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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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24 APRIL 1987

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: U.S. Plans Early Deployment of Star Wars Systems (Moscow TASS, 8 Apr 87).....	1
USSR: U.S. 'Neoglobalism' Linked to SDI Plans (Yu. Borin; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 1 Apr 87).....	2
TASS Hits U.S. Military Reorganization Bill (Vladimir Bogachev; Moscow TASS, 3 Apr 87).....	4
TASS Cites U.S. Comments on Thatcher Visit, SDI (Vladimir Bogachev; Moscow TASS, 1 Apr 87).....	5
USSR: Upgrade of Greenland Radar Violates ABM Treaty (Yu. Lebedev; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Apr 87).....	7

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

Gromyko, Ambassador Matlock Discuss Relations, Arms Issues (Moscow TASS, 6 Apr 87).....	10
FRG Paper Interviews USSR's Zagladin: SDI, INF, European Arms (Vadim Zagladin Interview; Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 2 Apr 87).....	12
CPSU's Shishlin on SDI, INF, Reykjavik, SALT (Nikolay Shishlin Interview; Budapest MAGYARORSZAG, No 12, Mar 87).....	16

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: U.S., West Europe Seen Opposing Accord (Various sources, various dates).....	19
U.S. Sincerity Questioned, by A. Shalnev	19
NATO SCG Meeting	20
NATO Seeks 'Unilateral' Advantages, by Vladimir Bogachev	21
'Unconstructive Elements', by Yu. Gavrilov	22
U.S. Said Hindering Accord, by Nikolay Turkatenko	23
'Disarmament Through Rearmament', by Yuriy Solton	25
Changing NATO Stance, by Vladimir Bogachev	25
Western 'Reservations', by Vyacheslav Lavrentyev, et al.	27
Military-Industrial Complex, by Valentin Zorin	29
Soviet Foreign Ministry News Conference 31 March (Moscow Domestic Service, 31 Mar 87; Moscow TASS, 31 Mar 87).....	31
Radio Broadcast, by Gennadiy Gerasimov, et al.	31
Karpov Speaks	34
USSR: Coverage of Thatcher Visit to Moscow (Various sources, various dates).....	35
Thatcher Policy 'Hackneyed'	35
PRAVDA Previews Discussions, by A. Maslennikov	35
Kinnock Cited	37
Thatcher-Kohl Discussions	38
TASS Cites Thatcher on Goals	38
Londoners Response to Visit	38
UK Deployment Linked to Trip	40
IZVESTIYA: UK Antinuclear Lobby, by A. Krivopalov	40
Airport Arrival Ceremonies	42
Gorbachev-Thatcher 30 Mar Talks	42
'Friendly' Talks; 'Controversy'	45
Talks Assessed; Howe-Shevardnadze, by Chris Moncrieff	46
Shevardnadze-Howe Talks 'Frank'	47
Protocol on Space Use	47
Thatcher Meets Peace Committee	48
UK Coverage of Visit Noted, by Yu. Sagaydak	49
Moscow TV Interviews Thatcher, by Boris Kalyagin	50
Thatcher, Sakharov Lunch Talks, by Chris Moncrieff	57
Ryzhkov-Thatcher Talks	58
Gorbachev Dinner Speech	59
Gorbachev Speech 'Angry', by Chris Moncrieff	64
Thatcher Dinner Speech	65
'Broad' Dialogue With Gorbachev, by Aleksandr Druzhinin	70
'First Assessment' Calls Visit 'Fruitful', by Viktor Levin	71
Thatcher Press Conference, by M. Thatcher	72
Foreign Ministry Press Briefing	74

Politburo Discussion	75
Arbatov on Thatcher Arms Stand	76
'Fabricated' Soviet 'Threat', by Sergey Kulik	76
Thatcher Moscow Send-Off	77
Thatcher Remarks on Plane Home	78
World Media Comment	79
UK Press Reaction to Visit, by A. Maslennikov	80
Britons Want Missile Solution, by Vsevolod Shishkovskiy	80
British Assessment, by Chris Moncrieff	81
Thatcher Statement in Parliament	82
PRAVDA Weekly Review, by Nikolay Bragin	83
 Soviet Colonel Views West European 'Fear' of INF Deal (V. Nikanorov; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 Mar 87).....	 88
 USSR: Comments on French Attitude to Possible Accord (Moscow MOSCOW NEWS, No 11, 15 Mar 87; Moscow TASS, 6 Apr 87).....	 92
Officials Oppose Proposal, by Viktor Tsoppi	92
Raimond Remarks Hit, by Vladimir Bogachev	93
 USSR: Comments on West German Discussion of Possible Accord (Various sources, various dates).....	 95
Kohl: 'Too Many If's', by Boris Kalyagin	95
Bundestag Debate, by Yu. Yakhontov	96
Genscher Cited	97
 TASS Reports FRG-GDR Talks on INF, SRINF (Moscow PRAVDA, 29 Mar 87).....	 98
 CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS	
Briefs	
Scientists Meeting in Geneva	99
 EUROPEAN CONFERENCES	
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister on European Issues (Vadim Loginov Interview; Prague Domestic Service, 3 Apr 87).....	100
 USSR: NATO-Warsaw Pact 'Unofficial Consultations' in Vienna (Moscow TASS, 23 Mar, 6 Apr 87; Moscow World Service, 7 Apr 87).....	 104
23 March Meeting	104
30 March Meeting	104
6 April Meeting	104
Moscow: 'Cautious Optimism'	105

TASS: NATO Said to 'Deliberately Inflate' Pact Strength (Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 1 Apr 87).....	106
USSR: NATO Stance on CDE Notification Provisions Hit (L. Levadov; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Mar 87).....	107
IZVESTIYA Assails U.S., 'Conventional Defense Initiative' (L. Semeyko; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 3 Apr 87).....	109
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS	
USSR: Congressman Urges U.S. To Join Nuclear Moratorium (Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 28 Mar 87).....	113
TASS Notes U.S., Japan Secret Nuclear Accord (Vasiliy Golovnin; Moscow TASS, 6 Apr 87).....	115
Soviet Commentator Views Campaign for Nordic NFZ (Sergey Astakhov; Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN, 1 Apr 87).....	116
USSR: GDR, CSSR Propose FRG Nuclear-Free Corridor (Moscow PRAVDA, 5 Apr 87; Moscow Domestic Service, 4 Apr 87).....	117
Berlin, Prague Reports	117
'Important Foreign Policy Initiative'	118
Briefs	
Readiness To Halt Nuclear Tests	119
3 April Semipalatinsk Test	119

/12223

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: U.S. PLANS EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF STAR WARS SYSTEMS

LD081323 Moscow TASS in English 1203 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 8 TASS -- The Reagan administration is secretly making plans for an early deployment of land- and space-based components for "Star Wars" systems, according to a study conducted by the U.S. Senate and circulated here today.

The report prepared by Senator Bennett Johnston and Senator William Proxmire, a member of the Subcommittee on Defense of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, said that the U.S. Department of Defense had a special program for the deployment of ABM components under the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative." The existence of such a program had not been announced officially.

In a statement circulated together with the report Senator Johnston emphasized that administration's plans to deploy SDI as soon as possible were absurd and very dangerous.

Such plans would undermine the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty and project the nuclear arms race to space, the statement said.

Senator Proxmire in his turn pointed out that the Reagan administration's plans for an early deployment of components for "Star Wars" systems were purely politically motivated. President Reagan is evidently striving for the realization of SDI before he retires in 1989 and, by doing so, is trying to make the United States continue work under that program in the future.

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CSO: 5200/1409

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: U.S. 'NEOGLOBALISM' LINKED TO SDI PLANS

PMO21545 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Apr 87 First Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Borin "International Notes": "In the Neoglobalist Deadlock"]

[Text] U.S. right-wing conservative circles and the U.S. military-industrial complex are intensely seeking a "way out" of the political deadlock in which the United States has been driven by the Washington administration's adventurist actions. After all, over the 18 months when the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions was in affect, the world saw for itself who was really striving to achieve military superiority. Reykjavik also opened many people's eyes to the real state of affairs. There is a serious crisis of confidence in Washington even among the U.S. allies. According to reports in THE GUARDIAN, opinion polls in Britain, France, the FRG, and Italy showed that only 30 percent of those polled believed in the administration's "honest intentions" to end the arms race.

You would think these facts ought to encourage the U.S. leading circles to pursue a more realistic policy. No such thing has yet happened. What is happening is the direct opposite. All sorts of recent "seminars" and "conferences," in which conservative organizations were largely active, have shown that people in the United States are striving to find a way out of the deadlock through an accelerated implementation of Washington's aggressive aims.

Moreover, the sinister "Star Wars" program is now already linked directly with the equally sinister concept of neoglobalism. Let us recall that the United States is attempting to implement within the framework of the strategy of neoglobalism some sort of exclusive "right" of Washington to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, is aiming to undermine and eliminate their legitimate governments which are not to the liking of U.S. imperialism, and is giving military assistance to various gangs of renegades fighting against their own people.

Now, however, in the opinion of U.S. "hawks," when the U.S. military department intends to submit to Congress options for the deployment of the "primary" SDI system in the very near future, the time has come to "modernize" and concretize the plans for neoglobalist piracy. It follows from the speeches made at the conference of conservative political action committees held in Washington that U.S. right-wing circles seriously expect the implementation of SDI will be a step toward the achievement of worldwide hegemony.

The scenario drawn up by the "hawks" is not all that complex. They calculate that, as a result of the deployment of SDI, U.S. territory will be proof against a counterstrike. On the other hand, strike space complexes coupled with nuclear missile weapons ought to pose a constant threat against the Soviet Union.

In this situation, the right-wingers dream, the time will have come to tackle "earthly problems" -- the overthrow of disliked governments in Asian, African, and Latin American countries.

The "hawks" in the United States are not only talking. They are also acting. For example, the establishment of yet another subversive "foundation" was loudly announced recently. Under the leadership of former U.S. Ambassador to Romania Funderburk, it will assist "the struggle against the spread of communism in the world in the course of low-intensity conflicts."

In other words, in the future this "nongovernmental organization" will be assigned very specific tasks in planning the launching of regional wars. The immediate task is also clearly formulated: "It is important to secure the downfall of at least one Marxist government." This is just for starters!

Later they intend to ensure that "more sophisticated" propaganda, political, psychological, and economic actions are taken against the socialist community countries. At the third stage, it was noted at the gathering of the conservative political action committees, the main efforts must be channeled toward... promoting "the USSR's disintegration into national formations." That is how they intend to "consign communism to the scrapheap of history." No less!

The history of the invention of such "scenarios" goes back several decades. "In June 1946, soon after the Potsdam Conference," according to the book "Winning a Nuclear War. The Pentagon's Secret War Plans," which was recently published in the United States, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff finished formulating the first detailed plan for an atomic war -- a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union code-named 'Pincher.' It defined in detail the precise number of aircraft carrying atom bombs, army divisions, and ships which would be 'needed to crush the Soviet Union.'"

The paramount task of this plan, as is shown by declassified government documents, was "to crush the Soviet Union or at least force it to capitulate on terms acceptable to the United States." This barbaric plan for the destruction of the Soviet state was logically continued in the scenarios for attacks on the USSR elaborated by the Pentagon and code-named "Bushwhacker," "Broiler," "Gunpowder," "Doublestar," "Fleetwood," and many, many others.

They console themselves with similar ravings today, but now involving SDI. The "future plans" being elaborated by U.S. right-wing conservative circles are in no way aimed at a constructive approach toward solving the most important problems of international security. The course of confrontation will not help official Washington get out of the political deadlock.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS HITS U.S. MILITARY REORGANIZATION BILL

LD031742 Moscow TASS in English 1437 GMT 3 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS -- Military News Analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

To make it easier to carry out their programme of "Star Wars" the exponents of militarising outer space in Washington have submitted to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States Congress draft legislation providing for the creation of a new service of the American Armed Forces -- the U.S. Defense Force and also of a respective department.

The four senators and representatives who submitted the bills believe that this new service should be charged with the task of defending the United States from all threats from the air, including aircraft, ballistic, cruise and other missiles, and should war break out of seizing control over outer space and conducting reconnaissance. Under the draft legislation the new department should be given responsibility over all commands and agencies connected with the use of outer space for military purposes.

One of the tasks of the secretary heading the department of this new service will be to develop space systems for intercepting and destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles, for defence against satellites and to develop mobile ABM systems.

At a press conference Representative Jack Kemp openly stated that the bill creates the foundation for implementing the "Strategic Defense Initiative". He said the issue was not the deployment of an ABM system of the United States but whether the Soviet Union would remain, as he alleged, the only country possessing one. Feigning innocence of pertinent knowledge, Kemp pretends not to know that the limited ABM system around Moscow was deployed in full accordance with the 1972 treaty and that the Soviet Union is by far not "the only country" having an ABM system.

It is well known that the American ABM defence in the Grand Forks area in the north of the United States not only exists but can be reactivated and put in combat readiness within a short period of time.

So the American Senate, which in its time ratified the Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of ABM systems, is now being asked to legalise measures that are absolutely clearly banned by this still operative treaty. For among other points the treaty of 1972 obliges the two sides not to deploy space-based ABM and mobile ground-based anti-missiles.

By their draft legislation the apologists of "Star Wars" not only challenge the common sense of the American law-makers but also openly proclaim the course of seizing control over outer space. This concept totally contradicts the commitment of the United States, adopted during the Soviet-American summit in Geneva, to strive to prevent the arms race from spreading to outer space.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS CITES U.S. COMMENTS ON THATCHER VISIT, SDI

LD011714 Moscow TASS in English 1646 GMT 1 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 1 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

A spokesman for the Reagan Administration said in Washington March 31 that, according to the information available to the American side, the British prime minister during her visit to Moscow had set forth with her own variations the stand on SDI that came in line with the U.S. approaches.

These approaches are well-known. In a bid to whitewash its "Star Wars" program, the U.S. administration is interpreting very tendentiously facts concerning the state of the American and Soviet anti-missile defense, distorting the stand of the sides on anti-satellite weapons and simply waving away the plain provisions of the Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of ABM systems under the pretext of its allegiance to "common sense."

"Common sense" which motivates Washington's actions in evaluating the American "Star Wars" program is in essence a product of pettyfoggery the purpose of which is to undermine the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems.

For instance, the 1972 agreement prohibits the deployment of a large-scale ABM defense and the testing of anti-satellite weapons in space, whereas Washington's "common sense" permits that. The U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative" calls for the breach of virtually every important provision of the ABM treaty. SDI and the ABM treaty are incompatible, mutually exclusive things.

The Reagan Administration spokesmen often emphasize with the air of significance about them that the Soviet Union has an anti-ballistic missile defense around Moscow. What they prefer not to mention, however, clearly aiming for the people with little, if any, knowledge on the matter is that the Soviet defense has been deployed in full compliance with the quantitative and geographical limitations set by Article III of the 1972 treaty.

It is common knowledge that the United States has an anti-missile defense deployed in the area where U.S. offensive missiles are stationed. The fact that the U.S. defense is partially mothballed does not change anything. The difference between a mothballed and an active weapon systems is about the same as between a dollar in his owner's pocket and his dollar deposited in a bank.

The British prime minister maintained that American ABM systems being developed under SDI are non-nuclear, whereas the Soviet anti-missile missiles, as Mrs. Thatcher said contrary to facts, were allegedly equipped with nuclear warheads.

It seems that Washington's "common sense" can take one too far! For the United States is making no secret of the fact that the purpose of a majority of nuclear tests conducted in Nevada is to develop ABM laser systems with nuclear pumping.

The United States, moreover, is the pioneer in the development of anti-satellite systems. Back in the 1960's the Pentagon deployed two anti-satellite systems on Kwajalein Atoll and on Johnston Island in the Pacific.

According to the American magazine BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, for some time those systems were equipped with high-yield nuclear warheads. At present the United States is intensively developing a second generation of anti-satellite systems.

The United States torpedoed the talks on anti-satellite systems and is turning down to this day the Soviet Union's proposals to conclude an agreement with the U.S. -- the agreement that would ban the testing of all anti-satellite weapons, preclude the deployment of new and provide for the destruction of all existing anti-satellite weapons. The United States rejected that proposal.

The Soviet Government decided not to be the first to deploy any anti-satellite systems in space. In other words, the U.S.S.R. instituted a unilateral moratorium on such launches and it will last for as long as other states, the U.S. included, refrain from the emplacement of anti-satellite weapons in outer space.

The stand of the White House in that issue is obstructionist, too.

Washington strategists are pretending that they are gravely concerned over Soviet anti-satellite weapons (of which only one unit exists) -- the unit which, by the way, the Soviet Union is prepared to destroy on the basis of a bilateral agreement with the United States. At the same time the Reagan Administration is confronting the world with the prospect of thousands of U.S. weapons appearing in space -- a factor which would dramatically heighten the threat of an all-out nuclear war that may break out as a result of malfunctions in the warning and communication systems.

Washington is now declaring its readiness to embark on a bilateral reduction of strategic offensive arms on a comparatively limited area of the land surface and at the same time is about to begin the deployment of far more dangerous weapons in truly boundless space.

In such circumstances the link between the reduction of strategic offensive arms and non-deployment of weapons in space is a strategic linkage. The Soviet Union will never agree to undo that package.

Some time back Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British secretary of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, said that research work (under the SDI program) could gather such momentum that it would be impossible to stop it even if there were serious grounds for trying to do so.

One cannot but agree with this view. At present U.S. research into the development of space strike arms approached a critical line beyond which one will have to decide whether to comply with the 1972 ABM treaty, and in doing so to maintain stability in the world, or to renounce that agreement and open up a road to the militarization of outer space and face a dramatically-grown risk of a nuclear war unfathomable in its disastrous consequences.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: UPGRADE OF GREENLAND RADAR VIOLATES ABM TREATY

PM071247 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 87 First Edition p 5

[Article by Major General Yu. Lebedev under rubric "Readers Request Information": "Radar Station in Greenland and Washington's Subterfuge" -- first two paragraphs are reader's letter]

[Text] "Newspapers make fairly frequent reference to the American radar station in Greenland. It has also been featured in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Nevertheless, I still do not understand why the creation of this radar station is at variance with the ABM Treaty. More information please."

Reserve Colonel M. Savin, Leningrad.

For several years the United States has been building a new multifunction radar station for a ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) at its military base in Greenland. This radar station is being constructed next to existing BMEWS radar stations built there before the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty was signed. This treaty permits the United States to retain these earlier BMEWS radar stations and keep them, including those on foreign territory, in their original positions. But strict limitations were imposed on the creation of new BMEWS radar stations after 1972: This kind of radar station may be sited only on the periphery of one's national territory; the placing of BMEWS radar stations on foreign territory is prohibited by Article 6 of the ABM Treaty. Even the most cunning treaty "interpreters" in the White House and the Pentagon cannot claim that Greenland is U.S. national territory. We will also note that, not limiting itself to Greenland, the United States has begun building a similar radar station in Britain.

It is therefore clear that building new U.S. radar stations in Greenland and Britain is not in accordance with the ABM Treaty.

The United States cannot be unaware of the unlawfulness of its actions. In an attempt to justify itself in the eyes of the world public opinion, the American administration is trying to "legitimize" the building of the new radar station in Greenland and pass off the work in progress as "modernization" of its old BMEWS stations.

What can be said in this connection? It is absurd to talk of any "modernization" when, figuratively speaking, a nuclear power plant is built in the place of a firewood stove. But this is exactly what is happening in Greenland, where the new radar station bears no resemblance to the previous one in terms of either equipment or potential. All the key components of the new radar station are new creations: an antenna system

based on a different (from the previous antenna system) principle of operation -- a "phased array" -- which gives the station a substantially more powerful performance and new potential (the new antenna is a six-tiered construction reaching a height of approximately 28 meters); a new "brain" for the station -- a rapid-response computer complex with a new generation of computers; and a modern control center appropriate to the station's new technical level and potential.

These are the facts. They are irrefutable evidence that the United States has no grounds for talking about modernization, because it is deploying a new phased-array radar station in breach of the ABM Treaty.

The 1972 ABM Treaty makes strict provisions regarding the permitted locations for siting large phased-array radar stations, basing these provisions on the intended purpose of these radar stations. Radar stations of this kind can only be built in ABM system deployment areas or at ABM test sites (in the capacity of ABM radar stations), on the periphery of the national territory of the country in question (in the capacity of BMEWS radar stations) -- outward looking and for the purpose of tracking objects in space or for use as national technical verification equipment. The new BMEWS phased-array radar station being built by the United States in Greenland does not correspond to any of the deployment regions or intended purposes permitted by the ABM Treaty.

So why is the United States proceeding with actions that are flagrantly in breach of its treaty obligations? We will consider the station's potential in order to answer this question.

The commissioning of the new radar station in Greenland will make it possible to have radar coverage of a considerably larger sector of the Arctic than was feasible with the old stations, increase the time available for tracking objects appearing from the north, and considerably enhance the potential for tracking a number of objects simultaneously. The technical specifications of the new station exceed BMEWS requirements: The information provided by the radar station will make it possible to assess the scale of an enemy nuclear missile attack and determine the location and expected warhead impact coordinates with an accuracy sufficient for targeting ABM missile complexes. Locating this radar station outside U.S. territory ensures advance detection of targets in the time needed for the early allocation of targets and for ensuring that they are intercepted in the furthest reaches of the ABM complex strike zones. It is with the aim of gaining these military advantages that the United States has built the new radar station in Greenland, ignoring the ABM Treaty requirements in this respect. It is becoming clear why Washington has needed to deceive public opinion, because Washington knows best of all how matters really stand. It is important to point out in this connection that the idea of "modernizing" the radar station in Greenland was repeatedly turned down by previous American administrations on the grounds that it ran counter to the ABM Treaty.

The unlawful U.S. establishment of a BMEWS radar station outside its national territory erodes the principles of the ABM Treaty. Yet that treaty is the foundation on which future Soviet-U.S. accords in the sphere of limiting, reducing, and ultimately totally eliminating strategic offensive weapons can be built. Attempts to weaken this treaty, and especially attempts to derail it, can only lead to a new, uncontrollable twist in the arms race spiral, notably in space.

This is what certain U.S. circles are aiming at, incidentally. The present Washington administration is following their lead. It has already refused to abide by the SALT-I interim agreement and the SALT-II treaty. And now, as we can see, it is the turn of the ABM Treaty.

I must also draw attention to another point of considerable importance. Those countries which indulge the United States and do not oppose the construction of new American BMEWS radar stations on their territory become, willy-nilly, accessories to the process of undermining international treaties.

This development of events cannot fail to cause concern in everyone who cherishes the cause of peace. Discussions among the Danish public (Greenland is part of Denmark) regarding the American BMEWS radar station in Greenland show no signs of abating, for example. The problem has even been a matter of debate in the Danish Folketing (parliament). A resolution passed by the Folketing instructs the government to do everything possible to ensure that the aforementioned radar station is not used for offensive purposes and is not brought into operation as part of preparations for "Star Wars." [paragraph continues]

The Danish Government, the resolution states, must urge the United States and the USSR to continue to adhere to a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. This demand is really intended for the United States, because our country is already in favor of unconditional fulfillment of this treaty.

So, Comrade Savin, this is how matters really stand with the new American radar station in Greenland. The danger lies not only and not so much in the station itself as in the U.S. departure from the ABM Treaty. That is why the Soviet Union cannot fail to react to the U.S. actions and to its attempts to derail the ABM Treaty. The USSR has repeatedly warned the United States that undermining this treaty, including the section concerning the problems of building BMEWS radar stations, could have serious consequences.

Our country is in favor of reinforcing the ABM Treaty system and ensuring that the countries concerned refrain for as long as possible from exercising their right to withdraw from the treaty and do not undertake any action in breach of the restrictions laid down by the treaty.

CSO: 5200/1409

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

GROMYKO, AMBASSADOR MATLOCK DISCUSS RELATIONS, ARMS ISSUES

LDO61729 Moscow TASS in English 1718 GMT 6 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 6 TASS -- Andrey Gromyko, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, received in the Kremlin today Jack Matlock, the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the United States, who presented his credentials.

Speaking during the ceremony Ambassador Matlock said in particular that although the United States and the USSR adhere to absolutely different values they have many common interests. Moreover, they share a common responsibility that transcends far beyond the specific content of bilateral relations.

The U.S. ambassador said that the deepening of understanding between his country and the Soviet Union is a matter of exceptional importance. He said it was necessary to create a basis of trust without which it will be very difficult to achieve mutually advantageous goals.

When accepting the credentials Andrey Gromyko said in particular that it has so happened in history that the USSR and the United States have in their hands the most dreadful weapons ever invented by man. Hardly anyone will deny that if these weapons are put to use as a result of somebody's recklessness not even the sound of human speech will remain on earth.

A simple conclusion stems from all this: Both powers should protect both themselves and the entire world from such a catastrophe, Andrey Gromyko said further. Not only their top leadership but also their diplomatic services can and must make their contribution to the great cause of preserving peace on earth.

Geneva and Reykjavik are important milestones on the difficult road of talks followed by the two powers. The prime aim of the talks -- elimination of the danger of nuclear war -- has not yet been attained.

Much work therefore lies ahead, including for diplomats, in order to build an edifice of lasting peace when all the peoples could breathe freely without fear of the morrow, Andrey Gromyko said.

Our thoughts and our concrete proposals are known to the government of the United States and to the whole world for that matter. They were outlined by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev in relevant statements.

We would like to express hope that, as different from the present, they will be objectively treated in accordance with the hugeness of the tasks facing our countries in ensuring lasting peace on earth, Andrey Gromyko said.

Then Andrey Gromyko and Jack Matlock had a conversation.

The president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR outlined the Soviet Union's principled approach to searching for ways of solving key problems of safeguarding international security, removing the danger of war and stopping the arms race.

"The aim of the Soviet proposals in this field is for nuclear arms never to be used", he said. "And this requires that nuclear arms be destroyed".

"We have done everything possible for normal relations between the Soviet Union and the United States", Andrey Gromyko stressed. "We made our concrete proposals on this score but in reply all sorts of manoeuvres are being undertaken with the aim of sidestepping the solution of burning issues. All this shows that at present the American Administration apparently does not have serious intentions to search for accords".

Jack Matlock expressed a certain optimism about the possibility of reaching accords between the United States and the Soviet Union.

/9716

CSO: 5200/1410

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG PAPER INTERVIEWS USSR'S ZAGLADIN: SDI, INF, EUROPEAN ARMS

DW030931 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 2 Apr 87 p 8

[Interview with Vadim Zagladin, CPSU Central Committee member and deputy chief of the Central Committee International Department, by FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU Chief Editor Werner Holzer and Geneva correspondent Pierre Simonitsch; date and place not given]

[Text] [FR -- FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU] Do you think it is possible to just "sweep under the rug" the nuclear weapons production technology, which has been known for 42 years? How can it be guaranteed that no country will try to hide or secretly produce a certain number of nuclear weapons? Will a world without nuclear weapons be more secure, or will the possibility be created of making it easier to wage wars with conventional weapons, which also have a high degree of destructiveness?

[Zagladin] Of course, it is impossible to "sweep under the rug" and forget nuclear weapons production technology. However, it is very realistic to agree on the elimination of existing weapons and on the renunciation of nuclear weapons production. That was the basis upon which the Soviet Union proceeded when it suggested on 15 January 1986 the program for a phased and consistent denuclearization of the earth by the year 2000.

The question about attempts to cheat is logical. Taking the necessity of strict observance of any future agreements, as well as prevention of such attempts, into account, the Soviet proposals presuppose a logically structured verification system, ranging from use of technical means to on-site inspections, with the forms and methods of verification being improved in the process of negotiation and practical implementation of the phased elimination of nuclear weapons. The USSR for its part is ready to agree on any additional verification measures.

Would a world without nuclear weapons be more secure? There is no doubt that it would be. First, in such case the danger of mankind being annihilated in a nuclear war would be totally eliminated; it would be immortal. Second, the reduction of nuclear weapons would not be a unique move. We hope for agreements on a chemical weapons ban as well as on a radical reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. All that would lead to a military balance recognized by both sides, and consequently to more confidence also.

In that case, too, reliable and effective verification, including on-site inspections, would be necessary. All that would rule out the possibility of anyone concentrating forces and creating the military superiority necessary for aggression.

[FR] Why have the Warsaw Pact countries not supported the Budapest appeal with specific proposals at the Vienna negotiations? Why has the West's proposal of December 1985 not been accepted in those negotiations, which envisages the withdrawal of some U.S. and Soviet troops from central Europe, but bypasses the discussion of actual numbers? Why has there not even been a counterproposal submitted? What leads the USSR to hope that the negotiations on the reduction of conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals will be more successful than the negotiations in Vienna? The increase in the number of participants will make it even more difficult to achieve agreement on a solution to issues such as the numerical strength of forces and weapons deployment.

[Zagladin] The Warsaw Pact Budapest appeal talks about a significant reduction of ground forces and tactical air forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. In effect it concerns all European countries. However, the Vienna negotiations are conducted by a limited number of countries representing the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and only concern the problems of mutual arms and force reductions in central Europe. It is clear that it cannot be the forum to discuss the initiative contained in the Budapest appeal.

The proposal on the partial withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet troops and weapons was submitted by the Warsaw Pact countries in February 1985. The West's proposals mentioned in your question are actually counterproposals in response to the Warsaw Pact initiative of February 1985. They were not constructive because they envisaged smaller reductions of U.S. and Soviet troops and no weapons reductions at all. But the most important thing is that those insignificant measures were accompanied by disproportionate verification measures, envisaging counting practically every soldier.

In order to find a compromise, the Warsaw Pact countries on 20 February 1986 submitted a detailed draft "Agreement on the Initial Reduction of the Sides' Ground Forces and Weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States and Related Measures in Central Europe," which considered certain moves to meet the Western position. The NATO countries ignored that draft, and that is the state of affairs in Vienna.

The proposal by the Warsaw Pact countries of 11 June 1986 on the reduction of forces and weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals harmoniously complements the program submitted by the Soviet Union to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000. We are aware that this is a complicated problem, but we think that it must be resolved. In that respect we hope that everyone will show common sense and recognize the fact that further stockpiling or even freezing armaments under the present circumstances entails danger of the most serious consequences for all of mankind.

[FR] Why is the Soviet Union agreeing to the conclusion of a separate agreement on the removal of the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles deployed in Western Europe, which threaten the USSR directly, as well as removal of the Soviet SS-20 missiles, even though in the past it insisted on linking the solution of the intermediate-range problem with U.S. renunciation of SDI?

[Zagladin] You are right. We have changed our position. However, the Soviet Union continues to assume that future security must be non-nuclear security, and would even prefer a radical solution to the problem of nuclear disarmament in the spirit of our complex approach, which envisages a package. But we are realists. An analysis of the situation showed a number of aspects that caused us to make a new move.

The U.S. delegation's attitude at the Geneva negotiations almost led to a deadlock. In view of the forthcoming elections in the United States, that situation could last. But we should not lose time because the process of the perfection of weapons is already overtaking the process of negotiations on their reduction.

In addition, we have listened to the wishes of many Western European governments, including the FRG Government, who have expressed their interest in freeing the continent from intermediate-range nuclear missiles and repeatedly stated their concern that such a process of denuclearization could be hindered because the USSR and the United States have not reached agreement on other aspects -- nuclear weapons and space-based systems.

We are also considering the interests of the Asian countries, in particular those of the PRC and Japan, who want the presence of that type of weapon on their continent to be radically reduced.

Finally, the wishes of the European and international public have been taken into account. They were formulated particularly audibly at the recent Moscow forum, For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity.

