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ARMS CONTROL

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POSSIBLE FRENCH ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS POLICIES EXAMINED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Mar 87 pp 61-73

[Article by Marisol Touraine, charge de mission in the office of Admiral Chabaud, adviser on strategic affairs to the General Secretariat for National Defense; slantlines indicate italics]

[Text] Antisatellite weapons are space vehicles and military tools, and they are of interest to France on both those counts. As a space power, either alone or in cooperation with its European partners, France has realized that mastery of space is now the symbol of its reasserted position as a global power and the sign of its ability to accept major technological challenges. But power in space is increasingly being reserved for states capable not only of traveling through it but also of militarizing it. In 1985, France launched Telecom-1, which has military communications capability, and that will be followed by the launching of Syracuse 2-A and 2-B in 1990 and 1997. Mention must also be made of the launching of Spot, the remarkable civilian observation satellite, and the scheduled launching in 1992 or 1993 of the first Helios, which will be used for military reconnaissance. France is therefore a full-fledged member of the family of space powers and must concern itself with the survival of its satellites. In that respect, it is directly affected by the deployment of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. Since the two superpowers allow considerable ambiguity to hang over their prospects in this field, all France can do is limit the resulting uncertainty by making an accurate assessment of the strategic role that ASAT systems might play in case of a crisis or conflict.

Ambiguity of ASAT Systems

The mastery of space is not a new stake in technological progress or government policies: the conquest of the moon and the Apollo program instilled the "high frontier" in our minds as the new frontier to be conquered. Its militarization, on the other hand, while not recent, remains more uncertain. So far it has comprised three stages. Beginning in the late 1950's (in 1957), space became the thoroughfare used by intercontinental /ballistic missiles/. As the nature of strategic relations between the two superpowers became diversified, the need for intelligence increased, and the unfortunate adventure of the American U-2, which was shot down in May 1960, opened the way

for putting /observation, surveillance, and communication satellites/ into orbit. Lastly, with strategic parity achieved, the attention of the two superpowers was drawn to theater equilibriums and particularly the conditions for a potential air-land conflict. It was then (in the mid-1970's) that we witnessed the placing in orbit of /satellites for reducing the capabilities of the air-land forces/--that is, satellites for reconnaissance, electronic monitoring, and ocean surveillance.

The paradox facing every ASAT policy today therefore emerged gradually: since satellites are not only the guarantors of information and communications but have also acquired growing military significance, their operational value is increasing at the same time that the risks of destabilization are growing. Everyone has an interest in maintaining them in order improve his defensive posture and in regulating them if it is a question of strengthening stability in case of crisis, the purpose being to protect the "stabilizing" satellites, which ensure control of intelligence (the early warning satellites are the most characteristic satellites in this respect). The absence of regulations governing antisatellite weapons therefore encourages the proliferation of "destabilizing" satellites--that is, those which facilitate battle management--and makes it only more necessary, but also more difficult, to reach a limitation agreement.

That duality between "good" and "bad" satellites--between those concerned with information and those concerned with battle management--brings us back basically to the two traditionally opposing views of deterrence held by the United States and the Soviet Union--that is, "pure deterrence" in the one case and "warfare deterrence" in the other. This explains the different choices made by those two countries in the field of antisatellite weapons. The first U.S. studies were quickly abandoned for reasons having to do with a poor cost-benefit ratio, whereas the Soviets have continued their program for interceptor satellites. Although of limited effectiveness, those ASAT systems are nonetheless the only ones currently operational, since the new U.S. system (a missile launched from an F-15 aircraft), which is more flexible in use, will probably not go into operation until 1987 or 1988.

ASAT systems therefore appear as the direct complement of a space strategy, and they reflect the very ambiguities of the strategic role of space. For example, an ASAT system can be viewed as a /military means of controlling an all-out conflict/ or defined as the /means of deterrence in space/. That ambiguity has not been removed by the American program: adopted in 1977 to induce the Soviets to conclude a treaty banning ASAT systems, it was later justified as being a satellite protection system and, under the Reagan administration, as a tool for deterrence in space just when renewed interest in ASAT systems was being aroused by a double awareness: a new awareness of the strong operational dimension of Soviet strategy and awareness of the role played by satellites in increasing the capability of conventional forces.

Because it is a medium-sized power, France cannot be satisfied with those ambiguities, which the two superpowers bury in their mass of armaments. That is why it has repeatedly taken stands in favor of increased regulation of the military use of space, notably in its memo of June 1984 (1). It is important

to France that its position not depend entirely on potential arrangements between the United States and the USSR. But apart from the fact that the very duality of satellites complicates any ASAT negotiations, it is absurd to set arms control and strategic thinking in opposition to each other at all costs: the exploration of negotiated solutions must not prevent us from thinking about the military position we should adopt in response to a possible continuation of their deployment by the two superpowers. Because they have been amply analyzed elsewhere, we will not consider the possible legal channels; instead, we will focus on France's means of facing up to the situation. It is not certain that deploying French ASAT weapons is the best response to be considered, but abandoning that solution cannot mean that we should evade the risks involved in their proliferation.

ASAT Systems: a Strategic Challenge

Although the two superpowers have conducted research on antisatellite weapons independently of their antimissile system programs, the spectacular launching of the SDI program and the possible use of the latter against satellites have helped overshadow to some extent the characteristics proper to ASAT systems. The French debate, for example, has tended to neglect them and to concentrate on an SDI as mythical as it is abstract (in its complete version) while using the same response in objection to them: like SDI, ASAT systems are said to be of no strategic importance to France; the challenge they present would be purely technological in nature.

The technological criterion has become inevitable in analyzing geostrategic situations. But in the specific case of ASAT systems, it remains relatively secondary: France has the technological means to acquire high-performance antisatellite systems (2) for coorbital interception, and from the financial standpoint, the cost of surveillance systems would make European cooperation essential, but the technologies are not very sophisticated and would not, so to speak, have enough of an economic ripple effect to justify the development of such systems. Since the interceptor satellite is not a sufficiently flexible instrument, two approaches are conceivable: the adaptation of existing technologies, notably those concerned with nuclear energy, ballistic launchers, and airborne missiles, all of which have been mastered by France; or the use of "exotic" technologies developed for other purposes (antimissile weapons, for example). In either case, the ASAT technologies are seen as a /by-product/, with the result that in evaluating the interest that France might have in acquiring ASAT weapons, considerations of a strategic nature are regarded as the most important issue. Three points can be mentioned in this respect: the growing politicostrategic role of space, the need for France to reinforce the overall credibility of its deterrence, and the threat constituted by the Soviet satellite-antisatellite tandem.

Politicostrategic Role of Space and ASAT Systems

The growing politicostrategic role of space is due largely to the fact that mastery of information has become necessary to any security policy. In the 1960's, power was asserted through the possession of nuclear weapons. In the past 20 years, however, we have witnessed a process of growing diversification

in the security stakes and the corresponding weapons. Mastery of that diversification is what now constitutes the symbol of power and influence. Crisis management in particular, which is so crucial in the nuclear age, and commitments outside Europe presuppose a rapid and correct assessment of real situations. Space seems to be a privileged place for establishing those equilibriums in information, and we can recall, as an example, the Soviet practice of sending more satellites into orbit in times of crisis (there were 30 additional launches during the Falklands War). The result is that absence from space might further reduce the influence of the medium-sized powers. The superpowers might be tempted to settle conflicts affecting European security by circumventing them from above--that is, in space. This would be a form of /reverse uncoupling/ corresponding to a division of strategic tasks.

But while controlling space is necessary for controlling politicostrategic crises, ASAT weapons appear to be of marginal value or even counterproductive, since they threaten precisely those satellites which provide intelligence--that is, satellites with the most stabilizing effect. Their use in "crisis gesticulation," while not impossible, seems hard to handle. Power in space therefore depends more on the control of observation and reconnaissance systems than on the installation of offensive and destructive systems which are immediately operational and therefore destabilizing with regard to deterrence. From that standpoint, and regardless of its value, we must remember that an ASAT system does not consist solely of its offensive component, which is the weapon, but also includes a /ground component/ of the greatest importance. In particular, it is linked to a network for tracking space activity, and another function of that network is to transmit orders to satellites. The greater role of space makes it important to have /autonomous/ capability on the ground for surveillance and the identification of objects in orbit. As an inescapable condition for an ASAT system, /the surveillance of space/ is necessary in itself for any policy for overall security and would be conceivable financially within a European framework.

Deterrence in Space

To ensure the credibility of the French posture, there might be a temptation to project the principles of deterrence into space, and in that case, an ASAT system would be the instrument of such a policy. Two sets of arguments, which are not contradictory to each other, can be advanced.

First, France would be renewing its gamble that the weak can deter the strong by deterring an attack on its satellites with the threat of retaliation of the same kind against the USSR, which might then find itself in a less favorable position with respect to the United States. There again, France would be playing the role of a /multiplier of uncertainties/. No matter how appealing it is, that approach is unconvincing. First of all, it ignores the specific nature of nuclear weapons--that which applies to nuclear weapons is not transposable to all weapon systems. And second, it ignores the fact that the principle of the weak against the strong is a principle of relative and proportional deterrence. And a comparison of the number of French satellites with the number of Soviet satellites shows that it is illusory to hope to inflict on the USSR a cost outweighing the advantage that country can hope to

gain from an attack on our satellites. The number of ASAT weapons needed obviously depends on the number of satellites to be attacked, and in 10 years, there will be, at most, 7 French satellites that cannot be quickly replaced, compared to about 60 Soviet satellites, which are relatively simple but quickly replaceable and backed by ground networks. This means that we could easily spend a disproportionate amount on the ASAT component in terms of the effort devoted to other force systems and the objective to be achieved. Lastly, must we necessarily begin the militarization of space on the basis of strictly national concepts at a time when a European policy seems to be growing increasingly essential?

But an ASAT system might also seem to be the means of reinforcing our strategic doctrine by replacing or supplementing the final warning on the ground with a /final warning in space./ The drawback to that approach is, first, that it leads to the idea of a nuclear ASAT system, the only kind likely to ensure the credibility of the link between a final warning and a nuclear strike. For one thing, our allies' satellites would not be spared, and for another, the credibility of that link is far from certain, so there is a strong likelihood that we would wind up with more tactical options and a greater "militarization" of the final warning. That would blur the step from the tactical level to the strategic strike. An ASAT system would then fit the logic of battle better than the logic of deterrence, and its relevance would shift as a result: far from being a factor in the projection of our principles of deterrence, its importance would lie in its /operational use/.

Soviet "Threat"

That first conclusion is confirmed, incidentally, when we examine the Soviet "threat" which we will theoretically have to face. The table below sums up the nature and characteristics of the Soviet satellites which a French ASAT system might have as its targets. The very great majority of them appear to be vulnerable to the current generation of antisatellite weapons.

But as is also observable in other areas of their military effort, the Soviets prefer to rely on quantitative mass effects: about 100 satellites are launched every year, and that compensates for their relatively short lifetime. This means that the USSR has /reserves of satellites/ ready for launching on a few days' notice in case of a crisis. That ability is due to a policy of maintaining /a large number/ of /dispersed launch pads/ (30, compared to 15 in the West). Soviet ASAT weapons are unambiguously viewed from the operational standpoint, as is shown by the inclusion of ASAT tests in the Warsaw Pact exercises of 1976 and 1982. They are intended for use as one weapon among many. It is that importance assigned to battle management capability which explains why /the large number of Soviet satellites is accompanied by "less dependence" on them/: probably from 5 to 10 percent of Soviet communications in Europe are transmitted by satellite, compared to 70 percent in the case of the United States (3). The Soviets have deployed redundant and easily replaced systems, making it easier to rely on ground communications networks.

A French ASAT system would therefore be even less useful as a deterrent in that the Soviets would seek to destroy Western satellites--as they would all

systems facilitating conflict management--in the early stages of a conflict and because that same reasoning has led them to relativize the place of satellites in their own defense system.

It turns out, then, that ASAT systems are becoming more feasible technologically at the very time when their potential targets are becoming more essential in combat situations. But the fact that it is technologically possible to attack satellites and that doing so fits in with a potential scenario of Soviet aggression does not mean that there is strategic value in retaliating by the same means.

Soviet Satellites That Could Be Targeted by a French ASAT

<u>Mission</u>	<u>Orbit (km and inclination)</u>	<u>Orbital period</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Possibility of degraded functioning*</u>	<u>Startup time in the event of crisis</u>
Communications:					
"Molnya"	Molnya 63/66 deg.	12 hrs	8	being replaced by geostationary satellites	
"Raduga"	geostationary		4	inaccessible?	
Navy communications	1,500 km 74 deg.	115 min	24	yes	a few hours
Telecommuni- cations	800 km 74 deg.	101 min	3	yes, but delayed transmission	a few hours up to a few days
Reconnaissance:					
Optical	175/550 km 65/83 deg.	89/95 min	6 at once	destruction of 3 satellites halts system functioning for 12 hours	a few hours
Electronic monitoring	600 km 81 deg.	97 min	6 or 7	yes	a few hours
Ocean surveillance	250/450 km 65 deg.	90 min	4	no: loss of locating capability	a few hours
Navigation	1,000 km 83 deg.	105 min	10/12	yes, unless sev- eral satellites are destroyed	a few hours
"Glonas"	20,000 km 63 deg.	12 hrs	9/12	inaccessible?	
Early warning	600/40,000 km	12 hrs	9	no	a few hours

* The reference is to vulnerability to interception by impact.

Scenarios for France

There are several conceivable scenarios in which France's satellites would be attacked. Would France be in a better position to deal with those attacks if it had antisatellite systems?

In a /peripheral conflict/ involving it directly, France might be confronted indirectly by the Soviet Union as part of the latter's support of a client state. That is one case in which recourse to national satellites would have the most value, since reconnaissance satellites could be used for the surveillance of troop movements behind the front and for keeping track of the tactical situation. The USSR could threaten them, in which case there would be a risk of escalation, since doing so would mean that Moscow wished to bring a regional conflict into the sphere of East-West relations, although that runs counter to all the policies pursued in such cases by both the Soviets and the Americans since 1945. One can make the more general assumption that the greater the risk of escalation in a regional conflict, the more cautious the USSR will be. It is not out of the question, however, that the use of incapacitating resources by the USSR would lead us to cancel an operation or that it might at least hamper that operation. For that reason, it is necessary in any case to /strengthen the protection of our satellites/. This does not constitute an alternative to arms control but a precondition, since it would increase the cost of an attack, thus making the use of an ASAT weapon less appealing and a negotiated agreement more attractive.

Are other states besides the USSR in a position to threaten French satellites or will they be in the future? The answer today is no, and it apparently will remain so for 15 or 20 years, because while /the proliferation of certain ASAT technologies seems conceivable, mastery of a complete system seems much more problematic/.

In case of a /nuclear conflict/, the use of ASAT weapons will probably not alter massive strategic strike capability, the implementation of which does not require satellites because the pinpointing of precise targets is not at issue. Soviet ASAT weapons therefore do not in any case represent a threat to France's ability to use its strategic nuclear force. On the other hand, a French ASAT weapon could be used for preemptive destruction of the opponent's defense systems--that is, for "punching a hole" in a watertight defensive shield. But here again, other penetration aids are conceivable and are being considered, so there is no ASAT specificity in that respect.

On the other hand, it might be more difficult to carry out the counterforce phases of a nuclear strike if navigation satellites increasing the accuracy of fire were destroyed. While France is not currently affected by that threat, the Alliance for its part might find the implementation of its flexible response policy more complicated in some respects. More generally, if there were a conflict in Europe--nuclear or not--the importance assigned by the Soviets to command, control and communications (C3) systems would probably lead them, in the very first hours of the confrontation, to destroy Western satellites and other command centers essential to implementation of the FOFA (5) tactic that has now been adopted by NATO.

The ASAT system would then merge into an overall anti-C3 strategy, and in that context, it would have no specific strategic value for the USSR. Since the elimination of C3 installations would, in Soviet eyes, be the first manifestation of an offensive, Soviet use of ASAT weapons would be the sign of a wide-scale conflict rather than the first stage of a more controllable escalation. That being the case, the contribution that would be made by a French launching seems very secondary, while the fate of France's own satellites would not be any different. It is doubtful, in fact, that French satellites alone would be spared, since they could provide a marginal but not negligible backup force for the United States, which is highly dependent on satellites in the European theater. In a conflict (temporarily) limited in its geographic extent, the USSR would probably attack French satellites (notably those used for telecommunications) in order to deter us from intervening in the conflict while laying on us the responsibility for an escalation--in keeping with the strategy of counterdeterrence it adopted 10 years ago with respect to Europe.

This means that the facts of the problem--crucial for France--of the conditions for its participation in a European conflict would be altered only marginally by the possession of antisatellite weapons. The only conceivable effect, on the other hand, is that France's determination might compel it, in case its satellites are attacked, to use its own ASAT weapons. Like all strategies which restrict one's choices and freeze one's responses in advance, this one would involve a risk of escalation that could lead to French involvement at an earlier stage. The operational flexibility achieved by the possession of ASAT weapons would thus be handicapped by the need for involvement at an earlier stage.

Conclusion

A strategic analysis of the value to France of acquiring antisatellite weapons teaches us the following: ASAT weapons are more appropriate to a context of combat than they are to one of deterrence, and if France is going to acquire them, it should do so for operational purposes, not in an attempt to transfer the principle of the weak against the strong or the final-warning concept to the space arena, and the use of ASAT weapons in a peripheral conflict appears to be ruled out because it involves a risk of escalation and because its use in the management of crises appears chancy. More generally, ASAT weapons are of little value in extreme situations of peace or total nuclear war. On the other hand, nonpossession of antisatellite weapons by France does not at all mean that the USSR would refrain from attacking French satellites if it felt the need to do so, and appropriate means of response should therefore be considered. Lastly, a French ASAT system would hamper Soviet battle management only marginally because the Soviets are less dependent on satellite networks than Westerners are and because it would be difficult to distinguish French strikes from launchings by the Alliance.

It might seem appropriate, therefore, to integrate the response to a possible Soviet strike against French satellites into the framework of /air-land use strategy/, which would preserve the principle of the universality of our deterrence. Since the Soviets view satellites merely as one component of

their C3 systems--and a secondary one at that--we could consider responding to an attack on our satellites with a /conventional/ strike against Soviet C3 ground installations, whether linked or not to satellites (ground relay stations) or ASAT weapons (the ground components), probably on the basis of a suitable declaratory policy. The problem is to lessen the value to the Soviets of carrying out an antisatellite strike by guaranteeing the credibility of our response, that being the basis of any deterrence.

One of the major lessons to be learned from a study of the ASAT problem is, in fact, that C3 systems are of crucial importance both in the event of a crisis (for its control) and in the event of a conflict (since they are the heart of the battle management system). That is why they must be safeguarded in order to promote stability in the event of a crisis (implying, theoretically, a ban on ASAT weapons), whereas in the event of a conflict, they will be the first targets selected. Incidentally, this does not prevent France from maintaining an active stance on arms control (6) while remaining technologically vigilant as far as ASAT weapons are concerned.

It is that threefold approach--technological vigilance, active diplomacy, and preparations for possible retaliation against the ground components of Soviet space facilities--which would enable France, if the two superpowers do not reach agreement (including an agreement on SDI, because any isolated settlement regarding ASAT weapons would be illusory), to adapt easily to various situations and to produce antisatellite weapons quickly if necessary.

FOOTNOTES

1. At the Geneva Disarmament Conference.
2. Here we are talking about systems of destruction, since incapacitating systems (for "blinding" the enemy, jamming his communications, and so on) apparently have little future in view of the progress achieved in the protection of satellites.
3. The data are obviously very difficult to evaluate in the Soviet case.
5. Follow-on forces attack.
6. The United States should find this an advantage, since its greater dependence on satellites would make a agreement limiting antisatellite weapons particularly worthwhile.

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CSO: 5200/2521

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: GERASIMOV FOREIGN MINISTRY NEWS CONFERENCE 14 MAY

ASAT, SRINF Issues

LD141423 Moscow TASS in English 1420 GMT 14 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS — "The President of the United States comes out in favour of implementing the plans aimed at developing anti-satellite weapon systems and seeks the lifting of the ban on an ASAT weapon which already exists in the United States," Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists today.

"Only yesterday", he pointed out, "President Reagan came forward with a statement that the Soviet Union ostensibly conducted ASAT tests while the United States sat idle, and that the USA, too, was in need of testing its ASAT systems".

"This is disinformation", Gennadiy Gerasimov emphasized. "In 1983 the Soviet Union announced a unilateral moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite systems. We have been observing the moratorium. Moreover, the Soviet Union consistently comes out in favour of banning ASAT systems".

"An ASAT weapon is not only a defensive one. This is a weapon of preparation for a sudden attack".

"This is why we are for a ban on ASAT systems. We hold that the attempts by the U.S. Administration to secure a congressional decision to resume the testing of ASAT systems are aimed at implementing the plans for the development of such space weapons and at undermining the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms."

Touching upon yesterday's speech by U.S. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger before journalists in Oslo on his way to a session of NATO's military committee, Gennadiy Gerasimov quoted him as saying that it would be rather difficult to verify an agreement on the elimination of shorter-range missiles because the Russians could ostensibly hide them somewhere, in a taxi, for example, and in general in anything moving.

The spokesman for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs refuted the remark, emphasizing that pronouncements of that kind would not promote progress at the talks on the conclusion of an agreement on shorter-range missiles

Nuclear Weapons in Japan

LD141438 Moscow TASS in English 1436 GMT 14 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS -- The U.S. and Japanese press have repeatedly cited facts about secret accords between the two countries' governments regarding introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan, Gennadiy Gerasimov, a spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry, said at a briefing here today.

As to the official quarters of both countries, the reaction to those reports was always one and the same: No comments in Washington and in Tokyo they referred to the three non-nuclear principles. On the whole, the point at issue was, allegedly, a misunderstanding.

Attempts are made to list new facts too, disclosed by the research group of the Japanese Communist Party, among "misunderstandings", Gerasimov went on. The names of the personnel of a special unit of the aircraft carrier "Midway", based in Japan, which is engaged in the assembling, equipment and storage of secret ammunition, were found in the Pentagon library.

The U.S. side and the Japanese authorities refer to the arrangement under which the United States should, in case it has an intention to introduce nuclear weapons in Japanese territory or its territorial waters, approach Japan with preliminary consultations. But Americans do not do it. In Japan, they say that they do not have any grounds to raise the issue of the presence of nuclear weapons on U.S. ships.

The Japanese Government follows the American principle in this case: Neither to confirm nor to refute whether Japan has or does not have nuclear weapons. The clarifications by the U.S. and Japanese sides on this point cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Therefore, there are grounds to believe that secret accords on this score really exist.

/6091

CSO: 5200/1488

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS REPORTS ON GROUP SESSIONS 22 MAY-5 JUNE

22 May Report

LD221840 Moscow TASS in English 1815 GMT 22 May 87

[Text] Geneva May 22 TASS -- Discussions were continued over the past week in all groups on medium-range missiles, outer space and strategic offensive arms at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms.

Discussions were particularly intensive in the medium-range missiles group.

29 May Report

LD291834 Moscow TASS in English 1732 GMT 29 May 87

[Text] Geneva May 29 TASS -- All groups -- on medium-range missiles, outer space and strategic offensive weapons -- continued meetings over the past week at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments.

Intensive discussions are being held within the framework of the group of medium-range missiles.

Meetings End 5 June

LD051922 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1859 GMT 5 Jun 87

[Text] Geneva, 5 June (TASS) -- Meetings in all the groups -- on medium-range missiles, space and strategic offensive weapons -- which continued at the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space weapons during the week, have just ended.

In the group on medium-range missiles, a first joint draft text of a treaty on medium-range missiles, reflecting the present positions of the sides, was compiled as a result of work which had already been carried out during the current round. Thus, an important step has been taken at the negotiations creating the basis for a further step forward on preparing a completely agreed joint draft treaty on medium-range missiles.

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CSO: 5200/1517

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW TV SHOWS INTERVIEW WITH RALPH EARLE

LD252306 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 25 May 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; interview with Ralph Earle, former U.S. SALT II delegation head by Yu Rostov, identified by screen caption; Earle speaking in English with superimposed Russian translation]

[Text] A Soviet-American meeting of legal experts in the area of arms control opened in Moscow today:

[Rostov] Despite the hopes which have appeared recently for positive changes in Soviet-American relations, their development as a whole over the past few years is giving rise to concern. Among those who strive to change the dangerous tendencies are the most influential specialists of the United States; not so long ago they determined the U.S. official policy. Here are just some of the participants in the present meeting: Ralph Earle, former head of delegation to the SALT II talks; Abram Chayes, one of the leaders of the Carter and Mondale presidential campaigns; and (Shirley Hoffstaedtler) minister in the Democratic administration.

[Begin recording] [Rostov] Why is it that the problem of ABM Treaty has become the foremost problem to be discussed at the meeting?

[Earle] The ABM Treaty and its fate give rise to concern in our countries. Both countries carried out research in this field for years and technological development, as frequently happens, wrecks what was accomplished during the talks.

We are discussing problems which arise and may arise in the future as a result of development of military technology.

[Rostov] A problem has surely arisen already?

[Earle] It revolves round the choice between the traditional and the new, so-called wider interpretation of this document. It is our viewpoint that the new interpretation seriously threatens the treaty.

It is my view that the purpose of the treaty was to prevent the creation of any ABM systems, save for the stationary ground-based systems. It is precisely in this way that the treaty should be interpreted.

[Rostov] You headed the U.S. delegation to SALT II talks. The treaty has not been ratified, but the United States and the USSR did observe its provisions. Now, however, the process has begun of devaluation of the SALT II. What is your attitude to this?

[Earle] I regret that, also for subjective reasons, since I gave 7 years to the treaty, but mainly because of objective reasons. It is my view that SALT II represented an important step toward lessening the tension between our countries, toward maintaining and even consolidating the strategic balance which has kept the peace between us for so long. I would like to see SALT II preserved and followed by the SALT IV, SALT V treaties and so forth. [Video shows meeting, Earle being interviewed]
[end recording]

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS HITS REAGAN WORLDNET SPEECH ON SDI, INF

LD052116 Moscow TASS in English 2024 GMT 5 Jun 87

[Text] Washington June 5 TASS -- President Reagan staying in Venice in connection with the coming conference of the leaders of seven capitalist countries spoke over the radio and channels of Worldnet. He said that his speech is addressed especially to the young people of Europe.

