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Worldwide Report
ARMS CONTROL

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23 OCTOBER 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: COMMENTATORS ASSAIL WEINBERGER SUPPORT FOR SDI

Chernyshev on Talks Obstacle

LD261457 Moscow TASS in English 1407 GMT 26 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 26 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

U.S. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger, delivering an address to the Executives Club of Chicago, again tried to present the U.S. SDI programme as a sure remedy against the continued nuclear arms race. According to him, "SDI is at the centre of any realistic attempt to rid the world of offensive ballistic missiles". What can be said on this score?

The Pentagon chief himself hardly believes this propagandistic nonsense. If only by virtue of his post, Weinberger should understand that as long as the threat of the deployment of a space-based ABM system by the USA exists, the Soviet Union will not agree to reduce or limit its offensive strategic weapons. It is very important to have freedom of decision-making in offensive strategic weapons in order to take countermeasures and restore the strategic balance if space weapons are deployed. That is why SDI constitutes a major obstacle to accord at the Soviet-American Geneva talks.

Moreover, the road of "star wars" onto which Washington has embarked is subverting earlier arms control agreements, primarily the ABM Treaty, which, under the White House's latest proposals, would be phased out over the next 5-7 years and be dead after 1993. Washington is actually inviting the Soviet Union to join an unprecedented arms race, moreover, extended into outer space.

The deeds of the U.S. Administration forcefully belie its propagandistic claim that it is committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Many programmes to build up and improve the U.S. arms arsenals are being carried on in parallel with "star wars" work. The Pentagon chief seems to have forgotten his statement that the weapons that are being currently purchased will constitute the backbone of the U.S. armed forces well into the 21st century.

The arguments that new sophisticated war technology, the SDI weapons, can guarantee security obviously are intended for the ignorant. The realities of the nuclear space age are such that there is only one road leading to security, namely, the elimination of the existing nuclear weapons, and not their replacement or the addition of what is called defensive technology to them. It is more than time for the Pentagon men to realise the danger of a situation in which the technology of destruction determines the policy of a nuclear power to mankind as a whole and to the United States in the first place.

'Unpredictable Accelerator' of Arms Race

LD261931 Moscow TASS in English 1915 GMT 26 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 26 TASS -- By TASS analyst Vasiliy Kharkov

U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, in a bid to push through the "star wars" programme, invents ever new pretexts for that.

This time, addressing the Executives Club of Chicago on Thursday, the Pentagon chief asserted that the White House's "Strategic Defence Initiative" was aimed "to rid the world of offensive ballistic missiles."

He added, however, that NATO should continue relying on offensive nuclear weapons until the Washington administration had fully deployed the SDI system. In other words, the nuclear arms race ought to continue.

A sufficient number of authoritative declarations have been made by military experts, political and public figures worldwide, including in the U.S., to the effect that the American "star wars" programme will become another unpredictable accelerator of the arms race.

The fact that the Pentagon chief and other zealous supporters of the "star wars" programme do not want to heed these sober warnings shows that they are captives of militarist thinking which is fraught with tragic consequences in our nuclear age.

At present, when the signs of a new mode of thinking are emerging in world politics which is evidenced, in particular, by the success of the Stockholm Conference, failing to reckon with the realities of the nuclear and space age is tantamount to acting contrary to common sense.

Weinberger is seeking to portray the nuclear sword, which is SDI, as a shield, and to conceal the fact that it is being made for delivering a first strike. It would be far easier to agree on the total elimination of nuclear missiles -- of any kind, ballistic, medium-range or any other. The Soviet proposals to this effect give a chance for such an accord to materialize.

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CSO: 5200/1009

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET PAPERS ASSAIL ITALIAN DECISION ON SDI PARTICIPATION

PRAVDA Commentary

PM301251 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 21 Sep 86 p 5

[Gennadiy Zafesov "Commentator's Column": "A Trap for Italy"]

[Text] Rome -- A so-called Italian-American "Memorandum of Mutual Understanding," or to put it simply, an agreement on the terms of Italy's involvement of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), has been signed in the United States.

Thus another country falls into the American trap. And although one would not call this an unexpected development, the adverse reaction to this step in Italy was far more violent than the initiators of SDI involvement had anticipated. Indeed, could it have been any different when, contrary to expectations, the matter was not even discussed in Parliament, and legislators were not even acquainted with the "Memorandum of Mutual Understanding." The government simply ignored not only the demands of the general public, who opposed SDI, but the country's supreme legislative body as well. The foreign and defense ministers declined to meet with parliamentarians and instructed their deputies to read out messages, the burden of which was that apparently it is necessary to observe secrecy and not divulge the nature of the memorandum...

It is natural that Rome's involvement in SDI should meet with sharp criticism among the broadest Italian public circles. It shows that most Italians are fully aware of the danger of such an action and the unpredictability of its consequences. People in Italy are also aware that it is by no means a "technical," as they would have it, but a military-political decision. The paper LA REPUBBLICA writes that the "Memorandum of Mutual Understanding" is only the first step toward Italian involvement in the "star wars" plans and it could be followed by other, even more dangerous actions. As well as criticizing the government's decision, people are dispelling illusions that involvement in SDI will give Italy "economic and scientific-technical advantages." The paper L'UNITA remarks in this connection that the United States will not agree to transfer the most up-to-date technology to the allies and that SDI will only increase Europe's subordination to and dependence on the United States.

The actions by the Italian Government in deciding to join SDI, which is a military program of unprecedented size, clearly contradict repeated assurances by actual official spokesmen for Rome of a desire to help curb the arms race, ease international tension, and reduce the war threat. The result is that Italy, which has already been forced to have U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles on its territory, is becoming more and more obviously involved in the transatlantic militarists' dangerous venture.

Many local observers note that this step by the Italian Government not only damages the cause of peace in Europe and in the world as a whole, but also contradicts the fundamental interests and clearly voices aspirations of the people of that country.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Commentary

PM251407 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (Second Edition) in Russian 24 Sep 86 p 3

[V. Pustov article: "Trap"]

[Text] Protests are continuing in Italy in connection with the signing of the "memorandum of mutual understanding" on the conditions of participation by Italian firms and companies in the American "star wars" program. Observers draw attention to the fact that, by signing the memorandum, the Italian Government has essentially violated its earlier pledge to first give parliament an opportunity to familiarize itself with the text of this document, discuss it, and then take a vote. What is noteworthy is the fact that even Amintore Fanfani, Senate president, has condemned the government as virtually eliminating the legislative organ from deciding the issue of the country's involvement in the so-called U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative."

The exclusion of Parliament and, consequently, the Italian public from deciding an issue connected with attempts to transfer the arms race into space and fraught with destabilization of the international situation can be explained by a number of reasons. What we are talking about here is a document of a secret nature, which is acknowledged in an official Pentagon statement on the signing of the American-Italian agreement. The "mutually understanding" American and Italian circles which regard SDI as an opportunity to satisfy their mercenary interests have absolutely no interest in breaking this secrecy. All the more so, as the newspaper LA STAMPA stresses, in view of the fact that no one can guarantee that this agreement would be approved by the Italian Parliament.

The assurances given by the heralds of SDI that the agreement is supposedly "to the mutual benefit" of both countries also fail to stand up to criticism. The benefits to the senior partner across the ocean are obvious. They are: gaining access to the technological achievements and innovations of the junior partner in electronics and other scientific and technical fields, an influx of considerable financial sources from the Apennines across the ocean, increased Italian dependence on the United States, and so forth.

But what can Italy gain in exchange? How realistic are the hopes of its weapons manufacturers that they will be made privy to top-secret advanced American technology? It would not be out of place to recall in this connection the cynical admission blurted out to THE NEW YORK TIMES by Pentagon officials after Washington signed a similar agreement with Tokyo. "Certain members of the Pentagon," the newspaper observed, "have communicated that they are very reluctant to inform Japanese industry of the key secret elements of developments in 'star wars'," One wonders why the Pentagon should suddenly by overcome with more benevolent sentiments regarding its Italian ally?

Ruling circles in Italy, as in other Western countries that have become America's accomplices in its realization of this extremely dangerous space adventure, also regard SDI as a means of gaining contracts worth billions.

However, the precedents that have already appeared in this respect cannot fail to disappoint those in Rome who are counting on huge dividends. According to figures in

the FINANCIAL TIMES, London had also hoped that the value of orders placed with British firms within the framework of the SDI program would be 1 billion pounds sterling. In actual fact, however, it has not gone higher than 15 million pounds sterling. Bonn has also found itself in a similar situation.

Italian public circles regard the "memorandum of mutual understanding" as a space trap. Italy has been given a place in this trap not only contrary to its national interests but also the interests of all mankind. And this cannot help but deepen the alarm of sober-minded Italians concerned for the fate of peace throughout the world. As M. Giacomantonio, national secretary of the Christian Association of Italian Workers, has said, Italy's involvement in SDI will greatly damage the resumption of dialogue between East and West. For mankind to avoid a tragedy, E. Amaldi, one of Italy's most prominent physicians, said, we must give up the "star wars" project, put an end to the arms race, and immediately begin a nuclear arms reduction.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly warned that attempts to put the "star wars" program into practice are fraught with extremely dangerous, possible irrevocable consequences.

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CSO: 5200/1009

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SHEVARDNADZE PRESS CONFERENCE AT UN ON SUMMIT, NST ISSUES

LD302215 Moscow TASS in English 2202 GMT 30 Sep 86

[Excerpt]

New York September 30 TASS — A press conference of Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, was held here today.

He said:

Ladies and gentlemen, I wholeheartedly welcome you. Allow me to thank you for your active participation in our process conference.

Over the past several days we have met quite frequently. I think that we have grown used to each other. Therefore let me get to the point straightaway.

By mutual arrangement the Soviet and the U.S. side are simultaneously making the following agreed announcement:

"On the forthcoming meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan.

President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev have agreed to meet in Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11-12 1986. The meeting was proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev and agreed to by Ronald Reagan. The meeting is in preparation for Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the United States, as agreed at Geneva in November, 1985.

The USSR and the USA appreciate the Government of Iceland's willingness to make this meeting in Reykjavik possible." [quotation mark as received]

Before you start asking questions I would like to make a few remarks.

We came to New York to attend the Forty-First Session of the U.N. General Assembly. We believe this session is not an ordinary one. Most of the statements we have heard show a new trend in the making. The value of words has fallen sharply while the stock price of concrete practical measures has soared. Weariness from rhetoric has given way to an upsurge of new energy.

Some genuinely positive developments are behind explosions, the success of the Stockholm conference, the signing in Vienna of the convention on the safe development of nuclear power, progress towards banning chemical weapons, and the documents adopted by the non-aligned summit meeting in Harare. Efforts have begun to explore ways to

strengthen security in Asia and the Pacific. The ideas outlined by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok have accelerated this process. Fresh approaches have emerged to the settlement of regional conflicts. There is an increased awareness of the importance of strengthening international cooperation in the economic and humanitarian fields.

Those are the factors that give us hope.

At the same time we cannot afford to indulge in illusions. There has been no movement at all towards resolving the central problem of our time -- the problem of security for all. This is profoundly disturbing to an absolute majority of the world's nations, as was clearly seen in the statements by delegates.

We are pleased to note that the proposal for a comprehensive system of peace and international security put forward by the socialist countries has met with lively interest in the United Nations and has turned out to be in harmony with the demands of our time.

We have met with representatives of over forty states. Almost all of them questioned us about prospects for Soviet-U.S. relations and the possibility of a second summit while strongly favoring positive steps in that direction. We understand that. Not everything in the world depends on the state of Soviet-American relations but a great deal does depend on them. As for nuclear and space arms, the whole question in fact, comes down to our two countries.

The world will live in a state of recurrent fever if the temperature of Soviet-U.S. relations remains for a long time at a critically dangerous level.

That temperature cannot be brought down if the arms race is not effectively stopped -- which, of course, implies preventing its spread to outer space -- and if movement is not begun towards disarmament and confidence-building.

Under these circumstances, the Soviet leadership believes that what is required is extra-powerful stimuli, a start on the most direct and the shortest road leading to results.

As instructed by Mikhail Gorbachev, I conveyed to President Reagan a proposal for an urgent meeting between the top leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States. The President accepted Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal and the meeting will take place in Iceland on October 11 and 12.

The meeting does not replace Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the United States agreed upon earlier in Geneva. The general secretary will visit the United States at a date that will be agreed between him and President Reagan.

As for the "interim" meeting, the objective is to make a direct assessment of the situation and work out some clear instructions designed to achieve progress in some questions relating to nuclear arms -- progress sufficient for attaining substantial results.

And of course, it is not ruled out that matters of bilateral Soviet-American relations as well as those connected with regional conflicts, and all other problems of mutual interest will be also discussed at the meeting.

Frankly, our contacts with the U.S. Administration in Washington and New York took place in a complicated and sometimes dramatic atmosphere. As we see it, however, it

was so complicated not because of the tensions around the events of the past few weeks. The real cause was the deadlock on the issues of nuclear and space arms.

Now that a breach in the wall has been made through joint efforts, one can state that the agreement on a special summit has been reached thanks to the realism and constructive approach displayed by both sides. It is not in vain that we have spent more than twenty hours negotiating with Secretary Shultz. To be more precise -- 25 hours.

The outcome of those negotiations gives us reason to hope that in the near future we shall be able to achieve more significant results and a turn for the better in Soviet-U.S. relations and in world affairs generally.

We have come to an understanding also with respect to the settlement of several cases which have been described here in such nervous and gloomy terms. I am referring to the questions regarding the Soviet citizen Gemnadiy Zakharov, the illegal decision of the U.S. Government concerning Soviet U.N. mission staff, and also the American citizen Nicholas Daniloff.

I want to be completely frank with you. It is of course deplorable that this has given rise here to competitions in confrontational rhetoric.

Although one should say there are also many objective correct speeches and commentaries. But something else remains a fact, too. There is speculation as to who blinked first and who outsmarted the other side and who was forced to his knees. I shall put it this way: The American people cannot be forced to their knees. The Russian, Soviet people, are not people who can be forced to their knees. This is a needless talk.

Some would like to engage us in a debate on matters of prestige. Points are being counted as if this were a baseball or football match.

We have a different idea of prestige. The crucial task for our countries is to find solutions to problems that concern mankind. Herein is the crux of the matter. This is what is the most important.

By the same token, it is a matter of prestige and responsibility for each side to work for an atmosphere conducive to the success of the forthcoming summit. In this respect a decisive role can be played by journalists -- Soviet and American ones -- who can create a good, working atmosphere for the successful holding of the summit meeting.

We are optimistic. In the past days we have heard clearly the voice of the America which strongly favours a serious and businesslike dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States. And I feel that we have given a worthy response to that wish. [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 2213 GMT on 30 September transmits Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's statement, rendering the preceding sentence as follows: And I feel that we will give a worthy response to that wish. (substituting "will give" for "have given")]

It remains for me to thank you too. You have been ubiquitous and patient, and we, respecting your very demanding job, have tried to meet you halfway.

I know that many of you and your colleagues literally stayed overnight near our mission. I often walked up to you but, unfortunately, could not say much at that time because serious negotiations were under way. The main thing now is that we have achieved results.

Still, to some of you, I would like to say this last word: Mutual understanding and accord between countries and nations are worth more than shortlived sensations.

Thank you for attention.

Eduard Shevardnadze responded to correspondents' questions.

Question: What are the prospects for Soviet-American relations?

Answer: I have already said that the situation now is alarming. The trouble is that there is no progress precisely in the main directions. Despite all these difficulties we are optimistic. Progress can be achieved and we need a summit meeting to do this. The leaders of our countries will now be able to provide the appropriate stimuli and the necessary directives to our delegates at the talks, as well as to the foreign ministers, in order to find the most sensible solutions. The secretary of state and I have agreed in principle that we will devote all our efforts to fulfilling our leaders' directives.

Question: What new things did you bring away from the talks with Secretary of State Shultz?

Answer: Talks can be conducted. And with a common desire, a sincere desire to achieve progress. We are capable of achieving this in the interests of both the American people and the Soviet people, and of all mankind. This is the main conclusion, the main lesson. I would add that the atmosphere that reigned at our talks, in the course of our dialogue with the secretary of state, this atmosphere enabled us to be frank, to be open, to find constructive solutions. And this despite the whole atmosphere of nervousness ruling around us. The atmosphere of the talks was a working one.

Question: Why was accord not reached on a summit meeting in the United States? Why in Iceland?

Answer: I have stated that in the main directions, concerning problems of space and nuclear weapons, there is no progress despite the fact that talks are being conducted on the level of experts, and that of foreign ministers, and at all other levels. But, as I said in Washington, there are prospects. Various options exist for a solution to the question of medium-range missiles too -- this is perhaps the most promising direction -- and on strategic, offensive, and space weapons. There are the Soviet Union's compromise proposals on the whole complex of these issues.

I would not like to say that the U.S. proposals contain not a grain of rationality. The moment has now come when it is necessary to adopt a fundamental political decision, determine on which questions there is mutual understanding, and draw up corresponding draft agreements. And then, when M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the United States takes place, it will be possible to sign these important agreements.

Why Iceland? I do not doubt that any country could receive the leaders of our countries. But M.S. Gorbachev believes that it is a working meeting which is needed, a meeting in a working atmosphere, with no extraneous fuss of publicity, on a narrow basis. And there won't be many of you reporters. And Reykjavik is a peaceful, cozy, beautiful city, where the atmosphere itself is conducive to fruitful work.

Question: What is the nuclear powers' reaction to the USSR's proposal on the conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests?

Answer: China -- a nuclear power -- does not conduct nuclear tests. The Soviet Union has not been conducting nuclear tests for a long time. If the United States agreed with our proposal, I think, both the British and the French would not protest.

I think, spokesmen of the U.S. Administration paid attention to the applause at the session of the United Nations General Assembly which welcomed the statement by the Soviet representative that we are prepared to sign here, within the walls of the United Nations Organisation, an agreement banning nuclear explosions. Applause at the United Nations is an exceptional phenomenon. With a rare exception I did not find people in the audience who would be indifferent to this problem. I suppose that the problem of ending nuclear tests will figure very importantly if not take the central place at the summit meeting.

Question: Apart from the meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Mr Shultz, did you have many other ones? How do you evaluate them?

Answer: I have been profoundly satisfied with them. I have said in my statement that there were over forty of such meetings, fundamental and thorough ones. They all were highly substantive and interesting. I got a lot from them in many respects. My interlocutors, possibly, have got something, too. I would like to draw your attention to one aspect. They all asked the question: "And what about Soviet-American relations? Will there be a summit meeting?" It is good that some clarity has appeared in this question now.

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CSO: 5200/1011

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET ACADEMICS DISCUSS ISSUES AFFECTING SUMMIT

LD282125 Moscow World Service in English 0910 GMT 28 Sep 86

["Top Priority" program presented by Vladimir Pozner, Moscow radio correspondent, with Dr Radomir Bogdanov and Dr (Igor Molashenko) of the United States and Canada Institute]

[Excerpts] [Pozner] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen, this is Vladimir Pozner presenting "Top Priority. We have a slight change on the panel today. Our usual participant, Dr Radomir Bogdanov, has invited a colleague of his, Dr (Igor Molashenko), also of the Institute of USA and Canadian Studies, because our usual participant, Dr Plekhanov, is sick. But then, on the other hand, we may have a new man here who will be a permanent member. Why not have three instead of two?

[Pozner] We move on now to a certainly as important, probably much more important area, and that is the speeches made by the chief executive of the United States, Ronald Reagan, and by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Eduard Shevardnadze, when they addressed the General Assembly of the UN, and I would like both of you to assess briefly, but (?succinctly), these two speeches. What was offered, what are the alternatives? What is the United States proposing to the world in the crucial area of arms reduction, arms control? What is the Soviet Union proposing?

[Bogdanov] You know, my feeling is that the American President was rather talking to his own, you know, Americans, than to the world's audience, because what he was saying he was neglecting everything what was happening in the, the, I mean substantial, in the international relations.

[Pozner] What was he neglecting, for instance?

[Bogdanov] He has neglected Soviet proposals. He rather distorted them. I'm sorry to say that. Then he didn't mention very important events in the international, you know, like Soviet moratorium, like, you know, Stockholm success which is really all, all people's success. He didn't mention, you know, real Soviet arms control proposals and he was representing, you know, a very distorted picture of the Soviet foreign policy. So my feeling is, because I believe that the American is very well informed, you know, and he was talking, that's why I say rather, to his own conservative audience than to the world community. What is the difference with our speech, our foreign minister's speech? That's what's exactly meant for the international audience. That was very, very, you know, large covering speech in the sense that our foreign minister has covered all the field which are of concern to everybody on this earth. That to my mind is the basic difference.

[Pozner] All right, all right. I'd like to ask you, Dr (Molashenko). how would you briefly sum up the offer, if you wish, of the American side, when you get down, when you boil it down to the essentials. How would you evaluate that?

[Molashenko] Well, yes, I accept this offer because I think that our foreign minister, Shevardnadze, made very good example, refusing to participate in rhetorical exchange with the American side. So let's talk about essentials. First, still I want to mention the problem of moratorium. You know, the Soviet Union proposed a very simple and straightforward thing, that to stop all tests, all nuclear explosions.

