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JAPAN-U.S. SDI TALKS END WITHOUT AGREEMENT

OW160511 Tokyo KYODO in English 0503 GMT 16 Jun 87

[Text] Washington, June 15 KYODO -- A fourth round of working-level negotiations between Japan and the United States on Japan's participation in the research phase of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ended Tuesday without an agreement.

"Though we have made progress in all aspects, details that we should discuss further in Tokyo remain," said Makoto Watanabe, councillor for the North American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. Watanabe told reporters that European firms have contracts with the U.S. concerning the SDI research project, and Japan must conclude negotiations soon to enable Japanese private firms to also participate.

Sources said discussions in the two-week meeting covered problems concerning the ownership of patents developed from the joint research on the space-based missile defense project and the protection of secrecy involving the research results.

The countries have been discussing how Japan would join in the research phase of the SDI since the Japanese Government decided to participate in the venture last October.

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C SO: 5260/111

JAPAN, U.S. REACH AGREEMENT ON SDI PARTICIPATION

OW050915 Tokyo KYODO in English 0841 GMT 5 Jul 87

[Text] Tokyo, July 5 KYODO -- Japan and the United States have reached agreement on Japanese private sector participation in the U.S.'s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as Star Wars, government sources said Sunday. Japanese ambassador to the United States Nobuo Matsunaga and U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger are to sign the agreement allowing Japanese firms to participate in the research phase of SDI in Washington on July 14 at the earliest or as late as July 17, the sources said.

The agreement comprises four parts. The first, an official note on the agreement, will be the only document made public. Three other documents will remain classified -- a memo will detail the agreement, a third document will specify particulars and a fourth will contain supplementary details.

The official note will specify that Japanese companies will have the right to use the technology developed under the research phase of SDI, but the license for the technology in principle will belong to the U.S. Government. The document will include a guideline on SDI participation by Japanese firms, the sources said. It also bans transferring results of SDI research to third countries.

Following Britain, West Germany, Israel and Italy, Japan is the fifth country to reach an agreement on star wars participation with the U.S.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: RESULTS OF 'AFTER REYKJAVIK' CONFERENCE ASSESSED

Officials Queried

PM221405 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 25, 21 Jun 87 p 4

[Valdimir Brodetskiy report: "The Main Issues First. International Meeting in Dagomys"]

[Text] Dagomys--"After Reykjavik: Planning for the 1990s"--such was the keynote of the meeting of experts in the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign, held at the Black Sea health resort of Dagomys under the aegis of the UN and with assistance from the Soviet Peace Committee. Among the participants were leading experts from 25 countries, distinguished scientists, military leaders, politicians, public figures and diplomats.

As the experts emphasized in Dagomys, the results of the summit in Iceland's capital generated hopes for the possibility of continuing Soviet-American dialogue with a view to creating a safer and more stable peace.

A problem central to the discussions was finding out what was primary and what was secondary--confidence or disarmament?

"Confidence building is the main thing," insisted Professor Sigrid Poellinger of Austria. A view which, it seems, is not indisputable.

To my question, "What should be the starting point?", Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, replied:

"It would be ideal if both processes unfolded in parallel. But we can no longer afford to waste decades on discussing confidence-building measures at a time when the arms race is continuing. Specific steps toward disarmament alone can raise the degree of confidence between East and West."

Question: Such steps on medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe seem to be quite near. But is it possible to expect any "breakthrough" in the near future in the course of the talks with the USA on strategic offensive weapons?

Answer: A ready formula of the agreement is already on the negotiating table. If the American side accepted the fact of logical interconnection of the talks on strategic offensive arms with the solution of questions of space armaments, if the USA gave up attempts to secure unilateral advantages, for instance, the establishment of the so-called sublevels of reducible and remaining armaments, we would be quite able in the near future to conclude a full-blooded agreement as well. Both sides see how disputed issues should be tackled. Everything now depends on the political will. If the American side is still unprepared for an all-embracing agreement, we suggest concluding 'key proposals' on the entire package of strategic offensive arms and space.

...Thus, the whole question hinges on space.

Marshal Ogarkov's Statement

One of the participants in the Dagomys discussion, American Lieutenant-General (Rtd) Daniel O. Graham, director of the High Frontier Organization, said that it was he who in 1981 prompted the idea of Strategic Defense Initiative to President Reagan. The general emphasized the "defense" nature of SDI. Moreover, he made references to statements by Soviet political and military leaders. As Graham put it, in 1982, Marshal N. Ogarkov declared that "strategic defense was not only desirable but even inevitable".

"Marshal Ogarkov never said that strategic defense was good," replies Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, chief of a department at the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. "Ogarkov made a statement to the effect that strategic defense is necessary, but it was a question of defense by exclusively ground means, without space echelons being attached to it. Ogarkov could not in 1982 make a statement about the advisability of space 'defense' for the simple reason that SDI is directly spearheaded against the ABM Treaty of 1972. The USSR's aim is directly opposite--to strengthen the ABM Treaty. It is impossible to reduce strategic offensive armaments without observing the provisions of this document.

"If the USA starts testing under the SDI program in space, the ABM Treaty, as well as the talks on strategic offensive armaments, could be given up as a bad job," maintains N. Chervov.

On the other hand, he goes on, the USSR is not against carrying out research work within the SDI framework. But the ABM limits must also be observed: tests must be aired out in plants, on ground and proving ranges, but not in near-earth space. What means can be located in space? Means of the type that are already there. For instance, lasers used for communication and for the exploration of planets. But if the power threshold of the lasers located in space has been trespassed, they can turn into combat means. Thus, an installation with a capacity of 10 to the nineteenth power joule has already become a weapon. What should be done to prevent such installations from being located in space? The USSR suggests on-site inspections--mutually verifying every rocket of each of the sides before launching. But so far the USA does not even want to hear about this.

Who in the USA advocates the full deployment of the SDI program? As General Graham asserts, his organization, High Frontier, has 83,000 members. Its budget runs to three million dollars. The general assured me that only three percent of this sum is made up of donations from aerospace companies representing the U.S. military-industrial complex. Well, it is quite possible: High Frontier is by far not the only, and not even the most costly, object of the military-industrial complex's generosity.

Putting the Cart Before the Horse

As assured by the American expert Edward L. Rowny, special adviser to the President and secretary of state for arms control matters, Washington's policy rests on four pillars: arms control, a solution to regional conflicts, humanitarian contacts, and concern for human rights.

"Isn't it reminiscent of the 'linkage policy' which was pursued by Henry Kissinger and which did so much harm to Soviet-American relations?" I ask Mr Rowny. "Isn't it better to follow the example of Soviet and American physicians who gave pride of place in their efforts to the struggle against man's most dangerous enemies--cancer and cardiovascular diseases? By analogy, nuclear weapons are today the most dangerous enemy of mankind. Do the 'linkages' have a right to hamper the struggle against the enemy?"

Mr Rowny believes that "linkage" is too "strong" a word. Practice, however, has shown that as soon as a change for the better is seen in the Soviet-American disarmament talks, Washington immediately starts looking for brakes to this process, referring now to regional conflicts, now to "lack of freedoms" in Soviet society.

The Soviet side has not refused to discuss any of the problems mentioned by Rowny and is conducting talks on them with the USA, A. Bessmertnykh stressed. The USSR has its own answers to these questions and its own claims on the USA. But the main thing is to solve the pivotal problem on which the very survival of humankind depends--that of eliminating nuclear weapons. For the sake of this it is necessary to give up obsolete stereotypes and discard the old mentality.

The discussion in Dagomys has shown that not everyone is prepared for this.

One result of the meeting is the common positive assessment of the exchange of views. The future will show whether the Dagomys discussions will lead to the application of their decisions in practice.

Moscow TV Roundtable

LD111543 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1155 GMT 11 Jul 87

[Studio discussion program introduced by commentator Yuriy Rostov, with Rowny, special assistant to the U.S. President on arms control; Admiral Eberle, director of the Royal Institute of International Relations; Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnikh, USSR deputy foreign minister; and Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov, colonel general and head of the Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union; Rostov identified by caption; Rowny and Eberle remarks in English fading into Russian translation; video shows discussion participants in a studio; date and place not specified -- recorded]

[Text] [Rostov] "After Reykjavik: Planning For The Nineties" was the title of an international forum of disarmament specialists held in our country, in Dagomys. I present a discussion program on the results of the forum.

Taking part in our discussion is Mr Rowny, special assistant to the U.S. President on arms control. On the British side we have Admiral Eberle, who is the director of the Royal Institute of International Relations. The Soviet side is represented by Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh, USSR deputy foreign minister, and Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov, colonel general and head of the Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

Twenty-five countries were represented at the meeting in Dagomys. Does that mean there were 25 approaches to the problems of security? Or did certain views and opinions predominate? I think we'll let our guests speak first, so I'll call on you, Mr Rowny.

[Rowny] First, I think the fact that the meeting was attended by representatives of 25 countries reflects the interests of the problems discussed here. The problems of security are of enormous importance to all of us, and we've got to find common approaches to them. I think arms control is important for the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union. It is also important for the security of all other countries. There are four main problems the United States wanted the meeting to discuss: bilateral agreements, regional crises, arms control, and human rights.

Bringing these questions together is not linkage; it is simply that moving in this direction creates the necessary conditions for accords on arms control. I was very glad that many of these present here -- everyone, perhaps -- understood that a 50 percent reduction of the strategic arms of the Soviet Union and the United States would be a very important step. The experts also agreed on the need to reduce conventional, chemical, and biological weapons.

[Eberle] We did not reach an unanimous opinion on what ought to be the ultimate aim of arms reduction, or on how safe a world without nuclear weapons would be. But we did discuss these matters in detail. I think we at least understood each other's views. Disagreements also emerged on the question of how, and how fast, we should move toward reducing nuclear and conventional arms. In this area, too, I think we've come to understand better the position of our opponents. This is very important, since mutual understanding gives us a chance of making real progress.

[Bessmertnykh] Among the positions most often mentioned during the meeting I would name the need for new thinking -- the need for a fresh interpretation of the problems of security, how they are to be understood -- these are, if you like, the conceptual aspects of the discussion. Interesting approaches were also made to the questions of nuclear limitation, nuclear disarmament. But I think the main thing is that virtually all the experts believe the need for nuclear disarmament, or at least the need to reduce nuclear weapons, is fundamental. This referred first of all, and most of all, to the European theater, though there were also some interesting statements that disarmament is a global problem, and that this is a problem that needs to be discussed and tackled in various regions of the world no less vigorously than in Europe.

[Chervov] There is no doubt that everyone supported the proposal to eliminate the medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe, the double zero option. Most were for this. As for the 50 percent reduction, it would ostensibly appear that there is much that is similar here; however, there are fundamental divergences in the approaches of the Soviet and U.S. sides to the concrete solution of this problem of the 50 percent reduction.

[Rostov] Eight months have passed since the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. How do the Soviet, U.S. and British representatives currently evaluate the long-term results and outcome of this Soviet-U.S. meeting?

[Bessmertnykh] Maybe Nikolay Fedorovich should speak first.

[Chervov] The view in the USSR is that Reykjavik marked a point of departure, the consequences of which are long-term. It is necessary to proceed from this point of departure, to strive for long overdue solutions to problems of nuclear and space arms. But influential circles in the United States do not accept the Reykjavik results. As far as a number of questions are concerned, they are dragging us backward to the pre-Reykjavik positions. The USSR's proposal to eliminate nuclear arms completely, supported by President Reagan in Reykjavik, currently fails to receive support from influential forces in the United States and NATO countries. This makes one doubt the sincerity and soundness of the U.S. and NATO proposals. Apparently the process of fully comprehending Reykjavik is proceeding slowly and with difficulty. It is obvious that not everyone has yet succeeded in understanding the opportunities opened up by Reykjavik. This has a negative effect on the talks in Geneva, particularly, on the problems of strategic offensive arms and space.

At these talks the United States is steering things thusly: That the ABM Treaty should in fact cease to be in force after 7 years; that is, after 1994. The U.S. Administration's statement on not going beyond the terms of reference of the ABM Treaty is merely a formality, since what is being envisaged -- and the Americans demand this of us at the talks -- is that they should be permitted to carry out tests on offensive space weapons.

Apart from this, the U.S. side at the talks on nuclear and space arms is avoiding concrete discussion of space weapons activities -- those permitted and those banned by the ABM Treaty -- and is proposing and striving to see that the existing connection between defensive and strategic offensive arms is broken. But objectively, this is impossible. If the U.S. side deploys arms in space, there will be no reduction whatever of strategic offensive arms.

[Rowny] I think Gen Chervov is distorting the true state of affairs, or at least is distorting the U.S. position. We recognize that Reykjavik was a very important event. However, as was stressed by Secretary of State Shultz during his visit to Moscow, our leaders tried in Reykjavik to achieve a process that was too rapid. No agreement was concluded in Reykjavik. But during the talks in Moscow, the sides decided to move toward a 50 percent reduction in strategic arms.

In Geneva we presented our proposals on this. We would like the USSR to reply to them. But the USSR has stated that it thought it necessary to link progress in this sphere with space weapons, with a question on which no agreement was reached in Reykjavik. I would like to stress that SDI does not involve offensive armaments; it is, in effect, a shield. We are prepared to deploy [razvernut] this shield and, at the same time, reduce offensive armaments. I think this is a realistic enough proposal. And it is not true to say that the United States is refusing a treaty on SDI.

The USSR has ABM systems, antisatellite systems, and other similar systems just as we have. One must have a shield as well as a sword. We now have the technology to create a defense that takes account of the existing ABM agreement. In 7 years it will be clear whether we have the opportunity to create an even more effective defensive system. That is when the deployment question will arise. There is no need to counterpose offensive and defensive armaments. One can develop both offensive and defensive armaments.

[Chervov] But you are obscuring the most important question, Mr Rowny. You, the United States, are demanding that for 7 years, it should carry out tests on space strike armaments. Is that so or not? If that is so, and it really is so, then the ABM in practice loses its force and becomes an empty piece of paper. Therefore, I cannot take your statement seriously.

[Rowny] That is an incorrect interpretation of the actions and intentions of the United States. In developing a defensive program, we are doing exactly what the USSR has done. It is a defensive program, a shield. There are no offensive weapons here. We are not violating the ABM Treaty. All of this is being done within the framework of the treaty. If the defensive system is effective and if it works, very well. If the system does not work, we will cooperate with the USSR and seek ways of stabilizing the situation.

We do not intend to abandon the ABM Treaty but this treaty must be reviewed so that it is in accord with current demands. In the past 12 years a number of the provisions of the ABM Treaty which said that we should reduce offensive armaments have not been realized.

Therefore, one should not say that we want to destroy the treaty. We will follow its principles. But I think it is essential to adopt amendments to the treaty. We hope that the USSR will in time agree to that.

[Chervov] Allow me to ask you, anyway: Do you intend in this 7-year period to test space strike weapons or do you intend to do this?

[Rowny] No, we do not intend to test space strike weapons. We intend, if our technological possibilities allow us to do this, to test a space shield, to develop ways of neutralizing missiles which threaten U.S. security. We have invited you into our laboratories in order to see precisely what we are doing. What we are doing is what the USSR has been doing for 10-15 years. We consider the combination of defensive and offensive weapons ensures deterrence in the best way.

[Bessmertnykh] The general says we had no accord on any link between strategic offensive weapons and the observance of the ABM Treaty. First, this link was established even before Reykjavik, and this included the joint establishment of such a link both at a high level and at summit level. Moreover, one must bear in mind that at Reykjavik the American side gave its agreement to not using the right to pull out of the treaty for 10 years. Immediately after Reykjavik, at the first news conferences and at subsequent ones, the President and the secretary of state confirmed this. Incidentally, only quite recently we discovered that the U.S. side is back-peddling on this and I don't think any philosophical reflections are needed on whether the Reykjavik accord is being observed or not when such overt back-tracking is discernible on one of the fundamental understandings achieved at Reykjavik. That is very important today. At Reykjavik we said strategic offensive armaments should be reduced by 50

percent in the course of 5 years. The general and I were both in Reykjavik and we know perfectly well how the talks on this went. The U.S. side is now proposing 7 years, and this is again a case of back-tracking on accords which were on the surface and were recognized by the U.S. side.

In this context, I would like to say how strange General Rowny's portrayal of the idea of the so-called space shield is. It comes across as some kind of strange structure which will destroy warheads and missiles one knows not how -- by smothering them, enveloping them, or some other method. In fact, it is a shooting shield which proposes to use the latest achievements of physics and electronics to destroy both missiles and possibly other things in the atmosphere, and perhaps even on earth. So it is not all so inoffensive as the U.S. side would like to make out.

I would also like to comment on what Mr Rowny said on the ABM Treaty. It seems to me that it is quite obvious for television viewers today what is planned for the treaty. We can today hear the views expressed that the treaty must be improved, that perhaps some new qualifying protocols should be appended, and so on. But if the U.S. side were honest enough perhaps it should be said bluntly that the ABM Treaty does not suit the U.S. side since it is hindering the new U.S. space programs, and it would perhaps be better to say directly that we -- I mean the United States -- are withdrawing from it, rather than deluding their own public and world public opinion.

[Eberle] I represent a country which did not take part in the Reykjavik talks. The majority of observers are forming the impression that no accord was achieved at Reykjavik. Nevertheless, many view the meeting as a very important event. For several moments, if one can put it this way, the clouds parted and we saw what could be achieved in the arms control sphere. Many saw this. For the European countries the Reykjavik meeting was a turning point. Mr Gorbachev was right to speak of a new thinking.

In Western Europe now we can also see the way to European security in a new way. Mr Gorbachev should realize that there is a new thinking in the West too, just as in the Soviet Union.

[Rostov] Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that we have different approaches to security problems. My next question is about the correlation between the problem of security and efforts to reduce the arms race. Over to you, Mr Eberle.

[Eberle] The main thing is that no country can achieve its own security at the expense of the security of another country. I think both West and East agree with that. At the same time, the idea of the full elimination of nuclear weapons in the next few years is seen with apprehension by the Western countries. Western Europe wants a reduction in both nuclear armaments and traditional types of weapons, but a fairly slow and cautious one. If we start to move too far and expect too much, we will merely give people false hope.

[Chervov] The nuclear potentials in the world today are enormous. Nevertheless, the nuclear arms race is continuing. And the U.S. side is additionally to take weapons into space [sentence as received]. That will not increase security. On the contrary: the security of all states will, in this case, be considerably lower and if weapons are put into space, the risk of war breaking out will increase.

The path of lasting peace indisputably leads through disarmament, through nuclear disarmament. Only disarmament can guarantee international security. The NATO concept of nuclear deterrence is today unserviceable. It is a cold war concept. The essence of it is that the more nuclear weapons there are, the greater will be security. But we know that even an unloaded gun can fire in 10 years' time, so the stockpiling of mountains of weapons can lead to a sharp diminishing of international security. Neither can international security be strengthened by the U.S. Star Wars program. As a military expert, I can state with full responsibility that the appearance of space strike weapons -- although Gen Rowny says they are not arms, but something in the order of papier-mache; but no, they are arms -- and if those arms appear in space, the risk of war will increase.

Having a shield over the United States means acquiring a first nuclear strike capability. At the present time it is impossible to acquire, or create, two securities: a reliable one for yourself and another, with slightly more holes in it, for your neighbor. No! Security must be universal and equal for all. And what the Soviet Union understands by the question of universal security is first and foremost the renunciation by the nuclear powers of war against one another, be it nuclear or conventional war. It is the prevention of an arms race in space. It is the ending of nuclear tests -- something the U.S. side is very frightened of and has no desire at all to do. It is a ban on chemical weapons; a reduction in conventional weapons to levels of sufficiency for defense only; the maintenance of military-strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, at an ever decreasing level; and overall a limitation of the military potentials of states to a point where the possibility of carrying out offensive operations and aggression is ruled out. We think this is where the paths lie to a lasting and secure peace.

[Rostov] Thank you very much. General, (?would you say something)?

[Rowny] I would like to go back to the ABM Treaty. At one time we decided that we didn't need defense, because we planned to reduce offensive weapons.

That didn't happen. And now, in order to secure peace, greater stability, and a higher degree of deterrence we are taking our own measures. We know the Soviet Union is testing ABM systems. We know the Soviet Union is doing work in the field of antisatellite weapons. And we would like to secure deterrence by creating [sozdaniye] a defense system. In other words, we would like to create a shield in response to the sword. I don't like the way you are trying to depict the present situation. We are not testing any space arms. We are just reserving the right to secure self-defense, particularly as the Soviet Union is also working on this question. Defense has never done any harm to anyone. We are testing our systems in order to secure a balance of power. The Soviet Union has apparently not completely rejected the idea of a 50 percent reduction. However, the Soviet Union says it is ready to accept this only if the United States abandons research in the field of SDI. But there are, in fact, similar developments existing also in the Soviet Union. Let us work in both directions, developing both defense and offensive weapons.

[Bessmertnykh] I'd like to comment on what Rowny has said. He said the sides entered into the treaty on limitation of antimissile defense because there was hope of simultaneously or subsequently also reducing strategic offensive weapons. It goes without saying that this was not the only reason we entered into that treaty, but nonetheless, the willingness of the sides to move in this direction was expressed by both Moscow and Washington. And something was done in this direction. The SALT II treaty was concluded, after the signing of the ABM Treaty, which to a considerable extent limited the development of strategic offensive weapons. The American side understood, and said at the time, that this was an important step, after the ABM treaty was concluded.

Yes, something more substantial might have been achieved; but we did not succeed in doing so, and we're still not succeeding. But the question arises, why? Why have the sides not been able to achieve deeper reductions? Because the American side has halted that process by at least two methods. The first was by launching a new space program, the program to develop space weapons. The second was to pull out of the SALT II treaty -- limitation of strategic offensive arms -- thereby showing us that entering into agreements with the United States is a risky business. It doesn't always observe treaties, and still less remains in them for the stated period. It even withdraws from them on one pretext or another, which naturally puts us on our guard. However much we're told by military men or by civilians, that American is not developing space strike weapons in space [as heard] this doesn't change the essence of the matter because weapons are being developed which are aimed against the strategic offensive missiles and their warheads.

We have a very simple way out of this situation, and we are offering it to the American side. If the system is intended to eliminate strategic missiles then why not simply begin by eliminating those missiles and getting rid of those missiles together with the rest of the strategic offensive arms; then there will be no need for a shield. But no, the American side nevertheless insists on its so-called shield, and refuses to eliminate strategic offensive arms.

Incidentally, Mr Rowny was not quite accurate when he said the Soviet Union was making a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive arms conditional on the United States giving up research in the field of SDI. We do not insist that the United States gives up SDI research. And moreover, in Reykjavik the American side was told they were welcome to go ahead with laboratory research.

And when Mr Shultz recently came to Moscow we told him what we understand by the laboratory concept. In addition, we proposed sitting down together, at the level of experts, to prepare a list of the devices that would be banned from being put in to space. In other words, we pointed to a path by which we could have found a compromise solution to the question. But again the U.S. side refused. So their main objective is, after all, to develop strike weapons in space -- despite all the persuasion and despite all the arguments, however strong.

As for security, in answer to your question I must say that we have no doubt taken -- I mean the Soviet Union and many other countries -- quite a big step in understanding what security means in the present age; that is, at the end of the 20th century, when nuclear weapons have reached incredible dimensions. We have begun to understand that the larger the level of confrontation is, the less security we have. That's the first point. The second is what we've begun to realize that security is an all-embracing matter. Therefore, the Soviet Union has put forward a new concept of security -- a comprehensive system of international security that would include all aspects -- military, economic, human rights, social, and possibly even ecological. In other words, what is needed is that all countries should move toward each other, as it were, on a wide front, and take practical steps to realize that the program, above all in the sphere of nuclear armaments, so that in the sphere of nuclear armaments we may have less danger and greater security.

[Chervov] I'll make just one remark. Gen Rowny has said that since the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union has been, all the time, building up its strategic arms while the Americans have stood still and sat with arms folded. But this does not correspond to reality: It is disinformation. At the meeting in Reykjavik, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev handed to President Reagan a table of the correlation of strategic offensive arms: What the strategic arms of the U.S. and Soviet sides consist of. The upshot is that the American strategic offensive arms can raise, at one time, 14,000 units of nuclear ammunition, and the Soviet side 10,000. So who has been standing still and who's been building up? Who has been engaged in the arms race? This applies to the American side. So this nod in the direction of the Soviet Union is not based on fact. This merely misleads the public.

[Rostov] Excuse me. I wanted to say that the discussion has gone on twice as long as we agreed.

[Rowny] All the same, I must speak. Gen Chervov put words in my mouth. We have done nothing in the sphere of offensive arms. I must repeat that we are putting a proposal for a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive arms. We do not demand any linkages. We are not developing offensive space arms, we are developing defensive arms. Let the USSR do the same. Let us continue to move forward in the field of arms control agreement.

[Eberle] I listened to the arguments put forward by both sides. I should emphasize that in my view both sides were frank [otkrovennyy]. I think we should continue the talks on these complex issues. The fears on both sides are real. It is necessary that military and civil specialists alike should continue to discuss these questions. We have got to continue with contacts. Our meeting in the USSR was very useful, precisely because it develops such contacts.

[Rostov] Let us express the hope that the talks and the contacts will yield the positive results Mr Eberle is hoping for. Let us conclude our discussion on this positive note. Thank you very much.

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CSO: 5200/1578

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

JIMMY CARTER VISITS MOSCOW, DISCUSSES SALT, INF, SDI

Meets Gromyko

PM031451 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jul 87 Second Edition p w

["Conversation in the Kremlin"]

[Text] Andrey Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, president of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, received in the Kremlin on 2 July the prominent member of the Democratic Party and former President of the United States Jimmy Carter, who is now staying in the Soviet Union.

Jimmy Carter spoke highly of his meeting yesterday with the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev during which he sensed the new, fresh approach of the Soviet Union to international problems of our time.

Andrey Gromyko emphasized the importance of the Soviet Union's stand on the question of fully liquidating nuclear arms by the beginning of the 21st century. The total elimination of the nuclear monster which is creating a mortal danger to mankind is the main issue of the world's future security. This danger can grow if mankind, its will and reason do not find a solution to this burning problem.

Andrey Gromyko and Jimmy Carter stressed the importance of the present stage in Soviet-U.S. relations when accords on concrete measures to reduce nuclear arms can be achieved if both sides display political will. In particular, already in the near future it could be possible to conclude an agreement on the elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. Unfortunately, as A.A. Gromyko noted, the position taken by our partners still creates difficulties on the road to this agreement. Many other important Soviet initiatives directed at solving key questions of security have not received a constructive reply.

[Regional policy problems were also dealt with, including the situation in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Central America, Southeast Asia and the south of Africa. Andrey Gromyko outlined the USSR's consistent stand in favor of a just solution of the existing international problems by peaceful means.

In conclusion of the conversation Andrey Gromyko stressed the important role that prominent politicians and public figures, who are aware of the common responsibility for the destiny of peace, can play in international affairs even if they do not hold official posts.

IZVESTIYA Interview

PM071225 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Jimmy Carter by A. Shalnev: "Jimmy Carter: If I Were President..."--date and place not specified; first three paragraphs are Shalnev introduction]

[Text] It is the custom in America: Someone who was once governor of a state or a senator in Congress is called "Governor" or "Senator" to the end of his days.