What is it that, in Reagan's opinion, the world will see in the 21st century? First of all, according to Reagan, the "Strategic Defence Initiative," also known as the "Star Wars" which Reagan, as usual, tried to present as "defensive weapons" allegedly called upon to make nuclear weapons "forever obsolete."

Touching upon the Soviet-American negotiations on medium-range missiles in Europe, the President said that the treaty on the area would not be the end, but the beginning of the arms reduction effort. Making assurances that the United States is striving for strategic arms reduction, Reagan demanded in the same breath that West European countries, jointly with the United States, should step up their military preparations.

Reagan's call to the Soviet Union: "Leave your weapons at home," "dismantle your weapons pointed at Europe," clearly had a wrong address. This call was made at the very moment when the Pentagon officially confirmed reports that it sends to the Persian Gulf via the Mediterranean a U.S. Naval force led by the aircraft carrier Saratoga. Somewhat earlier Reagan declared for keeping in the territory of Western Europe 72 "Pershing-A" missiles adopted for service by the FRG Bundeswehr. And the nuclear warheads to fit out those missiles belong to the USA.

Reagan spoke enthusiastically about economic and political prospects which, as he asserted, open to capitalist countries in the 21st century. But he passed in silence most acute problems facing those countries now. It is in order to try solve those problems that the leaders of seven countries gather in Venice.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS BRIEFING 9 JUNE

'Realistic Hope' for Summit

LD091350 Moscow TASS in English 1333 GMT 9 Jun 87

["On Possibility of New Summit Meeting" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow June 9 TASS -- The Soviet Union is for summit meetings of the Soviet and the American leaders, but only if these meetings bring concrete results, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said at a briefing in the press centre of the USSR Foreign Ministry today.

He noted that during the conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Shultz on April 14 the Soviet side proposed to work key provisions concerning the strategic offensive arms, anti-missile defences and ban on nuclear tests. Alongside the draft treaty on medium-range missiles, these themes could become the subject for discussion at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting.

It is realistic to hope for a meeting of the highest leaders of the USSR and the USA this year, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said. The Soviet and the American delegations in Geneva could well complete by September-October the drafting of a treaty on medium-range missiles so that the draft document be submitted for the consideration of the two leaders.

Foreign Ministers May Meet

LD091336 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1315 GMT 9 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow, 9 Jun (TASS) -- There may be a need for another meeting between the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state in the near future, a spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said at a briefing at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center today.

He recalled that in April this year there was an exchange of opinions in Moscow between Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz. This was a productive although sharp discussion of nuclear and space weaponry issues, and of the problem that is now of the greatest concern and which, according to the USSR foreign ministry spokesman, is the most promising -- the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe.

The situation now is developing in such a way that to evaluate the progress of the Geneva talks and to clarify how far practical progress in discussing these issues has been possible, there may be a need for another meeting between the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state in the near future, he stated.

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CSO: 5200/1517

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BBC 'IT'S YOUR WORLD' PROGRAM FEATURES USSR'S KARPOV

BK071221 London BBC World Service in English 1112 GMT 7 Jun 87

["It's Your World" live phone-in program with Viktor Karpov, head of the USSR Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate, speaking from Moscow in English-- moderated by Sue MacGregor in London]

[Text] [MacGregor] The first caller today is in France, in (Valle Orice), and he is Mr Charles Banks. Mr Banks, your question please to Viktor Karpov:

[Banks] Mr Karpov, how realistic is the claim that the possession of nuclear weapons has kept the peace between East and West in the past 40 years, or do you feel that there are deeper reasons why peace has been kept?

[Karpov] I think that there are deeper reasons than the existence of nuclear weapons. I think that after World War II we all felt that what happened during the war shouldn't be repeated in any way. So, the Soviet Union on its side worked for such a solution that war in Europe be eliminated, and we felt that the accumulation of nuclear weapons now in Europe reached such a level when the danger of unleashing a war in Europe inevitably will become a war -- a nuclear war -- so we felt that we should deal with nuclear weapons radically now, eliminate them. And Europe now presents a very good example that can be followed by other countries and other regions of the world. So, to start there by eliminating nuclear weapons means to help eliminate the danger of war in Europe.

[MacGregor] Mr Banks in France, would you like to come back to Mr Karpov?

[Banks] Well, I am very happy with that reply. I presume that Mr Karpov would say that since Chernobyl the situation really becomes more starkly obvious.

[Karpov] Yes, I agree with you that people on the example of Chernobyl saw the real risks of any war in Europe whatsoever, without the use of nuclear weapons because we have in Europe more than 150 nuclear reactors. If they are hit by conventional weapons it is disaster.

[MacGregor] Mr Karpov, if I may just add a supplementary question to the one that Mr Banks made. You do, perhaps, understand the fear amongst certain NATO countries that if all medium-range nuclear weapons are eliminated from Europe they will be left vulnerable to what they see as a vast superiority of the Warsaw Pact conventional forces.

[Karpov] I heard such arguments, but I do not believe them, in fact, because parallel to the proposals on eliminating medium-range weapons from Europe we suggest that conventional weapons be reduced, and be reduced in a way that won't exclude a

possibility of unleashing a conventional war, so that the reductions be so drastic and verifiable that any offensive operations by NATO or the Warsaw Pact countries be excluded. [sentence as heard]

[MacGregor] Well, verification I am sure is a question we will come back to on this program. Thank you Mr Banks in France. We now move to Darwin in Australia. We have a call from Marie Hathaway. Your question please, Marie Hathaway.

[Hathaway] No, it's Mark Hathaway, actually.

[(MacGregor)] It is Mark Hathaway. I am sorry, not only did I get your name wrong, but your sex wrong. I beg your pardon, Mr Hathaway. Your question please.

[Hathaway] Mr Karpov. Actually verifiability is the theme of my question. Would you mind giving some of the Soviet Union's proposed methods of verifying any arms reductions that are agreed to?

[Karpov] You see we suggest a wide range of measures to verify starting with the national technical means which are in the process of improvement all the time. And we suggest that these be added by various international verification methods including on-site inspection. So, the verification methods, of course, would be agreed upon with the methods of reduction so that every party to that agreement on reduction of weapons can feel sure that there is no violation whatsoever.

[(MacGregor)] Mr Hathaway.

[Hathaway] So, in effect, you would not be having inspection teams or anything like that...the Soviet Union's people visiting NATO installations or U.S. installations or vice versa?

[Karpov] We suggest that verification measures -- and on-site inspections included -- should be applied to all the parties of the agreement. So, of course, you would have an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on reduction of their forces in Europe. Of course we accept verification by NATO teams on our territory and vice versa -- NATO countries should accept Soviet and Warsaw Pact verification teams as well.

[(MacGregor)] Of course, Mr Karpov, as you know, America is very bothered by how much verification the Soviet Union would like and the U.S. is pushing some very specific measures including almost instant on-site inspection. Would this be acceptable to the Soviet Union?

[Karpov] Yes. It would be acceptable. In fact, we suggested, for instance, that measures on elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe be from the very start accompanied by possibilities of on-site inspection on the places where the destruction or disbanding measures be carried out.

[(MacGregor)] Are there not areas of the Soviet Union, though, that are closed not only to foreigners but to Soviet citizens too? Would that not be a problem?

[Karpov] You see, I think that when we agree on the verification measures, these verification measures should not be hindered by any restrictions. So verification should be omnipotent, so to stay, and be carried out in a way that no circumvention of the agreement be possible.

[(MacGregor)] So openness on both sides. Complete openness.

[Karpov] Yes, sure.

[(MacGregor)] Thank you Mr Karpov and Mr Hathaway in Darwin, Australia.

[MacGregor] We now have a question from Belgium -- from Brussels, Mr (Mukesh Patel). Mr (Patel), your line to Mr Karpov.

[(Patel)] Good evening, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] Hello.

[(Patel)] What influence does the recent landing of a light plane in the Red Square have on Soviet defense strategy?

[Karpov] On Soviet defense ... ?

[(Patel)] Strategy.

[Karpov] Ah, strategy. [laughs] You see, we feel that incident, of course, is an example of some lapses in the military defense of the Soviet Union... [changes thought] in the antiaircraft defense. Maybe that should be corrected, but we feel that here lies the necessity for more agreements that would guarantee that no such incidents will take place, in fact. So, more openness, more possibilities for cooperation in such things as the guaranteeing of the nonviolation of frontiers and such things that will increase credibility and increase the confidence-building process.

[MacGregor] Mr (Patel) in Brussels, were you happy with that answer?

[(Patel)] Yes, fairly happy, except that I think I would like to add that, in my personal opinion, the element of coexistence in any defense strategy is the key to the peaceful evolution of mankind, and I certainly hope that this is what the nucleus of the Soviet defense strategy is.

[Karpov] Yes, and I agree with you. And, recently in Berlin the Warsaw Pact countries proposed to NATO countries to have meetings to discuss the strategies of both blocs in order to establish a possibility of agreeing on nonoffensive strategy.

[MacGregor] Mr (Patel), thank you for your question. Before we leave the very interesting question of the Cessna which landed in Red Square, it was, of course, something that led to the replacement of Marshal Sokolov as the defense minister in the Soviet Union, the sacking of Marshal Kudinov as commander in chief of the Soviet air defense forces, which was quite drastic in some people's eyes. Mr Karpov, what has happened to Mr Mathias Rust, the young pilot? What is his position at the moment?

[Karpov] He is under arrest in Moscow because under the Soviet Penal Code the violation of the Soviet frontier is punishable. So, now the investigation is going on and then he will stand trial if the legal authorities decide that he should stand trial. But, maybe there will be some other measures applied to him, maybe extradition, I don't know, that will be decided by the legal authorities.

[MacGregor] So, for the moment he is still in prison in Moscow?

[Karpov] Yes.

[MacGregor] Thank you Mr Karpov. Now, we have a call from Buckinghamshire here in England from Mr (Matthew Humberston). Mr (Humberston), your question please.

[(Humberston)] I would like to ask Mr Karpov how does he rate Britain's nuclear capability?

[Karpov] Pardon? I didn't ...

[(Humberston)] How do you rate Britain's nuclear capability?

[MacGregor] You are talking, Mr (Humberston), of Britain's independent deterrent -- Polaris submarines?

[(Humberston)] Yes, yes.

[Karpov] You see, we feel that the British nuclear potential, of course, plays a certain and not so small role in the European nuclear equilibrium. But up to now, we are ready not to take into account this nuclear potential as far as the problem of medium-range missiles is concerned. But we feel that later on when the Soviet and American medium-range missiles are eliminated and the Soviet Union and the United States carried out the 50 percent reduction of their strategic offensive forces, I think that other nuclear powers should come into the picture, so to say, and participate in the talks to reduce nuclear forces on a multilateral basis. And, if they wish to participate in the negotiations, to eliminate them altogether.

[MacGregor] When you said, other nuclear powers, Mr Karpov, would you include France, and would you include China?

[Karpov] Sure. When we are dealing with the global situation China should be included, of course.

[MacGregor] What sort of forum would you consider appropriate?

[Karpov] It might be the conference of five nuclear powers as it was suggested already by Mr Gorbachev.

[MacGregor] So, this might be in Geneva again?

[Karpov] Oh, any place which would be convenient for that.

[MacGregor] Mr (Humberston) in Buckinghamshire, did that answer satisfy you? Would you like to ask another question?

[(Humberston)] Yes, it did, but, supposing, hypothetically, that Russia was an expansionist power, how would Britain be a suitable target, supposing, just hypothetically?

[Karpov] Target of what?

[(Humberston)] Of expansion. Would you ... is Britain desirable if you were an expansionist power?

[Karpov] Who is an expansionist power?

[MacGregor] Are you asking, Mr (Humberston), if the Soviet Union has it in mind to make Britain a satellite state of the Soviet Union?

[(Humberston)] Yes, I mean, yes, if it were an expansionist power?

[Karpov] [laughs] Who is an expansionist power in this case? Is it the Soviet Union or Britain?

[MacGregor] I think, he meant the Soviet Union, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] [laughs] Soviet Union is not an expansionist power, and we don't have any plan to wage war against Britain, or conquer it. Let the British people live in their country in peace and enjoy the better life and build that life. We are not interfering in that.

[MacGregor] Yes, Good morning, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] Good morning.

[(Schulemberg)] I'm very glad to talk to you. As you would certainly agree, West Germany is particularly involved in these questions of reduction of nuclear weapons and so on. And as you will certainly know, there have been discussions between several members of the West German Government concerning the issue. So my question has got two parts. Firstly, I would like to hear your comment on that -- on these discussions, controversial discussions, within the German Government. And secondly, I would like to talk about the issue of reunification of Germany which has been brought up by a member of the coalition, concerning this disarmament. And also the issue of changes at the East-West German border in order to, you know, pull the Berlin Wall down, or whatsoever, within a great solution of nuclear safety in Europe. So, I would like to know what you think about these two points.

[MacGregor] Mr (Schulemberg). You asked two very large questions there. Let us separate them into two, as you suggest.

[(Schulemberg)] Yes, yes.

[MacGregor] The first question, I think you were inviting Mr Karpov to comment on the recent agreement by the West German coalition government to take part in the NATO discussions next week, I think you implied that.

[(Schulemberg)] Yes.

[MacGregor] And to agree to the zero option as long as the Pershing-1A's remained on West German soil?

[Schulemberg] Yes.

[MacGregor] Right, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] Yes, this decision, we may hope that it is a decision to participate inside the process of making the Soviet-American agreement more realistic and possible. But I feel that as far as the West German Armed Forces are concerned, we are not having now in mind to include in the picture the West German missiles -- Pershing-1's. But we feel that as we deal with the United States on the medium-range missiles and operational tactical missiles, or the missiles on the range within the range of 500-1,000 km, we should deal with the American warheads, nuclear warheads, that are on West German soil and are warheads for those Pershing-1 missiles.

We feel that as we eliminate our Soviet missiles of that range -- 500-1,000 km -- why the Americans should retain warheads for missiles of this range?

[MacGregor] Yes, as you reminded...

[Karpov] It is only natural that these warheads should be eliminated.

[MacGregor] Mr (Schulemburg), would you like to comment on that briefly?

[(Schulemburg)] Well, no, that is alright. I would like to go on to the second part of my question.

[MacGregor] As Mr Karpov said, the Pershing-1 missiles are dual key control. In other words, they cannot be fired without American permission. Your second question was about the reunification of the two Germanys.

[(Schulemburg)] Well, it is that of course West German people is particularly involved, and several West German politicians brought up the question whether within a great solution of the European peace treaty or whatsoever, including disengagement of nuclear weapons, one should talk about reunification of Germany firstly, and secondly one should talk about the abolition of the Berlin Wall and the normalization at the border between East and West Germany, a situation which is not normal at all at the time being. [sentence as heard]

[Karpov] You say there are two German states, and of course the problem of reunification of Germany is the matter that can be decided only between them. So we feel that the improvement of relations between the two German states is the means that should be used here, and the frontier question that was mentioned here is, of course, a part of the improvement of relations between the two German states.

[MacGregor] Do you see the likelihood of the wall in Berlin being removed?

[Karpov] That depends upon the two states and their relations. If there is a possibility for such an agreement between the two Germanies, I think that might be done.

[MacGregor] Well, let us move on to a question from Malawi and from Mr (Basir Jogi) who is in Malawi. Mr (Jogi), your question please to Mr Karpov in Moscow.

[(Jogi)] Good morning, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] Good morning.

[(Jogi)] My question is, if the USSR is concerned about peace why does it not do away with its nuclear forces, thereby setting an example?

[Karpov] I am afraid I did not get your question.

[MacGregor] I will repeat the question, Mr Karpov: If the Soviet Union is so desirous of peace, why does she not get rid of her nuclear weapons -- I assume he means unilaterally -- as an example to others?

[Karpov] You see, of course that is something fantastic. We cannot get rid of our nuclear weapons if the four other nuclear powers retain their nuclear weapons. Of course it is not possible now, in this situation of mistrust that exists. So we should cooperate in doing that [as heard] and only balanced reductions that would guarantee security of all is a possible way out to a denuclearized world.

[MacGregor] I think the line probably is not good enough to go back to Mr (Jogi) in Malawi, but I am sure he is still listening, Mr Karpov. I think a lot of people feel that it really is up to one of the superpowers to make the first move in good faith.

[Karpov] Any why not Britain? [laughs]

[MacGregor] Well, Britain is not sitting down in Geneva currently face-to-face with the Soviet Union...

[Karpov interrupts] Okay, then, why not the United States?

[MacGregor] Is it time, perhaps, for somebody to make an imaginative 'leap into the dark,' in a sense?

[Karpov] Of course, we have suggested that 'leap in the dark,' in fact. We have suggested to the United States to reduce our offensive nuclear weapons, strategic offensive nuclear weapons, by 50 percent in 5 years. Is it not imaginative?

[MacGregor] What about the likelihood of an agreement on intermediate-range forces -- which are being discussed of course in Geneva at the moment -- by the summer, as was predicted earlier this year? Do you think that is still on the cards?

[Karpov] We feel that an agreement on medium-range missiles is possible, and is possible soon if the United States will remove those obstacles that they introduced in their position that is on the table in Geneva. I would mention the examples of these unrealistic, in fact, positions that cannot be the basis for an agreement. First of all, that is the insistence of the United States on the conversion of medium-range missiles into missiles of less range in Europe so that keep them [as heard] in Europe together with all the infrastructure -- the launch sites and all the equipment that guarantees the launch of missiles. We know that reconversion is very simple and can be carried out within 48 hours, so in fact under this pretext medium-range missiles can be kept in Europe, in fact, and reintroduced very quickly. The second one is the insistence of the United States on keeping the cruise missiles, in fact, without warheads -- nuclear warheads -- on European soil, or removing them intact to ships, which means, in fact, no destruction of them and no reduction of nuclear forces. And the third one, the insistence of the United States to have their medium-range missiles in Alaska within the reach of the Soviet territory. In fact, that would increase the danger to the Soviet Union from the American side.

[MacGregor] But, of course...

[Karpov interrupts] ...(When) the Soviet Union will reduce nuclear forces of its own.

[MacGregor] But, of course, the Alaska agreement could be seen to be side-by-side with an agreement to allow the Soviet Union (?similar) warheads east of the Urals.

[Karpov] Then in Asia.

[MacGregor] In Asia. But all the points that you mentioned could perhaps be solved by proper verification procedures, could they not, Mr Karpov?

[Karpov] Of course the proper verification can be applied here, but in fact we would not like an agreement that would be agreement on elimination of medium-range weapons only in words and not in real life, so that is why we feel this position of the United States should be transformed into a position that would open the way for the agreement on the real reductions and elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe.

[MacGregor] Well, Mr (Jogi) in Malawi, I hope you heard Mr Karpov's answer. We now move to (Mere) in Wiltshire here in Great Britain. Dr (Alan Hart), your question, please to Mr Karpov.

[Hart] My question is I travel in the Soviet Union and speak to the Russian people quite freely, and I know that the Russian people after their terrible experiences from Napoleon to the Great Patriotic World War II have no desire for war. I am grieved to hear so many politicians saying that Russia, the USSR, is a potential enemy, and they quote various reasons: We must keep strong, we must not appease like we appeased Hitler in 1939, we must not disarm unilaterally. They criticize...

[MacGregor interrupts] Could you come to your question please, Dr (Hart)?!

[Hart] What is your reaction to this statement of so many politicians and the reason they give for regarding Russia as a potential enemy?

[Karpov] You see various people that claim Russia is aggressive power and so on. I think they are guided by their own interests, political or other interests, and we in fact are for peace. We do not have aggressive designs or aggressive plans and now we are working for a better world with security for all and without the burden of the arms race and so for us that world means better life for the Soviet people, the better possibilities to expand, not what is called the Russian empire, but the life, the level of the Soviet people.

[MacGregor] Can I ask a question, not totally unrelated to that, but it has certainly to do with arms control, Mr Karpov? The question of chemical weapons. We heard in the news bulletin early today, which I am sure you heard on the BBC World Service that there is soon to be, there is probably soon to be a Russian initiative on the question of banning chemical weapons which would allow instant inspections as well, and this has of course in the past has been a stumbling block. Can you shed any light on that?

[Karpov] Yes, we suggested in Geneva during previous talks on chemical weapons a wide-range program for elimination of chemical weapons and strict verification measures to guarantee that there is no production of chemical weapons and the chemical weapons arsenals are destroyed. So now, one of the stumbling blocks there in Geneva is the problem how to verify some suspicious situations where some countries might have grounds to believe that some other participant of the convention on banning chemical weapons is circumventing the provisions of these conventions.

In fact, we support the British proposal introduced last June in Geneva on challenge inspections and we still are in that very position that we can cooperate with Britain on this question and can cooperate at the Geneva conference. The very problem now is that the United States insists on such a system of inspection which is unacceptable to the majority of the conference participants.

[MacGregor] But are you saying you would have agreed to challenge inspections?

[Karpov] Yes, we agree to challenge inspection and we agree that these inspection should be obligatory. There should not be the right to refuse such an inspection. What is now under discussion is how to guarantee to the countries the possibility of suggest alternative measures instead of on-site inspection to make the claimer the possibility to know that there is no violation and the suspicion is unfounded.
[sentence as heard]

[MacGregor] And will this be presented formally next week?

[Karpov] No, there is no such problem because we are now discussing, in fact we discussed these problems with the United States and with Britain for some time already. So there should be a consensus found here and we try to reach such consensus.

[MacGregor] So you see no real problem now in reaching an agreement on chemical weapons?

[Karpov] The problem is that we feel that some people in the United States have recently lost interest to agreement, maybe because they are planning to start the production of binary chemical weapons in October of this year. We do not know, but we notice such a tendency.

[MacGregor] This is something obviously to be discussed at Geneva.

[Karpov] Yes.

[MacGregor] Thank you Dr (Hart) in Wiltshire for your question from which we have strayed somewhat, but we will now move back to weapons in the more conventional sense and talk to (Klaus Sigabard) who is in (Lagas) in Portugal. Mr (Sigabard) your question please to Mr Karpov.

[(Sigabard)] Yes. Thank you very much. I would like to pose the following question to Mr Karpov: Since the nuclear armament appears to be a consequence of the conventional armament, would not it be a good idea to start dismantling the conventional armament on a scale much faster which is now being discussed at the MBFR in Vienna for instance.

[Karpov] Yes, I think that, as I mentioned already during the answer to that previous question, we suggest that parallel to the measures of elimination [as heard] nuclear weapons we discuss the possibility and the methods to reduce conventional weapons and conventional forces in Europe, starting in Europe, to levels that would guarantee the impossibility of unleashing aggression, (?unleashing) offensive so that NATO and Warsaw Pact have in Europe only such forces that will empower them to repulse an attack on the other side; [as heard] not more, not for an aggressive attack. So, we are ready to have guarantees of this process by implying strict verification measures that are needed for such resolution.

[MacGregor] Because currently, Mr Karpov, of course, the Warsaw Pact conventional forces outnumber the NATO ones by something like two to one, do they not?

[Karpov] No, it is not right. You see when the calculations are introduced by NATO, they usually discount the forces of France and Spain which number totally, both of them about 1 million personnel and a lot of weapons on the side of NATO. So if we take that into consideration, the number of conventional forces of both blocs will be roughly equal, about 3 million plus on each side.

[MacGregor] I see. That is not the figure that the International Institute for Strategic Studies here in Britain would agree with, I think, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] You see, sometimes we agree with the institute, sometimes we disagree when the secrets [as heard] introduced by the institute we do not consider right.

[MacGregor] Mr (Sigabard) in Portugal, would you like to come back on that question?

[(Sigabard)] Well, I would like to, maybe just enlarge on his last point, especially some reason what we know here, the number of armored vehicles in the USSR seems to be rather large, and probably much larger than necessary, but of course as you say, there seems to be a matter of interpretation of these figures.

[MacGregor] Yes, the figures I have in front of me for tanks and artillery say Warsaw Pact forces something like 70,000 tanks/artillery, NATO forces about 28,000.

[(Sigabard)] Yes, that is the figure I have here too.

[MacGregor] Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] Yes, I would like to comment on that. Of course, in the structure of the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, there are some dissimilarities so to say and there are some imbalances. Of course, it is right that the Warsaw Pact has more tanks than NATO, but on the other hand the NATO forces have more tactical aviation that is capable of delivering nuclear weapons. So, it is only two examples of the disparities here and we are for eliminating such imbalance during the process of reduction of conventional weapons.

[MacGregor] I am sure many people will be very happy to hear that Mr Karpov, but that is of course another forum that Geneva, and perhaps for another time. Now, from (Lagas) in Portugal we move to Bulgaria, to Mr (Kristo Grozev). Mr (Grozev), your question, please, Mr (Grozev).

[(Grozev)] Good morning, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] Good morning.

[(Grozev)] We know that in the presence of nuclear weapons, almost all kinds of conventional arms are fairly obsolete. So, suppose that the Soviet Union and the United States reach an agreement on dismantling all their nuclear weapons, won't the world be left dependent on the other countries with nuclear potential, for example, Israel or China or Pakistan? We have indications about their potentials.

[Karpov] There is such a problem, of course. (?If you) guarantee that when the nuclear disarmament is carried through by major powers -- the five nuclear powers -- there is no adherence of additional nuclear powers, and of course this problem needs some further studies and some further agreement which already goes out of the sphere of five nuclear powers and should be dealt with with the participation of other states as well.

[MacGregor] Mr (Grozev) in Bulgaria, would you like to come back to Mr Karpov on that?

[(Grozev)] Yes. My only question was will there be coordination and he answered that. Thank you.

[MacGregor] But I think there is a fear, Mr Karpov, of course that even should agreement be reached on intermediate and even the other ranges of nuclear weaponry in Europe and around the world, there will still be countries in the Third World that have a capability to fire nuclear weapons. What can one do about that?

[Karpov] I think there is already some good practice and good experience in the International Atomic Energy Agency which, I think, proved a rather efficient institution, and I think the improvement of that institution and give it more power and more possibilities to investigate and more 'glasnost' if your prefer this word...

[MacGregor] More openness...

[Karpov] Openness in this region of problems. I think it would help to overcome the suspicion that some other countries may appear as nuclear as nuclear powers while the five nuclear powers are eliminating their nuclear weapons.

[MacGregor] And of course if they won't stick to the protocol, and they won't sign the nonproliferation treaty this is the problem.

[Karpov] Yes, of course, and I think we should work for improving the procedures of the nonproliferation process.

[MacGregor] Mr (Grozev) in Bulgaria, we thank you again for your question. We now move to Luxembourg, here in Western Europe. And Mr (Neil Finn), you have a question for Mr Karpov?

[(Finn)] Good afternoon, Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] Good afternoon.