And you know what we hear from the American side, very strange proposal about very complicated procedure to verify and control nuclear tests.

[Pozner] If they want to verify testing, we want to verify the absence of testing.

[Molashenko] Exactly, yes.

[Bogdanov] That's the basic difference.

[Molashenko] And the basic difference when we are talking about the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva, I would say, is a -- yes, it's substantially, there are substantially two different approaches because the Soviet Union made a number of proposals in order to cut -- to have 50 percent reduction in nuclear weapons.

[Pozner, interrupting] You're talking about strategic nuclear weapons.

[Molashenko] Yes, and the American proposals as a matter of fact is an attempt just to have a dramatic radical restructuring of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. As a matter of fact, it's an attempt to engage us in a new arms race because, you know, if we accept American proposals, for example, we should create completely new strategic air force.

[Pozner] You know, I think that we are getting into an area that perhaps most of our listeners are not too familiar with. It is -- it calls for a certain amount of expertise. What I would like you to do, you, and you, Dr Bogdanov, is if you would sum up what President Reagan proposed to the world, as it were. How would you do it in the briefest way possible. What did he say [words indistinct] let us do this? Can you sum that up?

[Bogdanov] Oh, yes. I [laughs], you know, my impression is very clearcut impression that the American President has suggested to the world an American solution of all the problems, technological, you know, breakthrough for political achievements, you know, and new military technology as a solution of all political problems, which is to my mind...

[Pozner interrupting] Basically, SDI.

[Bogdanov] Basically, SDI, you know, which is....

[Pozner interrupting] I think that's -- I tend to agree with you.

[Bogdanov] Yes, which is basically American solution which is to my mind is not acceptable for the world community.

[Molashenko] Let me put it in a little bit different way.

[Pozner] Please.

[Molashenko] I would say that American proposal is an attempt to solve the problems of security on American terms and the Soviet proposal is an attempt to solve the same problem, on the -- on terms acceptable for both sides.

And this problem of technology -- technological approach -- is just a part, as I see it, of a broader American unilateral approach to the problem.

[Pozner] I'd like to go back to Dr Bogdanov since you obviously are good at this. How would you sum up the Soviet proposal?

[Bogdanov] Soviet proposal -- first of all, it is very clear you know, expression of the new thinking in the Soviet Union about security and foreign policy. You think it means, what, as my friend put it just now, reciprocal solution, mutually acceptable with the participation of all the interested parties; means of a^ll the world because there is no, nowadays, American security without Soviet security, there is no Soviet security without American, and there is no world security without each participant's security. That to my mind is a basic difference.

[Pozner] As we wind up, would you agree with this kind of general statement that I'm going to make, that whereas the American -- I see it this way anyway -- that the American proposal tends to tell people: Let us put our faith in technology. The Soviet proposal tends to say: Let us put our faith in human beings and political will. Do you think that's true?

[Bogdanov] Yes, I believe you have done it very well. You've put it in a nutshell.

[Molashenko] Yes, I think there is a consensus about this point between us.

[Pozner] Well good, let's hope that we have a consensus on a broader basis than just between us.

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CSO: 5200/1011

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG PAPERS PREDICT SUPERPOWER COMPROMISE ON ARMS CONTROL

SDI Viewed as Central Question

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 2 Aug 86 p 3

[Editorial by Erich Hauser: "Reagan's Poker Game"]

[Text] In the disarmament poker game between Washington and Moscow there is only one fixed date: President Reagan's term of office ends on 20 January 1989. Torn between "doves" and "hawks," he probably does not know himself whether or not he wishes to go down in history as the "Peace President." At least he plays the game with a cold-bloodedness and a constant alternating of positive and negative statements which practically appear to leave the decision--through greater and greater concessions--up to his opponent Mikhail Gorbachev.

The unconventional CPSU boss has apparently succeeded in the Kremlin in diminishing the influence of the "hawks" in the military apparatus and of hoary diplomacy. Indeed to achieve the resumption of the General Talks between the two superpowers Gorbachev threw overboard all that which the West had been threatened for the stationing of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe which began in 1983.

Gorbachev then proceeded with further clever moves in such an unrestrained manner that even experienced disarmament experts of the NATO countries at first wanted to believe that it was only propaganda. Example: Elimination of all atomic weapons of both blocs by the end of the century. Western military officials became perturbed because the NATO strategy of "flexible response" appeared to be endangered--to be sure, exactly as with Reagan's SDI program of a missile defense in space which, according to the President's great vision, would supposedly make all atomic weapons "obsolete" on the same timetable.

With further clever concessionary moves, however, the Kremlin boss gained greater and greater credibility among Washington's allies. In addition to the elimination of intermediate-range missiles on both sides, he also no longer was excluding nuclear missiles of shorter range. At the Budapest Conference of the Warsaw Pact he issued an offer concerning the reduction of nonnuclear equipped troops in the whole of Europe, whereby Soviet superiority could lose some of its threatening nature. He broke the hitherto operative taboo for all East Bloc military officials--mutual on-site inspections for the "verification" of disarmament--although the East's qualifying compromise formulas at the various

levels of East-West negotiations still remain the weakest point of Gorbachev's initiatives.

After renewed contacts with London and Paris, Moscow also let the question of British and French atomic weapons go by the board--at least for the time being. In his wooing of the European NATO partners, the Kremlin boss can now chalk up considerable points as a result of the success of his "flexibility." At the NATO Ministerial Conference in Halifax at the end of May, all the allies of the United States were horrified and depressed because just prior to it, Reagan had announced he would no longer abide by the Soviet-American SALT II Treaty for the limitation of strategic weapons as of the fall because of alleged violations by Moscow. The treaty, which in fact expired at the end of 1985, had never been ratified by the U.S. Senate.

For Reagan this notice is only a ploy to make Moscow yet more flexible. Both sides are already talking with each other about an interim-treaty which would represent an initial step towards the step-by-step elimination of atomic weapons and would replace SALT II. For the U.S. President it is really a matter of his SDI project, which he would like to leave to posterity as his most important accomplishment and which, on the other hand, is for Gorbachev that time bomb in space which he would like to defuse. Already prior to the Geneva Reagan-Gorbachev summit of last year Washington offered the Soviets a compromise which would give Moscow guarantees against the surprise subsequent deployment of an SDI system, but at the same time would permit the Americans the testing of system components under certain circumstances.

Both sides appear to be moving towards a compromise on this question. The European allies see Gorbachev's willingness to oblige as so far-reaching that West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, after his most recent visit to Moscow, opined that one must now jump at the opportunity. Disarmament in Europe is for both superpowers more or less a secondary matter. They are concerned with the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, with the question of second-strike capability, and with SDI. It is the Europeans' worry that nothing in the way of disarmament will come about before the superpowers have agreed.

Reagan, with his high-stakes poker playing, can chalk up uninterrupted popularity in the United States. To date, each time he has upped the ante in the face of European concerns, he has obtained still more concessions from Moscow. Gorbachev, with his flexibility, has increased the tensions within NATO. For him a time may come when he will break off the game or will be forced to do so--at least until the next U.S. presidential election. Reagan's successor in the White House would then have much to do to first mend the political damage in the NATO alliance.

November Summit Seen Likely

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 26 Jul 86 p 1

[Editorial by Bn: "Armament Matter in Motion"]

[Text] The signs appear favorable for a summit meeting between President Reagan and Party Chief Gorbachev in November if unforeseen incidents which would permanently worsen the political climate do not occur. In the process, it is expected that something in the area of disarmament will be set in motion and that the two most powerful leaders of the Western and Eastern worlds will, at their second meeting, be able to come before the public not only with declarations of good will, but with concrete agreements.

The heretofore lamented immobility on the American side has given way to a tactic of sounding out, which makes use of Gorbachev's suggestions to date to link them up with Washington's conceptions. This search for compromise is made easier by a new flexibility, heretofore absent on the Soviet side, on the issue of inspection, which for President Reagan is the beginning and end of any arms agreement. Here are starting points, not only for the efforts of the Europeans for confidence-building measures, but also for the conclusion of a worldwide, supervised prohibition of chemical weapons, which go beyond anything which is currently under discussion in the area of chemical-weapon-free zones.

New discussions began yesterday in Geneva on a complete ban on nuclear weapons testing. The Americans, who conducted a total of 15 underground nuclear tests during the Soviet moratorium ordered by Gorbachev, and have now apparently made up for their "arrearage," will presumably make their future position dependent upon Soviet willingness to allow direct inspection.

The American announcement that they will no longer abide by the missile limitations of the SALT II Treaty could become meaningless as a result of a 30-percent reduction of offensive missile weapons proposed by Gorbachev. Discussions on this subject, which also touch upon the extension of the ABM treaty regarding the limitation of missile defense systems, likewise began this week in Geneva apart from the arms control negotiations, which have been postponed until September.

According to reports, Reagan is prepared to delay the deployment of his SDI-system by 5 to 7 years in return for a generous interpretation of this ABM treaty by Gorbachev--that is, for dispensation for SDI experiments.

Reagan Wants Effective Treaty

Bonn DIE WELT in German 4 Aug p 2

[Editorial by Fritz Wirth: "They Are Getting Serious About the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit--The Soviets, However, Do Not Want To Appear as Losers Again"]

[Text] The contents of the latest correspondence between Reagan and Gorbachev are known only by intimation. The 3-day visit of Deputy Foreign Minister

Bessmertnich to Washington came off without any concrete information about its results reaching the outside, and the details of former President Nixon's visit to the Kremlin, which most certainly was politically important, remained uncertain.

Those are all good signs because they prove that they are serious about the upcoming summit and they are aiming at concrete results. And this is not surprising because both sides wanted and still want the summit for good reasons.

Reagan's critics, following the announcement of the abrogation of the SALT Treaty, ascribed to him a destructive Ostpolitik and disinterest in any agreement with the Kremlin. They should have known: This President does not intend to go down in history as the undertaker of Ostpolitik. But he has set up some ambitious hurdles: He does not want just any results, but effective and lasting agreements.

The SALT II Treaty does not belong to this category. Something many overlooked: When Reagan dropped it, he did not simultaneously drop the principle of nuclear arms limitation in the process. It is Reagan's aim to finish his second term in office with a durable agreement. His timetable calls for working out the skeleton of this agreement at the upcoming summit, then having the experts polish it up for 12 months, signing it during his planned visit in Moscow in 1987, and having it ratified in 1988 by Congress.

Gorbachev's starting position for the summit at the end of this year is more ticklish. There is agreement in Washington as well as in the Kremlin that the Geneva summit was a setback and disappointment for Gorbachev. He left the scene as the clear loser. Geneva must not be allowed to be repeated; that is the reason for the aggressiveness and harshness with which Gorbachev prepared the next summit.

Successfully, Gorbachev achieved more in this way than he accomplished last November in 3 days of discussions with Reagan: In Geneva, SDI was a taboo subject for Reagan. Now, however, it is on the negotiating table even before the second summit has begun. In the last letter he offered the Kremlin, as one hears, a 7-year moratorium on the deployment of SDI.

It is not true that this is an empty American gesture because the SDI program will only be ready for deployment in 8 to 10 years in any case. In this case, something on the American side began to move. While to date SDI has not been a "negotiating item" for the Reagan Administration, Ronald Reagan used new formulations this week. He was not only saying that he would not let SDI be "negotiated away."

The concessions in the forefield of the summit confirm: Washington is serious about an arms agreement. The new tensions and rifts in the Reagan Administration, particularly between the Pentagon and the State Department, show just how serious. The fissures opening up here show that the new National Security Adviser Poindexter is lacking the integrating strength of his predecessor McFarlane, who was able to keep the last summit and its preparations from these tensions. It will require decisive intervention by Reagan to prevent these disputes from becoming a burden for the American negotiating position.

The worries and concerns of the defenders of an unscathed SDI program are, moreover, to be taken very seriously. With the proffered 7-year moratorium on deployment, the Soviets, for the first time, have their foot in the door of the SDI program. For a moratorium will have as a consequence that Congress, in any case becoming more and more unwilling to pay for it, will reduce even more its financial support for this program during these 7 years, which could delay the SDI timetable even further.

These burdens have created for Reagan even greater pressure to succeed at the summit. And one of the most important criteria will be not only to what degree the SDI program remains intact for the future, but whether Reagan can succeed in frustrating the Soviets' plans to make the next meeting a purely "missile summit."

In their summit offensive of the past months there are still many problems-- crisis areas, as it were, by the names of Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua--in which the Soviets operate from a fragile defensive position. They must, as quickly and urgently as possible, become discussion topics in the forefield of this summit.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

ITALIAN OFFICIALS ON U.S.-USSR MEETING

PM031308 Rome AVANTI! in Italian 1 Oct 86 pp 1, 12

[Unattributed report: "Craxi Welcomes New Developments"]

[Text] Prime Minister Craxi was informed in advance in a special confidential message about the informal meeting scheduled for 11-12 October in Reykjavik between U.S. President Reagan and CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev. This is stated in a Chigi Palace communique which adds that Prime Minister Craxi was also given advance notice of the nature, form, and aims of the meeting within the framework of the close and constant consultations that exist between Italy and the United States on particularly important issues. The prime minister has already conveyed to President Reagan his appreciation of this new development, which the Italian Government believes reflects a shared desire to seek substantive progress not only on arms control but on the broadest range of East-West problems.

Recently, Craxi said, there has been a clear awareness of the possibility of better exploiting the potential of comprehensive negotiations, especially in connection with an understanding on arms reduction controls, though unconnected events — now resolved — did cast new shadows and uncertainties.

Foreign Minister Andreotti had this to say about the positive conclusion to the crisis over the Daniloff affair: "I had no doubt that the case would be resolved because of the obvious disproportion between this episode and the historic importance of the

U.S.-USSR negotiations as a whole. I can say that I received confirmation of this in my conversations with Shultz and Shevardnadze and I conveyed this unequivocally to journalists in New York."

Andreotti continued: "Now we have the clear assertion from Reagan that good progress has been made in preparations for the summit and I believe that, little by little, things will proceed in the right direction." "The most urgent topics," Andreotti's statement continues, "seem to me to be the European missiles and chemical weapons, which must be banned completely. The adversaries of dialogue in both Washington and Moscow will not remain silent. The Daniloff affair was eloquent in this respect. All those — and they are in a large majority — who want positive conclusions to be reached must be vigilant and assertive."

"The solution of the Daniloff affair is a good thing particularly because it symbolizes both superpowers' real intention to remove all obstacles to the negotiations on arms reduction." This was said by Deputy Prime Minister Arnaldo Forlani. "In this connection," he added, "it is also significant that for the first time the desire has been expressed to negotiate the reduction of medium-range missiles in Europe, independently of the French and British missiles."

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CANADA: U.S. OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS POLICY CALLED CHALLENGE

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 19 Sep 86 p A7

[Article by John Barrett]

[Text]

THE SUPERPOWERS resumed their talks on nuclear and space arms control yesterday in Geneva. This new round could have a critical bearing on a possible Reagan-Gorbachev summit later this fall. Most observers agree that the best bet for agreement is an interim accord on intermediate-range missiles in Europe. However, in the area most crucial to a reversal of the superpower arms race — “deep cuts” in strategic nuclear weapons — the talks have taken a disturbing turn.

At the summit meeting last November, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev set a common goal of reducing their strategic offensive forces by half, a significant step in the right direction. Since then the two sides have inched closer together on some issues, but this has brought into sharp relief their deep disagreement on strategic defences.

More recently, Moscow has linked “deep cuts” in offensive weapons with the level of defensive arms (potentially space-based) that each side would be allowed to research, develop and deploy. In particular, since June, negotiations have included the question of continued adherence to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972.

The thinking underlying the ABM Treaty was that, if both superpowers were confident their retaliatory forces could not be defeated by unrestricted ABM systems, they could start to think about reducing offensive weapons in a step-by-step manner (through SALT II and its successors). However, the resurgence of strategic defences has put pressure on this approach and raised difficult questions concerning the relationship between

offensive and defensive forces. Some U.S. officials would like to free the Strategic Defence Initiative (Star Wars) as soon as possible from the constraints of the ABM Treaty.

When the last round of talks ended on June 11, the Soviet Union offered a new proposal that would permit a certain amount of ABM research of the Star Wars variety, as long as it is conducted in the laboratory. And in view of the mounting U.S. challenge to the ABM treaty, Moscow for the first time directly linked its “deep cuts” to a renewal of each side’s commitment to it. That is, in return for a reduction of about 30 per cent in total strategic missile-launchers and bombers, each side would pledge not to withdraw from the treaty for 15 to 20 years. (The treaty as it stands is of unlimited duration and allows withdrawal on six months’ notice if dictated by “supreme national interests.”)

In July and August, reports began to surface that the United States might be ready for a “grand compromise” — that is, to restrain, albeit very loosely, its SDI program in return for strategic arms reductions. On July 25, Mr. Reagan sent a letter to Mr. Gorbachev proposing that unrestricted research, development and testing of Star Wars weapons — in other words, anything short of actual deployment — be allowed for the next five years. After that, both sides would have two years to hammer out an arrangement on defensive deployment of ABM systems resulting from such research, development and testing. If after these seven years no arrangement is reached, the United States could withdraw from the treaty and begin deploying Star Wars weapons. This withdrawal is just what the Soviet Union wants to prevent.

At the beginning of September, further details on the tentative U.S. position became public. Although again specifying warheads instead of launchers, the United States moved away from the 50 per cent reduction objective to 30 per cent. It also raised the limits on total missile warheads from 6,000 to 7,500, thereby approaching the latest Soviet-proposed limit of 8,000 warheads on missiles and bombers.

To some observers, the U.S. move seemed significant and suggested a compromise was possible. But such optimism is clearly misplaced. The Soviet Union is attempting to tie cuts to continued adherence to the treaty; the United States is trying to escape the treaty's restrictions on the SDI program by drastically revamping them.

Canada's commitments to the pursuit of "deep cuts" in offensive nuclear arms and to the integrity of the ABM treaty have been stated clearly and repeatedly. The latest developments in U.S. policy therefore represent a major challenge to Canadian arms-control policy that needs to be answered. In particular, the Government should make clear to Washington its concern that its effort to renegotiate the ABM Treaty runs a grave risk of overturning this arms-control corner-

stone and thus opening the way to an unbridled arms race.

Ottawa should encourage both sides to reaffirm their strict adherence to the ABM treaty for as long as possible. This means pressing the United States to keep SDI programs consistent with a restrictive interpretation of the treaty. It also means continuing to press the Soviet Union to allay Western concern over the radar installation at Krasnoyarsk, a clear, albeit not strategically significant, violation of the ABM treaty.

Certainly, Canada's counsel might be ignored, but as a loyal member of the Western alliance and a country whose security is enhanced by the preservation of the ABM treaty and effective arms control, we have the right and responsibility to give it. The United States periodically sends its key arms-control advisers to Ottawa for consultations and, at the end of this month, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze will spend several days in Canada. The Government should seize both opportunities to press home its concerns because, without meaningful restrictions on strategic defences, significant reductions in offensive arms are simply not in the cards.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CANADIAN EDITORIAL SEES GROUNDS FOR HOPE IN NST ROUND

Ottawa THE CITIZEN in English 19 Sep 86 p A8

[Text]

The sixth round of the latest series of U.S.-Soviet arms reduction talks opened in Geneva Thursday. Many consider it a make-or-break one.

There must be a bilateral arms agreement of some sort if there is to be a second summit. And there isn't much time left if the Washington meeting is to be held this year as agreed.

In a broader sense, President Reagan's term in office is soon entering its last lap. His organizers want him to make his mark in the peace field as well as the armed-strength one. What better way of starting to do this than by concluding a nuclear arms reduction agreement — the first of the nuclear age?

All this adds up to a hopeful feeling that this time Geneva will accomplish something. There are even signs that Mikhail Gorbachev also wants it to succeed.

The most immediate area for success appears to be that of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). These understandably concern European governments, East and West, because their range on both sides is sufficient to reach all their capitals and the time for doing so is very short.

More specifically, both sides are leaning toward an interim INF accord. It's just a question of numbers. How many will each side be allowed to retain in Europe? And, by subtraction from an agreed global limit, how many SS-20s will the Russians be able to keep in Asia?

In recent private preliminary discussions, the Soviet Union dropped its demand that British and French nuclear forces be counted as part of an agreement. The removal of that stumbling-block augurs well for the future.

In the field of longer-range strategic nuclear weapons, there are also grounds for some optimism.

The Americans may now propose a combined limit on strategic missiles and bombers. The Soviets would be allowed to maintain their intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) superiority while the U.S. could keep its advantage in bomber numbers without causing Moscow undue concern.

The compromise total figure about to be formally proposed in Geneva is 1,600 — certainly cold comfort for nuclear war worriers but down some 30 per cent from present-day numbers.

It's doubtful that an overall agreement can be reached in the near future on these strategic offensive weapons. It would have to be linked to one on strategic defence weapons. And there there must first be agreement on how long activities must be confined to research.

Whether the sixth round lives up to expectations is a highly political matter requiring the decision of both superpower leaders. Unfortunately the Daniloff affair could poison the atmosphere if Gorbachev allows it to.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SWITZERLAND: DAENIKER VIEWS PROSPECTS FOR DISARMAMENT

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHEN in German 14 Aug 86 pp 1-2

[Unattributed article: "True Peace Will Not Break Out Tomorrow--Division Commander Daeniker on East-West Confrontation and Chances for Disarmament"]

[Text] Division Commander [Major General] Gustav Daeniker, born 1928, PhD, historian, member of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, is chief of staff for operational training of the Group for General Staff Services.

