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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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18 November 1985

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET JOURNAL CALLS SDI 'NEW STAGE' IN U.S. 'MILITARISM'

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 8, Aug 85 pp 11-22

[Article by R. Ovinnikov, D. Sc. (History)]

[Text]

Reliance on nuclear weapons has been central to the imperialist power politics which the USA and its closest allies have been pursuing since the Second World War. The United States and the NATO military-political alliance it heads have always planned to impose their diktat on the socialist countries and on the forces of national liberation and social emancipation by means of military-strategic superiority, their ultimate goal being world domination. At the turn of the 1980s this militaristic venturesome course acquired an ominous new dimension. The strategic defense initiative (SDI), announced by the US President in March 1983, became part and parcel of this dangerous course which could trigger off a nuclear catastrophe.

The President stated that the ultimate goal of the new US military doctrine was to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". Nothing could be more false than assertions of this kind. Far from being revised, the policy of nuclear blackmail, which Washington has been pursuing since the end of the war, is entering a most cynical and dangerous phase now that it incorporates the most militaristic and aggressive doctrine ever advanced by the US imperialists.

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL

One of the most hypocritical methods of pushing the SDI through is that it is presented as a logical continuation of the "humane" line pursued by the USA which "had a total monopoly on nuclear weapons for many years and did not use it". This is the argument offered by US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to prove that others have nothing to fear from the new American doctrine.¹

The fallacy of these contentions is obvious. In reality the present and former phases of US military-political strategy—the "position of strength" strategy and preparation for a war—are closely related with one another. The United States used atomic weapons twice—in Hiroshima and Nagasaki—not to bring the end of the Second World War nearer, but to declare its military hegemony in the postwar world. From the very beginning nuclear weapons were a sinister sword which US imperialism ventured to raise over the socialist world.

Secret US documents which have become known to the public show that just 51 days after Japan's surrender the US Joint Chiefs of Staff drew up a report entitled Strategic Vulnerability of Russia to a Limited Air Attack. The report envisaged the atomic bombing of 20 Soviet cities.

¹ See *The Washington Post*, Apr. 3, 1985.

After that versions of a nuclear war against the Soviet Union, codenamed Charioteer, Cogwheel, Gunpowder, Double Star, ABC 101, Dualism, and Fleetwood began mushrooming. In 1949, the most large-scale project of all—the Dropshot plan—appeared. The only reason it was not carried out was that its authors were not sure of success.²

The next phase in the planned use of nuclear weapons by Washington against socialism was during the war in Korea. This became officially known for the first time from the memoirs of President Dwight Eisenhower, which were published as early as 1963.³ But the relevant documents were not made public until mid-1984, when another volume of *Foreign Relations of the United States* was put out. It became known from the documents that in March 1953 the US National Security Council had discussed practical versions of using atomic weapons on a limited scale in Korea. By mid-May 1953 the National Security Council had already contemplated the use of atomic bombs “in considerable numbers” “outside of Korea” as well. President Eisenhower said the only thing that worried him at the time was the possible response of the USSR to such actions by the USA. The plans for using nuclear weapons were being elaborated in Washington even after the armistice was concluded in Korea in July 1953. At a meeting in December that year, the National Security Council stressed the need to deal a “massive atomic air strike” at Korea, and also at Peking. It admitted that this “would mean all-out war against Communist China”. Similar lines were discussed the following month.⁴

Other sources show that there was a real threat in the first half of 1954 that the United States would start a nuclear world war in which a pre-emptive strike would be delivered at the Soviet Union. This greatly alarmed the USA's allies, primarily Britain, which, aware of Washington's plans, feared for their own fate.

At present, there is documentary evidence that organisations such as the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations, which supplied over half of all high-ranking foreign-policy officials for the postwar US Administrations from Truman to Carter, were inclined towards delivering a nuclear strike at the USSR “before it is too late”.⁵

All these facts are eloquent proof that in the period of the US monopoly on nuclear weapons, and later, when it had a substantial superiority in these weapons, constant plans were made for where and when such weapons would be used. The only reason why nuclear weapons were not used during those years by the USA was that the Soviet Union managed to undermine the American monopoly as a result of which the US authorities began to fear a retaliatory strike.

THROUGH PARITY TO DETENTE

As well as its overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons at the time, the USA had a considerable military-strategic advantage: its air-force and naval bases in foreign countries were located close to Soviet borders. From these advance posts the USA planned to strike at the USSR while it itself, being far away across the ocean, would remain unharmed. The Soviet military doctrine has always been defensive: the USSR has never built military bases abroad. Nevertheless, in order to ensure its security it

² See *Drop-Shot: The United States Plan for War with the Soviet Union in 1957*, Edited by A. Brown, New York, 1978, pp. 3, 6-7, 24, 29.

³ See D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years. Mandate for Change. 1953-1956*, New York, 1963, p. 180.

⁴ See *The New York Times*, June 8, 1984.

⁵ See I. Destler, L. Gelb and A. Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy*, New York, 1984, p. 107.

had to eliminate the advantages used by Washington for the policy of nuclear blackmail.

The manufacture by the Soviet Union of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the late 1950s reduced to naught the advantages of the USA's geographic location. For the first time the USA was losing its invulnerability and could not attack without expecting retaliation. True, in those years, too, the USA was far ahead of the Soviet Union in the number of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles. The Soviet Union, therefore, had no choice other than to catch up with the United States in those types of strategic arms in which approximate parity was crucial for safeguarding its security. By the early 1970s the Soviet Union had built up a potential for effective retaliation.

Furthermore, as Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's National Security Adviser, admits in his memoirs, the manufacturing potential built up by the USSR gave it the capacity for outstripping the United States in nuclear missiles, something the USA would be unable to match. "By 1969 it was clear," he writes, "that the number of Soviet missiles capable of reaching the United States would soon equal that of all American missiles... and, if Soviet building programs continued through the Seventies, would come to exceed them." Still, Kissinger notes that "the Soviet leaders... gave top priority to arms limitation".⁶ The Soviet Union decided not to achieve superiority in nuclear missiles but to have them limited and reduced. It was precisely this that resulted in the signing of the first US-Soviet strategic arms limitation treaty—SALT 1 in 1972.

SALT 1, signed by the leaders of both countries, registered approximate parity between the USA and the USSR in nuclear missiles. It stipulated that the two countries not exceed the existing level of strategic offensive arms. It is also important to note, especially in view of subsequent developments, that the USSR and the USA agreed at the same time to limit anti-ballistic missile systems, pledging themselves to refrain from manufacturing, testing and deploying new weapons capable of combatting strategic ballistic missiles. Under these parallel and interconnected accords each side pledged not to seek unilateral superiority either by exceeding the maximum limits fixed for their defensive arms, or by expanding anti-ballistic defence to neutralise a retaliatory blow.

SALT 1, which signified that both the USSR and the USA recognised that parity existed between them in strategic arms, was a turning point in Soviet-American relations. In the political context it opened the way to detente, to a normalisation of bilateral relations, and to an improvement in the international climate as a whole.

By that time, though, the USA had already started to equip its strategic missiles with nuclear multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Ignoring the USSR's insistence, it did not intend to give up the MIRV project in the hope of surpassing the USSR in this area. But in the conditions of the new balance of forces, as subsequent developments showed, the USA could no longer use that temporary advantage in its military-political and foreign-policy strategy.

On the whole, the achievement by the Soviet Union of strategic parity led the US policy of nuclear blackmail into a blind alley, and US imperialism could no longer use nuclear weapons against the USSR without risking its own destruction. In these conditions, Kissinger concludes, "strategic parity" with the USSR was turning more and more into a "strategic nightmare" for the United States.

Later the USA was compelled to sign the second strategic arms limitation treaty with the USSR. This fixed equal numerical limits for these weapons and envisaged the start of their practical reduction. However,

⁶ H. Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston, 1979, pp. 124, 128.

the signing of SALT 2 in 1979 was the last demonstration of common sense by the US ruling elite. It could not bear to be restricted in its nuclear sabre-rattling. R. Bartley, editor of *The Wall Street Journal* and an advocate of a return to nuclear blackmail on the part of the USA, openly declared some time later: "The whole period of arms control negotiations has given us very serious problems, by facilitating the Soviet movement toward strategic parity and may be in some sense strategic advantage."⁷ Allegations that the USSR sought superiority over the USA in strategic arms were a smokescreen behind which US imperialism was working to cast off the straitjacket of parity and set out to regain strategic superiority over the USSR.

A FRONTAL ATTACK AGAINST PARITY

Even under President Carter the United States began to depart from the policy of detente, going back to confrontation. As the memoirs of President Carter himself, of his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and of his National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski show, the spring and summer of 1978 was the time after which this trend again prevailed in US policy. That time, according to Brzezinski, was "the takeoff phase" for launching military programmes by the Carter Administration.⁸ The US Administration obviously aimed to upset the military-strategic parity and achieve US military strategic superiority, whatever rhetoric it used to camouflage this.

At its session in Washington in May 1978, the NATO Council, under pressure from the USA, adopted a long-term programme of building up and modernising the alliance's conventional and nuclear weapons, while in December 1979 it approved a resolution on its nuclear "rearmament" within the framework of that programme. This so-called double option nominally envisaged the holding of negotiations with the USSR on limiting and reducing nuclear arms in Europe and, supposedly, the deployment there of new US nuclear missiles only if the negotiations failed. Top officials of the present Administration, however, later cynically declared to their closest associates that the true meaning of NATO's "double option" was as follows: "If the negotiations fail, we'll deploy [US missiles.—R. O.]; and if they succeed, we'll deploy."⁹ Acting in this spirit, James Carter signed Presidential Directive 59 on preparations for a protracted but limited nuclear war on July 25, 1980.

But that was only the beginning of the transition by the US authorities to extremely risky and dangerous concepts. These were most zealously advocated by those who supplied ideas for the Republican presidential nominee, Ronald Reagan. Many of these people were later given high posts in his Administration. For instance, Robert McFarlane, who was at first deputy assistant, and then Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, wrote in an American journal in 1980 that the USSR was capable of winning a "nuclear victory" not by means of war but by achieving nuclear parity and thus ruling out war.¹⁰ On that basis he concluded that parity was unacceptable to the USA.

The USA itself was publicly recommended to take a course towards starting and winning a nuclear war. Two associates of the Hudson Institute published an article entitled "Victory Is Possible" in the journal *Foreign Policy*. They rejected outright "a condition of parity or essential equivalence" in strategic weapons with the USSR, insisted on a course

⁷ *Policy Review*, Winter 1985, p. 23.

⁸ See Z. Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, New York, 1983, p. 456.

⁹ S. Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, New York, 1984, p. 156.

¹⁰ See *The Washington Post*, Feb. 15, 1985.

towards US strategic superiority, and alleged that it was possible to win a nuclear war in which the USA "would destroy the Soviet state". Of course, the authors concluded, the US President "should not launch a strategic nuclear strike [against the USSR—R. O.] if expected U.S. casualties are likely to involve 100 million or more American citizens". But, in their opinion, if the USA could limit its losses to "20 million or more people", then a nuclear war would be justified.¹¹ Thus, the gamble on nuclear war with the purpose of destroying socialism was made very openly. The only question was, how many tens of millions of Americans should be sacrificed.

With the coming of the present US Administration to power the stake on victory in a nuclear war became an official doctrine. US Vice-President George Bush has said that a nuclear war can be won if one is well prepared for it. Eugene Rostow, then Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said for his part that even though up to 100 million Americans might be killed in a nuclear war "that is not the whole of the population" of the United States. And, last but not least, *Defense Guidance*, issued by the Pentagon in 1982 said: "Should deterrence fail and strategic nuclear war with the U.S.S.R. occur, the United States must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favourable to the United States".¹²

Briefly speaking, and this must not be forgotten, initial official directives of the present US Administration with regard to the Soviet Union have been aimed at stepping up the arms race, achieving US military-strategic superiority and starting a nuclear war against the Soviet Union, the gamble being on victory in such a war.

Naturally, such a misanthropic philosophy with its inevitable catastrophic consequences has made millions of ordinary Americans shudder. This set off a massive movement in favour of freezing nuclear weapons and preventing a catastrophe. Alarmed voices have even been heard in US ruling circles. A group of former prominent statesmen—McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara and Gerard Smith—spoke publicly in favour of renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons, for this "would bring ruin to all and victory to none".¹³ The position of the nuclear hawks within the US Administration and outside it grew worse especially after scientists established that a nuclear war would inevitably entail climatic calamities—a global "nuclear winter" would set in.

In other words, the plans of the more aggressive forces of US imperialism to launch a nuclear war ran into an impasse in terms of domestic and military strategy. These forces, however, have far from given up their plans. They refused to accept the fact, wrote *Dialogue*, the organ of the Trilateral Commission, with irritation, that "the balance of deterrence shelters" the socialist countries "from armed aggression".¹⁴ These forces saw in the new military strategy known as "star wars" a possibility to mislead the US antiwar movement and simultaneously to find a way of upsetting the military-strategic parity.

A COVER-UP MANOEUVRE

The purpose of the tactical turn made by the US Administration is quite simple. Since it was becoming increasingly difficult to advocate aggressive ideas openly, it was decided to carry on the speedy fulfilment of military programmes under the cover of talk about a need to streng-

¹¹ *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1980, pp. 14, 16, 24-27.

¹² *The New York Times Magazine*, March 4, 1984, p. 29.

¹³ *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1982, p. 757.

¹⁴ *Dialogue*, No. 35, 1984, p. 18.

then "defence". It was in precisely these conditions that the idea of including outer space in the strategic confrontation with the Soviet Union was presented in a new light.

For the first time the idea of extending the arms race to outer space, reckoning on US technological superiority, appeared among the backers of Ronald Reagan, then a presidential nominee. Among those who adhered to this position were, in particular, General D. Graham, former deputy chief of the Pentagon's intelligence service, and G. Kemp, a consultant for a number of American "think tanks", who later became a top official at the National Security Council in the Republican Administration. However, when it took office, the present Administration was too busy pushing through traditional military programmes to pay attention to what looked like science fiction.

In 1981 the ultra-conservative Heritage Foundation got interested in the idea of carrying the arms race into outer space. Among its members was Edward Teller, the "father of the American hydrogen bomb", and also friends of the President, businessmen J. Coors, J. Dart and J. Hume, members of his "kitchen cabinet". As early as 1982, however, controversies set in among them. One of the groups, led by General D. Graham, was in favour of starting to build a "space shield" over the United States immediately on the basis of available technology. Another group, headed by K. Bendetsen, former Deputy Secretary of Defence, believing haste to be risky, insisted on continuing preliminary research.¹⁵ But the common goal of all these efforts left no doubt. One of the advocates of using outer space against the USSR, a man by the name of Rather, wrote in 1982 that the first country to have monopoly on space weapons would possess "the longest 'big stick' in history", namely, "the capability for unilateral control of outer space and consequent domination on the Earth."¹⁶

In September 1982 Edward Teller, who was a member of the Bendetsen group, met with the President. But neither the President nor William Clark, his National Security Adviser, were yet interested in "star wars". The scales were tipped towards "star wars" by R. McFarlane. According to the *Time* magazine, he was most worried that the mounting movement in the country for freezing nuclear arms jeopardised the programme of building up strategic offensive arms being carried out by the Administration. In the programme, nominally designed to strengthen strategic defence, R. McFarlane saw an opportunity to counter this movement, and drew the President's attention to it.¹⁷

On top of all that, writes *The Washington Post*, the large scale of the movement to freeze nuclear arms in late 1982 and early 1983 greatly worried the chiefs of staff of all branches of the service. They saw that the insistence of official propaganda on the deployment of strategic offensive arms was imperilled, and therefore recommended that the emphasis be shifted onto the "defensive" aspects of the US military-political strategy. On February 11, 1983, the President, together with Caspar Weinberger and Robert McFarlane, met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. First they discussed ways of speeding up the deployment of the new MX intercontinental ballistic missile. But when the idea of "strategic defense" was mentioned, all attention was focused on it. Late in March the President was to speak in defence of the Administration's military programmes, specifically the MX missile, and the White House staff was kept extremely busy looking for a "new element" to help push the programmes through with greater ease. The idea of using outer space for "strategic defense"

¹⁵ See *The New York Times*, March 4, 1985.

¹⁶ *The New York Times*, March 7, 1985.