It is the same with former presidents: Jimmy Carter, who left the White House in January 1981, is still called "Mr President." Carter, who holds no elective office, devotes a considerable amount of time to his hobbies -- joinery (he is an expert furniture-maker) and writing (his latest book, which was published recently, is already on the best-seller lists). But the experience he accumulated in his 4 years in the White House and the wide contacts he established at the time with the leaders of other countries naturally cannot fail to leave their mark on how the public and press react to what Carter says, what he proposes, and the people he meets. In short, his voice is heeded -- particularly when the former president speaks on foreign policy matters. This attention is largely the result of comparing the Carter administration's foreign policy activity with that of the present administration -- a comparison which reveals an extremely important fact: Carter's 4-year rule was marked by the signing of the SALT II treaty, whereas Reagan's 6-year rule has been marked by the undermining of accords in the arms control sphere and, in particular, by the direct rejection of SALT II and the absence, so far at least, of any new agreements.

...My interview with Carter was brief -- only 12 minutes: The former president, who was on a private visit to our country, was running behind schedule. But on the same day he held a press conference at the U.S. Embassy. So I will supplement the short statements he made during the interview with his replies at the press conference.

[Shalnev] How have you been received in Moscow, Mr President?

[Carter] I have been received as someone who signed SALT II. The reception accorded me was exceptionally constructive and friendly. My meetings have left me with the most favorable impression.

[Shalnev] The official report on your talk in the Kremlin stated that you remarked, referring to the information you received as a result of your numerous meetings in various countries, that there is a prevailing desire worldwide to see the Soviet Union succeed in the transformations it has initiated. Could you possibly be a little more specific on that score?

[Carter] The leaders with whom I met consider openness and publicity to be positive... I think that Soviet policy in the nuclear arms control sphere is assessed on its merits -- as a policy that opens up a possibility for more rapid progress than in recent years.

[Shalnev] Since we have moved on to the subject of arms control, could you answer the following question: You are known as a critic of the "Star Wars" program. Why do you criticize it?

[Carter] It would be better for me to make those criticisms in the States rather than Moscow.

[Shalnev] Tell me, if you were president now, what would you do differently from Reagan in the sphere of Soviet-U.S. relations and in the arms control sphere?

[Carter] It seems to me that Reagan, as I understand it, made certain good proposals at Reykjavik. I want to give him his due. I hope that in the near future we will witness success in solving the question of medium-range missiles. I assume that those conducting the talks are close enough to an agreement to allow it to be ratified under Reagan. If I were president, I would like to see firm adherence to agreements that have already been concluded. I would insist that the SALT II treaty not be violated and that both sides adhere precisely to its provisions. I would advocate a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty oppose the use of space for destructive weapons. I think I would strive for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

[Shalnev] To return to the medium-range missile question, what else can you say on that score?

[Carter] It seems to me that both sides should be flexible. I do not like the idea that each side can retain missiles in Asia and Alaska. The Soviet missiles pose an unnecessary threat to the Asian countries. Nor is there any need for us to site missiles in Alaska. There are two other difficulties: one linked with the FRG's missiles. Personally, I believe the FRG, France, and Britain should be excluded from this first step toward a more comprehensive agreement. The other difficulty is the problem of verification. I do not believe it is possible to monitor the observance of an agreement without very extensive on-site inspection [inspektsiya na mestakh].

[Shalnev] Yet you think there is a chance of rapidly reaching an agreement?

[Carter] I think this will be done.

[Shalnev] As I understand it, a large part of the Kremlin talk was devoted to regional conflicts, including the Near East situation. What is your position?

[Carter] Personally, I would prefer to convene an international conference on the Near East with the participation of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and the interested parties -- principally Israel and its neighbors. The five permanent members of the Security Council could play a substantive role: They could provide a forum for the sides in the conflict to present their position under the close attention of the world press. The five permanent members, of course, could provide guarantees that any agreements that might be reached would be observed. There would also be a need to finance certain elements of a possible peace agreement: for instance, compensation to the Palestinians for their lost property and the restoration of the economy in the occupied territories. It seems to me that the problems between Israel and Syria, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and the Palestinians should be solved through bilateral or direct talks.

[Shalnev] Along the lines of Camp David?

[Carter] I would not draw parallels that far, since there are differences of course.

[Shalnev] One last question: Who will be the next president of the United States? A Democrat or a Republican?

[Carter] I believe it will be a Democrat... I want to say that it seems to me that arms control problems ought to be a key issue in the election campaign.

...A lot of what the former U.S. President said is disputable: This applies, in my view, to his plan for a Near East settlement, a plan which clearly relies on the Camp David model -- "Carter's brainchild," which, if not stillborn, at least had very major birth defects. Some of his ideas on medium-range missiles are also disputable: In opposing missiles in Asia and Alaska, Carter nonetheless tried to demonstrate the "need" to retain missiles in West Germany -- that is, 72 Pershing 1A's..

But after all, he is a U.S. President. Albeit a former one...

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CSO: 5200/1584

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET SCIENTISTS ON REQUIREMENTS FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY

LD242028 Moscow TASS in English 1716 GMT 24 Jun 87

[Text] Moscow, 24 Jun (TASS)--The report on a study "Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Nuclear Arms Reductions", drawn up by the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace Against the Nuclear Threat, was presented by Academician Roald Sagdeyev at the Press Center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs today.

Even in conditions of retained parity a further buildup and modernization of nuclear forces by both sides creates an ever more unstable military-strategic and military-political situation, the study says.

The Soviet scientists believe that durable military-strategic stability at various stages of nuclear arms reductions is possible only if:

- neither side has incentives to use nuclear arms first;
- neither side has the potential for delivering a disarming first strike;
- no conditions exist for an unsanctioned or accidental use of nuclear arms.

Analysis shows that there exists a set of variants of a radical reduction of nuclear arms up to and including their total elimination that allows for a strengthening of stability.

The creation, unilateral or mutual, of a territorial ABM system, especially with space echelons, would be one of the most destabilizing steps in the military field. A radical reduction of nuclear arms is possible only on the condition of ruling out the militarization of outer space. The task is for each side to have such armed forces that could perform only defensive actions to protect its territory or the territory of the members of its alliance, that would not have the possibility to threaten the territory of the other side with invasion.

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CSO: 5200/1578

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

BRIEFS

TALKS CONTINUE 27 JUNE--Geneva, 26 Jun (TASS)--Meetings were continued here last week within the framework of Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons. The Soviet and American sides discussed all the three topics included in the agenda, specifically, intermediate-range missiles, space weapons and strategic offensive armaments. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0210 GMT 27 Jun 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1578

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG PRESIDENT VISITS USSR: PERSHING 1-A'S HIGHLIGHTED

Pershing 1-A's To Be Discussed

LD031201 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1045 GMT 3 Jul 87

[Excerpt] Moscow, 3 Jul (TASS)--Disarmament problems will occupy an important place during the talks between FRG Federal President Richard von Weizsaecker and Soviet leaders, it was stated at a briefing held here today by Konstantin Mikhaylov, deputy chief of the Directorate for Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament of the USSR Foreign Ministry. The talks will touch on questions which are holding up progress toward achieving disarmament in Europe.

The U.S. Administration is trying to present the state of affairs at the Geneva talks in a rosy light. But of late, many difficulties, linkages and conditions have arisen there which are holding up the conduct of the talks. It is a matter of the Pershing-1A missiles in particular.

Attention was called at the briefing to the unfriendly campaign in the FRG which has been undertaken on the eve of the federal president's visit to the USSR. In connection with this the recent meeting of the "Association of Russian Germans" was pointed out; official representatives of the government took part in this and spoke "in defense of the rights" of Soviet citizens of German nationality.

Soviet citizens of German nationality who were present at the briefing noted in their statements that they enjoy all the rights granted to Soviet people and are full citizens of the Land of the Soviets.

A rebuttal was given to the assertion that about 60-65,000 USSR citizens of German nationality had expressed the wish to leave for the FRG. These figures, the USSR Foreign Ministry representative stressed are inflated 10-15-fold. Since the start of the year, slightly over 5,000 requests to leave for the FRG had been submitted. All matters are considered in a humanitarian spirit. Since the start of this year about 4,300 people left the USSR for the FRG.

Objectives Noted in Interview

PM061725 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 4 Jul 87 p 3

[G. Gavrilkin dispatch: "In Order To Strengthen Trust"]

[Excerpts] Bonn--FRG Federal President Richard von Weizsaecker spoke to Soviet journalists accredited in West Germany on the eve of his official visit to the Soviet Union, which will take place 6 through 11 July this year.

What the president expects from his trip, what his plans are during his stay, and his viewpoint on various problems of bilateral and multilateral relations--these and other questions were at the center of the journalists' attention.

Dwelling on disarmament problems, Weizsaecker expressed the thought that the reduction and elimination of individual types of weapons will only be worth while when a radical and balanced reduction of the already high level of existing arms potentials, including conventional arms, also becomes a real prospect. This does not signify in his opinion that security questions will lose their significance. To strengthen peace it is necessary to understand and take into consideration the security interests of the other side. The interdependence of these interests, beyond any doubt, has grown considerably in the second half of the 20th century. In Weizsaecker's opinion, the removal in practice by the end of this century of the opposing blocs' offensive potential and a reduction in the danger of surprise attack is an especially important task.

The West German head of state stated that the FRG does not possess nuclear weapons and therefore there is no point in discussing this problem with it. Furthermore, in his words, West Germany is the only country which has refused to possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. At the same time Weizsaecker advocated further strengthening the FRG's defense and expanding its military cooperation with France.

'Opportunities' Affirmed

PM061245 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jul 87 First Edition p 5

[TASS correspondent G. Kulbitskiy dispatch, specially written for PRAVDA: "In the Interests of Cooperation"]

[Text] Bonn -- The official visit by the West German head of state to the Soviet Union begins 6 July. On the eve of the visit, FRG President R. von Weizsaecker met a group of Soviet journalists. A number of topical international problems and questions of bilateral relations were touched upon in the course of the conversation.

The extensive program of our visit, R. von Weizsaecker said, will center around talks with M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, A.A. Gromyko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and other Soviet leaders. I am also looking forward to the forthcoming meetings and conversations with Soviet economic scientists, cultural and church figures, and students. The purpose of our visit is primarily to discuss the situation in the world and in Europe and the long-term relations between our countries. The more confidently we look into the future and the more clearly we perceive the historical perspectives, the better we will be able to make decisions on current questions.

This is why questions of security, disarmament, and cooperation will be discussed in a most detailed fashion in the course of the visit. We, the West German head of state said, are face to face with a real opportunity to achieve far-reaching accords on disarmament. Having declared that the FRG, being a member of the North Atlantic alliance, intends to make its contribution to the achievement of these accords, the president nevertheless refrained from stating his viewpoint regarding the stance of the FRG Government, which is striving to retain Pershing-1A operational and tactical missiles with U.S. nuclear warheads at its disposal in the event of a "zero option" on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles.

Asked about his assessment of the results of the CPSU Central Committee plenum and the USSR Supreme Soviet session, the president replied: These results are highly significant for the FRG. After all, they not only concern domestic restructuring for the purpose of boosting the Soviet economy's efficiency, but also considerably increase the USSR's opportunities for cooperation with other countries, especially in the economic sphere. Reforms and cooperation are interconnected. This is precisely why the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee plenum and the USSR Supreme Soviet session generated great interest in the FRG.

The forthcoming official visit to the USSR by FRG President R. von Weizsaecker was the main topic on the banks of the Rhine in the last few days. The second West German television channel ZDF announced plans to report directly from the Soviet capital. News of the FRG president's visit has already been assigned a major slot in the planning of forthcoming news programs not only by ZDF but also by the other leading channel, ARD.

H.-J. Vogel, chairman of the main opposition party, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, assessed the visit by the West German head of state as particularly important in light of the present state of relations between the FRG and the USSR and of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union. This visit, he emphasized in a statement released in Bonn, offers an opportunity to eliminate negative elements in bilateral relations and make a contribution toward the development of cooperation between states with different social systems.

E. Weber, deputy chairman of the German Communist Party, issued a statement on the eve of the visit which notes that the visit is taking place at a time when real chances exist to considerably improve the political climate in the world by taking steps along the path of genuine arms reduction. At the same time, mass attempts are being made by extreme right-wing West German circles to cling onto the policy of confrontation in the spirit of the "cold war" and to hinder disarmament. One cannot fail to hear the voices of politicians from the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union ranks, who are incapable of understanding the persistent need for new thinking in the nuclear age and advocate the retention of Pershing-1A missiles with U.S. nuclear warheads in the FRG.

It would be desirable, E. Weber points out, to reflect the desire of the overwhelming majority of West Germans that, under contemporary conditions when a military conflict between East and West could jeopardize the existence of human civilization, the FRG president's visit to the USSR be marked by clear signals in the direction of international cooperation, the direction of strengthening peace all over the world.

Meets Gromyko 6 July

LD062052 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 6 Jul 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] Andrey Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, received in the Kremlin today Richard von Weizsaecker, federal president of the FRG, who arrived in the USSR on an official visit. Taking part in the meeting and conversation were Comrade Shevardnadze and FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Welcoming the FRG President, Andrey Gromyko stressed that his visit to the Soviet Union is of particular political significance in current conditions. The hope was expressed that the meetings and conversations in Moscow would help to put Soviet-West German relations back on the road to stability and consistent development and elevate long-term relations to a new level.

An exchange of opinions on key questions of the international situation took place. Both sides hold the view that there is no more important task for states at the present time than the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war and the conclusion of agreements with this in mind.

Genscher, Shevardnadze Meet

LD071155 Hamburg DPA in German 0946 GMT 7 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow, 7 Jul (DPA) -- The German-Soviet treaties on scientific and technical cooperation in various spheres, signed in April and May, have come into force. The foreign ministers of both countries, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Eduard Shevardnadze, today signed a protocol in the Soviet Foreign Ministry guest house under which the individual agreements in the spheres of science and technology, health and agricultural research automatically come into effect.

Genscher and Shevardnadze earlier held talks at which disarmament issues were discussed, particularly the question of medium-range missiles. During the signing of the protocol, Shevardnadze turned to Genscher and said: "It would be nice if this were the INF agreement." Genscher replied: "But then it would not be me sitting here."

Gromyko Speaks at Dinner

PM071049 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

["A.A. Gromyko Speech"]

[Text] On behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, I cordially welcome in Moscow the eminent guests: Richard von Weizsaecker, Federal president of the FRG, his spouse, and the accompanying persons.

We view your visit as a good sign -- an expression of the desire to improve mutual understanding and trust in relations between our countries by the FRG.

We say "welcome" to you and express the hope that your forthcoming meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and your talks and conversations on Soviet soil will give a new impulse to the development of political dialogue and stepping-up of the varied mutually advantageous cooperation between the USSR and the FRG, and will help comprehension of each other's positions on the issues of peace, security and disarmament better.

You have arrived in the Soviet Union at a very interesting time, Mr President: A time of great changes and achievements in our country, when truly revolutionary processes of restructuring and profound democratization in the life of Soviet society are developing.

The recent plenum of the Central Committee of our party was devoted to the concrete tasks of this gigantic work.

It is of outstanding importance for the life of the country. Laws have just been adopted at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet which create a reliable basis for the dynamic development of the Soviet economy, and for raising the well being of the Soviet people.

The aim of restructuring is to raise our socialist society to a new level of progress. All of this is the best confirmation that the Soviet Union has no other thoughts than peaceful construction, than labor in conditions of peace.

Restructuring and preparations for war are simply incompatible. They are direct opposites. All those who ascribe evil intentions to us and continue to frighten the world with the "Soviet threat" ought to think about that. Such people are still looking at the world through glasses which make them color-blind. They do not want to see the world as it is.

Anticommunism, which, in the words of Thomas Mann, is the greatest stupidity of the 20th century, and its variant, anti-Sovietism, are as unacceptable in today's world as the whipping up of hostility to any other state.

During your visit, Mr President, you will be able to see for yourself that the strategy of perfecting society and improving the life of the Soviet people determines the philosophy of our foreign policy, too. Its essence is the prevention of nuclear war and the development of links -- trade, economic, scientific and technical, cultural and others -- with all states.

We favor honest competition between the two systems, excluding both "hot" and "cold" war, both economic and psychological, and of equal mutually-beneficial cooperation.

Our foreign policy has been expounded on more than one occasion, openly [otkryto] and in depth, in corresponding statements by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

As never before so concretely, we are faced with a choice: to survive or to perish together. Our joint sensible choice can only be one: mutual interaction and cooperation. We resolutely reject the opposite course -- confrontation.

We are firmly convinced that peace and cooperation need to be built to last, and on the foundation of disarmament and security for all. Therefore, the Soviet Union proposes a program of complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the present century.

Space must remain peaceful and it must be mastered to the benefit of our planet and not to its detriment. Together with the other socialist states, our country has come forward with an initiative to reduce conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals. There is a realistic possibility of a total ban on chemical weapons with strict international verification [kontrol]. For many months the Soviet Union unilaterally observed a moratorium on nuclear explosions and, as before, it is an ardent advocate of halting all nuclear tests. Unfortunately, we do not perceive an equivalent reaction, in keeping with the realities of the time, from the Western partners in response to our proposals. They are still limiting themselves to good intentions.

We live in Europe, linked by a single historical destiny. Our duty is to maintain peace here, not on postulates of strength, but on the basis of the realities which have come about, on principles of mutual respect and cooperation. The European process must pass naturally into its next phase, of which an important element would be real disarmament and the strengthening of trust and cooperation in all spheres.

We invite the Europeans, including the Federal Republic, to do some work together on the concept of building a "common European home." Each resident of this home will, of course, adhere to their own philosophy, to their own political choice, and keep their own way of living. But they must all, as we understand it, be united by a desire for goodneighborliness and for creating the kind of European arrangement that would ensure a peaceful future for each state and would rule out the very possibility of war being waged on European soil.

The talks now taking place in Geneva on ridding Europe of nuclear missiles -- medium-range and operational and tactical missiles -- are a serious test of the readiness of states to go from words to deeds. And although they are being conducted between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, to a large measure their outcome depends on the position of West European countries. We hope that the FRG Government will facilitate not in words but in deeds the success of these talks and the freeing of Europe from whole classes of nuclear weapons.

Relations between our two countries are packed full of examples of how important it is to make the right move at the right time. Having signed the Moscow Treaty in 1970, our countries drew a line under the past and opened a door to the future.

This treaty, treaties between the FRG and other socialist countries, and the Helsinki Final Act have consolidated the postwar political-territorial realities and met the demands of stability and peaceful development in Europe.

The Soviet Union remembers your speech in connection with the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, Mr President. The idea sounded clearly in that speech: Never again must a threat to peace come from German soil. We treasure that declaration.

We believe that the USSR and FRG, in spite of their political and ideological differences, can be good partners. A new, broad approach is needed here in the spirit of the time, and concrete acts, contacts, links are needed. These ideas are close to our heart.

One cannot call it a coincidence that when representatives of the Soviet Union and the FRG begin to speak of bilateral relations, they always come to the conclusion that objective conditions for their development do exist, and not a few either. This has happened more than once.

It is noteworthy that this idea is voiced not only by FRG officials, but also by representatives of the business circles. They emphasize perhaps to an even greater extent the fact that both countries have the potential for strengthening relations for mutual benefit. It would be good if this aspiration of both sides to develop trade, economic, scientific and technical, as well as other ties is translated into the language of practice, the language of real deeds.

Allow me to express confidence in the fact that the Soviet Union and the FRG will conduct affairs in such a way as to fill the future chapters of relations with rich and mutually advantageous contents for the benefit of our peoples and the cause of universal peace.

We wish you, Mr President, and all our guests, good health, prosperity, and the FRG people a peaceful future.

Weizsaecker Speaks at Dinner

PM071034 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report on FRG President R. von Weizsaecker's speech at 6 July Kremlin dinner, under general heading "Improving Mutual Understanding and Trust": "R. von Weizsaecker's Speech"]

[Text] The president expressed cordial thanks for the invitation to visit the Soviet Union. He said that his visit is a manifestation of the positive development of relations between our two countries. The FRG firmly intends actively to expand mutual relations with the USSR in the interests of both sides. The basis for this, as before, is the Moscow Treaty, to the elaboration of which you, Mr Chairman [Gromyko], made a substantial contribution. A favorable time has set in. Now it is important to take advantage of it, acting with a sense of historical responsibility and in the interests of people in Europe. This task is the pivot of our policy.

Over a long period of European development, often characterized by destruction and restoration, Russians and Germans have also had a stormy history of mutual relations. Along with conflicts, again and again fruitful spiritual and material cooperation developed, in which both peoples always participated wholeheartedly.

The painful memories of the horrors of the last war make us still more acutely aware of our responsibility for constructive and peaceful neighborly relations. We recall with grief the incredible sacrifices and tragic sufferings inflicted on the peoples of the Soviet Union during the war that Hitler brought to your country. I say this from my own experience as a man who went through the entire war, and the associated grief, as a soldier. In the end we Germans felt bitterly for ourselves how injustice and violence turn against one's own people, felt for ourselves what death, destruction, and exile mean.

Nobody has forgotten the bitter experience of the war, with its terrible excesses. But our memories should not torment us, they should help us. Only he who denies the past is threatened with the terrible danger of its repetition.

Today it is incumbent on us to do everything, really everything, in our power and that our intelligence instructs us to do in order to preclude the possibility of violence and war in the future and create a lasting peace in Europe. We sincerely seek good-neighborliness with the peoples of the Soviet Union.

We are going through a period of historic significance in East-West relations. The possibility of concluding far-reaching agreements is taking on very concrete forms. Here it is very important to take the decisions of the present day in light of the long-term prospects for the future. How do we see East-West relations in the year 2000? What all-European concepts do we have for the transition to the next century? What common tasks face us in tomorrow's world? What contribution can our two countries make? The clearer our ideas about tomorrow, the more confidently we will choose the correct path today.

In the sphere of disarmament and arms control, decisions of great significance have to be adopted. The starting point for these is recognition of the fact that military superiority has lost its meaning in the era of today's arms systems. The undoubted capability for mutual destruction excludes the possibility of securing victory in war. A radical and balanced arms reduction, including deep reductions in the sphere of conventional arms, is the imperative of the time.

Security includes the lessening of existing threats. Importance is attached to a balanced defense potential without an attack capability, the exclusion of the possibility of unexpected actions, a more solid awareness of interdependence on security questions, and a greater readiness to resolve questions through cooperation, including in space. In this spirit the FRG, as a steadfast and reliable member of the Atlantic alliance, will continue to use that membership in order to promote the cause of disarmament.

However, East-West relations should not be determined solely by security considerations, as has often been seen since World War II. Although it is impossible to renounce the concept of deterrence in preventing war, all the same, the language of intimidation should not remain the most comprehensible language of East-West intercourse.

Confidence measures have great significance in the disarmament sphere. But confidence cannot grow solely in the sphere of security. Confidence must develop step by step. Peace cannot be achieved through disarmament alone, and the path to further disarmament lies through peaceful cooperation in all spheres.

We want to systematically extend this cooperation with you. We want this in bilateral relations as the FRG, but also as one of the leading partners in the European Community, which will continue to develop step by step and will acquire growing significance in East-West cooperation.

We are following with keen attention the restructuring policy which has begun in your country. We are convinced that the success of the new way of thinking will not only be beneficial to your own people, but will also serve the cause of peaceful good-neighborliness.

In economic cooperation, we want to use the existing instruments and develop new ones. The FRG is prepared to conclude an agreement on encouraging capital investments. The FRG-USSR mixed economic commission is working on new ideas, including the creation of joint enterprises.

We attach decisive significance to international exchange in the sphere of education. In the intercourse between our countries, everything that is already operating today in the theoretical scientific disciplines must be extended to the practical spheres of the applied sciences and technology, management, the calculation of expenditure, the shaping of output, marketing, and vocational education.

Together with the agreement on scientific and technical cooperation, during my visit specialized agreements in the sphere of agriculture, health care, and atomic energy will also now come into force. We also want to cooperate in the sphere of environmental conservation.

Differences in systems and ways of thinking cannot be overcome all at once. And no country in the world can replace a necessary reform of internal structures with foreign economic cooperation. But one can provide decisive support for the other. We are convinced that the growing interdependence will serve not only as a boost for your national economy and ours, but also as a stabilizer of the international system.

The aim must be not to increase might, but to achieve coexistence, which gives us the capacity to resolve conflicts by political means without either side laying claim to the exclusive possession of the truth in the highest instance.

The order of the day for our world is not crusades, not a decisive apocalyptic battle between good and evil, but an increasing number of problems whose resolution is beyond the powers of either East or West in isolation: galloping population growth and hunger in the world, the continuing destruction of nature, which no borders between states or systems can stop, energy supplies, drug addiction and epidemics, and the ethical control of rapid scientific and technical progress. Future generations will judge us by whether we recognized this challenge in time and took it up jointly.

It would be expedient for all sides to lessen international tension and display restraint in foreign policy, above all in those regions where interventions have hitherto taken place: Central America, Africa, and the Near East. In this connection we would welcome it if the possibility which you have declared of finding a speedy and convincing solution for Afghanistan, accompanied by a full withdrawal of troops from there, were to culminate in success.

As we approach the next millenium we should stop thinking in terms of blocs and the borders between them. It is more important to recognize more clearly Europe's common ground, turning it into political capital. Politically Europe is divided, but spiritually it is not divided and is indivisible. All the peoples, from the Atlantic to the Urals, have made their own unique contribution to this, enriching the Europeans in general. We are linked by a common history, unity in the diversity of national cultures, and the indivisibility of our fates and our future in this crowded region.

We welcome the Soviet leadership's initiative on entering into frank [otkrovennyy] dialogue with the West on the subject of human rights with a view to better mutual understanding and the implementation of a new policy with regard to dissenters.

Mr Chairman, the more frank [otkrovennyy] and honest our discussions, the more fruitfully our mutual relations will develop. Mentioning unpleasant realities does not always please, but after all, they will not disappear from the face of the earth if they are denied. In this connection the president repeated the FRG's well-known positions on the question of the so-called fate of the nation.

Culture, R. von Weizsaecker went on, is of exceptionally great significance for good-neighborliness and peace. We seek to expand cultural exchange in all spheres. It is important to develop new concepts for the exchange of scientists, students, and practical workers. The setting up of cultural institutes in the two countries could form the necessary basis for exchanges in the long term.

Mr Chairman, I think we should develop a European cultural consciousness appropriate to our political goals. This could form the spiritual basis for joint actions. It is possible to conceive of European culture without the great Russian literature, without your people's love of reading, without your music, your representational art, without the theater, dance, and cinema of the Soviet Union. This year it is 150 years since the death of Aleksandr Pushkin. He is highly honored in our country as the personification of the Russian spirit. Thomas Mann, who considered Russian literature the most human of all, called Pushkin "a Slavonic Latin with a truly popular and European nature, like Goethe or Mozart."

But I attach decisive significance not to the export of one's own culture, but to an understanding of how another people feel about their own culture. If we understand and learn how to respect that neighbor in a more profound sense. One who has understood another's culture stops seeing him as an enemy.

Mr Chairman, our social and political systems pursue different ideals. We belong to different alliances. But we live in one and the same increasingly interconnected world. If we retain the ability to identify the historical scale of events, if we are capable of looking into a more distant future, then we will sense that the significance of what divides us will lessen, and the significance of what we can only tackle together will constantly increase. Therefore it is important to strive for peaceful and active coexistence and cooperation instead of enmity and indifference. Good relations between the FRG and the USSR are possible, and they are of vital significance for Europe, and not only Europe. This imposes a great responsibility on us. I accepted your invitation in the hope that this visit would be a link in a chain of meetings leading us toward friendship with the peoples of the Soviet Union.

The speeches of A.A. Gromyko and R. von Weizsaecker were heard with attention and greeted with applause.

The dinner took place in a friendly atmosphere.