Who remembers 1983? With its huge peace demonstrations, mainly in the FRG? With its appeal to the Reagan administration to desist from its "warmongering politics?" With demands for NATO to refrain from its planned counterarming, regardless of the Soviet SS-20 threat, because otherwise open conflict would be unavoidable? (In that year, an article in these pages began with the sentence: "There will be no war." A greater than normal number of letters to the editor came in. All of them came from concerned citizens, the majority from peace activists. They were in opposition. There were accusations of irresponsibility. They stated that, on the contrary, war was about to break out....)

Today, the trend is just the opposite. Peace, rather than war, is conjured up. It is just around the corner, we are told. Only a few obstructionists keep it from coming into being. There is talk not only of arms control but even of general disarmament. There was, of course, a short lull after the Geneva summit, but things are moving again. Serious Soviet proposals reportedly have been submitted. "Even" the U.S. side is said to have shown some "movement." Both sides are alleged to have given ground on preconditions for SDI and numbers of missiles. Thus there should be nothing to impede a second Reagan-Gorbachev meeting and an agreement that could entail not only limitation, but indeed a reduction of strategic arms. What proof is being offered to justify this optimism? Gorbachev is said to be in dire need of concentrating on his economic reform program, while Reagan wants to go down in history as a peacemaker.

It is not difficult to act as a wet blanket here and to risk being counted among those despicable hardliners, incorrigible military minds, and sinister arms lobbyists who are accused of still opposing the new process of detente. But aren't there some warnings to be heeded also? Can the memories of

historic experiences and the peculiarities of our complex strategic system be disregarded for the sake of wishful thinking? These warning signs are indeed substantial enough to lead to this conclusion: Peace is not that close--unfortunately--at least not any real peace. The average European would be well advised not to let his hopes run away with him.

Nevertheless, analysts agree on one thing: The resumption of disarmament talks between the great powers is a good sign. Now there are bilateral talks about nuclear weapons testing. The Soviet moratorium has produced some effect by leading the American to signal their readiness to negotiate a complete abandonment of testing, even though until now they have always placed maximum emphasis on verification.

The immovable positions with regard to SALT II also appear to have loosened somewhat. President Reagan's threat to abandon the expired and never ratified agreement on strategic arms limitation has apparently led to a conciliatory move by the Soviets. There is no longer any talk about the precondition of abandoning SDI prior to negotiations on reducing strategic systems--another lesson for those who are forever advocating Western concessions.

But that is not all. General Secretary Gorbachev's major disarmament offensive, which has been rolling on since the beginning of this year, effectively bolstered by recent announcements of troop reductions in Afghanistan and in Mongolia, is now being brought to the conference table.

Agreement is possible at least in the area of medium-range weapons (SS-20's and Pershing II's). Wasn't it President Reagan who some years ago proposed the so-called "zero option" (zero on both sides), an idea that has recently surfaced in Soviet proposals, at least for Europe, after previously having been totally rejected?

It is only one step from such straws in the wind to a belief in shining visions. Some people believe in the possibility of abandoning the fragile and highly amoral strategy of "mutual assured destruction" and of attaining a combination of offensive and defensive systems on both sides that would provide greater stability and less devastation in case of war.

Germans in particular believe that the time has come to relieve the pressure on Central Europe, which appears hardly tolerable any more as a "superpower target range," where thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands upon thousands of soldiers, tanks, guns and aircraft are stationed. A "demobilization from the Atlantic to the Urals," as proposed by the Warsaw Pact in Budapest on 11 June 1986, has a most attractive ring in many people's ears.

Despite Chernobyl, which glaringly illuminated the meaning of security to the Eastern superpower, there continues to be talk of a "security partnership." It postulates that security must be achieved by effectively incorporating the adversary's problems into one's own strategic thinking rather than continuing the dangerous and senseless spiral of the arms race. Recently, Eastern and Western military experts have submitted a jointly produced study incorporating this idea, showing how security and mutual trust could be enhanced by increasing military defensive capabilities only, while limiting offensive potential

and specifically by eliminating those weapons that might be tempting to use for a preventive strike.

Hopes are expressed for solving the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe with similar ideas. There should no longer be any talk of "first use" or "early first use." With a reduction of the threat, the counterthreat would diminish automatically. The important thing would be for one side to start with arms reductions. Then the other states would only wait for the opportunity to emulate a convincing example.

From the global strategic viewpoint it is evident that things are not that simple--no one knows for sure as yet what will become of SDI. Will an entire continent someday be able to rely on it for protection, even if the adversary finds ways of improving his offensive capabilities? Or will it result merely in securing retaliatory capability by protecting ICBM launch facilities that would otherwise be destroyed in a first strike? Technological insecurity is clearly reflected in the lack of strategic concepts. At present, everything is obviously based on far-reaching speculation.

The Americans want to reduce today's number of strategic warheads from about 12,000 to 6,000--they are worried about the ongoing Soviet buildup in this area. The Soviets appear satisfied with a top limit of 8,000. Is a "great compromise" conceivable here, even though each of the armed forces concerned is organized differently and has different points of emphasis in their strategic systems? Is it conceivable that the strategists even of a single country could agree on a solution? A case can be made for the "hardliners" who are totally opposed to a weakening of the proven retaliatory strategy, despite its ethical and alliance policy drawbacks. They consider an agreement that would be tantamount to an invitation to violations, thus engendering constant ill-feeling, to be worse than no agreement at all. Henry Kissinger's statement is most significant: "I would like to see the systems analyst who distributes the remaining war heads (8,000 if the Soviet proposal were to be accepted, or 6,000 in the U.S. version) in a way that would reduce the threat each side represents to the other."

However, strategy cannot limit itself merely to the elimination of old threats. It must, more importantly, deal with new ones. In 1977 Helmut Schmidt was the first to publicly point out the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 buildup to the West. The traumatic memory of the subsequent counterarming process with its internal conflicts and those within the alliance today obviates a similar warning shot with respect to the new Soviet SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 operational-tactical "Short-range systems." This new threat is being relegated to expert discussions among the military, or even the defense ministers.

What is involved here is nothing more or less than Moscow's principal new military option. These missiles, initially designated as counter-counterarms (ranges: SS-21--120 km; SS-22--900 km; SS-23--500 km), are capable of much more than merely countering the Pershing II's and Western cruise missiles that are covered by the SS-20's several times over. Launch sites in the East European countries can cover large areas not only of the FRG, but all of Western Europe. New types of warheads, even for non-nuclear strikes, and

great target accuracy provide these systems with special flexibility. Therefore, conventional or even chemical preparations fired against central headquarters, nuclear arms depots, air defense facilities and replacement depots for overseas reinforcements are quite conceivable. The corresponding NATO weapons (Pershing I and Lance) are totally inadequate for a response.

Such a sudden concentration of fire could become a deadly strike in combination with air attacks and quick assaults by "operational maneuver groups" (Red Army assault units), which are designed for quick penetrations in the depth of the Western defense. Of potentially equally great significance is the fact that this new capability provides the Soviet conventional arsenal with an additional dimension at just the moment when both sides are attempting to raise the nuclear threshold and even the Soviet side concedes the necessity for reducing conventional forces. Even if both of these could be implemented, Moscow's short-range missiles still constitute a sizeable leverage. Its military superiority will retain its clear political effectiveness during the balance of the 20th Century.

In any case, the NATO commander-in-chief, General Rogers, keeps repeating that the main danger to Europe lies in political blackmail. He is in favor of adequate counterpressure, of maintaining a balanced weapons mix--including the Pershing II--and of establishing a ballistic missile defense in the European theater. In this, he is not afraid to go against some opinions, even those coming from the White House. To a frontline soldier like Rogers, charity begins at home. Is the global SDI to be supplemented by a European Defense Initiative (EDI)? The first steps have been taken.

Caution Rather Than Euphoria

The neutrals' fateful decision is to either bide their time and hope for a disarmament miracle, or to continue to keep their powder dry. The Warsaw Pact has offered them the right to participate in the proposed new negotiations. They will have to remain aware of the fact that readiness to talk does not preclude vigilance any more than the other way around. Both appear to be necessary. Despite all doubts to the contrary, let us assume finally that the new resolve to implement arms control will gain a foothold on both sides and that solutions can be found within the foreseeable future that will satisfy all concerned. Nuclear weapons would be removed and conventional parity would be established. Would this lead to the elimination of power politics among the superpowers and national states, or would they--incapable of waging war, unable to wage peace--resort all the more to those indirect means whose proliferation we are presently witnessing in such a dramatic manner: economic pressure, civil and military espionage, sabotage and terrorist acts, and continued proof that a divergence of opinions leads to suspicion and sooner or later to the use of force?

Historic experience and our understanding of human nature unfortunately lead us to conclude that indirect and subversive methods--thanks in part to technological progress--would continue unabated. Perpetrators and precedents of all types are available in and around Europe. Everyone knows that in such a conflict the Western democracies would be particularly vulnerable in view of their open societal structure and the vulnerability of their facilities.

All the foregoing does not mean that war is unavoidable. It merely means that true detente--not only verbal but implemented by credible measures--will not occur very soon; not to mention true peace. Detente and peace are not the consequence but rather a basic prerequisite for effective arms control and disarmament. Nevertheless, the unsatisfying opposite path is also valid: the search for military-technological concepts that take into consideration the security requirements of all concerned.

But would it be asking too much to hold back on disarmament euphoria and enthusiasm in favor of constructive caution? Public pressure on governments, the abandonment of obsolete concepts of maximum arms buildups, and efforts to dismantle military organizations promote peace only until they degenerate into a demand for disarmament at any price. Patiently negotiated small steps that do not create vulnerability and indicate goodwill to the negotiating partner as well as the immovable intention of maintaining self-determination are at the present time not only the best result, but probably the only path toward greater security.

9273/12859

CSO: 5200/2745

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR MEDIA ASSESS RESULTS OF SECOND BW CONFERENCE

U.S. 'Confrontational'

LD271134 Moscow TASS in English 1105 GMT 27 Sep 86

[Text] Geneva, 27 Sep (TASS)—By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Korzhev:

The second review conference on the convention on the prohibition of the development, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons and on their destruction has ended here after three weeks of deliberations.

Its final declaration stressed the great significance of that document, the first-ever measure of real disarmament in the history of international relations, which is part of the package of arms control treaties and agreement in effect today.

Delegations from 63 of the 100-odd countries which are parties to the convention and another 4 countries which have signed but not ratified the document reaffirmed their support and commitment to its principles and goals, urged all states to refrain from any action that could jeopardize it and reiterated their determination completely to exclude the possible use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons.

The final declaration confirmed that the convention covered all microorganisms and toxins regardless of their origin and stressed the importance of international cooperation in peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities.

The conferees also emphasized the need to conclude talks on a chemical warfare agents ban as soon as possible and thus outlaw yet another kind of weapons of mass annihilation, which would help progress towards general and complete disarmament.

During the conference most of the attending delegations displayed a desire to strengthen it and increase its effectiveness and authority. The bulk of their proposals, including those for streamlining the convention's verification machinery and effecting some confidence-building measures, were along these lines.

Speaking at the final session, Viktor Israelyan, leader of the delegation of the delegation from the USSR, said the Soviet delegation also took a number of important steps in this direction and suggested drafting and adopting an extra protocol to the convention to provide for measures to enhance the system of verification.

Along with that, it backed a whole number of confidence-building measures, including exchanges of data on research centers involved in biological studies and on all

outbreaks of infectious diseases and the forming of expert groups to discuss new advances in biology with a bearing on compliance with the convention.

Israelyan said that as a depository state, the Soviet Union is aware of its responsibility in that connection and prepared to cooperate with all parties to the convention in the search for and implementation of concrete practical measures to strengthen the important international legal document.

According to an opinion expressed in conference circles, the meeting's results in these conditions could have been even more concrete had it not been for the position taken by the delegation of the United States and some other Western countries.

The American delegation attempted to foment a spirit of confrontation by groundlessly accusing the Soviet Union of violating the convention, and refused to support wishes expressed by other participants for working out additional international legal commitments and broadening peaceful cooperation in the use of achievements of biological science, in which developing nations were particularly interested.

Israelyan: Conference Results Positive

PM291147 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition) in Russian 29 Sep 86 p 4

[Report on interview with V.L. Israelyan, head of Soviet delegation to the Geneva toxic weapons ban talks, by unnamed IZVESTIYA Correspondent in Geneva: "Call for Cooperation" -- date of interview not given]

[Text] Geneva -- The second review conference on the effect of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development [razrabotka] Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction has ended its work at the Palais des Nations.

Plenary sessions and working groups discussed questions of strengthening the convention and effectively implementing all its provisions. The majority of delegates submitted constructive proposals at the conference, but a clearly dissonant chord was struck by the statement made by the U.S. delegation, which desired to undermine the convention and made unjustified accusations against the Soviet Union. This obstructionist approach was condemned at the conference.

What are the results of the Geneva meeting? This was the question asked of Soviet delegation head V.L. Israelyan by an IZVESTIYA Correspondent.

The overwhelming majority of delegations, he said, displayed their interest in strengthening the convention, and this is the avenue followed by the main bulk of proposals that were put forward, particularly as regards questions of improving the convention's verification [kontrolnyy] machinery and implementing a number of confidence-building measures. As for the Soviet delegation, it did everything within its power to resolve the main task facing the conference, which we perceived as strengthening the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons by all means. The Soviet Union undertook a number of very important steps in this direction at the conference. We submitted a proposal for the elaboration and adoption of a supplementary protocol to the convention which would provide for measures to strengthen the verification [kontrol] system. For this purpose it was also proposed that a special conference of convention signatory states be held after appropriate

preparations; moreover a readiness to do this without delay, next year for example, was expressed.

It is our belief, V.L. Israelyan declared, that broad cooperation between states in peaceful development of biological science and the use of its achievements in the interests of socioeconomic, scientific, and technical progress is an effective way to consolidate the convention's system. It can be said in this context that numerous proposals to this end were submitted at the conference. We are convinced such an approach will give an appropriate fillip to the further development of biological science and to the benefit of peace and progress. We consider that the spheres of bioengineering, genetic engineering, development of effective preventive measure and treatment of infectious diseases, and struggle against plant parasites are promising avenues in this direction. This would be in line with the interests of all states and, moreover, would help solve several problems which are acutely present in developing countries.

We consider that the results of the conference are positive, V.L. Israelyan said in conclusion, also because the convention it reviewed is a component of the presently existing machinery for curbing the arms race the for disarmament. For its part the Soviet Union is prepared to cooperate constructively with all countries which are interested in this not in words but in deed.

PRAVDA: Soviet Approach 'Constructive'

PM291407 Moscow PRAVDA (Morning Edition) in Russian 29 Sep 86 p 5

[Aleksey Ivkin "Our Commentary": "When There Is the Will"]

[Text] The second international conference which analyzed the operation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction has ended in Geneva.

It is no accident that the proceedings and the results of this conference attracted the attention of broad circles of the international public and led to the publication of numerous commentaries in the press. After all, the convention is so far the only international legal document banning a whole category of mass destruction weapons. It also contains the preconditions for the next major step along the path of disarmament to be taken by the community of states -- getting rid of chemical weapons, that is -- as was emphasized by the conference participants.

This document came into being during the period of detente. The convention was made available for signing in 1972 and it came into force in 1970. More than 100 countries have now acceded to it. The Soviet Union was one of the first countries to sign and ratify this document and it has strictly abided by its provisions all these years, as was once again confirmed in Geneva.

Many observers note that the conference proceedings were businesslike and constructive on the whole. The speech of the U.S. representative, who tried to confuse the issue by leveling accusations against the Soviet Union which have been refuted more than once in the United States itself, therefore sounded all the more as a discordant note. The U.S. representative's recourse to the topic of "yellow rain" clearly caused disillusionment among many delegates. After all, it is well known that the ballyhoo

raised around these accusations has long since been exposed. The "Soviet toxins" allegedly used in Asia were proved by authoritative expert opinion to be specific bee secretions.

Incidentally the United States should be the last to act as "the accuser." While the forum was under way reports have appeared in the U.S. press indicating that the Pentagon has by no means stopped the development of bacteriological weapons. This year alone 42 million dollars were appropriated in the United States for the implementation of 57 projects to create various types of bacteriological weapons.

Incidentally, the Soviet delegation did not take the path of confrontation and counteraccusations which was clearly the direction in which the Americans were trying to steer the conference. It put forward proposals aimed at increasing the number of parties to the convention, strengthening the convention's verification mechanism, expanding the use of biotechnology for peaceful purposes, and developing peaceful cooperation in this sphere.

This constructive approach, supported by most of the delegations, made it possible to conclude the conference with the adoption of a resolution which reflects the international community's strong interest in maintaining the ban on the biological weapons and advancing toward the next stages of disarmament which -- as the effectiveness and viability of this convention confirms -- are not a utopia but an entirely feasible task given statesmen's political will and a mode of thinking that corresponds to the realities of our age.

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CSO: 5200/1005

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET MILITARY JOURNAL ON U.S. BINARY WEAPONRY

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 86 pp 20-21

[Article by Col S. Titov: "Binary Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] E. Morev from Riga, V. Pulkovskiy from Novgorod and other readers have written the editorial staff requesting information about binary chemical weapons and how to protect oneself against them.

We are publishing this material to assist training managers.

Continuing the unabated arms race, U.S. militarists are expanding their chemical weapons arsenal even though it already contains more than 3 million rounds and 150,000 tons of toxic agents. Last year a joint House-Senate conference committee sanctioned the renewal of nerve gas production. For fiscal year 1986 alone about \$160 million have been allocated for chemical warfare preparations. The complete program for modernizing the U.S. chemical warfare arsenal will be in excess of \$10 billion.

The U.S. Army has put special reliance on the new binary type nerve agents. These include VX-2 and sarin (GB-2) which are in the toxic agent tables. A chemical plant costing \$22.1 million has been built in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. This facility will produce the following binary munitions: 155-mm sarin and 205-mm VX-2 artillery rounds as well as aerial bombs.

What are binary weapons? Conventional chemical munitions use a single prepared toxic agent obtained in fixed facility conditions. In opposition to this, binary munitions have two (hence the term) separated non-toxic or low toxic components. While the chemical round is in flight toward its target the components are mixed and there is a chemical reaction producing highly toxic agents, for example VX and sarin. The components used to obtain the corresponding toxic agent may both be liquid or a liquid and a powder. These systems also contain additives, catalysts to speed the chemical reaction process and stabilizers which preserve the individual components and the toxic agent obtained.

The enemy offensive chemical munitions include: aerial bombs, artillery rounds, rockets, cluster bombs, and aerial spray equipment.

The main components of any exploding type binary munition are the fuse, the burster, the body with chambers for the toxic agent components. Also there are the various auxiliary components to provide for component separation and mixing as well as the flow of the chemical reaction.

Figures 1 and 2 are diagrams of a binary 200-kg gravity aerial bomb and a binary 155-mm artillery round with sarin-2.




Figure 1. Binary aerial bomb with the toxic agent VX: 1 -- fill hole; 2 -- mixer; 3 -- motor; 4 -- tail fins; 5 -- steel tube; 6 -- liquid component; 7 -- powder (sulfur); 8 -- fuze.




Figure 2. Binary 155-mm artillery round with sarin: 1 -- fuze; 2 -- burster; 3 -- canister DF; 4 -- rupture disk; 5 -- canister JP; 6 -- body.

One of the components in the form of a sulphur cartridge is in the central tube. The body is filled with liquid 2-(diisopropylamino)ethylmethylphosphononate (component Qa). To increase the stability of this component during storage a stabilizer is added. The barrier between the components is ruptured at a pre-programmed time; they are mechanically mixed and within 5 seconds the reaction to form the toxic agent VX-2 is completed.

The most suitable non-toxic components for use in binary systems to form sarin and soman toxic agents are diphthoranhidrides and alcohol. For example, it is possible to use diphtoranhydride methylphosphonic acid (DF) and the isopropyl ester (JP). The catalyst is tertiary amin. Diphtoranhydride methylphosphonic acid and pinacol ester can be used to obtain soman (GD-2).

In the estimation of foreign military specialists, binary munitions are easy to produce, store and employ.

Thus, the U.S. is undertaking new dangerous steps on the path to broadening the arms race, exacerbating international tensions and intensifying the military threat.

The position of the Soviet Union in regard to chemical weapons is clear: their production and deployment must be banned and the existing stockpiles destroyed.

Under the increased threat that the imperialist powers will use chemical weapons the responsibility to improve civil defense in preparing non-military formations and the population to protect them from chemical weapons. This

protection provides a set of special measures prevent injuries and reduce the seriousness of injuries from toxic agents as much as possible.

To accomplish this chemical surveillance and reconnaissance will be conducted. The population will be notified of chemical contamination. Individual and collective protective measures and antidotes will be used when located or operating in an area subjected to chemical attack. There will be chemical monitoring of food products, water, protection resources, equipment and transportation. The population will be evacuated from the area which has been attacked. The results of the use of chemical weapons will be eliminated. Of course, it is necessary to study all the protective measures against this weapon.

