

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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THESIS

**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NAVAL SURFACE
RESERVE FORCE TRAINING AND THE RELEVANCE OF
THE TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION OF RESERVE
(TAR) PROGRAM**

by

Gail A. Emow

March 1999

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Cary Simon
Alice Crawford

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TRAINING AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE TRAINING AND
ADMINISTRATION OF RESERVE (TAR) PROGRAM**

Gail A. Emow
Lieutenant Commander, United States Naval Reserve
B.A., Washington College, 1978

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


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
Approved by:



Cary Simon, Thesis Co-Advisor



Alice Crawford, Thesis Co-Advisor



Reuben T. Harris, Chairman
Department of Systems Management

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TABLE OF ACRONYMS

AT	Annual Training
CINC	Commander in Chief
CNAVRESFOR	Commander, Naval Reserve Force
CNAVSURFRESFOR	Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CNSRF	Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force
CR-D	Crisis Response-Delayed
CR-I	Crisis Response-Immediate
FSC	Fleet Support Center
FSO	Fleet Support Officer
IDT	Inactive Duty for Training
IDTT	Inactive Duty for Training-Travel
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IP 2000	Infrastructure Plan 2000
IT	Information Technology
ITP	Individual Training Plan
NRF	Naval Reserve Force
ODS	Operation Desert Storm
OPLANS	Operational Plans
REDCEN	Readiness Center
REDCOM	Readiness Command
RESCEN	Reserve Center

RLO	Reserve Liaison Officer
SPUR	Surface Programs to Upgrade Readiness
SWO	Surface Warfare Officer
TAR	Training and Administration of Reserves
TPFD	Time-Phased Force and Deployment

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

As the Naval Reserves' integration with the regular Navy increases, there are indications that reserve training is accomplished more by the fleet than by surface reserve centers. There may no longer be a need to sustain a separate community to manage the selected reserves. This study examines the changing role of the Surface Reserve Force training program, particularly in terms of the roles of full-time reserve officers (Training and Administration of Reserves, or TARs) managing drilling reservists.

Due to diminishing resources and increasing operational commitments, the Navy has shifted its efforts to ensure that the force is correctly shaped, trained, and equipped to respond to a wide range of military and peacekeeping operations. Toward this effort, the Navy employs reserve force personnel to relieve the requirements placed on active force Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO). This is accomplished primarily by deploying and fulfilling close-to-home Commander in Chief (CINC) requirements. (SECNAVINST 1200.1A, 1998)

The Navy maintains TARs to ensure that essential reserve component readiness goals are accomplished. These goals

include enhancing training and material readiness for mobilization or deployment. Historically, this training was predominately accomplished at a local Reserve Center with only a two-week period spent with the fleet. But due to increasing demands by the fleet, training has shifted increasingly to on-the-job training, where reservists perform tasks and missions directly on site with the active forces.

Currently, the TAR officers' career path includes a balance of operational and reserve management assignments. Operational proficiency apparently enhances the TAR officer's effectiveness in training and management of the Naval Reserve. These assignments are located at Naval Reserve field activities throughout the United States, as well as on major Navy staffs afloat and ashore. Additionally, for professional development and to maintain operational proficiency, TAR officers are assigned to non-reserve program billets, i.e., billets having no association with reserves.

Due to changing operational requirements, TAR officer billets have steadily increased in the areas of fleet liaison and reserve coordination. Those at the field activities are concentrated in the areas of management and administration. The TAR community officer roles are in transition and TAR officers are working in closer geographic proximity with the fleet.

B. PURPOSE

The objective of this study is to conduct an exploratory analysis into the shifting roles of TAR officers, particularly in terms of the necessity of maintaining a separate community to manage Surface Reserve Force training. As the mission of the Naval Reserve becomes more integrated with the active forces, the requirement for full-time management of surface reserve centers by TARs becomes questionable. The goal of the study is to describe the phenomenon of closer reserve integration with the fleet, and to analyze the current role and utility of the TAR program as it relates to changes in training.

C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The primary research question is, what is the value added of the TAR program, given closer alignment of reserve training with the fleet? Value added in this context refers to the extent to which it is necessary to have full-time reserve officers managing selected (drilling) reservists. Additional questions addressed include:

- What are the changes to the Naval Reserve training mission pre- and post-Desert Storm?
- How do previous, current, and proposed policies impact the administration of Surface Reserve Force training?
- What is the current role of TAR program officers in terms of administering Surface Reserve Force training?
- How is the TAR program managed, and what are the possible effects on surface reserve unit readiness?

D. SCOPE

The scope of the thesis includes: (1) a description and analysis of the Naval Reserve training environment particularly in terms of pre- and post-Desert Storm changes; (2) an analysis of the surface reserve TAR officer training relationship with the fleet; (3) and an exploration of the value added of Naval Reserve training in terms of a changed training environment and emerging new relationships with the fleet.

E. METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this research includes a review of Naval Reserve and relevant training literature, semi-structured interviews of Reserve Center Commanding Officers, and a survey of clusters of selected reserve (SELRES) senior officers. The following documents and reports were reviewed to describe the Surface Reserve Force training program pre- and post- Desert Storm: a literature review of archival information, General Accounting Office reports, Naval Audit Service reports, contracted research group (RAND) reports, and Reserve Forces Policy Board reports.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with four former Reserve Center Commanding Officers. The interviews were used to gain an understanding of how the reserve training role

has shifted, and to enrich results obtained from a survey of 31 CINC and Fleet Reserve Liaison Officers, reserve policy planners, and senior TAR and SELRES officers.

F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The following definitions from Brauner and Gotz (1991) are provided for clarification of terms.

Selected Reserve (SELRES). Part of the Ready Reserve composed of all units and individuals having priority over all other reserve elements for training, equipment and personnel (drilling reservists.) Members of the Selected Reserve are the only reservists who typically drill one weekend per month and attend two weeks of annual training.

Active Guard and Reserve (AGR). AGR personnel are members of a reserve component on active duty for a period of 180 consecutive days or more for organizing, administering, recruiting, or training the reserve components. This category includes Navy Training and Administration of the Reserve (TAR). AGR also encompasses temporary recall categories such as Naval Reserve Canvasser Recruiter, Active Duty for Special Work (180 days or more), One Year Recall (OYR), and those personnel recalled under Section 265 of Title 10 U.S.C. All AGR personnel are counted against Congressionally authorized FTS end strengths.

Active Component (AC). AC personnel are paid from active component military personnel appropriations (MPN) and are assigned or attached to reserve component organizations or units to provide advice, liaison, management, administration, or training support. While not Selected Reservists, AC personnel are assigned billets in and deploy with their assigned units.

Federal Civilian Employees (CIV). CIV personnel are hired under Section 3101 of Title 5 U.S.C. to provide administrative, training, maintenance, and recruiting support to the reserve components.

G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

This thesis is comprised of five chapters. The first chapter introduced the topic and explained the purpose and methodology of the study. Chapter II depicts the historical organizational structure and role of both the Naval Reserve and the Training and Administration of the Reserves program through the Persian Gulf War. Chapter III describes the study methodology including the use of semi-structured interviews and questionnaire development. Chapter IV addresses the first two secondary research questions regarding changes to the Surface training program in the post Desert Storm 1990s, including future proposals for organizational structure changes. Chapter V is an analysis and discussion of the final two secondary research questions on the impact of changes on reserve unit and personnel readiness, and surface TAR officer utilization and management. Chapter VI draws conclusions on the value added of the surface TAR program and contains recommendations for improvements.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NAVAL RESERVES

The historical background of the Naval Reserves is important to understanding the current process of transition. The reserves have been in existence since Colonial days when the Secretary of the Navy had authority to lend older ships and equipment to states with a naval militia for drills and instruction. "By 1894, the militia movement had progressed to the point where the Secretary of the Navy was given authority to lend each state having a naval militia one of the Navy's older ships." (Mazza, 1992)

Prior to World War I, 16 states had naval militias, with over four thousand officers and enlisted personnel. Congress established the Federal Naval Reserve in 1915, and during WWI over 300,000 reserve personnel served on active duty. However, after the war, the states' naval militia were disbanded. With legislation in 1925 to establish the Air Reserve, the Naval Reserve organization was revitalized.

World War II demanded an increase of forces never before experienced in the history of the United States naval forces. Over three million women and men were in the Navy during this period and, "of the 320,000 officers on

duty in 1945, all but approximately 13,000 were reservists." (Leary, 1987)

The Naval Reserve reorganized its structure after WW II with much of the current organization tracing its origins to this reorganization. The Air and Surface elements developed separate command structures. Glenview, Illinois became the home of the Naval Air Reserve Training Command in 1946. Ten years later, Omaha, Nebraska became the home of the Naval Reserve Training Command. This training command was comprised of submarine, surface, and other non-aviation units. Prior to the establishment of this training command, active duty Naval Districts were responsible for the training and administration of the units belonging to the Naval Reserve Training Command.

