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'Analysis' on Congress' Rejection of B-2 Project
HK1511143091 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
5 Nov 91 p 6

["News analysis" by staff reporter Zhang Qixin (1728 0796 2500): Why Was the B-2 Bomber Left Out in the Cold?"]

[Text] Washington, 2 Nov (RENMIN RIBAO)—After nearly two months of debate, a joint U.S. House of Representatives and Senate committee decided on 31 October that no B-2 Stealth bomber planes would be purchased in 1992, reducing Bush administration's plan to acquire four more B-2's in fiscal year 1992 to naught.

Why has the B-2 been left out in the cold? To put it simply: In light of changes in the domestic and international situations, the aircraft has lost its original significance in military terms and has also become an enormous financial burden. The B-2 bomber was a product of the U.S.-USSR arms race. In the early 1980s, as a result of the intense military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as stagnation in disarmament talks, the Reagan administration proposed a grandiose plan to modernize nuclear weapons to reverse the decline of U.S. military forces. It was then that the B-2 bomber was born. According to its design, the greatest feature of the B-2 bomber is its use of special materials to evade detection by enemy radar. It also possesses the ability to penetrate high altitude air defense systems. If necessary, it could fly deep into Soviet air space to carry out nuclear attack missions. However this plane has very high technical requirements and involved astronomical costs from development to production. Each aircraft cost as much as \$865 million. The original Pentagon plan called for 132 B-2 bombers to replace aging B-52's.

With the changes in the international situation, the possibility of a nuclear conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has become more remote. At the same time, the decline of the Soviet Union has also led to a relative weakening of its military might. It was under these circumstances that an intense debate grew in the United States on whether it was necessary to build a huge fleet of B-2 bombers. In fact, the Pentagon had already changed its mind after being pressured from all sides and had reduced the order from the original 132 to 75. However, differences have also grown over the number 75. The government's view is: Because the continuing unpredictability of the international situation, the United States cannot reduce its nuclear deterrent and the B-2 is indispensable to efforts to modernize strategic nuclear forces. The Pentagon also argued that even if the B-2 does not carry nuclear weapons, it may still be regarded as an important conventional weapon for dealing with regional conflicts like the Gulf war. However, the government proposal was not convincing. Consequently, according to sources, the government is presently considering retreating even further by cutting down the B-2 order and seeking to maintain a level of 35

aircraft. However, the opposition has refused to rest its case. The view presented by the civilian research institute, "Defense Intelligence Center" is: In the light of "a shift from a U.S.-USSR arms race to cooperative relations," the B-2 project has lost its military value and "may be aborted completely." Not a few congressmen also use the same argument to criticize the B-2 project. The bicameral committee's decision not to purchase new B-2 aircraft represents the conclusion of this debate. U.S. newspapers maintain that this decision has, in effect, reduced future purchases to a very remote possibility.

In the meantime, while the U.S. Administration has sought to preserve sufficient military power to uphold its influence as superpower, its actions are restricted by its own financial abilities as well as by Congress. Because of high production costs and the endless problems encountered during its test flights, the B-2's have become a target of public censure. According to a research report by the "Defense Intelligence Center," the United States has already spent \$55 billion on developing the B-2 and the Strategic Defense Initiative. If these two projects remain unchanged, the United States will have to come up with \$200 billion. At present, the United States has a soaring financial deficit, and the annual military budget of nearly \$300 billion dollars is one important reasons behind the rising deficit. According to reference materials published by the U.S. Government the other day, the financial deficit for 1991 has already set a record, an unprecedented \$268.7 billion. Confronted by pressure from the financial deficit, the military budget and expensive weapons projects like the B-2 have naturally become a subject of continuing arguments between Congress and the administration. It appears that rejection of the B-2 project will not be an isolated incident. It could very well affect other U.S. nuclear weapons projects.

UN Representative on Transparency in Armaments

OW1611044291 Beijing XINHUA in English
0400 GMT 16 Nov 91

[Text] United Nations, November 15 (XINHUA)—China reiterates that the aim of transparency in international arms transfers is to build confidence and enhance peace and security.

Chinese ambassador for disarmament affairs, Hou Zhi-tong, made these remarks at the political and security committee of the UN General Assembly today when it considered a draft resolution on transparency in armaments.

China believes that the transparency is only feasible when countries participating in related measures find that it serves their national and international security interests.

It pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and therefore supports all proposals and measures truly conducive to the maintenance of world peace and security: the Chinese ambassador said.

In the committee this year, no other topic has given rise to such heated discussion, intense debate and frequent consultations as the issue of how to establish a UN register of international arms transfers.

"Transparency in international arms transfers and a register is not an end in itself," the ambassador pointed out, "but a means with which to enhance peace and security and stability of countries and regions concerned."

"Owing to their difference in security environments, defence needs and degree of reliance on arms imports," he added, "countries are affected differently by the same transparency in arms transfer."

He told the committee that there are so many related issues which warrant further in-depth and careful study and discussions.

For instance, how to ensure that the register of arms transfers conforms with the legitimate right of self-defense as enshrined in the UN Charter, reflect the principle of undiminished security for all countries and prevent the use [of] arms transfers to infringe on the sovereignty or interfere in the internal affairs of, or support secessionist activities in states, as well as how to truly achieve universality and non-discrimination are all extremely complex issues.

He said that a consensus opinion should be sought on the basis of extensive and adequate consultations among all countries on an equal footing and full respect for the legitimate concerns and reasonable demands of all countries, particularly the importer countries.

JAPAN

Foreign Minister Welcomes UN Call for Arms-Trade Reporting

OW1611063291 Tokyo KYODO in English 0500 GMT 16 NOV 91

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 16 KYODO—Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe welcomed Saturday a United Nations committee approval of a resolution calling for the establishment of a register system of conventional weapons within the world body.

At a press conference at the Foreign Ministry, Watanabe issued a statement saying it is a great pleasure that the resolution was approved by an overwhelming majority and marked a step forward to the realization of the arms registry system.

In the statement, the foreign minister expressed hope that the resolution will be adopted by the U.N. General Assembly. He said he believes it will help enhance the transparency of international transfers of conventional weapons.

Watanabe said that he also hopes the system will contribute to confidence-building measures among U.N. member countries and help strengthen the role of the U.N. in world affairs.

On Friday, the first committee of the U.N. General Assembly adopted the resolution co-sponsored by Japan and the 12 European Community nations by a vote of 106-1.

Cuba was the sole country voting against the resolution. Eight countries—China, North Korea, Pakistan, Myanmar, Iraq, Singapore, Sudan, and Oman—abstained.

Watanabe said that Japan will call on China to vote for the resolution at the U.N. General Assembly session scheduled in early December. General Assembly resolutions have no binding power on member countries.

NORTH KOREA

No Tae-u Nuclear Proposal Called 'Sham'

SK1011034391 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0020 GMT 10 Nov 91

[NODONG SINMUN 10 November commentary: "The Gesture of Empty Words by a Stooze of a Nuclear War"]

[Text] On 8 November, South Korean puppet No Tae-u at Chongwadae made a so-called decisive announcement on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. In the announcement, saying that he was declaring the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, he advertised that South Korea will not manufacture, possess, stockpile, deploy, or use nuclear weapons; that it will accept an international inspection of so-called nuclear

materials and facilities; and that it will make efforts for peace free from nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. He made absurd remarks, urging the North to take a corresponding measure.

Even though No Tae-u said that he would make a decisive decision to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, he did not utter a word about the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea or their nuclear base.

As the world knows, the nuclear danger on the Korean peninsula comes from South Korea where the U.S. nuclear weapons have been deployed for a real war, not from the North which does not possess nuclear weapons. If the United States had not deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea, the issue of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone would never have raised.

The U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea are a root from which springs forth the danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula. They are the greatest threat to our people and the rest of the Asian people. The issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula precisely means the issue of withdrawing the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea.

No Tae-u's denuclearization declaration ignored the issue of withdrawing the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea, which is a key to settling the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. Thus, his declaration is nothing but an open boast and the gesture of empty words that are not worthy of consideration at all.

No Tae-u does not utter a word about removing the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea for a real war. This shows that he tries as ever to render our people U.S. nuclear hostages and victims of a nuclear war. This clearly exposes the No Tae-u ring's sycophantic, traitorous, and antipeace behavior of stationing the U.S. nuclear [as heard] in South Korea; of prolonging No Tae-u's life under the U.S. umbrella as a reward for being watchman of the U.S. nuclear weapons; and of being indifferent to risking a nuclear holocaust for the country and fellow countries.

No Tae-u hurriedly announced the declaration, which has no actual meaning. This cannot but be interpreted as other than a contemptible maneuver for diverting the attention at home and abroad onto the issue of conducting a nuclear inspection against us. This is because he is faced with the strong antinuclear and peace offensive of all fellow countrymen in the North, South, and overseas and the world peace-loving people who are demanding that the U.S. nuclear weapons be withdrawn from South Korea. Thus he has been driven into a corner.

In a so-called decisive declaration, No Tae-u raved that the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula should be independently settled between the partners concerned, the North and the South. This is an impudent

remark of the puppets, who are under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and persistently begging for it. The master of the nuclear weapons in South Korea is the United States. The South Korean puppets are nothing but a servant drawing the cart of the U.S. nuclear war.

As shown in the fourth round of the North-South high-level talks, the South Korean authorities, saying that they support the U.S. position of neither confirming nor denying the presence of the nuclear weapons shipped into South Korea, said that they could neither tell whether U.S. nuclear weapons are in South Korea nor, if there are nuclear weapons, how many there are in South Korea. If they do not know how many foreign nuclear weapons have been introduced into their own land, how can they have the face to discuss with us the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula?

The No Tae-u ring has no knowledge of the U.S. nuclear weapons shipped into the South Korea and has no right to push the button of the nuclear weapons. Therefore, No Tae-u is not qualified to talk about the issue of negotiating with us over nuclear weapons. No Tae-u, who is not qualified, presumptuously talked about the issue of independently settling the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula between the partners concerned, the North and the South. This is nothing but an awkward trick aimed at stationing the nuclear weapons by excluding from the agenda the discussion of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea.

Traitor No Tae-u took issue with us while talking about carrying out an international duty and accepting a nuclear inspection. In connection with this, our position is clear. Our Republic's government is ready to sign [*choin*] the nuclear safeguard accords according to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not object to allowing a nuclear inspection. The point is that the U.S. nuclear threat to us still has not been removed. As we have repeatedly declared, we have no nuclear weapons. We have no intention or ability to develop nuclear weapons.

If a nuclear inspection should be conducted, instead of unilaterally inspecting us who possesses no nuclear weapons, the U.S. nuclear base in South Korea should be opened and an international inspection of it should be conducted at the same time.

If No Tae-u has even a little bit of concern about his fellow countrymen's fate and really wants to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, prior to talking about a nuclear inspection of us who possess no nuclear weapons, he should take issue with the approximately 1,000 pieces of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and he should demand a nuclear inspection of them.

Without uttering a single word about the U.S. nuclear weapons densely deployed in South Korea, No Tae-u demands that we carry out an international duty. This proceeds from an impure goal of keeping the U.S.

nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and of making a pretext of developing the South side's nuclear weapons.

Now, voices demanding that the Korean peninsula be turned into nuclear-free zone are rising everywhere in the world. Turning the Korean peninsula, where the danger of a nuclear war is heavily continuing, into a nuclear-free zone is an urgent and mature demand that brooks no further delay.

Representing the unanimous desire of the fellow countrymen and the demand of the times, at the fourth round of the North-South high-level talks we offered the proposal that a declaration on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone be agreed upon and adopted.

The draft of the declaration includes the issue that the North and the South will not test, manufacture, introduce, possess, or use nuclear weapons; the issue that the North and the South will prohibit the deployment and passage of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and in Korean territory; the issue that the North and the South will not conduct any war exercise under the simulated condition of a nuclear war; and the issue that the North and the South will jointly verify the total and complete withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons and the removal of nuclear bases in the South of the Korean peninsula, discharge the duty of simultaneous nuclear inspection as required by the international treaty, and publish at home and abroad the declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The South Korean authorities should not resort to a sham through empty words. They should not hesitate to accept our aboveboard and reasonable proposal. If the South Korean authorities persistently leave South Korea to the U.S. nuclear stockpile and nuclear forward base and go toward the road of kicking off a nuclear war, they cannot avoid the curse and denunciation of the people at home and abroad.

Papers Reject No Tae-u Denuclearization Proposal

*SK1011085191 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0820 GMT 10 Nov 91*

[Text] Pyongyang November 10 (KCNA)—Papers here today comment on the "important announcement" on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula made by No Tae-u of South Korea at "Chongwadae" on November 8.

Declaring the "denuclearization" of the Korean peninsula, No said "South Korea will not manufacture, possess, stockpile, deploy or use nuclear weapons", will accept an "international inspection" of nuclear substances and facilities and it "aspires after peace" free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. And he "urged the North to take corresponding steps".

A NODONG SINMUN analyst says that No Tae-u, in what he called a "momentous decision for the denuclearization" of the Korean peninsula, made no mention about the nuclear weapons and nuclear bases of the United States in South Korea.

The analyst continues:

This shows that he still intends to reduce the Korean nation to a nuclear hostage of the United States and a victim of a nuclear war. This also fully exposes the flunkeyist, anti-peace nature of the No Tae-u group which is prolonging its days under the protection of the United States by keeping the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea and standing guard over them, and cares little about the nuclear holocaust that might be inflicted upon the country and the fellow countrymen.

No Tae-u hurriedly released the insignificant "declaration" with a base trick to call the public attention at home and abroad to the question of "nuclear inspection" of the North, driven into a corner by the powerful anti-nuke, peace offensive of the entire fellow countrymen in the North, the South and overseas and the world peaceloving people demanding the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea.

In his "important announcement" No said the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula should be "solved independently between the North and the South". It is an obtrusive rigamarole of the puppets who are under the "nuclear protection" of the United States and are persistently entreating for it.

The No group which is none other than a servant drawing the United States' nuclear war chariot is not entitled to talk about "nuclear negotiations" with the North.

This notwithstanding, No cried for an "independent settlement of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula between the North and the South". This is nothing but a ham-handed ruse to keep the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea by excluding them in the debate.

The traitor No also urged the North to "discharge its international obligation" and "accept a nuclear inspection". Our position on these matters is clear.

The DPRK Government is ready to sign the nuclear safeguards accord under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty anytime and does not oppose a nuclear inspection.

The problem is that the U.S. nuclear threat to our republic still exists.

If No Tae-u has the least interest in the destiny of the fellow countrymen and truly wants denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, he should have taken issue with more than 1,000 U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and called for a nuclear inspection of them, before urging the North having no nukes to accept a "nuclear inspection".

No made no mention about the U.S. nuclear weapons densely deployed in South Korea and urged the North to "discharge its international obligation". This revealed his sinister intention to maintain the nuclear weapons in South Korea and invent a pretext for nuclear development.

A MINJU CHOSON analyst says that if the South Korean rulers truly want to get the danger of a nuclear war removed from the peninsula, they must not resort to sleight of hand but make efforts for the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea and affirmatively accede to our proposal for the adoption of a "declaration of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula". If they refuse this, they will face a stern judgement by the people.

Foreign Ministry on South's Antinuclear Proposal

SK1211143591 *Pyongyang Korean Central*
Broadcasting Network in Korean 1200 GMT 12 Nov 91

["News statement" issued on 12 November by DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman on South Korean 8 November denuclearization declaration—read by announcer]

[Text] Removing the danger of nuclear war and ensuring durable peace on the Korean peninsula are becoming all the more urgent. The United States is now making a big row, raving in connection with our nonexistent nuclear development about forcible inspection on nuclear facilities and a military attack. We cannot but regard this as an act of intentionally further aggravating the situation in Korea and Asia. The government of our Republic has been making every sincere effort to defend peace and remove the nuclear menace on the Korean peninsula. We have already made an epochal proposal for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in June 1986. Last July we proclaimed a new proposal for denuclearization, making the previous proposal even more specific.

In the fourth round of the North-South high level talks, we proposed a declaration for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. These proposals of ours are evoking the world's broad support and consensus. Now it depends entirely on the United States and the South Korean authorities whether the danger of nuclear war is to be removed and peace ensured on the Korean peninsula.

The United States some time ago admitted that it has deployed its nuclear weapons in South Korea for actual combat purposes and expressed its position to withdraw them. We welcomed this and made it clear that if the United States actually withdraws nuclear weapons from South Korea, it will allow for our signing of the nuclear safeguards agreement as well.

The South Korean person in authority, pressed by the rapid development of the situation, issued a so-called declaration on denuclearization on 8 November, stating

that he was making an important decision. It is needless to explain that this declaration was worked out according to the scenario written by the United States. If the United States intends to truly resolve the nuclear issue in Korea, it should negotiate directly with us. It should not avoid responsibility by using its servant and proxy.

The denuclearization declaration that the South Korean person in authority offered is nothing new in essence. We regard it as noteworthy that the South Korean person in authority, who desperately opposed the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula at the mere mention of it, stated that he favors denuclearization, though perfunctorily, and accepted even a very small part of the denuclearization proposal that we have already advanced. However, as world opinion appraises it fairly, this declaration mentions nothing about the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons, the key issue of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Mentioning the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula apart from the fundamental issue of it is no more than empty talk. It is a cunning tactic aimed at deceiving others. The United States has deployed numerous nuclear weapons in South Korea. How can one mention the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and ignore this problem?

The United States is beating around the bush, pretending that this issue has nothing to do with it but that it is an issue to be discussed and resolved between the North and the South. The facts clearly and realistically prove that the United States is raving about our nonexistent development of nuclear weapons to create an excuse for the South Korean authorities' nuclear development and, further, to find an excuse to attack our Republic and overthrow our system. If this were not the case, why should the United States so desperately make a row about our nonexistent nuclear development?

We have neither the intention nor the ability to develop nuclear weapons; therefore, we have no reason for opposing nuclear inspection. We have stated this repeatedly. The United States and the South Korean authorities should not make empty talk about the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula but take practical steps for it.

Now that the U.S. authorities have said that they will withdraw their tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea, they should precisely make public the types and number of the weapons, state a schedule for the withdrawal soon, and take the step of comprehensively and completely withdrawing them of all types from South Korea.

We strongly maintain that nuclear inspection should not be made unilaterally on us alone, but it should be made simultaneously in a fair manner on the U.S. nuclear bases in South Korea.

What we absolutely oppose is not the nuclear inspection itself on us. It is the act of the United States, which tries to unilaterally impose nuclear inspection on us alone,

thereby attempting to encroach on our sovereignty. If the United States does not have an ax to grind, it should agree to our proposal for denuclearization, and then all problems will be resolved.

The DPRK Government considers that the negotiations between our country and the United States should be held at an early date over the issue of establishing nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula. The South Korean person in authority should accept the declaration on denuclearization that we offered at the North-South high level talks, instead of uttering empty words about denuclearization.

PRC Support for DPRK Nuclear Proposal Cited

*SK1311051591 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0425 GMT 13 Nov 91*

[“Spokesman of Chinese Foreign Ministry Supports DPRK’s Proposal for Denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Beijing November 11 (KCNA)—According to a report of the Chinese PEOPLE’S DAILY on November 10, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, answering a question of a reporter last Saturday as to what he thought about No Tae-u’s “denuclearisation declaration” dated November 8, said:

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea put forward a proposal to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone some time ago. China supports this proposal and all steps which will give practical help in carrying it into effect. Because this will be helpful toward peace and stability of the Korean peninsula.

SOUTH KOREA

South Proposes Banning Nuclear, CBW Arms From Peninsula

*SK1111092291 Seoul YONHAP in English 0904 GMT
11 Nov 91*

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 11 (YONHAP)—South Korea proposed Monday to North Korea that elimination of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons from the Korean peninsula be included in their projected agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, and exchange and cooperation, a senior South Korean official said.

The proposal, made in the first working-level talks between delegates to the inter-Korean high-level talks in the truce village of Panmunjom on Monday morning, is a follow-up to President No Tae-u’s renunciation of nuclear weaponry and reprocessing and enrichment facilities last week.

In the most articulate reference to nuclear issues that South Korea has ever made, No urged North Korea to

stop developing nuclear weapons and evading international inspection of its nuclear facilities, declaring that his country "will not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons."

His government, opposing all weapons of indiscriminate death, would actively participate in international efforts for total elimination of chemical-biological weapons, he said.

During the closed-door talks Monday, the Southern delegates asked for sincerity from North Korea for resolution of pending issues, aired flexibility concerning the establishment of resident representative offices in Seoul and Pyongyang, and urged mutual opening and exchange of newspapers, radio and television programs, and published materials, the official said.

He said the South was also ready to become more flexible on military confidence-building measures to implement a non-aggression pact, and take practical measures for exchange and cooperation.

"It will be difficult for North Korea to accommodate our call for mutual opening of media programs, with all its jitters about unification in the form of absorption. We will offer concessions under which such opening may take place step-by-step," the official said.

As for the resident representative office, the South was likely to change the title to "liaison office," he said.

South and North Korea decided to produce an agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, and exchange and cooperation in the fourth round of prime ministers' talks in Pyongyang last month. They will hold the second working-level talks on Friday in the Southern sector of Panmunjom.

BULGARIA**Delegate to Vienna Armed Forces Talks
Interviewed**

*AU1311090091 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
8 Nov 91 p 4*

[Interview with Atanas Nastev, leader of Bulgarian delegation to the Vienna negotiations on the Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces and on Security and Confidence-Building Measures, by Petur Gornenski; place and date not given: "The Vienna Negotiations Are Facing the Next Step to the Consolidation of Security, But so Far Place Bulgaria in a Disadvantageous Position"]

[Text] [Gornenski] Mr. Nastev, which of the questions discussed at the negotiations of the 22 states is expected to be the main subject of the session now beginning?

[Nastev] I would like to point out that Bulgaria was the second country after Czechoslovakia to ratify the Treaty on the Limitation of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe that was signed in November 1990 by the leaders of 22 states. The negotiations of the 22 states are now focusing on the preparation for an agreement on reducing army personnel. This undoubtedly is an exceptionally important question for Bulgaria. In the first place, this importance is determined by the fact that, following the implementation of the conventional armed forces treaty that is expected for 1994, the balance of forces between Bulgaria and its NATO member-countries' neighbors will be drastically disrupted, to Bulgaria's disadvantage. The treaty was intended to restore the balance between the military blocs in the sphere of conventional military equipment, but not in the sphere of army personnel. The picture is quite different today, considering that military blocs no longer exist. It was the bloc approach, actually, that badly affected us. Everyone understands our position.

[Gornenski] Presumably, you have in mind the large military contingent that remains in the Turkish part of Thrace?

[Nastev] Yes, and I should also stress that they are the best equipped elite troops. In addition to this, I would like to add that the modernization of the Turkish Army continues at accelerated rates, which is not in contradiction with the treaty, as a matter of fact. Nevertheless, considering that the Warsaw Pact no longer exists, there are no serious arguments for the further preservation of such a large military potential in the area. We are just discussing the issues with our Turkish colleagues, and I would say that they are showing some understanding in this respect. We are holding talks on all other possible levels. Thus, for example, we submitted the problem to the attention of all delegations, the U.S. representatives included, at a recent Vienna seminar on military doctrines. I think that they understood our arguments. Nevertheless, it is certainly difficult to find a solution for the time being. Of course, we will insist on a solution for this important question. I am convinced that the

problem concerns, in particular, the number of army personnel. At the negotiations of the 22 states, our delegation is trying to reach an agreement to prevent the existence of units whose personnel and equipment exceed the 90 percent level of their normal size, to avert any possibility of sudden aggression.

[Gornenski] Can you describe the new developments that characterize the negotiations of the 22 states?

[Nastev] In the first place, the new stand of the Soviet Union should be pointed out. The USSR consented to the exchange of advance information on army personnel. The lack of such consensus was the chief obstacle preventing the progress of negotiations in the past. It is only on the basis of such consensus that future structures for a mutually acceptable solution of the "army personnel" concept can be determined. Bulgaria was one of the first countries to submit data on its army personnel.

[Gornenski] Could you provide some details on the main aspects of the negotiations on security and confidence-building measures?

[Nastev] First, I should mention the discussions on control over the activation of non-active combat units and sub-units by means of mutual briefing and information exchange. The discussions are based on a proposal in whose drafting we participated as co-authors. The fundamental difference of opinion, in this respect, is related to the fact that small states, such as Switzerland, insist that under special circumstances, such as natural disasters, the activation of military units should be exempted from the aforementioned measures. It is evident that small states are likely to have difficulty in reporting promptly about their special measures in such cases.

Another major question that was discussed at the negotiations of the 38 states relates to the extent of information exchange on the size of armed forces, regarding the submission of additional technical and tactical data on the basic types of armed forces and technical equipment, and on the new types expected to be introduced in the future. The discussion shows that no essential differences exist in the stands of individual countries on this question, but the solution is not likely to be easy.

[Gornenski] In connection with the complicated situation in Yugoslavia, how do you evaluate the chances of perfecting the Vienna Conflict Prevention Center's work?