Timely detection that the enemy has begun to employ chemical weapons is very important. This mission is assigned to the radiation and chemical detection posts which use chemical reconnaissance instruments. The initiation of a chemical attack is determined using these and external indications. The posts give the "chemical alert" on their own initiative and determine the direction the contaminated air is moving.

Chemical reconnaissance must determine the type of toxic agent and the level of contamination of the terrain, equipment and structures. They determine and mark the boundaries of the contaminated area and search for routes to bypass or pass through the contaminated areas. This reconnaissance is organized by workplace, rayon and city civil defense (CD) headquarters.

The population is notified of enemy use of chemical weapons so that they can take timely measures, primarily individual and collective protective measures. The "chemical alert" signal is given through radio relay networks and mobile loudspeaker units. While reporting the probable contaminated area and the wind direction of contaminated air, the least dangerous directions for evacuation from the possible contaminated zones is given. In population centers and workplaces the signal is repeated with sound and light signals.

At the "chemical alert" signal it is necessary to immediately don gas masks, use skin protection and, if one is available, take cover in the nearest shelter. It should be remembered that only a carefully selected and well fitted gas mask can dependably protect the lungs, face and eyes from toxic agents. Respirators and simple protective devices will not protect the lungs against toxic agents.

Skin protection protects against contamination from toxic agents in aerosol and liquid droplet form. There is also special protective clothing for this which are intended for personnel in non-military CD formations. Everyone else can use capes, raincoats and jackets with trousers made from rubberized cloth and synthetic layers or other athletic and work clothes of any dense fabric.

Shelters serve as collective protection for the population. If there are none nearby, then it will be necessary to use housing, production and auxiliary buildings as cover from aerosol and liquid toxic agents, but those inside will also need gas masks.

While working in a chemical contaminated area, personnel in the nonmilitary formations use antidotes -- therapeutic agents capable of neutralizing or eliminating the toxic agent from the organism. For example, atropine can neutralize up to one deadly dose of nerve agent. Antidotes are used by members of the CD formations at the order of their commanders or on their own initiative upon initial appearance of toxic agent effects.

If the population is to be evacuated from the chemical contamination area they will be notified by the DEZ, housing management and the militia over the radio relay network and mobile loudspeaker units. Evacuation collection points are used to assemble, register and disperse people. During independent evacuation from a chemical contaminated zone representatives of the militia and civil defense will direct the population. But if there are none nearby then one should move perpendicular to the movement of the air (perpendicular to the wind), staying to the high ground and to places with good air movement.

After exiting the chemical contaminated area, the gas mask and protective clothing should only be removed when the individual is convinced that there is no toxic agent in the air or on the clothing.

Chemical monitoring is conducted in order to determine if or to what degree food products, water, individual protective equipment, clothes, equipment and transportation are contaminated. They determine if it is possible for CD formations and the population to operate without individual protective equipment and also if decontamination is necessary. Such monitoring may identify new, unknown toxic agents. It is accomplished by the CD formation using military chemical survey and chemical survey instruments and chemical laboratories with their equipment, instruments and chemical reagents. The results of chemical monitoring are used to determine if facilities may be used for their primary purpose.

Civil defense forces eliminate the effects of enemy chemical weapons. They organize and conduct chemical reconnaissance and rescue efforts. They provide medical aid to the injured. They decontaminate terrain, structures and equipment, individual protection equipment and clothing. They provide for the complete sanitation of contaminated people.

During rescue efforts, first they locate people and determine if they can be reached and find out how many casualties there are. When rendering aid, they mask them, neutralize drops of toxic agents on exposed skin and clothing, and when necessary they inject antidote. Then they evacuate the injured to an assembly point where they are on the upwind side from the contaminated area. From these points they are evacuated to the nearest medical facilities or first aid detachments.

In order to keep CD formation personnel and the population from becoming casualties by coming in contact with contaminated equipment, transport, individual protective equipment and gear, they are decontaminated. This is done after they are evacuated from the contaminated area to decontamination or relocation areas. In other words, they are treated with decontaminating solutions.

The effectiveness of measures taken to eliminate the effects of enemy chemical weapons use is significantly increased with quality preparation of nonmilitary CD formations, workers and the population for action in chemical contaminated areas.

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CSO: 1801/247

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS: KABUL NEWS CONFERENCE SHOWS CHEMICAL WEAPONS

LD281756 Moscow TASS in English 1448 GMT 28 Sep 86

[Text] Kabul September 28 TASS -- Numerous specimens of chemical weapons -- grenades, mines and powder to poison water wells -- were shown to Afghan and foreign journalists at a press conference in Kabul today.

Spokesmen of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministries of Defense and health of the Republic answered questions put by correspondents about the use of the barbarous means of mass destruction by the enemies of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Way back six years ago a batch of U.S.-made chemical grenades had been intercepted in Herat Province, it was pointed out at the press conference. Since then numerous facts of inhuman actions by the counter-revolutionaries became known to the public. The counterrevolutionaries became known to the public. The counterrevolutionaries use chemical weapons, which they get from imperialist states, against civilians.

Sakhi Mohammad, a former member of a counter-revolutionary band, who was captured by the DRA's security forces during an attempt at using chemical-filled rockets in Kabul Province, spoke here before journalists at today's press conference. He related that he had been trained in the use of these weapons by U.S. and Pakistani instructors. Then he was infiltrated into Afghanistan with a group consisting of 20 counter-revolutionaries. Two U.S. instructors were accompanying the band, giving practical advice for the purpose of affecting as wide an area as possible.

Those present at the press conference could see not only the chemical weapons themselves but also French- and U.S.-made gas masks and special instruments to explore contaminated terrain. A large part of this equipment, according to reliable data, is supplied to Pakistan for the bandits directly by aircraft of the U.S. Air Force.

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CSO: 5200/1005

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET ARMY PAPER COMMENTS ON CD SUMMER SESSION OPENING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jun 86 p 3

[Article by A. Yevgenyev: "Tangible Deeds are Necessary: On the Beginning of the Summer Session of the Conference on Disarmament"]

[Text] The arms race launched on earth by the United States and its NATO allies and Washington's plans for the militarization of space demand that the peoples of the world take the most resolute action in the struggle against the nuclear threat. Under these conditions, the intensification of the entire mechanism of arms limitation and reduction talks takes on special significance. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament, in which all nuclear powers and other leading military countries are participating, is called upon to play a large part here.

During the years it has been at work, the conference has unquestionably made a definite contribution to the limiting of the arms race. Such important documents as treaties on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, on prohibiting the deployment of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons on or beneath the sea and ocean floor, conventions prohibiting bacteriological weapons and military or any other hostile use of means for influencing the environment, and a number of others have been developed within its framework.

The radical program for freeing mankind of nuclear weapons, which was set forth in M. S. Gorbachev's Declaration of 15 January 1986 and approved by the 27th CPSU Congress, created a largely new atmosphere at the conference and noticeably invigorated its work. The Soviet proposals were greeted approvingly by the majority of countries represented at the conference, in particular, by practically all of the neutral and nonaligned nations.

However, the mere approval of Soviet peace initiatives is clearly not enough. The task now is to devise specific measures and practical steps toward implementing the program for eliminating nuclear weapons before the end of the current century. Unfortunately, it must be said that there has been no appreciable progress in this regard as yet. And the main responsibility for this is borne by the USA and its closest NATO allies. Their efforts at the Geneva Conference are not by any means concentrated on the search for

solutions to unresolved problems but rather on the creation of an atmosphere of confrontation, which is a great hindrance to the commencement of practical, businesslike negotiations.

The question of halting nuclear weapons tests occupies one of the central places in international life. And this is understandable. After all, the prohibition of such tests would not only make it possible to sharply scale down the nuclear arms race and to halt their qualitative improvement, but would also be a real step on the road to eliminating nuclear weapons. What is more, the technical aspects of concluding an agreement on halting nuclear tests have been worked out sufficiently and so the question of concluding such an agreement does not require lengthy coordination. However, the USA and its allies essentially support nuclear explosions, declaring them to be a virtual "guarantee of the effectiveness of nuclear constraint."

The prevention of an arms race in outer space problem that gravely concerns all mankind. The transformation of space into an arena of military confrontation would dash the hopes of peoples of the world for the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, for salvation from nuclear arms. The position of the Soviet Union on this question is clear. The USSR favors the adoption of immediate effective measures to prohibit the creation, testing and deployment of offensive space weapons. What is more, these measures must be of a practical, tangible nature.

It should be noted that in recent months at the Conference on Disarmament there has been real progress on the question of drafting a future convention on the total prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. However, an ever greater source of concern today is the U.S. decision to begin production of binary chemical weapons, which will inevitably inaugurate a qualitatively new turn in the chemical arms race. This makes the necessity for the earliest possible prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production even more urgent. This is the specific goal of proposals submitted by the Soviet Union for the conference's consideration on 22 April 1986. The new Soviet initiatives ensure all conditions for the earliest possible completion of the drafting of the convention prohibiting chemical weapons. Any evasions or pretexts can only reveal the true face of those who are not ready to destroy this barbaric type of weapon.

The events in Chernobyl raise the question of radiological weapons with special urgency because the scale of the tragedy that would result from the use of radiological weapons would be immeasurably more serious than the results of the accident at the Chernobyl atomic power plant. There is no justification whatsoever for the fact that the appropriate treaty, the draft of which was submitted back in 1979, still has not been agreed to.

Integrally connected with this problem is the problem of ensuring safety in the development of nuclear energy--a question that is also the subject of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. Proposals submitted on 14 May 1986 by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on the establishment of international safeguards in the development of nuclear energy should give an additional impetus to the work of the conference.

Peoples of the world are entitled to expect that participants in the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament, which began on 10 June, will finally proceed from the fruitless talks that are bogged down because of the USA to the preparation of an international agreement on the terms of nuclear disarmament.

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CSO: 5200/1538

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

IZVESTIYA INTERVIEWS INDIAN CD DELEGATION HEAD

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 86 p 4

[Article by A. S. Gonsalves, head, Indian delegation to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament: "A Goodwill Gesture":]

[Text] We are on the threshold of major, important talks on Asian and Pacific problems. For many years, the region's problems have been dealt with through confrontation, demonstrations of power, and refusal to discuss them at the negotiating table. The complex, time-tangled problems of Asian security are becoming more and more acute and unmanageable, thereby threatening the common security. These are very alarming symptoms and one cannot ignore the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons in our region, whereupon it will be more difficult to hold talks on reducing tensions.

This is why I attentively studied M. S. Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok. Constraint instead of confrontation--that is what I see to be the meaning of the Soviet Union's appeal to the international community. It has taken the first step and demonstrated a new approach to conflict issues: the decision to withdraw six regiments from Afghanistan is a practical contribution to the solution of complex problems pertaining to the regulation of the situation in Asia. In my view, these are not symbolic gestures. They are the beginning of true regulation, naturally assuming that other parties will respond to the good will and desire of the Soviet Union to seek political solutions at the negotiating table.

The Soviet Union has once again confirmed the fact that it fully understands and respects the position of the nonaligned nations movement and their striving for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction of people on our planet. And the halting of all nuclear explosions and the conclusion of a treaty on the total and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests must be the first step in this direction. The Soviet Union has also repeatedly displayed its good will on this issue, having held to its unilateral moratorium already for one year and having resolved the problem of on-sight inspection through a Soviet-American experiment in the vicinity of Semipalatinsk, which showed that it is entirely possible to monitor all nuclear explosions.

The Conference on Disarmament must make its contribution to reaching an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. Such an agreement would limit the arms race, all the more so that there are no technical obstacles or difficulties whatsoever in the monitoring area. All that is needed is the political will of individual participants in the conference and their display of an understanding of their responsibility for the fate of peace and disarmament. Such an approach must also be taken regarding the halting of the arms race, the threat of nuclear war, and the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In his speech in Vladivostok, M. S. Gorbachev demonstrated the dynamism of Soviet foreign policy and the new approach to previously deadlocked problems and called for the reduction of tensions in Asia and the Pacific. Goodwill gestures can only be welcomed, but it is also necessary to respond to them with practical action, with tangible acts of well-wishing, mutual understanding and cooperation.

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CSO: 5200/1538

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

CANADIAN EDITORIAL SUGGESTS USE OF CDE 'FORMAT' IN FUTURE

Ottawa THE CITIZEN in English 23 Sep 86 p A8

[Text]

Although the Daniloff affair has not yet been settled and a summit date not yet set, there's some cause for satisfaction in East-West affairs today. The European Security Conference reached agreement Sunday on confidence-building measures (CBMs).

There was a will to succeed in Stockholm that could not be denied. Conditions were ideal for a measure of success: there was a deadline to report to the coming Vienna review conference, participants included neutral and non-aligned European states wooed by both East and West, and to oppose the reasonable CBMs that emerged would have been like supporting sin.

In a rare spirit of compromise, the clock was stopped to give more time to the negotiators, both Moscow and Washington gave in a bit to the other and, in the end, all sides could claim a victory of sorts for reason and against unnecessary tension.

More specifically, since January 1984 the 35-nation conference has been debating ways and means of creating an atmosphere of greater confidence among nations about their intentions concerning their respective armed forces. Starting next year, military exercises and manoeuvres involving 13,000 or more troops or 300 or more tanks will be subject to advance notification to all parties. If 17,000 or more are involved, other nations will have the right to send observers to watch the movements.

There will also be aerial inspection or verification as well as ground observation on demand when a party suspects another of violating the agreement. The Americans conceded that Soviet aircraft could be used in Eastern Europe to carry neutral observers. Allied aircraft will be used to carry Eastern verifiers over Western Europe.

Basically the aim is to prevent surprise attack and to avoid a miscalculation of the other's intentions. It's not quite an open plains and open skies regime but it's a meaningful step in that direction.

Fortunately the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe was not affected by the Daniloff deadlock. This was a multilateral conference, not a bilateral one. NATO nations co-operated closely with neutral and non-aligned ones, with Canada playing one of the leading roles.

From the outset, Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies wanted a non-use-of-force declaration. The others wanted more substance. The result incorporated both.

Stockholm now closes down until after Vienna completes its work. Its modest achievement may well signal that the same format should be tried again later to tackle more ambitious multilateral arms control measures. In the meantime we can be thankful that all concerned were willing to sacrifice some of their privacy for the greater perceived security of all.

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CSO: 5220/55

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

IZVESTIYA CITES CD ENVOYS ON SEISMIC TEST BAN VERIFICATION

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jul 86 p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA Staff Correspondent V. Kuznetsov under the rubric "At the Disarmament Conference": "For Effective Seismic Verification"]

[Text] -- Geneva -- At the conference on disarmament, the Soviet delegation brought forth a new initiative--the development of a series of measures for the international seismic verification of nuclear test bans.

As V. L. Israelyan, head of the USSR delegation, emphasized, the Soviet Union is open to verification of a nuclear test ban and favors the strict verification, including on-site inspection and the use of all seismological techniques. Therefore the Soviet Union has specifically proposed that a group of seismological experts begin developing a system for the transmission of second-level seismic data that would comprise the basis of international seismic verification of a nuclear weapons test ban.

An IZVESTIYA correspondent asked the heads of three delegations to the conference to comment on the new Soviet proposal.

RICHARD BUTLER (Australia). The Soviet Union's proposal is very well thought out and is a continuation of the Soviet-American experiment in the vicinity of Semipalatinsk, which has confirmed the possibility of joint verification of a total ban on nuclear testing. It now remains for a special group of seismological experts at the conference to study the technical aspects and to work toward the creation of an international seismic verification system.

HARALD ROSE (German Democratic Republic). The new Soviet initiative is a logical continuation of the January 15 proposals of M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary, CPSU Central Committee. It reflects the striving of the USSR to find new ways of outlawing nuclear weapons and the arms race. And scientists play no small role here. The proposal to develop a system of international seismic verification and to conduct an international experiment on the exchange of second-level data will help to advance specific efforts in this direction.

ROLF EKEUS (Sweden). The proposals of the USSR are a new approach to the problem of prohibiting nuclear tests. We support this proposal since it is effective and accords with Sweden's position that all nuclear explosions are detectable. The ability to distinguish between explosions and earthquakes is so great today that the resulting data will restrain any country from testing. There must be no time lost. Technical potential must be supplemented with political will, with the striving to reach agreement on these cardinal problems relating to the prohibition of nuclear weapons testing.

5013

CSO: 5200/1538

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

IZVESTIYA CONTRASTS NORWEGIAN, FINNISH NFZ ATTITUDES

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jul 86 p4

[Article by IZVESTIYA Staff Correspondent N. Ivanov under the rubric "Northern Europe": "Timely as Before"]

[Text] -- Helsinki -- A group of Finnish experts headed by State Secretary Klaus Ternyudd submitted a special report on the possibility of the establishment of a "nuclear-free zone" in Northern Europe to P. Vayrynen, Finland's minister of foreign affairs.

The "Ternyudd report" had been eagerly awaited for many reasons. After all, 8 months before this, a similar report had been delivered by K. Kolding, former Norwegian state secretary and minister of foreign affairs. The incumbent government of K. Willoch blocked every attempt to begin a businesslike dialog regarding a "nuclear-free zone." What position would Helsinki take now? More than 12 years have passed since U. Kekkonen, former president, advanced the idea of a "nuclear-free North."

Time has not diminished its attractive force. To the contrary, the events of recent years have demonstrated the farsightedness of U. Kekkonen when he suggested that his northern neighbors distance themselves from nuclear weapons. The appearance of cruise missiles in Western Europe has made this plan especially timely.

Today, more than 88 percent of all Swedes, 72 percent of all Danes, 75 percent of all Norwegians, and 86 percent of all Icelanders support the plan for establishing a "nuclear-free zone."

The time has come to take practical steps in this direction. Finnish experts propose convening the next session of foreign affairs ministers of the northern countries already in August for the purpose of organizing a commission to develop a general approach to the "nuclear-free zone." The basic position is that each country will unilaterally proclaim itself to be nuclear free. The report states that the geographical framework of the future zone should embrace Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, even though the possibility of Iceland's participation is not excluded. FRIHETEN, the Norwegian newspaper, notes that the Finnish side had proposed the

establishment of a commission at the time of the spring meeting of foreign affairs ministers, but had encountered Oslo's objections. Now, to all appearances, there are hopeful signs that the dialog will begin. As is known, the Danish parliament obligated its government to work energetically for the nuclear-free status of Northern Europe. There have also been changes in the Norwegian capital. Conservatives have retired, surrendering the reins of government to Social Democrats who have repeatedly proclaimed their readiness to promote the implementation of the "Kekkonen plan." Now they have every opportunity to back up their words with practical action.

Naturally, there are opponents to the plan for a "nuclear-free zone." Two reports--by Kolding and Ternyudd--essentially reflect two approaches to the plan for a "nuclear-free North." While not speaking out directly against the idea itself, Kolding, like the majority of his fellow conservatives, is attempting to postpone the implementation of the plan for a "nuclear-free zone" for an indefinite period. His main objection is that the discussion of a "nuclear-free zone" must be conducted in the "broad European context" and this means linking it to other negotiations which, as is known, have long been at a standstill.

Finland, as the initiator of the "nuclear-free zone," is in favor of practical steps. The authors of the "Ternyudd report" believe that the very creation of a zone that is free of nuclear weapons in the Northern region could be a contribution to the strengthening of European security, could become an example for those who are still "tangled in the web of nuclear problems."

SVENSKA DAGBLADET writes that Finland has not changed its stand on the plan to establish a "nuclear-free zone" and is prepared to promote its practical implementation.

5013

CSO: 5200/1538

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA COMMENTARY ON TREATY OF TLATELOLCO

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Sep 86 p 5

[Nikolay Ognev commentary under the rubric "We Answer a Reader":
"Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty"]

[Text] Reader N. Novikov from Kuybyshev asks us to tell him about the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which envisaged the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco is an attempt to secure in the international legal order the status of a nuclear-free zone in one of the largest and most heavily populated regions of the world. The treaty was concluded on 14 February 1967 at a conference of Western Hemisphere countries. This document received its name from the section of the Mexican capital in which the republic's foreign ministry is located, in whose building it was signed.

The movement to create a nuclear-free zone in Latin America arose after the October events of 1962, when a crisis situation arose in the Caribbean basin through the fault of American imperialism. In that moment, which was dangerous for the whole world, and which threatened the outbreak of a new world war, perhaps even with the use of nuclear weapons, representatives of the ruling circles of a majority of Latin American states called for the prompt withdrawal of the entire region from the United States' "nuclear security zone." The appearance of nuclear weapons in any of the states of the region--and such a tendency began to appear in the beginning of the 1960's--was regarded by many governments as a threat to the stability of the whole region and as an obstacle to its economic integration.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco obliges its participants to forbid the testing, use, production, acquisition, storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory, or to possess them in any fashion. Two additional protocols are intended to guarantee the status of a nuclear-free zone for Latin America, and to oblige countries possessing territories in the region (that is, the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands) to observe its provisions. The document's authority is arbitrarily extended to the wide expanses of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans bordering Latin America.

The procedure for adhering to the Treaty of Tlatelolco is somewhat unique. In addition to signing and ratifying it, one is expected also to adopt a special declaration on its entering into force.

