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COOK ISLANDS

Prime Minister To Maintain Nuclear-Free Stance

*BK0711072491 Melbourne Radio Australia in English
0500 GMT 7 Nov 91*

[Text] The prime minister of the Cook Islands, Geoffrey Henry, says his country will maintain its nuclear-free policy even though it is drawing closer to France. The Cook Islands and France recently signed loan agreement for the upgrading of the water supply in the capital, Rarotonga. The PACIFIC NEWS SERVICE, PAC NEWS, reported the Cook Islands is seeking a further loan from France to upgrade the water supply in the rest of the islands.

Sir Henry said the loans will have no effect on his country's nuclear-free stance, which he has maintained since 1965.

JAPAN

Government Welcomes South Korean NFZ Proposal

*OW0811060491 Tokyo KYODO in English 0558 GMT
8 Nov 91*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 8 KYODO—Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe on Friday welcomed South Korean President No Tae-u's announced plans earlier in the day for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

Watanabe said in a press statement that the Japanese Government considers No's announcement timely in the wake of the Persian Gulf crisis and as the international community increasingly realizes the importance of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The South Korean policy would be conducive to realizing peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the East Asia as a whole, he said.

"From this viewpoint, the Japanese Government highly appraises and also actively supports this initiative."

Watanabe said Japan demands that North Korea agree unconditionally to accept international inspections of its nuclear facilities and strongly hopes Pyongyang will respond positively to No's proposals.

No said in part that South Korea would use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only and would not manufacture, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.

Japanese officials said Tokyo was informed by Seoul of the initiative on Thursday night, prior to its public announcement in a nationally televised address by No on Friday morning.

NORTH KOREA

Daily Urges South To Address Nuclear Questions

*SK0911094191 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 0010 GMT 6 Nov 91*

[NODONG SINMUN 6 November article: "Why Did the South Side Avoid Answering?"]

[Text] A major point of contention during the fourth round of the North-South high-level talks held in Pyongyang last October was the question of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. The reason for this is because the removal of nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula is a pressing question in removing the constant danger of nuclear war and keeping our people from nuclear calamity.

However, the two sides' stands and attitudes on this were opposite. At the talks we put forward an emergency proposal for adopting a declaration on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and insisted that the two sides seriously discuss and solve it. We suggested to the South that if resolving it was too difficult during the talks, it should promise to keep discussing it for a future solution.

However, the South side unreasonably insisted, quite irrelevantly, that the North unconditionally agree to nuclear inspections, without mentioning a word about the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons which threaten the destiny of the nation.

This has graphically demonstrated that the South Korean authorities, while paying lip service to peace and reunification, are dreaming of something else.

The South side's secret design has been revealed more graphically in the words spoken at the full-dress talks and press conferences, where the South side persistently avoided answering questions about U.S. nuclear weapons clearly.

According to our side's spokesman, at the second-day session of the talks our side asked the South side if there are nuclear weapons in South Korea; if the South Korean authorities approved the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into South Korea or if the United States brought them on their own; and if the South Korean authorities allowed the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons after asking what the 40 million South Korean people want, with whom sovereignty rests. Our side then demanded that the South side give clear answers.

The South side, however, adamantly avoided answering our side's questions, giving unreasonable excuses and trying to free itself from the strained circumstances.

In essence, on questions about U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea that reporters naturally raised at the press conference held at the end of the first-day session of the talks, the spokesman for the South side

either evaded or postponed answering them, explaining that he would clarify the South side's stand on these questions during the second-day session or that he would answer them when the talks ended.

Nevertheless, the South side avoided giving clear answers either during the second-day session or in the ensuing press conference.

Why did the South avoid answering? Commenting on our questions about the nuclear weapons, not a small number of the South side's reporters we met on the trains shuttling between Panmunjom and Pyongyang said: It is not necessary to be deceptive about the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in the South since the United States has confirmed it. The authorities would not confirm it, because it is their greatest weak point.

Even the South is very unhappy about the U.S. nuclear weapons. Antinuclear sentiment is growing among the people.

Rational men would not feel otherwise. The South side's answer to the question if there are nuclear weapons in South Korea is an important issue, as it will define the source of the danger of a nuclear war that can descend upon the nation and will prove if they are willing to remove that source.

The danger of nuclear war constantly hangs over the Korean peninsula. Its source lies not in the North, but in the South. About 1,000 U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea are targeted at the North, threatening the destiny of the Korean people.

The presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea is explicitly recorded in the minutes of the puppet National Assembly, and the United States the owner of the nuclear weapons, has recently confirmed their existence. The source of the danger of nuclear war that threatens the survival of our people on the Korean peninsula lies in South Korea.

This notwithstanding, the South side, ignoring this fact, babbles only about nuclear inspection of the North. This is preposterous, in the truest sense of the word.

Not a single nuclear weapon is in the North. The South side's babbling about nuclear inspection is an extremely brazen-faced brigandish sophistry and ridiculously shallow artifice designed to divert the people's attention to cover up and justify its crimes.

It is no less disgusting to see the South Korean authorities claim that it is U.S. policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence of their nuclear weapons in South Korea and thus try to remove themselves from the deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea.

Although outside forces have brought nuclear weapons onto their land capable of annihilating their own people, the South Korean authorities say that they have nothing to do with them, not even to confirm their presence.

With this kind of attitude from the South Korean authorities who, while exercising no sovereignty at all, claim to be supreme rulers and responsible representatives, the world can see their brazen nature and the pitiful circumstances in which they find themselves.

Truly independent and responsible supreme rulers should defend the interests of the people and keep the nuclear weapons out of their country, no matter what nuclear policy some other foreign country may enforce, and demand that they be withdrawn.

The South Korean regime was framed by outside forces and is prolonging its remaining days under their protection and is a puppet regime with no military prerogative of supreme command. It has to follow the policy of outside forces neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons. Although the presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea has been made public, it is not in a position to call for their withdrawal.

In the press conference, the person who claimed to be the spokesman for the South side was asked by reporters: If the United States enforces a policy of acknowledging the presence of their nuclear weapons in South Korea, will the South confirm it? The South side has avoided confirming the presence of nuclear weapons on its soil. As the host nation, does it know that there are U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea? What a shame it was!

The spokesman for the South side revealed its pitiful position more clearly by answering that he knew it. Upon seeing such scenes, one of the South side's reporters said that he felt himself humiliated and said angrily: It is tragic that although they knew it, they are not in a position to say so freely.

The South side's refusal to answer questions about nuclear issues is associated with the more sinister criminal purposes it seeks to achieve.

Our side's proposal at the talks to put discussion of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula on an emergency agenda was very timely. It was a just and fair peace proposal, given the realistic call to remove the danger of nuclear war in the country, the ardent desire for peace that is growing among the people, the global trends for it, and the favorable environment created in the settlement of the peace question.

Our proposal was not unilateral and not something that the South side had not anticipated. Our side put forward a proposal for realizing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula a long time ago, and we publicized a Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on removing the nuclear danger not long ago and then delivered it to the South side.

The United States, who owns the nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea, has recently announced its plan to withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons, and even

No Tae-u expressed his willingness to discuss the issue of denuclearization in the international arena.

This being the case, if the South side is interested in settling the destiny of the nation and national peace, it has no reason to refuse our just peace proposal.

By refusing to discuss the denuclearization issue, the South side has exposed that its lip service to what is called a peace system or something else is a lie and that it has no intention of achieving peace or reunification.

It is universal knowledge that the South Korean ruling clique referred to the North's nonexistent nuclear development and heaped on us war-like outbursts, like a surprise attack against us or the choice of military action, when the next round of North-South high-level talks are only weeks away.

When the United States and the Soviet Union put the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons on the calendar, the South side, while verbally supporting it, objected to the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and noisily insisted that it still remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

This tells us that the South Korean authorities have not abandoned their sinister intention to maintain power under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Furthermore, they threaten us with nuclear weapons, in order to achieve reunification and prevail over communism through absorption by force, not minding the destiny of the nation.

The South Korean authorities must abandon their old habit of living without principles by clinging to the coattails of outside forces and remaining indifferent to national interests and dignity. They must truly work for the country and the nation after freeing themselves from an anachronistic way of thinking and ignominious modus vivendi of living under someone else's protection, with their fate entrusted to others, and honoring the aggression and war policy of the outside forces.

Only then they can exonerate themselves of the wrong they have committed and take responsibility for them.

Daily Says U.S. Withdrawal Necessary for Peace

*SK0811001291 Pyongyang KCNA in English
2145 GMT 7 Nov 91*

["What Does U.S. Imperialists' Plan of Nuclear Reduction Show?"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang November 7 (KCNA)—If the United States truly wants peace and security on the Korean peninsula, it should take a step to withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea at an early date, and at the same time, make a security commitment to remove the nuclear threat to us, says NODONG SINMUN in a by-lined article today.

The article says:

On September 27, U.S. President Bush announced that the United States would unilaterally withdraw short-range nuclear weapons from their ground and naval bases, etc.

This step of the United States should be taken, first of all, on the Korean peninsula where the gravest danger of nuclear war has been created.

By announcing withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons the United States admitted of its own accord the presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea and the need to withdraw them.

Having turned South Korea into the biggest nuclear forward base in Asia by deploying more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons, the United States has so far concealed their presence in South Korea to cover up its unpardonable criminal act.

Now, their preposterous assertions that there were no nuclear arms in South Korea and that our signing the nuclear safeguards accord and withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea were "separate issues" have been completely refuted and their crafty and brazen intrigues fully disclosed to the world.

Facts prove more clearly how just our demand is, that if the danger of nuclear war is to be removed from the Korean peninsula and Asia and peace and security be ensured, the U.S. nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from South Korea before anything else, that if nuclear inspection is to be made of our area, a simultaneous inspection should be made of the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea, and that if the way is to be opened to the solution of the question of our signing the nuclear safeguards accord, nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from South Korea and the U.S. nuclear threat to us be completely removed.

Though the United States has put forward a plan of nuclear reduction, it is still resorting to the policy of nuclear blackmail. First of all, it is making no reference to taking a practical step for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea and failing to announce a timetable according to the withdrawal plan.

What should not be overlooked in particular is the fact that the United States pays only lip-service to the withdrawal of nuclear weapons on the one hand, while talking on the other about its continued "nuclear umbrella protection" of South Korea. The danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and nuclear threat to us cannot be removed completely and finally only through the withdrawal of some nuclear weapons from South Korea.

If the U.S. nuclear threat to us is to be removed completely, the United States must totally withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea and, at the same time, give assurances of security to the effect that it will not threaten and attack us with nuclear weapons.

President Kim on Nuclear Inspection Issue

*SK1211091091 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 2100 GMT 10 Nov 91*

[Report on interview with Kim Il-song, DPRK president, by Ryosuke Yasue, president of Japan's Iwanami Shoten publishers on 26 September in Pyongyang—read by announcer]

[Excerpts] The answers given by the great leader President Kim Il-song to questions raised by Ryosuke Yasue, director of the Iwanami Shoten publishers of Japan on September 26, 1991 were carried by the December issue of Japanese magazine SEKAI.

Follows the full text of the answers:

I would like to bid you a hearty welcome to our country.

You have come to visit our country again at a time when understanding between the Korean and Japanese peoples is growing deeper and the two peoples are raising their voices louder than ever for normal diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan. I am very pleased to meet you, an old friend of mine, and talk with you again after six years since we met last.

I shall now answer your questions. [passage omitted]

Question: The question of the so-called nuclear inspection of your country is arousing international concern since it is related to the establishment of the Japan-Korea and Japan-U.S. relations.

I am very doubtful of the fact that the Japanese Government has placed this issue on the main agenda in the talks for normalizing Japan-Korea relations and that some media support it.

Japan must strive to demand the denuclearization of the North and South of Korea and Japan itself. It is obviously wrong for Japan to insist on this issue unilaterally over the bilateral question between Japan and Korea.

You have already put forward a non-nuclear policy of your country time and again and clarified the plan for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear free, peace zone.

President, what do you think of the issue of nuclear inspection in this connection?

Answer: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a non-nuclear state. Proceeding from the noble desire to remove the danger of nuclear war from the Korean peninsula and ensure the peace and security of Asia and the rest of the world, the government of our Republic has advanced a proposal for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear free, peace zone and has made positive efforts for its realization.

We have no intention to develop nuclear weapons and have no ability to do so. Therefore we have no objection

to nuclear inspection. What we are against is not the nuclear inspection itself, but the unreasonable attitude of some people who are trying to impose nuclear inspection on us unilaterally contrary to international justice. We have never put nuclear threat to anyone but, instead, we are exposed to nuclear threat. It is no secret that more than 1,000 U.S. nuclear weapons are actually deployed in South Korea. Therefore, if a fair nuclear inspection is to be carried out, it should be made not only on us, but also on the nuclear bases in South Korea.

An attempt of some countries to impose nuclear inspection on us is a flagrant encroachment on the sovereignty of our country. By nature, nuclear inspection is not a matter to be dealt with under any international pressure; it is a matter for us to settle independently with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Independence is the lifeblood of an independent and sovereign state. It is self-evident that a country which regards independence as its lifeblood cannot tolerate and accept the pressure of other countries which is aimed at meddling in its internal affairs.

Nuclear inspection is not a matter to be discussed at the talks for the normalization of Korea-Japan diplomatic relations. It is wrong for Japan desirous of establishing friendly relations with our country to try to bring pressure upon us in tune with the unjustified demand of outside forces, far from being sympathetic with and giving support to our country which is in the position of a victim exposed to a constant nuclear menace.

As we are not opposed to nuclear inspection, this issue will be settled spontaneously if unreasonable pressure on us is removed and impartiality is ensured. [passage omitted]

SOUTH KOREA**No Tae-u's Non-Nuclear Declaration Viewed**

*SK1111103391 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean
9 Nov 91 p 2*

[Editorial: "The Ultimate Goal of the Nuclear-Free Zone—The South and North Should Agree on Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula Before Anything Else"]

[Text] There is no need to say that nuclear weapons are the most dangerous threat to our national survival. No one can deny that a nuclear explosion, whether in war or accidental, is capable of annihilating the population and devastating the national territory. No less threatening to our lives and environment are the nuclear reactors which are supposed to be perfectly safe and accident-free.

At a time when the nuclear issues involving the Korean peninsula are being briskly debated at home and abroad, President No Tae-u made public on 8 November a "Declaration of Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula Peace Initiatives." It has drawn attention at home and abroad because it is the government's first official stand on

nuclear issues ever announced. Until now, our successive regimes have even denied the presence of nuclear weapons on our territory. Even though the United States has almost mocked the Korean people with its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of the nuclear weapons it has brought into South Korea via U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, without letting the Korean people know it, those in responsible government offices have been more dishonest than the United States by denying their presence.

President No, although not directly admitting the presence of nuclear weapons in the 8 November declaration, has promised that "we will use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and will not produce, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons," thereby making it clear that the government has formally adopted a non-nuclear policy. If his declaration, which said "we will sincerely enforce the policy of not possessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons" and "we will place nuclear facilities and materials completely under international inspections and will not possess nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities," is abided by, the ROK will be at once recognized as a non-nuclear country.

We appreciate President No's desire for peace as specified in his declaration. However, we have no choice but to point to the political nature of the declaration and his vague stand on our country's nuclear sovereignty. Calling on North Korea to "take a step corresponding to his declaration," President No made it clear that he wants North Korea to give up the idea of possessing nuclear reprocessing and nuclear fuel enrichment facilities. It is natural for the South and North to take such a course in order to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. Nevertheless, the last phrase of the declaration is unrealistic in that only the South and North were asked to be responsible for denuclearization. No one will object to the words that "all the issues concerning the Korean peninsula should be resolved independently by the South and North through direct negotiations between the two sides' authorities." However, it is hard to understand why the United States, the party directly responsible for nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, was not mentioned in the declaration.

In his briefing on the background against which the non-nuclear policy has been formulated, a Chongwadae official said: "Regardless of the non-nuclear declaration, the U.S. commitment to the defense of Korea, including a nuclear umbrella, remains firm and unchanged." The upshot is that the "nuclear umbrella is not necessarily premised on the deployment of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula; deterrence coming from outside the boundary is enough, given the highly-developed means to deliver nuclear weapons."

To say that Korea can be protected all of the time under the nuclear umbrella means that, while the Korean Government would not produce or use nuclear weapons, the U.S. troops who hold operational control over the Korean Armed Forces can always bring them into our

country and use them at any given time if necessary. North Korea is known to be insisting on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, pointing out such a possibility.

We understand that North Korea's insistence on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone is the ultimate goal of the Korean people living on the Korean peninsula. However, we also want the North Korean regime to clearly realize that it cannot force it on the party with whom it needs to cooperate for the settlement of the nuclear issues in so short a time. In an exclusive interview given to a HANGYORE SINMUN correspondent based in New York on 4 October, North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam definitely said: "If nuclear weapons are withdrawn from the South as proposed by President Bush, the North will automatically accept nuclear inspections." North Korea should hold to the words its foreign minister spoke in public.

We hope that the South and North authorities will meet soon to discuss and resolve the nuclear issues, without being influenced by political rhetoric, thereby moving in the direction of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Consultation on U.S. Weapons Deployment Sought

SK0911134591 Seoul YONHAP in English 1309 GMT 9 Nov 91

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 9 (YONHAP)—The South Korean Government, as a follow-up measure to cope with the new security situation generated by President No Tae-u's declaration Friday of a "non-nuclear Korean peninsula," is studying a way to settle an institutional device binding the United States to have prior consultations with South Korea on its plans to move to, or deploy in, Korea its weapons, a government source said Saturday.

The source said the government might seek to add a new provision to the defense treaty with the United States that stipulates mutual consultations before the United States works at plans to move or deploy in Korea its weapons connected with nuclear protection.

A separate device could be sought as well, he said.

The existing defense treaty does not have any provision regulating prior consultations on movements of U.S. military equipment in Korea and Korean officials are increasingly feeling the need to make up for the deficiency in preparation for the planned complete withdrawal of all nuclear weapons, the source said.

In the cases of Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the U.S. defense agreements stipulate that the U.S. side have prior consultations with the host countries whenever it is to move its weapons, military aircraft or naval ships in their territories, the source said.

'Source' Discusses U.S. Pullout of Nuclear Arms
SK1311041291 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
9 Nov 91 p 1

[Text] A highly-placed government source said on 8 November that the ROK and the United States have agreed to start withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons at the disposal of U.S. forces stationed in Korea before the end of the year.

He said: I understand that the two countries have not yet decided when to complete the withdrawal of the tactical nuclear weapons. I believe that U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney, who is scheduled to come to Seoul in November to attend the annual ROK-U.S. security consultative meeting, and ROK Defense Minister Yi Chong-ku will discuss this question and make a decision.

The government source also said: Since the two countries are of the same opinion that the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons should be completed at an early date, it will not take a very long time to complete the withdrawal. It is highly likely that the withdrawal could be completed by next spring at the latest.

Apparently, the first of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were brought into Korea in 1958, and their withdrawal will be the first in 33 years.

Meanwhile, a high-ranking government official has confirmed that the tactical nuclear weapons deployed by U.S. forces stationed in Korea will be withdrawn at the earliest possible date. A procedure will be set up to verify when the withdrawal is completed.

The official stressed: Since most of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are expected to be destroyed when they are pulled out of Korea and taken to the continental United States, there is no possibility of their redeployment on our territory after the withdrawal. The passage of aircraft and vessels carrying nuclear weapons through our territorial air space and waters is not a violation of our nonnuclear policy because it is guaranteed by a system called (right of harmless flight) under international law.

He continued: One of the five points in the nonnuclear declaration states that our government will not store or deploy nuclear weapons; this means that it will not introduce nuclear weapons into its territory. So, the passage and entering of nuclear-laden aircraft into our territory is a right guaranteed in the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Moreover, it is an issue to be discussed and decided among sovereign countries. Therefore, it does encroach upon the nonnuclear spirit.

Meantime, the government has stated: North Korea is now producing and storing a large quantity of poison gas—blister, nerve, blood, and tear—while breeding and producing a large quantity of biological weapons—cholera, pest, anthrax, and leptospira germs that can cause epidemic diseases. North Korea is believed to be

capable of producing about 4,500 tons of chemical weapons a year and has a storage of about 1,500 tons at the moment.

The government continued: North Korea has concentrated efforts on developing and producing chemical weapons since the early sixties when it began building research facilities for producing chemical and biological weapons. North Korean army units down to regiment-level have established chemical platoons and have been conducting offensive exercises with chemical weapons.

Seoul To Confirm Removal of U.S. Nuclear Arms
SK1011131491 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 10 Nov 91 p 1

[Text] The government plans to confirm the absence of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea once their withdrawal is completed, through parliamentary testimonies by either the foreign or the defense minister, a senior government official said yesterday.

"Once the pullout is completed, either the foreign or the defense minister may state that there no longer exist any nuclear arms as they respond to lawmakers' questions on that matter at the National Assembly," said the official on condition of anonymity.

President No Tae-u's national security adviser Kim Chong-hui said Friday [8 November] that when the U.S. nuclear bombs are withdrawn from South Korea, "some steps" may be taken to confirm their absence. He did not elaborate.

The official said Seoul and Washington will soon start negotiations on the schedule of the atomic weapons pullout.

"We have yet to begin negotiations in earnest, but my view is that the withdrawal will be completed in quite a short period," he said.

He did not rule out the possibility that the pullout would begin this year.

On the prospects of North Korea's accepting international inspection of its nuclear facilities, the official said, "The North may change its attitude overnight as it did when it decided to join the United Nations in May."

The government is studying the various "options" it may take in case the North continues to reject international surveillance of its nuclear facilities, he said.

The options may include bringing the issue to the U.N. Security Council, the official added.

President No declared Friday that South Korea would not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. Calling for a "nonnuclear Korean Peninsula," he urged North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons development program.

No also urged North Korea to renounce the possession of nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities. He pledged that the South would not possess such facilities.

**China Said To Back No Tae-u on
Denuclearization**

*SK1011103691 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
0800 GMT 10 Nov 91*

[Report from Tokyo-based correspondent Chon Yong-ok]

[Text] Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Xu Dunxin said that he highly appraises the declaration for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula announced by ROK President No Tae-u.

In an interview with Japan's TOKYO SHIMBUN at the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 9 November, Vice Foreign

Minister Xu stated that the Chinese Government supports the declaration for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and hinted at the intention to discuss the issue of accepting nuclear inspection again with North Korea

He also said that when U.S. Secretary of State Baker visits China on 15 November, the issue of the Korean peninsula will be included in the talks and that the talks are designed for security and peace in Far East Asia.

Vice Foreign Minister Xu revealed that when North Korean President Kim Il-song visited China in October, the issue of nuclear inspection was discussed. He stressed that since the ROK expressed its intention to accept nuclear inspection, North Korea should accept it also.

Vice Foreign Minister Xu suggested that the Korean peninsula's nuclear issue would be the greatest pending issue during the U.S.-China talks slated for 15 November. Xu is widely known as an authority on Asian affairs within the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

POLAND**Deputy Defense Minister on Disarmament Problems**

*LD1611035591 Warsaw PAP in English 2222 GMT
15 Nov 91*

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 15—Deputy Minister for National Defence Janusz Onyszkiewicz said Friday that Western Europe was underestimating the problem of the ratification of agreements on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional arms by

states which will emerge from the Soviet Union, like the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia and the Caucasian republics.

“It is not clear who can ratify such agreements and who will eventually be bound by them”, he said upon his return from Rotterdam where he had attended an international conference on economic and political aspects of European security.

Onyszkiewicz also reiterated a warning voiced earlier by head of the Ministry Piotr Kolodziejczyk calling for deliberation in appointing the new minister for national defence. At the same time, Onyszkiewicz excluded the possibility of himself assuming the post.

BOLIVIA

Government Supports Regional Anti-CBW Accord

*PY1311012291 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1456 GMT
12 Nov 91*

[Text] La Paz, 12 Nov (EFE)—Bolivia announced today its decision to support the agreement signed by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile rejecting the production, purchase, and use of chemical weapons [CW]. The commitment, which was signed in the Argentine township of Mendoza on 5 September 1991, states that the three countries "will not develop, purchase, store, directly or indirectly transfer, or use chemical or biological weapons [CBW]."

The agreement, which is now supported by Bolivia, seeks "to strengthen an atmosphere of peace and lowered tension" in the Southern Cone. It can be expanded with the further implementation of a treaty on zones free of chemical and biological weapons.

A Foreign Ministry communique published today in the local press reads: "Bolivia reasserts its support for the agreement by stating that the Mendoza commitment is compatible with the main objectives of its international policy."

The communique reads that Bolivia "reiterates its will to decisively support the implementation of policies and initiatives on disarmament and arms control in our hemisphere and, especially, in South America that can create conditions for harmonic and peaceful coexistence among nations."

BANGLADESH**Prime Minister Zia Welcomes Bush Initiative**

92WC0020A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 29 Sep 91 p 1

[Article: "Disarmament To Help Remove Poverty"]

[Text] Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia Saturday welcomed the U.S. President George Bush's unilateral announcement to destroy and reduce different types of U.S. nuclear weapons, reports BSS.

In a message to the U.S. President, Begum Zia termed the announcement as epoch making and historic. She said the unilateral announcement of the U.S. President would contribute immensely, significantly and positively toward all round peace and development of the world. "We hope that other countries having nuclear weapons will come forward to contribute duly in disarming their nuclear weapons on the basis of President Bush's announcement," she added.

She also hoped that immense wealth to be released following the disarmaments of the nuclear weapons would be spent for the welfare of the mankind and saving them from poverty, hunger and diseases.

Bush Arms Initiative: 'Sober Good Sense'

92WC0021A Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English
30 Sep 91 p 9

[Editorial: "A Laudable Move Toward Global Peace"]

[Text] U.S. president George Bush announced on Friday in an Oval Office speech the most dramatic reduction of U.S. nuclear weapons. He declared that the United States would destroy all ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons, bring home all nuclear cruise missiles from submarines and warships and end the alert status on which U.S. strategic bombers have operated for 24 years. The reductions involve several thousand nuclear artillery shells, warheads and ground-based missiles in Europe and South Korea and more than 400 highly accurate Tomahawk nuclear cruise missiles aboard U.S. submarines and surface ships world wide as well as nuclear bombs on aircraft carriers.

President Bush also said he would immediately deactivate all long-range U.S. missiles scheduled for destruction over the next seven years under the recently signed U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. He also said that he was cancelling the planned replacement of short-range nuclear attack missiles for strategic bombers.

George Bush's announcement has been already welcomed by Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, Australia, Japan and the Soviet Union. Bangladesh called it an epoch making and historic announcement. The Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has hinted a reciprocation of the U.S. gesture in this regard.

President Bush's announcement would indeed go down as epoch-making, imaginative and historic. It would give the Soviet Union the opportunity to shed the heavy burden of a costly nuclear arsenal which threatened world peace for the past five decades.

The nuclear race virtually began immediately after the end of the Second World War when the Soviet Union joined the nuclear club. Since then more and more sophisticated nuclear weapons and delivery systems have been devised by the superpowers on a competitive basis making world peace hang precariously on a very tenuous thread, so much so that the world has been on the brink of a nuclear holocaust twice in the past.

But fortunately for mankind the crushing weight of the arms race began to be felt slowly by the superpowers. The Soviet Union bent on maintaining its status as a superpower has crumbled under this weight. Nor was the United States totally immune from the corrosive and stultifying effects of the hectic arms race. The United States had to contemplate for more costly Star Defence system named as the strategic defence initiative aimed at putting up a protective umbrella in the sky for destroying possible Soviet strikers in the air. The mere feasibility study of SDI has cost the U.S. as much as 5000 million dollars. The wisdom of this venture has been called in question both in the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives.

Happily, pragmatism and sober good sense have at long last got the better of the insane craze for the mad armament race and a fresh spring breeze is blowing across the planet in recent days. While the big powers were engaged in the mad arms race the poverty stricken and deprived people of Asia, Africa and Latin America were groaning in hunger, starvation and malnutrition. Paradoxically the astronomical military expenditure of the super powers would be enough to feed these countries many times over. Hopefully, some of the funds so untied would go to alleviate world hunger. Naturally we have a sigh of relief at the new climate of nuclear disarmament and mutual confidence among the big powers. Long live disarmament and peace.

INDIA**Bush Proposal 'a Magnificent Peace Dividend'**

92WC0019A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 1 Oct 91 p 12

[Editorial: "Historic U.S. Gesture"]

[Text] Mr. George Bush has offered the world a magnificent peace dividend by outlining his historic proposals for eliminating short-range and tactical nuclear weapons from the U.S. arsenal along with an offer to do away also with long-range missiles with multiple warheads, the most lethal in the superpower inventories, if the Soviet Union follows suit. The first makes eminent sense for three reasons. With the danger of hostilities in Europe

virtually removed by the momentous changes in the Soviet Union, there is now little use for the short-range weapons in the theatre in which most of these are deployed. In the Far East, war in the Korean peninsula is no longer on the cards with Pyongyang increasingly isolated and the two adversaries cautiously working for a rapprochement. Secondly, Soviet developments have brought home to the world the danger of loss of control over nuclear weapons of which short-range ones are the most widely dispersed and hence the most in danger of being usurped. Thirdly, the damage that missiles with conventional warheads can inflict, as demonstrated by the sea-borne cruise missiles during the Gulf War, makes them just as effective. Getting rid of missiles with multiple warheads has always been on Washington's agenda because this is arguably one category in which Moscow has an advantage. Finally, the U.S. decision to discontinue having some of its strategic long-range weapons ready for instant use is a logical corollary to the end of the Cold War.

While the Bush initiative was instantly hailed in many capitals (though India unaccountably passed up the opportunity), it was only the British among the nuclear haves who readily declared their intention to follow suit. The French, while joining in the applause, stick to their stand that participation by them in this process of nuclear disarmament is not called for at this stage. The Chinese, who have said nothing so far, are likely to adopt the same stance. The Soviet Union too has reserved its position but this is clearly because the disarray in its decisionmaking machinery makes it difficult for it to translate the welcome voiced by Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Yeltsin into concrete steps right away. Near-nuclear nations, India among them, can now expect even greater pressure from the West to accept restraints, a pointer being the plea to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty made by Secretary of State James Baker to Mr. Madhavsinh Solanki at a meeting following the Bush announcement. The Indian plan for nuclear disarmament, outlined by Rajiv Gandhi to the U.N. in mid-1988, clearly requires countries like India to do their bit once arsenals start getting dismantled. In framing its response, New Delhi will have to keep this pledge very much in mind.

Commentator Urges Change in Nuclear Policy

92WC0018A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
10 Oct 91 p 8

[Article by C. Raja Mohan: "India's N-Policy Needs Reworking"]

[Text] The Soviet leader, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev has more than matched the sweeping nuclear arms reductions initiated by the U.S. President, Mr. George Bush. In some ways he has gone beyond the Bush initiative by imposing a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, thus bringing the comprehensive test ban back on the international agenda. He has suggested more balanced and deeper cuts in the strategic nuclear forces of the two

sides than Mr. Bush. And in a significant shift of the Soviet position, Mr. Gorbachev is no longer opposed to the Star Wars programme. He has called for a 'study' of the possibility of joint development of defences against missiles.

The initiative of Mr. Bush and the positive Soviet response to it create an entirely new international nuclear climate. Nuclear weapons reduction has acquired a pace which few proponents of nuclear disarmament had envisioned in the recent past. The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union has now dramatically accelerated nuclear arms reduction between the two superpowers. This will reinforce the increasing international attention being devoted to the problem of proliferation of mass destruction weapons, missiles, high technology conventional weapons as well as the importance of regional arms control in volatile Third World theatres.

London Declaration

The London summit of the Group of Seven last July issued a separate declaration calling for the strengthening of various non-proliferation regimes. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the so-called P-5, have been attempting to regulate the transfer of conventional weapons to the developing world. To buttress his initiative for a West Asia peace settlement, Mr. Bush has outlined a package of proposals for arms limitation process in that region. The decision of France and China to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has tended to give a new legitimacy to the treaty, although it changes nothing on the ground. (The NPT has always recognised the nuclear status of France and China).

At another level, the results of the UN investigation into the Iraqi nuclear programme have surprised everyone. It has demonstrated how far down the nuclear weapons road Iraq had travelled. Iraq is a signatory to the NPT and thereby had formally renounced its nuclear weapons option. The new revelations expose the utter inefficacy of the International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. The Western nations are now demanding a dramatic restructuring of the Agency. They want to strengthen the inspection and verification procedures by making them stringent and intrusive.

The rapid momentum in Soviet-American arms control and the new focus on non-proliferation have brought unprecedented pressure on India's nuclear diplomacy. India's polite noises welcoming the progress in Soviet-American arms control have elicited demands that India begin to do something about nuclear arms control. The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Madhavsinh Solanki stated after his recent meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. James Baker that Washington had advised India to sign the NPT. India of course reiterated its traditional position that NPT is discriminatory and its security concerns about nuclear weapons in China and Pakistan. Clearly there are growing external and internal

demands on New Delhi to recast its nuclear diplomacy. A restructuring of the Indian policy on nuclear weapons and arms control is necessary, but not because there are pressures from outside. A reworking of the policy is needed now to respond to the changed international and regional nuclear realities. Such a response must be built around three different levels: one, a maximalist position on global disarmament pressing for rational, non-discriminatory and universal regimes on disarmament; two, a pragmatic approach to the international problems of non-proliferation; and finally, the articulation of a framework for achieving nuclear restraint in our neighbourhood and avoiding a war with our adversaries.

From the very dawn of the nuclear era, India has been an active participant of the international nuclear debate. In recent years, New Delhi helped mobilise international public opinion for disarmament through the six-nation peace initiative at the peak of the second cold war. India joined Mr. Gorbachev in calling for a nuclear-weapon-free-world through the Delhi Declaration of 1986. At the third UN special session on disarmament in 1988, the late Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi outlined a comprehensive action plan for global disarmament including the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2010. However, the rapid change of Prime Ministers in New Delhi since 1989 has dampened India's ability to respond, quickly and innovatively, to the fast-changing disarmament scenario in the world.