¹⁷ See *Time*, March 11, 1985, p. 16.

best suited these intentions. The President's assistants cynically termed this trick Operation MX Plus.¹⁸

That is how the President's speech on March 23, 1983 was prepared. Most of the speech was devoted to justifying the offensive military programmes of the Administration, and the idea of "strategic space defense" was brought into play for the first time as a cover for these programmes. A corresponding insertion was introduced into the President's speech at the last minute by R. McFarlane and G. Keyworth, the President's adviser on science. Thus, the "star wars" programme was first launched into US domestic political orbit as a distracting propaganda ploy. Soon after that, however, it was decided that the study of the possibilities of this programme would continue with a view to building up the US military strategic potential. The temptation to develop a new "decisive" weapon to be used against the USSR proved too strong to be overcome this time as well. By the autumn of 1983, when the United States set to deploying its new nuclear missiles in Europe, three teams of experts were already working on "star wars" with the blessing of the Administration: the Defensive Technologies Study Team headed by J. Fletcher; the Future Security Strategy Study Team headed by F. Hoffman; and the interdepartmental team of the Administration itself, which was headed by Weinberger and Clark.¹⁹ The latter team, which was the most authoritative, recommended in mid-September 1983 that work on "star wars" be sharply accelerated.²⁰ According to a US magazine, behind all this was a calculation that "even prior to deployment, the demonstration of U.S. technology would strengthen the military and negotiating stances [of the USA—R: O.]" at the talks with the USSR. Proceeding from this, the President signed his Directive 119 on January 6, 1984, signalling the start of large-scale research to determine the "star wars" potential. Late in March the Administration appointed Lieutenant-General Abrahamson chief of the project to develop a ballistic missile defence system (BMD). In December that year the Pentagon awarded the first ten contracts on the project to US companies manufacturing the latest military technologies: Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, Rockwell International, Hughes Aircraft, and some others.

A LONG-RANGE GOAL

"Star wars", officially termed the "strategic defense initiative", is an expression of the extremely aggressive and venturesome course of the present American Administration. Its goal is to tip the strategic arms balance with the Soviet Union in its own favour, leaving it no chance to hit back. As a pamphlet issued in this connection by the White House early this year says the purpose of this programme is "the elimination of ballistic missiles and the nuclear weapons they carry".²¹ Nowadays, it is almost never mentioned that this programme is allegedly designed to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". This, however, could not have been otherwise: for 40-odd years these weapons have served as the basis for the entire military-political strategy of US imperialism and its nuclear first strike concept.

The aim is to neutralise those types of Soviet strategic weapons which, for geographic and historical reasons, are the backbone of its defence might. It is easy to see that under this scheme the USA has superiority in submarine-based nuclear weapons and strategic bombers which are left untouched, as are long-range nuclear cruise missiles. In practice, says R. Bowman, President of the US Institute for Space and Security Stu-

¹⁸ See *The Washington Post*, Jan. 4, 1985.

¹⁹ See *The New York Times*, Nov. 5, 1983.

²⁰ See *The Washington Post*, Oct. 18, 1983.

²¹ *The New York Times*, Jan. 4, 1985.

dies, the aim of the "star wars" plans is to hamstring that type of strategic arms which enables the Soviet Union to maintain parity. "We are tired of this equality business," he admits. "The only way we can regain our political leverage... is to regain absolute military superiority."²²

Thus, the "star wars" programme in its exposed form is extremely aggressive. It is a desperate attempt on the part of US imperialism to "stake its all" in the nuclear age. The stake is on making full use of the colossal military might of the USA and, if possible, the military potentials of its main allies, to check the course of history in one stroke, take social revenge worldwide, and destroy socialism. In practical terms, two interconnected tasks are set to this end: to regain invulnerability for the United States and, on the other hand, to render the Soviet Union extremely vulnerable.

According to the plans of the US Administration, there are two versions of accomplishing these tasks. The first version is to build a "space defense" shield against a retaliatory strike by Soviet strategic missiles. This would give the USA the opportunity to strike at the Soviet Union from behind the shield with impunity. This version requires a buildup of offensive strategic arms in order to ensure maximum first strike effectiveness and envisages only a limited ballistic missile defence (BMD). A study issued by the Brookings Institution says on that score that "a BMD system that would perform poorly against a well-organised first strike might do quite well against a poorly coordinated 'ragged' retaliation".²³

This is the path the US Administration intends to follow for the time being. The USA is getting ready to deploy a new, more lethal generation of offensive nuclear arms, wrote *The Wall Street Journal* recently. It specified that this meant the accelerated manufacture of first-strike Trident 2 ballistic missiles (D-5) based on the nuclear-powered Ohio submarines, nuclear cruise missiles of various basing, "invisible" Stealth bombers, and so on.²⁴ One should add to this plans, which the US Administration is pushing through Congress, for manufacturing more and more MX missiles, which also are first-strike weapons. And, finally, this kind of action includes the Pentagon's feverish development of various other "penetration aids", that is, means of penetrating Soviet defence.²⁵

Simultaneously, as US Assistant Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle admitted, the Administration has decided to take "intermediate steps" in the development of the BMD system to build a limited system of this kind which would mainly defend American strategic missiles, not the population.²⁶ B. Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (under Gerald Ford), said at Congress hearings that since such a limited system could only provide protection from a weakened retaliation, the building of the system gave an "inducement" for delivering a first strike.²⁷ That a limited BMD does not envisage the protection of the US population is not surprising. The system was proposed by an Administration which only recently said for the USA it was acceptable that many millions of lives could be lost in the name of destroying socialism.

The second version provides for the deployment of a large-scale antimissile and antisatellite defence. Theoretically, such a "space defense" system would enable the USA to intercept Soviet missiles "at boost-phases".

²² *The Christian Science Monitor*, Jan. 10, 1985.

²³ *Ballistic Missile Defense*, Edited by A. Carter and D. Schwartz, Washington, 1984, p. 7.

²⁴ See *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 25, 1985.

²⁵ See *The New York Times*, Feb. 11, 1985.

²⁶ See *The New York Times*, Dec. 30, 1984.

²⁷ See *The New York Times*, March 1, 1985.

se", when missiles are easiest to detect (as their location is known), and to destroy them most effectively, for this would occur before the warheads begin to separate. All this is presented as "defending the USA" from a Soviet "first strike". In reality, however, writes *The Christian Science Monitor*, the technology of a large-scale strategic BMD "could be available for space-to-ground attack missions before they are ready to intercept Soviet ballistic missiles" in flight. Furthermore, the newspaper adds, this technology will enable the USA in the first place "to fragment heavy concrete missile silos and destroy ICBMs before they are launched".²⁸ *The New York Times* writes that this would be "the most devastating offensive use of space weapons for a first strike".²⁹ As was admitted in a private conversation by a person taking part in the BMD development programme, it can also be used for hitting targets on the ground.³⁰

In any case, in a limited or large-scale version the US "strategic defense" system is designed primarily for aggressive tasks. This is most obvious now that its development is being accompanied by a buildup of strategic offensive weapons. This was pointed out by the President himself, who declared in his "star wars" speech: "I clearly recognize that defensive systems... raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with 'offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy'".³¹ This circumstance was also noted by US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger who has stated at least twice that if the Soviet Union had been the first to build a "strategic defense" system, the USA would have found itself in extreme danger, being almost unarmed.³²

All this clearly shows that, while the USSR has always striven for parity as the basis of its security, the basis of the US military-political strategy, by contrast, has always been the drive for military-strategic superiority. This is why it is socialism that is expected to fulfil the hard and very important mission of preventing a nuclear world war and saving mankind. As is known, the Soviet Union is doing everything possible to this end.

THE KEY ISSUE

When ballistic missile interception was tested in the United States early in June 1984, it meant that the USA set out to effect practical measures to militarise outer space. Everything must be done to prevent the arms race from spilling over into a new sphere, before the USA's unilateral measures make this process irreversible. It is quite obvious that an arms race in outer space would utterly diminish the prospects of reaching a new, mutually acceptable agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms between the USSR and the USA. This would not only derail the main Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 1972, but would also torpedo the fundamental agreement freezing the numerical level of strategic offensive arms. As a result of the destabilisation of the military-strategic situation, inevitable in this case, both sides would be unable to control the level of the armaments. The threat of a nuclear war would thus increase immensely. This is why preventing the arms race spilling over into outer space is the key issue today.

On June 29, 1984 the Soviet government officially presented a statement to the United States government. The statement called for Soviet-American talks to be held as soon as possible on the level of specially ap-

²⁸ *The Christian Science Monitor*, Jan. 23, 1985.

²⁹ *The New York Times*, March 7, 1985.

³⁰ See *The Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 14, 1985.

³¹ *The New York Times*, March 24, 1983.

³² See *The Washington Post*, March 10, 1985.

pointed delegations, in order to discuss the question of preventing the militarisation of outer space. The Soviet Union proposed that a whole class of attack space weapons, including space-based antisatellite and antimissile systems, as well as any land-, sea-, and air-based means designed for hitting targets in outer space be banned and eliminated.³³

It soon became obvious that the United States did not intend to give up the idea of a "trial of strength" in the new sphere. Washington displayed no wish to hold negotiations on preventing the militarisation of outer space and spoke merely of possible "limitations" in this sphere, that is, it actually insisted on legalising such an arms race. In other words, negotiations on the vital problem proposed by the USSR—the prohibition of space weapons—were being evaded.

The unwillingness of the US Administration to take any commitments to this effect showed that the task of preventing the militarisation of space is not an easy one. Only the line of preventing such a development, the line insistently proposed by the USSR, could yield definite results. Inactivity here would play right into the militarists' hands. Therefore, soon after the presidential elections in the USA and taking into account the USA's expressed interest in reducing the nuclear arsenals of both countries, the Soviet Union put forward a proposal on holding entirely new bilateral negotiations on the whole range of issues pertaining to nuclear and space weapons.

As a result of the Soviet-American meeting held on January 7-8, 1985 in Geneva the sides reached an understanding that relevant talks would be devoted to space and nuclear weapons (strategic and medium-range), and that all these problems would be considered in their interrelationship. It was also agreed that the aim of the talks would be to work out effective accords aimed at preventing an arms race in space, halting it on the Earth, and at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and strengthening strategic stability.³⁴

Strict observance of this understanding in all its aspects during the talks would have offered an opportunity of making real progress. However, the first round of the Soviet-American talks in Geneva gives us reason to state that the USA is already violating the previous understanding on an interrelated discussion of all issues concerning space and nuclear weapons, that is, its purpose is not to reach agreement with the USSR, but to upset the military-strategic parity existing in the world.

The Soviet Union nevertheless hopes that the USA's stance at the Geneva talks will change, which, naturally, would make it possible for both sides to reach mutually acceptable agreements. At the same time, aware of the dimension of the existing war menace and of its own responsibility for the future of the world, the USSR recently stated once again in no uncertain terms that it will never allow the military-strategic parity between the USSR and the USA, and between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, to be upset.

³³ *Pravda*, July 1, 1984.

³⁴ See *Pravda*, Jan. 9, 1985.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER EXAMINES ABM, SALT TREATIES

PM051644 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Nov 85 First Edition p 4

[Article by Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov: "To Preserve what Has Been Achieved in the Sphere of Strategic Arms Limitation"]

[Text] The continuing nuclear arms race is fraught with tremendous dangers to mankind. It leads to the heightening of tension, an increase in the threat of war, and the diversion of tremendous intellectual and material resources from creative purposes.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries do everything in their power to preserve and consolidate peace and stop the nuclear arms race. Our country proposes reaching agreement on the whole complex of questions connected with removing the nuclear threat -- ranging from the freezing to the complete elimination of nuclear arms along with a complete ban on space strike arms.

The USSR's proposals are not mere declarations. We have taken major practical steps recently: Specific proposals on preventing the creation [sozdaniye] and deployment of space strike means and radically reducing nuclear arms have been submitted at the Geneva talks; nuclear explosions have been unilaterally ended; and, in addition to the moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles, the SS-20 missiles that were deployed as countermeasures in the European zone have been withdrawn from combat standby.

The Soviet Union invariably advocates the organization of constructive dialogue with all states, above all with the United States. "Our countries," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, points out, "simply cannot permit themselves to bring matters to a confrontation. The real interest of both the Soviet and U.S. peoples lies in this. And this must be expressed in the language of real policy. It is necessary to stop the arms race, to get down to disarmament, and to steer Soviet-U.S. relations into a normal channel."

What is ultimately the determining, central factor in Soviet-U.S. relations? The renunciation by each side of encroachments on the other's security, the renunciation of acquiring military superiority over one another. In other words, what is needed is strict compliance by the sides with the principle of equality and identical security.

For more than 10 years, despite the sharp ups and down in Soviet-U.S. relations, a great contribution to this has been made by the unlimited-duration Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Defense Systems, the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms (both documents were signed 26 May 1972), and, since June 1979, also by the SALT II treaty. Today relations between the USSR and the United States will depend to a great extent on whether it proves possible to preserve the positive elements achieved during the seventies in preventing the creation of space strike arms and limiting nuclear arms.

I.

In the joint Soviet-U.S. communique of 30 May 1972 the sides emphasized that the ABM Treaty and the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT I) represent a major step toward containing and ultimately ending the arms race. They accord with the vital interests both of the Soviet and the U.S. peoples and of other peoples of the world.

Time has confirmed the correctness of this conclusion. The ABM Treaty is of fundamental importance for nuclear arms limitation, strategic stability, and international security. It is the foundation and the basis of strategic relations between the USSR and the United States, imposing clear limitations on the quantitative composition, structure, qualitative characteristics, and deployment of our two countries' authorized ABM systems.

In signing the unlimited-duration ABM Treaty, the sides agreed at that time that an indissoluble interconnection exists between strategic offensive and defensive arms. It was recognized at that time that only mutual restraint in the sphere of ABM systems can contain the arms race and make it possible to advance along the road of limiting and reducing strategic offensive weapons. The preamble of the treaty states: "Effective measures to limit antiballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of the outbreak of a war involving nuclear weapons."

All the main provisions of the treaty are devoted to achieving this goal. Article I prohibits the deployment of an ABM system for the defense of the country's territory and the creation of the basis for such a defense. Each side is permitted to have a limited ABM system for a single area with a radius of 150 km (the chosen areas are: in the USSR the capital, Moscow, and in the United States the Grand Forks ICBM base). Within the limits of one area no more than 100 ABM launchers, no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and only a limited quantity of ABM radars may be deployed.

The ABM components must be land-based and stationary. Article V prohibits the development [sozdavat], testing, and deployment of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

These main provisions are developed and supplemented by other articles and agreed statements. In particular, with a view to strengthening the provisions of the treaty, agreed Statement D prohibits the deployment of ABM systems and components based on other physical principles and capable of substituting for "traditional" ABM components outside the ABM area authorized for each side. The deployment of these ABM systems and components in the authorized area can be carried out only after preliminary consultations between the sides on their specific limitation and the introduction into the text of the treaty of agreed amendments entering into force in accordance with the procedure established by the ABM Treaty.

In short, as a result of the talks the USSR and the United States arrived at a joint understanding of the need to renounce the deployment of any large-scale ABM systems. They officially stated then that the acquisition by one of the sides of ABM means over and above what is authorized by the ABM Treaty will inevitably lead to the disruption of strategic parity and to an increase in the risk of nuclear war. This key idea of the ABM Treaty was correct for the conditions of 1972 and remains even truer and more fundamental for 1985 and the whole foreseeable future.

People in the United States certainly know and remember this joint conclusion. They are perfectly well aware that the deployment of a large-scale ABM system by one side will inevitably prompt retaliatory actions by the other in the form of the quantitative and qualitative growth of strategic offensive weapons and the creation [sozdaniye] of a large-scale ABM defense for the country, which also means the creation [sozdaniye] of means for the neutralization of ABM defenses. Nonetheless, the U.S. side is now making no secret of the fact that it is not suited by the goals and principles forming the basis of the ABM Treaty. In practical terms, the United States has embarked on the path of destroying this treaty.

The White House leaders have on many occasions publicly defined the goal of the work being done under the program for the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) (in other words, the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike arms), [a goal] which they claim is "the creation [sozdaniye] of absolutely reliable means of destroying Soviet nuclear missiles if they are ever launched against us or against our allies." But, this is precisely a de facto undermining of the ABM Treaty. First, because work is being done on the creation [sozdaniye] of an ABM defense system for the country's entire territory and, furthermore, for the territory of U.S. allies, which is banned by Article I of the treaty. Second, because it is a question of a space-based ABM system, which is banned by Article V.

Obviously, in preparation for eroding the content of the ABM Treaty, official Washington has recently been striving to convince the U.S. Congress and public that the treaty is supposedly "full of ambiguity." Therefore, it allows the United States "quite legitimately" to develop [razrabatyvat] test, and deploy ABM means based on other physical principles (lasers, directed energy beams, and so on). In the process they cite agreed Statement D which, they claim, allows the creation [sozdaniye] of such systems. But the Washington officials diligently omit mentioning the main point -- the fact that the possibility of their development [razrabotka] is permitted only with respect to the limited ABM areas allowed by the treaty and only in stationary ground-based systems. The text of Statement D does not allow any other interpretation. This is confirmed by those U.S. officials who participated directly in the elaboration of the ABM Treaty.

Legitimate questions arise in connection with the elaborate game of formulas surrounding this most important document for the entire process of strategic arms limitation. Why are U.S. Administration officials arbitrarily trying to make amendments to the ABM Treaty; amendments which distort its meaning? Why is the U.S. Administration refusing to consult with the Soviet side about this if, as is claimed, it is acting within the treaty's framework? There is no great secret here. Washington's leaders are preparing a "juridical basis" for launching practical work on the SDI program, including the testing and deployment of space strike systems. Practical preparations are in progress for the destruction of the ABM Treaty.