Of the fourteen states which originally signed the treaty, practically all have fully observed the above-noted conditions. In the intervening years since the agreement eighteen more Latin American states, including such large ones as Brazil and Argentina, have adhered to it. An absolute majority of participants have adopted the corresponding declaration on the Treaty of Tlatelolco's entering into force. Only a few states have signed and ratified the agreement without adopting the declaration on its entering into force; they approve in principle of the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in Latin America but do not agree with certain of the treaty's provisions. In particular, among these states are Brazil and Argentina.

Nine states outside the region, which have nuclear weapons, have signed the additional protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The Soviet Union, declaring its support for the idea of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, adopted a decision to adhere to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In May 1978 the Soviet Government signed additional protocol 2, which obliges nuclear powers to observe the status of the nuclear-free zone in Latin America, and in December of that year ratified it.

As the course of events has shown, however, several of the countries which signed the agreement have not taken it to heart. In recent years evidence has leaked into the foreign press that the United States has transported nuclear weapons through the Panama Canal, that is, through the territory of a country participating in the agreement.

CSO: 5200/1013

RELATED ISSUES

USSR MEDIA REPORTS, COMMENTARY ON JURMALA CONFERENCE

Petrovskiy: Consolidate Security

LD151757 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1600 GMT 15 Sep 86

[Excerpt] Jurmala (Soviet Latvia), 15 Sep (TASS)--Even though it is the closed season, the "Dzintari" concert hall in Jurmala resort was packed to capacity with representatives of the Soviet and U.S. public. All 2,000 seats here today have been occupied by the participants in a conference on topical issues of Soviet-U.S. relations.

"Small steps toward each other can become decisive at certain moments of history": These words of Susan Eisenhower, the granddaughter of the former U.S. President, set the tone of most of the speeches.

The conference will discuss the main problems of bilateral relations and ways to solve them. The U.S. delegation, which is headed by Jack Matlock, the U.S. President's special assistant for national security affairs, comprises about 300 members. They include eminent statesmen and public figures: Mark Palmer, Edward Djerejian, Dr Helmut Sonnenfeld, Ambassador Stephen Rinesmith, and John Wallach, among others. Dr Daniel Bretton, president of the Chautauqua Institute, spoke in favor of "an open, honest, and serious discussion" of the problems of modern times and in favor of coexistence without hate and distrust. "The memory of World War II compels us to think about life," he said.

Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, described the present state of Soviet-U.S. relations as "dissatisfactory."

"Mutual relations between our countries concern not only the USSR and the United States; the general state of affairs in the world and the prospects for the international climate depend on them, too. We are faced with a common goal: to unite our efforts in safeguarding the survival of humanity in conditions of a growing threat of its total self-destruction," he said. Vladimir Petrovskiy appealed to the participants in the conference to refrain from thinking in stereotypes. "One cannot apply the old standards to an evaluation of the contemporary situation in the world. One must think and -- the main thing -- act in a new way, taking stock of the realities of the nuclear-space age. The task of consolidating security must become the main direction of our joint actions. This must be approached by the limitation and cessation of the arms race," he said. Petrovskiy stressed in particular the necessity of preventing the militarization of space.

Petrovskiy Stresses 'Dialogue', 'Trust'

LD152159 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 15 Sep 86

[Text] Today in the town of Jurmala a conference of representatives of the public of the USSR and United States on topical questions of Soviet-U.S. relations opened. Our special correspondent Andrey Ptashnikov reports:

This is the second such conference.

Apart from representatives of the public and governmental organizations, also taking part in it are representatives of higher educational and scientific research institutions, military departments, the mass media, and cultural arts figures. The U.S. delegation includes such high-ranking administration figures as Matlock, member of the president's National Security Council. The discussions at Jurmala will be conducted on four main subjects: the general state of Soviet-U.S. relations and ways of improving them, the arms race and methods of halting it, regional conflicts and ways to settle them, and finally the role of the mass media in forming public opinion. Speaking at the opening of the conference from the Soviet delegation was USSR Deputy Minister of foreign affairs Comrade Petrovskiy. He said in part:

[Begin Petrovskiy recording] For our part, I would say we acutely feel the lack of trust. Trust is needed in our relations. One would think it is time to give up associating the image of the enemy with one country or another. We have a specific enemy: It is the nuclear threat on our planet. The present time requires that political permissiveness give way to dialogue, realism, and responsibility. I am profoundly convinced that an important role in changing the climate and creating an atmosphere for practical deeds can be played by the public when contacts are conducted in the hope of finding points which unite us and which make it possible to move forward. We attach great importance to the dialogue we are conducting today here at Jurmala. We hope this dialogue will lay the foundation for building bridges of cooperation. But these bridges require equal efforts from both sides. [end recording]

15 Sep Speeches

LD162230 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1850 GMT 16 Sep 86

[Special report on 15 September proceedings at U.S.-Soviet conference in Jurmala, Latvia, replacing scheduled "World Today" program]

[Excerpt] It would not be an exaggeration to say that these days the attention of the whole world is fixed on the small resort town near Riga where, for the first time, representatives of the Soviet and U.S. public are meeting, not through a space telebridge but directly, in real life. They are holding a frank conversation about the main thing today--about how to preserve peace, reduce the level of tension, block the way to nuclear weapons in space and revive the atmosphere of detente, filling it with fresh and specific content. These and other problems determining the planet's political climate are inextricably linked with Soviet-U.S. relations. The fact that around 300 people have come to Jurmala from the U.S. side is evidence of how deeply

people are concerned at the state of these relations not only in our country but also in the United States. They are prominent statesmen and public figures of that country. The conference began with a discussion of the general state of Soviet-U.S. relations and of ways to improve them.

USSR deputy Foreign Minister Valadimir Fedorovich Petrovskiy is speaking:

[Begin Petrovskiy recording] Of course, bilateral relations include as an integral part the development of relations between our countries in aspects connected with science, technology, culture, and economics. I must say at this point that there is a feeling of a certain movement, and something has been done recently in the development of the accord at summit level in Geneva. Air links have been restored between the Soviet Union and the United States; work is now being carried out on the opening of general consulates; there is also an agreement, which has been worked on, in relation to the research and exploitation of cosmic space and our further joint work on controlled thermo nuclear synthesis.

However, I must say again with all frankness that all the circumstances cannot fail to give rise to concern. For even on these questions where mutual understanding has already been attained, a whole series of promising aspects remain outside possible cooperation.

Let us also take cooperation in the sphere of the research and exploitation of cosmic space for peaceful purposes. I think that this is one of the most promising aspects of this cooperation for our countries. We have reached agreement on a whole range of parameters, but we have not been able so far to resolve a very important question. I shall tell you frankly, for example, the United States is so far not moving toward making use of Soviet rocket carriers to launch space installations on a commercial basis, and this is a very promising sphere for cooperation in these matters. One can say the same thing about economic trade relations. There are in a very grave state, and their development is brought on by many -- I would say -- artificial obstructions and obstacles.

I should nonetheless like to say a few words, in addition to the essential point, about methods for resolving Soviet-U.S. relations, about finding the means with which one must operate in order to bring them onto a new level. And I think that practical actions and specific deeds are a very important condition here.

The second thing which is required is the appropriate atmosphere, the appropriate climate. We, for our part, have an acute sense of a lack of trust, I would say. Trust is needed in our relations, and I must say that there is no anti-Americanism in our country. In general, the conditions of the nuclear space age require that activity in international relations should not be conducted from a position of anti-Sovietism or from a position of anti-Americanism, but from a position of our common concern, our common interests. I think it is time to give up associating the image of the enemy with one or another country.

We have a specific enemy. There is a real enemy. It is the nuclear threat to our planet. I also think that politicians must not think in mathematical categories -- a game with a zero result whereby one side's gain means the other side's loss. I believe that the present time requires that political permissiveness should give way to dialogue, realism and responsibility. [end recording]

The other members of the Soviet delegation who spoke at the meeting in the Soviet-U.S. conference also concentrated their attention on the same thoughts, on the same fears and concerns. On a good note, and in Latvian, to the joy of the people of Jurmala, a speaker for the U.S. side -- John Matlock, special assistant to the U.S. President for national security -- started his address. Voicing gratitude for the hospitality of the Latvian hosts, he described the questions on the meeting's agenda as vitally important for all, including Americans. However, he went on:

[Begin Matlock recording] I have arrived here with a heavy heart, as disturbing events have cast deep shadows on U.S.-Soviet relations and this cannot but reflect on our discussion here. The arrest of the U.S. journalist Nicholas Daniloff by the Soviet authorities (?has nearly) wrecked the present conference. [end recording]

Unfortunately, the artificially blown up Daniloff affair by U.S. propaganda was far from the only argument in Matlock's address by which he attempted to divert attention from the open questions directly asked by participants in the meeting. The U.S. President's assistant spoke for more than a half hour, not even mentioning such words as moratorium, or halting of the nuclear arms race but putting forward several curious versions of the aggressive character of the foreign policy course of the Soviet Union in contrast to the perfection in all respects of the United States.

Let me reply here for the audience's benefit. You say that you are in favor of limiting the use of force. That is very good. I was pleased to hear this finally from the U.S. side. I do not hear it at international conferences in which I take part. This has been a great revelation to me. Well, if that is the case, let me ask why you do not want the limitation of force in its material expression. How do your words fit in with the fact that you propose to strengthen forces, in its clearest, nuclear and space form? [end recording]

In the course of further discussions, the U.S. representative could see that not only Soviet but also many U.S. participants in the conference dispute the views put forward in his report on the essence of questions which are being examined.

[Begin Matlock recording in English with superimposed remarks by announcer in Russian] A rejoinder by this American, one can hear the thought that John Matlock unjustifiably assumed the right to speak on behalf of the American people -- the majority of the American people are resolutely against militarism, in favor of a moratorium on nuclear blasts, and for the speedy establishment of good relations between our countries. [end recording]

The participants in the meeting in Jurmala face a lot of work; there are still many problems to be examined and they are not simple but they can be solved as these first days show, if all the demagogy and propaganda tricks are warded off, and only if constructive and businesslike spirit.

Pozner on Audience Reaction

LD161245 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 15 Sep 86

[Vladimir Pozner report]

[Excerpts] Day one of the meeting of public representatives opened in Jurmala, a resort town close to Riga, capital of Soviet Latvia, exactly on schedule, 10 am local time. Some 2,000 Soviet citizens and 250 Americans sat shoulder to shoulder completely filling the Dzintari (?open air) concert hall. [passage omitted]

This was followed by the two principle speakers, Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR; and Jack Matlock, senior adviser to the President on Soviet affairs. They addressed the theme: The General State of Soviet-American Relations and How To Improve Them. The thrust of Deputy Minister Petrovskiy's remarks was that the improvement of relations between the two countries is not only possible but vital, for it concerns the survival of the human race. The nuclear age, he said, is the most fleeting of all, it leaves us little time to dally. It is, he said, absurd to speak of developing relations without reaching and signing agreements and while abandoning previous ones, for this in fact legalizes the arms race. There is nothing more important than barring an arms race in space and stopping the one on earth, he stressed, but this can only be achieved through concrete deeds, not words. In that respect, said the deputy minister, the Soviet unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests is a case in point. Every summit meeting has (?to raise) our relationship to a new level and this can only be the result of concrete decisions and agreements. We have only one common foe, nuclear weapons. We have a situation where either both sides win or both lose.

IZVESTIYA: Dialogue on Disarmament

PM161450 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition) in Russian 16 Sep p 4

[IZVESTIYA special correspondents Ye. Vostrukhov, A. Itskov, and A. Shalnev report "Jurmala: Dialogue on Disarmament and Cooperation"]

[Excerpt] Jurmala--The resort of Jurmala near the capital of Soviet Latvia is the venue of a meeting between representatives of the Soviet and U.S. public who have gathered to discuss topical questions of the relations between the two countries. This is their second meeting. The first was held in the summer of last year at Chautauqua in the northeast of New York state.

On this occasion there are four main themes on the forum's agenda: The general state of Soviet-American relations, arms control, regional conflicts, and the role of the mass media in molding public opinion. It is well known to what degree our countries' positions on each of these problems are dissimilar and some times even diametrically opposed. This was borne out yet again in the reports with which V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, and J. Matlock, a ranking official of the U.S. Administration, opened the meeting.

The Soviet representative emphasized that in the present conditions it is no longer possible to apply old standards and think in stereotypes, that it is necessary to think, and above all to act, in a new way taking account of the realities of the nuclear space age. We see our paramount task, the deputy minister said, in ensuring that joint practical actions are taken primarily in the most important area of our relations, the area of limiting and ending the arms race.

At the same time it is evident from Matlock's pronouncements that the Reagan administration is not yet ready to refrain from thinking in stereotypes, to reject the old approaches. Paradoxical as it may seem, the representative of Washington officialdom managed practically not to mention the problem of curbing the arms race and ridding the world of the nuclear danger in his more than 30-minute long report.

But the purpose of the Jurmala meeting is not to overemphasize and exacerbate contradictions. Its task -- at least as seen by the Soviet delegation -- lies elsewhere: to identify points of contact wherever possible in order to facilitate the solution of the problems confronting our countries and indeed mankind as a whole; to facilitate and to accelerate the solution of these problems because time is passing rapidly. The nuclear arms age is clearly the most transient of all ages through which world history has passed. It is noteworthy that the very titles of the topics discussed in Jurmala today not only identify the problems but emphasize "solutions" and "methods of settlement...."

Arms Race Discussion 16 Sep

LF161649 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 16 Sep 86

[Text] The conference of the representatives of the USSR and United States public, devoted to the topical questions of Soviet-American relations is in its 2d day in the Latvian town of Jurmala. Andrey Ptashnikov, our special correspondent, reports:

The course of the first 2 days of discussion in Jurmala has already given quite enough food for thoughts. First and foremost, I wish to note the following: Right from the very inception of the debate, Matlock, the head of the U.S. delegation, has been trying to prevent the debate from assuming a constructive nature. A number of other U.S. delegation members have taken a similar approach, albeit not in such a straightforward manner.

Thus, for instance, today's discussion at the conference revolved round the question of the arms race and ways to put a halt to it. Again we heard the American representative voicing groundless accusations against the Soviet Union, alleging that the USSR is striving to retain its military superiority over the United States. Members of the Soviet delegation to the Jurmala conference are giving a fitting rebuff to attempts of this kind to distort the real state of affairs, to shirk a direct dialogue about ways to avert the nuclear threat.

Thus, addressing a routine plenary session today, Colonel General Chervov, chief of a directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, said, in particular:

[Begin Chervov recording] The Soviet Union proceeds from this stance: As long as it is not too late, one has to stop in one's tracks - to lower the level of military confrontation. The Soviet Union favors a reduction in the military potential of the sides, to within the confines of what is sufficient and essential for defensive purposes. The Soviet Union confirms its new approach to the questions of disarmament and security by practical deeds. [end recording]

The conference of representatives of the USSR and United States public, continues its work in Jurmala.

Chervov, Talbot Remarks

LD161512 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1425 GMT 16 Sep 86

[Text] Riga, 16 Sep (TASS) -- There is no problem more important than halting the nuclear arms race -- this idea has become the central one at the Jurmala (Soviet Baltic region) conference of representatives of the USSR and the United States.

Today's agenda -- "The nuclear arms race and ways of halting it" -- aroused such interest that the 2,000-seat concert hall could not seat all those wanting to take part in the debates.

"The USSR proceeds from the premise that in the nuclear space age a new approach is needed to the problem of security, an approach whose essence consists in the fact that there can now be no alteration of peaceful and unpeaceful periods," declared Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, chief of an administration of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense. "It is senseless and even criminal to seek the solution of the problem of security in the arms race." Summarizing the Soviet position on problems of nuclear disarmament and security, Nikolay Chervov recalled that the USSR for over a year had been observing the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, while the U.S. Administration was not giving up its program of stepping up nuclear weapons.

"An accord on a mutual halt to nuclear blasts would make it possible to shift the disarmament process from standstill, and bring to Soviet-U.S. relations the element of trust which is so wanting," General Chervov said. He noted that in the event work on implementing SDI is continued in the United States, the Soviet Union would be forced to take counter measures.

A speech by Strobe Talbot, a spokesman for the U.S. delegation and head of the office of TIME magazine in Washington, left a 2-sided impression. He began with the already hackneyed "Daniloff case," the U.S. spy who was caught red-handed in Moscow, and tried to evade discussion of the main topics of the dialogue. Having declared himself to be a "a critic" of the U.S. Administration, Talbot nonetheless defended the "strategic defense initiative" program, calling it "attractive for Americans." He repeated the favorite argument in the White House that the moratorium on nuclear blasts is more advantageous for the USSR and therefore "unrealistic."

Chervov on SDI Countermeasures

LD161551 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1525 GMT 16 Sep 86

["Soviet Military Leader on USSR's Answer to SDI--TASS headline]

[Text] Riga, 16 Sep 86 (TASS)--"The Soviet Union is conducting basic research aimed at finding possibilities for taking counter-measures to the U.S. "star wars" program, said Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, head of the directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense. He was speaking today at the conference of representatives of the public of the USSR and United States which is taking place in the Latvian town of Jurmala (Soviet Baltic area).

"This research is looking at work in several areas which could lead to the creation of a modern and effective response to the SDI," the general explained.

"The Soviet Union has no plans or programs for creating [sozdaniye] weapons in the 'star wars' framework. We do not intend to put weapons into space and threaten the United States or other states from there. We propose banning all work on the creation [sozdaniye] of strike space weapons," said General Chervov.

Chervov on Euromissiles

LD161832 Moscow TASS in English 1715 GMT 16 Sep 86

[Text] Riga September 16 TASS -- "The elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe would mark a turning point in European history," Colonel-General Nikolay Chervov, chief of an administration at the General Staff of the Defense Ministry of the USSR, said today. He was speaking at a conference of representatives of the Soviet and American people under way at the Latvian town of Jurmala on the Baltic Sea.

"The U.S. Administration has said repeatedly that the deployment of Pershings and cruise missiles in Europe is of a provisional nature. But when the Soviet side suggested that the medium-range missiles be withdrawn from the continent on a reciprocal basis, a positive reply has not been received. The United States continues insisting on the zero option whose acceptance would mean unilateral disarmament for the Soviet Union," Chervov said.

Chervov, Palmer, Milshteyn Remarks

LD162251 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 16 Sep 86

[Text] The meeting of representatives of the Soviet and American public continues at Jurmala, near Riga. Topical questions of bilateral relations, which -- and this is well known -- have a great influence on the whole world political climate, are being discussed.

The nuclear arms race and ways of ending it -- this was the theme of the 2d day of the meeting. The speeches by the Soviet representatives once again showed that our country is approaching this issue in an extremely responsible way. As was stressed by Colonel General Chervov, a member of the Soviet delegation, the Soviet Union favors specific steps to eliminate the nuclear danger which hangs over the world. Much has been done prior to the Geneva summit and since it was held. The moratorium has been extended a number of times. Some missiles have been taken out of operational readiness. Specific proposals have been made for talks in Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna. The sense of this whole program is to stop the arms race. As far as the American side is concerned, then its unconstructive approach to the discussion was evident on the 2d day of the meeting as well.

[Begin recording of unidentified speaker in English] But let me just mention that in the last 20 years the United States has actually reduced the number of its strategic nuclear warheads by one-third [end recording]

In the speech by Ambassador Palmer, an American delegation member, and a number of other U.S. representatives, the old arguments familiar from speeches by U.S. Administration officials came out once again. These are claims about some lack of good will on the part of the Soviet Union, about an alleged reduction in the U.S. nuclear arsenals and a build-up by the Soviet Union, and about the Soviet Union's mythical leadership in the space arms race, and so on.

In a word, an attempt is again being made to lay the blame at someone else's door. And once again they are persistently by-passing what currently, it would appear, troubles everyone -- the possibility of ending nuclear tests and the Soviet moratorium. Here is evidence of an obvious attempt to sidetrack the participants in the meeting away from discussing the most urgent problems of the day. The discussions are heated [zharkiy]. Here is Milshteyn, senior learned employee of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences:

[Begin Milshteyn recording] Time is running out. The train is running away, as it were, and it will be more and more difficult to stop it if the far-reaching Soviet proposals cannot be accepted -- that is, those proposals which could be accepted here and now. It is a question, in particular, of the moratorium on nuclear tests; of strengthening the regime of treaties which have been concluded, not permitting a nuclear arms race in outer space; and, in particular, of the possibility of concluding -- independent of others -- an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe. There are many opportunities, and, of course, it is a matter of political will. [end recording]

Petrovskiy Summary

LD161730 Moscow TASS in English 1646 GMT 16 Sep 86

[Excerpt] Jurmala, 16 Sep (TASS)--Summing up the results of the first two days of debates at a conference of representatives of the Soviet and American people in this resort at the Baltic Sea, Vladimir Petrovskiy, a deputy foreign minister of the USSR, said that "a candid and interesting discussion is taking place."

"Fairly sharp issues are being discussed," he said in a TASS interview. "But one would like very much that the official representatives of the American delgation concentrate on the prime issues, namely how to achieve practical results in preventing an arms race in outer space and ending the arms race on earth. This is the question of questions."