It is absolutely essential that India maintain its international disarmament activism and regain its critical functions in the global debate on arms control. Given the many changes in the international situation since 1988, New Delhi needs to restate its larger disarmament objectives in the context of the Bush initiative and the response of Mr. Gorbachev. It must also point out some of the severe limitations in the current superpower approach and also suggest radical alternatives.

Insisting on the total elimination of all nuclear weapons world-wide should remain a key element of India's nuclear policy. Ideas of nuclear abolition are steadily gaining ground in the U.S. though the strategic establishments in that country and NATO continue to swear by the relevance of nuclear weapons. Mr. Bush has argued that the U.S. needs a credible nuclear force in the future. But against whom? With the end of the ideological rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and given the reality that there is no major military threat which the West cannot cope without resort to nuclear weapons, there is little strategic sense in maintaining powerful nuclear arsenals.

India must also continue to challenge the doctrine of nuclear deterrence that is at the core of Western nuclear philosophy, one that has been reiterated by Mr. Bush in his recent initiative.

Need To Demand More

The decisions by Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev to make the nuclear arsenals safer by reducing the alert status of

some of them is welcome. But India must demand more. It must demand that the nuclear weapon powers stop the deployment of nuclear weapons. There is no way their security will diminish if they take nuclear weapons out of all missiles, ships, submarines and aircraft and dump them in central warehouses. If they feel uncomfortable without their nuclear cover, non-deployment could be one way of holding on to them, as also keeping nuclear weapons out of harm's way. There are other proposals which India could make.

One is to reiterate the call for a global freeze on the production of all nuclear fissionable material. With the release of substantial amount of fissionable material by the current disarmament process and the increasing ecological problems of the weapons production plants, such a freeze is no longer unrealistic. The other is to call for shifting nuclear weapons out of national control to the control of the United Nations. This is not a zany idea. The former U.S. Secretary of State and the original champion of cold war, John Foster Dulles, was on record stating that when the Soviet Union ceases to be a threat, nuclear weapons could be brought under international control.

Many of these proposals would not be acceptable to the U.S. at least in the near term. But they will constitute a framework, within which India could articulate its disarmament interests. The second, pragmatic level in the Indian policy would have to operate under the assumption that nuclear weapons would be around for quite some time to come and that India will have to live with them. As long as they are around, preventing their proliferation remains on the international agenda. The diplomatic challenge is working out a *modus vivendi* with the global non-proliferation regimes.

At the practical level the problem is not that the NPT is discriminatory in a general sense, but to ensure that India will not have to suffer nuclear discrimination. One suggestion is that India join the treaty as a nuclear weapon power. That would require a formal amendment of the treaty, which the nuclear powers might consider too risky. Alternatively India could give a unilateral declaration to abide by all the commitments that devolve on nuclear weapon states. These include non-assistance and non-transfer of nuclear weapons and associated technology to non-nuclear weapon states. India has always shown this restraint unlike some nuclear weapon powers, most notably China. India can now formalise this position. It must also move towards joining the various operational non-proliferation regimes like the London Club (on nuclear transfers), Australia Group (chemical transfers), the missile technology control regime, as well as aligning with the COCOM (the Western group controlling the general transfer of strategic technologies). By formalising the responsible Indian position on non-proliferation and showing its good faith in cooperating with great powers on technology transfers, India has the opportunity of working out a special status in relation to the NPT. There is

enough realism in Washington on non-proliferation issues for a sustained Indo-American dialogue on these issues.

In the Neighbourhood

The third level relates to the problems of our nuclear neighbourhood. The problem here is no longer one of keeping South Asia free from nuclear weapons. It is of ensuring that the nuclear subcontinent is free from war. If that is the objective we should be working for, India must propose a whole range of measures in our region for nuclear restraint, elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, reduction of conventional forces, and building various confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of war between India and Pakistan as well as India and China.

By proposing genuine and realistic moves to reduce the nuclear danger in the subcontinent, cooperating with the great powers in preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and shaping the international disarmament agenda for a more secure world, India can step out of the current defensive mould into a more positive and constructive position. The visit by a senior American official dealing with non-proliferation, Mr. Reginald Bartholomew, to New Delhi at the end of this month is a good occasion to put forward the new Indian approach to arms control.

Envoy to UN Urges Elimination of Mass-Destruction Weapons

92WC0017A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 19 Oct 91 p 11

[Article: "Eliminate N-Weapons, Says Vajpayee"]

[Text] United Nations, Oct 18 (PTI)—India today called for the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, strongly objecting to attempts to preserve the monopoly of a few states over nuclear weapons, missile technology and export markets for conventional weapons.

Closed-door clubs, groups or regimes created to impose restrictions on trade in technology, equipment and material on a discriminatory basis will not solve proliferation problems, the Indian representative, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, told a United Nations committee.

Nor can the world rid itself of the threat of nuclear annihilation without changing the attitude that the spread of nuclear capability to "delinquent" third world states is the sole danger with regard to nuclear proliferation, he said.

"The only way is to eliminate all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons from the world and its outer space," Mr. Vajpayee said. Commending the action plan suggested by India to eliminate all nuclear weapons in three stages over a 22-year period.

He advocated that all states—nuclear states, threshold states and others—accept obligation to achieve a stage-by-stage, controlled slide down the ladder to a nuclear weapon-free world.

Mr. Vajpayee said weapons of mass destruction could not be eliminated by arms reductions and initiatives which in reality preserve the monopoly of a few states.

"It requires that old attitudes are discarded. It means the world should rise above these limited initiatives and gather courage to work towards truly global and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. It requires that uniform standards are applied to all countries," he said.

Referring to the "far-reaching positive changes" in the international scene, he said these "regrettably" brought about increased violence, ethnic differences and refugee flows. "The international community will have to consider possible dangers inherent in split control over nuclear weapons," he said.

NATO's Cut in Nuclear Arsenal Welcomed

92WC0016A Madras THE HINDU in English
19 Oct 91 p 8

[Editorial: "The Disarmament Race"]

[Text] The decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to effect an 80 per cent cut in its short-range nuclear arsenals may not have set the Atlantic on fire. But its impact on the current efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race cannot be underestimated. It is, no doubt, true that the NATO's move, as disclosed by the Belgian Defence Minister on October 17, can only be seen as a step taken in pursuance of the disarmament goals that the U.S. President, Mr. George Bush, had already outlined in his proposals on September 27. Yet, it is more than a mere sign of the present times that the NATO has decided to add its own mite to the current process of nuclear disarmament, albeit in conjunction with the U.S. administration. To this extent, the NATO has opened a third front for global peace, with the Soviet leader, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev's wholesome response to the Bush initiative having already thrown open a second frontier in the efforts towards an ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world.

Though the British Prime Minister, Mr. John Major, had, in fact, lost no time in following the American President's lead by announcing his intention to reduce the United Kingdom's separate stockpile of atomic weapons, it was predictably left to Mr. Gorbachev to flag off a healthy disarmament race through the counter-proposals which he unveiled on October 5. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact several months ago, as well as the Soviet Union's correlative commitment to pull out of the territory of the erstwhile East Germany, have virtually averted the need for more focal points in this unfolding series of Euro-Atlantic moves. What the NATO defence ministers have now done is to simply impart some more momentum to this disarmament race.

The stunning range of these proposals, made within the course of just three weeks, has already prompted some seasoned observers of the world political scene to talk in terms of a competitive "bidding" for nuclear disarmament. Quite apart from the slight suggestion of derision that may be implied in such a view, it is clear that the trilateral moves by the U.S., the Soviet Union and the NATO alliance deserve to be seen in a larger perspective. By making these proposals outside the hackneyed framework of a bilateral disarmament dialogue between Washington and Moscow, Mr. Bush, Mr. Gorbachev and the NATO Defence Ministers have apparently invested them with a seriousness of purpose that cannot be easily dismissed as a "bidding" for popularity stakes in a game of world peace. That seriousness is by no means eroded by the continuing uncertainty over the Soviet Union's political future.

Several features of the concerted Bush-Gorbachev peace offensive are commendable. But it is intriguing why the Soviet leader has suggested that Moscow and Washington should study the feasibility of developing joint systems, possibly using space technology, to avert nuclear attack. This is apparently a subtle call for a tacit covenant between these two countries to safeguard each other's security even without attempting to become allies. Be that as it may, Britain and France, which possess atomic weapons, may perhaps join the latest disarmament race sooner or later, especially in the light of the declaration of the NATO's intentions. But a

question mark still hangs over the attitude of China, the only other member of the so-called "nuclear club." At the same time, the continuing references to the concepts of "minimum, reasonable or credible deterrence" even in the current debate on a nuclear disarmament race do also dismay a country like India that has been exercising self-restraint—especially when the world is still saddled with an "overkill" stockpile of atomic weapons.

Delhi Opposes Pakistan's Nuclear-Free Proposal

*BK1211082691 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 0730 GMT 12 Nov 91*

[Text] India has opposed the Pakistani proposal to make South Asia a nuclear-free zone. The proposal cosponsored by Bangladesh secured 104 votes in favor and three against in the UN General Assembly's Political and Security Committee yesterday.

Explaining India's principal opposition to the proposal, the Indian ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Prakash Shah, said the sponsors of the move did not hold prior consultations with the countries in the region, which is essential for its success. He said nuclear weapons existed in the geographical region of India's security concerned. In a significant development, the Soviet Union, which has all along supported India on the issue, voted in favor of the Pakistani proposal.

RESPONSE TO BUSH INITIATIVE

Sergey Kortunov Sees 'Deja Vu' in Bush Initiative

924P0027A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 40, 6-13 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by Sergey Kortunov, candidate of historical sciences: "Nuclear Disarmament: The Initiative Is With the USA"]

[Text] As a disarmament expert I find it hard to abstain from high praise for the new US nuclear disarmament initiative. Undoubtedly, it is the result of competent work done by Bush's team. The presentation of that initiative is particularly impressive: it is clearly worded and therefore can be understood by the general public. It also smacks of selflessness. The disarmament initiative seems to be carried now by the Americans.

However, I can't help having an uncertain feeling of *deja vu*. Let us see what the US President actually offered.

He mentioned scrapping nuclear artillery shells and nuclear warheads on short-range missiles. But we, the USSR, have been urging the start of negotiations on all categories of short-range nuclear forces, including airborne means which George Bush leaves intact. Militarily and politically short-range nuclear weapons are rendered irrelevant by the withdrawal of Soviet troops (their target) from Eastern Europe. To leave these weapons in place would create, for Americans, unwelcome frictions in their relations with post-socialist East European democracies.

Bush also announced the elimination of US naval non-strategic nuclear arms. However, Gorbachev himself suggested this as a mutually strictly verified step two years ago. Observers of the development of US defence programmes are aware that Americans have long ago accepted the need for the removal of these weapons and have been re-equipping their naval forces with non-nuclear weapons (because, according to their analysis, nuclear arms cannot win a naval battle).

Let us examine the US decision about their strategic forces. The USA would remove long-range bombers from stand-by duty, as a symbolic act for the new stage of Soviet-US relations. Simultaneously, the USA would call upon the USSR to permanently station its mobile ICBMs, to reciprocate the US step. In practical terms, this would make their deployment meaningless altogether, since they would be vulnerable to a US preemptive strike. However, this would neither fit the US-advanced strategic stability concept nor correspond to the agreed-upon objectives of the coming Soviet-US talks on strategic offensive weapons.

It is hardly possible to count as revolutionary such US steps as the removal from stand-by duty of ICBMs which are already earmarked for elimination in keeping with START (obsolete Minuteman-2 missiles were to be scrapped anyway) or dumping all work on the projected

railway deployment of ICBMs. The very idea of railway deployment of missiles has since long ago been regarded as militarily and technically unfeasible, and politically impracticable. By the way, the USSR abandoned this idea a year ago.

The American call for the Soviet Union to restrict modernization of its missile forces and to mutually eliminate all multiple warhead missiles would, if heeded, eliminate the core of Soviet strategic forces in general.

At the same time, the US proposals do not contain a single word about the other component of the strategic arms triad, the submarine-based ballistic missiles in which the US has always had vast superiority over the USSR.

Moreover, Bush made it abundantly clear that the USA's newest programmes, including development of the B-2 strategic bomber and the Strategic Defence Initiative "component," would be continued anyway.

All that makes me believe that the US President's fresh initiative is actually far from altruistic and original.

Nevertheless, it is an unprecedented step forward. If we ignore the familiar attempts to graft to the USSR the American "strategic arms culture" we must admit that for the first time in the post-WWII era the USA managed to transcend the boundaries of the traditional "confrontative" model of Soviet-US relations, when practical steps taken by one side in slashing nuclear arms were tied in with corresponding steps on the other side. This time, however, the majority of measures announced by George Bush are unilateral and do not require any preconditions. Even in the recent past both sides strove to preserve their obsolete weapons systems—to be used as a bargaining chip, which only in fact delayed any negotiations.

The US Administration's motives for advancing the recent initiative can be assessed differently, of course. One may list the federal budget deficit; Bush's desire to score "brownie points" before the presidential elections, or the fear caused by possible decentralization of the Soviet nuclear potential, as possible factors. Still, the latest US proposals reflect the qualitative change the world has undergone which has made the former pattern of military confrontation meaningless. The US presidential initiative requires an equally effective response on our part.

GENERAL

Development of Nuclear Arms' Role in Strategy

924P0016A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 Aug 91 p 5

[Article by Prof Valentin Larionov, doctor of historical sciences and maj gen, retired: "Atomic Weapons and Policy 46 Years After Hiroshima: From the History of Nuclear Strategy"]

[Text] Today is Hiroshima Day. 46 years ago an atomic bomb was used for the first time for its intended purpose. Then, in 1945, there was naturally no such thing as a special "nuclear" strategy: only a few months has passed since the first test on a test range—the weapon was quite "raw." However, the results of the use of the relatively low-yield charge—low by today's standards—surpassed all expectations: as we know, more than 100,000 people died. And who knows, maybe it was the large number of dead that turned the Bomb into something so horrible that it was absolutely unthinkable to use it in battle. But the horror reigned more among the civilians, while the military had to somehow adapt to the new weapon. Retired Maj Gen V. V. Larionov, presently a consultant for the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Global Security, was one of those who worked in the General Staff on the strategy of the "unthinkable" war.

Nuclear weapons produced a revolution in military thinking. But it was not the sort of revolution that followed the invention of gunpowder and firearms and opened up new horizons in military art. It was a turnaround that ultimately led military thinking into a dead end. But this did not happen right away and did not occur smoothly, but as the result of a struggle between conservative and radical tendencies in strategy.

Relying on my own experience in working on the theory of nuclear strategy, I would like to trace this difficult path of coming to know the truth, a path that has led from intoxication with force to recognition of the impossibility (to put it mildly, the infeasibility) of using it in its most radical forms.

For a long time my scholarly activity, in addition to my principal work on the General Staff, was connected with the development of the work titled "Voyennaya strategiya" [Military Strategy] under the editorship of Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy. This book sustained three editions (1962, 1963 and 1968); it was translated into all the world's principle languages, and in its time it reflected, in the open press, the state of strategic thought in the late 1950s to early 1960s.

First Stage: Unrecognized Prospects

Not a single revolution in the military area has been limited to technical innovations or structural changes in the army. They have inevitably been accompanied by a revision of views on the methods and forms of using military power. In other words, the question has immediately arisen: How does a new weapon transform military art?

With the emergence of nuclear arms, the point of departure for changes in strategic thinking began with what had been determined: henceforth the age-old gap between the goal of war (attaining victory over the enemy) and material capabilities (a sufficiency of military might) no longer existed. The most extreme goals became attainable with the use of the new weapon. Just

one problem arose—how could to use the power in a way that was less dangerous for oneself and more damaging to one's adversary.

In the first years hardly anyone thought about the suicidal consequences of the first use of the new weapon. Suffice it to say that U.S. political and military leaders were in the thrall of illusions that the American century had dawned. It was believed that the USSR would not be capable of ending the American atomic monopoly for 10 to 15 years.

Even the test of a Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 changed nothing in the mind of Gen Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project (for development of the first atomic bomb).

Knowingly or unknowingly, Soviet foreign-policy propaganda encouraged this attitude: until the end of 1953 it belittled the role and potential of atomic weapons. A broad-scale campaign to ban them was waged vigorously and with hope of success.

In an interview with an American journalist, J. V. Stalin firmly declared: "Atomic weapons will be banned." From that it followed that it would not do to take them into account in long-range strategic planning.

It appears that the "great leader" was dissembling. Proof of this is found in the testimony of Soviet atomic scientists, including Academician A. D. Sakharov, that has only recently become available. They all recall how Stalin and the project's chief Beria had rushed them in developing a bomb. It was regarded not just as a means of retaliation, but also as a powerful argument in support of diktat in international relations.

It seems that Stalin was relying, and to a significant extent, on the success of the 1949 atomic tests when he undertook his adventure involving the forcible unification of Korea in 1950.

On 14 September 1954 in the USSR, in the region of the village of Totskoye (Southern Urals Military District), a tactical troop exercise was conducted with the actual use of an atomic bomb. A 20-kiloton device was dropped from a plane and exploded by remote control at a height of 350 meters above the "battlefield" at 09:33. And at 10:10, that is, 37 minutes after the blast, the "attacking" troops crossed through the contaminated zone wearing protective suits. Covering the contaminated area on foot at a speed of about 4-5 kilometers an hour, the personnel received a radiation dose of 0.02-0.03 roentgens, while those in tanks received from one-fourth to one-eighth that amount.

All these data, which were kept under a curtain of secrecy for more than 30 years, served as the grounds for a very important conclusion for that time. It was drawn in an analysis of the exercise by then Minister of Defense N. A. Bulganin. Atomic weapons, he concluded, were not so terrible as "the imperialists claim they are." Troops can

operate under conditions of their use, successfully protecting themselves from contamination; operational norms (the breadth of the front, the depth of operations, the rates of attack) for the World War II period should be preserved, with a certain adjustment for the increase in firepower of troops in combat.

Thus, the question of the impossibility of victory in a nuclear war was removed. Incidentally, this conclusion of military science was soon used by N. S. Khrushchev for the purposes of political struggle. In exposing G. M. Malenkov as a member of the "antiparty group," he held against him his statement concerning the inevitable destruction of civilization in the event of a nuclear war, as a statement that was contrary to the experimental data and, at the same time, expressed a lack of faith in the socialist state's victory in the event of any war, which for its part would inevitably be just.

In all truthfulness it must be said that the Soviet politico-military establishment was not alone in such assessments of the role and military properties of atomic weapons in combat and military operations. The conclusions of several Western military experts were equally skeptical in the first years.

Let us cite some characteristic excerpts from the book by Col F. O. [Mikshe], "Atomic Weapons and the Army," which was published in the West in 1955 and won great prestige, especially in professional military circles. In 1956 the book was translated into Russian.

F. O. [Mikshe] wrote: "Atomic weapons, if used in battle, may prove less effective than is usually believed at present. ... Despite the huge concentration of firepower in one bomb, the outcome of a battle is decided...when the unusual power of this weapon forces one to resort to a special, successful maneuver."

And a second excerpt: "To the question of whether it is possible to win a war without atomic weapons, one must definitely answer: yes! At the same time, no one can say firmly that a war can be won without the use of conventional means of warfare, that is, through the use of atomic weapons alone."

As we can see, at the outset of the path by no means everyone thoroughly understood that military art had found itself in an impasse.

Granted, as experimental data were accumulated, this delusion quickly passed. Military theoreticians gradually came to recognize that atomic weapons represented not simply an increase in troops' firepower, but a fundamentally new technical factor that radically altered the principles and norms of military art. The process of this recognition formed the content of the next stage in nuclear strategy.

The 'Romantic' Stage in Nuclear Strategy (From the 'Sokolovskiy Strategy' to the Concept of 'Mutual Deterrence')

The "Sokolovskiy strategy" entered the history of the development of military thinking as a symbol of the start of a new "age." Formally, this was connected with the publication in the Soviet Union of the book "Voyennaya strategiya" [Military Strategy] by a collective of authors under the direction of former Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy. For a number of years after that the book's ideas were developed in every way possible in articles and public speeches, and not just by the book's authors. The creation of "Voyennaya strategiya" had been initiated by then Ministry of Defense Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskiy. After reading a previous closed publication on that topic, he wrote: "It would not be bad to prepare a generally accessible book on this for a wide readership."

Marshal Sokolovskiy, who had just quit the office of chief of the General Staff as a sign of protest against N. S. Khrushchev's hasty decision on a major reduction in armed forces, proved extremely fortuitous for the role of editor and head of the group of authors.

"Voyennaya strategiya" declares the following principles:

- a future world war will probably be a general nuclear-missile war and a decisive clash between the socialist world and capitalism;
- the main form of strategic actions in such a war will be nuclear-missile strikes by strategic offensive forces and the actions of anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense forces in repulsing those strikes;
- strategic operations on land theaters of war will be a form of exploitation of the results of strategic nuclear strikes (occupation operations of sorts);
- by virtue of the likely short-lived nature of the war, its outcome will depend entirely on the state of prewar readiness of the country's economy and armed forces. The hope for a high mobilizational capability during the war, as had been the case in the past, was considered groundless.

Many Sovietologists in the West are still trying to guess the extent to which this work reflected the official views of that time. From a legal standpoint, the work was strictly the product of its authors. At the same time, it must be said that the entire group of authors (with the exception of Col Gen A. I. Gastilovich, deputy director of the Academy of the General Staff) consisted of officers and generals who were serving at that time on the General Staff.

On the General Staff itself during that period, the following ideas enjoyed currency: life had confronted us with a choice—either an offensive, or defeat. It was believed that in military art the time had arrived of the triumph of offensive actions on both sides.

As history shows, then Minister of Defense R. Ya. Malinovskiy liked to repeat in conversations with the offers of the General Staff that to fight for a long time today (i.e., in the early 1960s) is to fight badly, to fight with great losses; it is the lot of the doomed, and we do not want to be among them.

Rodion Yakovkevich believed that the strategy of the "blitzkrieg" had been compromised not because it was sterile but because there were no effective material means to develop it. Today those means had appeared in the form of nuclear missiles, and one should not close one's eyes to that fact.

In fairness it must be said that by no means everyone at that time shared the positions expressed in the book. As a coauthor and coeditor, who helped the marshal prepare the book for the press, I will relate one dispute.

Gen A. I. Gastilovich, a man of principled character who had written the seventh chapter, "Preparation of the Country to Repulse Aggression," did not agree with Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy on a number of issues, and did not share the book's general conception, which he considered unrealistically optimistic. He assigned a more significant role than Sokolovskiy did to "permanent mobilization," including mobilization in the course of war. That was the reason that, at Gastilovich's insistence, the title page attributed to him responsibility only for the seventh chapter.

Probably not everyone knows that the book was nominated for a prize three times: the first time—for a Lenin Prize, the second time—for the M. V. Frunze Prize, and the third time—for the Ministry of Defense's incentive prize. All three times the book was turned down. Each time one of the official members of the prize committees would put forward his arguments against the book at the last minute. In the process, it was usually claimed that the book had done great harm to our peace-loving foreign policy, since it too openly and directly exploited the feasibility of nuclear strikes by the USSR as a means of reprisal for aggression and a means of thoroughly defeating the enemy.

When the attacks on the book became totally unfair and even offensive, and many letters were received by the CPSU Central Committee and forwarded from there to the group of authors, Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy appealed to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and asked for an official statement as to whether the book "Voyennaya strategiya" had benefited or harmed Soviet foreign policy. In response he received the unambiguous conclusion of Deputy Minister V. S. Semenov. Although I do not have the document at hand, I know very well that it was presented to the CPSU Central Committee. I saw a copy of the letter. Notes that I made say:

"The book has unquestionably played a positive role, since it sobered up overseas strategists and was one reason that prompted them to abandon the intimidating

[ustrashayushchaya] doctrine of massive retaliation and adopt the more moderate doctrine of 'flexible response.'"

Today in works analyzing the history of Soviet nuclear strategy from Hiroshima to our days, one can read that the book and its misanthropic concepts were provoked in the early 1960s by N. S. Khrushchev and were one important element in his "strategy of bluff," which the Soviet premier made wide use of. The actual force (some 50 nuclear weapons) that the USSR possessed at that time was supposedly doubled or tripled in propagandistic threats. What can be said on this score?

These claims, of course, contain a certain element of truth. One could even add that for some two or three years the Strategic Rocket Forces that were established at the end of 1959 remained a powerful and independent combat arm on paper only.

Today one can assert that the 1960s were precisely the decade when hopes for nuclear weapons determined decisions in the area of military development and strategic planning.

By the end of the 1960s two aspects of the military-technology rivalry between the United States and the USSR had begun to clearly emerge. On the one hand, it became clear that the United States was unable to decisively break away from the USSR in terms of the number of its nuclear missiles. On the other hand, it was recognized that from the standpoint of national security and the attainment of political goals, superiority in numbers of missiles and bombers, above a certain level, had no fundamental significance.

Having created, by 1968, an arsenal of various classes of nuclear weapons that surpassed, in terms of a number of its components, the 1960 quantitative level from fivefold to tenfold, U.S. ruling circles, as [H. York], then director of the U.S. Defense Department's [scientific research and technical development agency], noted: "came to feel the full weight of that burden and the illusoriness of the hopes of solving the problem of national security through the race in military hardware."

The conclusions of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, published in a 28 September 1968 report, noted:

"Since the time of Hiroshima, the comparative strength of our nuclear forces relative to the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal has gradually changed from monopoly, to massive supremacy allowing the development of success, and finally, to the present situation. ... At present tendencies have been established in the direction of parity, and the sort of conditions that some specialists classify as the 'unquestionable effect of mutual deterrence' have emerged, whereby no provocations, with the exception of a nuclear attack on our own territory, would result in a deliberate exchange of strikes employing strategic weapons."

Thus, the changes that were taking place in armaments, as well as the evolution of the balance of the United States' and the USSR's strategic forces, were having a decisive influence on strategic thinking.

The doctrine of "massive retaliation" in the United States and the "Sokolovskiy strategy" in the USSR were raising doubts for a number of reasons. Some people called them "improbable bluffing." Other strategic policymakers, while not rejecting the idea itself of an exchange of nuclear strikes, essentially criticized that idea from the standpoint of traditional militarism. One such professional critic in the United States, for example, wrote: "The mistake in striving to rely on a massive nuclear strike in all cases consists, indisputably, in the fact that we deprive ourselves of the freedom of choosing the forces and weapons to be used. The adversary can count on our never undertaking to resolve any local conflict through the use of thermonuclear weapons. Therefore, if we have no other weapon in our arsenal besides nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, we will find ourselves facing the danger of gradual destruction."

The most consistent position in the United States on this issue was held at that time by Harvard University professor Henry Kissinger. He wrote: "Since we lost the atomic monopoly, we have been limited by the inability to find any means of using our most destructive weapons with the least risk. The more terrifying the power of our weapons becomes, the less likely their use becomes in practice. The price of launching an all-out nuclear war is too high for it to become our sole choice."

Kissinger proposed the development of a doctrine of so-called "intermediate" war between total nuclear apocalypse and capitulation, a war which should not be a deviation from the "pure" case of total war, but an independent form of employing military force. In short, he was talking about limited nuclear or conventional wars.

Starting with the mid-1960s, Soviet military doctrine was developed on the basis of those same postulates.

American students of Soviet military strategy usually link it with the departure of N. S. Khrushchev from the country's leadership. And as documentary confirmation of this, they cite A. A. Grechko's book written soon afterwards.

"We recognize," the author wrote, "that in a future war, if the imperialists launch one, nuclear missiles will be the decisive means of armed struggle. Along with them, conventional weapons will also find use, and under certain conditions units might conduct military operations using only conventional weapons.

"War may start with the use of either nuclear weapons or conventional weapons. Different scenarios for the use of all types of weapons that an adversary possesses are possible. ..."

Incidentally, today one can explain a certain curiosity in the third edition of the book "Voyennaya strategiya." In 1966, when the authors' group was proposed to begin preparing that edition for the Officer's Library series, Marshal Sokolovskiy insisted on making serious changes in the book, since many of its propositions had become dated. The changes were, first of all, supposed to pertain to the rejection of a nuclear strike as the main form of strategic action, and to the recognition of conventional operations. A manuscript was prepared in that spirit. But the censor intervened, and not without orders from higher up. It was ordered that everything be left the way it had been in the second edition, in order, as it was naively argued, to mislead a likely adversary as to our views, and therefore to intimidate [ustrashat] him.

In brief, the essence of the new stage in strategic thinking can be formulated as a desire to ensure readiness to repulse aggression and provide for the country's security with forces and weapons that were "measured" in accordance with the scale of the threat. Reliance was placed on expanding the range of the "utility" of military power, removing its fetters, and replacing the formula of "either-or" with a formula of "both-and."

From the standpoint of military technology, the essence of both was explained rather simply. As long as the capability of weapons had certain physical limits in terms of range and destructive force, the question of limits in the use of military force did not arise for the military-policy leadership. Strategy in any war, big or small, was based on the principle of the maximum use of the available arsenal of the means of force. But when it became obvious that the very means of waging armed struggle contained the potential of unlimited destruction, the desire to somehow limit war in its means, in space and in time became perfectly natural. It was under the sign of this desire that certain strategic concepts of that time became established in practice.

Recognition of the Impossibility of Victory in Nuclear War. The Impasses of Military Thought

In the history of international relations, the 1970s have gone down as the years of detente and active searches for ways of and formulas for maintaining international security. The idea of the impermissibility of nuclear war and the need to avert it gradually began to penetrate to all strata of the world community.

In the meantime, the improvement and quantitative buildup of nuclear arsenals were proceeding at full pace. New generations of conventional weapons appeared. In a number of areas these weapons started to come close to nuclear weapons in lethal force, and in accuracy and dependability even surpassed them.

In the long run, despite the yearning of peoples for peace, these two parallel courses promised nothing good. The flywheel of the race in military technology, cranked up to full force, kept turning and turning, following its own logic and internal laws of technological development.

Strategic military thinking also fell captive to the development of military technology.

The point of departure for a fundamentally different approach to the problems of nuclear strategy was the proposal of the concept of the new political thinking, the refraction of which in the military area found reflection in the following principles of international and national security:

- the world is interconnected, and the threat of war is becoming a universal human tragedy;
- the way to the strengthening of security and the stability of peace lies not through confrontation and the buildup of armaments, but through disarmament, the elimination of opposing military blocs, and nuclear disarmament;
- security cannot be achieved at the other side's expense; it can only be mutual;
- all of the aforementioned principles should find reflection in the transformation of military doctrines and military conceptions in the direction of defense.

Today, in 1991, some of what was conceived in 1985-1988 has already been implemented. But a great deal remains, including the main thing—we must surmount the impasses into which military thinking has been taken today.

Let us start with a disclosure of the basic concepts: war, military force, military victory, and the means and forms of waging war.

Here it would not be superfluous to recall once again that it is not just in connection with such a new factor as the appearance of nuclear weapons that we speak of the content of these concepts. Having said "no" to nuclear war, in policy and strategy we cannot recognize to this day that this requires a fundamental revision of many categories of military art.

Lately I have had frequent occasion to participate in discussions of the problems of war and peace with scholars, public figures and professional military men of various countries.

And I am becoming increasingly convinced that the divergence of opinions concerning the present state of the world, despite a general recognition of the ruinous consequences of nuclear and conventional wars, is still very great. It is interesting that the watershed between different positions often follows not the line of East-West confrontation but the line separating conservatives and radicals, who have, respectively, practically joined together on a basis that spans blocs. One gets the impression that with the spread of the principles of the new political thinking, conservative-minded people are united by the common postulates of a kind of "world military industrial complex." Naturally, none of the representatives of the world military industrial complex in various countries has ever recognized this, because

there are no official treaties and agreements on this subject. But unbiased people who are familiar with the mechanism by which budgets and military programs are drawn up, know that this is precisely the case.

With the appearance of nuclear weapons, the role and place of military force as an instrument of policy changed radically. In addition to waging war, armed forces acquired new tasks this side of "D" day: the maintenance of parity on an increasingly low level of minimal deterrence; the maintenance of forces and means of early warning in a state of technical readiness; technical verification of the observance of concluded arms limitation treaties; the improvement and utilization of means of preventing incidents on the land, in the air, at sea, and so forth.

In short, under these new, "nuclear" conditions, from being a tool of destruction, armed forces gradually must turn into a genuine instrument for protecting the peace and preventing nuclear catastrophe. A means created for war must serve peace.

Unfortunately, such an understanding of the tasks of armed forces is making headway with great difficulty. Models and plans of war are still being worked out by the general staffs of various countries. That can be concluded from the content of annual large-scale games and exercises. In the practice of the operational training of forces and staffs in the West and the East, not once yet has there been a recorded case of alternative security games and exercises, in which a mechanism for reducing (de-escalating) the threat of war and creating the conditions for avoiding disaster has been worked out on maps or computers.

But if military art is the theory and practice of the preparation and waging of war, there is no getting around the fact that the purpose of war is victory. It seems that even today not a single strategic plan, not a single existing model or scenario of war developed by general staffs envisages the defeat of one's own state. And what realistically was victory supposed to mean in the not-so-distant past—in the age of conventional weapons, as we now say?

First—the defeat of armed forces as the main object of destruction in an armed struggle; second—the undermining of the enemy's economic capacity; and third—the destruction of his political system or replacement of his government.

It is inconceivable to attain all these goals without invasion and the occupation of hostile territory. But occupation does not promise military victory, since it carries the threat of a deterioration in one's strategic position in comparison to one's initial position, and it does not open up prospects of victory. And, of course, there is no use even speaking of the possibility of obtaining some sort of economic advantage as the result of war. Captured and devastated land with an agonizing population will not argument the victory's material strength.

In connection with the question of the essence and means of attaining victory, a question arises regarding the problematical nature of one more dogma of military thought. As officially set forth, it is worded as follows: "only a decisive offensive leads to victory."

Once again "war to victory" is chosen here as an initial position. In this connection, attempts are made to prove that victory is unattainable by employing defensive means. But, one wonders, is it legitimate today to speak of victory in a nuclear, or even a conventional, war in Europe?

