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USSR'S KORNIYENKO ON RATIONALE BEHIND ABM TREATY

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 21, 1 Jun 87 pp 3-5

[Article by Georgi Kornienko]

[Text]

The first two Soviet-American documents on strategic arms were signed in Moscow 15 years ago, on May 26, 1972: the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

A hard-reached agreement

Four multilateral agreements concerning nuclear arms had already been in operation by that time: on the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water (1963), on the prohibition of the deployment of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space (1967), on nuclear non-proliferation (1968), and on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor (1971).

Drafted on the initiative of the Soviet Union and as a result of its persistent efforts, all these agreements, both separately, and even more so, together, were of exceptional importance. They were the first evidence of mankind's awareness of the need to arrest the spread of the nuclear plague throughout the world and to prevent its penetration into outer space.

But despite their importance none of these four agreements prevented the quantitative buildup and qualitative improvement of nuclear arms by the five states that had at that time acquired them.

So in 1972 the two most powerful countries reached an agreement to set certain limits to the growth of their strategic offensive nuclear-missile weapons and, what is particularly important (despite the seeming paradox, with which I will deal later) to reduce their strategic defensive systems to a minimum.

It was extremely difficult to reach these agreements. There were purely objective difficulties connected, for instance, with the need to find common denominators despite all the differences in the structures of the strategic armaments of the sides, differences explained by historical, geographical, technological and other factors. But subjective, which included psychological, differences were just as great, if not even more formidable. For it was the first time that the leaders and representatives of the two powers had to discuss and resolve many issues concerning weapon systems which, prior to that, had been zealously guarded by each side.

The logic behind breaching ABM

It was especially hard to overcome the psychological barrier when it came to working out an ABM treaty. Since time immemorial national defence was held sacred—how could one give up one's right to defence? This theme is to be found in statements not only by many American but also by some Soviet leaders of that period, as some people in the West rarely tire of saying.

It is important, however, that eventually the common view gained the ascendant: in the nuclear-missile age the indisputable right of every country to defence—and as such this right will always exist—can best be realized through the mutual renunciation of the anti-ballistic missile defence of one's territory.

It is only at first glance that this conclusion seems strange. But its meaning can be grasped by anyone who wishes to get to the crux of the issue. And the crux is that, in the absence of territorial ABM systems, each side is forced clearly to realize that in the event of delivering a nuclear strike at the other side it will suffer irreparable damage even from a weakened retaliatory strike. The creation of a large-scale ABM system by one side would inevitably generate fear in the other side that this was being done with a view to delivering a sudden first nuclear strike and then, with the help of this system, reducing the already weakened retaliatory strike to an "acceptable" level.

In turn, this would force the other side either to create its own ramified ABM system or substantially build up and improve its offensive strategic arms—probably some combination of the former and the latter with perhaps something else as well. There would be only one result: an endless spiralling of the arms race with each loop increasing the danger of nuclear catastrophe in a geometrical progression.

Such are the laws of logic that fifteen years ago led to the elaboration of the Soviet-American treaty, according to which each side renounced the creation of an anti-ballistic missile defence of its territory. These laws of logic are permanent and unchanging. And that is why this treaty is of unlimited duration.

It is undeniable that this was an additional impediment to the drafting of the treaty, as it was necessary to find such solutions and express them in wording that would not lose its meaning with time. It was painstaking work, but they were found—and there are no ambiguities in the ABM treaty. The appearance in Washington today of various "interpreters" of the document is explained not by any such ambiguities but by the desire to render the treaty meaningless.

I will return to this subject, but first I should like to take up another point. Why, despite all the difficulties of work-

ing out the first Soviet-American accords on questions of limiting strategic arms, including the ABM treaty, did it not take the parties concerned a great deal of time (just over two and a half years from the commencement of the talks in 1969 to the signing of the documents in May 1972) to formalize them?

The victories and defeats of realism

Unquestionably, this was possible because the then American leadership headed by President Richard Nixon made a realistic assessment of the alignment of forces in the world and the lines along which it was likely to develop and, together with the Soviet leadership, arrived at the following conclusion: in the nuclear age there is no basis other than peaceful coexistence for the maintenance of relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

The mutual readiness of the two countries to resolve questions concerning the limitation of their strategic armaments on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security stemmed naturally from this conclusion of fundamental importance formulated in the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

Owing to their mutual understanding of this principled basis for relations between them, the Soviet Union and the United States followed up—as early as in 1973—the first accords of 1972 with the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, and an understanding on the basic principles of talks on the further limitation of strategic arms. Furthermore, only a year later, in 1974, they signed a Protocol to the ABM treaty, under which they pledged to restrict their ABM systems still further, and a treaty establishing a ceiling to the yield of underground nuclear explosions. That year agreement was also reached on the main parameters of the next treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (the so-called Vladivostok accord) which went much further than the Interim Agreement of 1972.

After that the drafting of this treaty (SALT-2) slowed down and was concluded only five years later and the treaty, when at last it was signed in 1979, was not ratified. But this has its explanation. The quarters in the United States which refused to accept the need

to base relations with the U.S.S.R. on parity were already gaining in strength in those years.

The activities of these quarters reached their high point with the coming to power of the Reagan administration. A foreign policy course based on strength was publicly proclaimed and the principle of equality and equal security in relations with the U.S.S.R. was anathematized. This was openly stated both by the President and the Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger. And though with the passage of time and under the pressure of circumstances they began to express these views less bluntly, there were no changes at all in their emphasis on power politics and the attainment of military superiority.

Counting on U.S. technological advantages, the Reagan administration chose the attempt to make an armed breakthrough into outer space as the principal means of attaining this end. Without any beating about the bush, Caspar Weinberger defined the aim of the American space programme as follows: if the U.S. succeeds in creating a system that will render Soviet armaments ineffective, we will be able to return to a situation when the United States is the only country possessing nuclear arms. For reasons of camouflage this programme was called the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).

How Mr Perle "almost fell off his chair"

And it was here that the ABM treaty became a huge thorn in the flesh of the Reagan administration. At first Washington simply tried to ignore the existence of the treaty, pretending that SDI was just an innocuous research programme that did not affect the ABM treaty in any way.

Predictably they were unable to pull the wool over people's eyes for long. But meanwhile the authors of SDI were becoming increasingly eager to start to implement it as quickly as possible. It was then that a new manoeuvre was undertaken—the "broad interpretation" of the ABM treaty was put forward. Its essence boils down to the contention that the ban on the creation (development), testing and deployment of ABM systems or components of space and other types of mobile basing provided for by the treaty's Article V, supposedly applies only to those components

that existed at the time of the treaty's conclusion and which are listed in its Article II (ABM interceptor missiles, launchers for them and radars of a certain type). But since the ABM systems and components developed under the SDI programme are based on other physical principles, it is supposedly admissible to develop and test them without any restrictions whatsoever, in outer space included. And it is only the question of limitations on their deployment that is open to discussion. References are made to one of the annexes to the treaty mentioning ABM systems of such a new type (Statement D).

The juridical untenability and, moreover, the logical absurdity of such an "interpretation" is obvious to any literate person who has taken the trouble to read the text of the ABM treaty. The following precise definition is contained in Article II: "For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory." This definition is of a functional nature—it applies to any system capable of hitting missiles (incidentally this is confirmed also by the presence of the indefinite article before the word "system" in the English text). The fact that the said functional definition of the term "ABM system" is supplemented with a list of the components of which such a system "currently" consists (at the time of the signing of the treaty) emphasizes once again that the list of components cited in the article (ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars) can in no way be considered exhaustive for all time. The reason for including the word "currently" was to preclude the slightest possibility of incorrectly interpreting Article II.

The complete groundlessness of references to Statement D is also seen from its text: the statement allows for the development and testing only of ground stationary ABM systems of a new type to replace existing ones in the restricted areas permitted by the treaty—one for each side. This statement has no relation whatsoever to Article V, which prohibits the creation of space and other mobile ABM systems.

In its annual reports to the U.S. Congress, right up to 1985, when the Pentagon invented the "broad interpretation," the present administration, too, held to this sole correct understanding of the issue. Although it is commonly held that the legal adviser to the U.S.

State Department, Abraham Sofaer, is the author of this interpretation, in reality this lawyer was called in to formalize it at a later date, apparently to impart greater respectability to the ploy. In reality the "broad interpretation" was cooked up in the office of Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Perle. It was on his instigation that the New York lawyer Philip Kunsberg, who until then had dealt only with matters pertaining to pornography and the Mafia made the "discovery" required by his client (it took him less than a week to "study" materials related to the ABM treaty). According to The Washington Post, when Kunsberg presented the results of his "research" to Perle the latter jumped from joy, almost falling off his chair.

All American participants in the drafting of the ABM treaty (with the exception of Paul Nitze, who went over to the treaty's opponents)—four predecessors of Sofaer in the post of legal adviser to the U.S. State Department, six predecessors of Caspar Weinberger in the post of Secretary of Defence, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn and many others, armed with facts and convincing arguments, attacked the absurd interpretation of the treaty invented by Perle and Co.

Yet the Reagan administration persists in its intention to derail the ABM treaty, as it has already managed to do with the Interim Agreement on SALT-1 and the SALT-2 treaty. But it understands the impossibility of scrapping the ABM treaty out of hand, given the present alignment of political forces in the United States, Congress included, and in the world as a whole. True, the treaty provides for the right of each side to withdraw from it after notifying the other side six months in advance. But this right cannot be used arbitrarily. It is necessary to substantiate the decision with proof that exceptional circumstances connected with the content of the treaty have appeared and placed the supreme interests of the state in jeopardy. In the absence of such circumstances, the administration is aware that it is impossible to prove the contrary to anyone, including the U.S. Congress. Moreover, without the latter's approval no such insane act could be carried out.

Therefore, along with attempts to render the ABM treaty meaningless by way of the "broad interpretation," the

American administration would very much like to persuade the Soviet side to give up the treaty "without any fuss" and replace it with another treaty that would regulate the order in which space-based ABM systems are developed. President Reagan directly proposed this in Reykjavik. Despite the obvious and clearly expressed negative response of the Soviet side, the American side continues to return to this proposal.

The reasoning of U.S. representatives can be reduced to the following: If the ABM treaty did once make any sense it was only because there were no technical possibilities for creating an effective ABM system. But now, they contend, such possibilities exist and for this reason the treaty has not only become meaningless but has also become "immoral," as it prevents the creation of ABM systems capable of protecting human lives.

Such reasoning can only be described as "perverse logic." Of course nobody is denying the fact that science and technology have made major advances in the time since the signing of the ABM treaty. But if as a result of this it is now possible to create a more effective ABM system than was possible early in the 1970s, the need to preserve and, even more so, strengthen the ABM treaty is not reduced but increased by virtue of the very laws of logic that brought the treaty into being.

Naturally, it is not enough merely to preserve everything on which we managed to achieve accord in the past, because, for all their importance, all previous accords are capable only of diminishing the threat of nuclear catastrophe and not of eliminating it completely.

A realistic way of attaining this great aim was proposed in the January 15, 1986, statement by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev. This is a detailed programme for eliminating nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction within a historically short period of time—before the end of the present century.

Since then, the Soviet Union has taken other far-reaching steps in its striving to give an impulse to the process of nuclear disarmament. For this reason, it made a number of serious concessions on the questions under discussion, concerning both medium-

range and operational-tactical missiles and strategic offensive arms.

But if resolving questions concerning medium- and shorter-range missiles is possible in the form of separate accords, the radical reduction and subsequent elimination of strategic nuclear arms will be possible only in combination with measures preventing an arms race in outer space, and this includes preventing the creation of a space-based ABM system. Here we have an organic, unbreakable interconnection of these issues. And this was once again very clearly and firmly reiterated in Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of February 28.

Progress in resolving questions concerning medium-range and operational-tactical missiles and, more generally, the achievement of a nuclear-free world depends on the conclusions that are drawn in Washington from past experience and the present situation. In other words, this advance depends on whether at last Washington heeds the voice of reason.



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SOVIET GENERAL ON SDI TECHNOLOGY, PURPOSES

Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE in English No 4, Apr 87 pp 26-31

[Text] "After Reykjavik, the infamous SDI became even more conspicuous as an obstruction to peace, as a strong expression of militaristic designs and an unwillingness to get rid of the nuclear threat looming over humankind," said Mikhail Gorbachev. The US military space programme has come to epitomize the cause of peace through the American administration goes on to assert that SDI allegedly is not a weapon but a research programme, technology, etc. Washington has stepped up the propaganda campaign to misinform the world and American public about the true character of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The process of nuclear disarmament is "blocked" not by the USSR's "intransigence" in preventing the militarization of space, but by the US military industrial complex striving for military superiority over the Soviet Union and securing huge profits for military concerns.

We asked Major-General Yuri Lebedev, deputy head of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Department, and Alexei Podberyozkin, member of the SPC Public Commission on Disarmament, to tell our readers about the real aims of SDI.

Two Points of View

All of us now stand at the crossroads: either a nuclear-free world by 2000 or the unrestricted arms race and the high risk of nuclear war. In Reykjavik the United States gave preference to SDI and, consequently, chose a fatal path for the whole world.

To justify their dangerous course in the eyes of the public, the SDI apologists today very actively use all sorts of ideological dodges and distortion of facts. For example, on October 23, 1986--soon after the summit--Ronald Reagan said that he discovered (!) that many clearly didn't understand the matter and that the essence of SDI was not explained for them. He said that SDI envisaged only defensive and technological research. Still earlier, in March 1983, the president said that SDI "will make nuclear weapons obsolete and unnecessary."

But Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser, declared that in Reykjavik...SDI was the catalyst of any progress, and he even called upon the American president, in the name of that progress, and in order to facilitate the task of curbing the arms race, to take some decision on the deployment of

strategic defense. In other words, according to Brzezinski, SDI is a means of progress at the talks. But there are serious doubts--and not only in the USSR and other socialist countries, but also in the West, and in the broad West European and American public--not to trust these assertions, and what is more, to consider them a flagrant lie to cover quite different, real and dangerous goals. The question is which ones?

SDI Anatomy

We think the answer to the question what is SDI cannot be found in one of the following specific spheres--technological, military-technological, strategic, economic or psychological. SDI is the present militaristic policy of Washington which looks upon it as a means for securing one-sided freedom of action for the USA in the world arena. This is an old dream of neoglobalists who are craving for the freedom of punishing those nations whose policy they do not like.

From the point of view of the political realization of the wide complex of the programmes, united under the slogan of "strategic defense," SDI is aimed at achieving the USA's main goal--to strengthen the positions of American imperialism and its ruling elite in the world. SDI in practice is today the main means, an instrument, if you like, of the US hegemony in the world. If in relation to socialist countries, SDI is considered as the main lever of political pressure, then in relation to other countries, including the US allies--as a means of economical-technological leadership and rendering lifeless the scientific-technological and economic potentials of these countries by "transfusing" capitals, intellectual and technological resources into the United States.

From the military-strategic point of view, SDI is a wide complex of programmes for creating offensive strategic weapons and not a defensive umbrella which threatens no one as Washington is trying to prove in vain. It is envisaged within the framework of SDI to build up a whole number of new combat means of strike space weapons (SSW): laser, beam, kinetic (electromagnetic guns, self-guided missiles and rockets). These weapons have high striking power and can in no time at all destroy groups and separate objects at a distance of thousands of kilometres both in space, the atmosphere and on the ground.

SSW are global weapons which in practice can create a real threat to security of all states at any moment and carry out a whole number of functions of offensive strategic weapons.

First, SSW--and this is another, the so-called "defensive" function of their use--can also be employed for destroying the missiles launched in a retaliatory strike. This is perhaps the most topical subject today concerning the president's Strategic Defense Initiative. And we should bear in mind that the building up of such a "defensive" shield has nothing in common with the real defensive tasks. The well-known Western scientist Stephen French considers that even the most effective anti-missile defense cannot prevent the wiping out of millions of Americans.

Quite a logical question arises: if a guaranteed defense cannot be secured then what is the point of creating a large-scale anti-missile defense, in general?

Second, SSW can be effectively used for destroying satellites providing an early warning of nuclear attack, communication, etc. The West justly considers that their destruction is the most important condition for delivering the first strike.

Third, SSW can be used independently as a highly effective means for destroying a number of the most vital military and economic objects; oil tanks, aircraft, depots, different buildings, sown areas, forests and other large objects. The employment of SSW can lead not only to the destruction of these "targets" but can also bring about other large-scale consequences: fires, electromagnetic fields (which can paralyze or disturb people's vital functions and operation of equipment) as well as other natural cataclysms. One of the SDI supporters said that the use of SSW against ground targets would have such an impact that an industrial power would be thrown back into the 18th century in 30 minutes.

If a large-scale and anti-missile system cannot guarantee defense against a first strike--something which has already been proved--then it can be built only for the defense against a retaliatory, considerably weakened strike. In this way everyone can see the provocative "defense" function of SSW. Their clear aim is to put the other side, in this case the USSR and its allies, and other nations in perspective (where is the guarantee?), to a defenseless position against a possible American space blackmail.

Obviously, neither the Soviet Union nor its allies allow the development of such a situation. They will do everything possible to neutralize this threat but military confrontation will increase and the arms race will get a powerful impulse. The world will see new and more powerful systems of strategic weapons which will make our planet a much more dangerous place to live.

Today it is very difficult and even impossible to predict all the dangerous consequences of SDI being realized: such problems as strategic parity, strategic stability, scientific-technological, the economic and moral consequences of the SDI development will be directly dependent on the rates of realization of the US military-space programmes and general future political climate on the planet. It is already today clear, for example, that the space arms race will provide a powerful impulse to the development of all kinds of systems of nuclear and conventional weapons and will lead to dangerous changes in military strategy and concepts in the use of these weapons. From the military-technological point of view, the Strategic Defense Initiative of the American president is nothing but a complex of modern programmes for the employment of the latest achievements in science and technology, first of all in the technologies which today determine the level of scientific and technological progress (microelectronics and computers, programming, optic and electronic devices, composition materials, communication means, etc.). It is quite natural that the faster use of the achievements in these spheres for military purposes will result in the development of more dangerous weapons.

And their combat effectiveness may increase--and already has grown in part--by tens and even hundreds of times. The above is true both for nuclear and conventional weapons. It was this side of the problem that was emphasized by Mikhail Gorbachev in his reply to the questions of the editor-in-chief of the RUDE PRAVO newspaper: "Military buildup programmes are again being put into motion, but ones creating a much greater risk of the outbreak of a world war because they are being launched at a new scientific and technological stage in the arms race and in the presence of much larger arsenals of weapons capable of wiping out civilization in a matter of days."

The realization of the complex of the programmes, united under the SDI slogan, is an attempt by the USA to transfer the arms race into a qualitative, or as they sometimes say, "technological" sphere. American Admiral E. Zumwalt said shortly after the Star Wars programme was declared by Ronald Reagan: History shows that technological achievements have exerted the greatest influence on man's ability to wage war; they led to the necessity of revising strategic and tactical planning to fully realize new advantages. At present we are on the threshold of such a period of reappraisal.

The efforts taken by Washington in spiralling the "technological" arms race have made their mark--new generations of nuclear and conventional weapons have already appeared: cruise missiles, spy-strike complexes, various kinds of highly accurate types and systems of weapons. As a result, the report published by R. Sivard, director of the organization World Priorities, in 1985 shows that the fire power of conventional weapons alone has increased 200 (!) times.

Still more dangerous perspectives are in store for humankind in the new round of the arms race connected with space militarization is not prevented. This can be explained by the fact that at the present stage of the military-technological revolution the progress in information technology, which leads to the complete automation of human activity, begins to play a decisive role and increases by many times the combat effectiveness of all weapons. There is a direct interconnection between space militarization and the "informatization" of the arms race. Some Western specialists consider that the very possibility of introducing SDI appeared only when information technology had reached a high enough level of development.

The present US administration asserts that the work on SDI does not have an applied military character but allegedly has only a "pure research" phase. But today the work on the SDI programme complex is already far away from fundamental research. Below are some examples to confirm this.

It is well known that the SDI programme envisages the elaboration of the ground echelon of the wide scale anti-missile system. It is envisaged, in particular; to carry out tests on the anti-missiles of long-range interpretation having the warhead of an umbrella construction and to continue tests of the low-flying anti-missile. The working out of the means for the near-, middle- and long-range interception in the USA is planned to finish by 1990 and their development by 1995.

Much attention in creating the wide-scale anti-missile defense is given to the space echelon, and the design of the means of detection, target-tracking, weapons of directed energy transfer, kinetic weapons, highly efficient computers and energy sources is in full swing for this echelon. It is envisaged by 1990 to start demonstration tests for the prototypes of individual elements of the means under construction and by 1995--the tests of space devices with kinetic and laser weapons. The development of space devices with missile weapons can also be started in the current century, and the full-scale deployment of space strike weapons--after 2010. It is not so far-away perspective if we take into account that the created types of weapons can be used on Earth before their full-scale deployment.

Here is the chronology of these tests:

1984-1986. Five flight tests were carried out during this period of the ASAT anti-satellite system, and one of them--on September 14, 1985--against a real target, and the rest--against conventional ones;

June 10, 1984--an interception of an intercontinental ballistic missile warhead by a long-range anti-missile at an altitude of 160 km;

June 21, 1985--the test for accurate guidance of ground laser beam on a space "shuttle";

July 14, 1985--aiming of a ground laser beam at a missile Terrier-Malemute at an altitude of up to 600 km;

September 6, 1985--a ground laser destroyed one of the stages of ICBM Titan 2 located on Earth at a distance of one km;

September 5, 1986--interception of the second stage of a missile-carrier Thorad-Delta in space with the aid of a specially equipped satellite.

There are works in other directions as well: creation of orbital satellites equipped with a fragmentation-type warhead, satellite-mines, anti-satellite systems using sources of directed transfer of energy (high-energy lasers, super-high frequency generators, particle accelerators) as well as electrodynamic accelerators, and so on.

The work on SDI, creation of the wide-scale anti-missile system with space-based elements, does not mean at all--as the American president tries to assure--the elimination of nuclear weapons. First, the space-strike weapons by themselves, in particular laser with pumping from nuclear blast, electromagnetic impulse weapons and other systems, are nuclear weapons, to be more precise, their most sophisticated third generation. Second, works on SDI by no means stop or limit the existing programmes of the US nuclear weapons build-up, both strategic and tactical.

First of all, the speech is about the equipment of the US strategic forces with the latest ICBM MX with ten warheads, the deployment of which began at the end of last year, and Midgetman with one warhead. New submarine-based

ballistic missiles Trident 2, which are able to deliver high-accuracy nuclear strikes, will come into service. The USAF began to adopt for service new strategic bombers B-1B. The equipment of the in-service heavy bombers B-52 with cruise missiles and the work on the construction of new strategic bomber ATB Stealth, designed specially for delivering the first strike, are going on. The realization of these programmes of the US "strategic rearmament" will lead to the fact that the USA will have additional several thousand delivery means and over ten thousand nuclear ammunitions for offensive strategic weapons.

Programmes for the equipment of the US Armed Forces with cruise missiles of all types of basing including new generations have greater range, speed and accuracy, are under intensive development. New types of operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons are also being created.

The USA does not plan a pure quantitative buildup, but qualitative modernization of its nuclear potentials: strategic, operational-tactical and tactical, because the new nuclear weapons systems greatly outperform the available samples in their combat effectiveness. For example, the ICBM MX excels ICBM Minuteman 3 in its ability of destroying the well-protected targets--by 10-15 times. Submarine-based missile Trident 2, which is under construction, surpasses the available submarine-based missile Poseidon by the same order of magnitude. A similar situation can be seen in other fields--operational-tactical and tactical--which envisage the qualitative modernization of nuclear weapons. In other words, unless the present round of the nuclear weapons race is not stopped then by the end of the next decade the US nuclear potential will not only increase by tens of thousands of nuclear warheads quantitatively, but its destructive power will grow by several orders.

And what about the American president's declaration on the readiness for an agreement on the "elimination of nuclear weapons"? In practice, such a position leads to superarmament and creation of tens of thousands of new nuclear ammunitions of different power and purpose in the next decade. This is confirmed by the stubborn refusal of Washington to reach an agreement on banning nuclear tests, as well as the position of Ronald Reagan at the summit in Reykjavik where a real possibility of achieving an agreement on the destruction of nuclear weapons has appeared.

Now we see that alongside the work on space strike weapons, the USA is carrying out an accelerated work on the modernization of its offensive strategic and other types of nuclear weapons. One thing supplements the other. But as a complex, the US ruling elite prepares the so-called "integrated" offensive-defensive potential which, as it considers, will enable it to deliver a first, "destructive" strike or at least to blackmail with a possibility to do that.

It is clear that this is an extremely dangerous trend which will inevitably lead to a number of the most serious military-strategic consequences. To put it briefly, they can be expressed in the following:

First, the arms race will get a powerful impulse both quantitative and qualitative. The world will see thousands of qualitatively new systems of weapons which will result in principle changes in all military spheres which will greatly increase the danger to humankind's security.

Second, if the new round of the arms race is not stopped, the whole system of international obligations and the process of curbing the arms race will be destroyed. The arms race can become uncontrollable, spread into new spheres and draw new states into it.

Third, the threat to the security of all states and nations and to the whole of humanity will sharply increase. New weapons, first of all space strike ones, will greatly curtail the possibility of preventing a nuclear war. But non-nuclear wars can also inflict enormous losses and detonate a nuclear conflict. This is true, because if the arms race is not stopped today, very soon there will be a "silent revolution" even in the sphere of conventional weapons and these weapons will be almost equal to nuclear ones in terms of combat effectiveness.

Finally, a new round of the arms race--which the Soviet Union is struggling against persistently--will result in the most serious socio-economic consequences which in their turn can provoke big international political and economic problems, create almost insuperable obstacles on the path of the progress in science and technology and solution of humanitarian and other questions.

SDI, we must emphasize, already today has become a barrier on the way to reaching agreements. Everybody knows that the USSR and the USA practically came to an agreement in Reykjavik on the most radical reduction of nuclear weapons--offensive strategic and medium-range. In turn, if that reduction had been reached, they would have cleared the way to the further reduction of nuclear weapons--up to their complete destruction--would result in the reduction of other weapons, for example, conventional, and would help solve the problems of the destroying of chemical weapons, etc. In other words, if the agreements achieved in Reykjavik became a reality, logical chains of reduction and prohibition of weapons would appear. This didn't happen because of Washington's stubbornness which considers that it can obtain its security to the detriment of the USSR through SDI.

Thus, the realization of SDI has become the main obstacle on the way to achieving important agreements on reductions of nuclear weapons, the obstacle which over-shadowed the perspective of reducing the mounts of accumulated weapons. We think that today the main task of peace activists is to remove this obstacle.

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CSO: 5200/1541

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: WEST GERMAN 'EXPERT' COMMENTS ON PROSPECTS

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 19, 17-24 May 87 p 5

[Text] The Soviet proposals on freeing Europe from medium-range missiles have triggered off contradictory responses in the FRG, the only country on whose territory the American Pershing-2 missiles have been deployed. Two opposing camps have taken shape in the government coalition.