[FR] Soviet scientists agree with most of their Western colleagues that the SDI plans announced by the U.S. administration cannot be implemented as they exist. Why has the USSR launched a propaganda campaign against SDI and why is it so concerned?

[Zagladin] The problem is not whether the SDI program can be implemented in some variations or another. The very purpose of the program and in particular the repeated attempts to create an antimissile shield that could guarantee conditions for an unpunished nuclear attack, could become a powerful catalytic instrument in the weapons race, and not just in space.

You do not need to have much imagination to predict with certainty that a country that considers itself a possible object of nuclear aggression would immediately try to neutralize anything possible dangerous for itself and its allies. It would develop countermeasures against space-based ABM systems and improve the means to a breakthrough [die mittel des durchbruchs vervoll-kommenen]. Obviously it would become urgently necessary to develop and improve nuclear weapons against which the antimissile shield would be impotent, such as winged missiles [fluegelraketen], low-trajectory sea-based ballistic missiles, etc.

We should also keep in mind that in the process of implementing SDI, weapons will be developed that are designed to destroy objects in space as well as on earth. Countermeasures would become necessary for that, too.

Thus implementing SDI would not allow us to deal with the reduction of existing types of weapons. On the contrary' it would stimulate the beginning of an arms race in many new directions. It is that terrible prospect of the arms race and the destabilization of the international situation that causes our very negative position on that program, and not the stories about the Russians allegedly being afraid of SDI.

We advocate detente and peace without the danger of nuclear destruction. SDI is now the main obstacle to that goal.

[FR] Is Moscow still hoping to continue the dialogue with Reagan, or is it already counting on his successor? If Moscow is really interested in achieving disarmament agreements soon, it is hard to see why it publicly represents Reagan as a politician who lacks common sense. The Soviet side charges that Reagan at first agreed to the destruction of strategic nuclear weapons and then broke his word, either under outside pressure or after having read specific files that he did not have time to study earlier.

[Zagladin] The Soviet Union, or as you say, Moscow, does not hold a dialogue with some public figure, but with the chief of state or government who was elected by the people or the parliament of the respective country. A country's domestic problems cannot have any influence on our approach. It is up to the peoples of the respective countries to assess their statements. That is not our task.

Yes, we are ready to continue the dialogue with the present U.S. Administration. In doing so, we consider the matters discussed as well as another aspect of the problem that I mentioned in a different context -- the time factor. Nobody had heard about Star Wars 4 years ago. Now the United States is already preparing to implement the program. Who knows what may happen in another 3 or 4 years. Rejecting cooperation with the present U.S. Administration would mean nothing but a long interruption of work aimed at nuclear disarmament. We cannot afford that.

[FR] If an agreement on Afghanistan could be concluded, when would Soviet troops be withdrawn from Afghanistan? Does the USSR think that Afghanistan could become a neutral, nonaligned country whose people could be granted the right of self-determination and, based on that right, elect their own government? Does the proposal on national reconciliation submitted by the new Afghan chief of government envisage democratic pluralism, or is the rule of its Democratic People's Party considered a given?

[Zagladin] The Soviet Union wants to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible. In what period of time that will be possible is being discussed in the Geneva negotiations. It will be resolved, with the positions of both sides -- Afghanistan and Pakistan, whose positions are getting closer to each other -- being taken into account, and with Moscow and Kabul coordinating their approach as necessary. But I repeat, the earlier that is done, the better.

As for the second part of the question on how we would like to see the future Afghanistan, I would like to refer to the official statement made by Mikhail Gorbachev during his visit to India: "We advocate a nonaligned, sovereign, independent Afghanistan which controls and uses its resources and whatever it has. We advocate a neutral Afghanistan. It is up to the Afghan people to decide on the future form of government."

Finally, as for the domestic order that will be restored in Afghanistan after the war and the conclusion of the respective international agreements on guarantees against a possible intervention from outside, that problem will be resolved by the Afghans themselves. The concept of national reconciliation, which was submitted by the Afghan leadership, clearly envisages the organization of a coalition government with participation of forces now outside Afghanistan. I think that answers your question.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CPSU'S SHISHLIN ON SDI, INF, REYKJAVIK, SALT

AU260913 Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian No 12 March 87 p 4

[Interview given by Nikolay Shishlin, deputy department head of the CPSU Central Committee, to correspondent Peter Vajda "in Hungary last week": "New Approach--'Spring' Political Exhibitions--At Least One Step Away From the Abyss"]

[Excerpt] [Vajda] In our discussion today we primarily would like to speak--no matter how sketchily--about the current world political efforts and world political concepts of the Soviet Union. You in the Soviet Union recently successfully concluded a forum which--in terms of the wide circle of participants and the openness of the debate--the international peace movement has been unable to organize for years. How do you explain this?

[Shishlin] There are many reasons behind this. One is the increasing recognition of the fact that, for the first time in history, mankind has no guarantee of surviving a nuclear war. This fact is recognized by people such as physicians, among whom the peace movement is spreading like wildfire, and physicists, the best part of whom had already been aware of the danger at the beginning of the nuclear power advances in the forties. A second reason is that it has been clearer than ever before that the accumulating global problems can no longer be solved within national boundaries. A third reason is local conflicts. The main issue, however, is that the calendar showed the year 1987 and the place was Moscow where this policy was being asserted, not only in word but also in deed, a policy we were witnessing. Naturally, the worldwide interest in Gorbachev's personality and in Soviet policy also played a great role.

Peace Continues To Be the Goal [subhead]

[Vajda] Did the wide range of those present at the forum, including the presence of well-known and controversial personalities such as Academician Sakharov, play a role in the success of the forum?

[Shishlin] Concerning Sakharov, the answer is both yes and no. Many people regarded Academician Sakharov's presence as an expression not only of the new Soviet approach toward guaranteeing human rights, but of the wide range of views that were allowed to be represented at the forum. Academician Sakharov took part in the forum's activity, expressed his views on the moratorium and SDI, the disarmament issue, and human rights. He expressed views that differ from the official Soviet stand and views corresponding with it. All this showed the wide range of debate that was allowed to develop. On the other hand, why did I say no? I said this because although Sakharov's presence expressed an important nuance in the forum's work, this still was not the determining factor behind the great success of the forum.

[Vajda] What do you consider to be most important in the development of international relations in the recent past in the development of international relations and what are the prospects of rebuilding detente? Can we talk of a new Soviet foreign policy?

[Shishlin] Many things occurred last year in this respect. I refer, first of all, to our own initiatives -- and I include here the contact-building activity and the efforts for dialogue with the capitalist countries that were made by Hungary and the other fraternal countries. The goal was to improve the trend of international development. Reykjavik, of course, played the determining role and, on the one hand, it showed how dramatic the situation was and, on the other hand, that there were possibilities for change.

With regard to the new foreign policy, the goal continues to be to secure peace, and from this point of view the goal is not brand new. It is, nevertheless, new in its approach, because it attributes the greatest importance ever to the goals, hopes, dangers, and risks that affect the whole of mankind -- and all this in a world in which mutual relations and interdependence are asserted.

[Vajda] Back to Reykjavik: We know that a package deal was discussed there. Why has the issue of intermediate-range missiles been dropped from the package deal since then? What are the chances?

[Shishlin] With regard to the first part of the question, we wanted to take three or four steps away from the abyss at one stroke. However, when it became clear that this would not work, one could not say that it is not worth taking even one step. Then, let it be one step, we decided. This, of course, does not mean that the other issues -- strategic arms limitation, adherence to SALT, avoiding a war in space and halting nuclear tests -- are no longer on the agenda. As for the chances: We are facing months of complex diplomatic activity, of concentrated efforts, months of joint activity if we want to reach an agreement this year, since it is certain that this year the Warsaw Pact countries already will have coordinated their high-level evaluation of the situation. Our common goal is to achieve a breakthrough this year, at least in one area. In addition, one should be aware of the fact that in this respect much also depends on the attitude of the West European countries. These countries have their own interests, let us regard them as national or selfish interests, but we must take them into account as realities.... As for the United States itself, we, after all, have extended our Geneva dialogue, and Secretary of State George Shultz will travel to Moscow in April. We do not plan a 1-day meeting but a deep exchange of views. We are also in contact with the White House on this issue.

The Situation of Relations [subhead]

[Vajda] Is the White House interested in signing an agreement with the Soviet Union in the given period?

[Shishlin] There are groups in the administration that are interested in such an agreement. I was pleasantly surprised when Mr Perle from the Department of Defense declared that such an agreement was possible, while Defense Secretary Weinberger himself was making 1,001 objections to it. There is, therefore, a moderate wing in the administration; all these, of course, are relative concepts in such an administration, as we are talking here about a right-wing administration as a whole. However, the main thing is whether there will be a majority political will, whether they are ready to take into account objective political realities, such as the new congress which, in my view, cannot be ignored. Neither can they shine white with innocence after the Irangate affair. In addition, the U.S. President must take into consideration the time factor if he tries to bring about results. [paragraph continues]

I do not exclude the possibility that after a complex political struggle the U.S. Administration will be ready to settle the issue after all.

[Vajda] Can this mean a summit this year?

[Shishlin] If we could work out a mutually acceptable European zero-option for the Soviet Union and the United States, based on compromise, this no doubt would be worth signing in Washington by the general secretary and the President.

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CSO: 5200/1410

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: U.S., WEST EUROPE SEEN OPPOSING ACCORD

U.S. Sincerity Questioned

PM301407 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[A. Shalnev commentary: "So, He is Right...." under rubric "Facts, Events, Opinions"]

[Text] ...Question: "And so, the Soviet representative is right when he says that the United States has proposed making Pershing and cruise missiles into shorter-range missiles?" Answer: "This is one of the possibilities which would ensure equal limitations on short-range systems."

This is a direct quotation from a stenographic report on a recent U.S. State Department briefing. Judging by this report, the briefing was almost entirely devoted to the question of the Washington administration's stance on Euromissiles. The discussion was provoked by statements made by Viktor Karpov, chief of administration in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an IZVESTIYA interview ("Is Their 'Zero Option' a Bluff?", No. 82), during which serious doubts were expressed regarding the sincerity of Washington's stated desire to remove medium-range missiles -- Soviet and American -- from Europe as soon as possible.

The interview has aroused considerable interest in the American capital. The extent of this interest can be judged by the following fact: When answering questions by reporters, State Department spokesman Charles Redman read from a prepared text. In other words, the flood of questions had been foreseen. From my experience in dealing with members of the State Department and White House press departments, I know that the appearance of this text would not have been possible without detailed consultation with the White House and, considering the subject, the Pentagon and the CIA.

If we are talking about the essence of this response, it seems clear that the doubts about the sincerity of Washington's declarations are justified. As we can see from the quote above, the State Department has confirmed that, yes, the administration does in fact propose to turn medium-range missiles into shorter-range missiles. What does this mean? It means, for example, that Pershing-2 missiles will remain in Western Europe -- only in a somewhat truncated form, without the second stage. So what is the "zero option"?

When answering questions, Redman spoke as if this kind of "modification" is only "one of the possibilities." This answer revealed his insincerity: Judging by a report by Jeffrey Smith, a reporter with the capital's WASHINGTON POST who has good sources of information, this is virtually a certainty and not simply a possibility. He writes that the "Martin Marietta Company, which produces these missiles, distributed a brochure several years ago containing a description of the 'one stage concept.' [paragraph continues]

The concept was called 'accessible and approved.'" He continues: "A specialist in the armed forces told me that the problem of increasing a missile's range with the aid of adding a second stage is only 'slightly more complicated' than reducing its range by dismantling the second stage."

You must agree that against this background the statement made at the briefing by the State Department spokesman -- "the zero option is not a bluff" -- is bound to raise doubts. Equally strange, you will agree, is the claim that Karpov's statements in the IZVESTIYA interview reflect "the same Soviet position which has made real negotiations and the achievement of real results so complicated." This is Defense Secretary Weinberger's response.

After quoting this, one cannot fail to ask: What is the real impediment to the elimination of Euromissiles -- Washington's desire to keep them, only in a somewhat modified form, or the fact that Moscow is openly pointing this out?....

NATO SCG Meeting

LD312356 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 31 Mar 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report over video]

[Text] A session of the special consultative group of the North Atlantic treaty took place in Brussels, and a news conference was held on its outcome. Our correspondent reports:

Such meetings with journalists as this are a regular feature at the NATO headquarters. As a rule, there are many more questions for them than there are replies. But exceptions can also take place--today, for example.

The press was interested only in one issue: whether the United States and their allies were going to make any constructive moves in response to the Soviet proposal of 28 February. One would think that the task could not be formulated any clearer for the two official Washington spokesmen. But neither Holmes, chairman of the NATO special consultative group, nor Glitman, chief U.S. negotiator at the Geneva talks with the USSR on intermediary weapons, was able to resolve it. I shall add: to the general disappointment of my colleagues from dozens of countries who were present there. The point is that they heard several answers at one time, and the answers were different. Moreover, they were incompatible.

In one instance, the Soviet Union was praised for coming forward with new, constructive initiatives. In another, it was claimed that we made a step backward in comparison with Reykjavik. At the same time, note that the Atlanticists are pleased with the Soviet concession--singling out the problem of eliminating medium-range missiles from the general package. But at the same time, they themselves would like now to tie it up in a single knot with the small-range weapons. The Washington envoys have failed to give any answer, and, judging from all, they did not even intend to do so. [video shows two NATO spokesmen addressing news conference, then cuts to front page of a newspaper]

NATO Seeks 'Unilateral' Advantages

LD312019 Moscow TASS in English 1907 GMT 31 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 31 TASS -- by Vladimir Bogachev, TASS military writer

World public opinion welcomed the Soviet Union's initiative which calls, among other things, for singling out the problem of medium-range missiles from the package of other issues and for an undelayed conclusion of a separate agreement on the complete elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and their radical reduction -- down to 100 warheads -- on a global scale.

The Soviet Union made the move in order to give a new impetus to the process of arms limitation and reduction and to set in motion the talks on nuclear and space arms at Geneva.

The leaders of the NATO countries also reacted positively to the proposals -- in words. They acknowledged that efforts to resolve the issue of medium range missiles separately came in line with the list of priorities in the stage-by-stage approach to arms control.

However, as was the case on more than one occasion in the past, in reaction to a realistic prospect for concluding a Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of considerable numbers of nuclear weapons, the first such agreement between the two countries in the past seven years, they began looking for pretexts both to impede that process and to try and gain unilateral military advantages.

While welcoming the undoing of a package by the Soviet Union and the separation of medium-range missiles from it, Western politicians at once proposed their own versions of new NATO packages that would seriously complicate the task of early solution of the issue of medium-range missiles. The things went so far that instead of reducing nuclear arsenals in Europe NATO countries want to embark on their buildup, on the "rearmament" with U.S. theater missiles.

On the one hand, NATO leaders propose to link the elimination of medium-range weapons with the simultaneous solution to the issue of theater missiles, with chemical weapons, with conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe. But didn't the countries of the socialist community table the corresponding proposals long ago -- the proposals the realization of which would drastically lower the level of military confrontation without causing damage to national security of any country?

By the way, until recently NATO countries reacted with little, if any, activity to those initiatives of the socialist countries, but now that the Soviet Union put forward its proposals on medium-range missiles they displayed a sudden "interest" in those problems, evidently hoping to get a "bargaining chip" for the talks.

On the other hand, the United States and some other NATO countries insist that the Soviet Union give up the link of the problem of reduction of strategic offensive arms by 50 per cent to the problem of preventing strike weapons from being deployed in outer space.

The Soviet Union has emphasized more than once that the linkage between strategic arms reduction and non-militarization of space is a strategic one. It is senseless to reduce strategic arms on earth and at the same time to give the green light to an uncontrollable race in even more dangerous arms in space that has no boundaries. The Soviet Union shall never agree to undo that package.

The Soviet Union stands for disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament, and for the establishment of a comprehensive security system. This is the only way which can make humankind immortal once again.

'Unconstructive Elements'

PM030941 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Apr 87 First Edition p 5

[Article by Yu. Gavrillov: "'Atlanticists' Resort to Tricks to Hamper Talks"]

[Text] Talks began in Washington yesterday between French Prime Minister J. Chirac and U.S. President R. Reagan. The main item on the agenda is the Soviet proposals on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe.

It is just over a month since the Soviet Union put forward a major new initiative on singling out the question of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe from the package of problems and concluding a separate agreement. This step made a big impact worldwide and caused a flurry of diplomatic activity on both sides of the Atlantic. On the eve of British Prime Minister M. Thatcher's visit to the USSR there was an intensive exchange of views involving London, Paris, and Bonn. Paramount attention has also been paid to problems of curbing the nuclear arms race at the British prime minister's meetings in Moscow.

In analyzing the course of the debates and discussions, observers highlight several significant points. First, there are growing demands by broad European public circles for the NATO countries' governments to give a positive response to Moscow's proposals and not to miss a unique chance to strengthen security in Europe. Second, practically all the West European leaders advocated reaching a Soviet-American agreement on medium-range missiles. These are all positive factors. But there are also clearly discernible negative phenomena. Certain circles, primarily in the United States, want to place barriers in the way of the speediest achievement of accords, are expressing various reservations, and are urging action from a "position of strength."

On the one hand talks are in progress while, on the other, the Pentagon is testing Pershing-2 missiles and continuing to station U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe.

At the same time, appeals are being made in the Pentagon not to eliminate U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe but, in the event of an agreement with the USSR, to turn them into short-range missiles (we are talking about first-strike Pershing-2 missiles). And to reequip the cruise missiles for stationing on submarines and surface ships. Anyway, every effort is being made to push the idea of keeping a certain number of medium-range missiles in Europe despite the USSR's clear proposal on their total elimination on the continent, as discussed in Reykjavik.

Remember that at the meeting in the Icelandic capital the United States gave repeated assurances that, if the USSR were to detach the question of medium-range missiles from the Reykjavik package, reaching an accord on their elimination in Europe would present no problems. But now the picture is different. [paragraph continues]

"We can see," M.S. Gorbachev noted, "the question of medium-range missiles accumulating a whole package of conditions and demands on the Soviet Union. We discover that the NATO countries are retreating from the positions of their own 'zero option.'"

Is this not indicated by U.S. President R. Reagan's newly published statement? It was on the conclusion of the latest stage of work in the group on medium-range nuclear armaments at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva. While plugging the U.S. side's "determination" to reach an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe, the President tried to distort the USSR's approach to talks. He ascribed to the Soviet side a "new position" which, apparently, is "totally unacceptable" to the United States and its allies. Unconstructive elements in the U.S. side's approach were also revealed: The United States is insisting on linking a medium-range missiles agreement to "limitations" on operational and tactical missiles.

What is this if not another trick? After all, the USSR's position is well known: As soon as an agreement is signed on eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe the Soviet Union will withdraw the increased-range operational and tactical missiles from the GDR and CSSR on agreement with those countries' governments. They were stationed there as a countermeasure to the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe. As for the other operational and tactical missiles, the USSR has said that it is prepared to immediately embark on talks on their reduction and complete elimination. This was reaffirmed during the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers' committee session in Moscow.

Washington and its allies are perfectly well aware of this.

But this is a different matter entirely. The supporters of the arms race on both sides of the Atlantic find the elimination of deadly weapons in Europe a frightening prospect. They have started bleating about "Soviet military superiority," about an agreement on medium-range missiles being a "Russian trick," and so on and so forth. Meanwhile, the United States is trying to impose its negative positions on the NATO allies. This is exemplified by the recent NATO Special Consultative Group session in Brussels. As Allen Holmes, U.S. assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs, said, the NATO partners "fully supported that U.S. stance" on medium-range missiles in Europe and advocated the continued deployment of U.S. "cruise missiles" in Western Europe. In short, it is the old picture: The minute it becomes possible to reach positive decisions in the disarmament sphere, the NATO countries start looking for excuses to slow down the process.

Washington's maneuvers over a question which is of fundamental significance for the future of Europe are condemned by all honest people. The speediest conclusion of an agreement on medium-range missiles would pave the way for completely ridding Europe of nuclear weapons. That is why the "Atlantic" obstructions must be cleared out of the way.

U.S. Said Hindering Accord

LD011316 Moscow TASS in English 1158 GMT 1 Apr 87

["U.S. Hinders INF Agreement" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Washington April 1 TASS -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports:

State Department and White House spokesmen have been assuring public opinion almost daily that the United States is sparing no effort to achieve an agreement with the Soviet Union to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles in Europe and reduce their numbers elsewhere in the USSR and the United States.

These assurances, however, have invariably contained a small "but": the Soviet Union must agree to a dramatic increase in U.S. theater missiles or at least to the intermediate-range Pershing-2's on station in Western Europe being converted into shorter range missiles.

The supporting arguments have boiled down to assertions that it is U.S. allies in the North Atlantic bloc that want it this way and that the Soviet Union in Europe enjoys a "lead" over the United States and other NATO countries.

The Pentagon has been readily providing everybody willing with slick tables of falsified data to corroborate the point.

President Reagan in a recent statement declared that what he alleged was a Soviet "monopoly" in theater weapons "clearly is not acceptable" to the United States.

How do things stand in reality, however?

One can get the answer even just by leafing through American newspapers themselves. "Strictly speaking," said THE WASHINGTON POST, "The Soviet Union does not have a monopoly in all short-range missile systems".

The paper then said America had a much greater nuclear potential in Western Europe than the number of Soviet short-range systems cited by the Pentagon in a bid to prove a Soviet "margin of superiority".

THE WASHINGTON POST said Soviet theater missiles had been in Europe for at least 20 years but for some reason the United States had begun showing "concern" over them only recently.

The article did not give an answer to the question of why there had been so much attention given to the short-range missiles lately but quoted experts as saying the dispute over them "could prevent" an INF treaty.

This seems to explain everything.

The American side said in the Icelandic capital that it was prepared to sign an INF agreement and that it would not be difficult to reach it once the Soviet Union separated the issue from the Reykjavik package.

The Soviet Union has now done that so that the problem could be solved and an impetus given to talks on also other matters.

Moreover, it has also proposed working out adequate verification arrangements and expressed readiness for immediate talks on short-range weapons.

This has put the United States before the prospect of a major step forward in arms control. However, it is the last thing wanted by Washington "hawks" which enjoy tremendous influence on the administration and by right-wing quarters, most notably the military-industrial complex.

Their opinion has been reflected in another WASHINGTON POST article urging the administration to rectify what it called a Reykjavik "error" and not to agree to an INF accord in any case.

'Disarmament Through Rearmament'

LD022019 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 2 Apr 87

[Announcer-read Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Excerpts] And now Yuriy Solton discusses prospects to sign an agreement for medium-range missiles in Europe:

If an agreement of this kind is signed it will prove a notable move toward nuclear disarmament. If it was signed, nations would begin, for the first time, to get rid of nuclear weapons. [passage omitted] Understandably, such a notable reduction in nuclear confrontation would have a favorable effect on the whole international situation. A stimulus would appear to solve other disarmament problems.

When the Soviet Union put forward this initiative 1 month ago, it seemed an agreement could be reached quickly. First, because the Soviet Union almost fully met the NATO proposals for the so-called zero-option, and second, because the principle parameters of an agreement had been coordinated at the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik. But, in discussing prospects, we have to use the word "if", which is a pity.

All those opposed to nuclear disarmament of any kind have been distorting the picture and trying to torpedo the talks. What is more, they have been influencing the administration in Washington. Word has leaked that at the Geneva talks with the Soviet Union, the American side intends to link the problem of abolishing medium-range missiles with action on the question of tactical missiles. Moreover, the United States is pressing to escalate its missiles of this kind globally in general, and in Europe in particular.

It is the old vicious thesis of disarmament through rearmament. How to stop the arms race instead of legalizing it is what must be discussed. The American wish to link medium-range missiles with the tactical makes you think that this may be an attempt to hinder an agreement.

The Soviet Union believes, according to its Foreign Ministry spokesman, that tactical missiles, too, must be discussed, and given action. But it is strongly against signing a treaty for medium-range missiles to be linked with a decision on tactical missiles. What is more, it's against conditioning one on the other.

Changing NATO Stance

LD022101 Moscow TASS in English 2019 GMT 2 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 2 TASS -- Follows commentary by Vladimir Bogachev, TASS military news analyst:

Contrary to Bonn's previous statements. Lothar Ruehl, a spokesman for the West German Defence Ministry, announced the FRG's negative attitude to the Soviet proposal that an agreement be signed on tactical missiles after the medium-range missiles of both sides are eliminated in Europe. Lord Carrington, NATO secretary general, supported Washington's demands for a freeze on the current Euromissile situation. French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac expressed the view that the NATO's main objective now is a buildup of U.S. shorter range missiles in Europe.

There is an impression that some leaders of the NATO member-countries see their main objective now, as prospects are improving for a positive settlement of the question of the total elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, in putting up ever new obstacles in the way of lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe.

Quite recently calls came almost daily from the capitals of the European NATO member-countries for the speediest resolution of the problem of medium-range missiles, that a separate agreement be concluded on these missiles. Yet when the Soviet Union proposed that the problem of medium-range missiles be singled out from the package of disarmament issues, and an agreement be concluded on it without delay on the basis of the understanding reached in Reykjavik, the NATO member countries have for some reason immediately changed their stand.

American Ambassador Ronald Lehman, participant in the Geneva talks, pretended that the bilateral elimination of medium-range missiles might ensure unilateral advantages for the Soviet Union, and demanded that the Soviet Union "pay a high price" for the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear missiles from Western Europe. The leaders of the NATO member-countries forgot their own arguments in defence of the zero option, of the need to untie arms control packages, and began putting forward their own packages, linking, in particular, medium-range missiles with chemical weapons, conventional weapons and forces in Europe and so on and so forth. It must be noted, for that matter, that quite recently the NATO member-countries quite inertly reacted to the specific proposals of the countries of the socialist community on the same issues. They in Paris, Bonn and London are now citing fantastic data about some "military superiority" of the Warsaw Treaty member countries in the spirit of the worst traditions of the White House and the Pentagon.

There is rough parity in military power between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries. In some fields, for example, as regards the number of strategic bombers, the number of nuclear warheads in submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the United States and the other NATO countries have a heavy advantage. But as regards some other types of weapons the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries are ahead. A tendency is observed in Washington of putting forward demands for unilateral cuts in arms by the countries of the socialist community, while leaving intact even the American weapons, in which the USA has an obvious superiority.

The Reagan Administration is forcing on the West European NATO countries its obstructionist approach to nuclear disarmament, apparently, seeing in the agreement on the total elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe a threat to its concept of a "limited nuclear war" at a considerable distance from the shores of the United States.

In putting forward its proposals on medium-range missiles, the Soviet Union has again demonstrated its will to resolve the nuclear disarmament problem. The history-making chance to eliminate a whole class of nuclear weapons in Europe will not be missed provided all countries, including the USA, listen to the voice of public, understand the concerns and interests of other peoples and do not separate their security from the security of their neighbours in our world, where everything is so closely interconnected.

Western 'Reservations'

LD032219 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 3 Apr 87

["International Situation -- Questions and Answers" program presented by foreign affairs commentator Vyacheslav Lavrentyev, with political observer Nikolay Shishlin; commentator Nikolay Agayants; "our colleague" Vladimir Fadeyev; commentator Igor Surguchev; and Paris correspondent Oleg Maksimenko]

[Excerpts] [Lavrentyev] Hello, comrades! As usual, we have compiled our program from replies to your letters. Lately we have started to get more of them, and many of them contain not abstract questions, such as "tell us about Greenland," but there is interest in international problems concerning our country and the Soviet Union's foreign policy. [passage omitted] Naturally, many are concerned about the way the process of curbing the arms race and the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons are going -- that is, problems which our government has placed at the focus of its foreign policy. In this regard, many of our listeners are worried about the fact that fresh complications have arisen at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on medium-range missiles in Europe, hampering the attainment of accord. Why has this happened? Who is to blame? Erik Mikhaylovich Shulvovskiy from Noginsk asks in particular. Political observer Nikolay Shishlin will reply to this and a number of other questions. Go ahead, Nikolay Vladimirovich.

[Shishlin] First of all, there is the essence of the Soviet position, as set forth in the well-known statement of 28 February 1987. First, the Soviet Union is prepared to seek a solution to the question of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe and drastically limiting this class of weaponry in the Asiatic part of our territory and on the territory of the United States, independent of the scope of other problems concerning the curtailment of strategic weapons and other classes of weapons. That is, the Reykjavik package has been untied, something about which much has been said in the West -- in the United States and in the West European countries. That is the first thing.

Second, on the basis of this Soviet position, we certainly can speak of substantial progress at the Geneva talks. The Geneva talks really are a serious forum where serious work is in progress to draft the appropriate agreement. But one must not underestimate the difficulties, both subjective and objective, in what concerns the search for a compromise solution. The subjective difficulties consist in the fact that, as is revealed by the first reactions to the Soviet position, be they in the United States or in the West European countries, our interlocutors have as always an endless fund of reservations in order to try to haggle for as much as possible in things where there should be no question of any trading, where the discussion should be about finding a sensible balance of interests that would rest firmly on a foundation of sufficient security, equal security for both sides.

What reservations are we talking about? Well, first of all, they declare that since an accord is to be attained on eliminating medium-range missiles, then we must at the same time come to agreement on issues of operational and tactical missiles. But here, this detail must be taken into account: It has been stated by the Soviet Union that as far as the operational and tactical missiles stationed by us in response to the stationing of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe are concerned -- the missiles stationed by our country by agreement with the Czechoslovak side and the GDR -- these missiles will be removed from the territory of Czechoslovakia and the GDR as soon as an accord is reached in Geneva. But in what is called Europe, the European Continent, the one side and the other have operational and tactical missiles of lesser range.

Here the Soviet Union says firmly and definitely that we are prepared, as soon as a solution on medium-range missiles is found, to embark immediately upon talks with the aim of coming to agreement on both reduction and elimination of this class of missiles, too.

Further, there is also this theme in the Western reservations, that if Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe are eliminated, then what about conventional weapons, since the West firmly insists that there is a imbalance in favor of the Warsaw Pact countries in conventional weapons. In Vienna, what might be called preliminary discussions are in progress -- I would not even call them talks -- to try to find a framework for talks on evening out the armed forces and weapons of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The Soviet principle is this: Where there is imbalance, balance should be approached by way of reduction of the level of the weapons concerned. Thus, in essence, the political position is absolutely clear, sincere, and well-considered on the Soviet Union's side. Thus, I think that the West is quite simply exceedingly slowly approaching the adoption of a stand of responsibility, a stand of trust, and embarking quickly on energetic work to draft an appropriate agreement.

That is what I have called the subjective hindrances. But of course there are the objective ones, and we must take account of this, because in itself such a treaty, such as agreement on elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe will, of course, require fairly intensive work. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is prepared for the fullest verification [kontrol], one might say three-way verification, since it is a question of verification of practical steps aimed at curtailing the arms race.

[Lavrentyev] Nikolay Vladimirovich, the question is often asked: Why, given the profound similarity of the present Soviet position with the well-known U.S. zero option, does the United States not applaud the Soviet stand and why is there speculation about whether it will be possible at all to conclude this agreement in 1987?

[Shishlin] I think this reflects the real political picture both in the United States and in Western Europe, because the U.S. missiles in Europe and the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe did not, of course, appear by accident. In this case, the installation of the U.S. missiles was of course a factor for pressure on the Soviet stand, a factor for provoking the Soviet Union to further involvement in an arms race, which is for us, of course, extremely undesirable, considering the major constructive plans, which at present are being implemented in our country, our tasks in accelerating the socioeconomic development of the Soviet Union, and our tasks in the radical, revolutionary restructuring taking place in the framework of Soviet society.

