion of the conflict could not only threaten United States interests and international efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also start a fourth Balkan war that would jeopardize American leadership in NATO and alliance credibility.

⁷ *NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*, Interview with Richard Holbrooke, accessed 7 July 1998; available from <http://www.pbs.org>; Internet.

⁸ Tanjug News Agency, *Washington Opposes Greater Albania*, accessed 21 July 1998; available from <http://www.yugoslavia.com>; Internet.

⁹ Tanjug News Agency, *Greece Warns Against Kosovo's Union with Albania*, accessed 21 July 1998; available from <http://www.yugoslavia.com>; Internet.

¹⁰ Tanjug News Agency, *Solana: NATO Opposes Greater Albania*, accessed 21 July 1998; available from <http://www.yugoslavia.com>; Internet.

As the Contact Group called for the parties to resume negotiations after their 8 July 1998 meeting¹¹, and the 21 October 1998 agreement brokered between Richard Holbrooke and the parties for Serb troop withdrawal from the region, it remains critical that the international community and the United States continue to be actively engaged in negotiations to bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis. A durable solution to this political crisis can only be found if incentives are provided, and pressure is maintained on the parties to negotiate in good faith and without pre-conditions.

With this goal in mind, it is imperative that there is a thorough understanding of Serbian and Kosovar Albanian history and nationalist development. The next chapter will address these issues, which will then be followed by the current situation. Finally, possible solutions will be offered.

¹¹ USIA Washington File, *Pentagon Background Briefing on Kosovo*, accessed 20 July 1998; available from <http://www.usia.gov/current/news/topic.html>; Internet.

II. NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND DEVELOPMENT

A. SERBIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND DEVELOPMENT

The religious sentiment of the Serbians is neither deep nor warm. Their churches are generally empty, except on very great Church festivals, and on political festivals. The Serbians of our day consider the Church as a political institution, in some mysterious manner connected with the existence of the nation. They do not allow anyone to attack her, although, when she is not attacked, they neglect her.¹²

Serbians, as well as other southern Slavs, manifested little sense of cultural homogeneity or political power prior to the early 19th century. Before this time, the different ethnicities of the area knew little about each other, much less themselves. These ethnicities had little contact with each other due primarily to their continual subjugation to foreign rulers that kept them isolated, divided, and misinformed.¹³

However, there can be found several attributes throughout history common to the Serbians that led to their group identity and later, ethnic unity and nationalist movements. These attributes of Serbian

¹² Malcolm, 14.

¹³ Peter F. Sugar, ed., *Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Washington, D.C.: The American University Press, 1995), 398.

national identity, primarily language, historical myths, and religion, galvanized into a nationalist movement and ideology in the early and middle 19th century leading to Serb autonomy from the Ottoman Empire in 1829, and in the 1870's with the creation of a monarchy at the end of the Ottoman Empire.

The Serb Orthodox religion, probably the most influential attribute of Serbian culture, was founded in the 12th century when the first ruler of a somewhat unified south Slav region, Nemanjic, took the Orthodox religion after being held captive by Emperor Manuel in Byzantine Constantinople¹⁴. The religion was further developed and spread throughout the Kingdom by the ruler's son and successor, Saint Sava. Eventually becoming the head of the new national church, Sava combined the idea of church and state, and in the process founded the beginnings of Serbian national identity and statehood. In 1345, a Serb patriarchate was established in Pec, a city in modern Kosovo.¹⁵

¹⁴ Tim Judah, *The Serbs* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1997), 18.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

The Orthodox Church has been the one constant throughout Serb history, which prior to the 19th century, had seen almost continual subjugation to foreign imperialist powers with the exception of the two centuries (12th and 13th) under Nemanjic rule. While there was no written Slav history to speak of, the Serbian Orthodox church was always allowed to exist, even during Ottoman Turk rule, and it became the protector of the people and symbol of the only vestige of a glorious time when there was a "Slav" state. In this respect, the early contribution of Sava to the state and the church cannot be overstated. His canonization gave the Serbian people a saint who had come from their ranks, and would forever be perceived as the protector of the people.¹⁶

It was primarily the church in the 19th century that gave birth to Serb consciousness of who they were, largely by invoking distorted historical facts of events. The most important of which was the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, when the Ottoman Turks killed the Serbian leader, Lazar. In the view of Serb history, the death of Lazar marked the end of Serb independence¹⁷, and that their loss was due to a

¹⁶ Ibid., 26.

¹⁷ Michael A. Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed* (Berkeley, CA:

treacherous act by one of their own. This mythology was the basis for two unsuccessful revolts in 1689 and 1730 by Patriarch Arsenije Carnojevic which led to a mass exodus of Serb peasants and left unprotected many of the religious shrines of the Orthodox church and birthplace of Serbian culture in the Serbian heartland – the Kosovo area.

However, these revolts to Ottoman rule could hardly be characterized as nationalist movements – they were localized insurrections and did not mobilize "all Serbs."

Between 1790 and 1815 though, Serb nationalism grew with the increased power and wealth of the Habsburg Empire, the increased Russian imperialist involvement in the area, and the decay of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Turks began to intensify their oppression of the Serbs with increased taxes and religious persecution. Inspired and cajoled by Austrian Serbs, the Ottoman Serb peasants, led by intellectuals, revolted in 1804. Their demands were eventually met by a weak Ottoman regime and the Serbs received an autonomous province. This interaction between Austrian and Ottoman Serbs was critical in forming a sense of "common kinship."

University of California Press, 1996), 31.

This feeling of ethnic cross-border community was fostered in large part due to Serbian nationalist writers and artists of the 19th century that seized on the Prince Lazar mythology. They portrayed in their writings and paintings Lazar as a Christ figure who was betrayed by a Judas. Vuk Brankovic, the Serb who betrayed the cause at Kosovo Polje, becomes the Judas and represents the Serbs that converted to Islam. This epic represented not only the death of prior Serb independence, but also that the descendants of Lazar's killers (Muslims) had to be purged from what could only be Serbian lands.¹⁸ This mythology is also reflected in the Serb national anthem that has existed since the 19th century. The anthem extols of how their "grandfather's word still lives," and that any "traitor of the homeland be damned."¹⁹

The most prominent Serb writer in the 18th and 19th centuries, and author of the above epic, was Vuk Karadzic. His production of folk literature, songs and epics became a voice of the national spirit. He even created a reformed spoken and written (Cyrillic) language that was supposedly

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ William L. Reed, ed., *National Anthems of the World* (London: Villiers House, 1993), 548.

free of "foreign contamination."²⁰ Those that spoke this Serb language would always be Serbs, regardless of borders. These legends, writings, songs and poems, became a part of the Serb revolutionary.

These mythologies were later expanded upon after autonomy was granted in 1829, and helped consolidate nationalist pride. The most important of the post autonomy mythological literature was the "Mountain Wreath" by Bishop Njegos in 1847, which glorified the extermination of Muslims by Serb warriors that would not be baptized in the Orthodox religion after the battle of Kosovo Polje. It is a story of good over evil, and race betrayal.²¹

After autonomy was granted in 1829, schools began to be developed, and political parties were formed and grew stronger. In the latter half of the century, after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, Serb nationalism intensified when the government called for sovereignty, a Balkan leadership role, and territorial expansion into Serbian homelands (primarily Kosovo and the Sandzak areas, now predominantly Muslim). It is at this point that the

²⁰ Judah, 62.

²¹ Sells, 41-45.

Serbian government and people looked upon themselves as being a nation.²²

After the Central Powers defeat in World War I, seventy years of Yugoslavism followed. Under the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Yugoslavism was complicated by ethnicities and religions in the newly formed country. The newly formed political parties, led mostly by middle class intellectuals and workers, had their beliefs and political programs closely tied to these ethnic and religious divisions. There was a constant struggle between these groups, sometimes leading to violence. The young, inexperienced government continually found it difficult to reconcile the contradictory demands made upon it by the various ethnic and religious groups.²³

Although these parties did "govern" the state for much of the inter-war period, their actions and progress could hardly be called conducive to nation building. The response of the inter-war regime was to centralize power in order to contain these divisive forces. "No tradition of compromise and accommodation of differences was bequeathed

²² Sugar, 407.