The "zero" in relation to the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) and the agreement on shorter-range missiles are opposed by the leaderships of the FRG Ministry of Defence and the CDU/CSU. The "zero option" and the elimination of missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 km are favoured by the Free Democrats headed by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRG.

Whose point of view will prevail? This and other questions were put by our Bonn correspondent Vladimir Markov to Christoph Bertram, West German expert on politico-military problems, former director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

A: It is highly probable that an agreement on the total removal of medium-range missiles from Europe with the simultaneous preservation of 100 warheads on such missiles in the eastern part of the USSR and on US territory will be concluded this year. In this respect the situation has now taken a fairly favourable turn: the sides seem to have reached mutual understanding on the main issues of such an agreement. It is true that some rather important details are yet to be agreed upon.

The question of shorter-range missiles still hangs in the air. After the talks that US Secretary of State George Shultz had in Moscow, the sides incline towards completely eliminating also missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 km. As I see it, the Americans will go to the point of accepting the Soviet proposal on these missiles, so that now it will be up to the West European allies to the USA, primarily the Bonn government.

Q: How great is the danger that the West European NATO member-countries will play the part of a brake in this question?

A: Concerning the INF, I believe, this danger has passed. The government of the Federal Republic and the other NATO allies have concluded that they should

support the "zero option" on these missiles. The elaboration of a position on missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 km is yet to be completed both inside the West German Cabinet of Ministers and within NATO, but it will be speeded up in the near future. I believe that Bonn and other NATO allies will finally accept the "zero option" also on missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 km.

In the foreseeable future none of the West European governments, with the sole exception of France perhaps, will be able to afford the resumption of a discussion on the deployment of any significant number of new nuclear missiles, including those with a range of less than 1,000 km.

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CSO: 5200/1537

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON MISSILES

DW040901 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 0703 GMT 4 Jun 87

[Government statement by Chancellor Helmut Kohl during the Bundestag debate in Bonn; live]

[Text] Mr President, esteemed ladies and gentlemen: From this rostrum 4 weeks ago I delivered an interim report on the state of disarmament talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. On that occasion I expounded in detail the objectives of the Federal Government's security policy and explained the essential criteria of the Federal Government's position on the disarmament issues that are being negotiated in Geneva.

I announced on 7 May that the Federal Government would conclude the decisionmaking process following intensive consultations and accompanying meetings. I can state with special satisfaction today that the alliance partners' confidence in and understanding of those discussions again allows us to expect the alliance to demonstrate coherence and solidarity regarding the very complicated disarmament issues.

Our supreme political guideline, which is unreservedly supported by the alliance, is the reliable prevention of all wars in Europe — conventional or nuclear. [applause] In this connection I stress again that in view of the incredible destructiveness of modern conventional weapons systems, our country would be as vitally threatened as it would by nuclear weapons. Therefore, every Federal Government has the obligation to examine decisions on security and disarmament, not just with a view to dismantling nuclear weapons.

Proceeding from that realization, there is no alternative in the foreseeable future to the defense strategy of flexible response developed by the alliance. It is a strategy to prevent war. It has prevented wars in Europe in the past and will do so in the future. Regarding the practical aspect of that strategy, that means that the alliance will continue to have to rely on a balance of conventional armed forces and nuclear weapons.

Let me state quite clearly that we do not support any attempts to remove all nuclear weapons from Europe totally. Postwar history in Europe has confirmed that the concept of deterrence and the existence of nuclear weapons have made war in Europe impossible for 40 years. Of course, the role of nuclear weapons has to be reduced to the absolutely necessary minimum, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Our security is equally guaranteed by the presence of the troops deployed in our country, in particular U.S. troops. They demonstrate most clearly the policy obligation to support each other. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, our security policy has for many years been marked by two complementary elements — ensuring our capacity of defense and deterrence, on the one hand, and striving for arms control and disarmament in all areas, on the other. The goal is to establish a stable and balanced ratio of forces at the lowest possible level.

Decisions and measures in one of those two sectors are bound to have an effect on the other sector. It remains the joint objective of our defense and disarmament policy to intensify security for our country and the whole of the alliance. Therefore, the disarmament issues that properly concern us in a special way should not be viewed in isolation. Weapons and weapons systems in both areas of security policy must always be viewed in connection with the whole strategy.

Disarmament is not an end in itself. It must never lead to less security. [applause] The removal of individual weapons systems does not necessarily mean a gain for our security. Ladies and gentlemen, that fact has been particularly discussed by the Federal Government in connection with disarmament decisions on intermediate-range missiles. The complex interaction of disarmament steps and strategy require a thorough examination during the decisionmaking process both within the Federal Government and — more importantly — within the alliance.

Ladies and gentlemen, the importance of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy was clearly stressed by the SPD when it was in government — the government of Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Defense Minister Apel — in their 1979 white book. I quote: For NATO the nuclear forces in and for Europe, INF, are an important instrument for the credible capacity of premediated escalation in the framework of their deterrent strategy. In terms of concept and structure they are closely linked with the United States long-range strategic nuclear potential. The ratio of nuclear forces is no isolated quantity and can only

be viewed and assessed in the general context of the global ratio of nuclear forces. And the white book adds — I quote: It will be important to prevent weapons tendencies in the East from causing gaps in NATO's spectrum of escalation, leading to a loss of flexibility, and thereby jeopardizing the alliance's deterrent system, end of quote.

Ladies and gentlemen, as our colleague Dregger said quite correctly just now, that is an intelligent assessment of the situation. [laughter, commotion] That assessment makes it clear that the FRG must not be unlinked. The problems that we have had to decide concern crucial issues of our security, as everyone knows. That is why we have had detailed and time-consuming discussions with our alliance partners. I have always said, and I am saying it today, that decisions that are of vital importance to our people must not be made under pressure of time.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, these days the foundation of our alliance is again impressively proving its worth. Every member's security is the other member's security. There must not be less security, neither in the relationship of the American and European alliance partners, nor in mutual relations of the European alliance partners.

Ladies and gentlemen, those reflections on the general situation of our security policy decisions in recent weeks would be incomplete without our reaffirmation that we adhere to the second pillar of the Harmel report — the offer to our neighbors in the East to hold an intensive political dialogue and cooperate comprehensively in all the other areas. The East-West conflict cannot be permanently eased and overcome by security policy accords or disarmament agreements alone.

We welcome the statement by the Warsaw Pact leaders in their final communique issued recently in East Berlin saying, I quote, that they confirm their striving for a comprehensive system of international peace and security, which should include the military, political, economic, and humanitarian spheres.

Ladies and gentlemen, positive experience in those areas can lead to increased confidence between East and West. If the new way of thinking mentioned by General Secretary Gorbachev is really aimed at a fair and long-term balance of interests, we are prepared on our part to react to the new thinking with our own steps toward improved cooperation.

Weapons can be more easily dismantled when political confidence-building has visibly preceded the process of disarmament, or accompanied it in a credible way. [applause]

It is not weapons as such that are threatening. The thinking and acting of those who are politically responsible must turn out to be peaceful and demonstrated action. It can and must be proven, for instance in Afghanistan, where war has been going on for 8 years, longer than World War II — a war that is waged by the Soviet Army —, and at the walls and frontiers between East and West, where we still regrettably have to mourn victims every week.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, the Soviet proposals made in Geneva in connection with the INF negotiations do not contain a really satisfactory resolution of intermediate-range missile problems from our alliance's point of view. With a view to longer

range intermediate-range missiles, the Soviet proposal still envisages that 100 warheads each should remain in the United States and in the Soviet Union. The remaining 100 SS-20 warheads in the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union, because of the mobility necessary for training purposes in the European part — suggested by the Soviet Union in the treaty draft — constitutes an element of instability for Germans and Europeans. Moreover, such a situation would create grave verification problems.

For these reasons the Federal Government, together with our partners, prefers a worldwide abolition of that weapons category. [applause] We hope the Soviet Union will concede that point in the course of negotiations.

The Federal Government believes that after the resolution of further individual verification issues an agreement on longer range intermediate-range missiles will be possible in the coming months. Thus it would be possible for the first time to take a giant step toward disarmament. Such a success would be mainly the result of the firm and determined attitude of the Federal Government and the entire alliance in implementing the NATO two-track decision. [applause] It would simultaneously be evidence that real disarmament steps on the basis of a fair balance of interests of both sides can be achieved.

For the sphere of shorter range intermediate-range missiles, in the 500-1,000 km range, the Soviet proposal, which to date has not been submitted in writing, envisages a zero option limited to Europe. Ladies and gentlemen, for us Germans it is evident at first glance that such a solution has grave disadvantages. The overwhelming Soviet superiority in weapons with a range below 500 km, particularly in the form of the 583 Scud missiles against which NATO has nothing comparable to offer, would remain untouched.

That has not made it easy for the Federal Government to make a decision on a zero option in the 500-1,000 km range. That superiority must also be viewed against the background of the Warsaw Pact's clear superiority in the conventional field.

Ladies and gentlemen, that Warsaw Pact conventional superiority is not an invention of the current Federal Government. Again quoting the white book published by our colleagues Schmidt and Apel at the time, I quote: In central Europe and on Europe's flanks, the conventional Warsaw Pact forces, especially its ground forces, are clearly superior to those of NATO. The relations between NATO and Warsaw Pact combat tanks in central Europe is about 1 to 3, including reinforcements on both sides. However, that does not say everything about the degree of the threat. The quotation goes on: The Warsaw Pact's numerical tank superiority is not only of great military value, but also great political value. It is a reason for mistrust, because masses of tanks are classic means of attack and especially suited for quick occupation of foreign territories. That explains their political significance. I have nothing to add to the quotes from colleagues Schmidt and Apel. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, everyone knows — also here in this hall — that since 1979, when the white book was published, the Soviet Union's conventional forces have been developed further. This statement and the reality we are dealing with, makes it clear that unconditional acceptance of the Soviet zero option proposal for the 500-1,000 km range is out of the question for the Federal

Government. The result would be hard to tolerate for our country, which is exposed geographically.

I want to state most clearly that for us Germans concern is growing about the imbalance of systems below 500 km if ground-based missiles with a 500-1,000 km range were abolished. We cannot and do not want to accept such a situation in the long run and, therefore, we press clearly for the continuation of the disarmament process in that sphere also. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, we agree with the U.S. Government and the other alliance partners that the 72 German Pershing-1A missiles with their U.S. warheads cannot be included in a U.S.-USSR zero option. Those missiles have never been the subject of negotiations.

The strong preponderance of the Soviet Union in missiles with a range below 500 km, and the unilateral withdrawal of 2,400 NATO nuclear warheads between 1980 and 1988, which are not being replaced, should make it possible not to complicate or even endanger negotiations on that point.

Ladies and gentlemen, with the withdrawal of 2,400 nuclear warheads, NATO has unilaterally withdrawn more nuclear weapons from Europe than have ever been or are being negotiated in Geneva.

The Geneva negotiations continue. It seems important to me to point that out because many people act as if the negotiations had been concluded. To date agreement has not yet been achieved. The submitted draft shows that difficult problems still have to be solved. Great efforts by the two world powers are necessary to achieve success. I want to say clearly that we — the Federal Government and I personally — will do everything we can to contribute to success, a success that for that first time in the history of arms control would really lead to getting rid of weapons. [applause]

The Federal Government proceeds on the assumption that such an INF agreement can be signed this year. We hope that for this reason a third summit meeting will take place between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in the United States.

I know that if I say this here today there will hardly be any contradiction. Here in this house, too, the assessment of the situation has completely changed in the past 12 months. This is due to the success of the Federal Government's policy. [shouts, applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, if we had followed your proposals, we would have been confronted with the ruins of your policy today. [applause] We worked constructively, and today we can rightly claim that in the FRG, the coalition parties, and the Federal Government have made a considerable contribution to the possibility of having that meeting now. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, the Federal Government continues to maintain that the Geneva negotiations on nuclear intermediate-range missiles must remain part of a comprehensive disarmament process involving all weapons systems and entailing further disarmament steps. Colleague Brandt, I think that is a point on which we might possibly reach an understanding.

We consider the following disarmament steps as necessary and possible:

First, in the big powers disarmament process, we expect agreement on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive potentials of both sides. Broad agreement on that basis was negotiated in October last year at the Reykjavik summit meeting.

Ladies and gentlemen, such an agreement would envisage abolishing a total of 10,000 nuclear warheads. As to the remaining problems in that field, I stated here on 18 March, and I want to repeat it: Both negotiating partners must make efforts in Geneva to find a cooperative solution on the ratio of offensive to defensive weapons, considering the security interests of both sides. That is particularly valid for the application of the ABM Treaty.

I am further of the opinion that drastic reductions of offensive weapons would necessarily bring influence to bear on the necessity and volume of defensive systems.

The Federal Government hopes that a final agreement will be achieved in the foreseeable future. An agreement on INF could promote mutual confidence for such a decisive step as dismantling strategic systems.

Second, we are striving for a convention, to be concluded as soon as possible, on a worldwide chemical weapons ban. The very complicated negotiations at the Geneva disarmament conference have advanced so far that any unsolved verification problems should constitute no decisive obstacle to removing that cruel weapons category definitely and worldwide. [applause]

The Federal Government recognizes that the Soviet Union has demonstrated movement in the controversial verification problems. It is encouraging to see that the final communique of the Warsaw Pact summit in East Berlin last week restates that it is possible for the negotiations to be concluded this year.

We expect both sides to be flexible and negotiate so as to achieve results. By the way, in view of what has so far been achieved in the negotiations, this is not the proper time to introduce new or geographically limited concepts.

The FRG has from the start played an active role in the negotiations at the Geneva disarmament conference and will continue to do so in the decisive final phase. [commotion, applause] In this connection, too, we should recall Germany's particularly exposed situation and the special threat that we are exposed to from chemical weapons. We therefore expect everyone to respect our preeminent interest in such a convention.

Third, the next logical step in the disarmament concept of the Federal Government and its allies is to create a verifiable, comprehensive, and stable ratio of conventional armed forces at a lower level in all of Europe. In preparation for such negotiations our alliance has done considerable preparatory work. The member countries of the two pacts are holding preliminary talks in Vienna on a mandate for a conference on conventional weapons control.

Ladies and gentlemen, the essence is to eliminate disadvantageous imbalances. We therefore welcome as a step in the right direction the readiness stated in the Warsaw Pact's communique of 29 May 1987 — I quote — eliminate the existing imbalance in a number of elements.

The Federal Government and its allies consider it most important to start a phased negotiation process guaranteeing undiminished security of all concerned in every phase; to eliminate the capacity to launch surprise attacks or large-scale offensives; to define further confidence-building measures and improve openness and the predictability of military behavior; to take into account regional imbalances in all of Europe; reliably to rule out violations, and to develop effective rules of verification including the exchange of detailed information and on-site inspections.

Ladies and gentlemen, in addition, a second stage of the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security in Europe remains necessary. The successful conclusion of the Stockholm negotiations should be utilized for that purpose.

Regarding conventional disarmament negotiations, our alliance has not yet made a definitive decision on the framework and the elements of a mandate. Together with our British colleagues we are energetically trying to find a compromise. Given the special threat I mentioned that the FRG is exposed to by the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority, which will even be augmented as a result of nuclear disarmament steps, the Federal Government is urging speedy agreement to pave the way for necessary disarmament negotiations.

Ladies and gentlemen, in view of the superpowers' moves toward nuclear disarmament in Europe, the FRG and France have an identical interests in larger conventional stability at a lower level. Thus the Federal Government considers negotiations on conventional stability in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals — a term we owe to Charles de Gaulle, by the way — only conceivable together with France. In that respect we particularly rely on our French friends. [applause]

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, our experience of recent

years has shown that the fact that France and the FRG share equal security interests is becoming increasingly important. The German-French consultations 2 weeks ago took place in that spirit. The point is that German-French partnership in that area, too, makes it increasingly necessary for us to take a common political approach.

It was very satisfactory for me yesterday to have an opportunity to exchange views with the most important representatives of the groups in the French chamber on the foreign policy commission. Those talks led to considerable agreement on that special problem. The French colleagues also made it clear that the moment of close coordination in the security policy area between France and the Federal Republic has come, and that we should finally take advantage of the opportunities created by the Elysee treaty. [applause]

I am confident that it may be an important contribution to the security of Western Europe as a whole. In the Federal Government's view the development of cooperation with all WEU members, which will be promoted as a result, and the strengthening of its institutions are important elements in the work of European integration.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, in my government statement in March, I expressed the hope that broad consensus would be created in the Bundestag on the crucial problems of our security policy, in particular our loyalty to the alliance, as well as on disarmament and arms control. Problems that have an impact on our people's security until far into the next century are not suitable for short-term and therefore short-sighted partisan differences. We should not dispute each other's goodwill and intentions on crucial security issues.

We should be aware that basic agreement beyond all parties makes it easier to represent the special German interests in the international arena. The best possible representation of our well-understood national interests in the very field of security is one of our most noble duties toward the next generation. [applause]

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CSO: 5200/2550

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG PRESS CONSIDERS GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

DW051030 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0505 GMT 5 Jun 87

[Press Review]

[Excerpts] The main issue today is the parliamentary debate on Chancellor Helmut Kohl's government statement on Bonn's disarmament policy.

The Duesseldorf *Rheinische Post* writes: After all the fuss about the German attitude toward scrapping intermediate-range missiles in Europe, the Bundestag missile debate was remarkably calm. That was in part because the tension disappeared once the Bonn coalition parties, under pressure of circumstances, made up their minds about the so-called double zero option. On the other hand, former Chancellor Brandt in his last Bundestag speech as SPD chairman contributed in a remarkably fair way to the fact that the debate remained an exchange of arguments. Kohl now has his big chance, despite CDU/CSU reservations and the remarkably low participation in the vote on the motion. If a U.S.-USSR disarmament agreement providing for gradual dismantling of missiles in the 1,000-5,000 km range is signed in Geneva this fall as expected, Kohl could consider himself the first chancellor under whose government a first effective step was made toward disarmament, not just arms control.

Frankfurter Allgemeine states: No one found the courage to state two things publicly in the debate. First, that hopes about a continued disarmament process are almost exclusively linked to the person of the Soviet party chief — that is, basically one person. Second, that the record of the negotiations, particularly

over conventional disarmament, is discouraging. No one seems to want to consider — at least publicly — that after a Geneva agreement on the missiles issue, developments could stop and the shutters could go down. However, it was clearly noted that some people spoke with reserved optimism. [passage omitted]

Frankfurter Rundschau notes: After Reykjavik it was clear to experienced foreign policy experts, including in the chancellor's immediate circle, that the train that got going through Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, could not be stopped at the small Bonn railroad station. World powers who earn that appellation because of the power they have to blow up the world will always consider their own security first. That is proper, because as long as the powers that be in Washington and Moscow remain aware of the unimaginable dangers of the nuclear age, the power policy midgets are more or less safe from gamblers taking over. [passage omitted]

Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung writes: Chancellor Kohl and other leading CDU/CSU politicians could have avoided much excitement and confusion had they realized in time what was clear to Foreign Minister Genscher right away: If the Soviet leadership and the U.S. Government decided to put the military situation in Europe on a new basis, the FRG could not oppose it. With all their reluctance Kohl, Strauss, and the others only succeeded in demonstrating the FRG's helplessness more clearly than necessary.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S WOERNER COMMENTS ON WEAPONS POLICY

DW050740 Cologne Westdeutscher Rundfunk Network in German 0510 GMT 4 Jun 87

[Interview with Defense Minister Manfred Woerner by reporter Haller on the "A Jour" program; recorded]

[Text] [Haller] The Federal president said at the commanders meeting in Oldenburg that we cannot afford prejudices. Do you agree?

[Woerner] Without any difficulty. Prejudiced propaganda would be about the worst we could do. No one would take it from us anyway. However, one thing is equally clear: We must face facts. Unfortunately, those facts include that the Soviet Union, despite all its disarmament statements and assurances, has been actively rearming, including under Gorbachev. That cannot be hidden from the people. It has nothing to do with prejudice. If Gorbachev stops — very good. We want to disarm in the conventional field.

[Haller] So no prejudice, but what about the threat? You are worried that about 50% of the population does not believe that we are really threatened.

[Woerner] Yes, I am worried about that. Worried because I see the threat as before — not the threat of war — I do not think we will have a war because we will continue to avoid it, but threat does not mean only war. It can mean that one power can force its will on another because it is militarily superior, and because it is exploiting that military power in peacetime. I see the danger that if the Soviet Union was in such a situation, say through exploitation of its conventional superiority, I would indeed say that there is a danger to FRG citizens, their freedom, and the

Bonn government's freedom of action. I consider that a potential threat.

[Haller] I believe that most people are instinctively for disarmament. You say all the time that disarmament is not an end in itself. Is it possible that disarmament could increase the threat?

[Woerner] Naturally! By the way, I am also instinctively for disarmament, but also rationally. However, disarmament must be balanced, it must not create the danger of war. If disarmament were implemented in such an imbalanced way that one side became superior to the other, if wars became wageble, or that one side might think that military action or the threat of military force would make sense again, then disarmament would decrease, not increase security.

[Haller] That is hard to explain.

[Woerner] Naturally, many things in the security policy sphere are hard to explain. We have experienced that over and over again. On the other hand, the opposite also happens. Now, for example, our situation is better. We said during counter-armament that we would rearm and the the Soviet Union would return to the negotiating table and possibly offer what it had not offered to date.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S GENSCHER SPEAKS ON DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

DW091231 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1000 GMT 7 Jun 87

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Deitrich Genscher by correspondent Gerhard Fleischle; date and place not given--recorded]

[Text] [Fleischle] Mr Foreign Minister, this week there was an important decision, when the federal chancellor made his government statement on disarmament — the yes to the double zero option while exempting the Bundeswehr's Pershing-1A missiles and their U.S. warheads. Has that always been your course, too, or do you support it only because it is the result of a coalition compromise?

[Genscher] I would not speak of a compromise. We said from the beginning that in Geneva the United States took the line — and it is the Americans who are negotiating with the Soviet Union, not we — that only the American and Soviet systems are the subject of negotiations. We support that American position, as do the other alliance partners. Nobody had to convince anyone about it.

[Fleischle] I think that topic will play an important role during next week's NATO council session in Reykjavik. Will the German position become NATO's decision then, which will become part of the Geneva negotiations?

[Genscher] Which German position do you mean?

[Fleischle] The double zero position exempting the Pershing-1A's.

[Genscher] That is an American position, as I have said previously. However, the Federal Government is in agreement with the United States on the issue — as are the other alliance partners. We want to emphasize the Western alliance's disarmament position once again in Reykjavik, because the Western alliance indeed rendered essential contributions to movement within the disarmament negotiations. It has always been our position to ban chemical weapons worldwide. In that field we came much closer to success during the Geneva negotiations. It was our position to support the zero option for longer range intermediate-range missiles. What arises as the second zero option, the double zero option, is part of the NATO two-track decision logic — which was a Western alliance, starting with the Halifax German-French initiative, wanted conventional stability

as a subject of negotiations. In Brussels in December we decided upon important principles of conventional stability. Following the Stockholm conference's success, where we agreed upon a first package of confidence-building measures with the East — which, by the way, was a German-French initiative — we are of course interested in agreeing upon further confidence-building measures. We consider it necessary to conduct negotiations on shorter range missiles — below the 500 km range. There is a comprehensive Western disarmament philosophy that very surely will be emphasized and formulated in Reykjavik once again. We will not just confine ourselves to proposals on disarmament — being aware of the principles of the Western alliance's Harmel report — but we will at the same time pay great attention to detente, dialogue, and cooperation with the East. They belong together. One aspect alone could not achieve greater stability.

[Fleischle] Mr Minister, may I go back to some points you have already mentioned? First, the Pershing-1A's. Do you have definite information about how realistic and promising the American side in Geneva regards the German conditions in that context?

[Genscher] I must contradict you for a third time. It is not a matter of German conditions. It is the American negotiating position, which is supported by all the alliance partners, including the FRG. It is not we who are negotiating in Geneva.

[Fleischle] What about the Federal Government's desire that future agreements should be as global and comprehensive as possible?

[Genscher] The United States takes the view that it is desirable immediately to reach an international agreement on intermediate-range missiles. And that it is not desirable to leave 100 missiles on either side — which would make verification easier. As for intermediate-range missiles in the 500-1,000 km range, we think a global solution is a must — I mean we, the Western alliance — because the verification problem is even more important in that field, particularly in view of the greater mobility the Soviet weapons systems have. The Americans do not

have any. In this case it is a matter of unilateral disarmament by the Soviet Union.

[Fleischle] Mr Minister, it is not a very pleasant prospect for us Germans and our neighbors, for example the French, that only missile missions with a 500-km range will be possible in the future. Volker Ruehe said the shorter the range, the deader the Germans. Would it not be appropriate really to concentrate disarmament interests completely on the sector where the Soviets have a considerable superiority? What about those who want to negotiate the conventional sector?

[Genscher] Let me first say that it is wrong to proceed from the assumption that there would be a nuclear threat only because of missiles with ranges below 500 km following the double zero option. It makes no great difference for a victim of such a threat whether missiles are fired from the surface, or from a ship or plane, or whether it is a strategic weapon. All of Europe is threatened by the superpowers' strategic systems. There are sea-based systems and there are air-based systems, which means that what will be removed by the double zero option is only a small part of the nuclear potential the two superpowers have. It is sort of a first step toward nuclear disarmament. It is absolutely wrong to tell anybody there would afterward only be nuclear weapons with a range below 500 km. There are many more. That is the reason we support reducing the strategic potentials of the two superpowers by 50% and why we really want negotiations on the nuclear potentials on ranges below 500 km. I have already discussed the necessity of bringing about conventional stability, because conventional stability becomes more and more important for our security the further we advance in nuclear disarmament. I believe that one must, in really understanding nuclear weapons, dispense with the idea that such weapons are for warfare. They are weapons to prevent war. The West's overall nuclear potential is not expected to wage war. That would be the end of mankind. I suppose the Soviet Union is of the same opinion. Its function is to prevent war. For that reason it is wrong to carry on with war scenarios. It is a basic principle of our Western security policy to prevent any kind of war, be it conventional or nuclear. That is our policy's goal. Therefore, one must consider the double zero solution in that context. Then you will realize that such a goal is not at all threatened by the double zero option. However, we are taking into consideration the insight that came to light in Reykjavik during the summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev — that we must reduce the danger of the nuclear threat by establishing agreed-upon security structures between East and West — if we want to avoid a catastrophe for mankind. That is the responsibility that we bear today on both sides, no matter how different the systems of political and societal structures are.

[Fleischle] Many times concern has been expressed in connection with the disarmament discussion, that the deterrence capability would be reduced in the wake of partial denuclearization, because a decoupling of the United States from Europe would take place. Is that a solid argument?