[Nastev] The development of events in Yugoslavia have revealed the shortcomings of the presently existing structures of European security and cooperation. As far as the Conflict Prevention Center is concerned, for the time being it is only assisting the negotiations of the 38 states in exchanging information and in controlling extraordinary military activities. The majority of states are convinced that the Center should be entrusted with functions enabling it to nip conflicts in the bud, thus preventing them from developing into war. Along with

this, it would be appropriate to use other forms, such as fact-finding missions and observers' delegations, or other measures for the settlement of already existing controversies.

Last, but not least, I would like to point out the prevailing opinion at the Vienna negotiations, according to which an optimal result has almost been achieved in

implementing common interests in the sphere of confidence-building and security. It is now necessary to consolidate the regional aspects of security. A great amount of work is awaiting us to overcome those currently existing imbalances that are to Bulgaria's disadvantage and that are likely to persist also in the future, following the implementation of the Conventional Arms Limitation Treaty.

PAKISTAN**Government Lauds UN Resolution for South Asia NFZ**

*BK1311133091 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network
in English 1300 GMT 13 Nov 91*

[Text] Pakistan has expressed its satisfaction over the increasing support at the UN for its call for establishment of nuclear weapon-free zone [NFZ] in South Asia. Commenting on adoption of a draft [word indistinct] resolution on a nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia by an overwhelming majority at the first committee of the UN General Assembly, a Foreign Office spokesman in Islamabad said it augured to achieve this objective. A

notable achievement for Pakistan this year is that the Soviet Union supported the Resolution for the first time. He hoped it will also give impetus to the proposal of the Pakistan prime minister for five-nation consultation for establishing a nuclear nonproliferation region in South Asia.

At the first committee level another achievement for Pakistan was the passage of another draft resolution cosponsored by 40 other countries regarding regional disarmament. The spokesman expressed the confidence that the increased support this year would help achieve the objectives of nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia and reduction of conventional armament.

RESPONSE TO BUSH INITIATIVE

Shevardnadze Views Bush Initiative

924P0025A Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 40,
8-14 Oct 91 pp 19-20

[Article by Eduard Shevardnadze: "The American Peace Threat"]

[Text] It is not easy to comment on the nuances of President Bush's latest political initiatives or to see actual figures and comparisons behind the wording of the address from Washington.

However, I do not think it really matters what the military-strategic mathematics of the superpower relations will look like. This mathematics will be defined in the future talks where both sides will be seeking a mutually acceptable balance of interests and will make reasonable and necessary bargains. All this lies ahead. However, this time this future is not as distant as we, and the Americans, used to think. Without waiting for the

negotiations to start, the US President ordered that the United States eliminate its global stock of ground-based tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, proceeding from what the President said, in the nearest future the United States will eliminate all nuclear artillery shells and battlefield missile warheads currently deployed at US bases in Europe and across the world. The only exception will be the air-launched nukes.

US allies in Europe will also eliminate battlefield nuclear weapons (artillery shells and short-range missiles).

Another important element of the US-proposed package of measures is the idea of a zero option on sea-based nuclear weapons, non-strategic submarine-based nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons deployed on ground-based naval aviation, and nuclear bombs on aircraft carriers. In other words, the Bush proposal means that the super-power navies must be stripped of all non-strategic nuclear weapons. I would like to stress that the commitments relating to ground- and sea-based nuclear weapons must be comprehensive and undertaken on a mutual basis.

Who Beats Who?

US Non-strategic Nuclear Forces 7,922 Carriers and 7,147 Warheads, Including

Type	No. deployed	Year deployed	Range(km)	No. in stockpile
Aircraft	1,300	—	1,060-2,400	1,800
Missiles:				
Pershing II	27	1983	1,790	0*
GLCM	120	1983	2,500	0*
Lance	100	1972	125	1,282
Artillery	4,700	1956	30	1,540
Naval systems:				
Carrier aircraft	850	—	1,000-1,800	1,350
Tomahawk SLCM	325	1984	2,500	325
ASW aircraft	500	—	1,160-3,800	850

*Destroyed under INF Treaty by June 1, 1991

Soviet Non-strategic Nuclear Forces 13,759 Carriers and 11,305 Warheads, Including

Aircraft	2,560	1962-84	700-12,800	3,100
Missiles:				
SS-1s	661	1965	300	1,370
FROG 3/5/7	370	1965	70	1,450
SS-21	300	1978	70	310
Artillery	7,000	1973-80	10-30	2,000
Naval systems:				
Aircraft	730	1966-89	630-4,000	1,360
Anti-ship cruise missiles	1,010	1960-81	65-550	434
Land-attack cruise missiles	136	1987	3,000	136
ASW missiles and torpedoes	945	1965-80	16-120	945
Air defense missiles	47	1961-67	32/37	200

Data from SIPRI Yearbook 1991

According to the Bush plan, not all nuclear weapons removed from their current positions will be destroyed—a part of the nuclear arsenal will be moth-balled deep in the national territories.

It must be recalled that the Soviet side has traditionally insisted on the limitation and elimination of the battlefield nukes and as traditionally demanded negotiations on and reductions of naval nukes.

Nuclear-capable artillery and short-range missiles come to us as military excesses of the Cold War. By virtue of their performance characteristics, these weapons are the most dangerous and least necessary ones. Field commanders have always been faced with the dilemma of either using them or losing them to the enemy. Since the short range of these weapons made it possible to employ them only either on friendly territory or on allied territory, no side was exactly happy about the prospect. But such weapons existed when the opposing blocs immediately faced each other.

The situation changed radically after the Soviet troops withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Neither the Soviet forces nor NATO now have the targets to train their short-range missiles on, because the opposing are now separated by hundreds of miles, while the range of battlefield nukes does not exceed 150 kilometres.

The expediency of having sea-based intermediate-range nuclear weapons has long been a point of contention. Theoreticians believe that an exchange of fire with the use of such weapons would only result in the mutual destruction of the belligerent navies without producing any military gains. Today two powerful arguments are combined: the end of the military confrontation rendered these weapons politically redundant, while technological progress made tactical naval forces useless.

I suppose some Soviet experts may find the zero option for naval short-range weapons unfair. First, the Soviet Union has more such weapons and a greater variety of them than the US. Second, the US may be said to benefit from the zero option thanks to the high-accuracy conventional weapons of the US Navy.

In this case, I believe, one has to make a choice: either to keep the dangerous, unreliable and outdated nukes, which can't be employed anyway for obvious reasons, or to equip the ground forces and the navy with the high-tech hardware they really need.

The question is whether we should do this given our present condition. Yes, we should. We cannot afford to keep and maintain nuclear scrap. We must keep only the weapons we really need.

In his address President Bush advanced confidence-building measures: the lifting of stand-by alert, and speedier implementation of the already agreed-on reductions. These are reasonable and responsible steps which fit the pattern of new relations of partnership between the USSR and the US. The Soviet Union should support

them and reciprocate: the same applies to other directions specified by the American leader.

The White House also mentioned a radical reshaping of the nuclear buildup programme under way in the US. This measure is aimed at enhancing strategic stability. MIRV missiles will be removed from the arsenals, the development of mobile systems and strategic air-launched missiles will be halted. The only weapons system to be modernized will be the light single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile. Preference will be given to the stabilizing weapons systems (slow-flying, single-warhead missiles, which can be recalled from their mission after launch).

This proposal by President Bush offers us a unique opportunity to reorganize our strategic forces on a reasonable basis. If we do this together with the United States we will thus strengthen mutual trust and our national security.

The greatest controversy is expected to arise from George Bush's call to take urgent and concrete measures for a limited deployment of non-nuclear systems of defence from limited missile attacks wherever such attacks may come from, without undermining the strength of the existing deterrence potential.

The statement refers to the resumption of the R&D effort in the context of the Strategic Initiative declared by Ronald Reagan, which was the subject of lengthy and largely scholastic debates between Soviet and American delegations at the disarmament talks.

I think the time has come to thoroughly analyze this question in light of the new realities. If modern technologies make it possible to destroy a missile coming to Moscow or Kiev without any great damage, why not develop such technologies and be waiting for a hit instead?

It is high time we understood that technological progress is irreversible, especially in the arms production sphere. It is time we started to think about how to make technological achievements work for national security.

Proceeding from the recently concluded START Treaty we could warn the Americans that we will not be eliminating any missiles as long as they continue SDI research.

I believe that this formula made its way into the treaty from the Cold War era and became the subject of a compromise. Under the new circumstances we need to seek a new compromise that would enable us to avoid the

contradiction between technological progress and outdated thinking. We are no longer adversaries. We have exchanged statements to this effect. Why do we continue to suspect that steps taken by one side are aimed at placing the other one at a disadvantage? Who is going to object to the fact that the superpowers share the common interest of preventing terrorist attacks against them coming from a third party? That means that we can and must cooperate, share technologies and scientific achievements.

There is one more aspect. SDI elements can be used for the solution of such global problems as ecological monitoring, early warning of natural calamities and an effective navigation service.

I remember how James Baker and I once suggested that the moment would come when our countries began negotiating joint creation of weapons systems.

No, not even the most comprehensive plan for the reshaping of strategic forces can cover all the aspects of the problem. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union will find something to add to the Bush plan. For example, the problem of halting nuclear testing is already ripe for solving. It would be useful to start cooperating in making our arsenals safer. These and many other problems are bound to arise at the talks, but I am sure solutions and mutually acceptable compromises will be found.

Now I would like to express my personal foreign political assessment of the Bush initiative.

The main thing for me is that this initiative develops and consolidates the policy of partnership and interaction in Soviet-American relations. No such initiative was possible in the past. It only looks natural on the basis of all the recent positive changes. We have been erecting this mountain together for a long time and now we can ascend to see the new vistas that inspire faith and optimism.

One more thing. Soviet foreign policy has sort of lost its focus recently. There are several reasons for this. The renewed focus of our policy on truly historical ideas, expressed by President Bush on September 28, 1991, gives the necessary aims and missions to our policy. Both nations will benefit from this.

I was one of the people who five years ago heard accusations of being naive in connection with the idea of a non-nuclear world. The Bush statement strengthens my confidence that one day mankind will be freed from nuclear weapons.

Outlook, Opening of Strategic Stability Talks

Obukhov Views Issues

PM0811154791 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 44, 27 Oct 91 p 12

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov by unidentified correspondent under the "Disarmament" rubric; place and date not given: "What Will Come After Madrid"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov answers your MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent's questions. It is intended that he will be in charge of disarmament in the new Soviet-U.S. Strategic Stability Group (headed by A. Yakovlev).

[Correspondent] How, in your view, could this process develop after the meeting of the two presidents in Madrid?

[Obukhov] The latest initiatives by Bush and Gorbachev indicate, among other things, that a qualitatively different phase in disarmament has set in. Why? In addition to the traditional talks, unilateral measures are now being taken which serve as a sign of good intention and invite reciprocal actions. The nature of monitoring them is also changing—it will now be carried out solely on the basis of exchanging information about how the commitments are being fulfilled. Such is the extent of our trust.

What could figure on the post-Madrid agenda? The problem of strengthening strategic stability, creating joint missile-warning systems, developing environmentally safe techniques for the storage, transportation, and utilization of nuclear charges, and halting the production of fissile materials for weapons. The U.S. proposal on limited, nonnuclear ABM systems will be examined.

[Correspondent] There is real destruction of weapons under way for the first time in many years. The question arises: How much is this costing and can expenditure be reduced? There is also the opinion held that the Americans are destroying their weapons more effectively and that our side has made miscalculations here....

[Obukhov] I can completely rule that out. The destruction procedure is being discussed at the actual talks, and on the Soviet side this is not the creation of one individual, but represents an interdepartmental agreement. The rules governing weapons destruction are drawn up after complex discussion and are—like everything else—a compromise. Take, for example, the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The U.S. proposals here, say, regarding the transport systems on which the missiles are mounted, seemed very tough. We sought, however, to retain them for use for nonmilitary purposes. We succeeded in this to a certain extent: We demonstrated the rational nature of such an approach. In such cases your partner is always worried lest something be left not completely destroyed.

It is difficult to say for whom the cost of destroying the equipment is greater. We have a different way of calculating the cost and employ a different technique—the more sophisticated it is, the less the outlay. However, the high cost of the whole process does worry both us and the Americans. For example, we have both realized that the cumbersome monitoring procedure is not justified from the standpoint of cost. And we have abandoned it.

Finally, from next year the financing of arms reduction will be allocated a separate heading in the Union budget. This figure will become known when the budget is confirmed, but it will certainly amount over the next few years to a significant sum. Although there will nevertheless ultimately be a gain made through conversion and doing away with expenditure on maintaining and modernizing armaments.

'New Stage in Disarmament'

LD0411160491 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 4 Nov 91

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] At their last week's meeting in Madrid, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush checked their nuclear watches. They voiced satisfaction that the hands of the watches are moving farther and farther away from the fatal mark.

Both the American and Soviet programs are similar in volume and in schedule. The NATO has already decided to reduce its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe by 80 percent. The Soviet Union also decreases its relevant arsenals. The two countries take measures to limit their strategic nuclear forces.

True, there are issues that need to be discussed or coordinated. The two presidents agreed to create a special mechanism to elaborate concrete steps to fully realize their proposals. For example, a Soviet-American group on strategic stability is to be set up. The Soviet group is led by the well-known political figure Aleksandr Yakovlev. It is planned to discuss the possible creation of joint missile strike warning systems and elaborate ecologically safe know-how for storage and transporting nuclear warheads, to discuss how to discontinue the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons. They will also consider the American proposal about the joint nonnuclear limited system for antimissile defense.

So today we can definitely speak about the qualitatively new state in disarmament. The Soviet Union and the United States now think not only about how to limit the nuclear threat; they set themselves the goal to eliminate it altogether, or at any rate to draw it to a minimum.

Moscow and Washington have also decided to do without talks on working out detailed agreements in the field of disarmament because it takes years. They take unilateral steps showing their goodwill and inviting for reciprocal actions.

There are also changes in the field of control. Earlier treaties, especially the recent one on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, envisaged a huge and expensive control mechanism. The two sides are going to reject it in the future. The control will be based on the mutual exchange of information. It seems that this fact alone indicates a high level of trust between the two countries. So it is possible to hope that the disarmament process will be irreversible. And another detail: It is planned to set aside special funds in the Soviet federal budget to finance the scrapping of the reduced weapons.

Yakovlev in U.S. for Talks

LD1211011391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0010 GMT 12 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Ivan Lebedev]

[Text] Washington, 12 Nov (TASS)—Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Political Consultative Council of the USSR President, arrived in the United States on the evening of 12 November for consultations on issues of strategic stability. His agenda provides for meetings with the leadership of the State Department, with U.S. senators and congressmen, and with representatives of U.S. business circles. Yakovlev will deliver a message from USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to U.S. President George Bush.

In addition to the capital of the United States, Yakovlev will visit New York, Chicago, and Boston. He plans to make speeches at the New York Council for International Relations, and at Harvard and Princeton Universities.

Washington To Host Second Round

OW1611055491 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1715 GMT 15 Nov 91

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] DP [Diplomatic Panorama] learned that on November 25-27 Washington will host a second round of Soviet-U.S. negotiations on how Mr Bush's and Mr Gorbachev's interlocking initiatives on nuclear disarmament can be followed through. The Soviet delegation will be led by Deputy USSR Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov and the U.S. delegation by Deputy Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew.

In addition to the USSR Defense Ministry officials, the delegation is likely to include representatives from Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belorussia, the four Soviet nuclear republics.

Petrovskiy Views Talks

LD1611184391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1549 GMT 16 Nov 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow, 16 Nov (TASS)—The main aim of the Soviet-U.S. consultations starting in the United States at

the beginning of next week is the unofficial discussion of issues relating to securing strategic stability in a rapidly changing world, Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs, has stated.

In an interview with a TASS correspondent today he pointed out that the consultations are being held at the initiative of the United States, an initiative which met with the approval of the USSR and U.S. presidents. The need has now arisen, he went on, for us to hold an informal exchange of opinions on the emerging situation and take a look at what our countries can do to ensure that "the changes taking place right across the board in international relations" proceed along the lines of the established international structures and have no destabilizing impact. "The intention is to hold an unofficial—I stress, unofficial—exchange of opinions and compare our points of view," the high-ranking Soviet diplomat pointed out.

The first such consultations will be a sort of "test firing," V. Petrovskiy thinks, when the topics are set out, and a further round of discussions on this exceptionally important problem is mapped out, "this is in the interests of our countries, and also in the interests of the United Nations." This is all the more topical at this very moment; there is talk of forming a new world order, which is justly described in the United Nations (at the initiative of the USSR and the United States, incidentally) as a system of peace, security, and cooperation, based on the UN Charter, he stressed in conclusion.

Vladimir Petrovskiy, first deputy USSR minister of foreign affairs, flies to the United States on 19 November as part of a Soviet delegation to the talks on strategic stability matters.

Gorbachev Response to Bush Said Ill-Considered
PM1411154891 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Nov 91 First Edition pp 3-4

["Military Observer's Notes" article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev: "How the Americans Drained the Oka Dry: Are We in Danger, a Reader Asks, of Being Made Fools of?"]

[Text] In Secret From Our Own People

Yes, we are talking about how a modern operational-tactical system—Oka [also name of a river]—was destroyed, poured down the drain, just like that. But first, something else....

A month ago a photograph, showing members of the last crew on operational readiness at the Air Force base at Carswell (Texas) talking in the shade of their B-52 bomber after receiving the order to stay on the ground, went the rounds of the world's newspapers, provoking a torrent of emotion. This happened after U.S. President G. Bush's television address to the nation, in which he set forth large-scale proposals in the sphere of nuclear arms reduction. Defense Secretary R. Cheney immediately gave the order to lift the 24-hour alert status for the

crews of 40 nuclear bombers. An answering move by the Soviet Union followed. And more emotion.

Emotion is all very well, but in the United States the new initiatives were carefully evaluated—by the legislators in Congress, and by experts in the mass media. They discussed everything, down to the last little screw that became subject to cuts. Nobody evaluated the Soviet counterproposals.

Not a word from high-ranking officials at the Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry. Competent specialists prefer to remain silent. Yet basically what is at stake is the fate of billions of rubles of public money that was invested in the armaments that are subject to cuts.

M.S. Gorbachev spoke openly of the aims of the Soviet initiatives: We are moving toward a nuclear-free world, a more secure and stable world. Every sensible person will support the Soviet leader's summary. The logic of the times has led us to the disarmament process; this is the path to mankind's survival. All the same, people want to know: How far do the Soviet initiatives correspond to the American ones, how far do they meet the interests of our security? Boris Pankin, leader of our foreign policy department, has stated publicly that the president's initiative was launched after a major expert study and expresses in concentrated form the aggregate interests of the republics.

Well, fine, if there was a major study. But surely its results should be made known to the people, whose money was used to build the missiles, submarines, ammunition? But as yet.... As yet there is bewilderment and numerous questions. Here are a few lines from some letters to the editor:

"The arms that are being cut are worth millions, maybe billions, of rubles, our rubles. So why will they not tell us specifically what is being destroyed out of our defensive shield, and why it is being destroyed? Or is it a big secret? Are we in danger of being made fools of?"

"The Americans know everything or nearly everything about our missiles, but what Soviet citizens know isn't worth a cent. So does this mean that we are keeping secrets not from the military men across the ocean, but from our own people?"

There are a good many similar comments in the editorial mailbag. The readers' somewhat agitated tone is understandable. People want to know about their own defense arsenal—how much it costs them, how efficiently it is used (of course, it is not a question of revealing real secrets). People's concern, in my view, is also justified for the following reason. Many of the steps being taken in the sphere of the country's defense are incomprehensible to our own compatriots, including those in uniform.

Marshal S. Akhromeyev's Chivalrous Gesture

It is well known that May of this year saw the completion of the destruction of Soviet and American intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, with a radius of 500 to 5,500 km. Let me emphasize, 500 km and over. What does this have to do with it? Not one of the Ground Forces missile men whom I have spoken with can understand how the Oka operational-tactical system (NATO serial number SS-23, code name "Spider") came "under the axe." Many Western reference works give its range as 400 km. And so it is.

When people at the directorate of the chief of the Ground Forces Missile Forces and Artillery learned that the question of cutting the Oka had been raised at the Geneva talks, many of them were, so to speak, stunned. Not surprisingly—after all, this system has a range of 400 km. So how did this ill-starred question of the Oka ever come up?

One fine day the then commander in chief of the Ground Forces, Army General Ye. Ivanovskiy, summoned the chief of the Missile Forces and Artillery, Marshal of Artillery V. Mikhalkin, and asked him straight out:

"Vladimir Mikhaylovich, how did it come about that the Oka is being cut?"

Mikhalkin was flabbergasted:

"What do you mean, cut?"

The two men compared notes. No one from the General Staff or the Foreign Ministry had discussed it with them or consulted with them. They talked it over with General M. Penkin, chief of the Defense Ministry Main Missile and Artillery Directorate. He was surprised, too.

Shortly after that, Marshal S. Akhromeyev told Mikhalkin:

"I take 50 percent of the blame myself, Vladimir Mikhaylovich, I should have gotten involved in the talks earlier, but I'm damned if I know how the question of Oka came up, I only found out about it myself from the newspapers."

To Marshal Akhromeyev's credit, he agreed to a proposal to hold trial firings on the testing range in the presence of American experts, so that they could see the system's potential with their own eyes. Soon a group of officers headed by Lieutenant General Yu. Shumilikhin, chief of staff of the Missile Forces and Artillery, and S. Nepobedimyy, chief designer of the system, flew to Kapustin Yar. Initially, they were tasked with carrying out a 500 km launch, without the Americans. But the missile's control system registered "malfunction" when data for a 407 km launch were fed in. An encrypted message was duly dispatched to the General Staff: It is totally impossible to fire the missile a distance of 500 km. Soon Kapustin Yar received the signal: "Stand down"—the Americans are not coming. They have already been told, and told at high level, that the USSR

is prepared to destroy Oka. Later the question of Oka's rehabilitation was raised with Marshal D. Yazov when he was head of the Defense Ministry, but the "train" had already built up so much speed that it could not be stopped. And Oka, on which millions of rubles had been spent and which could have formed the basis of the Ground Forces missile subunits for years to come, went "under the axe." It is said that Army General Ye. Ivanovskiy, as a token of protest, refused to sign off on the agreed document on destroying the missiles, and did not go to the General Staff.

Oka is a modern tactical system with a range of 400 km. It became part of the armory in the eighties. More like a toy than a system, the missile men say, automated, autonomous, and what precision—it could hit a kopek piece, as the saying goes. Oka is the fruit of the labor of workers, engineers, and designers at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant (Udmurtia), where the missile was assembled, and the Petropavlovsk Heavy Machine Building Plant (Kazakhstan), which manufactured the launcher.

It is hard now to establish who was the first to cross the Rubicon, or in this case the Oka, at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva. But there are reports that the members of our delegation started discussing the Oka question because they were using Western catalogs in which the system's range is given as 500-550 km. Nobody consulted the military. First they agreed to include the question of the Oka on the agenda, and then to cut it, for the sake, so to speak, of being accommodating. It is easier that way. As for public money, there is so much of it.... So what happened? Millions of rubles went down the drain, and as far as weapons similar to the Oka are concerned, the Ground Forces were left with the 9K72 operational-tactical system (SS-1S)—the famous Scud—an old missile that could be described as obsolete.

An interesting point. At the time when the last Oka was being blown up at Saryozek and our diplomacy was celebrating victory: You see, for the sake of peace we had to make concessions and compromises, without which "there would be no diplomacy at all"—at that time a report came in that the United States was planning to deploy in Europe a modernized Lance with a range of up to 450 km—a system comparable to the Oka. One cannot help appraising the merits of American diplomacy—239 new Soviet missiles were blown up "just like that," because in no way did they fall within the terms of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, yet they were clever enough to squeeze them in all the same.

How George Bush Killed Three Birds With One Stone

I think this compliance (dilettantism and bungling also cannot be ruled out) may come about because in our country no one is accountable to the people for the steps taken in the sphere of arms and disarmament, where specially careful consideration is required. That is the way things have become established in our country. Do

we know who we have to "thank" for the fact that the USSR had become a great tank power by the late 20th century? Thousands of tanks are in the armory of military units, thousands rusting at storage bases, and thousands have gone "under the axe." No, this is not a criticism of the designers and workers who make them—all honor and praise be to them, the Soviet combat vehicles are competitive both on the market and on the battlefield. I am talking about those whose fault it is that we are cutting them by the thousands.

In the seventies and eighties our Armed Forces were swept by a tank boom, while the Americans were farsightedly investing in aerospace technology and high-precision weapons. Who got the strategy wrong? I am not asking this question out of idle curiosity. It is just that everything repeats itself, again and again.... Let us come back to the Soviet and U.S. presidents' recent initiatives. How well-considered are they, on each side? I conclude that they are well-considered to the extent that they are openly discussed. "We know about the American missiles that are being taken off alert duty in the context of the recent initiatives," writes M. Cherepenya of Lugansk, "but what about the Soviet ones...?"

