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ARMS CONTROL

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SDI, SPACE ARMS

XINHUA: USSR DRAFTS NEW PROPOSAL ON ABM SYSTEMS

Limit to Earth Labs

OW300743 Beijing XINHUA in English 0540 GMT 30 Jul 87

[Text] Geneva, July 29 (XINHUA) -- The Soviet Union proposed today in a draft treaty that anti-ballistic missile systems should be banned from space, and all research should be limited to laboratories on earth. The Soviet team at the Geneva arms talks formally presented the draft this morning, together with a list of systems that should not be deployed in space. The Soviet deputy chief negotiator, Aleksey Obukhov, told a press conference later today that the ban of space anti-missile systems should be linked with the U.S. proposed 50 percent cut in strategic nuclear forces.

"There is an indivisible and inherent inter-relationship between reductions in strategic offensive arms and limitation of ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) systems," he said. The United States has repeatedly declared that its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), commonly known as "Star Wars", is non-negotiable. The Soviet negotiator described Moscow's proposal on space defense systems as a 10-year extension of the 1972 ABM treaty limiting each side's deployment of anti-missile systems. He criticized the American SDI program that it aims to break the strategic arms balance and seeks unilateral superiority.

Obukhov disclosed that the Soviet Union is preparing a draft treaty on anti-satellite systems and air-surface weapons, saying the Soviet Union wants to start such negotiations immediately after the ratification of a treaty on space weapons. The talks on space weapons, separate from the Geneva arms negotiations on strategic and medium-range nuclear missiles, were deadlocked by the dispute over whether they should be linked to talks on strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union first linked the space defense issue with the elimination of intermediate nuclear forces, and then dropped the link for an early INF accord, but now ties the space weapons to strategic missiles.

U.S., USSR Negotiators on Draft

OW300747 Beijing XINHUA in English 0530 GMT 30 Jul 87

[Excerpts] Geneva, July 29 (XINHUA) -- U.S. disarmament negotiator Henry Cooper said here today that the Soviet latest draft treaty on defensive missiles and space weapons is unacceptable. Cooper, the acting head of the U.S. space and defense negotiating team, told a press conference that the Soviet proposed treaty offers nothing new and is aimed at blocking the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars. Earlier, Soviet deputy chief negotiator Aleksey Obukhov submitted the new draft treaty on space and

defensive weapons at the U.S.-Soviet arms talks. Obukhov told reporters that the draft envisages strengthening the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty and measures to prevent "an arms race in outer space". He said Soviet negotiators would also submit an annex to the ABM Treaty to cover implementation and interpretation of the accord. [passage omitted]

But Cooper said there is no objective link between strategic weapons and arsenals in outer space. "There is nothing wrong with defenses. People expect their government to defend them, not just to avenge them after they have been attacked," he said. He reiterated the U.S. charge that the Soviet Union also has its own space weapons research program. The Soviets have made "enormous investments in development, testing and deployment of defenses," he said. The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative complies with the ABM Treaty, which needs no strengthening, Cooper said. "Soviet insistence on 'strengthening' the ABM Treaty sounds suspiciously like yet again avoiding its commitments to achieve significant reductions," he said. He said if the two sides reached an agreement on reducing 50 percent of the strategic nuclear weapons, the United States would commit itself to the ABM Treaty until 1994.

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CSO: 5200/4015

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: THATCHER AIMS TO PROMPT U.S. ACTION ON ARMS

PM171211 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Special correspondent A. Shalnev dispatch: "Will It Be Possible To Get the President Moving? Prime Minister M. Thatcher's Visit to the United States"]

[Text] London -- British Prime Minister M. Thatcher embarks Thursday on a visit to the United States. The agenda for her talks in Washington with President Reagan and his closest advisers is extensive.

Above all, it will include questions of East-West relations, with a special emphasis on the situation in the arms control sphere. Then there are the prospects for convening an international conference on the Near East; the Iran-Iraq conflict; and finally the situation in the world economy, or rather the developments on the economic front since the meeting of heads of state and government of the seven major capitalist countries held in Venice in June.

Is M. Thatcher taking with her any specific concepts, ideas, or proposals relating to the first item on the agenda which she would like to share with the U.S. President? Whitehall has declined to give a direct answer to this question, referring to the confidentiality of such information. However, it is intimated that impatience and even irritation is growing in the British Government in connection with the increasingly obvious lull in the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms.

As David Mellor, minister of state at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, put it during a conversation with a group of Soviet journalists, "the talks have ground to a halt." Whose fault is this? According to the minister of state, the Soviet side is to blame because, "inexplicably" as he noted, it has so far failed to agree to a meeting between Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and Secretary of State G. Shultz -- a meeting to "clear the obstacles" out of the way of an agreement. This viewpoint is not new. As a simple comparison shows, D. Mellor's statement, intended for "general consumption," so to speak, repeats almost word for word what a State Department spokesman said in Washington a few days earlier.

However, highly informed influential circles in Whitehall are saying that M. Thatcher will do her utmost to stress in Washington that the White House must not let itself be sidetracked by "Irangate" and must, as leader of the Western world, display will in questions of arms control. "This leadership," it is said, "must be displayed now and not at some point in the future; it is necessary right now."

The following conclusion should be drawn from this utterance, in my view: According to London, the ball is now in the U.S. court, and the United States is doing nothing about it.

Opinions vary as to why Washington is in no hurry. "Irangate," no doubt, is among the factors, although it is by no means the main one. Meanwhile, the answer to the question of whether the British premier will manage to get the U.S. President moving is likely to emerge within the next few days.

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CSO: 5200/1602

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

GORBACHEV MERDEKA INTERVIEW ON INF, ASIAN SECURITY

PM231151 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jul 87 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with M.S. Gorbachev by Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA correspondent B.M. Diah; TASS report headlines: "Answers by M.S. Gorbachev to Questions From the Indonesian Newspaper MERDEKA"; 21 July in the Kremlin; first two paragraphs PRAVDA introduction--passages within slantlines published in boldface]

[Excerpt] On 21 July, M.S. Gorbachev received B.M. Diah, publisher and chief editor of the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA, in the Kremlin and answered questions from that newspaper.

An animated conversation took place between M.S. Gorbachev and B.M. Diah, the contents of which are cited hereunder.

M.S. Gorbachev. I am pleased to meet you, Mr Diah. I have heard a lot about your activity. After all, you have been engaged in journalism for some decades now.

B.M. Diah. I am fortunate to meet with you, Mr General Secretary. This is a great honor for me. I have, in fact, been working in the world of journalism for 50 years now.

M.S. Gorbachev. That's a substantial amount of experience. Experience is not a dead weight, especially if it is used correctly. So, we are now tackling new tasks in our country. At this stage of development we are constantly enriching ourselves on the basis of the experience and lessons of history.

B.M. Diah. We devote a very great deal of attention to your utterances and to those processes which are taking place in the Soviet Union.

M.S. Gorbachev. Thank you. Have our words "glasnost" and "perestroyka" reached you? Are they translated into the Indonesian language?

B.M. Diah. Those words are well known at home and need no translation.

M.S. Gorbachev. I should like to convey to you my written replies to your questions and to preface them with some brief, but, I think, essential observations. I am grateful to you and to your newspaper's editorial office for the fact that you have drawn attention to the forthcoming anniversary of my Vladivostok speech. The Soviet leadership attaches important significance to what was said in Vladivostok. We tried at that time to expound our policy vis-a-vis an enormous region -- a region where hundreds of millions of people reside. In so doing, we were counting on our policy's encountering the relevant comprehension.

I regard the questions you have addressed to me as evidence of the fact that in Indonesian society there is an interest in our policy, in our assessments of the state of affairs in the Asian-Pacific region, and in our reflections about the future of this region in the context of world politics.

In this regard, my comments amount to the following.

We have tried to look at the modern world from strictly scientific and realistic stances. The analysis made led us to a new vision of the world and to the new policy, which we have proclaimed at our party congress.

The analysis also helped us to see those realities that characterize the present world. And it differs substantially from how it was 30-40 years ago.

Above all, in connection with the accumulation of enormous stocks of nuclear weapons, human civilization has found itself in jeopardy. This is a reality that has to be reckoned with. Moreover, the correct evaluation of this reality leads to the conclusion that it is impossible today to resolve problems of world politics militarily. Such a path would be fraught with unpredictable consequences. This means that it is necessary to make adjustments to views of the world and to the policy of states.

The problems existing in the world require the pooling of efforts of all countries. In general, if one looks at the progress of science and technology, it is bringing us ever more closely together and is linking us more closely than ever. We are increasingly dependent on each other and we are becoming essential to one another.

B.M. Diah. As I recall, you expressed this very idea in your speech in Vladivostok.

M.S. Gorbachev. That's precisely what I would like to say -- that we based our Vladivostok speech on our views of the modern world.

I deliberately did not mention this at the beginning of our conversation in order to build a bridge to the next part of our reflections. I mean that one of the realities of this world is the emergence into the international arena of dozens of states which have embarked on the path of self-reliant, independent development. This is an enormous world with its own enormous interests and with an accumulation of major problems.

B.M. Diah. I am fortunate to hear at first hand about what you spoke of during your official visit to India, at the Moscow forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity," and in your speech at Vladivostok.

M.S. Gorbachev. I think that it is important to talk about these things until such time not only when they firmly sink into the minds of politicians but also find reflection in the actual polity of states. The point is that at the present time it is impossible to build international relations without taking into consideration the interests of all states. There must be a balance of interests. Only that will lead to a sensible policy. And that is what I wanted to say in the Vladivostok speech.

B.M. Diah. It seems to me that you taught the world another lesson in Vladivostok. You emphasized that the Soviet Union is not capable of solving all these problems on its own. A contribution has to be made by other Asian states, including China, India, Indonesia, and other countries. I believe that this a very accurate and subtle [tonkiy] remark.

M.S. Gorbachev. I indeed welcome this appraisal you have made of that statement. We ask for nothing more than, together with all states in the Asian and Pacific region, to build new international relations which would be in line with the realities of the contemporary world.

Actually, when you listed the states in the region, you failed to mention the United States. We are hoping for cooperation with that country as well. Even though time and again we hear from the United States arguments to the effect that the USSR is supposedly making efforts that are a threat to countries in this region. But this is absurd. We invite all states -- and this was said in Vladivostok -- to cooperate in the Asian and Pacific region in the interests of peace and mutual understanding.

In reply to your questions, I have tried to dispel all suspicions regarding the Soviet Union's policy in this direction. We strive for cooperation with states in this region, and I have introduced new specific proposals in my replies by way of confirmation of these words and of our political statements. There is, in particular, a statement about the major step of eliminating all our medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the USSR -- on the basis, of course, of a "global zero" with the United States.

I feel that my intention to limit myself to just a few brief remarks is turning into a second interview.

B.M. Diah. We are sincerely pleased with this meeting, Mr General Secretary. For me personally, it somehow crowns my 50 years of work as journalist.

M.S. Gorbachev. Thank you. I am pleased to have taken part in this coronation ceremony. (Animation)

B.M. Diah. There is one more question I would like to ask you. Within the framework of the ideas expressed by you in Vladivostok, is there any chance of your ever coming to Indonesia?

M.S. Gorbachev. Our relations with Indonesia are long established. They have developed their traditions. There have been, of course, ebbs and flows. But we cherish ties with Indonesia. Let us hope that the progress achieved in our relations in the recent past will grow. This will require contacts, including contacts at the political level, of course. They will probably be not only possible but also necessary. For the time being, we are awaiting a visit by the president of Indonesia.

B.M. Diah. I am sincerely grateful to you for this meeting and for your replies.

M.S. Gorbachev. Thank you for collaboration. I wish you a fruitful and interesting stay in our country. Until we meet again!

Question: We are coming up to the anniversary of your speech in Vladivostok, in which you put forward broad proposals for the strengthening of peace and security in the Asian and Pacific region. Many events have taken place in this vast region since then. Do you perceive any positive trends in their development?

Answer: I can answer immediately -- yes, I do.

The year that has elapsed and the main events during that year, including our talks with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India, convinced us even more of the correctness and timeliness of raising the questions of security in the Asian and Pacific region. Our approach toward the quest for their solution -- being open to a democratic discussion of any ideas and proposals -- has also proved correct.

What does a look back over the year show us? The antinuclear composition of the overall picture stands out, despite the whole complexity and diversity of the Asian and Pacific scene, despite all the hues in the distribution of light and dark tones.

Here are some of its features: The South Pacific forum elaborated the Rarotonga Treaty. Indonesia is actively promoting the concept of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia. Australia and New Zealand are firmly opposed to French nuclear tests in the South Pacific and enjoy the support of the world's broad public. There are growing demands to rid the Korean peninsula of nuclear weapons. Municipalities and cities in many countries proclaim themselves nuclear-free regions. There are cases of entire states taking this stance. The Philippines and several others have included antinuclear provisions in their basic laws. The PRC is more and more actively speaking out on disarmament problems.

In connection with the USSR-U.S. talks, Asian countries have expressed interest in the complete elimination of medium-range missiles not only in Europe but also in Asia. They are examining this question in the context of their own national security.

The Soviet leadership has adopted an entirely serious and responsible attitude toward these wishes.

Now I am in a position to announce: The Soviet Union, moving in the direction of the Asian countries and taking into account their concern, is prepared to embark on the destruction of /all its medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the country too/; in other words, it is prepared to dispense with the question of retaining the 100 warheads on medium-range missiles which are the subject of discussion with the Americans at the Geneva talks -- on condition, of course, that the United States does exactly the same. Operational and tactical missiles also will be eliminated.

In other words, we will proceed from the concept of "global double zero."

In this case, we do not link this initiative with the U.S. nuclear presence in Korea, the Philippines, and the island of Diego Garcia. But we would like to hope that there will be no buildup of this presence.

Question: We know that negative trends are also developing in the Asian and Pacific region. What could you say about them?

Answer: I have already said a few things. Complications and contradictions have not diminished; there is a growing trend toward confrontation, and any signs of settlement of regional conflicts are still weak. The conflict in the Persian Gulf is even growing more exacerbated.

In my Vladivostok speech, I identified the causes of this, and listed specific sore points which create a permanent danger.

Further, we now have to add the refusal by the United States, Britain, and France to accede to the Rarotonga Treaty and the U.S. "warnings" to states that are unwilling to put up with nuclear weapons on their territories or off their shores.

Question: What measures to lessen tension in Asia and the Pacific do you consider the most pressing and practicable?

Answer: First and foremost, it is necessary again and again to talk about nuclear weapons.

Some 18 months ago we put forward a program for the phased, total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere by the year 2000. On this basis a conceptual breakthrough was possible at the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik. For the first time people saw a prospect for a nuclear-free world.

They tried to block it. We did not agree to that. We put forward additional initiatives, which made it possible to transfer the preparation of an agreement on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles onto a practical footing.

I have just announced our new step relating directly to the Asian and Pacific region.

I also will mention certain other possible measures.

First. The Soviet Union is prepared to take on a pledge not to increase the number of nuclear-capable aircraft in the Asian part of the country, provided the United States does not station additional nuclear systems here that are capable of reaching the USSR's territory.

Second. Once again, I remind you of our readiness to lessen the activeness of the USSR and U.S. Navies in the Pacific Ocean. I spoke of this in Vladivostok. But the United States has given no reply. Yet it is obvious that the border of confrontation here runs through the proximity of the fleets. Hence the danger of conflicts.

It would be possible to agree to limit the areas of navigation by ships carrying nuclear weapons in such a way that they could not approach the coast of any side to within the range of operation of their on-board nuclear systems.

It would be possible to agree to limit antisubmarine rivalry and to ban antisubmarine activity, including aircraft activity, within specified zones.

Confidence-building would be promoted by limiting the scale of naval exercises and maneuvers in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the adjacent seas: not more than one or two major naval (including naval aviation) exercises or maneuvers a year, notification of them in good time, and the mutual renunciation of naval exercises and maneuvers in international straits and the adjacent regions and of the use of combat weapons in the zones of traditional sea routes in the course of exercises.

It would be possible to try out this "model" first in the northern Pacific, where there are not many "dramatis personae." And then to extend this practice to the southern part of the Pacific sea area and other countries in the region.

Third. The UN declaration on transforming the Indian Ocean into a peace zone was adopted more than 15 years ago. Preparations have been under way for some years now for convening an international conference on the Indian Ocean, under UN auspices. It is now scheduled for 1988. But there is still no certainty that it will take place, because experience shows that as soon as there is any progress here, Washington breaks off the talks.

It is time to create international guarantees for the security of shipping in the Indian Ocean and in the seas, straits, and gulfs which make it up. There is also the question of the security of air communications. This too can be resolved, given the political will. The question of collective measures against terrorism on sea and air routes in the Indian Ocean remains pressing.

In a word, much that is useful could be done to strengthen security in the Indian Ocean.

Fourth: The question of nuclear explosions is particularly important. Mankind has not forgotten that the first U.S. atomic weapon tests after the war took place in the Pacific. They took away the health and even the lives of many inhabitants of these localities. We understand why there are such powerful feelings of indignation here about the refusal of the United States, Britain, and France to stop nuclear explosions.

We value the support of the Asian and Pacific countries for the Soviet moratorium. We have not stopped fighting for a nuclear test ban, and we will persistently seek a full-scale agreement.

We greatly value collaboration with the countries of the Asian and Pacific region, which are taking part in the Geneva Disarmament Conference. The question of the banning and elimination of chemical weapons is at a decisive stage at that conference now. We hope that by joint efforts we will be able to draw up and adopt a historic convention, which, I am convinced, also will stimulate progress along the paths to nuclear disarmament.

Other measures also are clearly possible to lessen military tension in the Asian and Pacific region, measures originating in the countries of the region themselves. The particular features of their philosophy and their political and cultural uniqueness also could suggest unusual ideas on this score that are comprehensible and acceptable to everyone.

Question: In the Vladivostok speech you voiced the idea of convening -- albeit as a distant goal -- a Pacific conference with the participation of all countries oriented toward the ocean, on the model of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The reaction to this idea in Asia and in the Pacific countries was mixed. What is your approach to this question now?

Answer: I spoke of this in Vladivostok as a kind of working hypothesis, or, more accurately, an invitation to discussion. I only referred to Helsinki because as yet the world community has no other experience of this kind. This does not mean, of course, that the European experience can automatically be transplanted to Asian and Pacific soil.

Nowadays, however, any international experiment has pan-human and global features. That is only natural, because we are living in an interdependent and in many respects an integrated world.

Take the Delhi Declaration on the principles of a world free of nuclear weapons and violence. This is a completely new example of a political-philosophical approach to the fundamental problems of interstate contacts. This document goes far beyond bilateral and regional frameworks -- it expresses the aspirations of all mankind, even though it is the result of the development of relations between two countries.

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CSO: 5200/1588

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET NST DELEGATION OFFERS NEW GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

LD231423 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1415 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] Geneva, July 23 (TASS) -- The Soviet delegation to the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms at Geneva today offered a new version of the decision on medium-range and shorter-range missiles. This version complies with the decision set forth by Mikhail Gorbachev in an interview to the newspaper MERDEKA.

The Soviet proposal suggests eliminating Soviet and American medium-range and shorter-range missiles on a global basis.

All of the far-fetched obstacles created at the talks by the U.S. side should now fall away. As a result of the new Soviet initiative, real prospects open up for working out a draft treaty to fully eliminate USSR and U.S. medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in the immediate future.

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS CONFERENCE 23 JULY

TV Broadcast

LD232153 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1910 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Video report on news conference held at USSR Foreign Ministry press center moderated by Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov; special program preempts regularly scheduled programming]

[Text] [Gerasimov] Esteemed comrades, ladies and gentlemen. Today we are holding a news conference in connection with the publication of the replies by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary to the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA. Taking part in the news conference are: Yuliy Mikhaylovich Vorontsov, first deputy USSR foreign minister; MSU Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev, first deputy defense minister and chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; Igor Alekseyevich Rogachev, deputy USSR foreign minister; and Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, head of the Problems of Arms Control and Disarmament Administration. An opening statement will be made by Yuliy Mikhaylovich Vorontsov. [Video shows inside of Press Center, journalists in the auditorium and Rogachev, Vorontsov, Gerasimov, Akhromeyev, and Karpov seated on the rostrum. At one point, Colonel General Chervov is also shown seated in the audience.]

[Vorontsov] We view the replies by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to MERDEKA as a continuation and development of the Vladivostok program of peace and security in the Asian-Pacific region announced almost precisely a year ago. Speaking about the need for measures to ensure reliable security in the Asian and Pacific region, the Soviet Union noted at the time and confirms now that we view the Vladivostok program as part and parcel of the all-embracing system of international security that should safeguard our world against any exigency and ensure lasting peace for it.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has now announced a fresh, major foreign policy initiative by the Soviet Union. We have announced our decision to eliminate all Soviet medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles in the Asian part of the USSR. We have thus removed the question of the retention of those 100 warheads on medium-range missiles in Asia and on the territory of the United States, which are under discussion at the Geneva talks with the United States. In taking this step, the Soviet leadership took account first and foremost of the interest of the Asian countries in having medium-range missiles completely eliminated not only in Europe, but also in Asia. This decision was commensurate with the striving by the states of Asia and the Pacific basin to turn this region into a peaceful, nuclear-free zone.

I would like to stress in particular that in this case the Soviet Union is not linking this initiative with the question of the U.S. nuclear presence in Korea, the Philippines, and Diego Garcia Island. At the same time, I would like to believe that this decision will give a fresh stimulus to the Geneva talks, because by removing the question of the retention of 100 warheads on medium-range missiles in Asia we have substantially simplified the technical procedure of verification [kontrol]. It is now a matter of awaiting a political solution by the U.S. side to a number of questions that remain unresolved in Geneva.

In Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's interview a number of specific proposals aimed at reducing military confrontation in the Asian-Pacific region also were put forward -- in particular a reduction of nuclear-capable aircraft, and scaling down of the activities of the Soviet and U.S. naval fleets in the Pacific Ocean, the strengthening of security in the Indian Ocean, and the limitation and complete banning of nuclear tests.

The priority that we give to the military aspects of Asian security of which I have just spoken, in no way belittles the importance of the problem of settling regional conflicts. These issues are closely interlinked.

To conclude my opening statement, I would like to stress once again that by proposing that a comprehensive security system be worked out for the Asian-Pacific region, we do not have in mind any rigid framework or recipe that is fixed once and for all. On the contrary, we insistently repeat the idea that in creating a structure of regional security, priority is given to creative efforts and the open airing and discussion of any ideas and proposals by all interested countries, organizations, and even individuals.

[Gerasimov] Thank you, Yuliy Mikhaylovich. We move to the questions.

[Unidentified U.S. correspondent speaking in English with superimposed Russian translation] You talk about the fact that the proposal to remove the issue of the 100 warheads could give a new impetus to the Geneva talks. What specifically do you feel could happen at the Geneva talks?

[Akhromeyev] Well, regarding the Soviet Union, then the Soviet Union has said its piece in order to give a very big impetus for these talks to and successfully. Strictly speaking, two very large issues that have always been put before us by the U.S. side: that the reduction of medium-range missiles should be global -- or rather, not the reduction, but the elimination of these missiles -- and that the elimination of operational and tactical missiles also should be global. Well, as it has become customary to say it in the press -- they have been talking about the double zero. At present, the Soviet Union has given its agreement to this. In its turn, the United States asked us about it at the talks, and, for its part, said that, should this happen, the talks would be simplified and a number of problems the United States has at the moment would be removed. This refers to a number of issues which they put forward and which we do not agree with in the United States' position, the first one is that there should be a real and actual elimination of missiles -- that is, not alternation but elimination, scrapping, both on the Soviet as well as on the U.S. side.

