

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

UKRAINE'S SECURITY OPTION IN THE NEW EUROPE

by

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December 1998

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19990115 011

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 1998		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE : UKRAINE'S SECURITY OPTION IN THE NEW EUROPE			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Golopatyuk, Leonid S.				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Since the disintegration of the Soviet empire, the independence of Ukraine has become one of the most significant geopolitical factors for the security and stability of Europe. To a great extent, the future European security order depends on Ukraine's security option in the new Europe. While cognizant of other security options — for instance, to integrate in the West or to join the pro-Russian security treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States — Ukraine has defined itself as neutral. In its security policy, Ukraine intends to participate in Europe's major institutions, to develop close relations with its strategic partners and neighbors, and to maintain constructive relations with Russia. The process of Ukraine's self-definition in a new European security architecture promises to continue to present great challenges.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS European Union; European Security Architecture; Commonwealth of Independent States; Strategic Partnership; National Security; Neutrality			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 83	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified		20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI

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
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1998

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ABSTRACT

Since the disintegration of the Soviet empire, the independence of Ukraine has become one of the most significant geopolitical factors for the security and stability of Europe.

To a great extent, the future European security order depends on Ukraine's security option in the new Europe. While cognizant of other security options – for instance, to integrate in the West or to join the pro-Russian security treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States – Ukraine has defined itself as neutral. In its security policy, Ukraine intends to participate in Europe's major institutions, to develop close relations with its strategic partners and neighbors, and to maintain constructive relations with Russia.

The process of Ukraine's self-definition in a new European security architecture promises to continue to present great challenges.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE	1
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC AND METHODOLOGY	2
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW EUROPE AND INDEPENDENT UKRAINE.....	5
A. THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND BUILDING A NEW EUROPEAN SEACURITY ARCHITECTURE	5
B. KEY POINTS ABOUT UKRAINIAN HISTORY	8
C. EMERGENCY OF AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE IN DECEMBER 1991.....	10
III. UKRAINE'S SECURITY OPTION.....	15
A. A NEW GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF UKRAINE.....	15
B. GEOPOLITICAL AND STRATEGIC PRIORITIES	18
C. NEUTRALITY - AS A STRATEGIC OPTION OF UKRAINE.....	27
D. WESTERN, NATO, AND UKRAINIAN COOPERATION. INTERESTS AND PERSPECTIVES.	29
E. UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.....	42
F. ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH SELECTED COUNTRIES.	48
IV. CONCLUSIONS.....	57
BIBLIOGRAPHY	63
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	69

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, world attention has focused on the future of the new independent states in Central and Eastern Europe. As an integral part of this region, Ukraine plays a significant role in establishing the new European security order.

As a new system of international relations is being formed on the global and regional levels, it is imperative for Ukraine's national security to define its own place in the new geopolitical environment, and to outline and pursue its foreign policy interests and priorities.

Ukraine has declared its neutrality as an international legal status. Ukraine has adopted this policy as a means of obtaining full independence, political stability and economic prosperity. These goals do not contradict Ukraine's participation in cooperation with European institutions. Furthermore, according to Ukrainian officials, Ukraine has reserved the right to join any political-military structure that can help to provide for its national security.

The thesis concludes that, despite the success that Ukraine has achieved in recent years, several important problems must be resolved.

The need for coherent and complementary policies, domestic and international. Ukraine's foreign policy must be grounded on sound internal policies and political processes. Foreign policy should in turn have an influence on the process of creating favorable conditions for the internal development of the Ukrainian state. In this fashion Ukraine may be able to deal with crisis situations with its foreign policy and internal policy spheres properly correlated.

The improvement and normalization of Ukraine's relationship with Russia. It is necessary to determine what model of relations with Russia will be chosen by Ukraine.

Deepening relations, particularly in the economic domain, with Russia may be a step into a deadlock, a path that leads nowhere. Kyiv needs to separate its economic and political relations with Russia.

Russia is Ukraine's great neighbor. Ukraine must maintain constructive relations with Russia, and there are prospects for Ukraine in Russia. But it is only possible to achieve these prospects in the framework of European institutions, after Ukraine deepens its participation in these institutions, adopts European technologies, and comes with them to the Russian markets.

It is not enough to sign treaties and to solve particular controversial problems in relations with Moscow. It is necessary to change the nature of these relations. The only wise course is to make Ukrainian-Russian relations a part of a constructive system of intra-European relations, within the limits of a greater Europe.

Pursuing Ukraine's integration into Europe. Ukraine's future lies within European institutional structures, and the West should support the process of deepening Ukrainian participation in these structures. Western political and economic support will have a critical impact not only on Ukraine's ability to maintain its independence but also on Eastern Europe. The West – especially the European Union – should do more to assist Ukraine's economic transformation and to promote Ukrainian prosperity. If Ukraine is to reduce its economic dependence on Russia, it needs to find other markets for its exports.

The United States and its European allies should also encourage closer political and economic ties between Ukraine and Central Europe. Such links can help to tie Ukraine more closely to Europe and enable Kyiv to reduce its political and economic dependence on the Commonwealth of Independent States.

NATO enlargement will also have an important impact on Ukraine's security. The United States and its allies should keep in mind Ukraine's fragile security situation and

develop a policy that enhances Ukraine's ability to pursue an independent policy and that strengthens its Western ties.

Overcoming Ukraine's economic crisis by rapidly introducing real market reforms.

Ukraine's economy must be reformed by its own efforts. However, the practical problems are so numerous that substantial financial and technical assistance from the West is temporarily needed to help overcome the economic crisis and to establish full, equal and mutually advantageous relations with the West. By helping Ukraine recover, the West will make an investment in its own security and open the door to Ukraine's huge market and potential.

As Ukraine consolidates its identity in the Central European mainstream, the door to membership in (or association with) the full range of European and Trans-Atlantic institutions will remain open.

Ukraine has the opportunity to build on its foreign policy successes to create a climate for economic growth at home. And as economic prosperity takes hold, it will strengthen Ukraine's integration with Europe and the West.

Kyiv can ensure the sovereignty and even the prosperity of Ukraine, if it adopts a strategic vision capable of inspiring the nation. That vision must be of Ukraine as a key Central European nation and an important linchpin in the Western economic and security system. Ukraine must at the same time maintain a constructive relationship with Russia.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author would like to acknowledge and thank Professor Thomas Bruneau for his wisdom, encouragement, and skillful guidance in this job.

With all my heart, I would also like to say a very special thank-you to Professor David Yost who is really the great scholar, expert, intellectual, amazing teacher, and simply an interesting man. His breadth of mind, refinement, flexibility, and forbearance were extremely essential to the successful completion of this project.

My thanks also extend to Dr. Mikhail Tsykin and Dr. Donald Abenheim for their openness, benevolence, and valuable comments.

Finally, I owe my deepest gratitude to the closest and most influential persons in my life, my wife and daughter. Without their loving support and tireless patience this endeavor would not have been possible.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE

The unification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of a number of newly independent states in Europe are among the most remarkable events of twentieth century history. The disappearance of such geopolitical realities as the Warsaw Pact and the USSR has removed the old totalitarian pressure from over half the European continent, giving many nations the chance to integrate with Western society. The final disintegration of the Soviet totalitarian empire, the destruction of its military machine, and the creation of the strip of independent states along the European-Russian border between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea are the main consequences of the Soviet collapse.

As Zbigniew Brzezinski has noted, the geopolitical significance of the emergence of an independent Ukraine could be compared with the changes that took place in Europe after World War II.¹ Because of its large population, vast and strategically situated territory, rich natural resources, powerful industrial and scientific potential, developed transport systems, and convenient transit routes, Ukraine occupies a special place among the newly independent states. Indeed, according to John Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, Ukraine "is crucial for the stability of Europe."²

Before the disintegration of the USSR, Ukraine played an important role in the Soviet imperial system. Nearly 20 per cent of the Soviet Union's products were manufactured in Ukraine. Ukrainian agriculture was the main supplier of Russia's food. A considerable part of Soviet transit to Europe passed through Ukraine, particularly pipelines and electric power networks. More than one third of the Soviet military-industrial complex was located on Ukrainian territory.

¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Plan for Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 74, No.1, January/February 1995, pp. 36-37.

² John E. Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, "Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin," *Foreign Affairs* 75, No.3, May/June 1996, p. 52.

Historically, Ukraine has been both the target and site of various conflicts among competing empires, most notably Ottoman Turkey and Poland, Austria-Hungary and Tsarist Russia, and then Soviet Russia and Germany, seeking to expand their domains or to solidify borders. Emerging as an independent state in 1991, Ukraine has not forgotten its past and has built much of its security policy on the basis of its historical experiences.

In its foreign policy, although it has defined itself as "neutral," Ukraine has been challenged by two other security options: to develop close relations with the West, or to integrate itself into the Moscow-dominated security treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, since it was first declared in December 1991, Ukrainian security policy has aimed to balance the following principles: pursuing gradual but steady integration into Europe's political and economic structures, affirming its neutrality and developing special relationships with selected countries and institutions, and maintaining constructive and friendly relations with Russia.

The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze Ukraine's neutrality option as a means of providing for its security, preserving its independence, and encouraging the course of democratic transformation.

B. IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis topic is important for various reasons. As Brzezinski has pointed out, "Ukraine is just too big, too important, and its existence too sensitive a matter to both Russia and the West."³ This importance can be explained as follows. First, Ukraine has the ability to play a bridging role between NATO and Russia, and more effort should be put into developing this role, under conditions of Ukraine's active participation in European security institutions in order to heighten its credibility as a bridge and as a regional stabilizing force.⁴

³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 74, No.1, January/February 1995, pp. 37-38.

⁴ Roman Popadyuk, "Ukraine: The Security Fulcrum of Europe?" *Strategic Forum*, No.69, April 1996, pp. 1-2.

Second, as the process of NATO enlargement proceeds, the West should undertake a decisive effort to support and strengthen Ukraine's own domestic and external abilities to maintain its security.

Finally, serious political and economic support of democratic Ukraine by the West would be an investment in the development of democracy and stability in Russia.

The thesis addresses a number of related issues, such as:

- How did Ukraine emerge as an independent country?
- What security options should Ukraine prefer in its policy?
- Why has Ukraine defined itself as "neutral"?
- What external and internal factors influenced its choice to pursue the option of neutrality, at least in the foreseeable future?
- Why are Ukraine's policy and development so important for building a new Europe?

The thesis explores multiple aspects of a single case study: the participation of Ukraine in building a new European security architecture and Ukraine's efforts to protect and advance its own security interests.

The thesis seeks to address some of the challenges facing Ukraine, to assess the prospects for the neutrality option of national security for Ukraine, and to recommend approaches for resolving external and internal challenges, thereby reinforcing Ukraine's security.

Chapter II describes the process of building a new European security order after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of Ukraine as an independent state in December 1991. It also offers a brief overview of Ukrainian history.

Chapter III examines Ukraine's possible strategic priorities in a new geopolitical environment. Analyzing neutrality as the strategic option pursued by Ukraine, the chapter explores Ukraine's interests and prospects in cooperation with the West and in relations with Russia. The chapter also offers recommendations for establishing special relations with Ukraine's strategic partners and neighbors.

Chapter IV summarizes the conclusions of the thesis research. The thesis concludes that, in order to become politically and economically independent, and to play

an important role in European security, Ukraine needs to a) reduce its economic dependence and establish more balanced relations with Russia, and b) integrate into the European structures, and thereby receive Western political and economic support, and thus overcome the economic crisis by implementing effective reforms.

II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW EUROPE AND INDEPENDENT UKRAINE

A. THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND BUILDING A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The dominant feature of international politics during the period that began shortly after the defeat of Nazi Germany and that ended in 1991 was the Cold War. The end of that conflict and the radically changed position of the former Soviet Union allowed the current world order to begin.

The year between the destruction of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Paris in November 1990 saw the removal of the most important manifestation of the Cold War: the division of Germany and Europe.⁵ The division of Europe had symbolized the global battle between the ideological and geopolitical camps in the decades immediately after World War II. When that division came to an end, the consequences for the international balance of power were so substantial that all but the most hardened cold warriors in the West were forced to acknowledge that the Cold War had ended – even before the collapse of communist rule in the Soviet Union or the Soviet Union itself.

Moreover, the revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe was decisive not only in demonstrating that the ideological support for the international political order of the Cold War had been removed, but also in shifting the actual balance of power. The removal of Soviet military power from Eastern Europe dissolved the threat to Western Europe and also restored a reunified Europe to the center of the world political stage.

The disappearance of such geopolitical realities as the Warsaw Pact and the USSR has removed the old totalitarian pressure from over half of the European continent, giving

⁵ The Heads of State or Government of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe during the meeting in Paris on 19-21 November 1990 declared that “the era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended...and henceforth, our relations will be founded on respect and cooperation.” *Charter of Paris for New Europe*, Paris, 1990. Available HTTP: [http:// www osce.org](http://www.osce.org)

many nations the chance to join, or at least, cooperate with Western economic, political, and security institutions. But it has also created a "security vacuum" in this part of Europe, where difficult economic and social situations, border disputes (e.g., Ukraine-Romania) and ethnic tensions (e.g., in the Balkan region) have actually lowered the general level of stability from that of the Cold War period.