Other U.S. actions also undermine the ABM Treaty. Contrary to the provisions of Article VI, phased array radar stations (Pave Paws) are being constructed in Greenland and Britain. A large radar station -- for whose construction elements of a radar station tested for ABM purposes were used -- has been deployed in breach of Article I on Shemya Island (Aleutian Islands).

the construction on U.S. territory of large new Pave Paws radar stations, whose parameters have been brought up to the level required of ABM radar stations and which provide the basis for radar support of an ABM defense of the country's territory, is another such breach. In violation of the treaty's provisions, work is under way to create [sozdaniye] mobile ABM radar components and systems and multiple-charge nosecones for interceptor missiles. The Minuteman ICBM's are also being tested for the purpose of giving them an antimissile capability. Despite our repeated warnings, the U.S. side has taken no measures to remove the anxiety caused by the actions it is taking.

In order to conceal the facts of the extremely crude violations of the ABM Treaty and to somehow justify itself in the eyes of the world public, the U.S. Administration resorts to unscrupulous methods. It is trying to use fabrications to discredit the USSR's policy and to attribute nonexistent "violations" and "omissions" in treaty compliance to the Soviet side.

For example, people in Washington would like to present the work to create [sozdaniye] space strike weapons that is being done in violation of the ABM Treaty and the implementation of the "star wars" plan as a whole, as a measure in response to the Soviet air defense system, which, they claim, "is packed with active means and is constantly modernized. But we make no complaints on this account since there are no limitations on air defense systems and air defense means themselves have nothing in common with ABM defense. The presence of a reliable Soviet air defense system is explained by the military threat posed by the numerous U.S. military bases situated close to the USSR's borders and the many hundreds of nuclear-capable aircraft [samolet-nositel] at them. These means are targeted on us. Only shortsighted and naive people could close their eyes to such a threat.

The claims and talk that "only the USSR has an operational ABM system" are also hypocritical. Yes, an ABM system is deployed around our capital. We have never denied this; its presence is strictly in accordance with the ABM Treaty. Mobile complexes or multiple-charge launchers are not being created [sozdavatsya] here, nor are there any quantitative limitations violated. The improvement of the Moscow ABM system is implemented strictly within the treaty's limits.

The United States also has an ABM system of similar potential for one region and we have never reproached it for this, since it has the same right to this as the USSR. References to the fact that this U.S. system has been "mothballed" alter nothing, since the phased array radar (PAR) station there remains in operation and the mothballed interceptor missile launchers can be demothballed at any moment. This is exactly why the treaty does not differentiate between ABM components that are in combat service and those that are mothballed.

The U.S. Administration is trying to intimidate the public with the claim that the Soviet Union has already almost created [sozdat] the "space shield" which the United States is still trying [khotet] to create [sozdat]. C. Weinberger recently declared that the USSR supposedly already "is on the threshold" of creating [sozdaniye] an ABM system for the country's territory. But this is a deliberate untruth and an attempt to defame our country. The Soviet Union is not creating [sozdavat] space strike weapons, is not deploying a large-scale ABM defense system, and is not testing weapon types for this purpose. The propaganda statements by Washington leaders about some kind of "covert Soviet SDI" are just another attempt to justify "star wars" and the constructive U.S. stance in Geneva and to avoid talks on the banning of space strike weapons.

As for the Soviet stance on space strike arms, it has been clearly defined by M.S. Gorbachev. It is necessary, he pointed out in his interview with TIME magazine, to ban space strike weapons at all stages of their creation [sozdaniye], including targeted research work.

This, however, does not deny a country the right and possibility to conduct fundamental research in the space sphere. But, it is one thing to conduct investigations and research [izyskaniya i issledovaniya] in laboratory conditions and quite another when mock-ups and prototypes are created [sozdayutsya] and models of space arms are tested. This is always followed by the deployment of arms. This is precisely the line currently being conducted by the U.S. Administrations in the "star wars" program. The USSR considers any work outside the laboratory linked with the development [otrabotka] and testing of mock-ups and experimental models of individual parts and components to be impermissible. Everything done in order to subsequently design and produce corresponding space strike systems must be prohibited.

There are currently no U.S. or Soviet strike weapons in space. The Soviet Union has stated to the entire world that it will not be the first to take strike weapons into space. We will make every effort to convince other countries, above all, the United States, not to take this fatal step which would inevitably increase the threat of nuclear war and give impetus to an uncontrolled arms race in all directions. That is our policy and we are carrying it out conscientiously and responsibly.

The U.S. Administration is making considerable efforts to delude public opinion about the Soviet radar station under construction in the region of the city of Krasnoyarsk. This station is said both to have an ABM capability and to be tasked with providing early warning of a missile attack. However, the Krasnoyarsk radar station will resolve neither of these tasks. Once construction is completed it will be used exclusively for tracking objects in space and monitoring space. Therefore, it has nothing to do with the ABM Treaty.

The Soviet Union strictly abides by its commitments under the ABM Treaty both as a whole and in its parts and observes absolutely the spirit and the letter of this most important document. Strategic stability and trust would undoubtedly be strengthened if the United States adhered in deeds rather than in words to the provisions of the unlimited-duration ABM Treaty.

II.

Another important document that exerts a definite restraining influence on the arms race is the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). Its significance lies in the fact that it places definite obstacles in the way of the further quantitative growth and qualitative improvement of the sides' most powerful arms. The Soviet Union is profoundly convinced that if the United States had ratified this treaty, real reductions in strategic offensive arms would have started and the road would have been opened for subsequent more large-scale and comprehensive agreements in this sphere.

Elaboration of the SALT II treaty took almost 7 years. Even then, from the very outset of the talks, influential forces in the United States threw "wrenches in the works" and obstructed its elaboration in every possible way. There were periods when -- under pressure from them -- the reaching of any agreement at all was called into question. However, at the time there were other forces in the United States which were advocating agreement. Thanks to the Soviet side's tenacity, patience, and persistence the SALT II treaty was agreed and signed.

The treaty limited with no exceptions all types of strategic offensive arms held by the USSR and the United States at the end of the seventies: intercontinental ballistic missiles (SLBM's), and heavy bombers. Each side was authorized to have not more than 2,400 such delivery vehicles when the treaty came into force (that is, after its ratification) and not more than 2,250 by the end of 1981.

Within the limits of this overall total level each side could not have more than 1,320 "multiple warhead" [mnogozaryadnyye] delivery vehicles; that is, ICBM and SLBM launchers with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's) and heavy bombers armed with air-to-surface cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km. In turn, within the limits of the level of 1,320 units, the parties to the treaty could have not more than 1,200 MIRV'ed ICBM and SLBM launchers and within the limits of those 1,200 units, not more than 820 ICBM launchers with such warheads.

Other important qualitative limitations were also introduced on each type of strategic arms. The number of charges [zaryady] on MIRV'ed missiles was limited: not more than 10 warheads for ICBM's and not more than 14 warheads for SLBM's; heavy bombers equipped with air-to-surface cruise missiles could carry not more than 28 such missiles on average. Each side was allowed to create [sozdavat], test, and deploy only one type of light ICBM each in the future and it was forbidden to increase the numbers of existing heavy ground- and sea-launched missiles or to create [sozdavat] new ones. Moreover, other restrictions were also laid down.

The USSR and the United States have pledged not to circumvent the provisions of the treaty through the medium of third countries or in any other way. And the joint statement specified that further talks must be conducted on the basis of obligatory consideration of all the factors determining the strategic situation. A primary factor -- and the Soviet Union stated it when concluding the treaty -- is the presence of a considerable number of forward-based nuclear weapons in direct proximity to our borders, posing a direct threat to our country.

The treaty is effective until 31 December 1985. Certain restrictions on which full agreement was not reached were stated in a special protocol to the treaty of shorter duration (until 31 December 1981), to be returned to at the next stage of the talks. In particular, the protocol prohibited the deployment of mobile ICBM launch installations and the conduct of test launches, the deployment of cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km on sea- and ground-based launch installations, and the test-launching of missiles equipped with multiple, independently targeted warheads.

The SALT II treaty is a document which objectively examines and evaluates Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons. This is its chief merit. It sees the sides' strategic nuclear armaments (ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers) as a single entity. This made it possible to comprehensively regulate the correlation of strategic forces and consolidate strategic parity between the USSR and the United States despite differences in the composition of strategic armaments, in individual types, and in geographical and other factors. During the elaboration of the treaty the sides found and agreed on mutually acceptable solutions which accorded with the principle of equality and identical security and were of a long-term nature.

Assessing the significance of the treaty, President J. Carter stressed that "this treaty is the most important step ever taken in the establishment of nuclear arms control. Rejection of SALT II would be a serious blow to peace and to our country's security." H. Brown, defense secretary at the time, cogently advocated that the "SALT II treaty meets U.S. interests and should be ratified as soon as possible" and that, by doing so, the United States "will not be doing the Soviet Union any favors."

Nevertheless, the United States, as is known, frustrated its ratification. Not daring to openly renounce its pledges and oppose world public opinion, the White House administration announced in May 1982 the U.S. side's intention not to take any action that would undermine the SALT II treaty. The pledges on limiting U.S. strategic armaments were given a kind of semiofficial character.

The purpose of Washington's step was to avoid binding itself to any firm commitments regarding the limitation of strategic armaments, to have the chance to maneuver, and to attempt to implement the strivings for nuclear superiority.

It is well known that the line toward torpedoing the SALT II treaty process had been taken in the United States back in the summer of 1979. It was this deliberate U.S. Administration course and not the "events in Afghanistan," as White House spokesmen are now claiming, that caused the ratification of this vitally important treaty to be wrecked. The U.S. Administration frustrated the ratification of SALT II because it established strategic parity. Its adoption hindered the policy of strong-arm pressure on the USSR, destroyed the claims about a U.S. "strategic lag" and the myths about "windows of vulnerability," and, significantly, prevented the development of anti-Soviet propaganda to the scale on which it is conducted at the moment.

Nor did the treaty accord with the military development plans which the Pentagon had embarked on on the brink of the eighties. It was for these reasons that the United States took the path of gradually wriggling out of the treaty and repudiating one after another the restrictions envisaged by it as they became obstacles to planned programs for the creation and buildup of strategic armaments. The events of recent years fully confirm this. Having frustrated the ratification of the treaty, the United States launched production of long-range ground- and sea-based cruise missiles and embarked on their mass deployment.

In December 1979 the United States, having promised its NATO partners that it would ratify the SALT II treaty (and having deceived them), persuaded them to make a decision on the deployment of new U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe. Deployment began in November 1983. From the viewpoint of the SALT II treaty provisions this directly undermines the strategic balance established by it, which the sides had agreed not to violate. In fact, every U.S. medium-range weapon stationed near the Soviet border is essentially a strategic weapon as far as the USSR is concerned.

October 1981 saw the announcement of the U.S. "strategic program" for the eighties, which envisaged a further buildup of its strategic potential. The content of the program also confirmed that Washington is not concerned about keeping the pledges it has made. Take, for instance, the plans to create and deploy Midgetman ICBM's in the next few years. Since the Pentagon has now nearly finished testing the new MX ICBM, the Midgetman will be the second new type of ICBM whose creation and deployment are expressly prohibited by the SALT II treaty.

But while breaking the SALT II treaty the U.S. Administration is reluctant to bear responsibility for doing so. The White House is trying to shift the blame for its subversive actions onto the Soviet Union, stating that the United States will observe only those provisions of the SALT II treaty which the Soviet Union also observes. At the same time fraud is being perpetrated and shameless propaganda is being unleashed claiming that the USSR is failing to fulfill a number of provisions of the SALT II treaty -- those very provisions whose observance the United States itself would like to avoid. But, upon a conscientious examination of the thrust of the matter, nothing remains of all these so-called "accusations."

The thesis that the Soviet Union is failing to display restraint in developing its strategic armaments has received wide currency in the propaganda campaign which the United States is mounting. But the facts say the opposite. By the early seventies the United States had twice as many nuclear charges on its strategic delivery vehicles as the USSR, but it continued to rapidly build up their numbers. As a result, the number of nuclear charges on U.S. strategic delivery vehicles more than trebled. The Soviet Union naturally took steps to eliminate the discrepancy which had arisen and to restore the balance.

In the White House's language these Soviet actions are declared to "exceed the framework of defense requirements."

In the mid-seventies the United States had 550 ICBM's and 496 MIRV'ed SLBM's. The Soviet Union at that time did not have a single missile of this type. In subsequent years the USSR, with a view to eliminating this discrepancy, did of course create [sozdat] and deploy such weapons. Again this step of ours was described by Washington as "a manifestation of a lack of restraint." The selfishness and propagandist orientation of this approach are obvious.

The White House spread the story that the Soviet Union, in contravention of the provisions of the SALT II treaty, is developing two new types of ICBM. They are trying to aver that the Soviet RS-12M missile (what NATO calls the SS-25), which is nothing but a modernized version (modernization within limits specified by the SALT II treaty is not banned) of the RS-12 missile which we already had, is the second "new type" of ICBM. The issue of this missile has been discussed in exhaustive detail between the two sides. The Soviet side cited specific facts showing that the features of the missile's modernization fully comply with the relevant provisions of the SALT II treaty. But the U.S. side, despite the facts, continues to claim that the RS-12M is an ICBM of a new type. The strategem here is simple: accusing the USSR of developing a second new type of ICBM in order to give "the green light" to its own Midgetman missile.

Washington has just as biased an interpretation of the question of encoding telemetric information when carrying out missile flight tests. Matters are portrayed as though the methods of transmitting telemetric information in use in the Soviet Union do not comply with the treaty provisions. These claims are also unfounded. During the SALT II negotiations a mutual understanding was reached. Each side is free to use various means for transmitting telemetric information during ballistic missile flight tests, including its encoding, when it does not make it more difficult to verify the observance of the SALT II treaty provisions.

The Soviet side does not encode those parameters which have a bearing on the verification of the fulfillment of the SALT II treaty provisions. To resolve the question we suggested the U.S. side name the parameters which, in its opinion, should not be encoded, but this was rejected. The U.S. side's refusal to name these parameters is evidence that it is not seeking to resolve this question. Why is the U.S. Administration continuing to cling persistently to this "accusation?" Because the United States is constantly violating the provision on the nonuse of deliberate concealment measures which impede verification. This has almost become its daily practice. And here it is trying to use arguments about the "excessive level" of encoding to distract attention from its own unseemly actions.

One further fabrication is that RS-14 missiles (what NATO terms SS-16 missiles), which are banned under the SALT II treaty, have been deployed in the region of the Plesetskaya testing range. Back during the SALT II talks the Soviet side authoritatively assured the Americans that the USSR had never had SS-16 missiles on combat service [v boyevom sostave]. It does not have them now nor will it have them in the future. Moreover, work connected with testing and/or deploying the SS-16 ICBM is not under way on this or any other testing range. Stories about these missiles are a desire to raise a tally of "accusations" against the Soviet Union.

Those are the facts. They convincingly show the U.S. Administration's line -- to discredit the Soviet Union and thereby justify its own course toward definitively undermining the SALT II treaty.

The USSR's treaty policy and actions are honest and consistent. In the time which has elapsed since the signing of the SALT II treaty the USSR has done nothing to circumvent its provisions. It adheres strictly to the strategic arms levels set by the treaty.

With a view to avoiding exceeding them, the Soviet Union has dismantled about 250 strategic means (182 SLBM launchers and a considerable number of ICBM's and heavy bombers). The sublevels set for MIRV'ed missiles and heavy bombers with air to surface cruise missiles are strictly maintained. The provisions limiting the framework for the qualitative improvement of strategic means are being completely fulfilled.

The Soviet Union is not seeking military superiority and it therefore has no incentive to reject the accords elaborated on the basis of parity and identical security. Its positive attitude toward the SALT II treaty has never changed. As a document aimed at limiting nuclear arms and preventing nuclear war, the SALT II treaty is, in our opinion, of positive importance to this day.

The White House is seeking ways of achieving military superiority. Today it seems to it that the United States will achieve it by creating [sozdat] a fundamentally new type of weapon -- space strike weapons. But Washington is making a mistake. The USSR will provide an adequate response to the challenge that they want to issue. There will be no U.S. monopoly in space. Nor will Washington have the military advantages on which the initiators of "star wars" are counting. Seeking to undermine the Soviet Union's security, the United States has in fact embarked on the path of reducing its own security and building up the danger of war for the peoples of the whole world.

An analysis of the ABM and SALT II treaties shows that the links between defensive and offensive armaments are fundamental and principled ones. The treaties must be fulfilled as they are written. That means that only with a total ban on space strike weapons would the way be opened to the process of a radical reduction of nuclear armaments. The USSR advocates an accord on precisely this basis.