We feel that now the issues of any alteration of these missiles -- let's say land-based cruise missiles into sea-based ones, or Pershing-2's into operational and tactical Pershing-1's -- can no longer apply. Secondly, the warheads must be scrapped together with the delivery vehicles. Here the problem lies mainly with the U.S. warheads, which are intended for Pershing-1A missiles, and these belong to the FRG. We feel that both the U.S. warheads on Pershing-2's and on land-based cruise missiles and the warheads

for Pershing-1 missiles, which are the property of the U.S. side, should also, in the appropriate manner and following an established schedule, be withdrawn and then eliminated. Thirdly, the U.S. side is laying down unequal conditions on the schedule for the elimination of the missiles. This would seem to be a technical question, but, at the same time, it is not technical; it has a good deal of military significance; that is, we advocate that gradually and within an established timeframe -- the talks speak about a 5-year term -- the appropriate Soviet and U.S. weapons should be eliminated on an equal percentage basis. Finally, fourthly, that the right to verification [kontrol], the right to inspection [proverka] of the fulfillment of the agreement should be identical both for the United States and the Soviet Union, that we should be able to make sure that both the missiles and the warheads that the United States sited on the territory of its allies' countries are being eliminated. These, I think, are the most important problems about which we await a reply, a positive reply, from the U.S. side.

[Vorontsov] I would like to add that today, that in just 1/2 hour in Geneva, the Soviet delegation, at the official session of the Soviet-U.S. talks, will discuss all these issues with the U.S. delegation and will discuss them to find a speedy solution to these as yet unresolved issues.

[Unidentified Japanese correspondent, speaking in Russian] Earlier you said that one of the obstacles to the double zero option are the F-15's based in Japan. How has your opinion changed? Also, Washington welcomes Mr Gorbachev's proposal of the double zero, and how, in your opinion, will this influence the preparations for a summit meeting?

[Akhromeyev] We feel that if the Soviet Union manifests goodwill and goes to meet halfway, in the given instance, not only the United States at the talks, but also goes to meet halfway the countries of the Asian and Pacific region, including Japan, so that this issue will not be deadlocked -- the Soviet Union is manifesting this goodwill -- most likely, these countries, for their part, also will manifest goodwill to relieve the existing military tension. We anticipate that Japan also will assess this step in the appropriate manner.

[Vorontsov] At the moment, of course, what lies ahead is completing work on the treaty, work which already has been going on in Geneva for some time. As we have already said, the sides do have opportunities to complete a treaty in a fairly brief period of time if the United States finds the reply to a number of issues that were touched upon here by Marshal Akhromeyev. We expect the United States to come forward with specific proposals and an agreement to eliminate all warheads, including those they are now storing for missiles belonging to other countries. All the real opportunities are there for completing the elaboration of a document of full value, a treaty on the elimination, on the double zero, on the elimination of missiles on both sides; evidently, in the course of the next, I would say, 2 months, this would be quite sufficient. After this, if the treaty is agreed upon and initialed, the opportunity opens up for signing it at summit level.

[Gerasimov] I have a question here from the Polish paper TRYBUNA LUDU: What is your view of the approach by the PRC to questions of ensuring security in the Asian-Pacific region and its attitude to the program for this put forward by the Soviet Union?

[Rogachev] As you know, in recent years Soviet-Chinese relations have been developing unswervingly and gradually, step by step. At our meetings with Chinese representatives, we discuss a wide range of questions, not only of bilateral relations but also, of course, international problems. Questions of reducing arms, primarily nuclear arms, have also, of course, been touched on. Naturally we were aware of the concern by the Chinese leadership over the 100 medium-range missiles...

[?Vorontsov, interrupting] Warheads.

[Rogachev] ...Warheads, excuse me. When we made our decision, we took into account the wishes of various Asian countries, including the PRC. We note with satisfaction that in the Chinese attitude to problems of international security and disarmament there are points that have much in common with the attitude of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

[Unidentified correspondent speaking in Russian] Is this new initiative a compromise to ensure a good agreement, summit meeting, and disarmament talks; or is it, as certain Western mass media are dubbing it, a continuation of the political pressure by Soviet policy?

[Vorontsov] I would put the question in a different way and would respond in a different way. It is a step forward to an accord, and a serious step forward. Considering that the U.S. delegation in Geneva has more than once spoken of the desirability of such a development, and that it has stressed at the same time that if there were to be such a solution it would be possible to quickly draw up the joint text for a treaty on the complete elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles, we will now wait and see to what degree those U.S. predictions will come true.

IZVESTIYA Report

PM271235 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 4

[A. Kuvshinnikov and V. Mikheyev report: "Diplomacy of Flexibility and Realism"]

[Excerpts] Meetings with journalists at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center, which always start promptly, convey a sense that time is of the essence. Dynamic diplomacy does not tolerate bustle, nor will it endure unjustifiable pauses. The content of foreign policy also dictates the style, which, at the 23 July news conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center, could be described in three words: realism, flexibility, and openness.

The news conference opened with a statement by Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister. [passage omitted]

Also taking part in the news conference were Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister; A.I. Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister; V.P. Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Problems of Arms Control and Disarmament Administration; and G.I. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration. They answered the numerous questions with which journalists literally bombarded them.

IZVESTIYA: Soviet officials have issued repeated statements that during the Reykjavik meeting we defended the right to retain 100 warheads on medium-range missiles in the Asian part of our territory, arguing that this was required by the demands of maintaining security. Could you set out in more specific terms the new factors that have allowed the USSR to alter its position on missiles in Asia?

S. Akhromeyev: First of all, we are not talking about a unilateral reduction, but a reciprocal reduction in a certain number of warheads and delivery vehicles for both medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. However, you are correct; at Reykjavik we did indeed defend a position envisaging the retention of 100 warheads. The fact of the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in Japan and aircraft carriers in areas of the Pacific able to reach our territory were advanced as the argument for this.

Unfortunately, nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are still present on Japanese territory and aircraft carriers are still in the Pacific. But in this instance the Soviet leadership is assessing in a new way the situation in the world and the position of the Asian and Pacific countries and is counting on good will and a correct understanding of the Soviet position from these countries -- and not only understanding, but a corresponding political, and possibly military, reaction.

TRYBUNA LUDU: How do you assess the PRC's approach to questions of ensuring security in the Asia-Pacific region and its attitude toward the corresponding Soviet program?

I. Rogachev: We note with satisfaction that China's position on the problems of international security and disarmament displays features that have much in common with the position of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. I am referring to questions of averting nuclear war, eliminating nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, and preventing the creation of space weapons. China has supported the Rarotonga Treaty and the proposals to create nuclear-free zones in other parts of the Asia-Pacific region. China has stated its rejection of first use of nuclear weapons. All these facts mesh with the Soviet position.

... The Asia-Pacific region is sadly number one in terms of the number of "hot" spots, the intricacy of local conflicts, and the impact on the world situation of the international crises that arise there. Here is a statistic: Whereas in the first half of the 20th century all the major upheavals befell Europe, in the second half of the century only 20 out of the more than 250 military conflicts that have rent the world have taken place on the old continent.

During this period, nuclear tragedy was enacted for the first and only time precisely in Asia. It was in Asia that the longest war was waged. It was in Asia that armed clashes escalated, resulting in many states becoming involved in military operations. That is why it is no accident that the news conference has touched on questions of ways of settling regional conflicts, each of which has its own roots and own features.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: WORLD RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV MERDEKA INTERVIEW REPORTED

World Shows 'Enormous Interest'

OW231321 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1105 GMT 23 Jul 87

[From "The World Today" program, presented by Igor Fesunenکو]

[Text] Hello, comrades. You probably know that the main international event today is the interview with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev by the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA, which was published yesterday. Throughout the world, and particularly in countries of the Asian-Pacific region, the interview is presently being reprinted, analyzed in the most scrupulous way, and commented upon.

It is being noted that these materials express the Soviet leadership's desire to achieve the main strategic aim of Soviet foreign policy -- the stage-by-stage, complete, and universal elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

Enormous interest and the liveliest response was evoked from the world public by our country's latest step in this direction -- the readiness expressed by Comrade Gorbachev to proceed with eliminating all our medium-range missiles, including those in the country's Asian region. We are thereby prepared to remove the question of preserving the 100 warheads on medium-range missiles, which is now being discussed at the Geneva talks with the Americans, on the condition of course that the United States will follow our example and that operational and tactical missiles will also be eliminated.

This proposal, this new and important peace initiative of the Soviet Union, was made in response to the wishes of Asian countries and with regard for their concerns. Naturally this act of goodwill -- judging by the first reports coming in today -- has received the most positive response from the region's countries. For example, it was welcomed by the Japanese head of government Nakasone. KYODO expressed its conviction that the Soviet leaders' replies to MERDEKA attest to the Soviet Union's desire to relax tensions in this region.

Of course, you and I are interested in Washington's reaction. This time -- to be quite fair -- it was extremely operative [vesma operativ naya]. Last night an unscheduled news conference was held in the White House devoted to the new Soviet proposals on eliminating medium-range and operational and tactical missiles, not only in Europe but on a global scale as well, as Comrade Gorbachev proposed. An official representative of the White House read a prepared statement that said the administration welcomed the report on the proposals contained in the interview and that the U.S. delegation in Geneva is ready for constructive work.

However -- and we often have to resort to the word however when we deal with the present administration -- right after this promising statement at yesterday's White House news conference certain reservations followed to the effect that the text of the interview has to be studied in detail to see whether or not it contains any unacceptable conditions and to wait and see what specific proposals on this issue will be tabled at the Geneva talks by the Soviet delegation.

IZVESTIYA Reviews Response

PM271231 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA press service report: "World Welcomes Soviet Initiatives"]

[Text] The reaction to the major new initiative proposed by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was, as could be expected, instantaneous. In the words of a White House spokesman, it was literally immediately after Washington received the text of the interview which the Soviet leader had given to the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA that President Reagan met with F. Carlucci, his national security assistant, and G. Shultz, secretary of state. The President's spokesman refrained from making detailed comments apropos the conclusions reached by the participants in the White House meeting, however he stressed that the United States welcomes the Soviet Union's decision.

"We welcome the announcement of the Soviet's agreement with the President's proposal on the global elimination of U.S. and Soviet longer-range intermediate missiles [raket povyshennoy promezhutochnoy dalnosti], which was originally put forward in November 1981," the spokesman said. If it is achieved, this agreement will lead to the complete elimination on a global basis of this category of missiles... It will also facilitate the monitoring procedure... This encourages us from the point of view of achieving a conclusive accord on an agreement (on medium-range missiles. -- IZVESTIYA editorial note), as well as from the point of view of a potential summit meeting. In my opinion, any positive step in the sphere of intermediate nuclear forces -- like, say, a treaty on these forces -- is also a positive step in other spheres, and therefore, if this is a response to our proposal -- and this is the impression we have received, -- we consider this quite gratifying in principle."

One cannot help but pay attention to Washington's emphasized desire to affirm its authorship concerning the "global zero" and moreover the "double zero." Apparently, it will not be too much to expect that the "authors" scrupulously and fully implement their idea and thus ensure the elimination of medium-range missiles rather than their "modernization" -- as in the case of the Pershing-2 -- or their transfer from land to ships -- and as in the case of the cruise missiles deployed in a number of West European countries. And one more detail is worthy of note in the White House comments on the Soviet leader's initiative and the situation which has now arisen at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armaments. When talk at the Washington special briefing turned to the Pershing-1A missiles, the problem of which has been created by the United States and the FRG and serves as a serious obstacle to the achievement of an accord on medium-range missiles, a high-ranking spokesman for the administration said: "The Soviet Union's position on the Pershings is quite consistent, just like ours." It is difficult to regard this opinion as anything other than a direct indication that the United States is not averse to further complicating the process of the Geneva talks.

This impression is reinforced by the statement by M. Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks. He stressed that the United States would once again reject the Soviet Union's demand with regard to including in the text of the treaty provisions concerning the Pershing-1A missiles, which are in the FRG's possession.

Meanwhile, an official spokesman for the FRG Government made a statement which says in particular: The federal chancellor welcomes General Secretary Gorbachev's statement that the Soviet Union is ready to agree to the Western proposal on the global elimination of all medium-range missiles. General Secretary Gorbachev's statement reinforces the hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will achieve an agreement as early as this year on intermediate nuclear forces.

The spokesman also stated: "During the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armaments there has been talk only of U.S. and Soviet systems, and not of the weapons of third countries. That is why the United States resolutely rejected the idea of including in the agreement the Bundeswehr's Pershing-1A missiles when the Soviet Union demanded this a few months ago."

Speaking in the British Parliament, Prime Minister Thatcher stressed that the government she heads "warmly welcomes" the USSR proposal, if it is not bound up with additional conditions. She also indicated that this agreement must be submitted to "thorough monitoring" and must be examined "in conjunction with the situation in the sphere of other means of defense, in particular, chemical and conventional weapons."

The proposals, thoughts, and evaluations contained in the Soviet leader's initiative have met a broad and active response practically everywhere in the world, including in countries in the Asian-Pacific region.

Reaction 'Unanimous'

LD251757 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 25 Jul 87

[Text] The mass media and politicians around the world have been concentrating on the new Soviet initiative proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in an interview to the MERDEKA daily. Moscow has suggested that the Soviet Union and the United States do away with all their medium-range and shorter-range missiles in Asia as well as in Europe. Commentary is by Yuriy Solton and this is what he writes:

World reaction to the new Soviet move has been more or less unanimous. Most observers agree it's an important step toward nuclear disarmament and say it demonstrates the Soviet Union's constructive approach. Those in the East are grateful to Moscow and feel that the new Soviet proposal takes into account the concern and wishes of the Asians, and in the West many people consider that the slackened Soviet-American arms talks have received a new impact. The Soviet move is indeed an important step toward an agreement, and still one must be cautious in making predictions.

True, the White House spokesman has said Washington sees reason for encouragement in the proposal. But what does he mean by saying so? And then what has braked the Geneva talks? It was Washington's demands, which run counter to the principle of equal security. Thus, the United States won't agree that the two sides simultaneously eliminate their missiles at an equal rate over 5 years. In fact, the Americans don't even want to scrap their missiles. They would rather convert them. They've been opposing adequate verification measures and refusing to negotiate the elimination of their nuclear warheads for the Pershing-1A missiles in West Germany. Moreover, they have artificially complicated the matters by saying that the Pershings belong to West Germany and therefore were not negotiable.

The Soviet Union agrees that the West German missiles be left in West Germany but it maintains the American nuclear warheads for these missiles must be withdrawn from Europe and eliminated. Otherwise there can be no real zero in missiles. The new Soviet initiative is to a certain extent a compromise and it would seem that Washington should take a reasonable approach to it. In this context the statement by the American spokesman at Geneva, Max Kampelman, looks disappointing. It was made after the Soviet team tabled the new option. Kampelman tried to justify the earlier American stand, which has already obstructed the talks. Moscow believes that an agreement on a complete elimination of the two types of missiles on the two continents can be finalized in 2 (?months). But it (?will) take a political decision on the part of Washington.

Thatcher Gives 'Warm Welcome'

LD232027 Moscow TASS in English 1937 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] London July 23 TASS -- The British Government gave "warm welcome" to the Soviet initiative on eliminating medium-range missiles on a global scale if no conditions were attached to it, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said at Commons question time.

At the same time, she pointed out that the agreement on phasing out medium-range missiles must be "verifiable." The head of the British cabinet also said that the agreement must be regarded "in relation to the state of other defences, in particular chemical and conventional weapons."

UK's Thatcher Cited

PM300805 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

[Unattributed report under the general heading "Soviet Union's Peaceful and Consistent Policy"]

[Text] London, 24 Jul -- We greatly welcome the new Soviet proposals for the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical nuclear missiles on the basis of the "global double-zero," British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated in an interview on a BBC news program. The head of the British Government expressed optimism that a corresponding Soviet-U.S. treaty would rapidly be concluded; in her words, only a few details need to be clarified before such an agreement can be reached. However, as is clear from M. Thatcher's statements, she includes among these "details" the problem of the Pershing-1A missiles sited in the FRG, which the U.S. side is striving to retain on West German soil at all costs.

Touching on the major socioeconomic and political transformations taking place in the USSR, the head of the Conservative government recognized their "historic" and "unprecedented" nature. It is a "bold policy deserving every possible support," she said.

British MPs Interested

LD241345 Moscow TASS in English 1302 GMT 24 Jul 87

[Text] London July 24 TASS -- British MPs received with interest the new Soviet peace proposals put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in an interview granted to the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA and regarded them as a major step in the direction of nuclear disarmament creating favorable prospects for reaching accords in the Soviet-U.S. negotiations at Geneva. This was emphasized at a news conference given at the Soviet Embassy in London Thursday by a delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. led by Vladimir Karpov who heads the Soviet-British division of the Soviet Union's Parliamentary Group.

The speakers at the news conference stated that after their meetings and conversations with British MPs they were able to make the conclusion that the latter were increasingly aware of the importance of those initiatives for ridding mankind of the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

It was noted during the news conference that during a constructive exchange of views that had proceeded in an atmosphere of well-wishing the Soviet delegation and British MPs had discussed a wide range of problems, including revolutionary changes taking place in the Soviet Union. The sides also discussed questions of war and peace, ways for expanding mutual contacts in the scientific, cultural, ecological and other fields.

A parliamentary report on the results of the visit was circulated during the news conference. The document quoted the words of David Mellor, minister of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs of Great Britain, to the effect that frank exchanges of opinions, like the one that had taken place during the delegation's visit, gave rise to hopes for a successful development of Anglo-Soviet relations.

FRG's Genscher Welcomes Arms Offer

LD231314 Moscow TASS in English 1215 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] Bonn July 23 TASS -- Hans-Dietrich Genscher, deputy federal chancellor and foreign minister of the FRG, has welcomed the Soviet Union's readiness, as expressed by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev, to eliminate medium-range missiles on a global scale. Speaking in Bonn today Genscher said that the Soviet Union has thus made an important step forward in the matter of disarmament. As is stressed by the DPA news agency, Hans-Dietrich Genscher pointed out that it would be easier now to solve the problem of control. The search for ways to decide this problem was discussed during his recent talks with the foreign ministers of Bulgaria and Hungary, Hans-Dietrich Genscher said.

French Approval Cited

LD240547 Moscow TASS in English 0442 GMT 24 Jul 87

[Text] Paris July 24 TASS -- The new proposals providing for the elimination of all medium-range missiles, set forth by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev, make it possible to achieve substantial progress at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva, it is said in a communique issued by the French Foreign Ministry.

Moscow Radio on Asian Response

LD231800 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Aleksandr Zholkver commentary]

[Text] Among numerous reactions to Gorbachev's answers to MERDEKA, reports on the latest peaceful initiative of the USSR to eliminate all medium-range missiles in Asia particularly stands out. It is this proposal that was immediately flashed by all the world news agencies.

Indeed, it is a major step toward nuclear disarmament. I will remind you that 18 months ago our country proposed the program for totally eliminating nuclear weapons everywhere by the year 2000. On this basis, a fundamentally important breakthrough became possible at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik. However, those who are not averse to taking credit for the authorship of this initiative have persistently tried to close the prospect of a nonnuclear world. Insistence and flexibility have been needed to translate into reality the preparation for an agreement on scrapping medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe.

Everyone knows that this is the center of talks with the Americans in Geneva. However, the issue of 100 warheads for medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the USSR and of the same number of warheads for the appropriate U.S. missiles on U.S. territory still remained unresolved. In the meantime, Asian countries, in the context of their own national security, have expressed an interest in the full elimination of these missiles not only in Europe but also in Asia.

Now, in making concession to the wishes of Asian countries, the Soviet Union is prepared to resolve this issue as well, provided the United States will also do the same. In this case, operational and tactical missiles would also be eliminated in Asia. In short, the so-called global double-zero option would reign supreme.

It is easy to understand -- and this is what the first reports on the decision of the Soviet leadership focus attention upon -- how much this would strengthen peace and security in the whole world and, above all, in Asia, where a great quantity of explosive material from the activities of the Navy in the Pacific Ocean to the present U.S. gunboat diplomacy in the Persian Gulf accumulated.

By the way, I will remind you that in the same MERDEKA interview with Comrade Gorbachev a range of specific measures for strengthening security in the Asian and Pacific ocean regions was outlined. What is also remarkable is that antiwar and, above all, antinuclear actions in Asian countries themselves have of late particularly gained momentum, from India and, in fact, Indonesia to small island states in the Pacific Ocean. The very first responses to the new peace initiative of our country confirm again that a realistic approach to the major problems of humanity is carving its way in the world.

IZVESTIYA Views Asian Response

PM290925 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by Professor M. Kapitsa, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies, under the rubric "Problems and Opinions": "Asia and the Pacific Ocean: From Confrontation to Cooperation"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Broad circles of the international public assess the new Soviet peace initiatives announced by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his interview with the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA as an important action of global importance. These initiatives have generated special interest in the countries of Asia and the Pacific. A well-known Soviet specialist in international affairs discusses the problems of this region's security and the search for paths toward cooperation and the reduction of the danger of war.

Over half the world's population lives in the countries of the Pacific basin. The industrial production of these countries (excluding the socialist countries) has exceeded 50 percent of the output of the entire capitalist world. Very large states -- the USSR, China, the United States, and Japan -- are situated in this region and collaborate with each other.

Hence the importance of the Asian and Pacific region. Without peace and stability in it there can be no security for the whole world. Yet the situation in this part of the world is still causing alarm: Hotbeds of tension remain here and "small-scale wars" and military and political conflicts continue, poisoning the international atmosphere.

The situation is complicated by the aggressive course of the imperialist forces, above all the United States, which is seeking to create an "Eastern front" against socialism. The most powerful U.S. fleet is stationed in the Pacific region and a ramified system of military bases and strongholds is in operation. These are situated in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. Aircraft with nuclear cruise missiles are based on U.S. aircraft carriers and Tomahawk nuclear missiles are installed on ships.

In expanding its military presence Washington is at the same time seeking to consolidate existing military blocs and groupings and create new ones. This is particularly noticeable now in the example of the efforts to activate the three-sided United States-Japan-South Korea alliance.

Under these conditions safeguarding security in the Asian and Pacific region becomes one of the most acute and urgent problems of world politics. As the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th party congress noted, "We must obviously begin by coordinating and later pooling efforts in the interests of a political settlement of painful problems in order at the same time on this basis to at least eliminate the acuteness of military confrontation in various parts of Asia and to stabilize the situation there."

Progressive and realistically minded politicians in Asian countries had already reached the conclusion that it is necessary to seek some kind of lever or mechanism that could help ease tension. It is no accident that it was in Asia that the "five principles" of peaceful coexistence (the "pancha shila") and the "10 principles" of Bandung were born. It was here that the ideological and political principles and foundations of the Nonaligned Movement were essentially laid down. Many constructive initiatives on various aspects of the consolidation of peace and security have been put forward by Asia's socialist and nonaligned countries.

Broad opportunities for solving the region's problems are opened up by the Mongolian People's Republic's proposals on the conclusion of a convention on nonaggression and the nonuse of force by the Asian and Pacific states, and by the DPRK's proposals on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, the country's unification on the basis of peaceful, democratic principles without outside interference, the replacement of the truce agreement with a peace agreement, and the drafting of a nonaggression declaration between North and South. The efforts made by Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to normalize the situation in their region and the course aimed at establishing good-neighborly relations, trust, and cooperation with the ASEAN countries, the creation of a zone of peace in Southeast Asia, and the normalization of relations with China on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence proceed in the same direction. The struggle of the socialist and nonaligned countries for the speediest convening of an international conference on the transformation of the Indian Ocean basin into a zone of peace is an important avenue of efforts to consolidate peace in Asia.

The concept of security in the Asian and Pacific region thus does not arise out of nothing. It has substantial economic, political, and ideological preconditions.

A year ago, 28 July 1986, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, delivering a speech in Vladivostok, set forth a broad, comprehensive program for consolidating peace and security in Asia and the Pacific basin. What is the thrust of this initiative?

The Soviet Union suggested eliminating the "hot spots" in Asia, achieving an end to confrontation and a considerable reduction in armies and navies, and, by introducing confidence-building measures, approaching the convening of a regional forum of the Helsinki type. These measures would open the way to establishing peaceful, friendly, and constructive relations between Asian states and would free the region from conflicts, violence, and the nuclear threat. Here the Soviet Union proceeds from the need for a comprehensive approach toward the problem of security in Asia and the pooling of the efforts of area states for the sake of this goal, irrespective of their social systems.

As an Asian country the Soviet Union puts forward proposals for ways of strengthening security in the Asian and Pacific region in the hope that representatives of all other Asian and Pacific states will examine them, supplement, and develop them with a consideration for their own specific interests and wishes. In this multilateral process the USSR acts as an equal among equals, laying no claim to monopolizing the idea of Asian and Pacific security and demanding no kind of "patent" on it. Here it is not a question of creating some kind of closed system of relations between the region's states. These relations should be built so as to promote the creation of favorable conditions for developing their varied cooperation and the expansion of relations with states of other regions.