²³ M. George Zaninovich, *The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 17.

to the young Yugoslav system. While the government possessed the instruments of force, it lacked the confidence and legitimacy to achieve results without it."²⁴

The ineffectiveness of the government during this period was largely due to the way in which the government was set up. It was founded largely on pre-existing Serbian government institutions. The Serbs were rightly or wrongly perceived by other ethnic groups as being dominant in the system, and exploiting the other groups. While the Serbs were more industrialized and involved in government, the rest of the country was agricultural and peasant oriented. This bred chronic distrust of both the Serbs and central authority.²⁵

In 1931, King Alexander banned all parties under a new constitution in an effort to rid Yugoslavian politics of "tribalism." His newly created regency (a coalition government) attempted to govern until 1934, when Alexander was assassinated. However, all they did was further alienate the peasant movements (mostly in the south), and even the Serbs. After the assassination, the ethnic and

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., 24.

religion based parties re-emerged and continued until the beginning of World War II.

As can be seen, the inter-war years were characterized by a monarchy that was unable to create a common belief system for all of the ethnicities. The Communists gradually gained support from non-Serb and non-Croat ethnicities, mostly to give them a political voice in government against the other ethnically based parties. In 1938, the Communist Party changed from being organized along ethnic and religious lines to being a party that embraced Yugoslavism, including some Serb and Croat peasants, many of which were tired of government inefficiency and ethnic strife. Although they were not able to start an effective or articulate movement along these lines prior to World War II, a political ideology and a streamlined, dedicated leadership was effected that would see the Communist Party through the difficult early war years of World War II.

The Axis occupation of World War II imposed a brutal peace on Yugoslavia, a perfect setting for revolutionary struggle.²⁶ The Ustache movement with its ethnic hatred and

²⁶ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and its Problems, 1918-1988* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1988), 14.

Axis affiliation, and the Chetnik movement with its inactivity typical of the regime in which they represented, enabled the Communists to win the support of a significant part of the population. The old elites, who were at first demoralized and divided, were eventually destroyed by both the Nazi's and during the course of the civil war. As the Germans withdrew, the Communists were able to rapidly fill the power vacuum.

The Axis powers, by conquering Yugoslavia, had not only destroyed the state, but set its ethnic components against each other. Never had there been an internal struggle of such violence. Tito, out of the ruin of ethnic warfare among Yugoslavs and occupation by foreign forces, was able to place a patriotic, nationalist movement in the service of world Communism by destroying all the forces that opposed the transformation of the war of liberation.²⁷

By organizing minorities, western Serbs, and giving Croats a way out from a sinking Nazi ship, Tito had control over a large part of the population that he wished to transform into one nation. By downplaying ethnic rivalries, he called the people's attention to their common

²⁷ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Tito: A Reassessment* (London: C. Hearst and Company, 1992), 48.

service during the war years and the future vision under Communist ideology.

Internally, Tito also made concessions to the people of Yugoslavia. While continuing purges of radical elements and competitors, he continued to try to win the support of the people as evidenced by the 1946 constitution. In it, federalism was provided for with the establishment of six republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Slovenia) and two autonomous territories (Vojvodina and Kosovo). These boundaries were largely drawn along ethnic lines. Tito envisioned that ethnic based issues would melt away as Communism took hold in Yugoslavia, much the way it was perceived to have been done in Russia during the 1920's. As we will see in the next chapter, Tito was never able to abolish the political ideologies that were directly related to ethnicity that had been developed during the inter-war years and World War II. The Yugoslav experiment was held together largely due to his autocratic style of government. The experiment may have worked had there been another leader of Tito's stature and power after his death, allowing for more time to develop a Yugoslav national identity among the people. However, the power vacuum that resulted after his death,

showed that Yugoslav citizenship, for the most part, never became co-equal with Yugoslav nationality. Emotional loyalties to "homeland," religion, and history, were not completely broken, especially where the Kosovars were concerned. "Yugoslavia was a mosaic, not a melting pot."²⁸

B. KOSOVAR NATIONAL IDENTITY AND DEVELOPMENT

The Albanians, like the Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula, had little cultural homogeneity or political power prior to the 1800's. Albania's geography made communication difficult and favored small local units and their autonomous development. Albanian language, customs, social organizations, and traditions had little if anything in common with their Slav or Greek neighbors.²⁹

Albania, as well as the Kosovo area, consisted of clan structures, along with several different religions (Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim), which further served to isolate them from the outside world as well as each other. However, many inhabitants of the area converted to Islam; in Kosovo by 1459 when that part of Serbia was conquered by

²⁸ Sugar, 432.

²⁹ Peter F. Sugar and Ivo John Lederer, ed., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1994), 55.

the Ottoman Empire, and in 1468 in what is modern day Albania after the death of Skenderbeg, an Albanian leader who formed the first "league" in the area in order to unite the different clans in a common defense against the Ottoman Turks.³⁰

The Albanians and Kosovars played a significant role in the Ottoman Empire. Viziers and pasas (local lords and governors), and military commanders of Albanian descent, figured prominently in Ottoman administration of conquered lands and its society. However, these local leaders also developed their own land-owning, feudal, administrative aristocracy that practically ruled Albanian lands, resulting in the Albanians in many cases being able to defend their rights and privileges against most Ottoman demands.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, Ottoman rule declined and local Albanian governors began to assert themselves. There was no unity among the Albanian aristocracy since Skenderbeg, and at lower levels, clan leaders also differed in their views. Corruption and high taxes became the norm

³⁰ Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course, and Consequences* (London: Hurst and Company, 1995), 18.

and the Ottoman Empire was unable to control it.³¹ It is at this time, in the early 19th century, that the Albanians began to form their nationalist beliefs.

It wasn't until the 1870's, however, that the Albanians were able to start their first concerted national movement. It was much later than Western Europe because they had to overcome serious linguistic, religious, and regional differences. The leaders of Albania in the early 1800's couldn't make up their minds if they were dynasts or Muslim dignitaries of the Ottoman Empire.

The formation of the League of Prizren, a combination of middle class, worker, and intellectual, political committees from the region, met in June 1878. United in an effort to stop Montenegro from annexing Muslim lands as part of the Treaty of San Stefano, the movement called for greater unity among Albanians, regardless of their religion, clan, or pasa.

Informing the Congress of Berlin in 1878 of their national and territorial rights and ambitions, Bismark dismissed the League's appeal and denied that an Albanian nation existed. When the Montenegrins tried to occupy the region allotted to them, however, they were defeated in

³¹ Sugar and Lederer, 56.

battle by forces under the Ali Pasa of Gusinje. While the outside world at this time viewed the League as an instrument of the Ottoman Empire used in an effort to prolong their retreat from the area, the reality was that it had become a national organization which was willing if necessary to fight the Ottomans or any other group that tried to invade their lands. In 1881, however, the Ottomans sent an army to Albania and arrested all of the local leaders because they had become too powerful and were making too many demands.³²

The work of the Albanian League had lasting effects despite their defeat. The League helped protect the territorial integrity of the new nation, and brought the existence of an Albanian nation to the attention of the Great Powers. It was the first sign of nationalism in Albania while stressing ethnic unity, minimizing religious differences, and creating a unified language.