But having spoken about all these reservations, all the same I would like to say that, in practice, things are progressing. I think that the Soviet Union's bold step is already today showing the measure of its profound influence on European public opinion and on European political circles. I think the comrades will have noticed that although the talks that took place between the CPSU general secretary and the British prime minister were not simple but complex talks and there was a big difference in their positions, on the issue of so-called Euromissiles, on the issue of eliminating medium-range Soviet and U.S. missiles on the territory of Europe, the closeness of their positions was evident, and there was, of course, a similarity of approach. So I think that our assertive, dynamic, flexible and well-considered position is working, and this creates quite good prospects for 1987 to be marked by the first major, real, practical agreement not on limitation of the level of arms, but on elimination of a whole class of weapons.

[Lavrentyev] Here is a letter which our offices have just received from very Georgiyevna Kozlova from Chelyabinsk. She is interested in the results of the official visit to our country by Margaret Thatcher, prime minister of great Britain. Over to you, Nikolay Vladimirovich.

[Shishlin] Of course, the visit was very interesting, and there is still thought to be given to its results. It would be difficult from the fresh impressions of the talks that took place in Moscow to formulate so soon, accurately, and in an absolutely considered way what is sometimes called the final balance of the visit, that is, the practical results. When talks are held at such a high level, I in general do not think that the results necessarily have to be materialized in some or other details. Of itself, the rapprochement of the positions between Great Britain and the Soviet Union in the approach to certain major political issues is already of benefit not just to our and European politics, but to world politics as a whole. That is the first thing.

Second, I think that the visit itself, even though we know that Britain's Prime Minister Thatcher is at the moment interested in accumulating political capital, taking the forthcoming general election in Britain into account, and at the same time the stand adopted by the British prime minister and her visit to the Soviet Union, the first after a 12-year gap in meetings at such a level between our country and Great Britain, goes to show that nobody now would be right to ignore the need for dialogue between countries belonging to different social systems on the European Continent.

What is important here is that the European countries including Great Britain, are starting to speak with their own independent voice. In my view, this independent voice is what is most in keeping with Great Britain's weight in European and world politics, although I shall not conceal the fact that, of course, the British Conservative Government has a very similar view on many things to the opinions expressed in Washington. But one way or the other, the fact of the dialogue, the desire to understand each other, and the intensified exposition of their positions -- this is something useful to the highest degree, because what is absolutely necessary in the process of drafting policy is a knowledge of the point of view of the party with whom you wish to come to agreement. In this sense, Margaret Thatcher's visit to the Soviet Union has made it possible for the Soviet leadership to get a better idea of the British position, to understand the arguments of Great Britain, without necessarily sharing them, and, of course, this creates a sort of prepared ground on which those plants which are adapted to this ground can be cultivated.

Military-Industrial Complex

LD042356 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 4 Apr 87

["Moscow Viewpoint" commentary by political observer Valentin Zorin]

[Text] A great author said that history treads softly. It is indeed very often the case that those who witness crucial historic events were not aware of their importance as these events were taking place. My feeling is that at the moment the world is at a historic crossroads and our time will be studied by history students of the future as a turning point. The point at issue is the talks on medium-range nuclear missiles. The idea of the talks is to remove these missiles, tipped with warheads that are hundreds of times more powerful than the bomb that wiped out Hiroshima and Nagasaki, from the arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States and scrap them.

An agreement to do so would be a turning point in postwar history, creating a new psychological climate. It would show in real terms that the idea of nuclear disarmament is no utopia. The latest developments in Washington, viewed in this context, seem all the more surprising. As soon as the Soviet Union made steps towards the United States, Washington took a step back.

The United States Administration is trying to invent all kinds of conditions for an agreement in order to interfere with progress towards it. THE BOSTON GLOBE points out that none of the problems on the agenda is an insurmountable obstacle on the way to an agreement, but each and every one of them can be the stumbling block if the supporters of the rough line in the Administration get the upper hand.

One cannot help wondering about who's making policy in Washington today. During the Soviet-American summit in Geneva in 1985 the head of the Pentagon sent the United States President a provocative letter in a bid to torpedo the summit. I could see for myself how the pressure brought on by the opponents of arms control torpedoed the agreement on nuclear arms reduction and (?their) abolition that began to emerge at Reykjavik at the last moment. Watching the maneuvers of the United States military-industrial complex and its attempts to interfere with agreements on medium-range nuclear missiles, I cannot help wondering whether their verdict will be the final one again.

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CSO: 5200/1403

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY NEWS CONFERENCE 31 MARCH

Radio Broadcast

LD311956 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1425 GMT 31 Mar 87

[News conference at USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center in Moscow on 31 March attended by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate; Viktor Karpov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Directorate for Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament; and Nikolay Chervov, head of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff Directorate -- recorded]

[Text] [Gerasimov] The Anglo-Soviet summit dialogue has as its main purpose the search for a way to a better world and a reduction of the military threat. This search is being conducted in a friendly tone. The positions and views at times have revealed not only differences, but at times even opposition. However, I will not now mention specific details of these clashes of our views and approaches; they were reflected in the dinner speeches yesterday evening. You have all made a comparative analysis and the speeches have been published. I want to draw attention to the heading under which these speeches are published. The title is this, across the whole page: "In a Friendly Atmosphere."

The interlocutors clearly find each other interesting, but apart from that we favor cooperation with Great Britain; we favor expanded cooperation, and we want that cooperation to acquire a friendly character, and we are in favor of increased trust.

[Unidentified speaker] Recently, the White House published a statement signed by the U.S. President on the results of the stage of work concluded in Geneva by the group for medium-range [srednyaya dalnost] nuclear arms at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms. This document is an attempt to distort the position of the Land of the Soviets on the talks, and asserts in particular that it has moved away from the approach the Soviet Union presented in Reykjavik on missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km. Such assertions do not correspond with reality. The Soviet Union has consistently favored the limitation, reduction and, in the final analysis, the elimination of such missiles. Let me remind you that in Reykjavik, the Soviet side expressed a readiness to freeze missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km and to conduct talks on their future. This line is followed by the Soviet delegation in Geneva. It proposed a freeze on missiles of that range in Europe at the existing levels on both sides and talks on this category of arms.

The Soviet Union's readiness to try to reach a solution to the problems of operational and tactical missiles, taking into account their reduction and elimination, received

further development in the statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 28 February this year. Thus the Soviet Union -- and this is the main thing -- favors resolving the issue precisely in the direction of the reduction and elimination of this category of nuclear arms.

What does the U.S. side advocate? At Geneva it is submitting a claim, which is reflected in the White House statement, to be able to build up U.S. short-range missiles globally and in Europe in particular.

This, in fact, is the essence of the difference in the positions of the sides. The Soviet side has never given its agreement to a buildup in such missiles, since the discussion must be not about legalizing the arms race, but about ending it.

The U.S. approach to missiles of less than medium range [rakety s menshey chem sredney dalnosti] assumes a special meaning in light -- also vigorously defended by the United States -- of the claim that the U.S. Pershing-2's in Europe, which are subject to elimination, could be not eliminated, but converted to missiles with a shorter range. It is clear that in this case the possibility of reconversion would be preserved, that is to say, the actual maintenance of the U.S. potential of medium-range missiles in Europe.

Is this not the source of the U.S. side's persistent attempts to link medium-range missiles with operational and tactical missiles? The fact that a considerable part of the White House statement is devoted precisely to missiles of below medium-range and not at all to how the drafting of a treaty on eliminating the Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe can be facilitated attracts attention. This leads one to wonder whether there is an attempt here to complicate the reaching of an agreement on eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe when a real prospect for this opened up as a result of the new Soviet initiative and when practical progress opened up in this area. The Soviet side is also in favor of discussing and resolving the question of operational and tactical missiles, but it opposes the drafting and concluding of a treaty on medium-range missiles being artificially linked with a solution to the question of operational and tactical missiles, let alone made conditional on such a solution. Thank you for your attention.

[Unidentified speaker] Thank you.

[Unidentified speaker] Esteemed comrades, gentlemen, the fourth edition of the book "Whence the Threat to Peace" has been published in the Soviet Union. The book is published in nine languages. Its republication in a considerably expanded edition has been brought about by a number of important events that have taken place in the past 2 and 1/2 years: on the one hand, the vigorous struggle by the Soviet Union for peace, the scrapping of nuclear and other kinds of mass destruction weapons, for a considerable reduction in conventional armaments and for the establishment of an all-embracing system of international security; on the other hand, the U.S. Administration's course toward an unrestrained arms race, the achieving of military superiority, and material preparation for war.

The threat to peace -- not a mythical one but a real one -- emanates from the U.S. military machine, from Washington's belligerent policy, from its attempt to run international affairs from a position of strength, including the use of armed forces. This is backed up in the book by specific facts, and first and foremost by the fact that it is the United States that has always been, and today remains, the instigator of

the arms race. The Pentagon is currently pushing ahead with a multibillion-dollar program of chemical rearmament. It is developing biological weapons and striving to put weapons into space as quickly as possible and to threaten the whole of mankind from space.

[Tokyo NHK Television Network correspondent] NHK, Japan. Yesterday Mrs Thatcher said that there is currently a superiority in short-range missiles, a nine-to-one ratio. What have you to say about that, and what is your attitude to the issue?

[Unidentified speaker] I will answer your question, and another one raised here, that Weinberger has stated that the USSR is ahead of the United States in ICBM's and SLBM's by a factor of four to one, and the ratio for short-range missiles is nine to one. What must I tell you? First, to assess military potential, they must be taken all together, and we must not extract individual components.

I will quote you these figures; I have already spoken in my statement about naval forces. The United States has a superiority of 2.5 to 1 over the Soviet Union in nuclear warheads on submarine-based ballistic missiles; it has twice as many major surface vessels; it has an absolute superiority in aircraft carriers -- the United States has 20, and we have none at all. Their superiority in naval aircraft is 2.5 to 1; in the Marines it is 16 to 1; and in total naval tonnage the United States has a twofold advantage over the Soviet Navy. Why doesn't the United States pose the question of eliminating the imbalance in naval forces? Why does it aim to eliminate ground forces, to reduce the ground forces of the Soviet Union? Apart from this, it must be taken into account that the NATO countries have a considerable advantage, of almost 1.5 to 1, in tactical strike aircraft in Europe.

We do not deny that, yes, we do have more tactical missiles -- I stress, tactical missiles. The NATO countries have more tactical nuclear weapons. The advantage is on the NATO side in tactical strike aircraft. Thus it is probable that the fundamental issue is not whether one or the other side has 10 or 100 missiles more; the fundamental issue is to sit down to try to reach agreement and level out the questions of imbalance.

[Prague CTK correspondent] CTK. I would like to return to the ABM Treaty about which Comrade Chervov also spoke. What is your view on the conclusion of Senator Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, concerning the interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

[Unidentified speaker] We have always maintained the view that the understanding of the treaty by the sides was quite clearly expressed in the treaty itself at the time that the ABM Treaty was signed and ratified. In fact, this is what Senator Nunn, too, now has confirmed in his analysis of the treaty and of the discussions which accompanied the ratification of the treaty in the U.S. Senate. He came to what we view as the only correct conclusion, that during the ratification of the ABM Treaty in the U.S. Senate, all the statements concerned only one interpretation and that was the one inherent in the text of the treaty. There was at that time no mention of any broad interpretation. In our view, Senator Nunn has come to the correct conclusion, that the U.S. Administration does not have any right to resort to any other interpretation than the one that was laid down at the time of ratification of the treaty without the agreement of the Senate itself.

[Unidentified speaker, in English with superimposed translation] General Chervov, I shall return again to short-range missiles. If what the Americans are proposing in fact consists of a buildup which will in the final analysis lead to parity in short-range missiles in Europe, what is it that you do not like about that?

[Chervov] There are two points that we do not like. The first is that we are in general against building up nuclear weapons in Europe -- whether they are U.S. or Soviet makes no difference. So we propose the elimination, the reduction and elimination of operational and tactical missiles, and we are prepared to sit at the negotiating table.

Karpov Speaks

LD311154 Moscow TASS in English 1129 GMT 31 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 31 TASS--The Soviet Union consistently comes out for a limitation, reduction and, in the long run, elimination of missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km, Viktor Karpov, chief of the directorate for the limitation of weapons and for the disarmament of the USSR Foreign Ministry, told a briefing held here today for Soviet and foreign newsmen. He rejected the attempts of the White House at presenting in a distorted light the Soviet side's stand at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons. In that connection, the spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry recalled that at Reykjavik the Soviet side expressed readiness to freeze missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km and hold talks on their further destiny. This is the policy to which the Soviet delegation adheres also in Geneva.

But what does the U.S. side advocate? It puts forward at Geneva the claims, which is also mirrored in the statement by the White House, for a buildup by the United States of shorter range missiles globally and, in particular, in Europe. Herein, Viktor Karpov stressed, properly speaking, lies the essence of the divergencies in the stands of the sides. Never has the Soviet side given consent to a buildup of such missiles, since the point at issue should be not a legalising of the weapons pace, but its discontinuation.

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CSO: 5200/1403

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: COVERAGE OF THATCHER VISIT TO MOSCOW

Thatcher Policy 'Hackneyed'

LD212049 Moscow TASS in English 1904 GMT 21 Mar 87

[Text] London March 21 TASS -- British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher addressed a long policy speech today to a meeting of the Conservative Central Council in the city of Torquay. The press association agency described her speech as a "key" one within the framework of the preparations for the general parliamentary elections to be held in the near future.

Touching upon foreign policy issues, the British prime minister again reiterated her government's and the conservative party's intention to approach the key international issues solely from the positions of strength. She described strength as the "surest foundation on which to work for peace."

Margaret Thatcher reiterated the hackneyed proposition of the Tories that "it was the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles that brought the Russians back to the negotiating table" and put forward the proposal on the elimination of all nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe. "We see the strength and resolve of the West beginning to reap their fruit." Speaking on the Soviet Union's preparedness to work for a radical cut in the nuclear armaments in the world, she claimed that "nuclear weapons have prevented not only nuclear, but conventional war as well."

As seen from the speech of the British prime minister, she is planning to hold talks on questions of arms control in the course of her forthcoming meetings in Moscow from the "positions of strength."

PRAVDA Previews Discussions

PM240930 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Maslennikov report: "It Depends on London"]

[Excerpts] London, 23 Mar--As the visit by British Prime Minister M. Thatcher to the USSR draws near, more and more commentaries are appearing in the British press on the subject of what the incumbent of 10 Downing Street is taking to Moscow and how her talks in Moscow could affect the state of Soviet-British relations and the international situation as a whole. Naturally, under present conditions, when problems of ending the arms race are at the center of

international discussions, everyone is concerned most of all with the question of what role Britain could play in this process, or, more specifically, what contribution it intends to make to the implementation of the Soviet proposal on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe.

In general terms, London's position on this question was set forth by Prime Minister M. Thatcher in the House of Commons on 3 March, when she welcomed the USSR's new proposal as a "useful step forward." The conclusion of an agreement on medium-range missiles, British Foreign Secretary G. Howe stated, "could change for the better the entire atmosphere in which talks on arms control and East-West relation are held." British Government representatives subsequently explained that they do not insist on the "simultaneous" resolution of the question of medium-range missiles and shorter-range operational and tactical missiles [operativno-takticheskiye rakety menshego radiusa deystviya], as might have been thought from London's initial statements, but advocate the signing of an agreement on medium-range missiles together with subsequent talks on other types of missiles.

At the same time, it must be noted that in the statements of British statesmen and commentaries in the press here, this position is hedged about with all kinds of stipulations. In the course of the discussion of this problem in Parliament, representatives of the ruling Conservative Party expressed the view that since the Soviet proposal itself was the result of "the West's unity and determination," pressure on the USSR should by no means be slackened.

The recent statement by the British prime minister to her supporters at the Conservative and Unionist Associations Central Council in Torquay can hardly be called constructive. Talking about the "humanization of Soviet society," M. Thatcher allowed herself to attack the Soviet Union and openly lauded the "strong-arm approach" in relations with our country. She did not even shrink from asserting that "strength is the most reliable basis for the struggle for peace," and stated that in Moscow she intends to "seek a peace" based on "realism and strength."

In the era of the universal desire for disarmament and mutual trust, it is hardly likely that such an obsolete vocabulary will bring any statesman success. It should not be forgotten that attempts to talk with the USSR from such positions have never been any use, and have only led the world up blind alleys.

The British right-wing press also persistently promotes the thesis that the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe will supposedly place the Soviet Union in an advantageous position in relation to the NATO countries in terms of shorter-range tactical missiles. That being so, the originators of these concepts say, it is necessary either to abandon the "zero option," leaving at least some of the American cruise missiles and Pershings in Western Europe, or to grant the United States the right to "build up" its arsenals of this type of missile.

Of course, all these arguments ignore the very essence of the USSR's 28 February proposals, which clearly state that our country is prepared immediately after the signing of an agreement on medium-range missiles to withdraw the increased range operational and tactical missiles from the GDR and the CSSR and, at the same time, to embark on talks with a view to the reduction and complete elimination of other types of operational and tactical missiles. All this, I repeat, is very well known to the originators of these concepts. If they continue to seek every possible loophole or pretext for continuing to talk about the preservation and even the buildup of atomic weapons on the European continent, this can indicate only one thing: Certain highly

influential circles both in the United States and in Western Europe cannot give up the idea of "nuclear deterrence" or the associated desire to talk to the Soviet Union from a "position of strength."

Unfortunately the spread of such concepts is promoted to a considerable degree by the British Government's own policy. The British leaders make no secret of the fact that they intend to continue to build up their existing nuclear potential. This is the goal served by the plans they have drawn up for reequipping the country's strategic submarine fleet with American Trident-2 missiles.

How are we to assess the search now under way in London, Paris, and certain other NATO capitals for a so-called "European version of nuclear deterrence," which is supposed to replace the medium-range missiles if the Soviet Union and the United States sign an agreement on this question? Speaking at the Royal Institute of International Relations in Brussels the other day, G. Howe, head of the British Foreign Office, insistently sought to persuade his audience that it is time Western Europe started worrying about its own "nuclear future." In the time to come, Howe stated, "European security will depend on nuclear weapons."

These same considerations apparently also dictated the propaganda campaign being conducted against the concept of a nonnuclear defense for Britain, put forward by the Labor Party and other peace-loving forces in the country -- a concept which has received the support of millions of British people and has met with understanding in broad international circles.

Kinnock Cited

PM240951 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 24 Mar 87 p 3

[TASS report: "Unique Opportunity"]

[Text] London, 23 Mar -- British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's upcoming visit to the USSR represents a unique opportunity for a decisive shift toward the all-around development of relations between the two countries and the coordination of efforts in the struggle to end the arms race and for disarmament. Neil Kinnock, leader of Britain's main opposition party, writes about this in THE GUARDIAN.

Until now, he points out, the Soviet Union has been for the Conservative government just an object of desperate rhetoric in the spirit of the "cold war" times. This visit demands a more flexible approach by the prime minister, whether it is a question of developing bilateral ties or of cooperation in the cause of military detente and disarmament.

There is no doubt that the problem of making progress in the process of reducing nuclear arms must be the key item on the Moscow talks agenda, the Labor leader continues. The Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik was undoubtedly a major step toward reaching mutual understanding on this question. The British Government must now actively seek ways to develop this process. Kinnock emphasizes. In his opinion, Britain must, above all, abandon the buildup of its own -- that is, independent -- nuclear deterrent forces, which will inevitably happen as a result of purchasing the latest Trident first-strike nuclear missile systems.

Thatcher-Kohl Discussions

PM251005 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Mar 87 p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Consultations in Paris and Bonn"]

[Text] Bonn, 24 Mar -- Margaret Thatcher, who has arrived here from Paris, has discussed with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl topical problems of disarmament and arms control with a consideration for the USSR's proposal for the elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons. Important attention was paid to East-West relations.

At a news conference on the results of their talks, H. Kohl and M. Thatcher stressed that "there was a very intensive exchange of opinions on fundamental problems on the eve of the British prime minister's visit to Moscow."

The heads of the FRG and British Governments expressed themselves in general terms in favor of progress in the cause of disarmament and arms control and of ensuring trust between states. At the same time, nothing was said about specific steps by the West in this direction. [paragraph continues]

As in Paris, the British prime minister emphasized the alleged "USSR supremacy in the field of conventional armaments and chemical weapons" which, she said, "threaten" the West.

According to statements from British official circles, M. Thatcher's trip to Paris and Bonn was undertaken for consultations in connection with her forthcoming visit to Moscow.

TASS Cites Thatcher on Goals

PM271501 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Interview With the Prime Minister"]

[Text] London, 26 Mar -- "I will certainly use my visit to Moscow to explore ways to make progress in the arms control process," British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said in an interview here. This was reported by the PRESS ASSOCIATION.

According to Thatcher, Britain welcomed the statement by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that the USSR will separate [vychlenit] an agreement on medium-range missiles without linking it in any way to "Star Wars."

At the same time, the prime minister stressed that Britain "cannot consider just one aspect of arms control in isolation from all the rest."

M. Thatcher also said that Britain is willing to play its part in attempts to establish peace in the Near East.

Londoners Response to Visit

PM300911 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Mar 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "On Threshold of Visit"]

[Text] London, 28 Mar -- Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's official visit to the USSR and her talks in Moscow on topical problems of the international situation and of bilateral Anglo-Soviet relations are generating tremendous interest in Britain. [paragraph continues]

"Restructuring," "openness," and "democratization" -- these Russian words are to be frequently encountered in the flood of items about the Soviet Union and its people's life, which has increased sharply recently in the British newspapers and in radio and television reports and commentaries on the USSR. There are different opinions and assessments of the transformations taking place in Soviet society, and there are different attitudes toward them just as there are toward what the present visit by the head of the Conservative government may bring to international relations and to Britain.

What do British people themselves expect from the prime minister's trip to the Soviet Union? What is their attitude toward M. Thatcher's forthcoming mission? A TASS correspondent put these questions to passers-by on the London streets.

"Problems of arms control and the halting of the arms race should undoubtedly be at the center of Mrs Thatcher's talks with the Soviet leaders," Ann Rogers, an inhabitant of the London suburb of Southall, said. "Will there be a nuclear catastrophe or not? I not only welcome the Soviet initiatives on the elimination of all medium-range missiles in Europe, I also demand that Britain become an active participant in the implementation of these proposals, removing U.S. cruise missiles from its territory."

"What do I expect from the visit?" DAILY TELEGRAPH employee (Peter Maklin) repeats my question when I stop him in Fleet Street. "Probably the same as everyone -- dialogue and more mutual understanding. I do not support the ideas of unilateral nuclear disarmament for Britain. Nuclear armaments, in my opinion, have helped, as a deterrent factor, to preserve peace since World War II. But the level of military confrontation between East and West should be reduced, reduced through negotiations. Of course, I would like to see a world totally rid of nuclear weapons. But I believe that is unrealistic in the foreseeable future."

"What is your attitude toward President Reagan's assertions that the 'Strategic Defense Initiative' he proposes -- research work on which has been supported by the British Government -- is a guarantee of peace?

"My attitude is a negative one. I do not believe in 'Star Wars,'" (Peter Maklin) replied. "If weapons are put into space and are constantly hanging over your head, so to speak...then anything can happen. You remember the disaster involving the U.S. spaceship 'Challenger.' In my opinion, it is better to proceed along the path of nuclear disarmament."

What does lawyer Peter Green think of the visit?

"I approve of it, it's a very good thing. Relations between our countries are best built on the basis of friendship and cooperation, which I hope the prime minister's visit will promote."

Officer worker (Peter Tindoll) expressed a similar view:

"I would very much like M. Thatcher's visit to the Soviet Union to bring positive results," he said.

UK Deployment Linked to Trip

PM300857 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Mar 87 Second Edition p 5

[Report by unnamed own correspondent: "Building Up The Arsenal. Who Needs the New Missiles?"]

[Text] London, 25 Mar -- In a situation where the peoples of Europe and the world as a whole are impatiently awaiting the results of the USSR-U.S. talks on eliminating medium-range missiles on the European Continent, the NATO leaders are continuing to build up their arsenals of these deadly weapons.

This is evidenced by alarming reports that did the rounds of local editorial offices yesterday that siting of cruise missiles has begun at yet another U.S. airbase -- Molesworth in Cambridgeshire.

The alarming news was brought by members of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament who managed to photograph a massive covered truck of the kind that usually carries apparatus for launching cruise missiles as it entered the gates of the Molesworth base. U.S. Air Force Command and the British Ministry of Defense, THE GUARDIAN's military observer D. Fairhall writes, essentially confirmed that the siting of cruise missiles in Molesworth has begun, marking an important new stage in the buildup of the U.S. nuclear arsenal on British soil.

This fact, the correspondent writes, assumes special political significance in the context of the current East-West talks on ridding Europe of all missiles of that class, including Soviet SS-20 missiles, and, clearly, it forms part of the "arithmetic" Prime Minister Thatcher is taking to Moscow.

According to D. Fairhall, one explanation of what is, to put it mildly, an unusual step on the threshold of the Soviet-British talks is the fact that the NATO leaders effectively rule out the possibility of achieving a real "zero option" on medium-range missiles in Europe and therefore want to disperse the missiles over as many areas as possible in advance.

It goes without saying that the new militarist gesture by NATO appears out of place.

IZVESTIYA: UK Antinuclear Lobby

PM282017 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Krivopalov report: "Antinuclear Movement's 'Moscow Memorandum'"]

[Text] London -- On Friday, the IZVESTIYA office received a letter of invitation from the press department of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament [CND] in Britain. To where was I being invited?

Similar messages had evidently been sent to all the editorial offices of the leading British newspapers and to many foreign journalists working in the British capital. The British Isles' largest and most influential antiwar organization was informing us that a major demonstration was to be held outside the gates of the U.S. base at Molesworth, Cambridgeshire, on the morning of Saturday 28 March.

The point is that CND activists recently filmed a huge covered military transport entering the base. They assert that cruise missile launch equipment [apparatura] has started to be shipped into Molesworth.

THE GUARDIAN observes that London has no intention of altering plans to place [razmeshcheniye] 64 Tomahawk cruise missiles at Molesworth before the end of 1988 due to the talks being held in Geneva on eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

I called CND headquarters to find out about the upcoming demonstration at Molesworth. A press official told me that literally half an hour previously, a document had been delivered to the British Prime Minister's office pointing out, inter alia: "As Mrs M. Thatcher completes her preparations for talks with M.S. Gorbachev, representatives of British antiwar organizations have submitted to her office a 'Moscow Memorandum.' In this appeal, opponents of military preparations earnestly call on the prime minister to use her full authority in the interests of the speediest conclusion of an agreement in Geneva on eliminating all intermediate-range Pershing, cruise, and SS-20 missiles in both Western and Eastern Europe." [paragraph continues]

"Antiwar activists fear that to start placing [razmeshcheniye] cruise missiles at Molesworth this week would constitute anything but a positive signal to those conducting the talks in Geneva."

My telephone interlocutor told me, furthermore, that the memorandum contains four specific proposals to the British prime minister:

First, that she should agree to all necessary measures to monitor [kontrol] the observance of an agreement to eliminate intermediate-range missiles so as to ensure its effectiveness.

Second, that she should help create a good atmosphere for the talks in progress in Geneva by halting the construction work on new bases and the further placement [razmeshcheniye] of cruise missiles.

Third, that she should advance no prior conditions to the conclusion of an agreement on intermediate-range missiles, such as, for example, linkage [uvyavka] to operational-tactical weapons or the reduction of conventional arms.

Fourth, that she should abandon the Trident program in order not to obstruct the achievement of accords on strategic nuclear weapons.

I asked the CNO press official what [chairman] Paul Johns intended to say at the Molesworth base. [He said:] You can send to IZVESTIYA by way of an interview with him his latest comment:

"Starting the placement [razmeshcheniye] of cruise missiles at the very time when the USSR and the United States are nearing agreement on eliminating all intermediate-range missiles in Europe is an act of a staggering lack of concern. Mrs Thatcher seems to be pouring water into the gas tank while others are trying to drive the car."

The results of an opinion poll carried out by Gallup for THE DAILY TELEGRAPH have just been published. Some 56 percent of Britons polled believe that M.S. Gorbachev is making greater efforts for the reduction of nuclear arms than President Reagan (12 percent). Fifty-seven percent are convinced that the USSR wants good relations with the West. Three out of four approve of M. Thatcher's visit to Moscow.

Airport Arrival Ceremonies

LD281854 Moscow TASS in English 1845 GMT 28 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 28 TASS -- British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has arrived on an official visit in Moscow today at the invitation of the Soviet leadership.

At Vnukovo Airport she was welcomed by Nikolay Ryzhkov, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR foreign minister.

The welcoming party included Vladimir Kamentsev, vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Mikhail Smirtyukov, senior executive officer of the USSR Council of Ministers, USSR ministers Boris Aristov, Yuriy Volmer and Vasilii Shamshin, USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Kovalev, Valeriy Shaykin, chairman of the executive committee of the Moscow city Soviet, USSR Ambassador to Britain Leonid Zamyatin and other officials.

Among the welcoming party was also British Ambassador to the Soviet Union Bryan George Cartledge.

In the airport, the national flags of Britain and the Soviet Union were hoisted and a guard of honour of troops of the Moscow garrison was mustered in the airfield. The band struck the national anthems of the two countries.

Nikolay Ryzhkov and Margaret Thatcher inspected the guard of honour of the Soviet servicemen.

The welcoming ceremony in the airport ended in the march-past of the Guard of Honour.

From the airport the motorcade accompanied by a guard of honour of motorcyclists set out for the city. The national flags of Britain and the Soviet Union were put up in the streets and squares all along the route of the motorcade.

In the Georgievskiy Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace Margaret Thatcher was welcomed by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and wife.

Then a short conversation was held.

Gorbachev-Thatcher 30 Mar Talks

LD301918 Moscow TASS in English 1859 GMT 30 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 30 TASS -- Mikhail Gorbachev met with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the Kremlin on March 30.

They had a substantive and thorough discussion lasting several hours on major issues of the present time, including the decisive one, that of disarmament.

The conversation proceeded in a friendly way, although it was not without polemics which, however, was aimed at understanding each other better and seeing more clearly the positions and intentions and the political logic of each side.

The visit by the head of the British Government was important and necessary. Different as their positions and views were, the USSR and Great Britain remain partners in the search for the solution of the chief issue -- how to diminish the threat of war. This is the most important issue today.

The essence of the dialogue at that level is to look for ways for a better world.

Mikhail Gorbachev expressed strong disagreement with the view that security could be based on the position of strength. This was an old concept that had brought about many troubles in the post-war period.

The logic of Margaret Thatcher's reasoning made it clear that she stood for maintaining nuclear weapons and building up Britain's nuclear potential because she was convinced that the Soviet Union intended to impose communism around the world and that the threat of a Soviet attack on Western Europe remained.

Mikhail Gorbachev refuted with arguments this totally groundless opinion by relying on the philosophical concept of the contemporary world given at the 27th CPSU Congress, and pointed to the objective interrelationship between the goals of perfecting socialist society, reorganization and the peaceful foreign policy of the USSR.

A policy, especially in a situation of the imminent nuclear threat, should be based on realities, on co-existence between states with different social systems, on the right of free choice and independent development of each country. This is especially important for correct relations with the developing world.

The Soviet Union recognizes historical ties between states and regions in the present-day world -- be it West-East or North-South. It is necessary to make all these relations wholesome. Let us think about that -- how to ensure a balance of security, a balance of political and economic interests.

It is very important, Gorbachev said, that a major and at times acute discussion was held on problems in relations between states with different systems since herein is the starting point of misreading the Soviet Union's intentions and actions.

Having different views on the origination of regional conflicts, the interlocutors agreed that they should be settled by political means.

