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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SDI Criticized at Copenhagen Peace Parley (Ye. Silin; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 26 Oct 86)	1
TASS Analyst Dwells on Cost, Risks of SDI (Moscow TASS, 26 Nov 86)	4
EDI Advocated as Replacement for NATO (Robert Rudney; Paris LE MONDE, 28 Oct 86)	6
PRC Reiterates Opposition to Arms Race in Space (Beijing XINHUA, 26 Nov 86)	9
PRC Journal on SDI 'Stumbling Block' (Jiang Wandu; Beijing BEIJING REVIEW, No 49, 8 Dec 86) ...	10

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR's Petrovskiy Addresses Conference on Nuclear-Free World (Moscow TASS, 3 Dec 86)	12
USSR's Arbatov: Ban on Nuclear Arms Will Not 'Lead to War' (Moscow TASS, 11 Nov 86)	14
Moscow: Reagan Distorts Reykjavik, Americans Remain Uninformed (Sergey Bulantsev; Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 31 Oct 86)	15
USSR General on Linkage, Soviet Reykjavik Concessions (Nikolay Chervov; Bratislava PRAVDA, 18 Nov 86)	19
USSR: Ernst Genri on Meaning of U.S. Reykjavik Policy for Europe (Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 19 Nov 86)	22
USSR Views NATO Post-Reykjavik Disarmament Attitudes (V. Pustov; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Nov 86)	26

TASS: NATO Eurogroup Confirms 'Lack of Serious Intentions'	
(Moscow TASS, 3 Dec 86)	30
XINHUA Cites Soviet Official on Disarmament Progress	
(Beijing XINHUA, 27 Nov 86)	31
TASS: U.S. ABM Treaty Reinterpretation, SDI Hit	
(Moscow TASS, 3 Dec 86)	32
FRG: Kohl Writes on U.S. Talks on Reykjavik Meeting	
(Helmut Kohl; Madrid ABC, 18 Nov 86)	33
FRG's Genscher Urges End of Debate on 'Zero Option'	
(Hamburg DPA, 1 Dec 86)	35
FRG: Comments on NATO Defense Ministers Meeting	
(Various sources, various dates)	36
SDP's Vogel Sees Arms Race	36
Woerner Condemns SPD Stance	36
Press Review	37
Paper: 'Hawks' Dominated Meeting	37
FRG Paper Comments on NATO Conference	
(Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 5 Dec 86)	39
PRC Premier on Continued U.S.-USSR Arms Dialogue	
(Beijing XINHUA, 7 Dec 86)	40
PRC Journal Views U.S.-Soviet Arms Talks	
(Ren Zhengde; Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION, No 47, 24 Nov 86)	41
XINHUA Reports on New U.S.-USSR Arms Meeting	
(Beijing XINHUA, 2, 4 Dec 86)	44
Geneva Special Session	44
U.S. Pessimism Noted	45
Briefs	
Gorbachev Answers Finnish Group	46
Woerner: NATO Supports Zero Option	46
SALT/START ISSUES	
PRAVDA: Weinberger on Funds for MX, B-1B, Stealth	
(V. Sukhoy; Moscow PRAVDA, 24 Nov 86)	47
Pentagon Disparaging B-1B To Boost Stealth Program	
(Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 Nov 86)	48

Soviet Paper Scores Wyoming Deployment of MX (Vadim Biryukov; Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN, 19 Nov 86)	49
USSR: Further Commentary on U.S. 131st B-52 Deployment (Various sources, various dates)	50
TASS Quotes Pentagon Announcement	50
TASS Military Writer Comments	51
Reagan Ignores Public Opinion	52
131st B-52 En Route To Base	52
Reagan Seeks To Destroy Arms Control	53
PRAVDA: Decision 'Irresponsible', by Vitaliy	53
Violation 'Adventurism in Politics'	54
U.S. Expanding Arsenal, by Viktor Konnov	55
Denmark's Reaction	56
ABC Network Cited	56
FRG's Woerner Discusses SALT II, Zero Option (Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network, 3 Dec 86)	57
FRG Government Comments on SALT II, U.S. Decision (Hamburg DPA, 28 Nov 86; Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network, 28 Nov 86)	59
Cool Reception	59
Press Review	59
FRG: SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG on U.S. SALT II Move (Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 29-30 Nov 86)	61
UK Government Comments on U.S. Plans To Breach SALT II (Chris Moncrieff; London PRESS ASSOCIATION, 27 Nov 86)	62
French Editorial Views Reagan's SALT II Decision (Paris LE MONDE, 29 Nov 86)	63
Spanish Foreign Minister 'Regrets' U.S. SALT II Decision (Madrid Domestic Service, 2 Dec 86)	64
XINHUA Notes U.S. B-52 Bomber Deployment (Beijing XINHUA, 27 Nov 86)	65
XINHUA Notes U.S. Break of SALT II Provisions (Beijing XINHUA, 29 Nov, 1 Dec 86; Beijing RENMIN RIBAO, 30 Nov 86)	66
'U.S. Gone Beyond Limits'	66
U.S. Allies Criticize Violation	67
RENMIN RIBAO Commentary, by Zhang Liang	68

XINHUA News Analysis on 'Death' of SALT-II (Mei Zhenmin; Beijing XINHUA, 4 Dec 86)	69
XINHUA Commentary on U.S. Allies' SALT Views (Xia Zhimian; Beijing XINHUA, 5 Dec 86)	71
XINHUA Reportage: USSR Reaction to U.S. SALT Breakout (Beijing XINHUA, 6, 9 Dec 86)	73
USSR To Observe SALT	73
Condemnation of SALT-II Violation	74
XINHUA Cites USSR Spokesman on U.S. Violation of SALT II (Beijing XINHUA, 27 Nov 86)	75
Briefs	
FRG Minister on U.S. SALT Stance	76
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES	
USSR's Akhromeyev Discusses Separate Euromissile Accord (Paris AFP, 26 Nov 86)	77
Commentator Sees Zero Option as Undesirable for Western Europe (Otto Verberne; Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD, 3 Nov 86)	78
XINHUA Cites TASS on U.S. Missile Deployment (Beijing XINHUA, 28 Nov 86)	82
XINHUA Reportage: DPRK Envoy on U.S. Decision To Deploy Missiles (Beijing XINHUA, 9 Dec 86)	83
XINHUA Notes DPRK Protest Over 'Lance' Missiles (Beijing XINHUA, 25 Nov 86)	84
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS	
Soviet Delegate Addresses CD Chemical Weapon Talks (Moscow TASS, 24 Nov 86)	85
USSR Denies UN Charge of CW in Afghanistan (Paris AFP, 13 Nov 86; Moscow TASS International Service, 12 Nov 86)	87
AFP Version	87
TASS Version	87
USSR Media on U.S. CBW Activities (Various sources, various dates)	89
U.S. Biological Weapons Research	89
U.S. 'Chemical Refurbishment'	90

U.S. Chemical Modernization	90
Binary Munitions in UK	91
USSR: Commentary Scores Tehran Allegations of CBW Use (Moscow in Persian to Iran, 18 Nov 86)	93
IZVESTIYA Rebuts Claims of Nerve Gas Supplied to Libya (D. Pilyatskin; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 27 Nov 86)	95

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

TASS: Romanian Arms Cuts in Spirit of Warsaw Pact Appeal (Moscow TASS, 25 Nov 86)	96
Moscow Praises Finnish President's Nordic CSBM Proposals (Yuriy Andreyev; Moscow International Service, 15 Nov 86)	97
Briefs	
Pact Group Debates MBFR	99

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

Paper Discusses Advances in Nuclear-Test Detection (Roger Highfield; London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, 20 Nov 86)	100
--	-----

RELATED ISSUES

Gorbachev on Disarmament in Foreword to Book for India (Moscow TASS, 23 Nov 86)	102
Moscow: Round Table on Disarmament, Testing, SDI, Euromissiles (Igor Pavlovich Charikov, et al.; Moscow Domestic Service, 23 Nov 86)	104
USSR's Bovin on SALT II, Moratorium on Testing (Aleksandr Bovin Interview; Prague Domestic Service, 4 Dec 86)	110
IZVESTIYA Hits U.S. SALT, ABM Treaty Stance (V. Starodubov; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 9 Dec 86)	112
TASS Commentaries Deride U.S. Arms Control, Testing, SALT Stance (Moscow TASS, 10 Dec 86)	116
U.S. Jeopardizing Nuclear Disarmament	116
U.S. 'Defying Logic'	117
IZVESTIYA: Carrington Criticizes Chirac Address to WEU Assembly (Yu. Kovalenko; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 6 Dec 86)	119

USSR-PRC Agree on NFZ, Militarization of Space
(Ivanov; Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to
China, 5 Dec 86) 120

/7310

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SDI CRITICIZED AT COPENHAGEN PEACE PARLEY

PM281625 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Oct 86 Morning Edition pp 4, 5

[Article by Ye. Silin, deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation: "Reykjavik Viewed From Copenhagen"]

[Text] Representatives of the peace-loving public of most countries on all continents of the world took part in the Copenhagen world congress dedicated to International Peace Year. Nevertheless, since the congress was held in a European capital, the Europeans formed one of the largest regional groups there and their voice made a great impression. What was the center of attention? It is not hard to guess that the representatives of the European public were concerned most of all with the results of the recent Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik.

It is common knowledge that the Reykjavik meeting produced complex results. Naturally, the verdicts of the Europeans gathered in Copenhagen reflected the very broad range of feelings and opinions evoked by Reykjavik among diverse public and political circles in Europe. Furthermore, those verdicts underwent a noticeable evolution during the 5 days of the congress as people received more and more truthful information about what actually happened in Reykjavik. The intensive reciprocal exchange of opinions on Reykjavik played a great role. Representatives of the Soviet public took an active part in the discussion on those questions. Some of those representatives were also in Reykjavik during the summit. Representatives of the U.S. and some West European peace movements were also there. Thus, the discussion on Reykjavik began as early as the first plenary session at the congress opening and continued in virtually all the discussion centers and forums, at the press center, at numerous bilateral meetings, and in the congress lobby.

The Europeans were able to give the most concentrated expression of their position on the Reykjavik meeting's results at the special forum devoted to European security and cooperation problems and at the press conference on the theme "The View of the European Public's Representatives on Reykjavik." I should like to share my impressions of those discussions in particular.

The participants in the Copenhagen congress from the European countries made no secret of the fact that their first feeling at the reports from Reykjavik was one of profound disappointment at the historic opportunity missed there to resolve the problems of eliminating the threat of nuclear war by radically reducing and subsequently completely eliminating the nuclear arsenals on our continent and throughout the world, problems which most worry Europe. But before our eyes this feeling of bitterness and

disappointment gave way to serious reflections on the responsibility of each side for creating the situation and on Europe's role in the struggle to realize the potential for agreements which really materialized in Reykjavik, agreements which on the eve of the meeting the Europeans could only dream about as a very distant prospect.

Who produced these encouraging proposals in Reykjavik? Who persistently sought a practical solution of complex problems there taking account of the fears of the other side and its allies? In Copenhagen Europeans with the most diverse ideological views and political allegiances noted that it was Soviet leader M.S. Gorbachev who pursued that line in Reykjavik.

No one tried to dispute the fact that the U.S. President went to the meeting empty-handed or with a set of old proposals which had already brought the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms to deadlock.

"Many people in France were surprised at M.S. Gorbachev's abundance of constructive proposals and welcomed them," Professor (Zh. Astr), the well known political scientist said at the press conference. "R. Reagan bears the responsibility for the missed opportunities."

"The SDI is the main obstacle to the realization of the peoples' hopes for nuclear disarmament. This is a great tragedy for mankind. The 'Star Wars' program will protect the British people from the threat of annihilation," is the opinion of Labour Party MP E. Roberts. "The United States ignores Europe's interests, it is egging Europe on to increase its ruinous military spending and to adopt a strategy which poses a danger to the European peoples' existence," believes F. Ooijen, a member of parliament of the Dutch Labour Party.

At the same time it is important to note that for the Europeans assembled in Copenhagen it was no longer sufficient to determine who has the truth on their side or, perhaps more conveniently for some people, the bulk of the truth. The discussions showed that the main obstacle to reaching agreement in Reykjavik, that is to say, the U.S. "Star Wars" program, placed most keenly before the inhabitants of Europe the question of their contribution to surmounting this obstacle and to clearing away the blockages on the path of ending the arms race on earth and preventing it in space.

You may ask: What is the European population's attitude to the U.S. "Star Wars" plans? During the congress there was quite a lot of evidence that the majority of Europeans condemn and reject these plans. The majority, but not all. The discussion participants highlighted the stepping up of cooperation between the West German and U.S. military-industrial complexes. The military monopolies of a number of NATO countries are urging their governments to step up their political and scientific-technical collaboration in implementing the U.S. SDI plan. The Western European press organs which serve their interests attacked the Reykjavik meeting even before it began, just like those people across the Atlantic who even now continue to criticize R. Reagan for agreeing to go to Reykjavik and who praise him solely because he "found within himself the strength to say 'no' to M.S. Gorbachev's proposals."

The struggle against SDI and its European versions is developing most keenly in Western Europe right now in the light of the Reykjavik results. "Until now we somewhat underestimated the significance of this struggle," representatives of the FRG Green Party admitted during a lobby discussion.

Prevent the militarization of space and insist on the complete cessation of nuclear tests -- that is the common factor in the different opinions expressed in Copenhagen on the Reykjavik results not only by Europeans but by virtually all the participants in the congress who signed the Copenhagen appeal to support these demands, an appeal formulated by representatives of the antiwar organizations of the "Delhi Six" -- Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden.

The participants in the Copenhagen congress compared two important international events -- the Reykjavik meeting and the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe -- when speaking about the potential which exists but which has still not been fully used by the Europeans to influence the positive solution of questions of vital importance to them.

R. de Gendt from Belgium, a leader of the international Catholic organization Pax Christi and a member of the Committee for European Security and Cooperation, stated that Stockholm's positive results will make it possible to better highlight the approaches to realizing the positive plans outlined in Reykjavik. "It is necessary," he said, "for Europe's public forces to campaign even more energetically and in unison for the convening of a summit which would yield concrete results, primarily with regard to ending all nuclear tests and preventing the arms race in space."

It is true that initially not all our interlocutors understood the interconnection between our far-reaching and large-scale nuclear disarmament plans and the demands to tighten up the ABM Treaty procedures. E. Sandberg, representative of the "World Federalists" organization from Norway, expressed the wish, for example, that the problem of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe be resolved separately in isolation from the tasks of preventing an arms race in space. He was given the convincing answer: The readiness expressed by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik to accept a mutual 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms in all components of the triad they form, the complete elimination of the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, and the reduction to 100 warheads of the potential of the medium-range missiles located in the Asian part of the USSR and on the U.S. territory -- all this without taking account of the British and French nuclear forces and the forward-based U.S. facilities capable of reaching USSR territory -- represents such an important and global movement toward the wishes of the United States and its allies that the implementation of these proposals would be inconceivable without the most reliable verification [kontroll] of their implementation and without guarantees that new threats would not be created to our country's security by means of arms in space.

It should be noted that this logic underlying the package of Soviet proposals in Reykjavik was understood and supported by the majority of the congress participants, who were more concerned with the question of how to persuade the U.S. Administration and some of its West European allies to renounce the implementation of the "Star Wars" plan -- the main brake to progress on the path of nuclear disarmament.

Many people believe that the Europeans can work toward realizing their own aspirations if they learn to speak with their own voice and if they manage, as Polish Professor M. Dobrosielski noted, to formulate a common European approach to these problems as a whole.

Reykjavik and Stockholm in their own special way showed Europeans that the main present-day problems concerning them can be resolved. All it needs is work for the security of all through the efforts of all interested sides. Copenhagen undoubtedly contributed to a realization of that truth by a wide range of European public forces.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS ANALYST DWELLS ON COST, RISKS OF SDI

LD261627 Moscow TASS in English 1337 GMT 26 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 26 TASS--By TASS political news analyst Yuriy Kornilov:

It will take at least one or, according to other estimates, even two trillion dollars to implement Washington's SDI program.

The arms race devouring so enormous resources is thus not only a growing threat to peace and international security but also one of the major drags on the social development of newly-free nations.

While huge sums are thrown to burn in the insatiable furnace of the arms race through the fault of imperialists, most notably U.S. imperialists, in young independent countries 570 million people suffer constant malnutrition, 800 million cannot read or write, 250 million children have no possibility to study, 1,500 million people are fully deprived of medical assistance, and more than a billion live in dwellings unfit for human habitation.

The gravity of these burning problems could be greatly alleviated if it proves possible to stop and reverse the forced preparations for war, which have been started by imperialist quarters, and use part of the sizable funds released through disarmament to help advance newly-free countries.

The money spent to build a U.S. XM tank could otherwise be used, for example, to provide enough bread for 50,000 people for a year, while the cost of an American B-1 bomber is equal to that of bread supplies for more than three million people over a year.

While building up its military might and attempting to gain military superiority with the help of its voracious monster, SDI, the United States makes up for its enormous military spending by plundering developing nations.

According to expert estimates, in the five years between 1980 and 1984 the United States pumped annually out of developing countries some 10 billion dollars in profits of transnational corporations, 28 billion dollars in payments for foreign loans, 11.6 billion dollars owing to the overstated

dollar rate, and 15 billion dollars due to the lop-sided correlation of export and import prices.

The United States takes away from developing countries one in six dollars they earn in world markets.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

EDI ADVOCATED AS REPLACEMENT FOR NATO

Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Oct 86 p 2

[Article by Robert Rudney, research assistant at Catholic University of Louvain: "For a European Defense Initiative [EDI]"]

[Text] The French defense doctrine is predicated on an essential contradiction between, on the one hand, the independence of our national military forces and, on the other hand, the solidarity demanded by the Atlantic Alliance and, above all, by the agreements reached with the Federal Republic of Germany.

This strategy, couched in intentionally ambiguous terms, is on the verge of becoming obsolete. The East-West ratio of forces and the internal policy of several European allies are, together, manifesting a dynamism that is sapping the foundations of the French consensus.

France is not an island. She is a part of the European geopolitical reality. And the givens of this reality indicate that it is fast approaching a historic turning point.

The United States is tired of continuing to subsidize the defense of countries as wealthy as itself. The Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] is but a symptom. Graver still is the incessant criticism being leveled at the Europeans, stemming from the debate on equitable sharing of the financial burden by the members of the Alliance.

The Soviet threat remains a reality, as always. It is not strictly a military threat, but rather a Clausewitz-ian one: Its armed forces, its soldiers, its tanks, its SS-20 missiles, all serve to divide the opposing Alliance, to neutralize public opinion, and to extend Soviet political influence over Europe, without losing a pawn. That effort has been kept in check to date.

However, the internal debate in France's neighboring countries indicates that the gambit is still not lost for the Soviets. Among the opposition parties, especially in the FRG and Great Britain, it is clear that the key principle of the Western strategy--that is, the will to use nuclear weapons to bridge

the gap in conventional forces--is being put to issue again. The Pershings and cruise missiles are now fully installed and operational, but France is the only West European country that remains impervious to the quaking fear of the nuclear. A future government dominated by the SPD in Germany or by Labour in Great Britain might well shatter the Alliance by insisting on the denuclearization of NATO doctrine, even though the alternative strategies being proposed by these parties are mere pipe dreams. Nuclear weapons cannot be "disinvented." Like it or not, nuclear deterrence has kept Europe at peace for nearly four decades.

Crisis of Conscience

France finds herself directly involved in this crisis of conscience. She alone among the European allies is in a position to react in a positive sense. France possesses the necessary means for taking the initiative in regard to European security, disavowing any self-centeredness in her strategic dogmas.

French public opinion seems ready for such a reorientation. The results of the public poll published in LE MONDE of 28 June 1985 show that the vast majority of the French people approve the Franco-German rapprochement on defense and the committing of France on the side of the Germans, should this be necessary, in the event of aggression. Furthermore, the French political class--with the exception of the PCF, of course--is beginning to understand the need to call for European solidarity, even to the detriment of "national independence."

Within 10 years or so, the French Armed Forces will have an arsenal of some 1,000 nuclear warheads deployed in different manners--in submarines, in silos, in planes. This total is more than ample to defend the Hexagon.

However, ensuring the defense of the Hexagon is no longer sufficient. The time has come for France to assert herself as an Allied nation belonging to a collective European effort. This does not mean rejoining NATO.

Several Successive Stages

France's rejoining NATO would resolve nothing. What is needed is a transformation of the Alliance in several successive stages:

--A public and formal declaration by France stating that she will continue to honor her commitments to the FRG, and particularly the guarantee (Treaty of Washington, 1949, Treaty of Paris, 1954) that any and all armed aggression(s) against the West German territory will be considered an attack against France. Consequently, France will react using appropriate means, including a nuclear response;

--A decision to invite the other member countries of NATO in Europe to join in forming a European pillar within the Alliance;

--A proposed agreement between France and the United States to renegotiate the Treaty of Washington, with a view to establishing a new West European security system, providing for American participation, while reducing the budgetary load the present system imposes on the United States;

--A message to the member countries of the Warsaw Pact that France is acting solely in a defensive spirit and with the aim of diminishing the dependencies and imbalances that are working against the maintaining of peace in Europe.

The present French Government--the so-called "gouvernement de cohabitation" [French term for current Mitterrand-Chirac power-sharing style of Government]--would be the best placed to launch a call of this magnitude. All the interested countries would thus be convinced that these proposals reflect the sentiments of a vast consensus of the French people.

Just as Europe cannot await the next international crisis to restructure its security system, France is no longer in a position to take cover behind her nuclear wall and to ignore the political developments taking place within the countries that are her neighbors. The time has come, therefore, for France to assume her role in Europe, to indeed take the initiative in regard to European security.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRC REITERATES OPPOSITION TO ARMS RACE IN SPACE

OW260918 Beijing XINHUA in English 0851 GMT 26 Nov 86

[Text] United Nations, November 25 (XINHUA) -- China today urged at the U.N. General Assembly the superpowers with special responsibilities for the prevention of arms race and militarization in outer space to engage in genuine negotiations.

Speaking at the Special Political Committee of the 41st General Assembly Session, Huang Jiahua, Chinese deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, warned that "extension of the arms race into outer space has posed serious obstacles to its peaceful use and a grave menace to international peace and security."

He reiterated that China is opposed to any form of arms race and militarization in outer space.

The Chinese representative welcomed the final adoption by consensus of the draft principles on remote sensing of the earth from space after 12 years of negotiations in the U.N. Outer Space Committee.

"This set of draft principles embodies the compromise of different interests and claims and establishes the general principles governing remote sensing activities. It will serve to further promote the development of remote sensing activities in outer space," he added.

Huang said China hopes the space programs the Outer Space Committee is working on could be low-cost and effective, match the needs and level of the developing countries and lead to the expansion of international cooperation in outer space.

Huang announced that the Chinese Government will hold in Beijing in 1988, an international symposium on "Space Application in Communications and TV Education Through Satellite" -- as a contribution to the U.N. space program.

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CSO: 5200/4024

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRC JOURNAL ON SDI 'STUMBLING BLOCK'

Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English Vol 29 No 49, 8 Dec 86 pp 11-12

[Article by Jiang Wandl]

[Text] **T**he failure of US President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to come to any agreement at the Reykjavik summit has once again put the spotlight on the US's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Though taking a briefcase full of proposals with him, Gorbachev would agree to nothing unless the US agreed to confine SDI to laboratory research for at least the next 10 years. While Reagan, criticized by the Soviets for coming to Reykjavik empty-handed, would not budge an inch over SDI.

When Reagan announced his plan in 1983 for "rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete" through a space-based shield of missile-killing satellites with laser beams, the programme was heavily criticized by many scientists and officials in the US. Apart from being of no use at all against cruise missiles and bombers, whose capabilities are sure to assume a much greater strategic importance in the decade ahead, the SDI project was said to both militarize space and undermine the last major surviving arms control agreement, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty—which allowed only one ABM site to each superpower. But the supporters of SDI argued that space had already been milita-

rized. Both superpowers relied on space satellites for a wide range of military purposes. They pointed out that the Soviet Union had deployed an ABM system far exceeding the treaty limits, and was building a nationwide ABM radar and battle-management system at Krasnoyarsk. As the Soviets had never complied with the ABM treaty, they argued, the SDI programme could hardly undermine it.

More recently, SDI has met with growing resistance from scientists. The Cornell Institute for Social and Economic Research conducted a survey among 663 members of the National Academy of Science who work in the fields of physics, chemistry, mathematics and engineering. Of the 451 scientists who responded to the survey, only 2.5 percent said they strongly supported SDI, nearly 11 percent were neutral, 25 percent were opposed to it and almost 55 percent strongly opposed SDI. Opponents believe SDI is actually dangerous to American national security because it won't result in any arms reduction but will force the Soviet Union to increase its offensive forces and develop a defensive system of its own. Others think the programme costs too much and doubt whether it can work.

The explosion of the US's three main launch vehicles, the space shuttle Challenger and the rockets Titan and Delta, within a three-month period, has raised questions about America's ability to test SDI components and then to lift the enormous system into orbit. Some National Academy scientists say the prospects are poor that a survivable and cost-effective SDI system can be built within the next 25 years. At the end of October, about 7,000 US scientific workers had signed a pledge refusing to accept government funds for "Star Wars" research.

On the eve of the adjournment of the 99th Congress, 48 of the 100 Senators signed a letter urging that the growth in spending on SDI be held to 3 percent. In the current fiscal year, Reagan had sought US\$5.3 billion for the project, but Congress reduced it to US\$3.5 billion for the year beginning October 1. And it is almost certain that the Democrat-dominated 100th Congress will make it more difficult for the President's proposal to increase the SDI budget to find its way through the legislative labyrinth.

But there is no sign that Reagan will give up his plan. In Reykjavik, Reagan said, "The Soviet Union insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me and future presidents for 10 years the right to develop, test and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the free world. This we could not and will not do."

To bring his ambitious programme to fruition, Reagan has already spent a huge sum of money on it. According to current estimates, SDI will have devoured US\$26 billion by 1990. As the next president would be unlikely to make any big changes to US foreign policy in his first term, there is little possibility of the project, which would then be nearing maturity, being abandoned.