The Commandants of the Naval Districts supervised schedules of non-aviation units under their specific geographical control. Although the District Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserves had primary administrative authority for reserve affairs within each District, the Commandant was the one who reported up the chain of command to the Director of Naval Reserve/Assistant Chief of Naval Operations Naval Reserves. The establishment of the Naval Reserve Training Command brought a change to this reporting

responsibility. The Naval Districts were now responsible for reporting to the Naval Reserve Training Command. The following quote refers to the origin and reporting relationships of TARs:

Within the Naval Districts, numerous Naval Reserve training centers provided drill space, instruction, equipment, and administrative support to drilling reservists. These training and administrative support functions were usually provided by a cadre of reservists on indefinite active-duty known as TAR's (Training and Administration for Reserves). The commanding officers of the various units reported to the reserve center commanding officer (usually the TAR) who in turn reported to the District Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserves.
(Mazza, 1992)

The Naval Districts were tasked with ensuring that fleet mobilization requirements were met by qualified reservists serving in mobilization assignments. Surface mobilization assignments were the augmentation of billets aboard active-duty ships. Therefore, initial reserve units were structured to support this augmentation. Since it was not always feasible for an entire unit to augment a ship, "Naval Reservists in the surface program were formed into Surface Divisions, Fleet Divisions, and Military Training Divisions" (Kreh, 1969).

The mission of the Surface Division was to provide training to prior service personnel who had elected to

become drilling reservists. For example, this division oversaw personnel in Construction and Cargo Handling Battalions, Naval Control of Shipping, and Security Group units. The Fleet Division provided fleet-experienced shipboard rated reservists to specific assignments within various departments in the surface program, including Ship Activation, Maintenance, and Repair units. The Military Training Division was designed and charged with providing training and indoctrination to "newly enlisted reservists before they join the fleet for their two-year active-duty tours"(Kreh, 1969). Although these reserve divisions trained together, their mobilization billets corresponded to individual fleet requirements. However, many felt that the training needed to be upgraded. Reservists often complained of "boring, irrelevant, repetitive classroom training, obsolete equipment, and make-work assignments in the Reserve Center. The reservists called for more hands-on training with the active forces"(Herzberg, 1966).

The end of the Vietnam war instigated an economic and political necessity to streamline the military forces. The Total Force Concept was initiated to address this necessity. The following explains the linkage between the Total Force policy and the reserves:

All elements of the active force structure--including not only active and reserve components, but also civil servants in the DoD, civilian contractors, and retired military personnel--should be considered concurrently in developing military capability in support of national military objectives. In essence, the total force policy states that missions should be given to whichever component can achieve them most economically. The intent of the policy is to make better use of the reserve components and to save money by shifting some of the functions formerly performed solely by active units to the reserves and other personnel. (Gotz and Brown, 1991)

The Naval Reserve began a major reorganization to facilitate policy implementation of the Total Force Concept. In 1973, the Air and Surface Reserve Training Commands were consolidated under a newly established Commander, Naval Reserve Force (CNAVRESFOR) headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana, which held a dual role as the Director of Naval Reserve on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. New Orleans became the headquarters for the newly designated Commander, Naval Air Reserve and Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force (CNAVRESFOR). Both of these headquarters came under the direct command of CNAVRESFOR. The organizational structure of the Naval Reserve as shown in Figure 2-1 was formulated in the 1980s and, although changes have been instituted to the commands reporting to COMNAVSURFRESFOR, the basic structure is still

valid today. It can be seen that CNAVRESFOR has reporting relationships to the CNO and to both Fleet Commanders. This organizational structure depicts the separation of the reserve combat support forces from their operational commanders.




Figure 2-1. Organizational Structure of the Naval Reserve

The Naval Districts shifted the administrative control of surface reserve centers to the newly established Naval Reserve Readiness Commands (REDCOMs). These commands were responsible for geographic regions, which did not necessarily mirror those of the Naval Districts. The chain of command under this restructuring had the Reserve Center (RESCEN) Commanding Officers reporting to the REDCOM, and the REDCOM Commander reporting directly to CNAVRESFOR. The reserve unit Commanding Officers continued to report to the RESCEN Commanding Officer. The following is provided to

explain the reserve unit and active command relationship within this organizational structure:

The Naval Reserve began a major effort to align Naval reserve units with active force commands. This period of horizontal integration of reserve units with active components was an effort to institutionalize the "one Navy" concept originally envisioned under the Total Force Concept. Naval Surface Reserve Force ships were horizontally integrated into the active fleet for operational control. For non-hardware or augment units, this was the beginning of the gaining command concept. Under the gaining command concept, training and mobilization standards were developed and implemented through input received from the active forces. Although not institutionally formalized, direct or mutual support to active commands greatly increased to the point where many essential warfare and support functions are now carried out by the Naval Reserve. (Mazza, 1992)

During the defense build up of the 1980s, the Department of the Navy instituted a "horizontal integration" plan to facilitate the Total Force concept. Many reservists assigned to augmentation units began to train with the Active commands where they would serve upon mobilization, often training with the same fleet equipment and systems they would use when mobilized. This initiative expanded the size of the Naval Reserve, modernized equipment, and introduced the widespread use of augmentation units.

The Naval Surface Reserve Force developed a training plan to effectively align its training program with this horizontal integration initiative. Surface Programs to Upgrade Readiness (SPUR) represented the initiatives that were taken to better train reservists. There were five points in SPUR. The first point was the Naval Surface Reserve Training Plan. Second was the Readiness Center concept. Points three and four were interrelated. Three was a new Navy policy changing non-related billets to rated billets, allowing recruitment of experienced petty officers. Four was a change to Surface-Afloat augmentation units to fit mobilization plans. The final point of the SPUR was an efficient allocation of resources.

The Naval Reserve was expanding to a projected 140,000 reservists to train at the existing 235 reserve centers. Fifty-four reserve centers (of the 235) were to be enhanced to become Readiness Centers, where RESCEN reservists would be sent to train in Shipboard Simulators, Damage Control Trainers, and Medical Skills Training Labs.

In summary, reserve training prior to Operation Desert Storm was primarily focused on structural changes centered around preparing drilling reservists for billets that would augment the active forces in the event of Global War. The

Naval Reserve concentrated on establishing functional reserve management organizations that were responsible for supplying personnel to the fleet. After the conflict in the Persian Gulf, and a drawdown in active forces, the CINCs and fleet began to emphasize changes to force mobilization requirements and readiness reporting, which reflected an increasing peacetime reliance on reserve personnel and the need for changes to reserve training and management policies.

B. TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION FOR RESERVES

After World War II the number of reservists used on a full-time basis increased. This was due to the increasing number of ships and flying units being transferred to the reserves at the war's end. Because these ships and planes had to be maintained on a full-time basis, and could not be brought into service solely for drill weekends, a greater requirement for full-time reservists developed. Navy personnel managers determined that full-time reservists, or a Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) community, would most effectively serve the Navy's requirement for maintaining reserve equipment and handling the administration of the drilling reservists.

The Naval Reserve Surface Program created a greater reliance on full-time support staff who, until this point, were utilized to maintain and operate ships and as station-keepers to maintain and operate centers and facilities. With the advent of the Naval Reserve Training Centers, TARs began to actively participate in the management of the reserve forces, and to align reserve training with fleet requirements. The Navy was in its infancy of maintaining a full-time support force capable of ensuring the accomplishment of essential reserve unit readiness goals. Reserve readiness goals included the following: enhance training and material readiness for mobilization or deployment; recruit and man reserve units; and provide administrative support to reserve units and personnel.

The end of the Vietnam war brought about a major revision of responsibility between the active and reserve forces. The reduction in active duty manning levels mandated a greater reliance on the reserves as explained in the following:

The shifting of responsibilities from the active to the reserve(s) has prompted Congress and the Services to enhance the Guard and Reserve Full-Time Support (FTS) program. As a result, the Reserve(s) now have an increased number of qualified training, maintenance, supply and administrative personnel to help sustain the

unprecedented level of readiness required.(RFPB, FY1984)

Although it appeared that emphasis had shifted from "training" to "management" of reservists, this was not entirely the case. Naval Reserve leaders continued to support a policy of a Reserve Center in every state in the United States and its territories. Providing training to the heartland of America required innovative methods. These methods were the design and installation of Damage Control Trainers, Shipboard Simulators, and computer-based training devices at select reserve activities. Additionally, changes to weekend training requirements, the introduction of Mobile Training Teams, and an increased emphasis on mobilization readiness and reporting ensured that training was at the forefront of every evolution scheduled or coordinated by the TARs.