Margaret Thatcher kept forth at length on the positive aspects of Western democracy, British democracy in particular. But she heard strong arguments in debates on these issues. It is important, however, that frank exchanges of views took place on that subject, too. A dispute on any questions, if it is serious and not speculative, also is useful: It prevents thoughts from standing still and highlights what has seemed clear even without discussion.

The sides concentrated on ways of curbing the arms race. We are not going to make war on the U.S., or on Britain, or on anyone else, Mikhail Gorbachev said. This explains our initiatives and concrete steps. But we do not see any adequate response to them. We have been seeing for two years the same picture: As soon as there is a glimmer of hope for a positive solution, Washington, London, Paris and Bonn immediately bend their efforts to find pretexts to hold back the process because of the Soviet Union's "superiority."

And now we are seeing attempts to block the INF talks. Detaching the INF problem from the package, we hoped for British and French support. But where is it, that support?

The Soviet Union has done a good deal to give an impetus to the arms reduction talks. She has agreed not to count the British and French nuclear potentials, although they keep growing and being upgraded. But all this is quickly "forgotten" and more concessions are expected from the Soviet Union.

Mikhail Gorbachev strongly disagreed with the view that the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe would leave the Soviet Union with an overwhelming superiority in conventional weapons and create a political threat to Western Europe. He reiterated the Soviet Union's readiness to enter most deep-going and comprehensive talks on reductions in the conventional armaments and armed forces of both military alliances.

Mikhail Gorbachev noted that the Soviet proposals took into consideration the concerns of Western Europe and Britain, including those related to conventional and chemical weapons. It is no chance. We want to dispel Western mistrust. It is not bluff. It is our course of principle, which we formulated in long and deep deliberations and approved at the highest forum of the country.

We stand for a search for ways to a world with less weaponry. Trust cannot arise from nothing. What we need is talks, guests, not expectations. Let us go to Stockholm-2 and discuss conventional weapons there, exploring every aspect and leaving nothing aside.

Mikhail Gorbachev thoroughly briefed Margaret Thatcher on how the Reykjavik talks had really proceeded and how a unique chance had been missed to take a historic step by initiating real nuclear disarmament.

In this context the sides attached serious importance to the preservation of the ABM Treaty. Mikhail Gorbachev reaffirmed that the relationship between cuts in strategic offensive weapons and the non-placement of weapons in outer space was strategic linkage. We will never untie that package. We have a study of ways to depreciate SDI without spending mad funds that America will need to develop it. But who needs it except those who would like to earn nine-digit profits from it? He asked his visitor to think if it was admissible that all, primarily Europe, should become hostages to SDI-oriented war business.

Asked by Margaret Thatcher, Mikhail Gorbachev described in detail the nature, character and progress of reorganization in the Soviet Union, the problems that had to be tackled, difficulties and prospects offered to Soviet society by reorganization. We are overcoming a paradox in our development, with perhaps the best educated society in the world having long been unable properly to use its immense intellectual potential. We will do so through democracy, through the development of the entire potential of the socialist system.

Margaret Thatcher displayed much interest in what was taking place in the USSR and expressed the hope that these processes would be a success. She gave assurances that the West in general and she in particular had an interest in the ongoing processes in the Soviet Union bearing fruit.

As for humanitarian issues, Mikhail Gorbachev said, there is much in them which is speculative, pointed and intended to misrepresent the Soviet Union.

We should look for solutions to all problems and take steps towards each other while remaining different. It is not a shortcoming but advantage. We are ready to act in

politics with a broad approach, aware of inter-dependencies not only within the European framework but on a world scale. And let Western Europe rid itself early of fears of the Soviet Union. She should make a greater contribution to world politics, to the international process. She has every opportunity to do so.

But we still have the impression that Britain and her prime minister are not playing the role which they could play today, at this critical point, when the most important and urgent task is to take first steps towards reducing nuclear weapons.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher noted that as a result of extensive exchanges of views they had mutual understanding and close positions on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and that they were ready to bring talks on the elimination of chemical weapons to their conclusion and advocated the settlement of all the problems related to the need to reduce conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe.

The conversation was broad, frank and constructive and featured a search for solutions in favour of a safer world and approaches to cooperation.

The sides expressed their desire to broaden and deepen political dialogue and to develop closer relations between the two countries.

They noted the need for the further advancement of the Helsinki process to build a "common European home" with all its aspects, including economic, scientific, cultural and humanitarian ones, among them, the reunification of families and foreign travel. All this will help forge trust and contribute to better international relations as a whole.

We stand for cooperation with Britain, Mikhail Gorbachev said, for it becoming broader, deeper and friendlier, and for trust between us growing stronger. He expressed the hope that this was precisely what would happen. It would benefit Britain, the Soviet Union, Europe and the world as a whole.

'Friendly' Talks; 'Controversy'

LD301914 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 30 Mar 87

[Text] We have just received the following report:

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev held a meeting in the Kremlin today with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. For several hours the conversation ranged widely and in depth over major issues of the present time, including the decisive one of disarmament. The conversation was conducted in a friendly tone, though not without controversy which also, however, served the purpose of better understanding one another and more clearly grasping each other's positions and intentions and political logic.

The British head of government's visit was important and necessary, for however their positions and views might differ, the USSR and Britain remain partners in seeking a resolution of the chief issue -- that of how to reduce the danger of war. That is now the chief thing of all.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev voiced resolute disagreement with the view that security can be built on a policy founded on strength. That is an old concept which has already brought many misfortunes in the postwar period. We are for cooperation with Britain, said Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, for it becoming broader and deeper and friendly in nature, so that there might be a growth in trust between us. He voiced the hope that this will ultimately be so.

Talks Assessed; Howe-Shevardnadze

LD301137 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1016 GMT 30 Mar 87

[By Chris Moncrieff, PA chief political correspondent in Moscow]

[Text] The first round of crucial talks between Mrs Thatcher and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the Kremlin today ran well over the scheduled two hours. The talks were due to finish at 10 am BST but, as reporters gathered for a press briefing, there was no sign of the two leaders emerging. Only interpreters and note-takers were present for the first session of the discussions, which are expected to have a critical influence in the East-West disarmament negotiations.

Meanwhile, Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe had separate talks with his Soviet counterpart Mr Eduard Shevardnadze. Those covered bilateral relationships between Britain and the USSR and broadened out into wider international affairs. These talks were said to have taken place "in a very good atmosphere".

Later today the two foreign ministers will join Mrs Thatcher and Mr Gorbachev for the final round of the talks.

The two leaders, sitting in the splendour of the Kremlin's green-pillared Catherine Hall, were together alone -- apart from interpreters and note-takers -- for nearly four hours. And although the diplomatic term "forthright" normally implies animosity, British Government sources insisted there had been no hostility between them.

The talks resume later this afternoon. But before the first phase broke up, Mr Gorbachev probably summed up their mood when he said jokingly: "I would love to go on until 6 pm but cannot keep you any longer from your lunch."

When a smiling Mrs Thatcher, shielded from the icy winds by a black-fur lined hat and black coat, emerged from the Kremlin she was asked why the talks had gone on so long. She replied: "They were too interesting to break off. We are going back to resume what has been a very frank, wide-ranging discussion over world affairs and different political systems. We talked extensively about arms control."

Asked if they had got down to the "nitty gritty," she replied "Yes, we did."

There is no doubt that, even though the two leaders did not duck discussing particularly sensitive issues, the first phase of the talks was successful from Mrs Thatcher's point of view. Both made the point at the beginning that, while they may not like each other's political systems, they must recognise that they have to live side by side in the world and gain a deep understanding of each other's philosophies.

While Mrs Thatcher protests about human rights in the Soviet Union, the Russians believe the minority population in Northern Ireland is being persecuted by the British Government. This was the very point raised by Mr Gorbachev when the subject of human rights was discussed. But British sources said Mrs Thatcher "explained" the British position to the Soviet leader:

However, there was no reference this morning to the imprisonment of peace protesters in Britain -- an allegation that the Soviet press has been directing at Mrs Thatcher almost daily in the run-up to her arrival in Moscow on Saturday.

Britain's nuclear weapons, and the proposed Trident system, were also raised during discussion on arms control. The Kremlin has said that Britain must "surrender" its nuclear weapons if the disarmament talks in Geneva prove successful. But Mrs Thatcher has said in the past -- and made it clear again today -- that this could not be an issue.

British Government sources characterised this morning's discussions as "vigorous, lively and animated, even forthright but never hostile". And Mrs Thatcher herself said she found the talks "fascinating". The British spokesman said: "They are exploring each other's minds and trying to get a better understanding of each other."

The prime minister did not discuss with Mr Gorbachev in any detail individual human rights cases in the Soviet Union.

However, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the foreign secretary, in his separate talks this morning with his Soviet counterpart Mr Eduard Shevardnadze, did discuss some individual cases.

This afternoon the two foreign ministers were joining the two leaders in talks. They were scheduled to finish at 2:30 PM British time, but it seemed certain they would over-run a second time.

Shevardnadze-Howe Talks 'Frank'

LD301052 Moscow TASS in English 1041 GMT 30 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 30 TASS -- Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, has had a conversation with Geoffrey Howe, British secretary of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, within the framework of Soviet-British talks being held in Moscow between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain.

During the conversation, there was a frank and businesslike exchange of views on topical international problems and on matters of bilateral Soviet-British relations.

Protocol on Space Use

LD310916 Moscow TASS in English 0905 GMT 31 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 31 TASS -- Four Soviet-British documents were signed in the Kremlin today in the presence of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Nikolay Ryzhkov, a member of the CPSU Central Committee's Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain.

The documents included an agreement between the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on cooperation in studying and using outer space for peaceful purposes, an intergovernmental agreement to improve direct communications between the Kremlin and the British prime minister's residence in London, a memorandum of understanding between the two governments on new areas of cooperation in the fields of information, culture and education, and an agreement on the mutual granting of land plots for building new embassy compounds in Moscow and London.

The documents were signed by Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and foreign minister of the USSR, and Geoffrey Howe, secretary of state for foreign and Commonwealth affairs of Britain.

Thatcher Meets Peace Committee

PM301905 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "The Public's Stance"]

[Text] A delegation of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace visited Prime Minister M. Thatcher at the British Embassy in Moscow on 30 March.

On behalf of the Soviet public, the delegation welcomed the arrival of the British prime minister and expressed the hope that it would promote the development of normal mutual relations between the two countries and the improvement of the situation in the world. At the same time, the delegation expressed total disagreement with the British prime minister's assertions that nuclear weapons are not an evil but a "boon" for mankind and in this regard voiced concern at the course of the British Government, which runs counter to the prospect which has opened up before the whole world for a radical reduction and total elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe and throughout the planet. Understanding the motives of the Soviet Government which, for the purpose of the speediest start to nuclear disarmament, has agreed for the time being not to take account of the British nuclear potential, the Soviet public, for its part, cannot shut its eyes to the existence of British nuclear forces and its plans to increase them, nor to the support for the U.S. "Star Wars" plans. London's official stance on the issue of the total elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe remains contradictory.

The prime minister's attention was also drawn to the scarcity of truthful information in Great Britain about the life of the Soviet people. It is intolerable that millions of British people should derive their information about our country from nonobjective sources.

Trust between the two countries, the representatives of the Soviet peace movement stressed, cannot be built upon a position of strength or of that notorious "toughness," nor upon "demands" that the assense of our socialist system be changed; it must be created by specific acts of goodwill. In this respect the wish was expressed that M. Thatcher would use her stay in the Soviet Union to obtain truthful information about the important processes which are taking place in the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR.

UK Coverage of Visit Noted

PM310947 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 31 Mar 87 p 3

[Own correspondent Yu. Sagaydak Dispatch: "Honest Britain's Hopes"]

[Excerpts] London -- Britain's conservative press, which conducted a systematic anti-Soviet campaign on the eve of Prime Minister M. Thatcher's visit to the USSR, is in a state of shock. On Saturday, the day the British leader arrived on Soviet soil, the flagship of the bourgeois mass media -- THE DAILY TELEGRAPH -- published the results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Gallup Institute. Some 56 percent of those polled declared that the Soviet leadership headed by M.S. Gorbachev is "doing everything possible to reach an arms control agreement," whereas only 12 percent of Britons came out in support of President's policy in the nuclear weapons sphere. Another result which speaks for itself: According to the same poll, 57 percent of the British believe that "the Russians would like to maintain friendly relations with the West." [paragraph continues]

This means the anti-Soviet campaign did not work, Fleet Street was firing blanks from its big propaganda guns, and the truth about the Soviet Union is penetrating the British Isles despite the efforts of the "free and democratic" press...

The visit by British Prime Minister M. Thatcher is the center of attention in the country's mass media. Features in television news programs and extensive press commentaries are being devoted to it. It is gratifying that the voices of those political commentators who raise serious questions of Soviet-British relations and try to find the answer to the question of how we should build them in the future, how to achieve greater trust and mutual understanding, and how to rid Europe of nuclear weapons are being heard increasingly loudly.

"Mrs. Thatcher is really not in Moscow to discuss questions of an improvement in the human rights situation in the USSR... Her primary task is to reach agreement with the Soviet leadership on how to end the nuclear threat in the world," THE INDEPENDENT editorializes. [passage omitted]

Well, Soviet people also advocate progress in negotiations, ridding Europe of nuclear weapons, and arranging a constructive and frank dialogue. The way to the revival of European detente and to mutual understanding is open! It is only up to the British leadership: Either take advantage of the present opportunities or continue the policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union -- an unpopular policy with the British.

Moscow TV Interviews Thatcher

LD010011 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1910 GMT 31 Mar 87

[Interview with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher by Boris Kalyagin, political observer for Soviet television and radio; Tomas Kolesnichenko, PRAVDA international news editor; Vladimir Simonov, political observer for the NOVOSTI Press Agency; in Moscow on 31 March replacing World Today program; Thatcher speaks in English with superimposed translation]

[Excerpts] [Kalyagin] Madam Prime Minister, allow me first of all to thank you for finding the time to meet us and to answer our questions. Allow me to introduce to you my colleagues, Tomas Kolesnichenko, PRAVDA international news section editor, and Vladimir Simonov, political observer for the NOVOSTI press agency. My name is Boris Kalyagin. I am a political observer for Soviet television and radio.

Madam Prime Minister, we have a lot of questions for you, of course, but I would like to start with the most important. Your talks with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and conversations with Soviet leaders have ended. What conclusions have you drawn from these meetings and conversations?

[Thatcher] First, I am most grateful to Mr Gorbachev for having given so much time to me. We had talks for 7 hours and had discussions for 2 hours over dinner. I think that the discussions were most wide-ranging. When he came to London we also expected our discussions to be frank [otkrovenyy] and prolonged. Very often discussions held between leaders are formal. Mr Gorbachev and I do not have such conversations. Our discussions during this visit have passed in a frank atmosphere. I now have a better idea of his hopes. I can see what a serious task is posed in the restructuring of your society. We wish you all the best in this matter; we hope that you will succeed. We also discussed various regional problems. The point is, foreign policy has a bearing on domestic policy. We cannot be isolated from foreign policy. Of course, we spent very much time discussing arms control. First and foremost we are striving for peace; that is the most important thing, but we want to have peace in order to live the way we wish within the framework of secure borders. Thus it is not just a question of saying that there will be no nuclear weapons -- We want to guarantee peace. We need to have the ability to defend our country, to defend ourselves from attack.

We had very good talks. We also discussed matters of trade and cultural ties. I hope that this will lead to more frequent contacts, because as yet few people come to us from the Soviet Union. The more understanding there is, the better it will be for all of us, and the more open society is, the greater trust there will be in each other.

[Kayagin] Was this just an exchange of views on various issues, or can we speak of some concrete results from your meeting?

[Thatcher] Concrete results....First of all, we signed several agreements: an important agreement on the so-called hotline, the telephone link that enables us to contact each other immediately, and an agreement on cultural ties. We hope that more people will now be able to go from one country to the other. We signed a number of agreements on trade, which are most important. These are detailed agreements. I think that the most important matters that we discussed were the issues of arms control. In this area, we more or less agreed on an approach to medium-range missiles. We hoped

that there would not be such missiles, but they were deployed over here, and we responded with the Pershing and cruise missiles. We wanted them all to be eliminated not just in Europe, but worldwide. That would be the optimum outcome, but for the time being, we could agree on the zero option for Europe and to 100 units in the eastern part of the USSR and the same number of missiles in the United States. That is what we had to agree on. We also will have to have additional talks on shorter-range missiles. We recognize that.

We also have had special discussions on chemical weapons. We in Great Britain destroyed these weapons sometime at the end of the fifties, so we do not have chemical weapons. The United States does not want to modernize its chemical weapons, but the Soviet Union has them, is modernizing them, and has large stockpiles of these weapons. This naturally gives rise to great anxiety among us, and it was therefore most agreeable that Mr Gorbachev accepted our proposal regarding inspection [inspektsiya] to make certain that these weapons have been eliminated, so that we would know that they had been eliminated. You know that after the end of World War I, during which chemical weapons were used with terrible results, everything possible was done to prevent them appearing in World War II, that is arms control.

[Simonov] Madam Prime Minister, I would like to ask you what specifically Great Britain intends to do to improve the international situation, to strengthen general security?

[Thatcher] Just like you, we believe that every country has the right to defend its security. Defense is the only means allowing us to be sure of security within our borders. You have the Warsaw Pact, we have NATO. We have held talks on this matter. There is a proposal concerning the reduction of the quantities of nuclear weapons. We ourselves believe in nuclear deterrence and I will tell you why. Conventional weapons did not prevent two world wars during this century, and when we had conventional weapons we had a struggle around the world to be the first to obtain nuclear weapons, Hitler or us. If he had obtained those weapons, then the results would have been horrific. I think that there has never been a more significant factor of deterrence than nuclear weapons. Anyone who starts a war knowing that nuclear weapons exist also will know the consequences. I think that it is precisely for this reason that we have had peace in Europe over the period of the past 40 years. Peace, freedom, and justice are weighty concepts, and they are guaranteed by nuclear deterrence. At the same time, one can dream that at some time in the world there will be no nuclear weapons, but information and knowledge cannot be destroyed, just as the fact that nuclear weapons exist cannot be erased. For this reason, we will continue to believe in a certain measure of nuclear deterrence. However, we would like a reduction in the quantity of nuclear and chemical weapons and we must strive toward some sort of balance in conventional weapons.

[Kolesnichenko] I would like to raise the question of nuclear weapons. You say that it has kept the peace for 40 years. But, don't you see, we have already been on brink of war more than once -- nuclear war -- in those 40 years, and sometimes we were saved only by chance. In general, nuclear weapons are developing: at first they threatened cities, then countries and continents, and now all humanity. Mrs Prime Minister, is this not madness to rely on nuclear weapons as a guarantee of peace?

[Thatcher] In my view, you and I are saying the same thing. If you are saying that we were on the brink of war several times, but that war did not break out, then perhaps one of the reasons for this was indeed the fear of nuclear weapons. I believe that conventional weapons are also terrible, and that they do not allow war to be prevented, did not allow the war to be prevented in which the Soviet Union suffered dreadfully. If a new conventional war started, then there would still be a competition for who would be the first to obtain nuclear weapons.

For example, if a country where there is a tyrant, a fascist ruler knows that in starting war there are no prospects of winning because the other side has nuclear weapons, it is probably better. So it seems to me there is something more important, namely keeping the peace. If we can keep peace, it is only by means of deterrence, nuclear deterrence.

[Kolesnichenko] You know, we can take the road leading to the destruction of nuclear weapons, and we can take the road leading to the reduction of conventional weapons. Actually, we are proposing this; from the Atlantic to the Urals, there is the proposal. The Warsaw Pact made it concrete in Budapest. Why not solve these two problems instead of putting them in opposition to one another?

[Kalyagin] Apart from that, allow me to add....

[Thatcher, interrupting in English with "Can I just answer this one first?"] Europe in this century has been disfigured as a result of two world wars. The Soviet Union lost millions of people. In World War II in the USSR there were many conventional weapons, but this did not prevent Hitler from starting war. Conventional weapons have never been able to prevent war. Since nuclear weapons appeared, no one can risk starting a war. Allow me to ask you: What do you prefer? The absence of war because of the existence of nuclear weapons? Or do you prefer not to have nuclear weapons, but to keep the danger of another war breaking out with the use of conventional weapons? I have no doubt how you will answer me. I value peace, freedom, and justice before everything, and since I believe that nuclear deterrence hinders anyone from starting a major war, I think that nuclear deterrence must be maintained. Apart from this there is another reason for small countries like ours. Nuclear deterrence is the only means allowing small countries in effect to stand up to big countries. On the basis of conventional weapons, this simply cannot be done. A small country, if it stands alone, can stand up to a big country if it has nuclear weapons. You ask why I put the question like this. Historically, Great Britain had occasion to stand alone. Hitler occupied all of Europe, and we were alone. The United States had not yet entered the war and Hitler had not yet attacked the Soviet Union. We have this experience. We were alone. [words indistinct as many speak at once]

[Kalyagin] Do you think that there is a chance of an accidental occurrence of nuclear conflict? Time goes on; nuclear weapons are being perfected [sovershenstovovatsya]; the possibility increases of an accidental outbreak. We already are reaching the stage where it is not political figures who can solve this problem, but computers that will decide. The flight-time of a Pershing-2 from the territory of the FRG to Soviet soil amounts to only 8 minutes. Imagine an accidental launch of such a nuclear missile. Who will be making the decision?

[Kolesnichenko] It could even be a computer error.

[Thatcher] There are more nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union than in any other country. You have more ICBM's and warheads than in the West. You began to deploy [razmeshcheniye] medium-range missiles. We did not have them. You have more operational-tactical missiles, and you say that there is a danger of an accidental occurrence of nuclear war. I think that you and we know how dangerous these weapons are. In the course of 40 years we have had a sort of safety mechanism [zapasnoy mekhaizm] which has operated on your side and on our side. You probably have more experience in this field, whether the weapons are in the ground or in the air or at sea. We know this from history.

I want to tell you, conventional arms and conventional missiles are also dangerous weapons; they can also be launched; chemical weapons, all weapons are dangerous; it would be wonderful to have none of these weapons at all. However, this can only happen given great trust in each other. This means a far more open society.

Allow me to say the following: Since World War I, which ended in 1918, there has been no instance of any of the democracies attacking one another. That is why we believe in democracy. You want to get rid of the instruments of war. It would be very good if this were to happen, but we must trust each other. The Soviet Union has displayed very great caution, possessing on its side huge stocks of weapons.

[Simonov] Mrs Thatcher, surely this doctrine of nuclear deterrence is based on a policy of threat, and if this threat...

[Thatcher, interrupting in English] Based on a -- I'm so sorry -- based on a policy of...?

[Simonov] Threat... and if we do not from time to time -- or if certain people, who believe in this doctrine -- make this threat conform to reality by certain actions, then the threat can cease to operate. Thus, does it not seem to you that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence essentially invites the side that believes in that doctrine to use nuclear weapons at some time, in order to assert this threat from time to time?

[Thatcher] Surely a policy of using conventional weapons, bombs, missiles, aircraft, submarines, torpedoes, tanks, chemical weapons, surely all this is based on the possibility of using threat? If there is an invasion of some country, then will weapons really not be used on the basis of the concept of threat? Surely the existence of certain weapons is a guarantee of avoiding threat. You have so much weaponry. Mr Gorbachev tells me that the Warsaw Pact is based on the concept of defense. In NATO we stated at the start of the eighties that we threaten no one, that none of our weapons would be used unless an attack is launched against us. So we rely on weapons for defense, and we say that those who have plans to attack us -- let us hope that they do not -- will not win.

[Simonov] I think that your parallel with conventional arms does not withstand criticism, insofar as when we talk of nuclear weapons we are practically speaking of suicide -- even of the side that attempts to use nuclear weapons. I think that, yes, I think that you and I simply have different points of view, Madam Prime Minister, but on this problem allow me to go on to the next...

[Thatcher, interrupting in English] One moment, no, no, no!

[Kolesnichenko, interrupting] I would like to add to this question, if it is possible. We understand your point of view on the point of nuclear weapons. We, by the way, now, when we discuss, for example, missiles in Europe, as far as we know the Soviet Government does not broach England's nuclear forces; however, the disarmament process is proceeding. There were accords at Reykjavik as you know. They can now become treaties. The disarmament process is proceeding. But, all the same, at what stage does England mean to join this process, or do you not mean to join it?

[Thatcher] Let me first of all deal with the first point. You said atomic, nuclear weapons, were suicidal. Yes, they are indeed the most reliable means of deterrence; that's why we have these weapons, and you have more of these weapons than anyone else. Why? Because they are such a powerful deterrent that no one will ever dare attack you. They enable you to uphold the peace. I don't think you need such a large quantity of weapons for use as a deterrent. So it is necessary to achieve their considerable reduction.

As for intercontinental missiles, it is necessary to reduce them by at least 50 percent. I told Mr Gorbachev that. You first sited medium-range weapons. We did not have those weapons. We asked you to remove them. You did not do so, and we sited ours in response. Now we are advocating their liquidation, and then we must go on to missiles of lesser range. We have a very great deal of weapons. Let's take it step by step and gradually try to reduce the amount of these weapons. That would be the best for the whole world.

We will get to the stage when nuclear deterrence is not needed and when we can make better use of our resources. I would like us in 5 years to have a 50 percent reduction in ICBM's. We have only four atomic submarines. That is 2 and 1/2 percent of what you have.

Yes, let us first reduce strategic weapons, then medium-range weapons, then chemical weapons, and then let's take a look at conventional weapons. You have much more of those weapons, tanks, and planes, and so on. Let's get a balance here as well. Then no doubt we will be able to achieve real progress and everyone will be happy.

We publish all our information about defense potential. We have a more open society, and if you are going to have a more open society, and if you are going to have a more open society, too, it will be the better for everyone.

[Kalyagin] To return to your words about the need to reduce strategic nuclear weapons. Well, first of all, I do not entirely agree with you. Or, to be more precise, I do not agree at all when you say that the Soviet Union has more nuclear armaments than any other country in the world. I think it has been established that between our country and the United States there exists military parity; in one field they have more, and in another field we have more, but on the whole we are equal. But that is not the point.

[Thatcher] The question is how you are counting: launchers or warheads, because for each launcher there are six or so warheads.

[Kalyagin] They have more cruise missiles, 50 percent. I agree, but the fact is, as Reykjavik showed, in the way of such a radical reduction in armaments stands the Strategic Defense Initiative which destabilizes the situation in the world. How can we give up one class of weapons just so a new, no less powerful one can appear? How do you view this problem?

[Thatcher] First of all, the Strategic Defense Initiative is in the development stage so far. Any new class of weapons calls forth a new method of defense. First it was the bow and arrow, shield and so on; thus it would be very strange not to try to develop some defense against a new class of weapons. The Strategic Defense Initiative so far is in the research stage. The United States is not alone in doing research in this field. The Soviet Union has perfected an anti-aircraft defense system around Moscow, recently it was updated. You have 30 years' experience in developing countermeasures against missiles launched against you. We were worried in the seventies when you started developing ray weapons, laser weapons. You have probably far outstripped us in this.

So you, yourselves, have mounted great development work in the field of antimissile defense. You have the world's only operational antisatellite system in the world. I don't know why you are lumping everything together. Nuclear weapons are, yes, the most terrible weapons, and what you are proposing is not to have any defense against them. Perhaps one should have some defense, say for planes. If such a defense can be developed it would be a good thing, but if someone penetrated the defense, the threat would remain all the same. I continue to maintain that nuclear weapons are the most successful deterrent that we yet know against a new war and this has enabled us to keep Europe free of wars. For me, the most important thing is peace. I don't understand why you concentrate only on abolition of nuclear weapons. It is peace I am after.

[Kolesnichenko] Excuse me, we have already understood your concept of nuclear weapons, your attitude to them. That's why we went on to the question of SDI. You called it a program of defense, research. It's a research program, why has the Reagan administration already gone over to the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, a treaty that, as you know, does permit the system around Moscow that you spoke of? But this treaty does not permit testing [word indistinct] absolutely the deployment of systems in space.

Now, in the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty they are saying that already in the middle of the nineties, components of the first phase of SDI will be put into space and the whole treaty will be...

[Simonov, interrupting] Demolished.

[Kolesnichenko] Demolished, torpedoed. What do you think of that?

[Thatcher] Look, you're getting very technical. All right, you're asking technical questions, I'll give you a technical answer. It's a technical question. When I first met President Reagan at Camp David in 1984, work on SDI was only beginning. At that time there was no narrow or broad interpretation. These words started to appear after 1985. Now, a question needs to be asked concerning what you have been doing in relation to defense using new physical principles, which is mentioned, as I remember, in the main part of the treaty. This is mentioned in the so-called agreed statement D on new physical principles which did not exist at that time. What you call the broad interpretation of the treaty boils down to the fact that it is necessary to have the possibility of testing our research work before beginning deployment. I can give you an answer based not on the finer points of law but on common sense. How can you hold talks on deployment if you do not know whether something will work? Naturally, it is necessary to carry out research; it is necessary to hold tests. Only after that will it be known whether something can be deployed.

[Kolesnichenko] So you are in favor of the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

[Thatcher] I am for common sense; I am in favor of an interpretation based on common sense. How can talks on deployment be conducted, if it is not known whether your solutions are going to work? If they do not work, the talks will not start.

I am trying to propose the following: to extend the validity of the treaty, the term of its validity is too short. But it is up to you to decide, as long as it is you who participates in the talks, and I am proceeding from common sense. We know, for instance, that the system encircling Moscow works, and that you have updated it. We know that you have an antisatellite system. We do not know whether it works or not and how successfully, but we do not interfere with your tests. We know that you are working intensely on laser technology. We know that you are expert in the field of nuclear technology, and we do not complain.

[Kalyagin] Mrs Thatcher, you must be aware of the fact that this broad interpretation of the treaty, deployment of SDI elements in space, means deployment of weapons in space. That is just another phase of the arms race, when it spread to space. Are you really supporting such a development?

[Thatcher] Yes. But if you have an antisatellite missiles, and you are the only country in possession of it...

[Kalyagin] We have a moratorium on antisatellite...

[Thatcher, interrupting] You mean that you do not test antisatellite missiles? You are being too technical, much too technical. I would not like to go into as much detail.

[Kolesnichenko] You know, Mrs Thatcher...

[Thatcher] I can tell you that the nuclear weapon is the most powerful weapon that the world has ever known. I believe that it is probably sensible to build a defense against the most terrible of weapons. You have ground-based defense systems already, and you have certain systems that are used against nuclear weapons. The SDI is not a system of nuclear defense; it is a nonnuclear defense system. It is better to have a nonnuclear defense against nuclear attack than a nuclear defense.

[Kalyagin] Do you mean to say that the United States will suspend satellites fitted with laser guns over us, and we should sit quiet and do nothing, that we should cut down our nuclear missiles? That can hardly be imagined.

[Thatcher] How can you start negotiations on any issue if you have not even verified anything, have not made sure that something is going to work? Yes, we know that your system is working and that is being updated and is situated around Moscow. I believe that your antisatellite weapons will work as well. Our viewpoint is that the United States, if they could check how their system is working, to verify that, could conduct talks. You do it yourselves in the Soviet Union. We do not ignore that, as we do not ignore the fact that you were the first to deploy the medium-range missiles, SS-20's.

[Kolesnichenko] But Mrs Thatcher, even Washington does not accuse us of violating the ABM Treaty....

[Thatcher] Please tell me, are you interested in anything else regarding Soviet-British relations? I am interested, for instance, in strengthening trust and friendship. Mr Gorbachev's new proposal is one of the most interesting proposals that I have heard recently: a more open society, new incentives, restructuring -- this is an enormous task.