Apart from its military significance, SDI is a package

involving so many high-technologies— aerospace, laser, new materials, computer technologies and electronics—that it has attracted and will continue to attract more and more companies and research institutes to take part in it, breathing new life into their own research and development while earning them a lot of money from their biggest client.

America's allies are also interested in the new and advanced technologies involved in SDI. Following Britain, Israel and West Germany, Italy signed a government-to-government memorandum on September 19 on Italy's participation in the "Star Wars" research programme. On October 26, a Japanese government delegatin left for Washington to discuss the possibility of joining in. Given the go-ahead by their respective governments, many companies and research institutes are vying with one another for contracts in order to obtain a share of the new technologies free of charge.

To these reasons why the US cannot give up SDI must be added what it perceives as the Soviet threat. It says the Soviet Union has its own "SDI," and it has gone much further down this road than commonly believed. According to some Western specialists, Soviet space-weapon technology and recent advances in nuclear weaponry and anti-nuclear defences can rival those of the United States. Since the early 1970s, the Soviet Union has had the world's only anti-satellite system which can destroy a satellite using a conventional warhead. Moreover, the Soviet Union's "SDI" embraces an extensive early-warning network supported by nuclear-armed, ground-based missiles capable of intercepting warheads in space before re-entry. A particle-beam research programme comparable to that of the US has also been under way for the last 10 years. The expenditure on this has already reached US\$150 billion, ten times what the US has spent on SDI. ■

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S PETROVSKIY ADDRESSES CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD

LD031447 Moscow TASS in English 1401 GMT 3 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 3 TASS -- "The character of nuclear weapons leaves no hope that any nation would be able to defend itself by purely military-technical means. This task can be resolved, however, by political methods," Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy has pointed out.

Addressing a theoretical and practical conference sponsored by the diplomatic academy of the Soviet Foreign Ministry today he emphasized that security could not be ensured only by efforts in the military-political field. "The economic and humanitarian spheres should not be outside its framework. What is needed today is a comprehensive approach to security."

"Considering this question historically, security -- comprehensive and collective -- are different notions. Comprehensive security not only comprises ideas of collective security, but also develops them to match the nuclear-space realities of our time.

"This is a new, higher stage in the development of world global scale. It does not infringe the interests of any state but is directed against the common threat to mankind," the deputy foreign minister said.

"The new concept of security proceeds from non-acceptance of either nuclear or conventional wars. It rejects war as an instrument of politics."

"The concept of comprehensive security is based on the notion of a nuclear-free and non-violent world. The idea of a nuclear-free world was formulated in the January 15, 1986 statement of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and was further developed at the latest Soviet-Indian meeting in New Delhi," the speaker said.

"The Delhi Declaration is a document of a qualitatively new content, of universal significance in which the ideas of the Soviet Union for a nuclear-free world blended into one with the idea of a non-violent world advanced by India.

"Both these principles being represented in the Delhi Declaration, they made up the foundation which could be used as a platform for developing the system of comprehensive security.

"This document reflects the idea that peaceful coexistence should become a universal norm in international relations.

"The document directly proclaims new principles of international relations, including the postulate that human life should be recognized as the supreme goal of mankind.

"The question has never been raised this way before in diplomatic documents. This is a qualitatively new approach to this problem," the deputy foreign minister said in conclusion.

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CSO: 5200/1132

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S ARBATOV: BAN ON NUCLEAR ARMS WILL NOT 'LEAD TO WAR'

LD111331 Moscow TASS in English 1230 GMT 11 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS--Academician Georgiy Arbatov today said that the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik had been a moment of truth, which had made it possible to open the door to a nuclear-free future, even if only slightly.

He was speaking at a scientific conference on the theme "militarism and the present-day society" which opened here today. Attended by prominent Soviet scientists and public figures, it will last two days.

Arbatov, who heads the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, said the increasing militarism in the West included not only war and preparations for it but also ideology and the morals of society.

He said that the emergence of nuclear weapons had become a powerful generator of militarism and that it was wrong to assume that nuclear weapons must not be abandoned as this would lead to war.

The Soviet scientist said the use of nuclear weapons would incinerate human civilization and possibly also mean the extinction of mankind as a biological species.

Nuclear weapons, he said, had increased militarism to the extreme. That was why struggle against war and militarism was the paramount task of humanity today, he said.

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CSO: 5200/1144

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: REAGAN DISTORTS REYKJAVIK, AMERICANS REMAIN UNINFORMED

PM311557 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 31 Oct 86 First Edition p 1

[Sergey Bulantsev "International Review": "The 'Nuclear Winter' of the White House"]

[Text] "Is it possible to believe President Reagan? After all, in Reykjavik he said one thing and, on his return to Washington, he declared something completely different." A letter containing this question was sent to the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA editorial office by our reader N. Olennikova from Irkutsk. The mail, which currently is particularly plentiful in the editorial office's International Section, also echoes alarm for the future of Soviet-U.S. relations and reflections on the prospects of further talks on the problems of war and peace. The following question is very often asked: What are the U.S. President's guiding principles in claiming other people's proposals as his own, how is it possible for a statesman of such a rank to be so profligate with words?

A serious question. One of the N. S. Leskov's heroes claimed that "promises are made on the basis of considerations and honored on the basis of circumstances." But the way of thinking of the resident of a small provincial town in the last century can hardly enhance the moral character of a politician from a major modern power. The ethics of interstate relations in the nuclear missile age demand honesty and consistency which nurture the shoots of trust. But there is a serious shortage of precisely these human qualities in Washington. Evidence of this is provided by the vacillation and the differences of opinion on everything that happened in Reykjavik, starting with the objectives of the meeting and ending with its outcome.

As the meeting recedes further into the past, there is an increasingly passionate discussion in the world as to what was achieved there and what difficulties came to light. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has spoken on three occasions since the meeting with R. Reagan. One speech supplements another, revealing different aspects of the talks and the situation which developed subsequently in the world. But on the main point our viewpoint has not changed, it remains exactly the same as declared by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee at the press conference held only 1 hour after the meeting's completion. This is yet another demonstration of our policy's consistency and principledness.

But what is happening in the United States? Attempts are made to distort the truth and to change with hindsight the realities which were present at the talks. The initial curses of Reykjavik quickly gave way to joint enthusiasm. THE BOSTON GLOBE wrote, for example, about the "frenzied propaganda campaign which flooded the screens with the faces of Reagan and his spokesmen--each one of them taking the new line: The summit meeting was crowned with great success, we showed those Russians, now they are in our hands." The objective of the campaign, which THE NEW YORK TIMES describes as "the biggest in the entire Reagan presidency," is to prove that "the President made the broadest and most far-reaching arms control proposals. Gorbachev's reply was a refusal." The journal U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT describes this campaign as a "mass salvage operation aimed at stopping short any ideas that it was R. Reagan who wrecked the chance to conclude a nuclear arms accord."

Everything is being done to present the Soviet side as the stumbling block at the Iceland talks. And here is the result of the inexcusable lies and targeted conditioning of public opinion: R. Reagan's popularity among Americans has jumped by 10 percent.

Addressing a rally in North Dakota a few days ago, the U.S. President said that "when America gives its word it remains in force any place and any time." It sounds beautiful, but what happens in actual fact? The American people are still ignorant about what actually was the subject of the conversation in Reykjavik, what words were spoken by R. Reagan there, and what promises he made.

THE WASHINGTON POST gives the following anecdote as an example: "During a reception for Congressional leaders President Reagan nodded in agreement when Senator Nunn asked him whether he would agree to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons by 1996. But only a few minutes later the White House chief of staff declared: 'We have had no chance to complete the conversation on this subject because this question has no longer been under discussion since the moments the talks were broken off. They have not given a final opinion on this question'." Our readers are understandably puzzled: How can talks be conducted with the President if his statements are canceled out by his staffers?

After all the words spoken by the President during the conversation with M. S. Gorbachev are well known: "If we agree that all nuclear weapons are to be eliminated by the end of a 10-year period, we could pass this agreement to our delegations in Geneva so that they may prepare a treaty which you could sign during your visit to the United States." It is evident that, to use the language of Leskov's hero, "considerations" of reason prevailed with the President in Reykjavik but, on his return to Washington, the upper hand was gained by "circumstances," in other words by the massive pressure by circles linked with militarism and profits from the arms race.

People in the United States are clearly unwilling to understand that the nuclear missile age dictates the need for new ethics in international

relations, for new thinking conditioned by the prospects--not always rosy--presented by this age.

What dangers does it entail for mankind? We are right at the point when the outline of a worldwide, global tragedy has become perceptible. Thermonuclear death will spare no one. And this picture is painted not by astrologers but by scientists who can see better than most a "nuclear winter" for terrestrial civilization. There can be no victors in a nuclear war--does the U.S. President recall that about a year ago he accepted this evident truth in Geneva?

The present stage of our struggle for peace reflects the existence of two different concepts of security. We say: It is necessary to disarm, to come to talks not with a nuclear dagger behind one's back but with an open heart and pure intentions--with what is described as goodwill. And what do we hear in reply? It seems as if the other side is the captive of a paranoid idea: Peace is possible only given the existence of a firm, preferably nuclear missile, first put into circumterrestrial space. Therefore--arm, and arm again.

But the arms buildup creates a vicious circle. If the United States implements SDI, this threat will not remain unanswered. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has repeatedly stressed that we will take the appropriate measures to ensure our security. And you do not need be a prophet to foresee the development of events: Once equilibrium is restored, the United States would begin the development [razrabotka] of the next "security" aspecter, a new superweapon...." Can this process continue endlessly? Ultimately will there not be a spontaneous reaction which would result in the simultaneous explosion of all nuclear charges stockpiled on earth? Who can guarantee that there is not some global "critical mass of nuclear weapons"? It is not difficult to imagine what would happen then.

James Schlesinger wrote a few days ago in TIME magazine. "In contrast with Aladdin and his lamp," he writes, "we have no means of forcing the nuclear jinn back into the bottle. Peace without nuclear weapons is a utopian dream." Who is this James Schlesinger? A highly experienced politician, former CIA director under President R. Nixon, secretary of defense under G. Ford, secretary of energy under J. Carter. His stance is typical, it is conditioned by the militarization of thinking which is so typical of today's echelons of power in the United States. Yes, we have no magic lamp like Aladdin, but mankind is becoming more and more confidently aware that we are a single planetary family with a single common fate. This is why the nuclear jinn must be forced into the bottle of nonexistence. The arms race must be deemed a crime against the sacred human right to live.

Many of our readers' letters echo the idea expressed recently in our newspaper by A. Strelkov, a worker from Vladivostok: "Could it be that the time has come for us to display some strength [sila]?" This sentiment is understandable in purely human terms--after all, at times one wants to give a good whack to a rowdy who has overstepped the mark! But ordinary feelings must not

be applied to interstate relations; strength here is by no means the argument of the strongest, it is the weapon used by those who are suffering defeat in peaceful competition. This is why Lenin's Decree on Peace--the first in world history--invariably remains our Ariadne's thread in the most complex labyrinths of world politics. And those people in the United States who rely on nuclear and space gunboat diplomacy must remember the words spoken by their famous compatriot B. Franklin: "Those who fan the flame of discord and shift the logs must not complain if sparks hit them in the face."

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR GENERAL ON LINKAGE, SOVIET REYKJAVIK CONCESSIONS

AU201009 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 18 Nov 86 p 6

["Colonel General Nikolay Chervov On Stimuli of Reykjavik; Why Precisely a 'Package of Proposals'"]

[Text] Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, the well-known Soviet military expert, writes in an article for the NOVOSTI news agency about the comprehensive nature of the Soviet proposals in Reykjavik:

An extensive agreement arrived at in Reykjavik in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons and intermediate-range missiles would have brought the USSR and the United States to a practical stage of genuinely profound reduction, and later to the total scrapping of their nuclear potentials in a very short span of time. In a situation of real [realny] disarmament it is very important to exclude any opportunity that the Soviet or the American side could make use of to acquire unilateral military superiority. Therefore, it would be wrong to break apart [roztrhat] the comprehensive package of Soviet proposals.

One cannot tear a single measure out of the Soviet package without endangering the USSR's security. For example, a radical reduction and, even more so, the scrapping of the USSR and U.S. strategic offensive weapons would only lead to huge unilateral advantages for the United States, since it has thousands of intermediate-range nuclear devices and devices at forward bases, which are capable of hitting USSR territory. The scrapping of only USSR and U.S. intermediate-range devices would, again, provide advantages to the United States, because the American nuclear devices at forward bases around the Soviet Union and the nuclear weapons of Great Britain and France would not be scrapped.

The previous USSR stance genuinely envisaged a special decision on intermediate-range missiles. But what was involved at that time was the scrapping of Soviet and American intermediate range missiles in Europe only, on the condition that neither Great Britain nor France would increase their nuclear potentials. Now, the Soviet Union goes even further: British and French nuclear weapons are being withdrawn from the program: In Europe the Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles will be eliminated to zero; an agreement in its entirety concerning this problem will be realized on a global

basis. It is clear that objectively such an agreement is becoming an element of strategic equilibrium, linked with its other parts.

The interdependence between the reduction of strategic offensive weapons and the limitation of strategic defense weapons is enshrined in the agreement on antimissile defense. Destroying this interdependence with the help of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), that is, with the help of the militarization of outerspace, would lead not only to a feverish space arms buildup, but also to a strategic arms buildup.

Now, in the new situation, one cannot but take into consideration the interdependence between SDI and the intermediate-range missile problem. After all, the ever increasing participation of the West European countries and Japan in the realization of the SDI program is no secret, but an indisputable reality. Or is this not attested to by the fact that the intermediate-range missile problem has to be resolved in connection with SDI? Those who will be "sitting on two mutually incompatible stools"--taking part in the SDI program and at the same time demanding the scrapping of Soviet intermediate-range missiles outside the framework of that program--cannot acquire the good reputation of being serious people.

And the second circumstance. All Soviet proposals in the sphere of nuclear weapons meet the U.S. concern halfway. In this the USSR has made great concessions in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons (the marked reduction in heavy IBM's, it has retreated from the issue of nuclear devices at forward bases, it has agreed on a separate sublevel [poduroven] of cruise missiles having marine bases, and so forth) as well as in the sphere of intermediate range missiles (the [opening bracket as published] American "zero-option" has de facto been adopted, and the British and French nuclear weapons have not been taken into account.

The Soviet side has acceded to concessions and compromises because it clearly saw a goal ahead--real nuclear disarmament, resting on the program of scrapping nuclear weapons by the year 2000, which it proclaimed on 15 January 1986. This goal can be reached much easier when the issues of strategic offensive weapons, intermediate-range missiles, space, and nuclear tests will be assessed in their interdependence, in a "package." Only in such a case is it possible and quite justified to make partial concessions, and thus ensure progress in both the most important things and on the whole.

When submitting the most important proposals in the package, the Soviet side was willing to make big concessions, and, naturally, counted with bilateralism. But bilateralism was not achieved. Where, on what issues has the American Administration made concessions? Nowhere and none, unless we consider the rescinded demands for levels and sublevels in the sphere of strategic offensive missiles.

The United States has done nothing at all for the restoration of the equilibrium of compromises, it does not want to abandon the "Star Wars" plan, does not want to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, does not want to halt

nuclear tests. What does the White House want to achieve? It wants to force the USSR to make unilateral concessions. That, however, is an unrealistic policy. The USSR has never made, does not make, and will not make unilateral concessions. Those concessions which the Soviet delegation announced in Reykjavik are also a part of the package. No package--no concessions. This is the Soviet stance, as was accurately formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev. This logical and serious stance corresponds to the security interests of the USSR, the United States, Western Europe, and all other countries throughout the world.

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CSO: 5200/1149

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: ERNST GENRI ON MEANING OF U.S. REYKJAVIK POLICY FOR EUROPE

PM291545 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[Ernst Genri "Publicist's Opinion": "Who Is Betraying Europe?"]

[Text] Today thoughtful people are still trying to calculate what Reykjavik did and did not give to the world. In the West many figures, even those who by no means have left-wing convictions, are coming to the conclusion that it is difficult, if at all possible, to forgive Reagan for what he failed to complete in Reykjavik, and Secretary of State Shultz for his backpedaling in Vienna. For chances to reach agreement peacefully in our explosive epoch, as we all know, do not grow on trees. If you miss one, what will happen tomorrow?

But now not only the White House is surprised. After Reykjavik are at least the main U.S. allies in West Europe taking any steps away from the Pentagon's uncompromising, bellicose policy? For this would also seriously, very seriously even, help detente.

The answer is plain to see. No, they are not taking them. Neither Britain, nor the FRG, nor Italy. There is constant criticism of this position from public circles in West Europe, thousands of the most prominent politicians, scientists, cultural figures, and representatives of the working class directly condemn Washington's position, but the governments of the West European countries somehow do not see or hear anything. Why?

Is it possible at such a dangerous, dramatic moment for the entire world to pretend that everything is as it should be? That is exactly how the ruling forces in West Europe are now behaving. As if they did not really care about their own countries' fate.

Quite a strange question arises here. Are there anti-Europeans among the Europeans?

Surprising though it may seem, one has to reply: Yes, there are. Moreover, it would appear that in a number of West European countries such figures now occupy the highest posts. Although ordinary people in these countries are anxiously asking how long Europe still has to live, their ruling politicians are calmly making friendly visits to Washington, are reaching

understandings with Defense Secretary Weinberger, and are strengthening their contacts with NATO, but going hardly a step further.

It is not difficult to understand the American militarists. As far as they are concerned, one thing above all is clear. The present aggressive U.S. military strategy is directed primarily toward Europe. And toward not only socialist territory but capitalist Europe as well.

The NATO bloc is nothing other than an aggressive detachment in a forward position. What will happen to peaceful Europeans when this detachment, after widespread use of nuclear and laser weapons, lands on European soil hardly interests them.

The author of these lines thinks like a historian. It is not a question of newspaper debates. It is a question of gigantic and unprecedented problem. Will life end once and for all for the peoples whose ancestors built the great European culture? For those without whom modern civilization, the most important scientific discoveries, and the greatest works of art would not exist? The history of America itself, for example, cannot compare with Europe in this respect. What would the great people of the Renaissance, the heroes of European revolutions, or the geniuses of European science think of the possibility of the destruction of our part of the world, imagining a hole right in the middle of the map of the world? And what would be the cost of a catastrophe in Europe for America itself?

Yet the NATO states' present leaders seem to be deliberately pursuing this line. They speak loudly of their desire for peace but at the same time are steadfastly moving in exactly the opposite direction. If, in the event of a nuclear-space war, descendants of the present peoples survive on earth, what will they say of our contemporaries?

American armed forces pouring into Europe will not stop at any borders. They will be ordered to automatically destroy everything they encounter, without enquiring who is a socialist and who a conservative. Mr Weinberger or some other American militarist is hardly going to risk guaranteeing that the Pentagon's strategic plans will not touch a centimeter of West European territories, especially the NATO members. There is not and cannot be such a guarantee, since modern nuclear war is not a rational chess game but an orgy of raging total death.

In such a war, for example, what would happen to the usually cautious Britain--a country which has long considered itself the invulnerable preserver of peace in Europe? Are its present rulers helping it to preserve peace by associating themselves with the idea of "star wars"? Mrs Thatcher has still not said a word to "correct" White House policy, as the majority of British people clearly want. But she is sacrificing billions of pounds sterling on the weapons required by the United States in Europe (although the Soviet Union, in the event of an accord with the United States, would agree not to count these weapons, as well as France's, when determining the size of its own forces).

What will happen to the Germans of the FRG? Did they not experience enough during World War II, when Hitler urged them to conquer Europe? Do their present leaders fully understand that in the event of a nuclear war everything will be many times worse?

Why, in the fall of 1986, is the Bonn government appointing as chairman of the NATO Military Committee--the key Atlantic bloc committee!--Bundeswehr General W. Altenburg, who during the last war served in Hitler's navy, while Admiral K.J. Steindorf, former commander of the FRG Navy in the North Sea, earlier became NATO air force chief of staff in northern Europe?

The American militarists do not care about the fate of peaceful, sunny countries like Italy and Greece in the event of war. For the past few years the United States has turned the Mediterranean into a super-aggressive stronghold for its 6th Fleet, which threatens all the peoples of southern Europe.

Moreover, Italy, under pressure from the United States, is once again threatened by fascism. None other than Mussolini once directly pointed this out, saying a few days before he was shot: "Twenty years of fascism was too little. A greater man than I will some day bring the fascist idea to victory. If the allies (the wartime antifascist coalition--E.G.) win, then a third world war is inevitable. Then Italy's hour will come if it finds a man to play the trump card."

Mussolini could not know that 40 years later the NATO military bloc would become the "trump card" of fascists throughout southern Europe. He did not know but he guessed. Is it an accident that after the war high-ranking military men in Italy (and in Greece) became such close friends with the neofascists, with the Pentagon's obvious knowledge?

It is understandable when contemporary American militarists do not feel any particular pangs of conscience when imagining the destruction of West Europe. What is Europe to them! Any lively American small gambling town is more to the taste of many of them. But when in peacetime influential West European dignitaries pander to the same transatlantic extremists, that is another matter. How can one explain their position?

One thing is clear: The ruling circles in such European countries are ceasing to represent the most natural, most legitimate national interests. There is no other answer. The bourgeois circles which act in this way are betraying their nations. Not close European but transatlantic interests dictate their policy.

Even in the United States itself Reagan's party has suffered a painful defeat in the recent congressional elections. The voters are anxious. The atmosphere overseas is clearly beginning to turn. But as before the West European allies of the White House are still not budging from the position in which they are held by the Pentagon's iron grip.

Don't they dare? But no one can deny ordinary Europeans the right to be daring. Their fate and the fate of their future generations are at stake.

Yes, there are indeed anti-European Europeans in our day. We do not doubt what history will say of them. But the peoples of the West European countries must say this themselves, and they must say it now--before it is too late.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR VIEWS NATO POST-REYKJAVIK DISARMAMENT ATTITUDES

PM251551 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 86 Second Edition p 3

[Observer V. Pustov "Military-Political Review": "NATO After Reykjavik"]

[Text] There are matters, phenomena, and events which cannot be concealed from people for long. And this is precisely what happened on this occasion. The organ of the British business circles, the newspaper THE FINANCIAL TIMES, writes: "The U.S. Administration finds incomprehensible the results of a recent public opinion poll according to which, since the meeting in Reykjavik, the European allies of the United States trust the Soviet leader M.S. Gorbachev more than President R. Reagan when it comes to arms control."

This is quite natural. The European public, but not just the European public, was able to see for itself that the implementation of the radical measures for nuclear disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union was prevented by the notorious SDI program to which the U.S. Administration is stubbornly clinging. And what is more, resorting to brazen lies, Washington has renounced the accords achieved in Reykjavik. The peoples of our continent can by no means remain indifferent to this turn of events. However, their vital interests are one thing, and the mercenary interests of the ruling circles are something else. Support for Washington's militarist stance and its adventurist "star wars" plans has come from the government of the FRG--where some people believe that they cannot exist except atop the U.S. nuclear "powder-keg"--the governments of Britain and France, which have their own nuclear arsenals, and from NATO headquarters.

In this context, a political farce was staged in NATO. It was claimed that latent differences between the United States and their leading European allies had surfaced in Reykjavik. That is to say differences on the question of nuclear weapons--whether these weapons should be retained in Europe or whether they should be removed from the continent. West European leaders, accusing the White House of "excessive haste" in allegedly seeking to dismantle the nuclear forces, set about openly advocating that the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" above the western part of the Old World and that the British and French nuclear potentials should be retained.

"The fiasco of the talks in Vienna" (this refers to the recent meeting between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state--V.P.),

THE WASHINGTON POST writes, "made the European allies, who feared their success more than their failure, sigh with relief." In the heat of the propaganda ballyhoo some people let slip some cynical admissions. Former official statements by NATO country governments in favor of nuclear disarmament were nothing but a bluff, it appears. They were made on the assumption that the USSR would refuse to take the real interests and concerns of West European countries into account. They were wrong. Now official circles in London and Paris, supported by Bonn, have replaced their former promises "to join in due course" the USSR and the United States in the event that they come to an agreement on substantial nuclear reductions, with claims to some kind of special status of the British and French nuclear arsenals entitling them to build them up quantitatively and improve them qualitatively.

And these arsenals, let us be frank, are becoming more and more impressive. The basis of the British nuclear forces, for instance, is constituted by 4 nuclear submarines each equipped with 16 ballistic missiles, each of these missiles having 3-6 charges and a range of 3,500 km. In the future these submarines are to be replaced with new, more powerful ones. Each of these is to be equipped with 16 new U.S. Trident-2 (D-5) missiles. According to the blueprint, this missile will be superior to the present one in all parameters: range--11,000 km, accuracy of aim--90 m, number and yield of warheads--either 7 charges of 600 kilotons each, or 14 charges of 150 kilotons each.

The buildup of the French nuclear forces is also being expedited. At present 5 nuclear submarines carrying 16 M-20 single-charge ballistic missiles each are in service. The recently launched sixth submarine is armed with 16 M-4 missiles with a longer range (4,400 km) and MIRV'ED warheads (a total of 96 charges). By the beginning of the nineties, M-4 missiles are to be installed on 4 of the first 5 nuclear submarines as a result of which the number of nuclear charges in the French submarine fleet will increase to 496 units. In the nineties it is planned to launch the seventh submarine with further improved M-5 missiles.

France also has tens of Mirage-IV A nuclear-capable bombers and 18 stationary 1-megaton missiles in silos on the Plateau d'Albion (in the southeast of the country).

A few days ago the 1987 military budget was passed. The French Communist newspaper L'HUMANITE described it as a "hymn to the arms race." The record military appropriations exceed last year's by 11 percent. There is a sharp increase in the appropriations for the production and purchases of new types of weapons including nuclear weapons.

Showing unwillingness to think in terms of a nuclear-free Europe, the NATO leaders are seeking to prove what cannot be proved, namely that they possess some kind of claim to privileges in the nuclear arms sphere. These attempts are so groundless and dangerous that essentially they ultimately lead to the negation of the possibility and expediency of curbing and ending the arms race and embarking on nuclear disarmament. "There is no alternative to the

nuclear deterrent," French Foreign Minister J.-B. Raimond has said. In turn, British Secretary of Defense G. Younger let it be known that while the elimination of nuclear weapons remains a "remote objective," Britain has no problems, and that "there can be no question of achieving a zero level."