Anyone who has tried to evaluate the U.S. President's initiatives comes to the conclusion that they are very carefully considered and weighed, both by politicians and by military experts. Bush is, I think, a marksman who has succeeded in killing not two, but three birds with one stone. He has made the world a little bit safer. He has carried through a reduction in arms without the slightest weakening of his own Armed Forces, of which he is commander in chief. And he has given a powerful new boost to the most up-to-date military programs, in particular SDI, and to the building of the B-2 strategic bomber using Stealth technology.

Let us take a closer look at the American proposals. The United States is dismantling and destroying all its land-based tactical nuclear weapons. No doubt we should thank Bush for this—he has thereby taken a step toward a nuclear-free world. But the motives prompting the United States to take such a resolute step do not lie solely in the peaceable intentions of the U.S. leader. There were other reasons, too. What were they?

First, concern about the fate of Soviet stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons in a disintegrating state. Second, following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, the need to keep U.S. nuclear munitions on Old World territory began to be called into question. And, third, the Persian Gulf war showed that the strike firepower of high-precision weapons (in particular, the J-STARS reconnaissance and strike system) is comparable to strikes by low-yield nuclear weapons. In short, here the United States has gained political capital, without losing anything in the military sphere.

And now to the Soviet side. Military experts, to judge by conversations at the Ground Forces Missile Troops and Artillery headquarters, do not regret parting with the

nuclear warheads for the Luna and Tochka tactical missile systems or shells for the 152-mm and 203.2-mm artillery systems. Incidentally, this type of weapon was an American invention. The USSR adopted nuclear shells a few years later. True, having created the technology for manufacturing the munitions, we produced considerably more of them than they did across the ocean. And naturally, we will incur greater costs in destroying them—dismantling them safely is not a simple matter.

As for the question of what the Ground Forces will lose with the destruction of tactical nuclear munitions, you could say—nothing, because no one ever had any intention of using them anyway. At the same time, we have no system comparable to the U.S. J-STARS reconnaissance and strike system. Here it is apposite to come back once again to our discussion of the Oka system. Modernized, it could have become an important element in a strike system with a fairly good range. It could have, but.... The need for such a system is obvious. So that means spending more millions.

The United States gave much publicity to lifting the 24-hour alert status for the crews of nuclear bombers. Here too, of course, the Americans have lost nothing. If the situation changes, different orders can be given. The fact that strategic bombers will take to the air less frequently is a saving, albeit a small one, for the USAF.

Next point. The Americans announced the ending of the development of mobile versions of the Peacekeeper intercontinental missile, or rather, the project to install it on a railroad flatcar. This project had not yet begun to be implemented, so it will cause no losses across the ocean.

About land-based missiles. We know that the Americans are taking 450 Minuteman-2 missiles off alert duty. Following ratification of the treaty, their destruction will be accelerated. What is a Minuteman-2? It is an obsolete and outmoded single-warhead missile. After all, why not destroy a weapon that has become a burden?

By way of an answering step on our side, 503 ICBM's are being taken off alert status, including 134 MIRV'ed ICBM's. It has become known to the editorial office that in the course of Soviet-U.S. consultations 6-7 October concerning the initiatives of the USSR and U.S. presidents, the American side was informed of the specific numbers and types of ICBM's included in the figure of 503. RS-10 (SS-11) and RS-12 (SS-13) missiles are being taken off alert status, as well as missiles that cause grief to the U.S. military—the RS-16 (SS-17), RS-18 (SS-19), and RS-20 (SS-18).

What lies behind this response? It would be nice to hear about this from the people who drew up the proposals for the presidential statement and were then authorized to make commitments to the U.S. side in the course of consultations. People in the Strategic Missile Forces, to the best of my knowledge, learned about the types and numbers of missiles being taken off alert status only after the Americans had already been told. So why was there

once again, as in the case of the Oka, no consultation with the experts? Once again, a crucial document is drawn up "behind closed doors." Yet strategic arms do not belong to a private firm.

And surely questions arise when the following proposals are compared. The USSR is basically abandoning the modernization of all existing ICBM's, while the Americans keep their nuclear triad and accelerate the SDI program. Where is this leading? Whereas formerly SDI was regarded as impracticable, now the outlines of this program make it possible to say that it is capable of creating a "brilliant" umbrella over every Soviet launcher in 10 years. And missiles that have not been modernized will be guaranteed to be destroyed in the initial phase of the flight. So an imbalance arises.

In short, the Soviet initiatives, unlike the American ones, generate a great many questions and require comment from military experts, who, I repeat, have not yet said anything about the initiatives. They must speak out, most of all on the question of how to look after our defense potential properly without retarding the disarmament process. Especially since it is already clear that it is simply beyond our powers to react to the American programs with analogous ones of our own. At the Fifth (Extraordinary) Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies B. Yeltsin stated that defense appropriations will be reduced. If there is no money for new types of weapons for the future, God himself requires us to look after those we already have carefully and thriftily.

Blame It All on the Minister

What does the author propose? First, in the sphere of arms and disarmament—borrow from China's experience. In China they are pursuing military reforms and reducing the armed forces without any agreements with other states. Anything that works for defense and acts as a deterrent factor is neither reduced nor destroyed. But they are trimming off the "fat" in defense building unilaterally, without making a great fuss about it. Is this practicable? Yes. There is no point in spending billions on programs which any day now some political leader, for who knows what reason, will agree to drop. Incidentally, the implementation of some of the proposals in M. Gorbachev's recent initiative takes into account elements of the Chinese experience. In both the United States and the USSR, having decided to get rid of nuclear shells for land-based tactical weapons, they do not intend to destroy the guns themselves, because guns and howitzers can fire conventional shells, too.

Second, glasnost in the making of crucial decisions should become more effective. We know now specifically who was instructed by G. Bush to study arms reduction questions, who studied these questions, and who presented findings. But who made recommendations to M.S. Gorbachev?

I think more glasnost would make it possible to formulate a more carefully considered position not only on the disarmament question, but—and this is particularly

important—in the making of decisions on new defensive programs. A mechanism to prevent the "erosion" of public money is being created, but in a hit-and-miss way, so to speak. There have been attempts to discuss Union budget expenditure on the country's defense in Supreme Soviet committees and commissions. But only attempts. Yet why make things unduly complicated? Why not borrow the experience of states where the question has already been studied? In the United States, parliamentarians know what the expenditure is on every Pentagon program, and they know the nature of every program. Therefore the taxpayers' dollars go on those arms which military experts have demonstrated the need for. What is stopping us doing the same? Fear of revealing military secrets to foreign special services? American intelligence knows very well what programs we are currently implementing. I think there are other reasons. In today's conditions, the Defense Ministry's arms experts and the defense industry people do not want to put themselves to the trouble of enormous analytical work.

And I do not think it is enough to present the programs and expenditure on them to the parliamentarians and representatives of the public. Things must be organized in such a way that every program has someone's name on it. Say there is a plan for building an ultramodern aircraft. The representative bodies should know who, apart from the Air Force leadership, supports it in the General Staff, the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Defense Industry.... Today it is easy for people to hold responsible posts in our country; the post is responsible (excuse the tautology), but there is no responsibility. If there is a problem, you blame it all on the minister, the ex-minister. And so we blame first Ustinov, then Sokolov, and now we can blame Yazov, too.

These are serious proposals. As for jokes, if I had my way I would issue a decree stating that the generals, the people concerned, must openly say whether they are "for" or "against" when military programs are adopted or dropped. Why this decree? Ask any official to comment on any change in the Armed Forces, and you will hear: Only the minister or the chief of the General Staff can comment on this question. And if the military are silent, the Foreign Ministry takes this as a sign of consent.

But for now.... For now, we are manufacturing arms, and then promptly cutting them, like Oka, for instance. We gain from this in only one way. We gain the reputation of peacemakers in the world.

GENERAL

Modalities, Costs of Inspection Trips

924P0028A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK
in Russian No 33, Aug 91 [Signed to press 09 Aug 91] p 10

[Article by Lt Col P. Vladimirov, candidate of military sciences: "The Inspector is Coming to You"]

[Text] The signing of a number of international agreements in the area of arms limitation and arms reduction, but chiefly—their realization—has led to the appearance in the armed forces of certain states of a detachment of officers in a new military specialty—Inspectors. They have been given the duty of monitoring the execution of the provisions of the treaties by the participating states.

Inspection activity in the current conception was brought to life by the Stockholm document of 1986, within the framework of which the observance of coordinated measures on confidence and security on the European continent by participating CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] states is monitored. As a consequence the practice of inspections was extended to the Soviet-American Treaty on Eliminating Medium and Short-Range Missiles (INF) of 1987 and pointed to a sufficient degree of effectiveness of monitoring arms reduction.

Now, since the signing in 1990 of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Soviet-American Treaty on Strategic Offensive Weapons [START] in 1991, one should expect intensification of inspection activity and its designation a special activity, directed toward timely exposure of violations of treaty provisions by participating states, and the national security aspects associated with them. The most striking peculiarity of the forthcoming inspections is their broad scope; for example, whereas the INF Treaty envisages the inspection of 117 sites in the USSR over a period of 13 years, under START the number amounts to nearly 2,500; meanwhile, implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe involves over 10,000 inspections over an indefinite period. With the help of these inspections the West seeks convincing evidence that the Soviet Union is strictly observing the treaty obligations it has assumed.

But what sort of forces and assets does the West have for carrying out inspections? One must frankly state—significant ones. In the USA, for example, a special Command has been established for conducting on-site inspections, numbering over 200 personnel and possessing a budget of 96 million dollars.

On the whole the total number of coalition and national subunits for monitoring the implementing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe amounts to more than 2,000 persons. On this basis the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can create up to 150 inspection groups, which will permit them to place under surveillance at one time the maximum possible number of sites subject to inspection on the territory of the USSR and Eastern-European countries participating in the treaty.

The USSR is counting on carrying out the tasks it faces for monitoring the treaty provisions by means of the National Center on Reduction of Nuclear Danger, and can recruit specialists from the service branches and arms for inspection if that is required.

Naturally, the parties are counting upon enlisting their finest officers in order to carry out the inspections. In selecting the candidates, preference will be given to persons who have mastered foreign languages and who have experience in working abroad. They should have completely mastered their own military professions, know the basic weapons systems and military hardware which the armies of the states being inspected possess, and must have training in the sphere of international law. Training in the fundamentals of treaty provisions is being organized for them, in order that they might master the nuances of their execution, and if necessary interpret the most "obscure" passages for the benefit of monitoring. In order to preclude pressure on the inspectors or any kind of action against them on the part of representatives of the participating states undergoing inspection, all of them are as a rule protected by diplomatic immunity.

Inasmuch as inspections might pursue various goals—inspection of numerical limitations, monitoring the destruction and refitting of armaments, certification of reclassified multi-target strike helicopters and combat-trainer aircraft, inspectors must take their peculiarities into consideration in their work. It is possible that large inspection organs might have certain specialized inspectors, but it would be more advantageous for a state to have well-rounded specialists. The difference among them might consist merely of the fact that some of them were trained for the complex hardware of air force and missile troops.

In order to carry out their inspection, inspectors are authorized to ship in and make use of their own maps and charts, portative passive night vision instruments, binoculars, tape recorders, tape-measures and certain other agreed-upon instruments and property. Nor is there a ban on the use of such equipment as video cameras and portable computers. Not excluded for use in the future are other equipment, similar to, for example, the 10-million-dollar "Cargoscan" x-ray apparatus, which the Americans are using on Soviet territory within the framework of monitoring the provisions of the INF Treaty.

While carrying out inspections, inspection groups are provided with transportation, including helicopters in agreed-upon situations; and communications, including communication with embassies or consulates. The tactics of their operations are simple and consist of rapid action for carrying out their inspection functions, the priorities for which are, as a rule, determined beforehand. Inspection groups may be divided into two, and in certain cases three sub-units, which will permit simultaneous inspection of several monitoring sites in a short period. The result of the work of an inspection group is a written report, in which all remarks, as well as all violations of treaty provisions, are noted. Consequently such a report is of factological significance, and may serve as the basis for a complaint against the participating state undergoing inspection.

However, inspection activity is a costly occupation. Expenses are not only connected with receiving the inspectors and taking care of their everyday needs and their food. One must also add the expense for transportation. Suffice it to say that only one IL-62 flight to the USA costs us R240,000 in 1990 prices. As for communications, these services also cost a lot of money, especially when the matter concerns European countries and the USA.

Based on our experience of implementing the INF Treaty, one inspection on the territory of the USSR costs us R10-15,000; on the territory of the European NATO countries—R50,000 and 3,000 American Dollars; on the territory of the USA, R220,000 plus 35-40,000 dollars when inspecting sites and R450,000 plus 70-80,000 dollars (in Soviet currency at 1990 exchange rate) when inspecting the destruction of missiles. It must be said that even at the first stage of carrying out the INF Treaty, connected with the destruction of missiles, expenditures for monitoring amounted to more than half of the entire sum for implementing the treaty, and are already reckoned in tens of millions of rubles. As concerns the realization of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the START Treaty, apparently the amount of expenditures for monitoring will greatly exceed the sums for destruction of weapons and may be reckoned, due to hyperinflation, in the billions of rubles. What can one say? It is expensive, but in all likelihood the trust among the states taking part in the disarmament process is worth more.

And now on the prospects for inspection activity. One must assume that by the mid-1990's the greatest burden in monitoring the execution of treaty provisions will fall to ground inspections. This is explained primarily by the fact that the resolution capability of optical equipment installed on satellites and aircraft amounts to ten meters and will not permit observation and recording when checking numerical limits of aircraft, tanks or artillery systems. In the second half of the 1990's, the resolution capability of optical instruments might reach 3.0-0.15 meters, which will permit not only observation of weapons, but also their identification. But even in this period, the use of ground inspection groups for monitoring purposes will be not only sufficiently rapid, but also justified.

Thus, inspection activity, in spite of the rapid development of national and multinational technical means of monitoring, will retain its significance in the disarmament process in the decade to come.

Implementation of Disarmament Treaties Viewed

LD0711204191 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 7 Nov 91

[Text] Many experts question whether this country is able to act on the provisions of the disarmament treaties it has signed, say the multilateral treaty on the reduction of the conventional armed forces in Europe, or the Soviet-U.S. START treaty. The treaties concern all

former Soviet republics which have now become sovereign countries. A view from the chief of the Soviet General Staff's Legal Department, Lieutenant-General Fedor Ladygin.

Even though the treaties' ratification may face opposition, Gen Ladygin assumes they will be ratified. Once they are ratified they must be observed. This country has already taken action on a number of their provisions: A team of British inspectors is going to visit the Soviet Union soon to see what this country is doing on the treaty on the conventional armed forces in Europe; a Soviet team visited Britain late last month. Similar inspection tours have taken place in a few other countries. But inspections as such are sure to face many problems in the future. Gen Ladygin agrees.

The current situation in the Soviet Union will probably present problems, including those related to the inspection tours, but the problems can be negotiated. It is time to decide how inspection tours will be carried out of the Soviet arsenals in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Gen Ladygin sees the need for special consultations and talks to settle that problem. And there are major military facilities in the three Baltic states. It would make more sense to leave them where they are. Lease conditions may be negotiated in this case. The whole variety of such problems are being considered and negotiated, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff's Legal Department Lt. Gen. Fedor Ladygin said in conclusion.

Minimal Nuclear Deterrence Called New Strategy

LD1311161591 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2100 GMT 9 Nov 91

[By Radio Moscow military analyst Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Kozlov]

[Text] Nuclear deterrence is turning into the pivot of Soviet nuclear strategy. At a seminar on military doctrines just held in Vienna, the Soviet representative, Colonel General Bronislav Omelichev, declared that in the post-confrontation period the Soviet Union's security in the nuclear field would be ensured through a minimal nuclear deterrence. Here is a comment on this by our Radio Moscow military analyst, Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Kozlov:

The first deputy chief of the General Staff used the new terminology not just out of a desire to please his Western counterparts, Colonel Sergey Kozlov said. The evolution from seeking a Soviet nuclear parity with NATO to a minimal nuclear deterrence is quite logical.

This can be explained first of all by considerable reductions in the Soviet Union's mass destruction weapons potential. In keeping with the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union has destroyed over 2,000 missiles. The START agreement also passed a verdict on scrapping more than 4,000 more nuclear charges, and in response to the American initiative President Gorbachev has announced the elimination of several thousand tactical nuclear missiles.

The Soviet Union's decisive steps towards nuclear disarmament are not the only arguments in favor of changing both its military doctrine and its terminology. In fact, the elements of deterrence have always been present in Moscow's strategy, though the military leadership preferred not to use the term deterrent for purely ideological reasons.

That was stressed one year ago by (Michael Quinlock), an assistant to the British secretary of defense, during his visit to Moscow. This leading NATO analyst delivered a lecture to the Soviet General Staff of that time on a future deterrence and nuclear weapons in Europe.

It would be appropriate to mention at this point, Sergey Kozlov went on, the main step taken by NATO in this field. NATO ceased looking at the Soviet Union as its potential enemy. This alliance now treats the Soviet Union as a partner, and possibly a future ally in the military field. NATO's summit in Rome, where the basic principles of the military bloc's strategy were expected to be reviewed, including the role and place of nuclear factors among them, promised to be another step in that direction.

Regretfully, Sergey Kozlov said in conclusion, we'll have to live in a nuclear world for a long time yet, but the fact that the leading members of the nuclear club now address each other in the language of restraint, and begin using common terminology such as nuclear deterrence, adds more peace and security to our lives.

Defense Minister Shaposhnikov Visits Germany

Discusses Withdrawal With Kohl

*LD1111195991 Moscow TASS in English
1951 GMT 11 Nov 91*

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Semyonov]

[Text] Bonn November 11 TASS—German Chancellor Helmut Kohl received here today visiting Soviet Defence Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov.

During the meeting, Kohl expressed the hope the Soviet troops withdrawal from German territory will go on in accordance with the established schedule.

The sides also discussed issues connected with the future structure of the Soviet Armed Forces, including the control over Soviet nuclear weapons.

Talks 'Very Fruitful'

*LD1111225891 Moscow TASS in English
2228 GMT 11 Nov 91*

[By TASS correspondent Viktor Chistyakov]

[Text] Bonn November 12 TASS—Soviet Defence Minister, Air Force Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov described "as very fruitful and interesting" the negotiations held on the first day of his visit to Germany.

In a TASS interview the minister stressed his conversations with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg were held in an atmosphere of frankness and mutual understanding, and noted they will contribute to the expansion of cooperation between the two countries, including that in the military sphere.

"The negotiations with the minister of defence and the German chancellor were very constructive," Shaposhnikov said.

The fact that Shaposhnikov made his first foreign visit as the Soviet defence minister to Germany was provoked by unique contacts in the military sphere between the Soviet Union and Germany: Germany is the only NATO member-country on which territory Soviet troops will remain until the end of 1994.

Secondly, this visit renders its due to the important role Germany plays in the European and world politics.

During conversations with Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Stoltenberg, Shaposhnikov confirmed that all the treaties previously concluded by the Soviet Union will be fulfilled. Complete understanding with leaderships of the sovereign republics has been reached on this issue, the marshal noted.

The negotiations also focused on prospects for the cooperation in military sphere between the Soviet Union and Germany.

"We agreed that the interaction between our two countries will intensively develop in this sphere," Marshal Shaposhnikov said.

"The stay of the Soviet troops in Germany enables the creation of a solid basis for further development of qualitatively new relations even after the last Soviet soldier leaves German territory."

The sides discussed specific forms of cooperation, including the expansion of direct contacts between servicemen from the two states.

"Judging by the atmosphere and content of the meetings we had, the German side does not consider the Soviet Union its possible military opponent. I should say I do not associate today's German Armed Forces with the 'enemy image'," Shaposhnikov told TASS.

Discusses Arms Issues With German Minister

*LD1211170591 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1352 GMT 12 Nov 91*

[By TASS correspondents Lev Volnukhin and Viktor Chistyakov]

[Text] Bonn, 12 Nov (TASS)—Opening today's news conference on the first official visit to Germany by Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the USSR minister of defense, FRG Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg said: "The conversations I have held with Marshal Shaposhnikov have impressively confirmed the

radical improvement in relations between our states." Stoltenberg said that the principal themes in the talks held have been the exchange of views on topical questions of foreign and security policy, the development of relations between the two states' defense ministries and armed forces, the forthcoming ratification of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, and cooperation from the Soviet side in the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from the territory of Germany.

The FRG defense minister told journalists that since 1990, a program for increasing contacts between the two countries' Armed Forces has been working successfully. Many visits and meetings have already taken place, including those involving leaders of training academies, military medical staff, historians, and sportsmen. There is due to be an exchange of students from the General Staff Academy and cadets from military training schools. "We are ready to exchange experience and cooperate with the Soviet Union in all matters relevant to defining the place of armed forces in a democratic state," Stoltenberg remarked.

"Our primary concern should be directed at ensuring stability in Europe," he remarked. "The path to greater security in the continent requires measures to strengthen trust and good relations and reliable control—particularly over nuclear weapons—and to continue the process of arms control." Dealing with the question of the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces [WGF] from the territory of the FRG, Stoltenberg described cooperation between the relevant official levels in the Bundeswehr and the WGF as "effective and good". The approach of the Soviet side is in keeping with the spirit and content of the agreements, the minister said.

One subject of conversation in Bonn had been the implementation of the program to build housing for servicemen returning home from Germany. The FRG defense minister cited figures to the effect that construction work had already begun at six sites where 9,000 apartments are to be built. Around 2,000 servicemen's families are expected to be re-housed by the end of this year. "We have earmarked goals which derive from our common interests and we shall strive to attain them," the FRG defense minister said in conclusion. "This gives us confidence that together we will successfully deal with both present and future tasks."

In his remarks, Ye. Shaposhnikov said that he had accepted with satisfaction the invitation to visit the FRG and get to know the country, its Armed Forces, and his military colleagues. We have many common interests connected with the presence of Soviet troops in Germany and their withdrawal. During the talks, we discussed all aspects of these problems, the Soviet defense minister noted. Regarding the prospects for bilateral relations in the military field, we have established the existence of common approaches to their development and we agreed that they should be based on mutual trust and cooperation.

Touching on the role of the Soviet Armed Forces during the August putsch, Ye. Shaposhnikov stressed that "it was not a military coup". The military, in his words, remained on the side of the more democratic part of Soviet society. "The Army has been and remains with the people and now there are all the preconditions for the processes occurring in society and in the Army to be irreversible", he pointed out.

The USSR defense minister informed journalists of the main areas of radical army reform: the process of eradicating party structures, which is nearing completion; structural changes, including the reorganization of the central bodies and creation of a committee of defense ministers of the sovereign republics; and organizational and social measures.

The Soviet Union, stressed Ye. Shaposhnikov, will strictly observe all obligations resulting from treaties concluded earlier in the area of disarmament and arms control. This will be our contribution to strengthening trust and cooperation on the continent. "I would like to hope that we have now entered a new era of history in which there is no need to view each other through gun-sights and in which the opportunity has emerged to settle all matters in a spirit of good sense. The peace and happiness of peoples is worth working indefatigably for these noble objectives," he stated.

Replying to questions from journalists concerning Soviet nuclear weapons, the USSR defense minister emphasized that there is not a single element of nuclear ammunition belonging to our troops on the territory of Germany now. As for nuclear weapons on the territory of sovereign republics of the USSR, not a single one of these republics is laying claim to possession or control of those systems. It is wholly normal, nevertheless, that the leaders of the republics should be entitled to receive information about where and in what capacity those weapons are deployed. Shaposhnikov said that representatives of the sovereign republics have reacted positively to the USSR's coming steps to do away with tactical nuclear ammunition. This could represent not only another stage in advancing toward a nuclear-free world but also a kind of "stop signal" for the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons. The minister announced that the withdrawal of tactical systems from a number of republics has already begun, with a view to their subsequent destruction.

In conclusion, Shaposhnikov dwelled on a number of practical aspects of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Germany and their withdrawal from there. He said that the leadership of the USSR Defense Ministry is not making any additional financial demands on the German side. At the same time, the question of facilities belonging to the Soviet side and built with its funds but which are to be left on FRG territory when the troops are withdrawn remains to be resolved at separate talks.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Joint 'Global Defense System' Proposed

924P0026A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 40, 6 Oct 91 p 12

[Article by Sergey Machulin, laboratory director at the Central Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense: "How Can the Soviet and American Military-Industrial Complexes Become Partners?"]

[Text] It is entirely apparent to experts that the United States has no intention of disavowing continuation of its efforts in the Strategic Defense Initiative program. And our response to this program has been the modernization of strategic offensive weapons, planned under a veil of secrecy in the depths of the military-industrial complex. Incidentally, in accordance with the strategic offensive arms reduction treaty, it is relatively inexpensive fixed missile launch sites which are subject to destruction while mobile launchers, whose production and operation costs are many times higher, will be developed. Plans call for the deployment deep underground of new command centers and systems of command, control, and communications. All of this lumped together will take tens of billions of rubles out of our budget, already in bad shape.