While it will take some time to complete the ambitious transformation process now taking place in Central and Eastern Europe, it is necessary to deal immediately with present instabilities and to prevent additional ones from developing. This will require the creation of a reliable and flexible cooperative security system, so the nations involved can secure the lasting peace and stability that the transformation process needs in order to succeed.

The idea of a comprehensive all-European security system is not a new one; it has reappeared often in the international politics of the twentieth century and, in fact, in European history since the fourteenth century. However, it is only now, when the principles of openness and cooperation are gaining practical ground, that a European security system, which was declared by the Joint Declaration of the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Paris in November 1990 with regard to states within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), seems to have a chance for success.

The complexities of developing modern international security – even when the current circumstances are compared with the periods of the Alta Conference and the Cold War – make it impossible, from a practical point of view, to design a fixed security scheme for Europe.⁶

The emergence of a number of newly independent states, all striving for democratic development, will easily break any rigid model. The national identities,

⁶ Yalta Conference. "A major executive agreement concluded during World War II at a summit conference of the Big Three (President Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Premier Joseph Stalin) held at Yalta in the Soviet Crimea in February 1945 to develop joint strategy in the final stages of the war against Germany and Japan, and to resolve postwar political problems..." In Barbara P. McCrea, Jack C. Plato, George Klein, *The Soviet and East European Political Dictionary*, Santa Barbara, California and Oxford, England: ABC – CLIO, Inc., 1984, p. 343.

cultural, and historical experiences, and interests of these new post-communist democracies, including Ukraine, must continually be taken into account.

Europe and the world are now multipolar and, at least within OSCE, the Euro-Atlantic region is nominally united and indivisible. The worst possible development must be avoided: a new division of the European continent. It is necessary to comprehend the reality that both multipolarity and unity can now be seen in all the complex cooperation processes underway in Europe today within the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), and NATO.

Most Europeans have already come to accept this wisdom not only on a practical level of economic and political cooperation – but also on a philosophical level. Most Europeans recognize the need for a broad and comprehensive approach to European security. For this reason, having become recently an independent actor on the international stage, “Ukraine believes that international institutions capable of contributing to regional security, such as OSCE, NATO, EAPC [Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council], WEU, EU, PfP [Partnership for Peace], and the Council of Europe, should become the pillars of the new European security architecture.”⁷ The task is now to coordinate these organizations’ activities and divide the responsibilities equally and fairly, according to the principle of complementarity.

Standing firmly against the creation of new dividing lines in Europe, “Ukraine is convinced that with enough political will, it is possible to find appropriate, mutually advantageous modalities of European integration, including different levels of integration for new European democracies into such basic structures as EU, WEU, and NATO.”⁸

Regarding itself as an integral part of the Central and Eastern European region, and taking into account its unique geopolitical situation, Ukraine sees itself as a key participant in the European security debate and as a full-scale organic part of the new European security architecture. As Sherman Garnett has observed, “Ukraine is the

⁷ Hennady Udovenko, “European Stability and NATO Enlargement: Ukraine’s Perspective,” *NATO Review*, No. 6, November 1995, p. 2. Available HTTP:

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4

keystone in the arch of the emerging security environment in Central and Eastern Europe. It is a state that is too large and too geographically central to this emerging security environment to be ignored.”⁹

It is a remarkable feature of the new Europe that so many ancient countries, including Ukraine, have reemerged and are finding their rightful place alongside their European neighbors.

Ukraine has always had a distinct history. Sometimes its identity was submerged, and sometimes it was threatened; but it was never extinguished. Most Ukrainians consider the past as a story of repeated brutal efforts to subjugate their country, primarily on the part of Russia, but also Poland, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman Turkey. In this view of things, Ukraine’s history has been a record of betrayals, exploitations, suffering and partitions. To understand the aspiration of the Ukrainians, to determine their own future as a free and independent people, and their distinctiveness, one should keep some key points about Ukrainian history in mind.

B. KEY POINTS ABOUT UKRAINIAN HISTORY*

Ukraine’s turbulent history stretches back in time for hundreds of years, wars and invasions have taken a heavy toll. Now Ukraine wants to become a truly democratic and well-developed state.

The ancestors of the Ukrainians chose to live in this area during the Trypilska period several thousand years ago. In ancient times today’s Ukrainian land was inhabited by Antes and Rosses, the ancestors of Eastern Slavs.

It was here that in the ninth century one of the most powerful states of medieval Europe was founded. This was Kyivan Rus, which included Kyiv, Novgorod, Chernigiv,

⁹ Sherman W. Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997, p. 7.

* The chapter gives a brief review of Ukrainian history based on the facts derived largely from Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988.

powers and glories; at the time of Kyivan Rus, Kyiv was one of the richest and most developed cities of Europe.

However, in 1240, the Tatar-Mongols captured Kyiv, and Kyiv fell into a prolonged period of decline. The Tatar-Mongols ruled for almost three centuries thereafter. The Kyivan Rus State disintegrated and some of its territory came under the rule of Moscovy and Liethuania.

The world heard about Ukraine again during the times of the Cossack Republic -- Zaporizka Sich -- at the end of the fifteenth century. The long road to independence for the Ukrainian people began with Cossack military campaigns. In 1648-1654 Cossack armies headed by Hetman (military and state leader) Bohdan Khmelnytsky waged wars to liberate Ukraine from the Poles and the Crimean Tatars. Faced with ravaging attacks by the armies of Polish and Lithuanian feudal leaders from the West and the North, and by the Turks from the South, Khmelnytsky was forced to seek the protection of the Moscovite Tsar, formalizing the union of Ukraine and Moskovy (then Russia) by the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654.

Unfortunately, after this Ukraine plunged into a long period of domination by the Russian Empire. Despite repression and severe Tsarist autocratic rule, Ukraine in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries managed to preserve some values of political, economic, cultural, and religious development. Kyiv Mohyliyanska Academy became the first East European University. In that period the Ukrainians were one of the most educated peoples in the world and almost totally literate. Books were printed, philosophy was studied, and music, literature, and painting flourished. The first constitution appeared in Ukraine in 1711, during the time of the Cossacks.

But any further cultural development of Ukraine was checked by the Russian Empire, which was rapidly gaining strength. After winning the war against the Swedes that was fought on Ukrainian soil, Imperial Russia quickly turned Ukraine into a province with no rights whatsoever. Even the Ukrainian language was in danger of being extinguished. However, no amount of pressure could make the Ukrainians relinquish the idea of national revival.

The western part of Ukraine found itself under Polish, Austro-Hungarian, and Rumanian domination.

In January 1918, when the Russian Empire fell, the Ukrainians seized their opportunity and proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic, but it remained independent for only two years. The first President of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, was an outstanding scholar but not a hardened politician. Ukraine was torn by internal strife. The German occupation and later an invasion numerically superior Bolshevik forces put an end to Ukrainian independence. One should not forget that Ukraine, as a part of the Russian Empire, had just come out of the terrible experience of the First World War in which hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians had fought on the Russian side and on the Austro-Hungarian side. In this terrible tragedy Ukrainians were forced to kill their fellow Ukrainians in a conflict that was totally alien to their own interests.

The subsequent years under Soviet rule were a time of great suffering and almost total suppression of anything Ukrainian, with probably only one exception: the heavily Russianized Ukrainian language. Firing squads and concentration camps eliminated the most productive and promising Ukrainian intellectuals. Artificially created famines and deportations of the most industrious Ukrainian farmers to Siberia decimated the Ukrainian peasantry. The Nazi German invasion during the Second World War hit Ukraine especially hard. In spite of all these horrors the Ukrainian people have persevered. They have retained their national identity, and enough stamina to desire to change things radically.

C. EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE IN DECEMBER 1991

Ukraine was a cornerstone of the Russia-dominated Soviet imperial system. The negative features of the Soviet power appeared at the first plan a declining economy, a reduction of standards of living, an ecological disaster, and a violation of social and human rights, including national consciousness and culture. Thus when the opportunity to obtain

obtain independence came, Ukraine seized it. This event was like a funeral for the USSR, and it enabled the Ukrainians to enter the new epoch.

In 1986 the Soviet leadership began to reform the Soviet system. The goal of *perestroika* was to save the system through modernization. However, because the changes threatened the party apparatus, it resisted them. The Ukrainian Communist Party led by Volodimir Shcherbitsky was the most conservative wing of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the influence of a policy of *glasnost* – a certain degree of openness and freedom of speech -- was rather effective. *Glasnost* brought results that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev did not foresee.

A broad wave of public indignation was caused by the Soviet government's manipulation of information during the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986. Chernobyl was a revelation that opened people's eyes to the other terrible ecological crimes committed by the Soviet system.

Soon there were the attempts to learn about the so-called "white stains" of Ukraine's history. The truth about the Great Famine in 1932-33 evoked passionate sentiments.¹⁰ Simultaneously there appeared sensational information about mass burial places of Ukrainians shot by the KGB during the 1930s and 1940s. The truth about Ukraine's history supported a revival of the ancient national symbols. The yellow-blue flag, officially prohibited by both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, was instantly in sight -- that caused tremendous indignation among the communist party's oligarchy. Ukrainians restored from memory words of the forbidden national anthem, and fastened the symbolic trident on their clothes. These symbols have played a double role: they demonstrated support for the national revival, and also rejection of the Soviet system.¹¹

¹⁰ See "Case Studies: Persecution/Genocide," *The Human Rights Series*, Vol. III, NY: The University of the State of New York, 1986.

¹¹ The trident – *tryzub* – is the national symbol of Ukraine. The earliest archeological excavations of the trident date back to the first century A.D. Ukrainian Grand Prince Volodymyr the Great used the trident on his gold and silver coins. In 1918, the Trident was approved by the Central Rada in Kyiv as the official coat of arms in independent Ukraine. The Ukrainian flag is made up of two horizontal stripes, the upper one light blue (symbolizing the open sky) and the lower – yellow (symbolizing the wheat fields of Ukraine). Both the blue-yellow flag and the trident have been restored since Ukraine's declaration of independence on August 24, 1991.

By 1989 the slow but growing stream of changes in Ukraine reached a crucial point. It was transformed from the sphere of oral debates to political activity. Most informal public organizations were combined to create the organization "Rukh" (People's Movement of Ukraine), which announced the course of struggle for national sovereignty and independence. The appearance of this movement created a new and unusual situation in Ukraine. For the first time since the establishment of the Soviet regime, the political monopoly of the Communist Party was challenged. Other democratic movements and organizations shared a common ground and goals with "Rukh".

The events in March 1990 had great influence on Ukraine's future. In the election to the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament), despite the fact that the communists achieved a majority, the representatives of a democratic bloc received almost one third of the deputy mandates. The establishment of a new Parliament had great significance because, instead of the Communist Party, the Verkhovna Rada became the main center of political power in Ukraine.

At the same time thousands of members were abandoning the demoralized Communist Party. In Western Ukraine the dismantling of the monuments to Lenin began.

The important changes concerned the other realms of social life, particularly religion that began to exclude an artificially created Communist ideology.

By the end of 1990 it was clear that euphoria and optimism were disappearing. Instead, the deterioration of the economic situation became a big concern. On the one hand, the years of *perestroika* did not cause fundamental changes in the structure of the Soviet system, in that the Communists continued to dominate in a political, economic and social hierarchy. On the other hand, five years of *glasnost* brought about radical changes in ideology and public psychology.

The idea of national sovereignty was supported by the majority of Ukraine's population in the referendum on March 17, 1991.

On August 19-21, 1991, communist reactionaries undertook a desperate attempt to seize the political initiative. Having isolated Gorbachev in Crimea, the coup leaders -- relying on the military and KGB authorities -- declared themselves the State Committee

for the State of Emergency in an effort to preserve the Soviet system and the old order. This attempt failed, but the event itself caused unexpected consequences. The failed coup precipitated the processes that it strove to stop; it completely compromised the Communist Party, which was a main organizer of this plot. It also inflicted a defeat on the Soviet policy of centralism i.e., Moscow's rule over all the Soviet republics.

The unsuccessful coup d'etat created all the conditions necessary to get rid of the Moscow power elite; these conditions were exploited by those who were discontented. The democrats of Ukraine's Parliament did not waste any time in using this opportunity. On August 24, 1991, the Verkhovna Rada almost unanimously declared the Act of Proclamation of the Independence of Ukraine. Thus, the idea of independence was turned from utopia to reality.

Ukraine's overwhelming vote for independence in the All-Ukrainian Referendum conducted on December 1, 1991 delivered the decisive blow to the frail and failing attempts to preserve the USSR. Soon, the Presidents of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus declared that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and proclaimed a new "Commonwealth of Independent States" (CIS).

Within a few months, many countries recognized Ukraine's independence. By the time that Verkhovna Rada adopted "The Principal Directions of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine" on July 2, 1993, Ukraine had already achieved international de jure recognition. One hundred and forty-five countries had recognized Ukraine, and more than 100 of them had established diplomatic relations with it. In a short period of time, Ukraine managed to achieve its main goal – international recognition as a state, as an equal partner in international relations, and as an actor in international affairs.

