

3956

RECORD
COPY

MAIN FILE

JPRS: 3956

22 September 1960

MAIN FILE

SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY TRANSLATIONS

No. 25

RETURN TO MAIN FILE

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED

19990112 114

Photocopies of this report may be purchased from:

PHOTODUPLICATION SERVICE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
205 EAST 42nd STREET, SUITE 300
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

F O R E W O R D

This publication was prepared under contract by the UNITED STATES JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE, a federal government organization established to service the translation and research needs of the various government departments.

JPRS: 3956

CSO: 2800-D/25

SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY TRANSLATIONS

No. 25

Following are translations of selected articles from various issues of the Russian-language newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), Moscow. Specific source data is given under individual article headings.

<u>Table of Contents</u>	<u>Page</u>
I. Sluggishness In Combat Means Death (Time Factor in Contemporary Warfare)	1
II. Every Second Counts (Pontonier Training in Forcing Water Obstacles)	4
III. At Headquarters And In The Units	8
IV. Regulations -- Foundation Of Troop Training	17
V. Improve The Combat Skill Of Airborne Forces	21
VI. Practice Is The Criterion (Preparation of Dissertations in Academies)	24
VII. In The Interest Of Combat Readiness (Develop Militarily Useful Forms of Sport)	28

I. SLUGGISHNESS IN COMBAT MEANS DEATH

(Time Factor in Contemporary Warfare)

8 June 1960

Editorial

Page 1

The most important feature of present-day combat operations is tremendous density of fire. The employment of the atomic and the thermonuclear weapon makes it possible, within a short period of time, to blanket a wide and deep front with total destruction, to open huge gaps in the enemy combat formation, in a word, to alter abruptly the combat picture. So it is clear what a tremendous significance is acquired nowadays by the time factor in troop operations. After all, there need only be a delay in delivering an atomic attack and in exploiting its results; there need only be a little lag in taking measures to liquidate the results of the attack of the enemy-----and all the preceding efforts of the armed forces are brought to nothing. It can be said without hesitation that combat sluggishness on the present-day field-of-battle is likewise death. Increased fire power making ever more imperative the fight to gain time and to speed up combat operations; thus it demands high combat efficiency on the part of commanding officers and headquarters. We can no longer nowadays be satisfied in any sense with those methods of combat organization which were characteristic of the period of the Great Patriotic War [World War II], including even its final periods. Speed of reaction to situations, which have arisen, the taking of a decision within a very short period of time, the prompt communication of that decision to subordinates, and operational leadership in divisions and units in the course of combat operations---this is what is required of commanders so as to guarantee victory in modern warfare.

The best school for the development of organizational capabilities in our command staffs is their training in the difficult art of the direction of the combat activities of subordinates---tactical training. Obviously this training is effective only if it is carried out on a high methodological level, with no slackening or oversimplification; only if commanders and subordinates are put, in the course of this training, into difficult conditions, characteristic of modern combat and requiring the display of boldness and decision, speed and operational efficiency.

Something that went off well, for example, was the tactical training of the N----- unit. Excellent combat training, endurance and hardiness was evidenced in the course of this training by the tank battalion commanded by Maj. Drapov. The unit executed a forced march and emerged in good time into the region assigned; and advancing at high speed in the face of heavy "enemy" fire took the

assigned objective. The success of this combat was largely due to the quick and resourceful thinking and action on the part of the battalion commander in the organizing of the march and in the course of the attack. Thus, when, in the course of the actual combat, it was learned in the rear that the "enemy" held the only river bridge in the area, the officer commanding boldly shifted from the previously prepared plan of action and decided to force the river on pontons. An important build-up area was taken from the "enemy" by surprise.

Typical of the training exercise was the fact that its director was all the time creating a complex, dynamic situation. Difficult assignments kept being given Maj. Drapov and his subordinate officers Vykhot, Gruts, Solov'yev, et al. and little time was allotted for carrying them out. In the course of this interesting and instructive combat, the situation kept being changed frequently and abruptly and the officers commanding were often required to take prompt decisions on their own responsibility. All this made no little contribution to an increase in the skills of the officers commanding in directing their troops.

An important time-saving element in the period of combat preparation is speed in assessing the situation and in taking a decision. The officer commanding must, by a creative understanding of the situation, be able to foresee the course of future events so that he can influence them. During this period it is important that the officer commanding be freed from all obligations not immediately connected with the organization of the battle. Questions of supply must be boldly entrusted to staff officers and heads of services, stepping up their responsibility for the task assigned them. This in turn places upon the officers commanding the obligation of assigning to them in good time their preliminary individual missions by telegram-style orders. Unfortunately in some training exercises there still occur instances where the serious business of supply begins only after the officer commanding has given the order to attack, while up to that point a large group of responsible persons has been left to all intents and purposes idle.

The swift course of events in actual battle often precludes any possibility of assigning supplementary missions to subordinates or even of commanders getting word to their subordinates of changes on the field of battle. At the same time, in training commanders and staffs for bold and decisive independent action in any situation, including confused ones, those directing such training exercises have the obligation of requiring timely reports up to commanders and timely information down to staff officers of changes on the field of battle. It is extremely important that the superior commander should have the knack of apportioning time for the build-up, leaving as much of this build-up as possible to the subordinate commanders.

For troops to be taught the art of high-speed attack, it is important that not only the director of the exercises, not only the unit commanders, but the control machinery as well should give every possible support to those who are executing swift maneuvers, directing their energies to the fulfillment of combat tasks on the tightest possible schedule. But in point of fact, the speed of advance of the attacking troops is at times artificially inhibited by the control officers.

High speed of troop advance can be attained only by that commander who knows to perfection the tactico-technical potential of the units coordinated under his command and can assign them missions they can handle and exploit to the full their combat potential. And, vice versa, an ignorance of these potentials can lead to dismal results. In one tactical training exercise, a commander decided to skirt in his advance a region where there had been an atomic explosion, explained his decision in terms of the high levels of radiation. But he was relying on data supplied by a reconnaissance made more than three hours previously. The slowdown of the speed of advance was in this case the result of the insufficient military-technical training of the officer.

The campaign against sluggishness on the tactical training fields is a campaign for a high combat training of troops and for a precise coordination of units. The best intentions of a commander to attain high speeds of advance may well remain just intentions unless he succeeds in readying his transport and combat vehicles and his radiomen too, and all those who answer for direction of the troops in the context of swift advance and maneuver. It cannot, for instance, be considered a normal situation when, as has happened in some tactical training exercises, the deployment from marching column into approach march and thereafter into battle formation was effected too slowly, when the combat material was allowed to become congested, whole units went marching off in the wrong direction etc.

Modern warfare, with its rapid pace, swiftness of troop maneuver, large-scale use of weapons of mass destruction, poses exceptional demands to the moral qualities of every enlisted man, NCO and officer. That is why it is the duty of commanders and political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations to exploit to the full the possibilities of the summer combat training period so that every soldier shall steadily perfect his combat skill, be physically toughened up so that he is a staunch, bold and brave fighter, able to hold out and determined to do so, capable of overcoming successfully any of those difficulties which are typical of modern combat.