[Genscher] No, I do not think that the deterrence capability, which is part of our strategy to prevent war and is unre-nounceable under the given circumstances, is reduced. As to the second zero option, it is not reduced simply because the Americans do not have any systems they might remove. That is

certainly not the case. What is really important is that we contribute to the creation of security structures in the strategic sector — that means in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union — and other sectors. That means that we cooperate with the United States not only in defense, but that we also seek cohesion with them over disarmament and arms control. I have never understood the concern that there might be disconnection on account of current developments. On the contrary. Europe and the United States are not only linked by joint forces — there are some 300,000 American soldiers with their families over here — but also by a joint disarmament policy. That joint disarmament policy is the expression of values we advocate — to guarantee human lives and to maintain human dignity. It is our alliance's consciousness of values that implies that we support an active policy of securing peace, including disarmament as a main topic, and that we implement such a policy. Only if we succeed in linking the United States and its European partners, will we be able to keep our alliance alive in the future — linked by interests, by values, by joint defense efforts, and by a joint peace and disarmament policy.

[Fleischle] Mr Minister, going back to your remarks on the necessity of conventional disarmament, how do you assess the French-U.S. relationship, and how would you bring your influence to bear so that progress can be achieved in that field?

[Genscher] That problem indeed has yet to be solved because there are different views on the framework of negotiations on conventional weapons control. I hope we will settle the issue before or in Reykjavik. The West must show negotiation readiness in Vienna, for instance, where negotiations are taking place and where the Warsaw Pact has submitted proposals to the West. We must view the Western strategy as a whole. Political strategy today for us in Western Europe must mean moving closer together. The nucleus in that respect can only be the German-French relationship. In my view, in accordance with the Elysee treaty, we should move forward toward a French-German security partnership as the nucleus of a larger security policy identity of the EC countries or the Western alliance's European member countries. We should make our EC capable of mastering the future, which also includes common monetary policy.

On the other hand, we should not only attach military importance to our cooperation with the United States, but we should also view it as worldwide responsibility of the most important industrial nations for a sound world economy because social stability is a prerequisite for political stability everywhere. We should, in addition, view it as a community to develop the Third World and a community to guarantee the preservation of natural resources worldwide. The tasks the West are facing today must be solved in cooperation with the Soviet Union and its allies as well as the Third World countries. Those tasks are not to embark on an arms race, but on the contrary, to create agreed security and release resources by disarmament while creating opportunities for our countries' internal development and for the development of the Third World.

We must recognize that we have become a community of survival in this world. That also means that we have to leave to the succeeding generations a healthy environment. In other words, we must prevent other parts of the world from being struck by droughts or degenerating into desert as a result of a devastating

air pollution. These are life preserving tasks that we — East and West — must undertake jointly, unless we dispute our responsibility for the future. To me that is a peace policy and a freedom policy. Without life there is no freedom. Freedom can only be expressed in life. We must make sure that we pursue a policy that leaves more to coming generations than just the administration of the irreparable consequences of mistakes or omissions we make today.

[Fleischle] Mr Minister, as background to such ideas, would it not be very useful jointly to discuss the Warsaw Pact proposal to discuss military doctrines? Such a discussion could lead to new considerations and insights.

[Genscher] I think that the proposal is very important. however, it does not originate with the Warsaw Pact...

[Fleischle, interrupting] The West suggested it...

[Genscher, interrupting] But it was submitted by the West. We also said that in Brussels, where we posited our philosophy on military doctrine or the objectives of defense. We said that the armed forces' task should only be preventing wars and guaranteeing defense. They should not be there to start aggression or to serve as an instrument of political or military intimidation. In other words, we must reach understanding between East and West on what armed forces are necessary at all to preserve security, and what must be eliminated to abolish the capacity of one side or another — in the West we already have purely defensive armament — to exert pressure or even start large-scale operations.

I consider it important in this situation to intensify our awareness that those developments are an opportunity. We should not be afraid or helpless, but recognize the opportunity and use it — the opportunity to move resolutely toward European peace, as was outlined by the Helsinki Final Act, a peace among countries with different political and social systems that can live side by side without fear and in peaceful competition.

I think that we Germans have a special responsibility here. That is also in our own interest. We are the most affected by the division of Europe and by conflicts in Europe. The border across Europe is the border across Germany, no other country. We should welcome any step that brings us closer together and that also brings the United States and the Soviet Union closer together. It is not a threat to us, but an opportunity. We must resolutely take advantage of this opportunity.

[Fleischle] Are such developments not a source for illusions for Germans?

[Genscher] I think we have to pursue a matter-of-fact, realistic policy in regard to the FRG's relations with the GDR. Any step that we can take together to improve our bilateral relations is also a contribution to more stable security in Europe. That is in

accordance with our responsibility for peace that we have here in the heart of Europe. We Germans live in the center of Europe. Whatever happens in the two parts of Germany affects Europe more, and — by the way — whatever happens in Europe affects us more.

I say it again — the border across Europe is the border across Germany, no other country. That is the reason why our national and European responsibility should make us the motor in such a process of possible rapprochement between East and West. We must see that we should take advantage of the new developments in the Soviet Union, if possible. A Soviet Union that is opening itself internally and externally also becomes more predictable. Internal developments in a country have repercussions on its foreign policy. We should consider all that an opportunity, realistically and without any illusions.

[Fleischle] If we Germans take advantage of those opportunities now and create a broader basis of common interests, would that not cause distrust among third parties?

[Genscher] That will not be the case if what I said earlier is kept in mind. I said that it is necessary to develop our EC and strengthen the partnership between Europe and United States by adopting new tasks in the scope of that partnership — common environmental protection and the establishment of social justice everywhere in the world by cooperation with Third World countries — and at the same time pursuing an active East-West policy.

No. No one can justify suspecting such a balanced policy. I think that a German foreign policy is all the more successful the more European it is. In other words, a German foreign policy always can only be a European peace policy. That shows that we Germans have cast our fate with Europe. In the past we have often been in conflict with our neighbors. Today we find ourselves in agreement with our neighbors who also want to overcome the conflicts in Europe. Irrespective of social conditions, a new European identity is emerging. That is becoming increasingly clear in the Western democracies and the socialist states. Our common culture and our common history are much stronger than ideological differences, real or artificial. Such developments are also helpful for the Germans who also want to come together.

[Fleischle] But we do not want to play a leading role in that process, do we?

[Genscher] We must play an extremely active role in that process which is in our own interest. Moreover, a Europe with more stability and fewer conflicts, a Europe where peace is durably guaranteed, is also a better homeland for us Germans. Those who live in the heart of Europe know that Germans are better off when the situation in Europe is better. We also could say that the more European German policy is, the more national it is.

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CSO: 5200/2550

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH POLITICIAN CALLS FOR SERIOUS INF NEGOTIATIONS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 13, 14 May 87

[Commentary by former Netherlands Foreign Minister Max van der Stoep]

[13 May 87 p 9]

["Kohl's Dilemma. Bonn Does Not Want To Be the Only One To Deploy New Weapons Systems"; first and last paragraphs provided by NRC HANDELSBLAD]

[Text] Nixon and Kissinger believe that the United States should take a different line in the negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva: the last stage in the withdrawal of intermediate-range weapons from Europe can begin only when agreement has been reached on a conventional balance in Europe.

For the first time since the beginning of the nuclear era there seems to be a real chance that the Soviets and Americans will achieve agreement to reduce their nuclear armaments, by reducing their intermediate-range missiles (INF) to almost zero. A number of problems still must be resolved, however. Provisions for verification could still cause complications and certainly will do so if the Soviet Union clings to its proposal to permit each party to retain 100 longer-range INF systems outside Europe, which would require a more sweeping verification regime.

As for shorter-range INF weapons, the Americans, concerned about the relative ease with which they can be moved, are demanding their complete elimination, while the Soviet Union wishes to agree only to removing them from Europe. And finally there is the tough problem of the 72 Pershing I's in the FRG, which the Soviets feel should be included in the zero option for shorter-range INF weapons, because the Americans control the nuclear warheads. The Americans, however, consider these to be third-country weapons systems (which are not included in the negotiations) because the launching systems belong to the FRG.

In assessing the chances that the remaining obstacles can be eliminated, we must also bear in mind that both superpowers are clearly eager to reach agreement quickly. Since Irangate has so damaged his prestige, Reagan is eager to achieve a major success before he leaves the White House. Worried about the threat from the Pershing II and cruise missiles, Gorbachev, is prepared to pay a high price for their removal, particularly since that would

do away with the reinforced linkage between the security of Europe and that of the United States which was a primary purpose of the dual-track decision in 1979.

A fierce debate is raging as to whether or not the so-called double-zero option for the various INF weapons in Europe is a good idea. Richard Perle (U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger's right-hand man for international security affairs), for instance, defends the agreement that is taking shape with the same elan with which he for years cited the dangers of arms control. On the other hand many Atlantacists, who certainly do not consider Perle to be one of their own, are concerned.

Balance

Nixon and Kissinger have pointed this out most clearly. They note that if the double-zero option becomes reality, nuclear deterrence in Europe will then be based to a considerable degree on so-called battlefield nuclear weapons, any use of which would, practically speaking, be restricted to German territory. Nixon and Kissinger fear that Gorbachev would be able to skillfully exploit the German people's fear of such a situation by proposing a zero option for these weapons as well, and that no German government could refuse. But that would practically eliminate American nuclear weapons from the European continent and Soviet conventional superiority would become the dominant factor in the European correlation of forces.

For that reason Nixon and Kissinger believe that the United States should take a different line in the negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva: the last stage in the withdrawal of intermediate-range weapons from Europe can begin only when agreement has been reached on a conventional balance in Europe. Influential Democrat Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Defense Committee, came out with a similar proposal. However, the U.S. administration has already rejected these suggestions and could hardly do otherwise, since they would represent a radical change in the negotiating position adopted thus far in Geneva.

However, the U.S. administration has done something else: it still has not agreed in principle to Moscow's proposal of a zero option for shorter-range INF systems; instead, it has left it up to its allies to choose between accepting such a zero option and standing by the original idea of allowing the two parties equal (but as low as possible) numbers of these weapons in Europe. Shultz made it clear, however, that the United States prefers the zero option and also that if against all expectation the allies should choose the alternative of equal numbers, the alliance would definitely have to take advantage of its right to deploy new weapons up to the level agreed on with the Soviet Union.

Shultz has thus presented the NATO partners --and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular-- with a dilemma. The West German government is as desirous of opting for the idea of equal numbers as it is loath to be the only country deploying new weapons. Britain and Italy are impossible, given the range of this category (500-1,000 km.). That leaves the Benelux countries, or at least a strip along the eastern boundary of the Benelux area. But those

governments are hardly likely to be enthusiastic about proposing the deployment of new weapons at a time when the Americans say a double-zero option is within the range of possibilities. If Bonn really wants to oppose the double-zero option successfully, then it will also have to be prepared to be the only one to deploy new weapons.

This is the first of two discussions of the INF agreement by the former foreign minister. The second appears in tomorrow's edition.

[14 May 87 p 9]

["West Should Take Advantage of Chance to Negotiate. Psychological Delinkage Effect Cannot Be Denied Since Reykjavik"; last paragraph provided by NRC HANDELSBLAD]

[Text] It appears to be impossible to retract the zero option for longer-range INF weapons (i.e. the SS-20's on the Soviet side and the Pershing II and cruise missiles on the American). The NATO partners themselves proposed it in 1981 and to this very day they have been willing for the Americans to negotiate on that basis.

It will be all the harder for the governments of the Western European NATO countries to radically alter the pattern of the current negotiations since the Americans are clearly out to bring the talks to a successful conclusion quickly. For that reason suggestions to reduce the lower limit for short-range INF weapons from 500 to 300 km. have little chance of success.

It does appear possible to impose clear conditions for future negotiations. Thus, it would, for instance, be possible to make agreement on the further denuclearization of Europe dependent on attaining concrete results in negotiations on conventional parity in Europe.

Les Aspin, the Democratic chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Defense Committee, recently lamented in connection with the double-zero option that "we are eliminating the safest weapons and leaving in the most dangerous." He was referring to the reservations that many military experts have expressed about nuclear artillery in particular: if the Soviet Union attacks, either it has to be used in a very early stage of the conflict -- which is contrary to NATO doctrine-- or else there is a danger of its falling into the hands of the other side ("Use them or lose them").

Seen in this light, one may well ask whether Western Europe would not have been better off with a zero option for nuclear battlefield weapons and the retention of intermediate-range weapons in equal numbers, say 200 warheads. But it is now too late to achieve this.

There remains the question of whether the double-zero option really works to delink the security of the United States and that of Europe, as Nixon and Kissinger fear.

The U.S. government cites the presence of 300,000 American troops in Europe -- is that not the clearest possible proof of continuing American interest? And

although no less a figure than departing NATO Supreme Commander Rogers has made some marginal comments on the subject, we can fairly point out that besides nuclear battlefield weapons, NATO will still possess cruise missiles, which will not be included in any agreement, and aircraft with nuclear tasks. (There will undoubtedly be great pressure on the Netherlands to retain the F-16's nuclear task if an agreement is reached!)

But even if we assume that in strictly military terms an adequate linkage is being maintained, we cannot deny a certain psychological delinkage effect, an effect that is all the stronger since last November in Reykjavik the American President discussed plans to denuclearize the world with Gorbachev, without taking into account the consequences for the European allies.

Conventional

Is such an effect so harmful though? It is time for Western Europe to realize that the United States is coming to see nuclear weapons less and less as a means to defeat a conventional attack in Europe and increasingly as a means to deter the other side from using nuclear weapons itself.

Europe will have to concentrate far more on the issue of conventional armaments. If the countries of Western Europe continue to refuse to increase expenditures for this purpose and if, as is to be feared, efforts to create a more effective defense at the same level of expenditure (through standardization, division of labor, etc.) produce only modest results, then efforts to achieve greater security at the negotiating table become more important.

It would be going too far to say that negotiations on conventional forces in Europe are hopeless because the Soviet Union has a conventional superiority and because 14 years of MBFR negotiations have led to absolutely nothing. Gorbachev cannot carry out his plans to reform and modernize the Soviet Union if he is unable to reduce the burden of defense expenditures.

This gives the West opportunities that it ought to take advantage of. But unfortunately NATO has accepted a Soviet proposal on negotiations "from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals," which threatens to lead to an extremely complicated and protracted negotiating process. And within the alliance a struggle is still underway with France (which is not exactly enthusiastic about negotiations on conventional forces anyway) about how the negotiations should be carried on.

It would be extraordinarily regrettable if difficulties of this sort prevented a serious exploration of Gorbachev's willingness to get down to business on conventional weapons as well, particularly since on his recent trip to Prague Gorbachev hinted that he was willing to study whether conventional disparities, too, could be eliminated.

This is the second of two articles on the INF agreement by the former foreign minister. The first appeared yesterday on the Opinion Page.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE'S CHIRAC CALLS NATO RESPONSE 'REASONABLE, POSITIVE'

LD130919 Paris International Service in French 0800 GMT 13 Jun 87

[Text] The yes of the NATO allies to the double zero option has begun to arouse reactions, above all of course, in the Soviet Union. The TASS news agency considers that the agreement of the 16 NATO foreign ministers is a first step in the field of disarmament, before adding however that it is only a still rather timid first step.

In France, Prime Minister Jacques Chirac yesterday expressed his satisfaction regarding this decision comments which were all the more noticeable since France has still not officially commented on this matter. Listen to Jacques Chirac:

[Begin Chirac recording] I am particularly happy about the outcome of the discussions that were held among the NATO foreign ministers in Reykjavik with regard to matters of nuclear disarmament, an area in which we are not directly involved, as you know, but in which we are in agreement with the position of our European friends and allies. A reply that I would describe as reasonable and positive has been given to the United States (?for) the continuation and, hopefully, the conclusion of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Furthermore, with regard to conventional and chemical disarmament, hopefully, headway can be made within the framework of the Vienna conference, the CSCE. You know this was the French position and I am happy that this argument has finally prevailed, despite the difficulties.

Finally, I recall that it goes without saying that in the nuclear field our national forces, which as you know are not within the NATO integrated command, remain outside any kind of negotiation. France must never agree to let its nuclear force be the subject of negotiation other than under conditions that she desires and that she has already defined. [end recording]

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CSO: 5200/2554

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE'S LE FIGARO SEES 'MINIMUM' RESULTS AT VENICE SUMMIT

PM151446 Paris LE FIGARO in French 10 Jun 87 p 1

[Charles Lambroschini editorial; "Minimum Solidarity"]

[Excerpts]

In Venice, the Seven have opted for harmony, albeit at the cost of concessions that ill conceal their disagreements.

The declaration on disarmament published yesterday is very cautious. Faced with Gorbachev as the champion of denuclearization, they reasserted the principle of a nuclear deterrent as the foundation of western defense and the preservation of peace. However, there was not a single word about the issue that divides the Atlantic alliance — the current Geneva negotiations on Euromissiles.

Faced with the objective complicity between Reagan and Gorbachev to reach a rapid agreement, the western nations are split into two factions whose most eloquent spokesmen are France and Germany, respectively.

One wants to confine discussions to the "double zero option" — missiles with a range of 1,500-5,000 and 500-1,500 km. The other wants to include theater weapons — with a range of under 500 km — because they can kill only Germans, of both East and West: No matter if the dismantling of missiles in this category results in the denuclearization of the Old Continent.

Consequently the western nations are going to be in disarray when they arrive in Reykjavik where, starting tomorrow, Atlantic alliance foreign ministers will be meeting to discuss a collective response to Gorbachev's proposals.

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CSO: 5200/2554

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES EUROMISSILE CURBS

PM150921 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 8 Jun 87 p 4

[Unattributed report: "U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Missiles Should Not Jeopardize NATO's Capability"]

[Excerpts]

"A U.S.-Soviet agreement on Euromissiles should not jeopardize the Atlantic alliance's real capability to deter any attack by the Warsaw Pact, whether with nuclear forces or with conventional forces," [Foreign Minister] Pires de Miranda stated at the "Lisbon Meeting" organized by the Social Democratic Party, which brought together in Lisbon various world political personalities of the reformist area.

Pires Miranda was speaking at a session on the topic of "the importance of East-West disarmament for North-South relations," chaired by Marc Bazin, representing the Movement for the Establishment of Democracy in Haiti. In the foreign minister's opinion, "in view of the current situation of strategic nuclear parity between the United States and the USSR, the strategy of flexible response remains the most appropriate in view of the Warsaw Pact's enormous superiority in the field of conventional forces and in the area of chemical weapons.

"Disarmament is not equivalent to peace," Pires Miranda said, and, in his opinion, it is "an illusion to regard weapons — except [as published] the most terrible weapons — as the cause of war."

Describing weapons as "mere instruments," the speaker then maintained that "building peace is a political and not a military matter."

Elsewhere in his address, Pires de Miranda expressed his wishes for the conclusion of "an agreement between the Americans and the Soviets on the Euromissiles," while specifying, however, that this "should not jeopardize the Atlantic alliance's deterrence capability, based on the threat of the possibility of recourse to intercontinental missiles and other weapons of the U.S. strategic arsenal."

The foreign minister accordingly expressed his support for the so-called zero option, on the understanding that the necessary and sufficient conditions are preserved [words apparently dropped in newspaper] feasibility of a strategy of flexible response by the Atlantic alliance.

"However, it would be desirable," he remarked, "for the double zero option (for the U.S. and Soviet intermediate missiles) to be applied globally and not solely at the European level." Pires de Miranda also asserted the need for "the next steps in the field of arms control in Europe to be directed toward the elimination of chemical weapons and of the imbalances and disparities in conventional weapons."

The foreign minister then said that "an adequate disarmament agreement" would be "important for an atmosphere of less distrust between the superpowers, which would result in greater security for the North and the South."

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PEOPLE'S DAILY NOTES WEST EUROPEAN APPROVAL OF ARMS TALKS

HK190241 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 17 Jun 87 p 6

[Roundup by reporter Gu Yaoming (7357 5069 6900): "Western Europe Gives the Green Light to the 'Double Zero Option'"]

[Text] The just concluded spring meeting of foreign ministers of NATO member states finally ended the hesitation that various NATO states have felt for quite some time toward the elimination of intermediate- and short-range missiles, and supported the United States in reaching an agreement to eliminate these missiles in Europe. Moreover, the meeting appealed to the Soviet Union not to persist in retaining its SS-20 missiles in Asia and conclude a "double-zero-option" agreement with the United States on a global scale. This is an important development in the efforts of the United States and its West European allies to coordinate their position toward the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

In the 8 months since the U.S.-Soviet Iceland summit, a turn for the better in the efforts of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe to negotiate matters centering on the intermediate-range missile talks was achieved only after many setbacks. After careful study and weighing the pros and cons, some major West European countries finally reached a consensus on the issue.

West European support is without a doubt a big push to the U.S.-Soviet talks on intermediate-range missiles, but this does not mean that everything has gone well in the efforts to conclude an intermediate-range missile agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. At a press conference after the meeting, American Secretary of State George Shultz stated that the negotiations with the Soviet Union were still in progress while expressing his pleasure over the support given by Western Europe. What was actually meant is that there is still a lot of wrangling between the United States and the Soviet Union on some specific issues.

Before the current meeting, what was more frequently discussed by the delegations of countries concerned were the issues of verification in the intermediate-range missile agreement, West Germany's position that the 72 Pershing-1A missiles should not become part of any negotiations, and the Soviet SS-20 missiles in Asia.

On the verification issue, the speeches of some foreign ministers and the statement issued by the meeting repeatedly stressed the necessity of "an effective verification." This shows that European and American countries still have doubts and misgivings about the intermediate-range missile agreement. Naturally, it is also a very complicated point in the U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks.

On the issue of 72 Pershing-1A's in West Germany, after the meeting Shultz stated once again that the U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks would definitely not involve the weapons of a third nation. Although this statement could dispel some worries of West Germany and other allies of the United States, the Soviet Union once indicated that those missiles should be included in the talks. For the United States, this remains a thorny problem.

On the issue of Soviet SS-20's in Asia, the current meeting of foreign ministers and the meeting of defense ministers of the NATO member states held last month demanded that intermediate-range missiles be eliminated on a global scale. However, the Soviet Union still has reservations on this issue.

In addition, at the current meeting, the foreign ministers of NATO member states repeatedly urged the United States to hold negotiations with the Soviet Union on reduction of conventional and chemical weapons. Some foreign ministers stated that the future negotiations on reduction of nuclear weapons should be coupled with that of conventional weapons. This shows that West European countries still have doubts and misgivings on the agreement on intermediate-range missiles or on the next step the United States and the Soviet Union will take in their disarmament dealings.

The very day the meeting concluded, TASS published a commentary accusing the meeting of complicating the U.S.-Soviet negotiations. This demonstrates that the Soviet Union was dissatisfied with the meeting of foreign ministers of NATO member states and is ready to continue to haggle with the United States in their negotiations.

With Western Europe giving the green light to the "double zero option," people generally feel more optimistic about the conclusion of an agreement on intermediate-range missiles between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, more often than not, the complications of the U.S.-Soviet arms talks are unpredictable.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

FRG'S GENSCHER WELCOMES ZERO OPTION--Bonn (DPA)--Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has welcomed President Reagan's decision to propose a global zero option for intermediate-range missiles with a range between 500 and 1,000 km as well, and thus to include the double zero solution in the U.S. draft treaty. The United States was thus acting in accordance with the corresponding decision made at Reykjavik which now had to be realized and, where necessary, made more precise, Genscher told the FDP lower house group on Tuesday. The historical chance which was opening in disarmament policy should not be thrown away. [Text] [Hamburg DPA in German 1511 GMT 16 Jun 87 LD] /9274

CSO; 5200/2556

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET GENERAL ON EUROPEAN PARITY, WARSAW PACE INITIATIVES

PM171401 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major General M. Monin (retired), doctor of historical sciences: "Guarding Peace and Socialism; 14 May Marks the 32d Anniversary of the Warsaw Pact"]

[Text] The Warsaw Pact organization is history's first military-political alliance of a new type built on the principles of socialist internationalism. For more than 30 years the Warsaw Pact has faithfully served the cause of the preservation of peace and has reliably provided the fraternal socialist countries with foreign policy conditions which have enabled them successfully to implement the creative plans of economic and social development outlined by the communist and workers parties.

The current alarming and dangerous situation in the world which has developed as a result of intensified imperialist military preparations urgently demands the further strengthening of the socialist countries' cohesion and unity of action and the improvement of all forms and methods of their military-political and other cooperation with a view to curbing the military threat generated by imperialism and strengthening international security.

The socialist community countries are currently living through a truly crucial stage in their history. Relying on the advantages of socialism, they have set a course toward the acceleration of economic and social progress and have noticeably stepped up their cooperation on the whole range of problems which demand prompt coordination and expanded collaboration.

In view of the buildup of militarist preparations in NATO countries, the Warsaw Pact countries continue to do everything that is necessary to maintain their collective defense at the appropriate level. While not claiming greater security for themselves than the NATO countries have, the fraternal socialist countries cannot under any circumstances agree to lesser security either.

The measures adopted by the leading organs of the Warsaw Pact organization to further strengthen the defense capability of the allied states and to maintain the combat readiness of the Joint Armed Forces at the appropriate level are countermeasures; hence they are measures which have been forced on us. They by no means exceed the framework of the approximate parity of armed forces and conventional armaments which has become established between the two military-

political groupings in Europe. The sole aim of the measures is to guarantee the socialist countries their security.

Nonetheless, NATO state leaders and the reactionary news media are constantly trying to prove what cannot be proved, namely that the Warsaw Pact armies are allegedly considerably bigger than the NATO armies in Europe. According to the calculations of certain NATO figures, for instance, it is claimed that the Warsaw Pact countries have more combat-ready divisions than NATO countries. In reality, however, the reverse is true--NATO countries including France and Spain, have 94 such divisions while Warsaw Pact countries have 78. Furthermore, NATO country divisions, especially those of the FRG and the United States, are numerically far stronger than the divisions of the Warsaw Pact countries' armies. And similarly, data about the correlation of NATO and Warsaw Pact tanks, aircraft, and other combat hardware are falsified in the West. Then these "data" are used to inflate the myth of "Soviet military threat" which is nonexistent.

Questions of ensuring peace on the planet and averting a nuclear catastrophe occupy pride of place in the fraternal countries' cooperation. The new political thinking by which the Warsaw Pact member countries are guided today paves the way to the solution of these problems. As in the past, the Warsaw Pact countries are setting an example of a profoundly thought-out approach to the solution of the cardinal problems of world politics. The new coordinated political steps taken recently by the Warsaw Pact states with a view to halting the arms race and implementing the comprehensive Soviet proposals for achieving a nuclear-free world by the year 2000 fall precisely into this category. And the Political Consultative Committee proposals put forward in Budapest which advocate a comprehensive approach to the disarmament problem and make provision for the achievement of specific accords on all types of mass annihilation weapons to be backed up by substantial reductions in armed forces and conventional arms at regional and global levels are also a case in point.

