

10802i

JPRS 82936

24 February 1983

USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 2, April-June 1982

19990305 077

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

5
219
A10

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

JPRS REPORTS

Japan Report
Korean Affairs Report
Southeast Asia Report
Mongolia Report

Near East/South Asia Report
Sub-Saharan Africa Report
West Europe Report
West Europe Report: Science and Technology
Latin America Report

USSR

Political and Sociological Affairs
Problems of the Far East
Science and Technology Policy
Sociological Studies
Translations from KOMMUNIST
USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology
World Economy and International Relations
Agriculture
Construction and Related Industries
Consumer Goods and Domestic Trade
Economic Affairs
Energy
Human Resources
International Economic Relations
Transportation

Physics and Mathematics
Space
Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine
Military Affairs
Chemistry
Cybernetics, Computers and Automation Technology
Earth Sciences
Electronics and Electrical Engineering
Engineering and Equipment
Machine Tools and Metal-Working Equipment
Life Sciences: Biomedical and Behavioral Sciences
Life Sciences: Effects of Nonionizing Electromagnetic
Radiation
Materials Science and Technology

EASTERN EUROPE

Political, Sociological and Military Affairs
Scientific Affairs

Economic and Industrial Affairs

CHINA

Political, Sociological and Military Affairs
Economic Affairs
Science and Technology

RED FLAG
Agriculture
Plant and Installation Data

WORLDWIDE

Telecommunications Policy, Research and
Development
Nuclear Development and Proliferation

Environmental Quality
Epidemiology

FBIS DAILY REPORT

China
Soviet Union
South Asia
Asia and Pacific

Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Latin America
Middle East and Africa

To order, see inside front cover

24 February 1983

USSR REPORT

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 2, April-June 1982

Translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

CONTENTS

Contents of 'PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST,' No 2, 1982.....	1
Sinologists Must Reject Maoist 'Sinization of Marxism' (O. B. Borisov).....	3
PRC-USSR Hostility Blamed on Traditional Chinese 'Ethnocentrism' (M. S. Ukraintsev).....	17
Problems of Interpreting PRC Statistical Yearbook Explained (S. A. Ivanov).....	29
Political, Ideological Confusion Shows 'Social Crisis' in China (V. Ya. Matyayev, V. P. Fetov).....	42
PRC Tries To Push W. Europe into U.S. Anti-Soviet Policy (A. G. Larin).....	55
Indian Scholars Cited on Expansionist PRC Foreign Policy (V. K. Gusachenko).....	65
PRC Seeks To Turn Nonaligned Movement Against USSR (V. S. Stepanov).....	77
Financial and Monopoly Capital and Japan's Political Mechanism (A. A. Makarov).....	87
Inflationary Processes in China (P. B. Kapralov).....	96
U.S., PRC Oppose Korean Reunification To Preserve U.S. Military Presence (V. I. Andreyev, V. I. Osipov).....	106

CONTENTS (Continued)

'Conceptual' Framework of Harvard Study of PRC Economy Criticized (A. N. Zhelokhovtsev).....	117
Corruption of PRC Komsomol by Maoism in 1960's, 1970's Chronicled (V. N. Usov).....	121
Shoichi Ichikawa, Communist Tribune (60th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Japan).....	136
Maoist Moral-Educational Practices Attacked (N. Ye. Borevskaya).....	146
Ancient, Medieval Chinese Expansionism in Central Asia Described (V. S. Kuznetsov).....	160
PRC Attempts To Use Chinese Community on Madagascar as Channel of Influence (Ye. I. Petrova).....	166
Tikhvinskiy Reviews Book on Soviet Far East Policy 1939-1941 (S. L. Tikhvinskiy).....	174
Book on Japanese Monopoly Capital Reviewed (A. I. Senatorov).....	176
Book Places Responsibility for China's Problems on Mao Personally (Yu. S. Semenov).....	183
Book on CCP in 1920's Shows Differences Between Mao, Marxism-Leninism (V. I. Glunin).....	187
Book Denies Historic Ties Between China, Central Asia (V. A. Moiseyev).....	192
Second All-Union Conference of Sinologists.....	197
Thirteenth Conference of Young Sinologists (Ye. F. Piskunov).....	209
Conference of Young Sinologists on PRC Youth Problems.....	212

PUBLICATION DATA

English title	: PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST No 2, 1982
Russian title	: PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA
Author (s)	:
Editor (s)	: M. I. Sladkovskiy
Publishing House	: Izdatel'stvo Progress
Place of Publication	: Moscow
Date of Publication	: Apr-Jun 1982
Signed to press	: 19 May 1982
Copies	: 18,830
COPYRIGHT	: "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka" 1982

CONTENTS OF 'PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST,' No 2, 1982

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 82 (signed to press 19 May 82) pp 1-2

[Articles not published by JPRS are indicated with an asterisk (*), translations taken from English-language FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS No 3, 1982, are indicated with a double asterisk (**)]

[Text] Contents

"The Situation in the PRC and Some Objectives of Soviet Sinology"-- O. B. Borisov.....	3
---	---

Politics and Economics

"Soviet-Chinese Relations: Problems and Prospects"--M. S. Ukraitsev.....	15
**"Statistics and Politics"--S. A. Ivanov.....	25
**"China: Some Aspects of Domestic Development"--V. Ya. Matyayev and V. P. Fetov.....	38
**"Western Europe in Beijing's Strategy"--A. G. Larin.....	50
**"Beijing's Foreign Policy Evaluated by Indian Scholars"--V. K. Gusachenko.....	60
**"Beijing and the Nonaligned Movement"--V. S. Stepanov.....	73
**"Financial and Monopoly Capital and Japan's Political Mechanism"-- A. A. Makarov.....	84
**"Inflationary Processes in the PRC"--P. B. Kapralov.....	95
**"Friends and Foes of Korean Settlement"--V. I. Andreyev and V. I. Osipov.....	105

Ideology--Criticism of Bourgeois Sinology

**"Apologists of the 'Chinese Model' of Economic Development"--A. N. Zhelokhovtsev.....	117
--	-----

History

"Historic Fate of Chinese Komsomol"--V. N. Usov.....	121
--	-----

Struggle for a Just Cause

**"Shoichi Ichikawa, Communist Tribune".....	133
--	-----

Culture

*"Kobo Abe: Ideas and Images"--N. T. Fedorenko.....	140
"The Maoist Model of the Individual"--N. Ye. Borevskaya.....	151

Essays and Reports

"Was It Really a 'Silk' Route?"--V. S. Kuznetsov.....	159
"From the History of the Chinese Community on Madagascar"--Ye. I. Petrova.....	162

Book Reviews

**"Soviet Foreign Policy in the Far East (September 1939-June 1941)"--S. L. Tikhvinskiy.....	167
"Present-Day Japan's Urgent Problems"--A. I. Senatorov.....	169
**"An Excursion into the History of the Chinese Revolution"--Yu. S. Semenov.....	173
**"An Important Milestone in CCP History"--V. I. Glunin.....	176
"Falsification of the History of Kirghiziya"--V. A. Moiseyev.....	179

Scientific Life

"Second All-Union Conference of Sinologists".....	183
"Thirteenth Conference of Young Sinologists".....	190
"Problems of Youth Movement in China".....	191

COPYRIGHT: "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka" 1982

8588

CSO: 1805/1

SINOLOGISTS MUST REJECT 'SINIZATION OF MARXISM'

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 82 (signed to press 19 May 82) pp 3-14

[Article by O. B. Borisov: "The Situation in the PRC and Some Objectives of Soviet Sinology"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in bold-face in source]

[Text] The Soviet Union devotes great attention to the study of China and to relations with this great country which is our neighbor. Speaking from the platform of the 26th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, stated:

"Well, as for the Chinese people, we are profoundly convinced that their true interests would be met by a policy of peace, and only by a policy of peace and normal relations with other states.

"If Soviet-Chinese relations remain frozen, the reason does not lie in our stance. The Soviet Union has not sought and is not seeking confrontation with the PRC. We follow the course defined by the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, and we would like to build ties with the PRC on a good-neighborly basis. Our proposals aimed at normalizing relations with China remain in force, just as our feelings of respect and friendship for the Chinese people remain unchanged."

Speaking in Tashkent on 24 March this year, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev reaffirmed this principled stance on the part of our party and expressed readiness "to reach agreement, with no preliminary conditions, on measures acceptable to both sides to improve Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of mutual respect for each other's interests, non-interference in each other's affairs and mutual advantage--and, of course, without detriment to third countries."

In this way the leadership of our party and state, at the highest level, once again expressed its goodwill and sincere readiness to improve relations with China, in the belief that this would accord with both countries' vital interests and with the cause of universal peace.

It was precisely this spirit of the CPSU congress instructions that guided the participants in the second all-union conference of Sinologists in Moscow

25-27 January this year, organized by the Academic Council for Problems of the Foreign Far East, USSR Academy of Sciences.

It was noted at the conference that the political and organizational measures adopted by our party, particularly since the CPSU Central Committee October (1964) Plenum, enabled Soviet Sinology to move to the forefront in the study both of China and of the problems of peace and security in the Far East as a whole. As a result, the research of Soviet Sinologists became a reliable scientific base for the elaboration of long-term policy with regard to the PRC and the struggle for China's socialist future.

From the scientific, methodological and political standpoints, extremely great significance in the development of Soviet Sinology has been attached to the decisions of CPSU congresses and Central Committee plenums and to Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's statements about China.

At the very beginning of the antipopular Maoist campaign which became known as the "Cultural Revolution," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, speaking at the CPSU Central Committee December (1966) Plenum, gave an assessment of this anti-socialist campaign and exposed the nationalist, petty bourgeois roots of the ideology of Maoism, particularly anti-Sovietism. It was pointed out at that time that the "Cultural Revolution" would jeopardize the Chinese working people's socialist gains and would lead to the undermining of the CCP's authority and its internal disintegration. Life confirmed the accuracy of these conclusions. And if the decisions of the Sixth CCP Central Committee Plenum now say that the "Cultural Revolution" had nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism and that it did not meet the Chinese people's interests, this is evidence (although too late) of the bankruptcy of the Maoist experiments and the profound accuracy of our party's scientific approach to the analysis of events in those years.

As regards the Chinese leadership's international policy, as long ago as the CPSU Central Committee February (1964) Plenum it was said of this policy: "It is to be hoped that the Chinese leaders, following their incorrect, anti-Leninist path, do not arrive at virtual alignment with the most reactionary, bellicose forces of imperialism."

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties in 1969 gave an all-round analysis of the class nature and ideology of Maoism and showed that the Maoist leadership's policy was contrary to the vital interests of China's development along the path of socialism, while its hegemonist policy was fraught with danger to the cause of peace in Asia and the rest of the world. This assessment was also confirmed by subsequent events, when the Beijing ruling clique, in order to distract the people's attention from internal failures and to kindle hostile sentiments toward the PRC's neighbor states, undertook a whole series of hostile provocations against neighboring states. This also applies to Beijing's repeated aggressive actions against India and against the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Mongolia, Laos and other states.

A scientific analysis of Beijing's policy made it possible to correctly predict its aims and the methods of implementing them. As a result, the socialist

countries and all peace-loving forces were able to adopt appropriate measures to oppose the Maoists' provocations and mobilize the world public to expose Beijing's subversive policy. This made it possible to thwart the Maoists' plans to split the socialist community and the international communist movement and to set up their own center. It also hindered their plans to channel the national liberation movement and the nonaligned movement into an antisocialist, anti-Soviet course.

The course of the CPSU and the Soviet State toward China is a Leninist course, distinguished by its internationalist approach and its consistent and principled nature. It is a form of moral and political support for socialist trends in Chinese politics. Of course, interference in the PRC's internal affairs is alien to the Soviet Union. Its criticism of many of the tenets of Maoism--particularly in the foreign policy sphere--which do not accord with socialist principles and norms and of distortions of the principles of scientific communism is an important form of struggle for the purity of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Under the influence of our criticism the Maoists and their followers have had to maneuver, to give ground in some cases and to acknowledge, in essence, the accuracy of our assessments.

The 26th CPSU Congress reaffirmed the continuity of our party's political course with respect to the PRC--a course defined by previous congresses. This course combines rebuttal of Beijing's aggressive policy, defense of the interests of the Land of Soviets, the socialist community and the world communist movement and struggle against Maoist policy and ideology, which are hostile to Marxism-Leninism, with a willingness to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Our party's 26th congress drew attention to processes taking place in the PRC. It was noted at the congress that the real meaning of these processes has not yet been defined and that the main thing now is the extent to which the present Beijing leadership will succeed in overcoming the Maoist legacy.

Guided by the principles of the 25th and 26th congresses and CPSU Central Committee plenums and by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speeches, Soviet scientists have carried out significant work in studying the urgent problems of Chinese economic development, the situation of the working people, the class sources of events in China, the sociopolitical nature of Maoist ideology and the history of China and its relations with neighboring states. Much has been done to expose various kinds of Maoist falsifications of the history of Russian-Chinese and Soviet-Chinese relations and the history of the Chinese revolution and to criticize Beijing's hegemonist foreign policy and its pro-imperialist course.

In studying the problems of the PRC, Soviet Sinology adheres to a consistent, principled line and relies on objective scientific analysis of all aspects of Chinese reality in both the domestic and the foreign spheres, particularly with regard to the question of Soviet-Chinese relations.

The party and its 26th congress clearly defined the present tasks of Soviet Sinology. The most important of these tasks is to give an objective answer to the question of whether a process of qualitative, radical reassessment of the fundamental tenets of Maoism and of the political and socioeconomic events of

the past is indeed taking place in China, and what the extent (or depth) of this reassessment is. Our Marxist Sinology also hopes to establish, with full scientific reliability, the real meaning of the changes taking place in the PRC--whether they are really an attempt to find a way out of the crisis through progressive development, or only a manifestation of the Beijing leadership's desire to increase the effectiveness of its hegemonist, militarist political course with a view to the internal political struggle and global Maoist strategy. "The all-round Marxist-Leninist analysis of the class content of events in China in recent years and of the roots of the CCP leaders' present course, which jeopardizes the Chinese people's socialist gains, is a major, serious task," L. I. Brezhnev has said.¹

All work in the sphere of Sinology, as a comprehensive science devoted to the study of a particular country, takes account of the international political situation and is, of course, closely and inextricably linked with Beijing's actual political behavior.

The merit of Soviet Sinology in the difficult 1960's and 1970's, when the situation in China became extremely complex and contradictory, was that, following the party's instructions and enjoying the complete support of the CPSU Central Committee and the other fraternal parties, it was able to pool all Marxist-Leninist forces in INTERNATIONAL SINOLOGY and promote the elaboration of joint measures to consolidate our creative efforts. This resulted in a widely recognized system of coordinating efforts on the China question with our friends from the fraternal countries at all levels.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE CPSU AND THE OTHER FRATERNAL PARTIES AGAINST MAOISM AND THE POLITICAL DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF THE PRESENT BEIJING LEADERSHIP, WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO SOCIALIST PRINCIPLES, GOES FAR BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF BILATERAL SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS. After all, it is a question of the ideological orientation of the international revolutionary movement, the fundamental principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the creative application of the GENERAL LAWS OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION.

The general laws of socialist construction, accumulated in the aggregate international experience of real socialism, are the property of the world communist movement and of all progressive mankind. Attempts Beijing and by opportunists of various kinds to depict the defense of the general laws of socialist construction and socialist internationalism as some kind of imposition of the "Soviet model" on other parties and countries are futile. The ability to apply these laws and this experience creatively in each socialist country is an important guarantee of the success of the communists' creative work. Conversely, deviation from these laws and disregard for the historic experience of socialism lead to grave consequences. The crises which have arisen in certain socialist countries, including China, are clear evidence of this.

The CPSU, together with the other Marxist-Leninist parties, is resolutely opposed to any deviations from the fundamental principles of socialism and is waging an implacable struggle against opportunist and reactionary nationalist concepts.

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST BEIJING'S POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DOCTRINE AND AGAINST DISTORTIONS OF SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO OPPOSE EFFECTIVELY THE OTHER FORMS OF OPPORTUNISM WHICH EXIST BOTH IN EUROPE AND IN ASIA. This is all the more important at the present time, when a kind of allegiance is becoming established, made up of anticommunists like Reagan, the Beijing social chauvinists and various kinds of opportunists and rightwing nationalists. These seemingly diverse forces are united in the desire to make use of reactionary nationalism, nationalist prejudices and temporary difficulties in socialist construction to undermine the unity of communist ranks and our community and to discredit the ideals of Great October and of its banner--Leninism.

SOVIET SINOLOGY, IN GENERAL, HAS GIVEN OUR PARTY SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE IN THE STUDY AND PROFOUND INTERPRETATION OF CHINA'S CURRENT PROBLEMS, has done much to help create a scientific basis for the elaboration of an effective policy with respect to the PRC and to propagandize our party's Leninist course on the China question and has exposed the Maoist policy of putting blocs together on a militarist, anti-Soviet basis. During the period of the "Cultural Revolution" in the PRC, our Sinologists extended their scientific research and studied China's cultural and ideological heritage, basically in place of the Chinese who were deprived of the possibility to do so at that time.

Its indissoluble ties with life, its high achievements in scientific research and its internationalist approach to the study of China have won Soviet Sinology great prestige abroad, including in the PRC.

The activation of Beijing's policy of hostility toward socialism in the international arena and the alignment of the Chinese leaders with imperialists and with international opportunism give rise to the need to further extend and deepen scientific research into CHINA'S ROLE IN TODAY'S WORLD and the possible threat the Beijing hegemonists pose to the cause of peace throughout the world. It is a question of a wide range of issues and of the elaboration of scientifically substantiated concepts of THE EVOLUTION OF PRC POLICY and also of predictions of China's development in the next few years and through the end of this century. What lies ahead is obviously a more profound study of the socioeconomic, political and ideological processes taking place in China, the problems and policy of the country's militarization, the content, methods and forms of organization of Beijing propaganda and the anti-Soviet aspects of Beijing's activity.

Soviet Sinology also has to carry out considerable, truly comprehensive research on the economy, history, ideology, international relations, class structure and social and inter-ethnic relations in China. All of this, of course, requires improvement in the organization and quality of scientific research. Our Sinological thinking must be up to the standard of modern Marxist-Leninist science, so as to ensure that the most modern arsenal of scientific methods will be used in the research.

As for the historical aspect of Sinology, in this sphere scholars are doing great work in preparing a two-volume "Istoriya KPK" [History of the CCP] for

publication. This crucial work is not only of scientific significance, but also of great political significance. The study of the scientific history of the CCP, free of crude Maoist falsifications, will serve to restore the truth and will clearly show the historic international role of the Soviet Union and the world communist movement in the victory of the Chinese revolution. This task is all the more important now in view of the fact that the decisions on questions of CCP history since the formation of the PRC, adopted recently at the Sixth CCP Central Committee Plenum, intensified the falsification of CCP history.

The summarization of the historical materials associated with the CCP's activity and the struggle within the CCP between the internationalist and petty bourgeois-nationalist lines, the role of the international factor in the victory of the Chinese revolution and the significance of cooperation with the USSR for socialist construction in the PRC--this is far from a full list of the topics to be analyzed by Soviet Sinologists taking part in the preparation of "Istoriya KPS." This will not be an easy task. A bitter struggle is being fought by historians in the PRC, in the course of which the emphasis is frequently changed. Thus they have recently begun to reconsider the decisions of the Sixth CCP Central Committee Plenum, criticism of Mao Zedong has lessened and the propagandization of his "merits" has been stepped up.

The Beijing authorities are speculating crudely on the authority of the names of Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De and Zhou Enlai within the party to justify Maoism, seeking to represent it as "Sinized Marxism." They are stressing more energetically that Mao's "thoughts" became established in the struggle against the CPSU, the Comintern and the Soviet Union's revolutionary experience and prestige. The Beijing falsifiers are afraid of the truth, of facts. That is why they pour slander on documentary publications and memoirs about the CCP and the Chinese revolution published in the USSR. For instance, Beijing poured down crude insults on the books of Wang Ming, O. Brown and P. Vladimirov, representing as "malicious slander" their documented reminiscences permeated with the sense of internationalism, a deep love for the Chinese people and faith in the revolutionary potential of the Chinese working class. At the same time the anticommunist writings of American and Japanese Sinologists are relished and lauded. Particularly fierce attacks are made on the works by Soviet Marxist scholars in which, in the course of the profound analysis of historical facts and documents, the struggle between the two lines within the CCP--the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist line and the petty bourgeois, nationalist line--is described and the tremendous international assistance granted to the Chinese people at all stages of their struggle by the world revolutionary movement in the form of the Comintern, and particularly by the Soviet Union and the CPSU, is revealed. The Beijing falsifiers mock the sacred memory of Chinese internationalist communists, trying to depict them retrospectively as "friends" of Mao.

The publication of the scientifically substantiated "Istoriya KPS" and of works on the history of Soviet-Chinese relations and topical aspects of the socio-economic development of modern China will reveal, on the basis of broad, factual material and through profound, scientific generalizations, the concrete historical content of the 26th CPSU Congress thesis that "the experience of the PRC's

socioeconomic development in the last two decades is a grave lesson showing the results of the distortion of the principles of socialism and its essence in both domestic and foreign policy."²

The 26th CPSU Congress decisions indicate the major tasks of thoroughly, comprehensively studying the changes taking place in China in the sphere of party, state and cultural construction. It will be necessary to give an accurate assessment of the Chinese leadership's attempts to carry out the "four modernizations" and to analyze in depth the implications of present trends in the development of Chinese society, the possibility of the accomplishment of set tasks and the role of international imperialism in this.

Using the economic and social policy and practice of the Beijing leaders as a point of departure, we must REVEAL THE ESSENCE OF THE STRUGGLE OVER THE MAOIST LEGACY and the basic directions of the modification of Maoism, taking account of the complex, multifaceted nature of the processes developing in Chinese society, particularly in connection with the forthcoming 12th CCP Congress.

Official Chinese propaganda and reactionary forces in the West, primarily bourgeois propaganda, are trying to paint a picture of the situation in China which is far removed from reality, to sow illusions about the stability of the present Chinese regime and to imply that the people support the Chinese leadership's policy and that cooperation with the West will allegedly pave the way to progress for China and to the successful modernization of its economy and defense.

We are deeply convinced that distorting the ideas of scientific socialism, disregarding the general laws governing the construction of the new society--laws tested on the basis of the experience of the USSR and other socialist countries--and following a rightwing nationalist course of alignment with imperialism will not put China back on a sound path of development. As L. I. Brezhnev stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, "the imperialists will not be socialism's friends. Behind the readiness of the United States, Japan and a number of NATO countries to extend military-political ties with China there lies a simple calculation--that of utilizing its hostility toward the Soviet Union and the socialist community in their own, imperialist interests."³

Assessing the prospects for China's socioeconomic development, we would like to draw attention to the study and scientific criticism of Mao Zedong's concept of the so-called "new democracy," which is now being actively propagandized in China. It is this concept which the Beijing leaders are trying to use as the basis of some kind of "Chinese model" of socialist construction, counterposing it to scientific socialism, the experience of world socialism and the CCP's own general line, approved by the Eighth CCP Congress (1956) and based on that experience and on the successes of the PRC's first 10 years of existence. They would like to use this "theory of Mao Zedong" to justify anti-Sovietism and the alignment with the imperialists.

Chinese press publications indicate the following maneuver by China's rightwing nationalist forces with regard to Mao Zedong's idea of the "new democracy":

In the 1940's, they say, Mao Zedong carried out the "Sinization of Marxism-Leninism" and created a model for the transition to socialism which is allegedly suitable for China and for the backward countries of Asia in general--the "new democracy." But after the victory of the Chinese revolution and the PRC's formation, because of a number of "specific circumstances" (above all, the refusal of the United States and other Western countries to accept Mao Zedong's outstretched hand and their imposition of a trade embargo on the PRC), "China was forced" to turn to the Soviet Union. Under pressure from the USSR and prevailing circumstances, Mao Zedong had no alternative but to depart from the "new democracy" concept, adopt the "Soviet model" for the transition to socialism and substitute the concept of "people's democracy" for the "new democracy."

They further assert that, in the mid-1950's, in connection with the Eighth CCP Congress, Mao Zedong tried to put the party back "on the correct path of the new democracy," putting forward his "10 most important relationships," but the congress did not adopt Mao's line. Then, under the nationalist flag of the "rebirth of China's greatness," Mao began the struggle against the Eighth CCP Congress line, the struggle to discredit the Soviet Union's experience, by launching the experiments of the "Great Leap Forward" and the "Cultural Revolution," which later earned so much notoriety.

In essence, Beijing is now arriving at this conclusion: The sacrifices required by the "Great Leap Forward" and the "Cultural Revolution"--that is, of the entire subsequent 20-year period of the PRC's existence--are allegedly the price paid by the CCP and the people for the realization of the need to return to the path of the "new democracy."

The CCP nationalists' scheme makes it possible, according to their calculations, to shift the blame for the "Great Leap Forward" and the "Cultural Revolution" from Mao Zedong to external factors, especially the Soviet Union. These are the outlines of Beijing's new subversion, its crude falsification of history, which the Beijing leaders and their theorists have already begun to implement.

Soviet Sinologists, in cooperation with scholars in other social sciences, face the task of exposing this Maoist forgery.

It is well known that when Mao Zedong proposed this "theory," he made use of a number of Leninist tenets and CPSU and Comintern documents on the capitalist path of development for economically underdeveloped countries. But in the MAOIST INTERPRETATION the concept also incorporates a whole series of nationalist, anti-Marxist and populist provisions which must be subjected to scientific criticism, not abstractly or in isolation, but IN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF MAOIST POLICY. At the same time, it is obvious that the main flaws in the "new democracy" theory lie, first, in giving absolute priority to specifically Chinese features and ignoring the general laws of socialist construction; second, in ignoring and underestimating the role of the international factor in the Chinese revolution, which compensated for the relative weakness of the Chinese proletariat; third, in trying to use the ideas of socialism to satisfy great-power hegemonist ambitions, justify great-Han domination in China itself and establish hegemony in Asia through an agreement with the imperialists on the division of spheres of influence.

Bourgeois Sinology has long tried to prove that socialism is unsuitable for China in principle, that Marxism-Leninism is an alien phenomenon imported to China from Russia, that its application on Chinese soil can yield no positive fruit and that sooner or later it must be discarded. This means, oddly enough, that the feudal, colonial, comprador and Maoist orders are suitable for China and the Chinese people, but socialism is not. This logic leads further: From the standpoint of the absolute prevalence of Chinese traditions and specific features, THE EMERGENCE OF MAOISM IS PRESENTED AS A NATURAL PHENOMENON. It is allegedly intended to establish some kind of national concept of Chinese society and the Chinese state.

It would seem that certain researchers abroad are under the spell, to one degree or another, of China's uniqueness (which, of course, nobody denies). But as the PRC's sociopolitical experience shows, the exaggeration of China's specific features and the tendency to lay excessive emphasis on them are the results of deviation from scientific methodology. This objectively adds grist to the mill of the Maoist theorists who persistently propagandize the need for the "Sinization of Marxism," a thesis taken up by opportunists and nationalists of various kinds. Such so-called "ideas" can, in general, strengthen the position of national communism, which is diametrically opposed to scientific communism, diametrically opposed to real socialism with its inherent general laws revealed by V. I. Lenin and confirmed by 65 years of experience in socialist construction in our country and the experience of other socialist community states. Incidentally, during the period when the foundations of socialism were laid successfully in the first 10 years of the existence of people's China, the Chinese leaders themselves acknowledged these laws and followed them. This was indicated, in particular, by the stance of the CCP delegation at the 1957 Moscow conference of communist and workers parties.

No one denies the importance of taking national peculiarities into account when socialism is being built. This was expressly pointed out by V. I. Lenin and those who continued his work. It is clearly stipulated in CPSU party documents.

But in connection with the tasks of our Sinology, two facts must be stressed:

First, the study of Chinese traditions and of China's specific features, which are manifested in many socioeconomic and political phenomena in that country and in ideological concepts, is naturally necessary. In fact, it is essential. Otherwise, it would be impossible to make either current or long-term predictions of China's policy;

Second, and most important, this study must be guided by Marxist-Leninist methodology, with a view to how the general socioeconomic laws of the development of human civilization are manifested under specifically Chinese conditions.

It is necessary to take account of Lenin's statements that China has already "been drawn totally into the stream of world capitalist civilization" and that HUNDREDS AND HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS of people in the East, including China, "will henceforth participate directly in the struggle for the ideals for which the West has striven."⁴ V. I. Lenin is known to have had socialist ideals in mind. With regard to the period since the October Revolution and the formation of

the PRC, it should be taken into account, obviously, that by virtue of the entire course of events, THE CHINA OF THE 1940's AND 1950's WAS BEING DRAWN INTO THE STREAM OF THE EMERGING SOCIALIST CIVILIZATION.

The 26th CPSU Congress decisions also assign Soviet Sinologists the important task of conducting a comprehensive analysis of the changes taking place in China and making a scientific prediction of China's development in the 1980's and over the long range. Neither particular haste nor excessive sluggishness must be displayed in this work. Scholastic theorizing and pointless scheming are impermissible here. The study of China's economy, history, philosophy and culture must now, as in the past, be carried out on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology and in close connection with the requirements of practice, not in isolation from the tasks of the struggle for a socialist China. Soviet scholars were reminded once more of the urgency of this work by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's Tashkent speech on 24 March 1982.

An analysis of the situation in the PRC and the main trends in Beijing's domestic and foreign policy indicates that the Chinese leadership's course has evolved more and more distinctly toward the right in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Therefore, a new stage in this evolution can evidently be discussed. This is reflected in the emergence of a whole series of new features characterizing Beijing's foreign and domestic policy.

The Chinese leadership has moved from the development of conventional interstate relations with capitalist countries (which is quite normal and natural) to the formation of blocs and alignment with the leading imperialist powers on an anti-Soviet platform. Beijing is even calling openly for the creation of some kind of system of joint resistance to "Soviet hegemonism." With the same aim the Chinese leadership is nurturing plans for rearming the PRC with the aid of modern American weapons.

In this way, a dangerous new phenomenon has emerged and is gaining strength in world politics--the partnership of imperialism and Beijing hegemonism. True, it is not yet an alliance, the partners differ in some respects, but certain strategic interests of theirs coincide (anti-Sovietism, anti-detente, the virtually coordinated struggle against the countries of Indochina and Afghanistan, etc.).

Beijing is openly enlarging the framework of the "BROADEST INTERNATIONAL FRONT" FOR THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE USSR AND THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY by bringing in, in addition to capitalist and developing states, opportunist and nationalist elements in the revolutionary and democratic movement and even certain socialist countries (with the help of the more flexible policy of the "differentiated" approach). The same aims have recently been served by Beijing's tactics aimed at blackmailing the West with the possibility of an improvement in China's relations with the Soviet Union and simultaneously at "weakening" the unity of the socialist community countries.

A decision has been made to STRENGTHEN THE SOCIOPOLITICAL AND MATERIAL BASE OF CHINESE HEGEMONISM by setting the political system in order, expanding the regime's social support, stepping up the growth of the PRC's military-economic

potential (particularly in terms of sophisticated types of nuclear missiles) with the help of the United States, other NATO countries and Japan, attracting foreign capital and developing a mixed economy, including a private sector. A kind of galvanization of the notorious "open door" policy is taking place. And all of this is happening under the conditions of an underdeveloped China. As a result, a further shift to the right is also taking place in the PRC's social development.

A MODIFICATION OF MAOISM is in progress in the PRC, with the aim of finding ideological, political and theoretical justification for Beijing's alignment with the imperialists and various kinds of opportunists and nationalists. Maoism is being made more flexible and, so to speak, more attractive, while maintaining its foundations--"Sinized Marxism," hegemonism and anti-Sovietism--inviolable.

Among the most important tasks for Soviet Sinology are the elaboration of measures to counter the anti-Soviet plans of Beijing and imperialism and the thorough study of all the nuances of Chinese policy with respect to the United States, Japan, the NATO countries, the ASEAN countries and other states and the corresponding policy of the imperialist states and developing countries toward China. Here particular attention should be devoted to the study of existing and potential contradictions between China and these other states.

Imperialism and Chinese hegemonism are forming a bloc at a time when CERTAIN CHANGES CAN BE OBSERVED IN VARIOUS SPHERES OF LIFE, changes which are complex in nature and are due to the operation of various factors, in China ever since Mao Zedong's death and particularly since the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum.

In domestic policy a certain departure is in progress from a number of the most discredited voluntarist slogans and methods practiced by the Maoists during the periods of the "Great Leap Forward" and "Cultural Revolution." Much of this looks like attempts to overcome the grave Maoist legacy in the spheres of economics, politics and party, state, cultural and national construction, although the measures adopted are often superficial and forced in nature and are AIMED AT ADAPTING CURRENT POLICY TO THE URGENT DEMANDS OF LIFE. Nonetheless, if this trend gains the prevailing influence and leads to the reassessment of the basic foundations of Beijing policy, it could lead China onto a sound path of development.

In determining its policy, the present Chinese leadership is forced to take account of the elements of a socialist basis which exist in the country and the influence of the ideas of socialism and of the successful practice of building a socialist society during the first decade of the PRC's development. Opportunities remain in China for progress along the socialist path if the Maoist legacy is overcome in that country. The fraternal parties in socialist countries are fighting for precisely that path.

At the same time--and most important--deeper processes are under way in the PRC and a political course is being implemented with the aim of further consolidating the great-power nationalist strategic principles in the domestic

policy sphere and strengthening the links between these principles and the hegemonist, anti-Soviet foreign policy. The Beijing leadership, while advertising and publicizing the changes which take the realities of present-day China into account, is deliberately disguising the great-power nationalist essence of its policy.

Moreover, the rebirth of the mixed economy, the encouragement of activity by the Chinese and foreign bourgeoisie, the effective retreat in the establishment of cooperatives in the countryside and so forth lead, in essence, to a certain yielding of the positions gained by socialism in China. Beijing's pro-imperialist course and its hostility toward the socialist community also weaken the positions of socialist forces in the PRC and nourish and strengthen the rightwing tendency in the political orientation of the country's social development.

On this basis, we do not find any discrepancy between the domestic and foreign policies of the Beijing ruling clique, especially Deng Xiaoping's rightwing nationalist grouping. The changes in domestic policy are forced actions without which it would be difficult for the present leadership to keep the Chinese people in a state of obedience, to arrange matters in the economic sphere and to preserve the regime's foundations. These changes are aimed directly at creating a more reliable material and political base for the hegemonist, anti-Soviet foreign policy course.

The rebirth of the mixed economy, the encouragement of the development of the Chinese and foreign bourgeoisie and the effective retreat from the principles of cooperativization in the countryside, as already noted, are leading to a certain yielding of the positions gained by socialism in China. Beijing's pro-imperialist course and hostility toward the socialist community are also weakening the positions of socialist forces in China. In this sense, if we are talking about discrepancies, it is more accurate to speak of the CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE GENERAL POLITICAL COURSE OF THE PRESENT CHINESE LEADERSHIP AND THE OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT ALONG THE SOCIALIST PATH.

At the same time, note must be taken of the most important circumstance: that the Beijing leadership has entirely removed Mao's actions and tenets in the international arena from the field of criticism. Not only are no complaints made about them, but at the Sixth CCP Central Committee Plenum it was stated that, despite Mao's errors within the country, his foreign policy line was "absolutely correct" and that Beijing would continue to develop it.

As is known, the Soviet side has repeatedly proposed to the Chinese leadership that political dialogue commence at any level, including the highest. After all, it was on our initiative that the border talks began in 1969, and the talks on the normalization of interstate relations in 1979. It is also well known that it is Beijing which has broken off these talks and displays no desire to resume them. The present Beijing ruling clique openly calls on the entire world to launch a "crusade" against the USSR, which is accused of "hegemonism," "aggression" and "expansionism" and is depicted as the "main enemy" of China and other countries and the "main source of a new world war."

In 1981 alone, Chinese leaders made anti-Soviet statements on more than 100 occasions. Beijing's propaganda apparatus is designed to blacken CPSU policy, sow hostility toward the USSR, provoke deterioration in our relations with other countries and knock together a front for the struggle against the Soviet Union. Episodic "positive" reports about cultural life in the USSR, sports or Soviet literature are drops in the ocean of hostile Chinese propaganda. RENMIN RIBAO alone published about 2,500 anti-Soviet items in 1981.

Nor can we ignore the fact that the struggle against the Soviet Union, according to the current PRC constitution and CCP Charter, is a charter regulation and constitutional duty for every PRC citizen and every CCP member. The Chinese leaders constantly assert that the struggle against the Soviet Union is a long-term task and one of China's three main tasks for the 1980's.

At the same time, whether the anti-Soviets in the present Chinese leadership like it or not, the Soviet Union's prestige in the eyes of Chinese working people persists despite 20 years of shameless anti-Soviet propaganda in China. The Soviet Union remains a true friend in the memories of those who, hand in hand with Soviet people, fought a common enemy, built bridges and plants, railroads and power stations, founded higher educational institutions and trained specialists for the PRC. People are reminded of our country by the fraternal graves of Soviet servicemen who gave their lives for China's liberation and by the modern industrial enterprises built in the PRC during the course of fruitful Soviet-Chinese cooperation.

In view of the real situation in the country, the pro-imperialist grouping in Beijing has been forced to recognize the fact that Soviet experience and Soviet art and culture are of great interest to Chinese working people, particularly the intelligentsia, cadres and party members.

Our aim has always been to fight for China's socialist future. This is precisely the aim of our activity on the China question, including the ideological struggle against Maoism and the practices of the Chinese leadership. This is also a struggle for the normalization of USSR-PRC relations.

It must be stressed once again that the struggle of the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties against Maoism and the demonstration of its anti-popular, antisocialist essence have always been consistently internationalist in nature and are combined with deep respect for the Chinese people and their ancient culture and history.

Convincing new confirmation of this stance on the Soviet Union's part is provided by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech in Tashkent on 24 March 1982, in which he expressed support for the Chinese people's legitimate aspirations on the questions of China's ownership of Taiwan and condemned the imperialist concept of the "two Chinas." This approach demonstrates the unity of words and deeds in Soviet policy.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev recalled the good times when the USSR and people's China were united by bonds of friendship and comradely cooperation and

stressed that there has been and is no threat to the PRC from the Soviet Union. At the same time, this speech emphasized our willingness to improve relations with the PRC and hold constructive dialogue both at talks on border questions and at talks on the normalization of USSR-PRC relations.

In a word, just as before, it is now up to the Chinese side.

But Beijing's official reaction to the Soviet initiatives, just as before, is an unconstructive one.

In the past, the Chinese leaders not only failed to display a desire to hold talks with the USSR on the normalization of bilateral relations, viewing these talks, as they put it, as "inappropriate," but also made the possibility of holding such talks conditional upon such deliberately unacceptable preliminary conditions as the renunciation of support for Afghanistan, the Indochinese countries and Mongolia, the recognition of so-called "disputed regions," the renunciation of the "hegemonist policy" which is attributed to the Soviet Union and so forth--and these were expressed as ultimatums. Now, just as before, Beijing is making the possibility of a shift in Soviet-Chinese relations directly dependent on "a general change in the stance of the USSR and CPSU."

On 31 March of this year, when Li Xiannian, deputy chairman of the CCP Central Committee, spoke with a Peruvian delegation, he repeated an entire group of Chinese preliminary conditions, emphasizing that "there can be no question of any significant change in our bilateral relations with the USSR until the Soviet Union and CPSU change their stance." This statement indicates that Beijing is losing touch with reality.

The 26th CPSU Congress documents and the decisions and instructions of the CPSU Central Committee request Soviet scholars of international relations and, in particular, Sinologists to study processes in the world arena in greater depth and make well-considered proposals on the implementation of the foreign policy Peace Program put forward by L. I. Brezhnev from the platform of the party congress.

The precise assessment of the situation in China and of the grave consequences of the policy of Maoism--the assessment given by the CPSU, the other Marxist-Leninist parties and Marxist Sinology--will help true supporters of socialism in the PRC to gain a correct understanding of the situation in their country and strengthen their faith in the possibility of overcoming the Maoist legacy and ensuring a socialist future for China.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following in Lenin's Footsteps], Moscow, 1970, vol 2, p 392.
2. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 10.
3. Ibid., p 11.
4. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 21, p 402.

COPYRIGHT: "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka" 1982

PRC-USSR HOSTILITY BLAMED ON TRADITIONAL CHINESE 'ETHNOCENTRISM'

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 82 (signed to press 19 May 82) pp 15-24

[Article by M. S. Ukraintsev: "Soviet-Chinese Relations: Problems and Prospects"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The Chinese revolution developed under the direct influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution and with the support of the Soviet Union. Even Mao Zedong admitted that otherwise there would have been no victory for the revolution in China. There was nothing to divide the two neighboring socialist states, no reason for them to quarrel. The border between them was defined long before their formation--in the 17th-19th centuries--and until the early 1960's it was a border of friendship and cooperation. The Soviet Union helped China restore and develop its economy, defend its security and strengthen its defense. The PRC, for its part, supported the Soviet Union's foreign policy actions and its efforts to strengthen the socialist camp and promote national liberation movements and the defense of peace.

ONE PROBLEM AFTER ANOTHER. Gradually, however, one problem after another began to aggravate USSR-PRC relations. One problem arose when Mao Zedong--and after him, certain other Chinese leaders--declared the desire to make Mongolia part of China. The Soviet Union pointed out that the primary consideration in this matter was the position of the Mongolian people, who have demonstrated their firm determination to live in an independent socialist Mongolia. As for the Soviet Union, it does not want that country to be swallowed up by China.

After I. V. Stalin's death, Mao Zedong began to lay claim to the role of leader of the world communist movement. Posters were published in China depicting profiles of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Zedong. But the communist parties rejected these claims.

Differences then emerged in connection with Mao Zedong's plans to develop a huge military nuclear missile program as quickly as possible. The Soviet Union believed that this was unwise from the economic and military standpoints, that it would complicate the struggle for disarmament and the preservation of peace and that the Soviet Union had sufficient military might to defend all

of the socialist countries. This position, however, was received badly in Beijing.

Finally, in the late 1950's the dispute over the most important question for mankind--the question of war and peace--began to become increasingly acute. During summit meetings with Soviet leaders in 1957-1959, Mao Zedong insisted that the Soviet Union should carry out a nuclear missile strike against the United States and its allies and that the task of eliminating imperialism, especially American imperialism, and ensuring the victory of the world revolution was worth the sacrifices which would have to be made. The Soviet leaders firmly rejected the calls for war. They stressed that everything possible should be done to prevent a nuclear missile war and to ensure peace and international cooperation on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

It was under the load of these problems, weighing down Soviet-Chinese relations, that the USSR and the PRC approached the point (in the late 1950's and early 1960's) at which the Beijing leadership decided to break with the USSR and the socialist community and to gradually align itself with imperialism, especially American imperialism through different stages, while it indoctrinated the Chinese people and prepared the imperialist states for this move. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government undertook various measures to halt the deterioration of relations and to keep China from leaving the socialist community. They proposed summit meetings between leaders, an end to polemics, the preservation and expansion of economic cooperation and the continued exchange of experience and information. People in the USSR retained deep respect for the Chinese people and for China's cultural heritage. Even during the years of the "Cultural Revolution" in China, when the Red Guards held their wild orgies, the creative intelligentsia was massacred, books were burned and the very history of Chinese civilization was, so to speak, erased, Chinese works from various eras were translated in the USSR and works were published on China's history, its culture and the history of the Chinese people's revolutionary struggle. Mao Zedong and his group, however, did everything they could to exacerbate relations with the USSR and erect a wall of hatred between the Chinese people and the people of the Soviet Union.

Armed provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border in 1969 were organized by the Maoists to poison the Chinese people's minds with hatred for the USSR and, at the same time, to signal to imperialism, especially American imperialism, that Beijing was seeking rapprochement with it on an anti-Soviet basis. Beijing's policy of hostility toward the USSR and the other socialist countries and the Chinese ruling circles' slide into pro-imperialist positions led to the emergence of new problems in Soviet-Chinese relations.

HOW AND WHY ALL THIS HAPPENED. Why was China transformed from an ally of the socialist states into imperialism's junior partner? Why is China, after successfully building socialism during its first 10 years of existence, now submerged in a socioeconomic crisis and facing highly complex problems?

During the revolution in China and afterward, a fierce struggle was under way within the CCP between internationalists and national chauvinists. By the late 1950's Mao Zedong's group had succeeded in eliminating, compromising or

pushing aside many internationalist communists. Those who remained alive and were, so to speak, visible, were thrown into correction camps and annihilated during the "Cultural Revolution." As Mao Zedong's group grew stronger, increasing pressure was exerted on Chinese policy and its formation by ethnopsychology and various stereotyped ways of thinking which had begun to form in Confucius' time 2,500 years ago, and even before, and were later formulated, consolidated and propagated by China's feudal rulers. Foremost among these stereotypes were Sinocentrism and egocentrism, from which many premises have been derived: China is the most cultured and strongest country; it is surrounded by vassals and tributaries; China must not permit the emergence of a strong state next to it; China can only have ties with other countries if they are in China's interest; barbarians must be subjugated through the efforts of other barbarians; in the struggle against barbarians, all methods are valid--from simple deception to war--and war is regarded as a punitive campaign, a lesson and a punishment.

Because of this, Mao Zedong, who sought, as he said, "to place ancient times at the service of today," and his associates felt increasingly uneasy in a world where other major powers obviously existed. In 1959-1962 they attacked India and began subversive activity against that country in order to weaken or even dismember it. They tried in every way to set the USSR against the United States and cause a "fight between the two tigers" while the "wise monkey" (China) would sit on a hill and watch this fight. When they failed to persuade the Soviet leaders to launch a nuclear missile strike against the United States, Beijing moved to the left, accusing the Soviet Union of not being "revolutionary" enough, and ultimately emerged on the right. Since that time it has persistently tried to push the United States into a war against the Soviet Union.

Another stereotyped line of reasoning lay behind Beijing's policy of hostility toward the USSR: In order to keep the people in a state of obedience, an external enemy is needed. If there is no such enemy, one must be invented. The PRC ruling circles, embroiled in contradictions, confronting huge problems and incapable of improving the working people's life or offering them a convincing positive program, have always tried to convince the Chinese people that they are being threatened from the north, that the USSR is allegedly encircling China and that they have no other alternative but to work, submit to directives from the center and demand nothing in exchange. It cost the Chinese people huge sums and colossal effort to build the underground shelters and trenches constructed over a 10-year period for defense against the "threat from the north"! The myth of the "threat from the north" proved to be a soap bubble, but the money, construction materials and human labor were realities, realities which the Chinese rulers "buried" in the ground, reducing the country's already negligible resources.

Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in the past and Deng Xiaoping and certain other Chinese leaders today tried and are still trying to convince the people that the imperialist powers will help China carry out modernization, but that if imperialism is to help, it must be repaid in some way. Again, with unusual energy, the Beijing strategists are trying to convince, above all, U.S. imperialism that the enmity between China and the USSR is long-term, that China is ready to act as a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the Far East but that

the imperialist powers must first aid China in its development and consolidation. Deng Xiaoping has repeatedly asserted at meetings with foreign visitors that China's relations with the USSR will not improve in his lifetime or that of the next generation. In order to confirm these assurances, propaganda organs have become particularly sophisticated in their anti-Soviet statements.

This has engendered many problems in Soviet-Chinese relations today. Most of these problems resulted from the Chinese leadership's transition to national chauvinism and the attempt to operate in the modern world on the basis of the trumpery invented thousands of years ago by the Chinese feudalists.

THE USSR'S CONSTRUCTIVE POLICY AND THE CHINESE GAME WITH HEGEMONIST AIMS.

During the Moscow talks in September-November 1979, in proposals regarding the improvement of USSR-PRC relations, the Chinese government delegation made references to the existence of a "military threat to China from the north and south" and indicated the following "obstacles" which had to be eliminated to create the preconditions for the normalization of relations between the two countries: a unilateral reduction in the numerical strength of Soviet armed forces in regions bordering on China; the withdrawal of Soviet military contingents deployed on Mongolian territory; the cessation of Soviet support for the SRV "in any form whatsoever"; and the resolution of border questions through the recognition of so-called "disputed regions" on Soviet territory along the Soviet-Chinese border, which would signify the recognition of Chinese territorial claims on the USSR.

These "obstacles" (or problems) arose as a result of the Chinese leadership's transition to positions of hostility toward the USSR and its implementation of nationalist, aggressive aspirations.

The Soviet delegation demonstrated the groundlessness of China's demands. It stated that the USSR is only implementing the necessary defensive measures and that there are no grounds for references to a "concentration" of Soviet troops in the Far East constituting a "threat" to China. Pointing out that there are more troops on the Chinese side of the border than on our side, the Soviet delegation repeatedly raised the question of the commitments China intended to make in this connection. It received no response.

The Soviet side also rejected the Chinese authorities' attempts to interfere in the USSR's relations with Mongolia and Vietnam, stressing that our country's cooperation with other sovereign states could not be a subject for Soviet-Chinese talks. If China had no aggressive claims, it would have no difficulties in relations with those countries or with the Soviet Union.

It was also pointed out that if the Chinese side had really displayed a desire to fix the border line more precisely, then in the 10 years since the start of talks on border questions it would have been possible to examine every meter of the border, determine its appropriateness on the basis of a Russian-Chinese treaty document and eliminate the border issue. The Chinese side is not interested in reaching agreement, but in creating a border problem to exploit for political purposes.

Lastly, as regards another "obstacle"--the withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan--which the Chinese authorities "attached" to Soviet-Chinese relations later, this would not have arisen at all if Beijing had not entered into an alliance with imperialism.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the assumption that the accretions in Soviet-Chinese relations will disperse and disappear, provided there are no factors giving rise to them, as soon as an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation begins to be restored. Some of the remaining problems could be resolved on the basis of equality and mutual understanding, while the resolution of others could be postponed.

During the talks in September-November 1979 the Soviet delegation submitted for discussion, as early as the first plenary session, a draft declaration on the principles of mutual relations between the USSR and the PRC--a document of great political significance expressing the Soviet side's principled stance on the question of relations with China.

In accordance with the draft declaration, both sides must pledge to build and develop relations with each other on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, including the principles of complete equality, mutual respect for state independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, the non-use of force and threats of force, and mutual advantage.

In developing these general provisions, the Soviet side proposed to concretize and settle separately the sides' commitments regarding the renunciation of the use of force in any form and of the threat of its use. It was taken into account that this principle, as one of the most important in the UN Charter, is acquiring increasing weight in present-day international life. The USSR and PRC, in accordance with the UN Charter, must refrain from the use of force in whatever form and from the threat of its use in their mutual relations. They will not use armed force against each other, involving any types of weapons, including conventional missile and nuclear weapons.

It was proposed that the sides themselves claim no special rights or hegemony in Asia or in world affairs, and that they pledge to oppose anyone else's claims to special rights or hegemony in world affairs.

The Soviet Union, which itself has no hegemonist aspirations or intentions, is naturally opposed to a hegemonist policy, regardless of the side pursuing it. As is known, the USSR submitted a proposal on the impermissibility of the policy of hegemony in international relations for examination at the 34th UN General Assembly Session. At the same time, the USSR feels it is extremely important to cut short attempts by any side whatever to speculate on the term "hegemonism," create confusion over its real meaning and use it as a demagogic cover for its own hegemonist desires.

Hegemonism is the desire of one state to dominate others. It is the oppression of various countries and peoples. It is the attempt to subjugate others by means of force, pressure, threats, blackmail and interference in internal

affairs. It is the policy of territorial claims, expansion and aggression, the establishment of zones and spheres of influence. It is the attempt to dictate a line of conduct to other countries. It is the imposition of one's own course on other states and the implementation of a policy of hostility toward a particular country.

This policy has always been alien to the Soviet State. Since the time of its birth, the USSR has adhered to the Leninist policy of ensuring peace and security throughout the world and strengthening friendship and all-round cooperation between countries and peoples. This peace-loving policy is recorded and developed in the decisions of the 24th, 25th and 26th CPSU congresses.

In order to create a generally favorable atmosphere in USSR-PRC relations, the Soviet delegation proposed that the sides pledge to show restraint in their mutual relations and to do everything necessary to prevent the emergence of situations capable of causing a dangerous rift in the relations between them. If problems capable of causing such a rift should arise, the USSR and PRC should have contact without delay in order to settle these matters by peaceful means, in a spirit of reciprocity and with a view to each other's legitimate interests. The Soviet side also proposed that the USSR and the PRC make efforts to establish an atmosphere of mutual respect and trust in their relations, including the use of the press and other media to this end, and that they refrain from propaganda likely to cause unfriendly feelings in the Soviet and Chinese peoples toward one another.

When the Soviet side proposed the cessation of unfriendly propaganda, it was proceeding from the belief that this is in itself an important element in the improvement of interstate relations. On the other hand, a general improvement in relations could lead to the removal of many of the difficulties which exist in relations and could pave the way to the resolution of various issues. As is known, the Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed to the Chinese side in the past that the sides refrain from polemics in the press. More than once, it has, on its own initiative and unilaterally, ceased the publication of polemical materials, but this has met with no response in Beijing. Moreover, in China the propaganda campaign of hostility toward the USSR, far from ending, has been stepped up, particularly recently.

The draft declaration also provides for meetings between leaders when necessary, including summit meetings, to exchange views on the most important questions of interstate relations which cannot otherwise be resolved. The Soviet side made this proposal with a view to the fact that such meetings are now widespread in international practice and, so to speak, represent the norm in the regulation of interstate relations.

In accordance with the principles put forward in the draft, the Soviet side proposed to record that the sides will promote the establishment of closer and broader trade, economic, scientific, technical, cultural and other peaceful ties between them.

The draft declaration contains no preliminary conditions. Neither side makes any demands on the other. Neither side is placed in an inferior position.

The commitments envisaged for the sides in the draft are not directed against third countries. The draft is based on the mutual interests of the Chinese and Soviet peoples and it accords with the aims of lasting peace and international security in Asia and throughout the world.

Surely it is clear that if such a declaration was elaborated and formed the basis of Soviet-Chinese relations, firm foundations would be laid for USSR-PRC relations and a new atmosphere would emerge, in which it would be easier to reach agreement and the existing "obstacles" or problems would disappear of their own accord. But the Chinese side rejected the draft declaration and stated on 20 January 1980 that "the holding of Chinese-Soviet talks would be inappropriate at the present time."

Therefore, the same factors which led to the deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations were present: the Chinese rulers' ethnopsychological stereotyped thought patterns, their geopolitical and hegemonist ambitions. Does this mean that people like Deng Xiaoping will continue to be able to impose on China the role of imperialism's junior partner in the policy of hostility toward the Soviet Union and the socialist community? There is no simple answer to this question.

TWO COURSES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Soviet-Chinese relations consist, as it were, of two strata at present: the first is bilateral relations, the second is the international aspects of relations between the two countries.

Since the "Cultural Revolution" up to the present time, the Chinese authorities have been trying to preserve a certain volume of bilateral relations. Embassies operate in Moscow and Beijing; some trade takes place--this amounted to 320-360 million rubles a year and was reduced to 160 million just last year; air and rail communications are maintained; there have been no major border incidents; the joint commission on shipping in the border regions of rivers meets annually. Here, however, the Chinese continue to whip up revanchist sentiments toward the USSR in the Chinese people. The topic of the so-called "lost" territories is bandied about and attempts are made to prove that certain parts of the Soviet Union once belonged to China.

As for the international aspects of Soviet-Chinese relations, they are manifested in the clash of two courses--the course of detente and the preservation of peace and the course of escalating world tension and inciting war. Beijing behavior is marked by fierce opposition to the consolidation of international peace, to the reinforcement of detente and to disarmament talks, and by the tendency to provoke conflicts and exacerbate the situation in various parts of the world. The USSR is described as the "main source of war" and the "enemy of the people." The apogee of this policy is the persistent appeal for the creation of an "international structure" for the struggle against the USSR with the participation of China, the imperialist states and reactionary forces of all types. The Chinese leaders were particularly gratified by the arrival of the new Reagan Administration, which set a course of whipping up the arms race and stepping up confrontation with the USSR and other socialist countries. Beijing has proved a far more reliable and active partner for American imperialism in this vile cause than the Western European NATO allies.

SOVIET INITIATIVES AND BEIJING'S POSITION. The Soviet side has made one move after another and proposed "large" and "small" steps to bring USSR-PRC relations out of the state of crisis, but them on the track of dialogue and contacts and provide positive momentum for their development. We will not list all of the proposals made by the Soviet Union in the 1970's. We will simply mention the four draft agreements on the preservation of the status quo on the border and the draft treaties on non-aggression and the non-use of force. The USSR also began the 1980's with new initiatives.

It was said from the rostrum of the 26th CPSU Congress that "the Soviet Union has not sought and is not seeking confrontation with the People's Republic of China. We are adhering to the course mapped out by the 24th and 25th congresses and we want to build relations with China on a friendly basis. Our proposals aimed at normalizing relations with China are still in force, just as our feelings of respect and friendship for the Chinese people have remained unchanged."¹

On 7 March 1981 the Soviet embassy conveyed to the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs a proposal that confidence-building measures in the Far East be discussed, as these could reduce tension and strengthen peace in this important part of the world. In its message to the PRC Government, the Soviet Government said that some confidence-building measures are already being utilized successfully in Europe. These include the advance notification of military exercises, the exchange of observers to attend these exercises and so forth. The Soviet Union, the message went on to say, believes that the planning and institution of such measures in the Far East--with a view, of course, to its specific features--could not only reduce tension in this region but could also be a great contribution to the consolidation of the foundations of world peace. The measures could be planned jointly by the Soviet Union, PRC, DPRK and Japan--all neighbors in the Far East--and the United States, which has military bases in Japan, South Korea and other territories well known to the Chinese side and is engaged in active military operations here. The institution of these measures in the Far East, where the interests of many states are interwoven, could reduce mistrust.

After announcing that it was also appealing to the DPRK, Japan and the United States with regard to this matter, the Soviet Government noted in the message that if the need should arise for consultations or discussions among representatives of our countries--and this possibility cannot be excluded--in order to put the dialogue regarding these issues on a practical basis, the Soviet Union will certainly be willing to take part in them.

The Soviet side expressed the hope that the PRC Government would give our proposals careful consideration and would think about the kind of steps that might be taken to this end.

The PRC Government did not respond officially to the Soviet message. There was a notice in the Chinese press that confidence-building measures are "useless"² under the conditions of satellite surveillance and that the Soviet proposals were "aimed against the U.S.-Japanese military alliance and against U.S.-Japanese-Chinese strategic coordination."³

On 25 September 1981 the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the PRC embassy, saying that the last round of the border talks had been held in 1978 and suggesting the resumption of the talks in Moscow in the fourth quarter of 1981 or at any other time acceptable to the Chinese side. In its response of 26 December 1981, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed that the talks should be resumed but suggested that they be postponed indefinitely on the pretext that both sides had to make "thorough preparations" for their resumption.

A note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the PRC embassy on 3 February 1982 said that it acknowledged the Chinese side's declaration that it, just as the Soviet side, considers the resumption of the border talks to be necessary. The Soviet side is willing to resume the talks and is awaiting notification of the Chinese side's willingness.

It is now up to the Chinese side. Time will tell whether it is interested in resuming the talks or would prefer to use the question of their resumption as a means of striking bargains, and not only with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet side objected to the reduction of trade in 1981 and proposed its expansion in 1982. A return to the practice of border trade was again proposed.

On 16 December 1981 the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the PRC embassy that contacts should be resumed between the two countries in the area of scientific and technical cooperation, starting with the equivalent exchange of one or two groups of specialists for familiarization with technological achievements in one or two of the following fields: the technology of raw silk fabric production, the technology of chinaware production, the production of mineral fertilizers and raw materials for fertilizers and the production of pesticides. If the Chinese side should wish to exchange experience in other fields, the Soviet side will be willing to consider all proposals. There was no response to this proposal.

On 9 February 1981 the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education expressed its willingness to organize an annual exchange of students and teachers (10 people on each side) in order to improve linguistic knowledge over a period of up to 10 months.

In 1981 four groups of Soviet representatives visited China to take part in various international seminars and symposiums on new technology, but 17 groups of Chinese scientists attended scientific forums in the USSR.

A Chinese sports delegation took part in the 21st World Gymnastics Championship and in the 57th Congress of the International Gymnastic Federation, held in Moscow in November 1981. A Soviet sports delegation with seven members will take part in a track and field competition in Beijing in June 1982. In February 1982 four Chinese athletes took part in the Biathlon in Minsk. The USSR Committee for Physical Culture and Sports invited Chinese teams to take part in international competitions in table tennis in Mogilev and in figure skating in Moscow, but the Chinese side did not accept these invitations, referring to the lack of time for preparation. A group of PRC gymnasts took

part in international competitions for prizes awarded by the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, held in late March and early April 1982 in Moscow and Riga.

Much is being done by the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies and the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society. A number of events have been held in the USSR to commemorate significant events in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations, the Chinese people's liberation struggle and prominent Chinese internationalist communists and famous figures in literature and the arts.

The Soviet side gladly encourages trips by scientists and active members of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society to China.

As for China, it appears that many of the Maoist individuals who imposed ethnocentric stereotypes on China have been buried in the Babaoshan Cemetery. But many are still alive and are in high posts, and they are poisoning the atmosphere with a miasma of national chauvinism. A growing number of people can see, however, that the present-day world is not the "Middle Kingdom" of the era of the T'ang or Ch'ing dynasties, that China has fallen decades or even centuries behind some "barbarians," that modernization will require not magic but hard work and the correct policy for the next 50-70 years and, finally, that the imperialists will not present China with modernization on a plate. As China gains experience in international intercourse, the conviction is growing in that country that the role of imperialism's junior partner is contrary to the interests and dignity of the Chinese people.

THE POLICY OF "LITTLE STEPS" AND THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS. The shortsighted policy which has deprived China of allies and friends and has brought it into imperialism's train is being rejected more and more by the working people, intellectuals and politicians as they discard their Maoist blinders, as their "consciousness is set free" and as they become able to think and express their thoughts. Judging from the material analyzing the situation in China, prepared by the NATO staff in December 1981, even certain figures in the highest echelon of the Chinese leadership are advocating the relaxation of tension in Chinese-Soviet relations, believing that this would give China more freedom of maneuver in the international arena. People in China are becoming increasingly aware that even the developed capitalist states cannot get along without trade, economic, scientific and technical exchange with the USSR and cultural contacts with it.

Under these conditions, the Chinese authorities are taking some "little steps." Nearly half a million books are being purchased and the study of Soviet literature, scientific and technical achievements and economic experience is expanding--all this is being viewed both from the vantage point of studying the "enemy" and with a view to borrowing useful achievements. After the sharp decline in trade in 1981, the Chinese authorities proposed an increase in the volume of trade with the USSR, which will total 230 million rubles in 1982. This still does not compare with the level of the 1970's. They have requested the expansion of freight shipments from Europe and China and vice versa by Soviet railroads, and an agreement has already been reached on this matter. Chinese representatives have begun to take part in various

international (but not bilateral) forums and sports competitions held in the USSR and to permit Soviet representatives to attend similar forums and competitions in China. Individual Soviet scientists and specialists who visit China--although only as guests of the USSR embassy--are given assistance in visiting certain enterprises and scientific and educational institutions. In February-May 1982 a group of Chinese economists visited the USSR as guests of the PRC embassy. They visited USSR Gosplan, USSR Gosstroy and a number of scientific research institutions, enterprises and kolkhozes. In other words, they were granted wide opportunities to learn about the Soviet Union's economy.

It is still too soon to draw conclusions as to whether the "little steps" mean new shoots sprouting in Soviet-Chinese relations or whether they are isolated cases. Unfortunately, it must be said that even after the Soviet side made the abovementioned proposals, the Chinese authorities made a number of statements urging American imperialism to take new anti-Soviet actions and persuading it that Beijing's policy of hostility toward the USSR has remained unchanged, that the destinies and interests of China and the imperialist states are interwoven and that they must adhere to a united line.⁴

The Soviet Union believes that this kind of rhetoric is pointless and is contrary to China's own interests. Our country and party have a constructive program for the future. It was formulated by L. I. Brezhnev in his speech in Tashkent on 24 March 1982. He said: "The principled stance of our party and the Soviet State on the question of Soviet-Chinese relations was clearly set forth in the decisions of the 25th and 26th CPSU congresses. I would just like to remind you of the following elements:

"FIRST. Despite the fact that we have openly criticized and continue to criticize many aspects of the Chinese leadership's policy (particularly foreign policy) as being contrary to socialist principles and norms, we have never tried to interfere in the PRC's internal affairs. We have not denied and do not deny the existence of a socialist social system in China, although Beijing's alignment with the imperialists' policy in the world arena is certainly contrary to socialism's interests.

"SECOND. We have never supported and do not support in any form the so-called 'two Chinas' concept, and we have fully recognized and will continue to recognize the PRC's sovereignty over the island of Taiwan.

"THIRD. There has not been, nor is there now, any threat to the PRC from the Soviet Union. We have not had and do not have any territorial claims on the PRC and we are ready to continue talks on existing border questions with a view to arrival at mutually acceptable decisions. We are also prepared to discuss possible measures to strengthen mutual trust in the Soviet-Chinese border region.