The road to independence has been long and difficult; many of the milestones are covered with blood. But, at last, the Ukrainians have achieved what they were striving for -- Ukraine regained its sovereignty in 1991.

There were four prior attempts to achieve statehood as the ultimate expression of the national spirit. The first one was at the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the middle of the seventeenth century; the second one was with Ivan Mazepa (state and military leader) in the early eighteenth century; the third attempt was with the Central Rada (Ukrainian

government) at the beginning of the twentieth century; and the fourth and successful attempt came in August of 1991. It was the culmination of many efforts and many aspirations. The Ukrainian people, having experienced much suffering and oppression, regained independence at long last.

It would be wrong to say that the Ukrainians just seceded or broke away from the Soviet empire -- it would be more appropriate to say that they severed the Soviet empire away from them. What happened in August 1991 was the most important event in several centuries of Ukrainian history. Much of this time Ukraine had lived in bondage. As F. Stephen Larrabee writes, "the collapse of the Soviet Union -- in which Ukraine played an instrumental role -- resulted in the achievement of a goal long-cherished by many Ukrainians: the establishment of a sovereign and independent Ukraine."¹²

There were many slogans put out in those memorable days of August 1991. There were many heroes; some became well known and some remained unknown. A great upsurge of national awareness and lofty spirits were the mainsprings of the events in August 1991. It is a remarkable fact that the Ukrainian people have managed to do everything peacefully; this can be a positive example for many other nations to follow.

¹²F. Stephen Larrabee, "Ukraine's Balancing Act," *Survival* 38, No. 2, Summer 1996, p. 143.

III. UKRAINE'S SECURITY OPTION

Radical socio-political transformations in Central and Eastern Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s were caused by the end of the Cold War, and brought about structural changes with far-reaching effects in the geopolitical space in this part of the world. In essence, the formation of a new system of international relations on the global, regional, and sub-regional levels is now taking place.

Ukrainian foreign and security policy has many achievements to its credit. However, much remains to be done in the realm of foreign affairs, given the complex and difficult situation persisting now in Ukraine.

Therefore, it is extremely important for the future of Ukraine and its national security that the country finds its own place in the new geopolitical environment. Ukraine must construct good relations with its neighbors and outline its foreign policy interests wisely.

A. A NEW GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF UKRAINE

Today one can clearly trace the formation of three global geo-economic zones that will influence the future decades in world politics: European, North American, and Asian-Pacific.

The main vehicles of integration and cooperation in these zones have been regional organizations: namely, the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). Within these organizations a new system of leadership has emerged.¹³

The United States has supported the idea of creating a new transatlantic security structure that would combine North America and the integrated Europe, and the core of it

¹³ O. P. Moskalets, *Ukraine's National Security, Foreign Policy Issues*, Kyiv, National Institute of Strategic Studies 1997, pp. 110-111.

would be NATO. The United States has clearly formulated the continuation of its presence in Europe and participation in European affairs as key priorities¹⁴.

One of the U.S. goals in the future structure as it has been proclaimed, is the integration of Ukraine with Europe and into a world community where representative government, the rule of law, free and fair trade and cooperative security are the norm.¹⁵

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991, international relations have been characterized by the absence of the former keen ideological confrontation, the transformation from a bipolar to more multipolar array of power centers, and the increased prominence of geopolitical, regional, religious, and ethnic conflicts. Meanwhile, except for Greece, most of the countries that participated in the opposing blocs in Europe have been cutting the strength of their armed forces and their military budgets.

The present political map of Europe is rather conditional and unsteady. The process of national revival brought about the reappearance in the political arena of the Central and East European states. The separation from previous multinational formations has resulted in the emergence of new countries (Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and the republics of the former Yugoslavia and USSR). At the same time West European countries are becoming more integrated into the political and economic structures of the European Union.

Today, an intense discussion is going on about the character, main actors, and key factors, affecting geopolitics in Europe, particularly in its central and eastern parts. The issues include economic, geographical, socio-political, ethnic, and even religious and cultural dimensions. All of these factors complicate the task of organizing international security.

¹⁴ See *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1997, p. 4; also *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1996, p. 14.

¹⁵ *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1997, p. 22.

In the opinion of the majority of Ukrainian political scholars, the new geopolitical environment of Ukraine is being formed under the influence of two opposite tendencies: on the one hand, the process of disintegration and decentralization of the totalitarian system that existed "to the East of the Berlin wall"; on the other hand, the process of creating new sub-regional structures involving the East and Central European countries, and arranging for their cooperation with existing but transformed European regional institutions.

Until 1996, there was a disintegrative process in the center and to the east of Europe. This process happened sometimes in a civilized and peaceful way (Czechoslovakia), but more often took the form of military conflict. The tendency of this crisis caused East European countries and former Soviet republics to mobilize efforts to halting and overcome it. Since 1996, the disintegrative process has stopped, and a new process of sub-regional cooperation has begun.

Today, there are at least three "integrative spheres" in Europe. The first is Western Europe, where the "Maastricht process" is taking place with success. To some extent, at least, the European Union has legally combined this part of Europe into a united geopolitical space. The second sphere consists of Central Europe and the Baltic States. These countries are overcoming their crises with different degrees of success. The third sphere consists of the former Soviet republics that are united in a specific interstate formation -- the Commonwealth of Independent States. Each state belonging to the CIS interprets the essence of this organization in its own way, and has its own interests and goals. It is obvious that Russia has played the dominant role in this structure. Indeed, Russia has declared "the near abroad" as a zone of its "vital interests".

Practically any Central and East European country would be pleased to participate in the integration of the "Maastricht process". In reality, the residents of the West European "common house" have not rushed "to open the door" to their East European neighbors; and this is fully understandable. The Central and East European countries need to pass through certain stages of adaptation, to prove the viability of the new economic and political structures established since the collapse of totalitarianism, and to demonstrate their will and ability to cooperate.

B. GEOPOLITICAL AND STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

It is necessary to determine that Kyiv's foreign policy priorities correspond to Ukraine's national interests including its security interests.

Given the difficult and dramatic road of Ukraine to independence, this independence can only be presented if the national security of the Ukrainian State is reliably safeguarded. This security is not an end in itself, but a way of protecting the fundamental interests of the Ukrainian people.

It is important to underscore that the national security of Ukraine is an integral part of international security – on both the global and regional levels.

Let us consider the definition of “state security” used in this thesis. The elements of state security include the whole complex of factors that provide for the stability of the state, its capability to defend against and repulse external threats, and its capacity to act in accordance with its interests. The quality of state security is determined by the character of the country's interaction with other countries, taking into account national and state interests, including the defense of its historical and cultural values and its sovereignty.¹⁶

The analysis of the issues involved with security is impossible without outlining vital and important national interests of Ukraine and its priorities. Furthermore, internal and external threats must be evaluated.

Since the declaration of Ukraine's independence, the problem of prioritizing national interests -- that is, defining a hierarchy of interests -- has been an object of acute political and scholarly debate. Ukrainian society is split into several social groups, political parties and formations, each delineating its own hierarchy of priorities related to national security.

It is obvious that in conditions of socio-economic crisis, the majority of political parties and social groups emphasize the social and economic stabilization of Ukraine as a

¹⁶ O. Y. Manachinsky, *Military Security of Ukraine*, Kyiv: National Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997, pp. 7-10.

high priority. It is fully understandable, however, from the point of view of Ukrainian officials and experts that the realization of these vitally important interests would be practically impossible in the absence of real independence, strong state power, and constructive interactions with the world community.¹⁷

A correctly chosen geopolitical orientation provides a country with considerable privileges among equals. If the geopolitical orientation is chosen incorrectly, it may cause a country's downfall even in peacetime.

The geo-strategic position of Ukraine defines its role and place in a balance of power system that has already been formed in Europe. After the declaration of independence, the geographical position of Ukraine had not changed; however, Ukraine's geo-strategic interests in the system of balance of power in Europe had changed. Rather than forming part of a Moscow-directed Soviet empire, Ukraine had regained national independence.

The geopolitical position of Ukraine is determined by its history, its geographical situation, and its relationship to the cultural traditions of European civilization, and its economic links with other European countries. The recognition of Ukraine as an independent state does not yet mean that it has obtained the political status it deserves. This process is complex and lengthy. Besides, Ukraine is surrounded by states pursuing their own geo-politic and security. The collapse of the previous balance of power reflected by the Warsaw Pact and NATO military organizations brought about a renewal of ethno-territorial conflicts. Thus Ukraine has found itself between two regional centers of ethnic conflicts – the Balkans and the Caucasus, a situation that also can be deemed one of the threats to its national security.

¹⁷ M. A. Kulinich, "Ukraine in a New Geopolitical Environment," Kyiv, *Nauka i Oborona* 1, 1997, pp. 8-11.

According to research by Ukrainian experts,¹⁸ the national and geopolitical interests of Ukraine encompass:

- The entire present territory of Ukraine, to be preserved;
- The security and prosperity of Ukraine's neighbors, particularly, those regions where dense concentrations of ethnic Ukrainians are found;
- The geographical zones that directly adjoin Ukraine's border;
- The states with which Ukraine can join into alliance relations in order to counter an external threat.

Ukraine's national interests have constantly been influenced by the variety of factors that, under prevailing circumstances, have signified actual or potential threats to national security.

The general forms of the threats are many-sided due to their structure, and they affect different realms of social life in Ukraine. It is of great importance to underscore briefly the external potential threats:¹⁹

- Intervention in the domestic affairs of Ukraine by other states;
- Territorial claims against Ukraine, as well as actions against Ukraine's state sovereignty;
- Presence of foreign armed forces on Ukraine's territory;
- Military and political instability, including unsteadiness of the governmental institutions in the countries adjacent to Ukraine; and
- External support, overt or well concealed, for separatist tendencies in specific regions of Ukraine.

A rather paradoxical situation has emerged with regard to Ukraine's security. The present circumstances demand attention to the problems of seeking a way out of the socio-economic crisis. The stabilization of the political and economic conditions of the

¹⁸ O. Y. Manachinsky, *Military Security of Ukraine*, Kyiv: National Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997, p. 8.

¹⁹ M. O. Korop, "Geopolitics and National Security of Ukraine," Kyiv, *Nauka i Oborona* 4, 1995, pp. 20-28.

state is imperative. Taking into account the close ties and even dependence of Ukraine's social and economic spheres on the former Soviet republics that are also in the CIS, and in particular on Russia, the way out of the crisis and the keys for solving Ukraine's problems in carrying out effective socio-economic reforms actually should be found in interactions with these countries. The main actor in this context has been Russia.

At the same time, an analysis of the previously mentioned external threats shows that the major political factors that may generate these threats reside in the eastern neighbor or are to a large degree connected with it.

This situation might be called a "paradox of Ukraine's national security". This phenomenon brought about a heated discussion among most of the politicians and scholars both in Ukraine and abroad regarding Ukraine's strategic options in the new geopolitical setting.

Using different arguments and often guided by emotions, the participants in the discussion have reproached the leadership of Ukraine for lack of clarity in determining the nation's foreign policy strategy -- that is, whether to pursue a "pro-Western" or "pro-Russian" orientation, and so on.

The determination by Ukraine of its place in Europe and the world, including the formation of a hierarchy of national interests and foreign policy priorities, during the years of state independence since 1991 has been a very complicated process. The complexity of the process can also be partly explained by the specific role of Ukraine in the world community. In the opinion of Zbigniew Brzezinski, countries in Eurasia belong to two main groups: geo-strategic players and geopolitical pivots. "Active geo-strategic players are the states that have the capacity and the national will to exercise power or influence beyond their borders."²⁰ Brzezinski names "at least five key geo-strategic players" in Eurasia: France, Germany, Russia, China and India.

The states "whose importance is derived not from their power and motivation but rather from their sensitive location and from the consequences of their potentially

²⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1997, p. 40.

vulnerable condition for the behavior of geo-strategic players " belong to geopolitical pivots that are determined " by their geography, which in some cases gives them a special role either in defining access to important areas or in denying resources to a significant player."²¹ Using this approach, Brzezinski has argued that Ukraine is one of the countries that "play the role of critically important geopolitical pivots."²² The recognition of Ukraine's significant and responsible role has had an impact upon the nation's leadership. Ukraine has in recent years made only the first steps in defining its geo-strategic priorities.

It must be admitted that in 1991 many of the issues associated with Ukraine's foreign policy strategy, including the definition of its own national interests in the new geopolitical circumstances were viewed superficially by the public and by state officials, and sometimes even in a groundlessly romantic fashion. This happened for several reasons. First, there was a lack of experience in planning foreign policy strategy among the politicians and analysts. In 1991 Ukraine just did not have such professionals. The second was the vagueness of the basic social values that could furnish the grounds for modernization of a post-totalitarian society. The third reason was the complexity and uncertainty of the geo-strategic situation itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union.²³

Since Ukraine's declaration of independence, political leaders and analysts have attempted to find an adequate solution for Ukraine's security "paradox" and have determined a direction of strategic movement in the surrounding geopolitical environment. One result of their efforts was the formula "movement toward all the azimuths", in contrast, for example, to a formula such as "neither East nor West", or the Chinese model of "equidistance from the global centers of power."