I believe that it is just an incredible task and we wish you success in fulfilling it. And something else: I believe that we must know each other better. We hope that it will bring its results; we hope that we will be able to reduce weapons -- all varieties of weapons.

Thatcher, Sakharov Lunch Talks

LD311328 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1226 GMT 31 Mar 87

[By Chris Moncrieff, PA chief political correspondent in Moscow]

[Text] Mr Andrey Sakharov, the 65-year-old freed Soviet dissident, met Mrs Thatcher in the British Embassy in Moscow today and told her: "Two years ago you could not imagine sitting around a lunch like this." Afterwards Mr Sakharov, who was released last December after seven years internal exile, spoke freely to reporters outside the embassy in the full glare of the Kremlin opposite.

Mrs Thatcher, who had invited him and his wife Yelena Bonner, said as she left ahead of them "it was a very nice lunch." When Mr Sakharov, a tired and worn figure, emerged 10 minutes later with his wife on his arm, he spoke only in Russian to waiting reporters "We discussed human rights, people locked up in psychiatric hospitals and people in labour camps," he said. "We want through the arms discussion and there was no disagreement between us on the step-by-step approach to disarmament."

Mr Sakharov, asked if he thought the process of freeing dissidents was going fast enough, replied: "It is going to be a gradual process. About 100 are free, which is a huge event and very important for us." Mr Sakharov added: "The process of democratisation in the Soviet Union is very important for our country. Without it development is impossible. It is also important for the whole world." He was impressed by Mrs Thatcher's "clarity and honesty".

Earlier, a British Embassy car had difficulty in finding Mr Sakharov and his wife, who were waiting to be picked up outside their flat. Mr Sakharov surprised the occupants of two other cars by trying to get into them, mistaking them for the embassy car, which eventually found them.

The meeting with Mr Sakharov, the 1975 Nobel peace prize laureate whose exile was lifted in December by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, took place on the fourth day of Mrs Thatcher's visit to the Soviet Union. Yesterday, she described lengthy talks with Mr Gorbachev as "very good" while British sources said they were "frank and vigorous but never hostile." Mrs Thatcher told the Soviet leader in a Kremlin speech last night that the West would have more confidence and trust in him if he met fully his human rights commitments and if he withdrew Soviet troops from Afghanistan. She also pressed for an agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles from Europe, with restraints on shorter-range systems. Mr Gorbachev suggested the West was trying to "comouflage" its intentions by increasing the number of missiles in Europe and he attacked the levels of unemployment and homelessness in the West.

Today, however, the two leaders chatted as if last night's fiery speeches had never been made, when they watched a number of Anglo-Soviet deals being signed. One agreement involved development of Anglo-Soviet space research, with the possibility of a joint unmanned probe to Mars in the next decade.

Ryzhkov-Thatcher Talks

PM011509 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Apr 87 First Edition pp 1, 4

[TASS report: "Conversation in the Kremlin]

[Text] On 31 March, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolay Ryzhkov talked with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

They pointed to the usefulness of the current British-Soviet exchanges of views on a broad range of international problems, issues of bilateral relations, and the interrelationship between political relations of states and the possibilities of developing extensive trade and economic cooperation between them.

Normalization of the international situation would make it possible to channel extra resources and efforts to tackling many pressing economic and social tasks facing mankind.

It was not the policy of nuclear deterrence from the viewpoint by which Britain's Conservative government looked at international relations, but the termination of the arms race and other consistent measures to strengthen East-West trust that constituted the best guarantee of security for all peoples, Ryzhkov said.

The hope was expressed that the British prime minister's visit to the Soviet Union would promote better understanding between the two countries on fundamental issues of the international situation and facilitate their economic, cultural and other ties.

Margaret Thatcher showed interest in matters of humanitarian cooperation that, in her opinion, should be directed at increasing human contacts, raising the level of information about one another, and familiarizing peoples with life in the respective countries with a view to consolidating trust.

Nikolay Ryzhkov stressed that an active exchange of information, dissemination of the ideas of peace, and better knowledge of each other's life would contribute to a considerable extent to strengthening the spirit of cooperation in Soviet-British relations, and that the Soviet Union adhered to a constructive stand on all these issues.

We do not understand, however, when many mass media bodies in the West and even statesmen are seeking to distort the image of the Soviet people and smear the Soviet reality.

The participants in the conversation considered in detail issues of bilateral trade and economic relations.

Nikolay Ryzhkov expressed confidence that given goodwill and effort on both sides, it would be possible to increase substantially bilateral trade, which was noted by Mikhail Gorbachev during his stay in Britain in December 1984.

The Soviet side came out with specific ways to attain the objective. Margaret Thatcher's attention was drawn to the fact that various kinds of restrictions and discriminatory measures employed in the West, Britain included, with regard to trading with the USSR, hindered that growth.

It was also emphasized that the extent to which British proposals were competitive against proposals coming from other countries was an important condition for reaching practical agreements on several issues currently being discussed between Soviet organizations and British firms.

For her part, Margaret Thatcher reaffirmed Britain's interest in the further development and extension of trade and economic ties with the Soviet Union and said that her government would actively facilitate the realization of measures directed at attaining this objective.

The prime minister also noted that restructuring in the British industry carried out in recent years was creating conditions for enhancing its competitiveness in the world market.

Explaining that the restructuring of the economic mechanism in the Soviet Union was opening up great opportunities for business circles in the West to develop trade and economic ties with the Soviet Union, N.I. Ryzhkov particularly singled out the significance of the active use by British firms of new forms of cooperation -- coproduction, establishment of joint enterprises, research and development by scientists from both countries.

He expressed the hope that the British Government would assist in the implementation of many useful Soviet-British agreements that had been recently concluded.

The sides agreed to carry out practical measures to increase the volume of reciprocal trade and further broaden economic relations on a mutually beneficial basis.

The conversation was held in a businesslike, constructive atmosphere.

Taking part in it were, on the Soviet side: Comrade Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; Comrade Tolstykh, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology; Comrade Aristov, minister of foreign trade; Comrade Kovalev, first deputy minister of foreign affairs; Comrade Zamyatin, USSR ambassador to Great Britain; and on the British side: Howe, secretary for foreign and Commonwealth affairs; Cartledge, Great Britain's ambassador to the USSR, Wicks, principal private secretary to the prime minister; and other officials.

Gorbachev Dinner Speech

PM311419 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Apr 87 First Edition p 2

[TASS report under the general heading "In a Friendly Atmosphere"]

[Text] Esteemed Madam Prime Minister,

Ladies and gentlemen,

Comrades,

Greeting you today, Mrs Thatcher, we are greeting the country with which the Soviet Union, Russia, has had a long-standing relationship and common interests. The two nations have gained much of what is useful from the four centuries of communication since Moscow and London exchanged their first embassies in the mid-16th century. There

were other things, too, to the point of armed conflicts. But the two countries joined forces to fight Nazism. That glorious page will forever remain in history. It will never be obliterated from the memory of the Soviet people.

The times have changed. There are new problems, new concerns and hopes today. Soviet-British dialogue is an inseparable and important part of today's European and world politics. This is explained by the circumstance that the Soviet Union and Britain are two great powers and that each has made a major and irreplaceable contribution to world history. Both were among the founders of the United Nations and are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. All this determines their international role and responsibility.

It is from these positions and in the spirit of realism and a desire to better understand each other's way of thinking that we approach the current talks.

Your visit to Moscow, Mrs. Thatcher, is taking place at a very interesting and very responsible time, at a time which is crucial in many respects, and this is making an imprint in our dialogue.

We have talked a good deal today about the process of reorganization in our country. I want to repeat in this context: Our foreign policy today stems directly from our domestic policy to a larger extent than ever before. We say honestly for all to hear: We need a lasting peace to concentrate on the development of our society and to tackle the tasks of improving the life of the Soviet people.

The West is scrutinizing this open position for signs of the Soviet Union's weakness. They claim that the Russians have hopelessly fallen behind, that their system is not working and that the goal of socialism has proved altogether flawed. That is why, supposedly, any concession can now be wrenched from them if proper pressure is applied. It is a bad delusion.

The Soviet Union today is a result of immense, great socioeconomic changes and transformations, which her peoples have carried out in the seven decades since the revolution. True, there have been difficulties, sometimes dramatic, and quite a few external obstacles. [paragraph continues]

However, one thing is clear: The efforts of the people have turned the country into a world power, whose role in international affairs is well-known and commonly recognized. The economic potential of the Soviet state, its political prestige, and the ability of our society for more energetic advance are being turned by us to the good of world peace and progress.

The socialist system has demonstrated repeatedly and in many ways its advantage over capitalism. This is not boasting but a hard fact. Far from all its potentialities have been identified and put to use. The full development of the potential of socialism, the comprehensive perfection of the Soviet system, its new quality, and a new level of the material well-being and the cultural and intellectual standards of the people are what reorganization will give us.

At the same time, it is socialism's invitation to peaceful competition with any other social system, and not merely an invitation, but the manifestation of readiness to participate as equals in the development of an appropriate mechanism of this competition, cooperation and, if you wish, rivalry -- but peaceful rivalry. This mechanism should promote and strengthen trust and create an atmosphere for the peaceful competition of states.

It is one of the fundamental aspects of new political thinking. Today's world needs it. Otherwise the age which gave rise to nuclear weapons will be short and end in a tragedy for mankind.

It is alarming that the West continues to claim today that nuclear deterrence is the only way of averting war.

We do not understand how nuclear weapons can be lauded when there are four tons of explosives for everyone, including children, in the world and when the explosion of even a small part of the existing nuclear arms arsenals will jeopardize life on earth. We cannot agree to this from the point of view of either politics or morality.

I would like to say, too, that the Soviet Union has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and will never turn them against those countries that have no such weapons in their territories. This is our immutable principle.

I have already had a chance to point out the evil of the ideology and policy of nuclear deterrence. I want to explain our position anew. First, this tool is not fail-proof and as time goes on the risk of the accidental outbreak of a nuclear conflict keeps growing. It is the fuse of the charge which is capable of destroying civilization. Second, deterrence is a policy of blackmail and threats, and therefore a constant source of the arms race and the escalation of tension.

Third, the logic of deterrence, i.e. the buildup and upgrading of weaponry, means the subordination of politics to the interests of militarism with most grievous consequences for the well-being of the people and for democracy itself.

Old thinking, involving armed force as a means of achieving political goals and the presentation of other nations in the "image of an enemy," led to two world slaughters. It bred the cold war and today's extremely dangerous situation, and has brought the world to a point beyond which unpredictable consequences begin.

Our unilateral moratorium, a program for a nuclear-free world, announced on January 15, 1986, the Reykjavik initiative, the Moscow forum "For a Nuclear-free World, for the Survival of Humanity" and now the proposal to detach the question of medium-range missiles in Europe constitute manifestations of new thinking. The basic outlines of an accord on medium-range missiles in Europe were agreed upon in Reykjavik. It would seem that there are no serious obstacles to rapid progress. An accord would have major military and political importance, and, moreover, would change the situation psychologically: we have been arming ourselves until now, but then would for the first time start dismantling nuclear weapons.

But what is happening in response to our initiative?

We see the problem of medium-range missiles being weighed down with a package of conditions and demands directed to the Soviet Union. We see the NATO countries retreating from the positions of their own "zero option." Things have gone so far that, instead of reductions in the nuclear arms arsenals, Europe is being offered a buildup of those arsenals, "upgrading" with U.S. operational and tactical missiles.

We also hear statements that the West will trust the Soviet arms reductions proposals if the USSR modifies its political system, taking Western society as a model. It just cannot be meant seriously. To hope that we surrender our ideals at any time means to flee from reality.

The next few weeks will show if NATO really wants to remove a whole class of nuclear weapons from Europe in accordance with the wish of the peoples, or if it again is trying to find a decent way of disguising its desire to retain Pershings and cruise missiles in Europe and even increase their number, or replace them with something newer.

To the roar of nuclear explosions in Nevada, we had to break off our eighteen-month unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. But this does not mean that we have stopped our ideas of achieving a solution to this key problem of nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet Union is prepared to return to the moratorium any day and any month the United States declares an end to its testing. Let me take advantage of this opportunity to remind Britain that it is a participant in tripartite talks on this issue.

We hope that the in depth dialogue we are conducting with Western countries and our positions and intentions, which we have been talking about frankly and backing up with practical action, as well as this visit of yours, esteemed Madam Prime Minister, and our forthright talks will finally form a subject for serious deliberation and invite reciprocal moves. At this critical moment for Europe, it is its nuclear powers -- Britain and France -- that we are primarily addressing.

The world today is one in which a struggle is underway between reason and madness, morality and savagery, life and death. We have determined our place in this struggle definitely and irreversibly. We are on the side of reason, morality and life. This is why we are for disarmament, most notably nuclear disarmament, and for creating a system for general security. This is the only possible way that mankind can regain immortality.

Strength must give way to universally shared values and equal relations presupposing respect for the interests of every nation and for its right to an independent choice, the right to be unlike others.

It ought to be said that in the West there are still quite a few people with a penchant for talking about the freedom of choice. But they really mean the choice of the capitalist system. However, when this or that people -- in Nicaragua, Africa, the Middle East, or Asia -- actually reveals a desire to look for a different road on its own, one which will suit it better, it finds its way immediately barred with dollars, missiles, or mercenaries. They start with hypocrisy and end with bloodshed.

As a result, the "volcanoes" of regional conflicts are fuming.

The "lava of strife" they are spewing forth has been burning the whole organism of the world community and filling it with smoke. We propose looking at this problem, too, in the light of new thinking and demonstrating an ability to reckon with the realities of specific situations and see the real causes of any conflict, rather than zealously [dne m s ognem] search for a "hand of Moscow" everywhere.

Approaches to a settlement can be different. An international conference on the Middle East, activities by the Contadora Group, the U.N. secretary general's efforts for an end to the Iran-Iraq war, effective economic and political measures against the apartheid regime in southern Africa, cooperation between the countries of ASEAN and Indochina as a factor for a settlement regarding Cambodia -- these and possibly other methods and forms could help quench the fires.

As far as Afghanistan is concerned, we are for resolving the problem by political means through an end to outside interference. The Afghan Government's program for national reconciliation has evoked broad response both in that country and elsewhere in the world. It is the only right way to pursue. Soviet troops have come to Afghanistan at the request of its government, and they will be returned home as part of a political settlement. The process of achieving national reconciliation and a settlement concerning Afghanistan is already underway.

It is making progress. The main thing is not to hamper it and to put an end to any interference in the affairs of that sovereign country, which wants to be and will be neutral and nonaligned. We are, however, only witnessing a step-up in efforts to scuttle the normalization process on the part of certain Western forces.

The goal of "humanizing" international relations is served by continuing the all-European process started in Helsinki. The CSCE process is a kind of university of political dialogue. It has taught us more than one lesson in the difficult science of mutual understanding; it has been teaching us to see the opposite side not as an enemy, but as a partner. The document adopted in Stockholm is proof that these lessons have been learned well.

But further progress has to be made. We are waiting patiently for a reply to the Warsaw Pact countries' initiative on conventional arms and armed forces and are prepared for a decisive scaling down of the military confrontation of the two blocs in a zone stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Arms must be reduced to a level of reasonable sufficiency, that is to a level only needed to cope with the tasks of defense. In European buildings every apartment is entitled to protect itself against burglars, but only in such a way as not to demolish the next-door apartment.

We are prepared to come to terms on a dependable and irreversible destruction of all chemical weapons.

So we count on the West, especially West European countries, to be aware of its responsibility and to take reciprocal steps in what concerns non-nuclear arms.

The all-European process could be effectively assisted by a representative humanitarian forum we have suggested holding in Moscow. But it's interesting that as soon as we made the invitation to talk about human rights in a serious and businesslike manner and compare, in an atmosphere of mutual candor, how people really live here and in capitalist countries, they apparently have grown nervous and again are trying to reduce the whole subject to two or three individual cases, while evading a discussion of all the rest.

We also are prepared to discuss the particular case in a humane spirit, but are strongly intent on talking about the whole range of related problems openly and loudly so that we shall be heard in the West by the millions of the unemployed, the homeless, and the destitute, by those beaten by police and victimized in court, and by those whose civil rights and human dignity are subjected to glaring discrimination simply because of the color of their skin, and so that we shall be heard also by the trade unions deprived of the right to protect their members and thus of their inherent mission, and by blue-collar and other workers denied the possibility to take part in running the factories they have been bound to for their entire lives.

If we are to talk about human rights, let's talk about all rights and especially about those concerning millions of people.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Comrades,

Face-to-face meetings are the best way of finding common ground and bringing positions closer together on specific matters. What is essential here is an ability not only to talk, but also to listen; and not only to listen, but also to understand each other and to look jointly for solutions to the most formidable problems of the modern world. It is in this vein that we would like to pursue our political dialogue with Britain.

The Soviet Union cherishes its economic, scientific and technological contacts with Britain. Our departments have prepared well for talks on these matters. You will have an opportunity to see this for yourselves tomorrow. But things will not start to hum if the British side remains unwilling to remove the obstacles which keep everything that is the most interesting for us out of the exchanges, prevent Soviet goods' access to your market, or make offers by your firms noncompetitive. In short, we need reciprocity and understanding for each other's interests in this field.

We in the Soviet Union respect the British people's allegiance to traditions. We know the role your country has played in developing world trade and industry and appreciate the skills of its workers and the great contribution by its scientists, artists, and writers to the cultural treasure house of civilization. [paragraph continues]

We understand a feeling for one's historical "roots" and share it. A nation disregarding its history puts a question mark over its future. But it is likewise true that he who does not think of his future also devalues the best in his past.

So let us address the problems of the times so that the people of the 21st century could appreciate the political thinking demonstrated by the leadership of the USSR and Britain in this complex, watershed period.

I wish happiness and well-being to you, Mrs. Thatcher, and to all British guests, and peace and success in tackling their problems to the people of Britain.

Gorbachev Speech 'Angry'

LD310825 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 0820 GMT 31 Mar 87

[By Chris Moncrieff, PRESS ASSOCIATION chief political correspondent in Moscow]

[Text] The prime minister was today studying in depth a new English translation of Mr Gorbachev's fiery speech delivered at the sumptuous banquet in her honour at the Kremlin last night. Mr Gorbachev launched, in Russian, into a scathing attack on the West for its response to his proposal for the removal of all medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe. And he also, by implication, attacked Mrs Thatcher's unrelenting criticism of Soviet human rights policy, by referring to the "millions" out of work, homeless people, "victimised trade unions" and those "deprived" because of the colour of their skin in the West. As he spoke, Mrs Thatcher had in front of her at the banquet an "unofficial translation". But the British Embassy also recorded the speech and was having it translated separately.

Some Soviet sources claim that in one passage -- not included in Mrs Thatcher's translation -- he said: "I do wish people would see things in a reasonable light rather than walking around in broad daylight with a candle searching for the hand of Moscow." If this was said, it would have been a deliberately mocking of Mrs Thatcher, over her lighting of a candle during a service at St Sergius Russian Orthodox Church in Zagorsk on Sunday. Afterwards, Mrs Thatcher described her action as a symbolic gesture for freedom.

Despite his angry speech and her own no less robust one, both the Soviet leader and Mrs Thatcher remain the best of friends. Tonight, Mr Gorbachev and his wife Raisa, in a surprise gesture of goodwill, have invited the prime minister, to join them at a private dinner party. It will be the third time during the visit that she has been a guest in this way.

Thatcher Dinner Speech

PM311413 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Apr 87 First Edition p 2

[TASS report under the general heading "In a Friendly Atmosphere"]

[Text] Mr General Secretary, Mr Chairman, ministers and fellow guests. I am proud to address the distinguished members of the Soviet leadership in this historic place. Ya ochen rada opyat nakhoditsa v moskvye. (I am very glad to be here in Moscow again).

The Kremlin has been witness to many of the most momentous events in the history of your great nation. One of my most distinguished predecessors, Sir Winston Churchill, came here in 1942. Speaking then, he said that he would not have come to Moscow unless he had felt sure that he would be able to discuss realities. I echo his words.

I thank you for inviting me to make this visit -- the first official visit by a British prime minister to the Soviet Union for 12 years -- and for the hospitality and warm reception. It follows a long tradition of contacts between our two countries over the centuries.

Many people, very many people, in Britain remember vividly the highly successful visit which you paid us, Mr General Secretary, just over 2 years ago. We hope that you will visit us again soon. We would also welcome a visit from the chairman of the Council of Ministers.

One of the things which all those who met you in Britain remember most clearly is your direct approach to issues. We like that. Indeed, I have a modest reputation in that way myself.

The relations between our two countries can only be sound if each side knows precisely what the other is thinking, and the reasons why.

Of course we can each learn something from the other. You will recall that Aleksandr Pushkin's Yevgeniy Onegin learned all his knowledge of political economy from us British. One of the first things we are told about him is: "He spurned Greek poetry and myth, but how he knew his Adam Smith. As an economist he profoundly understood and could expound the means by which a state gets wealthy and how its livelihood is controlled. Smith said it has no need of gold -- "producing goods will keep it healthy."

I know that memories of the World War II are vivid in your country. So they are in ours. We fought the Battle of Britain in 1940 alone against the whole might of the German Air Force. Our great cities were bombed night after night. Many of our sailors took part in the northern convoys, with heavy loss of life, to ensure that supplies got through to help the Soviet war effort. Our people then fought side by side to turn back the tide of monstrous tyranny and oppression.

The Soviet Union itself suffered unimaginable and tragic loss of life and ruinous damage in battles fought on your own soil. As a young woman, I followed with anguish but also with admiration the suffering and the heroism of the Russian people.

That bravery and fortitude is as evident today. A few weeks ago I was visited by one of your firemen who had fought the blaze at the Chernobyl nuclear power station with such outstanding courage.

A true hero.

Mr General Secretary, I do not want this evening simply to set out the British view on a number of issues for the record. Rather, I want to use the opportunity to examine two very important questions:

-- How do we manage change in our societies?

-- How do we assure ourselves of security?

The two questions are very closely linked, because it is increasingly difficult for any country, above all a great power like the Soviet Union, to draw a clear dividing line between what happens inside its borders and the wider world within which it has to seek security and prosperity.

My visit to the Soviet Union comes at what is evidently a very exciting and stimulating moment in your national affairs. Indeed you yourself have called it a revolution.

We read your speeches with great attention. We hear your references to openness, democratization, independent judiciary, and incentives. We have read your references to free labor and free thought in a free country.

In our society, those words convey hope and faith in the spirit of the individual, a belief in freedom and justice. It was because we valued these things not only for ourselves but for other peoples that when on 3 September 1939 Hitler refused to withdraw from Poland, we went to war to stop tyranny from spreading across Europe.

Against that background we welcome the opportunities which your proposed changes will bring, both for the prosperity and well-being of your own people, and for the prospects for increasingly open contacts with other countries and peoples.

The fact is, Mr General Secretary, we are increasingly one world and need to think globally. National boundaries can no longer keep our countries and peoples in separate compartments. One has only to think of matters so diverse as acid rain, pollution, disease, broadcasting, sports, books and ideas, travel -- all these are bringing about changes which do not always recognize the boundaries drawn on maps.

The result is that one country's policies, practices, and standards increasingly affect the lives of others, and they in turn are affected by the hopes and ambitions of other peoples. More and more we face problems that we can only solve together.

This need to consider the impact beyond our borders of what happens within them applies to what is for me the most crucial question of all: That of how to establish greater confidence and trust between the countries of the East and West. This is vital if we are to reach agreements allowing us to reduce the burden of armaments and to devote more resources to increasing the well-being of the people. We all want to see such agreements. But whether they can be reached depends not only on the skill of the negotiators: It depends much more fundamentally on how governments and peoples in East and West view each other, what they believe about each other's intentions, how they judge each other's readiness to honor their commitments, and how they judge each other's long-term objectives in the wider world.

For example, we in the West have the system which we think is best for us. We fight the battle of ideas by letting the results of our own democratic system speak for themselves. But we seek no one else's territory or possessions, nor do we seek to impose our political system on others, for we believe in the right of other peoples to determine their own destiny.

It is only natural, therefore, that statements that you will struggle for the total triumph of socialism all over the world raise fears among our people because they are seen as a threat.

Or take the question of human rights: The extent to which you, the Soviet Government, meet the commitments you have freely undertaken in the Helsinki Final Act will determine how far other countries and other peoples have confidence in the undertakings which you give on, for instance, arms control. The greater your readiness to release prisoners of conscience and to allow those who wish to do so to freely leave their country -- and we welcome the steps which you already have taken -- the greater the readiness you will find in the West to believe that peaceful and friendly relations with the Soviet Union can be maintained and extended.

Similarly, Mr General Secretary, the Soviet Union's readiness to withdraw their troops [voyska] from Afghanistan with the shortest possible delay, so that the Afghan people can exercise their right to self-determination, will have a crucial part not only in the future of Afghanistan, but in deciding how others see you and whether they trust or fear you and make their plans accordingly. You would have our full support in implementing a solution that will allow an independent and genuinely nonaligned Afghanistan to live in friendly relations with all its neighbors.

Mr General Secretary, I believe that we have a unique opportunity to increase understanding and confidence between East and West. But just as we would expect you to judge us not only by what we say but what we do, so we will reach our judgments not on intentions or on promises, but on deeds and on results.

Mr General Secretary, every nation has the right to be secure and feel secure.

We in the West find our security in the Atlantic alliance which binds Europe and the United States. It is a defensive alliance. We threaten no one. NATO gave a solemn assurance in 1982:

"None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to an attack."

The mistake is sometimes made of believing that Europe can be divided from the United States. But on the fundamentals and in our determination to defend our democratic values, we are inseparable.

It is because of the unity of the NATO alliance, and because of our hopes for greater confidence between East and West that we are ready to look for ways to achieve security at lower levels of armaments.

I do not believe that it makes sense to try to achieve this in one leap. It makes better sense to approach it step by step.

But we must always keep in mind the impact of each agreement on our overall security.

The priorities are now surely clear to us all:

- An INF agreement with restraints on shorter-range systems;
- A 50 percent cut in United States and Soviet strategic offensive systems;
- A world-wide ban on chemical weapons.

Of course, reductions in these areas will enhance the importance of eliminating disparities in conventional forces.

You recognized the validity of this step by step approach, Mr General Secretary, in your statement of 28 February, in which you proposed the conclusion of a separate INF agreement.

I very much hope that such an agreement can be reached.

But at each stage of the negotiations we must ensure that each side enjoys undiminished security. In judging that, we have to look at the whole range of armaments, not just one category.

We can agree to medium-range missiles [rakety sredney dalnosti] in Europe being eliminated. But we must also have constraints on shorter-range missiles to ensure there is no circumvention of this agreement. The next stage must be further negotiations to reduce the imbalance of shorter-range systems, where the Warsaw Pact has a massive superiority of 9:1. There also must be real progress in negotiations to deal with the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional forces.

You yourself recently proposed, Mr General Secretary, that the way to deal with this is not for the one with less to increase his forces, but for the one with more to reduce them. I agree entirely.

Deep cuts in strategic weapons also should be within reach.

There is no reason why such reductions should be made to depend on limitations on the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative research program. You cannot stop such research any more than you can stop the onward march of science in general. Man will always strive to push forward the frontiers of knowledge. We know that similar work is being undertaken in the Soviet Union. I do not think that there will ever be a complete defense against strategic nuclear weapons. But we cannot foreclose on the chance that defenses could make a valuable contribution to a more stable relationship. As President Reagan and I agreed at Camp David in December 1984, the aim of any strategic defence system should be to enhance, not to undermine deterrence, to maintain balance, not to achieve superiority.

That is why I think we should be trying not to prevent research to the point of establishing feasibility, but to manage the results of that research so that neither side feels threatened by it. It is already agreed that any deployment would have to be a matter for genuine negotiation.

A further step to create confidence might be to have a timetable spelling out the planned research program of both parties, supported by a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a fixed period. This should give both sides enough certainty about the other's intentions to enable reductions in strategic weapons to proceed.

We also need to reach, as a matter of urgency, agreement to ban chemical weapons. Although Britain gave up hers in the late 1950's, the Soviet Union has a massive superiority over the West in these weapons.

Agreements in these three areas, with provision for strict verification in each case, would be a very remarkable achievement. We should concentrate on that. I do not believe that it makes practical sense to try to look beyond them. If we are too ambitious, we risk sacrificing what can be achieved now.

The fact is that nuclear weapons exist and the knowledge of how to make them cannot be erased.

Conventional weapons have never been enough to deter war, two world wars showed us that. They also showed us how terrible a war fought even with conventional weapons can be. Yet nuclear weapons have deterred not only nuclear war, but conventional war in Europe as well.

A world without nuclear weapons may be a dream. But you cannot base a sure defense on dreams. Without far greater trust and confidence between East and West than exists at present, a world without nuclear weapons would be less stable and more dangerous for all of us.

I recall to you some words of Sir Winston Churchill: "Be careful above all not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure, and more than sure, that other means of preserving peace are in your hands."

That is why the government I lead will not abandon the security provided for our country and for the NATO alliance by nuclear weapons.

Our own nuclear forces will remain at the minimal level needed to guarantee our own security and to contribute to the security of our allies. They may be very small compared to the forces of the Soviet Union. But for us they are, and will remain, crucial.

Mr General Secretary, I make these points to you not in any combative spirit, but in the hope that by clear thinking and frank speaking and in a spirit of realism and mutual understanding we may build a better and more constructive relationship between our countries and thus make our contribution toward a more secure and peaceful world.

Mr General Secretary, I started my speech on a note of hope. And it is with hope that I wish to end it.

I have high hopes for the future development of our bilateral relations.

Tomorrow we shall witness the signing of some agreements between our two governments. One of them sets out ambitious new ideas to improve communication between our two peoples. We in Britain have always had great admiration for the contribution which your country has made to European culture over the centuries. That contribution was

based upon unrestricted contacts and exchanges across the whole of Europe. I attach very great importance to reestablishing them. We would like to see many more of your young people come to Britain and see for themselves; and we would like to send more of ours to the Soviet Union. The free movement of people and ideas is an essential part or creating trust.

I have high hopes, Mr General Secretary, for the success of the negotiations in Geneva and in Vienna for reductions in arms.

I have high hopes that the important developments taking place in your country will contribute to greater confidence between East and West.

There is a famous passage in Shakespeare which speaks of a tide in the affairs of men, which when taken at the flood tide leads to fortune. Perhaps, Mr General Secretary, you have already caught that tide. You have certainly embarked upon a great endeavor. We most earnestly wish you and your people well. Your success would bring in other tides on other shores far beyond your own.

So, Mr General Secretary, I raise my glass to you and to the success of the course on which you are embarked. You carry our sincere good wishes.

I raise my glass to the well-being of the peoples of your great country.

I raise my glass to all my Soviet hosts in gratitude for their magnificent hospitality.

And I raise my glass to a relationship of goodwill and mutual respect between our two countries.

Za vashe zdorovye. Zhelayu vam uspyekha. (To your health: I wish you success).

'Broad' Dialogue With Gorbachev

LD011735 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 1 Apr 87

[Text] We begin with a commentary by Aleksandr Druzhinin on the outcome of the Anglo-Soviet talks just over here in Moscow.

The talks have demonstrated above all that the two nations, each with an economic and political system of its own, can conduct a broad dialogue. The Soviet Union and Britain have different political systems and different ways of life. Their approaches to many problems are also different. However, this did not prevent Mikhail Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher to candidly state their respective stands and candor paves the way to mutual understanding. Such dialogues are necessary in relations between all countries because they increase trust. Power politics, relying on strength are no alternative to dialogue because reliance on armed force in this nuclear age is a shortcut to a holocaust and there is no denying that.