Similar claims are voiced in Bonn and in the NATO supreme command. At the same time, hypocritical references are made to an alleged superiority of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact in conventional arms. Just because this fabrication has been cited ad nauseam it is no closer to the truth. An approximate equilibrium exists between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in conventional arms. NATO exceeds the Warsaw Pact in the total number of armed forces personnel, the number of combat-ready divisions and antitank means, while the two alliances are approximately equal in terms of artillery and armored and tank hardware. The Warsaw Pact has a slight superiority over NATO in tactical aircraft.

We must not forget either the NATO concept of "follow-on force attack," or the "Rogers Plan" as it is also known after its creator, U.S. General B. Rogers. The essence of this plan consists of creating a superiority over the Warsaw Pact in conventional arms and of ensuring favorable combat action conditions with the aim of routing the enemy during the initial stage of the war without recourse to nuclear weapons. A long-term program (through 1995) for building the NATO Allied Armed Forces makes provision for their equipping with new, highly effective arms which approach tactical nuclear weapons in terms of their destructive capabilities. Is this perhaps why the NATO bloc has still not replied to the Warsaw Pact's constructive proposals for talks on coordinated substantial cuts in conventional arms and armed forces in Europe?

However, let us return to nuclear arms. Are there any cunning tricks to which their champions do not stoop? Here is one of them. The selfsame Younger has tried to explain that the conventional wars fought between countries outside Europe since 1945 claiming millions of lives were due to the fact that these countries "did not have a nuclear shield to protect them from attack." It appears that the Conservatives in Britain now see nuclear weapons as a panacea against all bloodshed, against all wars be they large- or small-scale, nuclear or conventional, worldwide or regional. If only all countries beyond the confines of Europe had a "nuclear shield" in the shape of an atom bomb or something even more impressive... Does not worship of the nuclear idol lead to this kind of nonsense?

The eyes of the nuclear maniacs are turned to Washington. And they did not need long after Reykjavik to see for themselves that they were wrong to fear that the United States' claims that it seeks radical nuclear weapon reductions might be sincere. Reassuring signals poured forth from across the ocean as if from a cornucopia. The military budget for fiscal 1987, approved a few days ago, makes provision for a further massive buildup of first strike means--the strategic offensive forces. Thus, for instance, additional billions of dollars have been set aside for building a further 12 MX ICBM's, another nuclear submarine under the Trident program, continued development of the Midgetman ICBM, a new strategic bomber, and so forth; \$3.5 billion are set aside for research work under the SDI program.

At the United Nations the United States voted, together with Britain and France, against the resolution on the immediate ending and banning of nuclear weapon tests which had been adopted by the overwhelming majority of countries. And it confirmed its obstructionist action the following day with a nuclear explosion at the Nevada test site.

On the eve of the recent visits to Washington of the British premier and the FRG defense minister, the Western press tried to create the impression that they would all but have to restrain their U.S. partners', and in particular President R. Reagan's alleged striving for a nuclear-free world. In actual fact they did not have to persuade anyone one way or another. The meetings took place in a unanimous militarist atmosphere: No compromise in talks with the USSR. Immediately afterwards the incumbent of the White House went even further, switching from talks to unbridled anti-Sovietism in again calling for a "crusade" against the USSR.

Efforts to wipe out the Reykjavik accords and Washington's deliberate buildup of tension combined with stepped-up military preparations on both sides of the Atlantic look even more unseemly against the backdrop of Soviet readiness for genuine disarmament backed up by specific steps on the basis of total reciprocity, of course. The USSR's struggle against the nuclear threat, for peace and international security is reflected in its recent tangible actions aimed at strengthening security and stability in the north of Europe and taken in support of the proposal for creating a nuclear-free North. The Soviet Union has already dismantled medium-range missile launch pads in the Kola Peninsula and most of these launch pads in the remaining territory of the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts and has redeployed several operational tactical missile divisions from these districts elsewhere. The USSR has expressed its readiness to withdraw submarines equipped with ballistic missiles from its Baltic fleet if an accord is reached by the relevant states on a nuclear-free status for the Baltic Sea.

This is yet another manifestation of good will and it has met with positive response abroad. The new unilateral Soviet measures, P. Vayrynen, the Finnish foreign minister, has said, are extremely important from the viewpoint of the security of the entire north of Europe.

In the face of the nuclear threat, the USSR Supreme Soviet has addressed an appeal to the parliaments and peoples of the world calling on them to take resolute action in support of a practical transition to building a nuclear-free world and creating equal and reliable security for all states. The main obstacle on this path are the U.S. "star wars" plans which are an attempt to achieve military superiority and to find a way of winning a nuclear war.

The USSR has always been able to find an adequate answer to any threat to its security. And this will be the case in the future too. Our country possesses a sufficient intellectual, scientific, technical, and industrial potential to ensure this. However, the USSR is proposing a real alternative to the arms race in space, namely the peaceful exploration of space on the basis of cooperation between all states. All the Soviet proposals aimed at the elimination of all nuclear means introduced in Reykjavik remain in force. The world must be delivered from the nuclear sword of Damocles which hangs over it.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: NATO EUROGROUP CONFIRMS 'LACK OF SERIOUS INTENTIONS'

LD040033 Moscow TASS in English 2241 GMT 3 Dec 86

[Text] Brussels December 3 TASS--TASS correspondent Albert Balebanov reports:

The heads of the military establishments of West European countries have failed to display either new mentality or new approaches necessary to solve the problem of disarmament at the nuclear age of ours. This is seen from the results of a one-day meeting of the ministers of defence of 12 countries members of the NATO Eurogroup (without France and Iceland).

Hans Engell, chairman of the Eurogroup and Danish defence minister, addressing a news conference, made it clear that the NATO European partners would like to take only one aspect--medium-range nuclear weapons--out of the general context of the talks on disarmament, moving to the background the rest of the interrelated elements of the negotiations.

More, the ministers seem to be scared with the prospect of a complete elimination of all types of nuclear armaments that emerged following the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik and demand that part of the nuclear arsenals be preserved as a basic component of the NATO "deterrence strategy".

Another result of today's meeting of the NATO Eurogroup also confirming the lack of serious intentions in the alliance to put an end to the arms race has become the decision by the ministers to "preserve" Western Europe's "tangible contribution" to the North Atlantic alliance's militarist efforts. To this end, the Eurogroup member countries will phase into service with their armies in 1987 an extra 275 heavy combat tanks of the "Leopard-2" and "Challenger" type, 150 new armoured personnel carriers, 400 "Milan" missile launchers, 13,500 portable anti-tank missiles and 725 missile systems.

It was decided to purchase for the airforce 170 "Tornado" and "F-16" combat aircraft, 40 helicopters, and 50 additional self-guided anti-aircraft defence missile installations. The naval forces will receive nine combat ships and a submarine. It was decided to modernize old ships by fitting them out with modern electronic warfare systems and missile launchers.

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CSO: 5200/1144

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

XINHUA CITES SOVIET OFFICIAL ON DISARMAMENT PROGRESS

OW271008 Beijing XINHUA in English 0701 GMT 27 Nov 86

["Soviets Say Progress in Disarmament Talks Depends on U.S." -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Moscow, November 26 (XINHUA) -- Soviet Armed Forces Chief of Staff Marshall Sergey Akhromeyev warns that no progress will be made in U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations if the United States sticks to its present policy.

In an interview with the West German magazine STERN, Akhromeyev said progress is unlikely if the United States continues with its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and refused to respond actively to Soviet initiatives on disarmament.

When asked whether the Soviet Union will change its attitude toward SDI, Akhromeyev said that when the Soviet Union made concessions on strategic weapons and medium-range missiles, the United States should have responded with concessions on SDI.

SDI will destabilize the world situation, therefore it's impossible for the Soviet Union to change its attitude towards it, he said.

While saying that the Soviet proposals put forward in Reykjavik made it possible to drastically reduce the nuclear arms, the marshal accused Washington of offering nothing in reply.

He dismissed the suggestion that Moscow is sticking to a "all-or-nothing" principle by linking any disarmament progress to agreement with Washington on SDI and said that "our program for the abolition of nuclear weapons consists of three stages and envisions a gradual, step by step solution of the nuclear problem." The marshal also hinted that when the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests ends on January 1, 1987, the Soviet Union will not continue the ban unless the United States implements a moratorium of its own.

"Every one of our disarmament measures has its limits, including the moratorium," he said.

"Our moratorium became a touchstone to test the sincerity of both sides on disarmament," Akhromeyev said. He said that if the United States violates the SALT II treaty, the Soviet Union has the right to be bound by the treaty.

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CSO: 5200/4028

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: U.S. ABM TREATY REINTERPRETATION, SDI HIT

LD032228 Moscow TASS in English 2124 GMT 3 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 3 TASS -- Follows commentary by Vladimir Bogachev, TASS military news analyst: While intensively working to create a large-scale anti-missile space based defence system, the current U.S. Administration is trying to remove or at least shatter the legal barriers in the way of the U.S. "Star Wars" programme. Thus they in Washington are advancing casuistic "broad" and "narrow" interpretations of the treaty of 1972 on the limitation of ABM systems, which are aimed at demonstrating that this agreement allegedly allows a militarisation of outer space.

Last year, the U.S. State Department dragged out an obscure lawyer named Abraham Sofaer, who was to "reassess" the ABM treaty and discover in it a meaning that would suit the book of the "Star Wars" apologists. For a good fee, Sofaer, who had never before engaged himself in disarmament problems, began "proving", in disregard of the spirit and letter of the ABM Treaty, that this agreement allows any tests and creation of anti-ballistic missile systems based on new physical principles. The meaning of the sordid manipulations of the State Department lawyer was clear from the very outset. His "investigation" was designed to help the U.S. Administration give the "green light" to the creation of space-based and nuclear pumped laser anti-ballistic missile weapons.

"Sofaer's view" was so much in conflict with the explicit and unambiguous text of the treaty and the supplement to it that several American senators decided to study independently the materials to which Sofaer referred. Carl Levin, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, carried out his own study of Sofaer's conclusions and addressed a letter to the U.S. secretary of state saying that the lawyer deliberately presented in a distorted light the course of the talks on the limitation of the anti-missile defence system in order to justify the testing of new ABM technology. The Senate described the U.S. Administration's "new interpretation" of the treaty as being "wrong" and "totally vicious".

They in Washington are clearly banking on removing all obstacles from the way towards implementing the "Star Wars" plans in order to use the SDI as a means of whipping up the arms race, as a channel for experiments designed to create new space weapons, which, on top of all, will play a considerable role in strengthening the offensive nuclear potential of the USA.

The way to genuine security lies not through the construction of a space anti-missile shield. Lasting peace can be guaranteed only through the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has faith in the possibility of a world without nuclear weapons and is tirelessly pressing ahead towards the attainment of that goal.

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CSO: 5200/1137

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG: KOHL WRITES ON U.S. TALKS ON REYKJAVIK MEETING

PM021451 Madrid ABC in Spanish 18 Nov 86 p 38

[Article by Chancellor Helmut Kohl: "Cooperation in the Alliance"]

[Text] My talks in Washington 21-24 October 1986 took place immediately after President Reagan's summit meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, at a decisive moment for East-West relations. That is why I was very glad to have at that very moment the opportunity to meet with the U.S. President in very thorough talks. It was the seventh of these meetings since I took office.

I was able to ascertain once more that inside and outside the U.S. Government we have many friends in the United States who react with great understanding and support to our policy, and that the FRG has within that government influence and political weight which enable us to present our interests in the best possible way and to assert them time and time again.

The central topic of my talks, and especially of my meeting with President Reagan, was the assessment of his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, since I was the first of the heads of government of the European allies to have the opportunity to meet with Ronald Reagan afterward. We agreed on important points, with respect both to the analysis and to the conclusions drawn from it. Above all, we were in agreement that the Iceland meeting was an important stage in the East-West dialogue, in which considerable progress was achieved in the area of disarmament and arms control, and that the process will continue on the basis of this progress; the United States has now submitted in Geneva proposals which represent an advance in arms control. We were also in agreement that the two sides have left the door open for a second summit next year.

I thanked the President for his efforts undertaken also on behalf of the alliance. I encouraged him to continue this process of political understanding and of balance by means of responsible arms control from the viewpoint of security policy. In this respect what was very important was that this is not our stance alone and that everybody in the alliance unanimously supports the United States.

On the basis of my talks with President Reagan on the situation and prospects for the East-West dialogue I would like to sum up

the most important results as follows. The leaders of both world powers seriously intend to reach actual agreements. They regard the rapprochement on arms control achieved in Reykjavik as an important stage on that road. The Soviet Union's leaders have also assessed what was achieved in Iceland as an advance and progress.

The U.S. interlocutors are of the opinion that, despite the toughness of the negotiations, which ultimately prevented the finalization of what was achieved, the Soviet side conducted the talks with a desire for success. It was accordingly possible to create a basis between the two world powers on which further progress is feasible. The Reykjavik proposals remain on the table.

Careful and lengthy detailed work by the experts in the Geneva negotiations will be necessary to put what has been achieved into practice. There is a real prospect of achieving this.

In this connection I would like to cite Secretary of State Shultz, who said in the Washington talks that a watershed has perhaps now been reached which could lead to real disarmament. I feel confirmed in my assessment that the U.S. President, as he announced in his speech on the SDI in March 1983, is prepared to accept major reductions in offensive nuclear weapons. His aim is to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles. The latest U.S. proposal submitted in Geneva definitely follows this path.

The United States refuses to make the essence of the SDI a subject at the Geneva disarmament talks, so that it could be eliminated through negotiations. Washington is determined — like the Soviet Union, for its part, too — to carry out the research program. The latest statements even by prominent U.S. critics of the SDI — for instance, McNamara — prove that the United States regards the research program as a necessary guarantee and insurance against a possible breach during the envisaged disarmament process.

For its part, the Soviet Union has intimated that it does not interpret its stance that SDI research should be confined to laboratories in such a way that it must be conducted on closed premises. For instance, among other things, Sagdeyev, the director of the Soviet Space Research Institute, has said that laboratory research could also include activities conducted in space. And Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Batalin, who headed a Supreme Soviet delegation in the FRG, has also stated that the

Soviet demand for a package of solutions should not be regarded as final.

As far as we Europeans are concerned, there can be no doubt that drastic reductions in nuclear weapons within a relatively brief period of time, such as were discussed in Reykjavik, will lead to a considerable change in the East-West strategic balance. We must assume that such a development will have major repercussions on relations within the Western alliance and on the alliance's strategy. These repercussions must be examined carefully within the alliance and joint stances on them must be found.

The Europeans should not feel surprised at the historic dimension opening up here. Nor should we be daunted now by the rapidly changing world situation. I am convinced that our task is to join as European allies in this change, safeguarding our own interests. As could not be more natural, I took the opportunity of my visit and my talks in the United States to explain diligently German and European security interests within the framework of this situation. In so doing I was also able to speak explicitly on behalf of French and British interests.

I emphasized again our prime interest in an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The proposed zero option solution in Europe, with a simultaneous reduction to 100 nuclear warheads outside Europe, is acceptable to the Federal Government. An agreement could soon be reached if the Soviet Union were prepared to forgo the irrelevant interconnection which it has once more placed on the table as a package.

No area of arms control should be blocked as a hostage to another area of negotiations where there are no objective and unavoidable interconnections. On the contrary, every independent step on the path toward disarmament should be taken as soon as possible. An all-or-nothing policy prevents any possible progress. Each agreement on a topic could create further confidence which would help achieve progress also on the difficult arms control problems.

Within this context I also explained our stance on the short-range intermediate forces. The aim, as far as we are concerned, is to prevent the emergence of a new vague area of weapon systems not included in the agreements. In this area we have nothing equivalent to set against the Soviet weapons systems. What is at issue, as far as we are concerned, is a specific and short-term obligation to continue the negotiations with the aim of reducing these weapons, too, and granting both sides the right to equal maximum limits.

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CSO: 5200/2469

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG'S GENSCHER URGES END OF DEBATE ON 'ZERO OPTION'

LD011407 Hamburg DPA in German 1253 GMT 1 Dec 86

[Excerpts] Bonn, 1 Dec (DPA) — Speaking to the Presidium of the Free Democrats on Monday, Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) called for an end to the debate on the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles in Europe. In place of superfluous disputes about the targets for negotiations on intermediate-range missiles laid down since 1979, the whole weight of Europe should be thrown behind the success of the disarmament negotiations and the expansion of cooperation between East and West. A "new phase of objectivity" was necessary in East-West relations. [passage omitted]

Genscher expressed the hope that the latest decision by Washington to exceed the upper limits in the SALT II treaty concluded with Moscow was not the last word from the U.S. Government. He pointed out that all the allies of the United States had called for adherence to SALT II, in order to safeguard existing arms limitations and to agree disarmament using them as a basis.

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CSO: 5200/2469

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG: COMMENTS ON NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING

SPD's Vogel Sees Arms Race

LD061635 Hamburg DPA in German 1106 GMT 6 Dec 86

[Text] Bonn, 6 Dec (DPA) — The autumn meeting of the NATO defense ministers in Brussels, according to chairman of the SPD Bundestag group Hans-Jochen Vogel, provided the starting signal for a second round of rearmament. The call made there for equal upper limits for short-range missiles means arms escalation also in the nuclear sphere, Vogel said on Saturday.

Vogel described Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (CDU) as the driving force in this direction. He must be stopped, Vogel said. The SPD warned against the "disastrous" intention of setting the same upper limits for nuclear short-range missiles in furtherance of western rearmament. Rather, a clear commitment to the zero solution is needed here, too.

It also demanded unequivocal support for the complete withdrawal of longer-range INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] missiles from Europe. The demand that the withdrawal of these weapons should be balanced by cruise missiles on U.S. bombers in England, on the other hand, undermines the security interests of the West and East Europeans and blocks any sort of agreement between the superpowers, Vogel said.

Woerner Condemns SPD Stance

LD071532 Hamburg DPA in German 1411 GMT 7 Dec 86

[Excerpt] Hamburg, 7 Dec (DPA) — According to West German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (CDU), the NATO defense ministers did not decide at their fall meeting in Brussels to counterarm in short-range nuclear weapons. In an interview with the newspaper *Bild* (Monday's issue), Woerner, by saying this, has countered remarks made by SPD Bundestag group chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel that the defense ministers gave the starting signal in Brussels for a second round of counterarming.

At their meeting in Brussels the ministers supported the call for a "complete scrapping" of medium-range nuclear missiles. They also called for shorter-range medium-range weapons to be reduced at a further stage of the negotiations. The Soviets have 10 times as many shorter-range medium-range missiles as the United States. It is in the security interest of the Europeans to remove this superiority.

The SPD "stands on its own in the alliance". Anyone who like the Social Democrats gives up the call for equal upper limits and is ready to recognize a Soviet monopoly or Soviet superiority "infringes on the fundamental security interests of the west and isolates himself within the alliance." [passage omitted]

Press Review

DW051055 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German
0605 GMT 5 Dec 86

[From the Press Review]

[Text] A few newspapers comment on the autumn meeting of the NATO defense ministers in Brussels.

Neue Osnabruecker Zeitung writes: The defense ministers have demonstratively supported the zero solution for Europe. However, that does not mean that problems linked to such a regimen have been resolved, problems recognized by many who do not dare speak frankly. The ministers had no choice but to support the position taken by President Reagan in Reykjavik, because it corresponds to the Western argumentation in the discussion of NATO's two-track decision, and because a quarrel would suit only the Soviets. It is, therefore, logical and sensible if NATO gives at least the outward impression of pulling in one direction, limiting the damage.

The Hagen *Westfalenpost* points out: The news from Brussels sounds encouraging: Agreement by the NATO defense ministers about a zero solution for intermediate-range missiles. Behind it, however, is the compulsion to maintain unity, and probably also the insight that negotiations in the intermediate-range sphere would only be blocked if short-range missiles were to be included. Defense Minister Woerner, who actually prefers combining the two spheres, can be content. The decision to consider an intermediate-range agreement as an interim solution and to link short-range weapons negotiations directly to it, corresponds to European reservations.

Paper: 'Hawks' Dominated Meeting

DW072155 Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU
in German 6 Dec 86 p 3

[Article Signed Mac: "Strange"]

[Text] It is strange: The NATO defense ministers discuss arm control issues and expressly stress at the meeting and in the final communique that they support efforts for a reduction in intercontinental nuclear missiles, but do not say a word about SALT II. Only the representatives of several smaller NATO countries talked about that to the U.S. delegation on the fringes of the meeting and then stressed emphatically that efforts would be made to achieve a real nuclear weapons reduction along the lines of Reykjavik.

There is something wrong there. Whereas on Thursday NATO reportedly supported efforts for a zero solution with intermediate-range nuclear missiles, on Friday not a word was said about it in the final document. It suddenly said that NATO strives for a 50 percent reduction in intercontinental nuclear

weapons and intermediate-range missiles. That means in other words the end of the zero solution.

Realistically speaking, at the NATO fall meeting no progress in the direction of more arms control has been achieved, but only setbacks. Hopes for disarmament have been further dampened. It is unclear how they want to be successful in Geneva with such approach — if they want to negotiate at all. At any rate, Brussels was dominated by the hawks.

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CSO: 5200/2469.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG PAPER COMMENTS ON NATO CONFERENCE

DW051107 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 5 Dec 86 p 12

[Editorial by "FY": "Consequences of Backpedaling"]

[Text] Brussels, 4 Dec — Reactions are predictable to the NATO considerations to replace the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, in case of a zero solution, with other intermediate-range missiles. People to whom it has been suggested for years that political tension is the consequence of armament and that, therefore, disarmament leads to greater security, must feel ridiculous. It is the moment of truth for those in positions of responsibility who have been backpedaling for years when it came to stating unpleasant truth. Whoever wants to maintain a position against a superpower whose only effective foreign policy instrument is military superiority, is not helped much by such statements like "create peace with fewer weapons." Deterrence is indispensable. As long as a balance of political interests between East and West is not achieved, NATO should keep what it has safeguarded through the counterarmament decision: longer range intermediate-range missiles. They are better suited to the necessary deterrence than all the substitute solutions that are being considered now in Brussels.

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CSO: 5200/2469

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRC PREMIER ON CONTINUED U.S.-USSR ARMS DIALOGUE

OW070056 Beijing XINHUA in English 0037 GMT 7 Dec 86

[Text] Beijing, December 7 (XINHUA) -- Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang said recently that China wishes for continued dialogue between U.S. and Soviet leaders.

Zhao made this remark during an interview with Regino Diaz Redondo, director of the Mexican newspaper "EXCELSIOR," on December 4.

"Although U.S. President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev failed to reach any agreement during their meeting in Reykjavik, capital of Iceland," Zhao said, "dialogue is better than confrontation."

He said China hopes the two leaders will continue their dialogue and reach an agreement which will not harm the interest of any third party but be conducive to international peace and relaxation of tension.

"We do not harbor any illusions about this. The fact that the U.S. and Soviet leaders failed to reach any agreement at Reykjavik shows neither of the two countries has given up its basic position in seeking military superiority over the other," he added.

"If neither gives up this position," Zhao predicted, "it is impossible for their dialogue to achieve substantial progress."

"Their dialogue will be long-term bargaining and no substantial progress can be achieved in a short time. That is our general view of the U.S.-Soviet summit," he concluded.

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CSO: 5200/4033

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRC JOURNAL VIEWS U.S.-SOVIET ARMS TALKS

HK281428 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 47, 24 Nov 86
pp 31-32

["Special Dispatch from Geneva" by Ren Zhengde (0117 2973 1795): "The Core of the Three U.S.-Soviet Talks"]

[Text] Recently, the United States and the Soviet Union held three arms talks in Geneva: 1) The sixth round of talks on arms control; 2) the third round of talks on prohibition of nuclear tests; and 3) the talks on disputes over the treaty restricting strategic weapons. The topics for discussion at the three talks were different, but they were all directly or indirectly aimed at a core, that is, whether to reserve or to abandon the U.S. "Star Wars" project.

The talks on arms control were carried out by three groups, respectively responsible for discussing the matters concerning medium-range weapons, strategic weapons, and space weapons. They all directly talked about the "Star Wars" project. Through bargaining over the past few months since the fifth round of talks started in July, both sides have generally agreed to destroy all the medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet Union can retain 100 medium-range missiles in Asia and the United States can have the same number of medium-range weapons on its own territory. On the question of strategic nuclear weapons, both sides agreed that 50 percent of such weapons shall be destroyed within the next 5 years and, by that time, each side will retain 6,000 warheads and 1,600 launchers. In the next 10 years, all the offensive strategic weapons shall be destroyed. Both sides also promised not to withdraw from the 1972 treaty on restricting antiballistic missiles.

Despite the many differences between both sides during the talks, if they can really reach agreement on these points, we could say that this would be significant progress on the matter of disarmament. Unfortunately, all these common points are really only castles in the air, because a prerequisite for all this is to stop carrying out the "Star Wars" project. But there are great differences on this question between both sides and no unanimity has ever been reached.

As to the talks on prohibition of nuclear tests, both sides held two rounds of talks in July and September. The Soviet Union proposed an "immediate and overall" prohibition of all nuclear tests, but the United States emphasized that it is still not the time to talk about overall prohibition because it "does not conform to the interests of the United States and its allies."

The attitudes of both the United States and the Soviet Union have always been changing in accordance with their needs in developing their own nuclear weapons while restricting the other side. The possibility cannot be ruled out that under certain conditions both sides may reach a compromise on restricting the number and equivalent of nuclear tests when they feel no harm to themselves. However, it is very difficult for them to reach a substantial agreement on "overall and thorough prohibition" of nuclear tests. This is because that both sides have linked, though in different forms, the prohibition of nuclear tests with the reduction of nuclear weapons, making the problem more and more complicated. The Soviet Union has said that overall prohibition is an "organic part" of its "package proposal." But the United States emphasizes that ceasing nuclear tests should be carried out "simultaneously" with reducing the number of offensive nuclear weapons. On the other hand, behind the disputes over the nuclear test issue, there are entirely different intentions of both sides on the question of the "Star Wars" project. Apart from improving and developing the nuclear weapons, the main reason why the United States should stick to its stand of continuing nuclear tests is that it wants to try out its laser weapons necessary for the "Star Wars" project. But the purpose of the Soviet Union in opposing the U.S. nuclear tests is none other than destroying or postponing this project.

