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JPRS-TAC-86-078

29 SEPTEMBER 1986

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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29 SEPTEMBER 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

NEW DEFENSE MINISTRY-CNR RESEARCH RELATIONSHIP CRITICIZED

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 27 Jul 86 p 6

[Article by Alessandro Figa Talamanca: "The National Research Council Has Never Heard of Dr Strangelove"]

[Excerpts] In the crowded panorama of Italian politics, the fact that a framework agreement between the Defense Ministry and the National Research Council [CNR] has been finalized certainly does not seem likely to make the headlines. All the more so since the agreement is so general that it is impossible even to understand what its objective is. Maybe it is merely one of those innumerable initiatives aimed at creating an image for the CNR as an organization which is active in all sectors of the nation's life, and which is also aimed at bringing in funds. But if this were the case, then this agreement would not even be worth mentioning.

There is something disturbing buried deep inside the "vacuum" of this ostensibly pointless agreement. It is believed that for the first time since the end of World War II, the CNR may intend to carry out research work covered by military secrecy.

The first draft agreement, which was rejected by the Executive Council (the management unit of the CNR), contained an all encompassing clause which read as follows: "The CNR hereby undertakes not to divulge the results of studies or research conducted in agreement with the Ministry of Defense as part of the present agreement, nor to divulge any information or data to which it may have access as a result of this collaboration should the Ministry of Defense deem this necessary for reasons of security." A less general formulation is presently being worked out by the Minister for Research.

First, let us try to understand what the use of military secrecy is. Certainly, in the wording of the relevant clause in the agreement between the CNR and the Ministry of Defense, its use is not to protect military programs from a hypothetical enemy. The main use of secrecy is to cover up the "vacuum" or, in other words, to provide a license to carry out research which either is nonexistent or of minimal importance, and to make payments to organizations or individuals whose names can remain undisclosed.

In short, secrecy is used to ensure that research is not subject to effective checks, and that financing is not subject to administrative controls.

The CNR will not develop secret weapons in its laboratories, nor is there a hysterical Dr Strangelove concealed within the ranks of CNR researchers. No, the danger lies elsewhere. As Vittorio Zucconi explains so succinctly in his correspondence from Washington, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)--which already has been given the suggestive nickname of "Star Wars" by its opponents--is seen as a neat little pile of dollars to be distributed to industry and research laboratories.

Some of this money will reach Italy as well. One could maintain that there is nothing wrong with industry and the scientific community in Italy becoming involved in high tech programs. One could also maintain that SDI research brings the world one step closer to global disarmament and to peace.

But what is worrisome about all this is that what will actually happen is that the money allocated to SDI will be used as secret funding for parties and splinter groups, with the result that government and parliamentary freedom of action in important aspects of foreign policy will be undermined. What all citizens--whatever their political affiliations--should demand is that the choices regarding the role that Italy will play in the Strategic Defense Initiative be made in broad daylight, and that every cent allocated to research be accounted for.

What scientists should demand is that secrecy should be abolished from all areas of activity of the public research structures, and that a clause similar to the one included in the contracts made by the U.S. Army and universities be adopted as a standard clause for all agreements or undertakings concerning these structures.

But why is it that the CNR, the highest representative of the scientific community in Italy, did not simply reject all secrecy clauses out of hand, preferring instead the slippery path of compromise? It would have been easy to make a hard and fast stand. According to its statute, approved very soon after World War II, the CNR "promotes, coordinates and regulates scientific research for the purposes of scientific and technical progress."

What, then, has military secrecy to do with activities that are sanctioned by a legal statute?

But recent legislation--called for, paradoxically enough, by the left--sets the stage for a CNR which has severed its links with the scientific community. In the "new version" of the CNR or, in other words, a CNR freed from the constraints of a law which, as it happens, dates back to the liberation of Italy, a place will also be found for military secrecy. In fact, it is a miracle that the present Executive Council, whose term of office ran out and was extended, did as much as it did in making a timid display of resistance.

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CSO: 3698/M220

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG PAPERS NOTE PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL

Possibility of Accord Seen

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 30 Jul 86 p 4

[Editorial by Dieter Schroeder: "Nuclear Deterrence Lives"]

[Text] So far, neither a second meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev has been pinned down nor have arms control talks between the superpowers started in earnest. Until the summer break, negotiators in Geneva, Vienna, and Stockholm have been playing the usual trench warfare in their sandboxes. Even so, a feeling of spring seems to have sneaked into the dialogue between the President and the General Secretary. After years of stagnation, which came to an end last June, the mutual proposals, letters and pronouncements provided for the first time an outline of a possible arms control agreement between Washington and Moscow.

This development is all the more surprising since, until a short time ago, doomsday prophets have felt compelled to predict the end of all arms control efforts and the beginning of a new arms race. They had been inspired by President Reagan's announcement of an end to compliance with SALT II, which was never ratified by the U.S. Senate and has expired by now in any case. Reagan, however, did not exclude a change of mind provided the Soviet Union stopped violating the treaty. The President's announcement could be interpreted either as shedding tiresome shackles or as a "calculated risk" designed to edge Moscow toward greater cooperation. The Kremlin of course would vehemently reject any insinuation of having given in to threats, but as a matter of fact, the Kremlin has of recent become more willing to make concessions, at least in its offers.

One of the reasons behind Ronald Reagan's popularity within the United States is his claim of having restored the strength of the country. This is obviously one of the reasons why the Soviets have abandoned one untenable position after another. In January 1985, they returned to the negotiating table in Geneva without insisting on previous conditions, such as the removal of U.S. intermediate-range missiles from Europe and the abandonment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Later they modified other demands, such as to count not only missiles but, what is more important, to also count warheads.

The definition of strategic weapons now excludes the U.S. forward-based systems in Europe, such as airplanes and missiles that are actually intermediate-range weapons. French and British nuclear weapons are also no longer figured directly into the count. The decisive factor is that Moscow no longer demands Washington's renouncement of SDI, but instead seems to be content with a simple guarantee by the United States to stick with a longer expiration period of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which would restrict the deployment of missile defense systems. And there is more. As a quid pro quo, Moscow offered a mutual reduction of offensive weapons.

Gorbachev does have an ulterior motive behind this offer. If Washington agrees to such a guarantee with regard to the ABM Treaty, which currently can be terminated with six months notice, then development of SDI has to stay limited. And if Congress finds the courage to cut funds for SDI development, the pressure might mount enough one day to extend the termination notice even further. In the end, SDI could become hampered. This is a possibility even if the guarantee as proposed by Reagan extends only to the end of SDI's developmental stage which would be approximately 7 years. Soviet readiness to compromise even on this point is not out of the question.

Nevertheless, the fact that Reagan welcomes Gorbachev's offer has to do with a more realistic assessment of the SDI program. The vision that SDI can shield the United States and render it invulnerable has vanished into thin air. The only realizable defense seems to rest with a system capable of protecting missile and command centers--in other words, with a system that retains the capability for a second strike. The Soviet Union could try to overcome such a system by increasing its offensive weapons, and nobody doubts that the Soviets are capable of leaving the United States far behind in this regard. Limited defensive weapons systems clearly are meaningful only when coupled with a limitation on offensive weapons. The (temporary) limitations of technology have reduced SDI to a bargaining chip after all, even though Reagan denies it.

Seen in this respect, Reagan's interests square with Gorbachev's, even though he will not comment on it. A reduction in offensive weapons is still no guarantee against a first strike. The Soviets, too, are working on defensive systems, mainly on the ground-based kind because of still substantial Soviet technical shortcomings. Reagan, too, has come back to earth. Since both leaders are facing similar problems, a comprehensive arms control agreement seems feasible for the first time in many years and in the long run it could include a modification of the ABM Treaty. It is easy to see that both sides are working toward a negotiated number of defensive systems in order to maintain their respective capacities for reprisal. It seems that we will have to live with nuclear deterrence for a long time.

Pressure on Reagan Observed

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLEGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 29 Jul 86 p 2

[Article by Jan Reifenberg: "Is Washington Under Time Pressure? Arms Control Talks With Gorbachev"]

[Text] Geneva, July 28--Right now, the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in extensive and publicly conducted diplomatic battles. Everything points toward a second summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to take place before the year is over, or, at the latest, by the beginning of 1987. Both superpowers outdo each other with proposals for arms control measures. What they contain leads the optimistic lay person to believe that years of tough and largely unsuccessful negotiations have finally produced a silver cloud on the horizon. Its shape holds the promise of progress toward the reduction of nuclear arms stockpiles, of "confidence-building measures" within the camp of conventional fighting forces, and of progress toward a reduction of chemical weapons. At present, special talks in two areas are taking place in Geneva between Washington and Moscow. The experts conducting those talks realize that higher political demands require at least partial answers to the question of what specific developments would make suitable summit topics. Answers will have to be ready by the end of August or the beginning of September at the latest.

Once again a situation has arisen that is reminiscent of the first SALT treaty. Then negotiators who had wrangled for years about the limitation of strategic weapons had to have a content formulation ready for Nixon and Brezhnev so they could sign the treaty formally in the Hall of Catherine the Great in the Kremlin. It was dangerous then and it is dangerous now to underestimate the harm political pressure can do when it dictates an unwise haste where hard and concrete facts demand otherwise.

The American side contests this point. Reagan's negotiators take particular pride to not having fallen prey to the mistakes of their predecessors. Still, it cannot be denied that political considerations determine talks on both sides, from Stockholm to Geneva to Vienna, and the impression arises that neither Reagan nor Gorbachev can afford for this dialogue to fail. The question remains whether a president who assumed office with the pronouncement to never again seek "fatally flawed" agreements has realized now that within the twilight of searching for arms control one can at best reach small compromises.

Reagan's reply letter to Gorbachev must be seen as proof of a way of thinking he has adopted since his taking office. He offered the Soviet Union a delay of 5 to 7 years in the completion or at least partial material realization of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) provided Moscow were to accept thereafter the deployment of the first components of a strategic defense shield in space. Until that time Washington would comply with the present interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty to mutually

limit anti-ballistic missile systems. In 1991, or 1993 at the latest, this test ban treaty would provide for space-based defensive systems by either side, provided the reduction of present-day nuclear missiles and their warheads has begun. Americans thought Gorbachev should be very interested in the deal outlined in Reagan's letter.

Of course nobody in Geneva can tell if the General Secretary sees past the sugar coating of a continuation of the ABM Treaty and the renunciation of the current treaty clause which provides for mutual treaty termination within 6 months in case of "known danger to the highest national security interests" and whether he will swallow the bitter core of practically limitless research and testing of SDI system components. Since the letter also repeated proposals to gradually reduce all nuclear weapons by 50 percent and at the same time to limit underground nuclear testing, high-ranking NATO experts believe Moscow can live with this proposal.

In Geneva we will see the first Soviet response. A special session of the Standing Consultative Commission dealing with the SALT agreement will first of all tackle U.S. charges of alleged Soviet violations of SALT provisions as well as of the ABM Treaty. Then it has to be determined whether both superpowers, for political effect, are willing, when faced with the modernizations in weapons technology, to stay within the ceilings that had been planned for SALT II. The essential question is if, despite all public statements, economic and budgetary restrictions have already caused both sides to become more moderate spenders. The U.S. Congress refuses to shoulder the costs and Gorbachev would like to give precedence to the economic modernization of the Soviet Union.

The Americans have realized that the idea of a perfect defense through SDI is nothing but a wishful dream whose realization lies years ahead and might even be impossible. The negotiators in Geneva know that even Defense Secretary Weinberger and his staff are first and above all looking for a new kind of missile defense. The world, however, will have to live at present--and possibly beyond the time frame set forth in Reagan's letter to Gorbachev--with nuclear deterrence as the most effective means of defense. Furthermore, the West will have to ensure that the conventional defense of Europe is not impaired.

All American statements cite verification as the key issue in each and every new arms control agreement. This year's Soviet offers contain as an enticing new bait Soviet readiness for onsite inspections. But things always get sticky at the negotiating tables in Stockholm, Geneva, and Vienna when the time comes to consider the concrete content of these offers. It is questionable whether the only permitted "national technical means" of verification, referring to observation satellites in space, are still sufficient if one considers the development of mobile long-range weapons on both sides. American experts are troubled in any case by the question whether the information provided by satellites represents the true arsenal of the opponent or whether Moscow has succeeded for years in concealing their arsenals' locations, size and purpose. That is why Americans believe that progress could most likely be achieved in the last round of the Stockholm CDE conference.

Experts on both sides are very familiar with such difficulties--which politicians like to remove with the stroke of a pen--and they are very reluctant to make any predictions about a second "summit." They would, however, call a summit a success if Reagan and Gorbachev were to once more endorse a policy of current long-range missile reduction, if the mutual reduction of intermediate-range missiles were to start, if a basis for trust could be established in the sphere of conventional weapons, and if the same could be done with regard to the reduction of chemical weapons. They do not expect ideal solutions. It also needs to be seen if the time pressure already imposed by Reagan's term of office can be used advantageously. Experience, however, advises caution. Americans are rather sceptical when their European partners, and Genscher in particular, urgently admonish them to grasp the golden opportunity before it slips away to everybody's regret. It also seems that the struggle to contain the arms race will outlast the terms of office of those politicians who are currently responsible for it.

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CSO: 5200/2733

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG PAPER CALLS SDI KEY TO CURRENT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 1 Aug 86 p 1

[Editorial by Theo Sommer: "Talks, Weapons, Missiles--the Arms Control Dialogue Perks Up"]

[Text] The combined arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union amount to 50,000 nuclear weapons, 22,000 of which have strategic-range warheads. The issue now is whether the two superpowers will continue against all reason to beef up this insane arsenal of destruction or whether they can both finally agree to a step-by-step reduction.

Arms control and the reduction of armaments have been topics in Washington and Moscow for 40 years. Not much has come of it so far. The nuclear test ban treaty of 1963, the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, and the two SALT agreements of 1972 and 1979 have been useful checks in the nuclear arms race, but they have always been far from perfect, and, above all, very fragile. Again and again, they have been undermined by the breakneck pace of arms technology and the threads of disarmament dialogues have gotten tangled up in the East-West conflict. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reduced the chances that the U.S. Senate would ratify the SALT II Treaty to nothing. Up to now, both superpowers have observed the terms of the unratified treaty, but with its expiration drawing closer, the hawks in Washington have urged Ronald Reagan to turn his back once and for all on the treaty by the end of this year.

Ever since the day, seven years ago, when Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev signed the SALT II Treaty in the Redoutensaal of the Hofburg Palace in Vienna, arms reduction has trudged along at a laborious pace. If it was not Washington that refused to talk, then it was Moscow. The hardliners in both countries repeatedly put sand in the gears of diplomacy. Only in the last few months has there been a change. Both Reagan and Gorbachev have provided more detailed and realistic proposals for the grandiose and utopian design of a world without nuclear weapons. The dialogue between the superpowers is in full swing.

There are of course many people around the President who reject all negotiations with the Soviets because deep down they want no deals with them. Perhaps they don't trust the big superpower antagonist or they believe in America's capability to outgun the Soviets. This approach by the "squeezers," as Arnold Horelick, the Soviet expert of the Rand Corporation calls them, is

particularly opposed to any restrictions on the American SDI program. "Squeezers" see the "Star Wars" program as a lever to bring the Soviets to their knees.

Diplomatic Loose Change

Another approach is presented by the "dealers," as Horelick calls those who want to get down to business with the Soviets. They want to leave nothing untried that might get the stuck arms control process rolling again. They believe that a state of continued tension between Americans and Russians harbors great dangers. They are afraid that the Western alliance might loosen or even disintegrate if Reagan were to insist on playing the role of the man who always says no. They also view the SDI program not as an instrument of outmaneuver the Soviets in the sphere of world politics, but rather as diplomatic loose change.

With this constellation in mind, the U.S. President has responded to the proposals put forward in June by the new man in the Kremlin. His reply shows clearly the rift which runs through Reagan's team of advisors and is surely also present in his own views. He has adopted from the "dealers" the view of the necessity for negotiations and from the "squeezers" the unconditional adherence to SDI. He has combined both views in an offer to delay the development of large-scale strategic defense systems for 5-7 years, provided the Soviets agree to a deep cut in their missile arsenal.