There's no denying that the development of a comprehensive concept of security for Asia and the Pacific is a long-term task. This work could be done by advancing from the simple to the complex, for instance by beginning by holding bilateral consultations, perhaps not immediately at government level but through forums of scientists, political experts, and public figures. This approach would promote the fuller consideration of various states' interests and the gradual creation of a favorable atmosphere for the discussion of these problems at regional meetings and later at an all-Asian forum.

But at the very first stage it is essential to seek to expand the "confidence zone" between the states and to take practical steps on the path of strengthening security.
[paragraph continues]

This could be manifested in raising the level of political contacts, expanding trade and economic relations, overcoming impasses and conflicts in relations between individual countries, settling crisis situations, lowering of military activeness, creating nuclear-free zones, and so forth. The USSR's specific proposals on these questions are well known.

The Soviet initiatives could not fail to attract the attention of broad political and public circles in the countries of Asia and the Pacific basin. The socialist countries -- Vietnam, the DPRK, Mongolia, Laos, and also Cambodia -- actively supported these initiatives. A number of Soviet proposals put forward in Vladivostok were also welcomed with approval in China.

Economic and trade relations are expanding between the USSR and the PRC, summit contacts are being effected, and political consultations on the normalization of relations and talks on border questions are being held. The USSR and the PRC occupy coinciding or close positions on many international questions, although there are also differences on some regional problems. As for the specific idea of holding, in the long term, an Asian-Pacific conference along the lines of the Helsinki forum, the Chinese side has still not expressed itself directly on this question.

The Soviet proposals have met with a positive reception in India. The government and public believe it is essential, as Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said, gradually to advance toward the establishment of harmonious relations based on the principles of freedom, equality, and justice.

The countries of Southern Asia, the ASEAN states, and Australia and New Zealand have also treated the Soviet program for safeguarding peace and security with great interest.

What position has the United States taken with respect to the USSR's initiatives? Washington claims that the Soviet Union is seeking some "one-sided advantages." The U.S. Administration is trying to dictate what Moscow should do but is forgetting its own responsibility for peace and security in Asia. It is not hard to see that this obstructionist stance conceals a fear of change and the desire to retain for the United States the "right" to dictate, to dominion in the Pacific.

As for Japan, in this case it is oriented toward the U.S. Administration. Here, in an attempt to justify their negative approach, Japanese figures are referring to the existence of the so-called "territorial issue."

I should like to think that realism and reason will eventually gain the upper hand in Tokyo and Washington and that they will make amendments complying with the spirit of the times to their policy.

The USSR's position on the question of security in the Asian and Pacific region, which was clearly set out in the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's replies to the questions put by the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA does indeed accord with the spirit of the times. Our country again urges all states of the region to cooperate in the interests of peace and mutual understanding. The elimination of the nuclear threat is of special importance for establishing a climate of trust and cooperation in this part of the world, as it is everywhere. In this connection, in going halfway to meet the Asian countries, the Soviet Union has taken a new step at the Geneva talks on medium-range missiles.

It is a case of our readiness to eliminate the issue of retaining 100 warheads on missiles of this class stationed in the Asian part of the USSR, on the condition that the U.S. side undertakes similar actions. [paragraph continues]

In addition the readiness has been expressed to reduce the activeness of the Navies of the USSR and the United States in the Pacific and not to build up the number of Soviet aircraft carrying nuclear weapons in this region if the United States deploys no additional nuclear weapons there capable of reaching the Soviet Union's territory.

To ensure lasting peace and security in an important part of the world it will be necessary to overcome the old thinking, prejudices, and suspicions. But there is no other way.

Nakasone Welcomes Offer

LD230900 Moscow TASS in English 0802 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] Tokyo July 23 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vladimir Kuchko reports:

We welcome the proposal for liquidation of medium-range missiles globally which has been put forward by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev, Prime Minister of Japan Yasuhiro Nakasone said in parliament today.

General Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers Masaharu Gotoda held a press conference in the course of which he noted that the new Soviet proposals for medium-range missiles in Asia coincided with the Japanese Government's stand on problems of medium-range missiles.

The government is thoroughly studying the USSR's initiatives which were set forth in Mikhail Gorbachev's answers to questions of the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA, he said.

Nakasone Letter to Gorbachev

OW280835 Tokyo KYODO in English 0723 GMT 28 Jul 87

[Excerpt] Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone has renewed his call for Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to visit Japan at an early date, a Japanese opposition leader said here Monday. Saburo Tsukamoto, chairman of the No. 3 opposition Democratic Socialist Party, said he would convey a verbal message from Nakasone regretting Gorbachev's failure to meet Japan's request for him to visit Tokyo by the end of last January. Tsukamoto said he would deliver the message to an unidentified senior member of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee who he was to meet Wednesday.

In Tokyo, Nakasone told reporters Monday evening he talked with Tsukamoto over the telephone and asked him to convey a verbal message to the Kremlin leader. The prime minister declined to reveal details of the message.

Tsukamoto arrived in Moscow Sunday leading a DSP delegation. The mission is scheduled to stay in Moscow through August 2 and will go to Finland before returning to Tokyo August 4.

Nakasone's letter also welcomes Moscow's recent proposal aimed at eliminating all intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles, including those deployed in the Asian region. It further expresses the hope that Gorbachev will conduct serious negotiations with the United States leading to a summit with U.S. President Ronald Reagan by the end of this year, Tsukamoto said.

In a recent interview with an Indonesian newspaper, Gorbachev showed his readiness for a Japan visit, but indicated at the same time that a cloud over Japan-Soviet relations makes such a visit difficult at present. The Soviets say Japan's exposure of Soviet-related spy cases in Japan, Toshiba Machine's COCOM rules violation in its sensitive machine exports to the Soviet Union and Japan's participation in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or Star Wars, plan are having an adverse effect on Tokyo-Moscow relations.

TASS Cites KYODO Comments

LD230532 Moscow TASS in English 0508 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] Tokyo July 23 TASS -- The statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev on the Soviet Union's readiness to liquidate all its medium-range missiles also in the Asian part of the country opens up a realistic possibility for attaining an agreement at the Soviet-American negotiations on medium-range missiles, writes the Japanese KYODO TSUSHIN news agency, commenting on the USSR's new initiative to strengthen peace and security in the Asian-Pacific region.

Providing a detailed summary of the Soviet leader's answers to questions of the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA, KYODO TSUSHIN notes that the answers testify to the Soviet Union's striving for relaxation of tension in that part of the world.

Indonesian Minister

LD241422 Moscow TASS in English 1308 GMT 24 Jul 87

[Text] Jakarta July 24 TASS -- "Indonesia welcomes the peace proposals by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev which were put forward in an interview to the newspaper MERDEKA," said today Indonesia's Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja, answering a question of a TASS correspondent. We approve of any actions aimed at disarmament, he underlined.

The interview to the newspaper MERDEKA is a logical continuation of the Soviet leader's Vladivostok speech, following which the USSR undertook a number of steps reaffirming the striving to have good relations with Asian states, the minister said. This is particularly clear in questing for solution of the Afghan issue.

Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja said that an end to the arms race met the interests of all peoples of the world. The means to be released as a result could be used to build roads, schools, to make blossoming orchards out of deserts, he underlined.

PRK's Heng Samrin

BK291240 Phnom Penh SPK in English 1112 GMT 29 Jul 87

[Excerpts] According to TASS, this was stated by Heng Samrin, general secretary of the P.R.P.K. Central Committee and president of the State Council of the P.R.K., now on a vacation in the Soviet Union, in his meeting on 28 July in Moscow with Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee.

President Heng Samrin highly valued the new Soviet proposal expounded by M. Gorbachev in his interview with the Indonesian daily "MERDEKA" on July 21. He said:

"As a country in the Asian-Pacific region, Kampuchea fully approves and endorses the Soviet initiatives which represent a development of the Vladivostok programme, the struggle for peace and security of peoples on the basis of collective efforts made by riverine states.

"The materialization of the new Soviet proposals will create a firm base for maintaining peace and cooperation among states in the Asian-Pacific region," stressed Heng Samrin.

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: U.S. RESPONSE TO MERDEKA INTERVIEW REPORTED

White House Press Conference

LD230653 Moscow TASS in English 0631 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] Washington July 23 TASS -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports:

An extraordinary press conference was held at the White House Wednesday evening. It was devoted to the proposals for liquidation of medium-range and shorter-range missiles not only in Europe but also globally, advanced by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev in an interview to the newspaper MERDEKA.

A White House spokesman read out a statement which says that the administration welcomes reports on the proposals made in the interview and that the American delegation in Geneva is ready to work in a constructive spirit in Geneva.

And then reservations were made right away that it is necessary to thoroughly study the whole text of the interview, to see if there are "unacceptable terms" there, to wait what concrete proposals to that score will be made by the Soviet delegation at the Geneva negotiations.

The new Soviet proposals immediately attracted great attention of the U.S. mass media. Detailed excerpts from the interview were transmitted by the AP and UPI news agencies, radio stations and television. The keynote of the commentaries on the proposals is that the Soviet Union has again taken constructive steps towards as early attainment of an agreement at the Soviet-American Geneva negotiations.

Mikhail Gorbachev, AP underlines, has made a new step towards the United States in the course of the negotiations. The host of the ABC television evening news programme described the proposals as "an important step".

Kenneth Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in an ABC TV interview admitted that the Soviet Union-proposed "global zero" on medium-range and shorter-range missiles would remove many differences now existing between the United States and the Soviet Union on questions of verification of compliance with the agreement, now being negotiated in Geneva.

Kampelman Comments

LD232201 Moscow TASS in English 2155 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] Washington July 24 TASS -- Head of the American delegation at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons Max Kampelman positively assessed new Soviet peace initiatives set forth by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his replies to questions of the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA.

Kampelman said in an interview to AP news agency that those proposals removed a number of obstacles in the way to concluding a treaty on complete elimination of medium-range missiles of both sides. However, the head of the U.S. delegation indicated that Washington administration would not make concessions on the question of the FRG's "Pershing 1A" missiles, nuclear warheads for which are held by the United States.

White House 'Welcomes' Proposal

LD240101 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Station commentary]

[Text] The world's attention is now focussed on the new Soviet proposals on nuclear disarmament and other security issues put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in an interview for the Indonesian daily MERDEKA.

One of these new initiatives provides for the complete elimination of the Soviet and U.S. medium-range and shorter-range missiles. This is a fresh effort towards the success of the Geneva talks. Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan agreed at last year's Reykjavik summit that the two countries would eliminate their medium-range missiles in Europe. They also agreed that 100 nuclear warheads were to be left in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and another 100 in the United States. The compromise was struck after the U.S. refused to negotiate their nuclear arsenals in such places as South Korea and the Philippines.

This country has now made a new step to meet the United States half way. It has proposed that the two countries scrap all their nuclear warheads for medium-range missiles, and also do away with their shorter-range missiles. Thus Moscow is proposing a global double zero option. The Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev said, was not linking this new initiative to the U.S. nuclear presence in Korea, the Philippines, or Diego Garcia. It hopes, however, that the U.S. would at least refrain from building up that presence.

The White House has indicated it welcomes the new Soviet proposals. The President's spokesman Marlin Fitzwater has said it gives the United States some reason for encouragement in terms of the final treaty agreement, as well as a possible summit. The proposal, he said, would facilitate an agreement on verification measures. In the same breath, however, he tried to cast a shadow over the Soviet policy on the issue. He claimed that positive Soviet proposals before had been accompanied by unacceptable conditions. It is common knowledge, however, that it was concrete steps taken by Moscow that have translated the Reykjavik accord into practical talks towards an agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles.

Moscow has come forward with a whole range of initiatives and has made a number of concessions. All that has made the prospect of an agreement look near and likely. This is also true of the verification issue, where the Soviet side has offered onsite inspections and other strict measures.

Now that Moscow has made its global double zero proposal, it is up to Washington to respond with positive steps.

U.S. 'Reservations'

LD241809 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 24 Jul 87

[Viktor Levin commentary]

[Text] The world welcomes the Soviet proposal on the global double-zero option. Here is a commentary by Viktor Levin who is at the microphone:

[Levin] The replies of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to the questions of the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA touch upon many international problems, and the Soviet evaluation of each of them evokes great interest.

I think that our country's approaches to the solution of Asian problems and to the securing of peace in this region have not yet been fully understood because a bold and innovative approach undoubtedly presupposes renunciation of fixed stereotypes, and this, naturally takes time. This does not mean that Asian and Pacific countries have not yet started studying Comrade Gorbachev's replies.

The first reactions show deep interest but, I repeat, this matter requires time. But the problem of the global double-zero option, that is the liquidation of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles not only in Europe but in the territory of the USSR and the United States -- for everybody is following closely the course of the talks in Geneva -- has evoked an immediate and, on the whole, unambiguous reaction. The Soviet initiative is being viewed favorably, it is seen as a real and very important step toward working out a Soviet-U.S. agreement. Engell, Denmark's minister of defense, called the Soviet proposal an epoch event. The Austrian newspaper DIE PRESSE thinks that the way toward reaching unanimity at the Geneva talks is now open. The Japanese newspaper TOKYO SHIMBUN holds the same view, while Kusumaatmandja, the Indonesian minister of foreign affairs, emphasizes that halting the arms race answers the interests of all peoples.

Washington also welcomes the Soviet initiative. Fitzwater, official representative of the White House, said the Soviet proposal is welcomed in the United States. Does it mean that things are going to move well and fast in Geneva, and that the drafting of a treaty will be done in about 2 months? The Soviet Union is counting on this, but statements by certain representatives of the administration, in particular those of Glitman, chief negotiator in the group on nuclear medium-range weapons at the Geneva talks, are putting people on their guard and feeding doubts in the sincerity of the U.S. desire to reach an accord. One hears a lot about this sincerity, but how is one to understand Glitman's words when he says in effect that there is too little time left and the Soviet Union is wrongly overloading the talks with the issue of nuclear warheads for the Pershing-1A missiles of the West German Bundeswehr?

I think the matter rests not only in the fact that the U.S. representative is laying a dead cat at our door, but more in the fact that the presence of a political will in Washington for concluding this agreement is called in question. The Soviet Union has this will and it is confirming it by practical deeds, by its proposals, whereas reservations from the U.S. side breed doubts in its striving for an agreement. Indeed, one cannot regard 72 warheads as zero! Such an attempt is both erroneous from the arithmetical point of view and is beneath criticism from the political.

U.S. Replies Denote 'Own Logic'

LD261725 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 26 Jul 87

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Tomas Kolesnichenko]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] In the interview by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to the Indonesian paper MERDEKA the foreign policy idea of the Soviet Union is in fact laid out, based on the new thinking showing the whole heterogeneous world in its dialectical interdependence.

For example, our new denouement in Geneva, our readiness for the global double-zero, the complete elimination of medium range missiles and operative and strategic missiles. It will bring the Geneva talks to a direct finish, and open up a real prospect for a Soviet-American summit.

But this by no means exhausts the significance of the new Soviet initiative. Having also expressed readiness to embark on eliminating all our medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the country -- that is, to remove the question of keeping the 100 warheads the Geneva talks are discussing -- the Soviet Union is thereby opening up completely new prospects in the Asian-Pacific region. They have been set out in detail in four points in the interview with MERDEKA. Other measures are also possible, and we are ready to look at unconventional [neordinarnyy] ideas so long as they are acceptable to all. It is typical that our new proposals should have been put forward now at the anniversary of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech, in which the problems of security in Asia were laid out.

So, we have new proposals. What about the United States? This question is also being quite widely discussed and it is understandable why. The Soviet initiatives are addressed first and foremost to the United States. It is as if we are going to meet Washington not only along our part of the road, but are going further. But will Washington move from its position? For example, we are removing all medium-range missiles in Asia without linking this with the U.S. nuclear presence in South Korea, the Philippines, and on Diego Garcia. But at least surely the United States should not then modernize its forces and not increase its nuclear arms in the Asian countries. That's logical, isn't it? But the first responses of the United States show that they have their own logic, so to say, and it is expressed in such ambiguous words, as: Moscow's step is encouraging and heartening; but at the same time that same Fitzwater, press secretary to the White House, again repeated the fable of some kind of Soviet threat to the Pacific. And that was after our proposals.

Kampelman, the head of the U.S. delegation in Geneva, also praised the Soviet initiative, but here he too declared that the United States would refuse to examine the question of West German Pershing-1A missiles -- that is, the 72 U.S. warheads on them. That is one of the dead ends of the Geneva talks, and here you have the U.S. reaction: No, we won't come out of the dead end. Is that really the way to conduct talks? It must be admitted that even the commentaries of Western observers are expressing the idea that the Soviet Union is clearing away the obstructions on the path to most important decisions, and the United States is retreating unwillingly, fighting a rearguard diplomatic battle.

Well, we are waiting for a responsible approach from Washington, for the ball -- as the Americans themselves say -- is in their court.

Reagan 'Pleased'

LD281953 Moscow TASS in English 1933 GMT 28 Jul 87

[Text] Washington July 28 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko:

Speaking in the capital of the United States on Tuesday, U.S. President Ronald Reagan said that the U.S. side "is pleased the Soviets have now expressed support" for the concept of reducing together with the United States to "zero the number of both longer range and shorter range INF missiles" not only in Europe but also in Asia. According to the U.S. chief executive, the USA has also compromised by agreeing to the scrapping of all missiles and launchers covered by the treaty being prepared and by renouncing consent to "no conversion of these systems and launchers to other types of weapons."

Yet Reagan did not say a word about the problem being created by the stubborn reluctance of the USA to remove the main obstacle on the way to success of the talks on medium-range missiles, precisely to agree to the elimination of 72 Pershing-1A missiles which are nominally among the arms of the West German Bundeswehr, but whose nuclear warheads belong to the USA.

But White House and State Department officials did not lose time in immediately declaring that the question of the Pershing-1A missiles is not negotiable at the talks.

Fitzwater Expresses 'Readiness'

LD281623 Moscow TASS in English 1600 GMT 28 Jul 87

[Text] Washington July 28 TASS -- White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater stated on Tuesday the readiness of the United States Administration to accept the "double zero option" proposed by the Soviet Union to eliminate medium-range and theatre missiles both in Europe and in Asia.

But the White House spokesman stressed that the United States had no intention as before to conduct talks about systems in the armed forces of third countries. This means that Washington would like to keep outside of the accord the Pershing-1A missiles of the FRG for which the United States stores nuclear warheads.

The NBC television company notes that this stand makes the issue of the Pershing-1A missiles the last major obstacle on the way to reaching an accord on medium-range and theatre missiles.

U.S. Polls Register Backing

PM291145 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Special correspondent A. Blinov "Letter From Washington": "Contrary to the Mood of Americans"]

[Excerpts] Washington -- [Passage omitted] L. Harris, the well-known specialist in the study of U.S. public opinion, notes in his recently published book, "America From the Inside" ["Amerika Iznutri"], "Irangate" has inflicted a serious trauma on the Republican administration and has undermined its authority. But if "Irangate" were all...

The long-term evaluations of U.S. public opinion cited by Harris are of considerable interest. They illustrate the fact that even before "Irangate" the U.S. population's sentiments had veered away from the wave of conservatism that swept the incumbent Republican administration to power. This concerns problems in both domestic and foreign policy. In Harris' words, this is the reason for the Republican Party's defeat in last November's congressional elections to Congress. [passage omitted]

A 3-to-1 majority of Americans think military expenditure is out of control. Whereas in 1980, 70 percent supported the rise in military expenditure, now only 13 percent are in favor.

Certain of Harris' data are contradictory. But this can be understood if you consider the ideological influence to which the U.S. population is subjected. During the incumbent administration's activity, as he points out, there was been an increase in the number of Americans associating the USSR with "the image of the enemy."

This is a clear result of hostile propaganda in the United States in relation to the USSR, or, to be more precise, of a whole series of a skillfully organized propaganda campaigns. At the same time this has not taken its toll on Americans' desire to achieve an accord with the USSR, above all on disarmament questions. According to the Harris data, this is a stable factor in the sentiments of the U.S. population over the last 20 years. "The U.S. people, both on the level of instinct and of reason, are convinced," Harris writes, "that agreements between the United States and the USSR will bring about a reduction in tension, while disagreement may cause it to be reinforced." According to his data, in a ratio of 72 percent to 21, Americans believe that in the nuclear era it is important to maintain any previously concluded agreement that promotes arms control and advocates achieving new accords. Eighty percent as opposed to 16 percent favor concluding an agreement banning any underground nuclear tests; 82 percent as opposed to 16 percent favor a ban on the use of space for military purposes; and 84 percent as opposed to 13 favor a 50-percent reduction in the number of nuclear warheads and missiles on both sides over a 5-year period. There is also a majority favoring other measures to limit the arms race.

Analogous conclusions are reached by the "U.S. Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy-87" survey conducted under the aegis of the prestigious Chicago Council on International Relations. This points out that Americans "are placing the question of relations with the Soviet Union at the center of U.S. foreign policy problems." Hence, 81 percent of those polled advocated talks in the arms control sphere, and 78 percent advocated a renewal of exchanges in culture and education. Fifty-two percent did not support restrictions in Soviet-U.S. trade.

Let us turn to Harris' opinion once again: "A significant agreement on arms control could greatly promote the restoration of trust and faith in the traumatized Reagan Administration and in the President personally." And one increasingly encounters in the U.S. press now this assessment: Achieving arms control accords with the USSR, particularly on medium-range missiles, constitutes a "historic change" for the incumbent administration, practically the only means of ending what remains of President Reagan's term on a positive note. U.S. public opinion polls illustrate that the U.S. population favors such an agreement and will support it.

However, the U.S. Administration obviously lacks the determination for serious accords on disarmament question. This is, apparently, the reason for the recent difficulties at the Geneva talks. Does the U.S. side intend to offer some solutions to move the talks forward? This conclusion cannot be drawn from statements by official administration spokesmen.

Let us take another aspect of the problem. For many weeks now, with the administration support and the participation of specific congressional circles, a noisy campaign has blown up around the construction of the new U.S. Embassy complex in Moscow. People have gone as far as to maintain that it is bugged and is unfit for use. Why all this fuss now? To cover up their own improper actions? Or to consolidate "the enemy image" that has been painstakingly implanted by U.S. propaganda? Or, maybe, to justify their obstructionist position at the Geneva talks? [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET OFFICIALS, MEDIA COMMENT ON U.S. REACTIONS

Foreign Ministry Comments 26 July

PM271311 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Foreign Ministry on the Line"]

[Text] Question to B. Pyadyshev, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration: "How do you rate the initial reaction to the new Soviet initiative?"

[Pyadyshev] The Soviet initiative has hit the nail on the head. Positive responses are coming in with a unanimity rare for the world political community. Of course, they are accompanied by reservations and varying degrees of skepticism. But the denominator is positive. The assessment of our step that prevails in the United States is that it contains potential for a breakthrough in nuclear disarmament. It is pointed out, however, that the delegations at the Geneva talks still have much work to do. And yet the sentiment is that it is possible to complete the drafting of an agreement on the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles as early as this fall.

The view is held in Washington circles that the Soviet initiative, if it contains no "hidden surprises," removes 80 percent of the differences in the sides' positions. Well, it is now up to the United States to solve the problem of the other 20 percent. And let them not put up a smokescreen over "surprises" -- our position is open and clear. Washington officials point out that the United States would be prepared to agree now to the demand for a ban on converting the missiles subject to reduction into other systems, particularly as sea-based cruise missiles. But what about the Pershing-1A missiles? The Americans still say that those Bundeswehr missiles with U.S. nuclear warheads are not subject to negotiation. Bonn says the same thing. In the present situation, whether they want this or not, the FRG could hold things up. "West Germany hitting the brakes of disarmament? That is all we need!" -- the newspaper STADT-ANZEIGER, which is close to the liberals, exclaims in a temper.

Washington and Bonn must make up their minds about the Pershing-1A missiles. We have never raised the question of them at the talks. They belong to the FRG and are not in themselves a subject of talks. It is a question of the U.S. warheads. It is these that must be eliminated. Otherwise there will be no "global zero." What kind of "global zero" is it if the United States leaves 72 warheads in Europe? This is no joking matter. Each one is equal to many Hiroshima bombs. We end up with "zero" for the Soviet Union and some kind of square "zero" for the United States.