The way out of the prevailing situation, Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, points out, is an agreement between the opposing forces on the immediate cessation of the arms race -- primarily the nuclear arms race -- on earth and its prevention in space; an agreement on an honest and equal basis, without attempts to "beat" the other side and dictate one's own conditions to it; an agreement which would help everyone advance toward their desired goal -- the complete elimination of the nuclear threat. The retention of everything positive achieved in the past in the strategic arms limitation field would help to achieve this goal.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1112

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET CRITICISM OF REAGAN'S UN SPEECH

'New Smokescreen Diplomacy'

LD271956 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 27 Oct 85

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin; announcer read]

[Excerpts] This week Ronald Reagan, the U.S. President, came to New York to attend the celebrations marking the 40th anniversary of the United Nations, made a speech there, had meetings with many statesmen, and conducted a conference of leaders of the foremost capitalist states. In line with this, U.S. journalists are talking about Reagan's autumn offensive, about him making a fresh move on the board of world policy in the hope of seizing the initiative and, in the attempt, forestalling any criticism directed against him by other states, and so on and so forth.

Unfortunately, it seems to me this stormy activity does not leave the impression that any serious preparation is being made for the forthcoming negotiations. Statements by Washington administration officials demonstrate a very hard, an extremely hard and inflexible position of defending these known to be unrealistic. The idea that the United States is lagging behind the USSR in the military and strategic sphere, for instance, is being stated very vigorously; that is, the idea that the United States is weak and powerless before the Soviet military threat. Furthermore, this idea is backed by pretty big numerical computations. In general, it is very fashionable in Washington at the moment to pile on the figures. To recall a pretty old joke: A statistics expert says -- Shall I prove to you that these are more Irish than Chinese? Have a go, they say. Well here goes. If you only count the redheads, then there are more Irish. As you know, one gets the impression this is just what the Americans are doing: They are counting the redheads.

Here is an example. They say the Soviet Union has almost 300 more nuclear weapon carriers than the United States. Correct, they say, that's how it is. But they forget, in so doing, to add that it is not missiles that hit targets, nor aircraft or submarines, but warheads. And the United States has far more warheads than we have. But, I repeat, they are counting the redheads.

Or, for another example of just such an operation: In 1979, when the SALT II treaty was signed in Vienna, the sides exchanged official data on the composition of their strategic forces. Since that time virtually nothing has changed. The United States is down as having, in particular, 573 heavy bombers, while the Soviet Union has 156 such machines.

Well now, let's hear what Robert McFarlane, U.S. presidential national security aide, had to say recently. It turns out that the United States now has not 573 aircraft, but only 253 such machines; while the Soviet Union has not 156, but 480. One might ask what happened. Well, objectively nothing happened at all. The fact is that McFarlane is being crafty: The whole thing is that he is now counting only those U.S. machines in combat units whereas the SALT II states very precisely that all machines are to be taken into account, including those in reserve, those stockpiled, and those which have been mothballed. McFarlane prefers not to talk about that at the moment.

Why does the Soviet Union turn out to have three times more machines than before? Because once again in violation of the Vienna accord, McFarlane is counting not only our heavy bombers -- that is the Tupolev-95 and the Myasishchev -- but also machines with a medium operational range, what the West calls the Backfire, the Tu-22M.

So the sort of arithmetic one ends up with is fit for the political literacy beginners' class.

Well, such arithmetic is, of course, a manufactured thing, a manipulation of figures designed to show the United States lagging behind; it is subordinated to a political conception of the overall U.S. approach to disarmament. This approach may be formulated thus: In order to disarm, one must first arm oneself thoroughly. Well, we cannot accept such logic. Our concept of and our approach to disarmament consists of starting disarmament not from an increase, but precisely from a reduction of weapons. And thus, as the first steps -- and this was once again said in the Sofia statement -- we propose the development [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of offensive space weapons should be halted. We propose, further, once again to freeze the already existing nuclear weapons. Our proposal for a ban on nuclear explosions is oriented to the same end.

Unfortunately, comrades, all one hears from Washington is a monotonous, No! The President is literally bewitched with his strategic initiative. THE WASHINGTON POST recently said ironically that he regards this initiative really as Christ's second coming. Attention has recently been focussed here on the correlation between the star wars program and the agreement on limiting antimissile defense systems. The Americans constantly swear they are carrying out only research strictly within the framework of the antimissile defense agreement. Here, that same McFarlane comes out with a statement to the effect that, if one is referring to antimissile defense systems based upon other physical principles -- lasers, for instance, directional energy beams and so on -- then the agreement, it turns out, permits not only testing, but also development [sozdaniye]; not only research, but also development and testing of these same systems. Altogether, everything except deployment [razvertyvaniye] is permitted. This is the new interpretation McFarlane came out with.

Well now, this interpretation is in such contradiction to what is written in the agreement that it gave rise to a positive scandal. The U.S. allies in Western Europe objected sharply. A hullabaloo started in the apitol; disputes and discussions started even within the administration itself. And, in this sort of situation, the President adopted a decision which, in my view, one would be hard pressed to describe as a judgment of Solomon. It was decided thus: Juridically, to regard as correct this broad interpretation given by McFarlane, but in practice to maintain the restrictions deriving from the narrow, old interpretation of the agreement. To be precise, incidentally, one should evidently point out that this narrow interpretation contradicts the agreement. For this latter prohibits the development [sodavat] of antimissile defense bases throughout the country's territory. Yet, it is precisely this that the Americans are doing in implementing their star wars program.

Well now, with such a position being maintained, it is pretty difficult to imagine any broad agreements in Geneva. This is all the more difficult to imagine after the President's recent speech in the United Nations. Incidentally, even before this speech was delivered -- it received quite a lot of publicity there -- it was said that Reagan sees it as his task to shift the accents, so to speak, in order to shift attention from the problems of disarmament -- where the Americans evidently have nothing sensible up their sleeve -- to those problems where, in Reagan's opinion, pressure can be exerted upon the Soviet Union. Thus, taking this as his point of departure, the President moved into the foreground not disarmament, not what worries the whole world, but the settlement of what he described as regional conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Central America. Well, of course we all understand this is without a doubt a necessary matter. But, what does settlement mean? For the President, everything is very simple: The Soviet Union must stop helping its friends. Then, there will be a settlement in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Nicaragua, in Ethiopia and Angola -- these are the countries he mentioned.

The British newspaper THE GUARDIAN described Reagan's speech as new smokescreen diplomacy. Such an approach, the newspaper considers, is designed more for confrontation in Geneva rather than for securing calm and peaceful negotiations. And, on the whole, comrades, I should be hard pressed to dispute such an evaluation.

'Peoples Expected Clear Reply'

LD262047 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Oct 85

[Vitaliy Kobyshev commentary; from the 'Vremya' newscast]

[Excerpt] The speech by Reagan, the U.S. President, at the anniversary session of the UN General Assembly has given rise to heightened interest, as has already been reported, and it continues to be widely commented upon. Here is Vitaliy Kobyshev, the publicist:

Fellow, comrades. The point here is not just the fact that a speech by the head of a state like the United States is of itself an important event. Nor is this interest really explained in full by the fact that official U.S. propaganda has been advertising this speech in advance, energetically, if not to say wildly, as a program event, almost as an epoch-making event. I suspect the essence of the matter lies in something else.

The world public, with complete justification for doing so, expected that the U.S. President would use the lofty platform of the United Nations to speak out clearly in the runup to the Geneva summit meeting on problems, the serious discussion of which the White House has patently avoided lately.

First and foremost, it is a question of the limitation of the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race, and Washington's plans to take this race into space. The peoples expected the leaders of the U.S. Administration to give a clear and precise reply to the recent new Soviet initiatives. Instead of that, the White House representatives resorted to various kinds of distracting maneuvers. McFarlane, assistant to the U.S. President, put forward a proposal, the meaning of which amounted to this: to adapt the 1972 antimissile defense treaty to the U.S. star wars plans. This gave rise to a real scandal, including within the camp of U.S. allies. Then, Secretary of State Shultz made his own propaganda somersault: The antimissile defense treaty, he stated, has supposedly a broad and a narrow interpretation. In other words, the United States will do as they like with it. This, you understand, merely added fuel to the fire. Then, came the speech at the United Nations by the U.S. President, declaring in his pattern that nuclear war is a war that cannot be won.

'Contradictoriness' in Speech Noted

LD251958 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 85

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] The world press today comments on the speech delivered at the 40th anniversary session of the UN General Assembly by Reagan, the President of the United States. Here is Valentin Zorin, political observer of Central Television:

Hello, comrades! In analyzing the address delivered by the head of the United States from the platform of the anniversary session of the UN General Assembly, you pay attention first of all to the contradictoriness inherent in it. On the one hand, the President talks of a desire for peace; on the other, he proclaims plans that are dangerous for the cause of peace. On the one hand, he speaks of goodwill and a desire to solve contentious issues with the Soviet Union; on the other, he resorts to undoubted distortions of the policy and objectives of the Soviet Union.

Of course, one can welcome the fact that the leader of the Washington administration considered it necessary to state from the lofty platform of the United Nations that nuclear war is a war that cannot be won and that never ought to be fought. But that reasonable position cannot in any way be reconciled with the insistent desire, expressed in the same speech, to move forward and to push the idea of "star wars."

Having stated that the new Soviet proposals aimed at reducing nuclear armaments are being studied carefully in Washington and that these proposals contain seeds which, in the President's words, ought to be cultivated, the master of the White House immediately tried to prove that the door leading to the siting of weapons in space ought not to be shut tightly, but on the contrary, opened more widely because you see, that is the path on which lies the genuine security of the peoples.

The impression is being created that the Washington administration has now decided to resort to maneuvers with the object of avoiding a solution of the main issue: attainment of accords that would deliver the people from the endless twisting of the arms race, that would leave space peaceful, and that would lead to a substantial lessening of the military threat. However, it is not political maneuvers that lead one away from the main issues, but an immediate and constructive solution of these issues. That is the demand of the times.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Notes 'Disappointment'

PM280921 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Oct 85 Second Edition p 7

["At the UN General Assembly Jubilee Session"]

[Excerpts] New York, October 25 TASS -- The UN General Assembly has celebrated the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations. A message from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has evoked a great deal of interest among participants in the anniversary session. Representatives of the world community say it presents a constructive and realistic program for the accomplishment of the main task formulated in the UN Charter, that of providing guarantees for lasting peace.

Representatives of many states at the anniversary session responded with disappointment to the address by U.S. President Ronald Reagan, who was actually maneuvering to avoid answering the main questions, those of averting a nuclear war and limiting the arms race. It became clear from what the President said that the U.S. administration had nothing constructive in its approach to these basic problems of our time.

Bowing to the demands of the international community to rid mankind of the threat of nuclear annihilation, the President said -- and it is noteworthy -- that his administration continues "to believe that a nuclear war is one that cannot be won and must never be fought." He stated he was "preoccupied with peace, with ensuring that differences between some of us not be permitted to degenerate into open conflict."

However, the President's admission of the dangers of nuclear war did not at all imply that the United States renounced war planning or the nuclear-missile arms buildup. Moreover, Reagan dwelt at length in his address on the development [sozdaniye] of space strike weapons. Rationalizing the development [sozdaniye] of these weapons, he claimed they were "defensive" and directed "against weapons rather than against people." These allegations falsify the true meaning of the "star wars" program, which is intended to create for the United States an opportunity to deliver with impunity a nuclear strike at the USSR. It is common knowledge that the fulfillment of the U.S. program for the militarization of space could only aggravate the danger of nuclear war -- this is precisely what the President tried to camouflage in his address.

The President attached obviously secondary attention to matters of disarmament in his address, placing emphasis on the solution of "regional problems," which he thought should become "one of the central" issues on the agenda of the Geneva summit.

The U.S. "initiative" contains nothing new. It is just self-advertising without any grounds. Moreover, it is a stale commodity for the gullible that is being pushed.

The world situation today is such that one should not be looking for arguments leading away from the solution of basic questions, such as radical reductions in nuclear weapons, renunciation of the deployment of weapons in space, and the creation of an atmosphere of trust, cooperation, and security for all states. This is what Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stressed in his comments on the President's speech. He said: "We are interested in very different priorities" than the U.S. President and that, contrary to Reagan's proposals, the Geneva talks should concentrate primarily on disarmament problems. As for Reagan's "preoccupation" with regional conflicts, states are themselves capable of sorting them out, especially if problems of disarmament are resolved, Rajiv Gandhi said.

Cooperation on the international scene is necessary, and the Soviet leadership has stated this on more than one occasion. Solutions to all those questions which worry mankind should be looked for now rather than at some time in the future.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Comments

PM281325 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Oct 85 First Edition p 5

[PRAVDA political observer Georgiy Zhukov "Interview at the Teleprinter" on a TASS report about President Reagan's UN speech: "What Is Behind the Eloquent Phrases?"--first two paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[Excerpt] The following report has arrived at the editorial office: New York, TASS--U.S. President Reagan's speech has caused disappointment among representatives of many states gathered for the 40th anniversary session of the UN General Assembly.

We asked Georgiy [usually known by Slavic version "Yuriy"] Aleksandrovich Zhukov, PRAVDA political observer and chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, to comment on this report.

U.S. President R. Reagan's speech was widely advertised in advance in the U.S. news media. Moreover, journalists were briefed on the main themes of this policy speech.

Universal attention was attracted in particular by the statement of a ranking administration spokesman at a press briefing. According to his words, a considerable place at the talks with the Soviet Union in Geneva will be occupied by the discussion, as he put it, of "existing differences on regional problems" rather than questions pertaining to the reduction of nuclear arms and the prevention of the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike arms.

The President's speech confirmed that the U.S. Administration intends to resort to precisely this diversionary maneuver in order to prevent the Geneva summit from discussing and resolving the crucial problem of the present time, namely ending the nuclear arms race on earth and preventing it from spreading into space.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA readers are well aware that the new Soviet initiatives, which pave a realistic way to the solution of these burning problems, enjoy universal and growing support in the world. And it is becoming increasingly difficult for the U.S. propaganda services -- trying in every way to discredit the Soviet proposals by juggling figures -- to sow doubt about the realistic nature of these proposals.

...At the very beginning of his speech the President uttered a number of eloquent phrases about the benefits of peace and the significance of the United Nations, but what he said afterward is completely at variance with the main provisions of the UN Charter.

European Allies Ignored

LD290409 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 28 Oct 85

[From "Glance at the British Scene" program by Sergey Lebedev]

[Text] The delegates of many countries at the United Nations General Assembly session were clearly shocked by President Reagan's speech. Neither was the action of America's European allies pleasant for the White House. The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and Bettino Craxi who is to form a new cabinet in Italy, were disappointed by the fact that the United States President had minimized the arms control issue. The FINANCIAL TIMES has labeled Reagan's speech as disappointing. His speech, it says, does not show whether the United States intends to reply to the Soviet peace initiatives. THE SUNDAY TIMES warned the White House that by trying to minimize the significance of the armaments issue, it is driving a wedge between itself and its West European allies.

By emphasizing the so-called regional problems as items on the agenda of the coming Geneva talks, the President actually ignored the opinion of the NATO assembly in San Francisco, as well as the opinion of the broad Western public. At the assembly the European allies of the United States spoke for making the new Soviet peace initiatives the core of discussion at the summit. It was the general opinion of America allies that in Paris the Soviet leader had come out with proposals deserving great attention. West Europeans feel that the proposals on the non-militarization of outer space and the 50 per cent cut in nuclear arsenals are so important that they require a clear and sincere answer. Unfortunately, the answer has not been made so far.

In his speech at the United Nations General Assembly President Reagan actually ignored the key problem of the present international situation. This seems rather contradictory to United States allies because the President himself has conditioned a serious dialogue on arms limitation by Moscow's readiness to radically cut nuclear arsenal. The President claimed that everything depended only on the USSR. Now that everyone has seen the Soviet side take a concrete step in this direction, the White House pretends it has forgotten its own words. It appears that the administration has landed in its own propaganda trap.

The hints of several presidential closest aides [as heard] also seem strange. They are aspects of arms reduction should be discussed by the American and Soviet delegations at the current Geneva talks, while the summit meeting should focus on regional issues as Washington understands them. This is a clear attempt to avoid a concrete answer to the new Soviet initiatives. This stand is clearly unnatural. It implies that the leaders of the two great powers will not use the chance to discuss the most pressing issues in their bilateral relations, which also affect the situation in the rest of the world. This is clearly a negative approach. It also ignores the interests of European allies that are vitally interested in the interests of European allies that are vitally interested in the positive solution of questions at the current Geneva talks and at the coming summit meeting.

In a commentary on President Reagan's speech at the United Nations THE LOS ANGELES TIMES says the removal of the threat of nuclear war is the most vital question for most people on the globe. The paper feels that the proposal of the President to discuss the so-called regional conflicts in Geneva is nothing more than a propaganda trick. Naturally the Soviet Union is not opposed to the settlement of regional conflicts. The draft of the updated version of the Soviet Communist Party's Program, published a few days ago for nationwide discussion, says the following:

The Soviet Communist Party is convinced that all countries, big and small, can and must take part in searching for solutions of vital problems and the settlement of conflicts, irrespective of their potential, location and social system. This is a concrete program of overcoming international crises and conflicts. Another plank in the program expresses the important thought that the goal of the Soviet policy is to freeze and reduce armed forces and armaments in the most explosive parts of the globe. However, the key plank of the international section of the draft is the necessity to curb the arms race, primarily the race in mass annihilation weapons. According to the Soviet Union it's this issue the American President ignored in his speech on the 40th anniversary of the United Nations, that troubles the world most of all. It troubles Europeans, Americans and people in all other continents on the planet.