As the Naval Reserve entered the 1990s, TARs were actively providing the reserve units with advice and liaison to their active commands, and were providing active command experience and expertise to reserve unit personnel. Additionally, TARs were assigned to operational and management headquarters, and other support activities not directly involved in reserve unit support, to ensure the

reserves were employed in a capacity that contributed to the accomplishment of established reserve readiness goals.

The typical TAR officer career path became a balance of operational and reserve management assignments. TARs were providing nearly all of the full-time support to the Naval Reserve in the areas of manpower management, personnel administration, training, logistics, financial management, medical, and facilities management. Table 2-1 lists TAR officer community designators. Officer support from the medical and civil engineer corps was provided by USN officers, or reserve officers recalled for extended active duty periods. In an operational or tactical

Designator	Community
1107	General Unrestricted Line
1117	Surface Warfare
1127	Submarine Warfare
1137	Special Warfare
1147	Special Operations
1317	Naval Aviator
1327	Naval Flight Officer
1527	Aerospace Maintenance Duty
1637	Intelligence
3107	Supply Corps
Source: http://www.navy.mil/navresfor/nrpc/tar.html 8/19/98	

Table 2-1. TAR Officer Designators

environment there is a separation between surface and air program TAR officer assignments. However, all TAR officers regardless of community designation, are assigned to senior staff, planning and policy levels.

In summary, the Navy TAR program prior to Desert Storm had matured into a full-time support force that was accomplishing many of the goals essential to reserve unit readiness. The TARs were actively involved in enhancing training and material readiness for mobilization or deployment, recruiting for and manning reserve units, and providing administrative support to reserve units and personnel. However, with the CINCs and Fleets steadily increasing their reliance on reserve personnel, changes to the reserve training environment, to TAR management, and training policies were required. Therefore, the end of the 1980s brought changes to many training initiatives and was the beginning of a movement to more efficiently assimilate both drilling reservists and TAR officers into the CINC and fleet operational environments.

III. METHODOLOGY

A. OVERVIEW

Several sources of information were used to answer the research questions. Policy research, semi-structured interviews, and survey data were used to gain an understanding of how the changes in the Surface reserve training mission have effected reserve unit readiness, and on how policies impact the administration of training. The results obtained from the interviews and survey questions were also used to analyze various aspects of the Surface Reserve Force. These aspects were the role of the TAR officer in terms of administering Surface reserve training, TAR program management, impact of drill location on reserve readiness, and how distance traveled to training effects personnel. The results were used to analyze the primary research question concerning the value added of the Surface TAR program including TAR officers managing selected reserves.

The selection of participants for the semi-structured interviews and survey questionnaire was not random, nor was it representative. Participants were chosen for their expeditious accessibility via electronic email and/or their availability due to co-location at the Naval Postgraduate

School. Nonetheless, in the context of exploratory research, these interviews provided information used in the survey design.

B. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW

Four, former, Reserve Center Commanding Officers were interviewed to capture senior officer experience and perceptions on the topic. Two officers represent the Surface Warfare (SWO) and two represent the Fleet Support (FSO) communities. The FSOs are lateral transfers from the SWO community. All held the billet of Reserve Center Training Officer during their careers. Two were Lieutenant Commanders, and two were Commanders with an average of 15 years of service. Their viewpoints and observations of the surface programs and training were gathered from their responses to the interview protocol at Appendix A.

The questions for the protocol focused on the changes to the reservists' training environment, the roles and responsibilities of the TAR officer in this environment, and their perceived effectiveness in attaining organizational goals.

C. SURVEY

The only criterion for selection to the survey sample that was predetermined was paygrade. Senior officers were

chosen for the purpose of gaining a perspective that was based on several years of experience as a drilling reservist or as a TAR. Additionally, the more senior the officer, the greater the likelihood that the individual had served in billets across the full spectrum of surface programs. Email addresses were requested of current headquarters staff RLOs, operational staff RLOs, and SELRES officers throughout the United States. This request was made to staffs of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N095) and RESFOR. Several SELRES officers known by the author were also selected.

Thirty-one reservists (SELRES and TAR) responded to the survey of the 52 that were sent out. Respondents included three Flag officers, 15 Captains, and 13 Commanders with a mean of 19.1 years of service. The sample was selected from CINC and Fleet Reserve Liaison Officers, reserve policy planners, and senior TAR and SELRES officers. The communities represented by these reservists were predominately Surface Warfare (50 percent), with the remaining evenly distributed between the Aviation, Fleet Support and Intelligence communities. All of the communities had extensive knowledge of surface programs.

The survey questionnaire (see Appendix B) consisted of demographic questions, and training-related questions using a likert scale of three response choices that ranged from "not very effective" to "very effective." The focus of these questions was on the effectiveness of RESCEN training, fleet exercises, the effectiveness and/or readiness achieved by providing peacetime contributory support, and the training provided by TAR Officers. Additionally, the drilling reservist was requested to respond to exploratory questions regarding the relative importance of the location of their unit and/or RESCEN in proximity to their residence. The exploratory questions were developed to gain an insight into the extent to which Naval Reserve policies (i.e., a RESCEN in every state, flexible drill availability) impact upon the drilling reservists readiness levels (i.e., ability to work, employer support, fiscal constraints.)

In summary, Chapter IV addresses the changes that have taken place in surface reserve training. Using data derived from policy research, the survey, and the interviews, Chapter IV also addresses the impact that policies have, and will have, on the administration of training, and the TAR's role in administering surface reserve training.

Survey and interview questions are analyzed in Chapter V to address the current and expected role of TAR officers, how the TAR program is managed, and the possible effects on readiness. Conclusions and recommendations in Chapter VI address the primary research question of the value added of the TAR program.

IV. SURFACE RESERVE TRAINING

A. OVERVIEW

The secondary research questions regarding how the mission of reserve training has shifted, the impact of policy changes, and the current training environment are addressed from two viewpoints. First, the selected reserve mission requirements and policy changes are explored to gain an understanding of the impact of this shift. Second, the TAR program requirements and policy changes are used for an insight into the impact of this shift on the role of current TAR program officers in terms of administering surface reserve training.

B. SELRES MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND POLICY CHANGES

The role of the Naval Reservist has been changing dramatically throughout the 1990s. The call-up of Naval Reservists for Operation Desert Storm (ODS) justified the initiatives taken in the 1970s and 1980s to integrate the Navy's active and reserve components into a Total Force. This advance degree of integration appeared crucial to the success of various allied efforts. It seemed to confirm the reserves' position as an equal partner with the fleet, and made "seamless integration" the focus of peacetime training. Operation Desert Storm also signaled the end of

the "old" Total Force era for the reserves. President Bush's partial activation of the reserves to meet a specific regional contingency--as opposed to the existing general mobilization plans for a global war--ushered in the new concept of the One Navy Force.

The U.S. National Military Strategy - Flexible and Selective Engagement - reflects the nation's shift from containing the specter of international communism to focusing on regional contingency operations, such as ODS. Flexible and selective engagement identifies and addresses four principal dangers facing the United States and its friends: regional instability, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational dangers such as drug trafficking and terrorism, and threats to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Our national strategy for meeting these dangers has three components: peacetime engagement, conflict prevention, and warfighting. The U.S. Navy supports this strategy by maintaining a continuing forward naval presence, a flexible crisis-response capability, and the ability to conduct joint littoral operations as outlined in From the Sea (1992) and Forward ... From the Sea (1994). (A Guide to the Naval Reserve, 1998)

This dynamic strategy placed an increasing reliance on the Naval Reserve to help build and maintain a balanced, affordable Naval Service able to meet both the Nation's peacetime and crisis commitments. A well trained and equipped reserve force can provide valuable, lower cost peacetime support to the fleet while simultaneously

preparing reservists for rapid activation in a crisis-response situation. In short, the Naval Reserve is compensating leverage for the One Navy Force. "Rather than detracting from their primary mission, working alongside their Active counterparts increases the mobilization value of reserve members and relates directly to their individual proficiency and readiness for crisis response through the spectrum of conflict" (Total Force Policy Instruction, 1998).

In 1994, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations approved flexible readiness procedures that identified selected reserve units by their positioning in the Time-Phased Force and Deployment (TPFD) plans for crisis response. With lag time in deployment, reservists could reasonably defer elements of their training to the post-mobilization period and, by delaying this training, have more time for peacetime support to the active Navy. Before this decision, reservists conducted all such training as part of their peacetime (pre-mobilization) training requirements.

