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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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29 AUGUST 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPAN CONTINUES DEBATE ON SDI PARTICIPATION

OW081101 Tokyo KYODO in English 1050 GMT 8 Aug 86

[Text] Tokyo, Aug 8 KYODO -- A cabinet task force held a fourth brainstorming session Friday over Japan's participation in the U.S. strategic defense initiative (SDI) project and officials hinted a conclusion was near. Officials said the meeting focused on implications of Japanese participation and a 1969 Diet resolution banning military exploitation of Japan's space development efforts. "We don't think participation in the research phase of the SDI program will violate the Diet resolution," a government source said.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda, who chaired Friday's session, said he would like to call another session late this month or early next month to reach a conclusion "one way or the other." In a speech Thursday, Gotoda said he foresaw a "positive" conclusion from the ministerial task force.

Reacting to Gotoda's remarks, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone maintained his government is still studying the matter and said he doesn't know when a final decision will be taken.

Political sources say the government hopes to have the decision in time for Defense Agency Director-General Yuko Kurihara's scheduled September 2-8 visit to the United States. Kurihara, a member of the SDI ministerial group, is traveling to Washington at the invitation of U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Japan's participation in the SDI research project is expected to figure in the agenda of their talks.

Apart from Gotoda and Kurihara, other cabinet members who took part in the meeting included Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari, the minister of international trade and industry and the director-general of the Science and Technology Agency. It was the first gathering since Nakasone inaugurated a new government following the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party's landslide election victory in July.

West German and some other U.S. NATO allies have agreed to take part in the project, and the so-called "West German" model has been cited as a formula which Japan may follow. West Germany allows the private sector to undertake SDI-related research on behalf of the Pentagon while the government itself stays away from the program.

Government sources say Japan hopes to work out an agreement with the United States this year on ground rules for Japan's participation, including proprietary rights to research achievements and flowback of technology to Japan.

The ministerial task force was set up in April, a month after a government fact-finding mission recommended Japan take part in research work on the SDI project. Politics apart, "research work on the SDI project is important for Japan's high technology," said Bunsei Sato, a former minister of posts and telecommunications.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA VIEWS REAGAN-GORBACHEV LETTERS, 'ORCHESTRATED OPTIMISM'

PM071611 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Aug 86 First Edition p 4

[PRAVDA political observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov article: "The Washington Drip-Dripping"]

[Text] This is now the second week that U.S. newspaper pages have been sprinkled with abundant material devoted to correspondence between the leaders of the United States and the USSR and prospects for a new meeting between the two. The interest in this topic is, in itself, natural and logical. But the "orchestrated optimism" of this patently stage-managed newspaper campaign provokes caution. For all the diversity of expression, a definite leitmotif can be traced in it. The whole cascade of commentaries sticks to the same key and, moreover, it is essentially fed from a single source. This being a series of "leaks", or, indeed, the drip-dripping from the upper story of Washington's political kitchen. It is said that R. Reagan's July letter in response to M.S. Gorbachev's June letter has cleared away all the obstructions on the path toward a new summit meeting [vstrecha v verkhakh] and, they say, if the readiness displayed by Washington for compromises is reciprocated by Moscow, this meeting could pass off productively.

The President himself also confirmed the key of the "leaks." Addressing students working in institutions in the capital, he declared:

"Although I cannot communicate any details about these negotiations to you, I can tell you that once again hope for success is emerging within me... The specific proposals contained in my letter were put forward in response to the alarm expressed by the Russians; they were put forward in those spheres where our interests are close... We have given a constructive answer. We have clearly demonstrated our serious desire for an improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. But now it is the Russians' turn..."

Let me immediately make it clear that the U.S. President's letter to the CPSU Central Committee general secretary was not published. But on the basis of what is now being written in Washington and what is being said in Moscow about these commentaries, I would like to voice my opinion regarding the upbeat tone [mazhorny zvon] of the transatlantic drip-dripping.

First of all I want to note that the unprecedented hullabaloo concerning Reagan's letter does not concern the key problems connected with holding a new summit meeting. In my view, two criteria are more important than anything else when interpreting the U.S. response. First, how far the proposals contained in it accord with the principle of equal security. And second, how far these proposals accord with the historic goal the two leaders jointly confirmed in Geneva: to end the arms race on earth, and not to allow it to be carried into space.

As is known, the participants in the Geneva meeting pledged to strive for the normalization of Soviet-American relations, the improvement of the international situation, and the acceleration of talks of arms reduction. One can now vividly see the attitude of each of the sides toward these pledges. The USSR has come out with a series of large-scale proposals on the whole range of problems of reducing and eliminating arms and monitoring [kontrol] this process. However, Moscow has not perceived reciprocal movement. Washington continued to regale Moscow the same way it did prior to Geneva.

In order to stop marking time, the Soviet side took yet another important step. The June letter from the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to the U.S. President put forward major new compromise proposals.

The USSR expressed its readiness to agree to work in the SDI sphere being restricted to the level of laboratory research -- that is, the threshold the United States to all intents and purposes has already reached -- given mutual accord between the two states not to exceed the ABM Treaty for at least 15 years. Although the Soviet Union would have preferred to come to an immediate agreement on a radical 50-percent reduction in the strategic offensive arms capable of reaching each other's territories, it would be prepared initially to limit ICBM's SLBM's and heavy bombers to equal levels, with the question of medium-range arms to be resolved separately.

The White House could not ignore such a substantive step toward compromise. It has to admit the seriousness of the Soviet proposals and even state the possibility of a "turning point" in relations with the Kremlin. The work on the reply letter lasted a whole month. But, so far as can be judged from the "leaks," its contents cannot be considered to be a constructive response.

According to U.S. press reports, Reagan is expressing willingness to postpone the deployment of space-based ABM systems for 7 years. For 5 of those years the United States intends to develop [razrabotka] and test SDI components alongside its research. In the subsequent 2 years talks would be held on the conditions under which the space system would be deployed, given simultaneous joint agreement on the scrapping of strategic ballistic missiles. If such an agreement were not reached within 2 years each side would be entitled to deploy a space-based ABM system after giving the other side 6 months notice.

To put it bluntly, a meager spring is producing fountains of optimism generated by a droplet from Washington! There is even skepticism in the U.S. press on this score. "First," THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR correctly notes, "the proposed 'postponement' of SDI deployment is actually not a concession since in any event the United States will be unable to deploy such a system for the next 5-7 years. General Abrahamson, head of the SDI program, has stated that it will take at least 10 years for the United States to be able to embark on the deployment of space-based ABM systems, provided that current research provides proof of feasibility for such systems. Second, the Russians will hardly agree to the unilateral deployment of SDI even in the distant future. They are seriously concerned that a space shield will provide the United States with a first-strike potential."

Both the views expressed by the newspaper are perfectly valid. In fact, the American side is not only trying to evade any restrictions that would hinder the planned work under the SDI program. It is still seeking to ensure its own military superiority. This is shown by the proposal to eliminate strategic ballistic missiles but not all nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory. The White House certainly

does not propose eliminating or even reducing heavy bombers with cruise missiles or long-range sea-based cruise missiles. It only talks of eliminating ICBM's -- that would facilitate the creation [sozdaniye] of a space ABM system, for in that case it would have to deal with a smaller number of warheads capable of participating in a counterstrike.

"Heads I win, tails you lose' -- this is probably the only thing Reagan did not say in his recent letter to Gorbachev," Canada's GAZETTE notes with irony. "The President's reply contains no concessions. The only thing that is clear from it is that Reagan wants to cancel or at least emasculate the ABM Treaty."

On Hiroshima remembrance day the U.S. President once again declared publicly that under no circumstances will he abandon SDI and that the United States will begin deploying the space ABM system as soon as it has been created [sozdat].

"Yes, President Reagan wants the summit meeting to take place," THE BOSTON GLOBE writes. "But it is an important fact, of which Americans must be aware, that the only result that Reagan wants to achieve at a summit meeting is to prompt the Russians to legitimize the destruction, that he has carried out, of the entire system of agreed military restrictions. He wants to achieve this aim, but to avoid responsibility for it."

Even if the statements cited here sounded a dissonant note in the chorus of orchestrated glorification, I am pleased that my opinion is shared by sober-minded colleagues on the other side of the ocean. Indeed, although the drip-dripping of Washington "leaks" is clearly designed to create the impression that the possibility of a new summit meeting and its success depend on further concessions by the Soviet Union, the facts attest that, whereas Moscow's June letter contained major new compromise proposals, no countermovement can be discerned in Washington's July letter.

Even an indirect analysis of this document on the basis of the comments on it in the American press makes it possible to conclude that its substance hardly meets the two aforementioned criteria: Neither the principle of equal security, for it reflects a desire for one-sided military advantages, nor the task of ending the arms race on earth and preventing it in space, for it proposes talks on the terms for military rivalry in space and not the rejection of its militarization.

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CSO: 5200/1512

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S BOVIN DISCUSSES REAGAN LETTER TO GORBACHEV

PM091910 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug 86 Morning Edition pp 4-5

[IZVESTIYA political observer A. Bovin article: "Feigned Optimism"]

[Text] It is probable that everyone who takes an interest in politics would like to read the letters exchanged between the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President. But letters -- political ones especially -- are not always intended for general consumption. There are subjects whose discussion -- at certain stages at least -- demands confidentiality. Negotiations, R. Reagan has remarked, are "tender plants that can wither and die in the glare of publicity." Well, I will grant you that -- with reservations...

However, before politicians in Moscow had time to read the President's message attentively, journalists in Washington were already well into a discussion of its contents. Their judgments, as has indeed been established, were extremely diverse. But those commentaries that reflected the position of the White House were couched in approximately the following terms. The administration has studied M.S. Gorbachev's letter most attentively and sees positive elements in it; in its turn the administration is taking a big step in Moscow's direction and, as far as possible, is heeding the Russians' concern and wishes; hence, "the ball is now in the Soviet court." The optimistic conclusion is made that R. Reagan's letter will open wide the door to the second Soviet-U.S. summit meeting and permits the hope that everything will be "okay".

This is their reasoning. The causes of this official and semiofficial optimism are not hard to understand. Having clearly overdone it in connection with the "strong-arm game," the negativism, and all manner of provocative tricks, encountering growing pressure from its allies -- and indeed from U.S. public opinion -- and not wishing to appear too "hawkish" in the run-in to the November elections, the administration is seeking to display its peacemaking face, to sooth the allies, and to demonstrate to American its concern to improve relations between the United States and the USSR.

One could only rejoice if such a shift had actually occurred in Washington's policy. For the time being, however, there are no grounds for rejoicing. Or, to put it midly, there is little ground for rejoicing. Of course, I do not know what the official reaction to the U.S. President's letter will be. But it seems to me that this letter -- judging by what is being written in Washington and said in Moscow concerning its contents -- can in no way be viewed as movement toward an accord, toward a compromise, toward a reasonable balance of interests.

Let us examine the main issue -- SDI, the "star wars" program. Our idea is a complete ban on the emplacement of weapons in space. As a traditional stage we have proposed that the ABM Treaty be observed for a period of some 15-20 years; that is, to confine research [issledovaniye] in the said field to the laboratory. During this period we also proposed to radically reduce the offensive potentials of nuclear weapons.

What is the U.S. President proposing? Over a 5-year period the sides will research, develop, and test [issledovat, rasrabatyvat, ispytyvat] antimissile systems but not deploy [razvorachivat] them. If the research and testing show that such systems can be created [sozdat], the sides will undergo negotiations for 2 years on how to move towards "an era of defensive systems." If these negotiations prove to be fruitless, each side has the right to deploy its system, after giving the other side 6 months notice of the beginning of deployment.

Now let us look more closely.

First, the stated 5-year period has no practical significance whatsoever, inasmuch as -- according to those in charge of the "star wars" program -- the Americans will be able to start deploying the ABM system only in the mid-1990's, that is, in a minimum of 10 years.

Second, throughout these 5 years the Americans intend to violate [narushat] the ABM Treaty "without exceeding" it ["ne vykhodya" iz] because they intend to take the research outside the laboratories. Indeed the very "research" itself is understood extremely broadly -- even as far as full-scale tests [ispytaniya v realnykh masshtabakh].

Third, the Americans are proposing negotiations not on prohibiting the militarization of space but on how and at what pace to pursue this militarization. In the final analysis they are reserving for themselves the right to act as they deem fit.

So just where is the consideration of "Soviet concern" here? Where is the movement toward compromise? What we are essentially being offered is to express with our own signature our assent to the U.S. "star wars" program. And nothing else.

I will not go into the other elements of R. Reagan's letter scattered about the pages of the Western press. They are all formulated according to a single design: to take account of U.S. interests to the maximum degree while at the same time ignoring the interests of the USSR. Here, however, I must mention some reservations. The letter possibly does contain some pluses or other, some interesting details, some sort of movement along the path toward mutual understanding. But, as they say, on analyzing the whole picture there is no sign of any of this [no pri analize, tak skazat, na slukh vsego etogo ne vidno].

Correspondingly, nor is there any sign of promising signals testifying to the President's desire to complete his meeting with M.S. Gorbachev with a specific constructive result. Fly across the ocean merely to get to know each other again? Scarcely much point in that. One would very much like the meeting to take place and for it not to be reduced to a routine "spirit" but really improve Soviet-U.S. relations, and to advance the cause of disarmament. But, unlike, say, a moratorium, an agreement cannot be unilateral. It would be useful if people in and around the White House ceased negotiating with each other and thought seriously about how negotiations with the Soviet Union should be pursued. Neither pressure nor cunning will work here. Only honesty. Only the desire and the ability to understand one's partner's concerns and interests.

THE WASHINGTON POST recently cited the following utterance of "one White House official": Weinberger "would have to be dragged by the ears to an agreement." If it were only Weinberger... And this is the whole point. Washington has already learned to talk about the fact that it is necessary to reach agreement [dogovarivatsya]. People there are still not inwardly disposed toward such agreement. In my opinion R. Reagan's letter reflects precisely such a picture.

Of course, nobody can prohibit Americans from accompanying the utterances of their President with optimistic fanfares. All the same, it is better not to be too hasty.

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CSO: 5200/1512

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA: NO 'POSITIVE APPROACH' IN REAGAN LETTER TO GORBACHEV

PM131642 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Aug 86 First Edition p 5

[T. Kolesnichenko "Rejoinder": "Is It Really A Compromise?"]

[Text] It is sometimes jokingly said that a "pessimist is a well-informed optimist." But how do you define the actions of those politicians who, despite having negative information at their disposal, put on a show of official optimism for the public, in other words, pretend that things are the opposite to what they really are?

This question arises in connection with the stream of "leaks" from Washington concerning President Reagan's July letter replying to CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's June letter that continues unabated. The U.S. President himself is setting the tone. "I replied in a constructive spirit," he said in an interview that has just been published with West Germany's BILD-ZEITUNG... "Now it is up to them: If they reply in a constructive spirit we can make important progress." It sounds highly optimistic. If anyone, the author should know what is in the letter. The content of the letter should also be known to White House official press Deputy Spokesman Speakes who when asked to comment on the PRAVDA item (8 August) replied without batting an eyelash, so to speak: "We have replied in what is, from our viewpoint, a constructive manner. It is now up to the Soviet side." Then Speakes (like U.S. official propaganda in general) claimed that Reagan's reply paved the way for Soviet-American disarmament agreements and a summit meeting.

To put it mildly, this is a surprising stance. After all, there has been a great deal of comment in the U.S. press, which somehow learned of the content of Reagan's letter, noting that in reply to the Soviet Union's reasonable compromise proposals the White House had not responded in kind and had not budged from its position on cardinal problems of disarmament, above all regarding plans for transferring the arms race to space.

If there was still any doubt on this score it was totally dispelled by White House Director of Communications Buchanan's recent statement. In an interview for NBC television he bluntly asserted: "The only items on the agenda at the moment are the following: Who is going to create the strategic defenses, when will they be deployed, and who is going to deploy this system." Moreover, Buchanan believes the SDI is a "brilliant idea... guaranteeing U.S. national security," and it is on this, he said, that U.S. security should be based, "not on a scrap of paper signed by the Soviet Union."

Let us leave on the presidential assistant's conscience the fact that he sees accords aimed at eliminating the threat of a nuclear catastrophe as a "scrap of paper." Clearly, this illustrates the level of political thinking and the view of international commitments over there. But the question is: What was all that about the "constructive spirit" of the U.S. stance, "important progress," and "compromise"? After all, this is not "arms control," but an actual invitation to a new arms race on an unprecedented scale and the transfer of it to space.

I do not think this position really presents good prospects for the continuation of the Geneva dialogue either. In Geneva, as is known, both sides have confirmed the subject and objective of the Soviet-American talks: "To prevent an arms race in space and halt it on earth." It is this main problem of the present day that the Soviet Union's major new compromises are geared to solving. But judging by what is being written at the moment about Reagan's letter in the United States itself, a positive approach is something they have not dreamed of there.