Attempt To Divert Attention

LD241940 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1745 GMT 25 Oct 85

["International Diary" presented by Vladimir Pasko]

[Excerpts] Foreign news organs are focusing a great deal of attention on the jubilee session of the UN General Assembly on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of this organization. The delegates' speeches dealt with matters of acute concern to the whole of mankind. At the same time, in reports on U.S. President Reagan's speech at the session, it is noted that it has evoked frank disappointment in UN circles. I call on my colleague, Yevgeniy Kachanov, the commentator, to enlarge on this:

Such an assessment of the U.S. President's speech is not only given in news agency and newspaper commentaries. Criticism toward him has been heard from the UN rostrum itself and in its wings. The Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi; the head of the Swedish Government, Olof Palme; the Nicaraguan president, Daniel Ortega; and many other heads of state and government did not hide the fact that the position of the U.S. Administration set forth in this speech gives rise to serious anxiety. The agency AFP notes that, in fact, the only positive response came from the Pakistani President, Ziaul Haq. No doubt you'll agree that a compliment coming from the lips of the head of one of the most odious dictatorships seems very dubious indeed.

But, as they say, let's get to the point. What is up here? Why such a reaction? The British bourgeois newspaper THE GUARDIAN, take note, publishes its commentary under this headline "Reagan Stays Inflexible on Arms Control". The paper writes that the President's speech is being described as a new smoke-screen diplomacy with which the United States is heading for the forthcoming USSR-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva. Even U.S.

news organs, who, as a matter of duty, as it is called, are supposed to publicize the President's speech write the following literally: Reagan tried to divert attention from the Soviet proposals for arms control. This is the opinion of the TV company CBS. Or UPI: In recent days the administration has tried to belittle the significance of arms control as a priority matter on the agenda of the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. meeting in Geneva. In actual fact, in his speech to the UN President Reagan in essence demanded the agenda of the forthcoming Geneva meeting be reduced merely to the discussion of what he called regional conflicts.

As far as the most vital problems of the contemporary world are concerned, above all questions relating to the limitation of the arms race on earth and prevention of the militarization of space, Reagan effectively sidestepped them. Admittedly, he did not fail to come out again in defense of his Strategic Defense Initiative, more commonly known as the "star wars" program, and he attempted to prove that the program would allegedly give the world peace of mind. At the same time, he again confirmed his refusal to discuss the issue of "star wars" at Geneva, using the assertion that the United States did not want to end up defenseless as a pretext. It must be said that, for a whole week, the White House apparatus strenuously hyped the President's speech, calling it a most important statement on foreign policy matters. The results, as PRENSA LATINA points out, was an attempt to divert the attention of world public opinion from the global problems of the present day.

World Leaders' Criticism

PM281039 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 85 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Against U.S. Wiles"]

[Excerpts] New York, 27 Oct--U.S. President R. Reagan's speech at the jubilee session of the 40th UN General Assembly was greeted with indignation by representatives of many states who had gathered here for the 40th anniversary of the United Nations and was assessed critically by the world mass media. They note his desire to avoid resolving the main problems, radical nuclear arms reduction and the renunciation of the militarization of space, and to substitute the discussion of the question of "regional conflicts."

The proposal put forward by the head of the U.S. Administration to discuss the question of so-called "regional conflicts" in Geneva, the newspaper points out, "is nothing more than a propaganda maneuver."

Certain diplomats from the developing countries described the U.S. President's speech as "inapposite," CBS television notes. British Prime Minister M. Thatcher and B. Craxi, who is charged with forming a new government in Italy, were disappointed that the U.S. President minimized the significance of the problems of arms control.

As many U.S. political and public figures note, in his speech the President once again defended the so-called "strategic defense initiative," which, as is known, is aimed at the deployment of strike weapon system in space. Here, he was basically trying to distort the provisions of the ABM Treaty so as to make them accord with Washington's plans.

Observers have also drawn attention to Reagan's remark that U.S. efforts in this sphere will lead to the territory of not only the United States, but also other countries being protected. Yet, this is contrary to Article I of the ABM Treaty under which each side pledged "not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide [sozdavat] a base for such a defense," to say nothing of other states.

The administration's "new interpretation" of the ABM Treaty has already done serious damage to the United States and should be reviewed, Republican Senator J. Chafee stated.

Western Press Criticism Cited

LD272153 Moscow TASS in English 1851 GMT 27 Oct 85

[Excerpts] New York, October 27 TASS--The speech delivered by U.S. President Reagan at the U.N. General Assembly anniversary session has demonstrated most forcefully his administration's reluctance to take real steps to stop the arms race on earth and prevent its spill over to outer space.

According to James Reston, a leading U.S. columnist, the President was expected to lay down the policy of his administration in the field of arms control. But this policy simply does not exist, James Reston underlines. Therefore, Reagan devoted his speech, which is described by the U.S. news analyst as provocative preaching, to the problem of "regional conflicts".

The speech by the head of the administration was a premeditated attempt to distract attention from arms control, a high-ranking spokesman for the White House has admitted according to THE NEW YORK TIMES newspaper.

No wonder that Reagan's United Nations speech drew a sharply negative reaction. People throughout the world realize well what the vital issue of our times is. Even the Western press, as the Washington U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT weekly unwillingly admitted, is apt to ignore Reagan's speech as a propaganda ploy and not highly effective at that. The London TIMES writes that the world public opinion failed to see in the President's speech evidence of U.S. serious commitment to arms control.

Attempt to 'Displace Priorities'

LD282312 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 28 Oct 85

[Commentary by political observer Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Excerpts] An international action week for disarmament is underway at the moment at the summons of the United Nations and the WPC.

First and foremost, one should note the exceptionally broad scale of the present action week. On the whole, however, it is a universal referendum for halting the arms race on earth and its prevention in space. This is the most graphic evidence of which problems worry mankind most at the moment. One would think that these are all quite evident, but it is not so. Washington is engaging in attempts to displace priorities, so to speak. Even in such a responsible, speech as the one by President Reagan at the UN jubilee session on the occasion of its 40th anniversary, questions of disarmament were given minor attention. However, the White House representative did not then hide the fact that this was a deliberate attempt to divert attention from the problem of disarmament; first and foremost, from the specific, radical USSR proposals on this most important problem.

However, it must be said that this attempt was evidently not successful. It aroused active condemnation, both in the United Nations itself and outside its walls, even among the U.S. NATO allies.

As for the USSR, in the draft new edition of our party's program universal and full disarmament is viewed as one of the most important historical tasks. And the very wide scale of the present world action week for disarmament again convinces us that however great the threat to peace is at the moment, never before have the forces acting in defense of peace been so mighty, and never so realistic the possibilities of upholding it.

'Shots Aimed at Geneva'

PM291611 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Oct 85 Morning Edition p 5

[Aleksandr Bovin "Political Observer's Opinion": "Firing a Round"]

[Excerpts] "The official representatives taking part in the preparation of the summit meeting are speaking of differences on virtually all questions, including how to describe the new Soviet arms reduction proposals, how to interpret commitments under existing treaties, how much attention should be paid to the Soviet Union's violation of treaties, and ultimately, on the most important question--what U.S. goals at the summit should be. From the viewpoint of administration representatives, the confusion is explained mainly by the fact that President Reagan has not yet defined his own overall approach toward the meeting, not to mention toward specific issues."

These words come from THE NEW YORK TIMES and belong to the well-known observer Leslie Gelb. Gelb is a respected journalist and probably things are just as he writes. That is very bad. Because it confirms what many people guessed long ago -- that Washington is not preparing in earnest for political dialogue at summit level. Various people, various groups, and various departments are each pulling in their own direction. The main interest is overshadowed by the clashes of ambitious and private interests and recedes into the background -- they must come to their senses and reach agreement with Moscow.

Of course, much depends and will depend on the President and on his "own overall approach" toward Geneva. As has already been stated, this approach has not been definitely worked out, although it would seem high time... In my view, Ronald Reagan's speech at the UN General Assembly jubilee session makes it possible to determine with a great degree of accuracy the direction in which the President's thoughts are proceeding.

A few days before the President's speech official and UN official U.S. figures began to write and speak about R. Reagan's "fall offensive," about how he intends to "recapture the initiative" from Moscow, to make "a new move on the board of world politics," and so on and so forth. It was also reported that the President intends to "shift the emphasis" and turn the public's attention from disarmament problems, where the United States obviously has nothing to its credit, to other problems where, in R. Reagan's opinion, he will be able to win extra points. And the U.S. President has indeed shifted and reorganized the emphasis. Let's see how he has done this and what the result has been.

The President's speech writers were unstinting in colors to paint the U.S. love of peace. "Speaking to you this morning," R. Reagan said to the jubilee session participants, "I am absorbed most of all in thoughts about peace. I should like above all to ensure that differences between some of us should not develop into an open conflict and I want, on behalf of my country, to give a new undertaking, to make a new start." We continue to believe, the speaker said, that "nuclear war is a war which cannot be won and which should never be waged." Rising to emotive heights -- "Peace is the behest of god. Peace is the shadow thrown by people walking the path of virtue" -- the President promised: "In the next few weeks we will try to initiate a genuine process of mutual concessions and compromises." And, as it were, demonstrating the promised "new start" and his desire for concessions, R. Reagan noted that the Soviet arms reduction proposals "contain the seeds which we must grow."

I would be ready to applaud these words if I had not read other words uttered by the President. What have they to do with "growing" seeds...

Everyone expected R. Reagan to set forth the U.S. concept of disarmament. Their expectations were in vain. Obviously sensing that this concept -- disarmament through arms upgrading -- is not in keeping with common sense and gives rise to questions which can be hard to answer, the President decided to change the emphasis. The "settlement of local conflicts" in Africa, Asia, and Central America was advanced to the fore. What this means specifically is the events in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua.

Describing the situation in which the President's speech was prepared, THE NEW YORK TIMES reported that "Reagan is feeling uncomfortable because of the largely positive responses generated by M.S. Gorbachev in recent months." In that case, it is logical to suppose that in speaking at the United Nations, the U.S. President regained his composure, so to speak. This probably makes him feel better, somehow more at home and comfortable. And there would be no reason to object to that if the U.S. President was not one of those people on whom the fate of mankind depends.

The Japanese newspaper MAINICHI called R. Reagan's speech a "blank round." I cannot go along with that assessment. The round was not a blank. The shots were aimed at Geneva.

Question of 'Priorities'

PM291441 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Oct 85 p 9

[Vitaliy Kobysh "Observer's Opinion": "Our Peace Formula"]

[Excerpts] It is not very long until the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva, on which the peoples pin considerable hopes and expectations--hopes which have suffered much, so to speak, in the situation now prevailing in the world. Will the expectations be justified, or will the hopes prove in vain--who will answer that question today? Therefore people are listening all the more attentively and sensitively to what is said in leading circles on each side, seeking to perceive in their remarks the symptoms of how everything will go in Geneva and to predict its results.

It is well known that U.S. President R. Reagan's speech at the jubilee session of the UN General Assembly caused great interest, as was to be expected, and is still being commented on widely.

Geneva has fanned the interest in what R. Reagan said. But regardless of this, a speech by the head of a state like the United States is an event of some importance in itself. Let us also take note of the fact that official U.S.-propaganda advertised the U.S. President's speech in good time, loudly, not to say excessively, as being "programmatic" and all but "epochal."

All the same, the special interest evoked by this speech was, I believe, due to something else.

The world public had every reason to expect the White House chief to use the lofty platform of the United Nations to express himself clearly in advance of the Geneva meeting on questions which the U.S. Administration has flagrantly avoided discussing seriously in recent times. This means the problem of limiting the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, and Washington's plans to take the arms race into space. After all, the recent new Soviet initiatives have yet to receive a clear, distance reply from the Washington leaders.

Various kinds of extremely strange maneuvers took the place of such a reply. The U.S. President's adviser McFarlane, for instance, made a proposal which amounted to adapting the 1972 antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty to suit the "star wars" program put forward by the U.S. President. This was so provocative that a real furor ensued, also embracing the camp of the U.S. allies: Even the most loyal and dependent of them were shocked. U.S. Secretary of State Shultz, making some attempt to calm down the furor, put forward this idea: The ABM Treaty supposedly has a "narrow" and a "broad" interpretation. This was taken as unambiguous: The United States will do what it likes with the treaty. It turned out the secretary of state was only adding fuel to the flames.

Then the U.S. President's UN speech was published. After noting in passing that "a nuclear war is one that cannot be won" and that "within the Soviet proposal there are seeds which we should nurture," the White House chief focused on something different -- regional conflicts. He presented a kind of list of "hot spots" which disturb him most.

On the threshold of the Geneva summit what the world public expects is not diplomatic games or propaganda tricks, but a display of a serious, responsible approach to those problems of today which are associated with peace, security, and the very existence of the human race.

An approach which is clearly visible in the radical new proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and is enshrined in the clear lines of the draft new edition of the CPSU Program.

We conduct our struggle for the lasting peace and peaceful cooperation between peoples together with the other socialist community states. The fact that socialism is a mighty bastion of peace is confirmed by the results of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference held in Sofia last week. The statement adopted by the conference participants "For the Elimination of the Nuclear Threat and a Turn for the Better in European and World Affairs" is a concrete program for the struggle for a world without nuclear weapons, for war to depart from human society's life entirely.

Both our proposals and the peace formula contained in the new edition of the CPSU Program indicate the Soviet Union, for its part, is doing and will do everything to lift the threat of nuclear war from mankind, deliver him from the burden of the arms race, and prevent it from developing in space. The U.S. President's speech in the United Nations showed that the U.S. leadership has different sentiments and other plans. Naturally, this will not make the path to Geneva and the talks there any easier.

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CSO: 5200/1086

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

MOSCOW EXAMINES OCTOBER NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP SESSION

Meeting Opens

LD291331 Moscow TASS in English 1300 GMT 29 Oct 85

[Text] Brussels October 29 TASS -- A two-day session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group opened at the NATO headquarters today in the presence of defence ministers from 13 NATO countries (except France and Iceland). Spain is represented by an observer. No official agenda of the session, which is shrouded in secrecy, has been announced. But observers close to NATO circles expect it to focus largely on the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting.

U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger is now very active "working on" Washington's allies in Western Europe, who insist on a thorough study of the new Soviet proposals on disarmament. What he is trying to do is to cast aspersions on Soviet constructive initiatives and to discredit them with the help of the Pentagon's "analyses" and fabricated data. He is also trying to use the session to push through the "star wars" programme, secure an approval of further American nuclear tests and continued implementation of the NATO Council's decision on the deployment of 572 American first-strike nuclear missiles in the territories of a number of West European countries. According to the BELGA news agency, Weinberger intends to persuade the NATO partners in Brussels to participate in the American plans for the militarisation of outer space.

Local newspapers say that Washington's emissaries will again put pressure on the Netherlands to make it -- contrary to the will of the overwhelming majority of its population -- accept 48 American cruise missiles in its territory.

U.S. May Face 'Difficulties'

LD292103 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 29 Oct 85

[From "The World Today" program, presented by Dmitriy Biryukov]

[Text] A 2-day session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group at defense minister level opens today at the headquarters of the North Atlantic bloc in Brussels.

This group's sessions usually take place in secret. However, this time it is known that this meeting will discuss the new Soviet disarmament proposals. As you may recall, comrades, West European countries have generally taken a very serious attitude on the Soviet proposals, and this has worried Washington. One can draw this conclusion from the latest utterances of the highest representatives of the White House, and particularly by U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger. For example, the Washington correspondent of the newspaper "DAILY TELEGRAPH" has reported that Weinberger has come to Brussels with the aim of getting NATO member-countries' support for the American accusations that the Soviet Union supposedly violates arms control agreements. However, the newspaper goes on, Weinberger will probably face a number of acute questions regarding Washington's interpretation of the antimissiles defense treaty of 1972. Let us note, incidentally, that when the Pentagon says the treaty allegedly permits not only research in the field of space weapons but also their testing in practice, there has been indignation in European countries. According to the BELGA news agency, with Weinberger's assistance the White House intends to put its usual pressure on the allies to force them to support the "star wars" program.

You know, comrades, on what scale the week of action for disarmament is taking place. In dozens of countries fighters for peace are calling for a halt to deployment of American first-strike nuclear missile weapons in West Europe.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon intends to discuss during this session in Brussels not only plans for further deployment [razmeshcheniye] of these weapons, but also the issue of the replacement by the United States of American missiles and nuclear warheads already in Europe with more up-to-date ones. This means that, despite the fact that the official topic of the meeting should be the determination of the strategy of the North Atlantic alliance in the light of the forthcoming Soviet-American meeting in Geneva, in fact one can expect Washington to try to convince its West European allies of the need to fully support its aggressive course.

Commenting on the forthcoming session, many Western press organs have stressed that the representative of the White House will come up against certain difficulties, as the constructive, peace initiatives and realistic steps to relax international tension put forward by Comrade Gorbachev during his official visit to France met with a broad response in Western Europe.