II. EVERY SECOND COUNTS

(Pontonier Training in Forcing Water Obstacles)

7 June 1960
Page 2

Lt Col N. ARTYUSHEVSKIY

The motor vehicles fitted with their ponton blocks were approaching the river. The soldiers released the lashing cables, the pontons hit the water with a loud splash. The command was given: "assemble!"

The platoon commander, Sr. Lieut. Kaz'min, was losing no time. The soldiers had already done an immense amount of work at getting the pontons ready to be assembled. Everything was going well, when all of a sudden the officer noticed that Sgt. First Class Osipov's crew had struck a snag. Number 4 simply could not get into position so that one ponton could hook up with the second.

The first failure was quickly followed by a second one. At the start of the hook-up of the ponton-sections one of the members of the crew lashed the stringer in a way different from that called for in instructions. The whole thing had to be done over again. And here, precious minutes were lost.

At last the hook-up of the ponton was completed. Sr. Lieut. Kaz'min looked at his watch and felt his heart pound: "Washout! Complete washout! If we friggged around that long in a real battle, we couldn't help having huge losses and maybe even failing to carry out our combat assignment," he thought to himself.

Next day, Kaz'min went over the exercise again and again, looking for the miscalculations which had led to such an unenviable result. The basic defect in his opinion was that the crew had had little training in split-second timing. And that is what he told the batallion commander when the latter called him in for consultation. The batallion commander, a first-rate experienced officer listened closely to his subordinate, then gave orders as to how the defects were to be overcome, how all the soldiers were to be trained to value the time factor.

After this, the platoon commander assembled the sergeants, briefed them on the order and method of practical work-out of the movements and actions of the various crew members by numbers.

The platoon commander was present at the training exercises and gave special attention to the crews that were weakest. Now he came to Sr. Sgt. Osipov. The crew commander taught his subordinates how to hook-up pontons quickly and correctly.

The officer noticed that the soldiers were making practically no use of the mechanisms and instruments at their disposal. He drew the crew commander's attention to this. By making use of the crowbars, the crew members were able to pay out the stringers considerably faster than before, with a resultant gain of several minutes.

Quite some time went by. The pontoniers perfected their skill, attained smoothness, speed and precision in the carrying out of commands. And now comes the day of the final drill. It fell to the present writer to check on the performance of the platoon. The picture was entirely different from the one described above.

This was the way the situation developed during the exercise. The advancing troops, in pursuit of a retreating "enemy", broke through to a water barrier. The advance units successfully forced the river by ferry without a halt and seized a small beachhead. It was further necessary to step up the tempo of the advance, so that the "enemy" should not be able to entrench on the new line nor to wipe out the tiny handful of troops who had penetrated to the opposite bank.

Now here was where quick and bold action was called for on the part of the pontoniers. I saw how the huge special vehicles, concentrated in a dense green grove, prepared to effect the last decisive thrust to the water barrier. In order to save time, the commander took the bold decision to swing the ponton bridge into position working from both banks. The question arose: to what unit should the most responsible assignment be entrusted, namely the laying down of the bank span and the landing spans on the opposite bank? After a little thought, the commander entrusted this mission to the platoon commanded by Sr. Lieut. Kaz'min.

The soldiers acted efficiently and with a sure touch, each in his assigned place. The work was quickly finished. The commander looked at his watch and smiled happily: the crew had gained fifteen minutes. Having finished ahead of time the laying of the bank span and the landing span, the crew helped its neighbors assemble the rest of the pontons. The ponton bridge was swung into position ahead of deadline. This contributed to the more rapid accomplishment of their combat mission by the advancing units.

I have often had occasion to hear from various officers that the main thing in the fight to save time is the ability to work with speed and precision at laying down the bridge. At the same time I would like to warn some comrades against such a one-sided approach to the time factor. After all, the swift and efficient erection of a floating bridge does not depend only on the people directly occupied at assembling the sections. Of great significance here is, for example, the engineering reconnaissance of the water barrier. As the saying goes: look before you leap! This is directly applicable to the pontoniers. Without a detailed knowledge of the character of the water barrier, an accurate and speedy forcing of it cannot be organized. A careful and reasoned engineering reconnaissance constitutes the basis for success in the erection of a floating bridge or in the organization of a ferry crossing. A mistake in determining the width of the river may considerably retard the erection of a floating bridge. This sort of thing happened to us on one exercise.

Sr. Lieut. Pavlov did not give enough attention to determining the width of a river and allowed a mistake of more than 20 meters. When a start was made at erecting the bridge, several extra ponton blocks were found to be required for its hook-up. There was none nearby. Blocks had, in fact, to be hauled up from several kilometers away. As a result of this negligence, the erection of the bridge was held up for over two hours.

Made wiser by this bitter experience, the unit officers now think through in minutest detail all questions relative to the organization and execution of an engineering reconnaissance. Recently at one training exercise, the pontoniers were faced with the problem of effecting a crossing of a wide river. And here is how the reconnaissance was organized. The engineer reconnaissance group was split up into three sub-groups. One of them attended to the reconnaissance and clearing of the nearer bank, another covered the reconnaissance of the river itself, while the third operated on the opposite bank. Each group was well outfitted for its assignment. To measure the width of the river, for example, a distance gauge was used, while the speed of current was determined by means of a hydrospeedometer. Reconnaissance of the riverbed channel was carried out in a little amphibious automobile. On the basis of accurate data on the nature of the water barrier, the commander took the correct decision to erect a floating bridge, and the units successfully coped with the problem of forcing the water barrier.

The fight to save time is a dynamic, creative business. Every time there is the slightest chance to shave off one or two seconds, that chance must be seized. In this connection, much can be learned from the unit which Capt. Anufriev commands. Here there is a steady increase in the speed of construction of wooden low-water bridges. In the vanguard of the fight for time are the rationalizers — men with keen, enquiring minds and a creative urge. On the suggestion of Sr. Lieut. Denisov, a double-axle trailer was fitted with a mechanized pile-driver for driving piles through the ice in winter. This pile-driver has considerable advantages, as compared with the pile-driver on sleds formerly used for this purpose. Use of the mechanized pile-driver on the trailer permits of transporting it into working position 4 to 5 times more quickly. This pile-driver is easier to stop. It can be shifted 5 to 6 times more quickly from one support to another along the axis of the bridge.

An officer, Naymchuk by name, is setting an example of bold solution of combat problems, and of an incorporation of all that is new and progressive. Thus, in one training exercise, in the course of an advance, it transpired that the ponton unit was going to have to throw a bridge across a river without pause. The commander decided to carry out part of the operations while the vehicles were still in the approach area. He had the blocks

united, the ponton stringers made fast, the flooring laid and reinforced. This was a bold decision. It depended on a high degree of training of the personnel. Only operators possessing high combat skill could bring ponton vehicles up to a water barrier and successfully execute the detrucking of the ponton blocks onto the water with no hold-up. A creative application of this innovation permitted of a considerable economy in the time needed to erect the floating bridge.

After the exercise, there was much talk among us about this case. Some praised Naymchuk and backed him up. Others declared he took a great risk. I think myself that those comrades are right who backed up the bold actions of the officer. After all, in the case in point, we have to do not with any blind, unadvised risk, but rather with a considered decision, based on a profound knowledge of his subordinates and on a conviction of their capabilities and combat skill.