What a pity! Soviet-American dialogue could be an important step in improving the international situation as a whole. But for this to happen, it seems to me, it must be constructive, honest and open [otkrytyy], not a screen painted in "optimistic" colors.

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CSO: 5200/1512

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S GERASIMOV SEES DIFFICULTIES IN DIALOGUE WITH U.S.

LD031721 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1402 GMT 3 Aug 86

["International Panorama" program presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Text] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech, filled with ideas and proposals, described as a multi-vectorial speech, was considered by many to be a confirmation of our sincerity and a striking act of goodwill. We are in favor of dialogue. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said that a reply has been received from President Reagan and that we are treating this reply in a responsible manner and giving it attention.

One also must say that it is not easy to conduct dialogue with the Americans. For example: An extraordinary session of the Soviet-U.S. Standing Consultative Commission took place in New York. It was convened on the Soviet side's suggestion in connection with the U.S. Administration's decision to refuse to observe the SALT II treaty in the future. What happened? The U.S. representatives talked about some Soviet violations, justified the course that Washington has taken toward speeding up the arms race, and then proposed replacing limitations in the existing treaty with a temporary so-called regime of restraint.

The best area for showing reasonable restraint is in the star wars program. The U.S. press is now saying that the administration allegedly is prepared not to deploy an [razvertyvat] antimissile defense for 5 or 7 years and to observe the 1972 ABM treaty; but on the expiry of that period, or of a rather longer period, the administration will obtain the right to deploy the nuclear shield that is in preparation.

First of all, some comments on the observance of the treaty. There was the normal interpretation of this that prevented activities in the sphere of the Strategic Defense Initiative. However, they thought up a so-called broader interpretation a year ago that was so unconvincing that it has not been officially accepted thus far. In fact, this broader interpretation is a complete alteration of the treaty in order to permit work on developing antimissile defense. Washington is not being specific now about whether it intends to observe the treaty in an honorable way, showing restraint, or whether it will arbitrarily adopt the broader interpretation.

Regarding the point of postponing SD for 5 or 7 years, Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, who is in charge of the entire Strategic Defense Initiative, says that at least another 10 years will be needed before the United States will be able and technically ready to start deploying [razvertyvat] the antimissile defense system. If

one now comprises this forecast by an expert with the concession currently being written about the United States, the suspicion arises: Is impotence perhaps being made out to be a virtue here? The United States is simply not capable of deploying the system earlier, so what is the concession worth?

A joint search for a way to stop the arms race on earth and prevent it in space would be genuinely reasonable restraint. The arms race is depressingly ramified.

Whatever aspect of it you take, the U.S. side is lacking in restraint. Mention has already been made of the passion for chemical weapons and the intoxication with nuclear tests. One could also add the rejection of the Soviet initiatives on a mutual curtailment of naval activities, and in particular the refusal to help turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace which is very important for both large and small states in the region.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS ASSAILS REAGAN REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON NST, ARMS PLANS

'Arms-Twisting Session'

LD010636 Moscow TASS in English 0615 GMT 1 Aug 86

[Text] Washington August 1 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko

U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger have met with 35 leading members of Congress to discuss "arms control strategy," White House and Pentagon spokesmen said Thursday.

It followed from their further comments on the meeting, however, that it has really been nothing more than another arms-twisting session to make Congress endorse the administration's request for 320 billion dollars in military spending in fiscal 1987, including the funds asked for nuclear arms buildup efforts and the "star wars" program, in full. The House and the Senate are attempting to allay the Pentagon's appetite but the decisive vote is to take place next week. It is with an eye on that vote that the administration has stepped up its effort of "reasoning" with the members of congress.

The "arguments" it has been using, the above spokesman confirmed, include a claim that any cut in military funding would hinder progress at Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva and in general would intolerably weaken U.S. security in the face of a "Soviet threat." So their "logic" remains the same: In order to limit arms, it is necessary to pile up more of them and extend the arms race to outer space.

NST Report 'Defies Logic'

LD060939 Moscow TASS in English 0845 GMT 6 Aug 86

[Text] Washington August 6 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko:

President Reagan has sent a report to Congress, whose contents became known on Tuesday, claiming, in defiance of elementary logic, that in order to facilitate success at Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons it is needed to press on with America's "Strategic modernization program" and the "star wars" effort.

The report also reaffirmed the U.S. unilateral renunciation of the SALT-1 Interim Agreement and the SALT-2 treaty. The refusal to comply with these documents was motivated by allegations that the Soviet Union had been violating SALT-2, while the United States had been observing it scrupulously and that SALT-2 in general had only "codified a very major arms buildup".

The report has been sent to Congress at a time when its two chambers are completing debates and votes on all areas of military spending in fiscal 1987. The administration has requested a staggering 320 billion dollars for the Pentagon for that year. It's no wonder that the report concentrated on pointing to a mythical "Soviet threat" and demanding that Congress meet the request in full.

With all this in the background, one can hardly take the report's assertion that achieving "deep and equitable reductions in offensive arms" continues to receive "the President's highest priority" at its face value.

Arms Modernization Report

LD061422 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1310 GMT 6 Aug 86

[Commentary by TASS military observer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, 6 Aug (TASS). -- U.S. President Ronald Reagan has sent Congress the unclassified version of a White House report dealing with the prospects for the development of the U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. The following catches one's attention in the letter that prefaces the report. First, the President has yet again confirmed his refusal to observe in the future the Soviet-U.S. agreements on limiting strategic offensive weapons. In the future, he stated, the United States must make decisions on the structure of its strategic forces without considering the criteria contained in the SALT documents. Second, R. Reagan declared program for the U.S. strategic forces and the continued work on the SDI to be "vitally important."

In this way the present U.S. Administration has yet again demonstratively cast aside the legal agreements that restrain the nuclear arms race. Of significance is the stress the White House head places on the "need" to fulfill the whole "strategic program" for the 1980's expenditures on which are set at \$222 million for just 1982-87. In the first 4 year the current administration has been in power, the Pentagon has been allocated more than \$1 trillion.

Despite all this, the President states in an accompanying letter that the United States "will display maximum restraint" in modernizing its strategic forces and that the achievement of an agreement on "substantial reductions" of offensive weapons is a "primary task" for the U.S. leadership. It clearly sounds paradoxical!

The essence of this policy of Washington has been very eloquently explained by R. Bowman, president of the U.S. Institute for Space and Security Studies: "We are tired of equality. The only way that we can get back the leverage of political pressure is to regain military superiority."

The present U.S. Administration has begun to feel cramped not only by the framework of treaty restrictions, but evidently by the framework of its own planned "strategic program" as well. It is not without reason the U.S. Congress budget commission came to the conclusion that, having derailed SALT, the administration intends to embark upon an unrestricted buildup of nuclear arsenals. The commission's report says that a program for deployment of another 867 MX missiles, the construction of 36 atomic missile-launcher submarines of the Ohio type, and so on, will be started.

As is evident, the U.S. ruling circles are unwilling to give up the world-view of yesterday. Washington's hostility toward the process of arms limitation and reduction is quite obvious. However, the vital interests of mankind make imperative the rejection of this short-sighted and dangerous stance.

'Unlimited Buildup'

LD062013 Moscow TASS in English 1911 GMT 6 Aug 86

[Text] Moscow, 6 Aug (TASS)--By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev.

President of the United States Ronald Reagan sent to the Congress an unclassified version of a White House report on prospects for the development of the United States' and the Soviet Union's strategic forces. The letter enclosed with the report shows that, first, the President confirmed again his refusal to observe in the future the Soviet-U.S. arrangements on strategic offensive arms limitation. He declared that in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure not on standards contained in the SALT structure. Second, Ronald Reagan declared that the full implementation of the U.S. strategic modernization program and further work on the SDI are of critical importance.

Thus the present U.S. Administration ostentatiously discarded again the legal arrangements arresting the nuclear arms race. Characteristic is the emphasis that the head of the White House makes on the necessity of observing the entire strategic program for the eighties, the expenditures on which are estimated at \$222 billion for 1982-1987 alone. Over \$1000 billion was appropriated for the Pentagon in the first four years of the rule of the present administration.

And despite all this the President of the United States declares in the letter that the United States "will exercise utmost restraint" in modernizing strategic forces and that, allegedly, achieving agreement on substantial reductions in offensive arms is "the highest priority" of the U.S. Administration. This sounds paradoxical, indeed.

The essence of this policy by Washington was clearly set out by President of the U.S. Institute for Space and Security Studies Robert Bowman when he said: We are tired of equality. The only way for us to return the lever of political pressure is to regain military superiority.

Not only the framework of restriction under treaties but even the framework of the U.S. "Strategic Program" are too tight for the present U.S. Administration. It is not accidental that the committee on budget for the U.S. Congress arrived at the conclusion that abandoning the SALT the administration intends to embark on an unlimited build-up of nuclear arsenals. The committee's report says that the program of the deployment of 867 additional MX missiles, the construction of 36 atomic missile carrying submarines of the "Ohio" type and so on will be started.

It is apparent that the U.S. ruling circles do not want to give up yesterday's mode of thinking. Washington's hostility to the process of arms limitation and reduction is quite clear. But vital interests of humanity demand that this short-sighted and dangerous stand be abandoned.

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CSO: 5200/1512

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS: CD CW COMMITTEE FACES 'OBSTACLE' OF WESTERN WILL

LD091740 Moscow TASS in English 1652 GMT 9 Aug 86

[Text] Geneva, 9 Aug (TASS)--The state of affairs at the special committee on the prohibition of chemical weapons, engaged in subject talks aimed at drafting an international agreement, has attracted the attention of the disarmament conference.

The overwhelming majority of the delegations are of the opinion that the progress achieved in the special committee's work during this part of the 1986 session has been largely due to the Soviet initiatives submitted for consideration to the conference on 22 April this year.

The proposals made it possible to advance on a whole number of problems previously considered as leading to an impasse, and defined new areas in which research material had been accumulated. This material might form a basis for coordination and subsequent editing of the draft convention.

Undoubtedly, the progress could have been greater had it not been for the Western countries' contradictory stance on several key problems, including such an important one as non-production of deadly chemicals in the commercial industry.

Despite the fact that nearly all delegations attached top priority to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and advanced numerous proposals, characterizing in detail the positions of nations, including the USSR, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Pakistan, China and Australia, the special committee failed to start a concrete discussion on this issue with a view to drafting a corresponding international agreement or agreements.

The reason was one--the absence of political will on the part of the delegations from the United States and other Western nations.

The issue of working out a comprehensive disarmament program has been on the agenda of the conference for many years. However, the delegates to the corresponding special committee failed at the 1986 session to remove the main obstacle--the aspiration of the Western delegations to draw up not a truly comprehensive document that would contain practical measures in the field of restricting the arms race and achieving disarmament, but a list of the existing agreed upon statements.

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS: U.S. SENATE APPROVES FUNDS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS

LD081825 Moscow TASS in English 1749 GMT 8 Aug 86

["Plans To Impose Chemical Weapons on Europe" -- TASS item identifier]

[Text] Washington August 8 TASS -- The U.S. Senate has rejected by 57 votes, against 43, an amendment stipulating for the NATO country's consent for the beginning of production in the USA of a new type of chemical weapons -- binary ammunition. Concurrently, the Senate turned down by 51 votes against 50 an amendment to nullify funds for the production of the Bigeye chemical binary bomb in the 1987 fiscal year budget.

The White House urgently sent U.S. Vice President George Bush to the Capitol Hill before the vote which pulled through the Senate the decision on allocation of money for chemical weapons. The vice-president, acting as the Senate's presiding officer, broke the 50-50 tie.

The vote at the Senate, with the majority of votes held by the Republican Party, patently illustrated that in Washington they do not intend to spend the money in vain and delay with implementation of the U.S. dangerous "chemical rearmament" plans. And the main thing is that they are not going to consult on that question with their close allies in the North Atlantic bloc. Meanwhile, from the U.S. President's recent message to Congress on the problem of chemical armaments, the conclusion could be made that the administration has already met all the terms set by the Congress for launching the production of binary weapons. The President alleged that the NATO member countries approved the plans of deploying binary weapons on their territory.

But such assertions are at variance with reality. Since the NATO defence minister only "took into consideration" the U.S. plans; and this by no means testifies to their consent to grant their territory for stockpiling a new generation of chemical weapons.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET REVIEW OF U.S. STUDY ON WAR AVOIDANCE, SECURITY

Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE in English No 6, Jun 86 pp 30-37

[Article by Georgy Shakhnazarov, vice-president of International Association of Political Sciences]

[Text] I have in my hands "Preventing War in the Nuclear Age"* written by Dietrich Fisher, Professor of Economics at New York University. A well-known American specialist in international politics, Richard Falk said: "Preventing War in the Nuclear Age" is perhaps the most important book ever written about nuclear war."

Every contribution, no matter how insignificant, to the solution of the most complicated problem (and even a super-problem) of our time, and maybe of all mankind's history, is important for us. All mankind's sorrows and joys, its worries and hopes, acquire unusual colouring in its sinister reflection. It compels a revaluation of traditional notions, and sometimes provides them with a quite opposite meaning. Its fatal influence destroys the agesanctified moral principles, removes the sense from or requires a considerable revaluation of the classical philosophical truths and undermines the bridges which the human mind, since its birth, constructed over the eternity of time and infinity of space, and without which it would never be able to move forward.

Reasonable Beginning

In his book Dietrich Fisher presents rather laconically figures and facts, which characterize the scope of the nuclear threat, since they are known widely enough.

Not trying to frighten the reader but wishing to give him a proportional know-

ledge about the scope of military threat, Fisher takes the bull by the horns, so to speak, and begins to set forth his proposals how to counteract it. However, we won't follow him immediately because we have to solve still another important task, namely: clarify how much we can rely on

the objectivity and impartiality of the American author, otherwise it would be a waste of time to read this book. Really, lots of works have appeared lately beyond the Ocean, the authors of which adhere to the positions of an extreme national egotism and literally sputter when addressing their bitter enemies, Communists. Such self-blindness and hatred reduces to zero all the reasonings about the possible ways of reaching security. But only one way leads to preventing nuclear catastrophe—the way of negotiations, agreements, mutual understanding and trust between the confronting military-political blocs. Negotiations, as is known, will be successful only when both sides strive to understand their opponents and take into account their interests.

Dietrich Fisher, at the very beginning of his research, proclaims this idea and follows it conscientiously to the end. Already in the introduction we read: "The quest for security is by no means a 'zero-sum game', a situation in which one side's gains are by necessity the other side's losses. To be secure, it is not necessary to make potential opponents less secure. In fact, we cannot be completely secure as long as others feel threatened by us, for they will naturally try to find ways and means to eliminate that threat. It is in our own interest to recognize and respect the legitimate rights of others to be secure."

Along with the necessity to take into

* Dietrich Fisher. "Preventing War in the Nuclear Age". Totowa (New Jersey), Rowman and Allanheld, 1984. The full translation of the book will be published (in Russian) in the magazine "Inostrannaya Literatura" (Foreign Literature). Ed.

consideration mutual interests, Fisher advocates the strive for psychological compatibility, as we dare to call it. If we want to persuade them, he says, we must strive to understand their concern, interests and logic of thinking. Otherwise we cannot expect that they will listen to us.

Quite reasonable idea. Though, frankly speaking, Fisher doesn't always follow it in practice. For example, in the whole book one can't find any reference to the works by Soviet theorists on the problems of war and peace and nuclear disarmament. Meanwhile, in recent years we have published many serious books reading of which would help Western specialists understand the formation of Soviet politics on security and what arguments stand behind its components. To the credit of Soviet science we must say that it keeps a sharp eye on political literature in the USA and the West, in general, which helps our authors avoid a primitive and simplified interpretation of the opinions of the "the other side".

However, since the given shortcoming is characteristic of not only Dietrich Fisher but of American politics on the whole, we will content ourselves with the fact that unlike many of his colleagues, our author conscientiously considers the Soviet Union' political position contained in official statements by its leaders. Fisher's objectivity is also confirmed by the fact that he without hesitation refutes the myths created by American propaganda and gives US policy its due.

Transarmament Concept

Now about how to counter nuclear war. The central notion of its work—security—Fisher determines as the ability of the country to avoid war or in case of its beginning how to secure the maximum survival of the population. If the country, writes Fisher, wants to prevent war, it must pursue only goals which don't prevent other countries from obtaining similar goals for themselves. If we discard some unusual wording, we can see that we have Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative or, if we take the more old source, one of the Biblical commandments: do not do unto others what you would not have them do to yourself. We cite this without any irony because there is nothing bad in repeating a principle (maxim, ideal) which was worked out by mankind and remains a model for people's behaviour among themselves as well as for states on the international arena. But frankly speaking, it is insufficient, at least, to repeat such a demand in our era.