What happens now? **The first variant**, no alternative to which was under examination prior to the August events, is continuation of the efforts already under way in modernizing strategic offensive arms. But this leads to destabilization of the situation and a new spiral in the arms race. In essence, GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] documents proposed precisely such a development of events and included changing the course of USSR foreign policy. **The second variant** is simply to sharply curtail financing of the modernization programs for strategic offensive weapons (by 50 billion just this year, according to R. Khasbulatov). Without a doubt, this could improve the situation somewhat in other sectors of the economy, but will it outweigh the losses, such as millions of unemployed, qualified specialists of the military-industrial complex, the disintegration of collectives with great creative potential, and the destruction of production facilities with relatively high levels of technology? As far as the international aspect is concerned, a deterioration of the strategic potential of our country will hardly facilitate stabilization overall of the global environment.

The third variant. The most painless conversion of the military-industrial complex is possible in the event efforts are undertaken to develop a global system of strategic monitoring and defense under the aegis of the United Nations. We will provisionally call this the GSSMD. The idea, surprising at first glance, of uniting the efforts of until-recently opposing sides, has obvious advantages.

Let us stop for a moment to consider the possible mechanism of such a system. It would be advisable for the GSSMD to be able to monitor the condition of

strategic offensive weapons and of the armed forces of states in general. Additionally, it could fulfill functions of antimissile and antispace defense, as well as provide ecological monitoring and notification of emergency situations.

Command and control of the system should be effected with redundancy from several centers located in various states, by shifts international in composition directly subordinate to the United Nations Security Council. The nucleus of the system should be comprised of a global network of communications and computer information centers, which in principle may be used to accomplish any tasks of the United Nations and UNESCO, international economic, law enforcement, or humanitarian structures.

The first two groups of functions should be accomplished based on systems developed within the framework of the SDI program, but with substantially lower expenditures—approximately 10 to 15 times less than the American program. This is due to the fact that, with cooperation between the USSR and United States, there is no longer a need for so much complexity with respect to sophistication of delivery vehicles (decreasing active portion of trajectory, protective coverings, target decoys, etc.). In addition, the integrated efforts of the two superpowers will enable project duplication to be avoided. For example, the USSR may assume basic expenses in the sphere of systems for effecting orbital placement (including with the use of missiles subject to reduction), and the United States—in the sphere of command, control, and communications systems. It should also be taken into account that a substantial share of the expenses could be assumed by states fairly comfortably off which are not members of military blocs and are in primary need of guarantees of their security (the Arab nations, for example).

Questions may arise concerning the fundamental readiness of the two military-industrial complexes for cooperation, but such readiness has already been proven by numerous examples. Moreover, there emerges the fundamental possibility of a conversion of both our military-industrial complex and that of the West, the likes of which will not only avoid encroaching upon their interests, but in practical terms will not affect the nature of activity, assigning it instead to the establishment of a long-term program in the interests of the entire world community.

What will unleashing the proposed program do for our country's economy? First of all, it will enable us in the very near future to sharply (by 70-80 percent) decrease expenditures for financing research projects and arms production, while at the same time providing work for almost all enterprises of the military-industrial complex (GSSMD program financing may be effected mainly through foreign sources, with the USSR share being covered in the initial stages, for example, by provision of launch vehicles, communications and tracking satellites,

etc.). This kind of financing, plus the inevitable injection of sophisticated technology, with a relatively slight reorientation of activity, will create ideal conditions for conversion of the military-industrial complex. Those who think that without multi-billion capital investments we can redirect the cumbersome small-scale production of the military-industrial complex to civilian production output in short order are deluding themselves. Second, the development of GSSMD program projects will bring about the abolishment of restrictions in the import of progressive technologies, cause an influx of investments, and increase the intensity of interaction among specialists, and this will contribute to the enhancement of their qualifications. Additionally, participation of the military-industrial complex in international programs will remove the cover of secrecy which was needed mainly to cover up multi-billions, ineffective expenditures and the incompetent decisions of its leaders. It will enhance the effectiveness of the operation of collectives by breaching the information blockade and will enable organs of authority and the public to exercise control at all levels of the activity of the military-industrial complex.

Pentagon Aide Cited on GPALS, Weapons Proliferation

92P50046A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Nov 91 p 5

[TASS item: "It Is Necessary To Defend Oneself": "The Americans Can Rearm. But Can We?"]

[Text] Washington, 15 November—The intention, declared by the U.S. President in January of this year, to create a system for global protection against a limited missile strike (GPALS) reflects an urgent demand of the day in American national security. Douglas R. Gramm, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for military-political affairs, space research and treaty monitoring, stated this on the eve of first Soviet-American meeting of the group on strategic stability, which is coming up next week.

In the 1980's, continued the high-ranking Pentagon official, the main American efforts in anti-missile defense belonged to the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] program, which was based on the confrontation between the USSR and the United States and the competitiveness of their relations in the area of strategic forces. However, the 1990's are characterized by a substantial improvement in Soviet-American relations. As a consequence of this, the United States has adopted a new military strategy, and has shifted the center of its attention from SDI to GPALS.

Briefly describing the GPALS system, Gramm reported that it is intended to defend against a limited ballistic missile strike. The development of this program has acquired special significance as a result of the continuing rapid proliferation throughout the world of weapons of mass destruction and of advanced technology for the production of other types of modern weapons.

In this connection, he noted, the basic means to prevent further missile proliferation may be diplomatic and political efforts to introduce strict control over this process, and the preservation of the U.S. Armed Forces' deterrent capabilities. Therefore, it would unquestionably be to the mutual benefit of our two countries to implement the U.S. President's recent call for prompt practical steps to permit both the USSR and the United States to begin limited deployment of non-nuclear anti-missile defense systems in the near future to defend our countries from a limited ballistic missile strike.

R. Gramm noted the positive reaction of the Soviet representatives, who had been informed in Geneva and Moscow about the American side's intentions.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Missile Plant Production Records Said Falsified

92UM0167A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Nov 91 p 2

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Correspondent V. Sanatin, Yekaterinburg: "Paper Intermediate Range Missiles Catch Up with Tizyakov at Matrosskaya Tishina"]

[Text] I have learned from confidential sources at Sverdlovsk UKGB [Administration of the State Security Committee] that A. Tizyakov, one of the co-authors of the August putsch, was not only an experienced political plotter but also an experienced swindler in the economic sphere.

No, the former director of the plant imeni Kalinin did not sell intermediate range missiles on the black market. The former director simply... added missiles to the inventory on paper.

I cite a document: "After 20 missiles that had been manufactured in 1984 had been remarked, the customer paid 326,000 rubles each for them, according to certificates No. 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, and 24 dated February 28, 1985 and No. 64 dated March 30, 1985, and also accounts No. 40 dated March 1, 1985, No. 41 dated February 28, 1985, No. 43 and 44 dated February 28, 1985 and No 71 from March 1, 1985. Throughout the first stage. And in April 1985 during the second stage, they were presented and paid for and once again entered into the inventory of the enterprise and military mission."

Here I catch my breath. I am stunned by the "profit" of the swindle—R6,520,000. For 20 paper missiles!

But I am even more stunned by the accuracy of the KGB document: "Entered into the inventory of the enterprise and military mission." What does this suggest? The fact that Tizyakov entered into secret deals and agreements with the military long before the putsch and that is obviously why he ended up among those chosen.

The financial affairs of putsch participant Starodubtsev are already well known. The organs prefer not to dwell at great length upon Tizyakov. It is a pity that trivial swindlers and lovers of the "green snake" intended to bring discipline and order to the country. But it is twice the pity when you know that this document has already been lying for a long time on the desk of Russian State Security Service Chief V. Ivanenko. It is lying there and not going anywhere.

One can only guess why Ivanenko is silent. This document did not get to Moscow from the hands of the official leadership of Sverdlovsk UKGB. This document, like a visual aid on the spinelessness of law enforcement organs, was sent to the commission that had arrived from Moscow, from Ivanenko, to investigate the opposition of 64 that had developed in Sverdlovsk UKGB. The commission was in Sverdlovsk in January, long before the putsch. And long enough before the putsch it could have said who was who, beginning with Tizyakov. But obviously it was more important for the commission to investigate the democratic opposition in the monolithic ranks of the secret department. The KGB opposition was later summoned to Kryuchkov and reeducated. And they modestly forgot about the Tizyakov affair....

Right now it would not be a sin to ask Sverdlovsk UKGB Chairman E. Boytsitskiy why Directorate Agent V. Berdnikov, who dug up the affair with the missiles, was initially removed from the staff and later terminated. According to the unofficial calculations of the democratic opposition which also did not destroy Sverdlovsk UKGB, they have submitted reports on the dismissals of 47 agents during the last six months.

I think that the most important KGB investigations that are being shelved by the leadership are increasingly finding their way into the major press for this reason alone. If secrets of the most secret state department are simply fermenting among the bushes and basements—this means one thing: the department as before is serving a narrow clan. Dozens of agents are suffering from the duplicity of the situation: they would like to serve the people but they have to clean house on the sly and clean the "boss's" kennel. And when you have walked on the "boss's" floor—leave.

"... We are seeing a dual entry of 9M82 items in the inventories for 1984-1985 which may be categorized by Article 152 (annotation) of the RSFSR Criminal Code on accounting entries and other distortions when fulfilling plans... the obviousness of the advisability of dismantling finished items for those being assembled for research work at 'Novator' SM [expansion unknown] Design Bureau indicates the premeditated violation of financial discipline at the level of SPO [Scientific Production Organization] 'MEIK' [expansion unknown], 'Novator' SM Design Bureau, USSR Ministry of Defense VP [expansion unknown] 1219 when the customer paid for items."

A. Tizyakov was this 'innovator.' Sverdlovsk KGB agents have known this for five years and have hidden this for five years. Besides former Agent V. Berdnikov, the document was signed by KGB Agent V. Yeroshenko who still works in the organs at this time and who has just been transferred from the Urals to Kazakhstan. "I concur with the conclusions," wrote V. Yeroshenko, former USSR UKGB subunit chief for Sverdlovsk Oblast, on May 26, 1986.

Five years have passed, Mister law enforcers! What whales have taken a bath with impunity in state finances. How proudly they swam past the eyes and ears of the KGB and past the naked and disrobed people, heaven knows whom the people believed would protect their national wealth....

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Shift in NATO's Attitude on Conventional Arms Cuts

924P0035A Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian No 10, Oct 91 (signed to press 22 Sep 91) pp 42-51

[Article by Vladimir Borisovich Kudryavtsev, candidate of historical sciences and associate in the Planning and Evaluation Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "NATO and the Reduction of Conventional Arms in Europe"]

[Text] When analyzing the evolution of the views of the NATO political and military leadership on the problems of reduction of armed forces and conventional arms it is essential to take up the question of the role of general-purpose forces and conventional arms in the mutual relations of the United States with its West European NATO allies after World War II. And it has not been unchanging. Many times, depending on the overall situation and the views of the U.S. and NATO leadership concerning the substance, forms, and methods of preparing for and waging a possible future war, this role has undergone definite changes, above all in connection with the heavy accent on exploitation of the nuclear component in the 1950's and 1960's ("massive retaliation," "brinksmanship"). The adoption of the "flexible response" doctrine in the late 1960's after heated debate marked a fundamental revision by NATO strategists of the role and place of their conventional armed forces and weapons in the arsenal of nuclear and non-nuclear means of deterrence and resulted from their rethinking of the situation of strategic nuclear parity and the real consequences of allout nuclear conflict. In the United States special emphasis was put on the development of conventional forces during the administration of President R. Reagan. In 1982 C. Weinberger, U. S. Secretary of Defense at the time, in his annual report to Congress laid out the idea of "allout warfare using only conventional means (allout conventional warfare)."¹ In his opinion, under conditions of U.S.-USSR nuclear parity the United States should be guided in questions of strategic

planning by the idea that warfare employing only conventional arms is possible and that it will not necessarily be short-lived. In case the United States and its allies are drawn into such a conflict they can figure on a victorious conclusion to the war only if they have adequate force, and the effectiveness of deterrence by conventional forces will be quite low if the enemy draws the mistaken conclusion that it can attain easy victory in conventional warfare as well. From this the conclusion was drawn that not only the United States itself but also its Western European allies must prepare seriously for an allout, protracted war. The scale and scope of measures by the NATO countries should be a result of broad and soundly based evaluations of the enemy's capabilities, and not follow from propositions concerning the number of wars and fronts.

The ideas of "vertical" and "horizontal" escalation which flowed from the general scheme of "allout conventional warfare" accordingly envisioned securing offensive domination over the enemy in any stage of intensity of a conflict and expanding the geographic region of conflict. Needless to say, in these conditions the role of conventional armed forces and arms in cooperation of the United States and Western Europe increased immeasurably.

The New Phase

The views of the NATO political and military leadership on the problems of security, and in particular on the problem of reduction of armed forces and conventional arms, are very vividly and thoroughly presented in the decisions of various organs of the NATO structure where the common interests and concerns of all members of the North Atlantic Alliance are reflected. Let us trace the evolution of these views on the basis of an analysis of the decisions of supreme NATO organs in the last 5 years.

It is considered, for example, that a qualitatively new level of mutual understanding among all members of the alliance on the question of conventional arms was reached at the May 1986 session of the NATO Council, which took place in the Canadian city of Halifax. As official documents observe, the heads of state and government there "issued an open appeal to bolster stability in all Europe on the basis of negotiations on conventional arms control."² There too it was possible to reach agreement on the objective of bolstering stability and security in all Europe by expanding openness and establishing a verifiable, all-embracing, and stable balance of conventional forces on a lower level. A special High Level Task Force was formed at this session to study the question of preparing appropriate recommendations for the Council. It is true that significant differences of opinion on this matter were seen from the start. Thus, France, basing itself on the need for all countries taking part in the all-European process to participate in the new talks, categorically objected to this institution being a NATO task force rather than an organ that represented states more broadly.

Almost concurrently with the NATO announcement of initiatives in the area of conventional arms the American Congress in October 1986, during hearings on budget appropriations for the 1987 fiscal year, almost unanimously adopted a "conventional defense initiative", which envisioned appropriation of more than 500 million dollars for the development of conventional military potential. At this time the United States showed the following change in defense expenditures: 1982—12 percent growth (in comparison with the previous year); 1982—6 percent; 1984—5 percent; 1985—7.1 percent. In the opinion of L. Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, the bitter truth was that America had never engaged in choosing a national security policy, comparing objectives and capabilities, comparing what they would like to do with what it would cost. In his opinion, despite significant upgrading of military hardware, the military was not able to overcome its backwardness in the necessary number of ships and aircraft to deliver U. S. combat forces to remote theaters of war and the lag in arms stockpiles.

The session of the NATO Eurogroup at the defense minister level on 3 December 1986 focused its attention on questions of the development of conventional defense forces in 1987. It also summarized the contributions of their countries to strengthening the defense of the alliance by offering a training contingent of troops. The Eurogroup unanimously favored arms modernization, having in mind both replacement of outdated types and additional weapons purchases.

During the session of the NATO Military Planning Committee on 4-5 December 1986 in Brussels, the accent was on the "conventional defense initiative." As a result a plan was adopted for the development of NATO armed forces and arms in 1987-1991; it fully incorporated the decisions just made by the Eurogroup applicable to 1987. The defense ministers of the NATO countries reaffirmed their intention to increase their countries' defense expenditures three percent annually (in current prices) and noted the need for more rational use of this money. It was observed to be necessary to develop cooperation in the area of arms production and standardization and propagation of advanced technology as a way to overcome existing difficulties. The importance of various inter-alliance initiatives such as the NATO Armaments Cooperation Improvement Strategy approved by the defense ministers of the NATO countries in December 1985 was reaffirmed.

At the Turning Point

The realities of the second half of the 1980's could not help but be reflected in the approaches of the NATO countries to solving security problems. The results of the Soviet-American summit meetings in Geneva in 1985 and Reykjavik in 1986 were very important in this respect; they in fact laid the foundation of mutual relations between states with different social systems based on the principles of the new political thinking.

At the session of the NATO Council held in Brussels on 11-12 December 1986 there was a comprehensive review of the questions of conventional armed forces and arms. The ministers of foreign affairs adopted a decision to begin discussion with the Warsaw Pact countries on a mandate for negotiations on control of conventional arms in all Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. As we know, already during the Madrid meeting of participants of the Conference on Peace and Security in Europe one of the more active initiators of Europe-wide measures for conventional disarmament at the new talks already being proposed then was France. But from the start it opposed a negotiating forum on an inter-bloc basis. France wanted all 35 countries who participate in the CCSE [Conference for Cooperation and Security in Europe] to be involved in the negotiation process. The position of the other NATO countries was that, because the neutral and nonaligned countries did not want to reduce their own armed forces, citing their small size as the reason, the NATO people thus believed that they should not dictate the levels of armed forces of the alliance. France refused to accept the principle of overall ceilings for the alliances, but insisted that each of the 23 countries who were participants in the two alliances and the future conventional arms negotiations should adopt the appropriate legislative norms on the national level, regulating their rights and duties in connection with any treaty under discussion. France was categorically opposed to including tactical nuclear weapons in the mandate of the new talks and even threatened to withdraw from participation in the talks if anyone raised this matter during the actual negotiations.

The position of the FRG came down to the need to reduce the number of primary weapons systems, and this was considered a priority task relative to reductions in the number of servicemen of the two alliances. In essence it wanted to get unilateral reductions in the combat potential of the Warsaw Pact. The endeavor of the FRG to alter the structure of the Warsaw Pact armed forces to give them exclusively defensive capabilities should be viewed in the same light. In furtherance of these attitudes, in 1987 at the suggestion of G. A. Arbatov four Western researchers—Albrecht Von Mueller (FRG), Frank Von Hippel (U.S.), Andres Bosrup (Denmark), and Robert Neald (Great Britain)—wrote and sent to the CPSU Central Committee a conceptual letter on the question of control of conventional arms in Europe, based primarily on the ideas of "alternative defense". A few months later the authors received a letter from M. S. Gorbachev in which he thanked them for the letter and supported the concept of "defensive defense" in principle.³

Great Britain also opposed the inclusion of nuclear weapons in the subject matter of the future negotiations.

The December 1986 session of the NATO Council in Brussels heard the first report by the High Level Task Force, prepared under the chairmanship of NATO deputy secretary general M. Gvidi. The group's mission proved extremely multifaceted and difficult. This related

first of all to the need to reconcile the positions of France and the United States on the group of participants in the future talks. Finally agreement was reached that the talks would be held between 16 NATO members and 7 members of the Warsaw Pact, but on the understanding that they would regularly inform the other participants of the CCSE.⁴

The December 1986 session of the NATO Council adopted the Brussels declaration on conventional arms control, which was largely based on the first report of the High Level Task Force. The force was commissioned to continue work and report regularly to the NATO Council. The declaration confirmed the alliance's readiness to begin consultations on working out the mandate of the future talks on conventional forms covering all European territory.

At the session of the NATO Council held in Reykjavik in June 1987 the ministers of foreign affairs confirmed the intention of their countries to conduct separate talks on conventional forces in the group of 23 countries, which would have adequately broad ties with the forum of the 35 countries participating in the CCSE. This formula was a kind of compromise between the positions of the United States and France on this issue. But already in November 1987 France announced that the initial understanding of agreement needed clarification. In the words of an official representative of the U. S. administration, the French position in this period was that conventional arms talks should be suspended in 1992 so that the participants in the CCSE, at their meeting planned for this time to review the results attained since the signing of the Helsinki agreements, would be able to determine how much progress was made in the talks of the 23. The United States vigorously opposed this French proposal, describing it as an attempt to retreat from the compromise reached earlier, which envisions separate or "autonomous" negotiations on conventional forces. In the opinion of the Americans, this approach would create an "artificial blind alley" in concluding talks on disarmament. The French position was not adopted.

New Initiatives

There exists a view which holds that the shift of the attention of NATO, and above all of its Western European members, from nuclear to conventional forces in the second half of the 1980's resulted from the fact that new Soviet-American talks opened in March 1985 on nuclear and space weapons and these talks opened up real prospects for genuine reductions in nuclear weapons, which would inevitably lessen the role of the nuclear factor in the NATO-wide strategy of deterrence. Therefore, supposedly, the NATO people directed their gaze to the set of questions related to conventional armed forces. Such assertions are certainly not without grounds. At the same time, there was not even a hint that NATO was completely rejecting its reliance on the nuclear fist. This was made perfectly obvious by the March 1988 session of the NATO Council in Brussels.

Heated debates broke out at the session over the question of the consequences of conclusion of the Soviet-American treaty on medium-range missiles and compensation measures related to modernization of tactical nuclear forces. NATO was not united on this. The approaches were sometimes directly opposite to one another. The FRG rigidly resisted the idea of any modernization whatsoever; in the opinion of observers, this threatened to split the alliance into two camps. Ultimately, however, the extreme points of view (of the FRG and Great Britain) were converged in the spread of opinions of alliance members and agreement was achieved on the need to carry out a modernization of NATO tactical nuclear forces.

The Brussels session adopted a special NATO statement on conventional arms—"Control of Conventional Arms: A Program for the Future." The document sets forth clearly the goals of the allies in the then-upcoming negotiations on stability in the area of conventional arms: establishment of a reliable and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels; elimination of imbalances which impair stability and security; and, as the paramount task, eliminating the capability for sudden attack and carrying on large-scale offensive actions. The NATO objective, in the opinion of the authors of the document, should be to create a situation in Europe where the disposition of forces and the size and deployment of military systems already make a sudden attack and large-scale offensive action infeasible.

In the Declaration of Heads of State and Government adopted by the session the participants of the session, taking note of the positive aspects of USSR policy, at the same time stated that they did not observe any lessening of military efforts by the Soviet Union, which continued, as it was stated, to "stubbornly keep" much larger armed forces than needed for its defense. It was asserted that the steady growth of Soviet military potential demanded the alliance's constant attention because it affected all regions located within the alliance's sphere of competence. It was emphasized that maintaining an effective defense and reliable deterrent forces was the necessary foundation for constructive dialog with the East, including on issues of arms control and disarmament.

At the session of the NATO Council on the foreign affairs minister level held in Brussels on 8-9 December 1988 a statement on control of conventional arms was adopted which gave high praise to the position and actions of the Soviet leadership on eliminating the existing imbalance and its intention to change the location of Soviet armed forces. This was the reaction to M. S. Gorbachev's speech at the United Nations on 7 December 1988.

The Declaration of Heads of State and Government adopted at the session of the NATO Council held on 29-30 May 1989 on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the existence of the alliance announced an intention to come forward with new initiatives within the framework of negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. The

document emphasized the importance of U. S. President G. Bush's initiative to establish an "open skies" regime, which was expected to strengthen trust between the states through intelligence flights and promote greater openness in military activities, control over arms, and better information to the public.

The session approved an all-embracing conception of arms control and disarmament. The fundamental objective of NATO policy in the arms control field was proclaimed to be strengthening security and stability at the lowest possible balanced level of forces and arms, in conformity with the requirements of the strategy of deterrence. Further elaboration of the idea was expected to ensure a comprehensive approach that would encompass defense policy and policy in the field of arms control: these two aspects were declared to be mutually complementary and interdependent. It was emphasized that NATO members would be guided by such arms control principles as security, stability, and verifiability. The alliance's tasks in the area of conventional arms control came down to the following: creating security and a stable ratio of conventional forces in Europe on a lower level while simultaneously creating an atmosphere of greater openness in relation to the military system and military activity in Europe. At the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe the allies proposed reducing the total arsenal of arms in Europe to an overall limit with the emphasis on the most dangerous systems; a limit on the proportion of the total potential for each European country taken separately; a limit on stationed forces; adequate quantitative sub-limits for forces in all Europe. The system of reductions would have to be reinforced by additional measures such as openness, notice, and restraint in the deployment, maintenance, movement, and level of combat readiness of conventional forces. Also proposed were a set of all-embracing measures to raise the level of openness in relation to the military system, the level of openness and predictability of military activities, contacts, and communications, and a seminar for exchange of opinion on military doctrines. The start of negotiations on partial reduction of the tactical nuclear missiles of the USSR and United States to equal and verifiable levels was closely coordinated with the beginning of practical realization of a possible future agreement on conventional forces in Europe.⁵

The Contemporary Situation

At the present time NATO has formed a fairly precise approach to the problem of reducing conventional armed forces and arms and it has been reinforced in the decisions of the appropriate alliance organs. The generally constructive tone of this approach is a result of a critical rethinking of contemporary realities by the NATO political and military leadership. The evolution of the NATO leadership's views on military-political problems as a whole and the problem of reduction of conventional armed forces and arms in particular took

place under the influence of factors resulting from the establishment of the new political thinking as the standard in interstate dealings.

Radical changes in the Soviet approaches to the conduct of international affairs and swift changes in the countries of Eastern Europe created the preconditions for the North Atlantic Alliance to review its military-political course for the coming period. A portentous event in this sense was the London session of the NATO Council on 5-6 July 1990, with participation by heads of state and government. The session adopted the Declaration on the Transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance. The document contains a proposal to the Warsaw Pact states to issue a joint declaration which would proclaim that the alliances are no longer enemies and will refrain from threatening force or using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state. It contained a proposal to USSR President M. S. Gorbachev and the leaders of the states of Central and Eastern Europe to come to Brussels and speak at the North Atlantic Council, and to the governments of these countries there was an invitation to establish regular diplomatic relations with NATO. It was emphasized that the alliance, on its part, would make efforts to overcome the inheritance of decades of suspicion. It was ready to step up military contacts, including contacts of NATO commanders with Moscow and the other Central and Eastern European capitals.