Ronald Reagan had no other choice unless he wanted to risk offending Congress and the European allies. During the last few months, his antagonist, Gorbachev, has, at every conference table, shown flexibility and a readiness to negotiate. He has dropped the attempt to include U.S. forward-based nuclear missiles into the category of strategic weapons; he has dropped the demand that any regulation of intermediate-range missiles must allow the Soviets to retain part of their arsenal as a counterweight to French and British nuclear forces; he has allowed private American scientists to put up seismographs near the Soviet nuclear testing site; and he has shown a positive attitude toward the idea of on-site inspection at the conferences in Vienna and Stockholm. Whatever hidden snares and stumbling blocks Gorbachev's offers may contain, no one can any longer say that they are not respectable--and Reagan could do nothing but answer in a serious way.

There is the objection, of course, that Reagan's proposal was not very magnanimous. Gorbachev had talked about a 15-20 year moratorium on SDI, with the ABM Treaty remaining in force at the same time. Reagan reduced the moratorium limit to between 5 and 7 years. His proposal especially lacks in magnanimity when one considers the shuttle program setback and the cutback in SDI funds by Congress. Both preclude an earlier deployment. Also, Reagan refuses absolutely to see SDI touched. He even reserved the right of unilateral deployment in case Moscow does not go along with his proposal. What is the incentive for the Soviet Union here? Why should the Soviets not prefer to keep all their offensive missiles so they can more easily overcome Reagan's planned outerspace defense?

All this is correct and yet: For the first time, the President has linked missile reduction to his plans for "Star Wars." The President has hinted at a package deal that is bound to stay around. Whatever the exact wording of the final compromise, it is the kind of linkage diplomats have to look for--a reduction in offensive weapons in exchange for a limit on the development of defensive systems. Any other approach would be much less likely to succeed. In the end, the discussion will focus not only on the "how to" aspects of SDI, but on if it should be deployed at all.

Time Is Running Short

Michael Gorbachev has logic and common sense on his side. Why would anyone need defensive systems against offensive weapons that are supposed to be abolished anyway? Why should there be complicated negotiations about a simultaneously scheduled and agreed upon deployment of such defense systems if one could instead concentrate on a compromise to reduce existing arsenals? Why clutter the skies with laser-producing generators when the important issue remains how to stop the arms race madness here on earth?

The next phase will deal with the shape of the compromise. One thing is clear: Neither side will get its way and no arrangement will come about in just one step. America's interest in taking steps toward arms reduction must be squared with the Soviet Union's interest in removing the strategic threat posed by SDI the eastern superpower. Neither the Americans with their formula of "no limits on SDI" nor the Russians with their "no SDI research of any kind" will get anywhere. It will be the first task for the diplomats to pinpoint the borderline between admissible and inadmissible research. Thereafter negotiations will focus on a "functional equivalency" for SDI. Thus, Americans could more easily do without "Star Wars" if the Soviets were to dismantle the 308 heavy intercontinental SS-18 missiles, which are most feared by Washington as "silo killers." The Kremlin would have an easier time doing that if Washington were to forswear SDI field tests involving objects in orbit, ballistic trajectories and the earth's surface, and if it were to extend the six-month termination notice of the ABM Treaty to several years.

Gorbachev may have his doubts about the extent of Reagan's good will and many share them. But things are developing and the dynamics are not necessarily to the taste of the SDI-Freaks. The President has only two more years left in office and then this project will become an orphan. The budget politicians in Congress who now wield a carver's knife will reach for the hatchet. The American as well as the European public will tap their foreheads at those scientists and engineers who cannot let go of their profitable astroproject and who, with the reasoning of psychopaths, keep on chasing their space chimera that--according to the most recent estimate--will cost \$670 billion over the next 10 years. This development is best helped along by concrete evidence that arms reduction is possible. It may be paradoxical, but Gorbachev's flexibility and cooperation condemns SDI to oblivion.

"To prevent an arms race in space and to end the one on earth," was the way the foreign ministers of both superpowers described their goals 18 months ago, and that is the same way the President and the General Secretary have defined their's at their meeting in Geneva. Time is short if Reagan plans to wrap up an agreement while he is still in office. The prospect for a second summit meeting has a stimulating effect--and we feel fortunate that this is so.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

FRG PAPER SAYS NO ARMS TREATY WILL BE SIGNED UNDER REAGAN

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 12 Aug 86 p 3

[Editorial by Pierre Simonitsch: "Interlude"]

[Text] The Americans and Russians this week are putting on another great match, modestly described as "expert discussions." The guests came to the Soviet capital with a prominent team. On the outside right, veteran star Paul Nitze and the young go-getter Richard Perle are charging. In the midfield, Max Kampelmann awes the fans again and again with his dribbling skill, although he hardly ever goes for a goal. He has evidently not yet fully adjusted to the changeover from the left to the right shooting leg. The left wing of the U.S. team appears particularly weak. The defense will be hard put to stop the offensive moves of its opponents in time. Small fouls will be inevitable, particularly since there is no freeback. None of the players wants to risk being mistaken for a "liberal." The probable outcome of the match: another tied score.

There is quite a temptation to comment on the current dialogue between the superpowers simply in terms of sports jargon. Four years of negotiations and a summit meeting have resulted in nothing more than confusion in the stands. The disarmament proposals from both sides have been tailored for public relations, even though they are stamped "confidential." The complexity of the material, but even more, the shop talk and the playing with a marked deck have permitted arms control to degenerate into an arcane science.

And yet the basic military facts are known, the strategies of East and West are based on simple considerations. It should be possible, with good will on both sides, to find a balance which would guarantee the security of both blocs. For almost 20 years a series of treaties was successfully concluded: the limitations on strategic nuclear weapons (SALT I and II), the agreement to stop construction of an ABM system, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the ban on biological warfare, the halt in testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere and the restriction on underground tests to 150 kilotons, the preservation of the ocean floor and of space from weapons of mass destruction.

No additional agreement has been reached since 1979. Moreover, there is a growing impression that the United States is trying methods to free itself from all treaties which restrict its arms programs. Former chief delegate at SALT, Gerard Smith, presented evidence for this last week in an article entitled

"Reagan's Insidious Attack on the Last Pillars of Arms Control." The president's proposal that the ABM treaty be extended by 5-7 years means in reality nothing other than to allow it to expire, since it was originally concluded in 1972 for an unlimited time period. At two review conferences held in 1979 and 1982, the contractual partners found no shortcomings, until it suddenly stood in the way of the "Star Wars" project.

Together with Washington's announcement at the end of last year that it no longer intended to observe the quotas for nuclear delivery vehicles which had been established in the SALT II agreement, the intent is becoming clear. Instead of a bird in the hand, Reagan is promising the people two in the bush--i.e. much better arms control agreements. However, not even faint outlines of such agreements can be detected. Each time the Americans and the Soviets get down to business at the negotiating table, a chasm opens up between their opposing positions.

In the American delegation which has just been sent to Moscow, two men are in charge: the aged security politician Nitze, who in 1974 had advised President Ronald Reagan to abandon the SALT negotiations because he rejected Richard Nixon's policy of detente. Under secretary for defense Perle has never concealed the fact that he regards arms equilibrium with the Soviet Union as a mistake. Special ambassador Kampelmann, third in the group, underwent a conversion from liberal New York attorney to fervent advocate of the New Right. Whether these three men will succeed in working out a platform with the Soviets is dubious.

The expert talks in Moscow are supposed to prepare the way for the announced foreign ministers meeting in Washington on 18 September. For their part, the foreign ministers have the task of preparing the way for a meeting between their respective chiefs. There is not much time remaining if the summit is to take place in 1986. Gorbachev wishes to visit the United States only on the condition that there is progress in disarmament.

Of all of the subjects being discussed at the negotiations, according to the present state of affairs there appears to be prospects for success only in a partial reduction in the number of medium-range ballistic missiles. But even these prospects appear to be dissolving in the wide range of armament efforts and the undermining of previous treaties. All evidence appears to point to the fact that both superpowers are now looking towards the era after Reagan's departure from office, in just over two years. The one group is trying to put its program into action so vigorously that the next president will no longer be able to halt it. The others are waiting for better times.

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CSO: 5200/2746

SALT/START ISSUES

INDIA'S DEFENSE ANALYST ON DANGERS OF U.S.-SOVIET COMPROMISE

Madras THE HINDU in English 12, 14 Aug 86

[Two-part article by C. Raja Mohan, Institute for Defence and Analyses, New Delhi]

[12 Aug 86 p 8]

[Text]

AFTER a series of setbacks, the Soviet-American nuclear dialogue now appears poised for a forward movement. A flurry of diplomatic activity—including some interesting new proposals by the Soviet leader, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev and a basic shift in the U.S. negotiating stance seen in the President, Mr. Ronald Reagan's response—has created a new opportunity for a broad agreement on nuclear weapons and Star Wars at the summit between the two superpower leaders in Washington later this year. While the dimensions of a nuclear deal between the two are now visible, it remains to be seen whether Mr. Reagan is keen enough to clinch it.

Hopes exaggerated

The Geneva summit last November raised hopes all over the world that the first steps towards a renewal of detente and arms control had been taken. These expectations soon seemed exaggerated, as the spirit of Geneva began to evaporate. Despite the apparent warmth at the "fireside summit," the two leaders appeared to drift apart on all the major issues that had bedevilled the Soviet-American relations.

On the question of nuclear arms limitation—the touchstone of Soviet-American relationship—the gulf between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev appeared to broaden. Indeed at Geneva, the two leaders had declared their commitment to "accelerate" the on-going bilateral talks at Geneva on nuclear and space weapons. Yet in the months that followed the summit, the Geneva talks continued to be deadlocked. Despite some sensational proposals by Mr. Gorbachev in January this year, which included a comprehensive plan for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the end of this century, Mr. Reagan refused to move even a little towards some form of arms limitation.

Major victory

The Reagan Administration appeared strong enough to ward off not only the "strategic disarmament initiative" of Mr. Gorbachev but also all other pressures for arms control emanating from within the U.S. and its allies. Despite the strong sentiments within the U.S. Congress for a nuclear test ban—expressed in the form of non-binding resolutions passed in the House and the Senate—and the extension of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing by the Soviet Union, the U.S. refused to cease nuclear weapon testing.

On the question of Star Wars, despite the considerable cynicism within the U.S. over Mr. Reagan's dream to create a shield against nuclear weapons, the Administration's commitment to the programme remained unflinching. Further, the Administration scored a major victory as it coaxed some of its major allies to join the Star Wars programme. Britain, West Germany and Canada have already signed up. Japan is all set to team up. Finally, Mr. Reagan's decision at the end of May to abandon the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II appeared to snuff out all hopes of an agreement on nuclear arms between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

This regrettable response by the Reagan Administration to the various peace initiatives by Mr. Gorbachev lessened the chances that a second summit between the two leaders would take place. They had agreed at the Geneva summit that they would meet again in Washington in 1986 and at Moscow in 1987. Though both sides were keen on the second meeting, Mr. Gorbachev was unwilling to go to Washington just to smile and shake hands with Mr. Reagan. He insisted that the second summit should produce some tangible results on nuclear arms control. The U.S. has been reluctant to commit itself on arms control and instead persisted with the argument that there can be no conditions for a second meeting.

New flexibility

Despite this bleak picture, developments in the past few weeks have raised hopes not only for the second summit, but also a "grand compromise" on nuclear arms control.

Among these developments are the following:

A new package of arms control proposals put forward by Mr. Gorbachev demonstrates a new Soviet flexibility on the key questions of Star Wars and Euromissiles.

A vigorous "charm offensive" by Mr. Gorbachev on European security issues, his dramatic proposals for sharp cuts in the massive forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact and a willingness to dissolve these two military blocs and transform the four-decade old armed peace of Europe into a disarmed one have appealed to West European public opinion.

Whatever the chances of these proposals being accepted by the West, Mr. Gorbachev's image as a strong champion of peace in Europe, has come to stay. Further, he has succeeded in projecting the "European identity" of the USSR, while portraying the U.S., as the "outsider" who has hijacked European interests in peace and security.

Role for Europe

Mr. Gorbachev has been stressing the positive role for Europe in world affairs and has invoked Gen. de Gaulle's vision of a peaceful Europe stretching from "the Atlantic to the Urals".

He has also sought to enlist the West European Governments in his campaign to work out new arms control agreements with the U.S. His meetings with the French President, Mr. Francois Mitterrand and the West German Foreign Minister, Mr. Hans Dietrich Genscher in Moscow and the visit to London by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze (the first in 10 years) in recent weeks underscore the Soviet drive to persuade the U.S. to embark on the path of arms limitation.

Although the West European States have generally supported the tough American policies towards the Soviet Union, they are wary of the Reagan Administration's attempts to dismantle the entire edifice of arms control. The NATO allies were highly critical of the U.S. decision on SALT II. The West Europeans prefer arms control and regulated Soviet-American rivalry to an unrestrained arms race and are bringing pressure on the Reagan Administration to accept some agreement with Moscow. The British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher and the West German Chancellor, Dr. Helmut Kohl in particular have domestic political considerations—the approaching general elections and the growing peace constituencies—in trying to bring Mr. Reagan around.

A high profile "citizens' diplomacy" by the Soviet Union, through which it has reach-

ed American people, bypassing the Reagan Administration, the recent agreement between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and a private U.S. group, the Natural Resources Defence Council, to set up on-site monitoring stations on nuclear tests, has served to demonstrate the rather weak case of the U.S. Government against a nuclear test ban. The agreement between the scientific groups of the two countries underscored the point that it is not science but the egregious politics of the Reagan Administration that stood in the way of concluding a test ban. The U.S. Government has been claiming that technology available at present is not enough to verify a nuclear test ban.

Domestic American developments have been as important as Mr. Gorbachev's peace offensive and the pressure from the U.S. allies in bringing about a change in Mr. Reagan's stand on arms control, principally on his cherished Star Wars programme. In his June proposals, Mr. Gorbachev had proposed that both sides abide by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty for a period of 15 to 20 years and simultaneously enforce deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals. The proposals on ABM treaty would imply that the U.S. would not be able to develop, test or deploy Star Wars systems for a decade and a half or two. In his response, in late July, Mr. Reagan said he was willing to delay the deployment of SDI for a period of five to seven years. In offering this, Mr. Reagan for the first time, has shown a willingness to put his Star Wars programme on the bargaining table at Geneva.

Domestic compulsions

By resiling from his earlier position that the SDI is not negotiable, he has opened the door a little for a nuclear arms control deal with the USSR that would involve some cuts in offensive nuclear forces and some restrictions on the SDI programme. At the same time, he has also ensured that the second summit would indeed take place. What are the domestic compulsions that forced this new U.S. position on arms control to the fore?

First the unexpectedly strong criticism of Mr. Reagan's decision in May to bury SALT II. Many U.S. Congressmen, former officials and scientists have argued that the President's decision would hurt the U.S. more than the Soviet Union. They suggest that the Soviet Union is in a better position to build nuclear weapon systems rapidly beyond the SALT limits. It has also been argued that removal of existing ceilings on offensive nuclear weapons would make the task of the proposed Star Wars system that much more difficult. The U.S. media reported that although the service chiefs of the U.S. Armed Forces—the Joint Chiefs of Staff—endorsed Mr. Reagan's decision on SALT II, some of them were of the view that continued SALT restraints would be beneficial to the U.S.

Space transport bottleneck

Secondly, the Challenger tragedy and other American space disasters have ripped

apart some of the high-tech mystique around the Star Wars weaponry. Many of the hitherto ardent supporters of the SDI are turning sceptics of the programme. The recent U.S. space failures, which have virtually cut off U.S. access to space, if only temporarily, have highlighted how infeasible the proposed shield against nuclear weapons could be.

The current space transport bottleneck is very illustrative. It is estimated that the full deployment of an SDI system, as envisaged now, would require 5,000 launchings of space shuttles or shuttle-sized rockets. At the pre-Challenger rates of launching, the deployment of a medium sized Star Wars system could take more than 50 years. The opposition to the Star Wars programme has grown in the U.S. scientific community in the recent past, evident by an appeal by 1,600 leading U.S. scientists to the U.S. Senate seeking to slow the funding for the SDI programme.

Budget cuts

Thirdly, despite repeated requests by Mr. Reagan to exempt Star Wars from budget cuts, the U.S. Congress this year—as it did last year—slashed the SDI funding. Last year (fiscal 1986), Mr. Reagan asked for \$4.2 billions in spending for the SDI. Congress approved only \$3.1 billions. This year he wanted \$5.4 billions for the programme and is getting only about \$3.8 billions. These budget cuts would certainly constrain the rapid growth of the programme and would force the postponement of the SDI development and deployment decisions, well beyond the early 1990s, envisaged in 1983 when the programme was unveiled.