It would of course be naive to expect that the Moscow talks would lead to mutual understanding in all areas. The talks showed that Britain, just as other members of NATO, continued to adhere to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. It sees nuclear arsenals as a guarantee of peace. But is that notion entirely without fault? It's impossible to build a lasting peace on nuclear stockpiles. The building up of the nuclear missiles forces the other side to take measures in response, escalating the

arms race further and increasing the threat of a military conflict. Would it not be far more reasonable to take the choice proposed by Moscow and abandon nuclear arsenals altogether and make big cuts in armed forces (?and) conventional weapons? There would be no need then to deter anyone. There would be no need either to base relations with other countries on the threat to use force.

Some Western countries claim that nuclear weapons are necessary to protect them against what they term communist expansion. They also say that the Soviet Union's intention to press for a triumph of socialism arouses fears. Is it reason to suspect this country of aggressiveness? The Soviet Union's goal is a world free of nuclear or any other wars. We are for a triumph of socialism indeed but we press for it relying on ideas rather than the force of weapons of war. We rely on the force of our own example. We are not out to impose our system on those who do not like it. We are convinced of the advantages of our own system and that system has demonstrated them on many occasions. (?Let) peaceful competition demonstrate that we are right, that is our stand.

Speaking at a dinner in honor of the British prime minister, Mikhail Gorbachev called the Soviet approach to international affairs an invitation to competition with any social system. This country is prepared to contribute on equal terms to setting up an appropriate machinery for that peaceful competition. That machinery must develop and promote trust and an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence. Is that not an example of new political thinking? The world faced with the threat of a nuclear holocaust badly needs that new political thinking now.

'First Assessment' Calls Visit 'Fruitful'

LD012329 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 1 Apr 87

[From the "International Diary" program, presented by Viktor Levin]

[Text] The visit to the Soviet Union by Margaret Thatcher, prime minister of Great Britain, ended today. Now, making a first assessment of the results of the Soviet-British talks at the highest level, I think that one can say with complete certainty that the exchange of views was useful, although at times it was rather sharp.

The speeches given by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher at the official dinner in the Kremlin were published in our press; and it is clear from them that the Soviet Union and Great Britain have differing views on a number of highly important contemporary problems. For instance, I would like to note primarily the fact that the Soviet Union's call for the complete elimination of nuclear arms is received by the present British Government as just a Utopian dream. But it seems to me that hardly anybody could have calculated that, on arriving in Moscow, Margaret Thatcher would change her position on the spot and go over to the side of the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union. Such calculations would have been simply illusory. But it is definitely useful that, as a result of the exchange of views, Thatcher understands our position better, and we have had an opportunity to acquaint ourselves more deeply with Great Britain's approach to the burning problems of the present. The exchange of views gives us certain grounds to hope for a positive influence by the Soviet-British dialogue on the arms limitation process.

Before her trip to Moscow, Margaret Thatcher more than once stated her desire to receive the broadest possible information on restructuring [perestroyka] in the Soviet Union. She received such information first hand, as is said, from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. It must be assumed that Margaret Thatcher received the clear impression that the meaning of restructuring lies in opening up more fully the potential of socialism. It can hardly have been in the liking of the leader of the Conservative Party of Great Britain that we are striving for more socialism. But, as a serious politician--and all those who saw her on their television screens during these days were able to convince themselves that Margaret Thatcher is a high-caliber politician--I repeat, as a serious politician she cannot but be guided by reality.

I would like to repeat once more: The Soviet Union and Great Britain have different approaches to many problems. We are different, but there is nothing bad in that. Only one conclusion can follow: It is necessary to seek mutual understanding. On this level the visit was, without question, fruitful.

Thatcher Press Conference

PM011651 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Speech by M. Thatcher"]

[Text] I have had one of the most interesting and intensive [nasyschenny] visits since becoming prime minister, M. Thatcher declared. She was speaking on 31 March at a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists in the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center.

First of all, I would like to thank Mr Gorbachev and the Soviet Government and people who accorded me such a warm reception. I will never forget the enthusiasm of those Soviet people whom I met.

I certainly came to the Soviet Union at a most interesting and important time. I received some very interesting information from Mr Gorbachev in the course of our detailed conversations. In all probability, I have hardly ever had such lengthy conversation with any other world leader. Seven hours of official conversations yesterday, and two more hours during the dinner. We have an opportunity to meet again over a private dinner, during which we will continue our conversations.

During my meeting with Mr Gorbachev in December 1984, I said that I could do business with him. Yesterday we succeeded in doing a lot of business. I think that if you spend a long time with someone, you understand very well what he wants, in what he believes, and what his objectives are. I hope that Mr Gorbachev shares this opinion.

We all believe in frankness [otkrovennost]. We had numerous opportunities to speak frankly with one another yesterday. Our talks covered a very broad range of questions. We discussed the advantages of our political and social systems. Mr Gorbachev gave very detailed information regarding the policy of restructuring in the Soviet Union. I welcome this process. Everything that will help to make the Soviet Union a more open society will help to build trust.

We conducted a detailed exchange of opinions on the question of arms control. We agreed that first of all it is necessary to approach the question of an agreement on medium-range missiles under strict verification and that it is necessary to limit shorter-range missiles. It is necessary to discuss the question of these systems in greater detail during the talks which will begin right afterward. The main disagreements remaining between us are linked with the fact that the West must have the right to build up to the level of the Soviet Union, and with the question of which systems will be discussed during the talks on short-range [maloy dalnosti] missiles.

I must say that we are not prepared to agree with the idea of a nuclear-free Europe. We agreed that the question of a ban on chemical weapons should be examined first. The United Kingdom has made important proposals on this problem. Mr Gorbachev clearly pointed out that, broadly speaking, the Soviet Union accepts our approach. Both sides want an early start of talks on reduction of conventional arms.

With regard to the proposal to reduce strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent, the Soviet Union links it with limitations on the U.S. SDI. I submitted several proposals regarding the achievement of greater predictability in this area, and Mr Gorbachev will examine these proposals.

Although I do not want to underestimate the difficulties that remain, we have agreed in practice that progress in arms control will only be achieved by a stage-by-stage approach, when priority tasks are precisely defined, when they are defined jointly. I see this as a useful and positive step. It goes without saying that in general I have been inspired by the talks with Mr Gorbachev. But we were unable to achieve a great deal of progress in arms control.

We discussed other world problems too, including, of course, Afghanistan. I told Mr Gorbachev that I favor a neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan. But, of course, this could only happen as a result of the speediest withdrawal of Soviet troops.

We also discussed the problem of human rights. I welcome what has been undertaken in this area. Mr Gorbachev said that specific cases will continue to be examined with due attention. As far as possible, they will be resolved positively.

I regard this as the key to achieving greater trust.

Today we have examined bilateral questions, particularly the problem of trade. I agreed with the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers that we must strive together to ensure that trade turnover between us reaches R2.5 billion by 1990. This would enable both sides to increase their exports by 350-400 million pounds sterling.

To this end, Mr Ryzhkov gave me a list of goods which could become export and import items. As you know, in recent days British companies have signed a number of important contracts and written declarations of intent.

Finally, I want to say that, at the moment, this visit is giving me a great sense of satisfaction. I think that Mr Gorbachev and I have established a very good relationship and that we will be able to continue to conduct the frank dialogue we began two years ago. We now have a better understanding of what the other side is trying to achieve. I was able to say how much we welcome the policy of openness, restructuring, and democratization. It is paving the way to greater trust, which will

be necessary for an agreement in arms control. That I was able to obtain explanations on a number of my questions on arms control and that we agreed on the need to achieve progress as soon as possible on the question of an agreement on intermediate-range missiles and on banning chemical weapons gives me special satisfaction.

Replies were given to journalists' questions.

On the same day, M. Thatcher gave an interview for Soviet television.

Foreign Ministry Press Briefing

LD021451 Moscow TASS in English 1420 GMT 2 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 2 TASS -- "The visit to the Soviet Union by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain is being positively assessed in the Soviet Union," Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated at a press conference at the ministry's press centre today.

"The visit is of great importance for the development of bilateral relations. The dialogue with Britain has been raised to a new level. The visit gave an opportunity to have a frank exchange of views on various issues, to compare the positions of the sides, and to specify their intentions. A number of agreements were signed."

"At the same time from the Soviet Union's point of view, the visit has also laid bare the circumstances that the old way of thinking dominates among the British leadership."

"According to the old way of thinking, weapons are a boon and nuclear weapons are the greatest boon because weapons are terrible and nuclear weapons are superterrible and so much the better."

"This view is opposite to the Soviet Union's viewpoint according to which nuclear weapons are an evil."

"But the point of view of Mrs. Thatcher runs counter not only to our's but also to the viewpoint of the President of the United States who said he dreamed of living to see a nuclear-free world and who also considers nuclear weapons an evil which it might be as well to get rid of."

"When speaking to the Kremlin Mrs. Thatcher said that a world without nuclear weapons would become less stable and more dangerous. At the same time she supported President Reagan's SDI. As Reagan put it, SDI is needed as the key to a nuclear-free world. Thus, the purpose of the SDI, according to Reagan, in words, at least, is a world without nuclear weapons."

"According to Thatcher, such a world is a bad one and a dangerous one. A good world, in her view, is a world with nuclear weapons."

"The old way of thinking", the spokesman for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "also manifested itself in accusations levelled at the Soviet Union that its plans ostensibly include efforts to promote the cultivation of communism throughout the world and that it is these efforts that make the West arm itself."

"Those are old cliches which have been and are being used to justify the arms race. Such an interpretation of the world situation does not promote a peaceful development and is fraught with great dangers to our world which is oversaturated with nuclear weapons."

"Nucleophilia, the love of everything nuclear, expressed by the distinguished British guest also questions the reasonableness of the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such a stand runs counter to the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons and leads to the spread of nuclear weapons and to a growing risk of an outbreak of nuclear war."

"The maintenance of the old political thinking in London hinders the East-West dialogue and complicates a constructive discussion of international security issues," the spokesman for the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs said.

"Nevertheless, on a number of points the sides found common elements. These are the issue of medium-range missiles, although certain reservations were expressed by the British side, the issue of eliminating chemical weapons, and the attitude of the Helsinki process -- a positive desire to promote its development. Common elements were also discovered in the approaches to some regional conflicts and to their resolution by political means."

"Britain could play a greater role than the one she plays now, considering her resources for solving the cardinal issues of war and peace," the spokesman for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs said.

Politburo Discussion

LD022017 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1844 GMT 2 Apr 87

[Excerpts] Moscow, 2 Apr 87 (TASS)--At a session held today, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo heard a report by M.S. Gorbachev, N.I. Ryzhkov and E.A. Shevardnadze on the results of their talks with British Prime Minister M. Thatcher.

They noted the great importance of the talks both for bilateral and international relations. Under the new conditions developed in Europe and in the world, dialogue has continued with a major Western power which is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It provided an opportunity to frankly set forth our views on relations between states with different social systems, on regional conflicts and other important problems and -- what is particularly topical -- on prospects for disarmament. We compared our positions in depth and elucidated each other's intentions.

Agreements were signed on concrete questions of bilateral relations. The hope was expressed that M. Thatcher's visit will be followed by an activation of bilateral economic and cultural ties.

The talks have shown both sides recognize the importance of solving the problem of medium-range missiles, though Britain continues to take an approach toward an agreement hemmed with conditions; they express willingness to abolish chemical weapons, work toward a reduction of military confrontation in Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals -- enrich the Helsinki process and promote the settling of regional conflicts by political means.

On the cardinal questions of world development, fundamental divergences remain. It was reaffirmed that the Soviet leadership strongly disagrees with the position that the conduct of international affairs and national security are thought reliant nuclear weapons, though this encourages their proliferation and is fraught with universal catastrophe.

The Politburo is convinced of the need to continue and deepen the dialogue with Britain and the other Western states in the spirit of the new thinking, to overcome existing distrust and bring about a healthier international situation.

After having discussed the results of the conference of the Warsaw Pact member states committee of foreign ministers which was held in Moscow, the Politburo supported the steps mapped out by them all aimed at the elimination of the nuclear threat, the banning of chemical weapons, the advancement of the Budapest initiative on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, the development of the all-European process and also at the improvement of the foreign policy interaction of allied states.

Arbatov on Thatcher Arms Stand

LD012004 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1930 GMT 1 Apr 87

[Text] There could be a nuclear holocaust if Russian and American thinking on nuclear weapons was the same as Mrs Thatcher's, a leading Soviet foreign affairs spokesman said tonight. Mr Georgy Arbatov, a member of the Central Committee and director of the Institute of US/Canadian affairs, said that the Russian people were appalled by the prime minister's nuclear philosophy.

Speaking on channel 4 news he said: "I think on nuclear issues, and I really never thought I would have to say it, honestly, I think Reagan is more forward looking than Mrs Thatcher is.

"He at least has understanding that he can't, humanity and America can't live, forever with nuclear weapons.

"He understands it is not natural it is dangerous and he has to do something.

"Mrs Thatcher says it is ok she does not believe in a denuclearised Europe.

"If we were to think in the same way, and the Americans were to think in the same way, it opens up the way directly to a holocaust."

Mr Arbatov said that he had heard today from specialists and politicians that they were appalled by Mrs Thatcher's nuclear philosophy. He accused the prime minister of ignoring her advisers. "I think it was transparent in her appearance and speeches on our TV that she even doesn't listen very much to opinions that differ with hers even from her advisers. Maybe they don't dare to say."

'Fabricated' Soviet 'Threat'

LD311539 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1441 GMT 31 Mar 87

["Once Again About the 'Soviet Threat' to the West" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 31 Mar (TASS) -- TASS political observer Sergey Kulik writes:

Those who are attentively following the Soviet-British dialogue at the summit level currently underway in Moscow could not fail to take note of one circumstance. Contrary

to the generally known facts, on the initiative of the British side, fabricated allegations have once again surfaced about the Soviet Union's alleged intention to implant communism throughout the world, as well as conjectures that in no way correspond to reality about the "danger of an attack" by the Soviet Union upon Western Europe, which allegedly still remains. In other words, this is once again a case of the myth of the "Soviet threat," which the West uses as a cover-up every time it refuses to accept peaceful Soviet proposals.

Rebutting this quite groundless opinion in his talks with M. Thatcher, M.S. Gorbachev leaned on the philosophical concept of the present-day world as given at the 27th CPSU Congress. It is probably worth recapping the fundamental conclusions of that congress. They testify to the fact that the Soviet Union threatens no one, and that its ideal is a world without weapons or violence, a world in which each people freely selects its own path of development and its way of life.

Moscow works on the fact that the nature of present-day weaponry leaves no state the hope of defending itself through merely military-technical means. Ensuring security, therefore, appears more and more to be a political task, to be solved only through political means. Security cannot be built forever on the fear of retaliation, that is, on the doctrines of 'deterrence.' If we take international relations as a whole, security in our time can only be universal. Under these conditions, the arms race, the desire for military superiority, and threats of force, when viewed objectively cannot bring anyone political gain. The Soviet Union is convinced that the confrontation between capitalism and socialism can proceed only and exclusively in the forms of peaceful competition and peaceful rivalry.

It is precisely upon the bases of these fundamental views of the modern world that the Soviet military doctrine is built. Its orientation is unambiguously defensive. In the military area, the Soviet Union intends to continue to act so that no one has any grounds for fears, even imagined fears, about their security.

The old way of thinking, related to armed force as a means of achieving political aims, and with portraying other peoples in "the guise of the enemy," has already led to two world wars. We should do everything to prevent a third, which, in our nuclear age, threatens to destroy mankind.

Thatcher Moscow Send-Off

PM021049 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 1

[TASS report: "On Tour of the Country"]

[Text] British Prime Minister M. Thatcher left Moscow for Tbilisi 1 April. She is on an official visit to our country at the invitation of the Soviet leadership.

A send-off ceremony for the head of the British Government was held in the Georgiyevskiy Hall of the Great Kremlin Palace prior to her departure.

M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and his wife said farewell to M. Thatcher and wished her a good journey.

M. Thatcher said that she is satisfied with the results of her visit to the Soviet Union and believes that our countries have taken a major step toward the development of dialogue in all spheres concerning both international and bilateral relations.

M.S. Gorbachev said in reply that he also believes that the visit was highly important both for bilateral ties and from the international viewpoint. The visit confirms the desire of both countries' leaderships to conduct a fruitful dialogue and to cooperate in the quest for solutions to topical problems of contemporary development.

The motorcade, escorted by a motorcycle honor guard, made its way from the Kremlin to Vnukovo Airport. The state flags of Britain and the Soviet Union were flying in the streets and squares along its route.

At Vnukovo Airport the prime minister was seen off at the aircraft ramp by N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister; and other officials.

Taking part in the send-off ceremony were M.S. Smirtyukov, administrator of affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers; USSR Ministers B.I. Aristov, Yu.M. Volmer, and V.A. Shamshin; Moscow Gorispolkom Chairman V.T. Saykin; and other officials.

Diplomatic staffers of the British Embassy in the USSR were among the send-off party.

The state flags of Britain and the Soviet Union were flying at the airport, and servicemen from the Moscow Garrison formed a guard of honor. An orchestra played the two countries' national anthems.

N.I. Ryzhkov and M. Thatcher inspected the formation of Soviet servicemen.

The send-off ceremony at the airport ended with a march-past by the guard of honor.

M. Thatcher is being accompanied on her tour of the country by V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; A.G. Kovalev, USSR first deputy foreign minister; USSR Ambassador to Britain L.M. Zamyatin; and British Ambassador to the USSR B. Cartledge.

At Tbilisi Airport, M. Thatcher was welcomed by O.Ye. Cherkeziya, chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, and other officials.

Thatcher Remarks on Plane Home

PM030948 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "'Most Valuable Exchange of Opinions'"]

[Text] London, 2 Apr — British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has emphasized the importance of her visit to the Soviet Union. Talking with British journalists on board the plane on the way home from the USSR, she stated that the talks with M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, were the most valuable exchange of opinions she had ever had with any state leader.

According to a REUTER report, M. Thatcher noted that profound differences persist in the USSR's and Britain's approaches to various problems, in particular, questions of arms control.

Speaking of the processes taking place in the USSR, M. Thatcher stated that according to the impression she formed, the leadership's policy enjoys support in the country. The USSR made it clear to the West, she noted, that from the beginning of the process of reforms, Soviet society had reached a turning point "characterized by significantly more openness [otkrytost] and fundamental changes in economic management methods and in other spheres."

World Media Comment

PM010951 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Apr 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS 31 March roundup: "Constructive Dialogue"]

[Text] The world public's attention is focused on the detailed discussion of major questions of the time, including the key issue of disarmament, in the course of the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and Britain's Prime Minister M. Thatcher, and the speeches they exchanged in the Kremlin. The mass news media and major political and public figures abroad emphasize that face-to-face meetings and frank and constructive exchanges of opinions are necessary in the quest for solutions favoring a safer world.

The British newspapers, television, and radio give paramount attention to coverage of M. Thatcher's official visit to the USSR. The Kremlin talks, the BBC emphasizes, have taken the form of a frank discussion on a broad range of questions, in which arms control problems occupy a special position. Stating that differences remain in approaches to questions like the "nuclear deterrence" policy, regional conflicts, and human rights, a television commentator noted that, nonetheless, "the talks are proceeding in a friendly atmosphere, reviving memories of Soviet-British cooperation during World War II."

"Having examined Thatcher's critical observations on the USSR's domestic and foreign policy point by point, the Soviet leader fully refuted them," REUTER reported. THE TIMES in turn emphasizes that the Soviet side followed up with a "swift, resolute, and most firm rebuff to the attacks against Soviet policy on a broad range of problems -- from nuclear arms to Afghanistan and human rights."

The CPSU Central Committee general secretary, the FINANCIAL TIMES writes, criticized the West's response to the Soviet initiative on medium-range missiles in Europe. He pointed out that this question is being complicated by a whole package of conditions and demands being set before the Soviet Union, revealing slippage by the NATO countries away from their own "zero option" positions.

A U.S. NBC TV commentator noted that the Soviet side dismissed the attempts to link trust in the Soviet Union's proposals on arms reductions with changes in its political system. The participants in the talks, THE NEW YORK TIMES concluded, set out their views firmly but by no means from positions of hostility.

Publishing detailed reports on the Soviet-British talks and the texts of the speeches exchanged by M.S. Gorbachev and M. Thatcher, press organs in the socialist community countries emphasized that in today's world -- a world of a struggle between reason and insanity, between morality and savagery, between life and death -- the Soviet Union has defined its stance clearly and irrevocably: The USSR is on the side of reason, morality, and life.

UK Press Reaction to Visit

PM030946 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Maslennikov report: "Extensive Commentaries"]

[Text] London, 2 Apr -- All today's newspapers, publishing materials on the completion of the British prime minister's visit to the USSR, quote M.S. Gorbachev's words that the Soviet Union is prepared to continue to expand relations with Britain. [paragraph continues]

There is also extensive comment on M. Thatcher's words prior to her departure for Tbilisi, to the effect that the meetings and talks held in Moscow opened a new chapter in British-Soviet relations.

Many newspapers stress that the further positive development of the two countries' relations could give a powerful boost to the improvement of the situation in Europe and the widening of detente, as is envisaged in the new political thinking propagandized by the USSR. "Thatcher's visit to the Soviet Union," the FINANCIAL TIMES writes in an editorial today, "is an example of the practical detente and willingness to cooperate which lay the political foundations for agreements on the reductions of arms." "Detente in U.S.-USSR relations in the first half of the seventies," the authors of the article write, "was narrowly based on their military parity, but was without the support of a clear consensus among Western political forces as to how to regulate rivalry between the superpowers to avoid friction. This type of consensus can only be built by discussions like those in the Kremlin over the last few days."

Britons Want Missile Solution

LD012014 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 1 Apr 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by correspondent Vsevolod Shishkovskiy, identified by screen caption]

[Text] [Shishkovskiy] Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's visit to the Soviet Union and the meetings and conversations that took place in Moscow have helped to strengthen mutual understanding and will certainly have a positive influence on the development of British-Soviet relations. This is virtually the unanimous appraisal being given to these events by the mass information media and Britain's politicians and public figures. [video shows British television screen carrying details of the Anglo-Soviet agreements that were signed]

In reporting the signing of various Soviet-British documents, the newspapers and television have been pointing out the practical measures planned to expand cultural contacts and particularly to further develop economic links. It is being stressed that such links will help to strengthen trust and mutual understanding between our countries. [video shows British television screen pictures of Thatcher and Gorbachev together and then of Thatcher and Howe addressing Moscow news conference]

While positively appraising the frank exchange of opinions in Moscow on disarmament problem, especially on the removal of medium-range missiles in Europe, some observers are drawing attention to the inconsistency of Margaret Thatcher's position on this issue. [video shows British television picture of Neil Kinnock] This has been pointed out, too, by Neil Kinnock, leader of the opposition. It is incomprehensible, he said, how Mrs Thatcher intends to achieve an expansion of mutual understanding and cooperation and, at the same time, is threatening the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons. [video shows British television screen picture of David Owen] David Owen, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, again has spoken about the importance of the adoption of a separate solution on the medium-range missiles in Europe. [video shows more street scenes] This point of view is shared by many people in Britain.

[Begin video interview with in the street with L. Temple, director of the British travel firm Progressive Tours; name and position identified by screen caption; [Temple in English, with superimposed translation] I am glad for the opportunity to say to Soviet television viewers that millions of Britons are sincerely hoping that the results of the meetings and conversations in Moscow will be a strengthening of universal peace and a constructive solution to disarmament problems.

However, I think that the British public indeed has not received a clear answer to the question of whether Britain is ready to actively help a curbing of the arms race and prevent its transfer into space. As for the so-called nuclear deterrent on which Mrs Thatcher insists, it is a constant source exacerbating tension and threatening security. [end interview]

[Shishkovskiy] This is also the view of millions of Britons. They want their country to use all existing possibilities to normalize the international situation and further improve British-Soviet relations.

British Assessment

LD011717 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1543 GMT 1 Apr 87

[By Chris Moncrieff, PA chief political correspondent in Moscow]

[Text] Mrs Thatcher flies out of the Soviet Union tonight after her most spectacular overseas tour as prime minister. She believes she has speeded up the thaw in East-West relations after four tempestuous days of dialogue with Mr Gorbachev.

In an amazing gesture, the Soviet leader -- through an intermediary -- congratulated the prime minister on her forthright TV interview, beamed to 200 million Soviet citizens on Tuesday night.

Tory MP's will give her an enthusiastic welcome when she appears in the commons tomorrow to describe her historic visit -- during which she startled the men of the Kremlin with her candour, vigour, toughness, and sometimes even downright bloody-mindedness.

Mr Gorbachev responded no less robustly in one of the most astonishing personal political confrontations of the century. And if Mrs Thatcher melted the Kremlin she also left with them the firm impression that here was a woman who could not at any price be compromised. And that, plainly, is the kind of adversary with whom Mr Gorbachev prefers to deal.

For the prime minister, this visit must have enhanced her general election prospects. And although she rejects as unworthy any suggestion that this is an election tour -- "I am on an historic mission for Britain," she asserts -- there can be little doubt that her flawless performance will soon be reflected in the opinion polls.

Events today indicated that Mrs Thatcher certainly now enjoys the official seal of Soviet approval.

First, PRAVDA, the official newspaper, gave the prime minister front page treatment with a prominent picture of her and Mr Gorbachev. It also took the hitherto unheard-of step of mentioning her private dinner with Mr Gorbachev and his wife Raisa on Tuesday night, describing it as a meeting in "non-official circumstances."

The departure ceremony at the Kremlin this morning was unusual in that Mr Gorbachev's wife was present, another rarity in Soviet protocol. This was seen as demonstrating a special and personal friendliness and cordiality.

Even more significantly, Mr Gorbachev made it known to Mrs Thatcher through Kremlin sources that he took a very positive attitude to her outspoken press conference in Moscow and her equally robust TV interview. Mrs Thatcher told the Soviet millions things they may not have known about the Russian nuclear arsenal. But Mr Gorbachev's response indicated that her uncompromising attitude paid off -- and that the Soviet respect her for it.

She has emerged in the now-softer eyes of the Kremlin as the principal leader of the Western world. Her week in the USSR -- during which she and Mr Gorbachev have in one breath mercilessly attacked each other's principles and, in the next, toasted each other in a spirit of great cordiality -- must have a substantial effect on the forthcoming Geneva disarmament talks. She says she now believes a medium-range nuclear weapons agreement could be reached by the end of this year.

She foresees the gradual easing and growing openness of Soviet society. And she sees a Soviet leader who does not simply say "nyet" like his predecessors, but stands up to argument.

Before leaving for London tonight, Mrs Thatcher said: "The visit has opened a new chapter in British-Soviet relations."

Many people -- herself included -- believe it has also opened a new chapter on a worldwide scale.

Thatcher Statement in Parliament

LD022006 Moscow TASS in English 1851 GMT 2 Apr 87

[Text] London April 2 TASS -- British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made a statement in Parliament today in her visit to the Soviet Union. She expressed gratitude for the hospitality and welcome accorded to her and noted that the most important aspect of the visit was, of course, the very extensive talks which she had with General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev.

Margaret Thatcher stressed that in the talks on arms control the sides agreed that priority should be given to an agreement on intermediate range nuclear weapons, with strict verification, with constraints on shorter-range systems and with immediate follow-in negotiations to deal more fully with shorter-range systems. Margaret Thatcher again declared that her government would not be prepared to accept the denuclearisation of Europe.

In saying so she claimed that the Soviet Union had superiority in conventional and other forces. "I do not underestimate the differences which remain between us," the prime minister said. "But it was nonetheless clear from our talks that we do agree that progress on arms control requires a step-by-step approach with clearly identified priorities, and that we are largely in agreement on what those priorities shall be." "This is a useful and positive step. I am hopeful that a satisfactory agreement can be reached on intermediate nuclear forces by the end of this year."

Margaret Thatcher said that she had visited Zagorsk, toured a new housing development of Krylatskoye [as received] in Moscow and visited Tbilisi. "Wherever I went I was struck by the spontaneous warmth and friendliness of my reception by the people of the Soviet Union." "I believe that augurs well for our future relations."

"My visit," Margaret Thatcher said in conclusion, "took place at a most interesting and crucial moment in the development of the Soviet Union. I firmly believe that it is in our interests to welcome and encourage the course on which Mr Gorbachev has embarked. Our political systems will remain very different and we shall continue to hold widely divergent views on many international problems. But Mr Gorbachev and I were able to discuss these differences frankly in a spirit of friendship." "Mr. Gorbachev expressed the Soviet Union's willingness for wider cooperation with Britain in every field."

PRAVDA Weekly Review

PM051943 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

["International Review" Column by Nikolay Bragin]

[Text] Dynamism, Principledness [subhead]

It is customary in the international affairs of our times that not one significant step, not one specific proposal on the most important foreign policy problems emanating from the Soviet Union and its friends and allies, the fraternal socialist states, leaves any politician and public figure on any continent with feeling of indifference.

This week has seen the debate over the Soviet proposal on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe continue unabated. This is both natural and understandable inasmuch as -- as E. Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, stated in a speech 30 March -- "It is clear to everyone that such a step would be decisive contribution to ridding the European continent of the threat of nuclear nightmare and to relaxing the international political climate."

It is worthy to note that not even the most shameless adherents of the nuclear missile arms race in the Pentagon and NATO headquarters are in a position to come up with persuasive arguments to counter a Soviet proposal which gives full consideration to the position of the West, long an advocate of the "zero option" for the medium-range missile problem.

It goes without saying that our new initiative is encountering an interested response not only from the majority of political and public figures but also from the broadest mass of the people both within Europe and beyond it. Because, L'HUMANITE writes, it "answers people's innermost thoughts about making a start to mankind's transition to a nuclear-free world."

And just look at the propaganda maneuvers and the ideological diversions, planned by the West's special services that the foes of international detente are resorting to at this time in order to undermine trust in the sincerity of Soviet intentions to do everything possible for nuclear disarmament. It is becoming increasingly difficult to deceive people; they are judging the policy of any particular state or government not by wordy statements but on the basis of their practical deeds.

The deeds of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries of the socialist community speak for themselves. They consistently and purposefully aim for a situation wherein the world witnesses new approaches to the solution of the most urgent, vital problems -- and above all the problem of arms limitation and disarmament. This is demonstrated by the results of the Moscow session of the Warsaw Pact States' Foreign Ministers Committee. On 2 April the CPSU Central Committee Politburo discussed these results. It endorsed the collectively outlined steps aimed at eliminating the nuclear threat, banning chemical weapons, advancing the Budapest initiative on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, developing the all-European process, and improving the allied states' foreign policy collaboration.

The dynamism of the peace offensive -- as the West frequently calls the foreign policy initiatives of the socialist community countries -- accords fully with the demand for new political thinking in the nuclear age. This dynamism is also dictated by the vital needs of socialist society, by the process of restructuring in all spheres of its life.

In order to resolve successfully the very complex problems of restructuring in the economy and in the social and cultural spheres, the Soviet Union is vitally interested in a lasting, reliable peace and in the cessation of the arms race. Our entire community is interested in this.

Life itself confirms that the community countries' unity of action and close political, economic, and military cooperation is a reliable guarantee of our successfully overcoming the difficulties and impediments arising both in the path of internal development and in foreign policy activity. To strengthen this cooperation, to deepen the integration processes within the community framework -- all the fraternal countries are interested in this. This is indicated by the preparations now under way in Czechoslovakia for the official visit to the CSSR by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev. "The visit by the important Soviet guest," RUDE PRAVO writes, "will be an event of exceptional significance in relations between the two fraternal countries, a substantial contribution to the development of reciprocal cooperation, to the process of socialist building, and to the further broadening and deepening of traditional Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship."