DPA Carries Weizsaecker Speech

LD061318 Hamburg DPA in German 0821 GMT 6 Jul 87

[Excerpt] Moscow/Bonn, 6 Jul (DPA)--In his speech at the start of his state visit to the USSR Federal President Richard von Weizsaecker said in the Kremlin this evening:

"Mr Chairman, esteemed Mrs Gromyko, ladies and gentlemen!

I cordially thank you for your invitation to the USSR on my own behalf and on behalf of my wife, Vice Chancellor Foreign Minister Genscher and his wife, and on behalf of all the ladies and gentlemen who have accompanied me.

Your friendly words of welcome have given us the feeling that we are your welcome guests.

You said that my visit is an expression of the positive development of relations between our two countries. I share this assessment. We have the firm intention of actively expanding our relations with you to our mutual interest. The Moscow Treaty, in which you Mr Chairman were crucially involved, remains the basis for this. The time is favorable so it is all the more important to make use of it out of historic responsibility and in the service of the peoples in Europe. This forms the center of our policy.

In the long development of Europe, often characterized by destruction and reconstruction, Russians and Germans alike have had an eventful history. In addition to conflicts fruitful intellectual and material cooperation have developed again and again. Both countries have always been keenly involved with this.

Our responsibility for constructive peaceful neighborliness has been made more keen by the painful memory of the disastrous last war. We sadly remember the unspeakable losses and the moving sufferings which the peoples of the USSR had to endure in the war carried by Hitler into your country.

I am saying this from my own experience as one who as a soldier lived through the whole of the war and its misery. In the end we Germans had to learn the bitter experience of how injustice and force backfire on one's own people; we learned the meaning of death, destruction, and expulsion from one's native homeland. The grave experiences of war with its cruel excesses remain unforgotten on both sides. However, the memory should not torment but help us. Only he who denies the past is in the frightful danger of repeating it.

Our duty is to do everything, truly everything in our power which is dictated by reason to exclude force and war in the future and to create lasting peace in Europe. Our desire for good-neighborliness with the peoples of the USSR comes from a sincere heart. We are in a phase of historic importance between East and West; far-reaching agreements are tangibly near. It is very important to make present decisions in the light of long-term prospects for the future. How do we visualize relations between East and West in the year 2000? What kind of conceptions do we have for the whole of Europe at the turn of the century? What tasks present themselves for us together in the world today? What contributions can our two countries make?

The clearer our picture of tomorrow, the more certain shall we find the right way today. Decisions of great moment face us for disarmament and arms control. The starting position is the awareness that in the era of today's arms systems military superiority has become absurd. The ability which ensures mutual destruction excludes the possibility of winning wars. The radical and balanced reduction of armaments deep into the conventional area is the precept of the moment.

Security remains essential for each side. A wise Russian proverb reminds us that "nobody wants to be the chicken pecked by the crow down to its last feather." However, once security is guaranteed by everybody conceding it sincerely to everybody, then most issues will become solvable.

It is part of security to reduce existing threats. Balanced defense without offensive capability, the exclusion of the ability to mount surprise attacks, the growing insight into the interdependence of security, and increasing willingness for cooperative solutions -- including in space -- are important. It is in this spirit that the FRG will, as before, use its firm and reliable membership within the Atlantic Alliance to promote disarmament.

However, East-West relations must not, as has been the case again and again since the end of World War II be solely dominated by security considerations. Even if deterrence cannot be abandoned in order to prevent war, deterrence must not remain the language in which East and West understand each other best.

Confidence-building measures are very important in disarmament. However, confidence cannot flourish in the security sphere alone. Furthermore, after decades of distrust, confidence cannot simply be prescribed; it has to be developed step by step. Disarmament alone cannot lead to peace but peaceful cooperation in all areas will smooth the further path toward disarmament.

Gorbachev Meets With Weizsaecker

PM081103 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jul 87 Second Edition pp 1-2

["M.S. Gorbachev's Meeting With R. von Weizsaecker"]

[Text] On 7 July M.S. Gorbachev met FRG President Richard von Weizsaecker in the Yekatarinskiy Hall of the Kremlin Palace. While greeting the president and Foreign Minister Genscher, who accompanied him, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev recalled that during the latter's visit to Moscow last year, agreement seemed to have been reached on "opening a new page" in relations between the two countries. However, to date, it has remained unfilled, and at one time there was even a threat that it would be shut. Fortunately, this did not happen. It is precisely in this light that we are regarding the present visit of the FRG president.

In its attitude to the FRG, the Soviet Union takes account of its potential and possibilities and of its place in Europe and the world proceeds from the premise that the centuries-old history of links between the two countries -- in which there has been much which is grave as well as positive -- obliges them to relate to one another in a proper fashion. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev recalled that even during the most grave times of the last war, a sense of reality did not fail us. We did not confuse the German people with the Nazi regime, and we do not accuse them of the disasters which Hitler's aggression brought us.

We are constructing our present policy on a realistic evaluation of the possibilities of FRG participation in changing for the better the situation worldwide and in Europe. And we are of course calculating on a realistic evaluation by the FRG leadership of the role and possibilities of the Soviet Union.

In renovating our internal policy and implementing restructuring, we believe that as early as during its first stage possibilities are arising to bring relations with the FRG, and with other countries, to a new level, to impart a dynamic nature to them. We can see that in many layers of West German society, there is a reciprocal aspiration to develop relations with us in the most varied areas. All kinds of exceptional situations may arise. No one is insured against this. But if we adhere firmly to the main point -- a principled course -- any questions can be settled.

The two parties agreed that it is necessary to build relations between such states as the FRG and the USSR on a solid, long-term basis looking toward the year 2000 and beyond.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev welcomed Richard von Weizsaecker's statement about the Moscow Treaty and other treaties between the FRG and the socialist countries as a basis of the FRG's policy with regard to Eastern Europe. But when, he noted, we hear from time to time that the "German question" is open, that not all is clear with the "lands in the east," and that Yalta and Potsdam are "illegal," doubt arises: Has the FRG leadership made up its mind to consistently adhere to this treaty?

A sound approach to the question of relations between our countries at the present time and for the future will meet with an identical response on the part of the Soviet leadership, Comrade Gorbachev stressed. But it needs a policy which is not subject to fluctuation, or to an opportunist reaction to transient events and which reflects one's own, and not anyone else's, interests.

The opportunity exists to rethink relations between the two countries. We are prepared for this, but we must rid ourselves of complexes, political myths, and seeing the image of an enemy in the Soviet Union.

Solid relations between the FRG and the USSR would be of truly historical significance. Remaining as they are, in their own systems and their own alliances, both states can play a very big role in world developments. Stability in relations between them means stability in Europe and meets their own interests and also the interests of the European and world community of states.

A lively exchange of opinions on the concept of the "common European home" and the role in it of the Helsinki process with its "three baskets" took place. European construction is unthinkable without the active participation of the USSR and the FRG. The Soviet Union has an interest in the security of the FRG being reliable. It is prepared to jointly fill the "second basket," i.e. to strengthen the material base of pan-European development by expanding and improving economic links. It is prepared for a broad exchange on the "third basket," and this is also fully possible if it is not used in the future for interference in internal affairs.

Given certain emphases and nuances in approach to the construction of a peaceful Europe, similarity has been shown on this question in the essentials.

Reflecting on the concept of a common European home, the two parties touched upon the question of integrated processes in Eastern and Western Europe, and agreed that it is time to think about the pan-European process which could serve Europe as a whole. In this connection Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev drew attention to the serious harm which those elements of integration in Western Europe who are oriented toward creating new types of modern weapons in exchange for nuclear ones could bring to everyone. And this at a time when the question is being raised in all seriousness about a reduction in armed forces and all kinds of armaments in Europe, including conventional ones.

Supreme problems are facing mankind -- survival, the ecology, the scientific and technical revolution and its social consequences, problems of mutual information, power engineering, the population. They are soluble, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev emphasized, if one is guided by new thinking and one rids oneself of the psychology of the dinosaurs.

Richard von Weizsaecker touched on the question of the German nation. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev replied that he is not inclined to theorize on this concept in this context. What is of importance now is the political aspect. There exist two

German states with different social and political systems. They have values of their own; both have drawn lessons from history and each is able to make a contribution of its own to European and world affairs. History will decide what will happen in 10 years. No other approach is acceptable. If anyone were to take a different path, the consequences would be very serious. There should be the utmost clarity about this.

He recalled the postwar plans of Churchill and the Americans, and said that it is not the USSR that should be blamed for the division of Germany. Today, the two German states represent reality and it is from this that one must proceed.

Bidding farewell to the FRG's representatives, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev assessed the conversation that took place as being rich in content and frank [otkrytost], and expressed the hope that the new page in the mutual relations between the USSR and the FRG as a result of this visit and the further development of the summit level dialogue would be filled with positive content -- political, economic, scientific, technological and sports ties and contacts between the citizens of both countries.

Comrade Shevardnadze, Genscher, Ambassadors Kvitsinskiy and Meyer Landrut took part in the meeting.

Meets Gromyko 8 July

LD082139 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 8 Jul 87

[Excerpts] Talks were held today in the Kremlin between A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and FRG Federal President Richard von Weizsaecker.

Taking part in the talks were: on the Soviet side, P.N. Demichev, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; and Yu.A. Kvitsinskiy, USSR ambassador to the FRG; and on the FRG side, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, deputy Federal chancellor and Federal foreign minister; Andreas Meyer-Landrut, FRG ambassador to the USSR; and other officials.

The sides were unanimous in their assessment of the frank [oktrovennaya] conversation which took place the day before between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and R. von Weizsaecker, Federal president of the FRG, in which fundamental issues of the contemporary international situation and bilateral relations were discussed. That conversation, like the visit of the FRG president and the exchange of views which took place with him as a whole, showed that despite existing ideological differences there are a number of areas where the positions of the USSR and the FRG are close or coincide.

The general opinion among the participants of the talks is that in their own interests and also in the interests of peace in Europe and the whole world, it is necessary to affirm in international affairs the political philosophy which rejects wars, both nuclear and conventional, and which aims at peace and the joint resolution of the problems with which humanity is faced. The main problem is the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war and the establishment of an effective system of universal security.

When discussing political issues, A.A. Gromyko stressed that the Soviet Union has submitted important proposals on the elimination of medium-range and tactical and operational missiles in Europe. The position taken by the FRG regarding the Pershing-1A missiles on its territory gives cause for regret. Such a position is capable of spoiling things -- the vessel might be wrecked before it is launched. This chance to achieve an agreement has to be taken. Not only the Soviet Union and the United States are interested in this agreement on eliminating missiles, but also the FRG, other European states, and the entire world. It would be useful for the FRG Government to reconsider this greatly significant issue once more.

At the conclusion of the talks, R. von Weizsaecker stressed that everything will be done by the FRG side to place relations between the two states on a firm and friendly basis.

The two sides voiced their positive appraisal of the visit by the FRG Federal president to the Soviet Union, and expressed the conviction that this visit would be followed by further meetings, including meetings at a high level, which would be of benefit to both peoples and to the cause of peace, security, and cooperation in Europe.

Foreign Ministry Press Briefing

LD092133 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 9 Jul 87

[Text] A routine briefing on current political issues has taken place at the press center of the USSR Foreign Ministry. Touching on the subject of the visit by FRG President Von Weizsaecker to the USSR, Boris Dmitriyevich Pyadyshev, first deputy chief of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, said, among other things:

[Begin Pyadyshev recording] The past few days have been a time of active political dialogue between the Soviet leadership and the FRG president. The meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and President Von Weizsaecker, which took place 7 July, was of central importance. In the course of the conversation, Mikhail Sergeyevich stressed the possibilities for and the readiness of the Soviet Union to take relations with the FRG to a new level and to lend them a dynamic character. Comrade Gorbachev welcomed the statement of the FRG president on the Moscow Treaty and other treaties of the FRG with socialist countries as a basis of the FRG policy with regard to eastern Europe.

However, when one hears that the German question allegedly is open, that not all is clear as far as the eastern lands are concerned, and that Yalta and Potsdam are not lawful, one begins to doubt whether the FRG leadership intends to adhere consistently to the Moscow Treaty. The matter of the Bundeswehr Pershing-1A missiles is a question to which the German side has not managed to reply. One gets the impression that the West German side wishes to establish a vicious-circle situation here. In the course of the conversations, a question was put as to who has the Pershing-1A carrier missiles. There followed the answer that they are under the command of the Bundeswehr Air Force. Another question was: In whose hands are the nuclear warheads on these carriers? The answer was: The keys to them are in the hands of the United States. What comes out of it, then? The U.S. nuclear warheads can be used only in combination with the Pershing-1A missiles, and these missiles are in the hands of the Bundeswehr. The result is that the FRG is a co-owner of nuclear weapons. If this is the case, then it is one of the crudest violations of the nonproliferation treaty. Another side of the matter is this: This Americans are talking constantly about the interests of their allies, but the Soviet Union also has allies.

Why is it that the United States may transfer nuclear weapons to the possession of its partners, whereas the Soviet Union may not? The presence of the Pershing-1A missiles in the FRG causes a great deal of concern in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Poland, and in other socialist countries, as well. Overall, the FRG has shown that its position on this question leads it to an impasse.

The Soviet side has stated with all clarity that if the FRG Government wants to conclude as soon as possible an agreement on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles, it must define its position. [end recording]

Kohl Notes Ties, Visit

LD101254 Moscow TASS in English 1220 GMT 10 Jul 87

[Text] Bonn July 10 TASS -- The West German Government expresses readiness to cooperate with the Soviet Union on a long-term basis in the belief that relations between the FRG and the USSR are of pivotal importance, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl told a press conference here today. He highly appraised the results of the negotiations of West German President Richard von Weizsaecker during his official visit to the Soviet Union. The visit, the chancellor pointed out, is a landmark on the way to deepening understanding between the two countries. The head of the Bonn government favoured reaching an understanding on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe this year. At the same time he reaffirmed that Bonn was in no mood to renounce West German missiles Pershing-1A with U.S. nuclear warheads. Such a position is known to interfere with the progress in nuclear disarmament in Europe.

Moscow TV Carries Youth Meeting

LD122257 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1910 GMT 12 Jul 87

[Special program on the meeting between FRG Federal President Richard von Weizsaecker and representatives of Soviet youth at Moscow's Central Television Studio; Weizsaecker speaks in German fading to Russian translation; date not specified -- recorded]

[Excerpts]

[Unidentified youth, in German] Thank you very much.

[Unidentified youth, in German fading into Russian translation] Mr President, I would also like to say a few words about restructuring. In my opinion restructuring can be divided into two parts: Restructuring in a single country, for example, in the USSR, and restructuring in the world as a whole. It is this restructuring in the world as a whole that is connected with the overall struggle for peace; that is, all people, including young people, must contribute to this restructuring, and my question consists of the following: This is a question about the mass youth antiwar movements in the FRG. What mass youth organizations are there in the FRG whose activities are connected with an active struggle for disarmament, for the prevention of a new nuclear war, against the militarization of space, and against the siting of U.S. medium-range missiles on the territory of Western Europe? What forms of struggle are used by these organizations?

[Weizsaecker] First of all you have to proceed from the fact that our degree of organization is considerably lower than yours. We don't have the sort of youth

organization that you have. We, on the contrary, have very many spontaneous youth groups which concentrate on certain definite themes, but thereby go their own way. So I cannot say anything definite to you about any sort of central leadership, or about any definite political intention, or campaign. We don't have that. Second, the desire of the younger generation to ensure peace in our country is, for sure, no less than yours. This is connected with an aspiration to reduce, step by step, weapons that are capable of destroying mankind. Also of relevance here is the fact that a reduction in nuclear weapons must not lead to such a situation in which wars using other, so-called conventional weapons, might again become possible, like the terrible wars that have been waged previously. That means that the task of the struggle for peace lies not only in opposing nuclear weapons, but also in opposing conventional weapons.

In recent decades great mutual mistrust has existed between countries. A consequence of this mistrust was also a constant growth in armaments. For this reason the need to reduce weapons is the profound conviction of young people, but not only of young people. The aim of reducing these weapons has to be respect for the security needs of the other side. One must have the sort of weapons systems that are suitable only for defense and not for attack. Unexpected actions have to be excluded. A second essential aspect of ensuring peace: Trust is created not by disarmament, but by cooperation. And the better peaceful cooperation functions, the more favorable its effect on disarmament. Consequently, we want to devote ourselves to tasks relating to disarmament, but not at the expense of various spheres of cooperation.

Soviet Spokesman Comments

DW101020 Hamburg BILD in German 10 Jul 87 p 10

[Interview with Kremlin Deputy Spokesman Yuriy Gromitskikh -- title and name as published -- by correspondent Wolfgang Kenntemich; date and place not given]

[Text] BILD: How does the Soviet leadership assess Weizsaecker's visit?

Gromitskikh: As a very useful thing. The talks were necessary because there are opportunities to improve relations further. Possibilities for talks with the Federal Government are better now.

BILD: What role will the FRG play?

Gromitskikh: One stemming from the weight it carries in NATO as the second strongest alliance country and as the deployment country of most medium-range nuclear weapons, particularly the Pershing-2 weapons.

The Federal Government can render a significant and constructive contribution to getting disarmament moving. An agreement on a double zero solution for medium-range missiles would be a breakthrough.

However, the problem of the Pershing-1A missiles remains an obstacle.

BILD: What do you mean exactly?

Gromitskikh: We are asking the Federal Government once more to seriously consider its position and to maintain a constructive attitude.

The Americans must include the 72 Pershing-1A missiles in the negotiations. There is no other way! Now is the hour of truth. We will see who was honest about the zero solution and who was just evasive.

Moscow Radio Commentary

LD102203 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 10 Jul 87

[Text] An official farewell ceremony was held in Moscow today for FRG President von Weizsaecker. At Vnukovo Airport he was seen off by Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, and other officials. Over to our commentator, Viktor Levin.

[Levin] During his stay in Moscow, FRG President von Weizsaecker had a meeting with Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and held talks with Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, chairman of the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Summarizing the results of the conversations which took place, it is possible to say that they were useful, because the mutual interest and desire for the development of relations was expressed. This is grounds for a positive assessment of the visit by the FRG president to the USSR. One imagines that such a result causes satisfaction in our two countries, and in other states of Europe; after all, the state of affairs in the common European home depends to not a small degree on the development of Soviet-German relations. This topic was broadly reflected in the course of the conversations.

It is clear now as never before that any European state is simply bound to contribute to the resolution of the problems which confront our continent, and many such problems have accumulated. These are the problems of security -- which ought of course to be placed at the forefront; and the problems of cooperation in the sphere of economics, ecology, and humanitarian matters.

At a press conference in Moscow, President von Weizsaecker gave a positive assessment of the Soviet proposal to hold a conference in Moscow of the participating states of the All-European Conference on Humanitarian Matters, and this is gratifying. But we still never got a clear answer to the question of the FRG's position with respect to the Pershing-1A missiles.

It is well known that Bonn qualified its agreement to the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range and operational and tactical missiles with the demand to leave the Pershing-1A operational and tactical missiles -- whose nuclear warheads are controlled by the Americans -- at its disposal. If the warheads belong to the United States then they ought to be included in the clauses of the agreement which is being drafted. But if, however, they are at the FRG's disposal, then one is faced with a violation of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. For this reason, the Soviet side said that if the FRG Government wants the speedy conclusion of an agreement on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles, then it ought to define its position on this matter.

By the way, when we have been presented with tricky questions, we have not left them unanswered. For example, with respect to the question on the German nation, Comrade Gorbachev replied that the political aspect is now important. There are two German states with different socio-political structures. This is a reality. It is necessary to proceed from this. It is quite a different matter, however, that not everyone in the FRG likes such an approach. To recognize the realities and to go forward -- that is our approach. On this basis there are good prospects for relations between the USSR and the FRG.

Weekly Talk Show 12 July

LD122040 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 12 Jul 87

["International Observers Roundtable" presented by Nikolay Agayants, with Yuriy Kornilov, TASS political observer, and commentator Viktor Levin]

[Excerpts] [Agayants] Hello, comrades. We're at the height of summer, but in spite of that, and in spite of the fact that the vacation season has begun, the world's political life is not coming to a standstill. The processes taking place in the world and the events of recent days prove beyond dispute that today, the problem of survival, which of course existed previously, confronts us in its most acute form as the problem of preserving human civilization from inevitable destruction if there is a thermonuclear war. The new approaches to international affairs by which our state is guided, today constitute not only the sole possibility under existing conditions, but also the most absolutely realistic possibility. This is confirmed, among other things, by the Soviet-FRG talks held in Moscow this week, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov's visit to Austria, and the consultative meeting of the communist and revolutionary democratic parties of the countries of Asia and the Pacific which has just ended in Ulaanbaatar.

[Levin] Finally, by the birth of the 5 billionth inhabitant of the earth, which has been marked this week. You may think this is not an event of international significance, but at the same time, the very fact that there are now 5 billion people on our planet is a very important occasion for reflection about the destiny of mankind, the destiny of all children, and the destiny of the infant who has become the 5 billionth inhabitant of the earth. The new thinking that the Soviet Union is putting forward is ideally suited to solving the problems facing mankind. The concrete examples you mentioned, Nikolay Ivanovich, the Soviet-FRG talks, the Soviet-Austrian talks and so on, confirm that we are putting into effect our policy of implementing the new political thinking. We are making it concrete, we are giving that philosophy specific content in accordance with today's requirements.

[Agayants] Yes, here's a concrete example. On 7 July, in the Yekaterinenskiy Hall of the Kremlin Palace, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had a meeting with FRG President Richard von Weizsaecker. Welcoming the distinguished West German guest and FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, who accompanied him, the CPSU Central Committee general secretary reminded him that during Genscher's visit to Moscow last year, it seemed to have been agreed that a new page would be turned in bilateral relations, but that so far, that page has remained blank, and at one time there was even a threat that the entire book might be closed. Fortunately, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev noted, that did not happen. It is in this light that we regard the present visit of the FRG president to the USSR. All signs are that the talks were not easy. They touched on a wide range of problems concerning relations between our two countries and on the general European and human level. Tell us more about this, Viktor Nikolayevich.

[Levin] First I'd like to remind listeners what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev meant when he said that at one time there was even a threat that as yet unwritten new page in the book of Soviet-FRG relations might be closed. This happened through the fault of the FRG. We must be clear about this.

At the time of the election campaign in the FRG, when the parties of the present coalition government who'd also been in power before the elections were fighting to keep their seats in parliament, certain statements were made and -- I'd even say -- measures taken, which were in no way conducive to improving Soviet-FRG relations. On the contrary, a deep shadow was cast on those relations.

At the time, many sober-minded FRG politicians said with reason that it would probably be some time before the situation could be restored to normal, before a new stage, a new frontier, could be reached in relations with the Soviet Union. I don't think we've forgotten all that has happened -- no, it wouldn't be true to say that -- but we're realists and we fully understand that one should not overestimate certain negative phenomena if there is a desire to rectify past mistakes.

West Germany has recently shown that it does, indeed, want to get over the problems that have been created. It seems to me this visit by FRG President Richard von Weizsaecker has been just such an attempt, and that this attempt has been successful. Certainly, it has been a success. The dialogue has been carried a stage further and new vistas have been opened.

We know how the visit has been evaluated by FRG Chancellor Kohl: He has said that the visit of the FRG president is a milestone on the path to a deeper mutual understanding between the two countries. Foreign Minister Genscher, who accompanied Von Weizsaecker on his trip to the Soviet Union, has remarked that both governments are looking to the future. This is undoubtedly a positive sign, and we observe with satisfaction that progress has been made, though -- and this must also be pointed out -- not all the questions have been resolved. By no means all.

[Agayants] At the meeting in the Yekaterinenskiy Hall of the Kremlin Palace, Richard von Weizsaecker mentioned in the course of the conversation a question that the Western Sovietologists regard as delicate: the question of the German nation. In reply, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev declared, quite precisely, clearly, and firmly, that he was not inclined to theorize about the concept in the present context. What is important now, he said, is the political aspect. There are two German states with different sociopolitical systems. They have their own values. Both have learned the lessons of history and each can make its contribution to the affairs of Europe and of the world. What will happen in a hundred years, history will decide.

[Kornilov] Here, Viktor Nikolayevich, we're talking about factors which, in a general way, I'd say are hindering the development of a positive Helsinki process in Europe. Among these factors is another that can be noted. A new term has now cropped up in the West European press: In German it is kecker spatz, meaning something like impudent sparrow. What kind of a bird is this? We learn that this is to be the name of the joint exercise by the French Armed Forces and the FRG Bundeswehr scheduled for September. Efforts are being made to set up a joint French-FRG military brigade. The French minister of defense, speaking recently in Paris, alluded that this military cooperation between France and West Germany will be carried out within the framework of the NATO bloc. French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, in an interview just published on 8 July in the Paris newspaper LE MONDE, urged that the countries of Western Europe should continue their efforts to organize their joint defense on the basis of a so-called European security charter. Again, the French defense minister, speaking in Paris, not only advocated intensifying French-FRG military cooperation, but also tried to cast a shadow over the Soviet peace proposals and call into question the very idea of curbing the arms race in Europe.

[Agayants] Yes, that is so, Yuriy Emmanuilovich, but I'd like to return to the FRG-Soviet talks that have been held this week in Moscow. Our line, our course, is clear and precise. We are for honest competition between the two systems, excluding war, hot or cold, economic psychological. We are for equal, mutually beneficial cooperation. More concretely than ever before, we stand before the alternative: Either we survive together, or we perish together. So there is only one choice open to us that we can make together and that is to interact and to cooperate. The opposite course, of confrontation, we reject. It is our firm conviction that peace and cooperation must be built on the foundation of disarmament and security for all. That is why our country is putting forward its program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the present century. The FRG president was told this in Moscow in no uncertain terms.

I personally felt that Richard von Weizsaecker's stance during the talks was affected not only by the character of the Atlantic views and concepts regarding, among other things, Euromissiles, but also by the constant influence of the FRG's partner in that bloc, Washington. Though, in words, all this was dressed up to look very respectable, but perhaps I'm wrong.

[Levin] There's one question here to which, quite honestly, I don't yet know the answer. We know what Bonn's official position is on Euromissiles. That position is expressed in the fact that the FRG supports the Soviet-U.S. agreement which is being worked out on eliminating medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. But at the same time, Bonn is persistently trying to remove from the subject matter of the talks -- to place beyond the scope of those talks -- its own Pershing-1A missiles and their missiles of the operational and tactical class with a range of 700-750 km, which have U.S. nuclear warheads. Now, this element raises a number of questions. Who is the initiator here? Are the Bonn circles acting here on their own initiatives, on the basis of their own national interests as they see them? After all, what is the situation? If a Soviet-U.S. agreement is concluded on the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles -- and there is hope of that and I do not think one can still say at the present time that we may even get such an agreement this year -- if, then, that agreement does come about while the Pershing-1A missiles with U.S. nuclear warheads remain, it will undermine the treaty. Well, I think the main question is not: Who is the initiator? The main point is that the U.S. nuclear warheads for those FRG missiles are a factor that hangs like a heavy weight shackling the feet of the parties to the talks.

[Kornilov] The upshot of it all is that, objectively, the FRG is a co-possessor of nuclear weapons, and if so, this is in any case a violation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

[Levin] Quite right. This is another thing that attention was drawn to at the talks with Von Weizsaecker. I think we simply have to repeat that, yes, the right of the FRG president to the Soviet Union was needed; yes, it was useful; yes, it enabled us to move forward in Soviet-FRG relations, but at the same time questions remain and that we must work on, have to solve.