It is perfectly obvious that this has brought strategic planning to an impasse.

Naturally, the rational approach is to recognize the impossibility of victory in a future war, something which, strictly speaking, has already been formulated on the political level. The question is merely that this must be transferred to the practice of modeling and strategic planning.

And here, I think, a strict and complete linkage between the political and military-technology aspects of military doctrines is essential.

The limits of the use of military force should be determined by the impossibility of winning a war. A repudiation of victory in war—that is the path to a safe world. Only on this basis should future models of security be developed, and only in this way should the sides' military potentials be compared.

It is impossible to stop human technical thought. But it can be channeled into the creation of increasingly new weapons and military hardware, into the development of super-clever models of war, or it can create technical warning systems and models for preventing war.

But many people still believe that military force can perform the role of an instrument of power politics. That it is maintained solely for the sake of serving as a means of defeating an enemy in the event of war. That war should be planned and waged to victory, and that for this purpose superior, even redundant, forces are needed. That the sole means of achieving victory will be the offensive. This dogmatic scheme is coming into blatant contradiction with today's military realities and with the new political thinking.

Soberminded people today see the surmounting of the crisis and emergence from the impasse of political thinking to lie in the prevention of war, in repudiation of the cultivation of models of military victory, and in reasonable sufficiency and non-offensive defense.

Hopes for 'Transcending' Deterrence Viewed

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[Article by Sergey Vadimovich Kortunov, candidate of historical sciences and counselor at the Arms Limitation

and Disarmament Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Is It Possible To Transcend Deterrence?"; first five paragraphs are English-language summary of article]

[Text]

The Issue in Brief

S. Kortunov in his article "Is It Possible To Transcend Deterrence?", setting aside various ideological stereotypes and emotional attitudes, comes to the conclusion that deterrence as a principle of military strategy in terms of both terminology and substance constitutes a premise on which a defensive military strategy is based, since rather than attacking the potential enemy it implies dissuading him from the idea that war may bring him the attainment of his objectives.

Recently the Soviet Union has expressed its willingness to hold an in-depth discussion of the concept of minimal nuclear deterrence at an expert level between nuclear powers. That signals a willingness not only to take into consideration conceptual approaches of the other side but also to take them into account in our foreign policy, and what is more important, military and technological practices.

Dr. Kortunov comes up with the idea that in a divided world the task of reducing nuclear confrontation seems to be confined to teaching the level of minimum nuclear deterrence. To fully overcome deterrence it is also necessary to overcome the current structure of international relations.

At first glance, this appears a utopian prospect but the trends in the international evolution which have clearly manifested themselves in recent years show that important preconditions are evolving for transforming radically the system of international relations.

In this context to the mind of the author the new U.S. concept of going "beyond containment" apparently deserves attention. After all, it is predicated on the idea of incorporating the USSR in the world community and of jointly resolving global problems. If freed of various ideological and military power stereotypes inherited from the past and given a truly common human dimension, this concept may serve as a basis for the world's progress to a new community of the 21st century.

One of the basic problems of disarmament and, on a larger scale, of international relations as a whole is the continuing difference of opinion about the role of nuclear weapons in guaranteeing international security. In the Soviet Union, many continue to think that genuine security of states may be guaranteed only on a nonnuclear basis and that one should therefore strive for the complete removal of this weapon from military arsenals. This approach is opposed by the Western view of nuclear weapons as the only effective means of preventing a general war under the present conditions. On the Soviet side, the postulates of the doctrine of nuclear

deterrence are being subjected to resolute criticism, whereas in the West it has become a kind of "holy cow."

To be fair, it should be noted that the fundamental difference in conceptual approaches does not yet hinder the USSR and United States from negotiating a reduction of nuclear arms and even of signing important agreements in this area. But the situation may change when it is a matter not simply of reducing "surpluses" of nuclear weapons (without closing the way to their qualitative improvement), that is, of agreeing on verifiable procedures for the elimination of those arms that in one way or another have served that warranty period and are intended to be written off, but of nuclear disarmament in the literal sense of the word.

In this—subsequent and inevitable—stage, disagreements on the question of nuclear deterrence may become an obstruction to progress toward a truly secure world that may stop the entire process of negotiations.

At the present moment, when the world has come quite close to a radical reduction of strategic offensive arms and conventional armed forces, people prefer "not to notice" this danger. And this is quite easily explained: now, when very important areas of agreement have been probed on major security questions at the cost of great efforts undertaken at the very highest political level, it would hardly be justifiable to enter into sharp conceptual arguments of a confrontational nature at the official level.

At the same time, as everyone knows, a problem is not solved by avoiding it. Sooner or later it will have to be resolved. For this reason, it is not too early to talk about this, as some think. Talks must be started right now.

Above all one must determine whether or not the disagreement indicated above is really fundamental in nature.

If one sets aside various ideological stereotypes and emotional attitudes and takes a sober look at the existing realities, then the honest answer to this question will be negative.

It should be noted above all that as a principle of military strategy "deterrence" is not an invention of the nuclear age but is just as ancient a phenomenon as war itself. At the same time, terminologically as well as in essence, the principle at hand represents one of the postulates precisely of defensive military strategy, inasmuch as it presupposes not an attack but dissuading the probable adversary from thinking that the unleashing of war will help him to achieve the objectives that he is counting on. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of deterrence was originally identical with the doctrine of preventing war through the establishment of an adequate threat of a counterstrike, that is, the repulsion of aggression.

What did the nuclear age contribute to this situation? Just one thing: because of the colossal destructive power of nuclear weapons, deterrence began to be implemented

through the threat of the complete annihilation of the potential aggressor or, at a minimum, the inflicting of unacceptable damage against him.

In this connection, it would be at least naive to suppose that any of the nuclear powers is implementing any other doctrine than the doctrine of deterrence, provided, of course, that it does not intend to strike first. (Of course we are not talking about the term per se, which has largely been discredited thanks to our efforts, but about the essence of the matter). And the Soviet Union is no exception here: while verbally condemning nuclear weapons and resolutely criticizing nuclear deterrence, in practice it has been and continues to be guided by precisely this doctrine.¹ One can present more than one statement of representatives of the higher military leadership of the USSR confirming this conclusion. And it could not be otherwise under the conditions of a divided world, when the actions of the other side—especially in the 1950's and 1960's—not only represented a policy of brinkmanship but could quite justifiably be assessed as the preparation for a surprise attack against our country using nuclear weapons. It can be said that even today in purely military terms the strategic forces of the USSR are called upon to carry out approximately the same tasks as the American forces, with the only difference being that the Soviet leadership, in contrast to that of the Americans, considers further reliance on nuclear arms as a means of preventing war to be unpromising and extremely dangerous.

One must also dispel the deep-seated stereotype in our consciousness that says that the United States bears full responsibility for the nuclear arms race. True, they were the first to test and build nuclear weapons. But this indisputable fact merely means that at that time the United States had the most advanced technology in this area. It is difficult to believe that the Soviet Union would not have done the same if it had had the real possibility of building the atomic bomb in 1945 or earlier. After that, the attainment of advanced positions in comparison with the United States in particular directions of the nuclear arms race became a matter of national pride for us. It is enough to recall, for example, how the first test of a thermonuclear device (we developed it before the Americans) or the launch into space of the artificial earth satellite were presented in our official announcements. In subsequent years, the military competition between the USSR and the United States in the nuclear area developed in accordance with the logic of "action and counteraction," by no means being limited by moral or any other considerations but basically only by financial and technical possibilities. As for the Soviet Union, having attained the status of a "superpower" largely because of its nuclear weapons, it sought in the 1970's and 1980's to retain that status at any cost through the maintenance of military parity with the United States, initially understood as quantitative equality in the area of strategic offensive arms and later as approximate equality of the combat possibilities of the nuclear forces of the sides in different kinds of combat operations. In so

doing, the military competition continued even after all conceivable and inconceivable capabilities of guaranteed destruction had been exceeded many times over. Such were the rigid "rules of the game" in the bipolar world in which the USSR and United States "deterred" one another on the basis of the assumption that the other side represents an "evil empire."

In the light of all these facts, it becomes quite understandable why our criticism of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, just as all sorts of incantations about the "immorality" of nuclear weapons, were perceived in the West as unconstructive and possibly not completely sincere. There they judged our policy not according to declarations but military programs. It is superfluous to mention that the perceptible gap between the publicly declared military doctrine and the realities of our military development only heightened the West's mistrust of us, hindering the search for mutual understanding on key problems of security and disarmament.

Clearly one should also recognize that with respect to nuclear disarmament the United States and other countries of the West held a more consistent and honest position than we did. De facto—we will note this once again—both sides based their policy precisely on this principle. A confirmation of this is the ABM Treaty, which limited the antiballistic-missile defense systems to a purely symbolic number of antiballistic missiles and actually opened up the USSR and United States to a counterstrike. The treaty thereby essentially legalized the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence through the threat of the guaranteed destruction of the aggressor in a counterstrike.

From the point of view of strategic stability, this situation remains decisive to this day. And one cannot disregard it in real politics. Also a reality of our time is the fact that the responsibility for the existing situation is borne not only by the United States but by all nuclear powers. And hence any criticism of deterrence relates fully to the USSR as well.

The systematic removal of foreign policy from the realm of ideology presupposes the complete overcoming of the stereotypes of propagandistic thinking. Specifically we should recognize once and for all that nuclear deterrence is the "modus vivendi" of the contemporary world, of which we are a part, and hence it is necessary to accept the existing "rules of the game" until humanity devises a fundamentally new system for maintaining international security. In summary, the question is how to bring closer a new world that is safe for all, being guided by the existing realities rather than fruitlessly fighting against them.

Minimal Deterrence as an Intermediate Step on the Way to a Nuclear-Free World

Some well-known and high-ranking Western experts frequently say that if the USSR recognized the doctrine of nuclear deterrence this would contribute to greater mutual understanding, would strengthen the West's trust

of the USSR, and possibly would make it possible to reach agreements on radical reductions of nuclear weapons more quickly. We, in turn, repeatedly called upon the NATO countries to consider once again the basic postulates of the doctrine of deterrence, comparing it with the current tasks in the strengthening of security and the restructuring of international relations under democratic principles.

Recently people here have gradually begun to probe compromise approaches. On the one hand, the Soviet Union recognized at a high political level that it frequently was guilty of a simplified attitude toward the doctrine of deterrence. It was also declared that we give this doctrine its due and recognize that it played a useful role in preserving peace over a rather long period of history. The Soviet Union also expressed a willingness to discuss the concept of "minimal deterrence" more intensively at the level of experts from the nuclear powers and states in whose territory nuclear weapons are deployed.

On the other hand, the leadership of the United States, including President G. Bush, expressed for the first time in the postwar period a willingness to "transcend deterrence" in East-West relations. Although in the case at hand it is a matter of overcoming the doctrine of "political containment" that the United States always treated as the containment of socialism or "Soviet expansionism," the concept under discussion also cannot fail to influence the American doctrine of nuclear deterrence as flowing out of the first to a certain extent. It can be assumed that in the foreseeable future the American doctrine will drift precisely in the direction of "minimal deterrence," that is, the guaranteeing of stability at a significantly lower level of nuclear confrontation. In any case, the concept of "transcending deterrence" represents something new in the foreign political thinking of the United States, which previously never went beyond the scope of the exclusively geopolitical and egocentric approaches of military power.

The indicated declarations by the USSR and United States are not merely a verbal balancing act. In them can be seen their willingness not only to take into account the conceptual approaches of the other side but also to consider them in the practice of their foreign and—what is even more significant—military-technical policy. In essence, this is a fundamental shift in the approaches of the sides toward the guaranteeing of security, the importance of which cannot easily be overestimated. The United States recognized for the first time that in the future relations with the USSR may be built on a qualitatively new and more stable and secure basis. The USSR agreed that on the way to a nuclear-free world it is possible as an intermediate step to achieve a level of nuclear confrontation that would correspond to the Western concept of "minimal nuclear deterrence." It can be assumed that here an area of agreement is beginning to come into being that opens up fundamentally new prospects.

Of course all of these questions need to be specified and require joint in-depth study. Otherwise, as has happened repeatedly in the past, they will amount to no more than slogans.

What is "minimal nuclear deterrence"?

First of all it should be noted that although there is no shortage of diverse versions of this concept in Western political science, only France and Great Britain have presented it as an official state doctrine. And it is more political than military in nature, for both of these countries, without going into detail, declare that their nuclear capabilities are what corresponds to "minimal deterrence."

But leaving aside for the time being the question of the extent to which these statements are justified, it may be said that the problem of reducing "central" nuclear arms to the level of "minimal deterrence" is currently urgent for only two powers—the USSR and the United States, whose capabilities have greatly exceeded all theoretical "thresholds of sufficiency" to guarantee a devastating counterstrike under any scenario of a first strike by a potential aggressor. But despite the fact that it probably would be possible to keep each other from attacking through nuclear forces only a few percent as large as the forces that now exist, both sides are continuing to implement their nuclear programs based, in particular, on excessively high standards for an unacceptable loss in a nuclear war.

Apparently the reason for this should be sought in the fact that both sides continue to think that the approximate parity of the operational capabilities of the strategic nuclear forces of the sides in different kinds of combat operations guaranteeing "equal losses" in a nuclear war supposedly allows them to maintain the status of "superpowers" and to transfer the quantitative parameters of their strategic arsenals into some sort of political dividends. These erroneous notions prevailing because of the inertia in the consciousness of the military and industrial circles of both countries (which are apparently inclined to view nuclear weapons as a permissible instrument of policy) cannot, of course, fail to have a negative impact on the process of the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms.

If one looks at the treaty for the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms from this point of view, then it must be recognized that despite the fact that in political-psychological terms it is doubtless a meaningful symbol for the formation of a new nature in Soviet-American interaction and the intention of the two sides to cross the Rubicon of confrontation and "cold war," this treaty is simultaneously a very modest step in the direction of the establishment of a stable strategic interrelationship between the USSR and the United States, not to mention the limitation of their nuclear capabilities to the limits of "minimal deterrence."

In this connection, considering the fact that the programs for the creation [sozdaniye] of strategic arms for

the first decade of the 21st century are already being established at this time, a guarantee of continuity in the process of nuclear disarmament and the immediate start of negotiations on its next stage are becoming extremely important from the point of view of the strengthening of stability and the movement toward a "minimal nuclear deterrence" and then toward a "world without deterrence."

At the same time, one could talk about the complete elimination of those arms systems that each of the sides considers most provocative and dangerous to itself, representing a potential for attack, and about the achievement, in a manner of speaking, of a "zero option" for such systems.

The main objective of the subsequent stage in the reduction of strategic offensive arms would be not so much quantitative reductions as the formation of a structure of strategic forces of the sides that would not provide either of them a material or technical basis for a surprise first strike. In determining its parameters, it is essential to repudiate not only the capability for a preemptive counterforce strike but also the option of a surprise counterstrike (that is, a warning strike), threatening a crisis of stability, and to concentrate exclusively on the scenario of a counterstrike.

As for tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, this problem has much more political than military importance. In the West, the tactical nuclear weapons of the United States deployed in Europe were always viewed as an instrument to deter a hypothetical attack by the USSR using "superior" conventional armed forces and also as a means ensuring a "transatlantic linkage" with American strategic nuclear forces. Therefore, their purpose was always considered to be not so much tactical as "prestrategic," just as were the nuclear weapons of France and Great Britain that were intended for use in the European theater of military operations.

In this context, it becomes clear, in the first place, that parity between NATO and the USSR in this area has no essential military importance—in any case for the West—and, secondly, that the level of these forces is directly related to the balance of conventional arms in Europe. Hence it can be said with certainty that the elimination of imbalances and asymmetries in the area of conventional armed forces in Europe in accordance with the Paris treaty also opens up the real possibility for sufficiently radical reductions of tactical nuclear weapons to the level of "minimal deterrence." What this level will be must be determined in the course of negotiations. It is clear, however, that the capabilities of the sides that will be reduced to this level must be exhausted precisely in the function of deterrence and not give the other side the impression that they may be used in a first strike, including in the interests of initiating combat operations through conventional armed forces.

There is still another problem of considerable importance that has to do directly with the determination of

the level of "minimal nuclear deterrence." It is the limitation and reduction of sea-based nuclear weapons. Unless it is resolved, efforts in other areas of nuclear disarmament will most likely not be realized, for there will be extensive possibilities for the intensive "transfusion" of military competition to this direction of the nuclear arms race, for a "flanking" maneuver around future agreements on strategic offensive arms and tactical nuclear weapons.

In consideration of the significant naval superiority of the United States and other NATO countries, nuclear arms on the seas have great importance for the USSR in terms of deterrence. Nevertheless, the USSR proposed to the United States the start of negotiations on the gradual reduction and elimination of sea-based nuclear weapons, in the course of the first stage of which one could examine the question of the elimination of all nuclear weapons on surface ships. Clearly this would also lead to the establishment of "minimal nuclear deterrence" on the seas.

With respect to tactical land and sea-based nuclear weapons, the concept of "minimal deterrence" is conditional in nature and may be seen only as an intermediate step toward their complete elimination. For most probably minimal deterrence simultaneously presupposes the highest possible "nuclear threshold" that must preclude any possibility of the use of nuclear weapons other than as the most extreme means. But it is objectively lowered with the introduction of nonstrategic weapons in the nuclear arsenals. In this connection, based on R. McNamara's methods for calculating "unacceptable losses," in the long term "minimal deterrence" must be guaranteed exclusively through the strategic forces of the USSR and the United States at the level of 500 to 2,000 warheads depending upon at what stage other nuclear powers are included in nuclear disarmament with the complete elimination of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

The achievement of this level is an exceptionally difficult task. Here one must also take into account a whole series of other factors, including the prospects for the development of defensive strategic arms, above all large-scale ABM systems and strategic nonnuclear arms, in particular air and sea-launched cruise missiles, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, missiles, missile technology, etc.

To this should also be added the important circumstance that a radical reduction of the nuclear confrontation is not realized straight away and is linked with the resolution of many military, political, and other questions. In this respect, nuclear disarmament represents only part of a much broader process through deep reductions of armed forces and conventional arms and their structural reorganization under the principles of nonoffensive defense, through the introduction of far-reaching measures to build confidence in international relations, and finally through fundamental changes in international relations as a whole, the gradual replacement of the instruments of military force for preserving the peace

through guarantees of security in political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian areas, and their legal fixation in the corresponding bilateral and multilateral agreements.

On the other hand, it is also obvious that nuclear disarmament itself is becoming a key factor in this process. For the value of the agreements achieved in this area is determined not only and not so much by the quantity of weapons being reduced. Much more important is the fact that they are accompanied by affirmations of new and quite unprecedented standards of openness, trust, and mutual verification in the military and political relations of states, which provides not only for the implementation of disarmament measures but also creates a kind of "psychological comfort" and leads to greater predictability and stability.

Especially characteristic in this connection are the positive results of the INF Treaty. Having eliminated just 4 percent of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and United States, it brought the relations between the two countries out of a state of deep crisis and was a very powerful impulse for the entire disarmament process. Obviously the pending reduction of strategic nuclear forces of the USSR and United States as well as the removal of the potential for a surprise attack from the conventional arsenals of the European states will radically improve the whole situation on the continent and in the world as a whole and will have a generally positive impact on the entire complex of international relations.

The gradual process of nuclear disarmament does not reject the existence of mechanisms of deterrence for a certain historical interval of time. But in this essentially transitional period from excessive nuclear armament to a nuclear-free world, the role of such mechanisms would be performed by concerted treaty obligations under the conditions of a very extensive infrastructure for verification of their strict observance as well as maximum transparency in military actions. In other words, deterrence through nuclear power in this stage of history would gradually be transformed into a transparent political-legal deterrence through verification. As for the purely military aspect of deterrence, the effects would be minimized and the most dangerous dimensions would be eliminated. As for doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons under such a development of deterrence would be permitted only theoretically as the most extreme means in a situation that would be practically precluded.

There is no doubt that the progress through bilateral and multilateral verifiable agreements to new agreements defined by the level of "minimal nuclear deterrence" and to quantitative-qualitative parameters of nuclear capabilities will contribute not only to the overcoming of the confrontational approaches that characterized the international situation just a few years ago but also to a profound and irreversible reorganization of international relations on a qualitatively new basis and to the

rise of essentially new structural elements of the mechanism for mutual security and the necessary guarantees for its effective functioning.

Here, however, it is necessary to pause, for the picture that is being drawn is too rosy. Most probably, along with the development of this process, certain retarding mechanisms will also be introduced. Practice has shown that nuclear disarmament is a matter possessing "increased resistance" and apparently the opposition will increase as one approaches the boundary beyond which "arms control" ends and the actual elimination of nuclear weapons begins. In our world that is still far from calm, the achievement of a level of "minimal deterrence" is possible above all through reserves of redundancy of nuclear arsenals but the farther one goes the more difficult it will be to advance along this path. In the final analysis, precisely "minimal deterrence" may become an insurmountable barrier to a nuclear-free world if, of course, one does not expect a sudden radical change in the situation in international relations. For the achievement of a minimum agreed level of nuclear arms essentially does not affect the bases of deterrence and gives no answer at all to the question of what will ultimately be the basis for international security in a nuclear-free age and what is the alternative to deterrence.

It will not be possible, as some think, to surmount this barrier in one leap and immediately do away with nuclear weapons if humanity does not see that the world into which it is entering will be less dangerous than the previous world. For the building of a nuclear-free world under present conditions cannot, of course, be understood as a simple return to the prenuclear world with all of its problems and conflicts.

Is the Price for a Mutual Lack of Trust Not Too High?

One of the strongest arguments against the doctrine of nuclear deterrence in the present stage is perhaps the fact that it became an integral part of that system of international security that developed after World War II and that we want to get rid of in the foreseeable future.

Whatever incredible efforts may have been made at the highest political level to go beyond the limits of the "cold war," the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence—if it continues to materialize in monstrously increased military capabilities—will inevitably begin to reproduce the entire set of confrontational relations between states.

Immanent in the doctrine of deterrence is the concept of an "implacable enemy" and the idea of mutual intimidation and competition for a build-up of nuclear arms. It is as though it is absorbing into itself or, more accurately, into the instruments of its implementation, the entire load of mutual distrust, suspicion, enmity, and false, often caricatured, notions of one another that have accumulated over the many years of the "cold war." The gradual overcoming of all of these stereotypes also presupposes a new look at the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

Indeed, until recently the nuclear threat was personified. In other words, each of the sides saw the other as the indisputable carrier of such a threat. Hence the inaccurate assessments of the real intentions of the potential adversary, which represented the main reason for the destabilization of the strategic situation.

If the "enemy image" is dispelled, then the nuclear threat is depersonified as well. Psychologically it is already beginning to come not from the other side but from nuclear weapons themselves. But the nature of these weapons is such that however few of them may remain in the world, there will still be "too many." For at best they ensure equal danger, which is nothing other than an ersatz or surrogate for real security. Even if the threat of intentional nuclear war is reduced to zero, with nuclear weapons there will remain a danger of the start of war as the result of an accident, miscalculation, or provocation. It is for this reason that the lowest level of the nuclear balance that one might choose is incompatible with real—be it international or national—security, which by definition is the lack of danger.

Still, whatever moral, political, or other objections may be raised against the doctrine of deterrence, there is apparently just one truly solid guarantee for its being overcome and that is the gradual movement of mankind or at least of the industrially developed countries to a new world community in the 21st century, that is, in the direction of a more and more homogeneous world.

If one looks at the doctrine of deterrence in this broad historical context, its absurdity becomes very obvious.

First of all, the side that professes this doctrine takes as the basis for its policy the very worst case for the development of events, proceeding not from the true intentions of the opponent but from assessments—sometimes quite arbitrary—of the potential harm that he can cause. It is difficult to imagine a more absurd situation: because if it is projected to interpersonal relations, life will become unbearable, for in this event would we see every passing person as a potential robber, rapist, or murderer. Nevertheless, precisely such notions are inherent in the doctrine of deterrence.

Another inherent flaw of this doctrine is the complete incongruence between the supposed rationality of the threat to use nuclear weapons and the absolute irrationality of their use in the event that deterrence "does not work." For whereas it theoretically would seem to make sense to deter an enemy from attacking through the threat of a counterstrike, no reasonable justification can be found for inflicting such a strike.

Indeed, what could be the rational objective of a retaliatory strike by the side subjected to a nuclear attack? For essentially it would be destroyed and hence the objective of guaranteeing security would no longer apply!

The only possible motive for a counterstrike may be the mere desire for revenge under the principle of "dying

with trumpets blazing." Although inherent in the nature of man, revenge is neither a rational nor a constructive action.

Thus, the doctrine of deterrence, which infers a nuclear counterstrike as "punishment" of an aggressor who is the first to use nuclear weapons, essentially totally departs from traditional military affairs. Not offering any measures for defense in the traditional sense but promising to destroy the homeland of the aggressor, if that is the destiny of the own homeland, it becomes even more absurd, requiring that none of the sides make a serious effort to protect its own population. But putting aside any emotional or rhetorical considerations, precisely this is the essence of the ABM Treaty. Actually this treaty, as important as it may be for strategic stability, prescribes the building of national security only on the firm certainty of the destruction of the probable enemy, as though the objective is precisely his destruction rather than avoiding one's own destruction.

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence has still another aspect that its supporters prefer not to mention. The threat of the destruction of the probable enemy is identical to the threat to destroy all of humanity. Current studies of the probable consequences of nuclear war unequivocally indicate that the result will be the same for the aggressor and his punisher as well as for outside observers. Thus, here the "security" of nuclear powers has essentially been bought at the price of the annihilation of all mankind.

In a world dominated by the doctrine of deterrence, the nuclear forces of the states are essentially brought together in one whole—a kind of "doomsday machine" that will punish all through destruction if deterrence "breaks down." And every member of the "nuclear club" is actually given the opportunity to veto the further existence of the human race. If any society gave to each of its citizens the possibility of killing other citizens, then it would probably be considered at least absurd. But for some reason, when it is a matter of the organization of the entire world and of ensuring its survival, there are a lot of "responsible" politicians who view such a system of things as a masterpiece of wise government.

Not being able to deny the obvious faults of the doctrine of deterrence, these politicians present what they consider to be their "ace" argument: deterrence kept the peace for more than 40 years. At the same time, however, they do not present any proof. But this is not surprising, for it is not actually possible to prove this thesis: on the same basis one could say that peace was preserved during these years as a result, for example, of brotherly love. For in no way is it possible to verify this!

But even if one assumes that peace is guaranteed precisely through the doctrine of deterrence, one must also recognize that the price that has to be paid for it is too high. Since mankind entered the nuclear age, it has been living in a situation in which the mechanism of destruction has been perfectly tuned and the trigger is kept just

a hair away from being activated abruptly and unexpectedly. Just the mere probability that a nuclear disaster could end in the disappearance of the human race deprives the members of the world community of any right to pursue such a risky game. After all, another chance will not be granted.

In this connection, the predominance in today's world of the doctrine of deterrence can be seen merely as evidence of the fact that for some reason humanity has until now essentially been refusing to take into serious account the exceptional importance for it of the start of the nuclear age and has not yet gone beyond the state of the strange intellectual and moral numbness that has paralyzed its will to live and to take decisive action to preserve life.

There is probably only one rational explanation for this surprising fact: with the appearance of nuclear weapons, the traditional way of military and political thinking has not changed to this day. The nuclear revolution did not lead to a restructuring of consciousness. A situation has arisen in which humanity, on the one hand, has acquired monstrous military power whose use is fraught with the danger of complete destruction and, on the other hand, is continuing to hold onto to ideas of the prenuclear age, as though such destruction is still impossible. In essence, we are trying to satisfy ourselves with Newtonian policies in the world of Einstein.

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence essentially represents the repulsive political and intellectual product of the attempt of humanity to live in two worlds at the same time: the nuclear and scientific world and the prenuclear military and political world. In other words, it is a matter of the manifestation of the fundamental gap between the prenuclear basis of mankind's approach to political life and the realities of the present nuclear world. But the very realization of this indisputable truth is insufficient to overcome the doctrine in question. The political realities of our time are such that the "depersonalization" of the nuclear threat that has now beginning to show must be formalized in the form of the corresponding treaties on nuclear disarmament.

Is There an Alternative to Deterrence?

An analysis of the political and military aspects of the doctrine of deterrence shows unequivocally that it is internally contradictory and extremely dangerous. And for this reason, the development of relations between states on its basis will hardly guarantee genuine stability. The dilemma of the doctrine of deterrence, that to save humanity its survival must be threatened, is a trap from which there is no escape as long as states have nuclear weapons. The only way out of it is to take away from nuclear weapons the responsibility for the defense of the homeland.

And here we come to the main issue. Is this task realistic? The adherents of the doctrine of deterrence never tire of asserting that there is no substitute for this doctrine, inasmuch as it is merely the concentrated expression of

the military-power antagonism of states in the international arena, which throughout world history was the basis of the system of international relations.

It is difficult not to agree with this conclusion. An indisputable reality of our time, however, is the fact that in essence the nuclear revolution demolished this system, imperiously putting on the world political agenda the question of the search for a creative alternative to it. On the other hand, it is obvious that whereas the monstrous power of nuclear weapons essentially led to the self-negation of war and simultaneously abrogated the system of international relations based on military power that has existed for centuries, no really serious joint efforts have been made to establish a system to replace it. Hence the question of an alternative to deterrence remains unanswered.

It would probably be a mistake to think that the search for such an alternative has not begun at all. In particular, the USSR has formulated the bases for a comprehensive system of international security in the military, political, economic, and humanitarian areas. But this idea has not yet met with understanding in the West, because as the West sees it such a system is incapable of making conflicts disappear and of abolishing the centuries-old laws for the interaction of states on the basis of factors of strength. And this, they say, is why it cannot be an alternative to deterrence. On the other hand, the discussion in the United States of the review of the existing military-strategic doctrine in regard to the reduction of the military threat from the USSR has not yet led to any sort of serious departure of the American political elite from its orientation toward some variant or other of the previous doctrine, whether it be "enlightened deterrence," "defensive deterrence," "nonaggressive deterrence," "cooperative deterrence," "deterrence-prevention of nuclear war," etc. Even the most radical proposal of the United States in this series—the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI)—which, as R. Reagan promised, was supposed to lead to the "repeal" of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence—on closer examination turned out to be an attempt to include a new material-technical base under this doctrine, as many American specialists subsequently acknowledged. In the words of K. Adelman, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, SDI is the "quintessence of deterrence." Reagan's promise to share the SDI technology with the USSR can hardly be considered serious.

In this context, it must be recognized that under the conditions of a divided world the task of lowering the level of nuclear confrontation is very probably exhausted by achieving the level of "minimal nuclear deterrence." To overcome deterrence completely, it is also necessary to overcome the existing structure of international relations, inherent features of which are not only the preservation of profound differences in the social and economic system of industrially developed states but also the increasingly great potential for instability and conflicts in the world of the developing countries. This is probably possible only on the basis of the introduction of

elements of "worldwide federalism" into the present system of international relations, which will make it possible in the longer term to bring about their fundamental reorganization under the principle of the "United States of the world."

Such a prospect appears utopian at first glance—it departs so radically from today's realities and is unlike anything that we observe around us.

At the same time, the trends in international developments that have been clearly manifested in recent years indicate that important objective premises are coming about in this area for a change in the system of international relations—to be sure, still only in the most economically developed states. It is a matter not only of a crisis of military power manifested in the fact that war—not only nuclear but also conventional—has ceased to be a means to achieve any rational objectives in relations between these states but also of the increase in political and economic interdependence, the sharp step-up of integration processes, and the worsening of global problems that can be solved only through joint efforts. In recent years, there has also been an increased understanding in these states that today's world is not two mutually exclusive civilizations but one common civilization dominated by common human values and freedom of choice.

Important integration processes are taking place in the political sphere, although for the time being also in forms inherited from the postwar period. On the European continent, major elements of new structures of international security called upon to replace the structures of the military blocs have gradually begun to mature; the foundation of a common European house is rising before our eyes. In general, the axis of global conflicts is gradually shifting from the "East-West" plane of relations to the "North-South" plane of ties. This is objectively forcing the industrially developed countries to embrace one another and is making more and more urgent a transition of their relations from passive mutual understanding to active interaction and businesslike partnership for the purpose of maintaining dynamic stability under the conditions of the rapid changes in the world. This means that deterrence is gradually beginning to lose its functions as the main regulator of "East-West" relations (the very concept of "East" is disappearing) and is becoming more the guarantor of the security of the "North" under the condition of the movement of the latter toward a homogeneous (but not uniform) community.

It would, of course, be a fatal mistake to think that all of these changes will take place automatically. There are presently at least three powerful factors opposing movement in this direction: the unpredictability of the development of the situation in the Soviet Union and the unfinished nature of its transition to a new status that would preclude the possibility of the rise of confrontational thinking and opposition to the West; the imperial ambitions of the United States that clearly became

stronger after the war in the Persian Gulf (which are giving rise to a reaction of resistance); and recurring national-state egoism capable of again rising to the fore even in Europe after the collapse of the bipolar structure of international relations that was built in the years of the "cold war."

At the same time, one cannot fail to see that these centrifugal tendencies are opposed by an even more powerful centripetal force—the accelerating process of globalization of economic life, which in the final analysis must lead to an integrated world economic base and to a truly one-world market without any exclusion and discrimination. It is obvious that under these conditions security will become a natural state and the need to deter anyone will simply disappear (as is already happening, for example, in the relations between Belgium and the Netherlands).

In this connection, it is clearly worthwhile to take a closer look at the new American concept of "transcending deterrence." For it is based on the ideas of "including the USSR in the world community" as well as the joint resolution of global problems. If this concept is cleansed of various ideological and military-power stereotypes inherited from the past and if it is given a dimension that is truly common to all of humanity, then it could become the basis for the movement of the world toward a new community in the 21st century. Such an approach, of course, infers not only "the return of the Soviet Union to the bosom of world civilization" but also a profound restructuring of the approaches of the United States and other countries of the West to the USSR and the world as a whole.