Let's see, however, does Fisher suggest something essential for preventing nuclear war? Yes. His book emphasizes the ideas of freezing the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union and United States, an all-embracing ban of nuclear weapons tests, universal obligation of nuclear powers not to be the first to use these weapons, and many other widely-known initiatives of the same kind, up to technological ones.

The American author also speaks about the benefit of some measures for strengthening trust between potential enemies. Since national security is a sensitive sphere, he remarks, entailing emotions, it would be worth it to direct the efforts to a mutually beneficial cooperation between the two superpowers. We would like to join this idea. A certain impulse was imparted to the cooperation between American and Soviet science and exchanges in culture after the Geneva summit. We will applaud in case of a success of a joint project of curbing thermonuclear reaction or grandiose, almost fantastic idea of Carl Sagan to organize a joint Soviet-American flight to Mars.

Returning from space heights to sinful Earth, we should admit that though Fisher recognizes the usefulness of such undertakings, he speaks about them only casually. It can be explained by the fact that he has a superidea in store for the reader, for the sake of which, strictly speaking, the book was written. The matter is that the American professor considers total defence or transarmament to be the only radical means to prevent nuclear war.

The author's main argument is that wars originate only as a result of the employment of offensive arms. Therefore advocating more offensive arms (including for defence) is like calling for break-in tools to prevent burglary. And on the contrary, calling for a reduction in defensive arms to promote peace is like prohibiting locks—to avoid offering provocation to a burglar. There is a more promising alternative, transarmament, a shift from offensive to defensive arms.

By the way, to understand the transarmament concept, one must approach the problem gradually. Today, Fisher writes, public opinion as if polarizes two opposite camps. Supporters of one point of view, who are called "hawks", consider that the main thing is to search for national security through more armaments. Their opponents, "doves", consider that the main thing is peace. The latter advocate disarmament, even unilateral. It seems to me, remarks Fisher, that both are victims of linguistic confusion (let's remember this!—G. Sh.).

Simple but Unconvincing

The matter is that the word "strength" has two different meanings. Strength can mean the capability to harm others and to threaten them; it can also mean the capability to resist harm inflicted by others—to be immune against threats. The same ambiguity is also inherent in the notion "military strength". It is neither true that all weapons improve a nation's security nor that all weapons jeopardize international security. Defensive arms can improve a country's security without threatening other nations. Purely offensive arms threaten the security of others without improving a country's own security. Or a more clear and laconic conclusion: defensive capabilities strengthen peace, offensive capabilities threaten peace. The solution to the security dilemma is not to be found in more arms or less arms, but in different arms: weapons that can help resist aggression without being useful in carrying out aggression.

To avoid a misunderstanding, the author explains (referring to a well-known Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung) what defensive arms are and what offensive arms are. The first—arms with short range mobility and limited impact which can be used to fight only for military purposes on a country's own territory or very close to its borders. Purely defensive arms include, for example: arms in fixed positions, such as fortresses, fixed shore batteries, minefields. Interception aircraft or mobile anti-aircraft missiles are also essentially defensive arms. As for offensive arms, they include first of all strategic bombers and intercontinental missiles. A historical example of offensive arms of the past were gun boats sent by imperial powers to the capital city of a weaker nation to extract concessions. A modern successor to the gun boat is the aircraft carrier.

Of course, the definitions given above are conventional. The author gives examples when certain defensive arms can be converted relatively easy into offensive arms, and vice versa, but a principled difference between them remains.

Further. In case of conventional arms we may speak about both defensive and offensive potential. But when we speak about nuclear weapons, the distinction must be drawn also inside the offensive potential, namely: between the first-strike arms and retaliatory arms of the second strike, the former are intended as deterrent and therefore cannot be considered defensive.

Having sorted out and analysed in detail the specific features of each class, Dietrich Fisher draws the general conclusion: if the defensive potential of each

side increases the offensive potential of one side, i. e., it can withstand it, then both sides are in relative security. The situation is stable if they consider that it is bad to begin war rather than not to begin because the other side has enough defensive forces to repulse the attack.

And, on the contrary, the situation is unstable if one side has the perspective to win the war, having started it, because the other side would be unable to defend itself. Similar instability also appears when neither side wants to "win" the war but yet one of them is afraid of suffering great losses if it is attacked, therefore inclines to deliver the first strike.

This reasoning may look banal at first sight: is it necessary to subtilize and resort to the aid of mathematical symbols to come to such evident conclusion as, for example: if he is afraid of enemy, he won't begin war? But we won't hurry with estimates. We will try to find a rational grain in these simple maxims of international behaviour. In the given case—the danger of the temptation to deliver a pre-emptive strike because of one's own vulnerable position. In this connection Fisher cites American economist Thomas Shelling, who has formulated the issue as follows: "He, thinking I was about to kill him in self-defence, was about to kill me in self-defence, so I had to kill him in self-defence." And Fisher adds: for a country's own security, it is important not to threaten a first strike, and not even to allow the misperception to arise on the other side that it might be preparing for a first strike.

We repeat that the Soviet Union has undertaken the obligation never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Another nuclear power—China—has done the same. Neither the USA, England nor France, however, have undertaken such obligations.

But Fisher considers that the real means for strengthening universal security is a shift from offensive to purely defensive forces. As we have already said, he calls this transarmament.

But let's consider what conclusions can be drawn from the thesis that strong defence provides each country, even a small one, if not with a full guarantee then at least with a relatively high degree of security. Such as: if all countries follow this course, there will be peace on Earth without any agreements, and almost an eternal peace will reign everywhere. Hence the directions for practical politics: arm yourselves to the teeth with defensive arms: build pillboxes and boxes, dig underground shelters, buy interceptor-aircraft, ground-to-air missiles, etc.

Very well, the reader will say. The idea itself about a strong defence is absolutely correct, especially if one has in mind the defence against imperialist aggression. But, we will ask, what we will have to

do with the prevention of nuclear war? Is it not clear that this problem can and must be solved from quite a different angle than the problem of the defence of separate countries against outside aggression? And it is absolutely clear that in case of a nuclear war, any defensive efforts of separate countries couldn't guarantee them even survival because radiation, nuclear winter and similar things recognize neither borders nor policies of neutrality.

Around SDI

We have approached the most important problem around which the sharp political and diplomatic duel is developing in the world—Reagan's "Star Wars" project. It is known that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries decisively and categorically step out against this plan of space militarization, and add that its materialization would not only raise the level of military danger in the world to a new and higher mark, but would also block in fact the possibility of achieving an agreement on other aspects of disarmament problem—in the first run, the limitation and liquidation of strategic nuclear weapons. It should be noted that the overwhelming majority of Western scientists are against SDI. Many prominent political figures and a number of governments, including some from NATO, have refused to participate in this programme. In the USA itself reasonable politicians are calling upon the administration to change its mind.

But perhaps the most striking thing is that literally before our eyes the so-called defensive weapons, which have just appeared in the world, are already turning into offensive ones. The main idea of SDI is that lasers operating from space stations or from Earth and directed by mirrors in space at targets, can become a part of a defensive shield against enemy missiles. But recent analytical data shows that powerful laser beams emitted by such weapons can also be used for offensive tasks to form fire storms which can result in an ecological catastrophe of a nuclear winter type.

During mere hours the laser defensive system powerful enough to cope with the threat against ballistic missiles can destroy, by fires, large cities of the enemy, write specialists in the American Physical Society magazine. A US Navy Chief of Staff assistant on nuclear weapons said that an optical laser, undoubtedly, can be used to set more powerful fire than the one which practically had wiped out Dresden from the face of earth during World War II.

And one calls them defensive weapons.

But what is the attitude of our American author to SDI? Frankly speaking, still before opening relevant pages in his book, we suggested that the answer to this question would be positive. Really, the very possibility of defence against nuclear missiles ideally fits the total defence concept and may become its most powerful and almost irresistible argument.

But in fact we underestimated Dietrich Fisher and therefore we are ready to apologize to him for our bad thinking of him in that case. He is against "Star Wars" giving all the known mass press arguments, and among them the main one: instead of eliminating nuclear war, anti-missile space-based laser weapons might be designed to implement a nuclear war-fighting strategy of "damage limitation" and "prevailing" in a nuclear exchange. That would make a nuclear apocalypse more "thinkable" to certain people. Such a course, concludes Fisher, is suicidal.

By resolutely rejecting SDI, Fisher emphasizes that peace cannot be maintained for a long time on mutual deterrent and that balance of strategic forces is quite an uncertain category and a turn to one or another side, formed as a result of the action of some objective reasons or ill-intentioned striving for military superiority, can at a moment destruct this barrier on the path to nuclear war. Perhaps, there is some exaggeration in this reasoning because the so-called mutual deterrent has served till now a sole reliable barrier against the use of nuclear weapons. But the American author is right that peace cannot rest for ever on fear. That is why one of the USSR's policy principles on this problem has been and remains the constant reduction in the military confrontation level with the balance of military forces remaining about the same.

Stepping out against the perpetuation of the mutual destruction policy, Mr. Fisher forwards many sensible proposals. We will pay attention to one moment, namely: to his recommendation that superpowers refuse from nuclear first-strike armament till mutual nuclear disarmament is achieved. It is not difficult to see that with this formulation the American author demonstrates in fact his helplessness to answer the main question: how can nuclear war be prevented not with the aid of interim solutions, without disturbing the present unstable position, but for a long perspective and even for ever?

Forced Admission

Fisher has to admit, though indirectly,

the fiasco of his research. He writes that any real serious changes on the international arena are very complex since they depend on the simultaneous actions of many countries, therefore they appear only after long periods of time. The creation of a new world order, "less inclined to war", is quite desirable, but it will be more difficult to build it than the gradual changes in defence and foreign policy of separate states. If governments want to wait for the moment when all countries refuse simultaneously from the use of force, they will have to wait for a long time. The world might not live that long. And why, as a matter of fact, governments must respond to Fisher's or other ideologists' calls, who like Kant in the 19th century, are worried about the preservation of peace at the end of the 20th century? We cannot find the answer to this question in the book as we cannot find the most simple attempt to analyse the nature of states and factors influencing their foreign policy. Alas, like many other colleagues—politologists, sociologists, lawyers and philosophers—sometimes very educated and thinking people, Fisher remains a prisoner of purely formalistic interpretation of social phenomena. For him, states are not the most complex social organisms, positions of which in international affairs are determined by the actions of many reasons, and first of all, by the correlation of class forces on national ground and on international scale. They are, most likely, autonomous standardized units taking part in international games according to the laws of some sort of political mechanics. And an exceptionally simple algorithm is invented to make a mathematical calculation of their manoeuvre on a chess-board.

Fisher suggests the use of a diagram proposed by the Austrian mathematician Karl Menger in 1934. Menger categorizes people into those who tend to hurt others (impolite), and those who don't hurt others (polite, considerate). He further distinguishes between those who are easily hurt (sensitive or intolerant) and those who are not easily hurt. As a result, a not very difficult classification is arranged which is later applied to nations. It is reduced to the following types. First, those who advocate invulnerability without threat he calls peace-makers. Second, those who adopt a posture of vulnerability, he calls warmongers. Those who are invulnerable and nevertheless threaten, may be called "hawks". And finally, the last category, or "doves", those who are invulnerable and who threaten nobody.

The next stage of reasoning is the division of countries into compatible and incompatible pairs. We won't tire our readers and tell them about the results of

these theoretical exercising. It seems there are groupings of compatible countries which are able to maintain peace between themselves, and there also are incompatible ones which can unleash war between themselves. Two countries both of which are aggressive and vulnerable are most likely to go to war with each other. If both countries are nonaggressive and invulnerable, peace between them is most stable and secure.

It is hardly necessary to qualify such methodics. Even a person inexperienced in political theory can understand that it will give nothing sensible apart from banal truths. The matter is that when analysing the problems of war and peace, the speech mustn't be reduced to political definitions, but the deep class roots of the events must be cleared up.

Peaceableness or, on the contrary, aggressiveness, if they are taken in social plan and not in an individualistic, are not an ethical characteristic of human beings, personified in states, but a product derived from their class nature.

'Doomed' to Coexistence

Does this statement mean that the world is doomed to death since essentially opposite states—socialist and capitalist—exist on earth, because no less deep opposite interests, in fact, divide economically developed capitalist countries from developing countries; because, at last, there are rich and poor inside the imperialist camp itself (everything is relative in this world, in the long run)? No, it does not mean, because all of us irrespective of language and race want to live and have enough reason to realize this most simple and common idea. To do this, we must first of all understand the deepest interdependence connecting all peoples and countries.

To do him justice, the American author doesn't pass over this question. He asks himself: what is better—reliance on one's own forces or creation of more interdependent world? The greater integration in economic, like in other spheres, brings about common interests and better mutual understanding. Those countries which maintain considerable mutual trade usually have better relations between themselves than those which happened to be economically isolated.

On the other side, Fisher objects himself, wars often are waged for foreign raw material sources. For example, if the United States understands that it has become heavily dependent on Persian Gulf oil and considered it is necessary to invade the region if the oil flow is disturbed, it may lead to a war, and probably the Soviet Union will be involved in it. If the United States would rely on its own capabilities in the energy sphere, for example, by preserving part of its Alaska oil in case of emergency, this would strengthen peace.

Which of these two arguments is correct? Fisher gives an ambiguous answer: it is necessary to strengthen mutually beneficial trade relations and in many other spheres, but you mustn't allow that you or others be so heavily dependent on these relations that you will risk war to restore or preserve them.

Outwardly, the position seems wise. Why should you be in such a dependent position that later you have to resort to war to disentangle from it? The trouble is that this advice is again unreal. There are not many countries in the world which could follow it. And their number is constantly reducing. Because interdependence is a result of not only subjective will but of objective and mostly spontaneous process of international economic and, in general, social life of mankind which, as was stated still by Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and Vladimir Lenin, takes its origin under capitalism and finds its full development under socialism.

Independence is a necessary prerequisite for interdependence. Only a country possessing the opportunity to decide voluntarily, without military violence, political pressure and economic compulsion from outside, the question with whom and how it must cooperate, takes the appeared bonds of interdependence as a benefit and not as a curse. Otherwise, the relations, outwardly meeting the criterion of interdependence, will be, in fact, the relations of superiority and subordination. In other words, the old content will be put into the modern form, and the 19th century will put on the clothes of the 20th and even the 21st century.

It is like this today. There are two kinds of interdependence in international relations. One of them reflects the relations of inequality and belongs to the past; the other, belongs to the future—the relations of equal cooperation directed at overcoming national narrow-mindedness. Therefore, it is difficult, if possible, in general, to work out a common formula suitable for revealing the interdependence phenomenon. A concrete analysis is needed for each concrete case to answer the questions: is it useful or harmful, progressive or reactionary?

But there is a sphere where interdependence takes on complete clarity and single meaning—security in the nuclear age. As a result of the arms race imposed by the USA and NATO, all countries and peoples now are in one boat and they will only survive or perish together. Here is the possible limit of dependence on intentions and deeds of each other. Here is the highest necessity, dictated by the interests of our own survival and prolongation of life of the whole mankind, understanding of responsibilities concerning the partner (opponent, potential enemy), and taking mutual obligations.

The forced nature of the given type of interdependence doesn't make it attractive. But this isn't a question of choice, preference or passion. This is a question of life or death which requires the highest responsibility of states and their leaders.

The nuclear age imparts a new sense to centuries-old ideas. This is true for the notion of security than for anything else. In our time, the countries, which are able to secure their fullest self-sufficiency, are dependent, whether they want it or not. They may be innocent like God's lambs politically and don't infringe upon anybody's property and don't wish evil to anyone; clean as newly-born babies ecologically, preserve all forests and pastures, shift all industries to waste-free technology; cunning as devils militarily and have no offensive weapons and possessing everything needed for the defence of their Motherland. But all the matter is that no one is going to invade their country and their partisans won't have to display the heroic deeds in the struggle against the invaders. In case of a nuclear war, their population will freeze or die of hunger together with the rest. In case of an ecological catastrophe of a continental or world-wide scale, hunger will inevitably come to them.

Only Disarmament

Thus, with all good intentions of the author, his thought, like theoretical investigations by many other American politologists, rotates within the same two military strategy poles—offense or defence. Defensive strategy, undoubtedly, is more preferable in the nuclear age, but it also cannot solve the problem. Therefore, the answer to the question—defensive or offensive weapons—must be: neither the first nor the second, but—disarmament.

And that is the Soviet Union's programme. Postwar history has not known a more important document than Mikhail

Gorbachev's Statement of January 15, 1986, which set forth a total disarmament concept. Its realization is a unique chance to rid mankind of the overhanging threat, allow it to step over the horrors of the nuclear age, and move through not an easy and simple but a peaceful road to the solution of other problems facing it.