The U.S.-Soviet talks on the disputes over the 1979 treaty on restricting strategic weapons was held in the form of establishing a consultative committee by both sides. No substantial results were achieved by their talks respectively held in July and November this year.

The disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union stemmed from June this year when Reagan announced that the United States would no longer be bound by this treaty beginning the end of the year by reason that the Soviet Union "has repeatedly violated the treaty." Soon after that, the Soviet Union also condemned the United States for "repeatedly and rudely violating the treaty," saying that it would "adopt effective countermeasures" against the United States. As a matter of fact, this treaty has never been endorsed and observed by either of the two sides. Since its signing, the nuclear warheads and carriers of both sides have been greatly developed both in number and in quality. In reality, this treaty only exists in name. But why should the United States announce in such a serious manner that it prepares to abolish the treaty, and why should the Soviet Union strongly oppose it? There are some hidden motives on both sides. When they argue about whether this treaty should continue to exist or should be abolished, both sides are actually fixing their eyes on the 1972 treaty on antiballistic missiles, because the latter has a direct bearing on the carrying out of the "Star Wars" project.

It is not difficult for us to see that the core of the three talks between the United States and the Soviet Union is the "Star Wars" project. For the United States, reserving the "Star Wars" project will make it able to develop science and technology and enhance its economic strength while developing a new generation of weaponry systems capable of carrying out both offense and defense and able to restrain the Soviet Union and force it to submit at the talks. But for the Soviet Union, destroying this project will enable it to maintain its leading position in certain fields concerning nuclear weapons and prevent the United States from gaining the upper hand. Moreover, the arms race in outer space, which needs more money and manpower, may also be prevented.

The progress of the above three talks directly affects U.S.-Soviet relations. The summit meeting held in Iceland met with troubles due to the "Star Wars" problem, and the Vienna meeting of the two foreign ministers following the summit meeting was also replaced by the revilement between them. After that, U.S.-Soviet relations cooled down immediately. But none of them wishes to see the talks break down. Therefore, for a period to come, U.S.-Soviet relations will continue to be cold but not frozen, and the situation of confrontation and dialogue will also be continued.

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CSO: 5200/4029

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

XINHUA REPORTS ON NEW U.S.-USSR ARMS MEETING

Geneva Special Session

OWO21835 Beijing XINHUA in English 1634 GMT 2 Dec 86

[Text] Geneva, December 2 (XINHUA) -- The United States and the Soviet Union today opened a four-day special session on space and nuclear arms in preparation for their seventh round of Geneva arms talks, scheduled to begin January 15.

Officials on the two teams, headed by U.S. chief arms negotiator Max M. Kampelman and his Soviet counterpart, Victor Karpov, said that meetings have been arranged for separate negotiating groups on space systems, strategic long-range nuclear weapons and intermediate medium-range missiles.

The talks are reportedly aimed at an initial reduction of 30 to 50 percent in strategic weapons and removal of all medium-range missiles from Europe.

Kampelman said on arrival from Washington that the special session was aimed at achieving "a great understanding" on where the two sides stand following October's Reykjavik summit.

However, Karpov charged that the United States was trying to "cancel out what was obtained at the Reykjavik" summit by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

The two sides have remained at loggerheads over the outcome of the sixth round of Geneva talks, which began September 18 and ended November 12. The U.S. side claimed that the talks had been "useful and productive" while the Soviets thought it fruitless.

The Soviet Union has criticized the U.S. for breaking SALT-II strategic arms limits by deployment last week of a 131st B-52 bomber armed with Cruise missiles. Gorbachev called the B-52 bomber decision "a major mistake" which would cast a negative influence on the arms talks.

Nevertheless, the U.S. side maintained that the arms talks will proceed as before, despite the abandonment of SALT-II. Kampelman also ruled out any impact on the Geneva talks of the controversy over the sales of U.S. arms to Iran.

U.S. Pessimism Noted

OW040357 Beijing XINHUA in English 0236 GMT 4 Dec 86

[Text] Washington, December 3 (XINHUA) — Although the White House said that the United States still wants to move forward the arms control talks with the Soviet Union, some senior U.S. officials are pessimistic about the prospects for a nuclear arms agreement during the next two years of the Reagan presidency, according to a WASHINGTON POST report today.

The White House said in a statement issued yesterday upon the opening of the informal U.S.-Soviet arms discussions in Geneva that the United States sought to ascertain through the talks how the two sides might be able to broaden "areas of common ground".

It hoped that these informal discussions will be able to "set the stage for concrete new results" in formal arms talks set for Geneva on January 15.

But THE WASHINGTON POST, citing several government officials, said that the U.S. negotiators took no new offers to the current session and planned instead only to "listen" for new concessions from the Soviet side.

They said the principal U.S. goal for these and following talks is to persuade Moscow to "delink" potential agreements on strategic and medium-range missiles, space-based defenses and nuclear tests. But they added that the Soviets had provided no indication that they are willing to do so. Furthermore, the officials noted that both the United States and the Soviet Union have somehow hardened their positions since the Iceland summit in October.

The Soviets, while continuing to refuse bargaining separately on medium-range missiles in Europe, have now actually added a new linkage between reduction on strategic arms and nuclear tests.

During the last round of the Geneva arms talks and an informal expert-level discussion on nuclear testing that concluded last week, the Soviets made it clear that the start-up of talks on the "complete cessation of nuclear tests" was "an indispensable condition" for progress on strategic arms, they recalled.

On the U.S. side, the officials said, the Reagan Administration now insists that the goal of eliminating all ballistic missiles by 1996, which was discussed in Iceland, could be accomplished only if broad agreements are first struck on conventional arms, chemical weapons, nuclear proliferation and even regional disputes. In addition, as one official put it: "We have told them (the Soviets) that there must be a drastic change in U.S.-Soviet relations and greater openness in Soviet society."

Since those goals cannot be met "in the predictable future", he said, the U.S. position is essentially that nuclear weapons can never be eliminated and testing can never be barred.

The POST quoted Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as saying that as far as arms negotiation with Moscow is concerned, "we are in a valley right now."

Representative Les Aspin, chairman of the House Arms Services Committee, also said the chance of an agreement under the Reagan presidency "is not close to zero."

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CSO: 5200/4031

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

BRIEFS

GORBACHEV ANSWERS FINNISH GROUP--The Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev has replied to the peace appeal from the Finnish UN Disarmament Week Citizens Committee. In a reply submitted by Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Sobolev, Gorbachev describes the summit meeting of the leaders of the superpowers in Reykjavik as useful. The meeting showed that dialogue is necessary and the destruction of nuclear weapons is possible, Gorbachev said. At the same time he regretted that in Reykjavik it was not possible to reach a mutual understanding with binding agreements. Gorbachev also stressed that the Soviet Union appreciates international appeals for disarmament. The Finnish citizens committee sent the appeal to the leaders of both superpowers at the Reykjavik meeting. [Text] [Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1300 GMT 28 Oct 86 LD] /6091

WOERNER: NATO SUPPORTS ZERO OPTION--Bonn, 10 Dec (DPA)--According to Federal Defense Minister Manfred Woerner, NATO strongly supports the concept of a zero option for intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost said today that Woerner told the federal cabinet at its meeting that there is full agreement in the alliance that, after the complete withdrawal of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, there should be negotiations to agree on the same ceiling for shorter-range missiles on both sides. Last week Woerner attended the Brussels meeting of the NATO defense ministers. [Text] [Hamburg DPA in German 1636 GMT 10 Dec 86 LD] /9274

CSO: 5200/2469

SALT/START ISSUES

PRAVDA: WEINBERGER ON FUNDS FOR MX, B-1B, STEALTH

PM281549 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Sukhoy dispatch: "The Pentagon Is True to Itself"]

[Text] New York, 23 Nov--Will the Pentagon continue to advocate a buildup of U.S. military might and ask the new Congress, now controlled by the Democrats, for additional appropriations for the manufacture of supermodern weapon systems? That was what journalists asked U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger. He replied without hesitation: "Of course, without any doubt. The military budget must rise, because this is in line with the country's national interests." "But this kind of stance has nothing to do with political realism," the journalists persevered. "I have no intention of looking at questions of military policy from the viewpoint of 'political realism,'" the Pentagon chief uttered sagaciously. "If I had taken it into my head to do this, we would have been disarmed a long time ago."

For more than 5 years now, while holding the office of U.S. secretary of defense, C. Weinberger has been the most zealous advocate of "America's rearmament." Even now he and his "Pentagon host" insist on a consecutive 3-percent increase in the military budget in fiscal 1988 and 1989. They hope to use these funds to build a further 50 MX ICBM's, new B-1B and Stealth bombers, and other "infernal machines of war."

Everything changes in this world of ours. But the Pentagon does not change. Just as it did 30, 20, and 10 years ago, the U.S. military department today still dreams of boosting its budget and speeding up the pace of the arms race.

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CSO: 5200/1140

SALT/START ISSUES

PENTAGON DISPARAGING B-1B TO BOOST STEALTH PROGRAM

PM211701 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Nov 86 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "For the American Air Force"]

[Text] Washington, 17 Nov--...On the airstrip of Dyess air force base not far from the city of Abilene, Texas you can hear the roar of motors as a huge camouflage-painted plane lifts into the sky. It is one of the 19 latest B-1B strategic bombers which, according to the weekly U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, take it in turn to be on alert at the base. The journal describes this plane as the most complex and the most expensive plane ever built. Each one of these combat machines is intended, according to Pentagon strategists' plans, to "carry out strikes in the heart of Soviet territory," and each one costs 265 million dollars.

However, the first of the 100 bombers on order barely had time to enter U.S. Air Force service before some people in the military department began voicing dissatisfaction with the B-1B's tactical and technical qualities. The bomber's maneuverability, they said, is inadequate, its weight--238 tons--is too great, and on top of all this its fuel tanks leak. The U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT regards these revelations as "highly unusual." What is happening? Why are those on the banks of the Potomac beginning to disparage the bomber for which they had only praise until quite recently? The explanation is quite simple. The fact of the matter is that a competitor of the Rockwell International Company which produces the B-1B--the Northrop Corporation--is working on creating the latest, top-secret, "Stealth" strategic bomber.

The very best way to ensure the continuation of the program to build 132 "Stealth" planes, the total cost of which is 36.6 billion dollars, the journal notes, is to "cast aspersions on the type of bomber already created." The U.S. Air Force is interested in creating the impression that the "Stealth" bomber is essential, J. Epstein, member of the Brookings Institute, believes, and later this department will say that it really does need to have precisely that plane. In other words, billions more dollars will be demanded from Congress to create the latest strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems.

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CSO: 5200/1140

SALT/START ISSUES

SOVIET PAPER SCORES WYOMING DEPLOYMENT OF MX

PM261245 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 19 Nov 86 p 3

[Vadim Biryukov's "Commentator's Opinion": "Washington's Words and Deeds"]

[Text] At Warren AFB (Wyoming) the first four first-strike MX ICBM's have been set up on their launchpads and placed on standby alert. In Washington it was stated that the missiles are aimed "at the most important targets" in the Soviet Union.

As the press notes, this is only the beginning. In December it is planned to deploy another six MX missiles, and by the end of next year they are to number 50. At one time the U.S. President christened these 100-ton monsters carrying 10 individually targetable warheads "Peacekeepers". Probably for the same reason that the first American settlers, seizing the most fertile land from the local inhabitants, called their Colts "Peacemakers"...

A prolonged battle between the White House and Congress preceded the appearance of the first MX missiles on their launchpads. More than once the Reagan Administration had openly to twist the legislators' arms to secure the resources to build and deploy them. It was not by chance that the Pentagon placed contracts for the creation of the MX missiles in almost all parts of the United States. This was done in order to convert the maximum number of Americans into coparticipants in the production of this mass destruction weapons system.

In this last month after Reykjavik Washington has been stating its position in the sphere of curbing the arms race in a confused and contradictory fashion. But its specific acts--the installation of the MX missiles in Wyoming, and also the intention to commission the 131st cruise-armed bomber, thereby breaking the limit set by the SALT II Treaty, and the deployment of auxiliary command and control systems for conducting a protracted nuclear war--all create a very clear picture. White House assurances on the "determination to reduce nuclear potentials" in no way accord with the plans and actions of the U.S. military to expand and improve these arsenals.

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CSO: 5200/1140

SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: FURTHER COMMENTARY ON U.S. 131ST B-52 DEPLOYMENT

TASS Quotes Pentagon Announcement

LD271046 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1008 GMT 27 Nov 86

[Text] Washington, 27 Nov (TASS)--The Pentagon has announced that from 28 November it will introduce into the United States' operational strategic forces the 131st B-52 bomber which has been reequipped to carry cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. As has become known here, the final decision on introducing this bomber into the operational strategic forces, which will be a direct violation of the Soviet-U.S. SALT II Treaty, was taken by President Reagan on Tuesday at a special meeting in the White House attended by Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. As is pointed out in the statement read out by a representative of the military department, the President decided that the United States will not dismantle the Poseidon atomic submarines, each of which carries on board 16 nuclear missiles, in order to observe the limits of the SALT II Treaty.

Therefore, the United States is unilaterally renouncing the treaty which envisages limiting the number of strategic missiles with independently targeted warheads and bombers carrying cruise missiles to 1,320 units.

As a Pentagon spokesman told AP, the next, 132d B-52 bomber will be reequipped as a cruise carrier early next year.

The actions of the administration have caused indignation and criticism from many American politicians and experts. "It is just outrageous," said Spurgen Kenney, president of the public organization Association of Arms Control Advocates, "that the present administration walked out of the treaty limiting the accumulation of strategic offensive weapons." The U.S. renunciation of the SALT II Treaty was condemned by Senator Albert Gore, who called this action of the White House "a serious mistake".

Last month, the U.S. Congress recommended the U.S. Administration to continue adhering to the provisions of the SALT II Treaty. Introduction of the 131st strategic bomber reequipped as a cruise carrier to the U.S. operational strategic forces, the WASHINGTON POST notes, means the administration's official refusal to follow this recommendation.

TASS Military Writer Comments

LD271716 Moscow TASS in English 1151 GMT 27 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow, 27 Nov (TASS)--By TASS military writer Valdimir Bogachev:

The Reagan Administration has informed Congress that the United States would exceed on Friday, 28 November, limits set by the SALT II Treaty on the aggregate number of MIRVed strategic missiles and cruise-carrying long-range bombers.

In this way, Washington is derailing the 1979 treaty on the Limitation and Reduction of Strategic Armaments (SALT II).

During the 1984 election campaign, members of Ronald Reagan's entourage constantly emphasized that the incumbent head of the White House was sincerely striving to enter history as a peace-maker, that, once elected for another term in office, arms control would become issue No. 1 in his activity.

Experts grimly joke now that Reagan's most tangible contribution in this area would be the "final solution" to the issue of verifying compliance with agreements by way of eliminating the last agreements that could be verified.

The U.S. Administration's record on problems of war and peace over the past six years includes Washington's renunciation of the treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and thwarting in 1980 of the signing of a nearly agreed upon tripartite treaty on a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests.

Under forced pretexts or without any explanations whatsoever, the Reagan Administration unilaterally broke off the talks on limiting military activity in the Indian Ocean, on arms trading and on anti-satellite systems, and the Soviet-American talks on a total ban on chemical weapons.

The American "Star Wars" plans have jeopardized the extremely important treaty on limiting anti-ballistic missile defenses and the agreements on preventing the militarization of outer space.

Washington representatives assert in their public statements that the U.S. "has gone the extra mile" in settling disarmament problems.

The world public express fears in this connection, however, that if the U.S. goes at least a quarter-mile more in the same direction, there will remain no agreement on diminishing the risk of nuclear war.

The Reagan Administration's renunciation of the SALT II Treaty proves that Washington is seeking to remove all remaining barriers in the way of the nuclear arms race, that the American military is prepared to sacrifice in the future, too, the security interests of peoples, its own included, for the sake of arms-merchants' profits.

The [reputation that] the U.S. as a partner in talks, as a party to agreements has dropped to an extremely low level over the past six years.

The derailment of the SALT II Treaty shows that some people in Washington panically fear the emerging prospects [wordings as received] of the normalization of Soviet-American relations and the world situation in general.

Reagan Ignores Public Opinion

LD271803 Moscow World Service in English 1510 GMT 27 Nov 86

[Text] On 28 November the American B52 bomber carrying cruise missiles is to land at the Carswell military base in Texas and put on combat duty. Yuriy Soltan has this comment:

The decision on this seemingly routine event has been taken by the American President himself. The thing is that this will be the 131st bomber reequipped for transporting cruise missiles. Its placing into service means that the United States is going to breach the SALT II Treaty signed in 1979. Though the United States did not ratify it, the two countries kept honoring its major provisions. Under the SALT II Treaty the ceiling for the MIRVs and the heavy bombers carrying cruise missiles was 1,320 units. The United States has now broken this ceiling.

Significantly the American Administration took that decision following Reykjavik where, on the basis of the Soviet proposals, Soviet and American leaders agreed that it was possible to eliminate all the strategic weapons within the next years, scrap the Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe and reduce considerably similar missiles in Asia.

Even in the American Congress the President's decision was qualified as a historic mistake--as one more move after the arms deal with Iran running counter to the national interests of the United States. But the Reagan Administration refuses to heed the opinion of the public, and not only inside its own country for that matter. A resolution was adopted recently at the United Nations expressing the hope that the Soviet Union and the United States will use all their efforts for the sake of reaching an agreement on halting the arms race, on nuclear disarmament and the nonmilitarization of space. Only one delegation voted against it and that was the delegation of the United States.

131st B-52 En Route To Base

LD282143 Moscow TASS in English 2126 GMT 28 Nov 86

[Text] Washington, 28 Nov (TASS)--A Pentagon spokesman has told a TASS correspondent that the 131st B-52 bomber, which has been converted into a carrier of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, will land at the Carswell Air Force Base in Texas within the next half-hour.

From the moment of its landing, the bomber will become part of combat-ready forces. Thus, the United States will unilaterally exceed the limits set by the Soviet-U.S. SALT II Treaty.

Reagan Seeks to Destroy Arms Control

LD291611 Moscow TASS in English 1053 GMT 29 Nov 86

[Text] New York, 29 Nov (TASS)--It is now absolutely clear that the Reagan Administration is not going to seek any progress in arms control. In the remaining years in office it intends to exert serious effort to discard the existing arms control agreements and to utterly destroy the existing arms control regime. This is how President of the Arms Control Association Spurgeon Keeny commented in an interview to the ABC television network on the fact that the Reagan Administration exceeded the limit on B-52 strategic bombers equipped with cruise missiles, that had been set by the Soviet-U.S. SALT II Treaty.

PRAVDA: Decision 'Irresponsible'

PM011531 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Nov 86 First Edition p 5

[Vitaliy Gen "Commentator's Column": "Irresponsible Step"]

[Text] Washington--According to an announcement by Department of Defense spokesman R. Sims, the 131st B-52 strategic bomber armed with cruise missiles with nuclear warheads is coming into service. The United States will thus exceed the limit set by the Soviet-U.S. SALT II Treaty. Washington intends to take no compensatory measures, like dismantling the outdated "Poseidon" nuclear submarines, in order to remain within the limit.

In the Pentagon spokesman's words, the decision to breach the treaty obligation was made by Reagan at a White House conference with Defense Secretary Weinberger and Secretary of State Shultz. Moreover, the deliberate scuttling of the arms limitation accord was "motivated" by slanderous fabrications about "Soviet military threat" and "violations" of SALT II by the Soviet Union.

But the real motives behind this irresponsible step by the Washington Administration are clearly visible through the heaps of lies. The very same Pentagon spokesman noted in particular that "we cannot let ourselves reduce our structure of deterrent forces." In other words, SALT II--which has always generated the fury of Washington adversaries of detente--prevents the military-industrial complex and its political network from obtaining a completely free hand to continue a totally unrestrained arms race.

In its typical fashion, the White House announced its action at a carefully chosen moment, striving to minimize adverse reactions. Key congressional figures were notified only in the evening, when the country was preparing to celebrate the traditional Thanksgiving Day. Nevertheless, the President

was subjected to sharp criticism as soon as the administration's decision to break the treaty became known. Washington's actions were described as "a grave error of judgment" by Senator A. Gore.

To judge by everything, the administration still has to hear quite a few blunt words from Congress as a whole. THE WASHINGTON POST recalls that the Senate and the House of Representatives have already attached to the military budget bill a specific call to the White House to continue observing SALT II, which, in their opinion, "accords with the interests of U.S. national security." The latest decision means a haughty refusal by the administration to heed the demands by Congress.

And not only by Congress. By destroying SALT II the U.S. Administration stands again in front of everyone as a mouthpiece of militarism.

Violation 'Adventurism in Politics'

LD302200 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 30 Nov 86

[Text] News agencies report world reaction to the United States' demonstrative renunciation of further observance of the treaty with the Soviet Union on limitation of strategic arms, SALT II. Reviewing statements by official spokesmen and the press, especially those of France, FRG, Britain, and Japan, the AFP agency states: Western capitals have voiced serious concern at Washington's decision. Over to commentator Vladimir Pasko.

[Pasko] The commissioning of the 131st B-52 bomber carrying cruise missiles caused justified disquiet in the world. The U.S. rejection of further observance of the SALT II Treaty means the liquidation of one more arresting device on the road to an uncontrolled arms race. The latest arresting device to date remains the Soviet-American ABM Treaty, curbing the deployment [razvertyaniye] of anti-missile defense systems. But this, too, is under threat by the program adopted by the United States for deployment [razvertyaniye] of space weapons.

I will point out that back in May, when the U.S. Government announced its intention to reject SALT, this was opposed by all the U.S. allies. The plans were also denounced by the majority of Americans. Seeing the President off before the Reykjavik meeting, Congressmen declared that the Soviet-American accords should be observed. But acting in its accustomed manner, the government once more ignored the opinion of its compatriots, allies, and the world at large.

One's attention is drawn to the fact that the effective departure from the treaty has been made several hours after the promulgation of the Delhi declaration in which the Soviet Union and India once more called upon mankind to take steps to free the planets from nuclear weapons. The motives governing the U.S. Government in its dangerous actions are clear, and it does not itself do much to conceal them. As the NEW YORK TIMES reports, in an interview to the editors of provincial papers, the President clearly stated that observance of the limitations of the SALT Treaty hampered the plans of the administration for the modernization of its strategic forces.

But what, the question arises, does the U.S. Government think the others should do? Sit with arms folded? The Soviet leadership has repeatedly warned the United States of the illusory nature of hopes to achieve military advantages at the expense of the security of the others. In June the Soviet Government once more clearly stated that as soon as the United States exceeded the set level of armaments or otherwise violated the basic points of the agreement, the Soviet Union would take measures excluding the disruption of the military-strategic parity.

The U.S. departure from the SALT Treaty also reminds one how right the Soviet Union is to call on everyone in the world to act together against adventurism in politics. The danger embodied in the U.S. course is a call for action to all who realize the need for disarmament and liquidation of nuclear weapons.

U.S. Expanding Arsenal

OW022227 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0300 GMT 2 Dec 86

[From the "Novosti" newscast, Viktor Konnov commentary]

[Text] The Reagan Administration's rejection of the SALT II Agreement has caused leading U.S. political figures and the whole world to condemn this action. Our commentary:

[Konnov] Hello comrades. As is known the American Administration, as far back as half a year ago, publicly announced that the SALT II Agreement was dead. In order to justify the rejection of the agreement a whole series of excuses were invented--that supposedly the Soviet Union had infringed on certain aspects of the agreement, that the SALT II structure was antiquated, and so on.

When all these arguments were refuted by facts, the official representative of the American administration was forced to state: We are stepping out of the boundaries of the agreement to unfold a new weapons system in order to realize our modernization program.

This certainly was closer to the truth, but not the whole truth. The truth became apparent after U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger announced that the SALT II Agreement would be annulled so the Star Wars program could be included in the arsenal.

Hardly six months have elapsed since these words were spoken. A few days ago, the 131st B-52 bomber, armed with cruise missiles, was entered into service. Thus, the United States has exceeded the bounds of the quantitative limits established by this agreement. This first swallow, or more aptly, this first buzzard, will alas not be the last. By the beginning of the nineties the Pentagon plans to bring the total number of strategic bombers capable of carrying cruise missiles to 195.

According to general opinion, the SALT II Agreement acted as a brake in the arms race. Now the United States has released this brake.

Denmark's Reaction

LD292144 Moscow TASS in English 0952 GMT 29 Nov 86

[Text] Copenhagen, 29 Nov (TASS)--Denmark's Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen deplored the fact that the 131st B-52 bomber armed with nuclear tipped cruise missiles joins combat-ready forces of the U.S. and that the United States thus violates the SALT II Treaty. He emphasized the need for preserving a positive potential linked with the SALT II Treaty and the ABM Treaty. This step of the United States is ever more deplorable since it is taken at a time when there exists hope for progress in the sphere of arms control, the minister said. On behalf of the Danish Government he urged the United States and the USSR to use the opportunities for concluding agreement on nuclear arsenals reduction, the opportunities that opened after the Reykjavik meeting.

ABC Network Cited

LD291315 Moscow TASS in English 1208 GMT 29 Nov 86

[Text] New York, 29 Nov (TASS)--The ABC television company has described the U.S. violation of SALT II as a dangerous turning point in the history of Soviet-American relations. It pointed out that the U.S. had adhered to the provisions of the treaty for seven years despite the fact that it had not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. Last Friday, by phasing in a single bomber, the Reagan Administration deliberately undermined SALT II, thus doing away with virtually the only agreement limiting offensive nuclear armaments. Gerard Smith, former head of the U.S. delegation at the SALT talks, said in an ABC interview that he regarded this step taken by the Reagan Administration as a symbol of the fact that the process of the erosion of arms control was going full speed.

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CSO: 5200/1145

FRG'S WOERNER DISCUSSES SALT II, ZERO OPTION

DW040830 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0645 GMT 3 Dec 86

["Excerpts" of interview with Defense Minister Manfred Woerner by correspondent K. Prompers on the "Viertel Nach Sieben" program; date and place not given — recorded]

[Text] [Prompers] In deploying a B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles, the U.S. violated the SALT II treaty last week. Will you tell your U.S. counterpart, Weinberger, that you agree with the U.S. step?