Foreign Ministry Comments 28 July

LD281804 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1145 GMT 28 Jul 87

[Text] We are continuing the series: From the Decree on Peace to a World Without Nuclear Weapons. The zero option: Who is for and who is against? Such is the theme of the talk we present today. At the microphone is Boris Dmitriyevich Pyadyshev, first deputy head of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry:

[Pyadyshev] Today it is not only professional politicians who with justification can declare that real and favorable opportunities are taking shape for an agreement to be concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States on eliminating all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. People who are not professionally engaged in politics but who follow the development of events over the missile affair in the press and on radio are talking about this. Both the Soviet and foreign public senses that things are coming to a head. They feel that an accord is not far off on what is in practice the first agreement on nuclear disarmament.

There have up to now been many negotiations on nuclear disarmament, but over the past four postwar decades not a single specific step has been made toward that end. Alas not a single missile has been liquidated, not a single nuclear warhead. The initiatives submitted the other day by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in an interview to the Indonesian MERDEKA, open up a wholly realistic prospect of an early agreement on the total liquidation of two whole classes of terrible weapons, namely medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. What is it that moves Soviet foreign policy in its purposeful striving toward lessening international tension, toward disarmament, and toward intensifying goodneighborly relations and cooperation between peoples and states? It is moved by the ideas laid down 70 years ago in Lenin's immortal Decree on Peace. This, the first document of the socialist state, states precisely and clearly: The imperialist war is a most great crime against mankind. There is but one alternative to this crime: A just and democratic peace. Soviet foreign policy has always been loyal to this behest of Lenin's.

In the first major international conference that the Soviet Republic participated in -- the Genoa conference of 1922 -- our representatives proposed a universal arms reduction. Soviet diplomacy expressed a readiness to support all proposals aimed at alleviating the burden of militarism, on the condition of cutting the armies of all states and adding to the rules of warfare a total ban on its most barbaric forms. The Soviet proposals, which were submitted in the 1920's and 1930's mobilized public opinion abroad and increased the protest against the arms race and against preparations for war.

Today, too, the Decree of Peace is the chief landmark for Soviet foreign policy. The point of its operation in Lenin's idea -- to take as many of the clearest decisions and measures as would genuinely lead to peace. Eighteen months ago the Soviet Union submitted a program for a stage-by-stage total elimination everywhere of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. On the basis of this, conceptual progress at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik was possible. It was then that people saw for the first time the prospect of a nuclear-free world. The White House tried to shut off this prospect; the Kremlin would not agree to this. The Soviet leadership submitted additional initiatives that allowed preparations for an agreement to be transferred to a practical level.

It is by no means an easy matter to formulate additional initiatives, to modify one's position, and to go as far as a compromise option. Many factors must be taken into consideration, in respect to one's own security, as well as the economy, and reverberations within the country and abroad. In connection with the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Asian countries expressed their interest in seeing the medium-range missiles totally eliminated not only in Europe, but in Asia as well. The Soviet leadership took a very serious and responsible attitude to this desire. Complying with the Asian countries' wishes, and taking account of their concern, the Soviet Union is prepared to go as far as destroying all its medium-range missiles, in the Asiatic part of the country as well; that is, it is prepared to remove from the agenda the issue of maintaining those 100 warheads on medium-range missiles being discussed at the Geneva negotiations with the United States. This is on the condition, of course, that the United States does the same and that it eliminates operational and tactical missiles as well. In other words, the Soviet Union will proceed from the concept of a global double-zero. We do not link with this initiative, in the given case, the issue of the United States' nuclear presence in Korea in the Philippines, or on Diego Garcia island.

The Soviet initiative hit the bull's-eye. Positive responses are coming in with a unanimity rare for the world political community. They are, of course, accompanied by reservations and various degrees of skepticism. But the denominator is a positive one. In the United States the prevailing assessment of our step is that it contains potential for a breakthrough in nuclear disarmament. It is pointed out, however, that the delegations at the Geneva negotiations have quite a bit of work ahead of them. Nevertheless, the mood is that working out an agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles and of operational and tactical missiles could be completed as soon as this fall. The opinion circulating in Washington at present is that the Soviet initiative -- if it contains no hidden surprises -- removes 80 percent of the differences in the sides' positions.

It's now up to the United States to solve the problem of the remaining 20 percent. Let them not obscure the issue in regard to surprises; our position is open and clear. The United States would now be ready -- Washington officials note -- to agree to the demand for a ban on refitting the missiles curtailed onto other systems, in particular sea-based cruise missiles.

What about the Pershing-1A missiles? For the moment the United States is saying that these Bundeswehr missiles, with their U.S. nuclear warheads, are exempt from the negotiations, and the same thing is now being said in Bonn, too. Whether they want it or not, given the way things are apportioned at present, the FRG could bring the whole matter to a standstill. West Germany is putting the brake on disarmament. That's all we need! is the heartfelt cry of the STAATANZEIGER, the newspaper close to the liberals.

Washington and Bonn have got to define their position on the Pershing-1A missiles. We never raised the question of these at the negotiations; they belong to the FRG, and in themselves are not a subject of the negotiations. The question here is about the U.S. warheads -- they must be eliminated, otherwise the global zero will not come about. What sort of a global zero is it if the United States keeps 72 warheads in Europe? This is no joke. Each of them is equal to many Hiroshima bombs. So the Soviet Union ends up with zero and the United States gets a sort of zero squared.

The Soviet Union has said its piece. At the Geneva negotiations the Soviet delegation has expounded our proposals in specific terms. Further diplomatic work on reaching an agreement is expected to hinge on the four basic problems, on which the United States

must adopt a constructive position. First, the United States must declare clearly that they favor genuine elimination of missiles; we consider there can be no question of any adaptation of these missiles -- for instance, into land-based cruise missiles or sea-based ones -- or of Pershing-2 into the operational and tactical Pershing-1.

Second, warheads must be destroyed together with the carriers. The main problem here lies with the U.S. warheads for Pershing-1A missiles, which belong to the FRG. But that is not all. We consider that the U.S. warheads on the Pershing-2, land-based cruise missiles, and on Pershing-1 missiles, which are the property of the United States should also be withdrawn in an appropriate manner and according to established procedure, and should then be eliminated.

Third, the U.S. side is submitting unequal conditions for the procedure on eliminating missiles. It is proposed that at the first stage the Soviet Union should begin eliminating on its own, while the United States would join the eliminating later. This is, of course, unacceptable. We favor eliminating the corresponding means of the Soviet Union and the United States gradually, within a set period -- a 5-year period is being mentioned at the negotiations -- on an equal percentage basis.

Finally, we favor the right to verify [kontrol] and the right to monitor [proverka] the fulfillment of the agreement being identical for the United States and the Soviet Union. In other words, the Soviet side must have the opportunity to assure itself that both the missiles and the warheads the United States has deployed [razmestit] on the territory of allied countries are being eliminated. The United States would have the same right of verification [kontrol] in regard to us, and we would have it in regard to them.

A recent public opinion poll carried out by the United States Information Agency showed that the overwhelming majority of Europeans consider the Kremlin has done more for peace and arms control [kontrol] than the White House. It is natural that the view of foreign policy, which has its roots in the Leninist Decree on Peace, is persistently, committedly, and sincerely proceeding in such a way as to halt the arms race, eliminate the nuclear threat, and make the international atmosphere clearer.

Basis for 'Lasting' Peace

PM241351 Moscow SOVETSKAYA. ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Jul 87 Second Edition p 5

[Ernst Genri article: "Kremlin Puts Forward Concept of 'Global Double Zero Option'" -- capitalized words between slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev, answering questions put by the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA, has just announced that the Soviet Union is prepared to destroy /ALL ITS MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE ASIAN PART OF THE COUNTRY TOO/, that is, it is prepared to remove the issue of keeping the 100 warheads on medium-range missiles being discussed at the Geneva talks with the Americans, on the condition, of course, that the United States does the same. Operational and tactical missiles would also be eliminated.

This important initiative is the best possible answer to the propaganda ballyhoo that has been whipped up in the West over the past few weeks. Constant noises are made on the lines that to achieve a real change for the better in international relations Moscow must adopt a more active stance, the Soviet Union must take another step. [paragraph continues]

This refers now to a specific sphere of the disarmament talks, now to verification problems, and now to humanitarian cooperation. Only a blind man could claim to be unable to see how many such steps have been taken and what part of the overall distance has been covered by our country.

It is sometimes claimed that to reconcile two opponents it takes a third contender, stronger than either of them and threatening them both equally. Does this mean that the USSR and the United States can permit themselves to wait until hypothetical inhabitants from outer space appear and reconcile them by creating a new threat of universal destruction to replace the nuclear threat they themselves have created?

The plan for good-neighborly cooperation between the two great powers is, according to the Washington opponents of such a policy, totally unrealistic because of the insurmountable differences between them on key issues. At least, this is what these circles claim.

We also believe that the basis of our contradictions is of a profoundly economic, political, and ideological nature rather than the transient product of a confrontational frame of mind.

However, the only thing the Soviet Union wants from the United States is a lowering of the war danger and a lasting, immutable peace. As M.S. Gorbachev said in his interview with B.M. Diah, chief editor of the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA, about relations with the United States: "...we are hoping for cooperation with that country too." Against the backdrop of such a peace, everything else in our relations will arrange itself of its own accord.

However, it would be a serious mistake to assume that there are no influential groups in the United States which favor normal, mutually advantageous relations with the USSR. Without any doubt, such forces do exist in America, and they are interested in both the speediest possible end to the senseless arms race and broad economic cooperation with the socialist world.

These politicians are frequently connected with major corporations outside the military-industrial complex which are most of all interested in marketing nonmilitary goods. The U.S. military-industrial complex is indeed very strong and has grown even stronger under Reagan. It has the backing of billionaires in California and Texas, but nonetheless it is not omnipotent. The opponents of peaceful coexistence tend to forget the fact, but the civilian sector of U.S. big business employs a substantial majority of U.S. workers.

This year marks the 15th anniversary of the signing of many Soviet-American documents that concern the bases of our relations, are aimed at preventing nuclear war, and contain quite specific agreements on cooperation in science, technology, and culture.

I very much hope that the development in the diametrically opposite direction that marked the first half of the eighties is a temporary aberration, a mere coincidence of foreign and domestic policy circumstances in Washington.

It is vitally important today that the people in Washington also grasp the fact M.S. Gorbachev put as follows in his interview with B.M. Diah: "The problems of international politics can no longer be resolved through war today. This method is fraught with unpredictable consequences."

Fundamental criticism by Moscow of Washington's imperialist aspirations is, of course, inevitable, just like Washington's criticism of the Soviet people's socialist persuasions. Differences, including differences on regional problems, will persist: They are a fact of international life. However, this need by no means signify the two sides' refusal jointly to implement a firm and practical policy of peace, within the framework of the new thinking typified by M.S. Gorbachev's answers to questions from MERDEKA.

'Strange U.S. Behavior'

PM241607 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Bessmenov article: "Those Who Are 'Applying the Brakes' in Geneva" -- passages between slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva continue to attract the international public's attention. The nature of such close and constant attention needs no lengthy explanation, I think: To a large extent it will be decided here whether or not the process of /real/ disarmament will at last begin on the basis of the historic platform set out in Reykjavik. The unique opportunity to begin that process right now by destroying two classes of nuclear arms belonging to the USSR and the United States -- namely, medium-range and operational and tactical missiles -- must not be missed.

The talks themselves are confidential in character. Perhaps that also explains why people are examining in microscopic detail the commentaries connected with the Geneva discussions, particularly if they come from Soviet and U.S. representatives. This consideration, coupled with the fact that the talks have entered a decisive phase, places special responsibility on the two countries' officials and demands objective and balanced views.

Against this background one cannot fail to notice the considerable change in the U.S. Administration's propaganda line recently. Some 2 weeks ago Washington figures' comments were deliberately couched in optimistic tones, with emphasis on the fact that the talks as a whole and above all on the questions of medium-range missiles were developing successfully and that the unresolved questions were not an insurmountable obstacle. It was all down to the USSR's position, they said, although it must be borne in mind that even in Washington sensible people were admitting that the road to a productive round of talks was opened by the USSR's rational proposals.

The picture of the Geneva talks then began to acquire a clearly pessimistic hue. The signal to change the propaganda tone was given by State Department official spokesman C. Redman, who claimed that "the Soviet Union seems to be diverging from what we regarded as a constructive or positive approach to some of the existing problems." As ever, the first to announce "message received" was the British Foreign Office. Minister of State Mellor stated that he had observed "signs of procrastination from the Soviet side" (It is true that Premier Thatcher corrected Mellor 3 days later when she said: "I do not believe that the Russians are slowing down the efforts in arms control"). But matters developed. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Ridgway said: Moscow wants "to achieve in the propaganda sphere what it could not achieve at the negotiating table." Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Adelman stated: "Moscow is trying to alarm Washington by putting the brake on the adoption of disarmament proposals." Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks, said: "The Soviets are applying the brakes..."

The obliging U.S. mass media indulged in an excess of loyalty by augmenting the official thesis with detailed rumors to the effect that the Russians had decided to exploit Irangate to wring the necessary concessions from a "weakened president."

Primarily to seek an answer to the question of the motives that have prompted the Americans to so abruptly change their assessment of Geneva, let us impartially examine how matters actually stand at the talks and how the sides' positions are changing there.

In general, the sides managed to make some progress in the eighth round of the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms -- mainly (although not exclusively) by virtue of the efforts in the group discussing /medium-range and operational and tactical missiles./ A second version of a joint draft treaty was recently completed and specific proposals are now being worked out, although the text of the moment contains more formulas within parentheses, that is, those not agreed, than outside parentheses, that is, those which are agreed. Nevertheless, there has been movement.

Constructive work was made possible -- and this fact is indisputable -- by the Soviet submission in April of the well-known "double-zero option" for the solution of the problem of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe, which also took account of the wishes of our partners in the talks for a separate solution of the medium-range missiles question and in addition the elimination of operational and tactical missiles. This major step by the Soviet Union opened the door to the rapid attainment of an agreement. The talks seemed to have entered the home stretch. But following the U.S. penchant for using automobile terminology in a political setting, the United States has shifted into low gear and slowed down.

It took the United States 2 months to coordinate its reply to the Soviet proposal with the allies. This, however, was only a minor problem. The main one was how the United States could pocket our concessions while retaining the most unconstructive elements of its line at the medium-range and operational and tactical missile talks and digging its heels, saying: "Thus far and no further."

What are the Americans' "entrenched" positions?

On the question of converting its medium-range missiles into other types of armaments, the United States is trying to exempt its medium-range missiles [sredniye rakety] from the commitments on their elimination. It claims the right to transform the Pershing-2's into Pershing-1B's, transfer GLCM's to ships, or fit them with conventional charges.

The U.S. delegation is still insisting on a medium-range missile reduction procedure whereby at the first stage Soviet medium-range missiles alone would be eliminated unilaterally and the U.S. missiles would remain for a long time without being reduced and not even subject to any monitoring [kontrol].

A major new obstacle was placed in the way of an agreement. The U.S. side suddenly demanded that it should keep in Europe its nuclear warheads intended for the 72 West German Pershing-1A operational and tactical missiles. Thus, it was discovered that the United States, while posing the question of reducing operational and tactical missiles to zero, had in mind absolute zero for the USSR and "semi-zero" for itself. Moreover, on the pretext of the further modernization of FRG missiles, the United States had the idea of continuing to produce Pershing-1B "to the West German". The trick is that a peashing 1B operational and tactical missile can be converted in a matter of hours into a Pershing-2 medium-range missile capable of reaching targets in the USSR. This would

complete the circle: The United States would appear to remove the Pershing-2's from Europe, but would put them back via the FRG. It would be a patent and perfidious contravention of the treaty.

This U.S. line has so far prevented a final agreement on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles, which is within reach, from being achieved. These kinds of delays and obstacles (we have cited just a few of them) have seriously inhibited progress at the Geneva talks.

The U.S. position /on strategic offensive arms/ is unconstructive. At the current round of talks the USSR delegation has consistently sought to develop the mutual understanding reached on the question of a 50-percent reduction of these armaments in Reykjavik, in particular on the reduction of Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive arms over a period of five years so that by the end of the period each side would be left with no more than 1,600 strategic weapon delivery vehicles and no more than 6,000 warheads on them. A separate level would be set for SLCM's.

The United States adopted a line at the talks that has diverged increasingly from the understandings reached in the Icelandic capital. It made a number of unacceptable demands. For example, on the exclusion of long-range SLCM's from any limitations (the idea being to channel the strategic arms race in that direction), and on establishing sublevels for strategic offensive arms that would totally demolish the structure of the strategic armaments retained by the USSR after reduction and would also make it easier for the United States to construct SDI. On top of that, the U.S. delegation suddenly decided to demand that the Soviet Backfire bomber, which figures in joint Soviet-American documents as medium-range and has never been classed as strategic, be incorporated in the aforementioned sublevels (the idea being to try to make the USSR either go along with the elimination of these bombers, which have nothing to do with the talks, or keep them, but destroy the same number of strategic delivery vehicles within the framework of a single level for strategic offensive arms).

But the most significant thing is that the Americans are doing their utmost to revise the fundamental understanding reached during the Geneva meeting between the Soviet and U.S. leaders on the intrinsic relationship between strategic offensive arms reductions and the prevention of an arms race in space.

/In the space group/ the U.S. side is in a state of slumber and is avoiding serious work. As is known, during this visit to Moscow in April Secretary of State Shultz was given an account of compromise solutions envisaging the strengthening of the ABM Treaty on the basis of mutual pledges not to withdraw from the treaty for 10 years while strictly observing all its provisions; an accord on the line between activity that is permitted and activity that is forbidden by the treaty by agreeing on a list of devices that would not be allowed to be put into space, even for experimental purposes; and also an accord on permitted research activity on earth -- in laboratories, at test sites, and in manufacturing plants, including activity in the open air.

It would appear that the American delegation in Geneva, having planned the destruction of the ABM Treaty, is basically concerned with securing the most favourable conditions for carrying out the "Star Wars" program -- that product of distorted thinking.

That is the true picture of what is happening at the Geneva talks.

Kampelman, in his NEW YORK TIMES article of 21 July, was clearly being artful when he said that the "United States has repeatedly been the side setting the tone at the talks." He did not, after all, say what sort of tone it was, and that, on checking, proves to be a negative one.

What, however, are the /reasons/ for such U.S. behavior? I would suggest the following:

First, it is clear that the childish weakness of taking a bit more for oneself and of seeking solutions through unilateral concessions on the part of one's partner while forgoing nothing for oneself is still strong among some people in Washington. It is this illusion rather than any technical details that is capable of seriously blocking the accord.

Second, there are highly influential U.S. forces opposed to any agreement on disarmament and generally stiffen their resistance at the key moments when the outline of such an agreement begins to emerge. These forces are now trying to form a block with political circles in countries that are America's closest allies for whom the nuclear arsenals are the be-all and end-all of their approach to international affairs.

Third, overt and covert opponents of the accord are perhaps counting on using the difficult U.S. domestic political situation for their own purposes. For this they are resorting to a tried and tested device: Without any grounds at all they are planning their own short-term policies ("Irangate" among them).

Four, there are people in the administration itself who are seeking to gain time and delay the adoption of the necessary policy decision. They are suggesting "patriotic" postures to the president, hoping inwardly that their unacceptability to the Soviet side may wreck the accord.

Other reasons for the strange U.S. behavior in Geneva are also possible. But that is not the point. The important thing is that this behavior is alarming.

The Soviet Union's approach to drawing up a substantial accord with the Reagan administration on all the questions under discussion in Geneva is principled in nature and is not subject to short-term changes of course. This is shown by our practical deeds. The new, one can say without exaggeration, globally important Soviet proposal to completely eliminate all Soviet and U.S. medium-range and operational and tactical missiles both in Europe and Asia put forward by M.S. Gorbachev in the interview he gave to the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA says better than any words what it is that guides the Soviet side at the present crucial stage in international and Soviet-American relations. The powerful boost generated by the radical Soviet initiatives should also impart momentum in other basic areas of the talks on the nuclear-space package.

The American side does not have to do so much -- it has to show constructiveness, release the artificial brakes, and focus efforts on completing the work on the treaty. The Soviet Union will continue to do everything possible both in Geneva and, if necessary, at a higher political level to realize the unprecedented possibility of executing a turn toward nuclear deescalation, toward creating a real nuclear-free world.

'Do Americans Care?'

PM291051 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 30, 26 Jul 87 p 4

[First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov article: "Security Is Within Reach: Do Americans Care?"]

[Text] An agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe coupled with an agreement concerning the basic provisions of a 50 per cent reduction of strategic nuclear arms and a ban on space weapons could provide what's needed for a new Soviet-American summit meeting. But what remains is that the USA takes a serious and positive approach to the talks in Geneva. This is something which we still have not seen. What we see is a pile of American claims which the Soviet side finds totally unacceptable. And therefore it seems to us that our partners simply cannot make up their own minds at the talks. We are sure that all obstacles can be easily overcome provided there is a concerted effort to accomplish this on the part of the American leadership. Do they care?

The Soviet Union and the United States have really come close to the attainment of an agreement on the elimination of their medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe. The world has not yet witnessed anything like it. After all, the question in the past was arms limitation. And now the issue is the physical dismantlement of a brand-new combat materiel. It would be, however, premature to say that a "mere pace" has remained to the signing of this agreement.

Last April the Soviet Union put forward new initiatives concerning the problems which (as the American side claimed) were hampering agreement. Thus we tried to give new hope to the talks. But now this hope, obviously, is in jeopardy: the American side wants to introduce new conditions into the agreement reached at Reykjavik. These new conditions are acting like a brake on the way to reaching agreement.

The USA, in particular, insists on incorporating in the treaty provisions on its right to re-equip its Pershing-2 missiles into shorter-range Pershing-1B missiles, instead of dismantling them altogether. Should the Soviet side agree to accept this condition, the USA would be in a position to claim that it really adheres to the principle of destroying medium-range missiles in Europe. The problem, however, is that Pershing-1B missiles can be re-equipped into Pershing-2 missiles within a matter of only two days.

The United States is reluctant to destroy one more class of medium-range missiles deployed in Europe, namely, cruise missiles. The Americans have suggested that this problem be tackled by simply removing warheads from them or transferring these missiles to warships off the shores of Europe. But as a result, the agreement on ridding Europe of longer and shorter-range operational-tactical missiles would turn into a chimera.

One more important problem is the American proposal now in force to the effect that the first stage of the agreement the Soviet Union should unilaterally reduce and dismantle its missiles, moreover, under American inspection. At the same time, the American arsenal would be kept intact, whereas Soviet inspectors would not be allowed on American bases.

The "zero-option" on longer- and shorter-range operational-tactical missiles must really be "zero". If the American warheads are preserved in Europe under some pretext, it would hardly be possible to call this situation "zero". I am sure that Washington would put forward the same argument if the Soviet Union wanted to store up a certain quantity of warheads for its own or any other missiles in any country in Eastern Europe.

The 72 American warheads (for West German missiles) also amount to a real and serious problem. There are other problems as well. For instance, the American draft allows developing new types of medium-range missiles, but this extends only to the USA, whereas the Soviet Union is denied the right to develop land-based cruise missiles. The Americans want to deploy the remaining Pershing-2 missiles in Alaska, thereby increasing the nuclear threat to Soviet territory, moreover, in the absence of a similar reciprocal threat to US territory.

It must be pointed out that we have agreed to definite limitations in the development of our remaining SS-20 missiles, namely, not to deploy them to the west of the 80th meridian of the Eastern Hemisphere, which, incidentally, was done at the request of the American side to prevent these missiles from reaching the territory of the USA's West European allies. Our medium-range missiles would not reach American territory either. Why then does the United States continue to insist on the deployment of Pershing-2 missiles in Alaska?

