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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

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# USSR REPORT

## MILITARY AFFAIRS

### MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

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Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

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## EMPLOYMENT OF AIR ARMY FORMATIONS FOR FRONT MOBILE GROUPS FIGHTING IN OPERATIONAL DEPTH

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 86 (signed to press 24 Jul 86) pp 14-21

[Article by Mar Avn A.N. Yefimov, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces and USSR Deputy Minister of Defense, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, published under the rubric "Soviet Military Art"]

[Text] During the years of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet operational art successfully resolved the problem of rapidly exploiting a tactical success into an operational one by constantly increasing the attacks. In the course of the front operations, the mobile groups of the fronts (PGF) were the decisive means for exploiting the success. They first began to be organized in the Battle of Kursk, they consisted of tank armies or horse-mechanized groups (KMG) and were committed to battle in the aim of developing the offensive in the operational depth of the enemy defenses, defeating its operational reserves, cutting the escape routes of large groupings, for pursuing or surrounding them in cooperation with the combined-arms armies.(1)

The success of carrying out these tasks to a significant degree depended upon the effective cover and support from the air for the mobile groups and upon the clarity of their cooperation with the air formations. Being the most mobile, powerful and longest-range means of combat, aviation played an exceptionally important role in committing the mobile groups to battle, in breaking through the tactical enemy defensive zone and for operations in the operational depth. Under conditions when the tank formations drew 30-80 km away from the main forces of a front and were forced to operate in a dynamic situation, aviation was actually the only means of their cover and support. During this period from 30 to 40 of the air army formations was involved in the interests of the tank armies and horse-mechanized groups and in such operations such as the Orel, Berlin and others, major forces of long-range aviation were also employed. A portion of the air army formations (chiefly the ground attack planes) cooperated continuously with the tank armies. According to the situation, additional forces were assigned to reinforce them.

With the increased effective strength of the air armies, the air forces operating in the interests of the PGF over the operational depth constantly increased. Thus, while in the Kursk Counteroffensive (1943) one ground attack

division and one fighter division from the 2d Air Army were assigned to support and cover the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies of the Voronezh Front, in the Vitebsk-Orsha Operation (1944), the I Guards Bomber Air Corps, the III Ground Attack Air Corps, the I Guards Fighter Air Corps and the II Fighter Air Corps (up to 800 aircraft) were assigned to support and cover the 5th Guards Tank Army of the 3d Belorussian Front. A fighter air corps and three separate air divisions (around 500 aircraft) were to be used to support the KNG. In the Berlin Operation support and cover for the 1st Guards Tank Army of the First Belorussian Front was to be provided by the IX Ground Attack Corps and the VI Bomber Corps, the 188th and 221st Bomber Divisions and the 283d Fighter Division.(2) Here the air formations were to carry out the following missions: cover and support for the tank formations; preventing the planned pullback of enemy troops and combat equipment and their occupying of intermediate defensive lines; the defeat of arriving enemy reserves and counterstrike groupings; the conducting of air reconnaissance; the delivery by air of ammunition and other materiel to the tank troops (see the diagram).

[Caption for diagram on p 16: Diagram. Missions Carried Out by Air Army Formations to Support Mobile Groups of Front]

For covering the tank armies in the 1943 operations (Orel, Belgorod-Kharkov and others), fighter air divisions were assigned. The fighters carried out their mission in small groups. Depending upon the situation, they operated either from an alert status in zones located over the battle formations of the PGF or airfield alert (being called in). In the operations of 1944-1945, for carrying out the mission of covering the tank formations they began to employ larger fighter forces: for example, in the Vistula-Oder Operation, the 2d Guards Tank Army was covered by the VI Fighter Air Corps (iak) and one division from the III iak. This made it possible not only to keep a significant portion over the covered troops but also seal off the most probable approach routes of enemy aviation. The fighters intercepted the enemy bombers at the distant approaches and prevented aimed attacks against the tank troops. When necessary the forces could be bolstered by subunits on airfield alert.

One of the main tasks of an air army was air support for the tank field forces and formations. In the operational depth this was carried out by small groups of ground attack planes which were called in against targets and objectives impeding the advance. Aviation was called in by air representatives which were in the battle formations of the tank forces. If the ground and air situation had become extremely complex (in breaking through the rear defensive lines, crossing water obstacles, repelling strong counterstrikes and so forth), air support was intensified by calling in additional forces of the air armies and carried out in wave operations.

In the course of pursuing the retreating enemy, the air formations and units switched to disorganizing the retreat and destroying the enemy troops and combat equipment on the roads. For carrying out this mission, not only the frontal [tactical] aviation was used but also long-range aviation (Belgorod-Kharkov, Orel, Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy, Belorussian, Vistula-Oder and other operations). Here the following goals were set: in the first place, to cause maximum losses to the enemy personnel and combat equipment; secondly, to

demoralize the retreating troops and prevent them from escaping the strikes and to assist in every possible way in the tank armies anticipating the enemy in occupying intermediate defensive lines.

Depending upon the ground situation, the meteorological conditions and the available forces, the retreating enemy was combated by various methods. For example, in the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy, Nikopol-Krivoy Rog and Proskurovo-Chernotsy Operations, this task was carried out by launching strikes with small aircraft groups. Such air operations wore down the enemy, forced it to constantly disperse personnel and combat equipment, delayed the retreat and helped the encirclement and destruction of the enemy by the tank formations.

In the Belorussian, Vistula-Oder and other operations, aviation periodically made concentrated strikes against railroad facilities, crossings and troop columns. Initially small groups of aircraft created "plugs" on the roads and crossings and after this the enemy troop accumulations and combat equipment were destroyed by strikes of large bomber and ground attack forces. Indicative in this level were the operations of Soviet aviation during the Vistula-Oder Operation in January 1945, when the enemy, in suffering great losses, began to retreat to the third defensive line in the aim of digging in on it and stopping the offensive of our troops.

Air reconnaissance promptly detected the retreat of the enemy on the axes of Czesochowa, Sosnowiec and Krakow. Attacks by the bombers and ground attack planes of the 2d Air Army destroyed the bridges and crossings over the Pilica River and on the roads the enemy troop columns were destroyed as they retreated in disorder from the main area of the Vistula defensive line. Particularly successful were the air operations against the columns of the enemy XLII Army Corps and the 10th Motorized Division which were retreating from the area of Skarzysko-Kamienna on the Radomsko axis. The bombers and ground attack planes in groups up to 30 aircraft each attacked them around the clock. The scattered and demoralized Nazi troops under the continuous attacks by the Soviet pilots retreated in disorder, trying to escape from the advancing troops. Aviation held up the retreat of these groups and caused them great losses while the PGF tank formations surrounded and destroyed them. (3)

The combating of enemy arriving reserves was one of the main missions for the aviation in supporting the PGF operations in the operational depth. This was carried out in the interests of not only the tank field forces and formations but all the troops of the front involved in the offensive operation. But, considering that the tank armies operated on the axes of the main thrusts away from the main forces, the enemy reserves were aimed primarily against them. In such instances the air efforts were concentrated chiefly on causing maximum losses to the approaching reserves, to disrupt planned maneuvers, to thwart concentration in the forming-up areas and force the Nazi command to commit them to battle piecemeal. By this the air army formations helped the tank armies in repelling the enemy counterstrikes and developing the success of the offensive at a rapid pace. For example, in the course of the Zhitomir-Berdichev Operation in January 1944, as a result of launching effective strikes against the Nazi tank columns, the bombers and ground attack planes of the 2d Air Army helped the mobile group of the First Ukrainian Front

consisting of the 1st and 3d Guards Tank Armies in cooperation with the combined-arms armies to successfully repel the enemy counterstrikes.

Air reconnaissance played an important role in supporting the actions of the tank armies (KMG). It was virtually the only source of obtaining data on the enemy deep in its defenses. With the aid of the reconnaissance aircraft crews the command of the tank troops gained information on the enemy's defensive system, the concentration of its artillery and troops in the zone of advance; the presence of reserves and the nature of their maneuvering in the operational depth; the state and capacity of the roads and crossings. The air reconnaissance data provided an opportunity to study the man-made and natural antitank obstacles and the enemy artillery grouping ahead of time and to designate the routes for maneuvering and the bypasses of impassable areas of terrain.

Tactical and operational air reconnaissance were carried out for the tank armies. Tactical air reconnaissance was provided by the crews of those air formations which were assigned for direct support and coverage of the tank troops. The missions of operational air reconnaissance were carried out according to a plan of the air army staff by special reconnaissance aviation subunits. The reconnaissance data were transmitted to the air reconnaissance radio nets and received by the command post of the tank army commander. In individual instances for obtaining a mission and increasing the efficiency of submitting reports on the results of the air reconnaissance, the reconnaissance aircraft landed in the positions of the tank troops. Complete and dependable air reconnaissance data made it possible for the command to quickly discover the enemy's plans and take sound decisions for combat operations.

Under the conditions of the rapid advance of the tank armies (KMG), the prompt air transporting of ammunition and other materiel to them was of important significance. This was caused, on the one hand, by the great distance of the tank troops from the supply depots and, on the other, by the loss of the lines of communications during the spring and autumn muddy season. For carrying out this mission, transport regiments of the GVF [Civil Air Fleet], formations of long-range aviation and the air armies were involved. The following data show the scale of the shipments. In the Bereznegovato-Snigirev Offensive Operation of the Third Ukrainian Front carried out under the conditions of the spring muddy season of 1944, in just 17 days, the tank formations had air transported to them some 670 tons of varying freight, predominantly ammunition and fuel. By replenishing their supplies they were able to carry out a continuous pursuit of the retreating enemy. In the Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy Operation, the 326th Night Bomber Air Division of the 2d Air Army, from 8 through 16 February 1944, delivered on PO-2 aircraft for the 2d and 6th Tank Armies some 49 tons of gasoline, 65 tons of ammunition and 525 rockets for rocket launchers, making some 822 aircraft sorties. In the Belorussian Strategic Offensive Operation, the mobile troop operations received by air some 1,182 tons of fuel, 1,240 tons of ammunition and around 1,000 tons of equipment and spare parts for the armored equipment.(4) Due to the involving of aviation in transporting materiel, good opportunities were established for rapidly developing the offensive, for encircling and destroying enemy groupings,

defeating enemy reserves and quickly capturing important operational lines in depth.

Many factors influenced the air operations in the interests of the mobile groups of the fronts. One of the most complex problems was the organizing of changing airfields behind the advancing tank field forces and formations. With a rate of advance of 30-50 km a day and more, the air formations cooperating with the tank troops often were unable to shift to new airfields and, consequently, could not securely support them. Thus, the delay in relocating the formations and units of the 8th Air Army in the course of the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation led to a situation where the 3d Guards Tank Army was forced to operate with a weak fighter cover and a lack of support by ground attack planes. For this reason its formations crossed the San River on 21-25 July 1944 under attack by enemy aviation and as a result suffered losses.

An analogous situation developed with the reaching of the Vistula by formations of tank armies from the First Ukrainian Front. The crossing of the river by the forward detachments on 29 July was covered only by a portion of formations from the VII Fighter Air Corps which were located 80-120 km from the water obstacle. The main forces of the corps were located at airfields the distance of which did not provide dependable cooperation with the tank troops. Only on 4-5 August did the situation normalize. Such a situation was explained by the fact that the air rear bodies were not always able to ready new airfields. The reason was in the lack of suitable sites for building them in the narrow zone of advance of the tank armies (KMG) and the low productivity of the then available engineer construction equipment.

The commands of the fronts, the air and tank armies undertook every measure to promptly relocate the aviation. This task was carried out by capturing and holding until the arrival of the aviation rear units of enemy airfields as well as areas of terrain suitable for rapid construction of landing strips. Another effective measure was the assigning of reinforced airfield engineer battalions and airfield servicing units which moved behind the battle formations of the tank troops and were concerned with restoring and building airfields on territory freed from the enemy. For example, in the aim of providing continuous air support for the 5th Guards Tank Army in the Belorussian Operation, the 260th and 663d Airfield Servicing Battalions moved up behind the forward detachments of the XXIX and III Guards Tank Corps. In the course of the operation they prepared, respectively, eight and nine field landing strips. (5)

The successful carrying out of the set combat missions by the tank armies depended largely upon the organizing of dependable interaction with the air army formations. Headquarters Supreme High Command gave serious attention to this question. In August 1943, uniform mutual identification and target designation signals were worked out and adopted in the Soviet Army and at the end of the year the General Staff approved special instructions which set out the main provisions and principles for organizing and maintaining cooperation between aviation and ground troops.




Diagram  
 Missions Carried Out by Air Army Formations  
 to Support Mobile Groups of Front

In committing tank armies to a breach, when a basic portion of the air army forces was employed for them, the air formations were employed, as a rule, in a strictly centralized manner. Command over them was exercised personally by the air army commander. When the PGF reached the operational depth, decentralization was permitted in the control of aviation. For providing cooperation, along with the principle of air support, they began to employ the principle of operational subordination of the air formations to the tank army commanders and the commanders of the KMG for the entire period of their fighting in the operational depth. For example, in the 1943 Belgorod-Kharkov Operation, a ground attack and a fighter air division each were put under operational subordination of the commanders of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies.

For supporting and covering the tank armies, they usually assigned those air formations which had already cooperated with them in previous operations. However, the setting of missions for the aviation and the allocation of men and weapons were still carried out by the air army commander on the basis of the decision of the front commander. The tank army commander within the limits of the granted flying time set the objectives of the attacks and the operational time of the aviation (the Lwow-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, East Prussian and other operations).

In organizing cooperation, the operations section of the tank army staff and the staffs of the assigned air formations, as a rule, worked out the following combat documents: a plan for the cooperation of the tank formations with the aviation, a target map and a plan for organizing liaison. The first of these was signed by the commanders of the tank and air armies and approved by the front commander. The cooperation plan reflected the tasks of the tank army and aviation by stages of the operation; the composition of the supporting (attached) aviation and its allocation; the operating procedure of the formations of the tank and air armies in carrying out the set combat missions; the procedure for calling in and guiding the aviation; the reciprocal identification and target designation signals; the procedure for command, control and communications.(6) The cooperation plan was usually worked out in detail for the first 2 or 3 days of an operation and subsequently adjusted as the combat missions became clear.

The clarity and reliability of cooperation of the PGF with the air formations to a significant degree depended upon effective command of their actions in preparing for and in the course of the offensive operation. For providing command at the command post of a tank army there usually was an operations group (OG) headed by the commander of the air corps (division) and who was the senior air representative in the army. The group had its own radio equipment which provided contact with the commander of the air army, the staffs of the air divisions, the base airfields and the aircraft in the air. For example, the aviation operations group under the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army (Belorussian Operation) included six officers (the deputy chief of the operations group, the operations officer, the intelligence officer, signals officer, the head of the signals group and a code clerk) as well as several signalmen with three radios of the RAF type. The group was headed by the deputy commander of the 1st Air Army.(7)

Analogous OG headed by commanders of air divisions (regiments) were sent out to the tank corps where the questions of cooperation were further detailed. In the operations of 1944-1945 the operations groups received from the air corps, as a rule, 8-10 officers and 5-6 radios, and from the air divisions 5-7 officers and 2-3 radios.(8) Through these the air chiefs controlled the fighters and ground attack planes over the battlefield. When necessary or when impossible to promptly give combat missions to subordinates over their own channels, the officers in charge of the OG could use the communications of the tank troops. Such an organization of cooperation under the conditions of a rapidly changing situation was sufficiently effective and marked by simplicity, reliability and high efficiency. Direct guidance of the aircraft to the targets was carried out by guidance officers who were assigned to the first echelon tank brigades, the forward detachments and were in their battle formations.