The Warsaw Pact states regard the strengthening of security and cooperation in Europe as one of the key tasks of their foreign policy. Immediate measures to lower the level of military confrontation and to reduce the military potentials and the cost of their maintenance are needed most urgently in this region most saturated with arms where the world's two biggest armed groupings confront each other. The Warsaw Pact countries are convinced that the achievement of the aforementioned aims would be facilitated by the creation of zones free from all types of mass annihilation weapons in various parts of the continent, the signing of a treaty on the mutual nonuse of force and maintenance of relations of peace between the countries of the two military alliances in Europe, and a further balanced development of the all-European process in all spheres of cooperation provided for in the Helsinki Final Act.

The socialist countries' initiatives relating to time and quantitative frameworks and specific forms of substantial reductions in all the components of the European countries' ground forces and tactical strike aviation on the territory from the Atlantic to the Urals, the same forces and means of the United States and Canada stationed in Europe, and also operational and tactical nuclear weapons serve the aims of strengthening military-strategic

stability in Europe. The Warsaw Pact states' appeal addressed to NATO countries advocating that the military alliances' military concepts and doctrines be based on defensive principles in the interests of security in Europe and throughout the world is subordinated to the same noble idea.

A few days ago the Polish People's Republic put forward an important constructive proposal. W. Jaruzelski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee and chairman of the Polish State Council, presented on behalf of his country a new comprehensive plan for arms reduction and confidence-building measures in Central Europe by means of a gradual reduction of nuclear and conventional arms in the region where the two military-political alliances confront each other. This proposal is aimed at lowering the level of military confrontation in the European continent.

However, the NATO countries are in no hurry to respond positively to the socialist states' numerous constructive initiatives. It seems that the NATO leaders do not want to give up their nuclear weapons, that they want to retain them for reasons which have little in common with European and world security. And in order to cover up their true aims, they need the lies about the so-called "superiority" of the socialist countries and about the "military threat" from the East. The Western imperialist circles are using these lies to justify rising military expenditure and new rounds of the arms race.

However the people in the West who are hoping to achieve military superiority over the socialist world are hoping in vain. These illusory hopes will not come true. "As long as the imperialist NATO bloc exists," the CPSU Program emphasizes, "the party sees it as necessary to contribute in every way to the improvement of the activity of the Warsaw Pact organization as an instrument of collective defense against the aggressive imperialist aspirations, as an instrument of the joint struggle for a lasting peace and expanded international cooperation." In a single combat formation, the servicemen of the Warsaw Pact states' fraternal armies staunchly guard peace and socialism. Reliably they defend the peaceful creative labor of the socialist community countries and protect peace on the planet.

From the Warsaw Pact countries, unflinchingly upholding the cause of world peace and defending the vital interests of all mankind and the survival of the human race, shines forth a bright ray of hope that it is possible to curb the forces of aggression. It is therefore quite natural that the attraction of socialism and the real impact on the military-political situation in the world of the socialist community countries' concerted steps continue to grow steadily.

Led by their Marxist-Leninist parties, the states of the socialist military alliance continue to strengthen the positions of world socialism in a joint effort. As M.S. Gorbachev has emphasized, they now regard "the task of curbing the nuclear threat, thwarting aggressive imperialist aspirations, and preserving and consolidating peace as being as urgent as never before." They are tackling this task with full understanding of their purpose.

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CSO: 5200/1527

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SECOND STAGE SEISMIC PROJECT WITH U.S. SCIENTISTS

PM301045 Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 Apr 87 p 3

[Report by V. Bugayev, correspondent for the newspaper ZVEZDA PRIIRTYSHYA, under the rubric "We Report the Details": "Within the Radius of the Test Site"]

[Text] Bayanaul--The mountain echo carried the roar of a helicopter. It could not yet be seen, but fine beads of snow were already beginning to fall from the tops of pines. The sound wave conveyed the power of the MI-8's engines. The helicopter delivered 1.5 tonnes of freight to the "Dzhasybay" seismic station. Some 30 cardboard boxes and wooden crates contained U.S.-made seismic equipment. It was destined for the second stage of the Soviet-U.S. scientific experiment to verify nuclear tests, which is being conducted under an agreement between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Natural Resources Defense Council.

After unloading, the helicopter quickly flew off. But silence did not reign for long. A little while later another group of Soviet and U.S. seismologists arrived at the station from Barnaul Airport. The U.S. side is represented by seismologist Holly Eisler, doctor of sciences at the University of California; her colleague Frank Vernon; engineer Larry May; and technician David Carrol. The Soviet specialists are N.F. Yukhnin, N.V. Adimov, and V.I. Vasin, staffers of the USSR Academy of Sciences Earth Physics Institute, and S.B. Pynka, their Kazakhstan colleague.

"Over the course of three days," geophysicist Nikolay Yukhnin said, "we have to install a complete set of measuring and recording apparatus in a specially bored shaft and set up a Kennedy computer in the cylindrical universal block laboratory. Specialists at all three monitoring [kontrol] stations--in Karkaralinsk, Karasu, and Bayanaul--will thereby be able to embark on the second stage of the Soviet-U.S. experiment. The setting up of seismometers at a depth of 100 meters will preclude any influence from all sorts of natural interference. Therefore the second stage will ensure absolutely full verification."

The three-component seismometer contained in a strong metal capsule resembles an artillery shell in form. Frank and Larry carried it very carefully, by hand, from the laboratory to the borehole. It took exactly a day to install

the seismometer in the 100-meter borehole--the instrument has to be oriented very precisely.

"There are no problems," Holly said. To judge from her charming smile, it was not hard to guess that all was in order. "The second -stage apparatus is ready to work."

Now there was time for a calm conversation.

"Bayanaul is the most beautiful of the three sites I have visited," Holly Eisler said. "The landscape here reminds me very much of the snowy mountains in Utah, where I like to ski. And it seems to me that our peoples have much in common. We need to live in peace. This is why I am participating in this experiment, which is to make a contribution to the cause of strengthening peace. It is an experiment in the name of the future. It is a search for mutual understanding and trust. Unfortunately, our joint scientific experiment is not as well known in the United States as here in the USSR. The U.S. press prefers to keep quiet about it. But here we have found mutual understanding with our Soviet colleagues. We have been admitted to the 'holy of holies'--the region of the test site. Someone preparing for war would never do that. At the same time, Soviet specialists have still not received permission to install their apparatus in the States.

"The very first preliminary results of our joint work have proved that from a technical viewpoint there are no problems in international verification of nuclear tests," H. Eisler concluded.

Technician D. Carrol, the youngest participant in the experiment, joined the conversation. He is 23.

"I have never felt any difficulties here, although I am far from home. I have made many friends among Soviet specialists. On leaving for the Soviet Union I brought skis with me, and I have already had the pleasure of making several ski excursions at our permanent station in Karkaralinsk. Despite what is written about the USSR in the United States, I personally am convinced that you are people like us. The seismographs which we have set up here are working perfectly, picking up, unfortunately, even the echo of the nuclear explosions in Nevada which did not cease during the 19 months of the Soviet moratorium."

We left Bayanaul in the morning. The mountains saw us off in intoxicating silence. The peaceful blue sky extended above their slightly snowy peaks.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR READY TO WITHDRAW 18 WARHEADS FROM SUBMARINES IN BALTIC

PM091121 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 7 Apr p 7

[Halvor Elvik report: "Submarine Missiles Out of the Baltic"]

[Text] "The Soviet Union is prepared to withdraw unilaterally 18 nuclear warheads currently on board six submarines in the Baltic in connection with the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area," Dr Lev Voronkov said at a news conference arranged by the Novosti Press Agency in Oslo yesterday.

Voronkov was repeating earlier official signals from the Soviet Union on this point. This is different from how he himself was interpreted in the West after he published a book on the zone question a few years ago. Voronkov's book was taken as an indication of a reduction in the Soviet Union's willingness to adopt its own measures in connection with the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area.

Yesterday Voronkov said he was misunderstood and that he never intended to link the nuclear missiles on board Soviet submarines in the Baltic to the nuclear balance in Central Europe.

Voronkov stressed that the Baltic is not an inland sea, but international waters affected by national measures adopted in the area. He expressed concern at increased Western military activity in the area, both at sea and in the air, the latter connected with the fact that U.S. aircraft carriers have been sailing in the area.

"A nuclear-free Baltic must be guaranteed by the nuclear powers. This would not happen automatically even if the Nordic countries were to set up a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe." Voronkov said, before reiterating that the Soviet Union is nevertheless willing to adopt unilateral measures in the region in connection with such a zone.

Voronkov works at the IMEMO [World Economics and International Relations] Institute for security and disarmament [description as published] and was introduced by Novosti yesterday as the Soviet Union's foremost expert on the northern regions and Scandinavia. At the news conference he stressed the new principle underlying the majority of the Soviet Union's security initiatives in the last few years.

"The task is now to find solutions in a security system based on quantities of arms that are reasonable and sufficient. Ever increasing numbers of arms actually undermine security," Voronkov said.

He claimed that both the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and the decoupling of the medium-range nuclear arms in Europe from the Reykjavik package reflected the fact that the Soviet Union is now basing its security on the principle that arms levels must be reasonable and sufficient, but no more.

"The Soviet Union needs the resources for the modernization of its society," he said, calling for a peaceful rivalry between the superpowers, ideological systems.

"We cannot change the United States and the United States cannot change us," he said.

Voronkov strongly stressed the connection between Soviet foreign policy and the reform process inside Soviet society.

"If the policy of military confrontation continued, the internal reform process would proceed more slowly. But it will not be abandoned," Voronkov said.

He also said the Reykjavik summit showed that it is possible to hold fruitful talks even with the Reagan administration in the United States. But the Soviet Union wants to work together with all conceivable forces in Japan and Western Europe which want to cooperate so "we can all survive," as he put it.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PROGRESS IN GENEVA ARMS TALKS SEEN AIDING NORDIC ZONE PROSPECTS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 May 87 p 2

[Op Ed Article by Kari Mottola: "Nordic Zone Proposal May Advance Step by Step"]

[Text] The Nordic countries together are beginning to clarify "the prospects of a nuclear-free zone in the North as part of an effort to achieve arms reduction and disarmament in Europe."

The foreign ministers of five countries have agreed on tasks for the official work group which will hold its first meeting this month in Helsinki. By then 24 years will have passed from the time when President Urho Kekkonen first proposed the idea.

Three members of the Western military alliance: Iceland, Norway and Denmark, are taking their first steps with the two unaligned countries, Sweden and Finland, in the work which concerns the focal point of NATO's common defense strategy.

The use of nuclear weapons by US as a deterrent against the USSR is also the ultimate guarantee of security for the NATO members on the northern wing of Europe.

The US and the USSR are simultaneously starting the final lap of the negotiations to remove middle-range nuclear weapons from Europe. This is also tied with the destruction of shorter range missiles. An offer by the USSR to remove all other nuclear weapons from the old continent is also on the table.

Taken to their ultimate conclusion this chain of events will change the internal relations of the military alliances and NATO's defense strategies more than any other factor since the creation of the present arrangement in Europe. At the same time it will profoundly test the confidence of the military relationship between US and its western European allies.

The Nordic zone joint effort is getting under way at the same time when European security arrangements are undergoing profound changes. This connection has a greater significance for furthering the enterprise than the tug-of-war over details taking place inside the zone.

On the surface external conditions are favorable. They appear to be building bridges between those divergent views which the non-aligned Nordic and NATO countries have about the preconditions for the establishment of the zone.

Norway and Denmark stress that embarking on a new security policy base should occur at the same rate and following the same model as the broader European thaw, which would restrict the number and role of nuclear weapons and strive for balance in conventional arms between East and West.

Concrete military concessions should be obtained from the USSR in return for Norway and Denmark giving up the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons and transferring the defense of NATO's northern wing to dependence on conventional weapons.

According to Swedish and Finnish policy the Nordic nuclear free zone would strengthen the security of the area, even as an independent solution for which recognition would be obtained from the nuclear nations.

In the agreement outlined between the great powers the USSR would give up its medium-range SS-20 missiles, which could also be directed to the Nordic countries, and the shorter range SS-22 and SS-23 missiles, which also have been situated within reach of these countries.

The US would give up its terrestrially launched cruise missiles whose trajectories have been projected over areas that include Sweden and Finland.

Is the middle-range missile solution then a start toward a nuclear free existence in Europe and will it pave the way in NATO defense strategy for a long farewell to nuclear arms? In that case it would clear a way to a nuclear free zone for the Nordic NATO countries.

The agitated discussion in the West and the atmosphere created by it point to a opposite influence.

NATO will reach an agreement with the USSR on the medium-range missiles only on the condition that the train stops at this station. Regrets about more far-reaching nuclear disarmament have to be prevented and the ranks pulled together. Internal solidarity of the league is elevated to the status of a central obligation for its members.

Nuclear weapons will remain an integral part of the West's defense strategy at least until a balance satisfactory to the West has been reached in the area of conventional weapons. This means a disarmament solution in which the arms reduction on the part of the USSR would be greater than that of the West or additional arms build-up on part of the West, which supposedly would close the gap. Both are at best distant possibilities.

Tactical nuclear weapons are associated on both sides with conventional armed forces units in the "theater of battle." The nuclear weapons of the US air and sea forces, such as the F-111 fighter bombers and the rapidly increasing cruise missiles, remain as central elements of military strength in thinking about security guarantees given to Western Europe.

The seas surrounding the Nordic countries are the new focal point for the placement and movement of these nuclear weapons.

Norway and Denmark wish to continue basing their military security on the umbrella provided by NATO and, in practice, primarily by the US. The transition taking place in Europe does not yet signify such a structural change, that these auxiliary forces could also be given the nuclear-free option in the choice of weapons should things come to a head.

Although the need to place nuclear weapons, for example in Norway, even in a war or a crisis situation is unrealistic, the question is of political principles, the strategic unity of the league and of common responsibility.

New perspectives in Europe, however, increase the arm-wrestling between schools of thought and lead to an accelerating battle over souls. They are rightfully giving new emphasis, also in Norway and Denmark, for thinking according to which advancement in the matter of the Nordic zone can be more rapid than elsewhere in Europe and the solutions can be reached independently.

In favor of Nordic activism is the decision made at the end of March at the foreign ministers' meeting in Reykjavik to merely study the conditions for such a zone and not to act toward its realization.

Study, analysis and discussion has been approved in all Nordic countries as a proper and important approach to the zone question. Zone studies do not change power relations or undercut negotiation trumps and thus do not disrupt the great power arrangements.

But the Reykjavik decision will activate more than just a task force of officials, whose work is expected to take couple of years.

According to the rules, the foreign ministers meeting twice a year may take the advancing study as mere information, but they can also give it additional impetus or draw conclusions. The activities of parliamentarians and civic organizations are adding fuel to the political debate from aside.

After the completion of the study, at the latest, the Nordic countries will be forced to decide on the next step in a situation, in which the disarming of the middle-range weapons is at best only beginning to get under way.

The zone proposal is finally the only original offering by the Nordic countries for the new political alignment of Europe, although they may influence arms reduction and disarmament, in the spirit of the Reykjavik decision, at public forums, such as the conference for European security and cooperation.

The zone proposal, along with related questions, is a device by the Nordic countries to put forward their points of view in nuclear politics and to reject such formulations that nuclear restrictions elsewhere would increase the pressure for placement of nuclear weapons in the North, or that the North would be left behind.

Most room for maneuverability for the Nordic countries is provided by the fact that the nuclear free zone could be realized in stages, just like the disarmament between the great powers.

Intermediary phases and less binding forms are also available, such as a joint announcement, as a preamble to the actual agreement, or trust-increasing activities.

They offer possibilities for work for those wanting to take a more active line without placing the Nordic countries in difficulties over the common defense strategies of the military alliance or by being drawn into the competition between the great powers.

Political activism is determined by the value we wish to accord to the political cooperation by the Nordic countries in matters of common security.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

NORDIC PARLIAMENTARIANS SUBMIT NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE REPORT

PM091551 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Jun 87 p 12

[Christian Palme dispatch: "Thin Final Report on Nuclear-Free Zone"]

[Text] Copenhagen — There is not much left of the intended nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area after a year's work by a committee of Nordic parliamentarians. Only land areas and the 12 nautical miles of territorial waters should be contained in the zone, the parliamentarians say.

Yesterday parliamentary deputies from 12 parties in the Nordic countries put their signatures to the thin final report on the Nordic area as a nuclear-free zone. The report has been consciously drafted in the vaguest possible terms to achieve agreement within the committee, which includes several nonsocialist parties. However, the committee did not include any nonsocialist parties from Norway or Denmark (apart from some observers), and from Sweden's nonsocialist bloc only the Center Party was involved.

The zone outlined in the Nordic parliamentarians' document embraces the land areas of Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden, including the self-governing areas of Greenland, the Faeroes, and Aland. The zone should also include the 12 miles of territorial waters but not affect the right of passage, recognized in international law, through Oresund and the Great and Little Belts, for example. If the zone is set up, the superpowers will therefore be able simply to continue moving nuclear-armed ships and submarines in and out of the Baltic.

The parliamentarians write that the zone should be guaranteed by the nuclear powers which have deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. These powers must pledge not to threaten or question

the zone's status. But it is not necessary for all nuclear powers to approve the zone.

"We write 'should guarantee' in order not to give France a veto in a situation where the United States and the Soviet Union accept the zone," Sture Eriksson, the Swedish Social Democrats' representative on the committee, said.

The areas around the Nordic area and the Baltic itself are termed "attenuation zones." Thus, the Nordic parliamentarians are demanding not that the attenuation zones be made nuclear-free immediately upon the establishment of the zone, but that this be the long-term goal of future work.

"Attenuation is the zone's most important goal. Sweden has a very concrete interest in the reduction of nuclear weapons in the Baltic," said Par Granstedt, the Swedish Center Party's representative on the committee.

At the Nordic foreign ministers' meeting in Iceland in March, a committee of civil servants was set up to work on the zone issue. As yet, it has scarcely begun its work and the parliamentarians see themselves as a "pressure group" aimed to get the civil servants to work faster, Danish Social Democrat Anker Jorgensen, who was the committee chairman, said.

An important obstacle to the establishment of the Nordic nuclear-free zone is the opposition of the United States and NATO. Both Norway and Denmark are members of NATO and dependent on reinforcements from the United States to sustain their defenses.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

IZVESTIYA ON PARLIAMENTARY TALKS TO ESTABLISH NORDIC NFZ

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 5 Jun 87 pp 1-2

[A. Sychev article: "A Step Toward a Nuclear-Free Zone"]

[Text] Stockholm. (IZVESTIA's staff correspondent.) At a meeting held in Copenhagen a commission of Parliamentarians of the Nordic countries on establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the area approved the final report.

According to this document, the denuclearized north of Europe is to embrace Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Denmark's Greenland and Faeroes Islands, and Finland's Aland Islands. It is also proposed that the 12-mile national territorial waters be included in the zone. However, in keeping with the international agreements, warships carrying nuclear weapons should be allowed to pass freely into the Baltic Sea through the Oresund and Great and Little Belt straits without the right to call at the ports of the states participating in the zone. Flights of nuclear-capable aircraft are prohibited.

According to the document, the North-European countries should assume an obligation not to deploy, not to possess, not to test and not to produce nuclear weapons and not to train the armed forces personnel to use them. The states whose nuclear weapons are stationed in Western Europe should guarantee the inviolability of the zone. To control the observance of the zone's status it is planned to establish a special commission, with international organizations also having a chance of participating in its work.

Furthermore, the document contains proposals to set up areas of reduced military presence in the Baltic Sea and in close proximity to the zone.

As distinct from what had been presumed earlier, the Parliamentary commission decided not to stop its work after finalizing the report. The matter is that a commission of experts of the foreign-policy departments was formed at the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Nordic countries held in Iceland in March 1987. This commission started preparing its own report on the nuclear-free zone issue.

The preparation and publication of the report is certainly a new important move to implement the idea of a nuclear-free zone which is backed by a sweeping majority of the North Europeans. But, despite the support of broad

public and state quarters, the resolution of this issue is still encountering major difficulties. The newspaper DAGENS NYHETER writes:

"The counteraction by the USA and NATO is the crucial obstacle to the establishment of a denuclearized zone."

(IZVESTIA, 4 June. Abridged.)

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET GENERAL ON CYPRUS' ROLE IN NUCLEAR-FREE MEDITERRANEAN

NC201504 Nicosia O FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 20 Jun 87 p 1

[Part four of dispatch from Moscow by Khristakis Katsambas, chief editor]

[Excerpt] Cyprus' demilitarization is an objective that can be encompassed within the overall effort to make the Mediterranean Sea a nuclear-free lake of peace. This broader goal can be approached through efforts toward understanding between the two superpowers, and, by extension, between the East and West, and Soviet military leadership is optimistic in this regard.

These general conclusions arose from my lengthy conversation last Monday [15 June] in Moscow with Colonel Yuriy Lebedev, deputy director of a department of the General Staff of the Soviet Defense Ministry, and Colonel Vasilii Morozov, military adviser to APN.

When Col Lebedev spoke of his country's belief that the Mediterranean must be free of nuclear weapons and noted that the Soviet Union would not strike areas free of such weapons, I asked for his comments on repeated claims that nuclear weapons are being stored on the British bases in Cyprus.

He replied: We know of such claims. Even if such weapons are not on the British bases at this very moment, they could be deployed there at any time.

He added: Bearing in mind that the Cypriot leadership alone cannot rid its country of foreign military bases, the question of Cyprus' demilitarization could be handled in cooperation with all Mediterranean countries. We approve of the recent, pertinent declaration issued by the European Neutral and Nonaligned States in Brione concerning ridding the Mediterranean of nuclear weapons.

We are aware of the difficulties of the problem because the powers involved in it are not insignificant. However, peace and security in this region are significant. I tell you emphatically that the solution to the Cyprus issue should take into consideration the legal rights of both communities. We, as the Soviet Union, do not have any selfish interests in Cyprus."

The Soviet official is of the opinion that a Cyprus solution "would be an additional element working for total peace." He said: "Can you imagine how strong such a potential would be? This is what we, the Soviet people,

envision. However, it is not merely a vision; it is the principle guiding all our efforts. We are an external element to the Cyprus issue, but we are trying to promote such a development. We have made our views known to all the interested sides: the United Nations, Greece, Turkey, and even the EEC. It is also understood that we have explained our positions to the Turkish Cypriot community during our contacts with them."

Lebedev continued: "This process is progressing positively, and if there is goodwill on the part of the Western countries, we could see positive results, even this year. There are only a few unresolved problems," he concluded.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA NOTES MUNICIPAL NFZ'S IN WESTERN EUROPE

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 5 Jun 87 pp 1-2

[Valeriy Volkov article: "Good Prospects"]

[Text] The Portuguese city councils which have announced their territories nuclear-weapon-free zones have held their first national meeting in the city of Figueira da Fos. The antiwar forum was attended by about two hundred delegates representing local government agencies, leaders of the movement "No to Nuclear Weapons in Portugal!", activists of doctors', scientists', military and religious workers' organizations campaigning for peace, against the nuclear arms race.

The meeting which was part of the preparations for an all-European conference of the nuclear-free cities and communities scheduled for 1988 has gone beyond the limits of a purely national event and acquired international significance. In their unanimously adopted declaration, the delegates have spoken up for the conversion of the whole territory of Portugal into a nuclear-weapon-free zone, called for still more vigorous efforts against the arms race and the militarization of space, demanded that the material resources allocated for military purposes be rechanneled for peaceful needs and noted the growing responsibility of the local authorities for educational work among the population in favour of peace and universal security. The establishment of nuclear-free zones on the Iberian peninsula, in Northern and Central Europe, in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, noted the delegates and guests at the forum, meets the basic aspirations of all people of the continent.

The participants in the meeting have urged the municipal councils of the European states to coordinate still more closely the efforts by local government authorities in the struggle to eliminate nuclear, chemical and other mass destruction weapons, and have come up in support of the Soviet peace initiatives, including the proposal for eliminating all medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

The course and the results of the meeting, as well as the preparations for the all-European conference of nuclear-free cities and communities in other countries of the continent lead to the conclusion that materialization of the idea of nuclear-free zones is already within reach. It gives all people of good will an opportunity for making a tangible contribution to the cause of reducing the threat of an all-destroying war. Nuclear-free zones in Europe

are meant to pave the way to freeing our part of the world from the dangerous confrontation of mass destruction arsenals. The movement for the nuclear-free status in Europe just as on other continents has real prospects of becoming an effective factor of security not only for the European but for all other nations of the world.

Lisbon

(PRAVDA, 5 June. In full.)

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

IZVESTIYA REPORTS ON NEW ZEALAND LEGISLATION ON ANTI-NUCLEAR POLICY

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 8 Jun 87 pp 1-2

[Article by S. Mushkaterov: "New Zealand: Anti-Nuclear Policy Approved"]

[Text] On Thursday New Zealand's Parliament approved the bill sealing the country's antinuclear policy.

The new Act proclaims a ban on the deployment, testing and storage of nuclear weapons on the country's territory, as well as the calling of nuclear armed and nuclear-powered ships at the country's ports. The same measures are extended to planes crossing New Zealand's air space. Thus, the Labourites, headed by David Russel Lange, have fulfilled their election promise to outlaw nuclear weapons.

However, the Labour government met with difficulties in implementing their promises. The adoption of the bill was preceded not only by the 18-month discussion in the Parliament. The country had to meet with the policy of pressure and blackmail pursued during this period by the United States vis-a-vis New Zealand. It was precisely U.S. naval ships which visited New Zealand's ports most frequently.

The differences between Washington and Wellington reached their climax last September when the United States, backed by Australia, scaled down all joint types of "defence co-operation" with New Zealand.

However, neither these measures, nor Washington's threats to apply economic sanctions changed Wellington's stand. Speaking immediately after the approval of the bill by the Parliament, Prime Minister Lange stated that the government is proud that for the first time during 40 years New Zealand has fundamentally reappraised the security concept.

The decision taken by New Zealand's Parliament triggered off a stormy reaction by the U.S. administration. Speaking at a regular briefing, Charles Redman, a State Department spokesman, said that the new bill was incompatible with the U.S. global policy. He also stressed that New Zealand had lost a special status and influence usually enjoyed by allies.

(IZVESTIA, June 5, In full.)

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CSO: 5200/1533

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRC ENVOY FAVORS ASEAN NFZ, CALLS U.S. BASES 'PROBLEM'

HK021345 Manila THE SUNDAY TIMES in English 31 May 87 pp 1, 6

[By Francis Cevallos]

[Text] The Chinese envoy to the Philippines, Ambassador Chen Songlu, said yesterday the "concrete problem" of peace and security in Asia boiled down to the presence of American military bases in the Philippines.

Chen said China did not approve of foreign bases in the region.

Chen, in a free-wheeling discussion with newsmen on a number of subjects, said the matter of U.S. bases here was "an internal domestic question addressed to the Filipinos themselves."

He said the People's Republic of China had no intention to interfere with the purely domestic affairs of the country.

"Our fundamental policy is preserving the peace, fighting hegemony, fighting aggression in the Third World, and establishing international friendship," he said.

All throughout the two hours of talks, Chen, who has been in Manila for three years, never mentioned the United States by name.