The nationalist leaders were less sanguine however. They strongly believed that the external conditions of the region during the last quarter of the century were not favorable for achieving full independence. In July 1908 they got their wish. A revolt in the Ottoman Empire forced

³² Ibid., 62.

the Sultan to restore the Constitution of 1876 which would transform the Empire into a commonwealth where each nationality would enjoy full political and religious equality and right of self-government. Albanian nationalists in Kosovo organized mass demonstrations in favor of the program because it promised them, by peaceful means, the type of self-government within the Ottoman Empire that they had wanted for thirty years. When this was not implemented however, a revolt began in Kosovo under Hassan Prishtina. Lasting from 1909-1912, the Ottoman Empire eventually gave in to their demands whereby all of their requests would be submitted to Qamil Pasa as Grand Vizier of the region. Unfortunately, Albania's autonomous status was short lived as an alliance of Balkan states went to war and removed the Ottoman Empire from Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, and the Sandzak. The settlement after the first Balkan War, the 1913 London Conference of Ambassadors, recognized Albania but gave more than half of Albanian-inhabited territory, including Kosovo, to the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, while over 800,000 Albanians were left beyond the country's borders.³³

³³ Ibid., 69-73.

With the return of the "cradle of the Serb nation" to Serbia, Serbia considered the Albanians in Kosovo as undesirable foreigners. They were subjected to a deliberate policy of forced assimilation and denationalization, expulsion from their lands, and gross and systematic violation of their human and national rights.³⁴ Albanians were forced to change their language, their names, and land was taken from them to give to Serb and Montenegrin settlers. It is estimated that prior to 1941, over 500,000 Albanians were forced to emigrate from what was now "Yugoslavia," and that approximately 40,000 Serb colonists were settled in the area.³⁵ Two separate communities immediately formed: that of the relatively prosperous and modern Serb settlers, and primitive, uncompetitive and discriminated against Albanians.

Albania was able to annex Kosovo after 1941 due to the help of Italian forces, and later German forces in 1943. Albanians fought the Serbs, and later Tito's Communist forces, and eventually composed three battalions in the German army. Those Albanians that were communist, fought

³⁴ Pavlowitch, Stevan K. and Elez Biberaj, *The Albanian Problem in Yugoslavia: Two Views* (London: Institute For The Study of Conflict, 1982), 24.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 25.

with and against the Yugoslav communists. While trying to rid the area of foreign forces, the Albanian communists also did not want to play a second role to the Yugoslav communists. By 1945, however, Tito's communists were firmly in control of Kosovo.

It is at this time that the Albanians break off from their close ties to the Kosovars. The Albanians quickly distanced themselves from Tito's controversial form of communism. For the next thirty-five years, Kosovars would be able to realize their potential under a system that downplayed ethnic agendas, yet created a confederation with boundaries drawn along ethnic lines. With no help from Albania, the Kosovars for the most part, would have to struggle for the next twenty years to have the same rights and privileges as other republics in Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav constitution of 1946 provided for the multi-ethnic federation of six units, and two autonomous regions, one of which was Kosovo. Tensions with Albania and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo ensued for several years after. Rankovic, Tito's security chief, maintained a large portion of his security forces (SDB) in Kosovo through 1966, when he was deposed.

By 1968, with the Albanian population in Kosovo reaching 67 percent, and repression and reforms being implemented by the Communist leadership, revolts ensued in Kosovo. Thousands gathered in the streets calling for an independent university, the status of a full republic, and union with Albania. After the revolt was put down, Tito responded with more autonomy and economic aid for the region. Constitutional amendments in 1968 gave the autonomous provinces more influence. The government began to put special emphasis on economic and cultural development in the area - an independent university was created and more Albanians were promoted to positions of authority in the government and civilian sector. With relations finally being normalized with Albania in 1971, the Yugoslav government allowed books and teachers from Albania to enter the region.³⁶

Constitutional changes in 1971 and 1974 led to further autonomy for Kosovo in order to satisfy the growing and discontented Kosovar population, which now composed 73.5 percent of the population as compared to only 18.3 percent Serb. By 1981 however, conditions were right for another large uprising. With the Albanian population now

³⁶ Ibid., 12.

comprising 77 percent of the 1.6 million population, and Serbian population declining, not only relatively, but also absolutely by 28,000, living standards and unemployment began to become a factor. By 1981, approximately one-third of the population was unemployed, and one-third were students.³⁷ With little chance of finding work upon graduation from school, the revolt was largely due to a new generation of Kosovars whose aspirations could not be fulfilled. The revolts were suppressed in about six months with minimal loss of life. However, the region was sealed off from Albania and education facilities were closed.³⁸

With the death of Tito in 1980, the institution of a form of government that could not come to a decision largely due to policies being based along ethnic lines, and severe economic problems, tensions in Kosovo would grow throughout the decade. In 1989, out of the turmoil of inefficient government based on ethnic priorities and agendas, Serbian and Kosovar nationalists and national movements would come to the forefront, plunging the Former Yugoslavia into war.

³⁷ Ibid., 13 and 32.

³⁸ Ibid., 15.

III. THE MODERN SERBIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Yugoslavia, during the late 1980's and early 1990's, was destroyed for the sake of a "Greater Serbia." What Serbian political leaders had not been able to achieve in several Balkan wars and two World Wars, finally seemed within reach.³⁹

Slobodan Milosevic, with his manipulation of Serbian nationalism, rose to power in Serbian politics and became the motive force in the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. The role that this nationalist movement, the Orthodox Church, the mythologies of Serbia's past, and the Serbian media, played a prominent role in Yugoslavia's disintegration that cannot be overstated.

Milosevic used the media to spread crude and distorted interpretations of the past. With the help of political leaders, the church, and nationalists, he was able to nurture and sustain a nationalist movement based on ethnic and religious hatred that served his political needs. While much of his work toward the dissolution of the Yugoslav state was done while he was the "number two" man in Serbian politics (Chairman of the League of Communists),

³⁹ Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz, ed., *Why Bosnia* (Stoney Creek, CN: The Pamphleteer's Press, Inc., 1993), 251.

it all culminated in 1989 with his rise to power as the president of Serbia, which now also included the former Yugoslav provinces of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro.

Since the war in Bosnia has come to an end, however, Milosevic's power base has eroded, the nationalist flames that he stoked have cooled, and the country's economic condition has continued to deteriorate. Never before has his power been so limited.

A. MILOSEVIC'S RISE TO POWER

Considering the large diversity between Yugoslavia's six republics, and two autonomous provinces, it is not surprising how the country after Tito's death, gradually fell into disrepair. However, despite the fact that the complicated eight-man government could rarely come to common opinion on issues, Yugoslavia remained in a better economic position than most countries of the former Soviet Union. The liberal policies of Tito's Yugoslavia had developed a large tourist industry, and modern heavy industry. Yugoslavia was a food surplus nation that had

some of the most modern highways and infrastructure in the world.⁴⁰ So why did it fall apart?

Milosevic rose to power on the coat tails of Ivan Stambolic, until he became the Communist Party Chief in Yugoslavia (Stambolic had become Serbian President). Much like Stalin, Milosevic over time, won the confidence and loyalties of key members of the Party apparatus, and was able to manipulate the system to place people loyal to him in positions of power.

In 1986, he began stoking the nationalist flames after the release of a controversial, private document. The Memorandum as it became known, signed by Serbian intellectuals and political leaders said,

In the general process of disintegration which has encompassed Yugoslavia, the Serbs have been hit the hardest... This process is directed toward the total break up of the national unity among the Serbian people.

It concluded that under Communist domination, a policy was pursued calling for "a weak Serbia, a strong Yugoslavia" which led to the Serb economy supporting smaller, impoverished provinces, while they retained the same voting power and influence in the government. It also concluded that thousands of Serbians had been killed or raped in

⁴⁰ Bennett, 1.

Kosovo by Kosovo Albanians, and that the Tito regime was inherently against the Serbs and the creation of a Greater Serbia.⁴¹

With the release of the Memorandum, the typically ethnically liberal and progressive Serbian media assumed a "war footing" and gradually began to push Serbian nationalist rhetoric. Most of the ideas within the Memorandum were false. For instance, there were less rapes and murders between the ethnicities (Serbians and Kosovo Albanians) than there were among the Serbian population in the area.⁴²

Later, the Serbian media continued to spread distorted facts of the events in Kosovo. A disturbed Albanian soldier in the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) early in 1987, went on a shooting spree in his barracks that killed four "Serbian" soldiers. The Serbian media continually reported this event as such, when in reality, three of those killed were of Croat and Muslim ethnicity.⁴³

⁴¹ Gale Stokes, ed., *From Stalinism to Pluralism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 275-280.