²¹ Ibid., p. 41.

²² Ibid., p. 41.

²³ V. Kremlin, D. Bezljuda, V. Bondarenko, *The Common Problems of Transformation of Ukrainian Society: Socio-Political Situation in Ukraine*, Kyiv, 1997, p. 2. Available HTTP: <http://www.gov.ua/book/1/1008.htm>

Discussions at that time concerning the foreign policy "reference-points" of Ukraine, involved two dilemmas, namely: "West-Russia" and "post-communist conservatism – national romanticism". It was considered that to change a traditional political lexicon into a national one in times of *perestroika* would be enough to obtain financial support from the West. The major task was not to fall behind Russia. Political alignment with specific powers was deemed a question of minor importance. Hence, it was an attempt to use effectively a peculiar conception of a "geopolitical circle." According to this conception, all the areas around Ukraine (the East, the West, the South, and the North) constitute the priorities of its foreign policy. President Kuchma has pointed out: "The geopolitical position of Ukraine requires economic and political balancing in our relations with the East and the West. A strategic option of joining the European integration process will not influence Ukraine's efforts in terms of providing for our interests in the territory that formerly constituted the USSR."²⁴

However, the logic of Ukraine's political and economic development considerably exacerbated the problem of a strategic option. Ukraine aspires to a transformation from having been an object of geopolitics to becoming an actor in its own right in geo-policy. However, in view of the internal and external threats to Ukraine's security, the present state might be characterized as one subject to "disintegration": that is, a potential for disintegration of the economy, the social sphere, state power, territory, and so on.

If this process does not stop, it will move further and penetrate deeply, and finally lead to the destruction of social peace in the country.

That the problem of safeguarding Ukraine's security has been extremely complicated and critical is not surprising. Ukraine needs to solve this problem under conditions that have had few precedents in world history (Ukraine has chosen to become a non-nuclear weapon-state with an exceptional set of security assurances, during an era in which it has been striving to eliminate the consequences of the disintegration of the Soviet Union). The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United

²⁴ Leonid Kuchma, *There is no Motherland without Freedom*, Speech at a celebration of Independence Day of Ukraine, Kyiv, August 23, 1996, p. 6.

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland signed a joint declaration confirming security assurances to Ukraine in exchange for its ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT). These assurances “respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine,” “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine,” and “refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.”²⁵ France also reaffirmed its commitment regarding Ukraine’s accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.²⁶

Therefore, assuring Ukraine’s security has naturally appeared to be not only a problem of choosing frameworks for international cooperation, but also, and above all, a problem of finding partners and allies in the new geopolitical setting.

The existing dualistic approach of the Ukrainian leadership with regard to a strategic option reflects the political situation in the eastern and western parts of Ukraine, a situation that is consistent with conceptions of “civilizational” development and influence with geopolitical implications. Such conceptions have been proposed by Samuel Huntington as well as by William Wallace.²⁷

Huntington and Wallace advance the following conception. Future conflicts may happen along the lines that divide the world into civilizational formations, based on historical, cultural, ethnic, religious, and other factors. One of the cordons that separates “Western Christian” civilization from “Moscow Orthodox” civilization lies across Ukraine’s territory and divides it into the western part, which gravitates to the “West

²⁵ *Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon [5December 1994]*, PPNN Briefing Book, Vol.2, Treaties, Agreements and Other Relevant Documents, 6th ed., compiled and edited by Emily Bailey, Richard Guthrie, Darryl Howlett, and John Simpson, Southampton, UK: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton on behalf of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 1998, L-6.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. L-8.

²⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 5-8, and W. Wallace, *The transformation of Western Europe*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990, pp. 15-20.

Christian" civilization, and the eastern and southern parts that are prone to the "Moscow-Orthodox" civilization. This cordon is not only historically stipulated, but also coincides with the socio-economic and political separation of Ukraine at the present time. It has been recognized by most of the leading political scientists and scholars.²⁸

The continuation of an economic and political crisis may not only deepen disintegration tendencies along a line of "civilizational" division, but also transform it into a line of internal confrontation. Therefore, it has raised questions related to the unity of the Ukrainian State and nation.

Ukrainian geopolitical romanticism ended rather quickly, as Kyiv had to deal with two significant issues: the fate of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and NATO enlargement. In 1992-93, in connection with the issues tied with the nuclear status of Ukraine, Ukraine for the first time sought rational decisions in the context of a triangle consisting of Russia, Ukraine, and the West (above all, the United States). At that time the Ukrainian government felt the pressure exerted by both the United States and Russia. Kyiv was threatened by the danger of becoming a symbol of instability in Europe. The real danger of Ukraine's political isolation existed. Owing to common sense and an ability to find a reasonable way out of the situation, Ukraine resolved the fate of the former Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory. Ukrainian diplomacy thereby acquired positive experience. Making reasonable decisions that would advance Ukraine's national interests in terms of NATO enlargement was the next trial for Kyiv's officials and Ukrainian public opinion. (Ukraine's decisions in this regard are discussed in a later section of this thesis).

Ukraine long ago passed its first stage of identification in the foreign policy realm. The "black and white scheme" of geopolitical thinking so characteristic of political elites and public opinion during the first years of independence has yielded to a more complex set of considerations. It is not, however, an overstatement to say that Ukraine has been challenged to make a geopolitical choice: Europe or Eurasia?

²⁸ For a similar view see also Nicole Gnesotto ed., *War and Peace: European Conflict Prevention*, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, WEU, Chaillot Papers 11, October 1993.

The arguments of the Eurasian advocates are well known: they recommend cultivating improved relations with the republics of the Central Asia and the Caucasus within the CIS. There has been a transformation in conception of these relations – from an imprudent isolation (in the first years of Ukraine's independence) to a conscious recognition of the necessity for large-scale, mutually beneficial economic cooperation. The supporters of "the Eurasian vector" state that, in spite of the limited geopolitical options within the CIS, there is still no an alternative to the CIS in current circumstances. However, it is evident that a process of reintegrating Ukraine into "the Eurasian scope" has not only economic, but also geopolitical and military-strategic aspects. Ukraine certainly has an interest both in renewing old economic ties with the other former Soviet republics and in establishing new ones. That is axiomatic. Closed and balanced economic relations provide a powerful impulse for economic recovery and therefore a way out of the social and economic crisis. The more important question is the character of these ties and their content.

The supporters of "the European vector" offer the following essential argument: for Ukraine contemporary Europe presents an interest in both strategic and tactical matters. The achievements in science, education, religion, art, etc. in Ukraine are inseparably linked with the progress of the European cultural traditions. Therefore the existing public opinion about "the necessity of Ukraine's entry into Europe" or, in other words, the aspiration to see Ukraine as a full participant in the European process is not just schematic and illusory. Ukraine is persuaded that it has fundamental interests in Europe, such as technological modernization of its means of production, access to advanced scientific technologies, Western investments in Ukraine's economy, and financial cooperation. For the West Ukraine, also has been interesting as a big consumers' market, a source of relatively inexpensive but skilled man-power, and a country with great undeveloped potential. The issue of cooperation with the Central European countries is of great importance. Thus according to the "European vector" advocates, Ukraine's strategic task is to pursue humanitarian, cultural, and political integration with Western Europe, as well as effective economic cooperation, to the greatest extent

possible. As for Ukraine's relations with the other East European countries, they should be given a greater economic dimension.

Furthermore, the so-called "European-Eurasian" geopolitical dilemma has been complicated by the unresolved problems in Russian-Ukrainian relations. It has become apparent that the persisting tension to a large extent is artificially created. It does not have essential grounds in political, economic, or cultural matters. Apparently, this artificial tension has been sustained as a result of an inability (or a reluctance) of both countries' political elites to pursue a constructive political dialogue. This situation might be called a phenomenon of "residual ideologization."²⁹

C. NEUTRALITY – AS A STRATEGIC OPTION OF UKRAINE

The young Ukrainian state has focused its foreign policy efforts upon the creation and construction of reliable international mechanisms of security on bilateral, sub-regional, regional, and global levels.

How does the Ukraine's wish to take part in creating and strengthening European security institutions relate to its declared will to become a neutral state? This issue needs to be clarified.

In its Declaration of State Sovereignty on 16 July 1990, the new Ukrainian State initially adapted a policy of "permanent neutrality."³⁰ In this case, permanent neutrality should be interpreted as an international legal status, according to which Ukraine has decided not to take part in any military conflicts between other countries, not to join any military alliances or blocs, not to let foreign forces use the Ukrainian territory or maintain military bases in Ukraine.³¹

²⁹ V. Kremlin, D. Bezljuda, V. Bondarenko, *The Common Problems of Transformation of Ukrainian Society: Socio-Political Situation in Ukraine* (Kyiv, 1997): 2. Available HTTP: <http://www.gov.ua/book/1/1008.htm>

³⁰ *Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine* of 16 July 1990, Kiyv: Progress, 1990.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

In order to understand the phenomenon of Ukrainian neutrality correctly, it is necessary to take into account both the historical situation from which this idea of neutrality came out, and the evolution of the definition of "neutrality." In view of the disappearance of the bipolar bloc structure of the Cold War, neutrality no longer has the meaning it had during that period of East-West confrontation.

Some of the European states that were neutral during the Cold War – for instance, Austria, Switzerland, and Finland – have already reexamined the meaning of their neutrality. All three actively participate in the international processes in Europe, including NATO's Partnership for Peace. In this context, Ukrainian neutrality should be examined in a new way. Ukraine has adopted this policy not as an end in itself, but as a means of obtaining its major aims -- full sovereignty and independence, an effective state, territorial integrity, political stability and economic prosperity. These aims do not contradict the cooperative processes underway in Europe, notably in the OSCE and NATO's PfP. Thus, there is no contradiction between the Ukrainian policy of neutrality and Ukraine's interest in cooperation with European structures, including NATO, whose member-states have many of the same purposes as Ukraine.

Many Ukrainian officials do not appear to consider Ukraine's neutrality as necessarily a permanent state. During his visit to Latvia in 1995, President Kuchma stated that a policy of neutrality was "nonsense" in light of NATO enlargement and taking into account Ukraine's own geographic position. As he pointed out, Ukraine was "not Switzerland."³² Similarly, Hennady Udovenko, then the Foreign Affairs Minister of Ukraine, while visiting NATO headquarters in September 1995, underscored that Ukraine

³² C. Freelan and M. Kaminski, "Ukraine may spoil the CIS party," *Financial Times*, 26 May 1995. See also Kuchma's news conference on 7 December 1994 in which he rejected non-aligned status over the long run: "Yes, indeed it is my personal opinion that Ukraine can not remain non-aligned. But I want Ukraine to take this decision only when it firmly stands on its own." *Kyiv Radio*, 7 December 1994, Translated in FBIS-SIV-94-237, 9 December 1994, p. 33.

reserved the right to become a member of any political-military structure that showed promise of becoming an integral part of the new European security structure.³³

To clarify Ukraine's current interpretation of its neutrality, the recent statement by the new Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Boris Tarasyuk should be quoted. Tarasyuk stressed that, "having defined the priorities in foreign relations, independent Ukraine has chosen its option in a favor of the European variant of development, and determined the integration into the European and transatlantic political, economic and security structures as a priority task of foreign policy... That is why Ukraine's active participation in the process of enlarging European and transatlantic structures meets the national interest of our state. This is conscious Ukraine's option, declared in "The Principal Directions of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine" and ratified by the Verchovna Rada in 1993."³⁴

D. WESTERN, NATO, AND UKRAINIAN COOPERATION: INTERESTS AND PERSPECTIVES.

A new epoch in Europe has been marked by two trends of development -- integration and differentiation in the European space from the Atlantic to the Urals. Nowadays, the integration process is dominating on the Continent, and its main actors are the European Union, the West European Union, and NATO. However, a perspective of integration speeded up by the Maastricht Treaty and by concurrent decisions of the EU and NATO about enlargement toward the East must be analyzed carefully because these developments involve different interests, and the participants in this process understand the meaning and goals of integration in their own way.

³³ Hennady Udovenko, "European Stability and NATO Enlargement: Ukraine's Perspective," *NATO Review*, no. 6, November 1995, p. 17, Available HTTP: <http://> . See also *Statement by H. E. Mr. Hennady Udovenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, at the North Atlantic Council plus Ukraine Meeting*, Brussels, 14 September 1995, p. 3.

³⁴ See Yulia Mostova, "Go to a track, please!" Kyiv, *Mirror Weekly*, 29 May, 1998.

Contemporary Europe remains split by many differences, despite the fact that the integration processes favor closer cooperation in matters affecting the economy, legislation, defense, etc. Conformity to common standards is a main condition to join organizations such as the Council of Europe. After the Cold War, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the disintegration of the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, a complex and fluid system has been created. Many frameworks for cooperation co-exist. The most comprehensive and broadly inclusive frameworks are the UN, the OSCE, and PfP.