Historic Chance for Europe [subhead]

A major international event this week was the talks in Moscow between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and M. Thatcher, prime minister of Great Britain. The head of the British Government paid a 5-day official visit to our country which saw an exchange of opinions on a broad range of international problems and on issues connected with bilateral relations. A number of agreements aimed at developing these relations in specific areas was signed.

The Soviet-British talks drew the fixed attention of the press and state and public figures in Europe, America, and on other continents inasmuch as they concerned the most acute problems of our times, primarily the prospects for disarmament and the practical solution of the problem of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe. "M. Thatcher," LE MONDE remarks, "is the first West European leader to visit the Soviet Union since the unveiling of the Soviet proposal on eliminating medium-range missiles."

The leading press sources in Britain note that the head of their country's government had the opportunity not only "confidentially" but also publicly to set forth her point of view on all the issues of interest to her, and to obtain the most exhaustive reply to them from the Soviet side. Newspapers of the most diverse political tendencies point to the "frank nature of the summit-level Soviet-British dialogue," noting that it allowed the sides to gain a better understanding of each other's positions and to emphasize the pressing need to resolve a number of problems linked with improving the situation on the European continent and throughout the world. The presence of diametrically opposed viewpoints on certain cardinal questions of world development is also noted.

The UK press is now commenting extensively on M. Thatcher's statement made following her departure from the USSR in which she expresses profound satisfaction with the hospitality accorded her in the Soviet Union and with the spirit of frankness as well as the USSR's readiness for the further development of Soviet-British relations.

The Moscow talks represent a continuation of our country's dialogue with a major Western power which is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. They took place in the new conditions which have emerged in Europe and the world and, naturally, their results could not fail to affect the course of the current all-European process and the prospects for ridding the continent of nuclear weapons.

After hearing at its meeting on Thursday the report by M.S. Gorbachev, N.I. Ryzhkov, and E.A. Shevardnadze on the results of their talks with M. Thatcher, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo noted their great significance for bilateral and international relations. The talks made possible a frank exposition of views on the relations between states with differing social systems, on regional conflicts, and on other important problems, particularly the prospects for disarmament. There was an in-depth comparison of positions and a clarification of each other's intentions on this topic.

Just what did the talks show? First, the fact that both sides recognize the importance of solving the problem of medium-range missiles, although Great Britain continues to surround its approach to an agreement with reservations. The readiness was expressed to eliminate chemical weapons, move toward the lowering of military confrontation in Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals, to enrich the Helsinki process, and to promote the settlement of regional conflicts by political means.

Second -- and all commentators draw attention to this -- fundamental differences remain on cardinal issues of world development. M. Thatcher, still a captive of the antiquated positions of NATO's "nuclear deterrence" strategy, advocates the retention of nuclear weapons as some sort of panacea in averting a new world war. But the reality of the nuclear age speaks differently: There is nothing more dangerous for the fate of mankind than the retention and, even more so, the buildup of this weapon of mass destruction.

During the talks the Soviet side confirmed the Soviet leadership's resolute disagreement with the position that the conduct of international affairs and international security must rely on nuclear weapons, even though this encourages their proliferation and threatens a general catastrophe.

The times imperatively dictate the need for practical actions to halt the nuclear missile arms race. The Soviet proposals on medium-range missiles offer a unique chance for Europe to set an example in this. Reaching an agreement on this issue as speedily as possible would initiate a process which is awaited with such hope by the peoples of the entire world -- the transition to the stage-by-stage reduction and, subsequently, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The chance to embark on the 21st century without nuclear weapons must not be missed!

The Soviet Union is prepared to do everything possible in behalf of this great and noble goal. Our country is convinced of the need to continue and deepen the political dialogue with the states of the West in the spirit of the new thinking, with a view to surmounting the existing distrust and improving the international situation as a whole.

Why They Are Against [subhead]

So, just what is it that upsets those people who are opposed to an agreement and advance fabricated pretexts to block the process of transition toward practical steps along the path of nuclear arms limitation? They make no great secret of it, essentially putting forward the same arguments as heard before: Nuclear weapons, they say, "deter" the outbreak of a new war.

Judging by everything, the gamble on continuing the nuclear arms race -- and taking it out into space, moreover -- remains pivotal to the policy of the current U.S. Administration and the military-industrial complex standing behind it. The transatlantic arms manufacturers are obtaining billion-dollar profits from fulfilling orders for the SDI and other military programs. Even more pleasing prospects loom before them. It has been officially announced in Washington that the forthcoming 1988-1989 military budget will cross the \$300-billion mark, while for the 3 years 1986-1988 total military expenditure will amount to \$930 billion. This indeed is the distant prospect. Military orders worth hundreds of millions or billions of dollars pour into their pockets daily as though from a cornucopia. This week the United States embarked on the construction of two new aircraft carriers costing about \$7 billion. Multibillion-dollar contracts are being drawn up for the manufacture of the latest missile-carrying bombers. Here, surely, is where to find the answer to the question: Why is the military-industrial complex opposed to a reduction in any types of nuclear arms and their carrier vehicles, "Euromissiles" included. Of course, in the upper echelon of power in the United States people realize that it is difficult in the prevailing conditions to shirk with impunity the solution of the question of medium [-range] missiles in Europe. But they are also afraid of provoking the anger of the missile manufacturers, especially with the presidential election coming up next year. So they are deciding how to compensate for a possible loss in one thing by a sharp upsurge in the production of something else, in particular nuclear-tipped missiles with a shorter range [u kotorykh menshaya dalnost poleta] than the "Euromissiles." They apply the following figures here: The United States and NATO, they say, currently have nine times fewer missiles with a lesser radius of action [s menshim radiusom deystviya] than the Warsaw Pact countries. Therefore, they say in Washington -- and they are echoed in London, Paris, and Bonn -- the Russians must agree to allow the other side

"to catch up to them in terms of the number of such missiles." Observe: They are pushing to the fore not the idea of reducing operational and tactical missiles but they demand "to sanction" a nuclear missile arms race. In the name of the U.S. President the White House has just published a statement which reiterates the demand for recognition of U.S. freedom of action in building up missiles with a lesser range than the medium-range missiles. All this gives rise to completely justified doubts: Do people over there want the elimination of any types of missiles at all in Europe?

Today it is patently inadequate to declare verbally all nuclear armaments "amoral and barbarous," as President Reagan said in conversation with the leader of Britain's Labor Party, N. Kinnock, who was recently in the United States. What is essential are practical moves toward their limitation and subsequent complete elimination. This was agreed in Reykjavik.

The West, however, continues to pile up obstacles on this path. It seems to me that it is absolutely appropriate to recall here the just concluded visit to the United States by J. Chirac.

The French prime minister had meetings and talks with President R. Reagan, Secretary of State G. Shultz, and Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger which centered on the issue of the attitude to be adopted toward the Soviet proposal on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. So what happened? Maybe the sides mutually pledged themselves to promote the speediest realization of this proposal? Absolutely not! On the contrary, judging by commentaries in the U.S. press, the interlocutors played that same dubious game: How to justify delaying the solution of this problem. Chirac was distressed lest the security interests of the United States' European NATO partners might suffer with the elimination of the medium-range missiles while his transatlantic interlocutors assured him that they will act "with consideration for the concerns of their partners" and exert pressure on the Russians.

The Soviet leadership has repeatedly and quite categorically let Washington and its allies know that our country does not seek military superiority for itself, but that it will not allow the violation of the existing parity in the correlation of forces in the international arena. We will not waive our security in any circumstances. And the sooner people across the ocean realize this, the more easily the process of consolidating international security will move forward.

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CSO: 5200/1404

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET COLONEL VIEWS WEST EUROPEAN 'FEAR' OF INF DEAL

PM011151 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Mar 87 p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov military-political review: "Europe: Dispelling the Clouds of Militarism"]

[Text] A bright ray of hope has broken through the black clouds of militarism which had covered the European horizon, hope that the sinister palisade of nuclear missiles will disappear from the continent in the very near future. The European public, and indeed the entire world public, and the governments of many countries are continuing to discuss the Soviet proposal on the immediate solution of the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe. The Soviet peace initiative is assessed as a unique chance to rid Europe of a substantial proportion of its nuclear load.

The nuclear burden on our common European house is extraordinarily heavy and is continuing to grow. By the end of last year, an official spokesman for the NATO headquarters has stated, there were 316 U.S. medium-range missiles placed on the territory of the United States' West European allies. There are 108 mobile launchers for Pershing-2 nuclear missiles deployed in the FRG. There are 208 U.S. cruise missiles with nuclear warheads sited on the territories of Italy, Britain, Belgium, and the FRG. Under NATO's so-called "two-track decision," by the end of 1988 it is planned to increase the number of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe to 572.

In Western Europe protests are continuing unabated against the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" which is intensifying the threat that the Old World will be turned into a lifeless desert. The new Soviet proposal is aimed at averting precisely this danger. That is acknowledged even by the leading figures of a number of West European countries. Virtually all European capitals are expressing favor in reaching a Soviet-U.S. agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe. Dutch Prime Minister. Lubbers, for instance, expressed the hope that the previously planned placing of U.S. cruise missiles on his country's territory would not take place inasmuch as the Soviet-U.S. talks would make this step superfluous.

People on the other side of the Atlantic have also expressed favor in achieving positive results at these talks. But how sincere are these statements? You involuntarily ask yourself this when you compare some facts of the past few days. On the one hand eloquent assurances of Washington's readiness to resolve the "Euromissiles" problem constructively and on the other overtly provocative tests on first-strike "Pershing-2" missiles. It is true that they took place on Cape Canaveral (Florida) but they were carried out by servicemen of the 56th U.S. artillery Brigade stationed in the FRG. According to a statement by a spokesman for the testing range,

the series of six launches of these missiles at targets several hundred miles away in the Atlantic was aimed at checking the U.S. missile troops' combat readiness. There's no denying that they chose a suitable time for this ostentatious "check."

Here is one more comparison. On the one hand Washington's same old unfounded declarations of its intent to free Europe of medium-range missiles and on the other reports on the start of the placing of U.S. cruise missiles at the second U.S. air base (after Greenham Common) in Britain -- Molesworth in Cambridgeshire. [paragraph continues]

THE GUARDIAN newspaper attests that the U.S. Air Force Command and the British Defense Ministry essentially confirms the fact that the placing of cruise missiles in Molesworth has begun, which is an important new stage in the buildup of the U.S. nuclear arsenal on British soil. The newspaper's military observer, D. Fairhall, explained this rather strange step on the threshold of the Soviet-British talks by the fact that the NATO leaders in fact rule out the possibility of achieving a real "zero option" for medium-range missiles in Europe and therefore they would like to disperse missiles in advance over as large a number of regions as possible.

It looks as though the professional anti-Soviets have needed a month to somehow recover from the shock inflicted on them by the 28 February Soviet initiative on medium-range missiles. To all appearances, all previous opinions of the "zero option" voiced by military policy's smart operators were nothing more than propaganda bluff with which they were counting on retaining their innocence and acquiring nuclear-missile capital. They were gambling on the USSR never agreeing to the "zero option." The ploy failed. And now new "arguments" are hastily being sought in the militarists' camp which could cause the talks to be broken off and prevent the conclusion of a fair agreement on medium-range missiles.

What is at the basis of this panic-stricken fear in the face of a possible agreement? The U.S. newspaper the CHICAGO TRIBUNE recently involuntarily blurted out the answer to this question. Calling the new Soviet initiative "a trap for the United States," it urged that there should be no signing of "even a really fair agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces with the Soviet Union." The bourgeois newspaper is frightened that such an agreement would lead to the further development of events most contrary to the wishes of certain circles. "Probably," the CHICAGO TRIBUNE writes with unconcealed alarm, "assertions will be heard that since the treaty on intermediate nuclear forces eases tension to such a degree, there is no need to finance the necessary modernization of conventional forces, and with these assertions new actions will be initiated against the strategic defense initiative at home." So that's it. The militarists fear an agreement as the devil fears incense because it will cut the ground from under the champions of the buildup of the arms race and its transfer into space. That is why the United States and NATO are now so frenziedly seeking ploys which could deadlock the talks. Let's name a few of them.

First ploy. They suggest getting rid of all Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe but only of some of them. According to the plan of this venture's authors, each side, after the reduction, would be left with 50, or even better 100, missiles on European territory. Yet this indefinite solution, in contrast to the Soviet proposal, will not strengthen European security.

Second ploy. They suggest not eliminating the U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe but re-equipping or resisting them. That is, if an agreement is reached the United States

would, by removing the Pershing-2 missiles' second stage, turn them into missiles with a smaller range than the medium-range (Pershing-1 or Pershing-1b) missile while the cruise missiles would be placed on submarines or surface ships. Behind all this lies the desire of Washington and NATO, come what may, to retain the "Euromissiles" as first surprise strike weapons, merely switching the labels on them. Yet the Soviet Union has stated its readiness to eliminate all its medium-range missiles in Europe.

Third play. It is proposed to discuss the question of the medium-range missiles only in "linkage" with questions of operational-tactical missiles. Yet the Soviet Union has "extracted" the problem of medium-range missiles from the "Reykjavik package" precisely so that it can be resolved separately without any impediment. [paragraph continues]

What is the point of artificially constructing a new "package?" All the more so since the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's 28 February statement clearly said that as soon as an agreement is signed on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, the USSR will withdraw from the GDR and the CSSR, by agreement with those countries' governments, its enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles. Our country is also prepared to embark immediately on talks aimed at reducing and completely eliminating these missiles.

The ploys complicating a European settlement undoubtedly include expatiations to the effect that, deprived of U.S. medium-range missiles, Western Europe will remain "defenseless" in the face of some "Soviet military predominance."

Yet this "predominance" is only the fruit of inveterate anti-Soviets' idle fantasy. In actual fact, and this is acknowledged by serious researchers in the West, approximate parity exists in conventional armaments between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The Brookings Institution frankly admitted in an item published last year that the "correlation of forces is not only closer to parity but is even in the West's favor." Nor do the arguments about Western Europe's "nuclear defenselessness" without the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" withstand any criticism. Let us recall that the U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles are not the only nuclear weapons on the continent. There are two other nuclear powers belonging to the NATO bloc in Europe -- Britain and France. Although their nuclear potentials have been left out of the present talks, they can by no means be discounted.

The nuclear weapons of both these powers are constantly being improved. The recent successful second testing in the United States of the Trident-2 nuclear missile reminded us that soon these missiles, on each of which will be placed at least 10 warheads with a yield of 150-500 kilotons, will be received by the British Navy. Reports have percolated to the press on painstakingly concealed instances of London's participation in NATO efforts to build up nuclear arsenals. This information acquires a special ring against the background of increasingly frequent talk in Western countries of the need to create some "joint West European defense."

Bonn can claim far from the least role in this "defense."

Security must be equal for all. This is the line adhered to by the USSR and the other socialist community countries following a coordinated foreign policy course. The differences in particular types of armaments existing within the framework of the overall approximate parity between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the socialist countries believe, should be eliminated, aiming at the lowest level. Not building up but reducing armaments while retaining parity at the lowest possible level -- that is the formula for true security.

The decisions of the routine session of the Warsaw Pact states' foreign ministers committee held in Moscow recently fit well into this formula. The documents adopted at the session are imbued with one concern -- to strengthen and preserve peace, to avert the threat of nuclear war hanging over mankind. The speediest conclusion of a medium-range missiles agreement, the session noted, would open the way to Europe's full liberation from nuclear weapons. Every state in the continent can make a worthy contribution to this noble cause. Preventing the ray of hope which has brightly illumined the sky over Europe from being extinguished and clearing the cradle of human civilization of nuclear weapons -- that is the urgent requirement of the times.

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CSO: 5200/1403

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: COMMENTS ON FRENCH ATTITUDE TO POSSIBLE ACCORD

Officials Oppose Proposal

PM201409 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 11, 15 Mar 87 p 6

[Viktor Tsoppi article: "A Phrygian Cap Or A Little Red Riding Hood?"]

[Text] It is, of course, no use straining oneself trying to imagine what the situation would be today if General de Gaulle were still alive. We can only assume that he would have liked the formula of a peaceful, nuclear-free Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic which Moscow is proposing now. The great Frenchman thought at the level of world politics.

As far back as March 1959, the founder of the 5th Republic, which survived less than a year, ordered pulling the French Mediterranean Fleet from the NATO command. After that he banned the U.S. from deploying A-bombs and missile launchers in France.

The NATO allies frowned, were bewildered and indignant. U.S. politicians and the press branded De Gaulle's activities as "splitting." But the General acted. In September 1965 he clearly and honestly declared his intention "to get an end to our subjected situation called integration which is envisaged by NATO and which hands our fate into the hands of others.... We shall make sure that this organization would not deprive us of our freedom of action."

On February 21, 1966, Charles de Gaulle announced that France intended to restore her sovereignty, and had decided to leave the military organization of NATO. He demanded that all the bases, including 29 U.S. bases with 33,000 servicemen, HQs, airfields and arsenals--i.e., all the elements of the NATO military machine, not controlled by Paris--be removed from France. The French military units were withdrawn from the NATO armed forces.

This was De Gaulle's vision of the prospects of historical developments, which led to his trip to the USSR in the same 1966. He didn't see chances for strengthening peace without the participations of the USSR. And it led the General to his tense and all-embracing formula for security in Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals."

But the attitude to the problem in Paris today is, we must say, rather controversial. "The goal must be to avert the appearance of a nuclear-free Western Europe." That was how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted, just a few hours

later, to the proposal made by the USSR to rid Europe in five years' time of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles.

The paradox of this, essentially, anti-European stand taken by the leaders of a great European power is that, ever since De Gaulle's times, there are no U.S. weapons on its territory, including nuclear weapons. But it does have both on land and the sea quite a few missiles with nuclear warheads aimed at the USSR and other East European states. It was decided in Reykjavik to leave intact this rather dangerous nuclear attack arsenal, the same as the British nuclear missiles. Neither did Moscow mention it in its new proposal.

But Paris, which continues to improve and build up its nuclear weapons, came out against the proposal anyway. Already Bonn is for this, so is London and Rome, and all the other capitals are for the proposal, and news from Washington, including Reagan's statement, provide some hope that the very important first step for saving Europe would, after all, be made.

It took common sense several days to overcome inertia. President Mitterrand, vested with supreme responsibility for foreign policy declared that the new Soviet initiative "is in accord with the interests of France and peace," not forgetting to say that in his opinion, any reduction of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe should be "balanced, synchronous and controlled." And who is against this? It is notable that Jacques Chirac, the head of government of bourgeois parties, the partner-rival in "coexistence" of the socialist president, hurried to express his solidarity with Mitterrand.

So, has the ball really started rolling? Yes, it has. However, a lot still has to be done to rid Soviet-French relations of mistrust, misunderstanding and prejudice, and make them effective.

Several days ago Claude Malhuret, minister-delegate of the French Government for human rights, said: "The Soviet wolf is trying to pretend it is a kind of Granny." But we are used to treating Marianne wearing a Phrygian cap with respect rather than look at her as a scared Little Red Riding-Hood.

Raimond Remarks Hit

LD061342 Moscow TASS in English 1302 GMT 6 Apr 87

["Is France Against Nuclear Disarmament?" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow April 6 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev.

Whenever a prospect opens for the lowering of the level of military confrontation in Europe, whenever there are real hopes for the reduction of nuclear arsenals in Europe, the present French Government comes out with statements about its "special stand" of non-participation in talks, its actual refusal to help bring closer the stands of the sides on nuclear disarmament. Whenever there is an opportunity to hamper the advance towards the lessening of the danger of nuclear war, the same "special independent stand" of Paris results in stubborn opposition to any initiatives aimed at the stabilisation of the military-political situation in Europe.

A month ago the Foreign Ministry of France expressed "dissatisfaction" over the Soviet Union's proposal for the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. The French Foreign Ministry declared that its aim is to prevent the emergence of non-nuclear Europe. And now French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond, when interviewed by AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE pretended to know nothing about the Soviet Union's proposal on theatre missiles in Europe and actually supported the absurd proposals of hot heads in the Pentagon about transforming the U.S. Pershing-2 missiles into Pershing-1 missiles in return for the elimination of all Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe.

Trying to make himself sound more convincing, Raimond resorts to the terminology of chess and even recommends the U.S. Administration to ponder well before accepting the proposed gambit on medium-range missiles. The dangerous impasse that existed for long in the sphere of resolving the problem of nuclear arms reduction in Europe clearly suits the French foreign minister much more. It is also quite obvious, however, that Raimond's opening which envisages the preservation of U.S. "Pershings" in Europe might ultimately lead to the outcome unknown in the history of chess when both sides will turn out to be losers for nuclear war cannot be won.

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CSO: 5200/1403

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: COMMENTS ON WEST GERMAN DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE ACCORD

Kohl: 'Too Many If's'

LD222137 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 22 Mar 87

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Boris Kalyagin]

[Text] [Kalyagin] Tomorrow British Prime Minister Thatcher meets FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mitterrand. Some observers suppose she intends to speak in Moscow on behalf of the West European NATO partners. We have a few things yet to say about that visit, but we will start with a statement by the FRG Chancellor Kohl, which has aroused great interest.

A telebridge has linked us with Cologne. Our correspondent Vladimir Kondratyev is on the line.

[Kalyagin] Vladimir Petrovich, what did people in the FRG expect from the Chancellor's government statement, and to what extent have those expectations been justified?

[Kondratyev] On the eve of the statement a lot was written in the press to the effect that the chancellor should follow a certain signal, a positive signal, in the direction of Moscow. That was what was expected, above all. In the opinion of GENERAL ANZEIGER and other newspapers that signal was not made very loudly, nor audibly enough. The foreign policy part of the statement, which dealt with the problems which are now worrying the whole world, turned out to be strained, and I would say, tempered. However, that is a characteristic of Chancellor Kohl's personality. Kohl drew attention to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's words about a new way of thinking in international relations, but he himself is in no hurry to demonstrate such a way of thinking. There are too many ifs in his virtuoso passages. If the Soviet Union puts forward something more, if certain opportunities arise thereby, then we will make use of that, he said. That was roughly the leitmotiv of his utterances.

[Kalyagin] In his statement the chancellor spoke in favor of the rapid conclusion of an agreement on Euromissiles, that is, he spoke in favor of the elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Immediately he virtually spoke out against the elimination of nuclear weapons. How is that contradiction in his statement being explained?

[Kondratyev] Kohl's speech said unequivocally that there was no alternative to the so-called flexible-response strategy or for that strategy to be effective and convincing. The strategy of deterrence, Kohl said, also needs U.S. troops and arms in future.

The continuing military threat from the Warsaw Pact, its imaginary superiority, which allegedly gives it the capability of carrying out a sudden attack -- all those phrases, full of bitterness, which Kohl used, by no means bear witness to fundamental changes in the political course of official Bonn.

As far as the zero option is concerned, I think it would be appropriate to look at the news pictures to recall how that decision was adopted. In 1979 it was decided that 572 missiles would be sited [razmestit] on the territory of West European countries, including 180 Pershing missiles: [Video shows brief clips of archival film, showing Kohl at official meeting, and missile being positioned and launched.] The FRG accepted all those Pershings, and they are missiles with a very high degree of accuracy and a short flying time. Apart from that, the siting of Cruise missiles is in progress, a considerable number of which are also earmarked for the FRG. Now, when the opportunity really has emerged for eliminating medium-range weapons, those who were secretly hoping for the failure of talks on that problem have become very anxious and earnestly alarmed. But, as is known, words cannot be taken back [slovo nye vorobyey], especially when they are spoken by politicians. However hard Bonn politicians tried to wreck the agreement on medium-range missiles, after Reykjavik, straight after Reykjavik, with various extra complications and provisos, their position has turned out to be extremely unconvincing and wobbly. Moreover, their position has aroused a storm of indignation. Therefore, the government -- I have in mind, above all, the conservative part of it -- was finally forced to agree in principle with the Soviet Union's proposal.

[Kalyagin] In his statement the Chancellor talked about the unused opportunities for the development of Soviet-West German relations. Could you dwell on that issue in more detail?

[Kondratyev] In the chancellor's words those relations are of central significance for the FRG. The strengthening and deepening of them corresponds to the interests and wishes of people in both states. In that way we are assisting, the chancellor continued, mutual understanding between East and West, and we are strengthening peace in Europe.

The chancellor named a number of areas where those relations had the best prospects for development: the political, economic, and cultural fields. One can only welcome all that he said. But as is known, previously there was no particular shortage of statements about striving toward mutual understanding, but reality did not turn out to be quite so rosy.

[Kalyagin] Thank you, Cologne. Goodbye.

Bundestag Debate

PM231851 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Mar 87 First Edition p 6

[Yu. Yakhontov dispatch: "On the Debates in the FRG Bundestag"]

[Text] Bonn, 22 Mar--The last day of debate in the FRG Bundestag was given over to discussing the foreign policy section of the government statement by FRG Chancellor H. Kohl, and primarily disarmament issues.

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher noted in his speech that new prospects have opened up in East-West relations since Reykjavik, including in the

disarmament sphere. H. -D. Genscher spoke about FRG loyalty to "a policy of detente which must be realistic and have limits." In view of the changes taking place in the USSR's foreign and domestic policy, he continued, the West must show itself willing to cooperate, as this is also in its own interests.

The FRG foreign minister supported the proposal by H. Ehmke, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) parliamentary faction, who said in his speech that the West European countries must respond with their own initiative to the new course being pursued by the Soviet leadership headed by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The aim of the initiative is to ensure the continuation of the policy of detente, cooperation between East and West, and peaceful competition--without the use of force--between the two systems. According to H. Ehmke, the USSR's willingness to conclude a separate agreement on medium-range missiles opens a new chapter in international relations.

The stand taken by the extreme right wing of the conservative bloc was unequivocally expressed in the speech by A. Dregger, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU) parliamentary faction. On the one hand, he called for an arms reduction and spoke in favor of achieving a balance in this sphere at the lowest possible level and removing mutual distrust. He also spoke in favor of not stopping at disarmament in the medium-range missile sphere. He said that disarmament is also essential with regard to operational and tactical nuclear missiles and conventional arms. But, on the other hand, he believes that "partial nuclear disarmament" carries a "risk" if there is no reduction in conventional arms prior to this. The main thesis of the faction's chairman is that West Europe cannot be protected without nuclear arms as long as the Soviet Union has an advantage in conventional armed forces and arms.

A. Mechtersheimer, spokesman for the "Greens" Party and well known peace researcher, described the government statement as "a statement of old thinking." "The fact that a communist leader has been able to become the embodiment of people's hopes--people suffering from the arms burden--is a statement of the bankruptcy of the Western world," he noted.

Genscher Cited

LD021616 Moscow TASS in English 1507 GMT 2 Apr 87

[Text] Bonn, April 2 TASS--FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has again stressed the need for eliminating the Soviet and U.S. medium range missiles in Europe. In an interview with the DEUTSCHLANDFUNK radio today, he stressed that this measure is in the best interests of West Germany and Europe. The minister declared in favour of opening talks on tactical missiles right after the talks on medium range missiles.

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CSO: 5200/1403

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS REPORTS FRG-GDR TALKS ON INF, SRINF

PM021315 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 87 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Key Question"]

[Text] Berlin, 28 Mar -- E. Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, has received here W. Schaeuble, chief of the FRG Chancellery. There was an exchange of opinions on international questions, primarily on current issues of arms limitation and disarmament, as well as on questions of GDR-FRG relations.

The GDR leader stressed that safeguarding and strengthening peace is a key question in relations between the two German states. At a time of a tense international atmosphere, still more active efforts are needed to strengthen peace and avert the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. Both German states must promote a reduction in confrontation and the achievement of results in disarmament. The chances offered by Reykjavik must be grasped.

During the talk, considerable attention was devoted to what the two German states should do to effectively support M.S. Gorbachev's proposal to immediately conclude a separate agreement on eliminating all medium-range missiles in Europe. This, E. Honecker pointed out, would open up great opportunities for reducing the nuclear burden in Europe. In such a case the increased-range operational and tactical missiles sited in the GDR would be withdrawn.

Touching on GDR-FRG relations, E. Honecker said that they will make progress if both sides are guided by respect for sovereignty, equal rights, noninterference, a businesslike approach, and consideration of the other side's legitimate interests. There are many opportunities for doing this -- in the sphere of trade, the economy, environmental protection, science, technology, and culture, for instance.

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CSO: 5200/1403

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BRIEFS

SCIENTISTS MEETING IN GENEVA--Geneva March 31 TASS--A meeting of scientific and technical experts of the states participating in the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons has opened here today. The experts will consider exchanges of information as a measure of building trust, increasing the prestige of the convention and broadening international cooperation. The meeting will close on April 15. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1741 GMT 31 Mar 87 LD]

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CSO: 5200/1405

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ON EUROPEAN ISSUES

LD040929 [Editorial Report] Prague Domestic Service in Czech at 1425 GMT on 3 April 1987 broadcasts the weekly "People and the World" program, introduced by an unidentified presenter with interviews from the USSR by correspondents Stefan Simak and Petr Lukes. Beginning the 25-minute program, which is to be devoted in part to the "present and future of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations," the presenter introduces Vadim Loginov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, and asks him to speak on the occasion of the upcoming visit to CPSU General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev to the CSSR.

Speaking in Russian fading into superimposed Czech translation, Loginov says: "During the recent period since the April 1985 Plenum of the party's Central Committee, contacts between leading officials of our parties, states, and governments have become of a markedly regular nature. I can cite the visit by Comrade Husak to Moscow, and numerous meetings, both bilateral and with wider participation of leading representatives of our fraternal parties and states. These meetings will continue, and of great importance in this regard is the time when these talks will take place.

"It is an exceptionally extraordinary international situation in which the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact member states, are taking basic steps toward the positions of the West with the intention of finally mobilizing the process of real disarmament, in particular in Europe, where the largest amount of arms is concentrated -- both conventional and nuclear and chemical -- as well as the largest number of armies.

"Czechoslovakia is in the geographical center of Europe. Last September I stood next to a stone on which it is engraved that this is the center of Europe. It is not far from Frantiskovy Lazne if I am not mistaken. This very fact of fate itself compels us to speak about European affairs, about possible measures in which we would develop our joint initiatives aimed at weakening military confrontation in Europe. There is much to talk about, even concerning the further development of our cooperation, bilateral contacts in economics, in science, technology, culture and education. We have had many successes, but even more potential. The scientific, technical and economic potential of both our countries, highly developed in the scientific and technical and economic area, could be made use of much more effectively for the benefit of our own and your country. We are firmly convinced of this. This also will have to be a subject of talks.

"We are very interested in experiences gathered by our Czechoslovak friends in all areas of the economy, the life of society, the development of the democratic process. It is therefore possible to say with confidence that the program on which Czechoslovak comrades are now working, naturally also with regard to the wishes of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, will no doubt include not only official talks, but visits to a

whole number of work collectives, industrial enterprises, agricultural workplaces, whether cooperatives or state farms, and possibly also other towns. What is being planned is simply an extensive visit on many levels. We expect that its result will be a new stimulus to the comprehensive development of our contacts, which have been developing well up to now, but must develop even more dynamically in all areas -- political, economic and cultural-- in concrete contacts between the citizens of our countries."

The program then turns to the area of cooperation in science, with an interview given by CEMA Secretary Vyacheslav Sychev. He praises Czechoslovak activity in the complex program of the socialist community. Czechoslovakia takes part in solving about 95 percent of problems of the program and has entered into about 50 international agreements within the program's framework. About 370 Czechoslovak organizations are involved in cooperation among CEMA member states, he adds.