[Woerner] It is not a matter of the FRG agreeing or disagreeing with NATO countries. I think Mr Weinberger will again explain the reasons the Americans took that step. The FRG Government's position is clear. We have always appealed to both sides to adhere to SALT guidelines, even though that agreement was never ratified. The U.S. President has repeatedly stressed that he would only abide by it if the USSR did. He has repeatedly noted Soviet violations of the agreement. I think that it is a kind of signal, which by no means is to say that SALT II is now being put entirely aside. For the rest, we do hope that there will be agreements on a 50-percent reduction in the strategic sector, that the strategic potential will be reduced by 50 percent. In such a case all that would be invalid anyway.

[Prompers] Genscher does not tire of emphasizing time and again that the zero solution concerning intermediate-range missiles, which has been within reach, should be implemented as soon as possible. Altenburg, the chairman of the military committee, General Rogers, and his deputy Mack have serious qualms. Does the FRG defense minister share military officers' reservations or does he agree with the foreign minister?

[Woerner] To begin with, there are no differences of opinion within the Federal Government. There was a discussion within the Federal Government. The chancellor, the foreign minister, and I participated. We fixed a clear course. We agreed on the zero solution, but we anticipate that the shorter range intermediate-range missiles will be included during the next step, and the goal must be to reduce the number of them as well and to fix equal upper limits. Of course, there are problems when it comes to reducing the number of or even eliminating intermediate-range missiles. And those are the problems dealt with by the generals — quite rightly so from their point of view — when they refer to the fact that the threat from shorter range intermediate-range weapons can hardly be balanced, and when

they underline that there are in fact conventional imbalances. Those problems cannot be ignored. We, too, are aware of them. The difference is that, for example, Gen Rogers wants such an agreement to include the proviso on reducing the number of shorter range intermediate-range missiles to be bininding in that one agreement. We say that would be too much for the negotiations. We must solve the problems step by step. But we do need a definite commitment to go on negotiating. You see, the differences are not so dramatic. The problems must be recognized, for in the end it is completely irrelevant to the FRG citizens what the missiles that are targeted on us are called. We have clearly decided to support the zero option. In that respect, there are no differences between Genscher and Woerner. However, we want the number of shorter range intermediate-range missiles to be reduced as well. That is in the security interests of all citizens of the FRG.

[Prompers] Might that mean rearmament in short-range weapons?

[Woerner] At the moment we are not talking about rearmament. We are talking about negotiations on reducing the number of weapons. We do not want more, we want fewer, including shorter range intermediate-range weapons.

[Prompers] Let us be optimistic and let us hope that the Geneva negotiations will succeed. However, the imbalance in the conventional field remains. The NATO defense ministers will try to rectify that. You will go to Brussels with last week's budget decision — an increase of 1.9 percent for next year. Next year's budget will total DM51 billion, which is less than the demanded increase of 3 percent.

[Woerner] Surely, that is less than what had been requested. There is no doubt about it. But we are among the best within the alliance with that growth rate, which is real growth. The 3-percent limit we had fixed will not be reached by any of the allies

this year. It is a matter of individual national budgetary situations. For the rest, that figure is relative, because it does not tell us anything about the true increase in combat strength. For that reason, we are trying to find another yardstick, without giving up the ambitious goal of doing more for conventional defense. And that is the message that has to be discussed in Brussels now. In view of the foreseeable limitation of nuclear weapons, which all of us want, we must be aware of the fact that it would mean that we would have to make greater efforts in the conventional field, or else the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority would have much more significance than we might want to face in preserving our freedom.

[Prompers] Does that mean more pressure on the defense budget for 1988 and 1989 to create a better balance?

[Woerner] Yes, we do not need excessive growth rates for the defense budget, but we very surely will need higher growth rates than we have now — unless the Warsaw Pact could be persuaded to bring about conventional balance by disarmament. That is our goal.

[Prompers] But one could be very skeptical after 13 long years of MBFR negotiations in Vienna.

[Woerner] Skeptical or not, I believe that you should not expect dramatic results within 1 or 2 years.

[Prompers] There be may quarrels between Washington and Paris over the way negotiations on conventional weapons are conducted. The U.S. wants a small conference of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, whereas France would like to have something like a CSCE forum for that purpose.

[Woerner] That is right. There are different opinions. We Germans are trying to mediate, to find a compromise. I cannot say now whether that will succeed.

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CSO: 5200/2469

SALT/START ISSUES

FRG GOVERNMENT COMMENTS ON SALT II, U.S. DECISION

Cool Reception

LD281340 Hamburg DPA in German 1249 GMT 28 Nov 86

[Text] Bonn, 28 Nov (DPA) — The U.S. decision to put another B-52 bomber with cruise missiles into service, despite the arms limitations envisaged in the SALT II agreement, has been given a restrained reception by the Federal Government. Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost said in Bonn today that the Federal Government has always spoken in favor of continued respect for the SALT II limitations by both parties to the treaty.

The government stands by its view that the foremost aim of the superpowers must be to drastically reduce the nuclear offensive potential of both sides. These reductions had already been agreed in principle in Reykjavik in the form of a reduction by 50 percent of all strategic systems. Ost added that such an agreement would make the question of continued respect for the upper limits of SALT II irrelevant. It should therefore be striven for emphatically.

Press Review

DW280940 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German
0605 GMT 28 Nov 86

[From the Press Review]

[Text] Editorials today deal with the decision by the U.S. Government not to adhere to SALT II any longer.

Frankfurter Allgemeine maintains: The signal from Washington was given a long time ago, but it was postponed several times. The United States is intentionally overstepping the limits of the so-called SALT II for strategic nuclear weapons. It is a step that will be viewed by the allies with great reservation. The U.S. Government is right inasmuch as it has asked the Soviet Union repeatedly to stop its obvious violations of SALT II. The political aspect lies in the timing. President Reagan, who used to be able to manipulate public opinion for his goals and plans, seems to be increasingly missing that quality. In Reykjavik he gave an objectionable example of it, leaving the field open to Gorbachev for effective propaganda.

Frankfurter Rundschau has the following to say: The President maintains that the Soviet Union violated the treaty long ago with a new type of missile. Moscow says that the new missiles are just a modernization of old systems. Whether that is correct or not, why has the U.S. Government never discussed it seriously with Moscow? Because Reagan and his crew are not interested in negotiating their nice argument away? One of the few weapons limitation agreements is being thrown on the trash heap of history at a time when real disarmament chances are opening up.

Augsburger Allgemeine points out: It looks almost as if in his last term of office Reagan wants to destroy what he built in summit meetings with Gorbachev in Geneva and Reykjavik — the chance of a world with fewer weapons. The logic of terminating SALT II cannot be understood. Why fire the starting gun for nuclear armament if it is the declared aim of the SDI project to make all nuclear weapons superfluous? It seems that those in the United States who wanted the USSR to arm itself to death have won.

Neue Osnabruecker Zeitung underlines: The President will have to think of something to make his decision understandable to the Western Europeans. In rare unity, the allies supported adherence to SALT II. That point has become some sort of touchstone regarding how much European voices are really listened to in Washington. The President will risk the confidence of his alliance partners if he strains their tolerance too much. If the impression were to prevail on this side of the Atlantic that in the end only U.S. interests will be considered, it would be poor preparation for the current disarmament efforts.

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CSO, 5200/2469

FRG: SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG ON U.S. SALT II MOVE

DW020915 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 29-30 Nov 86 p 4

[Article by "JJ": "SALT in the Wound"]

[Text] What for months has repeatedly been announced has now become fact: The United States is breaking through an interim ceiling of the SALT II agreement (which was never ratified) by equipping a B-52 bomber with cruise missiles. That is one too many. Owing to that, the United States will have precisely 1,321 delivery systems with "multiple warheads." That category includes primarily missiles, but also bombers equipped with cruise missiles. Under the treaty, neither side is allowed to have more than 1,320 such systems.

General Secretary Gorbachev immediately attacked the move as being a "contradiction" to the "Reykjavik logic." However, the Soviet Union is also not totally innocent in that respect. The United States feels that the Soviet SS-25 missile is not just a modernization, but an impermissible new weapon. Washington also believes that the mammoth radar facility at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of the ABM Treaty regulating the two superpowers' antimissile capabilities. Qualitative changes are open to argument, but quantitative changes are not; and in that respect one cruise missile bomber more is just one too many.

Does it also herald the end of disarmament in general? Different factors play a more important role. Is the bomber indispensable to U.S. security? Hardly, given the top quality equipment of its existing arsenal. In addition, the alliance should be considered, which does not applaud the move at all. Even a loyal vassal of the President like Margaret Thatcher coolly stated that Her Majesty's Government wanted SALT to be observed by both sides. In Congress, which is dominated by the Democrats, and which has zeroed in on Reagan because of the Iran affair, that decision has not yet been approved. However, there is a way out for Reagan: He could scrap two old Poseidon submarines, as planned, so as to return to the treaty limits.

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CSO; 5200/2469

SALT/START ISSUES

UK GOVERNMENT COMMENTS ON U.S. PLANS TO BREACH SALT II

London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1625 GMT 27 Nov 86

[By chief political correspondent Chris Moncrieff]

[Text] The British Government spoke out today about the announcement from the Pentagon that the United States is to break out of the strategic arms limitations imposed by the unratified SALT II treaty.

This follows the decision to send the 131st B-52 heavy bomber equipped with cruise missiles to its operational base in Texas tomorrow. Its armaments will exceed the SALT II limits for warheads on cruise-carrying bombers.

A Foreign Office spokesman in London said: "The British Government has repeatedly made clear its view that the SALT agreements should continue to be observed by both sides."

At the same time an opposition front bench spokesman described the U.S. decision as "a devastating blow to arms control" which, he said, will "dismay the allies of the U.S."

The Foreign Office spokesman said: "We have recognised the United States concerns about Soviet non-compliance and we have asked the Soviet authorities on many occasions to respond to these concerns. We regret the lack of substantive Soviet response."

"We look forward to further consultations with the United States

Administration on this and related issues."

The statement adds: "Our priority remains the conclusion of a significant new agreement on strategic arms based on adequate verification to ensure compliance as identified between the prime minister and President Reagan recently at Camp David that would transcend the debate about past agreements in this area."

Mr George Robertson, a shadow foreign minister, described the United States decision as "a devastating blow to arms control".

He said: "The decision will dismay the allies of the United States throughout the world. Even Mrs Thatcher is known to have written earlier this year exhorting the President in the strongest terms to respect the treaty."

"By taking this action the President will undermine all the work being done to build confidence and reduce arms."

"By abandoning their respect for one of the few successful measures of multilateral arms control the Americans hand a huge propaganda advantage to Mr Gorbachev and add a new blow to Atlantic alliance solidarity."

Mr Robertson added: "This is the kind of unilateralism which underlines the lack of consultation which itself is the hallmark of the current NATO crisis."

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CSO: 5240/022

SALT/START ISSUES

FRENCH EDITORIAL VIEWS REAGAN'S SALT II DECISION

PM011602 Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Nov 86 p 1

[Editorial: "The Death of SALT II"]

[Text] Mr Reagan, who already had enough worries with the scandal over arms sales to Iran, has just run the risk of further embarrassment by adopting a measure which is bound to shock the Democratic majority in Congress and also its European allies. By deciding to put into service on Friday, 28 November, a new B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles without compensating for this increase in the U.S. strategic arsenal by a reduction in another sphere, he exceeds the limits imposed by the SALT II treaty signed in 1979 by Mr Carter and Mr Brezhnev. This officially spells the end of this treaty which of course had never been ratified but which was nonetheless the only framework imposed — and hitherto largely respected — on the arms race between the two superpowers.

This decision was not really unexpected because Mr Reagan had stated that he intended to take this action on 27 May of this year. However, there was reason to expect a different decision, in view of the major events which have taken place since then, and especially in view of what happened at Reykjavik. Did not Mr Reagan reach agreement with Mr Gorbachev at that meeting on the principle of a 50 percent reduction in strategic arsenals over 5 years, and even on the total elimination of nuclear weapons, starting with ballistic missiles?

These proposals were probably rather overambitious but, with the announcement made on Thursday, Washington is going too far in the other direction. A few days ago Mr Perle, the Pentagon's foremost thinker, came to Paris to explain that ballistic missiles, a destabilizing weapon and a major threat to the Americans, must be eliminated from arsenals: The famous

triad (ground-based missiles, submarines, and aircraft) which was the golden rule of nuclear deterrence for 25 years must now make way for the air component (planes and cruise missiles) — the only "right" weapon for the future.

However, the reason why the United States is now ditching the SALT agreements is that it refuses to compensate for this 131st bomber by dismantling one of its old submarines equipped with Poseidon missiles or one of its 40 even older Titan missiles which are buried in silos: in other words the very ballistic weapons which were said to be obsolete and dangerous. In view of the fact that Mr Reagan himself has condemned excessive duplication in the arsenals, it is difficult to see what military advantage he gains to compensate for the serious political risk he is running by violating the agreements.

The reaction of the Soviet spokesman who warned that this decision "will have an extremely negative effect" on the Geneva talks and who reaffirmed that the USSR "also considers itself to be released from its obligations," is not surprising. Nor is the reaction of the Europeans who, while warning Washington against illusions about the end of nuclear deterrence, expressed a desire for the "status quo" to be maintained, as has just been reaffirmed in London.

There is certainly little left of the "spirit of Reykjavik" even in Moscow where, pending the revival of fundamental negotiations, polemics are gaining the upper hand again. But, with the Iran affair and now the armaments issue, it is increasingly difficult to see the rationale behind U.S. policy.

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CSO: 5200/2462

SALT/START ISSUES

SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER 'REGRETS' U.S. SALT II DECISION

LD022243 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1900 GMT 2 Dec 86

[Text] At a meeting of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Minister Fernandez Ordonez has denied that Spain intends to participate in SDI, Star Wars, which is being sponsored by the United States. Here is a report on this from Antonio Regalado:

Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez has just called on the United States and the Soviet Union to return to the SALT II agreement which was recently breached by Washington. At a plenary session of the Senate, the Spanish foreign minister stressed that the Spanish Government has doubts about the SDI project, known popularly as Star Wars, and repeated that Spanish companies are free to collaborate in the venture. The question came from Antonio Romero Ruiz, a United Left senator for the Andalusian community, and Foreign Minister Fernandez Ordonez replied as follows:

[Begin Fernandez Ordonez recording] The Spanish Government has not envisaged the negotiation of any agreement with the U.S. Government which could somehow represent political support for this deployment. As a government we believe there should be no deployment by either side — because it is not only the United States that is carrying out space research — that there should be no deployment by either of the two sides of strategic defense without agreement between the two sides. [end recording]

[Regalado] He then took the opportunity to say the following:

[Begin Fernandez Ordonez recording] I would like to say to you that the Spanish Government regrets the recent decision by the United States to no longer observe the clauses of the SALT II treaty. We understand that it does not have any juridical force and that many violations by the Soviet Union have been denounced, but in spite of all this, observance by the United States Administration was an important contribution to the process of detente. [end recording]

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CSO: 5200/2463

SALT/START ISSUES

XINHUA NOTES U.S. B-52 BOMBER DEPLOYMENT

OW271010 Beijing XINHUA in English 0715 GMT 27 Nov 86

["Reagan Bomber Approval Puts End to Salt II"]

[Text] Washington, November 26 (XINHUA) -- The U.S. Air Force will deploy its 131st cruise-missile-carrying B-52 bomber Friday, exceeding the limits on strategic weapons in the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) with the Soviet Union, the local press reported today. The reports quoted unidentified Pentagon officials as saying that U.S. President Ronald Reagan made the final deployment decision at a meeting of his top national security advisers on Tuesday. The officials said Reagan rejected the idea of retiring some older Poseidon-missile submarines to remain within the SALT II limits. They said Reagan's final decision was "based on the Soviet threat" and continuing Soviet violations of the treaty, including deployment of a new generation land-based missiles. The officials told reporters Reagan also agreed that more aging B-52 bombers will be converted to carry cruise missiles and the next conversion will be finished early next year.

The SALT II treaty was signed in Vienna in 1979 by then U.S. President Jimmy Carter and late Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, but was never ratified by the U.S. Senate. Both countries claimed their obedience to the treaty despite Senate balking.

Reagan announced last May that the U.S. would end its adherence by the end of this year unless the Soviets took effective measures to end its violations.

The treaty allowed the United States to have 1,320 missile launchers, including 130 cruise-missile-carrying strategic bombers.

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CSO: 5200/4023

SALT/START ISSUES

XINHUA NOTES U.S. BREAK OF SALT II PROVISIONS

'U.S. Gone Beyond Limits'

OW290232 Beijing XINHUA in English 0220 GMT 29 Nov 86

[Text] Washington, November 28 (XINHUA) -- The United States today formally broke the U.S.-Soviet SALT II Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty by deploying its 131st B-52 bomber equipped with nuclear-tipped Cruise missiles.

The Defense Department reported that the big, eight-engined jet flew to Carswell Air Force Base outside Forth Worth, Texas, from Kelly Air Force Base at San Antonio, where it had been converted to carry Cruise missiles.

The service of this bomber means that for the first time in seven years, the United States has gone beyond the limits of the SALT II treaty signed by the late Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

The treaty, which allows the United States to have 1,320 strategic missile launchers, including 130 Cruise-missile-carrying bombers, was never ratified by the U.S. Congress, but adhered informally by the U.S. Government.

The final decision to scrap the treaty was made by President Ronald Reagan at a meeting with his top national security advisers on Tuesday to counter the alleged "Soviet threat" and Soviet violations of the SALT II treaty.

The decision has drawn sharp criticism from leading Democratic lawmakers, including Les Aspin, chairman of the House Arms Services Committee, and Sam Nunn, would-be chairman of the Senate Arms Services Committee.

Aspin told the "CBS Morning News" today that to violate the SALT II treaty was "a very bad decision", in the sense that, without SALT limits, the Soviet Union could add warheads to their large missiles faster than American production lines can.

He said that because of the breakout decision, the Reagan administration's arms control policies will be "in very deep trouble" in the coming 100th Congress.

Nunn also predicted that the decision will make it much harder "to reach a bipartisan consensus on strategic weapons and arms control here at home."

In Moscow, the Soviet Foreign Ministry warned that "the refusal of the U.S. Administration to abide by the SALT II treaty will inevitably influence most negatively" the Geneva arms control negotiations.

The ministry spokesman said the Soviet Union is now contemplating what response it will take to the U.S. move.

U.S. Allies Criticize Violation

OW010756 Beijing XINHUA in English 0750 GMT 1 Dec 86

[Text] Bonn, November 30 (XINHUA) -- The U.S. violation of its Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-II) with the Soviet Union has drawn a chorus of criticism from European allies.

According to the U.S. Pentagon, on November 28 the United States put into service the 131st B-52 heavy bomber equipped with Cruise missiles, thus surpassing the ceiling of 1,320 Cruise-carrying bombers and multiple-warhead missiles set out in the 1979 SALT-II treaty.

SALT-II was signed in Vienna by the late Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Both sides agreed to abide by it, even after it formally expired last December.

French President Francois Mitterrand said that it would be "wise and very useful" to keep the treaty at a time when the two superpowers are engaged in disarmament talks.

British, Federal German and Italian officials urged the United States and the Soviet Union to continue observing the treaty.

Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou expressed his "enormous concern" about the possible "terrible results" of the U.S. move.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan said last May he would breach SALT-II because of what he called numerous violations of the treaty by the Soviet Union, including the development of new missiles and the scrambling of radio signals from missile tests.

U.S. European allies tried in vain to persuade Reagan to cancel his plan.

Observers here said the American move will harm U.S. relations with European allies and damage the West's credibility concerning its role in disarmament.

RENMIN RIBAO Commentary

HK011001 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 30 Nov 86 p 6

["Jottings" by Zhang Liang (4545 5328): "Is It a New Signal?"]

[Text] On 28 November, the United States officially deployed the 131st B-52 heavy bomber equipped with Cruise missiles, thus going beyond the limit set forth by the second U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. A person from the Pentagon said that the reason the United States did so was that the Soviet Union had already violated this treaty long ago.

The Soviet Union reacted strongly to this. It not only categorically rejected the U.S. charge, but also asserted that this act by the United States will compel the Soviet Union to disregard the bounds of the treaty.

It appears that a dispute between the two superpowers is unavoidable. Perhaps outsiders may find it difficult to say who is right and who is wrong. However, it can be certain that their arms race will tend to spiral. To the people of various countries of the world who favor disarmament and treasure peace, this is evidently a bad omen.

The second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty was signed by the U.S. and Soviet heads of state in 1979. Although they maintained different views and reservations on this treaty, the two sides stated verbally that they would observe the provisions of the treaty. At present, the United States and the Soviet Union are having a dialogue, holding talks on disarmament, professing their sincerity in disarmament, and striving to create an image of "peace" for themselves. However, if they continue arms expansion under the pretext that the other side has broken the treaty and pay no attention even to a treaty which is in black and white, what can be assured by these promises of disarmament?

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CSO: 5200/4030

SALT/START ISSUES

XINHUA NEWS ANALYSIS ON 'DEATH' OF SALT-II

OWO41114 Beijing XINHUA in English 0910 GMT 4 Dec 86

["News Analysis: The Death of Salt-II Race -- (By Mei Zhenmin)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, December 4 (XINHUA) -- The U.S. deployment of the 131st B-52 bomber carrying Cruise missiles signals the death of the SALT-II arms limitations treaty, paving the way for a further escalation of the arms race and posing a more dangerous threat to world peace.

The Soviet Union has already made it clear that it will take "corresponding measures" to increase its nuclear arsenal.

Although SALT-II was never ratified by the U.S. Senate, both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to abide by the treaty provisions. But adherence to the treaty may have been more symbolic than real in promoting security and disarmament as both sides continued a nuclear build-up even within the limits of the treaty.

Under SALT-II, the total number of each side's land-based continental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers is limited to 2,250. The number of strategic bombers carrying ballistic missiles with multiple warheads and long-range Cruise missiles is limited to 1,320 on each side.

President Reagan's October 1981 military modernization program to raise the U.S. strategic capability marked the beginning of the U.S. comprehensive replacement of its strategic nuclear arsenal. 50 MX land-based missiles will be deployed this year and the second 50 have been put on the purchase list.

In addition to its numerous operation Trident submarines each equipped with 24 Trident-I missiles, the United States has planned to install the longer range Trident-II in 1989.

Besides the 131 B-52 bombers already converted to carry 12 Cruise missiles each, another 54 B-52 bombers are now awaiting conversion to the new generation B-1B bombers and are expected to be operational soon.

The Soviet Union has not stood idly by. Last year it deployed 45 SS-25 continental ballistic missiles and began deployment of SS-24s this year. The test launches of a new generation of its SS-18 and SS-19 will soon be under way. In the past year, a number of Soviet Typhoon submarines and class division submarines became operational.

According to foreign reports, in 1984-85 the Soviet Union developed successfully new types of land, sea and air-based Cruise missiles with a range of 3,000 kilometers. Two new types of longer range Cruise missiles are also being developed. Clearly SALT-II did not effectively reduce the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals but it was a kind of check on the superpowers.

The death of the treaty has cast a shadow over arms control talks between the two superpowers, each reverting back to previous, hardline positions. The once optimistic feeling around the world following the Reagan-Gorbachev summit at Reykjavik has thus died away.

The demise of SALT-II has heightened international concern about strained superpower relations and a worsening of East-West ties in general.

The international community has appealed to the United States and the Soviet Union to speed up the process of disarmament talks and continue to abide by previous accords as a precondition to a new agreement on arms control.

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CSO: 5200/4032

SALT/START ISSUES

XINHUA COMMENTARY ON U.S. ALLIES' SALT VIEWS

OW051602 Beijing XINHUA in English 1543 GMT 5 Dec 86

["Commentary: An Unwise Decision -- by Xia Zhimian" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Bonn, December 5 (XINHUA) -- When the United States put its 131st cruise-missile-carrying B-52 bomber into service last week, it burst through strategic nuclear weapon ceilings set by SALT-2, thus meaning the end of the trouble-laden treaty.

Word of the demise of SALT-2 quickly reached U.S. allies in Western Europe, and some promptly declared strong disagreement and wondered about the wisdom of the decision.

On the very day U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced the decision, French President Francois Mitterrand said it would be "very prudent and useful" if the U.S. respected SALT-2 provisions while it talked arms control with the Soviets.

Other U.S. allies, such as Britain, Federal Germany and Italy, expressed hope that the superpowers would continue to honor the treaty. Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou was more direct in expressing his "great concern" at the violation which could lead to "terrible consequences."

What was behind the chilly response for the decision? The U.S. itself may have left the door open.

Last May, the U.S. threatened to break the SALT-2 ceiling by the end of the year. Even then this was strongly opposed by its western allies. They made every effort to convince the Americans that violation threatened Europe with a new round in the superpower arms race.

Despite the vehemence, Washington turned a deaf ear to the protests. Apparently, competing with the Soviets for the military advantage is a top priority at the White House.

The basis of the concern of the European allies is somewhat more complicated. There are three significant aspects.

First, the U.S. decision creates doubt about the sincerity of the West on arms control. Since the beginning of this year, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has presented a series of arms control proposals.

To some extent, each may be a reflection of Soviet hope to downsize the world's arsenals. Clearly though the plans are a sophisticated attempt to put world opinion behind the Soviets, which would put more pressure on the United States. The Soviets are learning to play to the audience.

Against this background, Reagan made the hasty trip to Iceland to meet Gorbachev last October. There he joined the Soviet leader to piously declare their resolve to slash their nuclear forces. Yet at this critical moment, the United States decided to add the last straw to the SALT-2 treaty.

Secondly, the U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations in recent decades have actually written a history of arms stockpiling. However, each side has tried to blame the other for their wanton military build-up.

Less than six weeks after the bold words at Iceland, Reagan shredded the SALT-2 pact with the flight of the huge bomber bristling with cruise missiles. He only seemed to be labeling himself as a man who is not as interested in nuclear disarmament as he professes.

Thirdly, the decision harmed relations between the U.S. and some of its Western European allies. In the past two years, some European countries have expressed growing concern over Washington's insistence on implementing its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), fearing that this program would put the arms race into orbit. Washington does not seem to hear these European protests any better than the ones about SALT-2. This cannot help but worsen relations.