"Regrettably," Petrovsky said, "the U.S. official representatives have been stepping aside from answers to these questions and attempting to steer the discussion off course. It is very well that represented in Jurmala is not only the U.S. Administration but also the American public which, all indications are, is well aware of the importance of the issues under discussion."

U.S. Envoy's 'Demagoguery'

PM171258 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 17 Sep 86 p 5

[Report by PRAVDA special correspondent T. Kolesnichenko and TASS special correspondent B. Grishchenko: "Dialogue in Jurmala"]

[Text] Jurmala, 16 Sep -- A meeting of Soviet and U.S. public representatives has opened in this resort city close to Riga. The very fact that it is being attended by approximately 300 people on the American side attests to how profoundly the American public is concerned at the state of relations between our countries.

The topics on the conference agenda make possible a comprehensive discussion of problems which determine to a considerable degree the planet's political climate. The question of "the general state of Soviet-American relations and ways to improve them" was on the agenda yesterday.

However, the very first day of the dialogue showed that the U.S. Administration's official representatives participating in the meeting are trying to conduct the conversation in their usual manner, which, unfortunately, is in no way constructive. Moreover, to listen to them, the chief issue in Soviet-American relations is anything they like, even the artificially inflated "Daniloff affair," only not questions of security, ending the nuclear arms race, and disarmament.

The audience's attention was focused on just these matters by Academician N.N. Blokhin, head of the Soviet delegation, who opened the meeting, and by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy, who spoke next. They rightly emphasized that the threat of nuclear catastrophe is the common enemy of Soviet people and Americans today and called for a joint struggle against it.

J. Matlock, special assistant to the U.S. President, who spoke next, tried, however, to evade these frankly and directly posed serious questions. During his half-hour speech he contrived not to even mention words such as moratorium and ending the nuclear arms race. Instead, he lectured the audience on how perfect American foreign policy is in every respect.

During the subsequent debate Mr Matlock saw for himself that not only representatives of the Soviet public but also Americans themselves disagree with such an approach to questions of contemporary politics.

Under the terms of the meeting, after each speech representatives of both countries have the right to put several questions to the speaker. Thus, toward the end of the meeting an American tourist went up to the microphone and publicly requested Mr Matlock not to speak on the people's behalf. The American people, he said, demand of the White House and its entourage specific steps in matters of disarmament, ending the arms race, and above all, ending all nuclear tests.

Entry to the meeting is open to everyone. By their interested participation in the meeting the more than 2,000 people assembled in the hall have once again made it clear that what is needed today is a constructive, businesslike conversation, not the demagoguery and ruses to which the official U.S. representatives try to resort.

Further on Chervov, Talbott

PM180824 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKSYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Sep 86 p 3

[Special correspondents A. Novikov and Yu. Sagaydak report: "Dialogue Is Essential"]

[Text] "The Nuclear Arms Race and Ways of Ending It" -- this was the topic of the second day at the conference of Soviet and U.S. public representatives on topical questions of Soviet-American relations which is under way in Yurmala.

"So many nuclear weapons have now been stockpiled in the world that if they were activated, it would be possible to destroy all life on earth many times over. Meanwhile the arms race is continuing. And it is threatening to spread to space," Colonel General N.F. Chervov, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff directorate, told the conference. "No matter from what angle you view this problem, one thing is clear: The arms race must be stopped.

"Before the Geneva summit and after this meeting," N.F. Chervov went on, "the Soviet Union took major practical steps. Our country has extended four times the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests, which will remain in force until 1 January 1987...."

And how has the United States responded? "War must never be allowed to break out. The threat of a conflict must be eliminated," Strobe Talbott, the official speaker for the U.S. side declared bombastically.

A laudable endeavor! However, it emerges from S. Talbott's speech that the entire responsibility for the existence of this threat falls squarely on...the USSR.

However let us leave the unconcealed juggling with political realities to the conscience of the U.S. journalist and ask a simpler question: If the overall strategic parity, and likewise the level which the threat of war has reached, is at present officially recognized by both sides, why not take the first step toward the elimination of this threat? And what would be more to the point, what would be more tangible than the renunciation of nuclear tests, than joining the Soviet moratorium?

"The moratorium was declared by the Soviet Union at a time when it was more advantageous for Moscow than for Washington," S. Talbott declared.

Let us decode his words. What he is referring to is the hackneyed theory which claims that in the period prior to the announcement of the moratorium the Soviet Union carried out a massive series of nuclear explosions, obtaining, as a consequence, superiority over the United States in this sphere. The facts testify to the contrary. The United States is considerably ahead of the USSR in the number of nuclear tests.

The debate goes on. Heated discussions continue into the small hours in the Dzintari concert hall.

"Ultimately, the solution to the questions pertaining to disarmament will have to be found by our countries' leaders", Daniel Bretton, president of the Chautauqua Institute and one of the organizers of the Yurmala conference, said in an interview with your correspondent. "But we would like to believe that we can get closer to this with your taking small steps forward. It is remarkable that our two countries' citizens are sitting side by side and discussing these burning issues. This was long overdue."

U.S. 'Propaganda Attacks'

LD180759 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 17 Sep 86

[From the "Vremya" Newscast]

[Excerpt] The meeting of representatives of the Soviet and American public continues in Jurmala.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] The central problem under discussion at the meeting is the preservation of peace and the reduction of armaments.

[N.F. Chernov, head of an administration of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, identified by caption] The Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that in the present nuclear space age a new approach to the problem of security is necessary. The essence of this new approach lies in the fact that today there cannot be an alternation of periods of peace and periods without peace. It is now peaceful coexistence or nonexistence -- an apocalypse. Therefore it is mindless, and even criminal, to seek a solution to the problem of security in an arms race. The Soviet moratorium is the best confirmation of the fact that we Soviet people have no other intention than putting an end to the policy of nuclear confrontation. Establishing a ban on nuclear testing is the truest way to achieve an end to the arms race.

[Correspondent Yu. Rostov, identified by video caption] The American delegation is trying to move away from the problem of preventing war and to concentrate the debate on other issues. This was the objective pursued in the speech by Sonnefeldt, a former employee of the U.S. National Security Council, on the question of regional conflicts. Regional conflicts are truly a very important problem. It is vital to solve this, as Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, a member of the Soviet delegation, stressed. And the Soviet Union is working actively in this direction. The United States, however, believes that armed intervention, the overthrow of regimes which it does not agree with and the formation of an army of mercenaries are permissible.

Today, as during the 2 previous days, the American delegation has been trying to replace constructive debate with unsubstantiated propaganda attacks on our country. But the Soviet people and nearly 300 American guests are here for a serious and fruitful dialogue.

'Points of Contact'

LD182133 Moscow TASS in English 2000 GMT 18 Sep 86

[Excerpt] Jurmala, 18 Sep (TASS)--The closer the current meeting of representatives of the Soviet and U.S. public here draws to a close, the clearer it becomes for its participants that points of contact can and must be sought and found.

John P. Wallach, official spokesman for the U.S. delegation, international editor of the Hearst Newspaper Group, also had to recognize that.

Summing up the first results of the dialogue he pointed out today as its chief result the fact that the sides reached agreement on the need to struggle for disarmament. He said Soviet and American participants acknowledged that the nuclear arms race could lead only to a catastrophe and that this week generated a new hope in them.

Lomeyko on Media's Role

LD181915 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1259 GMT 18 Sep 86

[Text] Jurmala, 18 Sep (TASS) -- "The task of the mass information media is to promote the establishment of as much trust as possible in relations between countries," special envoy Vladimir Lomeyko stated today at the conference of representatives of the public of the USSR and the United States on topical problems of Soviet-U.S. relations, which is now in its 4th day. "Where there is an insufficiency of trust there is an excess of weapons," he stressed when presenting the Soviet point of view at the plenary session devoted to the discussion of the theme of "The Role of the Mass Information Media and Their Importance in Forming Public Opinion."

"In an age of increasing nuclear danger, the greatest moral duty of us all, including journalists, is to seek ways of overcoming suspicion and distrust. It is necessary not only to be able to defend one's own views but also to be willing and able to listen to others."

Vladimir Lomeyko stressed that it is essential to adopt a new way of thinking not only in politics but also in the information sphere. "The mass information media must promote mutual understanding."

"The striving by both sides to understand each other, to get information at first hand can be considered a positive aspect of the Jurmala dialogue. The edifice of cooperation can be built only on the foundation of mutual respect. This is the only way in which we will be able to solve the difficult problems facing us and, primarily, the ending of the arms race."

"Despite the provocative hullabaloo raised by those who are trying to cause a quarrel between our two peoples," Vladimir Lomeyko said, "we should not lose heart and should not reply in kind. We should seek out in each other the good things which unite us, and not what separates us."

"Those who accuse us of totalitarianism while at the same time singing the praises of the atom bomb, those who consider it permissible to use nuclear weapons allegedly in defense of their democracy, are in fact turning the whole situation upside down. This democracy is threatened only by the force of militarism. Under cover of the right to unlimited freedom, some people are demanding freedom for the propaganda of militarism," Vladimir Lomeyko said.

17 Sep Commentary

PM191117 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition) in Russian 17 Sep 86 p 4

[Report by Ye. Vostrukhov, A. Itskov, and A. Shalnev: "Reality Versus Fantasy"]

[Excerpts] Jurmala--Let us dream a little. Imagine we are in the year 2000. Soviet and American specialists are working together--from the heart of the earth to outer space:

Geophysicists have developed a sophisticated method to forecast earthquakes and preparations are in progress for a manned space flight to Mars. Reciprocal tourism is flourishing. Joint demonstrations are organized, against the arms race in particular....

Stop! But why will demonstrations against the arms race be needed even at the beginning of the third millennium? Surely it will have been ended by then? Who is the author of this fantasy, in which these rosy prospects are blackened with hopelessness in the struggle against the threat of nuclear catastrophe?

The author is Mark Palmer, until recently one of the leaders of the section in the U.S. State Department concerned with the Soviet Union, and now U.S. ambassador to Hungary. These fantasies are from the report he delivered at a meeting of representatives of the Soviet and American public currently in progress.

So will it really be impossible to end the nuclear threat even by the year 2000? Surely we will not still only be "putting forward initiatives aimed at disarmament" in 2000, as Palmer imagines?

A considerable number of questions on this score were put to the American ambassador, but there was no answer forthcoming either from him or from J. Matlock, another of the Washington administration's official representatives taking part in the meeting. As Matlock "explained," he would, of course, like to be more specific but, he said, there was not enough time.

But the very fact that American doctors and pensioners, teachers and journalists, employees and scientists came here, the very fact that they took an active part in the discussions, attests to the deep concern felt by a number of Americans for the fate of peace.

Also concerned is (R. Grem). Having spent almost half his life, as he said, "in government service," including service connected with the creation of weapons, he said, turning to one of the high-ranking figures from the Washington administration: "You claim that no one wants an arms reduction more than the U.S. Government. This claim is false. The people of America want this far more. I believe that Washington's 'star wars' program and your persistent continuation of nuclear test run counter to the interests of arms control and the interests of the American people."

Washington's stubborn reluctance to reach agreement on renouncing the use of force as means of resolving international problems also runs counter to all this. The same Matlock said a great deal on the subject of how Washington supposedly loathes using force, but when he was asked whether the United States is ready to support a corresponding resolution in the United Nations the answer was both immediate and categorical: "No!"

The discussions of the first day of the meeting revealed a mutual interest in further developing relations between the two largest world powers. But whereas the American side proceeds from the belief that such improvement will not come before the next century, the participants in the discussion on the Soviet side unanimously indicated that the improvement in Soviet-American relations must begin today.

U.S. Stance Scored

PM231127 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition) in Russian 18 Sep 86 p 5

[Report by own correspondents Ye. Vostrukhov, A. Itskov, and A. Shalnev: "At the Meeting of the Soviet and American Public in Jurmala: It Is Necessary To Disarm -- There Is No Alternative"]

[Text] Jurmala -- The latest day of the meeting was marked by recognition of an alarming fact: The first consignment of MX ICBM's are already on standby alert [na boyevom dezhurstve], and the U.S. Congress is not even aware of it. This was established during debates on arms control questions.

"The United States has not yet begun deploying the new MX missiles," maintained S. Talbott, major political scientist and expert on military issues, as illustration of Washington's "restraint."

"That is not true," objected Colonel General N.F. Chervov. "The first missiles are already on standby alert."

"That can't be true," said S. Talbott, clearly taken aback, "Congress at any rate knows nothing about it."

"That means the Pentagon has sidestepped Congress. Make enquiries at the Pentagon."

A high-ranking administration official, observing this dialogue, preferred to remain silent, and no refutation of it followed...

That dialogue was characteristic of the whole discussion of ways of curbing the arms race. On the one hand, the Soviet delegation's well-defined and clear stance, backed up by concrete facts. On the other, attempts to foist on the meeting's participants a conception of the present situation in the arms control sphere based on a suppression or deliberate distortion of the existing realities.

And the realities are specifically, as Soviet representatives reminded people, that in the comparatively recent period -- just prior and subsequent to the Geneva summit -- the USSR had unilaterally suspended the siting of medium-range missiles in Europe, taken some SS-20 missiles off standby alert, extended its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions four times, put forward compromise proposals at the talks in Geneva, Vienna, and Stockholm which meet the United States and NATO countries halfway, and advanced a realistic program to eliminate nuclear weapons by the end of the century.

As for the United States, it is curious that among the list of "initiatives" cited by U.S. representatives the proposal by Washington... "to talk with the Soviet Union about nuclear tests" was probably the most "radical." But if you talk about the U.S. stance at the arms control talks, then, as Col Gen N.F. Chervov observed, "the arms race is programmed into that very stance." However, he continued, there is only one option today: "The nuclear arms race must be stopped and a solution to confrontation sought. There is no other alternative, for that would mean a race toward nuclear catastrophe."

Leon (Makadden), an artist from California, perhaps summed up most clearly the opinion of many American participants in the meeting. "Surely," he asked, "it is impossible to return to the arms race? We must talk not about parity in armaments but in more general terms about the elimination of armaments!"

Incidentally, official U.S. representatives also spoke quite a lot about the need for disarmament. Only almost every statement of theirs on that score was accompanied by numerous "ifs," "buts," and "it is difficult." The problem of monitoring and verifying [proverka i kontrol] agreements was, for example, again raised as if it were some kind of almost insuperable obstacle to removing the nuclear danger. Again the problem of verification [kontrol] But even if the United States considers national means of verification [kontrol] "inadequate" and is not satisfied by the reliability of on-site inspection [inspektsiya], then, as a middle-aged American woman suggested, could intermediaries from third countries help resolve the problem? It is well known that such assistance was offered by the leaders of the "Delhi Six."

The official U.S. representatives' response was just to shrug their shoulders, hinting at their misgivings about the competence of third countries.

Nor did what Washington's envoys had to say about the "Star Wars" program spring any surprises. Avoiding a businesslike examination of the problems of banning space strike arms, they clearly intimated that instead of preventing an arms race in space, on which agreement was reached at the Soviet-U.S. Geneva summit, Washington would like to draft and ratify "rules" for conducting such a race.

But the Washington administration is not the whole American people, who -- as was shown once again by the statements made by ordinary members of the U.S. delegation -- are distinguished by reason and realism.

'Conversation' With Wallach, Zhurkin

LD191900 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1115 GMT 19 Sep 86

[Conversation with John Wallach, member of U.S. delegation to Jurmala meeting, and Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, first deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Soviet delegate at the debates, by "special correspondent" Andrey Ptashnikov; Wallach comments recorded in English fading into Russian translation read by Ptashnikov; slantlines indicate portions audible in English that differ from Russian translation -- date not given]

[Excerpts] [Ptashnikov] Mr Wallach, in their speeches all members of the U.S. official delegation have had extremely negative attitudes toward the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions. But at the same time, representatives of the U.S. public who are present at the conference in Jurmala, in their pronouncements and interviews by and large support this moratorium. How would you explain that?

[Wallach] Clearly, in our country there are people who support the moratorium and there are people who are opposed to it. I would prefer to see more serious negotiations at the negotiated....It is absolutely clear that there are people in the United States who support the moratorium on nuclear tests. But there are also those who speak against it. As far as I am concerned, John Wallach says, I am in favor of more serious and fruitful talks between our countries on various issues of bilateral relations, and first and foremost on the issues of curbing the arms race. Naturally, the moratorium is a very serious thing, but from the viewpoint of the U.S. Government, which I share, it is only the Soviet side that profits from it, since the USSR has already conducted all the tests it needs at present, but the United States has not yet managed to do that. Thus, the Soviet Union is striving to maintain its superiority in this field. Apart from that, the tests are needed for conducting checks on the weapons systems that have been stockpiled. But still I repeat that there is considerable support for the Soviet moratorium in the United States.

[Ptashnikov] And the last question, Mr Wallach. What is, in your view, the most significant thing about the Jurmala conference?

[Wallach] I think that this is a very major step forward, because this represents a new opening for both sides. It represents... I think that this conference is a step forward, because it has offered another opportunity for both sides to discuss various aspects of relations between them. It has enabled the representatives of the U.S. and Soviet public, and that is of special importance, to take part in a direct dialogue with each other and also to have discussions with official representatives of the USSR and the United States. And those representatives themselves have come to know each other better, because they have been spending a great deal of time together, both during their working hours and during their free time. I hope that that contact to a certain extent, no matter how little it might be, will help the cause of improving Soviet-U.S. relations. We hope that simultaneously with the process of halting the arms race, the process of expanding contacts between the peoples of our countries will also take place.

[Ptashnikov] Well, one can hardly fail to join Mr Wallach in wishing that. But quite a lot of what he said before that, clearly calls for not only an explanation, but for a direct answer as well.

In the course of the conference, in speeches by U.S. delegates, the thesis on the moratorium declared by our country, the moratorium we have already extended four times, being allegedly suitable only to the Soviet Union kept resounding. Why? Because the Soviet Union seeks to consolidate its military edge.

[Ptashnikov] The same view has just been expressed by Mr Wallach. What can you say to that?

[Zhurkin] Well, above all, that is complete nonsense. That is amazing. By the way, it was also noticeable at this discussion. We present figures, we give facts that reinforce our position, that reveal the incorrectness of the U.S. position. The Americans nod thus, very politely, then another person stands up and again repeats the same U.S. position. It has been said a hundred times over that the Americans carried out a little more than 500. How can you talk in such circumstances? They say no, over the last 5 or 10 years the Soviet Union has carried out more blasts. Well, this is some kind of predictability with the Americans -- it is an adherence to certain established cliches, and a reluctance to listen to the arguments of the other side, or somehow to answer arguments with arguments, and not simply with unsubstantiated affirmations.

It emerged perfectly clearly in this approach to nuclear tests: When facts, data are cited to them, they cannot reject a single fact, not a single figure, but they simply say: No, the Soviet Union has gotten ahead, and that is that. And in general, that is very typical of the current U.S. position, and it is also typical of the propaganda line of the present U.S. Administration.

[Ptashnikov] Victor Ivanovich, I would like to ask you to draw preliminary conclusions about the conference.

[Zhurkin] You know, if one attempts to draw this conclusion, I would like to say that first of all this was, of course, a sharp and frank talk between the representatives of the two sides, and secondly, this talk brought to light not only the Americans' unbelievable lack of information about our country's policy, about the Soviet peace initiatives, possessed not by all, but by many of the Americans, but at the same time, hard-line positions were formulated in the speeches of the official U.S. representatives, of the government representatives. Also, on the whole, they set out fairly frankly the main trends in the behavior of this administration, a line that has led to an aggravation of Soviet-U.S. relations, a line that leads to an increased threat of military conflict.

Meeting Ends

LD191035 Moscow TASS in English 1022 GMT 19 Sep 86

[Text] Riga September 19 TASS -- Many participants in the meeting of the Soviet and U.S. Public called it fruitful and important. Today the bilateral dialogue on a broad range of problems determining relations between the Soviet and U.S. peoples ended in the resort city of Jurmala (Soviet Latvia).

Arms Race, Regional Conflicts

LD192010 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1445 GMT 19 Sep 86

[Yu. Rostov report from Jurmala, with recorded comments from participants; date not given]

[Excerpt] [Rostov] Here in Jurmala, the sharpest discussion took place on the question of ending the arms race. There was a struggle between two approaches: the aspiration to move the question past its standstill and an approach that combined eloquent generatories with unfounded attacks against the opposing side. The floor is given to Strobe Talbott head of TIME magazine bureau.

[Talbott, in English fading into superimposed Russian translation] The important, and most hopeful thing in this field is the attempt to curb competition in the field of nuclear arms.

[Rostov] Talbott admitted, actually, that the United States was not consistent in this field. How is this explained?

[Talbott] One explanation is that the Americans have found it very difficult to accept the idea of equality, parity in nuclear arms between the Soviet Union and their own country. This is to be explained not only by the fact that the Americans feel nostalgia for the good old days when they had a monopoly, and even superiority over the Soviet Union. It is also to be explained by the fact that many Americans, who are ready in theory to agree with parity with the Soviet Union and live with this parity, these Americans are concerned about what today's Soviet Union has done, is doing, and will do with this parity which it has reached over the past several decades.

[Rostov] In fact, in Talbott's opinion this is not even parity, but Soviet superiority.