⁴² Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, *Bosnia And Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (London: Hurst and Company, 1994), 185.

⁴³ Judah, 163.

Using these reports, which had been enhanced and manipulated by the communist party under Milosevic, and the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje as a reason to go to Kosovo in 1987, signaled the turning point in Milosevic's career. Continuing to manipulate the media which he had gradually gained control of through the party apparatus, he arrived in Kosovo for his epoch speech. He had many of the Serbian complaints in the area dramatized and exaggerated by the media prior to his visit. The local Serbs talked of "genocide" by their Kosovo Albanian neighbors and mass rapes of their women.

In a staged event, an elderly man approached Milosevic as he was approaching the stage to give his speech. Filmed by the media, with over 10,000 demonstrators in attendance, the man complained of his and other Serbs plight in the area to which Milosevic replied, "No one should dare to beat you." It was also staged that the Orthodox patriarch was at his side, thereby involving and invoking the church in his nationalist rhetoric. In reality, the man complaining of these events was from Nis, an area not even in the Kosovo province, and after his staged act, the man returned home.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Ibid., 162.

This rally, sparked many protests, most of which were engineered (and paid for, including fees to the demonstrators for lost work wages) by Milosevic and the Communist Party, and placed increased importance on Kosovo being the Serbian homeland that would never be given up. With the deployment of over 25 percent of the JNA to the area, protests by Kosovo Albanians for educational and cultural autonomy were quickly suppressed with the use of mass force, resulting in 140 Kosovo Albanian deaths.⁴⁵

Throughout 1988 and 1989, Milosevic's control of the media aided in his ascendancy to power. Discrediting the provincial governments of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro as being ineffective, and with the use of planned demonstrations, he used the "Greater Serbia" nationalist theme and euphoria to cause the downfall of these governments (Kosovo - 1988, Montenegro and Vojvodina - 1989). The governments were reconstituted with Milosevic supporters and party officials that he was allowed to nominate as the communist party chief.⁴⁶

Milosevic's control of the media to spread nationalist propaganda, and his control of the communist party which

⁴⁵ Bennett, 95.

⁴⁶ Joseph Rothschild, *Return To Diversity* (New York: Oxford

enabled him to stage and pay for mass demonstrations, was instrumental in him achieving total power. In late 1989, Milosevic in a speech to the 14th Communist Party Congress out-maneuvered and deposed his former mentor as president of Serbia. Citing Stambolic's ineffectiveness in "protecting Serbian interests," and Milosevic's widespread and well planned support by other prominent leaders, it was a "fait accompli."

As Serbian president, Milosevic in 1990 changed the constitution of Serbia, effectively annexing the three provinces. However, by annexing these provinces and therefore controlling four of the eight votes of the Yugoslav presidency, led to stagnation of the government and the creation of nationalist movements in other provinces (Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo) that would eventually lead to the first shots being fired in the third Balkan war in 1991.

B. CURRENT SERBIAN ENVIRONMENT

Since the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995, the Serbian political environment has changed dramatically. No longer on a war footing, there has been a cooling of

nationalist passion. Milosevic's power base has begun to erode, the people have become war weary, and he has had to make alliances with even more extremist parties in order to retain power. Also, the outer wall of economic sanctions have continued to take their toll on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's economy, causing internal problems and giving rise to a reform minded leader in the satellite state of Montenegro.

Milosevic's power has been waning since the war in Bosnia began. The reach of his patronage network, once stretching into Croatia, Bosnia, and Montenegro, has been lost or is in turmoil. The strength of Milosevic's position, the army, police, and media, is directly linked to his control of monetary resources, which are now running low. With the "outer wall" of economic sanctions still in place, the FRY has since 1992 been excluded from both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. This has cut the country off from normal capital flows.

No longer "threatened" by outside forces as portrayed by the Milosevic controlled media during the war years, the people of the FRY have seen their country's industrial output decrease to forty percent of that in 1989, and average monthly wages decrease to 125 dollars. With

unemployment near forty percent, and corruption and black marketeering on the rise, Milosevic's political popularity has never been lower.⁴⁷

In order to recover from the November 1996 elections, during which Milosevic and his closely allied parties (namely the Yugoslav United Left (JUL), which is run by his wife) succeeded in winning only 110 of the 250 seats in the Serbian parliament, Milosevic has had to form a coalition. Choosing the Serbian Radical Party, led by Vojislav Seselj, Milosevic gained another 82 votes in the parliament, at the expense of now having to deal with the most ardent nationalist in Serbian politics. It should be remembered that Seselj, along with the notorious para-military leader Arkan, helped ethnically cleanse large portions of northeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war.⁴⁸

However, despite Milosevic's coalition, he still only controls what is estimated to be about thirty percent of the popular vote; mostly vocal, hard-line nationalists.

⁴⁷ Stephen Hedges, *The Looting of Yugoslavia*, US News and World Report, 21 July 1997, 39.

⁴⁸ International Crisis Group, *Serbia: The Milosevic Factor*, accessed 30 March 1998; available from <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/yugo/reports/yu01rep.html>; Internet.

Milosevic, also, does not control many of the municipal districts, including the Belgrade district.

During this same period, the prime minister of Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic, broke ranks with Milosevic and criticized him for the FRY's isolation and economic woes. Running against Momir Bulatovic, a Milosevic supporter and ally, Djukanovic defeated him in the 1997 presidential election. Djukanovic since then, has tried to create democratic institutions and distance Montenegro from Serbia, while at the same time not provoking the Serbian leadership. It is clear, however, that Milosevic's power and influence at the moment only remains within the borders of Serbia.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Ibid., 9.

IV. THE MODERN KOSOVAR NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

There has been significant growth in political activism by Kosovo Albanians since they were stripped of their provincial autonomy in 1989. Since then, a new parallel Kosovar society has emerged within the province which exists almost completely outside the Serbian state. The Kosovo Albanians have traveled a long, hard road since 1989, and are now at the crossroads - never before has their plight been so illuminated to the international community, never have they been better equipped militarily due to the influx of weaponry from Albania during the government's recent collapse, and never before have their goals been so high - complete independence from Serbia, as opposed to restoration of republic or autonomous province status. Yet, at a time when political unity is necessary, the Kosovo Albanian political movement has become fractured. This may lead to a continuation of the conflict and reduction of international community support as the movement becomes more militant.

The two sides view the current status of Kosovo very differently. The Serb view is that Kosovo is a part of Serbia. As such, they have no right to self-determination or succession, and that any form of independence would lead

to Kosovars uniting with Albania. Consequently, Kosovars must renounce secession in advance of any political agreement.

The Kosovar view is that they have declared themselves independent and that it is only a matter of getting the international community to transform this into reality. As President Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) said in March of 1998,

Former Yugoslavia has ceased to exist. Kosovo has its own borders and we have not asked for a change in borders. Perhaps Serbia does not think that way but an independent Kosovo is a good thing for Serbia.⁵⁰

A. THE RISE OF THE LDK

On 23 March 1989, the provincial assembly of Kosovo, surrounded by Serbian tanks and armored vehicles, voted in favor of accepting several amendments of the Serbian constitution that would severely restrict Kosovo's power. In doing so, Kosovars gave Serbia control over their courts, police, civil defense, social and economic policy, and education. Throughout the first six months of 1990, the Serbs passed measures aimed at further reducing Kosovo Albanian political power - creating new municipalities for

⁵⁰ ICG, *Kosovo Spring*.

Serbs in the region, annulling sales of property by Serbs to Albanians in an effort to force Serbs to stay in the region, and closing Albanian language newspapers and schools.