Press called the end of SALT-2 "a step towards a wrong direction," on the road to an arms control agreement. Some even called Reagan's decision contrary to Europe's interests.

Whatever it is, the decision to end the SALT-2 has caused speculation about the President's judgement. Reagan may have made a serious gaffe in the game of superpower chess.

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CSO: 5200/4036

SALT/START ISSUES

XINHUA REPORTAGE: USSR REACTION TO U.S. SALT BREAKOUT

USSR to Observe SALT

OWO60238 Beijing XINHUA in English 0204 GMT 6 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow, December 5 (XINHUA) -- The Soviet Union said today it will abide by the SALT-2 limits on strategic nuclear arms for now, despite the U.S. decision to break the treaty.

"Taking into account the immense universal importance of the issue and the need to preserve the key constraint on the strategic arms race, the U.S.S.R. refrains for the time being from abandoning the limitations under SALT-1 and SALT-2," a government statement issued today by Soviet News Agency TASS said.

The United States deployed November 28 the 131st B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles, thus surpassing the ceiling of 1,320 cruise-carrying bombers and multiple-warhead missiles set out in the 1979 SALT-2 treaty.

"Washington is making a big mistake. The exceeding of the limits set by the SALT-2 will not strengthen U.S. security," the Soviet statement said.

"The United States' breakout from the SALT-2 Treaty ... fully lays bare the militarist essence of the U.S. policy for the whole world to see."

However, Moscow said it believes "that there is still an opportunity for stopping the dangerous course of events that is being provoked by the irresponsible actions of the present American administration."

"In America and outside it, it may be presumed, there is still enough political wisdom and the mere sense of self-preservation not to allow the wrecking of the entire structure of accords on the limitation of strategic arms that was created during 15 years," the Soviet Government said.

It was the second time the Soviets had unilaterally continued their obligations to arms limits. They have extended several times a moratorium on nuclear tests even though the United States has refused to follow suit.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan said his move only counters Moscow's violation of the SALT-2 Treaty, which was signed by President Carter and Leonid Brezhnev but never ratified by the U.S. Senate.

Reagan's decision to scrap SALT-2 has been criticized both by congressional leaders and NATO allies.

Condemnation of SALT-II Violation

OW090130 Beijing XINHUA in English 0033 GMT 9 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow, December 8 (XINHUA) -- Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh Monday condemned U.S. abandonment of the SALT-2 treaty of 1979 as "an unprecedented offensive step." Speaking at a press conference, Bessmertnykh said that by breaching the SALT-2 agreement Washington appears to want "to commit future administrations to an arms race."

The SALT-2 treaty was signed by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the late Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in 1979. Last week, however, the United States exceeded the limits of the treaty, which was never ratified by U.S. Congress, by putting into service its 131st B-52 bomber armed with cruise missiles without dismantling a Poseidon submarine.

Bessmertnykh told reporters that "the consequences of the recent occurrences in international strategic stability may hinder the further development of the world situation."

Bessmertnykh added that the Soviet Government would continue to observe the terms of SALT-1 and SALT-2 "for the time being" in a bid to offer a chance for the White House to "assess the consequences its action will bring in terms of U.S. security."

"I think that a lot will depend in this case on the conduct of the United States itself, and primarily how it behaves in the military-strategic arena," he continued.

Bessmertnykh also regarded that both the Soviet Union and the United States should adopt measures to halt the limitless increases of offensive strategic weapons in order to diffuse the current intense situation.

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CSO: 5200/4036

SALT/START ISSUES

XINHUA CITES USSR SPOKESMAN ON U.S. VIOLATION OF SALT II

OW272110 Beijing XINHUA in English 1912 GMT 27 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow, September 27 (XINHUA) -- The SALT II Treaty will be a mere scrap of paper when an American B-52 bomber with cruise missiles enters the service tomorrow, and Moscow is considering concrete countermeasures, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said today.

Deputy ministry spokesman Boris Pyadyshev told a news briefing the United States plans to break the 1979 SALT II limits tomorrow. This would inevitably exert a negative influence on superpower disarmament negotiations in Geneva.

The United States says the 131st B-52 bomber capable of carrying nuclear cruise missiles will be placed in operational status Friday.

Reports said U.S. President Ronald Reagan refused to retire outdated missiles to keep within the treaty limits on the number of warheads. The treaty was never ratified by the U.S. Senate, but the two superpowers agreed to abide by its provisions.

"The Soviet Government has already said that it will consider itself free of the corresponding measures of that treaty" if the United States exceeds SALT II weapons limits, Pyadyshev said.

The military balance between the two countries cannot be violated, the spokesman said, adding that the Soviet Defense Ministry "is thinking about what concrete, practical steps might be taken" in response to the U.S. move, though it is not in a hurry to do so.

Pyadyshev said the U.S. action "cannot help but influence most negatively the atmosphere in which Soviet-American contacts take place in the context of arms and forces reduction."

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CSO: 5200/4023

SALT/START ISSUES

BRIEFS

FRG MINISTER ON U.S. SALT STANCE--Federal Defense Minister Woerner has described the U.S. breach of the SALT II ceiling on limiting missile deployment as a signal to the Soviet Union. In an interview with Deutschlandfunk today, Woerner supported President Reagan's decision to break the treaty with the Soviet Union, which was not ratified in the United States, by deploying the 31st B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles. Woerner said the decision by Reagan, which was announced months ago, was preceded by a number of Soviet violations of the treaty. He added that Reagan's signal does not mean, however, that SALT II would be dispensed with altogether. [Text] [Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1200 GMT 3 Dec 86 LD] /9274

CSO: 5200/2469

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S AKHROMEYEV DISCUSSES SEPARATE EUROMISSILE ACCORD

AU260820 Paris AFP in English 0806 GMT 26 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow, Nov 26 (AFP) -- Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, Soviet deputy defence minister and chief-of-staff of the Red Army, said here Wednesday in a magazine interview that a separate agreement on short-range nuclear arms in Europe "is not impossible".

The marshal, interviewed by the West German weekly STERN, included in this category missiles with a range of 1,000 kms (600 miles) and tactical combat aircraft. But he stressed the links laid down by the Soviet Union between the three main disarmament issues -- strategic arms, medium range missiles and space weapons. This excluded all compromise over Soviet Euromissiles proposals put forward at the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik as long as Washington remained intransigent over its Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), described by Marshal Akhromeyev as "an offensive arm."

He pointed out that the Soviet Union was "capable of perfecting excellent counter-measures at less cost than SDI" which "would be of no use to the United States." He gave a broad hint that the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests, which ends January 1, 1987, would not be renewed.

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CSO: 5200/1123

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

COMMENTATOR SEES ZERO OPTION AS UNDESIRABLE FOR WESTERN EUROPE

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 3 Nov 86 p 8

[Article by Otto Verberne, commentator on East-West affairs: "'Zero Option' Must Be Eliminated Quickly -- European Allies Have Done Too Little About West German Concerns"]

[Text] At Gleneagles, Scotland, the European NATO countries unanimously endorsed President Reagan's position on disarmament at the summit meeting with party leader Gorbachev in Reykjavik. They rejected linking, as the Soviet Union has since the summit meeting, an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe (INF) and a Russian-American agreement on Reagan's strategic defense initiative (SDI) and want the near-agreement achieved in Iceland on the INF, which provides for a zero option, to be completed in Geneva.

If Moscow had hoped to be able to incite the European NATO countries to oppose Reagan's plans for a strategic defense system in space, then they were as yet wrong there. The West Europeans did not fall away from the American ally. Not that the European NATO countries are all that enthusiastic about SDI or believe that the space project will provide much greater security for Western Europe. Rather, they are taking into account the possibility that in the future, depending on the progress of the installations of space defense systems, the United States will be less concerned about West European security. This is not certain however. But it is true that the Americans will proceed with SDI and it looks as if they will not allow themselves to be deterred from it by the West Europeans.

More serious and more urgent is the situation on the INF front. It would be of the greatest importance here if the European allies were still to make an effort to correct the American negotiating position.

Linking

To West European security it makes a basic difference whether Washington sticks to the Reykjavik "zero option" (no Pershing II's, cruise missiles or SS-20's in Europe, 100 INF warheads in Asian Russia and in the United States), or returns to the pre-summit proposal which provided for the reduction of INF warheads in Europe not to zero, but to 100 on the NATO side and 100 on the Soviet side. In the latter case, the recently renewed linking of West European security to American security would remain untouched.

However, in case the zero option is implemented this linking will once again be undermined and Western Europe will end up in a situation similar to that in the late seventies. Then the European NATO countries would be faced not only with the conventional predominance of the Warsaw Pact, but also with the Soviet Union's hundreds of shorter range (SRINF) and short range (SNF) missiles. Specifically, the SS-22 and SS-23 missiles (range respectively 900 and 500 kilometers) recently deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, by means of which a substantial part of Western Europe could be put under political pressure.

The risks to the security of Western Europe related to the implementation of the Reykjavik zero option are universally recognized in government and military circles in the European capitals and at NATO in Brussels. Consequently, the European concerns were raised by, among others, the West Germans and the British at the NATO conference in Gleneagles. The French government, which was not represented in Scotland, also has reservations. In addition, Chancellor Kohl drew Reagan's attention in Washington to the West European objections. And yet, since the Reagan-Gorbachev summit the European NATO countries, at Gleneagles or elsewhere, have not had the courage to state unequivocally that the zero option is dangerous "and thus unacceptable." In this context, Pierre Lellouche referred (NRC HANDELSBLAD, 23 October 1986) to the upcoming elections in the Federal Republic and in Great Britain. At this time, the government leaders of both countries cannot afford to take a "more Reaganistic than Reagan" position.

Since Gleneagles, the reproach addressed to the FRG no longer seems fully justifiable to me. Rather, it is the other NATO countries which have failed. Especially the other countries where INF missiles are to be deployed, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands should have shown greater understanding for the West German concerns (which already had been expressed earlier this year) and, together with Bonn, should have tried to reach a common position in which the zero option is explicitly dropped.

Sticking Neck Out

Where is that West European cooperation? The West Germans did stick out their neck and clearly made known their objections to the zero option. But they will not be inclined too quickly to take a separate position on an extremely sensitive question such as the missile question. They do not want that. Not only with an eye on the elections. But also with an eye on Moscow. They did not want it in previous years either. Helmut Schmidt insisted that the intermediate-range missiles should not be deployed only in the Federal Republic, but also in other European NATO countries. Should and could the European partners not have done more about the West German objections? Did not the European allies leave Bonn out in the cold?

West Europeans can continue to keep their doubts and concerns about the development of European-American relations, specifically about the linking and un-linking of security relations between the United States and its allies. However, for the West Germans this means that there is little reason left to have a great deal of confidence in their fellow Europeans when it comes to defense.

Gleneagles, but also for example the British Labor Party congress in Blackpool, could give Bonn reason to fear that the Soviet threat will be considered increasingly rather than decreasingly from a national point of view in the West European countries. At the expense of adequate understanding and concern for the West German and a "linked" West European security.

Even though the Russian SS-22's are capable of reaching Great Britain, concern about shorter range missiles seems much less great there than in the FRG. The SS-23's and other short range missiles cannot reach British territory and London probably assumes that those weapons would not readily be used as a military instrument or as political pressure against the United Kingdom, which furthermore is a nuclear power in its own right. If it is up to Labor, England will be safe as long as Dunkirk has not fallen. The French, on the other hand, do not leave any doubt about the fact that even though West German security is of vital importance, for France the war will start only at the Rhine. Paris does not even seem inclined toward strong "conventional" military cooperation with the FRG. Helmut Schmidt recently complained about this in his farewell speech in the Bundestag.

Consequently, the government in Bonn has the greatest reason to become worried when American missiles are withdrawn from Europe. For Bonn, the American presence in the FRG, including the nuclear weapons, is still the best guarantee for West German security. At the same time, the NATO policy of deployment of American Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe is the most "European" defense policy in years. With this deployment, not only the FRG but also Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands (?) accept equal responsibility in guaranteeing a common security.

With regard to the possible withdrawal of all intermediate-range missiles the allies are now considering reducing their worries about the Russian SRINF by countering the SS-22's and SS-23's with the deployment of extra shorter range missiles in Western Europe. In Reykjavik the United States demanded an equal ceiling in East and West for this category of weapons in order to enable possible supplementary deployments. However, so far enthusiasm for this plan has been very slight.

Not Smart

It is not a good solution either. The likelihood is great that precisely because of their shorter range, all the new shorter range missiles would have to be stationed in the Federal Republic. While other countries would feel free of the INF, the West Germans would then be the only ones to have to digest new missiles. That is politically not smart.

But what is more serious is that, unlike the Pershing II's and the cruise missiles, missiles with a range of 1,000 kilometers or less are not a threat to the Soviet Union. In the current situation, there are equal risks for East and West in the area of INF, an equal extent of vulnerability. Western Europe is threatened by the Soviet Union's SS-20's, SS-22's and SS-23's, but the leaders in Moscow know that in case of aggression they run the risk of nuclear hits on the Soviet territory itself. If both NATO and the Warsaw Pact were to

exchange the longer range missiles for shorter range ones, this would mean that the Soviet Union would keep the means to put pressure on Western Europe. While the threat to their own Soviet territory would have been taken away. The result of this would be a clearly uneven level of security and an increased danger of war. Uneven security also among the European NATO countries. Relatively greater for England and France who have their own strategic-nuclear arsenal at their disposal. Relatively less for the Federal Republic as well as the Netherlands and Belgium.

Concepts such as "Rapallo," "Finlandization" or "Alleingang" [going it alone] are often raised when the subject of the FRG comes up. The current Federal government -- I am not talking about the SPD and the Greens -- can certainly not be accused of "Alleingang." It has followed a consistent Atlantic course. If the other NATO countries want to follow this course, then they must also seriously consider West German concerns. This applies not least to the Netherlands, which has so little reason to feel much more secure behind the backs of its eastern neighbors than those neighbors themselves. The West Germans must not end up standing alone.

The European NATO countries, especially the other deployment countries, should now together with Bonn quickly find the courage to express themselves unequivocally against the European zero option.

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CSO: 5200/2449

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA CITES TASS ON U.S. MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

OW282225 Beijing XINHUA in English 1914 GMT 28 Nov 86

["TASS Raps Deployment of New U.S. Missile in South Korea" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Moscow, November 28 (XINHUA) -- The official Soviet news agency TASS today said Washington should bear full responsibility for the consequences of deploying "Lance" missiles in South Korea.

On November 14, the U.S. Defense Department and the U.S. Eighth Army Command in South Korea announced that a battery of "Lance" missiles would be deployed in the U.S. Second Division District near the military demarcation line in a few months.

The deployment of "Lance" theater missiles in South Korea has further increased international tension and was a provocative act to the demand for a halt to the nuclear arms race, TASS said in a statement. The statement said in the past the United States deployed hundreds of nuclear munitions and numerous delivery systems in South Korea.

The "Lance" missile is said to be a new, land-based weapon capable of launching neutron and other nuclear warheads and chemical weapons.

The U.S. action runs contrary to Washington's pledge to help solve regional conflicts and constitutes a new obstacle to Korean people's efforts to peacefully reunify their country, the TASS statement said.

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CSO: 5200/4027

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA REPORTAGE: DPRK ENVOY ON U.S. DECISION TO DEPLOY MISSILES

OW091114 Beijing XINHUA in English 1105 GMT 9 Dec 86

["DPRK Ambassador Condemns U.S. Decision on Missile Deployment in South Korea" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, December 9 (XINHUA) -- Sin In-ha, ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to China, condemned the U.S. decision to deploy "Lance" missiles in South Korea at a press conference he held here today.

He said this constitutes a challenge to the Korean people and the people the world over, who long for peace free from any nuclear threat and are making strenuous efforts to check the arms race.

"We will, as always, adhere to our banner of independence, friendship and peace and close our ranks with all peace-loving forces, so as to contribute to the peace in Asia and the rest of the world," he said.

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CSO: 5200/4035

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA NOTES DPRK PROTEST OVER 'LANCE' MISSILES

OW252300 Beijing XINHUA in English 1656 GMT 25 Nov 86

[Text] Pyongyang, November 25 (XINHUA) -- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) today protested the U.S. attempt to bring "Lance" missiles into South Korea, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported today.

The protest was contained in a letter sent to his U.S. counterpart by Yi Tae-ho, senior member of the Korean-Chinese side to the Korean Military Armistice Commission.

On November 14, the U.S. Defense Department and the U.S. Eighth Army Command in South Korea officially announced that a battery of "Lance" missiles would be deployed in the U.S. Second Division District near the military demarcation line in a few months.

The "Lance" missile, Yi said, is a mobile ground-to-ground strategic missile. It is a mass destruction weapon capable of launching neutron and other nuclear warheads and chemical weapons.

This is a challenge to the Korean people striving for national reunification, for the establishment of a nuclear-free and peaceful Korea, and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, he pointed out.

He demanded that the United States stop immediately its plan to ship "Lance" missiles into South Korea in accordance with the armistice agreement.

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CSO: 5200/4025

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET DELEGATE ADDRESSES CD CHEMICAL WEAPON TALKS

LD242101 Moscow TASS in English 1754 GMT 24 Nov 86

[Text] Geneva November 24 TASS -- Another round of multilateral talks on banning chemical weapons began here today within the framework of the disarmament conference. The objective of the talks is to work out a convention that would ban and abolish this extremely dangerous type of weapon of mass annihilation. In the opinion of many delegates, the talks are entering their closing stage. This is largely due to a number of major initiatives advanced by the Soviet Union during 1986.

Viktor Israelyan, head of the Soviet delegation, addressing the opening of the round presented the latest proposals on measures to prevent the production of chemical weapons in the commercial industry. This was one of the principal issues on which the sides reached no agreement so far.

The Soviet proposals provide for the determination of definite regimes of restrictions and control with regard to the four categories of chemicals the production of which for purposes permitted by the future convention deserves special attention.

The first category includes the most dangerous extra-toxic lethal chemicals possessing a complex of properties intrinsic in warfare agents and substances making up key components of binary chemical systems.

Each participating state will be able to produce them in the volume limited to one ton a year at one specialized facility given permanent international control.

The second category includes extra-toxic lethal chemicals which are not warfare agents. Their production could be carried out without qualitative restrictions in the conditions of systematic on-site inspections.

It is proposed to include in the third category so-called key precursors of extra-toxic lethal chemicals, that is substances involved in a one-stage chemical process of producing end toxins. The Soviet proposals provide for permanent control in respect to facilities producing such precursors in considerable amounts.

Finally, the fourth category comprises substances which are widely used for peaceful purposes but can also be used for purposes of chemical weapons. Their production could be controlled by way of on-site inspections at request. The Soviet proposals also provide for measures to prevent the use of multi-purpose production facilities, laboratories, scientific research institutions and test sites for the development of chemical weapons.

The head of the Soviet delegation stressed the need for the adoption of legislative, administrative and other measures which would preclude circumvention of the ban on the production and development of chemical weapons through transnational corporations.

Circles at the conference note the business-like, concrete character of the Soviet proposals. Many delegations draw attention to the strictness of the Soviet-proposed measures for international control which make it possible to guarantee compliance with provisions of the future convention by all its participants. At the same time, it is widely recognized that the Soviet proposals are characterized by compromise and take into account the interests of other nations.

The Geneva talks will continue until December 17.

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CSO: 5200/1125

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR DENIES UN CHARGE OF CW IN AFGHANISTAN

AFP Version

AU130915 Paris AFP in English 0910 GMT 13 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow, Nov 13 (AFP) — The Soviet news agency NOVOSTI Thursday denied allegations in a United Nations (U.N.) report Wednesday that Soviet troops were using chemical weapons in Afghanistan.

The agency, citing an unnamed Soviet military official, said evidence in Austrian jurist Felix Ermacora's report of the use of poison gas, napalm and phosphorous bombs was the work of Afghan rebels armed with U.S. weapons.

he official said: "In our operations against the rebels in several Afghan provinces we have seized a large number of chemical shells, mines, grenades and bullets containing highly toxic substances, some of them designed to paralyse through the nervous system.

"Markings on the weapons indicate that they were made in the United States after 1980. We know American instructors in training camps inside Pakistan have been teaching the terrorists to use chemical weapons. Some of the instructors have also got into Afghanistan."

NOVOSTI said the Soviet Union strictly observed a 1925 convention on chemical weapons, which it said had been confirmed by a U.N. special commission headed by an Egyptian general.

TASS Version

LD121720 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1520 GMT 12 Nov 86

["Who Uses Chemical Weapons in Afghanistan?" — TASS headline]

[Text] Kabul, 12 Nov (TASS) — "The United States and not the USSR uses chemical weapons in Afghanistan, [no end quotes as received] stated the representative of the Command of the Limited Soviet Military Contingent in DRA here today. In an interview to the correspondent of the NOVOSTI press agency, he called the reports of ASSOCIATED PRESS and REUTER that the Soviet troops have allegedly used chemical weapons in the Paghman region (Kabul province) "the latest lie in the series of falsehoods put about recently by Western news services."

"The Soviet Armed Forces, unlike the American forces, did not ever use chemical weapons anywhere and did not hand them to anyone. The USSR firmly and steadfastly adheres to the articles of the 1925 Geneva protocol on banning the use of chemical poisonous gases. This is confirmed by the conclusions of the special UN commission, which recognized as groundless all U.S. 'evidence' about the use of poisonous gases by the Soviet troops in Afghanistan," said the Soviet representative.

"At the same time we have at our disposal a sufficient quantity of chemical shells, mines, grenades and bullets filled with highly toxic combat substances, including some with neuromuscular effects, seized from bandit bands when these were routed in various parts of the country. Markings preserved on them show that they were manufactured in the United States after 1980. We are also well aware that U.S. instructors train terrorists in how to handle chemical weapons, in special camps on Pakistani territory. There is no doubt that, in supplying chemical weapons to Afghan counterrevolutionary bands, the United States is promoting uncontrolled proliferation of them," the spokesman for the military command stressed.

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CSO: 5200/1125

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR MEDIA ON U.S. CBW ACTIVITIES

U.S. Biological Weapons Research

LD131949 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English 1400 GMT 13 Nov 86

[Text] The United States Defense Department this year allocated \$42 million on research and development of various types of bacteriological weaponry. The corporation (?Marconi) is to carry out research and development into a deadly virus of the rare and quick-acting Rift Valley fever. The Pentagon's secret bacteriological center in Fort Detrick is particularly notorious, whose laboratories are responsible for the leakage of the virus causing the incurable disease AIDS, with this giving rise to a sharp outbreak of the disease among the American and, it was observed, among residents in other countries who live close to the Pentagon bases there.

The United States centers who specialize in developing bacteriological weaponry are spread throughout the world. One of these is sited in the Pakistani city of Lahore, where under the veil of combatting malaria, American experts on assignment from the CIA and the Pentagon conduct research on developing new types of bacteriological weaponry including (?those) causing grave mental disorders. Local residents meanwhile are being used as guinea pigs by researchers at the Lahore center with over 500 residents of Lahore who suffer from yellow fever, jaundice and mental disorders falling victim to criminal experiments. The Indian weekly BLITZ reports since 1980 Lahore has become the center for breeding particularly dangerous species of mosquitoes to be used against the population in Afghanistan. Attempts at using these to cause an outbreak of encephalitis among Afghan and Pakistani nomadic tribes have been made public. The outbreak of a hitherto unknown epidemic was registered over a year ago in the Indian state, Rajasthan. The Indian bacteriologists arrived at the conclusion that virus-infected mosquitoes were the specific carriers of the infection. Experts believe these insects had been prepared at the bacteriological center in Lahore.

The Pentagon continues research on developing new types of bacteriological weaponry despite the fact that the existing stockpiles are ample enough to kill humanity dozens of times over. The U.S. military cynically describes the bacteriological weaponry as the weaponry of the future and believes it to be among the most cost-paying, since in their estimate its production cost in quantities sufficient to kill one individual is from 30 to 40 times less than that of same amount of other weapons. [as heard].

U.S. 'Chemical Refurbishment'

LD251840 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1205 GMT 25 Nov 86

[Text] Washington, 25 Nov (TASS) -- Over the next decade the United States is planning to spend \$12.4 billion on the chemical refurbishment of its Armed Forces, reports the DEFENSE NEWS weekly. The Pentagon intends to spend \$8 billion of this sum on equipping Army subunits with modern equipment for staging military operations using chemical warfare. Also, \$2.5 billion will be allocated for purchasing some of the most up-to-date types of chemical weapons, including so-called binary ammunition, as well as the means for its delivery.

Thus, under the cover of hypocritical statements by the Washington administration to the effect that a total ban of such weapons is its "primary task," the United States is in fact actively continuing to prepare for warfare in which this mass destruction weapon would be applied. DEFENSE NEWS gives evidence that the Pentagon strategists are drawing up plans for the application of chemical weapons in Europe.

To justify these plans the leaders of the Pentagon are resorting to false references to a certain "weakness" of the United States in this sphere. But, U.S. chemical arsenals already have as many as 3 million ammunition units containing a total of 150,000 metric tons of poisonous substances. Soon there will be added a decision on the production of binary ammunition, which the White House achieved from Congress after a lengthy campaign of pressure and intimidation with "the Soviet military threat." In particular, in a special message to Congress, President Reagan alleged that the European NATO countries had approved plans for deploying this new generation of chemical weapons on their territory should a "critical situation" arise. This was one of the conditions for Congress agreeing to its production. But in reality, the defense ministers of the NATO countries had only "taken note of" the U.S. plans.

U.S. Chemical Modernization

LD252012 Moscow TASS in English 1912 GMT 25 Nov 86

[Text] Moscow November 25 TASS -- TASS Political Observer Vasiliiy Kharkov writes:

The Pentagon is going to spend 12.4 billion dollars in the coming years on chemical weapons. The American weekly DEFENSE NEWS which reported it on Monday specified where exactly the money would go.

Thus, 8 billion dollars will be allocated for equipping Army units with all that is necessary for combat operations with the use of chemical weapons. 2.5 billion dollars will be spent on the purchasing of new types of chemical weapons, including binary ones.

The weekly DEFENSE NEWS deals with military issues, and the information that it gives shows the striving of the Pentagon to modernize and build up U.S. chemical arsenals. This striving is even more alarming today, because a regular round of talks on the banning of chemical weapons that started in Geneva within the framework of the disarmament conference could bring them to a concluding stage.