The NATO people proposed that as soon as the treaty on reduction of conventional forces in Europe was signed further negotiations would be begun with the same participants and a mandate to supplement the agreement with further measures, including measures to limit the number of personnel in armed forces in Europe.

The objective of the alliance, the Declaration states, will be to conclude the negotiations on further reductions of conventional forces in Europe and on measures to strengthen trust and security as quickly as possible in order to get ready for the next meeting of the CCSE countries, which is to be held in Helsinki in 1992. The alliance will strive through the new talks on control of conventional arms within the CCSE framework to adopt far-reaching measures in the 1990's to restrict the offensive potential of conventional armed forces in Europe in order to prevent any country from having incommensurate military might on the European continent. A special High Level NATO Task Force will formulate a detailed position on the further talks on control of conventional weapons.

The Declaration contains a plan of actions for NATO after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and implementation of the treaty on conventional forces. It declares that the structure of the NATO Unified Forces and NATO strategy are changing radically so that they will include the following elements:

NATO will deploy a smaller number of reorganized forces in positions. They will be highly mobile and have

general capabilities so that "alliance leaders can decide with maximum flexibility how to react to a particular crisis." NATO will increasingly rely on multinational corps composed of national subunits;

NATO will reduce the readiness of its regular units, lowering requirements for their combat training and number of exercise;

NATO will increasingly rely on the ability to build up forces "if the need for this arises."

It is contemplated that "an appropriate combination of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe" will be preserved for the foreseeable future and, where necessary, they will be modernized.

A decision was adopted at the session to begin new talks on tactical nuclear weapons.

The new negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on reduction of short-range nuclear forces should, in the opinion of NATO people, begin shortly after signing of the agreement on reduction of conventional forces in Europe. Interested allies are working out an arms control framework for these negotiations with due regard for the need for a much smaller number of nuclear weapons and the decreasing need for sub-strategic nuclear systems of very short operating range.

The three documents signed during the meeting of the leaders of the CCSE countries in Paris in November 1990, the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe, the Joint Declaration of States, and the Charter for a New Europe, in fact reinforce the new principles of European security and create the essential conditions for the states to change their strategy.

At the same time we cannot fail to direct attention to how NATO sees the threat to the alliance that exists under contemporary conditions. The December 1990 communique of the session of the NATO Council says that the threats with which the countries of the alliance clash today in Europe are linked not just to the possibility of a deliberate attack by former enemies against allied territory, but also with the unpredictable repercussions of instability, which can occur in the present period of swift and universal political and economic changes. The communique observes that the establishment of relations rid of any conflict does not free NATO from the duty to balance, out of considerations of caution, what remains of the Soviet Union's impressive military potential. In the same way, the communique asserts, the possibility that the security of the allies in other regions will be threatened cannot be excluded.

At the December session agreement was reached on monitoring strict fulfillment of the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe by all parties, and in particular on seeing that the Soviet Union promptly resolves serious problems linked to the conditions and interpretation of the treaty, which is a key prerequisite to its swift ratification.

In this connection the situation which has developed in our country recently over the Treaty cannot help but cause alarm. Open, unsupported criticism of its principles in the press and even resounding calls to our parliamentarians to refuse to ratify it plainly do not help establish a normal climate in Europe-wide and world affairs. The large-scale move to transfer a large quantity of our armaments beyond the Urals, which someone tried to do secretly, obviously making the naive assumption that it would not be noticed, worked in the same direction. This led to confusion in the numerical data submitted and the political and moral costs associated with this. It seems that in the present situation all this will only retard the cause of Europe-wide disarmament.

The situation around the Conventional Arms Treaty in our country is being taken in the West today as a kind of indicator of whether the Soviet Union is really capable of finally overcoming the heritage of the past by rejecting the positions that flow from the postulates that we are surrounded by a hostile world with which conflict is inevitable and by undertaking further direct steps in the security area.

In the opinion of Western observers, if this does not work out the situation may run into a logical dead end. Such a development of events would be extremely undesirable for both the West and the USSR, because it would hinder the establishment of new foundations of European security, on which the peoples of all Europe are placing great hopes. The de facto collapse of the Warsaw Pact creates fairly good preconditions for forming a fundamentally different security system, without blocs, on the European continent. But a great deal here will depend on the posture of the NATO countries.

The sphere of conventional arms was thoroughly reviewed again during the series of meetings of NATO organs held in May and June of 1991. On the threshold of the sessions of the Military Planning Committee and the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, which took place on 28-29 May 1991, NATO experts prepared a draft document entitled "The Alliance's Strategic Conception." It formulated new approaches to military strategy and bloc military development. It discussed a significant reorganization of the armed forces in the coming years; they would have to meet criteria for being multinational and more mobile. In the opinion of American General G. Galvin, commanding officer of NATO Unified Forces in Europe, the alliance's new strategy is not oriented to the unexpected occurrence of war and aims at resolving any possible crisis.

The NATO armed forces will be reduced in number and will become much more flexible. This decision is an attempt at the most radical revision of alliance strategy since its founding in 1949. In the future this should lead to a significant reduction in the West's defense expenditures and it guarantees a continued U. S. military presence in Europe, but on lower levels than in the past. The NATO defense ministers decided to reduce alliance forces in Europe by one-third (by 1 million service personnel) and

U. S. forces from 320,000 to 100,000. NATO rejects the idea of "forward defense" on the former border within Germany and the multilayered organization of the eight national army corps, each of which covered its own defense sector along the front. The new strategy envisions the creation of direct reaction forces (for intervention in any possible conflict almost from the moment it breaks out), rapid reaction forces, the main defensive forces, and supplementary forces. In conformity with the new strategy NATO defense will have to rely on five or six newly formed army corps which will be made up of divisions from several allied countries, except for one entirely German corps which is planned to be stationed in the former GDR.

The rapid reaction forces will be on the order of 70,000-100,000 personnel (four divisions). They are also supposed to be provided with air cover (airplane and helicopters) and with support by naval forces in case of necessity. It is intended that two of these divisions will be British (one armored division and one lighter) while the other two will be formed from contingents from the other European NATO countries (one of them will be an airborne division with personnel from Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Great Britain, while the second will apparently be under Italian command and will consist of service personnel from the NATO countries of the Mediterranean region). It has been decided to assign the command of these forces to the English. The headquarters will be located in Germany, and they will be supported primarily by the United States. The rapid reaction forces include the NATO Mobile Forces in Europe (5,000 personnel), which have already been formed and in case of a crisis are assigned the role of advance units of the first echelon (direct reaction forces).

The supplementary forces will include U. S. armed formations transferred across the ocean as reinforcements.

The new conception assigns all these forces the mission of being capable of delivering a strike outside the bounds of the Eastern European states, in the depth of the defense of any potential enemy, as soon as NATO detects his troops movements. This plan for reorganization of NATO forces does not touch the French troops stationed in Germany, which are to be reduced by one-half before 1994.

Along with this the NATO rapid reaction naval group in the Mediterranean (Navocformed), which consists of warships of the U. S., German, British, Italian, Turkish, Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese navies, is given the status of a permanently active unit.

All of this illustrates that NATO, no longer viewing the Soviet Union as the enemy, which was declared during the London session of the Council in 1990, is reorienting its military efforts in the future to eliminating potential threats to the alliance from "third world" countries. The NATO people were obviously pushed in this direction by the events in the Persian Gulf.

At the same time there exists in NATO an attitude which holds that although the Soviet leadership at present is

devoted to detente and restructuring international relations, if this policy suddenly changes completely the alliance will have to review its policies once more.

The joint declaration of the countries that took part in the session of the NATO Council in Copenhagen on 7 June 1991 devoted a significant place to the all-Europe process, which they view as an instrument supplementary to NATO in ensuring European security. The document observes that the security of the NATO countries is inseparably linked with the security of all the other states in Europe. Therefore, the "consolidation and preservation of democratic societies on the continent and their freedom from any type of coercion or intimidation is a direct and important task" of NATO members as well as a task of all the other states participating in the CCSE, according to the obligations fixed in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter.

The final communique of the session notes that efforts to ensure stability in conditions of peace and freedom will be taken with due regard for the political, economic, social, and ecological elements of security as well as its essential military aspect.

On the eve of the meeting of foreign ministers of the CCSE countries in Berlin in June 1991 the leaders of NATO announced their determination to make it a "decisive new step in activating the role of the CCSE and solidifying its new organizational component, in particular by broadening its capabilities on the level of political consultations." Considering the analogous aspiration of the other participants in the Berlin meeting, including the USSR, it can be stated with satisfaction that this goal was achieved.

In summary it can be concluded that the process of further strengthening of European security is in the hands of all the participants of CCSE. The future of Europe depends on how they behave and what their practical steps are. The Paris summit meeting offered good guidelines. And it is extraordinarily important not to lose them in the heat of propaganda polemics.

Footnotes

1. Weinberger, W. "Secretary of Defense. Annual Report to the Congress," FY1-SL GEO, Washington, February 1, 1982, pp 1-16.

2. NATO'S SIXTEEN NATIONS February-March 1988, Vol 33, No 1, p 79.

3. See J. Krause, "Prospects for Conventional Arms Control in Europe," Institute for East-West Security Studies, Occasional Papers Series, New York, 1988, p 55.

4. See NATO'S SIXTEEN NATIONS December 1986/January 1987, Vol 31, No 8, p 97.

5. See NATO REVIEW No 3, 1989, pp 22-27.

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Further Reports on Troop Withdrawal From Baltics

No Plans To Move to Belarus

PM0111133091 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

[From TASS, RIA, and correspondents column: "Belorussian Military District Commander Colonel General A. Kostenko Refutes Rumors of Redeployment of Soviet Troops From Baltic to Belarus [Belorussia]"]

[Text] Colonel General Anatoliy Kostenko, commander of the Belorussian Military District, has firmly refuted rumors concerning the supposed plan to transfer Soviet troops from the Baltic to Belarus [Belorussia]. He told a RIA correspondent that he knows nothing of any such plans. "Moreover," Kostenko stressed, "I am familiar with the Belorussian parliament's position, and if such an intention were to arise anywhere, it would never be put into practice here."

Paratroop Unit in Estonia

LD0411162491 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1300 GMT 4 Nov 91

[Editorial Report] Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian at 1300 GMT on 4 November carries a five-minute report by Ene Veiksaar on troop withdrawals from Estonia.

Veiksaar says that according to a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA report of 1 November the Viljandi paratroop unit was meant to be withdrawing on 3 November. Toomas Matson, a local Viljandi journalist, presents an investigative report and pronounces the newspaper report to be untrue. The unit in question has not received any orders to withdraw, the general at the Baltic Military District cited in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is on leave as is the commander of the unit in question, and nobody knows anything.

Matson says that some foreign journalists had been attracted by the report and he names Finnish television and NBC among those who have both been refused interviews at the unit. He says: "Answering my question as to whether they think it realistic that they withdraw at least before New Year, the deputy commander of the unit said that in their opinion with the winter coming there is no need for them to start travelling." He says that he has telephoned far and wide in search of answers and goes on: "Vladimir Zhukov, officer of the press service of the USSR Ministry of Defense told the Baltic News Service that he had read about paratroop units withdrawing from Estonia only in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA." Matson adds that Matti Pedak, an Estonian Government councillor, said that Shaposhnikov had originally simply promised to have two paratroop battalions withdrawn, and that now we can see that he has not kept his word.

Matson concludes by noting that the Kohtla-Jarve civil defense regiment was to be handed over to Estonia by Friday 8 November, but the unit has not yet received any instructions to this effect.

Estonian Premier Questioned

*OW0511012091 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2030 GMT 4 Nov 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At a news briefing in Tallinn Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar has failed to answer a reporter's question why two airborne battalions stationed in the town of Viljandi and Voru has not yet begun withdrawing from the republic. Mr Savisaar said that he has no information about that now and will be able to respond in two days. Upon return from Moscow where he had met with Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov October 3d, Mr Savisaar revealed that Shaposhnikov had promised to pull these battalions out of Estonia within a month.

On November 4th deputy commander of the Viljandi Airborne Unit, Lieutenant-Colonel Vyacheslav Porokhov told the Viljandi newspaper's "SAKALA" correspondent Toomas Matson that so far he has not received any official order to withdraw the troops. He added that "it does not make sense to begin the withdrawal in the winter."

Estonian-Soviet Talks To Begin 10 Nov

*OW0711180091 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1726 GMT 7 Nov 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to the Estonian Government press office, talks between Estonia and the USSR will begin on November 10th in the village of Narva-Joesuu (in the northwest of Estonia). The Estonian delegation will be led by Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar, the Soviet one by Mayor of St. Petersburg Anatoliy Sobchak.

The talks will focus on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Estonia, border control, bilateral economic relations, etc.

Soldiers' Group Scores Conditions

*LD0911205991 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program
Radio-1 Network in Russian 2000 GMT 9 Nov 91*

[Text] The Coordination Council of representatives of all arms of troops stationed in the Baltic and veterans of the Soviet Army and Navy have adopted an address to the leaders and parliaments of the Baltic states, Russia, and the USSR. The document says that until normal social and living conditions are created at their new postings, the subunits of the USSR Armed Forces will not leave Baltic territory. The address includes the ultimatum that all decisions on restationing be made only with the agreement of the Coordination Council.

First Soviet Army Subunit Leaving Estonia

*PM1211152191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Nov 91 Union Edition p 1*

[Report from IZVESTIYA, TASS, RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY, REUTER roundup]

[Text] The first Soviet Army subunit is leaving Estonia. A train of military hardware belonging to an airborne battalion stationed near Viru has left.

Only 30 airborne troops remain to guard property. A battalion of the same type is preparing to pull out of Viljandi. USSR Defense Minister Ye. Shaposhnikov promised the Estonian Government to withdraw these two subunits within the month. The local mass media remind him that the month is already up.

No Withdrawal in 'Near Future'

*LD1211112391 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1045 GMT 12 Nov 91*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 12 Nov (TASS)—"There is to be no planned withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic states in the near future," a TASS correspondent was told today by a spokesman for the USSR Defense Ministry press center. He added that the question of withdrawing Soviet troops from the region "can be resolved only through talks between the governments of the USSR and the Baltic states." He was commenting on a press report that there has supposedly been a "withdrawal of a paratroop battalion from Estonia." The press center spokesman made it clear that a paratroop assault battalion stationed in Voru was disbanded a few days ago under a prior agreement with the Estonian Government. The personnel from that battalion have been reassigned to other units.

Lithuanian Aide: Statement 'Paradoxical'

*LD1311111891 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 13 Nov 91*

[By correspondent Janina Mecelicaite at the Lithuanian Supreme Council in Vilnius]

[Text] Today Audrius Azubalis, Supreme Council press spokesman, commented on a report issued by the TASS news agency quoting a statement made by a representative of the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center that a scheduled withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic states is not to be expected.

Audrius Azubalis said that this statement indicates that interference by the occupational regime is continuing. He said that it was paradoxical that such a comment could be made by the representatives of a country which has recognized us. This also runs counter to the norms of international law. Audrius Azubalis expressed the hope that contacts with the Soviet Union would sooner or later be established and that negotiations would begin.

Estonia Protests Planned Exercises

*LD1311110591 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 0700 GMT 13 Nov 91*

[Text] [First announcer] The board of the Estonian Committee has protested against USSR military exercises at the Aegviidu training center:

[Second announcer] The protest statement, disseminated last night, calls the exercises due to take place at Aegviidu a hostile action against independent Estonia.

The board of the Estonian Committee asks: Against whom is this so-called battle preparedness of the Soviet Army, with the participation of the commander of the Baltic Military District, directed? The board of the Estonian Committee calls in its statement for protest rallies, picketing, and other actions to be organized against the arbitrariness of the Soviet Army. An appeal is also made to the governments of democratic states and to the world public. The board of the Estonian Committee appeals to them to demand a prompt and complete withdrawal of USSR Armed Forces from the territory of the Republic of Estonia.

The present protest statement was disseminated to the press last night by Vardo Rumessen, member of the board of the Estonian Committee.

New Round of CFE Talks Opens in Vienna

*LD0411220991 Moscow TASS in English
1959 GMT 4 Nov 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna November 4 TASS—Elaboration of an agreement on reduction of the armed forces personnel in Europe, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals, is the main task of a new round of talks on conventional armed forces [CFE] on the continent, which started here today.

Local observers estimate its prospects in a positive way, and there are good grounds for that. Practically all the countries have submitted data on the over-all strength of their armed forces and provided explanations for the given figures. Now the participants of the negotiations have a full picture of the armed forces personnel in all 22 member-states. The presented data enables the negotiators to take a clear view of coinciding elements in the armed forces structures, as well as existing differences.

Besides, a helpful discussion sprang up about the most essential item of the talks—the scope of the future agreement, which resulted in a marked rapprochement of positions of all sides taking part in the discussion. Though it is too early to speak of an entire identity of views, none the less it can be stated that the negotiators are now in a position to see more distinctly possible contours of a future agreement and the main categories of the armed forces personnel, subject to limitation.

A regular session of the talks on confidence-building measures and security in Europe has started today in Vienna. Taking part in the talks are representatives of 38 member-countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Their major task is to work out an effective package of confidence measures which would promote reaching a new quality on the way to ensuring security and stability on the continent.

'Open Skies' Meeting Resumes in Vienna 4 Nov

*LD0411180891 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1621 GMT 4 Nov 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, 4 Nov (TASS)—“Climbing higher” in the matter of further strengthening trust and security, and raising them to a qualitatively new level is the task of the international “Open Skies” conference, the third round of which resumed work in the Austrian capital today, after a technical break.

Taking part are delegations from 22 countries in East Europe and NATO, as well as, with observer status, representatives of the neutral and nonaligned states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The conference is intended to lead to the signing of an agreement on reciprocal flights by unarmed aircraft, with the aim of monitoring the military activities of states and increasing openness in relations between them.

The Soviet delegation, headed by Yevgeniy Golovko, today stated its willingness to open the entire territory of the USSR to observation flights. This removes the main obstacle in the way of working out an agreement. It is now possible to begin work on its text, which is intended to be agreed by the forthcoming “Helsinki-2” summit of the CSCE states in the spring of next year. In addition, the Soviet delegation has brought with it a number of specific proposals on the quotas of flights and the observation apparatus.

The “open skies” policy, Ye. Golovko told a TASS correspondent, has the backing of the republics, which see in it a far-reaching measure of trust, from Vancouver to Vladivostok. He did not rule out representatives from the republics being in the Soviet delegation even at the current round.

New Positions Advanced at 'Open Skies' Meeting

*LD0611120491 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1717 GMT 5 Nov 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, 5 Nov (TASS)—Fundamentally new aspects in the Soviet position, which now make it possible to begin most actively the drawing up of the text of the “Open Skies” agreement, were put forward at the plenary sitting of the international conference on this topic which took place here today. Representatives of 22 NATO and East European countries are taking part. Envoys of neutral and nonaligned states, and also of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, are attending as observers.

In order to resolve the deadlock which had been reached at the talks, the USSR stated its readiness to open the entire territory of the country for familiarization flights by inspection planes. As far as the problems of flight quotas and also the selection of observational apparatus are concerned, disagreements over which prevented any forward movement at the previous two rounds of the conference, the Soviet Union proceeds from the premise

that the "Open Skies" regime is not some kind of immutable measure, but will develop and be perfected.

In the opinion of the Soviet side, during the first stage of the implementation of this regime, the quotas for the USSR and United States could amount to as many as 40 flights annually. For groups of states which have less territory compared to the USSR and the United States—for instance, Germany, France, and Canada—a quota of up to 20-25 flights could be set annually. For even smaller states, under 10 flights. During the second stage, let us say two or three years after it has become operational, the question of the advisability of changing the set quotas could be returned to. For instance, they could be increased for the United States and the USSR to 52 flights annually; that is, one per week.

The Soviet delegation thinks that the principle of the development in stages of the "Open Skies" regime also could be used to resolve the problem of selecting observation apparatus. In the first stage, this could include, in particular, optic and electron-optic equipment. During the second stage, the question of expanding the selection of apparatus by including infrared sensors could be examined.

Center Established To Finance Troop Withdrawal

*LD1311120291 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1105 GMT 13 Nov 91*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 13 Nov (TASS)—The Union Ministry of Defense intends to cover its expenses for troop withdrawal from Eastern Europe and Mongolia, for their housing in the country, and for the conversion of military production by selling off movable and immovable Army property. A commercial center is being set up for this purpose, which will be a holding company operating on the principles of paying for itself and self-financing, a high-ranking representative of the USSR Ministry of Defense stated to the TASS correspondent today.

The property in Eastern Europe and Mongolia, as well as on the country's territory, has "great potential," Lieutenant General Vyacheslav Gorokhov, who deals with armaments issues, reported.

He did not make any forecasts about possible reactions to setting up the center on the part of the sovereign republics that have declared the Army property deployed on their territory to be their own property.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Defense Minister Interviewed on Arms Reduction

*OW1511181291 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1715 GMT 15 Nov 91*

[Report by Mikhail Mayorov and Igor Porshnev from "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] We have scrutinized George Bush's suggestions on the reduction of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons

and have gone one step beyond the American plan, said Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov in an exclusive interview with DP [Diplomatic Panorama].

In anticipation of the next round of talks on the US and Soviet initiatives, scheduled to take place in Washington on November 25-27, Mr Shaposhnikov said that Moscow's proposals on ground-based tactical nuclear weapons were identical with those of the US president.

But the USSR has more drastic plans regarding naval-based tactical nuclear weapons. According to President Bush's proposal, these weapons should be removed from ships, part of them should be scrapped and the other part mothballed. We, said Mr Shaposhnikov, suggest that all tactical nuclear weapons be removed—and that they should all be scrapped. We believe that the sea must be nuclear-free, emphasized the Soviet defense minister.

The USSR also wants larger reductions in strategic nuclear arms than the US. Moscow suggested a 50% cut in these, said the minister, while the US only wants 37%. This means, said the minister, that we want each party to keep an upper limit of 5,000 nuclear warheads, not 6,000 as the US suggests.

We also urged the US to sign a statement to the effect that it would not be the first to use nuclear arms, said Mr. Shaposhnikov. The USSR has already committed itself not to make the first nuclear strike.

We suggested an end to nuclear tests. For starters, the USSR has already declared a year-long moratorium on nuclear tests, said the minister.

So far as manpower is concerned, the US said it planned a 500,000 troop cut within the next five years. The Soviet Union said it planned a 700,000 troop reduction, said Mr. Shaposhnikov.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Environmental Legacy of Novaya Zemlya Test Site Scrutinized

Unsafe Testing Practices Recounted

*92WN0090A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 31 Oct 91 p 4*

[Article by V. Karkavtsev: "We Threatened More Than the Swedes: Novaya Zemlya Test Site Closed by Order of President Yeltsin"]

[Text] Last year I was about to fly from Arkhangelsk to Novaya Zemlya for a whole month. This happened as follows. "Maybe we will fly tomorrow," said USSR Deputy Minister of Defense, Yuriy Alekseyevich Yashin. My colleagues and I were in the editorial office in boots and sheepskin coats. We sat by the telephone and waited for the cherished hour. By dinner, it had been called off: The weather was bad again. The next day everything repeated. Since at the time none of the

journalists had been on the nuclear archipelago yet, we kept our "deal" with the deputy minister strictly secret: Heaven forbid that other publications should catch wind of it. It was hardest of all to hide the boots and coats, since spring was already beginning in Arkhangelsk.

Colonel-General Yashin's month-long stay was explained simply: He was a candidate for people's deputy of Russia. It fell through in the elections all the same. So we were not waiting for the weather, since special airplanes flew repeatedly to Novaya Zemlya over this month. After Yuriy Alekseyevich had returned to Moscow, it was unexpectedly discovered that he had promised to show the secret archipelago to at least ten other Arkhangelsk newspapers.

For the deputy minister, head of the country's missile and space industry, Novaya Zemlya was a trump card. Still, he did not show it to the journalists, keeping it in his hand, as it was a question of fulfilling his aims to become a deputy. Now, a year and a half later, after some information on the nuclear test site has accumulated, it is clear why we were not taken there.

So, the Kazakhs stood up for Semipalatinsk. While nuclear warheads were exploded there, the Novaya Zemlya test site remained in the shadows, like some kind of inoffensive variant. To put it lightly, this is not quite so. We sent radiation into the stratosphere with our mightiest explosions in the air, thus tying the entire population of the Northern hemisphere with nuclear bonds. And here at home... In the summer of 1962 in polar Amderma, Gosgidromet registered a density of radioactive fallout, exceeding background values by a factor of 11,000.

I have always wanted to enliven the scattered information and inadequate figures about our feats in Novaya Zemlya with eyewitness accounts. Where are these people, are they alive, how do they feel? Silence. And then Anatoliy Pavlov, an associate at the "Morfizprivor" Institute in St. Petersburg and a "man from the epicenter," spoke for the first time in CHAS PIK. In 1958 he was serving his term in the post of cypher clerk and in breaks between classifying cheerful communiques to the party and government about the successful tests, he observed these very same tests in direct proximity.