With the background of the integration processes and other rapid changes taking place in the world, the system of international relations based on nuclear deterrence appears to be an absurd hybrid trapped half way between what philosophers call the "natural state" (individuals live together without establishing any central authority over them) and the so-called "civil state" characterized by the presence of such an authority. In the transition from the "natural" to the "civil" state, each individual relinquishes his right to provide for his personal security to the central authority, which subsequently uses the powers granted to it in accordance with a definite system of laws serving the common good.

Apparently something similar must be implemented in the future on the scale of all of humanity. This alone can give the only reliable guarantee of nuclear disarmament. If the latter is not accompanied by global political reforms, then in each conflict of interests the states will be tempted once again to take up the instruments of force and thus bring the world back to the threat of destruction. If, on the other hand, these political reforms are not accompanied by nuclear disarmament, then the political decisions will not be binding, for they will be disputed with the help of military power.

Thus, the overcoming of deterrence is a dual task. It presupposes the final overcoming of the ideological stereotypes, with which mankind has lived for so long, a vision not

only of the short-term but also of the long-term prospects for the development of civilization, and the unequivocal recognition of the characterized by a synthesis of all of the positive experience gained by mankind.

Footnote

1. Although, to be fair, we should point out that Soviet military doctrine—as opposed to Western doctrine—for many decades after the war to a large extent used such concepts as "victory" and "destruction" instead of "deterrence" and "prevention of nuclear war."

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SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Missile Scientist Assails Development Programs

92UM0020A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian 2 Oct 91 p 3

[Interview with Petr Leonidovich Korotkevich by Yuriy Shchekochikhin: "VPK (Bolsheviks): The Putsch, A New Version"—references to SDI as published]

[Excerpts] His work was super-secret for three decades. A year ago, he slammed the Kremlin's door in order to cross the threshold of the White House on the night of August 19. Today, Petr Leonidovich Korotkevich, one of the creators of the "nuclear shield," will appear on the pages of the newspaper for the first time in his life. [passage omitted]

We met about two weeks after the putsch at his home. We talked for nearly five hours. The text, transcribed from a Dictaphone, took up more than 50 pages. I selected from it what appeared to me will provide answers to those questions which had not previously received answers: Why did the putsch begin? Why did unarmed people turn out to be stronger despite the participation in it of three leaders of departments that had weapons?

At the very least, today I have a new version.

So....

[Shchekochikhin] Petr Leonidovich, what did you think when you heard the first reports of the morning of August 19?

[Korotkevich] Who could have devised all of this? Who was leading it? Pugo? No, not Pugo. Kryuchkov? No, not Kryuchkov. Yazov? No, not Yazov. I understood that Baklanov was behind the putsch.

[Shchekochikhin] It was Baklanov?

[Korotkevich] My seven-year-old son said on that morning: "What have these fools done. And once again your Baklanov." This is how often the name of this man was heard in our home....

[Shchekochikhin] But as I recall, Baklanov was the only one who did not say a word at that press conference. I remember Yanayev's trembling hands and I remember Starodubtsev's answer to Bobin's question. But I do not remember Baklanov. I even have difficulty imagining his face.

[Korotkevich] This quiet, gray-haired man of few words knows how to keep silent. Initially, he was needed by certain circles as a minister and later they found him a job in the Central Committee Secretariat and made him deputy chairman of the Defense Council.

[Shchekochikhin] But who made him? Who prodded him to go up?

[Korotkevich] To do this, you need to go back—to Brezhnev and to the Dnepropetrovsk Group and to that arrangement of forces which existed at the end of the 1970's—beginning of the 1980's: this Kirilenko, who was simultaneously responsible for both personnel and defense, was in the Politburo and L.V. Smirnov, Council of Ministers deputy chairman and VPK [Military-Industrial Complex] chairman was in the Council of Ministers. And behind them were others who arrived from the Dnepr. You probably know a little bit about our specific conditions?

[Shchekochikhin] Only what I probably saw at military parades and what I read in newspapers articles that had passed through strict censorship.

[Korotkevich] That is understandable.... So at one time there was a State Committee on the Defense Sectors of Industry. Then its redistribution to the ministry was begun: the defense industry, medium machine industry, the aviation industry and, finally, the ministry of general machine building which was involved with a quite important matter—sea-, land-, and space-based missiles. In the 1950's and 1960's, a brilliant assemblage of remarkable designers appeared. Well, everyone knows Korolev.... Yangel (ground-based strategic weaponry), Makeyev (all sea-based strategic weapons systems), Chalomey.... Yes and many, many more designers and major industrial leaders.

[Shchekochikhin] What was occurring at the end of the Brezhnev Era?

[Korotkevich] Cadre policy was violated.... People began to appear from nowhere, especially in cosmonautics. The more cosmonauts there were, the more of "us" there were in the Central Committee, the more stars the cosmonauts had, the more of them there were among "us" in the Central Committee's defense department. An illiterate leadership came into the Party structures which stopped listening to the advice of the experts. They looked for the people from nowhere and selected them as academicians in order to later cite the opinions of these academicians. And a profession appeared—the brother-in-law, which replaced the profession of Chief Designer.

[Shchekochikhin] Who, for example?

[Korotkevich] Semenov, Kirilenko's brother-in-law, who made a rapid flight up the career ladder and got the country involved in the adventure with SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]; Ustinov's brother-in-law who was involved with military lasers which did not, do not, and

cannot exist. Shvernik's brother-in-law, Shcherbitskiy's brother-in-law [wife's sister's husband], and so on and so forth.

[Shchekochikhin] That is, the Party aristocracy began to be introduced into the holy of holies for you but, excuse me, what were you yourselves engaged in?

[Korotkevich] The prospects for development of a new generation of ground-, sea-, and space-based missiles.... And I was deputy chairman of the scientific-technical coordinating council of the ministries of industry's defense sectors and the USSR Academy of Sciences.

[Shchekochikhin] And at that time, at the beginning of the 1980's, you encountered the fact that they began to place incompetent people on the Party Central Committee staff?

[Korotkevich] Caretakers arrived there. And they crushed everyone under them. The Central Committee's defense department—all of defense and the international department—all of USSR KGB.

[Shchekochikhin] That is, you want to say that the caretakers ultimately organized the August putsch?

[Korotkevich] The caretakers and the drunkards because only those people with drunken eyes can sign without reading the papers which they submitted for signature. It is these caretakers who reported to the caretakers a little higher up and those caretakers had already ordered where and in what programs to invest money. Science was not standing its ground and we understood that money was primarily needed for basic research. But the caretakers do not understand what science is. They see pieces of iron and they understand what they are but, say, "a casualty and damage effect countermeasures system" [sistema protivodeystviya porazhayushchim faktoram vozdeystviya] is a dark forest for them. For some reason, expensive programs also arose which made no sense whatsoever.

[Shchekochikhin] Which ones, for example?

[Korotkevich] There was no sense whatsoever to develop the so-called SS-20, the medium and lesser range missile, when we had aircraft. Specific people who suited the "caretakers" secretly made the decision to develop and deploy these missiles. When Mikhail Sergeyevich says that we have reduced these missiles in Europe, he is silent about the fact that so much money was groundlessly spent....

[Shchekochikhin] And just how much?

[Korotkevich] Six hundred billion of that same money which could have been spent on the resolution of civilian tasks and on those same aircraft of which we have a catastrophic shortage....

[Shchekochikhin] Was SDI, that is, the "Star Wars" program, also a mistake?

[Korotkevich] Baklanov, at that time Minister of General Machine Building, his deputy—subsequently Minister Shishkin, Kirilenko's brother-in-law Semenov, Shcherbitskiy's brother-in-law Gubanov, and the RVPK [missile military-industry complex] leadership, relatives, etc. were behind the SDI program. Each saw himself in a new chair after SDI: Baklanov—as Central Committee Secretary, Shishkin—as the Minister, and Semenov—as a Chief Designer.

[Shchekochikhin] Explain, how was this program bad?

[Korotkevich] Only a fool could approve the PRO [missile defense] program to explode a projectile over Moscow and thereby insure a solution to the problem. But this is the main thing: do you know how many hundreds of billions of rubles were spent? For the development of a long-range missile detection system in order to have time... to warn the Politburo!

[Korotkevich] What-what? Are you serious?

[Shchekochikhin] I repeat: only so that the Politburo would have time to descend into a bunker.

[Shchekochikhin] And were you able to hinder Baklanov?

[Korotkevich] A draft, directed at developing a new concept of the development of strategic defense and that would have permitted a twofold reduction of expenditures, was submitted to the country's leadership, the General Secretary, and the Council of Ministers Chairman.

[Shchekochikhin] How?

[Korotkevich] I will not delve into technical details because they will not mean anything to the uninformed man. I will only point out that this would have allowed us to examine the entire plan for financing weaponry. What do you think, the question on the military budget has been raised to what level today?

[Shchekochikhin] The published figure is R96 billion.

[Korotkevich] R300 billion! R300 billion goes for the military-industrial complex and for maintenance of the army. And these are not simply the limits but limits reinforced with funds. We have talked about radical transformations.

[Shchekochikhin] You—who is that?

[Korotkevich] The major scholars and military leaders of the appropriate directions of the branches of the armed forces, and the commanders-in-chief. And it is these people who had joined this council in which I was deputy chairman and who, due to the nature of their activities, had access to the leaders of the Ministry of Defense and to Politburo members.

[Shchekochikhin] Excuse me, but if your program had been adopted, would it have attacked the generals and marshals who are currently in command?

[Korotkevich] Certainly. If we are talking about increasing combat effectiveness, then weapons of deterrence would have had top priority. But why do we have such a quantity of missiles which do not meet the elementary requirements of today's missions? Therefore, we need to exclude them from the weapons plan. If it is a question of creating a single strategic defense system, then the need for the existence of entire branches of troops is no longer relevant and Ministry of Defense structural changes are required.

[Shchekochikhin] Which, for example?

[Korotkevich] Yes, take that same PRO [Antimissile Defense], PKO [Space Defense], and UNKE [expansion unknown]. Take these same chemical defense troops and PVO [Air Defense] troops! Take this same civil defense! Why do we need these independent structures which are only involved with support? I am not talking about the fact that these troops are not needed but they must be presented differently today and all PVO aircraft must be transferred to the Air Force. That is precisely how our draft attacked the currently existing military districts of which there are three just in Ukraine when Belorussia gets by with just one. That is, this would be the shift of the army to a more professional level and for its reduction but not the buildup of the already enormous quantity of ground-based equipment and these iron bars. Do you understand the essence of our draft?

[Shchekochikhin] I only understand that, if I may speak frankly, that the number of generals would have been drastically reduced and I am afraid that they would not like that very much.

[Korotkevich] Not only the generals. We were arousing the entire military-industrial complex. Why would anyone become involved with conversion if the plant grinds out thirty missiles and does not know any misfortune.

[Shchekochikhin] Stop-stop.... When was your draft developed?

[Korotkevich] In 1989. At that time, they designated Baklanov as Central Committee secretary for the defense industry.

[Shchekochikhin] And he began to slow it down?

[Korotkevich] Baklanov is a product of the system, a brainchild of the military-industrial complex. But I ask you, do not confuse these caretakers with the highly-talented experts who work in our industry. They should not be accused of anything. We have become accustomed to curse the staff but they are not guilty. They are professionals, including in the KGB, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and VPK, but the CPSU Central Committee nomenklatura stood over them since the head of the directorate was already the Central Committee nomenklatura. They were former obkom first and second secretaries, instructors, and heads of Central

Committee departments. This is the Partocracy elite which cannot itself do anything.

[Shchekochikhin] A caste, a class....

[Korotkevich] Yes, a caste which does not know and does not want to know anything but only carries out the order of some leader or other for whom it is one and the same thing to command this bath, this theater, or this Academy of Sciences. You certainly have met such people?

[Shchekochikhin] Sometimes it seems to me that I grew up with them since they so often flash into our lives.

[Korotkevich] Yes, that is it.... 1989, a new Supreme Soviet, which ceased being the Soviet under the CPSU Central Committee, appeared and although not a large but a percentage of people with common sense appeared who began to pose questions, why and for whose sake. They began to lie about this very R96 billion of the military budget... And our draft arose at that time.

[Shchekochikhin] In that same 1989?

[Korotkevich] Well, yes.... And how could it then be with what had already been signed and for which the resources had already been allocated? That same SDI for the Politburo? That is, what do we do with the elementary theft of state resources? We opposed: the commanders-in-chief, General Staff apparatus, and Ministry of Defense weapons directorate chief. Who began to impede the draft?

[Shchekochikhin] Certainly Baklanov, the father of SDI?

[Korotkevich] Yes, he.... The resolution had already been coordinated with everyone and approved by the State Military-Industrial Commission. And the Mafia opposed it. Yes, this very Mafia, the caretakers' Mafia, but nevertheless the Mafia. If you take billions and billions from the country and from the people every year under the guise of creating defense potential, and you make only what you need, you organize nuclear defense for yourself in order to just manage to crawl into a bunker, just who are these people? Common thieves.

[Shchekochikhin] Now I understand why it is part of this team of caretakers either ended up at the head of the putsch, like Baklanov, or supported it, like, for example, Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief Varennikov, of that same branch of forces which would have been reduced in accordance with your draft.

[Korotkevich] They did not support it. They both prepared and began it. [passage omitted]

[Shchekochikhin] What, in your opinion, was the last drop that overflowed the cup of patience of the caretaker VPK?

[Korotkevich] It seems to me that our proposal to unite nine defense industry ministries with the Ministry of Machine Building and with the State Military-Industrial

Commission, while eliminating the USSR Council of Ministers Business Management military-administration department, that is, to reduce this fanatical, unbridled Mafia to 700 people.

[Shchekochikhin] I think that both they and those generals whom we would have had to reduce, did not like it.

[Korotkevich] Naturally.... And they began to resist. The famous letter of 53 appeared. In December 1990. Analyze the names of those who signed it: Makashov, Baklanov, Varennikov, Rodionov, Semenov.... Prior to this, they had attempted to make Baklanov Premier. It did not pass. Well.... Let us find another method.... Let us demonstrate our power to the president and the Supreme Soviet.... Then specific actions occurred. The flywheel was started up and the process went on.

[Shchekochikhin] Later, after Yeltsin's election, the "Appeal to the People"....

[Korotkevich] Yes, intimidation occurred.

[Shchekochikhin] And then the putsch.

[Korotkevich] Thus, the putsch. The summit of their caretaker activities. This Mafia's first performance was on television. Yanayev, Pugo, Starodubtsev, and Tizyakov—the metalworker from the Ministry of the Aviation Industry—perform. Baklanov is silent.... He always preferred to remain in the shadows. [passage omitted]

We know everything about our military industrial complex, about our VPK (that is how I want to write "VKP(b)"). That is, we do not know anything because only now, after the meeting with P.L. Korotkevich, have I understood why everything that was associated with him was blanketed in this secrecy—super secrecy! They told us: Those people across the ocean are beginning "Star Wars" and should we be any worse?! They convinced us: We will respond to their Pershings with our SS-20's! We did not ask either why or how much these thoughtless programs cost and how much we all will pay for them with empty shelves in stores and poverty in a very rich country.

We suspected that the all-powerful military-industrial complex is standing behind the August putsch. I think that the information that one of the creators of the "nuclear shield" brought to light for the first time today is an entirely conclusive version of what the all-powerful military-industrial complex did so that the putsch would fail. How paradoxical this sounds.

When I was listening to P.L. Korotkevich, a comparison from some remote, died away, and already written off era, came into my head: Right now in August 1991, the advantage of missiles over tanks has been proven just like when tank corps defeated cavalry squadrons. Although certainly this is an entirely different matter. [passage omitted]

Round of U.S.-Soviet ABM Talks Ends

*LD2410213891 Moscow TASS in English 1908 GMT
24 Oct 91*

[Text] Geneva October 24 TASS—The 16th round of the Soviet-U.S. ABM talks ended here today. The talks are regularly held as part of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space armaments.

The sides exchanged views on problems regarding ways to prevent the arms race in outer space and to strengthen strategic stability in the world. It was agreed that the talks would resume in Geneva on January 13, 1992.

Official Views Antimissile System With U.S.

*LD2610092191 Moscow TASS in English
0909 GMT 26 Oct 91*

[Text] Moscow October 26 TASS—Vitaliy Shlykov, deputy head of the Russian Committee for Defence, told the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper on Saturday [26 October], the Soviet Union and the United States may cooperate in creating a global anti-missile defence system.

“The Soviet Union’s strategic defence lags behind the United States’, but the Soviet Union (Russia) needs an effective anti-missile system to ensure its security even now when there is no global confrontation with the United States,” Shlykov said.

“Soviet designers could share their experience with their U.S. colleagues if they decide to join their efforts in this field,” Shlykov said.

He said the idea was proposed by the United States during a Soviet military delegation’s visit to the United States in the beginning of 1991. The delegation was headed by Konstantin Kobets, head of the Russian Parliamentary Committee for Military Reform.

“The world has changed over the past two years. The former simple balance between the United States and the Soviet Union no longer exists. At the same time, the number of countries with ballistic missiles and nuclear capacities continues to grow,” Shlykov said.

“The United States is also concerned about the situation in the Soviet Union, fearing the disintegration of the Soviet Union may increase the number of independent republics with strategic nuclear weapons aimed against the United States and its allies,” Shlykov said.

He believes the situation in the world can be stabilised only through joint efforts by the Soviet Union and the United States.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Joint Commission Debates Withdrawal From Germany

*PM0611105191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Oct 91 Second Edition p 3*

[Report by correspondent Colonel V. Markushin: “Exchanging Arguments”]

[Text] The fourth session of the Soviet-German joint commission has been held in Berlin. It was chaired by Colonel General M. Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces, whose turn it was to preside. The commission noted that the Soviet troop withdrawal is proceeding in accordance with the timetable agreed by the two countries. This envisages that around 30 percent of the Western Group of Forces personnel and materiel will have been withdrawn by year’s end. In 1992 it is planned to withdraw approximately another 30 percent of the original number of troops.

The Soviet side pointed to the unsatisfactory state of affairs regarding the sale of Western Group of Forces property and the construction of housing for withdrawn Soviet servicemen, which could have a negative impact on organizing a smooth withdrawal by Soviet troops.

The German representatives stated that the sale of Soviet real estate was based in principle on market relations and was, therefore, only possible if the Soviet side agreed to the prices offered under these conditions. The German side had so far carried out in full its obligations vis-a-vis housing construction. Moreover, in their opinion, there was no legal connection between the troop withdrawal and the implementation of the housing program.

Defense Ministry Spokesman on Forces Reduction

*OW2510001891 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1500 GMT 24 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Service in the Soviet Armed Forces on a contract basis may be introduced as early as next year, the head of the Information Department of the Soviet Defence Ministry, Lt. Gen. Valeriy Manilov, said at a briefing today. One would be able to go to a military school for six months and then sign a three- to five-year contract. One’s monthly pay would in that case be between 400 and 600 rubles. The contract may afterwards be extended, in which case the pay will be raised and free accommodation given to one’s family.

In five to seven years’ time, Gen. Manilov said, some two thirds of Soviet servicemen would be serving on this basis.

The numerical strength of the Soviet Armed Forces will in the near future be reduced from the present 3.7 to 3 million. "There may be further reductions if the other side does the same," the general said to an IF [INTERFAX] correspondent.

From this autumn onwards one will not be enlisted for military service unless completely healthy. The USSR defence minister has recently issued an order in accordance with which 26,000 men who were previously listed as fit only for certain duties have been exempted from national service altogether.

On the eve of this autumn's call-up the USSR Defence Ministry sent its delegations to all former Soviet republics, except the Baltic ones, which reached agreements on call-up quotas with the governments of these republics.

The ministry has also drafted a bill on the status of a serviceman and worked out suggestions for the organisation of alternative forms of national service and proposed that amnesty be granted to those who have deserted because of bullying.

Baltics Withdrawal Not Before 1994

LD2510115591 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 24 Oct 91

[Text] The Soviet Forces will not leave the Baltics before 1994. This was stated by General Valeriy Manilov, chief of the information department at the USSR Defense Ministry, to the Baltic News Service. He said Soviet Forces will be withdrawn from the Baltic states only after their final withdrawal from Eastern Europe—Germany and Poland—which means after 1994. Manilov added that this will be so on the condition that social problems connected with military resettlement are resolved. In the opinion of General Manilov it is too early to speak of where the Soviet Army will withdraw to from the Baltics and whether its weaponry will be handed over to the Baltic states.

Manilov was here referring to the fact that relevant treaties between the USSR and the Baltic states have not yet been concluded.

Troop Withdrawal Pact Signed With Estonia

PM2710201591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Oct 91 Union Edition p 2

[IZVESTIYA correspondent L. Levitskiy report: "Paratroops To Leave Estonia as Early as November"]

[Text] Tallinn—Paratroop subunits will be withdrawn from Estonia as early as November. The date for termination of the presence there of units of other combat arms will be specified in the near future. Estonian Prime Minister E. Savisaar and USSR Defense Minister Ye. Shaposhnikov have signed an agreement on this.

In accordance with this understanding new units cannot be brought into Estonia, and the number of those already

there cannot be increased. All troop movements and exercises have to be agreed with the republic government. Land which the Army occupies has begun to be inventoried. Areas of land which are unused or have been seized without permission must be returned to their owners. And the Army will have to pay for those lands which are necessary.

The defense ministry promised to discuss the possibility of handing over weaponry, ammunition, equipment, transport, and uniforms, which are necessary for forming national defense forces. The government in turn guaranteed servicemen and members of their families all social and civil rights.

Judging by the press, the Estonian public has greeted the agreement's signing favorably. The signing has generated a different reaction in the military subunits. Meetings of officers from units located in Tartu have expressed serious anxiety.

"We understand the position of the Estonian Republic's Government," a jointly adopted statement says. "We ask you to understand us as well. The withdrawal of units from Estonia can only be carried out if the servicemen are provided with apartments in their new stationing location."

Property in Question as Army Leaves Poland

PM2510144191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Oct 91 Union Edition p 3

[By N. Burbyga: "Soviet Forces Leaving Poland Are Being Stripped as They March"]

[Text] Soviet forces deployed in Poland are to leave the country in two phases. Combat units will leave the Polish Republic by the end of 1992. The others will leave the country by the end of 1993. Colonel General V. Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of Forces, told our correspondent about the way the withdrawal of the forces is being carried out and what difficulties have arisen during the course of it.

[Dubynin] We are withdrawing the forces ahead of schedule. We succeeded in withdrawing a large number of servicemen by 1 September. Everything was done so that people can settle down in their new places, and children can prepare to go to school before the cold weather sets in.

We will withdraw forces only by railroad. The cost of one railcar is \$46,000. It is expensive. But we have no option. We are forced to agree to such expenditure since we have been forbidden to withdraw our forces "under our own steam." It suits Poland that we leave by railroad.

[Burbyga] To whom is the property of the Northern Group of Forces being transferred?

[Dubynin] Unfortunately we have no mechanism for the sale of real estate as yet. We have been forced to mortgage it without assessing its real value.

The Polish side is demanding that all installations constructed since 1945 be handed over free as compensation for the environmental damage caused, which has been assessed at 32 trillion zlotys, equivalent to approximately \$6.5 billion. We asked what methods were used to calculate this, but we did not receive a reply. Now we are hearing demands like this: You should pay us for every tonne of coal you burnt, for the exhaust from every vehicle, for every person who breathed in Polish air...

[Burbyga] But after all, we have some experience in this matter. Forces have been withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Mongolia, and they are being withdrawn from Germany...

[Dubynin] The problem is that until now no protocol on property or financial questions has been signed between our countries. And since that is the case, these questions are handled in a new way every time depending on individual opinions. For example, when we were selling fuel and equipment, which was economically inexpedient to take back to the Union, we were required to pay a state import duty and a tax on their sale. What can we do in such circumstances?

The purpose of such conditions is clear to me: They want one thing from us—that we agree to economic concessions, that is, we give everything away free. [Dubynin ends]

After I spoke to the commander of the Northern Group of Forces, I met with members of an RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet deputies' commission who have recently been in Poland.

"We are losing billions in freely convertible currency in Poland," V. Skrynnik, a member of the commission, told me. "Take real estate alone. Recently we have transferred 1,547 installations to the protection of Polish authorities, of which 675 were constructed at Defense Ministry expense. But they have still not been sold and are losing their commodity form. And no one knows what is to happen to them, because there simply is no mechanism in existence for selling them. We still have to transfer another 4,585 installations, 2,179 of which have also been constructed out of the military's resources. Furthermore, the authorities in the Polish Republic have introduced a system that restricts the normal economic activity of the Northern Group of Forces."

So, without rhyme or reason, the Polish side is rejecting our proposals concerning the settlement of property, financial, and other questions and our assessments of the value and sale of various kinds of property and real estate. The account of the Northern Group of Forces in the Polish National Bank has been blocked. It still has not been established which firms will mediate in the sale of the Northern Group of Forces property, and a customs duty and turnover tax are being imposed on various kinds of property being sold, as high as 30 to 60 percent of the value of the commodity. At the same time the tariff rates on transportation services have been raised, which makes it economically inexpedient to take

material resources to USSR territory. For example, the cost of taking one railcar to the USSR border is \$1,400-1,500, and for a vehicle it is \$260. But we are bearing colossal losses also because Union organizations such as the All-Union Association for the Export and Import of Industrial Goods, the All-Union Association for the Export of Machinery and Equipment, the All-Union Association for Fruit Import, the Ministry of Finances, and the Ministry of Railways have signed contracts to supply material resources and provide services for the group's troops without the participation of representatives of the Northern Group of Forces and without taking their interests into account, at prices that considerably exceed world prices.

Is there a way out of the prevailing situation? According to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet commission, first of all the signing of documents on the withdrawal of Soviet troops must be speeded up, and they must specially stipulate the settlement of property, financial, and other economic questions so that the methods used to assess the value and sale of movable property and real estate are finally established. But who will take on the burden of such work today?

Since the Northern Group of Forces units are being withdrawn into Russian territory, Skrynnik believes, it is the RSFSR Supreme Soviet that should take all the sale of various kinds of property and real estate on the Polish Republic's territory under its jurisdiction. Then the account should be unblocked and the resources going into it should be released for the provision of facilities for the troops being withdrawn, since over 9,000 officers and warrant officers in the group do not have housing in the Union. But while all this is being resolved, we must grant an official responsible for the affairs of Soviet forces present in Poland the right to independently resolve all property, financial, and economic questions with the Polish side.

Troop Withdrawal Treaty With Poland Initialed

*LD2710004191 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1500 GMT 26 Oct 91*

[Text] Moscow, Oct 26 (TASS)—The latest, 12th, round of talks on concluding a treaty between the governments of the USSR and the Republic of Poland on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland took place in Moscow on 25 October. As a result, coordination of the text has been fully completed, and at the instruction of the two governments it was today initialled by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Yuriy Deryabin and Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Jerzy Makarczyk, the information directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced. The treaty states that all Soviet combat units will be withdrawn from Poland by 15 November 1992, and the remaining units by the end of 1993. Furthermore, the most favorable conditions will be guaranteed for the troops.

The sides achieved mutual understanding on a linkage between the troop withdrawal and the solution of property, financial, and other mutual issues. The appropriate intergovernmental protocol will form an integral part of the treaty on troop withdrawals. The sides intend to complete joint drafting of the protocol before the end of the year. Work on the text of an intergovernmental agreement on the transit through the territory of Poland of the Soviet troops being withdrawn from the FRG is continuing and is progressing successfully.

The initialling of the text of the treaty on the withdrawal of troops from Poland is evidence of the constructive approach of the leadership of the USSR and the Republic of Poland to the problems existing in relations between the two states and of their aspiration to develop these relations on a fresh basis, in the spirit of the traditional friendship and cooperation, mutual trust, and respect for international law.

Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Comments

*LD2610214391 Warsaw PAP in English
1955 GMT 26 Oct 91*

[By correspondent Jerzy Malczyk]

[Text] Moscow, Oct. 26—Under an agreement reached in Moscow Saturday [26 October], all Soviet combat troops stationed in Poland will be pulled out from that country by November 15, 1992, and the remaining ones by the end of 1993.

A treaty to this effect, initialled here on Saturday by Polish and Soviet Deputy Foreign Ministers Jerzy Makarczyk and Yuriy Deryabin, also stipulates that at the beginning of 1993 the Soviet troops in Poland will number no more than 6,000 men, and at the beginning of the fourth quarter of 1993—no more than 2,000.

The treaty is the first result of the nearly year-long negotiations. Other documents are being prepared, concerning the transit of Soviet troops being withdrawn from Germany, and a protocol on property, financial, legal, economic and ecological matters connected with the pullout of the troops from Poland. The latter document is the condition sine qua non for today's treaty to come in force.

Another round of talks on the remaining issues is expected to be held in Warsaw in mid-November. Vice-Minister Makarczyk believes it will be the very last one and end in the signing of the protocol.

Makarczyk told newsmen he was very much satisfied with the results of the talks. November 15, 1992, is a much earlier date than the Soviet side proposed before. He also hoped to negotiate further concessions so that the Soviet contingent to be stationed in Poland till the end of 1993 be smaller than set in the treaty.

Makarczyk stressed that the acceptance of the dates fixed for the pullout was a sovereign decision of the Polish Government that should be assessed in the European context.

"We are regularly in touch with European organizations," Makarczyk said. "We also remember that the Soviet troops stationed in Germany find themselves on the territory of the European Community and the NATO. Poland is seeking association with the EC and has new relations with the NATO. All we can do in such a situation is to facilitate the realization of the German-Soviet treaty," the Polish official declared.

Deryabin assessed the treaty as a compromise favourable to both sides and said it constitutes a new quality in mutual relations.

The text of the treaty has not been published yet. It is believed it will be made public only after the document is signed. The two countries are to appoint their plenipotentiaries to coordinate the implementation of the decisions of the treaty.

Polish Attitude on Withdrawal Settlement Viewed

*LD0211115291 Moscow Central Television First Program
Network in Russian 2202 GMT 30 Oct 91*

["Television New Service" report by A. Guretskiy]

[Text] Fulfilling the agreement's terms, the troops stationed in Poland continue to be withdrawn to the Union. Although our two countries are linked by fine highways, one condition is dictated: only by rail—and not under their own power. This is profitable for Poland, because up to \$1,500 has to be paid for the passage of each railcar, and we are obliged to meet such expenses.

However, as the commander of our troops thinks, the problem is far more difficult with the Army's immovable property. Even what can be sold attracts customs duty and a turnover tax that mounts up to 30 to 60 percent of the value of the goods. The Polish side is demanding that anything built after 1945 should be handed over, free of charge, as compensation for the ecological damage caused, which Poland estimates at some \$65 billion. We already encountered these, or similar problems, previously, when withdrawing our troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, and, finally, Germany. Now, however, we do not have the appropriate protocols on property and financial matters. That being so, they are interpreted differently on each occasion, depending on the point of view.

Military Team in UK for Joint CFE Inspection

*PM0411115491 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Oct 91 First Edition p 3*

[TASS report: "For Joint Inspection"]

[Text] London, 30 Oct—A group of Soviet military inspectors have arrived in Great Britain for a joint

inspection of a number of military facilities in line with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces [CFE] in Europe.

The measure, code-named "Henley 7/91," is an important stage in Great Britain's preparations for honoring its obligations under the Paris treaty. This is the seventh bilateral inspection with UK participation and the third involving a former Warsaw Pact country.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Session Viewed

PM2410102391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Oct 91 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Major M. Zheglov: "NATO Bids Farewell to 80 Percent of Its Nuclear Arms"]

[Text] This month has beaten all records in the unique disarmament marathon. First the United States and the USSR competed in it, putting forward initiatives for the reduction of their tactical nuclear weapons arsenals. Then NATO joined them.

The jubilee, 50th, session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group has ended in the Sicilian city of Taormina. For such events it is the custom to present gifts to those celebrating the jubilee. But the alliance's defense ministers decided to avoid this tradition and gave a gift to everyone. This applies not only to us but also to the population of those West European countries on whose territory NATO tactical nuclear weapons are deployed. They will now be reduced by approximately 80 percent.

The defense ministers not only decided on a substantial reduction of nuclear aerial bombs, which, incidentally, did not generate any doubts seeing that the information leak came from the most reliable source—NATO headquarters—but also sent Lance missiles and nuclear artillery shells to be scrapped. This was also being talked about on the eve of the session by Western analysts, but with a certain amount of doubt.

Now, the concluding communique asserts, there remains in Europe "only a minimal level of nuclear arms necessary to maintain peace and stability" since "there are not sufficient conventional weapons systems to prevent war." Here too it was not so much fear of possible aggression from the East as concern in connection with the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world which most likely played a part. Indeed there is continued alarm over the effectiveness and efficiency of control over nuclear systems in the Soviet Union. It is no accident that the NATO defense ministers urged our country to take further steps aimed at removing this concern. One of these steps, in the experts' opinion voiced, incidentally, at the UN General Assembly, could be the formation of a single command for the USSR's strategic nuclear forces.

However that may be, in Taormina decisions were taken which naturally give rise to satisfaction. Moreover, they open up opportunities for cooperation in the further reduction of nuclear arms.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Medical Effects of 1956 Atmospheric Test Described

924P0018A Alma-Ata QAZAQ ADEBIYETI in Kazakh
9 Aug 91 p 3

[Article by Karim Sawghabayev, member of the USSR Journalists Union: "I Saw the Horror with My Own Eyes"]

[Text] I wish to say that I was a witness to the 1956 atmospheric bomb test. I still remember how well the grass grew that summer in Nurqayyr Kishlag. What a beautiful time it was with the fields gleaming in the sun! The steppe was alive with color. The sheep were coming home, people were running about. A group of soldiers, who got out of a tarpaulin-covered vehicle with giant wheels and a truck bed painted ash-blue, seemed very ominous to the village people looking on with great interest. Before you could bat an eye they pitched, in nice rows just below the village, their tents sewn from black canvas.

The soldiers remained in the village for some twenty days without budging an inch. Twice a day they taught the people what to do when the bomb exploded. 'First you will see an aircraft marked with a white stripe. After that the bomb will be dropped. When the bomb has exploded, a mushroom-like cloud will appear, the size of a five-wing yurt. When that happens, you must go into the dugouts you see there.'