Thus, in the course of the Great Patriotic War, many questions were worked out and tested out in practice concerning the employment of the air army formations in the interests of the mobile groups of the fronts. An accomplishment of Soviet military art was that the role and tasks of aviation were correctly determined in supporting the actions of the PGF in the operational depth, effective methods were worked out for air support and coverage of the tank field forces (KMG) under diverse situational conditions, the most acceptable forms were found for the command of the air formations and their cooperation with the troops being covered and rational ways were sought out for ensuring the relocating of air bases.

Experience showed that aviation was a reliable, effective and at times the only means for covering and supporting the PGF under the conditions where they were operating away from the other troops of the front. The involvement of the main forces of an air army for supporting the actions of tank armies (KMG) and the decisive combating by aviation of antitank weapons, personnel and other important objectives on the battlefield as well as reserves in the operational depth to a significant degree predetermined the success of the mobile groups of the fronts in offensive operations.

Under present-conditions, due to the improvement in weapons, as well as the better forms and methods of their employment, the questions of organizing and conducting air operations to cover and support the troops fighting in the enemy's operational depth away from the main forces have assumed new content. The development of the operational art of the air forces is impossible without a profound analysis of the experience of the Great Patriotic War and its employment in carrying out measures related to operational and combat preparations.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. See: "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 6, 1978, p 373; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 12, 1985, p 9.
2. See: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 5, 1974, p 23.

3. See: "Sovetskiye Voenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968, pp 370, 371.
4. I.V. Timokhovich, "Operativnoye iskusstvo Sovetskikh VVS v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Operational Art of the Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1976, pp 167, 168.
5. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 319, inv. 85876, file 5, sheet 40.
6. Ibid., folio 315, inv. 4440, file 166, sheets 88, 89.
7. Ibid., folio 290, inv. 201841, file 6, sheet 61.
8. Ibid., folio 2 VA, inv. 4196, file 100, sheet 82.

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## BUILD-UP OF EFFORT IN FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

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[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent, Col V.N. Kiselev]

[Text] The experience of previous wars shows that the success of an offensive to a significant degree depends not only upon superiority in resources established by the start of the hostilities but also upon the build-up of these in the course of the operation. The basic method for a build-up of effort in the front offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War was the committing to battle of mobile groups, second echelons and reserves of the fronts. Rifle formations comprised the basis of the second echelon and the reserve. The committing of them to battle led to an increased number of forces. The commitment to battle of the mobile group of a front, in addition, qualitatively altered the nature of the offensive operation, since formations and field forces of the tank and mechanized troops comprised the basis of the group. In terms of mobility they surpassed the armies and divisions of the first and second echelons. In endeavoring as rapidly as possible to exploit a tactical success into an operational one and to shift efforts in depth and achieve a high rate of advance, the commanders of the fronts committed the mobile groups, as a rule, significantly earlier than the second echelons.

Prior to the summer of 1943, a front ordinarily did not establish a mobile group. The basic functions of exploiting an operational success in depth was assigned to the combined-arms army which was reinforced for this by one or two tank or mechanized corps. With the establishing of homogeneous tank armies in 1943, the leading role in exploiting a success in the operational depth shifted to the front field force. Starting with the Kursk Counteroffensive, the front fighting on the main axis in a strategic operation had a mobile group (the echelon for exploiting success) consisting of one-three tank armies, and in the operations of 1944-1945, in addition, one or two horse-mechanized groups [KMG]. Thus, the mobile group of the Voronezh Front in the Belgorod-Kharkov Operation consisted of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies. The echelon for exploiting the success of the First Ukrainian Front in the Iwów-Sandomierz Operation included three tank armies and two KMG.(1) The mobile group of the front fighting on the secondary axis consisted of a tank or mechanized corps (First Baltic Front with the start of the Belorussian Operation and the Third Ukrainian Front in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation).

In a majority of operations of 1943-1945, the build-up of effort by committing the mobile group of the front to an engagement was carried out in the aim of completing the breakthrough of the enemy tactical defensive zone and the subsequent rapid exploitation of the success in depth. The use of mobile field forces for completing the breakthrough was caused, on the one hand, by the great strength of the enemy tactical defensive zone and, on the other, by the insufficient strike capability of the first echelon combined-arms armies for quickly breaching these defenses. Moreover, in 80 percent of the instances, during the years of the Great Patriotic War the tank armies were partially and sometimes completely committed to complete the breakthrough of the enemy tactical defensive zone(2) on the 1st day of the operation. This made it possible to quickly breach the defenses to the entire tactical depth and establish conditions for exploiting success in the operational depth. Thus, the 3d Guards and 1st Tank Armies of the First Ukrainian Front during the 1st day of the Zhitomir-Berdichev Operation completed the breakthrough of the tactical zone and, coming out in the operational depth, became separated from the combined-arms armies.

With an increase in the combat capability of the combined-arms armies, in a number of operations in 1944-1945, the tactical defensive zone of the enemy began to be breached by the front's first echelon and after this the mobile group was committed. However, in this instance, the build-up of effort by the tank armies occurred, as a rule, on the 2d-5th day of a front operation. For example, in the Belorussian Operation the 5th Guards and 2d Tank Armies were committed to the operational depth (on the 3d and 5th day of the operation), in the Iwów-Sandomierz Operation, the 3d and 1st Guards Tank Armies (on the 4th and 5th day), and in the Vistula-Oder Operation, the 1st and 2d Guards Tank Armies (on the 2d and 3d day).(3) Only in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation was the 6th Tank Army committed after the breakthrough of the tactical defensive zone on the 1st day of the offensive.

The build-up of effort by committing tank armies to battle in a number of instances was carried out in the aim of shifting the main efforts of the front from one axis to another where the greatest success had been achieved in the course of the breakthrough. Such a situation arose, for example, in the Belorussian Operation where at the beginning the commander of the Third Belorussian Front committed to battle the 5th Guards Tank Army according to the second version, thereby shifting the main efforts to the Bogushevsk axis where success was apparent. The high mobility of the tank army contributed to the rapid exploitation of the success in the operational depth.

In the front offensive operations the commitment of the front's second echelon was one of the methods of building up the effort.

In the second period of the Great Patriotic War, the fronts were able to assign one or two combined-arms armies to the second echelon. However, this occurred in a majority of the operations in the course of the offensive. Only the Western Front by the start of the Smolensk Operation of 1943 had two combined-arms armies in the second echelon. The other fronts established second echelons in the course of pursuing the enemy. Second echelons were employed most widely in the Battle of the Dnieper; they existed on all five

fronts (see Table 1). As can be seen from the table, the second echelons of the fronts were established by withdrawing armies from the first echelons as well as by field forces arriving from the reserve of Hq SHC [RVGK].

Table 1

Formation and Employment of Second Echelons of Fronts  
in Course of Battle for Dnieper in 1943\*

| No. | Name of Front | Strength and Method of Establishing Second Echelon | Time and Goal of Commitment to Battle                                                 |
|-----|---------------|----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1   | Central       | 13 Army -- withdrawn from front 1st echelon        | 1 Sep 43 -- for shifting effort to axis of apparent success                           |
|     |               | 61 Army -- from RVGK                               | 15 Sep 43 -- for widening bridgehead on Desna and exploiting offensive toward Dnieper |
| 2   | Voronezh      | 52 Army -- from RVGK                               | 15-16 Sep 43 -- for developing offensive in depth                                     |
|     |               | 27 Army -- withdrawn from front 1st echelon        | 27 Sep 43 -- for crossing Dnieper and widening Bukrin bridgehead                      |
| 3   | Steppe        | 37 Army -- from RVGK                               | 26 Sep 43 -- for crossing Dnieper                                                     |
| 4   | Southwest     | 8 Guards Army -- withdrawn from front 1st echelon  | 2 Oct 43 -- for capturing Zaporozhye                                                  |
| 5   | Southern      | 51 Army -- withdrawn from front 1st echelon        | 12 Oct 43 -- for shifting effort to Melitopol sector                                  |
|     |               | 44 Army -- withdrawn from front 1st echelon        | Not committed                                                                         |

\* See: "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1958, pp 352, 354, Diags. 31, 34; G.M. Utkin, "Shturm 'Vostochnogo vala'" [The Storming of the Eastern Rampart], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1967, pp 18, 30, 109, 144, 205, 272, 325.

Table 2

Employment of Second Echelons  
Established by Start of Front Offensive Operations\*

| No. | Operations and Fronts                                                            | Second Echelon Armies            | Aim of Commitment to Battle                                                                                                                                        |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1   | Smolensk Operation,<br>Western Front                                             | 68 A[rmy]<br><br>21 A            | From 7 Aug 43 -- for completing breakthrough of enemy tactical defensive zone<br>From 12 Aug 43 -- for completing breakthrough of enemy tactical defensive zone    |
| 2   | Belorussian Operation,<br>First Belorussian Front                                | 1 A(field)                       | 28 Jul 44 -- for crossing Vistula without a pause                                                                                                                  |
| 3   | Lwow-Sandomierz Operation<br>of First Ukrainian Front                            | 5 Gds. A                         | 4 Aug 44 -- for repelling enemy counterstrike and widening Sandomierz bridgehead                                                                                   |
| 4   | Iasi-Kishinev Operation,<br>Second Ukrainian Front                               | 53 A                             | For building up effort on Bucharest sector                                                                                                                         |
| 5   | East Prussian Operation,<br>Third Belorussian Front                              | 11 Gds. A                        | 20 Jan 45 -- for building up effort in going over to pursuit                                                                                                       |
| 6   | Vistula-Oder Operation,<br>First Belorussian Front,<br><br>First Ukrainian Front | 3d Sh. A<br><br>59 A<br><br>21 A | 28 Jan 45 -- for covering gap with adjacent front<br><br>14 Jan 45 -- for building up effort on Krakow axis<br>19 Jan 45 -- for capturing Silesian industrial area |
| 7   | Berlin Operation,<br>First Belorussian Front<br><br>First Ukrainian Front        | 3 A<br><br>28 A                  | 23 Apr 45 -- for cutting off enemy 9th Army from its Berlin grouping<br>21 Apr 45 -- for cutting off enemy 9th Army from its Berlin grouping                       |

\* See: "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh...", Vol 2, pp 305, 325, 344; "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 9, 1978, pp 60, 90-91, 114; Vol 10, 1979, pp 71, 76, 79, 83, 109, 333, 334.

In the third period of the war, the second echelons began to be established more and more frequently ahead of time, before the start of the offensive operations (see Table 2). However, in the operations of 1944-1945, they were sometimes also organized in the course of the offensive. Thus, after the destruction of the Minsk enemy grouping in the Belorussian Operation, the 49th Army was withdrawn into the second echelon of the Second Belorussian Front, and the 33d Army to the second echelon of the Third Belorussian Front. In this same operation the second echelon of the First Belorussian Front was re-established by withdrawing the 70th Army from the first echelon. After the capturing of Warsaw in the Vistula-Oder Operation, the 1st Polish Army was withdrawn into the second echelon of the First Belorussian Front. As before, the second echelons were also established from the armies received from the RVGK.

The second echelon of a front was committed for developing the offensive in depth, for repelling counterstrikes by enemy operational reserves as well as for widening the front of advance toward the breakthrough flanks.

For developing the offensive in the operational depth, the second echelon armies in a majority of instances were committed to battle upon approaching major water obstacles and crossing them without a pause. Thus, in the Battle of the Dnieper, the 61st Army of the Central Front, the 27th Army of the Voronezh and the 37th Army of the Steppe Front were committed to battle in approaching the Desna and Dnieper Rivers. In the 1944 operations, in approaching the Vistula, the efforts of the First Ukrainian Front were built up by committing to battle the 5th Guards Army, and the 1st Polish Army on the First Belorussian Front. The build-up of effort by committing the front second echelon for crossing rivers without a halt was carried out, as a rule, in the concluding stage of the operation, when there was fierce fighting for the capture, broadening and holding of bridgeheads which were the forming-up areas for the subsequent offensive operations.

The war's experience showed that the success of offensive operations to a decisive degree depended upon the outcome of repelling the enemy counterstrikes. In 1942-1943, the presence of strong operational reserves made it possible for the Nazi Command to launch powerful counterstrikes against our troops. The front's second echelon had to be committed to battle to repel these. Thus, in the Stalingrad Offensive Operation, the commander of the Stalingrad Front built up the efforts of the 51st Army by committing the 2d Guards Army which had been transferred from the RVGK. By the joint actions of these armies, the enemy counterstrike grouping was halted and defeated. The second echelon of the Voronezh Front in the Belgorod-Kharkov Operation was also employed to repel a counterstrike. The 47th and 4th Guards Armies which were committed to battle sharply altered the balance of forces and checked the counterstrike by the Akhtyrka enemy grouping which was subsequently defeated.

The widening of a front's zone of advance was both a cause and a consequence of committing second echelons to battle. In the first instance the increase in the zone of advance of the assault grouping of a front as it advanced in depth frequently led to a reduced superiority over the enemy and this required a built-up of effort. Such a situation arose, for example, in the 1943 Orel

Operation. On the 7th day of the offensive, the assault grouping of the Western Front (11th Guards Army) was extended over 150 km.(4) The successful conclusion of the operation was achieved by the front's commander by committing to battle the 11th Army as well as other forces. The widening of the zone of advance of the First Belorussian Front in the Vistula-Oder Operation, in being caused by the offensive of the adjacent Second Belorussian Front to the north, forced the commander of the First Belorussian Front to successively commit the 1st Polish Army on 29 January 1945 and the 3d Shock Army on 31 January to the gap which had formed between the front.(5) As a result the exposed right flank of the assault grouping was supported and this made it possible to rapidly continue the offensive to cross without a halt the fortified areas on the eastern frontier of Nazi Germany. The commitment of the 59th Army of the First Ukrainian Front on the 3d day of the Vistula-Oder Operation was an example of using the front's second echelon for widening the zone of advance toward the breakthrough flanks.(6)

Sometimes the second echelon of a front was employed for building up effort in the course of breaching the enemy tactical defensive zone (the 68th and 21st Armies of the Western Front in the Smolensk Operation of 1943). The army formations were committed to battle successively over a period of 5-6 days and this made it possible to breach the defenses.(7) However, as a consequence of the absence of second echelons in the armies of the front's assault grouping, the premature commitment of them piecemeal did not have a substantial impact on the course of the operation.

The commitment of front reserves to battle played an important role in building up the effort in the course of an offensive. In the offensive operations of 1941-1942, these were the basic means of a front for exploiting the success. However, the limited capability did not make it possible at that time not only to create second echelons but also to have strong front reserves which, as a rule, consisted of just two-four rifle divisions.(8) The situation changed little in the 1942-1943 winter campaign. Prior to the start of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, the reserve of the Stalingrad and Don Fronts had just one rifle division each. The Voronezh Front prior to the Voronezh-Kastornoye Operation had two reserve rifle divisions. Subsequently, there was a tendency for the front reserves to grow. In the 1944 operations, the fronts had in reserve up to two rifle corps (the Leningrad Front in the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Operation, the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation). In 1945, the commanders of the fronts on the main axes began to assign mobile formations to the reserve. For example, the reserve of the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin Operations consisted of cavalry and mechanized corps.(9)

The build-up of effort by committing reserves to battle was carried out for the same purposes as committing the second echelons. Here the reserve formations were ordinarily incorporated in the first echelon armies. Thus, the rifle corps from the reserve of the Leningrad Front during the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Operation were put under the 21st Army. The cavalry, mechanized and tank corps of the front reserve, in being committed to battle, were transferred to the combined-arms armies or fought independently, remaining subordinate to the front.