He restated his country's position on the communist insurgency problem here, which he said was "non-interference with a purely domestic problem."

He said his country did not intend to export its "brand of socialism" nor support communist rebellions in foreign countries. The Philippines and China established diplomatic relations with each other in 1975.

China, Chen said, had signed the Treaty of Raratonga which prohibits the manufacture, use and testing of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear wastes in the South Pacific.

He also said China was in favor of a declaration among ASEAN nations making the region a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFRAN)."

The main thrust of China's foreign policy towards the Philippines is to engage in trade and improve cultural and friendly relations, he said. He said he was happy to note "good relations continue to improve and grow under President Aquino."

Chen said China wished to help the Philippines in whatever way it could economically, pointing out for example to the growth of trade relations between his country and the Philippines.

Last year, he said, China and the Philippines had a total trade of about \$230 million, with the trade surplus in China's favor.

To reduce the trade gap, he said, "We (China) had to buy more goods from the Philippines other than the traditional commodities."

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CSO: 5200/4011

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MANILA'S LAUREL ON CONTRACTS WITH NON-ASEAN NATIONS

Indochina, Burma Participation Sought

BK211127 Hong Kong AFP in English 1111 GMT 21 Jun 87

[Text] Manila, 21 June (AFP)--The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has opened contacts with Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma on a proposed nuclear-free zone in the region, Philippine Vice President Salvador Laurel said here Sunday.

Mr Laurel also said "Japan may take a more active role in the defense strategy of the Pacific basin" if a treaty on the zone failed to materialize, but he did not elaborate.

Speaking at a news conference on his return from last week's ASEAN meeting in Singapore, he said "contacts are going on and feelers are being sent" to Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma on the nuclear-free zone proposal aired at the talks.

Mr Laurel, who is also foreign minister, said a nuclear-free zone treaty would not be effective without the signatures of the four non-ASEAN countries, since the Soviet Union would be able to continue using Vietnamese facilities in Cam Ranh Bay and Danang.

He said a previous agreement on the creation of a zone of freedom, peace and neutrality in the region got bogged down on the question of "mechanics," reflecting the need for the participation of the four countries.

Mr Laurel said U.S. opposition to the nuclear-free zone proposal by Indonesia and Malaysia at talks between ASEAN and its dialogue partners did "not mean the ASEAN will be influenced."

U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz said in Singapore he felt nuclear-free zones would weaken the U.S. nuclear deterrent, which he said had so far succeeded in maintaining world peace.

Mr Laurel said ASEAN--Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand--had decided at the Singapore Ministerial Meeting to invite Japan's next prime minister to the ASEAN summit in Manila in December.

Present Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone is expected to step down by October.

Editorial Doubts Unity of Views

HK231136 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 23 Jun 87 p 6

[Editorial: "Nuke Ban Issue"]

[Text] Vice President and Foreign Secretary Salvador H. Laurel, fresh from the ASEAN ministerial conference in Singapore, has defined the crux of the "nuclear-free zone" issue before the regional organization. He said that, besides that ASEAN member nations, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam must sign a treaty providing for the designation of Southeast Asia as a "nuclear-free zone."

What Mr Laurel left unsaid is that there is no visible way of making the four countries come around to thinking of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Burma appears well content with its hermit-like existence, oblivious to problems of war and peace in the outside world. Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, which evidently is intent on maintaining its military bases in Vietnam.

There is no way of going around the fact that it is in the interest of the USSR and its client states for ASEAN to undertake a unilateral banning of nuclear weapons. Our impression is that Mr Laurel would not subscribe to such unilateral renunciation.

In the meantime, President Aquino is under "pressure" from so-called "cause-oriented groups" to implement what is claimed to be an absolute and sweeping ban on nuclear weapons in the Philippine Constitution. What is little known is that the Constitutional Commission adopted a resolution clearly vesting the President with the discretion to determine exceptions to the policy of "freedom from nuclear weapons."

It is an unmitigated disservice to President Aquino and the government that almost all of the members of the Constitutional Commission, who had a direct hand in the passage of that resolution, have kept quiet, possibly for fear of the "parliament of the street."

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CSO: 5200/4313

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

SEMIPALANTINSK MILITARY TEST--[No dateline as received]--An underground nuclear explosion of 20 to 150 kilotonnes was carried out on 20 June 1987 at 0500 Moscow time [0100 GMT] in the Soviet Union at a testing ground in the area of Semipalatinsk. The above test was carried out with the purpose of improving [sovershensvovaniye] military technology. [Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0205 GMT 20 Jun 87 LD] /12913

NEVADA TEST 20 JUNE--Washington 20 June TASS--Today the United States staged another underground nuclear weapons test at the Nevada proving ground. A spokesman of the U.S. Department of Energy said that the explosion yield was less than 20 kilotons. The AP agency points out that this is the eighth officially declared nuclear explosion carried out by the USA this year. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1933 GMT 20 Jun 87 LD] /12913

TEST ON MURUROA--Canberra 22 June TASS--France today conducted its fourth underground nuclear explosion on Mururoa Atoll this year. The blast, the seismological board of New Zealand reported, had a yield of 15 kilotons. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0658 GMT 22 Jun 87 LD] /12913

CSO: 5200/1551

USSR: FURTHER ON WARSAW PACT BERLIN INITIATIVES

Army Paper Editorial

PM091815 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jun 87 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Guarantor Of Lasting Security"]

[Text] Two events last week attracted the attention of the world public. They were CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's official friendly visit to Romania and the Berlin conference of the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee. In Bucharest and in Berlin there was further striking confirmation of the fundamental interests and goals of the socialist community states which are united by ties of broad, multifaceted cooperation and are successfully coordinating their actions in international affairs.

The objective need to bring the socialist countries closer and closer together stems from the very essence of socialism. The sense of community increases the fraternal states' efforts in socialist building and helps to safeguard their reliable security. This is particularly important at a time when the world situation is very serious and complex. The arms race continues, as does the accumulation of new types of nuclear weapons, and conflict situations and tension in various parts of the world are persisting and intensifying; manifestations of the imperialist policy of force and threat of force and interference in other states' internal affairs are continuing, the world economic situation is deteriorating, and the gulf between the developing and developed countries is constantly deepening.

In the present international situation, the Soviet-Romanian joint communique noted, in which we are concerned with mankind's very survival, special significance attaches to concerted, purposeful actions by the states of the Warsaw Pact which is an effective factor in the struggle to preserve and strengthen peace in Europe and throughout the world.

The Berlin conference of the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee was a convincing example of such actions dictated by supreme responsibility for the fate of the world.

At its 4 June session the CPSU Central Committee Politburo approved the work done at the Berlin conference of the Political Consultative Committee by the Soviet delegation headed by M.S. Gorbachev. It expressed a high opinion of and supported the document on the Warsaw Pact countries' military doctrine which clearly expresses the defensive nature of socialism's military strategy and contributes to the development of dialogue between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO and to confidence building in Europe.

In the GDR capital the idea was clearly expressed that states' increasing interdependence, scientific and technical progress, and the creation of weapons of unprecedented destructive power demand the abandonment of the fallacious concept of "nuclear deterrence." There can be no winners in a nuclear war. The participants in the Berlin conference of the Political Consultative Committee reaffirmed their belief that the cardinal task is the prevention of war, the removal of it from the life of mankind for all time, the preservation of world peace, the cessation of the arms race, and the transition to specific disarmament measures, above all nuclear, geared to complete and general disarmament.

The Berlin conference participants unanimously stated the emergence of a real possibility of the immediate implementation of practical steps in nuclear disarmament to halt mankind's slide toward nuclear catastrophe.

Proceeding on the basis of the need to rid mankind of war once and for all, halt the arms race, rule out the use of military force, strengthen peace and security, and implement complete and general disarmament, the Warsaw Pact states adopted in Berlin an important document which clearly and unequivocally says that the fraternal states' military doctrine is defensive in nature and is based on the need to keep military forces balanced at the lowest possible level. The Warsaw Pact states will never, under any circumstances, commence hostilities against any state or alliance of states whatsoever, unless they come under armed attack themselves. They will never use nuclear weapons first. They are not making any territorial claims on any state inside Europe or outside Europe. They do not regard any state or any people as their enemy. On the contrary, they are prepared to develop relations with all countries in the world on the basis of mutual consideration of the interests of security and peaceful coexistence.

To remove the years of mutual suspicion and distrust, obtain a better understanding of one another's intentions, and ensure the military concepts and doctrines of the military blocs and their participants are based on defensive principles, the Warsaw Pact states made a proposal to the states of the North Atlantic Alliance on holding consultations to compare the two alliances' military doctrines, analyze their character, and jointly examine the directions of their future evolution. The consultations, which the fraternal countries are prepared to hold in 1987, might also address the imbalance and asymmetry in certain types of armaments and armed forces and look for ways of eliminating them on the basis of a reduction by the one who is in the lead, on the understanding that such reductions will lead to the establishment of increasingly lower levels.

The Warsaw Pact states see it as their paramount duty to their peoples to reliably safeguard their security. The allied socialist states are not aiming for greater security than other countries, neither will they accept less security. The allied states' armed forces are being maintained at a combat readiness sufficient to prevent be taken unawares; but if they are nevertheless attacked they will deliver a crushing rebuff to the aggressor.

The Berlin conference of the Political Consultative Committee fully confirmed the correctness of the fraternal parties' and states' general political line and the effectiveness of the coordination of their efforts in the international arena. In Berlin, the leaders of the allied socialist states once again expressed their resolute will to strengthen the Warsaw Pact which is the guarantor of the peoples' lasting security.

PRAVDA Editorial

PM081037 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jun 87 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Socialism's Peaceful Strategy. Paving the Way to a Nuclear-Free World"]

[Text] The specter of a deadly nuclear conflagration cannot fail to concern millions of people on the planet. They see opponents of security and the peoples' cooperation are not abandoning their black schemes. The demand of the times is to make the course of world events take a turn for the better. The socialist community countries are acting in the spirit of this demand.

The important constructive proposals advanced by the Warsaw Pact states at the Political Consultative Committee conference in Berlin have attracted great attention everywhere. The world has received further graphic confirmation that the socialist countries, by virtue of the very nature of the new social system, have not linked and do not link their future to the military resolution of international problems. The Political Consultative Committee conference's unanimous adoption of the document on the Warsaw Pact states' military doctrine is of fundamental significance.

These words resounded over the world like an oath:

"The Warsaw Pact states will never, under any circumstances, begin military actions against any state or alliance of states unless they themselves are the target of an armed attack.

"They will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.

"They have no territorial claims on any state either in Europe or outside Europe.

"They do not regard any state or people as their enemy; on the contrary, they are ready to build relations with all countries of the world without exception on the basis of mutual regard for the interests of security and peaceful coexistence."

The document on the Warsaw Pact countries' military doctrine convincingly expresses the defensive nature of socialism's military strategy. The very essence of the doctrine expresses the new political thinking which the USSR and the other fraternal countries of socialism are so persistently introducing into the fabric of international relations.

The Warsaw Pact states reject the concept of "nuclear deterrence" advanced by imperialism's aggressive circles as false, dangerous, and immoral. Nuclear weapons cannot guarantee security. On the contrary, the more there are of them in countries' arsenals, the less is their security. Human reason demands states cast off nuclear chains on the eve of the new millennium. The Soviet program for a nuclear-free world opens up real prospects of achieving this aim.

The Political Consultative Committee conference in the GDR capital advanced a detailed, realistic program for purging the most sensitive region of the planet -- Europe -- of nuclear weapons.

The Warsaw Pact countries call for an agreement on the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe to be concluded without delay on the basis of the accord in principle reached in Reykjavik; for the simultaneous elimination of Soviet and U.S. operational and tactical missiles in Europe and the resolution of the question of tactical nuclear means in Europe, including tactical missiles; for agreement on the radical reduction of strategic offensive arms with simultaneous strengthening of the ABM Treaty setup; for an accord to be reached on such a priority measure as a total nuclear test ban.

The problem of the militarization of space remains acute. The fraternal countries' position is clear: Weapons must not appear in space, the ABM Treaty must be strictly observed, and space must be used for peaceful purposes alone.

The Berlin conference participants vividly demonstrated their political good will. Seeking to remove the mutual suspicion and mistrust which have accumulated over the years and to achieve better understanding of each other's intentions, they proposed to the North Atlantic Alliance states the holding of consultations for the purpose of comparing the two alliances' military doctrines. The imbalances and asymmetries in individual kinds of arms and armed forces conditioned by historical, geographical, and other factors and the search for ways to eliminate them on the basis of a reduction on the side which is ahead, achieving lower and lower levels, could also be the subject of consultations.

The socialist countries are ardent champions of creating on the planet a climate of trust, mutual respect, and friendship among the peoples. They are full of determination actively to promote the elimination of hotbeds of tension and the just political settlement of regional conflicts, in whatever part of the world they arise.

Taken together, the proposals of the Berlin Political Consultative Committee conference lay a solid foundation for elaborating the "key provisions" of Soviet-U.S. agreements which could become the subject of a top-level Soviet-U.S. accord and the basis for preparing legally binding Soviet-U.S. agreements.

The socialist states' initiatives are having an increasing positive impact on the atmosphere of international relations. However, it has, regrettably, to be stated that the West is being unjustifiably slow in responding to these initiatives aimed at solving problems of concern to the European peoples.

The Berlin conference once again demonstrated the fraternal countries' unity in their approach to international events and the tasks which they have to resolve together. Practical new measures aimed at improving the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact states' foreign policy cooperation, mutual information, consultations, and other forms of their interaction were outlined.

Having discussed the results of the Political Consultative Committee conference, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo approved the work done there by the Soviet delegation headed by M.S. Gorbachev.

The socialist countries are aware that the successful realization of their mission of preserving and strengthening world peace largely depends on their unity. The communist and workers parties, whose interaction is the soul of the fraternal countries' political cooperation, are purposefully striving to strengthen our peoples' friendship and comradely cooperation.

M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Romania, which marked a new stage in the development of Soviet-Romanian relations, was a significant event. The visit reflected the feelings of friendship and fraternal solidarity linking the CPSU and the RCP and the peoples of the USSR and Romania, made it possible to define ways to further develop the entire range of Soviet-Romanian ties and cooperation -- in the political, economic, cultural, and scientific, and other spheres -- and showed the determination of the two fraternal countries to cooperate actively in the struggle to strengthen peace and the peoples' security.

The situation which has taken shape in the modern world throws down a real challenge to governments, to political parties, and, what is more, to every person, reminding them of their responsibility for preserving peace. Life attests that the course being implemented by the Soviet Union and all the socialist community countries meets the demands of our complex but very promising epoch.

NATO in 'Disarray'

LD052247 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 5 Jun 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video interview with Yuriy Kashlev, head of the Soviet delegation at Vienna follow-up meeting, by unidentified station correspondent, in Vienna on 5 June -- live or recorded]

[Text] At the plenary session of the all-European meeting in Vienna, Comrade Kashlev head of the USSR delegation, spoke today. He called on Western participants to get on with it and give up their tactic of dragging their feet over agreeing possible accords. Interviewed by our correspondent, Comrade Kashlev said, among other things [Video: Brief shot of meeting in session, then interview with Kashlev standing in room or foyer as other officials move about informally in background]

[Kashlev] The situation here is a mixed one. On the one hand there is a very strong sense of the influence of the Soviet Union's foreign policy initiatives; we have, for instance, the recent Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, and here at the Vienna meeting itself the socialist countries have submitted more than 10 proposals on matters concerning military security. On the other hand there is a kind of disarray, of confusion, which evidently derives from the position common to the NATO countries which are quite unable to determine fitting responses to our initiatives. Yet here, at least, at the Vienna meeting itself, the Western participants have not submitted a single proposal on military security. They are trying to sidestep this subject, to pass over it in silence, and thereby cut short the all-European process.

Alongside the all-European meeting there are consultations taking place here too among the 23 countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on conventional weapons and armed forces. Here too, the situation is not what one might call even. We have long since set out our ideas about the mandate: We are pushing for truly radical and real reductions in armed forces, in conventional weapons, and in tactical nuclear weapons. But the Western countries are as yet avoiding giving a response. All the same, we are continuing the struggle, for ours is, so to speak, a just cause.

Mongolian Government in Favor

PM111301 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jun 87 First Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Mongolian Government Statement"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 7 Jun -- People in Mongolia have greeted with approval the results of the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee conference held in Berlin, a Mongolian Government statement reads. The military doctrine adopted by the fraternal socialist countries, which is of a defensive nature, was a graphic manifestation of their peace-loving course. It fully serves the aims of the prevention of war and the nonuse of force in interstate relations.

The large-scale initiatives of the conference participants, the statement emphasizes, enrich with new practical aspects the proposals which they advanced earlier of ending the arms race and of disarmament. The elimination of Soviet and American medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe opens up the real possibility of freeing the world from nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

The Mongolian Government again voices full support for the Warsaw Pact states' constructive policy of promoting the speediest political settlement of crisis situations in Asia and other parts of the planet.

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CSO: 5200/1526

FRG PAPER ANALYZES SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENT

DW141011 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 12 Jun 87 p 4

[Christoph Bertram article: "After the Missiles, the Tanks?"]

[Excerpt] Moscow in June — [Passage omitted] Most western countries are audibly demanding that disarmament not be confined to nuclear weapons, while at the same time they are unsure as to who should take part in negotiations: only NATO and Warsaw Pact members, as the United States insists, or all CSCE countries, as France insists? A Gorbachev aide comments pointedly: "First, you suggested the zero option for longer range intermediate-range weapons, and when we agreed you became terribly excited about the imbalance of short-range weapons, until we finally said: Ok, we are ready to remove them as well. Now you are constantly talking about the necessity of conventional weapons control. Do you really know what you want?"

Experts admit frankly that the Kremlin also does not exactly know what it wants. However, the Soviet leadership has given a number of signals. In East Berlin in the spring of 1986, Gorbachev announced "a significant reduction of ground and tactical air forces in all of Europe — from the Atlantic to the Urals." At the same time, "the operational-tactical nuclear weapons" (meaning short-range nuclear weapons with a range of less than 500 km) have to be reduced, he said. In Budapest last year, the Warsaw Pact members laid down a plan that envisages a reduction in both alliances' armed forces by 100,000-150,000 troops in the next 1 or 2 years, and subsequently even by 25%; in other words, equal reductions on both sides. In Prague in April this year, the Soviet party leader indirectly referred to western criticism that the Warsaw Pact is superior to the West in many areas, stating: "The USSR advocated the elimination of any elements of imbalance or asymmetry in armaments if it really exists — however, not in a way that the side that is at a disadvantage catches up, but the side that has a lead reduces its weapons."

At the Warsaw Pact summit in East Berlin several weeks ago, the East presented a comprehensive document that combines previous suggestions, and in addition — this is new in the history of disarmament — offers talks not only on troop reduction but also on the two military groupings' doctrines. The document reads almost like a NATO communique: "The Warsaw Pact member countries state again that their military doctrine is of a defensive nature. It proceeds from the necessity to keep the

balance...at the lowest possible level, and considers it expedient to reduce the military capabilities to an level necessary for defense. "A declaration on the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member countries" mentions as a basic objective the "reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe to a level that allows each side to guarantee its own defense, but does not allow them to have weapons for a surprise attack on the respective other side or and offensive operation in general." Of course, the debate in the Soviet Union is still continuing. Should conventional and nuclear weapons be negotiated in a package or separately? According to official statements, both belong together because the delivery weapons — missiles, guns, aircraft — are able to fire nuclear and conventional (and chemical) ammunition. But such a linkage is not absolutely necessary. A high-level official says that it would also be possible to ban all nuclear warheads in Europe in a separate move.

Understandably, the Soviets refuse to see that they are conventionally superior. A military officer says briefly that on the whole there is conventional parity, and the West must recognize that. There are at best some "asymmetries" in specific areas. Asked what asymmetries the Russians want to eliminate, they do not see the beam in their own eye, but point out the mote in NATO's eye — the U.S. Navy in European waters. One military official even mentions NATO's alleged superiority in antitank weapons. Asymmetry to the Russians is what the other side has.

Another unsolved problem also is of crucial importance; should the objective of the negotiations only be a new quantity — fewer troops and units on each side — or should it also be a new quality of security — with each side having only the option of defense, not of attack? It is true, there are connecting elements between quantitative and qualitative reductions. A high-ranking military official explains it patiently: "If our Armed Forces were to be reduced by 25% we would also have to change our military structure." But the most important prerequisite for successful negotiations is a clear idea of the objective. If it only consisted of the fact that arsenals in east and west are reduced to an equal level the strategic option [præmie] of surprise — and counterattack could be increasing instead of decreasing. That would indeed be no advantage for Europe.

A Central Committee official stresses that "the Berlin statement is aimed at ruling out an attack. We are ready to make such a

move." But in the East the "military doctrine" of the politicians and the operational task doctrine of the armed forces are highly contradictory — more than they are in the West. What the Warsaw Pact has said in Berlin is a statement of political intentions, not their translation into military practice. As before, the objective of the Soviet military apparatus in the event of an attack is to destroy the attacker on his own territory with quick comprehensive counterattacks. That is why it has those large armored armies for large-scale breakthrough, the air forces for superiority in the air, and the planned action of units in the enemy's rear country. The Red Army's operational doctrine just is not defensive.

The trauma of 1941, the destruction of the country by an attacker, lives on in military planning. The capacity to defeat an enemy, if necessary, still is to most Soviet military men the best defense, even 22 years after the end of the war and the beginning of the nuclear age. A scientist says that "in many military periodicals high-ranking generals publish historical reflections on World war II, dealing with the successful Soviet offensive tactics. And in a short passage at the end of such article it usually says that what was true at that time still is true today."

To what extent the Soviet Union is in a position seriously to abandon that operational doctrine, ultimately will be decisive for the prospects of arms control in Europe. As long as it is valid, military planning in the West will be marked by fear of a surprise attack, arms control will be confined to the cautious lowering of arms levels, and the reduction of military options of attack will be postponed. It is an encouraging impression of talks in Moscow that practical and scientific experts agree on that assessment of the problem. It is a disquieting impression, however, that everybody, in particular the practical experts, are aware that putting that realization into practice will be a long and difficult process.

Valentin Falin, head of the *Novosti* news agency and former ambassador to Bonn, is pessimistic, as usual. "We are ready to change our operational doctrine if we have the material guarantee that a conventional attack against us is not possible." In other words, NATO with its defensive structure first has to make concessions to the Soviet Union before Moscow would agree to change. The argument that the lack of men and money would force the West to reduce its troops considerably in the foreseeable future mostly falls on deaf ears. In Falin's view, "Britain has lived beyond its means since 1918. The United States and the Federal Republic can continue to do so in the next 25 years."

The scientists, on the other hand, who are not burdened by military responsibility argue as if the change of thought were already reality. One of them says that the blind belief in tanks is even declining among the Soviet military. He says that one of the most recent studies proves that the outcome of the battle of Kursk in July 1943, which has been so important for the Soviet military doctrine was decisively determined by antitank forces, and not by armored troops, as has been claimed in the past; the author is an active-duty military officer. Other scientists are trying to compile criteria for concepts such as "adequate defensive power" or "predictability in the nuclear age."

They are pondering over the problem whether unilateral measures such as the removal of bridge building gear from the units

in central Europe could contribute to creating confidence; or the problem in what way the interests of a regular soldier could best be safeguarded in the event of the demobilization of a large part of the armed forces. One scientist says quite frankly that the Soviet Union should prepare itself mentally for the possibility that its troops will eventually not be deployed in Eastern Europe any more. Others toy with the idea of changing the Red Army's conventional doctrine of offensive defense totally to defense. If history and the lessons of Clausewitz had been heeded, that would also in the past have been a better doctrine for the Soviet Union. By the way, several Soviet strategists in the twenties had said that doctrine should be followed. And how about the trauma of 1941? The cool reply is that the Red Army also was unable to prevent the German attack with its offensive doctrine.

No one knows whether those are just ideas or indications of a more far-reaching revision of Soviet security policy. Officially, the old analysis of threat continues to apply. Obviously, the scientists capitalize on the fact that the political leadership with its vision of a nuclear-free world has challenged them to think about the conditions of conventional incapacity to attack which alone would make the renunciation of nuclear weapons possible. Occasionally, in talks with officials, that also seems to be the most important argument for the various signals for conventional disarmament. Some politicians and soldiers in Moscow consider the by-product of the denuclearization of Europe more important than the taming of the shrew conventional armament.

In addition, no one can explain convincingly why the difficulties which for so many years have blocked the Vienna MBFR talks — today they are mocked at as a shame and a bad joke — should suddenly not exist anymore now that new negotiations have been suggested that the Russians would prefer to be held between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The answer often is that nothing is impossible if there is the proper "political will." A young scientist explains the new Soviet openness to details in this way: "Perhaps we are less interested in the details since we have realized that political will is decisive."

Thus credibility gaps remain, and it is understandable that diplomatic observers in Moscow demonstrate skepticism. Shrugging, one of them says: "The Russians are just good actors." It may be that with their demonstrative interest in conventional disarmament they only want to cut a good figure, just like Moscow drivers who do not fasten their seat belts but only put them on loosely, so as to deceive the traffic police.

But once before — regarding the zero option — the West believed too long that the Soviet signals were nothing but empty talk. There are two important reasons for us to take the Moscow debate seriously — if not in every respect, at least the ultimate goal.

The first reason lies in the Soviet Union itself. The military apparatus is a severe strain on its weak economy. We can only speculate on how weak it really is. In this huge developing country, statistics reflect reality but incompletely. Some western observers estimate the Soviet citizens' per capital income to be not much higher than in a South American banana republic. Regarding defense expenditures, some western countries may live beyond their means, but the Soviet Union does so more than

anyone else. If Mikhail Gorbachev wants to remedy that situation he will have to reduce conventional armament — best of all, through agreed troop reductions. In the meantime, advisers close to the General Secretary are recommending moves of unilateral restraint — for example, in connection with the forthcoming modernization of Soviet armor. In their Berlin statement the Warsaw Pact countries have bound themselves to “exercise utmost restraint regarding the development of their military capabilities.” Even though the Russians are not up to the neck in water, they have to curb conventional armament if they ever want to regain solid ground.

The second reason why the West should not sweep the signals from the East under the rug is that it would not be in our interest. The Kremlin's signals in many respects correspond to western ideas of a stable Europe. Unlike nuclear weapons, conventional weapons are an instrument of warfare. That must be the starting point for any meaningful arms control for Europe — and not more and more new nuclear zero spirals.

That is no easy program for the west either, as the laborious discussions of the alliance on the problem of the negotiation procedure have shown. But meanwhile the Kremlin has — at least orally — come closer to many western wishes. Dialogue does have a chance, after all.

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CSO, 5200/2556

RELATED ISSUES

SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT COUNCIL DELEGATION IN USSR

Meets With Gromyko

PM021509 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jun 87 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Meeting With Representatives of the Socialist International"]

[Text] A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, had a meeting in the Kremlin 1 June with delegation of the Socialist International's Consultative Council on Disarmament headed by Kalevi Sorsa, chairman of the council, who is vice chairman of the Socialist International and chairman of the Social Democratic Party and foreign minister of Finland.