In mid-July 1990, Albanian members of the parliament met in the streets and voted overwhelmingly to declare Kosovo "an equal and independent entity within the framework of the Yugoslav federation." With this announcement, the Serbian authorities dissolved the parliament and removed the last vestige of Kosovo's autonomous status. Three weeks later, the Serbian Assembly passed a law on labor relations in Kosovo and expelled more than 80,000 Albanian workers from their jobs. Subsequent protests by Kosovo Albanians were then used as a pretext to send in several more units of the Serbian Army and 25,000 policemen from Serbia to the province.⁵¹

By September 1990, Kosovo Albanian delegates met and passed a proclamation of a constitutional law for a "Republic of Kosovo," a document which provided for a new assembly and presidency. All other laws made by Serbia it declared, would be valid only if they were in harmony with their new constitution. On May 24, 1992, elections were

⁵¹ Malcolm, 343-346.

held at polling stations in private houses throughout the region and a new government (both assembly and president) were elected.⁵²

Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the LDK since 1989, was elected president. The basic policy of Rugova since 1990 has been to prevent violent revolt, to internationalize the Kosovo Albanian problem, and to deny the legitimacy of Serbian rule by boycotting elections and other state functions while nurturing the parallel state apparatus of the "Kosovo Republic."

The first of these aims has been successful in its implementation. The clan-like structure of families in the area, inherited from the Ghegs of northern Albania of which most Kosovars are ancestors, has helped in keeping others who may wish to use more violent means under the control of clan leaders and the LDK party's aims. The second and third aims are directed against the idea that the Kosovo problem is an internal question for Serbia. This idea is very much alive, as evidenced by the Dayton Accords and the lack of addressal of the Kosovo problem within it. By

⁵² Ibid., 347.

setting up a parallel government and other structures, the Kosovo Albanians have

Engaged in a strategy of political "as if". To behave as if Kosovo were not part of Serbia might seem, in the short term, sheer make-believe; but if the strategy continued long enough, foreign governments might feel obliged to admit that they were the ones engaging in fiction when they continued to treat Kosovo as a mere region of the Serbian state.⁵³

While the Serb government sacked most Albanian workers that worked in government positions in 1990, and also over 6,000 teachers that participated in protests or failed to comply with a newly instituted Serbian curriculum, some have found employment in the parallel system of clinics and schools. They are paid by the LDK from a voluntary three percent income tax that is levied from the diaspora, which is approximately 350,000 strong with over four million Albanian sympathizers in Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Greece.⁵⁴ Most people that work within this parallel structure however, are more likely and frequently subjected to arrest, intimidation and beatings by the Serb police. In 1994 alone, the Council for Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms in Kosovo recorded 2,157 physical assaults by the

⁵³ Ibid., 348.

⁵⁴ ICG, *Kosovo Spring*.

police, 3,553 raids on private dwellings and 2,963 arbitrary arrests.⁵⁵

The outbreak of war in 1991 in Slovenia and Croatia had a dramatic effect on the thinking of Kosovar leaders. If other Yugoslav republics could secede from the Yugoslav union, then they could also. The LDK changed its position from attaining republic status within Yugoslavia, to full sovereignty and independence.

The position of Kosovo Albanians during the war, although not directly involved in the fighting, suffered dramatically. With an economy greatly suffering from economic sanctions, Kosovo would be the last place that Serbia spent any of its money.⁵⁶ Compounding Kosovo's economic problems was the implementation of the United Nations Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) along the Macedonian border which was designed to prevent the Bosnian war from spreading. However, it also had the effect of cutting off all trade (most of it illegal) along the border between Kosovo and Macedonia.

⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, *Milosevic: The Invisible Hand*, accessed 15 May 1998; available at <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org>; Internet.

⁵⁶ Bennett, 354.

The end of the war brought no end to the crisis in Kosovo and Rugova's prestige since then has been greatly diminished. After spending four years telling his people that they must be patient until the international community imposed a beneficial settlement for them in relation to the Former Yugoslavia and Serbia, the Kosovo problem was not even addressed at the Dayton Accords in November of 1995. Instead, the LDK saw the international community legitimize the problem as being internal to Serbia, congratulate Milosevic for his support and efforts at ending the war, and that his presence in Yugoslavia led to stability in the region.

Rugova, since Dayton, has seen many of the levers that the international community could pull to influence Serb behavior in Kosovo rapidly disappear. First, Kosovo did not obtain a regional solution to the problem. Second, they saw a reduction in sanctions (all except the outer wall of sanctions, which does not permit Serbia to be involved or negotiate with the IMF and the World Bank), and thirdly, most of Europe has recognized the "third Yugoslavia" and has not made any calls for Kosovar independence. The only good thing to come out of Dayton for the Kosovars, was that the peace settlement can be

interpreted as being based on the principle that statehood in the Balkans derives from ethnicity, which could help legitimize violent revolt in Kosovo in the future.⁵⁷

In 1996, President Rugova for the first time met with Milosevic. Through the mediation of a Catholic charity, the two sides signed an agreement under which schools and university buildings would be made available to the parallel Albanian education system and that their language could be used in the schools. This agreement has, in fact, never been implemented by the Serbs, and further undermined Rugova's credibility in the eyes of many Kosovars.⁵⁸

By early 1997, several other Kosovo Albanian parties began to emerge from the shadows. Some of which, especially the second largest party in the region, led by Adem Demaci, were calling for a more militant approach to solving their problems. Frustrated that Kosovo did not feature in the Dayton Accords, because of the continued economic deterioration of the area, or due to Rugova's ineffectual policies, violence in the area has dramatically increased. Demaci, due to his sympathetic position and the

⁵⁷ Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin Books USA, 1996), 384.

⁵⁸ Malcolm, 354.

success that the Kosovo Liberation Army enjoyed in the early months of 1998, became their political representative.

B. RISE OF THE KLA AND THE LDK RIFT

Given the level of oppression in Kosovo, and the independence movements in other parts of the Former Yugoslavia, it is not surprising that an ethnic Albanian liberation army has appeared, but that it took so long to form. However, given the reasons listed above for the loss of leverage by the LDK, as well as the anarchy in Albania in the spring of 1997 which created an excellent source of weapons for the movement (as many as 800,000 rifles)⁵⁹, the KLA announced its existence and became a major player in Kosovar political affairs.

Attacks by the KLA occurred as early as 1993. However, they seem to have been isolated incidents and not coordinated in any way. The first planned assaults, however, occurred on 22 April 1996 when four almost simultaneous assaults were launched in separate areas of

⁵⁹ Jane's Intelligence Review, *Ethnic Violence Escalates in Kosova*, 1 February 1998, Vol. 10, No. 2, 13.

Kosovo. The attacks resulted in the deaths of two Serb police officers and three wounded.⁶⁰

Attacks have continued since then. The most spectacular attack, which gave the KLA real credibility, occurred on the night of 10 September 1997, when ten coordinated operations in locations 150 kms apart targeted police barracks and vehicles. This series of attacks proved that there was a well organized, armed movement which had the knowledge and resources to plan and execute complex attacks in an area heavily controlled by Serb military and police forces.⁶¹

In the summer of 1997, the KLA acknowledged its existence and claimed responsibility for several incidents in which Serb police were killed in the area, as well as Kosovo Albanians that had "collaborated" with the Serbs and their system of government. The list of "collaborators" include the head of the Socialist Party of Serbia in Glogovac, and a deputy in the Yugoslav Assembly's House of Citizens, as well as the deaths of five policemen, five Serb civilians, and eleven Kosovo Albanians.⁶² This use of

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² ICG, *Kosovo Spring*.

a para-military force in the area may well bring about the same results as Serb para-military units did in Bosnia. By attacking collaborators, the KLA is forcing the general Kosovar population to "choose" sides and arm themselves. The movement has become sufficiently powerful in the Drenica region of Kosovo (with Demaci saying that the KLA has 30,000 men under arms), so that in November 1997, an armed band was able to force a column of Serbian police armored vehicles to withdraw from the area.⁶³