"FOURTH. We remember well the days when the Soviet Union and people's China were united by bonds of friendship and comradely cooperation. We have never regarded the state of hostility and alienation between our countries as a normal development. We are prepared to reach agreement, with no preliminary

conditions, on measures acceptable to both sides to improve Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of mutual respect for each other's interests, non-interference in each other's affairs and mutual advantage--and, naturally, without detriment to third countries. This applies to economic, scientific and cultural relations as well as to political relations--to the extent that both sides are prepared for specific steps in any of these spheres."⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Party's Current Objectives in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," Moscow, 1981, pp 14-15.
2. RENMIN RIBAO, 13 March 1981.
3. Ibid., 3 April 1981.
4. Ibid., 6 February 1982.
5. PRAVDA, 25 March 1982.

COPYRIGHT: "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka" 1982

CSO: 1805/1a-F

PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETING PRC STATISTICAL YEARBOOK EXPLAINED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 82 pp 25-37

[Article by S. A. Ivanov: "Statistics and Politics"]

[Text] **A**n almanac devoted to China's economy has been published in Peking for the first time in the PRC's existence.¹ This vast collection (about 1100 pages) contains documents and materials, reviews, articles and statistics which comprise the most complete picture of the separate branches of the PRC's economy over the past two decades, and of economic policies and science in China.

The almanac consists of eight sections.

The first section contains general information about China: a brief historical essay, reviews of physical and economic geography, the country's administrative division, the national composition of the population, data on party, state and government bodies and public organisations.

The second section includes materials of plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the CPC, of sessions of the National People's Congress and other documents adopted after the 3rd plenary meeting of the CPC CC (December 1978) which announced the shift of emphasis to the field of economic development and signified a move to the right in the Chinese leadership's political course. Also in this section the reader will find the main legislative acts of the PRC, decisions, decrees and circulars on economic matters of the CPC CC and the State Council of the PRC, of ministries and departments characterising the official guidelines of Peking's economic policy for 1978-1980.

The third section includes articles by prominent Chinese economists and administrators in the field on key questions of China's economic policy, on the "readjustment" and economic reform. These reports were written especially for the yearbook and attempt to substantiate the idea of a "Chinese model" of the economy.

Of much interest is the longest, fourth section of the yearbook containing materials on the main branches of industry and agriculture, transport, trade, finance and monetary circulation, and capital construction. This section includes articles on the economic development of various regions of the PRC. The contents reflect the strains within the PRC's economy, the uneven nature of the siting of production, and the drastic differences in the level of economic development of individual areas of the country.

The fifth section reprints the most important articles from the central press on questions of economic theory from 1978 to the first half of 1981, making it possible, as it is noted in the foreword to the collection, to regard it to a certain extent as a yearbook of Chinese economics. The materials in this section bear evidence to the noticeable stepping up of economic research in China which was seriously undermined during the "decade of chaos of the cultural revolution". The centre of economic discussions has now moved from criticism of the "theories of the gang

¹ *China's Economic Yearbook*, Peking, 1981.

of four" to questions of "readjustment" in the economy, of economic reform and the Chinese "model" of modernisation.

The yearbook's sixth section consists of statistical tables, most of which are published for the first time and are of great scientific and practical interest. Since the well-known reference book *The Great Decade* (1959) they represent the first Chinese publication of a number of aggregate figures concerning the development of the country's economy.

The seventh section deals with the main events of the PRC's economic life in the period from December 1978 to December 1980, while the eighth includes various supplements: lists of the main research and educational establishments dealing with economics, periodical publications on economics, scientific societies (including a society for studying the economy of the USSR), of books on economics published in China, etc.

Even a short enumeration of the questions addressed to in the yearbook points to the uniqueness of this publication. The materials of this collection expand the information available for the study of the PRC's economy and merit serious investigation and evaluation by Sinologists.

The very fact of the yearbook's publication and the contents of the materials included show that much more attention has been given to economic problems in China in recent years, that there has been a certain improvement in the standard of research and publications, and that statistical services are being upgraded. This is explained by Peking's desire to get the economy out of its present crisis and away from the "brink of catastrophe" to which it was brought by the policies of Mao Zedong and his associates.

The decision to put out the yearbook was taken by the centre of economic studies under the PRC's State Council. The editorial board of this publication was headed by Director of this centre and of the Institute of Economics under the State Planning Committee, Xue Muqiao. Prominent figures who are not only in charge of the organisation of economic research in China but also take a direct part in drafting economic plans and formulating economic policy served on the board. All this emphasises the importance attached to the yearbook in China itself. It is something much more than an ordinary reference book, being in effect an official publication with considerable political and ideological overtones.

From this point of view, the almanac is intended first of all to substantiate Peking's present political course. It is designed to serve as evidence of the improvement of the situation in China after a long period of political and economic upheavals and of the present leadership's ability to ensure steady development in the country. Commenting on the publication of this yearbook, the newspaper *Renmin ribao* stressed that it should strengthen "faith" in the "four modernisations" and the "resolve" to carry them out.²

The materials in the yearbook are also intended for external consumption. It is not by chance that the foreword mentions the "pressing need" for such a publication for circulation "abroad". The Maoist political and economic "experiments" have not only cost the Chinese people dearly but have also seriously undermined China's international prestige. For the Peking leadership, which is now seeking to "make friends" with world imperialism, it is important to present China as a sound poli-

² *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 8, 1981.

tical and economic partner. The Chinese press notes that the yearbook has attracted attention in a number of Western countries, including Japan, the USA, Britain, France and Italy. So the publication of the yearbook is clearly a propaganda measure to boost Peking's prestige.

* * *

The statistics in the yearbook present the fullest available official system of indicators of the PRC's economic development after the 20-year-long statistical black-out. But, of course, the filling in of this gap caused by the disintegration of China's statistical service as a result of the "great leap forward" and the "cultural revolution" is far from complete.

But the materials of the yearbook make it possible to form a preliminary idea of the dynamics and key tendencies in the PRC's economic development, including the "darkest" periods for students of the Chinese economy (for instance, many figures for 1965 and 1975 are published for the first time) and present a definite picture of the present state of China's economic potential. Here are some of these figures:

	1952	1965	1975	1979
Gross output of industry and agriculture, bln yuan	82.7 (in 1952 prices)	198.4 (in 1957 prices)	450.4 (in 1970 prices)	617.5 (in 1970 prices)
including:				
industry	34.3	139.4	321.9	459.1
agriculture	48.4	59.0	128.5	158.4
national income (in current prices), bln yuan	58.9	138.7	250.5	335.0
Key products:				
coal, mln tons	66.00	232.0	482.0	635.0
oil, mln tons	0.44	11.3	77.0	106.2
steel, mln tons	1.40	12.2	23.9	34.5
electricity, bln kwt hrs	7.30	67.6	195.8	282.0
cotton fabrics, bln metres	3.80	6.3	9.4	12.2
grain, mln tons	163.90	194.6	284.5	332.1

It should be noted that official Chinese statistics can be used only with certain reservations; they require a balanced approach and a thorough verification of the authenticity of the quantitative and qualitative indicators. Such an approach is fully justified, as many Chinese economists admit themselves.

One of the reasons for this is the low reliability of Chinese statistics and the weakness of the PRC's statistical service which is only beginning to get back to relatively normal activity after a lengthy period of disarray. As evidenced by Vice-President of the PRC's Academy of Social Sciences Yu Guanyuan there were times when "statistical work in China was performed by only 14 persons".³

Moreover, statistics were directly subordinated to the political interests of the Maoists. The "super high" indicators of the increment of

³ Keyan guanli, 1981, No. 1.

production in the years of the "great leap" are the most odious example of such statistics: whereas only 200 million tons of grain were harvested in China in 1958, the figure announced was 500 million tons. Similar things happened with the "fulfilment" of plans to produce other types of output as well.

Despite measures taken in recent years to consolidate statistical services, the number of statisticians at the county level and higher now comprise only 76 per cent of the 1965 total while the corresponding figure in the Main Statistical Board is a mere 50 per cent.⁴ According to well-known economist Sun Yefang, "the rash of fictitious data" has not been overcome to this day, "statistics are inaccurate", the "counting methods are imperfect" and the "standard of analysis is low".⁵ This is especially true of value indicators: gross output of industry and agriculture and national income.

Also giving rise to doubts is the "quality" of many indicators in kind. Thus, according to official statistics, the output of coal in the country in 1980 was 620 million tons; by this token, China ranked among the world's top producers. But of this amount, only 344 million tons came from the so-called "mines of uniform state distribution" at which a more or less strict tally of output is kept. The remaining coal came from locally managed mines, including 113 million tons produced by the small and dwarf collieries of agricultural communes and teams. So considering the low grade of the coal, the large percentage of admixtures, a topic repeatedly raised by the Chinese press, the volume of coal production in China in terms of coal of average quality is substantially lower than the official figure.

In addition to this, the figures quoted in the yearbook contain many discrepancies. Thus, it is said on page III-28 that the norm of accumulation in 1979 amounted to 34.6 per cent while the figure on page IV-36 is 33.6 per cent. Page III-39 says that in 1980, of the 266 types of material and technical resources belonging to the nomenclature of uniform state distribution, 224 types were supplied to customers by the so-called method of "open supply", that is by contract. But in the same context page IV-6 speaks of 146 out of 210 types. It is impossible to make sense of the data on the scale of development of the collective sector in trade and services given on page IV-7 and IV-122. In the first instance, it is stated that the number of enterprises in this sector in towns alone (above the county level) exceeded 1.3 million in 1980. In the second instance, it is stated that their number in the country as a whole (including rural areas) was 763,000.

Chinese economists are compelled to admit in one way or another that the indicators of economic growth for the past two decades are incorrect in many ways, that growth of "statistical" value was not always accompanied by a corresponding growth in production of end product, and that a substantial share of the output could not find a market. Suffice it to say, for instance, that given the acute "consumer hunger", a shortage of key industrial and consumer commodities, the stocks of industrial output that could not be sold for various reasons amounted to about 85 per cent of the entire national income created in 1980. Lying unwanted in storehouses were 20 million tons of rolled stock (in 1981 its annual production was 26.7 million tons) and products.

⁴ See *Jingji guanli*, 1981, No. 2.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

of the engineering and electrotechnical industries to the sum of 60 billion yuan.

So the "statistical successes" so vigorously advertised by Peking are often evidence not of the growth of the PRC's national wealth but of just the opposite—the squandering of this wealth as a result of economic failures.

Fulfilling certain "political orders", the compilers of the collection tried to camouflage many of these failures. Thus, in the statistical supplement the authors provide selective data for years and periods that were relatively "favourable" for China's economy (1952, 1957, 1965, 1975, 1979) thereby creating an illusion of steady, dynamic economic development. The method of hushing up the situation in "troubled" branches of social production like civilian engineering which saw a sharp drop in output for 1980 and 1981 serves the same aims. In these two years, the output of power equipment dropped 76.2 per cent; of mining equipment, 61.5 per cent; metal-cutting machine tools, 28.6 per cent; tractors, 58.3 per cent; and the output of locomotives dropped 28.6 per cent. In 1981, the machine-building industry in the PRC ran at one-third of its potential.⁶ It is not by chance that the article in the yearbook on the leading sector of the machine-building industry—enterprises of the 1st Machine Building Ministry—which includes heavy and power engineering, machine tool building, the output of motor vehicles, etc., is three times shorter than the article about the pharmaceutical industry.

But despite these subterfuges, the yearbook admits willy-nilly the tremendous damage inflicted on the PRC's economy by the Maoist distortions of the principles of economic development, the endless political campaigns and the headlong rushes from one extreme to the other so characteristic of Peking's economic policy.

The Chinese working people paid especially dearly for the "great leap forward" and the "cultural revolution". The direct losses of the national economy during the three years of the "great leap" exceeded 100 billion yuan.⁷ The efficiency of social production took a nosedive. The "leap" became a tragedy for Chinese working people—in 1960 the mortality rate exceeded the 1957 level by ten million. As a result of dislocation in industrial and agricultural production and the dismantling of the mechanism of planning and management, the volume of national income produced in 1962 (in 1957 fixed prices) dropped by more than a third as compared with 1959. Output of agricultural produce in 1961 shrunk by more than a quarter as compared with 1958.⁸ The 1960 level was exceeded by Chinese industry only in 1966.

The "cultural revolution" cost China 500 billion yuan. In 1967, the decline of industrial production was 13.8 per cent, and in 1968 it dropped by another 5 per cent.⁹ In 1968-1969 agricultural production was only marking time.¹⁰

A very strained situation took shape in China's economy in the final years of Mao Zedong's life. In 1974-1976 alone the country had a shortfall of industrial output of 100 billion yuan, 28 million tons of steel, and revenue of 40 billion yuan. The "great helmsman" left a disastrous heritage. The Chinese press admits that "it will take 20-30 years to

⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 15, 1982.

⁷ See *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 19, 1981.

⁸ *Yearbook*, p. VI-10.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. VI-13.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. VI-10.

heal the wounds inflicted by the ten years of calamity", as the "cultural revolution" is now called in Peking.¹¹

The departure from the main precepts of Marxist-Leninist theory, disregard for the laws of socialist construction, the great-power orientation of the socio-economic course, hypertrophied development of the military industry, scorn for the pressing needs of the working people, and curtailment of mutually advantageous economic ties with socialist countries—all this generated serious disproportions in the economy. Today Chinese economists cannot but admit (and this is seen from the materials in the yearbook) that China's economy has an irrational structure of branches and territories, a low efficiency rate, and a total lack of planning in production.

True, in the period since 1949 the structure of the PRC's economy has been subjected to substantial transformations. The share of industry in gross output of industry and agriculture rose from 30 per cent in 1949 to 81 per cent in 1980. This indicator, however, speaks not so much of the level of industrialisation of the PRC's economy as of the chronic and profound backwardness of agricultural production which continues to rely mostly on manual labour and is characterised by low productivity and a small percentage of marketable produce. Labour productivity in agriculture has declined by almost a quarter since 1957. More than 300 million people employed in the agrarian sector (in all, 850 million people live in villages) are incapable of ensuring industry with a steady supply of raw materials and the 130 million urbanites with food. In a country where 70 per cent of the national income is created in agriculture and branches connected with the processing of agricultural raw materials, more than 20 per cent of the urban population's grain ration is still ensured by import.

The weakening of agriculture by forced "communisation" and bleeding funds from it to meet military expenditures have undermined the productive forces of the countryside and resulted in the pauperisation of the rural working people. Late in the 1970s, in every fourth production team, the annual per capita income was under 50 yuan, failing to ensure even a subsistence level existence for 100 million peasants.

The industrial base of the PRC, formed in the 1950s with the internationalist assistance of the USSR and other socialist countries, was developed to a certain extent in the subsequent period. But on the whole, under worldwide conditions of rapid scientific and technological progress, it is technically backward and not very productive. Of the 350,000 industrial enterprises in the country, 99 per cent are small and medium ones. They account for 75 per cent of all industrial output and for 80 per cent of all factory and office workers employed in industry. About a quarter of all enterprises are operating at a loss. 43 per cent of the products put out by state-owned enterprises are below top quality standards, while 56 per cent are more material-intensive than stipulated. About a third of the facilities available in Chinese industry stand idle due to shortages of fuel and electricity.

Serious failings have come to light in the field of capital construction. The scope of this construction was artificially inflated for the sake of the political ambitions of the Maoists and greatly exceeded the country's material and technical possibilities. The coefficient of commissioning large and medium projects dropped from 43 per cent during the first five-year-plan period to 6.2 per cent in 1980. The average time need-

¹¹ *Renmin ribao*, July 3, 1980.

ed to complete a construction project exceeded 16 years. The building industry in the PRC needs five to six years just to complete unfinished construction projects begun according to plan, without starting any new ones.¹²

The PRC's economy is experiencing an acute shortage of skilled personnel. As admitted by the authors of the yearbook, a survey conducted at the end of 1979 showed that 8 per cent of all industrial and office workers are either illiterate or semi-literate. Employees with training as engineers or technicians account for a mere 2.8 per cent of the total labour force in industry.¹³ Only a third of the management staff in agriculture "is competent in questions of management".¹⁴ According to official figures, there are more than 150 million illiterates in the country.

The data published in the yearbook and other Chinese press publications point to the sharp contradiction between the great-power, nationalistic and militaristic direction of the economy and the extremely low living standards of the Chinese working people. China is facing complex socio-economic problems: a chronic shortage of housing, food, and basic necessities and rampant inflation.

In the 1970s, the rate of accumulation considerably exceeded the rational level for Chinese conditions and amounted to 33.9 per cent in 1975, to 36.5 per cent in 1978, to 34.6 per cent in 1979 and to 32.4 per cent in 1980. At the same time, the decade from 1968 to 1978 witnessed an annual decline in the real earnings of industrial and office workers, while the value of a workday in the countryside diminished by a third.¹⁵ In 1980, nominal wages amounted to 63.5 yuan a month, while the monthly earnings of peasants on collective farms were 7.2 yuan.

In the period from 1957 to 1978 the grain consumption by the PRC's urban population dropped by 3.2 per cent, and vegetable oil went down 33.3 per cent. As admitted by the Chinese press, the living standards of the peasantry are, on the whole, lower than in 1957.¹⁶ The per capita consumption of sugar by the population is 88.3 per cent less than the world average, consumption of milk is 98.9 per cent less, of meat—60 per cent and of eggs—64.3 per cent less. There is strict rationing of the basic foodstuffs, clothing, footwear and manufactured goods.

The unfavourable demographic situation has again aggravated the problem of unemployment that was almost liquidated by the end of the first five-year-plan period. According to official statistics which the authors of the book prefer not to cite, there were 13 million unemployed in China in 1980, or more than 10 per cent of the urban population.¹⁷

The Maoist course affected all branches of the national economy, the living standards of the population and put China behind industrially developed countries by at least 20 years in industry and 50 years in agriculture. While having the world's greatest labour force and rich natural resources necessary for the country's comprehensive development, the Chinese economy is capable of producing only slightly more than 240 dollars per capita of national income and in this respect is on a level with the underdeveloped countries of the world.

¹² See *Yearbook*, p. IV-9.

¹³ See *Ibid.*, p. IV-35.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. IV-17.

¹⁵ *Jiefang ribao*, Dec. 1, 1979, *Nunye jingji wenti*, 1980, No. 1.

¹⁶ See *Nunye jingji wenti*, 1980, No. 1.

¹⁷ See *China Daily*, Aug. 29, 1981. In the opinion of foreign specialists the real number of unemployed is about 30 million.

Though claiming to embrace all aspects of China's economic policy, the authors of the collection nevertheless prefer to sidestep the question of the prime causes of failures in the economy and the aggravation of disproportions, in particular the militarisation of the national economy. Chinese special economic publications intended for a limited number of selected readers do occasionally mention facts pointing to the lop-sided development of the economy, the excessive growth of the military sector and the spending of a considerable share of the national income on the attainment of the militaristic ambitions of the Chinese hegemonists. For example, the magazine *Xinhua yuebao* was forced to admit that "military production has been turned into a separate system, there is a gap between military and civilian production, and the share of military industry is excessively great".¹⁸

Facts show that the millstones of militarism are grinding away enormous sums that are badly needed for solving the socio-economic problems facing the country. As is known, direct budget allocations for military needs in 1977-1979, that is after the coming to power of the country's new leaders, have grown almost by 50 per cent. In the state budget for 1980, direct military spendings exceeded by 20 per cent the total sum of state allocations for agriculture and by 30 per cent the state allocations for science, culture, education and medical services.

On encountering the aggravation of economic problems, the shortage of financial and material resources, the emphatic condemnation of Peking's militaristic course, and its criminal aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam by the socialist countries and the peaceloving public as a whole, the Chinese leadership has been compelled to "shade" the militaristic aspects of its economic policy, to reduce direct budget allocations for military needs (from 19.3 billion yuan in 1980 to 16.9 billion in 1981) and to use part of the capacities of the defence industry for the production of civilian goods.

But these manoeuvres do not provide grounds for concluding that a reorientation of economic policy to the solution of tasks of civilian development is in the offing. The Chinese leadership is not giving up its course of building military-economic might, and especially nuclear-missile potential. The reduction of direct military allocations in the state budget is compensated for by the growth of corresponding spendings in the budgets of civilian ministries and departments and local budgets. According to Chinese data, for instance, while budget spendings on science were cut in 1981, spendings on research in military and associated branches were increased as compared to 1980.¹⁹ It was stated at a conference on industry and transport held in Hunan province in September 1981 that even under conditions of the "readjustment", enterprises of the military industry should be developed at a priority pace and be the first in line to get types of fuel, materials and initial products that are in short supply. In recent years China tested an inter-continental ballistic missile, staged the largest military exercises in the country's history, conducted new tests of the atomic bomb and carried out other measures that show that China is further building up its military-industrial potential.

Besides, many statements by the Chinese leadership indicate that the present course in the economy is by no means an impediment to its militaristic plans. The magazine *Beijing Review* openly stated that

¹⁸ *Xinhua yuebao*, 1980, No. 6.

¹⁹ See *Keyan guanli*, 1982, No. 2.

Peking does not intend to give up the task of modernising its national defence system.²⁰ It was also reported that the military industry had overfulfilled its plan for 1981 and reduced China's lag behind developed countries in quality of the main types of modern arms.

The materials published in the collection show the consequences to China's economy of the lengthy dominance of Maoism, the price the country's working people have to pay for Peking's great-power, nationalistic ambitions and on the whole confirm the thesis expressed at the 26th Congress of the CPSU that "the experience of the social and economic development of the PRC over the past twenty years is a painful lesson showing what any distortion of the principles and essence of socialism in home and foreign policy leads to".²¹

* * *

The materials of the collection rather patently demonstrate that definite adjustments and changes are being made in the PRC's economic policy after the death of Mao Zedong, especially after the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC.

The main content of these changes boils down to the following: the "shifting of the centre of gravity of the work of the entire Party to the fulfilment of socialist modernisation" has been proclaimed and is being carried out to a certain extent. The task of consolidating the material basis of Chinese hegemonism is being set by Peking as the main aspect of the activity of party, state and economic bodies. Some of the more odious precepts of the Maoist economic policy which have demonstrated their untenability are being discarded, but great-power and nationalistic aims have been retained. Being condemned are such "leftist guiding ideas" in economic development as the "blind pursuit of high rates", the emphasis on "leaps" and the inevitability of disproportions, the one-sided emphasis on the development of heavy industry to the detriment of agriculture, etc. Attempts are being made to improve the situation in the economy and to smooth out the more acute disproportions within the framework of "readjustment". The role of planning is being admitted; measures are being taken to change the system of managing the national economy so it can make more active use of economic levers, and elements of material incentives are being introduced.

At the same time, as it follows from the materials of the collection, China has set course toward restoring its former mixed economy: the state capitalist sector is being revived, for instance, and the private sector is being expanded. Various "systems of production responsibility" (which presently encompass more than 90 per cent of the production teams) are being introduced in agriculture and lead to an "individualisation" of the work of peasants and to the erosion of collective property in the countryside. According to Chinese statistics, of the 6 million main self-accounting units in agriculture, by October 1981 more than 38 per cent had switched to the system of so-called full responsibility of the household for production, actually signifying a return to forms of land use that existed before collectivisation.²² This policy introduces elements of uncontrollable commodity relations into the Chinese countryside and creates the danger of a rebirth of the kulak (rich

²⁰ *Beijing Review*, 1981, No. 48.

²¹ *The 26th CPSU Congress. Documents and Resolutions*, Moscow, 1981, p. 15.

²² *Jingjixue zhoubao*, Jan. 11, 1982.

peasant) stratum and of serious deformations of the existing socio-economic structure of agriculture.

The private sector is rapidly gaining in strength. By October 1981, there were more than a million of private businesses in towns as opposed to 150,000 in 1978. Renting state-owned service enterprises that operate at a loss to private individuals has been permitted, as has the limited use of hired labour. Private and collective enterprise is beginning to play an increasingly noticeable role in the sphere of trade, public catering and the services. The share of these enterprises in the overall turnover of retail trade and public catering, the yearbook says, increased from 8.9 per cent in 1979 to 12.6 per cent in 1980.

Laws adopted in China in recent years legalise the economic activity of Western capitalist companies in China. They are offered certain financial and tax privileges. By the beginning of 1981, foreign capital investments in China amounted to some \$1.5 billion. Late in 1979 China signed agreements on Western credits and loans to the tune of \$27.6 billion.²³

A number of measures that adjust the economic policy and to a certain extent stimulate the economic activity of enterprises, collectives and individual producers may make for some improvement in the situation in the economy and help bring it into line.

At the same time the content of the collection shows convincingly that during its five years in power, China's present leadership, while increasing its attention to problems of developing the economy, has proved incapable of discarding the aims of the Maoist economic policy, renouncing military-industrial buildup and normalising the economic situation in the country. The introduction of some new principles of economic development, including those copied from various bourgeois, right-wing reformist concepts and intended, as it is stated in Peking, to "enliven" the national economy has brought about a general shift of economic policy to the right and the growth of the PRC's economic dependence on the capitalist world.

But the situation in the economy remains complex and unstable to this day and is a constant catalyst of socio-political tension. An effective programme of overcoming economic difficulties has not yet been worked out. The present economic policy and practice of Peking is notorious for its abrupt zigzags. There are no scientifically substantiated economic plans. The texts of many key decisions, reports and draft laws, as well as of decisions on economic matters included in the collection will go down in the history of the PRC as a chronology of unfulfilled promises, contradictory instructions, voluntaristic zigzags and dashed hopes. Suffice it to recall only a few of them.

The first session of the National People's Congress held in March 1978 after the death of Mao Zedong approved the "Basic Provisions of the Ten-Year Plan of Developing the Economy of the PRC for 1976-1985" which provided for the accelerated development of the economy. In particular, the task of increasing the output of oil from 100 to 250 million tons, steel production from 30 to 60 million tons and the grain harvest from 280 to 400 million tons by 1985 was set. The attempts to "spur on" the economy to fulfil far-reaching political plans without solving the problems that accumulated during the long years of Maoist "experiments" resulted in an aggravation of disproportions in the economy and in the worsening of the socio-economic situation. Peking had

²³ *Yearbook*, p. IV-133.

to admit that the difficulties had been "underestimated" and "indicators set too high" during the drafting of the ten-year plan and that "however one revises it, the plan has lost its significance".

The 2nd Session of the National People's Congress in June 1979 announced the scrapping of the ten-year plan and transition to a "readjustment" of the economy intended, as it was officially announced, to span a three-year period (1979-1981). The announcement of the course of the "readjustment" was hailed as a "great historic turn" but actually signified a serious flop of the post-Mao leadership's economic plans.

At the 3rd Session of the National People's Congress (September 1980) the discouraging admission was made that with the exception of the first five-year plan (1953-1957), which, as is known, was drawn up with the USSR's assistance and was successfully completed, the PRC "had no possibility at all of drawing up real plans", and that for a lengthy period of time, planning work "was almost entirely paralysed".²⁴ But just as in the past, in conditions of the preservation of the great-power, nationalistic and militaristic core of the Chinese leadership's present-day policy, the admission of errors did not and could not lead to a rejection of its former aims. The Session of the National People's Congress demanded a swift reform of the economic mechanism, and starting with 1981, ordered that it be spread to all enterprises of the state industry. Decisions were adopted on substantial expansion of the "market regulation" of the economy and the "mounting of competition" between enterprises, and a course of creating a mixed economy was set, to include the state-capitalist and private sectors, and the pursuance of an "open doors" policy in economic ties with the West was envisioned.

The ill-prepared overhaul of the entire economic mechanism caused a new spasm in the economy. The old disease of running ahead too fast made itself felt in the reform. All this, as it is noted by Chinese economists today, brought about an invigoration of parochial tendencies, impeded the reduction of the scale of capital construction, weakened centralised control over the economy, and impaired the fulfilment of the course of "readjustment" in general. It was noted in the Chinese press that "economic disproportions have not been overcome, and in some fields they have become even worse. The aims of the adjustment set forth at the 2nd Session of the National People's Congress have yet to be attained."²⁵

Once again the signal to withdraw was given. In December 1980, a working meeting of the CPC CC on economic questions heralded, as it was reported by the Xinhua Agency, a new "turning point in economic work". The course of further "serious adjustment" of the national economy was formulated. On the one hand, it boils down to the utmost restriction of investments and to freezing the level of the population's incomes and, on the other hand, to attempts to increase stocks of marketable goods, including switching some heavy industrial enterprises over to consumer goods production. The "sweeping, allround reform of the economic mechanism" that was announced by the session of the National People's Congress was put off. Peking stated the need of strengthening centralised planning guidance. The decisions on "mounting competition", on the reform of the system of price-setting and

²⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 15, 1980.

²⁵ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 23, 1980.

the further expansion of the economic independence of enterprises that were adopted by the highest state forum a mere three months prior to this conference were being soft-pedalled. The set of measures outlined by the "further serious readjustment" of the economy was characterised as a "resolute retreat where it is necessary". With the help of these measures, the Chinese intended to achieve a balanced state budget in 1981, curb the issue of money, and to stabilise prices.

But the 4th Session of the National People's Congress in December 1981 had to admit that "the crisis situation in the national economy has not yet been fully liquidated". In 1981, the decline of production in branches of heavy industry was 4.5 per cent. In 1979-1981 the total deficit of the state budget reached the astronomical figure of more than 32.5 billion yuan. Then, Peking stated that the course of "readjusting" the economy would be continued for at least the entire 6th Five-Year Plan (1981-1985). It was also admitted that work to draw up the 6th Five-Year Plan "is still not completed" although earlier there were good intentions to discuss this plan at the session. There were also plans to study the ten-year programme of developing the economy for 1981-1990. But this decision, too, remained on paper.

The constant recarving of plans, the inconsistency and contradictory nature of economic directives have generated an atmosphere of uncertainty and doubts in the country about the stability of economic course and the prospects for China's development as a whole. "There are many ideological problems now; there is total confusion in ideology", laments the magazine *Honqi* of the CPC CC. "What unity can there be in the fulfilment of the four modernisations?"²⁶

On the one hand, the preservation of the aims of Maoist policy objectively nourishes the leftist tendencies that have rather deep roots in Chinese society. "The left-wing deviation in economic work is not just a historical question," wrote the newspaper *Gongren ribao* on November 8, 1980. "It continues to exist to this day." That is why many of the pragmatic precepts and declarations of the Chinese leadership are met with resistance on the part of local officials who sabotage their implementation. In China, there are people who "oppose big changes", who "want to reverse the development of events" and "overthrow the present system and leadership".²⁷

On the other hand, right-wing tendencies are very strong. Their development is enhanced in many ways by Peking's so-called open policy in the field of economic ties with the West, providing for the creation on Chinese territory of mixed enterprises and enterprises fully belonging to foreign capital, the enclaves of capitalism in the form of "special economic zones". This course substantially expands the avenues of Western influence on China and of the negative influence of bourgeois policy and ideology. Peking has had to admit that "some people have insufficient resistance to bourgeois influence and corruptive impact" and that "they blindly adore the Western bourgeoisie".²⁸

The sharp swings of the pendulum of economic policy, the abrupt dashes from ambitious plans of accelerated development to "readjustment" of the economy, from attempts to introduce market methods of economy and decentralisation of management to emphasising the role of state planning and administrative methods of management, from the

²⁶ *Honqi*, 1980, No. 14.

²⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 9, 1982.

²⁸ *Gongren ribao*, Oct. 19, 1981.

unchecked "opening of doors" to the West to the cancelling of multi-billion dollar contracts for foreign equipment—all this, and the continuing struggle within the Chinese leadership determined the transience and vagueness of economic policy, the ambiguity of economic discussions during which both left-wing and right-wing views are expressed.

As the materials of the yearbook show, in this atmosphere of contradictory tendencies, the search for the so-called "Chinese road of socialist construction", as opposed to the experience of real socialism, the rejecting or revising of the general laws of building socialism under the guise of "national peculiarities" has become the main trend of economic theory in China. This "Chinese model" of economic development is perceived by the Chinese economists to have the following main features: mixed economy, use of land by individuals or small groups, selective modernisation of several priority branches and industries, first of all of the military-industrial complex, combination of centralised planning and market regulation in certain proportions, utilisation of the financial, technological and economic assistance of the West.

Peking's claims that it must create its own "model" under the pretext of taking into account "national peculiarities" have an obvious ulterior political motive. In the recent past, Peking used the hyperbolisation of these "peculiarities" to substantiate various leftist concepts of social development of the notorious "barracks communism" type. Today "national peculiarities" are again appearing as the main argument in favour of the present version of "socialism of the Chinese type", of the Chinese "model" of socio-economic development which, as stated by the Peking theoreticians, should "differ from the Soviet model and the models of other countries".²⁹ The purpose of these "peculiarities" is to justify the belittling of the experience of building socialism in the USSR and the other fraternal socialist countries and a disregard for the general laws of socialist construction.

"The Soviet Union is not imposing any patterns or 'models' of state organisation on anyone, ignoring the peculiarities of any given country", states the resolution of the CPSU CC "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". "It exerts a growing influence on the course of history by the very fact of its existence, by the real practice of the new type of social and international relations, by force of example in the solution of most complex problems..."³⁰

Closely intertwined on the pages of the yearbook are views reflecting China's real economic problems and cunning propaganda, sparse statistics and selfish political designs. Though reflecting the changes taking place in the PRC's economy, the yearbook does not provide an answer to the pressing question: will the people in Peking be able to overcome their Maoist heritage? But it is on this that the country's emergence on the healthy road of development depends. It is only scientific communism, a renunciation of those aspects of the present policy that are not in accord with the principles and norms of building socialism, that can help solve the difficult problems in the economy because there is no nor can there be any road to socialism in circumvention of the general laws discovered by Marxism-Leninism and confirmed by the experience of the USSR and other socialist countries.

²⁹ *Yearbook*, p. III-41.

³⁰ *Pravda*, Feb. 21, 1982.

COPYRIGHT: Translation into English, Progress Publishers, 1982

COPYRIGHT: Akademiya Nauk SSSR

POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL CONFUSION SHOWS 'SOCIAL CRISIS' IN CHINA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 82 pp 38-50

[Article by V. Ya. Matyayev and V. P. Fetov: "China: Some Aspects of Domestic Development"]

[Text] Nearly six years have already passed since the death of Mao Zedong (September 9, 1976) and the removal of the "gang of four", the leaders who were closest to him and headed the extreme "left" wing of the Maoists (October 6, 1976). This justifies an attempt to see what results have been achieved by Mao's successors and to evaluate their policy. As though in anticipation of this, the Peking leaders themselves have engaged in summing up some results, portraying the post-Mao period as the most fruitful stage in the history of the CPC and the PRC.

The tone for the official propaganda was set by the report of the most influential leader currently, Deng Xiaoping, on January 16, 1980, to 10,000 representatives of the leading cadres. It was contended in the report that "a great change" has taken place in China since the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC (December 1978), that "the political situation has entered the stage of stability and cohesion, vigour and buoyancy", that "positions for victorious advance have been comprehensively prepared". Deng also announced "tremendous successes in the economy", though he did not say anything to confirm his words. He declared as "absolutely erroneous and groundless" any doubts about the most optimistic evaluations of the domestic situation and the prospects of China's development and demanded that the cadres "show not the slightest wavering".¹

Since then, a constant campaign has been underway in China to publicise the regime's "achievements", the "stability" and "upsurge" that it has supposedly ensured. The 6th Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC of the 11th convocation, held late in June 1981, gave a fresh impulse to this campaign and muted the criticism of the recent past. The Plenum set forth the theses of "concerted advance" and the supposed "rectification of all mistakes and restoration of all that was correct" at the highest level.² Everything is being done to inculcate the belief that the leadership has a scientifically substantiated, clear, precise, agreed-upon "line" ("the Marxist-Leninist line has been restored", as the CPC CC Decision on Certain Aspects of the History of the CPC Since the Formation of the PRC, adopted by the Plenary Meeting declared).

To say that such contentions are premature is an understatement. Indeed, rather serious changes are taking place on the domestic scene in modern China. But in many ways they are an inevitable, forced retreat from the disastrous practices of Maoism, political manoeuvring that is

¹ *Zhengming*, Hong Kong, March 6, 1980.

² *Renmin ribao*, June 30, 1981; July 1, 1981.

absolutely essential for getting the country out of the impasse and the crisis engineered by Mao Zedong.

At the 26th CPSU Congress Leonid Brezhnev said: "At present, changes are under way in China's internal policy. Time will show what they actually mean. It will show to what extent the present Chinese leadership will manage to overcome the Maoist legacy. But, unfortunately, there are no grounds yet to speak of any changes for the better in Peking's foreign policy. As before, it is aimed at aggravating the international situation, and is aligned with the policy of the imperialist powers. That, of course, will not bring China back to the sound road of development. Imperialists will never be friends of socialism".³

* * *

The changes that have taken place as compared with the situation that existed in the country only five or six years ago are considerable. The leadership has departed from Mao Zedong's fundamental leftist precepts, first of all from the "theory" and practices of the "cultural revolution". Constitutional bodies of power and administration and various departments are being restored to political life, and the YCL, trade unions and other public organisations are formally operating again. The democratic parties within the framework of the organ of the united front—the People's Political Consultative Council of China—are again working. The system of direct elections to bodies of state power is being introduced at the county level.

A criminal code and a code of criminal procedure have been adopted for the first time in the PRC's history, and other legislation is being drafted. Steps are being taken to develop science and education. There are some positive changes in the sphere of literature, art and publishing.

Of much political importance is the condemnation of the Maoist repressions, the posthumous rehabilitation of the former Chairman of the PRC, Liu Shaoqi, and other victims of the Maoist political campaigns and also the recognition of the historic importance of the 8th CPC Congress. The closest associates of Mao Zedong of the times of the "cultural revolution", including his widow Jiang Qing, have been brought to trial. All this can be assessed only as evidence of the bankruptcy of the political course of Mao Zedong in its most important aspects and this has objectively undermined the "great helmsman's" erstwhile prestige.

The present Chinese leaders have arrived at the recognition of the importance of economic work, of the need for planned, balanced development of the economy, the use of economic levers, of rejecting levelling and restoring the system of material incentives. Measures are being taken to overcome the disproportions in the economy that express themselves first of all in the hypertrophied—given Chinese conditions—development of heavy industry, the economically unjustified ballooning of accumulation in the national income and the backwardness of the agrarian sector. The task of rectifying the former extreme neglect of agriculture, of bolstering weak sectors of the economy, and raising the efficiency of production and management are being stressed. The aim of improving the standard of living of the working people on the basis of increased production is also being declared and the wages of a considerable part of the working people have been increased, although it must be said that this increase has failed to keep up with the inflationary growth of prices.

³ *The 26th CPSU Congress. Documents and Resolutions*, Moscow, 1981, p. 15.

A number of statements very critical of Mao and his "thought" were made in China in 1979 and 1980, including at the highest level. It was said that the "thought of Mao Zedong" is "inapplicable" to modern China, that it cannot be regarded as a development of Marxism-Leninism, and that its political value is little. Severe criticism was levelled against the "big leap forward" and other voluntaristic experiments of Mao. The "cultural revolution" was described as a "misfortune", a "catastrophe", a "feudal fascist dictatorship", etc.

In short, the assessments of Mao Zedong, his "thought" and policy made earlier by the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties were in effect confirmed.

But this is only one aspect of the complex processes taking place. The forces that took the upper hand in the Chinese leadership after Mao's death veered sharply to the right, imposing a nationalistic policy of a right-wing reformist type of the country. Measures that signified a retreat from the positions already gained by socialism were carried out. This expressed itself in the acceptance of the extended existence of a multi-sectoral economy and the restoration in practical terms of state-capitalist and private sectors.⁴

Under Mao Zedong, the deformation and distortion of socialism took place mainly because superstructure used socialist forms of ownership of the means of production (state and cooperative forms) for anti-socialist purposes. Now the sphere of operation of the socialist economic sector is being narrowed because negative basic processes have come into being and forms of economic activity alien to socialism are springing to life. The danger to the positions of socialism in China is aggravated by the overall pro-imperialist policy of Peking, by its courting of foreign loans and credits and by the flow of foreign capital into the country.

The multisectoral economy, farming by small groups or individuals, the selective "modernisation" of military and allied industries first of all, the combination of centralised planning with "market regulation", the use of financial, technical and economic aid from leading capitalist countries—all this is now being presented as a "Chinese road" of development that accords with the conditions in the country, as a type of "socialism that suits China"⁵. Taking this into account, Peking's imperialist "partners" are trying by all means to push China off the rails of socialism, to draw it into the system of the international capitalist division of labour.

While this indeed makes it possible to alleviate some difficulties and to solve some immediate problems (for instance, to breathe new life into the market and to increase agricultural production by making maximum use of small-scale peasant farming), this right-wing pragmatic policy has not led to any major positive changes in the country's socio-economic life. Contrary to official evaluations, it has not become a factor capable of ensuring stability and overcoming the crises. On the contrary, as time passes its destabilising role both in the economy and in China's socio-political affairs is manifesting itself with increasing clarity.

The main details of the political picture of post-Mao China are as follows: an acute factional struggle at the very top and in various echelons of the party and state apparatus continues; there are frequent reshufflings in the leading bodies of the party and the state as a reflection

⁴ State-capitalist enterprises using the money of both national and foreign bourgeoisie are appearing. In 1981, the latter's investments in various forms amounted to about \$1.5 billion. Small private enterprises are cropping up.

⁵ *Hongqi*, 1982, No. 6.

of this struggle; the failure of all attempts to take the party out of the continual serious ideological and organisational crisis and to restore its guiding role; social tension is mounting, this finding its expression in various forms of popular protest and dissatisfaction and in the "credibility crisis" which the Chinese press itself describes as a lack of faith on the part of the people in the leadership's ability to ensure the fulfilment of the proclaimed course of "four modernisations", to improve the life of working people, and to place the country firmly on the rails of progress; attempts to get the economy to function smoothly are not producing the desired effect, and new socio-economic difficulties are appearing (the serious decline in the rates of growth of production, the appearance of new disproportions, the growth of unemployment, growth of inflation and the budget deficit);⁶ there is no clear-cut social orientation with respect to questions of China's further development; there are sharp differences of opinion on all these matters.

The policy of the Peking leaders bears the stamp of half-hearted measures, instability and the constant introduction of amendments to decisions already approved. While losing ground in the top echelons of power, the "leftists" still have considerable influence and support in the country as a whole. The right-wing leaders headed by Deng Xiaoping, who hold pro-imperialist views on the main issues, have to take this into consideration as well as the special positions of the groupings of Deputy Chairman of the CPC CC, prominent economist Chen Yun, and Deputy Chairman of the CPC CC, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Ye Jianying. Behind a smoke-screen of talk about "cohesion" and "collective leadership", each of these groupings is striving to secure key positions in the party and state apparatus for itself. The adoption of long-term economic plans is being put off because of endless disputes and the struggle for influence. The date of the 12th CPC Congress has already been postponed several times.

Although long-term planning is invariably proclaimed as a top priority task, neither a sixth five-year plan nor any other long-term plan has appeared in recent years, while the current annual plans of developing the national economy are adopted late in the year and actually consist of scattered target assignments which are being constantly changed. The amplitude of the pendulum of economic policy is great: from attempts to accelerate production growth rates to drastically slowing them down, from pinning hopes on capitalist methods and decentralisation of management to recognition of the role of state planning, from autarchy to the "open doors" policy in the hope of "buying modernisation" from the West, and finally to a certain sobering in this respect.

In China, "democratisation" is of a "showcase" nature in many ways and is chiefly implemented in forms that do not restrict the authorities and are directed at giving a "nicer appearance" to the remaining mainstays of the regime to placate foreign public opinion. At the same time, the repressive apparatus is being strengthened and spending on its upkeep is being increased. The army is still the mainstay of the regime, even though it is no longer pushed to the foreground.

When struggle was mounted against the "leftists", a certain amount of criticism of the "thought of Mao Zedong" fit in with the plans of Deng Xiaoping's faction and was secretly instigated by it. But then the leadership and Deng Xiaoping himself increasingly began to fear

⁶ See *Renmin ribao*, March 5, 1982.

any further deepening of the criticism of Maoism, viewing it as a danger to the regime as a whole.

So the people in Peking resorted to a modification of Maoism and began re-interpreting the "thought of Mao Zedong" in accordance with the requirements of current political practice. The latest interpretation was represented as a "restoration of the true appearance of the thought of Mao Zedong" in the form of an "integrated scientific system". In this capacity, it is no longer presented as a mere "Sinicisation of Marxism", but again is being passed for a "development of Marxism-Leninism", as was the case under Lin Biao and the "gang of four". More than that, it is being contended, in effect, that by itself Marxism-Leninism cannot be the guiding ideology of the CPC because "it is European both in form and content". In other words, while intensively parasitising Marxism-Leninism and making statements about the "application of Marxism-Leninism in conditions of China", the Peking leaders are continuing to substitute Maoism for the former.

While making certain changes in home policy, the Peking leaders are marching further along the Maoist course in international affairs. Now they are "interacting strategically" with imperialism in the name of joint struggle against socialism, national liberation, democracy and progress. One can speak of "changes" in this field only in the sense of the greater class betrayal that characterises the PRC's foreign policy. Just as under Mao Zedong and the "gang of four", the Chinese people are being deceived. Under various pretexts and slogans, an openly anti-socialist policy that stems from the overall great-power, hegemonistic course of the leadership is being imposed on the people of China. Their country is being turned into a seat of aggression, a source of danger to peace and security of other nations. Sinking further into "cooperation" with the imperialists which is directed against the USSR and other socialist countries and which is increasingly acquiring a strategic, militaristic character, China is becoming imperialism's junior partner and henchman.

This policy, which subordinates the country's development to Sino-centrist, hegemonic ambitions is in contradiction with the cardinal interests of the Chinese people. Propaganda of the "Chinese road" and the "Chinese economic model", that are offered in contrast to the experience of the USSR and world socialism, is intensifying in Peking. As to "modernisation", it is viewed through the prism of anti-Sovietism and its achievement is associated with the possibility of playing a "still greater role" in the struggle against the USSR and "tying down" the Soviet armed forces.⁷

So China's political development in the period after Mao has been very contradictory. The reason for this is not so much inertia of the past as the system of views held by Mao's successors, views dominated by the ideals of hegemonism and great-power arrogance. Their ambitions are getting the upper hand over the true long-term interests of the Chinese people, over the need to take the country's real needs and possibilities into account. The Chinese leaders refuse to use genuine Marxism-Leninism to solve the country's socio-economic problems. Under the pretext of "searching for a road which suits the actual conditions of China", they are imposing a nationalistic line of development on it. This policy contradicts the policy-making theses of the 8th CPC Congress, the importance of which is purportedly being admitted in China once again, but which in reality are adjusted by Peking to suit its present course.

⁷ See Sixiang Zhangxian, 1981, No. 4.

The 6th Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC was a definite milestone on the road of China's political development. It signified yet another temporary compromise at the top based on the Great-Han aspirations of Maoism. Moreover, the compromise in the sphere of division of power was supplemented by a compromise in the sphere of ideology formalised in the lengthy and contradictory Decision on Some Aspects of the CPC's History Since the Formation of the PRC adopted by the Plenum.

Like previous ones, this Plenary Meeting did not break with the past, did not analyse the mistakes and failures made both during and after Mao's lifetime, did not show the causes for these failures and did not offer any clear, scientifically substantiated prospects. Events before the Plenary Meeting, and especially those after it demonstrated that the meeting was not of the epoch-making importance imputed to it by Peking. It is only an intermediate link in the chain of phenomena connected with internal political struggle. The results of its work expressed themselves in the adoption of a system of historical and ideological falsifications designed to justify the leadership's present line, to whitewash Maoism in the above-mentioned spirit and turn this whitewashed version into the ideological and political platform of the post-Mao regime, into a "uniform" ideology of the party and the people.

The practical significance of the Plenum is that it demonstrated the limit to which the present ruling upper crust is prepared to stretch the historical truth. It seeks to confuse matters, operate on half-truths and restrict itself to such biased "criticism" of Mao and "self-criticism" as will help it retain the Sinocentrist nucleus of Maoism and, most important, to pass the present leaders off as both legitimate successors of Mao and innovators who are creatively blazing the trail forward.

The Plenum concentrated on the solution of political, ideological and cadre problems while putting off the most important questions of economics, foreign policy and the date of convening the 12th CPC Congress because of a lack of agreement. The adoption of the Decision on Some Aspects of the History of the CPC Since the Formation of the PRC was timed to coincide with the 60th anniversary of the CPC. This is the second document of such a general character adopted in the more than 60-year history of the CPC. The first, the Decision on Some Aspects of Our Party's History⁶, was adopted on the very eve of the 7th CPC Congress (1945), the congress where the "thought of Mao Zedong" was proclaimed the party's guiding ideology. It contained an interpretation of the party's history in a manner suiting Mao on the eve of the moment when he was to take the decisive step to consolidate his dominance of the CPC. The present document, too, was adopted before a CPC Congress and is intended to consolidate a version of Maoism that suits the purposes of the present leaders. Again the "thought of Mao Zedong" is being declared the "guiding thought of the Party" which "will continue to direct our activities over a lengthy period of time".

The history of the CPC and the PRC is presented as a process of the assertion and "victories" of the "thought of Mao Zedong" as opposed to the line of the internationalist forces in the CPC which are criticized in the Decision. The events connected with Mao's usurpation of power in the party are singled out as the most important milestones of its history. On the whole a "shift" in defining and timing the stages of the Chinese

⁶ Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1953, Vol. 4, pp. 321-405 (in Russian).

se revolution and the development of the PRC is made in the Decision. At odds with reality, it ascribes all successes to Mao Zedong while hushing up and making obscure the errors, failures, repressions and lawlessness connected with his directives.

The course of the revolution in China and the emergence of the PRC are portrayed as a result of the "independent" line of the CPC which acted outside the framework of the world revolutionary process. The Decision falsifies history and ignores the part the international factors played in the Chinese revolution. It is haughty in its disregard for the international communist movement. It does not even mention the countries and forces of world socialism and slanders the CPSU, the USSR and the Comintern.

Mao's crimes and miscalculations are presented only as "mistakes". Moreover, responsibility for them is laid upon the whole party. Under the guise of consideration for national specificity, the Chinese leaders exaggerate and make absurd Lenin's correct, essential thesis on the combination of the international and the national, belligerently oppose the theoretically and practically untenable concept of "Sinicised Marxism" to the international Marxist-Leninist teaching.

Trying to "cross" Maoism with Marxism-Leninism by way of adulterating and distorting the latter from right-wing revisionist positions, the Chinese leadership in effect continues to make use of notions of petty-bourgeois socialism, which in its very essence contradicts the Marxist-Leninist teaching. The greater part of the cadres holding leading posts at home have long been connected with Mao's views and activities, and this is making itself felt. They covered a considerable distance with him along the petty-bourgeois path, and today they are connected in some way or another with the modification of Maoism. Being Maoists of various shades, they are united by their common desire to preserve "Sinicised Marxism" and the "thought" of hegemonism.

The Decision expounds on the theses of the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC. It is clear, however, that the revival of Maoism is clashing with sentiments spreading in the party and society. The Peking leaders are intimating that in the "continuity" of policy on a Maoist basis they see the key to "stability". But in reality, their line leads to the formation of a lasting universal contradiction between the objective necessity of putting an end to the Maoist heritage and the subjective intent of the leadership to perpetuate the main elements of Maoist policy. There is no doubt that this contradiction will lead to more collisions of varying intensity in different spheres of the country's life.

* * *

Events of the second half of 1981 and the beginning of 1982 confirm this conclusion. Of course, official Peking propaganda, as before, tries to paint a rosy picture of the country's socio-political development. According to it, "unity of views has already been attained within the party on the key questions of historical truth and untruth and also on the currently implemented political directives. The party has performed its historical task of putting an end to chaos and returning to the correct path in the sphere of the guiding ideology". Peking has also declared that "a new road of developing the national economy has been found that accords with the specific conditions of the country", and that "the country's economy has embarked on the road of healthy development".⁹

⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 1, 1982; March 15, 1982.

In interviews with foreign guests, both Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping portray the situation in the same cheerful spirit. Similar thoughts, though somewhat more cautiously, were expressed also by another Deputy Chairman of the CPC CC—Li Xiannian. Speaking on January 24 at a reception in the building of the National People's Congress, he declared: "A further ideological cohesion of the people has been attained, society has become more stable, the adjustment of the national economy is being carried out with still greater success".¹⁰

Reality, however, does not confirm such assessments. "There are still numerous difficulties and a mountain of problems", wrote the newspaper *Heilongjiang ribao* on the eve of 1982.¹¹ On November 27, 1981, the Peking newspaper *Beijing ribao* noted: "The ideological situation in the party and within the masses is very complicated. Not only does the left-wing deviationist ideology has a great influence, but there also exist such serious phenomena as subjectivism, bureaucratism, extreme individualism, anarchism, factionalism, isolationism and other manifestations of non-proletarian ideology".

It is also admitted in the Chinese press that "some party cadres are retreating from the line of the CPC CC, up to and including open actions against the CC" and are resorting to "vicious attacks against the CC, and against the line of the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC".¹² It follows from some materials that it is differences over the present policy of the CPC CC that form the dominant tendency in party organisations.

It should be stressed that it was precisely the period of "study" of the Decision adopted by the 6th Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC that gave fresh evidence of the continuing crisis in the party and of its inability to be the guiding force today. Materials published in China show that what now characterises the CPC is sabotage of decisions adopted at the top, abuse of power by party functionaries, corruption and disintegration, parochialism, factionalism, forming of splinter groups, lack of control over the carrying out of decisions and disunity and conflicts among cadres. The actual situation in the CPC is evidenced by the fact that despite the orders of the CPC CC that conferences to elect delegates to the 12th Party Congress be held before November 1980, most of the provincial party organisations have been unable to convene such conferences so far.

The state of ideological disarray and disunity characteristic of the party is aggravated many times over on the scale of society as a whole. Special alarm is caused by entry into adult life of young people (more than a half of the country's population of a billion) among whom Maoist policy has sown sentiments of apathy, anarchism and nihilism. It is asserted that the young people are "politically immature, easily embrace both correct and incorrect views" and do not lend themselves to guidance.¹³

Contrary to statements that "a new road of development of the national economy" has been found, Peking's activities in the economic field have demonstrated that, first, empirical economic incentives by themselves do not lead to positive changes in political and social development and, second, that the country's leaders have no long-term, realistic economic policy at all, that they are neck deep in arguments over questions of economics, constantly waver in choosing priority industries, and change

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Jan. 25, 1982.

¹¹ *Heilongjiang ribao*, Dec. 30, 1981.

¹² *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 8, 1982.

¹³ See *Zhongguo qingnian bao*, Nov. 10, 1981.

their preferences for practical measures to remedy the situation incessantly.

It was noted in a survey of the Chinese economy made by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development that the country's leadership lacks "political consensus" as to the direction of and prospects for the economy's development and that neither has a serious analysis of the state of the economy been made. What it has is not a programme of action but a set of different variants for possible development of events. The Peking press notes that in the field of planning "there is no uniform understanding".¹⁴

The 4th Session of the National People's Congress held late in 1981 also failed to clarify these matters. The leadership's contentions about the existence of completed "outlines" of the 6th Five-Year Plan for 1981-1985 remained hanging in mid-air because this plan was not submitted to the session and was not discussed by it.¹⁵ It limited itself to the "adoption in principle" of the outlines of the economic development plan for 1982. Thus it was again patently confirmed that the ability to do long-term planning has been lost in China. Likewise, the inefficiency of the appropriate agencies became obvious. The leadership proclaimed at the session that the policy of "adjustment" would be continued for at least the next five years. No outlines of a concrete programme of "modernisation" can be seen, and the task of "defining the general aim of modernisation... and the concrete aims of each stage" is only being set. The Peking leaders are increasingly getting the message that the strategy of "running to the right" brings fresh complications.

Using as a pretext the public's demands for an end to bureaucratism, which has become a veritable political plague in China, the Peking leaders began, in January and February of this year, large-scale reorganisation of the bodies of power and administration, planning to substantially reduce the number of ministries and departments and the size of their staffs. On the basis of existing reports, it is early to say how well this new reform has been thought out and prepared since it affects the status of millions of officials who are extremely sensitive to any changes in their position. But what is already absolutely clear is that, contrary to statements to the opposite, the measures adopted do not signify a fundamental overhaul of the conservative political system within which the cadres form a caste.¹⁶ Neither have these measures lead to a substantial reduction of administrative expenses. These transformations appear rather to be a means of diverting the public's attention from its demands to dismantle the bureaucratic machine, which the public at large associates with the political practices of Maoism and the voluntarism typical of it. Although the perfection of the mechanism of administration is objectively necessary and urgent it is being conducted, like the previous "initiatives" of the Chinese leadership, by campaign methods and is acquiring the features of an extensive purge.

Last but not least, the Peking leadership's foreign policy course is clearly becoming a factor that exerts a destabilising influence on the internal situation in China. There was a time when China's foreign policy, based on friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, served as a mighty factor in the moral and political

¹⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 28, 1981.

¹⁵ It was announced in January 1982 that outlines of the 6th Five-Year Plan are to be submitted to the 5th Session of the National People's Congress in 1982, i. e., at least 18 months after the beginning of the five-year-plan period.

¹⁶ *Hongqi*, 1982, No. 6.

rallying of the CPC and the Chinese people under the banners of progress and socialism. The situation is totally different now. Peking's anti-Soviet, pro-imperialist course is exerting a baneful, divisive influence on the ideological and political state of Chinese society, both as a result of the direct penetration of the country by bourgeois ideology (the danger of which is already admitted in China) and foreign capital, and of China's siding with imperialist reaction and its rejection of the progressive ideas of our time, of Marxism-Leninism.

* * *

The frenzied measures of the authorities on the ideological and political front are an important indicator of the social crisis in China. The fundamental cause of the failure of the post-Mao leaders in this field is rooted in the absence of a reliable foundation in the form of a stable, scientifically proven socio-economic course, in the typically Maoist discrepancy between words and deeds, and, in this case, between the declarations filled with socialist phraseology and the many concrete measures that further jeopardise the people's socialist gains, undermined as they already are. The campaign to study the Decision adopted by the 6th Plenary Meeting is indicative in this respect. It was viewed by the Chinese leadership as a unifying platform for overcoming the ideological disarray reigning in the party and society, as a document "of great importance for the unification of ideology within the party".¹⁷ But the intrinsically contradictory Decision distorting the truth generated new discussions in the party and society, resulting in a serious struggle of views which demonstrated that Maoism as an ideology and resolutions based on it cannot serve as an instrument of cohesion.

The apology for this document that appeared immediately after the plenary meeting soon gave way to attempts to "explain" the theses contained in it. Then materials that were pleading and defensive in tone were published. But when it became clear that the "arguments" had not convinced anyone, orders were sent down to end the discussions and accept everything as it stood.

This is the source of the admissions that the state of affairs on the ideological front is "unsatisfactory", that political work is extremely ineffective and that "there have been no fundamental changes" in the outlook of party members or the masses. These admissions were made at national conferences on ideological and political work in the army, in industry and transport, and among young people, held early this year, and at the January meeting of the Central Commission of the CPC on the verification of discipline. The reason for this situation is that in addition to the remaining "left-wing" influence, other sentiments and various manifestations of disgruntlement, labeled in the PRC as "bourgeois liberalisation", are increasingly making themselves felt.

The numerous Maoist errors and distortions, especially the "cultural revolution", resulted in the distortion of the very notion and perception of socialism in the minds of the masses in China, first of all the younger generation. At the same time the course of "four modernisations" was set forth without a clear-cut political or ideological definition, without clear class positions or social orientation, without the assertion of the leading role of the Communist Party (even a Maoist-style one). The

¹⁷ Deng Xiaoping's speech at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC on June 29, 1981.

amorphous calls of the type of "unfettering the consciousness" and "practice is the only criterion of truth" that were used by Deng Xiaoping's supporters in the heat of the power struggle actually prepared the ground for the revival and spread of nihilistic, ultra-individualistic and openly anti-communist views, opinions and concepts, for attacks from overtly bourgeois positions, denying the possibility of a socialist perspective for China and negatively assessing the road traversed by the PRC in the thirty years since its establishment and the socialist transformations of the first decade in particular.

This process was stimulated by the accelerated "opening of the country" to the West, by the Chinese mass media's non-critical and sometimes simply "showcase" presentation of the economic situation and living conditions of workers in developed capitalist countries, coupled with slandering the reality in countries of real socialism.

Those who profess the above-mentioned sentiments are displeased with any steps or statements that even slightly obstruct the dismantling of the foundations of socialism in China. It is through this prism that they look at the Decision which formally proclaims adherence to socialism and confirms the guiding role of the CPC.

Facts show, however, that the leadership in Peking is alarmed by the invigoration in the CPC of those who criticise Maoism from Marxist-Leninist positions or positions close to Marxism-Leninism, who view the "thought of Mao Zedong" as "historical idealism in combination with narrow-minded empiricism", as "a world outlook of petty producers personified by the peasantry", who describe the supporters of Mao's views as "an anti-scientific, anti-democratic, conservative grouping which under the front of Marxism bases itself on peasant socialism and feudalism".¹⁸ The campaign of studying the Decision showed that there are "people in the party who did not support the thought of Mao Zedong previously and continue to negate it now," who reject the assessment of his role and place in the history of the CPC and the PRC contained in the Decision.¹⁹ "There are also such comrades", one of such items noted, "who hold that the thought of Mao Zedong was suitable only for the period of the new democratic revolution and cannot be applied in conditions of socialist construction".²⁰ The thesis on the successes in the PRC's development as a result of the supposedly exclusive implementation of the Maoist line and of Mao Zedong's leadership is being questioned.

Strange though it may seem, such views are also referred to as manifestations of the new socio-political trends of "bourgeois liberalisation". More over, it is clearly intimated that they present the greatest danger. Pressure on all the most consistent critics of Maoist policy and those dissatisfied with the Peking upper crust is being organised first of all and mainly under the guise of a struggle against "bourgeois liberalisation". This accent accords with the interests of Deng Xiaoping's pro-imperialist grouping because attention is being diverted from its accelerating shift to the "right" in home and foreign policy.

For the same reasons and also because of the continuing power struggle it is not in the interest of Deng and his supporters to see an excessive attenuation of struggle on "the other front"—against "leftism", although to a certain extent, this does obstruct their efforts to camouflage the indissoluble connection between the "thought of Mao Zedong" and

¹⁸ *Xinhua ribao*, Sept. 16, 1981.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*; *Jiefang ribao*, Sept. 18, 1981.

²⁰ *Xin shiji*, 1981, No. 9.

the repressive terrorist practices of Maoism at the time of the "cultural revolution". Time and again calls are sounded to concentrate on the total uprooting of the "residual influences of leftism".²¹

From the viewpoint of the alignment of forces (and, correspondingly, of factional contradictions) the launching of an all-out offensive against "bourgeois liberalisation" is restrained by the fact that the views covered by this notion are expressed first of all by representatives of the more literate segments of the population without whom the modernisation of the country is impossible. Given the continued existence of the "leftist" opposition, such an offensive on "bourgeois liberalisation" may objectively facilitate and strengthen the positions of those who criticise the present course from the "left". In these conditions, the calls from above for an intensification of ideological and political work are quite ineffective and often run up against open sabotage. Taught by the bitter experience of the "cultural revolution" and other such campaigns of "ideological struggle", the cadres regard such calls as a prelude to a purge. Their passive attitude is also explained by the uncertainty as to the outcome of the infighting in the top leadership and reluctance to identify themselves with an unproven political line.

With a view to place the forming of social consciousness under its control, the Chinese leadership has belatedly put forward the task of creating a "socialist moral civilisation" as an inseparable part of the country's modernisation. The actual meaning of this thesis is far from clear as yet. What is clear, however, is that in returning to the glorification of Mao and in reimposing Maoism on the country, the Peking leaders are again reviving many of former directives of Mao only recently condemned as manifestations of the "leftist line": the exhortation "to learn the spirit of Daqing"²², the principle "politics is the commanding force"²³, the call "to learn from Lei Feng", etc. There are reports about a special order issued by the CPC CC to start, beginning with 1982, "an extensive study of Mao Zedong's works by all cadres."²⁴ The notorious "zhengfeng"—the Maoist method of uprooting dissenters—is being praised.

Peking is not offering any other visible outlines of the "socialist moral civilisation". The obsolete Maoist precepts that were rejected by Chinese society are again being imposed on it. The negative attitude to real socialism does not allow the use of the achievements of the socialist countries as examples and models. The exaggeration of national peculiarities and the artificial self-imposed isolation from socialist countries make several objectively correct theses suggested for raising the standard of ideological and political work unpersuasive in the end.

●

"The experience of the social and economic development of the PRC over the past twenty years is a painful lesson showing what any distortion of the principles and essence of socialism in home and foreign policy leads to", it was said at the 26th Congress of the CPSU.²⁵ The present situation in China convincingly confirms the correctness of this conclusion.

As was stressed by Leonid Brezhnev in his speech in Tashkent on March 24 this year, "we did not and do not deny the existence of a

²¹ *Hongqi*, 1982, Nos. 1, 3.

²² *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 26, 1981.

²³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1982.

²⁴ *Fendou*, 1982, No. 1.

²⁵ *The 26th CPSU Congress. Documents and Resolutions*, Moscow, 1981, p. 15.

socialist social system in China. Although, of course, Peking's alignment with imperialism's policy in the world arena does contradict the interests of socialism".