"The entire time of service, not once did I ever see either protective cloaks, or dosimeters. One day a radioactive cloud passed through Belushye toward Amderma. For several days the garrison went about in gas masks and ate dry rations. It was forbidden to take water from the lakes. After serving, I said that I had served on a minesweeper. That is what they taught us to say. Not long ago, I corresponded with many people from Novaya Zemlya. Some have died, and many of them have had poor family relations: They have divorced, taken to drink, or fallen seriously ill. At the end of 1970, it was discovered that I had skin cancer. When they asked at the oncological institute whether it had to do with radioactive substances, I was forced to answer 'no.'

Perhaps Anatoliy Pavlov is unfamiliar with the speech by V. Mikhaylov, deputy minister of nuclear power engineering and industry, at a session of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet in June of this year. Professor Mikhaylov talked about new ministerial programs, in which "special attention will be devoted to revealing the people who have suffered from the atmospheric nuclear tests of 1949-1962." The assurance that premier V. Pavlov was ready to support these programs personally also inspired optimism. All very well, it seems, except that many of these people will have to be "revealed" via funeral bureaus.

The ministerial "special attention" is supposedly being applied to the small peoples, who have lived along the shores of the Arctic Ocean since time immemorial. In any case, today Moscow is already prepared to issue recommendations on what they should eat and when. Scientists from the VPK have calculated, for instance, that the half-life of cesium from the body of a Northern reindeer is 20 days. Why have they done this? The formula is simple. Lichen grows on the tundra. It grows for a long time, accumulating radiation within itself. However, the silly reindeer do not understand this and eat lichen exclusively all winter. Summer comes and grasses grow, which simply do not manage to collect radioactive contamination in a month or so. So, having roamed about the grass, the reindeer are free of cesium by autumn: Its concentration drops by a factor of 5-10. Then, the military specialists claim, it is possible to eat reindeer meat. However, forgive me for asking an immodest question: What are the native peoples supposed to eat the rest of the year? After all, the lake fish, ptarmigans, and even the snow with which the reindeer herders fill their pots and teakettles, concentrate the test site's terrible energy within themselves.

Statistics show that oncological mortality among the native Northern peoples is higher than on the average in the country by a factor of two. Cancer of the esophagus is encountered more often here by a factor of 15-20. Essentially, the 70,000 people settled along the shore are on the verge of dying out. The sad international competition to accumulate radioactive substances is as follows: The content of strontium-90 in the bodies of our reindeer herders exceeds the norm by a factor of 20-40.

Our nuclear experts love to compare the Novaya Zemlya test site to Nevada. Over there, they say, they have only 100 kilometers to Las Vegas, but here it is more than 1,000 to Arkhangelsk. And they have soil, while we have rock. However, here is a warning from Finland's MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]: "The shock wave of a nuclear explosion may lead to the appearance of cracks in the island's slate layers, through which the emission of radioactive substances into the atmosphere may be possible."

The dialogue that sprang up at a meeting of experts from Finland and the USSR, held in Moscow this February, seems noteworthy to me in the sense of "suitability or unsuitability." Having heard our experts' statement to

the effect that the seismic situation at Novaya Zemlya is favorable, the Finnish representative Tapio Ryutoma remarked:

"The natural seismicity here from 1977 to 1986 appeared in 4 earthquakes rating from 4.6 to 6.5 points on the Richter scale."

Obviously not expecting such details, our deputy minister B. Mikhaylov tried to put a stop to the question:

"I found out about this for the first time in your report... Give us the data, we will take a look."

They looked. In an April report at an international symposium in Ottawa they were forced to verify: Yes, Novaya Zemlya does shake. And it does so fairly significantly: 4.4 points were recorded here on 1 August 1986.

The military is in no rush to give away its secrets. Let us recall last year's "Greenpeace" breach, when four bold spirits landed on the archipelago and studied a deserted test shaft. Their dosimeters at that time showed a hundred-fold excess of radiation level over the background value. Their eyes beheld ugly mountains of trash, left by the tests. The military does not want to show us such a Novaya Zemlya.

The military does not like it when someone else accomplishes a breach. Yet, to give them their due, they do know how to neutralize them. Last year's plan by the Arkhangelsk Oblast Soviet to restore soviet power on Novaya Zemlya, eliminated there since 1954, was also an attempt at such a breach. I remember the precise decisions of that oblast session: "We should finish the organization of an island soviet of people's deputies before 1 May 1991..."

The plans were smashed over the granite hardness of the VPK [military-industrial complex].

Incidentally, even a joint trip to the archipelago on O. Baklanov's airplane was undertaken. The deputy chairman of the oblast soviet, Viktor Shiryayev, recalls it unwillingly:

"They resolved their business there, and looked at us as though we were bugs. They did not even let me come near the government salon."

A representative of soviet power, who was on territory subordinate to him, is saying this...

Finally, about moratoriums: They are various, it turns out. Judge by the stern letter sent to the editors of Arkhangelsk newspapers: "We deem it necessary to inform you that RSFSR VS member A.H. Butorin can examine these issues (about the Novaya Zemlya test site—V.K.) more responsibly and objectively than USSR and RSFSR deputies... We insistently request that you abstain from publishing materials, whose authors do not have objective information with regard to the Northern test site. We ask that you send these materials for the examination of A.N. Butorin, who has all the necessary

information, making it possible... to determine the expediency of their publication." This friendly note was signed by the two big leaders of nuclear affairs, V. Mikhaylov and G. Zolotukhin.

My remarks, I fear, might not go through said expert analysis.

Effects to Last 5600 Years

92WN0090B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 31 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by V. Yakimets, candidate of technical sciences, presidential advisor, "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" Movement: "I'll Show You!" Khrushchev Shouted at the UN. And Soon He Did—With 58 Megatons"]

The Novaya Zemlya test site, given a "voice" in 1955, starting with the 58-ton bomb, carried on the tradition of Semipalatinsk. The overwhelming majority of the USSR's powerful, open nuclear tests were performed precisely here. There was a massive development of second-generation, thermonuclear (hydrogen bomb) weapons.

On 30 October 1961, the planet's atmosphere received the most terrible blow in the entire history of nuclear tests from a single nuclear explosion, the full power of which is estimated at 58 megatons.

The total power of explosions in the atmosphere over Novaya Zemlya in 8 months of 1961-62 was about 300 megatons, which surpasses the sum total power of all atmospheric tests by all other nuclear powers during the period of above-ground explosions from 1945 to 1980.

The power of a series of 12 explosions in October 1961 and a series of 10 explosions in September 1962, each in itself, was almost equal to the power of all atmospheric explosions performed by the U.S. over the entire period of open-air tests from 1945 to 1963...

After the treaty forbidding tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space was concluded in 1963, data were published in the United States on all open nuclear explosions.

To this day, we do not have complete information at our disposal about the open explosions, produced in our country from 1949 to 1962 at Novaya Zemlya and in Kazakhstan.

As a result of an analysis, done by the UN Scientific Committee on the Effect of Nuclear Radiation, of the consequences of all atmospheric explosions, it was ascertained that these explosions have created a global radiation burden on the population of the Earth, equal to four annual norms of the natural background or about 30 million man-Sieverts (20 million man-Sieverts causes one fatality as a consequence of oncological disease). In other words, more than a million lives have already been laid on the nuclear altar of the "cold" war as a result of tests in the atmosphere.

About 90 percent of the overall radiation background during above-ground tests of a thermonuclear weapon is caused precisely by the radioactive isotope carbon-14, and only about one percent—by the more frequently mentioned cesium-137 and strontium-90... Yet this means that the basic consequences to the health of the Earth's population will manifest over the course of the next 5,600 years. A. Sakharov was the first to speak of this. The June 1958 issue of *ATOMNAYA ENERGIYA*, published at that time for restricted circulation, contained his article on the possible consequences of the accumulation of radioactive carbon in the biosphere as a result of atmospheric explosions. By Sakharov's calculations, an atmospheric explosion of one megaton causes the death of about 10,000 of our descendants over 5,000 years from various cancerous diseases and disturbances of the genetic and defensive immune systems of an organism. A.D. Sakharov brought these estimates of his, as well as a number of other arguments for the complete cessation of nuclear tests, to the attention of N.S. Khrushchev, but was turned down.

Does this mean that not only the physicists and specialists, who prepared the tests in 1961-62, knew about the fatal consequences of open tests? One wonders how events would have turned out, if Sakharov's estimates had appeared in the world press in time? Perhaps the insane eight-month nuclear bacchanalia might have been stopped, before it ever began?

Further Restrictions on Testing Urged

924P0037A Moscow *PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK*
in Russian No 45, Nov 91

[Article by Col P. Vladimirov, candidate of sciences:
"Trial by Moratorium"]

[Text] In content M. S. Gorbachev's October statement not only proved adequate to G. Bush's September initiative but even went further in terms of a number of its proposals. In particular, one such strong move was the Soviet Union's introduction of a unilateral moratorium (incidentally, now the second one) on the conduct of nuclear weapons tests for one year. At the same time, the USSR president expressed the hope that other nuclear powers would follow our example. The path has thereby been opened to a speedy and complete cessation of nuclear testing.

However, in responding to it, U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney, upon arrival in Italy for the session of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, stated that the United States does not intend to impose a ban on nuclear weapons tests. His main argument for not doing so was that the United States cannot, at such an uneasy time, abandon its policy of "nuclear deterrence," and that the testing of nuclear devices furthers U.S. progress in this area. There you have it, terse and weighty.

Well, such a conclusion put a logical period after the chain of events that had preceded M. S. Gorbachev's proposal and R. Cheney's response to it. And the events

that took place were significant ones. Now it is clear that the Soviet and American sides taking part in them had different ideas as to the ultimate goal of the process of limiting nuclear tests and of its effect on national and world security. Otherwise a consensus would have been found long ago. Do you want to check this out? Then let's turn some pages of history.

After the 1963 signing in Moscow of the Treaty Banning Tests of Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere and Space and Under Water, the next major step forward in this area was the Treaty Limiting Underground Tests of Nuclear Weapons, signed by the USSR and the United States in 1974. It was further developed in the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, signed in 1976. However, neither treaty was ratified. There was one reason for that—the verification measures provided in these documents turned out to be "inadequate," in the American side's opinion.

In 1980 the United States broke off trilateral negotiations (with the participation of Great Britain), which were nearing conclusion, on the complete and general banning of nuclear weapons tests.

On 6 August 1985 the Soviet Union declared its first unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, which stayed in effect until February 1987. The United States did not follow our example, and during that period it conducted 26 nuclear tests (four of them were not reported).

Altogether, the USSR has conducted 716 nuclear explosions, including 501 underground, since the conclusion of the 1963 treaty, and the United States has conducted about 1,090 and 760, respectively.

In all honesty, the first Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing was not altogether ignored. To a certain extent it stimulated the beginning of the negotiations on limiting and terminating nuclear testing that opened in November 1987 in Geneva. The Soviet and American sides agreed to come to agreement at them on effective verification measures that would permit ratification of the 1974 treaty between the USSR and the United States limiting underground nuclear weapons tests and the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. At the same time, it was proposed to begin working out subsequent interim limitations on nuclear testing along the road toward the ultimate goal of ending them completely. In this connection the American side stated that following ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties the United States would continue the negotiating process that had begun.

Within the context of these negotiations, in order to test the effectiveness of the methods proposed by the sides for determining the yield of nuclear explosions—the remote seismic method and the hydrodynamic method—a joint verification experiment was conducted in August-September 1988 on the test ranges in Nevada and near Semipalatinsk. As a result, enough information was obtained to assess the practical applicability of the

tested verification methods. Relying on it, in September 1989 in Wyoming the sides agreed to use both the hydrodynamic verification method and seismic units on the territory of the side being verified for all nuclear tests exceeding 50 kilotons, and also agreed on the right to conduct on-site inspections to verify tests with yields of under 35 kilotons.

However, despite the progress made in the course of negotiations, the U.S. State Department made a statement in January 1990 that the United States had "made a decision to postpone further negotiations on the limitation of nuclear testing after the two treaties presently being discussed between Moscow and Washington are ratified by the Senate." An explanatory piece for journalists passed out by the White House noted that "a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a long-range U.S. goal." But a ban on such tests "must be viewed in the context of the period in which the United States will not have to depend on nuclear deterrence...and in which broad, thorough and effectively verifiable arms limitations are achieved, along with substantially improved monitoring possibilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and greater balance in conventional forces." Thus, the roots of R. Cheney's response to M. S. Gorbachev's proposal go back to this statement by the U.S. State Department.

In September 1990 the U.S. Senate unanimously voted to ratify the 1974 and 1976 treaties and the protocols to them, stipulating in the process, in a resolution on the subject, the need for guarantees that the United States retained the potential for "reliable nuclear deterrence." Such guarantees included the future implementation of effective programs of underground nuclear tests in accordance with the treaty limitations and for the purposes of "improving corresponding knowledge and weapons," as well as the retention of the ability to resume activities banned by the treaty in the area of nuclear tests in the event that the United States should find itself "no longer bound by circumstances to observe them."

During hearings on ratification of the treaties, representatives of the administration emphasized their support of a "reasonable" program of nuclear testing of that type of weapon as a means of deterrence. In that context they justified their position primarily by citing the increased demands under the conditions of a reduced threat of nuclear war for the safety of the storage and the reliability of the United States' nuclear arsenal, and also the need to test subsequent generations of nuclear systems (the SREM-T and SREM-2 air-to-surface missiles, and the B-90 bomb).

This has been a survey of the steps taken by the Soviet Union and the United States in the area of the limitation and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. Regardless of the relatively discouraging results, I would not want to say that the idea of a complete nuclear test ban has no future. To the contrary, in my opinion the negotiating process in this area will be resumed and, one

would like to believe, fairly soon. In this connection a certain role will be played by our second moratorium on nuclear testing.

In these negotiations it might be possible, for a start, to agree on a substantial reduction in the number of nuclear tests, and also on advance notification of each of them for the purposes of carrying out on-site verification to ensure the observance of agreed-upon limitations. A reduction in the number of nuclear tests could prevent the attainment of advantages as the result of conducting an intensive program of testing third-generation nuclear weapons, as well as of completely new types of weapons, such as the x-ray laser. The most effective approach to the problem of limiting nuclear tests would be a radical reduction of the "threshold" yield to one kiloton, and of the number of allowed nuclear tests to one or two a year. If the realization of such restrictive measures is not achieved, the process of nuclear tests will continue to fuel the arms race and stimulate military developments of a destabilizing nature.

Kazakh Opposition to Nuclear Testing Hit

924P0033A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Nov 91 p 8

[Sergey Skorokhodov report: "The Test Site. By Ukase of the President of Kazakhstan the Nuclear Test Site Has Been Evicted From Semipalatinsk to Russia"]

[Text] Alma-Ata City—The road there is three hours under a scorching sun across the steppe, where the eye can follow the asphalt strip clear to the horizon and no village or hamlet is passed. All there is is a branch line of the railroad running alongside, empty as the steppe itself. The rare building, almost on the horizon, seems ghostly, incidental, as if picked up from somewhere and tossed there by some whim of fate, by mistake. So we come to the Kurchatov General Reception Point, a city that appears on no map, the holy of holies of the country's military-industrial complex.

We arrive at night. Hundreds of electric lights are shining, peering into the streets. The city rises up out of the darkness as if emerging from the veil of secrecy that surrounds it.

Before setting out on the journey over the test site, a few words about the Nevada-Semipalatinsk anti-nuclear movement, which had gathered correspondents from dozens of countries in Kurchatov.

It is believed that the impetus for its creation was the emission of radioactive gases following the testing of a nuclear device on 12 February 1989. However, this fact would not have brought any of the inhabitants living near the test site into the movement had there not already been reasons that were much more weighty.

"For 10 years I was a pilot with medical aviation, and I know the region like the back of my hand. The horrible wretchedness of existence, a traditional way of life

scarcely touched by civilization, and the lack of any kind of reasonable public health services are the real causes of the people's accumulated anger. Anyone who has been in those remote mountain villages or the shepherds' winter shelters will immediately know what I mean."

He is a military pilot, deputy of the Kurchatov City Soviet, Major Ivan Novikov. He was born in Semipalatinsk and for seven years has been serving at the test site, and he believes that the government, which has destroyed the economy of the republic and drowned it in the mismanagement of the promised communist future, has now cunningly been using the test site, making it responsible for its own transgressions.

It was not difficult to do that. The test site covers 18,000 square kilometers, taken from the cattle breeders. Cyprus could fit into it easily twice over, so could Israel and Luxembourg together. Plus the city, with its almost barrack like cleanliness, with heated bathrooms and stores from the Ministry of Defense, and from which the indigenous inhabitants are banned. Finally, the absolute majority of the population of Kurchatov is Russian. All of this has prepared the ground for and fostered the sense of grievance and sown enmity. And so, while officially proclaimed as anti-nuclear, the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement has been directed not so much against nuclear testing but rather against the test site in general. Against its inhabitants, mostly scientific people, and its soldiers and generals, even now its excess of coupons, and its explosions. And so, after enduring the fiasco in Alma-Ata in the 1989 election campaign, the well-known Russian-speaking poet Olzhas Suleymanov saddled up his horse. Promising to shut down the test site, he set off on it for the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Now the test site has been shut down. And the question that arises is this: What will the Nevada activists do here now, after Nazarbayev's ukase? "Now we come here as victors." This phrase, which I heard on the first evening, provides the key to understanding all the magnificent activity that started in Kurchatov and two days later moved to Semipalatinsk. A little "dancing on the grave," a little show of strength, a little throwing of dust into the eyes of foreign correspondents, who have come to believe seriously that the genius of Olzhas is capable of shutting down a nuclear test site.

Who will explain to them that by August of this year an ukase of the president of the country had been drawn up, halting nuclear testing, along with a corresponding government decision that defined ways to use the Union's largest scientific and technical base and allocated R5 billion to do it? Well no one, because Nevada has had nothing to do with it.

The two days at Kurchatov were the same. In the morning the buses raised dust across the steppe, and returned only at nightfall. We visited borehole No. 1365, notable because it was the last one used for an explosion at the site. The radiation meter on the concrete lid read a peaceful 12 microroentgens. For the site experts it was

the best proof of the groundless nature of the charges that since 1963, when atmospheric and above-ground testing was banned, they have been continuing a "radiation war" against the inhabitants of the surrounding villages. But it was not so! I remember the inexpressible despair of the victims of the nuclear testing who gathered at a conference and attacked the already fallen stronghold. Eleven relatives suffering from oncological diseases buried M. Iskakov. Until his family moved to Kherson Oblast, the children of Gavrilov, former worker at the test site, were sick. A dwarf with no arms, K. Kayukov, was born and, "thanks to the people's president Olzhas Suleymanov," became an artist.

The conference presidium was almost empty, but all the new witnesses and victims went to the dais in order to cast their own stone. They were ready to pour out all their bile on the test site for their failed lives, for the sicknesses and deaths of their near and dear. For them the test site was the whole reason, it was to blame for everything.

As I leaf through my notebook I find the opinion of the chief medical officer at the Semipalatinsk interblast oncological outpatient department, A. Kolker:

"We cannot establish any direct link between the increased incidence of disease and the nuclear explosions. However, the scientists and doctors know that even low doses of radiation can have a global effect on biological organisms... The incidence of blood diseases is stubbornly rising. But it is not only radiation, but also the condition of the environment that is responsible for the leukemia. All these nitrates and pesticides and fungicides and so forth that are now entering our bodies."

But now, the sensation. It is the original mother of all the noisy activity that was with truly eastern magnificence called "Five minus One. Global Destruction" by the international conference. It embodies the spirit of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement itself, which places itself in the service of shutting down the nuclear test site in Kazakhstan. Is this not a sensation—by the will of the people (read "will of the movement") a test site has been shut down, for the first time in history, perhaps in the world!

Thus, before a hundred foreign journalists in Semipalatinsk a certain Zhakiya Akhmetov, a Kazakh aged 74, stood up. He served in a special service in units 46149 and 93833, and on 29 August 1949, on the day that the first atomic bomb was exploded, he became, to use his own words, "a laboratory rabbit" for the Soviet generals.

"Toward six o'clock, after dinner," Akhmetov related, "we 50 enlisted men were paraded and given dark glasses. On the command we climbed into a trench about three meters deep, which we had dug ourselves. I saw a gray dog there, and above that a rabbit with six of its young. The officers left, and after some time the bomb fell somewhere above. It seemed to be quite close, 50 or 100 meters. We were prone. An hour later, the command came—all out! We climbed out and formed ranks. They

collected our dark glasses; there were only 49. I do not know where the other pair went. We did not look at the crater. I remember only that the ground was white..."

God, what the foreign journalists must have written in their notebooks! But how should we look at this fact: If the explosion did not occur after noon but in the morning, at 0700 hours, if not 50 meters but even 250 meters from the crater the concrete was melted and torn out of its footings in some horror and hurled into the sky; I do not know. But I am sure that while the activists in the movement look for new witnesses and victims of radiation, and Colonel Petrushenko (a USSR People's deputy, incidentally) in the full view of the public bathes in the lake formed in the crater of the last nuclear explosion while on the bank the radiation meter reads only 10 microroentgens, both the former and the latter remain pawns in some big political game going on inside the republic.

Explosions are explosions. But the test site is still three unique reactors. And finally, there are 17,000 people, mostly scientists and highly skilled experts, working in Kurchatov on a whole series of serious problems. And today each family lives under constant stress, while the 30th unemployed person has been registered in the city soviet.

This is of little concern to the members of the movement. But the Russians are very concerned. And while the victors were drinking with the foreigners, on the third floor of the Irtysh Hotel a new conference was under way for the Novaya Zemlya people.

"Essentially the entire test program is being transferred to Novaya Zemlya." That is what USSR People's Deputy A. Yemelyanov thinks. "They are already doing geological survey work there at a new site. However, at the northern test site the cost increases by an order of magnitude for each explosion. Moreover, there are zones there where already today the radiation level is up to 1 Roentgen an hour.. And the opinion also exists that the archipelago is in general incapable of handling such a burden..."

Only a very naive person can suggest that by closing the test site here in the country we will achieve the same among all the nuclear powers, or stop the other two dozen countries that are trying to acquire nuclear weapons. From this viewpoint we should remember what the chief at the test site, Lieutenant General A. Ilyenko, said:

"We were the first to destroy capitalism. We were the first to destroy the churches. We did many things for the first time. And we sincerely and bitterly regret it now. The struggle to destroy nuclear weapons is a noble cause. But we must all reach the nonnuclear finishing line together, simultaneously."

Yes, the test site is a heavy burden. And today it has been simpler to unload it on Russia and the Russians.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Problems of Destruction of Chemical Weapons

92UM0114A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 31 Oct 91 p 3

[Interview with Chief of a directorate of the Chemical Troops, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Major-General Igor Borisovich Yevstafyev by Vladimir Shchedrin: "Yellow Smoke of the Homeland: Will We Rid Ourselves of It in the New Century?"]

[Text] According to current calculations, the state program for destruction of chemical weapons in the USSR will cost 10 billion rubles. Of course, it is not only an issue of money. We need to create an entire series of industrial facilities and train thousands of skilled specialists. We need laws, procedures, and time. The mountains of chemical projectiles and bombs have been accumulated for nearly a century and they have not only been accumulated in our country. We will permit the experts to speak. Our interlocutor is Chief of a Chemical Troops directorate, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Major-General Igor Yevstafyev.

[Yevstafyev] We never were monopolists in chemical weapons. But here is the paradox: as of today, three states—the USSR, United States, and Iraq—have officially announced that they have reserves of these weapons and facilities for their production. It would be too naive to draw a line under this list. According to various assessments, another nearly 20 states are potential possessors of military toxic substances. Among them, we can legitimately include those countries which have production facilities or which manifest interest in the acquisition of semifinished products or technologies for chemical weapons production. And this is still not all of them. "Old" Second World War-vintage chemical weapons have remained on the territory of a number of countries. This is also a reality.

[Shchedrin] Today, who is the "champion" in reserves of the "Poison Death"?

[Yevstafyev] The Soviet Union has 40,000 tons. The United States' reserves total 30,000 tons. Iraq has less, although we still do not have a precise figure.

[Shchedrin] These reserves in our country increase annually, if not daily...

[Yevstafyev] Fortunately, no. First of all, a Soviet-American agreement exists that was signed by the presidents of both countries on June 1, 1990. In accordance with it, the parties have assumed the obligation to cease production of chemical weapons. We had actually already done this in 1987. Since that time, not one projectile or bomb containing the corresponding chemical charge has been produced. The Americans had not produced chemical weapons from 1969 through 1987.

Since 1987, binary weapons have been produced in the United States but only until the previously mentioned agreement was signed. So, the American and Soviet arsenals are not being increased.

[Shchedrin] Igor Borisovich, your assurances are sufficient for me personally. But it is possible that incredulous readers will be found. In this regard, let us talk about monitoring and the exchange of data in this sphere. How effectively does this system operate?