With these limited military successes, a growing rift has emerged between Rugova and the LDK, and the government-in-exile, led by Prime Minister Bukoshi. The situation has degenerated to the point that Bukoshi has declared that Rugova's policy of peaceful resistance has brought the Kosovar movement to a dead-end, and has yielded no positive results. With Bukoshi's backing, Demaci has not only continued to advocate civil disobedience and active resistance, but has acknowledged the KLA, and has only asked that they suspend their activities during periods of negotiations with the Serbs. Rugova, on the other hand, while holding the purse strings of the three percent

⁶³ Ibid.

levied taxes on the diaspora by virtue of being the leader of the LDK, continues to deny that the KLA exists and continues to ask the international community to become involved in solving Kosovo's problem.⁶⁴

Despite the increasing violence in the area, Rugova has continued to advocate his policy of passive resistance. But, as events of the last several months have shown, he may be losing control of his political movement. To date, all Rugova can show for his efforts is a nine point, U.S. backed education agreement signed in 1996 that has not yet been implemented. The growing militancy of the Kosovar population will continue to increase, especially when they see that the international community will become more interested and involved in their plight when violence is used. Yet, the more violent approach may cause the Kosovar independence movement to lose its legitimacy, and in the process, alienate the international community.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

V. POLICY OPTIONS

Given the historical and ethno-national backgrounds of the Serbian and Kosovar peoples, and what the international community wants or is willing to tolerate as far as the eventual status of Kosovo, an analysis of current options for conflict resolution is needed. While European support will be required to help resolve the Kosovo crisis, the United States must play a dominant and active role for crisis resolution.

In the Bosnia-Herzegovina case, the Europeans and the U.S. pursued different goals. With regard to economic sanctions, the Europeans used a "carrot and stick" approach - more funding to the FRY if Milosevic intervened or used his influence to get the Bosnian Serbs to sign agreements - which only made Milosevic more powerful and instrumental in the peace process. The U.S., on the other hand, used the economic embargo to undermine the Milosevic regime. The U.S. and Europe also operated at cross-purposes with the arms embargo against the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Europeans were against supplying arms to the Bosnian Muslims because they had their own peacekeeping troops on the ground under U.N. mandate, and the U.S. was in favor of "Train and Equip" for the Muslims because they had no

capacity to produce their own weaponry (while the FRY did) and the program would eventually even out the decided advantage that the Bosnian Serbs had in artillery and tanks.

It is therefore imperative that the U.S. remains engaged and takes the lead in crisis resolution negotiations. Only the U.S. has the ability to coordinate an overall, coalition strategy among the European nations, and the military capabilities and firepower that can influence Milosevic's behavior.

Understanding the history of the conflict, and being able to "pull the proper levers" at the right time is critical in order to manipulate and influence the factions. While the policy options offered assume that airstrikes and other stand off capabilities may be used in an effort to coerce the parties to find an amicable solution, they do not assume that NATO or any other foreign military force will be deployed to Kosovo in order to "keep the peace." Ample evidence of the failure of this method, as implemented by the international community after the Dayton Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina, shows that in cases where "ancient ethnic hatreds" exist, whether real or perceived, insertion of international forces in the area will be

detrimental to long-term conflict resolution. In Bosnia, the construction of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, served not only to keep the hostile military forces from coming in contact with each other, but also served to keep the people apart and further polarize the hard-line politicians.

Besides, the stand-off military capabilities that the U.S. and European militaries possess, coupled with the aim of the policy options listed below, ground forces would not be required to obtain a peaceful solution.

The Kosovo crisis, if it is ever to be resolved, must be solved by the Serbians and Kosovars in a way that will be amenable to both parties. Interaction between the parties is the only way to build the necessary confidence building measures. Political will, ethnic and cultural tolerance, and renewed emphasis toward democratization, will need to be shared by all parties.

A. LEVERS

Milosevic exercises his authority by means of the country's financial controls, media, and state security forces. By attacking these critical nodes in the Milosevic regime, combined with the loss of nationalism that was explained earlier, Milosevic will be willing to enter into

negotiations if he believes he is becoming dangerously close to losing any more power within the government or even being overthrown.

Poverty and uncertainty have become a critical factor in the FRY. Lawlessness, corruption, and a mafia style economy have become the norm. Milosevic, under this type of economy, has accumulated enormous wealth that he uses to control the media, and pay bribes to government, party, and police officials. His autocratic regime gives him the power to control the issuance of credits and hard currency through the Yugoslav National Bank, thereby controlling the economy.⁶⁵ While he has put himself in the unique position of being in almost complete control of the economy, he has also created a critical vulnerability for the international community to exploit.

While general sanctions have limited Milosevic's capacity to do many things, they have caused the people of the FRY to rally around the flag, and for the most part they have been able to get by through timely payments of pensions and other forms of relief by the Milosevic regime. Sharper economic sanctions that specifically target

⁶⁵ David Cortright and George A. Lopez, ed., *Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1995), 144.

Milosevic's assets are needed. Freezing his foreign bank accounts (estimated to be from 200 to 500 million dollars)⁶⁶, and placing sanctions against commercial businesses and their subsidiaries that he has interests in, will greatly affect his ability to control the economy, pay off his patronage network, and meet the peoples' pension and wage obligations. This may take several months to be effective, but if it is done in a coordinated way by the U.S. and Europeans, it should prove to be decisive.

The same financial lever must be used in order to downplay the effects of the media in Serbia. Milosevic has routinely used the media in an effort to fuel the people's nationalist flames during periods of crisis. He continues to do it in the case of the current Kosovo crisis in order to justify sending so many troops and security personnel to the region. Without the financial means to operate the media campaign, the people of the FRY will become less enflamed about the situation in Kosovo, and Milosevic will lose a cause that he has used to divert their attention away from their poor economic plight.

Lastly, the Yugoslav army and police forces have become disenchanted with the Milosevic regime. In the case of the

⁶⁶ ICG, *Serbia - The Milosevic Factor*.

police forces, they have become disenchanted because they typically have to wait months to be paid. While being paid mostly in cash, and about fifty percent more than other low-skill government workers, many of them are assigned to the Kosovo area and are away from their families.⁶⁷

The army, since the end of the Bosnian war, has become even more distant than the police from the Milosevic regime. Many officers are being held accountable for losses in Bosnia and Croatia, and equipment has not been maintained or replaced due to the economic situation. Additionally, many officers and troops have had to subsidize their incomes by working another job. Milosevic has had to infiltrate the army with police forces in order to keep their allegiance, which is deeply resented by the upper echelons of the military.

General Momcilo Persic, Chief of Staff of the Army, has lashed out at the policies of the Milosevic regime. In January 1998, he complained of the Milosevic regime not doing what it could to have the economic sanctions lifted from the country. The General has also called for Yugoslavia to work towards eventual membership in the Partnership for Peace program and eventual NATO membership.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

All of these declarations are clear signs, that while the army may not be able to directly oppose Milosevic, there is dissention in the ranks and they are willing to make a deal with regard to the Kosovo situation. Concrete promises to the Yugoslav army's high command of financial, technical, and material support, by the international community should the Kosovo dispute be settled amicably, will weigh heavily on Milosevic's mind.⁶⁸

In the case of the Kosovars, both the LDK and the KLA must also be pressured to make a deal. Their pressure points, like Milosevic's, are centered around money. By applying overt and covert pressure on the accounts that send money to the LDK via the three percent levied tax on the diaspora, Rugova will eventually have to compromise. Unable to provide basic education and health benefits to the Kosovar population through their parallel governmental structures, something the Kosovar population has become very dependent upon, will cause Rugova to lose even more influence than he has of late with the emergence of the KLA. By freezing these accounts, and emphatically stating that the international community will not allow an independent Kosovo or Greater Albania, Rugova will be

⁶⁸ Ibid.

increasingly pressured to deal. Conversely, allowing Rugova access to the funds at appropriate times will strengthen him in his dealings with the KLA and other hard-liners, as he is the only one that can manage and manipulate the parallel Kosovar institutions. Rugova, having exhibited a more moderate stance on Kosovar recognition during the early 1990's, should be willing to negotiate a peaceful settlement in an effort to retain power.