Indeed, for almost a quarter of a century, China's ruling circles have been violating the common laws of socialism and socialist construction and fostering nationalistic evolution. They have arrived at a course characterised by "partnership" with imperialism at the present stage and by the desire to put together an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist "front" of world reaction and any of its fellow-travellers and to create a material basis for its policy of hegemonism.

Pushing the country further along the road of great-power hegemonism the Chinese leaders are acting contrary to lessons of history and are not getting to the root of the social crisis in China and are not doing away with it. The vicious circle of crises, goes on: the absence of solution to urgent problems of China's development stimulates a sharp struggle in the leadership, while political infighting obstructs the working out of effective ways and means of removing the difficulties, ensuring the country's progress and fulfilling its people's aspirations.

Experience shows that for China, only development based on scientific socialism, on Marxist-Leninist teaching can be effective, for it is the only road that is in keeping with the aspirations and interests of the people.

COPYRIGHT: Translation into English, Progress Publishers, 1982

COPYRIGHT: Akademiya Nauk SSSR

CSO: 1812/15-E

PRC TRIES TO PUSH W. EUROPE INTO U.S. ANTI-SOVIET POLICY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 82 pp 51-60

[Article by A. G. Larin: "Western Europe in Beijing's Strategy"]

[Text]

In the late seventies and early eighties, Washington, which has based its global strategic plans on unbridled anti-Sovietism, became a major foreign policy partner of Peking. But nonetheless, the Peking leaders' interest in Western Europe did not diminish. On the contrary, in a bid to impose on the world their plan for organising a structure of joint resistance to the Soviet Union they assign West European powers an important role in it. The Chinese leaders keep repeating that "Europe, the USA, Japan, China and the Third World should unite" to confront the USSR.¹

Peking's persistence in attempting to draw capitalist Europe into this intended alliance is explained by the fact that it is with the European continent that it connects its chief strategic task of intensifying the mutually exhausting confrontation between the two opposing world systems and provoking them into a large-scale conflict. This task has determined the essence of the PRC's policy in Western Europe for many years now. At present, however, certain circumstances have prompted the Chinese leaders to step up their efforts to influence developments in the region in a direction favourable to them. First, they are encouraged by the worsening political climate in Europe as a result of the imperialist powers' intention to tip the balance of power and gain superiority over the socialist community, thus obtaining the possibility of imposing their terms. Second, after adopting a policy of active aggression against the socialist countries of Indochina, the PRC leadership hopes that increased tensions on the western borders of the socialist community would become a factor capable of weakening the cooperation between the USSR, other socialist countries and Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos. Third, the Peking leaders see that even though the crises breaking out in Asia or Africa, "periphery" of contention of the two world systems, destabilise the world situation, they will not grow into a global conflict, something Peking still plans for Europe. It is not fortuitous that the PRC deems it necessary to stress that the emergence of new hotbeds of tension on the globe in no way reduces the importance of Europe as the "centre of gravity in the clash between the superpowers for world hegemony."²

In a bid to undermine European security, the Peking leaders pin their hopes on the USA above all, for its European strategy meets their interests. Peking's West European policy is presently characterised by its cooperation with Washington, and its aiding and abetting American imperialism, which forces its diktat upon its NATO allies.

¹ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 6, 1981.

² See *Shijie zhishi*, 1981, No. 10, p. 2.

Of paramount importance in the alliance between the PRC and the USA is Peking's support for US attempts to deploy new American nuclear missiles on the territories of the European NATO countries. The Chinese leadership was jubilant over the NATO decision to deploy American missiles in Western Europe³ and urged that it be carried out forthwith. It echoed Washington in its campaign against "reconciliation"—the term Peking used to refer to all those phenomena in the political life of Western Europe that prevent another round of the arms race. These include mass protests against nuclear "rearmament" and some West European governments' vacillations and doubts with respect to new missile systems. For example, Peking described the Dutch government's plans to postpone a final decision on deploying the missiles on its territory as the "Dutch disease" impairing "West European defences".⁴

Needless to say, in such cases, Peking is at one not only with the USA but also with the influential forces in Western Europe who toe Washington's line. Nevertheless the PRC leaders' alliance with the United States is especially far-reaching, and whenever there is disagreement among the US allies, Peking invariably supports Washington's tougher line. For instance, the two capitals criticised the desire of West European countries to maintain contacts with the USSR on the highest level and were annoyed by the meetings Leonid Brezhnev had with French President Giscard d'Estaing and West German Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1980 and also by Leonid Brezhnev's visit to West Germany in 1981. The Chinese leaders approved US attempts to put off talks with the USSR on medium-range nuclear missiles and Washington's demand that the European capitalist countries cut their economic cooperation with the USSR.

The Chinese leaders are especially satisfied with pronouncements representatives of the Washington Administration have made about the possibility of using Europe as a theatre of a "limited" nuclear war, through exchanging "tactical" nuclear attacks there. The US ruling elite views a "local" nuclear conflict as a means of clearing the way to world hegemony. Growing adventurism in the White House strategy inspires Peking's hopes for a world nuclear catastrophe which would supposedly make China the strongest state on earth. It is not mere chance that the Chinese leaders, for all their ostentatious "peacefulness," find it impossible to abandon the thesis of the inevitability of a new world war. For instance, Deng Xiaoping openly stated in a talk with Italian journalist Fallacci that "the third world war will break out because of Europe" and no later than in the eighties.⁵

Pinning their hopes on such a course of events, the Peking leaders fear lest the spirit of political realism should triumph in Western Europe as a result of the peace policy of the USSR and the entire socialist community. They try to preclude this by fabricating concoctions about a "Soviet threat" and by distorting the intentions of the socialist countries and the meaning of the Peace Programme set forth by the 26th CPSU Congress for the eighties. The Chinese leaders, for example, denigrate the numerous initiatives of the Soviet government designed to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe.

They unconditionally support everything that promotes the buildup of the military potential of capitalist Europe; consolidates its forces and fosters Western attempts to gain military superiority over the socialist

³ See *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 14, 1979.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1981.

⁵ See *Corriere della Sera*, Aug. 29, 1980.

community. Peking approves all manner of military preparations by West European countries, such as raising defence budgets, taking part in NATO manoeuvres on an unheard-of scale, joining NATO (in connection with Spain's entry into the alliance) and even plans for shifting European integration to the military and political fields.⁶ During their meetings with representatives of European capitalist states, the Chinese leaders invariably emphasise their interest in seeing a "united and strong" Western Europe confronting the Soviet Union. This was what the delegation of the European Parliament heard on its visit to China in late 1981.⁷

The Peking leaders' desire to use Western Europe as a strike force against the socialist community was also evident in connection with the counterrevolutionary machinations in the People's Republic of Poland. The Chinese leadership virtually joined the NATO countries in "protesting" against the Polish government's actions designed to normalise the situation in the country and in "warning" and threatening the USSR. However, they found Washington's line most concordant with their interests because, rather than confining itself to psychological pressure, Washington resorted to "sanctions" against the Soviet Union and Poland and "arm twisting", urging its West European allies to follow suit.

The Chinese leaders persistently recommend the influential circles of capitalist Europe to engage in dialogue with the USSR "from the position of strength" and are even more willing to support US attempts to limit and even thwart that dialogue altogether, to impose a line of extreme hostility towards the USSR upon the West European countries and to turn Europe back to the "cold war" period.

The Chinese leaders believe that involving the European capitalist countries as much as possible in international crises provoked by reactionaries in different regions of the world, especially the Middle East and Indochina, is an important means of undermining detente. They fear Western Europe will recognise eventually that the progressive changes in Afghanistan and Kampuchea are irreversible, and consider it an alarming signal that the European capitalist states refuse to join the American Administration's embargoes and restrictions on trade, economic and other contacts with the USSR to "punish" it for helping Afghanistan. They demand that the West European countries "support the peoples" of Afghanistan and Kampuchea, that is, the counterrevolutionary forces which have been kicked out of those countries. Talking to the British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, Deng Xiaoping stated, for example, that neither events in Poland nor any other crises "should overshadow Afghanistan and Kampuchea".⁸ The Chinese press is constantly reproaching Western Europe for allegedly refusing to rise above its "private interests", an unfavourable characteristic as compared with the allegedly global outlook of the US.⁹

The stand adopted by Great Britain, which has noticeably stepped up its activities in Asia under the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher, is in this respect most in keeping with Peking's interests. In 1981, Lord Carrington visited Afghan mutineers' camps in Pakistan and went on to the PRC. Flaunting his Government's common position with Peking, which delivers weapons to Islamabad and the Afghan outlaws, he declared that "Great Britain and other West European countries should

⁶ See *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 6, 1981.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1981.

⁸ *Renmin ribao*, April 4, 1981.

⁹ See *Shijie zhishi*, 1981, No. 1, p. 4.

ensure Pakistan's independence" and unambiguously called for buildup of forces of Khmer reaction.¹⁰

China's policy on the Middle East problem is shaped somewhat differently, though it, too, manifests a desire to exploit the tense situation to whip up anti-Sovietism in the European capitalist countries. In this case, emphasis is laid on helping imperialism maintain and consolidate its positions in the crisis area. Though Peking counts chiefly on the United States in this respect too, it cannot ignore the line of West European states, nor their attempts to offer, on behalf of the EEC, their own programme of settling the crisis, which differs slightly from that of the US. The position of the West European countries boils down to strengthening their own ties with the oil-extracting countries in the Middle East and to their attempts to make Western policy more effective on the whole since the Camp David accords have yielded no results and anti-American sentiments are rather pronounced in the region.

These goals do not run counter to the Chinese leaders' interests. At the same time, they fear lest disagreement between Western Europe and Washington should weaken imperialism's influence on the Middle East. The Peking leaders believe that the imperialist powers should act in a more concerted way. In practice, this means that the West European countries should follow the Washington Administration's line, perhaps making some amendments and complementing it with their own actions. That is why, commenting on the West European plan, *Renmin ribao* approved the EEC countries' desire to act in the Middle East "as an independent force in international political life" and at the same time called on the West European countries "to take into account the difficulties facing the US" and on the latter to recognise in its turn that "the Common Market" can "play a binding and complementary role".¹¹

This approach is in general characteristic of China's attitude to the "European" summit in the Western Europe-US-developing countries "triangle". Peking encourages broader political, economic and military contacts between capitalist Europe and the developing states, portraying them as "cohesion" in the fight against "hegemonism". Simultaneously it never fails to stress that the European capitalist countries should not go against the United States.

The Peking leaders' line on imperialism's military efforts in the developing countries is also pro-American: Peking urges Western Europe to give the widest possible support to the US military preparations. In this field, the PRC leaders think most highly about the policy of Great Britain, which allowed Washington to build a major strategic base on Diego Garcia and is actively contributing to forging the "rapid deployment force".

So Peking's policy towards the West European capitalist countries in all its regional aspects bears the imprint of its close partnership with the US as the main force opposing detente. This circumstance is clearly reflected in its conceptual approach to relations between capitalist Europe and the United States. If before the Chinese leaders willingly supported the European countries' claims to "equal partnership" with the US, now they prefer that the two parties "extend the field of mutual understanding" and show a stronger "desire to hold consultations and to cooperate",¹² describing all this as an allegedly indispensable and justified reaction to the notorious "Soviet threat".

¹⁰ See *Renmin ribao*, April 4, 1981.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1981.

¹² *Renmin ribao*, March 12, 1981.

Through the agency of the US, the PRC leadership wants to draw the European capitalist countries into the mounting confrontation with socialism the world over, both on the European continent (which is especially important for Peking) and beyond its boundaries. The Chinese leaders hope that the confrontation would be especially effective from the point of view of their interests, if capitalist Europe became a link in the international "structure of opposition" to the Soviet Union. Regarding their military and political cooperation with Washington and US-led NATO as the more realistic framework of the "structure", the Peking leaders hope to establish future strategic links with Western Europe itself. Obvious hints to the effect have already been made in China.¹³

Peking wants the supplies to China of modern equipment, technology and know-how, including in the military field, to be a major form of the West European participation in that alliance and a prerequisite for establishing direct military and political cooperation with Western Europe. Without this it would be impossible to put into effect the ambitious plans of turning the PRC into a "superpower". Even if economic and military contacts with the US are established and expanded, China still needs West European countries to obtain the widest possible group of partners so it will not have to depend entirely on Washington.

What is more, in pushing those countries toward military cooperation, the Peking leaders pursue a political aim—they want to worsen Europe's relations with the socialist states. Western observers have long noted that China would welcome such a development as a reward for its arms purchases.¹⁴

For their part, European imperialist circles seek to promote China's development for both political and commercial considerations. First, it suits their interests to see the strengthening of a country hostile to the Soviet Union, situated on its eastern borders. It is not by chance that some influential West European politicians speak of their desire to see China "strong". Second, by giving Peking access to their economic, scientific and technological potential, they hope to tie the PRC over to the world capitalist market and to consolidate its pro-imperialist and anti-Soviet positions.

At present, Western Europe has become firmly established as China's major economic partner. Trade and economic relations between them are developing on a long-term basis in the form of several bilateral treaties and agreements on economic cooperation, a trade agreement with the EEC (1978), and legal documents guaranteeing China large credits, for the most part through government guarantees. European capital takes part in large mixed projects in prospecting for and extracting fuel and industrial raw materials, above all oil, in China. For example, an agreement concluded between the PRC and the Italian ENI Company (1979) and called "the deal of the century" envisions Italian participation in oil prospecting on Chinese territory and also deliveries of equipment to China to extract, process and transport the fuel. Contracts with the French companies SNIA and Total (1980) ensure joint prospecting for and exploitation of oil deposits on two vast areas of up to 10,000 sq km each in the Gulfs of Bohai and Tonkin.

Seeking to get a firm hold on the Chinese market when there is competition from Japan and the United States, the European monopolists have granted China all sorts of economic privileges (as has the US). The

¹³ See *Shijie zhishi*, 1981, No. 10, p. 5.

¹⁴ *New Statesman*, Aug. 23, 1978.

EEC and some non-member countries (Sweden, Spain, Austria and Norway) have given it the most favoured nation status; West Germany, France and other states have begun treating the PRC as a developing country and given it easy terms on loans and other privileges. The Common Market raised its import quotas for Chinese textiles and discussed extending China the preferential treatment developing countries enjoy in trade with the EEC (since China has declared itself not merely a "socialist" but also "developing" country). In 1980, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recognised the PRC as a developing state.

The interest capitalist Europe shows in economic cooperation with Peking and in building up its military potential has infused China with hopes of gaining extensive access to the European NATO arsenals in the future. Much has already been done—since 1977, when the Chinese leaders set forth far-reaching plans for the military modernisation of the country, they have familiarised themselves with the up-to-date military equipment markets in Europe and established stable contacts with the representatives of military-industrial concerns and government bodies engaged in arms exports.

Peking has showed an interest in British Harrier fighters, French Mirages, British Chieftain tanks and West German Leopards, anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles of French make, West German submarines, Italian torpedo boats, British artillery, submarines, transport planes, modern electronic detection and guidance systems, etc. According to Western press estimates, the list of military hardware China is interested in runs to 5,000 items.

The Peking leadership attaches much attention to buying "dual purpose" hardware and software that can be used not only in the national economy but also in the military field. This sort of cooperation embraces the electronics, nuclear, aircraft and space industries and other fields of paramount military and strategic importance. The following fact illustrates the tasks the Chinese leaders set themselves in this respect. When the five-year economic agreement which dealt, among other things, with the problem of uranium enrichment and processing nuclear wastes, was signed with Belgium in November 1979, Fang Yi, Vice-Premier of the State Council, stated: "China is not interested in the agreement if it prohibits the use of Belgian technology for military purposes".

Peking is vigorously cooperating with Western Europe in building aircraft and missiles. In the second half of the seventies, China began building a plant to produce jet engines under a British licence. In 1980, an agreement was signed with France on building a helicopter plant. Chinese engineers were greatly assisted in developing their own satellites-launching systems by familiarising themselves with the Ariane satellite launcher produced in Western Europe.

As rapprochement with the West grew, Peking began overtly manifesting its desire to expand forms of military cooperation with the European imperialist circles. Beginning in the late seventies, Chinese delegations repeatedly visited army, air force and naval schools in Britain and other West European countries. Taking this interest into account, the British Defence Secretary Francis Pym offered the services of the British Air Force in training Chinese pilots during his 1980 visit to China. The leadership of the People's Liberation Army of China seeks to use Western assistance to modernise their entire system of military training.

What is more, Peking is obviously intent on establishing dependable relations with the militarist circles of capitalist Europe to organise in-

formation exchanges, to use their advice in working-out military doctrines and, finally, to lay the groundwork for coordinating strategic plans. It is indicative that Yang Dezhi, the Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army, who visited some West European countries in 1981, discussed problems of "politics in the field of defence".

The Chinese leaders' attempts to establish military contacts with Western Europe are largely in the interest of its more aggressive circles, because this enables them to play a political game of bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union by making overtures to Peking. It is sufficient to recall the notorious COCOM decision to remove China from the list of socialist countries to which arms exports are prohibited and to cancel the prohibition of selling it defensive and offensive weapons (with the exception of nuclear weapons).¹⁵

Nevertheless, the powers that be in capitalist Europe have different ideas about the extent to which China should be aided in building up its military potential and about whether it is worthwhile to give it arms or whether it would be better to confine themselves to economic aid. Right-wing political parties closely connected with the military industry, such as the West German CDU/CSU and the British Tories, especially zealously support the idea of direct participation in rearming the Chinese army. Shortly after it came to power in 1979, the Tory government lifted restrictions on military technology sales to China and stated its readiness to deliver fighter aircraft, missiles and destroyer equipment to China.¹⁶

A more cautious stand was adopted by Italy, and France in particular. President François Mitterrand declared that his country would be "extremely cautious" in dealing with the issue of arms supplies to the PRC. He stressed in connection with his trip to China (which he made before he was elected President): "France should not arm China. It should not meddle in something that can precipitate war."¹⁷ The SPD/FDP ruling coalition in West Germany and some other parties supported by broad sections of the public also spoke against this kind of cooperation with China. Helmut Schmidt emphasised in one of his statements: "The Federal Republic of Germany is not going to supply China with any arms, as some others do."¹⁸ In general, Western Europe (with the exception of Britain) shows a certain reserve in selling Peking military goods, as distinct from the United States.

It should be pointed out that on a number of international issues, China's position differs from that of capitalist Europe and there exist factors which interfere with the rapprochement between the two sides and obstruct their closer alliance.

The existing alignment of forces on the international scene and the persistent struggle waged by the socialist community with the USSR at the head to strengthen peace and security on the continent constitute one of the more important factors. The positive results achieved in improving the political climate in Europe have forcefully demonstrated that detente is attainable and provides a realistic alternative to the "cold war", which could blow up into a full-scale war at any time. Under the circumstances, the profound incongruity between Peking's policy and the interests of the West European states became pronounced and rendered Maoist diplomacy ineffective.

¹⁵ See *Mainichi*, Nov. 13, 1980.

¹⁶ See *Daily Telegraph*, March 25, 1980.

¹⁷ *Monde*, Feb. 16, 1981.

¹⁸ See *Izvestia*, Jan. 13, 1979.

The West European states, for all their diverse and controversial policies, are deeply interested in preserving peace and, hence, in a dialogue with the socialist community. Even as they attempt to shift to the position of strength they are loath to completely renouncing the positive results achieved during the successful development of detente.

As for the Chinese leaders, they are disappointed with even the toughest policy which the influential circles in Western Europe resort to in their relations with the Soviet Union. The Peking leaders want to frustrate any dialogue between Western and Eastern Europe and to aggravate confrontation between them to the extreme.

This difference of opinion became clearly manifest in the course of meetings Chinese leaders had with many of their West European counterparts. "We don't believe in the inevitability of war," the Swedish Prime Minister Fälldin said, among other things, during his visit to the PRC.¹⁹ West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher spoke about Bonn's interest in detente and cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe and in holding a conference on the reduction of armaments in Europe when he was in Peking in 1981.

The disagreements are not confined to this, however. The ruling elite in capitalist Europe is not merely dodging the role Peking wants to impose upon it. It is not averse to shifting the major burden of opposing the socialist community onto its Chinese partner. This evokes clamorous protests on the part of the latter and accusations that the "pacifiers of the aggressor" want to "turn the scourge to the East". This criticism of attempts to "turn the scourge to the East" was even reflected in the documents of the 10th and 11th CPC Congresses, which confirms the gravity of the existing differences.

Western Europe treats the idea of an alliance with China with certain caution. True, some elements find it quite enticing to "play the Chinese card" in an attempt to bring pressure to bear on the USSR through a political and military alliance with the PRC or even by merely threatening it with a possibility of such an alliance. On the whole, however, Peking's actions in this respect fail to meet with the desired response in capitalist Europe. Realistically-minded West European leaders are unwilling to risk their relations with their eastern neighbours. French President Mitterrand stressed that "it is not right to hope interminably that there will be a confrontation" between the USSR and the PRC.²⁰

When evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of the projected alliance with China, the leaders of the European capitalist countries cannot ignore the Peking leaders' adventurism and persistent striving to undermine international stability and to draw their Western partners into a military conflict with the socialist countries. These considerations affected the attitude of the West European countries toward China's attack on Vietnam. True, the European capitalist countries refused to denounce China as an aggressor, hoping to use its actions to bring pressure to bear on the socialist community. However, aware of the grave consequences that such recklessness might lead to, the majority of them deemed it necessary to favour the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the territory of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

There are certain differences between the interests of the Chinese leaders and those of the European capitalist countries as far as Kampu-

¹⁹ See *Renmin ribao*, April 8, 1981.

²⁰ *Monde*, Feb. 16, 1981.

chea is concerned. Though the powers that be in capitalist Europe act in tandem with China, trying to force Vietnam to stop its aid to the People's Republic of Kampuchea, it is obviously not in their plans to see Kampuchea turn into a satellite of Peking again. They are aware that Peking's expansionistic aspirations are not limited to the socialist countries of Indochina and can affect the positions of imperialist powers in Southeast Asia in the future. So the West European powers seek to counter China's plans with the idea of "neutralising" Kampuchea, and some of them, to Peking's displeasure, have broken relations with the Pol Pot clique and are developing economic contacts with Vietnam.

The fears caused in Western Europe by Peking's hegemonistic and provocative policy grow as its rapprochement with Washington, openly aimed at aggravating the world situation progresses. Many West Europeans understand that this alliance means threat of conflict situations into which Western Europe itself might be drawn. It is only natural therefore that in 1979, when diplomatic relations were established between the PRC and the USA, some West European political leaders voiced their alarm over the consequences of a possible alliance. "An alliance between the USA and China directed against the Soviet Union would be a nasty affair," Herbert Wehner, Chairman of the SDPG faction in the Bundestag, said.²¹

No doubt, this stand reflected the interests of many West European countries, large and small alike. Echoing it, Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky rejected Peking's idea of an anti-Soviet "united front" and stated that the US "should avoid all that". Europe, he stressed, "needs detente. I want no crusade; I want no cold war."²²

The above-mentioned motives which force the powers that be in capitalist Europe to show reserve toward China are complemented by significant circumstances that restrict the activities of the Peking leaders themselves, in particular, the paucity of their finances. Peking's economic backwardness greatly affected the development of its economic relations with the West. Peking had to halt negotiations on its military equipment purchases and put off buying British Harrier fighters which it had been seeking for many years and which Britain had agreed to sell in 1979. The Chinese representatives explained their renunciation by the need "to revise priorities in spending".²³

Attempts to develop its own production of modern military technology using Western licences have also failed for the foreseeable future. China failed to launch the mass production of jet engines in keeping with the 1975 agreement with the Rolls-Royce.

Chinese domestic economic factors had an even more pronounced negative effect in civilian fields than in the military. China concluded a number of contracts with West European companies in 1977-1978, and, beginning in early 1979, started going back on them, delaying negotiations and setting forth unacceptable terms. It cancelled its order for a cold roll-mill to be built in Baoshan to the tune of DM 500 million, which was to be undertaken by an international group of companies headed by West German Schloemann-Demag. The same lot befell contracts with West German and British companies to build petrochemical enterprises. Another contract was postponed with Dutch Port and Delta Consortium set up specially to build port and hydro-engineering facili-

²¹ *Neue Ruhr-Zeitung*, Feb. 1, 1979.

²² *Kleine Zeitung*, Feb. 7, 1979.

²³ See *Daily Telegraph*, March 28, 1980.

ties in the PRC to the tune of about \$2,000 million. According to some estimates, West German and British companies alone have lost more than \$1,000 million.

Though these postponements and cancellations of contracts affected other partners of China, not just Western Europe, the latter's trade with the PRC suffered most. In 1980, Chinese foreign trade increased by 23.6 per cent as compared with 1979; its trade with the US went up 46 per cent and with Japan, 32 per cent, while its trade with the EEC remained virtually at its former level and amounted to \$5,000 million. No major contract was made. The trade balance between the Common Market and the PRC deteriorated because of reductions in Chinese imports by more than 20 per cent. It is obvious that Peking shows preferences to the US and Japan, guided both by commercial considerations and the political importance of these two partners.

At the same time, the Peking leaders do not want Western Europe to lose interest in the Chinese market and are trying to convince their partners that the slump in trade is of a "temporary nature"²⁴ and that they are not going to renounce their "open doors" foreign economic policy.

To sum up, relations between China and the European capitalist countries are complicated. Peking's persistent attempts to turn Western Europe into a link in a global "structure of resistance" to the Soviet Union have encountered serious obstacles of a political and economic nature because they obviously contradict West European interests. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to overlook the fact that Peking's instigatory policy accords with Washington's tough, position-of-strength course and with the stand taken by the more extremist circles in Western Europe. This line is therefore becoming more dangerous for the European countries than ever before.

²⁴ *Renmin ribao*, March 31, 1981.

COPYRIGHT: Translation into English, Progress Publishers, 1982

COPYRIGHT: Akademiya Nauk SSSR

CSO: 1812/15-E

INDIAN SCHOLARS CITED ON EXPANSIONIST PRC FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 82 pp 61-72

[Article by V. K. Gusachenko: "Beijing's Foreign Policy Evaluated by Indian Scholars"]

[Text]

The dangerous trends in the Chinese leadership's foreign policy the hallmarks of which are aggressiveness, blatant interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and hegemonistic ambitions are even more exacerbated at present.

Hence neighbouring countries, large and small, including a major nonaligned state—India—are quite apprehensive of the PRC's foreign policy course. Of late, a number of works have been published in India on China's foreign policy which are sure to attract the attention of specialists and interested readers alike by the depth of their analysis.

A thorough study of the most important aspects of Peking's strategy in foreign policy can be found in the monograph *India, China and Indochina* by Professor T. N. Kaul, a distinguished Indian specialist on international relations, who formerly held the posts of State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indian Ambassador to the USSR, USA, Britain and Iran and who helped in the preparations for and contributed to the success of a number of major conferences and forums.

Professor Kaul starts off by showing the very beginning of Indo-Chinese ties when, as a result of World War II and a massive restructuring of the whole system of international relations, the two great nations became independent. India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, strived for a new type of relations with the PRC, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and goodneighbourliness, and he himself was a direct and enthusiastic contributor to the working out of these principles. Such an approach was in keeping with the interests of both the Indian and Chinese peoples. "Nehru hoped that friendship between India and China would help keep Asia out of the cold war and bring about relaxation of international tension and lessen the threat of a world war."¹ But, the book notes, Peking viewed international relations differently, and that was the root cause of the subsequent conflict between the two countries.

In fact, Jawaharlal Nehru pointed out the PRC's great-power, expansionist tendencies back in the early 1950s. He warned that Peking viewed India as the main obstacle to its hegemony in Asia. Regrettably, his misgivings proved true. In 1959, the Chinese troops made a number of armed provocations in the Sino-Indian border area, and in 1962 the PRC launched a large-scale armed aggression against India. As a result, peace in Asia was gravely threatened and India was confronted with a complex, long-term foreign policy problem.

¹ T. N. Kaul, *India, China and Indochina (Reflections of a "Liberated" Diplomat)*, New Delhi, 1980, p. 5.

Reflecting on the present state of the Indian-Chinese relations, T. N. Kaul points to the beginning of the 1950s when he was transferred from his post in Moscow to the Indian embassy in Peking. It was natural for Ambassador Panikkar to instruct the newly arrived diplomat to keep up his close ties with Soviet representatives in the PRC, among whom he remembers with particular fondness Ambassador N. V. Roschin and Counsellor N. T. Fedorenko. The author reveals special warmth when writing about his frequent meetings and friendship with the then young M. S. Kapitsa, "a brilliant diplomat, fluent in English and easy to get along with". Taking issue with Peking's present assertions about the "expediency" of Soviet policy towards India, T. N. Kaul cites a little known but doubly significant historical fact: "I recall an informal conversation in 1951 with Kapitsa, when we discussed, without the authorisation of our respective governments and Ambassadors, the possibility of an agreement for mutual cooperation and non-aggression between India and the USSR. We thought it was a good idea but said no more. A few weeks later, Kapitsa told me that his Ambassador wanted to discuss it with mine. I told my Ambassador, accordingly mentioning that Kapitsa and I had been exchanging ideas on the subject informally. He agreed to receive Roschin. Kapitsa and I were present at the meeting. Roschin said his government would be willing to consider such a pact. Panikkar said he would inform Delhi."²

However, Kaul notes with regret, for a number of reasons Delhi was not ready for such a pact at that time. "...The Soviet response to my informal suggestion was significant. It showed the importance the USSR attached to India, even as early as 1951. That such an agreement should have been signed in 1971 is, therefore, no surprise. Perhaps, if it had been signed in 1951-1952, the course of subsequent events might have been different; China might not have ventured her massive aggression against India in 1962..."³

Peking gradually removed its peaceable mask, which, says the author, it wore diligently in the first half of the 1950s. Then, under the banners of chauvinism and hegemonism, the PRC began gross interference in the affairs of its neighbours, thus aggravating the international situation. "For Mao, the end justified the means, and the loss of millions of human lives, even Chinese lives, was but a negligible and perhaps an inevitable price to pay for the achievement of his goals. Mao told Nehru in 1954 that he was not afraid of atomic war; if three hundred million Chinese were killed there would still be as many left, he said... Mao was Machiavellian. His main aim was to push China to the position of a Super Power, the overlord of Asia... Mao... considered China the centre of the Universe, the Middle Kingdom round which the rest of the world revolved."

Mao Zedong's approach to international relations. T. N. Kaul writes, was not fortuitous: it reflected his ideas about China's role and place in the world.⁴

India, Indonesia, Nepal, Bhutan and many other Asian states have learned the hard way the extent of Peking's moral degradation. But nowhere, perhaps, did the debasement of the rulers of "the Celestial Empire" manifest itself so blatantly and in such a disgusting form as in the violent conflict between China and Vietnam in February and March of 1979. "How could a country like China," the author asks, "swearing by

² *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

the teaching of Leninism, Marxism, ... issue an open threat to a socialist nonaligned smaller neighbour like Vietnam, to 'punish and teach her a lesson'? Punish her for what? For being friendly with another socialist country, the USSR, in order to retain her independence and not to become subservient to China?"⁵

The Chinese troops that invaded Vietnam's territory, T. N. Kaul writes, did not simply perpetrate a murderous attack but behaved like thugs. Even after cease-fire was declared, China "...continued to shell and destroy whatever her forces could not loot while retreating—bridges, power plants, waterworks, granaries, schools, markets, factories, irrigation dams, etc. Since they could not capture many Vietnamese soldiers, they kidnapped young women, children, and old men, took them away with them. The behaviour of the Chinese soldiers towards the captured civilian women was brutal." Some experts, says the book, see the moral debasement of the Chinese officers and men as a logical consequence of the "great cultural revolution" ... "when hundreds of Generals and thousands of trained cadres were either liquidated or removed".⁶ Be that as it may, China today appears before the world community in its ancient garb of expansionism, hegemonism and racism. "For nothing else can explain China's wanton aggression on a small, friendly, nonaligned, and socialist neighbour—Vietnam."⁷

Anxiety and indignation are aroused, says T. N. Kaul, by Peking's policy toward yet another Indochinese state—Kampuchea. True, Mao and his clique did not make open war against her, but Chinese advisers incited Pol Pot to annihilate his own countrymen. Pol Pot is on record as repeating Mao's cynical formula to the effect that Kampuchea must become a "clean sheet of paper on which we will write anew the country's history". Counting on turning Phnom Penh into a springboard for further expansion in Indochina, the Chinese leaders decided to use Kampuchea as a testing ground for a method of colonisation the likes of which can be found only in the history of the "Middle Kingdom" and in the annals of foreign policy of a handful of imperialist powers.

Their plan was as simple as it was horrid: to "replace" the murdered Kampucheans with ethnic Chinese and thus dissolve that country within the "Han family" in the manner of Tibet and Inner Mongolia.⁸ The outrages provoked by the Maoists in Kampuchea "are something to be seen to be believed. Nothing the like of this human tragedy has happened in recent history", concludes the author.

The appetites of the past and present rulers of China do not stop in Indochina. A similar fate, warns the Indian scholar, is being prepared for other countries of Southeast Asia: Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines; and Indonesia. Thus China provides a direct threat to all nations of this region. It is high time the ASEAN states understood, points out Kaul, that the guarantee of their independence lies in harmonious cooperation with Indochina, which "in friendship with India, South Asia and ASEAN, can be a bulwark of peace and progress and safeguard the region from the threats, interference and domination of the Great Power."⁹

There is no unity yet, the author notes with regret, among those who are confronted by the "Chinese problem". Some countries bordering on the PRC stand in much fear of their giant neighbour for several reasons: Pe-

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁷ *Ibidem.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

king's "fifth column", i. e., huaqiao who hold important positions in the economies of the states of Southeast Asia is one reason; another is the small states' fear of the Maoist guerrillas operating in the jungles; lastly, Washington's pharisaic policy which in fact lulls the vigilance of China's neighbours and destroys their immunity to the "Peking virus".

Proceeding from his impressions after visiting Vietnam, Kampuchea, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, T. N. Kaul writes that the ASEAN member-countries more often than not avoid the risk of showing their true attitude toward China. Bangkok, for example, cannot help being wary of the Pol Pot detachments trained by Peking and entrenched in Thailand's territory bordering on Kampuchea.¹⁰ Singapore cannot take a stand corresponding to its real feelings and is obliged to toe the anti-Vietnamese line in large measure because huaqiao comprise the majority of the population of this city-state. Malaysia is subject to Peking's pressure for the same reason (40 per cent of the population are ethnic Chinese) and because of clashes along the Malaysia-Thailand border provoked by pro-Peking subversive elements. Indonesia and the Philippines, in the author's opinion, are somewhat less susceptible to fear because their territories are farther from China than those of other ASEAN countries, and also, in Indonesia's case, because it has gained some experience of struggle against "Chinese subversion and infiltration in the past."¹¹

The position of these countries, says Kaul, is also influenced to a certain degree by Peking's massive anti-Vietnamese and anti-Soviet propaganda which camouflages its own long-term goals. The opinion is even voiced, notes the author reproachfully, that a Sino-Soviet conflict, if it were to take place, or a fresh clash between China and Vietnam, would be to ASEAN's advantage. "This is a suicidal and counterproductive approach to the problems of this region."¹² Countering the proponents of this dangerous view, the author states with conviction that Vietnam is not only struggling for its freedom and independence but also poses the main barrier to Chinese expansion towards the South and Southwest. The interests of South and Southwest Asia are vitally linked with the interests of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. Indochina is no enemy to, nor does it threaten the countries of South and Southeast Asia. The sooner this is realised in the countries concerned, the better it will be for peace and progress in the region. And further, developing his thought, the author comes to a conclusion worthy of note: "The threat to this region is not from Vietnam or Indochina, nor from the Soviet Union which is far away, or even so much from America or Japan, as from China. It is evident that the USA and its allies are trying to encourage China in the latter's expansionist designs because they feel they can benefit from a possible Sino-Soviet conflict. It is a short-sighted policy."¹³

As for allegations by Peking and the West about Soviet aspirations to hegemony in Asia, in particular via support to India and the countries of Indochina, these assertions are absolutely groundless, points out the author. Good relations between the USSR and these countries are not directed against the interests of third countries. "Each sovereign country has the right and the duty to safeguard its own vital national interests and make such friends as are likely to help it in time of need. The Soviet Union has proved, by her deeds, to be a reliable friend of India and In-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 37, 34, 36.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 149.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

dochina. She ... is helping them to stand on their own feet, to deter threats of aggression to their independence and sovereignty." ¹⁴

T. N. Kaul writes that the leaders of all countries courted by Peking must make up their minds at last as to who are their true friends and who are their enemies. Close cooperation in recent years between Peking, Washington and Tokyo "has only encouraged the present Chinese leadership in launching their expansionist designs in Southeast Asia." ¹⁵ Events in Indochina must open our eyes, says the Indian scholar, and show us the gravity of the danger posed by Peking; Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have graphically demonstrated how small countries can safeguard their freedom. "The threat from China is likely to increase and not decrease unless China is made to realise that aggression does not pay, and that Big-Power chauvinism and expansionism will not be tolerated. India and Indochina have experienced China's aggression and understand it better than others." ¹⁶ The guarantee of peace in Asia and of the well-being of its peoples is seen by T. N. Kaul in a resolute and coordinated rebuff by the countries of the continent to expansionist attempts by Peking. Such a rebuff would spoil its appetite for international piracy, fraught with dire consequences not only for the PRC's neighbours and security in general, but for the Chinese people themselves. At the same time, this would meet the vital interests of the Chinese people, says the author justly in concluding his book. ¹⁷

A book by another Indian specialist, Sailen Chaudhuri, *Maoist Betrayal. India: A Case Study*, analyses the evolution of Peking's foreign policy since the time when the Chinese leaders betrayed the spirit of Bandung and began to pursue a policy of hegemonism. Says the author in the foreword: "The thirty years of the People's Republic of China, barring a few initial years, have graphically demonstrated to the world that its basic aim has been to ensure its domination over Asia." ¹⁸ At present, says Chaudhuri, the Chinese leadership uses the developing countries as small change in its bargaining with imperialism, aimed at obtaining a more favourable "redistribution of spheres of influence", from Peking's point of view. Peking hopes to use this alliance with the camp of imperialism, "for satisfying some of its hegemonistic ambitions in the Third World". ¹⁹

Mao Zedong, writes Chaudhuri, was never the Marxist he attempted to appear throughout his career, but was a proponent of Great-Han chauvinistic ideology. ²⁰ Having gained power, he began, first little by little, then ever more unabashedly, to promulgate the idea of restoring the grandeur of the ancient "Middle Kingdom". Reminding the reader of the numerous aggressions by all China's ruling dynasties against the surrounding states—Burma, Vietnam, Korea, Mongolia and others—the author points out that Mao Zedong inherited the expansionist traditions of the Chinese emperors. Following in the footsteps of Chiang Kaishek and other nationalists, Mao preached a take-over of the so-called lost territories. It was not surprising that when China made aggression against India in 1962, not a word of condemnation came from the rulers in Taiwan, though they considered themselves mortal enemy of Peking leaders. What's more, Chiang Kaishek and his followers made it known to the Mao-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

¹⁸ S. Chaudhuri, *Maoist Betrayal. India: A Case Study*, New Delhi, 1980, p. V.

¹⁹ S. Chaudhuri, *Op. cit.*, pp. VI-VII.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

ists that Peking's policy in this matter coincides with their own stand.²¹

Studying the causes and evolution of Sino-Indian conflicts, Chaudhuri, like T. N. Kaul, concludes that even in the first years of the PRC, when the Maoists were not very strong and had to rely on the support of the USSR and other socialist countries, Peking already entertained hegemonistic ambitions. At the Bandung Conference (1955) Zhou Enlai spoke of peace, while in Zhongnanhai the use of force against India, which was becoming an obstacle to the PRC's thrust southward, was planned. Soon after Bandung "the Chinese leaders openly declared: Tibet is China's palm, and Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh and northeastern region of Assam are its five fingers. The palm is now integrated into China, and the fingers, too, will soon be its own."²²

In the second half of the 1950s China began provocations along the border with India, and their number rose as geometric series. In 1962 Peking unleashed a major war against India in pursuit of two goals: to seize a part of Indian territory and to force Delhi to reconcile itself to Chinese expansion on the Asian continent. Writing of the world's reaction to the Sino-Indian conflict, Chaudhuri places special emphasis on the constructive position of the Soviet Union. From the very beginning, the USSR insisted that an end must be put to this war which only benefited the forces of imperialism and reaction, stresses the author.²³

During the years of the "cultural revolution" Peking's agents actively incited subversive elements in different parts of India, above all in West Bengal, to organise terror and armed operations against the authorities. Even today, says Chaudhuri, the Chinese leadership continues to woo pseudo-revolutionaries in India, yet there is no agreement among the Maoists and, as the PRC moves closer to imperialism, discord aggravates. "Whatever manoeuvres the new Maoist leaders may try to resort to in order to regroup and rejuvenate their followers in the foreign country with the help of ultra-revolutionary phrase-mongering, these factions are historically doomed. Maoism, because of its anti-scientific character, is incapable of providing any answer to the crucial problems facing the world in general and the developing countries in particular. Blind anti-Sovietism pushed the Maoist leadership down the slippery path of rank opportunism which ultimately led to its active participation in the establishment of a new axis which is aimed against the world of socialism, against the Third World and against the national liberation movement," concludes the author of the book under review.²⁴

Much attention is paid in the monograph to an analysis of China's policy toward the neighbouring small countries. Burma is treated by Peking, says the book, as if it were China's vassal. Off-handedly, Peking interferes in Burma's internal affairs and attempts to dictate policy to it. Soon after the Bandung Conference, Chinese troops invaded the northern part of the country despite the fact that the Burmese government played an important role in getting the PRC invited to Bandung, supported China in the UN and conducted a friendly policy on other issues. Peking stubbornly refused to leave Burma alone, and aggression against this sovereign state continued until 1959 when China, coming out openly against Delhi, decided to neutralise the Burmese by peaceful initiatives. But, notes the author, "problems related to China's moral and material support to anti-government secessionist elements in Burma have never been sol-

²¹ See *Ibid.*, pp. 25-28.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 41.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

ved. Such support, in the form of money, arms and training ... continues and Burma has to spend quite an amount of resources and energy which could be used for development work ...".²⁵ "Yunan province has been turned into the main centre for subversive activities in South and Southeast Asia. From there, large groups of Chinese advisors and 5,000 servicemen infiltrated Burma's Kachin area to help the tribes to regroup, build communications and teach the use of Chinese arms in their fight against the Central Government."²⁶ In the north of Burma, Peking's agents train subversive elements to infiltrate Indian territory. Hence the importance of Burma in the overall strategic plan of Maoist expansionism, according to Chaudhuri.

Nepal is another object of Peking's hegemonistic strivings. "China pursued the same policy of hot and cold in respect of Nepal, depending on its own political necessities." It "violated Nepal's borders, denounced the Nepalese Government, manhandled Nepalese journalists, interfered in its internal affairs and carried out hostile propaganda against those with whom Nepal had good relations."²⁷

A "policy of diktat" is also pursued by Peking in Sri Lanka, where it seeks allies not only among leftists but also among rightist elements. "The story was the same as in Burma. When Sri Lanka protested against China's violation of diplomatic norms and export of Maoist literature, the latter threatened menacingly that '700 million people are not to be trifled with'. The practical expression of the threat was the 'guerrilla warfare' organised by Maoist groups made up of disgruntled elements, renegades and other scum." What was the price paid for this Maoist "revolution"? Says the author: "Over a thousand were killed and the economy of this small island-country was crippled. But China did not care a fig for such a tragic consequence of revolution because it had a high stake: Sri Lanka's strategic position which could offer China a vantage point to pose constant threat to India".²⁸

Pakistan, on the contrary, is regarded by the Chinese leadership as an accomplice in its "chauvinist and hegemonistic designs ... against India" and the USSR.²⁹ The Kashmir problem is used by Peking as a "club against India" and at the same time as "fuel" to feed the fire of Indo-Pakistani contradictions.

The chapter on the Chinese policy toward Dacca is titled "Bangladesh: China's Soiled Role". Relying on rich factual material, the author has managed to reveal the hidden side of the Chinese diplomatic manoeuvres around events here, including actions with which the Maoists, in collusion with US imperialism, tried to strangle the liberation movement in Bangladesh. In an attempt to forestall the appearance of a new independent state, in 1971 Peking and Washington urged Islamabad to massacre the people that rose in revolt. "This alliance, which acted in unison against the interests of both India and independent Bangladesh, was eventually to become the decisive factor in the planning and actual launching of aggression by China against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam."³⁰

One would have expected, that the leaders who replaced Mao Zedong, continues Chaudhuri, would have learned their lesson and abandoned his hegemonistic policy. But this has not happened. Within the country they

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 79, 86.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

go on strengthening the military-bureaucratic dictatorship, militarising the country and its economy and implementing their great-power, hegemonistic goals.³¹ "In the foreign policy sphere, too, the new leaders of China inherited all the postulates of the 'great helmsman'... The heirs of Mao Tse-tung are willingly following his behest to conquer the whole world". Thus, a new deal with the USA and the PRC as major partners, "and Japan and West Germany as junior partners ... is directed against the USSR, its socialist allies and the countries of the Third World."³² In the author's opinion, "this causes particular concern in the newly-free countries which are threatened by a pincer attack from the joint front of Great-Han hegemonism and world imperialism".³³

So what is the outlook? Will Peking's behaviour in the international arena change for the better in the foreseeable future, asks Chaudhuri who is inclined to give a negative answer. China's gross provocations against Afghanistan, collusion with the most reactionary imperialist circles directed against revolution in Iran, continued blatant interference in the affairs of China's neighbours—all of these leave little doubt in Chaudhuri's mind that China will be a veritable centre of counterrevolution, threatening peace of the Asian continent³⁴ for a long time to come.

A book by H. K. Sareen, *Insurgency in North-East India*, tells of Peking's attempts to fan separatist feelings among the tribes of India's border states, thus undermining the unity of the country.

The author reviews the history of anti-governmental actions by the Naga separatists, who are invariably backed by Maoist China, and continues his story to the present day when all of a sudden, Peking expresses a desire to improve relations with Delhi. Sareen, however, questions the sincerity of the Chinese leaders and substantiates his doubts with facts demonstrating Peking's unceasing provocations against India.

As before, the Naga "problem" remains a trump card for Peking. These people, says the author, ardently desire peace and an end to the insurgency movement which has brought them immense suffering. But China's goal is different: it continues to create subversive elements, hoping to prevent the easing of tension in the neighbouring Northeastern regions of India, as well as in Burma. Yet China's problem is that neither its agents nor their counterparts from the CIA have been able to reconcile the feuding factions of insurgents to unite them into a strike force, something both Peking and Washington are equally interested in. Especially intricate pressure is brought to bear by the Chinese leadership on Burma. China has concluded an agreement on "mutual cooperation" and "assistance" with the "Burmese camp of Naga" in accordance with which relations between Peking and the Naga separatists are formally maintained "only along Party lines". "At the government level Rangoon is assured of 'strengthening' the 'mutual friendship', while all the insurgents in that country are liberally patronised by the Maoist leadership of China... This is the Maoist concept of goodneighbourly relations!"³⁵

Following in the footsteps of imperialism, China in fact is trying to achieve something that imperialism failed to do—to tear away from India the states of Manipur and Mizoram through the hands of another group of tribes—the Mizo. "All the information available now points out that but for the Maoist interference in the affairs of Mizoram, peace might have

³¹ See *Ibid.*, p. 102.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 107-109.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116.

³⁵ H. K. Sareen, *Insurgency in North-East India*, New Delhi, 1980, p. 44.

been stabilised..."³⁶ Peking is also attempting to use other tribes to undermine India's territorial integrity, but, in the author's estimate, without much success so far.

The activity of the Mizo National Front (MNF) forced the Indian Government to ban this organisation by a special decree (January 1982), i. e., after the publication of the monograph under review. The MNF is charged with intimidation of Mizoram's population and impressment into a so-called Mizo national army. The MNF leaders have openly issued a call for the creation of an "independent Mizoram" which, according to their plans, would include the territories of the states of Assam, Manipur and Tripura.³⁷

In February 1982, Indian security forces thwarted a plot to assassinate the chief minister of Mizoram's government. Firearms and ammunition of Chinese make were taken from the arrested leader of a group of terrorists who had been enlisted from pro-Peking organisations operating in the area. The Indian press reported that several more armed groups, trained by the Chinese, had infiltrated Mizoram. Under the circumstances—attacks by separatists on army patrols, assassinations of political and public figures, explosions and other acts of sabotage—the Indian authorities were obliged to take additional measures to maintain law and order.³⁸

In light of these events, Sareen's warning, given in the last lines of his work, is very much to the point: "The insurgency operation covers a total area of about 154,100 sq km with a population of about 39,891,000 from Arunachal Pradesh to Tripura, along the long international border of India in the Northeastern region. Besides, Peking is engaged in instigating both Nepal and Bhutan against India. Washington has made a job division with Peking, and this axis now menaces the independence, sovereignty and integrity of India."³⁹

Peking's policy is also exposed by the materials provided by former MP of India, Shashi Bhushan. His booklet, *Karakoram Road. Dominationist Conspiracy of China in Kashmir*, sponsored by the conservative Socialist forum of the Congress, reveals China's plans in Kashmir aimed at destabilising the Indian state from this direction as well. The author recalls that Peking has long taken a provocative stand on the Kashmir question. It has not only supported Islamabad's claims but engaged in training armed detachments to tear this territory away from India.

In 1978, China completed construction of the Karakoram road and is still working on a number of other roads in this area. They are intended above all for transporting troops and arms to Pakistan and the borders of Afghanistan. The completed roads and those still under construction will enable China to make its military and political influence felt (through the port of Karachi) in the Arab East and in Africa, as well as in South-east Asia. Peking's activity in Kashmir betrays its desire to get hold of the rich mineral resources of the area.⁴⁰

Having embarked on an expansionist, hegemonistic course, Peking, by the logic of events, could not but renounce the goals of the anti-imperialist struggle. Naturally, this pleased Washington. "In pursuance of their large interests, the USA is boosting up China diplomatically. Their motivation is political; their role is imperialistic".⁴¹

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

³⁷ *Pravda*, Jan. 22, 1982.

³⁸ *Times of India*, Feb. 10, 1982.

³⁹ H. K. Sareen, *Insurgency in North-East India...*, p. 93.

⁴⁰ Sh. Bhushan, *Karakoram Road. Dominationist Conspiracy of China in Kashmir*, New Delhi, 1978, pp. 4-5, 7.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Bhushan makes insistent calls for the Indian government not to give in to Peking's "sweet talk" and "peace-loving" rhetoric: "In the pursuit for normalisation of relations with China, there should be no illusions. The numerous sacrifices made by the Indian soldiers and policemen who laid down their lives defending our country remind us that as long as the Chinese aggressors continue to occupy an inch of our territory, there can be no negotiations except for withdrawal of the Chinese aggressors from our territory."⁴²

Peking's reluctance to settle the border dispute and its intention to use this problem to put pressure on India are evidenced by China's position at the talks of experts of the two countries held 10-14 December 1981. India's Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao, speaking at a working committee session of the ruling party INC (I), said that the talks had not led to any progress on the issue and that the process of normalisation would apparently take a long time.⁴³ The well-known observer A. S. Abraham said in this connection that a complete normalisation of Indo-Chinese relations cannot be achieved without the satisfactory solution of the border problem, of which India is aware.

A monograph by young scholar, Dev Singh Karki, entitled *China and Non-Alignment*, traces the course of Peking's reaction to the emergence and subsequent development of nonalignment. While formally supporting the movement, Peking is conducting a chauvinistic, great-power policy, hostile to the young states in practice, so that the relations between these two important elements in international affairs are fraught with contradictions and instability.

The principle of peaceful coexistence and all the other political and economic conceptions, which have become an integral part of nonalignment, are either discarded or ignored by the Chinese leadership. The true value of Peking's loud declarations and the hypocritical nature of its foreign policy have been learned through bitter experience by India and Indonesia, Burma and Nepal, Vietnam and scores of other Asian and African countries, says the author. "It has become necessary to expose the Chinese more than ever before, as they are colluding with imperialists like the USA to subvert the legitimate aspirations and independence of the small nations in the world. The most recent example is of course that of Afghanistan."⁴⁴ The present leadership's course, says the initial part of the book, is not some unexpected turn of policy but proceeds logically from previous theories and practices of Peking in the sphere of international relations.

D. S. Karki and S. Chaudhuri share the view that at the Bandung Conference, Peking was already engaging in hypocrisy: while flirting with some Afro-Asian leaders the Chinese representatives completely avoided taking any pledges with regard to nonaligned countries. Zhou Enlai "wished to exploit Bandung to inaugurate the PRC campaign to establish a forum rivalling the nonaligned movement where the PRC's expansionist ambitions could be pursued in an unfettered way." The Chinese delegates deliberately sidetracked discussions at the conference from questions of expanding the movement to the topic of a vague, "abstract, idealistic Afro-Asian solidarity".⁴⁵ For the reason, as well as due to disagreements fuelled by Peking among participants in the conference, its effect, says Karki, was not as great as it could have been.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁴³ *Pravda*, Jan. 11, 1982.

⁴⁴ D. S. Karki, *China and Non-Alignment*, New Delhi, 1980, p. V.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

Subsequently, while talking glibly of peaceful coexistence Peking has been putting increasing efforts into its policy which actually runs counter to nonalignment and has never missed a chance to strike out at the movement.⁴⁶ Since the end of the 1950s, Peking has wished for nothing more than "to drive a wedge between the nonaligned nations and their most staunch supporter, the Soviet Union."⁴⁷

In the 1960-1970s the Chinese leadership realised the increasing role of the nonaligned movement in the system of present-day international relations and therefore decided to use nonaligned countries for its own selfish ends. As a result, Peking's manoeuvres in relation to nonalignment have acquired an especially ominous character, combined with a policy of "collusion with imperialism". Emphasising that the objectives of the PRC are diametrically opposed to those of the nonaligned movement, Karki notes the following: Peking "realises quite well, and correctly so, that the consolidation of the nonaligned movement works against the objectives of its own global policy—this is bound to remain so, as long as the Chinese do not give up their hegemonistic chauvinism... As far as the nonaligned movement is concerned, they are ... wolves in sheep's clothing."⁴⁸

Exposing Peking's mendacity in its declarations of support for the principles of peaceful coexistence with examples of China's relations with every Asian state, the author also draws attention to a peculiar feature of Chinese policy—the camouflaged desire to use objective disagreements and contradictions among Asian countries to blunt their vigilance and divert their attention from the real ends of the PRC's leadership. Hegemonistic designs, says the Indian scholar, also underlie the Maoists' African policy. This is evident from their provocations against Angola, Mozambique, Ghana, Tunisia, Kenya, Burundi and other states of the continent wherein Chinese representatives and agents have been repeatedly caught red-handed.⁴⁹ Economic "assistance" from Peking has won the Chinese a bad reputation for the inferior quality of their goods and equipment, for the political strings attached and for repeated failure to fulfill its promises. But especially repugnant to Africans are the signs of Great-Han arrogance occasionally revealed by Chinese representatives. As an example of this, Karki refers in particular to the racist discrimination to which African students studying in the PRC are subjected.

Peking's designs to use the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America as stepping stones to win China a leading role in international relations are doomed to failure, concludes the author. There are many reasons for this. The developing countries are growing ever more cognisant that Chinese adventurism threatens to undermine universal peace. Of major importance is the developing countries' growing understanding of the significance and value of the political support and economic assistance rendered them by the Soviet Union. Without Soviet support, for example, Vietnam would not have been able to win the protracted war against US aggression. Cuba has withstood and survived the struggle against US might due to the generous assistance of the USSR. Angola and Mozambique won freedom with Soviet backing. When the US imperialists resorted to an open show of gunboat diplomacy during Bangladesh's fight for independence in 1971, it was the Soviet Union's firm, decisive support that helped nonaligned India withstand a serious crisis.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

"The Chinese resent greatly the fund of goodwill built up by the Soviet Union in the Third World and cannot tolerate the independence of the nonaligned nations, consolidation of their strength and their increasing influence, as this has frustrated their hegemonistic designs and has denied them their separate sphere of influence. Therefore, it is logical to assume that in the foreseeable future, the PRC shall continue to subvert and sabotage the nonaligned movement. The time is ripe to uncover the real intentions of China, which is unabashedly aligning itself with the imperialists to thwart the progressive movements in free and independent nations of the world and sometimes ... endangering the very existence of small nations... The nonaligned nations" must be ever on guard "against Chinese conspiracies"⁵⁰.

An analysis of Indian literature on China leads us to conclude that Indian researchers have comprehended the basis of Peking's foreign policy. In recent years Indian specialists of differing views and trends of research have given more attention to how Sinocentrist factors and moods obtaining in the upper echelons of the Chinese leadership affect the formulation of priorities in foreign policy. Indian researchers have exposed and graphically demonstrated the continuity between the essentially hegemonistic foreign policy of the former feudal rulers of China, on the one hand, and that of Mao Zedong's heirs, on the other. This conclusion is difficult to challenge.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

COPYRIGHT: Translation into English, Progress Publishers, 1982

COPYRIGHT: Akademiya Nauk SSSR

CSO: 1812/15-E

PRC SEEKS TO TURN NONALIGNED MOVEMENT AGAINST USSR

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 82 pp 73-82

[Article by V. S. Stepanov: "Beijing and the Nonaligned Movement"]

[Text]

The nonaligned movement, which now embraces about a hundred states, appeared after the Second World War in the framework of the world revolutionary process. It took root within the national liberation movement. The Declaration on the National Liberation Struggle adopted at the 4th Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-aligned Countries (Algiers, 1973) reads in part: "The policy of nonalignment, the major goal of which is the struggle for independence and national sovereignty, is fully identified with the liberation struggle being waged by the oppressed peoples against all forms of oppression and exploitation."¹

Indissolubly linked with the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle, from the outset of its organised activities, the nonaligned movement has also acted on the international scene as vigorous force championing peace, peaceful coexistence, world detente and disarmament, and opposing the danger of global war. The heads of state and government of twenty five nonaligned countries who gathered in Belgrade in 1961 for their first conference, stated that they "categorically reject the inevitability of war" which "is not only an anachronism, but also a crime against humanity". The participants in the conference drew the highly indicative conclusion that "a lasting peace can be ensured only if ... colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism in all their manifestations are fully destroyed."² The conference participants advanced the policy of peaceful coexistence as an alternative to the cold war and the likelihood of a world nuclear war. Thus, the nonaligned movement emphasised the inseparable link between the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle on the one hand, and the struggle for the strengthening of international peace and security on the other. The drive for the attainment of these goals is the essence of the movement, the basis on which it emerged and continues to develop as an influential factor in international affairs.

At the turn of the 1980s, the international situation was tangibly aggravated by the line of the most reactionary imperialist quarters, in the United States above all, to stop detente and enter into a new round of the arms race. Thus, more vigorous activity on the part of all forces opposing mankind's sliding toward cold war with its ensuing consequences for the destiny of the human race is crucial.

In his message to Fidel Castro, Chairman of the nonaligned movement, on the occasion of Nonaligned Movement Day, Leonid Brezhnev pointed out that the role of the movement is "becoming extremely important today when the aggressive circles of imperialism, resisting the

¹ *Nonaligned Movement in Documents and Materials*, 1975, p. 207 (in Russian).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

objective course of historical development, are increasingly obviously staking on force in world affairs... The nonaligned movement, which unites almost two thirds of states of the world, possesses a tangible potential in opposing the threat of war".³

The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community have invariably supported this movement since they regard it as an important factor in the consolidation of universal peace, world detente, and cohesion of all the peaceloving forces opposing imperialism and reaction. The Soviet government welcomed the first and all subsequent summit conferences of the nonaligned countries. Other countries of the socialist community and the international communist movement have taken a similar stand. The document issued by the Conference of 29 Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe held in 1976 stressed the important part played by the nonaligned movement, its "active contribution to the struggle for peace, security, detente and cooperation on an equitable basis, for the establishment of a just system of international political and economic relations, to the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and all forms of dominance and exploitation."⁴

Imperialist powers, which formerly did not take the trouble of concealing their negative attitudes toward the nonaligned movement (labeled "immoral" by Dulles), changed their tactics and began flirting with it, seeking to pose as friends of the nonaligned countries and advocates of the "pure," "genuine" and "independent" nature of the movement. Showing a new approach to nonalignment, *The Christian Science Monitor* wrote: the USA did not propose that the nonaligned countries pursued their policy of nonalignment in the interests of the West rather than of the East, since these countries protect their independence from both sides.⁵

The new approach of the West to the nonaligned movement was based on the concept of "equidistance" of the movement from the two principal forces of our day and age confronting each other on the international scene, i. e., imperialism and socialism. In his speech at the International Scientific Conference in Berlin in October 1980, Boris Ponomarev, Alternate Member of the CPSU Central Committee Political Bureau, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated: "Of late we are witnessing ever more attempts by international reaction to emasculate the anti-imperialist trend of the nonaligned movement, to split its ranks, to counterpose them to the socialist community and other progressive peaceloving forces. The concept of 'equidistance' has become an instrument with which these attempts are to be realised. This 'equidistance' is supposedly a condition ensuring the independent role of the nonaligned movement."⁶

The concept of "equidistance" of the nonaligned movement was also used by the Peking politicians, who early in the 1970s revised their negative attitude to the movement and are seeking to utilise it in implementing their hegemonistic designs vis-à-vis the developing countries, and in inflicting maximum damage on the countries of the socialist community.

Today the Chinese leaders go out of their way to associate China with the nonaligned countries, posing as the movement's active ally and patron. With this aim in view, Peking ideologists have included the non-

³ *Pravda*, Sept. 1, 1981.

⁴ *Kommunist*, No. 10, 1976. p. 19.

⁵ *Christian Science Monitor*, Sept. 8, 1979.

⁶ B. Ponomarev, "The Joint Struggle of the Working Class and National Liberation Movements Against Imperialism and for Social Progress", *Kommunist*, No. 16, 1980, p. 38.

aligned movement in the "Third World" with which Peking associates China as well. In his message to the 5th Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Nonaligned Countries of 15 August 1976, Premier of the PRC State Council Hua Guofeng noted that "China and the numerous nonaligned countries belong to the Third World".⁷ Peking keeps asserting that the nonaligned movement is part and parcel of the "Third World" led by China. It assigns a similar subordinate role to the non-aligned movement in the latest modification of the Maoist foreign policy doctrine which seeks to "make broader the framework of the 'widest international front' of struggle against the USSR, to set up a 'structure of joint resistance' to the Soviet Union by means of drawing into it not only capitalist and developing states, but also most diverse nationalistic and opportunistic elements within the revolutionary and democratic movements."⁸

The principal aim of the designs pursued by the Chinese leaders as regards the nonaligned movement consists of depriving it of its anti-imperialist content, pushing it to the right, and making it anti-Soviet and anti-socialist. To achieve this goal, a wide range of ways and means is used—from ideological subversion directed against the movement at large to the brainwashing of representatives of certain nonaligned countries.

China is going out of its way to falsify the history of the origin and development of the nonaligned movement, trying to prove that it "emerged because a number of countries did not want to join the military blocs headed by the United States and the Soviet Union".⁹

In connection with Nonalignment Day, first celebrated on 1 September 1981, the Chinese press carried articles explaining the movement's emergence this way: after the World War II, in the course of the upsurge of the national liberation struggle and the disintegration of the colonial system, a large group of states which had won national independence appeared; "after that the two superpowers, the USSR and the USA, in a bid to gain world hegemony, bent every effort to set up opposing military blocs, and also engaged in heated competition in the Third World, seeking to win over the states which had won independence, and convert them into vassals"; some young states discerned the danger and raised the banner of non-participation in the blocs of the superpowers: "This was precisely the reason for the emergence of the nonaligned movement".¹⁰

Such an interpretation puts the imperialist powers and the socialist states, the USA and the USSR, on an equal footing, deliberately glossing over the well-known fact that it is not the Soviet Union but the imperialist powers that seek to draw the newly-free countries into military and political blocs. Tracing the genesis of the concept of nonalignment in its "negative" aspect (as "nonalignment to the blocs set up by the great powers"), member of the National Council of the Communist Party of India, Sarada Mitra, justly notes that the countries which threw off the shackles of colonial domination had no choice as to what blocs they were to join because not a single military bloc was set up by the Soviet Union either in Asia, or in Africa, or in Latin America. The only blocs were those established by US imperialism. Therefore the newly-free countries could either join those blocs or remain outside them. The latter position was

⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 16, 1976.

⁸ O. Borisov, *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 4, 1981.

⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 21, 1976.

¹⁰ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 31, 1981.

called "nonalignment".¹¹ The concept of nonalignment meant for the young independent states rather "dissociation", i. e., liberation from any military and political commitments as regards their former colonial powers.¹²

In their ideological subversion aimed at the nonaligned movement, the Chinese leaders have recently spared no effort to impose on the entire movement and on individual countries an anti-Soviet interpretation of the term "hegemonism".¹³ Applying the label "hegemonism" to the Soviet Union, Peking propagandists are vainly seeking to prove that the efforts of the nonaligned movement against the policy of hegemonism in international relations is nothing but an onslaught against the USSR, Soviet foreign policy and a number of other socialist countries, for example, against Vietnam, to which Peking also attributes "hegemonic" designs ("small-scale" or "regional hegemonism").