The USSR comes out for the complete elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial basis for their production as soon as possible, which was reaffirmed in the large-scale

disarmament program put forward by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on January 15. Late the USSR took steps specifying provisions of the program that refer to chemical weapons. The USSR which strives for the early banning and scrapping of these mass destruction weapons attaches much importance to the creation of an effective and reliable verification system.

On November 24 the Soviet delegation put forward at the Geneva conference new proposals on measures for preventing the production of chemical weapons in the commercial industry. This is one of the most important problems on which accord has not been achieved so far at the talks on drawing up an international convention. Soviet proposals are of a compromise nature. They take into account the ideas expressed earlier by some other participants in the talks. Thus, they open up the way to the early coordination of all the provisions of the convention and its further signing.

However, this way is being blocked by Washington's striving to modernize its chemical arsenals. In this context it is difficult to understand some of the statements made in the West and obviously encouraged by Washington to the effect that before scrapping nuclear weapons it is necessary to clarify the situation with chemical and conventional weapons. Soviet proposals on this package of problems have been put on the negotiating table. It is for Washington and its NATO allies to respond to them.

Binary Munitions in UK

LD290437 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 28 Nov 86

[Text] The first consignments of equipment for storing and servicing American binary nerve munitions have been delivered to the United States Air Force Base in Greenham Common. Here is a commentary by our military observer Aleksandr Vasilyev, and this is what he writes:

The United States is poised to deploy a new kind of mass extermination weapon known as binary weapons in Britain. Bigeye binary air bombs are to be carried by United States F-111 fighter bombers stationed in Britain. The bombs release a highly toxic agent only upon explosion, but this makes them no less deadly. One milligram of the agent is enough to cause one fatality and the potential release of the binary agent on the scale of the present deployment will be greater by far.

The Pentagon's chemical factories in Pine Bluff in the United States manufacture more than 70,000 binary bombs and shells a year. Fifteen more plants, mothballed for the time being, may be recommissioned at any moment.

Washington has gone out of its way to assure the world that binary weapons are to be stored in the United States and shipped to Europe only in the event of an international crisis. In a bid to conceal its true intentions, Washington recently demanded that London impose strict limitations on the presence of British newsmen outside American military bases in Britain, but the truth has come out anyway. General Bernard Rogers, the commander in chief of the NATO forces in Europe, said bluntly that binary weapons were designed for use in Europe at the very start of military operations. The threat facing the Europeans under such circumstances defies the imagination. They will be

doomed to a horrible death in the binary gas chamber, while those who inflict it upon them will be across the ocean.

Britain has become the first NATO country where preparations have started for the deployment of the new American chemical weapons. This comes as no surprise, since Britain's leadership has to all intents and purposes submitted its foreign policies to America's aggressive course and supported unconditionally United States war preparations and acts of piracy on the world scene. Recent pronouncements of the Tory government on the commitments to reducing and scrapping chemical weapons appear to be hypocritical against that background. The responsibility for the consequences of the deployment of new American chemical weapons in Britain rests squarely with the United States administration. Politicians in Britain who are ready to trade in chemical death in order to please Washington will not be able to evade it either.

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CSO: 5200/1125

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: COMMENTARY SCORES TEHRAN ALLEGATIONS OF CBW USE

NC191054 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1700 GMT 18 Nov 86

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] A spokesman for the limited Soviet contingent in Afghanistan has stated in Kabul that, unlike the American Armed Forces, the Soviet military has never used chemical weapons, nor has it ever supplied these weapons to anyone. This statement was made in response to false Western allegations on the use of chemical weapons by the limited Soviet contingent in the DRA. These accusations and fabrications are also being disseminated by the Iranian mass media. For example, Radio Tehran recently reported that Soviet forces used toxic chemicals in Kabul, allegedly resulting in civilians' being poisoned. The objective of these reports is obviously to mislead Iran's public and to malign the Soviet people's devoted assistance to the friendly Afghan people in thwarting outside aggression.

Facts are available about actual use of toxic chemicals in Afghanistan, but the ones using them are the Afghan counterrevolutionary groups sent into Afghan territory from Pakistan and Iran. In addition, everyone knows which Western companies manufacture lethal gases.

The statement by the spokesman for the limited Soviet contingent in Kabul indicates that the Soviet forces have various types of U.S. chemical weapons on hand which were confiscated from rebel groups in Afghanistan. Former counter-revolutionaries who have surrendered to the DRA and captured insurgents have stated on several occasions that U.S. instructors teach the use of chemical weapons in special camps near Pakistan's Peshawar. Foreign instructors endorse use of these weapons, primarily against civilians. They also want them to be used in such a way that the Afghan Armed Forces and the limited Soviet contingent can be blamed.

The U.S. imperialists have repeatedly used chemical weapons against peoples struggling for their freedom and independence, as during the aggression against the Indochinese. It was also revealed and proven that the U.S. commandos who attempted the disgraceful landing near Tabas in April 1980 were armed with chemical weapons, to be used in Iran.

Radio Tehran's efforts to lift the blame for the use of chemical weapons from the shoulders of the perpetrators and their associates and place it on others proves that Tehran does not want to normalize relations with the DRA and that they are trying to justify their participation in the undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan.

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CSO: 5200/1125

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

IZVESTIYA REBUTS CLAIMS OF NERVE GAS SUPPLIED TO LIBYA

PM011551 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Nov 86 Morning Edition p 4

[D. Pilyatskin "Rejoinder": "On Nervous Ground"]

[Text] The scandalous story involving covert weapon supplies to Iran has caused America's NATO partners to ask a number of questions. "The most difficult question to answer is how the U.S. allies, and Britain in particular, should react to this frightening spectacle of American stupidity, duplicity, and incompetence," Britain's SUNDAY TELEGRAPH asks.

How, indeed? Especially if you bear in mind that this whole outburst of righteous indignation can be directed at London itself. According to a report in that same newspaper, arms and ammunition have been regularly supplied from London to Tehran. This is where the SUNDAY TELEGRAPH rushes to the Thatcher government's aid.

Simon Russell, the newspaper's defense correspondent, stunned readers with a sensation recently. It turns out that Libya has received missile warheads "containing lethal nerve gas" from the Soviet Union. You need more? The man in the street is being frightened by talk that Syria has chemical weapons, too.

Proof? There is none, although that does not inconvenience Russell. He cites the CIA's "suspicion," which "has been confirmed in the last few weeks by the British intelligence services, who traced (!) the source of the nerve agent back to the Soviet Union." And that is that.

This fabricated lie is so patent that it remained the exclusive monopoly of the SUNDAY TELEGRAPH -- no other respectable London newspaper repeated Russell's story. But Britain's airwaves were contaminated. This was the work of the BBC, which clearly decided that the patented "toxic nerve agent" would distract listeners from the somber thoughts about the U.S.-British "Irangate."

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CSO: 5200/1125

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

TASS: ROMANIAN ARMS CUTS IN SPIRIT OF WARSAW PACT APPEAL

LD251936 Moscow TASS in English 1920 GMT 25 Nov 86

[Text] Bucharest November 25 TASS -- A referendum, held in the Socialist Republic of Romania on November 23, approved the initiative for reducing by five per cent Romania's armaments, troops and military spending.

At the conference of the Political Consultative Committee in Budapest on June 10-11, 1986 the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation are known to have proposed drastic mutual cutbacks in the armed forces and armaments of the military-political alliances confronting each other in Europe.

These proposals, once realized, would cut the two alliances' land forces and tactical strike aviation by approximately 25 per cent as against the current level, that is by half a million people on either side. The reductions would be accompanied with the respective drop in the states' military spending.

The United States and its NATO allies have failed to respond to this initiative so far, as well as to the proposal that contacts be established between the working groups of the two military-political alliances to consider in detail the issues of the mutual reduction of the armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

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CSO: 5200/1152

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

MOSCOW PRAISES FINNISH PRESIDENT'S NORDIC CSBM PROPOSALS

LD160510 Moscow International Service in Finnish 1700 GMT 15 Nov 86

[Article by correspondent Yuriy Andreyev]

[Text] The Soviet Union has given its support to the initiative of the President of the Republic of Finland, Mauno Koivisto, for measures to strengthen confidence in northern Europe as well as to reduce the activity of naval forces in the area. This initiative has received great and positive attention in Sweden, Norway and elsewhere in Scandinavia.

The initiative presented by the President of the Republic of Finland, Mauno Koivisto, and the proposal made 23 years ago by President Urho Kekkonen for the establishment of a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone are based on the same premise: It is an attempt to promote peace and strengthen stability in northern Europe. It is also an attempt to create new attitudes on the questions of war and peace in the age of the nuclear missiles, and it has been stated that all these problems can be resolved politically. Only in this way is real security guaranteed in this area.

Mauno Koivisto's proposals for measures to strengthen confidence in northern Europe follow the [words indistinct] of the proposals observed in the final act of the Helsinki CSCE and the Stockholm conference that followed. It will be recalled that in the final act of the CSCE one of the most important measures in the field of confidence is [words indistinct] the necessity of influencing the spread of the danger of nuclear conflicts.

As is known, at the Stockholm conference the Soviet Union submitted proposals for limiting military activity in Europe and the seas and airspace around it. The United States and other NATO countries opposed the discussion of these questions in the first stage of the Stockholm Conference. In order to reach agreement on the first resolution at Stockholm, the Soviet Union agreed to transfer the discussion of these questions to the second stage of the conference. The relevance of confidence-building measures in the seas around Europe remains, it has even grown with regard to the seas bordering Northern Europe.

Last June, the Norwegian minister of defense told the Storting that the activity of naval forces in the North Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean had increased, which cannot but cause concern. In the name of preventing military conflicts, Foreign Minister Frydenlund urged an investigation into the question of reaching an agreement between coastal nations and those nations that have military activities in the northern seas. A similar idea was presented in November by Minister of Defense Holst. Foreign Minister Vaeyrynen has also said that Northern Europe needs far-reaching confidence-building measures.

Speaking of the Soviet Union, it must be said that it submitted a proposal in the United Nations, in 1984 on limiting the concentration of naval forces. This concerns measures in general as well as agreements concerning particular areas, such as the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and these proposals are still valid. It is obvious that all measures concerning the activity of naval forces and their armaments should be carried out in accordance with the principle of not damaging the security of others.

President of the Republic Mauno Koivisto rightly said that confidence-building measures in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans would be useful to the security of all parties, including peoples of northern Europe. We can now speak of many Finnish initiatives for increasing confidence in northern Europe. These include the proposal for establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons, for ensuring peace in Finnish and Norwegian border areas, the proposal for banning the use of long-range sea and air missiles in the region, and last, the restricting of military activity in sea areas. Naturally, the realization of these constructive proposals in the part of Europe where at the moment the tension is relatively low compared with other parts of the continent would contribute to creating a stable situation and mutual confidence throughout the continent.

By promoting this kind of development, the Soviet Union saw it as feasible to undertake the following measures: The Soviet Union has removed from the Kola Peninsula the launching devices of medium-range missiles, and a large proportion of these launching devices from the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts, in northwestern Soviet Union. Many operative tactical divisions have been removed from this area, said Yegor Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee in Helsinki. He said that these measures were taken to complement the Soviet Union's position, and as a continuation of the support for the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Northern Europe. Yegor Ligachev went on to say that the Soviet Union could withdraw its submarines equipped with ballistic missiles from the Baltic if agreement is reached on the nonnuclear state of this sea. The Soviet Union hopes that all who are interested in strengthening peace in northern Europe will look favorably upon these proposals.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1146

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

PACT GROUP DEBATES MBFR--Sofia, 19 Nov (TASS)--A meeting of the working group of experts of the Warsaw Treaty member countries on the reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe was held here on 18 November. The meeting discussed various aspects of the implementation of the program of the reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe set forth in the Budapest appeal of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member countries to the NATO countries and to all the countries of Europe. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1837 GMT 19 Nov 86 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1152

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PAPER DISCUSSES ADVANCES IN NUCLEAR-TEST DETECTION

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 20 Nov 86 p 13

[Article by Technology Correspondent Roger Highfield]

[Text]

IS IT possible to detonate a Hiroshima-sized nuclear bomb without anyone knowing about it?

The Foreign Office thinks so, based on its knowledge of how to disguise nuclear blasts and its estimates of the capabilities of detection technology. However, a critique of the Government's case by leading scientists in the field, which will be published in the journal "Modern Geology" on Friday, says it is highly unlikely that "cheating" could go undetected.

A comprehensive test ban treaty is a long-term policy aim of the Government, but the question of cheating is fundamental to the Government's position on negotiating, let alone imposing, such a ban.

Baroness Young stated on behalf of the Government in a debate on nuclear arms: "It would be premature for substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test ban to be resumed while the outstanding technical problems remain unresolved."

The basis for the Government's argument is a document called CD/610. Reading this document, which until now has not been readily available, it is clear that geology is the heart of this superpower issue.

The editor of "Modern Geology", Dr Beverly Halstead of Reading University, has ensured the paper is available to the scientific community by publishing it, for "if there is to

be an informed debate...it is time working scientists actively participated in these discussions".

In CD/610 the Government raises two basic problems in forensic seismology: identifying the shock waves that radiate from an underground nuclear blast among the background seismic noises caused by wind, industrial and domestic activity, thermal stresses and the movement of the oceans; and distinguishing between a blast and an earthquake.

This is not helped by cheating. At test sites in Nevada (where Britain and the US carry out tests), East Kazakhstan, Semipalatinsk, and Novaya Zemlya (Soviet Union) the nuclear blast can be muffled or "decoupled" and disguised in various ways:

- The shock wave generated by an underground test is cut by up to 10-fold by detonating the bomb in fine sands rather than hard rock.

- The "hide-in-earthquake" scenario in which the bomb is detonated in the tail of one of the 8,000 or so earthquakes that occur annually. Otherwise, a series of bombs can be detonated in succession to mimic the seismic signature of an earthquake.

- The bomb is detonated in a "Big Hole", an underground cavern, which can cut the shock waves by up to 100-fold.

After a review of seismic detection technology and our

ability to interpret seismic data, CD/610 concluded: "Monitoring at teleseismic ranges by itself would be insufficiently effective to permit a test ban to be brought into force." It estimated that a test of some tens of kilotons (a kiloton is the equivalent of 1000 tons of TNT) could occur without detection.

However, we should be "much more optimistic", according to Prof. Lynn Sykes, of the Lamont Doherty Geological Observatory of Columbia University, New York, who was part of the US delegation that negotiated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1974 (this limits tests to 150 kilotons) and who comments on CD/610 in "Modern Geology".

The Government's case sounds like a slightly modified version of a 15-year-old case, says Prof. Sykes, which he finds strange given the UK's "outstanding research on test ban verification for 30 years".

Indeed CD/610 assumes the Soviets would not accept independent seismic monitoring stations on their own soil, something which they agreed in principle in 1980.

This would push verification of bomb tests from 10 to one kiloton according to Prof. Sykes. By comparison, the bomb used on Hiroshima in 1945 was 20 kilotons, so a one-kiloton test would be of little military significance, according to Dr Richard Garwin, who helped develop the H-bomb.

Other points Prof. Sykes raises are:

- The deposits of fine sands in the Soviet Union are insufficient to soak up explosions of more than around two kilotons.

- An explosion in sand or gravel, or the collapse of a "Big Hole" may be visible to satellites. Indeed, DC/610 ignores satellites, which can resolve objects down to four inches.

- Satellites could spot the excavation of holes—the volume of material necessary to decouple just an eight kiloton bomb is around the volume of the largest Egyptian pyramid. The excavation would be a vast task,

- The paper largely ignores "tell tale" high-frequency shock waves sent out by nuclear tests, which can be detected with the latest equipment. One such seismic array, at present in operation in Norway, has detected "subkiloton" tests.

mic array, at present in operation in Norway, has detected "subkiloton" tests.

- A foolproof method is not necessary—a 90 per cent confidence limit of detecting a test is good enough, given that a series of tests is required to develop a new weapons system.

Much of what is said by Prof. Sykes is echoed by Dr Jeremy Leggett, of Imperial College's department of Geology, in a second critique. For policy makers little-versed in the technical details, CD/610 he said "may be seriously misleading".


He adds that most of the 8,000 "confusing" earthquakes fall outside the Soviet Union, and, of those in the USSR, most are too deep to be confused with weapons.

In spite of the negative tone of CD/610, certain techniques

are highlighted as a potential means for verification. However, according to Dr Leggett, the British Government, unlike the American, has never disclosed how much research is invested in tackling this problem.

Perhaps the most telling point made by both Dr Leggett and Prof. Sykes against the Government's technical case concerns the change in negotiating position of its US ally.

After more than 25 years of claiming that a lack of adequate verification impeded the test ban treaty, the US Government has changed its tune. The Reagan Administration now argues that nuclear tests are essential to test the shelf-life of existing nuclear weapons to ensure they are safe and reliable.



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RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV ON DISARMAMENT IN FOREWORD TO BOOK FOR INDIA

LD231151 Moscow TASS in English 1128 GMT 23 Nov 86

[Excerpts] New Delhi November 23 TASS -- A ceremony on the occasion of the publication of the book "Peace Has No Alternative" by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was held in the presidential palace here today. The book is a collection of recent speeches, articles and interviews by Mikhail Gorbachev. It was issued by the Delhi "Patriot publishers". Taking part in the ceremony of presenting the book to the Indian public were Zail Singh, president of India, Narayan Dutt Tiwari, minister of external affairs, prominent politicians and public figures of the republic.

In the foreword specially written for this book and addressed to the Indian reader Mikhail Gorbachev writes:

"Dear friends,

This book includes my recent speeches, articles and interviews. I hope that they will also be of interest to Indian readers.

Quite a few pages of this book are devoted to foreign-policy issues. This is natural. The mountains of weapons stockpiled in the world have led to a situation where humanity finds itself at a point beyond which lies the total ruin of civilization and the turning of our planet into a radioactive wasteland.

This danger imperatively places before all nations and all political and public circles the need to feel profoundly that this is the moment of truth, and to finally start learning -- and quickly -- the great science of living together, respecting the social, political and ideological choice of every people.

The outgoing year of 1986 has been rich in actions and initiatives aimed at radically improving the international situation. We are inspired by the fact that in this most needed and most important work for peace, the Soviet Union and India have acted both in parallel and jointly.

Was it possible to achieve a dramatic turn for the better already in this year? We answer this question in the affirmative. This was shown by Reykjavik and the agreements that became outlined there. But Reykjavik also showed another thing -- new thinking continues to clash with old concepts about one's position in the world and misconceptions about the intentions and capabilities of other members of the international community.

No, neither the force of inertia nor the pipedreams of rising to military superiority -- if not on earth, then in space -- have receded into the past. This means that it is necessary to keep on struggling with redoubled efforts for the sake of a peaceful future for all countries and peoples.

The developing countries, in which more than two thousand million people live, have an important role to play in the fight against the threat of war. Here I would like particularly to stress the role of the great country of India in this noble cause. Suffice it to recall the well-known initiatives of the Delhi Six and your country's fruitful activities in the Non-Aligned Movement.

We share India's concern about the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. For its part, the Soviet Union supports the idea of this huge area becoming a region of peace and cooperation. To this end, our country is ready for wide-ranging cooperation with all states in Asia and the Pacific region.

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CSO: 5200/1134

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW: ROUND TABLE ON DISARMAMENT, TESTING, SDI, EUROMISSILES

LD240156 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 23 Nov 86

["International Observers Round table" program chaired by Igor Pavlovich Charikov, All-Union Radio foreign policy commentator; with Aleksandr Nikolayevich Antsiferov, international affairs journalist; and Viktor Aleksandrovich Tsoppi, member of the editorial board of NOVOYE VREMYA]

[Excerpts] [Charikov] Hello, esteemed comrades! One of the most important events of coming week may certainly be considered to be the upcoming visit by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the Republic of India.

In the political sphere, the standpoints of our countries either coincide or else are very close. Rajeshwar Rao, general secretary of the National Council of the Indian Communist Party, published an article in the NEW AGE magazine that says the following: Of great significance is the broad program for ensuring international security and cooperation in the Asian-Pacific area, which was formulated in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok. Cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and with all peace-loving Asian states in the name of ensuring peace and cooperation in Asia and Oceania accords with the national interests of our country.

[Antsiferov] Here too I think that one should not fail to mention the fact that Delhi, the Indian capital, has given its name to an entire political concept, which is highly popular at the present time. I have in mind the Delhi Six. The Delhi Six and its political activities have brought together the long-term political interests of a whole group of countries -- a very large number of countries -- well-known in political terminology as the nonaligned states and as the Nonaligned Movement. If we look at the motives and the demands of the situation that existed in the world, say, 20 years ago -- that is, if we closely view the origins of the Nonaligned Movement -- we shall see that aspirations for peace and support for the ideas of disarmament, peaceful coexistence and good-neighborliness were characteristic of the movement right from the start. But whereas at the beginning of their existence, say, 20 to 25 years ago, the nonaligned countries laid particular emphasis on issues connected with decolonization and development of national economies, national infrastructures, national cultures, and so on and so forth, there is now the totally clear-cut and unambiguous formulation of the political demands, without whose fulfillment it has proved, and they understand this -- it has proved impossible to fulfill the demands of an economic nature or

demands, say, affecting the national and regional interests of countries. The Delhi Six, as a paramount demand -- or rather not as a demand but as one of the most important conditions for giving the fullest effect to, and defending the interests of the nonaligned countries -- has been putting forward the issue of disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament.

It is not by chance that the leaders of the Delhi Six in their appeal to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev approve of and support the Soviet Union's initiative in proclaiming a unilateral moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons; it is not by chance that they have addressed the same appeal to U.S. President Reagan to join in the Soviet moratorium; it is not by chance that the Delhi Six has been advocating the implementation of the idea of universal and total disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament.

[Tsoppi] I think that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to India will certainly encompass all those problems that not only have to do with our bilateral relations but are also of global significance. This is shown by the expectancy and the frame of mind with which the Soviet leader's visit to India is at present awaited. The HINDUSTAN TIMES, which is one of India's largest newspapers, has been saying that the Soviet leader's visit will have political, economic, and strategic -- note the word strategic -- consequences, which go far beyond the framework of bilateral relations. The Third World, which for brevity's sake is the name not very accurately given to the developing countries, is now proving more and more convincingly that it by no means wishes to reconcile itself to the role of an unnecessary third party. Great India, about which we have just been speaking, is an example of this, but it is not the only example. In short, I want to say that all peoples, wherever they might live, and all states have at the present time a host of reasons to actively struggle against the extremely big military danger that stems from the United States.

Perhaps as never before this danger became obvious to everyone during the past week. President Reagan made a speech at the ethics and public policy research center. The ethical value of this grandiose self-exposure surely lay in the fact that it provided splendid proof that Reagan and ethics are not related, or even acquainted, and that the policy of the present U.S. Administration is not burdened with any ethical views. There has never before been such malicious threats to deal with mankind as oneself saw fit -- and at any cost in blood. To all intents and purposes, Reagan has given up the very idea, let alone the practice, of peaceful coexistence, and has been announcing this in very coarse terms.

[Antisifervo] But perhaps this is just rhetoric.

[Tsoppi] No, this is a matter of deed, and the symptoms that we are detecting at the present time are, to speak bluntly, sinister. Well, take Reykjavik, for instance. Reykjavik -- what is that? Is roughly, I rather think, how the U.S. position looks at present. Were accords reached there with the Soviet Union? That didn't take place! There was nothing! Today Washington is arguing in roughly the same way that Naska shouted in Gorkiy's play, "The Lower Depths." No, there was nothing. There was nothing because as it has become clear the United States doesn't need this today.

[Charikov] But of course, not all of the United States.

[Tsoppi] Not all of the United States. I'm thinking of course of the administration. This is harmful both to the President and to his associates. Nothing of this is

necessary because it could lead to nuclear disarmament, to a peaceful world and to normal international relations! You see what a nightmare could take place! In a word, one must forget, sooner forget, about Reykjavik, and make the whole world forget about it. It's true that there are more than enough other causes for hysteria in Washington. For example: To justify armed aggression against Libya, the clever ideologists who work for the administration conducted a wide-scale campaign of disinformation about Libya. It ended with a shocking scandal.

[Charikov] And people were perfectly right when they said that as a whole the start of President Reagan's fall in prestige began after Reykjavik, when in essence they lied to the United States; when a people who very much placed grandiose hopes on this meeting were given a completely wrong account, with black being said to be white, and with everything being turned upside down. In essence, they deceived the people.

You know, recently, about 1 or 2 weeks ago, we broadcast a radio hookup between Vilnius and Milwaukee. I was a presenter at that time and you know, from the nature of the question the Americans asked, you could judge that generally they don't know anything about this. One participant -- unfortunately I don't remember the surname -- told us the following story, that some kind of scientist was supposed to visit him in the town of Milwaukee, which is a town in the State of Wisconsin, a scientist who worked as a contract employee for the U.S. Air Force for several years. He worked on some kind of new type of weaponry, and he was supposed to travel to Milwaukee in order to take about how pernicious the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative is not only for the United States but also for the whole world. Incidentally, I've heard that they've now rephrased it to the strategic burial initiative. So this scientist was supposed to hold a press conference in Milwaukee, where he was getting ready to talk about the grandiose danger inherent in this venture. And what do you think? The mass news media, in this case the ones in Milwaukee -- I don't know, it's as though it was at somebody's prompting, at somebody's command -- they instantly turned their backs on this person.

[Tsoppi] As though they had been gagged.

[Charikov] And all three major television networks -- ABC, NBC and CBS -- recalled their film crews, and this press conference was not shown. And this American, a participant in the radiobridge, a participant in the discussion, says: And we never did get to know what the Strategic Defense Initiative represents.

But let us return to Reykjavik. The Reykjavik meeting resulted in the U.S. allies in Europe also being forced to adopt a stance.

[Antsiferov] Altogether, the Reykjavik effect is, of course, a broad concept, if I may say so. And there are both the official allies, and then there are the populations of the states that belong to NATO. As far as the populations of the NATO states are concerned, an interesting tendency is discernible here. According to a recent public opinion poll carried out by the Emnid Institute in Bielefeld, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is currently more popular in the FRG than President Reagan.

[Charikov] It is not, of course, a question of the personal popularity of either one or the other, but it is clearly a question of...