[(Finn)] Mr Karov, my question is: If in achieving a zero solution in Europe, medium-range missiles are transferred to Central and Eastern USSR, is there not a danger of another zone of confrontation across the North Pacific?

[Karpov] But, in fact we do not suggest that these missiles should be moved there. We suggest that all medium-range missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe be destructed or dismantled in a way that is guaranteed that they cannot be moved anywhere and used as weapons.

[MacGregor] But there is an intermediate agreement on the table, is there not, to keep 100 warheads east of the Urals?

[Karpov] Yes, it is there in the draft treaty presented both by the United States and the Soviet Union, in fact. Here, we agreed at Reykjavik that the United States will have the right to keep 100 weapons on their missiles, medium-range missiles, on its national territory, and the Soviet Union will keep 100 weapons on its medium-range missiles in its Asian part. And we agreed, in fact, to have control over these missiles that will be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States. So, there shouldn't be any possibility for both countries to violate the level of 100 weapons on missiles.

[MacGregor]: Mr (Finn) in Luxembourg?

[Finn] Yes, that doesn't stop great power rivalry in the region, and it is a fairly explosive region with the China-Soviet confrontation and also with the growing influence in Micronesia of the USSR. So, is there still not a risk of having any missiles in this area?

[Karpov] You see, we are for elimination of all nuclear weapons anywhere. In fact, we are for elimination of the rest of the medium-range missiles in Europe that will be retained by the United States and the Soviet Union for the time being. But we should work for that in a wider context of Asian problems. There are American bases, there are American missiles, for instance tactical missiles being now installed in South Korea with all the launch sites and necessary facilities being built there. The Americans are building a huge airbase in Misawa, in northern Japan, which will be a base for F-16's -- the nuclear-delivery planes -- and so why we should not have that in mind and have special talks on the possibilities of reducing the nuclear risks there having in mind these factors as well?

[MacGregor] So you are saying the focus of attention will shift after an agreement in Europe?

[Karpov] Oh yes, I think so.

[MacGregor] Mr (Finn), thank you for your question from Luxembourg. We now move to Kendle in Cumbria, here in Great Britain. Mr (Edward Stanton) is on the line. Mr (Stanton), your question please.

[(Stanton)] Oh, greetings to you Mr Karpov.

[Karpov] How do you do?

[(Stanton)] I am very pleased to be able to speak to you today.

May I ask you, Mr Karpov, would you agree that our world would be a safer place to live in if both East and West were to substantially cut down on weapons of mass destruction, and at the same time direct more money and effort into peace-building activities?

[Karpov] Yes, I agree completely with you. That's our goal, to convert the present world where competition in arms building, arms race, is one of the main trends into a world of peaceful cooperation for development of economy and interrelationship -- peaceful interrelationship -- between all countries of the world.

[MacGregor] Is it not so, Mr Karpov, though that it is essential for the Soviet Union's internal economy that some sort of arms agreement is reached because, it is said by outsiders, you simply cannot afford to go on putting money into the nuclear arms race?

[Karpov] You see, of course, we are not interested in wasting our money on arms race, and we would prefer to have that money introduced into the economy that will make the level of life in the Soviet Union much higher.

[MacGregor] One final question, Mr Karpov, if I may ask you, because the line to Kendle in Cumbria was not very good, as you could hear. You have yourself been sitting opposite Americans over the table for 20 or so years. Very little has been achieved in terms of -- in fact, one could say nothing has been achieved -- in terms of reducing the nuclear stockpile in the world. What are your hopes that something will be, quite shortly?

[Karpov] You see, I would say that there was a chance to reduce nuclear stockpiles in 1979 when the SALT II agreement was reached but was not ratified by the United States. We hope that the medium-range missiles in Europe agreement can be a practical step in that direction to reduce the nuclear stockpiles. It would be, maybe, not a wide range reduction but it will be a real reduction in the nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, and that might be a practical step to other measures that will further reduce Soviet and American nuclear potentials and later on to lead to agreement between all nuclear powers to reduce their weapons and eliminate them.

[MacGregor] Mr Viktor Karpov in Moscow, we thank you for joining us today. To everyone who called in, we thank you too from "It's Your World" between London, Moscow, and the rest of the world. From us today, goodbye.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1515

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

UK'S HEALEY DISCUSSES INF WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS

Meets Dobrynin, Zagladin

LD111829 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1735 GMT 11 May 87

[Text] Moscow, 11 May (TASS) -- Today Anatoliy Dobrynin, CPSU Central Committee secretary, and Vadim Zagladin, CPSU Central Committee member, received Denis Healey, prominent figure of the British Labor Party and "shadow" foreign affairs minister, who is in Moscow at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

An exchange of opinions took place on a wide range of disarmament problems, above all relating to the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space weapons and first and foremost to the elimination of medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe. Both sides attach great importance to achieving the zero option on missiles of both these types.

The question of the prospects for cutting troops and conventional arms in Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals -- was touched upon in particular. The Soviet side stressed that the countries of the socialist community put forward as far back as June 1986 proposals on reducing land troops and tactical strike aviation by 25 percent at the start of the nineties. At the same time, it was proposed that tactical nuclear weapons should be reduced.

Later on, considerations were expressed concerning the possibility and necessity of reducing tactical strike aviation the very beginning and of diminishing the concentration of troops, and first of all of the most dangerous offensive types of weapons along the line of contact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization. It is a question of measures that would rule out the possibility of a sudden attack.

The asymmetry in the armed forces of the European countries, conditioned by historical geographic, and other factors, needs to be removed, but not by a build-up on the part of those lagging behind, but by reductions on the part of whosoever has turned out to be ahead.

Military balance should be retained at the lowest possible level. The level of weaponry should be lowered to a limit of reasonable sufficiency, that is, to a limit that is essential for solving only defensive tasks.

Denis Healey spoke out for a most rapid start of practical talks with the aim of a real reduction of troops and conventional weapons in Europe. A readiness for this was expressed from the Soviet side. Together with this, it was stressed that the West is limiting the discussions now being conducted, with problems of procedure. Thus, the talks have not moved as far as yielding concrete deeds. In the view of the sides, the Vienna meeting should as soon as possible work out directives to discuss all of these problems at the second stage of the Stockholm conference.

Also touched on were questions of bilateral Soviet-British relations; moreover, both sides spoke out for their all-around improvement.

Healey Comments

AU112008 Paris AFP in English 1952 GMT 11 May 87

[Text] Moscow, 11 May (AFP)--British shadow foreign secretary Denis Healey said here on Monday that he had been "authorized" to say that "the Russians are praying for a Labour government" following the announcement of a British general election on 11 June.

The Labour politician, talking to journalists outside the British Embassy here, was responding to a question as to whether the Soviet leadership might prefer to see a Conservative government re-elected after British Prime Minister Thatcher's diplomatically successful visit here in March.

Mr. Healey said: "I think they'd much prefer a Labour government, and the idea that they would prefer a Tory government (...) is the most utter bunkum and they have authorised me to say so."

When pressed to identify who had authorised him to reveal the Soviet view, Mr. Healey said simply that he had seen "a lot of people" in the course of consultations at the U.S.A. and Canada Institute and the World Economics and International Relations Institute. On Tuesday he is to meet Foreign Secretary Eduard Shevardnadze.

Mr. Healey had disarmament talks on Monday with the deputy director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, Radomir Bogdanov, and Central Committee Secretary Anatoly Dobrynin, with whom he also raised specific human rights cases, although he declined to give names.

Mr. Healey said he felt after his discussions that the Soviet Union was prepared to negotiate significant reductions of conventional arms, and that the "essential difference" between East and West could be overcome if the issue could be discussed at a broader arms forum sought by the Warsaw Pact countries.

He added however that because of NATO reticence, "very little progress of substance had been made in Vienna where the two blocs were deciding on a suitable forum to replace the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks.

The West German magazine BILD reported Monday that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was preparing to propose the withdrawal of all foreign troops from "all sovereign European states" at a forthcoming Warsaw Pact summit in East Berlin.

Meets Shevardnadze

LD121519 Moscow TASS in English 1509 GMT 12 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 12 TASS -- Edward Shevardnadze, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and foreign minister of the USSR, today received Denis Healey, a prominent member of Britain's Labour Party who is the "shadow" foreign secretary, and they had a thorough and spirited discussion of the key international problems of the times.

Healey was briefed in detail upon recent Soviet initiatives towards an early accord on the issue of medium-range and theater missiles in Europe. He hailed the Soviet Union's readiness to come to terms on a complete elimination of these classes of weapons from Europe.

The common understanding was expressed that in the nuclear and space age a lasting security, both general security and the security of each nation in particular, can only be ensured through all-round cooperation among countries with different social systems, a scaling down of military confrontation and radical steps towards complete nuclear disarmament, and by preventing the arms race from spilling over into outer space.

As they discussed a Middle Eastern settlement, they called for convening an international conference on the Middle East.

Healey Holds News Conference

LD121812 Moscow TASS in English 1757 GMT 12 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 12 TASS -- Denis Healey, a prominent member of the British Labour Party, foreign secretary in the "shadow" cabinet, spoke at a press conference here today devoted to the results of his talks in Moscow. Denis Healey is staying in the Soviet Union on the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

He said that "we are presented now with an opportunity for lifting the shadow of nuclear war, for burying the cold war psychosis and for moving towards an international security system. The movement so far has been steadily in the right direction even if not as fast as I would wish." Denis Healey stressed his conviction that "the Soviet Government is completely sincere in what it is seeking to do".

Denis Healey said he had a busy time in Moscow discussing a wide range of major international issues. His talks focused on disarmament issues because they are "the kernel of East-West relations at the present time".

He expressed the view that the Soviet side attaches much importance to the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms, first of all to the question of eliminating medium-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe. Denis Healey said this "negotiation is going well although some technical difficulties are to be overcome" and that the attainment of accord is possible. He also said that it was his impression that the Soviet side "is pressing very hard to get agreement on this". Denis Healey added that if European countries "look at the alternative, they will have to decide that the Soviet offer is the best".

Denis Healey said he was disturbed by the stand taken by the British Government which refuses to accept the Soviet proposals on medium-range missiles. In his opinion Britain could play a more important role by using her influence to persuade the West Europeans, especially West Germany, of the need to accept the Soviet proposal.

Moscow Radio Interview

LD132109 Moscow World Service in English 1550 GMT 13 May 87

[Interview with UK Shadow Foreign Secretary Denis Healey by correspondent Barabeychik on 12 May in Moscow on the 'Guest Speaker' program -- recorded]

[Text] [Barabeychik] A 3-day visit to the USSR by Denis Healey, the foreign secretary of the shadow cabinet of the United Kingdom, has just ended. I was talking with the secretary on Tuesday before his departure for home.

[Begin recording] [Barabeychik] Mr Healey, the Soviet Union and the United States are negotiating an agreement on the removal of their medium-rockets from Europe. Much depends here, naturally on the position of the European nations. What does Labour in Britain think here?

[Healey] The Labour Party is strongly in favor of what I understand to be the Soviet proposal, namely that whole class of nuclear missiles should be removed from Europe, the intermediate nuclear forces and what you call the operational tactical weapons.

[Barabeychik] Do you think the support of this idea of the Soviet Union will get you more supporters during the election?

[Healey] I think it will although I don't think it will be a dominant issue in the election. I think people in Britain, like the Soviet Union, are more interested in their living standards, what the health service is like and the education of their children, and such questions, I think will be central to the election.

[Barabeychik] The removal of medium-range rockets from Europe is but the first step in the right direction toward a denuclearization of our world. Our ultimate goal still remains, the elimination of all nuclear weapons in three stages by the end of the century as proposed by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in mid-January 1986. What do you think of this overall aim?

[Healey] I think the objective is very sensible but the means to achieve it have not been fully explained. What I agree very much with Mr Gorbachev and Mr Dobrynin is that what we need to do is to move to a new system of international security, which is based on cooperation between the blocs in the light of the fact that we now have an independent, interdependent and even integral world. But of course cooperation in one field requires cooperation in others and it would be impossible to have nuclear disarmament among the great powers unless it extends to all other powers and also covers the creation of a balance of conventional weapons of a defensive nature and this I think is the next big task in Europe. It is also incidentally the area of disarmament from which the Soviet Union will gain most economically, because the reduction in existing nuclear forces has very little economic effect.

[Barabeychik] Reviewing the present situation in Europe we see that the pulling together of efforts of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and their work for peace and security could bring more efficient results than now when they act to a large degree not in harmony. If the Labour comes to power in June, would you more actively cooperate with the Soviet Union?

[Healey] Yes we would. We'd do so as a loyal member of NATO because we believe just as, for example, Poland, believes its security depends on cooperation with the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact, we believe our security will depend on cooperation with our European neighbors and the United States in the Atlantic alliance; and so we would wish to use our influence inside the alliance for peace, just as I hope our friends in Eastern Europe would wish to use their influence in the Warsaw Pact for peace.

[Barabeychik] You have been received by Anatoliy Dobrynin, the secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and by our Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. How would you comment on the state of relations between our parties, between your party and the CPSU in their activities for peace?

[Healey] I think that there is very close agreement between our parties on the major issues of East-West relations and it was mainly about those issues that I was talking in the last 2 days, particularly about the scope for reaching rapid agreement on nuclear disarmament and a reduction and balance of conventional forces in Europe.

And here I think our parties stand very close. There are some other issues, particularly affecting human rights, where we still have some disagreements, so I hope that area of disagreement may be narrowed as a result of the new laws on this matter which have been introduced by the Soviet Union.

[Barabeychik] Speaking of our internal problems, the last time we met with you was here in Moscow in June of 1986, so a year has passed. How do we proceed with our perestroyka [restructuring]? Can you make certain comments here?

[Healey] Well, I think all of us in the West have been very impressed by one aspect of the new perestroyka and that's glasnost [openness]. I think that a great deal of progress still has to be made, as Secretary Gorbachev has many times stated, in overcoming resistance in the bureaucracy to some of the changes in the structure of the Soviet economy, which I think the Central Committee wishes to achieve. Perhaps in the Soviet Union you still have a problem in overcoming resistance in the middle ranks and establishing enthusiasm at the bottom. [end recording]

Moscow TV Interview

LD160345 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 14 May 87

[Interview with Denis Healey, UK Labour Party spokesman for foreign affairs, by political observer Boris Kalyagin; Healey in English with superimposed Russian translation; date and place not given -- live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Kalyagin] Hello, Comrades! Our interviewee today is Denis Healey, one of the leading figures of the British Labour Party -- the country's chief opposition party -- and foreign secretary in the Labour Party's so-called shadow cabinet. Denis Healey, there has arisen today a real opportunity to rid the European Continent -- our European home -- of a considerable proportion of the nuclear arsenals that have accumulated in it. We proposed eliminating all the medium-range Soviet and U.S. missiles and the operational and tactical missiles in Europe, taking into account the West's proposal, President Reagan's so-called zero option. Now we are even proposing two zero options. What do you and your party think of that initiative and what, in your opinion, are the prospects of reaching an agreement on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles?

[Healey] The zero option for medium-range missiles was first proposed to Brezhnev by Labour Party Leader Michael Foot and me. We support that proposal 100 percent and we are glad that the Soviet Union also supports it. We think, though, that it also would be preferable to eliminate the 100 warheads that the Soviet Union intends to keep in Asia so the United States will not keep its 100 warheads on its territory. I believe that your security in the Far East can be ensured by other means and, of course, for the purpose of verification, it would be preferable to eliminate all arms of that class, rather than to leave 100 warheads. We nevertheless support your initiative and firmly support another zero option -- namely the elimination of everything that you call operational and tactical missiles. We call them reduced-range missiles. I think that we are bringing all our influence to bear on the British Government to make Great Britain expound its position on this question with considerably greater clarity. We are also trying to influence the FRG Government to express its agreement with the missile proposal. Agreement already has been expressed by Foreign Minister Genscher, in contrast to FRG Chancellor Kohl.

[Kalyagin] We try to go halfway to meet the West's position, taking their wishes into account. But one gets the impression that as soon as we accept the proposals of Western governments, they themselves begin to deviate from them and put forward new conditions. The impression now is that certain Western leaders have an interest not in reducing nuclear missiles in Europe, but in equalizing their levels, as they put it; in other words building up their own missiles. Is that really a path toward disarmament?

[Healey] I do not think that is really the serious view of any of the Western governments, in particular the FRG Government, with which I cannot agree. [as heard] I do not think that when it comes to making a final decision, the FRG Government will consider it preferable to leave a certain quantity of missiles on its territory. A recent public opinion poll showed that three-fourths of the FRG population, or 77 percent, support the zero option, both for medium-range missiles and for operational and tactical missiles. I believe that in 1 or 2 months we will be able to reach a concrete agreement on this question. It will be the first step toward creating an international security system that would recognize the interdependence of the world today that your general secretary spoke of at the 27th CPSU Congress last spring.

[Kalyagin] We, of course, would prefer to rid the European Continent of all nuclear arms altogether, but many Western leaders currently are speaking in their defense. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was recently in our country, as you know. She had the opportunity to speak to Soviet television viewers and showed herself to be quite consistent and, I would say, a zealous supporter of keeping nuclear arms, calling them the best guarantee of peace. What is your opinion?

[Healey] As you probably know, the Labour Party and I personally do not agree with Thatcher on this question, and I think that many people in Great Britain -- even people who do not support the Labour Party -- are very anxious over the new stance the Conservative government has adopted. It is of the opinion that even if there is a balance of conventional weapons in Europe, Great Britain and other Western countries must still have their own nuclear weapons in order to threaten the Soviet Union, so neither side is able to attack the other using conventional forces. Now, however, we have approximate parity, although in certain types of weapons -- for example tanks -- you have superiority. It is therefore very important for both sides in Europe to start talks not only on reducing conventional weapons by 25 percent -- which is what your government proposed -- but also on reducing the superiority of the West and the East in whatever area.

Parity must be restored by reducing weapons, and not by building up the interior side. I hope that we will soon get down to this question.

I believe that you are not making full use of the principle of glasnost, which you have adopted for your domestic affairs, in the sphere of foreign policy. The West's information on your forces in Europe currently depends on intelligence data obtained by satellite; yet it would be greatly to your benefit at the talks if you were to tell us frankly, as we tell you, what forces you have in Eastern Europe. Otherwise, we will have to rely on data that may be inflated for political propaganda reasons. During my talks in Moscow over the past 2 days, I appreciated very highly the fact that you are ready to place your cards on the table. That needs to be done in future talks to ascertain what points in your position worry us, and what it is in our position that worries you, so that we would be given the same sort of detailed information as was given to the United States in Reykjavik on strategic nuclear forces. More openness and readiness to expound all the facts will help both sides advance along the path of cooperation and ending the arms race.

[Kalyagin] I believe that in Vienna at the talks on reducing armed forces and weapons in central Europe, our representatives give the Western representatives figures about our armed forces, and the talk of the enormous advantage held by the Warsaw Pact countries in the military sphere really is, of course, of a mythical nature. Our side has superiority in one type of weapon, the West in another. You mentioned tanks, for example. It is true that the Warsaw Pact countries do have more tanks, but, on the other hand, the countries in the NATO bloc have considerably more antitank weapons. But, in any case, the main thing is that the Warsaw Pact countries came out with a proposal for a radical reduction in armed forces and weapons throughout the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, and we are awaiting a reply from the NATO countries. So far there has been no reply. We also feel that there must be a reduction in conventional weapons equal to that of nuclear weapons.

[Healey] Yes, I agree. I personally have criticized Western governments for not even agreeing on a procedure for discussing these questions, not to mention the aim that must be set in the talks. But the Warsaw Pact countries have so far not shown a readiness to provide detailed information about the Warsaw Pact forces in Eastern Europe and therefore the reduction talks have been unequal. We publish our figures, but you do not publish yours. Even during the discussions over the past 2 days when I touched on that question, I was asked to refer to figures published by private organizations in Western Europe, in particular the International Institute of Strategic Studies, in the establishment of which, incidentally, I took a personal part.

[Kalyagin] I think that even what you have been saying, your approach, is evidence that serious talks must be started between the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries, and I think that when we receive a reply -- a positive reply, if there is one -- from the NATO organization, there will be talks and there will be an exchange of all the figures, all the information, that is needed. But there is also another threat, a threat which could come from space. At Reykjavik, the possibility of scrapping all strategic nuclear armaments took shape, but it also became clear there that President Reagan's SDI is standing in the way of this, and regrettably the British Government is taking part in developing [razrabotka] this program. What is the Labour Party's attitude to these plans?

[Healey] The Labour Party and I personally very frequently have spoken out against President Reagan's SDI, against what we call Star Wars. We were against the British Government's decision to take part in it, although I must note that such participation is envisaged on an extremely low level. [Former] Defense Secretary Heseltine said initially that we would get contracts worth approximately 1.5 billion pounds sterling. As far as I am aware, the figures are much smaller: Only around 43 million pounds sterling.

I think that it will be very dangerous for the whole world if either country attempts to create a defense against strategic weapons of the kind that President Reagan is talking about. But I am bound to say that only a small number of people in the United States -- and even those directly involved in the creation of the so-called SDI -- are convinced that it can really be effective. It can be successful in the creation of a local defense, such as the one you already have created around Moscow.

We also know that the United States is conducting laser technology research. As far as we know, you also are carrying out similar research. Former U.S. defense secretaries like Schlesinger and many others are speaking out against the SDI because the program will merely lead to another twist in the arms race spiral, not to enhanced security. But we must consider the realities, and one of them is the fact that the U.S. Congress presently does not want to provide the President with the necessary funds to finance SDI.

I was very encouraged by the fact that your representative in Geneva, Mr Karpov, defined your position in a very positive, new way. If I am not mistaken, he declared that the United States and the Soviet Union should attempt to draw up a draft agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic armaments on the understanding that if the United States contravenes the ABM Treaty or starts to site weapons in space, the Soviet Union will no longer consider itself obliged to observe the treaty on reductions in strategic armaments. It seems to me that this new definition of the Soviet position is very useful because it helps to continue the talks, although there are of course substantial obstacles in the path of these talks. During my conversations in Moscow, I expressed the hope that in light of what Mr Karpov said, an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States can be achieved relatively rapidly, perhaps not on all the details of a treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear forces, because that will of course require more time, but on the general principles of such a treaty.

[Kalyagin] We desire to reach an agreement on strategic armaments and, naturally, an agreement which would tightly close the door to the penetration of weapons into space. This is because I quite agree with you: SDI will not improve the United States' security, but it will destabilize the situation in the world, because we cannot sit around idly while the United States is building up military preparations aimed at the militarization of space. [passage omitted]

I would like to go on to Soviet-British relations, because we have spoken about you possibly coming to Moscow again. What are the prospects for their being expanded, and what is the British attitude to the development of links between our countries?

[Healey] As you probably know, Britain's trade with the Soviet Union has fallen considerably under the present government. We hope to expand trade with the Soviet Union, although we recognize that you, like any other country, can only buy the goods that are competitive, both in terms of quality and price and in terms of delivery dates. [passage omitted]

I personally have made many critical remarks about the present U.S. Administration. Those remarks have often been repeated by my U.S. political colleagues, particularly Democratic Party members of the U.S. Congress. I would now like the U.S. Administration to base its actions more on a vision of the world which does not envisage the self-destruction of mankind in a nuclear war. It seems to me we must all make efforts to ensure that the shadow of self-destruction is finally removed from our lives.

[Kalyagin] Perhaps you could say a few words about your present visit to our country. I know that you held interesting meetings and talks. What have the results been?

[Healey] I spent 2 hours in conversation with Dobrynin and I had very pleasant conversation with Shevardnadze. During the conversations I have had here I was struck by the fact that the Soviet leadership has a clear program aimed at saving the country and the whole of mankind from the nuclear threat, at delivering us from the nuclear trap we all fell into 40 years ago. Like all statesmen who have recently visited your country -- including Thatcher -- my visit has left a great impression on me. Naturally, I understand that Thatcher substantially changed her stance, her attitude toward Gorbachev's policies, like Admiral James Eberle of the Royal Institute of International Relations. They all left your country with the firm conviction that you are serious in your intentions to strengthen peace. There are certain problems, some of which I raised in my conversations, but I believe that if we maintain the constructive approach which has been in evidence over the past two years, we shall be able to overcome both the technical and political obstacles in the way of talks, and even those who are possessed by nuclear mania, as Gerasimov said yesterday, will not be able to oppose it.

[Kalyagin] Denis Healey, thank you for your interesting and detailed replies. Until we meet again in Moscow.

[Healey] Thank you. I hope that the opportunity will present itself.

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CSO: 5200/1510

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW WEEKLY TALK SHOW ON INF

LD230850 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 22 May 87

["International Situation--Questions and Answers" program, "recorded during a meeting between young international affairs journalists from All-Union Radio and students and teachers at higher educational establishments in the town of Ivanovo", with unidentified chairman and journalists Petr Fedorov, Sergey Fanton, Viktor Shcherbakov, Dmitriy Morozov, and Igor Charikov]

[Excerpts] [Fedorov] Comrades, questions have now come to us in written form. A whole group of these concern the state of affairs at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva, specifically posing a question that in summary sounds like this: How does it happen that for 2 years, if not more, the mass media stubbornly asserted that the zero option offered by Reagan was not possible, yet now we have agreed to it, and we now appear to be calling the U.S. proposal our own, Soviet, proposal?

[Unidentified speaker] It is just like yesterday; a question was asked from an audience of history teachers, just as curious, saying: Comrades, let's admit all the same that the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 missiles was an impetus toward the present medium-range crisis. That is, Western reasoning on this issue has had a certain influence on people. After the war, when the Soviet Union did not yet have nuclear weapons, when the medium-range class of weapons was not yet in existence, the first atomic weapons in Europe comparable with the present medium-range system weapons were deployed precisely by the Americans on the B-29 bombers in Britain. [passage omitted on U.S. missile deployment through the fifties]

These missiles presented a serious threat to the Soviet Union and, at the end of the 1950s and start of the 1960s, we deployed our first medium-range missiles in response to the actions of the West. These were the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. Initially they were deployed on the territory of our country, and then we came out with, properly speaking, the first zero option, the first zero solution to the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe. We proposed touching zero, that is, U.S. zero medium-range missiles and Soviet zero medium-range missiles. It was our idea, our Soviet initiative. The West refused, and at that time our SS-4 and SS-5 missiles were deployed on the territory of Czechoslovakia and the GDR. In number, the NATO weapons considerably exceeded everything deployed among Soviet missiles. You have to say that parity in this class of weapons in Europe was attained by the 1970s, when we started to withdraw from combat duty the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and to replace them with SS-20 missiles. Yet for every three of the old missiles only two new ones were put in

place. For some reason the West suddenly got scared. They had repeatedly replaced their own weapons themselves, but the very first Soviet replacement of medium-range missile systems spilled over, as you know, into the NATO two track decision, when they decided on upgrading. [passage omitted on background to deployment of U.S. missiles in FRG]

Concerning our latest proposals -- we won't go through the stages from Reagan's proposal to ours -- the fact of the matter is that we have already made it clear that initially the zero option was ours, a Soviet option. Our current proposals are intended to unravel this knot.