In the course of certain front offensive operations, the effort was built up by employing airborne forces. During the first year of the war, operational-tactical and operational-landing forces were employed in the concluding stage of the Battle of Moscow in surrounding the Vyazma enemy grouping. From 18 January through 24 February 1942, the 201st Airborne Brigade with the 250th Rifle Regiment and formations from the IV Airborne Corps were landed in its rear. The landing troops, in fighting together with the I Guards Cavalry Corps and partisan detachments, tied down up to five enemy divisions. In the autumn of 1943, an airborne force was employed consisting of two airborne brigades for assisting the troops of the Voronezh Front in crossing the Dnieper. In cooperating with the partisans, the airborne forces diverted to themselves a portion of the forces of three enemy infantry divisions and three tank divisions, making it easier for the troops advancing from the front to widen the bridgeheads on the Bukrin bend. (10)

The effort in the course of an offensive was built up by air strikes. However, in 1941, the build-up of effort by this means was slight. This was explained by the weakness of the front's Air Forces and their dispersion between the combined-arms armies. This impeded the massed employment of aviation and its maneuvering. With the establishing of air armies in the spring of 1942, the commander of a front gained a powerful means for building up the effort with fire damage to the enemy in the course of offensive operations.

The most effective form for building up air efforts in 1943-1945 was massed bombing and strafing attacks which were made against enemy strongpoints and centers of resistance in breaking through its tactical defenses. Of particular importance for the course of the operation was the building up of effort by air strikes in repelling enemy counterstrikes. Thus, in the course of the Zhitomir-Berdichev Operation, formations from the 2d Air Army detected the moving up of enemy counterstrike tank groupings and attacked these, making 2,500 aircraft sorties. (11) This helped to carry out the mission by the main forces of the First Ukrainian Front. The crucial role in repelling counterstrikes was played by building up effort by massed strikes of frontal aviation in the Lwow-Sandomierz, Berlin and other operations.

The resources of a front were regrouped from one axis to another in the aim of increasing the efforts of the troops which had achieved the greatest success in the course of the offensive or for repelling counterstrikes by superior enemy forces.

A regrouping for building up effort on a sector where success had been achieved in the course of an offensive was carried out, for example, in the Smolensk Operation by the Western Front which launched the main thrust in the zone of the 10th Guards Army. However, the 10th Army achieved the greatest success during the first days of the operation. The commander of the front decided to regroup the V Mechanized Corps from the zone of the guards army and commit it on the sector of the 10th Army, having transferred the corps to it. (12) During the Chernigov-Pripyat Operation, the 2d Tank Army which was committed in the zone of the 65th Army as well as the 13th Army were regrouped to the sector of fighting of the 60th Army in order to utilize its success on the left wing of the Central Front.

A regrouping for building up the effort of troops which were repelling enemy counterstrikes was carried out, for example, on the Second Ukrainian Front after the capture of a bridgehead on the Dnieper. The enemy was endeavoring to destroy the troops on the bridgehead and restore the situation. The command of the front regrouped the 7th Guards and 57th Armies from the left wing to the Ingulets River and these repelled the counterstrike in the center of the front's zone of advance, creating conditions to widen the bridgehead.

The build-up of effort in the course of front operations was carried out by regrouping (maneuvering) the artillery reinforcements. The possibilities for employing such a method during the first period of the war were limited by the small amount of RVGK artillery. Sometimes in the launching of several attacks by the fronts, and this was an ordinary phenomenon in the front operations of 1941-1942, the commanders of the fronts carried out successive regroupings. Thus, the Western Front in the Rzhev-Sychev Operation launched three attacks: the main one by the 20th and 31st Armies and two others by the forces of the 5th and 33d Armies. Here the 5th Army went over to the offensive 3 days after the main assault grouping and then the 3d Army. The different time of the start of the offensive was necessitated by the regrouping of artillery initially in the 5th Army and then in the 33d.

The increased amount of RVGK artillery and the organizing of artillery divisions and corps created good conditions for maneuvering the artillery. Here the build-up of effort by regrouping artillery in the course of the front offensive operations of 1943-1945 assumed a significant scope. This ensured the commitment to battle of the second echelon of the front, the shifting of effort to new axes and the repelling of enemy counterstrikes. As a result of the build-up of effort, the artillery of the 3d Guards Tank Army in the storming of Berlin, for example, established a density on the breakthrough sector of 342 guns, mortars and rocket launcher vehicles, (13) while the 47th Army in being committed to battle in the Belgorod-Kharkov Operation had 110-140 guns and mortars per kilometer of front.

A front's effort could also be built up by the going over to the offensive by armies which were not part of the assault groupings. These armies, with the start of a front operation, were ordinarily on the defensive but after the breaking through of the enemy defenses by the assault groupings, when the enemy was commencing its retreat, went over to the offensive. Such actions were characteristic for a majority of the offensive operations of the last war. For example, in the Vistula-Oder Operation, the assault grouping of the First Ukrainian Front broke through the enemy defenses on a sector of 39 km. The enemy formations which were on the breakthrough flanks, under the threat of encirclement on the 4th-5th day of the offensive, began to retreat. The 6th Army, a portion of forces from the 3d Guards Army and the 60th Army which prior to this had been on the defensive, in supporting the flanks of the front's assault grouping, went over to pursuit. As a result, the force of the attack against the enemy increased and the front of advance widened to 250 km, preventing the enemy from maneuvering to parry the development of the offensive by the assault grouping in depth. (14)

Thus, the effort in front offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War was built up in the aim of completing the breakthrough of the enemy tactical defensive zone, for exploiting success in the operational depth and for repelling counterstrikes of strong enemy groupings. Here the effort was built up by committing mobile groups, second echelons and reserves of the front to battle, by massed attacks of frontal aviation, by the maneuvering of its forces, by the regrouping of men and weapons, as well as by employing airborne troops and by the going over to the offensive of army field forces which were not part of the assault groupings.

#### FOOTNOTES

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8. "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva," Moscow, Izd. VAF, Vol 5, 1958, p 678.
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10. See: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 12, 1985, pp 15-20; "Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Military Encyclopedic Dictionary], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1983, p 174.
11. I.V. Timokhovich, "Operativnoye iskusstvo Sovetskikh VVS v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne" [Operational Art of the Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1976, p 165.
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ORGANIZATION OF PACIFIC FLEET COMMUNICATIONS IN PREPARATION, LANDING OF AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS IN PORTS OF NORTH KOREA, SAKHALIN, KURIL ISLANDS

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[Article by Capt 1st Rank (Ret) P.Ya. Smirnov and Candidate of Naval Sciences, Docent, Capt 1st Rank (Ret) V.I. Solovyev; during the described period P.Ya. Smirnov was the signals chief of the Pacific Fleet]

[Text] The main form of assistance from the Pacific Fleet [TOF] to the First and Second Far Eastern Fronts in defeating the Kwantung Army was the landing of amphibious forces on enemy-occupied islands, ports and naval bases. Here great attention was given to the dependable operation of communications. Measures to ensure the promptness, reliability, dependability and secrecy of transmitted information under combat conditions were carried out in accord with the landing operations and preparations for them. These included: the planning, setting of assignments, preparatory measures to organize communications, the carrying out of communications and the procedure for its employment in the loading of the force on the vessels and ships, during the move at sea, during the fight for landing, during operations on shore and so forth.

The planning of the landing of the amphibious forces and landing operations in the Far Eastern campaign was carried out, as a rule, in a short period of time. For this reason the staffs of the fleet, formations and units which organized communications had to show great efficiency and activity in order to provide the command with the initial data for setting the communications tasks as well as promptly work out the corresponding documents and clear, exhaustive instructions on organizing communications in the various stages of the landing operations. At times, due to a shortage of time, the signals documents were not worked out. Thus, in the course of preparing for the Seisin Landing Operation, the planning carried out by officers from the fleet signals section included: determining the amount of work to maintain communications proceeding from the number of units and subunits, ships, vessels, aircraft and so forth to be involved in the operation; calculating the available communications equipment and determining its necessary amount; establishing the possibility when necessary of providing additional equipment or replacing failed. The working out of the documents to organize communications in preparing the landing forces for the landing in the course of the Southern

Sakhalin Operation were conducted by officers from the staff and the signals section of the Northern Pacific Naval Flotilla (STOF) under the leadership of Capt Lt I.I. Averin. They prepared and promptly distributed to the executors a diagram and instructions for communications as well as recommendations to the ship commanders on employing the signals equipment. The calculation made by them of the required amount of equipment, with the correctness of this subsequently being confirmed as a whole, provided a basis to incorporate in the signals system for the operation a flotilla radio net, telegraph and telephone communications for the staffs, radio and wire liaison communications for the flotilla forces with the formations and units of the 16th Army.(1)

In preparing the Kuril Landing Operation, the signals scheme and instructions were worked out in the joint staff which included representatives from the staffs of the Kamchatka Defensive Area (KOR), the Petropavlovsk Naval Base (PVMB) and the 128th Air Division. In the planning they intended to employ the previously elaborated radio nets and links, the network of permanent telegraph and telephone communications of the fleet and the PVMB as well as the liaison communications with the troops of the Second Far Eastern Front. The correctness of the calculation and the most effective allocation of the available resources were negatively influenced by an uncertainty in the choice of certain command posts. Thus, it was not finally decided where to locate the command post of the operation commander, Maj Gen A.R. Gnechko (commander of the KOR), on shore (Cape Lopatka) or on a ship (TShch-334). Because of this the necessary equipment had to be specially allocated for three points (two shore and one ship) and subsequently the landing forces experienced a shortage of this equipment.(2)

The short time for preparing the landing of the troops and the landing operations was also reflected in the setting of the signals tasks. Prior to the landing of the amphibious troops in the North Korean ports, these tasks were given orally: general ones by the fleet commander, Adm I.S. Yumashev, in setting the tasks for the operation and more specific ones by the fleet signals chief and the flagship signalman of the landing forces. In the course of preparing for the landing of the forces on the coast of Southern Sakhalin, the signals tasks were given both orally (in the instructions of the chief of staff of the STOF, Rear Adm I.I. Baykov) as well as in writing (in the communications scheme and in the landing of the force at the Port of Maoka, in a liaison table and the "Manual to the Landing Ships in the Fight for the Landing") as well as by signals instructions.

Approximately the same time was allocated for preparing one or another force for the landing: 26 hours in the Port of Toro, 34 hours in Maoka and 29 hours on Shumshu Island.(3) Regardless of such a short period of time, it was possible to almost completely carry out the preparatory measures for organizing communications, and this largely predetermined its dependability in the course of hostilities. This was explained by the high overall preparedness of the TOF signals service which was able to generalize and utilize the combat experience of the signals services of the other fronts. The signals system included the nets and links of radio and wire communications of the fleet forces and the liaison communications with the staffs and troops of the fronts; these had been established previously and worked out under daily conditions, in drills and exercises. By the start of

the war against Japan, the transmitting radio centers had 118 radio transmitters with a power from 0.1 to 100 kilowatts, while the receiving centers had 173 short- and long-wave receivers. In addition there were 175 vehicle radios with a power of from 0.1 to 1 kilowatt and several receiver centers mounted in buses, more than 550 telephones and 70 telegraphs which included around 20,000 users.(4) Over 30,000 kilometer-wires of main overhead communications lines were laid.(5) At the same time, consideration was also given to the composition and organization of the participating forces and the particular features of their command and control in each individual instance. For ensuring dependable operation of the permanent communications, its nets and links were supplemented with the required radio and wire communications. The Chief of the Signals Directorate of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, Col Gen Sig Trps N.D. Psurtsev, approved the organization of liaison communications of the TOF with the ground troops. This was planned as follows: with the communications center of the 1st Far Eastern Fleet -- the signals center of the fleet, the ships of the light detachment and security of the water area and the shore defense sector; with the signals center of the 2d Far Eastern Fleet -- the signals center of the STOF; with the signals center of the KOR -- the signals center of the PUMB. On 6 August, telegraph communications of the TOF Staff was established with the staffs of the High Command (GK) of the troops in the Far East and the Second Far Eastern Front. Radio and telephone communications with the Main Naval Staff (GMSH) and with the Staff of the First Far Eastern Front were provided constantly. In all the radio centers and radios of the fleet, the STOF, the air forces, naval bases, formations, units and ships, they began standing watch according to a combat schedule. On 8 August, upon orders of Col Gen N.D. Psurtsev, a permanent radio watch was established for the TOF Signals Center in the radio link of the signals center of the GK in the Far East.(6) The preparatory measures also included the further equipping of the ships with communications equipment and on these ships they established flagship command posts for the commanders of the landing forces. Thus, prior to the landing of the party in the Port of Otomari on the minesweeper TShch-524 they additionally installed four radios and in the course of preparations for the Kuril Landing Operation, on the TShch-334 there were five radios and two receivers.(7)

In the aim of supporting the force assigned to land on Shumshu Island, from the personnel of units of the PUMB a signals platoon was organized for the composite naval infantry battalion. This had 5 USW radios, 3 shortwave radios, a telephone exchange with 12 subscribers and wire communications equipment. A correction post was established for the artillery battery on Cape Lopatka and 4 artillery support ships were equipped with correction posts.(8) Also considered was the fact that with the available equipment it would be impossible to constantly provide communications for each of the landing forces. For this reason, in certain instances, for example, in the Kuril Landing Operation, direct radio communications was provided only on the most crucial links and on the other via intermediate radios.

The organization of communications had a fuller support in the landing of the amphibious force at the Seisin Naval Base. For example, the communications of the TOF Staff with the fleet forces involved in the operation provided the following nets: with the minelayer (ZM) "Argun" -- in the radio net of the

separate ZM division; with the patrol boats EK-2 and EK-9 -- in the SKR [patrol boat] radio net; with the destroyer (EM) "Voykov" which supported submarine (PL) and was part of the PL brigade -- in the submarine radio net; with the minesweepers -- in the radio net of the minesweeping brigade; with the shore defense (BO) boats -- in the radio net of the BO boats; with the landing vessels and transports -- in the radio net of the auxiliary and landing craft. In all these nets the flagship of the landing forces maintained radio contact with the signals center of the fleet while the remaining ships stood receiving watches. The radio communications were carried out in the shortwave band and here daytime and nighttime wavelengths were assigned. Tactical communications of the landing forces were planned by visual devices and the ultra-shortwave A-7-A radios in the radio nets of the landing detachments and torpedo boats and by MN radios in the radio nets of the class "F" patrol boats, minesweepers, BO boats, and torpedo boats of the "Vosper" class. In these radio nets they planned to maintain communications of the commanders of the landing detachments with the landing craft and transports, the group commanders with their ships, boats and also, respectively, communications between the ships, boats, landing craft and transport. Communications of the ships with the correction posts was to be carried out by RB and REM radios in radio links; with the units of the landing force through the flagship of the landing forces in the radio net of the landing force using USW and via the correction posts; with aviation -- through the flagship in the radio nets of the air formations operating on shortwave (here aviation was to be called in via the fleet staff or the air forces staff, while contact with the aircraft was to be established with the airfield radio). In the course of the Seisin Landing Operation, the fleet forces cooperated with the formations and units of the 25th Army (Diagram [Fig.] 1). The organization of radio communications here made it possible for the fleet ships, the shore defense formation, the Vladivostok Naval Defensive Area (VMOR) to establish and carry out direct communications with the cooperating formations and units via the operations group of the 25th Army as well as maintain radio communications with the airfields and aircraft of frontal [tactical] aviation. Diagrams [Figs.] 2 and 3 give some idea of the adopted organization of radio communications in the landing of amphibious forces in the Southern Sakhalin and Kuril Operations.

In the loading of the landing troops on the ships and transports, communications between the landing units and subunits was sharply curtailed and the ship radios observed complete radio silence. At the loading points for the landing in the North Korean ports and naval bases, communications were provided by personal contact, messengers and by visual devices. In the Southern Sakhalin and Kuril Operations, telephone communications was still employed.