Modern combat operations call for swift maneuver. Under these conditions water barriers must be forced at high speeds. It is precisely for this reason that the pontoniers of the N— Division are learning to act with speed and precision, and to put a high value on the time factor.

III. AT HEADQUARTERS AND IN THE UNITS

PART I

25 June 1960
Page 2

Col. M. Zabavskiy

I had to consult with the chief navigator of the fighter command on a duty mission. But the General, Maj. Gen. (Air) I. P. Bashilov was not at headquarters. Some time later I came back again. And again the same result. I did not succeed in catching Gen. Bashilov either the second or the third day. I learned he was out at the fighter command. I had to wait a long time for the General's return. And before long he was off again.

I must confess the thought occurred to me then: "Is it a good thing for a section commander to spend so much time with the troops? He has subordinates; they can keep him posted on the situation in the command, collect the necessary information, give orders. But the commander's place is at headquarters. From here, from the center, he has a clearer picture of the situation in the units; it is easier for him here to make a sound decision and to see to it that his orders are carried out."

I must say I had before me enough examples of this style of work. Quite a few commanders and indeed even the ordinary staff workers preferred the quiet of their office to troublesome trips out to training exercises, to carrying out demonstrations and methodological instructions or inspecting units. And it seemed they were right: in the quiet calm of a large headquarters with its well-oiled machinery, its broadly ramified reliable liaison, a better job could be done of directing troops.

But it wasn't long before I began to see the questionable aspects of this style of command. It was easily noticeable: the person who never plunges into the refreshing streams of practice, has only a superficial knowledge of the life of the troops, is compelled to think in generalities, to live by outworn concepts and ideas. Not even the most reliable telephonic liaison, not even the most detailed reports of subordinates can take the place of personal observations.

In this context I took a different view of Gen. Bashilov's style of work. Besides, I had the chance to get to know what he does while with the units and how he does it.

On a duty trip to one of the units, I dropped it on the command post. Beside the radar screen was a familiar figure. It was Gen. Bashilov. He was looking intently at the target blips and giving commands to the fighter-interceptor crews. It was not hard to see that the General does not just have a theoretical knowledge of guiding planes to their objectives, but also has a lot of practical experience in the fulfillment of this mission.

After awhile, he handed over to a navigator and, after giving orders to ready an aircraft, left for the airport. Before long there appeared on the radar screen a blip from his fighter plane too. The General had decided to make a personal check on one of the variants of target interception he had suggested.

I. P. Bashilov is a first-class military pilot. He was one of the first aviators to master completely the radar technique. This enables him to give very knowledgeable instruction to the navigational and flight personnel of the units, to check on their operations, to work out concrete recommendations for the troops.

Well-known in the units of the fighter command of anti-aircraft defense are many other officers of the headquarters, where Gen. Bashilov serves. Great authority, for example, is enjoyed by Flight-Inspectors, Col. A. V. Karikh, Lt. Col. I. A. Sazonov and by Engineer Lt. Col. A. A. Sadyrin, a specialist in the field of aircraft technology. These officers were awarded the Order of the Red Star, by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the 42nd anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, for outstanding service in military and political training and for exceptional mastery of the new complex combat material.

Their great experience of practical work among the troops aids them in penetrating deeply into questions of training and education of troops, in drawing reliable conclusions on the state of combat readiness of units and subunits and on the organization of the training program. Their visits to the troops certainly do leave their mark.

We have reckoned it out that Comrades Bashilov, Karikh, Sazonov and Sadyrin spent on an average more than 50% of their duty time in 1959 among the troops.

In speaking of the usefulness of regular visits by the officers of the general staff to troops under their command, I do not in the least indicate that they should spend all their duty time in the units. However much they may want to, officers working in the central staff cannot become personally acquainted with the state of affairs in every unit of the Armed Forces; and it is surely clear that there is no necessity for that. The function of supervision and aid to troops are assigned to all the lower echelon staffs and there is no need to substitute for them.

And on the other hand there are also at present other duties which accrue to the members of the general staff for the fulfillment of which it is essential that they have enough time free from such trips. The preparation of regulations, manuals, instructions, guide books, study programs, text books and operational documents, in which the officers and generals of the central staff participate in basically their fundamental activity.

It would be in place here, it seems to me, to touch on yet another question. At the present time, noone, I think, will deny that the study of the practical activity of the troops is one of

the paramount obligations of the staff headquarters commanders. However this study is sometimes understood in very strange ways. Some comrades, when they go out on inspections, never get below divisional headquarters and "study" the situation in the actual sub-units, with the help of reports or even conversations with the senior commanders and chiefs. They do not find time to visit a single battery, a single company or squadron.

"Why should the representatives of the senior staff appear in the subunits? After all, we are called upon to carry out the direction of divisions, regiments, not companys," -- declare as a rule these comrades, who are accustomed to think only on the grand scale. And they forget that the life of the troops can be seen in its true light only when actually among them in the sub-units.

It is therefore not surprising that some staff officers in preparing recommendations for the troops are themselves insufficiently clearly informed as to how the directives are going to be implemented practically. It has been a long time since they have been on any airport, battery firing position, or in any active radar station rooms. And real life, during that period, has sped ahead, far outdistancing the imagination of those persons who are studying it only on paper.

2. The Paper War Still Rages

Practice shows that the more cumbersome the structure of the staff, the more it works "for itself" and the less fruitfully it participates in the actual direction of the troops. With the increase in the numbers of administrations, departments, services and people, there is a growing necessity for coordination of their activities, there arises an inevitable overlapping in actual work, and there is a growing demand for all sorts of correspondence and statistical reports. For the settlements of any question, even a comparatively unimportant one, the executives have to get their papers stamped in many offices and waste a heap of time on this. And the important thing is that this lowers the personal responsibility of the workers, gives rise to the so called "footballing" of papers from department to department.

The following example shows how the general staff works for a considerable amount of its time "for itself". In one of the command headquarters which is assigned the mission of direct troop command, of the number of documents prepared and multiplied in the typing pool, in the course of four months, 16.5% were sent out to active units, 38.5% were destroyed and 45% were stuffed in the files of the administrative headquarters.

The curtailment of intra-staff correspondence and of the staff-troop correspondence is one of the important problems in

improving the style of the administrations. It must be said that there are more than enough ways of solving this problem.

In the recent past, we have specifically found it possible to curtail considerably the business of reporting, both in respect of frequency and in respect of scope. Thus, for example, reports which used formerly to be presented quarterly or even monthly, it has now been found sufficient to have submitted once or twice a year. In a number of administrative headquarters it has been possible to curtail the correspondence to one fifth. But of course what has been done is not all that could be done.

It would seem that the campaign for improving the style of staff work and specifically for the curtailment of paper work, should be pushed in several directions. It is absolutely essential, for example, to get rid of the practice of one and the same information being required from the units by various administrative staffs. This overlapping arises because of the fact that every commander wants to have all the data at his fingertips. But surely it is not, after all, so very difficult to concentrate them in one place and in this way to free the units and divisions from the task of compiling numerous reports and memoranda on analogous questions.