Despite Peking's concoctions, not a single document issued by the nonaligned movement contains any testimony that while declaring the need to oppose hegemonism, the movement implies a struggle against the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviet Union was the first to raise the question concerning the need to exclude the policy of hegemonism from international relations and has tabled a proposal to that effect in the United Nations. This was predetermined by the fact that of late the aggressiveness of imperialism, every now and then, has assumed the form of hegemonism and of a struggle for world domination. Peking itself pursues a similar policy, and its foreign policy is marked by further aggravation of bellicose great-Han nationalism, unbridled hegemonism, anti-Sovietism and hostility toward socialism. The June 1980 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee noted: "The partnership between imperialism and Peking hegemonism represents a new dangerous phenomenon in world politics, dangerous to the whole mankind, including the American and the Chinese peoples."¹⁴

Arbitrarily attributing an anti-Soviet interpretation of "anti-hegemonism" to the nonaligned movement, the Peking leaders would like to steer the struggle of the nonaligned countries against the policy of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community on the one hand, and to avoid criticism and whitewash the truly hegemonic policy of the imperialist powers, their own hegemonic policy, on the other.

In a bid to set the newly-free states and the nonaligned movement against the Soviet Union, the propaganda of Peking and the imperialists has been trying to smear the character of the economic relations between the USSR and the developing countries and popularise within the movement the false thesis concerning the equal responsibility of Western and socialist countries, of the "two super-powers" for the economic backwardness of the developing nations. In encouraging such an identical approach to capitalist and socialist states, *Renmin ribao* interpreted the documents adopted at the 5th Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Nonaligned Countries as follows: the economic declaration has mentioned more than once the exploitation of the developing countries by the developed ones; the term "developed countries", repeated many times in the

¹¹ S. Mitra, "Bandung and Present-Day Realities", *World Marxist Review*, No. 5, 1980.

¹² Yu. Alimov, "Nonaligned Movement—an Influential Force in International Relations", *World Economy and International Relations*, No. 11, 1976.

¹³ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 6, 1976.

¹⁴ *Materials of the Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee*, June 23, 1980. Moscow, 1980, p. 12 (in Russian).

declaration, "implies the Soviet Union" among others because it calls itself "developed socialist" country; along with the USA, the USSR has slighted the nonaligned countries but forbids them to use similar evaluations with respect to the USSR and USA.¹⁵ It is clear that here, too, the Peking propagandists, as is the case with "hegemonism", are deliberately confusing the terms to implant in the minds of the participants in the nonaligned movement the concept of "equidistance", upon which the thesis of "equal responsibility" is based. In fact, neither in the past, in the era of colonialism, nor at present has the Soviet Union ever taken part in the imperialist exploitation of the developing countries, which resulted in their backwardness. "Similarly, the socialist states have nothing to do with the grave consequences caused by the capitalist economy, the crises, the collapse of capitalist currencies, inflation and other upheavals of the world capitalist economic system."¹⁶

Peking actively encourages the concept of the movement's "nonparticipation in blocs" and alleges that "this principle is the soul of the non-aligned movement, the source of its strength."¹⁷

No doubt, nonparticipation in military blocs is a major component of the nonalignment concept and politics and a principal criterion for membership in the movement. However, the concept is far from being exhausted by the abovementioned element: it is much broader and much deeper in essence. The theory and practice of nonalignment deny a simplified approach to the definition of that notion as nonparticipation in blocs alone. All the activity of the nonaligned movement from its inception and to the present testifies to the fact that it appeared on the international scene as an active political force full of initiative (although recessions were sometimes observed in its activities, for example, in the latter half of the 1960s) which supported the strengthening of peace, detente and cooperation, and fought against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and apartheid. The concluding declaration of the last summit conference of the nonaligned countries (Havana, 1979) stressed that the "struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism (including Zionism) and all forms of aggression, occupation, domination, intervention or hegemony, as well as against great-power and bloc policies is the quintessence of the nonaligned movement's policy, in conformity with its initial principles and fundamental character."¹⁸

The narrowing of the concept of nonalignment and the reducing of the latter to nothing but the choice of a position as regards the two blocs i. e., the two "super powers" is necessary for Peking in its attempt to erode the fundamental initial principles of nonalignment and to deprive it of its social content, because putting the two blocs and the two great powers on an equal footing is tantamount to a distortion of the political character of the nonaligned movement as an anti-imperialist force and as an objective ally of socialism.

The problem concerning the criteria for membership in the nonaligned movement is another aspect of ideological subversion staged by the Chinese leaders against the movement. On this issue, too, Peking joins hands with the imperialist powers. In a bid to dull the anti-imperialist nature of the nonaligned movement, on the eve of the Colombo Conference, the Western states tried to introduce a number of countries into the movement which were—and some of them continue to be—participants in im-

¹⁵ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 21, 1976.

¹⁶ R. Ulyanovsky, "Equitable Partners", *Pravda*, Sept. 28, 1981.

¹⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 31, 1981.

¹⁸ Quoted from *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 3, 1980, p. 6 (in Russian).

perialist military and political blocs: Australia (ANZUS), Pakistan (CENTO), Portugal and Turkey (NATO), Thailand and the Philippines (SEATO). This caused controversy and dispute within the nonaligned movement.

Actually, the Peking rulers approved of those attempts by the imperialist powers. Glossing over the essence of the differences among the nonaligned states concerning the criteria for admission of new members, the Chinese press began to link some of the abovementioned countries with the nonaligned movement.¹⁹ However, contrary to Peking's wish, the participants in the movement agreed that the admission of members of military-political alliances would be dangerous to the integrity of the movement.

The world public has also noticed Peking's desire to include itself in the nonaligned movement. For example, the Indian weekly *Blitz* noted in May 1976 that the Peking leaders were trying to take part in the Colombo Conference.²⁰ In this connection, some countries raised the issue of the need to work out the attitude of the movement toward China. An international seminar "The Role of Nonalignment in the Changing World" was held in Delhi in April 1976. It was attended by public and political figures, scholars, and journalists from 24 nonaligned countries. The seminar examined a broad range of problems, including criteria for membership. In this connection, a discussion emerged on the role of China. Many delegates censured the policy of the Chinese leaders, in particular, their stand vis-à-vis Chile, Angola, and the US military presence in the Indian Ocean. They pointed to China's territorial claims to neighbouring countries, its attempts to encourage revolts against the governments of nonaligned countries, and to use the huaqiao in subversive activities against local governments.

Not a single participant in the seminar raised the question of admitting China to the community of the nonaligned countries. Moreover, many of them stated the need to be on the alert as far as China's policy was concerned. According to I. Roshadi, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Indonesian Parliament, the participants arrived at the conclusion that China could not call itself a nonaligned country.²¹

This unofficial discussion in Delhi demonstrated that any serious attempt by Peking to penetrate the community of nonaligned countries would meet with a decisive rebuff. Moreover, it would result in an open discussion of the PRC's foreign policy, something undesirable to the Chinese leaders, and to the renouncing of many of China's odious practices. Finally, Peking was compelled to declare openly: "China is by no means a nonaligned country."²² In his conversation with the Chairman of the Federal Executive Council of Yugoslavia Veselin Duranovic, the then Chairman of the CC CPC Hua Guofeng said in November 1980: "China appreciates the nonaligned movement, though it is not associated with it", "China is not a nonaligned country."²³

On the other hand, Peking tried to secure the expulsion of Cuba and Vietnam from the movement, seeking to undermine the positions of the states which favour the preservation and intensification of the anti-imperialist trend in the nonaligned policy, stronger cooperation between the movement and the world of socialism and with other progressive and de-

¹⁹ See *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 16 and 20, 1976.

²⁰ See *Pravda*, May 18, 1976.

²¹ See *Pravda*, May 6, 1976.

²² *Renmin ribao*, May 22, 1979.

²³ *Borba, Politika* (Belgrade), Nov. 9, 1980.

mocratic forces. Peking's politicians and imperialist propaganda are going out of their way to persuade the community of the nonaligned countries that Cuba and Vietnam allegedly have no right to be in their ranks because they are allies of the USSR.²⁴ The internationalist assistance given by Cuba to Angola and by Vietnam to Kampuchea was slandered by Peking and the West as "aggression" against the nonaligned countries, and a violation of the principles of the nonaligned movement. Proceeding from such "reasoning", attempts were made to frustrate the holding of the 6th Conference in Havana. However, the joint efforts of the imperialist powers and the PRC leaders aimed at foiling the Havana meeting proved fruitless. The 6th Conference was held, as planned, in September 1979 in the capital of socialist Cuba, thereby reiterating the adherence of the nonaligned movement to anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and to the struggle for peace and security of nations. The London-based *Financial Times* was forced to admit that mainly "the anti-colonial, anti-Zionist and anti-racist nature of the movement"²⁵ was stressed in Havana. In its turn, Peking expressed its faked concern that "today the nonaligned movement is undergoing a serious crisis" allegedly due to external pressure from the Soviet Union and to the "subversive activities" of Cuba and Vietnam from within. It also acknowledged, though indirectly, the failure of its attempts to lessen the anti-imperialist potential of the movement.²⁶ The Conference openly denounced not only the aggressive policy of imperialism, but also the hegemonic, expansionist policy of Peking itself, including its armed aggression against the SRV.

Seeking to impose on the proponents of the nonaligned movement the idea that relationships of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union are incompatible with membership in the movement, the Chinese leaders had in mind the expulsion not only of Cuba and Vietnam, but also of some other nonaligned countries. Thus, when the Desai government took over in India in 1977, Peking raised a hue and cry that the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union was allegedly one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Indira Gandhi government, which policy allegedly undermined India's prestige in the movement.²⁷ However, the confirmation by the Indian government of the continuity of its foreign policy, in particular, its friendship and cooperation with the USSR, demonstrated the untenability of Peking's attempts to erode the non-aligned movement on the basis of anti-Sovietism.

After the Havana Conference, the imperialist powers and the Peking hegemonists invigorated their well-coordinated efforts to revise the anti-imperialist decisions taken by the Conference. Both Peking and the West began encouraging right-wing regimes within the nonaligned movement to create a bloc which could be used to oppose its anti-imperialist trend. In an interview to the Japanese newspaper *Asahi* in January 1981, Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew expounded the credo of the proponents of that bloc within the nonaligned movement, stating that "decolonisation and struggle against imperialism no longer cement the movement."

These statements were backed by practical steps. For example, in January 1981, the Foreign Minister of Egypt Butros Ghali made a trip to some Latin American countries which are members of the nonaligned mo-

²⁴ *Renmin ribao*, May 22, 1979.

²⁵ See *Financial Times*, Sept. 8, 1979.

²⁶ See *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 11, 1981.

²⁷ See *Renmin ribao*, April 3, 1977.

vement. While revealing the tasks of his mission in an interview to the Argentinean papers *Nación* and *Clarín*, Butros Ghali declared that the Sadat regime was worried by a certain deviation to the left in the non-aligned movement and attacked Cuba, which chairs the movement.²⁸ In January 1981, Latin America was visited by Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore Sinnathamby Rajaratnam who stated after his visit to Argentina that at the Havana Conference, the "aims of the nonaligned movement were distorted, while the movement itself was dominated by those who are striving for collusion with a super power." Therefore, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam claimed that the forthcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers in Delhi "should try to avoid a repetition of what has happened in Havana". He added that he discussed the abovementioned problems with top-ranking officials of Argentina.²⁹ The Chinese press which quoted Sinnathamby Rajaratnam left no doubts concerning the designs of the Chinese leadership itself which, enjoying support of Western powers and relying on the pro-imperialist quarters within the nonaligned movement, counted on revenge for the defeat in Havana at the next forum of the nonaligned countries.

The subversive activities of Peking and the West against the non-aligned movement on the eve of the Delhi meeting (in Havana a decision was taken that a meeting of the nonaligned countries at the foreign ministers' level which is traditionally convened between summit conferences, was to be held in Delhi in February 1981) were carried out in the two following directions: ideological subversion with the purpose of inculcating false concepts and pseudo-theories in the movement, which bear on the essence, trends and principles of the nonaligned movement on the one hand, and the pushing of certain nonaligned countries and the movement at large toward pro-imperialist and pro-Peking positions on specific international issues, on the other hand.

Peking and imperialist politicians have chosen the so-called Afghan and Kampuchean issues in a bid to impose them on the nonaligned movement as the principal problems allegedly facing not only the movement, but also the world community.³⁰ With active support from Peking and the West, the delegations of some nonaligned countries succeeded in drawing the participants in the Delhi meeting into a discussion of the Afghan and Kampuchean "questions", which took its toll on the constructive nature of the discussion of major international problems. The final declaration of the conference included provisions glossing over the existing situation in Afghanistan and Kampuchea.

Peking declared that it was satisfied with the results of the Delhi meeting, primarily having in mind the abovementioned provisions. The Chinese mass media, which wrote about the "crisis" of the nonaligned movement on the eve of the meeting, now contended that a "great victory of the principles of the nonaligned movement" was scored in Delhi.³¹ Obviously the Chinese leaders believe that such falsifications will whitewash their own counterrevolutionary and pro-imperialist policy vis-à-vis Kampuchea and Afghanistan.

The massive efforts aimed at discrediting and isolating the progressive countries within the nonaligned movement, primarily Cuba as its Chairman, were an important factor in the joint subversive activities by Peking and imperialism after the Havana Conference. The Peking leaders

²⁸ See *Pravda*, Jan 21, 1981.

²⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 21, 1981.

³⁰ *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 9, 1981.

³¹ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 15, 1981.

tried to sow doubts concerning Cuba's being honest as Chairman of the nonaligned movement, hoping to undermine its prestige and influence. While distorting the developments in Afghanistan, Peking slanderously accused Cuba as Chairman of the nonaligned movement of the lack of activity, due to which there allegedly "emerged a situation... in which the nonaligned movement is still unable to take any measures."³² At the same time, the active efforts of Cuba to normalise the situation in South-west and Southeast Asia are well known. The statement issued by the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (14 May 1980) on political methods of settlement of Afghanistan's relations with Iran and Pakistan stated that it "welcomes and supports the initiative by the Republic of Cuba as Chairman of the nonaligned movement to offer its good offices".³³

Fresh forms of discreditation and isolation of Cuba were used. At the 34th UN General Assembly, the United States, China and their accomplices stubbornly opposed the election of Cuba as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, though it was the principal candidate from the group of Latin American countries. Seeking, at any cost, to foil the election of Cuba, the USA and Peking coerced Colombia not to withdraw its candidacy, though in the course of the election it got fewer votes than Cuba and, in accordance with established tradition, it should have withdrawn. More than 150 rounds of election took place, and from 74 to 95 votes were given to Cuba (96-98 votes were necessary). It was only at the concluding sitting of the session on 7 January 1980 that the deadlock was broken: at a meeting of the Latin American group, with the participation of Cuba, a compromise was reached: Cuba and Colombia withdrew in favour of Mexico which was elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council.³⁴

This undertaking by Washington and Peking had the purpose of proving to the nonaligned countries that they had made a mistake by agreeing to convene a summit conference in Havana and entrusting Cuba with the Chairmanship of the nonaligned movement until the next conference, because Cuba allegedly did not enjoy prestige in the international community and could not properly represent the interests of the nonaligned countries.

Addressing the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in December 1980, Fidel Castro noted that Cuba became Chairman of the nonaligned movement when international tensions had been aggravated, with numerous conflicts mounting and fresh hotbeds of tension emerging in different areas. The contradictions between the nonaligned countries were being brought to light. "Cuba has striven to find just, concerted solutions to eliminate the differences existing between some member countries of the nonaligned movement and prevent the clashes that occurred among them under certain conditions," Fidel Castro stated, "realising that the movement needs internal unity to continue its important role in the world politics".³⁵

As an influential factor in present-day international relations, the non-aligned movement is far from being a simple phenomenon. There is a constant struggle under way within the movement on issues concerning its orientation, as well as on many other problems. To achieve unity among its ranks is not an easy thing. Participation in the movement of a multi-

³² *Renmin ribao*, April 22, 1980.

³³ *Pravda*, May 15, 1980.

³⁴ *Pravda*, Jan. 9 and 11, 1980; *Izvestia*, Jan. 7 and 9, 1980.

³⁵ *Granma*, Dec. 20, 1980.

tude of countries from different continents with different economic, social and political structures (socialist countries, feudal states, countries of socialist orientation, capitalist states, countries with mixed economies, etc.) and of national liberation movements as well naturally exerts a great influence on the position of those countries as regards certain international issues and results in a divergence of opinion. Dealing with the situation in the newly-free countries which comprise a majority in the nonaligned movement, Leonid Brezhnev stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress: "These countries are very different. After liberation, some of them have been following the revolutionary-democratic path. In others capitalist relations have taken root. Some of them are following a truly independent policy, while others are today taking their lead from imperialist policy. In a nutshell, the picture is a fairly motley one."³⁶

It is precisely this heterogeneity that Peking is trying to use in a bid to subordinate the nonaligned movement to its hegemonic policy by destroying the anti-imperialist foundations of the movement, setting it upon the states of the socialist community, and splitting its ranks. Nevertheless, the differences of opinion between individual nonaligned countries or groups of countries are not so insurmountable as to prevent their cooperation on basic problems and in all spheres which comprise the essence of the movement.

The striving to conceal or gloss over at any cost the deep contradictions between the stand of the Chinese leaders and that of the majority of the nonaligned countries with respect to the basic problems of contemporary international politics, and the craving to portray China as their "reliable ally" is a characteristic feature of Peking's policy vis-à-vis the nonaligned movement. However, many years of experience and the character of general discussions at the forums of the nonaligned countries, as well as the final documents adopted, show that the nonaligned movement is far from sharing the goals and principles underlying the foreign policy doctrine and the international activities of the Chinese leaders. Peking's line is essentially at loggerheads with the interests of the nonaligned countries. Moreover, it poses a grave danger to the very existence of the nonaligned movement.

Experience has demonstrated that it is the countries of the socialist community and other progressive and democratic forces that are the genuine friends of the nonaligned nations. The existing differences in the positions and views between nonaligned and socialist states on certain specific issues cannot be an obstacle hampering their cooperation in achieving their common major goals.

In his congratulations on the 20th anniversary of the movement, Leonid Brezhnev noted: "The development of friendship and cooperation with the nonaligned countries which comprise an important part of the common front of struggle waged by the peoples for peace and freedom, has been and continues to be a fundamental stand of the Soviet Union. We are confident that only together, by joint efforts of all peaceloving states and peoples it is possible to paralyse the action of the aggressive forces, to turn the course of events from the fanning of international tension toward the strengthening of detente, from the aggravating of conflicts toward their settling, toward universal introduction of the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems in the practice of international relations."³⁷

³⁶ *The 26th Congress of the CPSU, Documents and Resolutions*, Moscow, 1981, p. 16.

³⁷ *Pravda*, Feb. 9, 1981.

FINANCIAL AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL AND JAPAN'S POLITICAL MECHANISM

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 82 pp 83-91

[Article by A. A. Makarov]

[Text]

As it develops, Japan's state-monopoly capitalism tends to exert an increasing impact on governmental policy.

Yet, owing to the postwar political, economic and social reforms (1945-1952), the introduction of universal suffrage and the growing prestige of progressive forces, above all the Communist and the Socialist Parties, the monopolies are unable to flaunt their political influence or to exercise it in a conspicuous way. Like other imperialist countries, the Japanese monopolies' political domination is a *de facto* rather than a *de jure* affair. It is mostly anonymous and is brought into play in circumvention of the representative system—the elections, Parliament, etc., as is evident from an analysis of activities of the leading business organisations. These cannot be qualified as governmental or quasi-governmental, since civil servants formally have no place in them. Moreover, the monopolies, with their multi-billion-yen budgets and huge staffs of employees, receive practically no state subsidies. Still, the leading business organisations often have more say in policy-making than the government or the parliamentary faction of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which is presently in power.

Japan has a great number of organisations, uniting businessmen, that are registered as trade associations. Thus there are nearly 100 industrial and trade associations, the most influential of which are the Japanese Association of Iron-and-Steel Industry (Nihon tekko rommei), Association of the Shipbuilding Industry (Nihon zosen kogyokai), Association of Automobile Industry (Jidasha kogyokai), the Japanese Foreign Trade Council (Nihon boekukai), and some others.¹

In addition to trade associations there are regional organisations, such as the Economic Federation of the Kansai Region (Kansai keizai rengokai) uniting leading businessmen from major industrial and trade centres of the East Coast—Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto and others.

These two types of organisations exert a significant influence on planning governmental measures in the economy and other spheres. However, it is the Big Four of the national business organisations known as *zaikai*

¹ See *Japan Company Handbook*, Tokyo, 1980.

(literally "financial circles") that take a most active part in decision-making on the key issues of national policy and maintain an energetic pressure on the whole system of state institutions—Parliament, the legislative and the executive bodies. There are the Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren), the Federation of Business Organisations (Nikkeiren), the Trade and Industrial Chamber (Nissho) and the Economic Development Committee (Keizai doiyukai). Their directors are drawn from the leadership of the biggest financial and industrial groups which control most of the country's industry, trade and banking: Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Mitsu, Fuji, Daiichi-Kangyo and Sanwa. In addition, the most influential figures of the Big Four participate in the major trade and industrial associations, as well as in the entrepreneurs' unions, and are thus in a position to streamline their activities. Characteristically, in dealing with governmental bodies, the *zaikai* claim to represent the whole of the monopoly bourgeoisie, the foremost contingent of the capitalist class, rather than any individual industrial or banking group. In so doing, they pursue the long-term objectives of big business and, to attain them, are even ready to sacrifice the interests of some capitalist enterprises.

Although the Big Four perform largely the same functions, each of them has its specific line of activity. Thus, whereas Keidanren is concerned with general economic and political issues, Nikkeiren's speciality is essentially social problems, mostly relations between labour and capital. Unlike Keidanren, the Nissho, Trade and Industrial Chamber, deals with more specific economic problems, being the watch-dog of big business in the realm of small-scale and medium businesses. The Economic Development Committee is the "brain trust" of big business, exploring the most promising directions for the development of economic and social structures.

No matter how independent and specialised they may seem, the Big Four work in close contact with the Federation of Economic Organisations, the most powerful group, with a membership of 979 (as of 1980), including 798 big corporations and banks, acting as a coordinating centre.² In postwar Japan, it has an approximately the same political standing as the National Association of Manufacturers in the USA, the National Council of French Industrialists (Patronat) in France, or the Confederation of British Industry in Britain. The rest of the business organisations coordinate their activities with Keidanren. This is especially true of the Federation of Business Organisations which is often referred to as "Keidanren's labour department". In recent years, a tendency toward closer cooperation between Keidanren and Economic Development Committee (Keizai doiyukai) has emerged.

Close connections between the Big Four are determined both by their common class interests—the desire to preserve and consolidate the capitalist mode of production and secure the optimal conditions for the monopolies—and by the following peculiarity: the Big Four members often participate in the boards of two or more than two business organisations.

Keidanren is topmost in this respect, with President Yoshihiro Inayama and Vice President Norishige Hasegawa being on the Nikkeiren Board. By the same token, Takeshi Sakurada, former head of Nikkeiren, was on the Keidanren Board, while President Kanichi Moroi of Chichibocemento, one of the founders of Keizai doiyukai, is an executive director of Nikkeiren and an adviser at Nissho.

² *Japan*, Moscow, 1981, p. 136.

In describing the features of the monopolies' political domination, Lenin pointed out that "...the bourgeoisie...has excellently mastered the art of hypocrisy and of fooling the people in a thousand ways, passing off bourgeois parliamentarism as 'democracy in general' or as 'pure democracy' and so on, cunningly concealing the million threads which bind Parliament to the stock exchange and the capitalists, utilising a venal mercenary press and exercising the power of money, the power of capital in every way."³

This postulate aptly characterises Japanese monopolies' political style, which consists in using veiled methods of influencing the government rather than direct, overt pressure.

As distinct from other developed countries, postwar Japan has a relatively small monopoly representation in its highest political bodies. Thus, businessmen constituted 12 per cent of all deputies of the ruling party in the lower house of the Parliament in the 1970s, their group ranking third in number after civil servants and local politicians.⁴ In the USA, by comparison, businessmen make up more than a quarter of the Congressmen. In addition, Japanese statistics do not differentiate between representatives of big monopolies and medium and small businessmen in listing them under the category of "businessmen".

Unlike the other developed capitalist countries, hardly any of the Japanese financial and monopoly elite are appointed to high governmental posts. None of the fifteen postwar Premiers were among the country's wealthiest citizens, neither were they on the board of a leading business organisation. Likewise, there are no monopoly people in the leadership of the LDP factions, with the possible exception of Tokusaburo Kosaka who, prior to turning to politics in the early 1970s, headed the Shinetsu kagaku kogyo chemical company and was active in both Keidanren and Nikkeiren. However, his Society for the Study of New Phenomena in Politics (Simpu seiji kenkyukai) draws its members from among middle-level politicians and plays a secondary role in the ruling party. Indicatively, most of the *zaikai* leaders themselves are reluctant to be assigned to high posts in the government, preferring to remain in the sidelines as much as possible and to conceal their actual political power.

The postwar Japanese Cabinets and the parliamentary LDP were composed mostly of former civil servants and professional politicians. Cases of businessmen being appointed to ministerial posts are extremely rare: they accounted for only a few of some 200 such appointments made in the 1970s. Thus, Toshio Komoto, a big industrialist and owner of the Sanko kisen shipping company, was Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry in the first Miki Cabinet (December 1974-September 1976). Toshio Komoto is one of the leading figures of Takeo Miki's faction and, according to Japanese commentators, owed his prestigious appointment to the generous financial support of his patron.⁵

There are no businessmen in the top echelons of the civil service either. For example, only professional diplomats employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been made Ambassadors in recent years. However, big businessmen have been appointed heads of special missions with the rank of Ambassador. Such missions were sent in the 1950s to

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 561.

⁴ Characteristically, this share declined steadily after the war. Thus, in 1946 it was some 20 per cent; in 1967, it was down to 15 per cent. Calculated on the basis of M. Ishikawa, *A History of Political Structure in the Postwar Period*, Tokyo, 1976, p. 24 (in Japanese); *Jiyu minshu*, No. 5, 1968, pp. 36-37.

⁵ K. Sasago, *Political Funds*, Tokyo, 1979, pp. 75-76 (in Japanese).

Southeast Asian countries to negotiate reparations to be paid by Japan as compensation for damages suffered by these countries during World War II. Later similar missions went out to different parts of the globe, such as the PRC, the USA, Western Europe, etc. For example, the Japanese delegation to the 1976 foreign trade talks with the EEC was headed by Toshio Doko, the then President of Keidanren; and that sent to the October 1981 talks, by Yoshihiro Inayama, today's President of Keidanren.⁶

Despite the formal independence of political establishment from financial and monopoly capital, and an insignificant monopoly representation in political institutions and the civil service, the monopoly-financial elite is directly involved in policy-making.

In influencing the system of political power, the business circles have definite objectives and goals. The most important of these is, undoubtedly, the consolidation of political conditions preserving the existing socio-political order based on private property and exploitation of hired labour.

In the latter half of the 1970s, when the LDP gained almost as many parliamentary seats as all the opposition parties combined, the *zaikai* leaders addressed particularly sharp-worded admonitions to the Liberal Democrats, calling on them to stop factional wrangling and concentrate all efforts on standing up to the opposition. After the LDP fared especially badly in the December 9, 1976 elections to the lower house (it barely managed to win a majority), President Shigeo Nagano of the Trade and Industrial Chamber came out with an article in *Tyuo koron*, a popular socio-political journal, incisively criticising the LDP factionalism.⁷

By exerting pressure on the state machinery as the most important link in the political system, monopoly capital is seeking the best political, economic and social conditions for itself. Through the mechanism of state regulation, it exerts a decisive influence on the shaping of the most important policies, such as general economic structure, economic planning, financial system, social security, education, militarisation, etc. Moreover, in Japan, which depends on foreign trade for its survival, the monopolies are particularly concerned with external economic expansion.

Cooperating with state and political bodies, the business community exerts pressure which affects the whole of political establishment, including the Government, the LDP leadership, the LDP's central bureaucracy, the LDP factions, the central executive, and Parliament, and is exerted through a variety of channels and methods, the choice of which depends on the nature and scope of the objectives pursued, as well as the business grouping involved.

The financial and monopoly bosses and the LDP leaders have traditionally maintained a close cooperation based on a community of main class interests and goals. However, this does not rule out temporary frictions. Thus, in 1956, most leaders of the business organisations urged Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama's resignation over his policy of normalising relations with the Soviet Union. Late in 1974, the relations between the Conservative Party and the monopoly-financial elite soured dramatically owing to the *Bungei shunju's* exposure of the then Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's illicit sources of wealth, which cast a shadow on the whole capitalist establishment. Likewise, there was no love lost between the monopolies and Takeo Miki, Prime Minister from 1974 to 1976, who sponsored an investigation of the Lockheed scandal connected with a

⁶ *Mainichi shimbun*, Oct. 3, 1981.

⁷ See *Tyuo koron*, 1977, No. 2, pp. 142-147.

group of top government officials, Prime Minister Tanaka included, receiving bribes from the US Lockheed aircraft corporation. It was revealed that between 1958 and 1975, Lockheed, which sought profitable orders, had transferred them a total of 3.7 billion yen (\$12 million in 1976 dollars).

However, in the course of their contacts, financial and monopoly bosses, the Government and the LDP leaders agree on a wide range of issues, including the economic growth rates, major trends in external economic policy, domestic political problems, the most important bills to be tabled by the Government, etc.

At this level, the monopolies are generally represented by the leaders of one of the business organisations, most often Keidanren, or by all the Big Four, and the ruling conservative party, by its Chairman—the Prime Minister—and often by its General Secretary and Chairman of the LDP Council for the Study of Political Issues. More specific matters are taken to Cabinet Ministers heading respective departments of the central administration.

Presently, the Japanese monopolies are concerned with a prospective “administrative reform”, proposed by the Suzuki Cabinet after it came to power in July 1980, and projected as a national priority. The Big Four and the Government have repeatedly discussed the forms and the scope of the “reform”, envisaging a general cut-down on all governmental subsidies and on the numbers of administrative and bureaucratic personnel. It is indicative that none other than Toshio Doko, an outstanding figure in the financial and monopoly elite and Keidanren’s President from 1974 to 1980, has been appointed head of the Special Council for the Administrative Reform,⁸ a consultative organ supposed to advise the Government and coordinate work on the draft “reform”.

The *zaikai* leaders and Prime Ministers maintain both official and unofficial personal contacts. The Prime Minister is usually invited to the congresses of the Big Four, while their representatives are often to be seen at the Prime Minister’s official residence. Not infrequently, a Cabinet head meets all the leaders of the Big Four during his term of office.

Personal contacts between the Government and business circles are very extensive indeed. Each postwar Premier has been a member of several societies—sometimes a dozen at a time—organised as clubs to serve as channels for his contacts with different groupings of the business community. These societies are composed of persons who, for example, studied at or graduated simultaneously from the same university, came from the same region of Japan, etc. Some of them unite people of the same age. Their meetings are held in unofficial surroundings such as fashionable hotels, restaurants, golf clubs and so on, and pursue the same aims as the official contacts: to acquaint Prime Minister with the business community’s opinions and requests on a wide range of issues and to have the Government agree on specific policies.

The *Zaikai* magazine intimated, for example, that when Prime Minister Ohira was in office (1978-1980) there was more than 15 societies which had on their rolls such financial and monopoly dignitaries as President Otsuki of Nikkeiren, President Nagano of Nissho, President of the major Arabia sekiyu oil company Kobayashi; Yoshihiro Inayama, who was Vice President of Keidanren prior to May 1980, and later its President, and others.⁹

⁸ See *Japan Times*, Aug. 25, 1981.

⁹ *Zaikai*, Oct. 16, 1979, pp. 23-42.

The LDP top functionaries, too, are exposed to the Big Four's political pressure. This applies in particular to its Secretary-General and chairmen of the two most important subdivisions of the conservative party's headquarters—the Council for General Issues (Somukai) and the Council for the Study of Political Issues (Seimu tyosakai) who are constantly in touch with the *zaikai* leaders.

These discuss essentially the same problems as with Prime Minister and in addition decide on the financing of the party. This is especially important for the LDP since it, unlike most bourgeois parties in capitalist countries, has practically no independent sources of revenues and is almost fully subsidised by business circles. In some years the share of these subsidies in its "political funds" reaches 80 per cent.¹⁰

The LDP receives contributions from a vast number of juridical and private persons: national and regional business organisations, monopoly associations, individual corporations, and numerous individuals. The largest donations come from major private banks and other credit-and-finance establishments as well as iron-and-steel and electrical engineering companies representing the industries which profit the most from the policy of "accelerated economic development" pursued by the LDP in the 1960s and the early 1970s, when these industries were in a privileged position and enjoyed governmental credits and orders.¹¹ The arms producers' political activity has been stepped up in recent years in connection with the LDP's more vigorous policy of militarisation. In a bid to force on the government the decision on domestic production of the key types of hardware, the interested corporations united by the Japanese Military Industry Association (Nihon heiku kogyokai) have been transferring the LDP considerable sums of money. According to the communist *Akahata*, they amounted, in 1978, to 1.1 billion yen, or some 10 per cent of funds raised by the LDP for that year.¹²

Keidanren acts as a coordinating centre for the collection campaign, controlling 50 per cent of all the "political donations" the LDP receives either as a lump-sum from the specialised intermediary organisation the People's Political Association (Kokumin seiji kyokai) or as direct contributions to its coffers.¹³ Keidanren is also central in procuring election funds for the party, which it does before elections to Parliament or local self-government bodies by bringing in money from the monopolies.

Granting the LDP huge election subsidies has become a political practice in postwar Japan. Moreover, the amounts granted grow steadily. Thus, before the 1976 elections to the House of Representatives, it received 3.3 billion yen, whereas before the 1979 elections to the same House the sum rose to 8 billion.¹⁴ And it was already the recipient of a total of about 15 billion yen on the eve of the elections in 1980, to both Houses of Parliament. It was this injection that allowed the LDP to gain much more seats in Parliament in the summer of 1980.¹⁵

Subsidies directed to the LDP reach its factions and individual Liberal Democrats as well. These come from Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, as well as other industrial and financial groups, separate corporations and companies, industrial and trade associations and others, with the

¹⁰ See *Asahi nenkan*, 1979, p. 278.

¹¹ See K. Sasago, *Political Funds*, p. 26 (in Japanese).

¹² See *Akahata*, Aug. 8, 1979.

¹³ See T. Akiyama, *The Structure and Activities of the Four Leading Business Organisations*, Tokyo, 1978 (in Japanese).

¹⁴ See *Japan Times*, Aug. 2, 1979.

¹⁵ See *Akahata*, June 27, 1980.

exception of Keidanren which makes contribution to the LDP as a whole.

These subsidies are greatly instrumental in forming the "political funds" of the party. As a rule they reach their destination through the medium of "support societies" (koenkai), intermediary organisations specialising in funds collection run by leaders of all the LDP factions. The 1978 statistics show that the officially announced revenues of the five biggest groupings within the LDP, headed by T. Fukuda, K. Tanaka, Y. Nakasone, M. Ohira and T. Miki, amounted to some 2.1 billion yen, or 20 per cent of all cash collected by the party.¹⁶

Pressure exerted on the Government and state agencies by the monopoly-financial elite is an important part of the state-monopoly capitalist system. To a large extent, this is so because of Japan's historical peculiarities: the traditionally active Executive, the absence, until the end of the 19th century, of elected bodies, the numerous remnants of feudalism which persisted in the structure of state power till the end of World War II, etc. The monopolies seek to establish sound contacts above all with the so-called "economic" departments—the ministries of finance, foreign trade and industry, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, building, communications, labour and the Economic Planning Agency.

An important avenue of the Four's infiltration in the Executive are the mixed government-monopoly consultative committees and councils which added up, in the 1970s, to more than 230, with a staff of 5,000. The monopoly elite is widely represented in them, along with members of the government, the bureaucracy, professions and academic circles. Thus, in early 1977, the monopoly and financial bourgeoisie constituted 56 per cent of the key consultative committees, such as the Economic Council under the Economic Planning Agency, the Committee for Industrial Structure under the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry, the Committee for Financial System under the Finance Ministry, and some others, with the proportions for civil servants and bureaucrats being 20.6 per cent and representatives of public organisations and professionals—university professors, physicians, lawyers, journalists, etc.—23.4 per cent.¹⁷

Its majority in the government-consultative organs, which can sometimes become powerful levers of policy-making, enables the monopoly bourgeoisie to exert vigorous pressure on the central administration and ultimately on the government, most members of which are also part of these organs. The monopolies' recommendations agreed upon in the consultative committees are either translated into governmental decisions, or are written into the bills tabled in Parliament. One of the significant functions of these organs is their participation in budgeting, a major prerogative of the government. The *zaikai* people maintain close cooperation with officials from the Budget Department of the Ministry of Finance and are in a position to assist in drawing up the budget. Their role is especially important in the initial stages when the general structure of the budget is outlined—the prospective level of economic growth, the main trends of tax policy, finance and foreign trade policies, etc. Characteristically, the draft budget cannot be approved by the Cabinet unless it has been passed by the abovementioned committees.¹⁸

The membership of these also allows the Four to influence economic planning, something which acquired momentous importance after the

¹⁶ See *Yomiuri Yearbook*, 1980, Tokyo, 1980, p. 136 (in Japanese).

¹⁷ See *Akahata*, March 5, 1977.

¹⁸ See T. Ono, *The Rulers Whom No One Knows*, Tokyo, 1967, p. 119 (in Japanese).

emergence of a state-monopoly capitalist system in Japan. The key role in economic planning is being played by the Economic Council set up in 1952, which is a consultative organ attached to the Economic Planning Agency. According to Haruhiro Fukui, a US specialist on Japan, for more than two decades, "the Economic Council became an *ad hoc* and yet virtually permanent agency through which the government sought the opinions and cooperation of the business community in revising existing economic plans or formulating new ones."¹⁹

The backbone of the Council is made up of *zaikai* people who control all of its activities. Kazutaka Kikawada, President of the Tokyo Denki Corporation and former president of Keizai Doyukai, a pillar of the financial and monopoly establishment, was its head between 1966 and 1978, the year of his death.

Although the Council's legal status entitles it to perform some auxiliary functions within the framework of the Economic Planning Agency, in fact it has assumed the task of mapping out the main directions of economic planning, while the Agency has become its secretariat of sorts, responsible for routine preparatory and research work and planning technicalities.²⁰ Its recommendations invariably underpin the governmental long-term plans from the first Five-Year Plan of Achieving Economic Independence published in December 1955 to the latest Seven-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development for 1979-1985.

The key "economic" consultative organs function in close cooperation with the main business organisations, above all Keidanren. For quite a number of years, their recommendations on major issues intended for the government have been submitted for preliminary consideration to Keidanren.

The Committee for Industrial Structure is a key link in the system of ties between Keidanren, the consultative organs, and the government. Since it was founded in 1964, it has invariably been headed by Presidents of Keidanren; 55.8 per cent of its members belong to the Four, and 7.8 per cent to the government and the bureaucratic elite. The representatives of Big Business are especially numerous in its Steel Department, where they account for 98 per cent of the staff. This department has been even dubbed the "Secret Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry".²¹

The Committee's activities have earned it a reputation of being an active champion of monopoly interests. It was instrumental in shaping the policy of "accelerated economic growth rates" in the 1960s, and prompted the course of "restructuring and rationalising" small and medium-sized enterprises pursued in the interests of the monopolies since the late 1970s.

The traditionally weak legislative power and the traditionally strong Executive, as well as a relatively short history of Japanese parliamentarism have predetermined the place which Parliament has come to occupy in the Japanese state-monopoly capitalist system. As distinct from the USA where Congress lobbying is a paramount functional element of the political system, the Japanese financial and monopoly leaders prefer to act directly through the Executive. At the same time, by cooperating with the government, the leadership of the ruling party and the upper echelons of the state bureaucracy, they ultimately bring pressure to bear on Parliament as well.

¹⁹ See *Asian Survey*, 1972, Vol. XII, No. 4, p. 331.

²⁰ See *Japan's Economic Plans*, Tokyo, 1969, p. 91 (in Japanese).

²¹ *Akahata*, March 5, 1977.

Present-day political practices, however, do not rule out the possibility that the business community might exert a direct influence on Parliament. Monopoly lobbying is clearly visible in the mechanism of price rises for various types of commodities and services, the decisions being adopted by Parliament behind the scenes. Such bills proposed by the Cabinet are a major element of the ruling party's legislative programme. Often they are a direct consequence of "political donations" it receives from the monopolies.

Having taken in its stead the "oil shock" of late 1973 when OPEC raised the oil prices, the government has put through Parliament a number of bills on higher prices for gas, and electricity, and on higher railway tariffs, etc. This brought huge profits to the respective monopoly groupings. Several specialised groups have cropped up within the parliamentary LDP, such as the "overland freight group", the "oil deputies", the "rice deputies", etc., their purpose being to support monopoly interests. They are not connected with any particular faction but rather have direct links with relevant departments of the central administration.²² Changes in legislation which their patrons might wish are traded for "political donations".

* * *

As a result of the postwar development of state-monopoly capitalism, a financial and monopoly establishment has taken shape in Japan which exerts a vigorous and unremitting influence on major state policies. Acting as it does in circumvention of the representative system (elections, Parliament, etc.) or influencing the composition of the representative organs, the financial elite in the person of the leaders of biggest business organisations has become an integral part of the modern Japanese political system. The key role in this sense is played by Keidanren, the leading organisation of the business world.

The Japanese monopolies' political style is peculiar in that they seek to remain outside the elected organs and the government, preferring indirect pressure and unofficial contacts with the LDP leadership, the heads of its factions, and high-placed government officials. The most important circumstance in this connection is that the ruling LDP is fully dependent on monopoly subsidies, which allows the latter to use "political donations" as a powerful means of pressure on the Japanese conservatives.

One of the most efficient channels of monopoly capital's pressure on policy-making is its cooperation with the central administration. The finance and monopoly elite can take a direct part in the work of ministries and departments mainly by sitting on the key consultative bodies which are a key link in the system of state-monopoly capitalism. This allows the elite to pull the strings behind the scenes, while remaining, on the face of it, uninvolved in government decisions. These tactics, which have been termed the "invisible cape" (*kakure-mino*), are aimed at concealing the role the finance and monopoly elite plays in present-day Japan. This circumspet influence is consistently exposed by progressive forces, above all communists and socialists, who denounce the anti-popular, pro-monopoly nature of state policies.

²² See K. Sasago, *Political Funds*, pp. 102-103 (in Japanese).

INFLATIONARY PROCESSES IN CHINA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 82 pp 92-101

[Article by P. B. Kapralov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text]

During the last few years, China's economy has distinctly displayed the symptoms of a profound malady: a destabilised price system, spiralling prices of many basic necessities including food, raw materials and fuel, multiple issues of paper money not backed by sufficient inventories, a disorganised financial system, and a considerable budgetary deficit. By admission of the Chinese press, skyrocketing prices and the haphazard issue of paper money "have disrupted economic activity, increased the burden on urban and rural dwellers alike, causing alarm and undermining the people's trust" in the country's leadership.¹ "Can we stop inflation? This is the most important problem today, from every point of view," wrote the leading economic journal *Jingji yanjiu*.²

The growing inflationary processes in China are a result of the long years of Chinese economy's functioning in conditions of profound structural disproportions, steadily falling efficiency of social production, and sliding overall economic productivity and performance indicators in industry, construction and agriculture.

DIMINISHING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY—A FACTOR OF INFLATIONARY PROCESSES IN CHINA

China's nationalistic policy of unbridled militarisation has considerably slowed down the country's rate of economic growth, undercut returns on investments, pushed up unit production costs of major manufactured goods, frozen the basic indicators of the working people's living standard at a low level, and reduced their economic activity. Years of feverish militarisation, artificial whipping up of the rate of economic development, and the already excessive rates of formation of capital and the scale of construction in heavy industry have had a negative effect on the Chinese economy. The most salient features of which remain, as before, low agricultural productivity and a mass of small industrial enterprises. This one-sided development, accompanied by all sorts of imbalances, has put an additional strain on China's weak, backward national economy and produced an inevitable backlash—the alarming growth of allocations necessary to attain the projected economic targets. China's programmes for nuclear and conventional rearmament which, in expert estimates, absorbed approximately 40 per cent of the budget allocations throughout the 1970s, have exacerbated the country's pressing economic problems—the growing wear and tear on an obsolescence of

¹ *Renmin ribao*, 26 April 1980.

² *Jingji yanjiu*, No. 8, 1981.

equipment in industry and agriculture and the acute energy, food and raw-materials crisis, particularly painful in a country with a high population density.

According to Chinese economists' estimates between 1970 and 1979, the growth in national income per one yuan of investment was half that of the first five-year-plan period. In 1970-1978 the excessive rate of capital formation (33 per cent on average) resulted in capital formation growing twice as fast as the national income (200 and 93 per cent respectively). An economic journal complained that "on the whole, we are now spending two units of currency on what earlier cost us but one".³ As a result of the deterioration in revenue from profit and turnover taxes per unit of output, unit consumption of fuel and working capital China's treasury loses annually 20 billion yuan (or approximately 20 per cent of the revenue of 1979), as well as 100 million tonnes of standard fuel (approximately 20 per cent of the annual consumption) and several hundred million yuan worth of working capital.⁴

The table on page 94 gives more detail on the excessive strain and spread of funds in China's economy which are a spur on the inflationary processes.

In 1978, at the height of the "four modernisations" boom and feverish attempts to accelerate the implementation of the ambitious ten-year plan of economic development, the rate of capital formation was raised to 36 per cent of the national income, with investment accounting for nearly one half of the budget.⁵ The crack programme of erecting more than one hundred large modern industrial facilities resulted in over-accumulation of sorts (a particularly grave symptom against the background of growing military spending) and a back-breaking mobilisation of enormous material and technical resources which it proved impossible to "digest". To finance these plans, the government was forced to issue paper money repeatedly. However, "attempts to step up construction by printing more money not only fail to do so", wrote *Hongqi*, taking stock of the practice, "but even produce the opposite effect of slowing it down—everywhere such methods produce only negative results: competition for resources flares up, plans are disorganised, construction is prolonged and delayed considerably."⁶

The insufficient material resources diverted for the implementation of these overambitious plans from the sphere of consumption and realistic social reproduction have thus become dead capital. The inevitable result has been the falling efficiency of commissioned fixed assets and the growing gap between budgetary expenditures and revenues.

In the second half of the 1970s, completion terms and construction costs of large and medium-sized facilities had doubled as compared to the mid-1950s.⁷ "If large and medium-sized enterprises take ten years to complete, eight more years to be recouped, with many of them operating at a loss, where will we be by the end of century?" queried one author in a financial journal.⁸ The commissioning of a large project with an estimated initial cost of 100 million yuan requires a minimum additional outlay of a few more tens of million yuan. Spreading investment too thin has bled the Chinese economy white: to boost new industrial

³ *Jingji guanli*, No. 3, 1981; *Hongqi*, No. 23, 1980; *Renmin ribao*, 7 December 1979.

⁴ *Jingji guanli*, No. 3, 1981; *Hongqi*, No. 17, 1980; *Caizheng*, No. 2, 1981.

⁵ *Caizheng*, Nos. 1, 2, 1981; *Renmin ribao*, 24 March 1981, 9 April 1981.

⁶ *Hongqi*, No. 17, 1980.

⁷ *Hongqi*, No. 23, 1980.

⁸ *Caiwu yu kuaiji*, No. 10, 1980.

construction, the existing enterprises are deprived of depreciation funds and working capital; the refurbishing of transportation and energy sectors is postponed; agriculture is ignored. The commissioning of projects falls behind schedule, with many new enterprises standing idle due to shortages of raw materials, fuel and energy. Chinese economists estimate that under these conditions, the new fixed assets cover only 40 per cent of capital inputs.⁹ The Chinese press admitted that wherever new

Indicators	1st Five-Year Plan (1953-1957)	4th Five-Year Plan (1971-1976)
Capital formation in the national income, per cent	24.2	33.0
Share of the heavy industry in gross industrial and agricultural output, per cent	22.5	39.8
Labour productivity rate of growth at state-owned enterprises, per cent	8.7	1.3
Average growth rate of monetary revenue, per cent	11.0	4.2
Fixed assets needed to produce additional 100 yuan of national income (yuan)	168	346
Consumption of standard fuel per 100 million yuan worth of agricultural and industrial output, thous. tons	620	950
Terms of completion of large and medium-sized enterprises, years	6	11.5
Average additions to fixed assets for the production of 1 ton of steel, yuan	1342	2452
1 ton of coal, yuan	56	119

Sources: *Guangming ribao*, 28 June, 1980, *Renmin ribao*, 29 April, 15 August 1980, 30 March 1981; *Jingji yanjiu*, No. 6, 1980; *Caiwu yu kuaiji*, No. 10, 1980, *Hongqi*, No. 16, 1980.

big industrial projects are located, there are accumulations of unused materials, and a waste of fuel and energy, whereas many existing enterprises operate below capacity due to raw materials, coal and electricity shortages; the loss in capacity due to this inefficiency is about one third of the total.¹⁰

Recent statistical data and estimates published in China show that the economy is "marking time" as a result of this policy of over-accumulation. Although in 1965-1976 fixed assets grew by 178 billion yuan, during the same period industry produced 100 billion yuan worth of defective and sub-standard goods; in 1974-1976 alone an equal amount was lost due to work stoppages.¹¹ The growth of heavy industry out of all proportion with the country's potential and consequently accompanied by delays in the rehabilitation period and the growing share of inefficient small enterprises resulted in a sharp deterioration of production conditions, slowing down of the turnover of production and lowering of monetary funds, growth of unit costs and losses, reduction of enterprises' incomes as well as the budgetary revenues from industry as a whole, primarily at its key state-financed enterprises. It is symptomatic that out of the 140,000 enterprises commissioned in 1966-1976 only 1,570 were classified as large and medium-sized ones.¹² Compared to 1966, in the late 1970s unit costs in the production of electricity, cast iron, synthetic ammonia, and sulphuric and nitric acids went up by 30-40 per cent. The

⁹ *Renmin ribao*, 26 February, 2 June 1981.

¹⁰ *Renmin ribao*, 7 December 1979.

¹¹ *Renmin ribao*, 26 December 1980, 15 January 1981.

¹² *Renmin ribao*, 15 January, 17 July 1981.

working capital turnover slowed down, and the growth of inventories in 1964-1979 was more than three times that of the national income.¹³ More than half of the indicators characterising consumption of resources and quality of products have deteriorated. The beefing up of Group A enterprises (producer goods), unnatural for a backward country (61.7 per cent in 1978) and accompanied by longer periods of turnover, has cut overall profitability in industry by one-third compared to 1957. At enterprises of the 1st Ministry of Machine Building, the corresponding reduction was 40 per cent down over 1966.¹⁴ However, the actual drop in profitability of China's industry has been much greater than official statistics care to reveal. For many years, a growing share in the enterprises' revenues and, correspondingly, in their profit and turnover taxes is represented by so-called pseudo-revenues from the sale to the state of defective or low-quality products which form a sort of useless ballast in the stores.¹⁵

A similar picture of overexertion and overextension of the already meagre government resources was also observed in agriculture throughout the 1970s. Chinese agriculture was compelled independently to accumulate the huge resources needed for its growth. Rural areas had to build up their own unwieldy production machinery, to expand local irrigation facilities and to build clusters of small Group-A enterprises producing metal, cement, chemical fertilisers, farm machinery and even small hydroelectric stations. The share of government spending on capital inputs into agriculture was constantly dropping, and the share of financing done by the population was on the rise. Industrial enterprises of large teams, communes and districts were allowed to take money and grain from production teams under the guise of "loans". The upkeep of manpower diverted to construction sites and enterprises was effected with the help of "additional manpower units" also funded by production teams.¹⁶

This additional burden, far in excess of the rural areas' possibilities, has had a very negative effect on the condition and rate of growth of agriculture, as well as on the performance of local industry and irrigation. The exorbitant expenditure of manpower and other resources in small-scale irrigation and industrial projects with the resultant low efficiency (due to the unreliability of small irrigation installations and the high cost and low quality of products turned out by small enterprises, among other things) stunted current agricultural production, reduced peasants' incomes and sapped their strength, the whole combining to slow down agricultural development and pushing up the cost of agricultural produce.

New low-quality, low-performance indirect labour has proved more expensive than the living labour it replaced. Thus the very need for such costly "modernisation" and "mechanisation" has been called into question. According to data published in *Jingji guanli*, prices of agricultural machinery, chemical fertilisers, insecticides, pesticides, plastic film, etc., are so high that mechanisation is five times more expensive than manual labour. It must be added that the acreage cultivated by machines is growing slowly in spite of the larger fleets of agricultural machines, which, however, are largely obsolete, unreliable, and plagued by shortages of fuel and spare parts. A typical new feature of China's agriculture is that growth in grain production falls far short of that needed to cover

¹³ *Caiwu yu kuaiji*, No. 10, 1980; No. 5, 1981; *Hongqi*, No. 18, 1981.

¹⁴ *Renmin ribao*, 24 March, 3 September 1980, 2 March 1981.

¹⁵ *Renmin ribao*, 17 February, 31 March 1981.

¹⁶ *Nunye jingji wenti*, No. 4, 1980.

additional expenses on machinery, fertilisers and pesticides.¹⁷ Break downs of agricultural machinery are frequent due to low quality, unreliability, and lack of spares.

Despite considerable growth of unit production costs in agriculture (with low government spending), the state for years refrained from raising procurement prices of agricultural products. National income produced in agriculture was syphoned off elsewhere, thus inflicting heavy damage on the sector. According to some Chinese estimates, in the late 1970s from one-third to one-half of the state's monetary revenue was due to non-equivalent exchange between industry and agriculture, and to agricultural taxes.¹⁸ The situation is particularly acute in grain growing—China's leading agricultural sector. Simply to maintain the level of per capita grain production of past decades (approximately 300 kilos) given the invariably low procurement prices (during the 12 years between 1965 and 1977), the average production team had to cough up more and more money to maintain local complexes producing agricultural machinery and equipment, chemical fertilisers, pesticides, cement and irrigation systems. As a result, growing production costs have left the growth of agricultural production far behind, a process reflected in the freezing or reduction of peasants' incomes. According to Chinese estimates, from 1965 to 1977 agricultural production grew by 83 per cent in terms of money, inputs of embodied labour rose by 130 per cent, and procurement prices by only 9.2 per cent. As a result of the depreciation of the work-day unit and climbing consumer prices, the monthly incomes of commune members remained stable at 5 yuan per capita and even diminished in some cases.¹⁹

In the 1960s and 1970s, the growing internal expenses in agriculture resulted in the impoverishment of the Chinese countryside and a deterioration of the overall economic and environmental situation in the rural areas. The growing rural population density and slow modernisation of agriculture steadily increased the burden on the economic and environmental potential, with reproduction increasingly assured at the price of its irreplaceable depletion. To meet the country's growing requirements in food and fuel, steppe and pasture land was ploughed up, forests cut down and valuable topsoil destroyed. All available vegetable resources—straw, firewood, and manure—were used as fuel. These measures, dictated by the inexorable current reproduction needs, have steadily harmed the conditions of the reproduction cycle: in vast agricultural areas which have no more forests, rivers erode topsoil which results in increasingly frequent droughts and flooding, deforested soil becomes infertile and subject to wind erosion, and the total area of wasteland is growing.²⁰ The annual loss due to the leaching of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium from soil is estimated at 8 billion yuan.²¹

GROWING PRICES AND INFLATION

A redistribution of China's national income in favour of military-industrial programmes through artificial freezing of wholesale prices and

¹⁷ *Jingji guanli*, No. 10, 1979; *Nunye jingji wenti*, No. 4, 1980.

¹⁸ *Renmin ribao*, 14 September 1981.

¹⁹ *Nunye jingji wenti*, No. 1, 1980; *Jingji guanli*, No. 10, 1979. *Guangming ribao*, 7 December 1978.

²⁰ *Hongqi*, Nos. 9, 21, 1980; *Renmin ribao*, 27 October 1980, *Nunye jingji wenti*, No. 10, 1980.

²¹ *Renmin ribao*, 10 November 1980.

consumption fund has been slowing down the operation of the economic mechanism for many years. A manifestation of the resultant strain has been the constant spontaneous "regulation" of prices and their hidden growth, with consumer prices particularly affected. "For ten or twelve years", admitted *Caizheng* journal (meaning the late 1960s and the early 1970s), "retail prices grew constantly and the real incomes of the working people kept falling"²². In 1965-1976, for example, market consumer prices increased by 40 per cent. According to foreign sources, in comparison with the mid-1950s, in the late 1960s, some staple foods were two-and-a-half or even five times more expensive.²³ In the late 1970s the gap between the officially frozen "stable" prices and the real costs and real possibilities of marshalling the necessary resources produced profound dislocation in the economic mechanism, disrupting the existing price system, pushing up prices of basic commodities and raw materials, and destabilising the budgetary and monetary systems. From 1978 to 1981 there were a series of planned price hikes in China, generally accompanied by further uncontrolled rises, involving food, agricultural and industrial raw materials, fuel, grain, oil-bearing seeds, cotton, animal products, cast iron, cement, some kinds of rolled metal, petrochemicals, timber and coal. Prices for major agricultural products went up by 20-50 per cent, and for timber, cement and rolled metal by 100 to 150 per cent.²⁴

The period of 1979-1981 was marked by a considerable slowing down of industrial and agricultural production (by approximately one half), natural calamities and aggravated food and energy problems. The growing prices of major resources and raw materials were accompanied by an unhealthy increase in the amount of money in circulation and a false expansion of the aggregate demand of regions, enterprises, and the population. The Chinese press describes China's existing monetary system as "a tree without roots" or "water without a source". According to some estimates, only one half of this illusory "growth of income" is backed by the supply of consumer goods, and in any case, this "growth" is constantly being depreciated and syphoned off in the form of savings bank deposits and government bonds.²⁵ These inflationary processes are vivid proof of the Chinese economy's profound sickness and the disparity between the existing system of prices and incomes, on the one hand, and the necessary allocations for social purposes, on the other. In these conditions, belated and half-hearted measures to "regulate" wholesale prices, wages, etc., only push up prices.

The Chinese press and official publications typically give the following dual definition of the present inflation-ridden economic situation: the growing cash incomes of the population are accompanied by the continuing sizable budgetary deficit and the growing issuance of paper money and increased prices for many goods.²⁶ Against the background of the difficult overall economic situation, the additional cash paid out to farmers for fulfilment and overfulfilment of procurement plans and as "bonuses" to industrial workers and other employees only place an additional strain on the state budget and destabilise the price system, because all this is not backed by sufficient supplies of goods. A slight increase in procurement prices for major agricultural products in 1979 combined with fuel price hikes had the effect of promptly pushing up food prices

²² *Caizheng*, No. 2, 1981.

²³ *Zhongguo jingji nianjian*, 1981; *Feiqing yuebao*, No. 10, 1968.

²⁴ *Toyo keizai* (Tokyo), No. 4280, 1981; *Renmin ribao*, 1 December 1979.

²⁵ *Renmin ribao*, 27 October, 7 December 1981; *Hongqi*, No. 4, 1981.

²⁶ *Renmin ribao*, 13 September 1980; 8 March, 30 April 1981.

in urban areas, followed by pay raises and compensations to workers and other employees, resulting in higher costs incurred by enterprises and a chain reaction of overt and covert price rises in urban areas. The net result was an across-the-board increase of prices for both producer and consumer goods destined for agriculture. The 1979 increase in procurement prices for agricultural products was 22.1 per cent and the 1980 rise was another 7.1 per cent, with retail food prices in the towns shooting up by 30-40 per cent and 13.8 per cent respectively. Consumer goods prices in town and country went up an average of 7 per cent after the 1980 increase.²⁷ The scale and scope of price increases produced "a chain reaction of chaotic, frequently concealed price rises."²⁸ The half-spontaneous nature of this process was officially recognised in April 1980 in a notice of the State Council which amounted to an attempt to justify increases in "prices" that were obviously lowered and no longer covered the growing production costs of food, agricultural raw materials, and fuel. The notice also established an official procedure for setting new prices of goods and services "essential to the people's life".²⁹

The figures quoted reflect only the official side of prices "regulation", ignoring the sweeping scale of concealed and spontaneous inflation. According to Chinese sources, in 1979-1980 prices grew at an average annual rate of 6 per cent. Foreign estimates put the figure at between 7-12 and 20-30 per cent.³⁰

Skyrocketing prices in town and country alike are at the same time a measure of the growing shortage of basic necessities: food, consumer goods, fuel, housing, land and water. According to accounts by city dwellers, overpopulation and congestion is "terrible" and "growing with every passing day". Statistics testify that more than one half of living space in China's towns and cities is in dilapidated houses badly in need of repair. Meanwhile, in 1981 housing construction costs doubled compared to 1966 and the housing construction completion index fell by one quarter. The growing shortage of water compelled authorities to introduce water rationing. In 1978-1979, the number of cities with excessive environmental pollution increased from 18 to 22. The gravity of the problem is illuminated by the fact that in Shanghai, for example, the population density is 41,000 per square kilometre—three times the 1957 figure.³¹

INFLATION AND "THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT"

The rampant inflation in China is a result of the failure of the "great leap forward" policy and "super-high rates of growth", exacerbated by setbacks in all sorts of "streamlinings" and "reforms" designed to restructure the country's economic management.

The present Chinese leadership is manoeuvring feverishly: it has abandoned attempts to boost its unworkable "four modernisations" programme; it has slowed down the economic development rate and the budgetary investment volume, and it has permitted, and even encouraged, various forms of private and cooperative small-scale enterprise.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1 November 1979, 8 March, 30 April 1981.

²⁸ *Renmin ribao*, 8 February 1980.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 26 April 1980.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 8 March, 30 April 1981; 13 September 1980; *Asia Business*, 23 February 1981.

³¹ *Renmin ribao*, 1 June, 5 August, 10 November 1980; *Jiefang ribao*, 13 October 1980.

The largely spontaneous process of restructuring economic links, accompanied by the weakening of state control and planning in the sphere of production and distribution, as well as growing parochial and centrifugal trends, and free market play, has completely put off balance the country's entire budgetary and monetary system, reducing revenue of the national budget, which in turn, provoked new issues of paper money and new inflationary trends.

Since the second half of 1980, there has been a sharp drop in the output of heavy industry, primarily at large enterprises of national importance (following the curtailment of large- and medium-scale industrial construction) in key branches and industrial areas. The losses and the number of enterprises operating at a loss have shot up, with continuing disruption of management, deteriorating labour discipline and falling budget payments.³² In these conditions, the fact that many enterprises have been allowed, by way of "experiment", to keep a fraction of their profits has only exacerbated the parochial trends and financial abuses, creating new loopholes for those who want to dodge budget payments. In 1979-1981, the amount of profit and turnover taxes paid by the enterprises into the state budget fell from 49.3 to 34.7 billion yuan.³³

In the last few years, the state-controlled sector of industry and construction—never a model of stability—began losing ground to the anarchy-prone small-scale industry. The 1980 "reform of financial management" which increased the powers of local authorities in financial and investment policy has resulted in an enormous waste of resources badly needed by the national economy. "The big has lost ground to the small, and the advanced is losing ground to the backward". The end result was that in 1979-1981, total local investment almost doubled (from approximately 11 to 20 billion yuan), with investment from the state budget falling from 51.5 to 26.4 billion and the share of state-owned enterprises dropping by more than one half—down to 17.6 billion yuan.³⁴

In the last few years, "the new five little ones" (primitive textile, knitting, tobacco, liquor and sugar factories mushrooming haphazardly as a result of a reorientation from the heavy to light industry) have snatched large amounts of valuable raw materials designated for big Group-B enterprises, whereas "the old five little ones" continue to waste resources badly needed by Group-A industries, successfully resisting attempts by the authorities to put a check on them.³⁵ As a result, during the period in question, the state budget lost considerable revenue due to the poor economic performance of these small-scale local industries: they produce only one-third of the profit per 100 yuan of output and, correspondingly, one-third of the taxes large industrial facilities put out.³⁶ It is noteworthy that without the reduction and even lifting of taxes during the last two years, the survival of such small enterprises with their negative effect on the treasury would have been impossible.

In Chinese agriculture, overt or covert splitting of communes, widespread small-scale cooperative or individual farming on a contractual basis ("systems of production responsibility, allocation of production

³² *Renmin ribao*, 12 September 1980, 8 May 1981; *Jingji guanli*, 1980, No. 12; *Honqi*, No. 8, 1981, etc.

³³ *Renmin ribao*, 30 August, 27 October, 15 December 1981; *Caiwu yu kuaiji*, No. 4, 1981.

³⁴ *Renmin ribao*, 8 March, 30 April, 15 December 1981.

³⁵ *Jingji guanli*, No. 12, 1980; No. 1, 1981; *Honqi*, Nos. 1 and 11, 1981; *Caizheng*, No. 1, 1981.

³⁶ *Caizheng*, No. 12, 1980, No. 3; *Renmin ribao*, 25 December 1980.

among groups, households and individual peasants")³⁷ has been accompanied by a weakening of the centralised system of procurements to the state and the strengthening of the free market in the field of agricultural raw materials. All this should be viewed against the background of China's overall economic difficulties and rampant inflation.