The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress contains the deep characteristic of the modern world realities which predetermine the only reasonable and responsible line of the behavior on international arena. The first conclusion reads: "The character of present-day weaponry leaves no country with any hope of safeguarding itself with military or technical means, for example, by building up a defence, even the most powerful. To ensure security is increasingly seen as a political problem, and it can only be resolved by political means."

To sum up our comments on the Dietrich Fisher book, I don't want to repeat the well-founded reproaches, which it arouses, but talk about its humanistic spirit. The author himself determined the main idea of his work as follows: it is in our own interests that we do not pose any threat to others. The sooner and deeper this idea overcomes the present American public opinion, the better it will be for peace, and America itself. We can assure Americans that the so-called "Soviet threat" is a myth. There is no other people in the world more devoted to the idea of peace than the Soviet people—a people which has probably experienced the horrors of war more than anyone else.

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CSO: 5200/1510

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW: NST, ASIAN SECURITY, INF

LD012303 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 1 Aug 86

["International Situation: Questions and Answers" program, presented by Vladimir Pasko, All-Union Radio foreign affairs commentator, with Nikolay Shishlin and Igor Surguchev, international affairs journalists; Vyacheslav Lavrentyev, commentator; Sergey Pravdin, identified as commentator and one of Pasko's colleagues; and Boris Adrianov and Viktor Levin, also identified as Pasko's colleagues]

[Excerpt] [Pasko] Hello comrades! The problem of ensuring security in the nuclear age continues to be the main topic of the letters arriving for our program. U.S. President Reagan has reaffirmed that there can be no victors and vanquished in a nuclear war, writes Comrade Makarov from Krivozerye in Penza Oblast, for example. So one wonders why the crazy arms race continues. Where is the logic in the words and deeds of the U.S. leaders? The same point is noted by another one of our listeners, Comrade Oriko from Tomsk, who reckons that you cannot trust the United States or its NATO allies, nor Japan. They all say one thing and do another, he writes, and so we must keep our powder dry. War veteran Pavel Ivanovich Shestakov from Novyy (?Torgez) in the Mari ASSR emphasizes in his letter another aspect of the problem. We have been living in peace for 41 years now, he writes, and the struggle for peace has gone on for 41 years. There are no easy roads here, Pavel Ivanovich writes, but this struggle must be continued. May the people of Europe know no more wars and deprivations. Peace is needed equally by all, the Soviet people and the people of the United States. Three different letters, three different authors, and three different people, but the problem they raise is the same: how to avert the threat of war, and how to preserve peace. This problem today concerns everybody.

As is known, affairs in the international arena are not in the best shape. More than half a year has now passed since the Soviet Union came out with a specific and wide-scale developed program for the elimination of mass destruction weapons in the world by the end of the century. The basis of this exceptionally important document is the Soviet concept of security in the nuclear age which is gaining ever broader recognition everywhere. This program was substantially augmented by the proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries for a considerable reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, which might be discussed at a special forum made up of the European states, the United States, and Canada. Today the attention of the world community is drawn to the new initiatives of the Soviet Union concerning the strengthening of security in Asia. I will ask international affairs journalist Nikolay Shishlin to speak in greater detail about this issue.

[Shishlin] Much is being written and said abroad about Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok. This is natural; the speech has drawn attention because of its fresh approaches to key international problems. It, as it were, in addition interprets the new thinking that was announced as early as the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, and this new thinking has been broadly developed and clarified in the work of the 27th CPSU Congress. At the same time, the Vladivostok speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev draws attention due to its richness of practical ideas and practical propositions. This concerns primarily problems of security, which are, naturally, organically interwoven with problems of limitation and curtailment of the arms race. As it happens the problems of disarmament, the problem of overcoming the arms race, are put on an absolutely practical plane in the speech we are talking about.

First and foremost one's attention is drawn to the new affirmation of the Soviet stance on the fact that our country does not intend to increase the numbers of medium-range missiles stationed in Asia. Incidentally, I would like to draw attention to the fact that the Soviet proposals concerning the relevant U.S. and Soviet weapons in Europe do not provide for the transfer or moving of medium-range missiles, but for their elimination, which, of course, is not without interest for the Asian states. Further, in this Vladivostok speech, the Soviet Union also proposes ideas for limiting and curtailing the arms race, such as drafting a joint approach concerning prevention of the proliferation and build-up of nuclear weapons in this extensive area. Our country energetically supports the idea of creating nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, in the South Pacific and the Korean peninsula in particular. All of this is quite a useful and fruitful idea. I do not think that one can pass by or simply brush aside such major Soviet ideas as that of reducing the activities of naval fleets in the Pacific, or the proposals for turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. They may say that some of these ideas have already been in political circulation. That is, of course, correct, but taken together, and augmented by new practical considerations, free of any kind of tone of ultimatum, these Soviet ideas, in my view, represent more than an invitation to a dialogue. They are an invitation to act together in the name of strengthening Asian security, and hence universal security.

There is also a second leitmotif in the speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in Vladivostok; it concerns in essence all of this extensive Asian and Pacific region. A great deal is now being written about this idea of staging a Pacific conference, or one could say an Asian-Pacific conference, in Hiroshima. The Soviet Union, as is known, has many times put forward the idea of drafting a system of collective security in Asia. In this case this really was a proposal to jointly think about it. In this way this extensive region, a region one must say is nervous, containing quite a few situations of conflict, of real conflict, and with quite a few smoldering situations of conflict -- thus this region, jointly, in joint search, joint discussions, and joint efforts could find ways to strengthen relations of peace and peaceful cooperation. The road to this collective system of security, the road to formation of definite channels of peaceful, neighborly cooperation, lies, of course, not only through multilateral efforts but also through bilateral efforts.

When one acquaints oneself with the responses to the speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in Vladivostok, it is noticeable how the ideas of the Soviet leader have been interpreted in every country, whether mentioned in the speech or not. One must say that in general they have been interpreted fairly realistically. They provide confirmation of the Soviet Union's firm will to break with the unhealthy inertia in the

development of international relations, including development of relations on the Asian Continent. This concerns, I think, primarily the relations between the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Asia. Here, of course, quite a promising process is developing. I have in mind our relations with the Mongolian People's Republic; together with Mongolia we are now elaborating the idea of considerably reducing the Soviet troops in Mongolia. I have in mind the development of our relations with fraternal Vietnam, with the DPRK, and undoubtedly with our great neighbor, the PRC.

Incidentally, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statements are addressed to China concerning the possibility of reducing the armed forces and conventional weapons in this extensive zone. One would think that the Chinese comrades, who have repeatedly expressed somewhat similar considerations, will show interest in this new Soviet proposal, and one would like to hope that this will provide a stimulus for practical talks on this truly vitally important problem.

As far as the firm Soviet intention to work toward complete restoration of Soviet-Chinese relations, I think that the Vladivostok speech is the best affirmation of this.

Undoubtedly the ideas and considerations expressed about the relations with Japan, about relations between the Soviet Union and our friend India, and with other states, not necessarily such large ones as China, India, and Japan, with practically all countries of Asia, are promising.

Returning to the questions asked by the listeners, the common denominator of this speech in Vladivostok, as it were, is, of course, the dominant thought, that security in our world cannot be lasting today if it is security for one side. This security has to be universal. This security has to be indivisible. Construction of such a system of security cannot be the monopoly of any one country of the world. It is truly the concern of all Asian states, the concern of all countries of the world, and it is toward stimulating the actions of all countries together in the name of survival, in the name of the firm assertions of peaceful coexistence as a universal principle of international relations, that the Soviet Union is directing its efforts.

Listener Viktor Anatolyevich Glazunov from Leningrad has sent a letter in which he says that fairly frequently he hears in radio programs that the United States is putting pressure on its allies and disregarding their opinions. Tell me, Comrade Glazunov goes on to say, why there should be arm-twisting of ministers, premiers, and presidents of countries that are very close friends of the United States in military blocs and countries that have a highly developed industry and agriculture? Something here does not make sense to me.

I ask my colleague Viktor Levin to shed light on this matter.

[Levin] In his letter my namesake, Viktor Anatolyevich Glazunov, says that he has received the impression that the leaders of the Western countries are simply, by virtue of their imperialist solidarity, marching in step with the United States and that there is no need to prevail upon them to do so. Imperialist solidarity is, of course, an important factor, and our listener is quite right to draw attention to it. This same imperialist solidarity that is called Atlantic solidarity in NATO circles secures for the United States the adoption of decisions to their liking. This was so in the case of the siting in Western Europe of U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles, which led to the transformation of the West European states into nuclear hostages of the Pentagon. This is the way that the United States is striving to obtain agreement for the siting of new

types of chemical weapons. However, as the militarist appetites of the United States increase, there is increased understanding of the danger of the U.S. course and mounting resistance to it. At times this resistance is, as it were, muffled and behind the scenes at the official meetings, but of late it has been more and more frequently splashing out into the open.

Here for instance, is what the West German magazine DER SPIEGEL had to say, and I quote: At the secret session of the NATO Council in the Canadian city of Halifax, Netherlands Foreign Minister van den Broek astonished his counterparts with the results of a public opinion poll. Van den Broek reported that 18 percent of his fellowcountrymen consider the greatest danger to peace comes from the United States. U.S. Secretary of State Shultz remained silent, DER SPIEGEL says. He must have already learned from his conversations with the foreign ministers how his government's current foreign policy horrifies its European allies.

One could add to this what was said by Karsten Voigt, spokesman on foreign policy issues for the FRG's Social Democratic Party. The U.S. Administration, he said, is currently instilling more fear into the allies than are the Russians.

Taking into account the Soviet threat myth that still enjoys currency in the West, sharp dissatisfaction with the United States is to be heard in both the view of DER SPIEGEL and the utterances of Voigt. And I should think so! Washington continues to act in its own way, totally ignoring the views of its allies.

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RELATED ISSUES

TURKISH PREMIER DISCUSSES ARMS ISSUES IN MOSCOW

Talks with Ryzhkov 28 July

PM301344 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jul 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Soviet-Turkish Talks"]

[Excerpt] Talks between N.I. Ryzhkov and T. Ozal began in the Kremlin on 28 July. Taking part in the talks were B.I. Aristov, USSR minister of foreign trade; K.F. Katushev, chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations; A.A. Reut, first deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan; Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister; V.S. Lavrov, USSR ambassador to Turkey; and other officials on the Soviet side and V. Halefoglu, foreign minister; A. Kurtcebe Alptemocin, minister of finance and customs; (N. Tezel), deputy foreign minister; O. Cankardes, Turkish ambassador to the USSR, and other officials accompanying T. Ozal on the Turkish side.

During the talks between the Soviet and Turkish heads of government there was a detailed exchange of views on topical international problems. They examined in detail the state of and prospects for future expansion and strengthening of the entire range of Soviet-Turkish good-neighborly relations.

During a discussion of questions pertaining to the present-day international situation, which took place in a constructive spirit and an atmosphere of frankness, the sides expounded their approaches to their solution. Noted the growing tension in the world, they advocated the need to take effective steps to strengthen international security and effect disarmament and to ensure a broad and productive dialogue between East and West to achieve the relevant accords.

T. Ozal's attention was drawn to the extensive program to prevent nuclear war and eliminate mass destruction weapons which was put forward by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev on 15 January 1986, to other peace initiatives by the Soviet Union and its allies, including the one on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, and to the Soviet Union's repeated extension of its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests.

The Soviet side gave a principled assessment of the U.S. course toward the militarization of space. In this context it was stressed that any support for the SDI program, let alone participation in it, can only be seen in the Soviet Union as a direct contribution to the implementation of the U.S. plans, which jeopardize international peace and security. N.I. Ryzhkov expounded the Soviet Union's "star peace" program -- a program of stage-by-stage point practical actions to establish broad international cooperation in the sphere of exploration and use of space in the interests of the peoples of all countries. [paragraph continues]

It was said that the Soviet side is prepared to consider the matter of involving Turkish universities and scientists in certain international projects in space research which will be implemented by Soviet scientists.

Prime Minister T. Ozal confirmed Turkey's commitment to the solution of problems of disarmament, of ensuring security and trust. He advocated the speediest achievement of mutually acceptable accords at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons and at other talks on questions of disarmament and the safeguarding of peace and the peoples' security.

There was also an exchange of views on the question of eliminating chemical weapons. The Soviet side approved of the Turkish leadership's statements that Turkey opposes the use of chemical weapons and that there are no such weapons on Turkish territory.

The sides stated their desire to conduct a further joint quest for points of contact on various aspects of the international situation and in that context they paid special attention to the discussion of European problems. This quest would contribute to the broadening of mutual understanding and the sphere of action in favor of peace and cooperation in Europe and adjoining regions. The importance of the continuation of the all-European process and the improvement of the situation on the continent was stressed.

Both sides also stated that peace can only be preserved and strengthened as a result of joint efforts by all states -- both big and small.

Ryzhkov, Ozal Speak at Dinner

PM011414 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jul 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "In a Friendly Atmosphere"]

[Excerpt] A dinner in honor of Turkish Prime Minister T. Ozal and his wife was given on behalf of the USSR Government in the Grand Kremlin Palace on 28 July.

The officials accompanying T. Ozal on the trip were with him at the dinner.

Present on the Soviet side were N.I. Ryzhkov and his wife, G.A. Aliyev, and E.A. Shevardnadze, deputy chairmen of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers, USSR ministers, chairmen of USSR State Committee, and other officials.

N.I. Ryzhkov's Speech

Addressing the guests, Ryzhkov said:

Of course, trade and economic cooperation is only part of the great complex of Soviet-Turkish relations. In order to help strengthen mutual trust it needs a healthy political atmosphere. Being in different military political alliances, our countries must adopt a particularly responsible and circumspect approach to the solution of any question that affects their foreign policy interests, above all their security interests. We believe that we have possibilities of mutual understanding on these fundamental questions. Turkey surely has an interest in overcoming the current dangerous tension in the world and placing East-West relations on the path of detente and constructive cooperation. We are convinced that this would meet its national interests and the interests of our country and the international community as a whole. No one can remain aloof, everyone must contribute to preventing a nuclear catastrophe and saving world civilization.

The further accumulation and refinement of nuclear and conventional armaments and the militarization of space, which is the aim of the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" of the United States, are fraught with the danger of turning the arms race into an uncontrolled and uncontrollable process with all the fatal consequences that would therein result. That is why the world public reacts so acutely to everything that increases world tension and hinders the solution of the urgent tasks of international security.

The Soviet Union is doing all it can to fundamentally improve the international situation. The measures we have proposed for this are not geared to securing one-sided advantages and acquiring military superiority. They are well-known. Their aim is to get the process of real disarmament moving and bring about a reduction of states' military arsenals to the level of reasonable sufficiency. We are prepared to do this both on an all-embracing basis, which we would prefer, and through partial measures and intermediate solutions. It is now up to the United States and the other NATO countries and their ability and willingness to do their part. Today Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev made an important political speech in Vladivostok. He paid a lot of attention to the situation in the Asian-Pacific region and expressed specific ideas on the kind of process that would create international security and peaceful collaboration among states in that large area. In particular, it is a matter of blocking the spread and growth of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific and radically reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Asia. [paragraph continued]

He also announced the Soviet leadership's decision to bring back from Afghanistan to the Soviet Union by the end of the year part of the Soviet limited troop contingent, which is in that country at its government's request. It is natural to expect a curtailment of outside interference in the DRA's affairs in response to this important step aimed at accelerating a political settlement.

Our common border with Turkey is in direct proximity to areas with dangerous hotbeds of tension. The task of eliminating these hotbeds is one of the urgent problems of improving the international situation. The Soviet Union's approach to the solution of this important task is reflected in our proposals on turning the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and cooperation and in the principles we have put forward for achieving an all-embracing, just, and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem. In supporting the efforts of neighboring states to create in the Balkans zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons we are guided by the peoples' security interests.

Allow me once again to express satisfaction in connection with your visit to the Soviet Union, Mr Prime Minister, and to wish our Turkish guests and the entire Turkish people prosperity, progress, and peace.

T. Ozal then delivered a speech.

T. Ozal's Speech

Esteemed Prime Minister, tension remains in the current international political atmosphere. A lack of mutual trust should be seen as the chief cause of this situation. The arms race is increasing the feelings of distrust and anxiety and is hampering economic improvement. Disarmament, which will ensure that the resources spent in the arms sphere are used for the welfare and economic benefit of the people, is of vital importance from the viewpoint of the cause of peace and stability. We sincerely want to see the rapid achievement of sensible agreements, based on balanced mutual interests, at the forums currently examining various aspects of disarmament. Turkey has always sincerely supported disarmament efforts aimed at establishing genuine peace and tranquility in the world. I want to stress that we are following with interest the recent constructive initiatives of our neighbor the Soviet Union in this sphere.