[Kornilov] I'd put it this way, Viktor Nikolayevich, that if you take what we've been saying in a broad perspective, then this visit and these talks have demonstrated once again the strength and timeliness of the new political thinking and of the new philosophy in Soviet foreign policy. Now this brings me to a curious fact. A book called Hammer has just been published in New York. It's the autobiography of Armand Hammer, a prominent representative of U.S. business circles who is also very widely

known in our country. He was in the Soviet Union in 1922, as a young businessman, and met Vladimir Ilich Lenin. Now, in the year of the 70th anniversary of the Great October, we turn particularly often in memory to our history.

Well, Hammer writes in his book that when he was in Moscow and met Lenin, he presented to Lenin, as a souvenir, a statuette he'd bought in London of a monkey sitting on a volume of Charles Darwin and examining a human skull. Hammer recalls in his book that Lenin was greatly taken by the symbolism of this little statuette and made an extraordinarily perspicacious remark. As the weapons of war become more and more destructive, he said, civilization may be destroyed unless mankind learns to live in space. The time may come, Lenin continued, when a monkey surviving on earth will pick up the skull of a man, look at it, and wonder where it came from. Hammer writes that Lenin was saying this 23 years before the explosion of the first atom bomb. An interesting fact and it happened, I repeat, in the year 1922. In 1918, 3 years before the encounter, Vladimir Ilich Lenin had noted that: Modern technology is now making war more and more destructive, but there will come a time when war will be so destructive that it will cease to be possible at all. These words have been preserved for us in her reminiscences by Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya. How prophetic, how relevant and topical these words of Lenin seem to us today!

[Agayants] Now, in this notable year in our own history and in the history of mankind, the Soviet Union is demonstrating a realistic and constructive foreign policy literally in all areas of activity and in all regions of the globe. We've already mentioned today the visit of the head of the Soviet Government, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, to Austria. This is also very indicative of our course in foreign affairs: the development of good relations with all states. During the visit to Austria of the Soviet delegation led by Comrade Ryzhkov, a number of agreements were signed, for instance on trade in the Danube region between the USSR and Austria; a protocol on cooperation in the deliveries of natural gas from the USSR to Austria; and agreement on cooperation in the tourist trade; a program of cultural and scientific cooperation, and so on. We believe that the potential for developing Soviet-Austrian economic relations is far from exhausted. We're now beginning to talk about developing industrial aware that Austria could also play a very substantial role, not only in the development of economic relations, not only in the creation of new economic systems, but that it could also play a very important political role in the life of the European Continent, in the life of the entire world. It's this urge to develop relations in every direction, this striving to bring into action the whole potential for strengthening peace that is the hallmark of our policy.

[Levin] It's perfectly apparent that today, when huge armories of nuclear weapons have been stockpiled and pose a threat to the very survival of the human race, new approaches to the problems of war and peace are a vital necessity; that we need a new political thinking that will fully correspond to the harsh realities of the age. We assume it must be based on recognizing the fact that in modern conditions, war is unthinkable and must be excluded from the life of society; that security, whether it be a question of particular countries or of entire continents, can only be mutual. That is our position, that is our course, and we adhere to it rigorously.

Politburo Discusses Visit

LD171709 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 17 Jul 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] In the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

At its latest session, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo discussed organizational, political, and economic measures connected with the practical implementation of the decisions of the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

The Politburo examined the results of the conversations and negotiations of Comrades Gorbachev and Gromyko with Von Weizsaecker, the FRG's federal president, and of Comrades Shevardnadze and Yakovlev with Genscher, the FRG vice chancellor and foreign minister, which took place within the framework of the FRG federal president's official visit to the Soviet Union.

The conversations and meetings with the FRG state official in Moscow were useful. They provided an opportunity to compare the positions of our countries in international affairs, focus attention on the issues of halting the arms race and disarmament, on a cardinal improvement in the situation in Central Europe, and on the need for a fresh approach to the solution of contemporary problems.

The main pressing task is to free the European Continent from medium-range nuclear weapons and operational and tactical missiles. In this connection the hope was expressed anew that the FRG Government will not put obstacles in the way of this process and will take the appropriate steps to facilitate the achievement of an accord on this issue in Geneva.

It was noted that despite political and ideological differences and a different military and strategic orientation the USSR and the FRG can be partners. The Soviet side confirms its readiness to develop stable relations which are not subject to the transient moment, with the FRG as a significant West European partner, provided it be understood that the FRG will display a similar readiness and will not burden it in any way. There are broad objective possibilities for cooperation between the USSR and the FRG in the construction of the common European house on the basis of recognition of and respect for the realities in Europe and the strict observance of the Moscow treaty and its filling with life. A new productive page can be opened in relations between the USSR and the FRG by the joint efforts of both sides. This would accord both with the interests of the peoples of the two countries and also with the interests of the whole continent.

There was an examination of the outcome of Comrade Ryzhkov's visit to Austria and the results of his talks with Vranitzky, federal chancellor of the Austrian Republic, and with other state officials.

It was noted that this visit confirmed the traditionally fruitful character of Soviet-Austrian relations and showed a mutual interest in an expansion of bilateral cooperation in the political and economic fields and in the sphere of culture and humanitarian links.

The Politburo heard a report by Comrade Dobrynin on the results of the consultative meeting of revolutionary-democratic parties for peace, security, and good-neighborly cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region which took place on 7-9 July in Ulaanbaatar, and approved the activities of the CPSU delegation at this meeting. The significant importance was noted of the desire expressed by the fraternal parties taking part in the meeting to make their multilateral contacts more regular and varied in order to seek together ways of consolidating peace, eliminating tension, and improving the political climate in Asia and the Pacific Basin, in which the peoples of this extensive and most populated part of the globe are vitally interested.

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CSO: 5200/1582

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW HITS NATO DISCUSSIONS ON ZERO OPTION

Reykjavik Foreign Ministers' Session

OW131313 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2307 GMT 11 Jun 87

[From the "Novosti" newscast, presented by Vsevolod Solovyev]

[Text] The NATO foreign ministers conference opened in Reykjavik. Our commentary.

[Solovyev] This session is cause for particular interest. For it is at this session, according to the promises of the NATO leaders, that an answer will, at long last, be given to the Soviet initiatives on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe as well as the elimination of operational-tactical missiles. In other words, an answer to the double zero option.

The Soviet proposals have already been discussed at the previous sessions of NATO's various military organs. However, the participants at these sessions were not able to formulate a common position of the bloc on this question.

A majority of NATO members today speak out in support of the Soviet proposals. But a majority is not everyone. Recently, FRG Chancellor Kohl made a statement in which he positively responded to the idea of the elimination of intermediate-range missiles and operational-tactical weapons in Europe.

At the same time, he announced that there can be no talk about the unconditional acceptance of the Soviet proposals on zero option for missiles with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km. But it is precisely these missiles that belong to the operational-tactical category. How is one to understand the chancellor's statement? Is he for or against the proposals?

It has been stated in Paris that the prospect of eliminating intermediate-range missiles in Europe is consistent with French interests. But the French Government, for all intents and purposes, adopts the position of rejecting all proposals in regard to disarmament.

London expressed its readiness to approve the double zero option; however, under conditions of appropriate guarantees of security from the West.

London places its hope on the nuclear deterrent strategy. It could therefore be assumed that appropriate guarantees would be the further stockpiling of nuclear and conventional weapon arsenals.

At the conference of the Seven which just ended in Venice, leaders of the largest countries of the West made numerous calls for peace. To what extent these are sincere will be shown at the NATO Council session which opened in Reykjavik.

NATO Council Session

LD191752 Moscow International Service in Polish 1300 GMT 19 Jun 87

[Station commentary]

[Text] At the end of the NATO Council meeting in Reykjavik, the countries of that bloc at last gave a positive response to the Soviet Union's proposal which was supported by all the Warsaw Pact states, that is, the proposal to eliminate medium-range and operational and tactical missiles from Europe. This can undoubtedly be regarded as a first step by the Western countries on the road toward a real lessening of the nuclear threat hanging over Europe. Taking their decision, the governments of the NATO countries could not fail to take into account the almost unanimous approval evoked among the nations of Europe by the idea of a double zero option. Recently conducted public opinion polls in the FRG, Italy, and Great Britain showed (?absolutely) that the policy of the United States, the leader of NATO, (?no longer) wins the confidence of the nations of Europe. According to data from the U.S. Information Agency, 63 percent of Britons justifiably think that the initiative on arms control issues belongs to the Soviet Union, and a mere 13 percent gave preference to the United States.

NATO's agreement to the liquidation of missiles should be regarded somewhat as an attempt to regain confidence, even partially. One can at the same time perceive a certain nervousness in the decision by the NATO Council, (?a nervousness) with which some circles in the Western countries regarded the real prospect of reaching an agreement concerning two classes of missiles. NATO has hedged its agreement round with conditions, which may turn out to be a serious obstacle on the road to reaching agreement. There is insistence, for example, on keeping both the West German Pershing-1A missiles and the U.S. nuclear warheads for them, thus mixing together two completely different problems.

The Soviet Union proposes the liquidation, for the time being, of Soviet and U.S. missiles only, which does not apply to the Bundeswehr's Pershings. The nuclear warheads are another issue. They are to be found (?on the weapons of the army) of the United States and for that reason should be liquidated.

Reading the communique of the final session, one must wonder at how the very generalized cliches declaring faithfulness to the cause of disarmament differ from the theses on the subject of NATO's specific military-political activity. This is particularly evident if we compare it with the documents

of the recent Berlin conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee.

As is known, the conference adopted a document on the military doctrine of the fraternal countries which stresses that the main task of the armies of the alliance is to prevent both nuclear and conventional war. It is underscored here that the Warsaw Pact countries will never be first to use nuclear weapons and will not begin war operations against any state or alliance of states, if they themselves are not the object of aggression. A completely different approach is presented by the NATO ministers. In (?their) document, the basis of stabilization is taken to the long-discredited doctrine of nuclear deterrence and flexible reaction. The former actually pushes toward permanent fanning of the nuclear threat and envisages attempts to disturb the military-strategic balance to the West's advantage. As for NATO's flexible reaction doctrine, it does not rule out first use of nuclear weapons. It is no accident that NATO has decided to ignore the appeal of the Berlin conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee on conducting consultations with the aim of confronting the military-political doctrines of both alliances.

(?How many) various kinds of insinuation have been thought up about the military doctrines of the socialist countries? Now, however, when--after presenting the essence of their military doctrine--the Warsaw Pact has proposed the elimination in the course of consultation of mutual suspicions, NATO evaded a response: Perhaps because it does not intend to give up its aggressive strategy. They gave similar treatment to the issue of conventional weapons. As is known, in Berlin, a constructive formula augmenting the initiative on the reduction of armed forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals put forward by the socialist countries in Budapest last year, was proposed at the highest level. In accordance with this formula, existing and asymmetry should be removed, by reducing the armaments of the (?group which is ahead). Against common sense, however, NATO demands reductions from the Soviet Union alone, leaving itself the right to increase armaments.

As for the speeches which responded at the NATO Council session, many of them recalled echoes of cold war policy. That is how many journalists described the speech by bloc Secretary General Carrington, who expatiated on the increasing divide, detrimental to the West, between the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, demanding that efforts in the military sphere could not weaken.

So, forced to take a step (?to meet) the Warsaw Pact on the issue of the double zero option, NATO is still imprisoned by its confrontation policy, in the trenches of nuclear dogma.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW COMMENTS ON REAGAN SPEECH

LD162104 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 16 Jun 87

["Latest News" commentary by Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] As we have already reported, President Reagan has spoken on television, expounding the position of his administration on the problem of disarmament. A "Latest News" commentary. Our political observer Aleksandr Zholkver is at the microphone:

[Zholkver] I would formulate the first impression after becoming acquainted with the President's speech using the well-known saying: Better late than never.

After long weeks of all kinds of conferences, consultations and discussions in the most varied bodies of NATO and at various meetings of Western leaders, including the last meeting of the Big Seven in Venice, Washington, it seems, is ready to give a positive answer to at least some of the most important USSR proposals on problems of disarmament, first and foremost, nuclear. At all events, President Reagan stated that the Soviet-American talks now being conducted may lead to the concluding of a historic treaty on reducing medium-range missiles.

It is true that in this speech too the head of the Washington administration did not mention a word about such an important aspect of this problem as the question of Pershing-1A missiles which are in the armory of the Bundeswehr. Meanwhile this question is being widely discussed in the FRG itself, where I happened to spend the whole of last week. And yet another statement by a representative of the Bonn government has been published today, which once again confirms that the Bundeswehr's Pershings supposedly do not come under the agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles and ought, as they say, to remain inviolable. It is not surprising that such a formulation of the question is engendering unease and indignation in the West German public. In Bonn I happened to witness a 100,000-strong antiwar demonstration and one of its main slogans said "Remove all Pershings." While looking at this mass demonstration I was also thinking of another thing: The very upsurge in the antiwar movement, and not only in the FRG but also in other countries, including the United States, is one of those reasons which impelled Western leaders, including President Reagan, to finally give a positive answer to the Soviet Union's and other socialist countries' peace initiatives.

In this connection how can one not recall the USSR's new proposals on halting nuclear tests, as laid down in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's reply to the statement by leaders of the Delhi Six? Or the recent Berlin initiative by the Warsaw Pact organization on the formulating of military defense doctrines, or the proposal repeated most recently by the GDR and the CSSR on the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in the center of Europe?

There are many aspects to the problem of disarmament and concrete proposals to all of them have been made by the socialist countries. It seems that Washington is ready to accept at least one of them. Indeed, as they say, better late than never.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET ARMY PAPER CITES GENERAL ROGERS' TIMES INTERVIEW

PM221045 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jun 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "General Rogers Is Angry"]

[Text] London, 20 Jun--General B. Rogers, NATO supreme allied commander in Europe, is angry. He does not hide his feelings and eagerly imparts his accumulated indignation to representatives of the Western press and in a talk with a TIMES newspaper correspondent recently made it clear that the talks on an agreement to eliminate medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe do not suit him at all, just as they do not suit other NATO generals.

"I believe," Rogers stated, "that we have been moving too damned fast at the talks." And what if they should suddenly lead to the signing of an agreement? What will happen then? The general believes that nothing good will happen. NATO, he says, will lose a "weapon of nuclear resistance" and the countries of the bloc, primarily West Europe, will be "defenseless" in the face of the "Soviet threat." The supreme commander in chief totally ignores the fact that it was the Soviet Union which was the initiator of important peace proposals and that it is Moscow which is insisting on measures in the disarmament field.

B. Rogers' interview with the TIMES is one of the general's numerous statements on a medium-range missile agreement recently. To this can be added the fact that it is symptomatic of the outburst of militarist and anti-Soviet sentiments in the United States, which are intensified whenever the prospect of an accord between the two great powers arises.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: APN MILITARY BULLETIN CITED ON FRG PERSHING

LD011515 Moscow TASS in English 1435 GMT 1 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 1 TASS -- The United States known stand with regard to West German "Pershing-1A" delivery vehicles highlighted the NATO problem of "double control" and observance of fundamental articles of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty the anniversary of whose signing falls due today, says an article published in the Military Review of the NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY. The governments that signed that treaty, among them the USA and the FRG, pledged themselves not to transfer and not to accept nuclear arms, the military review writes. And without such transfer and acceptance "Pershing-1A" missiles largely become pointless for they were conceived as a binary system of sorts: Its components are held by two countries which have a special relationship in NATO. The question arises as to what is the mechanism of putting that binary system into operation. A system which envisages a direct transfer of nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear country in an "emergency" has been adopted within NATO.

In this case non-nuclear countries on whose territory U.S. nuclear weapons are situated, for instance the FRG or Italy, are given the right to use such weapons on their own delivery vehicles on order from the national command. According to scenarios of NATO exercises, at a certain stage of a crisis a number of delivery vehicles at the disposal of the FRG, approximately one-third, and possibly even a greater part, is fitted out with U.S. nuclear warheads.

As to the FRG Government, it, on the one hand, publicly denies its involvement in this binary system from time to time and proclaims its adherence to the letter of the Paris agreements and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. On the other hand, Bonn participates ever more actively in the political consultations with regard to nuclear weapons, and in the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO.

The persistent striving to preserve "Pershing-1A" missiles is based on far-reaching calculations linked with the United States intention to violate the non-proliferation regime on the terms it imposes itself, and create the precedent for a "broader interpretation" of the new treaties with the USSR that have not yet even been signed. No less significant is the striving to avoid now and in the future the elimination of the systems discarded by the USA. Washington is already openly discussing the plans of reequipping "Pershing-2" missiles into "Pershing-1B" missiles and transfer at least part of them to the Bundeswehr to replace the obsolete "Pershing-1A" missiles, naturally, with U.S. nuclear charges. The question of what an effect such actions might have on the talks on medium -and shorter-range missiles is relegated to the background, as if the interest in it was being lost, the article says in conclusion.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA NOTES JARUZELSKI COMMENTS ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES

PM080943 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "W. Jaruzelski's Speech"]

[Text] Warsaw, 1 Jul -- We attach enormous importance to the Soviet-U.S. talks and especially to the elimination of medium-range missiles, which could be a first step [as published], W. Jaruzelski, chairman of the Polish State Council, stated at a news conference in Tokyo. A report on it was put out by PAP.

Such a step, he said, would be the first real specific action of the postwar period to limit arms in such an important and dangerous sphere as nuclear weapons. In light of this, Poland ardently supports all efforts in this sphere. We believe that the Soviet proposals are courageous, open, and realistic in their content. We hope that U.S. actions will follow the same road. The United States has nuclear missiles and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles sited in various parts of the Far East and the Pacific. The question of reducing and eliminating these means in this particular region is to be the topic of separate talks, which we also wish success.

Poland has put forward an initiative of its own -- a plan for the reduction of arms and strengthening of confidence in Central Europe. It is a very realistic plan, in our view. It takes account of the interests of all parties involved, has the support of all our allies, and has attracted the attention of most of our Western partners.

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TASS ASSAILS U.S. 'ANTI-HUMAN POSITION'

LD112223 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1005 GMT 11 Jul 87

[By TASS political observer Sergey Kulik]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Jul (TASS) -- The more real, visible and tangible the possibility of accords on nuclear weapons becomes as a result of the Soviet Union's constructive initiatives, the more obstacles and difficulties are invented by the U.S. side to hamper this. They are stalemating the talks on some of the most important problems for the destiny of civilization.

Washington does not have and cannot have any arguments to justify such a position -- we'll give it the name it deserves: an anti-human position. For this reason the U.S. side systematically endeavors to blame the USSR for the fact that the Geneva talks are marking time. Even at the present time U.S. State Department Spokesman Redman, addressing journalists in Washington on Friday, has stated: "The Soviet Union is moving away from what we consider to be a constructive or positive approach to certain difficult problems." Redman even found it possible to speak of a certain reluctance on the part of the Soviet interlocutors to "participate seriously and constructively in their proceedings."

This is said after the Soviet Union has put forward the idea of the double zero in Europe for medium-range and operational and tactical missiles! This idea was approved by the Western Europeans, and the United States found itself forced to consent to it too. But now they are taking evasive action: they are insisting on the retention of U.S. nuclear warheads for the operational and tactical missiles that they gave to the FRG.

They even try to justify such a "position" by contending that the weapons of a "third party" cannot be subject to discussion at the bilateral Soviet-U.S. talks. But no one knows better than Washington that it is a matter of U.S. warheads, that the "third party" has nothing to do with it, because the FRG does not possess any nuclear weapons.

A strange opinion, to say the least, is being expressed on the banks of the Rhine, too, with regard to this question: "The FRG considers that the Pershing-1A missiles are not subject to the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva." In other words, certain circles in the West are conducting matters so that the zero should be on the side of the Soviet Union, and quite a substantial nuclear arsenal should remain on the side of the United States.

In its attempts to hinder progress on disarmament, the U.S. side does not shrink, at times, from appearing in the eyes of the world public in a perfectly ludicrous light. Washington's present stance on the Soviet proposal for a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive arms is certainly ridiculous. It is a long-established principle in Soviet-U.S. agreements that the warheads on missiles are counted by the number with which a missile of a given type has been tested. But now the U.S. side has proposed a new and totally arbitrary way of counting. Its use offers the possibility of counting far more warheads on Soviet missiles than they actually have, while for the warheads on the U.S. missiles, an appreciably smaller number is given than the real one.

The reasons for such "new absurdities" in the U.S. position are very old. They are the interest that the influential military groups have in the arms race and, in consequence, the lack of any constructive concept on the part of the NATO ruling circles of how to build East-West relations if confrontation is renounced. That is why it is difficult not to agree with the frank admission made in Brussels on Friday by (Keel), the permanent U.S. representative at NATO headquarters: "The United States," he said, "has not the slightest desire or interest in eliminating all its nuclear weapons in Europe, at least in the near future".

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CSO: 5200/1580

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS BLAMES U.S. FOR LACK OF PROGRESS AT GENEVA

LD111751 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 11 Jul 87

[Text] A TASS observer says the Geneva talks on nuclear arms have been making no headway through the fault of the United States. Simultaneously, the United States has been trying to accuse the Soviet Union of this. Yesterday, a State Department spokesman said the Soviet partners were unwilling to conduct serious negotiations. The TASS observer recalls that it's the Soviet Union who has suggested a double zero option on medium-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe. The idea has been welcomed by West Europeans.

The United States was compelled to accept it too but now the United States is insisting on the retention of American nuclear warheads on shorter-range missiles earlier transferred to Federal Germany. The United States explains this by the fact that weaponry of a third party is not subject to Soviet-American negotiations.

However, the observer notes, Washington is well aware that it's American nuclear warheads that are at issue and a third party has nothing to do with this since Federal Germany does not have nuclear weapons. Some circles in the West wish the Soviet Union would have zero and the United States would keep a formidable nuclear arsenal. Such a position is due to the fact that influential militaristic groups in the United States are interested in the arms race.

This, the TASS observer sums up, hinders progress at the Geneva talks.

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CSO: 5200/1580

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS BRIEFING 14 JULY

Notes U.S. Test Ban Stance

LD141458 Moscow TASS in English 1440 GMT 14 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 14 TASS -- The U.S. delegation holds a destructive position at the Soviet-American talks on the termination of nuclear tests, Boris Pyadyshev, first deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, said at a briefing for Soviet and Foreign journalists here today.

The Soviet Union, he said, would like to have full-scale talks started on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests instead of consultations by experts on technical matters. Questions of ratification of the Soviet-American treaties of 1974 and 1976 could be considered as a first step towards this main aim. To facilitate an earliest ratification of these treaties, the USSR is prepared to agree with the USA on holding appropriate calibrating experiments of each other's proving grounds.

The Soviet Union also comes out for the adoption of other practical measures aimed at complete prohibition of nuclear tests. We are prepared, for instance, Pyadyshev went on, to reach an interim agreement with the Americans on limiting the yield of underground nuclear explosions to a ceiling of one kiloton and the number of nuclear weapon tests to two or three tests a year.

The Soviet Union is prepared for most radical and resolute steps towards achieving the aim of a universal ban on nuclear tests, and it will depend on the USA whether progress will be made towards this aim and whether the sixth round of Soviet-American talks, started now, will be filled with concrete content, the Soviet spokesman stressed.

Views Double Zero Option

LD141859 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1516 GMT 14 Jul 87

[Excerpts] A briefing was held at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center today on current questions of international policy. Addressing Soviet and foreign journalists, Boris Dmitriyevich Pyadyshev, first deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry said among other things:

[Begin Pyadyshev recording] [passage omitted] Let us recall that the U.S. leadership continually expresses the desirability of solving the problems of operational and tactical missiles and medium range missiles on the basis of a global double zero option. But what kind of zero can this be if the Soviet missiles are liquidated while

U.S. nuclear warheads remain in Europe on Bundeswehr missiles? I must also note that the U.S. braking mechanism is also at work in questions of strategic offensive weapons and questions of space weapons, which are being discussed at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva. [end recording]

In connection with the renewal of Soviet-U.S. talks at the expert level on questions of ending nuclear tests, Comrade Pyadyshev noted that the U.S. delegation was taking a destructive position at the talks, hindering the conclusion of a universal nuclear test ban treaty. For its part, the Soviet Union is ready, for example, to reach an intermediate agreement with the United States on limiting the strength of underground nuclear explosions to one kilotonne, and the number of nuclear weapons' tests to two or three a year.

During the news conference, Comrade Pyadyshev answered journalists' questions.

Examines Arms Talks 'Obstacles'

LD141546 Moscow TASS in English 1516 GMT 14 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 14 TASS -- U.S. official spokesmen made a number of statements in the past few days to the effect that the Soviet-American talks in Geneva had allegedly lost momentum because the Soviet delegation was holding up the discussion almost on purpose and in some cases even deviated from its original stand. Boris Pyadyshev, first deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who spoke at a briefing today pointed out that those allegations were very much at variance with real facts.

During three months that have elapsed since the beginning of the 8th round of the Geneva talks the Soviet delegation put forward seven concrete proposals. It is especially important that each of the proposals carefully took into consideration the concerns of the American side.

If the working out of a joint treaty on immediate-range missiles has not been completed so far, there is only one reason to it: a non-constructive stand of the U.S. side and the desire of the U.S. to include in the treaty the provisions that would ensure military superiority for the U.S.

The spokesman of the USSR Foreign Ministry mentioned some of the obstacles on the way to reaching agreements. The U.S. insists on unilateral reductions of the intermediate-range missiles on the first stage, on the retaining of a possibility to transform Pershing-2s into Pershing-1B missiles and turn ground-based cruise missiles into sea-based ones. The U.S. refuses to discuss the control problem with regard to U.S. military bases in third countries which could be connected with U.S. intermediate-range missiles. The U.S. tries to avoid the discussion of the elimination of 72 U.S. nuclear warheads for West German Pershing-1A missiles.

The U.S. leadership continually expresses the desire that the problem of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles be resolved on the basis of "global zero" for each of the sides. It does not look like "zero" if American nuclear warheads for Bundeswehr missiles are preserved in Europe, Pyadyshev pointed out.

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CSO: 5200/1580

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: U.S. AT GENEVA 'GROSSLY DEPARTING' FROM EARLIER ACCORDS

LD162226 Moscow TASS in English 2058 GMT 16 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 16 TASS -- Follows commentary by Vladimir Bogachev, TASS military journalist:

The U.S. side at the Geneva talks is grossly departing from the accords on medium- and shorter-range missiles, on which understanding was reached earlier, thus piling up new obstacles in the way towards reaching agreement, and, in doing so, crudely distorting the Soviet Union's stand.

Despite the absolutely unequivocal public statements by the Soviet officials, Charles Redman, a spokesman for the U.S. State Department, claimed at a briefing in Washington that the USSR was raising in Geneva the question of the elimination of the West German Pershing-1A missiles. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has never raised and does not raise the question about these West German missiles.

After starting a discussion of the question of the shorter-range missiles, the USSR and the USA have reached agreement on a bilateral scrapping of the corresponding Soviet and American delivery vehicles and nuclear ammunition to them. Now Washington demands a unilateral scrapping of only the Soviet weapons of that class, insisting, without any sound reason, on its right to preserve the U.S. nuclear ammunition to the West German missiles.

Aiming to put up new obstacles in the way of reaching agreement, the U.S. delegation at Geneva is also trying to revise the Reykjavik accords regarding the 100 nuclear warheads on medium-range missiles of both sides outside the European zone.

Of a clearly obstructionist character are also the proposals of the USA that the process of elimination of medium-range missiles be started with unilateral cuts only in the Soviet medium-range missiles. Over the past six months, Washington has refused to observe the agreements as soon as they became an obstacle to a practical fulfillment of the Pentagon's military programmes. Is there any guarantee that after a unilateral scrapping of the Soviet medium-range missiles Washington will not torpedo the whole agreement on medium-range missiles? Of a clearly unequal character are also the American proposals on excluding the U.S. military bases on the territory of third countries, which may be connected with medium-range missiles, from the zone of verification of observance of the agreement.