To do this, we have gone as far as removing the medium-range missile issue from the Reykjavik package. We have agreed to link this no longer with the space weapons issue, and here too, questions often come up, asking whether we are not making too many concessions to the West, are we not accepting solutions that would harm the security of our country. You know, it is when you come up against these problems that the logic of the new way of thinking in the nuclear age is apparent.

I'll take up your attention a little longer, because in my opinion mastery of this logic is now essential for everybody. It is true that for a long time diplomacy proceeded from the inherent worth of each separate stage. We now look to the ultimate aim, the ultimate aim being nuclear disarmament, not only in Europe, but in the whole world, by the year 2000. Here, you'll understand, you can get an even deeper and clearer understanding thanks to two recent world events that have very much changed politicians' minds. I mean Bhopal and Chernobyl. You know, a Europe utterly devoid of nuclear weapons would still present a very serious threat to the existence of all mankind even in the event of using conventional weapons. If, say, all nuclear stations in Europe were eliminated, that would lead to mass annihilation. If only the chemicals and pharmaceutical plants were destroyed, that would also lead to mass poisoning -- you recall the dioxin poison story. So brinkmanship with nuclear weapons is losing its sense and, in my view, this argument can also refute the assertions of a number of Western politicians that nuclear weapons are the sole guarantee of maintaining peace in Europe. [Passage omitted noting that a similar argument was used when dynamite was invented]

[Fedorov] Questions, please.

[Koryagin] Andrey Koryagin, of the Komsomol. I have a question concerning Soviet-U.S. relations. I think there is a perfectly logical interest in precisely this area of international relations. The question is this: Can the substantial progress in Soviet-U.S. relations be accounted for only by the new political thinking of the Soviet leadership?

[Unidentified speaker] The level of Soviet-U.S. relations today leaves much to be desired. What can we do about this? We have already done a very great deal; we have proposed that the Americans look at our future with different eyes, the eyes of people of the 20th century, thinking under conditions of an abundance of nuclear weapons.

You know, the positive processes we note from time to time in current life in the United States are, naturally, the result of the insistent and persistent policy being pursued by our present leadership.

[Fedorov] The thing is that Reagan's term in office is coming to an end. There will be elections in 1988, and for his finale the present administration would very much like -- regardless of cost -- that he go down in U.S. history as a man of peace. This is an important factor on which you can calculate -- but you cannot, of course, rely on it, because I recall and you have probably recalled the words of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the news conference in Reykjavik, that we have come to the conclusion that the U.S. President is not at liberty to make his own decisions. As far as the Californian bourgeoisie is concerned, it is not a matter of its empathy or antipathy regarding the Soviet state, the fact is that this young, military-industrial bourgeoisie is built on space and nuclear weapons and on electronics. It can acquire capital only from weapons, only if there are bad relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The factor so well described in the Manifesto [Communist Manifesto of 1848] comes into play: For the sake of a 300 percent profit there is nothing the bourgeoisie would not do.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW: 'TOP PRIORITY' PROGRAM DISCUSSES INF PROPOSAL

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["Top Priority" program presented by Vladimir Pozner with panelists Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of the USA and Canada Studies Institute]

[Text] Hello. This is Vladimir Pozner presenting "Top Priority." With me on the panel today are Doctors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov of Moscow's USA and Canada Studies Institute. As you know, "Top Priority" takes a look at the crucial events and issues of the day, and as I see it there are two of them that are attracting worldwide attention presently. One, of course, is the congressional hearings in Washington, and the other is the issue of INF, or medium-range missiles in Europe. Naturally, there are other events of importance, for instance the undoing of Gary Hart, a subject we have not touched upon. Then of course, there was the accidental Iraqi [as heard] rocket attack on the USS Stark which led to the death of 37 American sailors. All of these are important events, but still I believe that the congressional hearings and the INF remains the most important. And since those hearings basically are more an American affair, although they concern other countries, but still they apply more to the way things are done in the United States, I believe that we should concentrate today on INF. And with that in mind, I would like to remind both of you as well as our listeners about the recent decision of the NATO foreign ministers when they were in Norway to call for a global ban on medium-range missiles.

Now, this is somewhat unexpected since there has not been unity in Western Europe concerning the zero option. There has not been a consensus on the desire to have both U.S. and Soviet missiles taken completely out, and in fact destroyed. Certain things were added; certain demands such as talks about short-range missiles; there's been linkage. And now suddenly there's the decision to ask for a global doing-away with medium-range missiles, that is to say, that would include the 100 warheads in Asia. How do you understand that, how do you feel about that? Dr Bogdanov?

[Bogdanov] You know, my impression is that we are witnessing a very big disarray within the NATO ranks. We have a kind of disagreement, worsening of relations between the boss -- let me put it that way -- I mean the leader of NATO, the United States, and the other members of this NATO. And what we witnessed just now, to my mind: It illustrates the disarray, lack of understanding, and the kind of, you know, lack of confidence in themselves, because they -- my impression is they don't know what they want. But at the same time, I believe that they will have to give an answer by the end of June. The beginning of June they meet in Venice, the Big Seven, and they will have to answer not the Soviet Union, not, of course they will have to answer us, but they will have to answer their own public opinion, what is their final decision. Now, as to their demand, request, whatever you call, about zero-zero option.

[Pozer] Global zero option, yes?

[Bogdanov] Global zero option, there is some (?tricking), and it's very (?trick) because as you know, we have suggested to them very recently just about 1 or 2 days ago by the statement of Secretary-General Gorbachev, that they are ready to do, provided you do away with your own INF in three places: In Japan, in Philippines, and in South Korea. (?But) what was the Americans' reaction? No, no, no, we don't have equal systems, they say. That is the whole trick. They compare our INF, our ground missiles, and they say we have no ground missiles.

But at the same time, if you are fair enough and if you don't take the other side for idiots, I'm sorry to say that, you have plenty of cruise missiles with nuclear warheads on the 7th Fleet, you have plenty of aircraft carriers able to deliver nuclear charges against the Soviet Union, and some other things, and if you make a just fair...

[Pozner] Comparison...

[Bogdanov] Comparison between INF that Soviet Union has and USA has you will see of course they are different...

[Pozner] All right...

[Bogdanov] But basically they are...

[Pozner] I understand what you're saying. Now the decision in Norway about the global zero option in being spoken about in the West, at least by some, as a Weinberger victory, whatever that means. Dr Plekhanov, do you agree with what Dr Bogdanov just said? And if you do are we to understand that by a Weinberger victory what is meant is really a ploy that would make it basically impossible for the Soviet Union to agree to ban or to do away with the 100 warheads in Asia. I mean, what is your feeling about this? And what is this business of a Weinberger victory? How do you understand that?

[Plekhanov] Well, if Mr Weinberger continues to be unenthusiastic about arms control, about measures such as elimination of INF from Europe altogether, denuclearization of Europe as such, if that is still his position, then of course this decision by NATO ministers can be interpreted as a Weinberger victory because it puts forward a formula which complicates the reaching of agreement tremendously. If we talk about the global elimination of INF, including 100 warheads which is supposed to be left with the Soviet Union and 100 that will be left with the United States...

[Pozner] In Asia.

[Plekhanov] Yeah, if we eliminate all those missiles, then of course that inevitably raises the problem of the American systems which Dr Bogdanov has referred to, in the Pacific. We have to think of our defense in the Pacific and we cannot be just left without any INF in the face of a huge armada of the American nuclear warheads in that area. So then, but then the United States raises the objection. They say no, no, no, we're not prepared to negotiate (?there). So, we are then thrown into a whole jungle of new difficulties, new equations, new problems from which we have already been able to emerge by agreeing in Moscow, I mean the Russians and the Americans, agreeing to concentrate on the European equation, and to eliminate all INF's from Europe, to agree on elimination of the shorter-range tactical missiles from Europe, and that would be the formula which could satisfy all the objections and all the difficulties which are

there. So what I'm talking about is that the European formula, which has been discussed by Secretary Shultz with the Soviet leaders in Moscow, seems to be the optimum solution for now. If we agree on that, later on we can move to the global.

[Bogdanov] And let me just very short comment about the so-called Weinberger victory. I believe (?a) Weinberger victory, and my impression is that his position within this administration's becoming stronger and stronger -- that at some point I'm really afraid that this gentleman will ruin everything. He's getting too much power.

[Pozner] I hear you speak, I hear you being quite negative about the NATO proposal. And yet, the other day, when General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev was hosting his vis-a-vis, his counterpart from Vietnam, he specifically addressed the issue of a global ban, that is of doing away with the warheads in Asia, and he said that, in fact, the Soviet Union was ready to do that... and he said that, of course for this to happen there would have to be certain conditions, such as no military buildup by the Americans in the Philippines, in South Korea, in Japan, certain other items and issues. However, he did say that the Soviet Union is for this. Now, is there any contradiction between what you're saying and what's in that statement?

[Bogdanov] There is no contradiction, there is no contradiction at all. We are ready to do that on the fair base and we have to care about our security as much as the other side has to care about their security. And in that global solution I see only one thing, again trying to move in such a way that to get universal superiority over the Soviet Union. Because if you are fair enough, if you look at that proposal from the absolutely objective, you know, view, you will see what they ask is just unilateral disarmament without any trade-offs, without any compromises. That's what I'm objecting to.

[Pozner] Right...

[Plekhanov] There, there is another...

[Pozner] Yes, Dr Plekhanov.

[Plekhanov] There is another aspect to this idea about global elimination. You know, one of the arguments that the NATO is putting forward in favor of a global ban is that if we simply concentrate on Europe and leave some warheads in Asia, that would tremendously complicate the business of verification. That is a serious argument. And we have responded by putting forward the idea of intrusive verification by both sides, with on-site inspections, with inspectors being able to see the places where the missiles are produced, where they are stored, and so on, to count things, to look into the sheds, so to say, and so on. And that sort of verification is apparently unacceptable to the Pentagon. So by moving toward this global idea they are trying to run away from the idea of intrusive verification, from the ability to control what the other side is doing and to see what he's doing, whether it is fulfilling the terms of the agreement. I think that that's also an important aspect.

[Pozner] So what you're saying basically then is that this proposal, the way it's been made from the West, is really a monkey wrench thrown in rather than a view for a radical step forward, and for in fact, arriving at an agreement that we seem to be, as Mikhail Gorbachev said, steps away now, from finding.

[Plekhanov] Let me put it this way. If the idea of a global ban is not seen, is not put forward as an alternative to the European ban, then we have no objections. Let's remove those missiles from Europe and then let's talk about the global ban. If however, it is seen as something that is to replace the agreement which is now in the making, then of course it is ...

[Pozner] Dr Bogdanov, you are shaking your head.

[Bogdanov] Yes, I am shaking my head, because I...

[Pozner] You don't agree?

[Bogdanov] I cannot, I cannot agree with you, Sergey. I look at that more seriously, and I believe that the Weinberger faction -- I call it the faction -- within this administration is trying its last maybe, maybe, last, you know, thing to torpedo the real agreement which is within the reach. That is what I feel. And (?maybe) Secretary Weinberger is just trying to gather around him all the hawks within NATO and to make a united front and to fight (?to the world.) That's my impression.

[Plekhanov] Caspar's last stand. [Pozner laughs]

[Bogdanov] Maybe, maybe.

[Pozner] All right. Now let's look at another very important development that's happened quite recently, what I'm referring to is General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's interview with journalists representing one of Italy's most popular and most widely read newspapers, the Communist Party paper called L'UNITA. And one of the questions that came up was the issue of whether or not the Soviet Union was persistently trying to draw Western Europe away from the United States, to drive a wedge between Western Europe and the United States with this whole issue of INF and General Secretary Gorbachev very clearly indicated that this was out of the question and in fact it was an old thing brought up time and time again to try to scare the West Europeans and, if anything, the idea of getting the medium-range missiles out of Europe is a way of moving towards the very basic and profound proposals that were made by Gorbachev back on 15 January 1986 with the aim of reaching or achieving a nuclear-free world by the year 2000. But what I would like to ask you at this point is the following: If we do get this agreement on INF, if it is signed, if we manage to do something extremely important which is completely do away with a class, an entire class of weapons, something that has never happened before, and something that would be extremely conducive to further progress in nuclear disarmament. If all of this happened, is there not a chance that the present Reagan administration, or perhaps not even, perhaps even the following administration, might take this opportunity to go to its own people and say, now you see, our intentions are honorable, our intentions are peaceful; we have this agreement, we are destroying medium-range missiles, but as a trade-off for that we want to destroy the ABM Treaty? Do you think that's a possibility? How do you feel?

[Bogdanov] Two comments. Number one, on trying to separate Western Europe from United States: I would like to call my American listeners' attention to the last part of that, you know, general secretary's very important statement. He says that we are very pragmatic and realistic people and we don't want to ruin the equilibrium of forces in...

[Pozner, interrupting] ...the balance of forces.

[Bogdanov] The balance of forces in Western Europe. And I would like my listeners at the American end to think it over carefully what does it mean. Number two. I unfortunately in full agreement with you [as heard] and I am thinking along the same lines.

[Pozner] In other words you do think...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] Yes, I do think...

[Pozner, interrupting] That the signing of INF might be used...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] I am not only -- I am sure that in the inner circle discussion at this administration on the very high level they are convincing each other: Okay, we give something to those Russians, but instead of that we'll get, in exchange for that we'll get the ABM Treaty ruined.

[Pozner] What do you think, Dr Plekhanov? Is that a reality?

[Plekhanov] I think there are indicators that such thinking indeed exists in the Reagan administration and some of the conservative circles in Washington. But as I think about that reasoning it really strikes me as very short-sighted. In the first place, an agreement on INF is not a concession to the Russians; this is in the interests of the Americans as well. So this is a mutually beneficial step forward. Secondly, talking about the trade-off: You know, if you stop one dangerous development and open the floodgates to another one and think that you have a balanced policy, that doesn't strike me as a reasonable approach because I think that the INF agreement should be seen as an opening wedge to a whole series of agreements on arms control, because this could be a turning point in the very negative development of the last few years when we were not signing any agreements and the old agreements were falling apart. I would like to challenge this approach head-on, and I don't see how reasonable people, serious people, can support this logic.

[Pozner] Well, let's leave that aside, serious or non-serious. With time running out I'd like to have a very short answer from both of you on the following: If we had thought about this possibility of the American leadership using INF as a trade-off when approaching their own people and the congress and saying look we've done INF, let's move away from ABM, let's do away with that treaty -- if we've thought of that, obviously Soviet leadership has also thought about that. With that in mind do you think Soviet leadership will go ahead and press for INF, for a zero option, anyway?

[Bogdanov] Anyway, it's more important. It's most important now.

[Pozner] You agree with that?

[Plekhanov] Yes, of course, of course.

[Pozner] Thank you very much. This is Vladimir Pozner on behalf of the panel of "Top Priority" wishing you all good listening.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S GERASIMOV LINKS ACCORD WITH SUMMIT PROSPECT

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[Text] Prague May 23 (CTK) -- "If an agreement on the liquidation of medium-range missiles is reached and if we agree with Americans on key issues in reducing strategic aggressive weapons and on 'Star Wars' problems, it would be a sufficient basis for holding a summit", Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said in an interview for today's RUDE PRAVO.

He added that "Mikhail Gorbachev does not conceal that he is ready to go to the United States. But he cannot go as a tourist. He has already been acquainted with President Ronald Reagan in Geneva and later in Reykjavik, and to do so for the third time has no sense. It is time for deeds. That is why, if diplomats reach sufficient progress in Geneva in summer, it could be expected that a summit can be held in autumn".

Asked about progress in the Geneva talks on medium-range missiles, Gennadiy Gerasimov said that the talks are close to conclusion. With political goodwill of both sides it is possible to close them soon.

He pointed, however, to the strange stand of the United States and its allies. "The United States says that it has to hold consultations with its allies, adding that it does not want to exert pressure on them. And its allies say that they do not want to hurry, that they must explore the question. This stand is rather strange since what is now being proposed by the Soviet side is the same what the Western side proposed several years ago, in 1981".

"The allies are now split. Margaret Thatcher says one thing, Helmut Kohl another. They do not have a joint stand. Even the recent meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Norway failed to reach a joint stand. And this, of course, makes it difficult to reply to the question when and whether at all it is possible to expect a positive culmination of the talks".

Gennadiy Gerasimov pointed out that an agreement on the liquidation of medium-range missiles could give the Reagan administration a final chord before its departure to the past. "But in the United States itself, there are forces which are against this agreement. They include also Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger."

"These forces are afraid of an agreement especially because it would be a first agreement on real reduction of nuclear weapons. They are afraid that after a first step a second would follow, and that one stone would start an avalanche, that a second step will be followed by a third and the process of nuclear disarmament, as proposed by the Soviet Union, would start", Gennadiy Gerasimov stressed.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW 'ROUNDTABLE' ON INF PROPOSAL, SDI

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["International Observers Roundtable" program with APN political observer Spartak Ivanovich Beglov, TASS political observer Yuriy Emmanuilovich Kornilov, and All-Union Radio commentator Vitaliy Sergeyevich Sobolev]

[Excerpts] It goes without saying that Soviet-Vietnamese collaboration also includes international problems: It is directed toward turning Asia and the Pacific into a region of stability, good-neighborliness, and cooperation. This can only be achieved by the efforts of all states of the region, by settling conflicts by political means, limiting and reducing armaments, and strengthening trust. Speaking at the dinner in honor of Nguyen Van Linh, Comrade Gorbachev drew attention to the problem of medium-range missiles as applied to Asia.

[Kornilov] Well, the Soviet Union is pursuing a vigorous policy of clearing Europe of nuclear weapons, and we'll undoubtedly be speaking further today about this very important problem.

But in this present context one would like to emphasize that our country is not pursuing that policy to shift the nuclear threat to other parts of the world, for example to Asia. On the contrary, our aim is to begin with Europe, but to work toward ridding all regions of these weapons; and that presupposes a solution to medium-range problems, not on a regional, but on a global basis. In his speech at the dinner for Nguyen Van Linh on 19 May, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was at pains to emphasize that there would be no obstacle to such a solution if the United States would agree to eliminate its nuclear weapons in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and also to withdraw its aircraft-carrier fleet to behind agreed limits -- it being assumed that the United States would not have any medium-range missiles on its own territory.

[Sobolev] There have already been plenty of reports that enable us to draw conclusions about world reactions to that proposal. As usual the reactions have been of two kinds, have they not, Yuriy Emmanuilovich?

[Kornilov] That's absolutely true. On the one hand, the public in Asia and in the United States itself applauds and supports the idea: After all, who does not realize that to travel on the route leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons in Asia is to strengthen security -- not only in that vast continent, but also beyond. But the reaction of official circles, and of their allies -- Japan, for example -- is a

different one. State Department spokesman Redman, while not directly rejecting the Soviet proposals, is in fact doing so indirectly, by suggesting that the United States has no medium-range missiles in the Pacific, as if the world were unaware that none other than Washington and the Pentagon has concentrated a powerful nuclear fist in Asia and the Pacific, and that they are constantly topping up the nuclear armories on their ships and on their military bases on foreign territory.

[Sobolev] Japan has unfortunately not accepted the Soviet proposal, either.

[Kornilov] In this instance Japan, too, is taking a similar stance. What it amounts to is that they are playing along with the U.S. political propaganda line. KYODO reports, in a recent criticism of the Soviet proposal, that the problems of medium-range missiles should be tackled and solved on a global basis. A senior Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman has gone so far as to assert that there are no nuclear weapons in Japan. As if the international public were ignorant of the reports both in the Japanese and in the world press, in which facts have many times been adduced to show that such weapons are being delivered to Japan and stockpiled there. As if the world public had no knowledge of the statements by both the Japanese and U.S. military, and by diplomats and politicians too, in which -- either directly or indirectly -- they in fact admit in one way or another the presence of nuclear weapons in Japan. An admission of this kind was made recently, for example, by a prominent member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, Munenori Akagi, who once held the post of head of the National Defense Agency. He said in an interview with AKAHATA that the U.S. command is bringing nuclear weapons into Okinawa. Are not such weapons being introduced into Japan's ports by the U.S. aircraft-carriers and other warships on which they have been installing nuclear Tomahawks for a number of years?

[Beglov] In the U.S. arguments against the Soviet proposal for a global zero, for medium-range nuclear missiles in Asia, the idea occurs that the Americans find any restriction on their naval activities unacceptable. Well, you know, this already begins to smack of a homily about America's right to do as it likes on the seas, including in Asia and in the Pacific: Everything is permitted.

In recent days we've heard that the Soviet side has been obliged to strongly protest against two U.S. violations of our territorial waters in the region of Avacha Bay, by the U.S. missile cruiser Arkansas. What is behind this? For some U.S. politicians and admirals the Pacific has become a sort of -- at least in their ambitions it looks alike, as they say, an inland lake. We know there are now 180 U.S. naval vessels concentrated in the Pacific, plus 1,400 aircraft -- that is, fighter-bombers and bombers. Of course in a situation like that it would be naive to expect people to believe the tale that there are no nuclear weapons aboard those ships. Nuclear weapons are known to be based in South Korea. Finally, there are 48 F-16 fighter-bombers based on the U.S. military base at Misawa in Japan. These have a range of 1,600 km and are capable of carrying nuclear weapons and reaching our Far Eastern shores.

[Sobolev] Well, let us move on from the problems of Asia to those of Europe, or rather, to the problem of nuclear missiles in Europe, which continues to attract the closest attention throughout the world, since this is an area where the possibility can be discerned of achieving a concrete agreement, for the first time in history, on the almost complete elimination of a whole class of nuclear missiles. It is for good reason that so much attention was given to this particular problem in Comrade Gorbachev's interview with the Italian Communist newspaper, L'UNITA, a major event of recent days which is being actively commented on in the press, among the public and in political circles in various countries. What I'd like to draw attention to is that one can now distinguish two groups of obstacles that are in the way of concluding a treaty

to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe and to cut them back sharply in Asia, as was already mentioned. First, there are the unconstructive elements in the U.S. draft treaty and the obscurities regarding the position of America's NATO allies in Western Europe, without whose consent the U.S. says it won't go ahead with an agreement. There are three elements of the U.S. stance that, above all, place an obstacle in the way of an accord: the intention not to eliminate the Pershing-2 missiles but merely to tinker with them -- these are the ones that can reach the territory of the Soviet Union within minutes. The second is the order in which the reductions would be carried out: the functions of the sides would at first sharply diverge, with the Soviet Union making the reductions while the United States would only verify [kontrolirovat] the process. The third element is the U.S. intention to install the remaining medium-range missiles in such a way that they would assume the character of strategic missiles, since they would be capable of reaching the territory of the other side in the agreement. As I understand it, ways of overcoming these obstacles are now being discussed in Geneva.

As for the West European countries, the idea seems to be that they are supposed to work out a common position by the time the so-called Atlantic marathon -- that is, the series of sessions of the NATO bloc -- comes to an end. By 11 or 12 June, that common position will have been elaborated at a meeting of foreign ministers. For the moment, the majority of these countries have spoken pretty unambiguously in favor of eliminating medium-range missiles on the continent; but as Comrade Gorbachev said in his replies to the journalists of L'UNITA, some people are trying to create an endless chain of more and more new attachments. Here is one example of how far that chain could go. Dregger, the chairman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union faction in the Bundestag, has advocated making the disarmament issue dependent on the reunification of Germany. The representatives of the Free Democratic Party have strongly criticized what they call this far-fetched idea on the part of their partner in the ruling coalition, and the Social Democrats have even said that to carry it out would be a political crime.

[Kornilov] I would add that these ideas -- in quotes -- are being put forward at a time when public opinion polls in West Germany itself show that 78 percent -- mark that, 78 percent -- of respondents are in favor of ridding Europe of the nuclear missile threat.

[Sobolev] These differences of attitude between the public and the ruling circles in West Germany have been having very real political consequences in recent days. In particular, Chancellor Kohl recently put forward the argument that, if we're negotiating on a reduction of nuclear missiles in Europe, we need to reduce not only medium-range and operational and tactical missiles, but also other types. The press of Western Europe, as well as the political circles, have been fairly unanimous in seeing in this an intention to make yet another linkage and still further enlarge the package of issues being examined in connection with the elimination of medium-range missiles -- in other words, to make it even more difficult to get an agreement on this question.

[Kornilov] No, I'd say they are even speaking more bluntly. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU says, for instance, that as a result of Kohl's position, the West German Government stands before the world community as an obstacle in the path of solving this extremely important problem and so delivering West Germany itself, among others, from the nuclear missile threat.

[Beglov] Yes. I would describe the situation like this: On the basis of the impressions I've formed from being in Geneva and talking with members of the Soviet and U.S. delegations and from the discussions going on there within the press corps, as far as the diplomats are concerned, that is to say, the members both of the Soviet and of the U.S. delegation, in spite of the differences you mentioned, both Soviet and U.S. diplomats nevertheless begin from the premise that the elimination of medium-range missiles is above all a matter for the USSR and the United States. It is a question of a Soviet-U.S. agreement, the foundations of which were laid at Reykjavik. All that is needed now is a process of well, gradually arriving at a mutual agreement, if you like, adjusting to each other. In that process, in the work on the text of the treaty, a great and positive role is being played by the position occupied by our country -- by the fact, in other words, that we are pursuing the line of perfecting our proposals, in every direction, so that they may incorporate all the useful thoughts and considerations of the other side, while on the other hand also expecting the other side to cooperate in this endeavor, of course. In that sense the mood of the delegation is that, until they have drawn up a draft treaty, which must then be approved at the summit meeting, they will not get up from the table, and they will work indefatigably.