It is becoming evident that the U.S. Congress is no longer willing to fork out funds

to Mr. Reagan's requests on defence budgets in general and the SDI in particular. The SDI programme is unlikely to grow as fast as its proponents want, given the emerging fiscal restraints on the U.S. economy and a determination in the U.S. Congress to cut the expanding deficit.

Fourthly, Congress is also pushing actively for arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. Bills are pending in the U.S. Congress to limit funding for those weapons systems that would facilitate violation of SALT limits. On August 8, the House of Representatives voted, in a non-binding resolution, for a one-year ban on American nuclear testing. The U.S. Congress is also seeking to reimpose a ban on American testing of anti-satellite weapons which it had enforced last year.

Finally, a section of the Reagan Administration strongly favours an arms control deal with the USSR and believes that a window of arms control opportunity exists now and might close soon. This section led by the Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, argues that by agreeing to some limits on the SDI, deep cuts in Soviet offensive forces can be obtained in a "ground compromise". They also point out that failure to strike a deal on arms control now might erode Congressional support on defence spending. Despite the strong opposition from the right wing to making any concessions on the SDI, Mr. Reagan has tilted towards the moderate position on arms control.

What would be the shape of the "ground compromise" that could emerge out of the second summit of Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Would it take the world closer to nuclear disarmament? These are the questions that need to be looked into in detail.

[14 Aug 86 p 8]

[Text]

REFLECTING the upbeat mood in Washington and Moscow that an arms control agreement is round the corner, are a number of bilateral talks held recently between the U.S. and the USSR. Intense diplomatic manoeuvring is on by both sides to hammer out at least the broad principles of an arms control agreement at the second summit between the U.S. President, Mr. Ronald Reagan and the Soviet leader, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev in Washington later this year.

At the end of July, the U.S. and Soviet delegations met in Geneva to discuss the various issues relating to nuclear testing. Mr. Gorbachev has invested considerable energy and personal prestige on the question of the comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing. By imposing a unilateral moratorium—now a year long—on Soviet testing, Mr. Gorbachev expects some agree-

ment on this issue at the next summit. The moratorium ran out on August 6, and the Soviets have said that further extension would depend upon the U.S. response to the new Soviet arms control initiatives.

At the Geneva meeting, the Soviets were reported to have pushed the Americans towards an agreement on the test ban. Despite great international and domestic pressure on Mr. Reagan, he has refused to accept a ban on all nuclear tests. At the meeting, the U.S. negotiators have called for improved techniques to monitor nuclear tests. Despite the wide gulf between the two sides on nuclear testing, possible compromises do exist.

Decade-old treaties

The U.S. could agree to ratify the threshold test ban treaty of 1974, which put a ceiling of 150 kilotonnes on the under-

ground nuclear tests and the peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) treaty of 1976, which imposed a similar ceiling on PNEs. These agreements—more than a decade old—have never been ratified by Washington. The U.S. has also proposed cuts in the number of nuclear tests conducted annually in proportion to the cuts in strategic nuclear forces now under discussion. It remains to be seen if the Soviet Union would accept these limited gestures from the U.S. and give up its insistence that an agreement on a nuclear test ban be concluded immediately.

At another session in Geneva, officials from the two sides discussed the future of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II. Although Mr. Reagan had declared in May that the SALT II would no longer be in force, he had left himself room for a retraction. He indicated the possibility of a reconsideration of the SALT II decision depending upon changes in Soviet arms control policies. Although these talks in Geneva were not fruitful, the two sides have agreed to meet again, thus keeping up the momentum for the coming summit.

It has also been announced that the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze would meet in September in the U.S. to prepare for the second Reagan-Gorbachev summit. A previous meeting had been cancelled by the Soviet Union after the U.S. attack on Libya in April.

Another critical meeting is being held this week in Moscow between the two sides. A high power U.S. delegation, led by Mr. Paul Nitze, Special Adviser to Mr. Reagan, is discussing arms control issues with the Soviet side. This meeting would be a key step towards bridging the arms control positions of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and towards a productive summit.

This widespread arms control diplomacy and the expectations of a grand bargain are based on a perceptible movement in the respective positions on the central issue of arms control—the U.S. Star Wars programme.

Breathing space

In June Mr. Gorbachev proposed that the two sides abide by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for at least 15 years along with an agreement to reduce the offensive nuclear forces. The Soviet proposal also allows laboratory research into Star Wars weapons systems. The Soviets have thus dropped their total opposition to the Star Wars programme, but would want a commitment from the U.S. that it would restrict its Strategic Defence Initiative to work within the limits imposed by the ABM treaty. The Soviets hope that the 15-year period would give sufficient breathing space to them and would prevent an immediate, unconstrained arms race in defensive weapons. The Soviets have till now demanded a total ban on all space-strike weapons, and a complete scrapping of SDI. Their new flexible position found a response from the Reagan Administration.

The U.S. Government indicated that it was willing to delay the deployment of SDI systems for a period of five to seven years. Mr. Reagan, who until now refused to bargain on SDI, has now signalled for the first time that he is ready to do so. The new U.S. position is the result of a tortuous reconsideration of the goals and objectives of the SDI programme.

In March 1983, Mr. Reagan called upon the American scientific community to search for the means to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". This quest for defences against nuclear weapons is not entirely novel. In the era of bombers, the U.S. and the USSR devoted considerable energy towards air defence. This was rendered obsolete by the missiles of intercontinental range deployed in the 1960s. In the mid to late 1960s, the two sides worked on missile defences but veered round to an agreement that the then existing technologies were incapable of providing defences against nuclear missiles.

Basic strategy

This understanding was codified in 1972 when the U.S. and the USSR signed the ABM and SALT agreements. These treaties resolved the offence-defence relationship in the nuclear age in favour of offence. The two sides would lose their security on offensive nuclear forces, which would be capped by the SALT ceilings. The defences on either side would be reduced to the bare minimum by the ABM treaty.

The treaties also canonised the basic nuclear strategy followed by the two giants—nuclear deterrence based on mutual assured destruction. The U.S. and the USSR would each have the capability to threaten the other, but would not have the means to defend against a retaliatory strike. That is, the ability on each side to wreak certain and massive destruction on the other, after absorbing a first strike, would deter both from resorting to a nuclear strike. Defences had little place in this scheme of deterrence based on offensive forces.

Exotic technologies

The significance of the SDI programme put forward by Mr. Reagan in 1983 stemmed not only from his visions of exotic space technologies, but also from the grand revival in the nuclear doctrine of the role of defences. Mr. Reagan also implied the overthrow of the doctrine of deterrence based on offensive forces, and the ushering in of a strategy that would be based on defending U.S. population against nuclear weapons.

Despite Mr. Reagan's vision of Star Wars as an astrodome defence above the continental U.S., few hard-nosed strategists shared his enthusiasm. Although the SDI programme was sold to the American public as a protective shield that would defend U.S. population centres, key officials of the Reagan Administration had a more realistic view of SDI.

For example, Mr. George Keyworth, who recently left office as the Science Adviser of the President, had said often that the only

feasible role for SDI was not defence of the people but the protection of missile sites and command centres. Influential sections of the Reagan Administration are coming round to accept that SDI is not a substitute for nuclear weapons, but an aid to defend American nuclear forces from a discerning first strike. But the U.S. Defence Secretary, Mr. Caspar Weinberger has been refusing to accept this pared down vision of SDI. The U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, decrying this conceptual confusion, has sought to redefine the goals of SDI to the limited purpose of missile defence, by writing it into the Defence Authorisation Bill.

Fiscal constraints

Given the increasing fiscal constraints on the U.S. budget, declining Congressional commitments to unrestrained defence spending, a growing realisation that man is as yet a space pioneer rather than a space warrior, it appears certain that SDI is unlikely to deliver in the coming two decades, the promised utopia of a nuclear free world. SDI would mean a continuing reliance on offensive nuclear weapons and the doctrine of deterrence, with an increased role for defence.

Thus the wings of the SDI are being clipped and there is a rapidly emerging consensus in the U.S. strategic establishment behind the 'bastard brother' of the SDI (to use an uncharitable expression of the *New York Times*), a robust research programme into defences with the goal of defending the retaliatory nuclear forces. This process in the U.S. of redefining SDI has indeed enhanced the prospects for an agreement with the USSR on SDI.

The moderates in the Reagan Administration are arguing that without giving up the goal of building defences, SDI deployment could be used as a bargaining chip to obtain deep cuts in Soviet nuclear forces. This is reasonable, they argue, because SDI systems are nowhere near deployment. It is obvious that Mr. Reagan has tilted towards this moderate position, despite some strong opposition from the right wing to any bargaining on SDI.

Despite the closeness of the two positions on SDI—the USSR wanting a 15-year long prohibition on SDI and the U.S. ready only for a five to seven year postponement—much fine print needs to be worked out, before the grand compromise can be consummated. For example the Soviet Union wants the language of the ABM treaty to be tightened to plug the loopholes. The U.S. on the other hand is for a looser interpretation of the treaty. It is widely accepted, even in the U.S. that the treaty prohibits the development and testing of most SDI systems and components. But the Reagan Administration wants the USSR to agree to testing and development of Star Wars systems.

It is also well known that the ABM treaty does not prohibit the development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), and of defensive systems against tactical ballistic missiles (ATBM). But work on

ASAT and ATBM would largely be indistinguishable from ABM work. The Soviets, would obviously prefer a ban on these two kinds of systems and the U.S. would prefer the loophole to continue.

Further, the U.S. is demanding that the Soviets agree now to the eventual deployment of SDI, in return for an agreement to delay the programme by five to seven years. It remains to be seen whether the USSR would agree to this virtual legitimisation of SDI, in return for a non-concession, i.e. the U.S. willingness not to deploy systems which in any event are not ready.

Other problems

Besides these main issues relating to SDI, a variety of other knotty problems need to be resolved, before a grand compromise is constructed. First and foremost a lot would depend on Mr. Reagan's ability to unite his badly divided bureaucracy around a single position on arms control. Although the right wing in the Reagan Administration has lost the most recent arms control battle, it has not lost the war. Its ability to block an arms control agreement is yet considerable. Second, although both sides are agreed on deep cuts in strategic nuclear weapons, problems remain. Despite some new Soviet concessions, the two sides are quite apart on which systems need to be cut and to what extent. Much horse trading and a lot of beam counting is to be done before they can arrive at a mutually acceptable nuclear balance.

Let us assume that a grand bargain would indeed be announced at the next summit. What would be the disarmament value of such an agreement involving some cuts in offensive nuclear forces and a delay in SDI deployment? The two sides would no doubt present it as a great accomplishment, and a significant step towards disarmament. Unfortunately, it would be nothing of the sort.

Joint burial

At best, it would be a repackaging of the old SALT formula: some cuts in offensive nuclear forces, without eliminating any of the modern nuclear weapon systems, and an increased emphasis on defensive weapons. In this best possible scenario defensive weapons would be legitimised and a regulated race in defensive weapons would begin.

At its worst, if most of the U.S. proposals are accepted by the USSR, it would be a joint burial of the ABM treaty through negotiation. The ABM treaty is of unlimited duration in its present form. If the two sides agree to its extension, by say 10 years, it would in essence be a scheme to phase out the treaty in a decade. If the treaty's loopholes are not plugged and they agree to testing and development of SDI systems, while delaying its deployment, a race in defensive weapons would begin right away. Both sides would rush to perfect defensive weapons, and once they begin to deploy them after the stipulated period, they would

be forced to join in a race to build more offensive weapons.

It is clear that if the Soviets succumb to this enticement of a grand compromise, all prospects for nuclear disarmament would vanish. The race for space weapons would begin. It would be ironic, if Mr. Gorbachev who raised hopes this January by proposing the elimination of all nuclear and space weapons, would in the name of pragmatism move towards the grand bargain. That would be reenacting the tragedy of arms control. This time it could be a farce.

/9274

CSO: 5250/0006

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: SOVIET, SRI LANKAN, BELGIAN CD ENVOYS INTERVIEWED

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 30, 4 Aug 86 p 20

[Text] The current session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference centres on the problems connected with curbing the nuclear arms race, attaining nuclear disarmament, preventing the spread of the arms race to outer space, and banning nuclear weapon tests. What is the situation at the conference? What role does it play in seeking solutions to the disarmament problem? What are the obstacles in the way of concrete negotiations? At the request of New Times, Izvestia correspondent Vladimir Kuznetsov put these questions to some of the conference participants. Their answers follow.

Victor Israelyan, the head of the U.S.S.R. delegation:

The complex state of affairs at the conference is due to the policy pursued by the West, especially the U.S., which is out of keeping with present-day realities. This professed desire to promote disarmament is not backed by a practical readiness to work out concrete international agreements. One gets the impression that our partners are almost allergic to talks on such key issues as nuclear disarmament, the prevention of the arms race in outer space and the banning of nuclear weapon tests. Their argument against a practical dialogue is that these problems are supposedly to be dealt with at bilateral talks only. This is neither more nor less than disregard for the vital interests of the other states. Nuclear disarmament is vital to all countries, large and small.

Why can the conference not get down, for instance, to the elaboration of an agreement (or agreements) on keeping the arms race out of space? After all, the nuclear powers and all the countries with space-vehicle launching capability are represented at it. In fact, they are negotiating solely the banning and destruction of chemical weapons.

On April 22 the Soviet Union came up with new major initiatives which make it possible promptly to draw up a convention on the banning and elimination of chemical weapons and the facilities for their production. Our proposals take into account the positions of many states, including that of the U.S. However, attempts are being made to block them. The fact that the United States and NATO have given the green light to the production of binary chemical weapons to be deployed in Western Europe is a cause for special

concern. This queries the whole issue of control over the observance of the prospective international agreement.

The situation which has now taken shape at the conference makes it imperative for all states to exert vigorous efforts to change the course of world events for the better. Real chances are not to be missed; concrete measures must be taken to liven up all negotiations, bilateral and multilateral alike. Such is the stand taken by the Soviet Union. By following suit, our partners will facilitate progress towards the agreements.

Abdul Cader Shahul Hameed, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sri Lanka:

This may sound ironic, but certain quarters seem to need reminding that we are living in the year the U.N. has proclaimed the International Year of Peace, and that the appropriate resolution was adopted at the U.N. General Assembly unanimously. At their Delhi meeting last April, the non-aligned countries' foreign ministers voiced their profound concern over the nuclear arms race and the prospect of ever newer weapons of mass destruction being developed. As early as twenty years ago Sri Lanka warned of the danger of the arms race in space. I spoke of it myself at a session of the General Assembly in 1966. And now new space weapon systems embodying the latest in high technology are being developed. No arguments will conceal the fact that the development of these weapons is beyond civil control. Lest the laboratory research projects being worked on across the Atlantic today should become an appalling reality tomorrow, we must prepare, with the help of the Disarmament Conference, an effective agreement guaranteeing weapon-free space.

In the International Year of Peace we have witnessed General Secretary Gorbachev's creative new proposals of January 15, and a series of other initiatives. Such opportunities to safeguard peace are not to be missed. I am confident that the Soviet proposals mark a turning point and will lead to the conclusion of an agreement on reducing the present nuclear arsenals. In this context, putting an end to all nuclear tests and signing the appropriate agreement within the framework of the conference would be a reliable barrier to the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Ambassador Constant E. Clerkx, Belgium's permanent representative at the conference:

Belgium has been participating in the conference for eight years now. We attach great importance to it and seek to be instrumental in working out effective measures for disarmament, and providing conditions for eliminating certain kinds of weapons wherever possible. We have never concealed the difficulties involved in this effort, and have always stressed the need for joint action in the thorough preparation of decisions and compromises. The complete banning of chemical weapons remains, to my mind, a priority task.

Our approach is not mere altruism. It was on Belgian territory that this barbarous weapon was first used on April 22, 1915, killing more than 5,000 and maiming about 10,000. And that was not all. Chemical death haunted Belgium for a long time, and quite recently old German phosgene and mustard-gas shells went off at the army proving ground near Ypres claiming more lives--four Belgian sappers died, and the fifth was injured.

This is why my delegation favours expediting a multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons, simplifying the procedure of negotiations, and using all the opportunities offered by a unique forum such as the Disarmament Conference.