At last, the USA does not wish in general to eliminate its missiles and insists on the "right" to refit "Pershing-2" into "Pershing-1B" missiles and land-based cruise missiles into sea-based ones.

The real aims of each of the sides at the Geneva talks can also be seen from their practical actions in the military field. While the Soviet Union not only strictly observes the moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles, but has also unilaterally considerably reduced their number, work is continuing in the U.S. military bases in preparation for the reception of 64 U.S. cruise missiles so as to bring them up to a state of "operational preparedness" by the end of 1988.

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CSO: 5200/1580

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: U.S. NUCLEAR AIMS IN PACIFIC AREA SCORED

PM071319 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jul 87 First Edition p 3

[Own observer Aleksandr Golts "Military-Political Review": "The Asian Dilemma"]

[Excerpts] The Soviet Union favors a drastic lowering of the levels of nuclear arms in Asia because it believes that this would lead to a stabilization of the military and political situation in the region and diminish the threat of war. To this end, the USSR has agreed to limit the number of warheads on its medium-range missiles in the country's Asian territory to 100 units in view of the fact that the United States is permitted to have the same number of warheads on its territory. It is essential to ensure that neither the Soviet nor the U.S. missiles can reach the other's territory. Therefore the Soviet Union resolutely protests the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles in Alaska.

At the same time, our country has said more than once that it is prepared to resolve the problem of medium-range missiles once and for all on a global basis, and not just in Europe. In order to achieve this, Washington would have to eliminate its nuclear means in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines and withdraw its aircraft carrier groups beyond agreed lines. And, of course, the United States would have no medium-range missiles on its territory. "We have been proposing persistently that talks with the United States on nuclear arms in Asia and the Pacific region be opened and that this problem be resolved on the basis of reciprocity and strict observance of the security interests of everyone," M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, emphasized at a lunch in honor of Prime Minister R. Gandhi of India.

And how has the West responded to this? With attempts to use the problem of the Soviet missiles beyond the Urals as a pretext to put up another obstacle in the path of the elimination of medium-range missiles, to gain a maximalist reputation in the cause of disarmament, and to kindle fear among Asian states. And this goes hand in hand with rejections of Soviet proposals to create a mechanism for talks. Unilateral steps infringing the principle of equality are frankly being demanded from the USSR.

The feverish military preparations which the United States has launched in the Pacific region of late suggest that the Pentagon leaders would like to use Asia to compensate for the loss of part of their nuclear potential when the accord on medium-range missiles which is emerging at the Geneva talks is reached. Therefore they continue to cling to the idea of siting their missiles in Alaska.

It must be noted that the Pentagon has its supporters. I have in mind the Pentagon-inspired "proposal" put forward by Japanese Premier Nakasone who has called on the United States to site the missiles in Alaska regardless of opposition, allegedly as protection against the "Soviet military threat."

Luckily by no means all the Asian and Pacific Basin countries' leaders display such allegiance to U.S. strategy. On the contrary, what the states of the region seem to have in common is an active unwillingness to expose themselves to the risk of being involved in Washington's military preparations. Furthermore, many of them have already found a good way to ensure the security of their peoples and to strengthen the security of the whole planet. I have in mind the creation of nuclear-free zones. As is known, 13 states in the southern part of the Pacific have proclaimed such a zone in their subregion.

The example of the countries of the South Pacific has proved an inspiration. At a recent conference of ASEAN foreign ministers (this regional organization comprises Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei) it was decided to continue searching for ways to transform Southeast Asia too into a nuclear-free zone. Indonesian Foreign Minister M. Kusumaatmaja emphasized at a press conference that "substantial progress has been achieved" in the elaboration of a draft agreement on this subject.

Washington tried to put pressure on the conference participants to prevent the inclusion of the question of a nuclear-free zone on the agenda. During his visit to Singapore U.S. Secretary of State Shultz declared that a "nuclear-free zone" did not seem to him to be "a very good idea." The head of the U.S. foreign policy department then argued that peace and security in the region allegedly depended on the United States as a nuclear power "detering aggression." "When you declare more and more areas to be nuclear-free zones, you are depriving yourselves of the possibility of deterrence," Shultz said in an effort to intimidate the ASEAN members.

What the secretary of state was worried about was not, of course, the security of ASEAN states, which would undoubtedly increase rather than diminish if Southeast Asia were turned into a nuclear-free zone. The point is that Washington is worried to death that the expansion of nuclear-free zones will sharply reduce the sphere of nuclear preparations.

And another point is highly illustrative here. Having ticked off the ASEAN representatives for coming up with the idea of a nuclear-free zone, Shultz immediately tried to steer the discussion onto the well trodden path of the "threat" which allegedly emanates from the Indochinese states. The logic here is simple, not to say primitive. Since there is a "threat,"

there is also a need for U.S. "protection." And as for nuclear weapons, they are just an inevitable adjunct, so to speak.

The Pentagon chief Weinberger, who visited the region shortly after Shultz, also tried to breathe life into the selfsame policy of confrontation. He visited Australia, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Japan. The leitmotif of his speeches everywhere were deliberations to the effect that nuclear-free zones will make the West defenseless in the face of Soviet expansion. He also alluded everywhere to the allegedly growing "Soviet military threat."

The level to which Weinberger has sunk is illustrated by the following claim: "As is evident from the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok, the USSR has a firm plan to build up its arms in the Pacific until it has established supremacy in that region."

Such blatant lies are rare even among Washington politicians. But where did Weinberger get all this nonsense about "striving for supremacy" from? Did he deduce it from the Soviet leader's words to the effect that "our interest is not based on claims to some kind of privileges or special position, nor on egoistic attempts to strengthen our security at the cost of others or to gain advantages at other people's expense"? Or does perhaps the appeal to all countries of Asia and the Pacific region for cooperation in the name of peace and security, which rang out from Vladivostok, point to "Soviet expansion"? Or does Weinberger see a striving for a buildup of military preparations in the Soviet proposals to limit the activities in the region of naval fleets and above all of ships carrying nuclear weapons or in the proposals to introduce military confidence-building measures in the region?

The last thing that can be suggested is that a careless secretary, instead of giving the Pentagon chief a translation of the Vladivostok speech, slipped in one of his own reports to Congress. Incidentally, it seems to me that the very fact that Weinberger risked such a blatant lie is not a bad sign. It means that in our stance and in our actions it is now rather difficult to find any "grey areas" or insufficiently clearly defined ideas. The constructive policy of the USSR which is based on the new political thinking leaves no room for anti-Soviet speculation. The Weinbergers of this world have to twist and turn. But even that does not help them much. The peoples of Asia can see who is actually proposing to resolve the dangerous nuclear dilemma in this region. The Soviet Union is confident that the states of Asia and the Pacific Basin are fully capable of embarking in earnest on the building of a regional security system. And the efforts in this direction of the countries of Asia and Europe could be pooled. And that would give a very powerful impetus to the creation of a comprehensive system of international security.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS ASSAILS NAKASONE SUGGESTION FOR U.S. INF IN ALASKA

'Unfavorable Impression' Produced

LD100609 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1125 GMT 9 Jul 87

["Are They Correcting Themselves?" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 9 July (TASS) -- TASS Political Observer Askold Biryukov writes:

Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone has made an attempt to soften the unfavorable impression produced by his proposal that U.S. medium-range missiles should be sited [razmestit] in Alaska. He made this suggestion at the conference of the "Seven" in Venice. Speaking in parliament, the head of the Japanese Government declared that he had put forward his idea that the United States should site 100 nuclear warheads in Alaska with a view to seeing medium-range missiles eliminated on a global scale. When the Soviet side advocates at the talks that 100 warheads should be retained in the Asian part of the USSR, we are forced to agree to this, he said.

If total elimination of medium-range missiles is to be achieved, the United States must have in its hands "an instrument with which to balance" its position at the talks on the level of "the technique of conducting them." The siting of medium-range missiles on U.S. territory would be such an instrument.

One listens to these arguments and is astonished. It is as if the Japanese prime minister did not know that the USSR's agreement in Reykjavik to the U.S. proposal to keep 100 warheads each on medium-range missiles -- in Asia for the USSR, and on its national territory for the United States (but not in Alaska in so far as the United States would be capable of keeping their medium-range missiles trained on Soviet territory from there) -- was the result of a unique compromise brought about by the fact that the U.S. Administration intended to keep nuclear means in the Asiatic and Pacific region, which were deployed [razvernuty] against the USSR. If the United States were to agree to the elimination of its nuclear means in Japan, South Korea, on the Philippines, and to withdraw its aircraft-carrier groups behind agreed boundaries. Then the path to resolving the medium-range missiles problem on a global basis would be open.

It is precisely to this direction that the Japanese newspaper AKAHATA has drawn attention. Hypocritically advocating in Venice the global elimination of medium-range missiles, it notes, the prime minister at the same time put forward a plan for the new deployment of the United States' nuclear forces. It was as if he had forgotten about the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and

about the stationing [razmeshcheniye] in the western part of the Pacific of naval vessels with nuclear "Tomahawks" on board. Meanwhile, the newspaper recalls, the USSR has stated its willingness to resolve the medium-range missiles problem on a global basis.

The "ballon d'essai" released by the Japanese prime minister was literally caught in midair by those circles in the United States who cannot stomach even the smallest steps on the path towards nuclear disarmament. David Emery, deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control Disarmament Agency, told a group of Japanese parliamentarians that the "United States will not renounce the right to deploy its medium-range missiles in Alaska, until such time as equivalent [as received] concessions come from the Soviet Union."

Despite the efforts of the Japanese premier to correct somewhat his position, the impression is being created that in Tokyo, not only do they not wish to facilitate the achievement of an agreement on medium-range missiles, but they are attempting to place new obstacles in the path of purging both Europe and Asia of nuclear weapons. We shall speak frankly: Such a position can surely not be worthy of a country which has itself experienced the horrors of the use of weapons of mass destruction.

'Gratifying Militarist Circles'

LD161631 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1030 GMT 16 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow 16 Jul (TASS) -- TASS Political Observer Askold Biryukov writes:

Yasuhiro Nakasone, the prime minister of Japan, gratifying those militarist circles in the United States for whom the prospect of a possible Soviet-U.S. agreement on medium-range missiles sticks in the throat, has made another statement in the Japanese parliament, which can only be regarded as blatantly playing up to those circles. Not satisfied with his sensational proposal that the United States should site [razmestit] medium-range missiles in Alaska, which he made at the recent conference of the "Seven" in Venice, the head of the Japanese Government has gone further, clearly indicating the target for those missiles, too -- The Soviet town of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy in the eastern fringe of the USSR. In his words, those medium-range missiles, targeted on "an important Soviet base" in "far eastern Siberia," may allegedly become a good "trump card" in talks with the USSR.

It is evident that the Japanese premier is troubled by the dubious laurels of the U.S. political players, who are accustomed to approach serious international problems as they would a poker game. The Washington players now have in their hands a whole stack of "trump cards," apart from the one the Japanese premier slipped them. Attempts are being made to convert "Pershing-2's" into "Pershing-1B's", to switch land-based cruise missiles to sea-based cruise missiles, to move away from a solution of the issue of eliminating the 72 U.S. nuclear warheads on the West German "Pershing-1A" missiles, and, in addition, there is the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of the notorious SDI, and so on. But, typically, all these "trump cards" have the same military characteristics. They all testify to the efforts of the militant circles in the United States not to allow nuclear disarmament, and ensure that Washington has military superiority and the so-called "position of strength," from which, in its view, it would be possible to dictate its will to the Soviet Union and secure unilateral disarmament from it.

But the Soviet Union has a different approach to international affairs, a serious and realistic approach. Moscow will not accept the U.S. nor the Japanese bluff. The USSR is prepared to take into account the anxiety of the other side at the talks.

But the other side must not ignore Moscow's anxiety. What is more, there are more than enough grounds for the latter. For some reason or other Japan stubbornly refuses to take note of this. They do not want to take into account that the U.S. nuclear potential in the Far East aimed at the USSR is concentrated largely on such delivery vehicles as aircraft carriers, sea-based cruise missiles, and planes carrying nuclear weapons. The latter includes bases in Japan itself, in particular in Misawa where the number of U.S. fighter bombers deployed almost doubled the other day. The United States is not only reluctant to remove these nuclear weapons from the region, but even has plans to build them up in the future, including with Tokyo's assistance, which is what Nakasone's proposal is all about.

That, then is how official Tokyo regards this play about scrapping medium-range missiles "on a global scale"! We will put it bluntly. This is a dangerous game. With "trumps" like those being played in Washington and Tokyo one soon gets into trouble.

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CSO: 5200/1580

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET BROADCAST TO CHINA ON ASIAN INF ISSUE

OW030625 Moscow in Mandarin to China 1500 GMT 30 Jun 87

[Kudin commentary]

[Text] China calls on the Soviet Union and the United States to remove medium-range missiles not only from Europe but also from Asia. Fan Guoxiang, head of the Chinese delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference, has emphatically pointed out: The security of Europe is important and equally important is the security of Asia. Kudin, station observer, has the following comments on this matter.

It should be pointed out that the Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed its willingness to settle the medium-range missiles issue on a global basis. When our country put forward the proposal on removing Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles from Europe, we were not saying that disarmament would stop after that. Our position is that disarmament should begin in Europe and continue until nuclear weapons are eliminated on all continents. The plan put forward by the Soviet Union to build a nuclear-free world by the year 2000 is based on this ultimate objective. This shows that the Soviet Union and China share the idea of eliminating nuclear weapons in both Europe and Asia. The question is when and how this can be achieved. We suggest, as a compromise proposal, that after removal of medium-range missiles from Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union should each keep 100 warheads in the interim stage prior to the creation of a nuclear-free world. The problem is that the United States wants to keep nuclear missiles in Asia. It still has strong combatant units equipped with nuclear weapons there. In view of this threat, the Soviet Union is compelled to keep an equilibrium of forces in Asia. This is completely justified.

Let me repeat that our country stands for simultaneous removal of Soviet and American medium-range missiles from Asia. Soviet leader Gorbachev said in May this year that there is no obstacle to such a settlement if the United States eliminates its nuclear weapons in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines and moves its aircraft carriers out of the region. At the same time, the United States should not deploy medium-range missiles on its homeland either. Our position in settling this issue is consistent with China's interests because China is surrounded by U.S. nuclear bases. History shows that these bases have repeatedly threatened China's security.

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CSO: 5200/1580

ITALIAN PC PAPER ON CONSEQUENCES OF 'ZERO OPTION'

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 29 May 87 p 8

[Article by Marco de Andreis: "In Italy the Day After the Zero Option"]

[Text] What would happen in Italy if the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on elimination of the Euromissiles? With the departure of the Cruise missiles, however, we would still find ourselves with 500 nuclear warheads: 250 bombs for planes, Italian and American, 120 warheads for Lance and Nike missiles, 40 artillery shells, 115 devices for antisubmarine warfare, and 22 atomic mines. If NATO is afraid of denuclearization it is because of the continuing predominance of a security concept that is at least 30 years old and dies hard.

It is becoming increasingly more difficult to follow the pirouettes of the European governments in face of the issue of "the zero option for nuclear weapons." However, it is clear that all these developments are a symptom of the huge resistance that the prospect of an agreement is encountering. On what is this resistance based? On a concept of security that is old and dies hard. Indeed, from a common sense point of view, it is hard to understand what the Atlantic Alliance has to fear from a treaty under which the counterpart, in order to achieve the zero level (whether double or single), would have to dismantle a significantly larger number of nuclear warheads and missiles. Have we not for years been given the explanation that the Pershing and Cruise missiles were only intended to balance the Soviet SS-20's. Certainly. Except that it was not true. Or at least it was true only in part. For example, the outgoing commander of the Alliance, General Rogers, addressed the American Congress as follows: "Many believe that it was because of the SS-20's that we decided to install the Euromissiles. Yet we did so, aside from the SS-20's, because we had a gap in our range of defensive possibilities, and we had to close that gap."

According to those who think like Rogers, in order avoid a war, in order to deter, NATO nevertheless has to be ready to use nuclear weapons, even first, if necessary. There is some logic in all this only if the adversary, for his part, is without nuclear weapons. Otherwise mutual destruction is assured.

Although it has been more than 30 years since NATO found itself in that situation, the most conservative elements of the Alliance have developed increasingly abstruse theories for continuing to believe in the magical

virtues of nuclear weapons. For example, the prevailing doctrine of the Alliance postulates that the threat of first use of atomic weapons can work even with an opponent possessing nuclear armament. As long as NATO has at its disposal a range of nuclear devices that is continuous from the very short-range rocket to intercontinental missiles.

It is now clear that such a doctrine, presented to the voters, is a challenge to the aforementioned common sense. Thus, the proponents prefer to concentrate on the easy argument of the necessity for numerical balances. However, if this is to be lacking, as would happen with the "zero option" in its various versions, then there is panic among the nuclear proponents. They fear that this agreement would open the road to ever more clear-cut disarmament measures. Therefore, on the one hand they talk about denuclearization of Europe as a consequence of the "zero option." As they also insist that without atomic weapons NATO would find itself naked in face of the "crushing Soviet conventional superiority." These are propagandistic exaggerations. It is worth the effort to evaluate these arguments also in light of the situation of our country.

Let us begin with the first argument, denuclearization. With the missiles with range of 500 to 5,000 kilometers removed, NATO would continue to have lined up on the old continent, despite the departure of the Cruise missiles, about 4,500 nuclear warheads--without counting several additional hundreds on board U.S. Navy ships under the two fleets that gravitate around Europe. One of these fleets has its bases at Gaeta and Naples.

On the other hand, some 500 nuclear warheads would still be stationed in Italy, despite the departure of the Cruise missiles. These include 250 bombs for Italian and American planes, 120 warheads for Lance and Nike Hercules missiles, 40 artillery shells, 115 devices for antisubmarine warfare, and 22 atomic mines. While the latter were to have been withdrawn recently (we use the conditional because one never succeeds in finding out anything from our government), a NATO meeting last October had on the agenda new nuclear stationings on the southern flank of the Alliance--that is, Italy, Greece and Turkey. The position taken on that occasion by the Italian Government was not made known.

As for the relationship of conventional forces, on the other hand, it was stated that the not dramatic numerical advantage enjoyed here and there by the Warsaw Pact was in general compensated by better Western quality. Then, the Italian situation in particular--contrary to what we are accustomed to reading--is really privileged. The Hungarian and Soviet forces assigned to the Italian theater are among the least effective in the East; in our defensive sector, Yugoslavia and Austria are interposed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; and there has been a rather large Italian rearmament in the past decade, which is confirmed, among other things, by the growth in our military expenditures. All things to keep in mind.

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CSO: 5200/2561

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

GSFG-GDR EXERCISE NOTIFICATION--By agreement with the government of the GDR the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the National People's Army of the GDR will conduct a joint exercise to improve the field training of the troops. It will be conducted between 23 and 30 March of this year in the area of Gardelegen, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Luben and Brandenburg in the German Democratic Republic. Units and formations of ground and air forces will be involved in the exercise. A total of around 25,000 troops will take part. In accordance with the Stockholm Conference agreement the government of the GDR has invited to the exercise observers from all the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 87 p 1] 11499

CSO: 1801/167

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW: WEINBERGER OPPOSES SOUTHEAST ASIA NFZ IN BANGKOK

LD271152 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 26 Jun 87

[Text] U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger ended his visit to Thailand. Here is a dispatch from Jakarta by our correspondent in that region, Vladimir Beloshapko:

[Beloshapko] As befits his rank, Weinberger conducted his talks with Thailand's leaders on a blatantly militaristic note. Once again he confirmed that the U.S. Administration firmly opposes the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia as much as in any other area of the world. Justifying that stance at a press conference in Bangkok, the Pentagon chief came out with things which, to put it bluntly, sound astonishing. Weinberger flabbergasted journalists by stating that the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia would lead to an increase of terrorism in the region and, at the end of the day, the USSR would turn out to be the only country capable of having nuclear weapons inside that zone. This is the reason, continued Weinberger, why the United States cannot give up its military presence in that part of Asia, a presence aimed, in his words, at containing Soviet expansionism.

It was somehow embarrassing to hear such ridiculous talk from the mouth of a high-ranking representative of a great power. Perhaps the only thing clear in it is the Pentagon's unwillingness to lose its military position in Southeast Asia. As for the remainder, Weinberger's words are completely devoid of logic, proof, and straightforward common sense. For instance, what kind of Soviet nuclear presence is the U.S. defense secretary talking about? It is the United States alone that possesses nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia at its military bases in the Philippines. Nor did Weinberger adduce any facts to back up his claims about Soviet expansionism simply because there are none. On the other hand, the Pentagon chief's visit to Thailand provided new and weighty evidence of the United States' own growing military expansion in Southeast Asia. After all, at the talks in Bangkok, there was discussion -- moreover, very specific discussion -- of the forthcoming creation of U.S. military depots in Thailand, of increasing US military assistance to Thailand, and of continuing interference in Cambodia's affairs.

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CSO: 5200/1583

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR SUPPORTS DPRK NONNUCLEAR ZONE PROPOSAL

PM171945 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Statement by a USSR Foreign Ministry Representative"]

[Text] The DPRK Government is proposing that the Korean peninsula be transformed into a nonnuclear peace zone and for this purpose it is again addressing an insistent appeal to the U.S. Government and to the South Korean authorities to take practical steps to remove from South Korea the U.S. nuclear weapons that are already there and to prevent the siting of new nuclear means in the south. The DPRK Government also believes that Japan must not allow the use of its territory as a staging post for the implementation of U.S. nuclear plans with respect to the Korean peninsula.

As long ago as a year back, the DPRK Government unilaterally proclaimed its refusal of the testing, production, importation, or siting of nuclear weapons on its territory and the banning of their transit through the republic's territory, airspace, and territorial waters. The transformation of the Korean peninsula into a zone free of nuclear weapons would not only be a weighty contribution to the cause of eliminating the reasons for tension in Korea, but would also have a salutary effect on the overall political climate in the Far East and would promote the involvement of the whole Asian and Pacific region in the nuclear disarmament process.

The Soviet Union fully supports the DPRK proposal. If the nonnuclear peace zone is established on the Korean peninsula, our country, as a nuclear power, would, for its part, be prepared to give the necessary guarantees that the zone's status would be observed.

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CSO: 5200/1583

GORBACHEV REPLIES TO PEACE MARCHERS' LETTER

LD141641 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 14 Jul 87

[Text] A letter has arrived for Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, from participants in the American-Soviet peace march held 14 June to 8 July along the Leningrad-Novogorod-Kalinin-Moscow route. A number of appeals from individual American participants in the march have also been addressed to him. One of them forwarded a letter from the leadership of the Presbyterian community of the U.S. city of Baltimore. The letter, which is also addressed to President Reagan of the United States, expresses profound alarm over the continuing nuclear arms race, contains an appeal to the leaders of the two countries to make the world free from nuclear weapons, and expresses the readiness of religious circles to help toward this process.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has given the following reply to the appeals addressed to him:

Dear friends! I thank you for the letters, telegrams, and appeals in which you express gratitude for the cordiality and hospitality shown by the Soviet people to the participants in the Soviet-American peace march. I think the meetings with thousands of Soviet citizens and the ardent discussions about how to ensure a peaceful future for our children and how to guarantee the survival of mankind will remain for a long time in the memories of those who participated in the march.

This first joint march of Soviet and American citizens in the history of mutual relations between the USSR and the United States is a specific contribution to strengthening trust, mutual understanding, and friendship and a convincing example of people's diplomacy in action.

The Soviet leadership supports such initiatives, for they lead to the establishment of goodneighborly relations directly between the ordinary peoples of different countries, break down old stereotypes, and help to create the image of partner and friend instead of the image of an enemy.

I share the feeling expressed in the appeals that I have received of profound alarm at the threat of nuclear catastrophe, fraught with the destruction of all living things on our planet, which hangs over mankind. From all points of view, including the moral one, the time has come to do away with nuclear thinking, to beat swords into plowshares, and to direct the released means toward social requirements and creative purposes.

It is our conviction that creating a nonviolent world, a world free from nuclear weapons, is the only alternative to the policy of nuclear suicide and the guarantee of mankind's survival.

Everyone who holds peace dear has a staunch and unbending ally in the Soviet Union in the attainment of these truly sacred goals of mankind. All our policy is subordinate to this. We shall continue to build our efforts to ensure that the opportunities now opening up to proceed along the road to eliminating nuclear weapons will become a reality.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev wished the participants in the Soviet-American peace march and their families' good health, happiness, and prosperity and a world without wars and weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1581

SOVIET PREMIER'S NEWS CONFERENCE ON VISIT TO AUSTRIA

PM131501 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Press Conference in Vienna"]

[Excerpts] Vienna, 11 Jul -- A press conference was held here today by F. Vranitzky, chancellor of Austria, and N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, on the results of the official visit by the head of the Soviet Government to Austria.

Opening the press conference, F. Vranitzky stated:

On the final day of your visit here, Mr Chairman of the Council of Ministers, I would like to express my great personal satisfaction at this visit. It has reflected the high level of bilateral relations between our states and has consolidated that level even further. All our conversations and talks in Vienna and our tour of the country were conducted on the basis of mutual understanding and an awareness of the fact that the Soviet Union played a great role in the liberation of Austria and the restoration of a democratic, independent Austria. I should like to recall that the visit was also marked by good personal conversations which enriched our acquaintance. As someone deeply involved in public life, I should like to tell you that the many meetings at plants and on the streets of the cities that we visited were highly significant. I should like to note that a statesman who visits another country is usually well prepared for that visit, but Mr Ryzhkov's knowledge of Austria was not only surprising, it was astonishing. I should like to interpret this as a sign of your interest in our country. The talks covered a very broad range of questions: bilateral political and economic relations, questions of disarmament, European policy, the CSCE, and the conclusion of an agreement on the notification of accidents at nuclear power stations. And this range of themes ends with a friendly invitation to participate in a forthcoming space flight and a proposal to include an Austrian among the cosmonauts.

I would like to emphasize the great number of conversations and talks and to highlight four particularly important items. They are: disarmament, the CSCE, European policy, and our economic cooperation. During our conversations I expressed Austria's viewpoint in support of global equilibrium at the lowest possible military level. Austria is interested in eliminating nuclear weapons on the basis of proximity [likvidatsiya yadernogo oruzhiya po sosedstvu], and this concept of proximity must be interpreted quite broadly. We therefore support all proposals whether they contain a zero or a double zero option. We also have the opportunity to repeat Austria's proposal on verification.

Second, the CSCE. In the security sphere we spoke in detail about the fact that the significance of disarmament in the conventional arms sphere will increase and that for this reason the further examination of this question, that is, disarmament in the conventional arms sphere in the CSCE framework, is of very great importance. The chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers put forward a proposal to convene a conference of foreign ministers in Vienna. We actively support this proposal because it is advantageous from the viewpoint of conference venue that these meetings and conferences also be held in Vienna after the present CSCE meeting. We have already expressed our interest in this several times.

In this connection I would like to stress the desire of Austria and of the other states belonging to the so-called neutral and nonaligned group not only to be informed about all these processes but also to be heard in them.

In conclusion F. Vranitzky expressed gratitude to N.I. Ryzhkov for the visit and expressed wishes for success in the cause of restructuring Soviet society.

N.I. Ryzhkov in his statement shared his impressions of his visit to Austria and his meetings and conversations with Austrian leaders and representatives of the country's political, business, and public circles.

He said:

Speaking about the main results of our visit, it may be stated that it confirmed the continuity of the good-neighborly character of relations between our countries and highlighted the joint interest in and readiness to continue developing Soviet-Austrian cooperation both in the political and economic sphere and in the area of cultural and humanitarian ties.