[Talbott] The Soviet Union has a superiority of about three to one in land-based ballistic missiles.

[Rostov] Then Talbott, while admitting that there might be some claims against the Reagan administration in the field of the arms race, for B-1 bombers, Trident submarines, or cruise missiles, claimed that such super destructive missiles as the MX are not even sited [razmeshchayutsya] in silos, and are quite unlikely to be sited. And what do they think in Washington about one of the most important questions, the end of nuclear explosions?

[Talbott] The Soviet Union announced its moratorium at a time when this moratorium was much less advantageous to the Americans. Therefore, I must say that the moratorium is not a realistic proposal, and therefore all this naturally applies to the talks currently underway in Geneva on the subject of nuclear space weapons.

[Rostov] And more arms' race propaganda. In space, on earth, propaganda for more and more destructive systems allegedly designed to strengthen stability. Another assertion that the United States is falling behind the Soviet Union in the military arena. Comrade Chervov, member of the Soviet delegation, spoke in reply.

[Chervov] The problem of disarmament is, of course, a complicated one but not so difficult that one cannot manage to grasp it. So much nuclear weaponry has been accumulated in the world today that if it is put into operation it is possible to annihilate everything living on earth many times over. But the arms race is continuing, it threatens to spread into space. No matter how you look at the problem there is just one choice. It is necessary to stop the nuclear arms race, to seek a way out from confrontation.

Esteemed Mr Talbott is not being entirely candid when he says that the USSR has three times as many land-based missiles but says absolutely nothing about the United States having three times as many sea-based missiles. He says absolutely nothing about the United States having several times more heavy bombers and cruise missiles. It turns out that when they look at our missiles their jaws drop but they notice absolutely nothing about what is happening back in the United States.

The establishment of a ban on nuclear tests is the most realistic way of achieving an end to the arms race. Without tests it is impossible to improve — to improve or create [sozdavat] — new types of nuclear weapons. If we, together with the United States, were to reach agreement on ending nuclear explosions this would allow the impasse to be overcome in the whole process of nuclear disarmament. The Soviet course of ending the arms race is not meeting with support from the U.S. Administration. The United States does not wish to end nuclear explosions and continues testing with the aim of creating [sozdaniye] new nuclear armaments.

At the same time, they are trying to cover up their militaristic position by various kinds of inventions. For example, for a long time the U.S. Administration hid behind the problem of monitoring [kontrol] which it had invented. They alleged that the Russians did not agree to monitoring [kontrol] and therefore there was nothing to reach agreement with them about. After the USSR stated that there was no problem of monitoring — we agree to any form of monitoring, including international, including on the spot inspection — it became clear that the leading circles of Washington were simply lying. Now, they have been forced to state openly that they are not prepared to renounce the arms race and for that reason are going to continue nuclear tests. And this is happening at the same time when the United States has carried out more nuclear explosions than all the nuclear powers put together.

Therefore, those who speak about some sort of lagging behind by the United States in nuclear testing in reality would like to retain for the United States the opportunity to create [sozdaniye] new types of nuclear weapons and thus to continue the arms race. The true reason for the U.S. Administration's unwillingness to renounce nuclear explosions lies in Washington's striving to destroy the existing balance of forces to its advantage. This is the aim of the program of creating [sozdaniye] new types of weapons, the MX strategic missiles — some of which are already on combat duty, by the way, Mr Talbott, and you say that they are somewhere far away; you do not know the real state of affairs in your own country. [applause]

Moreover, new Trident-2 missiles are being created [sozdatsya] as well as nuclear warheads for Midgetman missiles and also nuclear charges for strike space means according to the star wars plan. There are simply no other reasons.

Allow me to conclude my speech with the words of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. In his interview to RUDE PRAVO, he said: I would like to believe in the wisdom, realism, and elementary feelings of self-preservation of the American people. Our two peoples must cooperate and not be at odds with each other, be friendly and not fight. I appeal for this once again.

Blokhin: Meeting 'Useful'

LD200150 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 19 Sep 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by station correspondent Yu. Rostov from meeting of representatives of U.S. and Soviet public in Jurmala, Latvia]

[Excerpt] [Rostov] Unfortunately, however, the discussions also have confirmed the fact that very influential forces in the United States do not want an honest and direct dialogue between the two countries and in particular, a dialogue on issues such as curbing the arms race and creating a climate of trust. And so, members of the Republican Administration, or political figures close in outlook to official Washington, have by no means furthered the creation of an atmosphere of good will at the meeting. Two trends, two political orientations fought at the conference: a course built upon a distorted view of the world seen through the prism of the confrontation of force, and the course which is concerned with the world and the preservation of the lives of millions of people. [video shows various speakers at rostrum and being interviewed, then Academician N.N. Blokhin, captioned as head of Soviet delegation, is interviewed to camera in foyer]

[Begin Blokhin recording] Representatives of official America attempted firmly to insist upon those stances which the U.S. Government is implementing, and they sometimes even allowed themselves, I would say, violations of tact in relation to the republic in which they met with us today. I believe that this meeting was useful on the whole, and I believe that it will serve to further develop mutual dialogue, and will play a definite role in the development of our relations. [end recording]

Graham: Americans Want Disarmament

LD192136 Moscow TASS in English 2000 GMT 19 Sep 86

[Text] Jurmala September 19 TASS -- Richard Graham, an American, told journalists after the completion of the meeting of Soviet and American public figures here today, that he arrived in Jurmala to bring it home to Soviet people that not all Americans share the point of view of the current U.S. Administration concerning the "star wars" programme.

During the free debate he wished to put a question to Jack Matlock, head of the official U.S. delegation, special assistant to the President for national security affairs, who proclaimed from the conference rostrum that nobody wants disarmament more than the United States Government.

This is not true, Richard Graham told him. The American people want disarmament more than the American Government does. Is it that Mr Matlock had failed to notice that at the 27th CPSU Congress it was stated for the whole world to hear about the USSR's peaceableness. Where is your answer to this?

Graham said that he himself was at one time a member of the United States Government, took part in the programme for developing cruise missiles. He said that his knowledge allowed him to make conclusions today about the danger looming large over all -- the members of government and ordinary people -- if they do not stop on the brink that separates the world from annihilation. There are public opinion polls, strong anti-war and anti-nuclear stands held by United States scientists. He said that all this gave him grounds to believe that the majority of Americans stand for disarmament.

Graham has failed to receive a direct answer to the question he put to Mr Matlock. It is not hard to guess why. The United States Administration, contrary to common sense, continues to reject Soviet ideas of disarmament and universal moratorium on nuclear tests.

Lomeyko: 'Approaching Nuclear Catastrophe'

PM261333 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKSYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Sep 86 p 3

[Report by own special correspondents A. Novikov and Yu. Sagaydak: "Considering the Main Thing"]

[Excerpt] The conference of representatives of the USSR and U.S. public on topical questions of Soviet-American relations has concluded in Jurmala.

"We must consider together whether it is possible to have new thinking not only in politics but also in the information sphere. And whether it can be done in such a way that the mass media help establish mutual understanding and generate an atmosphere of peace and confidence," USSR special envoy V.B. Lomeyko told a plenary session. "The presence of nuclear weapons has made the arms race senseless, since there can be no victor in the nuclear age. But it continues nevertheless, and mankind is gradually approaching nuclear catastrophe. We can be committed to different views, but we can only survive or perish together. Unfortunately, not all journalists are fully appreciative of their responsibility to the peoples."

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR LEADERS DISCUSS ISSUES WITH VISITING MADAGASCAR CHIEF

Chief Confers With Gromyko

PM291501 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 26 Sep 86 pp 1, 4

[TASS report: "Soviet-Malagasy Talks"]

[Excerpts]

Talks were held in the Kremlin 24 September between A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Didier Ratsiraka, general secretary of the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution [AREMA] Party and president of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar.

Taking part in the talks were:

On the Soviet side -- A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; S.B. Tatliyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; B.I. Aristov, USSR minister of foreign trade; K.F. Katushev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations; L.F. Ilichev, USSR deputy foreign minister; and P.P. Petrik, USSR ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Madagascar;

On the Malagasy side -- Jean Bemananjara, Democratic Republic of Madagascar foreign minister; Gisele Rabesahala, Democratic Republic of Madagascar minister of revolutionary art and culture; Pascal Rakotomavo, Democratic Republic of Madagascar minister of finance and economy; Victor Ramahatra, Democratic Republic of Madagascar minister of public works; Jose Rakotomavo, Democratic Republic of Madagascar minister of industry, energy, and mining; Joseph Randrianasolo, Democratic Republic of Madagascar minister of animal husbandry, fisheries, forest and water resources; Maxime Zafera, director of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar President's Civil Office; Jean Robiarivuni, Democratic Republic of Madagascar general director for planning question; Richard Fandriamahuli, governor of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar Central Bank; and Frederic Randriamamonjy, Democratic Republic of Madagascar ambassador to the USSR.

Extensive exchange of opinions on fundamental problems of international life took place during the talks.

Both sides expressed serious concern with the tension in the world caused by the policy of the aggressive forces of imperialism and their course of whipping up the arms race

and transferring it into space, of fanning conflict situations in different regions. The participants in the talks declared that the main task in our time is to prevent a nuclear catastrophe.

The Soviet side drew the high-ranking guest's attention to the large-scale Soviet peace initiatives, whose goal is the elimination of the threat of nuclear war from mankind's life, the stage-by-stage reduction and ultimate liquidation of the arsenals of deadly weapons, and the radical improvement of the international situation. These initiatives were put forward in the 27th CPSU Congress decisions and the statements by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. D. Ratsiraka, having emphasized the Democratic Republic of Madagascar's commitment to a policy of peace and disarmament, declared his country's support for the Soviet Union's peace initiatives and the program for the liquidation of nuclear weapons by the end of this century. The Soviet Union's decision to extend the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions through 1 January 1987 was described by the president of Madagascar as a bold and responsible step in the interests of strengthening international security, which must be joined by the United States and the other nuclear powers.

The Soviet side emphasized that the realities of the nuclear and space age persistently dictate the necessity of creating an all-embracing system of international peace and security. Having emphasized that peace can be preserved and strengthened only as a result of joint efforts by all states, be they large or small, both sides spoke out in favor of a constructive dialogue on this proposal being held at the United Nations.

The participants in the talks, having pointed out the interconnection between disarmament and development, noted the persistent need to switch the funds being presently expended for military purposes to the needs of development.

D. Ratsiraka spoke of Madagascar's proposal to establish special funds of nonaligned states, with whose help developing countries would be able to oppose more effectively the neocolonialist economic pressure and blackmail by imperialist powers.

Both sides emphasized that the successful solution of topical international problems depends to a considerable extent on the further strengthening of the unity and cohesion of all progressive anti-imperialist states and their ability to effectively oppose the forces of aggression and militarism. The Nonaligned Movement's activity to improve the international situation was highly appraised.

The Soviet Union's firm support for the UN General Assembly's resolution on the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace was declared. Both sides confirmed their readiness to work for the convening of an international conference on this question not later than in 1988.

Talks With Gorbachev

LD261220 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 26 Sep 86

[Excerpts] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received today in the Kremlin Didier Ratsiraka, general secretary of the Vanguard Party of the Malagasy Revolution and president of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar.

A conversation was held in an atmosphere of comradely sincerity and mutual understanding. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev informed the eminent guest of the work being carried out in the Soviet Union to implement the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the party's strategic directives to accelerate the country's socioeconomic development. He stressed the close connection between the CPSU's domestic policy and its peace-loving foreign-policy course.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Didier Ratsiraka exchanged opinions on a number of topical international problems. It was unanimously noted that there is no more urgent task in the world today than the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons, eliminating the danger of a world catastrophe, and ending the arms race, which is so ruinous for all mankind.

The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized the importance of ending nuclear tests as a first, true step toward averting the nuclear threat. The president of Madagascar welcomed the Soviet Union's extension of its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, and noted that if the United States and the other nuclear powers joined in this step it would play an important role in reducing tension in the world, which meets the vital interests of all countries and peoples. The Soviet Union's peace initiatives strengthen peoples' hopes that the situation can be changed and that there are accessible, real alternatives to confrontation.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Didier Ratsiraka agreed that the realities of the present epoch urgently require from all countries and political leaders a new thinking that excludes from international relations the placing of stakes on force and nuclear blackmail and attempts to dictate one's will on sovereign states. An example of a new approach to world problems is the proposal to create an all-embracing system of international peace and security, which has been put forward by the countries of the socialist community for examination by the United Nations.

The leaders of the two countries resolutely condemned the star wars plans, stressing that their implementation would increase the threat of self-destruction of present-day civilization.

The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the president of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar expressed the conviction that the problems of development and the liquidation of poverty and backwardness are inseparable from ending the arms race and achieving disarmament, which would release considerable funds and intellectual and technical potential for the needs of development.

Gromyko Speech

PM261413 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 26 Sep 86 p 4

[TASS account of speech by A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, at 24 September Moscow dinner in honor of Didier Ratsiraka, general secretary of the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution Party and president of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar: "In a Friendly Atmosphere"]

[Excerpts] It is a pleasure for me, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, to welcome the leader of friendly Madagascar and the persons accompanying him here in the Kremlin. You are always a welcome guest, Comrade Ratsiraka.

Our party's 27th Congress set the Soviet people creative tasks which are historical in scope. It is on their fulfillment, rather than on the arms race, that we want to focus our country's entire intellectual and economic potential.

Certain people in the U.S. Administration try to convince the world that the extension of the arms race to space will render the use of nuclear weapons impossible and that states will gain greater confidence in their security.

To put it bluntly, this does not contain the tiniest hint of peacemaking. Almost a century ago the colonizer and butcher Cecil Rhodes, whose name is linked with quite a few blood-soaked pages of African history, also had dreams about outer space. "What a pity," he wrote, "that we cannot get to the stars. I would annex planets if I could." It is possible that somewhat similar dreams are cherished by today's neocolonialists who have not learned the lessons of history.

Silence is reigning at the Soviet Union's nuclear test sites for the second year in succession.

We call on the United States to join the moratorium on nuclear tests which we have extended on four occasions already. We propose that we raise jointly a material barrier across the path of further buildups of nuclear weapons. Evidence of this can be seen in the USSR's large-scale proposals for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the start of the next century put forward in the 15 January statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The Soviet Union's proposals on the elimination of nuclear weapons have made an enormous impression on the world. The peoples understand that a world saturated with nuclear weapons poses a danger for the fate of all mankind. It is therefore not surprising that the proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons have generated a wide response in the world and have given people even greater confidence that the threat of catastrophe hanging over mankind can be averted if an active struggle is waged for this purpose. The Soviet Union calls on all nuclear powers to embark seriously and with the utmost responsibility on an examination of these proposals.

As for the question of nuclear tests and our moratorium on them, some NATO states make statements to the following effect: Yes, the Soviet moratorium sets a good example. There is, however, a shortage of just one thing -- trust among countries.

We have repeatedly declared that we are prepared to embark on broad and convincing verification [kontrol] measures, including the creation of international verification [kontrol] of the termination of nuclear tests. And this is known to the whole world. We are prepared to give the status of an intergovernmental accord to the agreement between Soviet and U.S. scientists regarding the installation of instruments at nuclear test sites to check [proverka] the observance of the moratorium by both countries.

But the international situation cannot be normalized just by means of verification [kontrol] measures. Effective measures are needed for the restructuring of interstate relations. The world must be safe for all countries.

Proposals to create an all-embracing system of international security were contained in the Political Report delivered by M.S. Gorbachev at our Party's 27th Congress. These proposals have become the focus of attention by the international public.

The socialist countries submitted a proposal for laying the foundations of an all-embracing system of peace and security for examination by the 41st UN General Assembly session. They want to achieve a sharp turnabout away from confrontation and

military antagonism toward detente and cooperation. The fruitful completion of the Stockholm conference confirms that even highly complex international problems can and must be solved by political means.

The socialist community countries advocate that all UN member countries treat the UN Charter with profound responsibility for the fate of mankind. We perceive a place for participation by both large and small countries in the system of international relations.

As an Indian Ocean state, Madagascar desires security in that region. You have declared this repeatedly. The Soviet Union advocates that the Indian Ocean be turned into a zone of peace, with no room for the alien presence of naval units from states whose coasts are not washed by the waters of this ocean.

For the purpose of contributing to the speediest convening and successful holding of an international conference on the Indian Ocean we are prepared to reach agreement with the United States and other major naval powers on freezing and substantially reducing all military activity in that ocean's waters.

Madagascar is an active member of the Nonaligned Movement. This movement's summit forum, held recently in Harare, declared that in our time the alternative is not between war and peace but between life and death. The prevention of nuclear war has become the main task of our time. Having quoted these words from the Harare Appeal, I want to emphasize that people in the Soviet Union have given attention to this impassioned call. It was issued by more than 100 states in the world. It is also in harmony with the Soviet people's mood. Comrade President! There is no doubt that the results of your visit to our country will give a new fillip to the long-term development of friendly cooperation between the Soviet Union and Madagascar. In conclusion A.A. Gromyko proposed a toast in honor of President D. Ratsiraka and all guests, for the further strengthening of Soviet-Malagasy friendship, and for peace and security on earth.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS COMMENTARY ON NUCLEAR WAR PREVENTION ACCORD ANNIVERSARY

LD301201 Moscow TASS in English 1136 GMT 30 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 30 TASS -- By TASS commentator Vladimir Mostovets:

The agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war is among the major Soviet-American documents laying the groundwork for relations between the two countries, that were signed in the early seventies.

The agreement, concluded in Washington on September 30, 1971, obliges both sides to continue the implementation and perfection -- in the way they will find it necessary -- of organizational and technical measures to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their control.

The significance of the Soviet-American agreement of unlimited duration has grown even more in the eighties when, through the fault of the U.S. Administration, the world situation has noticeably aggravated and the nuclear arms race is threatening to break out of control and spread to outer space.

The agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war was signed during the period of detente. That period saw the conclusion of several major treaties directed at curbing the arms race and improving the overall climate in international relations.

The Soviet Union, living up to the letter and spirit of the accords, has been persistently pursuing ever since the policy aimed at strengthening peace and diminishing the danger of nuclear war. It has advanced dozens of peace initiatives. The programme for stage-by-stage abolition of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass annihilation by the turn of the century, advanced by the USSR in January 1986; became an important step toward preserving peace on earth.

The USSR has been observing its self-imposed moratorium on all nuclear blasts for more than a year. It expects that the United States will heed the demands of the world public and follow its example.

Such demands are openly rejected in Washington. The U.S. is stubbornly following the course towards an unrestrained arms race, militarization of outer space and heightening of world tension. Moreover, the current American Administration has not only cursed detente, by regarding nearly all positive accomplishments of the seventies as a "concession" to the USSR and a sign of "weakness" on the part of the U.S., but has also undertaken a dangerous step in disrupting the system of treaties that have kept in

check the nuclear arms race. This is how one can assess President Reagan's decision to break out of the Soviet-American legal documents limiting strategic offensive weapons -- the 1972 interim agreement and the 1979 SALT-2 Treaty.

This amounts to an attempt to disrupt the military parity between the USSR and the United States, which is the basis of strategic stability worldwide. In a bid to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union, the United States has launched an unrestricted arms race.

The importance of the agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States, concluded 15 years ago, lies not only in the fact that it provides for concrete measures to prevent incidents that might escalate into a nuclear catastrophe. The agreement is an integral element of the series of historic accords reached between the USSR and the United States after lengthy and difficult talks in the seventies, which created the groundwork for future more drastic cuts in armaments, for the establishment of trust between nations and improvement of the international situation on the whole.

Rejecting the significance of the accords and burying detente in oblivion is tantamount to crossing out all achievements in the field of arms control and undermining the efforts to maintaining peace and averting the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA WEEKLY REVIEW: UN SPEECHES, SUMMIT, CDE

PM301137 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 28 Sep 86 p 4

[Yuriy Zhukov "International Review"]

[Excerpt]

Last week was full of events which mirrored the complex and contradictory nature of the present international situation.

People everywhere hailed the great success achieved in the struggle to strengthen peace as a result of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The agreement elaborated there represents a major step toward easing tension and improving the international climate. The measures to strengthen international cooperation in the sphere of nuclear and radiation safety, agreed upon as a result of the special session of the IAEA General Conference, are also of great significance.

At the same time, the alarm created by the fact that during the lengthy Soviet-U.S. talks devoted to the problem of ending the arms race all the Soviet side's efforts to achieve specific results are foundering on its partners' reluctance to seek mutually acceptable accords has increased everywhere these days. The matter is reaching the point where a legitimate question arises: Is the American leadership at all ready for such accords, and does it in fact want them?

This week people everywhere have shown a lively interest in the course of the talks between responsible Soviet and U.S. figures that have taken place in Washington and New York. These talks have been conceived as one of the decisive stages in the work on organizing a new meeting of the two countries' top leaders -- a meeting which could be effective and significant in terms of its practical results, primarily in the sphere of curbing the arms race.

At the same time, new public statements by the U.S. President abounding in deliberate distortions of USSR policy and confirming that the present American Administration is guided by anti-Soviet stereotypes in its assessments have given rise to disappointment and an active protest in broad public circles.