The 1979-1980 rise of procurement prices for agricultural products advertised as a "measure designed to raise the peasantry's standard of living", but insufficiently backed up by supplies of consumer goods, was inconsistent in many respects. Malpractices by state procurement agencies at the local level—down-grading of produce, strict quality standards, short-weighing and outright deceit—accompanied by growing prices (overt and covert) of the producer and consumer goods offered to the farmer have eaten up a great deal of the much publicised additional income for peasants. It is symptomatic that since the autumn of 1979 when the new procurement prices went into effect, articles of the following type began to appear in the Chinese press: "Why Don't Peasants Benefit Properly from Higher Agricultural Prices?"³⁸ Meanwhile, production costs in agriculture have grown considerably. In rural areas around Shanghai praised as models for emulation, there was an "onslaught of price rises" in 1979-1980—50-60 per cent on average—for the simplest farm implements such as sickles, hoes, and tubs for organic fertiliser.

In view of consumer goods shortages, the cash remaining in the peasants' hands is expropriated by the state in the form of compulsory "bank deposits" which have almost tripled during the last few years.³⁹

In these conditions, peasants are increasingly resorting to dodges and loopholes left open by the system of small-scale cooperative and individual farming. In reporting crop figures to the state, peasant households underestimate them, thus boosting sales of "above-the-plan" produce for which they get 50 per cent more, or they simply sell them at free market prices. There are numerous reports in the Chinese press testifying to the increasing instances of the latter practice.⁴⁰

Uncontrolled local price rises in 1980-1981 embraced about one half of the total range of agricultural products in the first and second categories. Particularly affected were raw materials for the light industry: cotton, tobacco, silk cocoons, sugar-bearing crops, and products of animal husbandry, which in monetary terms account for at least half of the government's agricultural purchases and 20 per cent of the country's exports. With state procurement prices going up by 22.1 per cent in 1979 and by 7.1 per cent in 1980, market prices were going up at an even faster rate, broadening the gap between the two. For example, the market price of tobacco is 20-50 per cent higher than the official one which was raised in 1979-1980.⁴¹ And what is worse, tobacco factories compete for raw materials which are in short supply, increasingly selling their products at free market prices. The fact of independent marketing of many consumer goods at prices which are much higher than the official ones has been repeatedly observed in China in the course of the last few years, and this is largely due to the higher prices of agricultural raw materials.

³⁷ See the statistics in *Jingji guanli*, No. 8, 1981, *Nongcun gongzuo tongxun*, No. 9, 1981.

³⁸ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1980, No. 11, *Renmin ribao*, October 28, 1979; 6 November 1979; 29 March, 12 November 1980.

³⁹ *Guangming ribao*, 19 September 1980; *Jingji yanjiu*, No. 11, 1980.

⁴⁰ *Honqi*, Nos. 3, 4, 1981; *Renmin ribao*, 26 December 1981, 8 January 1982.

⁴¹ *Jingji guanli*, No. 4, 1981.

In 1981, in a number of areas, procurement prices for agricultural products in short supply shot up by 20-100 per cent. This is not surprising in view of the fact that according to some estimates, new prices of agricultural products are 25-30 per cent below production costs.⁴²

In the last few years, there have been signs of a weakening of the state system of allocating major raw materials. Wholesale industrial fairs have been allowed, and all manners of black marketeers and middle men are becoming increasingly active: reselling agricultural produce and other consumer goods at a profit, they contribute to the continuing inflation. Free-market trade is gradually ousting the government system of rationing at fixed prices in urban areas.

* * *

The spiralling inflation in China at the turn of the decade is evidence of its profound economic sickness due to the policy of militarisation. The Chinese leaders' disregard for economic laws, the ongoing continuous in-fighting at the top, chaos at all echelons of the state and economic hierarchy, and the weakening of state control of production and distribution make it difficult to combat the economic crisis and prevent normalisation in production, and commodity and money circulation.

⁴² *Renmin ribao*, 29 September 1981; *Fudan xuebao*, No. 1, 1981.

COPYRIGHT: Translation into English, Progress Publishers, 1982

COPYRIGHT: Akademiya Nauk SSSR

CSO: 1812/15-E

U.S., PRC OPPOSE KOREAN REUNIFICATION TO PRESERVE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 82 pp 102-112

[Article by V. I. Andreyev, candidate of economic sciences, and V. I. Osipov, candidate of juridical sciences: "Friends and Foes of Korean Settlement"]

[Text]

The normalisation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula is a key international problem. The search for concrete ways of resolving this problem is unquestionably the business of the Korean people alone. However, maintaining peace in the region is a concern of all the nations and peoples of the world. Throughout its history, the Korean problem has been one of confrontation between two diametrically opposed socio-political systems and two foreign policies. Hence its international significance.

The Workers' Party of Korea and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) supported by the fraternal socialist countries and all progressive forces of the world are working for the reunification of the Korean nation—an issue which featured prominently at the 6th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in October 1980.¹

What is the reason for the lack of progress in the solution of the Korean problem? Why has the dialogue between the two parts of Korea which began ten years ago failed to produce any tangible results? The principal reason is the open interference of imperialist forces, primarily the USA, in the internal affairs of the Korean people. Their main goal is to buttress the most reactionary quarters of the South Korean ruling elite to ensure its survival and pro-American orientation.

There are many reasons for imperialism's particular interest in South Korea, but chief among them is its location, which militarily and strategically, makes it possible to maintain a permanent seat of cold war tensions in the region. Then too, the conditions for neocolonialist economic expansion here are favourable.² During the last few years, the military and strategic importance of South Korea has grown as a result of the "normalisation" of Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations and as a result of the far-from-fruitless attempts to add Peking to the existing Washington-Seoul-Tokyo axis which to all intents and purposes has become a reality. The role of the reactionary South-Korean regime in imperialist plans was also heightened by the recent positive changes on the Asian continent: the formation of a unified socialist Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic's joining the forces of socialism, the victory of progressive national forces in Kampuchea, the dissolution of the SEATO

¹ *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1981, No. 2, pp. 39-41.

² South Korea offers favourable conditions for foreign capital: for example, average wages paid by US subsidiaries there are only 12.8 per cent of those paid by similar enterprises in the US.

military bloc, and the victory of anti-imperialist revolutions in Afghanistan and Iran. The south of the Korean Peninsula has remained one of the last US outposts on the Asian continent, and its loss would seriously undermine US imperialism's positions there. It is not coincidental that on the day following the fall of Saigon, James Schlesinger, the then US Secretary of Defence, said that after the US withdrawal from Vietnam, Western Europe and South Korea would become the frontline of defence.³

The strategic goal of the US policy in Asia—the knocking up of an anti-Soviet alliance—determines the US desire to prop up its Seoul puppets as one of the few remaining regimes directly depending on Washington for survival. As the balance between the forces of peace and war in the world and on the Asian continent changed so did Washington's attitude to these changes and the role it ascribed to Seoul. When the policy of containment was in vogue, South Korea was viewed as an American beachhead for "rolling back" communism, since the early 1970s, Seoul has been transformed into a sort of front line for the defensive position taken by Japan—a senior partner of the United States in Asia which is becoming increasingly involved in Washington's militarist plans. Although Japan and South Korea are not bound by any formal military agreements, their armed forces have been maintaining close contacts between themselves and with the US army since the normalisation of Japanese-South Korean relations in 1965.⁴ This tripartite military cooperation includes deliveries of arms and other military equipment to Seoul, as a part of its armed forces modernisation programme, and liaison among the three armed forces. In 1976, the United States sponsored a joint Japanese-South Korean early warning system. The air forces of the two countries and that of the United States use the same codes. In 1977, the navies of the USA, Japan and South Korea held joint exercises during which they worked out plans for interaction in an "emergency". In April 1979 a Japanese-South Korean parliamentary council on security was set up to coordinate the two countries' positions in the military sphere. During his July 1979 visit, the first in postwar years, Yamashita, Japan's Chief of the Defence Agency and the Seoul side reached an agreement on exchange of officials in charge of defence matters.⁵

More than 40 corporations belonging to the Japanese military-industrial complex, with the giant Mitsubishi *zyukogyo* at the head, are actively cooperating with Seoul in outfitting the South Korean army. Japan is supplying artillery and small arms, ammunition, other military equipment, and materiel.⁶ Also noteworthy are the repeated US-Japanese statements to the effect that South Korea's security is inseparable from Japan's security. This wording, used in the joint Sato-Nixon communique in November 1969, was explained by Japanese government officials as meaning that in case of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula Japan "has a responsibility for immediate action to assist such military operations as the United States may launch from Japan, even before the United Nations decides whether any such war in Korea is aggression or not".⁷

This is the lynchpin of the Washington-Seoul-Tokyo axis which determines South Korea's role in imperialist plans and the growth of US and

³ *New York Times*, 1 May 1975.

⁴ V. M. Mazurov, *South Korea and the USA (1950-1970)*, Moscow, 1971, p. 191.

⁵ *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1981, No. 2.

⁶ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 21 March 1981.

⁷ *Japan Quarterly*, 1970, No. 3, p. 256. See also: D. T. Kapustin, *Taiwan and South Korea in Sino-American Relations*, M., 1980, p. 44.

Japanese assistance to South Korea in the latter's bid to attain "military self-sufficiency", that is, further militarisation.⁸ This also explains the interest of imperialist quarters, primarily those of the USA, in perpetuating the partition of Korea; it also clarifies the reason for their interference in the internal affairs of the Korean people with a view to maintaining their hold on the south of the Korean Peninsula.

The stationing of US troops and nuclear weapons in South Korea is the major instance of foreign interference in the affairs of the Korean people. The United States has about 40 military bases and nearly 40,000 servicemen in South Korea. In addition to conventional weapons, in the mid-1970s the United States troops in South Korea had 150 nuclear mines (the remaining 300 nuclear mines are situated in Western Europe), 70 pieces of 155-mm, 175-mm and 203-mm howitzers with 210 nuclear warheads, 150 Sergeant, Lance and Nike Hercules surface-to-surface missiles with 162 nuclear warheads, and 54 Phantom F-4S, each capable of delivering up to four nuclear bombs.⁹ All in all, the US army in South Korea has more than 700 nuclear warheads.¹⁰

It goes without saying that the US troops and military bases situated in the so-called "security arch" are meant to be used on a broader theatre of operations than just the Korean Peninsula. In terms of Korea itself, they guarantee the survival of the pro-American puppet regime in the south of the country and are main obstacle in the way of a peaceful, democratic reunification of the country without foreign interference. Kim Il Sung, President of the DPRK and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK said, that "the most essential thing in the resolution of the Korean problem is to put an end to outside interference and to allow the Koreans to solve the problem of reunification by themselves. Without the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea, the problem of the reunification of our country will not be solved."¹¹

The USA occupied the south of the Korean Peninsula in September 1945. In July 1950, an illegal resolution of the UN General Assembly gave the status of UN troops to the US forces in South Korea and authorised their presence there. In 1975 when the 30th session of the UN General Assembly passed a new resolution on Korea, the October 1, 1953 US-South Korean agreement on mutual security was used as a justification for the continued US military presence in the country. Under the agreement's Article 4, the United States was given an unlimited right to station its ground, sea and air forces in South Korea. In November 1978, the so-called US-Korean joint military command was set up; it was called upon to improve the interaction between Seoul's 600,000-strong army and the US forces stationed in the country, and to ensure the participation of South Korean top brass in military planning. Thus, under one pretext or another, US troops have been stationed in South Korea for the whole of 37 years which have passed since the country's liberation from the Japanese colonialists.

Throughout the 1970s, the US military presence in South Korea was a permanent feature of the US political manoeuvring in Asia, with the buttressing of the forces opposing the Soviet Union and further rapprochement with Peking remaining the key factor. On the other hand, the Washington Administration's attitude to a political settlement on the

⁸ *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1980, No. 4.

⁹ *Changjo thonsin*, 1975, No. 21-1, pp. 17-18.

¹⁰ *Nodon Sinmun*, 20 March 1981.

¹¹ Kim Il Sung, *On Independent Peaceful Reunification of Motherland*, Pyongyang, 1980, p. 141 (in Korean).

Korean Peninsula, the main conditions for which is the elimination of the US military presence there, has been changing with every readjustment of US foreign policy. For example, when the so-called Nixon Doctrine was in effect and preparations were being made for president's first visit to China in June 1971, the US troops in South Korea were reduced by about one-third—20,000 of the 64,000 men were withdrawn over Seoul's violent protests. A part of the reduction was the withdrawal of the division guarding the 29-km stretch of the demilitarised zone. As a result, the entire 250-km-long demarcation line between the DPRK and South Korea came under the control of the South Korean army, which undoubtedly was the main reason for the reduction of US troops, since the remaining US units in the hinterland were not supposed to be committed to action in the case of limited conflict with China in the demilitarised zone. The withdrawal of US forces from an area of possible armed clashes was intended by the United States as a conciliatory gesture toward China.¹² As compensation, Seoul was offered a five-year programme of military modernisation with \$1.5 billion earmarked for that purpose.¹³

The Nixon Administration's policy in the Korean Peninsula was subsequently reasserted in President Ford's "Pacific doctrine" in which the United States voiced its intention to use China as an instrument of regional and global policy openly for the first time. The main provisions of the doctrine were discussed by Gerald Ford in Peking on the eve of its announcement on 7 December 1975.¹⁴ Of the six main provisions of the Pacific doctrine, one dealt directly with Korea. The US President said that tension persisted in Korea; the US has close ties with South Korea and remained committed to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, as the presence of US forces there attested.¹⁵ It is obvious that having won the support of a new ally, the United States intended to continue its policy of preserving the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

The advent of the Carter administration to power raised new hopes for the positive resolution of the US withdrawal problem. At the height of detente, during his election campaign Jimmy Carter promised to withdraw US forces from South Korea. He repeated that pledge after his election at his first press conference on March 9, 1977 with a proviso that the withdrawal would be effected in stages over a period of four or five years and would affect only 33,000 army personnel.¹⁶

The US Administration even made public the draft of this plan for withdrawal of its armed forces: As a compensation, the US promised South Korea military assistance to the tune of \$1.2 billion including the transfer of \$800 million worth of munitions previously attached to the US troops that now had to be withdrawn.¹⁷ The US commitment to defend South Korea also remained in force.

These pronouncements of the US President were met positively in Pyongyang.¹⁸ However, a change in US foreign policy, freezing detente, resulted early in 1979 in a postponement of making good Carter's election promises and his subsequent abandonment of these promises under the pretext that he had received new data about the military might

¹² D. T. Kapustin, *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

¹³ V. A. Marinov, A. V. Torkunov, *South Korea—An Imperialist Base in the Far East*, Moscow, 1979, p. 18.

¹⁴ D. T. Kapustin, *Op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.

¹⁵ See *Department of State Bulletin*, 29 Dec. 1975.

¹⁶ *Asian Survey*, 1980, Vol. XX, No. 11, p. 1079.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1080.

¹⁸ Kim Il Sung, *Op. cit.*, pp. 112-113.

of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Moreover in 1979, the US Air Force in Korea was beefed up by 20 per cent in airmen and in combat aircraft.¹⁹ This presidential U-turn is believed to have been brought about by Peking's disapproval of the reduction of the US military presence in South Korea.²⁰

The Reagan Administration has rejected every positive achievement in the field of international detente of the last decade, openly announcing its intention to maintain the US military presence in Korea. During Chung Doo Hwan's February 1981 visit to Washington President Reagan spoke out resolutely against the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and promised "unconditional support" to the Seoul regime. Fanning up tensions in this part of the world, the USA expressed its readiness to give South Korea "arms and military technology for its defence industry". The 1981-1982 fiscal year budget provides for \$167 million of credit to Seoul for the purchase of weapons and materiel needed for a special combat troop training programme.²¹ Chung Doo Hwan's visit to Washington and its results were met with profound satisfaction by the Seoul regime. The United States' confirmation of its commitments to South Korea has encouraged Seoul to continue heightening tensions in the Korean Peninsula and to maintain a state of perpetual instability in this part of the Far East.

Japan's ruling quarters, which usually toe the line of US Far Eastern policy, have also endorsed the US presence in South Korea. Their position was reasserted in a joint communique after President Reagan's meeting with Japan's Prime Minister Suzuki in Washington in May 1981.²²

In an attempt to hoodwink the world public, the USA put forward its own programmes for a Korean settlement during the 1970s. In effect, they amounted to the continued interference of US imperialism in the internal affairs of the Korean people. All governments in the South of the country were put into office by the United States to act as its loyal servants.

The police dictatorship of Syngman Rhee which began in South Korea in 1948 and the military-bureaucratic regime of Park Chung Hee which replaced it in 1961 were shored up by the United States. The assassination of Park Chung Hee by his own henchmen in October 1979 did not and could not change the situation in the country, its foreign policy or attitude to the Korean settlement. Political analysts agree that the decision to replace the dictator was made in Washington, because, as the *New York Times* wrote, his hard line in domestic policy, which drew increasing criticism from Washington, became alarming and embarrassing for the two major centres of organised power in the country—the armed forces and the South Korean Intelligence Agency.²³

At the same time, alarmed by the political instability in the country after Park Chung Hee's assassination and the inability of the provisional civilian president, Choi Kuy Hah, to keep the population in check, Washington began prodding the Seoul military toward a direct seizure of power, though they had in fact controlled domestic situation previously. The May 1980 mass uprisings against the existing regime and for democratic rights were used as a pretext. The disturbances embraced more

¹⁹ *Asian Survey*, 1980, Vol. XX, No. 11, p. 1079.

²⁰ *Pravda*, 8, 21, January, 1979.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 3, Jan., 1981.

²² *Ibid.*, 25 May 1981.

²³ *Pravda*, 4 Nov., 1979.

than 20 South Korean towns, reaching their culmination in Kwangju. The emergency meetings devoted to the events in South Korea were held at the White House; US navy, including the aircraft carriers Coral Sea and Midway were sent to the South Korean coast. The US government gave the official go ahead for the use of elite South Korean troops subordinated to the US-South Korean joint command to crush the revolt encompassing 800,000 people in Kwangju.

Taking advantage of the situation in the country, a military junta headed by General Chung Doo Hwan, known for his close ties with the US Administration, came to power. The general did not even think it necessary to conceal that his actions had been blessed by Washington. Having seized power, Chung Doo Hwan announced that he had informed the US well in advance of all his measures of reprisal, including the exact date of declaring the state of emergency.²⁴

The United States was thus shown to be a direct accomplice in the bloody put down of the democratic expression of the will of the South Korean people and in placing a new puppet in office in South Korea. The French *L'Humanité* wrote that "again South Korea is living through tragic days, and again it is the US invaders who are to blame."²⁵

Chung Doo Hwan's enthronement in South Korea created a difficult situation in the country: a state of emergency was declared, the parliament was dissolved, and political parties and public organisations were suspended. All those who dared to criticise the new regime and its measures were severely persecuted. More than 50,000 people were sent to "reeducation camps". The only purpose of all this was to prevent the democratisation of South Korean society.

The 6th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea noted that these developments made dialogue between the two parts of Korea impossible. Kim Il, Vice-President of the DPRK and Chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country, made a statement on January 20, 1981, in reply to Chung Doo Hwan's proposal to hold a summit meeting between the two countries' leaders. Kim Il's statement made it clear that the DPRK could not have any dealings with Chung Doo Hwan, who became President illegally, and was responsible for monstrous massacres of the civilian population and mass reprisals. The document goes on to say that if Chung Doo Hwan wants to maintain contacts with the DPRK he must beg forgiven of the whole of the nation for the large-scale bloody massacre of his countrymen, immediately release all democratic public figures from prison, restore the disbanded democratic parties and organisations, abandon his policy of confrontation and the partition of the country, demand the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, etc. The DPRK expressed its preparedness to resume a dialogue with those South Korean politicians who oppose partition and fascism.²⁶

Not only does the present Washington Administration turn a blind eye to the terror and violence reigning in South Korea, as Carter's Administration turned a blind eye to gross violations of human rights of the Park Chung Hee regime, they continue to extend support to Chung Doo Hwan. This is evidenced by the red-carpet reception given to Chung during his February 1981 Washington visit.

The French *L'Humanité* devoted a commentary to the visit entitled "A Terrorist at the White House" which says, among other things, "Pay-

²⁴ *Izvestia*, 1 June 1980.

²⁵ *International Affairs*, 1980, No. 8.

²⁶ *Nodon Sinmun*, 20 Jan. 1981.

ing homage and granting credits to a regime which is essentially terrorist, the Reagan-Haig team brands as terrorists those, who, in South Korea and elsewhere, are fighting to put an end to tyranny, to outlaw torture, corruption and foreign occupation. It is to fight them that Reagan has promised weapons to Chung Doo Hwan."²⁷

A recent demonstration of the close relationship between the Chung Doo Hwan regime, the US imperialists and the Japanese revanchists is the large-scale US-South Korean military exercises, "Team Spirit '82" which continued for two months in South Korea and its offshore waters in February-April 1982. Seoul and Washington officially announced that the main aim of the exercise was to "work out troop deployment operations for possible emergency situations". However, the composition and strength of participating troops, and the very nature of the exercise leave no doubt that the troops worked out primarily an offensive, aggressive strategy. In addition to troops already stationed in South Korea, the US high command moved special air force units, marines and diverse equipment from its bases in Japan and the Pacific to take part in the exercise. Military exercises of this type have become common here over the last seven years. They have always had a provocative character and are obviously spearheaded against the DPRK.²⁸

Peking was rather reticent about Chung Doo Hwan's coming to power. This meant that it was in sympathy with the actions of the Seoul military and Washington which put him in power, since as Xinhua put it, popular demonstrations in Kwangju and other parts of South Korea were "detrimental to stability on the Korean Peninsula".²⁹

The US intention to maintain its military presence in South Korea is approved by Peking. This stand by the Peking leadership is a direct by-product of its anti-Soviet policy and its policy of alliance with imperialist forces for joint struggle against countries of socialism. China feels that the reduction of the US presence in continental Asia reduces its chances of provoking a clash between the USSR and the USA here. Actively fanning international tensions in the world, Peking is not interested in detente on the Korean Peninsula, which would benefit objectively from the withdrawal of foreign troops.³⁰

Although Peking's true objectives in the Korean Peninsula are an open secret, it has not officially announced its position due to tactical considerations, which place Korea within the sphere of its hegemonistic aspirations. Peking's stand on the Korean problem is the quintessence of its hypocritical, two-faced foreign policy. American Sinologist Hinton remarked in this connection that Peking is cautious and does not openly admit the identity of its interests in Korea with those of the United States.³¹

Peking has gone too far from the direct participation of Chinese volunteers in repelling the US-supported aggression of Syngman Rhee against the DPRK in 1950-1953 to announcing that this assistance was a serious mistake and making territorial claims on the DPRK both in the form of open encroachment on Korean territory and by provoking border conflicts in the 1960s, up to the present "cartographic" aggression.³²

²⁷ See *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 11 Feb. 1981.

²⁸ *Pravda*, 18 Feb. 1982, *Izvestia*, 20 Feb. 1982.

²⁹ *Pravda*, 28 May 1980.

³⁰ V. A. Marinov, A. V. Torkunov, *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

³¹ *Major Powers and Peace in Korea*, Seoul, 1979, p. 110.

³² *Pravda*, 24 May 1980, 20 May 1981. In *A Short History of Modern China*, published in 1954, Korea, along with some other countries, is referred to as "Chinese territory annexed by imperialists".

One of the first documents recording a Sino-US deal detrimental to the interests of the Korean people was the Shanghai communique following Nixon's 1972 visit to China. Its text provides evidence that serious negotiations had taken place on the question of Korea and that the two sides had made considerable mutual concessions.³³ The US side declared its intention to maintain close ties with Seoul and provide it with all necessary support. At the same time, it desisted from spelling out the precise kind of ties and support. For its part, the Chinese side refrained from including a direct demand for withdrawal of US troops from South Korea in the communique. The Shanghai communique was a result of the definitive change of Chinese leaders' foreign policy during the September 1971 crisis—a turn from the struggle on two fronts, against the USSR and other socialist countries on the one hand, and imperialism on the other, to proclaiming the USSR enemy No. 1 and rapprochement with imperialism to attain its great power, hegemonistic goals.

Official Chinese declarations of support for the reunification of Korea do not deceive anyone, since the facts give the lie to these declarations. For example, China disregarded the Tokyo and Algerian international conferences in support of an independent, peaceful reunification of Korea. Commenting on the absence of Peking's representatives at the Tokyo conference, the Japanese press, for example, noted that the Chinese leadership stayed away because the conference pilloried the South Korean clique as well as the ruling quarters of the USA and Japan which favour the perpetuation of Korea's partition into two states.³⁴

Peking's attitude to the reunification of Korea was cynically described by Deng Xiaoping in his interview with a *Washington Post* correspondent in November 1978. He said that the reunification of the two Koreas will be a protracted process, and in general he questioned the need for reunification.³⁵ The Chinese leaders made their position even clearer during the January 1980 visit to China of ex-Defence Secretary Harold Brown, when the situation in the Korean Peninsula was discussed by the two parties. It became clear that the US intention to step up its military presence in that region and to perpetuate the partition of Korea was fully endorsed by the Chinese leaders.³⁶ Making a case for the US refusal to withdraw its troops from Korea, Secretary of State Alexander Haig made it clear that such a step would be opposed by China.³⁷

According to Donald S. Zagoria, a State Department official, Peking is taking two stands: a public one and a private one. The latter, which it cannot exercise openly, consists of supporting the presence of the US troops in South Korea.³⁸ A similar point of view was expressed by the authoritative magazine *Asian Survey*, which wrote that in spite of formal appeals to withdraw the US troops from Korea, the Chinese really wanted these troops to stay.³⁹ Numerous sources bear witness to the fact that in confidential meetings with high-ranking US officials, the Chinese leaders gave open approval of the presence of US troops in South Korea, while officially paying lip-service to the DPRK's demands for their withdrawal.⁴⁰ When the inconsistency in their approach is pointed out to the

³³ D. T. Kapustin, *Op. cit.*, pp. 96-97.

³⁴ *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1979, No. 2, pp. 81, 82.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

³⁶ *Pravda*, 10 Jan. 1980.

³⁷ *New Times*, 1981, No. 4 (in Russian).

³⁸ *Korea News Review*, 1978, Aug. 5, p. 8.

³⁹ *Asian Survey*, 1980, Vol. XX, No. 11, p. 1134.

⁴⁰ *Korea Herald*, 2 Oct. 1973, *Washington Post*, 28 Feb. 1976, *Asian Survey*, 1980.

Chinese, writes *The Washington Post*, their answers are frequently vague and irresponsible.⁴¹

During the last few years, Peking has not been averse to trading with Seoul. In 1980, trade between the two countries reached \$600 million—much more than trade between China and the DPRK. Whereas earlier trade was primarily carried on via go-betweens in Hongkong and Singapore, it is now carried on openly on an official basis. For example, Chinese coal which is used to repay imports of South Korean goods to China, is shipped to South Korea directly from Chinese ports under the flag of the PRC.⁴² According to preliminary estimates, trade between the two countries topped the billion dollar mark in 1981.

Air communication is another field of cooperation between Peking and Seoul; since 1980, China's civilian aircraft have enjoyed right of passage over South Korean air space. According to Western sources, in 1980 Seoul was secretly visited by an emissary from Peking who continued secret negotiations on economic and political cooperation.⁴³

Facts prove beyond a doubt that for Peking, the Korean Peninsula is only small change in its unprincipled bargaining with Washington, threatening peace. One can hardly disagree with the view of US orientalist R. Scalapino who feels that in the future, China may take a stand even more inimical to the DPRK. To prove his point, he quotes a highly significant statement of Deng Xiaoping who said that the time had not yet come for changing Chinese policy with respect to Korea.⁴⁴

Recent pronouncements by Chinese leaders increasingly highlight the appeal to create a Washington-Peking-Tokyo-Seoul axis in the Far East. The growing military and political links between the USA and China, illustrated by the 1981 Peking visit of Secretary of State Haig, are directly affecting the emergence of this broad alliance designed to perpetuate the partition of Korea, to shore up South Korean militarist regime, and to torpedo the DPRK's proposals for a peaceful, independent reunification of the country.

The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community have consistently shown their support of the DPRK's course of reuniting the Korean people. The Soviet Union sympathises with the constructive steps of the DPRK's government and the Workers' Party of Korea in promoting a political settlement on the Korean Peninsula. Expressing the sentiments of the Soviet Communists and the whole of the Soviet people and setting forth the consistent policy of the party and people, CPSU CC General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev said from the rostrum of the 26th CPSU Congress that "the Soviet Union supports the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in its struggle for the country's peaceful democratic unification without outside interference."⁴⁵

The USSR Supreme Soviet, too, has repeatedly expressed its support for the Korean people's aspiration to live as one nation. In reply to a letter of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK the Chairmen of the two Chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet noted that the Soviet people have been following with sympathy the courageous struggle of the fraternal Korean people to overcome the artificial partition of the country and expressed solidarity

⁴¹ *The Washington Post*, 3 April 1980.

⁴² *Izvestia*, 17 Feb. 1981, *Pravda*, 26 Sept. 1981.

⁴³ *Pravda*, 10 July 1981.

⁴⁴ *Korea Observer*, 1980, Vol. XI, No. 3, p. 250.

⁴⁵ *The 26th CPSU Congress, Documents and Resolutions*, Moscow, 1981, p. 15.

with efforts aimed at attaining this goal. The main obstacle in the way of Korean reunification is the presence of US troops in the South of the Korean Peninsula who support the Seoul puppet clique with their bayonets. The letter goes on to say that the new DPRK proposals are evidence of the fact that the Workers' Party of Korea and the republic's government are constantly seeking for ways to resolve this pressing problem—the peaceful reunification of Korea on a democratic basis without any outside interference.

The letter of the USSR Supreme Soviet expresses confidence that a peaceful reunification of Korea will result in the normalisation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and that it will be a contribution to a healthier atmosphere in the Far East, to peace and goodneighbourliness in this region of the world. The letter particularly stressed that the peaceful reunification of Korea can be made easier through the establishment of durable peace and security in Asia based on the joint efforts of the countries of the continent.⁴⁶

New evidence of the Soviet Union's desire actively to promote an equitable settlement of the Korean problem and to put the matter in the forefront of international affairs was the speech of Andrei Gromyko, member of the CC CPSU Politburo and USSR Foreign Minister, at the plenary meeting of the 36th Session of the UN General Assembly. He said: "The Korean problem can and must be solved by peaceful means; the fact that the problem remains outstanding is one of the old sources of tension in the Far East. We think that the proposals put forward by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea provide a suitable foundation for its settlement."⁴⁷

The just struggle of the Korean people for the reunification of the country, for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula enjoys the all-round support of the world progressives. The other countries of the world gave unambiguous evidence of their attitude toward the problem of a peaceful settlement in Korea during the discussion of the matter at the United Nations in the 1970s. The 30th Session of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution, the main thrust of which was a demand for the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea. The implementation of this UN resolution by the United States would undoubtedly be an important step toward normalising the situation in Korea. The nonaligned countries also repeatedly expressed their support of the peaceful reunification of Korea in a number of resolutions passed by forums of democratic international organisations.

The USSR's consistent struggle for peace and security on the Asian continent is fully in line with the genuine interests of the Korean people, because principles which could become a foundation of security in Asia based on collective efforts are practically identical with the principles of the programme for peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the DPRK. They are in keeping with the foreign policy of this peaceloving socialist country. Security in Asia can and must be based on the universally recognised norms of international law; it must take into account the positive experience of states which signed the 1975 Helsinki Final Act as well as the objective realities in Asia today, its traditions and peculiarities. Security in Asia must be built on such principles as the renunciation of the use or the threat of the use of force in relations among states, inviolability of national boundaries, settlement of all international dispu-

⁴⁶ *Pravda*, 27 Jan. 1981.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 23 Sept. 1981.

tes by peaceful means only, mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, the recognition and strict observance of the right of every people to be the master of its own destiny, and development of mutually beneficial cooperation.⁴⁸

It is evident that once translated into reality, these principles of relations among Asian states will make it possible to resolve the most essential and important problems of Korean reunification; specifically, they will secure peace on the Korean Peninsula, enable the people of South Korea freely to choose their form of government and social system, put an end to imperialist interference in the internal affairs of the Korean people, and promote cooperation between the North and South of Korea. The implementation of the DPRK's proposals for a peaceful democratic unification of the country with no outside interference depends directly upon the overall situation in the region, on the balance of forces of peace and war, and on the choice of principles to be used as a foundation of relations between the parties involved.

The Peace Programme for the 1980s adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress is a continuation of the policies mapped out by the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses aimed at securing peace on all continents and in all regions of the planet. It includes measures for reducing nuclear and conventional weapons and proposals on the settlement of existing conflicts and the prevention of new ones; it is pervaded by the desire to stabilise and deepen detente and to develop peaceful cooperation among the countries of all continents. It is an expression of Soviet Union's readiness to negotiate on all pressing problems of peace and security and to meet any constructive proposals halfway, no matter who puts them forward. That is why Soviet proposals not only extend the basis for attaining a peaceful reunification of Korea, they could provide the necessary prerequisites for their fulfillment, including the most important of them all—reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The important thing is not only to preserve the existing balance of forces but to reduce the level of military and political confrontation.

Closely linked with the proposals of the 26th CPSU Congress on confidence-building measures in the Far East is the proposal of the 18th Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party on working out and signing a convention on non-aggression and non-use of force in relations between states of Asia and the Pacific.⁴⁹

This initiative was highly assessed in Leonid Brezhnev's reply to Yu. Tsedenbal's message in which he expressed confidence that the initiative of the Mongolian People's Republic will meet with positive responses from many countries of Asia and the Pacific.⁵⁰

The support of initiatives and proposals designed to turn Asia into a zone of peace and cooperation is a touchstone of a country's sincerity to resolve all seats of tension in Asia peacefully, and one such seat is the Korean Peninsula.

The struggle of the Korean people for the country's reunification on a peaceful democratic basis without outside interference is an integral part of the struggle of all peoples for peace, security, detente, and social progress. There is no doubt that the joint efforts of all the peaceloving peoples of the world will prove victorious.

⁴⁸ I. I. Kovalenko, *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Peace and Security in Asia*, Moscow, 1976, pp. 188-189, *Izvestia*, 30 Sept. 1981.

⁴⁹ *Pravda*, 27 May 1981.

⁵⁰ *Izvestia*, 30 Sept. 1981.

'CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK' OF HARVARD STUDY OF PRC ECONOMY CRITICIZED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 82 pp 113-116

[Article by A. N. Zhelokhovtsev, candidate of philological sciences: "Apolo-
gists for the 'Chinese Model' of Economic Development; Critique of Bourgeois
Sinology"]

[Text]

In 1980 Harvard University published a collection of articles in its East Asian Series entitled *China's Development Experience in Comparative Perspective* edited by Robert F. Dernberger and foreworded by the editor. Written in collaboration with the East Asia Council, the book is based on the proceedings of a conference which took place before the 1976 change in China's leadership. The book's appearance was delayed by political developments in China and the need to update its material. In his foreword, Dernberger stresses that although the dramatic changes in China's leadership have resulted in the replacement of the radical programme and policy, the main thrust of the publication is to elucidate the fundamental features of the programme within the context of the model, which are the same under both right-and left-wingers. The authors' reasoning is more akin to the argumentation of the present leadership than that of the radicals (p. V). The obvious conclusion is that the authors have set out to outline the general regularities of China's development.

As a point of consensus Dernberger notes the scope and significance of Chinese experience: the country accounts for approximately one-third of the developing world's population. But the American Sinologists feel that the Chinese Government is "inconsistent" in its development policy to the extent that "inconsistency" has become typical of the entire Chinese experience. They also observe that China's development is taking place in "an environment different" from that of the other developing countries. This rather vague expression in fact refers to the socialist features of the Chinese economy which are not to the authors' liking. Still the author of the foreword is compelled to make the following conclusion: China continues to develop. This simple statement is in itself a shift in the approach of US scholars to China, for previously it granted the status of "developing" country to Taiwan alone.

Quoting Reynolds, Dernberger repeats a point of view common in the US: "Chinese borrowing from the Soviet prototype in the 1950s can best be described as complete and slavish imitation." (p. 4). This rankling admission is somewhat alleviated by the fact that, soon Maoists began to stress their own innovations (p. 5). This observation introduces the keynote of the Harvard study—the desire to denigrate Soviet experience and the "Soviet development model", while praising original "Chinese features", particularly when they display manifestations of nationalism. The

authors have no qualms about taking liberties with established facts as long as they succeed in pandering to the national self-esteem of the Chinese and convincing them that socialism "has no prospects".

To attain this goal, the US theoreticians pose as judges of socialism. Both Robert Dernberger and Benjamin Ward, the author of a large article entitled "The Chinese Approach to Economic Development", declare that they "do not believe" in socialism. They do not believe that in the long run, the Soviet model will prove effective in attaining the economic and social objectives of socialism (p. 5). The US economists, you see, have more faith in the Maoist model of development! Simple, widely available statistics illustrate the striking difference between the Soviet Union's planned, stable economic growth and the Chinese economy's leaps and bounds with frequent reversals and setbacks due to Maoist experiments and the need "to adjust" the imbalances—but nonetheless the Harvard Series authors go out of their way to pinpoint the non-existent "advantages" of Chinese experience which they need to glorify the Chinese economic model.

Dernberger writes that China's economy and development policy can be classified temporarily as Soviet type, adding that this differentiates China from other developing countries and that China's experience may prove to be more interesting[Sic!—A. Zh.] for the developing countries, because the Chinese have corrected the more obvious and costly drawbacks of the model, adapting it to the needs of a developing country.

It is hard to believe, but this American "scholar" of socialism is in sympathy with the Chinese type of "corrected" socialism which has been freed from "obvious drawbacks". This abstract, politically biased, and groundless theorising is so controversial that it has provoked polemics on the pages of the collection itself. Ward, for one, is more inclined to equate Maoist China's and Soviet economy. Making his case, he mentions "four fundamental economic institutions": nationalisation of the means of production, collectivisation of agriculture, mobilisation of the state and the population by the party and industrialisation as a central economic goal. While conceding the existence of these determinants in China, Dernberger accuses Ward of disregarding the differences between the USSR and China, saying that "China's economic functioning and performance differ from those of the other developing countries and the other Soviet-type economies as well".

Two-trends gradually emerge in the discussion of the Chinese economy by US scholars. The proponents of the first one try, contrary to historical fact, to identify the Chinese with the Soviet economy and to represent Maoist economic policy as a "Leninist" and socialist one, and the Communist Party of China as a Leninist party. This school of thought readily admits the drawbacks and mistakes in China's economic management, but tries to compromise existing socialism by shifting the blame for the Maoist economic setbacks on "Leninism" and "socialism".

The second trend, represented by Dernberger, emphasises the "original features" of Chinese economy and strives to prove its difference from Soviet economy. Contrary to fact, he is ready to extol any "innovations" introduced by the Maoists in China's economic system.

The main question which the Harvard study authors set out to answer pertains to the applicability of China's economic experience in other developing countries and its potential for universal diffusion. Albert Feuerwerker, for example, feels that, on the whole, the Chinese economy is developing successfully, but due to its specific features it is irrelevant for other developing countries (p. 13). He finds these specific features pri-

marily in the collectivisation of agriculture, which in general seems to be a constant source of irritation for US writers on China, in "the mobilisation" of manpower and in low productivity. Ward is more optimistic in this respect. He feels that "China offers an institutional pattern for economic development that appears to be substantially superior to its leading alternative, capitalism; however, the long-run stability of that pattern in the Chinese environment is not established, and a strong potential for deterioration of the distributive achievement continues to exist" (p. 113). Noting that during the inception of the People's Republic of China the country's economy was more backward than that of Russia after the revolution, Ward attributes all successes of Chinese economy to "the strong and positive force" of nationalism (p. 103). Paradoxically, this US scholar also considers the profound indoctrination of China's population as a positive factor. He concludes that "a more serious appraisal of the diffusionist potential of the Chinese pattern" is needed (p. 113).

In contrast, Dernberger, in the concluding article of the collection, asserts that the Chinese economic pattern is not transferrable (p. 330). Feeling that the Chinese economy is a unique phenomenon, he remarks that economy and society as a whole have not yet since taken shape in China (p. 297). It follows that in the social and economic spheres, China is living through a period of instability, which reduces the attraction of its example to other countries.

Dernberger tries to define a "Chinese model of economic development". In his view, its determining factors are the country's natural environment, China's political unity and "the Chinese view of human nature". Its most salient feature is the use of traditional institutions and imperatives of modern Chinese nationalism in the establishment of a socialist society (p. 297).

US scholars of different orientations are unanimous on this point: they give top marks to modern Chinese nationalism. The introduction of the "modern nationalism" concept has been prompted by the need to differentiate between the "old" nationalism of Guomindang China surviving in Taiwan, and the new nationalism of Peking's leadership described as "modern" nationalism. It is obvious that the political sensitivity of the matter should favour vague wordings and imprecise definitions. Nevertheless, Dernberger goes so far as to say that "the Chinese Communists came to rule China as the legitimate and authoritative inheritors of the leadership of this nationalist revolution" (p. 296).

On the whole, this Harvard publication produces a mixed impression.

You may say that US Sinology is lagging behind changes in Chinese leadership and economic policy. In their evaluations, US economists are departing from attempts to smear socialism, by references to the failures of Maoist experiments, in favour of extolling "corrections", "improvements", and "innovations" introduced by the Chinese leadership, with the overall assessment of China's economic development becoming definitely positive. Some even go so far as to proclaim China's "successes" as "excellent and unique" (Perkins, p. 148). Great emphasis is laid on the non-existent "advantages" of the Chinese model of economic development over the development of the Soviet socialist economy. US Sinologists are enthusiastic about the Peking's leadership's "modern nationalism". They discern its sources in traditional Chinese philosophy and in the history of the Chinese national revolution. They are in full sympathy with the nationalistic trends in China's economic and social policy. This stand is an undisguised apologia of China's new policy of cooperation.

with imperialism. In this sense, the Harvard book is a reaction of sorts by America's Sinologists to the political overtures of the Chinese leadership. By definition, such an apologia is highly unprincipled and contradictory. Indeed, if the "successes" of the Maoist "model" of economic development—permitting the highly doubtful assumption of its existence—are so "excellent" and "unique", what is the reason for the conclusion that it is irrelevant for the other developing countries? Could the explanation for this obvious contradiction be that the "successes" are really non-existent?

The 1976 changes in China were followed by changes in its economic and social policy and the consequent delay in the Harvard book's publication. The development of political situation in China was not confined to these changes, however; in addition, it provided no proof for the apologist pro-Peking stand of the US Sinologists. In 1981, hardly a year after the book's publication, the Chinese leadership was compelled to revise their long-term economic agreements and contracts with a number of capitalist countries and to abandon some ambitious development projects which proved economically unfeasible. Such are the "excellent and unique" successes trumpeted about after a delay of a few years.

This addition to Harvard's East Asia Series contains considerable economic material, including data collected in the People's Republic of China. In this review we have intentionally confined ourselves to the most general aspects of the way China's economic and social policy was treated in the book, for its conceptual framework holds no water; that is its main drawback. The Chinese experience is naturally inapplicable to other developing countries but for very different reasons. And not because China has carried out the collectivisation of agriculture, but because of its leadership's haphazard and opportunistic approach to economic matters which has nothing in common with scientific socialism.

To sum up, the publication under review only shows its authors' undisguised sympathy for "modern nationalism" and China's pro-imperialist policy but it fails dismally in coming up with a cohesive and substantiated concept of China's development. Political instability in China, which in a year's time could overturn US Sinologists' theoretical constructs, has shown instability in American theoretical thought. To this day US Sinology has no valid concept of modern China's development.

COPYRIGHT: Translation into English, Progress Publishers, 1982

COPYRIGHT: Akademiya Nauk SSSR

CSO: 1812/15-E

CORRUPTION OF PRC KOMSOMOL BY MAOISM IN 1960's, 1970's CHRONICLED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 82 (signed to press 19 May 82) pp 121-132

[Article by V. N. Usov, candidate of historical sciences: "The Historical Fate of the Chinese Komsomol (Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Chinese Komsomol)"]

[Text] Sixty years ago, on 5 May 1922, the first congress of the Chinese Socialist Youth League (SYL) began in Guangzhou, marking the birth of a new youth organization in the country--the Chinese Komsomol.

The Chinese Komsomol has traveled a long and hard road over the last six decades, marked by significant achievements and by serious defeats. A Chinese proverb says: "Do not forget the past--it will be a teacher in the future." It will be helpful to recall the past history of the Chinese Komsomol, the basic directions of the Chinese youth movement's development and the reasons for its successes and failures in these days marking the 60th anniversary of the Chinese Komsomol.

The victory of the October Revolution in Russia, the creation of the Communist International and the appeals for the liberation of the colonial peoples and for struggle for national independence led to the dramatic upsurge of the national liberation and workers movement in the Orient. On 25 July 1919 the Council of People's Commissars, headed by V. I. Lenin, approved a message to the Chinese people and the governments of South and North China, which said: "We will bring people liberation from the weight of foreign bayonets, from the weight of foreign gold, which are smothering the enslaved peoples of the Orient, especially the Chinese people. We are bringing assistance not only to our laboring classes, but also to the Chinese people."¹ One of the founders of the CCP, Li Dazhao, wrote about the significance of the experience of the October Revolution and the Soviet Union for China: "We must proudly salute the Russian Revolution as the dawning of a new world civilization. We must listen carefully to news from the new Russia, which is being built on the principles of freedom and humanitarianism. Only then can we stay in step with world progress."²

The upsurge of the national revolutionary movement in China was marked by loud student demonstrations in 1919, directed primarily against Japanese imperialism.

The "May Fourth Movement" was a protest against the imperialist policy of the colonizers after World War I. It began with a boycott of foreign goods and establishments after anti-imperialist demonstrators had been fired upon in Beijing. The most revolutionary elements of the left wing of this movement then began to unite for the purpose of creating a communist party and socialist youth leagues.

V. I. Lenin, the Comintern and the Soviet communists helped the Chinese communists build a party, construct its ideological and organizational bases and establish ties with the working class and other revolutionary forces. On the direct orders of Lenin, Soviet communists assisted the first Marxist groups in Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou and helped in the organization of the First CCP Congress.³

Communists offered the same kind of effective assistance in the creation of the Chinese Komsomol. According to the recollections of S. A. Dalin, who attended the first congress of the Chinese SYL, the Chinese delegation which attended the congress of Far Eastern revolutionary organizations and the congress of Far Eastern revolutionary youth in the beginning of 1922 asked the ispolkom of the Communist Youth International (CYI) to send a representative to the first all-China congress of the league. The ispolkom appointed S. A. Dalin.⁴

The First SYL Congress lasted 6 days. Zhang Tailei presented an introductory speech. Chen Duxiu, representative of the CCP Central Bureau, presented a report on Marx and Marxism. The CYI Ispolkom was represented by S. A. Dalin, who conveyed the greetings of this international organization and discussed its objectives, stressing the particular principles which were most pertinent for the Chinese SYL. The 25 congress delegates, representing 15 organizations in various Chinese cities, adopted a league charter and program, drafted by Zhang Tailei, Qu Qiubo and S. A. Dalin.⁵ The charter stipulated that the youth league could be joined by young men and women "between the ages of 15 and 28 who acknowledge the program and charter of this organization."⁶ The program stressed that China was facing the prospect of a bourgeois democratic revolution to ensure national independence, secure freedom of the press, assembly, unions and strikes and provide for the election of representatives to central government bodies by a national vote. By participating in this revolution and helping to overthrow the old regime, the working class would be preparing itself for the coming proletarian revolution.⁷

A central committee was elected at the congress. Zhang Tailei was elected central committee secretary.⁸ The congress adopted a decision on affiliation with the Communist Youth International.

An important objective of the Comintern and CYI in those years was the compilation of an extensive program to win the multimillion-strong masses of young urban and rural laborers over to the side of the youth leagues. The Third Comintern Congress on 12 July 1921 adopted a special resolution, "The Communist International and the Communist Youth Movement," which directed communist youth leagues to win the allegiance of the broad strata of laboring youth by means of a persistent and daily struggle for their immediate economic demands and by means of intensive political indoctrination.

The fifth point of the resolution was of fundamental importance to the struggle against avant-garde tendencies in the CYI. It stressed that communist youth leagues would support the program, tactics and political directives of the communist parties--sections of the Comintern in various countries.

At the Second CYI Congress in July 1921, which followed the Third Comintern Congress, a special resolution was adopted on interrelations between communist parties and communist youth leagues.⁹ With a view to the fact that the formation of communist parties had changed the priorities of communist youth leagues, which had been formed earlier than the communist parties in some places, the CYI stressed in its documents that regardless of how necessary and helpful the vanguard role of the Komsomol organizations had been prior to the formation of the communist parties, it would be harmful after the creation of these parties if the correct interrelations between youth and the party did not exist and if the political leadership were not totally under the control of the party.

At that time this resolution was pertinent and necessary. This is attested to by the situation within the Chinese youth movement. After the Chinese SYL was created, it tried to take on the functions of the CCP and to replace the party, despite the warnings issued by the CYI. The Fourth CCP Congress, which was held illegally in Shanghai in January 1925, had to give this matter special consideration. The resolution of the Fourth CCP Congress on the youth movement stressed that the Komsomol should be absolutely subordinate to the party leadership. Stipulating a number of ways to strengthen the party leadership of the youth movement, the congress directed the SYL to win the allegiance of the broad masses of young workers and peasants and to turn the Komsomol into a workers organization.¹⁰

Gradually the Chinese SYL, backed up by the support and experience of the international communist and youth movement, became a strong vanguard of Chinese youth and a reserve of the CCP. By the time of its second congress (August 1923), it had organizations in more than 30 regions in 16 Chinese provinces and had 6,000 members.¹¹

The Third SYL Congress was held in Shanghai in January 1925 in an atmosphere of intense revolutionary feelings. It resolved to rename the organization the Chinese Communist Youth League (Komsomol). By doing this, the revolutionary association of Chinese youth openly declared itself to be a communist organization. A congress declaration said it was necessary "for Chinese youth to acknowledge the strength of the proletariat and believe in it" and emphasized that the youth league would wholeheartedly support the cause of the proletariat.¹² By September 1925, the total Komsomol membership had reached 9,000 and the percentage of worker and peasant members had risen from 10 to 40 percent. Over 3,000 Komsomol members joined the party.¹³ The Komsomol became the party's reliable assistant in the organization of the masses for struggle against oppression and participated directly in the armed struggle against the reactionary militarist forces. The Komsomol gave the party considerable assistance in the organization and conduct of the demonstrations of 30 May 1925 in Shanghai and other cities. At the request of the CCP, the Komsomol sent around 500 of its members to the Wampu Military Academy. Along

with CCP members, they represented the academy's best cadres, wholly devoted to the revolution.

The Komsomol acquired particularly strong influence in regions where the workers movement was most highly developed. In Guangdong, for example, the number of Komsomol members rose from 187 in 1925 to 2,535 in 1926. By spring 1926 there were already 12 provincial and 55 city Komsomol committees in China, uniting 795 primary organizations.¹⁴ Numerical growth was accompanied by changes in the social composition of the league. Whereas 80 percent of the members were students prior to the "May 30th Movement," the proportion accounted by workers and peasants rose to 40 percent within the next year, and it was 50-65 percent in Shanghai and in Guangdong Province. By May 1927 the Komsomol had more than 50,000 members.¹⁵

In 1927 reactionary forces in China took the offensive. Reactionary coups took place in Shanghai, Guangzhou and other cities. The journal ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN was banned. The Fourth Komsomol Congress was held in an atmosphere of reactionary terror in Wuhan in May and was attended by just over 60 delegates. With a view to the current situation, the congress decided to involve the broad masses of youth in a revolutionary struggle against the Chiang Kai-shek regime.

The repressive actions against communists and the terror led to the dissolution of the largest Komsomol organizations in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Changsha and other cities, and some Komsomol cadres were executed. The sad result of all these reactionary excesses was the reduction of the Komsomol membership to 10,000 by August--that is, to one-fifth of the previous figure.

Tens of thousands of Komsomol members gave up their lives in the struggle for a bright future for the entire Chinese population. They followed the example of their older comrades, internationalist communists like Zhang Tailei, Deng Zhongxia, Qu Qiubo and Cai Hesen.

One of the important services performed by the Komsomol, guided by the CYI, was its struggle against liquidation and "vanguardist" tendencies in the CCP and Komsomol leadership. In 1927 the CCP had one group of members with liquidation sentiments, who insisted that the Komsomol should be liquidated and merged completely with the party, while another group with "vanguardist" sentiments wanted the Komsomol to lead the entire struggle independently, without party guidance. They wanted the Komsomol to be an organization parallel to the CCP and to be called the "Communist Youth Party." In November 1927 these liquidationist and "vanguardist" tendencies were severely criticized at an extended plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee. The plenum, which was overseen by Ren Bishi, correctly pointed out the fact that the liquidation of the Komsomol and the merger of league organizations with the party on the pretext of the concentration of forces and reinforcement of the party would inevitably reduce the revolutionary role of young workers and peasants and weaken the party's influence among the young masses. The plenum underscored the need for the preservation and thorough reinforcement of the Komsomol as an organization of progressive revolutionary youth and as the CCP's closest assistant. Pointing out the fact that the revolutionary youth movement was

part of the larger proletarian movement, the plenum stipulated that the Komsomol is only the leading organization of proletarian youth and that only the communist party can be and is the vanguard of the proletariat.¹⁶

The difficulties of the underground existence did not destroy the Komsomol. Most of its work was moved to rural areas. By March 1928 the number of Komsomol members had already risen to 70,000.¹⁷ But this rise was accompanied by a reduction in the substratum of young workers and students and an increase in the number of young peasant members.

The Fifth Chinese Komsomol Congress was held in Moscow in July 1928 to sum up the results and lessons of its work after the fourth congress and to set basic objectives: the unification of even broader masses of youth around the CCP, the encouragement of even more young people to participate in the revolutionary struggle of workers and peasants and the assistance of the party in the preparation of the masses for armed struggle and the overthrow of the regime.

After Japan's treacherous attack on China in 1931, the Komsomol concentrated on mobilizing youth for a struggle against the aggressor. Chinese Komsomol members fought heroically against the Japanese invaders in the defense of Shanghai and fought against Chiang Kai-shek's policy of capitulation. More than a third of the fighters in the Chinese Red Army at that time were Komsomol members. In 1933 the Komsomol Central Committee created the CYI youth division, which displayed exceptional heroism in the repulsion of Chiang Kai-shek's campaigns. Two currents in the CCP were acquiring increasingly distinct outlines at that time: the Marxist, internationalist current, based on Marxism-Leninism and guided by the ideals of the October Revolution, and the nationalist, petty bourgeois current, representing various non-proletarian movements and views--from chauvinists and nationalists, who viewed the communist party and Marxism only as a means of resurrecting "China's past grandeur," to petty bourgeois revolutionaries, who, in V. I. Lenin's words, "adopt only a few aspects of Marxism, only a few elements of the new way of looking at the world or isolated slogans and demands."¹⁸ The latter line, associated primarily with the name of Mao Zedong, later made up the petty bourgeois nationalist current. The struggle between the two lines was naturally reflected in the activity of the Chinese Komsomol at various times. The events of 1930 were a characteristic example. At that time Li Lisan, who actually headed the CCP Central Committee leadership, and the CCP and Komsomol leaders who supported him, including Mao Zedong, tried to convince the communist party and youth league to skip the bourgeois democratic stage of the Chinese revolution and embark on the adventurous road of putschism. The CYI severely criticized the Li Lisan leadership's position. "By decreeing the organization of armed rebellions everywhere (despite the absence of the necessary preconditions in China's main industrial centers at that time), the Li Lisan leadership has essentially commenced the liquidation of the communist party, Komsomol and mass revolutionary organizations by diluting them in its own 'preparatory committees,'"¹⁹ the materials of the December (1932--V. U.) Plenum of the CYI Ispolkom emphasized. "Li Lisanism has severely compromised the Chinese Komsomol's position in the struggle for the young laboring masses," the plenum concluded. "Above all, it has weakened the ranks of the league by transforming it into several separate and unrelated

organizations. The direct result of this was the significant decrease of the Komsomol membership from 30,000 to 15,300 (excluding the soviet regions)."²⁰

The December ispolkom plenum stressed: "The depth of the consequences of Li Lisan's liquidationist, semi-Trotskyist aims in the Komsomol resulted from the fact that the league leaders of that time did not organize a struggle against the essential liquidation of the Komsomol as an independent organization, but actively supported Li Lisan in his struggle against the Comintern and CYI line."²¹ The CYI believed that one of the main reasons for this state of affairs in the Chinese Komsomol was the unsatisfactory composition of its membership and the inadequacy of its proletarian elements. Only the intervention of Chinese internationalist communists and the CYI, the repeal of the decisions of the Third Komsomol Central Committee Plenum and a change in the Komsomol leadership allowed for the correction of serious errors.²²

In November 1935 the CCP Central Committee adopted a decision "On Work with Youth." This decision turned the Komsomol into a youth organization of Japanese resistance and national salvation, which was supposed to be of a "nationwide nature." Although this originally seemed to contribute to the creation of a broad youth front, it had a negative effect on the ideological indoctrination of Chinese youth. In addition to this, reactionary forces began to set up and reinforce their own youth organizations in the country, which were designed mainly to prevent the unification of broad segments of Chinese youth in a single organization. During the war against Japan, especially in its last stages, there was a significant decline in the activity of youth organizations. Although the young people themselves took an active part in the war in many regions, this was not the result of guidance by the CCP or Chinese Komsomol.²³

On 2 September 1945 militarist Japan announced its unconditional surrender. The Soviet Union made a decisive contribution to the defeat of the Japanese Kuangtung Army. Japan's surrender also signified the Chinese people's victory in the struggle against the aggressor. But peace did not come to China. On Chiang Kai-shek's orders, Kuomintang troops began an offensive against the Chinese People's Liberation Army. By the end of October 1945 the civil war had engulfed 11 Chinese provinces. At this difficult time the Soviet Union served the CCP armed forces in Manchuria as a reliable rear front. This allowed the CCP to strengthen the army considerably, take the offensive against the Kuomintang troops and enlarge the liberated regions.

The CCP encountered new problems, including the problem of intensifying work with youth. On 28 September 1946 the CCP Central Committee proposed the creation of a democratic youth league and directed local party organizations to carry out this measure on an experimental basis. By doing this, the Central Committee acknowledged the need to create a new progressive youth organization under the party's political guidance, an organization which would be more massive than the earlier Komsomol.²⁴ A new stage in the history of the Chinese Komsomol began at that time, connected with the creation of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949.

On 1 January 1949 the CCP Central Committee adopted a decision on the creation of the New Democratic Youth League (NDYL) throughout China. On 11 April 1949

the first all-China congress of the NDYL was held in Beijing. It was attended by 376 delegates, representing 190,000 members. Around 10.9 percent of the congress delegates were workers, 15.4 percent were peasants, 71 percent were students and 2.7 percent were employees, clerks and so forth.²⁵ Ren Bishi was elected honorary chairman of the congress. Zhu De addressed the congress on behalf of the CCP Central Committee and PLA.

The First NDYL Congress was a significant event in the life of Chinese youth and in Chinese history in general. At this congress, the organization of the league was officially established, its administrative organs were elected and a program and charter were adopted, defining the goals, priorities and nature of the youth league as a helper and reserve of the CCP. Organizationally, the NDYL was constructed according to the principle of democratic centralism. The highest administrative organ was the league congress, and between congresses all activity was to be overseen by a central committee elected by the congress. All of the activities of regional, district, city and other organizations of the league would be overseen by the appropriate party organizations. The wording of the First NDYL Congress documents was apparently influenced strongly by the documents of the Seventh CCP Congress. This is why the charter of the First NDYL Congress stipulated that all league members must earnestly "study the Thought of Mao Zedong."

Progressive Chinese youth, united within the ranks of the NDYL, contributed much to the defeat of the Kuomintang troops and the victory of the people's revolution and, after the formation of the PRC, helped to reconstruct the national economy and played an important role in the struggle against American aggression and in defense of Korea.

The victory of the people's revolution in China gave the country's youth remarkable new opportunities. The NDYL initiated many valuable undertakings on the labor front and led the "Movement for New Production Records," which was of great assistance in the reconstruction and development of industry and transportation. The NDYL was actively involved in the institution of the land reform, the development of the movement to form rural cooperatives and the cultivation of virgin lands.

The Second NDYL Congress was held in Beijing in summer 1953 and was attended by 795 delegates, representing the league's 9 million members, organized in 380,000 primary groups. The congress amended the charter. Whereas applicants for league membership once had to be recommended by one NDYL member, they now had to be recommended by two members or one communist. This improved the organization membership and enhanced its militant spirit. The statement about the "earnest study of the Thought of Mao Zedong" was removed from the charter, and this helped to strengthen the influence of Marxist-Leninist forces in the NDYL leadership.

Under the guidance of the CCP, Chinese young people and their vanguard, the NDYL, proved to be an active and energetic force in various spheres of production activity during the years of the First Five-Year Plan, participating in the construction of plants and factories--work which was being conducted largely with the aid of the USSR and other socialist countries. Thousands of

young people distinguished themselves as heroes of labor and exemplary workers. During those years the NDYL had close and friendly relations with communist youth organizations in the socialist countries and progressive youth organizations in the capitalist countries, participated actively in the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle and defended peace and friendship among youth and the peoples of other countries. The NDYL established all types of contacts with Soviet young people and their vanguard, the Leninist Komsomol. The activities of the NDYL were designed to instill league members and young people who did not belong to the league with feelings of loyalty to their motherland and friendship for the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The Third NDYL Congress in Beijing in May 1957 was an important event for all young people and league members. The preparatory work conducted by the league before the congress testified to the tremendous role the congress should play in the history of the Chinese youth movement. Meetings and conferences of league members were held throughout the country for young people to discuss the draft charter of their organization and specific aspects of league affairs and to elect representatives to the congress. By this time the youth league membership was 23 million, having increased by 14 million. The number of primary organizations had risen to 920,000. Since 1949, 2.8 million individuals from the NDYL had been prepared for CCP membership. Representatives of youth leagues in 16 countries attended the NDYL congress as guests and shared the delegates' joy in the successes of Chinese youth in the construction of a new life.

A message from the CCP Central Committee, read aloud at the congress, set three main objectives for league members: a correct and conscientious approach to labor, constant and persistent study and the unification of the broad young masses. It stressed the need to study the progressive experience of the Soviet Union and all people's democracies, to learn the best from people of all countries and to unite with the people of the socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union, and will all peaceful people in the world. The secretary of the NDYL Central Committee stressed in the accountability report that the main objective of the youth league was the indoctrination of the younger generation in the spirit of communism and the unification of all youth under the guidance of the party for active participation in the construction of socialism.

The congress resolved that the NDYL had completed its mission and should be given another name--the Chinese Communist Youth League (Komsomol)--which reflected the league's political objectives and the nature of the Chinese youth movement more precisely. A special decision was adopted in this connection. Important changes in the youth movement and youth's new objectives were recorded in the new league charter adopted at the congress.

The congress decisions armed the Chinese Komsomol with a clear program for the further improvement of its organizational and ideological work. It directed the Chinese youth league to develop friendship and cooperation with youth organizations in the socialist countries and progressive organizations throughout the world. For many years the Leninist Komsomol gave Chinese youth a great deal of selfless assistance, passing on its own experience and

knowledge. The 11,000 Chinese students and post-graduate students who attended Soviet VUZ's and the 10,000 Chinese workers at Soviet enterprises were always given friendly support by Soviet young men and women. Permanent contacts were established between the youth of Moscow and Beijing, Irkutsk Oblast and Liaoning Province, the Kazakh SSR and the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, and so forth. Youth organizations in the two countries constantly exchanged delegations, in which all categories of Soviet and Chinese youth were represented. All of this helped to develop and strengthen the progressive youth movement in the PRC and promoted the cause of socialist construction. Our Chinese comrades were eager to learn the experience of the Komsomol at that time, and the Leninist Komsomol always aided them in this. The first foreign group of auditors in the Central Komsomol School of the Komsomol Central Committee was a Chinese group. Between 1952 and 1957, 124 Chinese Komsomol personnel graduated from the Central Komsomol School.²⁶

The progressive, internationalist directions in which the Chinese youth movement was developing did not, however, please the nationalist group in the CCP, headed by Mao Zedong. Some CCP leaders were particularly disturbed by the internationalist line of the Chinese Komsomol and its friendly ties with the Soviet Komsomol and international democratic organizations. Mao Zedong and his followers realized that a nationalist line could not be forced on the Chinese Komsomol until its internationalist ties had been severed. The Chinese Komsomol's contacts with the Leninist Komsomol and other communist youth leagues were sharply reduced by the Maoists and slanderous rumors about the USSR and other socialist countries began to be spread in China.

The establishment of the cult of personality in China and the escalation of anti-Sovietism within the country were naturally opposed by the experienced party and Komsomol cadres who had been tempered in the crucible of class battles. But this opposition was weakened by a number of factors, especially the deliberate Maoist policy of sharply augmenting party ranks primarily with individuals from the petty bourgeois strata and, in particular, the illiterate peasant masses, who were impressed by the image of the "leader." Besides this, a purge of Komsomol ranks began in spring 1957 and went on for 2 years. It was preceded by the policy speech presented by Mao Zedong in February 1957, which was entitled "Concerning the Correct Resolution of Contradictions Within the People" and which marked the beginning of the so-called "Movement for the Correction of Style." As a result, over 900,000 primary Komsomol organizations (of the total 920,000) were, according to reports in the Chinese press, subjected to "regulation." Various penalties were imposed on 9 million Komsomol members (or one-third of the total). More than 10 percent of the Komsomol members in some primary organizations were declared "rightist elements."²⁷

Finally, the debilitation of the Komsomol was also the result of the absence of publicity in the work of party, Komsomol and government organs, which deprived many party and Komsomol members of the correct reference points. This made it easier for Mao Zedong and his supporters to revise the line of the Eighth CCP Congress and Third Komsomol Congress radically and replace it with the so-called "Three Red Banners: The General Line, the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes."