Recognizing that the main task of each state in the international sphere is to preserve peace and stability, Turkey wishes to maintain friendly relations and develop cooperation with all countries of the world. In this connection we attach special significance to our relations with neighboring countries and sincerely want them to develop in an atmosphere of peace, friendship, and cooperation. We are maintaining a peaceful approach to relations with all our neighbors.

Meets Gromyko 29 July

LD291831 Moscow TASS in English 1801 GMT 29 Jul 86

[Text] Moscow July 29 TASS -- A conversation between member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Andrey Gromyko and Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey Turgut Ozal was held in the Kremlin today.

The sides expressed satisfaction over the state of and prospects for Soviet-Turkish relations, declared for their further widening on the basis of goodneighborliness. Favorable prerequisites exist for this: the experience of cooperation accumulated over many decades, the absence of irreconcilable contradictions between the USSR and Turkey. It was noted that commercial and economic ties can be widened considerably, which is an important basis for the further steady development of a complex of relations between the two states.

Andrey Gromyko emphasised that the pooling of the efforts of all who are capable of assessing soberly the realities of the nuclear age, both politicians and non-politicians, is necessary for effectively opposing the nuclear menace. Hope was expressed in this connection for the increase of Turkey's contribution to the solution of the tasks of safeguarding peace, for the possibility of a closer interaction of our two neighbour countries in this sphere.

Turgut Ozal said that Turkey, on its part, wishes that the Soviet Union and the United States should reach arrangement with taking into account the latest Soviet proposals.

Pointing to the usefulness and constructiveness of the Soviet-Turkish dialogue, Andrey Gromyko and Turgut Ozal expressed the conviction that the talks and the meetings held in Moscow will give a fresh impetus to versatile cooperation between the USSR and Turkey.

Holds Press Conference

TA301513 Ankara ANATOLIA in English 1500 GMT 30 Jul 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 30/7. (AA)--Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal said Tuesday at the end of his official contacts in Moscow since Monday that, "his visit to the Soviet Union did not perhaps open a new page in Turkish-Soviet relations, but was not unsuccessful either."

Mr Ozal explained that he did not see any political slight in his inability to meet the Soviet party boss Mikhail Gorbachev, who is visiting Vladivostok at the moment.

Speaking at a press conference in Moscow following the completion of his official program in the Soviet capital, Mr Ozal said that the new Soviet leaders shared the view that being in different blocs in no way hinders the expansion of relations between the two countries.

Mr Ozal went on to say that the Soviets invited Turkey to join in a Soviet space defense project for peaceful purposes to counter the American Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] (star wars) program.

Mr Ozal explained that Turkey had not yet reached a definite decision about participating in the SDI program. "At this stage Turkey is neither against nor for the program," Mr Ozal added.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS REPORTS CONFERENCE AGAINST NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN BUDAPEST

Conference Opens

LD181836 Moscow TASS in English 1749 GMT 18 Jul 86

[Text] Budapest, 18 Jul (TASS)--TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kuzmin reports:

The participants in an international conference, which opened here today and at which the causes and consequences of the nuclear arms race are under discussion, are voicing the idea of the need to do one's best and to pool the efforts of scientists with a view to preventing a nuclear catastrophe. The conference is being attended by scientists from 10 European countries, as well as from the U.S. and Canada.

When opening the conference, Ferenc Marta, vice president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, emphasized that the scientists' movement for the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe and against the runaway arms race is now assuming increasingly wide scope. The arms race poses increasing danger to the peoples of the world. Human civilization will not be able to survive a nuclear war. The destruction of all types of nuclear arms would serve to build confidence between peoples and to strengthen peace on earth. Scientists can make an invaluable contribution to the struggle for the utilization of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Soviet Envoy Speaks

LD212139 Moscow TASS in English 1705 GMT 21 Jul 86

[Text] Budapest, 21 Jul (TASS)--By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kuzmin.

The anti-nuclear movement of scientific workers is broadening by pooling their efforts. The scientists may greatly contribute to campaigning for peace, against the threat of nuclear war.

This has been underlined at the International Conference of Scientists, which ended here today. Representatives of 10 European countries, as well as the U.S. and Canada discussed causes and consequences of the nuclear arms race.

The Budapest conference showed that workers in science were worried over the unrestricted arms race and were fully determined to avert the threat of nuclear conflict, S.P. Kapitsa, head of the Soviet delegation to the meeting, said to a TASS correspondent.

The delegates spoke at Budapest about scientists' special responsibility for the cause of peace on earth. They said that today, as never before, was it necessary that scientific workers in all countries multiply their efforts in the interests of preventing nuclear conflict and preserving world civilization.

Representatives of various countries highly assessed the latest Soviet arms control initiatives. The Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on no nuclear explosions was enthusiastically backed. It was emphasized that this step paved the way for a total elimination of nuclear weapons, for strengthening confidence between nations.

The scientists expressed their conviction that it was absolutely feasible to detect a nuclear blast of any yield. In this connection, they welcomed the Soviet-American experiment near Semipalatinsk, S.P. Kapitsa concluded.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA: PENTAGON INFRASTRUCTURE PLANS FOR NUCLEAR WAR

PMO31326 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 86 First Edition p 5

[TASS report under the rubric "Behind Events": "Pentagon-Style Survival"]

[Text] Washington, 28 Jul -- Contrary to the U.S. Administration's widely trumpeted statements about its "desire for peace" and the reduction of nuclear arsenals, the Pentagon is carrying out extensive work to prepare for and wage a nuclear war and is creating a complex system of defensive arms, bomb shelters, and a range of satellite links and communications to ensure U.S. "survival" in a nuclear conflict.

This was directly stated in a long WASHINGTON POST article. It points out that the U.S. military department is creating a major "land-based emergency control system" [nazemnaya sistema upravleniya v chrezvychaynykh obstoyatelstvakh] -- [GVEN] -- which is conceived, in particular, as a command post for relaying orders to strategic missile complexes and air and naval bases in the event of a nuclear conflict.

THE WASHINGTON POST notes that the Pentagon has allocated \$800 million for the creation of the system. By Pentagon standards this is by no means a large sum. However, GVEN is only one component in the comprehensive plan drawn up by the administration for creating a military infrastructure aimed at making the United States not only able to wage a nuclear war but to "survive it," maintain its forces, and prepare to wage new combat actions. According to the newspaper, the U.S. Administration plans to allocate \$40 billion for these purposes.

THE WASHINGTON POST frankly hints that the Reagan administration is clearly being duplicitous in its approach to the problem of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, and its claims about its desire to ensure peace are no more than a propaganda screen for its militarist preparations. It is reminiscent of the worldwide outburst of indignation triggered by Defense Secretary C. Weinberger's statement that the United States is striving to win "strategic superiority" in a nuclear conflict. "Behind the scenes, often in complete secrecy," the newspaper writes, "the military has spent almost \$20 billion on creating a command control, communications, and intelligence network (termed C-3I by the Pentagon) most of which is intended for surviving a long nuclear war and reaching the "post-attack stage."

Essentially, W. Arkin, an American nuclear weapons expert, stated in the newspaper, "this will allow the United States to prepare for a fourth world war."

THE WASHINGTON POST, quoting statements by D. Latham, leader of C-3I, notes that it is planned to launch a "Milstar" satellite system within the framework of the program. According to preliminary assessments it will cost \$10-20 billion. The system, the article points out, will be the first communications system to ensure a "campaign of repeated exchanges" of nuclear strikes. It also embraces a space-based nuclear detection system [sistema yadernogo obnaruzheniya] that will determine which enemy targets have been destroyed and which ones should be struck again.

THE WASHINGTON POST article unambiguously attests that the United States is continuing to pursue its dangerous course of preparing to unleash a nuclear conflict.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET WEEKLY VIEWS CONSEQUENCES ON NUCLEAR WINTER RESEARCH

PM251011 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 27, 6 Jul 86 p 6

[Aleksandr Pumpyanskiy article: "Going To Weather the Winter?"]

[Text] At long last, we've received some heart-warming news from across the ocean: the winter is going to be less severe than predicted earlier. It's going to be shorter and milder, too. Which winter? The nuclear one.

The term "nuclear winter" came into political and scientific vocabulary three years ago. A nuclear war could turn our warm green planet into an icebox. The clouds of ash, smoke, soot and dirt that would be lifted into the atmosphere in nuclear mushroom clouds would block the sun and bar its warm rays from reaching the Earth. A deadly ice age would set in.

As a result of independent research, both American and Soviet scientists have arrived at similar conclusions. Even a comparatively small-scale (as against the total nuclear tonnage accumulated to date) nuclear exchange is likely to cause a "nuclear winter". Even without a retaliatory blow, a first strike is sure to trigger off a climatic catastrophe not to be weathered either in the West, East, North or South.

Having changed our concept of man-made Armageddon overnight, the end of the world is now being associated with cold and dark rather than fire and brimstone. Physicists have passed their judgement on nuclear illusions: the use of the Bpmb means death for all! They have also passed a special decision concerning the nuclear arms race: the available stockpiles are more than enough even for the limited purposes of civilization's suicide. Terrifying as science's verdict may sound, it asserts the importance of life. Now the question is whether or not politicians will heed this ultimate warning and draw relevant conclusions.

One rather peculiar conclusion has already been made. The NEW YORK TIMES reports: "Taking into account the impact the 'nuclear winter' theory might have on the U.S. strategy, the federal government, since 1984, has spent millions of dollars on computer analysis and other research." With what result? "The fall in temperatures is expected to be less marked or durable than predicted earlier, measuring on the average 25°F instead of 45°F."

Having thus confirmed the fundamental conclusion about the "nuclear winter", the official researchers commissioned by the U.S. Government have, nonetheless, diminished its effect. Are we going to weather it, after all?

It is up to experts to verify the temperature predictions. The only argument a layman can raise in a computer debate is this: "nuclear winter", hopefully, is a theory that can never be tested by practice. It is always more realistic to presume the worst. In world politics, we should go by the assumption that "nuclear winter" must be prevented at all cost, rather than speculate on the possibility of a thaw.

"Nuclear winter" is the real and scientifically substantiated metaphor of the ultimate danger inherent in the nuclear age. This danger can't help imposing strict and categorical constraints on politicians.

In this context, nothing is more dangerous than "nuclear optimism". It is the "nuclear optimists" who have masterminded every new step in the arms race. Given a free hand, they can bring the world to its end.

No policy is more dangerous than nuclear maneuvering. Is SALT II dead and buried, obsolete or still alive? These questions have been repeatedly put to Reagan, Weinberger, Shultz and others, with no satisfactory or clear answer being given by any of them. The Reagan administration's titanic effort to prove that what they have done to SALT II is logical, moral and useful brings to mind the famous sculptural group of Laocoon with snakes, the important correction being that it is the administration who is twisting and strangling the treaty. The latest intellectual tour de force was performed by the so far little known Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway, who said: "The question of whether SALT II is dead or alive is a play on words, which has nothing to do with the core of the problem."

Quite a good pun. But there is a difference between life and death. As there is a difference in the political course of the two "superpowers".

The USSR has long suspended its nuclear tests, by introducing a one-sided moratorium on nuclear explosions.

In recent months, it also has proposed the following:

The total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century (provided no first-strike space-based weapons stipulated by the SDI be developed)

The elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles deployed in Europe;

The elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production by the end of this century;

A reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals;

International cooperation in peaceful space research for the benefit of all mankind;

Reliable control and verification of all stages of disarmament by both national means and international procedures, including on-site inspection;

A comprehensive system of international security covering the military, political, economic and humanitarian aspects.

Last but not least, the USSR has tabled a new compromise proposal in Geneva, which can be summarized as follows: the USSR and U.S. should agree to abide by the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems for at least 15 years, confining the SDI projects to laboratory research, while strategic offensive weapons should be reduced by both sides to 8,000 warheads each (which is nearly a 30 percent reduction).

One can dislike the Soviet system, but one can't fail to see the above actions as a systematic and consistent drive towards a definite goal, which, in the final analysis, is to make our era nuclear-free in the nuclear age: the world in which we all live has armed itself to the teeth and has become a mortally dangerous place to live. The only solution is to clear it of arms and make it safe for all.

Even President Reagan had to admit recently: "The Soviets have made suggestions on a range of issues, from nuclear power plant safety to conventional force reductions in Europe. Perhaps most important, the Soviet negotiators at Geneva have placed on the table new proposals to reduce nuclear weapons. We cannot accept these particular proposals without change, but it appears that the Soviets have begun to make a serious effort."

And what is the Reagan Administration really striving for?

To carry out infinite rearmament programs extending well into the next millennium? Right. The administration openly says so, clanging the armour that can hardly warm its owner during a "nuclear winter".

What else? To go as far as possible along the lucrative Star Wars Milky Way? To engage outer space in the arms race? Yes.

To achieve real and verifiable reductions in strategic weapons with a view to totally eliminating nuclear arms? That's what President Reagan says, although it doesn't seem to agree with previously announced objectives, unless we consider it a play on words, of the same sort as this: Star Wars are going to bring peace to earth; space weapons render nuclear arms obsolete and unnecessary, etc.

Why is Reagan bent on burying SALT II? Because the treaty constrains his "modernization" programs. Why does Reagan speak out for nuclear arms reduction? Because he can't otherwise justify his denunciation of SALT II. He allegedly rejects a bad treaty for the sake of a good one. But where is this good treaty? Does Reagan really want it?

Unfortunately, on this score there are grave doubts. The fact that, during the six and a half years of Reagan's presidency, not a single arms control agreement with the USSR has been concluded, while a lot of damage has been done, leaves little room for hope. The old ABM treaty is more likely to be rejected than a new arms reduction treaty concluded. It is not for nothing that Weinberger has been struggling so frantically for the U.S.'s right to withdraw from the ABM treaty (as if that is a most important and inalienable right granted to America by God and the Founding Fathers).

With much venom, the same Weinberger has recently remarked: You see, even the president's decision about SALT II has not made the Soviets slam the door. Instead, they came up with fresh proposals in Geneva.

That's logical for you! Political posturing tends to be self-satisfied and vain. This sample smacks of provocation, too. However, such minor faults fade into insignificance against the far graver sin of nuclear thoughtlessness.

One doesn't slam doors in nuclear depots. It would be bad form to challenge America's made destructive bent. The crucial question is whether or not the West is going to take up the challenge of reason.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET JOURNAL SURVEYS EVENTS DECEMBER 1985-MARCH 1986

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 86 (signed to press 19 Mar 86) pp 81-100

[V. Baranovskiy, B. Bolotin, E. Grebenshchikov, O. Ivanova, Yu. Krashennnikov roundup: "Current Problems of World Politics"]

[Excerpts] 3. East-West: Preserve the 'Spirit of Geneva'

At the start of 1985 the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the Soviet Government adopted a decision on a number of important foreign policy actions of a fundamental nature designed to contribute to the maximum extent to an improvement in the situation on the world scene, overcome the negative, confrontational trends in international relations and achieve a general lessening of the threat of war looming over mankind. The statement of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which contains a specific and comprehensive plan of action in this field, was issued on 15 January.

The core of the new broad-scale set of Soviet peace initiatives is a program of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the world over the next 15 years. The Soviet proposals stipulate that the USSR and the United States should set the other nuclear powers an example and at the first stage, within 5-8 years, halve the nuclear arms capable of reaching one another's territory, given both countries' mutual renunciation of the creation, testing and deployment of space-based arms. At this stage it is proposed agreeing on a complete halt to all nuclear explosions and eliminating the intermediate-range missiles (ballistic and cruise) in the armament of the two states in the European zone. The United States must undertake here not to supply strategic missiles and intermediate-range missiles to other countries, and Britain and France not to increase their corresponding nuclear arms. In the subsequent two stages it is envisaged incorporating the other nuclear powers in the process that has begun, freezing and then liquidating all tactical nuclear missiles and, finally, completing the elimination of all remaining nuclear arms in the world by the end of 1999.

As a most important component of the process of a reduction in and the elimination of nuclear weapons it is essential to close off all channels of their improvement, in connection with which the USSR adopted the decision to extend by 3 months the unilateral moratorium it announced last August on all nuclear explosions and appealed once again to the United States to join in this constructive step. Then came one further important decision. Responding to the appeal of the leaders of six countries addressed to the USSR and the United States to refrain from nuclear testing in the period prior to the next Soviet-American top-level meeting, M.S. Gorbachev declared on behalf of the Soviet leadership that the Soviet Union would not carry out nuclear explosions even after 31 March--until the first nuclear explosion in the United States.

The 15 January statement also proposed a ban on the creation of arms based on new physical principles and approximating in their destructive factors weapons of mass annihilation (it is a question, inter alia, of beam, radiowave, infrasound, geophysical and genetic weapons). The USSR advocates removal from states' arsenals in the next few years of chemical weapons, destruction of the stockpiles thereof and liquidation of the industrial facilities themselves for their manufacture under strict supervision, including international on-site inspection. Finally, the statement proposes that conventional arms and armed forces also be a subject of agreed reductions.