At the moment, the general staff gives commands to the units via the heads of the subordinate staffs and by that very fact creates a superfluous correspondence. Besides, the general staff often pursues a detailed study of all questions, takes upon itself the solution of trifling details which could be decided in the subordinate units successfully and independently. Obviously, the expansion of the rights of subordinate commanders would permit not only of increasing their feeling of responsibility for the matters committed to them, but it would also save the general staff of the various branches of the armed forces from functions which simply do not belong to them. After all, the lion's share of correspondence is carried on about questions which could be perfectly well attended to in the subordinate offices.

The question of the curtailment of correspondence is important further because it will free the staff personnel from purely bureaucratic affairs and leave them more opportunity for creative organizational work among the troops. The practice of our progressive officers gives convincing testimony to how important this is. To headquarters, for example, come, frequently enough, letters thanking our personnel who have shown concrete assistance to the units in the solution of practical problems.

In the recent past, for example, two such letters came from units thanking one of our officers, M. F. Kutsevalov for what he had done. The commanders note with words of genuine gratitude the fruitful activity of this experienced specialist. And for us, such reactions were not unexpected. In the collective where Comrade Kutsevalov serves he is known as an energetic worker and one who

shows great initiative. The Communists of the administrative headquarters chose Comrade Kutsevalov as the Party Office Secretary.

Similar reactions from the active units have come in concerning the work of many other staff officers. Their style of work serves as an example for the personnel, for the workers of our collective.

PART II

Krasnaya Svezda, 28 June, 1960

p. 2

3. Not Only An Inspector But A Helper

In one of the units, construction work was going on. But the reports on the progress of the building which had come from the unit to our headquarters were not satisfactory. The time-limit for the completion of the work arrived, but the construction was not even nearing completion. A group of staff representatives, the officers N. M. Nikitin, I. M. Taran and S. I. Galitskiy, were dispatched to investigate on the spot. They established the fact that the responsibility for the non-fulfillment of the plan rested with the designers, who had held up the presentation of the necessary documentation. The staff officers went to see the designing organization and learned that the preparation of the technical documentation had been held up by a lack of properly qualified specialists.

It would have seemed that the obligations of the staff representatives had been fulfilled. Now a report would have to be written on the situation and a recommendation made to supply the designing organization with the necessary staff. And formally nothing more was demanded of the officers. But Comrades Nikitin, Taran and Galitskiy had a different idea of their assignment. "Of course, if we report to the senior commander on the causes of the hold-up of the construction, then measures will be taken," they figured, "But how much time will be wasted?! We must help the construction workers."

After reporting by telephone the crux of the matter and receiving permission from the commander at headquarters, they — and they were specialists in this field — simply sat down at the designing boards with the workers of the designing organization. The officers worked without taking any account of time. Soon the design was ready, approved and handed to the construction workers. The whole matter was straightway put on the right rails.

It may be objected: After all, if the representatives of the senior staff get bogged down in a mass of trivial practical assignments they will miss the main duty. On principle, nothing can be said to such an objection. But it seems to me that it would be a serious mistake to make this principle into an inviolable rule.

Yes, the senior staff worker is called upon to give, in the name of the commander of troops, orders to the commanders of subordinate units and to check on the fulfillment of these orders. But he, as a specialist highly qualified, a man of broad horizons, is not justified in being a passive observer refusing to have anything to do with minor matters. After all the decision of major general problems often depends on just such minor matters.

In this connection, I will go into this one example. In one of the units, our staff representatives, L. M. Lecnov, V. S. Dubrovskiy, B. T. Surikov, discovered that certain shortcomings had been permitted in the exploitation of combat material. Now what was this — result of simple ignorance or of an improper attitude to the matter on the part of persons responsible for the maintenance of combat readiness? Anyway, in either case, instructions had to be given to the commander for the prompt elimination of the shortcomings, which had been discovered.

But the staff officers decided to "get to the root of the matter". Now what is the explanation of unevenness in the working of equipment? They began a detailed study of the question and discovered that a mistake had been made in the assembling of one mechanism. It was quite easily understood how this occurred: the mechanism was constructed in such a way that it could be assembled in various ways. An insufficiently experienced specialist was therefore by no means protected from blunders.

And so there was discovered an apparently insignificant constructional shortcoming of the equipment, which however was pregnant with unpleasant consequences. The officers of the group gave detailed instructions to the local workers on the way to service this mechanism. When they came back to staff headquarters they prepared a corresponding instruction for all units equipped with this sort of combat material and also sent out corresponding demands to the factories supplying it. Thus attention to "trivial details" helped to prevent blunders on a large scale.

It would seem that attention to "trivial details", the capacity to see among individual practical affairs problems which demand an over-all solution is one of the paramount characteristics of the style of work of officers of the general staff. It is obvious that such a style of work can exist only in persons who love their military profession, are well trained in their specialty and, what is most important, approach the fulfillment of their duties wholeheartedly.

If a person doesn't want to burden himself with extra efforts, if he is a cold-hearted fish, he will never become a genuine commander. I would like to mention a few workers of this type here.

One day a letter came to our staff headquarters telling of shortcomings in the housing of officers of one of the garrisons. The author of the letter drew attention to the fact that it was

essential to provide more housing allocations for the garrison. Officer G. T. Galionko and other comrades were sent to the unit to explore the possibilities of doing so.

After some time they returned and, basing themselves on various formal circumstances, explained that there was no possibility of increasing the allocation for housing construction in the garrison and that besides there was no particular necessity for it. It was clear that the comrades had approached the whole problem quite heartlessly, not wanting to take upon themselves the responsibilities for the taking of the essential decisions. They took the path of least resistance: they prepared the draft of a letter refusing the request, without giving any thought to the persons whose needs they had been assigned to satisfy. Of course, the matter was not left like that. Measures were taken and construction was carried out in the garrison. But it would seem that a not very flattering impression of these comrades was left on the troops of the unit where these staff representatives had been.

Nor is any better impression left on the troops by those workers who use their visits to the units only for the collection of unfavorable facts for a regular lecture and do not consider it their duty to help the commanders in the overcoming of the shortcomings they have turned up. It must be said that workers of this type do not even try to analyze the causes of the shortcomings. They are completely satisfied with establishing the unfavorable evidence.

What formalism and indifference can be seen at present in the reports of some staff officers who visit units! One such "boob-snoop" discovered that one of the soldiers had forgotten how Ohms Law for alternating current is formulated. And he writes: "personnel do not have a good knowledge of electrical engineering", although this soldier is in practice an excellent operator. This same snoop discovers a cigarette butt behind the barracks and blows it up to read: "In this unit there are serious defects in internal neatness." And so, with one stroke of the pen, all the achievements of the personnel are crossed out.

Unfortunately even some senior commanders consider that an inspection which does not contain "facts" of this sort witnesses to an insufficiently fruitful work of the staff officer in the unit he was inspecting. Whereas, not infrequently the commander is not at all upset that his subordinate was not able to discover in the unit any positive examples in the unit, any interesting experiments; that he did not turn up any serious big questions or important informations.

Does this mean that the staff officer should overlook trifling violations and concentrate all his attention only on the solution of difficult questions? Certainly not. But it is important that the details should not swallow up the important thing.