Since independence, Ukraine has not only created its own national security system, but has also obtained recognition as a country that is making a valuable contribution to the consolidation of international security. Ukraine has made significant decisions since gaining independence, such as unilateral nuclear disarmament, an unprecedented reduction of its armed forces and armaments, and active participation in peacekeeping operations.

Unsure and ambivalent Western attitudes towards Ukraine may be coming to an end. It is necessary to understand that the period of Ukraine's state and national revival has only one natural prospect – becoming firmly established as an independent actor in international relations.

Perceived by the world community, as one of the key countries of European security, Ukraine is likely to be a state that simultaneously belongs to East, Central, and South Europe. With no exaggeration, it can be stated that Ukraine is able to play a cementing role and provide stability in those parts of the Continent that belonged to the USSR or was under its control. However, Ukraine's distinctiveness lies in the fact that while open for integration with Europe, it intends, unlike the countries of Central and East Europe, to overcome two dividing lines on the Continent that appeared after World War II. The first one is the divide between the former Warsaw Pact members and Western Europe. The second is the western boundary of the former Soviet Union that until now sometimes was considered a border of the still amorphous CIS, and that separates Ukraine from its natural partners in Central and East Europe.

Ukraine's strategic course toward Europe may be defined as a successive and gradual movement in the direction of the leading European organizations. For Ukraine, entering the European economic zone (by analogy with the entry by the European Free Trade Area countries into the EU's zone), joining the European political space (Associate Partnership of the WEU) is an optimum variant. Ultimately, Ukraine's strategic goal is using European integration to lessen the Russian Federation's influence over Ukrainian affairs, while counteracting tendencies to divide Central-Eastern Europe into spheres of influence between the West and Russia.

Ukrainian scholars suggest that it would be quite reasonable for Ukraine to follow the course of a rational limitation of its strategic ties with super-states (Russia, the United States). This would promote Ukraine's independence from geopolitical manipulation, and shield it from external pressure.

For Ukraine, that has become a stumbling block for the super-states, a policy of neutrality has vital significance. Therefore, using the so-called many-vector foreign policies, Ukraine's European option is not stipulated by the present conjuncture, but by long-lasting national interests. According to Government Program for the period 1995-2000, Ukraine's foreign policy priorities include the following:

- Improved relations with West and Central Europe.
- Close cooperation with the Visegrad countries to strengthen regional security and joint defense of one another's interests in international organizations.
- Membership in the Central European Free Trade Association.
- Cooperation with European security organizations – including NATO (especially its Partnership for Peace program), the WEU, and the OSCE, -- and within the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.
- Harmonization of Ukrainian legislation with EU and Council of Europe standards.³⁵

³⁵ Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine under Kuchma*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, pp. 184-185.

Ukraine's strategic course to become ultimately a full member of the European Union will remove the hesitation of potential partners concerning the unpredictability of Ukraine. This is not just declaratory policy. Since 1994 a number of important steps have been taken to strengthen Ukraine's ties with Europe. In June 1994, the EU signed a partnership agreement with Ukraine – the first such agreement signed with a CIS state. Although the accord made no mention of possible EU membership, the agreement creates distinctive relations for Ukraine with the EU and envisages the concrete deeds that will promote Ukraine's participation in the European security architecture. Using its geopolitical position and resource potential, Ukraine, taking into account common European strategic interests, can actively participate in the realization of the EU's interests in the Black Sea region and the former Soviet Union.

In November 1995, Ukraine achieved another important break-through when it became the second CIS state (after Moldova) to be admitted to the Council of Europe. The Council's decision explicitly recognized the progress that Ukraine has made in creating a pluralistic democracy and respecting human rights since achieving independence in 1991.

Ukraine is also seeking closer relations with the Western European Union, which is an important European security organization. In June 1997, Ukraine and the WEU concluded an agreement providing for the use of Ukrainian long-range airlift capability. Ukraine has deemed that the WEU should grant it associated partner status. However, relations between Ukraine and the WEU are limited so far to regular exchanges of visits and information, because Ukraine's neutrality and membership in the CIS are regarded by the WEU as incompatible with any form of WEU membership. President Kuchma has stated that Ukraine has the right to join any political-military structure that could serve as an element of European or Transatlantic security, and "neither normative statements nor any form of participation in a CIS could limit our freedom of option."³⁶

³⁶ Volodimir Horbulin, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, "International Security and National Security of Ukraine," Kyiv, *Politichna Dumka* 1, Spring 1997, p. 85.

Central European states such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are among the priorities in the EU enlargement process. Therefore Ukraine might enhance prospects for closer cooperation with the EU through participation in Central European regional structures.

Despite facing many problems of its own during the years of independence, Ukraine has been an active participant in the international community's efforts to settle regional conflicts in Europe (peacekeepers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the observers in Nagorno-Karabakh). Participation in regional cooperation mechanisms is an important aspect of Ukrainian foreign policy. This has been evident in Ukraine's activities in such regional structures as the Central European Initiative (CEI), Black Sea Economic Cooperation Association (BSECA), Carpathian Euro-region and Euro-region Bug. (These initiatives are discussed in Chapter III, Section E). Ukraine sees considerable potential in these structures for strengthening regional stability and has proposed that the OSCE and CEI combine their efforts to consolidate stability and security in the Central and Eastern European region. Ukraine also has clearly indicated its interest in the activities of the Council of Baltic Sea States, and would welcome a form of cooperation with this group.

Thus Ukraine's course towards full-scale integration into European structures of cooperation is an integral part of its efforts to provide for its national security, as well as to contribute to a united and stable Europe.

Of all the Euro-Atlantic institutions with which Ukraine is developing closer relations, NATO has a particular importance for Ukraine. Kyiv sees NATO as the most reliable and capable pillar of European security.

Though it has a population of 51 million and a territory of 600,000 square km, Ukraine looks more like an object than a subject of policy in relations with NATO does. This is because of Ukraine's relatively modest stature in the world distribution of economic strength, the weakness of Ukrainian State power institutions, the gradual development of its civic society, and the lack of development of the domestic markets.

However, it would be inaccurate to imply that there is an absence of mutual interests. Ukraine's interest in relations with NATO is by no means less than NATO's in cooperation with Ukraine. The reason for NATO's interest is the change in the geopolitical situation in Europe and in the world, since the mid-80s.

Ukraine's emergence as an independent power was a key element in the European scene, at variance with situations in which the leading powers were France, Britain, Germany, and Russia and, subsequently, France, Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, the USA, and the USSR. It was the emergence of a separate, rather significant unit, which could be supported by the USA, France, Britain, and Germany as a forward edge of defense against a possible renewal of the Russian empire, especially in the case of an anti-Western alliance consisting of Russia, China, and Iran forming at some point. At the same time, the old centralizing traditions of Moscow, the active foreign policy of the Russian Federation and the stable personnel links of its elites with those of the great European nations have prevented the latter and the USA from regarding the present Russian Federation as an ordinary state. The potent myth of a "eternal Russia" continues to exist in the consciousness of the West.

The decision on NATO's enlargement came after destruction of the old bipolar world (1989-1991), and the emergence of Ukraine, weak but worthwhile partner for the West in certain dimensions. This decision could not objectively foresee, to a full extent, the events of even the near future, which essentially altered the estimation of the prospects of Europe and Asia: the war in Chechnya, the weakness of the CIS, the sub-regional rapprochement of some newly independent states, a relative strengthening and stabilization of Ukraine, etc.

It is difficult for Ukrainian scholars to imagine how the decision on NATO's enlargement crystallized. However, in the opinion of Ukrainian experts, NATO's July 1997 enlargement decision was caused by the Alliance's striving for economic stability and new markets necessary for Western Europe and the USA. In this context, Ukraine could also be regarded as a potential new market, an additional stabilizing factor for Europe. 50 million consumers having no modern goods, services, proper infrastructure,

dwelling, etc. are attractive for producers, especially when the market is only one thousand kilometers from Berlin.

One should have no doubts as to Ukraine's contribution to European stability. In 1991, an alignment of 1.2 million Soviet troops armed with high-quality armor, aviation, artillery, and missiles, plus nuclear arms was located in Ukraine. Today the Ukrainian army numbers 346,000 troops. Ukraine today has no nuclear weapons, meeting its requirements as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT. Certain categories of armaments are subject to the requirements of the CFE Treaty.

Thus, Ukraine as a strong and prosperous country is an extremely attractive from the point of view of both the economic and security interests of NATO and prospects the European Union. Moreover, during the last years the Ukrainian leadership has undergone a significant evolution in its estimations of the Alliance in particular and the West as a whole.

The official standpoint of Ukraine has undergone a certain evolution during the last three years. Ukraine did not acquire at once the status it achieved at the NATO Madrid summit of 1997.³⁷ On the one hand, despite the high skills of the pro-NATO foreign-policy group (it could be also called pro-Western), it is clear that its members had a Soviet background. On the other hand, NATO's approach to Ukraine also evolved from a skeptical and careful attitude to an interested and positive one. The evolution of predominant Ukrainian views from 1994-1995 to 1997-1998 can be summarized as follows:

1. In 1994-1995, many Ukrainians argued that NATO should admit new members from Central and Eastern Europe only after or in conjunction with the establishment of an all-European collective security system. By 1997-1998, many Ukrainians judged that

³⁷ On July 9, 1997 Ukraine's President Kuchma, President Clinton, NATO Secretary General Solana, and the leaders of NATO in Madrid signed a *Charter on a Distinctive NATO-Ukraine Partnership*.

NATO's enlargement actually meant the beginning of alterations in the ideology and practice of the Alliance.

2. In 1994-1995, many Ukrainians contended that NATO must not admit new members rapidly in the next few years; in their view, this process should have been spread out over decades. In 1997-1998, many Ukrainians said that, having once started, NATO must not stop the admittance of new members; the process must continue in an uninterrupted fashion, as regards those seeking membership.

3. In 1994-1995, NATO's enlargement was never interpreted as a hostile step by the Ukrainian leadership. In 1997-1998, Ukrainians endorsed NATO's official policy: that is, "the member States of NATO...have no intention, no plan and reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy."³⁸

An appeal for the conclusion of an agreement between NATO and the Russian Federation and an agreement on a distinctive relationship between Ukraine and NATO has always been one of the main themes of Ukraine's foreign and security policy.

Thus, the results of Ukrainian thinking in 1994-1998 could be described as an evolution towards a clearer and more determined standpoint.³⁹

NATO's enlargement will not only substantially change the geo-strategic situations in Europe as a whole, but Ukraine's position in particular as well.

It is in Ukraine's vital interests that the border with NATO remains a zone of peace and stability. Opposed to turning Ukraine into a buffer zone, the Ukrainian leadership has clearly formulated Ukraine's doctrine with respect to NATO enlargement:

³⁸ Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, May 1997.

³⁹ See *The State and Prospects of Ukraine's Foreign Policy: Experts' Discussion*, Kyiv, Ukrainian Center of Peace, Conversion, and Crisis Research Studies, Annual Report 1997, p. 17.

1. Ukraine considers NATO an alliance of democratic, peace-loving countries, an alliance that is one of the most effective structures to promote and ensure stability, security, democracy, and economic prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic region.
2. Ukraine's strategic goal is to integrate into the European and Trans-Atlantic structures by establishing a special relationship with NATO (as well as associate membership in the EU and associate partnership with the WEU).
3. Ukraine does not oppose the enlargement of NATO, because NATO unites the democratic nations and has clearly proven its ability to reform and adapt to meet new security challenges in the post-Cold War period.
4. The decision to seek membership in military-political structures, including NATO, is the right of all nations and no "third" party has the veto right over this decision.
5. NATO enlargement should be an evolutionary, gradual process. This process should be kept open and transparent, and should not cease abruptly after the first post-Cold War group of nations joins the Alliance. The NATO entrance door should be kept open for those countries, which meet the requirements for NATO membership and are willing to join.
6. Ukraine is aware of Russia's legitimate security interests and favors NATO-Russia cooperation, including the conclusion of a special agreement between NATO and Russia. At the same time, Kyiv maintains that it is extremely important to break away from the established stereotype that implies that NATO's relations with Ukraine depend on NATO-Russia relations. NATO-Ukraine relations should be separated from the context of NATO-Russia relations and put into the perspective of NATO relations with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These processes should go forward in parallel.
7. Ukraine, as a country that voluntarily gave up its nuclear arsenal, was seriously concerned about the possibility of NATO stationing nuclear weapons on the territory of new member-states. The provisions of the NATO-Ukraine Charter emphasized that in foreseeable circumstances "enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO's current nuclear posture and, therefore," there would be no nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of new members.⁴⁰
8. Ukraine is at present the largest non-bloc country in Europe, but it will not necessarily retain its non-bloc status in the future. Only if democratic tendencies in the new independent states continue can NATO be

⁴⁰ Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine, Madrid, 9 July 1997.

transformed into the foundation for Euro-Atlantic security structures embracing all European states. At present Ukraine's entry into NATO may be a strategic wish or a long-term plan.⁴¹

Taking into consideration the extremely great importance of NATO's territory coming up to the Western border of Ukraine, the Ukrainian leadership in 1996-1997 persistently sought for Ukraine's interests to be taken into account and for the establishment of a special partnership with NATO. Ukraine was not always well understood by its partners and the path to the "Charter on a Distinctive NATO-Ukraine Partnership" was not simple. Ultimately, the NATO-Ukraine Charter was signed by Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma and the leaders of the NATO member-states in Madrid, on July 9, 1997.