The KLA, while not being as susceptible to monetary levers, must have their supply of weapons cut off from neighboring Albania. Due to their fundamentalist views, they are the least likely party to compromise and present the biggest threat to a negotiated settlement. A preventative deployment force along the Albanian border, much like the one in Macedonia, should effectively cut off the supply of light weapons, and black market supplies currently being filtered into the area. Greatly outnumbered and out gunned by FRY forces, without the ability to make their own weaponry, the KLA will be forced to submit or carry on a low level guerrilla war, with ever decreasing amounts of weapons and ammunition. The latter situation will soon be realized as only playing into the

hands of Milosevic and his strategy of maintaining the status quo.

B. MILOSEVIC'S MANIPULATION AND UTILITY

However weakened Milosevic may be, he still remains the only credible interlocutor in Serbia. While many of the other Serbian party's leaders differ from Milosevic on many issues, the largest parties are unwilling to give up Kosovo. The JUL party, Seselj's nationalist party, and the leaders of the former coalition parties of the 1996 uprisings in Belgrade, remain steadfast nationalists. Dependence on the anti-Kosovo nationalist fervor would be necessary if any of them came to power, as they have nothing else to inflame the passions of the people, or any of the levers that Milosevic holds over the country to wield power. Unseating Milosevic would place an ineffectual leader that does not have the power to influence events or bring stability to the area.

Only Milosevic has control of the media to rally the people behind an agreement, or the political power via his domination of party politics and patronage network to push through the constitutional amendment necessary to change the status of Kosovo. Milosevic's track record suggests

that he is willing to respond to pressure, but only if he perceives that he will lose power.⁶⁹

Milosevic is an opportunist that has sacrificed many of the beliefs and abandoned strategies in the past in order to maintain power. He has abandoned the Communist Party and his friend, Ivan Stambolic, as mentioned earlier, in his effort to become Serbia's leader. When his effort to become the leader of Yugoslavia failed in 1990, he channeled his energies into the creation of a Greater Serbia. And, in 1995, Milosevic signed the Dayton Accords and the Erdut Agreement, under which he abandoned the Bosnian Serbs and Krajina Serbs due to the threat of additional airstrikes on Serbian territory, and with the advancing Federation forces into Bosnian Serb areas in October 1995, massive refugee flows into Serbia. All of these events threatened to destabilize Milosevic's control over Serbia. In the end, he was willing to change course or deal in order to remain in power.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

C. OPTIONS AND ANALYSIS

A lasting solution to the Kosovo crisis will have to allow for the conflicting views of the Serbs and Kosovars. According to a recent poll in Serbia and Montenegro 42.0 percent of the Serbs wished to abolish all autonomy for Kosovo, while 40.7 percent were prepared to give the Kosovars limited autonomy. Only 2.2 percent believed that they had the right to become a republic, and 5.9 percent advocated partition of the region along Serb and Kosovar held areas. The Kosovars, on the other hand, were 88.9 percent in favor of independence, and 26.9 percent advocated territorial division and population exchanges. It is important to note, however, that over fifty percent were also willing to return to "autonomous province" status as guaranteed under the 1974 constitution.⁷¹

In analyzing the below options, it is important to note that the international community, for all intents and purposes, has established Kosovo as being a part of Yugoslavia. The inability of the international community to come to a common strategic plan for Kosovo during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and at the Dayton Peace Accords, has legitimized it as a FRY internal matter. Decisions

⁷¹ ICG, *Kosovo Spring*.

made thus far have advocated the ending of human rights abuses and greater freedom for Kosovars, but they have in no way advocated the redrawing of existing borders. While Kosovo may be able to escape from being under the Serbian government in the short term, it is doubtful that they will be able or allowed to break away from the FRY.

1. Status Quo

In the short term, the status quo is the best option for Serbia. Stoking the nationalist flames of his country in order to prop up his regime, Milosevic needs the Kosovar crisis to continue in order to divert attention away from the country's economic problems. In the long-term, however, the drain on resources, materiel, and personnel, will continue to weaken the economy and his leadership.

To both the LDK and the KLA, as well as the international community, the status quo is an unacceptable option. Although the KLA has been largely defeated by Serb forces since their early successes through April 1998, they will continue to fight as long as there is international support and funding for their cause. They believe that eventually the international community will come to their aid. As for the international community, the large amounts of refugees and human rights violations in the Kosovo area,

combined with the possibility of spillover of the conflict into other ethnic Albanian areas on the Balkan peninsula, is a situation that they can no longer tolerate.

The status quo option appears to be untenable to both parties. In the long term it will have a great impact on the Serb economy, while the Kosovars will become more radicalized and alienated, leading to large refugee flows from the area and the possibility of a protracted guerilla war being waged.⁷²

2. Independence or Partition

The independence option is the most preferred by the Kosovo Albanians. While the LDK's position has gone from the restoration of autonomy to republic status to full independence (February 1998), the LDK now appears to be open to international options for the resolution of the conflict. The KLA, however, remains steadfast in achieving independence and reserves the right to unify with Albania. The Serbs denounce this option and they have said that military force would be used to protect their land, religious shrines, and Serbian people in the area. The

⁷²European Action Council for Peace in the Balkans and Public International Law and Policy Group of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Kosovo: From Crisis to a Permanent Solution*, 01 November 1997; accessed 1 May 1998; available from <http://www.ceip.org>; Internet.

international community is unwilling to consider this proposal, fearing that independence would not only lead to the possible migration of Serbs from the area, but also the creation of a Greater Albania and other independence movements of minorities in the area (e.g., the Vojvodina Hungarians in northern Serbia, or the Sandzak Muslims in central Serbia).

The idea of partition, similar in its end-state as the independence option, under which the Serbs would keep the northern and eastern parts of Kosovo where their religious shrines and Serb population live, has met with some Serbian parties approval. Kosovars, however, are unlikely to approve of such an option. Most of Kosovo's material wealth (mining) lies in the northern part of the region, and they in turn would probably ask for the border to be drawn to include majority held ethnic Albanian areas north of the border in Serbia. This would be unacceptable to the Serbs.⁷³ Furthermore, the international community would not approve of such an option because of not only the Greater Albania scenario, but also because of their reluctance to define borders according to ethnicity or religion as was done in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

⁷³ Ibid.

3. Autonomy

As stated earlier, the current rise of nationalist tensions by the Kosovars in Kosovo is largely due to the revocation of their autonomous status by the Serbs as guaranteed to them by the 1974 constitution. Prior to 1989, the Kosovars enjoyed the same status as other republics, including their own legislative apparatus, financial autonomy, and representation in the federal parliament, constitutional court, and presidency. However, the Serbs rejected this constitution because they believed and still believe that the Kosovars, while being largely supported by them economically and financially, had too much say in the federal government and offered little to the other republics.

While the Kosovar position has intensified since the beginning of 1998, it is likely that they would accept this option as a starting and interim point for long-term negotiations. The Serb position may soften, and given the events of the last year, prefer this option if they are able to avoid more of the financial responsibility and aid to Kosovo, rather than establishing an international protectorate in the area or giving them republic status.

4. Improvement Of Human Rights

Improving the human rights conditions in Kosovo, which would include ending police repression, institution of the education agreement, re-employing Kosovars in government and public positions, and allowing international monitoring agencies to operate in the area, would be the least costly option available to the Serbs. While the Serbian government has rejected this proposal, in that they have the right to combat "terrorist" forces within their borders by all means available, one of the former coalition parties of 1996, the Civic Alliance of Serbia, has indicated that it is in favor of this arrangement.⁷⁴ While in favor of regional autonomy and equal rights for all citizens, this proposal in the long-term does not solve the question of Kosovo's constitutional status. Kosovars, while in favor of this option as an interim framework to promote broader dialogue, will only accommodate the option if guarantees are reached for a long-term, permanent status of Kosovo.