Twice a day we went in and out of the dugouts at the soldiers' orders. The opening of the dugout was made with thick felt. Old man Aqbas was to secure the one end of the felt door, and I the other. The doors and windows of the houses in the village were thickly closed with felt. Fireplace chimneys were also closed up with felt, and the felt was weighted down with heavy objects. Pots and pans treated with fire retardant were buried in pits dug in the ground. On the day before the bomb test, the wells supplying our water were felt wrapped and covered.

It was 0900 in the morning. Olzhaghul, Malike, Bibish, the wife of old Aqbas, a girl name Qazipa, Aydarbekov Qabdyrash and the mother of Nurqabdes, my elder sister Mariya, all of us saw how the bomb became a cloud like an exploding mushroom, and went to the shelter in good order. I was at the upper end of the felt door, old man Aqbas was at the lower. For a time old man Aqbas left open the side of the felt door itself. I also opened

mine. At that time intense spectra with all the colors of the rainbow passed before my eyes. I certainly did not know at that time that all this was radiation loaded with death.

The next day we went to school. All the glass in the windows of the school was broken out. Our class rooms had been blown up. The teacher who was to give us our Russian language instructions was weeping. We cried too. The confusion at school depressed us very much. But old man Aqbas went blind two days later. There were also not a few who died of cancer after that test. The illness crept like a snake from one village to the other. The death of 14 persons in just a month in the small village of Yedirey remains in my memory. I want to write about the details. Beginning that day we could no longer drink the water of the springs we loved to drink so much. How difficult it was that we were forbidden to go to their stone basins. Looking back on what happened, only four of us are still alive today out of the 16 who shared the fate of being in that dugout for half an hour or so. All the others have died of cancer.

Each year after the test, doctors came from Alma-Ata and we were examined closely repeatedly. As far as I know, the very last atmospheric test was at night some time in the autumn of 1962. At that time I was working as a thresher in a place called Sarytobe. During the day I dumped wheat and at night I guarded the threshing area. I was a student in my second year. Once when I was star gazing on the top of the wheat heaped up like a mountain, something flashed before my eyes. Afterwards I heard a great rumbling that was as if the Yedirey mountains were crashing into one another. I tumbled down from the heaped up wheat. That must have been an atmospheric test at night. Rayon people experienced the damage done by such tests. There was a lot of death. Deaths of young children began increasing year by year in particular.

We lived near the mysterious Semey Testing Area. You can no longer find a single fertile area in a region where the grass in the pastures was once as thick as the hair on the back of a camel. How many hundreds of springs have dried up. How many thousands of people have become victims of throat cancer. This disease is particularly noticeable in the "Ayryq," "Arqalyq," Abay atyndaghy and "Qaratau" sovkhoses. There has been a very rapid increase in recent years in the numbers of those dying prematurely due to blood diseases in the very young, cancerous lesions and tumors, and leukocytosis. One person from every family in the Yegindibulaq area has fallen victim to an untimely cancer. There are many children being born with no arms, mentally deficient or without tongues. Be that as it may, the number of those with their bodies half-withered has recently been on the rise. Three years ago there were quite a number of those who died from high blood pressure after the storms of a very wet year, whose hair is falling out, whose faces have become broken out. In addition, some 56 persons have hung themselves in the rayon in the last 6 years.

Although we have said that we are going stop the destruction of our poor steppe, below ground and above, it is all no more than empty words. To be sure, a little hope has been created since the formation of "Nevada-Semey." The inhabitants of our Yegindibulaq Village have not supported this initiative with their souls. It is no secret. How otherwise can you explain the failure to this day of rayon organizations in the area to provide sufficient funding for "Nevada."

Some 78 percent of the people in a rayon of 19,000 have no opportunity to drink qymyz. In addition, 95 percent cannot freely obtain nourishing fruit. More than half of village people see no horse meat the year long. Patients in sanatoria get it occasionally. The reason I tell all of this is because various efforts in the rayon in connection with the ecological question are not being advanced sufficiently.

Foreign Journalists Tour Semipalatinsk Site

924F0009A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Oct 91
pp 1, 3

[Article by PRAVDA special correspondent Igor Mosin: "Recollections of a Nuclear Superpower—The Semipalatinsk Test Site: Pages of History, the Nuclear Pulse."

[Text] Even journalists cannot keep up with events today. We had not managed to finish writing the article about our visit to the Semipalatinsk test site when suddenly there was an ukase from the president of Kazakhstan: Halt nuclear testing. Form a scientific research center on the basis of the test site. I thought: Another page in our history has turned. And what a history—the explosion of the first atomic bomb, the creation and testing of new kinds of weapons, the antinuclear movement. And it was literally yesterday that USSR President M.S. Gorbachev made his statement. It lays out the most important aspects of the problems of nuclear disarmament on the planet.

Today the passions surrounding the idea of further testing of nuclear weapons have reached their peak in our country, and not only here. Who knows how all this could end up when placed on top of today's unstable political, economic, and social situation in the country? So what is happening today inside and outside the country's nuclear complex, what problems are bothering military and civilian personnel, and what is our attitude toward the history of the creation of nuclear weapons and their further improvement? Is this a good or an evil? These are the questions to which we tried to find answers and which we tried to think about when, along with our colleagues from the Japanese newspaper ASAHI and the French information agency AFP, on the initiative of the Soviet Committee for the Protection of Peace, we set out on a journey through the institutes, laboratories, and test sites in which, figuratively speaking, our country's nuclear pulse beats.

The international group of journalists was at the very gates of the nuclear hell. What did they see?

The Experimental Field

Kazakhstan, the city of the Kurchatov, our path to the nuclear test site. The Bezbrezhnaya steppe. The warm breeze tenderly takes you by the hand and tugs at your hair. We go up to the very top of the observation point and the experimental field is like the palm of your hand. It is interesting how cunning people can be. On fields with this innocent sounding name at one time they isolated new strains of agricultural crops. Here they have nursed, tended, and raised new kinds of nuclear weapons.

The candidate of technical sciences who accompanied us, Lev Leontyevich Nefedov, without hurrying, with a thoroughness typical of a scientist, delves into the matter.

"It was on this experimental field that the majority of domestic atomic explosions were conducted. There were 98 in the air and about 25 on the ground. Keeping track of nuclear time began with the explosion of the first atomic bomb, with a capacity of 20 kilotons, in 1949. That was Kurchatov's brainchild. And in 1953 they had already tested the hydrogen bomb. Its father was the academician Sakharov. This was the largest bomb in the entire history of the test site—about 500 kilotons."

...If we closed our eyes for a minute, from the roof of the observation point it was quite easy for us to picture how all this was. It seems that the atmosphere has been preserved to this day. The nervous, strained anticipation of the people, the clear commands, the countdown to the time of the explosion, the blinding flash that swept away everything in its path, the sea of flames and fire, and the evil nuclear mushroom that grew up out of this hell.

One must admit that all these pictures which have been seen dozens of times in movies did not especially disturb us. Probably because there we felt like outside observers. They evoked nothing but respect for the force and power of the atomic genie that had been let out of the bottle. But now we had been given the extremely rare opportunity to touch with our own hands, to feel, and to see of what it was capable.

We descended from the observation point and proceeded—toward the epicenter of the explosion. Three-storied towers extend toward it from two sides in a wedge formation. Instead of windows there are concrete embrasures. These buildings were equipped with the most varied instruments. The closer to the epicenter they were, the more signs of destruction there were on them.

On the surrounding steppe one can see some kind of half-destroyed structures, dug-outs, immense overturned reinforced concrete slabs. One got the impression that a giant iron broom had swept the entire area but was unable to finish the job.

"Before testing the item, as the atom bomb was called," V.N. Vyalykh, candidate of economic sciences and a worker at one of the laboratories at the test site, told us

as we proceeded on our way, "the experimental field was divided into sectors. Aircraft, weapons, and tanks were placed in them, and dug-outs and various shelters were constructed. There was even a mockup of a subway. Animals were tied up at various distances from the epicenter: cows, horses, and dogs. Gas masks were placed on some of them. It was necessary to study the effect of the blast, light, and shock wave on the technical equipment and shelter, and the effect of the radiation on the living organisms. Now you can see what happened to these structures after the explosion."

The car stopped. A historic place. It was here, in this sky right above our heads, that nuclear explosions burst at one time. We tried to find at least certain traces of that first explosion in 1949. The specialists stopped us. It was no use. And we could see for ourselves that it was no use. Under our feet was the ordinary steppe, just as it was for hundreds of kilometers around us. Ants were crawling, a lizard quietly slithered by, some kind of little beetle was preoccupied with tending to his affairs.

Our colleague, a Japanese journalist, D. Tomari measured the radiation level with his own instrument. You could see from his face that he was troubled. The background was the same as in Tokyo or Moscow.

True, the needle of the Japanese instrument moved up when it came near to a small slag heap, but not very strongly.

"This is the kind of slag," L. Nefedov explained, "the land was turned into after the first explosion in 1949. The radius of the affected spot was approximately a kilometer. All the slag has been removed and buried. Still it gave off background radiation. We deliberately left this small heap in order to get an idea of what happens to the earth after an explosion."

As we were told, the most tragic page in the history of the test site was linked to the first atomic explosion. All the preparations for the testing took place in a situation of the strictest secrecy. The local authorities were not informed. The archive documents show that the specialists tried to take into account all factors that would reduce the negative consequences of the explosion, but there was much that they simply did not know. We had taken only the first steps along the nuclear path.

Early in the morning on 29 August when the atomic mushroom had blossomed over the steppe, a strong wind blew. The radioactive trail covered the village of Dolon. And although the residents of the surrounding population points, including Dolon, were evacuated during the time of the explosion, afterwards they returned to their homes. As became clear later, some of the village residents had come home during the night to get something or to inspect their houses. At that time nobody had warned them yet of the full danger of the radiation. In Dolon the dose of radiation per person was 160 rems. That is a lot. Such things did happen.

We proceeded farther through the field trying to find at least a few traces of the explosions. We found a small depression which, as the specialists explained, had apparently been formed after one of the explosions. The Japanese carefully measured the radiation level. And everything was normal here. Moreover, some green plants were growing right in the crater: a small tree, bushes, sedge, and grass. And that had to be. Even explosions cannot stop life.

"After the rains, water collected here," explained Vyalikh, "and the greenery took root."

This is somehow alien to the ordinary perception. Flowers in an atomic crater. They explained to us that the air explosions, depending on the size of the charge and the height of the explosion, as a rule, do not leave any special marks on the land.

We approached the test structures. No, time and the weather have not yet smoothed this over. We stopped near a low, strongly reinforced concrete dug-out. The walls were about two meters thick. They were thoroughly reinforced with several layers of wire the thickness of a finger. The embrasure, from which they were apparently supposed to fire on the conventional enemy, was so smashed up that it was difficult to imagine what kind of force it would have taken to do this. Some of the two-meter reinforced concrete covering was ripped off, taking some of the material below along with it, and the surface of the concrete was melted away.

...Tests were conducted on the experimental field from 1949 through 1963. In 1963, the governments of the leading countries signed an agreement to halt nuclear testing under water, on land, and in the air.

The stamp of neglect has lain on the experimental field since that time. The observation towers and the experimental structures have quietly fallen apart and grass has grown over them. And although the field is fenced in by several rows of barbed wire, in many places it has already been broken. It is no problem to ride through here on a horse but do not even think of driving a Kirovets. In a word, the experimental field has been forgotten and neglected.

Paradoxical as it may be in terms of common sense, the test site is essentially not protected. You can drive through it and animals wander here. During the summer period the test site leaders assign particular sections to the sovkhoses and kolkhozes for procuring grass. You understand, they explained to us, that to protect a zone with an area of 18,500 square meters would take an entire division. There is no point in such protection. Local residents are well aware of where our zone is. Outsiders are not allowed in here. Why waste the energy?

There is logic here too. Especially when you fly in a helicopter over the endless expanses of steppes. Indeed, no protection would be adequate. And still, of course, there is something unnatural in this—a nuclear test site without protection. In Nevada we were told that they

patrol the test site with combat weapons. People wander around in ours, and if someone is caught, they talk to him and let him go. This is an unexpected twist.

Apparently we were not the only ones who were struck by the overall picture of collapsing structures and the spirit of neglect of the experimental field.

"Why do you not restore all this and make it into a museum," a French press correspondent Serge Berg asked cautiously, clearly afraid of offending the host. "After all, that is all your history. I would definitely leave an immense piece of land scorched by the atomic explosion, and I would bring in the weapons, tanks, and aircraft with which the experiments were conducted. And let the people come and see where all this can lead. Moreover, it would be good business."

Just as human beings we were embarrassed in front of our foreign colleagues about our disorderliness, our lack of historical memory or something. The Semipalatinsk test site has already gone down in the history of the country and the world as, as it were, a unique forge of nuclear weapons. But such, apparently, is the peculiarity of human psychology that people who make history think about it the least.

It seems to us that the time has now come to look back. We must get a clearer idea of the landmarks along our nuclear path and try to preserve for posterity that which still can be preserved. We must not be Ivans who do not remember their relatives. The country's best minds worked on the nuclear shield to protect the homeland. So much labor, spirit, and energy was invested in it by scientists, military specialists, engineers, and workers. Whether we like it or not, the Semipalatinsk test site has become the symbol of our military might, a guarantee of the country's safety, and a unique scientific laboratory. And it would seem that we do not have the right to forget about this, not to mention throwing it away.

When People Leap Over Mountains

I must admit that up until the very last moment, even though we had a firm agreement, I was not at all sure that the military would show us their holy of holies—the adits and wells where the nuclear tests were conducted. Especially to foreign journalists. But no. We sat down on the benches of the helicopter, raised the window coverings, and the dragon fly took us to the next object—adit No. 190.

As it turned out, there is a significant difference between an adit and a well. We had visited a well the day before and already had an idea of what that was. First we had bumped along in the car for an hour or an hour and a half over a road filled with potholes and finally we stopped near a kind of barrel covered with concrete. Cut wires extended from all sides of it. Not far away again there was some kind of smashed-up control panel. There were no fences or any kind of protection around it. Just steppe

and more steppe. Frankly, if one were to stumble across this object by accident it would be impossible to guess its intended purpose.

"This is a concrete plug," explained L. Nefedov, "the harness for the well. Equipment was attached to the cables you see all around. It drops into the well in order to record various descriptions. At the moment of the explosion, naturally, the instruments burn, but they still manage to transmit the necessary information.

It was explained that the wells are drilled to an average depth of about 600 meters. Their diameter is 90 centimeters. It takes approximately a year to prepare for the explosion. A second well is drilled next to the main one. Various kinds of equipment are installed in it as well. It records data as if from the outside. After the charge is in place, the main well is blocked up—by layers of gravel and concrete alternating up to the very top. After the explosion, a kind of concrete knob-cap is poured on top just to be sure.

Our guides were absolutely certain that the underground explosions were completely harmless from an ecological standpoint.

The Japanese took out his instrument and measured the radiation level of the concrete plug itself, the leftover equipment, and the grass. And disenchantment awaited him here.

"Still," Tomari-San asked the question, "we know that on 12 February 1989 there was a discharge of inert gases from this particular well. They were carried in the direction of Kurchatov. So it is not as harmless as you say it is."

"Indeed," the colonel from the main administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense K. Zhvalikovskiy agreed, "there was a discharge of inert gases. But if we were to encounter them the radiation danger would be no more than it is during a flight in a plane. In general, nothing that is at all dangerous can be discharged from the well. So such explosions are actually absolutely harmless."

This well left one with a strange impression. On its concrete plug sparkled little puddles from a recent rain shower; a steppe bird flew by chirping something to us, and there was green grass all around. It was hard to believe that there was anything down below there, that man had brought to life a terrible, destructive force. He had ensnared the atomic genie with instruments, listened to it, and analyzed what it was capable of. Ah, what terrible games man has begun to play with nature. Who knows what would await us if suddenly someone were to take a wrong step in this duel. And the pure bright sky was blue above us. As though it were trying to convince us that life is beautiful and surprising. The concrete cap silently reminded us that it is not all so simple, that a nuclear monster could burst out of its bottle...

That was yesterday, but today were to learn about the adit. Unlike the well, it is drilled horizontally and is placed, as a rule, in the body of a mountain.

A stiff wind beat on the window of the helicopter. It was impossible to escape the noise from the engine. We had been flying for about 20 minutes and there was not a soul below us—just the steppe. The mountains seemed to appear all at once, unexpectedly. Where did they come from in this boundless Kazakh steppe? We still live in a surprising country. Here you have the steppe and mountains and everything else.

The helicopter carefully landed in a meadow and we got out and moved to a bus. We rode for a couple of minutes and there we were at our destination—the foot of an immense mountain. The metal doors of the adit were open. Rails went into the caves, some kind of cables extended in there, and immense ventilation pipes extended to the outside. Abandoned cars were standing on the rails. Next to the entrance to the adit hung the most ordinary kind of fire shield. Above it was a warning sign—speed three kilometers per hour. Apparently this was the maximum speed for the cars to move along the rails.

We proceeded into the dark, cool mouth of the mine. We moved about 20 meters along the rails and it was as though we had entered a different world. Dense, thick darkness and cold. No signs of life. Uncomfortable, somehow terrifying.

"The length of the adit is 500 meters," said L. Nefedov. "There are about 200 meters of rock on top of us. If we proceed we will run up against a concrete wall. It walls off the actual cavity from the explosion. Its diameter is about 25 meters.

And much as we wanted to visit the cavity itself, to see what happens right at the epicenter of the explosion, as it was explained to us, it would be dangerous to go any farther. It was quite possible that some kind of rock could fall on our heads. No work has been done in the adit for a long time. We measured the radiation right at the gates to the atomic womb. The needle on the instrument showed that the radiation level was little more than it was on the steppe. But this is understandable, the specialists explained, since there was granite all around and it always produces an elevated background on its own. It is the same near the granite embankments in Moscow and St. Petersburg. It seemed that the readings from the instrument finally depressed our Japanese colleague.

We went out into the daylight and began to climb to the top of the nuclear mountain. Mountain dog rose pushed through in between the granite slabs. We tasted the rose hips. Good fruit. As we were all climbing to the top we decided to sit down on the rocks and hold a kind of news conference. We wanted to know what happened during the explosion to the mountain on which we were sitting.

"Nothing special," responded V. Vyalykh. "As a rule, the observers were about three kilometers away. They could feel the underground tremor in their legs, they could hear a sound like from a fly swatter, stones were scattered, and dust was raised. The mountain itself jumped two or four meters."

There is your nothing special for you, we thought to ourselves. What kind of force must the atomic charge have had in order to make a whole mountain of granite bounce several meters like a ball? It was as though the strong, unshakable slabs on which we were sitting were silently confirming it: Yes, those atomic charges are powerful if they can cause mountains to dance.

Then in the test site museum we could see with our own eyes and, as they say, feel the consequences of the atomic explosion. In the exhibition our attention was drawn to some fantastic kind of foamy mass.

"This," explained the chief of the test site administration Colonel E. Bogutskiy, "is what the granite is transformed into during the explosion."

Frankly, this modest exhibit was the first to make my skin crawl. What temperature and pressure must there have been in the epicenter of the explosion in order for a piece of granite to be transformed into foam? And what would happen to a person if he were to fall into this nuclear flame? He would simply evaporate without the slightest hint that he ever lived or existed at all. In that same atomic museum we saw alcohol-preserved specimens of underground animals that had been subjected to the effects of the shock wave and radiation. When you looked at them you got this penetrating feeling of how fragile, unprotected, and vulnerable the organism is. What could happen to us if some time we were to start waving our nuclear warheads around? God forbid.

"The preparation of the adit for the explosion," L. Nefedov explained to us while we were on the mountain, "takes much more time than the well. The tunnel is dug with the help of explosions. As for radioactivity, our specialists spent hours working in the very epicenter-cavity for two years after the explosion. As a rule, after the explosion the cavity that was formed more or less caves in. But there are also exceptions. There are three cavities that remained at our test site. In general this is a unique phenomenon.

"When will the next explosion take place?" we wondered.

"Nobody knows that; the politicians have to straighten out their relations first. All we do is follow orders," he then added.

Now we know that there are no more atomic explosions at the test site.

"And you know," one officer from the group of guides admitted to us, "I am sad that they are not conducting any more tests here. Everything is rusty and grown over with plants. I recall when we were preparing for the

explosion and some nights we did not sleep at all. We believed that our work was necessary to the country. And now I am ashamed to tell people that I work at the test site. They have turned us into some kind of nuclear maniacs. Can it be that nobody needs this weapon, these tests, our labor, our service to the cause itself? My mind cannot grasp that."

The dragonfly helicopter took off for Kurchatov. And questions beat in my head to the rhythm of the helicopter noise: What will happen to nuclear testing now, are the military to blame for anything, in general how is the atomic problem to be solved in terms of the big picture? There were many questions—but who would undertake to answer them specifically?

An Atomic Lake

Even during the news conference on the nuclear mountain, one of the military personnel said to us hotly:

"Why are you looking at us as though all we do is test nuclear weapons? About one-third of all the explosions are conducted on orders from the most diverse organizations. They are intended for development of the question of the use of the atom for peaceful purposes and for science. Only one-third of the explosions is military.

This was a completely unexpected turn for us. It turns out that things is not all so simple. The military test site conducts a large number of tests for peaceful purposes.

"Of course," stated V. Mikhailovich, USSR first deputy minister of atomic energy and industry, during our meeting. "Peacetime explosions are a special area of the activity of the Semipalatinsk test site. I advise that you start to learn about this by swimming in the atomic lake."

Tell me, what normal person would go swimming in a lake that was formed by an atomic explosion? There would be such radiation and such mutations in the water that it is terrible to even think about it. These are approximately the thoughts that ran through our minds.

And then the helicopter was hovering over the lake. The birds eye view from that altitude was excellent. In the middle of the steppe there was an immense mirror of water with gigantic piled-up banks. And although we had our swim suits in our bags just in case, still there were doubts in our minds—could one really swim here?

"You not only can but you must," said the security chief of the test site for I. Muromtsev, "if the weather permits. When we were driving past the sun was scorching and we could not deny ourselves the pleasure of taking a swim. And they breed excellent carp here.

From on board the helicopter one really can see about ten fishermen sitting on the banks of the little streams that come out of the lake. The helicopter lands.

We cautiously descended about 30 meters down the steep slope to the shore of the lake. As as if confirming

our fears, the water washed some dead little fish right up to the edge. And again doubts crept in—did they die suddenly because of some atomic factor?

Vyalykh tasted the water and calmed our fears:

“It is a fresh water lake and the corresponding kinds of fish are bred in it. But now, judging from the taste of the water, the salinity level has increased and that is why these fish are dead. We undressed.

And the first one set the example. We took our time, looking attentively over the lake and shores. Some kind of stamp of its unusual creation has been left on the surrounding area. There is practically no vegetation of any kind on the banks. The water is dark and gloomy. There is something lifeless and unnatural about the lake. The dead fish only deepened this impression.

It was habitual now for the Japanese to measure the radiation of the water and the shores. As if out of spite, here too everything was within the limits of the norm. One got the feeling that he wanted to slip into the water. What difference would it make! But the sun was shining brightly. The colonels and lieutenant colonels were already swimming merrily in the atomic lake. Ah! I decided to take a chance. The entire group of journalists boldly dove into the water.

The bottom was nice and sandy but the water, true, was salty. I was afraid to swim very far. I was afraid some kind of nuclear mutant would suddenly grab me by the leg.

We went up to the top, jumping among the immense, endless granite cobblestones. And these rocks alone brought us back to a thought we had already gotten used to—how powerful did the charge have to be in order to rip such a hole and toss these mountains of granite to the surface? And what if it were placed and were to go off in some strategically important place, where people are walking and driving cars? No matter what we say, these jumping mountains and this lake show better than any arguments that nuclear weapons are inhuman and unnatural.

To put it more broadly, in terms of the energy capabilities a nuclear explosion has no equals. During the tests they produce conditions that do not exist on earth. In essence we are touching upon the holy of holies in nature. This is a key to an understanding of the processes taking place in the material of which stars are made, in the sun. The prospects for application of the atom take one's breath away.

“What is the value of the test site besides its military purpose?” General G. Soldatov, chief of the test site's political department, reflected in a conversation with us. “Obviously, the fact that here theory is verified by practice. Here we have the cutting edge of nuclear science, if you will. All the textbooks, aids, and reference works related to nuclear weapons originated, figuratively speaking, in our laboratories. The entire army uses them.

Can you imagine the colossal scientific potential that has been created at the test site? The task now is not to diffuse it but to dispose of it correctly.”

“Believe me,” another major general, the deputy chief of the test site, I. Parfenov backed his colleague up, “we have a better idea than anyone of what nuclear weapons are because we test them. We are in favor of reducing and completely eliminating them. But with parity of the two sides. The military has the responsibility for protection of the state. Who would be the first to be called to account if something were to happen? Therefore one must be extremely cautious when talking about our developments in the area of the creation of nuclear weapons. Incorrect steps in this area are fraught with unpredictable consequences. It is time to start to speak about this at the top of our voice.”

There is one unusual detail in our history of the creation of nuclear weapons. It turns out that all the peaceful applications of nuclear weapons begin in the military laboratories. The people who worked on the creation of the most powerful weapon provided an impetus for the use of atomic energy for national economic purposes. We had a curious discussion on this subject with the deputy director of the Institute of Atomic Energy imeni I.V. Kurchatov, A. Gagarinskiy. Recall that it was within the walls of this institute that the work on the creation of nuclear weapons began. It was created in 1943 especially for these purposes.

“Today,” said Andrey Yuryevich, “nuclear weapons for us are—history. But all of our present main directions of research have grown out of them. We are continuing to work in the area of low-and medium-energy physics and neutron physics. This is fundamental research. The second large area of our work involves thermonuclear research. This is the creation of a source of energy for the future—Tokomaks and Inters. And, of course, the largest amount of attention is being devoted to problems associated with atomic energy engineering. In particular, we are working on creating equipment for space, sea, and ground use of atomic installations.”

“It seems to me,” reflected the scientist, “that human-kind has not yet discovered all the attractiveness of the use of the power of the atom. We are coming to this but, taking into account the situation today, it will probably take a long time. You will agree that the atom has no equals when it comes to moving large masses of rock, laying canals, mine stripping work, or putting out fires. But today people have been frightened by Chernobyl. I think time will put everything back in its place and the civilian clothing of the atom will be much more attractive than its military uniform.”

...We were told that when the American experts were leaving the Semipalatinsk test site they took reels of the rusty barbed wire as souvenirs. It seems that they became the possessors of the really symbolic exhibits. Today the Semipalatinsk test site has finally rid itself of the status of an object behind barbed wire. But what will happen to it in

the future—to the people, equipment, and area of work? How will the largest nuclear power continue to live without its main test site?

Test Ban Said Needed To Halt Arms Development

LD2410182991 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 0100 GMT 24 Oct 91

[Vladimir Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] In the past year, when the Soviet nuclear testing grounds kept silent and one of them, near Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, was closed the United States continued nuclear weapons tests in Nevada. All in all it has conducted seven nuclear tests in the intervening period.

Will the situation persist in the coming period when Moscow and Washington start abolishing thousands of warheads in keeping with the recently taken decisions? Will explosions in Nevada continue, now that the Soviet Union has introduced a one-year moratorium for all nuclear tests?

The Soviet and American Presidents will reportedly discuss banning nuclear tests at their meeting in Madrid next Tuesday [29 October]. In the current situation it is becoming even more urgent and the United States has a chance to show understanding of the Soviet stand and demonstrate it is prepared to meet the Soviet Union halfway in reducing nuclear arsenals. The American public also demands that the United States approach to nuclear tests be changed.

So the Greenpeace organization called on President Bush last Friday [25 October] to immediately stop all nuclear tests in response to the Soviet one year moratorium. In a statement the public organisation even claimed that the United States was testing the world's patience by refusing to follow suit.

But the main thing probably is that the need to stop nuclear tests is prompted by all recent developments. While taking far-reaching steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals the Soviet Union and the United States can hardly be interested to preserve [word indistinct] to perfect their nuclear weapons. Abolishing of nuclear artillery shells and nuclear mines and air bombs would be meaningless if they were expected to be replaced by new even more sophisticated nuclear weapons.

Lately the progress of nuclear disarmament is developing rapidly. Last month, President George Bush advanced his well-known initiative that soon was reciprocated by President Mikhail Gorbachev.

The NEWSWEEK says, quoting a high-ranking American official, that the United States is preparing a new radical proposal on reducing nuclear arsenals including restrictions of nuclear tests. No doubt such initiative just before the two Presidents' meeting in Madrid would be a step forward.

But there's a more challenging problem: to make all nuclear testing grounds keep silent forever.

Medical Effects of 1954 Totskoye Test

924P0009B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Oct 91 p 3

[Article by PRAVDA special correspondent Igor Mosin: "Atomic Soldiers"]

[Text] *It was almost 40 years ago that the bomb burst in the skies over the Southern Urals...*

Nuclear Weapons: Pages of History

In the history of the creation of our country's nuclear shield there is a special page which was not crystal clear for a long time. To myself I call it the "human" page. A good deal has been written about the outstanding scientists, engineers, and leaders who work on domestic atomic energy projects. The attention paid to them is understandable. But what do we know about those hundreds of thousands of simple workers who assembled them with their own hands, exploded them, and passed through the nuclear flame?

Not long before his death my father admitted that he, too, was a participant in the atomic bomb tests. Today they are known as the Totskoye maneuvers. "Why have you remained silent so long?"—I was surprised. "I signed a pledge to remain silent for 25 years," he answered. All the time periods have already passed. It is time to look the atomic soldiers in the eye and ask—how it all really was.

On 17 September 1954, PRAVDA reported: "In keeping with the plan for scientific research work, one of the kinds of nuclear weapons has been tested in the Soviet Union. Valuable results were obtained which will help to successfully solve problems of protection from nuclear attack."

Sometimes I think: Who knows how our history would have developed were it not for this explosion? The Americans have already flexed their atomic muscles over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The aspiration to build relations from a position of strength has become increasingly clear in their policy. It is a great temptation to have your hands on an argument like a nuclear weapon.

I think that many people like myself somewhere in their subconscious live with the assurance that, in spite of all our fumbling and blundering, our homeland's nuclear shield is still reliable. Because of my profession I have had occasion to have contact with the country's nuclear complex. After what I have seen, my confidence is stronger. It is a reliable system. It is perhaps one of the few things we have left. And are the people who were able in this war-torn country to forge a powerful nuclear shield in the shortest possible period of time not worthy of the deepest respect and recognition?

How did our nuclear history begin? I have spoken with dozens of soldiers and officers who participated in the testing of the first bomb. From the mosaic of memories an overall picture emerged.

V. Trofimov, a participant in the Totskoye maneuvers and today a senior adviser of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, says:

"Our company consisted mainly of Moscow chaps. We did not know what to expect. This is the task that was set: Provide stable communications for the republic staff. When we arrived at our destination we especially remembered the endless fields of watermelons and tomatoes.

"The dress rehearsal took place at the end of August. We set off special explosives and then worked out the plan. During the actual explosion I remember the flash, which hurt our eyes. I had no idea of what an earthquake was but here I felt the earth shake for the first time. Next to our shelter was a melon growers' lodge made of strong hewn oak. I recall how the shock wave came and the logs of the lodge began to fly up one after another like specks of dust. An unforgettable sight."

The troops that were to have participated in the tests began to assemble near the small station of Totskoye in the Southern Urals several months ahead of time. They had to prepare the area for the maneuvers: dig dugouts and trenches, build roads, and put the brand new technical equipment in place: aircraft, tanks, implements, motor vehicles, experimental animals. Even the former front line soldiers were surprised at such large-scale preparations. In addition to the work there was continual training and short-distance double-time forced marches. And they tried to do everything in gas masks. And the summer was very hot that year: 30-40 degrees was the norm. The population was evacuated from the nearby population points.

Archive reference

"In the initial region for the attack they constructed 188 kilometers of trenches and communications passages, 264 dugouts with breast works, 91 shelters of the light type, 385 trenches for artillery and mortars, and more than 420 trenches and fortifications for tanks and self-propelled artillery equipment. A considerable amount of engineering work was done in other regions as well. In the defended region 195 kilometers of trenches and communications passages were outfitted."

In order to guide the pilots better, an immense white cross made of reflectors was placed at the intended epicenter of the explosion. Threads of roads extended toward it from all sides. The evening before the tests, the region of the maneuvers was visited by N.A. Bultanin, defense minister at the time, and I.V. Kurchatov, who was the leader of the atomic project. They attentively inspected all the fortifications and apparently left satisfied.

E. Kann, pensioner, participant in the Totskoye maneuvers, says:

"I ended up in the maneuvers right before I was to be discharged. I was three months short. I served at the station for training the Grom-1. I was at the epicenter an hour after the explosion. We had no protective devices. We followed the tanks. I remember the strange rose-colored sky and the violet clouds. After the maneuvers we changed uniforms, took a shower, and set out for Brest where the unit was permanently stationed. There were no measurements of radioactivity and we had no medical monitoring."

From an order from Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov, the leader of the Totskoye maneuvers:

"...On the day of the maneuvers from 0500 to 0900 travel of individual citizens and vehicles is prohibited. Travel is permitted only in groups with responsible officers. All travel is prohibited from 0900 to 1100... The withdrawal of the troops outside the prohibited zone is to be completed by the beginning of 9 September and I am to be informed of this in writing. All the prepared shelters and refuges and also the readiness of the means of communication to receive and transmit signals are to be inspected by special commissions and the results of the inspections were to be documented."

On 14 September 1954, three aircraft appeared in the sky. One of them was carrying the atom bomb. The alarm siren was heard and everyone dashed to their shelters and took their positions. At 0933 at an altitude of 350 meters the atom bomb was exploded. Every last one of the eyewitnesses says that at that moment it was as though the earth were rocking, it had slipped from under their feet. Then there was a hellish rumble and crackling sound, the blast wave passed, and a blindingly bright nuclear mushroom grew into the air.