The NATO-Ukraine Charter codifies the special character of Ukraine-NATO relations and represents recognition by the Euro-Atlantic community of Ukraine's key role in European security. It also helps to lock in the reform process underway in Ukraine, ensuring that the country will be a net contributor to stability in Europe. Five aspects of the Charter are particularly important:

- Ukraine sought specific mention in the Charter for its territorial integrity. In response, the Charter included language on the NATO Allies' support (a) for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, and economic prosperity and (b) for the general principle of the inviolability of frontiers.
- Ukraine sought references to the security assurances it received when it gave up the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. In response, the Charter provides for a crisis consultation mechanism and affirms NATO support for the security assurances Ukraine received when it acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state.
- Having given up its own nuclear weapons, Ukraine subsequently expressed great concern about possible nuclear weapons deployments in neighboring states. In response, the Charter underscored NATO's policy that it has no plan, reason or intention to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members in foreseeable circumstances.

⁴¹ See speech by Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States Yuri Shcherbak, "After NATO Expands: Consequences for Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, June 15, 1997, p. 3.

- Ukraine sought to clarify its position on the basing of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory. NATO developed language with Ukraine to affirm that the presence of foreign troops must be in conformity with international law, the freely expressed consent of the Host State, or a relevant decision of the UN Security Council.
- Ukraine requested mechanisms for ongoing and crisis consultations. The Charter provides for a NATO-Ukraine Commission to meet at least twice a year to review progress and to suggest ways to improve the relationship.

The signing of the Charter thus not only meets Ukraine's concerns but also represents a strong Western political commitment to ensuring the indivisibility of European security by reinforcing Ukraine's anchoring within the Euro-Atlantic architecture. The formalization of the Ukraine-NATO relationship as a distinctive partnership provides a stable political basis for its qualitative evolution in the future. The Charter gives Ukraine the opportunity to develop a close relationship with the Alliance in most areas of its activities. It provides a solid mechanism for the elaboration of a common view and common approach to important areas of European affairs.⁴²

Ukraine has already achieved significant results in cooperation with NATO in the settlement of conflicts, peace-making operations, and standardization and, to certain extent, joint exercises. The Western countries first expressed their interest in military-technical cooperation within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program.

In cooperating with NATO, it is obvious that Ukraine should learn from the experiences of the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in particular that of Poland. The Poles have established close relations with NATO countries, first of all with Germany and France, and are rather successfully and actively modernizing their techniques. Uniting economic interests with those of security may offer Ukraine a certain chance to integrate into Europe. The West and Ukraine may be interested in cultivating mutual interests in the spheres of military-industrial cooperation and regional or sub-regional security. Security interests are closely connected with economic interests. Is

⁴² See in particular the article by the Director, Policy Analysis and Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Ihor Kharchenko, "The New Ukraine-NATO Partnership," *NATO Review*, No. 5, September/October 1997, pp. 27-29.

Ukraine really able to cooperate with the West, and in particular with NATO? It is necessary to cooperate with NATO within the framework of a common defense and security policy. In buying or selling something, Ukraine should cooperate with particular companies and governments. In such cases the relations of the parties should have a sufficient political and legal basis: Ukraine's participation in the PfP program, the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, Ukraine's participation in the EAPC, the Agreement on Cooperation in Emergency, the Agreement on the Establishment of the NATO Information and Documentation Center in Kyiv and other agreements.

Thus, the activation of military cooperation is urgent for the pace and scale of the development of the whole complex of relations between Ukraine and NATO. This cooperation may be summed up as follows:

1. The relations between NATO and Ukraine are a fact of an all-European, and not simply bilateral or sub-regional dimension (unlike the relations NATO-Bulgaria or NATO-Hungary).
2. A transition of Ukraine-NATO relations from the "16+1" format to a "17" format (i.e. quasi-accession) is not a current foreign-policy issue. Such a transition depends on Ukraine's overcoming the social-economic crisis.
3. The military aspect of cooperation today plays the most important role in the context of its development. Whereas there are no grounds to expect that situation to change by administrative measures, the NATO countries could apply maximum efforts within the framework of bilateral interstate military cooperation. (This could include joint exercises, exchanges of military specialists and students, and visits of ships and units.)
4. The involvement of Ukraine in the arms market of NATO countries could have an essential pro-NATO influence on Ukrainian society as a whole, and particularly the political and military elite. Such a step might require a summit political decision, but it would not only show the attractiveness of the Western orientation to Ukrainian producers and consumers; it would also tie the military-industrial complex of Ukraine to that of NATO.⁴³

⁴³ Given summary bases on the analysis of factual information on the main events and trends in foreign and security (defense) policy of Ukraine in *Monitoring Foreign and Security Policy of Ukraine*, published by the Ukrainian Center for Peace, Conversion, and Conflict Resolution Studies, Kyiv, 1997-1998, Available HTTP: .

Ukraine's future after the NATO's first post-Cold War round of enlargement will be influenced by three major factors: U.S. policy, Russian policy, and Ukraine's own development and policy.

U.S. policy. By establishing Strategic Partnership relations with Ukraine, the United States has demonstrated its profound understanding of Ukraine's key role in the system of European security. According to "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," published in May 1997, "The United States has vital security interests in the evolution of...Ukraine into stable, modern democracies, peacefully and prosperously integrated into a world community where representative government, the rule of law, free and fair trade and cooperative security are norm."⁴⁴

Further developments in this sensitive and extremely important region will depend to a great extent on the US and its consistency in supporting Ukraine. Ukraine hopes that the United States will not consent to the creation of new a sphere of influence in the region and that it will pursue a balanced policy of equal partnership, taking into consideration the national interests of all countries in this part of Europe.

Russian policy. There is a unique consensus in Russia today among the major political forces, ranging from pro-Western democratic reformers to aggressive nationalist radicals. Lamentations over the lost grandeur of Russia, embodied in the former Soviet Empire, constitute the core of this consensus. Living through a hard economic, military, political, and psychological crisis, Russia will have to choose between two alternatives in the twenty-first century:

- The first is to become a democratic country of a European type with a prosperous market economy and friendly relations with its neighbors on the basis of acknowledging their sovereignty and independence. Ukrainians hope this will be the way of Russia's development. Indeed, this choice is that desired for Russia by Ukraine, Europe and the world at large;
- The second alternative is to try again to create a new empire. It is impossible for Russia to do this without incorporating Ukraine. It can be

⁴⁴ See *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington: The White House, May 1997, p. 22.

predicted that attempts to restore the empire or to forcibly reintegrate the post-Soviet countries under Russian control will accelerate Ukraine's movement towards NATO.

Ukraine's development and policy. The third and perhaps most crucial factor is Ukraine itself. This factor encompasses Ukraine's political development, its successes and setbacks in pursuing economic reform, as well as the recovery of its industrial and agricultural potential on the principles of the market economy. The goal is consistent Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth and prosperity. If Ukraine's economic policies fail, its independence is going to face a hard trial. Ukraine's economic access to Europe may be blocked by the solid curtains of the European Union's trade barriers.

The Ukrainian leadership is convinced that the new Ukraine-NATO partnership will become a key element in the process of building a new European security system, along with NATO's decision on enlargement and the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. It will give a new impetus to the process of overcoming the old hostilities and suspicions between East and West, and will contribute to building up a new unified Europe.

E. UKRAINIAN – RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

In discussing the delicate and sometimes painful issue of Ukrainian-Russian relations and their significance for the security of Ukraine, it is objectively important to avoid at least two extremes. One extreme is “to explain away many, if not most, of Ukraine's domestic difficulties by blaming the infamous hidden (or not so hidden) hand of Moscow.”⁴⁵ This tactic was regularly used by many of Ukraine's politicians during the first two years of independence. The other extreme is to underestimate Russia's influence on developments in Ukraine and its security. It is not easy to determine the reality between these two extremes. Russia's leadership and its policies concerning Ukraine are clearly not responsible for the majority of the problems now facing the country. Direct

⁴⁵ John Jaworsky, *Ukraine: Stability and Instability*, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, McNair Paper 42 – Chapter 6, 1996, p. 1. Available HTTP: [http://: www.ndu.edu](http://www.ndu.edu)

and indirect Russian interference in domestic or foreign Ukrainian affairs nonetheless "consists of attempts to take advantage of Ukraine's internal problems to promote Russia's domestic and international interests."⁴⁶

Both scholars and politicians examining the economic and ethnic situation in Ukraine sometimes fail to recognize the real political situation. Russia's attitude towards Ukraine's statehood and Russian interference in Ukraine's internal affairs since August 1991 have created this situation.

The majority of the Russian political elite considers Ukrainian statehood and independence to be unwanted and temporary, and is pressuring Ukraine to give up its status as an independent state. This pressure started immediately after 24 August 1991, when the Ukrainian Parliament proclaimed the nation's independence.

Disregarding the fact that over 90 per cent of Ukraine's population and 50 per cent of Crimea's population voted in favor of Ukraine's independence, Russia stepped up its pressure on Ukraine. The propaganda campaign against Ukraine in the Russian press was soon accompanied by open interference in Ukraine's internal affairs. Today the notion is current in some political circles that the Ukrainian people obtained independence, but now do not know what to do with it. Russia's anti-Ukrainian policy counted on this. The organization of incidents of sabotage and the provocation, worldwide publicity about ethnic problems in Ukraine, and the discrediting Ukraine in the world community – all these factors have given rise to such notions.

The propelling force behind Russia's behavior towards the other states of the former USSR is the centuries-old imperial mentality of the Russians, particularly the Russian political and military elite. As in the past, Russia tries to ensure its own national interests at the expense of the interests of other states, even encroaching upon their independence. But a number of factors that drive Russia's behavior is specific only to Ukrainian-Russian relations.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 2.

First, a unique phenomenon arises from the origin and development of the statehood of both Ukraine and Russia. The renewal of the independence of Ukraine ruins the myth of the 1,000-year Old Russian State. Russians generally identify their ancient history with Kievan Rus. But Kievan Rus was a state of the Ukrainian people, which reached the peak of its power before Moscow - Russia's capital – even existed. According to the testimonies of ancient annals, chronicles, and maps, the word “Rus”, up to the eighteenth century, was used to indicate Ukraine; the present-day Russia was called “Moscovy”, from the name of the Moscow principality. After establishing its colonial rule in Ukraine at the end of the seventeenth century, Russia also appropriated the country's name and history.⁴⁷ This was an attempt to prove the antiquity of its own statehood, in order to achieve equal status with other European great powers. For more than 300 years, Russia did everything to convince itself and others that Ukraine constitutes merely a part of Russia, and that Ukrainians are a sub-species of Russians. This is the reason for the Russian attacks on the Ukrainian language, culture, tradition, and religion and for the Russian distortions and suppressions of Ukrainian history. Policies of Russification were aimed at depriving Ukrainians of their historical memory and national identity.

Second, because of its geopolitical position and potential, Ukraine has played an extremely important role in the formation, development, and disintegration of both Russian and Soviet empires. The incorporation of Ukrainian territory into Russia, which was initiated by the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654, strengthened Russia's position and moved its borders closer to Western Europe. During the eighteenth century control over Ukraine helped transform a distant and little-known Moscow tsardom into a great European power.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ See Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988, pp. 37-67, 255-261. Also Michailo Hrushevsky, *Ancient Time of Ukraine*, Kyiv, 1907.

⁴⁸ The Pereyaslav treaty of 1654. Growing pressure and Catholic-Uniate persecution sparked the great Ukrainian revolt of 1648. The Zaporizh'ya Cossacks led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky defeated the Poles. However, because of antagonism between ordinary Cossacks and the leadership (*starshina*), and also because of betrayal by the Crimean tatars, Khmelnytsky was compelled to conclude a treaty with Moscow in order to protect the Zaporizh'ya Sich – the Ukrainian state. At Pereyaslav the Cossacks and Moscow's and

In the twentieth century, the Ukrainian factor turned out to be a decisive one, first in the years between the Russian Empire's collapse in 1917 and the USSR's birth in 1922 and then when the USSR itself collapsed in 1991.

Ukraine has been caught between two forces: the desire for political independence and the desire for economic prosperity. Many believe that the only chance for Ukraine to reform its economy lies in closer ties with Russia. However, these closer ties would come at the cost of Ukraine's independence. "This dilemma between closer economic ties and the desire for independence is the fundamental question in the international politics of the former Soviet Union, and nowhere is it more important than between Russia and Ukraine."⁴⁹ Therefore the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations will depend mostly on how Ukraine resolves this dilemma.