The reports about contemplated American and NATO programmes for the buildup and improvement of nuclear weapons also provide us with grounds for concern. On the pretext of preserving American "nuclear guarantees" for Western Europe it is planned, among other things, to increase the number of submarine-launched cruise missiles, to deploy additional bombers and nuclear artillery, and increase the action range of Lance tactical missiles. NATO has resorted to one more means of undermining the likely agreement by putting forward an unending chain of linkages. After we had decided the question of operational-tactical missiles on account of which, as we are told, the West felt concern, talks were started about tactical and battlefield weapons, and then about conventional armaments and troops.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization's reply to all these linkages has long been known: there is a need to resolutely end all imbalances by cutting the armaments of either side which has an advantage by establishing equally low ceilings for the troops and armaments of both sides. The levels of both sides' troops and armaments must be sufficient for defence, but preclude the possibility of carrying out offensive operations. These questions, along with the problem of remaining tactical nuclear weapons, should be examined at separate multilateral negotiations.

From the Soviet point of view, all medium-range missiles in Europe must be eliminated, and we regard the recent decisions of NATO countries as a reply to our proposals on a "double zero option" in Europe. But unresolved questions remain. For instance, we are prepared for a "global nuclear option" on condition that the American nuclear weapons in the Far East, including those deployed in Japan, the Philippines and South Korea, are taken into account and the American aircraft-carriers in the Pacific are withdrawn beyond the definite agreed lines.

Sometimes we are asked: "Why are you in such a hurry to sign this agreement?" But I would put it differently: "But why should we wait with our hands in our pockets?" Real disarmament has to start sometime, somewhere. At present the possibility of eliminating medium-range missiles has become more plausible, and we do not want to miss this historic chance. Why put off this question and have to start all over again when a new American administration takes office?

No one can guarantee that we humans will have another such chance in the future. After all, the continuing arms race goes on to generate and fuel mistrust. President Reagan said recently that the USSR and the United States have arms because they do not trust each other. It is not so important whether mistrust gives rise to the arms race or vice versa. The important thing is this: the arms race and mistrust are interconnected, and it is possible to get rid of them only together.

And the sooner this is done, the better. Don't you agree?

U.S. Commitment Questioned

LD291302 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1145 GMT 29 Jul 87

[By TASS Military Observer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jul (TASS) -- The United States has replied to the Soviet initiative on the global elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. In his announcement, President Reagan said: "The United States is proud to be able to make this proposal."

I believe the relatively prompt response to the new Soviet move, bringing closer the positions of the two sides at the Geneva talks, in principle can be seen as a positive phenomenon. However, even a first look at this reply, speaking frankly, does not give much ground for optimism.

So far as is possible to judge from the speeches of the President and other administration representatives, we are talking about just two changes: the U.S. renunciation of its demands for the inclusion in a future agreement of two provisions -- the conversion of "Pershing-2" medium-range missiles to shorter-range missiles (operational and tactical missiles), and the redeployment of land-based cruise missiles onto naval ships. Now, according to the White House head, the United States is prepared to destroy missiles and launchers that come within the agreement and renounces the idea of converting these systems and launchers into other types of weapons. But these obstacles at the talks were erected by the United States itself and clearly ran counter to the very idea of destroying a whole class of nuclear arms. Furthermore, the Soviet initiative helped undo one of these knots tied by Washington, since, given a global "zero" in terms of operational and tactical missiles, the possibility of converting "Pershing-2" missiles is automatically excluded.

As for the other obstacles the U.S. side has placed on the path of reaching an agreement, they are still there. In the first place, as Glitman, head of the U.S. group on medium-range missiles at the Geneva talks, has stated, the United States has no intention of tackling the question of U.S. nuclear warheads destined for the West German "Pershing-1A" missiles, since, according to him, "the talks do not affect third countries."

This position, it must be said, is very strange. If the above-mentioned warheads really belong to the United States, they do not represent arms belonging to "third countries." If, however, Washington regards them as arms belonging to "third countries" which are not subject to discussion at bilateral talks, this brings to mind the thought that the FRG possesses or strives to possess nuclear weapons.

In the second place, the U.S. side has apparently retained its proposal on unequal conditions for the elimination of missiles, according to which the USSR should alone commence elimination of this kind. As for the United States, during the first stage it will monitor [kontrolirovat] the USSR, not on a reciprocal basis, having itself retained the possibility even of building up corresponding nuclear arsenals of its own. This question is clearly not a technical one; it is of some considerable political and military significance.

In the third place, the United States continues to bluff and to prevaricate also in verifying [kontrol] the implementation of a future agreement. At the talks the USSR favors strict global verification [kontrol], including on-site inspections of all military bases where missiles subject to elimination and launchers are currently deployed, or where they can be potentially deployed. As for the U.S. side, it continues, as can be seen, to insist on excluding a whole series of military facilities from the on-site inspections. Thus, progress in verification [kontrol] is likewise absent from the U.S. response.

Furthermore, Glitman stated categorically that "the United States is not prepared to make any additional concessions." This once again does not show that the U.S. side is trying to go down its part of the road to the achievement of an agreement. And yet even Washington circles agree that the Soviet initiative has removed 80 percent of the differences in the positions of the two sides. But the United States, having submitted its new proposals at the Geneva talks, still has not been able to ensure the resolution of the remaining "20 percent" of difference.

And so the question arises: Is official Washington really interested in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement? And the governments of the U.S. allies, first and foremost the FRG and Great Britain, with whom the Reagan administration regularly consults on the questions of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles, are assuming no small responsibility. So the declarations of the U.S., British and West German representatives about their readiness to make their contribution to an agreement are not yet being confirmed in practice.

U.S. Obstructing Geneva Talks

LD291755 Moscow TASS in English 1403 GMT 29 Jul 87

["Europe Is Our Common Home" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow July 29 TASS -- Follows commentary by Yuriy Kornilov, TASS political news analyst:

On these days, European and world public are marking the 12th anniversary of the signing in Helsinki of the Final Act of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. The past years have reaffirmed the unpassing significance of that forum, which summed up the political results of the Second World War and laid the groundwork for developing the policy of detente by the collective efforts of 35 states.

The Soviet Union, which is true to the spirit and letter of the Helsinki accords and favours a new thinking in politics, has put forward the idea of a "common European home", which is, as a matter of fact, a follow-up and development of the approaches and principles, which were proclaimed in Helsinki 12 years ago. What is the pivot of that idea? The notion of the "common European home" implies first and foremost the recognition of a certain integrity, albeit the point at issue are states belonging to different social systems and opposite military political blocs. It combines long-ripe problems and the availability of real opportunities for their resolution.

Needless to say that in this nuclear age the national and regional problems are closely tied together with the general human problems, the main of which is to prevent nuclear self-destruction. In Europe, where the density of the population and the level of urbanisation are particularly great, not only nuclear, but a so-called "conventional" war would have truly destructive consequences.

In favouring the clearing of the European Continent from the militaristic evil, the Soviet Union, our friends and allies, all who treasure peace on the European soil resolutely declare for freeing Europe -- in common with Asia -- from medium-range missiles of immense importance for consolidation of European security would be implementation of the proposal of the socialist states on a considerable cut in the armed forces, tactical nuclear and conventional weapons in Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals. [sentence as received]

The proposal of the GDR and Czechoslovakia on creating a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe, the idea of Bulgaria and Romania concerning the turning of the Balkans into a zone free from nuclear and chemical weapons, the memorandum of the Government of the Polish People's Republic pointing out ways of cuts of arms and building up confidence in the European soil are getting increasing public support in Europe. These are different proposals, but their aim is one -- to divert the threat of war from our common European home, to ensure lasting peace for all the European nations.

The development of the positive all-European process is welcomed by millions of people, yet this process is a source of a different, often diametrically opposite, reaction in some U.S. circles, in the NATO camp. An evidence of that are the stubborn attempts of Washington, which supports by word of mouth the idea of eliminating medium-range missiles, but is putting up ever new obstacles at the Soviet-American Geneva talks, upholding a, so to say, 'zero', under which the U.S.A. would be allowed to leave in Europe 72 nuclear warheads in the Bundeswehr Pershing-1A missiles. Isn't it clear, where the NATOists are leading things, when touching upon the problem of a cut in the forces and arms in Europe, they are operating the so-called "usual stability" concept, behind which one can clearly see an attempt at evading the real mutual cuts in the nuclear potentials of the sides?

Wisdom based on experience has given Europe strength in order to become the place where the Helsinki Final Act originated. This document is our common property, and the positive ideas, on which it is based, should be saved and multiplied by common efforts. The most important component of the all-European process started in Helsinki is the curbing of the weapons race, an incessant lowering of the level of military confrontation, which ensures at each stage a balance at as low a level as possible.

'Lack of Political Will'

LD251436 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 24 Jul 87

["Top Priority" program presented by Pavel Kuznetsov with Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov, not further identified]

[Text] [Kuznetsov] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. Time for Top Priority, a weekly panel discussion of major world events. I'm Pavel Kuznetsov your host, sitting in for Vladimir Pozner, who is off on a short vacation. Together with me are our usual panel, Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov.

In his replies to the Indonesian newspaper, MERDEKA, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has said that having taken into account the concerns of the Asian countries, the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to eliminate all of its medium-range missiles in the Asian part. In other words, he said, we'll proceed from the concept of a global double zero. Well, the question, the problem of whether the United States and the Soviet Union should retain 100 warheads each in Soviet Asia and on U.S. territory, respectively, has been the subject of a heated debate at the Geneva arms control talks for some time now, with the United States backing the view that there should be a global ban on such missiles. In fact, some time ago there was even a strong-worded statement from Washington saying that there would be no Soviet-American summit this fall if we, that is, the Soviets, do not accept this global ban.

So I'd like one of you to start the ball rolling by saying what is it that our offer reflects, represents: yet another concession to the American side, or perhaps an effort to put the Geneva arms control talks now stalled back on track, or what? Professor Bogdanov.

[Bogdanov] Pavel, Pavel, I'm frankly very much excited by this latest news. I feel that behind your question there's another question which you, to my mind, you didn't dare to (?formulate) it, formulate it. Clearly, you mean to say that what you call an offer, you had in mind a Soviet concession, I'm sorry that, that...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Yeah, well I mentioned this word, does this represent a Soviet concession?

[Bogdanov] Yeah, you put it very elegantly, yeah, you put it very elegantly, Soviet offer.

[Kuznetsov] No, I can't accept this accusation, (?You're) beating round the bush (?I said) yet another Soviet concession. OK.

[Bogdanov] Yeah, that, that, that was my feeling.

[Kuznetsov] OK, OK, all right, go ahead.

[Bogdanov] If you look at that Soviet offer, and it's really an offer, as just Soviet-American business that they're discussing in Geneva, you may be right. It looks like a concession. But I believe you would be very wrong to do that because it's high time, not only in that case but in any other cases, to fix all in the framework of the overall international relations with a very clear understanding, that the Soviet-American relations are just a part, very important but just a part of the bigger structure of the international relations, and in that bigger structure. Pacific and Asian countries play such an important role and have such an important perspective that, of course, you have to mind about this very seriously.

And as general secretary put it recently, he had a number of approaches from the Pacific and Asian countries caring about their security and asking us to settle that problem of 100 Soviet warheads and 100 American warheads. Just to satisfy them, to accommodate their wishes, the secretary general took that decision. We don't link that to the American nuclear capabilities in Korea, on Philippines, and so on and so on.

And, and you didn't mention that we are not dealing only with INF but that (?termination) of tactical missiles too. So you have a real double global zero. Of course, there is one point, you may call it a condition, whatever it is, the general secretary says provided the American side will reciprocate us, and provided (?at least) there is no enhancion [as heard] of American nuclear capabilities in the places where they have it.

[Kuznetsov] Mikhail Gorbachev said that the latest move, our latest move is a part of our program to rid the world of nuclear arms, all nuclear arms, by the year 2000, so I'd like you, Professor Plekhanov, to numerate some of the other provisions contained in the, in those replies by Mikhail Gorbachev. Dealing with other problems of arms control in that very important area, I agree with Professor Bogdanov 100 percent on that.

[Plekhanov] Yes, actually I think the best way to understand this offer by Mikhail Gorbachev is to view it in the context of the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region. I recall a conversation I had with (Walter Hinkle), who was governor of Alaska, was in the 1970's, then he was secretary of the interior in the Nixon administration, now he's one of the major oil developers in Alaska. And he came to the Soviet Union, and he's interested in fostering cooperation, economic, technical cooperation between western states of the United States and the Soviet Far East. And he said: look, the importance of this area, the Pacific Basin, is growing, but people still keep looking at it as a back door, and they keep viewing the Atlantic, Europe and the Atlantic as a front door. We must stop looking, looking at the Pacific as a back door. It is increasingly getting to be the front door in terms of the development, the rates of economic development...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] Maybe not the front door, but the main gate. [laughter]

[Plekhanov] The main gate, maybe one of the main gates. And I think that this business with the 100 warheads belongs to this context rather than the offshoot. It's not an offshoot of the European, just the European talks. It's the start of a new, well actually not really a start, but a continuation of our new more vigorous, more active peace policy in the Asia-Pacific. And therefore this idea about those warheads is complemented by three other proposals.

[Kuznetsov] Aha, what are they?

[Plekhanov] One is basically a freeze on all other nuclear armaments, American and Soviet, in the area. That has to do primarily with the nuclear capable aircraft, the aircraft armed with nuclear weapons. We have them in the area, the United States has them, and we offer that we not increase those armaments. And we also regulate and control the activities of other armed forces, primarily the navies, the naval activities, exercises and so on, the deployments of naval forces in the Pacific in such a manner that we reduce to the minimum the risk of military conflict. Thirdly, there is the renewed call for a conference, an international conference on security in the Indian Ocean, demilitarizing the Indian Ocean. That is now a focus of increased international interest and great alarm in connection with the Persian Gulf.

And we are all for calling a conference, a United Nations conference, and there is such a resolution at the UN calling for such a conference in 1988 which would provide for, for a safer and more peaceful Indian Ocean. And fourthly, Mikhail Gorbachev reiterated our intent to press for a ban on all nuclear testing, and that is an issue which is especially sensitive to the people in the Pacific because some of the worst tests are being conducted there.

[Kuznetsov] Yeah, by France. Now let's touch upon the first reactions to the Soviet move. Overall the feeling was rather positive. Well, it was welcomed as good news that is supposed to put the Geneva arms control talks back on track, that it brings an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States closer, although it does not clear the way for an agreement, as THE TIMES of London put it. In Washington, White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater treated the news also -- he put what I would say is a spoonful of tar in his bucket of honey by saying that, well, in the past the United States has seen very positive statements from the Soviet Union only to find out later on that they contain some unacceptable conditions for the United States. Do the Soviet offers now contain any...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] Pavel, Pavel, I'm not surprised at all. I would have been surprised if Mr Fitzwater put it differently, that they accept Soviet offer. You have to deal with some very funny (?cycle). They suggest something, then they try to find out reasons to kill their own proposals. At any Soviet offer they react in that way. Yes maybe it's OK, but let's wait (?and look). Let's study the offer because my impression is that still they have such powerful antidisarmament forces within this administration, and they still have to strike a deal among themselves. That's why Mr Fitzwater was putting in that very ambiguous way. I'm not surprised, I'm not surprised.

[Plekhanov] You know, according to the literature on the history of this zero option, which was first proposed by the Americans in 1981, you know, all the available information is that when they did put that proposal on the table, they were certain that the Russians would never take it, and I think that at least for some people in the administration, the very fact that the Russians did take that proposal up immediately makes that proposal unacceptable. I mean, if you pressed for something that you thought the other side would not accept and then the other side does accept it, your first reaction is: wait a minute, let me see, let me think now.

[Kuznetsov] OK, we've touched upon the Soviet role in promoting the Geneva arms control talks. I'd like to take a look at the other side, what the other side is doing, has been doing in fact. For example, on 17 July, while in Washington on a 1-day visit, Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, said in part that great changes are taking place in the world, including historic changes in the Soviet Union. Since both leaders discussed arms control and, in particular, the issue of INF, I think that the words about unprecedented opportunity existing these days refer to the burning issues of arms control. But, at the same time, what surprises me is that, according to reports from Britain, they are about to complete the construction of yet another military base to station 64 Tomahawk nuclear-tipped American cruise missiles. So, if there is unprecedented opportunity, why continue with that base? Why not freeze it and wait for the outcome of the Geneva talks?

[Bogdanov] You, as usual, you have to deal with double standards. One standard for the Soviet Union, the other one for the Western world. And what they mean by unprecedented opportunity, what they mean by that, the opportunity for them, or the opportunity for us, and the opportunity for both of us. If you talk about the opportunity for one side, maybe you are right, building up this base. But if you mean the opportunity for both, then of course, it's really wrong move which makes the other side really suspicious about the real moves of the others, and that would be my answer to that.

[Kuznetsov] During the period of a temporary impasse at Geneva, and I think you know, there were a number of theories making rounds in the West concerning the intentions of Moscow with regard to the problem of the elimination of medium- and shorter-range weapons, and one of the theories was that the Soviet Union has cooled to the idea of a summit with Washington, and, therefore, it's just played for time and just kept waiting. What do you think of that?

[Plekhanov] I think the latest move by the Soviet Union just pulls the rug from under this idea, because it shows that we continue to press for an agreement, we continue to be constructive and flexible, and whatever happens in Washington is up to Washingtonians, Americans to decide. This has been our position on a constant base. If you recall the Watergate crisis, for instance, despite all the difficulties that were on the American side, that did not cause us to raise the level of our demands. That would be like, that would be contrary to the ethic of intergovernmental relations. The issues which are on the table are important enough, you know, to survive any administration, and you know, whatever happens with the Reagan administration, it's their problem.

[Kuznetsov] Yeah, by mentioning Watergate you came close to the second theory that was, and continues to be popular actually to this day, and it goes like: the President, the administration has been terribly weakened by the Iran-Contras scandal, and the Soviet Union would not like to bolster the image of the President, to throw him a lifejacket in the form of an INF accord. But what do you think about this theory?

[Bogdanov] I'm in a difficulty to give you an honest answer because...

[Kuznetsov] Why? Give us a dishonest answer then.

[Bogdanov] No, I wouldn't like to be dishonest with you, but frankly...

[Kuznetsov] Some kind of an answer then.

[Bogdanov] Frankly if I say that we are so much enthusiastic about helping this administration it would be very much dishonest about it. This administration, well, what for we should help them for what we have witnessed for the last 7 years, I don't know. But that's a rather emotional side of the story than practical. We have put it very clearly; this is a political reality, this administration. You like it or dislike it, you have to deal, and we have taken a firm decision to deal with them. But emotional side is little bit different thing. Whether we like them or dislike. I personally dislike them very much.

[Kuznetsov] Yeah, in other words, you've, what you've just said is that an arms control agreement is not a lifejacket, is not a gift to anybody. It's just...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] No, no, no. Look, we should be beyond that. We should. Arms control, that's the thing given by God to all of us, not to this administration.

[Kuznetsov] Yeah, Yeah, and just in case President Reagan benefits from it, it's beyond our business.

[Bogdanov] It's beyond our business, he's not benefiting. Peoples are benefiting from that, that's our view.

[Kuznetsov] Would you agree with that?

[Plekhanov] Yeah, I agree with that. And if the President does benefit from it, well, that would be for a change one honest benefit that we would have earned.

[Kuznetsov] As time's running out on us, I'd like you to sum up your impressions of the current situation. Your feelings about, well I'm not asking you to make any predictions, but to say what you feel about the prospects for an INF accord now that the ...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Well, I think that the prospects have improved, but yet it's -- I feel reluctant to say -- oh well, now everything's OK. And one reason is that the INF agreement, the importance, the priority of it is somewhat lesser now in Washington than it used to be. Do you agree with that?

[Bogdanov] I agree with that and I always keep in mind the real capability of this administration to deliver, are they able, yet able to deliver?

[Kuznetsov] What is the major roadblock now, this is my final question. Your view?

[Plekhanov] Well, there is that question of 72 Pershing 1A's stationed in West Germany, armed with American nuclear warheads. The missiles are controlled by the West German...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] Sergey, I'm not in agreement with you. I believe that the main block is on their lack of political will.

[Plekhanov] Yeah, that's right.

[Bogdanov] That's, that's what it is.

[Plekhanov] Politically, of course.

[Kuznetsov] So, if I am allowed, if you allow me to sum it up, the ball is in the American court now.

[Plekhanov] Oh, absolutely.

[Bogdanov] Yes, I think so.

[Kuznetsov] Thank you very much, Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov, for taking part in our program. I'm Pavel Kuznetsov, your host on Top Priority signing off 'til next week at the same time on the same wavelength. Goodbye.

Obukhov News Conference

PM271205 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general headline "Real Basis for Agreement": "News Conference in Geneva"]

[Text] Geneva, 25 Jul -- A news conference held at the USSR's permanent mission in Geneva was devoted to an explanation of the main points of the interview given by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA.

As A.A. Obukhov, deputy head of the USSR delegation at the talks on nuclear and space armaments with the United States, stressed, M.S. Gorbachev has unveiled a major new initiative on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Asia. Yesterday the Soviet side submitted this new version for examination. "We believe," the Soviet representative said, "that these proposals will enable considerable progress to be made at the talks on the package of medium-range and operational and tactical missile questions. All the far-fetched obstacles raised at the talks by the U.S. side should now disappear." The Soviet decision envisages the complete elimination of medium-range and operational tactical missile warheads, including the U.S. warheads for the Pershing-1A operational and tactical missiles belonging to the FRG. The production of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles would end. In other words, the Soviet side believes that a global zero option on USSR and U.S. medium-range and operational and tactical missiles really should mean zero. There should be no substitute. Thanks to the Soviet initiatives submitted in the past and now, a real prospect is opening up for working out a draft treaty on the complete elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range and operational-tactical missiles in the very near future.

Yu.K. Nazarkin, head of the USSR delegation at the Geneva disarmament conference, highlighted the fact that M.S. Gorbachev's interview touched on a whole series of other arms limitation and disarmament questions, including those which are being examined at the conference -- the banning of nuclear explosions, the banning and elimination of chemical weapons, the prevention of the arms race in space, and so forth. The Soviet Union takes a constructive stance on all these questions in its attempt to conclude concrete agreements.

AFP Cites Obukhov

AU241512 Paris AFP in English 1450GMT 24 Jul 87

[Text] Geneva, July 24 (AFP) -- A Soviet negotiator here on Friday decried U.S. verification proposals for the elimination of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) as overcomplicated and unfair.

The official, Aleksey Obukhov, in a news conference, was amplifying two of the four conditions spelled out by the Soviet Armed Forces Chief of Staff Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev Thursday to a Soviet proposal for an INF withdrawal, not only in Europe but also in Asia. That proposal had been made by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in an interview with an Indonesian newspaper, made late Wednesday.

The Soviet official also reiterated Moscow's insistence that the U.S. withdraw its warheads from the West Germany Army's 72 Pershing 1-A missiles. Washington on Thursday rejected that precondition, set out by Marshal Akhromeyev.

Mr. Obukhov said that the verification of an accord for the elimination of medium-range missiles would pose problems in transporting verification equipment to where it was needed and regarding access to sites. He said that U.S. proposals for verifying the elimination of INF were "overcomplicated" and would take "at least a year to be accomplished."

Mr. Obukhov's U.S. counterpart Maynard Glitman said last month that verification was the "principal" obstacle to a U.S.-Soviet INF accord. INF, or medium-range nuclear missiles, are defined as those with ranges of between 500 and 5,000 kilometers (310 and 3,100 miles). They are divided into Longer-range (LRINF) and Shorter-range (SRINF) sub-categories. INF are generally contrasted with the long range strategic weapons, which are capable of hitting any part of each superpower's territory from the other.

The Soviet negotiator also said on Friday that the U.S. proposals on verification were "not equal."

"The inspection rights for U.S. inspectors will be much more than the rights given to Soviet inspectors in Western Europe."

Mr. Obukhov expressed surprise at Washington's rejection of the condition on the West German Pershings. The missiles themselves are West German property, while only the nuclear warheads belong to the U.S. Washington regards the warheads as outside the scope of the Geneva negotiations, as they involve a third nation. Mr. Obukhov said that the U.S. delegation had "no reason to be surprised" at the condition.

An agreement on the total elimination of INF, which retained the warheads on the West German Pershings would be "unrealistic," Mr. Obukhov said. Asked about a possible compromise on the warheads, the Soviet negotiator said that Moscow had brought to the negotiating table a proposal opening the way for an agreement on the "double zero" option -- covering both LRINF and SRINF. He said it was up to Washington to say whether or not it agreed and called on the United States to stop raising "artificial obstacles."