4. See What Is New And Support It

Many of our comrades are constantly on the road. Today a duty assignment takes them to the north, tomorrow to the torrid sands of Central Asia. The study of the peculiarities of service and combat performance of troops in various circumstances, a conversation with many different persons, widens the horizon of the staff officer and enriches his experience.

The officer who has initiative and is able to see and appreciate what is new, does not keep the experience he has gained under a bushel but will try to disseminate it as widely as possible; to pool his own ideas and skills. In the person of such staff workers the unit officers see the carriers of advanced, progressive knacks, of forward-looking combat performance and training.

Engineer Lt. A. I. Bratchikov and other officers of this command who were in the radio mechanic subunit drew attention to one of the old type stations. The radar apparently had outlasted all its guaranteed time-limits but was nonetheless working excellently. The officers established the fact that the equipment had not even been subjected to capital repairs. Thanks to this, there was a considerable economy of resources.

How is such "durability" of machinery attained? The officers made a detailed study of this question. They found out much that was interesting. On the basis of their report, a directive was issued acquainting all radio mechanic troops of anti-aircraft defense with the methods of servicing the machinery used by this progressive crew. And it must be said that the campaign for the lengthening of the periods between major repair became quite widespread among the units of anti-aircraft defense and showed an enormous economy effect. And so, the fact that the fine initiative of the collective of the subunit was noticed in a timely and vigilant fashion by the staff officers caused it to assume the character of a broad movement in all the units of the anti-aircraft defense.

Unfortunately we have had to encounter examples of the opposite. There are still in our collective persons who are indifferent, I would even say incurious, with respect to what is new. Such a worker not only goes past interesting experiments without noticing them; but he tries to dodge even what is thrown into his arms.

Comrades F. R. Kholyavko, M. M. Reznik and K. K. Polyanskiy, lecturers in one institute elaborated a proposal whose implementation promised a considerable increase in the tactico-technical potential of the radar station. The staff officers, G. I. Myagkov and V. A. Zhurin, took a sceptical view of this proposal when they were acquainted with it. It may be that a valuable initiative might have been lost had not other officers supported it.

The organizational side and the technical coverage of further work on the realization of the proposal were entrusted to an engineer Lt. Col. A. V. Prokof'yev. He helped the rationalizers to carry the work through to its conclusion and soon the station, after undergoing slight alterations, successfully passed its range testing.

It should be noted that Comrades Myagkov and Zhurin are conscientious and highly qualified workers. That makes it all the more distressing to see such conservatism, such fear of bold innovation mushrooming even among such staff personnel. It would seem that one of the most effective means of fighting this evil is a sound party criticism. The Party Office in which these comrades serve took the right action in putting the question of the duties of Communists in publicizing and disseminating progressive experiments up for consideration by the general party meeting. A voluntary military technical society of this command is also devoting itself to the consideration of proposals received from the units.

Lt. Col. M. Zabavskiy

Deputy Secretary, Party Committee of Staff
and Administration, Commander-
in-Chief Anti-Aircraft Defense
Troops.

IV. REGULATIONS --- FOUNDATION OF TROOP TRAINING

24 June, 1960
Page 1

Editorial

The Regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces containing as they do everything new that military science has achieved represent a single coherent system of organization, training and education of the personnel of the Soviet Army and Fleet. They define the basic principles of combat operations and regulate the many-sided life and activity of units and ships. Furthermore the regulations serve as a source of military skills, a powerful source for the formation of high moral qualities in the troops. In clear and concise fashion, they enunciate the demands on the various categories of military personnel, define precisely their duties, both in time of peace and in time of war; and, in so doing, the regulations reveal the essence of military duty and the way to fulfill it.

Hence it is clear what an enormous part of our regulations play in the life and activities of the troops and how important it is that our officer staff have a profound mastery of them and make a bold and broad application of them in the training of the troops so as to attain on this basis a still higher level of combat readiness of units and ships. It is obvious that we are here speaking of the capacity of the officers to apply creatively the propositions of the regulations in practice. The regulations are no collection of dogmas and stereotypes. In war, as the proverb says, there are no rules for all cases. The peculiarity of our regulations is that they open up before the officers a broad scope for the display of initiative, independence and creativity.

"We do not say to the educator: act thus and not otherwise: but we do say to him: master the laws of those phenomena which you want to direct and then go to work, keeping in mind those laws and the circumstances in which you wish to apply them". These words of the well-known Russian educator, K. D. Ushinskiy, may be applied to the letter to military training. A commander will become master of the situation and a genuine master of his trade only if instead of mechanically executing orders and prescriptions, he is able, after having grasped the bases of the various rules, creatively to apply them both on the training field and in combat. A knowledge of the regulations and an understanding of their essential content permits the commanders and chiefs to carry on the training of their subordinates in a purposeful way, to make timely discovery of shortcomings in the training program and to get rid of them. This must be specially stressed in view of the fact that in the summer training there are still occurring oversimplifications and slackening, which is injurious for military training and there are making themselves felt habits of adhering to the old schemata and stereotypes. The commander of one of the subunits, Officer Dolgopyatov, for instance,

in one of the exercises carried out a straight line advance, developed his attacks on strong points predominantly head-on, not making use of intervals in the lines of the "enemy" for a swift development of attack in depth and the delivery of blows on the flank and in the rear of the "enemy". We note also that approach to the main line of resistance, the dismounting and deploying of subunits for attack are being carried out likewise at slow speeds. All of this is in flat contradiction with the directions in our regulations which call for high-speed attack impetus, active advance and swiftness from the troops.

Not a few slackenings and oversimplifications are being permitted in the training of flyers. In some units, there is an oversimplification of the condition for the fulfillment of training missions by the interceptors; they are not being taught sufficiently to perform under conditions of jamming, although as is well-known, such jamming will be employed most intensively in modern air combat.

The creation of a situation as closely approximating actual combat as possible is an essential condition for the successful and efficient training of the naval forces as well. But actually the mock war damage on navy exercises is at present being grossly oversimplified. The source and location of a "fire" for example is learned long before it is signalled. The trainees establish the location of a future "fire" by previously laid down iron plates. During tactical exercises it occurs, to cite an instance, that the departure from base of submarines is carried out without any attempt at security and it is only on approach to the battle zone that the submarine crews begin to act as is specified in regulations.

Need it be said how unfavorably this affects the combat training of the personnel -- this and similar oversimplifications? The training will only be correct and fruitful only if every exercise, every drill, is carried out in strict accord with the demands of the regulations and instructions, only if the situation prevailing during them reflects fully the characteristics and peculiarities typical of modern combat.

In the land units and in the navy there are many experienced commanders and political workers, full of initiative, who are carrying on a great and assiduous work at the implementation of regulations in the life, training and general living conditions of the units and the ships. Among them might be named the progressive commander Anton Fedoseevich Pakal'chuk. He and his closest assistants are devoting much zeal and energy to seeing to it that the training program is run off without any oversimplifications, in strict accord with regulations. The tank troops here have a good, thoroughly modern training base, which permits of carrying out exercises in a situation close to actual combat. In the unit there is strict discipline; the exigency of the commanders and the political training work are skillfully directed toward the reinforcement

of military discipline. It can safely be said that, in the hands of the progressive commander, the regulations have become a genuinely great organizational and disciplinary force. And it is no accident that in the unit there is a daily growth in the ranks of specialists, an increase in the achievements in military and political training.