A considerable part of our talks with Chancellor Vranitzky and Foreign Minister Mock was devoted to questions of the present-day international situation and problems of disarmament and averting the nuclear threat. The talks showed the closeness of the sides' views on the aforementioned questions and confirmed their joint deep interest in improving the international political climate and radically reducing military confrontation, which has acquired a particularly dangerous scale in Europe.

Today both the West and the East need confidence in the future. The awareness of the need to remove the threat of nuclear catastrophe from our continent is gaining increasing acceptance in Europeans' thinking. The question of collaboration among the political forces in Europe to whom the people have entrusted their fate is on the agenda. But very much more work needs to be done here.

The Soviet Union, as is well known, has put forward a broad and precisely scheduled program for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons leading to their full elimination everywhere by the end of this century and the prevention of the arms race in space. In the past 18 months we gave concrete form to our proposals on a number of occasions taking account not least of the Western countries' opinions. It actually formed the basis of the decisions adopted in Reykjavik.

Austrian statesman rightly emphasize the need to create a climate of confidence in relations among states. Without doubt, every step toward real disarmament will reduce

the distrust among countries and engender confidence among them. The main thing is to set this process in motion. That aim would also be promoted, of course, by broadening multilateral peaceful cooperation among states.

With the aim of removing the mutual lack of trust, the Warsaw Pact states elaborated the basic provisions of their military doctrine and proposed to the NATO members that consultations be held regarding the two alliances' military doctrines. Our military doctrine is strictly defensive in character and is subordinated to a single goal -- to prevent war, both nuclear and conventional. Thus we state with the utmost responsibility that we will never be first to use nuclear weapons and we propose to build our armed forces and conventional armaments in strict accordance with the principles of reasonable sufficiency, in other words, solely for defensive purposes.

We have still not received an intelligible answer from NATO to our proposals to hold consultations aimed at comparing the military doctrines and bringing them closer together on the basis of the principles of defense alone.

The Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva are now centered on the question of eliminating medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe. I believe that we have shown the maximum readiness to seek compromise decisions and tried to take account of the corresponding interests and wishes of both the United States and the European NATO members. Even now, however, the agreement of our proposals is accompanied by various conditions.

I would like to hope that NATO's objections will still be removed and that the historic and truly unique opportunity to take the first step in the sphere of real disarmament will not be missed.

Europe today is looking to Vienna and hoping that the meeting of CSCE representatives in the Austrian capital will end with the adoption of worthwhile, balanced decisions and that its final documents will promote the all-European process in all the sections of the Helsinki Final Act. Our delegation at the Vienna meeting has precise instructions to act in exactly that way.

In brief, a very broad range of international problems was subjected to thorough examination. Our opinions and approaches did not coincide on all matters but we tried to achieve better mutual understanding and, I believe, we succeeded.

In conclusion I would like to express my sincere satisfaction at the results of the talks and friendly conversations that I have had with Austria's leaders. I thank you for the hospitality and attention shown to us everywhere in your country. I wish the Austrian people peace and progress.

N.I. Ryzhkov and F. Vranitzky then answered many questions from correspondents. The journalists present at the press conference showed tremendous interest in the processes of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union and their influence on the Soviet economy and on economic ties with other countries.

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CSO: 5200/1581

U.S., SOVIET VIEWS ON 'NAVAL ARMS RACE' CONTRASTED

PM021335 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel General V. Lobov, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff: "Peace and Stability for the World's Oceans"]

[Text] In the total confrontation policy being implemented by U.S. ruling circles and in their pursuit of military superiority over the Soviet Union and their neoglobalist aspirations, a prominent place is given to militarist activity in the world's oceans. "Turning the USSR into an isolated island" and "ensuring undivided U.S. control of the rest of the world" is the creed of Washington "hawks." Their viewpoint is shared and supported by the head of the current U.S. Administration himself. "Superiority at sea is a necessity for us," President R. Reagan said at the commissioning ceremony for the battleship New Jersey. "We must be able to control the air," he continued, "and above and below the sea surface in order to ensure access to all the world's oceans."

The U.S. so-called "new naval strategy," whose main provisions were formulated in the first half of the eighties and have formed the basis of the development and practical activity of U.S. naval forces since then, is designed to implement these political directives. It is part and parcel of the "direct confrontation" doctrine -- the overall U.S. military doctrine aimed, as is well known, at achieving "total and indisputable U.S. superiority" and "actively opposing the USSR across the board and in all parts of the world," including the high seas.

The main idea of the U.S. "naval strategy" is to implement "global and immediate deployment in the front lines" with a view to "containing the Soviet fleet" in its bases on the eve of a military conflict. To this end, it will be necessary to considerably enhance the USN's offensive potential, ensure its superiority at sea through quantitative and qualitative growth in its strike means, and establish control in all "vitally important" parts of the world -- the North Atlantic, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas. U.S. naval forces must be prepared to conduct offensive operations against the Soviet Navy in the USSR's own territorial waters and hit targets located deep within its territory.

Those are the general targeted directives of the U.S. "naval strategy" -- its nucleus, so to speak. But that is not all. It also envisages specific actions on the high seas and oceans in both peacetime and wartime. It is believed that these actions will be subdivided into three main phases: the transition from deterrence to a show of force at the start of a confrontation, the seizing of the initiative, and, finally, the transfer of hostilities to Soviet territory. And even in the first phase -- that is, still in peacetime -- it is planned to site six or seven U.S. Navy carrier battle groups in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and between two and six such

groups in the western Pacific and northern Indian Ocean. As for the third phase, the transfer of U.S. Navy strikes against Soviet territory will mean the use of nuclear devices.

All the above makes it easier to conclude that the "new naval strategy" of the United States will inevitably lead to an intensification of U.S. Navy aggressiveness, a growth in the level of the sides' military confrontation, and a heightened likelihood of military conflicts. The already fragile stability both within individual regions and on a global scale will be threatened. The world's oceans are turning more and more into the starting point for the unleashing of aggression against the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, and young independent states pursuing an anti-imperialist policy not to Washington's liking, and into a springboard from which a first nuclear strike will be launched.

For it is a fact that around half of all U.S. strategic munitions are sited on nuclear missile submarines, which are used for constant combat patrols in the world's oceans. There are around 40 such submarine missile platforms in service with the U.S. strategic offensive forces at any given time. They carry around 400 Trident-I ballistic missile delivery vehicles and more than 250 Poseidon C-3 delivery vehicles. These missiles are able to deliver nuclear charges yielding between 50 and 150 kilotons to targets thousands of miles away. Tests of the new sea-launched Trident-2 ballistic missile, with enhanced strike accuracy and warheads yielding up to 600 kilotons designed to inflict a so-called "disabling" strike -- that is, a first nuclear strike -- are now being conducted at an accelerated rate.

The United States is currently expediting the creation of a material base for the implementation of its "naval strategy." Particular attention is being devoted to building up U.S. general-purpose naval forces. Although the U.S. defense secretary's report to Congress "On the Fiscal 1988-89 Budget and the Defense Program in Fiscal 1988-92" specially stressed that already "on the whole the correlation of naval forces favors the United States," nonetheless major funds are being requested to continue carrying out the program to build a 600-ship Navy, which, in the Pentagon's opinion, would make it possible to resolve the task of "responsibility for three oceans." By 1990, it is planned to have 15 aircraft carriers -- 6 of them nuclear -- in service and to replenish the Navy with other types of ships. This will make it possible to deploy even more powerful U.S. Navy groups than at present in "forward positions" -- that is, close to Soviet borders. Their nucleus will be comprised of carrier battle groups and tactical [operativnyy] missile and surface-ship hunter-killer groups. It is planned that the forward-based groups will include Los Angeles and Sturgeon class multirole nuclear submarines. Twenty-five such craft together with 14 surface ships have already been equipped with long-range cruise missiles. By the mid-nineties it is planned to bring the number of such missiles fitted to various types up to approximately 4,000 -- with more than 750 of them being nuclear-tipped. The United States has already set up hundreds of naval and air bases in virtually all parts of the globe in order to deploy, service, and provide backup for the combat activity of this entire armada.

The naval arms race launched by the United States by no means promotes security and stability in the world's oceans. It is no secret that the United States along with its allies has already concentrated naval battle groups comparable in size with wartime groups in the Atlantic and the Pacific. Other U.S. actions -- its "gunboat diplomacy," which in our day and age could more accurately be called "aircraft carrier diplomacy" -- also create serious dangers. The annals of imperialism's bloody crimes include such aggressive acts as the 1983 shelling of the Lebanese coast by the large 16-inch guns on the battleship New Jersey and the strikes by U.S. aircraft -- including deck-borne

aircraft -- against peaceful Libyan cities and other targets in March and April 1986. The U.S. Navy's provocative actions in the Eastern Mediterranean this January, when, on the pretext of the deteriorating situation in Lebanon, a massive buildup of U.S. 6th Fleet ships was concentrated in the area, are still fresh in the memory.

Particular concern is currently aroused by the expansion of the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf and the northern part of the Arabian Sea. Using the shelling of the frigate Stark as a pretext, Washington has sent additional warships into an already explosive region, is keeping the carrier Constellation on combat standby in the region, is threatening to strike against Iran, and is seeking the right to site its aircraft on the territories of a number of coastal Arab states.

The events in the Persian Gulf, thousands of miles away from the U.S. coast and arbitrarily declared by Washington to be a "vitaly important" zone for the United States, have again demonstrated with utter clarity the acute need to strive to stabilize the situation in the world's oceans, to limit military activities on the high seas, and to safeguard the security of the world's sea lanes and air routes. All this will undoubtedly lead to a strengthening of the peace and security of the world's peoples, will increase the level of confidence in relations among states, and will promote the development of peaceful international cooperation.

It is possible to resolve this task? Yes, it is. The Soviet Union has repeatedly indicated this. Our country has put forward a range of far-reaching proposals in line with the interests of all states and peoples aimed at limiting naval activity and naval arms. These proposals were set out by the Soviet side at the UN Disarmament Commission session held last May.

What is the Soviet Union proposing? First and foremost, to limit the spread of nuclear weapons on the high seas and oceans and to withdraw them altogether from certain waters -- the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, for instance. It proposes that the nuclear powers institute the practice of giving notification that their ships are not carrying nuclear weapons in agreed sea and ocean areas free from nuclear weapons. It proposes that measures to reduce the military presence in the South Atlantic and to ensure the nondeployment there of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weaponry be discussed with the United States and the other major naval powers. Finally, it proposes discussing the question of providing guarantees of the security of shipping in peacetime (the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans, the Persian Gulf, international straits, and so forth).

Even the list of these proposals shows how important they are and what a favorable effect they would have on the situation not only on the high seas and oceans but worldwide. And other, earlier, Soviet initiatives are still on the agenda, too. More than 3 years ago now, the Soviet Union advocated in particular limiting numbers of the main types of warship; introducing restrictions on submarine forces and means; discussing measures with regard to naval bases on foreign territory; reducing the number of ships in the major powers' fleets (aircraft carriers and others) on a balanced basis; and agreeing confidence-building measures with regard to naval activity designed to promote the prevention of conflict situations.

The proposals put forward by M.S. Gorbachev in Vladivostok 28 July 1986 and in Delhi 27 November 1986 also drew an extensive worldwide response. In Vladivostok, it was proposed to reduce the activeness of naval fleets -- first and foremost ships equipped with nuclear weapons -- in the Pacific. It was pointed out that the strengthening of stability would promote limitations on rivalry in the sphere of ASW [antisubmarine

warfare] weapons, and, in particular, would be conducive to an agreement on refraining from ASW activity in certain parts of the Pacific. It was stressed that if the United States abandoned its military presence in the Philippines, for instance, we would not be found wanting.

Just 4 months later in Delhi, an extensive program to demilitarize the Indian Ocean and turn it into a zone of peace was set forth. It was a question of Soviet readiness to start talks at any time on substantially reducing the numbers and activity of naval forces in the Indian Ocean, holding talks on confidence-building measures in the military sphere with regard to Asia and adjacent Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, participating in multilateral talks among all states using the Indian Ocean with a view to elaborating guarantees of the safety of shipping -- including in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz and Molucca -- and discussing other states' proposals for ensuring peace in the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union has put forward the same wide-ranging ideas on the question of turning the Mediterranean into a zone of lasting peace and cooperation. The USSR is prepared to extend agreed confidence-building measures to this area, is striving for armed forces reductions in the region and the withdrawal of ships equipped with nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean Sea, and advocates that such weapons not be sited on the territories of the Mediterranean nonnuclear countries and that the nuclear powers pledge not to use such weapons against any other state in the region which will not permit their siting on its territory. If the United States withdrew its fleet from the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union would simultaneously follow suit. "In short," M.S. Gorbachev pointed out, "the Soviet Union does not lack goodwill. We are open to any constructive ideas aimed at real disarmament."

How has the United States, to whom these proposals were primarily addressed, reacted? Unfortunately, it has to be said that on various fabricated pretexts the United States has either rejected a discussion of the Soviet proposals, has pretended that it has not noticed them, or has delayed talks in every possible way and sought to ensure that they do not elaborate the planned agreements. That, for instance, is what happened to the Soviet-U.S. talks on limiting military activity in the Indian Ocean. These started back in 1977, and definite progress was achieved. But then, through the fault of the United States, the talks were broken off and have still not been resumed.

However, sooner or later all these questions -- like the other questions of safeguarding international security and preventing nuclear war -- will have to be resolved. That is the call of the time, that is the will of the peoples. And the Soviet Union -- a firm proponent of turning the world's oceans into a zone of peace and stability -- will unswervingly operate in this direction along with other interested states. For only the complete removal of the threat of war -- from whatever quarter, including the world's oceans or space -- will make it possible to build a nuclear-free and nonviolent world, to create relations of mutual respect, friendship, and cooperation among the peoples, and to assert civilized norms, openness, and trust in international relations.

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CSO: 5200/1581

USSR'S PRIMA KOV ON 'NEW PHILOSOPHY' IN FOREIGN POLICY

PM100941 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jul 87 First Edition p 4

[Academician Ye. Primakov article: "New Philosophy of Foreign Policy" -- words within slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] I.

You can often hear it said that our country has been struggling for peace among the peoples since the first day of Soviet power -- so is it possible to speak of new approaches, let alone a new foreign policy philosophy, when peace remains the main aim of the USSR's foreign policy today?

The continuity of the soviet state's foreign policy line is indisputable, of course. Nevertheless, the qualitatively new conditions existing now, as M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has repeatedly stressed, have created a need -- perhaps the first such urgent need in our history -- to adopt an innovative approach to a whole series of crucial problems of international life.

The world approached the turn of the 1980's rapidly losing faith in the certainty of its eternal future. The problem of survival, which previously existed, has now become an acute problem of protecting human civilization from inevitable destruction in a thermonuclear war.

Until quite recently we said, and did not just say but were sure, that if the imperialist forces committed aggression against us they would be consumed in the flames of the war that they had started. In the past, this conclusion was perfectly valid. Its function as a warning to a potential aggressor was clear but perhaps the most important point was the mobilizing force of the statement: It oriented us toward the need to increase combat capability as the /only/ practical way of maintaining the country's security at the proper level.

Until comparatively recently we regarded peaceful coexistence as a breathing space interrupted by those who are trying for the umpteenth time to stifle the first country of victorious socialism. That situation also persistently dictated the need to once more increase combat capability as the only practical way of ensuring the country's security.

Today such assessments and interpretations are clearly inadequate and inaccurate. Even though the improvement of the Soviet Union's defense capability is as important as ever, political means of ensuring its security are now coming to the fore. We are dealing with a fundamentally new situation. [paragraph continues]

Given the accumulation of means of mass destruction in such quantity and of such quality, there can be no winners in the event of thermonuclear war. Peaceful coexistence thus becomes a vital necessity for mankind's survival. So naturally this situation urgently demands not only new methods of implementing foreign policy, particularly that of the great powers, but also a fundamentally new philosophy for approaching international problems.

But why did this indisputable and correct idea not begin to materialize intensively in our country until after the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum? It must be admitted that the experience of previous development, when we sometimes misused the epithet "historic," in no way inclines one to define new "historic landmarks." In this instance, however, it is a question not of some artificial turning point but of a real one from which a radical qualitative shift in the USSR's domestic and foreign policy began.

The organic link between our country's domestic and foreign policy has perhaps never before been as clear as it is now. After the April plenum, a course of accelerating the Soviet Union's economic, social, and political development was adopted. The vital necessity of this course is demonstrated, for example, by the dynamics of such a largely synthesizing indicator as the national income growth rate. In the decade before the April plenum (1976-1985) the USSR's national income growth rate exceeded the corresponding indicator in the United States only by a factor of 1.3. Consequently, the gap between USSR and U.S. national incomes was not only not reduced, it actually increased.

The 27th CPSU Congress and subsequent Central committee plenums defined the main instrument for the acceleration of development as the democratization of all spheres of Soviet society's life. Openness, criticism, self-criticism, emancipation, and the rejection of the "presumption of infallibility," which were all initially directed inward, were also reflected in the practice of the elaboration and implementation of our state's foreign policy course.

There is another aspect to the unity of domestic and foreign policy which appeared particularly clearly after the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum: The reliance on sharp acceleration of the Soviet Union's economic and social development revealed more clearly than ever before the need to optimize the correlation between productive spending and the military spending necessary for the country's reliable security.

II.

As I have already said, the Soviet Union's new foreign policy philosophy was not born in a void, but present conditions did not allow it to be simply a new version of the old principles either reformulated or better formulated. The 27th party congress emphasized the dialects of the unity and struggle of opposites in the modern world. The Central Committee Political Report rectified the distortion whereby the examination of the confrontation between the two world systems -- the socialist and the capitalist systems -- ignored their interdependence. It is important to note that the increasing interdependence of the modern world is expressed not only in the problem of survival, a problem common to all its parts, but also in the existence and development of a world economy, the existence and sharpening of general human interests connected with protecting the natural environment, eliminating the backwardness of the so-called Third World, conquering disease, finding new sources of energy, using space and the world's oceans for mankind's progress, and so on.

The understanding of all this forms the basis of the new foreign policy philosophy.

Of course, one of the main questions which cannot be avoided is how far it considers the social changes objectively taking place in the world and what is the relationship between ideology and foreign policy. The social renewal of the world is an objective necessity for mankind. But the mechanism of this renewal -- both revolutionary and evolutionary -- is set in motion by internal contradictions in each country. Back at the dawn of Soviet power, V.I. Lenin resolutely opposed the transformation of the first state of victorious socialism into an exporter of revolution to other countries and limited its international influence to that of setting an example. To exclude the exporting of revolution is the imperative of the nuclear age.

At the same time the stabilization of the international situation cannot and must not be achieved by the artificial maintenance of the social status quo, in other words, by exporting counterrevolution.

Interstate relations in general cannot be the sphere in which the outcome of the confrontation between world socialism and world capitalism is settled. However, the U.S. Administration does not understand that fact. During the Reagan presidency the ideological hue of U.S. foreign policy has become even clearer. For example, the deliberate bias of U.S. foreign policy toward the struggle against socialist principles and socialist social structures in a number of states is common knowledge.

The new foreign policy philosophy must be implemented primarily in new conceptual approaches to the problem of security.

First, political measures are coming to the fore in ensuring states' security. Accords and agreements between the USSR and the United States and the Warsaw Pact and NATO on arms reduction, confidence-building measures, and the elaboration and introduction of an all-embracing system of international security are a function of them.

There is no reliable alternative to political measures in the security sphere. Strategic parity currently exercises a deterrent [sderzhivayushchiy] effect, but even now military measures of deterrence [sderzhivaniye] -- the balance of fear -- are not only immoral, they are also unreliable. If the level of parity continues to rise with the involvement in "deterrence" of new spheres, such as space, for example, and new means, such as "exotic weapons," the risk of war will generally increase. The adoption of the most important military decisions will become the prerogative of technology, and that will push the world toward the brink of catastrophe.

Second, certain changes must embrace the military component, which in present conditions still retains its significance in safeguarding the security of the two opposing sides. The recent Political Consultative Committee conference in Berlin adopted a document on the Warsaw Pact countries' military doctrine. Its defensive character is not only declared but is also being implemented: both in the refusal to be first to use nuclear weapons and to begin military operations at all, and in the introduction into military planning and building of the principle of the reasonable sufficiency of military means. The military doctrine is aimed at preventing an all-annihilating war. At the same time, its function must be to rebuff the aggressor if he encroaches on the socialist community countries' sovereignty. The dialectical interconnection between these two tasks is obvious. The readiness to repulse the aggressor is the most important means of deterrence.

So long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, strategic parity between the USSR and the United States, for all its disadvantages, will retain its significance as a stabilizing factor. In this period, however, sufficiency is achieved by lowering the level of parity. This tendency must be the dominant one. It is served by the Soviet proposals of 15 January 1986, which provide for the /phased/ elimination of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction.

When we speak in this period about reasonable sufficiency, despite the importance of the quantitative aspect of strategic parity, its qualitative aspect is of paramount importance: the inability of either side to avoid a crushing counterstrike. Western experts put the percentage of "unacceptable" damage at a 60 percent loss of industry and around 30 percent loss of population.

After the elimination of nuclear weapons, stability in the world must be maintained mainly by political and legal means, including international ones, while military means must be based on reasonable sufficiency to repulse aggression.

Clearly, mention should also be made of another aspect of the sufficiency problem: On a number of occasions in the past we accepted the "rules of the game" imposed on us, which consisted in making symmetrical responses to U.S. moves in the arms race. It may be assumed that the United States thereby deliberately intended to exhaust us economically. Now the introduction of the principle of reasonable sufficiency makes such attempts by the United States very difficult.

However, the sufficiency built up for defense is not a permanently fixed amount and certainly does not give grounds for complacency or for inactivity. It is well known that for 18 months the USSR maintained a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, ceaselessly proposing that the United States follow its example, which generated the broadest support from the public in different countries, but it was forced to abandon the moratorium when a limit was reached beyond which the continuation of U.S. nuclear tests could have harmed Soviet security.

As the notion of sufficiency intensifies, so a countervailing tendency also develops -- the improvement of destabilizing systems of such high accuracy and power as MX missiles, Trident-2, and cruise missiles. That is why the sufficiency for defense that is being reached does not diminish in the slightest the urgency of the need to halt and curtail the arms race.

Third, the security of one side cannot be ensured at the expense of the other side's security. The search for military superiority inevitably rebounds against those who conduct it -- after all, the other side will inevitably seek and find countermeasures and, in critical situations, may even refuse to be "driven into a corner." The new foreign policy philosophy takes into account the need to recognize the objective character of different countries' national interests and not to counterpose them but to painstakingly seek areas where these interests can be combined.

The universalization of security and the repudiation of unilateral security are also expressed in the idea of worldwide security. On the one hand, the security system must cover all geographical regions, in other words, the whole world. On the other, it must apply to various spheres: not only military but also economic, political, and humanitarian.

Fourth, the new foreign policy philosophy must include the rejection of the horizontal spread of confrontation between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. [paragraph continues]

In this context, it becomes particularly important to stop examining regional conflicts from the angle of Soviet-U.S. rivalry, which hinders their settlement. However, the United States is committed to just such a line. Suffice it to quote two examples: Rather than giving support, Washington has essentially been undermining the efforts of the Contadora Group -- a number of Latin American states which have put forward realistic proposals whose adoption would remove the conflict around Nicaragua and stabilize the situation in Central America. Instead, the United States fuels tension around that country, supports the Somozista bandits from whose number the so-called contras have been recruited, supplies them with modern weapons, incites neighboring Honduras against Nicaragua, and gives it military aid.

The U.S. stance toward the settlement of the "Afghan problem" is also typical. At the very moment when the Afghan leadership adopted a course of national reconciliation, opening the doors of government to all the forces ready to defend the country's national interests, U.S. arms supplies to the Afghan dushmans reached their peak.

III.

Has the USSR's new philosophical approach to foreign policy issues been successful?

Of course, there is still a long way to go before these new approaches and the new political thinking are espoused by the U.S. leadership. Moreover, the U.S. side is fiercely resisting the Soviet course. Militarism is not surrendering its positions that easily, nor will it.

Yet the situation today is by no means the same as it was 2-3 years ago. It is increasingly difficult for anti-Sovietists in the West to maintain the image of the USSR artificially created by them as a belligerent undemocratic state looming over the world and thinking only of expansion. Public opinion polls in the United States and the West European countries attest that this myth does not hold up when viewed against the restructuring and openness in the USSR and the Soviet Union's constructive foreign policy. The popularity of the Soviet state and our leadership abroad -- among the people's masses and the intelligentsia -- is unprecedented.

Of course, the change in public opinion in the West still does not create by itself a fundamental turning point in the international situation, but it does form real preconditions for such a turning point. The development of this trend is undoubtedly promoted by the flexibility and constructiveness of the Soviet Union's foreign policy measures.

Sometimes they are seen as concessions by the USSR. Indeed, it must be said quite clearly that in a number of cases concessions are made -- they are designed to reduce matters to a common denominator on arms reduction problems. But these are concessions to common sense, not a retreat in the face of U.S. pressure. When we agree to "zero" medium-range missiles in Europe, we want to rid the European Continent of nuclear weapons -- irrespective of who was the first to make this proposal. It is no accident that with regard to the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, the USSR has also proposed "zero" operational and tactical missiles.

Events have shown that stagnation is by no means synonymous with firmness; the flexible and dynamic Soviet proposals, which are being constantly developed and honed, keep in a state of constant strain and allow no rest for those militarist forces which would feel much more comfortable without this flexibility and dynamism on our part.

We proceed on the basis that the new approaches to international affairs by which Soviet policy is guided are not only the only possible approach under present conditions, but are absolutely realistic.

SOVIET WEEKLY HOLDS ROUNDTABLE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

PM141039 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 27, 13 Jul 87 pp 18-21

[NEW TIMES roundtable entitled "Of Reasonable Sufficiency, Precarious Parity, and International Security" with: Lieutenant General Mikhail Abramovich Milshteyn, retired, professor, doctor of military sciences, chief scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States and Canada; Major General Vadim Ivanovich Makarevskiy, retired, candidate of military sciences, senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations; Major General Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Nozhin, retired, professor, doctor of philological sciences, instructor at the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee; Rear Admiral Aleksandr Romanovich Astafyev, retired, senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations -- accompanying boxed feature comprises photographs and identification of roundtable participants]

[Text] /What military doctrine is consonant with the dictates of the time? What level of armaments is sufficient for defence? Is strategic parity a reliable guarantee of peace? What should take the place of mutual nuclear deterrence? NEW TIMES invited for a round table talk on the subject a number of former high-ranking military leaders, members today of the Soviet Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament, a group functioning under the auspices of the Soviet Peace Committee./ [passage within slantlines published as editorial introduction]

NEW TIMES: How would you comment on the document adopted at the Berlin meeting of the WTO Political Consultative Committee, "on the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member states?"

Mikhail Milshteyn: It is a document of enormous significance. It demonstrates to the whole world the defensive character and orientation of the military doctrine of the U.S.S.R. and its allies. Many of its basic principles are given in a new formulation, besides which the document is, so to speak, a challenge to other states, and primarily the NATO countries, to examine their own doctrines in the light of ours. Lastly, it confronts Soviet military science with major tasks: the detailed elaboration of the fundamental principles of our military doctrine, specifically its military-technological aspect.

N.T.: What is basically new in the approach of the Warsaw Treaty States?

Milshteyn: Formerly military doctrines represented the sum total of a country's views on the preparation for war, the character of the war and its prosecution. Today for the first time in history the main task set the armed forces is prevention of war. The defensive character of our doctrine is unambiguously stated.