[Tsoppi, interrupting] It is an assessment of their policies.

[Charikov] Yes, an assessment of their policies, their contribution to the tackling of the world's complicated political tasks mankind faces today. And that are faced by the American people and the peoples of Western Europe.

[Tsoppi] The whole point is that our policies, our diplomacy and our peaceful offensive are personified in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, who heads the...

[Antsiferov, interrupting] That is precisely the point. DER SPIEGEL says on the subject of the results of this opinion poll that they are sensational, and that the popularity of the U.S. President depends to a great extent on the U.S. policies directed toward a further increase in the arms race. The same polling institute established after Reykjavik that FRG citizens, when asked which country — the USSR or United States — demonstrates greater commitment to concluding disarmament agreements, voiced a perfectly clear and unambiguous preference for the Soviet Union. You can judge the degree to which this is unprecedented for the FRG if only by the fact that all these polls are conducted in a context of the most severe ideological pressure, in the context of the anti-Sovietism the bourgeois press disseminates in the FRG.

[Cherikov] Not without assistance from across the Atlantic, of course

[Antsiferov] Not without accompaniment, and at any rate...

[Tsoppi, interrupting] Not without the involvement of major statesmen in the FRG.

[Antsiferov] Quite right. But it seems to me that here, on this question, a major role has been played by the West German peace supporters' campaign. The country is just at the moment marking the anniversary — the word jubilee is not one I could bring myself to utter — the third anniversary of the adoption by the West German Bundestag of the decision to site U.S. Pershings and cruise missiles on the territory of West Germany. The West German public is marking this sombre and, I would add, ignominious anniversary with demonstrations, meetings and participation in symbolic blockades. The pitch of the protests remains as high as three years ago.

[Tsoppi] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, I remember that we were both working in Bonn at the time.

[Antsiferov] Quite right, and these events were unfolding before my very eyes. Now, as then, the pitch of the antiwar protests of the West German public is not abating.

If we call these blockades symbolic, or rather the demonstrators themselves call their actions, their blockades, symbolic, they are symbolic only in the sense that as a rule these are unarmed, peaceful participants in antiwar protests confronting the army and police, who are armed to the teeth, soldiers of the U.S. Army and a whole gang of plainclothes agents working for various intelligence agencies from both sides of the Atlantic.

[Tsoppi] I would like to add that members of the antiwar movements have become almost the main object of persecution by the authorities. This is because the authorities both in the United States, and, in this case, the FRG, see the antiwar movement as the main obstacle on the path to the attainment of their goals. Literally a few days ago a mass protest demonstration was held in the United States outside the offices of the Department of Energy, which controls, or rather carries out the program of nuclear blasts in Nevada. Around 200 participants in the demonstration were arrested just because they ventured to go out into the streets to demand that the government should halt nuclear tests and join the Soviet moratorium. Some of them held up the following slogan: We are ashamed to be American. Around 200 people were arrested because they were exercising a right enshrined in the Constitution. And literally at the same time a demonstration was under way near the nuclear test range in Nevada. And the participants of this demonstration were arrested in the same manner.

[Antsiferov] Generally speaking, repressions, as has been rightfully noted, are a typical reaction of those who hold power against the participants of the antiwar movement. Precisely for this reason I would like to stress that for participants in the antiwar movement these actions are not in any way symbolic.

[Tsoppi] These are active steps, of course.

[Antsiferov] Naturally, the blows they receive are not symbolic, their arrests are not symbolic at all either, nor are their prosecutions symbolic; and you cannot at all call symbolic those fines that they are forced to pay or else they will just be simply taken to the prison.

[Tsoppi] And this is because they are fighting against the decisions of their governments that are not at all symbolic but against decisions that are very dangerous.

[Antsiferov] Right. And against missiles which are not symbolic.

[Tsoppi] Yes, against missiles that are not symbolic, but quite concrete, real ones, loaded with nuclear devices.

[Antsiferov] Yes. But it is also necessary here, it seems to me, to take into consideration one very essential nuance. The actions of peace followers sometimes have, as it were, a mediating character in the development of the real political situation in their country. They have a mediating effect on the political situation. If, say, we observe the development of the political situation in the FRG, which I came to know while I was working in that country, I must note that the political face of the country has changed in many areas over the past years precisely thanks to the antiwar movement. And what has come of it? The antiwar movement itself, the demands for disarmament, and the demands to barring U.S. first strike nuclear arms from the territory of the country, turned out to be that very common denominator from which a whole political party arose. I mean the Greens...

[Charikov interrupts] Which is acquiring an increasingly large number of followers. Not only in the FRG.

[Antsiferov] Yes. If, say 7 or 8 years ago the Greens movement comprised large groups of the population but they were dispersed around various parts of the FRG and used to voice demands that were local in nature, like say, for environmental protection...

[Tsoppi]... Sometimes made by naive pacifists...

[Antsiferov] This is now a movement aware of its role, which is a political party. The main demand of this party in the area of politics and foreign policy in particular is precisely the demand for the rejection of the siting, and for the withdrawal, of all U.S. nuclear missiles from FRG territory.

And look what changes have taken place over the past few years within the Social Democratic Party, whose leadership in the past, so to speak, were the ringleaders of the U.S. plan for siting missiles in Europe. At present, however, they are opposing the FRG Government on this matter and advocating the withdrawal of the missiles from the territory of the country.

[Tsoppi] I would still like to get back for a minute to our dear Europe, since what is happening in the United States, what is happening in Soviet-U.S. relations, and what is

happening in the worldwide debate on the subject of whether the planet and all the living world on the planet should or should not exist -- all this is bound up with the fate of Europe. All this depends on how not only sensible people, world public opinion, public opinion of those countries that are the subject of our conversation here, and the public opinion of the FRG in particular, perceive all that is happening, but it also depends on the governments of these countries, unfortunately. It depends on them, but why unfortunately? Because if we observe now what sort of position the governments of the FRG, France, and Britain, all these countries have taken since Reykjavik, this position may seem very strange, illogical and inconsistent --although it has a logic of its own, of course.

Let us recall that when Reagan, in conditions quite different from the present ones, put forward his zero option, NATO's West European members applauded it tumultuously. But now, when an accord on scrapping both Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe has been reached in principle in Reykjavik, these same people, these same statesmen are loudly indignant and, I would say, are even lamenting from fear. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher went to Washington a few days ago to persuade Reagan to renounce everything that Reykjavik has led to, and judging by everything, she succeeded.

[Antsiferov] What I don't know is who was trying to persuade whom.

[Tsoppi] Yes. And in Washington the following connection can be traced: In Washington, as they heed these revelations, they justify their own rejection of the Reykjavik accords, they justify it by the fact that, as noble people, they can't ignore the interests of their allies. That's how imperialist solidarity, or, if you like, mutual assistance operates.

[Charikov] I would now like to summarize the outcome of our discussion. The situation in the world is strained, and all the same we are not going to plunge into despondency. We look to the future with optimism, and we merely believe that politics -- in the sense in which we have the word in mind -- is a sequence of efforts aimed at achieving our main goal, which was formulated in the CPSU program, in the materials of the recent CPSU congress, and in speeches by our leaders. On this, comrades, we end our program.

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CSO: 5200/1134

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S BOVIN ON SALT II, MORATORIUM ON TESTING

LD042122 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 4 Dec 86

[Bohumil Horak report on his interview with Aleksandr Bovin, "A leading Soviet foreign political commentator of the daily IZVESTIYA," carried on the "Magazine" program; date and place not specified; questions and answers in Russian with superimposed Czech translation of Bovin's replies -- recorded]

[Text] [Horak] First I asked Comrade Bovin: What are the perspectives of Soviet-U.S. relations after the Reagan government's violation of the SALT II agreement?

[Bovin] It is of course a negative phenomenon if we consider what the SALT I and SALT II agreements mean in the historic context. We can criticize these agreements, we can say that they are incomplete, but despite this they represented one of the basic frameworks which at least limited the arms race in some way. It is fundamentally negative (?when evaluating) Reagan's policy. We can therefore summarize by stating that this step breaks this restraining framework, that it undermines the political, moral and legal limits which put a break on the arms race and gives the green light to uncontrolled arms increases. This is the basis of the whole thing. At the same time it must be said that in the United States itself they do not all hold the same standpoint in this respect. Many Americans, and even U.S. military officials are against this step by Reagan because while the aforementioned limitations exist it is much easier to foresee the reaction of the other side. The Americans know that the Soviet Union will not have more missiles than the number set, and they can form their policy accordingly. We also know that the Americans will not have more missiles than the number permitted, and it is thus easier for us [words indistinct] these limitations do not exist, an uncertain situation arises; we can increase numbers, they can increase numbers, and this is not to the liking of many military officials. I must, regrettably, repeat that the step mentioned will not lead to an improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations. On the contrary, it creates a more uncertain, misty and gloomier perspective than in the past.

[Horak] My next question was: What will the line of U.S. foreign policy be in the 2 years remaining to the expiry of Reagan's presidential mandate?

[Bovin] I personally think that nothing special will take place in these 2 years. President Reagan will be enjoying his period of office. There is a slang expression, lame duck, which describes the state of affairs when a President is ending his period of office and no longer has such authority as before because everyone knows that in 2 years there will be another president. So I do not expect any fundamentally new moments in U.S. policy during these 2 years. I think that Reagan will continue the adventurous line he has followed up until now.

[Horak] In less than a month, 1 January 1987, the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions will expire. My last question was, therefore: Will the Soviet Union extend this moratorium, or will it renew tests?

[Bovin] You know, this is not a question of principle but of military technical necessity. If it is vital for us from a military viewpoint to renew tests, we will renew them. From the moral viewpoint we do not have to reproach ourselves. We waited a long time and tried to convince the Americans, but we also have our vital military needs.

We have to make certain tests, and if our military officials say that it is not possible to delay any further, we will renew tests. Maybe we will be able to wait another 6 months, but I do not know. I repeat, it is necessary, we will do it. At this moment it is not a question of principle but purely a problem of military needs.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1164

RELATED ISSUES

IZVESTIYA HITS U.S. SALT, ABM TREATY STANCE

PM111055 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by V. Starodubov: A Blow to the Foundations of Disarmament, or How the United States Is Destroying the SALT Legal Treaty System"]

[Text] The other day the United States brought into service its 131st heavy bomber equipped for long-range cruise missiles. In so doing, a 5 December Soviet Government statement stressed, it trampled on the treaty which enshrined military parity between the USSR and the United States and which for a number of years had limited the nuclear arms race in its central area -- the sphere of strategic offensive armaments.

But the SALT II treaty, which was the result of many years of intensive talks, is not the only target of the Washington administration which has revived the idea of achieving military superiority over the USSR. The sword also hangs over the ABM Treaty, which formed the cornerstone of the entire legal treaty system of the strategic arms limitation process.

This treaty effectively came under attack even before the SDI "Star Wars" program was adopted. You will recall that General Rogers, supreme allied commander, NATO forces, Europe, who had been in charge of scientific research in the ABM sphere before being appointed to that post, plainly stated that the United States had never curtailed work in that sphere. There is no doubting the authenticity of this statement: It is corroborated by the U.S. side's treaty violations, recorded by Soviet national verification [kontrol] facilities.

For example, this year the United States will finish constructing a major new phased-array radar in the vicinity of Thule (Greenland). The construction has taken place in violation of two treaty provisions -- Article VI, which prohibits the deployment of missile attack warning stations (this is the official function of the radar), except in "positions on the periphery of one's own national territory," and Agreed Statement F, which prohibits the deployment of "major phased-array radars," except within the rigid framework of agreed limitations. It is idle to pretend that they are not constructing a new radar in Thule, but merely modernizing an old one. How is it possible that the replacement of the previous five radars without phased arrays by one large phased-array radar can be squared with the concept of "station modernization"?

It is in this context that one should view the fact that the radar in Greenland is a Pave Paws type of station, and the specifications of the performance of this type of station exceeds the range of performance of radars used for ABM purposes. This is hardly going to dispel concern that the United States is thus creating an ABM system for the territory of its country, something that is banned by Article I of the treaty.

USSR national verification facilities have also observed a number of other U.S. actions incompatible with the provisions of the SALT II treaty, including the testing of a mobile radar which, under the terms of the treaty, is an ABM radar; the testing of an element of a multicharge interceptor missile; other actions, including those connected with the SDI program.

The U.S. Administration also plans to deal a blow to the ABM Treaty by modifying the sense of its clear-cut provisions prohibiting the creation [sozdaniye] and testing of space-based ABM systems. In accordance with Article V of the treaty, both parties pledged not to create [sozdavat], not to test, and not to deploy space-based ABM systems or components. What is vague about that? But, apparently, it is possible to cast doubt even on an indisputable commitment. What they hit on was that the aforesaid allegedly applies only to traditional ABM components, listed in Article II of the treaty, that is, to interceptor missiles, their launchers, and to ABM radar stations, and not at all to the nontraditional ABM systems and components which are being developed within the SDI framework -- they, apparently, can be created and even tested, in space among other places, in accordance with Agreed Statement D, attached to the treaty.

These claims are essentially deceitful. The general definition of the ABM system contained in Article II ("For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory") is deliberately omitted. They emphasize the next part of the sentence, which says merely that this ABM system "currently" consists of interceptor missiles, their launchers, and radars. This is an attempt to dissociate SDI systems, based on other physical principles, from the aforementioned commitment stated in Article V.

The reference to Agreed Statement D is also wrong. Again the quotation begins in the middle of the statement: "In the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion..." They extend this part of the statement, taken out of context, to all ABM systems "based on other physical principles," including space-based systems.

They call this trick a "broad" interpretation, which, apparently, makes it possible not only to create, but also to test, in space among other places, SDI systems and components. The deception is visible to the naked eye if you look at the full text of the agreed statement. It clearly says that it was elaborated "in order to ensure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the treaty." Consequently, it does not extend to all systems "based on other physical principles," but only to those which, if deployed, would not contravene Article III, that is, could be deployed only in the area of the capital or in one area containing ICBM silo launchers. It is clear that space-based ABM systems and components cannot be based in the aforesaid ground areas, therefore, the statement is not referring to them at all.

Knowing that the so-called "broad" interpretation has no legal foundation, its authors often try to "support" their fantasies by referring to certain negotiation materials which allegedly permit a different interpretation of the treaty provisions. But the talks participants -- both Soviet and American -- totally disagree with this. For example, G. Smith, head of the U.S. delegation which participated in the elaboration of the ABM Treaty, stated unequivocally that "Agreed Statement D cannot be interpreted as authorizing the testing of ABM systems or components which are categorically prohibited by other provisions of the Treaty" and that the administration's interpretation "turns the ABM Treaty into a dead letter."

The need for such a detailed consideration of the question of "interpretations" arose not because the falsifiers had to be exposed -- they were only carrying out instructions. The thing is that the U.S. Administration's entire stance in the "arms control sphere" now hinges on this "broad" interpretation of one of the main provisions of the treaty. Remember Reykjavik. What was the stumbling block there that prevented such far-reaching talks results from becoming binding accords for both sides? The U.S. President's stance, whereby during an agreed 10 years of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty the United States would be able to carry out all the work on the creation [sozdaniye] of SDI systems and components, to the very point of deployment, and immediately after the 10-year period (or at least within 6 months) deploy these systems. The President claimed that this allegedly accords with the treaty. He was referring, of course, to the phony "broad" interpretation elaborated by the pushers of SDI.

But there are no "broad" or "narrow" interpretations of the ABM Treaty. There are commitments formulated with the utmost clarity. They must be fulfilled, not falsified. "Without strict observance of treaties, particularly such a fundamental one," CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev stressed, "international order and elementary stability cannot be ensured, and tyranny and chaos will rule in the world."

As for the SALT II treaty, it has been a thorn in the Pentagon's side for a long while. The document was never ratified for a reason. The first major problem arose in connection with plans for the deployment in Europe of U.S. Pershing II medium-range missiles and cruise missiles which, from the Soviet viewpoint, are strategic first-strike weapons. Washington was bound to know that in making such a decision it was violating the strategic balance between the sides established by the SALT II treaty and that it was a direct violation of Article XII of the treaty prohibiting circumvention of it in any manner.

The 131st heavy bomber adapted for cruise missiles is merely a symbol. If it were just a matter of this aircraft or even of all such bombers planned for deployment, the Pentagon would possibly have found some existing weapon to dismantle in order to remain within the permitted levels of the SALT II treaty. But it is being pushed to the limit by the prospect of also having to find a way of compensating for other projected programs -- Ohio submarines carrying 24 ballistic missiles and also the MX and Midgetman ICBM's. In fact, for each pair of Ohio submarines it would have to dismantle three Poseidon submarines, each with 16 still perfectly up-to-date ballistic missiles. When you consider that in addition to the 8 Ohio submarines that have already been constructed it is planned to construct a further 12, to compensate for them it would be necessary to dismantle not only all existing 16 submarines with Poseidon C-3 missiles, but also round up a considerable number of modern Minuteman III launchers.

Given the U.S. Administration's negative attitude to earlier agreements, one can scarcely expect Washington to be seeking new accords which would conform to the principle of equality and identical security. [paragraph continues]

No, Washington has not renounced talks, but it is acting at them in a posture that is intended to secure military superiority for the United States. This is true also of the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armaments.

...Washington has long since ceased even to remember the "Principles of Mutual Relations Between the USSR and the United States," signed at summit level in 1972, a document that enshrined the sides' common understanding that "in a nuclear age there exists no other basis for maintaining relations between them than peaceful coexistence." The commitments to "expand the legal treaty basis of their mutual relations and make the necessary effort to ensure that the bilateral agreements concluded between them are... unswervingly implemented."

The U.S. Administration is also disregarding its agreement that "nuclear war must never be unleashed and there could be no victors in a nuclear war." It has discarded the commitment to accelerating the fulfillment of "tasks set in the 8 January 1985 Soviet-American joint statement, namely: To prevent an arms race in space and halt it on earth, limit and reduce nuclear armaments, and strengthen strategic stability."

How does one assess the Washington administration's behavior since Reykjavik? The results of the summit meeting gave people hope of release from the nuclear nightmare. For a moment the force of Soviet logic appeared to have achieved the impossible -- the U.S. President had agreed to the elimination of all nuclear weapons over a period of 10 years, including the most destructive -- strategic offensive armaments. But on returning home, back to the nuclear missile and space fever, coming under the influence once more of those opposing an end to the arms race, the administration went back on its word. It again became clear that it places the interests of the military-industrial complex and other U.S. militarist circles above the security interests of the peoples of the world, including Americans, and above the task of delivering mankind from the threat of nuclear annihilation.

As for the Soviet Union, it resolutely counters the current U.S. Administration's irresponsible line with a course of peace and international security. In the sphere of limiting the arms race and effecting disarmament the USSR, as M.S. Gorbachev said, 'has done and is doing all it can to clear the fear from the horizons of the world. We have probably done even more than could properly have been expected of us. The Soviet Union is doing this for the good of world peace, for people living now, for the future.'

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS COMMENTARIES DERIDE U.S. ARMS CONTROL, TESTING, SALT STANCE

U.S. Jeopardizing Nuclear Disarmament

LD102218 Moscow TASS in English 2204 GMT 10 Dec 86

["March of the Times and Washington" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow December 10 TASS -- Follows commentary of Vladimir Chernyshev, a TASS military writer:

The U.S. leadership begins glancing at the watch, which is inexorably counting minutes, and is drawing the conclusion that it is necessary to make progress soon. Failing which, there is going to be no arms control agreement under the current administration, the newspaper NEWSDAY said the other day. This may ring as a serious observation, but it hardly corresponds to fact. Rather the U.S. Administration is doing its utmost to put the clock far backward. As far as agreements are concerned, while wrecking the existing ones, the U.S. Administration clearly does not wish for any new ones. It needs talks only as a cover for its militaristic plans.

Take, for example, the question of ending all nuclear tests. The eighteen-month old Soviet moratorium is approaching a point, which was named in the fourth extension of the moratorium as its ultimate one. It might seem that Washington should have to hurry up to answer positively to the USSR's good example, to the calls of world and American public, by acceding to that Soviet move, since a moratorium would be the main obstacle in the way of the nuclear weapons race. Yet instead of that the U.S. Administration is demonstrating stubborn reluctance to heed the voice of reason, is continuing nuclear weapons tests and perfecting ever new types of such weapons.

Such practices are evidence that all of Washington's statements to the effect that it strives to curb the weapons race, to lessen the threat of nuclear war and even totally eliminate nuclear weapons are no more than a propaganda cover. Those who really wish for the attainment of the above-said aims, would not pile up new mountains of weapons doomed to destruction. New warheads and "third generation" nuclear weapons including the "Star Wars", which are being tested in the Nevada test range, are designed by the American strategists to help them move the clock backward, to the times of U.S. superiority in the past.

Yet these are futile hopes. The dreams of the White House and the Pentagon do not tally with the present-day realities. A result will be only a lowering of security for the United States itself. Meanwhile the U.S. Administration increasingly appears for the whole world to see as a champion of the interests of the military-industrial complex, the sponsor of a tremendous arms build up which jeopardizes the possibility of nuclear disarmament. As Jerome Wiesner, a prominent American scientist, said, this is precisely the social cancer named militarism.

U.S. 'Defying Logic'

LD101955 Moscow TASS in English 1930 GMT 10 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 10 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

Judging by public remarks made by Washington officials, the aims of the current American Administration in the field of arms control are clearly divided into two categories -- long-term and immediate.

All the U.S. "tasks" in the field of disarmament without exception are declared long-term. Their formulation by the present administration is unclear and uncertain as far as the timing and ways of resolving them are concerned.

On the other hand, the immediate goals of the U.S. are dealing with arms buildup. They are specific, visible and backed by lavish budgetary allocations.

Washington, for instance, proclaims a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing to be its long-term objective, while the intensive testing programme is the task of the day.

The White House proclaims the elimination of nuclear weapons its task in an extended perspective, while the development of new weapons of mass annihilation, such as MX, Midgetman and Trident, is the immediate goal.

Defying elementary logic, Washington is seeking to assure world public opinion that the unrestrained buildup of American nuclear arms is opening the only real way towards their reduction in the future.

The latest developments confirm the conclusions that Washington offers a similar course in the field of accords on limiting and reducing arms. The U.S. leadership actually defends the absurd thesis of moving towards new arms control agreements in the future through the elimination of the existing accords today.

In the six years in power, the U.S. Administration has not signed a single arms reduction agreement. Over the same period, it actually derailed the threshold test ban treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty and thwarted a number of talks, including on anti-satellite systems, on the non-militarization of the Indian Ocean and on arms trading, and effectively broke off the talks on a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests.

The U.S. Administration proclaimed the SALT-2 treaty "dead" and recently exceeded -- in an ostentatious way -- its quantitative limits. Moreover, the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency publicly expressed its displeasure over the Soviet Union's decision to refrain for the time being from pulling out of the SALT-1 and SALT-2 restrictions.

The American agency described the Soviet step as insincere.

At a time when the Soviet Union unilaterally sticks to provisions of the key constraint on the strategic arms race, Washington, in building the arsenals of weapons of mass annihilation, is seeking to deceive world public opinion by making assurances of its adherence to the idea of substantial cuts in strategic offensive arms -- some time in the future.

It is clear to all unbiased people on earth that Washington has embarked on the destruction of all treaty barriers in the way of the nuclear arms race. The present American Administration has undermined its reputation as a party to accords on the limitation and reduction of armaments.

Who can believe now in the sincerity of the White House's declarations about its readiness to display in the future utmost restraint in building up nuclear arsenals?

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RELATED ISSUES

IZVESTIYA: CARRINGTON CRITICIZES CHIRAC ADDRESS TO WEU ASSEMBLY

PM051653 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko dispatch: "West Europe: Nuclear 'Charter'"]

[Text] Paris — The latest session of the WEU [Western European Union] Assembly, which has now finished here in Paris, has been addressed by NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington.

He advocated increasing military expenditures and augmenting West Europe's contribution to the North Atlantic alliance's militarist program and proposed that the WEU be more actively used to organize joint weapons production.

French Prime Minister J. Chirac proposed formulating a kind of "charter of principles of West European security," which would give impetus to the grouping's activity. According to Chirac, its basic "principle" should be that nuclear deterrence remains the "sole effective means" of averting war in Europe. He also stated that nuclear deterrence is bound up with the need for strategic unity on both sides of the Atlantic, which, he said, requires the presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear armed forces on the continent of Europe. Finally, in the French prime minister's opinion, strengthening defense is an essential condition for the political building of Western Europe.

Stressing his solidarity with NATO, the French prime minister expounded the hackneyed thesis of the "threat from the East" and spoke of the danger posed by the arsenal of nuclear, conventional, and chemical weapons in the countries of East Europe, omitting to mention the fact that there is rough equality between Warsaw Pact and NATO forces.

The French prime minister's speech is yet another example of how in the West they use the false thesis of "Soviet superiority" to justify their efforts to modernize the nuclear arsenals, block the disarmament process, clutch at the "nuclear umbrella," and hatch plans to exploit the WEU as a basis for the military building of West Europe.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR-PRC AGREE ON NFZ, MILITARIZATION OF SPACE

OW111122 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China 0400 GMT
5 Dec 86

[Ivanov commentary]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] In the 1950's, the Soviet Union and China cooperated vigorously with each other in ensuring the security of Asia. The Soviet Union energetically supported China's proposal for signing a collective peace treaty by (?a majority of) nations, including the United States. Although this proposal received favorable responses from the world, it was unable to be put into practice because of the obstacles set up by the United States. In January 1957, the Soviet Union and China issued a joint statement in which the two countries called for replacing confronting military blocs with collective peace and a collective security system.

Soviet-Chinese relations have noticeably improved in recent years. This makes the people of Asia and the rest of the world feel satisfied and optimistic. The Soviet Union and China have undertaken not to be the first to use force, have opposed the militarization of the space, and have advocated the establishment and strengthening of nuclear-free and peace zones. The people of Asian and other countries consider this a major positive step.

Of course, ensuring the security of the Asia-Pacific region is inseparable from Soviet-Chinese relations. In his speech in Vladivostok on 28 July, Gorbachev said: History has entrusted an extremely important task to the people of the Soviet Union and China. The development of the international situation depends to a large extent on the two biggest socialist countries.

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