The equipment, the trenches, and the foxholes were covered with earth. Immediately after the blast wave passed one could hear the command "to battle" and the soldiers began to put their positions in order and dig out the equipment and arms. At the same time a powerful artillery strike was begun against the conventional enemy. Participants in the storming of Berlin recalled that when it was taken the preparations were not as extensive as they were for the Totskoye maneuvers.

The troops were divided into "red" and "blue." Some attacked while others retreated. It was necessary to work out military tactics under the conditions of an atomic attack. The artillery did not touch the actual epicenter of the explosion. They struck in quadrants around it. The fire was so intense that the sun was concealed in the smoke. After the artillery preparation and the air bombing the troops received their orders to move forward, toward the epicenter of the explosion. The earth all around reminded one of slag, and instead of trees there were charred pegs sticking up, the tanks were melted and pressed into the earth. In some places some kind of formless mounds of iron jutted out—it was impossible to

determine from these remains what their purpose had been. The experimental animals had been transformed into charred carcasses.

One thing that was unexpected: The instruments measuring the degree of radioactive contamination in the area practically did not react to the radiation. Soon it was discovered that the bomb had exploded somewhere in the range of 300-500 meters from the earth and the contamination of the area was less than expected.

I. Bukhonovskiy, a former major in the medical service, doctor of medical sciences, says:

"During the Totskoye maneuvers I ended up in the zone of the tests 30 minutes after the explosion. The earth had been turned into slag and it was as though it had been whipped up. There were fires everywhere and birds were flying with burnt wings. Many of the experimental animals had simply been burned and there were quite a few injured cows, sheep, and horses. As a medical specialist I had the opportunity to study in detail the effects of atomic weapons on living organisms.

"Of course, it is an inhuman and inhumane weapon. It could destroy life on the planet altogether. In terms of its destructive factors it has a diverse character. It is capable of leading to the most unexpected diseases. We recorded 100 stomach ulcers in one of my patients who was subjected to the radiation."

The maneuvers continued all day long. The retreat signal was heard toward evening. The people changed clothes. Some of them bathed and some did not. There was simply no water. They kept their old boots, weapons, and belts. One detail. The ordinary soldiers' belts at that time were canvass but the participants in the test were issued leather ones. And, of course, none of the young soldiers wanted to let go of something that valuable. So they dispersed to their various units with radioactive weapons, boots, and flashy belts. There was no decontamination of equipment, arms, or uniforms. How many groups of recruits used these weapons after this one?

Here is what one more participant in the Totskoye maneuvers, V. Grekov, has to say:

"Our communications company served the general staff of Marshals Zhukov and Peresyarkin and General Lebedev. We started approaching the general staff headquarters in the morning. Someone from headquarters rode in a specially equipped Pobeda with reinforced windows and we drove together around the region of the future tests. The leaders inspected the troops for training readiness. Our task was to immediately connect the general with whomever he needed to talk to. During the maneuvers themselves, incidentally, we, too, were working without gas masks. How can a radio operator work in a gas mask?"

"How did you feel when you saw the consequences of the atomic explosion?" I asked my father as a participant in the Totskoye maneuvers.

"You know, I was working as a mine layer," he answered. "I had already seen a lot. But this was a different kind of weapon, of a qualitatively different level. The earth was all baked underneath it. At that time I thought: God forbid that we should be hit with this kind of bomb. There would be nothing we could do."

"What about radiation?"

"Who thought about such things at that time? Before the beginning of the maneuvers we were issued underwear, apparently for protection, even though the weather was hot. And after the explosion we bathed in the bath house, changed uniforms, and that was all. We left in the same vehicles we came in. We even took the field kitchen with us. That was all the protection... We went to the epicenter of the explosion without gas masks. The dust was terrible. One can imagine what it was like. Then we signed a pledge of silence for 25 years and we all went back to our separate units to continue our service. You understand that our generation did not think about itself at that time; we thought about our work. That was just how we were raised. We were proud that we were the ones who had been recruited for the testing of the atomic bomb. Incidentally, when they were making the selection of who would go on the maneuvers they did not take the boys who were not very strong physically. It was flattering for them to choose you."

That is the way it was. How did the fate of the atomic soldiers develop after that? Alas... In the Totskoye maneuvers, as in all of our Russian history, the heroic is fatally merged and entangled with the tragic. As is always the case, among major actors are the simple soldiers who place their body and soul on the altar of the homeland, the hard times that require victims, and for some reason the state immoral as ever. I understand that every time has its own truth. At that time, apparently, it was possible somehow to explain such maneuvers using soldiers. But I am tormented by the question of why people who have served the state with their faith and truth today are forced to tolerate undeserved insults and degradation from it.

Not very many of the participants of the Totskoye maneuvers have lived until our day. Those who are left have joined into a committee of veterans of special-risk units. Why do they need this?

"Understand correctly," S. Ipatov, a former sergeant who participated in the atomic bomb tests, said to me, "for in the long run it is not a matter of any selfish interests. We have gone without state help for 40 years and we can continue to get along without it. But in society today there is the attitude that our generation lived its life in vain. As though it were in vain that we built, worked, and defended the homeland. Can we really put up with this? The atomic tests were our little brick in the foundation of the state's power. People must understand this. This is why we are speaking, and writing, and proving our case."

"In the Totskoye maneuvers," says the chairman of the atomic soldiers committee, V. Bentsianov, "44,000 people participated. After the test they remained silent for many years because of the pledge they signed not to reveal a military secret. Everyone forgot about them as though they had never existed. And yet they were there—they served and worked and raised children, in a word, they lived. But they also went through the atomic tests. They began to develop diseases but they could not speak about them—that same pledge kept them from doing so. And they remained silent. There were no special examinations, no observations, even for purely scientific purposes. In a word, there is nothing and there was nothing.

From the archives. On the radiation situation in the region of the Totskoye maneuvers after the atomic bomb explosion:

"The contamination of the area at a distance of 400 meters from the epicenter two hours and 30 minutes after the explosion did not exceed 0.1 roentgens per hour. Passing over the contaminated section of the area at a speed of four to five kilometers per hour, the soldiers and officers could have received a dose of radiation of about 0.02-0.03 roentgens, and in armored personnel carriers and tanks—one-fourth to one-eighth that much.

"The radiation levels in the region of the atomic explosion were measured by specially installed remote monitoring-measurement instruments. The remote gamma-radiometer installed at a distance of 730 meters from the epicenter registered the following amounts: two minutes after the explosion—65 roentgens per hour; 10 minutes—10 roentgens per hour; 25 minutes—2.4 roentgens per hour; 47 minutes—1.5 roentgens per hour."

"We know better than anyone else," continued Bentsianov, "what a nuclear weapon is. We would like for people to learn the names of those who were sworn to secrecy. We want to increase the prestige of the atomic soldiers and all other defenders of the state along with them. We want to help our comrades who are experiencing difficulties today—to protect them socially and materially. I think they deserve that."

I think so, too. But not everything is going well with the protection of the atomic soldiers. The committee's chairman, that same V. Bentsianov, who is nearly blind, has gone through more than 200 offices persuading and proving the right of the former soldiers to special medical examinations, treatment, and some kind of elementary material assistance. In the USSR KGB, the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the USSR Council of Ministers—in a word, at all the highest levels on which the solutions to practical problems depend—they listened attentively, promised to help, and signed papers—but they did nothing. Unfortunately, our diplomatic machine has no morality. I am terrified to think of how many more chiefs large and small—and they change so

rapidly today—the committee chairman will have to go through. For he has more than one operation on his shoulders.

"I will stay the course," he says. "If only I have enough time and energy."

The fate of the atomic soldiers leads one to sad reflections. I understand: In 1954 the main thing for the state was to create an atomic bomb. Military personnel were to find out what it was capable of and how it was to be applied, scientists were to verify their calculations in practice, and politicians were to find convincing arguments for diplomatic battles. Those days nobody thought about the people who let the bomb pass through their midst.

Well, every time has its own truth. It is hard to judge it from the standpoint of our lofty current ideas. But why are we so indifferent to the atomic soldiers today? Does the country have some kind of moral duty to its citizens? Without mutual respect and confidence it is impossible for a morally healthy and strong state to exist.

A petty little thought comes to mind: Perhaps there are so many of these participants in the atomic tests that the state is simply not capable of helping them. Judge for yourselves: In the committee's card catalog, of the 44,000 participants only 40 people have been located. And there are fewer of them each day.

But the most intolerably painful thing in the history of the atomic soldiers is that they have been forced to go and ask for what the country should have granted them with words of the profoundest gratitude and recognition. Sometimes a terrible thought creeps in—since they are treated this way, perhaps their life really was lived in vain. Did my father, who endured the hard military life, who passed through the atomic flame, and then spent the rest of his life moving from one remote garrison to another, live in vain? For his fate is the fate of the entire country after the war. There are millions like him. Inspired by their victory and proud of their country. Did the soldiers, who just today have started speaking at the top of their voice, really go through the atomic furnace in vain?

I cannot agree with that. Systems can change, leaders come and go, but with any state structures, parties, and governments one must plant the grain and smelt the steel, protect the state and write books, make discoveries and create new machines. The real citizen serves not systems and rulers but his native land. And there is no higher authority. Every person has in his heart an unerring tuning fork which is called a conscience. And even in the years of the worst stagnation if a person has lived according to his conscience, doing his work honestly, without behaving like a scoundrel or licking people's boots, he has nothing to regret. And such people are in the majority, and the state rests on them. As for the others—the present and past oracles of our life, God will judge them. Listen to your tuning fork.

...Just before this article was to be published Bentsianov called again and joyously roared into the receiver:

"You know, life is not so bad. It seems the new authorities are meeting us half way."

Well perhaps the atomic soldiers really will break through the bureaucratic hell this time.

Yeltsin Sets Moratorium on Nuclear Tests

*OW2810182191 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1700 GMT 28 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] President Boris Yeltsin has suspended nuclear testing on Russia's territory for a term of 12 months. This means nuclear explosions on the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago have to stop.

The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Government was instructed to think of how to use the test site at Novaya Zemlya for civilian needs and to give reliable social guarantees to the local military made redundant through the test ban.

Mr. Yeltsin's decree says the one-year moratorium reflects Russia's desire for a total ban on nuclear testing and is in response to the numerous test ban requests received from local authorities and citizens.

RSFSR Parliamentarian Defends Novaya Zemlya Site

*924P0019A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Nov 91 First Edition p 3*

[Interview with RSFSR People's Deputy Albert Nikolayevich Butorin, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on the Environment, by staff correspondent Colonel O. Falichev; place and date not given: "Does Russia Need a Nuclear Test Range?"]

[Text] Many people still recall the wave of newspaper articles in support of the establishment of soviets on Novaya Zemlya. The democratic press did not fail at the time to reproach the military for allegedly trying to block the formation of soviet power on the archipelago. Among the few who took the opposite point of view and favored a carefully considered approach to the fate of the test range was A. Butorin, a nonparty deputy from the Arkhangelsk National Territorial Election District.

Today, with the change in the political situation in the country, the Novaya Zemlya test range has moved to the jurisdiction of Russia. The RSFSR president signed an order to halt testing at it. This made us all the more interested in finding out the opinion of Albert Nikolayevich Butorin, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on the Environment, on these issues.

[Falichev] Albert Nikolayevich, you are presently taking part in the Fifth Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies,

where, let's say without exaggeration, the legislative foundations of the new Russia are being laid. And earlier in the session, as far as we know, the question of the test ranges and of payment for leasing the land they occupy was touched on.

[Butorin] It was not simply touched on but rather heatedly discussed. Why? The question of land in any state is the most important question and is not just economic but also political in nature. And in our country the threat that the lands belonging to the state and the kolkhozes [collective farms] will be taken away and squandered is absolutely real. It is important to erect a barrier to that and impart a civilized, law-based character to the privatization process. That is why on 11 October Russia's Supreme Soviet passed the Law on the Charge for Land, which will take effect as of January 1992. The purpose of this law is to provide incentives for the rational utilization, conservation and development of land. The amount of the charge is 10 rubles [R] per hectare of land that is not fit for agricultural cultivation or use as hay meadows. However, if it is used for military test ranges, the charge triples. Thus, according to Act No. 579002, dated 6 July 1988, 55,000 square kilometers of land has been detached for the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test range. Consequently, as of 1992 the Arkhangelsk Oblast Soviet Executive Committee should receive something on the order of R165 million annually for the leasing of that territory. A fee is also collected for leasing detached coastal waters covering an area of 35,000 square kilometers (around the Northern Test Range), the amount of which fee is determined by the Law on the Utilization of the Continental Shelf.

This approach, which I believe is a correct one, will prompt the Ministry of Defense to reduce everywhere the territories that were previously detached for test ranges, airfields and other military purposes. And if their boundaries remain unchanged, more will have to be paid.

[Falichev] You are known as a deputy who defended the existence of the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test range and were opposed to the establishment of a soviet there. Have your views not changed now, since RSFSR President B. Yeltsin's 26 October 1991 order "On Ending the Testing of Nuclear Weapons on the Novaya Zemlya Test Range?"

[Butorin] Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's proposal presupposes an even higher degree of trust among nuclear states. That is what must be kept in mind, first of all. It allows us to hope for reciprocal steps in that direction from President Bush. That is the main thing on the path toward a nuclear-free world.

I am also convinced of something else. If reciprocal steps are not taken by the United States by the end of the year, our country will be forced to conduct nuclear tests on the test range in minimal but sufficient numbers for preserving Russia's nuclear defense potential.

We all hope that the bold and decisive steps of our presidents—of the USSR and Russia—will prompt the American side to sit down to the negotiating table in the very near future to discuss the further limitation of underground nuclear tests, including the drafting of an international agreement for conducting them safely along the way to a complete nuclear test ban.

As for the soviet (now we can speak of a mayor's office, if you like), there was no objective need for it. Its establishment would have taken R600 million in additional investments. Where were they to be gotten?

[Falichev] The United States recently came out with new proposals for reducing nuclear arms...

[Butorin] President George Bush's recent proposal for reducing nuclear arms was a long-awaited response to appeals for such a thing that the USSR had made for many years. But look what the U.S. reaction was to the deeper proposals Mikhail Gorbachev made in response! At a meeting of NATO's nuclear planning group in Italy on 17 October, U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney stated that the United States does not intend to ban nuclear weapons tests. Why? It turns out, as R. Cheney stressed, that "nuclear arsenals that undergo testing are more reliable than arsenals without testing."

So what do we get? People in the West, including America, praise us for peace-loving steps, the reduction of the army, and the closing of nuclear test ranges, while they themselves, when the matter gets down to specific reciprocal steps, move aside. And not just that. They continue to develop and test third-generation nuclear weapons. Another fact. The Warsaw Pact has not existed for a long time, while NATO continues to meet and improve its nuclear plans. Against whom, one wonders?

[Falichev] Cheney, of course, is something, but you will agree, Albert Nikolayevich, that he is not all of America. This summer, I know, you took part in the work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. You talked with representatives of U.S. military policy circles. What is their position on these questions? Were there people among them who think differently from Cheney?

[Butorin] In Geneva I meet not only with Americans but also with diplomats from China, Great Britain and France. Of course, they included various people. But the remarkable thing is that as a result of these meetings I became convinced: Not one of the countries mentioned intends to give up strategic weapons in the foreseeable future. I asked Great Britain's military attache directly: "In the event of a nuclear war those weapons will not save England. Why do you not give them up, thereby setting an example of good will for others? Anyway, is the 'nuclear umbrella of Uncle Sam,' your dependable NATO ally, not enough?" The British colonel laughed: "Yes, the United States is our faithful ally, but under conditions of competition in world markets, anything can happen among allies. No," he summed up, "we value the status of a nuclear power."

As for the Americans, the exchange of opinions with us took place in the presence of Colonel A. Lugachev, an expert with the USSR Ministry of Defense. On the other side Dr. Lassey [as transliterated], head of the U.S. department of nuclear tests, his adviser D'Agostino [as transliterated], and U.S. Defense Department expert Dr. Nelson [as transliterated] were present. During the discussion I said that I opposed the unilateral disarmament of the USSR, and I described how I saw that mutual process. In turn, I asked the Americans such questions as: "Has the United States abandoned the doctrine of the 'defense of vital interests' in all parts of the planet? What are the prospects for the reduction of nuclear tests? Who is in charge of the territory of the nuclear test range in Nevada, and has that territory been detached? Does the U.S. Government pay the state of Nevada \$1 billion annually for the risk of being its neighbor? Were representatives of the Green Peace international environmental organization allowed onto the nuclear test range in Nevada?" And others.

[Falichev] Did your interlocutors answer them candidly?

[Butorin] The Americans received us in their embassy with the embodiment of courtesy and good will. They tried to give clear answers to all our questions, and they spoke openly and uninhibitedly. That is why I shall allow myself to cite the answers of the Dr. Lassey I mentioned.

"The doctrine of the defense of the United States' vital interests remains in effect on a global scale," he said. "Our countries are striving to minimize nuclear tests, but so far they remain as they were written into the last treaty between the USSR and the United States. The territory of the nuclear test range in the state of Nevada and its closest surroundings belong to the U.S. Government (this was decided right away by the U.S. Congress), and therefore there can be no talk about payment for leasing those lands. That is, the authorities of the state of Nevada receive no compensation. The closest population is located 40-130 km from the test range and also receives no compensation, since it is not subject to any harmful effects from the test range."

[Falichev] Excuse me, but can it be that no one there is angry over the continuation of nuclear tests? Can it be that we are not an example for them?

[Butorin] A number of factors are operative. First of all, a faith in the safety of the tests. Second, reliable information in the independent press, which does not permit certain politicians and military people to lead it by the nose. However, the main thing, I think, is something else. The local population has a developed sense of patriotism and pride in having the nuclear test range nearby. This is the result of the implementation of an extensive public-relations program. What sort of program? For example, every year an "Open Doors Day" is held at the test range. Certain things are shown, and questions asked by reporters and representatives of the local authorities and the public from neighboring states

are answered. Senators in whose electoral district the nuclear test range is located are admitted to it at any time without impediment.

What else? The total number of the test range's employees is around 8,000. Until 5 August 1983 all nuclear tests were announced in advance, and then the test range's leadership ceased to announce them in order not to worry the local population needlessly and not to provide the occasion for any sort of demonstrations before the tests.

Well, we are not, alas, an example for them. And in general, the United States has almost no influential public organizations that oppose nuclear tests. Granted, sometimes relatively small groups of Americans emerge who demand a ban on nuclear tests. But in the United States, in Dr. Lassey's words, no one takes these people seriously. And if anyone violates the prohibited zone or creates obstacles to the test range's work, they all are arrested and fined without hesitation.

[Falichev] But how, then, did Drs. Lassey and Nelson justify the need to continue the tests, in numbers of which the United States has long since surpassed the USSR?

[Butorin] They cited several basic reasons. They included the need to periodically check a weapon taken from the stockpile for its degree of reliability, and to get a precise measurement of its present characteristics; the testing of new designs of munitions that are lighter and smaller, and the protection of them against accidental or unauthorized use; the study of the effect of radiation on military equipment, communications equipment, electronics, and so forth. And finally, basic research in the interests of peacetime nuclear power engineering.

[Falichev] You mentioned Green Peace.

[Butorin] The representatives of that international environmental organization are doing great work. However, in the United States they would never be allowed to violate the borders of the Nevada test range and infiltrate its territory as they did on Novaya Zemlya. In October, Green Peace held a briefing in Moscow on the radiation safety of the northern seas. Thanks, as they say, for the concern for us. But it would have evidently been fair at the briefing to remind the public that this year alone the United States and its allies have already conducted 13 nuclear tests. We have not conducted one. So would it not be better to arouse the international public against the nuclear test race in the United States?

[Falichev] What sort of conclusions can be drawn from all that you have said, Albert Nikolayevich?

[Butorin] The degree and nature of external military threats change with time, but the state of a state's security, I believe, should correspond to the world reality that exists at the present time. Unfortunately, in our country the center of gravity in the struggle for general nuclear disarmament has for some reason drastically

shifted in one direction. The voice of professionals is being drowned out by a chorus of incompetent, populist speeches and writings on radio and television and in the press. Fabrications are frequently passed off as facts, and the influence of environmental factors unrelated to radiation is presented as the impact of it. Thereby, public opinion is disoriented, and damage is caused to the state's defense and economic might. After all, nuclear tests are not just weapons, and not even primarily weapons, considering today's peace processes. They are the power energy of the 21st century, the shortage of which we will all have to confront even in the nearest future. But the Americans, judging from press reports, are working successfully to solve this problem by creating a thermonuclear capsule—the prototype of a fuel capsule for thermonuclear reactors of the future. However, that is a subject for a separate discussion.

Discussions Held on Nuclear Testing Moratorium

*LD0511020191 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 4 Nov 91*

[From the "Vesti" program]

[Text] Representatives of the Soviet Peace Committee and the Archangelsk branch of the Novaya Zemlya-Nevada Archangelsk and Russian Novaya Zemlya Socialist Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs have gathered today to discuss a series of questions connected with the decision by the president of the republic to suspend nuclear tests in Russia.

[Correspondent V. Budnikov] The participants have noted that while there is a tendency abroad for the consistent reduction of the number of the nuclear tests, our policy in this sphere has been extremely inconsistent. One minute we announce a full unilateral moratorium, the next minute—after nobody is seen to be joining it—explosions follow with rapid progression. In order to avoid repeating this sad experience, Russia should use all channels and opportunities to turn this moratorium into a universal and permanent one, especially now that the situation is beneficial for this.

The Chinese are not against the moratorium and have so far abstained from tests. The U.S. Administration has been called upon by 109 congressmen to follow Russia's example.

[Moscow TASS in English at 1803 GMT on 4 November quotes Vladimir Kozin, a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, as saying that the one-year moratorium on nuclear tests should become permanent. He says: "Our major task is to urge nuclear powers to join the moratorium and, then, stop for ever nuclear tests in all environments."]

Prospects for Permanent Closure of Novaya Zemlya Site

924P0024A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Nov 91 p 7

[Report by Vladimir Anufriyev: "On Banning Nuclear Tests on Novaya Zemlya"]

[There will be no nuclear tests at the test site in the Arctic archipelago of Novaya Zemlya for at least a year. This has been announced by the presidents both of the country and of Russia. There are reports that the northern test site will be completely closed down.

A TASS correspondent reports that in the defense industry department of the Arkhangelsk Oblast administration they have still not received the official text of the 26 October instructions from Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic President Boris Yeltsin on the moratorium on nuclear explosions on republic territory. However, according to the information that is available, this document not only imposes a one-year ban on testing but also orders that all activity at the test site be halted. In this connection, measures are to be devised for the further utilization of its scientific and industrial potential, and for social protection for servicemen.

Let us preface further discussion with a brief historical and geographical description.

The island of Novaya Zemlya is located between the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea. The archipelago is made up of two large islands—North Island and South Island—separated by the Matochkin Shar Strait, and numerous small islands. North Island is up to 123 kilometers wide, South Island up to 143 kilometers. A mountain range runs along Novaya Zemlya, reaching a maximum height of 1,547 meters. North Island and part of South Island fall within the arctic desert zone. About half of the surface of North Island is glacier-covered to a depth of more than 300 meters [moshchnost prevyshayet 300 metrov].

The island of Novaya Zemlya was discovered by Russian-Pomor hunter-fishermen in the 11th century. In the latter part of the last century Nenets reindeer breeders started to settle there. By 1954 the largest settlement—Belushya Guba—contained 104 Nenets families. The Soviet Government decided they were all to be resettled on the mainland. Atmospheric, underwater, and underground nuclear tests have been conducted at the Novaya Zemlya test site since 1957.

Territorially Novaya Zemlya is part of Arkhangelsk Oblast. However, even today this affiliation is purely formal. All the institutions of civilian power were liquidated in the mid-1950's and since then the military have been totally in charge. How zealous they have been with respect to the now badly damaged Arctic environment can be judged from the sensational figures made public by the USSR people's deputy from Murmansk, A. Zolotkov.

It turns out that for two decades radioactive waste was being dumped into the sea close to the archipelago. At least 11,000 containers filled with equipment from nuclear reactors, radioactive structures, and other dangerous "trash" is lying in shallow water without any reliable packing around it. Not only the simple folk of the North but even the oblast leadership were unaware of this barbarous practice.

The new oblast soviet has decided to re-establish its jurisdiction over the islands of the archipelago. However, this has been sharply rebuffed by the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense, under the signature of its former chief, Moiseyev. It was said that there is no civilian population on Novaya Zemlya, that everything would be decided by the military command, and that the creation of a soviet for the island would introduce confusion into the well-oiled mechanism of the power structures.

Notwithstanding, the oblast soviet has no intention of retreating. Its chairman, Yu. Guskov, has repeatedly emphasized that he will not reconcile himself to such an enormous and rich part of the territory being excluded from the oblast's economy.

Everything connected with Novaya Zemlya is cloaked in secrecy. Meanwhile, a TASS correspondent learned that geologists from Arkhangelsk have been doing survey work on the archipelago and have found deposits of copper, with reserves calculated to be millions of tons.

The opinion is that the northern test site has been a reserve site. But this is not so. According to information cited by USSR People's Deputy A. Yemelyanenko, the total yield of the 132 detonations there considerably exceeded the yield of the 467 explosions at the Semipalatinsk site. In terms of yield, just seven of the 56 above-ground tests conducted on Novaya Zemlya were comparable to the yield of all known atmospheric tests conducted by the other nuclear powers during the entire period of testing since 1945!

In 1961 the most powerful hydrogen bomb in history was detonated above Novaya Zemlya; it had a yield of 58.5 megatons. Some idea of the monstrous force of such an explosion can be gained from the testimony of eyewitnesses. The shock wave broke windows in houses in Dikson, which is 700 kilometers away from the test site. The medical-biological and genetic consequences of thermonuclear explosions in the atmosphere will, according to the experts, affect the region for 5,600 years.

The protest against the continuation of nuclear testing on Novaya Zemlya is becoming increasingly organized in the Arkhangelsk region of the north. The oblast leadership has said an unambiguous "no" to any buildup of testing in connection with the closure of the Semipalatinsk site. Under pressure from the nongovernmental Novaya Zemlya-Nevada organization, radiological monitoring has been set up over the territories of the Far

North, and representatives of the local authorities, the public, and the press have visited projects at the test site.

On 17 November it is intended to hold an organizational conference in Arkhangelsk for the new Novaya Zemlya antinuclear movement. Its aim is to halt the testing of nuclear weapons on Novaya Zemlya and throughout the world. The new movement plans to unite all the antinuclear forces in Russia.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Gorbachev Proposes Joint CW Elimination to U.S. Official

LD0511135791 Moscow TASS in English 1325 GMT 5 Nov 91

[By diplomatic correspondent Sergey Staroselskiy]

[Text] Moscow November 5 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev made two important proposals at his meeting with US Defence Minister [title as received] Donald Jesse Atwood, said Arkadiy Volskiy, chairman of the Soviet Scientific and Industrial Union.

The first one deals with joint elimination of chemical weapons [CW]. According to some estimates, it could take the United States 10 and the Soviet Union even more years to carry out the job. Cooperation could reduce the term dramatically.

On the other hand, some Soviet military plants' developments are ahead of similar American projects. Cooperation was suggested in that field as well, Volskiy said.

Volskiy made the statement at a news conference on the results of the American military industrial delegation's official visit to the USSR to discuss conversion with their Soviet counterparts.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Far East Commander Says Divisions To Be Cut

LD0411204191 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1800 GMT 4 Nov 91

[Text] Colonel General Viktor Novozhilov, commander of the Far East Military District troops, has departed for Seoul. He is to take part in an international conference on problems of security in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

Viktor Novozhilov informed RIA that the report in KOMMERSANT about the elimination of the Far East Military District is not true. The number of divisions, however, will be cut by two-thirds. This will be discussed at the upcoming conference in Seoul.

General Novozhilov confirmed the report leaked in the press about a major new initiative on strengthening security in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, but

refused to give additional information. He merely confirmed that the initiative has been agreed with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and he stated that it would produce a bombshell effect.

Troops To Be Out of Mongolia by Sep 1992

OW0611113991 Beijing XINHUA in English 1118 GMT 6 Nov 91

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, November 6 (XINHUA)—A Soviet major general has told Mongolian press that the Soviet troops stationed in Mongolia will complete their withdrawal by September, 1992.

General Mizun, head of a team in charge of the Soviet pull-out, said all the combat troops had returned home, and the remaining ones were only rear personnel in charge of removing military ordnance and facilities from Mongolia.

Mizun's remarks were carried in a Mongolian magazine which reached here today. He stressed that although Soviet troops in Mongolia once had strategic vehicles, they had never deployed any nuclear weapons in Mongolia.

The Soviet Union stationed its forces in Mongolia first in 1963, and had its first withdrawal between April and June in 1987.

It began to carry out the first stage of a large-scale withdrawal plan between May and August 1989, in accordance with an agreement reached by the two countries. Under the plan, 50,000 Soviet soldiers, or 75 percent of all Soviet troops in Mongolia, were sent home.

The second phase began in 1990 and the third in 1991.

Early this year, the Soviet ambassador to Mongolia, Vasilii Ivanovich Sitnikov, declared the time for the complete pullout would be in the first half of 1992.

The soldiers at present in Mongolia account for 15 percent of the former total.

CENTER-REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

NEW TIMES Examines Nuclear Problems

PM2510145091 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 40, 8-14 Oct 91 pp 14-15

[Pavel Bayev article: "Russia's Nuclear Burden"]

[Text] For the first time in human history a democratic revolution has taken place in a nuclear power. The rich revolutionary experience of our country shows the main problems are still ahead. The democratic forces have just broken the first bulwark of the opposition, and their leader has just announced the first democratic decrees. It has become clear, however, that many former policies on

European security are senseless. The main idea behind the balance of power has proved abstract and ill-founded. The most intricate nuclear equations underlying the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which was considered of historic importance but yesterday, today evoke nothing but regret over the wasted time. One more thing has now become clear. The nuclear factor greatly increases the risk of conflicts generated by revolutionary situations, and makes the whole of Europe a hostage of unpredictable social changes which are hard to control. New developments make it indispensable to urgently revise the nuclear status of our country.

Inner Deterrent

Nuclear relations among sovereign republics is the first thing to specify now. Today the USSR nuclear club consists of three members: the Russian Republic, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Perhaps even two, if we take into consideration that the Ukrainian government proclaimed a nuclear-free policy. The nature of nuclear relations should be specified without delay, because after presidential elections the isolationist tendencies in the republic can markedly grow. The danger of nationalism can scarcely be exaggerated. Combined with nuclear ambitions it can be detrimental to any government system.

It should be noted that even a nuclear-free Ukraine will pose a definite challenge to the security of a new Union. It results from the fact that 10 republican leaders, with the best of intentions, are trying to shape the new Union on the basis of two incompatible patterns: a "loose confederation" with a free market economy with common armed forces. The economic and military-strategic areas only seem homogeneous. In reality, though, the economic area is yet to be built up, while the military and strategic area can hardly be retained. Republics cannot be sovereign without their own armies. Para-military formations, like National Guards, are but the first step in that direction. The second might be the demand of the republics that conscripts should perform active service only in their native territories. Following that, demands on the division of military property might be expected. All this evolution will hardly take more than one year.

The Ukraine, counting on the numerous army officers and its well developed military infrastructure, is better prepared than any other republic to form its own armed forces. There are quite a few forces and situations which can easily create tensions in this quasi-state. (To my mind, for instance, the Crimea would sooner invite the descendants of Baron Wrangel than welcome a president representing the Rukh movement.) Hence armed forces may be used for "peace-keeping" operations in interior conflicts. In this light the statement by the representative of President Yeltsin concerning the boundaries does not look overly bold or mistaken. It is necessary to state one's position while the monopoly of the means of pressure is retained.

Of course, even disguised nuclear blackmail is out of the question. Nevertheless, there exists the effect of nuclear deterrence, because of which even the most resolute leaders are cautious in adopting risky resolutions. The strategy of "inner deterrent" should be based not on threats, but on the common realization of responsibility, which can promote consolidation. The atmosphere of confidence should prevail and new structures are to be set up. One such structure could be a nuclear consultation centre open for cooperation among all members of a new Union. It would be not out of place to recall that Norway and Denmark, both nuclear-free countries on principle, participate in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.

Apparently, the nuclear responsibilities of a new Union centre will boil down to consultations and planning procedures, with Russia actually keeping nuclear potential under control. Such a state of affairs will have certain advantages (a permanent membership in the UN Security Council will be kept, for instance), but also will entail more problems and heavier responsibilities. None other than Russia will have to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons within the ex-USSR. None other than Russia will bear responsibility for the security of nuclear stockpiles. And this problem calls for serious attention.

Preventive Measures

Let's begin with stating the fact that it is impossible to ensure an acceptable security level of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. This conclusion might seem peremptory, but many things prove that it is correct. I shall mention three of them. The democratization of a social system influences its military establishment. In this situation no escapades of Army and Naval officers can be considered too extravagant. Even the Hunt for "Red October" best seller about the run-away Soviet nuclear submarine will fade in this light. The danger of terrorism keeps growing before our very eyes, and nuclear warheads urgently being withdrawn from the centres of tension are a perfect object for terrorists. Last but not least, amidst a general mess intricate technological systems fail now and then. We had some instances of this in peace time, like the terrific explosion of missile depots in Severomorsk in May 1984.

In my view, instead of citing more examples to prove my point it would be better to try to think of some preventive measures. The first of them can be stricter centralized control over nuclear weapons. Situations like the one in Foros, when the supreme commander of the army forces was deprived of access to the strategic nuclear arms control panel, should be utterly excluded. (By the way, it is still not clear who got access to that panel then.) For the near future perhaps it would be agreed that two persons are to exercise that control: the president of the USSR and the president of Russia. Before long it could be necessary to secure the personal control of the Russian president and to legalize the procedure of passing control in extraordinary cases.

The second measure can be a technological one, based on the latest methods excluding the use of nuclear weapons without official government approval. It is necessary to carefully inspect all nuclear installations, to enlarge the best protected depots, to close small ones, and to limit the number of exercises with the deployment of nuclear weapons. It is worthwhile to recall that top secrecy does not always guarantee security. Very often the blanket of secrecy covers extreme disorder.