[Yevstafyev] The problem of monitoring can be tentatively divided into two aspects: national and international. International monitoring is a mandatory block of any interstate agreement. We have become convinced in practice that we can insure monitoring—naturally, under the condition of good will by the partners and high training of national specialists. However, international monitoring will not provide 100 percent effectiveness. We need national monitoring, that is, states' strict execution of their obligations. On the whole, the primary portion of the multilateral convention, which has been worked on for 20 years, has been devoted to the issues of monitoring. Yes, the time period is more than significant. But obviously only right now has the situation developed when participants in the negotiating process have "matured" in order to conclude this colossal work. The presidents of the USSR and United States have designated compromise versions on the majority of unresolved issues and they have also expressed the need for the most rapid conclusion of the talks. I think that the recent war in the Middle East, which demonstrated a serious threat as a result of the possible utilization of this type of weapon, served as the latest impulse.

[Shchedrin] Igor Borisovich, at the beginning of the conversation, we were talking about a nearly astronomical figure—R10 billion—needed to destroy all reserves of toxic substances in our country. And, in fact, how should we destroy chemical projectiles and bombs?

[Yevstafyev] Previously, a total of two methods existed: dump them in the oceans or incinerate them in the open air. The latter method is not only unacceptable but it is also banned today. The draft convention also prohibits dumping them in the ocean. Although, it seems to me as a scientist that the method of dumping them in the oceans appears to be ecologically safe.

[Shchedrin] How do we need to understand this?

[Yevstafyev] We need to do everything rationally. The burial of radioactive wastes by dumping them in the ocean continues until today and is very widely utilized throughout the world. We have nevertheless once and for all rejected the idea of dumping chemical weapons into the ocean. The method of destroying them using a nuclear detonation also exists. At one time, the American side was also examining this possibility. We are conducting research in this area but the question is based on the nuclear explosion itself: where do we conduct it? In the United States, the primary method is direct incineration of toxic substances with total screening of

all combustion components. In a more simplified manner, the technology is such: the chemical munition is unsealed and the toxic substance is pumped out and burned in a special incinerator at high temperature with the guaranteed screening of exhaust gases. Work is being conducted on this method, for example, on Johnson Atoll in the Hawaiian Islands. Our technology is differentiated only by the presence of one additional stage. After unsealing the munition, we carry out neutralization of the toxic substance by mixing the chemical "filling" with a special degasifier. The mass that has been formed is shipped for incineration. From our point of view, this method is safer. However, at the present in our country we have practically not verified the most ecologically complex stage on an industrial scale—incineration of the reaction masses.

[Shchedrin] Today, can we frankly state: stores of munitions with toxic substances exist on the territories of which republics?

[Yevstafyev] Only on the territory of Russia.

[Shchedrin] Consequently, the primary burden of work for the destruction of chemical weapons in our country lies primarily on Russia's shoulders?

[Yevstafyev] In the current situation—absolutely. And to our great regret there are still not enough good contacts on this problem between the USSR Ministry of Defense and Russia's highest organs of power. There is total mutual understanding with the autonomous republics but at Russia's highest level—alas.... I am far from the thought that they do not want to or cannot understand us, the military experts. I think that the matter is simply the Russian Government's lack of information. But this problem is colossal in its importance and requires a prolonged period of time for its resolution.

[Shchedrin] Can you talk about the time periods today?

[Yevstafyev] According to today's assessments, work may be completed on coordinating the text of the multilateral convention at the talks in Geneva in 1992. In this case, it can be opened for signature in 1993 and it will enter into force in 1994-1995, that is, after all states have signed it whose participation in the convention is necessary. The draft stipulates that all reserves of chemical weapons must be destroyed within 10 years of the convention entering into force.

[Shchedrin] According to the time periods, does it turn out that we will also be lugging toxic substances around in the new century?

[Yevstafyev] Everything depends on us. The destruction of chemical weapons—is not a secondary task. It is no less important than nuclear disarmament. But we have really attained such impressive results in this area in such a short period of time! Why can we not also do it here?

Signing of CW Agreement With U.S. Denied

*PM0811094991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Nov 91 First Edition p 6*

[Unattributed report: "The Report Does Not Correspond to Reality"]

[Text] Professor I. Yevstafyev, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Chemical Troops Chief's Directorate [nachalnik upravleniya nachalnika khimicheskikh voysk], refuted a report published in yesterday's edition of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and stated that "O. Bedula's remarks published 5 November 1991 in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the alleged signing of a treaty between U.S. specialists and the USSR Ministry of Defense Chemical Troops Chief's Directorate on the question of building a terminal for the dismantling [rassnarazheniye] of chemical munitions in the Udmurt Republic does not have any real basis and does not correspond to reality. No talks are being or have ever been held on this question with U.S. specialists."

General on Chemical Disarmament Cooperation

*LD1211193491 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 0000 GMT 12 Nov 91*

[Interview with General I.B. Yevstafyev, Chemical Troops, by unidentified station reporter; place and date not given—recorded; Yevstafyev speaks in Russian with superimposed English translation]

[Text] [Announcer] At the talks in the Kremlin last week, the Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachyov, offered the American undersecretary for defense, Mr. Donald Atwood, to unite efforts for destroying chemical weapons. Asked to comment on this proposal, chief of the General Staff for Chemical Troops [as heard], General Yevstafyev, told this:

[Yevstafyev] In recent years the two countries actively cooperate in destroying chemical weapons through exchanges of experience and know-how. We have agreed with the American colleagues matters relating to sufficient security and risk-expulsion [as heard], highest permissible concentration, and discharge volumes. American experts visited a number of Soviet objects and Soviet experts visited an American object at the Johnston Atoll.

[Reporter] What does General Yevstafyev think are the results of these exchanges?

[Yevstafyev] I must say bilateral cooperation with American experts has been useful for our scientists, especially in the areas of risk assessment and production safety. Our side was lagging in that area and is still behind.

[Reporter] What is the general's opinion of the prospects for Soviet-American cooperation in chemical disarmament?

[Yevstafyev] Concrete steps should follow, such as purchases of the American technology. During our visit to

the United States, we realized that the American industry is much better equipped to solve the problem of discharge purification. In 1990 and 1991, a number of American firms and state organizations offered us on a commercial basis individual elements of technologies and even turnkey projects for destroying chemical weapons. The offers were interesting, but the matter is we cannot solve the problems on funding these projects, currency payments and the like. All these problems are listed in the state program for chemical disarmament submitted to the government.

Official on Inquiry Into 1979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax Event

*92400030A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 45, 13 Nov 91 p 2*

[Report by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent for the Urals Natalya Zenova, under the rubric "Continuing a Topic": "Once Again on 'Military Secrets'"]

[Text] Yekaterinburg—LITERATURNAYA GAZETA was first in the country to conduct an independent investigation on the causes of the 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk. We maintained that this calamity took place not because of consumption of "infested meat," as the official version stated, but after an emergency discharge of substances related to biological warfare ("Military Secrets," LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, No. 34, 1990).

This topic was continued in one more article ("Military Secrets, Part II," LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, No. 39, 1991), which provided new arguments supporting the same conclusion.

On the basis of this newspaper's investigation, a deputy's inquiry was sent to the president of Russia. Boris Yeltsin assigned the handling of this problem, which produced serious international reverberations, to Aleksey Yablokov, state adviser on ecology and health care, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

This is what A. Yablokov told our correspondent:

"I will see to it that this matter is taken to its logical conclusion. The first step, which we have already taken, was to contact the KGB—let them dig into their archives and officially reply: "yes" or "no." If "yes," if the military admits fault, then the issue is resolved in principle, and one of the main tasks that remains is to get more precise figures on the number of families that perished, and to determine the amount of monetary compensation. If "no," then a government commission will be created on the basis of the argued conclusions reached by the press.

"However, I would like to state right now, before the investigation of the Sverdlovsk emergency comes to an

end: Our parliament should adopt a law that will make the development, production, and storage of biological weapons a criminal offense. A law of this kind was adopted in the United States last year. Also, this crime should be put in the category of those without a statute of limitations—that is, a crime against humanity.”

Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak: Suspicions of BW Research

924P0036B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 20 Nov 91 p 4

[Report by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent V. Chelikov: “Plague in the Backyard: Has the USSR Stopped Developing Bacteriological Weapons?”]

[Text] Yekaterinburg—KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has already reported more than once that Yekaterinburg students sent to harvest potatoes in the Krasnoufimsk Rayon are catching a strange disease. The first harvesting brigade ended up in a hospital more than three years ago, and the causes are still not clear. Then the illness spread beyond students and beyond Krasnoufimsk. Among the various explanations offered for the mysterious illness are suggestions that perhaps the students were subjected to the effects of either chemical or bacteriological weapons. Especially considering that there already is such a precedent—the still unsolved outbreak of anthrax in 1979.

On 4 April 1979, Sverdlovsk emergency center started receiving the first calls. They were coming from the same area, and the symptoms described were the same: high—up to 41 degrees [Celsius]—fever, coughing, vomiting. Soon the departments of City Hospital No. 24 were filled to capacity and patients were being taken to the neighboring hospital, No. 20.

The initial diagnosis pronounced in the hospital was pneumonia. It was being updated; tests were being done. By evening it became clear, however, that the diagnosis was wrong—most patients were dying. They died suddenly, talking to the doctors succinctly and lucidly only minutes before death.

The next day a Voice of America broadcast said that in violation of the 1972 convention, the Soviet Union was developing bacteriological weapons. The proof—the discharge of an anthrax strain at Military Base 19 in Sverdlovsk, as a result of which hundreds of people had already died and all of Sverdlovsk would soon be a dead city.

A.N. Solovyev, first deputy director of the Sverdlovsk city health services department, who was in the midst of the events from the very first day, maintains that at the time VOA broadcast this information the medics did not have a precise diagnosis yet. Test results arrived much later and partially confirmed the information broadcast on the short wave: People were getting ill with, and dying of, anthrax.

I do not know whether the regime of secrecy in the Soviet Union caused more inconvenience for anybody than it caused for the Soviet Union itself. Still, at that time, during the last years of the Brezhnev era and on the eve of the Olympic Games, which are prohibited from being held in a country with especially dangerous diseases—including the “Siberian plague”—under the shadow of the military-industrial complex, this whole incident was put under such secrecy that the city was immediately rife with the most incredible rumors.

There were good reasons for that. It was markedly noticeable that the disease had struck the area located to the south of the military base. This was also the direction of the wind prior to the incident. People living nearby maintained that they saw the discharge in the form of a pink cloud that rose behind the high fence sometime between 1700 and 1800 hours the day before. There were rumors that there were uncountable corpses on the base itself, as well as next to it. It is indeed true that an almost entire shift from the ceramics plant that is located next to the military object was taken to the hospital. Rumors affected the medics, too: having received assurances from Base 19 that the military had nothing to do with the incident, they started responding to calls in plague-protection suits and gas masks. Relatives were refusing to take and bury the dead.

As a means of destruction, anthrax is one of the most effective. In its natural form, skin anthrax is most common. People contract it through contact with infected animals. In its intestinal and lung form, the mortality rate is 80 to 100 percent. The lung variety is most suitable for use as a weapon. The incubation period is very short—six to eight hours, death is instantaneous, and transmission from person to person is unlikely. The main problem is the means of dispersion and of subsequent cleanup, since in natural conditions the “Siberian plague” is not carried by air, but can remain in the soil for decades.

In 1979, the overwhelming majority of patients were dying from the lung variety, resulting in swift death.

To liquidate and to establish the cause of the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk, a government commission arrived; it was headed by a deputy minister of health, USSR Chief State Physician-Hygienist P.N. Burgasov.

A station was set up at Hospital No. 40; all patients even remotely suspected of having contracted “the Siberian plague” were brought there. For treatment, in addition to the usual medications, live anthrax vaccine was delivered from Tyumen. But since Russians have always believed that it is better to overdo than not do enough, a mass vaccination of the population was instituted.

More than 3,000 Sverdlovsk residents were vaccinated. Senior medical school students were drafted to go door-to-door and implement preventive measures. Some were dismissed from school for refusing to fulfill their physician's duty. Frightened by the panic, students were simply afraid to go into the nidus of infection, despite

knowing that the disease was not transmitted by human contact. Nobody was certain, however, that they were dealing with the same disease that was described in the textbooks.

The all-out immunization did play a certain positive role. However, in the words of the above mentioned Solov'ev, this positive is nullified by the death of seven people caused by the universal inoculation. During the autopsy on these people, in addition to the main virus, a virus from the vaccine was detected—which accelerated the illness and led to death. Aleksey Nikolayevich says that even then he spoke against the vaccination, went to the former first secretary of the former CPSU obkom [oblast committee] B. Yeltsin, and later wanted to write a dissertation under a disguised and soft title, "The Disadvantage of the Vaccine." The obkom dismissed his exhortations, and also advised him against writing a dissertation...

Two months later, the epidemic was over; according to official data, it took 64 lives. Sverdlovsk did not have a crematorium then, so they were buried in the clay soil of the Eastern Cemetery, chloride of lime was poured all around the burial site. Now this place is marked with a red cross on all city development maps, so that even many years later no work will be done here, lest death is released again.

The official version of the incident, published in the *ZHURNAL MICROBIOLOGII, EPIDEMIOLOGII, I IMMUNOBIOLOGII* (1980, No. 5) and signed by Professors I. Bezdenzhnykh and V. Nikiforov, blamed everything on private enterprise. Allegedly the farmers started the mass slaughter of infected cattle. That allegedly the meat, again on a mass scale, was being sold on the farmers market. Thus, in addition to everything, a class underpinning was put to the incident.

Actually, there was indeed infected meat. In this case the Sverdlovsk procuracy displayed an amazing perspicacity and operational swiftness. Having gone through the chain of persons selling and buying meat, it zeroed in on a man who had slaughtered a cow dying of the "Siberian plague." Two other cows belonging to the same owner turned out to be infected, too. The cow carcasses were burned, the man was investigated by the organs. Otherwise, no other mass slaughter or respective mass sales of meat was discovered. It was strange even to suppose that the farmers would suddenly start slaughtering their few remaining cows in the spring (!), and all of this went unnoticed by various watchdog services. But even had it indeed happened, the infected meat could not cause the lung variety of the "Siberian plague."

It seems that the government commission itself did not particularly believe in the version presented to it. Otherwise, why would Burgasov insist on treating affected areas from the air, washing roofs with a soapy solution and caustics, and laying asphalt (to cover contaminated

soil). All of this only reinforced the opinion of Sverdlovsk residents that blame should be laid on the emergency at Base 19. So what kind of a base was it?

I have in my possession the reply of former USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov to the inquiry from Deputy of Kravets of the Yekaterinburg City Soviet, dated 2 June 1990. The minister writes: "Said object in Sverdlovsk is a structural subunit of the Scientific-Research Institute of Microbiology of the USSR Ministry of Defense—the sector of military epidemiology. This institution is engaged in researching methods for anti-bacteriological protection of troops and the population; in particular, they are developing methods for disinfecting areas of habitation, military equipment, and armaments and facilities, as well as means of protecting people from biological aerosols and of rapid detection of harmful substances in the environment." Further on in the letter, D. Yazov mentions the official version of food contamination.

There is one more puzzle in the letter. Dmitriy Timofeyevich writes: "Pathogenic microorganisms are not used in the work of the sector." And three paragraphs later: "In developing vaccines, the institute's laboratories did not have in their possession the quantity of pathogenic material that could have caused the contamination of the environment and through that of the people." Do you not agree that there is quite a difference between "not used" and "not possessing such a quantity"?

For clarification, I went to the deputy chief for science of Base 19, candidate of technical sciences Colonel G. Arkhangel'skiy. He said that what they use in their work are mostly imitators of biological aerosols. Sometimes, however, and with great precautions, they use microdoses of pathogenic organisms. In 1979, the base was developing a vaccine against anthrax. They were not brought into the efforts to liquidate the outbreak. Despite the fact, said Col. Arkhangel'skiy, that at that time the base specialists could have provided substantial help to the city. Now they themselves would like to know what actually happened.

There are facts, however, that indicate that the base had nothing to do with the epidemic. For instance, the version of a weapon discharge (at least, in finished form) does not hold water. In 1979, over 500 were hospitalized, but only 64 died. Naturally, it simply does not make sense to make a weapon of such low effectiveness.

There could be the possibility of a discharge of an unfinished vaccine, specially activated for use as an effective antidote in combat conditions. But, first, are there ways to activate a vaccine? Second, and this is most important, why did the infection spread over such an enormous area, covering not only the vicinity of the base, but also the chemical machine building plant, the Elisavet settlement, and the oblast's Sysertskiy Rayon?

Thus, the cause of the outbreak is still not known. Only one thing can be said with certainty—a new epidemic of

anthrax could start in Yekaterinburg at any moment. The reason for that is the improper liquidation of the consequences of the 1979 epidemic. I want to remind that the anthrax bacillus may remain in the soil for decades. It is hard to eradicate it, even if the entire area is burned out. It will simply submerge several centimeters into the water and survive.

Perhaps, we should look into the recent past for the cause of the strange disease striking students in Krasnoufimsk fields?

The investigation continues.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Commentator Views DPRK Nuclear Issue

*SK1711124991 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1100 GMT 16 Nov 91*

[By station commentator Alekseyev from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] China is strongly against the presence of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said this at a news conference in Seoul.

He attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] conference. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stressed: At the same time, the issue of an emergency nuclear inspection of the DPRK should be settled only by negotiations. No force should be allowed.

Station commentator Alekseyev writes:

First, I would like to recall the essence of the issue. Pyongyang signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985. It is clearly stated in the treaty that all non-nuclear countries that have signed the treaty should place their nuclear facilities, if they have them, under international inspections.

As specified in the treaty, such non-nuclear countries are denied the right to attach any conditions to international inspection.

Regrettably, however, Pyongyang has avoided solving this issue. Despite the DPRK's argument, this has in a sense raised concerns in the international community.

Lately, the North Korean leaders have repeatedly stated that the DPRK is not engaged in developing nuclear weapons and that it has neither the intent nor the technological capability to do so.

Many countries regard, with reason, such unilateral statements as insufficient, under the present circumstances.

Meanwhile, realistic preconditions for achieving the plan to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone have been provided recently.

Let me remind you: Until now, Seoul has regarded all of Pyongyang's proposals concerning this as purely propagandistic tricks and instantly rejected them.

Now the situation has changed. On 8 November ROK President No Tae-u declared that his government calls for turning the ROK into a zone completely free of nuclear weapons. Even Washington knows such a stand. The United States has said that it was preparing to withdraw its nuclear weapons from the ROK.

I believe that Pyongyang, too, will take this situation into consideration and respond to such a measure, for only when the South and North guarantee it can the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone become a reality.

What remains to be done is to find a shortcut to the destination. Of course, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was right when he said that no attempt to settle this issue by force should be allowed.

The settlement of the issue needs to be accompanied by an attempt to take into consideration all nuances of the political situation on the Korean peninsula.

The experience acquired by the international community shows that the best way to solve this problem is through the negotiations among all the involved parties.

RSFSR Foreign Ministry Backs Korean NFZ

*92P50046B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Nov 91 p 1*

[Item Under the rubric "News": "A Good Idea"]

[Text] "The idea of turning the Korean peninsula into a zone free of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction has always been supported by the Government of the RSFSR," so says a statement of the RSFSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs distributed yesterday. In this connection the ministry welcomes the declaration by the Government of the Republic of Korea that it will renounce the acquisition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

In the RSFSR Foreign Ministry statement, the hope is expressed that "this impulse will be taken up by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which will in the near future announce the complete and unconditional fulfillment of all its obligations under the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty."

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Asian-Pacific Security Conference Held

Soviet Far East Commander Participates

*PM1111102991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Nov 91 Second Edition p 3*

[Lieutenant Colonel P. Kochnev report: "Dialogue in Seoul"]

[Text] An international conference on Asian-Pacific security problems has been held in Seoul. Colonel General V. Novozhilov, commander of the Far East Military District [MD], took part in it. The conference was organized by the Center for U.S.-Soviet Studies at Seoul's Tongguk University. In effect the dialogue on military problems, which began this spring in Tokyo on the initiative of IZVESTIYA and Japan's YOMIURI SHIMBUN, was continued in the ROK capital.

Participants in this debate, including high-ranking military men from the United States and the ROK, along with scientists and journalists, discussed the changes in the military-political situation in the Asian-Pacific region.

Troop Reductions Explained

*LD1211114291 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1033 GMT 12 Nov 91*

[By TASS correspondent Anatoliy Vostokov]

[Text] Khabarovsk, 12 Nov (TASS)—In the very near future, Soviet Armed Forces in the Asiatic part of the country will be cut by 200,000 men, including 120,000 in the Far East. Eleven air regiments have already been disbanded, Colonel General Viktor Novozhilov, troop commander of the Far Eastern Military District, told a TASS correspondent. According to the general, the USSR Defense Ministry supports his proposal on halving the number of divisions in the Far East.

Viktor Novozhilov reported all data on the Soviet troop cuts to participants in the trilateral Soviet-American-South Korean meeting in Seoul, at which security problems in the Asia-Pacific region were discussed.

Reports on Sino-Soviet Border Troop Reduction Talks

Fifth Round Opens

*LD1211140291 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1346 GMT 12 Nov 91*

[Text] Moscow, 12 Nov (TASS)—The fifth round of Soviet-Chinese negotiations on mutual reduction of armed forces and strengthening of trust in the military sphere in the Soviet-Chinese border region began in Moscow today [12 November].

Delegate Previews Talks

*OW1211111291 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin
1100 GMT 11 Nov 91*

[Interview with (Griyev), leader of the Soviet delegation to the Sino-Soviet border talks, by station reporter Kalibov; from the "Current Event and Commentary" program—place and date not given]

[Text] The fifth round of Soviet-Sino talks on reducing each other's armed forces in the border areas and on strengthening mutual trust is set to begin in Moscow on 12 November. On the eve of the talks (Griyev), leader of the Soviet delegation and special ambassador of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was interviewed by station reporter Kalibov. The following is his report:

[Kalibov] Comrade ambassador, what results have been achieved since the first round of talks began in 1990?

[(Griyev)] To put it briefly, we have achieved positive and constructive results. The first point I want to mention is that both sides are determined to conclude a general agreement on the mutual reduction of troops in the border areas and on strengthening mutual trust. This is a big step forward because it is the first time in the history of relations between the Soviet Union and China that the question of reducing each other's troops in the border areas has been discussed in detail. In the fifth round of talks, efforts will continue to draw up a general agreement. This is not a simple matter since it is a very sensitive and delicate question which concerns the security of the two countries.

The second point I want to make is that the Soviet side is determined to continue, in a constructive spirit, towards a speedy conclusion of the general agreement, which the Soviet side is prepared to sign. There is another very important element among the political experiences accumulated during these talks—the mutual understanding and cooperation of the two delegations and their efforts to solve very complex questions by seeking a mutually acceptable compromise. I think during the fifth round of talks, as in the previous ones, we will reach a mutual understanding on specific questions in connection with some of the provisions of the future agreement. In this regards, I want to emphasize that we will begin specific work in Moscow to (draw up) the agreement because conditions will be ripe for us to do so after both sides have expounded on each other's principled stand regarding this document.

[Kalibov] In general, after the conclusion of talks the other party is invited to visit some military units. Is the Soviet side prepared to do so this time?

[(Griyev)] Yes, we are. We feel that by inviting the Chinese delegation to visit Soviet military units, the other side will be able to witness life in the armed forces

of our country. In general, we will invite the guests to visit Soviet troops and military academies that reflect to a large extent the condition of the Soviet Armed Forces. Besides, we will invite the guests to visit military areas so that they can see the true conditions of the Soviet Armed Forces which we have intentionally hid. This shows that trust has been growing and has been strengthened.

Editor Views Border Talks With PRC

*OW1511130391 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin
1100 GMT 13 Nov 91*

[From the "Along the Road of Friendship and Cooperation" program]

[Text] Listeners and friends, the fifth round of the Soviet-Chinese talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces along border areas and on confidence-building began on 12 November in Moscow. Station editor Glebov reports:

The Beijing Soviet-Chinese summit meeting in May of 1989 was the main driving force which brought about the current talks. At that summit meeting, both sides agreed on taking measures to reduce armed forces along border areas. Both sides agreed that the reduction should reflect the normal and good neighborly relations between the two countries. After the summit meeting, Soviet and Chinese diplomats reached an agreement in less than a year on formulating a principle to guide the mutual reduction of armed forces along border areas and to guide matters of confidence-building. Premier Li Peng signed this agreement during his visit to Moscow. He and the Soviet side agreed on the scope of the talks. Beginning last autumn, the talks have been alternatively held in Moscow and Beijing. On the eve of the beginning of the fifth round of talks, (Jeliyev), head of the Soviet delegation and a special envoy from the Soviet Foreign Ministry, offered his views on the progress of the talks.

He said that the talks can be compared to scaling a ladder. We are progressing toward the signing of a general agreement. Both sides will make concrete steps on mutual reduction of armed forces along the border areas on the basis of a general agreement.

The two delegations have reached the stage of item-by-item discussion of the agreement. Apparently, both sides will clarify their respective stands in future talks. The talks have entered a stage where a foundation has been laid for solving issues in a realistic manner. It is very possible that after the item-by-item discussion both sides will agree on the future agreement in Moscow. The future agreement will be a very comprehensive document which will touch on the complex, sensitive, and delicate issues of national security of the Soviet Union and China. The document will involve reduction of the number of armed forces, the process and measures for supervising and monitoring such reductions, and the geographical scope of the future agreement. It should also include special measures for building military confidence.