The new Soviet proposals, which formulate a bold and at the same time realistic program of deliverance of the earth from the threat of nuclear perdition and outline specific steps on the path of arms limitation and disarmament, have had the broadest international repercussions and made such a profound impression on the public opinion of various countries that rejecting them out of hand has proven impossible even for the opponents of an easing of tension. The initial official reaction of the United States and other NATO countries to M.S. Gorbachev's statement was of a more benevolent nature than the traditionally negative stereotypes which have become firmly established in the West's "public diplomacy" in the period "since detente".

However, in the wake of this, as from a cornucopia, showered a variety of reservations, clarifications and explanations. Officially or unofficially the "counterarguments" being advanced amount to a set of propositions which in abridged form may be formulated thus:

the Soviet Union's demand for renunciation of the militarization of space allegedly makes achievement of the accords it proposes impossible;

removal of nuclear weapons from states' arsenals would enable the USSR to take advantage of its "superiority" in conventional arms;

a complete halt to nuclear testing is unacceptable to the United States inasmuch as it is essential for the development of a number of American military programs (primarily within the SDI framework);

the American intermediate-range missiles deployed in West Europe "are the connecting link between European and American security" (and, consequently, essential for preserving the solvency of the "nuclear guarantees" to the allies on the part of the United States);

the freezing of the nuclear arsenals of Britain and France would be contrary to the plans for their modernization;

it is not legitimate to demand that the United States undertake not to supply strategic missiles and intermediate-range missiles to other countries inasmuch as this would render impossible the equipping of the British fleet with the American Trident system;

in order for the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in the European zone proposed by the Soviet Union to be effective it must simultaneously reduce the number thereof in the Asian part of its territory also.

At the same time observers note that the search for an adequate response to the USSR's "political challenge" has brought about a very acute struggle in the highest echelons of the U.S. Administration between the "hawks" and the "pragmatists". It took the U.S. Administration more than a month to formulate a response to the Soviet proposals. As M.S. Gorbachev declared from the platform of the 27th congress, the individual positive pronouncements contained in this response (on the need for all nuclear powers, for example, to aspire to the elimination of nuclear weapons) are literally "swamped by a variety of reservations, 'linkages' and 'conditions,' which in fact are blocking a solution of fundamental questions of disarmament." The United States' allies also sometimes attempt to avoid a precise, unambiguous reaction to the Soviet initiatives, although more realistic evaluations are being made in West Europe, which have to be heeded to this extent or the other across the Atlantic also.

The positive impetus engendered by the Soviet-American top-level meeting is very important for the success of the bilateral and multilateral negotiations being conducted in Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm.

The fourth round of the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms began on 16 January in Geneva. During the meeting of M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan it was decided to speed up these negotiations, bearing in mind that their aim is to prevent an arms race in space and put a halt to it on earth, limit and reduce nuclear arms and strengthen strategic stability. However, the American side is adhering to an "abbreviated" interpretation of the subject of the negotiations, arbitrarily excluding therefrom the "space component" and presenting matters such that it should only be a question of spheres where "there are points of contact" between the sides. But attempting to exclude one of the three jointly determined areas of the negotiations means inevitably creating additional difficulties for the achievement of the sides' mutually acceptable accords on questions on whose solution the fate of general peace depends.

The latest session of the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security and Disarmament in Europe opened on 28 January in Stockholm. Certain opportunities have come to light at it recently making it possible to create barriers in the way of the use of force and hidden preparations for war--whether on land, at sea or in the air. The set of new Soviet initiatives also contains the key to the solution of problems which have not been solved at the Stockholm conference--concerning, inter alia, the question of notification of large-scale army, navy and air force exercises.

The talks on a mutual reduction in armed forces and armaments in Central Europe resumed on 30 January in Vienna. The 38th round of the Vienna talks began under conditions where a general framework of further discussion and certain contours of mutual accords appeared virtually for the first time. This became possible after the Western partners had accepted, in the main, on 5 December the socialist countries' idea formulated in February last year concerning initial reductions of Soviet and American forces in Central Europe combined with a subsequent nonincrease for a certain length of time in the levels of the armed forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in this region. However, the proposals of the Western participants in the talks in response continue in a number of aspects to be of one-sided and unrealistic nature--primarily owing to the arbitrary interpretation of the question of supervision.

In order to overcome the existing differences and finally achieve some movement at the talks the socialist states submitted on 20 February a new draft agreement which takes account of all the elements of the Western participants' position acceptable to them and proposes compromise solutions on a number of important questions on which agreement between the sides is still lacking.

Following the Geneva summit discussion of the question of the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons, which is being studied by the multilateral Geneva Disarmament Conference, has been stepped up also. A bilateral exchange of opinions began between delegates of the USSR and the United States at this forum as practical realization of the understanding reached by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan on an intensification of discussion at expert level on all aspects of this problem, including questions of supervision. In February the Disarmament Conference adopted the report of the special Chemical Weapons Committee and instructed it to continue work, referring to the speediest preparation of the draft of a corresponding convention. It has, however, to be seen that completely contrary to the task of banning and destroying these barbaric weapons is the program of "chemical armament and rearmament" being implemented in the United States. A most powerful arsenal of chemical weapons, including over 3 million shells, aerial bombs, mortars and land mines, which constitutes approximately 150,000 tons of chemical warheads, is not enough for the Pentagon. It is preparing to equip itself with a new variety thereof--binary weapons--for whose series production Congress had already appropriated \$126 million.

4. The Capitalist World: Contradictory Trends

Whether or not the Common Market will succeed here, time will tell. But even now the accords reached in Luxembourg, particularly on the greater degree of foreign policy coordination, are being put to a serious test in connection with the different approach of individual members to a number of international problems. The differences which exist between the partners are being manifested most graphically in respect of the American "star wars" program.

Great Britain has the dubious honor of first West European country to officially support the SDI. On 6 December the defense secretaries of Britain and the United States signed in London a "memorandum of understanding" regulating general rules of British companies' participation in realization of the American project. Yet only a year ago Foreign Secretary G. Howe was warning of its dangerous consequences. American diplomacy attempted to use this year to mobilize available resources of the "special relationship" between London and Washington.

In the wake of Great Britain negotiations on the terms of association with the SDI were begun by the FRG. The main question which has to be settled is the form in which West German firms' "contribution" to realization of the plans for the militarization of space will be effected. This question is giving rise to serious disagreements in the ruling coalition in Bonn itself. FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher (who has repeatedly made critical pronouncements in respect of the SDI) believes that an essential condition of the country's participation in the "star wars" program is the conclusion of a general agreement between the FRG and the United States on S&T cooperation. However, Genscher's position was said by Chancellor H. Kohl not to conform to the government's viewpoint.

In January FRG Economics Minister M. Bangemann made a trip to the United States to negotiate "an improvement in the general terms of the exchange of the results of scientific research and technological experience" and also a strengthening of the legal positions of the research establishments and industrial enterprises which announce "a desire to participate as subcontractors in the SDI research program." And although a government report says that financial resources for official participation in the SDI will not be allocated, the practice of the state subsidizing research performed by military concerns makes it possible to overcome this "self-limitation" with ease. Washington, however, wants more--an official intergovernmental agreement, which would stimulate the FRG's political participation in the SDI.

Nor is the United States leaving France "unattended," although Paris, as is known, has from the very outset refused to support the American plans for the militarization of space. This position was confirmed once again in President F. Mitterrand's book "Reflections on France's Foreign Policy," which was published at the start of the year. For this reason American diplomacy sees its mission in this case lying elsewhere--preventing the possibility of active opposition to SDI on the part of Paris and, if successful, enlisting French private firms in realization of the "star wars"

program. The experience of R&D connected with space which has been accumulated by some of them is considerably greater than that of other West European countries. A statement by French Defense Minister P. Quilès on 24 January calls attention to itself in this light. He confirmed that "from the political and international viewpoints" the government, as before, does not support SDI, however, he gave notice of a positive attitude toward private companies' participation in contracts connected with it. Thus the possibility of the conversion of French firms into subcontractors of the American military-industrial monopolies is by no means ruled out.

A consequence of the possible participation of West European companies in implementation of the "star wars" program could be, specialists believe, West Europe's increased technological dependence on the United States. As a result there would be an increased threat of subordination of the economy of the West European states to American monopoly capital. Such a prospect is causing concern in West European political and business circles. There is also a very pained reaction here to the transatlantic monopolies' attempts to lay their hands on all that lies in temptation's way. They are at times the cause of acute domestic political collisions in the West European countries. Great Britain, where the decision to sell to the American United Technologies concern the country's sole helicopter company, Westland, which had found itself on the verge of bankruptcy, caused a major political conflict in the M. Thatcher cabinet, may serve as an example. M. Heseltine who had the office of defense secretary and who had insisted on the adoption of a "rescue plan" for the British helicopter industry not by way of its transfer to American hands but with the help of a consortium of West European companies, resigned from the government.

The stream of reports and commentary devoted to the upcoming building of the tunnel under the Channel distracted attention for a time away from the other "European" idea which has been under discussion for several months in political and military circles on both sides of the Atlantic. The essence of this idea is that it is essential that West Europe, to "solve" problems of safeguarding its own security, which would inevitably be exacerbated in the event of the United States' creation of a "space shield," have something like its "own" SDI double--a "European Defense Initiative" (EDI). This idea is being propagandized more assertively than others by Gen B. Rogers, NATO supreme commander in Europe. In January he called on the United States' allies to "begin a parallel program of the creation of space arms" and proposed that use be made for this of the possibilities which could be afforded by realization of the Eureka project--a program of the S&T cooperation of 18 West European countries. Such a proposal pursues two goals simultaneously--binding West Europe to Washington's military-space plans and at the same time, having limited the civilian focus of Eureka, preventing its conversion into a means of strengthening the positions of the West European center of interimperialist rivalry.

It is significant that among the West European states the greatest interest in the EDI idea is being displayed by, perhaps, the FRG. Evidently its supporters here (among whom are Defense Minister M. Woerner and, of course, CSU Chairman F.-J. Strauss) would like to accomplish a "breakthrough" toward possession of superstrategic--space-based--weapons, bypassing the "nuclear phase".

Meanwhile the deployment of all 108 Pershing 2 intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missiles on FRG territory has been completed. Cruise missiles have begun to arrive at the Hahn military base in the region of Hunsrueck (Baden-Wuerttemberg)--a year earlier than the previously appointed time. Development of the next program, according to which after 1988 it is planned embarking in the European "theater" on the deployment of new, this time, tactical, ground-to-ground and air-to-ground missiles fitted with nuclear warheads, is proceeding. The following picture is observed in the conventional arms sphere: in the current year the military provision of the West European NATO participants alone is to be increased by 900 tanks and armored personnel carriers, 250 aircraft and 20 warships (including an aircraft carrier).

In the United States the policy of continuation of wide-ranging military preparations has been reflected in the draft budget for the 1987 fiscal year. The White House's request provides for the appropriation for the Defense Department of a new record sum--\$311.6 billion. It is planned increasing almost twofold--to \$4.8 billion--the resources allocated for implementation of the "star wars" program; \$1.4 billion has been requested for the creation of the mobile Midgetman missile and \$1.7 billion for production of the Trident nuclear submarine. During the present administration's term of office the Pentagon's share of budget appropriations has grown from 21 to 28 percent.

A further characteristic feature of the administration's budget is the sharp reduction in appropriations for practically all civilian domestic programs (housing, transport, aid to the cities, farmers and the poor, medical services, job placement, environmental protection and so forth) and a proposal to eliminate 14 such programs designed for the needy altogether. This is being substantiated by the need to reduce the budget deficit.

However, this November's mid-term elections to the United States' highest legislative body are forcing many congressmen to ponder the electorate's reaction to a policy based on the "guns before butter" formula. As the experience of recent years testifies, despite all its wealth, the United States is not in a position to permit itself both. In any event, in developing its policy in the sphere of military organizational development the administration is finding itself forced to bear in mind the mood which exists on Capital Hill also.

And this fact is giving rise to certain apprehensions among the representatives of the American ruling class who are on the far-right flank of the political spectrum. Any arms control, even a slight retreat from the principle of reliance on military strength, could, according to their ideas, appear a sign of impermissible U.S. "weakness". After the top-level Geneva meeting they manifestly resolved to switch to a counteroffensive, to which the demands for an increase in the military items of the federal budget testify, in particular:

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya". 1986

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET ADMIRALS ON ROLE OF SSBN'S, SURFACE FLEETS

Medvedov on Naval Arms Race

PM040706 Moscow TRUD in Russian 27 Jul 86 p 1

[Article by Admiral P. N. Medvedev, member of Navy Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate: "The Fatherland's 'Ocean Guard'"]

[Excerpts] Today our country is celebrating Navy Day for the 47th time. On this festive occasion Soviet people honor with love and pride our Navy personnel, naval veterans, shipbuilders and ship repairers, and defense industry workers who strengthen our state's naval might. The history of our Navy is closely linked with that of our socialist motherland. Revolutionary sailors were one of the party's strike detachments in the Great October Socialist Revolution. Many of us carry the image of the fighter in sailor's jacket and cap, girded with machinegun ammunition belts, as a symbol of courage and Bolshevik stoicism in the struggle for Soviet power. The Navy made a large contribution to the victory in the Great Patriotic War. In the fighting against the German fascist invaders and then the Japanese militarists, the Navy showed mass heroism.

Our country has a vital need of a strong, up-to-date Navy, because it is not only the world's largest continental power but also a great naval power. The sea's waves wash Soviet shores in the south, east, west and north over a total distance of approximately 40,000 KMS.

The Communist Party and Soviet Government firmly and consistently pursue a Leninist policy of peace. At the same time, as M.S. Gorbachev stressed at the 27th CPSU Congress, considering the complex international situation and the growing aggressiveness of reactionary imperialist circles, the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo devote unremitting attention to the country's defense capability and the combat might of the Armed Forces to prevent imperialist forces from gaining strategic superiority.

The Soviet Armed Forces are always ready to restrain any aggressor, be it on land or at sea.

In their implementation of an aggressive policy, the NATO countries give a prime role to their naval forces. Over the postwar period the United States has used its Navy more than 200 times to unleash wars and military conflicts. NATO does not conceal its aspiration to gain military superiority at sea in order to hold complete sway over the World Ocean. An extensive network of American naval bases has been developed in all ocean regions. American aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines constantly operate in the waters of the northeast Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and off the shores of the Near East. What is more, these operations are frankly aggressive in nature. The events of April this year, when deck aircraft from the U.S. 6th Fleet were used in a criminal air attack on sovereign Libya and in strikes against its innocent cities, are still fresh in our memories.

At present, more than half of U.S. strategic nuclear ammunition is deployed on American nuclear submarines. The majority of these submarines are on combat patrol in regions from where it would be possible to carry out nuclear strikes against objectives located in the heart of our country's territory.

All this compels Soviet naval personnel to increase their vigilance and combat readiness, persistently strive to master combat skills, and learn to conduct contemporary combat operations so as to allow no one to take us unawares.

In order to at least somehow justify the naval arms race, Western propaganda intimidates the world public with the development of the Soviet Navy and its increasing potential. But our country's increased naval might is only a countermeasure.

The Soviet Union is a determined opponent of the militarization of the ocean. It has put forward a whole series of constructive initiatives aimed at reducing confrontation at sea. They include proposals on restricting the limits of patrolling by missile-carrying submarines, completely demilitarizing the Indian Ocean, permanently ending the USSR and U.S. naval presence in the Mediterranean, and extending confidence measures to the seas and oceans.

Soviet ships have never attacked other countries' ships or shores or threatened anyone with attack. The actions of our Navy on the World Ocean are conditioned purely by the security interests of the Soviet state and its allies and by the interests of stabilizing the situation in troubled regions of the world.

The contemporary Navy is a complex military organism. Basically, it includes every arm of service in the necessary proportions. It is hard to overestimate the role played in contemporary naval combat operations by strategic and multipurpose nuclear submarines, naval aircraft, surface ships designed for various purposes, the marine infantry, and coastal missile units.

The most sophisticated and powerful warships today are the nuclear submarines. Within them are concentrated the most complex types of weapons and mechanisms, long-range missiles and self-targeting torpedoes, and sophisticated means of observing and detecting targets. They are capable of traveling unlimited distances for unlimited periods of time. Our nuclear powered vessels demonstrated this as much as 20 years ago, by completing the first group submarine around-the-world voyage in history.

Nevertheless, the strength of our Navy is not just based on its powerful equipment. Primarily, it lies in people--in our remarkable sailors and petty officers, warrant officers, officers, and admirals.

Of course, it is impossible to enumerate every good ship and unit, but it is equally impossible not to mention certain collectives. The crew of the missile cruiser Slava, commanded by Captain 2d Rank V. Krikunov, delegate to the 27th CPSU Congress, is worthily greeting Navy Day. The cruiser rightly bears the title "excellent."