The Geneva meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and President Ronald Reagan of the United States gave a new impetus to the talks. For its part the Soviet Union has put forward a series of proposals which, we think, show its desire to get things going. I am sure that the new proposals for banning chemical weapons tabled by the American and Soviet sides will help reach mutually acceptable means of verification and control, and the other provisions of the convention now being worked out.

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CSO: 5200/1572

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET CONCESSION IN STOCKHOLM NOTED

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Aug 86 p 2

[Editorial: "A Door Ajar"]

[Text] The Soviet Union has come a long way since the former Foreign Minister Andreij Gromyko curtly rejected all Western demands for a means of checking that agreements about disarmament and lessening of tension are followed.

"We will never," said Gromyko, "allow anyone to peek through the Soviet Union's keyhole."

The same attitude was maintained by the Soviet delegation, when the Stockholm Conference on confidence-inspiring measures was opened in January of 1984. Even if the Soviet attitude was somewhat softened, Moscow still insisted, at the beginning of the summer, that the NATO-countries' proposal, that the parties could carry out inspections "in place," was nothing but a masked effort to legalize espionage.

Therefore, it meant an important Soviet concession, when the Soviet chief delegate, Oleg Grinevskij, reported the other day, in plain language, that the Soviet Union was prepared to allow foreign representatives to inspect military installations in the Soviet Union (something which had been hinted at when the summer session ended in July). The about-face on the part of the Soviets removed the perhaps most difficult obstacle at the Stockholm Conference.

It can now be taken for granted that the Conference, after more than two and a half years of marking time, will be able to produce a final document and thereby avoid ending in a fiasco. To which degree the 35 participating countries will be able to carry the Helsinki process further and create satisfactory guarantees against Europe entering a war by mistake, will be decided during the four weeks remaining before the Conference ends on September 19.

There is no lack of stumbling blocks. Among other things, there has to be agreement on how many times per year such inspections may be carried out when it concerns other than previously announced maneuvers. Furthermore, the Conference has to define very carefully which troop movements and maneuvers have to be announced beforehand. This is where the two blocs are far apart. While the West, so far has set military maneuvers with 6,000 men as the lower limit, the East has drawn the line at 18,000 men.

Now that the larger obstacles have been overcome, it should not be too much of a problem to reach a compromise on some of the smaller questions, especially since the two super powers are eager to demonstrate a lessening of tension before an expected summit meeting. How the compromises are worded will be a deciding factor in the strength of the final document. For the moment, it can only be noted that the Stockholm Conference, after more than 31 months, has saved itself from a dangerous failure.

12339

CSO:5200/2755

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW 2 SEPTEMBER PRESS CONFERENCE ON TEST BAN VERIFICATION

Radio Broadcast

LD021804 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 2 Sep 86

[Report on a 2 September news conference by commentator Pavel Kasparov held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center with recorded passages on questions and answers by participants: Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov; Yevgeniy Velikhov, USSR Academy of Sciences vice president; Igor Neresov, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of Armenia; Andrey Kokoshin, deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute at the USSR Academy of Sciences; and correspondents]

[Text] [Kasparov] Do problems exist over monitoring in the question on a nuclear test ban, or is this just a pretext to cover up the absence of the necessary desire on the part of the U.S. Administration? The answer to this question has become the subject of a news conference for Soviet and foreign correspondents. Addressing those gathered, Academician Velikhov had this to say on the subject.

[Velikhov] Today there is a historic opportunity to stop the testing of nuclear weapons immediately and forever. The halt in nuclear weapons testing is currently directed at a totally specific objective -- to stop the creation of new destabilizing types of nuclear weapons, because the experience of the preceding decades shows that new rounds in the creation of new nuclear weapons, their so called theoretical improvement [uslovnnoye sovershenstvovaniye], is the main source of destabilization. For this reason, we see today that halting nuclear tests is the central issue. The issue has become, in general, to create a more stable world, and to secure stability and security in the process of passing from a nuclear world to a non-nuclear world, which was advanced in the Soviet proposal by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 15 January.

The Soviet moratorium is a most graphic example of new thinking in the nuclear age, thinking in which politicians, in this case the Soviet Government, come to the conclusion that the security of primarily the Soviet Union is secured first and foremost not by an additional increase in new types of nuclear weapons, but on the contrary, by stopping the nuclear arms race and by the further destruction of nuclear weapons. The Soviet moratorium and its extension until 1 January 1987 is the materialization of this new thinking. One of the arguments, among many arguments we will probably have to discuss today if there are such questions, is that there still exists the argument that it is difficult to verify fulfillment of a treaty for a total nuclear test ban. It has to be said that this argument is today refuted by the united

opinion of all of the world's geophysical community. Geophysical methods today provide the full possibility of verifying fulfillment of an agreement on a nuclear test ban.

[Kasparov] Numerous questions were then asked to those participating in the new conference.

[Unidentified correspondent] (?Bobyak) of Czechoslovak radio. The Soviet Union considers it possible to conclude a treaty for a nuclear test ban with the United States this year, and to sign it at another summit meeting. Yevgeniy Pavlovich, you have touched on the question of monitoring. I am interested in what specific questions on monitoring have to be resolved in order to guarantee reliable observance of such a treaty?

[Velikhov] As far as the problem of monitoring a total nuclear test ban is concerned, we are convinced that the latest achievements in the sphere of seismology, combined with the corresponding international procedures that are jointly adhered to, including on-site inspection, will secure a high degree of certainty that nuclear tests are no longer being carried out.

It can be said that today we have all the means to verify the reliability of fulfillment of this treaty. However, taking account the fact that, so to speak, this treaty is of particular importance, we are prepared for the further improvement of all these means, which can be conducted simultaneously, even after the conclusion of the treaty.

[Unidentified correspondent] Bulgarian news agency. A month ago, here at a news conference, it was said that this fall, Soviet seismological equipment would be installed near the test site in Nevada. When will this be, and what is the attitude of the U.S. Government?

[Kasparov] Here is an answer given by Comrade Neresov:

[Neresov] During the talks on the conduct of analogous work in Nevada and the Soviet Union, an agreement was reached that work would begin in the Soviet Union in the region of Semipalatinsk, and a little later it would begin in Nevada. A Soviet delegation is planning a trip to the United States, where specific issues concerning the installation of equipment in Nevada will be discussed. There are now on our territory, two Soviet-American stations already working and a third is being assembled. This is, for the moment, the first stage of work on the installation of surface equipment. A little later, in November, when borehole equipment is ready -- equipment will be installed in boreholes -- borehole preparations are currently under way on the Semipalatinsk test site. In America, we have to agree on analogous questions, and begin work, to all appearances, sometime in January or February 1987.

[Unidentified correspondent] DIARIOS Y NOTICIAS agency, Argentina. The leaders of the Delhi Six made a specific proposal for cooperation in implementing nuclear test monitoring. In what form and at what level is such cooperation possible? Do you have ties with the scientists and scientific organizations of those countries, and will there be a discussion on this issue at the nonaligned conference.

[Kasparov] Academician Velikhov replies:

[Velikhov] In May we invited representatives from six countries, specifically Indian and Swedish scientists, to the seminar; the first seminar we had for scientific discussion of the possibility of cooperation with American scientists, who were present

at our seminar, and so they were fully informed about the Soviet-U.S. cooperation. Then there were representatives of all the countries present at the forum, who actively participated in it and discussed these problems. Soviet scientists -- the Soviet Union is completely open to international cooperation concerning development of facilities for reliable confirmation of a complete end to nuclear tests.

[Unidentified correspondent] TASS: Please explain why the Soviet side agreed to the use of U.S. equipment in both instances for this experiment?

[Velikhov] I refer to an historic example; when there was such international, one might say, interest and dispute on a more particular issue, what plasma temperature Soviet scientists had achieved, that is, plasma in thermonuclear installations, which they announced to the whole world, and Western scientists were doubtful; we then decided to invite British scientists with their equipment and that cleared up all the questions. As far as the quality of the equipment is concerned, one could happily use Soviet equipment, and if some problems arose with export licences, we would of course use Soviet equipment.

[Kasparov] The U.S. journalists present at the news conference tried to divert the attention of those taking part from the chief topic of conversation, and to force a discussion of the issue concerning the correspondent of the U.S. magazine U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT Danilooff. As has already been reported in our press this journalist, if he may be called this, was exposed a few days ago by the USSR's state security bodies as carrying out intelligence activity and was arrested red-handed while carrying out an act of espionage. A reply was made to the U.S. journalists by Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Information Department.

[Gerasimov] If you have questions concerning Danilooff, I am prepared to reply to them within the limitations of what I know about this topic at a special briefing. I would also like to remark that at the moment, at this news conference, we are discussing a very important issue, because monitoring has been the barrier that has always remained in the way of a total cessation of nuclear tests. We have suspected that the United States is setting it up hypocritically and that in fact, it was a pretext to continue the arms race. Now that we are clearing away all the technical reasons, all the technical arguments, and the political ones as well, now, when we are discussing this important and in general interesting question, the U.S. journalists, who are present here in some numbers, have not as yet asked a single question on this topic. Obviously it is of no concern or interest to them.

[Kasparov] Later however, one of the American journalists, although she did not identify herself, did ask a question. A similar question was also asked by a London FINANCIAL TIMES correspondent:

[Unidentified woman reporter in English] Mr Velikhov, my understanding is that when U.S. and Soviet scientists were concluding the agreement [superimposed translation begins] on siting [razmeshcheniye] U.S. equipment in Kazakhstan, at the last minute you insisted on including a clause that these scientists would not be able to continue monitoring if the Soviet Union resumed tests. If the Soviet Union is not sure about problems of monitoring, why did you insist on including this point?

[Kasparov] Academician Velikhov answer this:

[Velikhov] From the very beginning when the question of the aims of this work were being discussed, from the very beginning we firmly insisted that our task was to create the scientific and technical foundations to prove the possibility of complete

confirmation of a halt in all nuclear tests. We are studying the question of verification of a treaty on halting all nuclear tests, and we would not want any vagueness in this connection, because the mutual study of nuclear tests is a question which, in this case, does not interest us as Soviet scientists. It creates a mass of numerous, additional, unnecessary complications regarding the possible accusations of espionage and so on, you know. So we simply did not want to pose this question from the very start.

If from the very beginning we had reduced this question to American scientists coming here to observe the Soviet Union's nuclear tests, then we would have fallen into a very stupid position; because they have been here now for a month and no tests have been held, and there will be no tests before 1 January and what will happen in the future is unknown. Surely we have concluded an agreement for a year and its scientific task is completely different. It consists not in studying nuclear explosions, but in studying conditions permitting the possibility of detecting any nuclear explosions to be reliably confirmed.

[Arsentyev] APN -- Arsentyev. I would like to return to the problem of the moratorium, or to be more precise, to the political side of that important problem. On the eve of Geneva President Reagan stated that the proportion of the military-industrial complex in the U.S. gross national product amounted to 6 percent. However, American sources mention a rather larger proportion, about 7 percent. There is an obvious desire here to create the impression that the tail does not wag the dog, but facts show that the opposite is true. What can you say about this, Andrey Afanasiyevich?

[Kasparov] The journalist's question is answered by Dr of historical sciences, deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute, Kokoshin.

[Kokoshin] The political influence of those who are interested in continuing the arms race and continuing to create more and more new armaments systems and in the appropriate political climate cannot be measured in such concrete economic indices, although 7 percent is also an extremely significant figure, an extremely significant level. It would probably not be correct to reduce everything exclusively to the interests of the manufacturers of arms, by that same vulgar method, of those interested in obtaining from it income and super-income; although that does play a very substantial role. However, there are no less important political factors, including the fact that in the United States there exists a very significant group of politicians who possess a certain social base, certain historic traditions, who largely link their prosperity and what I would call their dominating role in the country's political life, precisely with the policy of confrontation, with the policy of maintaining international tension at a fairly high level, with a policy based on American military might and on the continual presence of that military factor in American foreign policy.

As for the scientists and their role in this whole process, here too there is an ambiguous picture taking shape. On one hand, we see many U.S. scientists advocating a complete halt to nuclear tests, not simply advocating -- they are contributing their efforts both as citizens and as experts to this problem. We see thousands of American scientists refusing to participate in the star wars program.

At the same time, we often come up against scientists who take different positions. Their thesis, so to speak, is that science has no limits and that in particular it is impossible to halt military-technical progress. It is this line that meets with increasing disbelief and resistance from the broad public. This calls for new thinking, which the Soviet Union today voices loud and clear, and which meets with the

understanding of many people who are very far from our vision of the world in its social context, but who realize that the further creation of ever more new weapons systems and the limitless reaches of science in this connection -- this line needs a radical revision.

[Kasparov] The participants in the news conference held at the USSR Foreign Ministry also replied to many other questions from Soviet and foreign journalists.

TASS Report

PM031241 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Sep 86 Second Edition p 3

[TASS correspondents N. Zheleznov, V. Shishlin report: "The Scientists' Weighty Arguments"]

[Text] Is there a technical problem of verification in the path of the banning of nuclear tests, or is this nothing more than an out-of-date pretext to cover up for the lack of political will on the part of the American Administration? The answer to this question, as well as weighty arguments from scientists that testify to the possibility of verifying nuclear explosions of even a small yield, was presented to Soviet and foreign journalists at a press conference held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center on 2 September. Taking part were well-known Soviet scientists, including participants in the Soviet-American research that has been in progress for more than a month now in the Semipalatinsk region, in the environs of the Soviet test range.

Before giving a detailed answer to the question about scientific and technical means of verification, Academician Ye. P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, said in his introductory address, I would like to stress that today, at last, there is a real, historic opportunity to put an end to nuclear weapons tests immediately and forever. The idea of a test ban is now directed toward an entirely specific objective -- that of ending the creation of new types of nuclear arms. The experience of past decades shows that successive rounds of improvements of weapons are the main source of tension and destabilization in the world.

The intentions of the American side, the scientist observed, are clear from a statistical analysis of the various kinds of tests now taking place at U.S. test ranges. These tests are mainly directed toward the development [razrabotka] of new types of nuclear weapons. We are faced with the desire to create [sozdaniye] types of third generation weapons. It is important to note that these weapons are also intended for use in a space-based echelon of ABM defense, although this is contrary to the U.S. President's statements that such a defense would supposedly be nonnuclear. This is a typical example of the profoundly contradictory stance of today's American Administration in defending the need to continue nuclear tests. The possibility is not excluded that the continuing tests in the United States are directed toward the creation [sozdaniye] of weapons of the neutron bomb type. And that, as is well-known, will provide support for the technical idea of local nuclear conflicts, which is rejected by the world public as an extremely destabilizing and dangerous avenue of arms development.

Hence it is clear, Ye. P. Velikhov went on, that ending nuclear tests is the key question of international life today. And a realistic solution to it -- that is, a concrete plan for the transition from a nuclear world to a nonnuclear world -- is contained in M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January statement.

People across the ocean are, however, continuing to cast doubt on the seriousness of the Soviet Union's intentions of making our world safe for human survival. The vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences recalled the debate that has lasted not for years, but for decades about the problem of verifying that test explosions are not being carried out. Today, he stated, this argument is refuted by the common opinion of the entire world geophysical community of scientists. From the scientific and technical viewpoint the road to the conclusion of a complete nuclear test ban treaty is open. Accurate geophysical methods, which were recently discussed in Moscow at a prestigious international forum of scientists, make it possible to register explosions of even a very low yield. Convincing evidence of this is provided by the joint work being carried out by the Soviet-American group of seismologists in the environs of our testing range near Semipalatinsk.

But even after the authoritative words of the 36 countries' scientists at the Moscow forum, new arguments have been invented. Many have already emerged, but they have one thing in common -- they plumb inexhaustible depths of unfounded fantasy and are contradictory. It is suggested, for instance, that tests could be carried out in deep space, even outside the solar system. We are prepared to offer our conclusions about the absurdity of this farfetched project. It is also claimed that complex technical devices could be created that would entirely block the path for the spread of seismic waves. This too is without foundation. Such vast installations -- underground cavities -- can easily be detected with the use of space systems.

However sophisticated the opponents of a nuclear test ban may become in their quest for new obstacles, the scientist said in conclusion, one single conclusion suggests itself: The question of ending nuclear tests is today not a technical question, but a political question. That, in any event, is how it is assessed by the world public, which clearly understands who is continuing to test these lethal weapons and to what end.

The scientists then answered journalists' questions.

Question: The Soviet Union considers it possible to conclude a nuclear test ban treaty with the United States this year, and to sign it at a new summit meeting. What specifically are the questions of verification that must be resolved in order to ensure reliable compliance with such a treaty?