In his four conditions, Marshal Akhromeyev said Moscow demanded there should be no conversion of Pershing-2 missiles into Pershing-1's or transfers of land-based cruise missiles onto warships. He demanded the liquidation of all SRINF missiles on both sides -- including the warheads on the West German Pershing 1A's.

The Soviet Armed Forces chief called for a reduction on the basis of step by step equality in INF forces and said that verification procedures had to be "effective, real" and equal for both sides.

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SHEVARDNADZE DISCUSSES MISSILES WITH FOREIGN ENVOYS

British Ambassador

LD251521 Moscow TASS in English 1414 GMT 25 Jul 87

[Excerpt] Moscow, 25 Jul (TASS)--Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Foreign Minister of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze received Britain's ambassador in Moscow Bryan George Cartledge at the latter's request on 24 July.

The British Ambassador handed over a personal message of the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev. In the course of the talk principal attention was paid to prospects of attaining a Soviet-American agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles at the Geneva negotiations.

Eduard Shevardnadze noted that the new Soviet proposal which opened up the way to a global ban on these armaments, created good opportunities for completing the work on drafting a relevant treaty within a brief timeframe. The main task now is not to complicate the course of the negotiations, to display the utmost good will and political realism.

Underlined in this connection was the need for physical liquidation on both sides of all relevant missiles and warheads, including American nuclear war heads to shorter-range "Pershing 1A" missiles which belong to the FRG. A reliable control over destruction of medium-range missiles and shorter-range missiles and also their warheads should be ensured.

Paying enhanced attention at the negotiations on nuclear and space armaments to the problem of liquidation of medium-range and shorter-range missiles, the minister said, the Soviet Union is not changing its principled stand, with the priority significance being attached, as before, to the task of reduction and liquidation of offensive armaments and also the question of preservation and consolidation of the ABM Treaty.

CSSR Envoy

PM271451 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Ambassadors Received"]

[Excerpts] E.A. Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR foreign minister, received J. Rehorek, CSSR ambassador to the USSR, 24 July at the latter's request.

During the discussion of the situation in Europe both sides expressed profound concern at the position adopted by the United States and the FRG with regard to Pershing-1A missiles. It was stressed that the intention to retain the Europe U.S. nuclear warheads intended for Pershing-1A missiles runs fundamentally counter to the task of eliminating medium-range and operational and tactical missiles -- a task which, judging by its statements, the U.S. side shares.

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: FURTHER ON ISSUE OF FRG PERSHING 1-As

Karpov Urges 'Genuine Zero Option'

LD291652 Moscow TASS in English 1644 GMT 29 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 29 TASS -- "In the question of the Pershing-1A missiles the American side and the other NATO countries for that matter are often engaged in a substitution of terms", the TASS diplomatic correspondent was told by Viktor Karpov, head of the directorate on problems of arms limitation and disarmament of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"The Soviet Union is not raising the question of eliminating the West German Pershing-1A missiles. It raises the question of the need to eliminate all American and Soviet nuclear warheads for theatre missiles, a class of weapons to which Pershing-1 missiles of all modifications belong".

"It is not the Soviet side, and I want to emphasize this, that invented the problem of theatre missiles", Viktor Karpov said further. "That was an initiative of the United States. This question was raised with particular persistence by the U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz during his visit to Moscow in April of this year. We responded to the American proposal and proposed to liquidate not only medium-range but also theatre missiles. Moreover, we are speaking of a global elimination of American and Soviet missiles of these classes. And this automatically implies the destruction of all nuclear warheads, both for medium-range and theatre missiles".

"Nothing is changed by the fact that in addition to warheads for its own missiles the American side possesses a certain number of warheads for West German missiles. These are American and not West German warheads. Washington cannot deny this. If the United States handed over to West Germany the warheads for the Pershing-1A missiles it would violate a provision of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty which prohibits nuclear powers from handing over their nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries, and not just into their ownership but also under their control. It is important to note that the FRG too would violate Article Two of this treaty if it were to accept into its ownership or under its control the said American warheads".

"With due account for this the United States has stopped using the thesis that these warheads belong to a third country because thereby Washington would have admitted the fact of its violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. So as a result American representatives are saying clearly insupportable things to the effect that the West German missiles are supposedly obsolete and should cause no worry since they will die off by themselves. And if this is so, they reason, there is no need at all to speak about American warheads for these missiles", Viktor Karpov said further.

"But it is necessary to talk about them because a genuine 'global double zero' provides for the elimination of all American and Soviet nuclear warheads for medium-range and theatre missiles", the Soviet expert said.

U.S. Position 'Unchanged'

LD291917 Moscow TASS in English 1848 GMT 29 Jul 87

[Text] Washington July 29 TASS -- Marlin Fitzwater, an official White House spokesman, told a briefing today that the U.S. Administration's stand on the West German "Pershing-1A" missiles, the nuclear warheads to which are stored in the U.S. bases, remained unchanged.

We are not negotiating weapons systems of third countries, he said.

The aim of this manoeuvre by Washington is to preserve in Europe its nuclear warheads designed for the theatre Pershing-1A missiles, which are nominally among the arms of the FRG.

Fitzwater also said that the Reagan administration remained committed to the SDI programme and was resolved to carry on its implementation.

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW BROADCAST TO CHINA ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN ASIA

OW231143 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0300 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Alekseyev commentary from the "World Today" program]

[Text] A year ago, Soviet leader Gorbachev expounded on the basic principle of the USSR's Asian policy in a speech delivered in Vladivostok. In that speech, he stressed that our country strives for the total destruction of nuclear weapons in the Asian-Pacific region. How is this principle reconciled with the present stance of the Soviet Union toward the medium-range missiles in Asia? To answer this question, our station's observer Alekseyev makes the following comments:

As everyone knows, the Soviet Union holds that after reaching an agreement on the medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States can each keep 100 medium-range missile warheads, and these warheads can be deployed in the Asian part of our country and the continental United States, respectively. Yet, the West has made every effort to distort the Soviet stance. Some have said that the Soviet Union wants to deploy medium-range missiles in Asia as a threat to China. There is no need to prove that this assertion is absolutely untenable. Both the Soviet Union and China are socialist countries longing for peace and therefore have built their relations on the principled foundation of good-neighborliness and cooperation. These relations continue to be strengthened and broadened. Is it that the imperialist bloc, resentful of this positive course in the Soviet-Chinese relations, is trying to slander the Soviet intention by taking advantage of the issue on medium-range missiles in Asia? The Soviet Union has advocated and continues to advocate the solution of the issue on medium-range missiles on a global scale. Our leaders have unequivocally talked about this on numerous occasions. Of course, our starting point is that the balance of forces must be maintained and that neither side should gain military superiority.

As emphasized by Soviet leader Gorbachev in his Vladivostok speech, at present and in the days to come, we will do nothing more than meet the needs of our national defense, the protection of our allies, and the minimum requirements we have set in consideration of the U.S. military activities near our border. Should the United States remove its nuclear weapons from Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, the Soviet Union will agree to destroy all its medium-range missiles and withdraw its carrier fleets beyond the limit agreed upon. On the other hand, of course, no medium-range missiles should be kept in the continental United States. Only such a totally reciprocal plan can ensure equal security on both sides. Any other methods will increase the danger of nuclear clashes, and that will not be in the interest of the Asian people.

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET AMBASSADOR PRAISES AUSTRALIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO ARMS PROPOSAL

BK230920 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0830 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Excerpt] The Soviet ambassador to Australia, Dr Samoteykin, said Australian submissions had played a part in Moscow's latest offer to scrap all medium-range missiles in Soviet Asia. Dr Samoteykin told a news conference in Canberra that Soviet and Australian positions on many nuclear disarmament issues were very close. From Canberra, Graeme Dobell reports:

[Begin recording] [Dobell] Dr Samoteykin said Australia had expressed anxiety about the Soviet Union retaining medium-range missiles in Asia. The prime minister, Mr Hawke, had put this concern to the Soviet foreign minister, Mr Shevardnadze, in talks in Canberra in March. The Soviet ambassador said that Mr Gorbachev's latest offer to scrap the Asian missiles was to some extent a result of the consultations with Australia. [Unidentified person] We took into consideration [words indistinct] the other neighboring countries that are much more closer than Australia, of course. But (?voice of) Australia was [words indistinct].

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: INF INITIATIVE NOT LINKED TO U.S. ARMS IN JAPAN

OW241125 Tokyo KYODO in English 1115 GMT 24 Jul 87

[Text] Tokyo, July 24 KYODO -- The Soviet Union does not link its missile reduction initiative with nuclear arms which the United States allegedly deploys in Japan, a Soviet Embassy official said Friday.

Counsellor Aleksandr Panov was referring at a press briefing to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal Tuesday to remove medium-range missiles not only from Europe but also from Asia.

Gorbachev said the Soviet Union does not link the initiative with the U.S. nuclear presence in South Korea, the Philippines and on Diego Garcia in the India Ocean, but did not refer to Japan.

Panov said the Soviet Union has made a large concession to the United States so that the two countries can achieve a concrete result in their arms control negotiations in Geneva.

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S KOHL WELCOMES GORBACHEV INF STANCE

LD231735 Hamburg DPA in German 1713 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] Bonn, (DPA) — Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has welcomed the Soviet Union's readiness for a worldwide zero solution in the sphere of medium-range nuclear missiles. Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost stated in Bonn today that Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has thus met a Western proposal to that effect. It was important for the West that the verification of an agreement on medium-range weapons be eased and the security of its friends and allies in Asia increased.

According to Ost, Gorbachev's statement strengthens the chancellor in his expectation that an agreement will be possible before the end of this year.

Speaking about the Soviets' demand for the destruction of the U.S. warheads for the Bundeswehr's 72 Pershing-1A missiles, government spokesman Friedhelm Ost stated that the Geneva medium-range negotiations [as received] deal only with United States and Soviet systems, not the weapons of third states or existing joint arrangements. For this reason, the United States resolutely rejected the inclusion of the Bundeswehr's Pershing-1A missiles when the Soviet Union added that demand a few months ago. Ost added: "This clear stand of the United States is supported unanimously by the Federal Government and by the Alliance as a whole."

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CSO, 5200/2578

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S GENSCHER WELCOMES GORBACHEV'S DISARMAMENT OFFER

LD230854 Hamburg DPA in German 0758 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA) — Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has welcomed the declared willingness of Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev for the worldwide removal of longer-range medium-range missiles. The Soviet Union has taken a substantial step forward with this, Genscher said in Bonn on Thursday. This will make it easier to resolve the problem of verification.

Genscher recalled that at his meeting in Moscow with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze he had already advocated such an agreement for a global zero option that goes beyond Reykjavik. This solution was also among the topics discussed recently with the Bulgarian and Hungarian foreign ministers. The Foreign Ministry said that the Hungarian foreign minister had already announced this Soviet step at his meeting with Genscher in Bremen on Tuesday and Wednesday.

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CSO: 5200/2573

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG SEES PERSHING REMOVAL AS NATO MOVE

LD241346 Hamburg DPA in German 1232 GMT 24 Jul 87

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA) — The Federal Government does not see the 72 Pershing-1A's in the FRG's possession as just a means of preserving the credibility of the Western strategy of deterrence. Under given circumstances it would also be prepared to include the controversial missile system as negotiating material in a global disarmament treaty that would limit the invasion capacity of the Warsaw Pact states. This emerges from explanations by the Bonn Defense Ministry spokesman Horst Prayon today at the federal press conference in Bonn.

The key question in Bonn's strategy considerations is therefore not specific weapon systems but the maintenance of options for the security of the FRG as part of the Western alliance. The continued existence of the Pershing system might contribute to "making the Soviets more flexible in removing their attack capability." If Moscow reduced its aggressive potential "then the Pershing-1A's are no problem as far as we are concerned," Prayon said in response to numerous questions from journalists.

But the Federal Government sees the removal of the Pershings not as a national question but as a decision that would have to be made jointly by NATO. This aspect was also pointed out by government spokesman Friedhelm Ost, who had already welcomed the most recent proposal by Soviet General secretary Mikhail Gorbachev for a worldwide zero solution for medium-range missiles on the previous day. [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/2578

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG DAILY, PERSHING'S COULD BE SCRAPPED

DW261120 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 25 Jul 87 p 3

[Article by "Moe": "Scrap Value"]

[Text] Everybody in Bonn applauded when Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to the worldwide elimination of all medium-range weapons with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 km. Even Alfred Dregger. However, qualifying his initial reaction, he said he suspected that the USSR would also want to include the U.S. warheads for the 72 West German Pershing 1-A missiles -- something it has done, meanwhile.

In that respect, a change of policy seems to be in the offing because it would of course be impossible now to justify the fact that the first real mutual nuclear disarmament agreement failed by the Bundeswehr's 72 launching pads. Our security could not be crucially affected because military experts have confirmed that the Pershing 1-A's are not in keeping with the latest technological developments and will be totally obsolete in 5 years at the latest.

In view of that fact, the Federal Republic has little latitude in the attempt to make the Soviets agree to an at least partial dismantling of their conventional superiority in return for our giving up that weapons system. The now envisaged dismantling of all medium-range missile also makes it impossible in 5 years to renew the Pershing 1-A's from U.S. stocks. So why should we stick to a weapons system which before long will only be of scrap value?

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CSO. 5200/2578

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG: DIE WELT VIEWS SOVIET CAMPAIGN ON PERSHING 1-A'S

DW261145 Bonn DIE WELT in German 25 Jul 87 p 2

[Ruediger Moniac article: "Initial Nervousness"]

[Excerpts] Moscow is now increasingly emphasizing specific factors of the Geneva missile negotiations in public and thus makes it clear that it intends to wage a war of nerves about the Geneva negotiations. The Soviets are bringing the Pershing 1-A missiles into the focus of their psychological campaign. Beside the solution to three other "main problems" which according to Moscow's reading cause the negotiations to get deadlocked, Soviet Chief of General Staff Akhromeyev urged in particular the elimination of U.S. nuclear warheads that in the event of war would be used for the German Pershing 1-A missiles. [passage omitted]

Moscow wants to create an atmosphere in the alliance to the effect that the negotiations should not be allowed to fail because of the Germans. That would be like opening a gate of incursion:

The Soviets would have succeeded overnight in making the Americans generally negotiate with them on third countries' weapons systems. Based on their understanding of state sovereignty, the nuclear powers France and Britain cannot accept that. Paris and London are therefore watching the war of nerves about Bonn with substantial concern. The Germans, however, are less under allied pressure than under pressure from their own ranks. FDP Secretary-General Hausmann has already signalled initial readiness to give in. The government should counteract such tendencies in time.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRENCH DAILY VIEWS LATEST SOVIET ARMS PROPOSALS

PM241014 Paris LE MONDE in French 24 Jul 87 p 1

[Editorial: "No More SS-20 Missiles in Asia?"]

[Text] Mr Gorbachev is not prepared to allow the Geneva negotiations on the INF to become bogged down — a risk which the two main negotiators themselves recently discussed in the press. In an interview to an Indonesian newspaper, "Mr Yes" removed a major obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement. His statements will probably have to be confirmed at the negotiating table, but the Soviet leader states very clearly that he is prepared to abandon the idea of a residual contingent of 33 SS-20 missiles (100 warheads) in the Asian part of the USSR, and any other shorter-range missile, contrary to his previous demands.

It is true that this residual contingent has not been finally rejected by the Americans: In Reykjavik last October, Mr Reagan accepted the Soviet demand which meant a substantial concession from Moscow (there are at present more than 170 SS-20 missiles in Asia, in addition to which there are around 40 shorter-range SS-22 and SS-23 missiles). But these remaining missiles were behind many of the complications which arose recently.

First, they made the monitoring problem more difficult. The United States pointed out that it was more difficult to verify an agreement on partial reduction than a treaty on total liquidation. It will therefore probably now be able to accept provisions which are less tough.

Second, the two sides were arguing about where this residual

arsenal would be deployed. Probably with the aim of increasing its pressure on the USSR, the United States was claiming the right to deploy its 100 warheads (probably Pershing 2 or Cruise missiles) anywhere on its territory, including Alaska. The Soviet Union refused to be exposed in this way. This problem will, therefore, be settled with the establishment of what Mr Gorbachev calls the "global double zero option," in other words the dismantling of all such weapons everywhere.

In these circumstances, the main obstacle is now on the Western side, with the U.S. refusal to discuss the Pershing 1-A missiles which it has handed over to the FRG. The Soviets are demanding that the agreement should cover if not these missiles, at least their nuclear warheads which are still under U.S. Government control and ownership. The United States argues that it cannot discuss forces belonging to third countries, but its argument is not very convincing. Has not Moscow threatened to do likewise and hand over to Prague and East Berlin some of its missiles which would be affected by the zero option?

Mr Gorbachev had hitherto seemed rather hampered by his demand to keep some nuclear missiles in Asia, which conflicted with his desire for complete denuclearization and was probably imposed by his military chiefs. He has now shaken off this constraint and is more easily able to ask Washington to go the rest of the way and is probably more likely to be heeded. Indeed, it would be very surprising if Ronald Reagan has abandoned the idea of having the summit and "historic" agreement which he wants with the Soviet leader at the end of the year.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

GREEK GOVERNMENT WELCOMES GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

NC231146 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 1100 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] The Greek Government approves of any initiative or proposal aimed at partial or general disarmament. This was stressed by Soterios Kostopoulos, press and information secretary general, when responding to a question from a foreign correspondent about the Greek Government's view of yesterday's proposal by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev for double and zero options world-wide.

Gorbachev's proposal, Kostopoulos added, complies with the goal of eliminating U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles. The idea for the initial zero option, as well as the double option, enjoys the unreserved support of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and the other leaders of the Group of Six, Kostopoulos noted.

The efforts and pressure of the leaders of the Group on both parties seem to be bearing fruits. Specifically, they ask that the medium-range weapons of the two superpowers be withdrawn following an agreement that will also include an element of verification.

Kostopoulos concluded: The Greek Government believes that (?such) an agreement is a first step toward complete nuclear disarmament.

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CSO: 5200/2579

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA: USSR READY TO 'ACCOMMODATE ASIAN COUNTRIES'

OW230002 Beijing XINHUA in English 2343 GMT 22 Jul 87

["Gorbachev: Moscow Ready To Reach Agreement With U.S. on Worldwide Elimination of INF" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Moscow, July 22 (XINHUA) -- Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev today said his country is prepared to reach an agreement with the United States on eliminating their medium- and shorter-range missiles not only in Europe but also in Asia. He said the Soviet Union is prepared to do this "in an effort to accommodate the Asian countries and take into account their concerns."

The Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to remove their medium-range missiles from Europe, and each side maintains 100 nuclear warheads to be deployed respectively in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and U.S. territory.

Asian countries are against the deal and demand that the two superpowers also eliminate their medium-range missiles in Asia.

NATO defense ministers also proposed at a meeting held in May that the Soviet Union remove all its SS-20 missiles from Asia and the superpowers eliminate all their medium-range missiles.

In an interview with Burhanuddin Mohammad Diah, publisher and editor-in-chief of the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA, Gorbachev said the Soviet leadership has considered the Asian countries' wishes "with all seriousness and responsibility" and Moscow is now prepared to agree to eliminate all of its medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the country as well. Gorbachev added that his country is prepared to do this, "provided, of course, that the United States does the same."

"Shorter-range missiles will also be eliminated," Gorbachev said in the interview which was broadcast by the Soviet Central Television and the official news agency TASS tonight.

"In other words, we will proceed from the concept of a global double zero," he said.

The Soviet leader told Burhanuddin Mohammad Diah in the Kremlin that this time the Soviet Union does not link the concept with the U.S. nuclear presence in South Korea, the Philippines and on Diego Garcia, the Indian Ocean. "We would like to hope, though, that it, at least, will not grow," Gorbachev said.

In a speech made on May 20 Gorbachev said his country would agree to dismantle all its 100 medium-range missiles in Asia if Washington withdraws its nuclear weapons from Asia.

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CSO: 5200/4013

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA ON U.S. REACTION TO PROGRESS IN GENEVA

USSR Avoids Key Issues

OW220946 Beijing XINHUA in English 0937 GMT 22 Jul 87

[Text] Washington, July 21 (XINHUA) -- A high-ranking U.S. official today accused the Soviet Union of "putting on the brakes" at the Geneva arms control talks and declared that the United States will not "succumb" to Soviet attempts to get an agreement that is not in the interests of the West.

In a commentary carried in THE NEW YORK TIMES, U.S. chief arms negotiator Max Kampelman asserted that in recent weeks, the Soviet effort in Geneva to work out an agreement "has come to a virtual halt" not only in terms of intermediate-range forces (INF), but also in the negotiations on strategic arms (START).

He charged that the Soviets have "raised the last-minute issue of the German Pershings (missiles)" and "held back vital details of their position on verification".

"They have refused not only to face up to the key remaining issues in INF, but they are not addressing START reductions or seriously facing the other central elements in our relationship," he said.

Kampelman defended, among other things, U.S. insistence that it be allowed to retain 100 warheads on medium-range missiles in Alaska after concluding an INF treaty. He said that the problem was the result of Soviet refusal to eliminate medium-range weapons globally.

If the Soviet Union agrees to a "global zero", he said, then the problem would "disappear".

Kampelman told Moscow that while the United States is ready to address the remaining differences in a "constructive manner", it will "not succumb to last-minute Soviet tactics designed to produce agreements not in our security interests".

"The Soviets should not miscalculate," he warned.

U.S. Lauds USSR Acceptance

OW230618 Beijing XINHUA in English 0610 GMT 23 Jul 87

["U.S. Welcomes Soviet Acceptance of "Global Double Zero" Option on Medium- and Shorter-range Missiles" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, July 22 (XINHUA) -- The United States today welcomed Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement on eliminating the two superpowers' medium- and shorter-range missiles.

"We welcome reports of Soviet acceptance of the President's proposal for the global elimination of U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF missiles initially made in November of 1981," White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said in a statement issued late this afternoon.

He said Gorbachev also indicated that he is prepared to agree to the global elimination of shorter-range INF missiles. The United States made such a proposal on June 16, he recalled.

The latest Soviet announcement "gives us some reason for encouragement in terms of a final treaty agreement, as well as a possible summit" between Reagan and Gorbachev, Fitzwater said.

But he cautioned that similar Soviet statements in the past have been later coupled with "unacceptable conditions". "We, therefore, look forward to seeing their official statement at the Geneva negotiation."

In an interview with the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA, published by the official Soviet TASS news agency today, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union is prepared to destroy all its medium-range missiles including those in its Asian territory, "provided the United States does the same".

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CSO: 5200/4013

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY URGES INF DESTRUCTION

OW240822 Beijing XINHUA in English 0808 GMT 24 Jul 87

[Text] Beijing, July 24 (XINHUA) -- China has all along held that the security of Europe and that of Asia are equally important and that the medium-range missiles deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union in both Europe and Asia should be totally destroyed.

The spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry made this statement here this afternoon when asked to comment on Soviet leader Gorbachev's recent talk about the question of eliminating all the Soviet medium-range missiles deployed in Asia.

"We have taken note of the remarks made by Soviet leader Gorbachev indicating readiness to eliminate all the Soviet medium-range missiles deployed in Asia and the reaction of the U.S. side," he said.

"We sincerely hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will reach an agreement through serious negotiations and put it into practice, and we welcome such efforts," the Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

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CSO: 5200/4013

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: U.S. 'EXCEPTIONS, EXCLUSIONS' HINDER AGREEMENT

PM231535 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 21 Jul 87 p 3

[Own international observer G. Dadyants: "Vienna: Those to Blame for the Time Lost"]

[Text] After the NATO Council session in Reykjavik optimism regarding the prospects for concluding an agreement on eliminating medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe was clearly generated in the West. The way to resolving the question of medium-range missiles has been cleared, U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz stated. We are on the way to concluding an historic agreement with the Soviet Union, President Reagan echoed him.

U.S. statesmen's feigned optimism regarding the prospects of the Geneva talks on eliminating medium-range missiles has clearly diminished. Pessimism, instead of optimism, is being strenuously generated and it is being claimed that the Geneva talks "have lost momentum" as a result of the "stance adopted by the Soviet delegation."

We will not join in with the U.S. leaders in either ringing the bells of celebration or tolling the death knell but will look first at the diplomatic calendar.