Other leading vessels include the aircraft-carrying cruiser Novorossiysk and the missile cruiser Groznyy, whose commanders -- Captain 1st Rank Ye. Litvinenko and Captain 2d Rank M. Pinchuk -- were also delegates to the party congress. The crew of the Guards large [antisubmarine warfare] ship Krazny Kavkaz of the Black Sea fleet works persistently, striving for success in combat training and socialist competition. [passage omitted]

The source of the Soviet Army and Navy's power and invincibility lies in the Communist Party's leadership and in the vital unity of the Armed Forces and the people. Naval personnel are linked by many vital threads to local party, Komsomol, and soviet organs, which spiritually enriches them and contributes to their deeper understanding of their duty to the party and the people. Educated in the spirit of great communist ideological commitment, patriotism and internationalism, naval personnel have an aware attitude to their military work and their social duty, and they are superior in moral, political, and psychological respects to their potential adversary. Closely rallied around the Leninist Communist Party, together with members of the other branches of the Armed Forces they reliably and vigilantly guard the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people and the achievements of socialism.

Chernavin on Navy's Record

PM060726 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 30, 4 Aug 86 pp 6-7

[Article by Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, Navy commander in chief: "On Guard of the Homeland"]

[Excerpts] The Soviet Union is a great sea power. The USSR's coastline is almost as long as the equator. On guard to defend the peaceful life of their homeland, Soviet sailors keep vigilant watch on the expanses of the World Ocean.

After the second world war, aggressive imperialist circles headed by the U.S. ignored its lessons. At first they secretly and then overtly started to hatch new plans for war against the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries. Our country was rapidly being surrounded by a network of military bases. The imperialists were hammering together one aggressive military bloc after another.

Today the U.S. is spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the arms race and this includes naval hardware. The U.S. Navy is being expanded along two lines: the buildup of strategic nuclear-missile systems and of general-purpose forces. The World Ocean has been turned into a base from which to prepare for an aggressive war against the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries.

To counter imperialist intrigues, in the mid-1950s the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government passed a decision on the construction of a powerful ocean-going fleet armed with nuclear missiles. Scientists, designers, engineers, technicians and workers -- in fact the whole of the Soviet people -- contributed to its creation. Within a brief space of time Soviet sailors were equipped with hardware and weaponry enabling them to accomplish major operational and strategic missions and oppose aggression from the oceans.

To ensure the country's security against a surprise attack today the Soviet government has been compelled to take effective measures. Washington cannot afford to ignore the grave consequences of the retaliatory blows that will be struck from the oceans should the aggressor venture to unleash a nuclear war.

The main strike force of the Soviet Navy are atom-powered submarines and aircraft carrying long-range missiles. These naval weapons are characterized by tremendous destructive power, high mobility and capability for warfare on a global scale.

Surface ships have changed beyond recognition. We now have aircraft carrying cruisers of the Kiev class and nuclear-powered cruisers of the Kirov class. The air arm, which is part of the navy, can help secure victory in practically any major operation. Its purpose is to hit surface, submarine and air targets and also to conduct long-range reconnaissance at sea. All modern weaponry is manned by excellently trained personnel, including the marines.

Today the worthy successors to the combat glory of older generations of Soviet sailors keep watch on the high seas. They are living up to their duty in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans, as well as in the Arctic. They navigate along difficult, often unexplored routes and are training to secure victory in the most complicated operational and tactical situations, and to wage radio electronic and all other modern ways of warfare.

Commanders, political organs, staffs and Party organizations are concentrating sailors' efforts on raising the level of combat readiness, the proficiency and quality of all combat training, as well as on complete mastery of modern weaponry and other fighting equipment. This is a continuous process inasmuch as the sophistication of warfare calls for constant perfection of combat training.

The Soviet Navy has been constantly extending its contacts with the fraternal navies and armies of the Warsaw Treaty member countries. The Allied fleets are becoming more experienced in combat training and political education. In the course of combined exercises and manoeuvres coordination of action between ships, and the fighting skill of the crews are being improved. As brothers-in-arms, the servicemen of the socialist countries have been cementing their friendship.

On Soviet Navy Day many of the crews are far from their home shores. They are carrying out an important internationalist mission and doing their patriotic duty. People all over the world know that Soviet warships ply the seas to curb the imperialists and frustrate their hegemonic, predatory ambitions, and not to launch aggression, build up tension or exert military pressure on other peoples. Proudly flying the Soviet state flag at sea and in the oceans, Soviet warships demonstrate their readiness to safeguard their homeland.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S ALIYEV INTERVIEWED ON ARMS ISSUES, U.S.-SOVIET TIES

AU301219 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jul 86 pp 3-4

[Excerpt] Geydar Aliyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who was the chief of the CPSU delegation to the 13th LCY Congress [25-28 June], received during his stay in Belgrade Risto Bajalski, editor of POLITIKA foreign affairs section, and replied to a few questions about the USSR internal development, the international situation, and Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

Instead of Tension, Detente

Question: The situation in the world remains unstable; specifically, the tension between the USSR and the United States does not cease. The arms race is not being stopped, but the machinery for negotiations does exist, and a Soviet-American summit meeting will occur. Which, in your opinion, is the road to an improvement of the international situation?

Answer: The contemporary international situation in fact continues to cause considerable concern. But our country, not being taken in by the provocations of imperialism, persistently continues to strive for simple and clear agreements: instead of an arms race, its reduction; instead of a military confrontation, equal security for all countries; instead of tension, detente; instead of confrontation among states, a constructive dialogue, the establishment of trust and mutual understanding. Striving for this, the Soviet Union has come forward as an initiator of a radical and realistic program for freeing the world from nuclear arms by the end of this century. Our complex plan opens up the possibility of a full and complete liquidation of nuclear weapons in the whole world, which would be implemented under strict international control, just as the liquidation of chemical weapons, their reserves of them, and the industrial base for producing them. In this sense we believe that it would be useful to create nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe, including the Balkans, and transform the Mediterranean, this cradle of many civilizations, into a zone of reliable peace and cooperation.

The Warsaw Pact members states recently proposed a multidimensional program for reducing the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

The 27th CPSU Congress has initiated the idea of creating of a universal system of international security which would include all aspects: military, political, economic, and humanitarian. As was stressed in the political report by the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress, security in international relations can only be general.

We proceed from the premise that a new political thinking, which is extremely necessary in our tense time, presupposes a new, qualitatively higher level of flexibility in foreign policy and in the readiness to strive for reasonable compromises with one's partners. This readiness, unfortunately, is often missing in the case of many political leaders of the West, especially the United States. How else could one explain the circumstance that the U.S. Administration sanctions and in all possible ways stimulates a continuation of nuclear tests despite the will of the people?

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has been doing and will continue to do all that is in its power so that the "Geneva spirit" can find its embodiment in concrete agreements. We will tirelessly continue to propose to the United States to reach an agreement about concrete measures for the reduction and then the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war. We will not lack good will. A convincing confirmation of this is the one-sided moratorium of the USSR on all nuclear tests which was extended by the Soviet leadership for the third time, to last until 6 August.

Reagan's administration, which has unfortunately embarked on the road of undermining the Geneva agreements, has so far made no gesture of good will, at least a symbolic one, in return. On the contrary, its efforts have been directed toward aggravating world tension.

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CSO: 5200/1516

RELATED ISSUES

CPSU'S ZAGLADIN INTERVIEWED ON ARMS ISSUES

SALT, CDE

AU111238 Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech 5 Aug 86 p 5

["Vadim Zagladin on Topical International Issues; I Want to Believe in the Power of Common Sense" -- Part I]

[Text] During his stay in Prague, Vadim Zagladin, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, gave an interview on topical international issues to Bohumil Horak, chief editor of the main editorial office of the Czechoslovak Radio's international section. Here are excerpts:

[Horak] We recently commemorated the 11th anniversary of the signing of the CSCE Final Act in Helsinki. Could you, at least briefly, assess the period that has elapsed since and tell us where, in your opinion, lie the "reserves" of dentente?

[Zagladin] The Helsinki conference was an exceptional phenomenon in the history of international relations. Whereas the SALT I and the SALT II treaties and the agreement on antimissile defenses were the first approaches toward the new thinking in the sphere of disarmament, Helsinki was the first step in the sphere of mutual relations between East and West, in the sphere of security and cooperation.

However, the results of the Helsinki conference underwent hard tests. A new confrontation, far sharper than any before, caused great problems for the Helsinki process and delayed the realization of its principles. No less important is the fact that, despite these "storms" on the international scene, Helsinki has survived and maintained its ground. In this connection I would like to underscore two things in particular. First -- it has demonstrated that the roots of Helsinki are very firm -- particularly in Europe. Today we see how all European countries are activating their relations, and how they are expanding their cooperation on various levels. Relations are developing among governments, among political powers, regardless whether or not they are in power, and one can say that autonomous relations have been created between trade circles in East and West, and that a considerable cultural exchange is underway. Czechoslovakia, too, plays a very active role in this. The Budapest session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw pact member-states affirmed that the socialist countries want to go even further. They want to give the results of Helsinki a new content, fill them with new initiatives and actions, each country according to its specific needs and possibilities.

[Horak] The Stockholm conference, as a part of the Helsinki process, has become pressed for time. What possibility do you see of overcoming this time pressure, also from the viewpoint of the perspectives of the November Vienna followup meeting?

[Zagladin] Our standpoint in this matter is clear. We would like to Stockholm conference to be a success so that it ensures the success of the Vienna followup meeting. This is precisely what our diplomacy and the diplomacy of the other socialist states strive for. The recently concluded further round of the deliberations of the Stockholm conference yielded certain results in this respect. Nevertheless, the issues being discussed in Stockholm, although very important, are not the most important and decisive; disarmament is. The issues of trust are merely a part of it. But one can gauge the measure the political goodwill of individual participants by them.

The socialist countries are prepared for various compromises. However, we often come across the question whether it makes sense to accede to compromises. One has to see that there are "compromises" and compromises.

We accede to compromises without abandoning our principles. And the only purpose of these compromises is to make headway toward consolidating peace. This is the purpose of these compromises, whether they are compromises in Stockholm, Geneva, or in the course of other deliberations.

Politics, and this also applies to international policies, is the art of the possible. We proceed from this fact and are trying to find such possible and bilaterally acceptable solutions as would move the cause of peace forward. Even though there is not much time left before the conclusion of the Stockholm conference, I would like to express the hope that we will succeed in arriving at an acceptable compromise.

Nuclear Test Moratorium

AU111306 Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech 6 Aug 86 p 5

["Vladim Zagladin on Topical International Issues; I Want To Believe In the Power of Common Sense" -- Part II]

[Text] During his stay in Prague, Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, gave an interview on topical international issues to Bohumil Horak, chief editor of the main editorial office of Czechoslovakia Radio's international section. We publish the second part today:

[Horak] The current unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosion runs out on 6 August; it is a moratorium that has been extended by the Soviet side twice. Nothing, however, attests to the United States wishing to match this Soviet step. Will this reaction of rejection have any impact on the prospects of all ongoing deliberations?

[Zagladin] This is certainly going to have a negative influence, but some issues have to be weighed more profoundly. In view of the space and other militarist U.S. plans, the cause of its hitherto stance is clear from its point of view. Nonetheless, one has to see something else, namely, that our moratorium, which has been the expression of the political will and political determination to take a decisive step forward in disarmament, is being perceived by everybody as an endeavor to resolve the most urgent

problem of the present -- the problem of mankind's survival. One needs deeds. And our country, together with the other Warsaw Pact countries, insists, above all, on practical steps. The moratorium one of these. It is a courageous, even risky step. After all, when one side continues its tests and the other halts them, it understandably weakens the latter's defense capability to a certain extent. Of course, next to this negative aspect, the moratorium also has a very positive impact. By this I mean the political effect. During the course of the moratorium very profound changes occurred in the world, in public opinion. Even numerous Washington's allies, members of NATO, favor a moratorium. This also has made it possible recently for American and Soviet scientists to come to an agreement on concrete verification work regarding nuclear explosions. This is of immense importance in view of the fact that the issue of verification has always been handled as an obstacle on the road to disarmament. Now it shows that with goodwill verification is feasible.

[Morak] What are the prospects for Soviet-American relations in the upcoming period? Is their recent activation a sign of a more fundamental turn in international relations?

[Zagladin] An activation, but not a turn, is really occurring in our relations with the United States now. The relationship between these two quantities is decisive for today. An activation has been occurring in an important, but nevertheless secondary direction. [paragraph continues]

In the sphere of economic relations, in cultural exchange, and in consular relations. At least in this direction the American side manifests a certain readiness to go ahead, though not completely and with all consequences. However, it has not manifested such readiness in fundamental issues yet. It will be necessary to take a look at the new proposals or new ideas that are contained in President Reagan's response to M. Gorbachev, and which, as M. Gorbachev also said in Vladivostok, we are carefully studying. Our standpoint is as follows: We would like to go ahead not only in secondary issues, but at the same time and above all we wish a fundamental turn in Soviet-American relations as a whole. We are consistently of the view that today it is possible to consolidate security only when the legitimate interests of the participating parties are fully and comprehensively respected. If the Americans were to approach these issues in the same manner, the situation would be different. However, the greatest harm to the interests of the United States is not being caused by the USSR, but by the American military-political oligarchy unifying business, political, military, and certain scientific circles, that are interested in permanently endangering security. Either we ensure an adequate measure of security for all and launch appropriate cooperation, or civilization will find itself imperilled. Mr Gorbachev said in Vladivostok that one has to establish a partnership of common sense. This is a correct idea. Nevertheless, the question is whether common sense exists, and how strong it is. I want to believe in the power of common sense, just the same.

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CSO: 5200/1514

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET GENERAL VIEWS DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION

DW121301 Bonn DIE WELT in German 12 Aug 86 p 6

[Article by Soviet Major General Yuriy V. Lebedev, deputy chief of the Laws and Treaties Directorate of the Soviet Armed Force General Staff, and member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva INF negotiations]

[Text] In the Western press, material has appeared that questions the USSR's concrete and comprehensive proposals on verifying the reduction and limitation of forces and weapons. DIE WELT, for instance, has tried to represent the matter as if the USSR only advocated guaranteed verification measures in words whereas in reality it dodged them.

However, that is absolutely wrong. It should be stated publicly that the objective of verification proper, as well as the state of the negotiations, are distorted and material attempts have been made to avoid talking about the state of the negotiations and the essence of the agreements. Only the verification issue is discussed. We asked ourselves why the verification procedure should be formulated if there is no agreement on the dimension and sometimes not even on the subject matter of verification?

The Soviet Union's approach to the verification issue is essentially that disarmament without verification is impossible, whereas verification without disarmament does not make sense either. The main objective of verification is contributing to limitation of the arms race and to observance of specific requirements that should be formulated as a result of the negotiations.

There is another objective requirement for the verification process: It should by no means curtail state sovereignty. Therefore, the Soviet Union continues to advocate verification by national technical means. They have already proved their reliability and efficiency in practice. The capabilities of such means are constantly improved to the extent that they are being perfected. However, in applying definite agreements, the Soviet Union is ready to expand verification measures to include on-site inspections. Such an approach was clearly and unequivocally explained in the statement made by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on 15 January 1986. The Soviet delegations strictly adhere to it in the negotiations.

By referring to insufficient verification measures, the U.S. side has for some time rejected the Soviet proposals on imposing a bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. The Soviet Union has for some time unilaterally renounced carrying out nuclear tests, has supported the idea of an international verification system, and has expressed its readiness to accept on-site inspections.

Verification by National Means and On Site

When it became obvious that nuclear explosions, even those of negligible destructive force, could be monitored by modern seismic instruments, the U.S. side stated frankly that it could not discontinue tests.

The Soviet Union is known to be against the development, testing and deployment of space weapons. It is of the view that as long as there are no such weapons in space, a ban on weapons would be easy to verify. The U.S. side, denying the possibilities of verification, suggested the idea of "open laboratories," where the sides, in the U.S. view, could monitor development of space weapons components. The Soviet Union rejected that U.S. proposal, because it violates the principle of banning production of space weapons. The Soviet Union had agreed to "open laboratories," not just to monitor production of offensive space weapons, but with the goal of checking that the sides did not work on developing those weapons. That did not fit into the U.S. concept, which continues the development of antiballistic missile systems components. The United States rejected the Soviet proposal.

Criticism of the USSR's approach to the issue of verification of nuclear weapons reductions, which is being negotiated in Geneva, is also unfounded. Five rounds of negotiations have already taken place. However, irrespective of the repeated constructive development of the Soviet proposals, the United States stuck to its previous positions that are incompatible with the principle of reciprocity.