Answer: My personal opinion, Ye. P. Velikhov said, is expressed in the declaration unanimously adopted at the recent international forum of scientists in Moscow. As for the problem of verification of a complete nuclear test ban, we are convinced that the latest achievements in the sphere of seismology, combined with international procedures, including on-site inspection, will ensure a high degree of certainty that nuclear tests are no longer taking place. This certainty will be further strengthened if international scientific cooperation continues to develop. Today we have every means of verifying the reliability of the fulfillment of this treaty.

The full range of seismological methods, and also space observation means, Prof I.L. Nersesov, leader of the comprehensive experiment by Soviet and American scientists, said, developing this theme, is quite sufficient to fully guarantee the fulfillment of an agreement on ending all nuclear explosions.

Both we and our American colleagues have sufficient seismological stations to determine with certainty the locality of an explosion. Our joint experiment in Semipalatinsk is aimed at studying the finer details of the process and accurately picking out against the background of natural "noises" signals of artificial origin. We are already confident that not even the smallest explosions will go unnoticed.

Answering a question from the CZECHOSLOVAK NEWS AGENCY on whether the Semipalatinsk experiment is of significance for the development of fundamental scientific research, M.B. Gokhberg, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Earth Physics, said: This will undoubtedly promote the more accurate prediction of approaching earthquakes.

Journalists asked Ye. P. Velikhov to comment on the American Administration's current objections to joining in the moratorium immediately.

The quantity of contradictions present in these objections, the scientist stated, indicates the weakness of the U.S. Administration's position. First, all these arguments are being put forward in order to justify their position in the face of public opinion in their own country, which, especially since the Soviet moratorium, has been actively calling for an end to nuclear tests. In particular, it is suggested that nuclear tests are necessary because it is the only way the United States can guarantee the reliability and life cycle of the nuclear weapons already in the armory. This argument is patently farfetched, and not only scientists, but military experts say so. The thesis that ending nuclear tests will supposedly lead to the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is even more dubious. This is rejected outright by the countries that have signed the nonproliferation treaty.

I will add, A.A. Kokoshin, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States of America and Canada, said, that a complex combination of interests lies behind the policy of continuing nuclear explosions, the policy of creating more and more new weapon systems. It would be incorrect to reduce the matter entirely to the interests of the weapons producers and their desire to make money from this business, although that does play a substantial role and affects the present administration's course. Political factors, however, are equally important: Many U.S. politicians associate their prosperity and their country's success with the policy of confrontation, a policy based on American military superiority.

Question: Do not the Russians gain more from the joint experiment than the Americans?

Answer: For scientists, this question does not arise. The entire experience of our work with our American colleagues shows that in this case everyone gains, and the biggest gain is in the trust between our countries. We remember how troubled the American seismologists were on the day our instruments in Semipalatinsk recorded an underground explosion in Nevada. Let us hope, they acknowledged, that the scientists will soon hear only silence from the Nevada range as well as the Semipalatinsk range...

Journalists inquired as to what is the minimum yield meaningful from the viewpoint of testing new weapons.

In order to create [sozdaniye] third-generation weapons, the scientists stated, tests on the scale of hundreds or tens of kilotons are needed. In order to create tactical nuclear weapons, tests of the order of a kiloton are needed.

Of course, kilograms and grams can be exploded, but it is hardly necessary to record them solely in order to see that both in the USSR and in the United States the geologists, road builders, and construction workers are carrying out their ordinary work with explosives. Explosions of military significance evidently do not occur below the threshold of one kiloton.

Asked whether American specialists will be able to continue their work in Kazakhstan in the event that the Soviet Union resumes tests, the scientists stressed that the main task of the joint research is to create the scientific and technical foundations for demonstrating the possibility of full verification of all nuclear tests. Our aim is not to study nuclear explosions, but to give the politicians the key to agreement, the key to a planet without nuclear weapons.

Velikhov on Seismic, Space Monitoring

LD021200 Moscow TASS in English 1155 GMT 2 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 2 TASS -- All arguments that it is hard to verify a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by existing methods are utterly far-fetched, according to Yevgeniy Velikhov, a vice-president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Speaking at a news conference here today, which featured also several other Soviet experts knowledgeable in the field, he said there were a number of seismological networks in different countries, which made it possible to identify a signal from a very weak explosion even against the background of seismic noise. He mentioned, by way of an example, what he said was a very sensitive system called "Norsar" which had been deployed, among other countries, in Norway as well as a powerful seismological system in the United States.

Most other Western countries, the Soviet Union and a number of other states also had national seismological systems, Velikhov said.

"It is possible to monitor full compliance with a nuclear test ban agreement with the help of geophysical methods," Velikhov said, adding that "the Soviet Union is prepared to keep upgrading the verification system also after the agreement's conclusion."

Over the past twenty years, the Soviet scientist said, a system for monitoring any activities in the territory of any country from space had also been well developed. "This system makes it possible, for example, to detect any cavity needed for underground nuclear testing," Velikhov said. "Combined with seismic methods, this is quite enough fully to guarantee the observance of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty." The latest experiment, currently being conducted by Soviet and U.S. scientists in the area of Semipalatinsk, aimed to study ways of separating a signal coming from an explosion more efficiently from natural seismic noise, Velikhov said. "Even the smallest blasts will not go unnoticed," he said.

"But the issue of ending nuclear testing is a political one," he said. "One should ask what this testing is for, who conducts it and what the cause behind the nuclear arms race it."

"The Soviet Union believes that an end to nuclear testing is central to creating a more stable world and ensuring transition from the nuclear world to a non-nuclear world, which has been proposed by the Soviet Union in the January 15 statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee," Velikhov said. The other Soviet experts addressing the news conference were Dr Mikhail Gokhberg, acting director of the Institute of the Physics of the Earth at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Igor Neresov, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of Armenia who is in charge of the experiment involving Soviet and U.S. scientists in Kazakhstan, and Andrey Kokoshin, a deputy director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies at the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

They pointed to the untenability of the U.S. arguments against the test ban moratorium. It is being claimed in the West, for instance, that an end to nuclear testing would make peace more insecure, while continued testing would enable Washington to know what the Soviet Union can achieve in developing new kinds of weapons. The scientists said such claims were patently absurd.

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW: U.S. USES VERIFICATION ISSUE TO IMPEDE TEST BAN

LD723239 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 7 Sep 86

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Text] They say we are living in the century of information. We are living in the nuclear era, in the era of scientific-technical revolution, but also in the century of information.

But any invention, from Promethean fire to the nuclear fire, has one side turned toward good and another one turned to evil. This applies also to the century of information. Sometimes it becomes a century of disinformation, and the biggest lie in this context is that on the intentions of the Soviet Union. It is possible to conjecture about them, and you try and prove it. Caspar Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defense, the other day did conjecture when he was speaking at the congress of the American Legion Organization, which unites rightwing veterans. Weinberger said that beyond any doubt, there is a threat to the United States and that this threat is the Soviet Union.

Recently, this book, "Sovieticus", has been published in the United States. One must assume this to mean in translation from the Latin, the Soviet man, in scientific terms. In order to emphasize that one has to do with something out of the way, the title adds: American Ideas and Soviet Realities. The author, Stephan Cohen, sees a highly dangerous gulf between the former and the latter, between what the Americans think about the Soviet man and what he looks like in fact. The author writes about Sovietophobia -- that is, about hatred toward us -- which indeed determines the ideas the Americans have about us. He writes that this is a neglected disease; it is as if it had been in remission in the years of detente, but now there is again evidence of it, and even of an acute bout of it, which is particularly dangerous when foreign policy and issues of war and peace are concerned.

But now it has become a little more difficult to blacken the Soviet intentions, since our country, not only in words but also in reality, shows its concern over peace, and an example of this is the moratorium. The opponents to the latter have several divergent arguments. Well, in the past, their main bulwark, so to speak, was the question of verification [kontrol] -- that is, of ensuring that we would not dupe them continuing somewhere around the corner, on the sly, to take pleasure in nuclear explosions, whereas the Americans would have closed their ranges. Very little remains of this argument, because technical possibilities for carrying out inspection [proverka] as well as readiness on the part of the Soviet Union do exist.

Presently, the second bilateral meeting on nuclear tests is proceeding in Geneva. The meeting is a closed one, but from U.S. statements, Washington's position is to be seen

as almost crystal-clear. In general, the United States is allegedly for the ban on nuclear weapon tests, only this should be sometime in the future. But, for the time being, they are for verifying [kontrol] limitation of the nuclear tests. Of course, this is a little bit better than unlimited freedom of tearing the ground by negations, but it is worse than full abstention from these explosions, and here the United States makes the good the enemy of the better. The U.S. side is sticking to the view that it is necessary to verify [kontrolirovat] the limitation of nuclear tests, but we consider it necessary to verify [kontrolirovat] the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests. Even the nonspecialist will easily admit that it is easier to verify [kontrolirovat] silence on the range than racket.

Presently, the United States has found a new method of checking inspection [proverka], the so-called cortex, and they are highly praising it as an achievement of technological thought. But it is not these achievements which are at issue here; the point is that negotiations on a new method, if they are to start, can draw much in length. For example, it was not that long ago that the President dispatched to the Congress a report with the following title: "About the Potential Directions of U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in the Development of Possibilities for Checking Inspection [proverka] Agreements on Arms Control." This tricky report says that much time will be necessary for determining technical details of calibration of tests.

Well, in the meantime, tests will go on, one must suppose. This is to say, Washington would prefer a mire of technical discussions in which it would be easy to drown several years, and during this time the United States would continue their tests.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW: ARBATOV INTERVIEWED ON MORATORIUM, VERIFICATION

Part One

LD301123 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 29 Aug 86

[Text] After the news conference held in Moscow on Wednesday which was devoted to Soviet-American relations, Vladimir Pozner interviewed one of the participants, Gerogiy Arbatov, director of the Institute of the United States and Canada Studies, on other aspects of the Soviet moratorium. We present the first part of this interview.

[Begin recording] [Pozner] Academician Arbatov, you are aware of the fact that on 18 August the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union's Communist Party made a statement in which he announced the prolongation of the unilateral test ban that the Soviet Union announced at the end of July 1985 and actually imposed upon itself on 6 August 1985. There has been a series of, if you wish, argumentations by the administration, by the White House, as to why it will not accept a test ban, a comprehensive test ban, and I would like to run some of these arguments by you and to have your opinion, as a member of the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet parliament and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and as the director of the United States and Canada Studies Institute, which is the foremost think-tank in the Soviet Union on Soviet-American relations.

One of the arguments is that the test ban does not correspond to the national interests of the United States, or of its allies. Now, what would you say to that?

[Arbatov] It depends on what you understand under national interests. If it is an interest, national interest, of the United States to achieve military superiority in order to start a war and inflict a military defeat on the Soviet Union, which I am sure it is not, but if it is understood in this way by American leadership then everything which goes with the arms race, including further and further tests of nuclear weapons, is in the American interest. But I think, again I repeat this, it is not the national interest of the United States. I think United States actually are just as interested as we are in avoiding nuclear war and therefore I just don't believe in this argument. You know, national interest is a slogan, a very, such a glittering generality, a cliché, behind which a whole lot of bad designs and a lot of scandals have hidden themselves throughout history. And I don't think it can be taken seriously.

It has to be asked I think by us, and we asked it from the Americans, it should be asked by the allies of the United States and I know that the allies ask this question and I think it should be asked by Americans, I'm not giving them any advice but as a student of the United States I know that many Americans ask this question: Why do the Americans need more and more nuclear tests while the Russians are living with this long

nuclear fast, already for a year, and now are going to prolong it for another half-year? [as heard] Where is the difference?

[Pozner] What about this argument, that basically the United States is for a test ban but it is impossible to verify, or there is a problem about verification on site, what do you think about that?

[Arbatov] I think it was completely beaten already. The first thing, I don't know any other issue in the field of arms control which is so simple to verify as nuclear explosions. And for instance, the Americans have made 18 tests during this year of our moratorium. They have announced only five.

[Pozner] Fifteen.

[Arbatov] Fifteen, 15. But we have, of course, registered three others which were in very low range which the Americans didn't announce. And so the technology has made such a big step forward, in seismology and in other fields of analysis, how to distinguish nuclear tests from earthquakes or some other explosions, you can make a distinction, that it doesn't make any problem. Nevertheless we agreed, we have nothing against it, and all other kinds of inspection.

[Pozner] And we have agreed to on-site inspection.

[Arbatov] Including on-side inspection.

[Pozner] And in fact we have American scientists...

[Arbatov, interrupting] Yes, and this I wanted to say. We have agreed also to the six nations representing, you know, representing five continents, who proposed their services, and among them is even an ally of the United States, a member of NATO, and a neutral country, nonaligned country, not a single ally of the Soviet Union, that they can do it and we agreed also to American on-site inspection. And more than this -- we (?made it) on a private base. On agreement reached between Soviet and American scientists there is already equipment installed at the biggest nuclear test site in the Soviet Union, near Semipalatinsk. It is there, it is working there.

[Pozner] In fact it registered the American test (?last week).

[Arbatov] Yes, yes it registered the American test. [end recording]

Part Two

LD212238 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 30 Aug 86

[Text] We bring you part two of Vladimir Pozner's interview with a leading analyst of United States-Soviet relations, Director of the United States and Canada Institute in Moscow Georgiy Arbatov. They discuss some argumentation by the opponents of a nuclear moratorium:

[Pozner] What about the view that the moratorium is really only a political step that in no way harms the Soviet military program, it's just a political step and that's all it is?

[Arbatov] Well, you know if absence of tests doesn't harm any program then I would ask: Why don't the Americans join us?

[Pozner] That's a good question.

[Arbatov] Yes. So it is certain risk, and it was not an easy decision and we had to weigh up the harm in military programs that this will inflict and the possible political effect in somehow promoting arms control and in future disarmament, as we have decided to give preference and to make it highest priority this move to stop the arms race. So it was not an easy decision, but we decided we can live with it, and would it be on both sides, and we proposed that we have an agreement, not simply, not simply our word and American word, but we have agreement with procedures of verification, etc., etc.....

In this case, there will be no harm for anybody because we would stop developing, new nuclear systems, new nuclear weapons, and then it will be equality, but equality on a much better basis than this, you know, very fluid equality when each side tries to, to...

[Pozner] Call it a fragile balance.

[Arbatov] Fragile balance and very unstable situation when each side wants to get ahead and the other side has to reach it, and then it, the other gets ahead, etc... So we are advancing, you know, on this equilibrium, but on higher and higher planning (?or) to higher and higher levels. And we propose to stop it, which would mean -- I think it is one of the most effective steps in arms control, because it would, it would mean that we stopped qualitative arms race in nuclear field, and it would also have very good effect on non-proliferation. [sentence as heard]

[Pozner] Trying to play down the importance of the moratorium we get this argument from American that people really aren't afraid or worried about nuclear tests, they are worried about nuclear weapons, and the nuclear tests have no effect on the number of nuclear weapons, we should think about doing, first of all cutting down on the number of weapons. What would you respond to that?

[Arbatov] You know you, you, if you cut existing nuclear weapons but go on with building new nuclear weapons it is a further arms race, it is not an arms control, and you cannot build new nuclear weapons without testing them. Therefore it is tremendously effective, effective. And I, it's also not true that people are not worried about nuclear tests. As far as I know through the public opinion polls show that even 80 percent of Americans reading and hearing all this poor excuses for American behavior (?on) this, in this case for their very obstinate, refusal to join the moratorium. Eighty percent of Americans are against nuclear tests if it is (?made that they are stopped) together with the Russians and if they are verified and this is certain so it's, it's just a game. [sentence as heard] You know, I think all the energy and ingenuity with which Pentagon and American Administration invent excuses not to, to follow the example of Soviet Union and abstain from other arms control steps would it be really spent on pursuing goal of improving international relations, the atmosphere, improving the atmosphere and taking clear measures for arms control and for stabilizing the situation and we would live in a much better, better world. [sentence as heard]

Part Three

LD021403 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 1 Sep 86

[Text] We begin our program tonight with part three of an interview granted to Vladimir Pozner of our staff by Georgiy Arbatov, director of the Moscow-based Institute for United States and Canada Studies. Last Friday and Saturday were aired parts one and two. All of them deal with the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing which went into effect on 6th August last year. On 18th August of this year Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced in his televised statement that it would be in effect until 1st January 1987.