In the complex international situation our socialist power is continuing its great peace offensive in accordance with the plan elaborated by the 27th Party Congress. I have in mind, in particular, the USSR delegation's active participation in the work of the 41st UN General Assembly Session in New York.

Two Philosophies [subhead]

As already reported, U.S. President R. Reagan delivered a speech at the General Assembly session last Monday. E. A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, mounted its rostrum Tuesday. Both those speeches are now being commented on widely throughout the world. On comparing them, people everywhere say that what we see here are two diametrically opposed approaches to the burning problems of the development of international relations in the nuclear age -- two philosophies of world politics.

Even though he frequently repeats that nuclear weapons must not be used and nuclear war should not be waged, the leader of the greatest capitalist power is in fact guided by the unrealistic idea that the new, sophisticated technology of war can reliably ensure security. Precisely this philosophy gave rise to the crazy nuclear arms race, which has already swallowed more than \$1 trillion but has not only not strengthened U.S. security but, on the contrary, has weakened it.

Following the President, on Tuesday C. Weinberger, the bellicose U.S. defense secretary, unceremoniously demonstrated the worth of the U.S. leadership's hypocritical phrases about its imaginary desire to reduce nuclear arms. He sent Congress an open letter anathematizing the House of Representatives' recent proposal to ban all nuclear tests with a yield of less than 1 kiloton -- "particularly," he emphasized, "in conjunction with a number of other amendments to the draft law on appropriations for the Defense Department's needs." Weinberger, you see, does not like any restrictions at all. Give him total freedom of action. He must be permitted everything. Even though the overwhelming majority of Americans now advocate an end to the arms race, he demanded its continuation, while on the same day the president, his patron, publicly threatened to veto the Congress decision if it dares to reduce military spending.

In his speech at the General Assembly session the representative of the greatest socialist power proceeded from the directly opposite principle elaborated by the 27th Party Congress: In our time there is just one road to security -- to destroy existing arms and not replace them with new ones. We cannot allow policy to be dictated by the technology of mankind's destruction!

The participants in the General Assembly session were struck by the fact that the U.S. President, who addressed them, either kept quiet about the USSR's constructive proposals or presented them in a distorted light. Having violated the confidentiality of correspondence at the highest level, he deemed it possible to embroider the American position on these issues, expounding the contents of his 25 July letter to M.S. Gorbachev, while at the same time keeping quiet about the substance of the Soviet proposals. Well, the Soviet side had to fill in that gap at a press conference last Wednesday.

The USSR counters the total political permissiveness preached and practised by the leaders of the U.S. Administration with political responsibility which accords with the new thinking dictated by the realities of the nuclear age. And the course of the debate at the General Assembly session shows that this constructive Soviet position meets with the broadest support.

Special interest is aroused there by the idea proposed by the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries of creating an all-embracing system of international security providing for the assertion of the principles of civilized and correct interstate contacts backed up by proper international material guarantees. This idea is gaining more and more supporters.

Considerations of political responsibility also dictate the Soviet Union's approach to solving the question of a new Soviet-American summit meeting. It could undoubtedly be of great significance if accords on several important issues are reached there -- accords that can curb the arms race and facilitate international cooperation.

But this is what is striking: As the facts show, whenever the door on the path to the normalization of Soviet-American relations is opened slightly, the forces opposed to this at once endeavor to slam it shut.

This was the case when Powers, the CIA pilot, was sent into USSR airspace in a spy plane to wreck the incipient thaw in Soviet-American relations. This was also the case when the provocation was carried out involving the South Korean passenger aircraft sent into the region of Kamchatka and Sakhalin, once again for espionage purposes. And this has been the case now, when, on the eve of crucial talks in Washington and New York, the absolutely illegal decision to expel 25 employees of the Soviet UN Mission from the United States was loudly and noisily announced, while at the same time an incredible ballyhoo was raised over the arrest in Moscow of an America spy caught red-handed, whom the United States portrays as an innocent lamb who has supposedly been made a "hostage."

THE NEW YORK TIMES acknowledged the provocative nature of these actions last Tuesday. This is what it wrote: "Many specialists said that E.A. Shevardnadze would not even come to Washington after we had ordered (!) the expulsion of 25 Russians from New York." And THE NEW YORK TIMES went on to specify that those words came from a State Department spokesman.

But the gamble that the Soviet people would lose their nerve and he would break off the dialogue failed. "It is our principle," M.S. Gorbachev said in this regard during one of his meetings with working people on his tour of the Kuban and Stavropol Kray, "to pursue a firm policy and defend the principles of which I have spoken, but to do so constructively. It is necessary to show restraint. And restraint is not softness. Let them rush about.... We cannot be provoked."

Restraint, patience, principledness, and staunchness in defending the cause of peace are yielding their fruits. However hard it is to work with some of our obstinate partners, the USSR is making progress step by step, waging its peace offensive. And the first glimmers of light are appearing on the world's horizon.

Victory for Common Sense [subhead]

An example of this is provided by the successful results of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which lasted 2 years and 8 months and ended in Stockholm Monday.

This is a victory for common sense, the result of efforts and a gain for all the 35 countries which participated in the conference. The Soviet Union sees in the agreement reached the shoots of the new thinking which are pushing up through the European soil.

And yet, how many times the American press predicted failure for the Stockholm conference! For how long the American delegates persisted in refusing pointblank even to discuss, for example, the renunciation of the use or threat of force -- which the representatives of the socialist and a number of European countries advocated. How crudely they rejected all the proposals not only of the socialist but also of other European countries aimed at constructively resolving the tasks facing the conference.

Month after month, year after year an arrogant, categorical "no!" was heard in response to constructive ideas. Even on the eve of the end of the conference, 19 September, THE WASHINGTON POST wrote, referring to statements by R. Barry, head of the American

delegation: "The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe has gotten into an impasse."

But I have before me the bulky final document of the conference. In it there are 104 articles plus 4 appendixes containing a far-reaching program of action -- a detailed package of political measures aimed at reducing the risk of war in Europe and strengthening security and confidence has been agreed upon.

However, concern cannot fail to be aroused by the fact that, hardly had the American delegation returned to Washington, the same bellicose Weinberger at once voiced displeasure with the agreement reached. Reporting this, the CBS-TV Company added that "certain administration spokesmen called the agreement worthless as soon as it had been signed" (?!). And it explained: "Some people say that in this case the White House was interested in the very fact of the document's being signed, and not in its contents." That is the Pentagon's interpretation.

However, you cannot cut away with an ax what has been written with a pen. The agreement exists. The world public will vigilantly follow the fulfillment of the earnest obligations assumed by all the conference participants, including the United States. The very victory of reason and good will, won at the cost of lengthy, persistent, and patient work at the conference, inspires people to new important steps aimed at further developing all-European cooperation in ensuring security.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW: CDE, MBFR, TEST MORATORIUM

LD282120 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 28 Sep 86

["International Observers Round Table" program with Rudolf Georgiyevich Kolchanov, deputy editor in chief of TRUD; Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Lebedev, member of the NOVOYE VREMYA editorial board; and Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zholkver, political observer of Central Television and All-Union Radio]

[Excerpts]

[Zholkver] Hello, comrades. The past week has been marked by many important events in international life. The conference on Confidence Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe has ended in Stockholm and the World Congress of Trade Unions has ended in Berlin. General political discussion has begun at the UN General Assembly session. In addition negotiations have resumed in Vienna for the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and a general conference of the IAEA, was held. Given all the difference in character and agenda, these major international forums have one thing in common in my view: in Vienna and in New York, and particularly in Berlin and Stockholm, the shoots of a new political thinking can be seen, so necessary to our stormy and so dangerous nuclear space age.

[Zholkver] I believe that this also was very graphically manifested during the concluding phase of the Stockholm conference on measures to strengthen trust, security and disarmament in Europe. Why do I stress the concluding phase in this way? Because generally, frankly speaking, the conference did not always work as effectively during the more than 2 years in which sessions were held in the Swedish capital and it must be said here directly that the catalyst accelerating that conference's work and ensuring its successful conclusion was Mikhail Sergeyeovich Gorbachev's 15 January statement which set out the wide program of measures on disarmament, on the creation of an all-embracing system for security and concretely, as well, on European problems.

[Lebedev] Yes, the Stockholm conference's success certainly does call for a very serious analysis, I would say, and this from various points of view, including that of the political effect against the background of this new political thinking's gradual assertion in world politics and in international relations and the military aspect of the agreement that has been reached is extremely important and interestingly as well.

[Zholkver] Perhaps it would be worth dwelling on this in greater detail.

[Lebedev] Yes, it would not be possible to list all the points of this agreement here, but even, say, what was mentioned by Ambassador Grinevskiy, the leader of the Soviet

delegation, at the news conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center a few days ago. Even that shows just how precisely the balance of this agreement, this compromise, has been adjusted. An understanding has been reached, for example, that there will be notification of one's military activities each year, meaning that all participants in the agreement -- 33 European countries plus the United States and Canada -- will do this.

[Zholkver] And this notification will be given in good time.

[Lebedev] This will be done in good time, by 15 November, if I am not mistaken, each year. Naturally this is a colossal advance. And then the intention is that states will undertake to notify all exercises by land troops and associated contingents of air and naval forces 42 days in advance when more than 13,000 men are participating in them. By the way, this is not such a large figure, these are not such large contingents, with 13,000 men.

[Kolchanov] These figures are not large, but the thing that I believe is a very great inspiration for all those who read the Stockholm conference documents is the way things are regulated in a precise and detailed way. This really is expressed in specific terms, and specific terms are all the more important in the military sphere. The figure of 13,000 is not a large one, and that applies to cases where maneuvers are being held or where troop movements are being carried out.

[Zhoalkver] Rudolf Georgiyevich, you have mentioned issues relating not just to maneuvers but to troop movements as well.

Well let us call a spade a spade: What we are talking about in the first place is the movement of U.S. troops for endless military exercises in Western Europe. In fact, NATO's major autumn military maneuvers ended in Western Europe last week: More than 100,000 officers and men participated in them, together with large quantities of military equipment, and involving a large number of U.S. troops. The United States will provide notification of all of its troops movement to Europe that are in excess of this figure from now on, which effectively means those which are in excess of one division.

[Lebedev] Yes, and naturally there is another very important aspect, the issue of inspections, the problem of monitoring, which the Soviet Union and its allies are supposed to be avoiding, and which people are getting sick and tired of. Now it is perfectly obvious and it is down in black and white that this problem does not exist, that we agree to on-site inspection, including inspection from the air. So the inspection issue has disappeared. But I am now going to return to a very important political aspect of the results of the conference. The accord that we have been proposing from the very beginning should be set down dealing with the nonuse of force in any of its forms, so to speak, but primarily in its most dangerous form of armed force. This accord is an accord of principle, and the importance of the Stockholm accord also is enormous in this respect in my view.

Essentially these things are all elements in the all-embracing system of international security which we are seeking and which is winning over more and more supporters. Many of the elements in the agreements that have been achieved are capable of being transferred over, not automatically, of course but they are capable of being made into the foundation for the creation of collective security in other regions. I would say that there are grounds for rejoicing in general, but in so doing, so to speak, one should not forget that this struggle continues, it is not dying down, and undoubtedly there are still some very serious battles ahead because the ink was hardly dry on this

agreement, as they say -- this agreement for which the clock had to be stopped at the conference and so on and so forth in order to make it possible for work to continue through the week end -- the ink was scarcely dry on the document when U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger came out with the statement that he was opposed to it, that he did not like it all, and so on and so forth. In fact we are coming up to another very important event, a major political meeting in Vienna, which has the responsibility of giving further new impetus to detente within the European process and evidently of becoming -- as we hope it will become -- a step toward radical disarmament measures in Europe and accordingly toward setting up this all-embracing system of international security.

[Zholkver] But as I already have mentioned, some very important talks resumed in Vienna last week, talks on reducing armed forces and armaments in central Europe. This was the 40th round: these talks have been going on for 13 years. I have had the opportunity to visit the Hofburg Palace in Vienna on many occasions where these talks take place. Unfortunately, it must be noted that the talks have not yet got off the ground thus far. As happened during the previous round and the one before that, the delegations from the Warsaw Pact countries put forward specific proposals, and our own Soviet proposal is known for conventional armament reduction in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. But let us hope that the lessons of Stockholm will nevertheless be applied to these talks, too. I would particularly like to refer to the fact that during the meeting between Eduard Amvrosyevich Shevardnadze and FRG Foreign Minister Genscher last week, both sides noted that serious accords had been reached in Stockholm and that these convincingly show how realistic the strengthening of security of states through political means is. They agreed that the success of Stockholm must give an additional impetus to the arms limitation talks.

But, true, I do have to say that even before this, on the eve of this meeting, I did see a statement by Genscher who welcomed the Stockholm results as a triumph for commonsense and responsibility.

[Kolchanov] Though it is true that there was a certain amount of self-glorification in Genscher's statement, it nevertheless did contain the conclusion which you mentioned, Aleksandr Vladimirovich. That really is the case.

[Zholkver] I must say that during this meeting with Comrade Shevardnadze it was stressed on the Soviet side that statements alone about a desire for an improvement in the situation, about a desire to reach agreement, are not enough. What is needed are practical deeds. An example of an extremely important practical step of this type is the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear tests, and it appears to me that it is not fortuitous that this question, this practical measure, an action step, has occupied such an important place in the general political discussion which began at the General Assembly session last week.

[Lebedev] Yes, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, and indeed I would say that on the matter of the general political discussion and our moratorium proposal, which has been receiving overwhelming support, in the speeches of the delegates to the session, that nevertheless, U.S. officials in Washington and in New York are again raising against this background the question which everyone already has grown tired of; namely, the question of monitoring, and second the fact that they supposedly cannot agree to a moratorium because they have to maintain and check the state of their existing nuclear arsenals' combat-readiness, and that it is virtually in the interests of the whole of mankind that the United States should test its warheads and the safety devices for them and so on. In this connection I will give my own magazine a bit of a plug, because next week's issue of NOVOYE VREMYA includes an interesting article by Academician Velikhov which devotes considerable space to these questions about why the United

States need explosions and nuclear tests. He quotes the opinion of a well-informed U.S. specialist, Seaborg, who was well-known at one time as U.S. Atomic Energy Commission chairman. He stated quite officially, so to speak, that even at the time when they were signing the Moscow treaty banning nuclear tests in three areas during the 1960's, the United States was officially stating that they had all the means necessary for checking the combat-readiness of nuclear weapons even then without having recourse to carrying out nuclear explosions. So, of course, the object is not to check combat-efficiency but to develop new systems.

[Kolchanov] I once again would like to refer to the World Trade Union Congress and the discussion in the commissions and at the plenary sessions. Views were expressed there on nuclear explosions as well. They said that we perfectly understand, even though we are not specialists, that nuclear explosions are needed to develop qualitatively new nuclear weapons that are even more dangerous and even more terrible; and no explosions are needed to convince oneself of the serviceability or nonserviceability of existing weapons. Nuclear tests are needed to intensify and accelerate and build up the arms race. This is something that is understood even by the man in the street, by the ordinary person, if it is possible to use that term in this context, the person who is not well-versed in the finer points of nuclear physics.

[Zholkver] Well, this is confirmed by the specialists, including U.S. specialists. You, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, mentioned Academician Velikhov: For my own part I would like to mention something that was said by one of the Americans who is closely cooperating with our scientists, whose apparatus has been installed at Karkaralinsk not far from the Soviet nuclear proving ground.

He is Cochran, Thomas Cochran, chief geophysicist of the U.S. Natural Resources Defense Council. He draws attention to the fact that all talk about monitoring being impossible is refuted by the evidence of the U.S. apparatus. It is interesting that the Americans already have been at work in Kazakhstan for several weeks. On the other hand, the Soviet scientists were not given visas to enable them to take our apparatus to the United States, although they were due to go there on 14 September.

[Lebedev] There was a struggle going on between the old and new ways of thinking, as far as we can judge.

[Zholkver] Yes. Well, the Americans gave permission in the end for our Academy of Sciences delegation to arrive, but they were strictly to arrive only in Nevada and to verify the explosions being carried out by the United States. This is a fundamentally different arrangement.

[Lebedev] It is a form of complicity.

[Zholkver] Yes, yes. We invite U.S. scientists to check that tests are not being carried out here. They invite us to go to the United States to be present at the tests in Nevada and legalize and legitimize them. And as a matter of fact, it was virtually on this type of pseudoargument that President Reagan's latest speech was constructed. You see, it too was, strictly speaking, an attempt to sidetrack the issue of demands for a moratorium by talking about explosions being necessary to check the safe-keeping of nuclear arsenals, even though, as you said, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, and as U.S. scientists are confirming, this is by no means necessary. And you see, the most important thing is that the issue here is not to preserve nuclear arsenals intact but to reduce and in the long run, by the beginning of the next century, to completely eliminate nuclear weapons. This is precisely the basis of the USSR's nuclear disarmament proposals.

[Kolchanov] Naturally. We do not need to monitor tests but to liquidate the tests themselves, the subsequently to liquidate the amassed weapons.

[Zholkver] And, of course, measures are necessary to ensure the security of peaceful nuclear power production. The IAEA conference in Vienna was devoted to this.

[Kolchanov] Such nuclear problems place at least two tasks before mankind: arranging international cooperation in driving out nuclear weapons; and, on the other hand, achieving broad international cooperation in the peaceful and safe utilization of nuclear power. This nuclear power is necessary. There is no equivalent source of energy thus far which has the same potential. There already are 370 reactors at the present time. Nuclear energy is to provide more than 20 percent of the total output of electrical power by the year 2000...

[Zholkver, interrupting] Well, it is now more than half in a number of countries...

[Kolchanov, interrupting] [Words indistinct] percent and even more.

[Zholkver] The question being raised by scientists now is not whether nuclear power is necessary or not; rather, the overwhelming majority underline that there is still no alternative to nuclear power.

[Kolchanov] Not yet, at any rate.

[Zholkver] There is thermonuclear fusion, which, by the way, provides more potential for producing energy and more safety.

[Kolchanov] An almost unlimited source.

[Zholkver] Yes. Well, the thing is to increase and ensure the safety of nuclear power. The Soviet program of international cooperation on this question is aimed precisely at this...

[Kolchanov, interrupting] And by the way, it testifies yet again to the realistic and constructive position and new way of thinking on the part of the Soviet Union. You see, if you analyze this program and these proposals by the Soviet Union -- there are 10 points here to so you would probably need more than one Round Table -- the main thing in this program is the creation of a system of immediate notification of danger when there are radioactive emissions. Logically following from this is the agreement of some type of immediate aid to one another in such a case.

[Lebedev] The Head of the Soviet delegation, Comrade Shcherbina, USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman, in his speech raised the question of practically reducing to zero the possibility of accidents like those which have already occurred.

[Kolchanov] And there have been more than 150 of them.

[Lebedev] Yes, in different countries of the world.

[Kolchanov] In the United States, FRG, Britain, and major accidents, too.

[Lebedev] Yes, and so returning to those questions mentioned by you, agreements already have been signed in Vienna on this. As a matter of fact, they are based on those ideas expressed by the Soviet delegation. In general, judging by what I personally have read in agency reports and the foreign press over the last few days it is the atmosphere of this special IAEA conference in Vienna which has been striking.

The Soviet report was accorded enormous attention. The exceptionally open nature of the information which was presented in connection with the Chernobyl accident was underlined. Our delegation submitted a report at a conference of experts as far back as August. And now Comrade Shcherbina arrived in Vienna immediately after visiting Chernobyl, when the work in eliminating the consequences already has entered its final phase. In political and journalistic circles in Vienna note is being made of this Soviet approach -- the openness of the honest information which has been presented, and at the same time, as you said, Rudolf Georgiyevich, a constructive and all-embracing program for ensuring the reliability of nuclear energy and very effective and far-reaching international cooperation in this sphere...

[Zholkver interrupting] Including the joint development of new and even safe types of nuclear reactors.

[Kolchanov] Yes, that is very important. And if all the leading nuclear energy specialists from many countries unite, then the optimum developments in this sphere can indeed be achieved.

[Zholkver] You mentioned many countries, Rudolf Georgiyevich. I must say that it is by means just those countries which already have nuclear reactors that are showing interest in these problems but also those which intend to build them, including many developing countries, which also do not imagine their effective future development without nuclear power, just as, by the way, they do not see the prospect of the possibility of their future effective accelerated development without the preservation of universal peace. It is a close tie between the problems of peace and development. It was confirmed last week at a very important international conference in the capital of the People's Republic of the Congo, Brazzaville, especially on this question. This indeed is a problem for the whole of mankind, very seriously affecting the so-called third world and nonaligned countries who declared the close link between the problems of development and the problems of consolidating universal peace at the tops of their voices at the recent meeting in Harari and, by the way, they supported the Soviet position on very many questions, and above all on the moratorium.

To sum up the results of our conversation, I believe it should be noted that those very sprouts of new political thinking about which we have spoken today and illustrated with numerous examples, have shown that it is indeed possible to rise above disagreements and reach accords and arrive at agreements in complex contemporary circumstances. It is possible to negotiate on security questions if there is the political will and desire for this. This will and desire have repeatedly and very clearly been confirmed by both our country and other socialist countries. I believe all of this shows in what direction it is possible and necessary to take the new building site of detente.

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