The Ukrainian state's awareness of its own geo-strategic interests, an intensification during recent years of its relations with European institutions, and an extension of bilateral relations with countries whose geopolitical interests coincide with those of Ukraine -- all these factors have created the prerequisites for the Ukrainian leadership to pursue a more independent policy regarding the post-Soviet space. It is understandable that an open refusal of the "Russian vector" is impossible. Europe today is like an elite club where a so-called system of "identification friend-or-foe" exists, and Ukraine has been assigned a rather conventional role. This is partly because the Russian political establishment expresses a sharp reaction to any independent foreign-policy steps by Ukraine.⁵⁰

embassy made final agreements. For more information see D. Mackenzie and M. Curry, *A History of Russia and the Soviet Union*, Chicago, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1987.

⁴⁹ Paul D'aniery, "Independence and Sovereignty in the Ukrainian-Russian Relationship," *European Security* 4, No. 1, Winter 1995, p.603.

⁵⁰ As example, see "Theses of Council of Foreign and Security Policy *Russian Strategy*," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, May 27, 1993 and May 25, 1996.

The Ukrainian-Russian relationship will occupy during the next few years a central place in the foreign policy of Ukraine. An appreciable influence of the "Russian factor" will be felt also in all spheres of social life.

An analysis of the present state of Ukrainian-Russian relations requires us to take into account a whole complex of problems connected with the internal situation of the Russian Federation, as well as its foreign-policy objectives. Russia is attempting to dominate or at least to control the situation within the post-Soviet space. It is extremely significant that characteristics of Ukrainian-Russian relations affect the development of the internal situation in Ukraine. Some political groups, parties, and leaders pin their own hopes and interests on these relations. This causes a constant conflict between the political forces of national and pro-Communist orientations. Taking into consideration the fact that the political map of Ukraine has been traditionally divided into ethnic regions, an unbalancing of relations between Russia and Ukraine brings about a certain tension between the western and eastern parts of Ukraine.

An additional factor which has served to hinder the full normalization of relations between Russia and Ukraine is "the West's agreement to regard Russia as a "Great Power," which it tiredly proclaims on every occasion [and which] has also increased Russia's arrogance and unwillingness to accept any system of relations within the former USSR other than those between a "Great Power" and satellites."⁵¹

Ukraine's pro-Western orientation and its real steps toward European integration cause the ruin of Moscow's geopolitical design for the space in which the Russian Federation until recently occupied the dominant position. The Russian political elite links dominance of the former Soviet space with a renewal of Russia's superpower status. Under such conditions, Ukraine's strategic interests, which are opposed to a recreation in any form of a Russian imperial space, differ fundamentally from the strategic interests of Russia (as its political elite perceives them).

⁵¹ Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine under Kuchma*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, p. 226.

Several Ukrainian foreign policy goals objectively contradict imperial Russian strategic interests -- as the following examples suggest:

- Ukraine's decision to make the vector of European and Euro-Atlantic integration a main priority -- a deepening of relations with European countries that implies a gradual withdrawal from the Eurasian zone of Russian influence;
- Ukraine's pursuit of strategic partnership relations with the United States against a background of heightening contradictions between Washington and Moscow;
- Ukraine's support for NATO enlargement toward the East, and an intensification of Ukraine's relationship with the Atlantic Alliance; and
- Ukraine's disagreements with Russia about the Commonwealth of Independent States.⁵²

Taking into account the fact that Ukraine's strategic interests do not chiefly coincide with imperial Russian interests, Kyiv's policies must be calculated to protect its own interests, as well as the interests of the countries that share Ukraine's strategic goals. This is the only way to avoid Western misperceptions implying that Ukraine is a state-satellite of the Russian Federation, and to reinforce Ukraine's national security.

According to M. Korop, a Ukrainian political scientist, "improved bilateral relations may be a way that Ukraine would get around its opposition to political and military integration in the CIS. What will be the models for this new relationship: USA/Canada, USA/Mexico, Germany/Austria or England/Scotland?"⁵³

According to most Ukrainian scholars, the optimum variant of Ukrainian-Russian relations might be the model of "cooperative independence" -- relations based on a bilateral commitment to strengthen Russia and Ukraine as stable and independent states. This model excludes the creation of any Russian-Ukrainian military-political alliance, but

⁵² M. O. Korop, "Geopolicy and National Security of Ukraine," Kyiv, *Nauka i Oborona* 4, 1995, p. 18.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

provides the possibility of forming interstate structures for the coordination of common tasks such as solving economic and ecological problems.⁵⁴

In view of the unstable situation in the Russian Federation and Moscow's policies relating to Ukraine, it is necessary to pursue measures to prevent a sharpening of bilateral relations. These measures should reduce Ukraine's dependence on Russia in key economic realms.

The importance of the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty on Partnership and Cooperation signed in May 1997 by both Presidents established legal principles for implementing measures in this regard.

Given the excessive dependence of the Ukrainian economy on Russia, it is reasonable to pursue a diversification of Ukraine's foreign trade, notably with regard to energy and oil provisions.

Ukraine's policies have never been and never will be anti-Russian, only anti-imperialist. While striving to develop equal and positive good-neighborly relations with Russia, Ukraine should continue to resist any encroachment upon its sovereignty. Kyiv needs to further separate its economic relationship with Russia from its political links, and to define ways to reduce Ukraine's economic dependence on Russia.

F. ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH SELECTED COUNTRIES

The fact that since 1991 Ukraine has been taking a direct and active part in the building of the new Europe, that its voice sounds as an equal among the equals in the "European concert" of free nations, is of major historical significance.

The progress that Ukrainian foreign policy has achieved in recent years is not insignificant. Ukraine has established relations with a majority of countries worldwide, accumulated experience in international communication at various levels, and forced a

⁵⁴ *Ukraine's National Security*, research made by National Institute of Strategic Studies, Kyiv, 1997, pp. 108-118.

"breakthrough" in the information blockade that Russia maintained in relation to Ukraine in the international arena.

The Ukrainian establishment has recognized that Kyiv's current foreign policy requires modification, reinterpretation, and the redefinition of priorities. Ukraine has gradually modified its foreign policy, moving from a period of "romanticism" to one of pragmatic "practical politics." The latter involves "a concentration of efforts to control the implementation of already achieved agreements and orientation on those spheres of foreign policy activities where we can really count on immediate results, mainly in the economic field."⁵⁵

Ukraine's main national interest recognized by practically all-political forces, is to deal with the crisis in the economy. It is essential to normalize the social and economic situation in the country, and to create appropriate international conditions for the gradual improvement of the people's living standards. In this regard it is important to define the priorities, or strategic partners, in foreign policy activities on which Ukraine should concentrate its limited resources. A strategic partnership brings together two states to pursue the attainment of a common goal. It means cooperation by these two states in the realization of shared goals.

As mentioned above, Ukraine's priority is undoubtedly the development of normal relations with *the Russian Federation*. Russia has been and will remain the number one priority in Ukrainian foreign policy. Unless Ukrainian-Russian relations are normalized, it will be impossible for Ukraine to pursue a balanced foreign policy. There is no other option.

This discussion devotes particular attention to the United States, Germany, Poland, and Turkey.

The United States of America. Ukraine has also worked to improve bilateral ties with key Western countries. Relations with the United States of America remain one of

⁵⁵ Hennady Udoenko, "Foreign Policy: New Approaches," *Ukrainian Business Journal*, No. 5, 1997, p. 18.

the most important aspects of Ukraine's foreign policy. Their evolution can be characterized as a gradual transition from an "overconcentration" of the U.S. administration on the "Ukrainian nuclear aspect" of Washington's Russian policy to the beginning of a real dialogue on a wide range of issues between Washington and Kyiv without always looking back at Moscow. Naturally, the reassessment of international political realities is a complicated process, but fortunately Ukrainian-American relations have already passed from the stage of reassessment to that of specific cooperation.

U.S.-Ukrainian relations improved dramatically in 1994 as a consequence of several events. First, when Ukrainian parliament – Verchovna Rada – ratified START I.⁵⁶ Second, within American official circles and the media a debate about the strategic significance of independent Ukraine began. Zbigniew Brzezinski's arguments for changing U.S. policy toward Ukraine reminded the American people that Russia could not become an empire again without Ukraine.⁵⁷ Finally, after visiting Ukraine, former president Richard Nixon stated that "the independence of Ukraine is indispensable...Ukraine's stability is in the strategic interests of the United States."⁵⁸

Indeed, the resolution of the nuclear question and the recognition of Ukraine's geopolitical significance by American officials opened the door to an expanded U.S. engagement with Ukraine. In October 1996, the two sides even declared their relations "a strategic partnership." Ukraine is now the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Ukraine became a party to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) I treaty in May 1992 when it, along with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, signed the Lisbon Protocol. This agreement again committed Ukraine to non-nuclear status, and stated that it would sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and return its strategic nuclear weapons to Russia.

⁵⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994): 67-82.

⁵⁸ Richard Nixon quoted in Taras Kuzio, *Ukrainian Security Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995): 61.

⁵⁹ Sherman W. Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997, p. 129.

If the Ukrainian leadership adopts real market-oriented reforms, it can count on continued U.S. support to help address a range of internal issues, as well as U.S. support in international affairs. Policy recommendation for strengthening U.S.-Ukrainian relations should include the following points:

1. The United States should not be neutral on the status of unresolved Ukrainian-Russian issues when Ukraine has right and justice on its side.
2. The United States has to continue its strong assistance to Ukraine's efforts to join the European Union, the World Trade Organization, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and should support Ukraine's pursuit of its legitimate interests in the Central European Free Trade Area.
3. To ensure that Russian-Ukrainian disputes do not lead to violence, the American efforts should include:
 - ◆ A significant American presence in both countries, including a substantial economic assistance program and citizen exchange programs.
 - ◆ Strong support for human rights on an individual rather than collective basis. This is the best hope for preventing any of the parties from resorting to repression and thereby escalating the conflict.
 - ◆ Strong support for efforts to depoliticize ethnic issues by relying on private and market structures. This may reduce the tendency for a minority to think that its needs can be met only by secession.
 - ◆ Strong support for mediation and conciliation efforts outside traditional diplomatic channels.

A policy of engagement in Ukraine requires a definition of United States interests in the new Eastern and Central Europe. Stability in this region depends heavily on American encouragement to Ukraine. Even the lack of market-oriented reforms in Ukraine can not be used to explain the absence of appreciable progress in the cooperation between the two countries. The problem of reforming the administrative Soviet economy in a country that had practically no national economic system is much more complicated than meets the eye. The United States' own democracy has been a work in progress for 222 years, and Americans must remember how long it has taken them to make this much

progress. Therefore, America's own historical experience should make Americans patient, persistent, and admiring when they look at Ukraine.

Germany. Within Western Europe, Germany has taken the strongest interest and now is Ukraine's number one partner. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian-German relationship has not developed, as Kyiv would prefer. This can be explained by Germany's priorities and its close ties with Russia and Poland. However, after his visit to Kyiv in June 1993, former Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated that Bonn intended to pursue a "balanced" relationship with Ukraine and Russia, and would not give preference to Russia.⁶⁰

In fact, relations have improved, particularly in the economic fields, where Germany is Ukraine's second largest trade partner (behind the United States) and the largest foreign investor in Ukraine. Bonn's key role within the EU helps to provide West European economic assistance to Ukraine. However, Ukraine's slow implementation of economic reforms is a major obstacle for German investment in Ukraine. So long as this situation exists, Ukraine is unlikely to receive greater trade and investment from Germany. It is also necessary to mention German-Ukrainian cooperation regarding security policy, the restructuring of the armed forces, exchanges of specialists, ship visits, training, information exchanges, and arms control.

In view of certain historical traditions (for instance, Western Ukraine has close religious and historical ties with Bavaria) and present political and economic map of Europe, Germany should be the most important West-European partner for Ukraine. However, in developing its ties with Germany, Ukraine needs to balance its relations with the other European states in order not to frighten them with a "Kyiv-Bonn" axis. Instead, the transformation of "the Weimar triangle" (Warsaw-Bonn-Paris) into a rectangle with the participation of Kyiv might make a fundamental contribution to European security. Meanwhile, it is significant for Ukraine to focus attention on developing close relations with Germany's traditional partners -- Austria and the Czech Republic.

⁶⁰ F. Staphen Larrabee, "Ukraine's Balancing Act," *Survival* 38, No. 2, Summer 1996, p. 155.

Ukraine should overcome at least three potential impediments on its way to effective cooperation with Germany.

- The first is Ukraine's unsatisfactory investment system, which makes an increase of German investment impossible.
- Second, Ukraine has not designed and carried out a program to satisfy the demands of the ethnic German minority in Ukraine.
- Third, Ukrainian diplomacy in Germany has been rather passive and slow moving.

Therefore, many possibilities to strengthen Ukrainian-German cooperation remain to be pursued.

Poland. In the context of NATO and EU enlargement, closer ties to Central Europe could develop Ukraine's European orientation and help to reduce its dependence on Russia. That is why many Ukrainians have begun to consider that the road to Europe runs through Warsaw. Encouraged by many Polish officials, Kyiv believes that Poland could play an important role as a "bridge" between NATO and the EU and Ukraine.