The delegation includes representatives of the leadership of parties belonging to the Socialist International from Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Senegal, Finland, the FRG, France, Switzerland, and Japan.

During the talks K. Sorsa announced that this delegation had visited the United States where it met with Vice President G. Bush and Secretary of State G. Shultz to ascertain the U.S. Administration's current approaches to the disarmament problem.

A.A. Gromyko remarked that the Soviet Union is open to talks. Unfortunately, there has not yet been a U.S. response to the Soviet disarmament proposals. I would like to express the hope that common sense and awareness of responsibility to all peoples will prevail and that obstacles in the way of an agreement will be removed.

The development of international relations is now at a crucial juncture. A very acute question arises most clearly: Will mankind at last take the path of eliminating corresponding classes of nuclear arms and achieve a radical improvement in the international climate, or will the momentum of the insane fueling of tension in the world and of the spread of the arms race into space prevail?

In our time actions aimed at strengthening peace on the part of all political forces and all parties and organizations opposed to war are more important than ever. It seems to us that social democracy also has at its disposal a great potential for positively influencing the course of world events.

It is no coincidence that now that mountains of nuclear weapons, figuratively speaking, have been piled up in the world, people -- even those adhering to a different ideology and way of life -- strive instinctively, you might say, to join hands and together erect an insuperable barrier toward the nuclear abyss. Everything progressive in the world, the entire force of human genius and common sense, and awareness of the peoples' common responsibility for the future make political parties and public organizations pool their efforts and use their influence to make a turn toward peace and a peaceful future for mankind. Precisely this policy is expressed by the Soviet Union's proposals submitted on our state's behalf by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, for consideration by the U.S. Administration.

There was also an exchange of opinions on the problem of conventional arms.

We welcome, A.A. Gromyko emphasized, the progressive movement in the development of contacts and dialogue between the parties and organizations of the Socialist International, in whose name your delegation speaks, and the CPSU.

Finland's Sorsa Addresses Group

LD012038 Moscow TASS in English 1910 GMT 1 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 1 TASS -- A press conference of a delegation of the Consultative Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament was held here today.

Kalevi Sorsa, chairman of the council, vice-chairman of the Socialist International, chairman of the Social Democratic Party and minister of foreign affairs of Finland, said at the press conference that their visit to Moscow was taking place at the time when real preconditions were taking shape for the reaching of large-scale agreements in the sphere of disarmament between the Soviet Union and the United States on intermediate-range nuclear missiles and shorter-range missiles in Europe. It should be pointed out, he continued, that the reaching of such an agreement would be a major contribution to ensuring a peaceful future of humanity. With all the difference in the existing approaches to some disarmament problems the objective of both sides is peace, and this is what really matters.

Socialist International Statement

PM051129 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jun 87 Second Edition p 4

["Joint Announcement for the Press": "Meetings with Socialist International Consultative Council on Disarmament"]

[Text] The Socialist International Consultative Council on Disarmament visited the Soviet Union 1-2 June 1987. The council comprises: K. Sorsa, vice chairman of the Socialist International, chairman of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, foreign minister of Finland, and chairman of the Socialist International Consultative Council on Disarmament; P. Vaananen, general secretary of the Socialist International; P. Vittorelli, secretary of the Socialist International Consultative Council on Disarmament and Italian Socialist Party expert on international security; Professor G. Kramer, [name as published], expert on disarmament of the Socialist Party of Austria board; L. Budtz, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Denmark Foreign Policy Commission and parliamentary deputy; H. Hoschnik, member of the Social Democratic Party

of Germany board and parliamentary deputy; L. Kangas, secretary for international questions of the Finnish Social Democratic Party; Professor A. Rosas, disarmament and European security expert of the Finnish Social Democratic Party; J.-M. Boucheron, chairman of the French Socialist Party parliamentary group; D. Spring, parliamentary leader of the Irish Labour Party; Y. Seki [name as published], chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party parliamentary foreign policy commission; C. Tatebayashi, chief of the Japanese Socialist Party Central Committee international bureau; W. Kok, chairman of the Dutch Labor Party parliamentary group; D. Ka, minister, member of the Politburo, and national secretary for international relations of the Socialist Party of Senegal; L. Stampa, member of the Spanish Socialist Party committee for peace and security and councillor to the Spanish foreign minister; and Professor Zh. Zigler, [name as published], member of the leadership of the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland.

The Socialist International Consultative Council on Disarmament delegation was received by A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The hope was expressed that the solution of the medium-range missile problem will be followed by a succession of other decisions, first and foremost the 50-percent reduction of USSR and U.S. strategic offensive armaments, with the guarantee, of course, that weapons will not be sited in space.

The Soviet side's representatives, like the Consultative Council delegation, opposed the transfer of the arms race to space and advocated the strict observance and strengthening of the ABM Treaty. It is very important to retain the terms of this treaty, which prohibits the development, testing, and siting of all other ABM systems in addition to those on which accord has already been reached.

The Soviet Union considers it a priority to achieve the earliest possible reduction of conventional armaments in Europe and sees this as an important step toward improving the political climate here and making progress toward disarmament. It supports the idea of creating a corridor free of nuclear weapons in Central Europe.

The Soviet viewpoint on problems of security in Asia and the search for ways to eliminate nuclear weapons there was outlined at the meeting. It was stressed that the Soviet approach to these problems is essentially the same as the approach to Europe. The two dimensions of USSR policy -- Europe and Asia -- are links in the creation of an all-embracing system of international security.

The UN General Assembly's third special session, to be held in 1988, should make a great contribution to the development of broad democratic dialogue on the basis of security for all. The Soviet side stressed that the session is expected to link the goals of present and future disarmament with the prospects for achieving a nonnuclear world and the creation of an all-embracing system of international security.

A.F. Dobrynin conveyed friendly greetings and wishes for success to the members of the Socialist International Consultative Council on disarmament from M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The sides expressed satisfaction at the meetings and conversations which had taken place and their readiness to continue developing contacts and dialogue.

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CSO: 5200/1526

RELATED ISSUES

UN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE HELD IN BAKU, USSR

Conference Opens

LD021034 Moscow TASS in English 1014 GMT 2 Jun 87

[Text] Baku June 2 TASS -- An international conference on "interconnection of bilateral and multilateral disarmament talks" opened today in the capital of Soviet Azerbaijan.

Taking part in it are heads of delegations at disarmament conference in Geneva, diplomats and politologist [as received] from 28 countries.

Free discussions and an extensive exchange of views have begun at the conference which was organised by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research with the assistance of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Questions of war, peace and universal security are being discussed.

U.S. Aide on Military Doctrine

LD021516 Moscow TASS in English 1504 GMT 2 Jun 87

[Text] Baku June 2 TASS -- An international conference, "bilateral and collective talks on disarmament and their relationship", opened in the capital of Soviet Azerbaijan, Transcaucasus, today. It brought together the heads of delegations at the Geneva conference on disarmament, diplomats and political scientists from 28 countries: The USSR, the United States, Australia, Bulgaria, developing Asian, African and Latin American states.

The conference, organised by the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) with the assistance of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, focuses on problems of ensuring universal security.

Any military doctrine adhered to by one or another side should take into account the other side's security interests, David Emery, deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, told TASS. Joint progress made by the United States and the USSR at the Geneva talks with an eye to reaching accords is viewed as the most suitable way of scaling down the risk of war.

He noted that progress had been achieved lately and expressed the hope that the USSR and the United States came close to solving the issue of reducing the number of nuclear missiles.

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S PETROVSKIY, FOREIGN OFFICIALS DISCUSS ISSUES

Receives Denmark's Kimberg

LD031638 Moscow TASS in English 1415 GMT 3 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 3 TASS -- Benny Kimberg, head of the Foreign Policy Department of Denmark's Foreign Ministry, was received in the USSR's Foreign Ministry today. Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy foreign minister of the USSR, and senior officials of a number of the ministry's subdivisions conducted a detailed talk with him.

The sides exchanges views on international issues, primarily on issues of limiting and arresting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, the work of the United Nations and the Vienna meeting of the participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the creation of comprehensive system of international security, and also issues of Soviet-Danish relations.

Receives French Officials

LD021145 Moscow TASS in English 1103 GMT 2 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 2 TASS -- The issue of finalising as soon as possible the elaboration of a convention on a total ban on and elimination of chemical weapons was the focus of attention at two-day Soviet-French political consultations which ended in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs today.

Taking part in the consultations on the French side was Benoit d'Aboville, deputy director of the Political Department of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and on the Soviet side -- senior officials of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The participants in the consultations were received by Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR.

The sides agreed to increase efforts in this direction.

The issue of reducing the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe was discussed in detail.

There was also an exchange of views on a wide range of other issues, including non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and the development of international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space.

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CSO: 5200/1526

RELATED ISSUES

IZVESTIYA'S BOVIN CALLS FOR 'ART' OF NEGOTIATIONS

PM051139 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jun 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by political observer A. Bovin: "From the Art of Wars to the Art of Negotiations"]

[Text] There is no sensible alternative to detente, disarmament, and peaceful coexistence -- that, in my view, is the basic postulate of the new political thinking. If you accept this postulate, if you move to a new system of political coordinates, then it is also essential to accept a number of highly important consequences which sound paradoxical to the traditionally tuned ear. For instance, there will be no victor and vanquished in a nuclear war: There will be two losers. If you want to strengthen your security don't forget the security of your potential adversary. More weapons do not mean more security.

The recent conference of the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee and the documents adopted at it make it possible to penetrate to new horizons of nuclear-age thinking. For hundreds of years military doctrines have been the basic rules for waging wars and winning wars. But now? Now the military doctrine according with the demands of the time is primarily the political and theoretical foundation for preventing nuclear war. This doctrine utterly rules out the use of force, fraught with the danger of a nuclear clash, for resolving any disputes between states. The only acceptable method of clearing up relations and managing a broad range of international problems is not the art of war but the art of negotiation.

When you want to quarrel it is not arguments which are important but the level of noise. When you want to cooperate, to reach agreement, it is arguments that are important and that means a new style and new quality for negotiations are necessary.

One of the most urgent requirements is to learn to understand and to consider the legitimate interests of our partner in negotiations. This science is not simple. It presupposes the ability to see the world as a whole and oneself through another's eyes. It proceeds from the need to constantly measure one's requirements and claims against the other sides' requirements and claims. It focuses attention not so much on the delimitation of rival interests -- which of itself is entirely natural -- as on the search for fields in which these interests may coincide, intersect, or run parallel.

The consideration of mutual interests is the departure point, the foundation for elaborating mutually acceptable compromise solutions. When partners have equal rights it is only solutions of this kind which are possible. Compromise is the air without which constructive policy will choke, without which peaceful coexistence is impossible. To ensure that both partners can make headway, each must retreat, that is sacrifice part of his preliminary demands for the sake of concord.

"Compromise," V.I. Lenin pointed out, "is the name given in politics to the surrender of some demands, the renunciation of part of your demands for an agreement with the other party." This is no less true of agreements with states. Within the framework of these agreements, each side naturally seeks to defend its own vital interests. But, as the history of diplomacy shows, neither side can, if we have in mind questions of any importance, count on gaining a total victory. That is why mutually acceptable solutions are halfhearted. While not fully satisfying either side at the same time they partially accord with the interests of each side -- that is both the limitation and the strength of compromise.

Of course, each partner has a limit for concessions determined by the supreme interests of state security and commitments to allies. But to a considerable extent this limit is subjective because it is determined not by interest "per se" but by precisely how a given interest is understood and formulated. For instance, U.S. strategists are inclined to expand U.S. "vital interests" to include virtually the entire world. Of course, no one is obliged to take into consideration this interpretation of U.S. security. But, by insisting on it, Washington makes any negotiations unpromising.

In defending its own interests the Soviet Union is prepared to understand and recognize the legitimate interests of the United States and of any other state. Practice shows that firmness and toughness in defending fundamentally important positions (it is assumed that these positions have been correctly defined) in no way rules out great flexibility, maneuverability, and pliability on a broad spectrum of great and small problems.

Recalling his work under V.I. Lenin's leadership, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin wrote of Lenin's "inimitable political realism," of his "amazing," "unrivaled," flexibility. Of course, firmness and persistence in defending principled positions were just as characteristic of Lenin. But Chicherin had no need to write about that. That went without saying. That had been nurtured by decades of the underground, by the fierce struggle against tsarism. It was important to Chicherin to stress the naturalness through which Lenin lived "the break from the former views of an underground revolutionary party to the political realism of a government in power -- something extremely difficult for everyone.

One expression of V.I. Lenin's political realism was his keenly negative attitude toward ultimatums. The day following the victorious uprising, delivering his concluding speech on the decree on peace, Lenin resolutely expressed himself against the demand for peace being put as an ultimatum. "The ultimatum form," Lenin argued "can be pernicious to our entire cause. We cannot demand that some insignificant concession from our demands should give the imperialist government the right to say that it was impossible to enter into talks about peace because of our implacability." And again: "We do not venture to, we must not, enable the governments to hide behind our intractability."

Let's ask ourselves the following question: Perhaps this flexibility was enforced, was explained by the weakness of the international positions of that newborn state? After all it was a time when, as Lenin put it, we "had to temporize, retreat, and maneuver. Well, there is some particle of truth in that argument. But only a particle. Lenin's thinking was not linked merely to considerations of the day. It has a more general nature: Any ultimatum, given the sides' equal rights and parity, restricts whoever makes it. An ultimatum fetters him, freezes his position, prevents him from taking

account of any change in circumstances, and breaks the feedback enabling him to rectify his policy. It reduces the space for political maneuvering, which gives a partner obvious tactical advantages and enables him to withdraw from talks while essentially giving as the reason the implacability and intractability of the side making the ultimatum. An inevitable withdrawal from ultimatum demands caused by the pressure of the situation and one's own interests, while being expedient and essential beneficial, will outwardly, in its form, look like a retreat, like loss of face, and so forth. The long-term negative points with which ultimatums are fraught markedly outweigh their short-term, essentially propagandist, positive points.

The nuclear age urgently demands the intensification of the degree of frankness, honesty, and directness in all foreign policy activity.

In the middle of the seventies F. Ikle, a U.S. "hawk," giving recommendations on conducting negotiations, totally permitted "methods" like bluff, extortion, and threats. Undoubtedly a habitual matter for our U.S. partners... But, as is now fashionable to say, an unproductive one. Perhaps the appeal not to use subterfuge or bluff is another extreme redolent of complacency. Nonetheless the proportion of "subterfuges" in the diplomatic tool kit should be in inverse proportion to the importance and dimension of the problems under discussion. Because it is scarcely possible to suppose that either side will allow itself to be bypassed, duped, or confused where it is a case of questions of national importance. Stating positions clearly, minimizing ambiguities, uncertainties, and all kinds of vagueness, being ready to explain particular details giving rise to doubts -- all this given, of course, an explicitly stated political will, will make it possible to accelerate the process of negotiations.

Finally, a constructive approach toward negotiations, like the art of foreign policy in general, demands that the main, basic, determining factor be highlighted. At every given moment the politician is faced with an assortment of problems. Unless he sees their varying importance and different caliber and weight, unless he arranges them in a specific hierarchical order from the most important, the very important to the secondary, the insignificant, then there will be no policy. Because policy is the art of choosing. You must remind people of this repeatedly inasmuch as the Americans have frequently demonstrated their inclination to deviate from the discussion of the main questions, mentioning different questions which, although important, are still not "the most important." A typical example: The refusal to ratify the SALT-II treaty because of the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The senior U.S. diplomat G. Kennan had every grounds for reminding Americans: "The question of war and peace is of decisive significance. All other problems, genuine or imaginary -- Angola, Afghanistan, Central America, human rights, and any others -- take second place by comparison."

Yes, the question of war and peace and above all the question of disarmament are of decisive importance for advancing toward peaceful coexistence. All Soviet proposals -- in Geneva, Vienna, Stockholm, and Reykjavik -- are aimed at leading this question out of the impasse, the artificially created impasse.

In principle each of the above-listed demands on the nature and form of negotiations is nothing new in the history of diplomacy. Each was to some extent or other taken into account even in prenuclear times. But most often they were only proclaimed. The language of what must be, in which the theory of diplomacy has frequently spoken, differed considerably from the language of reality, in which diplomatic practice was expressed. So the new element now is that what must be should acquire the status of reality. The stake is so high (survival!) that exceptions to the rules must become rules. We must not only rise to the level of the new political thinking but also raise political conduct to this level, not only think but also behave and act in a new way, responsibly and cautiously. The transition to a nuclear-free, nonviolent world is at the same time the transition from the doctrines of waging wars to the doctrines of conducting negotiations.

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CSO: 5200/1526

RELATED ISSUES

USSR: FURTHER ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM MONGOLIA

TASS Report

LD071457 Moscow TASS in English 1432 GMT 7 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow June 8 TASS -- In accordance with the Soviet leadership's decision and by agreement with the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, the earlier announced return of one motorised rifle division and several individual units (from among the body of Soviet troops which are temporarily on Mongolian territory) from Mongolia to the Soviet Union has been completed.

Army Paper Commentary

PM101045 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jun 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by V. Senchuk under the "The Course is the Peoples' Security" rubric: "On the Basis of New Thinking"]

[Text] In accordance with the Soviet leadership's decision and the accord with the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR] Government one motorized rifle division and several individual units from the Soviet troops temporarily on MPR territory have been withdrawn from Mongolia.

The good will of the Soviet Union and People's Mongolia and their efforts aimed at asserting an atmosphere of good-neighborliness and mutual trust in the Asian and Pacific region were vividly manifested in this important military-political action. One of the inalienable qualities of the socialist countries' approach toward the process of forming an all-embracing system of international security -- the unity of word and deed -- was once again convincingly demonstrated to the whole world.

Less than a year after M.S. Gorbachev's historic speech in Vladivostok a whole series of specific steps have been taken to implement the Vladivostok initiatives, including the withdrawal of part of our troops from MPR territory. It may be said that this step was the logical development of the approach of the Soviet Union and Mongolia to problems of the Asian and Pacific region, an approach based on the new political thinking.

The MPR's voice is being heard increasingly imposingly in favor of a stable, nuclear-free world. You will scarcely find a people who would like to be the target for the use of force or the threat of force. It is not surprising that Mongolia's proposal for creating a mechanism ruling out the language of force in dealings between the states of Asia and the Pacific is being welcomed everywhere as a substantial contribution to the creation of reliable security.

The ideas put forward by our Mongolian friends relating to ways of ensuring stability in the Asian and Pacific region have been reflected in the documents adopted at international forums for peace and security in Sydney, Bangalore, and Manila. The implementation of these ideas has been promoted by meetings of representatives of the trade unions and young people of the region in Ulaanbaatar. The conference of representatives of the Asian countries' communist and workers parties to be held in Ulaanbaatar soon will undoubtedly be a major event in coordinating joint efforts in favor of peace. The MPR's proposal to hold an all-Asian forum of representatives of the public of the region's countries and a meeting of the parliamentarians of Asian states has met with broad response.

The initiatives of fraternal Mongolia are organically combined with the broad Soviet peace program for the Far East and Asia as a whole which was set forth in Vladivostok and continued in the Indian capital. The Vladivostok and Delhi initiatives laid the foundation for movement toward peace, security, trust, and cooperation in one of the world's most vast regions. They became an example of new thinking in international affairs. After all, in these initiatives the proposals include questions of accelerating the solution of a regional settlement, initiating talks on reducing the activeness of navies of the Pacific, radically reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Asia, and transferring to a practical plane the discussion of confidence-building measures and the nonuse of force in the region.

It is characteristic that the theme of socialism's peace offensive has become the leitmotif of speeches at meetings to mark the send-off of Soviet servicemen in Mongolia's cities and population centers.

"The MPR," T. Namsray, member of the Politburo and secretary of the MPRP Central Committee, said at a meeting, "fully approves the Soviet Union's far-reaching peace-loving initiatives which define the main paths for the consolidation of peace and security among the peoples and the elimination of the threat of nuclear catastrophe."

The MPR's party and military leaders, Soviet and Mongolian servicemen, and representatives of the working people, expressing during the send-offs their firm support for the bold, innovative efforts of the USSR, the MPR, and the other socialist countries in the struggle for a peaceful future for their peoples and all mankind, rightly stressed the need to maintain a high level of vigilance under conditions where the imperialist forces are continuing to gamble on "nuclear intimidation," on the unrestrained arms race with its transfer into space, and on the strong-arm solution of international problems.

So far it must be noted that the socialist countries' open and honest approach toward the solution of questions of security in the region is failing to meet with a positive response from the United States and its allies. Quite the opposite is happening. Through Washington's fault militarization and the buildup of the military threat in the Asian and Pacific region, although it has still not been militarized to the same degree as the European region, is beginning to acquire dangerous dimensions.

The United States is expanding its military presence in the region. It has concentrated a powerful nuclear strike force here and is swelling its nuclear arsenals on its ships and at its military bases on foreign territories. It is deploying the U.S. nuclear-capable Lance missiles in South Korea. By their dimensions and unpredictable consequences, the U.S.-South Korean Team Spirit war games are generating increasing alarm among the countries of the region, including those which are not in the immediate vicinity of the region of these maneuvers. With Tokyo's tacit consent Washington is systematically violating the "three nonnuclear principles" -- U.S. F-16 aircraft designed to deliver nuclear strikes are deployed at the Misawa base, the in-flight refueling of B-52 strategic bombers is carried out from the Kadena base, and ships of the U.S. 7th Fleet equipped with Tomahawk nuclear missiles are registered at Japanese ports. U.S.-Japanese military cooperation is acquiring a nuclear dimension increasingly openly and at the same time military appropriations in the Japanese state budget have for the first time exceeded one percent of the GNP.

The situation in the Asian and Pacific region is complex but undoubtedly soluble. By untying the Asian knot and pooling the efforts of the countries of Europe and Asia in a single Eurasian process, it would be possible really to embark on the creation of an all-embracing system of international security. [paragraph continues]

Good political will is needed, and new approaches and a new thinking are needed because in the nuclear missile age, under the conditions of an interdependent world, this alone can be the way of mankind's development.

That is why it is profoundly symbolic that the completion of the withdrawal of part of the Soviet troops stationed in the MPR has coincided with the work of the Politburo Consultative Committee in Berlin and the adoption there of the document on the Warsaw Pact states' military doctrine, which is of an exclusively defensive nature and confirms in particular that its members do not treat any state or people as their enemy.

The fraternal alliance of the peoples of the USSR and Mongolia has never threatened anyone and it has always pursued one goal -- the defense of independence from outside encroachments, and the safeguarding of a peaceful sky for constructive creation. The cooperation of our peoples' armies rests on these principles and they are confirmed by the glorious traditions of mutual aid between the USSR and the MPR. Our countries' combat cooperation was tempered and tested in the struggle against the white guard gangs of Baron Ungern, when the troops of the 28-year-old commander in chief D. Sukhbaator together with the cavalry regiment of K.K. Rokossovskiy and other Red Army units liberated Mongolia from the invaders and brought it new life. This cooperation was tested by fire during the fighting at Halhyn Gol in 1939 when the soldiers of Zhukov and Choybalsan stood side by side to the death.

During the Great Patriotic War the MPR population rendered the aid within its power in defeating the common enemy and echelons with gifts from the Mongolian working people and thousands and thousands of parcels went to the front and the Red Army received about 500,000 horses from Mongolia. In 1945 units of the Mongolian People's Army made a fitting contribution to the defeat of militarist Japan's Kwantung army.

This combat cooperation continues to this day. Today Soviet and Mongolian servicemen are standing guard over peace side by side. That is why the send-offs for the Soviet servicemen returning to the motherland developed into a graphic demonstration of the indestructible fraternal friendship of the Soviet and Mongolian peoples and became evidence of the local population's gratitude and thanks to the Soviet servicemen worthily fulfilling their international duty.

Broadcast to China

OW091225 Moscow in Mandarin to China 1500 GMT 8 Jun 87

[Korolev commentary]

[Text] The Soviet Defense Ministry has announced the withdrawal of a motorized rifle division and several separate units of the contingent of Soviet troops temporarily staying on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR], in accordance with a decision of the Soviet leaders after consultations with the MPR Government. Our station commentator Korolev writes the following about this:

The troop withdrawal has again proved that this action by the Soviet and Mongolian Governments is in line with the socialist countries' principled policy to consolidate peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region. Although its level of militarization is not as high as that of Europe's, the Asian-Pacific region covers a vast area with great military potential, unclear powers with large numbers of troops, and countries with advanced science, technology, and industry. They are capable of conducting any kind of arms race, which, of course, can cause serious consequences because of frequent conflicts in the region.

Fully considering all of the above factors, the Soviet Union and the MPR have exerted efforts to prevent disaster in the region. For example, the MPR has proposed a conference to work out an international convention on nonaggression and nonuse of force among countries in the Asian-Pacific region. The signing of such a convention will be a reliable guarantee for the security of this vast region. Last year, Soviet leader Gorbachev put forth a series of constructive proposals in his speech at Vladivostok, aimed at turning the Asian-Pacific region into a zone of peace and rapprochement. Among them is a proposal for reducing troops and conventional arms in Asia. The Soviet Union maintains that this issue should be resolved step by step in different areas beginning, for example, in the Far East. Gorbachev declared at that time that the Soviet Union and the MPR were studying the withdrawal of a large number of Soviet troops from the MPR. Now this has been accomplished.

Gorbachev Vladivostok Speech Recalled

OW151505 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1200 GMT 13 Jun 87

[Belov commentary]

[Excerpt] The Soviet Union recently withdrew a motorized infantry division and some independent units of its armed forces temporarily stationed in the Mongolian People's Republic. Station observer Belov's commentary follows:

It has been announced that the Soviet troops stationed in Mongolia have been reduced according to a decision by the Soviet leadership and an agreement with the MPR Government. How should this be appraised? I do not think people would doubt this move is conducive to strengthening peace and stability in Asia. A reduction of troops means more trust and less danger of conflict in the center of Asia.

All this is obvious. I hope, however, our listeners will look at this event from another angle: a complete plan for the development of cooperation and the strengthening of security in the Asia-Pacific region. Less than a year ago, Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, expounded this plan in his speech in the USSR far east city of Vladivostok. He called for withdrawing some Soviet troops from Mongolian territory; this was carried out less than a year later. This proves that deeds according with words is one of the most important aspects in socialist state policy.

Earlier, on rather toward the end of 1986, the Soviet Union realized another of its intentions announced in Vladivostok --in accordance with an agreement with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan some of the Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan returned to their fatherland. The Soviet Union and the Afghan authorities also agreed on a timetable for the final withdrawal of Soviet troops, thus paving the way for mediation around Afghanistan [a fu han zhou wei di tiao ting].

Since the Afghan Government began carrying out a plan for national reconciliation on 15 January, there has been a possibility of more extensive mediation. The national reconciliation policy has produced a favorable influence on the situation in the whole region. [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/1526

RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV REPLY TO 'DELHI SIX' ON SDI, INF, TESTING

LD111406 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 11 Jun 87

[Text] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has sent a reply to the joint statement of the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden. The message says:

It is with great interest that I familiarized myself with the joint statement of the leaders of six states of 22 May 1987. I fully share its passionate appeal to begin, at long last, the process of nuclear disarmament, thus laying the foundations for a more secure world, to save future generations from the nightmare of nuclear disaster.