Determinations of the appropriate readiness levels for reserve units continues to rest with the unit's active component commander and, inevitably, some reserve unit missions make meeting all training requirements in

peacetime the only prudent readiness decision. However, having the ability to defer some training, for some units, gives the active component commander the flexibility to free valuable reserve time for meeting current operational requirements. Ultimately, flexible readiness is a means to obtain greater leverage from the Navy's selected reserve in accomplishing day-to-day missions without sacrificing post-mobilization effectiveness. "The new flexible drill program will allow reservists to spend only the time a project actually requires, yet still get paid for a drill after accumulating four hours of drill" (*Handbook for the Guard and Reserve*, 1998). The Naval reserve policy statement discusses the importance of flexible drills by mandating:

All echelons throughout the Naval Reserve will ensure that every effort is made to perform the maximum number of Annual Training (AT) and Inactive Duty Training (IDT) periods at the gaining command consistent with available funding. Maximum flexibility will be employed to schedule these periods so they support peacetime support needs of the gaining command consistent with the attainment of the requisite readiness status. (Woods, 1997)

Often, the traditional one-weekend-a-month is not enough time to accomplish necessary peacetime support activities. In recognition of this, post-ODS reserve policy authorized flexible drilling. Flexible drilling allows a

component commander to combine the mandatory 48 drills per year into periods that meet his or her operational needs. Thus, rather than one weekend per month, reservists can serve throughout the work week as their civilian employment permits. With increasing frequency, reservists can devote a week per quarter rather than a weekend per month to their reserve unit.

To support the overall readiness of the One Navy Force and to ensure the appropriate level of training is provided, the selected reserves have been organized into two readiness categories based upon the unit's placement in the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) contained in Unified and Fleet CINC operational plans (OPLANS). These two categories are defined in the Total Force Policy (OPNAVINST 1001.21B, 10 Jun 1998):

Crisis Response - Immediate (CR-I). Those units and individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) personnel whose mobilization assignment requires they maintain 100 percent training readiness in peacetime and are planned to be deployed within a nominal 14 days of any mobilization will be placed in the CR-I category. Flexible readiness will not apply to such units or individuals. Personnel in CR-I units may perform peacetime support functions consistent with maintenance of full training readiness.

Crisis Response - Delayed (CR-D). Those units and IMA personnel, whose mission with the Total Force strategy allow them to maintain a training readiness not lower than training readiness level

three (C-3), will be place in the CR-D category. Such units or IMAs may be organized to fulfill an Echelon 2 commander's need to meet certain preplanned crisis response roles, which do not require their immediate deployment.

COMNAVSURFRESFORs (CNSRF) training philosophy provides the reservist guidance with regard to the prioritization of flexible drill schedules within their respective crisis response category. The following is an excerpt from the Surface Master Training Plan (1998), which identifies surface programs and provides policy and procedural guidance for training reserve personnel.

Training Philosophy: The Naval Surface Reserve Force is primarily focused on requirements based training. Each reservist is given a document, an Individual Training Plan (ITP), listing all of the training requirements for their mobilization billet. Training to accomplish these mobilization training requirements must be given priority. These requirements, which are established by the program sponsor, technical manager, and gaining active duty command, define the training required for the Reservist to be fully mobilization ready. Per OPNAVINST 1001.21B, these training requirements must mirror the training required of the Reservist's active duty counterpart performing the same duties.

Peacetime Support. Peacetime support is defined as readiness related activity supporting the mission needs of the active component. Working alongside their active counterparts increases the mobilization value of Reservists and relates directly to their individual proficiency and readiness for crisis response.

Mazza (1992) notes that the primary challenge in carrying out training in the Naval Reserve has been in the area of training standardization and readiness accounting. Progress has been made in recent years in the evolution of the previously-mentioned individual billet training. Requirements for the ITP are created by the gaining commands with many of these requirements being kept sufficiently broad to facilitate the realities of training across a broad spectrum of local environments. A key characteristic of the Naval Reserve is the predominance of prior service personnel. More than 93 percent of Naval reservists are veterans of active service. Since most Naval reservists are veterans, a logical approach would be to use on-the-job training to hone skills and proficiencies acquired on active duty. "This journeyman-style training is the most cost-effective approach to meeting statutory training requirements" (Schank and Bodilly, 1987).

The surface programs where reservists are assigned and trained are listed in Table 4-1. This myriad of programs creates a need for various training initiatives. For example, to permit gaining commands to fully utilize their resources, the Director, Naval Reserve would like to move centers where feasible, and to co-locate units based on

their mobilization area (RADM Vaughan, 1998). However, the reservists assigned to units in the heartland of America continue to be a challenge to train. "The demographics of unit assignments and coordination of training for inland reserve units with appropriate active gaining commands and fleet units have been inherent problems that affect readiness"(Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal 1990). Distance Learning initiatives, computer-based training devices, and telecommuting efforts are rapidly bridging the readiness gap between fleet-concentration-based units and those in the heartland.

<u>Program Title</u>	<u>Program Title</u>
Submarine	Naval Control of Shipping
Mine Forces	Bases and Stations
Mobile Logistic Support	Sea Systems Command
Surface Combatant	Supply Systems
Cargo Handling	Merchant Marine
Construction Forces	Health Services
Amphibious Forces	Training
USMCR Medical/Dental Units	Law
Special Warfare	Personnel Services
Major Fleet/Force Staff	Public Affairs
Major Unified/Joint Shore	Research
Support of Allies	Maintenance
Telecommunications	Fleet Hospital
Military Sealift	
Space and Electronic Warfare Systems	
Chaplain/Religious Program Specialists	

Source: COMNAVSURFRESFORINST 3502.1C

Table 4-1. Naval Surface Reserve Force Programs

In summary, the involvement of the gaining command in developing valid training requirements for the reserve forces has increased dramatically since ODS. Reservists are spending less time at reserve centers because the gaining commands require their presence on-site for the performance of day-to-day operations. Crisis response capabilities are being enhanced by specialized training for crisis-related missions, maintenance of war fighting skills, and emphasis on joint training missions. Distance learning coupled with virtual and real-time venues allows increased training opportunities for reservists geographically distant from fleet assets. These technologies may facilitate cost-effective utilization of reservists for matching training requirements with heartland assets.

C. TAR PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AND POLICY CHANGES

The responsibilities for providing trained personnel falls on a variety of people. These personnel can be viewed as a triad comprised of the Gaining Commands, TARs, and Drilling Reservists. Moore (1991) states that "in an era of shrinking manpower resources, gaining commands are more aware of the mutual support aspects of an active partnership with their reserve units." Reserve assets represent a tremendous source of additional manpower to

meet active mission requirements. Additionally, reservists can derive substantial training benefits from sharing the peacetime operational requirements of their gaining commands.

Full-time support personnel have gone from a fairly static training environment of ensuring drilling reservists were prepared for their assignments in event of a mass mobilization, to one that is more dynamic and responsive to the active component. Rear Admiral Vaughan (1998) stated that "supporting the fleet is our number one job." The "our" included the TARs, the means by which the drilling reservists attain their readiness goals. The TARs are responsible for providing a viable training environment in which the drilling reservist can support the fleet, regional contingencies, forward deployments, contributory support, and develop closer relationships with the active forces.

Table 4-2 shows the major Naval Reserve mission areas as a percentage of the Navy's total capability (as of fiscal FY98), and vessels within the Naval Surface Reserve Force. This reflects the force mix decisions that have been made since the inception of the Total Force Plan. Those missions that appear most specifically related to combat-

only environments have the heaviest concentration in the reserve component, such as Inshore Undersea Warfare units, which comprises 100 percent of the Navy's total capability. Those requirements that must be met during peacetime, as well as in war, have lesser concentrations of capabilities residing in the reserves. Some areas, such as medical and intelligence, routinely integrate their reserve assets into peacetime operations, both during weekend drills and annual training.

<u>Mission Area</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Inshore Undersea Warfare	People/Hardware	100
Naval Embarked Advisory Teams	People	100
Naval Control of Shipping	People	99
Cargo Handling Battalions	People/Hardware	93
Military Sealift	People	90
Construction Battalions	People/Hardware	65
Intelligence	People	53
Fleet Hospitals	People/Hardware	40

<u>#</u>	<u>Ship Type</u>
One	Aircraft Carrier
Ten	Guided Missile Frigates
Two	Tank Landing Ships
One	Mine Countermeasure Command Ship
Four	Mine Countermeasure Ships
Six	Coastal Minehunter Ships

Source: Reserve Forces Policy Board FY98

Table 4-2. Naval Surface Reserve Mission Areas as a percentage of the Navy's total capability

Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force has defined "The Training Process" to provide focus to the TAR personnel assigned the responsibility of program execution and implementation. Surface reserve training is defined

using a four-part process, with the quality of the whole dependent upon the manager's ability to effectively carry out the responsibilities of each part. The training process is divided into planning, scheduling, executing, and analysis.

