Predicting Military Innovation,
Abstract
Although military technology is increasingly available and affordable, not all states have the capacity to improve military effectiveness by acquiring hardware. Indeed, integrative deficiencies-such as inflexible command structures, inappropriate doctrine and tactics, improper training, insufficient support-are quite common in the developing world. For many states, as a result, improving military effectiveness requires some level of innovation, e.g., reorganizing command structures, introducing new doctrine and tactics, modifying training techniques, and improving support. Given that improved military effectiveness generally requires innovation, what are the key indicators that intelligence analysts can use to predict whether a state is likely to achieve military innovation? The literature reveals four dominant perspectives that attempt to explain military innovation: structural realist (neorealist), societal, organizational theory, and cultural (both strategic culture and organizational culture). Drawing on these perspectives, we deduce hypotheses on military innovation that are tested in three case studies: the Israeli Defense Forces (1948-1982), the North Vietnamese Army (1965-1970), and the Chaco War (1932-1935).
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA361462
Entities
People
- Christopher Layne
- Jeffrey A. Ilsaacson
- John Arquilla
Organizations
- RAND Corporation