Or take, for instance, the adjutant on political affairs, the officer Ivan Nikolaevich Komlev. In the unit he is known as a political worker who has a thorough training militarily speaking. He knows weapons well and is well acquainted with the combat material of his unit; he is a good shot, a first-class tank driver. In his person the troops see a man well up on regulations and instructions and a tireless fighter for fulfillment of their requirements. He is regularly present at tank marksmanship and gunnery exercises and at driving exercises. He penetrates into all details of the matter and helps the officers better to organize the training program; indeed sometimes he even appears himself in the role of training director or exercise monitor. Yes, indeed, our commanders, political workers and Secretaries of Party and Komsomol Organizations have something to learn from these officers — and above all concreteness and objectivity in the propagation of military regulations.

A broad and bold implementation of the regulations and instructions into the practical side of training is inconceivable without a planned and profound study of them. An example should be set in this matter by the military institutes and academies. Their graduates have the obligation of knowing exceptionally well both the letter and the spirit of military regulations, of having a clear idea of the various ways and means of instructing troops. The persistent study of the regulations must be continued likewise in the system of commander training, making use of its various forms with this goal in view. The important thing which must here be attained is the capacity to apply creatively on the training field the various propositions of the regulations and at the same time to teach the officers not to think in outmoded fashions or act in a groove. All political training work, written and spoken propaganda, should be directed to a profound and many-sided popularization of the military regulations and instructions, to a training of military personnel to a love for them, and to the habit of everything and always following their requirements. It is important that, on the units and on the ships, there should be systematically conducted lectures, lessons and conversations, political information and political exercises, devoted to the propaganda of the most important propositions of the military regulations. The same goal must be pursued by visual propaganda as well. Let each of us have in him a lively urge to read these regulations, without reminders and nudges from anyone else, entirely independently and on our own, to master

their propositions, to find his own ways of applying them in actual concrete situations.

Military regulations are the fundamental basis of training of the Army and Navy. Let us have ever better mastery of them and attain new heights of military skill.

V. IMPROVE THE COMBAT SKILL OF AIRBORNE FORCES

15 June, 1960
Page 1

Editorial

The appearance of the weapon of mass destruction has radically changed the character of contemporary combat and this could not but be reflected on the employment of airborne troops. Their role in modern war has increased considerably. And this in turn means that the requirements for the training of units and subunits of these troops have likewise increased.

Now, as never before, a high degree of combat training, discipline and organization is required of airborne troops, the capacity to act boldly and decisively and with initiative in the subunit staffs in any sort of situation, even the most complex, in the rear of the enemy. The airborne military is obliged to be completely master of airborne equipment, to execute parachute jumps boldly, to know exceptionally well all types of firearms, to be able to drive a motorcycle and automobile, to use explosives and be able to operate a radio. He must be active and tough, resourceful and enterprising, always loyal to the duty of military comradeship and persistent in pursuit of the goal set him.

And particularly high demands are made obviously on those who day by day teach and train their subordinates, prepare them to act boldly in contemporary combat, — that is, to the officer staff of the airborne troops. Every officer of these airborne troops must, in addition to having profound general skills essential to him as an officer as such, have an excellent knowledge of the nature and peculiarities of combat operations of parachute subunits and be able skillfully to direct combat in complex situations, boldly to execute parachute jumps; he must be master of methodological organization and execution of exercises with his personnel on airborne training.

We have not a few officers who work well with their subordinates, instill into them skillfully and persistently the qualities necessary for successful operation in the rear of the enemy. Let us take, for example, the work of the subunits commanders A. Dobrovolskiy, N. Suchugov, A. Simonchuk and V. Brovkin. Relying daily in their work on the Party and Komsomol Organizations and on the military personnel as a whole, they persistently strive for high quality of military training, for strengthening of discipline and for an increase in the battle-readiness of their personnel. Every exercise in airborne training, every field exercise they conduct in a situation approximated as closely as possible to actual combat conditions. The troops of these subunits are successfully mastering two or three alternate professions, skillfully accustoming themselves to complicated parachute jumps, self-defense and close combat knacks.

Progressive commanders devote an immense amount of attention in the training of their personnel of the airborne troops to field exercises and this is quite easily understandable. After all the airborne military must be able not only to make a good parachute jump but to carry on skillfully in the fighting and execute quick and tight-schedule assaults, make good use of terrain, attack the enemy swiftly. And this is just how the troops are trained in the subunit commanded by the Communist, Officer A. Benderskiy. On one of the exercises, the subunit carrying out the assignment came up against a water-barrier. Sr. Sgt. A. Khablov and privates N. Pochuliya and A. Zamulidinov were the first to negotiate the water barrier during the period of the break-up of the river ice; in the water they supported an assault bridge, assuring the rapid crossing on it of the entire personnel. Having got across thus quickly, the unit emerged in the rear of the enemy and attacked him by surprise.

Unfortunately, in some subunits the campaign for the perfecting of the field training of the troops is not being carried on persistently enough. Here and there there are occurring slackenings and oversimplifications in the training. A landing is, for example, not infrequently carried out on terrain well known to the companies, which invariably leads to stereotypes in the operations of the airborne troops and has an unfortunate effect on the formation in them of the indispensable combat qualities. Not everywhere is the technical training of the troops in good shape. In the field exercises sluggishness is sometimes permitted in the operations of the companies.

Every effort must be made to put an end to this and other shortcomings, which are interfering with the perfection of the field training of airborne troops. It is important that the creative thinking of the commanders and political workers, of the whole personnel for that matter, be continually directed to the improvement of the training program, to the search for new, more effective methods of training the troops. Every exercise should fully reflect the peculiarities of modern combat. In the exercises there must absolutely be created a situation from which something can be learned, a situation characteristic of the combat of the airborne personnel, so that units and subunits may learn the art of winning through to victory in complex situations, in stubborn combat with a strong and technically well-outfitted enemy.

One of the complex and difficult forms of combat operation is, as is well known, night fighting. And the airborne troops must be well schooled in this sort of operation. With this goal in mind, the personnel must be carefully prepared for exercises; questions of orientation must be more thoroughly developed in these exercises, as must the assembly of the personnel after landing, coordinated action and the instruction of each airborne troop and subunit as a whole to make use of all the advantages of darkness for the delivery of surprise and swift attacks on the enemy.

There are great opportunities on the summer training fields for instructing the units and subunits in speedy and organized maneuver, in the knack of showing up suddenly where the enemy does not expect them. At the basis of the training of airborne troops should be tactical training in practical landings in a complex ground situation. So as to assure the successful accomplishment of a landing and specifically its freedom from accident, the requirements of all instructions on paratrooper training. Every paratrooper must have a good knowledge of airborne equipment, know how to pack parachutes and load containers. All the artillery crews and troops servicing combat materiel must have a perfect knowledge of the method of and rules governing packing equipment in the craft, the packing and assembly of parachute equipment.