'Remarkable Contradictions'

LD292251 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 29 Oct 85

[Commentary by political observer Aleksandr Zholkver from the "International Diary" program]

[Text] The NATO body's name speaks for itself: it deals with nuclear armaments planning within the Atlantic bloc. The group's activity, despite its arch-secret nature, has always caused anxiety within Western Europe, where, as we all know, the principal NATO nuclear arsenals are located. However, especially alarmed voices can be heard in West European countries in connection with the current session in Brussels. Indeed, what is happening in the Belgian capital?

There is wide discussion throughout the world, from the jubilee UN session to many national parliaments and every possible scientific forum, regarding the most vital contemporary problem, namely, curbing the highly dangerous and ruinous arms race. The present international week of action, conducted in response to a call from the very same United Nations, has truly become a world-wide referendum in favor of disarmament. Many eminent statesmen and scientists of high standing -- and by far not just in the socialist countries -- indicate that favorable conditions for this are created by the new Soviet peaceful initiatives, from halting any nuclear explosions and reducing the numbers of missiles in Europe to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's well-known proposal for reducing the strategic nuclear weapons of the USSR and the United States by half and their renunciation of the manufacture of strike space weapons. And, right now in Brussels, according to Western news agencies, NATO is discussing plans for increasing nuclear armaments and placing them in space orbits. That is precisely what, writes the London DAILY TELEGRAPH, the head of the Pentagon, Weinberger, is aiming at in the Belgian capital.

It is impossible in this connection not to note at least two remarkable contradictions in Washington's official position. First, they have frequently given assurances -- the most recent occasion being during President Reagan's recent meeting with the heads of government of the famous Big Five -- that the American Administration is elaborating, in response to the USSR initiatives, its own proposals regarding arms limitations. But, as we can see, the Washington emissary is not at all concerned at the NATO meeting with limiting but, on the contrary, with increasing armaments. Second, President Reagan's speeches contained frequent assurances that the development [razrabotka] of space weapons would allegedly make nuclear weapons redundant. But now, in Brussels, it turns out that in -- let us say -- parallel with the development [sozdaniye] of space weapons, NATO is planning to increase and modernize nuclear weapons as well. And, as they elaborate here, in a great, historical perspective, up to the year 2000.

To justify all these truly monstrous plans, the head of the Pentagon cites an argument which is as old as it is false: the necessity to catch up with the Soviet Union. In reality, numerous facts, including the latest ones, show that the genuine initiator of the arms race both on earth and in space is the American military-industrial complex itself. Precisely at the time when Weinberger was leaving for Brussels, THE WASHINGTON POST published highly noteworthy data on that account. It cited a list of 22 major American concerns which, using their close links with the Pentagon, receive military tenders from it worth billions of dollars. And the U.S. military industry, THE WASHINGTON POST writes, believes "star wars" to be the most promising source of profit ever. Thus is confirmed yet again one of the provisions of the draft new edition of our Party Program: that it is precisely the nuclear and other arms race that brings unprecedented profits to the monopolies which, having merged into the military-industrial complex, have become the most zealous bearers and organizers of the policy of aggression.

Weinberger Applies Pressure

LD302218 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 30 Oct 85

[From "The World Today" program; presented by Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] What are the United States and its NATO allies doing? One can judge this particularly from the results of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group session which ended today in Brussels.

The fact is, details of a session of this top secret group are not usually reported. However, even from those scanty reports which have found their way to the pages of the Western press one can draw quite a clear conclusion: Pentagon boss Weinberger was again applying pressure in the Belgian capital on the U.S. allies in NATO, demanding their support for Washington's plans to increase nuclear armaments and, simultaneously, create space weapons.

However, this time, not everything went that smoothly; those in the NATO capitals cannot fail to take into account the wide response generated around the world by the new Soviet initiatives concerning a radical reduction of nuclear armaments and the refusal to produce space strike weapons.

In these conditions, West European leaders have urged Washington to consider the Soviet initiatives carefully and to respond to them with their own proposals on the issue of disarmament. THE NEW YORK TIMES has even started to refer to it as a rebellion of the NATO allies. In order to suppress this rebellion, Weinberger resorted to his old method in Brussels, that of falsifying facts. The Pentagon boss called for catching up with the Soviet Union in both nuclear and space armaments. Meanwhile, numerous facts show the United States is the true initiator of the arms race both on earth and in space.

'Growing Anxiety' Noted

LD302105 Moscow TASS in English 2052 GMT 30 Oct 85

["Session of NATO Defence Ministers"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, October 30 TASS -- TASS Military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

The two-day session of the NATO Nuclear-Planning Group, which has ended in Brussels, was keynoted by growing anxiety of U.S. West European allies over attempts of the Reagan administration's representatives to diminish the significance of the problem of limitation and reduction of armaments at the coming Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva.

Success or lack of success at the Geneva meeting in the eyes of the world public opinion will be linked with its progress in the field of limitation of nuclear armaments, wrote the London newspaper THE SUNDAY TIMES. The newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES stresses that the attempt of the U.S. Administration to divert the public attention from problems of disarmament at the coming summit meeting was undertaken without taking into account demands of the Europeans.

According to Western press reports, chief of the Pentagon Caspar Weinberger burst into feverish activity at the session of the NATO defence ministers and undertook desperate efforts to put to doubt the USSR's large-scale proposals on nuclear and space armaments and to discredit the very idea of agreement with the Soviet Union. A conclusion can be made that his efforts were crowned only with partial success this time.

In a communique, which was issued in Brussels, the participants in the session reiterated run-of-the-mill phrases on "Atlantic solidarity" and "flexibility" of the American stand at the negotiations with the USSR, and expressed "hope" that the recent Soviet peace initiatives "indicate a Soviet willingness to accept verifiable and equitable arms control agreements".

Contrary to the efforts of the chief of the Pentagon who sought to prove that disarmament problems played a minor role, the session "welcomed the opportunity for effective arms control offered by the Geneva negotiations".

Greece expressed its views in a statement included in the minutes. Denmark reserved its position on the INF [intermediate nuclear forces] part. American news agencies stress that the defence ministers did not note in the communique that they supported the U.S. "star wars" research work.

The Brussels session has shown that the military leaders of the European NATO countries are experiencing to a still greater extent pressure from the public who demand that an end be put to the reckless arms race.

No Support for SDI

LD310136 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1745 GMT 30 Oct 85

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Konstantin Patsyuk]

[Excerpt] Many mass information media abroad note the importance of the new Soviet proposals put forward by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev during his visit to France. As is well-known, these proposals are aimed at curbing the nuclear arms race on earth and preventing it from being spread to space.

Judging by the pronouncements over the past few days that have been heard from Washington, the U.S. Administration is clinging to its plans to militarize space as before. What is more, on the approach to the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting it has again been attempting to impose this dangerous course on its NATO allies. This is shown by the 2-day session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group which finished in Brussels on Wednesday. Its participants -- the war ministers of the bloc -- experienced strong pressure on them from Weinberger, their U.S. counterpart. He attempted to convince the session participants that the Soviet Union is allegedly not complying with agreements it has concluded with the United States. He needed this maneuver, it seems, in order to justify the U.S. "star wars" program, which is indeed itself leading to an undermining of these agreements.

Support for this program was expressed by FRG Minister of Defense Woerner. He even went so far as to refer to it as being what common sense demands and almost as a panacea against the threat of nuclear annihilation which menaces mankind. However, by no means all participants in the session are of this view in respect to the U.S. militarist program, which has unleashed a fresh spiral in the nuclear arms race.

In this connection, foreign observers are drawing attention to the fact that in the communique about the Brussels meeting, its participants did not have a word to say about their support for the "star wars" plans.

Final Communique Examined

LD302248 Moscow TASS in English 2232 GMT 30 Oct 85

[Text] Brussels, October 30 TASS -- TASS correspondent Albert Balebanov reports:

A two-day session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group ended at the headquarters of the North Atlantic Alliance today with calls for further build up of the U.S. and NATO nuclear potentials. Taking part in the session held behind closed doors, were defence ministers of 13 NATO countries. France and Iceland were not represented. An observer was present from Spain.

Under Washington's pressure, the participants in the session supported in the final communique the course at further deployment of U.S. first strike missiles in a number of West European countries and modernisation of other types of nuclear weapons in Western Europe, as well as "efforts of the United States and Britain" to upgrade their strategic nuclear arms.

The results of the session showed that the United States exerted strong pressure on its partners in NATO to get their unconditional support for its militaristic course in the sphere of nuclear arms and for its obstructionist stand at the Geneva talks. This is shown by the activity of U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger at the session and in its lobby. He was unsparing of allegations about "the Soviet menace", allegations based on the Pentagon's so-called "analysis" of the Soviet missile potential.

Observers, however, are of the opinion that Weinberger did not succeed in everything, even though he expressed satisfaction with the results of the session after its ending. Thus, Greece expressed its special viewpoint in a statement included in the minutes, and Denmark reserved its position on the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles in Western Europe.

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CSO: 5200/1088

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

MOSCOW TV'S 2 NOV 'STUDIO 9' PROGRAM

OW021035 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0600 GMT 2 Nov 85

["Studio 9" program presented by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet Television and Radio; with Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin]

[Excerpts] [Zorin] Hello, comrades. We are meeting with you again in Studio 9 of the Ostankino Television Center in our traditional talk devoted to topical problems of world politics. Taking part in our program today are academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin.

The fall of this year has turned out to be particularly full of events of paramount international affairs: the visit of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to France, and the most important proposals directed at the suspension of the arms race that he made during this visit; the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member-states, which adopted a statement for the removal of the nuclear threat and a turn for the better in European and world affairs; Comrade Gorbachev's visit to Bulgaria; and the 40th jubilee session of the UN General Assembly.

All these were events of paramount international importance; and although each has its own specific nature and composition, a common thread unites them: the desire to take effective measures which could deflect the threat hanging over mankind. It is obvious to every sensible person that a serious change is now needed in international affairs, that to go on like this is impossible, and that mankind has come to an extremely dangerous limit.

Geneva Summit

I think that, strictly speaking, this circumstance gave rise to the need for an event which is taking place this month; I mean the meeting, at the highest level, between the leaders of our country and the United States in Geneva. As you know, this meeting will take place on 19-20 November.

In this connection, the question arises, with which I would like to begin our talk today. I think that this meeting was perhaps impossible 1 year or 18 months ago -- at any rate if we take into account, not the nature of protocol, but a practical meeting for solving matters, and the existing circumstances in international affairs. But now it has become a political reality. Georgiy Arkadyevic; why?

[Arbatov] One thing that is certain is that this objective necessity for some sort of turning point or change in the entire course of international affairs -- which, strictly speaking, existed 18 months ago -- has become even more obvious and urgent. But, of course, for an objective need, including this one, to turn into practical deeds, one also needs a political will, the political will of those who must take part in a certain event -- in this case the United States and the Soviet Union.

If we talk about the United States, I would say that recently -- beginning last year precisely with the election campaign, but particularly the last few months -- this necessity and requirement that something must be done and the understanding that the matter is approaching quite dangerous events and changes, has gathered strength. It has gathered strength, and this, strictly speaking, was noticed earlier, last year during the election campaign.

Now, I would like cite a very interesting article by former U.S. President Nixon, who, I think, most briefly and correctly defined the reason why dialogue, and particularly summit meetings, are necessary.

This reason is survival. If one is to ensure survival, that is, to prevent nuclear war, one needs talks, objective and practical talks, to solve practical problems. This has begun to get through to the Reagan administration. And generally quite painful for it have become the rebukes of critics that it would be likely that Reagan would be the first U.S. President in the last 50 years not to meet with Soviet leaders and not to have had serious talks with them about problems dividing the two sides, about world problems, about what needs to be done in general, and so on.

I think that it has gotten through to the administration that it needs a meeting, no matter what policy it conducts afterwards. If the danger of the situation has indeed gotten through to it, and it understands that, if the course of events further develops like this, it could lead to a very tragic finale, then this meeting is needed to somehow outline paths leading to a way out of the deep rut in which American policy has found itself in recent years, to of course find a way out together with the Soviet Union, and to find mutually acceptable solutions.

[Arbatov continues] But, even if the administration wants to continue its former policy, it also needs a meeting. It needs one so that at least it can say to its critics, both within and outside the country, that it has done everything. In this case, the meeting can then be broken off, and then, of course, everything will be done to propagandistically support this action and argue that it was not the United States which broke off the meeting, but the same atheistic communism, the same Russians.

I think that this was one reason that pushed the United States to this decision about a meeting. The other was the struggle, the persistent and acute struggle which is being waged around questions of Soviet-American relations and the problems connected with them -- strictly speaking, the most fundamental problems, the problems of peace and the arms race.

This struggle is being waged simultaneously at a number of levels. One of these is the Reagan Administration itself. Of course, the matter here looks very distinctive. It is not a struggle between moderates and extremists, between doves and hawks, as they say. It is rather a struggle between the extreme right and the far right. Although I would say that even these distinctions cannot after all be ignored, they too may play a certain role.

However, I think even more important than this struggle is the one being waged within the ruling class, what are called U.S. ruling circles. I mean precisely monopolistic capital and the political elite and those who surround them. In general, the position of these ruling circles has also noticeably moved to the right, which has incidentally given rise to great concern even among U.S. allies and among many Americans, because they are afraid that this drift to the right will ultimately place America in a position of isolation; that is, will isolate America from the rest of the world.

Nevertheless, the distinction here is much more clearly pronounced and more substantial than within the administration. Here there are many very serious forces and specific people who understand that the American position is not adequate to the realities ... [corrects himself] the present American policy is not adequate to the realities of the world, and that it must be made to correspond with these realities, including economic ones, because an entire chain is created here: enormous military spending linked to a large deficit, linked to the national debt. All this threatens serious financial upheavals and social upheavals.

I happened to be in the United States recently, in September, and talked with a number of major specialists on the American economy, and to major financiers. Many of them expect a possible catastrophe within the next 2 or 3 years if things go the way they are going now.

U.S. 'Struggle' With Allies

Then there is a struggle within American public opinion, although the antinuclear movement in America has become somewhat more passive. It managed to be deceived in some things. There are probably some objective reasons for this, but, on the whole, serious conflicts are coming to a head, which are moreover tied to social and foreign policy problems.

Finally, there is a serious struggle being waged within the very alliance of capitalist countries, between America and her allies. I think that tension here has reached an unprecedented scale in the fund of military history, although all this is concealed by outward solidarity. It proceeds along quite a few lines. All these lines of struggle and tension being created also push, and have pushed, the American Administration into finding a way that would lead to a summit meeting.

[Shishlin] On the whole, you can probably say it in that way -- rushing in with a no to the possibility of a Soviet-U.S. dialogue would have meant a serious mistake for the U.S. Administration...

[Zorin interrupts] ...and political isolation...

[Shishlin] Yes, and serious political losses...

[Arbatov interrupts] All the more so against the background of the great approval with which the initiatives were met...

Reactions to SDI

[Shishlin] This is precisely what I wanted to talk about, and deal with the issue of the political scene, which I cannot say has become better or more stable in the last year to 18 months, but it has begun indeed to change substantially in some aspects. To a large extent it is connected with the extensive Soviet initiatives and the actions undertaken by the Soviet Union for smoothing international relations. In this connection, I would like to remind those watching our program about the Soviet Union's resolute condemnation of the program which is designated SDI. This clear and principled position was very much to the point, and ensured proper conclusions were drawn about the Soviet Union's stand and its approach to the sensitive issue of one's own, and international, security.

I have in mind our actions, such as unilateral moratoria on antisatellite weapons, the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear arms, nuclear tests, any nuclear tests. Of course, all this had an effect on the political climate, and yet the question could be asked: If you look at U.S. reaction to the Soviet initiatives, you can easily see that it has been especially negative. The Americans rejected the Soviet examples of goodwill and, in fact, pulled in an entirely different direction. Well, does that mean that the Soviet initiatives were useless? There is no doubt that they were not. The recent appeal by six leaders of various states to U.S. President Reagan and the CPSU Central Committee general secretary is very interesting, and not simply because of the political activity demonstrated by these leaders, but by the ideas they expressed. On the whole, these ideas are in harmony with the political aspirations, which are characteristic of our country, socialist states, the Nonaligned Movement, neutrals and, in general, the widest circles of the international community and different political forces.

I think that as we discuss the issue of why there was no U.S. rejection of Soviet-U.S. direct dialogue at the highest level, it is probably appropriate to take into consideration the substantial intensification over the last few months of political dialogue between our country and what is normally called Western countries. You know, comrades, about the serious and substantial results -- we have already reminded you about the visit -- Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to France. It was significant, not only for Soviet-French bilateral relations. Its political echo is protracted. I think that, in this connection, it is noteworthy to mention a report from Japan about the great interest being shown by Japanese political circles, including Prime Minister Nakasone, about direct contacts with the Soviet leadership. Actually, high-level contacts with Japan have already been planned for the coming few months. That is also a new element in the world political scene. I think that it is worth noting that the sharp worsening of problems in what is sometimes called the Third World is characteristic of the current world political picture. That includes growth of foreign debts, conflict situations, and the slack pace of development. All that has political consequences. Now, the leaders of developing states, leaders of the Nonaligned Movement, clearly see the interrelation between the current state of the world and those urgent and most difficult tasks they have to solve, and that they can be solved confidently only in different circumstances. This very position of the developing states, which causes their increased political activity, shows that again that activity does not follow the course outlined in the current U.S. Administration's policy.