Fig. 1. Diagram of Liaison Radio Communications of Pacific Fleet With 25th Army in Landing Troops at Ports of North Korea

- Key:
- a--Liaison radio net of First Far Eastern Front
  - b--Radio link of staff of 25th Army
  - c--Aviation call radio net
  - d--Aviation guidance radio net
  - e--Liaison radio net of 25th Army; ships of light forces detachment
  - f--Radio net of 393d Rifle Division




Fig. 2. Diagram of Radio Communications for Forces of STOF in Southern Sakhalin Operation

Key: a--Submarine radio net  
b--Surface ship radio net  
c--Auxiliary vessel radio net  
d--Command post of commander  
e--Ship USW radio net




Fig. 3. Diagram of Radio Communications of Landing Forces of TOF in Kuril Landing Operation

Key: a--Patrol boat "Kirov", command post of landing forces commander  
b--Radio net of surface vessel  
c--Radio net of auxiliary vessel  
d--Radio net of landing units

The crossing at sea was carried out, as a rule, with radio silence of the ships, vessels and shore communications centers. At times the complex situation forced the violating of the established conditions. Thus, in the moving of the landing force from Vladivostok to the port of Rasin, on 12 August, the fleet communications center sent four radiograms to the ships while the flagship of the landing forces EK-5 sent one radiogram by the unacknowledged method. In the moving of the landing forces of the forward detachment and the three landing waves in Seisin on 13, 14, 15 and 16 August, the signals center transmitted 21 radiograms (1,358 groups) but the ships maintained radio silence. Thus, over the time spent on the 15 crossings at sea, the 234 ships, vessels and transports transmitted only one radiogram.

Communications at sea between the vessels and ships was maintained chiefly by visual devices which at times were employed without acute need. Thus, in the moving of the landing force from Petropavlovsk to Shumshu Island, with the onset of darkness they began excessive traffic of light-signal texts. The commander of the landing force was required to issue an order on the transmitting of only extremely essential messages. In this same move, communications within the landing detachments was maintained also via the ship radios operating on USW. But in going around Cape Inkanyush, the radio watches were closed and all reports and orders were transmitted solely by flag semaphore and directional light-signal devices.(9) USW radio communication between the ships and vessels was maintained during the crossings of certain other landing forces, however largely in those instances when the meteorological conditions required as it was impossible to utilize visual means of communications. For example, limited use was made of this in the moving of the landing troops to the ports of Yuki, Rasin and the Seisin Naval Base. On the way to Odentsin and Gyonsan, regardless of thick fog, radio was not used at all due to the developing situation and urgent reports from the ships and vessels or orders for them were delivered by torpedo boats.

The clean organization of communications at sea as well as the skillful use of its diverse equipment made it possible, in a majority of instances, to achieve the undisclosed moving of the landing forces from the embarkation points to the destinations. The ensuring of secrecy was largely aided by radio intelligence and the measures to disinform the enemy carried out with radios.

On 14 August, in the moving of the main forces of the landing party to Seisin, the fleet radio intelligence detected a detachment of Japanese ships (a battleship and four destroyers) which might impede the landing. Upon the proposal of the chief of the operations section and the signals chief of the fleet, it was decided to confuse the enemy by radio disinformation. For this purpose on the wavelengths of the radio nets of the light forces detachment, the submarines and aviation, the TOF Communications Center in open text transmitted, in accord with the legend, the order of the fleet commander to attack the Japanese detachment indicating its precise coordinates and then coded radiograms canceling this. The enemy, as was assumed, took the false text as real. After intensive talks between the detachment command and the Maizuru Naval Base and which was intercepted by our intelligence, the enemy ships headed to Gyonsan, thereby eliminating the threat to the landing force.(10)

In the course of the fighting for the landing and the actions of the forces on shore, the communications equipment, including radios, were used without restriction. The flagships of the landing forces maintained radio communication with the TOF Communications Center (the landing in the ports of North Korea) and with the STOF Communications Center (the landing in the Southern Sakhalin ports) in a telegraph mode, basically with the employment of a code. Thus, the traffic of the flagship with the STOF Communications Center in coded radiograms was: 91.4 percent of the messages in the landing in the Toro--Esutoru area, 94.8 percent in Maoka and 98.0 percent in Otomari.(11) Radio traffic during this period was also characterized by a high priority rating: some 26.8 percent were "urgent" and 54.2 percent were "emergency."(12)

On the tactical level radio communications with the shore and between the boats was provided in a telephone mode. Moreover, visual communications were also used extensively. In the Seisin Landing Operation the load factor just on the communications equipment of the flagship was expressed in the following figures: 864 outgoing and 567 incoming radiograms, 1,649 semaphore messages, 712 blinker messages and 364 flag signals.

No matter how well communications was organized, the situation or other actors made their negative corrections. In landing the first wave of the force on Shumshu Island, due to the fact that the overloaded landing vessels could not come closer than 100-150 m from shore, the soldiers had to swim to it. Of the 22 radios delivered to the beachhead, only one could operate as the remainder were wet. The absence of radio communications between the correction posts and the ships reduced the effective employment of the ship's artillery which was the only means of fire support for the first wave of the landing force under the conditions of nonflying weather. Because of the fog, the posts of the observation and communications service (SNIS) on shore were not set up and as a result of this visual communications was not properly utilized. During the first 24 hours, there was also no wire communications as the high rate of advance did not make it possible to promptly put up communications lines. For this reason, the entire burden rested on the ship radios which were in short supply. The insufficient training of the specialists also led to reduced effectiveness of communications. Thus, in landing the force in the Toro--Esutoru area, radiogram distortions were 10.6 percent and with the radio traffic between the patrol boat "Zarnitza" and the STOF Communications Center some 20-6 percent of the radiograms were delayed.(14)

As a whole, the signals service of the TOF was able to ensure the command and control of the forces in preparing and landing the Far Eastern amphibious forces. Its experience makes it possible to conclude that for organizing and ensuring prompt, dependable, reliable and secret communications in landing the amphibious forces and in carrying out amphibious operations, it is essential to have a rather developed fleet signals system which includes stationary and mobile communications equipment, well-trained personnel of the special subunits and units as well as spare equipment. Special attention must be given to liaison communications with the ground troops and the other Armed Services. The fleet and flotilla should possess specially equipped ships which are able to carry out the functions of staff, command and communications

ships. Effective communications in all stages of the landing operations, in addition, was provided by the following: precise planning and accurate calculating of the necessary resources; by the prompt setting of missions, by the working out of leading documents and informing the executors of their requirements; by the correct use of all the communications equipment considering its technical capabilities, the existing situation and the meteorological conditions.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. V.N. Bagrov, "Yuzhno-Sakhlinskaya i Kuril'skaya operatsii" [The Southern Sakhalin and Kuril Operations], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1956, pp 49-50.
2. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 234, inv. 310119, file 3, sheet 1.
3. V.N. Bagrov, op. cit., p 49.
4. TsvMA [Central Naval Archives], folio 129, file 34090, pp 21, 51, 56.
5. MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 5, 1982, p 25.
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7. KRASNYY FLOT, 10 April 1946; V.N. Bagrov, op. cit., p 53.
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## EXPERIENCE IN DEFENSIVE COMBAT BY RIFLE DIVISIONS AT STALINGRAD

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 86 (signed to press 24 Jul 86) pp 38-43

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col P.I. Balashov]

[Text] By the defense of cities during the first period of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet troops made a major contribution to carrying out the task of grinding down the enemy, causing it great losses in personnel and equipment. A few forces, in defending the cities, in using the factory, plant and other stone structures, were able to tie down significant enemy forces for a long time.

Prior to October 1942, the defensive in a city was organized by establishing battalion defensive centers. However, as a result of the fact that the troops did not sufficiently employ stone buildings for stiffening the defenses and the strongpoints did not have fire contact between them, the defensive centers in a number of instances did not have a substantial impact upon the strength of the city defenses.

Having generalized the experience of defensive combat in the cities, Hq SHC, in a directive of 14 October 1942, demanded that troops on the defensive in a city make wide use of other stone buildings for strengthening the defenses, build strongpoints with close fire coordination between them, establishing a unified system in the form of a defensive line or position. Following this principle from mid-October to mid-November 1942, the defenses were organized by the rifle division commanders in Stalingrad.

The battle formation of the rifle formations, depending upon the situation, was formed up in one or two echelons. Thus, after the crossing of the 138th Rifle Division (commander, Col I.I. Lyudnikov) to the right bank of the Volga on 17 October, its battle formation was formed up in two echelons. The first included the 650th, 768th and 344th (minus one battalion) Rifle Regiments and the second had the 118th Guards Rifle Regiment (transferred from the 37th Guards Rifle Division) and the 2d Battalion of the 344th Rifle Regiment.(1) From the first days of November, the division was fighting in a single-echelon configuration, with a small reserve (Diagram 1).




Diagram 1  
 Combat Actions of 138th Rifle Division  
 From 17 October Through 11 November 1942

In the 13th Guards Rifle Division (commander, Maj Gen A.I. Rodimtsev), the configuration of the battle formation for virtually the entire defensive period was in a single echelon. Only from 21 through 23 September did the 39th Guards Rifle Regiment fight in the second echelon of the formation. The three battalions of the division's artillery regiment supported the 39th, 42d and 34th Guards Rifle Regiments. A separate antitank battalion fought basically in antitank region No. 1 on the left flank of the division, in the defensive sector of the 39th Guards Rifle Regiment.

The regiments defending more dangerous sectors had a battle formation of two echelons while those fighting on less threatened sectors had one.

In a number of instances, a deep configuration for the battle formations of the formations and units was impeded due to the fact that the defensive was being carried out under conditions of a limited depth of the defended bridgeheads. In the 13th Guards Rifle Division, for example, the distance from the forward edge to the bank of the Volga was around 500 m in the sector of the 39th Guards Rifle Regiment and 300 m on the sectors of the 42d and 34th Guards Rifle Regiments. In the 284th Rifle Division this was 1.5 km, in the 39th Guards Division, the 45th and 138th Rifle Divisions 300-400 m.

In this situation the defensive was organized according to a system of strongpoints each of which could include several streets or buildings. The strongpoints were linked by communications trenches and were included in a single fire plan. On likely tank approaches, multirow barricades were created. Ahead of the forward edge and in depth antitank and antipersonnel minefields were set. Just in October-November, in the zone of the 13th Guards Rifle Division, over 6,000 antitank and antipersonnel mines were set, some 234 DZOT [log emplacement] and firing positions were built, around 5 km of communications trenches were dug, barricades were built and on the important sectors almost 3.5 km of wire obstacles, 350 knife rests and hedgehogs were set out. All the city structures and edifices, individual buildings, basements and attics were adapted for the defensive.

In the 308th Rifle Division, on 8 October 1942, an obstacle of 450 incendiary bottles with KS fluid were set out in the boundary of the 339th Rifle Regiment and the 42d Rifle Brigade. The bottles were buried and camouflaged. In the second half of the day up to a company of enemy infantry and five tanks with mounted submachine gunners went over to the attack. Having driven at a high speed into the bottle obstacles, the head tank caught fire. The troops dismounted and fell into the spilled burning liquid. The Nazis lost three tanks and around 25 men killed with 30-35 men being burned. (2)

Regardless of the fact that enemy tank actions were difficult in the city, all defensive centers and strongpoints were equipped primarily to repel enemy tank attacks.

In operating as antitank reserves, the artillery was employed as separate weapons or in platoons. This was explained on the one hand, by the shortage of artillery and, on the other, by the difficulties of maneuvering in a city. Frequently there were only antitank rifles in the antitank reserve of the division commanders. Thus, in the order of the artillery chief of the 13th

Guards Rifle Division No. 2 of 18 October 1942, just five antitank rifles were assigned to the antitank reserve.(3) Tanks were also used to fight against enemy tanks.

A characteristic feature in the defensive actions in a city was the fact that these broke up into a series of battles for individual strongpoints, often for individual rooms, floors, basements, stairwells and attics. The success of the defensive combat of the battalions, regiments and divisions as a whole depended upon the enterprising actions of small groups. An example would be the actions of the reinforced rifle platoon in the defensive sector of the 347th Rifle Regiment of the 308th Rifle Division (commander, Col L.N. Guryev). The strongpoint between the Barrikady and Krasnyy Oktyabr Plants had been built in a strong stone building. Foxholes and communications trenches had been dug around it. On 26 October 1942, after intense shelling and an air strike, enemy infantry and tanks went over to the attack. The firing of the antitank weapons and tank destroyers eliminated four enemy tanks. The advance of the enemy infantry was checked. Good conditions were established for a counterattack. The platoon commander left one squad ahead of the front of the attacking infantry and led the two others through the communications trenches to attack in the flank. Having lost 27 men killed and wounded, the enemy pulled back to the initial position. Thus, the garrison of a strongpoint, in fighting boldly and with initiative, during the day drove off four enemy attacks and caused it great losses.(4)

For a period of 58 days, 24 men from the 42d Guards Rifle Regiment of the 13th Guards Rifle Division under the command of Lt I.F. Afanasyev defended a 4-story residential building which had been turned into a powerful strongpoint.

Often in the city the formations and units were forced to fight while encircled. An example of such fighting is the defensive in the settlements of Spartanovka and Rynok by the group of Col S.F. Gorokhov. In driving off fierce enemy attacks, it was able from 14 October through 24 November to cause the enemy great losses and hold a bridgehead which was 4 km along the front and 2 km in depth.(5)

The rifle divisions conducted an active defensive in Stalingrad. If at a certain area the enemy succeeded in driving into the defenses, the division commanders in a short period of time carried out counterattacks and restored the situation. Thus, on 11 November, the 344th and 650th Rifle Regiments of the 138th Rifle Division counterattacked the enemy, captured four buildings and dug in inside them.

From the morning of 22 September, an enemy infantry division with the support of around 100 tanks went over to an offensive against units from the 13th Guards Rifle Division (Diagram 2). The 34th and 42d Guards Rifle Regiments, in fighting fiercely, drove off 12 enemy attacks. However, in the second half of the day, in the area of Dolgiy [Long] Ravine, up to an enemy infantry battalion with 15 tanks pushed into the defenses on the right flank of the 34th Guards Rifle Regiment. Simultaneously up to a battalion of Nazis pushed into the defenses on the left flank of this regiment in the area of 9 January Square. The division commander committed his reserves to battle. The

composite battalion and the reconnaissance company from the 34th Guards Rifle Regiment received the mission of counterattacking the enemy which had driven in on the right flank while the 3d battalion from the 39th Guards Rifle Regiment was to do the same on the left flank. The counterattack was carried out by surprise from several directions in the enemy flank and rear. On both flanks of the 34th Guards Rifle Regiment the enemy troops were thrown back.

The experience of the defensive fighting in cities showed that nighttime counterattacks were very effective, as during the night it was possible to achieve major successes with insignificant forces. Numerous examples show their effectiveness. Thus, during the night of 1 October, the enemy with forces of subunits from the 518th Infantry Regiment, the 14th and 635th Combat Engineer Battalions with a total of over 1,000 men attacked the right flank of the 34th Guards Rifle Regiment, it drove into its defenses, reached the Volga and began to widen the breach to the north and south along the river bank. The commander of the 13th Guards Rifle Division took the decision, after a short but powerful intense shelling, to counterattack the enemy during the night with his own small reserves (around 300 men).(6) The situation was restored. The success of the nighttime counterattack was achieved due to the promptness of carrying it out, to a good knowledge of the terrain by all the personnel and to the bold and decisive actions of the soldiers and commanders.