- **Planning:** Mobilization billet training requirements are easily identified using the automated system and provided at each RESCEN. The RSTARS system has different modules that are used by a RESCEN to effectively manage the personnel assigned. The Manpower Module RSTARS(MP) provides all of the necessary personnel and administrative information on an individual reservist. The Training Module RSTARS(TM) provides the training requirements for each reservist and contains automated means for scheduling the accomplishment of those requirements and recording the training once complete.
 - ITPs and management reports are produced from RSTARS(TM) data to serve various functions:
 - Tracking training accomplishments
 - Production of "Unit Training Objectives" (UTOs) from professional, directed training, and OJT requirements.
- **Scheduling:** UTOs are the basis for the Event Planning and Scheduling (EPS) system input form each unit which lists FY training requirements and requested resources needed to accomplish required training. Planning Board for Training (PBFT) discusses training objectives for the fiscal year.
- **Executing:** Orderwriting, logistic arrangements, classroom and instructor prep, execution of contracts for services and facilities, critique of instruction, feedback, documentation of training.
- **Analysis:** Determine where process improvements might be made, for higher readiness attainment. (COMNAVSURFRESFORINST 3502.1C, 1998)

The types of training requirements referred to in this process are billet related, professional (Instructor, Warfare, Damage Control), directed (General Military Training, Special Interest), and accession (Advanced PayGrade, Accelerated Initial Accession Program, New affiliations). The various resources available for training purposes are listed below (COMNAVSURFRESFORINST 3502.1C, 1998).

- **Facilities:** Local, Off-site, Common-site (Active & reserve sponsored)
- **Curricula:** Surface Training Series (STS) {QSPs}, Exams, Modularized NEC training courses, Computer Based Training, Formal Schools, PQS, NWP libraries
- **Equipment:** Training devices/Technical Training Equipment: Damage Control Trainer (DCT), Medical Skills Training Labs
- **Financial:** Exportable, Civilian Augmented Training (CAT), Training Team Training (TTT), Continuing Medical Education (CME), Annual Training (AT), Inactive Duty Training, Travel (IDTT), Temporary Active Duty (TAD)
- **Human:** General Voluntary Training Unit (VTU) personnel

The TAR officers can be responsible for providing training to units from several mission areas, therefore the various resources available to them are numerous.

The CNSRF training philosophy encourages innovative approaches to Reserve Center training. Annual Training (AT) and Inactive Duty for Training, Travel (IDTT) at the

gaining command provides the most realistic training. In lieu of Reserve Center classroom instruction, the use of Exportable Training funds (Exportable) and Civilian Augmented Training (CAT) are preferred by reserve management. Reserve leadership is charged with coordinating and identifying training opportunities for peacetime contributory support. Additionally, TARs are responsible for ensuring that reserve unit Commanding Officers and Officers in Charge are working with their "gaining commands to refine individual training plans so reserve requirements mirror active navy billet training requirements" (Fiscal Program and Policy Guidance, Fiscal 1999).

The TARs at RESCENS, REDCENS and REDCOMs have been actively involved in enhancing training and material readiness for mobilization or deployment, recruiting for and manning reserve units, and providing administrative support to reserve units and personnel. However, steadily increasing reliance on reserve personnel for peacetime contributory support and contingency operations of the CINCs and Fleets has caused top management to re-evaluate the Surface Reserve Force management structure. The impetus for this evaluation was the need to move TAR officer billet assignment in a direction that efficiently assimilates both

drilling reservists and TAR officers into the CINC and fleet operational environment.

The spillover effect of the CINCs driving the requirement for TAR officers is Surface Reserve Force management must reorganize in order to reallocate the fixed number of TAR officers under their control. As with active forces, the full-time support pool is fixed, so proper requirements determination is critical. However, requirements for different functions have not been easy to determine, "one reason being that the workload essential to the reserve mission, cannot always be identified" (Brauner and Gotz, 1991). The methods used for determining TAR officer manning at field activities are often discussed and debated. The most recent *Naval Audit Service Report* (1994) found multiple discrepancies in the rationale used to man RESCENS, REDCENS, and REDCOMs. The audit report recommended closures of RESCENS, and consolidation of REDCOMs. Many of these recommendations became moot points due to the Base Realignment and Consolidation Act. The questionable manning practices contributed to confusion about the most efficient methods for determining TAR manpower at the shore commands.

Two current initiatives in the Surface Reserve Force are REDCOM of the 21st Century and Infrastructure Plan 2000

(IP 2000). Both were developed, in part, to identify TAR billets that could be reprogrammed to gaining commands for a more effective means of providing reserve support to the fleet. The REDCOM of the 21st Century, as illustrated in Figure 3-1, consolidates functions at the REDCOM level, minimizes staff, moves TAR functions to Fleet Support Centers (FSCs), and assigns administrative responsibilities to selected reservists at the former centers, which have become Detachments reporting to the FSCs.




Figure 4-1. Fleet Support Center Organizational Structure

The "Infrastructure Plan 2000 is an initiative to transfer REDCOM functions to other activities, and establishes Fleet Support Centers at larger RESCENS" (Lange, 1998). This will reportedly permit the Naval Surface Reserve Force to move TAR billets to various active

organizations. The billet requirements at the active organizations depend on Echelon/level of command and "appear to be pretty consistent and based on CINC requirements" (Isgrig, 1998). The Fleet CINCs are to have Staff liaison/reserve advisors (RLOs) as well as people working specifically in manpower and mobilization training. The Type Commanders (e.g., Surface Forces Atlantic, Submarine Forces Pacific) are to have TAR billets for "special assistants" in manpower and mobilization planning, and the numbered fleets have RLOs in Plans. Although not formally a part of IP 2000, the Naval Reserve is transitioning to using TARs to participate in the direct recruitment of selected reservists. This function was undertaken to ensure that recruitment of reservists is directly attuned to fleet needs, as well as to supporting a naval presence in every state.

In summary, the standard against which selected reservists are being assessed and evaluated is meeting active Navy requirements. The quality of the "One Navy Force" is assessed in terms of how closely the reserve units and IMAs conform to the active force. The quality of the reserves is judged in terms of how long it takes to achieve active force standards. To provide trained and

ready reservists at the expected level, the organizational structure of the Surface Reserve Force will likely require further changes. The TAR officer has various responsibilities depending on what level of the organization s/he is assigned. At RESCENS, TARs are in command, and also train and support reservists. At Fleet Support Centers, TARs further develop their training, support, administrative and planning skills. And, at gaining commands and CINC staffs, TARs provide expertise for incorporating the selected reservist into operations, contingency planning, and policy development. At each of these levels, the type of training received by the drilling reservist has a direct bearing on the capability of the active force to perform its missions.

D. SUMMARY

The secondary research questions regarding the changes to the Naval Reserve mission, and the impact of policy changes on administering surface reserve training have been addressed. The predominate shifts in reserve training are the emphasis on providing support for Contingency operations and contributory (peacetime) support, and the receipt of training away from the RESCEN. Policy changes have included introducing flexible drills and the

organization of the drilling reserves into two readiness categories (CR-I or CR-D). Also, the CNSRF training philosophy provides reservists with guidance regarding a means of prioritizing their flexible drill schedules within their respective readiness categories. Reservists are being asked to participate more frequently in the daily routine of active commands. Unit relocation and information systems technology are methods that afford the reservist an opportunity to gain training and support the active forces.

Additionally, the secondary research questions regarding policy impact, as it pertains to TARs, on the administration of Surface reserve training, and TAR role changes have been addressed. First, the degree of coordination between the CINCs, gaining commands, TARs, and SELRES has grown due to the increased reliance on reserve support. Limited TAR personnel resources have resulted in facility closures, the reallocation of resources, and reorganizations within the surface reserve management structure. Fewer reservists performing drills at the field activities have increased the requirement for TARs to spend their time coordinating the frequent travel to exercises and gaining commands, monitoring readiness attainment, and

providing administrative support to manage the training process.

Chapter V continues the analysis of the secondary research question regarding the current role of TAR program officers in terms of administering surface reserve training. Additionally, the secondary research question on the effects of TAR program management on readiness is analyzed. Both analyses are derived from the survey and interview data. Finally, Chapter V analyzes survey and interview data that were exploratory in nature, but did not address specific research questions. Chapter VI draws conclusions from the analysis in Chapter IV and Chapter V to address the primary question of the value added of the TAR program.

V. ANALYSIS

A. OVERVIEW

The secondary research questions regarding the current and expected role of TAR officers, how the TAR program is managed, and the possible effects on readiness are analyzed using survey and interview data. Each survey and interview question is analyzed with respect to these research questions.

B. ROLE OF THE TAR OFFICER

1. Survey

The survey respondents were asked how often they had worked with TARs. This question was asked to determine the level of knowledge those surveyed had with respect to the TARs' roles and responsibilities. Only the SELRES officers responded to this question. Figure 5-1 displays the results of this question. Although the "rarely" response also included the "Not at all" option, the eight percent who chose that category commented that they had worked with at least two TARs. The responses indicate that 48 percent of the SELRES have occasionally worked with TARs, while the remaining 44 percent have worked with TARs extensively. These results support the assumption that the respondents

have a relatively comprehensive knowledge of TAR roles and responsibilities.