N.T.: But other states, the NATO countries, for instance, also officially maintain that their armed forces serve defensive purposes exclusively.

Milshteyn: There is indeed no dearth of verbal assurances of this kind. The Americans and NATO as a whole go in for such declarations. But declarations are one thing, and their realization in practice is quite another. We have renounced the use of force in general to resolve outstanding issues, offensive action against any state, and have undertaken the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. [paragraph continues]

Moreover, we are ready for a structure and disposition of our armed forces in zones of contact that would, first, guarantee the other side against sudden attack, and, second, in general exclude the possibility of offensive action against it. This is an instance of new thinking, both political and military. It is well-known fact that military thinking -- let military scientists not take offence -- is perhaps the most conservative and inertia-prone of all sciences.

Aleksandr Astafyev: To my mind, the very public exposition of the fundamental principles of our military doctrine is of historical significance. After all, it has always been considered inexpedient to do this.

N.T.: Openness in the military sphere?

A. Astafyev: Precisely. The public announcement of the defensive nature of the doctrine is extremely important for a correct understanding of the aims and intentions of the U.S.S.R. and its allies. I should like to underscore the significance of the proposal to discuss the NATO and Warsaw Treaty military doctrines at representative meetings of experts. Such meetings could be the starting points for negotiations of an altogether new kind between the two blocs. So far these negotiations have amounted largely to a simple count of who has what. If, on the other hand, the character of military doctrines is discussed and compared, we would be bound to arrive at new approaches to questions of war and peace. In which case the possibility could emerge for abandoning the dangerous and futile concept of "nuclear deterrence," for instance, and proceeding to laying the foundation for a system of international security based on the nuclear-free world concept.

N.T.: Of late a new concept -- "reasonable sufficiency" -- has appeared in the political lexicon. It was reflected also in the documents of the Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee. What exactly does it mean?

A. Astafyev: In the first place, in using the term "sufficiency" or "reasonable sufficiency" we must ask: sufficient for what? Ten years ago the then U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara calculated, with the help of experts, that for the U.S. nuclear weapons with a yield of about 200 megatons was sufficient. Sufficient for what? To destroy the key centres of the Soviet economy and manpower resources. In other words, "sufficient" to destroy an entire country, its industry and people.

When the Warsaw Treaty countries propose keeping within the limits of sufficiency, they mean sufficiency for defence. In other words, a sufficiency of military potentials that would rule out the victory of one side and the defeat of the other.

Vadim Makarevskiy: This is a very complicated question, for the geographical location and historical experience of the various countries, their views on the aims and purposes of defence, their economic and other potentials have to be taken into account. The Political Consultative Committee documents, besides declaring for the prevention of war both nuclear and conventional, speak of readiness to give a crushing rebuff to the aggressor, to rule out any possibility of being taken by surprise. That means that the armed forces remain, but at a considerably lower level. In June last year the Warsaw Treaty states therefore proposed to the NATO states that the level of armed forces in Europe be lowered, their numerical strength on both sides reduced by 100,000-150,000 within the next one or two years, and by the beginning of the 1990s by roughly half a million men.

The principle of sufficiency also means ending the drive to outstrip the other side of arms development, renouncing the building up of rapid deployment and other mobile forces, and of enormous facilities for the movement of troops by air and sea.

Thus, transition to the sufficiency principle signifies lowering the existing armament level, on a parity basis, of course -- parity with a tendency to lowering the level of armament to a point where neither side would have the means to wage offensive operations.

N.T.: The "sufficiency" thesis presupposes reduction but not total elimination of armed forces. How much should remain?

A. Astafyev: Reasonable sufficiency cannot be achieved only by quantitative reduction of armaments and armed forces. It is also a matter of the restructuring of the armed forces for defence, of the character of armaments, and lastly, of the military-strategic conceptions underlying the defensive military doctrines of both sides. The transition to reasonable sufficiency must proceed parallel with the establishment of a system of international security encompassing the military, political, economic, and humanitarian spheres. Before creating a non-offensive reasonable defence it is essential at least to restructure one's military potentials and revise military and political views. This will be a protracted process that must begin with the elimination of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction. A system of international security presupposes renouncing not only nuclear weapons and nuclear war but also war against one another in general. After all, even conventional weapons today present a terrible danger; "conventional" war in Europe would be a disaster for the whole continent.

M. Milshteyn: In my opinion the question of reasonable sufficiency must be tackled now. Yes, this will be a long-drawn-out process. And sufficiency in the context of the total elimination of nuclear weapons is a matter of the distant future. We know that our proposal of January 15, 1986, for the stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 did not find due support in the West, especially among the political leadership, and among some scientists as well. Some say that nuclear weapons cannot be "de-invented," others that it is precisely thanks to nuclear weapons that war has been averted to date; still others claim that complete elimination of these weapons would give military superiority to the Warsaw Treaty countries, and there are also those who do not exclude the possibility of South Africa, Israel, Brazil and Pakistan acquiring these weapons.

Of course the total elimination of nuclear arsenals is the only real way of averting a nuclear holocaust. But it will take time to achieve this objective. Hence transition

to reasonable sufficiency should proceed simultaneously with the reduction of nuclear stockpiles and also of armed forces and conventional armaments.

N.T.: What does reasonable sufficiency mean in these circumstances?

M. Milshteyn: In all probability it will not mean the same for all countries. Reasonable sufficiency implies possession of a military potential that, on the one hand, would be enough to safeguard the security of one's own country and, on the other, not enough to give effect to offensive plans, and especially to surprise attacks. However, considering, say, the geographical and geostrategic positions of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., reasonable sufficiency will differ in arithmetical terms. Therefore to specify exactly how many rifles, guns, tanks, aircraft and missiles each side should have is impossible at this juncture. The concrete parameters will be determined by agreement. [paragraph continues]

For this purpose it is proposed to hold a meeting of experts at which, for instance, it would be necessary to agree on which armaments should be considered defensive and which offensive. The building of armed forces, their disposition and the character of armaments should in future be determined exclusively by defensive considerations.

V. Makarevskiy: One can speak of sufficiency on both a global and a regional plane. I believe that at the present time the principles of reasonable sufficiency should be elaborated only on a regional plane -- in Europe with regard to NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

N.T.: In what sense could one speak of sufficiency on a global plane, in the light of the process of reducing nuclear weapons?

A. Astafyev: Here one can speak only of one thing -- sufficiency for maintaining military strategic parity. So long as the West is not prepared to renounce "nuclear deterrence" we are also obliged to have nuclear weapons -- such are the "rules of the game" forced upon us. And although we do not agree with the nuclear deterrence concept and urge renunciation of it, we are willy-nilly compelled to follow its logic. After all, the purpose of our strategic forces is to deter the adversary from embarking on aggression. Whether we like it or not, mutual deterrence is a fact. And this being so let us ask ourselves: How many times is sufficient for the enemy to be destroyed -- 150? 100? 15?

N.T.:...Or perhaps once is enough?

A. Astafyev: Right -- sufficiency at the lowest level.

M. Milshteyn: Moreover peace can be preserved only if the parity between the two sides is such as to allow neither to wage offensive action. If there is an illusion of superiority, not necessarily of quantity but of technology -- I have in mind the SDI programme -- the irreparable could happen. So the present parity is not a guarantee of peace.

N.T.: Does that mean that the classical formula that a threefold preponderance is needed for the success of an offensive no longer applies?

M. Milshteyn: That preponderance applied to artillery, tanks and infantry. Today of course the approach is somewhat different. Nevertheless that formula is not wholly outdated. The necessary superiority of strength can be created on some narrow sector of the front by weakening other sectors. But if offensive means -- mobile forces with

aircraft and tanks -- are withdrawn, as the U.S.S.R. and its allies propose, any attempt at an offensive thrust would have to be preceded by regrouping and concentration of troops, etc. This is bound to be noticed by the other side, and surprised attack would thus be excluded.

N.T.: Can Clausewitz's formula that war is the continuation of politics by other means be considered valid today when such gigantic arsenals of nuclear weapons have been accumulated?

Yevgeniy Nozhin: The problem of nuclear weapons has an inbuilt contradiction. We say the use of the nuclear weapon is suicidal, for the aggressor will inevitably perish from the consequences of the use of his own weapon. This has been proved scientifically. There is practically no doubt on this problem of the relation between the concepts of politics and war has acquired an entirely new dimension today.

Theoretically war is still the continuation of politics. If the Americans are preparing for war that is a continuation of their policy. If we reject war, that is precisely our policy. But theory is one thing and practice something else again. This is worth pondering over.

V. Makarevskiy: On February 16 at the International Forum for a Nuclear-Free World, For the Survival of Mankind, Mikhail Gorbachev said that world war has ceased to be a continuation of politics by other means. World war means nuclear war, in which all would perish. It is necessary to go over to new forms -- to defence, moreover, "non-offensive defence." In other words, the Clausewitz formula is not applicable to world war. But war is nevertheless still a continuation of politics as regards local conflicts. Take the Iranian-Iraqi war -- a classical illustration to Clausewitz. The Falklands war was also a continuation of politics. The Clausewitz formula remains valid also in other sphere -- the arms buildup, which is also a continuation of politics.

N.T.: You mentioned "non-offensive defence." There is a great deal of talk about this nowadays. Could you dwell in greater detail on this question? What is meant by "non-offensive defence," what are its basic principles?

V. Makarevskiy: It is one of the unofficial concepts being propounded in Western countries by individual scientists, nongovernmental organizations and representatives of opposition parties. It is also called "non-provocative defence." Its most important principles are:

renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons and of nuclear weapons in general;

the withdrawal of the most dangerous, offensive armaments from the zones of proximity of the two military blocs.

Thus it is a matter not only of reducing the armed forces of the sides, but also of qualitative change in these forces, of the elimination by mutual agreement of such types of offensive weaponry as tactical long-range bombers, tactical missiles, long-range artillery, large armoured formations, etc. In other words, a restructuring of the armed forces of the sides.

This essentially is what the Warsaw Treaty states had in mind when they proposed creating a nuclear-free corridor along the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty

and NATO forces extending for 150 kilometres on each side; withdrawing from this zone on a reciprocal basis all types of nuclear weapons -- warheads, nuclear artillery, nuclear-armed tactical strike aircraft, as well as air defence missile complexes capable of firing nuclear warheads.

Of course, it is for the military experts of each side to decide on the structure of the "non-offensive defence." Here, in my view, the creative imagination of the experts should not be limited. What is important is that the "non-offensive" principle is observed.

N.T.: Many in the West have noted the provision in the Berlin documents relating to asymmetry, the readiness of the U.S.S.R. to do away with it, by reducing, not increasing the various components. Is this an indirect admission of the Soviet Union's preponderance in one or another sphere?

V. Makarevskiy: Of course a certain disproportion does exist. That is why at the Vienna talks on the reduction of armaments and armed forces in central Europe we have proposed that the U.S. forces be reduced by 13,000 men and ours by 20,000.

M. Milshteyn: Asymmetry does of course imply preponderance, but preponderance both on our side in some respects, and on the other side, in other respects.

The West has its own preconceived notions about the Soviet Armed Forces. First, it is said that they are numerically superior to the Western. Second, that we have more tanks. Third, that the U.S.S.R. has more tactical nuclear weapons. Fourth, that the U.S.S.R. has more room for maneuvering of troops, reserves and combat units. Whether that is so is debatable. Some elements are counterbalanced, others are not. For instance, NATO has more anti-tank weapons. That is why it is proposed to hold meetings of experts, of the commanders of armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, their secretaries general and, lastly, highest ranking military leaders.

N.T.: But is there not a danger of getting bogged down in levels, sub-levels, comparisons, etc.? It will be extremely difficult to wade through this maze of problems.

M. Milshteyn: There is perhaps such a danger, when it comes to conventional armaments. If negotiations are conducted after the Vienna pattern we are bound to fall captive to statistics, juggling with figures and will not achieve any concrete results. In my view the only correct approach would be to use a model the Soviet formula at the Geneva nuclear and space talks. This proposal -- which has been accepted by the Americans -- is very simple: to cut strategic nuclear armaments by half. The problem has to be solved en bloc, as the Warsaw Treaty states suggested in June 1986, not allowing ourselves to be caught in a quagmire of statistical wrangling from which it is sometimes simply impossible to extricate oneself. That would really be a new approach, an example of new thinking.

N.T.: What is the reaction abroad to the Soviet proposals? We know that you have recently been in the U.S. and in Austria and met with Western military men. What was discussed at these talks, what results have such discussions yielded?

M. Milshteyn: The meeting of Soviet and American retired generals and admirals was the first of its kind ever held. Seven of us went to the United States and met with nine American retired admirals and generals. On the agenda were the limitation of armaments

and the military policy of the Reagan administration. The Soviet delegation outlined and substantiated the latest Soviet initiatives. On the whole our proposals met with wide support among the American participants, with the exception of the proposal for the total elimination of nuclear weapons of which I have already spoken.

V. Makarevskiy: Let me add that the atmosphere of the meeting was friendly. The discussions were held in public. With us was an official from the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defence, General B.T. Surikov. The Pentagon, regrettably, did not send its own general to the meeting.

Ye. Nozhin: I should like to make some remarks about the general significance of our trip. The emergence of such groups as ours and similar groups in the United States and Western Europe is in my view a manifestation of the new political and military thinking which is now gaining momentum. [paragraph continues]

When, say, doctors, writers, art workers speak up for peace that is logical. But when generals, men whose profession is war, begin to fight for peace, this looks somewhat paradoxical. But therein lies the strength of our group. The public evinces the keenest interest in our activity. It is noteworthy that our discussions in America drew a great many newsmen. And that is very important. I believe the public discussions exerted a considerable influence on public opinion through the mass media and the direct contacts we had with people. I personally had occasion to appear together with the American Admiral Eugene Carroll in a direct one-hour radio broadcast. Questions were put directly by the audience.

I made a live television appearance also in Shreveport, Louisiana, a town in the deep south. I assure you that our whole trip evoked great interest and was very useful.

N.T.: What about the meeting of retired admirals and generals held in Vienna in early May? You took part in it, did you not, Admiral Astafyev?

A. Astafyev: That was the fourth meeting of its kind. This time there were eight generals from five NATO countries and eleven generals and admirals from the Warsaw Treaty states.

We had agreed in advance that there would be no reports or papers prepared beforehand. We would simply conduct the discussion with a view to working out concrete recommendations that could be used in the future. What specifically did we discuss? The general theme was the new military thinking in the nuclear age. I must admit that before the meeting we were not sure how our Western colleagues would react to this idea of doing away with nuclear weapons altogether. Margaret Thatcher and Jacques Chirac had been in Moscow shortly before and both had been emphatically in favour of retaining the "nuclear deterrent."

But to the credit of the Western generals be it said that none of them supported that concept. Moreover, the British General Harbottle regretted that his Prime Minister had been so openly insistent in her advocacy of "nuclear deterrence."

We also discussed the military aspects of the international security system. Clearly many questions still remain unanswered. We agreed to examine this problem in greater detail at our next meeting in May next year.

N.T.: You said that you worked out recommendations for future work. Exactly what recommendations?

A. Astafyev: One of them related to direct contacts between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty commanders-in-chief, and between the secretaries-general of the two organizations, and the setting up of working groups to study military-strategic concepts in the nuclear age which could serve to reduce tension. We proposed holding seminars, discussions, and exchanges between the military organizations and institutions of both blocs at different levels. Also discussed were confidence-building measures to supplement those worked out at the first stage of the Stockholm conference.

I should like to stress that we declared unanimously for ending the Vienna talks and going over to a new basis in accordance with the mandate of the second stage of the Stockholm conference now being examined at the meeting in the Austrian capital.

N.T.: We thank you for your participation in our Round Table and hope that you will cooperate with us in the future as well.

The Round Table was conducted by A. Lebedev, D. Pogorzelskiy and N. Zholkver.

/9716

CSO: 5200/1581

PENTAGON HOLDS 'NUCLEAR WINTER' EXPERIMENTS

LD241933 Moscow TASS in English 1542 GMT 24 Jun 87

[Text] New York June 24 TASS--TASS correspondent Aleksandr Pakhomov reports:

The pentagon continues attempts to refute the conclusions of authoritative scientists that civilisation on earth would perish as a result of nuclear conflict. An ASSOCIATED PRESS report says that a forest area of over 120 hectares was set on fire not far from Los Angeles on Monday. The aim of that experiment in which aircraft of the Defense Nuclear Agency were used was to "check" the theory of "nuclear winter" in such a way as to dampen fears of Americans caused by the threat of a global catastrophe, to discredit the forces declaring for nuclear disarmament. More than 50 scientists watched the fire spread and huge clouds of smoke penetrate the atmosphere.

Fires will be raging on earth in the event of nuclear war, (said) one of the scientists Rick Fletcher. Buildings, forests will be burning. We wish to learn what effect the smoke from fires will have on the atmosphere, he said. The scientists declare that the results of the experiment, processed by computers, will enable them to create various "models" of atmospheric changes during nuclear war.

The use of even a part of nuclear armaments stockpiled in the world will cause (?truly) catastrophic changes in the earth's atmosphere and climate, will lead to radio-active contamination of vast areas, destruction of the ozone layer protecting the earth against cosmic irradiation, will lead to the pollution of the stratosphere and troposphere with smoke, dust and ashes. This means that "nuclear winter" will set in on earth. The air temperature will drop by 15-25 degrees, and the biggest part of wildlife and vegetation will be destroyed.

/9716

CSO: 5200/1581

USSR'S CHERVOV OUTLINES FEATURES OF WARSAW PACT DOCTRINE

AU151201 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 13 Jul 87 p 7

[Interview tih USSR Colonel General Nikolay Chervov by NOVOSTI's Vasiliy Morozov: "The Doctrine of Preventing War; Colonel General Nikolay Chervov on an Important Document of the Warsaw Pact Countries" -- place and date of interview not given]

[Text] In connection with the publication of the document On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member States, NOVOSTI commentator Vasiliy Morozov asked Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, chief of the Administration of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, to comment on several issues.

[Morozov] What are the fundamental special features of the Warsaw Pact's military doctrine?

[Chervov] The main feature is that the Warsaw Pact military doctrine is strictly defensive and is subordinated to the task of preventing war, both nuclear and conventional. Formerly, on the whole, military doctrine did not address the issue of strategy to such an extent. In principle, it rested on a set of views connected with the buildup of armed forces, with the preparation and waging of war. The military doctrine of the socialist countries constitutes a system of fundamental views on preventing war, the maintenance of the armed forces, the preparation of states and armed forces to beat back aggression, and on ways of waging an armed struggle to defend socialism.

The exclusively defensive orientation of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact organization finds its expression in the fact that the socialist countries will never under any circumstances, start a war -- either nuclear or conventional -- against any country, whether in Europe or any other part of the world, unless they themselves become the subject of an armed attack. They will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The USSR and the other socialist countries have no territorial claims against any state inside or outside Europe. They do not regard any state or nation as their enemy.

Another special feature of the Warsaw Pact military doctrine lies in the fact that it is oriented toward achieving the lowest possible level of the military groupings facing one another and it proceeds from the position that in our times truly equal security is not guaranteed by a high, but by the lowest possible level of strategic equilibrium.

Each of the sections of the Warsaw Pact military doctrine, are an essential component to preparing and maintaining the armed forces of the allied armies, including issues

connected with defense planning, the training of troops and staffs, and the manner of conducting military actions.

Therefore, the publication of a uniform military doctrine is not only a declaration of principles but also a mere affirmation of the strictly defensive nature of the policy of the socialist states. It is one program of activities for building up the allied forces of the Warsaw Pact states. The principle of adequacy for defense is incorporated in the foundations of this program. In general, this principle envisages that the allied socialist states will maintain their armed forces and armament at such a level that any aggressor's attack would not catch them unprepared and would not yield the aggressor any benefit.

[Morozov] This is the first time a military doctrine has set the task of preventing war. With what means and instruments does the Warsaw Pact organization want to fulfill that task? What place will the military means have in fulfilling that task?

[Chervov] The Warsaw Pact member states realize that the military-strategic equilibrium continues to be the decisive factor in preventing war. However, the feverish arms buildup makes it disproportionately high, which does not bring greater security. Security becomes reliable when balance exists at the lowest possible level. In this connection, the task of military means for not preventing war is, in particular, oriented toward maintaining the sides' military potentials at a level sufficient for defense only.

[Morozov] What can you say about the NATO concept based on "nuclear deterrence" being submitted by the West as a guarantee of security?

[Chervov] The concept of "mutual deterrence by means of nuclear deterrence" is innately contradictory. Its proponents assert that the more nuclear weapons, the greater, allegedly, the security and the greater the military competition, the better, allegedly, for the cause of peace. "Nuclear containment" is the concept of the "cold war" period. It was tolerated up to a certain time. It has no justification now.

The concept of nuclear deterrence is selfish. It is possible that it ensures the security of a nuclear state to a certain extent. But what are the other states and regions to do? They are forced to entrust their security to nuclear big powers or to seek other ways. This will objectively lead to proliferating nuclear weapons in the world and undermining of states' security.

The concept of the nuclear deterrent constitutes a pressure, a position of strength. It fans a feverish arms buildup and makes military equilibrium unstable. One cannot exclude the possibility of war being unleashed accidentally. The alternative is to scrap nuclear weapons and reduce military potentials to the level of sensible adequacy.

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CSO: 5200/1581

IZVESTIYA HITS WESTERN RESPONSE TO PCC PROPOSALS

PM171221 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Jun 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Political observer Vikentiy Matveyev article: "Playing Hide and Seek"]

[Text] What can you say about a person who complains about his neighbor but at the same time stubbornly refuses to meet them to discuss the causes of his complaints and ways to improve relations?

The government of NATO countries have more than once expressed concern about the intentions and plans of Warsaw Pact countries. On 5 June, for instance, President Reagan in a speech transmitted via the Worldnet television network claimed: "The Soviet Union maintains on its territory and in East Europe vast nonnuclear forces which are ready to strike."

At the time when these words were broadcast, a week had passed since the adoption by the Warsaw Pact states at their Berlin conference of the document on their military doctrine. This document contains an invitation to NATO countries to hold consultations with the aim of comparing the two alliances' military doctrines.

As for the question of a disequilibrium in specific arms categories in Europe, the Berlin document states unequivocally: "Existing imbalances and asymmetries in individual types of arms and armed forces could also be the subject of consultations...". This section of the document has attracted an especially wide response in the West, although official circles in Washington and other NATO capitals have evidently decided to shrug off what is a fundamentally important readiness on the part of the socialist countries.

Speaking at a time when the text of the documents adopted at the Berlin session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee must have been lying on his desk in the White House Oval Office for days, the U.S. President behaved as if he had never seen these documents or as if, having acquainted himself with their content, he deemed it preferential to ignore them utterly.

On 10 June the WASHINGTON TIMES cited a noteworthy remark by the U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger on the subject of the Warsaw pact countries' Berlin communique which, according to the newspaper, contained a proposal for more significant reductions in any type of arms in which one of the sides has an advantage. "I have not seen the communique, or any comment on it," Weinberger said.

How is one to interpret such an amazing statement? Could it be that the basic information system in the Pentagon had broken down?

The problem lies elsewhere, of course. It is impossible to plead "ignorance." Back in 1985, during his visit to France, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, expressed himself in favor of a dialogue between the military organizations of the Warsaw Pact and NATO with a view to lowering tension in Europe. The Soviet side expressed readiness to organize such contacts at the level of authoritative military leaders.

Incidentally, in the recent past, even some influential NATO representatives have spoken about the desirability of an exchange of views with Warsaw Pact representatives.

On the subject of the Warsaw Pact military doctrine the most tendentious information is being disseminated in the West to this day. In the FRG, for instance, a publication under the title "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy" has just appeared. It claims that this doctrine has never been declared in print! That it allegedly "demands superiority over the enemy, specifically the NATO forces in the European theater" ...And that allegedly "the Soviet leadership is still hoping to win a nuclear war"...

The document "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact States," adopted in Berlin, was published in the press and disseminated through GDR ambassadors together with the other documents from that Political Consultative Committee conference, and in most cases even the official representatives of NATO countries responded to them on the whole positively, saying that they would study their content and formulate their response, but that they needed time.

The last point is a natural one, although the said documents are not of a nature to compel the NATO government to grope their way through debris. The Warsaw Pact countries' position is set out clearly and succinctly. In addition to the proposal to hold consultations on military doctrines, there is a proposal to convene a meeting of the foreign ministers of all CSCE participant states. At this meeting a decision could be adopted to embark on large-scale talks with a view to agreeing radical reductions of armed forces, conventional arms, and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe with a corresponding reduction in military expenditure.

These questions are being actively discussed both at the official and the public level in the West. Their topicality is unquestionable. Delivering a policy statement 4 June, that is after the publication of the aforementioned documents from the Warsaw Pact countries' Berlin conference, FRG Chancellor H. Kohl said in part: "I emphasize once again that, in view of the inconceivable destructive force of modern conventional weapons systems, our country would face the same threat to its existence in the event of a conventional war as in the event of a nuclear clash."

And what has the Warsaw Pact countries' document to say on this subject? "The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact and each of its members is subordinate to the task of forestalling war, both nuclear and /CONVENTIONAL/ war (my emphasis -- V.M.).

In the same statement H. Kohl approved in general terms--but no more!--the documents adopted by the Warsaw Pact countries in Berlin. However, what is needed are not general compliments but a precise, businesslike response. Meanwhile, the head of the FRG government said absolutely nothing about the nitty-gritty of the Warsaw Pact countries' Berlin conference documents, as if it did not exist! However, how can you reconcile the expressions of concern at the "inconceivable force of modern weapons" on the one hand, and total disregard for the substance of the proposals put forward by the Warsaw Pact on the other?

However, the fact that this is not a question of accidental failure to mention these proposals but rather of a deliberate line, of conscious attempts to sidestep the practical examination of the socialist countries' new initiatives in Europe is borne out graphically also by the document on East-West relations adopted in Venice by the heads of the seven main capitalist countries. It contains not a word about the socialist countries' new proposals. Instead, the Venice conference participants are trying to bring down non-existent barriers by appealing to the Soviet Union "to conduct talks in a positive and constructive spirit."

Are they not aware that what is needed are not high-sounding appeals but specific actions at the negotiating table?

After the Venice meeting journalists asked U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz how the Western governments intended to respond to the new Warsaw Pact countries' proposals. The State Department chief retorted that this question would be discussed at the NATO Council session in Reykjavik. We have now read the final communique of that session. It once again contains stereotyped claims about "imbalances in the sphere of conventional, chemical, and nuclear weapons, "but not a word about the Warsaw Pact countries' new proposals addressed to NATO.

So there is evidence of a clear unwillingness on the part of NATO leaders to tackle in earnest the questions raised by the practice of international relations and the broad public--questions about which, incidentally, NATO country officials are also rambling on while trying to hide in the bushes in an effort to sidestep a concrete dialogue. The former U.S. diplomat J. Dean writes in the June edition of the influential U.S. journal BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS: "Over the past 2 years the USSR has taken 25 major steps--in the main unilateral and unanswered (by the West -- V.M.) steps--in the direction of the U.S. position on arms control, while the United States has taken relatively few countersteps."

This, with regard to Washington's position, is putting it relatively mildly, but the idea is clear. This kind of hide and seek game on the part of NATO leaders cannot go on forever. With increasing urgency, life is demanding a definite answer to the Warsaw Pact governments' precise initiatives and proposals.