The sniper movement became widespread in the Stalingrad fighting. In the 284th Rifle Division V.G. Zaytsev became the initiator of the sniper movement and during the fighting he destroyed 242 enemy soldiers and officers.(7) In the 13th Guards Rifle Division, just in October 1942, some 52 snipers destroyed 480 enemy soldiers and officers.(8)

There were also particular features in the employment of the branches of troops. The divisional artillery assigned to fire from indirect firing positions was used on a centralized basis. In the hands of the formation commanders it was an important means in repelling the attacks by the enemy infantry and tanks, in combating enemy artillery as well as in supporting the counterattacks of the units and subunits. In addition, it participated in carrying out counterartillery bombardment.

Tanks in the defensive battles were employed in small numbers. These strengthened the defenses of the subunits in the strongpoints, and fought from ambushes, as mobile firing positions and supported the assault groups in carrying out counterattacks.

The effective and diverse party political work was an important factor in the successful fighting of the rifle divisions in Stalingrad. The appeals, messages and information were passed on down the lines. In lulls in the fighting, talks were held in individual strongpoints and shelters.




Diagram 2. Combat Operations of 13th Guards Rifle Division on 22 September 1942

#### FOOTNOTES

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4. A.M. Samsonov, "Stalingradskaya bitva" [The Stalingrad Battle], Moscow, Nauka, 1968, p 265.
5. TsAMO, folio 345, inv. 27689, file 1, sheet 374.
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## PARTISAN RECONNAISSANCE DURING YEARS OF GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 86 (signed to press 24 Jul 86) pp 44-52

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Maj Gen V.N. Andrianov]

[Text] During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet partisans conducted reconnaissance in the rear of the Nazi troops both in the interests of carrying out their own combat missions as well as in the interests of the Soviet Army Command.

Reconnaissance "for oneself" was one of the most important types of support for the fighting of the partisan formations. This included the measures of the command as well as the combat work of the partisans and underground members to gain information on the enemy, including: its forces, grouping, intentions, political situation, the nature of the terrain and meteorological conditions in the areas of the forthcoming fighting and other data essential for organizing and successfully conducting the partisan struggle.

Reconnaissance in the interests of the Soviet Army Command was an extremely important area of partisan combat activity, as this was aimed at securing information essential for the troops to successfully carry out the tasks set for them. The conducting of reconnaissance in the interests of the Soviet Army was one of the manifestations of the close interaction between the partisans and the regular troops. In assessing the reconnaissance activities of the partisans, MSU G.K. Zhukov has pointed out: "...We gained good intelligence information from our partisan detachments fighting in the enemy rear."(1)

Partisan reconnaissance provided the Soviet Army Command with valuable intelligence data on the nature of the enemy defenses, its troop grouping, and it disclosed camouflage and other enemy measures. Partisan activities were particularly intense during the period of the preparation and execution of offensive operations by the Soviet troops.

As an example of the conducting of reconnaissance in the interests of the Soviet Army, one might give the successful actions of the 11th Partisan Brigade (commander, A.N. Brednikov; commissar, F.I. Sazanov) in Leningrad Oblast in November 1943-January 1944. The formation was based to the

northeast of the town of Luga. In virtually all the population points of this rayon, detachments and regiments of the brigade had an extensive and dependable network of underground scouts. Moreover, many local inhabitants upon partisan assignment carried out various tasks of a reconnaissance nature. During the period of preparing for the offensive by the Soviet troops at Leningrad and Novgorod, partisan reconnaissance established permanent observation of all railroads and highways in the brigade's zone of actions. For monitoring the movement of trains and enemy troops over the Warsaw, Baltic and Vitebsk Railroads as well as the highways, the underground scouts cooperated closely with special partisan reconnaissance groups equipped with radios. The persons in charge of these groups immediately transmitted the obtained data to the operations group of the Leningrad Partisan Movement Staff under the military council of the Volkhov Front.

By the start of the offensive, the brigade's forces had reconnoitered many enemy garrisons as well as its defensive system in the major population points as well as in the areas of the railroad stations of Vyritsa, Siverskaya, Mshinskaya, Tolmachevo, Luga, Novinka, Oredez, Batetskaya as well as along the Luga and Oredez Rivers. Here with the aid of underground members, the partisans were able to obtain diagrams of the location of garrisons and the positions of enemy defensive facilities in a number of areas as well as copies of the enemy's defensive plans for the city of Luga. The brigade's scouts had established the numbers, location of units, the names of their commanders, they had recorded the movement of the staffs and units of 21 enemy divisions and brigades and had ascertained the location of the staffs of the XXXVIII Army Corps and the 18th Army as well as the position of four airfields.(2)

With the start of the Soviet troop offensive, the reconnaissance subunits in the brigade constantly watched the defensive works and movements of the Nazis and transmitted the obtained data directly to the staffs of the advancing units and formations from the Volkhov Front. The scouts frequently led the advancing units to the enemy flanks and rear. This was the case in the areas of Oredez, Batetskaya, Tolmachevo and Luga. The partisans transmitted to the command of the CXII Rifle Corps detailed information on the enemy situation and forces in the zone of advance and delivered to the corps staff diagrams of the enemy's defensive positions on the sections of Roglitsy--Betetskaya--Luga and Oredez--Velegoshchi. Analogous intelligence data were received from the 11th Partisan Brigade by other formations of the front.(3)

The most complete and reliable data on the enemy's dummy facilities and camouflage measures were usually received from partisan scouts, underground members, local inhabitants and troop reconnaissance groups. They were able to surveil virtually the entire terrain within the limits of the operational depth of the enemy defenses.

Often partisan reconnaissance secured and promptly transmitted to unoccupied land information of an extremely important military and political nature. For example, scouts from a partisan detachment under the command of D.M. Medvedev were able to secure reliable data on the location of Hitler's headquarters in the Vinnitsa area. The group of the legendary scout N.I. Kuznetsov captured and brought to the detachment the section chief from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine Maj Haan and the Imperial Communications Advisor Reis who has arrived

from Berlin. From the latter they took a map with the designated communications routes and communications lines on the territory of the Ukraine, Poland and Germany. The prisoners stated that this was an underground multistrand armored cable running from Hitler's Headquarters located near the village of Yakushintsy to Berlin.(4)

In the spring of 1943, scouts from the Dyadya Kolya Partisan Brigade (commander, P.G. Lopatin; commissar, A.T. Yezubchik) captured and sent to unoccupied territory a staff officer from Army Group Center who provided valuable information on preparations by the Nazi Command for the Kursk Offensive in the summer of 1943. These same data were confirmed by scouts from the detachment of D.M. Medvedev. The partisans informed the Soviet Command of preparations by the Nazis for terroristic acts against the heads of the three Allied powers which were to meet in Tehran at a conference. In December 1943, Belorussian partisans secured valuable information on enemy flying bombs, their design, performance and the preparations to launch them against facilities of countries in the anti-Hitler coalition. These materials were secured 6 months prior to the use by the Nazis of the flying bombs in raids against London.(5)

Partisan reconnaissance provided great aid to the Soviet Army counterintelligence bodies in fighting enemy agents, reconnaissance groups and sabotage-reconnaissance subunits. Thus, in the summer of 1942, the Alesya Partisan Detachment (commander, A.L. Kastrovskiy; commissar I.N. Perovskiy) in Mogilev Oblast successfully conducted an operation to capture the German intelligence resident von Feit. In interrogation the inveterate Nazi intelligence agent told about his espionage activities and named agents who had been placed in the underground and partisan detachments.(6) At the end of 1943, scouts from the 1st Partisan Brigade of Leningrad Oblast in Estonian territory conducted an operation to capture the deputy chief of the Nazi sabotage-intelligence school Iashkov (Guryanov). The prisoner was brought to the brigade's staff and then shifted to the SMERSh [Death to Spies] Counterintelligence Section of the Leningrad Front.(7)

In June 1944, Belorussian partisans established that the Nazis were planning to drop 15 saboteurs dressed as Soviet officers in the rear of the Third Belorussian Front with reconnaissance and sabotage missions. The report stated that the enemy agents were supplied with a large number of ration certificates and various papers printed at the Bobruysk Printing Plant. The papers had been notarized with false signatures of the front commanders.(8)

Partisan reconnaissance did not immediately assume a wide scope and achieve high results. During the first period of the war, its activities had serious flaws. In many partisan detachments, little attention was given to reconnaissance work in the interests of the Soviet Army and reconnaissance was primarily carried out "for oneself." Many of the detachments for a long time were unable to establish an extensive, truly active reconnaissance network. They were not always skillful in involving the local populus for obtaining additional intelligence data. The gained information about the enemy was not always correctly put together and transmitted as the precise coordinates of the reconnoitered installations were not given nor the time and sources of their obtaining and so forth. Often the intelligence reports of the

detachments lacked an analysis of the information received about the enemy. Up to the summer of 1943, the command of the partisan formations did not always establish contact with the intelligence sections of the troop staffs. The intelligence sections of the partisan movement staffs did not always have equipment making it possible to supply the scouts with good cover documents for operating under the conditions of the harsh occupation regime.

The main reasons for the listed shortcomings were: the lack of experience among the partisans in conducting reconnaissance, the poor staffing of the reconnaissance bodies of the formations with skilled reconnaissance personnel, and the absence of radio equipment in many partisan detachments in 1941-1942.

Definite oversights in the use of partisan reconnaissance were also made by the front command bodies. In a number of instances they underestimated the intelligence capabilities of the partisans. Proper coordination was lacking in the work of the military intelligence bodies and the reconnaissance of the partisan movement staffs. This led to duplication and sometimes to failures in the work of the scouts and the underground members and made it easier for the enemy to combat our reconnaissance.

An important stage on the way to fundamentally improving the reconnaissance activities of the partisans was the Order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense "On the Tasks of the Partisan Movement" of 5 September 1942. This clearly set out the main tasks of partisan reconnaissance. The Order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of 19 April 1943 "On Improving Intelligence Work in the Partisan Detachments" also played an important role in improving reconnaissance.(9) The order demanded that the partisans widen the framework of reconnaissance activities, extend it to all the occupied territory of the nation and improve reconnaissance in the interests of the Soviet Army. The order demanded that skilled specialists, including intelligence officers from the Soviet Army and the Chekists [Interior Ministry officials] be recruited and assigned to leading intelligence work in the partisan formations. It obliged the partisan commanders to provide all possible aid to the intelligence groups of the Soviet Army and to promptly and systematically transmit intelligence reports to the General Staff and the staffs of the fronts, and over two signatures: the commander of the partisan formation and his deputy for intelligence.

The underground party bodies and the staffs of the partisan movement in 1943 initiated extensive work to carry out the demands of the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In July 1943, the Central Partisan Movement Staff (TsShPD) conducted assemblies for the chiefs of the intelligence sections of republic and oblast staffs and here they heard their reports and proposals.

Of great importance was the strengthening of the partisan formation staffs with specialist intelligence officers. The Leningrad ShPD [Partisan Movement Staff] sent, for example, 118 deputy commanders for intelligence having special training to the partisan detachments and brigades in 1943.(10) In April-June 1943 alone, the Ukrainian ShPD sent 20 deputy commanders for intelligence and 17 intelligence specialists to strengthen the partisan formations.(11) According to the data of the Belorussian ShPD, by February 1943, deputy commanders for intelligence were found according to the TOE in


just 70 detachments and brigades. Some 5 months later they were in 300 partisan formations.(12) Under the staffs of the partisan movement, during the period from 15 July 1942 through 15 February 1944, some 1,744 intelligence specialists were trained in special schools.(13)

The oblast party committees, having paid more attention to the questions of the work of partisan reconnaissance, were responsible for the recruitment and assignment of its leading personnel. Candidates for these positions were chosen by the underground party raykoms together with the command of the partisan brigades and detachments. The party obkoms individually reviewed each applicant. Among the leaders of the intelligence bodies in the partisan formations in Belorussia, for example, communists made up 62 percent.(14) Komsomol members also took an active part in intelligence work. They comprised the basic portion of the personnel in the reconnaissance subunits (up to 75 percent).

Due to the adopted measures, by the summer of 1943, virtually each commander of a detachment and a formation had an intelligence deputy who directly planned and led the intelligence measures. Under him were the reconnaissance subunits: in a detachment usually a platoon or squad and in the formations a company. He was also concerned with the questions of agent intelligence. Overall leadership over reconnaissance was carried out by the commander and commissar of the detachment (formation). In contrast to the regular troops, the deputy commander for intelligence was not under the chief of staff.

On the partisan movement staffs the reconnaissance sections were concerned with the organizing of reconnaissance and in the operations groups and offices on the fronts this was the responsibility of the assistants of the corresponding intelligence chiefs. The partisan movement staffs coordinated the intelligence plans with the intelligence sections of the front staffs. These were drawn up on the basis of the tasks set by the front command. In accord with the plan, the intelligence orders were worked out. These were issued to the partisan formations by radio or by liaison officers who flew into the enemy rear.

The increased amount of radio equipment in the partisan formations and the precise system for organizing radio communications with them (see the diagram) provided an opportunity, as was pointed out by the chief of the Signals Section of the TsShPD, Maj Gen I.N. Artemyev, to provide the army command with precise information on the situation in the enemy rear.(15)



Schematic Diagram of the Organization of Communications  
for the Office of the Partisan Movement Staff  
Under the Front Military Council

- Key:
- 1--Partisan formation
  - 2--Partisan detachment which are part of formation
  - 3--Partisan groups which are part of formation
  - 4--Individual partisan detachments
  - 5--Individual partisan group
  - 6--Radio communications link
  - 7--Wire communications link
  - 8--Back-up radio communications links
  - 9--Communications link by airborne equipment
  - 10--Radios of liaison officers from ShPD office

- a--Radio center of ShPD office
- b--Airfield for loading personnel and freight
- c--Rear echelon of ShPD office and training point
- d--Operations group of ShPD office under army military council

The intelligence plans of the fronts began to reflect the use of partisan reconnaissance. For example, virtually all the intelligence plans of the First Baltic Front for 1944 provided the involvement of the partisan detachments in carrying out intelligence missions for the front.(16)

A distinguishing feature in the reconnaissance activities of the partisans was the fact that the formations and even the detachments were engaged both in operational and clandestine intelligence. Here the latter was conducted not only by local patriots living around the enemy facilities which were of interest to the front command but also by specially recruited partisan scouts. The intelligence network was made up, as a rule, of courageous underground members who penetrated the various administrative and military bodies of the enemy. Thus, on the small territory of the western rayons of Kalinin Oblast and which remained under the heel of the occupiers up to the end of 1943, 38 underground members worked in enemy intelligence bodies and police formations, 39 in the occupation institutions, 12 at industrial enterprises, 14 in restaurants and officer clubs, 84 underground members conducted reconnaissance of the enemy garrisons and 189 surveilled the transport facilities and monitored enemy movements on the lines of communications.(17)

Much boldness, creativity and daring were needed to introduce the scouts into enemy facilities and installations. As an example one might give the operation of the Minsk Partisan Formation (deputy formation commander for intelligence, Capt K.I. Domorad) in introducing its own agent in the Nazi intelligence-sabotage school of the Abwehr.

In the spring of 1943, the partisans learned that not far from Novo-Borisov in the village of Pechi, a Nazi military intelligence school was operating under the guise of a school for senior specialists of the TODT military construction organization. Here they trained agents and saboteurs for being dropped in the enemy rear and placed in partisan detachments. The variable personnel of the school was recruited from traitors.

The command of the Minsk Formation set the task for partisan reconnaissance to penetrate the Nazi school no matter what. For this purpose from among the Novo-Borisov underground members they had to choose a person who would be able to gain admission to the school. Upon the recommendation of the deputy commander for intelligence of the Brigade imeni S.M. Kirov, S.K. Alay, the choice fell on one of the partisan signals operators.