As the Beijing leaders departed from the approved line of the international communist movement, their hegemonistic policy in the international arena acquired more distinct outlines, their anti-Sovietism grew more pronounced and their convergence with imperialist and reactionary forces began. The line of Mao Zedong's group was contrary to the interests of the Chinese people, including Chinese youth. The latter and its vanguard, the Komsomol, suffered the brutal effects of Mao Zedong's "experiments" and actions against the people.

By the end of the 1950's, the younger generation in the PRC was already being instilled with blind faith in Mao and his policy. The country was engulfed by one campaign after another to promote the study of Mao Zedong's works. Primary, city and district Komsomol organizations were obligated to hold rallies and conferences for campaign activists. The campaign to "Learn from Lei Feng" glorified Mao and his "Thought" and marked the beginning of an entire series of identical campaigns promoting the study of the biographies of deceased "heroes."

The Maoists then began to use the Komsomol to conduct their "special line" in the international arena and to attack USSR policy and the activities of the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Student League. In this way, they undermined the internationalist ties of the Komsomol and all Chinese youth with the youth of the socialist countries and the democratic youth of other countries.

The Ninth Komsomol Congress, after being postponed for 3 years in violation of the charter, was held in Beijing in June 1964 in an atmosphere colored by the establishment of the cult of Mao Zedong in the country, the imposition of the special line on the international communist, workers and youth movement and slander of the Soviet Union, CPSU, Leninist Komsomol and other socialist countries. The Komsomol Charter was partially but substantially revised at the congress. Whereas it once said that "the theoretical basis of the organization is Marxism-Leninism," the new charter declared the "Thought of Mao Zedong" to be the ideological basis.²⁸ When Secretary Hu Keshi of the Komsomol Central Committee spoke at the congress, he made special mention of this, stating that the new charter "clearly establishes the Thought of Mao Zedong as the guiding ideology."²⁹ This created an unprecedented situation in which "the Komsomol, performing its work under CCP guidance,"³⁰ as the charter said, changed its ideological platform although the CCP Charter continued to list Marxism-Leninism as the official guiding ideology for another 5 years.

The statement that "the Komsomol, loyal to the principle of proletarian internationalism, will vigorously develop and strengthen the unity of young people in the countries making up the camp of peace, democracy and socialism, headed by the Soviet Union," was also removed from the preamble to the Komsomol Charter. Instead of this, the need for the Chinese Komsomol to fight against "contemporary revisionism" was declared.³¹

The new charter reduced the number of Komsomol Central Committee plenums, reduced the role of the Standing Committee of the Komsomol Central Committee

between congresses and augmented the role of the Central Committee Secretariat. The new charter required applicants for membership in the Komsomol to be recommended by only one Komsomol member, and not two as in the past, which made it simpler to join the organization and ensured a larger influx of youth from non-proletarian strata. In 1965 alone, 8.5 million people joined the Komsomol--that is, more than 25 percent of the total membership. The erosion of the Komsomol by non-proleterian elements was promoted by the Komsomol Central Committee decision on the need to accept its members from families belonging to the "exploiter classes." The slogans formulated in spring 1966 at the Third Komsomol Central Committee Plenum and on 3-11 July at the plenum of the Beijing Komsomol Gorkom differed little from the Red Guards' later slogans.

But even this type of organization did not please the initiators of the "Cultural Revolution," who wanted to accomplish a counterrevolutionary coup and strike a blow at the CCP, Komsomol and other public organizations. Soon after the 11th CCP Central Committee Plenum, during which Mao set forth the slogan "Fire on Headquarters," the Chinese Komsomol virtually left the political arena. On 14 August 1966 the Red Guards--the Maoists' storm troopers--seized the Komsomol Central Committee building. The last issue of ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN, the Komsomol Central Committee journal, came out on 16 August, and the last issue of ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO, the Komsomol newspaper, came out a short time later. Komsomol Central Committee secretaries ceased to be invited to official functions and the very word "Komsomol" was seen less and less frequently in newspapers, and then disappeared completely. Mao Zedong and his coterie liquidated the youth organization, complaining that the Komsomol had become too diversified in its social composition, that it had "started to display some of the features of a nationwide organization" and that this was inconsistent with Mao's theory about the "intensification of class struggle."

The real reasons were quite different, however. Mao Zedong and his closest associates were trying to create a new youth organization, which would have no traditions or experience and would be isolated from all other mass organizations, especially the party. Mao's plan was impeded primarily by one of the main principles of Komsomol activity, in accordance with which the Komsomol, as the helper and reserve of the CCP, worked under its direct supervision. Mao and his supporters were displeased with the fact that local Komsomol organizations and organs were closely connected with elected party organs on the same levels. The suppression of party organs--from provincial to primary--and their isolation from the management of national affairs constituted one of the main objectives of the "Cultural Revolution." All of this motivated Mao Zedong to order the dissolution of Komsomol and Pioneer organizations according to the slogan "Rebellion is a rightist affair" and the formation of Red Guard organizations.

How did the Chinese Komsomol look on its 60th anniversary? What is the situation in the Komsomol today?

When the "Cultural Revolution" was still going on but Mao Zedong and his coterie no longer had any need for the Red Guards, they began to be sent to rural regions for long-term settlement.

Mao Zedong and his supporters "remembered" the Chinese Komsomol and began to speak of the need to "revive" this organization. By fall 1973 Komsomol committees had been formed on the levels of provinces, cities of central jurisdiction and autonomous regions in China, but a national organization could not be created in Mao's lifetime because of the factional struggle within the Chinese leadership and the newly created Komsomol organs. In 1975 a special preparatory committee was formed to convene a 10th Komsomol Congress, but in spite of all its efforts, the congress was not held in 1976 or even in 1977. The committee was abolished at the time of the arrest of the "gang of four," who had supposedly composed this organ of their proteges.³² A new preparatory committee was formed.

The 10th Komsomol Congress, which was convened 14 years after the Ninth and 12 years after the disintegration of the organization at the time of the "Cultural Revolution," was held in Beijing from 16 through 26 October 1978. It was noted at the congress that the Komsomol had 48 million members, united in more than 2 million primary organizations.³³ Han Ying (elected first Komsomol secretary after the congress) had to admit that in 1966 "the Komsomol Central Committee was dissolved and most Komsomol cadres were suppressed" and the Komsomol itself "has virtually not existed for the last 12 years."³⁴ Although the congress documents corrected a number of Mao's instructions, fundamental dogmas of Maoism were left unchanged. Young people were called upon to "learn from the army," "prepare for war" and "prepare for struggle against the Soviet Union." The "need to carry out a cultural revolution if one should be required in the future" was stipulated at the congress. In essence, Maoism is recorded in 10th congress documents and decisions as the "leading and guiding force of all Komsomol work."³⁵ Questions connected with the place and role of youth in Chinese society, the free choice of professions, the advanced training of young workers, their financial status, the elimination of unemployment in the cities, the cancellation of the minimum age requirement for marriage and many other matters were ignored at the congress. Aspects of the new organization's international activity were given the least attention at the congress. Participants were advised to take the Maoist "three worlds" theory as a guide and fight against the Soviet Union.

One of the main documents adopted at the congress was a Komsomol charter. People in Beijing tried to portray the adoption of this document simply as the approval of amendments to the 1964 charter. But an analysis of the two documents and the "amendments" to the 1964 charter indicates that this is a completely new document. The charter states that the "Thought of Mao Zedong" is the ideological and theoretical basis of Komsomol activity. It contains the new statement that the Chinese Komsomol will adhere to the "foreign policy line of Chairman Mao...and struggle against...contemporary revisionism."³⁶ In this way, the current Beijing leaders have obligated Chinese youth to fight against the world's first socialist country. At the same time, the charter does not say a word about the struggle for peace, which was stipulated as the aim of the Chinese Komsomol in previous charters. The new charter does not provide for any kind of supervising bodies in the Komsomol and does not specify any requirements for members of administrative organs or representation standards for provincial and all-China Komsomol congresses. It does not specify any method for the calculation of the number of Komsomol Central

Committee members and alternate members, from among whom the replacements for members are chosen. The number of Komsomol Central Committee plenums has been reduced; the new charter states that they will be convened "once a year."

The preparations for the 10th Komsomol Congress and the proceedings of the congress, as well as three subsequent Komsomol Central Committee plenums, and their documents testify that an organization has been created in the PRC on a new, essentially Maoist basis. The Beijing leaders are openly trying to turn the Komsomol into an instrument of their great-power, hegemonist line. The events of recent years have indicated, however, that some Chinese young people recognize the pernicious effects of Maoism and are advocating the radical revision of all national policy and the return of the country to the road of genuine, scientific socialism. The future of the Komsomol and all Chinese youth will depend largely on the strength and development of these forces.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetsko-kitayskiye otnosheniya. 1917-1957. Sbornik dokumentov" [Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1917-1957. Collected Documents], Moscow, 1959, p 43.
2. Li Dazhao, "Selected Articles and Speeches," Moscow, 1965, p 67.
3. "Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party," KOMMUNIST, 1981, No 9, p 91.
4. S. A. Dalin, "Kitayskiye memuary. 1921-1927" [Recollections of China, 1921-1927], Moscow, 1975, p 53.
5. Ibid., pp 75-76, 102; "Replies to Questions About the Main Accomplishments of the Komsomol," Office of the Komsomol Central Committee, Tianjin, 1979, p 3 (in Chinese).
6. "Replies to Question...", p 3.
7. S. A. Dalin, Op. cit., p 103.
8. Ibid., p 104.
9. "Komintern, KIM i molodezhnoye dvizheniye, 1919-1943. Sbornik dokumentov" [The Comintern, the CYI and the Youth Movement, 1919-1943. Collected Documents], vol 1, Moscow, 1977, pp 91-92.
10. For more detail, see V. I. Glunin, "The Role of the Proletariat in the Chinese Revolution (Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Fourth CCP Congress)," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1975, No 1, p 122.
11. "Replies to Questions...", p 4.
12. ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN, 1925, No 69, pp 297-298.

13. NARODNYY KITAY, 1957, No 10, p 31.
14. B. A. Mitbreyt, "Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskogo soyuza molodezhi Kitaya" [Essays on the History of the Chinese Komsomol], Moscow, 1961, p 44.
15. NARODNYY KITAY, 1957, No 10, pp 32-33.
16. "Materials on the History of the Chinese Youth Movement," vol 3 (1926-1927), Beijing, 1957, pp 526-533 (in Chinese); NARODNYY KITAY, 1957, No 10, pp 32-33; "Slavnaya stranitsa v zhizni komsomola Kitaya" [A Glorious Page in the History of the Chinese Komsomol], Moscow, 1957, p 11.
17. NARODNYY KITAY, 1957, No 10, p 33.
18. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 20, p 65.
19. The "preparatory committees" or "action committees" were organizations which Li Lisan's supporters wanted to create to unite party, trade-union and Komsomol organs.
20. "Materials on the National and Colonial Question," Moscow, 1933, No 4 (10), pp 104-105.
21. Quoted in: G. Besspalov, "Kitayskiy komsomol" [The Chinese Komsomol], Moscow, 1931, pp 29-30.
22. Ibid.
23. B. A. Mitbreyt, Op. cit., p 97.
24. "Slavnaya stranitsa v zhizni komsomola Kitaya," p 14.
25. B. A. Mitbreyt, Op. cit., p 111.
26. G. Yeliseyev, A. Krushinskiy and V. Milyutenko, "Krichashchiye batal'ony. Tak nazyvayemaya 'velikaya proletarskaya kul'turnaya revolyutsiya' Kitaya vblizi" [Screaming Battalions. A Close-Up of the So-Called "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in China], Moscow, 1967, p 111.
27. XINDAO RIBAO, 18 September 1970.
28. ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN, 1964, No 14, p 26.
29. Ibid., pp 20-21.
30. Ibid., p 27.
31. Ibid., pp 26-27.

32. A. Krasil'nikov and V. Usov, "On the Question of the 10th Komsomol Congress," VESTNIK KMO SSSR, 1979, No 1, pp 31-36.
33. RENMIN RIBAO, 27 October 1978.
34. Ibid., 24 October 1978.
35. Ibid., 28 October 1978.
36. Ibid., 27 October 1978.

COPYRIGHT: "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka" 1982

8588

CSO: 1805/1

SHOICHI ICHIKAWA, COMMUNIST TRIBUNE (COMMEMORATING THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF JAPAN)

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 82 pp 117-126

[Text]

The Communist Party of Japan (CPJ) began its courageous activities in difficult circumstances. The military and police apparatus of imperialist Japan did everything it could to keep the Communists underground, to prevent the growth of their influence upon the people and the spreading of socialist ideas. Unfair trials, grim prison terms and even short shrift lay in store for those who joined the ranks of the Japanese proletariat's militant party.

Shoichi Ichikawa, an outstanding Japanese revolutionary who came to the communist movement under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution, was among the victims of the bourgeois terror. He did not live to see the defeat of imperialist Japan. Serving a long prison term, he died on March 15, 1945 of the numerous privations of prison life.¹

Shoichi Ichikawa believed that a communist should not give up his struggle even when facing a capitalist court or execution but, conversely, should continue it and lead the fight for the liberation of the working class. Shoichi Ichikawa's life shows how this should be done. His speeches during the hearings at the trial of a large group of Japanese Communists seized by the security service and brought before the Japanese imperial court on July 21, 1931 have gone down in the annals of the Communist Party of Japan. Following the advice of his comrades in struggle, Ichikawa used the capitalist court as a rostrum to deliver a barbed, well-argued reply to the slander and lies of official propaganda about the Japanese Communists.

His speeches at the trial staged by his political adversary who resorted to violence to prevent the dissemination of socialist ideas are still relevant. Bourgeois propaganda and often those who pose as "champions of freedom" continue trying to brand the Communists as the "enemies of democracy", ignoring the indisputable fact that it was the Communists who bore the brunt of the fascist regimes's attacks, and who are still deprived of the possibility even to state their cause "legally" quite often.

Ichikawa made a thorough analysis of the emergence of the Communist Party of Japan and its development during the first nine years of its existence and drew quite a few conclusions not only from its early successes but also from its failures and mistakes. He stressed that Com-

¹ For details of Ichikawa's life and work see *A Life Given to Struggle*, Moscow, 1966 (in Russian).

munists must study Marxism-Leninism in depth and consistently put into life the principles of proletarian internationalism. It is only natural that his speeches at this bourgeois trial virtually became the first textbook on the history of the Communist Party of Japan which taught many a generation of the Japanese Communists to foster the revolutionary traditions of the party. In the autumn of 1931, Ichikawa's speeches were published in a special issue of the Japanese journal *Puroretaria Kagaku* (*Proletarian Science*) devoted to the 14th anniversary of the October Revolution. Later, they were expanded and revised by the author himself and went through several printings under the title *The Brief History of Struggle of the Communist Party of Japan*. In 1934, his speeches were published in the Soviet Union in the journal *The Pacific Ocean* (No. 1, pp. 8-168), which has now become a bibliographic rarity.

Our editorial board believes it will be interesting for our readers to get an idea of some of his speeches which forcefully describe the heroism of the pioneers of the Japanese communist movement, those who laid the foundations of the Communist Party of Japan, which is now marking its 60th anniversary. The translation has been checked against Ichikawa's *Collected Works* published by the Communist Party of Japan.

FROM SHOICHI ICHIKAWA'S COURTROOM SPEECHES

We have been put on trial only for being members of the Communist Party of Japan. Many of my comrades have been subjected by the capitalists to ruthless persecutions, arrests, imprisonment and many years of penal servitude or have fallen victim to white terror because they were Communists and acted in the interests of the party. I am also facing trial solely because I am a member of the Communist Party of Japan. There are no other reasons....

This trial is nothing but an episode of class struggle. The Japanese government has turned the court proceeding into an arena of class struggle. Look! Isn't this courtroom crowded with policemen, gendarmes and overseers? Weren't we handcuffed before being brought here, deprived of the right to speak at our trial and threatened that public trials would be forbidden?

Under no circumstances should we stop our class struggle, and, as soldiers of our class, we must fight the bourgeoisie. Communists do not cease class struggle but, on the contrary, spearhead it both when they are being tried by their class enemy and when they are executed....

The bourgeoisie spreads rumours that the Communist Party of Japan is an organisation of incendiaries, aggressors and killers, brands Communists traitors and mutineers and punishes under criminal law, portraying them as people to be abhorred and feared as villains and beasts. It is not satisfied with this, however. Whenever an opportunity arises, it seeks to do away with the members of the Communist Party, revolutionary workers and peasants and other sympathisers supporting the CPJ, in circumvention of the law, the court, and lengthy procedures. Not only does the bourgeoisie prosecute Communists legally, making use of existing laws, but it also persecutes them with the aid of many "illegal" means.

But what wrong has the Communist Party of Japan done to be so mercilessly persecuted? Why does the bourgeoisie hate it so much? Whose enemy and whose friend is the Communist Party of Japan after all?

Why has the CPJ been steadily growing since the events, of March 15² despite all repressions? Every ten party members arrested are replaced by 100-200 new members. The party is becoming an ever more formidable opponent of the bourgeoisie. What are the reasons for its inviolability and invincibility?

This happens because the Communist Party is the party of the proletariat. As long as the proletariat exists and continues to grow, its vanguard, the Communist Party, will inevitably exist and develop. The proletariat is a product of capitalism. Japan's present social system is a capitalist society based on the differences between two classes—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie has appropriated the means of production, taken state power into its hands and is, with the help of this, exploiting and enslaving the proletariat. The proletariat, on the contrary, produces all the wealth of society and possesses nothing but the labour power it is forced to sell. As the chief opponent of this society and a consistently revolutionary class, the proletariat has the historic mission of tearing down the very foundations of capitalist society. Therefore, it is not a class of the past but a class of the future. The future belongs to the proletariat. As the party of the proletariat, the Communist Party stands at the head of the historic cause of putting an end to the sway of the bourgeoisie, of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, and of building socialism.

The Communist Party is the party of the proletariat, which means the following. First, the Communist Party has the deepest roots in capitalist society, the last society of opposing classes in human history, and for this reason it can be neither set up nor broken at anyone's whim. Second, as the vanguard of the working class, the Communist Party is a true friend of the working people and a confirmed enemy of the bourgeoisie, the landowners and all exploiters. Third, the Communist Party does not obey the capitalist order and the laws of the present state but contends them. The Communist Party obeys only international proletarian discipline, which is not an abstract notion but is epitomised in the Comintern's discipline. In other words, the Communist Party's illegality with respect to the bourgeoisie reflects the primary essence of the proletarian class, and in every country the proletariat inevitably believes that by opposing the bourgeoisie in their own countries, workers throughout the world are drawing closer together...

The Communist Party of Japan was formed 9 years ago. Throughout this period it has always operated as a section of the Communist International.

The bourgeoisie claims that the CPJ was founded anew on many occasions. This is an outright lie. The CPJ was subjected to numerous bourgeois repressions, its development was hindered by petty-bourgeois opportunism within the party, and on one occasion this led to the disbanding of the party organisation. Nevertheless, the CPJ did not cease to exist and, along with the Comintern, and as one of its sections, it continued developing and gaining potential.

The bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats assert that the CPJ was allegedly established as a result of a conspiracy by a handful of socialist leaders and wise guys who came from God knows where. They assert that the CPJ is a conspiratorial organisation run by those ringleaders

² Wholesale arrests of Communists were carried out all over Japan on March 15, 1928. (Translator's notes here and further on).

and wise guys—a party for the select few closed to the masses. This is blatant demagoguery.

The CPJ has been formed and is being supported and expanded by the revolutionary forces of the Japanese working class which fights the bourgeoisie. Throughout its development, from the moment of its formation, most of the effort has in fact been made by workers, unknown rank-and-file members rather than by famous socialist leaders and “wise guys”. The fact that for the bourgeois government, the CPJ is a conspiratorial organisation and an illegal party does not mean that it is a special sect of conspirators. A Communist Party which must mobilise the people at large for a revolution cannot be a sect of conspirators...

The CPJ is no chance occurrence. A Communist Party cannot be established or destroyed arbitrarily. Certain situations are necessary for the emergence and development of the Communist Party of Japan.

In terms of the international situation, the imperialist world war of unheard-of ruthlessness was the first major explosion of international contradictions. Since then, to quote the great Lenin, we have entered the period of wars and revolutions. This is the time of transition from the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie to the dictatorship of the proletariat on a world scale. In 1917, the Russian proletariat won the revolution led by the Bolsheviks. What is now the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was established. The first proletarian state emerged. The world was divided into two camps—the capitalist world which is inexorably heading for destruction and that building socialism which can be stopped by no force...

Now let us deal with the domestic situation.

Since the war, Japanese capitalism has changed greatly compared to what it was previously. Japanese imperialism has grown rampant, having seized foreign markets and resources during the war. This development was accompanied by sharply growing internal contradictions which in the postwar period subjected the whole of Japanese society to interminable crises, depression, and stagnation.

The rice riots of 1918 were the first flare-up, then came the economic crisis of 1920, the earthquake and the crisis of 1923, the financial crisis of 1927 and, finally, the present worldwide crisis.

For a number of years after the war, the productive forces of Japanese capitalism continued to develop, though obstructed by the domestic situation... The Japanese bourgeoisie is trying to find a way out of the crisis at home by all manner of economic and political means, violent or peaceful, legal or illegal. In the final analysis, the victims are the workers and peasants of Japan and also the working people of its colonies—Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria. None of this will provide a way out of the crisis. The economic and political crisis has deepened increasingly, and today Japan is at its epicentre. This is only natural and no chance misfortune, but a result of the existence of the capitalist system in Japan.

Thus contradictions exacerbate and the crisis sets in. This process promotes the concentration of capital in the hands of monopolies. Political and economic power is held by a small group of the financial bourgeoisie.

In present-day Japan there is, on the one side, the big bourgeoisie gorged on the blood of workers, peasants and the colonial population (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Kawasaki and Okura) and, on the other, the millions of starving people. Nevertheless, the capitalists are closing down factories and stopping machines and other productive

forces because their enterprises fail to bring the necessary profits. The bourgeoisie that rules the Japanese state has reduced the countryside to an unbearable plight. The agrarian revolutionary crisis is approaching, as there is no other way out but to confiscate the land owned privately.

The state is on the verge of bankruptcy, while the government will not lift a finger to cut the military spending that can no longer be subsidised by the big bourgeoisie—Mitsui and Mitsubishi. Neither can the colonies (Taiwan, Korea and others) and semi-colonies (Manchuria) that form the foundation of Japanese capitalism and imperialism be as "skillfully" plundered as before. Japanese capitalism has no power of its own for the salvation. The country's bourgeois economic system is on the brink of collapse. The bourgeoisie is seeking for a way out in a destructive imperialist war.

Several years ago the Japanese imperialists unleashed a predatory war against China. Now there will be a second world war which will engulf the Pacific Ocean! This destructive, ruthless imperialist war is already on the agenda for the Japanese brass and other imperialists.

In this way we have, on the one hand, the economic crisis, the unbearable impoverishment and enslavement of the vast majority of workers and peasants and, on the other, a beastly war! These are the various manifestations of one and the same phenomenon produced by avaricious capital keen on nothing but gaining profit. These are the circumstances under which the Communist Party of Japan was born, and has struggled and continues to develop...

The Communist Party of Japan was founded in early July 1922 as the Japanese section of the Third International, the Communist International, which was a party of the world proletariat. From the moment it was founded and to the present time, our party has operated as an arm of the Comintern. However, one should not believe that its emergence had nothing to do with Japanese capitalism or with the political and economic situation in Japan. The development of Japanese capitalism was the main condition for the formation of the Communist Party of Japan. The CPJ is the political party of the Japanese proletariat...

In the Meiji period, the young Japanese proletariat took part in the mass liberal struggle against the government of the aristocracy, the absolutist government. At that time the mass struggle was directly or indirectly led by the political parties of the bourgeoisie, but simple workers were the rank-and-file soldiers in that struggle. When the vast sacrifices made during the Japanese-Russian war caused growing discontent among the Japanese people, the Japanese bourgeoisie directed that discontent against the Portsmouth Treaty. The bourgeois leaders used the proletariat for their own purposes and then betrayed it as soon as they had no further need of it; they reached a compromise with the bureaucratic government of the aristocracy. The list of similar examples goes on and on. The movement for universal suffrage is another ugly instance of bourgeois treachery toward the proletariat. Ojaki Yukio and others of that ilk who led the mobilisation of the people for the democratic movement, above all the movement for universal suffrage, were not to hold that stand for long. Very soon they came to terms with the government, gave the workers over into the hands of the police and watched calmly as they were sent to prison.

In the period from Meiji to Taisho, the Japanese proletariat gained its first experience in political struggle. It goes without saying that like their fellow workers the world over, the Japanese proletariat was frequently deceived, but nevertheless it was already opposing the bourgeoisie.

As soon as the proletariat began insisting that its interests be looked after and counteracting capital, the bourgeoisie immediately set out to suppress it, using the power of the semi-feudal state apparatus. The nascent workers' movement, the trade union movement, and the socialist movement were declared illegal and subjected to repressions.

Shortly after its foundation in 1901, the first social democratic party was banned on the basis of the police law on maintaining political peace. Later on, the Kotoku trial (1910) was used to victimise the socialists.³ The Japanese proletariat struggled on despite these persecutions. During the Japanese-Russian war the Japanese proletariat was in its infancy: it knew practically nothing of internationalism. Nevertheless at the international congress of socialist parties held in Amsterdam in 1904, on the eve of the first revolution in tsarist Russia, Comrade Sen Katayama, who represented the Socialist Party of Japan (and is now among the Comintern's leaders) shook hands with Plekhanov, who represented the Social Democratic Workers' Party of the Russian empire, the enemy of the Japanese bourgeois state. This handshake with a socialist from a hostile country by a pioneer of the emergent Japanese proletariat is a glorious event in its history.

Let us turn to the rice riots of 1918. During the rice riots, petty-bourgeois leaders called for the punishment of dishonest traders. This was the aftermath of the crisis of Japanese capitalism and the first outburst of contradictions that were proliferated during the World War. I am not going to describe the brutality with which the rice riots were quelled. It is noteworthy that the proletariat, though lacking an organisational leader at the time, nevertheless managed to head the movement. Workers were fighting heroically and formed the core of the movement.

Why were the rice riots destined to meet with tragic defeat? This was caused by the absence of a communist party, the party of the working class, and by the lack of strong leadership on the part of the organised proletariat standing at the heart of the mass uprising. This is a graphic illustration of the crushing defeat that befalls any mass uprising when there is no communist party.

It is only natural that the emergence of objective factors, such as the numerical growth of workers and their concentration at major factories, and also the development of subjective conditions—the growing experience in political and economic struggle both at home and on the international scene—led the Japanese proletariat to feel the need for a political party of its own, as a single body leading the class struggle.

A bill on controlling the radical social movements was set forth in 1920 to counteract this desire. This was the first repressive action taken by the frightened Japanese bourgeoisie to interfere with the Japanese workers' initiation into class struggle and to block the tendency of the growing revolutionary political struggle keyed by the Bolshevik ideas adopted under the impact of the Russian revolution. At the time, the Japanese proletariat, and later on the organisation of the Communists headed the mass movement against that bill. It was repealed under the impact of major political demonstrations in February 11, 1923. As a result of mass demonstrations led by the newly formed and as yet weak Communist Party, bills on trade unions and on arbitration in rent conflicts were also foiled.

³ The trial of 26 Japanese socialists accused of plotting to assassinate the emperor; 12 of them were executed and the rest sentenced to life or long-term imprisonment.

The trade union movement was rapidly expanding at the time, and the communist movement spread among the workers. The anarchists and the Bolsheviks were much spoken of then: political struggle made impressive headway. The Socialist League (Shakaishugi domei) was formed in December 1920. It was an association of anarchistic, communist and other revolutionary organisations. The Socialist League did not have the power of a proletarian political party and was of a different nature, as a matter of fact. Nevertheless Socialist workers who had already had some experience in class struggle and developed class consciousness viewed it as a militant organisation of the proletariat, greeted its establishment, and quite a few of them took part in it. Many of those who now work in the CPJ or have been put in the dock, seized as the party leaders, were then members of the Socialist League...

As the emergence of the Socialist League was warmly welcomed by advanced workers, the reformist trade union leaders of that time, Kotaro Tanabashi and Hisashi Aso, frightened by the political demands of the workers, came out against them, called for the workers to go "Back to the Trade Unions!" and bent over backwards to distract them from political struggle. It is only natural that a few months later, the bourgeois government mounted repressions against the Socialist League and banned it...

Japan's advanced workers and conscious Socialist workers were keenly aware of the weakness of socialism, when it either has no party or only one ideological organisation or a conglomeration of ideological organisations. They grew convinced that an ideological organisation or an association of ideological organisations similar to the Socialist League would be rendered useless in the final analysis and might even be harmful for the movement. They came to realise during the economic crisis of 1920 and subsequent reaction that if the situation remained unchanged, it would be impossible to rebuff the capitalists who took a tough stand against the workers and to win in the daily economic struggle. They also realised that the old methods were not fit to ensure the pooling of forces and to make the disconnected and reformist workers' trade union movement a mass revolutionary movement.

Anarchism and syndicalism also interfered with the class political development of the Japanese proletariat. A new, strong centre of leadership was badly needed to overcome this obstacle, too.

For the reasons mentioned above, the Japanese workers demanded the establishment of their own, Communist, Party and acted as the chief motive force in its formation. No doubt, the process was accelerated and promoted by the development of the world proletarian movement; the influence of the victorious Russian proletarian revolution carried out by the Bolsheviks in 1917 was especially felt. Indeed, the tremendous impact of the Russian revolution cannot be overestimated.

In collaboration with the world bourgeoisie, the Japanese bourgeoisie encircled young Soviet Russia, launched a counterrevolutionary attack against it, and mounted a vicious campaign against the Russian revolutionary party of Bolsheviks in the press, in public schools and through other means. In spite of that, the Japanese proletariat displayed class solidarity and a sense of friendship. It regarded the revolution in Russia as an event of relevance to its own destiny and believed that the country of workers and peasants, the country of the proletarian dictatorship born of the Russian revolution, was indeed the state of the workers. This is the root of the Japanese bourgeois government's counterrevolutionary interference in the affairs of Soviet Russia and, conversely, the Japanese

proletariat's opposition to such a malicious action of the Japanese government as the invasion of Siberia. The worker's intuition and the experience of the world communist movement prompted the Japanese workers to the conclusion that the victorious proletariat of Russia was the elder brother of the Japanese proletariat, a respected elder brother of their class who would teach and inspire the Japanese workers.

We should without fail bear in mind the following historical fact: the Japanese workers were not just sympathetic to the Russian revolution from across the sea. Advanced workers with developed consciousness themselves went across the sea to Siberia to help complete the Russian revolution. They carried out courageous propaganda among the troops of the Japanese bourgeoisie involved in the aggression, urged them to prevent the defeat of the Russian revolution, and to raise no arms against the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia, the country of our elder brother and the workers' homeland. Coming up against enormous difficulties, our friends, these respected advanced workers went to Siberia—and even further to European Russia—rendered aid to the revolution and fought against the aggression of Japanese imperialism. Some of them, like Comrade Sato, perished in Siberia in the arduous and heroic struggle in defence of the Russian revolution. In other words, the Japanese workers displayed an awareness that the Bolsheviks who were at that time called extremists and likened to devils and wolves, the Bolsheviks who filled the capitalists with fear, were their true friends and leaders. They showed they understood that the revolutionary party of the Bolsheviks, strong as steel and led by Lenin, the outstanding leader of the world revolution, was the true vanguard of the workers, the friend of the working people, and deserved their utmost trust.

I have spoken above about the foundation on which the party was built. I also want to describe the concrete circumstances of the formation of the CPJ. It should be pointed out above all that the Japanese working class set up the CPJ under the direct guidance of the Comintern—with its help and as a result of its activities. The Comintern was founded in March 1919. Unlike the Second International, the Comintern, from the outset, paid exceptional attention to the East with its numerous colonies and semi-colonies and with its nations calling to be liberated from imperialism. The Comintern realised that the East was destined to become the locale of massive revolutionary struggle. Speaking of the East as the scene of the colonial revolutionary movement, Japan, situated in one of its corners, is a stronghold of reaction and counterrevolution. Japan oppresses China, Korea and Taiwan and plans to invade Soviet Russia from the east....

In 1921, the Comintern, greatly concerned with the East, urged the convocation of a congress of Far Eastern nations. A preparatory conference was held in Irkutsk in late 1921, and the congress of Far Eastern nations took place in Moscow in January-February 1922. Apart from the task of giving a revolutionary rebuff to a new division of the world and to new plans for a world war, the congress primarily aimed at forming a communist movement and supporting national liberation in the Far East.

Among the participants in the congress were representatives of the victorious proletariat of Soviet Russia, of the national revolutionary movement of China, of the Korean national revolutionary movement opposed to Japanese imperialism, of the revolutionary movement for the independence of Mongolia, of the national movements of many other countries, and also of the Japanese proletarian movement. These peo-

ple—communists and representatives of socialist revolutionary organisations or of national revolutionary organisations—differed on some points, but all of them were revolutionaries and resolute opponents of imperialism. The congress decided that along with the movement to establish communist parties in China and Korea, the Japanese workers should press on with the formation of their own communist party.

Inspired by their success at the congress, the Japanese representatives contributed to the movement for the establishment of the CPJ...

The Comintern used all means to guide the Japanese revolutionary workers. It worked vigorously with revolutionary people, even with anarchists, including Sakae Osugi... It sought to make them see how fallacious anarchism and syndicalism were and to drive it home that these ideas were merely empty revolutionary rhetoric of no significance to the emancipation of the proletariat and that, since they were not concerned with the problem of power and were incapable of guaranteeing eventual victory to the proletariat, anarchism and syndicalism would lead only to defeat.

In this way, the Comintern leaders used all the means at their disposal to promote the growth of class consciousness among the Japanese workers and the establishment of the Communist Party of Japan as an organisation of the Japanese proletariat's political struggle indispensable to its victory in class struggle and as the leader of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat.

I have already mentioned earlier that the advanced Japanese workers were far from passively waiting for a stable and strong leadership on the part of the Comintern but themselves were active in the interests of setting up a party...

The Communist Party of Japan was not implanted from without nor from above by the Comintern. Nor is it mechanically subordinate to the Comintern. The concrete circumstances of its formation also corroborate this fact.

The Communist Party of Japan was formed on the basis of meetings between Comintern leaders and the Japanese communist leaders of the time in July 1922. In November 1922, its representatives attended the 4th Comintern Congress and reported on the establishment of the party. It was only then that the CPJ was recognised as the Japanese section of the Comintern...

If we want to sum up briefly the importance of the foundation of the CPJ, it should be called an historic event in the Japanese proletarian movement.

Since the moment of its formation, the party has been engaged in struggle for the sake of the working class and spearheading that struggle. In the nine years of its existence, the party has done nothing unusual or extraordinary: it has simply defended the interests of the working class and fought for its emancipation, defended the interests of the poor peasants and fought for their emancipation.

In other words, our party has struggled in defence of the daily interests of the workers, in particular, it has opposed capitalist rationalisation in industry. Like no other organisation, it has diligently and honestly promoted the organisation of trade unions and striven to revolutionise them and to form a united front. Furthermore, our party has fought for the interests of the peasants, especially the poor peasants, in preparation for the forthcoming agrarian revolution.

Our party has fought for young people and working women and aided the Young Communist League. It has called for unity between the wor-

kers and the peasants, has fought for freedom of speech, assembly, and for organisations for the workers and the peasants. It has opposed capitalist anti-labour legislation, the class bill, the law on controlling the radical social movements, the law on maintaining peace and so on, combatted terror, the terror of the world's most ruthless police, and has come out against the government's move toward fascism.

Our party fought in defence of the Soviet Union, the world's only proletarian state, in support of the Chinese revolution, in the interests of the national liberation movements in the colonies and for internationalist unity with workers of other countries. Furthermore, it fought against the danger of an imperialist war and, of course, against Japanese military invasion and against various forms of chauvinism and militarism. All this struggle is focused on the task of defeating the present Japanese state, including the abolition of imperial power, and on the task of emancipating the workers and peasants; it has been carried out for the sake of the proletariat and for the sake of establishing its dictatorship. Through all sorts of activities, our party has resolutely opposed Social Democracy.

It is noteworthy that our party, in particular, with the Comintern's help, has overcome all forms of right-wing opportunism within its own ranks.

During that period, the party scored numerous successes but also met with failures. We do not want to conceal this. When the CPJ, as a section of the Comintern, maintained stable contacts with the Comintern's leaders, it developed in the right direction. When the party divorced itself from the Comintern's leadership, it invariably stagnated, moved away from the masses and found itself isolated.

No revolutionary actions are possible without a revolutionary theory. We must equip ourselves in every way available with revolutionary theory, the theory of Marxism-Leninism. This revolutionary theory will facilitate the victory of the party in the workers' and peasants' struggle...

COPYRIGHT: Translation into English, Progress Publishers, 1982

COPYRIGHT: Akademiya Nauk SSSR

CSO: 1812/15-E

MAOIST MORAL-EDUCATION PRACTICES ATTACKED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 82 (signed to press 19 May 82) pp 151-158

[Article by N. Ye. Borevskaya, candidate of philological sciences: "The Maoist Model Individual (About the Ideological and Moral Indoctrination of Chinese Youth at the Beginning of the 1980's)"]

[Text] The problem of Chinese youth is a problem concerning half of the country's population (up to 21 years of age). The crisis of faith, the rising crime rate, which is 10 times as high as it was in the first half of the 1960's, moral decline and mass ignorance are all perceptible features of PRC public life. The social practices and policy of the leadership obviously coincides here with the deideologization and degradation of social morality and the erosion of socialist moral values. The unemployment reigning in the country, the ineffectiveness of economic policy, the war hysteria and the Beijing's leadership's unprincipled conspiracy with reactionary regimes in the world arena are naturally affecting the status of young people and their attitudes and lines of reasoning.

Even Beijing ideologists have admitted that serious problems among youth are the result of "social, political, economic and cultural factors,"¹ although they certainly have not listed all of them and have confined their effects to the period prior to 1976. The negative features of Chinese life which influence personality development include "the serious errors committed when the state was being built" (as the Beijing ideologists themselves admit), the distorted ideas young people are given about Marxist-Leninist theory, their indoctrination with the "Thought of Mao Zedong" and the corrupting influence of the atmosphere of the "Cultural Revolution" and the "feudal-fascist dictatorship."

Obstacles to the development of the socialist individual in the PRC have been growing since 1958, when Mao Zedong openly proclaimed his "special" economic line, which led to the creation of a special political regime in the country--a military-bureaucratic dictatorship.

The "Cultural Revolution" united previous elements of Maoist indoctrination in a system for the ideological brainwashing of youth. The metamorphosis undergone by the teaching of sociopolitical subjects in the country's academic

institutions is ample proof of this. Chinese students did not have a long acquaintance with the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, as recorded in textbooks introduced in 1953 and compiled according to the recommendations of advanced Soviet pedagogical experience. The "socialist indoctrination" instituted in the Chinese schools in the 1957/58 academic year and in VUZ's in 1958/59 was already based on "Sinized Marxism" and the materials of current ideological and political campaigns.

In the late 1950's, the basic principles of moral education, particularly the principles of the interrelations between the group and the individual and between the individual and society, began to be subjected to Maoist distortion.

When the people's regime was being established, the emphasis in education was on the cultivation of civic awareness and social habits in youth and the inculcation of standards of socialist communal living. The community of individual and group interests was underscored in Chinese works of the mid-1950's.²

When the prevalence of the Maoist ideology was established during the period of the "Great Leap Forward," "social indoctrination" was contrasted to upbringing in the home, which began to be regarded as an obstacle to the development of the socialist citizen. Clear indication of the inaccurate interpretation of collectivism can be seen in the 1958 campaign in China to turn all schools into boarding schools for "more effective socialist indoctrination." The boarding schools were established for stronger control over the thoughts and behavior of youth and the cultivation of stereotypical group behavior in youth, just as in the rest of the population.

The Maoist efforts to equalize individuals presupposed the denial of self-expression and of personal ideals and ambitions. A Chinese student wrote quite eloquently about this at that time: "Our society is like a big smelting furnace: All the people who enter it come out looking the same.... People are arbitrarily labeled individualistic. A person who reads, writes or talks a great deal about his favorite things, displays some distinctive trait and so forth is considered to be an individualist."

In accordance with the Maoist "theory of intensified class struggle under socialism," proclaimed by the 10th CCP Central Committee Plenum in September 1962, even adolescents were actively involved in numerous political campaigns of pseudoclass struggle. The struggle against "class enemies"--the individual's teachers and fellow students--at countless "criticism meetings" was supposed to "strengthen the will and nurture hatred." This encouragement of the merciless treatment of the "enemy" in the Chinese schools was inconsistent with socialist relations, standards and values because it was not accompanied by the cultivation of socialist humanitarianism and high moral standards. The resulting personality was deformed and onesided.

"Patriotic indoctrination" was based on the chauvinist thesis that "the members of the yellow race held the leading position in the world prior to the 15th century." Feelings of hatred for the USSR and socialist countries were fostered. In essence, there was no internationalist indoctrination.

The Maoists of that time gave organization and discipline their own anti-socialist interpretation, and young people were taught blind obedience rather than an awareness of their obligations. They were taught to follow the leader's instructions unconditionally instead of performing their duties voluntarily and enthusiastically. In the 1960's this also entailed constant attempts to institute army forms and methods of work in academic institutions.

One of the distinctive features of work with youth during the period of the "Cultural Revolution" was that its initiators essentially engendered petty bourgeois attitudes and took advantage of certain personality traits of adolescents, such as mental and emotional instability. The propagandistic slogans with which young people were bombarded at that time ("Rebellion is a rightist affair," "Go against the current," "Oppose authority" and "The more books you read, the more reactionary you will be") were coined with different aims in mind. The most obvious was the stimulation of aggressiveness and the persecution of the targets of "struggle." But another goal--a covert and far-reaching one--was the subversion of the principles of socialist civic awareness and the suppression of progressive folk traditions and customs: the love of parents, respect for the elderly, the thirst for learning and diligence.

After 1976 much was said in China about the ways in which the forms and methods of work with youth in the previous decade had crippled young people and contributed to the birth of a generation of "anarchists" and "hooligans." But what was suggested in exchange? A "change of appearance for the younger generation" and its indoctrination in the spirit of "communist morality" were declared to be the most urgent objectives. However, the accomplishment of communist indoctrination necessitates the consideration and use of numerous factors involved in personality development--economic, political, social, cultural, historical and psychological. To sustain youth's faith in Maoism and trust in the CCP, which were severely shaken by the deformation of the socialist order and the violations of socialist legality, several Beijing ideologists suggested that the main content of ideological and political work with youth should be "the encouragement of support for four principles" (the socialist course, the proletarian dictatorship, the party leadership, and Marxism-Leninism and the "Thought of Mao Zedong"). No propaganda in this area can be productive, however, as long as the content of these concepts remains Maoist and as long as social practices are contrary to genuine Marxism-Leninism.

Unresolved economic problems, distorted socialist social relations, a system of public education in a state of neglect, and daily incidents of violence and lawlessness--these are both the surface and the essence of the social reality which is now influencing the process of the indoctrination of Chinese youth.

The need to find jobs for 26 million unemployed youths is one of the Chinese leadership's unresolved problems. What is more, 23 million people will reach working age each year in China, but the number of jobs will increase by only 3 million. For this reason, according to forecasts in the Chinese press, the 1980's will be marked by the sharp exacerbation of unemployment, particularly among youth.

The unattained objectives in general cultural construction and the resulting high level of illiteracy are another extremely complex problem. Universal elementary education is to be instituted by 1985, but only in regions with the most highly developed economy, and it will not be instituted throughout the country before the end of the century. According to our calculations, no more than 40-50 percent of the school-age children were attending secondary schools of the first level at the beginning of the 1980's, and only 20-25 percent were attending schools of the second level.³

The official figure of 150 million illiterate individuals, cited in 1978, seems to be an obvious understatement. It is just as obvious that the figure does not include "double illiteracy," which is widespread in the country.

The development of young people's ideological and moral convictions has also been adversely affected in recent years by such social processes as the exacerbation of international conflicts, the intensification of the actual inferiority of non-Han peoples and the ideological shift to the right. After growing disillusioned with barracks communism, most of the young people who were indoctrinated in the 1960's have difficulty imagining an alternative to this "model." The results of a sociological poll conducted by RENMIN RIBAO correspondents among various groups of youth--urban, rural and student--are indicative. More than 60 percent of the respondents expressed unconditional faith in the advantages of the socialist order, and around 25 percent of the young people called these advantages negligible, based on their Chinese experience, but stipulated that "genuine socialism does have advantages."⁴

The young people of the early 1980's, who were never tempered in any real revolutionary or reforming activity and are unfamiliar with the principles of scientific communism, have no valid social reference points or values. In a number of VUZ's, for example, students who had no opportunity to distinguish Marxist-Leninist theory from the "Thought of Mao" did not wish to attend lectures on sociopolitical subjects or suggested that they be made optional. "Attendance and academic progress in these classes are quite low."⁵ Confirming the compulsory nature of the study of Marxist-Leninist theory in the socialist school, the administrators of the educational system have appealed for "stronger and better instruction in these subjects." But what do they mean? In the 1981-82 academic year re-edited textbooks began to be used in classes in five social sciences in China's secondary schools. Two new classes were added to the curriculum of the partial secondary school: "Adolescent Indoctrination" (moral training) in the first year, and "A Brief Course in Law" (a pertinent subject at a time when 60 percent of all the crimes in China are committed by young people) in the second year. "A Brief History of the Development of Society," "A General Review of Political Economy" and "The Fundamentals of Dialectical Materialism" are being added to the curriculum in higher classes.

Now that the "modernization of Maoism" is underway in the PRC, however, Chinese young people cannot be expected to acquire a truly scientific outlook--the basis of thorough personality development. The reluctance to allow adolescents to read original sources has engendered the artificial substitution of social science textbooks for these sources. "Students learn better from a

textbook because the reading of selected articles can easily distort their original meaning and provide the reader with selective information."⁶ Furthermore, the decisions of the Sixth CCP Central Committee Plenum, which essentially vindicated Maoism and are of an obviously anti-Soviet, antisocialist nature, were made the basis of instruction in all of the social sciences in the Chinese schools and VUZ's by a decision of the Ministry of Education in the 1981/82 academic year.

The Third Komsomol Central Committee Plenum in August 1981 resolved to incorporate the conclusions of the sixth plenum in the process of education and indoctrination, and the same conclusions now lie at the basis of the activities of Pioneer organizations. The absence of Marxist-Leninist theory in curricula is depriving Chinese youth of the opportunity to acquire an integral and balanced scientific view of the world. Students are required, just as they were in the preceding two decades, to develop blind faith in the Maoist truths they are offered, and not to develop ideological convictions based on scientific knowledge.

Recently the main goal of the ideological and moral indoctrination of Chinese youth was declared to be nothing more or less than the development of "communist morality." A movement for a so-called "socialist spiritual culture" was launched for the attainment of this goal in the country, especially among youth. In academic institutions it has taken the form of extracurricular activity and has supplemented and reinforced the "code of regulations for elementary and secondary school students" instituted in the 1979/80 academic year. The earlier Maoist "movement to learn from Lei Feng and establish a new style" is being expanded parallel to it. The "beauty of words of deeds" has been given the top place among the "four aesthetic rules" making up the content of the movement for a "socialist spiritual culture," just as one of the central objectives of the textbook "Adolescent Indoctrination" is the development of "standards of thinking and behavior." The setting of such priorities is accompanied by demands for "balance" in words and deeds. The current practices of the Chinese leadership are certainly not helping discussions about morality and moral standards become convictions. In present-day China, the ideas the people are taught in the system of social indoctrination and education are contradicted by their direct observations. The inconsistency of the information acquired by youth from various sources could either engender a conflict between the individual and society or create split personalities. The words of the hero of Li Tuo's story "Listen to This Song" express the mood of young people: "I often wonder when it was that I grew accustomed to the fact that words are inconsistent with the facts. It is not only in a crowd, but even when more than three people are present, that I rarely speak frankly, and I do this automatically."⁷ It was with good reason that a young people's newspaper printed a letter from a reader who said it was time to finally coordinate propaganda with reality.⁸

The millions of young people whose childhood was crippled and whose parents suffered from the excesses of the Red Guard hordes and from the brutality of authorities have long ceased to be affected by the "instruction in revolutionary traditions" in which they listen to the recollections of poor people and former farm laborers about their bitter life prior to the declaration of the

PRC. Many people between the ages of 16 and 25 have the same reaction as the hero of the story "The Unyielding," who is merely amused by an old woman's recollections of a landowner's insults: "Could what my father endured in the 'pen' (the name given to the make-shift jails of the period of 'Cultural Revolution') really have been easier to bear than your Aunt Bao's experience in the 'Hall of Mercy'?"⁹

The fear of unemployment and the fierce competition engendered by the shortage of schools and the elitist educational system ("key schools," which are actually the only ones whose students are authorized to apply to VUZ's, constitute only 0.5 percent of all the secondary schools in the country) contradict the indoctrination cultivating cooperation and mutual assistance. One of the most prevalent conflicts in contemporary literature about youth consists in the reluctance of adolescent heroes to share knowledge with their comrades--after all, each Chinese schoolchild hopes to pass the exam of a "key school," which is supposed to save him from unemployment. In this connection, the heroine of the story "Classmates" displays characteristic behavior when she hides a textbook from her friend, and the hero of the story "The Nightingale" has to give up his musical pursuits to prepare for a VUZ education--after all, if he should fail he would become one of the millions of people "waiting for work." "Waiting, waiting, and for how long?" his father exclaims in horror.¹⁰

Conditions in today's China tend to separate the individual from the group. In the real socialist society, their indissoluble unity does not mean the absorption of the individual by the group; on the contrary, a well-rounded group must consist of well-rounded individuals. The Maoist interpretation of the "group-individual" problem acknowledges only the automatic priority of "social interests" in relation to the interests of the individual, which presupposes the individual's alienation from social ideals and aims.

After the "Cultural Revolution" with its slogan "We will kill our egos" and its zealous efforts to develop the primitive mob mentality, it was not until the late 1970's and early 1980's that warnings against "anarchism" and "extreme individualism" were heard in China, and they were supposed to have been engendered by the rule of the "gang of four." It was not simply that young people should not have these traits. The impoverishment of personality during the decades of Maoist rule, the lack of self-respect and the accepted practice of trampling on human dignity were the direct results of Maoist "indoctrination" and naturally engendered the negative reaction of desocialization.

In the first stages of the country's new leadership, young people who were wholly taken in by the promises of "democratization" organized numerous demonstrations in support of socialist democracy, demanding that the necessary conditions be established for the development of the individual. However, these demonstrations--rallies and dazibao [large-character posters]--were soon equated by the leadership with zaofan rebellions. Speaking at a session of the Liaoning Province Youth Federation, the first secretary of the party committee alleged that youth "cannot implement the principles of democratic centralism or the connection between freedom and legality correctly, seeks only personal advantage and does not think about the common good."¹¹ Resolute demands were issued that young people substitute the word "group" for the word

"I," "contemptuously and indignantly rebuff individualism based on personal aims and personal interests and, like Lei Feng, devote their entire lives to boundless service to the people."

The underlying reason for these directives can be found again in the fundamental incompatibility of the interests of the laboring public with the policy of the Maoist leadership. This is the reason for Chinese youth's lack of enthusiasm in the struggle to attain the Maoist ideal, which is based on the restriction of objective social and personal interests. "Why else would we want socialism but to make our lives better and happier?" asked a young participant in a discussion printed in the trade-union newspaper GONGREN RIBAO. Participants in a rally of outstanding young people who had been sent to the mountains and rural regions complained about the absence of the elementary necessities of life and educational opportunities. In response to this, Hu Yaobang, who attended the rally and is now the chairman of the CCP Central Committee, called upon youth to "continue displaying the spirit of stubborn and selfless struggle," and Wang Renzhong, deputy leader of the State Council Educated Youth Leading Group, for work with "literature youth" resettled in remote regions, melodramatically asked young people to "cultivate the characteristics of the willow and pine"--to be hardy and undemanding--and "gladly put up with all privations."¹²

The ideals and values proclaimed by Maoism conflict with the experience and moral values of the individual when young people try to make plans for the future. This is what causes them to lose faith in Maoist ideals and sometimes leads to desocialization. On the one hand, young people are required to be undemanding, to appreciate "simplicity and deprivation" and to express a unique "party style," which must be mastered. On the other, they are witnessing the revival of non-socialist forms of ownership and behavior, the abuse of power by authorities, enrichment at society's expense, ill-gotten gains, etc. All of this has an adverse effect on the social and moral climate. Wang Donxing's mansion worth millions, which was written up in the Chinese press, the nationwide scandal which erupted when it was discovered that the head of the coal base in Heilongjiang Province had amassed a fortune of almost half a million yuan through speculation, and the magnificent villas and automobiles owned by educational department officials, bought with funds earmarked for school construction--these are examples of the reality facing the same young men and women who are the target of propaganda advocating the cultivation of "the spirit of the poor."

Liu Binyan published an essay on this subject, "People and Werewolves," containing the following distressing statement: "The mutual assistance of brothers, mutual gratitude for services rendered, friendship and all other noble sentiments are only a cover for naked selfish interests."¹³ It is not surprising that the advancement of a CCP gorkom secretary in the film "The Martyr's Smile" is symbolized by constant moves to more and more luxurious living quarters until he finally reaches a magnificent mansion guarded by an iron fence. The author of one letter to the editors of a youth newspaper recommended that the Chinese leaders who are trying to teach Chinese youth how to act first "stop abusing their power, using society for personal gain, grasping at privileges and indulging in vengeance, slander and dishonesty."¹⁴

Chinese propaganda is still trying to convince youth, however, that the true "communist spirit" consists in the "refusal of rewards" and "work under any conditions whatsoever." "Moving forward" or "moving toward enrichment" (there is a play on words here because the homonym "qian" means "forward" and "money") are symbols of the relationship between society and the individual in Chinese propaganda. It declares that only young people who are willing to work an unregulated workday for meager wages, without hoping for the improvement of the living conditions of the present generation, display "communist morality." It praises those who "do not invest funds and effort in the comfort of their own little family." The youth newspaper ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO contrasted the desire for a happy marriage to "outstanding labor successes," calling these concepts "incompatible." By creating artificial clashes between two groups of categories--personal and social interests and needs--the Maoist ideologists are impeding the kind of social orientation and level of individual development that constitute the purpose and meaning of the socialist society.

In praise of the spirit of self-sacrifice, RENMIN RIBAO glorified, for example, the behavior of two young women who worked for a woodworking combine and abandoned their husbands and small children to take part in the extraction of fire-resistant materials in remote alpine regions thousands of kilometers away from home. Examples like these are used to support the conclusion that "the progress and transformation of the society and the prosperity and strength of the state have always depended on outstanding people with a spirit of self-sacrifice." The newspaper went on to say: "Whether in peacetime or wartime, we must place social needs above personal ones for the sake of the national interest, forget personal considerations for the sake of social needs and experience difficulties before we indulge in happiness."¹⁵ When Maoist ideologists interpret the concepts of the "individual" and "society," they emphasize only one aspect--the work of each individual in the interest of "society" (or, more precisely, the Maoist regime)--and they ignore the concern of society or the group for each of its members, but, after all, socialist humanitarianism and collectivism consist only in the unity of these categories. The model of the faceless individual--the ideal concerned exclusively with the good of "society"--is being painstakingly cultivated by the Beijing ideologists in the movement for a "socialist spiritual culture" and is portrayed as a "national tradition."

All of the preaching in China about the denial of personal needs for the sake of "society" often serves to camouflage difficulties engendered by a reluctance or inability to solve major economic and social problems. One of these problems is the extremely defective structure of higher education, which does not come close to meeting the needs of the national economy. This is an old problem, and the "Cultural Revolution" only exacerbated it. Many VUZ graduates are placed in jobs unrelated to their profession, or even in jobs which do not require a higher education. Even in the mid-1950's, some educational system personnel were already pointing out the danger of the Maoist distortion of such seemingly correct concepts as "the subordination of students to the interests of the state." The use of students in unskilled jobs and the tendency to ignore the individual inclinations of young graduates conflicted with the real interests of society and the objectives of economic construction

and injured morale severely. According to 1980 statistics, from 40 to 60 percent of the graduates of the Science and Technology University in Shanghai had to change their specialty, 50 percent of the graduates of Fudan University, the country's largest VUZ, could not find jobs in their special field, and graduates of the Marine Biology Department of the university have been awaiting placement for 3 years. According to the data of the central press, one-third of the VUZ graduates in a number of provinces were not working in their specialty at the end of the 1970's.¹⁶

Propaganda about the spirit of self-sacrifice is once again being associated with the "exemplary hero" Lei Feng. One of the basic areas of the ideological indoctrination of youth is called "learning from Lei Feng." At the present time, however, tremendous difficulties have been encountered in the glorification of this "cog." For a decade and a half, Lei Feng served as a perfect example of the spiritless individual, a symbol of blind obedience and unquestioning faith. Today the Chinese leaders are making an earnest effort to cultivate this kind of rough-hewn individual, but this time for the sake of "modernization" or "regulation," they are pragmatically confining the development of the individual only to limited professional training and the nurturing of "talents," they are setting up elitist schools and they are disregarding the socialist principles of public education. At the same time, they are propagandizing a semiliterate fighter as the ideal mass hero, whose claim to fame is that he memorized the sayings of Mao from morning till night and did not throw out his old socks. The prevailing opinion among Chinese youth is that Lei Feng was primitive and faceless and did not have any "individual distinctions or abilities."¹⁷ Students are saying out loud that when Lei Feng is described with the popular term "rencai"--"gifted individual"--the character "cai" which is part of the compound words "mucai" and "gangcai" (wood and metal) should be used, and then this word would mean "wooden individual." "He did whatever he was told and had no creative impulses."¹⁸

Who should Chinese young men and women take as a "model"? An entire galaxy of revolutionary heroes of the anti-Japanese and revolutionary wars for the liberation of China were "banned" for many years, nothing was said about them in the press and all of them were eclipsed by a single hero--the "Great Helmsman." The best literary heroes who could teach young people to think profound thoughts and develop their senses to the fullest are simply unknown to many people. The teaching of literature in the schools is quite poor, extracurricular reading has been ignored in most schools and, in general, there is not much to read. There are almost no books for children and adolescents in rural areas. A survey of the students of rural secondary schools revealed that many of them knew nothing about Lu Xing, Guo Moruo or Mao Dong. But children amuse themselves with picture books about medieval China and "mysteries," which are issued in mass editions. The result was reflected in the findings of a survey of fourth- and fifth-graders. In answer to the question "Who is your favorite hero?" the teenagers named the heroes of novels about medieval knights: Youe Fei, the Yang brothers¹⁹ and others. In light of these feelings, suggestions have been made in the Chinese press about the diversification of the gallery of "exemplary heroes": "One single type of character is replacing or eclipsing all others. Various strata of youth need to read about different types of characters," the correspondent of a youth newspaper wrote.²⁰ Nevertheless, the Lei Feng movement will continue to develop as long as the Beijing leaders need "undemanding buffaloes."

Soldiers are still at the top of the list of heroes recommended for Chinese youth, and the heroes of the "defensive counterstrike"--the aggression against the SRV--are now ranked with the real heroes of the anti-Japanese and revolutionary wars (Zhao Yiman and Liu Hulan) and with Zhang Zhixin, who fought against the "gang of four." Youth rallies are being organized everywhere to honor the participants in the provocative attack on the SRV, their photographs are hanging on the walls and bulletin boards of schools and a campaign "to learn from the heroes of defensive counterstrike" has been launched among students, so that they can learn to "sacrifice their lives even in childhood." Literature has been made an integral part of this campaign--poor students are reindoctrinated after they are seated at a desk previously occupied by a former Red Guard who is now a soldier fighting against the SRV, or become better students to please their older friends or relatives who took part in this aggressive action.²¹ The message from the Komsomol Central Committee to all Pioneer and Komsomol organizations, published in May 1979, revealed the purpose of learning from such heroes: "Obeying orders at all times, making an effort wherever the party commands, and placing the interests of the state and the nation above personal considerations."²² This was precisely the primitive formula reiterated by Jiang Nanxiang, then the minister of education, when he spoke at the all-China conference on ideological and political work in academic institutions and defined the main feature of "communist morality."²³

The establishment of the system of communist indoctrination is inseparable from reforms in all spheres of social life, and certainly in the sphere of public education. When the new educational reform was being instituted, there was obviously a struggle within the Chinese leadership over the objectives and duties of the schools. Mao Zedong's definition of the goals of education in Chinese academic institutions at the end of the 1950's considerably restricted the concept of education as a medium of thorough personality development and reduced it to the memorization of political slogans and the training of automatic executors and performers of primitive physical labor. A new definition after Mao's death added the concept of "all-round development" to the Maoist backbone and added the duty to train "skilled personnel" to the duty to train "laborers." In principle, this did not change anything because it simply perpetuates social differences. "Our indoctrination within the walls of academic institutions should train cultured laborers with a socialist consciousness and develop skilled personnel, thoroughly developed in the moral, mental and physical sense, both 'reds' and 'specialists.'"²⁴ An article by Deputy Minister of Education Zhang Chengxian, published in fall 1980 and entitled "Consistent Effort Aimed at All-Round Development and the Improvement of the Quality of Education," gave a broader interpretation of "all-round development": "Moral indoctrination and mental, physical, aesthetic and technical development must all be given attention because all of them are integral parts of a single concept and ensure the healthy physical growth and mental development of youth. The tendency to disregard any of these aspects is wrong and harmful."²⁵ The author of this article speaks of the need to train students for creative labor, of the dialectical connection between accumulated knowledge and the development of abilities and of the need for an individual approach to indoctrination. He mentions several errors and difficulties standing in the way of "all-round development," particularly the practice of singling out "promising" students in graduating classes. He lists

only one reason for the present situation--the serious disruption of the balance between the secondary and higher levels of education, as a result of which only 4-5 percent of the graduates of secondary schools of the second level (mainly the graduates of "key schools") can expect to continue their education. The problem is just as acute when it comes to entrance exams for the secondary schools of the first level, and then the second level. Young people who are not enrolled are threatened by unemployment.

Only 60 percent of the 96 percent of school-age children who enroll in schools complete their elementary education (only 30 percent master the entire curriculum), and 12 percent of these have no chance of entering a partial secondary school. Only around 50 percent of the graduates of partial secondary schools move up to the next level. The drop-out rate is particularly high among girls, and girls constitute most of the army of illiterate and semiliterate youth.

There are many reasons why students drop out of school, but tuition fees are one of the main ones. The Chinese leadership only makes promises but does not actually consent to any significant rise in state allocations for education--a vitally necessary measure in today's China. Instead of this, tuition fees are raised in an attempt to improve the quality of education. According to reports from the elementary schools of Hubei Province, the fees for one child in the elementary school have risen from 7 to 15-19 yuan a year, and the parents of children who live outside the school boundaries must pay an additional 25-35 yuan.²⁶

Due to the low level of teaching in the last 15 years, 130 million young people between the ages of 15 and 25, who were living in rural areas in 1980 and had completed elementary school or even had a partial secondary education, were also illiterate or semiliterate.²⁷ The situation of the non-Han peoples is particularly tragic. In Xinjiang 45 percent of rural young people are illiterate, 60 percent of the rural population is illiterate in Guizhou, 70 percent in Gansu, and 98 percent in the regions in this province which are inhabited primarily by non-Hans.

Many obstacles stand in the way of the establishment of a unified general educational system in China, but the main problems stem less from the existence of these obstacles than from the approach to them. The present Chinese leadership has inherited and developed Mao Zedong's often repeated statement about the need to adapt schools to local conditions, to the needs of local industry and to the agrarian specialty of the region. For many years, this has impeded the creation of a unified socialist system of general education in China. At conferences on education in the CCP Central Committee Secretariat in summer 1980, the idea that "uniformity in the schools should never be a goal" in China was raised once again. Given the overall economic underdevelopment of the country and the state of crisis in the educational system, this means that most of the academic institutions in China will remain irregular for many years. The incomparably lower level of training in these schools predetermines and limits the nature of the future activity of their graduates, their social status and the structure of their personality.