Now as for the apprehensions. Indeed, the question of the position of the allies is a big worry to all who have an interest in the success of the talks. Therefore all these endless attachments being strung out by certain NATO states as regarded in Geneva in this way: Some governments are trying to carve out for themselves opportunities of some sort to make the process of the talks depend on them and thereby to score points, as it were, within the Atlantic alliance: See how we're concerning ourselves about our security, and so on and so forth. Certain states -- nuclear ones I mean -- such as Britain and France are swayed by considerations of their so-called nuclear status, the fear of losing this mark, you might say, of belonging to the nuclear league, because little would then remain of their prestige on the international scene. All this is perhaps more the psychological, emotional element. But there are also the passive political opponents, including those in West Germany, in Bonn, where one member of the coalition, namely the Free Democratic Party and Foreign Minister Genscher, who represents it in the coalition, has clearly expressed itself in favor of an agreement.

These are all maneuverings by Chancellor Kohl and attempts to act according to the saying: Run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. He is both afraid of scaring off the Liberal members of the coalition, and at the same time loath to repel his right wing.

This has of course affected the election results, both in Hamburg and in Rheinland-Pfalz, where the Christian Democratic Union is generally considered to have suffered considerable losses because of this maneuvring and a certain lack of principle over this important issue.

So now, of course, with the 4 June looming, when the West German Government is to make a definitive statement on this question, many observers consider that the Federal Republic of Germany and its government simply can't afford the luxury of wrecking an agreement of medium-range missiles, because they would then be displaying in the eyes of the world irresponsibility on this very important question, especially since the meeting that took place on Friday between Chancellor Kohl and French President Mitterrand, after which it was clear that the French side actually does not support many of these attachments that Kohl spoke of earlier. After that one must assume that the West German side will take the only decision that is now permissible: not to obstruct what is being done in Geneva.

[Kornilov] I'd agree with that, with one addition. Truth to tell, if we glance at the history of international relations in recent times -- recent decades, actually -- we're hardly likely to find there are pages where Washington has demonstrated that it takes much account of its allies. Washington has displayed the very opposite. So Bonn may, as you say, risk a rational decision on one condition: that all these amplifications and linkages from Bonn that we were talking about really originate on the banks of the Rhine and not in Washington.

[Beglov] In the case I'd make the Washington address more precise: We should be talking about the Pentagon.

[Kornilov] The Pentagon, you're right.

[Beglov] At the meeting of defense ministers in Stavanger -- NATO ministers -- the Pentagon and its boss imposed the formula that the NATO countries must upgrade and strengthen their nuclear weapons in the spirit of the strategy of flexible response. So with one hand the U.S. Government is negotiating, while with the other hand it is laying mines under talks.

[Kornilov] That can't be ruled out.

[Belgov] That's right. But, you know, I remember what Reagan said of his own administration at the very beginning of his rule: Sometimes we have a situation where the right hand does not know what the extreme right hand is doing. That may be what's happening here.

[Sobolev] I'd like to point out that the Geneva talks, and also the meetings and consultations in Western Europe taking place in connection with the medium-range missile problem, are surrounded by, I'd say, a very special, very intense public atmosphere. The elections in Hamburg and Rheinland-Pfalz have precisely shown that the voters, the public, have no intention of reconciling themselves to the politicians who want to hinder the reaching of an agreement. It looks as though the West European politicians may have learned a lesson from this. In Britain, for instance, no sooner had the Conservatives announced an early election than they practically at once said they were ready to welcome a medium-range missile agreement. In Italy, where an early election is also in the offing, the government has adopted a positive attitude to the Soviet proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles. This problem is of interest not only to the Europeans and the United States. But also to the entire international community.

The Delhi Six, on the occasion of the third anniversary of its foundation, issued a statement, stressing the importance of averting a nuclear disaster and achieving universal disarmament. It draws special attention to the talks concerning nuclear missiles in Europe, and says the achievements of an agreement on medium-range nuclear systems would, in itself, be merely the first step toward the common goal of total destruction of nuclear weapons throughout the world. We emphasize once again the very great importance of implementing the two important measures set out in the Delhi and Mexico Declarations: Ending all types of nuclear tests, and preventing the arms race from being extended into space.

I would now like to draw the attention of our listeners to the fact that the end of May this year calls to mind events that happened 15 years ago and remain to this day extraordinarily topical. In May 1972 a document was published on the foundations of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. It enshrined for the first time in the form of a treaty the principle of peaceful coexistence as the basis for maintaining peace between the Soviet Union and the United States. It also enshrined another fundamental principle in international relations -- equality and identical security. Even now, resolving any issues in East-West relations, and other issues too, is possible only in accordance with those two principles.

At the same time, 15 years ago, the SALT I Treaty, or the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, was also signed.

[Beglov] Finally, what in my view was the main fruit of what some historians call the Soviet-American week of May 1972 -- the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles Systems, or the ABM Treaty.

[Sobolev] Yes, whose fate is still today causing very stormy debates in various circles, even within the framework of the U.S. political system and of NATO, not to mention the entire international community.

[Beglov] The great wisdom behind the idea of this treaty consisted in the fact that it guaranteed each side the opportunity of limiting and reducing strategic offensive weapons systems in the certainty that no developments and no arms race in the antimissile field would create the possibility of a first nuclear strike going unpunished. That was the point of the treaty -- to place obstacles to the development of those types of arms which might destabilize the situation and deprive both powers of the possibility of controlling the situation. For that reason I think that that treaty could be considered to be, in effect, the only existing buttress of stability. If one were to demolish this buttress it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to talk about reducing strategic nuclear arms and indeed other types of nuclear arms as well. Whatever those in the United States who have begun demolition work in the area of Soviet-U.S. detente might say to justify themselves, it seems to me that the main reason is an inability on the part of a considerable section of the U.S. ruling circles to recognize the principles of which you have spoken -- the principles of parity, equality, and identical security. But still, relapses of the old thinking are constantly making themselves felt: The latest examples during the past week are also connected with the ABM Treaty.

[Kornilov] This concerns what is known as the broad interpretation of the treaty signed in 1972. A secret Pentagon report to Congress the other day describes in minute detail the work and tests which the United States could carry out in the SDI program by adopting what is known as the broad, broadened interpretation of that document.

[Sobolev] In effect, it generally wrecks the entire treaty. But although the administration is attempting to win over congress with such letters, it has not been very successful so far. During a recent debate the U.S. legislators adopted an amendment demanding that the administration refrain from adopting the broad interpretation. In addition, U.S. NATO allies are also demanding -- with I would say, rare unanimity -- that their senior partner adhere to the ABM Treaty. Not to mention the Soviet Union: The Soviet position, which rejects the militarization of space and demands adherence to the ABM Treaty at the minimum for the following 10 years, was confirmed in the interview granted by Comrade Gorbachev to the newspaper L'UNITA.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: REAGAN STATES ARMS STANCE IN TV INTERVIEW

LD280813 Moscow TASS in English 0736 GMT 28 May 87

[Text] Washington May 28 TASS -- On Wednesday President Reagan gave an interview to a group of television journalists from Western Europe and Japan.

In answer to the correspondents' question as to how close the Soviet Union and the United States are to an agreement on medium-range nuclear system in Europe, Reagan said: "We have been in close consultations with the allies on this. There seems to be some pretty general agreement on the basic terms of what we are negotiating."

But in his answer Reagan emphasized that there was no thought on the side of the United States of totally denuclearising Europe, pleading a certain "great superiority" of the Soviet Union in conventional weapons.

The U.S. President stated the administration would go ahead with work under the "Strategic Defence Initiative."

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CSO: 5200/1510

PRAVDA ON FRANCE-FRG NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT CONSULTATIONS

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 May 87 p 5

[Article by V. Bolshakov, PRAVDA's own correspondent: "The Decision has been Postponed"]

[Text] Paris, 23. The French-West German meeting for consultations on the problems of nuclear disarmament in Europe has concluded here. Participating were President F. Mitterrand and Prime Minister J. Chirac, as well as the chancellor of West Germany, H. Kohl. Great importance was attached to this meeting. First, because much depends on the position of Bonn in the drawing up of a common approach of the NATO countries towards the "double-zero option", as the Soviet proposal is now called, regarding the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range and operational-tactical missiles in Europe. Secondly, because the position of France, as President Mitterrand literally declared the other day, will depend also on the final position of the FRG.

The routine French-West Germany meeting revealed that it has still not been conclusively decided, in either Paris or Bonn, whether they want the elimination of Soviet and American missiles in Europe.

In the opinion of chancellor H. Kohl, who spoke at a press conference yesterday along with his negotiating partners, the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles with a range of from one to five thousand kilometers, as well as operational-tactical missiles with a range from 500 to 1000 kilometers, is "a good idea." Good, but...with the condition that the Pershing I missiles, sited in the FRG, wouldn't be taken into consideration under the agreement between the USSR and the United States. These missiles, with a range up to one thousand kilometers, are "shared" between the FRG and the United States--the launchers for them belong to Bonn, but the nuclear warheads for them belong to Washington.

President F. Mitterrand unexpectedly fully supported chancellor H. Kohl, on the one hand speaking out for the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, and on the other expressing "understanding" of the attempts of Bonn to keep the Pershing I's on West German territory. After all, they could, as is known, easily be altered into Pershing II's, even on the launching sites. French Prime Minister J. Chirac went even further, actually speaking out against the elimination of American operational-tactical missiles in Europe. This provoked here a number of puzzling questions: after all, the president of France announced yesterday that in questions of defense, he and the prime

minister speak "as one." The president, however, quickly dispelled this question, declaring to a correspondent of a Japanese information agency, that he also is not against the retention of American operational-tactical missiles in Western Europe.

Commenting on the results of the meeting in Paris, L'HUMANITE writes today in an editorial that it took place directly after a routine French nuclear explosion on the atoll of Muraroa, and after enormous sums of money were allocated for the manufacture of French chemical and neutron weapons and for improving France's nuclear arsenal. It is no wonder therefore, notes L'HUMANITE, that Paris once again confirmed its reputation as a "hawk" in questions of disarmament.

CSO: 5200/1514-P

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN MISSILE STANCE

LD261540 Moscow TASS in English 1538 GMT 26 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 26 TASS -- Intensive bilateral and multilateral consultations are conducted in the NATO countries on the Soviet proposal for scrapping shorter-range missiles from Europe along with the intermediate-range forces. However, a constructive response has not been received from it as yet, Yuriy Gremit'skiy, first deputy head of the Information Directorate of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said here today.

He told a briefing for Soviet and foreign reporters here that the NATO allies were working on a common reply. In Britain, for instance, as it can be seen from press reports, numerous reservations to a future answer are worked out so that it could be interpreted as both positive and negative. In France, they are busy intensively building up to their stance of an outside observer: The problem of shorter-range missiles allegedly does not concern France.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman dwelt, in particular, on the stand by the West German Government. The attempts by some West German politicians to compile a new list of conditions which can torpedo progress that shaped up in Geneva give rise to amazement, he said.

It is absurd, for instance, to demand that U.S. nuclear warheads to the Bundeswehr "Pershing-1A" missiles be preserved and call for a further build up of shorter-range missiles at a time when the Soviet Union is ready to eliminate this class of nuclear weapons.

The argument about West Germany's exceptional vulnerability to Soviet tactical nuclear weapons also looks inconclusive. If there really is such a concern why then the proposal by the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for setting up a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe is rejected?

This initiative, once implemented and coupled with the double zero variant for intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, proposed by the USSR, would lift such apprehensions. And the creation in central Europe of a zone free of chemical weapons alongside a reduction in troop concentration along the line of the two blocs' contact and withdrawal of the most dangerous offensive types of conventional armaments from this zone, as is proposed by socialist countries, would lead to a marked strengthening of West Germany's security on the whole.

The Federal Government should adopt a clear stand as to whether it really wants to have intermediate- and shorter-range missiles dismantled and if its previous unambiguous statements on this score are valid.

Considering the role which is assigned to West Germany in solving the missile issue and also the critical nature of the time factor for a success of the Geneva negotiations, we are justified in expecting a responsible approach by the West German leadership to settling this acutest problem of European security, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasized.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

IZVESTIYA: HONECKER CITED ON 'DOUBLE ZERO OPTION'

PM261229 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 May Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "E. Honecker Speech"]

[Excerpt] Berlin, 25 May--The GDR in conjunction with the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, and all peace-loving forces is seeking disarmament in the nuclear and conventional spheres on the basis of equality and identical security.

This was stated by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, at the 13th congress of the republic's peasant cooperative members in Schwerin.

The far-reaching proposals by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev and the initiatives by the Warsaw Pact states have made the achievement of concrete agreements a realistic prospect. In this connection the GDR leader pointed to the need to eliminate all nuclear missiles in Europe, whether medium-range or operational and tactical missiles, even including battlefield nuclear weapons. The "double zero option," as it is known in the West, would do no one any harm, but would be a considerable boon to all who are interested in stable peace and security.

On the basis of a policy of dialogue and cooperation the GDR will continue to make its own contribution to the struggle for disarmament and to back any initiative aimed at eliminating the nuclear threat. We see this, E. Honecker stressed, as a way of carrying out our duty to ensure that war will never again emanate from German soil. This also applies to the further development of relations between the two German states. Those "prophets" who, in connection with such important issues as eliminating medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and ridding the continent of all types of nuclear armaments, have started talking again about the "reunification of Germany" should be warned. The only thing one can say about these people is that they do not know what they are doing. In fact, as is known, there is nothing to "reunite," since the GDR and the FRG have never been together, they are worlds -- socialist and capitalist -- apart. The sooner everyone in the West, above all in the FRG, realizes this, the better it will be for the future of mankind for the safeguarding of world peace, E. Honecker stressed.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW ON APPLYING DISARMAMENT PLAN TO ASIA

LD211459 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 21 May 87

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] Work is underway in Geneva to coordinate agreement on the total removal of Soviet and American medium-range missiles from Europe. At the same time a draft treaty provides for the Soviet Union to retain 100 warheads on such missiles in its eastern part and for the same number to be retained by the United States on its territory. Listeners have been wondering why the so-called zero-option on medium-range missiles is applicable in Europe but not applicable in Asia. Radio Moscow's Yuriy Solton writes the following:

Such an option can well be applied to Asia and moreover that is what the Soviet Union has been working for. In his speech of 19 May Mikhail Gorbachev reaffirmed the Soviet Union's readiness to resolve the problem of medium-range missiles on a global basis. But this would require reciprocity from the United States. The Americans have accumulated a powerful nuclear force in the Asia-Pacific region. This first of all includes the U.S. Air Force units based on the Philippines and in Japan. Secondly, it is the complex military infrastructure in South Korea, which makes it possible to deploy there not only Lance short-range missiles but also nuclear means of a longer range that are capable reaching targets in the Soviet Union, China and other countries. These are the circumstances that have compelled the Soviet Union to counter the American measures by deploying nuclear weapons in the Soviet east, for purely defensive purposes.

There would be no obstacles in applying the zero-option to Asia if the United States scrapped its nuclear weapons in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines and if it withdrew its marine-borne aviation beyond the coordinated lines. Besides, the United States should have no medium-range missiles on its own territory. But fresh reports from Washington have been proving that the American Administration is so far not ready for such a decision. So, the Soviet consent to retaining 100 warheads both on Soviet and American medium-range missiles would be regarded as a compromise. Mikhail Gorbachev has said that our vigorous efforts to rid Europe of nuclear weapons are by no means aimed at having the nuclear threat moved to any part of the world. Europe, with its largest nuclear stockpiles, marks only the starting point of our course toward the scrapping of all nuclear weapons on all continents by the year 2000, in line with the program announced by the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986. This program is to lay the foundations for a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN ON U.S. ASIAN POLICY

LD211546 Moscow TASS in English 1530 GMT 21 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS -- "In his recent speech at Stanford University U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz made remarks containing inventions concerning the Soviet Union and its policy in the Pacific Ocean region", Yuriy Gremitiskikh, a spokesman for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at a briefing for journalists here today.

"Mr. Shultz took liberties with obvious facts, and interpreted them arbitrarily. He perceives a threat to stability in the Asian-Pacific region in the development of all-round Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation and regards it as a factor in the aggravation of the situation in that part of the world".

"At a time when all sober-minded political figures approvingly regard the Soviet Union's steps to normalise relations between the countries of the region, Mr. Shultz asserts that the USSR ostensibly makes use of regional tension in its own interests".

"While accusing the Soviet Union of a massive build up of nuclear and conventional arms in Asia, the U.S. secretary of state, apparently, deliberately forgets about the large-scale initiatives which the Soviet Union proposed in the field of disarmament most recently."

"It is well-known to Mr. Shultz that it is precisely the U.S. Administration that seeks to leave in Asia the nuclear systems deployed against the Soviet Union. This makes us look for an answer and maintain the balance of forces there".

"At the same time we have repeatedly stated our readiness to tackle the problems of medium-range missiles on a global basis. Already now we suggest starting headway in directions leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons in Asia. This was stated in utter clarity by Mikhail Gorbachev in his May 19 speech at the dinner given in honor of Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the CPV Central Committee".

"The meaning of pronouncements by Mr. Shultz is that the United States and some of its allies lately take steps aimed at undermining the progressive development of positive processes in the Asian-Pacific region, the processes in which the USSR, Vietnam and other socialist countries took the lead".

"Through his speech at Stanford University Mr. Shultz countered the policy of goodwill and confidence-building measures in the region by a course towards maintaining a 'reliable deterrence capability', i.e. towards militarising the region, towards stirring up conflicts, and towards replacing relations of good-neighbourliness and cooperation between the countries of the region by a policy of confrontation and animosity and the establishment of closed military-political groupings", pointed out the spokesman for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"Soviet political analysts are surprised", the spokesman said, "that the United States has so hastily reacted and, besides, at the level of a State Department press spokesman to the far-reaching constructive proposals put forward on May 19 by Mikhail Gorbachev about a solution to the problem of medium-range missiles on a global basis if the United States agrees to eliminate its nuclear systems in Japan, South Korea, and in the Philippines, and to withdraw its aircraft-carrier flotilla to beyond agreed-upon boundaries".

"Such an approach to the Soviet proposals does not correspond to the importance and the level of the well-reasoned Soviet proposals which deserve the most serious attention and study", emphasized the spokesman for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: JAPAN 'NOT PREPARED' TO SOLVE NUCLEAR ARMS ISSUE

LD212102 Moscow TASS in English 1923 GMT 21 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Askold Biryukov writes:

A high-ranking spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Ministry has criticized the readiness to solve the issue of intermediate-range missiles on a global basis, which was expressed by the Soviet Union, arguing that this proposal was totally baseless. He also made an unwarranted statement to the effect that there were no nuclear weapons in Japan.

One gets the impression that the Japanese official spokesman either failed to familiarize himself attentively with the essence of the Soviet stance, or tried intentionally to mislead the public.

What point is at issue? It is common knowledge that the USSR's consent to scrap Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe by restricting them to a minimum number beyond this continent is a certain compromise. It is explained by the fact that the United States seeks to remain and even to build up its nuclear systems in Asia aimed against the Soviet Union, which compels the USSR to look for a response, to preserve the balance of forces.

It is an open secret for everyone, including Tokyo, that the United States has concentrated a powerful nuclear force in the Asia-Pacific region, augments nuclear arsenals on its warships and at military bases in foreign territories.

The purpose of all this, as John Lehman, an author of the U.S. new sea strategy and former secretary of the Navy, put it, is to maintain the readiness of the U.S. Navy for conducting offensive operations against the USSR in its own territorial waters and launching strikes at targets deep inside Soviet territory.

It is but natural that the Soviet Union cannot turn a blind eye to this. At the same time, it is prepared to solve the issue of the intermediate nuclear force (INF) on a global basis.

There would be no impediments to this if the United States agreed to the elimination of its nuclear systems in Japan, in South Korea and in the Philippines, to withdrawing its aircraft-carrier flotilla, ever more often operating in direct proximity to Soviet shores, beyond the agreed-upon frontiers. Certainly, in this case the United States would not have intermediate-range missiles in its territory.

Such is the stand of the USSR and it appears to be quite logical and grounded. On the other hand, the Japanese spokesman's bold statement to the effect that there are no nuclear weapons in Japan gives rise to bewilderment. The Japanese and world press have repeatedly cited facts of the delivery and storage of nuclear weapons in that country. This was admitted by Japanese and U.S. persons of influence, among them, military men, diplomats and politicians.

Munenori Akagi, a prominent figure of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, who at one time was at the head of Japan's National Defence Agency, said in an interview with the newspaper AKAHATA recently that the U.S. command introduced nuclear weapons in Okinawa. Is it that the U.S. aircraft-carriers and other ships which have been armed with nuclear "Tomahawk" not for the first year and now do not introduce them in Japanese ports?

Did the Japanese authorities check even once the presence of nuclear weapons on them in response to numerous demands by their fellow citizens? Or do they consider that these weapons are unloaded from those ships and submarines somewhere before they enter Japanese ports? Or is it a secret for what purpose U.S. F-16 aircraft, known as capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are deployed at Misawa base?

No, Japan has knowledge about all this. The negative reaction by its spokesman seems to be explained by the fact that in Japan they are not prepared for a joint search of ways to solve the ripe issues affecting the security and interests of the countries in that region.

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CSO: 5200/1510

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S DEFENSE MINISTER ASSESSES DOUBLE ZERO OPTION

LD011939 Hamburg DPA in German 1904 GMT 1 Jun 87

[Text] Mainz, 1 Jun (DPA) — According to Defense Minister Manfred Woerner, the decision of the government coalition in favor of a double zero option for the elimination of intermediate-rangemissiles is in the interest of German security. In an interview with Southwest Radio's "News at 9" Woerner said he himself had supported a joint upper limit on short-range weapons. However, following the expected agreement between the superpowers, the first outlines for a unified disarmament system are now becoming visible. It is in the German interest if, following such an agreement, attention now focused unavoidably more on the reduction of conventional weapon systems on the Soviet side.

The interview was prereleased to DPA in edited form.

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CSO: 5200/2543

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S STRAUSS SEES 'LOOSENING' TIES WITH U.S.

LD011450 Hamburg DPA in German 1316 GMT 1 Jun 87

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA) — CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss evaluates the disarmament measures in the field of intermediate-range nuclear missiles as the expression of a loosening of the ties between the United States and its European allies. Strauss, who goes along with the compromise made shortly beforehand in a coalition talk with Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, then told journalists in Bonn: "The whole thing of course signals the Americans becoming disconnected from Europe." To be sure, the Americans are not going to withdraw soldiers from Europe tomorrow, but there are developments that have a momentum of their own. "Who knows what the situation will be under the next U.S. president?"

The CSU chairman let it be known that he only declared his readiness for the agreement now concluded with reservations. "I'm one of the 'unfortunate' people," he stated, referring to CDU/CSU group misgivings that were put forth by Deputies Juergen Todenhoefer and Manfred Abelein against a double zero option. In Strauss' view, it would have been "more honest" to say that there was no second zero option. This is because the 72 Pershing-1A missiles must be kept as a balance against the Soviet missile strength. [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/2543

FRG COALITION ANNOUNCES DISARMAMENT STAND

DW020931 Bonn DIE WELT in German 2 Jun 87 p 4

[Article by "DW": "Text of Document: More Stability With Fewer Weapons in Europe--Coalition Leaders Define Position on Disarmament"]

[Text] Bonn — On Monday, the leaders of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, under Federal Chancellor Kohl's chairmanship, defined their position on the Soviet proposals for a double zero solution for intermediate-range missiles. In addition to CDU Chairman Kohl, CSU Chairman Strauss; FDP Chairman Bangemann; Ministers Woerner, Schaeuble, and Zimmermann; Bundestag group Chairmen Dregger and Mischnick; and CSU land group chief Waigel took part in the coalition meeting. The coalition adopted the following resolution:

The preeminent goal of our policy is to preserve peace and prevent all war — conventional or nuclear. Based on those considerations, our alliance has developed its proven strategy of flexible response. It is a strategy whose goal is preventing war. It has prevented wars in the past and will do so in the future. There is no alternative to that strategy in the foreseeable future. For its effectiveness and credibility, a balance of nuclear and conventional armed forces is necessary. Therefore, our alliance cannot renounce all nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. The presence of allied troops, in particular U.S. troops, in Europe remains equally indispensable for our strategy to prevent war.

In its peace policy, which is marked by consistency and continuity, the Federal Government advocates the establishment of a stable and balanced, thus guaranteed ratio of forces for all European countries through extensive disarmament in all areas. We are striving for arms control agreements guaranteeing greater security for all concerned at the lowest possible balanced armed forces level. That requires consideration of the justified security interests of all countries — big, medium, and small. The basis of our alliance is the principle that one member's security is another member's security. There must not be less security for anyone, neither in the relationship of the American and European alliance partners, nor in the relations between the European alliance partners.

Consistent with that policy and on the basis of the alliance decisions of 1979 and 1983 (Montebello), a total of 2,400 U.S. nuclear warheads are to be withdrawn unilaterally from Europe between 1980 and 1988 and will not be replaced. The alliance's nuclear capabilities will thereby be reduced to the lowest level in 20 years.

The Federal Government supports agreement on the speedy removal of all land-based longer range intermediate-range missiles with ranges of between 1,000 and 5,500 km (LRINF systems) between the United States and the Soviet Union — best of all, worldwide. That would be the first far-reaching disarmament step. That success would in particular be the result of the firm and coherent position maintained by the Federal Government and the alliance as a whole in implementing the NATO two-track decision. It would also prove that specific disarmament steps on the basis of a fair balance of both sides' interests are possible.

The Federal Government advocates the clear and verifiable reduction of the U.S. and Soviet land-based nuclear systems with a range of between zero and 1,000 km that are deployed in Europe. Such a reduction has to be negotiated and carried out step by step in connection with establishing a conventional balance and eliminating chemical weapons worldwide.

An initial step would be a globally valid agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that in the future they will have no shorter range intermediate-range missiles (500 to 1,000 km). In that respect the Federal Government hopes that the U.S.-USSR negotiations in Geneva will be successful as soon as possible.

The Federal Government insists that the Bundeswehr's 72 Pershing-1A missiles are not at present and will not in the future be negotiable. In that respect the Federal Government agrees with the United States and its other allies.

The Federal Government considers the following steps on the road to comprehensive disarmament necessary and possible:

- A 50-percent reduction of the Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear weapons arsenals;
- Worldwide elimination of chemical weapons;
- Reduction of conventional ground and air forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals to a balanced low level. That requires the elimination of the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority;
- Further substantial reduction in U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities that are still deployed in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/2543

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S KOHL OUTLINES INF POLICY

LD040804 Hamburg DPA in German 0707 GMT 4 Jun 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA) — Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl called on the United States and the USSR to undertake additional disarmament measures beyond the sphere of intermediate-range missiles. In a government statement today, Kohl told the Bundestag that the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear missiles must remain part of a comprehensive disarmament process which must extend to all weapons systems and lead to further disarmament steps.