Clearly, the landing and combat of a paratrooper in the rear of the enemy makes great demands on the physical qualities of the paratrooper. This means that in the program of combat training there must be daily attention to the physical toughening of the troop, they must be trained in prowess and endurance, making as much use as possible of training in the overcoming of various difficulties, obstacles, water barriers and of harrier and long-distance forced marches.

The campaign for the improvement of the quality of combat training, for the strengthening of conscious discipline, for the heightening of battle-readiness of the companies and units is the central task of commanders, political agencies, Party and Komsomol Organizations of the airborne troops. The successful solution of this problem requires the mobilization of the entire personnel and every soldier personally. And in the front ranks here obviously must go the Communists and Komsomol members. By their ardent Bolshevik talk and by their personal example they are called upon to train up the airborne troops to a high combat morale, to inspire the entire personnel to an outstanding training and service record, to a model fulfillment of their duty to their country.

The personnel of companies and units of airborne troops are faced with great and weighty tasks. In perfecting their combat skill, in mastering complex special equipment, the airborne troops are full of resolution to fulfill any task assigned by the Party and Government in the defense of our beloved socialist homeland.

VI. PRACTICE IS THE CRITERION

(Preparation of Dissertations in Academies)

15 June, 1960
Page 2

Maj. Gen. A. Sinitza, Col. V. Konoplyanik,
Col. V. Sharovator

The fact that Soviet military science and technology has been enriched in recent years by many new and excellent works is greatly to the credit of the academic staffs of the advanced military training schools. And that is quite normal. In these advanced military training schools are concentrated excellent academic forces, there are laboratories which make possible the successful conduct of the most complex research. The task consequently is to perfect still more the achievements already scored. This task flows from the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers directive on "Measures for the Improvement of the Caliber of Dissertations and the Procedure of Awarding Degrees and Diplomas". This resolution considerably steps up the demands on research work and puts in a new light many questions of the preparation and defense of dissertations, which is a paramount component part of the work of anyone specializing in military science.

Much has already been done in the advanced military schools to bring the academic work into strict accord with this resolution. But there are still many defects. Among them there are those specific ones which are peculiar to individual schools in virtue of specific circumstances; but there are also general ones, characteristic of many such schools. And it is about the last we should like to speak so as to help toward their speedy elimination.

First of all must be considered the choice of topics of dissertations. Their actuality is determined by the extent to which the content of a scholarly work can be useful for the solution of actual problems of military affairs and for the improvement of the combat training of the troops. This must be recalled to mind because there are still being encountered dissertation writers who are working on vague researches, having no practical significance. Obviously this sort of defect can more easily be eliminated if the determination of the importance and novelty of the dissertation topic is the fruit of creative efforts not only on the part of the writer himself but of the entire collective, the Dean, the Faculty and the Academic Council of the school. But what ought to be the chief criterion in the assessment of topics of dissertations about to be written. There can be only one answer to that: the significance of the problem being treated for the development of military science or the practical applicability in the combat training of troops, in the instruction of the auditors or cadets, or in the improvement of military equipment or armaments. As an example of the serious attention which ought to be devoted to the topics of

scientific research we should like to cite the M. V. Frunze Military Academy. Here, each and every academic topic, together with its whole context, is subjected to an all-round evaluation in the academic council of the academy. And it is no accident that the dissertation topics chosen and confirmed in this way have great academic and practical significance. At the same time there are other academies where the topics chosen are admitted to be a fiasco after they have been worked on for a protracted period of time. This was the case with the dissertation prepared by the officers A. Sergeev, N. Morozov and V. Pybkin. Their dissertations were turned down because the researches had lost practical significance in present-day conditions.

Officers working in units, staff headquarters and industrial enterprises have a special need for preliminary evaluation of the topics of their scientific work. Now actually the professors of certain military schools do not like to look over the topics presented to them. This leads to individual aspirants going to work at dissertations, as they say, at their own risk, without being sufficiently informed as to what has been done already in that field of science which they have chosen as the subject of their research. And not infrequently it comes out that a similar work has already been done by someone else. Of course, the defense of two dissertations on one and the same topic is in order. But is it always necessary? In such cases it is inevitable that there will be a repetition of many questions, whereas every dissertation ought to enrich science and practice with new conclusions and recommendations. The aspirants also expect more help than they have had in the past from their unit commanders and the heads of institutes. It seems to us that the time has come to think of empowering the commanders and directors to grant, where necessary, supplementary leave to officers and generals working on dissertations as externs, so that they can take their examinations and profit by thesis guidance.

Of great significance for every officer working on a dissertation is a close contact with the actual units where training is being carried on employing combat materiel and armaments. It is precisely here that the candidate can find everything that is new which is coming out in the course of the actual combat training of the troops, can check in practice the new propositions which he is advancing in his thesis. Obviously this contact with the training units must be continuous and business-like and not sporadic, which latter is the case when the thesis writers limit themselves to brief trips out there. In this connection, we should like to draw attention to the dissertation of officer A. Silaev from the I. V. Stalin Military Academy for armored troops. Not being in solid liaison with industrial enterprises, he was not in a position to work through the special questions having to do with the exploitation of the conclusions and recommendations he had made in the production of combat materiel. The dissertation had to be reworked.

Some dissertations are too broad in scope. Take, for instance, the dissertation of officer Tsirkov. It reached to 500 pages. Now, it is obvious that among such a wealth of material it is difficult to find valuable information, conclusions and recommendations.

The academic councils of the advanced military training schools have a responsible role in the preparation and review of dissertations. To them alone is given the right to award by secret vote in their sessions the title of Doctor or Master of Science. On these academic councils are big-name specialists of various branches of knowledge. And therefore the academic councils have every opportunity to consider each and every dissertation profoundly and from all sides and to make a well-founded decision. Yet cases are still not infrequent of the Supreme Attestation Commission not confirming the decisions of the academic councils of the military schools on the award of academic degrees. The principal reason for the occurrence of such lamentable lapses is to be found in the fact that the academic councils at times accept for defense dissertations of an inferior caliber. Thus, for example, the dissertation of officer N. Barsukov should not have been accepted for defense. It was entirely descriptive. It simply explained what was already being applied in practice. Comrade Barsukov did not recommend anything new in his conclusions and proposals. True, the academic council was up to snuff and did not award the writer the academic degree of Master of Science.

Now again such cases can be avoided by an all-round evaluation of the research presented for defense. And in such an evaluation should participate as many specialists as possible from those branches of science and practice in the interests of which the thesis writer has been working. Last year, for instance, the dissertation of officer M. Goreev was presented to the academic council of the M. V. Frunze Military Academy. Before the defense, the academy had received 28 positive reactions from units and staffs. Obviously such a serious preliminary evaluation precluded any lack of objectivity in the evaluation of the dissertation by the academic council.

It is quite clear that such assessments heighten the responsibility of the institutions, units and staffs to which the dissertation is sent for their reaction. It would be good if there was not only a profound study made there of the academic work despatched but also a testing of individual proposals in practice. Yet it does happen that reactions and conclusions are given in such places without solid foundations and occasionally purely formally. So as not to be led astray in such cases, the academic councils of military schools should in our opinion dispatch the dissertations for evaluation to as wide a group of persons and interested organizations as possible.