Despite the fact that the Polish-Ukrainian relationship has historically been marked by mistrust and even hostility, in December 1991 Poland was the first country to recognize Ukraine's independence. Polish-Ukrainian relations have rapidly evolved since May 1992, when Warsaw and Kyiv signed a Treaty on Good Neighborly, Friendly Relations and Cooperation. After signing the treaty, President Lech Walesa argued that "Poland needs a rich, strong and independent Ukraine...[and that] independent Ukraine is [an] assurance for an independent Poland."⁶¹ Soon President Leonid Kuchma stated that Ukrainian-Polish relations have developed toward the level of a strategic partnership.⁶²

Indeed, a chronology of events confirms the strengthening of relations between the two countries:

⁶¹ Taras Kuzio, *Ukrainian Security Policy*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995, p. 75.

⁶² O. Y. Manachinsky, *Military Security of Ukraine*, Kyiv, National Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997, pp. 63-64.

- ◆ A military agreement between Poland and Ukraine calling for an expansion of information exchanges, as well as military training and conducting joint exercises (February 1993);
- ◆ The establishment of a Special Consultative Committee of Presidents was set up (November 1992); and
- ◆ An agreement to establish a joint peacekeeping battalion (October 1995).

Further cooperation between Poland and Ukraine should be intensive. Poland has strongly supported efforts to strengthen Ukraine's ties to the West and to integrate Ukraine into European institutions. Poland may help Ukraine gain membership in the European Union and the Central European Trade Association (CEFTA).

The transnational connections between Poland and Ukraine are an important element of security and cooperation. In this regard, international structures such as the Carpathian Euro-region, which includes Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and four *oblasts* (province) of Ukraine, as well as Bug Euro-region that consists of the frontier Polish and Ukrainian provinces, could play a significant role in supporting stability and enhancing regional security.

Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement can become a decisive factor on the way to democratic transition in Central-Eastern Europe and a key element of European stability and security.

Turkey. Turkey is becoming a top priority in political issues and an important strategic partner for Ukraine. The two countries, which belong naturally to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Agreement (BSECA), have the longest coastlines on this body of water and thus share a number of common interests.

- First, Ukraine and Turkey are the two main active member states of the BSECA, and both look to this organization as a vehicle to improve their bilateral relations. Ankara and Kyiv are active supporters of proposals for the demilitarization of the Black Sea and the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Black Sea. Both states have supported the territorial integrity of states in the Black Sea region, and both strive to ensure an atmosphere of confidence and security in the region.
- Second, Turkey and Ukraine are both concerned about Russia's effort to strengthen its influence in the Black Sea region and the Caucasus, and

about the possible revival of a new Russian empire. Kyiv and Ankara oppose Russia's designs in the Crimea. The Turks have expressed support for Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty over the Crimea and have offered help in resolving the problems of settling the Crimean Tatars. Turkey plays an important role in helping Ukraine lessen its dependence on Russian oil and gas supplies by developing these resources and transporting them from the Caspian Sea region and the Middle East. Turkey is interested in developing a security belt of independent states on Russia's periphery, including Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and Ankara considers firm close bilateral relations with Ukraine as a basis of this policy.

- Third, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Ukraine's independence. As a member of NATO, Turkey has been one of the active supporters in developing a "distinctive partnership" between NATO and Ukraine. In turn, "Ukraine is a bridge joining Eastern Europe to Russia and [the] Asian world; Turkey is a bridge between Europe and Asia."⁶³

Thus, the growing mutual strategic and economic interests between Ankara and Kyiv have great prospects and could become an important strategic factor in the security of the Black Sea region, and could also lead to an even closer rapprochement of the two countries.

According to Igor Turyanskiy, the first Ukrainian Ambassador to Turkey, the major problem in Turkish-Ukrainian relations is that "the peoples do not know each other...[It is therefore necessary] to increase knowledge in both Turkey and Ukraine of each other's geography, language, [and] political and economic situation."⁶⁴

Other European countries. Wishing to be a reliable contributor to European security and stability, Ukraine is pursuing an active foreign policy to establish stable and friendly relations with all neighboring countries.

- ♦ *Hungarian-Ukrainian* relations, while not so close as Polish-Ukrainian relations, have improved significantly since 1990. The two countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1991.

⁶³ Yaprak Balkan Alp, "Ambassador Turyanskiy: Ukraine looks to Turkey as economic model," *Turkish Daily News*, 25 August 1995.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

- ◆ Relations with the *Czech Republic* and *Slovakia* have also been normalized: Ukraine signed treaties of partnership and cooperation with the former in April 1995 and with the latter in July 1993.
- ◆ In 1993 *Moldova* and Ukraine, despite the conflict around the Dnister Republic, signed a comprehensive military agreement that in effect made them allies against Russian support to Dnister secessionists.
- ◆ Although Ukraine has close and friendly relations with *Belarus*, Kyiv recognizes that Belarussian integration with Russia would significantly complicate Ukrainian security.
- ◆ After six years of difficult negotiations, *Romania* and Ukraine have at last resolved their border issues. In June 1997, Kyiv and Bucharest signed a treaty on relations of good neighborliness and cooperation.

If one regards foreign policy as a separate sphere with its own tasks, recent Ukrainian foreign policy (especially in 1997) can be considered to about 70-75 per cent successful. But foreign policy must be grounded on a certain political concept. Indeed, it has to originate from the society.

In fact, however, Ukraine's foreign policy is relatively isolated from its internal policy and internal political processes. It is paradoxical, but true: not having a strong basis in a reformed economy, political consensus, and coincidence with the interests of the elite, but, on the contrary, a long distance between these interests and the foreign policy orientations, Ukraine still has a basis for its foreign policy. The fact that, despite a comprehensive economic, social and political crisis, Ukraine has established auspicious bilateral relations with most of its strategic partners and neighbors, and has good international positions, are not a paradox, but the reality.

IV. CONCLUSION

Ukraine became an independent actor on the international stage after the collapse of the USSR. Since then, Ukraine has been seeking its place in the European security environment while contributing to the construction of new security architecture.

Ukraine pursues its international relations without any intent to harm the legitimate interests of other states. Ukrainians can be proud of their achievements in building a democratic, socially responsible state based on the rule of law, despite the difficult circumstances of transition, characterized by the political and economic legacy of the Soviet Empire.

The foreign policy successes that Ukraine has achieved in recent years have solidified in many people's minds the reality that Ukraine will survive and prosper as a sovereign and independent state, secure within its borders and at peace with its neighbors.

Despite these achievements, several vitally important problems have remained unresolved.

Remedies for Ukraine's Security Needs

This thesis concludes that four remedies for Ukraine's security needs stand out:

The need for coherent and complementary policies; domestic and international. Ukraine's foreign policy must be grounded on a certain political concept, internal policy and internal political processes. In turn, foreign policy should have an influence on the process of creating favorable conditions for the internal development of the Ukrainian State. Therefore, it gives Ukraine the opportunity to foresee certain crisis moments with the foreign policy and internal policy spheres properly correlated.

The main danger in isolating foreign policy from internal policy consists in the fact that it impedes the creation of a mechanism for communicating foreign policy decisions in Ukraine and winning public support.

The improvement and normalization of Ukraine's relationship with Russia. In bilateral relations, there is no problem more artificial than that of Russian-Ukrainian

relations. The difficulties in these relations are not completely the fault of Ukraine, but result from Russia's claims and unwillingness to establish relations with Ukraine based on universally recognized standards of international law, particularly those concerning territorial integrity, state succession, and the protection of national minority rights and citizenship.

An absolute lack of seriousness and hypocrisy in Ukrainian officials' approach to Ukrainian-Russian relations is also obvious. Certainly, one can not expect good results from such an approach. Therefore, it is time for wise and enlightened persons in political or near-political circles to press parliamentary authorities and executive officials of the state to reject unsound speculation on Ukrainian-Russian relations and form a consistent, serious and tough attitude to them.

It is necessary to determine what model of relations with Russia will be chosen by Ukraine. Deepening relations, particularly in the economic domain, with Russia is a step into a deadlock, a path that leads nowhere. Kyiv needs to further separate its economic and political relations with Russia.

Russia is Ukraine's great neighbor. Ukraine must maintain constructive relations with Russia, and there are prospects for Ukraine in Russia. But it is only possible to achieve these prospects through Europe, when Ukraine integrates into Europe, adopts European technologies, and comes with them to the Russian markets.

It is not enough just to sign treaties and to solve particular controversial problems in relations with Moscow. It is necessary to change the nature of these relations. The only opportunity is to make Ukrainian-Russian relations a part of a constructive system of intra-European relations, within the limits of a greater Europe. However, today there is no consent from Moscow for this scenario, nor is Kyiv capable of either suggesting it or bring it about. Thus it is a visionary hypothesis. The attainment of this goal should nonetheless be regarded as a strategic prospect.

Pursuing Ukraine's integration into Europe. Ukraine's future lies within European structures, and the West should support the process of deepening Ukrainian participation

in these structures. The Western political and economic support will have a critical impact not only on Ukraine's ability to maintain its independence but also on Eastern Europe. The West should adopt a 'double staircase' approach – one for political and security cooperation and one for market reforms.⁶⁵ Each Ukrainian step upward would be met by a symmetrical step by the West.

The West -- especially the EU -- should do more to assist Ukraine's economic transformation and to promote Ukrainian prosperity. If Ukraine is to reduce its economic dependence on Russia, it needs to find other markets for its exports. EU markets are currently closed to many Ukrainian exports (particularly steel, chemicals, textiles and agricultural products). A relaxation of the restrictions on these products would create a larger market for Ukrainian goods and help Ukraine to reduce its economic dependence on Russia.

The United States and its European allies should also encourage closer political and economic ties between Ukraine and Central Europe. Such links can help to tie Ukraine more closely to Europe and enable Kyiv to reduce its political and economic dependence on the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, Ukraine's relationship with Central Europe (particularly with the Central European Initiative and Central European Free Trade Association) will ultimately depend on the pace of Ukraine's overall economic transformation.

The West can bolster Ukraine's security through strong, sustained economic support, with particular assistance in the energy sector: developing an expanded energy strategy, providing by oil and gas from the Middle East and the Caspian region, and restructuring and modernizing the coal industry.

On the security side, NATO enlargement will also have an important impact on Ukraine's security. If not managed skillfully, enlargement could exacerbate Ukraine's security dilemmas and lead to increased Russian pressure on Ukraine to join the CIS

⁶⁵ John E. Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, "Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin," *Foreign Affairs* 75, No.3, May/June 1996, pp. 60-61.

political and military structures. Therefore, the U.S. and its allies should keep in mind Ukraine's fragile security situation and develop a policy that enhances Ukraine's ability to pursue an independent policy and strengthen its Western ties. The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership signed by Ukraine and NATO in July 1997 can serve as a basis for the further development of such ties. It is now urgent for both sides to fill this document with concrete content and pursue its implementation.⁶⁶

In sum, serious political and economic support of Ukraine by the West would be an investment in its own security and far less expensive for the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union than if Ukraine was to lose its independence.

Overcoming Ukraine's economic crisis by rapidly introducing real market reforms. Ukraine's economy must be reformed by its own efforts. However, the practical problems are so numerous that substantial financial and technical assistance from the West is temporarily needed to help overcome the economic crisis and establish full, equal and mutually advantageous relations with the West. By helping Ukraine recover, the West will make an investment in its own security and open the door to Ukraine's huge market and potential.

As Ukraine consolidates its identity in the Central European mainstream, the door to membership in or association with the full range of European and Trans-Atlantic institutions will remain open. At issue is when Ukraine will turn the corner to economic prosperity.

The political process now unfolding in Ukraine and which will proceed through presidential election in 1999 will be a key factor in shaping Ukraine's prospects. During this period, it will be important for Ukraine's leaders to consider two points.

1. Ukraine is competing for capital in international markets, and investors will come to Ukraine only when conditions on the ground are competitive

⁶⁶ See "Fulfilling the Promise: Building an Enduring Security Partnership between Ukraine and NATO," *Report of a workshop* (Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Dr. Steven E. Miller, and Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randal), Washington, D.C., April 8-9, 1998.

with those in other emerging markets. The objective reality that Ukraine must consider throughout this political period is whether the policies it pursues are strong enough to meet the test of the global marketplace.

2. Delays in economic reform will extend the pain of the Ukrainian people. Their interest is in better jobs and economic security, and these achievements will only come when Ukraine removes regulatory and financial barriers to investment.

Ukraine has the opportunity to build on its foreign policy successes to create a climate for economic growth at home. And as economic prosperity takes hold, it will strengthen Ukraine's integration with Europe and the West.

The situation is critical, but not hopeless. Kyiv can ensure the sovereignty and even the prosperity of Ukraine, if it adopts a strategic vision capable of inspiring the nation. That vision must be of Ukraine, as a key Central European nation and an important linchpin in the Western economic and security system, Ukraine that at the same time enjoys a constructive relationship with Russia. With the right set of policies, informed by a sound vision, Ukraine can not only survive but also flourish.

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