Figure 5-1. SELRES-TAR working relationship

When asked what these 25 SELRES officers expected from the TAR officers they worked with, they responded with more than one choice per respondent. Figure 5-2 summarizes their responses into four categories. Only five percent expected to receive training from the TARs. Sixty-nine percent expected TARs to either coordinate the SELRES participation in fleet exercises and operation, or to act as a point of contact (POC) regarding the experience, location, and availability of the reservists. The responses that fell under the "other" category were negative in nature. Seventeen percent stated they "viewed the TAR community as

a non-value added, additional level of red-tape, that is not necessary for our Navy."




Figure 5-2. What SELRES expect from TAR officers

When the TAR officers were asked what functions they expected to provide and/or perform for the SELRES, their responses fell primarily (72 percent) in the category of coordinating the SELRES' participation in fleet exercises and operations. The remaining 28 percent was evenly divided between the "train" and "POCs" categories. Figure 5-3 illustrates the responses of the six TAR survey respondents.




Figure 5-3. TAR expectations of support to SELRES

These respondents indicated that the training that they do provide is limited to some directed training, and training in cargo handling, assault craft operations, and for harbor defense units.

2. Interview

The interviewees were asked five questions that pertained to their roles and responsibilities, and policy issues.

The four TAR officers considered their responsibilities to fall in two categories. Figure 5-4 depicts their choices:




Figure 5-4. TAR Roles and Responsibilities

None of the four officers interviewed saw themselves as trainers of the reservist. Instead they stated that their time was evenly split performing administrative tasks and acting as liaison and/or advisors to the gaining commands.

Figure 5-5 reflects the actual amount of time the TAR officers spent on training, administration, and liaison. The least amount of time, 10 percent, was spent on training, where 50 percent was spent on administration, and 40 percent on liaison-associated tasks.




Figure 5-5. Actual Time Spent on Evolutions

Support from the Readiness Centers and Reserve Liaison Officers (RLOs) was an issue addressed in the interview. Figure 5-6 illustrates the average amount of time each source was found to have provided assistance to the RESCEN for training evolutions. Clearly, the reserve management chain of command provided a minimal level of training support to the RESCEN when compared to that received from the gaining command Reserve Liaison Officers.

The interviewees said that the reliance on the gaining command RLOs was a reciprocal relationship. The gaining commands require human intervention in order to locate the reserve resources available to them for exercises and mutual support. The personnel management systems for active

and reserve do not interface. The liaison task facilitates the identification of personnel for training opportunities.




Figure 5-6. Level of Assistance to RESCENS for Training Support

The degree of support received from the gaining command is helpful when coupled with the increasing demand for reserve support made by the gaining command. The post command TARs reported a 75 percent increase in the demand for SELRES in exercises and to provide contributory support. The remaining 25 percent in which they did not perceive a marked change in demand appeared to be concentrated in units designated as crisis-response delayed (CR-D). Additionally, the interviewees report that the frequency at which the reservist is able to travel to their gaining command or for exercises has increased. Figure 5-7 depicts the frequency that reservists are being sent to

their gaining commands or like active commands for training:




Figure 5-7. Inactive Duty for Training-Travel Usage

The IDTT frequency was dependent on the Surface program and location of the gaining command (distance from RESCEN) being supported. A Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity unit often receives IDTT funding every drill weekend. While a reserve unit, for example a Security Group in St. Louis, may combine an IDTT with their annual training once a year. One caveat in the correlation between demand and IDTT frequency is, reportedly, the less exposure reservists have with the active command, the less they are demanded, further amplifying the misconception that the reservist is not contributing to the mission.

C. TAR PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AND POLICY CHANGES

1. Survey

The roles and responsibilities of the TAR officer are an integral part of program management. Performance as a trainer, administrator, and the ability to liaise, impact the reservists' integration into the active forces. Figure 5-8 illustrates the opinion of those surveyed regarding the level of training readiness provided by TAR officers assigned the responsibility of training the selected reservist to their mobilization billet requirements. The




Figure 5-8. Survey Results of TAR Officer Direct Contribution to Reserve Training Readiness

following comments were made in response to the request in the survey to comment on the reasons for choosing each response. These comments are an indication of why 88

percent felt that the TAR officer contributed nothing toward the reservists training readiness:

I cannot think of a single incidence where a TAR trained me, or my unit for any fleet operational evolution. It has always been administrative.

Most at NRC/NRRC were too far removed from operational experience.

Typically the TARs at reserve centers are under challenged, and do not provide a product or service that is key to the success of our Navy.

The mismatch between the TAR's stated mission and its ability to carry out that mission is reflected in these responses and comments. If measured solely by reaction criteria, the face validity of these results would indicate a complete inability to provide one of the most critical services for which a TAR is responsible. Clearly, the majority of the respondents feel that TARs make no direct contribution to training readiness.

2. Interview

Whether or not the TAR program provides the only source of expertise to facilitate the reservists' training evolutions was a question posed to the interviewees. The responses to this question were evenly split due to different perspectives. The two officers who took the strict perspective of a RESCEN Commanding Officer felt that

their level of reserve expertise was integral to their success in accomplishing the mission. One even stated that, "if the staff is not very strong, the placement of a USN officer in command of a RESCEN can be devastating." While on the other hand, the other two officers reflected on their experiences with commissioned units where they felt it was their amphibious warfare or surface warfare expertise that enhanced their job performance, not only their ability as a reserve subject matter expert.

Two of the four interviewed felt that only reserve subject matter experts can facilitate training evolutions for the reservists. However, all four officers felt that the differences between active and reserve administrative procedures create the barriers that cause the active forces to rely on TAR support.

As previously mentioned, the interviewees reported that the CINCs and gaining commands have been unable to readily identify reserve billets due to separate and distinct management information systems. This is believed to have contributed to the CINCs' and gaining commands' difficulty in accurately assessing the number, type and readiness of reserve personnel assigned to their respective

areas of responsibility. The reserve subject matter expert provides the linkage between the two systems.

If the differences are overcome, all the interviewees agree that alternative types of manpower could be utilized to support the reserve program. Their experiences have shown them that little difference exists between the job performance required and provided by USN and TARs at RESCENS or on active duty staffs. These experiences are supported by the observations of the SELRES officers surveyed, in these comments:

The TARs in operational billets are valuable.

In operational roles, the TARs are almost indistinguishable from USN.

In summary, the requirement for reserve program management appears relevant to the efficient coordination of gaining command needs, trained personnel, and the identification of the reservists to meet those needs.

D. TRAINING LOCATION IMPACT ON RESERVE READINESS

1. Survey

The receipt of relevant training takes place on two fronts, RESCEN/REDCEN and fleet exercises or contributory support. Both the SELRES and TAR officers were requested to evaluate the effectiveness of the training they received or

provided at various locations. These locations were, fleet exercises, gaining command (contributory support), at RESCENS, and REDCENS. Figure 5-9 reflects the opinions of the survey participants with regard to the effectiveness of training provided away from the reserve field activities. The proportionality of responses received regarding the effectiveness of the training received or provided during fleet exercises and while performing contributory support is exactly the same. Sixty-eight percent of the survey respondents stated that the training experienced on fleet exercises or in providing contributory support was very effective in keeping reservists mission ready.




Figure 5-9. Survey Results of Fleet and Contributory Support Training Effectiveness

Comments made by the survey respondents supported these opinions:

We were fully integrated with the active troops.
We were doing the job we were hired to do.

The training helped develop and hone skills.

Real work relevant to the gaining command was
being accomplished.

Conversely, Figure 5-10 reflects that the respondents
felt that the training conducted at the RESCEN or REDCEN
was deemed as not very effective in keeping reservists
mission ready.




Figure 5-10. Survey Results on RESCEN/REDCEN
Training Effectiveness

Reserve Center classroom training does not lend itself
to a wide variety of training that is easily transferable.
Medical skills training labs and damage control trainers
provide basic skills knowledge but were often found to be
unrealistic and poorly equipped. Outside of a limited
number of storekeeper, yeoman, and hospital corpsman hands-

on tasks being performed at the center, little else resembles the training required to participate functionally out in the fleet. Hence, the following solicited comments made by the respondents were not unexpected:

Irrelevant to the real mission of the unit.

Material presented by instructors was considerably different than fleet procedures.

Any work outside of administration done at the Reserve Center is not relevant to the active duty command. Real work is done at the active duty command.