The all-round development of student youth does not depend only on the content of academic curricula, but also (and this is just as important) on the

opportunity for all children to acquire a full education and on a rise in the overall level of education. At present, the general knowledge of Chinese schoolchildren is extremely inadequate, even when measured against the current requirements, which are not very strict. Up to 25 percent of the students in a number of elementary schools in Hubei Province are repeating grades. Whereas 70-80 percent of the students in the first and second grades pass their final exams, only 40-50 percent in the fourth and fifth grades can pass them. Even in Beijing the situation is no better: Only 30 percent of the graduates of partial secondary schools had acquired the general knowledge required at this level of education.²⁸

There are several reasons for the low level of knowledge: the unsatisfactory material and technical facilities of schools (a minimum of 17 percent of all school buildings in China are in a hazardous state), flaws in curricula, the impairment of discipline during the "Cultural Revolution" and, last but not least, the extremely poor training of teachers and their exceptionally low cultural level. Around 70 percent of the teachers in rural elementary schools actually do not know any more than their students,²⁹ and 60 percent of the teachers in partial secondary schools are not VUZ graduates. Many schools simply do not have anyone to teach such subjects as foreign languages, physics, chemistry and biology.

Under these conditions, all of the talk about the thorough and balanced development of the individual must be regarded as good intentions at best. They can affect the students of the "key academic institutions," who constitute only a small percentage of the total number of students. The experimental curricula distributed by the Ministry of Education in April 1981, placing more emphasis on instruction in foreign languages, biology, music and drawing, were designed precisely for these schools.

There is virtually no organized artistic education for children in China. There is no network of specialized music and art schools (there are only one or two music schools even in the largest cities). China's first juvenile film studio was only opened in June 1981 ("adult" studios produce far too few movies for children). There are only two professional children's theaters and seven children's libraries in the entire country. This was the level at which the committee set up by the Ministry of Culture in spring 1981 for the artistic education of children and young adults had to begin its work. Furthermore, the committee was given very little authority.

Problems in the indoctrination of the younger generation are closely connected with the resolution of problems in all spheres of social life. Only radical changes in state policy and the renunciation of the spiritual fetters of Maoism can establish the necessary conditions in the PRC for the development of the socialist citizen.

FOOTNOTES

1. RENMIN RIBAO, 25 November 1979.

2. Wu Jiang, "Questions of Communist Morality," Beijing, 1955; Zhou Yuanbing, "The Cultivation of Communist Morality in Youth," Beijing, 1956, and others.
3. A transition is now being made to the 12-year system of education which existed prior to 1966: 6 years in elementary school and two levels (3 years each) in secondary school.
4. RENMIN RIBAO, 24 February 1981.
5. RENMIN JIAOYU, 1979, No 5, p 33.
6. JILIN SHIDA XUEBAO, 1979, No 4, p 132.
7. INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA, 1981, No 11, pp 142-143.
8. ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO, 12 July 1980.
9. ERTONG WENXUE, 1981, No 4, p 42.
10. SHAONIAN WENYI, 1979, No 10; ERTONG WENXUE, 1981, No 7, p 16.
11. GUANGMING RIBAO, 3 November 1979.
12. RENMIN RIBAO, 30 August 1979.
13. A. N. Zhelokhovtsev, "At the Crossroads," LITERATURNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 1981, No 1, p 84.
14. ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO, 14 October 1980.
15. RENMIN RIBAO, 9 April 1981.
16. GUANGMING RIBAO, 26 July 1980; RENMIN RIBAO, 6 May 1978.
17. RENMIN RIBAO, 5 March 1981.
18. RENMIN JIAOYU, 1981, No 5, p 21.
19. RENMIN RIBAO, 6 September 1981, 18 November 1981.
20. ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO, 6 September 1979.
21. SHAONIAN WENYI, 1980, Nos 1, 4.
22. RENMIN RIBAO, 9 May 1979.
23. GUANGMING RIBAO, 4 August 1981.
24. Ibid., 22 September 1981.

25. HONGQI, 1980, No 22, p 45.
26. GUANGMING RIBAO, 28 October 1981.
27. RENMIN JIAOYU, 1980, No 1, p 38.
28. RENMIN RIBAO, 7 July 1981, 12 November 1981.
29. Ibid., 13 October 1981.

COPYRIGHT: "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka" 1982

8588

CSO: 1805/1

ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL CHINESE EXPANSIONISM IN CENTRAL ASIA DESCRIBED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 82 (signed to press 19 May 82) pp 159-161

[Article by V. S. Kuznetsov, candidate of historical sciences: "Was It Really a 'Silk' Route?"]

[Text] The illustrated journal CHINA, which is designed for a wide range of readers in China and in Europe, Asia, Africa and North and South America, published a series of essays under the heading "The Silk Route." The publication of these essays about the Silk Route by the editors of CHINA was apparently supposed to, first of all, arouse the foreign reader's feelings of gratitude to the Chinese emperors for initiating peaceful relations with all of their Western neighbors and, secondly, convince readers inside and outside the PRC that China had supposedly been present since time immemorial in Central Asia, which was part of the traditional Chinese concept of the "western territory."

From the second century B.C. to the 13th and 14th centuries of our era, the magazine says, the Silk Route served China as a means of "friendly and cultured relations" with other countries. It began in Xian, then passed through Shenxi, Gansu, Xinjiang, Pamir and Central and West Asia and ended in the Mediterranean countries.¹

The idea of establishing this route is ascribed to Emperor Wudi (140-87 B.C.), to whom, as the authors of these essays write, the entire non-Chinese world is obligated for the silk it uses and for its acquaintance with other creations of the Chinese civilization.²

It is true that China's trade and cultural exchange with the West was accomplished by means of the Silk Route. But this is only one aspect of the matter, however important it may be. Another important aspect consists in the methods and means by which the Silk Route was established and the goals of this undertaking. When Wudi thought of establishing a route to the West, he certainly was not planning to do the Western "barbarians" a great favor. It is a well-known fact that he was motivated only by greed when he turned his gaze to the West. Just as people in China once truthfully wrote, he and his associates acquired an "appetite for luxury" and wanted to "take prisoners and expand foreign markets."³ For this purpose, Wudi launched military campaigns against

his neighbors directly to the west--Huns and other non-Hans. In 119 B.C. Wei Qing and Huo Qubing crossed the Great Gobi Desert with 200,000 troops and defeated the Huns. "The victory in the war against the Huns contributed to the growth of the Han Wudi's arrogant and aggressive ambitions," and in 110 B.C. the "Han Empire's army of 100,000 conquered the Qiang tribe, which was all that lay between the Hans and the Western countries."⁴

In short, Wudi decided to blaze a trail to the West on someone else's land, without seeking the consent of its owners. This road, which was later called the Silk Route, was not broken by peaceful caravans laden down with Chinese fabric, but by Han hordes carrying death and destruction to the non-Chinese population of Central Asia.⁵

Contrary to the assurances of CHINA magazine, the Silk Route was not a peaceful caravan road along which "Chinese silk moved farther and farther west." This was a road of aggressive wars, a road along which the Han Empire accomplished military-political expansion in Central Asia and tried to lay its hands on this region. The process began with Wudi and was continued by his successors--the East (or Late) Han emperors. "Ban Chao and his comrades," we read in CHINA magazine, "were among those who marched along the Silk Route in the first century of our era."⁶

This naturally raises questions about Ban Chao's identity and his motives. The authors of the essays say nothing about his personal motives. A detailed answer can be found in a biography of Ban Chao in a Chinese source. It says that the life of a petty scribe displeased Ban Chao and he decided to try his luck in foreign lands with the aid of his sword.⁷ "You and I," Ban Chao said to his men when they were in the state of Shanshan (Loulan), "are on the outer edges of society. All of us want to perform great feats and win riches and fame."⁸

As for the reasons why Ban Chao was sent on the campaign, the magazine editors say: After the eastern Han dynasty was established, to the Tarima basin "Ban Chao was sent to quickly establish order there...and won the love of the local population by doing this."⁹

Since CHINA magazine says nothing about how Ban Chao established order in someone else's territory, by doing which he supposedly won the love of its inhabitants, we will fill this gap with information from the biography of the Han conqueror. As soon as Ban Chao had arrived in the state of Hotan, located near what is now the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region of the PRC, he lured the high priest of the state into a trap and cut off his head.¹⁰ More than 700 inhabitants of the state of Gumo were beheaded a little later.¹¹ Ban Chao's comrades-in-arms were cutthroats just like him. When Ban Chao requested reinforcements, the Han court sent him Xu Gan, a man from the same district as Ban Chao, leading a detachment consisting mainly of pardoned criminals.¹²

The allegations in CHINA magazine that Ban Chao "quickly established order" in western states and won the love of the local population are glaring contradictions of the historical facts. In 74 B.C. Ban Chao laid siege to the

troops of the Kucha and Gumo states for a long time. Han Emperor Suzong was worried that Ban Chao did not have the strength to hold out, and he even decided to recall him.¹³ The prospect of being bogged down in the western territory for a long time as a result of the local population's active resistance of the Han Empire's plans made some Han courtiers even think about leaving this region in peace for a while. For example, one dignitary, Bao Yi, announced: "We have sent people to a difficult and dangerous place. They must leave this place (that is, the western territory--L. V.) quickly or we will incur the wrath of the barbarians and they will murder us."¹⁴

The late Han rulers never gave up their hope of consolidating their hold on the Tarima basin. But they were certainly not worried about building strong bridges of trade and cultural exchange with the Mediterranean, as CHINA magazine presents the matter. The Tarima basin appealed to the Han court primarily as an object of territorial conquest, as a vast region of Han colonization. When Ban Chao explained why there was no need to retreat from the western territory, he stressed that the lands in Shache and Shule (Kashgar) were fertile and extensive and that the Middle Kingdom had no need to spend its money on the maintenance of troops because they could take care of all their own needs.¹⁵

In the attempt to portray the Chinese aggressive campaigns as some kind of brief and infrequent visits to carry the achievements of the Han culture to the inhabitants of outlying barbarian lands, the editors of CHINA have resorted to all sorts of tricks. "The Han dynasty's emissaries and soldiers," the magazine's readers are assured, "carried the techniques of steelmaking to the inhabitants of Davan (now Fergana--V. K.) and also taught them how to dig wells."¹⁶ But what are the facts?

In 104 B.C. Emperor Wudi sent his troops to Fergana, but they were dealt an utter defeat by the local population. In 102 Wudi launched another campaign, again unsuccessfully, resulting in the acquisition of only a herd of horses. In an ukase of 30 August 1757 Ch'ing Emperor Hongli (inscribed with the Qianlong motto, 1736-1795) recalled the unsuccessful campaigns of Wudi's troops in Fergana: "In the past, Emperor Wudi of the Han dynasty sent his troops on a difficult campaign to Fergana, but they only brought back some horses." If the population of Fergana had not known the techniques of steel-making, as CHINA asserts, why were so many Han soldiers buried on foreign territory after being sliced up by the steel swords of the Davan natives?

The magazine's allegation that the Han soldiers taught the population of Fergana how to dig wells is also puzzling. How did the Fergana farmers get along without wells before the arrival of the Han troops? And how did the Han soldiers manage to share their experience in well-digging when they were busy fighting with the local population? In their attempt to extoll aggressors and robbers, the editors of CHINA have once again proved that it is only one step from the sublime to the ridiculous. The truth about the people who were sent by Wudi on the "civilizing mission" to ancient Fergana is eloquently set forth by a contemporary--historian Ssuma Chien: Most of the troops Wudi sent to Fergana were youths with "bad reputations"¹⁷ or, in other words, the dregs of society.

The authors of the essays and the editors of CHINA magazine persistently tell the reader that the local population of Central Asia would supposedly have vegetated without the Chinese presence and there would have been no regional socioeconomic development: Caravans of camels and horses, laden down with silk and other goods, crossed the dusty plain, brought excitement to Hexi and awoke the slumbering Tarima valley, and the state of Shule flourished, and all because of the Silk Route.¹⁸

Contrary to these picturesque descriptions, in reality everything was quite different. The peaceful life of the population in Hexi was disturbed by Han invasions, and not by trade caravans from China. As for the Tarima valley, the states there lived a full life, but they died wherever the Han hordes were; for example, in the abovementioned Shule state, which was subjected to repeated attacks by Ban Chao's detachments.¹⁹

Evidently, however, the editors of CHINA were acting according to the naive principle that "the end justifies the means" and could therefore depict the robbery trails and military conquests of the Han hordes as a peaceful trade route supplying the West only with Chinese silk and technical experience.

In addition to CHINA magazine, other PRC publications have also given the history of the Silk Route their own, great-Han interpretation. For example, the foreign readers of CHINA RECONSTRUCTS (published in English, French, Spanish, Arabic, German and Portuguese) are guided along the Silk Route by some men named Wang Xi and Liu Qingxia. They are the authors of a report on the "Along the Silk Road" ballet. The ancient Silk Route, Wang and Liu say, was the main trade artery connecting the China of the T'ang dynasty (618-907) with the West. "Economic and cultural exchange between China and foreign countries," they go on to say, "flourished during the early period of the T'ang dynasty. In particular, there was the extremely lively exchange of Chinese silk for pearls from Persia."²⁰

Against the background of Silk Route landscapes, the ballet depicts events, Wang and Liu exclaim dramatically, reflecting the friendly relations that existed a thousand years ago between China and the countries to the west. The choreographers, the authors of the report state, researched the period thoroughly so that they could reproduce the actual appearance of medieval musicians and dancers from various countries. Wang and Liu, on the other hand, display no desire to reflect reality in their excursions into the past. And the plain and simple reason is that a realistic account would have proved that T'ang China's relations with its western neighbors were not at all as idyllic as Wang and Liu paint them. Ample evidence of this can be found in history. When the T'ang dynasty began ruling, China fought a series of aggressive wars against the independent states of Central Asia. In 629 T'ang Emperor Taizong launched a campaign against the eastern Turkic khanate, and this Turkic state ceased to exist. In 640 the T'ang troops destroyed the state of Gaochang, and in 648 they attacked the principality of Kucha.²¹

The rulers of the T'ang Empire were interested in more than Persian pearls. They also had designs on the territory of the Persian state. After a series of territorial conquests in the west, the T'ang court began to refer to part

of the land under its control as the "Persian General Government" ("Possu dudufu").²² When Firuz, the son of the Sassanid ruler Yazdagird, arrived in the T'ang capital, he was named the "Chinese ruler of Persia."²³ It was precisely the T'ang Empire's aggressive impulses that led to its armed confrontation with the Arab Caliphate. In 751 an Arab force defeated the Chinese army, commanded by Gao Xianzhi,²⁴ on the Talas River and put an end to T'ang China's attempts to interfere in Central Asian affairs.

FOOTNOTES

1. CHINA, 1979, No 6, p 21.
2. Ibid., p 26; 1980, No 6, p 38; No 8, p 11; No 9, p 30.
3. See "Essays on Chinese History from Ancient Times to the 'Opium' Wars," edited by Shang Youe, translated from Chinese, Moscow, 1959, p 80.
4. Ibid., pp 82, 83.
5. Ibid., p 81.
6. CHINA, 1979, No 6, p 27.
7. Fan Ye, "Hou Hanshu (The History of China in the Late Han Period)" Beijing, 1965, p 1571.
8. Ibid., p 1572.
9. CHINA, 1980, No 11, p 30.
10. Fan Ye, Op. cit., p 1573; L. S. Vasil'yev, "Ban Chao in the Western Territory," VESTNIK DREVNEY ISTORII, 1955, No 1, p 112.
11. Fan Ye, Op. cit., p 1575.
12. Ibid., p 1576.
13. Ibid., p 1575.
14. L. S. Vasil'yev, Op. cit., p 113.
15. Fan Ye, Op. cit., p 1576; L. S. Vasil'yev, Op. cit., p 116.
16. CHINA, 1979, No 6, p 27.
17. "Records of the Grand Historian of China, Translated from the 'Shih chi' of Ssuma Chien by B. Watson," vol II, New York-London, 1961, p 281.
18. CHINA, 1980, No 11, p 30.

19. Fan Ye, Op. cit., bk 45, pp 575-583.
20. Wang Xi and Liu Qingxia, "Along the Silk Road Dance Drama," CHINA RECONSTRUCTS, 1980, vol XXIX, No 3, p 24.
21. "Essays on Chinese History...", pp 210-211.
22. "The Cambridge History of China," vol 3, pt 1 (edited by D. Twitchett), Cambridge University Press, 1979, p 280.
23. Li Ungbing, "Outlines of Chinese History," Shanghai, 1914, p 141.
24. "Essays on Chinese History...", p 212.

COPYRIGHT: "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka" 1982

8588

CSO: 1805/1

PRC ATTEMPTS TO USE CHINESE COMMUNITY ON MADAGASCAR AS CHANNEL OF INFLUENCE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 82 (signed to press 19 May 82) pp 162-166

[Article by Ye. I. Petrova: "From the History of the Chinese Community on Madagascar"]

[Text] The history of tropical Africa was such that today's independent states in this region did not grow out of a national organization. State unification preceded national unification there, and this led to ethnic diversity in each state. This is why the question of nationality is an important consideration when socioeconomic and cultural policy is being made in the countries of this region.

The resolution of the ethnic problem, which is quite difficult in itself, is complicated in African countries by the presence of a large foreign population (from other continents and of other nationalities and races). The problem of foreign minorities transcends the framework of interethnic relations, and represents not only a separate problem for the state, but also an additional economic, social and political problem to be dealt with in conjunction with the complex and incomplete processes of national consolidation.

Strictly speaking, the problem of interrelations between the native local population and the foreign population existed in a somewhat obscure form even during the period of colonial rule and was controlled by colonial methods. After the declaration of independence, it became particularly acute. The reason was that independence usually does not eradicate all of the aftereffects of colonialism in the economy, the socioethnic sphere and the national culture. Although this independence promises foreign minorities broader opportunities and provides the local population with fundamentally new opportunities, it makes competition quite probable.

Under these conditions, the new state often finds itself in a dual position. On the one hand, it must consider the economic interests of various foreign communities, but on the other, it must respond to demands for Africanization. Furthermore, it must consider the local population's traditional, sometimes negative attitude toward people from other continents, as well as the international repercussions of events and attitudes. This is far from a complete list of the factors influencing the state's behavior toward foreign minorities. The social and political characteristics of the foreign community, its size and economic importance,

the peculiarities of its formation and development and its past relationship with the local population still, however, represent one of the deciding factors.

The topic of foreign minorities in tropical Africa has been discussed at length in scientific literature. Nevertheless, the topic has certainly not been exhausted because, for example, the Chinese community in Africa has still not been researched.

There are only a few works about the history of the Asian communities on Madagascar. Virtually all of them are of a descriptive nature.¹ The most interesting are the works by L. Slawewski² about the Chinese on Madagascar. The author made extensive use of Malagasy archives when he wrote these works.

The interest in the study of the Chinese community on Madagascar stems from the fact that it represents less than 1 percent of the island population but occupies strong economic positions and is capable of influencing economic conditions within the country and the foreign policy aims of the state.

In this context, it should be noted that Beijing, which is conducting a great-power, hegemonist, pro-imperialist line in its foreign policy and hopes to use the developing countries in its own interest, has kept a close watch on Chinese communities overseas. The PRC leadership maintains that Chinese emigrants are "part of the Chinese nationality" and that "the fate of Chinese living abroad is inextricably linked with their homeland."³ The practice of "building bridges" and involving the huaqiao in the sphere of Beijing's own interests corroborates its unequivocal intention to establish a "fifth column" in a number of developing countries.

The Chinese immigration to Madagascar, which has been going on for more than a century, has been irregular. During various stages of this process, different factors stimulated each new wave. The first mention of Chinese on the island is found in a book by English missionary William Ellis, published in London in 1867.

In the second half of the last century the Chinese began to extend their trade activity from Mauritius to Madagascar. At the end of the 19th century the nature of Chinese migration to the island changed somewhat. Madagascar ceased to be a peripheral trading point and became a center of the commercial activity of Chinese who had moved here from Mauritius. Their number grew. They settled in places on the east and northeast coast that were already well known to the Mauritian Chinese.

This was partly due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of Chinese had emigrated from the province of Guangdong and Hong Kong. Most of them--the ones from Hong Kong--settled in Mauritius (they spoke in the Hakka dialect). The minority, from Guangdong, spoke the Youe dialect and had to find a new refuge--on Madagascar--after a falling out with the Hong Kong emigres. To this day, Chinese who speak Hakka constitute the majority on Mauritius, while the Malagasy Chinese speak Youe. The Chinese were attracted by the new economic opportunities created by the vigorous colonization of the island by the French.

When Madagascar was declared a French colony in 1896, the nature of migration changed. It was no longer trade activity that lay at its basis, but an acute manpower shortage, particularly in the construction of a railroad from the east coast

to the center of the country. The colonial administration looked to the East in search of cheap manpower. Four groups of Chinese coolies, totaling 3,000 individuals, were sent to Madagascar in 1896 and 1897. These operations, just as two subsequent ones in 1900 and 1901, were a failure. Hunger, disease, the brutal conditions of labor and the drastic change in climate killed many of the workers. The survivors were hurriedly sent back to their own country.⁴

The subsequent growth of the Chinese community was the result of free emigration directly from China. There were 512 Chinese on Madagascar in 1909, 935 in 1921, 1,805 in 1931 and 3,637 in 1941.⁵ This means that the size of the community had increased 6-fold since the beginning of the mass immigration.

The restriction of immigration, particularly after written authorization from the governor-general was required for entry, sharply reduced the flow of immigrants to Madagascar. The growth of the Asian population on the island in the postwar period was mainly the result of a natural increase. Around 13,000 Chinese now live in the Democratic Republic of Madagascar.

A 1925 Malagasy law established the institution of congregations--associations of Chinese in locations inhabited by more than nine Chinese. In essence, the congregation was a form of administrative control over the Asian communities.

The head of the Chinese congregation was elected by its members, was approved by representatives of the colonial administration and served as a connecting link with this administration. The congregation is a closed organization, inaccessible to the outside world, in which virtually all Chinese social life takes place.

The Chinese, who tend to uphold traditional beliefs, do not advertise their religious convictions. Various religious rites, weddings, funerals and celebrations of the Chinese new year take place within the congregation--the guardian of Chinese traditions.

The clan became the most distinctive feature of the structure of the Chinese community on Madagascar. The family is the primary link in the clan system. The extended family plan for the unification of plans led to the creation of the economic plan. A higher order of clan is political, and there are only two of these on Madagascar.

In the opinion of L. Slawewski, the process of separation into two clans began with an argument between two relatives, engendering feelings of rivalry and a struggle for influence first within the bounds of a single family.⁶ Each of the competing groups acquired more and more supporters. As a result, all of the Chinese living on Madagascar were split into two camps. Since one of the initiators of the argument--was a loyal and devoted member of the Guomindang, the other decided to call himself an opponent of the Guomindang. In this way, by the beginning of the 1950's there were two "political clans," inaccurately called "rightist" and "leftist."

The Guomindang group was quite active politically and socially. The reason was that it represented a political organization, while the unity of the opposing group was based more on tradition. A section of the Guomindang had been set up on

Madagascar as early as 1921 and a consul was appointed by the Guomintang Government. The colonial administration was loyal to them at the end of the 1940's, hoping to make use of their obviously anticommunist aims. Political support for the Guomintang and the maintenance of extremely close ties with Taiwan were also characteristic of the Tsiranana Government in the 1960's.

The so-called anti-Guomintang group became the target of lively Beijing propaganda. The first communist cells came into being in the Malagasy Chinese community at the end of the 1940's, and this was followed by the appearance of brochures published in Beijing, secret broadcasts and the growth of Radio Beijing's audience. P. Tsiranana even threatened to deport members of this community for engaging in "subversive activity."⁷

The Guomintang campaigned to collect contributions for the Taipei regime, published a daily newspaper for the Chinese on Madagascar until recently and opened the first Chinese school in the city of Tamatave in 1930. The anti-Guomintang group also opened a school later.

The different Chinese schools, which represent the result of political division, reproduced this division in new generations. Incidentally, this "reproduction" is less apparent now, and this is a result of new and significant changes in the Chinese community and the entire country.

Whereas the Chinese community was once split vertically into two parts, a horizontal split into two layers is now apparent. The young Chinese, who have absolutely no ties to their distant motherland or the now weaker old patriotic feelings, biases and ideals, have been educated in a new way and are much more open, receptive and mobile and tend to have a more universal view of life.

We believe that this is the result of several political, economic and social factors. In light of the events of the last 15 years on the continent and on Madagascar, citizens of Asian origins do not exclude the possibility of leaving the country and are striving to acquire the kind of knowledge, skills and occupations that might be useful in a new place, although this is only a probability rather than a firm intention.

The economic foundation for the reorientation of youth was laid when the government's attempts to Malagasize the economy made it much more difficult for the Chinese to succeed in the sphere of trade, which had previously been virtually reserved for them. It was not easy for them to exercise their new independence and take the opportunity to try their strength in other fields (industry, civil service and so forth). The problem is that the traditional nature of the Chinese schools, their low level of teaching and the impossibility of acquiring a modern education, particularly a technical one, in them make their graduates unable to compete with the graduates of Franco-Malagasy schools. Independence, however, gave the Malagasy Chinese the important social opportunity to attend Franco-Malagasy secondary academic institutions. This has created a dilemma for many young people: They can either learn the Chinese language in the Chinese school and then take over their fathers' "affairs" or they can try to succeed in non-traditional spheres of activity after acquiring an education in a state school or a vocational and technical institute.

Incidentally, for many young Chinese the problem of making this choice arises only when they are old enough to make clear judgments but too old to be reeducated. Under these conditions, some have to turn to the specialties they are capable of mastering on their own: electrical equipment and automobile repair and so forth.

The social behavior of the Chinese immigrant is determined by circumstances and compromise, and whereas political and economic circumstances are his point of departure in any matter, his decision is always a compromise.

To some degree, the Chinese community is an "open" system, mainly for historical and demographic reasons. According to the 1904 census, there were 452 Chinese living on Madagascar, and only 6 of them were women. Although the Chinese would have preferred Chinese brides, they had to marry Malagasy women. The need to adapt, reinforced by the ethnic and religious tolerance they had developed when they left China, and the desire to adapt were reflected in the fact that Chinese continued to marry Malagasy women even after the sexes were in balance. The official registration of marriages, a practice which has been going on for two or three decades, was dictated by totally different reasons. When faced by possible changes, the Chinese individual prefers not to leave his accustomed place to take off for parts unknown. In this kind of situation, he resorts once again to a compromise. Retaining his Chinese or Taiwanese citizenship, which is largely symbolic and personifies his loyalty to a distant motherland and his forefathers, the Chinese simultaneously acquires the status of not just an emigrant, but the head of a Malagasy family.

At the same time, the Chinese community is "open" only to the degree required by economic or political circumstances. In itself, it is closed and inaccessible to the outside world. The offspring of mixed marriages are recognized by the community, frequently attend the Chinese school and sometimes even acquire a higher education. In 1964, two of the 34 Malagasy Chinese studying in Taiwan were offspring of mixed marriages.⁸ Nevertheless, they have a dual status: They can become official representatives or heads of congregations, but they cannot teach in the Chinese school.

Although the Sino-Malagasy, who now number 14,000, can never be fully integrated in the Chinese community, they represent one of the channels of Chinese influence on the island, particularly since they, in contrast to the Chinese, quite often have Malagasy citizenship. The son-in-law of former President P. Tsiranana, a Sino-Malagasy, was a foreign affairs adviser in the president's office. Usually, however, the Chinese cannot acquire this kind of government position.

Most of the Chinese are engaged in all-scale retail trade in urban and rural areas. They usually combine this trade with money-lending and the retail of agricultural products. Rural shop owners supply the population with the vital necessities: salt, sugar, flour, kerosene, soap, clothing and so forth.

Most of the urban Chinese are grocers. Some own hotels and restaurants. During the colonial era the Chinese were midway between the Europeans and the local population in terms of income. Immigrants constituted an intermediate link in the economic structure of the colonial society. They retained their economic position

after the declaration of independence. At the end of the 1960's the Chinese owned around 2,000 enterprises of various kinds. The Chinese community on Madagascar have never experienced strong socioeconomic polarization. The overwhelming majority of the Chinese who emigrated to Madagascar were merchants, and they had virtually no alternative choice of employment.

The Chinese immigrants, or at least the majority, regarded emigration as a way of making money (as much and as quickly as possible) to live comfortably when they return to their homeland. The best way of attaining this goal was, of course, trade. Regarding their stay on Madagascar as a temporary one, the Chinese made no attempt to settle here and did not buy land.

According to 1951 statistics, there were 2,181 Chinese in trade, 41 in industry, 39 in agriculture and fishing, 12 in transportation, 7 in education and 1 in the army.⁹ Commerce was the sphere of 93.6 percent of the entire adult Chinese population (of 2,320).

Another reason was that the Chinese had close economic ties with the French from the very beginning and functioned under their auspices. Close ties with the French and the dependence of the Chinese on French economic activity were demonstrated in statistics as early as 1896, when 10 of the 50 Chinese who had settled on Madagascar by that time lived on Nosi Be, 30 lived in Diego Suarez and the rest lived on the east coast,¹⁰ or, in other words, in regions which had been under French control even before 1895.

The French were extremely satisfied by the mediating role the Chinese played for them, which gave them an opportunity to control the development of Chinese business. Chinese economic operations were confined to the local European firms and enterprises with which they had worked from the first. The Chinese could not have direct contacts with foreign firms or conduct independent large trade operations. They were virtually barred from big business. They were never able to establish strong corporate organizations, large export-import firms or trading houses.

The third reason for the absence of strong social differentiation in the Chinese community was connected with important internal features, particularly the existence of communal solidarity as the basis of equalizing support and mutual assistance relations.

The Malagasy Chinese are externally indifferent when it comes to politics. With the exception of the Sino-Malagasy, they do not play a visible role in domestic politics, but they do not conceal their foreign political sympathies. They are a constant channel of feedback from Beijing or Taipei. If the large Sino-Malagasy substratum is taken into account, this influence extends to the country as a whole because, in contrast to the "pure" Chinese, the Sino-Malagasy are active in public life.

The ability and desire of the Chinese to adapt to local conditions, the tendency to take Malagasy citizenship, the presence of a connecting link between the Chinese and the local population--the Sino-Malagasy--and the absence of antagonism in the local population's treatment of the Chinese have given the Chinese a relatively strong position on the island.

The Beijing leadership and Taipei regime are making every effort to win as many huaqiao supporters as possible. They have not overlooked Madagascar, this "African island" with its important strategic location in the Indian Ocean.

The colonial administration of Madagascar, just as its direct heir, the first president of the country, P. Tsiranana, maintained close ties with Taiwan. In 1964, Madagascar was the first of the African states to open an embassy in Taipei. In January of the same year, when France established diplomatic relations with the PRC, P. Tsiranana, who was reputed to be the most loyal and devoted supporter and follower of French policy, issued a statement, which said in part: "If France has recognized communist China, it obviously had its own reasons for doing this. But for the first time I will not follow General de Gaulle's example. Madagascar believes that the recognition of the Beijing leaders would be contrary to its interests."¹¹

Tsiranana's blind anticommunism was combined with a purely practical consideration. He remembered, just in time, that there was a strong Chinese community on Madagascar and that it could, in his opinion, become not only the target of Beijing propaganda but also a conductor of Chinese hegemonistic ideas.

The foreign minister of the Tsiranana Government made a completely unequivocal comment on this matter when he was questioned about the wisdom of refusing to recognize the PRC with its huge population: "We see China as a militant and imperialist nation. Do you know that Beijing regards Madagascar as something just short of a Chinese province?" The chief function of the Malagasy armed forces was even declared to be "the prevention of possible invasions by enemy forces"--primarily Chinese.¹²

The new government which took power in 1972 and announced its plans for the socialist development of the country, broke off ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the DPRK, DRV and PRC in 1972 and signed an economic, technical and trade agreement with China in Beijing in 1974. The active Maoist propaganda which followed these actions influenced not only the local Chinese, but also some Malagasy political forces. Manandafy Rakotonirina, the sociology professor who founded the MFM [Militants for the Establishment of a Proletarian Regime] movement, which means "little people in power" in the Malagasy language, said at that time: "We do not object to the epithet 'Maoist' if it is used in the sense of 'a supporter of authority emanating from the lowest strata and an irreconcilable opponent of all kinds of bureaucracy.'"¹³

As for the Chinese community on Madagascar, for the historical reasons listed above, the Malagasy Chinese felt closer to Taipei than to Beijing until the 1970's.

The establishment of diplomatic and economic relations with the PRC evoked a positive response in the community, and not only among Chinese who had sympathized with Beijing earlier. The fact that virtually all of the local Chinese were descended from emigrants from southern China--now part of the PRC--had its effect.

Beijing is counting on the support of actual and potential huaqiao allies. In a policy statement, Vice Chairman Liao Chengzhi of the NPC Standing Committee, frankly said: "We must conduct our work even among those who still do not trust

their motherland and oppose us, so as to turn as many passive factors as possible into active ones."¹⁴

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, J. Donque, "Les Minorites chinoise et indienne a Madagascar," REVIEW FRANCAISE D'ETUDES POLITIQUES AFRICAINE, 1968, No 26; Tsien Tche-Hao, "La vie sociale des chinois a Madagascar," COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY, 1961, Vol 3, No 2.
2. L. M. S. Slawewski, "French Policy Towards the Chinese in Madagascar," London, 1972; L. M. S. Slawewski, "L'origine et la croissance de la communauté chinoise a Madagascar," BULLETIN DE MADAGASCAR, 1969, No 276.
3. Quoted by T. M. Kotova, "Beijing's Plans to Use the Overseas Chinese Bourgeoisie," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1978, No 2, p 108.
4. For more about the Chinese coolies on Madagascar, see L. M. S. Slawewski, "French Policy Towards the Chinese in Madagascar," pp 20-50.
5. L. M. S. Slawewski, "L'origine et la croissance de la communauté chinoise a Madagascar," p 497.
6. L. M. S. Slawewski, "French Policy Towards the Chinese in Madagascar," p 70.
7. L. M. S. Slawewski, "Two Chinas in Africa," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1963, Vol 41, No 2, p 400.
8. L. M. S. Slawewski, "French Policy Towards the Chinese in Madagascar," p 60.
9. Ibid., p 43.
10. L. M. Slawewski, "L'origine et la croissance de la communauté chinoise a Madagascar," p 495.
11. LE MONDE, 23 January 1964.
12. JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 December 1968, No 414.
13. LE MONDE, 23 January 1973.
14. RENMIN RIBAO, 7 March 1978.

COPYRIGHT: "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka" 1982

8588

CSO: 1805/1

TIKHOVINSKIY REVIEWS BOOK ON SOVIET FAR EAST POLICY 1939-1941

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 82 pp 127-218

[Review by Academician S. L. Tikhvinskiy of book "Pered velikim ispytaniyem. Vneshnyaya politika SSSR nakanune Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny. Sentyabr' 1939 g. - iyun' 1941 g." [Before the Great Trial. Soviet Foreign Policy on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War, September 1939-June 1941] by P. P. Sevost'yanov, Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, 367 pages]

Soviet foreign policy in the period immediately after the outbreak of the Second World War and up to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War commands special attention of Soviet historians. This was one of the most difficult periods for Soviet diplomacy, and it has been the target of numerous lies and falsifications heaped up by bourgeois historians in an effort to malign Soviet foreign policy. An objective and scholarly analysis of Soviet diplomatic activity shows the rational character of the foreign policy moves made by the Soviet government in the complicated circumstances of the period and exposes bourgeois distortions of the history of international relations at the time.

The work reviewed here is a piece of research that contains a deep and comprehensive analysis of Soviet diplomacy in the period between September 1939 and June 1941. The author has drawn an overall picture of Soviet efforts to safeguard the security of all its borders, highlighting Soviet moves aimed at achieving security, reducing the threat posed by Japanese militarism in the Far East, and assisting China in its war against Japanese aggression.

In the opening phase of the Second World War, efforts to ensure the security of the Soviet Union in the Far East were high on the list of Soviet foreign policy priorities. Indeed, it was a time when Western powers were at pains to plunge Japan into war with the USSR. Considering their import and magnitude, Soviet foreign policy tasks in the Far East were no less challenging than the goals pursued by Soviet diplomacy on the crucial political fronts of Europe. In the Far East, Soviet diplomacy tackled the multiple tasks of warding off Japanese aggression against the USSR, thwarting an imperialist alliance on an anti-

Soviet basis, giving all-out assistance to China in its war against Japan, while at the same time resisting the attempts of the Chinese government to provoke a confrontation between the USSR and Japan, and finally, working to weaken the anti-Soviet basis of cooperation between militarist Japan and Nazi Germany by exploiting inter-imperialist contradictions.

"The Soviet attitude to militarist Japan and to the problem of containing and preventing Japanese aggression against the Soviet state was chiefly motivated by a desire to reduce the threat from Japanese militarism by employing political levers and to work for a more constructive relationship with Japan while firmly opposing Tokyo's anti-Sovietism in all its manifestations," the author writes. In the late 1930s, militarist Japan on two occasions tried by military force the security of Soviet borders in the Far East, but both times took a sound whipping. The outcome of the Halhyn-gol conflict was the Soviet contribution to the wrecking of the West's "Munich policy" in Asia.

Of special significance to the USSR in 1939-1941 was its fraternal alliance with the Mongolian People's Republic, providing for mutual assistance in the event of an attack on either country. The USSR and Mongolia worked jointly to normalise international relations in the Far East while making concerted efforts to strengthen Mongolia's defences.

Sevostianov gives full credit to Soviet diplomacy for its skillful exploitation of the German-Japanese contradictions to bring about a situation in the second half of 1939 in which Germany, potentially enemy No. 1 of the Soviet Union in Europe, found itself urging Japan, potentially the main enemy of the USSR in Asia, to stabilise its

relations with the Soviet Union (p. 266). This was an upshot of improved Soviet security in the West and of the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. Later, however, in 1940, when Nazi Germany began preparations for a war against the USSR, it changed tactics and pressed for Japanese support of its military preparations.

The author identifies two distinctly opposite attitudes toward the aggressive policies of the Japanese militarists in the Far East: on the one hand, the consistent, unrelenting struggle of the Soviet Union against Japan's aggressive ambitions, and, on the other, the Western countries' attempts to "pacify" Japan on an anti-Soviet platform.

Soviet diplomacy sought to realise the idea of collective security in the context of the Asian source of main danger. Great Britain and the US rejected the 1933 Soviet proposal to conclude a Pacific pact as a collective political barrier against Japan's growing expansionism. Not a single Western power joined the USSR in taking the side of China when it fell victim to Japanese aggression in the summer of 1937. As for the Soviet Union, it gave China considerable economic and military aid and allowed volunteers from its own military experts to go to China. Meanwhile, at the Brussels Conference convened in November 1937 to discuss the situation in Eastern Asia, the US and Britain succeeded in voting down the Soviet proposal calling for the League of Nations to impose sanctions against Japan. In July 1939 an agreement was signed in Tokyo under which Britain recognised Japan's seizures in China and undertook not to interfere with Japanese military ambitions in China. Paris also abandoned its policy of support for China.

For Britain and France (until the latter's defeat) the period between 1939 and 1941 was, in the words of the author, "a time of active pursuance of the 'Far Eastern Munich' policy" (p. 263). As for the US, it pinned its main hopes on the possibility of Japan's spearheading its expansion against the USSR. So much so that even Japan's stepped-up thrust in the South was initially interpreted in Washington as a move to capture strategic resources Japan might need to mount an attack against the USSR. Washington refused to consider any substantive aid to China.

The Soviet government's readiness to conduct a broad dialogue with Japan in the interests of the USSR's own security paved the way, in 1939-1940, to an agreement with Japan on a whole range of commercial, economic and political issues, such as fishing, Japan's payment for the Chinese Eastern Railway, demarcation of the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo in the conflict zone, and the signing of a neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan. What made agreement possible on all these issues was the consistent, unwavering stand of Soviet diplomacy which cleverly exploited both Japanese business interests and inter-imperialist contradictions. The neutrality pact signed by the USSR and Japan on April 13, 1941, decisively wrecked the "Far Eastern Munich" policy which threatened the interests of the USSR, China, and other Asian countries. "The neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan," P. P. Sevostianov writes, "dealt a powerful blow to the plans of Hitler's followers engaged in active preparations for an attack against the USSR. The effect of the Soviet-Japanese pact on Germany was to an extent similar to that of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact on Japan 18 months earlier: it struck at the unity of the aggressor powers vis-à-vis the USSR".

For all that, the threat of Japanese aggression was not completely removed with the signing of the non-aggression pact. The Soviet government therefore had to maintain its vigilance in the Far East until the final rout of Nazi Germany. The important thing to note here is that the neutrality pact did not affect the development of Soviet-Chinese relations which were characterised by various military, financial and other forms of material aid to the Chinese people fighting the Japanese aggressor. This question is discussed at length in the book.

The account of Soviet policies in the Far East in 1939-1941 on the eve of the Great Patriotic War brings out more clearly the farsightedness of the Soviet Union's current policies of opposition to Peking's hegemonistic ambitions and the reactionary policies of Japanese imperialist quarters. This work by P. P. Sevostianov will be useful to all students of the history, of international relations and the Soviet policy in the Far East.

COPYRIGHT: Translation into English, Progress Publishers, 1982

COPYRIGHT: Akademiya Nauk SSSR

BOOK ON JAPANESE MONOPOLY CAPITAL REVIEWED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 82 (signed to press 19 May 82) pp 169-172

[Review by A. I. Senatorov of book "Yaponiya" [Japan], Ed-in-Chief, Ya. A. Pevzner, D. V. Petrov and V. B. Ramzes, Moscow, Mysl', 1981, 430 pages: "Current Japanese Issues"]

[Text] Soviet scholars have written a new work about present-day Japan. It is a thorough study of many fundamental problems in the economic and political development of our neighbor in the Far East.

The authors of the book "Yaponiya," published as part of the series of volumes on "Present-Day Monopolistic Capitalism," based their research from the recognized fact that Japan has become one of the main centers of imperialist competition along with the United States and Western Europe. Japan's place in today's world is concisely and vividly described in the first chapter of this work (D. V. Petrov, author).

The authors of this new work have concentrated on singling out the distinctive features of Japan's development in the 1970's. Comparisons with the 1960's, references to other periods in Japan's postwar history and the examination of events in this country against the background of changes in the contemporary capitalist world and in its main citadels--all of this contributes to a clear and vivid description of Japan's current economic and social structure and of the results, problems and contradictions of Japanese domestic and foreign policy.

Most of the work is taken up by an analysis of the Japanese economy. Ya. A. Pevzner, Ye. A. Pigulevskaya, V. K. Zaytsev, Ye. L. Leont'yeva, Yu. S. Stolyarov and B. P. Yatsenko have carefully examined the process of the concentration of production and the monopolistic structure, the mechanism of state-monopoly economic regulation, the basic features and contradictions of the production process and the nature of foreign economic ties.

The comprehensive description of the dynamics of Japanese productive forces not only indicates their present status but also provides some ideas of the general prospects for future development. In the three decades since the war, Japan has acquired new production potential and accumulated massive productive resources and the necessary skilled manpower and scientific, technical and organizational

experience. Many branches of Japanese industry meet the latest requirements of science and technology. The structure of the processing industry is now much more similar to the structure in the United States, and current differences between these two countries "are within the bounds of two similar industrial structures of the same type" (p 41). Japan is also catching up with other developed capitalist countries in terms of the proportion accounted for by large branches in the structure of the gross national product.

However, although Japan now ranks second in the capitalist world in terms of GNP and industrial output, it is far from equivalent to the leading countries of this world in all areas. The authors of this book state, in particular, that Japan still has not bridged the "technological gap" separating it from other developed countries because small-scale production, which tends to lower the general level of labor productivity, is still quite prevalent in its economy. Agriculture in Japan is still labor-intensive, with a lower level of labor productivity and higher overhead costs than in other capitalist countries.

As Japan entered the ranks of the leading powers in the capitalist world, its economy encountered new problems. The authors correctly direct attention to the fact that the accelerated transformation of Japan into one of the main industrial centers and one of the main exporting countries "was largely based on the low cost and easy accessibility of raw materials and fuel and energy resources" (p 42). Under these favorable conditions, when Japan, which did not have its own raw materials, developed its processing industry, it concentrated all cycles and stages of materials processing within its own territory. But cheap raw materials and energy resources are a thing of the past.

The low level of wages in the country, which had much to do with the international competitive potential of Japanese products, is also gradually losing its significance. Japan has ceased to be the only country with cheap manpower among the industrially developed capitalist states.

The need arose to reorganize the sectorial structure and to eliminate problems connected with disparities in the territorial distribution of productive forces, with environmental pollution and with the transition from extensive to intensive means of using labor resources and from primarily labor-intensive production to the capital-intensive variety. The 1970's, the book says, were a turning point in the Japanese economy's postwar development, and this was reflected primarily in the transition from high growth rates to moderate ones.

Interesting observations are made in the book in the analysis of the concentration of production and changes in the monopolistic structure. Large enterprises with more than 1,000 employees represent only 0.1 percent of all enterprises in Japan, but they account for 15 percent of the manpower, 26 percent of product shipments and 24.9 percent of the net product and occupy the dominant position in key industries (p 77). Japan is not far behind the United States in terms of the dimensions of large production units in ferrous metallurgy, electrical engineering and the automotive and petrochemical industries. But small and medium-sized enterprises contributed as much to the rapid growth of industry in the 1960's as large firms.

The concentration of capital reached a high level in Japan. Furthermore, since the end of the 1960's many Japanese firms have merged, even the largest corporations. Large-scale mergers had strengthened the position of Japanese corporations in relation to Western European and American ones by the beginning of the 1970's. In 1979 there were already 74 Japanese corporations among the 300 largest non-American corporations, and 6 of these were among the world's largest corporations (p 86).

The authors examine some of the consequences of monopoly domination, including their influence on prices. They reveal the mechanism of monopoly pricing, which allows powerful corporations to appropriate part of the surplus value created at other enterprises, and they note that monopoly control over prices and the reduction (but far from the total disappearance) of price competition have become characteristic features of the Japanese market.

Among the various forms of monopolistic enterprise, financial groups are playing a more important role as associations with relatively stable ties and financial strength. It is precisely on the level of the financial groups (the big six are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa and Daichi-Kangyo), as the book points out, that the most important strategic decisions are made on investments, prices, production organization, social policy, interrelations with the government and with political parties, etc. A natural result of the development of the monopolistic structure is the further integration of the state within this structure.

From their study of the latest changes in the monopolistic structure, the authors anticipate the continued massive concentration of economic strength and the growth of the "authority of the financial oligarchy, monopolizing and usurping all of the benefits of cooperative forms of labor and of scientific and technical achievements" (p 121).

As the book points out, the state, which supports monopoly ownership and is supported by it, "constantly strives to regulate affairs in such a way as to bridge the growing gap between the common interests of monopoly capital and the narrow commercial interests of individual monopolies" (p 122).

Although there is no question that public administration and the state enterprise are playing an increasing role, the main regulating function of the state-monopoly economic system does not concern administrative activity, but the redistribution of national income through financial and credit policy. State-monopoly capitalism necessitates the expansion of the operational sphere of the fiscal system, which now must not only finance the government as a political instrument of the bourgeoisie, but also "sustain the reproductive process at many levels" (p 140).

State programs and forecasts are a relatively new phenomenon in the capitalist economy. Their aim is the general reinforcement of state-monopoly capitalism and the alleviation of social conflicts. Japanese state policy serves the interests of monopolistic capital. It is precisely for this reason that state programs are limited. The experience in the use of state programs testifies that the capitalist state's ability to take social welfare issues into account "is limited by the class interests of the bourgeoisie, which cannot be disregarded without directly

endangering the very existence of the capitalist order" (p 159). From their analysis of the economic policy of the Japanese state in the 1970's, the authors arrive at the following conclusion: The constantly growing objective need for state regulation is surpassing the capabilities of state-monopoly capitalism; successes in the development of the scientific and technical base of planning can be used to full advantage only if social relations undergo radical changes.

The peculiarities of cycles and crises in the postwar Japanese economy are examined in the work. The authors stress that the increasing internationalization of economic relations in the capitalist world has modified the economic cycle in Japan. This is the reason for the extraordinary nature of the crisis of 1974-1975. In this crisis, the authors believe, cyclical factors interacted with symptoms of prolonged structural disparities in the development of the Japanese economy and the severe structural crisis in the world capitalist economy. The effect of new factors, among which the abrupt exacerbation of the energy and raw material problems was prominent, made the crisis particularly severe and lengthy.

In view of the increasing influence of foreign economic factors on Japan's economic development, a special chapter in the work deals with foreign economic ties. It describes the characteristics of Japanese foreign trade, outlines the geography of foreign economic ties and analyzes trends in Japanese foreign investments. It contains a long discussion of currency problems and the role of the state in foreign economic ties.

Citing facts, the authors argue that Japan will become more dependent on foreign markets, despite changes in the structure of foreign trade, and its commercial conflicts with other capitalist countries will extend to other goods. This will be accompanied by the further development of production specialization and cooperation by Japanese monopolies with the monopolies of other imperialist countries.

One of the most important areas of Japanese imperialism's foreign economic expansion is investments abroad, the export of capital. The biggest monopolies are engaging more actively in commercial activity abroad after encountering serious difficulties in the domestic market (prior to the beginning of the 1970's the leaders in Japanese overseas investments were medium-sized industrial firms, and even small ones, and diversified trade companies). Several Japanese international monopolies now have global economic interests (the reader of this book could expect a thorough discussion of the growth of multinational companies and of their activities in Japan and abroad. Unfortunately, this is not the case. This is one of the book's noticeable flaws).

An analysis of the status and tendencies of foreign economic ties logically suggests the inevitability of the further exacerbation of conflicts between Japanese interests and the interests of the two other centers of imperialist rivalry--the United States and the EEC countries.

The author of the seventh chapter has conducted an impressive study of the social class structure. V. B. Ramzes presents a clear and concise demonstration of his method of calculation, which resulted in the determination of the main tendencies of social changes and advances in the class structure of the Japanese society. The author refutes the official Japanese propaganda statement about Japan's

evolution into a "classless state of universal prosperity," pointing out the intensification of the polarization tendencies and the constant and growing division of Japanese society into a small handful of exploiters and tens of millions of exploited. According to his calculations (table 46), in 1975 the proletariat accounted for 59.8 percent of the Japanese working-age population (56.1 percent in 1965), intermediate strata, to which the author relegates the administrative personnel in the capitalist economy, the personnel of security services and the semiproletarian stratum of rural landowners, accounted for 9.2 percent (7.7), the petty bourgeoisie accounted for 24.6 percent (31.4) and the bourgeoisie accounted for 5.8 percent (4.1).

The same chapter contains interesting observations on the crisis in the traditional system of relations between labor and capital, based on the use of the peculiarities of Japanese family life, social customs, religious beliefs and ethical standards for production purposes, which was reflected primarily in the cultivation of an atmosphere of fictitious kinship at enterprises, similar to feudal clans.

The working conditions and standard of living of the laboring public are described in the work, the main trends in the struggle of Japanese trade unions to improve the situation of the laboring public are listed (Chapter 8, author--V. N. Khlynov), and the heightened political activity of various urban and rural strata is noted.

In another chapter by the same author on problems in domestic policy, the alignment of political forces in the country is examined. He says in this chapter that an objectively favorable atmosphere for an extensive and intensive advance by democratic forces came into being in the 1970's; the confrontation between democratic and reactionary forces was reflected in a great variety of problems, and the struggle for democracy and social progress moved beyond the bounds of sporadic events to the stage of constant demonstrations against monopoly domination.

The author of this chapter commends the compilation of concrete programs for the economic development of Japan by the communist and socialist parties as "the basis of the democratic alternative to monopoly domination." "Reflecting the actual plans for the reorganization of the Japanese economy under capitalist conditions, they envisage the institution of a group of democratic reforms to limit the power of monopolies and improve the position of the laboring public" (p 327).

Unfortunately, only the JCP and JSP proposals regarding economic reorganization for the more thorough consideration of the interests of the laboring public are mentioned in the work, while the means and methods by which these parties hoped to accomplish this reorganization are not analyzed. As for the medium-range economic programs drafted by the centrist opposition parties, they are only mentioned in passing. All of this obstructs the view of the prospects for the alternative proposals of the opposition.

The final chapter of the work (author--D. V. Petrov) contains an analysis of Japanese foreign policy. The author feels that the characteristic features of Japanese diplomacy in the 1970's were the following: 1) the rapidly growing role of the economic factor (the main purpose of diplomacy is the maintenance of the most favorable conditions for monopoly expansion and the broader use of economic

means and methods of foreign policy struggle); 2) the persistent augmentation of efforts to stabilize the imperialist system as a whole; 3) the intensification and reinforcement of the global nature of foreign policy (particularly through active participation in the joint actions of imperialist powers); 4) the maintenance and development of close ties with the United States, a considerable rise in their level and the expansion of their volume with a significant increase in Japan's role and functions in the American military-strategic system in Asia; 5) the exacerbation of conflicts between the officially declared policy of peaceful development and the renunciation of armed force and Japan's actual policy of remilitarization and the buildup of military potential (pp 334-337). These features of Japanese diplomacy are corroborated in the book by abundant factual material.

The current campaign for the rearming of Japan is quite correctly analyzed in a special section of the chapter on foreign policy. Ruling circles are developing and popularizing a group of arguments in favor of militarization and are methodically establishing the necessary material, organizational, legal and psychological conditions for the rapid deployment of powerful armed forces in the future. Ruling circles in Japan are building up military potential "without preliminary permission" while they are striving to create a legal base for the more intensive militarization of the country by amending the constitution, which prohibits the maintenance of armed forces and the contemplation of war as an instrument of policy. This is attested to, in particular, by the constant increase in military spending. Whereas these expenditures were 2.4 times as high in 1979 as in 1960 in the United States, 8.1 times as high in the FRG, 4.9 times as high in France and 3.8 times as high in England, they were 13.1 times as high in Japan (p 342). This indicates that plans for extensive militarization are a clear tendency in Japanese policy.

The process of militarization in Japan is closely related to U.S. military strategy and foreign policy. Japanese ruling circles expect the augmentation of military power to strengthen Japan's position in the military-political alliance with the United States and provide broader opportunities for the attainment of Japan's own goals in dealings with the country which is simultaneously its ally and its strongest and most dangerous competitor. Their plans are contrary, however, to long-range national interests and actually signify "Japan's further involvement in the American military-strategic system and limited political maneuverability" (p 338).

In this connection, it is significant that these developments will not promote the military or economic security of Japan. The adventuristic, aggressive nature of American imperialism's foreign policy could involve Japan in armed conflicts and injure Japanese economic interests in various parts of the world, including the regions where major suppliers of raw materials and energy resources are located. This is exactly what happened to Japan, for example, during the U.S. conflict with Iran, which is still going on. The Japanese must realize another important fact: When American ruling circles insist on the constant augmentation of Japanese military spending, they are hoping that this will weaken Japan's position in commercial rivalry with the United States.

The authors attempt to determine the motives of Tokyo's convergence with Beijing. In particular, they point out the fact that Japanese ruling circles "are striving to develop contact with China to secure the entrance of Japanese business community and to attain foreign policy goals. Here the primary consideration is the expectation that closer relations with the PRC and the attachment of the Chinese economy to the Japanese economy will strengthen the antisocialist, anti-Soviet position of the Beijing leadership, thereby weakening the socialist system as a whole, and will allow for the long-term use of China as a major ally of imperialism in its confrontation with the forces of peace and socialism" (p 381). An important role is played by the fact that the PRC leadership has supported Japanese reactionary forces in the most acute Japanese political issues and has expressed official approval of the Japanese-American military alliance and the plans to militarize the country, which are being opposed by democratic forces.

Japan is taking concrete steps to coordinate its activity in the international arena with the Beijing hegemonism as well as American imperialism. This is clearly reflected in many features of Japanese foreign policy. The authors correctly point out, in particular, that Japanese policy in relations with socialist Vietnam is governed almost completely by "the objectives of the military alliance with the United States and the far-reaching goals of convergence with China" (p 376). This kind of Japanese-Chinese convergence can only destabilize the international political situation in Asia.

At the same time, there are still many deep-seated conflicts between Japan and the PRC. What is more, according to the authors of this book, conflicts between these two powers in the struggle for the dominating influence in Asia will be exacerbated as China's economic, military and political strength increases.

The analysis of Japanese-Soviet ties in the work logically proves that the maintenance of peace in Asia and the satisfaction of Japan's commercial needs will necessitate the development of neighborly and friendly relations with the USSR. The authors list substantial achievements in this area and criticize the forces which are attempting, against the interests of the Japanese people, to impede the development of friendly relations with the USSR.

Only constructive efforts to consolidate detente and develop truly friendly and neighborly relations with all countries, the authors say in the conclusion of the book, can safeguard the peace and security of Japan and augment its role in the international arena.

As a study of such a great variety of current issues, "Yaponiya" will be of indisputable interest to a broad group of readers and will help to increase their knowledge of Japan and of general trends in the development of the present-day capitalist world.

COPYRIGHT: "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka" 1982

8588

CSO: 1805/1

BOOK PLACES RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHINA'S PROBLEMS ON MAO PERSONALLY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 82 pp 133-136

[Review by Yu. S. Semenov of book "Iz istorii sovetsko-kitayskikh otnosheniy v 50-kh godakh (k diskussii v KNR o Mao Tszedune)" [From the History of Soviet-Chinese Relations in the 1950's (Concerning the Debates Over Mao Zedong in the PRC)] by O. Borisov, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1981, 143 pages]

The latest change of tack in Peking toward a pro-imperialist policy is resented by the Chinese people who wonder more and more why their leaders call China a socialist state and pledge allegiance to the cause of socialism, while joining hands with imperialism in opposing the USSR and other socialist nations.

Another issue that has provoked heated debate among different sections of the Chinese society is the role of Mao Zedong and Maoism in the history of China. This debate is growing more intense with the approach of the 12th CPC Congress, especially as the present Chinese leadership has accepted a modified version of all the nationalist, voluntaristic, and anti-Soviet concepts of Maoism.

This debate has brought to light numerous facts of the criminal policies pursued by the

"great helmsman" that have done irreparable moral, political and economic damage to the country and its people. The aura of Mao's infallibility and the "wisdom" of his "thought" has begun to fade.

* * *

The criticism of Maoism has acquired such proportions as to pose a threat to China's new leaders, who themselves launched this campaign prompted by tactical considerations. However, a definitive condemnation of Mao and Maoist principles did not enter into their plans. As a matter of fact, they were prepared to let the steam off, to rehabilitate the victims of hongweibing reprisals and to open an escape valve for popular indignation by presenting the "gang of four" as scapegoats for the Maoist policies and injustices. But they still needed Mao and Maoism as a "banner" and "theoretical" basis for their nationalist and hegemonic ambitions. Now a 'modernised' Maoism, labelled "the Chinese model of socialism" serves their plans and goals best.

At the June 1981 6th Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee the Chinese leaders set out to find a temporary compromise suitable to both the "leftists" led by Hua Guofeng and to the "pragmatists" led by Deng Xiaoping. Anxious to stay in power, the two factions thought it wise to restore the prestige of Mao and his "thought". To dampen any further criticism of Maoist concepts, the 6th Plenum issued a directive requiring that "Mao Zedong's merits be placed first and his mistakes second".

In order to prove this thesis, Peking was prepared to rewrite and distort China's entire history. In an effort to put the history of the PRC at the service of the present regime, the Peking leaders have falsified, not only the history of the CPC but also the record of Soviet-Chinese relations.

In this context, special importance must be attached to any truthful account establishing the role of Mao Zedong in disrupting China's relations with the Soviet Union and showing where and how Mao's successors have distorted history. This makes the appearance of O. Borisov's book *From the History of Soviet-Chinese Relations in the 1950s* particularly timely.

What makes Borisov's monograph a valuable piece of research is the wealth of new

historical material, the insightful Marxist-Leninist interpretation of events, the accurate projection of the historical past onto the policies of China's present leaders and the establishment of an intimate relationship between Peking's former and present policies. The author set himself the challenging task of writing the true history of Soviet-Chinese relations, bringing out the controversial and essentially negative role of Mao Zedong in these relations and his attempts to hamper the establishment and development of friendship between the Soviet and the Chinese peoples.

The monograph is far more comprehensive than its title suggests. It contains concise but well-documented notes on the history of the Chinese revolution, provides numerous facts from Mao's political biography and the history of Soviet-Chinese inter-state and inter-party relations, and quotes opinions and assessments of Mao Zedong by his contemporaries. The book helps to trace the road of Mao and his supporters to power and the shaping of Peking's reactionary-nationalist and great-power policies.

Anxious to seize full power, says the book, for many years Mao manoeuvred and played up on the ideals of the revolution, socialism and communism, and used any means, fair or foul, to capture control of the party, the army and the country, ruthlessly eliminating his political rivals, even those who had helped him rise to power. Mao's policies have brought so much suffering and agony to the Chinese people that bitter memories of them will live for many generations to come.

Biographical sketches of some of China's leaders destroyed by Mao Zedong—Gao Gang, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, He Long and Lin Biao—add up to political portraits of some of the more prominent and authoritative members of the CPC blacklisted by Mao as his rivals. The book also includes facts from the lives of internationalist Sino-logists who worked in China at different times—G. I. Mordvinov, P. P. Vladimirov, Otto Braun (Li De)—that throw additional light on the dramatic clash of two lines in China: one Marxist-Leninist and internationalist, the other Maoist and nationalist (pp. 107-128).

The present Peking leaders have put forward a theory whereby the responsibility for

China's setbacks and failures in revolutionary and socio-economic development, resulting first and foremost from Mao's policies, was shared with him by all the leaders of the CPC and the party as a whole, whereas credit for the successes scored by the party and the people is ascribed to the "correct policy" of Mao Zedong alone. To lend their theory an air of impartiality, Mao's advocates have acknowledged in vague terms that in his "advanced years" Mao "had shortcomings and made mistakes and even some grave errors", which "brought misfortune and inflicted wounds on the party and the people". Among these "shortcomings" tentatively divided into two categories, they list, first, "the affliction of pressing for quantity and speed in his leadership of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism" and, second, "absolutisation and extension of the class struggle", including "the use of methods applicable to the enemy for resolving contradictions within the party".

Official Chinese propaganda is now trying to convince the people that "the thought of Mao Zedong is a valuable possession gained with the blood and sweat of millions of communists" and tens of millions of revolutionaries. The author cites facts showing how much this "thought" has cost the Chinese people in wasted blood and sweat (p. 8, 35, 90-91). China's successes were gained, not because of, but in spite of, Mao's "thought", in the struggle against it and in overcoming its consequences. The first three years of the "great leap forward" launched by Mao in March 1958 caused damage to the country estimated at 100,000 million yuan at the very least. According to the Chinese press, it "resulted in serious disproportions" and a "sharp decline in the economic situation". Living standards also deteriorated markedly.

In autumn 1958, an equally adventurist movement to set up "people's communes" claimed to represent the ideal communist society was launched in the countryside. Unrealistic plans for building peasant socialism based on an absolute levelling out of incomes, elimination of the wage system, and an unjustified introduction of a supply system modelled on barracks communism aggravated the already difficult position of the countryside. The moral and material damage done by Mao's discreditation of the ideas of scientific communism is difficult to calculate.

China's progress was halted for many years, and it was not until the mid-1960s that the country began to recover from the shock.

It would be wrong to say that all Chinese leaders followed Mao's arbitrary and reckless directives, failed to caution against the dire consequences of his "thought" and did not oppose his arbitrary actions. Speaking at the Lushan Plenum in autumn 1959, Peng Dehuai cited numerous facts to illustrate the destructive nature of Mao's policy of the "three red banners", a monument to "petty-bourgeois fanaticism" and leftist aberrations. Mao Zedong dealt brutally with Peng Dehuai and his other opponents (p. 130).

At the 10th Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee, Mao Zedong put forward what the Chinese leaders today timidly call an "erroneous" new theory whereby "the class struggle persists through all historical stages of socialism". This paved the way to another campaign of repression launched by Mao against the CPC and the people in the mid-1960s.

The abominable political campaign organised by Mao Zedong in 1966 under the cynical signboard of the "cultural revolution" led to a deliberate purge and massive physical destruction of the best party and state cadres, the progressive intelligentsia, the suppression of the leading role played by the working class and its vanguard, the Communist Party of China, and to the creation of an atmosphere of terror and slavish adulation of Mao.

There is still no way of evaluating the colossal damage suffered by the country during "the decade of great chaos", as the grim period of the "cultural revolution" is now referred to in China. But even the bits and pieces of information available today give a fair idea of the price the Chinese people paid for Mao's "leftist error". The Chinese authorities have admitted that during the "cultural revolution", over 200 million people fell victim to various reprisals and persecutions, while 10 million, mostly communists, were killed or tortured to death.

In September 1967, Leonid Brezhnev said that "what the group of Mao Zedong calls 'the cultural revolution' would be more correctly labelled a counterrevolution". Characteristically, the same conclusion was reached in China ten years later. The Chinese leaders, says the book, have been compelled to reas-

sess the "cultural revolution" as "a decade of chaos", a "great devastation", "white terrorism" and "counterrevolutionary subversion that pushed the people into an abyss of suffering and plunged the cause of socialism into a vortex of calamities". "For this reason alone, 'the cultural revolution' should not have taken place," the Chinese leaders themselves admitted (p. 8).

All the more illogical, odd and sacrilegious appeared their subsequent attempts to present the tragedy of the Chinese people as the result of a mere "error" of Mao Zedong who, it was said, could be expected to err occasionally like any other man. The "cultural revolution" can by no means be explained away as the result of Mao's aberrations or a simple "mistake", however grave, of the "great revolutionary". It was a deliberate destruction of the entire structure of socialism, democracy and people's power that had become an obstacle to the realisation of the mad ravings of a despotic and ruthless usurper suffering from megalomania. Was it not Mao who brought the country "on the verge of catastrophe"? Is it not Mao who now takes the blame for making the Chinese young a "lost generation"? The "credibility crisis" and unemployment—are not all these the legacy of Mao?