In his interviews with Vladimir Pozner, Academician Arbatov takes a look at some of the arguments of the American opponents of the moratorium.

[Begin recording] [Pozner] Academician Arbatov, the Americans say that a test ban is only, (?well), basically to the Soviet Union's advantage because the Soviet Union has finished testing a new generation of missiles, the SS-23's, the SS-24's, but that the United States has fallen behind and therefore has to test.

[Arbatov] You know, I would say that the Americans have been tremendously inefficient. They have made all in all 225 tests more than the Soviets and if the Soviets are before them then I think the taxpayer has full right to ask Pentagon and (?this) Nuclear Energy Commission, what are they doing? What are they spending the money on? So, I am absolutely sure that this is not correct.

[Pozner] In other words, that (?they've not fallen behind)?

[Arbatov] They have not fallen behind. And you know, actually they have -- to show just the number -- during this year, they have made 18 tests and they have all in all made 225 tests more than we. So, if you take this frequency of testing as a model then they are at least 15 years before us.

[Pozner] Ahead of us.

[Arbatov] But we -- ahead of us -- and we agreed to stop. So where is the difference? And then again, giving this question -- that's, first -- that they think about waging war. What role does it play, whether this or that nuclear warhead is more or less modern? If both sides actually agreed in principle that as a first step they could cut it by half, by 50 percent, to what role does this play? For deterrence, not at all; so even this argument itself shows that they think about weapons for waging nuclear war.

[Pozner] Well, now what do you think about the view that has been pronounced both by President Reagan and by some of his advisers, according to which tests are absolutely necessary so as to verify whether or not your defensive potential is actually usable?

[Arbatov] Nuclear arsenal.

[Pozner] That is to say, your nuclear arsenal is indeed ready to repulse an enemy, and you must test to check that. What do you think about...

[Arbatov, interrupting] Well, you know I took it very seriously at first, you know, because I started my life as an auxiliary officer during the World War II and I know that in artillery there is such a rule, that if you have old munition...

[Pozner, interrupting] The shells.

[Arbatov] Ammunition, the shells. You have from time to time to take, let's say, 5 out of 10,000 and to test them, to shoot them.

[Pozner] Yes.

[Arbatov] So that you are sure that this munition created maybe 5 or 10 or 15 years ago is okay.

So, because I took it serious I made my own inquiries, and I applied to the best scientists we have, and best specialists -- including military specialists -- and I got the absolutely persuasive information that this is a (?lie again) because in artillery shells what is unreliable with time? It is the chemistry. Different substances come together...

[Pozner, interrupting] You have a chemical reaction.

[Arbatov] So you might have a chemical reaction which will make (?gun) corrosion somewhere, etc. Therefore, you need to do it. The nuclear weapon is a weapon of a different kind. Part of it is actually close, is resembling artillery shell, which starts the whole reaction, brings together this part of fusionable material, which creates together critical mass and/or (?over) critical mass, and makes the explosion. But this can be tested without nuclear tests. [Words indistinct] for a small explosion of this, small test of this. All other parts can be also tested without explosions, which are vulnerable. As to fusionable material, there is absolutely no need to do it because it has a tremendous period of lifespan. So this is nonsense. And this nonsense (?more than this) is proven by American experience because since 1974, I think, neither Americans nor we make any tests over 150 kilotons.

[Pozner] Yes, we have an agreement.

[Arbatov] We have an agreement. Not signed but observed; well, signed, but not ratified (?by Americans) but nevertheless both sides comply with it. But Americans have a lot of weapons, bombs, and some warheads and you know the overall amount of megatons -- the amount of bang in this untested for 12 years already -- nuclear weapons comprise 70 percent of the whole nuclear arsenal of the United States.

[Pozner] And nobody said anything.

[Arbatov] Nobody says anything with this 70 percent. So it's an absolutely clear attempt to mislead public opinion again, a trick, just a trick to justify something which is done for other means. You know, it is wrong. The nuclear tests are not made in order to be sure of the deterrent, of weapons needed for deterrent; we have a lot of these weapons. Would we have two times or even five times less, we would have too much of them. They are not tested. What is tested, for a long period already, are the weapons intended to wage nuclear war and to try to win nuclear war, contrary to the solemn pronouncements made by American leadership, orally and also in written form, including the declaration in Geneva during the last summit, that United States thinks that nuclear war cannot be waged and there will be no winners in nuclear war. But the practice shows us this quite different thing, that the military planning is directed towards finding a way to wage nuclear war.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: MORE ON MORATORIUM EXTENSION, U.S. RESPONSE

London TIMES Criticized

PM291058 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Aug 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Melor Sturua "Rejoinder": "The Strange Logic of THE TIMES"]

[Text] London's THE TIMES has published an article devoted to disarmament problems. Not a very lengthy article, but highly interesting in content. After all, it is not without reason that it is said that THE TIMES is for those who read between the lines rather than at odd times. However, in this specific instance everything is so clear that one cannot believe one's eyes. Is it possible that London has been so blind and reckless in hitching itself to Washington's military chariot and, furthermore, to the U.S. President's coattails?

Rodney Cowton, author of the article in THE TIMES, did not find to his liking the fact that the Soviet Union extended the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions through 1 January 1987 and called on the United States to reach agreement on the complete ban of nuclear tests.

He described these peace-loving steps by Moscow as a "propaganda ploy." Why? Maybe we are trying to deceive or confuse someone? No, Cowton does not go so far as to say this. He does, however, say things that are no less absurd. If you read his argument not at odd times but between the lines, it boils down to the following: "Do not dare insult Reagan. Do not dare take away his star toys!"

I am not exaggerating in any way. Read it, and see for yourselves: "The Russians must realize that there is no possibility of reaching agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty while President Reagan is in office because he believes that it is important for the United States to have a program for testing its weapons systems. Thus the Soviet Union's current emphasis on a comprehensive test ban treaty can only be a propaganda ploy, and it testifies that we will learn about the Soviet Union's readiness to be serious in approaching arms control at the moment when the Russians abandon this ploy."

How about that? It appears that we must abandon the "ploy" rather than Washington abandoning whipping up the nuclear arms race on earth and its transfer to outer space. It appears that only agreement to countenance this path leading toward a catastrophe for human civilization will serve as confirmation of our love for peace. All the rest is propaganda, because it is not to Reagan's liking!

According to the latest statistics, the population of the globe has passed the 5 billion mark, and the population of the United States is in excess of 240 million. Mr Reagan, even though he may be the President of the United States, is still just one

man. And the majority of our planet's inhabitants, including Americans, demand that an end be put to nuclear insanity. Even in Britain itself, as the results of a recent opinion poll show, 84 percent are in favor of the moratorium. Nevertheless, according to London's THE TIMES, the entire world is out of step and only the occupant of the White House is in step.

Leafing through the yellowed pages of THE TIMES from the period when it was still styled THE THUNDERER and did not belong to newspaper barons from across the ocean, I came across an editorial proudly saying: "For almost 2 centuries Englishmen everywhere have drawn from our pages the sad truth and the merry truth, the terrible truth and the great truth." Oh, how long ago that was! Now, as the servile manner of the former THUNDERER shows, one can draw from its pages only one "truth" -- London's dangerous and shortsighted obedience to Washington.

U.S. 'Feeding Fear, Mistrust'

LD281521 Moscow TASS in English 1509 GMT 28 Aug 86

[Test] Moscow August 28 TASS -- By TASS commentator Leonid Ponomarev.

Whether nuclear blasts will continue to thunder at testing ranges in the near future depends wholly on the position of the present U.S. Administration.

The Soviet Union has voluntarily and unilaterally refrained from conducting any nuclear explosions for more than a year now and will continue to do so until year's end.

But the planet continues to be shaken by nuclear blasts at the U. S. testing range in Nevada. Since the Soviet Union declared its moratorium, the United States has staged as many as 18 such explosions.

The White House administration has demonstratively kept testing solely for upgrading nuclear arms and developing new kinds of such weapons and stubbornly refused to join the Soviet moratorium.

The danger emanating from this policy of Washington, which is a challenge to the entire world, is many-sided.

It is fuelling world tension and thus feeding fear and mistrust and undermining the security of all nations, including the United States itself.

What is even more dangerous is that it makes for a continuous buildup of ever new kinds of weaponry, whose application cannot be justified by any sensible arguments.

While seeming to recognize that the situation is a deadlock and admitting that the further stockpiling of weapons of mass annihilation will not guarantee greater security, U.S. leaders in practice engage in activities which are directly opposite to what they say for propaganda purposes.

This is seen especially clearly on the example of U.S. military spending. Outlays for the Pentagon in fiscal 1981 through 1986 amount to 1.6 trillion dollars.

All this money is being spent, of course, not to ensure "greater security", as the White House claims, but to give Washington a military advantage and commanding heights in the world and satisfy its long-standing imperial ambitions.

But in the present-day world security cannot be unilateral, it cannot be for "the select". Either it is equal for everyone or it is no longer security but a threat by some countries to others.

The Soviet Union persistently follows a policy of ensuring security for all nations and an end to nuclear testing everywhere once and for all will certainly serve the security interests of all mankind.

The sooner the present U.S. Administration joins the moratorium on nuclear testing, the sooner the arms race will start to peter out.

Reagan 'Losing Politically'

LD282309 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 28 Aug 86

[Commentary by IZVESTIYA political observer Stanislav Kondrashov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Good day, comrades. Ten days have passed since the Soviet Union extended its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions by 5 more months, until 1 January 1987. It can be said that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement rocked the silence of the August holidays in world politics. It is too early to take stock of results. But I think the numerous reactions can be divided into three categories. Those who supported the moratorium before welcomed the new move, both at the level of ordinary and prominent representatives of world public opinion and at the official level. The Delhi Six are an example of the latter. They are acting as a kind of referee and as a possible mediator between the two military-political blocs. Those who had been hesitating joined those in favor in quite large numbers, having been convinced that Soviet intentions were serious.

A reader of London's THE GUARDIAN newspaper expressed that this in a manner typical of Englishmen. "In this dispute," he wrote, "it is becoming more and more difficult not to look like a defender of the Soviet Union." In official circles in Washington, the decisionmakers continued their opposition, even though, as THE NEW YORK TIMES put it, "the idea of stopping tests has the support of the people." It had the American people in mind. Another newspaper, THE WASHINGTON POST, described the disagreeable spectacle, and I quote, of "the administration being kicked towards talks on the universal banning of nuclear weapons tests." These kicks -- not hard enough, admittedly -- are coming from the U.S. Congress, which adopted a series of resolutions, encouraging, as it were, the White House in the direction of greater flexibility.

In other words, the Reagan administration is losing out politically. But this, after all, is not the purpose of the new Soviet initiative. Our objective is to have the one-sided silence in the nuclear testing grounds reciprocated. All this leads us to the old question: What could force the Reagan administration to change its position? Consideration of the military needs? But it is still banking, patently, on success in the arms race. The new political thinking for which Moscow is calling? But, alas, Washington is still thinking in the same old way and does not wish to agree with our premise that in this day and age it is suicidal to base interstate relations on the illusion of achieving superiority in the terrible weapons of destructions.

And, alas, the logic of commonsense is not strong enough to win over those who worship force. In present circumstances they can only be overcome by force -- not the force that springs to mind immediately, but rather the force of political pressure from the world community, above all U.S. public opinion and the U.S. Congress, where many believe that the moratorium is in the interests of U.S. security and universal security.

In world politics, it is extremely rare that immediate and, so to speak, clean results are achieved. But our moratorium continues to force and continues to influence the moral and political climate of the world and America itself.

'Test of Maturity' for U.S.

PM291504 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Aug 86 Second Edition p 3

[V. Levin article: "Policy of Peace Versus Policy of War: Historical Test of Maturity"]

[Text] The 18 August statement by M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has firmly captured the imagination of the peoples and remains in the center of the world public's attention. People are writing about it, arguing about it, analyzing it.

It is no exaggeration to say that mankind has understood and accepted the noble idea that the only path to true peace is via the complete elimination of the awesome instruments of nuclear destruction. The cessation of nuclear tests is a realistic and effective step in that direction. After all, without tests nuclear weapons cannot be improved or modernized and, consequently, without tests their quantitative buildup and qualitative improvement will also inevitably cease.

And that is not only the USSR's view. The resolution on the immediate cessation and banning of nuclear weapons tests submitted at the UN General Assembly session last December was supported by 120 states, stressing that the banning of tests "would be a most important element in ensuring the success of the efforts aimed at halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expansion of the existing arsenals." The "Delhi Six" -- states from four continents: Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden -- called the ending of tests "an important step toward curbing the nuclear arms race."

People are unanimous that the ending of nuclear explosions is an event of tremendous significance. By its decision to extend the moratorium imposed over a year ago, on 6 August 1985, the Soviet Union confirms its goodwill and demonstrates its sense of high responsibility for the fate of the world and its understanding of the realities of the nuclear age. The new thinking in action -- that is how the Soviet decision has been characterized, with every justification. The explains the so considerable and clear support for the Soviet Union's new initiative on the part of the broadcast public circles and many governments.

And yet the U.S. Administration continues to persist in its obstructionist approach in not accepting the moratorium idea. Once again the United States was in a hurry to reject out of hand the appeal for the cessation of nuclear tests. And to give at least the semblance of justification to its position, the White House, followed by those political forces which blindly seek to emulate Washington, has been trying to discredit

the Soviet Union's decision. Various arguments are used but none stands up to criticism.

Immediately after Comrade Gorbachev's speech on Soviet television, L. Speakes, the White House's official spokesman, began arguing that the United States needs to continue nuclear tests because, he claimed, "the USSR carried out a considerable modernization of its nuclear forces before announcing its moratorium. We have not yet finished responding to their modernization by the modernization of our own forces."

Let us look at the facts. They prove irrefutably that Washington has the dubious honor of being undisputed leader in terms of the number of nuclear explosions. The United States has conducted more than all the other nuclear powers put together. Here are the figures for the past 2 years (cited at a recent USSR Foreign Ministry press conference): In 1984 the Soviet Union and the United States carried out approximately the same number of nuclear tests and in 1985 the United States conducted around 20 explosions whereas prior to the announcement of the moratorium, the USSR conducted 9. Since the moratorium was announced, 18 U.S. nuclear devices have been detonated. So where is the gap? Speakes' arguments on this theme look absolutely ridiculous.

The argument is also being used that the Soviet moratorium avoids the essence of the problem which, according to Washington's statements, is that the USSR allegedly enjoys superiority in the strategic offensive arms sphere. This thesis has been developed by the West German FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, for example, clearly at U.S. prompting. It is an old and utterly false thesis. After all, it is common knowledge that parity in strategic nuclear arms is guaranteed by the commitments arising from the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty. The Soviet Union has always honored its commitments.

But the United States recently decided to smash the strategic parity and secure military superiority. That is why new MX ICBM's are being sited in the launch silos, "Trident" missile-carrying submarines are being commissioned, and cruise missiles are being deployed on ships and strategic bombers. That is also why Washington has begun creating [sozdaniye] space-strike complexes.

Washington also cites the problem of verification [kontrol]. But in fact no problem exists here. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that it is prepared for appropriate verification measures [mery kontrolya]. Our country is just as interested in verification as the United States. And when, under an accord between USSR and U.S. scientists, American specialists installed their seismological apparatus in the Soviet nuclear test region -- near Semipalatinsk -- there seemed to be nothing more to say.

However, the administration's representatives simply will not give up. Incidentally, the fact that the USSR has recently recorded three explosions not announced by Washington demonstrates the high reliability of national verification facilities [sredstva kontrolya]. We also have good reason to suppose that America's facilities are not inferior to our own. After all, the U.S. seismographs installed in the Semipalatinsk region registered with accuracy nuclear explosions in Nevada. Furthermore, the USSR does not object to international verification [kontrol] or on-site inspection [inspektsiy na mestakh].

What is the United States counting on as it deliberately distorts the truth? On the U.S. public's lack of information. However, those Americans with sufficient access to information who give thought to the realities of the modern world are coming to the clear conclusion that the administration, despite its assertions that it desires peace, really does not want an agreement with the Soviet Union. An editorial in the CHICAGO TRIBUNE has noted: "As gossip columns customarily say, it will undoubtedly be denied,

but it is becoming increasingly obvious that President Reagan never really intended to reach an important new agreement on nuclear arms control with the Soviet Union." And NBC anchorman R. Mudd has said that although the administration refuses to admit it, it does not want to end nuclear explosions because that would block the testing of laser weapons, which play a leading part in the "star wars" program.