The chancellor mentioned in this connection a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive potentials in East and West, as a result of which about 10,000 nuclear warheads could be eliminated. In addition to this, he demanded a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, rejected geographically restricted zones free of chemical weapons, and supported a verifiable, comprehensive, and stable balance of conventional forces at a low level in Europe.

Kohl expressed hope that an agreement on the reduction of intermediate-range missiles could be signed this year. In that event he expects there to be a third summit meeting between U.S. President Reagan and Kremlin chief Mikhail Gorbachev in the United States.

In his government statement the chancellor avoided the concept of a double zero option which the coalition compromise of Monday boiled down to. He underlined his desire for an elimination of intermediate-range systems which is not merely limited to Europe but which applies worldwide. The 100 warheads which would remain in the Soviet Union according to the present agreement pose an element of instability for Europe. They could easily be moved and would cause serious problems for verification.

The chancellor expressed concern about a zero option for shorter range INF missiles which would only be limited to Europe and not linked to wider disarmament steps. There could therefore be no question for the Federal Government of an "unconditional acceptance of the Soviet zero solution proposal for the 500 to 1,000 km range." This second zero option must be seen above all in conjunction with the "overwhelming superiority" of the Soviets in the missile range below 500 km as well as in the conventional sphere. The "conventional superiority" of the Warsaw Pact is not an invention, nor is it pessimism on the part of the Federal Government.

Speaking about the Bundeswehr's 72 Pershing-1A missiles, Kohl stressed that they remain excluded from a U.S.-USSR zero option. These cruise missiles have never been the subject of negotiation. "The strong superiority of the Soviet Union in cruise missiles with a range of less than 500 km as well as the unilateral removal of 2,400 nuclear warheads by NATO, which are not being replaced, between 1980 and 1988 should make it possible not to complicate the negotiations in this point or even endanger them." In any case, with the removal of 2,400 warheads NATO has disarmed more nuclear weapons unilaterally in Europe than are now the subject of negotiations in Geneva.

In contrast to critical remarks from the CDU/CSU group, Kohl gave the assurance that the alliance has a united position on the disarmament question. The consultations were characterized by mutual trust and understanding between the alliance partners. It is his aim not to uncouple the FRG as a nonnuclear power from the alliance. The basis of the alliance remains the thought that the security of the one was also the security of the other. "There must be no reduction in security, either in the relationship between the American and the European alliance partners nor in the relationship between the European alliance partners themselves."

The supreme political guideline remains the prevention of any wars in Europe, conventional or nuclear. There is no alternative in the foreseeable future for the defensive strategy of flexible response. The alliance remains dependent on a balanced potential of conventional armed forces and nuclear means of deterrence. "Efforts which have as their target the complete removal of nuclear weapons in Europe cannot be shared by us." But the role of nuclear weapons must be "restricted to the absolute lowest quantitative and qualitative level."

Kohl also said that the U.S troops and those of the other alliance partners are a guarantee for security. In general, security policy is based both on maintaining a defensive and a deterrent capability as well as on the striving for arms control and disarmament. But disarmament is not an end in itself. The Federal Government is therefore concerned to increase the security of the FRG and the alliance as a whole.

Kohl also spoke positively about results of the Warsaw Pact summit to safeguard peace. If Gorbachev's "new thinking" leads to a fair and long-term balance of interests the Federal Government is prepared to respond with its own steps to intensify cooperation. Nevertheless, concrete actions to end the war in Afghanistan are necessary. Also, people must not continue to be killed on walls and borders between East and West.

In the conventional field, Kohl demanded removal of the imbalance, safeguards against a surprise attack, measures for confidence building, as well as effective verification measures with on-site inspections in a step by step process of negotiation. In this connection Kohl expressly stressed the close alliance between the FRG and France. Bonn and Paris have an equal interest in greater conventional stability at the lowest level.

Kohl appealed to the opposition parties to be willing for a "broad consensus" in "key questions of security policy." Security questions are not suitable for short-term party-political conflict. "Let us not deny the other's goodwill in key questions of our security." Fundamental agreement transcending party lines make the representation of the special German interests on an international level easier.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG SPOKESMEN EXCHANGE VIEWS ON ARMS CONTROL

LD041221 Hamburg DPA in German 1053 GMT 4 Jun 87

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—SPD Chairman Willy Brandt, the first speaker in the debate, acknowledged that the government had "moved a little bit" on the question of the zero option. This had happened more from worry than insight. He feared that the damage done to the influence and weight of German foreign policy in the past few weeks because of the debate in the union had not been undone by Kohl's statement. It would be good if there were full agreement between the government and the opposition to support the double zero option "without if's and but's" and to promote the policy of disarmament by all reasonable means. [passage omitted]

Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who called for further comprehensive disarmament steps, warned against linking different areas of arms control. The goal should rather be to make achievable results possible and to coordinate further steps in such a way that the security of all those involved was increased through balanced reductions. The conclusion of a U.S.-USSR agreement on intermediate-range weapons in the near future would be a clear sign of the will to disarm, would promote other areas of negotiation, and would have a positive effect on East-West relations as a whole.

Genscher emphasized that it was in the European interest to give full support to the disarmament efforts of the United States and the USSR. Europe and the United States were linked not only in their joint defense effort but also in their joint disarmament efforts. The minister gave assurances that the rapprochement between the two superpowers was not directed against the FRG. On the contrary, this process was in German and European interest, offering the chance to create reliable structures in Europe.

Greens Deputy Angelika Beer spoke of the great lie in the talk of the zero option because it was pretended that all European nuclear weapons were to be removed. Since NATO had already decided on a series of new rounds of arming in compensation, there would be more Eurostrategic nuclear weapons on the Western side in the end than there were today.

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CSO: 5200/2548

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH PARLIAMENT ON INF ACCORD

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 20 May 87 p 1

[Text] The Hague, 20 May--Spokesmen for the major political parties have expressed support for a superpower accord banning intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) but said negotiations on other types of weapons should not be allowed to get in the way of such a deal.

On the first day of parliamentary debate on Soviet proposals to ban INF, all parties expressed the view that it was a "historic moment" with an accord in sight.

But Relus ter Beek for the Labour Party (PvdA) and Frits Bolkestein for the Liberal party (VVD) warned against tying an INF ban to negotiations on shorter range (500-1,000 km) nuclear missiles or conventional forces.

Christian Democrat (CDA) spokesman Joep de Boer said his party felt it was better to get an agreement on INF, which seemed within reach, and to hold back on a shorter-range missile deal.

He said an INF accord should not be endangered by "trying to couple more onto the train than the locomotive of (Nato) alliance consensus can probably pull."

Bolkestein said VVD support for an INF deal was conditional on Soviet agreement to remove all INF weapons, including those in Soviet Asia.

Under a tentative deal reached in Reykjavik last October the U.S. and Soviet Union agreed to eliminate their INF in Europe but keep 100 warheads elsewhere.

Nato ministers meeting in Stavanger, Norway, last week called, however, for a ban on all INF.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said on Tuesday Moscow would agree to remove all its INF from Europe and Asia if the U.S. removed its nuclear means in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.

Bolkestein also said his party favoured a Dutch initiative aimed at negotiations with the Warsaw Pact on reducing conventional weapons, based on a Nato proposal for a zero option on tanks, "the symbol of Soviet oppression in Eastern Europe." Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek and Defence Minister Wim van Eekelen will answer parliamentary questions on these issues on Wednesday.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PREPARATIONS FOR INF BASING IN WOENS DreCHT

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 20 May 87 pp 1-3

[Text] Woensdrecht, 20 May--Builders at this Dutch air force base have nearly finished the first of three nuclear rocket shelters--ready for 48 U.S. cruise missiles that might never arrive.

The Netherlands was the last of five Nato countries to agree to accept U.S. cruise or Pershing-2 medium-range missiles and plans to deploy them in mid-1988 at Woensdrecht, tucked away in woods in the southwest of the country near Belgium.

Britain, Italy, West Germany and Belgium have already started or completed stationing their share of the weapons.

Few would deny there is some way to go to a U.S.-Soviet accord on abolishing medium-range missiles in Europe.

But Dutch officials and anti-cruise campaigners believe a superpower deal could materialise before deployment is due in the Netherlands.

"Yes, it is possible, because in our schedule they (the missiles) only come in the summer of next year," Dutch Defence Minister Wim van Eekelen told Reuters News Agency.

The government decided in November 1985 to accept the missiles in the face of fierce public opposition.

Ton Frinking, defence expert for the Christian Democrat party (CDA) that heads the centre-right coalition of Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, said Washington would have to ratify the deal before next May because American presidential election fever would then take over.

"Of course the timing is anybody's guess, but if it (a superpower agreement) is ready by May next year, then we will see no cruise in Holland," he said.

Building Work

Jan Bosman of the anti-cruise group BIVAK, which helps organise demonstrations outside Woensdrecht and maintain two "peace camps" nearby, also believes the

chances are high the missiles will never be flown in. He urged the government to stop building work.

"It's not logical to build the base when it's likely not to have the missiles," he said.

Van Eekelen disagreed: "Construction is certainly going on until the signature of an agreement. We only start adjusting our position when an agreement has been signed."

A rare tour of the construction site at Woensdrecht confirms that building and other preparations are continuing.

New roads, enhanced security and a growing number of U.S. staff have transformed a relatively sleepy jet engine repair depot with 22 guards and a police dog into a missile base watched over by dozens of armed Dutch troops and surrounded by electronically-monitored fences.

Trucks

Earth-moving trucks are dumping soil over one concrete shelter and another two of the hangar-like buildings are taking shape. Each is designed to house a flight of 16 missiles and the vehicles that would carry them off into the Dutch countryside for launch in time of war.

"The operational area is called the Ground Launched Cruise Missile Alert and Maintenance Area (GAMA) and that is almost 30 percent complete. It should be ready by mid-1988," said Woensdrecht spokesman Loe Baltussen, a Dutch air force captain.

Nearby, barracks and support buildings are sprouting on the former World War II German bomber base for the 1,300 U.S. troops expected to make up the 486 Tactical Missile Wing.

U.S. Air Force captain Willette Parker said some 400 single people would live inside the five-km inner perimeter wire. Families will live locally.

Baltussen said the GAMA would cost 100 million guilders and was funded by Nato, with contracts going to an undisclosed number of Dutch firms.

The Dutch paid 59 million guilders for some new buildings and the virtually impregnable fences, one of Nato's biggest-ever security projects, he said.

Although Woensdrecht has a reserve Nato role as a war-time airfield, it is not clear what would happen to the missile base if the cruise rockets were not deployed there.

In The Hague, U.S. Embassy spokesman Sam Wunder said it was still too early to speculate on the base's future. Van Eekelen said it was Nato money, so the alliance would have to decide.

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CSO: 5200/2545

ITALIAN DAILY URGES EARLY EUROPEAN STANCE ON INF

PM261148 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 23 May 87 pp 1, 10

[Alberto Cavallari commentary: "The Post-Yalta Era Is Over"]

[Text] The German issue is reemerging with full force in the Euromissiles negotiations begun a month ago between the Russians and Americans. Like Janus, the issue has two faces because it relates to two problems — what Kohl really thinks and what Gorbachev really thinks.

Initially, Helmut Kohl said that he wanted negotiations based on the zero option, that is, on the elimination of LRINF long-range intermediate missiles (1,000-5,000 km). Then he said that he wanted the double zero option, which would eliminate SRINF short-range intermediate missiles (500-1,000 km). Still later, he said that there could only be German backing for the two negotiations if they include a triple zero option, that is, the elimination of very short-range missiles (0-500 km). It was therefore concluded that Kohl was taking a leap in the dark so as to sabotage the negotiations. He wanted too much because he wanted nothing. The *Financial Times* backed him up when it said that "the shorter the range of the missiles, the deader the Germans."

This week Helmut Kohl clarified his thinking by specifying that he does not, in any way, intend to make the triple zero option a precondition and to sabotage the negotiations. He said that he hopes for an accord on long-range missiles followed by another on short-range missiles and that he was only asking that these ideas be followed subsequently by a further accord on very short-range missiles.

He said he is not making this third agreement a precondition for his acceptance of the preceding ones. "My goal" he added, "is to do everything humanly possible to ensure that President Reagan and Gorbachev can meet and reach a decision this year, by this summer or autumn, at the latest."

Perhaps the unpleasant shock suffered by Kohl in the elections in Hamburg and Rhineland-Palatinate influenced this elucidation. Be that as it may, now we know what Kohl really thinks, and the other Europeans no longer have any excuse for continu-

ing their indecisiveness with regard to the negotiations. Germany accepts the dismantling of the long-range missiles, as the Russians and Americans want, plus that of short-range missiles, as the Russians are proposing; but it is also urging the dismantling of very short-range missiles, since it is they that would cause more German than other deaths. The German theory based on a gradual process and aimed at a broader disarmament cannot be rejected. It is merely a matter of discussing what measures should accompany it — a joint European defense, an increase in conventional forces, or the search for a new balance in East-West security that would not benefit the Soviets.

So we come to what Gorbachev really thinks. According to authoritative American observers, Gorbachev is not going to stop at the double zero option but is about to make the Germans a promise — to support the process of the unification of the two Germanies in exchange for their neutralization. Of course, the Americans are not saying that this is definitely Gorbachev's intention. They are only saying that some information confirms it while other information suggests otherwise. It is rumored that Gorbachev will talk about this on his visit to East Berlin scheduled for the end of the month. According to other rumors Gorbachev has absolutely no plans to discuss it. However, analysts such as William Pfaff are right to say that the possibility is being envisaged in Germany, creating considerable expectancy, and that it must be assessed even if it is not true. Indeed, if Gorbachev were "also" considering German unification and neutralization, as well as balanced Euromissile disarmament, the entire framework of negotiations would not be the only thing to change. So too would modern history, based on the Yalta treaty, and a world order whose linchpin is a Europe divided by the division of Germany.

It is highly unlikely that Gorbachev wants to go that far. It is even possible that the Americans, though correctly balancing rumors against denials, are amplifying the problem by ascribing to Gorbachev the image of destabilizer of the post-Yalta order and therefore of the negotiator that Europe must fear. But, as

Pfaff says, it cannot be denied that if Gorbachev did decide to raise the German issue he would have good reason for doing so. He may, for instance, have assessed the economic military costs of the contraposition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe and decided to reduce them. He may have in mind a European disarmament that would lead to a reorganization of central Europe, albeit still linked to Germany's reunification, and he may want to achieve this soon. As for the Germans, they say they know nothing about it. But even while denying all knowledge, Kohl himself adds that "the German issue nevertheless remains open." After all it, is better to be prepared to discover that certain information is false than to discover too late that it is true. No one can rule out the possibility that the German issue will revive the spirit of reunification.

If so, there is an initial observation to be made. The West is entirely unprepared for an event that would suddenly project it into the post-Yalta era and it should be discussing this amid the alternating possible hypothesis and credible denials. Indeed, the event would spell the beginning of the end for the old order which everyone — both Russians and Americans — has considered unchangeable for the past 40 years. It would nullify NATO's role, based on Europe's division. Suddenly, instead of achieving steps forward in the idealized stability of balanced disarmament, it would mark the transition to an era of instability linked to East-West neutralization. How far is the West able to issue a response if the Germans consider the reunification issue "open" and the other allies consider it closed? How acceptable is a post-Yalta situation organized on the basis of Europe's neutralization? No one has raised these issues: No one has the courage to do so.

Another point is this: No one knows Gorbachev's real opinion concerning the German issue, which remains supremely important in Europe. Whether with regard to Euromissiles or reunification, it is essential to know what he thinks while the negotiations are in progress, while Kohl is calling for a third round of talks on very short-range missiles, and in view of Bonn's arguments, it is becoming essential to prepare a joint European response on the question of the "new security." Indeed, any argument about missile classification, strengthening conventional forces, or counting in the French or British nuclear forces is meaningless unless we know the USSR's opinion concerning Germany or a reorganization of central Europe, albeit in the long term. However, no light can be thrown on this by the negotiations between the two superpowers, which want to withhold certain explanations. It is the Europeans who must clearly put the question to Gorbachev and discover what he thinks, in the

knowledge that the German issue really is supremely important. The time has gone when it was possible to joke about the issue with the cynical facetiousness of a Mauriac: "I love Germany so much that I am glad to have two of them." The old issue of reunification — raised back in the sixties by Brandt and Egon Bahr, in terms of unity of people, if not states — will be raised sooner or later.

In view of the forementioned, it seems all the more lamentable that the Europeans are seeking to evade the Euromissiles issue by deferring their response. Indeed, behind the Euromissiles issue lies the German issue. Behind that lies the issue of reunification. And behind that lies the hypothesis of a neutralization. If this is rejected, as it should be, it is necessary to proceed from the basics, setting disarmament and the organization of a European defense on a par. But first the Europeans said nothing. Then they postponed everything until the NATO meeting at Reykjavik in June. It is virtually certain that they will not discuss it in Venice even if they claim to want to do so. The British and Italians are busy with their electoral affairs and everyone is afraid of showing his hand and ready to confuse the issue in question with the problem of counting in the British or French nuclear forces. But we knew this already, that is, that the Europeans are blind to their future which, like it or not, is bound up with the German issue. Even if Gorbachev is not saying it, perhaps he is thinking it. But what if Gorbachev is thinking it?

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CSO: 5200/2544

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SPAIN'S GONZALEZ ON LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS OF ZERO OPTION

LD272127 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1800 GMT 27 May 87

[Text] Tomorrow there will be a meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries following the conclusion today of the 2-day meeting held by NATO defense ministers in Brussels. The balance of forces and the withdrawal of nuclear missiles are the subject of study and negotiation between the two blocs. In the Congress lobby this afternoon, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez referred to the so-called zero option, which is still being studied by the members of the Atlantic alliance. Reporters asked him if the triumph of the zero option will modify Spain's stance in its negotiations with the United States on the reduction of its troops on Spanish soil. This how he replied:

[Begin Gonzalez recording] No, No, on the contrary. Although there are arguments for all tastes, the first thing I would like to say about the triumph of the zero option is that I believe that an agreement is going to be reached, given that we have been expounding it for some time now — you know how it has been described, don't you? So, the agreement is going to be reached. When the agreement is reached — of course, with the support of Mrs Thatcher, Mr Kohl, and others — it will be a sensible and appropriate agreement. When we have said that we think that it is sensible it has been described otherwise. But you have to be patient, after all, and argue the point, as Don Quixote said. On the other hand, an agreement on Euromissiles, just like a complementary agreement on short-range missiles, will inevitably generate a momentum for agreements that seek a balance in conventional arms and the removal of chemical weapons. I don't know if I'm being sufficiently clear. Without a doubt, I believe that this momentum — I want to take a logical and not contradictory approach here — will favor our (?position). [end recording]

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CSO: 5200/2546

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SPAIN'S DEFENSE MINISTER ON TALKS WITH WEINBERGER

LD271214 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 0600 GMT 27 May 87

[Interview with Defense Minister Narciso Serra by unidentified studio interviewer on 27 May--live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Interviewer] There is still time to negotiate but it does not seem that the U.S. Administration is really prepared to change its stand on the future of the 72 F-16 planes which are stationed at the Torrejon de Ardoz base. Yesterday Defense Minister Narciso Serra met U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. Good morning, Minister Serra:

[Serra] Good morning.

[Interviewer] It seems that the Spaniards are very interested in the negotiations with the United States and you have met Caspar Weinberger who is...

[Serra, interrupting] We also devoted a lot of time to the U.S. and Spanish positions and the positions of the other allies in order to, (with the consent) of the foreign ministers, reach a final agreement among the European countries to achieve things which are essential — that is to say the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

[Interviewer] You talked about disarmament a moment ago. Is the signing of a treaty between the United States and the USSR imminent as reported in some news media?

[Serra] I see that in the time between the meeting in Norway 8-10 days ago and yesterday's meeting in Brussels several countries have accepted the double-zero option more clearly. Spain also supports this option which is being discussed in Geneva; I am referring to the elimination of long-and short-range missiles within the so-called intermediate-range missile category — that

is to say their total elimination. There were countries like Norway which was asking on what conditions we can accept this, but yesterday I saw that a larger number of countries are accepting this option as the most positive — the option which gives greater security.

We are waiting for the FRG to express its opinion. It will do so on 4 June. Here, we must rely on the German Government to decide what is better. I believe that avenues are being opened up and that the total elimination of missiles is the best way to increase Europe's security. This has been Spain's position since the beginning.

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CSO: 5200/2546

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SPANISH DAILY VIEWS IMPACT OF ZERO OPTION ON U.S. BASES

PM031534 Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 30 May 87 p 4

[Editorial: "Implications of 'Zero Option'"]

[Text] Prime Minister Gonzalez has not only stated his resolute support for the "zero-zero" option for the withdrawal of nuclear missiles. In letters to Reagan and Gorbachev, the Spanish Government leader urges them to try to reach an agreement this very year. If the possibility of such an agreement on detente exists, it is to be assumed that neither the U.S. President nor the CPSU general secretary will miss the opportunity, irrespective of their European partners' pressure, though it is not superfluous. Felipe Gonzalez' request can be regarded as a goodwill gesture. However, his enthusiasm contrasts with the reticence of other government leaders, despite the consensus eventually and laboriously reached at the latest NATO meeting.

France, in particular, is the country with the most reticent and worried stance toward a possible comprehensive plan for the withdrawal of missiles; it would like this dismantling to take place in stages. Paris is advocating a partial reduction lest either of the blocs has cause to change its mind for whatever valid reason. In the event of having to resort subsequently to a redeployment, it fears that the Soviets will find this easier. In view of how difficult the Western countries found it to grasp the need to respond to the deployment of SS-20s with Pershing and cruise missiles, another such campaign seems inconceivable after a total withdrawal operation.

The suspicions of certain governments that cannot put their trust in the security provided by the Soviet offer are so logical that the American Government — and Weinberger himself — reassures them by saying that even if the "zero option" is implemented there will not be a total denuclearization of Europe. There will still be some 4,000 nuclear warheads in bombers, submarines, and land and seagoing vehicles of the Atlantic countries' defense forces.

The fact is that in Brussels the consensus among the Eurogroup members prevailed, not without reservations and on condition of another arms effort to reduce the imbalance in conventional forces between the two blocs. Only after the Venice summit and the foreign ministers' meeting in Reykjavik will it be possible to consider the strength of this joint stance and the possible speed of a Western response to the Warsaw Pact's latest proposals.

The latter now extend beyond the field of nuclear missiles. The official communique even proposes an accord on conventional forces. We are entering a very risky and suspect area since opinions differ greatly about the strength of the armies based in central Europe. According to Washington and the major Atlantic states, the Eastern bloc forces enjoy a large superiority. According to Moscow, there is no such superiority because it is counterbalanced by the Western arsenal and aeronaval forces. Therefore, an understanding on such matters is very unlikely to emerge soon. Thus, when Moscow proposes reaching an agreement and asks the NATO countries meanwhile to suspend plans to expand their conventional armies, the most natural interpretation of these proposals is as a delaying maneuver — another trick to maintain the status quo in conventional weapons, that is, to ensure that while the missiles are being withdrawn the Soviet superiority in almost everything else remains.

Of course, the Soviet command is not considering reducing its presence in the Eastern bloc countries. This was confirmed by a Warsaw Pact spokesman, General Nikolay Chervov, when he said that they have no more troops "than we need." In East Germany alone, there are 380,000 men. Bearing in mind that these divisions, with their respective armored complements, are there not solely to defend themselves against a possible Western attack but to a large extent to neutralize any hint of a patriotic rising, it will be realized that the Soviet high command really is not considering any idea entailing a substantial demobilization.

All these derivations from the initial proposal on the "zero" option show that the matters now of burning concern to NATO concern Spain too and inevitably also involve its bilateral negotiations with the United States with regard to the balance of forces issue. Lord Carrington's offer to mediate between the two sides if Madrid so requires is not superfluous, though the Gonzalez government has deemed such a mediation futile. Our government wants to show that there is no direct relationship between the bilateral Spanish-U.S. negotiations and NATO. This conflicts with the stance adopted in the referendum, which linked continued Atlantic alliance membership with the reduction of U.S. forces in Spain, which is one of the goal of the negotiations with Washington.

It so happens, however, that the talks between the two governments coincide with those to be conducted in Geneva and the broaching of the "zero option" issue within NATO. All this requires a readjustment of joint and national strategies that in turn entail the need for certain redefinitions which, like it or not, also affect our country and our alliances. In fact, a new period has begun in both the Western world and the Eastern bloc, whether they like it or not. Or a lull, at least. All countries either belonging to or under the influence of the two blocs will be affected by the outcome of this peaceful confrontation between the two superpowers and the measures that will be taken in accordance with any agreements produced by the proposed new meeting.

This being so, it is very difficult to assess what arrangements will be advisable for the future, which is dependent on what role is allocated to particular forces in each area within the overall system of collective security. The sensible thing would seem to be to await the joint decisions. To wait and see would be the most prudent course, without ignoring Spain's just demands and without Washington's interpreting the pause as a gesture of weakness. Any American pressure in this direction would be a mistake and, above all, an attempt to impose on the present democratic Spanish state worse conditions than the previous regime was forced to accept.

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CSO: 5200/2546

FILIPINO RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV REJECTS ALL SUPERPOWER PRESENCE

Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 22 May 87 p 4

[Editorial: "Superpowers Should Leave Asia Alone"]

[Text]

SOVIET leader Mikhail Gorbachev has thrown a diplomatic challenge to Washington that President Ronald Reagan could have a tough time wriggling himself out of. Raising a proposal similar to one he issued concerning intermediate nuclear-armed missiles in Western Europe, Mr. Gorbachev has called on the United States to join the Soviet Union in abolishing all intermediate-range nuclear forces in Asia. For us Filipinos, in particular, the proposal is most relevant. In the Philippines -- along with Japan and South Korea -- the US is believed to have stored and deployed nuclear weaponry.

For years the US embassy in Manila, following standard State Department practice, has neither confirmed nor denied the presence of US nuclear weaponry in the Philippines. But since America's military bases here are an important component of Washington's forward defense system, it has been generally acknowledged that US nuclear weapons are indeed stationed on Philippine territory. There are many Filipinos who take comfort in that thought, believing that the American nuclear umbrella is the single most powerful strategic guarantee against encroachment by any other foreign power.

On the other hand, there are also a growing number of Filipinos (and not just radical leftists) who are deeply disturbed that a foreign power is already in place, not only compromising Philippine sovereignty but also exposing the country to danger of nuclear attack should a shooting war erupt between the US and the USSR. Mr. Gorbachev's latest proposal for the mutual abolition of INF in Asia, if read between the lines, also confirms that the Kremlin has poised its own missiles against American military installations in the islands. The danger of vaporization for millions of Filipinos, should actual hostilities between the two superpowers break out, is real.