The third preventive measure to ensure sufficient guarantees is a unilateral reduction of nuclear arms. According to Western estimates (which we quote so often!) the Soviet Army and Air Force have about 8,000 units of non-strategic nuclear warheads. Even if the USSR has a third of this number it should be cut several times, to become approximately 500 units. Reductions cannot be the main issue at negotiations (which will not begin, apparently). The time of talks and accounts has gone. Now the possessor himself will determine the ceiling, taking into consideration the amount which he can reliably keep under control.

Shoulder to Shoulder

Sharing the burden is a usual thing for NATO. Today it has cropped up in NATO's relations with the ex-enemy. The nuclear threat from the East cannot be neutralized by the classical "deterrence." It calls for partnership. Judging by their first visits, notwithstanding their kind feelings towards Gorbachev, NATO leaders have come to the conclusion that the Russian Republic will be their only partner in nuclear talks.

Nuclear cooperation is most promising in the field of the latest technologies, not military, but accompanying. For some time now the United States has been informing us that it is ready to give assistance in the technical improvement of the control and communication system, to offer the latest R/D on preventing non-sanctioned use of nuclear weapons, and to cooperate in counteracting terrorism. We should respond to that immediately, without our usual sloth and our eternal fear lest our "nuclear secrets" get into enemy hands. Cooperation calls for more openness.

The unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons can become a major trend of cooperation as well. The United States has been the first to take this road, and is ready, together with us, to proceed at a much quicker pace. Technological aid is also possible here, because an ecologically clean process of the destruction of nuclear warheads is required. For extraordinary situations the following way seems quite reasonable: Certain groups of nuclear warheads can be kept under international control right in Russia, until they are destroyed.

I should like to mention one more trend of cooperation. Russia will need nuclear status for decades, not for a year or two. Hence, it will not be able to do without nuclear testing. The Novaya Zemlya testing ground is notorious for its nuclear tests. Joint programmes of its updating

together with the United States and France can at least partially lessen the anxiety of Northern Europe.

Responsibility for nuclear problems rests with the Russian government now. Meanwhile, energetic Russian leaders have very modest experience in this field. The standard of nuclear behavior have nothing to do with either resolutions passed in camera, or with inflammatory speeches. Clear-cut and well-considered policy is needed for the solid basis of Russia's nuclear status.

Ukrainian Official Cited on Nuclear Weapons Issues

LD2310202591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1910 GMT 23 Oct 91

[By UKRIFORM correspondents Aleksandr Litvinov and Mikhail Melnik for TASS]

[Text] Kiev, 23 October (TASS)—The Ukraine has no intention of retaining nuclear weapons that are deployed on its territory and it has no plans for the creation of its own strategic troops. This was revealed today in an interview given to UKRIFORM correspondents by Pavel Mysnik, chairman of the subcommission of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet permanent commission on issues of defense and state security.

He stressed that the Ukraine will adhere to those interstate treaties which have been concluded by the former USSR including those on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

Issues, Pavel Mysnik said, connected with the Ukraine complying with the non-nuclear principles that it has proclaimed are now being worked out, including the abolition of the nuclear weapons which are deployed on its territory. The majority of these, it is known, will be destroyed in accordance with a treaty concluded between the USSR and the United States. As far as those weapons which are not covered by this treaty are concerned, the republican Supreme Soviet and its government are seeking ways to destroy them, the chairman of the parliamentary subcommission added.

Foreign Ministry's Obukhov Wants Central Nuclear Control

OW2410024091 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1710 GMT 23 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov, a leading Soviet expert in nuclear disarmament, said in an exclusive interview with IF [INTERFAX] that he was "absolutely convinced" of the need for united control over Soviet nuclear weapons. According to him, verification of the Soviet Union's compliance with its disarmament pledges should also be

by one authority. A united control cannot do damage to the sovereignty of the former Soviet republics, said Mr. Obukhov.

Mr. Obukhov will accompany Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to Madrid in late October to meet with U.S. President Bush. The meeting is planned to discuss the latest Soviet and U.S. initiatives on nuclear disarmament. Mr. Obukhov said to IF that these initiatives are new in that Moscow and Washington said they planned to move toward disarmament without any linkages and complex verification measures.

Republics To Join U.S.-Soviet Arms Talks

Four Nuclear Republics To Join

LD2310175191 Moscow TASS in English 1712 GMT
23 Oct 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Aleksey Tabachnikov and Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 23 TASS—Representatives of former Soviet republics, on whose territories strategic nuclear arms are located, will from now on take part in the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

This was the decision of the first meeting of representatives of Foreign Ministries from 11 former Union republics (with the exception of Moldavia and the Baltic states) last Tuesday in Moscow, said Nikolay Spassky, a Soviet Foreign Ministry expert on the Soviet-U.S. relations.

They also agreed to coordinate their stands on preparations of a Soviet-U.S. summit, which is expected to be held late this October.

Spassky told TASS that "the meeting was the first discussion of all the range of relations with the United States with participation of sovereign republics." The opinions varied in details, still the general attitudes were the same.

All the republics have confirmed their adherence to the Soviet-U.S. agreements on various aspects of bilateral contacts.

Meeting participants also discussed the opening of their consulates in the U.S.A. However, it was only the matter of elaboration of the way to solve this problem, since a number of material and technical difficulties arises, Spassky noted.

Issue of 'One Nuclear Space'

OW2410191291 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1813 GMT 24 Oct 91

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Mikhail Mayorov and Igor Porshev from "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Ukrainian parliament's resolutions to form a Ukrainian army has posed additional problems to Soviet nuclear arms negotiators at talks with the United States. It is very likely that President Mikhail Gorbachev will have to give explanations to President George Bush at their meeting in Madrid on October 29 whether the USSR will remain as one nuclear space.

It is not ruled out that before the next round of Soviet-US consultations on cuts in short-range and strategic weapons, originally scheduled for the middle of next month, there will be negotiations between the former union republics. The Western partners are interested in unified control of nuclear arms in the USSR, because the decay of a nuclear super-power into several smaller nuclear powers is fraught with unpredictable consequences.

The USSR Foreign Ministry seems to be aware of the response abroad to statements similar to those by the leaders of the Ukraine. While Prime Minister Vytold Fokin would like to have one nuclear button in Moscow and the other in Kiev, the first Vice-Premier Konstantin Masik claims that Boris Yeltsin has discussed with the military the possibility of a nuclear strike against the Ukraine.

After the US Deputy Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew has had the first round of consultations concerning the implementation of the Bush-Gorbachev disarmament initiatives, some Soviet experts seem to have a rose-coloured picture of the situation. The USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov says the main political result of the consultations with Mr. Bartholomew was that neither side found any problems that would prevent them from implementing nuclear disarmament proposals. Apparently, the march of events in the USSR will make experts change their evaluations.

Idea of Russian-Ukrainian Nuclear Exchange Mooted

Said 'Impossible'

OW2810090991 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0803 GMT 28 Oct 91

[Reports by Diplomatic Panorama's M. Mayorov and I. Porshev from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature for "October 25, 1991"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] An exchange of nuclear strikes between Russia and the Ukraine is "technically impossible," said a leading expert of the USSR Foreign Ministry who has been lately at work on the preparation of a Soviet-U.S. treaty on strategic offensive arms on October 25. According to him, numerous technological and programmatic constraints place rigid limits on the length of a missile's flight path.

To shorten this path, a missile's engine must be stopped in mid-air, which is impossible. The pitch angle programme cannot be changed to suit the shortened flight

path because a missile's strength would not allow it to take a turn during the powered-flight phase.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot be used against nearby targets; if they could, they would have a different appellation, said the USSR Foreign Ministry expert.

'Ill-Considered Statements' Criticized

924P0012A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 25 Oct 91 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Krotkov: "Blast Waves of Nuclear Jokes"]

[Text] The sensation surrounding a hypothetical nuclear attack on the Ukraine, the possibility of which has allegedly been discussed in the Russian leadership, is gaining momentum. In the wake of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, which gladdened its readers in a period of a subscription campaign with this sensation, fuel has been added to the fire by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, which carried in yesterday's edition an interview with Konstantin Masik, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers. The latter confirmed that in response to a direct question of his concerning a nuclear attack Yeltsin had replied that he had discussed such a possibility with the military and that there were no technical possibilities of it happening.

A few days earlier the Russian leadership, I will recall, had categorically rejected this information as disgraceful, absurd gossip for which there was no justification, and now, however it moves, it has found itself in a very difficult position. If Boris Nikolayevich attempts to refute Masik's words, he will be accusing a leader of a sovereign republic of slander, and it would be difficult to expect any political or economic success at negotiations.

Another version of the development of events—namely, that Yeltsin confesses—is dubious. Yes, he says, I acknowledge it; I am sorry. I venture to assume, for that matter, that in reality negotiations did not take place. Let us once again try to understand the words which Masik attributes to Yeltsin: "...there are no technical possibilities." Just a minute! This is rubbish. There certainly are technical possibilities for this insanity!

Incidentally, the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center, to which we turned for explanations, considered the very formulation of the question provocative and counseled "so serious a paper as RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA to pay less attention to such unserious statements."

Perhaps Boris Nikolayevich was making an unsuccessful attempt at a joke, deciding to play a practical joke on his partner, playing up to his fears. It has been noted that Yeltsin, when in the mood, is inclined to make jokes with so serious a countenance that only his raised brows and barely perceptible smile give him away. If this really was a joke, it was in very bad taste and extremely beneficial to Ukrainian separatists and a loser for Russians. To employ football terminology, it cannot be ruled out that

Boris Nikolayevich intended an effective play action but, as a result, scored a safety—if, of course, Masik is telling the truth. Lev Sukhanov, an aide to the president of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic whom we contacted, believes, for example, that "this is an invention."

Some commentators seriously believe that there are sufficient grounds for the Ukrainian leader's "exaggerations" (let us say). On 22 October this republic's parliament enacted a whole package of military laws, which, in particular, assume that for a transitional period the Ukraine will have nuclear weapons—in spite of the concept of military reform prepared by the corresponding committee under the auspices of the USSR State Council and approved by Mikhail Gorbachev. The draft calls for the basis to be the need to preserve unity in the control of the strategic nuclear forces. After all, if the property claims in respect to missiles and nuclear-powered battleships go too far, they run the risk of blowing up not only Russia and the Ukraine but also the whole planet. If only this were understood by the high contracting parties. Then who knows, favorable soil for the nuclear scandal would not have been created.

But the entire blame cannot be heaped on the Ukraine, for that matter. With certain ill-considered statements about sovereignty, Russian leaders also have accelerated the centrifugal wave which is from day to day assuming the shape of a tidal wave.

Ukrainian Officials Discuss Nuclear Weapons Issue

Deputy Supreme Soviet Chairman

LD2410124191

[Editorial report] Kiev Radio Kiev in English at 0100 GMT on 24 October carries a 10-minute announcer-read report on proceedings at a 23 October session of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet. After setting the scene and describing some proceedings of the session, the announcer says:

"Naturally, the issue pertaining to the stand of the Ukraine on nuclear arms on its territory was repeatedly raised. This issue is presently being considered in the world, not always in a delicate manner, even sometimes leading to misinformation. It was in this connection that the deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Volodymyr Grinev, held a briefing in the break between sittings upon the request of foreign journalists, in particular the British and Americans, who were perturbed by the latest reports by the Soviet news agency TASS. It was singled out that the central agency of the former union, referring to British mass media, reported that the British Government expressed anxiety with the fact that the Ukraine wants to take over the nuclear forces on its territory.

"It was stated at the briefing that something strange is being undertaken in Moscow on this issue, and that is

why the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine commissioned the Foreign Ministry to make a corresponding official statement.

"In connection with the report of TASS, Volodymyr Grinev said the following:

"[Begin Grinev recording in Ukrainian fading into English translation] Today everybody is concerned at what is taking place in the Soviet Union and Ukraine, which is possible but not a reality—the division of nuclear forces. This is the most terrible variant for the entire world. Nuclear arms must not be proliferated. This is truly a misinformation as far as the stand of Ukraine as a state goes. Not one person of Ukraine's leadership has made statements as those reported by TASS."

"Ukraine will never take possession of nuclear weapons. Ukraine will take part in the joint command and leadership of nuclear weapons jointly with other republics of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine will adhere to the three non-nuclear principles. Possibly Ukraine will put forward a proposal to set up an international fund for destroying nuclear arms. We are today preparing a statement which could be adopted on the non-nuclear status of Ukraine already today. [end recording]"

Further on Grinev Briefing

*OW2410181091 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1210 GMT 24 Oct 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At a Wednesday news conference in Kiev the deputy chairman of the Ukrainian parliament Vladimir Grinev stressed the determination of his republic to become a nuclear-free state. It will not have its own nuclear force. However, the Ukraine insists that nuclear weapons not be withdrawn to other regions, but be destroyed in its territory.

Earlier the Ukrainian parliament approved in the first reading documents on the formation of its own armed forces.

According to the draft documents, within two years the Ukraine will force its own armed forces consisting of 450,000 men. There will be three arms of services: the land force, the air force and the navy. The Ukraine will also have 30,000 to 50,000 Republican Guards who will include women.

Border guards will form a separate force.

The strategic force will occupy a special place and during the transitional period it will remain under union command.

Officers will serve on a voluntary basis, conscription will continue for soldiers. There will also be an alternative civil service. Ukrainian will be the official language of the army.

USSR Defense Official on Nuclear Arms

*LD2410163691 Moscow TASS in English
1537 GMT 24 Oct 91*

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—The Ukraine does not claim to possess and have under its jurisdiction nuclear weapons situated on its territory, Valeriy Manilov, chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Defense Ministry, told a news conference here today.

He made a reference to a statement made on Wednesday by Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, that nuclear strategic forces should be controlled by one authority and that the Ukraine does not claim this.

This attitude of the republic was confirmed earlier during consultative meetings at the USSR Defense Ministry, Manilov said. Nuclear weapons should remain under single control. All the matters connected with the country's nuclear potential are in the competence of the centre, he said.

"The Ukraine, just as any sovereign state, has a right to create its own armed forces", the Defense Ministry representative said. "This matter is being discussed at various levels. The USSR Defense Ministry participates in consultations. I believe a wise, lawful, civilized decision will be found and the Ukraine will take part in a defensive alliance, will find its niche in a single defense area on the terms it decides to accept".

Further on Manilov's Comments

*LD2510101191 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 24 Oct 91*

[Report by N. Svanidze on a news conference by General V. Manilov, chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Defense Ministry, at the USSR Defense Ministry in Moscow on 24 October, and on a interview with General Manilov by an unidentified "Vesti" correspondent for which place and date are not given; from the "Vesti" newscast—passages in quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] [Svanidze] I think that none of the events brought to the fore by the centrifugal processes inside the former Soviet Union caused so many concerned comments as the decision of the Ukraine to form its own armed forces. Even the official refusal of the Ukrainian parliament to have nuclear weapons and its statement on the republic's nuclear-free status did not allay these fears. This was felt today at a news conference at the USSR Defense Ministry.

[Manilov] "I think that the world community has nothing at all to gain from the nuclear potential being divided on some pretext."

[Svanidze] That's what General Manilov said in the course of our conversation about the Ukraine's policy. The Ukrainian parliament has already given its approval, at the first reading, to the documents for setting up its own armed forces, which will include three branches of the armed forces totalling 450,000 people. With regard to nuclear weapons, the position of the republic's leadership is rather shaky. Kravchuk, chairman of the parliament, says that the Ukraine will be nuclear-free, and the parliament itself is not inclined to part with warheads for a transitional period. Of course, the decision of the Ukraine alone does not imply any definitive certainty about the military fragmentation.

[Manilov] "It is impossible to solve this issue unilaterally, only together."

[Svanidze] However, the prospect of the fragmentation of the Armed Forces of the former union into many unequal parts is quite real. At the same time the ever-changing fabric of relations between the republics is such a delicate matter that the eloquent general, in expressing the position of the Defense Ministry in his conversation with a "Vesti" correspondent, had to mask the position of his department diplomatically with respect to the Ukraine.

[Manilov] "It is natural that every sovereign republic has rights to its own national armed forces, but the fundamental interests of the people residing in these republics lie in using the armed forces to ensure the defense and protection of these interests with maximum efficiency and minimum expenditure." [video shows Manilov at a news conference speaking from the rostrum and in conversation with a "Vesti" correspondent]

Chairman Kravchuk Discusses Nuclear Forces

*LD2410161491 Kiev Radio Kiev Network
in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 23 Oct 91*

[Excerpts] Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine, arrived in the Crimea yesterday. Serhiy Sysyun, our special correspondent, reports:

[Sysyun] Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk started his tour of the Crimea in Sevastopol. At 1500 the plane landed in Belbek, now a well-known airport. Just 40 minutes later came Sevastopol and the first meeting at the Sergo Ordzhonikidze plant. Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk spoke to workers at this enterprise about the economic and political situation in the republic and about relations with sovereign states. Here are just two points from the speech, almost word for word, about the economic interstate agreement: We will sign the agreement. No one rejects the economic agreement, only the Ukraine wants to sign this agreement on conditions profitable for the Ukraine.

Regarding the territorial organization of the Ukraine, Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk said his election program is based on the fact that the Ukraine is territorially united and indivisible. The chairman of the Supreme

Soviet of the Ukraine said he favors self-determination and self-government of territories within borders which are politically secured. [passage omitted]

Contact with the audience was being established, as they say, and one could feel people's reaction. Therefore, I want to present one such fragment. The talk is about the future referendum.

[Begin Kravchuk recording in Russian] There are no people, irrespective of nationality, who do not want to live as masters in their home. Independence means to be a master and to decide on the issues of where to build, what to build, on your own. Therefore, the atomic station would not have been built near Kiev. If Ukraine's leadership had had more courage then, I am convinced that this question would have been put to the people. Nobody would have agreed to build the Chernobyl atomic power station, which is not only a threat to Kiev but also to the Crimea through the Dnepr, 120 km from Kiev.

If the people chooses its state and creates its destiny and its life as it pleases, this people is worthy of respect. If it does not wish that, if it says, as the old tales say, come and rule us, if it is so, then it's a different question. The unity of the Ukraine with Russia and other republics—no one is going to break such unity. The introduction of two languages is your right, as is preventing the development of western Ukrainian nationalism—together, that is. Besides, let us look at what nationalism is and what national revival is. There is one thing and the other, there is one thing and the other! The fact that some people leave, even 5,000, in comparison with 52 million, that is absolutely not the opinion of all the people of the Ukraine. You see, we are accustomed here to decades of silence, when only one person spoke, or sermonized, rather than spoke, and everyone repeated that and everything was quiet. Now, a thousand people, or a hundred, go out on the street and say: We want to move toward Russia. So do I have to conclude that all Crimeans want to raise this issue now? Even if twenty deputies want this today, tomorrow there will be other deputies who will not want it! [end recording]

In the end, those current employees of the plant expressed their attitude to this meeting by applauding.

As is known, Sevastopol is the city of marines and it is obviously impossible to visit such city without meeting marines. This meeting with representatives of the Black Sea Navy took place yesterday. It is quite logical that the conversation turned to military issues and the future of the Armed Forces, apart from economic and political issues. Here is what Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk said:

[Begin Kravchuk recording in Russian] The Ukraine stands for the common defense space of military-strategic nature, i.e. all military and strategic forces including nuclear ones should be under collective authority and should be controlled from a single center—the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. We are against dividing the military-strategic and nuclear

forces between republics and against the transfer of nuclear weapons from one territory to another. We stand for destruction of both strategic and tactical nuclear forces. However, until this destruction is achieved by means of negotiation with all countries which possess this weaponry, and until everyone has agreed on destroying it, the Ukraine will be one of those who will stimulate this process. However, while this is going on, we stand for single control, for collective control from one center. As for everything else, proceeding from this concept, we are somewhat reconsidering the concept of reasonable sufficiency, which reads: troops totalling 9 percent or 8 percent of the population. For us, this would mean 450,000 in the Ukraine. However, that includes all forces, both strategic and nuclear, and so forth. Since we are handing that over to collective (?command) the principle of reasonable sufficiency sharply decreases here. The number of troops is examined, proceeding from this principle. However, these should be the armed forces of each republic which defend its interests. [end recording]

Foreign Minister on Disarmament, Arms Destruction

LD2410121891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1830 GMT 23 Oct 91

[By a TASS-UKRIFORM correspondent]

[Text] Kiev, 23 Oct (TASS)—The Ukraine will strive to participate in talks and conferences on problems concerning nuclear weapons and will consistently advocate their reduction. It is even now ready for such initiatives, Anatoliy Zlenko, Ukrainian foreign minister, said at a Kiev news conference, replying to questions on the Ukraine's desire to take control of the all-Union nuclear weapons on its territory. On Tuesday, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet approved in the first reading a bill that provides for the establishment of control of this kind.

The Ukrainian Government is actively working in order to be ready, along with other states and on equal conditions, to commence the process of the destruction of nuclear weapons. The Ukraine will be a nuclear-free power, Zlenko stated.

The minister also recalled that the Ukraine's desire to become a nuclear-free state is enshrined in its declaration of state sovereignty. The document emphasizes the Ukraine's intention to become a neutral state in the future, refraining from participation in military blocs and adhering to three non-nuclear principles: nuclear weapons will not be accepted, produced, or acquired.

Statement on Nuclear Weapons, Treaties

LD2410213691 Moscow TASS in English 2051 GMT 24 Oct 91

[Text] Kiev October 24 UKRIFORM-TASS—"The presence on Ukrainian territory of nuclear weapons of the former USSR is temporary. At present these weapons

are controlled by the appropriate structures of the former USSR. The Ukraine insists on its own right to monitor the non-use of nuclear weapons deployed on its territory," the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet (parliament) said in a statement announcing the republic's nuclear-free status.

The republic will pursue a policy aimed at complete annihilation of nuclear weapons and its basing components, deployed on the territory of the state of Ukraine. It is going to accomplish this within a minimum time-frame, basing itself on legal, technical, financial, organizational and other possibilities, with the due guarantees for ecological safety.

The statement points out that the Ukraine, as one of the successors to the former USSR, will observe provisions of the 1991 USSR-USA treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons insofar as it concerns nuclear weapons on its territory.

The Ukraine is prepared to begin talks with Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Russia with the participation of relevant structures of the former USSR regarding destruction of strategic nuclear weapons covered by the treaty.

The Ukraine will take measures to destroy all other nuclear weapons that are deployed on its territory and, with this aim, is ready, if need be, to take part in talks with all interested sides, including through existing multi-lateral mechanisms in the field of disarmament.

The republic, the statement continued, will take necessary measures to ensure the physical safety of nuclear weapons that are deployed on its territory until complete annihilation of these weapons.

The state of Ukraine is planning to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as a nuclear-free power and to conclude a relevant agreement on IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] guarantees.

Pankin Says Gorbachev Controls Nuclear Arms

AU2510173291 Paris AFP in English 1702 GMT 25 Oct 91

[Text] Paris, Oct 25 (AFP) — Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has full control over his country's nuclear arsenal, Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin said here Friday [25 October].

"Nuclear weapons are under centralized control, therefore under the unified command of the president of the Soviet Union who alone is able to deal with this matter, in line with decisions taken by the State Council," the minister told a press conference at the end of a four-day visit here. Union leaders were currently reviewing what measures to take "to guarantee the centralized nature" of this control, he added before flying home.

Soviet nuclear weapons are currently deployed in Russia, Belorussia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and it was "legitimate" for the presidents of these republics to ask who controls them, Pankin said.

The Ukrainian parliament on Thursday accepted central Soviet control over nuclear weapons on its territory, but demanded a right of veto over their use.

Speaking of Western aid to the Soviet Union, the minister said that a G-7 mission from the richest industrialized countries would shortly be going to Moscow to examine how to funnel aid there.

French President Francois Mitterrand, with whom he held talks Friday morning, might also visit Moscow in December, Pankin said.

The minister, who was speaking to reporters after his talk with Mitterrand, said that Russian President Boris Yeltsin might come to Paris "in January or February."

The federal government in Moscow, he said, would "welcome such a visit, which would be perfectly in line with the new relationship in our country between the Union and the republics."

He reiterated Moscow's support for a Mitterrand proposal to hold a four-party summit of nations that maintain nuclear weapons in Europe—Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States. "It is not impossible," he said, that the issue be discussed next week in Madrid, when U.S. President George Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev meet ahead of the Middle East peace conference there.

"President Mitterrand detailed his idea, which is natural in the current situation, to convene the four nuclear powers for a general discussion on the future attitude to adopt vis-a-vis these weapons ... following the joint initiatives of Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev concerning tactical nuclear weapons. "I would personally add," Pankin said, "that we must discuss how we can get rid of these weapons as quickly as possible and head for minimum deterrence."

Other topics at the half hour-talks between the two men were the Madrid conference, Mitterrand's proposal for a European confederation, the domestic situation in the Soviet Union and European security and disarmament, French spokesmen said.

Pankin, in Paris to sign the Cambodian peace accord, also held talks here with U.S. Secretary James Baker, Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasir 'Arafat and French counterpart Roland Dumas.

Before leaving, he also met with French conservative opposition leader Jacques Chirac, the mayor of Paris, who announced that "friendship pacts" would shortly be signed between the French capital and Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Further on Ukrainian Nuclear Weapons Issue

Kravchuk Supports Central Control

LD2510210791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 25 Oct 91

[From the "TV Inform" newscast]

[Text] Evidently the rumors of a possible nuclear duel between the Ukraine and Russia which were launched into news orbit by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA have created quite a stir. The wave of repercussion is receding, but the need for explanations remains.

Many people in our country, including, of course, Odessa, are worried today by the problem of the Ukraine's participation in the economic community, the future of the Armed Forces and the nuclear arsenals of the sovereign republic. At a meeting in Odessa military okrug today, Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk said what he thought of the report in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA of an allegedly possible exchange of nuclear strikes between Russia and the Ukraine:

[Begin Kravchuk recording] This is a crude provocation. The intention to set the Ukrainians and Russians against each other is a hopeless undertaking. We want the strategic military nuclear claim to be controlled by the center alone. We lay no claim to the nuclear button. It must be in the hands of one person. That is our principled position. We have on Ukrainian soil a Russian population of 11.5 million. That is centuries, it is people whose land is here, it is a blending of history, culture and way of life, by all, all together. No one can believe this inhuman stupidity which is now being dished out by the media. We had, have, and will have the most friendly relations with Russia. [end recording]

Desire To Retain Weapons Denied

OW2510211491 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1945 GMT 25 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A representative from the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry told an "INTERFAX" correspondent that the rumor recently spread in the mass media on the Ukraine's desire to keep atomic weapons on its territory and to become a member of the "nuclear club" was clearly misinformation. The Ukrainian surmised that this misinformation was spread with the goal of discrediting the Ukraine and its foreign relations, to undermine the process of establishing statehood, and to distort the true position of the republic and its Supreme Soviet in relation to atomic weapons. The misinformation on Kiev's nuclear ambitions was also meant to throw a shadow on the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Ukraine, in which the republic's intentions to remain a neutral and non-nuclear state are emphasized. As the

diplomat underlined, this intention was entirely reaffirmed by the Supreme Soviet on October 24th in a special announcement on the "non-nuclear status of the Ukraine."

Official on Nuclear Control Policy

LD2610114191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0630 GMT 26 Oct 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The Ukraine's decisions, first not to sign the Economic Treaty and then to set up its own Army, as well as the existence of enormous stocks of nuclear weapons deployed on its territory and rumors of their possible privatization have prompted a cautious and wary reaction both inside the country and abroad. A special declaration by the Ukrainian parliament today made everything clear.

[D.V. Pavlichko, chairman of Foreign Affairs Commission of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet] The situation has developed in such a way that these weapons are located on the territory of the Ukraine, and many Western politicians are afraid that the emergence of independent states on the territory of the Soviet Union could lead to the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. This idea was put into the world's head by the center, which claimed that they could not leave because there are nuclear weapons in various republics and that would be very dangerous.

Therefore, the parliament of the Ukraine has said clearly and precisely that, today the nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of the Ukraine are under the control of the structures of the former Soviet Union: in other words, the control of the USSR Ministry of Defense. The parliament of the Ukraine declares that it, the Ukraine, does not wish to have control over those weapons in respect of, so to speak, the possibility of using them. We have declared only our right to have our own control over the nonuse of those weapons. This means that we, a state on whose territory nuclear weapons are located, bear responsibility for those weapons and, strictly speaking, for ensuring that they are never used until they are destroyed.

Defense Official on Nuclear Control

LD2610100291 Kiev Radio Kiev Network in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 26 Oct 91

[Interview with Ihor Derkach, Ukrainian people's deputy and member of the Ukrainian Commission for Defense and Internal Security, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] When our radio listeners hear discussion of the draft laws on the defense and Armed Forces of the Ukraine it makes an impression that these issues of defense and creation of our own army and own armed forces are not well thought-out and prepared. What is your opinion?

[Derkach] Very many issues have been thought-out. Today, if one recollects the speech by Defense Minister Morozov, at the closed session, a great number of details there are absolutely well thought-out and he has corresponding models and mechanisms already elaborated. However the thing is that there is no political decision, so something major is missing—something, which would make it possible for him to develop this, is missing. That is to say that right now he should take over leadership of the Armed Forces are situated on the territory of the Ukraine.

USSR President Gorbachev and Defense Minister Shaposhnikov are just constantly inflaming the situation in this respect. They are constantly making statements about the need for unified Armed Forces. They are taking away from the Ukraine any ideas and any right to form its own Armed Forces and at the same time they say they agree to make some concessions and hold some negotiations. This is a typical position of Russian great-power chauvinism. Therefore, it is now very difficult for the minister of defense, very difficult. This should be settled at the highest state level: Either Kravchuk or Fokin must tackle this during negotiations at the State Council with President Gorbachev.

As far as the preparation is concerned, I want to tell you that there are already a great number of officers who wish to work in various ways. Simply, this is not publicized because there is no need for that. The military sphere requires specific activity and does not require these issues to be submitted now to the Supreme Soviet.

[Correspondent] What about this concept? Please, if you could give literally just one detail.

[Derkach] As far as the concept is concerned one detail is that one cannot talk now about the collective strategic defense at all, because there are no elaborated and clear cut Ukrainian interests, there is no Ukrainian military science which would [words indistinct] form this strategic defense. It is necessary now, in my opinion, to take under control all nuclear forces which are in the Ukraine and start negotiations with France, Russia, Germany, Britain, and the United States on issues of their reduction and complete destruction. We cannot allow, as one deputy said, that Russia, having crushed the Union structures, will in fact control nuclear weapons on the territory of the Ukraine. This indeed would be suicide for the sovereign Ukrainian state.

Moreover, policy can change and there could be a threat from beyond the Ukraine's borders! That is the most important thing today, in my view,—this collective strategic defense. The issue of the armed forces is a separate issue and it should be settled in accordance with these laws which I support completely; and they should be adopted.

Report Called 'Misinformation'

*OW2810093191 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0803 GMT 28 Oct 91*

[Report by Diplomatic Panorama's M. Mayorov and I. Porshev from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature for "October 25, 1991;" transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The TASS report that has received wide coverage by all major news agencies in the world concerning the Ukraine's alleged desire to keep nuclear weapons on its territory and join the nuclear club is misinformation of pure water, said a senior Ukrainian Foreign Ministry staffer to DP [Diplomatic Panorama] over the telephone. He expressed the opinion that the TASS report had been aimed at discrediting the Ukraine, its foreign policy, undermining the Ukraine's progress to full-fledged statehood, misrepresenting the republic's and its Supreme Soviet's stand on nuclear arms and deceiving the international community. In addition, the false report concerning the Ukraine's alleged nuclear ambitions was intended to cast a shadow over the republican Sovereignty Declaration that emphasizes the republic's plans to become a nonnuclear neutral state. According to the diplomat, this intention received full confirmation in a ruling "On the Ukraine's Non-Nuclear Status" passed by the republic's Supreme Soviet on October 24.

Addressing whether the Ukraine plans to use the services of the Union Foreign Ministry, the diplomat said that Kiev had yet to decide whether the structure should or should not be salvaged in the Ukraine. He remarked, however, that the USSR Foreign Ministry's diplomatic staff are well-qualified and, Kiev believes, they can provide required help to the foreign ministries in the sovereign republics. The Ukrainian diplomat did not rule out the possibility that Kiev's attitude toward whether the Union Foreign Ministry should continue or not will become clear before November 5, the date of the next session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Sovereign Republics. He confirmed, however, that the Ukraine planned to assume full control over its foreign political and foreign economic interests.

According to the diplomat, many staffers of the Union ministry apply for jobs at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry. The applications are considered on a case-by-case basis, and there are already examples of diplomats moving from Moscow to Kiev. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry will continue to hire qualified diplomats from Moscow—on condition, though, that they speak the state language—Ukrainian.

Commentator Wary of Status Statement

*LD2510212891 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1442 GMT 25 Oct 91*

[Commentary by TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 25 Oct (TASS)—World public opinion is following with intense interest the legislative

activities of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet regarding Union nuclear weapons located on the republic's territory. [passage omitted]

The statement by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet published on 24 October about the republic's nonnuclear status has also raised a number of questions in the West. On the one hand, legislators in Kiev say that the Ukraine will observe the articles of the 1991 treaty between the USSR and the United States on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons where it concerns nuclear weapons on its territory. On the other hand, they talk about the republic's intention to carry out a policy aimed at the destruction of nuclear weapons "in the minimum amount of time possible." This part of the statement can be seen as Kiev's unfounded claim to the right to alter on its own authority the time limits laid down for the elimination of strategic weapons stipulated in the treaty on strategic offensive weapons.

The statement emphasizes that the republic will employ the necessary measures to guarantee the physical security of the nuclear weapons situated on its territory throughout the entire period up until the complete destruction of the nuclear weapons. This is perhaps the most alarming part of the Ukrainian statement. For it is only one small step from the establishment of Ukrainian control over the "physical security" of Union nuclear weapons—obviously with the assistance of the Armed Forces—to the possibility, God forbid, of the seizure of these weapons.