5. Republic

Giving Kosovo equal, republic status in the FRY, while keeping the borders of the FRY intact, is the toughest option to implement. For the Serbs, not only will they

⁷⁴ Ibid.

have to give up some of their federal superiority to another republic, but also have to deal with other nationalist movements in the Vojvodina and the Sandzak that would in turn request the same treatment. Also the Serbs would have to have concrete guarantees for the safety of the Serb population in Kosovo. While this republic status would be ideal and receive approval from most Kosovars, the international community in the short-term should avoid this option in that it could empower other nationalities within Serbia and Macedonia, to ask for the same treatment. It should also be avoided because Kosovo under this arrangement would have its own constitution, legislature, and veto power in the federal government. Considering the current poor relationship between the Kosovars and Serbs, the FRY government would fail to work under this arrangement. Federal voting would be along ethnic lines, much the way it was done in the 1980's in the Former Yugoslavia, leading to political stagnation and ineffectiveness. Constitutionally, the Kosovars would then have the right to secede leading to the same problems of Serb aggression and Greater Albanian containment that we currently face.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ Ibid.

While republic status may be a long-term solution, it will require time for both sides to back down from their current hard-line positions and to develop the necessary confidence building measures before the republic option can guarantee any form of success.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. CURRENT ACTIVITIES

The final solution to the dispute in Kosovo must be left for the Serbs and the Kosovars to decide. However, international assistance and pressure, and even more so, adherence to a strategic plan, will be crucial in achieving a lasting and peaceful solution. Pressure will be needed to bring the parties to the negotiating table, and then again in order for them to make a deal.

So far, the disunity of the international community has wasted valuable time in an effort to solve a problem that has been brewing in its modern context since 1990. In the most current wave of violence to sweep the region, beginning in December 1997, it took the Contact Group until 9 March 1998 before there was a call for an arms embargo.⁷⁶ The fall of the Albanian government and the dispersal of many of their army's arms caches in 1996 should have been an early warning to the conflicts escalating violence. The Contact Group's key demand of ending the violence in the region and for the factions to enter into a dialogue with no preconditions, has not been met. Since then, the

⁷⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Kosovo Home Page*, Recent Agreements, accessed 25 October 1998; available from http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/kosovo_hp.html; Internet.

international community has made threats to further "internationalize the measures, and to pursue a freeze on funds held abroad" but have not been able to achieve any agreement or compliance among themselves for its implementation.⁷⁷ Milosevic, sensing the discord within the international community, has continued to pursue his objectives in the region, which by October 1998 were largely attained in that he had recaptured all areas and cities in Kosovo that were reported to be held by the KLA. As of the beginning of October, the current fighting has caused the evacuation of over 300,000 refugees from the area before there was a decisive and believable call by the United States for NATO forces to be ready to conduct airstrikes in the area and the possible implementation of a 47,000 man force for peacekeeping purposes. Since then, there has been a gradual reduction of Serbian police forces in the region.⁷⁸ However, the U.S. element of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission reports continued cease-fire violations in the Kosovo area, and even artillery shelling (not clear whose) in the Drenica region. They have also

⁷⁷ ICG, *Milosevic: The Invisible Hand*.

⁷⁸ Steven Erlanger, *Serbs Warned: End Violence in Kosovo*, New York Times News Service, 2 October 1998.

observed that Serbian forces have not withdrawn enough forces from the area, which led Ambassador Hill (U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia) on 22 October 1998 to say that, "We are not satisfied with the level of Serbian compliance." As of 25 October 1998, SACEUR was scheduled to meet with Milosevic to demand full compliance with the terms set in the Holbrooke-Milosevic negotiations.⁷⁹

B. RECOMMENDATION

As these most recent events illustrate, the United States must lead the effort for conflict resolution in Kosovo. While most European nations continue to have a soft stance against Milosevic (the carrot and stick approach to negotiating), and Milosevic expertly continues to string out the international communities' demands and manipulate the situation in order to maintain the status quo, only the U.S. has been able to influence recent events with diplomatic and military overtures.

The following is a recommendation for the best course of action in order to bring the various factions to the negotiating table (short-term solution). While the time

⁷⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Kosovo Home Page*, KDOM Daily report and Kosovo Progress Report of 22 October 1998.

table for the below actions to be effective may vary with international community support and other factors, the order in which they are used is critical so that various factions will be undermined or empowered at the proper time.

1. The Serbs

- First, the U.S. and NATO must position forces and threaten the use of airstrikes on military and police forces engaged in attacks against the Kosovo population. Aircraft equipped to jam communications should begin SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense) missions over Kosovo in an effort to cut-off communications between Belgrade and units deployed to the region. Milosevic will be unwilling to sustain heavy losses in the field for fear that the military will no longer support him. This must also be the first step from the international communities' point of view in order to stop the fighting in the area, and to alleviate the refugee flow and humanitarian crisis in the area.
- Secondly, all accounts held by Milosevic and the FRY government outside its borders should be frozen. IMF "outer wall" sanctions have hurt the Milosevic

regime, but not enough. The international community must attack Milosevic's source of power - money - which allows him to operate his political and media machine. Loss of popular support, inability to pay pensions to the people etc., will undermine his authority in the FRY, and cause him to enter negotiations before his power base erodes.

2. The Kosovars

- With the recent developments in Albania, including riots and another change of government, inform the Kosovar leaders (both LDK and KLA) that Albania has not recognized Kosovo's independence or as a parallel state in the past, and with their current problems, the likelihood of recognition, or even support, is decreasing.⁸⁰ Lack of Albanian government interest in the Kosovars plight, Serb superiority in balance of forces, and international community non-acceptance of the possibility of a "Greater Albania," should alert Kosovar leaders to the fact that they must enter negotiations and move away from their hard-line stance.

⁸⁰ European Action Council.

- With Albanian permission, the U.S. and NATO should deploy a preventative force along the Kosovar border. Like UNPREDEP in Macedonia, this force would prevent illegal weapons and black marketeering from entering Kosovo. The Albanians in the current situation would probably approve of such a stabilizing force on their territory. This overt action would greatly decrease the KLA's ability to wage war. Kosovo will be effectively contained, and Serb superiority in balance of forces will obviously put down any future insurrectionist movements. The hard-line stance of the KLA will be greatly undermined. Their position can be even further undermined by allowing funding to enter the region to help rebuild the infrastructure and economy of Kosovo, only after they have come to the negotiating table, and only through moderate LDK organization and parallel structure of government.
- While the above listed action will effectively disable the KLA fighting force and empower the more moderate LDK, it will be important to remind the LDK that they are not in a position either to make excessive demands. The LDK must be informed that

unless they come to the negotiating table, accounts that are currently transferring funds to the LDK's parallel government institutions will be frozen. Rugova, fearing loss of power and international community to support, will quickly comply and assume a more moderate stance at the negotiating table.

While the factions may not come to the negotiating table immediately after the implementation of the above measures by the international community, over time they will erode each of their power bases. As each faction begins to feel that it is losing power over its respective institutions, and diplomatic pressures are increased by the United States and the international community, they will come to the negotiating table without pre-conditions.

Both sides at the negotiating table should be expected to retain hard-line policies. However, continued pressure applied by the international community will eventually bring about an agreement whereby each side must give. In this vane, it seems the most likely option in the short-term would be for the Serbs to declare Kosovo an autonomous province. It is middle ground for both sides, and would not entail the redrawing of borders which the international

community seems unwilling to do. While the Kosovars and many people in the international community would like to see Kosovo attain republic status within the FRY in the long-term, confidence building measures must first be established and mutual trust among the ethnicities attained for it to be successful.

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