The Soviet Union has no illusions regarding the U.S. Administration's position. We know with whom we are dealing. But sooner or later the realities of the nuclear age must be understood by America's leaders. At least, this is to be hoped.

Life itself tests all state leaders for political maturity and understanding of the profound changes in the world. By its decision to extend the moratorium, the USSR has again offered a historic opportunity to move toward ending the arms race. This opportunity must be seized in the interests of all mankind.

Soviet 'Nuclear Silence' Lauded

PM030924 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Aug 86 Morning Edition p 1

[Melor Sturua article under the rubric: "Publicist's Comments" "Silence"]

[Text] Silence reigns at the Soviet nuclear test sites, a silence more eloquent than any words, since this silence is emblematic of a cause -- a noble cause.

Silence reigns at the Soviet nuclear test sites, but what an ardent struggle rages around it! The seismographs of human conscience seek hope in it. The seismographs of misanthropy try to discredit it.

Nothing would appear simpler than to set about breaking the silence. Breaking it by venomous words and atomic explosions.

But the silence reigning at the Soviet nuclear test sites is a special silence. In breaking it Washington gives itself away, since those who oppose the moratorium favor the arms race. Such is the implacable logic of the silence. It forces everyone to reveal their true colors.

Silence reigns at the Soviet nuclear test sites. What will its future be? Will it become the silence that unexpectedly and with lightning speed settles on the battlefields when war is over or will it become the calm before the storm, the calm before a new spiral in the nuclear race? This is essentially Hamlet's question -- to be or not to be? Except that what the nuclear-age Hamlet holds in his hands is not the skull of the poor jester Yorick but our entire fragile and beautiful planet. Our planet that is unique in life and irretrievable in nuclear death.

Silence reigns at the Soviet nuclear test sites. It has made modest, quite unremarkable Semipalatinsk more renowned than Nevada with all its luxury, its casinos and brothels, and Las Vegas, where Walpurgis Nights rage, although the electricity and neon there burn around the clock. Semipalatinsk has kindling hope, Nevada is extinguishing it. Semipalatinsk is kindling life, Nevada is frittering life away on a conventional and nuclear roulette wheel.

"Magnanimity in politics is quite often the greatest wisdom. Great empires and weak minds are incompatible," said the philosopher Edmund Burke, whom the whole Anglo-Saxon intellectual elite venerates to this very day. In extending its unilateral nuclear

moratorium four times the Soviet Union has displayed the magnanimity and wisdom worthy of a truly great power and has displayed and applied new political thinking in regard to the most vital current problem. The position-of-strength policy to which Washington is so deeply attached is the complete opposite of this new thinking. And it indicates not strength but weakness or, at the least, feeble-mindedness on the part of statesmen who measure a nation's greatness by a nuclear yardstick.

Silence reigns at the Soviet test sites. The very silence that is essential for creativity and invention. A silence that makes the voice of reason clearer and that issues a challenge to that other silence -- the silence of the grave.

Silence, you are the best sound that I have heard, a poet said on another occasion. It will continue to be such if the Semipalatinsk silence spreads through our planet and develops into world peace.

31 August Talk Show

LD311913 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 31 Aug 86

[International Observers Round Table program, with Rudolf Georgiyevich Kolchanov, deputy editor in chief of TRUD; Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Lebedev, member of the NOVOYE VREMYA editorial collegium; and presented by Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zholkver, political observer of Central Television and All-Union Radio]

[Text] [Zholkver] Hello, comrades. Our conversation today is taking place on the eve of a significant day: Tomorrow is not only the start of the new school year, which is celebrated in our country is Knowledge Day, tomorrow is International Peace Day. Forty-seven years ago tomorrow, World War II began with the attack on Poland by Hitlerite Germany. This day is now marked in many countries under the slogans of the struggle for peace and for prevention of a new war. And it seems to me to be truly symbolic that the most mass social organizations, the trade unions, have made this day their own, so to speak, by declaring it to be the trade union day of action. So over to you first of all, Rudolf Georgiyevich, as the editor of the trade union newspaper.

[Kolchanov] Trade union actions on 1 September are indeed growing year by year; the antiwar nature of these actions is becoming increasingly striking and increasingly evident, and altogether, as was stressed at the press conference held last week -- it was conducted by AUCCTU Secretary Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Subbotin -- it is a characteristic feature of the modern trade union movement that antiwar feelings are growing in the movement's various sections. I want to say how the Soviet trade unions are deepening with every year the forms in which they participate in the peace struggle.

Tomorrow, for instance, 1 September, traditional peace watches and antiwar meetings will be held in many towns. In addition to the traditional and customary ones, however, quite interesting peace watches, for example, will take place together with working people of the socialist countries who are working the USSR on the friendship construction sites. In Novyy Oskol, for instance, a labor watch will be organized, with Bulgarian workers taking part; in Tula, on the Soyuz-2 gas pipeline construction site, with GDR workers taking part; and on the forestry working sites in Khabarovsk Kray, with working people from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea taking part. Over 30 foreign delegations which will come to us from France, Great Britain, Sweden, and many other countries will participate in international meetings, manifestations and peace lessons in schools.

In short, this process in becoming more profound, and the task involves consolidating it, strengthening it, and uniting in this great movement all the great forces of the world public.

Now, I would not say that everything looks rosy: The trade unions' antiwar movement is not yet on such a scale as to accord with the colossal tasks facing the public and all those who hold peace dear. But nonetheless, the September manifestations are expanding geographically, and it is important that the trade unions of the capitalist countries are taking an increasingly active part in them.

[Zholkver] So, Rudolf Georgiyevich, you consider that the thesis current in the West, to the effect that the antiwar, antinuclear movement is on the decline, does not correspond to reality?

[Kolchanov] One must in no way describe the antiwar movement as being on the road to extinction: it is undergoing a qualitative change, becoming broader and broader in make-up -- it comprises communists and social democrats, peasants, representatives of churches, representatives of public organization, of youth, women's and religious circles, and so on. It is becoming a public manifestation more pronounced in nature; the basic directions of its actions are precisely defined. And one should in no case speak of a decline. The mass antiwar manifestations will not end on 1 September. In 2 weeks, in mid-September, the 11th World Trade Union Congress opens in Berlin, one of whose chief tasks is to examine the problem of man's chief right, the right to life.

[Zholkver] You know, I would like to draw attention to another specific feature of the antiwar movement. When I have to do television reviews, one looks at the pieces our correspondents send us, and everything looks so peaceful there, with people walking along, pushing children in prams. And yet in a whole series of countries it is far from simple to go out on the streets under antiwar slogans. In the FRG I happened to see batons being wielded against those taking part in demonstrations. This occurred quite recently in Hamburg, to say nothing of the arrests of those taking part in antiwar demonstrations in the United States. One could, I think, recall the case of the ship belonging to the Greenpeace antiwar movement members, which was sunk in Auckland, New Zealand.

[Kolchanov] In New Zealand, yes.

[Zholkver] So it is far from safe to take part in the peace movement in a whole series of countries which do so love to describe themselves as free countries.

[Lebedev] Yes, you are right, Aleksandr Vladimirovich. One could cite here, of course, the example of Britain: Still fresh in our memory are the fights waged by the heroic women during the siege of the Greenham Common base, where U.S. cruise missiles, the first in Europe, were deployed [razmeshchatsya].

[Zholkver] They are still there today!

[Lebedev] They are indeed still there today. And, incidentally, the women peace activists have not yet lifted their siege of the base. But at times an almost war situation arose there.

[Zholkver] In any event, it is far from being peacefully idyllic there; I chanced to visit it 2 years ago, and chatted to many witnesses, and so, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, I think this is a very striking example.

[Lebedev] Yes, it is by no means safe. But if you permit me, I would like to say a few words about another, somewhat new, aspect of the antiwar movement. There are other, apparently peaceful forms of manifestations, at conferences and seminars, but they carry a great deal of political weight. For instance, the example of scientists in particular is very important and characteristic. In recent months I have had occasion to attend three major international meetings in Moscow, and with my own eyes saw not just the concern and anxiety of scientists, but also saw scientists who are trying to use their knowledge and possibilities to change this seemingly fatal course of events. For instance, physicist Frank von Hippel, the very important Princeton University professor, spoke several times in Moscow. And even before the extension of the moratorium was announced by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, and appraising highly the fact that the moratorium was still in force and that this would give an example of very serious political good will, he called, on behalf of many scientists, for this moratorium to be extended. And he was not the only one, of course. Cochran, another very famous U.S. scientist who carried out the experiment in Semipalatinsk, in fact, did too. And our leadership, our country, regards all these opinions wholly responsibly and seriously: and we see the rectification of this in Mikhail Gorbachev's statement.

[Zholkver] You have just mentioned the American apparatus which has been set up in Semipalatinsk and which registers the complete silence on the Soviet nuclear testing grounds, and which registers the explosions which are unfortunately continuing to resound from the other side of the Atlantic, from Nevada. The explosions which the Americans fail to announce in advance, incidentally, are also registered. This, of course, is of great scientific and, in my view, very great political importance. For the fact is that talks about the difficulties of monitoring were until just recently, strictly speaking, one of the main arguments against unilateral moratoriums. Such a moratorium it stated, could not be monitored.

[Lebedev] Incidentally, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, at these meetings both in our country and abroad scientists are saying that now, with the present technical means, it is possible nationally to monitor explosions with a power of up to a tenth of a kiloton, whereas 10 years ago monitoring of up to 1 kiloton was carried out.

[Zholkver] It seems to me that when we speak about the role of scientists and of the scientific public in the struggle for peace, one should note the fact that scientists have currently been stepping up their activity, over the last few months and weeks in particular, I would say. The reason for this, it seems to me, however lamentable this may be, is the catastrophes which have taken place recently: I have in mind the Challenger catastrophe and the accident at Chernobyl AES. This compelled many scientists to come out even more actively in defense of peace, and frankly speaking, attracted greater attention to what scientists have to say.

I note that last week, the IAEA conference was held in Vienna, the Atomic Energy Agency, an organization which is not, of course, an organization of peace champions.

[Kolchanov] An intergovernmental organization.

[Zholkver] Yes, experts, major scientists, but objectively, what was discussed in Vienna strengthens the arguments of peace champions and members of the antinuclear movement. The U.S. Professor Gale was in Vienna. Many of our radio listeners probably recall this name: he took part in giving medical aid to the victims of the Chernobyl accident. And now Professor Gale declares that this accident served as an important lesson for all of us. If the damage from such an incident turned out to be so serious, then the use of a nuclear weapon of even a small capacity will have very dangerous

consequences. It is simply essential that we should find ways for joint peaceful existence on our quite small planet, Professor Gale underlines. That's the opinion of a scientist, and it should be said that there was a spate of similar statements against star wars and so on after the Challenger disaster. Americans had been given the impression, by some of the American scientists among others, that this was a very advance project, making maximum use of computers and protected by multiple safeguards; and the disaster showed that this American electronic aviation system was, after all, far from perfect. What if the star wars system were based on that system? What if this same atomic weapon is launched into space? And it's not for nothing that one of the biggest antiwar organizations of scientists is called the Union of Concerned Scientists. The scientists are worried about the dangerous way things are going, and they are issuing a warning.

[Lebedev] One sometimes hears it said that the announcement by the Soviet Union that the term of the moratorium is being extended till 1 January 1987 has somehow failed to create much of a stir among the public, that, supposedly, the reaction that Moscow was hoping for has not materialized. This, of course, to put it mildly, is not true. Even if you take the reactions of the governments in Europe, it can at least be said that a great many of them have reacted positively: Sweden, the Netherlands; incidentally, in the FRG as well, Foreign Minister Genscher has responded positively. The congress of the Social Democratic Party of Germany.

[Zholkver, interrupting] You mentioned the congress of the Social Democratic Party -- very influential and one of the oldest of the social democratic parties, a party that is now putting forward as its slogan a change of government in Bonn, the Social Democrats have declared that if they come to power in Bonn they will tear up the agreement with the United States in FRG participation in the U.S. star wars program and demand the withdrawal of the first-strike perishing missiles from West Germany. But another thing I think is very important is a certain, if you like, theoretical proposition which is embodied in the new draft program of the German Social Democratic party. True, the program won't be approved till the next congress, but the draft has already been submitted. And there in the foreign policy section, we find these words: nuclear intimidation must be replaced by the principle of common security. This is a fundamental change of position, because hitherto, everything was built on the so-called balance of terror, with the build-up of armaments on both sides being seen as a way of strengthening peace. Now they're getting away from this, and moving closer to our position.

You know that at our 27th congress, the task was set of creating a comprehensive system of international security; we and the other socialist countries submitted specific proposals for discussion at the coming session of the General Assembly. And here we have a point of view that clearly coincides with our own -- and from the Social Democrats of the FRG and, I'd say, not only the FRG. Perhaps I'm encroaching on your field, Rudolf Georgiyevich, but last week in Goteburg there was a congress of the social democratic parties and trade union organizations of the countries of northern Europe.

Speaking at that congress, the chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Labor Party -- he's also the prime minister -- Ingvar Carlsson, advocated the destruction of nuclear weapons, and said that stopping nuclear tests would be the first important step that could halt the development of new destruction types of nuclear armaments. So here too, as we see, is a case where our points of view do coincide.

[Kolchanov] Yes, in general one can say without hesitation that indeed, the overwhelming majority of people on our planet are in favor of an immediate cessation of nuclear tests; and, you know, evidently there's nothing fortuitous about this.

There are a great many problems of disarmament, but there is this resolute widespread, massive support for this particular proposal, that nuclear tests should be stopped immediately. Why is this? First, I think, because at the present time, nuclear weapons are the most terrible means of mass destruction. Second, it's -- how shall I put it -- it's a very instantaneous act. Let me explain what I mean by that. Between the decision, say, to dismantle even the simplest missiles, and the implementation of that decision, quite a long period of time elapses. Whereas with nuclear tests, the actual decision and the end result happen in the same moment: all you have to do is decide, and it's done, as they say. Already, there are no more nuclear tests.

[Zholkver] It's a practical measure.

[Kolchanov] A practical measure, yes. And another thing that's very important in my view, in this connection, is this: the cession of nuclear tests is linked both to the past and to the present, and also looks to the future. I mean that, in the first place, nuclear tests are necessary in order to check the battle efficiency of the nuclear potential that has been stockpiled in the past. If we don't carry out any more nuclear tests, then the power of that nuclear potential will already have been reduced. By stopping nuclear tests we would, in effect, be stopping work on improving nuclear weapons in the present; and by stopping nuclear tests, we'd be guaranteeing to deliver mankind from the creation [sozdaniye] of new nuclear weapons of mass destruction in the future.

[Zholkver] Well, Rudolf Georgiyevich, you may also have seen the statement by the White House press chief, Speakes, to the effect that it's not so much a matter of stopping nuclear tests, but rather of reducing nuclear arsenals. The idea being that stopping nuclear tests won't reduce the quantity of nuclear warheads even by a single one.

[Kolchanov] Stopping nuclear tests isn't the last step, but it's a real step, a visible step, and a very appreciable one.

[Kholkver] And it's the first step. This same Mr Speakes knows perfectly well that, in a statement made as long ago as January, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev proposed a perfectly specific, step-by-step plan for full nuclear disarmament: total abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. But, after all, we've got to begin somewhere: The flywheel of the arms race has been wound up to such a pitch that before we can turn it back, we have first of all to stop it. Apart from anything else, it's a law of physics. Indeed, if we begin by stopping the improvement of nuclear weapons, that will give us a chance to set about reducing them, the more so as -- as I said -- the relevant Soviet proposals are already in existence.

[Lebedev] Of course, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, the Washington administration is also aware of the weakness, lack of logic and, simply, the flaws of their position and of the evasions you've been talking about.

This, as well as much else, is of course directed to the one aim of distracting attention from the importance of this proposal, on the one hand, and on the other hand, of also creating the illusion that, well, there's a Soviet-American summit coming up, that's the main thing -- the main thing is that it should take place, then we'll see, as it were. But the whole point of the accord between the Soviet and American leaders in Geneva was that this should not be just a meeting for the sake of a meeting, but should be held for the sake of achieving specific agreements; and furthermore, that those agreements should be in the key areas of stopping or limiting the arms race.

[Zholkver] But you know, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, amongst the mail we receive here at the radio and television there are also letters from people asking on and the same question: Just what is going on? Here we are putting forward one proposal after another an arms reduction and on banning nuclear tests, taking practical steps -- the unilateral moratorium -- and still there is no response or reaction. Why?