"At present these weapons are under the supervision of the relevant structures of the former USSR," the Ukrainian legislators acknowledge. The words "at present" trigger an alarm bell. At the Supreme Soviet session it was repeatedly emphasized that nuclear weapons on the territory of a sovereign state belong to that state. It seems that the Ukraine is insisting on its right to control the non-use of its nuclear weapons. At first glance, this sounds perfectly proper. However, it is worth pointing out that the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to which the Ukraine is intending to add its signature forbids the control of nuclear weapons being handed over to other nonnuclear countries, regardless of the pretext. This is clear. In the given case it is obvious that the additional control over the "non-usage" of nuclear weapons could in certain circumstances end up increasing the threat of them being used.

The intention of Ukrainian legislators to give the republic nonnuclear status can only be welcomed. However, the implementation of this resolution should be carried out in strict accordance with existing international agreements and should on no account whatsoever lead to an increased risk of the sanctioned or unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons. It is worthy of repetition—the stakes here are too high.

Laws on Nuclear Arms Viewed

PM2510140791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Oct 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev:
"Joking With Nuclear Weapons Is a Bad Idea"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet's adoption at their first reading of draft laws on the republic's defense and Armed Forces has given rise to a stormy negative reaction literally throughout the world and has been unequivocally assessed by specialists as an irresponsible step endangering the still fragile structure of military-political stability on our planet.

The laws provide in particular for the transfer to the control of the republic's president of all-Union strategic forces, that is nuclear arms, deployed on Ukrainian territory. None of the references of the Kiev legislators to the republic's "nuclear-free principles" or to the temporary nature of the Ukraine's nuclear status can conceal the fact that it is a case of an attempt to undermine the spirit and letter of the very important treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The treaty on nonproliferation, of which the Soviet Union is a signee, bans the transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them to nonnuclear states. The expansion of the "nuclear club" by even one new member could drastically weaken the barriers on the path of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and lend new impetus to the creep of weapons of mass destruction across all continents.

The decision of the Kiev legislators will undoubtedly have the most serious international consequences. "We do not want one nuclear power to disintegrate into three or four nuclear powers," official spokesmen for the U.S. Administration have told a LOS ANGELES TIMES correspondent.

D. Howell, chairman of the British Parliament's House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, called the decision of the Ukrainian legislators "a serious threat to peace." "This is an example of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the emergence of new nuclear powers which horrifies us," he stressed.

The West greeted with understanding the statement in New York by USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister V. Petrovskiy to the effect that the Soviet strategic forces will remain united under a strictly centralized system of combat administration which totally rules out their unsanctioned use.

Indeed, the stakes here are too high. Any tough measures are justified in preventing the slightest possibility of the use of nuclear weapons by irresponsible groups or individuals. And the Ukrainian parliamentarians should obviously realize that.

Ukraine Declares Nonnuclear Commitment

OW2510181191 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1500 GMT 25 Oct 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine has reaffirmed the republic's commitment to the three non-nuclear principles: not to deploy, manufacture or purchase nuclear arms. Its Thursday [24 October] statement "On the Non-Nuclear Status of the Ukraine" says that Kiev will fully abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968.

The presence of the ex-USSR's nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory is declared temporary and subject to control by the appropriate agencies in Moscow. The Ukraine insists on being given the right to verify the non-use of nuclear weapons stationed on its territory.

It pledges to do everything to scrap nuclear arms and their components on Ukrainian territory within the shortest possible time.

As one of the legal successors to the former USSR, the Ukraine will comply with the 1991 Soviet-American treaty on cuts in strategic nuclear arsenals and is ready to open negotiations with Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Russia, in the presence of appropriate ex-union structures, on the elimination of nuclear weapons mentioned by the treaty.

Ukraine's Kravchuk Views Nuclear, Conversion Policies

PM0411150991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Oct 91 First Edition p 2

[Colonel N. Mulyar report: "Leonid Kravchuk Meets Garrison Soldiers"]

[Text] Odessa—There has been a meeting between Ukrainian presidential candidate Leonid Kravchuk and servicemen from the Odessa Garrison at the District Officers' Club. After talking about the sociopolitical situation which has developed in the republic, he presented his election program, which incorporates five objectives: statehood, democracy, sufficiency, spirituality, and trust.

Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, devoted a large part of his speech to the Armed Forces. He reaffirmed that, while forming its own Army on the basis of reasonable sufficiency, the Ukraine does not aspire to a monopoly on the nuclear button. Strategic nuclear forces must come under a unified command, although, as a whole, the presidential candidate would like the Ukraine to have nuclear-free status in the future. But we understand that this is a long process, Kravchuk said. It must take the form of agreements and treaties with all states which have nuclear weapons in their territory.

Talking about conversion, the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet stressed that this is a big problem for the republic, because it has a great many enterprises connected with the manufacture of missiles and nuclear equipment. Converting them to produce ovens and coffee grinders would mean "destroying" top-class plants. That could not be tolerated. However, we must know exactly what kind of equipment and how much needs to be produced now and in 10 years time.

Kazakh Defense Official on Joint Nuclear Control

*AU2610175891 Paris AFP in English 1751 GMT
26 Oct 91*

[Text] Moscow, Oct 26 (AFP)—The Soviet Central Asian Republic of Kazakhstan said it wants joint control with Moscow over the nuclear arms on its territory, but total control over conventional forces there, the new top Kazakh defense official said Saturday [26 October].

General Sagadat Nurbagambetov, whose has been named head of the Kazakhstan State Committee for Defense, was quoted by the Kazakhstan news agency KAZREVIEW as saying that "all Soviet troops present on Kazakh territory will be under our control."

He stressed that Kazakhstan "had no intention of creating its own armed forces," but did plan to set up a national guard.

Kazakhstan is one of the three republics, with Russia and the Ukraine, where Soviet nuclear arms are stationed.

Concerning their control, Nurbagambetov said the republic "wanted to work in close relation with the center, but would not accept any unilateral decisions on its part"—apparently demanding veto power over their use.

Kazakh authorities have spoken out for the total destruction of nuclear armaments, and this month urged the closing of the nuclear testing site at Semipalatinsk, on its territory. It is one of two major Soviet nuclear testing sites, with the other in northern Russia.

Nurbagambetov, 64, served for 20 years from 1969 to 1989 as deputy commander of Soviet troops in the Central Asian district. He later served as deputy commander in the southern group, before being elected a deputy from Kazakhstan in 1990.

On Wednesday [23 October], the Soviet Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Vladimir Lobov reaffirmed that he wanted Soviet nuclear potential concentrated in Russia.

This came after President Mikhail Gorbachev denounced what he called the dangers of "privatization and nationalization" of Soviet Armed Forces in a speech at the opening of the Soviet parliament Monday [21 October].

Shaposhnikov on Control of Nuclear Weapons

*LD2710224891 Moscow TASS in English
2225 GMT 27 Oct 91*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Riabikin]

[Text] Moscow October 27 TASS—"There is every reason to think that nuclear weapons will not spread to separate republics. They will be controlled from the single centre," Soviet Defence Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov told TASS on Saturday [26 October].

All republics agree that pledges to the West and other partners must be honoured. This applies both to strategic and tactical weapons.

The Armed Forces in republics, the minister pointed out, are presently subordinate to the Soviet defence minister. However, republics of the former Soviet Union are now making decisions at variance with the decisions made by the Fifth Congress of the People's Deputies, empowering the USSR State Council and the president of the USSR to deal with problems of defence, international relations and law enforcement. According to Shaposhnikov, republics should coordinate all decisions on defence with the State Council.

The minister said he saw his own task in averting the involvement of Armed Forces in conflicts caused by political ambitions of one or another leader. The military-strategic space will remain intact even when the old Union disintegrates. A good way out of the present complex situation, Shaposhnikov believes, is to announce the transitional period and establish a defence union of sovereign states for the duration of this period.

Taking into account the fact that many republics are now making decisions concerning their citizens' service on their own territory, the minister said, the Armed Forces can only be saved from complete disintegration by organizing service on a contractual basis, that is a mixed principle of forming armed forces with orientation towards professionalism. "We have a programme for this and it will be submitted to the State Council very soon," Shaposhnikov said.

Carpathian MD Aide Denies Removal of Arms

*PM0111152491 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Nov 91 First Edition p 3*

[Interview with Major General P. Falin, first deputy chief of staff of the Carpathian Military District, by Reserve Colonel S. Kutz under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Rumors Unfounded"; date and place not stated]

[Text] Lvov—In connection with the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet's adoption of the declaration of independence, the law on the creation of their own armed forces, and other legislative acts, there have been rumors of the removal from the Ukraine, including the Carpathian Military District [MD], of combat equipment, arms, nuclear munitions, and other property. We asked

Major General P. Falin, first deputy chief of staff of the Carpathian MD, to comment on this.

"There are no grounds for such statements," the general said. "No combat equipment, still less nuclear weapons, could be removed from the district without the supervision of the railroad administration and the agreement of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. In Lvov Oblast, for instance, a working commission has been set up, headed by Z. Kotik, deputy chairman of Lvov City Soviet Executive Committee. It includes the deputy chief of the Lvov Railroad and a representative of the district's military communications service, Lieutenant Colonel V. Tatarinov. It monitors the dispatch of all equipment and armaments from the district and also troop movements. Similar commissions exist in other oblasts.

"Answering a question from V. Durdinets, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet commission on defense and national security questions, concerning an instance of troop movements, we recently reported that the subunits had been returning from the firing range after scheduled exercises. All these are movements within the district, and they are agreed beforehand with the oblast organs of power. As for shipments of the combat equipment of troops under central jurisdiction—strategic and air defense forces—these take place under licenses issued by oblast soviet executive committees. One copy of the license is retained at the railroad directorate's military shipments department. The district command has received no USSR Defense Ministry instructions on sending combat equipment or arms, including nuclear missile arms, outside the district without the knowledge of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry."

Observer Comments on National Nuclear Control

LD0111235291 *Moscow TASS International Service*
in Russian 1404 GMT 1 Nov 91

[By TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, 1 Nov (TASS)—The leaders of the Western countries are by no means pleased at the prospect of the formation of numerous new states in place of the Soviet Union, some of which would have control of what are now nuclear weapons of the Union. Naturally, in this connection a consolidating role in strengthening the Union falls to the country's president. Inter alia, the results of recent meetings between M.S. Gorbachev and the leaders of the United States, Spain, and France provide completely unambiguous evidence of this.

At the news conference of the presidents of the USSR and France in Soustons, Francois Mitterrand spoke directly of his support for efforts directed toward the preservation of the Soviet Union and even its reinforcement. "The center must preserve control over the Armed Forces, and above all nuclear weapons. Questions of foreign indebtedness, aid to the Soviet Union, and the general economy should also fall within its authority ... France is not interested in the disintegration of the

Soviet Union or the formation of a political vacuum on its enormous territory," the French president emphasized.

Changes in the climate of international relations over recent years have also led to a shifting of emphasis and priorities on ensuring security and stability. In particular, problems of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons have come to the forefront, as well as measures to avert the threat of a transfer of means of mass destruction to the control of irresponsible groups and persons. It is for this reason that the proposal of Francois Mitterrand to convene a conference of the four powers possessing nuclear weapons in Europe, in connection with the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, has therefore met with a great international response. The French president considers that in connection with the present situation in the USSR "it is necessary to discuss the question of what mutual obligations we can assume so as to continue to implement strict control over nuclear weapons."

It can be imagined that under present circumstances this proposal deserves the most serious attention. It goes without saying that there must be discussion at the conference not only of the "physical security" of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery. Although even the question of whether the guarding of strategic weapons, let us say, on the territory of the Ukraine, will be controlled from the center or from Kiev, is of great importance to all the countries of Europe.

If a conference of the four powers actually takes place, the question of the resolute strengthening of the conditions of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons must be made the cornerstone. Even a minimal risk of the transfer of control over nuclear weapons to "new masters" is fraught with catastrophe. The security system in respect of nuclear weapons must be built on warning all potential claimants to membership of the "nuclear club" of possible sanctions, from an economic blockade to measures of a military nature. The "carrot and stick" policy which is odious in other situations ceases to be odious in the case of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It goes without saying that an enormous role in strengthening conditions of nonproliferation can be played by further cuts in the arsenals of all nuclear powers, as well as an accord on the cessation of underground nuclear tests.

NATO Leaders Warn Soviets on Proliferation

AU0811135891 *Paris AFP in English 1330 GMT*
8 Nov 91

[Text] Rome, Nov 8 (AFP)—NATO leaders warned all the authorities in the Soviet Union on Friday [8 November] to avoid the proliferation of nuclear arms and urged that the Soviet nuclear arsenal be put under a single authority.

In a statement issued at the end of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit here, they called on the various Soviet leaders to refrain from any action likely to lead to the proliferation of nuclear arms and other means of mass destruction.

The Government of the Soviet Union and the republics should adopt energetic measures to avoid the export of nuclear or other military technology that could lead to destabilization, the statement said.

The leaders of the Atlantic alliance hailed statements by Soviet leader that they will ensure reliable control over nuclear arms under a single authority.

This issue affects the security interests of the entire alliance, the text warned. It asked that Soviet republics limit the development of conventional military forces which, it said, by their size and nature could aggravate political tensions.

The allies also hailed the changes in the Soviet Union and stressed that it was up to the people of the Soviet Union to decide on their future relations, through peaceful and democratic means.

But they encouraged them to move ahead along the path of cooperation, both among themselves and with the allies.

Threats, intimidation, coercion and violence have no place in this process, the statement said, urging respect for human rights and the rights of minorities.

The summit also expressed hope that economic freedom and a market economy would develop in the Soviet Union, saying they were ready to help the Soviet Union head in this direction with technical assistance in key sectors.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Vienna Troop Talks To Include Soviet Republics

AU1311114391 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 13 Nov 91 pp 1-2

[Report by "W.A.": "The CSCE Takes the Disintegration of the Soviet Union Into Account"]

[Text] Frankfurt, 12 November—Because of the disintegration of the Eastern superpower, the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of troops from the Atlantic to the Urals are now aimed at directly including individual former Soviet republics in the respective agreements. For this reason, a so-called political agreement that would not have to be specifically ratified by the NATO members and the states of the former Warsaw Pact will replace the originally planned agreement on the reduction of troops deployed in Europe. Given the statements of independence by almost all former Soviet republics, this approach will help avoid problems of international law complicating the disarmament efforts. The Soviet side has reportedly agreed to this procedure, so that it is considered likely that such an agreement will be signed at the next CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki in the spring of next year. An initial draft will be submitted to the delegates of the 22 countries taking part in the Vienna negotiations in the next few days when the exchange of data has largely been completed.

There is agreement in Vienna that national upper ceilings regarding the future number of troops can no longer be fixed with the Soviet Union alone. Much rather, the individual republics such as Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus [Belorussia] will be bound to sign the planned agreement separately. In this way, the plans of some former Soviet republics will be taken into account to set up their own armed forces, in addition to mere national guards. The agreement, which is called "CFE 1a" [Conventional Forces in Europe 1a] complements the CFE treaty signed in Paris a year ago, which envisions the limitation of conventional weapons systems. A number of countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, have ratified this treaty. In some countries, above all in the United States, there is still parliamentary opposition to this treaty, which results from the existing uncertainty about developments in the former Soviet Union.

The Ukraine is not the only former Soviet republic planning to place the military equipment and facilities of the Soviet Armed Forces on its territory under its own control. There are similar aspirations in other republics, including Georgia and Azerbaijan. Soviet Defense Minister Shaposhnikov, who is currently visiting Germany, said several days ago that a "council of defense ministers of the sovereign states" would be formed that will deal with the armed forces' future.

Qualifying this statement, the minister said, however, that given the serious economic crisis it is "inconceivable" for the time being to divide the armed forces.

Irrespective of such imponderabilities, some progress is taking shape at the Vienna negotiations. That holds true not only for efforts to reduce the military personnel of the Armed Forces but also for aspirations to extend air inspection beyond the treaty area between the Atlantic and the Urals to both North America and the Asiatic part of the former Soviet Union. The discussions on an agreement guaranteeing "open skies" have been stimulated by the promise made by the Soviet Union several days ago that it has given up its former reservations about military facilities and off-limits regions being overflown. Even though a number of details, including the type of aircraft and sensors to be used, will yet have to be clarified, the negotiators in Vienna are optimistic about submitting an "open skies" agreement at the CSCE follow-up meeting in March next year for signing.

FRANCE

Prime Minister Addresses Defense Institute

PM1211120491 Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE
in French Nov 91 pp 9-19

[Speech by Prime Minister Edith Cresson to Higher National Defense Studies Institute on 5 September: "Defense and Europe's Future"]

[Text] Everybody is aware of your institute's eminent contribution to the geostrategic debates and its role in the preservation of a spirit of defense inspired by the common perception of the national interest. I am happy to address you at a time when Europe is experiencing profound upheavals.

The fall of the Berlin Wall tolled the knell of totalitarianism on our continent, where all peoples are now engaged in the same democratic aspiration. But the destruction of the Berlin Wall—that symbol of Europe's division—was also the end of a dubious order based on the opposition of two antagonistic blocs. The Paris summit in November 1990 consecrated the end of Yalta and, at the same time, the end of a confrontation which has influenced our defense options for decades.

Of course, we must avoid overoptimism. The former reasons for our security concerns have certainly not completely disappeared. The buildup of armaments of all kinds on our continent is still considerable if only because the very recent disarmament agreements have not yet been fully implemented. In addition to these remaining traditional risks are the new causes of tension or conflict in Europe and the rest of the world.

Events in the USSR have gained speed. The putsch on 19 August which fortunately failed, and France welcomes that, also hastened many changes. The situation is new and contains a large, unpredictable element for us but also for the main protagonists: Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and the republics' leaders.

In the southern part of Europe, the peoples of Yugoslavia have not managed to curb the exacerbation of national feeling and antagonism among the nationalities. Faced with this situation, France, with its EC partners, is pursuing conciliatory efforts in a realistic and willing way. But, at the same time, the fighting continues. As the president of the Republic said: "A federation cannot be based on force." It is necessary to negotiate. And we know the ferocity of the hatred which divides Serbs and Croats.

There are many potential hotbeds of conflict. Between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and within those countries, borders were produced by irremediable disasters, and they perpetuated great suffering. They are not being called into question but many see them from a historical viewpoint. Worse still, communities and ethnic groups form threatened and, in some cases, threatening enclaves.

France has closely followed these developments for a long time. It knows that it is expected to help avert disaster. Its role in the EC Council of Ministers is irreplaceable. That is why I have asked EEC Chairman Lubbers to convene an EC Council of Ministers meeting as soon as possible. I also suggested that he should invite both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin to address us.

Europe must make every effort to speak with one voice. Indeed, as the same time as Eastern Europe is experiencing problems, a new balance is emerging: that of the EEC, which constitutes the envied model and a reference point. The countries which make up the EEC have surmounted former antagonisms. The post-totalitarian Europe, whose advent we hailed, still has to find new balances to avert the risks of lasting instability.

Similarly, the Israeli-Arab conflict, which the international community is anxious to solve, has not yet been settled. Moreover, on the African continent the democratization process is under way and has been speeded up since the La Baule summit. But the challenge of development to speed up that trend still has to be taken up.

We are at a turning point for our defense. It is obvious that these events have a fundamental effect on our strategic vision. That is what I would like to try to evaluate with you.

First, we must clearly reaffirm, even if it seems obvious, that defense is still vitally necessary. France cannot be expected to lower its guard. There is no more vital duty for a state than to create the material and political conditions for its security. At times of international tension, you must be able to opt for firmness and the rejection of ambiguity: From the crisis started by the deployment of the SS-20 missiles to the crisis sparked off by Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, France has never shirked its responsibilities. It will not do so in the future.

Second, we must stress that the main effect of the changes which have just come about may be to place security questions in a global context. This is true in the

internal sphere for the definition of our means of defense and its insertion in the national entity. It is also true in the international sphere in which security policy should also equally integrate the changes stemming from the disarmament negotiations and those connected with the changes in the European scene.

First, the Vital Need for Defense

A credible defense is still an essential element of our sovereignty and independence. Moreover, it is this conviction which I see as the essential explanation of the consensus which our country is showing on defense questions. Indeed, it is the concern for our complete political independence which is at stake and not a stronger perception than elsewhere of the threats we are likely to face.

The need for defense still exists in strictly military terms, for at least two reasons. The first relates to our deterrent capability. It is the fundamental element of our defense system and the guarantee of peace in a world whose unpredictability must not be underestimated, as recent history has shown. The second relates to what has just happened in the Gulf region. This reminds us that our security is part of a world context.

The Gulf crisis revealed the scale of risks in a world characterized both by great instability and confusion, a globalization of security interests, but also of our economic and political interests. The Gulf war reaffirmed that a country like ours has special responsibilities in ensuring that international rules are respected. Finally, it confirmed the need for the Europe we are building to have the means of realizing its ambitions. Its contribution to the Gulf war—I am thinking in particular of the Western European Union [WEU]—and also the shortcomings which that crisis revealed, must be lessons from which we learn when we are moving toward a new stage in European integration.

Second, we are still loyal to our alliances. Of course, the Atlantic alliance and its military organization were designed after World War II to face a very specific situation. It is no longer confronted with an arsenal considerably superior to its own, ostensibly placed in an offensive position in the heart of Europe.

With the Soviet withdrawal, the collapse of its ideology, the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, and the effort to demilitarize the economies, the democratic battle has been won peacefully. But although this implies that the Atlantic alliance should be reformed, the link of solidarity which it establishes among its members for the preservation of the common values they share must remain.

Similarly, Franco-German cooperation in the security and defense sphere continues to be an essential aspect of our security policy. This cooperation, which is not an attack on anybody, continues to be a major axis of our European policy. My conviction is that the two governments, the two countries, and the two peoples agree on

the essential issues, namely that the stability of the future European order largely depends on the closeness and strength of their bilateral cooperation.

A More Comprehensive Approach to Security

Despite the need to maintain some fundamental aspects of our security and defense policy, it seems clear that this is not raised entirely in identical terms to those which prevailed until just recently.

It seems to me first and foremost that the main effect of the end of East-West confrontation is to place the security question back in a global context.

This global nature of defense is certainly not new. The economic, social, and industrial aspects of the security of a country like ours are well known to you. But it was sometimes difficult to take them all into account in a context characterized by the confrontation between two military blocs which to some extent have been paralyzed by the East-West confrontation. The essential focus of defense policy in those conditions was defined by the need to meet two imperative needs: to be capable of deterring a strong enemy force and, if necessary, to participate alongside our allies in the battle to halt a major offensive in Central Europe.

The upheavals on the European stage make it possible to return to a more comprehensive and balanced approach to our security from two viewpoints.

First, the definition of our means of defense. You know that the president and those members of the government mainly concerned with this sphere have started to consider the necessary adaptations to our military.

Back on 3 March, the president of the Republic called on the country to open a broad debate on the future balance of the armed forces, their missions, and their composition. Parliament already held an initial debate with the government in June. Considerable legislative work is under way; the bill on national service, the 1992 finance bill, and the draft programming law are part of the long-term planning of our defense with a view to the year 2002.

As I said in the National Assembly, this work is being carried out without prejudice or taboos. It should produce a better equipped army with greater strength than at present, but a more compact one—a reduced format for the three branches of the armed forces but on a scale compatible with the ability to carry out their missions.

The new makeup of our defense, adapted to a changing strategic context, is already one of the priorities recently reaffirmed to the deputies in accordance with the president's guidelines: maintenance of nuclear sufficiency; the attainment of a threshold of credibility in the space sphere; strengthening logistical capabilities; reduction in manpower; reduction in national service, and the professionalization of some units.

I would like to take this opportunity to stress the four directions which will characterize this planning.

—Emphasis on the joint armed forces approach to programs and operations: It is important to increasingly relate the defense effort to operational concepts rather than the traditional distinctions based on individual branches of the armed forces.

—The constant effort to adapt and modernize our armed forces in accordance with the requirements of mobility and firepower which now characterize warfare.

—The need to take account of the future in studies, research, and training. In this connection, it is impossible to overemphasize the importance of the scientific and human dimension of defense. Nobody is unaware that France's high level of scientific and technical development owes a great deal to the contribution made by defense.

—Finally, the growing role which will henceforth be played, alongside the nuclear deterrent force and conventional forces, by new means whose strategic importance was revealed by our recent experiences in the Gulf and the development of the risks of crisis in Europe and the world. This involves space, intelligence, and communications.

I would particularly like to emphasize this last point. A technological revolution has taken place: the information revolution. It directly affects our armed forces from the triple viewpoint of the management of the battlefield and the chain of command, of detection, and intelligence. This force has the role of exploiting the other components of our defense forces.

Finally, we must prepare to make the appropriate contribution to the developing military cooperation networks within the Atlantic alliance or emerging in the European framework. In this connection, there is reason to wonder whether in both cases we have proved capable of imagination suited to the scale of the changes which have been made or are under way. I will return to this a little later with regard to Europe and, with regard to NATO, I leave it up to our allies, who are members of the integrated military structures, to give an answer.

The comprehensive nature of our security and defense policy also means that we must take more account of the aspects of our security which are not directly military.

Being independent also means fighting energetically to avoid being outstripped in international economic cooperation. The maintenance of an economy open to the world, the exploitation of our industrial capabilities, our overseas economic activity, are preconditions for our security.

Similarly, separating our means of defense proper from its technological, economic, and social environment would strike me as a dangerous illusion.

It is dangerous mainly because the efficacy of our arms is linked to the performances of our enterprises. There is no strong defense system which is not based on real industrial capacities. The battle for technological innovations, the improvement in our industry's performance, the training of cadres, especially young people, is indissolubly linked with our defense effort.

It is also dangerous because our defense is also the defense of our fundamental values. Indifference, injustice, and inequalities undermine the defense spirit. The struggle against unemployment, and to promote economic and social integration, is also a real battle which involves our survival as a state which is willing and able to play a role in Europe and in the world.

Similarly, when the danger is at our door, we must be able to mobilize all our energies for the defense of our territory; we must be capable of equal mobilization to promote our economy. This means that, without controversy or taking sides, we should make the necessary judgments with full clarity and the broadest possible participation in the decisionmaking process.

This Comprehensive Approach Is an International Need

This need for a comprehensive approach to security and defense is also clear in the international sphere. Indeed, everybody is now aware that a security policy must include disarmament.

In this sphere too things have changed considerably. The 1986 Stockholm agreements on confidence-building measures, the 1987 Washington agreements on intermediate-range nuclear forces, the 1990 Paris agreements on conventional forces, and the Moscow agreements reached two months ago on Soviet and U.S. strategic weapons all constitute progress and new facts which have considerable defense implications.

Disarmament is a major aspect of our security policy. We therefore cannot set defense requirements against disarmament issues. Both must form a coherent whole. I am aware that the situation is still imperfect. The Paris agreements on conventional weapons are merely one stage. A great deal still has to be done to ensure that the negotiations produce fully satisfactory conditions of stability. I would like to add that it would be particularly worrying if the threat to stability resulting from the situation in the USSR were to be aggravated by uncertainties about the implementation of disarmament agreements and the progress of future negotiations.

The speed of the changes in Europe, particularly in the USSR, implies that the arms control effort should be continued without pause. I am thinking in particular about the discussions under way in Vienna among all the CSCE countries. In the immediate future the aim is to arrive at guarantees of the level of staffing in the armed forces. But the aim is also to prepare for the discussions which will start after the Helsinki CSCE meeting next spring. All the questions linked to European security, the

prevention of crises and conflicts, and disarmament must be tackled from a comprehensive viewpoint.

I hope that the 12 will make the decisive contribution to the design, course, and outcome of these discussions which, in the past, have sometimes been too dependent on exclusive talks between the two superpowers.

But the arms control and disarmament effort must also be brought into the world sphere. Western Europe cannot make do with being a kind of pocket of stability when the law of the jungle prevails everywhere else. You know what is at stake—the issues were put forward in the disarmament and arms control plan recently proposed by France.

More especially, I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize the importance of the commitment of the whole international community to an active and effective policy of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms control. It goes without saying that any state has the right to guarantee its defense and hence to produce or procure the necessary means for it. It is equally obvious that all the possible mechanisms of cooperation must be put into operation to avoid aggravating the situation in areas of tension and to prevent the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction.

Finally, it strikes me that the upheavals being experienced in the European political and military context also have the effect of putting the question of the relationship between the national defense dimension and its multilateral aspects in new terms.

A new security architecture is being outlined before our eyes. Around the strictly national aspect of defense—a kind of hard core—a series of solidarity systems is being formed, of which the EEC, and WEU, the Atlantic alliance, and the CSCE are the main components, but to which could be added other institutions which in one way or another make their contribution to Europe's stability and security.

However, it is true that at the regional level, the thaw which we are witnessing is reawakening sources of tension and conflict. The painful case of Yugoslavia is now an example of that. It is not a strategic danger. The issue is how to maintain dialogue, respect the rules, and hence stability in a changing Europe. To this end, each institution must play its role. I am thinking in particular of the EEC and CSCE which I think should be the two pivots of the future European balance, with the Atlantic alliance continuing to play its role in its sphere of competence.

France's Major Role

Among these institutional developments, I would like to stress the importance of the effort made by France to reconcile the national dimension of its defense policy and the vision of European integration which it advocates in the framework of the current intergovernmental conference on political union.

The importance which France attaches to including the prospect of a common foreign and security policy in the future treaty is well known. It is not aimed at tackling any particular threat or hastening the transfer of sovereignty in a sphere in which the inviolable national role very quickly emerges. It is a way of asserting the comprehensiveness of our approach to European union which cannot automatically exclude any option, even the most ambitious, without running the risk of undermining the current integration process.

Of course, the debate on the subject is not over, either in the internal sphere or with our partners. It also relates to the role of the WEU which France has just chaired—a chairmanship characterized by particularly important Franco-German initiatives.

The 12 must agree on a plan for union which is as complete as possible. This will determine their ability to act in a new Europe which is rapidly being reshaped. The issue is none other than stability, peace, and progress on our continent.

These are the challenges which we are issuing and the French Government's ambitions. I am pleased to see you involved in these important deliberations for the future of France and Europe.

GERMANY

Soviet, FRG Defense Ministers Brief Press

On European Stability

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[Excerpts] Bonn (ADN)—The main concern of the German and Soviet defense ministers—Gerhard Stoltenberg and Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov—is securing European stability, it was stressed at a joint news conference by the ministers in Bonn on Tuesday [12 November]. The path to more security in Europe called for confidence-building measures and relations; secure verification, above all of nuclear weapons; and the continuation of the arms control program, Stoltenberg said. Shaposhnikov arrived on Monday for a three-day visit to Germany. In addition to international issues, the talks also focused on the situation and the withdrawal of the Western Group of Soviet forces. As Shaposhnikov stressed, the existing treaties will be observed, and the withdrawal is passing off as planned. Stoltenberg assured him that the incidents in which Soviet soldiers became the targets of provocations would be energetically investigated. Such attacks are indeed painful, but they are isolated cases. Moreover such things happened before, said the minister, who was once stationed in the GDR himself. [passage omitted]

In addition, the Soviet minister reported on the reforms within the Soviet Armed Forces. The dissolution of party structures is largely complete. However, a witch-hunt is

not being carried out; instead, the assumption is made that the great majority of former party functionaries in the Army were responsible members of the military and carried out their orders in an orderly manner. Shaposhnikov reiterated that the Soviet Union would adhere to all the agreed treaties on disarmament and arms control. The Council of State also agrees to that. Representatives of all the republics had also spoken in favor of preserving the unity of the Soviet Army, which would make control easier. Moreover, no republic has laid claim to nuclear weapons.

On Troop Withdrawal Issues

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["cas." report: "Army Contacts Will Be Deepened"]

[Text] Bonn—The Bundeswehr and the Soviet Army are to further deepen their contacts. FRG Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg promised his colleague from Moscow, Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, cooperation on all problems that need to be solved in integrating the Armed Forces into a democratic nation. Moreover, officers from both sides are to be sent to staff courses. Next year, a German soldier will also participate in the Soviet MIR space project, Stoltenberg reported in Bonn on 12 November.

Shaposhnikov expressed his "satisfaction" with the fact that the German authorities are doing everything possible to prevent assaults on Soviet soldiers in eastern Germany. Just like the Federal Government, he regards the sporadic assaults as "painful," but he is very satisfied that both sides want to jointly prevent further incidents, the Soviet minister said. He affirmed that the 240,000 men who are still deployed in eastern Germany will be withdrawn by the end of 1994 as agreed.

The construction of apartments for those who return home is proceeding as planned. Shaposhnikov conceded that there are problems in the Ukraine, but he rejected the impression that the construction program had already been stopped there. Further talks will be held, the minister said and added that locations can only be changed where the construction work has not yet started.

According to Shaposhnikov, the Soviet Union will not demand additional money from the FRG. The total of more than 13 billion German marks are being "appropriately used." Stoltenberg reported that in the USSR the construction of 8,000 of the planned 36,000 housing units has been started. By the end of the year, 2,000 are expected to be finished. All problems, even the sale of the Soviet Armed Forces' real estate in eastern Germany, are discussed in the responsible joint commission, he said.

Marshal Shaposhnikov reaffirmed on 12 November that the Soviet units on German territory no longer have nuclear ammunition. In that context he stressed that the nuclear weapons in his country are under the Army's

control. The individual republics are not striving for their "possession," they only want to know where the weapons are stored and how large they are in number. Referring to the army reform, Shaposhnikov said that the unity of the Armed Forces is to be preserved, although some republics intend to form some "guards" in addition. However, whoever seeks the split of the central armed forces is "not a representative of reason."

According to Shaposhnikov, the Army will keep out of politics in the future and only represent the interests of its motherland, the state, and the people. It will also

continue to have a "mixed" structure, that is, with members of the various republics. The soldiers' period of service is to be 18 instead of 24 months in the future.

Neither Stoltenberg nor Shaposhnikov publicly referred to the cases of desertion from Soviet units in eastern Germany. However, they were discussed by the delegations. The Soviet side took the view that most of the soldiers had deserted for economic reasons and it asked for help in bringing the army members back to the USSR. The German side pointed out that the federal and the land interior ministers are responsible for that.