A plan was worked out in detail, down to the finest points, for placing the partisan scout ("Cadet") in the lair of Nazi intelligence. And difficult testing began for the Soviet patriot. Only the finest thread linked him to the motherland. Only two people K.I. Domorad and S.K. Alay knew his dangerous, risky work.

In observing great caution, "Cadet" learned the names of the school graduates, their groups, and carefully studied the external portraits of his new "friends" (habits, distinctive marks, manners, inclinations and so forth). After a certain time "Cadet" began to deliver valuable intelligence messages. In them, he informed the brigade command of the number and areas where the enemy saboteurs were dropped in the rear of the operational Soviet Army and in

the partisan detachments, he described them, he provided information on the content of work of the Abwehr school and forwarded other valuable information on the enemy. (18)

Of great importance for the Soviet Army was the information gained by the partisans by operational reconnaissance. Although in each detachment and formation there were special reconnaissance subunits, in actuality all the partisans were involved in reconnaissance, regardless of what missions they were carrying out. Operational reconnaissance of the partisans was carried out by surveillance, by questioning the population, and by capturing documents and prisoners. Ambushes and raids were the basic methods of capturing "boxes" and documents. Great attention was given to mobile ambushes. During the years of the Great Patriotic War in the course of bold operations the partisans frequently captured high Nazi military leaders as well as valuable operational documents and information which they were carrying. Thus, the reconnaissance group of the 4th Kletnya "For the Motherland" Partisan Brigade (commander, I.A. Ponosenkov; commissar, N.M. Sukhorukov) on 1 September 1943 organized an ambush on the Altukhovo--Trubchevsk road. After the unexpected raid the partisans captured the commander of a special purpose Nazi troop group, Lt Gen Borneman with his aide and security as well as valuable documents, including important orders, secret instructions and bulletins from the German Army General Staff and maps showing the positions of the Nazi troops in the zones of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts. (19)

The partisans provided great aid to the intelligence groups of the Soviet troops dropped into the enemy rear. The experience of the war showed that it took longer for the army scouts after landing in the enemy rear to reach the reconnaissance objectives than it did the partisans. Often they began to carry out the mission without getting their bearings on the unfamiliar terrain or sizing up the situation. Considering this, the armies and fronts began to more frequently practice the dropping of reconnaissance groups in the partisan positions as this provided the scouts with a safe landing, provided them with data on the situation, the necessary materiel and quickly led them to the reconnaissance objectives. Many Soviet Army reconnaissance groups were based in partisan detachments over the entire time they were in the enemy rear. They used the partisan airfields for sending captured documents to the intelligence sections of the front and army staffs as well as for moving important prisoners behind the front line. Sometimes the reconnaissance groups restored communications lost with their command through the partisan radios.

Help was provided to the Soviet Army reconnaissance groups also in actions in large population points. Thus, the underground group established in the autumn of 1943 in the town of Rybnitsa (Moldavia) upon the initiative of the local communists V. Rybalko. M. Cheplan and I. Direvich, established contact with the reconnaissance of the Second Ukrainian Front. The partisans and underground members helped the scouts secretly enter the city, they securely hid their radio equipment, prepared Romanian passports and passes and also provided various information for moving about freely. Due to this aid as well as the intelligence data obtained on the enemy, the scouts operated actively in Rybnitsa up to the arrival of the Soviet Army, having successfully carried out the missions set for them. (20)

Partisan reconnaissance and the intelligence bodies of the fronts (armies) cooperated actively in conducting disinformation measures. For example, at the end of May 1942, the Command of the Maritime Army used the Crimean partisans for disinforming the commander of the 11th German Army, Gen von Manstein. As is known, in May 1942, the fighting on the Kerch Peninsula ended unsuccessfully for the Soviet troops. After this, the Nazi Command was able to throw all the liberated tank and infantry units into the storming of Sevastopol. It was essential to defer the start of the enemy offensive for a certain time. For this purpose, persuasive disinformation material was prepared in the form of an order from the commander of the Maritime Army and which indicated the supposed landing of a prepared airborne assault force on the Aypetra sector as well as amphibious forces in the area of Yalta, Alushta and Semidvorye. It was essential to present this order to the command of the Nazi troops in such a manner that it did not cause the slightest doubt on Manstein's part as to its reliability. The task was assigned to the commander of the 3d Partisan Rayon of the Crimea, G.L. Severskiy. The disinformation material was delivered from Sevastopol to the partisan airfield in a cloth parcel along with a letter from the army commander, Gen I.Ye. Petrov, which set out the essence of the assignment.

For carrying out the mission, G.L. Severskiy established a special group headed by the chief of staff of the Yevpatoriya Partisan Detachment, A.D. Makhnev, and the intelligence officer, Galyshev. The group included Misyura whom the partisan command was firmly convinced was a traitor sent to the detachment by the Gestapo. In the instruction session G.L. Severskiy gave Misyura the parcel and ordered him to sew it in the lining of his jacket. Soon thereafter the special group came out on the Simferopol--Alushta Highway in the area of Taushan-Bazar, where a Nazi post was located. In endeavoring to provide maximum verisimilitude for the planned operation, the group destroyed the sentry at the barrier and threw grenades at two trucks carrying soldiers. During the fighting Misyura endeavored to hide in a ravine. He was killed when he ran across the highway where there was an intense cross-fire. The "postal box" was in a prominent place, the group retired from combat and returned to its base.

Soon a mass enemy troop movement began along the southern roads of the Crimea. In the Sevastopol area, the enemy limited itself to just artillery and air operations and did not commit the tank and infantry units freed on the Kerch Peninsula to the battle for the city. A massed storming of Sevastopol was put off for a certain time. (21)

As a result of the measures carried out by the Communist Party, Hq SHC and the leadership of the partisan movement, the reconnaissance activities of the partisans in the course of the Great Patriotic War were constantly broadened and improved. The party bodies of the Union republics, the oblasts and rayons and the partisan movement staffs provided direct leadership of partisan reconnaissance, they were concerned with strengthening all elements of the intelligence service with party and Komsomol cadres, they strengthened the detachments and formations with experienced intelligence officers and aimed the partisans at broadening intelligence activities in the interests of the Soviet Army as well as at strengthening ties with the front and army command.

In terms of its content, partisan reconnaissance became a component part of Soviet Army reconnaissance. The improvement in the reconnaissance activities of the partisans helped to increase the amount of intelligence information turned over to the staffs of the fronts (armies) and had an influence on increasing the effectiveness of combat operations carried out by the partisan forces.

#### FOOTNOTES

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4. D.M. Medvedev, "Silnyye dukhom" [Strong in Spirit], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1951, pp 65-66.
5. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 241, inv. 10254, file 18, sheets 41-42.
6. Party Archives of the Party History Institute Under the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party, folio 3500, inv. 4, file 125, sheets 64-74.
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10. IOPA, folio 0-116, inv. 2, stor. unit 157, sheet 4.
11. Party Archives of the Party History Institute Under the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, folio 62, inv. 1, stor. unit 1, sheet 67.
12. V.K. Kiselev, "Partizanskaya razvedka," p 21.
13. Central Party Archives of the Marxism-Leninism Institute Under the CPSU Central Committee, folio 69, inv. 8, file 27, sheets 20-23.
14. KOMMUNIST BELORUSSII, No 7, 1974, p 40.
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16. TsAMO, folio 235, inv. 2076, file 14, sheets 1-285.

17. Kalinin Oblast Party Archives, folio 479, stor. unit 65, sheet 193.
18. R.N. Machulskiy, "Vechnyy ogon" [Eternal Flame], Minsk, Belarus, 1969, pp 315-320.
19. Central Party Archives of the Marxism-Leninism Institute Under the CPSU Central Committee, folio 69, inv. 1, file 9, sheets 163-172.
20. Party Archives of the Party History Institute Under the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party, folio 3280, inv. 1, stor. unit 155, sheets 1-18.
21. "Chasovyye sovetskikh granits" [Sentries of the Soviet Frontiers], Moscow, Politizdat, 1983, pp 172-173.

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## COHESION PROBLEMS OF MULTINATIONAL COLLECTIVES DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 86 (signed to press 24 Jul 86) pp 56-61

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col A.N. Razmaznin: "From the Experience of the Work of Commanders and Political Bodies in Uniting Multinational Troop Collectives" published under the rubric "Party Political Work"]

[Text] "The party proceeds from the view," states the new wording of the CPSU Program, "that the consistent carrying out of a Leninist nationality policy and the greatest possible strengthening of the friendship of peoples are a component part for the improving of socialism and a practically tested path to the further flourishing of our multinational socialist motherland."(1)

A characteristic trait of CPSU nationality policy has been the fact that it organically considers the interests of defending the socialist fatherland and is closely tied to the party's military policy. The military policy, in turn, takes into account the level of national relations in the country, the demographic processes, the degree of economic and sociopolitical development in the Union republics, national traditions and the military experience of the nations and nationalities.

The party is precisely that force, emphasized the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev, which is capable of considering the interests of all classes and social groups, all nations and nationalities of the country, to unite them into one and to mobilize the energy of the people for the common cause of communist creation.(2)

The Soviet Armed Forces have incorporated in themselves the social transformations of real socialism and the achievements of scientific and technical progress and they reflect the interests of all the classes and social groups, the nations and nationalities of the Soviet state. V.I. Lenin pointed out: "The organizational development of our army can only lead to successful results as it has been established in the spirit of general Soviet construction...."(3)

In the heroic struggle of the working class and the peasantry for their socialist fatherland during the years of the Civil War and foreign military

intervention, the vital force and activities of the Soviet school was vividly and persuasively apparent in the international indoctrination of the Army and Navy personnel. From the very first days of Soviet power, service in the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] was proclaimed to be the right of all workers regardless of nationality. "The Red Army," stated the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars [SNK], "is joined by each person who is ready to dedicate his strength and his life to defending the victories of the October Revolution, Soviet power and socialism."(4)

By the end of the Civil War, the Red Army included 77.6 percent Russians, 13 percent Ukrainians, 4 percent Belorussians and 4.7 percent Latvians, Tatars, Bashkirs and other nationalities.(5)

In indoctrinating the men in a spirit of friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism, the commanders and military commissars steadily explained the party's Leninist nationality policy to them, they unmasked the nationalistic intrigues of the bourgeoisie and combated national prejudices. A major contribution to the international indoctrination of the Red Armymen and the population was made, in particular, by the Federation of Foreign Groups of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)], the Polish Bureau of Propaganda and Agitation Under the RKP(b) Central Committee, the Turkestan Commission of the RSFSR VTSIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] and the SNK and later the Turkestan Bureau of the RKP(b) Central Committee, the Central Bureau of Communist Organizations for the Peoples of the East, the Polish and Eastern sections of the Political Directorate of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council [RVSR] as well as the international sections and departments in the political bodies of the fronts and armies. Political indoctrination in the Army and Navy was actively carried out by the political sections, military commissariats and party organizations.

The powerful strength of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, in uniting the nations and nationalities of the USSR into a solid and close-knit family, was fully apparent in the Great Patriotic War.

All the peoples of our nation rose to defend the socialist fatherland. From the very first days of the war, recruits from the national republics began arriving in the operational army. Many recruits had a poor knowledge of Russian or did not know it at all. For example, among the 2,824 soldiers of non-Russian nationality which were received in one month by the 160th Rifle Division, 975 men were in this category.(6) This complicated their training for combat. It was essential not only to organize the instruction of the servicemen in Russian and unite them in a single military family but also indoctrinate the personnel for working with them. The political bodies and party organizations gave particular attention to the recruitment of the company deputy political instructors, agitators and translators from the soldiers and commanders of non-Russian nationality who did know Russian. In particular, in the 160th Rifle Division 17 deputy political instructors, 77 agitators and translators, 11 party organizers and 10 Komsomol organizers were appointed to the companies from servicemen of non-Russian nationality. Under the division's political section there were courses which trained political workers and leaders of the party and Komsomol organizations for units and subunits which were multinational.(7)

The political bodies selected political workers who knew the languages of the Soviet peoples for the positions of regular agitators. Personnel for working with the servicemen of non-Russian nationality were trained in schools and at courses.

Of important significance for improving these activities was the Directive of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army of 17 September 1942 "On Indoctrinational Work With the Red Armymen and Junior Commanders of Non-Russian Nationality." From April 1942 through February 1943, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army sent to the front some 2,429 non-Russian political workers who had been sent to the army under special assignment by the central committees of the Union republic communist parties.(8) In July-August 1943, it conducted assemblies for agitators of different nationalities from the political bodies of the fronts and military districts. The participants of the assemblies shared the experience of their work and made a number of proposals to improve this.

Special groups were set up for the purpose of studying Russian in the units and subunits. The exercises were held daily for 1.5-2 hours. Also widespread were military friendship evenings for the men representing the fraternal Soviet peoples, receptions for the Red Armymen and commanders of different nationalities who had distinguished themselves in the fighting by the military councils of the armies and the command of the formations, meetings of soldiers arriving on the front with compatriots and veteran soldiers, the ceremonial passing on of weapons belonging to heroes who had died a death of the brave to their combat comrades and the establishing of nationality groups of Red Army amateur artistic activity.

The indoctrination of the Soviet military in a spirit of friendship of the Soviet peoples was one of the important factors for our victory over the Nazi invaders.

The postwar period in the life of the Soviet Armed Forces has been marked by a further uniting of the multinational troop collectives. In following the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee on the questions of ideological and political indoctrination activities, the commanders, political bodies and party organizations have done a good deal to increase the activity of the patriotic and international indoctrination of the motherland's defenders. The practical work of strengthening friendship and combat fraternity among the men of different nationalities has been established and constantly improved in the regiments, on the ships and in the formations.

The commanders, political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations in the leading units of the Red Banner Odessa Military District have carried out effective work to unite the multinational military collectives and to establish a healthy political and moral climate in them. Serving in its troops are soldiers from more than 70 nationalities including representatives of the Russian federation, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, the Transcaucasian Republics, Central Asia and the Baltic. The resolving of practical questions related to uniting the multinational military collectives here is carried out by a well-conceived range of political, ideological and

organizational measures carried out in a constant relation to the tasks of combat readiness, military and political training and the strengthening of military discipline.

These activities have been significantly strengthened in line with the celebrating of the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 and preparations for the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In carrying out the course outlined by the 27th CPSU Congress of fundamentally reorganizing party work, the commanders and political workers have focused efforts on intensifying the training and indoctrinational process, on the most rational utilization of the available means, capabilities and reserves and on developing the creative potential of the multinational troop collectives. The content, forms and methods of work here are being enriched and the ideological and political basis for the work include: a profound explanation to the personnel of Lenin's nationality policy, the activities of the CPSU to carry this out, the importance of the friendship of Soviet peoples for strengthening the economic and defense might of the nation and the achievements of our multinational state; the indoctrination of patriotism, Soviet national pride, proletarian internationalism; unmasking the reactionary ideology and policy of nationalism. The men develop a feeling of responsibility for belonging to the Soviet Armed Forces and a readiness to carry out their political and international duty in any situation, no matter how complex. Here the tasks of strengthening party influence on the unity of the troop collectives are carried out comprehensively, considering not only the national but also the personality traits of the servicemen, the level of their training and the assigned duties.

The commanders, political bodies and staffs pay unflagging attention to improving the training of the officers as indoctrinators and to instructing them in actual work in the multinational collectives. For example, the political section headed by Officer S.A. Posokhov, together with the staff, has organized at the meetings of the primary party organization secretaries a discussion of the experience of leading officers in studying the new recruits and placing them in the subunits considering national traits. A seminar was conducted for the company commanders and their deputies for political affairs where they examine the forms and methods of work of uniting the multinational troop collectives. The officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"] and sergeants were taught the ability by coordinated efforts to uphold proper relations between the men and effectively utilize the recommendations of military pedagogics and psychology for this.