Let us start with the fact that there has been considerable progress made at the eighth round now underway as a result of the major steps our side has made toward meeting our partners half way. Specialists consider that, given further intensive work, a joint draft agreement on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles could be drawn up as early as this fall. But, unfortunately, the clearer "the light at the end of the tunnel" grows, the more obvious the obstacles still impeding an agreement become; it is the U.S., not the Soviet side that has heaped them up.

The Soviet stance on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles is crystal clear -- zero medium-range and zero operational and tactical missiles in Europe. There will be no transferring of missiles to Asia or other "safe" places. All missiles will be subject to destruction under the strictest international and national verification, going as far as on-site inspection. Verification must also apply to the bases where medium-range missiles are or could be sited, their tests sites, and the enterprises where they are built. There must be no loopholes enabling these most destabilizing arms to be retained.

What is the U.S. stance, then? It consists almost entirely of provisos and "exceptions." Elimination of medium-range missiles? Fine, but first you Russians must destroy your SS-20's, then we Americans will start dismantling our Pershing-2's. But is it necessary to dismantle Pershing-2's at all? After all, they can be so easily converted into shorter-range missiles: You merely have to remove the final stage. Verifications? Yes, only not on medium-range missile test sites or U.S. military bases

in third countries which could be connected with medium-range missiles: At best there would be verification allowed around the perimeter of enterprises producing medium-range missiles but without any access by inspectors to the enterprises themselves since they are "private" firms and the U.S. Administration supposedly has no say there....

The impression created is that the United States, which had ceaselessly charged the Soviet Union with "refusing verification," backpedaled on verification questions as soon as the USSR announced that its verification requirements would be of the utmost stringency. But is it simply a matter of verification? Do they not want by this method of "exclusion" to ultimately exclude the agreement itself?

In recent days yet another "exclusion" for operational and tactical missiles has been devised in the West -- a problem regarding Pershing-1A missiles has arisen or, more precisely, been artificially created. These missiles were shipped into Europe by the United States and "handed over" to the FRG. These U.S. missiles are now declared to be "weapons belonging to third countries," which cannot consequently be discussed at the talks. It might even be possible to agree with this argument if the Pershing-1A's existed only in a nonnuclear version. But the nuclear warheads for these missiles, which are categorized as operational and tactical, belong to the Americans and are kept on FRG territory. Perhaps our partners in the Geneva talks are proposing to leave the Pershing-1A's but destroy their nuclear warheads? Certainly not. They want to keep the missiles and their warheads.

Thus, in addition to the French and British nuclear arsenals, they want to add another 72 Pershing-1A's to the total of "third countries' weapons."

You can imagine what would happen if the USSR adopted the U.S. stance. We could, for example, hand over SS-12 missiles to our Warsaw Pact partners, let us say, the GDR or Czechoslovakia, and leave nuclear warheads on their territory. [paragraph continues] The SS-12's, like the Pershing-1A's, would become "third countries' weapons" and be excluded from the agreement. But then it would no longer be an agreement about destroying missiles but an agreement about retaining them. Everything would remain as it was and, even if the threat to Europe did not increase, it would in no way diminish.

U.S. maneuvers around medium-range and operational and tactical missiles are all the more alarming in that they are accompanied by blatant attempts to artificially exacerbate international tension, including tension in Europe.

Therefore, another question has to be asked: Were the U.S. statesmen who are now accusing the Soviet Union of "hampering discussion" really being sincere when they said at the outset that the way to an agreement on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles had been cleared and that they were seeking an "historic agreement" with the Soviet Union? Will not such so-called "exclusions" serve as grounds for frustrating agreement at the last minute? We are already familiar with these U.S. tactics, which were clearly shown during the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Reykjavik.

What we have is a clear lack of realistic policy in the West. The reasons are the same old ones: influential militarist groups' commitment to the arms race and a consequent lack of constructive ideas in ruling NATO circles on how to build East-West relations if confrontation is repudiated.

Nevertheless, we are optimistic rather than pessimistic regarding the problem of nuclear disarmament, but our optimism is based not on propaganda considerations but on a sober estimation of the prevailing international realities and of the need for concrete actions in the spirit of the new political thinking in the nuclear age. We advocate the "double-zero option" without any exclusions and, naturally, are opposed to replacing the logic of the Geneva talks with a disorderly game without rules in which there can be no winners and the whole world can stand to lose.

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: NATO URGED TO ABANDON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

AU221607 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 21 Jul 87 p 6

[Article by NOVOSTI political commentator Spartak Beglov: "How to Stop Loving the Nuclear Bomb; Opinion From Moscow"]

[Text] When the author of these lines visited Geneva 2 months ago, it seemed as though the Soviet-American negotiations on medium-range nuclear missiles were approaching the final tape in an atmosphere of the firm resolve of both delegations to overcome the last obstacles on the road toward agreement. Today, however, nobody could find a reason for optimism.

It is not merely a matter of new tricks, applied by the U.S. side to preserve nuclear warheads for the reduced modifications of Pershing missiles which -- should this be needed -- could be very easily converted from a one-stage to a two-stage variant. Likewise, the escalated demands of military and political figures in the NATO countries to exclude from the reduction the maximum number of nuclear devices in the "European theater" and their efforts to achieve a full rehabilitation of the bomb as the mainstay of NATO strategy have also cast doubt on the fate of this agreement.

U.S. General Bernard Rogers, whose term of office as commander-in-chief of NATO troops terminated only a short time ago, and FRG Defense Minister Manfred Woerner are spreading fear by claiming that the elimination of medium-range and tactical-operational missiles will undermine the very foundations of the strategy of "flexible response." (According to M. Woerner, the arsenal of tactical nuclear devices will then have to be augmented both in the air and on the seas.)

This means that even if the medium-range and tactical-operational missiles are taken out through the front door, the NATO strategy will demand their return through the back door. This again confirms that "nuclear containment" is a vicious circle.

Is there really no way out of it? The Soviet leadership maintains there is. One can get out of this circle by everybody getting rid of the militarized way of thinking. War is far too serious a matter to be entrusted to generals. The bankruptcy of the NATO strategy is due to its totally ignoring the new reality, the reality of the nuclear age. The NATO generals regard Europe merely as a "combat action theater." Favoring the use of nuclear weapons as a means of conducting war, they proceed from the possibility, or inevitability, that they would use these arms first.

To stake all on some "partial" or "preventive" nuclear strike is pure nonsense; after the first use of nuclear arms, the chain reaction of retaliatory strike and counterstrikes will inevitably lead to the activation of strategic nuclear arsenals. The side that will decide to launch the first nuclear strike will itself perish by this

strike, particularly in densely populated Europe. There is no sensible plan for using nuclear arms to win the war. There can be only a suicide plan. However, the NATO strategists have yet another trump card. They claim that the best way to dissuade the Soviets from launching an attack is to keep them ignorant of the West's plans. If we sort out all these things, we will find that there is simply no better way for the influential group of NATO strategists to keep their positions of power and their control over politicians than to fan the smouldering embers of the myth about the "Soviet threat" in any way they can. Were this not so, they would be scarcely making such an effort to show open contempt for the Warsaw Pact's latest proposals to substantially reduce conventional weapons and armed forces, and to adopt equal and mutual commitments to strictly adhere to a defense doctrine that is similar to the doctrine recently affirmed by the representatives of the countries of the socialist community.

In his recent talk with the UN secretary general, Mikhail Gorbachev spoke of the essential need to "get rid of the diktat of the militarist element." The two men spoke of interest in the release of resources for development. The USSR is willing to give up its nuclear status; it calls upon everybody to act according to the principle of sensible sufficiency in the issues of defense and to stop "flirting" with the nuclear bomb.

After getting acquainted with the resolution adopted by the CPSU Central Committee toward the end of June 1987, FRG Foreign Affairs Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher quite rightly appealed to the West not to sit with hands in lap, but to provide an adequate reply to the new Soviet thinking. This, of course, requires both the renunciation of the "nuclear-arms-above-everything" dogma and the ability to get rid of this "love" for the sake of preserving human values.

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS REPORTS CD DISCUSSION ON MEDIUM-RANGE DISARMAMENT

LD240844 Moscow TASS in English 0757 GMT 24 Jul 87

[Text] Geneva July 24 TASS -- The significance of elimination of medium-range missiles in the field of disarmament has taken up a prominent place in the discussion at the conference on disarmament. Belgium's Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans has said that a serious hope for concrete results appeared at the Soviet-American negotiations on that problem. Conclusions of a relevant agreement would mean a substantial reduction of the military potentials at the expense of one type of weapons of mass destruction. Belgium will render every assistance to these negotiations and is ready to take tough measures of control on its territory. Meanwhile the Belgian foreign minister backed the nuclear deterrence concept, motivating [as received] his statement by NATO's known arguments.

The Soviet-American negotiations on medium-range missiles should be supplemented with multilateral efforts within the framework on the conference on disarmament, said David Meiszter, head of the delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic. This is unfortunately being hampered by the stand of a number of Western states which link their security with the outdated nuclear deterrence strategy, though this concept does not add to security but lessens it and escalates the arms race. Addressing the participants in the conference, New Zealand's permanent representative at the U.N. Geneva Bureau Graham Fortune has said that the existence of nuclear weapons imperils national security of every state. New Zealand would welcome the early conclusion of an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on elimination of the medium-range missiles globally. That would be not only a measure of building up confidence but could become a turning point in the arms race, the first agreement on deep reductions of nuclear armaments.

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: CONCERN OVER FRENCH-FRG MILITARY COOPERATION

French Nuclear Weapons

PM241601 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko report: "Brigade, Axis, and Eurodefense"]

[Text] Standing in a tank hatch, French and West German soldiers are embracing. The first says: "Why didn't we think of this before! Together we could have held Indochina and Algeria." The other adds: "...and Alsace and Lotharingia!" That was how the newspaper LIBERATION caricatured the Paris and Bonn decision to create a united military brigade.

Hardly had the news been announced in the two capitals than practical steps followed. A group of French military men arrived in West Germany to hold talks with their Bundeswehr colleagues. They will have to determine the numerical strength of the brigade, its nature, tasks, and deployment area, and, finally, the language in which orders will be given. Observers are pointing out that yet another problem is linked with the fact that the FRG Army depends on the U.S. NATO command. As for the French Armed Forces, they are formally not under NATO jurisdiction and have their own nuclear weapons -- which, incidentally, in no way prevents them from participating in joint maneuvers and cooperating with the NATO armies. However, all these difficulties exist more in theory than in practice.

The press called the decision to set up a Franco-West German unit a "historic event" and a "promising symbol." "Who could have predicted in 1945," the newspaper LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS wrote with emotion, "that West Germany would become our military ally and that French and West German soldiers would rub shoulders in the same subunits."

But things are not restricted to soldiers fraternizing. For the two countries' politicians and military men the brigade will be an experimental laboratory, a test bed where various ideas linked with the building of a "West European defense system" can be streamlined.

The creation of a joint military subunit is an important event in further stepping up military cooperation between the two countries. The starting point for the "new stage" in Franco-West German relations was 22 January 1963, when a treaty on cooperation between the two countries was signed at the Elysee Palace in Paris. France's subsequent departure from the NATO military organization somewhat stalled the process. But in the early eighties the military articles of the treaty began to be stepped up, as part of Paris' general rapprochement with Bonn in all areas.

Next January both countries intend to widely mark the anniversary of the Elysee Treaty. There have been calls to conclude a new agreement, which would bring Paris and Bonn even closer together, on the anniversary date. Despite occasional differences on certain questions, France and the FRG are striving to adopt united positions on various international problems. The Soviet proposal on "Euromissiles" is a recent example of that. Despite the contradictions existing within the two countries' ruling coalitions, Paris and Bonn have coordinated their positions quite successfully.

The two countries are the main trailblazers for the political integration of West Europe. They attach particular importance to the "Single European Act" adopted by the EEC, which envisages the creation of a single European market by 1992. It is political integration, the two capitals are stressing, that must completely open up the way to military integration.

One of the central points in increased Franco-West German cooperation is the question of Paris' nuclear forces. More and more politicians in the two countries are militating for the expansion of the French concept of nuclear deterrence and the utilization of French nuclear weapons to defend the FRG. Without this, in their opinion, it will be impossible to achieve "real progress." The first concrete steps in this direction were taken in January 1986, when the French president and the FRG chancellor agreed that Paris would consult Bonn on the use of nuclear weapons. Former French President V. Giscard d'Estaing, who is now chairman of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Commission, has recently advanced the idea of siting French nuclear weapons on FRG territory following the conclusion of a treaty on the elimination of "Euromissiles."

"The U.S. guarantee is irreplaceable for us," H. Kohl repeats, stressing the importance of special links with Washington. Bonn religiously observes its transatlantic partner's interests, constantly recalling that its rapprochement with Paris does not run counter to NATO's plans. But there is hope in the NATO alliance that increased cooperation with West Germany will help to return France to the NATO military organization. There is increased pressure on both sides of the Rhine from those who insist on the FRG being given access to nuclear weapons.

Solidarity with Bonn on defense questions is today proclaimed a priority. To this end France must review the concept of defense and develop a "new global strategic system" which would also extend to West Germany. Some figures insist that the doctrine of the "battle for forward positions" be adopted as official policy. Others such as ex-Minister Jean-Francois Deniau, for instance, demand that it be officially announced that "security of French territory is indissolubly linked with the security of FRG territory." He is echoed by L. Fabius, former French prime minister in the Socialist government, who proposed that the defense of the FRG be seen as the defense of "French vital interests," and even put forward the idea of setting up a "Franco-West German confederation."

It must be said that the thesis of the indivisibility of French and FRG defense and their interrelation had long been floating around in works by local theoreticians and political scientists. Thus, in his book "The Future War" P. Lelouche, deputy director of the French Institute of International Relations, wrote that France should not leave West Germany isolated under any circumstances (referring to the notorious "Soviet threat"). It is time, P. Lelouche states, to reject the sacred taboo and transfer the French Army from the banks of the Rhine to the banks of the Elbe, that is, to the GDR border. He believes that French defense should start at the Elbe.

Different projects concern the two countries' conventional armed forces and arms. Probably the "boldest" was the proposal by former FRG chancellor H. Schmidt to fully integrate all French and FRG Armed Forces under French command. Cooperation has been organized between the two countries' general staffs, and officers are exchanged. In the words of French Foreign Minister J.B. Raimond, in 10 years' time all West German Army officers will have "passed through" the French Army and vice versa.

Joint arms production is one of the main avenues of bilateral cooperation. The French firms Dassault-Breguet and Aerospatiale, together with the West German firms Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm and Dornier, produce antitank missiles and air defense systems. Preparations are under way -- although not without difficulties -- for the production of a military helicopter. In all there are several dozen military projects whose feature is that they are open for participation by other NATO countries. On the whole, such cooperation is seen as a basis for creating an extensive West European market in the latest weapons systems to serve the NATO countries.

French Neutron Warheads in FRG

LD290337 Moscow in French to France and Belgium 1700 GMT 28 Jul 87

[Yuriy Soltan commentary -- read by announcer]

[Text] Charles Hernu and Pierre Messmer, two former defense ministers of France, made identical suggestions in the FRG press: deploy French missiles with neutron warheads in the FRG. One notes not only the simultaneous character of this intervention, writes our commentator Yuriy Solton, but also that both men still have considerable political importance, and it is obvious that they speak on behalf of influential forces.

Their ideas are not new: The first practical steps in this direction were taken as early as January 1986 when the French president and the West German chancellor agreed that Paris should consult Bonn on the use of its nuclear weapons. Voices were heard from time to time in favor of a Paris-Bonn nuclear axis. But today, statements of this kind take the shape of a major campaign. There is no secret in this. Thus, former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who today is the chairman of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Commission, says without mincing words that French nuclear weapons should be deployed in the FRG to fill the void if a Soviet-U.S. agreement is signed on the withdrawal of Euromissiles. So, some forces in France and in the FRG sound the alarm at a moment when this agreement is on the point of being born.

We remind you that Paris and Bonn recently agreed to set up a Franco-West German fighting brigade. It seems that determining the brigade's members, its mission, and where it will be stationed pose no problem; the only thing they cannot decide is in what language to give the commands. In my view, this doesn't matter, because those who have decided to set up a joint brigade and those who plead in favor of deploying French neutron weapons in the FRG speak the same language -- one which is militaristic, Yuriy Solton concludes.

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: ADDITIONAL U.S. MISSILES IN UK DRAW COMMENT

UK Defense Ministry Confirmation

LD161523 Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 16 Jul 87

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] The British Defense Ministry has confirmed officially that a consignment of American cruise missile launchers has been brought to the Molesworth military base 80 kilometers north of London. Yuriy Solton has written the following comment.

Molesworth is the second base after Greenham Common where American nuclear Tomahawks will be deployed. There will be a total of 160 of them in Britain. Colonel Kent Harbaugh, who has been placed in charge of the Molesworth base, has told journalists the missiles will be put on a stand-by alert by the end of next year as planned. The colonel's statement strikes you by its categorical nature. What stands behind it? Is this the zealotry of a hard-core soldier or the categorical opinion of a person who knows that the American program for cramming Western Europe with cruise and Pershing-2 missiles will be carried through in spite of everything?

In any case, the question arises what the [as heard] Americans are after; are they for an earliest attainment of an agreement on eliminating medium and shorter-range missiles as Washington officials claim, or for their further buildup? The Soviet Union has long unilaterally stopped deploying SS-20 missiles in its European part, and is gradually dismantling older missiles. As for the United States, it apparently prefers to act differently.

One cannot help but draw a link between the deployment of another consignment of American Tomahawk missiles and the unconstructive stand taken by the American delegation at Geneva. It torpedoed the work of finalizing the text of a treaty on eliminating nuclear missiles in Europe. Worthy of attention in this respect are opinions that have lately been voiced in some NATO capitals. Some claim there that nuclear disarmament may threaten peace.

The West German defense minister, Manfred Woerner has declared for one that in case Moscow and Washington sign an agreement on reducing landbased nuclear missiles in Europe, the West should immediately enlarge the arsenal of its air and sea-based nuclear missiles. The reasons lying behind such a negative stand taken by NATO countries, as the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev noted recently, are the same: The interests shown by the influential militarist groupings in the arms race, and as a consequence of this, the lack in the NATO ruling quarters of a constructivist concept as to how East-West relations should be built if confrontation is given up, writes in his comment Yuriy Solton.

UK Newspaper Cited

LD240826 Moscow TASS in English 0755 GMT 24 Jul 87

[Text] London July 24 TASS -- The United States assumed control over a base in Great Britain specially for the cruise missiles, the DAILY TELEGRAPH newspaper reported.

However, the paper went on, the proposal put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on the global abolition of medium-range and shorter-range missiles may lead to a situation whereby that base will never be used.

DAILY TELEGRAPH noted that the construction of the base cost 60 million dollars.

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

IZVESTIYA SAYS NUCLEAR ARMS STORED AT KADENA AFB

PM081251 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jun 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by S. Agafonov under rubric "Followup": "Kadena's Nuclear Filling"]

[Text] Tokyo--IZVESTIYA has already reported that there was a powerful antiwar demonstration last Sunday at the Pentagon's largest base in Asia--Kadena. One of its main slogans was an appeal for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Why was this appeal made at Kadena in particular? What is the role of this U.S. Air Force base in U.S. nuclear strategy?

These questions were answered by an international symposium held in Okinawa. I would like to acquaint readers with some of the data made public at the symposium.

Kadena has the world's largest underground ammunition dump. The dump has special compartments for N-B-C (nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical) weapons. A special company which goes under the code name "subunit No 400" is stationed here to tend N-B-C munitions.

According to established facts, nuclear bombs with B-61 warheads, which can be installed on virtually every type of aircraft stationed on Okinawa, were taken to Kadena in 1985. Each bomb has a yield of 500 kilotons (equivalent to just over 40 Hiroshimas).

In addition to these aerial bombs, Kadena's underground dump also contains nuclear depth charges, with which P-3C antisubmarine aircraft are equipped for operational flights. These flights are made daily, because, in line with U.S. operational plans, P-3CS from Kadena must close the Tsushima Strait in the event of a blockade of the Far Eastern straits.

Kadena is also noteworthy because it has multipurpose maintenance installations for the regular preventive maintenance of the aircraft themselves and the electronics with which they are crammed. Virtually all U.S. aircraft stationed in the Pacific pass through Kadena's maintenance hangars, flying to Okinawa for a technical inspection with all their combat equipment.

Kadena does not only serve as a reserve airfield; it is also a fuel artery. KC-135 aircraft, which refuel strategic bombers in the air, thereby increasing their range and allowing them to patrol airspace near the borders of the USSR and the DPRK, are stationed there.

Kadena has yet another function--to gather the intelligence on the basis of which combat missions are formulated and operations by strategic aircraft in "an emergency" are controlled. In the event of a conflict, it is via Kadena that the order for a nuclear attack will be given. In March this year a special E-4B aircraft nicknamed "Doomsday" landed at Kadena. This aircraft is equipped with apparatus for controlling U.S. troop operations in a full-scale nuclear conflict.

The aforementioned facts are sufficiently eloquent and require no further explanation. A point that must be underlined, however, is that Kadena is by no means the only U.S. base in Okinawa and Japan as a whole. There are 120 Pentagon nests in the Japanese archipelago. The Land of the Rising Sun has formally proclaimed three nonnuclear principles--not to have nuclear weapons in Japanese territory, not to produce them, and not to import them. What remains of these principles when you learn what Kadena alone is filled with?

After the Soviet Union stated its willingness to resolve the medium-range missile problem on a global basis on condition that the United States eliminate its nuclear means in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, official Tokyo protested, saying: Japan has no nuclear potential, but, on the other hand, it has "new nuclear principles." Protests are protests but facts are facts. Tokyo plays a considerable role in U.S. nuclear strategy: Major Pentagon strategic bridgeheads are on Japanese territory and nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are deployed at these bridgeheads. All this is reality and, like any reality, it carries more weight than any declaration.

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CSO: 5200/1603

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC: USSR PROPOSAL THREATENS WEU, OPTIMISM STILL EXISTS

HK020322 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI in Chinese No 10, 16 May 87 pp 13-14

[Article by Xin Peihe [2946 3099 0678] on 29 April: "How To Reply to Gorbachev?--Shultz Returns From His Visit to the Soviet Union"--first paragraph is SHIJIE ZHISHI introduction]

[Text] Shultz has returned home with another new proposal from Gorbachev. The United States feels that a "historical opportunity" has appeared for reaching an agreement on the medium-range missile issue. However, Western Europe is apprehensive that a nuclear-free zone may appear in this area which may throw it into a dangerous situation of being threatened by the Warsaw Treaty Organization's conventional forces. At present, the United States and Europe are making efforts to coordinate their stands and are holding discussions to study their countermeasures. What will be the prospects for the talks on the medium-range missile issue on the new basis? Please read this article.

Shultz paid a visit to the Soviet Union from 13-15 April. This was an important conversation between U.S. and Soviet leaders after the Iceland summit conference both countries held last October. The conversation was held when U.S.-Soviet relations were at a crucial point. During his 3-day visit, Shultz held "frank" talks with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze. Chairman Ryzhkov of the USSR Council of Ministers, and CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev on various questions concerning U.S.-Soviet relations. The talks were longer than originally scheduled and a question attracting people's attention was the question of arms control, especially the question of medium-range missiles.

"Contrary to the expectations of the West," Gorbachev put forth another new proposal: The Soviet Union is willing to eliminate its short-range missiles within a short and definite time and agrees to make this included in the medium-range missile agreement. In reply to this proposal Shultz said that although the United States has yet to consult its Western allies, the new proposal has undoubtedly provided a new basis for reaching an agreement. Therefore, before leaving the Soviet Union Shultz said that "headway has been made" in his 3-day Moscow talks and "the greatest headway has been made on the question of medium-range missile control."

On 28 February this year, Gorbachev put forth a new proposal, saying that the talks on medium-range missiles can be held separately. Thus, a new situation appeared in the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks, which had been suspended due to the linking up of the medium-range missile and SDI issues. However, Western Europe showed their worries about the Soviet superiority in short-range missiles. In view of this, Gorbachev further proposed during his Czechoslovakia visit on 10 April that while discussing the question of medium-range missiles, the United States and the Soviet Union begin to hold talks on reducing short-range missiles and conventional weapons. Later, when meeting with Shultz he proposed again eliminating the Soviet short-range missiles in a year's time.