There is no doubt that, given the political will, it is possible to achieve far-reaching agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament. By its practical deeds and large-scale initiatives, the USSR has convincingly proven that it has this will. It is reflected in what is possibly the most concrete and eloquent way by the USSR's approach to the problem of medium range missiles.

Our recent proposals on this score, as well as those on the operation and tactical missiles which take maximum account of the interests of the United States and of its West European allies have, it would seem, removed all the obstacles and have brought the talks on medium-range missiles into the finishing straight.

However, the nervousness with which some in the West received the prospect, the real prospect, of reaching agreement on medium range missiles has given rise to serious doubts about the sincerity of the previous assurances given by some West European governments about their interest in completely eliminating the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles from the European zone.

Nevertheless, we have not lost hope that common sense will triumph and that the above prospect will become a reality. Thus, for the first time since nuclear arms appeared, an extraordinary important step would be made along the difficult but the only sensible path for mankind: the complete and universal elimination of nuclear arms.

The USSR will spare no effort to ensure that a mutually acceptable Soviet-U.S. agreement on medium range missiles is worked out and signed in short time on the basis of the basic accord reached in Reykjavik. It is precisely this task that has been given to the USSR's delegation to the talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva. It is now up to our partners whom we expect to meet us half-way.

I have repeatedly had occasion to set out the USSR's position regarding the absolute impermissibility of spreading the arms race into space and our assessments of the U.S. SDI program, which poses an extreme threat to the cause of peace. The truth is unequivocal here: Taking arms into space would irreversibly lead to an increase in mutual lack of trust, would whip up the arms race, and would make peace even more vulnerable.

We resolutely reject the Star Wars plans, and we oppose them with a set of initiatives aimed at establishing broad cooperation in the peaceful research into and conquest of space in the interests of the whole of mankind.

The Soviet Union is striving to convince the United States of the need for all-round strengthening of the ABM Treaty, which makes up the main foundation for accords on substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons. It must be extremely clear that if this treaty is not preserved in full, then such reductions will not be possible. To avoid undermining agreements on strategic offensive weapons through putting weapons into space, we consider that the USSR and the United States should undertake a pledge not to withdraw from the treaty for 10 years, and also agree on a list of space-based devices which would be banned from space in that period, including for the purposes of testing.

I expect the world public is well aware of our principled position on the question of nuclear tests. I repeat what I have said before: The ending of the unilateral moratorium that lasted more than 18 months by the Soviet Union, was a forced decision, one imposed upon us. We repeatedly invited the United States to begin full-scale talks on a total end to nuclear tests with strict international verification [kontrol], including on-site inspections. As first steps toward this main goal, during such talks, it would be possible to examine issues of ratification of the Soviet-U.S. treaties of 1974 and 1976, and those of substantial reductions in the thresholds for power and of nuclear explosions provided for by those treaties, with a simultaneous limitation of their quantity.

With the aim of promoting the speediest ratification of the aforesaid treaties, the USSR is prepared to come to agreement with the United States on staging the relevant calibrating experiments at each other's test sites.

We favor the use of both the national seismic apparatus of the two countries and means of seismic monitoring [kontrol] belonging to the six states in conducting such experiments -- of course if they agree to this. We are also prepared for immediate practical measures in connection with these talks, for example, reaching an interim understanding with the U.S. side on limiting the power of underground explosions, with a threshold of 1 kilotonne and the number of nuclear weapons tests to 2-3 a year.

In brief, the USSR has no shortage of good will. We are open to any constructive ideas that go in the direction of real disarmament. The noble aspirations of the leaders of the six states reflected in their joint statement not only meets with full understanding and active support from our side but also strengthens our confidence in the final triumph of human reason and spurs us on to even more energetic actions for the sake of realizing the dream of a nuclear-free world for the sake of preserving civilization on earth.

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CSO: 5200/1526

RELATED ISSUES

USSR: FURTHER RESPONSE TO LATEST DELHI SIX MESSAGE

Received by Vorontsov

LD211743 Moscow TASS in English 1202 GMT 21 May 87

[Text] Moscow, 21 May (TASS)--Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov today received Sweden's Ambassador to the USSR Anders Thunborg and India's Charge d'Affaires in the USSR P. Budhwar, who delivered a text of the statement by the Group of Six--Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden--on the occasion of the third anniversary since the joint statement by heads of these states calling for an end to nuclear tests and for nuclear disarmament.

Yuliy Vorontsov noted that the Soviet Union appreciated the activities of the Group of Six, members of the Non-aligned Movement. The initiatives of the six on nuclear disarmament and prevention of militarization in outer space and Soviet peace initiatives pursue the same goals of ridding our planet from a lethal burden of nuclear weapons.

TASS Highlights INF

LD241609 Moscow TASS in English 1506 GMT 24 May 87

[Text] Moscow, 23 May (TASS)--TASS political news analyst Yuriy Kornilov writes:

The Soviet public has summed up a joint statement issued by the leaders of the Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden on 22 May as an "important, positive and timely" document.

Printed in full in the Soviet press, the statement has riveted much interest and is being widely commented on in the Soviet media.

The close attention given to it is only natural as its authors raise the key issues of the international situation--the issues of war and peace.

They bring up the problem of problems--nuclear disarmament, saying with reason that talks on disarmament matters are now at the decisive phase and that there is a real possibility to reach agreement, at least on one important issue--that of eliminating medium-range missiles from Europe.

This is a correct analysis and an important conclusion.

It would be appropriate to recall in this connection that the Soviet Union, continuing to be committed to a peaceful foreign policy, which is its policy of principle, stands strongly for doing away with all nuclear weapons by century's end.

It is convinced that a first-ever drastic reduction and near elimination of a whole class of such arms is quite feasible.

For the opportunity that has presented itself to be realized, it is only needed that certain quarters in the West renounce "positions-of-strength" policy and all manner of far-fetched "linkages" and reservations and really demonstrate a political will for this reduction.

Having separated the medium-range missile issue from the Reykjavik package, the Soviet leadership continues to attach priority significance to the attainment of an agreement on significant cuts on strategic weapons and their subsequent elimination altogether, which should, of course, be inextricably connected with a commitment to observe the Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of anti-missile defense systems.

The conclusion of a medium-range missile (INF) agreement would definitely make it easier to solve both that and other disarmament problems. The Soviet Union is prepared boldly to agree to limiting and destroying nuclear armories.

We understand and share the call in the joint statement by the leaders of the six states not to jeopardize the possibility to start the process of nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet public was and remains in favor of halting all nuclear testing and preventing an arms race in outer space.

The INF problem today is the litmus test that will show visually who is in face for warding off the nuclear threat and who would like to continue banking on force and confrontation.

There is no doubt, however, that the vast majority of the members of the world community--and the joint statement by the leaders of the six states bears this out once again--are resolutely for breaking the vicious circle of fear and mistrust, laying the foundations for a safer world and saving the succeeding generations from the nightmare of nuclear catastrophe.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW: INF, START, SDI, MBFR PROSPECTS

LD122305 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 12 Jun 87

["International Situation -- Questions and Answers" program presented by Vyacheslav Lavrentyev, with political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin; commentator Boris Andrianov; commentator Vladimir Pasko; Vladimir Korablev, "our correspondent" in Bucharest; commentator Yevgeniy Grachev; "colleague" Sergey Pravdin; Kipros Mazheyka, "our correspondent" in the Netherlands]

[Excerpt] [Lavrentyev] Hello, comrades! As always our program is compiled on the basis of replies to your letters, and we are going to begin with the questions that occur most frequently. They concern the problem of curbing the arms race, of ending nuclear weapons tests and prospects for achieving an accord on reducing and destroying nuclear missiles. This subject is mentioned in letters from Comrade Nayanov from Mogilev, and Comrade Khlystov from Voronezh. I have tried to reduce the questions to a common denominator and formulate them as follows: How realistic now is the possibility of the signing of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe and operational and tactical missiles? In what areas of disarmament can one expect the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States to move closer together? I have asked political observer Nikolay Shishlin to reply to these questions. Please go ahead, Nikolay Vladimirovich.

[Shishlin] Although at first sight it might appear easy to answer this, it is not a simple question. Intensive talks are indeed taking place in Geneva dealing precisely with the fate of medium-range missiles in Europe -- I refer to Soviet and U.S. missiles -- and talks are taking place about the fate of operational and tactical missiles. Nevertheless, I repeat this is not a simple question.

Yes, work is essentially already being done now in Geneva on the single text of a Soviet-U.S. agreement, although this agreement today contains plenty of parentheses which still have to be removed for this agreement to be ready for signing. The Soviet-U.S. dialogue itself on this problem was difficult. There were attempts to destroy the Reykjavik accord by talking, say, not about the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe but by talking about the elimination of medium-range missiles as such, as a class of armaments on a global level. Of course, of itself the idea of eliminating medium-range missiles on a global level is not so silly, and if there is movement forward in Geneva, if what was agreed by both sides in Reykjavik is implemented, and this, today, is the subject of deep discussions in Geneva, then the time will come, and of course medium-range missiles as such will also be able to be eliminated on principles of reciprocity.

Nevertheless, when we talk today about the prospects for an agreement we have to take into account the political backdrop against which the deepened Soviet-U.S. discussion has developed. Until recently a fairly sharp struggle was taking place in West Europe about the approach to this problem, West Europe appeared to be quite distinctive. Whereas West Europeans used to worry about the oversaturation of Europe with weapons of all kinds, and in particular with such terrible weapons as medium-range missiles carrying nuclear warheads, when prospects of a solution to this problem began to appear the West Europeans took fright: in particular I am thinking of the French, the West Germans. I am thinking of the British position which in no way sees firm security on the continent of Europe within a nonnuclear Europe. A fairly complicated political struggle, deepened political reflection, and a deepened political dialogue were needed for the West Europeans to accept what is called the zero option on medium-range missiles.

Moreover, getting a second-zero -- on operational and tactical missiles -- today seems to be quite achievable. Operational and tactical missiles are missiles with a range of 500-1,000 km. I think that of itself this heated discussion which has taken place throughout these months of 1987 has shown that a third zero is also achievable -- a any rate, this third zero has to be placed on the agenda -- that is, the question of the fate of the so-called tactical missiles, the missiles with a range which is lower than the threshold of 500 km.

So, although I began by saying that it is difficult to predict the prospects of these talks, whether it is going to be possible to complete them this year, I would nevertheless say: The next 4-6 weeks are going to be decisive. It seems to me that following the Venice meeting of the capitalist Big Seven and following the forthcoming NATO conference in Reykjavik -- a routine session of the NATO council is due to take place there -- it will be possible to judge quite definitely the position of the NATO countries. Today I do not think it rules out the possibility of an accord. More than that, it presupposes the possibility of an accord.

Why, then, am I dragging things out and not saying quite definitely that yes, this possibility will be implemented in 1987? There are some problems. There are some, in particular in Geneva. What are these problems? In the first place the Westerners, or to be more precise the United States, are insisting that their missiles, the Pershing-2's should not be withdrawn, should not be eliminated, but should be reequipped, that one stage should be removed and that the missile would thereby be turned from a medium-range missile into an operational and tactical missile. That is an unacceptable approach. Second, they consider that as soon as we agree to eliminate missiles, the Soviet Union must be the one to start doing so, that the Soviet Union should be the first to eliminate its armaments and reduce them to a number approximately equal to that of the U.S. medium-range missiles located on the territory of West Europe, and that only at that point will the Americans, too, start going things. This, too, is an unacceptable approach. The reductions must be proportionate. There is also the following kind of problem, where, say, the West Germans consider that the 72 West German Pershing-1 missiles -- true, these are operational and tactical missiles -- that these should be retained in the Bundeswehr arsenal because these are supposedly national West German forces, and they ought not to be discussed within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. talks. So there are complications here.

Yet nevertheless, I think to sum up, there is a far greater chance now of being able to work out a major, broad compromise in the medium-range missile problem and on operational and tactical missiles; if that is so, then the first major truly historic step will have been taken not simply toward limiting the arms race but toward eliminating a certain class of armaments. It is there that the new perspectives open.

[Lavrentyev] Nikolay Vladimirovich, is there any drawing together of the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States in other areas of disarmament?

[Shislin] I fear that in answering this question one has still to remember what there was at Reykjavik. There was indeed at Reykjavik in addition to the fate of the medium-range missiles an accord about a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive armaments. This understanding, that it is essential to reduce strategic offensive armaments by 50 percent and then to go even further, is preserved. But unfortunately the same blind adherence of the United States to its Strategic Defense Initiative or the Star Wars plans is also preserved, which is condemning this dialogue to being a dialogue of the deaf.

Because when we talk about strategic offensive weapons and the Strategic Defense Initiative the strategic link is plain. In fact, the elimination of strategic offensive weapons makes SDI absurd, and we thus deem it to be unthinkable to solve questions concerning the fate of strategic offensive armaments outside a strengthening of the provisions of the ABM Treaty. But I do not believe there is no possibility at all here of a further drawing together of positions, though this is on the understanding that the United States really does become imbued with a spirit of good will, and it understands that when the discussion concerns the SDI, the Soviet position here is immutable. This is a position of principle. The militarization of space is quite simply intolerable.

Among the problems currently under discussion -- and not always fruitlessly -- I would cite the idea that was proposed at Budapest at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee concerning deep reductions in conventional armaments. Discussions are now taking place in Vienna about the form in which the subject, the form and the method should be defined: The objects of the talks have actually been defined. Some very interesting ideas have been expressed in Berlin at the recent conference of the Political Consultative Committee. I am thinking about the idea of comparing the military doctrines of the two blocs, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. After Berlin the NATO people stated that this is a very interesting document, adopted by the Warsaw Pact participants, though I get the impression that they are avoiding any comparison of military doctrines. They are somewhat afraid of comparing the military doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, because the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, as a defensive doctrine, is easily looked through: This Berlin document marks out some utterly precise factors. But the NATO people conceal things, and what they conceal is also clear: the fact that the NATO doctrine is of course far from defensive in character. To correct these doctrines a little for the sake of strengthening peace in Europe and throughout the world as a whole, for this, of course, political boldness is needed, a new political thinking is needed, new actions and new deeds are required of a kind which would lead to a real improvement in international relations.

But I would like to end my reply to this question in the following way. Of course it might appear that at present some doors leading toward disarmament are closed. But generally speaking, the locks are not totally unyielding, and what has been begun by the Soviet Union over the past few years, all these major initiatives which have been proposed, they are without doubt getting rid of these locks, and new prospects are opening up for moving forward toward peace, toward a nonviolent and nonnuclear peace.

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S KARPOV ON TEST BAN, EUROMISSILE CURB PROSPECTS

PM151051 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jun 87 Morning Edition p 6

[Interview with V.P. Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Administration for Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament, by A. Shalnev: "Disarmament: What Is Holding Things Up?"]

[Text] "A treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, were it to be concluded, would be a reliable guarantee of the nonresurgence of nuclear weapons," V.P. Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Administration for Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament, said in an interview for IZVESTIYA.

In response to a request for comment on the "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Total Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests" -- the joint document recently submitted by a group of socialist countries to the Geneva Disarmament Conference -- he said.

"The struggle we are waging to end nuclear weapon tests is not something ad hoc. It is not a concession to our time but the long-term, consistent line of the Soviet leadership. The draft submitted in Geneva 9 June is a synthesis of all the discussions which have taken place within the framework of the Disarmament Conference, at UN General Assembly sessions, and in the course of our bilateral contacts with the United States and other countries. The views expressed by the members of the 'six-country initiative' have also been used. But this draft is not just the sum of other countries' proposals and of the Soviet Union's previous proposals. It is a new stage in the elaboration of a decision that could form the basis of a universal agreement to end nuclear tests.

"I will point particularly to the very direct link between the 'Basic Provisions' and the results of the recent Berlin conference of the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee -- a conference which discussed a wide range of questions connected with the strengthening of international security, the nuclear disarmament process, the reduction of conventional arms, and the prohibition of chemical weapons. The question of ending nuclear tests is an important constituent part both of nuclear disarmament and of the system which is to replace nuclear weapons, the system of security in a nuclear-free world. A treaty on ending nuclear tests would guarantee the nonresurgence of nuclear weapons under conditions of nuclear disarmament. This is the thrust of our proposals for the future."

[Shalnev] What is new about the proposals submitted?

[Karpov] The chief thing is a clear-cut and consistent system of verification -- verification serving as a 100-percent guarantee no one would be able to violate the treaty, were it concluded. This system is ensured by a combination of three kinds of verification: national technical means, an international system of seismic verification, and on-site inspections. Inspection will be foolproof [bezotkaznyy]. If there are grounds for suspecting a nuclear explosion is being conducted on a particular state, then that state -- on being presented with a justified request -- will be obliged to receive an inspection group and give it an opportunity to conduct an inspection anywhere. The procedure for drawing up such requests will be elaborated.

[Shalnev] What could serve as grounds for suspicion?

[Karpov] Seismic data, observations from satellites.

[Shalnev] The White House lays down as one of the chief conditions for ratifying the 1974 and 1976 "threshold" treaties a requirement that an efficient verification system be set up. Regarding what is envisaged in the "Basic Provisions" submitted in Geneva is it possible to expect speedy U.S. ratification of these treaties?

[Karpov] It is hard to say. The desire to delay a decision now clearly prevails in the U.S. stand on questions of verification. A number of artificial considerations are advanced as conditions. It is a question, for example, of Washington insisting on the need to use its Sortex verification system. Yet U.S. scientists themselves reject that system as inefficient several years ago. According to our scientists' assessments, CORTEX could provide just an approximate picture of the yield of explosions with a margin of error of 30 percent either way: An explosion with a yield of 100 kilotons could be "read" both as an explosion with a yield of 70 kilotons and as an explosion with a yield of 130 kilotons. In addition, this system does not work at all with explosions with a yield of less than 50-70 kilotons. To cap it all, it requires colossal material expenditure. Therefore, I regard the Americans' persistence in the question of Cortex as a desire to delay ratification of the "threshold" treaty and, if we speak of the aim for the future, to hamper the elaboration of an agreed system to verify the ending of tests.

[Shalnev] Since we are speaking of verifying observance of agreements, I would like to ask you to comment on the recent THE WASHINGTON POST report that the CIA, the FBI, and the National Security Agency are demanding the White House exclude a number of military installations from those which may be inspected within the framework of realizing the agreements on reducing nuclear arms.

[Karpov] Yes, we have already encountered this at the Geneva talks on nuclear arms. The draft treaty on medium-range missiles submitted by the U.S. contains a number of blank spots regarding verification. The United States, for example, does not want to admit verifiers to production enterprises associated with medium-range missiles and is prepared to agree to verification only on the periphery of those enterprises, without allowing verifiers inside. The United States would like to exclude medium-range missile test ranges from verification by inspectors, as well as the procedure for reequipping Pershing-2 missiles as lesser-range missiles, as it proposes in its draft. It turns out that Washington goes into reverse when we ask the United States a practical question on a system of reliable verification and propose a specific solution involving inspectors. The question of verification at U.S. military bases where

medium-range missiles are now or could be stationed is a particularly sensitive one for the United States. We see Washington is actively engaged in seeking "exclusions." This strikes us as a very dangerous tendency. We believe that an agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons and, still more so, an agreement on their total elimination demands really reliable verification, including on-site inspection. We will stand firmly by this position.

[Shalnev] What are the prospects for reaching an agreement on medium-range missiles?

[Karpov] It is not only a question of verification here. The U.S. position contains other elements that hamper an agreement, although the foundations have already been laid for attaining a definitive accord. With intensive work a joint draft could be drawn up in 2-3 months. This is perfectly realistic. But, I repeat, there are number of elements in the U.S. position which complicate matters. [paragraph continues]

There is also a new factor: The FRG position announced 4 June by Chancellor Kohl. Its essence is as follows: Bonn supports the "double zero" in Europe but insists that the FRG keep not only the Pershing-1A missiles that belong to it but also the U.S. nuclear warheads for them. Since the FRG is a party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the United States does not have the right to transfer to its control over its own nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Under Article II of that treaty the FRG pledged not to acquire control over such weapons. If Bonn demands its own control over the Pershing-1A warheads, how can this be squared with its pledges under the treaty?

The United States also finds itself in an incomprehensible position. It has declared that it supports the FRG decision and that the arms of third countries cannot be discussed at the Soviet-U.S. talks. It is not clear whether the United States regards the nuclear warheads which it owns in the FRG as arms of third countries. If it does, the warheads are not under U.S. control but under FRG control, which is a violation of the pledges both Washington and Bonn adopted under the Nonproliferation Treaty. If it does not, this means the warheads must be destroyed along with all the other Soviet and U.S. warheads for medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe. The United States must seriously weigh the adverse consequences with which its intention to keep in Europe a certain proportion of the warheads for operational and tactical missiles could be fraught. Let us discuss: If the United States keeps warheads in the FRG, will it not then want them in Italy, the Netherlands, and Britain? On the other hand, let us imagine that the CSSR and GDR Governments turn to the Soviet Union and say: There is no need to withdraw SS-12 missiles from our territory, just transfer them to us and station the warheads for them just nearby... The exact opposite of what we are now trying to agree on will happen: the preservation and buildup of missiles of this class, instead of their elimination.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW: TESTING, PACT INITIATIVE, INF

LD142034 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 14 Jun 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Nikolay Ivanovich Yefimov, first deputy editor-in-chief of IZVESTIYA; Georgiy Aleksandrovich Kuznetsov, first deputy editor-in-chief of ZA RUBEZHOM; and Vitaliy Sergeyevich Sobolev, All-Union Radio commentator]

[Excerpt] [Sobolev] Hello, comrades. In summer the pace of international life usually slackens: events thin out, people are in a holiday mood, parliaments disperse for the summer recess, and so on. But the past week has not confirmed that rule at all. It's too soon for those concerned with foreign policy to start thinking of their vacations, and as has commonly been the case, especially in recent years, the tone has been set by the external political actions of the Soviet Union and of the socialist countries. Judging by comments published abroad, I'd even say that our fraternal countries have in a way spoiled world public opinion somewhat.

It has become customary to hear news from Moscow of sensational new initiatives at regular intervals. But this persistence in putting the new political thinking into effect is bearing fruit. Of course our efforts are not being overlooked. For instance, the U.S. journal BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS has taken the trouble to count, and found that in the last 2 years the Soviet Union has undertaken 25 serious steps, mainly unilateral and unreciprocated -- meaning unreciprocated on the part of official circles in the West, but not without public response. The journal notes that these have often been steps to meet halfway the positions of the United States and its allies, who, for their part, have taken relatively few corresponding steps.

In general, the journal makes a favorable analysis of Soviet political flexibility and deplores the measures by which previous accords have been, or will be, broken. In recent days the socialist countries and the Soviet Union have put forward a number of further initiatives, dealing with among other things the question of a universal and total ban on nuclear tests. Well, we know -- and it is obvious -- that it is sensible to begin stopping the nuclear arms race in this particular way. The Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions is fresh in everyone's mind. Now the Soviet Union is once again displaying political flexibility regarding limiting nuclear tests to a kilotonne in yield and to conducting two or three a year; and also in the matter of verification [proverka] of the observance of these limits.

[Kuznetsov] We should mention this is fully in accord with the wishes of the U.S. Congress, because both the Senate and the House of Representatives have passed a resolution to restrict nuclear tests to a kilotonne. Consequently, it is now solely and entirely up to the Reagan administration.

[Yefimov] I'd like to draw listeners' attention to two of our initiatives that were put forward 2 weeks ago...

[Sobolev, interrupting] And which are still being discussed and commented on in the world.

[Yefimov] Yes, still. As you remember, 2 weeks ago in Berlin, the Warsaw Pact countries adopted a very important document, on military doctrine. That document not only sets out fundamental propositions on this problem, this very important problem, but also puts two exceedingly important proposals to the Western countries.

First, the participants of the Warsaw Pact and the members of NATO are invited to hold consultations for the purpose of collating the military doctrines of the two alliances and jointly examining the direction of their development and evolution to remove the distrust that has been building up. The distrust is considerable and has often been the result of ignorance. So it was proposed that we should, if not solve this problem altogether, then at least begin moving toward a solution. Second, it was suggested that we should examine, at those consultations, the imbalances and asymmetries in particular types of arms and armed forces...

[Sobolev, interrupting] ...which the West says it's very worried about.

[Yefimov] ...Examine these asymmetries with the following objective before us: to work out ways of removing those imbalances and thus reduce the surplus of whoever is ahead and establish an even lower level of these arms on both sides. The Western leaders have indeed talked a lot in the past, and talk a great deal at present, about the supposedly overwhelming superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in particular types of arms. It would seem that the Western countries, if we are to believe what they say, should be eager to take us up on that. This past week we are reviewing having given the West a great opportunity to consider the question and give us an answer.

[Sobolev] You're thinking mainly of Venice?

[Yefimov] Yes, above all Venice, where the leaders of the seven leading countries of the West -- mostly they were the NATO countries -- even issued a special statement on relations between the countries of East and West. Alas, the seven passed over both proposals in total -- I stress, total -- silence. Why? Is it that they don't know what answer to give, and don't want clarity and definitude on this point that is so important to them? Or is it to their advantage that matters should remain unclear?

[Sobolev, interrupted] ...advantageous to exploit the vagueness for propaganda purposes.

[Yefimov] In any case, Venice gave no answer to these proposals.

[Sobolev] And neither did the NATO Council -- that is, the conference of foreign ministers of that bloc that was held at the end of the week in Reykjavik.

[Yefimov] In Reykjavik, the NATO foreign ministers talked about the superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in conventional arms, chemical and nuclear weapons, and so on.

[Kuznetsov] So one wonders what's the matter: On the one hand they raise the alarm, and on the other hand they do nothing to extinguish its cause. In passing, I want to remind you of a date: 15 June is the 5th anniversary of the Soviet Union's official undertaking, given at the second extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Incidentally, this proposal, important in itself, was developed by the Warsaw Pact states when they submitted their proposal, addressed to the NATO countries, for a treaty that would renounce not only first use of nuclear weapons, but also the use of conventional weapons -- in other words, a nonaggression pact.

This again is a document that would exclude the possibility of a military conflict; and they also rejected this treaty on the pretext that it was only a piece of paper, as if all treaties were not paper, in the strict sense of the word. Yet on the other hand, if all treaties are observed, then why would this particular one not be?

[Yefimov] Well, that undertaking, by the way, that we took at the extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly, has now been included in the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact countries. But, I repeat, neither Venice nor Reykjavik has given an answer to the Soviet proposals. There are none so deaf as those who will not hear.