The quality of the dissertations depends likewise on the academic mentors. They are under obligation to direct the creative

thinking of the thesis writers to the well rounded elaboration of new or little explored questions of military theory, to the creation of more perfect models of combat materiel and armaments. A close business-like contact of the academic mentor with the thesis writer will always yield positive results.

The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and of the USSR Council of Ministers sets up a procedure for the acceptance by academic councils of dissertations for defense which is a little different from what it used to be. The organization of the defense must be carried out in the case of Master dissertations not less than three months and in the case of doctoral dissertations not less than four months after the publication in full or of individual chapters of the works. This undoubtedly will permit the academic councils and the academic public better to study and check the contents of new works and give a better-rounded evaluation of their academic or practical value.

In the fight for a further raising of the standards of dissertations and for the expansion of academic research, the Party Organizations of the academies and advanced military institutes, as well as the academic councils, can do a great deal. They should take a day by day interest in the preparation of dissertations and in their realization. This will help to raise the academic level of dissertations, will improve the training of military science staffs.

VII. IN THE INTEREST OF COMBAT READINESS

(Develop Militarily Useful Forms of Sport)

11 June, 1960
Page 4

Maj. Gen. Tank Corps A. Ustinov

We were on a visit to the N—— unit. At the session of the sports committee there was talk about the competitions in militarily useful forms of sport. At the meeting were present many activists. Officer V. Sokolov gave a report on the plans for the forthcoming competitions. The comrades who were present, while approving in general the measures taken, expressed a number of critical observations. The crux of them came down to the following: more attention should be given to militarily useful forms of sport. Those who spoke mentioned that in these sports competitions by no means all the troops take part, that there is a shortage of trainers, and referees in the units and not a sufficient quantity of sports fields.

The speeches were business-like and concrete. In point of fact in the units as a basic rule the whole work has been devoted to a development of the classic forms of sport. And there's nothing wrong with that if parallel with it there are carried on competitions in winning through in an obstacle course by grenade throwing, field firing, forcing water barriers by swimming, gunnery, technical and engineering training and anti-gas defense.

Mass participation limps badly too. True, in the free hours, on the days off, the sports areas are always crowded. But as a general rule, those competing or working out were always the same ones. The majority of the troops preferring to be spectators.

Critical comments forced the sports committee to review the previous plans, to take energetic measures so that every enlisted man, NCO and officer should become active sportsmen. In the unit supernumerary sports instructors, trainers and referees were mustered. On their own the troops outfitted a few new sports areas. And now all the companies of the unit can work out at the same time in sports areas. Very useful were the training demonstrations for officers and PT activists in the organization of militarily useful competitions. Questions of sports work have been discussed more than once at company Komsomol meetings. The Komsomol members set themselves the goal of bringing it about that every soldier would get to be a 2nd degree GTO /Gotov na trud i oboronu = Ready for Work and Defense/ medal wearer, a qualified sportsman. A new chart of training sessions and competitions was worked out. All the PT men began to train not less than twice a week. Every month competitions were staged in militarily useful forms of sport.

All training and competitions which are transpiring at the moment can be divided into three groups:

first — training and competitions in various divisions of physical preparedness provided for by the program;

second — trainings and competitions in running, jumping, hurdling, donning individual anti-gas defense equipment, getting through infected zones, grenade throwing at targets and other exercises, which are encountered in tactical exercises;

third — training and competitions in knacks and standards of operation with weapons and combat materiel; occupation and shifting of firing positions; boarding and detrucking from a combat vehicle, loading tanks with ammunition, hooking up communications lines and practical transmission of telegrams.

It is typical that the majority of the competitions are carried out as a complex whole: running with subsequent loading of ammunition into a tank; hurdling ending up boarding an automobile. Complex competitions permit of increasing the overall physical toughness of the troops together with the attaining of the combat standards.

In the recent past there have been great changes in the units. The commanders, political workers, Party and Komsomol Organizations have been doing a considerable work at enlisting all the troops in the exercises of the sports companies and sections. Competitions and training sessions in militarily useful forms of sport have occupied an important place in the mass sports work.

The results of each competition are widely publicized in the pin-up newssheets, local radio broadcasts and in pictures. The winners of the competitions are noted in special orders from the commander of the division and awarded diplomas.

Regular training sessions and mass competitions have a good influence on the state of combat readiness, the strengthening of discipline. They help to train up physically tough soldiers, with high endurance quotients. Thus, in the company where Capt. V. Dolinskiy is commander and Sgt. K. Gridzhyus is sports instructor, all the enlisted men and NCOs fulfilled the conditions for a 2nd Degree GPO medal and became qualified sportsmen. The company held first place among the subunits in the district sports review.

It should be noted that this company was best not only in respect of mass sport work but in respect of military training and political training as well. Here there is strong discipline and the majority of the enlisted men and NCOs are top men in studies. For three years the company has been adjudged excellent.

It is interesting that from the time training sessions and meets in militarily useful sports have been being carried on in the unit the results attained by the troops in the fulfillment of the various combat standards has improved considerably. The majority of the crews, for example, load a tank with ammunition or change its tracks much faster than called for.

There is no doubt about it that the PT men of the unit have attained real successes. Nevertheless it would not be right to say

that everything possible has been done in the subunits for the development of sport. And there are by the way not a few resources. They must simply be skillfully utilized.

However there are a number of other reasons which do not depend on the sports committee which are slowing down the development of PT in the unit. Some comrades responsible for sports in the division and in the okrug are more attracted to the training of individual champions and little teams and do not bother themselves much about mass sport.

Now can such a situation in all conscience be called normal when the best qualified sportsmen wander round for years in various groups, do not bother with combat training, do not put their skills and sports experiences at the disposal of their fellow-soldiers serving in the same regiment. Private Shcherba is a good gymnast but as a rule he is not in the unit. He is difficult to detach even for a few days for a demonstration training in gymnastics for the supernumerary trainers. The light athletes Golubev, Ryazantsev et al. are almost the whole time with various teams. They are not to be seen on the subunits. Now, the actual situation demands that the best PT men should not so frequently leave the unit, that they should come out as regular anchor-men, organizers of mass sports, that they should be supernumerary trainers and instructors. This will contribute to a general raising of the level of sports work in the units and will permit of training up new record breakers and champions.

A serious drag on the development of PT work is the acute shortage of qualified trainers and referees in certain individual forms of sport which are most complex from a technical point of view. Nobody is training them. For example, such a useful form of sport as sombo [self-defense without weapons] is very popular among the soldiers; but there are practically no sombists in the unit, because nobody can really organize the training. In our opinion it would be to the point to carry through a training of trainers in various forms of sport on an okrug basis and scale. It would be desirable to make a practice of having free time competitions and meets in various militarily useful forms of sport for tankmen, artillery men, motorcyclists, airmen, signalmen and sappers separately. This sort of competitions, as also reviews of sports work now being carried out among the troops, will contribute to the discovery of competent PT men and will permit of steadily improving records and will make sport really a mass affair. Every enlisted man, NCO and officer should take part in these free-time meets.

Militarily useful forms of sport should occupy an important place in the training of army PT men. This is required by the interests of combat training of the troops, it is a vital demand of the present situation.