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CSO: 5200/1581

HINTS OF MAJOR SHIFTS IN PACT DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLEGEMEINE in German 4 Jul 87 p 5

[Article by Jan Reifenberg: "'We Are No Longer Talking About How To Win the War'-A New Soviet Military Doctrine -- Moscow Delegate Signals Foreign Policy Shift"]

[Text] Berlin, in early July -- "The Soviet Union's strategic doctrine up to now was just as incomprehensible to us Russians as it was for the West. Marshal Sokolovskiy's demands of the sixties are a thing of the past. [paragraph continues]

Now a genuine coalition doctrine is being developed for the first time whose primary goal is the maintenance of sufficiency for defensive purposes. We are no longer talking about winning the war (by nuclear, chemical or conventional means) but about how to prevent it. The principal problem existing between us and Western Europe -- that of the threat of a surprise attack -- must be overcome by the withdrawal of all offensive forces. As in all other areas, the Soviet Union is presently engaged in a thoroughgoing reevaluation of its military posture. That does not sit well with a good many people; but the necessary political decision by the leadership is being implemented."

The above points were made by a high-ranking Soviet political figure and scientist in commenting on Gorbachev's new policies at a conference devoted to security between East and West sponsored by the Berlin Aspen Institute. The speaker also announced that Moscow's relationship with its East European partners would undergo fundamental change. In place of a monolithic bloc dependent on Moscow's orders, the Soviet leadership was now thinking of the creation of a "commonwealth" of East Bloc nations within the framework of which increasing freedom of movement of the individual members would become inevitable. Another conference participant referred to the Brezhnev Doctrine as "antiquated thinking" because the use of force does not lead anywhere.

In private conversations, Soviet participants admitted that the response to these ideas of Gorbachev in Eastern Europe was divided. Jaruzelski and Kadar in Poland and Hungary fully support them whereas the group of aging diehards runs the gamut from "unpersuadable Ceausescu to Husak and Zhivkov all the way to Honecker."

The Soviet representatives entreated the Western participants in the conference [to believe] that the Soviet Union is poised at the beginning of a truly "revolutionary" process in which the reordering of the economy and the relaxation of domestic policies play a principal part. Shifts in foreign and security policy must be viewed in this light by the West. " [Gorbachev] is making some unconventional decisions. Foreign policy is no longer a 'sacred cow' but a subject open to criticism. We stagnated for three decades and as part of the process of the national revival of current optimism, something will have to happen in this field."

The West is being called upon to work together with the Soviet Union. It is for the West to decide what kind of a Soviet Union it wishes to have: a garrison state which staggers from one crisis to the next or an economically and politically viable nation in which irreversible change is taking place. The fossilized administrative state, largely unchanged since the thirties, is now giving way to an "economy based on common sense and historical experience" and this puts an end to Stalinism at long last. To be sure, [the Soviet Union] wishes to have a "socialist market economy" -- not patterned after the Western model -- in which "objective economic rules are subordinated to political decisions."

Abandonment of [Military] Superiority

An expert from the America Institute, which has close ties to the Politburo, said that the reformulation of Soviet foreign policy is based on two assumptions. It proposes to view the world as a whole and to accept the fact that security can no longer be maintained by military means alone but only by means of "common security between East and West and in the international arena." [paragraph continues]

[The Soviet Union] has come to the realization that military means must be subordinated to political means, if the goal of military-strategic balance is to be attained. A memorandum on future Soviet military doctrine [it was said] contains both an appeal for the prevention of war and for the abandonment of [military] superiority. To turn this into a reality, it is necessary to redefine the relationship between defensive and offensive forces. "The Soviet Union was unwilling to accept the concept of deterrence. Today, it does so because the overall goal is the prevention of war. For this reason, the asymmetries between the Warsaw Pact and NATO must be eliminated. We readily admit that we have problems in this regard with our East European allies." Arms limitation, in other words, is the key to progress. The "correlation of forces," which has been the determining factor in Europe for the past 40 years, must give way to new ways of thinking. Some of the Soviet participants said they observed "some positive developments" in Geneva and Vienna. They agreed with the West that the prospects for an agreement on the elimination of medium-range weapons in Europe and thus for another Gorbachev-Reagan summit are good. On the other hand, it was plain to see that progress toward a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive weapons would only be possible if Washington severely limits its SDI program and continues to adhere to strict compliance with the ABM Treaty. It remained unclear in the discussion how a breakthrough toward a mandate for conventional arms limitations "from the Atlantic to the Urals" might be achieved in Vienna. Western arguments to the effect that a repetition of the unsuccessful 14-year MBFR negotiations could only be avoided if the Soviet Union agreed that Warsaw Pact superiority in tanks, personnel and chemical weapons is the determining factor for NATO's present threat scenario were met with silence.

The Soviet participants also refused fully to accept the connection between East-West security issues in Europe and the situation in areas outside Europe. "They will become credible only once they withdraw their forces from Afghanistan," British and U.S. participants said. The response was that the Moscow leadership is firmly decided on doing just that but that the West "has no idea of the true situation in Afghanistan" and is in fact making it more difficult for the Soviets to withdraw because of its continued support for the Afghan rebels. The Soviet participants reacted heatedly and emotionally to the suggestion that fundamental change in the situation in East Europe would inevitably raise the German question anew. Repeated U.S. attempts to link security, stability and human rights were angrily dismissed.

All of this was followed by the threat that Gorbachev will be unable to push through his plans for reform, if the West insists on giving the world power Soviet Union "bad grades and constantly tries to put it in the wrong." All in all, however, the Western participants came away with the impression that the general secretary is pleading for understanding for a variety of reasons. But the question remained open as to whether a more flexible and less bureaucratic Soviet Union would serve as a stabilizing factor.

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CSO: 5200/1581

RELATED ISSUES

NEW BLOC FORUM TO COVER DISARMAMENT, DEVELOPMENT

PM251657 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jun 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Founding Conference"]

[Text] The importance of deepening cooperation in the struggle for new political thinking when solving the very acute problems facing mankind was emphasized at the founding conference, held in Moscow, of the "Problems of Peace and Disarmament" multilateral troubleshooting commission of the socialist countries' academies of sciences. Representatives of the Academies of Sciences of Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, the GDR, the DPRK, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia participated in it. The scientists approved the main directions and forms of work of the multilateral troubleshooting commission and the plan of action for 1988-1990.

On the same day the conference participants together with representatives of a number of developing countries held a "roundtable" on the subject "Disarmament and Development" at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations. The theses "The Concept of the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development," prepared by the institute, were discussed.

The speakers emphasized that the "Disarmament and Development" formula reflects the new political thinking orientated toward cooperation and mutual assistance in the present interdependent, yet contradictory world.

The scientists spoke of the need for the profound elaboration of the problems addressed. In particular, they pointed out, it is necessary to reply in greater detail to the spurious arguments of apologists for militarism, who perceive production of means of mass destruction as a constant source of economic growth. The U.S. Administration uses these arguments to propagandize its military programs. But the facts indicate otherwise: After artificially ensuring a brief "economic takeoff," swollen military budgets then doom the capitalist economy to a long depression.

It was emphasized that disarmament will produce a substantial socioeconomic effect for all mankind. In this connection note was taken of the special significance of realizing the "disarmament and development" formula for solving the acute social and economic problems which developing countries are encountering.

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CSO: 5200/1581

USSR: MONGOLIA HOSTS ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY CONFERENCE

Dobrynin Speech

LD071119 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0725 GMT 7 Jul 87

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 7 Jul (TASS) -- A.F. Dobrynin, head of the CPSU delegation and a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, spoke in the course of discussions at a consultative meeting which opened here today, of the representatives of communist and revolutionary democratic parties, "for peace, security and goodneighbourly cooperation in the Asian Pacific region."

He expressed the hope that the Ulaanbaatar meeting would mark the strengthening of unity in the ranks, cooperation, and its expansion and the attainment of a new level of mutual understanding among the fraternal parties. This constitutes the fundamental task of the meeting. The meeting is taking place in a crucial and complex period when national and regional problems have become tangled in a single knot with those of mankind in general. The main one of these problems is to avert the nuclear self-destruction of humanity. The countries of the Asia-Pacific region, where a large part of the world's population lives, can and should make a weighty contribution to dealing with this task. Life itself puts the task of guaranteeing peace and security to the Asia-Pacific region, as a part of the problem of setting up a comprehensive international security system, at the focus of attention of the meeting.

The problems of this vast region are close to the Soviet Union as an Asian and Pacific state. A.F. Dobrynin recalled that in his famous Vladivostok speech of July 1986, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, put forward the conceptual basis and practical program for ensuring peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region by the joint efforts of all its countries. Based on recognition and understanding of the existing realities, this program proceeds from the long-term interests of peoples in the region and looks to the future. It is based on our universal approach to the principles of constructing international relations on the new thinking in the modern epoch.

Guided by the new thinking, and striving to have it understood and accepted by all of our partners in political dialogue, we intend to continue to put forward the concept of the integrated guarantee of peace and security in the Asia and Pacific region by the joint efforts of all states of the area. The development of the situation here reaffirms the topicality of the program of measures put forward in Vladivostok for the reduction of tension and the establishment of broad political dialogue aimed at strengthening peace and security.

In connection with this he drew attention to the fact that the process of militarization in the Asia-Pacific region is gathering dangerous pace. The responsibility for tension in the region lies primarily with the U.S. militarist circles. In accordance with the concept of neoglobalism, Washington is building up its nuclear weapons, the power of its naval fleets and of other parts of its armed forces here, and is setting the aim of consolidating the Asia-Pacific region in the system of its military bridgeheads stretching from Europe, across the Near East and Southeast Asia, right up to Japan and Oceania. Military-political partnership in the U.S.-Japan-South Korea triangle is being made more active. The second largest group of U.S. troops abroad, after Western Europe, is situated in the Pacific region.

Supporting Washington's global course, Japanese ruling circles are steadily strengthening the combat might of their own armed forces. On the whole, these joint military preparations are aimed not only against the socialist countries; the military bases on foreign territories in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region are also intended to impose on them the will of the imperialist multinational monopolies.

The monopolies gain vast profits. The profit margin there is twice that in the developed countries. With a Philippines foreign debt, for example, of \$26 billion, that country has to pay virtually half of its export earnings toward interest payments.

Yet another aspect should not be omitted. Militarization often leads to enhancing the role of military circles in the political life of countries. This directly threatens that military dictatorships will be established, as has happened, for example, in South Korea. Also, the direction of the Pentagon's general course is causing concern.

At the same time, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out that, of late, positive tendencies can be seen in the Asia-Pacific region. The urgent need to change the current dangerous course is being recognized more and more deeply here. The forces trying to put a barrier in the path of the proliferation of nuclear arms and demanding to give a peaceful and secure future to the peoples, one that would be free from threats, violence, and fear, are becoming more active. During the year that has passed since M.S. Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok, the public of the Asia-Pacific region have been able to see specific facts once again that it is precisely the USSR that builds its policy taking into account both the interests of the Soviet people and those of strengthening peace in Asia and in the Pacific basin, and throughout the world as a whole.

Such specific actions of the Soviet Union as its course to implement major actions leading to a gradual elimination of the world's nuclear weapons, the prolonged unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, practical steps to withdraw a number of military divisions from Mongolia and Afghanistan, the proposals for transferring the issue of measures of trust onto a practical place and its support for initiatives to set up nuclear-free zones in the Asia-Pacific region and the idea of converting the Indian Ocean into a peace zone have met with an attitude of interest from the majority of Asian states.

The head of the CPSU delegation stressed that the Soviet concept of peace and security in the Asian-Pacific region contains the principle of universality. This means that all countries of the region are invited to a dialogue, regardless of their sociopolitical structure and their foreign policy orientation. The Delhi declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons is a convincing example of the fruitfulness of such an approach.

Citing relevant examples, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee reaffirmed the support which our party and the Soviet Government invariably give to the peace initiatives of the socialist states of Asia and to the positive ideas which other countries of the region put forward. The Soviet Union will continue to conduct a political dialogue with states and public movements of the region, to develop and refine its initiatives, and to support positive initiatives coming from other states, both socialist and non-socialist, and from public organizations and individual figures.

We would like to work together with the PRC in the task of guaranteeing peace and security in Asia and the Pacific Ocean area. Noting the positive moves in relations between the USSR and PRC, he expressed the conviction that the further improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations will serve the strengthening of peace and stability in the region. Our conception of the strengthening of peace in the Asian-Pacific region presupposes, of course, drawing the United States and Japan into that process. The American and Japanese people would only gain from the establishment of an atmosphere of neighborliness and cooperation here.

The head of the CPSU delegation noted the considerable stepping up of ties between the USSR and various countries of the Asia-Pacific region in recent years, both at the level of states and at other levels. We are devoting great attention to the expansion of trade and economic, scientific and technological, and cultural cooperation with countries of the region, he said. A plan is being worked out for development of the Soviet Far East as a highly efficient national economic complex which is part of the system of the international division of labor. It was stressed that the Soviet Union advocates involving the Asian-Pacific region in the overall process of creating a comprehensive system of international security. As M.S. Gorbachev said at a meeting in May this year with Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee, the efforts of the countries of the two continents of Europe and Asia in the direction of building regional systems of security, could merge into a unified Euro-Asiatic process which would provide a powerful stimulus for the creation of a comprehensive system of international security.

The speech then touched on the problems and tasks which require joint discussion in order to transform the concept of peace and disarmament into action by the broad masses of the people and by public organizations.

Going on to tell the participants in the meeting about the results of the CPSU Central Committee June Plenum and of the restructuring underway in the USSR, A.F. Dobrynin noted that the fundamental revolutionary changes taking place in the country are of immense significance not just for Soviet society but for socialism and the world as a whole. They open up new possibilities for the full uncovering and utilization of the advantages of the socialist system and provide additional arguments in favor of socialism as an alternative to capitalist society. Soviet people are thereby fulfilling their internationalist duty too. Understanding throughout the world is growing of the indissoluble link between the USSR's peaceloving foreign policy and its domestic policies and concentration on constructive work to improve the country. As a corollary, trust is reinforced in the world and support is growing for Soviet initiatives in the spheres of disarmament and international security.

The head of the CPSU delegation conveyed to the participants in the meeting comradely greetings and wishes for fruitful work in the interests of activating the struggle for peace, security, and goodneighborly cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region.

Batmonh Speech

PM081151 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "For Peace, Security, and Good-neighborliness"]

[Excerpt] Ulaanbaatar, 7 Jul -- The consultative meeting of representatives of communist and revolutionary democratic parties "for peace, security, and good-neighborly cooperation in the Asia and Pacific region" opened in the Mongolian capital today.

J. Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] greeted the emissaries of 21 communist and revolutionary democratic parties of Asian and Pacific countries.

Contrary to the people's fundamental interests and through the fault of reactionary imperialist circles, the Mongolian leader emphasized, individual zones of the Asia and Pacific region are being turned into bridgeheads for nuclear missile means, being covered with a dense network of military bases, and becoming an arena of conflicts. In what ways is the dangerously explosive situation to be overcome and are lasting peace and security really to be ensured in the region? Today the peoples see the answer to these questions in the constructive initiatives and proposals of the socialist and other peace-loving states, which express profound awareness of their responsibility for the fate of mankind and the desire to resolve global problems of mankind's survival in close combination with ensuring regional security. In this connection the MPRP attaches special significance to the Soviet Union's Vladivostok package of proposals.

The improvement of the political atmosphere in the region, the ensuring of genuine peace and universal security, and the removal of the nuclear threat, J. Batmonh pointed out, can be achieved only on the basis of joint efforts by all states and public forces in the region. It is our conviction that the communist and workers parties marching in the front ranks of the peace champions movement are called upon to play an important role in this. There is no more urgent task for them today than that of rallying all antiwar, peace-loving, and democratic forces in the struggle to avert the threat of nuclear war and end the arms race, for peace and the people's security.

He voiced firm confidence that the interests of ridding the vast Asia and Pacific region of the pernicious nuclear arms race and of military confrontation and the peoples' will to live under conditions of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world will prevail over the adventurist, aggressive aspirations of imperialism's most bellicose forces. The realities of the nuclear missile age demand this.

The MPRP, true to the ideas of peace, friendship, and international solidarity, the MPRP leader said, has come out resolutely in support of the idea of holding a meeting of representatives of communist and workers parties of countries in the Asia and Pacific region on questions of peace and security in the region. We hope that our meeting will enable us better to learn each other's positions and will promote the pooling of the fraternal parties' efforts and their cooperation in the struggle against the danger of war and to ensure a peaceful future for the peoples of the region.

Dobrynin Interview

LD101350 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0840 GMT 10 Jul 87

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 10 Jul (TASS) -- The program for peace in Asia and the Pacific put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in Vladivostok is a year old. It can be said today with every justification that its ideas are alive and working for the cause of the peace and security of peoples. A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, says this in an interview published today in the newspaper 'UNEN'.

The USSR, he stressed, is doing everything it can to move the concept of guaranteeing peace and security in this vast region onto a plane of specific actions. The whole range of global-scale peace initiatives advanced of late by our country on the basis of the new political thinking is doubtless having a positive influence in this sense.

At the same time, the USSR's ties with the countries of Asia and the Pacific are broadening and deepening, and regular contacts are being maintained with many states in this region. Specifically, the signing of the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons is an outstanding result of our cooperation with India.

We actively support the peace initiative of the socialist countries of Asia for the normalization of the situation in the region and for the settlement of local conflicts, as well as the proposals and practical steps of a number of nonsocialist states for the creation of a peace zone and a nuclear-free zone in Asia and the Pacific.

As M.S. Gorbachev has stated repeatedly, there is no step toward the reduction and elimination of weapons and military presences that we will not take in conjunction with the United States on the basis of reciprocity and equal security for us and our allies. So for the most part, it is now a question of the West displaying a constructive attitude to the problems of peace in Asia and the Pacific.

Assessing the significance of the consultative meeting of representatives of communist and revolutionary-democratic parties "for peace, security, and goodneighborly cooperation in Asia and the Pacific" that has closed in Ulaanbaatar, A.F. Dobrynin said that the CPSU accords great importance to the unity of action of communists and all forces acting from a standpoint of peace, humanism, and the survival of mankind. Thus the meeting was most timely, its occurrence marked a strengthening of the unity of the ranks, of interaction, of an expansion of cooperation and the attainment of a new level in mutual understanding between fraternal parties on matters of the struggle for peace and security.

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CSO: 5200/1585

MEXICAN CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION DISCUSSES ARMS ISSUES IN MOSCOW

Meets With Gromyko

PM061337 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 2

[TASS report: "To Strengthen Friendship Between the USSR and Mexico"]

[Excerpts] The problem of eliminating the danger of nuclear war and details of the restructuring of Soviet economic management were the two main topics in which the Mexican parliamentarians were primarily interested.

Their delegation was received in the Kremlin on 3 July by A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. The Mexican National Congress delegation, which arrived in Moscow at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet, is headed by Antonio Riva Palacio, chairman of the National Congress Permanent Committee and chairman of the Senate's Grand Committee.

The conversation, which proceeded in an atmosphere of friendship, began with A.A. Gromyko giving a detailed briefing on the USSR's peace-loving foreign policy and the Soviet proposals aimed at the strengthening of peace.

Our goal is to destroy the nuclear monster, he noted. Under these conditions we are trying to explain the Soviet initiatives to everyone, to the whole world, and to prove that the elimination of the terrible nuclear danger is in the interests of all peoples. It is gratifying that the Soviet Union and Mexico invariably advocate peace and disarmament at all forums. Mexico, just like the Soviet Union, realizes that no problem on earth today is more important than the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union's proposals, A.A. Gromyko noted, also envisage a phased process leading to the destruction of nuclear weapons. We have submitted specific proposals on this account, and they are now being discussed by the USSR and U.S. delegations in Geneva. Hitherto, however, the U.S. side has not given the consent which could offer an opportunity to sign the appropriate document. I would like to express hope that the blocking of the way to agreement -- regardless of whether it is being done loudly, to the accompaniment of hackneyed statements, or silently -- will be abandoned and that common sense and reason will gain the upper hand. This would already be an important step toward a radical solution of the question of the elimination of nuclear weapons, for which the Soviet Union has been and is calling.

A. Riva Palacio: As one of the "Delhi Six" or the "Four Continents Group" as it is also known, Mexico displays firm determination to struggle against nuclear weapons.

A.A. Gromyko: These are remarkable words! The peoples can only applaud this stance by Mexico.

A. Riva Palacio: Just the detailed briefing on the Soviet Union's struggle against nuclear weapons, its struggle to destroy these weapons, is worth the trip to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union wholly supports the steps taken by the "Delhi Six" against nuclear weapons, A.A. Gromyko noted. Evidence of this can be seen in the replies sent by M.S. Gorbachev to the messages of the heads of state and government from these "Six Countries," which have already gained profound respect.

The implementation of restructuring is inseparably and organically linked with Soviet foreign policy. We have no other goal but peace. The country needs peace for the successful implementation of restructuring. The word peace on our banner not only expresses the lofty ideal of the socialist social system but also corresponds with our practical policy in internal affairs. We are therefore justified in saying that the USSR's domestic policy and its foreign policy constitute a durable alloy.

The Mexican delegation's members highly appraised the Soviet Union's bold and innovative approach to international affairs. They noted that the USSR's foreign policy initiatives offer good prospects for progress in the cause of disarmament.

Taking part in the conversation were R.-B. I. Songayla, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; T.N. Menteshashvili, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; A.N. Aksenov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting; V.G. Komplektov, USSR deputy foreign minister; V.M. Mishin, USSR Supreme Soviet deputy; N.F. Rubtsov, chief of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretariat, USSR ambassador to Mexico R.A. Sergeev; and Mexican ambassador to the USSR H. Flores de la Pena.

The delegation departed for Leningrad in the evening.

Hold's News Conference

PM131359 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Complete Satisfaction"]

[Excerpts] A. Riva Palacio, head of a Mexican National Congress delegation, chairman of the Senate Grand Commission, and chairman of the Congress Permanent Commission, has expressed complete satisfaction with his visit to the Soviet Union. He was speaking at a 9 July Moscow news conference for Soviet and foreign correspondents.

The guest stated that the two countries have similar positions on a number of pressing international questions. A sense of responsibility for the fate of human civilization is the basis of these positions. Mexico is making efforts in its region to alleviate international tension. As one of the "Group of Six" it advocates improving the situation throughout the world.

IZVESTIYA Reports on Visit

PM141615 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "On the Visit to the Soviet Union by a Delegation of the National Congress of the United States of Mexico"]

[Excerpts] A delegation of Mexico's National Congress headed by Senator A. Riva Palacio, chairman of the Grand Commission of the Senate and of the Standing Commission of Congress, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet 2-9 July 1987. The delegation consists of Senators R. Salinas Losano, S. Diaz Palacios, and J. Munoz Mosqueda; and Deputies J. Siller Rojas, M. Murillo Morales, and A. Ualey [as published] Martinez.

The Mexican parliamentary delegation was received by A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Meetings and conversations took place with Soviet of Nationalities Chairman A.E. Voss and with chairmen and members of permanent commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers.

During the exchange of opinions on key international problems the parliamentarians noted with gratification the coincidence or proximity of the positions held by the USSR and Mexico on key questions of war and peace.

It was emphasized by both sides that it is impermissible to solve the task of preserving the strengthening peace on the basis of the possession of nuclear weapons. The strategy of nuclear deterrence is dangerous in itself, runs contrary to the logic of the humanitarian philosophy of peace and development, and contradicts the very essence of civilization. The delegations expressed commitment to the principles of building a nuclear-free and nonviolent world. It was emphasized in this context that parliamentarians can and must make their contribution to intensified collective efforts whose purpose is to assist the democratization and humanization of international relations and the growth of trust and mutual understanding between states for the purpose of solving the problems of security and world development.

The parliamentarians from the two countries resolutely spoke out against the plans to transfer the arms race to outer space, in favor of the strengthening of existing international mechanisms and primarily the ABM Treaty regime, and in favor of the peaceful use of outer space.

The Mexican parliamentarians noted that the Soviet proposals for the elimination of nuclear arms are being welcomed with approval. In this context the sides stressed that particular importance for the strengthening of peace is attached to the Soviet proposals for the elimination of medium-range missiles and other nuclear means in Europe; the signing of an accord on medium-range missiles would be a practical step toward the common goal -- the complete elimination of nuclear arms.

The participants in the meetings spoke in favor of the swiftest possible conclusion of a treaty on the complete banning of nuclear weapons tests, the strengthening of

international mechanisms to ban and eliminate chemical and bacteriological weapons, and the establishment of an international regime aimed at the development of nuclear power engineering for peaceful purposes.

The parliamentarians noted with gratification the growing role of Latin American countries in international affairs and their constructive contribution to the preservation and strengthening of peace and to the efforts to consolidate international law and order and trust and cooperation between states.

Expressing serious concern over the existence of seats of tension and conflicts in various parts of the world, both countries' parliamentarians expressed resolute support for the efforts by the Contadora Group and its Support Group aimed at a fair, balanced, and lasting settlement of conflicts in Central America via talks, since this is a demand by all Latin Americans supported by Central American countries and based on the principles of noninterference in states' internal affairs, the peoples' self-determination, the peaceful solution of disputes, and cooperation in the interests of development. Both sides pointed out that the present situation in Central America is the consequence of the serious economic backwardness of the region's countries, which engenders injustice and scandalous inequality, and they rejected attempts to present this situation as result of the so-called "East-West confrontation."

They stressed the great importance of the collective quest for ways for the peaceful solution of conflict situations in the world such as the seats of tension in the Near and Middle East and some Asian and African countries.

The Soviet and Mexican parliamentarians condemned the use of force to achieve political goals, as well as all forms of terrorism.

The USSR Supreme Soviet deputies expressed support for the desire of Latin American states to achieve the consolidation of Latin America's nuclear-free status (the Tlatelolco Treaty). Both sides supported the idea of proclaiming the South Atlantic a zone of peace and cooperation.

The parliamentarians of the Soviet Union and Mexico noted that, in the contemporary international situation, particular importance is attached to the normalization of international economic relations, the affirmation of equal and totally discrimination-free trade, economic, scientific, and technical ties between countries, the establishment of a fair and equal world economic order, the ensuring of states' economic security, and the political solution of the problem of the developing countries' external debt.

The parliamentarians of both countries believe that disarmament and development are organically interlinked with progress and mankind's survival, and they favor the convening of an international conference on this problem under UN auspices in the fall of this year.

The Mexican parliamentarians confirmed their commitment to the principles of Mexico's foreign policy, which are unanimously supported by the whole people and aim to defend national sovereignty and ensure peace and coexistence with all countries. They spoke of various aspects of their government's foreign policy activity, and especially of the efforts made by President M. de la Madrid within the framework of the six-states group for ensuring universal peace and strengthening international security. The Soviet parliamentarians expressed support for these countries' peaceful efforts.

The guests also touched on several aspects of the work of Mexico's National Congress to solve political and socioeconomic problems.

BRIEFS

SOVIET-U.S. PEACE MEETING 6-8 JULY--Moscow July 8 TASS--A meeting of the working group on a cut in arms of the Dartmouth conference of Soviet and American public was held at the Soviet Peace Committee in Moscow on July 6-8. The meeting was chaired by Academician Georgiy Arbatov, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and Professor Paul Doty of Harvard University. In a frank and businesslike atmosphere prominent Soviet and American experts discussed key issues of Soviet-American relations, exchanged views on the approaches of the sides to the resolution of the problem of putting an end to the arms race and of disarmament. They pointed out the usefulness of such meetings for a better understanding of each other's stands. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1440 GMT 8 Jul 87 LD]

SPAIN ACCEDES TO TREATY ON SEABED WEAPONS--Moscow July 15 (TASS)--Jose Cuenca, Spanish ambassador to the Soviet Union, today deposited with the Soviet Government the document on Spain's accession to the Treaty of the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. The Treaty was signed on February 11, 1971. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1723 GMT 15 Jul 87 LD]

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