In evaluating the Soviet-Chinese talks and the importance of the talks in the Soviet-Chinese relations, (Jeliyev) said that the talks will have a very big and important position in the entire Soviet-Chinese relationship. Reduction of armed forces along border areas will reduce and eliminate military confrontations and will help build military confidence. He said that these are the main purpose of the talks. The reduction will also enhance trust between the two countries. He also said that signing of a concrete agreement will bring greatest economic results to both the national economies of the Soviet Union and China.

Commentary on Talks To Reduce Border Troops

*OW1611090991 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin
1100 GMT 15 Nov 91*

[Commentary by Kondratyev from the "Current Events and Commentary" program]

[Text] Listeners and friends: Another round of Soviet-Chinese talks on reducing border troops and building up military confidence is under way in Moscow. Please listen to station commentator's Kondratyev's short commentary.

The Soviet Union and China signed an agreement on this issue 18 months ago. I believe that major gains achieved during the relatively short period since then have helped eliminate military confrontations along the border between the countries. They have also served as important factors in defusing tension in Asia. Past military confrontations along the Soviet-Chinese border and ensuing disputes caused tension throughout the world, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Detente along the Soviet-Chinese border evidently has had a positive effect on the world's political climate. It has changed people's views of security issues in the Asia-Pacific region.

Meanwhile, the previous four rounds of talks have strengthened confidence in the two countries. Now neither the Soviet nor Chinese people glance nervously at the border. I can say definitely that confidence between the countries is growing constantly. This has played an important role in prompting Moscow to decide on slashing its Asian-based troops by 200,000 men. It should be noted that military detente along the border between the two countries has produced economic benefits. Everybody knows that military confrontation is a waste of money and manpower. Both countries have stopped massive military spending. Furthermore, troop cuts have led to an increase in regional contacts. For instance, our Central Asian region has established economic links with China's Xinjiang, and our Far East region has expanded cooperation with various provinces in northeast China. In short, military normalization along the Soviet-Chinese border has given rise to pronounced practical benefits.

Not all relevant problems have been resolved, but it is very important that both sides are discussing these issues in a positive and friendly atmosphere.

CENTER-REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Ukrainian Officials Stress Plans for Nuclear-Free Status

Defense Committee Chairman

*AU1211130491 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
7 Nov 91 pp 1,13*

[Interview with Lieutenant General Vasyl Durdinets, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council Standing Commission for Defense and State Security Matters, by Jan Zizka; place and date not given: "The Ukraine's Territory Is Indivisible"]

[Excerpts] Vasyl Durdinets, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council Standing Commission for Defense and State Security Matters, led the parliamentary delegation that came to the CSFR in search of experience for establishing its own Armed Forces.

[Zizka] The Ukrainian parliament recently decided to establish republican Armed Forces. What does this mean in practice?

[Durdinets] The decree on the Armed Forces and their subordination to the Ukrainian Supreme Council proceeds from the republic's declaration of independence. The right to our own Armed Forces was contained in the declaration adopted in July 1990 on the Ukraine's state sovereignty. Armed Forces are one of the characteristic features of statehood. We have begun to form a legislative base incorporating our concept for defense and for establishing these forces. At the same time, the Ukraine should become a neutral state that does not possess nuclear weapons and that is not a member of any military bloc. When we establish our Armed Forces, we will proceed from the principle of reasonable sufficiency [rozumna dostatecnost]. Apart from the republican Army, collective strategic defense forces—common to all the republics of the former USSR—will be deployed on the Ukraine's territory. Our republic will contribute financially to their operation and will dispatch recruits. [passage omitted]

[Zizka] What is the Ukraine's position regarding the nuclear weapons on its territory?

[Durdinets] It is clearly stated in the declaration on state sovereignty that the Ukraine will gradually become a state without nuclear weapons. Today we are not a sovereign nuclear state, as the nuclear weapons on our territory are not Ukrainian. We are embarking on a path of gradual nuclear disarmament essentially under international control. We are interested in the complete

destruction of all the nuclear weapons and their components deployed on the Ukraine's territory. We support the initiatives of Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in the nuclear disarmament sphere. The Ukraine is one of the USSR's legal successors and will adhere to the treaty on limiting strategic assault weapons. However, we are fundamentally opposed to redeploying nuclear weapons from the Ukraine on any other territory.

[Zizka] You do not agree, in that case, with the statements made by certain Russian representatives that Soviet nuclear weapons should be concentrated on Russian territory?

[Durdinets] No. We absolutely disagree. Their destruction is the only thing possible. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister

*PY1411171091 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO
in Portuguese 11 Nov 91 Section 2 p 4*

[“Exclusive” interview with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko by unidentified reporter at ministerial office in Kiev; date not given]

[Excerpt] [FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] The appearance of a new nuclear power is awakening fear in the West. Is it justified?

[Zlenko] The world is afraid, but I believe it is unjustified. We do not want to be a new nuclear country. We want to eliminate all nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory.

The declaration of sovereignty, which was signed on 16 July 1990, clearly established that the Ukraine will be a neutral republic without nuclear weapons. Congress has confirmed that nuclear weapons will temporarily remain in Ukrainian territory. Those weapons belong to the USSR.

We want to eliminate all nuclear weapons, we want to avoid the use of nuclear weapons, and we want to negotiate with the Soviet republics that have nuclear weapons in order to reach a consensus for eliminating that arsenal.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Even if your Russian neighbor has nuclear weapons?

[Zlenko] In spite of everything. We want to become a neutral, denuclearized republic. The Chernobyl accident compels us to eliminate all nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory. We are also seriously considering the elimination of our conventional arsenal. [passage omitted]

Security Aide: No ‘Claims’ on Strategic Forces

*LD1711112991 Kiev Radio Kiev in English
0100 GMT 17 Nov 91*

[Text] The head of National Security Service of Ukraine, Yevhen Marchuk, in his interview to foreign newsmen,

has confirmed once more that Ukraine was not putting in claims for strategic nuclear forces located on its territory. Yevhen Marchuk has also stressed that Ukraine was going to create its own armed forces in three stages: four, five, six years. To do this it has to conduct negotiations with the Ministry of Defense of the Union to work out and sign corresponding agreements as well as negotiations with the neighboring republics Russia, Belorussia, and Moldova. As the Black Sea Navy is concerned, Ukraine has no claims on the whole Black Sea Navy but being a naval power it must have its own naval defensive forces.

Kazakh President Seeks 'Double Control' of Nuclear Arms

*LD0911094891 Moscow TASS in English 0920 GMT
9 Nov 91*

[Text] Moscow November 9 TASS—Before returning in Alma-Ata from London, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of sovereign Kazakhstan gave an interview to the TRUD newspaper, which is published today. Responding to a journalist's question, Nazarbayev said he was satisfied with the results of his visit, which will help develop multifarious ties between Kazakhstan and Britain.

Many leading British businessmen are ready to invest their money in Kazakhstan's economy but they asked that their entrepreneurial activity be supported by the government in the form of capital insurance. Nazarbayev said a firm agreement about this was reached with the British side.

"Kazakhstan does not claim the role of a nuclear power either of the global or regional level. At the same time, it is not going to become a nuclear hostage of the centre or Russia if it unilaterally proclaims itself as successor to the Union in the military field. The solution of the problem lies in establishing a double control over nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons on Kazakhstan's territory will remain where they are deployed now," Nazarbayev emphasised.

Nazarbayev spoke out in support of the provisions of Boris Yeltsin's reform programme. "It's good that he decided to assume the entire responsibility and begin decisive actions," Nazarbayev said.

Cheney Concerned Over Control of Nuclear Arms

*PM1211105591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Nov 91 Union Edition p 3*

[A. Blinov report: "Cheney Is Concerned..."]

[Text] Washington—Soviet nuclear weapons are now under the strict control of the country's central authorities, but... no one knows what will happen in the future. U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney made this comment in a program of the American CNN-TV Company last Sunday.

In an interview with the well-known commentators R. Novak and R. Evans, the Pentagon head declared that he regards as a real possibility the collapse of the USSR and, as a consequence, the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons.

"We now have sufficiently convincing grounds to believe that the Soviet nuclear systems are under strict centralized control," R. Cheney declared. "However, the problem is that we do not know how matters will stand in a year or two, i.e. who will control the Soviet nuclear arsenal in the future. We simply do not know whether the center will remain, whether it will be some association of Soviet republics, or whether the republics will individually control nuclear weapons."

According to R. Cheney, he is seriously concerned that a country which possesses 27,000-30,000 warheads could "literally fall apart." As a result of this there will be "a spread of knowledge about weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons, as people who possess technical knowledge will work for other countries."

Recalling that the United States created its own space program after World War II with the help of Werner von Braun, the rocket specialist imported from Germany, R. Cheney said that countries with nuclear ambitions might use the services of specialists from the USSR. "Anyone who was hitherto employed on the Soviet nuclear program could now be hired to work in Pyongyang or Baghdad," R. Cheney declared.

The U.S. defense secretary also does not rule out the possibility that in the event of the USSR's collapse nuclear weapons might end up in the hands of persons who will wish to pass them on to "partners" in other countries.

R. Cheney does not believe that the United States should be afraid that individual republics, having secured nuclear weapons, will use them against the United States. This is "a very remote possibility which does not seem real." Something else is more dangerous: "The fact that they have not made progress with economic reform increases the possibility that chaos will arise, when more incentives will emerge for the spread of the potential than in the past."

Yakutsk Declares Territory Nuclear-Free Zone

*OW1311025491 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1610 GMT 12 Nov 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet session in Yakutia declared the republic's territory a nuclear-free zone Monday [11 November]. This places a ban on the deployment and storage of nuclear weapons, the development of deposits of fissionable materials or the organization of their enrichment, the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and the storage of nuclear wastes on Yakut territory.

The latest nuclear test was carried out in the republic three years ago. All in all, Yakutia has survived 12 peaceful nuclear blasts.

The country's first uranium-mining installation opened in Yakutia during World War II. Until recently, there were plans to restore it, since the high level of local uranium's enrichment makes its extraction profitable.

Missiles Commander Notes Need for Control

LD1611150391 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1300 GMT 16 Nov 91

[Text] The commander of the Soviet troops in charge of strategic missiles, General Yuriy Maksimov, has said that the Soviet nuclear forces must be single and centrally governed. The Soviet Union remains the only possessor of the country's nuclear weapons. Their proliferation is banned by international treaties, said the general, and nobody will be allowed to make several nuclear powers within the Soviet Union. Yuriy Maksimov said that internationally the country has no legal right to do so.

FRG Fears Missiles 'Out of Control'

AU1811100491 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG in German 17 Nov 91 p 2

[F. Weckbach-Mara report: "Soviet Nuclear Missiles Out of Control"]

[Text] New nuclear dangers are threatening Europe and the entire world. This is the conclusion drawn by congruent reports by intelligence services, which are also in the hands of the FRG Government. According to information obtained by BILD AM SONNTAG, satellite pictures and information gathered locally clearly confirm that Mikhail Gorbachev has long since lost control over the nuclear weapons arsenal. There are now four nuclear superpowers in the Soviet Union and one medium-sized nuclear power: Russia, Belorussia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. The danger: In some of them there is imminent unrest and civil war as in Yugoslavia.

300 Nuclear Bombs in Turkmenistan

After talks with the new Soviet defense minister, Bernd Wiltz, defense spokesman of the Christian Democratic Union [CDU]/Christian Social Union Bundestag group, told BILD AM SONNTAG: "The people I spoke to clearly told me that central power and control over the Soviet nuclear potential can only be achieved if the republics on whose territory these weapons are deployed have some say. The matter would become extremely dangerous if these new nuclear powers—Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan—make the nuclear

weapons an instrument of their republics' national interests. This could endanger Europe's security and the process of nuclear disarmament."

According to information available to the FRG Government, Russia has 15,000 nuclear weapons, including 1,100 with long-range carrier systems, some of them deployed in concrete silos.

—Ukraine: 6,000 (170 intercontinental missiles);

—Kazakhstan: 1,200 nuclear weapons (100 intercontinental missiles);

—Belorussia: 2,000 nuclear weapons (50 intercontinental missiles).

In addition, according to intelligence service reports, there is Turkmenistan. After all, this republic of unrest has 300 nuclear bombs of the size dropped on Hiroshima in World War II.

Therefore, Hans Stercken (CDU), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, warns in an interview with BILD AM SONNTAG: "These republics are demanding the power of disposal over the nuclear weapons stored on their territory as a political pawn. Thus, they also document their independence. As nuclear powers they want to be directly involved in the disarmament negotiations in the future. This harbors dangers and potential problems in worldwide disarmament. In addition, the republics have already made claims in the conventional area. Some of them want to enhance armament, while at the same time the governments in some places are becoming increasingly unpredictable."

Olaf Feldmann, disarmament spokesman of the Free Democratic Party of Germany and member of the Federal Executive Committee, states even more clearly: "In the Soviet Union there is a difference between theory and practice regarding power over nuclear weapons. There is the serious danger that these weapons could be used to exert pressure or be actually deployed in civil war clashes by the various groups. The result would far exceed that of the Chernobyl disaster. Therefore, we must now support Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's course toward peaceful democracy."

Danger of War and Civil War

The Social Democratic Party of Germany also sees matters in this way. Its defense spokesman, Erwin Horn, told BILD AM SONNTAG: there is an acute danger that individual republics of the former Soviet Union will experience the same developments as in Yugoslavia—with war and civil war. Some of these states that are threatened by collapse have already become nuclear powers; this is the biggest danger of the present, and it might become a matter of existence for the West; because the explosion of nuclear weapons concerns us all. Therefore, it is the command of the hour that all the democratic states support a peaceful and democratic course on the territory of the former Soviet Union, even if that costs money.

FRANCE

Reductions in Nuclear Forces Announced

92ES0131B Paris LE MONDE in French
30 Oct 91 p 14

[Article by Jacques Isnard: "France Will Reduce Nuclear Investments"]

[Text] France next year is going to spend 3 percent less than in 1991 on nuclear programs for the military. This decision is inscribed in the draft defense budget bill for 1992 that will be submitted to the deputies on 13 November. According to Defense Minister Pierre Joxe, it marks "a break with the trend of previous years."

Counting both operational and capital outlays, France in 1991 spent a total of 42.9 billion French francs [Fr] on its nuclear forces, an amount equal to 22.1 percent of its defense budget, though only 5.8 percent of the military's manpower is involved in the nuclear programs.

It is in the area of investment outlays (studies, testing and mass production of equipment) that the 1992 budget will be reduced by 3.28 percent.

Officially, this initiative is presented by the defense minister as the consequence of what he has called "the recomposition of the strategic situation in Europe." The decision affects both the arsenal of strategic weapons—though the nuclear missile-launching submarines seem to have been hit less hard—and the panoply of prestrategic arms.

The reduction in France's nuclear spending is primarily the result of decisions made last summer to cancel development of the S-45, a long-range (6,000 km) strategic surface-to-surface missile, and to scrub deployment of the medium-range (480 km) prestrategic Hades missile.

Slower Pace

But it should be noted that the 1992 budget also includes reductions in armed forces subventions to the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) and in appropriations for the Nuclear Test Center Directorate (DIRCEN) in the Pacific. These two agencies are responsible for developing, testing and serial production of nuclear weapons. The reduction in their appropriations may be explained by the interruption of the S-45 and Hades programs, but it also foreshadows a decline in the number of nuclear tests conducted each year (from six to four).

Mr. Joxe recently told senators that "the strategic naval component (Editor's Note: missile-launching submarines and the new M-5 sea-to-ground missile program) will continue to get solid support in 1992."

Since the retirement of the Redoutable, the Strategic Naval Force (FOST) has consisted of five missile submarines carrying M-4 missiles with multiple warheads. Not until 1995 will France have a fleet of six strategic

submarines, with the entry into service of the Triomphant, which will carry M-45 missiles that are quieter than the M-4's. Between 1995 and 1997, the force will remain in that configuration. In July 1997, the Triomphant-class Temeraire is expected to enter into service. But by that time the oldest one of the five submarines now on operational patrol will have been retired, and in any event the others will not be armed with the Triomphant's M-45's.

While the FOST will remain the most important component of the deterrent force, the government has nevertheless agreed in principle to accept some slippage in the building program for the "new generation" submarines. Originally, the intent was for the fleet to be renovated at the rate of one new vessel brought into service every 24 months. As revised, the program will reportedly call for introduction of one new vessel every 30 months, and one-for-one replacement of aging vessels as they are retired does not seem to be in the cards. In the end, the FOST fleet is expected to consist of five submarines.

Nuclear Authorities Anxious About Funding Cuts

PM1511152091 Paris LE MONDE in French
13 Nov 91 p 13

[Jacques Isnard report: "Atomic Energy Commissariat Concerned About Cut in Nuclear Expenditure in 1992"]

[Text] The chiefs of the Atomic Energy Commissariat (CEA) have expressed their anxiety to deputies of the Defense Commission over the cut in nuclear investments starting in 1992. They foresee serious social consequences, especially for employees of the CEA and its subsidiaries, and reduced military capabilities if, in addition, nuclear tests become less frequent in 1992, as is planned.

Defense Minister Pierre Joxe has not concealed the fact that next year should mark "a break away from the trend of previous years," since the capital funds allocated to deterrence—in line with a policy that adheres to the principle of strict "sufficiency" in the nuclear field—will fall by some 3.3 percent from this year's level.

Philippe Rouvillois, director general of the CEA, and Roger Baleras, the organization's Director of Military Applications (DAM), told parliamentarians with whom they met within the forum of the commission that they estimated that the reduction of their funds from all sources in 1992 would total 9.6 percent, at a stable franc rate. The CEA has both a civilian budget (10.1 billion francs in 1991) and a subsidy from the Defense Ministry (9.7 billion francs) for its military activities. It should also be pointed out that in 1991 this budget was cut by some 500 million francs at the end of the summer. Next year the reduction from the initial 1991 budget will be 7 percent at the current franc rate (or 9.6 percent at a stable franc rate, adjusted to inflation.)

The CEA chiefs fear major repercussions from this on spending plans, on the cost of the future dismantling or conversion of some industrial sites (including, it is said, those at Marcoule and Pierrelatte) for which no provision has been made, on the redeployment or diversification of the group's activities over the next several years, and of course also on staff. The trade unions forecast the loss of 400 jobs at the DAM office, which employs some 6,500 staff.

The CEA's director general asked how, under such conditions, it is possible to attract young researchers and at the same time how highly qualified personnel can be reassigned to other tasks.

Brain Drain

The CEA's future military activity is dependent on the 1992-1997 plan, on which the government is taking its time to decide. According to its chiefs, the CEA is affected in two ways: the rate of nuclear testing and the plans—among which it will be necessary to choose—for new strategic weapons such as the M.5 sea-to-air missile.

Speaking to deputies, Mr. Baleras was categorical on the first point. He said that full-scale nuclear tests will remain "irreplaceable" for several years to come, since no amount of laboratory tests will suffice. He also said that France—which now possesses weapons boasting a level of miniaturization comparable to that of some American weapons—must not allow itself to be left behind by the United States, which is again stepping up its research. For his part, Mr. Rouvillois believes that nuclear testing must be maintained in the near future "as near as possible to the present level" of six per year (instead of four, as has been suggested.)

But the point that the CEA general manager emphasized most to the deputies was the need for France to avert a brain drain—that is, the loss of research teams' technological capability—if research into improving weapons' operational safety, into their evasion of improving detection methods, and into the field of impact performance is not continued.

Without further explanation, Mr. Rouvillois also made a cautious reference to the plan for an M5 missile deployed on new Triomphant-class strategic submarine and to its spinoff, the secret MS5 project, which involves deploying the same kind of missiles on submarines and on the Albion Plateau (to replace the existing S3 missiles.) Apart from improvements over the M4 currently in service, the M5's range—there is talk of its being double that of the M4, which is already 5,000 km—would enable submarines to patrol in equatorial waters, the area of the world where detection is most difficult.

The Navy says that it is particularly attached to the complete implementation of the M5 project. Few Navy staff, however, are in favor of the deployment on the Albion Plateau, at a cost of some 15 billion francs, of M4 missiles taken from submarines meanwhile modernized with M5's. They are even less enthusiastic about the

combined solution offered by the MS5 project. In order to be operational by the start of the next century the M5 project would have to receive initial funds in the 1992 budget.

Army Announces 20-Percent Reduction in Personnel

*PM1411125491 Paris LE MONDE in French
14 Nov 91 pp 1, 12*

[Jacques Isnard report: "Army To Lose One-Fifth of its Personnel"]

[Text] Before the debate that deputies were due to conduct on Wednesday and Thursday, 13-14 November, on the 1992 draft defense budget, Army Chief of Staff General Amedee Monchal and the spokesman for the National Assembly Defense Committee, Francois Fillon, Rally for the Republic deputy for Sarthe, revealed the major guidelines of the reorganization of France's land forces through 1997. Personnel will be reduced by over 20 percent.

General Monchal and Mr. Fillon presented this information to two different bodies—the former to the Higher National Defense Studies Institute [IHEDN], and the latter to his colleagues on the Committee. Though doubtlessly fortuitous, the fact that their statements coincided achieved the same result, namely, to present to the public official projects that have hitherto remained at the study stage. Between 1991 and 1997 the French Army, which currently has 280,400 men, should be reduced to 220,000 or 230,000 men, 120,000 of them draftees and 110,000 officers and enlisted men. This means a 20-24 percent reduction from 1990 levels. In comparable Western countries the expected reduction by 1996 varies from 20 to 35 percent. But General Monchal stressed that France started earlier than its allies, since its Army still had 330,000 men in 1977, which means a reduction of one-third in 20 years. In 1992 alone the Army will lose 19,300 personnel, 2,300 of them officers or enlisted men. This is the first time for decades that we have seen such cuts in personnel, though the expected savings are modest (400 million francs) because of the Army's equipment modernization requirements.

According to Mr. Fillon's calculations, these personnel should be subdivided as follows: 176,200 from conventional land forces, 20,000 from administrative support, 20,000 from training institutions, 10,000 from overseas, 2,800 from tactical nuclear weapons personnel (a single Hades missile regiment in nondeployment status), and 1,000 from nuclear arsenal support. The main body of personnel—43 and 20 percent, respectively—should serve in the mechanized armored corps (CBM), with 100,000 men, and the rapid action force (FAR), with 48,200 men.

It is precisely with regard to the future organization of the former sector—the so-called conventional land forces—that General Monchal provided the most new information to the IHEDN. The aim is to replace over

the next decade the present organization, which gives priority to bring all the forces together under a single national command, with a "modular" system of inter-force units organized on the basis of tasks.

According to the chief of staff, "We could establish on demand, for the purposes of a specific task, all the necessary inter-force modules under the command of an operational staff. The latter would be kept permanently informed, planning, maintaining links with our allies, and authorized to draw together forces from all the services on the basis of the kind of task to be undertaken. To this end it would take—I was about to say, seize—forces from permanent commands whose purpose is to support them, through training, personnel management, administration, and logistics."

This arrangement should feature in the 1992-1997 military planning bill which is being drafted and which should in principle be presented to Parliament next spring.

At the practical level, two inter-force staffs (principally composed on the basis of the Army and Air Force) should be established in order to draw various forces, in the event of operations decided on by the government, from two separate "reservoirs" of personnel composed of professionals and voluntary conscripts according to the tasks concerned.

One of these staffs will be more particularly, though not exclusively, oriented toward actions in Europe, while the other will be oriented more toward other parts of the world.

According to General Monchal, the first "reservoir"—from which each staff will be able to draw personnel according to needs—will be formed on the basis of heavily armored track-laying units whose aims should be fire power, tactical mobility under enemy fire, and the protection that this implies. The second "reservoir" will

comprise more agile or lighter forces, less well protected and less permanent under enemy fire, capable of strategic and tactical mobility.

This reorganization, begun after the Gulf war and vindicated by the composition of the Daguet division, is intended to modify both the existing ratio between draftees and enlisted men and the present division of materials between the MBR [expansion unknown] and FAR.

The chief of staff was not afraid to tell the IHEDN that such a reform "is on the same scale as that which the Army underwent in the sixties after the war with Algeria." But for his part, Mr. Fillon, who advocates an Army comprising a total of 185,000 enlisted men, complains in his report that the government's plan "vacillates," without properly deciding, between two different concepts of the Army.

GERMANY

Former GDR SS-23 Missiles Rendered Inoperable *LD1411090491 Hamburg DPA in German 0811 GMT* *14 Nov 91*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The Bundeswehr has rendered inoperable all 24 of the SS-23 missiles which were taken over from the GDR's former National People's Army (NVA). The Ministry of Defense announced in Bonn today that "components crucial for deployment" have been destroyed. This means that the missiles can no longer be used.

The complete destruction of the systems, including the missile fuel, will be concluded in Germany by the middle of 1993. This time scale is required because new industrial processes to destroy the weapons system have to be developed.

The Defense Ministry added that the destruction of all 72 Bundeswehr Pershing-1A missiles has been concluded in the United States. The missiles were destroyed in connection with the disarmament treaty on medium-range missiles.