The political section where Officer V.A. Iglin is a political worker is constantly concerned for the commanders and political workers to acquire work habits in the area of uniting the multinational troop collectives. Qualification lectures and reports are regularly given for the officers. In the libraries and educational labs, there are exhibits of special literature, special-subject and procedural conferences and seminars are regularly held. For example, here a practical scientific conference on the subject "The Unity of Ideological and Organizational Work -- A Most Important Condition for the Effective Activities of the Military Cadres to Unite and Indoctrinate the Troop Collectives" was held in close relationship to life. A seminar was also

held on "Urgent Questions of Moral and Legal Indoctrination for the Personnel of the Multinational Troop Collectives in Light of the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress." Procedural exercises on the subject "Forms and Methods of Work for Subunit Commanders in Increasing the Effectiveness of Military Indoctrination" have been held with the commanders of companies, batteries and platoons.

The commanders, political bodies and party organizations are working to increase the role of political exercises in the international indoctrination of the men. A Marxist-Leninist scientific ideology and total dedication to the cause of the party and to communist ideals are formed in the process of the political training of the personnel. At the exercises a central place is held by a profound study of Lenin's ideological and theoretical heritage and the materials and decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress by the men. The historical advantages of the achievements of real socialism are persuasively and soundly demonstrated in resolving the most complex sociopolitical, economic and nationality problems as well as in the development of science and culture.

The questions of fraternal friendship and solidarity and the unity of the nations and nationalities of our country are being evermore reflected in the content of the political exercises for the soldiers and sergeants. Thus, the political section of a formation where there are men from 36 nationalities (Northern Caucasus Military District) has recommended for independent study additional themes on the timely problems of nationality relations and the forming of close-knit military collectives. The group leaders are helped in improving their skills in conducting political exercises and in studying the national traits, traditions and customs of the peoples of Central Asia, Transcaucasia, the Ukraine and Moldavia.

The formation's political section adopted measures to improve the work of the agitation and propaganda collective and groups as well as the lecture cycles of legal knowledge and moral indoctrination. There has been greater propagandizing of the Marxist-Leninist theory of nationality relations, internationalism and the united friendship of peoples as one of the most important sources in the might of the Soviet Armed Forces. More attention has begun to be shown to a well-reasoned unmasking of the fabrications of the bourgeois falsifiers of CPSU nationality policy and who have constantly attempted to undermine the friendship of our nation's peoples.

The Lenin Lectures held in the subunits on the subjects "V.I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Friendship of Peoples as a Source of the Strength and Might of the Socialist Commonwealth Countries" and "V.I. Lenin on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland" have helped unite the multinational troop collectives and instill in the men a feeling of national pride for the socialist motherland. The officers from the political section, the party and Komsomol organizations have shown concern so that the Lenin Lessons, special-subject evenings and oral magazines are conducted on a high ideological level. Such forms of work are being successfully employed as sponsorship ties, meetings of

the soldiers with the multinational collectives of enterprises and institutions, kolkhozes and sovkhozes and with war veterans. Party and soviet workers from the Union and autonomous republics are invited to speak to the personnel.

The commanders and political workers systematically study the interests and attitudes of the personnel, the individual traits of the men and carefully consider these in their activities. The instructions prepared by the political section on organizing individual indoctrinational work with the servicemen is a good support here. The question and answer evenings and the assemblies of the personnel also help to unite the troop collectives. During each training period the subunits conduct general and Komsomol meetings with the agenda "The Company -- My Combat Multinational Family" and "Friendship and Comradeship -- The Guarantee for the Successes of Komsomol Soldiers in Serving the Motherland."

The work of the communists in uniting the troop collectives is under the constant supervision of the political section, the party committees and bureaus. In all the party organizations they have organized the personal contribution of each communist to the strengthening of military discipline. The sessions of the party committees and bureaus examine the questions of increasing the responsibility of the party members and candidate members for the state of indoctrinational work with the men and its results. In the formation's subunits and units a healthy moral situation and an atmosphere of strong friendship and military comradeship are constantly maintained and this helps to achieve high indicators for the personnel in combat training and service.

The Komsomol committees and bureaus have also done a great deal to unite the troop collectives. The Komsomol activists participate in propagandizing examples of military friendship, a helping hand and the heroic feats of men of different nationalities in our country during the years of the Great Patriotic War, during the days of peacetime military training and in carrying out their international duty abroad, in particular in Afghanistan. The Komsomol organizations have maintained a correspondence with enterprises and schools where the servicemen worked or studied prior to induction. The members of the Komsomol committee in one of the units read the received letters before the men formed up and placed them on the stand "They Are Writing About You, Soldier."

The commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations are working to strengthen the indoctrinational effect of combat training and the socialist competition. They are constantly concerned with this in the formation where Officer V.P. Pomytkin is the chief of the political section. Here they widely analyze the fulfillment by the subunits of tasks in tactical exercises, at firing ranges and in political exercises and they point out and commend the smooth actions of the multinational crews and squads as well as the helping hand in mastering combat skills.

Indoctrinational efforts are reinforced by measures to improve the organization of the troop services, to improve the material and living conditions and to maintain firm proper order in the units and subunits.

We should note the experience of organizing work in a formation with the soldiers who have a poor knowledge of Russian. Circles have been organized for their instruction in the units and seven-ten men study in each of these. The best trained officers are assigned as leaders. Sergeants with a higher education as well as the wives of servicemen with experience in teaching Russian are used for conducting exercises with the non-Russian soldiers. Pedagogues from local schools are invited with the agreement of the oblast public education section and the Komsomol gorkom. Sponsorship by outstanding men in training is organized for men in the subunits who have a poor knowledge of Russian. The sponsors help their comrades in more rapidly mastering the specialty.

In forming close-knit troop collectives a greater role is being played by the officer clubs, soldier clubs, museums and rooms of combat glory, libraries, Lenin rooms and local radios. The commanders and political bodies see to it that their activities are full of heroic-patriotic and internationalist themes which propagandize the friendship of peoples, their unity and fraternity during the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars and the combat alliance with the men of the socialist commonwealth armies.

The political bodies have begun to more fully consider the spiritual needs of the servicemen of different nationalities in organizing subscriptions to newspapers and magazines. The libraries of certain units receive from three to eight newspapers of the Union and autonomous republics. Libraries of Soviet multinational literature are organized on volunteer principles in the subunits. According to the established tradition, upon being discharged into the reserves, many servicemen present their comrades with books and magazines, including in the national languages. There is better propagandizing of advanced experience in uniting the multinational collectives on the pages of large-run newspapers.

Active cultural and educational work as well as the skillful use of movies, the radio and television help to arm the personnel with ideological and artistic values of the multinational socialist culture, they increase their political awareness and social activeness, they bring the men of different nationalities closer together and strengthen friendship and troop comradeship.

At present, it is a time of increased responsibility. There is the urgent demand of today to seek out new effective ways to mobilize the masses. One of the most important conditions for uniting the troop collectives and for their successful leadership is the closeness of the leaders to the people and constant contact with them. The carrying out of this task will help to further establish in the troop collectives, the units and ships an atmosphere of friendship, unity, discipline and organization, as well as purposefulness in practical actions to indoctrinate and train dependable defenders of the motherland and internationalist soldiers.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Programma KPSS: Novaya redaktsiya. Prinyata XXVII syezdom KPSS" [The CPSU Program: New Wording. Adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, p 45.
2. See: "Materialy vneocherednogo Plenuma Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS, 11 marta 1985 g." [Materials of the Extraordinary Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of 11 March 1985], Moscow, Politizdat, 1985, p 12.
3. V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, pp 76-77.
4. "Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti" [Decrees of Soviet Power], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, Vol I, 1957, pp 352-355.
5. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 9, inv. 9, file 4, sheet 22.
6. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 395, inv. 9153, file 13, sheet 126.
7. Ibid., sheet 127.
8. Ibid., folio 32, inv. 15797, file 15, sheet 85.

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## EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE MILITARY DOCTRINE VIEWS IN POSTWAR PERIOD

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[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Capt 2d Rank V.P. Zimonin, published under the rubric "In Foreign Armies"]

[Text] In the official press and in statements by the Japanese military-political leadership, one searches in vain for any objective and integrated expression of views accepted in the state on the fundamental questions of a possible war, its goals and nature, the preparation of the country and the armed forces for it as well as the methods of waging war, that is, those questions which reflect the content of military doctrine in its traditional understanding.(1) Moreover, the true content of Japanese military-doctrine views is camouflaged and distorted in every possible way or simply concealed from the public. The joint Japanese-American research has pointed out that one of the purely Japanese features in the elaboration of policy is that due to the lack of agreement in social circles over the most important foreign policy questions the government "has been forced to establish a hazy and often confusing picture of goals and actions in terms of questions concerning security."(2) For this reason, it is no accident that many observers, military figures and researchers both in Japan and outside have commented on the weak elaboration of military doctrinal concepts in this country or have asserted that in the area of military policy Japan merely obediently follows in the footsteps of the American political course.

However, facts show that, having recognized the inevitability of the nation's defeat in World War II, the Japanese military leadership headed by the emperor carefully thought out and subsequently consistently carried out an entire range of measures making it possible to maintain conditions for a rebirth of the economic, political and ideological bases for such a phenomenon as Japanese militarism, on their basis to create a modern military machine and initiate extensive militaristic preparations in accord with the new military doctrine views.

The main military doctrine views stem from the general directions of domestic and foreign policy of the ruling circles in the Japanese state and from its sociopolitical and economic system. These were elaborated by the imperial household and by the nation's leadership as a whole in accord with an

assessment of the possible consequences for the fate of Japanese imperialism in the event of a continuation of the war after the Soviet Union's entry into it. During the first postwar years, due to objective factors, the doctrinal views of the Japanese military political leadership still did not have clear outlines, however their formation was carried out in accord with the class interests of the ruling circles in the Japanese state.

As a result of the failure of the United States to carry out the measures of the occupation period as set out by the Potsdam Declaration as well as due to the vitality of militarism which has deep historical roots, the military defeat of Japan did not lead to the abandonment of the struggle for domination in the Asian-Pacific region on the strategic level by the ruling circles of the Japanese state. On 15 August 1945, having transmitted over the radio the order of Emperor Hirohito to the Japanese Armed Forces on the surrender, the announcer of the Japanese radio station read the following statement: "We have lost. But this is only temporary. Japan's mistake was a shortage of material, scientific knowledge and weapons. But we will rectify this mistake." (3) Thus, a policy of revenge and of preparing for new campaigns of conquest from the very outset lay at the basis of the new system of military doctrine views being shaped by the Japanese militarists. This system envisaged first of all a solution to the problems of establishing the domination of the exploiting classes inside the nation and the maintaining of the capitalist system in it.

From the very outset of the American occupation, the transitional government of Prince N. Higashikuni, the following governments and the Japanese reaction supporting them made every effort to prevent fundamental changes in the political and social system of the nation and to maintain the military cadres and administrative apparatus of the large monopolies. Thus, the Japanese ruling circles endeavored to provide favorable conditions for the rebirth of militarism and for accumulating forces for new campaigns of conquest. This was so apparent that the American historian W. Price even in 1946 wrote: "Having suffered a defeat, the Japanese militarists have begun to prepare for an extended struggle. They have prepared Japan for future wars...." (4)

In the military doctrine views, an important place is held by the determining of the enemy against which one must fight in a possible war and irregardless of the fact of whether the enemy represents an unprovoked military threat for Japan. As is known, in the history of this country from the period of imperialism there is no example when any state was the first to attack Japanese territory. In this context for establishing the "necessity" of a constant rise in armed forces, the Japanese reaction has resorted to various fabrications and to camouflaging its true goals.

Since the adoption of the Law Governing Self-Defense Forces on 1 July 1954 and up to the present, in the public press for these purposes they have employed the assertion of the presence of two types of threat to Japan: the threat of "direct aggression" and the threat of "indirect aggression." (5) By "direct aggression" here they understand an immediate aggression against Japan by any state and by "indirect aggression" the increasing actions of subversive elements which can be maintained from outside, illegal penetration from overseas, the importing of weapons and so forth. As a result of "direct

aggression" there is the threat of the loss of a portion or all the nation's territory while as a result of both "direct" and "indirect" aggression its system might be altered. The Japanese government has urged the people and the armed forces to be ready to repel both types of aggression aimed against the state. However, even Japanese bourgeois researchers in the military area do not believe that any nation would attack Japanese territory if it "would not be provoked or threatened by Japan." (7) The former chief of the NDA [National Defense Agency] and presently Prime Minister of Japan Y. Nakasone in March 1970 admitted that "there is a very slight probability that Japan could be the object of direct aggression." (8)

All the more perfectly ridiculous is the assertion of the Japanese reactionary circles that the socialist countries and primarily the Soviet Union threaten Japanese security. In viewing the USSR as the main enemy and in propagandizing this among the population, the Japanese government has endeavored to use anti-Soviet fabrications for establishing the need to increase military potential. Also fallacious is the thesis of the threat to Japan in the event of the development of popular disturbances in the country.

The determining of allies in carrying out Japanese military policy in the future has also had a substantial influence upon the development of the doctrinal views of the Japanese leadership. Immediately after the signing of the Active Surrender at a session of the Japanese Secret Council, the view was adopted: "In any event...to maintain such a course which would make it possible for us to establish a benevolent attitude on the part of the United States." (9) The former Japanese premier and main military criminal at the Tokyo Trial, Gen Tojo, predicted in his will the "inevitability" of a third world war in which the United States and USSR would be enemies and urged Japan and the United States to ally with one another in the name of combating communism. (10)

Thus, the Japanese leadership has made a major about-face in military policy and in a short period of time realigned itself with a new ally in reactionary affairs in the figure of one of its former main opponents in the war in the Pacific, the United States. In American imperialism it found hope and support in carrying out plans to restore Japan's military positions.

The antipopular essence and reactionary nature of Japanese military policy was also apparent in the bloody adventure of international imperialism headed by the United States in Korea. This aggression in the Japanese ruling circles and among businessmen was greeted as a "God-sent good fortune" (a statement by one of the responsible leaders of the Japanese government with the start of the war). (11) The American intervention was fully supported by the major parties of Japanese capital of those years, the Liberal and Democratic Parties. (12) For strengthening the puppet South Korean Army around 8,000 Japanese "volunteers" were sent to the Korean Peninsula, including officers, soldiers and sailors from the former imperial Army and Navy, as well as 46 combat ships; during the war Japan itself was turned into a staging area, arsenal and supply base for the combat operations of the U.S. Armed forces. (13) Over the years of the Korean War, due to the mutual interest of the Japanese and American leadership, the relations between these countries developed from relations between conqueror and vanquished into a stage when

Japan appeared as a still-younger, but already important partner in the American game. As was subsequently pointed out by the American researcher, V. Rance, "Japan showed its readiness and capacity to support our Armed Forces when and where it was necessary."(14)

Outright Japanese involvement on the side of the imperialist forces in the Korean War, the incipient process of the remilitarization of the Japanese economy with the lack of resolution to many social problems and the growing exploitation of the workers evoked sharp protests and actions by the broad masses of people and this was described by the reaction as the increased communist danger in the nation. Under the pretext of the need to defend the foundations of bourgeois democracy, the authorities demanded the establishing of a more powerful armed force than the police. Soon thereafter (on 10 August 1950) upon the decision of the Japanese Parliament, it was established in the form of a "reserve police corps" which 2 years later had evolved into a "security corps" and after another 2 years into a constantly growing "Self-Defense Force" which was organized according to the principle of a mercenary army. This meant that the Japanese ruling circles had set out to actually realize the plans for a military rebirth which had been set even during the days of defeat and had taken the first steps on the way to creating the material bases for elaborating an independent military policy.