In this sort of situation, in such a state of affairs, I think that a negative Washington response to Soviet-U.S. dialogue would have simply been a political catastrophe, a very serious, tangible defeat.

[Zorin] Georgiy Arkadyevich, I would like to ask the following question: The United States and our country will take part in a bilateral meeting. We have spoken, and you have produced a large number of arguments showing the motives for which Washington considered it expedient to finally agree to that meeting. What are our motives?

[Arbatov] Well, you see, I am sure that our leadership had no illusions about the character of U.S. policy in general, and the current administration in particular, when the decision was taken.

[Arbatov continues] But first of all, the leaders of a country that knows what war is better than any other country, that lost over 20 million people in the last war, naturally cannot overlook even the slightest possibility. They cannot overlook even the slight possibility for securing peace and removing this new and even more terrible threat. This is simply a matter of responsibility for their own people and the entire world, responsibility that is recognized by an ever growing number of people in other countries. I think that there are also other important reasons. One of these is that the time has come to determine once and for all the true intentions of this administration, to check it out fully, so to speak. You see, the administration was very frank at the beginning.

It said that all these agreements on arms limitations were bad, that it did not want to take them into consideration and did not want to hold any kind of talks with the Soviet Union. That applies to 1980, the 1981 election campaign, and part of 1982. The United States strives for military superiority over the Soviet Union. It wants to throw communism and socialism on the dust heap of history, and so forth. Later, after meeting with growing dissatisfaction and opposition to this policy both within the country and

among allies and in the world in general, the position was changed. But the position was changed formally, outwardly, verbally. They stopped uttering words about their aim being superiority, about their aim being to make it possible to wage war and win. Instead, they began to say that it is not possible to wage a nuclear war or that it is not possible to win. They resumed talks with the Soviet Union and agreed to abide by the agreements signed earlier by the Soviet Union and the United States. It is clear that it is not possible to survive on rhetoric alone; talks go on, the arms race goes on, and there comes a moment when it finally becomes necessary to show clearly how the matter is progressing, what the administration wishes, and what it is actually striving for.

This final moment has now come because of the logic of the technological development of means of destruction, new weapons systems, because of political logic, and because of many other reasons.

'Checking Out' Reagan

I also think that the moment of truth has also come at another level. I think that the critical time has come for checking out the U.S. leader, President Reagan. This may be his greatest checkup. What is he actually, the current leader of the largest and most powerful capitalist country? Is he a man completely divorced from reality, living in a world of some extremely reactionary dogmas, incorrect and sometimes falsified quotes that were handed to him and that he took without discrimination, and felt very comfortable in this shell all these years? Or is he a man who is getting some understanding of the realities of the current world, a man who is climbing out of that shell and rising to the responsibility required from him by his position and his political role? Of course, this is also a checkup of the President's entourage, his aides, although I do not believe in the theory that the king is good and it is all the fault of the ministers. The king himself selects his ministers. You see it is always safer to let the man live in a comfortable shell than to tell the 75-year-old man that he has lived for decades in a world of incorrect images of the surrounding political atmosphere, the world in general, military affairs, and even U.S. realities. And Nixon, in the article I mentioned, among many correct things said something that I think is very wrong: about Reagan actually not having to prove to Gorbachev in Geneva that he is standing for peace, that Gorbachev already knows that. I think this is incorrect. It is incorrect not only from Gorbachev's point of view, but from the entire world's point of view. Very many in the world are not sure whether Reagan stands for peace nor not.

[Arbatov continues] After all, you know they say that it is easy to love mankind in the abstract, and harder to love each man specifically; so it is very easy to say, in the abstract, that you support peace and universal well-being. But when it boils down to specific political steps, to restraining not only in words, but in deeds, when it boils down to terminating military programs and the conflict this entails internally between various representatives and influential groups in the ruling class, then this turns out differently. I think that Reagan still has much to prove. He has to prove his seriousness as a political figure, his responsibility, his ability to understand the world, and, of course, his peaceableness.

[Zorin] And Georgiy...

Reasons for Going to Geneva

[Shishlin interrupts] Valentin Sergeyevich, before you ask another question, I nevertheless would like to return to the initial question: What are we going to Geneva with? Why are we going to Geneva?

I think that the Americans and the present U.S. Administration can probably take into consideration not only what I have mentioned about military-strategic parity -- this is regardless of how this situation is assessed in the United States. But generally one thing is sure: They recognize the Soviet Union's ability to deal the United States unacceptable damage, at least equal to the U.S. ability.

I think we, in going to Geneva, have managed to show not only the United States that the socialist community, the socialist countries -- and this was probably most convincingly demonstrated at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee in Sofia -- are united, and all attempts to pursue a differentiated policy in relation to the socialist countries and to arouse some kind of discord between them have proved bankrupt.

It seems extremely important to me that, during the past year, we have begun to prove, and to prove well, that the Soviet Union can solve its internal problems more confidently and can focus, in the long term, on concentrating its efforts in solving constructive tasks, which is demonstrated in particular by the new draft edition of the CPSU Program that has been published.

Now, generally, I would not like to discourse on the topic of strong or weak positions, about who has the stronger or weaker position among the participants at the forthcoming Geneva meeting, but we can say one thing definitely, that the Soviet Union's position is not weak and is moral.

[Zorin] Now, when only a few days remain before the summit meeting, a very important circumstance, it appears to me, is becoming noticeable: extremely serious differences between this meeting's participants, besides differences on the most principled issues, not secondary ones.

In particular, the latest statements of the Washington Administration's leaders, as well as Reagan's speech at the jubilee session of the UN General Assembly attest to this. So, frankly speaking, the backdrop for the forthcoming meeting is not the best. Now, Georgiy Arkadyevich, how would you assess this situation on the eve of the meeting?

[Arbatov] This is a question which truly cannot fail to cause alarm. A startling thing has occurred. Since the very moment this summer when agreement was reached on the summit meeting, the U.S. position on everything relating to Soviet-U.S. relations, to limiting the arms race, began to harden and to become even worse than previously.

Of course, this inevitably leads to very serious reflections, to doubts about the U.S. side's very intentions. Now, what in fact is a summit meeting? Without in any way belittling its significance, it is two working days. Taking into consideration what is said in the United States about the so-called attention span [spoken in English] -- in other words, that period during which the President can work, listen attentively, and understand his interlocutor -- it becomes fairly short, so it will be two short working days. Naturally, the summit meeting is not just these 2 days, it is everything occurring over a period of several months before it. Generally, you could even say that in some areas the summit meeting has already begun.

The Soviet peace initiatives can be understood in this way. With the nuclear test moratorium, we can see that, despite the categoric U.S. rejection, it received a response and it has now been repeated most convincingly and eloquently in the appeal of the leaders of the six states. The same goes for our other proposals, our new proposal on strategic arms limitation. I would even say that conceptual attitudes which I think have a significance no less important than concrete proposals, what Comrade Gorbachev spoke about in Paris, that in the nuclear age entirely different attitudes are needed in relations between states and in international relations in general, that the role of force must be viewed in a completely different way, and so forth. All this is related to, and is a preparation for, the realization of this objective necessity, some decisive turnabout in the development of international relations.

[Arbatov continues] Unfortunately, we see something else from the U.S. side: an unequivocal no. When Nikolay Vladimirovich said that it had not given a final no to dialogue, again I would say that it is still early to say that, because it could say no at the meeting itself. This could be part of it, and we cannot be sure now whether it is positive.

Look at what is happening, if we take seriously Reagan's speech at the General Assembly. First of all, it amounts to a substitution of the agenda. It is an attempt to turn the meeting into something like a trial, in which the U.S. President, with his highly extremist and, I would say, archly conservative views, will act simultaneously as the prosecutor, the judge, and the jury.

But this will not work with us. It will not work with us. A game like this will not get anywhere with us and will fail at the summit meeting. It must be a serious political event. Only then will a serious success and serious results be possible. This is all that the Soviet Union has in mind, not any of these political games.

Then, of course, this souring of the atmosphere that is going on, an intentional souring to a great extent, literally on the eve of the meeting, cannot fail to arouse alarm. After all, this is something which sets up a lot of inertia. An atmosphere of anti-Soviet hysteria, created earlier, is intensified and aggravated, later weighing like lead shoes on the feet of every U.S. statesman. After all, if the Soviet Union is that bad, how can agreement be reached with it?

What about all the ultimatums they attempt to give us; in order to have peace you should do this, that, or the other. In other words, do everything to make the world an American one. This too will not work, with us or with others.

The world has become much larger, it is much bigger than America, and neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can rule it in their way. The world lives; and the majority of the world is, after all, not even the Soviet Union together with the United States.

[Shishlin] Nevertheless, Georgiy Arkadyevich, if we take a look at what American preparations for Geneva have amounted to, then despite all the extremism of the present U.S. Administration, it still seems to me that they are somehow digging in, they are attempting to secure those lousy positions which were so characteristic of the U.S. foreign policy course and activities.

In other words, if we now sift through what we have heard and seen over the past few months, then unfortunately very little remains. At least no elements of a new approach can be seen. Yet a new approach is simply a categoric demand in the nuclear age.

Now, you recall Mikhail Sergeyevich's address to the French parliamentarians. This idea of a new attitude, of an entirely new concept, if you will, in international relations was also seen in the document of the Political Consultative Committee conference; and generally this new concept includes several elementary truths of the nuclear age, although I must note that, for some reason, elementary truths are often learned with the greatest difficulty.

What elementary truths are we talking about? Primarily, of course, we are talking about a military solution to the problems of USSR-U.S. mutual relations or, in a broader context, to East-West mutual relations simply not existing. Further, in the nuclear age -- and I agree with you that in this case the interests of not only the Soviet Union and the United States are in question, but essentially those of the whole world -- security must be shared evenly. It must be universal, regardless of the size of one country or another.

[Arbatov] That it cannot be achieved at the expense of another party or against it.

[Shishlin] It is impossible, yes.

[Arbatov] We can die together or survive together, it is that kind of...

[Shishlin interrupts] That is why, if a solution is sought, we must reach out to, and not turn our backs on, one another.

Third, of course, interstate relations must be freed from ideological prejudice. Interstate relations in the nuclear age must be built on a common interest in -- I use that word again -- survival. Because of this, we must of course reach agreement, we must see, a reasonable compromise.

[Shishlin continues] I think that all the American political baggage is not packed. It is even somewhat scattered, judging by what we know. Generally, this is of course in the order of things. One has to also take into account this routine diplomacy; it is unavoidable. However, the fact that the preparations in America for such a responsible and, also, such a rare meeting are for the time being conducted in a far-from-constructive tone, gives rise to watchfulness and concern.

Bush's Reaction to USSR Proposals

In this connection I would like to quote U.S. Vice President Bush. He said the following concerning Soviet ideas and initiatives in an interview with ASSOCIATED PRESS: The concrete proposals made by the Russians, although we have a few problems concerning these proposals, were steps in the right direction, says Bush. Up to now, a noticeable lack of specifics was observed; but now they have presented something and I would welcome this. ASSOCIATED PRESS assesses these quite loose words by the American Vice President thus: Bush's reaction to the Soviet proposals was one of the most positive within the administration up to now.

[Arbatov] How far to the right did one have to go to judge this a positive gesture?

[Shishlin, laughing] Yes.

[Arbatov] But there is something else here, because many Americans understand this and there's more to the world than America. They see the great activity of Soviet policy. They see the truly sincere desire, and not simply words. A certain number of intermediate-range missiles have been removed, tests have been halted, and a moratorium here

and a moratorium there; and against this background, there is emphatically a challenge: No, we shall go the old way, we shall conduct another test, and we shall launch another military system, and so on. It has begun to get through to Americans and the administration that this puts them in quite a complicated position in this extremely concerned world, a concerned world with an oversaturation of weapons and the military threat hanging over it.

[Zorin] Georgiy Arkadyevich, you have said that an atmosphere is being generated on the eve of the meeting which is unlikely to facilitate progress.

[Arbatov] You put it too mildly.

[Zorin] I think that within the framework of today's discussion it will be interesting to hear a reply to the question about world reaction to the coming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting?

[Shishlin] The question appears to be simple, yet at the same time it is not all that simple. A general assessment of the situation shows that the majority of states welcome the meeting, unconditionally placing great hopes on it. Some common interests of countries and peoples are expressed here. But the reaction itself to the meeting is diverse and different.

'Class Solidarity' in NATO

Georgiy Arkadyevich has already mentioned the sessions being held within the NATO framework. Specifically, you can also mention the meeting of the capitalist six within the framework of the 40th UN anniversary. Here you can say plainly that class solidarity remains; and with all the existing differences with its partners, the United States is managing to hold the general front of capitalist states. Nevertheless, in the main and on the whole I think we are justified in saying that U.S. allies, including fairly close one, stand for an agreement with the Soviet Union; they come out extremely cautiously concerning "star wars" plans. Moreover, they exercise specific pressure on Washington to submit its constructive counterproposals to the extensive Soviet initiatives, which are assessed as the cornerstone and clearly defined issues which can be discussed at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting.

We have already mentioned developing countries. I think that here the main phenomenon is not the sympathy and support by the Nonaligned Movement as the declared position of the Soviet Union, insofar as this position is really dictated by our own interests and those of international security. I do not think that it is possible to talk about this as much as about...

[Arbatov interrupts] ...interests of development...

[Shishlin] ...interests of development, yes; and the amount of growth of political activity and political weight of this group of states in this aspect. I think it is risky for Washington to ignore this group of states. Naturally, I need hardly say that we are supported by socialist countries, and this support is expressed in various very interesting ideas, in active political steps, political actions. Talking about the essence of the matter, we can say that the wide international background is favorable for the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting.

PRC Reaction to Summit

[Zorin] I would like to return to the question of world reaction to the coming meeting and, view of the fact that you have just returned from a trip to the PRC, I would to ask you, Georgiy Arkadyevich, to speak about PRC reaction to the forthcoming meeting.

[Arbatov] You know that I held many discussions. Most of the time, I had to deal with Chinese foreign affairs specialists and scientists, and naturally this issue constantly received special attention. I would say, actually, it is from official documents and not only from conversations, that the position of the PRC has undergone very substantial changes with respect to Soviet-U.S. relations. China has completely departed from that inherently colorful Chinese and mythical image of sitting on the mountain and watching two tigers fighting. They in China understand well that no one will be able to sit out a world nuclear war, a nuclear war between the USSR and the United States.

China is interested in preventing such a war like any other country. I am convinced there has been a serious improvement in China, in the understanding that international tension and the arms race cause great harm to China's interests. The Americans began it [the arms race] not only in Europe, but in the Pacific as well, they are intensifying it in the Pacific. This leads to the militarization of Japan, creates the threat of the militarization of Japan. The Soviet Union is naturally forced to reply with measures for strengthening its defenses. This leads to the situation in which China is faced with a very difficult choice. In the conditions of the arms race being intensified by the United States, it has either to slip down to the position of a third-rate military power or join the race and do away with all its plans for overcoming centuries-old backwardness in the country, and modernization, which is now being given primary importance.

[Shishlin] Georgiy Arkadyevich, what you have said about China is very interesting. I will interrupt you for just a moment because, as far as the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting is concerned, an interview with Deng Xiaoping, one of the Chinese leaders, appeared a few days ago in TIME magazine, in which he directly comments on the views of the Chinese leadership on the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting.

I think these words speak about China's attitude. Deng Xiaoping says: We welcome the summit meeting. It is better to meet with one another than not to meet at all. But we do not attach any particular hopes to it. It is hard to judge the Soviet proposal to reduce the number of their missiles by 50 percent. It appears to be a fairly good proposal. Nevertheless, we shall not judge -- and it is not easy to judge -- whether the two sides will be able to reach agreement on this proposal.

[Arbatov] Yes. Well, as a matter of fact, doubts about the meeting also exist in China -- what is how I would put it -- in China, too, about the outcome.

Hopes for Geneva

[Zorin] We have returned to the topic of today's discussion, and, in conclusion, I would like to ask you the following question: How do you imagine now, at the beginning of November this year, a general assessment of the international situation?

[Shishlin] Well, we have spoken about this already, and I understand, Valentin Sergeyevich, by the deliberate and precise way you put the question that a general assessment of the international situation is by no means the outcome of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. Unfortunately, one must precisely declare that preparations for the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting have been different in Washington and Moscow, and the method of preparations was different.

At the same time, both a need for an agreement and the possibility for an agreement exist, and the need is most imperious. The aim and cost of this meeting is very high, and of course the Soviet Union strives to get maximum results from Geneva. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States, separately or together, are capable of solving all international problems, and this task is not being addressed. However, Geneva could create the prerequisites for a turn to the better.

I think that as a result of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Geneva -- Georgiy Arkadyevich may correct me -- the world will not get worse. But whether or not it will get better remains for the Geneva meeting to answer.