The present Chinese leaders are twisting history to prove that the Chinese people did not enjoy the internationalist support of the Soviet Union and other countries, but waged its revolutionary struggle independently, "relying on their own forces". Moreover, they claim that the CPC led by Mao Zedong "always resolutely opposed erroneous foreign influence and pressure" and that "it was solely for this reason that the Chinese revolution was brought to completion". Today the Peking leaders are even trying to put some responsibility for the failure of the Maoist experiments on the Soviet Union which allegedly exerted "enormous political, economic and military pressure on China". It is suggested that China's internal difficulties were compounded by the need to resist "pressure from outside" and to "wage a just struggle" against the USSR.

Without trying to belittle in any way the role of the CPC at every stage of the Chinese revolution, we should recall here that there was a time when the Chinese leaders themselves stated that without the support

of the USSR and other socialist countries, the CPC and the Chinese people would not have achieved their victory or scored any successes in the early years of people's government and the economic construction in China. Was it not these same Chinese leaders who expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union for its assistance and support of the Chinese revolution throughout its history, who recognised the crucial role of the Soviet Army in defeating the million-strong Kwantung army of Japan which occupied the whole of China's Northeast, and who praised the great contribution of the Soviet Union and other socialist nations to the rebuilding and development of China's devastated economy and to the fostering and strengthening of its international position? (pp. 64-68).

In the course of the debate on the role of Mao, Peking's propaganda has falsified some concrete facts from the history of Soviet-Chinese relations, assuming that time has erased from people's memories the actual state of things and that unprepared readers would accept Peking's allegations at face value. The Chinese and the foreign public is told, for example, that "the Soviet Union treacherously broke contracts, recalled its specialists, and launched large-scale subversive and divisive activities in Xinjiang", in an effort to "undermine the sovereignty of China and place it under Soviet control", etc. Borisov's book gives a clear and precise retort to these allegations and brings out the motives behind Peking's slanderous campaign against the USSR (pp. 68-75).

The debate on the role of Mao and his "thought" is of fundamental significance. It will show whether the Chinese leadership can find the strength and courage to rid itself of the burden of the Maoist legacy.

"The experience of the social and economic development of the PRC over the past twenty years is a painful lesson showing what any distortion of the principles and essence of socialism in home and foreign policy leads to," said the Central Committee Report to the 26th Congress of the CPSU. This important conclusion is amply illustrated by the book under review which should be of unquestionable interest both to students of China and the general public with an interest in international affairs.

BOOK ON CCP IN 1920'S SHOWS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MAO, MARXISM-LENINISM

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 82 pp 129-133

[Review by V. I. Glunin, doctor of historical sciences, of book "Revolutsionnoye dvizheniye v Kitaye v 1927-1931 gg. (Problemy strategii i taktiki)" [Chinese Revolutionary Movement in 1927-1931 (Strategy and Tactics)] by A. M. Grigor'yev, Moscow, Nauka, 1980, 294 pages]

The last three or four years have been marked by ideological and political processes within the Communist Party of China that deserve close attention. On the official level, they have been summed up in the Resolution on Some Questions of the History of the CPC Since the Establishment of the PRC, adopted at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee on June 27, 1981. This compromise document that presented an idealised version of Maoism as Marxism-Leninism enriched by the experience of the Chinese revolution, culminated a protracted struggle that developed within the Chinese leadership following Mao's death on a number of problems, including the assessment of the "thought" and activities of Mao Zedong. One obvious purpose of this falsification of the historical experience of the CPC and the world communist movement was to provide a justification for China's claim to "exclusiveness" and its "special path" in the revolution and in socialist construction that defied the common laws governing building of existing socialism and rejected the experience of the CPSU and other Communist parties.¹

At the same time, in searching for ways of overcoming the deep crisis into which Maoism had plunged the country and driven by the objective needs of the developing Chinese society, the Peking leadership, its subjective will and tactical considerations notwithstanding, has been taking advantage of and applying in practice some aspects of the historical experience of real socialism, including those that were successfully tested during the first decade of the PRC's existence. This tendency has inevitably produced some deep contradictions that reflect, either directly or indirectly, the realities of China today.

¹ See *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1981, No. 4, pp. 80-91; O. B. Borisov, *Home and Foreign Policy of China in the 1970s. A Political Essay*, Moscow, 1982, pp. 363-383 (in Russian).

Speeches by top CPC leaders, formal resolutions, including those of the 6th Plenary Meeting, as well as other CPC documents available today point to at least some basic tendencies in the assessment of party history. One such tendency is represented by an active, if still small, group (its actual influence is hard to assess as yet) which tends to give a near-Marxist interpretation of the history of the CPC and to rid it of all Maoist elements. Another tendency encompasses a large number of CPC history teachers and writers of textbooks on party history who will not or cannot reject the Maoist legacy, who defend the "purity" of "Mao's thought" and who make formal concessions to recent changes. This tendency is deeply rooted in China's nationalist traditions and enjoys influential backing, notably among the military. The third trend reflected most clearly in the Resolution of the 6th Plenum represents a middle-of-the-road stand which has become the official platform of the present party leadership. It seeks to "reconcile" Marxism and Maoism in two ways: by filling the nationalist form of "Mao's thought" with Marxist content and increasing the "number" of Marxist tenets in Maoism, while retaining intact some fundamental principles of Maoism. This tendency is particularly manifest in that section of the 6th Plenum Resolution which sets forth the "six integral parts" of "Mao's thought" claimed to be the result of the "fusion of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution" alleged to have been carried out by Mao Zedong and his close associates.

In the light of the above, special importance is attached to Soviet studies of CPC history based on Marxist-Leninist methodology and solid research into source materials. Over the past 15 years, Soviet Sinologists have carried out extensive research into the history of the CPC which presently enables them to examine the current ideological and political processes in China in a broad histo-

rical perspective and against a solid historical background.

The monograph by A. M. Grigoriev, Dr. Sc. (Hist.), reviewed here, stands out among a series of similar works published by Soviet historians in recent years as a notable phenomenon in Soviet studies of Chinese party history. The author deserves credit not only for the fundamental scholarly character of his monograph, but also for its analysis of current political problems. This reviewer shares the high opinion of Prof. A. V. Meliksetov regarding the scholarly and political qualities of the monograph.²

The best point of Grigoriev's monograph is its thorough analysis, based on a wealth of authentic historical facts, of one of the key problems of the international communist movement, the correlation of the general and the specific, the international and the national factors in the revolutionary process—in the present case, with respect to the Chinese revolution and the CPC. In Chinese sources, this problem has been defined by the well-known formula of "the fusion of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution" which implies the "thought of Mao".

A Marxist approach to studying the evolution of the CPC's revolutionary strategy and tactics between 1927 and 1931, however short this period may be in terms of history, has enabled Grigoriev to carry out a differentiated analysis of the experience accumulated by the CPC in these years, as well as the theoretical assessments of it made at different levels: in local and regional party bodies, in the central leadership, in the CPC mission at the Comintern Executive Committee and in the Comintern itself. The book shows that the long-term party strategy worked out during the period of 1927-1931 was the product of concerted efforts by the Comintern and the CPC; the same is true of many policy, organisational and practical party decisions.

The author, however, goes beyond this general conclusion, giving a detailed analysis of who, where, when, at what level, and in what specific political and ideological context worked out and approved any given theoretical, strategic, tactical or organisational

decision. In this way, the CPC's strategy and tactics reveal with a fair degree of accuracy what in them was borrowed from the common experience of the world communist movement, what new solutions were found by the Comintern, what, in fact, was the original contribution of Chinese communists adhering to Marxism-Leninism, and what was the obvious or disguised distortion of Marxism.

This analysis is applied in more detail to the proceedings of the 6th CPC Congress in Moscow and to the line of Li Lisan, providing some idea of the proportion of contributions by the Comintern and the CPC to the elaboration of the strategy and tactics of the Chinese revolution. It appears that the lion's share of priority decisions belonged to the Comintern. The author's historical erudition has enabled him to trace within narrow time limits the gradual evolution by the Comintern and the CPC of a long-term strategy of the Chinese revolution, which took in theoretical principles, the experience gained at previous stages of struggle, and general and specific policy decisions. This strategic line foresaw the democratic, anti-imperialist, and anti-feudal character of the Chinese revolution, provided for the alliance of the working class and the peasantry in which ideological hegemony belonged to the working class as its principal motive force, considered the agrarian and peasant question as the main social issue of the revolution, called for the establishment of bases in the countryside, defined the role of the army and armed struggle and envisaged party leadership of the army and bases as a form of "ideological hegemony of the proletariat" in a predominantly peasant country in which the prevailing socio-economic relations and the political set-up of society were pre-capitalist. The book conclusively proves that all major components of this strategic line and corresponding policy decisions were worked out by the Comintern and the CPC leadership without the direct involvement of Mao Zedong, and not infrequently, despite his opposition.

Grigoriev's book helps dispel the myth of Mao's role as the architect of the CPC's long-term strategy which allegedly brought the party to victory in 1949. It demonstrates that "the fusion of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution" was

² See *Peoples of Asia and Africa*, 1981, No. 4, pp. 205-210 (in Russian).

a historical process in which the Comintern did most of the Marxist interpretation of the Chinese revolutionary experience. The author shows how the Comintern, on the basis of the facts and information from China, worked out precise Marxist plans, recommendations and directives on the basic questions of the theory, strategy and tactics of the Chinese revolution.

In discussing the ideological and political links of the revolutionary movement led by the CPC, the author builds a strong case against the unscientific, historically false, reactionary attempts to oppose the "world village" to the "world town", i. e., the Chinese experience to the world communist movement. In view of the 6th Plenum's attempts to represent the historical experience of the CPC as the "thought of Mao" alone and palm it off as an original, independent Chinese model of the revolutionary process, the following conclusion drawn by Grigoriev seems particularly relevant: "The actual progress of the Soviet movement [in China.—V. G.] demonstrated that its development and positive results would have been impossible but for the preceding 'urban' stage of the revolution and the ideological, political and other assistance from the 'world revolutionary town', or the Comintern, the parties affiliated with it, and the Soviet Union. It was precisely this that enabled the young non-proletarian Communist Party of China to provide the unfolding peasant movement with a proletarian ideological hegemony". (p. 259).

The period between July 1927 and September 1931 examined in the book marked a watershed in the history of the CPC, with the main emphasis in party work gradually shifting from town to countryside; the party began to recruit armed forces of its own and establish revolutionary bases in rural areas as well as to adopt predominantly armed, or more precisely, military forms of struggle against reaction.

Following the Guomindang's withdrawal from the united front and the 1927 defeat of the CPC-led mass workers' and peasant movement, the party entered a period of acute ideological and political crisis, divisions and vacillations, and quests for new paths of revolution. The overcoming of this crisis was closely linked with the assistance rendered by the All-Russia (Bolshevik) Commu-

nist Party and the Comintern. The latter addressed a number of basic documents to the CPC showing that the tactic of legal opposition to the Guomindang regime advocated by some CPC leaders was unrealistic and would lead the party to a dead end. The Comintern also demonstrated the objective possibilities and the socio-historical, economic, political, military, and technological conditions for launching the armed struggle against the Guomindang and setting up the party's own armed forces and bases (Soviet areas) in the Chinese countryside. The Comintern policy of "promoting the Soviet movement", says the book, "enabled the CPC to survive as a party, to begin building the Red Army, to set up strongholds of revolutionary government—Soviet bases—and opened the way for the CPC toward the peasantry, numerically the strongest force of the Chinese revolution" (p. 258).

The party's new orientation, writes the author, was drawn up on the basis of the general principles of Marxist-Leninist theory dealing with the tasks of the national liberation movements, and the role of peasantry in the revolutions in the East, as well as on the basis of the earlier conclusions drawn by the Comintern and the CPC, which established the crucial importance of the agrarian-peasant problem, the role of the armed forces and armed struggle in the Chinese revolution, and took account of the experience in setting up revolutionary bases in 1925-1927" (p. 259).

The Comintern played a major role in overcoming various deviations and dangerous tendencies in the CPC and in waging consistent struggle against right-wing and "leftist" revolutionary and Trotskyist distortions of the crucial problems in the Chinese revolution. In this context, the author has made an analysis of the activities and works of Mao Zedong in the period under review which completely explodes the myth of Mao's "absolutely essential role" in elaborating and resolving all problems of the Chinese revolution and reveals the subjective-idealistic and nationalistic character of this viewpoint. The persistent emphasis on the "original" quality of the "thought of Mao Zedong" in Chinese research and documents dealing with the CPC's history and the consistent ignoring of the international factor in the history of the CPC give added

proof of the Chinese leaders' nationalistic ambitions and their efforts to foist an absolutised and warped image of the Chinese revolutionary experience, in the form of a modified version of "Mao's thought", on the world revolutionary movement.

Numerous documents quoted in the book show that Mao's position in the period under review was not what is presented in the resolutions on some questions of the CPC's history approved by the 7th and 6th Plenary Meetings of the CPC Central Committee held in April 1945 and June 1981 respectively. The author points out, for example, that the land laws and resolutions on the agrarian-peasant question approved under the guidance or with active participation of Mao Zedong in 1930 were not included in any published edition of his works. For example, Mao's stand as reflected in the Land Law endorsed by the Revolutionary Military Council of China in June-August 1930, as well as the "Land Question", a resolution approved by the Presidium of the Jiangxi Action Committee in the city of Jian on November 18, 1930, were fully in accord with the views of Li Lisan and even pushed the party further to the "left" (pp. 195-197). "The tendency, which appeared already in the 'Jinggangshan' documents and Mao Zedong's decisions on the agrarian and peasant question, and evolved to become a distinct policy in 1930 (in accordance with which large sections of the middle peasants were regarded as kulaks and exploiter elements in the village with all the ensuing consequences), reemerged after 1949 when Mao Zedong speeded up peasant cooperation in the countryside in 1955-1956 and launched a 'movement for socialist education in the village' in 1962-1965" (p. 197).

One of the merits of Grigoriev's book is its examination of the elaboration of the CPC's strategy and tactics in a concrete historical context, for example, in close connection with the social environment in which the Chinese communists worked. The impact of this precapitalist, traditional environment on the social makeup of the CPC, on the character and norms of the inner-party life, on its ideology and policy is discussed at length in the book. It is the influence of this specific social environment, which included millions upon millions of pauperised peasants and lumpen-proletarians that the auth-

or sees as one of the main causes behind the persistently recurring leftist adventuristic deviations and trends in the CPC. This problem obviously calls for further study.

Another question requiring deeper investigation is the issue of the Soviet movement which gained ground in the early 1930s but was defeated in the mid-1930s. The author's conclusion that "the Soviet movement became a tactical, rather than a strategic phase" (p. 258) is not entirely convincing. The author contradicts his own analysis of the CPC's strategy as it shaped up by the 1930s. Also, the tactics of overthrowing the Guomindang, the party's chief task at the time, can hardly be regarded as a policy of "skipping an essential historical period" (p. 103).

The title of the book reviewed here does not accurately reflect its content. The work is concerned with history of the CPC, and examines the strategy and tactics of the CPC from 1927 to 1931, emphasising the history of the establishment of Soviet bases and the Chinese Red Army. Other trends in the Chinese revolutionary process are either not discussed at all or are barely mentioned. The author did not attempt to make a comprehensive review of the role and influence of the Soviets within the overall context of the political situation obtaining throughout the country, as this problem requires a more broadly-based effort to investigate the history of all or at least the main political trends of revolutionary, reformist-opposition, conservative and reactionary character. Regrettably, such research is still scarce in the Soviet Union: Soviet sinologists have only just embarked on basic studies of the political (as well as socio-economic) history of China in all its diversity. Urban movements in China in the 1930s and the 1940s have also been inadequately studied both in this country and abroad. A doctor's thesis on the workers' movement in 1927-1937 recently defended by T. N. Akatova partially makes up for this lack, but the situation will improve dramatically only with the publication of a series of studies on the urban situation.

While discussing the central theme of the monograph, the CPC's strategy and tactics, in detail, Grigoriev also raised many related issues that call for separate studies: the functioning, character and makeup of the bodies of revolutionary government in the Soviet bases, the concrete progress of agra-

rian reforms in the changing military and political situation, the organisational climate in the CPC and norms of party life. A subject that merits special attention is the relationship of the party and the army, their intermingling, struggle and cooperation and mutual influence and interdependence throughout the civil and liberation wars of 1927-1949.

The fact that the present CPC leadership has modified "the thought of Mao Zedong" and the notorious formula of "the fusion of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution" elevating them to the level of "the Party's collective experience" as opposed to the experience of the international communist movement prompts Soviet historians to carry out deeper and more detailed research into the impact of the international factor on the revolutionary process in China and to prepare new studies on the policy of the Comintern, the CPSU, and the Soviet state towards China.

Soviet historians, philosophers and economists have carried out an enormous amount of research to expose the fallacies of Maoism. A. M. Grigoriev, for his part, also pays particular attention to the role of Mao Zedong, who had already emerged at the time as one of the more influential leaders of

the CPC. Many pages of the book are devoted to an assessment of the contribution made by Qu Qiubo, Zhou Enlai, Xiang Ying, Wang Ming, Bo Gu and other CPC leaders to the elaboration of the party's strategy and tactics in the period under review. He examines the assistance given by the Comintern and the All-Russia Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to the CPC in training its cadres. At the same time, Soviet historians have thus far made an insufficient study of the activities, political writings, and theoretical works of the CPC's internationalists, those party members who adhered to Marxism-Leninism. Apparently the time has come to draw up a long-term plan for publishing works by Chinese Marxists, this project involving the enormous and difficult task of locating and collecting such works, most of which appeared in periodicals that are hard to come by.

The monograph under review makes a valuable contribution to the research into the actual meaning of the formula of "the fusion of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution" and thereby to the Marxist interpretation of the history of the CPC.

COPYRIGHT: Translation into English, Progress Publishers, 1982

COPYRIGHT: Akademiya Nauk SSSR

CSO: 1812/15-E

BOOK DENIES HISTORIC TIES BETWEEN CHINA, CENTRAL ASIA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 82 (signed to press 19 May 82) pp 179-182

[Review by V. A. Moiseyev, candidate of historical sciences, of book "Protiv maoistskikh fal'sifikatsiy istorii Kirgizii" [Refutation of the Maoist Falsification of the History of Kirghiziya], Frunze, 'Kyrgyzstan', 1981, 140 pages: "The Falsification of Kirghiz History"]

[Text] The exposure and logical scientific criticism of Maoist theories about the history of the peoples of Middle and Central Asia, including the Kirghiz people, are an important duty of Soviet historians. A book published by the Kyrgyzstan Publishing House in 1981, "Protiv maoistskikh fal'sifikatsiy istorii Kirgizii," edited by corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences K. K. Karakeyev, warrants attention in this connection. The work was written by historians V. M. Ploskikh, M. Ya. Sushanlo and G. P. Suprunenko from the Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences and research associate V. P. Gurevich from the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The work consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion and a short foreword by the editor. The introduction contains a thorough analysis of the works published in recent years in the PRC on Central Asian subject matter. It notes that historical science in the PRC is often used by the Maoists as an instrument for the attainment of various unscrupulous political goals, particularly the cultivation of anti-Sovietism in the country and the substantiation of territorial claims to the land of neighboring states. "The Beijing ideologists," the Soviet researchers stress, "try to use examples from 'history' to convince the Chinese people of the Maoist allegation that the 'northern neighbor' has always been China's 'main enemy' and to simultaneously substantiate claims to Soviet territory by juggling the facts" (p 10). In the performance of this "social function," the Chinese historians of today, the introduction goes on to say, are trying to "review questions, which have already been answered by historians, about the origins of the multinational Russian empire and the inclusion of Kazakhstan and Central Asia in this empire and to distort the nature of Kazakh and Kirghiz interrelations with the Ch'ing empire" (p 14). "In the pursuit of great-power, hegemonist ambitions, the Maoist leadership of the PRC takes every opportunity...to denigrate Russia's role in the history of the Kazakh, Kirghiz and other Central Asian peoples, most of whom became Russian subjects voluntarily" (p 16). The Chinese distort the ancient and medieval history of the peoples of

Central Asia, who are now designated by the Maoists as "branches of the Chinese nationality."

The intention of the authors of this work was to employ a great variety of Russian and Chinese sources and literature "to expose the pseudohistorical approach of PRC historians to the past history of the Central Asian people, especially Kirghiziya, and to show how the interrelations of the peoples who inhabited Central and Middle Asia at different times with China took shape and how the Kirghiz people's ties with Russia came into being and gained strength," as well as to reveal the truth about the Russo-Chinese demarcation of Central Asia (p 20).

The first chapter of the book, "Turkestan--The Country of the Turks," contains a discerning analysis of the means and methods by which Chinese feudal historians falsified historical events, interpreted the history of neighboring peoples, especially nomads, tendentiously and from a Sinocentric vantage point, and misrepresented their relations with China. In this chapter, the authors also examine some of the key issues in the ancient and medieval history of the Turkic peoples who settled in East Turkestan, Tyan-Shan and adjacent regions of Central and Middle Asia, including China's expansion to the west of the Great Wall of China. Comparing the data in written sources with the findings of archaeological excavations, the authors trace the origins and succession of early nomadic cultures in the territory now known as Kirghiziya: Saky, Kenkol, Karabulak-Vorukh, Shurabashat and others. From their study of remnants of the material culture of nomads in Kirghiziya, Soviet scholars have concluded that the culture of the territory's ancient inhabitants "is closely connected with monuments in South Siberia and Mongolia and has nothing in common with the Chinese, Iranian and Byzantine cultures" (p 30). Therefore, there is no truth to the statements about the "indissoluble millennial ties" between China and Central Asia in ancient times and the middle ages. Of course, this does not mean that the nomads in Kirghiziya did not maintain contacts with the abovementioned countries.

The Chinese emperors of the Han (West Han: 206 B.C.-25 A.D., East Han: 25-220 A.D.) and T'ang (618-907 A.D.) dynasties made repeated attempts to establish their rule in Hsiyu--the western region (this is what the Chinese call the territory west of the Great Wall of China). For this purpose, the Chinese court resorted to the most diverse and extremely subtle methods of influencing the nomads, from bribery and blackmail to armed invasions. One of the tactics most frequently used by the Chinese emperors was called "yi yi zhi yi"--"barbarian restraint of barbarians"--that is, the tactic of kindling intertribal and interethnic hostility among non-Han peoples and then subjugating these peoples in the capacity of some kind of supreme arbiter. The reader of this book will learn how this tactic was implemented, although it did not bring the conquerors from China the success they anticipated (pp 23-34).

The authors correctly stress that the Chinese conquerors did not enter Central Asia for almost 800 years after the troops of the T'ang dynasty were driven out in the ninth century. During this time, around ten large states rose and fell in this vast Asian region and the ethnic composition of the territory changed. The people of Kirghiziya were part of the Karakhinid state in the 10th, 11th and 12th centuries, they were under Chagatai rule and then the rule of Tamerlane in the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries, and finally recognized the authority of the

Mogulistan rulers in the 16th century. They had no ties with China. "The Chinese border of that time," the book says, "was far from Tyan-Shan and the Wall of China was a reality, and not a mere symbol" (p 31). Summarizing the examination of the ancient and medieval history of Kirghiziya's nomads, the authors conclude that "the native Turkic population of Central Asia, the centuries-long history of its political, socioeconomic and cultural development and its struggle for independence against external enemies, including the Chinese empire, contradict the Maoist lie that the Tyan-Shan and Pamir regions belonged to ancient and medieval China" (p 40). This conclusion is based on the study of a great variety of sources, including Chinese chronicles, and can be trusted.

In the second chapter, "The Kirghiz People's Struggle Against the Aggressive Policy of the Ch'ings," the authors discuss the political role of Kirghiz tribal associations in Central and Middle Asia in the 18th century and the first half of the 19th. The Manchurian Ch'ing dynasty's aggressive policy in relations with the Jungar khanate, East Turkestan and Central Asia is the focal point of the discussion. Describing the events connected with the Ch'ing empire's aggression in Central Asia in the 1750's and with the Manchurian Chinese troops' destruction of the Jungar khanate and conquest of East Turkestan, the authors note that the Ch'ings made repeated attempts to win the Kirghiz tribal elite over to their side but encountered definite resistance (p 49). Nevertheless, simply on the grounds that Ch'ing military detachments passed through the nomad camps of the Kirghiz Sayak and Sary-Bagysh tribes in 1757 and 1758 and some Kirghiz tribal chiefs sent their diplomatic representatives to Beijing, the Ch'ing hastened to announce that the Kirghiz had supposedly "consented to be Chinese subjects." Soviet historians who have analyzed the information in Chinese official chronicles have proved that these allegations are absolutely inconsistent with the actual state of affairs (pp 51-52).

In the 1760's, after the formation of the Sinkiang territorial unit, a few Kirghiz tribes, whose nomad camps had been located in East Turkestan, were under the yoke of the Ch'ing dynasty. The cruel colonial regime the conquerors established in the conquered Jungar and Kashgar regions and the feudal exploitation, ethnic oppression and contemptuous violation of the traditions and customs of non-Han peoples in this territory kindled rebellion and led to continuous anti-Ch'ing demonstrations. The Kirghiz people, just as the other people of Central Asia, "invariably supported the anti-Ch'ing demonstrations of the population of East Turkestan against brutal foreign oppression" (pp 60-61). There was probably no large anti-Ch'ing national liberation movement of the non-Han peoples in Sinkiang in which the Kirghiz did not take part. Just in the 19th century, this took place in 1822, 1826, 1830, 1847, 1855, 1856, 1857 and 1861, not to mention the rebellion of 1864-1878. Rebels from East Turkestan could always find refuge and assistance in Kirghiz nomad camps.

The book contains interesting information about the location and number of Ch'ing troops in Sinkiang and the disposition of guards and patrols (pp 57, 61). The authors cite concrete historical facts as evidence that the Ch'ing empire's policy in Central Asia was a policy of "barbarous robbery and genocide, leading to the extermination of entire ethnic groups and the destruction of their material and spiritual culture" (p 64). In the light of a multitude of irrefutable facts,

the attempts of present-day Chinese historians to rationalize the evil actions of the Manchurian Chinese conquerors, whitewash their behavior and deny the progressive, national liberation nature of the rebellions of the non-Han peoples of Sinkiang represent a flagrant distortion of historical facts and a reflection of the great-Han chauvinist policy of China's ruling circles in matters pertaining to nationality.

The authors of this work have conducted the most painstaking analysis of the sources cited by PRC historians who allege that the Kirghiz tribes of the Tyan-Shan were dependent on the Ch'ing emperor and that Kirghiziya was one of the possessions of the Ch'ing empire. After examining such sources as "A Geographic Description of the Western Region" and "A Brief Summary of Important Information About the Western Region" by renowned Chinese historian of the Ch'ing era Qi Yunshi, "Eye-Witness Accounts and Reports on the Western Region" by Manchurian bureaucrat Chun Youan, who served in Sinkiang for many years, "The Government Chronicle of the Great Ch'ing Dynasty" and other materials and comparing them with the testimony in Russian-language sources, the writers arrive at a completely valid conclusion: The Ch'ing Government made every attempt to impose its authority on the Tyan-Shan Kirghiz people and to add the Kirghiz nomad camps to the empire's possessions by force, but it suffered an utter failure (pp 67-68). The authors point out the following extremely characteristic feature of Chinese sources, which Maoist historians try to disregard: "All of the references by the authors of this material to the 'vassal status' of the Kirghiz are actually based on relations with the peoples of East Turkestan and a few (more precisely, just two or three) neighboring tribal subdivisions," but "relations with a few neighboring tribes in East Turkestan are no basis for sweeping generalizations about all of the Kirghiz people" (pp 69, 70). The isolated incidents of brief stays in Kirghiz nomad camps by single detachments of Ch'ing aggressors also cannot be regarded as valid arguments in favor of territorial claims of Kirghiz lands.

At the end of this section, the authors present a brief list of the reasons why Kirghiz Atake bey from the Sary-Bagysh tribe established direct diplomatic relations with the Russian Government.

The convergence and unification of Kirghiziya and Russia are discussed in the third chapter--"The Historic Choice of the Kirghiz People to Join Russia." The situation in the Kirghiz nomad camps, which had been complicated by the invasion of Kokand feudal lords and the exacerbation of inter-clan strife, combined with the reinforcement of Kirghiz trade and political contacts with Russia, whose possessions were close to their nomad camps, motivated northern Kirghiz tribal associations to ask the Russian Government to accept them as Russian subjects in the beginning of the 1850's. This began the process of Kirghiziya's voluntary entry into the Russian empire. The Ch'ing authorities, the authors note, tried to impede Russo-Kirghiz convergence by sending their own armed detachments into the Kirghiz nomad camps and flirting with members of the feudalized tribal elite. The uncerecermonious behavior of the Ch'ing plunderers forced the Kirghiz chiefs of the Bugu clan to ask the Russian authorities for help in 1862. In their appeal, they said: "When we became Russian subjects, we hoped that we could live peacefully and not be bothered by the Chinese, but they are still trying to hurt us and have taken away our camps on the Tekes, Muzart and Kegen Rivers, calling

these camps their own, although these lands have always been our property since time immemorial, since the time of our ancestors, and are now even tsarist property because they belong to Russian subjects" (p 100). The Russian authorities took the appropriate measures and guarded their subjects against foreign invasions (pp 100-102).

The authors stress that the Russo-Chinese territorial boundary in Central Asia was delineated by competent government commissions and recorded in the appropriate treaties and agreements: Beijing (1860), Chuguchak (1864), St. Petersburg (1881), Novo-Margelan (1884) and several others.

The book concludes with a description of the massive national liberation uprising of the non-Han peoples of Sinkiang in the 1860's and 1870's, when they threw off the yoke of the Ch'ing colonizers and established several independent states. The Kirghiz people took an active part in this rebellion. Several of the documents the authors consulted cleared up some questions about the history of this rebellion. This section ends with the fall of the Kokand khanate and the entry of the Russian empire by South Kirghiziya and Fergana (pp 114-115).

In the final section of the work, the researchers demonstrate that the policy of the present Chinese leadership on the question of nationality is still reactionary and chauvinistic, even though this has been concealed recently by demagogic statements about "concern" for the "good" of the non-Han peoples. The situation of the native population of Sinkiang (now Xinjiang) is still difficult (pp 135-137), however, while the laboring people of socialist Kirghiziya have turned their homeland into a highly developed industrial and agrarian republic during the years of Soviet rule, and their achievements in science, technology and culture are renowned in our country and abroad.

Therefore, the book covers an extremely broad range of historical problems of great scientific and political importance. The authors' thorough knowledge of their subject matter and their use of a large group of sources helped them to compile a serious scientific work, filled with carefully substantiated conclusions and opinions. We believe, however, that the book would have been better if the analysis of the peculiarities of Chinese feudal works of history and, in general, the distinctive features of Chinese sources had been presented in the introduction or in a separate section of the first chapter rather than being scattered among different sections (pp 21-23, 50-52). Besides this, Turkic sources should have been used, especially those written in the Uighur language. These comments do not detract in any way from our high rating of the book as a whole. The facts presented by the Soviet researchers provide more irrefutable proof of the anti-scientific, pseudohistorical approach of PRC historians to the interrelations of the Central Asian peoples with China and Russia, and evidence of their abandonment of the Marxist-Leninist, class analysis of historical events.

COPYRIGHT: "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka" 1982

8588

CSO: 1805/1

SECOND ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF SINOLOGISTS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 82 (signed to press 19 May 82) pp 183-189

[Report on Second All-Union Conference of Sinologists in Moscow on 25-27 January]

[Text] The Second All-Union Conference of Sinologists was held in Moscow on 25-27 January under the supervision of the USSR Academy of Sciences Academic Council on Problems of the Foreign Far East. It was organized by the Organizing Committee of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the Far East.

The conference was representative. It was attended by 400 people (of the estimated total of 1,000 Soviet Sinologists), working in 53 research institutes, higher academic institutions and practical organizations.

All branches of Soviet Sinology were represented at the conference: history, historiography, economics, domestic policy, government structure, law and tradition, foreign policy, ideology, literature and art, and linguistics.

The purpose of the second conference, convened 10 years after the first, was to summarize the results of the scientific activity of Sinological centers and individual Sinologists into set priorities and objectives for the future.

At the plenary session, an introductory speech by Academician P. N. Fedoseyev, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was followed by reports by O. B. Rakhmanin, first deputy chief of a CPSU Central Committee department; corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. I. Sladkovskiy, director of the Institute of the Far East, USSR Academy of Sciences; M. S. Kapitsa, chief of the First Far Eastern Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs; corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences N. T. Fedorenko; Doctor of Historical Sciences L. S. Kyuzadzhyan, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Scientific Information on the Social Sciences; Doctor of Philological Sciences V. M. Solntsev, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies; and representatives of the Vladivostok and Central Asian Sinology centers: Doctor of Historical Sciences F. V. Solov'yev, Candidate of Philological Sciences A. A. Khamatova, corresponding member of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences R. B. Suleymenov, Doctor of Historical Sciences B. A. Akhmedov and Candidate of Historical Sciences K. Sh. Khafizova.

At meetings of the eight conference sections, 120 reports and speeches were presented on the present status and future prospects of scientific research in various branches of Sinology, and on individual major issues.

The main purpose of the conference was to analyze completed research projects and to inform Soviet Sinologists of several pertinent and important, both in the scientific and in the political sense, objectives, dictated by the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and by the present situation, connected with the global nature of the anti-Soviet, antisocialist behavior of the Beijing leaders, their close alliance with imperialism and the fierce internal struggle and political and economic instability in China.

Academician P. N. Fedoseyev, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, said in his introductory speech that the Chinese leadership's alliance with imperialism poses a massive threat to the cause of peace, national liberation and social progress. The principled line of the CPSU, aimed at exposing and counteracting Beijing's hegemonistic plans, is intended to protect not only the interests of the Soviet people, but also the interests of the Chinese people, and to put China back on the road of socialist development. This line has been completely confirmed by experience.

Soviet Sinologists--the party's loyal helpers--have devoted their energy to the elaboration of this line and have thereby fulfilled their patriotic and internationalist duty to the Soviet and Chinese people, to the fraternal socialist countries and to all progressive mankind.

The future work of Soviet Sinologists must be guided by the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and the instructions of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev about the need for the determination of the main tendencies in PRC development and for scientific criticism of the Beijing leadership's foreign policy line of alliance with imperialism, a line which could have a ruinous effect on the Chinese people and on China.

Special attention must be given to the difficult problems connected with the 26th CPSU Congress proposals regarding confidence-building measures in the Far East, which Beijing is opposing in every way possible, and to the development of research into the role and place of China in the region and in the world as a whole and the nature of the Chinese leadership's foreign policy strategy and tactics in the international arena.

In conclusion, Academician P. N. Fedoseyev expressed the hope that Soviet Sinologists would continue to serve the party and government as reliable assistants in the investigation of problems in Soviet policy toward China.

The report by O. B. Rakhmanin contained a detailed assessment of the development of Soviet Sinology in light of the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and the present situation in China. After pointing out the fact that Soviet Sinology had seriously assisted the party in the study of current events in China and contributed to the creation of a scientific base for effective policymaking in relations with the PRC, O. B. Rakhmanin stressed that the main objective of the conference

should be the mobilization of Sinologists to carry out L. I. Brezhnev's instructions at the 26th CPSU Congress on the need for comprehensive Marxist-Leninist analysis of the class content of events in China and the roots of the present policy of the CCP leaders.

O. B. Rakhmanin stressed that the Chinese leadership's has been evolving toward the right since the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's and has now entered a new stage. This new stage is distinguished by the desire to build a "structure of joint opposition" to the USSR with the imperialists; the expansion of the boundaries of the "broadest possible international front" against the USSR and the socialist community in general through the inclusion of capitalist and developing countries in this front, as well as various opportunist and nationalist elements; the consolidation of the base of Chinese hegemonism through the reorganization of the political system and the expansion of the regime's social support; the modification of Maoism in order to justify Beijing's alliance with imperialism and opportunism.

In his report, O. B. Rakhmanin charged Sinologists with a number of crucial tasks: The compilation of a work on CCP history, in which the struggle between internationalists and petty bourgeois-nationalist elements in the CCP and the real role of the international factor will be elucidated with the aid of reliable documented information; the comprehensive study of changes in China's domestic policy and socioeconomic conditions; the disclosure of the essence of the struggle over the Maoist legacy and the basic trends in the modification of Maoism; the scientific criticism of Mao Zedong's concept of the so-called "new democracy," with which the present leadership has armed itself as a special "Chinese," or even "Asian," model of transition to communism.

In his report, O. B. Rakhmanin attached great significance to the excessive emphasis that is being laid in some cases on China's unique features, which have been elevated to the status of an absolute standard. A political result of this has been the tendency of some foreign researchers to deny the possibility of China's transition to socialism or to make allegations about the prematurity of this process and thereby legitimize Maoism as a supposedly natural phenomenon for China. The study of Chinese traditions and the distinctive features of China, O. B. Rakhmanin emphasized, is necessary, but it must be conducted, as Marxist-Leninist methodology demands, strictly with a view to the general laws governing the development of human society.

In conclusion, O. B. Rakhmanin mentions some of the complex problems in the current situation in China, which have been interpreted in different ways, and clarify the essence and implications of these problems.

In his report, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. I. Sladkovskiy analyzed the situation in China over the last 10 years and the measures taken by our party to normalize relations with China. He described in detail the status and results of research projects in the major branches of Sinology. He said that special attention should be given to the study of Soviet-Chinese and Russo-Chinese relations and the history of the formation of the Russo-Chinese border, all of which are of great political significance in connection with the Chinese leadership's territorial claims and the Soviet-Chinese border talks.

He underscores the importance of the research into PRC economics, which has been conducted in spite of the difficulties connected with the absence of official statistics.

In his report, M. I. Sladkovskiy also summarized the results of Soviet Sinologists' studies of the Chinese political system, the ideology of Maoism, foreign policy, ethnic traditions and ethnic relations. He underscores the importance of the study of China and problems connected with China in peripheral centers--Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghiziya, the Far East and the Ukraine.

He also discussed the publishing activity of the Institute of the Far East and the results of the publication of PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA over the last 10 years.

Professor M. S. Kapitsa, chief of the First Far Eastern Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presented a report on problems in Soviet-Chinese relations, in which he thoroughly analyzed the reasons for disagreement between the USSR and the PRC, engendered by the Maoist leadership's great-power, chauvinistic and militaristic ambitions (territorial claims, the nuclear arms race, the peculiar position on questions of war and peace, and anti-Sovietism in ideology and foreign policy). He revealed the evolution of Beijing's main foreign policy goal--from a desire (based on leftist opportunist aims) to push the USSR into a war with the United States, to the attempt (now based on rightist opportunist aims) to push the United States into a war with the USSR. The Chinese leadership is provoking the United States into a war against the USSR and is simultaneously using every means at its disposal to prevent the normalization of intergovernmental relations with the USSR by imposing completely unacceptable terms which essentially represent intervention in the internal affairs of our country.

As M. S. Kapitsa pointed out, territorial claims to Soviet lands still occupy an important place in Beijing's position. It has demanded Soviet "recognition" of the unjust nature of Russia's treaties with China, which would put the sovereignty of the USSR over 1.5 million square kilometers of Soviet territory in question, and the resolution of the issue regarding the so-called "disputed regions" in favor of the PRC.

The Soviet Union's answer to these unacceptable "conditions" has been a clear and concise program for the normalization of relations, set forth in the 1979 Soviet draft Declaration on Principles of Interrelations Between the USSR and the PRC, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, the renunciation of the use of force and threats of force, the renunciation of all claims to special rights or hegemony in Asia and the rest of the world, restraint in relations, a refusal to exacerbate relations, the renunciation of unfriendly propaganda about the other side, the settlement of disputes in the spirit of goodwill and the organization of meetings between the leaders of the two countries, including summit meetings, for the attainment of these goals.

Proceeding from these principles, the Soviet Government has repeatedly submitted proposals to the PRC Government on the regulation of relations, the conclusion of the border talks and the expansion of commercial ties and scientific and technical cooperation.

The current Chinese leadership has either failed to respond to these proposals or has rejected them outright on various spurious pretexts, confining itself to the tactic of "minor moves" (the authorization of scientific, technical and athletic contacts in international forums and competitions, the purchase of literature, a request for transit authorization for PRC trade with the West and the study of Soviet technology for the purpose of adopting the latest models), but has categorically refused to establish bilateral contacts on a permanent basis. Although the Chinese leadership has maintained limited bilateral intergovernmental relations with the USSR, it has openly opposed the Soviet line of international detente in the world arena, slanderously describing the USSR as the "main source of war," and is trying to build an "international structure for struggle" against the USSR, made up of China, the imperialist powers and all reactionary forces. The proposals put forth in L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the 26th CPSU Congress with regard to the extension of confidence-building measures to the Far East were rejected by the PRC Government.

In his report, M. S. Kapitsa stressed that China's move to a pro-imperialist position has given rise to new nuances and new problems in Soviet-Chinese relations.

The report by corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences N. T. Fedorenko, in which he discussed objectives in the study of Chinese literature, directed the attention of Sinologists to the need for the thorough study and analysis of the classical heritage of medieval Chinese culture, which the Maoists abused in every way possible during the years of the "Cultural Revolution," as well as the new Chinese literature which meets the criteria of critical and socialist realism. Works by prominent representatives of this literary current, who were repressed at various times by the Maoist ruling clique, were not published in China for many years, and their study and publication in the USSR represented an important international contribution by Soviet scholars to the reinforcement of Soviet-Chinese friendship and to the preservation of the progressive traditions of Chinese literature.

The report by Doctor of Philological Sciences V. M. Solntsev, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies, was on research in Chinese linguistics. After stressing that this research covers all branches of linguistics, the speaker cited a number of examples of Soviet achievements in the study of the Chinese language. In particular, he reported the completion of a project which has taken many years--the compilation of a complete Chinese-Russian dictionary--headed by renowned Sinologist Professor I. M. Oshanin. The first volume of the dictionary is already being printed.

In his report, Doctor of Historical Sciences L. S. Kyuzadzhyan, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Scientific Information on the Social Sciences, told conference delegates about the status of scientific informational work on China. The speaker described in detail the system for the collection, processing, analysis and publication of data on monographs, articles and other publications about China, published in the foreign press. The recent renewal of a number of publications in China has made synopses of these articles a priority matter.

The reports by representatives of the rapidly developing Sinological Center in the Far East aroused great interest--Doctor of Historical Sciences F. V. Solov'yev, head of the China Sector of the Institute of History, Ethnography and Archaeology at the USSR Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Scientific Center, and Candidate of Philological Sciences A. A. Khamatova, dean of the School of Oriental Studies at the Far Eastern State University. They informed the conference of the work performed by these establishments in Chinese studies, particularly the institute's work on a history of Manchuria and the Far Eastern State University's training program for Sinologists and suggested a number of ways to improve the training and use of Sinological personnel.

The report by representatives of Central Asian scientific establishments engaged in the study of the history of China and neighboring states also aroused interest: Doctor of Historical Sciences R. B. Suleymenov, corresponding member of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences; Candidate of Historical Sciences K. Sh. Khafizova (Alma-Ata); and Doctor of Historical Sciences B. A. Akhmedov (Tashkent). They demonstrated the value of sources in the Turkic, Arabic, Persian and other languages of China's oriental neighbors in the study of China's history and its policy in relations with neighboring countries, and discussed the role of Chinese sources and Sinological research in the study of the history of these peoples.

In their report, R. B. Suleymenov and K. Sh. Khafizova also demonstrated the importance of the comprehensive use and comparison of sources in various languages for the study of the ancient and medieval history of Asian peoples. They made the helpful suggestion that archaeological, ethnographic and linguistic data be used in the study of the history of China and its neighbors. The comprehensive use of all these sources is being attempted at the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography and is producing promising results.

Doctor of Historical Sciences B. A. Akhmedov analyzed the work of Uzbek scholars in his report. They make extensive use of works written in the Uighur, Persian and other oriental languages which are part of the manuscript collection of the Uzbek SSR Institute of Oriental Studies and are of great value in the study of the history of East Turkestan.

The development and status of individual branches of Soviet Sinology in the last 10 years were analyzed in reports and discussions at section meetings.

In the history section (headed by Doctor of Historical Sciences V. I. Glunin), 11 reports were presented and discussed: 8 on China's contemporary history and 3 on its modern history. The reports touched upon a broad range of issues pertaining to CCP history, the history of the Chinese revolution, the role of the international and military factors in the revolution, the history of the workers movement, present-day processes in the CCP and the analysis of historical works about the CCP and the Chinese revolution. The reports on modern history dealt with the popular anti-Manchurian movement, Russo-Chinese economic relations and the policy of the Chinese Government in Sinkiang.

When the reports were being discussed, the need for further analysis of theories about the Chinese revolution and CCP history was underscored. Speakers made several statements requiring further discussion--for example, the idea of a single

revolutionary process in China, beginning with the Sinkiang revolution of 1911 and ending with the formation of the PRC, and the discriminating role played in the revolution by ethnic factors, which supposedly gave rise to several contradictions in the development of the Chinese revolution and the establishment of the CCP. Speakers also mentioned the feudal nature of the Chinese peasantry, which raises questions about the petty bourgeois factor in the Chinese revolution.

Speakers stressed the need for a detailed study of Chinese militarism, the nature and role of the worker and peasant movements and the role of the international factor, particularly the Komintern, in the Chinese revolution. Speakers expressed the hope that researchers working on this topic would pay special attention to the 1940's and 1950's.

The publication of Russian translations of works by representatives of the Marxist-Leninist line in the CCP was proposed in the history section.

Some 25 reports, 16 of which were read, were submitted to the historiography section (headed by Doctor of Historical Sciences V. N. Nikiforov). Reference was given to speakers from peripheral Sinological centers. Equal time in the reports was given to the status of historical studies of China in the USSR (five reports) and in the West (six reports), but Chinese historiography (three reports) and the Japanese study of Chinese history (one report) were not given sufficient attention. The reports dealt mainly with the study of Chinese ancient and medieval history, particularly such topics as the formation of the Chinese nationality, the nature of the social order, foreign policy and the role of militarism and tradition.

The reports suggested that the thorough study of Western and Chinese works of history, particularly the latter, and the establishment of a special scientific subdivision for the daily observation of Chinese historical research and the analysis of its contents will be the main objectives of Soviet historiography in the 1980's.

Historians from outlying areas, particularly Central Asia, requested the broad-scale cooperation and assistance of historians in Moscow and Leningrad so that their historical reference works in non-Chinese languages could be put to proper use.

Proposals were also submitted on the preparations for the compilation and publication of a medieval history of China and an encyclopedia of China.

The work of the section entitled "The PRC Economy" (headed by Doctor of Economic Sciences V. I. Akimov) was of considerable interest to Sinologists specializing in economics as well as experts in other branches of Soviet Sinology. They heard 18 reports and speeches.

It was noted at the meetings of this section that Soviet Sinologists-economists have accomplished much in the last decade in the study of productive forces in the PRC. In particular, 35 collective and individual studies were written and published, as well as many articles and other scientific publications on the most diverse aspects of the PRC economy.

Soviet economists have been able to arrive at a fairly precise estimate of the ruinous effects of the "Great Leap Forward" and "Cultural Revolution" on the PRC national economy, to reveal the basic features and peculiarities of economic development in 1961-1965 and 1970-1981 and to provide quantitative and qualitative assessments of the state of the Chinese economy which are quite close to the actual situation.

An analysis of PRC economic development reveals the haphazard and uneven nature of reproduction after 1957. There are obvious disparities in the directions and intensity of the reproduction of the social product, production relations and manpower in the PRC. The intermittent growth of productive forces has been accompanied by the "ebb" and "flow" of various forms of ownership, stagnation processes in the development of the total labor force and abrupt fluctuations in the amount of live labor employed in large- and small-scale production, construction and public services. All of this confirms the fact that the Maoists have departed in their economic policy from the fundamental principles of the construction of a planned socialist economy, are violating the requirements of objective economic laws and are disregarding the long-range class interests of the laboring public. The search for a new "model" of economic and social development in the PRC in recent years has quite often led to undiscerning choices and attempts to cultivate elements of Western experience in the fundamentally different atmosphere of China.

The inefficient structure of agriculture in the PRC is one important reason for its failure to keep up with the requirements of economic development and is aggravating the food problem. A study of the present Chinese leadership's agrarian policy indicates that the measures it has taken have not led to the effective resolution of problems in the multisectorial development of agriculture.

Contrary to official statements by Chinese leaders, the living conditions of the PRC laboring public underwent perceptible deterioration after 1957. The high rate of absolute population growth is seriously complicating the food problem. Apparently, the 1980's will not become the turning point in the resolution of the food problem in the PRC.

At meetings of this section, suggestions and opinions were expressed regarding the expediency of establishing a specialized system of information on the PRC and the need for more pronounced centralization in the study of the state of science in the PRC and China's demographic problems.

The work of the section entitled "Domestic Policy, Government Organization and Political Traditions in Present-Day China" (headed by Doctor of Juridical Sciences L. M. Gudoshnikov) aroused the interest of specialists in these areas and experts on ethnic relations, social problems and other matters. In all, 11 reports and speeches were presented in this section.

Speakers discussed a broad range of topics connected with the study of domestic problems in the PRC and analyzed the basic aims of the Chinese leadership's domestic policy in the 1970's and 1980's. In particular, it was noted that researchers in our country have accomplished much in the study of the social class structure of the PRC. A historical-sociological research system is now being developed as a separate, and promising, field of research in Soviet Sinology. This could necessitate the training of Sinologists specializing in sociology.

The state of contemporary Chinese law was also discussed at section meetings. Since the end of the 1970's the Chinese leaders have taken some steps in the legislative sphere in line with the political directives on the "establishment of order throughout the country" and the program of the "four modernizations." The facts testify, however, that what is occurring in the PRC now is not the reinforcement of "socialist legality," as Chinese propaganda constantly implies, but the augmentation of the punitive functions of government bodies. Laws pertaining to PRC cooperation with foreign capital, for which preferential conditions are being established to encourage its operations in the country, occupy an extremely important place in economic legislation.

The study of ethnic problems is an important part of the research of Soviet Sinologists. The non-Han peoples of the PRC are deeply dissatisfied with the Chinese leadership's policy on nationalities, are demanding that Beijing seek fair solutions to ethnic problems and are resisting the authorities in various ways. The issue of nationality is more acute today in the PRC than it was in the 1950's.

The study of the historical heritage and political culture of the PRC has grown increasingly intensive in recent years. The Maoist doctrine about "making use of antiquity for the sake of today" has become an integral part of the political culture of the Chinese and is one of the important elements of PRC political and ideological life. This doctrine is used to attain the strategic objectives of the Chinese leadership's domestic and foreign policy. This is why there is such an urgent need for the more thorough study of both the historical heritage and the ways in which "antiquity" functions in the policy of the Chinese leadership.

At meetings of this section, current problems in the study of the armed forces' role in Beijing policy were discussed. It was noted that the gradual transformation of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] into a weapon and prop of Mao Zedong and his supporters in the 1960's assigned Soviet Sinologists the task of investigating the army's role in national politics. Much has already been accomplished in this area, although many unsolved problems still exist. In connection with this, it was suggested that study of the army's role in Beijing policy should be divided into the following basic fields: the use of the PLA in domestic political life; the study of the role played by the factor of military strength in Beijing foreign policy; the study of problems pertaining strictly to military organization.

At meetings of the foreign policy section (headed by Doctor of Historical Sciences M. S. Kapitsa), nine reports and speeches were presented. The main results and objectives in the study of PRC foreign policy, questions connected with the analysis of Russo-Chinese and Soviet-Chinese relations, problems in Chinese-Japanese relations, the military and political aspects of the arms race in the PRC, Beijing's policy in the developing world and other topics were discussed.

It was noted that Chinese hegemonism's military-political partnership with imperialism is turning China into an integral part of worldwide imperialist reaction, is escalating tension in the world and is a source of serious military danger.

Speakers noted the great significance the Chinese leadership has attached to convergence with Japan, counting on their common anti-Soviet interests, geographic proximity and definite historical similarities and hoping to acquire Japanese assistance and technology.

Speakers stressed that China, in the capacity of an actual ally of imperialism, will continue its attempts to provoke a military confrontation between the United States and the USSR and between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in the foreseeable future and will try to involve these states in a variety of local conflicts. The growth of PRC military potential will be accompanied by stronger Chinese pressure on neighboring countries and more pronounced territorial ambitions. The attempt to break up the socialist community with the aid of the "differentiated policy" and to undermine the community's ties with developing countries and national liberation movements will continue. China will try to make more extensive use of the United Nations and other international organizations for its own strategic, tactical and propaganda purposes. The problem of China's inclusion in the talks on the limitation of the arms race and on disarmament will grow increasingly acute.

Speakers stressed the expediency of requesting Sinological scientific centers to concentrate on researching the following aspects of China's position in the system of international relations:

Beijing's stance on the principal global problems of international relations and its ability to influence their outcome;

PRC activity in the United Nations and other international organizations and China's maneuvers in connection with the struggle for the new order in world economic relations;

Beijing's policy line with regard to crisis situations in the world as a significant indicator of the strategic aims of its foreign policy;

China's ability to influence the development of international relations within the two world social systems and to influence the interrelations of the systems themselves;

The role of international factors in the struggle within China and in the world arena for the accurate determination of the objectives of its social development;

The most probable directions in which PRC foreign policy will evolve.

Reports by 12 Sinologists from the Institute of the Far East, Institute of Philosophy and Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Moscow State University Institute of Asian and African Studies were presented in the ideology section (headed by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V. F. Feoktistov). They summed up the results of the study of Chinese philosophy and the ideological situation in the PRC of the last 10 years. They noted that Soviet Sinologists, working with scholars from the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism and USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy, had taken an active part in the elaboration of the Marxist interpretation of Maoism as a petty bourgeois, social-chauvinistic ideological and political current and one variety of anticommunism. Speakers pointed out the retention of the fundamentals of Maoism in the ideology and policy of the current CCP leadership. The present stage in the evolution of Maoism is distinguished by more vehement anti-Sovietism and hostility toward

scientific communism, more pronounced great-power chauvinism, hegemonism and militarism, a further move to the right in politics, political and philosophical pragmatism, the parasitical use of Marxism-Leninism, the intensification of the crisis of Maoism and attempts to update Maoism and correct some of the more odious Maoist ideas which are keeping Beijing from carrying out its strategic plans. The struggle between the two main varieties of Maoism--ultraleftist and rightwing nationalist--is still going on. They agree on the main thing--the desire to preserve and develop the main content of Maoism as the ideological base of the party and state--and disagree only on the specific ways in which Maoist strategic goals are to be attained. Although the elaboration of the successive "varieties" of Maoism have taken place in an atmosphere of conflict between different tendencies and positions within the Chinese leadership, the desire to preserve the basis of Maoism is their common feature.

It is the important duty of Soviet Sinology, speakers emphasized, to continue the Marxist-Leninist analyses of Maoism, investigate such matters as the class essence of the current CCP ideological platform, the CCP social base and the factors contributing to socioeconomic and political processes, and to forecast Maoism's evolution.

The discussion of the most pertinent issue in contemporary Sinology at the conference served as a basis for the following conclusions and proposals with regard to future work:

- 1) In view of the serious signs of crisis in the PRC economy and the contradictory tendencies in its development, the study of the aims and prospects of Chinese socioeconomic development is one of the main functions of Soviet Sinology.
- 2) Now that the current Chinese leadership has had to acknowledge many of Mao Zedong's errors while striving to preserve the hegemonistic, anti-Soviet essence of Maoist ideology and to camouflage it with the resurrected concept of "Sinized Marxism," it is essential that Soviet Sinology expose the anti-Marxist essence of Maoism and Mao Zedong's "new democracy" theory.
- 3) With a view to the fact that the present political regime in the PRC, which has retained all the features of a military bureaucratic dictatorship, is experiencing serious difficulties in all areas, the Chinese leadership has had to seek a broader social base for the implementation of its policy. This has given rise to the need for sweeping comprehensive studies of all aspects of present-day societal relations in China in close conjunction with historical, political, economic, social, ethnic, ideological, cultural and other problems. The in-depth analysis of CCP history and Chinese militarism is quite important in this context.
- 4) The study of PRC foreign policy and of Soviet-Chinese relations, as the main arena in which the great-power and anti-Soviet essence of this policy is displayed, is still an extremely important and pertinent field of Soviet Sinology and should concentrate, on the one hand, on finding effective ways of improving Soviet-Chinese intergovernmental relations and, on the other, developing measures to counteract the "differentiated policy" of the Chinese leadership, aimed at disuniting and splitting the socialist community. Special attention must be given to the

study of various aspects of Beijing's political partnership with American and Japanese imperialism and to the development of methods of accomplishing detente in the Far East, particularly the confidence-building measures proposed by the 26th CPSU Congress.

5) The falsification of Chinese and world history by the PRC leadership in order to "substantiate" claims to the territory of the USSR and other neighboring countries gives rise to the need for the thorough exposure of the invalidity of these claims, the scientific disclosure of the state, economic and cultural development, independent and separate from the Hans, of a number of peoples in China and neighboring countries, and the exposure of the aggressive nature of the Chinese rulers' policy toward these peoples. Scholars from Mongolia, Vietnam and other countries adjacent to China, as well as scholars from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, must be invited to take part in this work.

6) In addition to conducting research projects, Soviet Sinologists will have to institute a number of organizational measures for the success of their work: the better training and use of personnel, the quicker publication of Sinological literature, the establishment of a special information service and the better use of documents and reference work in the oriental languages in the Uzbek and Kazakh SSR's.

COPYRIGHT: "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka" 1982

8588

CSO: 1805/1

THIRTEENTH CONFERENCE OF YOUNG SINOLOGISTS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 82 (signed to press 19 May 82) pp 190-191

[Report by Ye. F. Piskunov on 13th Conference of Young Scholars of Far Eastern Affairs on 31 March in the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the Far East]

[Text] The 13th Conference of Young Scholars of Far Eastern Affairs was held in the Institute of the Far East, USSR Academy of Sciences, on 31 March. It was attended by institute researchers and post-graduate students, and representatives of other research institutes, higher academic institutions and practical organizations. The conference gave them a good opportunity to freely exchange views, acquire new information, broaden their professional outlook and acquire public speaking experience.

The plenary session of the conference was called to order by Professor V. A. Krivtsov, doctor of historical sciences and deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the Far East. He noted the continuous and stable growth of the creative scientific work of the institute's young researchers and the higher quality and scientific value of projects. He asked young institute researchers to continue improving their professional knowledge and informed conference participants of a number of tasks which would be part of the institute's total projected workload. Sinology is a comprehensive science, essentially consisting of many sciences, V. A. Krivtsov stressed. This is why the level of training in scientific theory in these sciences has to be particularly high. Only this can make work with concrete Chinese materials a basis for the compilation of truly interesting and valuable scientific studies. One of the most important problems facing Soviet Sinology, V. A. Krivtsov said, is the problem of Soviet-Chinese relations. The struggle to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations, he said, is everyone's business. This is stipulated in party documents, especially the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the speech by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev in Tashkent. V. A. Krivtsov expressed his certainty that young Sinologists would make a fitting contribution to the investigation and resolution of this difficult and urgent problem.

Professor Ye. F. Kovalev, doctor of historical sciences, said in his report that the training of young specialists is becoming extremely important in the attainment of the institute's main objective--not only the study of China, but also the

struggle for a socialist China. A great deal of work will be required, Ye. F. Kovalev said, to bring our activity up to an even higher ideological-political and scientific level. He noted that the improvement of methodology and the ability to apply the basic ideas of the founders of Marxism-Leninism to the present situation in China will be extremely important. He stressed the importance of this conference of young scholars of Far Eastern affairs in the scientific work of the entire institute. "Creative activity presupposes the lively exchange of opinions," he said, "and this is an essential condition for the improvement of scientific and theoretical bases. This is the 13th conference of its kind. It is demonstrating once again how each of us can carry out the party's instructions in line with the slogan: 'We will implement the decisions of the 26th Congress!'"

The closing speech at the plenary session was presented by Candidate of Economic Sciences P. B. Kapralov. "The comprehensive Marxist-Leninist analysis of the socioeconomic, ideological and political processes in China is a crucial task with which Soviet Sinologists were charged in party decisions, and this applies fully to the team of young researchers at the Institute of the Far East. The institute's young scholars will make every effort to meet the high demands now made on Sino-logical science and make a fitting contribution to the scientific study of China."

The work of the conference was then continued in three sections: economics, history and ideology, and international relations.

In the economics section, 15 reports on general economic and sectorial problems in the PRC's national economic development were presented. The reports which aroused particular interest were "The Status of Scientific Research in the PRC" by Ye. V. Grebennikova, "Problems in the Correlation of the Plan with the Market in the Works of Chinese Economists" by Ye. F. Avdokushin, "Some Problems in the Spread of the System of Production Responsibility in Rural China Today" by V. Ye. Zotov and "Problems in the Structure and Dynamics of the Development of Farming Branches in the PRC" by S. N. Aleksakhina. The work of the economics section was distinguished by the diversity of the subject matter and the comprehensive approach to the study and discussion of contemporary socioeconomic processes in the PRC.

"The Modified Interpretation of Mao Zedong's Ideological Legacy" by S. R. Belousov was the report which aroused the most interest in the history and ideology section. He analyzed the events of the last year and a half in China's political and ideological life and described how the present Beijing leadership is updating and using the basic postulates of Maoism. Other interesting reports were "An Enquiry Into the Understanding of Politics in Ancient China" by A. B. Krasnov and "The Modification of the Maoist Concept of the 'New Democracy' on the Eve of the Victory of the People's Revolution in China and in the First Years After the Formation of the PRC" by D. A. Smirnov.

There was an interesting discussion in the foreign policy section with regard to the possibility of China's participation in the "Pacific community" which, as we know, has been proposed by Japan and is to consist of the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the five ASEAN states.

In conclusion, it should be noted that several pertinent problems of the Far Eastern countries were examined and discussed at the conference. Many reports reflected serious research and the authors' desire to not only analyze important

problems in this region in depth but also to add something new to their examination. The conference was a veritable school for young specialists. This is the 13th conference of its kind, and this salutary tradition will help young scholars to delve even more deeply into their subject matter and improve their professional skills.

COPYRIGHT: "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka" 1982

8588

CSO: 1805/1

CONFERENCE OF YOUNG SINOLOGISTS ON PRC YOUTH PROBLEMS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 82 (signed to press 19 May 82) p 191

[Report on Second All-Union Conference of Young Sinologists on the Youth Movement in the PRC, in Frunze, on 8-12 February 1982]

[Text] The beginning of the 1980's was marked by the abrupt activization of the PRC leadership's policy on Chinese young people, who now constitute more than half of the population. The resurrection of the Chinese Communist Youth League, All-China Youth Federation and All-China Student Federation on a neo-Maoist basis and the tasks set for them within the country and in the international youth movement testify to new developments in the PRC youth movement.

These topics were discussed at the Second All-Union Science Conference of Young Sinologists on the problems of the youth movement in the PRC, held from 8 to 12 February 1982 in Frunze.

The conference was attended by 50 young scholars from Moscow, the Central Asian republics, Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Chita and Blagoveshchensk, 35 of whom made reports and speeches. Most of the speakers were members of the group set up by the Komsomol Central Committee and USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the Far East to study the youth movement in the PRC. Plenary sessions were also attended by Orientologists from the Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences, Komsomol activists, lecturers, propagandists and representatives of VUZ's, establishments and enterprises in Frunze.

Long reports were presented at the conference by Comrade Yu. A. Dergausov, secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee; Professor V. A. Krivtsov, doctor of historical sciences and deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the Far East; and V. G. Karymov, candidate of historical sciences.

The work of the conference was continued in three sections: foreign policy, socio-economic and domestic political affairs, and ideology, culture and ethnic and demographic affairs.

The exposure of the true essence of the Chinese leadership's pro-imperialist foreign policy and Beijing's destructive tactics in the international youth movement was an important part of the work of the conference. Speakers cited concrete examples to prove that the Beijing leadership has been encouraging the Chinese

Communist Youth League, All-China Youth Federation and All-China Student Federation to conduct subversive activity in the international movement more and more vigorously over the last 2 or 3 years.

The difficult socioeconomic conditions of the life of Chinese young people were discussed in detail at the conference. The unemployment problem--one of the most pressing problems in China today--was also discussed. It was noted that the examination of the socioeconomic status of young people of various social strata provides a basis for the correct interpretation of processes now taking place in the PRC youth movement. Speakers pointed out the urgent need to summarize research in this area and to compile scientific forecasts of the youth movement's influence in PRC domestic politics.

Speakers in the section on ideology, culture and ethnic and demographic affairs noted the exacerbation of social contradictions in various social strata and the dissatisfaction of young people with their present situation: Social conflicts are keeping their intensive ideological training from producing the desired results. The social and economic problems of young people of non-Han nationalities are particularly acute.

The conference was held in an atmosphere of enthusiastic and effective discussion of the difficult position of today's Chinese youth as a result of instability and contradictions in the economic and sociopolitical development of the PRC.

COPYRIGHT: "Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka" 1982

8588

CSO: 1805/1

- END -