The Kremlin must have its own ulterior motive for proposing to Washington to join it abolishing INF in the region; thus, the matter should be studied closely not just by the US but also by the governments of those countries to be directly affected. Any premature endorsement of the proposal would make any party seem like it were playing into the hands of the Soviets. Moreover, Mr. Gorbachev's suggestion fails to take into account another nuclear power in the region, China, which over the years has shown a reluctance to even consider any form of nuclear disarmament.

But the major objection to the Gorbachev or any other Soviet or American plan to ease tensions in Asia is that it fails to acknowledge the fact that it is precisely the superpowers' military presence in the region which has given rise to increased tension. The existence of US bases in Korea, Japan and the Philippines has compelled the Kremlin to engage in a massive naval buildup in the Pacific and to secure berthing privileges for Soviet warships in Vietnam. Without superpower meddling, the peoples and governments of Asia have shown that they can get along peacefully with each other. Moreover, the rising standards of living and booming economies of many Far Eastern societies have served to ensure stable, harmonious relations among most nations in the region. Most Asians now believe they are better left on their own. If the Soviets and the Americans were really sincere in their oft-stated desire to guarantee peace in the region, they should then order their military forces to quit Asia altogether.

/13104

CSO: 5200/4312

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

TASS: PROXMIRE ON LAUNCHERS--Washington, 25 May (TASS)--Speaking at the Senate Senator William Proxmire reported that the Reagan administration intended to add one more launcher for strategic weapons. The senator said that the terrible and senseless nuclear arms race continued, ruthlessly and inexorably pushing the civilization to destruction. Are not there any restrictive measures in the arms control area which could put an end to this senseless, costly and useless race leading to destruction? There are no such measures, the Senator stressed, because since December last year the Reagan administration unilaterally exceeded the limits set by the Soviet-American SALT-2 Treaty on the number of strategic bombers armed with cruise missiles. Since then, Proxmire continued, new and new [as received] bombers with cruise missiles on board have been added to the American arsenal. With the arrival of yet another B-52 aircraft their number will reach 142. Such unrestrained build-up in the armory, the senator warned, can not prompt reply measures from the Soviet Union. Asking why that senseless nuclear arms race continued, Proxmire himself gave the answer: because the USA refused to observe the SALT-2 Treaty. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1237 GMT 25 May 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1510

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: DISARMAMENT COMMISSION SUMMER SESSION TO DISCUSS CW

TASS Commentary

LD082249 Moscow TASS in English 1552 GMT 8 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow Jun 8 TASS -- TASS news analyst Vasiliy Kharkov writes:

The second, summer part of the session of the Commission on Disarmament which opens in Geneva on Tuesday is called upon to give a new strong impetus to the quest of the decisions to end the arms race, above all of nuclear arms, and to ban chemical weapons.

It should be noted that multilateral talks are conducted in the framework of the commission to work out an international convention on the elimination of these weapons of mass destruction and the industrial basis for their production.

Objectively assessing the results of the spring session of the commission as regards chemical weapons, its participants hold that a considerable part of the convention has already been formulated. Yet there remain numerous proposals to agree upon. It is a very topical question how far the summer part of the session will advance toward the solution of existing difficulties.

It will depend on this if the year 1987 will become the year of the origination of this international convention.

At the commission's spring session, the Soviet Union advanced a number of new proposals and considerations which largely determined the progress started at the talks. They removed some serious obstacles, promoted greater openness.

It is the plans for the production of binary ammunition that impede the talks on chemical weapons now. These plans are oriented at a new spiral in the buildup of chemical arsenals and contradict the very idea of the convention. Debates on binary weapons are scheduled to be held in the U.S. Congress in September. They cannot but be affected by the course of the talks in Geneva.

By its concrete proposals the Soviet Union showed the readiness for the strictest system of control and verification, also international. The USSR declares for ensuring complete confidence that obligations assumed under convention are strictly observed by all its parties.

Striving to promote the working out of this important international document, the Soviet Union stopped manufacture of chemical weapons and started building a special enterprise to destroy its stockpiles.

This bold step announced by Mikhail Gorbachev last April is a new major contribution to ridding the world of lethal chemical weapons. Will the participants in the talks reciprocate this step by similar steps at the current session?

USSR Delegation Arrives

LD080911 Moscow TASS in English 0843 GMT 8 Jun 87

[Text] Geneva, 8 Jun (TASS)--The Soviet delegation led by Ambassador Yuriy Nazarkin arrived here to participate in the summer session of the disarmament conference.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1523

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

AL-QADHDHAFI ALLEGEDLY ORDERED GAS USE IN WAR

NC030400 Cairo Voice of the Arabs in Arabic 2040 GMT 2 Jun 87

[From the "Voice of the Libyan People" program]

[Text] Brothers, here is a news report from Libya: Sources close to the Libyan leadership have stated that Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, in his capacity as commander in chief of the Armed Forces, issued orders for the use of poisonous gas in the Chadian war as revenge and in order to put an end to the successive defeats suffered by the Libyan forces there. This is in addition to Libya's using the internationally banned napalm and phosphoric bombs which their planes are dropping on Chadian cities and its countryside.

These sources have revealed that a large quantity of poisonous gas has arrived in the southern military zones and that thousands of gas masks have been brought into the (Niksu) region for distribution among the Libyan troops. This is to prevent them from being poisoned by their own gas, similar to the cases of poisoning in Libyan ranks as a result of (?using) wells, which al-Qadhdhafi's followers had previously poisoned in order to prevent the Chadian forces from using them.

/8309

CSO: 5200/4603

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

DANISH PAPER: ANKER JØRGENSEN LEADING PUSH FOR NORDIC ZONE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 24-30 Apr 87 p 6

[Editorial by ts: "A Man and His Zone"]

[Text] The poker game in Reykjavik has become practical superpower politics.

When the president and the secretary-general outbid one another in the Høfði House in Iceland and ended up agreeing on nearly everything, though far from agreeing on anything definite, the world felt, and justly so, that unreality had come to prevail, and the official optimism had to be coupled with considerable skepticism.

The superpowers have now got started in the area of intermediate-range missiles, and even if Gorbachev has been accommodating enough to offer to expand the area to be covered by the upcoming agreements, it is, however, still only Europe that their negotiations deal with. That makes it easier for both superpowers to toy with the idea of freedom of nuclear weapons. It is not in their territories that we have to revive the danger of war that the world knew prior to the nuclear age.

That worries the major West European countries.

But while the superpowers are changing the game of negotiations and draft treaties are being presented in Geneva, one man is continuing his tireless efforts in a minor part of the world.

The man is a Dane, and it is a nuclear-free zone comprising the Nordic countries that he wants. Even if the man is no prime minister, he has managed to set up a committee of parliamentarians who--as appears from the daily press--are proceeding steadily with the many ideas of a treaty which will make our actual freedom of nuclear arms an acknowledged state under the international law.

Anker Jørgensen--for he is the one who has succeeded Finland as the leader in the efforts for freedom of nuclear arms, who since the sixties, to the satisfaction of everybody, has been fighting for the cause without achieving the slightest indication of a result--ought to feel encouraged by the developments in superpower politics. Both the Soviet Union and the United States are talking a lot about a world free of nuclear weapons, and even if our closer

friends in Western Europe are not quite as enthusiastic, it is, however, nice being in tune with both the spirit of our time and the big powers of this world.

And if a world free of nuclear arms is a good thing, a nuclear-free zone, comprising the Nordic countries ought, indeed, to be a commendable step in the right direction, even if it is somewhat overshadowed by negotiations concerned with abolishing or transferring actually existing weapons.

Even if Anker Jørgensen is both busily involved and energetic, the results may not appear for a long time to come. Most recently the Icelandic demand that the zone comprise large parts of the Soviet Union further underlined the difficulties in connection with the idea of a nuclear-free zone.

But Anker Jørgensen deserves being judged on the basis of his intentions and not merely on the basis of the prospects of an absence of results. For the fact of the matter is that the reason why the idea of a nuclear-free zone since the fifties has been occupational therapy for diffusely peace-loving politicians and no practical politics, is that the idea of a nuclear-free zone is an extraordinarily bad idea.

It is worth repeating the reasons for this.

The creation of nuclear-free zones is at any time to the advantage of the strongest conventional military power in a given area. That may be the reason why the United States supports the idea of a nuclear-free zone comprising Latin America. And that is, at any rate, the reason why the Soviet Union supports the idea of a nuclear-free zone comprising the Nordic countries.

The political effect of a decision of a nuclear-free zone would be that Denmark and Norway would be proclaiming Denmark and Norway second-rate NATO areas. The association between the independence of Danish territory and the guarantees implied in the Atlantic Treaty would become weaker.

It is not quite as dangerous to wage war in the Nordic countries as waging war (or threatening to do so) in West Germany or other areas in Western Europe. This would be the signal sent to the Soviet Union.

The concrete effect of the break with the NATO strategy--and that is the actual content of a decision of a nuclear-free zone--would be ruining the basis for our reinforcement agreements. Forces under NATO command cannot in a situation of war fight on the basis of different nuclear strategies. To believe that is, at best, an illusion in honor of peace politicians. The consequence of the idea of a nuclear-free zone and the showdown with the nuclear strategy proponents must logically be the withdrawal of Denmark from the military cooperation within NATO.

If Denmark does this, we shall be on our way to becoming a country the security of which may be threatened without a threat to world peace. It is the enormous advantage of the NATO alliance that we are almost as secure as the superpowers. A world with nuclear weapons is not safe enough to allow us to relax. But in that world one cannot become any safer. For a nuclear war between the superpowers would in any circumstances involve us in a global Armageddon.

On the other hand, it is quite easy becoming less safe. That is done by making Denmark's security a local problem. A matter between us and the Soviet Union, for example. By creating doubts about our affiliation, we jeopardize our freedom of action in the areas of our foreign policy and domestic policy, without achieving anything but telling the world that we do not like to experience a nuclear war.

The world hardly doubts that.

The only implication of the idea of a nuclear-free zone is the indication that a nuclear war south of Padborg would trouble us less. An indication that is not calculated to increase the solidarity from the outside world upon which our security is dependent. And a position which, incidentally, does not make sense, considering the global effects of a nuclear war.

It is thus not accidental when sensible people in Norway, Denmark, and Iceland in more or less conspicuous ways seek to obstruct the work of Anker Jørgensen. It is done by expanding the geographic area that the zone ought to comprise, by making unrealistic demands of reciprocal benefits on the part of the Soviet Union, by drawing the attention to law-of-the-sea problems in the Baltic and the straits, or by pointing out that the United States may not at all guarantee a nuclear-free zone, if established.

The maneuver of evasion most widely used is less demanding intellectually and certainly not to be rejected. It consists in pointing out that "the zone will have to become an integral part in a wider European context." Incidentally, this is the official policy of the government.

However, all of it is irrelevant talk compared to the naked truth: A nuclear-free zone is an extremely bad idea.

That is the actual reason for the many obstructions encountered by Anker Jørgensen in his tireless work in the service of peace.

7262

CSO: 5200/2537

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

FINLAND'S LEADING PAPER COMMENTS ON NORDIC ZONE STUDY GROUP

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Even a Snail Advances"]

[Text] The Nordic foreign ministers have finally reached mutual understanding on the creation of an official committee to study the requirements for a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe. In connection with this, there is good reason for our writing Northern Europe in lower case since mutual understanding on geographical limits was very indefinite: In Iceland they would draw the lines from Greenland to the Urals.

When Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen speaks of an "important step forward," he is measuring things with the yardstick of a Northern European nuclear-free zone diplomat. They are used to advancing in this matter at a snail's pace. Urho Kekkonen proposed his plan for a Northern European nuclear-free zone in 1965. It was not until the early 1980's that we began to really discuss it in the Nordic countries. A diplomatic milestone was achieved in 1981 when the issue was officially raised at the Nordic Foreign Ministers Conference. Since then matter have proceeded like this, but often in routine fashion.

These past few years the Nordic countries have commissioned their own national studies on the zone project. In them the complicated nature of the matter and the difficulty of accommodating it to the official NATO defense doctrine have been emphasized. Finland's own report did not come out until after our neighbors' last summer.

We here have constantly tried to set in motion a joint Nordic investigation of the matter, one that would officially commit the Nordic countries to engaging in diplomatic-level discussion of the zone project. In this sense, the creation of the committee is a victory for Finland.

A deadline has not been set for the committee, nor is it otherwise required to strive for the adoption of a common position on the matter. The zone project is largely a matter of eternity. The most important thing is for the dialogue on the matter to continue over the coming years as well. We believe that even this will further the ultimate goal, keeping Northern Europe proper free of nuclear weapons despite the lack of an official agreement.

11,466

CSO: 5200/2516

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

FILIPINO ACTIVIST ON 'LIMITATIONS' IN CHARTER

Quezon City NATIONAL MIDWEEK in English 8 Apr 87 pp 6, 7, 8, 43

[Article by Frank Arcellana, M.D.: "Nuclear Weapons and the 1986 Constitution"]

[Text]

The officers and members of the National Organization Against Nuclear Power and Weapons, or N.O. Nukes, have mixed emotions about the so-called nuclear weapons-free provision of the 1986 Constitution. Although most of us feel that it is a definite advance in the over-all anti-nuclear struggle, we cannot be too elated about this provision, because of a potential built-in loophole and the numerous limitations and stumbling-blocks to its actual implementation. However, we are not discouraged, and we welcome these new challenges and pledge to persevere more than ever, so that mainly through the help and collective strength of the Filipino people, all of us will soon realize a genuine Philippine nuclear weapons-free zone.

Article II Section 8 of the recently ratified Charter states: "The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory."

This provision has historical significance because it makes the 1986 Philippine Constitution the second constitution in the world (after that of the Republic of Palau, an island in the Pacific)

with a nuclear-free provision. Other nations like New Zealand declared themselves nuclear weapons-free through legislation. This constitutional provision then is quite an honor and accomplishment for the Philippines. We commend the constitutional commissioners for their acute awareness of world events, especially the peace movements and nuclear disarmament. The inclusion of this provision may be also a manifestation of the commissioners' responsiveness to the popular clamor of the people to ban nuclear weapons from our country. The nuclear weapons-free provision, if properly interpreted and truly enforced, will make the retention of the US bases beyond 1991 quite problematical for the US military establishment.

The US bases in Philippine territory serve as the infrastructure, forward staging area and "nuclear cockpit" for the US nuclear warfighting strategy in East Asia and the Pacific. In addition, the US military has integrated a lot of its first-strike tactical nuclear weapons into its conventional weapons system.

The scope and intent of the nuclear weapons-free provision

can be gathered from the Con-Com's deliberations on the subject. As gleaned from the Con-Com record, the ban includes nuclear weapons testing and the dumping of nuclear waste. It also prohibits the manufacture of nuclear weapons and parts thereof. It also bans the entry, passage or transit of nuclear arms-bearing seacraft and aircraft. The ban on nuclear-capable and nuclear-powered warships is also strongly implied.

The antecedent phrase, "consistent with the national interest," is the potential built-in loophole that can make the provision worthless and possibly taint the constitutional commissioners with the ignominy of having committed the most grievous deception against the Filipino people in the history of constitution-making.

It should be noted that the Primer on the Constitution published by the Con-Com itself already cites "exceptions" to the nuclear weapons-free provision if it is to be "consistent with the national interest." The commissioners involved in the making of the Primer have thus already exposed this potential loophole.

Speaking of nuclear weapons and the national interest, from the modern, liberated and scientific point of view (as opposed to the backward, colonial, and unscientific viewpoint), nuclear weapons ultimately terrorize all nations and make all nations insecure. Therefore, these immoral instruments of indiscriminate mass killing and destruction cannot serve our national interest or the national interest of any nation, for that matter.

There is a problem however, with the above argument. The Rambos and cavemen in Washington, including the myopic hawks at the Pentagon, insist

that they need to deploy their death toys in their 350 bases in East Asia and the Pacific to enhance their first-strike capability. This warlike policy is part of the US "national defense" which is for US "national security," which is in the US "national interest."

The nuclear weapons-free provision will thus be the acid test of so-called special relations between the Philippines and the US. But have there been such "special relations?" Are the long historical ties with the US based on true friendship, mutual respect and equality? Or have these been characterized more by exploitation, subservience and injustice?

History has taught us that US interests are frequently opposed to Philippine interests. Even Ninoy Aquino assailed such "special relations" with the US back in 1971 as detrimental to our peace and prosperity.

Let us therefore shake off this yoke of mental colonialism, unite with New Zealand, the South Pacific nations and our ASEAN neighbors in banning nuclear weapons, and in declaring our global region a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality.

A few militarists, fascist holdovers, and traditional politicians have tried to distort the true meaning and intent of the provision either out of sheer ignorance or because of eagerness to please their foreign masters. Some of them would pretend to love nuclear weapons just to be able to get financial and other logistical support from the powerful US military-industrial complex in their campaign for the coming congressional and local elections.

One former martial law administrator, in a speech before a civic group in Bulacan, said that the removal of nuclear weapons

might endanger the security of our region because it would disturb the "balance of power." He was merely mouthing an oft-repeated Pentagon disinformation line.

On a televised public information program on the Constitution, a former senator and constitutional commissioner said that possible exception to the freedom from nuclear weapons provisions which may be "consistent with the national interest" is indicated in the following scenario: since nuclear science is developing, someday Vietnam may learn how to make nuclear weapons and when that time comes, we should probably have nuclear weapons too! (But Mr. Former Senator, doesn't this directly violate Article II Section 2, or the anti-war provision in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies?)

The above are recent examples of the brand of dangerous thinking found even among Filipinos. It is the same kind of thinking we are all trying to change, world-wide, if we ever hope to prevent the incineration and death of the only planet we have.

There are many limitations and stumbling-blocks to the full implementation of the provision and the complete realization of a Philippine nuclear weapons-free zone. First, the provision is non-absolutist in character. It is not an absolute ban because of that potential loophole, to begin with, and because it is only a policy which can be vigorously pursued, or lamely followed, depending on the commitment and resolve of the government.

Second, the timing of its implementation is vague. Will the executive branch immediately invoke the constitutional mandate after ratification or will it drag

its feet and wait for the Congress to convene?

Third, there is a lack of local expertise to inspect the bases for nuclear weapons. Components of nuclear weapons that can be quickly assembled are probably secretly concealed. There will be a need for an independent body of local and international experts which will be in charge of initial verification of deployment and the subsequent surveillance and monitoring of our territorial waters and air space.

Fourth, the extensive areas allotted to the US bases pose a big handicap for any inspection team. Imagine combing through an area as large as the combined areas of Singapore and Washington, DC.

Fifth, the stipulations in the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, like the refusal to discuss the issue of nuclear weapons by the American panel, and the "unhampered use of the bases" clause, are major stumbling-blocks to the immediate implementation of the provision. Because of the "unhampered use" clause, the whole Philippine archipelago has become virtually a US military base where a nuclear weapon can be hidden anywhere.

Sixth, the US military's insolent policy of "neither to confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons" when confronted by the country hosting their bases and receiving port calls to the US warships, is another major stumbling-block.

Seventh, the historical heritage, the structure, orientation, and semi-colonial makeup of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are potential limitations and stumbling-blocks to the full enforcement and realization of the Philippine nuclear weapons-free zone. Would the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, for instance,

assist a flotilla of fishermen meeting and protesting the entry of a nuclear-capable US warship? Or would they look the other way or even assist in water-hosing and dispersing the protesters?

Despite the numerous limitations and stumbling-blocks confronting us, we must persist and persevere in making our country free from the danger and menace of nuclear weapons. Because of the bases that serve US first-strike and nuclear warfighting capability in East Asia and the Pacific, Soviet SS-20 missiles are now trained on the Philippines, ready to pulverize, vaporize, incinerate and irradiate Luzon off the face of the earth. Like a sword of Damocles, nuclear devastation can fall upon us any time through madness, in desperate retaliation against US nuclear forces, through computer error or by accident.

Even without a nuclear war or even if there is no deliberate or accidental nuclear attack, we remain exposed to the threat of a nuclear holocaust from accidents involving the nuclear stockpile or the transfer and transit of nuclear weapons in our waters and territorial air space. The list is long. There have been literally hundreds of nuclear weapons accidents and "minor incidents" reported by the US Navy that have been only recently declassified. Complex technology cannot be perfect or 100 percent fail-safe. Accidents can be catastrophic, killing not only people but also contaminating fish and marine life, the major source of protein for most Filipinos. We must remember and learn from these recent technological catastrophes: Bhopal, Challenger, Chernobyl. We must not allow the next nuclear catastrophe to take place in our country.

The Soviet nuclear submarine that sank off the coast of Bermuda could have been a US sub-

marine sinking off Subic and scattering deadly radioactive material. The bomb that accidentally dropped from a US warplane and that gouged out a big hole in a rice field in Zambales could have been a nuclear bomb. And such "accidents" have happened before, in Palomares, Spain, and in Greenland, where thousands of acres were contaminated by plutonium.

Because of the ever present nuclear menace posed by nuclear weapons, these nuclear weapons cannot nor can ever be consistent with the national interest.

With the ratification of the 1986 Constitution, we urge the Aquino government to enforce this constitutional mandate calling for freedom from nuclear weapons. A step in the right direction would be the immediate formation of an independent commission, perhaps assisted by international technical experts, to study and supervise the implementation of the provision. Deployment of nuclear weapons on Philippine territory should be verified. Subsequent surveillance, monitoring, and regular and random inspections should be strictly carried out.

The constitutionalization of cause-oriented groups and people's power should pave the way for the recognition, encouragement, protection and appreciation of anti-nuclear and peace organizations, and the vital role of these organizations in the actual enforcement of the nuclear weapons ban. Our own organization, N.O. Nukes, plans to establish community-based citizens' groups called Anti-Nuclear Vigilantes, or ANVs (which is the same acronym for Active Non-Violence). These ANVs will coordinate with the local N.O. Nukes chapter and local law-enforcement agencies.

More than just a symbolic gesture, all the governors and mayors will be encouraged to follow the fundamental law of the land and declare their respective provinces, cities and municipalities nuclear-free zones. They should assist, cooperate and offer police protection to the local ANVs and other peace groups in the surveillance and monitoring of the Philippine skies and waters.

In the realm of international diplomacy, it is high time that the Philippines pursued an independent foreign policy and launched various peace initiatives. It should challenge that haughty policy of the US of "neither to confirm nor deny." It should seek a definite timetable and agenda with ASEAN in the realization of a nuclear weapons-free Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. It should unite with New Zealand and the South Pacific nations in the establishment of this nuclear-free zone. In pursuit of these new tasks in international diplomacy, a top-level revamp in the foreign ministry may be necessary.

In line with the re-structuring and the re-orientation of the AFP, perhaps it is not unreasonable to allow the Philippine Constabulary to be totally absorbed by the Navy and Coast Guard. We deplore the fact that among the major services, the Philippine Navy is the smallest unit. Is this the proper thing when we are an archipelagic nation with a coastline longer than that of the United States? We must have the biggest maritime fleet in Asia if only to guard and protect our territorial waters. At the present time, how can our Navy police our shores and guard the Philippine seas from incursions of foreign nuclear-bearing and nuclear-capable warships and vessels, when it is not even effective against illegal fishermen,

smugglers, gunrunners, pirates, escaping cronies on the "hold" list, returning fascists and other assorted international criminals? In other words, a truly new, nationalist and re-structured AFP, with the Navy as its biggest unit, would be the minimum military organization necessary to protect the integrity of our territorial waters and air space, and to keep our country nuclear-free.

Since the US bases on Philippine territory serve US nuclear warfighting capability in Asia, and because the more recent tactical nuclear weapons like the Tomahawk cruise missiles have been integrated into the conventional weapons system of the US military, the mere removal of nuclear weapons from the US bases here without the removal of the bases themselves, poses a huge problem, not only for the US military, but also for the hosting country. It is a huge problem for us in terms of effecting "waterproof" and "air-tight" surveillance and error-less verification procedures. In short, the simplest and best way to render our nation nuclear weapons-free may be through the dismantling of these military facilities.

In line with these observations, and since all true Filipinos believe that the bases will have to go sometime, we urge the national government to study all its so-called "open options" now regarding the final disposition of these bases, and not to wait till 1988 when the agreement is reviewed or in 1991 when the actual agreement expires. We propose a step by step phase-out starting with the immediate removal and subsequent prohibition of all nuclear weapons, followed by a radically decreased acreage occupied by the bases to release fertile lands that can be used in the land reform program of the government. Then the rest

of the facilities can undergo economic conversion for peaceful and civilian purposes.

We urge the government to tap the assistance and talent of the academic community, peace organizations and other independent bodies, in doing these exhaustive and extensive studies, so that we can all be ready and well-prepared to finally win true independence and sovereignty for ourselves and our children.

/9274

CSO: 5200/4311

RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV DISCUSSES ARMS ISSUES WITH ROMANIAN LEADER

Gorbachev Dinner Speech

PM261051 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 May 87 p 2

[Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, at a 25 May dinner given in his honour in Bucharest by Nicolae Ceausescu, RCP general secretary, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania]

[Excerpts] Esteemed Comrade Ceausescu,

Esteemed comrades,

Now a few words about international affairs. For us, as for the leadership of Romania and of the other socialist states, the paramount issue is how to stop the arms race and prevent a nuclear catastrophe.

The arms race is becoming an increasingly heavy and unbearable burden on the peoples of almost all the countries and continents. But the glimmers of hope for speedy disarmament which appeared after Geneva and Reykjavik time and again alternate with waves of fear of a buildup of the weapons arsenal, which is a threat to humanity's very existence. The rapid growth of military spending diverts enormous resources, hampers economic and social progress.

Humanity is faced with many a burning problem which could be resolved or at least whose solution we could tackle jointly, if we succeed in ending the arms race. Among these problems are eradication of illiteracy and stamping out of diseases, protection of the environment and harnessing new energy sources.

The only feasible and sensible approach to the global problems of the present is expressed in the now well known and comprehensive formula: disarmament and development. It epitomizes new political thinking, which rejects militarism and the cult of violence in the international arena and is directed towards cooperation and mutual assistance in the present-day interdependent world.

The pursuit of the phantom of military superiority has continued for more than 40 years now. We believe it is clear to everyone that neither of the sides is capable of gaining advantage [pereves] over the other. Hoping to reach such an advantage is tantamount to harboring illusions, and a policy based on illusions never did any good.