The studio presenter continues: "Our Moscow correspondent Stefan Simak asked Vadim Loginov two questions: the first concerning the proposal by Czechoslovakia and the GDR on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe; the second asking how Loginov evaluates the cooperation of Warsaw Pact member states in realizing the Budapest appeal."

Loginov replies: "I will say right at the beginning that the first and second questions are extremely important. Both were the topic of talks at the just completed session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' Committee. The initiative of Czechoslovakia and the GDR, and I would say in fact two initiatives -- one concerns the nuclear-free corridor, and the second a chemical weapon-free zone -- has the unconditional support of not only the Soviet Union, but also all states of the Warsaw Pact and generally of a large number of other European governments. You know that even the late Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme received this idea with enthusiasm. In government circles and, in particular, among the public it also enjoys wide support. It will, it appears, be necessary to more actively gain the support of the government in Bonn so that it also shows a more stimulating approach. So far it looks as if the West German Social Democrats have taken up an open and positive attitude and even cooperate with you and comrades from the GDR on this subject; but the government is avoiding the problem. It is clearly time for wide political circles of the West German public to become actively involved and bring both Bonn and, naturally, also Washington to a more active policy, because there is also a number of U.S. weapons in the relevant area.

"As far as we are concerned, we not only support this idea but we naturally are prepared to take practical steps for its realization on the basis of reciprocity, however. You are informed about our statement that we are willing, immediately after entering into an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe, to undertake the liquidation of increased range operational and tactical missiles that are sited within the frameworks of agreements with your government and with the GDR Government on the territory of Czechoslovakia and the GDR. We do not have the least interest in leaving these missiles there, because they were placed there after NATO installed Pershing-2 and cruise missiles. Then we made it known in a statement by Comrade Gorbachev on 27 February, and very clearly, that we also will undertake immediately talks on the reduction and removal of operationally tactical missiles in this area. These, then, are completely practical measures on how to reduce the level of immediate confrontation in the zone of contact of troops of the two groups, the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

"The second question concerns conventional weapons and arms forces in Europe, including central Europe. You know that there exists a collective initiative formulated in the appeal of the Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Pact political Consultative Committee, addressed to the NATO member states and all European countries. Our states in the near future are willing to undertake a great reduction -- let us say about 150,000 men on each side -- the reduction of the number of tactical air forces; and some time in the nineties the number should fall by more than 1 million soldiers and officers on both sides. This is no small number for Europe or even just central Europe. I would like to point out that in this program it is stated that the first armies to be reduced would be those that are sited directly on the line of contact. Contained in it was also a proposal suggesting that there should be simultaneous talks about the reduction of the number of operationally tactical missiles. This proposal, then, is on the table, and our allies energetically are putting it forward.

"You no doubt know that the Warsaw Pact proposed a meeting of both commanders in chief, but General Rogers did not agree. Perhaps he was a little frightened; I do not know. But who better than they to evaluate the problem of the number of armed forces? Then there was a proposal of a meeting of general secretaries of both pacts, Lord Carrington and Minister of State Krolikowski; that is Krolikowski made this proposal. Carrington declined.

Simply it was a sort of game of hide-and-seek. Finally, in the end there was success when the NATO parties agreed to consultations with the Warsaw Pact member states, and these consultations are now taking place in Vienna. What is taking place there is the process of the mandate for future talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, in the geographical area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. For the moment what is taking place is what I would call a mutual testing of each others' positions, but gradually criteria are being outlined on which a framework of talks could be founded. There are disagreements here. The Warsaw Pact member states would prefer these talks to take place within the framework of an all-European process, for example, at a Stockholm-2 conference. Naturally it is not important where this conference would take place, but we are intentionally calling it Stockholm-2. What should be discussed there is not only the degree of trust, but also the question of disarmament, because this also corresponds to the Madrid mandate.

"The representatives of NATO, on the contrary, wish the talks to be with the participation of 23 countries, that is NATO and Warsaw Pact member states. Many neutral and nonaligned nations naturally are not happy with this, and this is why we at the Foreign Ministers' Committee once again with all official emphasis stressed in the document that in our opinion representatives of neutral and nonaligned countries should take part in such talks.

"This does not just depend on us, however. The main goal despite all this remains the reduction of arms and armed forces in Europe. At which forum this problem will be solved in the final analysis is not important for European nations. But to remove the right from anyone to take part in such talks is in our opinion not just. That is how I would answer the second question."

Following a musical interlude the program turns to economic relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, with an interview with the director general of a Moscow agricultural combine. He praised the contacts with Czechoslovak enterprises and their experiences, which have been useful in Moscow.

Vadim Loginov also was asked his view about new possibilities of cooperation. He pointed out that the new possibilities of direct contacts between individual enterprises have the potential to give great results. He pointed out that the new possibilities of direct contacts between individual enterprises have the potential to give great results, and spoke about such cooperation between a Soviet and Bulgarian enterprise where these results are already taking place. Possibilities are now much greater than they were even 6 months ago, he says.

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CSO: 5200/1411

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: NATO-WARSAW PACT 'UNOFFICIAL CONSULTATIONS' IN VIENNA

23 March Meeting

LD231429 Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT 23 Mar 87

[Text] Vienna March 23 TASS -- Regular unofficial consultations between representatives of Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries on questions of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe were held here today.

30 March Meeting

LD301323 Moscow TASS in English 1315 GMT 30 Mar 87

[Text] Vienna March 30 TASS -- A regular meeting was held here today within the framework of unofficial consultations of representatives of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member countries on the problem of the reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

A Soviet delegation called the attention of the meeting on the results of the session of the foreign ministers' committee of the Warsaw Treaty member countries held in Moscow. The urgent need was emphasized for working to bring down the level of military confrontation in Europe by means of reciprocal stage-by-stage and substantial reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments. In the opinion of the Soviet side, the consultations started here should promote the passing over to concrete talks on disarmament in Europe on an all-European basis.

6 April Meeting

LD061136 Moscow TASS in English 1109 GMT 6 Apr 87

[Text] Vienna April 6 TASS -- Another meeting took place here today in the framework of unofficial consultations of representatives of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO Countries on cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

Representatives of socialist countries in their statements evaluated the work done so far and voiced considerations about possible ways of making the consultations more efficient. They subjected to well-argued criticism of the "military superiority" of Warsaw Treaty countries on which the NATO representative insist. [sentence as received]

It was agreed that the consultations will resume in early May after a recess in the work of the Vienna followup meeting of representatives of the states taking part in the conference on security and cooperation in Europe.

Moscow: 'Cautious Optimism'

LD071430 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 7 Apr 87

[Text] Representatives of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries have held unofficial consultations in Vienna on the problem of reducing the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. The meetings will now resume in May. Here is what Radio Moscow commentator Aleksandr Pogodin writes:

The problem of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe seems to have acquired a rather strange character. For many years NATO has been saying that the Warsaw Treaty countries have a superiority in the field. But even if that was so, the more reason there would be for talks between the two blocks to lower the level of military confrontation between them on the basis of equal security. And that was what the Warsaw Treaty countries had been repeatedly suggesting but had failed to find any response. That includes last year's proposal on a substantial reduction of the armed forces and conventional arms on a territory from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Today, when there is a sufficiently real prospect of eliminating Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, the problem has become even more acute. The West claims that the elimination of the Euromissiles would leave NATO absolutely defenseless before a so-called Soviet tank threat. And of course nothing is said about the fact that NATO has the superiority in bombers, antitank defense weapons, and certain other arms. Nor is it mentioned that the superiority of the sides in one or another field actually evens them out as military specialists believe. In other words there is a parity in the field of conventional arms between the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries. The Warsaw Treaty countries believe that when there is an inequality in some elements of conventional arms, it is necessary to even out the situation through corresponding reductions. The stage by stage reduction of military confrontation in Europe should be constantly based on an ever lower balance between the sides. Are the NATO countries prepared to follow that only realistic way? After the first series of consultations they expressed cautious optimism. Well, we'll now have to see what the new meetings in Vienna will bring.

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CSO: 5200/1411

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

TASS: NATO SAID TO 'DELIBERATELY INFLATE' PACT STRENGTH

PMO21529 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Apr 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Deliberate Distortions"]

[Text] London, 31 Mar -- NATO experts deliberately inflate figures on the quantity of conventional arms and the numerical strength of the USSR Armed Forces and those of other Warsaw Pact countries. This is the conclusion drawn by the authors of a report on the correlation of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces, released here by Bradford University.

"Differences in the numerical strength of the two military-political groupings' armed forces are insignificant, and there can be no question of any massive Warsaw Pact superiority," Lutz Unterseer, a West German expert on military questions, emphasizes in the report entitled "Conventional Ground Forces in Central Europe -- An assessment of the Threat."

The report "The Myth of Soviet Military Superiority," prepared by British researcher Andrew Kelly, points out in particular that when counting the strength of Warsaw Pact and NATO states' armed forces, NATO experts often "overlook" the armed forces of states like France and Spain.

At the same time, the very same report cites data according to which it is NATO countries that enjoy substantial advantages in terms of a whole range of arms, such as aerial bombs. Commenting on his report, A. Kelly told REUTER: "We conducted this research because the imbalance in the correlation of conventional arms is used as a basis for the nuclear policy being elaborated by the West. We believe that the assessment of the threat (from the East -- TASS note) is exaggerated. Hence the West could move toward the creation of a defense geared to a lesser extent to nuclear arms."

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CSO: 5200/1411

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: NATO STANCE ON CDE NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS HIT

PM310917 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 87 Second Edition p 3

[Colonel L. Levadov article: "Wary Start"]

[Text] This is the 3d month that military activity in Europe has been significantly regulated by the provisions of the final document of the Stockholm Conference. The accords reached in the Swedish capital were a major step toward easing tension and improving the political climate on the continent.

The measures worked out at the conference encompass, as is well known, a wider spectrum of military activity than those implemented in accordance with the Final Act of the all-European conference. Whereas previously notification of forthcoming ground force exercises was issued 21 days in advance and was applied to exercises involving over 25,000 men, now notification is issued 42 days in advance and applies to exercises involving more than 13,000 men or 300 tanks. This also applies to transfers of ground forces. Notification must also be given for exercises involving amphibious or airborne assault troops if the number of personnel directly participating in the seaborne or airborne assault reaches 3,000.

Observers must be invited to all types of notifiable military activity if more than 17,000 men are participating in exercises or ground force transfer, or if more than 5,000 men are involved in a parachute drop or amphibious assault.

Agreement was reached on allowing up to three inspections per year on the territory of each state in the zone where confidence-building and security measures are in force. Certain other commitments were agreed.

An important role is played by a new confidence-building measure--the exchange of annual plans for notifiable military activity, which will undoubtedly help to eradicate suspicion in relations among the all-European conference participant states.

Just what have been the first results of the practical implementation of the Stockholm Conference decisions?

Demonstrating a serious and responsible approach, the socialist countries are conscientiously and scrupulously fulfilling all the provisions of the final document. They submitted detailed plans for notifiable military activity in 1987 within the precise schedule laid down and strictly in accordance with the proposed form.

Regrettably, not everyone was prepared for the precise fulfillment of adopted commitments. In particular, the United States and certain other countries were late in presenting their plans for notifiable military activity in 1987. And Canada, Portugal, and Italy did not present other states at all with either plans or reports that they would not be holding any notifiable military activity in 1987.

In late January West German soil was unexpectedly shaken by the rumble of tanks. It transpired that this was a major exercise--codenamed "Caravan Guard"--by the U.S. 5th Army Corps. Hiding behind the fact that the Stockholm accord came into force on 1 January 1987 and that formally there was no need to give notification of exercises for 42 days, the U.S. command not only failed to invite observers to the exercise, but even provided no prior notification of it, although there were 23,000 troops participating in the exercise.

According to the West German magazine DER SPIEGEL, the United States refused to show good will even after an official appeal on the subject from FRG Foreign Minister H. -D. Genscher (incidentally, as a country whose territory is used for military activity, the FRG should also have been notified about the exercise). Furthermore, the possibility should not be discounted that even the closest ally does not enjoy the U.S. generals' confidence, seeing that they decided to rehearse their combat tasks with no peering outsiders present.

Czechoslovakia too was formally entitled not to give prior notification, 42 days in advance, of the Czechoslovak People's Army exercise held in early February. However, it did not follow the U.S. example. Guided by the spirit of the final document and showing a sincere desire to strengthen confidence and security in Europe, the CSSR included this exercise in the plan of notifiable military activity and duly gave prior notification about the exercise to all countries participating in the all-European conference. According to the replies received from the observers who were invited, all the necessary conditions stipulated by the document were created for their work. They were able to follow the most important points of the exercise and to talk with participants in it.

It is also striking that the NATO countries are keen to interpret individual provisions of the Stockholm document in an advantageous light and to exploit the opportunities presented to them for purely intelligence purposes. Such attempts can hardly promote the confidence that has been lacking in Europe for so long.

Implementation of the accords approved by the conference on confidence- and security-building and disarmament in Europe has only just begun. However, the disparaging attitude adopted by certain NATO countries to their commitments puts us on our guard. It can only increase the other side's distrust.

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

IZVESTIYA ASSAILS U.S. 'CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE INITIATIVE'

PM070907 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 5

[L. Semeyko article: "Pentagon's 'Threesome'; Washington Organizing New Round of Arms Race" -- Passages within slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] Washington continues to spew forth a stream of "defense initiatives." The "strategic" initiative has been followed -- not without the participation of certain NATO allies -- by the "European" initiative, and quite recently by the "conventional" initiative. Whereas a great deal has already been said about SDI and a few things have been said about Euro-SDI -- That is, the plans to create a combined anti-air and antimissile shield for Western Europe -- the Conventional Defense Initiative [CDI] is still clearly a novelty for many people. Therefore we will turn immediately to its essence: It is a question of a program for the large-scale modernization of conventional (that is, nonnuclear) U.S. arms and the introduction of state-of-the-art technical achievements into the arsenal of warplanes, tanks, artillery, and so forth.

"The Conventional Defense Initiative is an effort in this direction," Weinberger has stated. "The initiative makes it possible to use the (NATO) alliance's technical superiority to eradicate important gaps and shortcomings in our conventional force potential." In other words, it is by all accounts a question of an urgent change of course toward a qualitative conventional arms race.

The following questions arise: Why for the umpteenth time has the United States brought the concept of the accelerated modernization of conventional forces to the forefront? Why are they being particularly stressed now in particular, after Reykjavik? The answers to these questions will clearly have to be sought in the attempts to play "U.S.-style" on the relationship between nuclear and conventional arms, and between these arms and space arms. To play on it in such a way as to compensate for the arms race being reversed in one of its directions (while the chance still exists!) by taking an immediate leap forward in another direction, and ultimately to prevent real disarmament.

For both the USSR and the United States, Reykjavik marked a movement toward new landmarks in approaches to nuclear disarmament. There can no longer be a return to previous recipes. But after the meeting in the Icelandic capital it became obvious that the United States wanted not only to retain a substantial proportion of its nuclear potential by the end of the century, but also to combine it with the active buildup of its nonnuclear potential and the creation of a space-based ABM system.

Making the Western public accept this "threesome" was not so simple. That is why the United States, with the support of the allies, is seeking an appropriately "flexible" argument. They are attempting to persuade the public that, due to the possible drop in the level of nuclear confrontation or even the possible elimination of nuclear weapons, the importance of the correlation between the sides' conventional forces has grown considerably. And this correlation, they claim, does not favor NATO. Hence the need for the urgent implementation of all the "initiatives" -- CDI, Euro-SDI, and, of course, SDI.

The philosophy behind this presentation is full of contradictions, since it is founded on old-fashioned militarist thinking and, moreover, on distorted realities.

/First./ U.S. leaders and their NATO comrades in arms claim that Western security must rest on the "curbing" [sderzhivaniye] (or more accurately "deterrence" [ustrasheniye] of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization not only with nuclear weapons, but with conventional weapons, too. The East, they say, has "superiority" in the might of its conventional forces and conventional arms. "The deterrence [sderzhivaniye] effect," Pentagon men argue, is lost when the Warsaw Pact Organization has an approximate "twofold" advantage in tanks and warplanes, and a "threefold" advantage in artillery, infantry combat vehicles, and so forth. We will go on to examine these figures -- they are groundless. Now let us turn to another of Weinberger's statements: Despite these advantages, he stated in Congress, "we consider it unlikely that the Soviets will conclude that their advantages are sufficient to attain their military-political goals in the time they would need." But if that is so, why get alarmed and hatch a dangerous multibillion-dollar race under the CDI banner?

Such a race is really dangerous. If current conventional arms were used in a war the consequences would be truly catastrophic. According to West Germany's Bundeswehr, for instance, a 20-day "conventional" war in Europe would be equivalent in terms of its destructive consequences to a 5-day war using tactical nuclear weapons. So why increase manyfold the probability of the catastrophic consequences of a conventional war through a qualitative arms race at a time -- and this is the main thing -- when, even the Pentagon admits, there is little likelihood of "Soviet aggression"? There is no logic to it.

/Second./ Weinberger cites "appalling" figures about the balance of conventional forces, but in so doing falls into another trap of logic. "The conclusion about the effectiveness of our deterrent potential," he stated, "will be made by our enemies, not by us." (We, of course, are the main "enemy.") Let us look at the essence of what he said: The way that U.S. combat potential in relation to the balance of the sides' armed forces is ultimately assessed will allegedly depend on the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union recognizes that military-strategic equilibrium exists between these forces. Consequently, Weinberger should seemingly be reassured about his own "deterrent potential," all the more so since our assessment of the balance of forces is soundly based. Equilibrium was arrived at by taking account of a number of factors, including numbers of arms. Certain arms -- artillery, for instance -- are held in virtually identical numbers by the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO; the Warsaw Pact has more of certain arms while NATO has more of others, but on the whole the combat potential of the sides' armed forces groupings is approximately equal. Being "startled" about certain individual advantages on either side and basing a policy on them would be simply dishonest. But, objectively speaking, it is possible to play the "numbers game" -- trying to prove the socialist countries; "superiority" in

conventional arms -- until the cows come home. That is why the USSR is proposing a new approach. This is how M.S. Gorbachev put it: "Let us look at all this in a new way: Let the West make relevant cuts in those arms which it has more of, and we will unhesitatingly eliminate the 'surplus' in those areas where we have more arms. In other words: Let us seek a balance at a reduced level."

However, Washington failed to react to this appeal. It does not favor cutting mutual "surpluses," but instead advocates building up its own so as to obtain military advantage. "The program to modernize our nonnuclear potential," Weinberger claims, "allows us to use our technical achievements in order to derive the greatest advantage from them."

/Third./ Weinberger also contradicts himself in his approach to the relationship between nuclear and conventional arms. On the one hand, he stated in JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY that the United States "should maintain a strong (!) nuclear potential which will continue to be the most important means of preventing a conventional attack." [paragraph continues]

While on the other hand he stated, admittedly in Congress, that "since the Soviet Union has acquired a nuclear potential that is at least as formidable as ours, confidence in retaliatory nuclear strikes for preventing a nonnuclear attack has been undermined."

Excuse me, but this is a clear case of sleight of hand. How can "retaliatory" nuclear strikes prevent a nonnuclear attack?! It is also meaningless because, if, according to Weinberger, confidence in the ability to use nuclear weapons has been "undermined," why retain them? Why pin hope on them? Would it not be better for both sides to cut down the terrible "surpluses" in their military potentials, as the Soviet Union urges?

The Pentagon leader arrived at a different conclusion. He favors modernizing strategic and regional nuclear potential (the corresponding plans now include turning Pershing 2's into shorter-range missiles -- just so long as they can be left in Europe). He advocates expediting the SDI program. He advocates starting to develop [razrabotka] a West European ABM system. Finally, the Pentagon chief advocates CDI -- the creation [sozdaniye] of conventional weapons models and systems, which, one can assume, with the help of "new-potential technology" would surpass current cluster weapons, "vacuum bombs," and phosphorus munitions in terms of their destructive qualities. In other words, they would approximate even more closely the effectiveness of tactical nuclear munitions, and would possibly even be on a par with them.

The Pentagon's new "initiative" is the latest attempt to retain military force as an effective policy tool in the next century. This is essentially the response to the Warsaw Pact countries' Budapest appeal for armed forces and conventional arms reductions in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. But it is not the response which the peoples of Europe and the world expected from America and its allies after Reykjavik.

The solution to the problem of survival lies not merely in removing the nuclear and space threat. It also lies in radically reducing armed forces and conventional arms, first and foremost on the European continent. It is a most important task to substantially reduce all the European states' ground force components and tactical strike aircraft and the corresponding U.S. and Canadian forces sited in Europe in the very near future.

The best forum for working out corresponding disarmament measures would be the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe,

whose second stage (Stockholm II) lies ahead. The general thrust of its work in ensuring a phased reduction in the level of military confrontation in Europe is exceptionally important. The participants in the latest (24-25 March 1987) session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee stressed that it is necessary to maintain military equilibrium at lower and lower levels; where inequalities exist in certain elements, it is necessary to equalize the situation with corresponding cuts. This approach differs from NATO's approach of achieving "equalization" through arms upgrading.

It is still difficult to forecast the ultimate results of the Vienna meeting, where the "Stockholm II" mandate is currently being drawn up, as is the course and outcome of the further struggle on security and disarmament issues. But it can be said with confidence that the CDI banner raised by Weinberger will probably not promote a real reduction in the combat potential of conventional forces on our continent.

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CSO: 5200/1411

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: CONGRESSMAN URGES U.S. TO JOIN NUCLEAR MORATORIUM

PM301130 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 28 Mar 87 p 3

[TASS report: "Accords With Common Interests"]

[Text] New York, 27 Mar--The introduction by the United States and the Soviet Union of a mutual, verifiable [poddayushchiysya proverke] moratorium on nuclear tests would accord with American security interests. Thomas Downey, member of the House of Representatives of Congress, points this out in an article carried in NEWSDAY Thursday.

The congressman recalls that on 26 February the Soviet Union was forced to end its 18-month unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions because the United States had continued its test program all that time.

"A verifiable [poddayushchiysya proverke] total nuclear test ban treaty," the congressman writes, "accords with the United States' best interests. Nevertheless, the Reagan administration is endeavoring to scuttle what the five previous U.S. administrations saw as of fundamental significance for our national security."

The congressman resolutely rejects the "arguments" with which the Reagan administration seeks to justify its stubborn refusal to end nuclear explosions, including its claim that the safety of the U.S. nuclear arsenal depends on regular tests. The problem of inspection [proverka] is no longer an obstacle to concluding a moratorium, he writes, and the administration knows that perfectly well. The Soviet Union is prepared to agree to the placing of monitoring stations on its territory and to the holding of on-site inspections [inspektsii na mestakh]. Last May the USSR demonstrated the earnestness of its intentions when an agreement was concluded between the Natural Resources Defense Council and the USSR Academy of Sciences, which enabled American seismologists to install and use their equipment around the Soviet test site in Kazakhstan.

"In 1968," Downey continues, "the United States signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, in which it confirmed its desire to prevent the spread of nuclear arms. Since 1968 the United States has detonated 316 nuclear devices--which hardly gives other countries a stimulus to stop their nuclear programs. A mutual, verifiable [poddayushchiysya proverke] moratorium on nuclear explosions

by the United States and the USSR would be a signal that our country takes seriously its pledge to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

Numerous public opinion polls show that Americans support a moratorium on nuclear tests because it is achievable, is verifiable [poddayetsya proverke], and accords with our security interests, the congressman concludes.

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CSO: 5200/1408

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS NOTES U.S., JAPAN SECRET NUCLEAR ACCORD

LD061228 Moscow TASS in English 1111 GMT 6 Apr 87

[Text] Tokyo April 6 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vasiliy Golovnin reports:

Washington and Tokyo keep in secret archives the texts of the so-called confidential arrangements of 1960 on introducing clandestinely U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan, about the existence of which there has been no knowledge until recently, Rear Admiral (retired) Gene Larocque, director of the U.S. Centre for Defense Information, told the newspaper 'AKAHATA'.

He emphasized that he intended to resort to legal procedures to force the Reagan administration to make public these agreements which openly violate the official ban on introducing nuclear weapons in effect in Japan.

Late last week, representatives of the Communist Party made public a directive by U.S. State Secretary Dean Rusk of February 24, 1966, addressed to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. The directive, stamped as top secret, bluntly speaks of the existence of confidential accords, concluded six years earlier, on an unimpeded delivery of U.S. nuclear weapons to Japan.

The directive also instructed the embassy to prevent by any means the U.S. Far-Eastern ally from supporting the USSR's proposal for the non-use of nuclear weapons against those non-nuclear countries which refuse to deploy them in their territories.

The press points out that the directive became the first documentary evidence of the fact that Washington and Tokyo have deliberately deceived the public for almost 30 years and violated the ban on the introduction of mass annihilation systems to Japan, blocking the conclusion of effective agreements on averting the risk of war.

The U.S. Embassy in Japan today failed either to disprove or certify the very fact of the existence of Rusk's secret directive. Replying to a question by the TASS correspondent, a staffer of the Embassy Information Department said only that he was not authorized to make statements on some or other official telegrams coming in from Washington.

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CSO: 5200/1408

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET COMMENTATOR VIEWS CAMPAIGN FOR NORDIC NFZ

PM031159 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 1 Apr 87 p 3

["Commentator's Opinion" by Sergey Astakhov: "For a Nuclear-Free North"]

[Text] The Reykjavik meeting of the foreign ministers of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, and Sweden ended with a decision to set up a joint working group of experts to study the prerequisites for establishing a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. The results of the group's work will form the basis of future political assessments and actions.

For several decades now broad strata of the population in the Scandinavian countries have been waging a struggle for the creation of a nuclear-free zone there. Recently this movement has markedly stepped by its activity under the influence of the Soviet Union's wide-ranging initiatives on disarmament and, in particular, since the Reykjavik meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan, which gave the peoples of the world new hope that the elimination of nuclear weapons is something entirely realistic and feasible. According to Finnish President M. Koivisto, the creation of a nuclear-free zone would contribute to strengthening the atmosphere of trust and make it possible to rule out speculation about the use of nuclear weapons in the region.

It must be said that despite overt opposition from Atlanticists, the plan for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe has won broad support. The credit for this goes to the mass peace movements in the Scandinavian countries, such as "Spring of Peace" in Helsinki, the North European "Treaty Now" organization, and others, and also the backing given to the idea by Scandinavian trade unions. The measures adopted by the USSR Government on dismantling the medium-range missile launch installations on the Kola Peninsula and the majority of the installations in the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts also had a beneficial influence on this.

The peoples of Northern Europe are increasingly taken with the idea that the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the region will be a major contribution to safeguarding the security of the European Continent. Despite all the obstacles, the peoples of the Scandinavian countries are fully resolved to bring their struggle to create a nuclear-free zone to a victorious conclusion.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: GDR, CSSR PROPOSE FRG NUCLEAR-FREE CORRIDOR

Berlin, Prague Reports

PM071353 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS reports: "To Start Talks"]

[Text] Berlin, 4 Apr -- Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, has made a proposal to FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl on starting talks on creating a corridor free from nuclear weapons in Central Europe.

Both German states, the GDR leader's message says, must see it as their special task to actively contribute to the realization of the prospect of the creation of a nuclear-free world outlined at the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik. The elimination of all nuclear weapon stocks on both sides of the dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in central Europe would result in the easing of confrontation between the two military-political alliances and the strengthening of trust and of the security of all the states affected by this step and their neighbors and allies. The document points out that the creation of a corridor would be a real contribution to the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Prague, 4 Apr -- The Czechoslovak Government is proposing to the FRG Government that talks begin immediately on the creation of a corridor free from nuclear weapons in central Europe. So says a letter from CSSR Premier Lubomir Strougal to FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

The Reykjavik meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United States raised the issue of nuclear weapons to a qualitatively new level. It is the question of eliminating nuclear arsenals in Europe that has been brought to the forefront.

The significance of a corridor free from nuclear weapons has increased in connection with the USSR's proposal on eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. The CSSR sees its creation as a possible way of contributing through joint efforts to the elimination of nuclear weapons in central Europe and the safeguarding of peace and security. The corridor would extend width-wise for 150 km on both sides the dividing line between the states in question. At the next stage it is intended to extend the corridor to cover the whole of the central European region.

'Important Foreign Policy Initiative'

LD042116 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 4 Apr 87

[Text] The GDR and CSSR have put forward an important foreign policy initiative, by proposing to the FRG talks on the creation in central Europe of a corridor free of nuclear weapons. The proposal is contained in a message from Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, and Strougal, chairman of the CSSR government, to FRG Federal Chancellor Kohl. Over to our commentator Vladimir Pashko:

[Pashko] The fraternal countries are stepping up their efforts to see the implementation of the idea of a non-nuclear world, put forward by them a year ago. As follows from the message by Comrade Strougal, in the given specific instance we are talking about a strip about 300 km wide along the frontier line separating the FRG from the GDR and Czechoslovakia which would be cleared of all systems of nuclear weapons, with a subsequent extension of the corridor's range to take in the entire central European region.

It would be hard to overestimate the significance of this proposal. Its implementation would be an effective measure to strengthen confidence in Europe, and would facilitate a general consolidation of the regime of nuclear arms nonproliferation. I should note that the first mention of the idea of creating a non-nuclear corridor in Central Europe was made by the Palme Commission -- an independent commission on disarmament and security issues which unites prominent state and public figures from various countries. The idea was taken up. In March 1986 the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee spoke out in favor of it.

This was reflected in the subsequent appeal by the fraternal countries to European states, the United States and Canada on the creation of a non-nuclear zone in Europe. The leadership of the GDR and the West German SPD took upon themselves the task of drawing up the principles of the creation of a non-nuclear corridor. In October of last year the principles were introduced for public judgement. The proposals of the GDR and Czechoslovakia to the FRG to embark on specific talks on the creation of a non-nuclear corridor is not only topical, but very timely. For it falls on the exceptionally fertile soil created by the Soviet proposal to conclude urgently a separate agreement on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. As is known, the Soviet initiative has been widely supported by the Western Europeans, including West Germans. It is likewise quite obvious that the creation of a non-nuclear corridor would, in turn, substantially facilitate the holding of talks on the reduction and elimination of operational and tactical missiles, and would accelerate the resolving of the issue of reducing the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. In recent times not a little has been said by the FRG leadership about the desire to reduce the military confrontation in Europe and eliminate nuclear weapons on the continent. The proposal of the socialist countries opens up a great opportunity to attain these goals.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

READINESS TO HALT NUCLEAR TESTS--West Berlin April 3 TASS--The campaign against the threat of a nuclear war is the main task of the organization International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, said U.S. Professor Bernard Lown, co-chairman of the organization. Addressing a meeting sponsored by the West Berlin Association of Physicians, he said that the Soviet Union, declaring a unilateral moratorium on any nuclear explosions, made its utmost to prevent the dangerous development of the international situation and to start a process of normalizing Soviet-American relations. Academician Mikhail Kuzmin, chairman of the Soviet section of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, confirmed the USSR's readiness to resume at any time the moratorium if the United States stops nuclear testing. M. Kuzmin said that the acceptance of the Soviet proposal on liquidating Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe could be an important step on the way to disarmament. [Text]
[Moscow TASS in English 1918 GMT 3 Apr 87 LD]

3 APRIL SEMIPALATINSK TEST--Moscow April 3 TASS--The Soviet Union conducted an underground nuclear explosion within the range of 20 to 150 kilotons at the test site in the Semipalatinsk region today, April 3, 1987, at 5:20 Moscow time. The test was carried out with a view to perfecting military technology.
[Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0158 GMT 3 Apr 87 ID]

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