[Sobolev] And yet all the same, I'd like to note here a few signs -- though not very clear so far -- that the new political thinking on which the socialist countries base their position is meeting with some response among Western ruling circles, signs they are interested in such thinking. I have in mind the declaration by those who took part in the meeting of the leaders of the seven leading countries of the capitalist world in Venice. Interestingly, although the meeting was traditionally described as economic, economic questions took a back seat and it was documents of a political nature -- on terrorism, the Gulf, and East-West relations -- that were in the forefront. This latest declaration speaks of potential for progress in those relations and hopes for improvement in political and economic relations, and also in relations in the sphere of security, between the countries of East and West. Of course, these words are still quite vague, and are almost lost in the welter of calls for vigilance and oaths of allegiance to common ideals, principles and aims, notably the principle of nuclear deterrence. But still, the big seven, as it's called, has seen fit to note changes for the better and prospects for further improvement in relations between the two still opposing groups. Britain's Prime Minister Thatcher, who was hurrying home for the parliamentary election, found it necessary to go out of her way to emphasize that she approves of the reforms in the Soviet Union. Western journalists drew attention to the way the leader of the British Conservatives tried to use the meeting in the interests of her election campaign. That phrase was, of course, mainly for the benefit of her own voters, but I think we can also take note of it.

[Kuznetsov] You know, while on the subject of the voters: They talk about the big seven who've been in session in Venice. But I'd say there was another, invisible, participant, namely world and European public opinion, which, as many recent polls show, thinks very highly of the Soviet peace initiatives and will have an effect, in one way or another, on the minds of the politicians.

The poll that has created the biggest stir is one carried out for all of Europe by the Swedish paper DAGENS NYHETER. This poll shows that Soviet policy is indeed very well regarded, since 51 percent of the respondents in Europe as a whole expressed a positive view of the course of the USSR in providing for peace and security, and disarmament naturally, while only 18 percent reacted negatively. But you must not forget that the poll was carried out not among the progressively-minded public; on the contrary, they polled all strata so as to obtain a wide spectrum of opinion.

[Sobolev] Georgiy Aleksandrovich, the results of that poll set off a whole avalanche of others: the rightwingers were worried, for instance, so they tried to check and double check the result, and reached a very sad conclusion from their point of view. Altogether, you can say that something amounting almost to a new political phenomenon has taken shape quite clearly this week, and in Washington and the other Western capitals they're very upset about it.

[Yefimov] Yes, I agree with that. Indeed, Reagan has even let slip the remark that the respondents will see the light, that they'll soon come to their senses. But some West European observers are saying it's time they woke up in Washington.

[Sobolev] What they're annoyed about, if I may say so, is that the majority now have more confidence in Soviet foreign policy; it seems more peace-loving and more loyal to treaties than does U.S. policy. The latest research shows people in West Europe express greater confidence in Moscow than in the Reagan administration. Most believe Moscow is more concerned about preservation than Reagan is. Three-fifths of West Germans think that in the future their government should cooperate not only with the United States, but also equally with the Soviet Union. They see not military strength, but the strength of reason. This makes a big impression in Europe, where not only nuclear war, but even conventional war is unthinkable. I've been to West Germany, and there from one town, you can see the next. War is simply unthinkable. Therefore, this policy is of course in the interests of the Soviet Union and Soviet people, but it is equally -- and they also feel this -- in their interests.

[Kuznetsov] You know, I've also had personal experience of this. I've just come back from Greece, where I took part in the Peace Week dedicated to the anniversary of the death of the outstanding peace campaigner, (Grigori Solombrakis). I must tell you I was present at very many meetings, and typically, whenever the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union were mentioned, there was tumultuous applause from the audience. To be honest, this made an enormous impression on me emotionally. A municipal councillor from the ancient Greek city of Delphi said to me, why are you surprised? After all, people see that while Gorbachev puts forward one peace proposal after another, Reagan is preparing for Star Wars. They see where the danger is coming from and they understand who is bringing them peace.

[Sobolev, interrupting] ...though great obstacles are being put in the way of their understanding that. Just at this time, an utterly shameless campaign has been mounted over the supposed theft of secrets -- which no one wanted -- concerning the Ariane rocket, and the Soviet citizen Varygina-Verdier was arrested. The case has collapsed, bringing them nothing but shame and may now even boomerang back at them.

[Yefimov] You know, when I was in the FRG in Cologne, I had a meeting with the editor-in-chief of a very conservative newspaper. He told me something that I think gives one a very good idea of the atmosphere now developing in Western Europe. He said that 4 or 5 years ago there was nothing to stop him from publishing positive material

about the Soviet Union, but he didn't publish it. Why not? Because he was afraid that if he did, some of his readers -- a substantial number, he said -- would cancel their subscriptions. But now, he told me, he's not afraid of that. He's begun publishing such material, and reactions have been wholly favorable. Why? Because the climate is changing.

Here's another instance. In a conversation with the mayor of Stuttgart -- a large city, the capital of Baden-Wurtemberg, which is the third-largest land in the FRG, the mayor is called Manfred Rommel, the son of the field marshal and a member of the ruling CDU -- he told me: We are following with enormous interest what is happening in the Soviet Union. Your policy of restructuring, democratization, criticism, and openness, which you are carrying out, is making a very great impression. He said, I understand that this policy cannot fail to make the Soviet Union stronger economically, spiritually, politically and so on; but personally, I'm not afraid of that, because fear of the Soviet Union is receding.

This is because your initiatives and actions are not only paving a way to our hearts but also they are convincing us that you are pursuing a sincere, honest, and very reasonable policy.

He also told us that the government of that land, and he personally, even though it belongs to the CDU, have insisted on this, and have conveyed their opinion to the FRG Government -- their opinion that it should accept the Soviet Union's two proposals of eliminating medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in Europe.

Well, evidently the opinion of officials like Mayor Rommel, and of the public at large is naturally having its effect on the statesmen and this has been reflected in the declaration of the seven on East-West relations. Yet the members of the seven supported the U.S. stance at the talks. The U.S. position is based on the premise that was expressed loudly by Chancellor Kohl when he gave his consent to the so-called double zero option, that is, that 72 Pershing missiles, the carriers for which belong to the Bundeswehr and the warheads to the United States, should not be taken into account at the talks.

[Sobolov] That same decision was confirmed in Reykjavik by the NATO Council.

[Kuznetsov] Yes, in other words this was confirmed nonpublicly in Venice and the same thing was confirmed in Reykjavik by the NATO Council. But this does in fact amount to a very serious obstacle to achieving an accord. President Reagan said in Venice, yes, we can reach agreement this year. But if the Americans are going to put such obstacles in the way, then really the whole problem becomes a lot more difficult. It was an accident that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, replying to the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden -- to their joint statement -- spoke of the nervousness with which some people in the West have received our initiative; and of the fact that there are difficulties that cause us to doubt whether the West is interested in the total elimination of medium-range missiles in the European zone.

[Yefimov] In other words, the old way of thinking persists and it is still quite firmly fixed in their heads.

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PRAVDA WEEKLY REVIEW: DISARMAMENT-DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, INF

PM151127 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Jun 87 Second Edition p 4

["International Review" column by Nikolay Bragin]

[Excerpts] Poles Apart

The socialist countries' peaceful arsenal of initiatives and proposals were replenished last week.

They submitted their "Main Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and Universal Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Tests" for examination by the Disarmament Conference in Geneva 9 June. The document "On Overcoming Underdevelopment and Establishing a New International Economic Order," which was adopted at the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee Conference held in Berlin 28-29 May, was published the next day. Both these acts convincingly reaffirm the desire of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states to find new approaches to solving the most acute international problems.

The Warsaw Pact states' proposals formulated in Berlin proceed on the basis of the need to establish an international economic order which would be based on the realities of our time and on new political thinking incompatible with methods in interstate relations such as diktat, discrimination, or shackling. The immorality of these methods is obvious.

Practical arms control and disarmament steps should be one of the main conditions for successfully solving the acute economic problems mankind is encountering, for improving the international situation, and for maintaining peace. The funds thereby released could be channeled into countries' economic and social development goals and the elimination of unemployment and backwardness in a number of states. Disarmament for development. This approach is understood by the peoples and acceptable to them.

To that end the fraternal countries have proposed a whole range of measures to fundamentally restructure the international economic order. The development countries, as is attested by the extraordinary "South-South" conference of nonaligned states in Pyongyang, have reacted with satisfaction to the socialist states' proposals, which advocate the just settlement of such acute problems as the developing states' foreign debt and the protection of their national rights and interests from infringement by multinationals.

The USSR and allied countries again advocated the convening of a world forum which could discuss as an integral whole the most important international economic problems and questions of economic security, the establishment of a new economic order, the development of trading, scientific, and technical cooperation, and the eradication of everything burdening world economic ties.

There can be no doubt that the implementation of these proposals would largely promote an improvement in the international climate and the creation of more favorable conditions for mankind's progress toward a stable and lasting peace and the resolution of the central problem of our time -- arms reduction and disarmament.

Banning Nuclear Weapons [subhead]

The Disarmament Conference resumed work in Geneva last week. And from the very first day it focused on the joint initiative by the group of socialist countries. Their proposal for a draft treaty on the complete and comprehensive banning of a nuclear weapons tests is designed to promote the immediate initiation of full-scale talks at the Geneva forum on the problem, which is directly linked with the broader and more comprehensive process of limiting the arms race and ensuring nuclear disarmament.

The world public is well aware of our principled stance on the question of nuclear tests. The USSR has shown through practical actions that it is a firm and consistent proponent of banning nuclear weapons tests. And the fact that the Soviet Union had to end its unilateral moratorium that had lasted for more than 18 months was not its fault. It was a decision that was forced and imposed upon us.

We are now again inviting the United States to start full-scale talks on totally ending nuclear tests subject to strict international verification, including on-site inspection. The Soviet Union is also prepared as a first step toward this main aim to examine during the talks a number of interim solutions to limit the yield and number of underground nuclear explosions.

The Soviet Union has no shortage of goodwill. We are open to any constructive ideas in the direction of real disarmament. "The new proposals submitted by the socialist countries at the Geneva conference," a program on West Germany's ARD TV noted, "open up the possibility of translating statements about the desire for disarmament into practical decisions."

Regrettably, Washington is still not showing the political will needed to get things moving in this direction. The peoples of Europe and other continents are persistently demanding that the governments of the United States and the other Western countries switch from words to action in solving the fundamental problems of our time -- the complete and unconditional banning of nuclear tests and the reduction of nuclear arms and delivery means in order to save mankind from the threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe and realize the most treasured dream of all peace-loving peoples: to enter the 21st century without nuclear weapons.

Taking the First Step [subhead]

The other day it was announced at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva that the first joint draft of a treaty on medium-range missiles reflecting the sides' current positions had been compiled by the group on medium-range missiles. Of course, further work will still have to be done on preparing a fully coordinated joint

draft treaty on medium-range missiles. But the basis for such a treaty already exists. The ball is now entirely in the U.S. court. Pleading the need to win the support of its NATO partners, the United States has until recently been delaying the process of concluding preparations for the treaty in every possible way.

One cannot fail to agree with the opinion expressed at various levels in many countries that a treaty on the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe could already have become reality had it not been for the policy of sabotage on the part of the so-called "military party" -- those circles in the NATO countries which in no way want to abandon their gamble on nuclear weapons. Official Bonn had been stubbornly slow in defining its position until recently. Even now, after being reluctantly forced to consent to the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe, the FRG Government is insisting that Pershing-1 A missiles with U.S. nuclear warheads be retained.

Or take the final documents of the Venice "big seven" meeting. They contain many words about the importance of the arms control problem, but at the same time contain not even a reference to the Geneva talks on the problem of medium-range missiles. It was officially promised that the final definition of the NATO countries' coordinated position would be completed at the NATO Council session in Reykjavik. The press has reported that the foreign ministers have "finally reached agreement" on the Euromissiles problem and given the "go-ahead" to the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. But with conditions. With provisos. And to the accompaniment of propaganda alleging that the "military threat posed by the Soviet Union has not diminished." So judge for yourselves how sincere NATO'S "yes" in Reykjavik will be. It seems to me that there are no grounds as yet for excessive optimism on this question. The unpredictability of the evasive maneuvers and steps taken by Washington and some of its partners cannot but make us wary.

One wonders why not only the Western mass media but speeches by ranking statesmen both overseas and in West Europe are now stressing with renewed force the need for the NATO countries to continue to firmly follow the "nuclear deterrence" doctrine and build up the West's military might in every possible way. [paragraph continues]

Why are President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz currently unfurling the thesis that positive steps in the arms reduction sphere must be closely linked with the "human rights" problem and the growth of "confidence"? Things are interpreted in the following way: The Soviet Union should allegedly "prove" its readiness to heed Western appeals -- and sometimes a tougher word, "pressure," is used -- on these issues.

But why, one wonders, should the Soviet Union have to prove anything? Does your country flout the most elementary human rights -- the right to work, housing, social security, and racial equality? Does the USSR persecute people for their political activity in defense of peace or their participation in antiwar demonstrations? Should not the Americans be concerned about the beam in their own eyes rather than the motes in others'?

The same can be said about the "confidence problem." Our country is doing everything possible to confirm through action its readiness to expand mutual understanding and cooperation both with the United States and the other Western countries. In complete accordance with the principles of new political thinking firmly asserted in the USSR's approach to the problems of the nuclear age, the Soviet Union sees states with different political systems as partners bearing equal responsibility for the fate of peace. The methods of which not only the propaganda media but sometimes even the highest-ranking

figures in the capitalist world resort, in depicting the Soviet Union and our people as an "enemy" which thinks only of "occupying" the United States and seizing foreign territory, are alien to us. No, it is not us but Western -- and primarily U.S. -- leaders that ought to ponder how to restore confidence in their policies.

Incidentally, let us look at the facts. A few days ago the results of an opinion poll in various countries were published. They are very eloquent and speak for themselves: The overwhelming majority of those polled believe that the plaudits in the struggle for progress in the arms control sphere belong to the USSR. That is the opinion of, for instance, 83 percent of those polled in Britain and 72 percent of those pulled in the FRG.

More and more people in the world believe that given political will on the part of statesmen in the West and the East it is possible to achieve far-reaching agreements in the nuclear disarmament sphere. The Soviet Union has proved through its practical actions that it has such will. This is seen most concretely and eloquently in the USSR's approach to the medium-range missile problem. It was the Soviet proposals that brought the medium-range missile talks into the finishing straight.

The onus is now on our partners, from the whom the USSR expects reciprocal movement.

Life persistently dictates that the first, exceptionally important step be finally taken on the difficult but only sensible path toward the complete and universal elimination of nuclear weapons on earth and the prevention of their transfer to peace.

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RELATED ISSUES

ROWNY, CHERVOV ARTICLES ON ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

PM171115 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 June 1987 Second Edition carries on page 4 two articles under the rubric "From Different Positions."

The first article, under the heading "'Arms Control Is Not an End in Itself,'" is by Lieutenant General Edward Rowny, retired, special adviser to the U.S. President and Secretary of State for arms reduction talks. It is "from the speech delivered at the recent international meeting of experts in Sochi organized by the United Nations in conjunction with the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace" and reads:

"First of all, I think it is important to state clearly that the United States does not view arms control as an end in itself. Arms control should be regarded as a means which countries use to consolidate their security and to support their national interests. Indeed, to be really effective and stable, arms control agreements must be accompanied by respect for and observance of all the principles and provisions of the UN Charter.

"As President Reagan has noted, real peace is not simply the absence of war. That is why it is not based on the simple absence or limitation of arms. Arms control, for instance, is just one of four bases on which the United States is seeking to improve relations with the Soviet Union. The three other fundamental goals are the settlement of regional conflicts, progress in fields which affect bilateral relations such as exchanges between people, and the promotion of the cause of the observance of human rights.

"The Soviet Union's participation in regional conflicts is a critically important indicator of whether its global goals are promoting peace on the planet... The situation in human rights and fundamental liberties in the USSR also has profound influence on the state of East-West relations. We are following with great interest the recently emerged phenomenon of glasnost or openness. After the release of several political prisoners and a certain easing of censorship on self-expression in the cultural field, we hope there will be a far greater easing of repressions. In our opinion, this will require not simply cosmetic changes. Deeds, not words, are needed. If truly in-depth reforms take place in the Soviet system, I can bear out that our confidence will grow in the USSR's observance of agreements in arms control.

"The United States' arms control goals are closely interlinked with our military and foreign policy aimed at stepping up the deterrent [sderzhivayushchiy] factor and stability. Since the present administration came to power President Reagan has put forward the following fundamental principles:

"-- we are seeking only agreements which reduce forces and do not simply limit them;

"-- to this end we are seeking agreements on broad, in-depth, and equal reductions in offensive armaments;

"-- within the framework of offensive nuclear weapons we give priority to the reduction of the most destabilizing form of these weapons, that is high-velocity ICBM's which cannot be turned back;

"-- we are also seeking fair agreements on arms control in the sphere of nuclear tests, chemical weapons, and conventional armaments;

"-- we insist on agreements which can effectively be monitored. Agreements in the arms control field lacking clauses on effective monitoring are worse than the complete absence of agreements.

"These principles comprise the core of our efforts to put arms control on an honest footing. But it must be admitted that a whole series of previous agreements were erroneous in concept. These agreements suffered from being violated by the Soviet Union. For instance, the defects of the 1979 SALT II treaty were typical defects of previous agreements. In contravention of SALT II the Soviet Union encoded telemetric data connected with the testing of ballistic missiles causing difficulties over monitoring measures. The USSR has deployed a second new type of ICBM's banned under the treaty -- the SS-25 -- and has exceeded the numerical ceiling for strategic nuclear charge delivery vehicles.

"Moreover, the Soviets are violating the ABM Treaty by arming their installation in Krasnoyarsk. This enormous radar station with a phased array is a violation of the ABM Treaty because of its location, orientation, and potential.

"The United States has put forward far-reaching proposals which could considerably reduce the threat emanating from offensive strategic armaments, medium-range nuclear missiles, and chemical weapons. We are now working on concluding an agreement on in-depth reductions of medium-range missiles. But although we welcome any stabilizing reductions of medium-range missiles which enhance security, it is also essential to seek progress in other fields, including strategic nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and conventional forces. On 8 May the U.S. delegation in Geneva submitted a draft treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic systems in accordance with the Reykjavik formula. This draft provides for specific reductions of the most destabilizing and dangerous nuclear systems.

"Positive movement is also necessary to reduce the imbalance in conventional armaments and the introduction of a monitorable ban on chemical weapons. In April 1984 at the Geneva disarmament conference, the United States submitted the draft for an all-embracing treaty on banning the development, production, utilization, transportation, and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

"As for conventional forces, at the Vienna talks NATO is seeking scrupulously to answer all questions which cause concern for the Soviet side while the Soviets have still failed to give a constructive reply to the Western initiatives.

"Only when the Soviet Union begins to work seriously on the solution of the questions on the broad agenda affecting peace on the planet will it be possible to say it is taking the necessary steps on the path of creating a more secure world."

The second article, under the heading "Words and Deeds," is by Lieutenant General Nikolay Chervov, chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. It reads as follows:

"Rowny's thesis, which proposes linking arms control questions with other problems, was condemned by the experts at the meeting addressed by the U.S. spokesman. [paragraph continues]

Naturally, we believe that regional problems, human rights, and bilateral relations are important. We do not belittle the significance of these problems -- they must be discussed and we do discuss them with the U.S. side at all forums and talks. We have something to say to the U.S. side on all these questions. In particular the Soviet public is concerned by the repressions against fighters of peace in the United States and the position of political prisoners in U.S. prisons, about which Mr Rowny, for understandable reasons, keeps quiet, preferring to expatiate on human rights anywhere except the United States, in his own country, where this problem is becoming increasingly acute. But there is a fundamental question, including in Soviet-U.S. relations. That is the reduction of nuclear armaments and the solution of the problem of space.

"Now regarding the statement about the U.S. Administration's desire to halt nuclear tests. Alas, this is the only words, demagoguery. For 18 months we preserved the moratorium and urged the U.S. side to adhere to it, but it categorically refused. There is an official statement from President Reagan and Rowny himself to the effect that as long as there are nuclear weapons nuclear tests must be carried out. We suggest to the administration halting tests right now.

"As for chemical weapons, Rowny has given priority to verification [kontrol]. He says verification is now an obstacle in reaching a convention on banning and destroying chemical weapons. That is not completely true because there are other obstacles, which the U.S. side is creating. In particular, Americans are reluctant to review and ban binary chemical weapons. These are new lethal chemical weapons. What kind of convention on banning chemical weapons will it be if Americans allow themselves to create and produce a new type of weapon of this sort? In addition the United States is trying to remove from verification the production capacities of private commercial enterprises and multinational corporations, where 50-60 percent of the volume of chemical weapons production is concentrated.

"The problem of conventional armaments is a serious one. We do not belittle it. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries advocate lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe. But for a year now neither the United States nor NATO as a whole has given a constructive answer to the Warsaw Pact's Budapest program, which provides for 25 percent reduction of conventional armaments in the early nineties.

"As for the observance of treaties, it is wrong for Rowny to pose as a guardian of the treaties, for after all the United States itself is flagrantly violating them. The U.S. side has in fact discarded the SALT II treaty. The United States has totally rejected this treaty, is failing to observe it, and is violating ceilings. At the same time it has to find some reason! It turns out that the Soviet Union is to blame. It is allegedly violating the SALT II treaty, allegedly creating a second new type of ICBM, and encoding telemetric data!

"Of course, that is not the reason, the reason is that the SALT II treaty was impeding the Americans' new programs. They had come up against the framework of the SALT II treaty. The question arose whether to observe the treaty or to halt the military program. As we know, the U.S. side chose the path which rejects the treaty and cancels it.

"About the creation of a new missile in the USSR. Under the SALT II treaty the creation of one new type of ICBM is permitted. We have this one new type. What the Americans tell us is a second new type is the modernization of an existing missile. They are perfectly well aware of the fact, we have explained it. In fact they have no argument to offer, but in their propaganda they continue to crank up this thesis.

"Under the SALT II treaty the encoding of telemetric data while testing ballistic missiles is not banned unless this encoding makes it more difficult for the other side to monitor the fulfillment of the SALT II treaty. We do not encode that part of telemetric data which is required for monitoring the fulfillment of the treaty's provisions. The Americans have frequently been asked to state which telemetric parameters have in their opinion been coded and prevented monitoring. They give no reply. Well, since they give no reply that means this is all a soap bubble, a fabricated accusation.

"As for the Krasnoyarsk radar station the reason is that the U.S. has now constructed a radar station in Thule (Greenland) and has embarked on the construction of a similar radar station in Britain. All this is a gross violation of the ABM Treaty inasmuch as the radar station constructed in Greenland and the one under construction in Britain are banned by the ABM Treaty. It only permits radar stations on the periphery of national territory. But neither Greenland nor Britain are peripheral territories of the United States. Regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar station, it should be said that it is not a missile attack warning station. It is a station for tracking objects in space and we have it at the construction stage and it will be commissioned later.

"The United States, as Rowny rightly noted, has indeed submitted a draft treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments. But what kind of draft is it? On its basis we will undoubtedly fail to reach an agreement. First, the Americans know the Soviet side's position in accordance with which strategic offensive armaments can only be reduced by 50 percent or more if there is a ban on tests of ABM components in space and if the matter is linked to the solution of the problem of space and the rigid, strict fulfillment of all provisions of the ABM Treaty. It is this provision -- and it is fundamental and basic -- which is lacking in the U.S. draft treaty. That is why this point alone already makes it impossible to reach agreement. In addition the draft mainly affects the limitation of Soviet military programs for strategic arms and in no way affects U.S. military programs.

"Nonetheless we hope that real opportunities exist for reaching an accord with the United States on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. For that, it is essential that the U.S. should finally move from words to deeds.

MOSCOW URGES LIMITATION OF SEA-BASED NUCLEAR ARMS

LD222029 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 22 May 87

[Text] At a session of the UN Committee on Disarmament in New York the delegations of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union have tabled a working document entitled "Naval Armaments and Disarmament in the Field." In the following commentary Radio Moscow's defense correspondent Aleksandr Vasilyev looks at the document and at the whole question of naval armament. This is what he writes:

The proposal of the three socialist countries to slow down the buildup in the sea-based nuclear weapons stems logically from the complex of the Soviet initiatives aimed at clearing the world of nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range, ground and sea-based. To speed up the solution of this problem the Soviet Union has decided to break up the package of its proposals put forward in Reykjavik and has suggested that an agreement be reached over each separate issue. While certain progress has been made in the work of eliminating nuclear missiles in Europe and talks are underway over the reduction of strategic missiles, sea-based nuclear weapons have not yet attracted enough attention of the world public. This is an especially alarming factor in view of the fact that NATO leaders, for instance, intend to sharply intensify the build up of nuclear weapons on board the ships and submarines deployed near the shores of the European continent in order to make up for the elimination of nuclear missiles in Europe. It's hardly surprising, therefore, that the socialist countries have proposed that urgent steps should be taken towards containing the race in the sea-based nuclear arms. It's enough to say that out of the 50,000 nuclear warheads accumulated in the world a considerable part is based at world seas. One nuclear submarine has the destructive potential of surpassing in strength all that was blown up during World War II, and the United States alone has no less than 20 such submarines on a constant combat patrol.

It's hard to imagine what would happen if even a smaller part of the nuclear weapons hidden in the ocean depths is ever used. Each of the nuclear warheads mounted on submarines is no less than 10 times more powerful in comparison to the bomb that was blasted in Hiroshima, and the British submarine fleet alone has about 400 such warheads.

The buildup of the sea-based nuclear weapons proceeds at a constantly increasing pace. The United States sets the tone for this. In the last 2 years it has increased the number of nuclear warheads at its nuclear carrying submarines almost by 20 percent. Every Trident system mounted today on American submarines surpasses 10 nuclear submarines of the Polaris class in its strike capability.

France and Britain are trying to catch up with their NATO ally. They are putting into effect the unparalleled programs for modernizing their sea-based nuclear arsenals. With the completion of these programs the number of nuclear warheads on British submarines is expected to increase by almost 40 percent. The surface vessels and attack submarines carrying out combat patrol practically in all the explosion-prone parts of the world should also be put into the bargain. Many of them are already furnished and others are being furnished with nuclear weapons and their delivery means. Some 1,500 nuclear munition units and over 600 nuclear-carrying aircraft are concentrated on American aircraft carriers alone. Planes of the carrier-borne French and British aviation are also capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Aware of the dangerous nature of a further build up in sea-based nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have proposed on many occasions that possible ways be considered of reducing that element in the states' military might, both within the general context of measures aimed at limiting it and also at corresponding talks on nuclear disarmament. The decision not to deploy nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean could be made as a first step.

The Soviet Union is prepared to take upon itself a pledge not to deploy nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean and in regional countries if all other nuclear powers are willing to do the same. The Soviet proposal to withdraw nuclear-carrying vessels from the Mediterranean and to renounce the deployment of nuclear weapons on territories of the Mediterranean littoral countries that have no such weapons remain in force.

In the opinion of the socialist countries the attempt at curbing the buildup in sea-based nuclear weapons could become a major contribution to the establishment of an all-embracing security system.

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