We hope that this indisputable truth will, at last, be realized in Washington and in the capitals of other states of the North Atlantic Alliance. Then the possibility will open up to make the first real steps on the way towards disarmament, will give humanity a chance to sigh with relief.

The Soviet Union, Romania, and the other Warsaw Treaty member states have covered probably much more than their half of the way for the sake of attaining that aim. Lying on the negotiating table before our Western partners are valuable proposals on the entire -- if we may say so -- "quintette" of modern weapons: strategic nuclear weapons, medium-range missiles, operational and tactical missiles, chemical weapons, and conventional weapons.

It goes without saying that in preparing these proposals the security interests of all the allied socialist countries were most carefully considered. At the same time it is also easy to see in them the wish to meet the other side as much as possible, to take into consideration its wishes and interests. This is particularly evident on the example of medium-range missiles in Europe.

We do not lose hope that common sense will prevail among the NATO member countries, and that use will be made of the truly unique chance for disarmament, that the settlement of the problem of medium-range missiles will be followed by some kind of a chain reaction, as a result of which Europe will gradually cease to be the venue of the concentration of the most monstrous amount of weapons in mankind's history. And this, in its turn, will give an impetus to a broad development of cooperation on the continent, from which all European nations -- and not only European nations -- would gain.

I wish to stress that the Soviet Union and Romania have a common approach to these burning problems. We value the contribution of our Romanian comrades to the joint efforts made by the socialist countries for strengthening their security and preserving peace, we will further closely cooperate on these issues.

Ceausescu Dinner Speech

PM261435 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 May 87 Second Edition p 2

[TASS account of "Speech by Comrade N. Ceausescu," RCP general secretary and president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, at 25 May dinner in honor of M.S. Gorbachev in Bucharest, under the general heading "In Honor of the Soviet Leader"]

[Excerpts] Esteemed Comrade Gorbachev!

Esteemed comrades!

The world situation remains, as before, particularly serious and complex, mainly as a result of the continuation of the nuclear arms race which constantly intensifies the danger of a devastating war. This demands, more than ever before, the pooling of effort and increasingly close collaboration by all peoples for the sake of putting an end to the dangerous course of confrontation and war, implementing disarmament, and ensuring cooperation and peace.

The changes that have occurred in the world, and the existence of nuclear arms and vast arsenals of mass-destruction weapons, demand new thinking and a new approach to the problems of war and peace, based on the fact that, in today's conditions, a war with the use of nuclear weapons is unthinkable, that such a war would have neither victors nor vanquished, and that all mankind would perish in it. Nuclear weapons cannot ensure greater security; on the contrary, they increase the insecurity of peoples. The basic issue of our epoch is the termination of the arms race, the transition to disarmament, and primarily nuclear disarmament, and the defense of peace and life on earth!

Romania has resolutely advocated and does advocate the elimination of all nuclear arms by the end of this century. Proceeding from its consistent stance regarding the need for a stage-by-stage solution of disarmament questions without their interlinkage, our country supports the proposals for separate examination of the question of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe as the first step toward removal of all nuclear arms from the continent and their complete liquidation. We also acclaim the Soviet proposals on operational and tactical missiles, including the withdrawal of these missiles from the CSSR and the GDR and their destruction. We believe that the United States and, of course, the NATO countries must respond in a positive spirit to these proposals, abandon the certain restraint they still display, and find ways for the speediest reaching of proper agreements on the removal of nuclear arms from the continent and their complete liquidation.

At the same time, we believe that, in the spirit of the agreements we reached at the Budapest conference of Warsaw Pact socialist countries, it is necessary to move more resolutely toward the reduction of conventional arms. On the basis of a nationwide referendum, last year Romania unilaterally reduced its armaments, numerical strength of troops, and military spending by 5 percent, thus demonstrating that it is fully determined to act with the utmost vigor in the direction of disarmament, detente, and peace.

By means of closer collaboration, the European countries can and must play a more important role in the struggle for disarmament, security, confidence-building, and cooperation in the continent and throughout the world. In this spirit, we believe that it is necessary to do everything to ensure the conclusion of the Vienna meeting with the best possible results, which would bring about real positive progress toward disarmament, confidence-building, and cooperation in the continent.

Within the framework of actions to strengthen security and cooperation in Europe, Romania consistently advocates the transformation of the Balkans into a zone of peace and cooperation, free from nuclear and chemical weapons. We support the proposals to create such zones in Central and Northern Europe and elsewhere in the world.

We believe that, under the present circumstances, it is necessary to aim more resolutely for the exclusion of the use of force or threat to use force from international relations and the settlement of all conflicts and disputed questions between states only through peaceful talks held in a spirit of full equality and respect for each people's right to free and independent development.

Report on Leaders' Talks

LD261415 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1330 GMT 26 May 87

[Excerpts] Bucharest, 26 May (TASS)--On 25-26 May meetings were held here between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Nicolae Ceausescu, secretary general of the RCP and president of the Socialist Republic of Romania. In the course of the meetings there was a detailed exchange of views on topical problems of socialist construction, bilateral relations, and world politics.

Speaking about the international situation, Mikhail Gorbachev noted that there are in the world not only the interests of separate states or groups of states -- socialist, capitalist, developing states -- but also general, mutually linked interests. It is important to know how to find ways to make these accord with one another, to know how to respect one another's interests. Herein lies the meaning of the new thinking, which should come to replace the old, obsolete approaches to international affairs.

The global problems of mankind can be resolved only through the efforts of all the states of the world. These are the questions of strengthening peace, halting the arms race, protecting the environment, the problem of hunger, and of scientific and technical progress.

There is no more acute problem among the problems of disarmament, Mikhail Gorbachev said, than that of the militarization of space. Putting weapons into space will inevitably lead to the increase of mutual distrust and suspicion. This will make the world less stable, less predictable, will whip up the arms race, and will lead to the destiny of mankind being dependent upon chance technical malfunctions. All this places a tremendous responsibility on the governments of all the states of the world.

Nicolae Ceausescu stated that on the majority of the issues that were discussed the Soviet Union and Romania have identical or close stances. He discussed the contradictions between the capitalist powers and the developing countries and stressed the pernicious role of nonequivalent [neekvivalentnyy] exchange and of the growing burden of financial debt. Today, without stopping the arms race, not a single state is in a condition to resolve its social or other problems of development.

During an examination of international matters, the importance was noted of the foreign political activity -- which is full of initiative -- of the socialist countries in the struggle for eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, disarmament, and reducing military confrontation in Europe. The general view was expressed of the necessity to activate efforts in resolving the more acute problems, such as achieving an agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles, reducing strategic arms by 50 percent, stopping nuclear tests, and not permitting the arms race to be transferred into space.

Gorbachev Friendship Rally Speech

PM271119 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 May 87 Second Edition pp 2-3

[Speech by CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at Soviet-Romanian friendship rally in Bucharest on 26 May, published under general heading "Making Working People's Lives Richer and Fuller," headlined "Speech by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev"]

[Excerpts] Esteemed Comrade Ceausescu, dear comrades and friends:

Comrades, a regular session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee will assemble in Berlin the day after tomorrow. As always the situation in Europe and in the world will be analyzed jointly and joint foreign-policy actions which have become topical will be coordinated. Interaction, cohesion, and unity are our great gains. To a decisive extent, thanks to joint efforts, it has been possible to defend the security and the sovereignty of the socialist states and to block the way of those who are fond of military adventures. In solving common tasks, the community has helped to defend the interests of each of its members. By the active and well-coordinated actions of the socialist states, the postwar frontiers of Poland and Czechoslovakia have been fixed, international recognition by law of the GDR has been won, the blockade of Cuba has been broken, and great assistance has been given to Vietnam in the struggle against American aggression. The countries of the socialist community have been at the source of the collective security process on the continent. Here in Bucharest the initiative for an all-European conference was put forward.

Far be it from us to think that all our joint steps have invariably been felicitous and crowned with success. But there is one thing we can say firmly: We have lived and we continue to live by our concern for peace. The prevention of nuclear disaster and the saving of mankind is the main purpose of our policy.

Today there is a question which stands before all countries: How to ward off the military menace? But differing answers are given to it. Security by means of deterrence, primarily nuclear -- that is how the ruling circles in the United States and the leaders of a number of capitalist countries phrase the issue. Our approach is fundamentally different: security through a movement to peace without weapons or violence. We propose a realistic way to this: a program for the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons; for banning the spread of the arms race to outer space; and for halting nuclear tests.

Now the issue of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe is on the agenda. In their most recent statements and in conversations with us, certain statesmen from the NATO countries have announced that the radical solution of this issue proposed by the Soviet Union is, in principle, possible. However, this has been followed by a multitude of buts. They have started to say that medium-range missiles cannot be destroyed without a parallel solution of the issue of operational and tactical missiles. When we agreed to destroy that type of weapon also, our Western partners got all excited and said they would be left defenseless before the supposedly overwhelming might of the Warsaw Pact.

Then the condition was advanced of renouncing the 100 warheads that, according to the Reykjavik accord, were to have been left to the Soviet Union in Asia and to the United States. As you know, a few days ago we announced that even that is not excluded. But then after that all sorts of obstacles are being raised. At least now it should be clear to all who is for a nuclear world and who is for a nonnuclear one. It should also be clear just how false is the myth spread by anticommunists concerning the aggressive intentions of the socialist states. At this crucial and extremely responsible moment peoples are within their rights to demand an end at long last to the game of cat and mouse in tackling such a serious issue as nuclear disarmament and the consolidation of peace and security in Europe.

One would like to think that when it comes to making the final decisions good will and political realism will prevail in the West and, as the result, it will be possible to conclude an agreement on liquidating medium-range missiles as early as this year.

Almost a year has passed since the Warsaw Pact member states put to all the European countries a concrete program for reducing the armed forces as well as tactical, nuclear, and conventional arms in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. Certain NATO member-countries have, as it were, agreed to hold talks, yet they are against having the issue of tactical nuclear weapons discussed at such talks. The question arises: how to deal with those arms if, for the major part, they are dual-purpose ones -- that is, designed for both conventional and nuclear ammunition? It seems to us that it would be logical to consider the issue of those arms in combination with conventional arms.

It is appropriate to say here in Bucharest how we see the situation in the Balkans. It is well known that for centuries this region has been regarded as the Europe's powder keg. And if peaceful relations are now being maintained between the states situated here, then this is to their common indisputable credit. Yet nobody has any doubt that the Balkan countries would feel more confident and at ease if the ideas of turning this region into a zone free from both nuclear and chemical arms were implemented. There are proposals from Romania and Bulgaria to this effect. As far as we know, other states have a positive attitude toward them. In connection with this, I would like to state that the Soviet Union is prepared to give the necessary guarantees relating to the nonsiting [nerazmeshcheniye] and nonuse of nuclear and chemical weapons in this area. [Moscow Television in Russian at 1403 GMT on 26 May carries a live broadcast of Gorbachev's speech in which he says instead of the preceding sentence: In connection with this, I would like to state that we have neither nuclear nor chemical weapons in the region of the Balkans and that the Soviet Union is prepared to give the necessary guarantees regarding their nondeployment (razneshchcheniye) and nonuse.] I think it would be worthwhile to go even further and free the Balkan Peninsula from any foreign troops and military bases.

The efforts of the Balkan states to turn their region into a zone of peace and cooperation are considered by us an inalienable part of the all-European process. Basing itself on existing rich traditions, the USSR is ready to develop cooperation with all states located there and to promote with all the means at its disposal the formation in the Balkans of a stable and healthy situation.

I would also like to draw attention to the agreed proposal of participant states of the Warsaw Pact on freezing for 1 to 2 years military expenditure by states of both alliances [soyuzov]. As is known, the initiators of this measure were Romanian comrades. The easing of military confrontation would promote the implementation of the known proposal of our friends from Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, put forward jointly with the SPD [Social Democratic Party], on the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe.

Also recently promulgated was Poland's comprehensive plan for cutting down on weapons and strengthening trust in the center of our continent. All of these proposals once again confirm the importance of the contribution by every socialist country to the consolidation of peace, and of the coupling of each of their initiatives with the agreed line of the socialist community in international affairs.

Ceausescu Friendship Rally Speech

PM280925 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 May 87 Second Edition pp 1-2

[TASS report on speech by N. Ceausescu, secretary general of the RCP and Romanian president, at 26 May Bucharest Romanian-Soviet friendship rally: "Speech by Comrade N. Ceausescu"; carried under the general heading "Making Working People's Lives Richer and Fuller. Romanian-Soviet Friendship Rally"]

[Excerpts] Dear Comrade Gorbachev!

Esteemed comrades!

The international situation continues to be particularly serious and complex, mainly as a result of the intensification of the arms race and the accumulation of an enormous quantity of weapons -- particularly nuclear weapons -- which could destroy life on earth many times over. Certain military conflicts have continued and even exacerbated in recent years and there have been new acts of force, threats of the use of force, interference in internal affairs, and trampling of the independence and freedom of a number of states. The situation in the world economy has deteriorated considerably, particularly in the developing countries.

It can also be said at the same time that one of the characteristics of the current world situation is the intensification of the struggle for disarmament and peace and for the assertion of a new policy -- a policy of detente and cooperation among all states irrespective of their social systems. The peoples increasingly recognize the seriousness of the present situation and the danger posed by nuclear weapons to mankind's existence and life on earth itself. Never before have there been such large-scale actions by the peoples, international or regional conferences, and direct talks aimed at ensuring disarmament and peace.

The new situation created as a result of the appearance of new and exceptionally dangerous types of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction requires new thinking and a new approach to the questions of war and peace -- an approach based on the fact that under current conditions a new world war and any war at all would be inconceivable. It is necessary to wholly eschew anachronistic, obsolete concepts claiming that nuclear arms promote the strengthening of defense capability, the security of states, and the maintenance of peace. On the contrary, they intensify danger and constantly increase the threat to peace and the lives of all the peoples. The peoples' real security is not guaranteed by the accumulation and development of new types of weapons but only by their complete destruction and elimination, the development of extensive economic, scientific, and technical cooperation among states, and the strengthening of collaboration among all nations with a view to producing democratic and constructive solutions to the important problems of the day and ensuring peace.

On the basis of these realities we believe that the fundamental question of our time is the ending of the arms race -- primarily the nuclear arms race -- the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the substantial reduction of conventional arms, and the struggle for new equal relations, free cooperation, and lasting world peace. Mankind does not need nuclear arms -- be they strategic, medium-range, or shorter-range! Mankind needs peace, security, and a climate of trust and cooperation. [paragraph continues]

More than ever, all the peoples must pool their efforts and collaborate more and more closely in order to achieve disarmament and peace, eliminate nuclear weapons, and exclude war from society's life! Socialists and Communists have always opposed war and must do so even more now that arms such as nuclear weapons -- whose use would lead to the annihilation of life on earth -- have been created.

We welcomed and support the Soviet Union's proposals on the phased elimination of all nuclear arms. We have advocated and continue to advocate the separate solution of the various problems and aspects of nuclear and universal disarmament without making them contingent on each other [bez ikh vzaimnogo obuslovlivaniya]. Consistently hewing to this principled position, our country supports the Soviet Union's proposals to examine separately and reach agreement on the question of medium-range missiles in Europe, as well as the proposals concerning operational and tactical missiles, the withdrawal of these missiles from the CSSR and the GDR, and their complete destruction. We believe that on the basis of the proposals advanced by both the Soviet Union and the United States agreement could be reached this year on withdrawing medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe as a first step toward the removal of all nuclear arms from the continent and, ultimately, toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide.

We are also in favor of the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, which lead to the intensification of the arms race, increase the danger of war, and at the same time lead to serious environmental pollution. Everything must be done to halt the production of new nuclear weapons!

At the same time, we are in favor of resolute measures to reduce conventional armaments, the numerical strength of troops, and military expenditure. The vast resources which become available as a result of the reduction of military expenditure could be used for the needs of each country's socioeconomic development, and in particular to support the developing countries' efforts toward progress.

It must be candidly stated that without reducing military expenditure the fulfillment of plans and programs for the development of socialist and other countries is impossible. Disarmament and the reduction of military expenditure are an objective necessity for ensuring our countries' economic progress and the progress of all the peoples.

In the spirit of the proposals of the Warsaw Pact socialist countries on cutting conventional armaments by 25 percent before 1990, it is necessary to make every effort to switch to concrete measures in this area. Only last year Romania embarked -- on the basis of a national referendum in which nearly the entire people, including young people of 14 and over, participated -- on a unilateral 5-percent reduction in its armaments, troops, and military expenditure, thus demonstrating its will to act unswervingly in favor of disarmament and peace. We believe that the existing situation demands the most resolute switch from words to deeds, to concrete action on disarmament, the elimination of nuclear armaments, and the reduction of military

expenditure. There is no question more important today than disarmament, safeguarding the supreme right of the peoples, of human beings to existence, to life, freedom, and independence, and to peace!

I must tell you, comrades, that during our talks yesterday and today with M.S. Gorbachev we discussed questions of bilateral relations and questions of disarmament. We noted with satisfaction the identical nature of fundamental positions and reached the conclusion that our countries and all the socialist states must act to safeguard disarmament and peace.

The countries of Europe -- the continent on which a vast quantity of both nuclear and conventional armaments has accumulated -- have a big responsibility in the struggle for disarmament and peace. All the European countries must join forces and collaborate in the most active way to ensure disarmament, mutual understanding, security, and peace on the continent.

We appeal to the countries of the West and of NATO to abandon their erroneous position and realize that the existence of all the peoples and the peoples of Europe depends on the elimination of nuclear weapons, to tell the peoples the truth, and to abandon the illusion that nuclear weapons are sited.

The interests of Europe, of each inhabitant of Europe, and of the peoples and the interests of the younger generation, children, and the future demand that we do all we can to rid Europe of nuclear weapons.

Romania consistently advocates the development of extensive cooperation among the Balkan countries, the settlement via talks of all the problems that still exist between some of them, and the transformation of the Balkans into a zone of good-neighborliness, peace, and cooperation free from nuclear and chemical weapons and from foreign forces and military bases. We support the creation of such nuclear-free zones in central and northern Europe and in other continents as well.

In this respect we believe the role of the United Nations and other international organizations in the solution of serious problems of international life, in the democratization of interstate relations, and in the conduct of a policy of cooperation, detente, and peace must increase. From this lofty platform I want to stress with great satisfaction our countries' active cooperation in the United Nations and in the world arena as a whole in the struggle for disarmament and for security, cooperation, and peace the world over.

We believe our peoples' desire for peace requires strengthening this cooperation between our parties and peoples, between all the socialist countries, with all forces struggling for peace.

The RCP will extensively develop relations with the other communist parties and will continue its extensive actions to strengthen cooperation and solidarity among the communist and workers parties on the basis of complete equality and respect for the independence of each party and its right to independently develop its own political life and revolutionary strategy and tactics in accordance with the specific conditions of the country in which it is carrying out its activities.

We are also developing cooperation with socialist and social democratic parties and national liberation movements, with democratic and progressive parties and anti-imperialist forces the world over.

We are convinced that through a concerted struggle by the peoples and the progressive and advanced forces of the whole world it is possible to provide mankind with a peaceful and happy future and to create a fairer and better world -- a world of cooperation, mutual understanding, and peace.

I want to express once again the belief that Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to our country will mark an important new stage in strengthening friendship and cooperation between our parties and peoples in the interests of both countries and the cause of socialism, peace, and progress.

I ask you, dear Comrade Gorbachev, to take away with you the feelings of warm friendship and solidarity the Communists and the entire Romanian people have for the Communists and peoples of the Soviet Union and our wish for new, even bigger victories in the fulfillment of the important decision of the 27th CPSU Congress, in all activity in socialist and communist building, and in the struggle for disarmament, security, and peace the world over!

In conclusion, N. Ceausescu proposed a toast in honor of fraternal friendship and cooperation between the RCP and CPSU, between Romania and the USSR, between the Romanian and Soviet peoples, and for the strengthening of the unity and collaboration of the socialist countries and revolutionary, democratic, and progressive forces of the whole world, and for world peace.

Joint Communiqué

PM280955 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 May 87 Second Edition pp 1-2

["Soviet-Romanian Joint Communiqué"]

[Excerpts] M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was in Romania from 25-27 May 1987 on an official friendly visit at the invitation of N. Ceausescu, general secretary of the RCP and president of the Socialist Republic of Romania [SRR].

M.S. Gorbachev and N. Ceausescu examined major international problems from a position of lofty responsibility for the destinies of the world and for the security of the peoples. A joint evaluation was expressed to the effect that the situation in the world remains very serious and complex. The arms race and the buildup of new types of nuclear weapons are continuing, and tension and situations of conflict remain and are being amplified in various zones of the world; manifestations of an imperialist policy of force and the threat of force and of interference in the internal affairs of other states continue; the world economic situation is deteriorating, and the gulf between the developing and the developed countries is constantly deepening.

At the same time the leaders of the two parties note that there are powerful forces in the world that are increasingly resolutely opposing the arms race, acting in defense of peace and the lives of peoples, and advocating the elimination of the threat of a devastating nuclear war in which there would be neither victor nor vanquished.

The misanthropic concept according to which weaponry, especially nuclear, strengthens the security of states and preserves peace must be rejected once and for all. War must no longer be regarded as a means of settling conflicts between states. The realities of the nuclear and space age and the threat of destruction of the very conditions for existence of life on earth require new political thinking and a responsible approach to the issues of war and peace by all governments and political and public forces.

M.S. Gorbachev and N. Ceausescu stated that a resolute transition to disarmament, the creation of a nuclear-free and violence-free world, is the basic issue of the present.
[paragraph continues]

They stressed the importance of the Soviet program of eliminating nuclear arms by the end of the century, of the large-scale initiatives based on the terms of reference worked out in Reykjavik, of the need to conclude an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles and also of operational and tactical missiles of the USSR and the United States in Europe as soon as possible.

The two leaders are of the opinion that there are currently real opportunities for attaining progress in the cause of universal and complete disarmament. The world community demands practical measures in this direction; the United States and its NATO allies ought to display a constructive approach, to eliminate obstacles on the path of reaching accords on the fundamental questions of disarmament, including a complete and universal ban on nuclear testing, prevention of militarization of space, and the conclusion of an international convention banning chemical weapons.

The important role of Europe and all states of the continent in resolving questions of nuclear disarmament, reducing conventional arms and also other complex problems, in making the entire international situation healthier was stressed.

The importance of implementing the Warsaw Pact member states' program for reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe by 25 percent at the start of the 1990's with a corresponding reduction of military spending by states was reaffirmed. A useful step in this direction would be the institution of a 1- or 2-year moratorium on growth in military spending by states of both alliances.

The leaders of the USSR and the SRR advocated a dynamic development and deepening of all strands of the pan-European process in the sphere of security and in the political, economic and humanitarian fields, and also a successful conclusion to the Vienna meeting and the attainment there of substantial results.

The need to put an end to the imperialist policy of enmity between peoples and to the propaganda of anticommunism, racism, chauvinism and nationalism, and to act to educate peoples in a spirit of friendship, cooperation and peace was stressed.

There was a common conviction that the cause of strengthening European security will be served by the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe, including the Balkans. The Soviet Union supports the proposals by the SRR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria for turning the Balkans into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons. The socialist countries' initiatives aimed at improving the international situation and reducing military confrontation show how active their foreign policy is and how lofty their sense of responsibility for the fate of peace.

In the present international situation, when the very survival of mankind is in question, coordinated purposeful actions by the member states of the Warsaw Pact, which is an effective factor in the struggle for preserving and consolidating peace in Europe and throughout the world, are of special importance.

The visit and talks passed in an atmosphere of friendship, cordiality, and mutual understanding.

APN Commentary

AU011330 Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 30 May 87 p 3

[Article by NOVOSTI reporter Spartak Beglov: "Gorbachev and Romania"]

[Excerpts] If they want to characterize the significance of the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to Romania, Moscow observers call it a "stage" visit [Etappen-Besuch]. This means that the visit and the negotiations between the leading Soviet and Romanian personages were intended to coordinate the relations between the two fraternal states in line with the requirements of the current process of profound changes in the socialist countries. "Everything is being restructured. There can be no stopping," Gorbachev said on this occasion in Bucharest.

Recently Gorbachev called on the West to show the political will necessary to conclude a treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles by the end of this year. It is time, he said, to stop the "cat-and-mouse game" in this area as well. This also applies to the extremely delayed reaction of NATO to the proposal of the Warsaw Pact countries with regard to a considerable reduction of conventional armaments and forces from the Atlantic to the Urals.

In Bucharest, support for the efforts of the Balkan states to make their region a zone of peace and cooperation was expressed again. By making concessions to the corresponding proposals, the USSR expresses its readiness to give the necessary guarantee for not deploying and not using nuclear and chemical armaments in this zone. The USSR is in favor of freeing the Balkan peninsula from all foreign troops and military bases.

"Disarmament and development" -- this is the comprehensive, global formula that, in the fraternal countries' opinion, sets the priorities of international political in the spirit of the new way of political thinking.

RCP Assessment

PM081004 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jun 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS reports: "High Assessment"]

[Text] Bucharest June 6 TASS -- The Political Executive Committee of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee highly appraised at its meeting here the results of the official friendly visit of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to Romania, the talks between Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Mikhail Gorbachev. The agreements reached in the course of the talks are opening up new prospects for bilateral relations and signal an important stage in the development of good relations between the two parties, countries, and peoples.

The Political Executive Committee pointed out with satisfaction that the mutual wish was expressed at the talks for giving an even broader scope and filling with even richer content the multifaceted relations between the two countries.

Special significance has been noted of the agreement reached during the visit that economic cooperation be raised to an even higher level through intensifying cooperation and specialization of production, especially in the key industries, as well as of the significance of the determination reaffirmed in the course of the dialogue to broaden cooperation between the Romanian Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The significance was pointed out at the meeting of the determination expressed by the two party leaders to develop interaction between Romania and the Soviet Union in the international arena, to participate actively together with the other socialist countries, with the other progressive, democratic forces in the fight for ending the weapons race and transition to disarmament, above all to nuclear disarmament, for strengthening security, trust and cooperation in Europe and all over the world, for ensuring lasting peace on earth.

Information was presented to the meeting on the session of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee in Berlin. The Political Executive Committee noted the significance of the document approved at the meeting, which is evidence of the high responsibility shown by the Warsaw Pact member-states to the issues of peace and disarmament.

The Political Executive Committee has reaffirmed Romania's determination to work in close unity with the other socialist countries, with all the peoples of the world for mutual understanding and cooperation, for peace, in whose conditions all states could direct their efforts at free, independent development on the path of economic and social progress.

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