To determine if the two groups of dissimilar responses were due to chance or not, a Chi-square test was performed. The responses used to develop Figures 5-9 and 5-10 were used in this test. Although the survey sample size was small (31 officers), the expected frequencies are larger than five and therefore the Chi-square is statistically significant (Levine, Berenson, Stephen, 1997). Table 5-1 indicates that the Chi-square (33.621) is quite large given the degrees of freedom (2). The p value is less than .0001, meaning that there is less than one chance in 10,000 of obtaining a chi-square value of this size if the variables were independent in the population. This means there could be a relationship between location and effectiveness. In other words, results indicate the respondents in this study

strongly perceive fleet and contributory support training to be much more effective than Reserve Center or Readiness Center training.

STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF LOCATION BY EFFECT			
Statistic	DF	Value	p-value
Chi-Square	2	33.621	0.000
Phi Coefficient		0.736	
Sample Size = 62			

Table 5-1. Results of Chi-Square Test on Training Effectiveness

Another method of gaining experience is through participation in actual operations. The method described as fleet training refers to exercises routinely conducted by the active forces. In actual operations drilling reservists volunteer to be recalled to augment the active forces during an operation. Figure 5-11 illustrates sixty percent of the SELRES and eighty-three percent of the TARs reported being involved in actual operations.




Figure 5-11. Involvement in Actual Operations

For those involved in operations, their opinion of its training effectiveness is roughly divided between it being about average and very effective. Figure 5-12 depicts this division.




Figure 5-12. Survey Respondents Opinion of the Training Effectiveness of Actual Operations

These comments provide insight into understanding the rationale used by the SELRES to evaluate actual operations:

It's the real deal.

Staff work was necessary, which would not have been done without Reservists.

To be an evaluator in fleet training exercises you need real-time, up-to-date experience. Things change too rapidly for a reserve officer to evaluate fleet training.

I was performing real-world duties and accepted as an equal with my contemporaries.

The responses to the effectiveness of training received at various locations, resoundingly indicate that the ability of the reservists to gain relevant training is dependent upon their exposure to fleet exercises, operations, and in providing contributory support.

2. Interview

All of the post-command TAR officers were in total agreement in their responses to the questions in the "Training" section of the interview protocol. Reportedly, the prioritization of evolutions and efficient resource usage varied depending upon regional assignment of the RESCEN. The types of training routinely provided by the RESCEN are directed and rate training. This is accomplished in a classroom environment or through computer-based

training. Ten percent of the time spent on drill weekends was dedicated to relevant training. Reportedly, the majority of the weekend is spent on arranging for and finding future training opportunities, processing paperwork, and maintaining personnel, training, and medical records.

The interviewees stated, unanimously, that what little relevant training does occur at the RESCEN can be provided by the active duty command or via the internet. The other weekend administrative functions were divided into two categories. Thirty percent of the functions, training advertisements and applications, could be done via the internet directly to SURFRESFOR. And, the TAR officers stated that the remaining 70 percent, the processing of travel and record maintenance, could be done using skeleton crews at RESCENS or personnel at mega centers.

The interviewees stated that the training received by reservists outside the reserve centers was accomplished through exercises and by providing contributory support. Figure 5-13 depicts the breakdown most often experienced by the post-command TAR officers. Although a limited number of reservists known to the interviewees were involved in actual operations, the total number did not constitute

participation in operations as a measurable contributor to training readiness.




Figure 5-13. Reserve Support as a Function of Type of Training

In summary, the interviewees reported that reservists are being provided relevant training "out in the fleet" that is preparing the reservists for mission requirements. Additionally, the administrative tail connected with their training evolutions may also be accomplished "outside" the traditional fixed staff RESCEN environment.

E. TRAVEL DISTANCE EFFECT ON PERSONNEL

The findings described in this section do not correspond directly to research questions, but contribute to the overall study. The availability of the reservists for training and recall may be impacted upon by a

"willingness" to travel. Therefore, the author requested that the SELRES address a few questions related to their willingness to travel to drill, to what extent distance traveled affects their satisfaction with reserve participation, and how often they can drill (job flexibility).

The distance the respondents currently live from their respective reserve centers ranges from a low of 10 to a high of 1200 miles, with a median of 179 miles. Figure 5-14 reflects the distance the reservists would be willing to travel or drive for drill weekends. A large majority, 80 percent, is willing to travel more than 200 miles. Adding the 16 percent of those who would travel between 100 and 200 miles, 96 percent of the reservists are willing to travel over 100 miles to drill.

More than 60 percent of the reservists felt that the distance they traveled had no effect on their satisfaction with their reserve participation. This corresponds to the 60 percent who felt that staying close to home was "not important" to them in meeting their reserve commitment, and their "somewhat" amenability to serving in billets located in various areas throughout the United States. However,




Figure 5-14. Distance Willing to Travel to Drill

respondents', whether in the 96 percentile or the four percentile, did report potential problems in traveling too great a distance. These problems were:

You work all week and all weekend you get tired. Add to that a long drive to and from Drill and you get really burnt out!

I am not independently wealthy with the financial means to fund on my own far-flung travel to drill sites.

Better financial commitments should be made to our enlisted sailors. More and better employer support/commitment is required.

The comment regarding employer support and commitment effects a citizen-sailors availability for training and operations. When the SELRES were asked how often they could afford to take off from work to drill, 60 percent were limited to between two and four days per month. Figure 5-15

illustrates the remaining responses. Over a third of the respondents are able to take off more than four days or have no restrictions. These results coupled with the distance responses indicate that most of these reservists are able to take advantage of flexible drills and participate more often than weekends only to receive relevant training.




Figure 5-15. Availability for Flexible Drilling

F. Summary

The secondary research questions regarding the current and expected role of TAR officers, how the TAR program is managed, and what are the possible effects on readiness were analyzed using survey and interview data. The analysis indicates that the role of the TAR officer, according to those surveyed, is to either coordinate the SELRES

SELRES participation in fleet exercises and operation, or to act as a point of contact regarding the experience, location, and availability of the reservists. A portion of the coordination requires liaison with fleet and gaining command personnel. The survey respondents feel that TARs make no direct contribution to training readiness. The TAR officers feel they provide essential subject matter expertise due to the differences in active and reserve administrative procedures. The training and experience received through participation in exercises, operations, and by providing contributory support are more effective than that received at RESCENs and REDCENs. Additionally, the exploratory questions revealed that, in general, the selected reservists surveyed are not encumbered by travel distances or job restrictions in the performance of their reserve commitments.

Chapter VI draws conclusions from this analysis to address the primary question of the value added of the TAR program. Additionally, the recommendations present areas of potential improvement in Surface Reserve Force management processes.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis analyzed various aspects of the Surface Reserve Force to determine the value added of the surface Training and Administration of Reserves program. Research questions addressed: changes in the reserve training mission, policies on the administration of reserve training, the role of the TAR officer in administering training, and the effects of TAR program management on reserve unit readiness. Due to the small number of respondents interviewed and surveyed, and the non-representative nature of the sample, the research is exploratory. A larger scale study could likely amplify the preliminary findings found here.

The analysis of reserve policies, and the interview and questionnaire data resulted in three main conclusions: the policy to maintain a Reserve Center in every state is problematic; the Surface Reserve Force's organizational structure and processes have been inconsistent; and, separate and distinct management information systems and administrative procedures have created barriers to the ability of the Commanders in Chief and gaining commands to readily identify their reserve resources. However, overall,

the TAR program does add substantial value to fleet training and readiness.

The conclusions reveal a surface reserve program in transition. Initially, the TAR community trained reservists at reserve centers and on ships. Indeed, the TAR community was created to provide this training. Gradually, training has transitioned more to the fleet and to gaining commands in the form of exercises and contributory support. Throughout this transition the TAR community shifted its role from trainer to coordinator, administrator, and point of contact (liaison) for active commands requiring reserve support. To elaborate on the overall conclusion, TAR officers accomplishing these new roles, i.e., Reserve Liaison Officers, appear to add value to the reserve program. Recommendations are provided to address shortcomings documented in the three conclusions, and to enhance the utilization of reservists by the active forces. The following provides amplified conclusions followed by recommendations:

1. The policy to maintain a RESCEN in every state is problematic. A center in every state requires drilling reservists to be too far geographically from gaining commands, and too far from relevant training platforms.

Reservists are often at a disadvantage because RESCEN training does not prepare them for fleet requirements, and the fleet suffers because it receives less than optimally trained reservists. Additionally, fiscal constraints have mandated careful consideration and reevaluation of how and where reservists are trained to maintain an acceptable readiness level. Multiple alternatives exist for the reservists to receive relevant training and for the training to be cost effective.