According to this new proposal, the Soviet Union will eliminate 130 short-range missiles ranging 500 to 1,000 km, but the existing 72 similar NATO missiles (the Pershing IA) will not be touched. What the United States will do is just to pledge not to deploy such missiles in Europe again. Baker, chief of staff of the White House, said with joy that since the Soviet Union has made a concession on the question of short-range missiles, there has appeared a "historical opportunity" for the United States and the Soviet Union to reach an agreement in this respect. After hearing the new Soviet proposal, Reagan also said that the two countries will possibly be able to make a breakthrough on the question of arms control.

However, since medium-range and short-range missiles have been deployed in Europe, Gorbachev's new proposal will directly affect the security and interest of West European countries. Thus, there are strong repercussions in these countries.

In contrast to the joy of the United States, most foreign ministers of the NATO countries have adopted a cautious attitude toward the new proposal, saying that "it is necessary to make a careful study of it." British Secretary of State in Charge of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Howe warned that the West "not be blindfolded by the Soviet hand."

Since the 1960's NATO has been pursuing a strategy of flexible response based on "nuclear deterrent" (that is, to deter the Soviet Union with a "three-in-one" military strength, a combination of conventional weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, and strategic nuclear weapons, on the basis of the relative superiority of the U.S. strategic nuclear strength and the obvious superiority of tactical nuclear weapons in the European theater of operations, believing that this can put a curb on Soviet attacks. If medium-range and short-range missiles are cut down to the zero point according to Gorbachev's new proposal, Western Europe will be faced with the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization in respect of conventional arms. Thus, it will not be safer but will be in a more dangerous situation. This is what Western Europe is worrying about on the question of establishing a nuclear-free zone there.

British Secretary Howe emphasized: "The nuclear deterrent and flexible response is indispensable to the security of the West, especially of Western Europe, in the visible future." West German Defense Minister Woerner said that so long as the Soviet Union is superior to the West in conventional

weapons, the latter should continue to have nuclear weapons. Therefore, the West European countries hope to retain nuclear weapons and demand the Soviet Union to cut down large quantities of its conventional weapons. Moreover, Western Europe also suspects that Gorbachev's new proposal is aimed at inducing the United States and Europe to loosen their military ties so as to jeopardize the U.S.-European alliance.

In view of the worries of Western Europe, Shultz and Reagan recently made quite a few soothing remarks. They emphasized that "If not agreed by Western Europe, the United States will not reach any agreement with the Soviet Union on eliminating short-range missiles," that "whether the soviet proposal on short-range missile agreement is accepted or not, we will maintain our strategy of flexible reaction," and that "Reagan will not sacrifice the interests of European allies to hold talks with Gorgachev." Shultz explained that after withdrawing and eliminating medium-range missiles from Europe, the United States still has other nuclear weapons to prevent the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe. A large number of submarine-launched missiles, bombers, and ground-based strategic nuclear weapons the United States has deployed throughout the world are all directed against the Soviet Union. Besides, West Germany will retain the 72 U.S.-controlled Pershing IA missiles, and Britain and France will also retain their own nuclear weapons. However, the worries of the West European countries still cannot be eliminated. It seems that hard consultations and negotiations are still needed in order to harmonize the understanding and stand between the United States and its West European allies.

Since 20 April, senior officials of the NATO countries have been holding a meeting in Washington to discuss the problem of how to reply to Gorbachev's new proposal. The meeting is chaired by Perle, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense. It is reckoned that the reply may include the following points:

Do not agree to eliminate all nuclear weapons in Europe; insist on the stand that the United States has the right to possess in Europe an equal number of short-range missiles with the Soviet Union, but the number should be kept at a relatively lower level; and demand the Soviet Union to cut down large quantities of its conventional weapons in Europe.

Then what will the situation be after the United States makes the reply?

It seems there are still many difficulties in reaching an agreement. The United States and Europe still have to overcome their differences, the Reagan administration still has to convince the Congress, and proceeding from their respective strategic interests, the United States and the Soviet Union will certainly continue to bargain over the question again and again. Besides, the problem concerning how to concretize the complicated nuclear-checking question, which has been greatly emphasized by both the United States and the Soviet Union, cannot be easily solved either.

Moreover, on the question of holding talks with the Soviet Union, there have always been sharp conflicts between various factions within the U.S. Government. On the question of observing the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty and the time limit for reducing 50 percent of strategic weapons, the

hardliners are forcing Reagan to withdraw from the stand of the Iceland conference. Lastly, will the United States continue to make use of Gorbachev's eagerness for relaxing relations to demand the Soviet Union to make more concessions not only in respect of conventional weapons but also in respect of strategic weapons, thus making the agreement on medium-range missiles more complicated? This possibility cannot be completely ruled out.

It seems that we have talked much about the obstacles on reaching a medium-range missile agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the optimistic atmosphere cannot be denied. People will just wait and see.

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CSO: 5200/4014

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

DOBRYNIN RECEIVES U.S. ENVOY--Moscow, 24 Jul (TASS)--Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoliy Dobrynin today received the U.S. Ambassador in the USSR John Matlock on the latter's request. They discussed the present state of relations between the USSR and the United States and the prospects of Soviet-American talks in Geneva in the light of the new Soviet proposal by Mikhail Gorbachev to eliminate medium-range and shorter-range missiles on a global scale. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1750 GMT 24 Jul 87] /9604

FRENCH MINISTRY APPROVES USSR MISSILES STANCE--Mikhail Gorbachev's disarmament proposals represent significant progress according to the French Foreign Affairs Ministry. The Quai d'Orsay considers that Moscow's acceptance of the dismantling of the nuclear medium-range forces stationed in Asia answers U.S. requirements and can speed up the Geneva negotiations. [Text] [Paris Domestic Service in French 2100 GMT 23 Jul 87 LD] /9274

CSO: 5200/2570

TASS COMMENTARY LAUDS JARUZELSKI PLAN

LD241826 Moscow TASS in English 1825 GMT 24 Jul 87

["Important Peace Initiatives of Socialist Countries" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow July 24 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

Early in May of the current year, the head of the Polish United Workers' Party, president of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic came out with important initiatives to reduce armaments and strengthen confidence in the centre of Europe which are known now as the "Jaruzelski plan". A few days ago, the Polish Foreign Ministry presented in Warsaw to the heads of diplomatic representations of the participating countries in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe a memorandum which offers on the basis of the "Jaruzelski plan" with taking into account the changes that have occurred in the world of late, a concrete large-scale programme to lessen the persisting danger of an armed conflict in Europe, and particularly for the prevention of a possibility of a surprise attack.

The memorandum says the Polish Government is convinced that at present there exist conditions that make it possible to adopt measures aimed at ensurance of equal security for European states, provided their military potentials are kept at a much lower level than the existing one.

Poland's proposal is aimed at lowering the level of military confrontation in the zone comprising the territories of nine states: Belgium, Hungary, GDR, FRG, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The plan, specifically, presupposes gradual withdrawal and reduction of definite, jointly agreed-upon types of arms and amounts of nuclear weapons, as well as conventional arms.

It is precisely the "Jaruzelski Plan" that first placed on the agenda the question of changing the nature of military doctrines of states in such a way that they could be mutually recognised as exclusively defensive. The memorandum of the Polish Government proclaims the need to justify military doctrines by the principle of sufficiency, in accordance with which each state should have only such a military potential as is necessary for ensuring effective defences.

The memorandum of the Polish People's Republic emphasizes the insistent need to agree upon appropriate and far-reaching measures for confidence-building and security, as well as mechanisms for stringent verification of the observance of the obligations assumed in the centre of the European Continent, including those which it would be difficult to apply, for various reasons to entire Europe.

The Polish plan proceeds from the opportunity for parallel discussion and implementation of disarmament in three territorial zones, that is in the belt on both sides of the line of contact of the two opposing military-political groups, in the region of central Europe and throughout Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The plan of the Polish People's Republic is linked harmoniously with the Budapest address of the Warsaw Treaty countries, with the initiatives of the USSR, GDR, Czechoslovakia, other countries of the socialist community. But this is not just a sum total of the previous proposals. This is an original document and one of its most important specific features is that in the sphere of conventional armaments the emphasis is placed on the kinds of arms that have the greatest destructive force and precision, that is on the most dangerous, destabilizing means of warfare. The Polish proposals suggest a number of new concrete methods for implementing disarmament, verification, procedures facilitating the implementation of arms reductions.

The community of socialist states and every separate socialist state exert persistent efforts to consolidate peace and international security. The important peace initiative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, aimed at easing tension in the Korean peninsula, is a new example of such efforts. The Government of the DPRK, specifically, suggests that stage-by-stage reductions of the armies of the DPRK and South Korea be carried out in 1988-1991, so that their numerical strength in the North and the South of Korea be respectively reduced to 100 thousand servicemen. With the achievement of practical results in this direction, U.S. troops and their nuclear armaments should be evacuated stage-by-stage from South Korea so that all U.S. nuclear bases be removed from the Korean peninsula by the time the North and the South complete the aforementioned arms reduction.

The Soviet people strongly support the efforts of the fraternal socialist countries aimed at ridding the globe of the threat of nuclear war and are prepared to take all necessary actions for their implementation.

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CSO: 5200/1606

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET GENERAL EVALUATES CSCE WORK ON MILITARY ISSUES

LD251448 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 25 Jul 87

[Text] A session of representatives from the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe continues in Vienna. Major General Zakharov, member of the Soviet delegation, gives his evaluation of its work in military matters.

[Zakharov] The main thing is that we have succeeded in thwarting the attempts by the United States and some of its closest allies to take the issues of disarmament away from the all-European process. One can say directly now that there are changes.

For example, the NATO member countries consent to have the military aspects of these (considerations) recorded in the final document of the Vienna meeting. Earlier they had simply flatly refused to do this. The NATO member countries, however, are clearly trying to drag things out. In particular, we have not yet edited the final document. At the consultations between the two blocs on the conditions of the future talks on conventional arms, the conversation is being conducted now on the basis of the document proposed by the Warsaw Pact. We all feel that the tone is set precisely by the Warsaw Pact [word indistinct].

Yet there are barriers according to the NATO bloc here, too. The main barrier to working out the mandate, according to them, is our proposal to include tactical nuclear arms in the scope of the talks. If one uses military language, one has to say frankly that the NATO doctrine and the U.S. doctrine is built on deterrence. They make no secret of the fact that tactical nuclear arms are an element of deterrence. We are told that we -- meaning the Warsaw Pact -- have superiority in tactical nuclear arms and in tactical strike aircraft. We answer: Okay, let us liquidate this imbalance, as you call it; let us have negotiations, that is what we are suggesting. At that point they make a sharp turn and say: No, we are not going to hold negotiations. So we ask: So this means that there is no superiority on the part of the Warsaw Pact? Silence is their reply.

Our proposal on doctrines has played a useful part, and now 35 states here are listening attentively to this proposal, as it is for the first time not simply a defense doctrine, but a doctrine directed against war and toward consolidating the foundations of security for all, that has been proclaimed. The very fact of its being proclaimed has a beneficial effect on the climate in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/1606

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

NATO-PACT CONSULTATIONS: DRAFT MANDATE TABLED

LD271233 Moscow TASS in English 1140 GMT 27 Jul 87

[Text] Vienna July 27 TASS -- The closing session, before a break in the Vienna meeting, has been held here at the USSR Embassy within the framework of the consultations between representatives of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member countries on questions in connection with drawing up a mandate for the future talks on force and conventional arms cuts in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The delegations of the socialist countries have reaffirmed their principled stands set forth in the working document containing the main elements of the mandate for the future talks, which was tabled at the consultations more than a month ago.

At today's session the draft mandate was, at last, tabled also by the NATO delegations. It is based on the known "usual stability" concept, behind which is visible an attempt at evading real mutual cuts in the military potentials of the sides, excluding from the subject of the future talks the most destabilizing, offensive types of weapons -- the tactical nuclear weapons and tactical strike air force. Besides the NATO document excludes, as a matter of fact, the possibility of direct participation in the future talks of neutral and nonaligned states of Europe. Representatives of the Warsaw Treaty member states gave in their speeches a preliminary general evaluation of the NATO document and noted that it does not contain an adequate response to the major proposals of the socialist states on force and conventional arms cuts in Europe.

It has been agreed that the consultations will be continued after the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states -- participants in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, resumes its session in September.

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CSO: 5200/1606

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

XINHUA: PROSPECTS FOR NEW CDE, MBFR TALKS

OW280404 Beijing XINHUA in English 0158 GMT 28 Jul 87

[Text] Vienna, July 27 (XINHUA)--NATO countries submitted a draft mandate Monday for talks on conventional disarmament which calls for "a stable and secure balance of conventional forces at lower levels." The 16 NATO and 7 Warsaw Pact countries have been conducting preliminary talks on new all-European arms talks since February 17.

The draft detailed a proposal presented two weeks ago by NATO countries at the current Vienna 35-nation conference on security and cooperation in Europe. The meeting, which began last November, is reviewing compliance with the 1975 Helsinki accords, which cover European military security, humanitarian issues, and economic cooperation.

At the meeting, the West proposed two sets of all-European disarmament negotiations: one involving the 23 countries of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on conventional disarmament, the second involving the 35 countries of the Vienna conference to deal with security and confidence-building measures in Europe such as verification and the exchange of military information.

The West insists that neutral and nonaligned countries should only participate in the second set of talks. However, the East wants neutral and nonaligned countries to participate in all talks.

The West's proposal came in response to a proposal put forward by the Warsaw Pact countries June 22, which insists the all-European negotiations on conventional disarmament should be held with the 35 countries of the Vienna conference, and should include naval and air conventional forces and tactical nuclear arms with a range of up to 500 km (310 miles).

However, NATO countries want to concentrate on conventional weapons and exclude chemical and nuclear arms from the talks, which they believe would help do away with imbalances jeopardizing stability and eliminate the possibility of surprise attacks.

Analysts here said despite the differences between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, there exist prospects for new all-European arms talks next May.

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CSO: 5200/4016

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA SUPPORTS DPRK CALL FOR NUCLEAR-FREE KOREA

PM220951 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jul 87 Second Edition p 5

[Pavel Senchuk "Comentator's Column": "Removing the Nuclear Splinter"]

[Text] Let us imagine that all the initiatives to create nuclear-free zones are crowned with success. Where then would those in the Pentagon who love to dump nuclear "toys" in other people's houses find to leave their lethal load?

This is no idle question. Let it suffice to recall those zones already in existence on Earth, and also the proposals to proclaim nuclear-free zones in Africa, the Near East, and Southeast Asia. Many of them have been discussed at UN General Assembly sessions and other international forums. Moreover, particular attention has been drawn to initiatives of this kind in regions where the situation is extremely tense. The Korean peninsula is indisputably among the latter.

That is why the recently published DPRK Foreign Ministry statement concerning the creation of a nuclear-free peace zone on the Korean peninsula received such broad support from the peace-loving public in various countries.

The DPRK Foreign Ministry statement expresses well-founded alarm. It points directly to the threat of war inherent in the supercharged U.S. militarist preparations in South Korea. At present more than 1,000 units of various types of nuclear weapons are deployed in the south of the peninsula, and nuclear dumps are being built everywhere. F-4 fighter-bombers and nuclear weapons carriers are stationed there.

I would remind readers that as long as a year ago the DPRK Government, on a unilateral basis, essentially proclaimed the north of Korea free of nuclear weapons and proposed securing nonnuclear status for the entire Korean peninsula. Unfortunately, the U.S.-South Korean side ignored this initiative and refused to remove the nuclear splinter from the peninsula's body.

Yet it is surely obvious that to declare the Korean peninsula a nuclear weapon-free zone would above all facilitate the removal of one of the main causes of tension in Korea and promote the normalization of the overall situation on the peninsula. It would create conditions favorable for holding a comprehensive dialogue between North and South, as the DPRK leadership has repeatedly suggested.

The significance of the DPRK initiative, as I understand it, goes far beyond the limits of the Korean peninsula. If a nuclear-free zone were successfully created there, it would favorably affect the entire military-political climate in the Far East and the nuclear weapon nonproliferation regime.

I would like to hope that Washington and Seoul will still heed the voice of reason.

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CSO: 5200/1605

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

TASS: PEACEFUL TEST 26 JULY--Moscow, 24 Jul (TASS)--An underground nuclear explosion with a yield of up to 20 kilotons was conducted in the Soviet Union, in Yakutia, at 6:00 Moscow time today. [Words indistinct] conducted in the interests of the national economy. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0328 GMT 24 Jul 87] /9604

CSO: 5200/1605

RELATED ISSUES

FRG'S GENSCHER CALLS FOR END TO EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION

LD181429 Hamburg DPA in German 1328 GMT 18 Jul 87

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)--Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher describes cooperation between West and East as mankind's task for survival. In a BILD AM SOONTAG interview, released ahead of publication, he says that there is no longer any place for a West-East confrontation. Asked about his meeting with Bulgarian Communist Party leader Zhivkov, Genscher says that there is an historic opportunity for a flourishing of East-West relations.

In response to a question about what is specifically achievable, Genscher replied: "A worldwide ban on chemical weapons and the double zero option are achievable this year. We appeal to the United States and the Soviet Union to remove the last obstacles to a decisive breakthrough in the double zero option." No one would have greater advantages from this than the Europeans, "above all we Germans in West and East." Genscher believes that Gorbachev's reform policy is meant seriously: "The West is missing an historic chance if it does not take Gorbachev seriously and at his word."

/9274

CSO: 5200/2577

FRG'S WOERNER DISPUTES MOSCOW'S DISARMAMENT AIM

DW210920 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 20 Jul 87 p 2

[Article by "CAS": "Woerner Sees No Evidence of Disarmament Will"]

[Excerpts] Federal Defense Minister Manfred Woerner has again criticized that there is no convincing evidence of the Moscow leadership's will to disarm. However, if Europe's security is to be guaranteed on a long-term basis, the Soviet troops' invasion capability will have to be removed, Woerner said last weekend. In that way, Mikhail Gorbachev could prove that he is serious about his disarmament proposals, the CDU politician reiterated his demand to the CPSU General Secretary. Woerner said that the Federal Republic could not make its security policy dependent on statements of intent. He urged the Western European countries to intensify their military efforts and improve coordination in that respect to avoid dependence on the superpower's "pure goodwill." Bundeswehr Inspector-General Admiral Dieter Wellershoff demanded advance concessions by the Warsaw Pact in conventional arms control.

Andreas von Buelow, military expert of the SPD Bundestag group, reproached Woerner with "detente hostility." In support of that reproach Buelow quoted from the "1987 Armed Forces Comparison" published by *Hardthoehe* [Defense Ministry]. It represented an attempt to corroborate the CDU minister's gloomy political analyses by figures, Buelow said. He talked about a "summer offensive" by Woerner aimed at getting more budgetary means for an "overdrawn military armament program."

In proof of his argument the SPD Bundestag member pointed to the fact that in the comparison of forces, "the SS-20 missiles which had been overassessed as a super threat" for years, were now being considerably underassessed regarding their value to the Soviet Union, so that, according to the defense ministry's opinion, their destruction within the framework of a medium-range missiles agreement would constitute no significant loss for the USSR. On the other hand, the role of aircraft for the transport of nuclear weapons is considered essential, Buelow stated. Behind that is Woerner's desire for the new fighter 90 aircraft and the "extended air defense." [passage omitted]

The Netherlands has shown interest in participating in the development and construction of the German-French PAH II antitank helicopter. The Federal Defense Ministry confirmed that Prime Minister Lubbers has expressed that wish toward French Prime Minister Chirac. The PAH II helicopter so far has been a strictly bilateral armament project of the Bonn and Paris governments. As was learned from their talks in Toulon, Defense Ministers Woerner and Giraud have no objection to the participation of the Netherlands.

The participation of The Hague could reduce the costs. The Federal Government will have to provide DM2.35 billion for the development alone, although the defense ministers succeeded in reducing the industry's cost estimates by approximately DM250 million.

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CSO: 5200/2577

FRG EXPERTS REASSESS SOVIET MILITARY POWER

DW240630 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Jul 87 pp 1-2

[Article by "FY": "SPD Deputies Reassess Eastern Military Power"]

[Text] Bonn, 22 July — In Bonn on Wednesday, SPD politicians Andreas von Buelow and Erwin Horn gave an entirely new assessment of Soviet military power. While Von Buelow said that the Soviet Union wants to dismantle its military invasion capability systematically and is seeking advice on how to develop "defensive structures of defense," Horn said that the Soviet Armed Forces in Europe are not at present capable of launching an offensive. They are inferior to NATO on the land, in the air, and at sea, he said.

Von Buelow said that following numerous talks he had in the Soviet Union, Poland, and the GDR, he had come to the conclusion that the strategy of "forward defense" [Vorwaertsverteidigung] does not apply anymore. Their guideline is "sufficient defensive defense." He added: "Social-Democratic ideas and concepts are expressly mentioned in that respect." His interlocutors at the Friedrich Engels Academy in Dresden, where the NVA trains its general staff officers, told him they had been given orders to translate the new strategy or doctrine into structures and armaments. Von Buelow added that "Western partners who have familiarized themselves with the matter are consulted very frankly. He admitted, however, that strategy will remain a "piece of paper," if armament, training, and military exercises are not realigned.

Von Buelow said that the West's tactical nuclear weapons are the main obstacle to changing the Soviet military strategy from a strategy of attack of the West's territory to a strategy of defense of its own territory. Obviously the East will eliminate its conventional superiority only if the two blocs' nuclear tactical weapons are removed. According to Von Buelow, realigning armaments from offensive to defensive weapons would probably cover the "time span of an entire generation." Von Buelow, who in the past proposed the reorganization of the Bundeswehr on the grounds

that it is important to deprive it of its "capacity to attack," stated with regard to the Soviet Army that only to a limited extent is it possible to implement defensive defense unilaterally. As long as both military blocs "as a rule" have units which have the capacity to "conquer each other's territory," both will have to retain counteroffensive units. He reproached the defense minister with misjudging the reorientation of the Soviet military strategy and being unable to "creatively" work out proposals on bilateral disarmament. Between his thinking and that of the federal president as well as the foreign minister there is a gap that is almost impossible to close. There is a "historic opportunity to reorganize things in Europe," Von Buelow said.

Whereas Von Buelow described as a future opportunity the elimination of the Soviet Union's military superiority in Europe and its capacity to attack NATO countries, Horn claimed that the Soviet Army is unable to attack. He cited talks he had with U.S. experts in Washington earlier this month. For establishing the capacity to attack, the Soviets would need to have at least 14, probably even 21 days preparatory time and would have to transport at least 150,000 troops to central Europe by air. It is striking that Horn named only one interlocutor. He said that Professor Steinbrunner of the Brookings Institute said that the Soviets would need at least 90 days to establish the capacity to attack. A surprise attack would be impossible. Also, there are no Soviet plans to use chemical weapons. Horn admitted, however, that the use of chemical weapons is "possible at very small traffic centers, such as the Brenner Pass." He said that the Soviets have always been quite sure that NATO's navy and airforce are superior, "now" they believe that also applies to its land forces. They believe they would have to make "gigantic military contributions" to be able to "withstand" the West's potential. U.S. analysts conclude from that fact that the Soviet Union has no capacity to attack. Due to its "effective antitank capacity," NATO is not only in a position to "stop the Soviet Union's first strategic echelon," but also to attack its second echelon, he said. Horn added: "The Soviets cannot compete with NATO in the military area."

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CSO: 5200/2577

RELATED ISSUES

BRIEFS

FRG'S WOERNER ON EUROPEAN MILITARY EFFORTS--Hamburg (DPA)--Federal Defense Ministry Manfred Woerner (CDU) finds that convincing proof of Moscow's desire for disarmament is lacking. In an interview with the Oldenburg NORDWEST-ZEITUNG he said that for this reason the Federal Republic cannot make its security policy dependent on declarations of intent by Soviet Party Leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The West European states must increase their military efforts and coordinate themselves better. However, he gave a warning against the "illusion that a united Europe will be independent from an alliance with the United States if it wishes to adequately and safely counterbalance the Soviet Union." Woerner thought that the invasion capability of Soviet troops must be reduced for lasting security in Europe. On this point, Gorbachev can prove that he is serious about his disarmament proposals. [Excerpt] [Hamburg DPA in German 1040 GMT 19 Jul 87 LD] /9274

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