[Arbatov] Well, you know, I think that of course we must also fear disappointment; and insofar as there are many expectations, it would be much better and safer if these expectations were not followed by disappointment. Politically, this is very undesirable. But overall I would say that despite all this we should not lose the feeling of reality in all its diversity and the understanding of several truths.

One truth is that the history of Soviet-U.S. relations did not begin with the Reagan administration and most likely will not end with it. The second one is that there is more to the world than America, and we cannot and do not look at the world through a prism of Soviet-U.S. relations. They are very important and we attach enormous significance to them, but we know that there is much more to the world. There are things to do in the world; many processes, including very positive ones, are occurring, and I would say that, overall, both our international situation and generally, I think, the prestige of the Soviet Union are higher than in many years.

This instills confidence and optimism if we look at things from the point of view of big world strategy and the world situation.

[Zorin] Our time on the air has run out. It remains for me to thank you, my colleagues, for participating in our talk today, and to thank our television viewers for their attention. So, until our next meeting here in our Studio 9, thank you.

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CSO: 5200/1106

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET COMMENTARY ON GDR-CSSR CW-FREE ZONE PROPOSAL

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 40, Oct 85 pp 11-12

[Article by Vladimir Ustinov: "The Start Could Be Made In The Heart Of Europe"]

[Text] On September 13 the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia put forward an important initiative aimed at improving the European political climate and reducing the threat of war—a proposal addressed to West Germany to create a chemical weapon-free zone in Europe and to begin talks to this end. The governments of the two socialist countries consider it feasible to do away with the stockpiles of chemical weapons in this region and to rule out the deployment on the continent of new and highly dangerous types of these weapons, primarily the binary.

In their letter containing the proposal, the two countries stress that, alongside nuclear weapons, chemical weapons are one of the most dangerous means of mass destruction. Energetic efforts on both global and regional scale are needed to outlaw them. Consistently advocating the conclusion of a comprehensive convention on banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, the G.D.R. and Czechoslovak governments hold that talks on the creation of regional chemical weapon-free zones would be a concrete step towards the building of confidence and the prohibition of these weapons the world over. With this in view, they are prepared to conclude with the West German government an agreement which would remove chemical weapons from the territory of the states situated directly on the demarcation line between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries.

The new proposal is consonant with European public sentiment and is essentially in line with the initiative of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the West German Social Democratic Party, the biggest opposition party in the Federal Republic, as regards the creation in Europe of a zone free of chemical weapons. As the initial step these parties urge the establishment of such a zone on the territory of the G.D.R., West Germany and Czechoslovakia.

It will be recalled that the Independent Commission on Disarmament consisting of prominent public leaders from a number of countries declared for such a zone in 1982. In the opinion of the Commission, agreement should be reached on notification of the locations of existing storage facilities and stockpiles of chemical weapons in Europe, verification of their destruction, and also permanent procedures for control over the observance of the agreement, including a number of on-site inspections on demand.

The importance of the initiative of the G.D.R. and Czechoslovakia can hardly be overestimated. For it relates to a region where considerable armed forces equipped with up-to-date weapons have been concentrated. Moreover, both nuclear and chemical weapons have been deployed on the territory of West Germany. As Der Spiegel observed, the 2,000 tons of nerve gas stored at American depots in the vicinity of Pirmasens alone are enough to wipe out hundreds of millions of lives. Ex-

pressing the opinion of wide sections of the West German population, Julius Lehlbach, Chairman of the Federation of German Trade Unions in Rhineland-Palatinate, stressed that chemical means of warfare are an offensive weapon that presents "a threat to the basic human right—the right to life." According to estimates by experts, enough of the toxic agent VX has been stockpiled in West Germany to destroy all mankind. But apparently even this is not enough for the apologists of chemical warfare. The Pentagon's contingency plans provide for the further increase of these stockpiles by air lifts of poison gases from the United States.

As was pointed out at a press conference held in Moscow on September 19, a particularly great threat to Europe is presented by the U.S. binary weapons programme. Washington makes no secret of the fact that these weapons are planned to be deployed on the territories of a number of West European countries. Their use in the event of war in Europe would take an enormous death toll, with the loss of life among the civilian population running to 20-30 times that inflicted on the armed forces.

A key role in carrying out these sinister plans is allotted West Germany, where another five storage facilities for binary chemical weapons are to be set up. And at present its territory is being used for the NATO Autumn Forge exercise in the course of which U.S. and West German troops rehearse operations with chemical weapons, binary included.

It is not surprising, then, that some West European countries are seeking to safeguard themselves against this barbarous means of mass destruction. For instance, the Dutch Parliament adopted a resolution in February 1982 against the deployment of chemical weapons on the country's territory and their use by the Dutch armed forces.

As regards the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, their attitude to the idea of creating a chemical weapon-free zone was expressed in the Warsaw Treaty states' Prague Political Declaration of 1983, which called for ridding Europe of chemical weapons.

The communiqué of the April 1983 session of the Warsaw Treaty Committee of Foreign Ministers emphasized that the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons on worldwide scale

would offer a radical solution to the problem of preventing chemical war. At the same time parallel steps to this end within the limits of the European continent would be useful. The socialist countries declared their readiness to enter into contacts with other interested states in order jointly to examine the practical issues involved in ridding Europe of chemical weapons, in particular the scale and sequence of the specific measures to be taken, the relevant commitments and verification of their observance.

In order to hasten the opening of talks on this important problem, the Warsaw Treaty countries addressed to the NATO states in January 1984 a detailed proposal relating to the ridding of Europe of chemical weapons. Noting that the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles on a worldwide scale would be the radical way to remove the chemical threat, they emphasized that "partial measures of a regional nature in the matter of limiting, reducing and abolishing chemical means of warfare would involve fewer countries than global measures and would be simpler to agree on and carry out."

Last year the socialist countries advanced at the Stockholm conference a proposal for ridding Europe of chemical weapons as a major confidence-building measure.

This approach met with a lively response the world over. Some West German media noted the major significance of the Warsaw Treaty countries' proposal which could lead to the worldwide prohibition of chemical weapons.

Olaf Feldmann, a West German Free Democratic Party expert, observed that, considering the way talks on global agreement on chemical weapons were dragging out, it was "logical to tackle the problem again, for the time being within the limits of the European continent."

The official reaction in the NATO countries to the socialist countries' initiative was restrained or evasive. A statement issued by the British Foreign Office on January 11, 1984, for instance, declared that the proposal did not fully accord with the British government's desire for the speediest comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons which would be the most effective way of ridding the whole world

and not only Europe of these weapons. Actually the contention was merely an excuse for evading discussion of concrete disarmament measures.

As regards the Warsaw Treaty countries, they are convinced that the pressing problem of banning chemical weapons can be resolved and that for this it is essential to use both global and regional measures. As can be seen from the initial comments, the latest initiative of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia has found a positive response all over the world.

But there are also discordant voices. For instance, the CDU/CSU deputy floor leader in the West German Bundestag, Volker Rühe, sees in the proposal for a chemical weapon-free zone a threat to NATO. Even more categorical are the pronouncements of NATO leaders. And it is not surprising that in an interview to *Die Welt*, NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington declared against the creation of such a zone in Europe, contending that this would make the European continent less secure inasmuch as there supposedly are no effective means of verification.

The Soviet Union's approach is altogether different. As CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has said, "in the event of the creation in Central Europe of a zone free of chemical weapons, the U.S.S.R., adhering to its fundamental foreign policy principles, would be ready to guarantee and respect the status of that zone." It was also emphasized that such a guarantee would become effective if the United States acted likewise.

Thus, once again it is up to the West.

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CSO: 5200/1109

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS REPORTS SYDNEY CONFERENCE FOR NUCLEAR-FREE PACIFIC

LD211447 Moscow TASS in English 1335 GMT 21 Oct 85

[Text] Canberra 21 October TASS--TASS correspondent Aleksey Voronin reports:

A regional student conference "For Peace, National Independence and the Nuclear Weapon-Free Pacific Ocean" was held in Sydney in the presence of representatives of Australian student organizations and envoys of 13 countries, including the Soviet Union, New Zealand, the Philippines and several South Pacific states. The conference was sponsored by the international union of students and the student union of Macquarie University in Sydney.

Dorothy Costa, one of the conference's sponsors, told the TASS correspondent that those who took the floor of the forum spoke about the growing aspiration of youth and students for ensuring lasting peace and international security and removing the world war threat. They stressed that a complex and dangerous situation had obtained in Asia and the Pacific Ocean area. U.S. increased military presence, Washington's actions to militarize outer space and the moves to intensify the United States' military cooperation with Japan and South Korea put in peril peace and security in that region. The military alliance between Australia and the United States and the continued nuclear weapons testing by France are also conducive to heightening tensions there.

Participants in the conference urged the United States and other nuclear powers to follow the example of the Soviet Union, which pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, with a view to creating propitious conditions for setting up new nuclear-free zones in the world.

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CSO: 5200/1096

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

NEW ZEALAND HITS WEINBERGER--New York 17 October TASS--The Government of New Zealand will continue to pursue its anti-nuke policy despite Washington's attempts to exert pressure on the country and to rouse public opinion against it, New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer said in Wellington today. AP reports that he criticized statements by U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger to the effect that the New Zealand Government was taking a wrong position towards the USA by having prohibited calls of U.S. ships with nuclear weapons at New Zealand ports. The deputy prime minister strongly denounced Weinberger's statement to the effect that if New Zealand did not renounce its anti-nuclear course the United States would have to take alternative measures in the Pacific and characterized it as an open threat to a sovereign state and another manifestation of U.S. policy from strength." [quotation mark as received] [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1215 GMT 17 Oct 85 LD]

NEW ZEALAND PREMIER CITED--Washington 14 October TASS--Prime Minister of New Zealand David Lange has stressed the need of attaining a balanced verified reduction of armaments. Appearing in the CBS Television programme, he reaffirmed once again that his government did not intend to allow entries of ships with nuclear weapons aboard into New Zealand's ports. Our country will not be a party to nuclear strategy and does not want to be protected by nuclear weapons, he stressed. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0751 GMT 14 Oct 85 LD]

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CSO: 4200/1096

GENERAL

FRENCH LEADERS STRESS FRG COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Vienna OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT in German No 5, 1985 pp 473-474

[Text] France: Defense Policy

Declarations by the French president and defense minister indicate new nuances in the question of European defense. The emphasis is on a greater inclusion of the FRG in the nuclear deterrence doctrine than has been the case, something that is in harmony with the views of the bourgeois opposition parties. The FRG territory is to be especially defended, since a violation of German territory will have decisive effect on French security policy interests.

On the occasion of the German-French "Alliance" maneuvers Defense Minister Hernu pointed to the joint security interests by stating at Muensingen that even a minor crisis affecting Germany would also touch France. For that reason the two countries should develop plans for a crisis situation and stage joint maneuvers.

The newly established "Rapid Development Force" (FAR) also offers opportunities for operative intervention in the Eastern forelands of France. Relevant expressions--"French security begins at the Elbe"--include the intent to procure by the mid-90s intermediate range missiles that could engage targets beyond the Oder-Neisse border while excluding the two German states. At this time, only the Pluton missiles are available as far as tactical nuclear weapons are concerned, but these have a range of only 120 km.

The defense minister has issued a directive for the formation of a working group, consisting of officers, scientists, and engineers, which would function as a "space command" and advise the French government on military uses of space. This is not designed to establish a French military presence in space, rather it is to establish long-range options for space activities. Thus, this is not meant as an abandonment of the current deterrence doctrine.

General J. Lacaze, the chief of the French General Staff retiring at the end of July, spoke out in favor of the acquisition of the neutron weapon and chemical armaments, arguing that France could not defend itself adequately against a Soviet attack with chemical weapons. Neutron arms could considerably increase the credibility of a "last warning" within the framework of tactical nuclear weapons.

The general also criticized the insufficient financial resources allocated for the arms program for 1984-1988. Since drastic cuts are to be made in conventional forces, an organizational reduction should be included in the plans. Adequate air forces should be allocated to the "rapid deployment force" for air support.³ According to the view of experts energetic countermeasures should be taken to avoid the cuts in the conventional sphere.

Reorganization of the 1st Army Completed

The reorganization of the 1st Army that has been going on for years came to its preliminary conclusion in early July. Now I Corps includes the 1st and 7th armored divisions (Trier, Besancon), the 12th and 14th light armored divisions (Saumur, Montpellier), and a supply brigade. The 1st armored division, previously assigned to II Corps, was allocated to I Corps, apparently to compensate for the loss of armored forces to the FAR.

II Corps consists now of the 3rd and 5th armored divisions (Freiburg i. Br., Landau), the 15th infantry division (Limoges), and a supply brigade.

III Corps includes the 2nd and 10th armored divisions (Versailles, Chalons s. M.), the 8th infantry division (Amines), and a supply brigade. The three army corps are said to include about 165,000 men and 1400 light and medium tanks.⁴

Corps troops include the following: two signal battalions, one armored reconnaissance battalion, one reconnaissance battalions, one artillery battalion, two air defense artillery battalions, one battalion of combat helicopters, two traffic control battalions, two transportation battalions, two engineer battalions, one supply brigade. An armored division includes about 10,000 men, a light armored division 5600-6000 men, and an infantry division about 7500 men. An armored division has either three tank battalions with 52 battle tanks each, or two tank battalions with 70 tanks each. On the corps level command is facilitated by the command and information system RITA.

In the area of arms procurement the delivery of armored 155-mm cannon on the AUF-1 self-propelled chassis and of 155-mm TRF cannon is to be concluded. By the end of the 80s, they are to be joined by the LRM multiple rocket launcher. In air defense artillery the SATCP (missile sol-air tres courte portee) missile is to be put in service shortly. Battlefield surveillance up to a range of 100 km is to be carried out in the future by the CL 289 reconnaissance drone, while the "Orchidee" device will serve to detect moving targets up to 80 km away in the enemy rear areas.

The "Rapid Deployment Force" (FAR)

On 4 July, the new 4th airmobile division was officially established in Nancy as part of the FAR. It includes about 6500 men with 240 combat and other types of helicopters. This division, along with the 6th light armored division (Nimes), the 11th airborne, the 11th naval infantry and

the 27th Alpine division comprises the FRA, headquartered at Maisons-Laffitte. The previous 4th and 6th armored divisions were disbanded or restructured. The equipping of the FAR that has been criticized from several quarters has not yet been concluded.

"Farfardet 85" Maneuvers

Parts of the FAR conducted from the 1st to 6th June their first major exercise in Languedoc, Roussillon and the adjoining waters. The maneuvers had a triservice character. The exercise consisted of an airmobile operation to capture a harbor, using a combat helicopter battalion (60 helicopters), light tanks, and a total of 3000 men. Deployment of a battalion of combat helicopters on board of the aircraft carrier "Foch" and the attack of this battalion in the mission zone were practiced. The capture of the harbor of Sete was carried out by two marine infantry commandos and a light armored battalion, supported by 22 combat aircraft. The aircraft carrier "Clemenceau" with its naval aircraft served as the support base. The main purpose of the maneuvers was the landing from the sea by commando troops and light tanks, as well as the reception of helicopters by an aircraft carrier. Coordination between the landing units, naval forces, and combat aircraft was also practiced.⁵

German-French "Alliance" Maneuvers

From 10 to 20 June, joint German-French maneuvers took place at the Muensingen training area on the Swabian Alb. Thirty-one hundred men of the Bundeswehr and 1500 French soldiers participated, and the American Air Force made some A-10 ground attack aircraft available. At French request the "Alliance" was organized by the Bundeswehr and concluded with a joint declaration by the two defense ministers to the soldiers of the II German and II French corps.

"Airex 85" Air Force Exercise

From 11 to 22 March the French air force conducted maneuvers in which other NATO countries participated, designated "Airex 85". The exercise was designed to test mission readiness, especially in the defense of friendly airspace, and conduct of counterattacks. General Capillon, chief of staff of the air force, pointed out that the French air force was the only one in the West that put in action almost its entire force, i.e., about 100,000 men and almost 400 combat aircraft, including the Mirage 2000.

The participating aircraft of the NATO countries (FRG, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, U.S.) started their squadrons from their home bases and flew a total of some 785 attacks against targets in France, with flight conditions closely resembling combat operations. The 180 aircraft of the home defense were reinforced with other squadrons, so that some 240 aircraft could be used. In addition to the 785 simulated attacks by the allied air forces, the French aircraft themselves carried out 939 attacks. To test coordination the exercise included naval aircraft and air defense batteries of the ground forces. There were also "penetrations"

into "enemy" states in order to engage targets in depth while overcoming opposing antiaircraft fire. Some 360 missions were assigned to the squadrons of the tactical air forces who were charged with neutralizing radar facilities and engaging missile bases.

FOOTNOTES

1. LE MONDE, 15 June, 22 Jun 1985.
2. LE MONDE, 5 Jun 1985.
3. "Diminishing French Defense," NZZ [NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG] 4 Jul 1985, p 3; APA [Austrian Press Agency] report, 1 Jul 1985.
4. ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Apr 1985, p 32 ff.
5. LE FIGARO, 7 Jun 1985, p 8.

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