The substance of those positions is openly aimed at achieving unilateral advantages for the United States and jeopardizing the USSR's security interests. That applies to attempts to disrupt the balance of forces to U.S. and NATO advantage, as well as to the intention of making the Soviet Union restructure its nuclear forces according to the pattern of U.S. forces. It is not surprising that for the time being no agreements have been reached at the negotiations.

Nonetheless, the U.S. side insists on discussing the verification issue. It would be appropriate to ask: Given the fact that no limitation or reduction measures have been worked out, what should be the field of application of the verification measures? The Soviet Union is not afraid of being "sued" regarding the observance of the obligations it has assumed. It respects all international agreements and is no less -- perhaps even more -- interested than the United States in having effective verification. A result of that is Soviet readiness to implement verification by national technical means, as well as by on-site inspections. That readiness of the Soviet Union could concern real agreements whose content has to be consistent with the necessary verification measures. [paragraph continues]

Regarding the Soviet -U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, any verification measures could not now be applied to anything, because there are no agreements.

While advocating a radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons, a ban on offensive space weapons, and the withdrawal of intermediate-range missiles from Europe, the USSR does not regard resolving the verification issues as an unsurmountable obstacle. It is ready for the most radical measures. It is also ready to discuss the principles of verification. However, such discussion must not replace the main problem -- the negotiations -- whose solution the U.S. side is evading by hiding behind the verification issue. Verification without formulating concrete arms limitation measures does not make sense and can only be turned into a means of enlightenment -- something the United States also strives for. Let us for instance deal with problems of banning

chemical weapons. The U.S. position on that issue is that only a state-owned chemical industry would be exempt from verification by the USSR. The Soviet Union wants all loopholes allowing for violations of a future convention to be closed, and in that connection insists on verification measures being equally extended to state-owned as well as privately owned industries.

It is known that pursuant to the Soviet program to liquidate mass destruction weapons on earth, the Warsaw Pact member-countries submitted a program on the mutual reduction of forces and weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Besides measures to verify the reduction process proper, the suggestion has been made to verify the military activities of troops that are left following the reduction. For the verification of force reductions and on-site inspection of the liquidation or stockpiling of arms, a representative of an international consultative commission could be called in.

Equal Security For All

Will the aforementioned verification measures reliably monitor observance of the obligations undertaken by the sides? The way they will be implemented will depend on NATO's response to the Warsaw Pact's proposal. So far there has been none.

Instead of reproaching the USSR about insufficient steps in the field of verification measures, the Western countries should apply an equal standard to their own and other countries' security. It is unjustified to resort to measures that would only include one side.

That also fully applies to the principle of "transparency" which is used by NATO to block the negotiations. At the Vienna negotiations on reducing forces and weapons in central Europe, for example, the West wanted to know details of the numerical strength, the nature of activities, and the organizational structure of the USSR's Armed Forces, including the battalions and individual barracks, as well as an analytical report on all troops in the area and the places of their deployment. That would mean, giving away all "secrets." According to the Western countries' concept, not only the troops in the reduction area, but also in the eight military border areas of the European part of the USSR, as well as in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania -- which have nothing to do with central Europe -- were to be monitored.

What do the NATO countries suggest? According to the West's proposal, the USSR and its allies would only be allowed to monitor those Western military activities pursued within the central European area. The United States', Canada's, Great Britain's, and other NATO countries' territory would naturally be excluded from such monitoring on the pretext that everything is known to the Soviet Union anyway.

The facts prove that the United States and some of its NATO allies deliberately want to separate the problem of verification from the essence of the sides' concrete obligation to reduce their forces and weapons and refuse to link it to any limitations. That would prevent the further strengthening and improvement of weapons for the purpose of achieving military superiority over the countries of the socialist community.

In the Political Report by the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress, Mikhail Gorbachev said: "I want to note the verification problem, to which we attach special importance. We have stated repeatedly that the USSR is receptive to verification and that we are no less interested than others. An all-encompassing, very accurate verification is probably the most important element of the disarmament process."

That statement by the USSR's leading representative is fully pursued by the Soviet delegations at the negotiations. That means that for us words and deeds are one.

RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV DISCUSSES ARMS ISSUES WITH JAPANESE CP CHAIRMAN

Meeting With Gorbachev Planned

OW051023 Tokyo KYODO in English 1018 GMT 5 Aug 86

[Text] Moscow, Aug 5 KYODO -- Visiting Japan Communist Party Chairman Tetsuzo Fuwa will meet Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev Wednesday to exchange views on a ban on nuclear weapons. The meeting is scheduled for Wednesday morning (Wednesday afternoon Japan time), 41 years to the day after the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Wednesday will be the last day of a unilaterally declared Soviet moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.

The Fuwa-Gorbachev meeting will be the first Japan-Soviet communist summit based on a joint declaration on a ban on nuclear weapons issued in December 1984.

Beside the nuclear weapons issue, Fuwa is expected to exchange views on northern territories -- the four tiny Soviet-occupied islands off Hokkaido which the Tokyo Government has been pressing the Soviet Union to return to Japan -- and Japanese fishing in the Northern Pacific. Gorbachev's visit to Japan may also come up in the meeting.

NST Discussed

OW111149 Tokyo NHK Television Network in Japanese 1010 GMT 11 Aug 86

[Text] The regular JCP-CPSU meeting, which had been postponed for 1 week, began in Moscow at 1100 [Moscow time: 0700 GMT] on 11 August. General Secretary Gorbachev, who was originally thought to be absent due to his cold, attended the meeting in person and held talks with Chairman Fuwa.

[Begin recorded report by Moscow correspondent Hideki Yamada] The JCP delegation headed by chairman Fuwa arrived in Moscow on 4 August. It had been kept waiting for over a week for the meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. The meeting was held at long last.

General Secretary Gorbachev was reportedly to be absent from the talks since he had lost his voice due to his cold. However, General Secretary Gorbachev attended the meeting in person. Accompanied by Secretary Ligachev, the party's no. 2 man, he greeted Chairman Fuwa and his party.

When Chairman Fuwa asked him about his cold at the beginning of the talks, Gorbachev answered that he had not completely got over his cold, but added that he thought he would get well soon. Touching on his visit to Japan, General Secretary Gorbachev said that he was happy to visit Japan in response to the invitation he received, but that the Japanese side may still have to make preparations for his visit. At the present regular meeting, the two sides will exchange views on the implementation of the joint communique on the abolition of nuclear weapons since its adoption by the JCP and the CPSU in December 1984. At the talks, the Soviet side will state its views on the U.S.-USSR negotiations, including the U.S.-USSR summit talks, and also on the nuclear arms ban, while Chairman Fuwa and his party will state their views on how they think the international antinuclear and peace campaign should be carried out and on various Soviet proposals concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear tests. Then, discussions will be held separately on various issues.

What will be noteworthy at the current talks is that General Secretary Gorbachev may have something to say about the extension of the moratorium on nuclear tests because the moratorium which had been in effect for over 1 year expired on 6 August. In addition, attention will be centered on the timing of General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Japan. It is expected that the contents of the talks will be disclosed today, 11 August. [end recording]

Moscow TV on Talks

LD111826 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 11 Aug 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; announcer-read report over video]

[Text] Today, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, met with T. Fuwa, chairman of the Presidium of the Communist Party of Japan [JCP] Central Committee.

In the course of the meeting, which was held in a warm, comradely atmosphere, priority was given to summing up the results of implementing the accords that were stated in the joint statement by the CPSU and the JCP, adopted in December, 1984, and which envisages active cooperation of both parties in the struggle for averting a nuclear war, for totally banning and eliminating nuclear weapons.

As a result of a detailed exchange of opinions, M.S. Gorbachev and T. Fuwa agreed that the joint statement of the CPSU and the JCP remains fully in force. The developments that have taken place in the world arena since the statement was adopted, confirmed the topicality and vitality of this document. The CPSU and the JCP will continue to develop and expand their cooperation in order to assist in reaching the objective is sets, which are of vital significance for the whole of mankind.

M.S. Gorbachev noted the great importance of the very fact that there was a meeting between representatives of the CPSU and the JCP, which goes to show the further development between them of friendly relations which are becoming richer and richer and more constructive. Our parties, like all fraternal parties, are independent and equal, he stressed. But being national forces expressing the interests of their peoples, they are also forces of international nature. The very course of events in the world and the vital need for stepping up the cooperation of the communists of various countries. Differences in the conditions for their activities and disagreements which exist on one or another issue should not hinder this to any degree.

Describing the main trends in development of world politics, M.S. Gorbachev noted that there are two lines evident in this, as before, two approaches to the solution of vital problems. One, which is consistently adhered to by the Soviet Union and which is advocated by various forces that have a sincere interest in consolidating international security, consists of an honest struggle to end the arms race and confrontation, and go on to disarmament and broad international cooperation on the basis of recognition of the legitimate interests and rights of all peoples, and of a realistic approach to evaluating the prospects for development of civilization from the point of view of the nuclear threat. It is this approach which dictates the peace-loving initiatives of the USSR and the other socialist countries which have been put forward in recent months, and first and foremost since the Geneva meeting of 1985. The Soviet Union continues to demonstrate an adherence to ideas formulated in the Soviet-U.S. statement.

The other approach, which is adhered to by forces which advocate strongarm methods of solving world problems, without taking into account the possible consequences of their use, consists in the boundless buildup of the arms race, in transferring it to space, and in continuing confrontation. Following their openly selfish ends, these forces obviously do not intend to lay down their arms. This is the reality which must be faced.

But, while realistically evaluating the state of affairs, M.S. Gorbachev went on, we by no means occupy positions of pessimism. The capabilities of the fight for peace are huge, and the potential of peace is growing. And today there is every chance not to hand over the fate of the world into the hands of those who are irresponsibly orientated toward militarism and the arms race.

The Soviet Union will go on persistently struggling for the speediest possible implementation of a high strategic goal: the banning and elimination of nuclear arms, to achieve success at the talks that are being held, which presupposes also the solution of partial tasks of a tactical nature, leading to the achievement of this.

T. Fuwa spoke of the struggle of the Communist Party of Japan against the threat of nuclear war, and for the banning and elimination of nuclear arms. The JCP is in favor of the elimination of U.S. nuclear bases on its country's soil, is unfolding a nationwide movement to declare prefectures, towns, and other inhabited places nuclear-free territories, and is carrying on a persistent struggle for the strict observation of the "three non-nuclear principles" proclaimed by Japan, and in defense of the peace-loving tenets of the constitution of its country. In carrying out this work, the JCP aspires to bring the widest possible public forces into action. The party aspires to increase its efforts constantly in this direction.

During the discussion, M.S. Gorbachev and T. Fuwa noted the growing significance of the burgeoning struggle of peace-loving democratic forces for liquidation of nuclear weapons. Both sides stressed the desire to step up the activity of representatives of the CPSU and JCP in international democratic public and nongovernmental organizations.

M.S. Gorbachev and T. Fuwa noted the importance of achieving progress in promoting and spreading the ideas contained in the appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, "down with nuclear weapons" [doloy yadernoye oruzhiye], adopted in August 1985.

It was agreed to continue the mutual consultations of the leadership of both parties, as was indeed envisaged in the joint statement of 1984.

Taking part in the meeting were Comrades Ye.K. Ligachev, A.N. Yakovlev, and V.V. Zagladin.

Talks Participants Listed

LD121748 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1658 GMT 12 Aug 86

[Text] Moscow, 12 Aug (TASS) -- Talks have been held at the CPSU Central Committee between representatives of the Japanese Communist Party -- T. Fuwa, chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party [JCP]; H. Tachiki, member of the Permanent Bureau of the JCP Central Committee Presidium, chairman of the International Department of the JCP Central Committee; S. Niihara, member of the Presidium of the JCP Central Committee, deputy chairman of the International Department of the JCP Central Committee; H. Kikunami, member of the JCP Central Committee; and H. Nishiguchi, senior executive of the JCP Central Committee -- and representatives of the CPSU -- Y.K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; A.N. Yakovlev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; V.V. Zagladin, member of the CPSU Central Committee, first deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee; I.I. Kovalenko, deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee; and A.I. Senatorov, head of a section of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

Ye. K. Ligachev talked about the work that has gotten widely underway in the Soviet Union to fulfill the program of reforms that was adopted at the 27th CPSU Congress, and to speed up the country's social and economic development. The party's innovative approach to the economic, social, and political tasks which stand before Soviet society, has received the full support of the people. In this lies one of the most important guarantees of the irreversibility of the processes taking place and of ensuring acceleration not in words, but in deeds.

On the basis of the results of the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and T. Fuwa there was a continuation of exchange of views on problems concerning the elimination of nuclear weapons, and also individual steps leading to this aim. In the general view, the cessation by all nuclear powers of nuclear weapons tests, and the elaboration and conclusion of a treaty on the universal and full banning of such tests would have an important significance.

Through the joint efforts of all peace-loving forces, it is necessary for 1986 -- international peace year -- to also be the year of a change for the better in all mankind's struggle against the nuclear threat -- the year that opened up a realistic path toward the reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons.

There was an exchange of views on ways to strengthen peace and security in Asia and in the Pacific Ocean region. Both sides noted that the interests of the peoples would be served by the development and strengthening of mutually beneficial diverse cooperation among the states of the region, and not by the confrontation of some states against others.

Having confirmed their aspiration for the dissolution of existing military blocks, the representatives of the JCP and CPSU emphatically came out against the creation of new closed groups, whether economic or military-political in nature, in Asia or in any other region of the world.

The CPSU and the JCP spoke out in favor of the further development of Soviet-Japanese relations in the political, economic, scientific, cultural and other fields in the interests of the peoples of both countries and of the consolidation of peace throughout the world.

The representative of the CPSU and the JCP expressed the desire to develop relations between the two parties on the basis of independence, equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and solidarity in solving common tasks.

The CPSU delegation gave a dinner today in honor of the delegation of the Japanese Communist Party.

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CSO: 52001/1514

RELATED ISSUES

JAPAN: HIROSHIMA PEACE SUMMIT APPEALS FOR DISARMAMENT

OW061121 Tokyo KYODO in English 1017 GMT 6 Aug 86

[By Suvendrini P. Suguro]

[Text] Hiroshima, Aug. 6 KYODO -- The first Hiroshima peace summit closed Wednesday, the 41st anniversary of the atomic bombing of the city in World War II, with an appeal for the world to heed calls for nuclear disarmament to help safeguard peace. The symposium of scientists, pacifists and Nobel Prize winners, held to mark the International Year of Peace, issued an appeal which said, "We have carefully studied the facts regarding the damage inflicted on Hiroshima and realize that at present the total world nuclear arsenal contains one million times the destructive power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. "A single nuclear war might well annihilate the human race and so we invite the world to heed the spirit of the Hiroshima declaration which calls for these aspirations."

it was delivered by Linus Pauling, winner of Nobel prizes for chemistry and peace and president of Linus Pauling Institute of Science and World Affairs, at the first peace symposium in Hiroshima.

The symposium was attended by a wide variety of people, both local and foreign who applauded when the appeal was read out.

Dr. Frank Blackaby, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, suggested that as national security can only be achieved by having friendly relations with neighboring countries, Japan as a prosperous nation should help its Asian neighbors. "There is tremendous potential for more aid to flow from Japan to the Asian developing countries and in this way bring about peace," he said. He also urged Japan to help in providing more assistance in research for arms control around the world.

Dorothy Hodgkin, Nobel Prize winner for chemistry, said Japan should work harder and become a responsible partner in keeping the Pacific Ocean nuclear-free. "Even though it is said Japan is nuclear-free, the fact that U.S. warships are allowed to travel freely in and out of her ports threatens the security of the north Pacific Ocean," she explained.

Paul Crutzen of the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry, suggested that Japan use her advanced technology in ways that will strengthen peace moves. "It is important that third countries also provide valuable information on nuclear activities to the people. At present the superpowers are monopolizing this function and it is hard to believe them," he said.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Nobel Peace prize winner, answering a question on how the Japanese government can help to end the apartheid system of racial segregation in South Africa, said it is important to stop the burgeoning trade between the two countries. "It is a moral decision they have to take. We are not asking for political or economic sanctions but for support of the freedom we have been fighting for years," he declared.

Following the close of the peace summit there will be a concert by the Hiroshima Symphonic Orchestra and a dinner for the symposium participants Wednesday evening.

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CSO: 5260/121

RELATED ISSUES

BRIEFS

TOKYO ANTINUCLEAR FORUM--Tokyo, 31 Jul (TASS)--An international forum for banning nuclear weapons has opened in Tokyo today. It has been sponsored by the recently set up organization Solidarity with Movements for Liquidating Nuclear Weapons, comprising noted public figures, parliamentarians and scientists. The forum is attended by representatives of peace organizations from 18 countries. They will discuss pressing issues of the movement for stopping the arms race, thwarting U.S. dangerous plans for space militarization and for removing the threat of a global nuclear conflict. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1633 GMT 31 Jul 86 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1516

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