At the same time, the Japanese leaders in no way wanted to be under the protection of their stronger partner. But in fearing even more to be unable to handle the revolutionary actions within the country with its own forces, the government of S. Yoshida in working out the first "Security Treaty" with the United States, insisted that American troops continue to remain on Japanese territory after the end of the Occupation period.(15) This treaty which was the legal basis for the Japanese-American military treaty was signed on 8 September 1951. In using the agreement with the United States, the Japanese ruling circles were able to make every effort to strengthen the positions of monopolistic capital and improve the state's military structure, primarily by creating armed forces of significant size and combat might and by further increasing their ability to carry out the domestic and foreign military-political tasks. In this context the Japanese diplomat T. Takeuchi has written: "It was essential to strengthen the military and strategic potential of the insular island as the central sector of the Eastern Front in the struggle against communism."(16) However, this task was proposed not to repel a supposed threat from outside but, as was perfectly obvious, for carrying out aggressive plans!

From the mid-1950's, definite circles in the Japanese leadership began to show a desire to increase Japanese independence in carrying out its own military policy and its role in the Japanese-American alliance. On 20 May 1957, a document was approved which was to be of long-lasting doctrinal importance, "The Fundamental Course in the Area of National Defense"\* ("Kokubo-no kihon hoshin") and which demanded the "development of the effective defensive capabilities" within the limits necessary for an "independent defense" and in accord with "national might and the state of affairs in the nation" in relying in fighting against an outside enemy on "the joint security system with the United States."(17)

The Security Treaty which was revised in 1960 and starting in 1970 automatically extended for a year no longer entrusted the carrying out of police functions to the American troops. Japan in accord with Article 3 of the new treaty assumed the obligation to continue to increase its own military potential. If necessary the treaty provided for joint actions by the armed forces of the two countries.

Under the new treaty which was a reflection of the further development of the military doctrine views in the area of allied relations, Japan voluntarily assumed the obligation to widen its participation in imperialist policy. This was reflected in forcing preparations to carry out a police role in the Near East and in the extensive support for American aggression in Indochina and the broadening of economic and political expansion in the Asian countries. The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Shiina stated in March 1966 that "under certain conditions," the action of the treaty "could extend beyond the Far East." Vietnam precisely fell under these "certain conditions," since the Vietnamese War, in the words of the minister, "related to Japanese security." Even before he had stated that on the basis of the Security Treaty, Japan "was obliged to help the Americans" in carrying out military operations. All of this nullifies any assertions on the defensive nature of Japanese military policy.

Facts indicate that even at this time the system of military doctrine views in Japan provided for direct involvement of the Japanese Armed Forces together with the American troops in wars (with the employment also of nuclear missile weapons) far beyond the Japanese Islands. Confirmation of this is the secret plans worked out in the 1960's for conducting a war in the northeastern part of the Asian Subcontinent and the adjacent seas. The operational-strategic plans "Three Arrows" (1963), Flying Dragon (1965) and Bull Run (1966) envisaged the conduct of military operations by Japanese troops in North Korea and China, the sealing off of the straits as well as offensive operations against enemy naval and air bases, the landing on the Kuril Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin which belonged to the USSR and, in the event of success, the conduct of operations in the Soviet Maritime.(19)

These dangerous preparations, in the words of Japanese authors, represented "not a passive involvement in that aggressive war which the United States initiated; the new danger was that the Japanese government and the Self-Defense Forces by their own will were beginning to actively collaborate with the American Armed Forces long before an attack on Japan and would assume a major involvement in the aggression."(20)

The period which started at the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's was characterized by the emergence of Japan in second place in the capitalist world in terms of the economic development level and by the permanent holding of this and by the rapid becoming of one of the three (along with the United States and Western Europe) centers of interimperialist rivalry. Economic expansion in Asia constantly widened and the positions of the Japanese monopolies throughout the world were strengthened. The increased economic capability established conditions for growing political ambitions among the imperialist circles and greater activity on the part of the Japanese military.

In Japan a broad and sharp debate broke out over the question of foreign policy which was to play a significant role in the development of military doctrinal views. "Japan," stated the Minister of Foreign Affairs Aichi, "can no longer play a passive role in international affairs if only because economic might is growing into political might." The Japanese Prime Minister E. Sato went even farther in stating on 26 March 1970 that Japan should increase its defense might in order to bring it into accord with the nation's economic power. Such an idea could not help but evoke profound concern among the public. The well-known military reviewer K. Murakami thus assessed the development prospects of the nation if the governments were to follow the Sato policy: "Japan inevitably would turn from an 'economic power' into a 'political power' and then into a 'military power'." (21) Subsequently, Japanese officials repeatedly affirmed loyalty to the military course declared by Premier Sato.

Thus, a new, modern stage began in the shaping of military doctrine views which were assuming an evermore aggressive nature. These were based upon the principle of relying on their own forces ("jishu boei") and this was described in a governmental document "White Paper on the Questions of Japan's Defense" published in 1970. (22) "The 1970's," the paper states, "will obviously become a time when the state might of Japan will reach unprecedented amounts. This will be an age when the nation's obligations on the international scene will grow and because of economic growth it will have to resolve profound domestic and international problems. For this reason at present it is essential, having abandoned imitation and copying, to achieve our own goals with our own hands." (23)

The essence of the new military concept was the outright rejection of the unquestioned following in the wake of the American military-political ship. The chief of the NDA, Y. Nakasone in March 1970 urged the elaboration "of our own strategy and tactics and the creation of new models of domestic weapons." "The independent defense system," he stated, "cannot exist without obtaining independence in these areas." (24) The concept of "independent defense" envisaged the minimum purchasing of weapons and combat equipment from the United States, an increase in Japanese military production and a wider sphere of action for the Japanese Navy and Air Force. The NDA chief openly urged the assuming of a "larger share of leadership and responsibility in a wider partnership with the United States." (25)

The elaboration in the 1970's of the so-called "multilateral" or "equidistant" diplomacy played a definite role in strengthening a Japanese imperialist course, particularly after the departure of the United States from Vietnam. The essence of this diplomacy was "the inadvisability of directing the nation's foreign policy course at a previously selected target," the elimination of "dependence upon the United States" and the abandonment of passive diplomacy. (26) This course was backed up by the elaboration and implementation of a broad range of measures in accord with the document "Basic Provisions of the Defense Plan" adopted by the Cabinet in 1976. This document was of important and permanent doctrinal significance, particularly for the military organizational development of Japan. On the basis of this document, proceeding from the notion of establishing so-called "base self-defense

forces," over a period of several military "five-year plans," there were plans to rapidly modernize and significantly strengthen the combat might of the Japanese Armed Forces. (27)

However, in the mid-1970's, in East Asia as well as throughout the world, the positions of socialism were significantly strengthened and there was a further rise in the national liberation movement. Under these conditions, without having sufficient forces to confirm its dictating of terms in the Asian-Pacific Region, Japan preferred to return, in truth, this time on a higher level, to cooperation with the United States in carrying out economic steps and military-political influence in the region, since the functions of the main guard of imperialist interests here continued to be with Washington. (28)

In the course of the summit talks in August 1975, Washington, in exchange for a statement on Tokyo's readiness to "increase Japanese responsibility" for the financing and implementation of joint military measures, agreed to a plan proposed by the Japanese side for the "sharing of defense" with the aim of precisely stipulating American military obligations, the amounts of the Japanese military contribution and providing definite independence for the Japanese command. In the same month, the U.S. secretary of defense agreed with the Japanese leadership on annual meetings among the leaders of the military departments and, upon Japanese initiative, the establishing of a new body within the Japanese-American Consultative Committee on Security Questions in the form of a subcommittee for military collaboration. Analogous to the functions of the NATO Defense Planning Committee, it was to carry out the tasks of coordinating the elaboration of specific joint strategic operations, the systems of their rear support and the exchange of intelligence data. This would significantly strengthen the organizational aspect of military collaboration. Joint measures were worked out for strengthening the South Korean regime. (29)

In November 1978, the Japanese Cabinet approved the "Guiding Principles of Japanese-American Defense Cooperation" which had been prepared by the Subcommittee (30) and in December 1984 these became the basis for the plans adopted for joint operations in the event of an "emergency period."

Significantly more attention was paid to elaborating the system of military doctrinal views by the National Defense Council, the Council for the Comprehensive Support of National Security organized under the prime minister in 1980 as well as the numerous Japanese research organizations, primarily the Nomura Interdisciplinary Research Institute, the Institute for Problems of Peace and Security, the Japanese Center of Strategic Research (organized in 1980), the Research Defense Institute Under the NDA, the Center for the Study of Strategic Problems Under the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (established in 1982) and other official, semiofficial and private institutions and organizations.

The approach to elaborating a new system of military doctrine views was based upon an interdisciplinary, global approach the essence of which was to coordinate and unify the economic, diplomatic, ideological and military-political efforts of Japan and the other imperialist countries in the struggle against socialism as a social system and the bearer of communist ideas. Such

an approach was organically incorporated in the overall system of military strategic preparations for the anticommunist "crusade" headed by the United States and supported by other Western countries and aimed at unleashing a new world war. Presently in the works of Japanese theorists an ever-larger place is being given over to careful research on the nature of a modern coalition worldwide nuclear missile war and the place of Japan in it. Thus, a former highly-placed co-worker from the NDA, H. Okazaki, has asserted that "there are virtually no conditions under which Japan could be involved in a local war" and feels it necessary to proceed from the possibility of its involvement "only in a world war." (32)

In the military doctrine views of the Japanese leadership, far from the last place is held by plans that in the new world war being prepared by the imperialist circles chief attention of the belligerents will be concentrated in Europe or the Near East (33) while the Land of the Rising Sun will remain the strongest capitalist military power in the Asian-Pacific Region and extend its influence in it. Practical preparations for this are underway. As was shown by an analysis of exercises and maneuvers of the Japanese Armed Forces, in the course of them they work out the methods of launching "mass pre-emptive strikes," blockading the strait zones, controlling the sealanes within a radius of 1,000 and more miles, transporting troops over long distances, landing amphibious and airborne forces and conducting offensive actions under the conditions of employing weapons of mass destruction and electronic countermeasures.

The main direction in the organizational development of the Japanese Armed Forces has been the establishing of a modern, powerful army, aviation and Navy capable of fighting against a "strong enemy" and carrying out tasks not only on a national scale but also a regional one within the global strategic aims of the imperialist system.

Anticommunism and hostility to everything new and progressive underlie the content of the developing system of Japanese military doctrine views.

The basic trend in Japanese military policy is a course of supporting the aggressive line of the United States and its NATO allies for preparing for a world war against the Soviet Union which is termed openly the main Japanese enemy, and the other socialist countries; at the same time conditions are being prepared to strengthen the struggle to repartition the spheres of imperialist influence in accord with the economic, political and military weight of the Japanese state.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. See: "Voyennaya strategiya" [Military Strategy], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1962, p 62; "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 3, 1977, p 225.
2. See: I. Destler, H. Sato, P. Clapp, H. Fukui, "Managing an Alliance. The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations," Washington, 1976, p 60.

3. A.P. Markov, "Yaponiya: Kurs na vooruzheniye" [Japan: A Policy of Armament], Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1970, p 8.
  4. W. Price, "Key to Japan," New York, 1946, p 286.
  5. "Chernaya kniga Yaponii" [The Black Book of Japan], translated from the Japanese, Moscow, Progress, 1973, p 249.
  6. See: "Boei hakusho" (White Paper on Defense Questions), 1977, Tokyo, 1977, p 189.
  7. YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 6 January 1971.
  8. THE JAPAN TIMES, 25 March 1970.
  9. "Istoriya voyny na Tikhon okeane" [The History of War in the Pacific], Moscow, Inostrannaya literatura, translated from the Japanese, 1958, p 92.
  10. N.N. Yakovlev, "3 sentyabrya 1945 goda" [3 September 1945], Moscow, Molodaya gvardiya, 1971, p 178.
  11. See: A.P. Markov, op. cit., p 181.
  12. K.O. Sarkisov, "Yaponiya i Organizatsiya Obyedinennykh Natsiy" [Japan and the United Nations], Moscow, Nauka, Main Editorial Office of Eastern Literature, 1975, p 26.
  13. PRAVDA, 6 October 1951; MANABU, No 8, 1979, p 17.
  14. "U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings," No 2, 1960, p 87.
  15. K. Kawai, "Japan's American Interlude," Chicago, 1960, p 29; F. Shiels, "Tokyo and Washington Dilemmas of a Mature Alliance," Lexington, 1980, pp 74-75.
  16. FAR EASTERN SURVEY, 19 November 1952, p 162.
- \* The Japanese military political leadership has never restricted the meaning of the term "national defense" to what is understood as "ensuring national security by defensive means and the methods of conducting combat," and uses this only in the aim of misleading public opinion. As has been pointed out by Japanese authors, "history teaches that all aggressive wars were carried out under the pretext of defense or self-defense" (see: "Chernaya kniga Yaponii...", p 97).
17. "Nihon-no boey. Boey hakusho" (White Book on Questions of Japanese Defense), Tokyo, 1970, p 29.
  18. See: "Chernaya kniga Yaponii...", pp 21, 24, 31, 45, 46, 102; ASAHI SHIMBUN, 26 March 1966; "Japan's Defense Debate," Tokyo, 1981, p 24.

19. For more detail on these plans see: "Nikkan-to betonamu senso" (Japanese-South Korean Relations and the War in Vietnam), Tokyo, 1965, p 4; ASIAN SURVEY, September 1967, p 614; "Chernaya kniga Yaponii...", pp 114-127.
20. "Chernaya kniga Yaponii...", p 126.
21. ZA RUBEZHOM, No 2, 1970, p 10; see: M.I. Ivanov, "Rost militarizma v Yaponii" [The Growth of Militarism in Japan], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982, p 56; ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 16 November 1970.
22. "Nihon-no boey. Boey hakusho," pp 29-31.
23. Ibid., p 29.
24. D.V. Petrov, "Yaponiya nashikh dney" [Contemporary Japan], Moscow, Znaniye, 1979, p 32; Y. Nakasone, "Nihon-no boey" (The Defense of Japan), Tokyo, 1970, p 3.
25. See: TOYO KEYZAI, 28 February 1970, pp 100-104; Y. Nakasone, "Nihon-no boey," p 5.
26. "Yaponiya, 1976. Yezhegodnik" [Japan, 1976. An Annual], Moscow, Nauka, Main Editorial Office for Eastern Literature, 1977, p 77; N.A. Okazaki, "A Japanese View of Detente," Lexington-Toronto, 1974, p 81; B. Gordon, "Japan, the United States and Southeast Asia," New York, 1978, p 579.
27. See: "Vooruzhennyye sily Yaponii. Istoriya i sovremennost" [The Armed Forces of Japan. History and Present Time], Moscow, Nauka, Main Editorial Office for Eastern Literature, 1985, pp 114, 253-256.
28. KOKUSAY MONDAY SHIRYO (Monthly of Materials on International Problems), No 1, 1979, pp 32-35.
29. "Jieytay nenkan" 1976, p 67; "Waga gayko-no kinkyō, 1978," Tokyo, 1978, p 106; PACIFIC COMMUNITY, Vol 7, No 1, 1977, p 144; THE JAPAN TIMES, 18 June, 16 July and 29 August 1975.
30. KOKUSAY MONDAY SHIRYO, No 1, 1979, pp 32-35.

31. "Niju isseyki-e-no senryaku. Kiki-o do norkoeru ka" (Strategy for the 21st Century. How to Surmount Crises), Tokyo, 1978, p 258; "Boey hakusho," 1983, p 7; "Report on Comprehensive National Security," Tokyo, 1980, pp 3-19.
32. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Vol 7, No 2, 1982, p 193.
33. See: YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 1 November 1982.

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