- **Assign only select unit types and personnel to "heartland" reserve centers.** The Director, Naval Reserve could limit assignments in the "heartland" to CR-D, Seabee, and medical units. These units do not require extensive training days with their gaining commands and could receive relevant training from local civilian organizations, i.e., hospitals, fire departments, and community self-help projects.
- **Explore the use of information technology to provide support to gaining commands.** This would require the identification of billet requirements (functions) and specific courses of instruction that lend themselves to computer networking as a means to

support the active commands, i.e., staff, Judge Advocate General, and Public Affairs Office administrative support. Providing a virtual link to the gaining commands has the potential to increase the number of unit types or personnel assigned to "heartland" units without diminishing readiness. Additionally, increased emphasis on using information technology between RESCENS and gaining commands could increase training efficiencies and eventually lower costs based on limited use of Inactive Duty for Training, Travel (IDTT) funds.

- **Assign more units geographically closer to their gaining command.** Changing the physical location of units that are required to spend extensive time at their gaining commands could reduce the high costs of traveling from heartland areas to the coasts. This, in turn, would encourage reservists to train directly and more frequently with their gaining commands.

2. The Surface Reserve Force's organizational structure and processes have been inconsistent across regions and commands, creating inefficiencies in terms of

optimizing training readiness and utilizing scarce resources. Manning levels at RESCENS and REDCOMs are not uniform. The execution of two different restructuring initiatives, the REDCOM of the 21st Century and IP 2000, could focus scarce resources towards supporting reservists' and gaining commands' needs.

- **Establish shore manpower requirements for the Surface Reserve Force commands.** Requirements should be based on the goal of all training being attained through the use of Active-duty for Training and IDTT. Requirements for TARs should be based on ensuring that the reserve personnel meet all medical and dental readiness requirements. Finally, requirements for field activity personnel should be based on their responsibility for monitoring training requirements, providing administrative support, and making travel arrangements. The point is to ensure that reservists are able to dedicate drill time almost exclusively to readiness and gaining command needs.

3. Separate and distinct management information systems and administrative procedures have created barriers

to the ability of the CINCs and gaining commands to readily identify their reserve resources. This relates to the CINCs' and gaining commands' difficulty in accurately assessing the number, type, and readiness of reserve personnel assigned to their respective areas of responsibility.

- **Increasingly assign TARs to gaining commands and CINC staffs.** As subject matter experts, TARs are expected to assist the active forces in identifying the reserve requirements. As such, they must work with the Surface Reserve Force Headquarters to effectively align daily and contingency operational requirements with personnel resources available in the reserves. The use of subject matter experts at the gaining commands and on CINC staffs is an evolving and much-needed measure.
- **Establish comprehensive CINC and gaining command staff manpower requirements for TARs.** These requirements must be based on reserve requirements (allocation) within the CINCs' and gaining commands' respective areas of responsibility. The job requirements for each TAR billet must be well

defined, documented, and relevant to the efficient coordination of CINC/gaining command needs. This includes providing trained personnel, and facilitating the identification of reservists to meet those needs.

- **Improve the link between reserve and active management information systems.** This could permit alignment of Reserve Unit Identification Codes to their respective CINC and gaining command Unit Identification Codes. This will enable CINCs and gaining commands to prioritize which billets are mission essential, and more accurately reflect the needs of the gaining command. Additionally, unit and individual assignments could be readily compared to operational and contingency plans.

Implementation of the recommendations may reduce some of the barriers between reserve and active force management. Continued integration of reservists' with the active force should strengthen both reserve forces and fleet training and operational readiness. In the future, there eventually may be no need to have a separate TAR community to manage reserve resources. However, the

elimination of the TAR program would require fundamental policy and cultural changes. These would include detailing active personnel into reserve management billets and, in turn, rewarding and promoting those personnel for succeeding in their reserve management assignments.

APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Demographics

1. How long have you been associated with the reserves?
2. Current desig/grade, rate/rank; and, designator history?
3. In what capacity, and in what unit?
 - Active Duty / Gaining Command POC
RC staff, Reserve Liaison
 - TAR
RC staff, RES or AD staff, Ship's company (NRF/USN)

Changes

1. What changes have you experienced in the way you received "training" before Desert Storm and now?
 - (Before)
 - (After)

Roles

1. What do you see as the responsibilities of TAR(s) at your command? As a TAR in general?
2. Do you consider the TARs at your gaining command and Reserve Center as:
 - Trainers
 - Administrators
 - Liaison / Advisors
3. How often does the Readiness Center staff and/or Reserve Liaison at the AD command provide you with assistance?

Policies

1. How often do you send reservists to their gaining command or like active command for training?
2. Are the gaining commands requesting reservists to assist them in accomplishing their mission (everyday requirements)?

TAR Program

1. Do you believe your job can only be accomplished by a reserve "subject matter expert?" If so, do you believe that the differences between reserve and active administration create a barrier between AD and SELRES personnel? If not, then what type of individual (CIV, AD) can perform your job as effectively?
2. Are you able to differentiate (job performance) between those individuals who are TARs and other members of the command?
3. Identify how much time was spent on training, administration, and liaison in each job.

Training

1. What kind of training do you do at the reserve center, on-board ship, with the unit (Commissioned)?
2. Are you spending more or less time "training" reservists than you expected?
3. How much of the training can "only" be accomplished at the Reserve Center?
4. Can the "administration" be provided via mega centers?
 - Via website or record-holding centers?
5. How often do you train at the Reserve Center?
 - What type of training do you do there? How is that training accomplished?
 - Who provides this training?

Training Location

1. Were the reservists involved in formal training exercises or were they providing contributory support/backfill?

Comments/recommendations on improving management of SELRES.

APPENDIX B. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Are you a Selected Reservist, TAR, or USN?
2. What designator and paygrade are you?
 - a. What is your designator history?
(How long have you been a Selected Reservist, TAR, USN?)
3. How long have you been associated with the reserves?
4. How often have you worked with TAR officers at your command?
 1. Not at all, rarely
 2. Occasionally
 3. Extensively
5. What did you expect from these officers?
 - a. To train you in certain evolutions?
 - b. To coordinate your participation in Fleet exercises and/or operations?
 - c. To act as a POC that knows your experience, location, and availability?
 - d. Other (state)
6. About how much of your Drill time do you personally spend on Administrative work - finding training opportunities, requesting orders, traveling?
 1. Less than half
 2. About half
 3. More than half
7. Have TARs in your experience trained you for certain evolutions?
 - If yes, what evolutions?
 - To what extent was the training linked to Fleet requirements?
 1. Not at all
 2. Somewhat
 3. Greatly

8. Have you participated in Fleet exercises?
If yes, what type (Reserve, NATO, active - name)?
For how long?
How effective was this training in terms of Fleet needs (in your opinion)?
 1. Not very effective
 2. About average
 3. Very effective
and, why was it effective/not effective?
9. Have you provided "peacetime contributory support"?
If yes, what type (billet related or operational need)?
For how long?
How effective was this training in terms of Fleet needs (in your opinion)?
 1. Not very effective
 2. About average
 3. Very effective
and, why was it effective/not effective?
10. Have you received and/or provided training at a Reserve Center?
If yes, what type (mobilization, DCTT, SBS, Directed)?
How effective was this training in terms of Fleet needs (in your opinion)?
 1. Not very effective
 2. About average
 3. Very effective
and, why was it effective/not effective?
11. Have you received and/or provided training at a Readiness Center?
If yes, what type (mobilization, DCTT, SBS, Directed)?
How effective was this training in terms of Fleet needs (in your opinion)?
 1. Not very effective
 2. About average
 3. Very effective
and, why was it effective/not effective?

12. Have you been involved in actual operations?
If yes, which ones?, for how long?
How effective was this training in terms of Fleet needs (in your opinion)?
1. Not very effective
2. About average
3. Very effective
and, why was it effective/not effective?
13. How far (miles) do you live from the Reserve Center?
14. How far would you be willing to travel/drive for Drill weekends?
1. Less than 100 miles
2. Between 100 - 200 miles
3. More than 200 miles
15. How often can you afford to take off from work to Drill? (How flexible is your work schedule?)
1. Not at all
2. Between 2 - 4 days monthly
3. More than 4 days monthly
4. Whenever (no restrictions)
16. To what extent does the distance travel for Drill weekends affect your satisfaction with reserve participation?
1. Not at all
2. Somewhat
3. Greatly
and, why?
17. How important is "staying close to home" to meet your reserve commitment ?
1. Not important
2. Somewhat important
3. Very important
and, why?
18. How amenable are you to being assigned to various areas (units) throughout the U.S. during your career?
1. Not at all
2. Somewhat
3. Greatly
and, why?

TARs:

1. What functions do/did you expect to provide and/or perform for the SELRES?

- a. To train them in certain evolutions?
- b. To coordinate their participation in Fleet exercises and/or operations?
- c. To act as a POC that knows their experience, location, and availability?
- d. Other (state)

2. Have you had the opportunity to train selected reservists for certain evolutions?

If yes, what evolutions?

To what extent was the training linked to Fleet requirements?

- 1. Not at all
- 2. Somewhat
- 3. Greatly

and, why?

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