[Lebedev] The blame lies principally with the Washington administration, of course. The forces creating what at the moment would appear to be a deadlock situation are, of course, right-wing political forces and the military-industrial complex which has not the slightest desire to stop the flywheel of this arms race and which, you know, has, if you will forgive the crude expression, driven many politicians crazy -- even those from whom one might have expected more realistic and sober stances. This military-industrial complex, military business and the state apparatus linked with it, is attempting to create the impression that America's capabilities are, allegedly, unlimited; and the United States can permit itself whatever it wants and that this can only serve to revive, so to speak, the U.S. economy, the West's economy.

[Zholkver] It should be said that this kind of argument -- that military expenditure and military production are, so to speak, the engine of the economy -- is becoming perhaps especially persistent now and even, I would say, in the past few weeks. Official government data has just been published in America on economic development during the second quarter. Growth was minimal -- 0.6 percent. More and more American economists are talking not only of the possibility of a new recession, but of it having already actually begun. It is in these circumstances, at a time when production in civilian branches is not expanding or hardly expanding, that military production is considered a kind of cure-all, so to speak. It knows no marketing crises, military contracts are obtained irrespective of whether the goods are sold or not, and the main thing is that the most colossal and truly astronomic sums are involved here. As regards SDI, I recall that until recently we were talking in our conversations about the figure of \$1 trillion but now they have started talking about \$2 trillion.

[Kolchanov] Senator Proxmire said in a recent speech that SDI will cost more than \$2 trillion, while maintenance and modernization will cost between \$200 billion and \$300 billion annually. In principle, of course, this subject -- the influence of the arms race on the economy -- is not so simple that we can analyze it in detail in only 2 or 3 minutes. In some places it does indeed create jobs, but, as research shows, far fewer jobs than if that money were invested in civilian industries. But there is another reason why gigantic military expenditure is bad from the purely economic point of view: One part of the economic mechanism is artificially inflated -- a flux economy arises -- at the expense of structural destruction of other industries.

[Zholkver] And besides, without putting too fine a point on it, the capabilities of such a rich country as the United States are by no means unlimited.

In some places a flux economy, as you mentioned, Rudolf Georgiyevich, causes fluxes and distortions in the budget as well, and a gigantic budget deficit of the order of \$200 billion...

[Kolchanov, interrupting] yes, United States can no longer afford guns and butter.

[Lebedev] But what it can afford are demonstrations of force for, among other things, raising morals inside the country, as we can see -- for stirring up these chauvinistic and nationalist feelings. At a time when public opinion inside the country has begun to approach a turning-point and when the constructive nature of our initiatives are clearly winning support. It has become necessary once again -- for that reason among

others -- to deflect attention by some sort of provocation or some kind of demonstration of force and to create the sensation that there is an enemy somewhere creating a direct threat to U.S. security. Once again they have selected Libya as a target for these purposes.

[Zholkver] Yes, this gunboat diplomacy, so to speak, against Libya -- it is now nuclear gunboat diplomacy -- is also a demonstration to show that, according to them, anything is permitted for the Americans: Everywhere and at any point on the globe the United States can permit itself to dictate its will to a third country. After all, this is not an isolated act. Virtually the same thing is happening with Nicaragua -- an undeclared war against a government with which the United States has diplomatic relations.

[Kolchanov] American brigandage against the Libyan people is widely condemned by the countries of the Nonaligned Movement. There are 102 countries and I mention this in connection with the fact that at this very moment their eighth conference is being held. The leaders of the nonaligned countries have frequently spoken out against U.S. neoglobalism and I think that, without fear of anticipating, one can say that there will be a condemnation of the brigandish acts at this 8th conference as well, just as there will be support for all disarmament acts and, naturally, for the Soviet moratorium on ending nuclear tests.

[Zholkver] Yes, there is already a draft declaration which will be discussed from tomorrow, from 1 September, by the heads of states and government in the Zimbabwean capital, Harare. The draft has been worked on in advance by experts and foreign ministers and in this draft political declaration it is bluntly stated that the Nonaligned Movement welcomes the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions announced by the Soviet Union and appeals to the United States to join that moratorium. The Nonaligned Movement, likewise, welcomes the comprehensive nuclear disarmament program put forward by the Soviet Union and, what is important, it is stated there that these proposals are in harmony with the stance consistently maintained by the nonaligned countries. And what do the nonaligned countries represent? Half of mankind, three-quarters of the delegations at the United Nations, and a colossal moral authority...

[Lebedev, interrupting] Aleksandr Vladimirovich, you mentioned the aspect of harmony, so to speak, between the socialist countries' foreign policy initiatives and the demands put forward by Nonaligned Movement in all its political diversity, of course, and its multilayered character, so to speak. The Americans very often complained that in almost 80 percent of the votes taken at the UN General Assembly is on fundamental resolutions concerning international issues, the Nonaligned Movement and the developing countries vote en masse with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and against the United States.

However, the question arises as to why this should be surprising at a time when, in my view, all this provocation and whipping-up of tension in the southern Mediterranean off the coast of Libya is being carried out, not by coincidence, on the very eve of the opening of the nonaligned conference in Harare? How else could the Nonaligned Movement react to American policy?

[Sholkver] I think that if we were to try to sum up the analysis of the antiwar movement to which we have devoted our conversation today, this would explain our inherent feeling of historical optimism. Of course, our proposals are not making their way immediately, simply or with ease; a stubborn and harsh battle is being fought for and around them. But we can see a build-up of forces acting in harmony with our

proposals and it is this which gives us hope and confidence that the upper hand in the world will be gained by realism and an understanding of the need for a joint quest for ways of improving the international situation, of ending the senseless arms race and of eliminating nuclear weapons.

And it is in expressing this confidence that I would like to conclude our conversation today. Thank you comrades, for taking part in it. Thank you, comrade listeners, for your attention.

'Pre-Atomic' Thinking

LD012105 Moscow TASS in English 1835 GMT 1 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 1 TASS -- TASS news analyst Leonid Ponomarev writes:

The need for new political thinking in the nuclear age is not a far-fetched demand or a propaganda play. A new age has gone begun in the field of security, that is, in the question of war and peace. It was ushered in by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. So it was in August 1945 that the pre-atomic age ended and the new, atomic age began. This succession of eras was not immediately recorded by human mentality: It took decades and the accumulation of nuclear systems on such a scale as to push man kind to the very brink of an abyss. The plunge is imminent unless the nuclear arms race is stopped. It is symptomatic that while broad sections of the world public are aware of the peril, many leaders in the West, primarily in the USA, regrettably, continue to apply the yardstick of pre-atomic politics to realities. At that time force could be brought into play at any moment to achieve political or other ends -- but it is madness to do so today. Yet this mentality is not only surviving but becoming even more militaristic in the top echelons of power in the USA. It is rooted in the prevalence or even dominance of the element of military strength in politics. The United States thinks a nuclear war, either "limited" or global, possible and is going ahead with the Pentagon's programs aimed at ensuring America's "survival" in a nuclear war, in other words, at its victory in a nuclear conflict. For instance, the Pentagon has been given 40 billion dollars for improvements in the command, control and communication systems in the eventuality of nuclear war. At the same time Washington keeps declaring its commitment to peace and disarmament. Washington's deeds, however, clash with its words. The paramount task today is to stop the arms race, primarily the race with nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union halted its nuclear weapon tests more than a year ago. The U.S. Administration was offered several ways of formalizing an accord on a moratorium -- but all of them were declined.

The Soviet initiatives are cynically rejected under absurd pretexts. They claim, for instance, that the nuclear arms stockpiles will not be lessened by a moratorium, that the Soviet Union may call off its moratorium whenever it thinks fit and the West will find itself "at a disadvantage," etc. In short, one absurdity is being piled up on another only to justify the U.S. nuclear arms buildup. This position of Washington undoubtedly is a consequence of the militarisation of political thinking, a bad underestimation of the USSR and a risky overestimation of the strength of the arrogant and conceited military-industrial complex. The rhetoric with which the American man in the street is being duped is mere words but they are dangerous because they cloak the unwillingness of the administration to tackle in all seriousness the problem of limiting the arms race. However, it is necessary to reckon with realities, which demand not militarization but the adjustment of political thinking to fit the new, atomic age.

U.S. Position 'Suicidal'

LD031118 Moscow TASS in English 1635 GMT 2 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 2 TASS -- TASS news analyst Vasiliy Kharkov writes:

The fact that the Soviet Union has been unilaterally keeping from nuclear explosions for a second year now, is a convincing evidence of its high responsibility for the destinies of humanity. Ridding the world of the threat of nuclear catastrophe is a concern of all peoples, the most burning task. If a reliable barrier to the arms race is not placed today, it might be too late tomorrow. Decisive and responsible decisions are needed now that mankind's very existence is threatened.

It must be clear to any sane person that nuclear tests speed up the nuclear arms race. It is precisely tests that make it possible to develop new types of weapons of mass destruction, to upgrade the existing arms systems. "Far from enhancing security, the build-up of nuclear arsenals might result in zero security, that is in total self-annihilation", general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev noted in his recent answer to the leaders of the "Delhi Six".

Washington persists in its refusal to follow the Soviet Union's example, does not wish to join in the moratorium, is ignoring not only the world public opinion, but also the striving of American citizens, two-thirds of whom, as public opinion polls showed, insist on an immediate end to nuclear testing.

Continuing to conduct nuclear explosions in Nevada, the U.S. Administration explains this by the need to conclude a planned series of tests. But this means carrying the nuclear arms race in a vicious circle from which there is no way out.

An official spokesman for the Department of State explained that Washington regards nuclear testing necessary for preserving the combat potential of its nuclear deterrence forces. This means banking on nuclear muscles, and this stand is suicidal. The world can live no longer in the atmosphere when it is attempted to present the build-up of nuclear arsenals as a factor of deterrence.

The point of the matter is that the United States is striving to achieve superiority in nuclear arms. The Pentagon's chief Weinberger admitted this by saying that the United States must ensure appropriate "strategic positions in nuclear conflict". Besides that, the continuation of nuclear explosions is also required by the technology of creating space strike arms in the SDI framework, now being worked out in the USA.

It is now suicidal to build inter-state relations on the illusion of achieving superiority in horrible weapons of annihilation. It is suicidal also for the reason that, as entire post-war experience shows, the United States will be unable to achieve superiority. The Soviet Union will be able to answer any challenge of the USA, including the SDI programme. The complete elimination of such armaments is the only road to peace. The Soviet Union appeals to the reason and dignity of Americans, urging them not to miss the historic chance which is offered by Moscow's new peace initiative. Will common sense prevail in the USA?

'Clouds Summit Prospects'

LD032212 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 3 Sep 86

[Commentary by international affairs journalist Nikolay Shishlin]

[Text] By this fall, the Soviet and U.S. positions on the question of the halting nuclear tests will be revealed. The Soviet position is well-known. Our country has extended its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions until 1 January 1987 and this Soviet decision has met with wide international support, with a wave of sympathy and understanding.

But what is the U.S. position? The United States is continuing tests, along with sufficient propagandist cosmetics in Washington circles in line with this provocative action. First of all they state that halting all nuclear tests is America's long-term goal. However, before achieving this goal, they claim that it is necessary to make a deep reduction in strategic armaments, to find a solution for intermediate range strategic armaments, to solve both regional conflicts and almost all international political problems on the agenda. This is their first position. But it has to be regarded as a propagandist exercise -- on the whole a fairly clumsy one.

The second position is the tiresome theme of monitoring. It is typical that the United States speaks, without feeling ashamed, about the need for monitoring the halt to nuclear tests, or more precisely, monitoring nuclear tests -- although it knows perfectly well that the Soviet Union favors the strictest and fullest measures on monitoring in any decision on the problem of arms curtailment and limitation.

When the well-known Delhi Six proposed that experts of the Soviet Union and the United States and the experts of this group of states meet, the Soviet Union consented, but the United States has remained silent on this matter. Of course, the U.S. baldest argument on the Soviet decision is calling the Soviet actions propaganda. After all, this is propaganda by example. This is propaganda that is heard. The silence on Soviet nuclear proving grounds is being heard.

The diversity in positions is such today that it leads to the conclusion that we cannot speak of any conscientious U.S. attitude toward the Soviet-American dialogue. All this seriously clouds the prospects for the Soviet-American dialogue. All this seriously clouds the prospects for the Soviet-American summit meeting. After all, it is a matter of a serious meeting, of a meeting not for the sake of smiles, not for the sake of handshakes, but for solving at least a few substantial problems that concern the destinies of international security.

For this reason the question on halting nuclear tests has today become the object of a very serious, difficult struggle. Deadlocks grow from U.S. actions, but there is a way out of these impasses. I think the wave of support for Soviet initiatives will create a political climate in which the United States will find it impossible to hold on to its conservative, reactionary, militaristic position.

U.S. Test Schedule 'Packed'

LD041543 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 4 Sep 86

[Text] Aleksandr Pogodin comments on the American Administration's decision to hold another nuclear test:

As a rule, official statements announcing tests in Nevada are scarce of details, or uniform. They say about some of the tests that their purpose is to help develop energy installations for laser systems. So what is actually implied is the accelerated development of laser weapons, the major component of the star wars program. Sometimes it is announced that the test involved technical problems related to nuclear warheads. If we take into account the Pentagon's numerous statements about high qualities of nuclear weapons already available in the United States, it will become clear that nuclear systems of a new generation are being perfected in these particular tests.

The newly announced nuclear test is not a chance episode or some special case. Three blasts are scheduled in Nevada for this month alone. The program scheduled for subsequent months is even more packed. Washington officials realize that the continuation of tests, and especially their sharp acceleration, will touch off a new wave of public protest. The echo of nuclear explosions reverberates much stronger than the numerous assurances by the American Administration of its desire to radically cut nuclear weapons. Washington's chief argument that it is impossible to verify that nuclear tests are not carried out holds no water. There's no need to quote here opinions of prestigious experts of the Soviet Union, United States and neutral countries acknowledging that this verification, and the most effective at that, is a feasible thing. But it is also unnecessary to Washington.

As American Deputy Defence Secretary Richard Perle has declared, he's against a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests even if such tests can be verified. So what we are dealing with is a deliberate and open challenge thrown down to world public opinion demanding that nuclear testing be stopped. But it would be perfectly logical to ask at this point: Do actions by the American Administration have as their aim to force the Soviet Union to slam the door, so to speak, and cancel its moratorium?

U.S. 'Isolating Itself'

LD042045 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 4 Sep 86

[Commentary by Vladimir Tsvetov, political observer]

[Text] According to reports from the United States, another underground nuclear explosion has been scheduled to take place on 4 September. In a latest news commentary, at the microphone, is the political observer, Vladimir Tsvetov:

They say that a vice which has become a habit does not cause qualms of conscience. Disregard for the aspirations of the peoples of the world has become such an inseparable quality of U.S. politics that its leaders are not even ashamed of this vice. This has just become evident once again: The United States has announced another nuclear test.

It has done so despite mankind's desire to end such tests. I am not speaking lightly of mankind: Support for the Soviet proposal to end all nuclear explosions is no longer simply a widespread, massive phenomenon uniting whole peoples; it is shared by the whole of the human race.

Where, then, does this contempt for people's interests on the part of the United States come from? It follows from the very essence of imperialism. Having seen in the growth and strengthening of socialism a danger to themselves, the most conservative circles of the monopolistic bourgeoisie are trying to take their social revenge: to solve by force

the problem of relations between labor and capital, between socialism and imperialism. Hence the striving for military superiority, to be able to dictate terms to the world. In the present situation, military superiority means, above all, nuclear superiority. That is what, socio-politically, lies behind the nuclear blasts at the Nevada test site.

Is there a way out of this predicament? The view is generally accepted that in politics, unhurried persistence always gets the better of unbridled force; and that really is so. But time won't wait. More and more nuclear weapons are piling up in the arsenals, and therefore the world is becoming a more and more dangerous place. So, in the saying I've just quoted, the emphasis should be not on the word "unhurried", but on the word "persistence". The more stubbornly persistently, the more resolutely and more loudly the peoples of the world demand that the United States stops nuclear explosions, the more difficult it will become for them to ignore the will of the peoples. The Soviet proposal to end all nuclear tests has won lasting assent in the hearts of men; and every new nuclear explosion that is carried out despite the unilateral Soviet moratorium is another plank in the fence with which the United States is isolating itself from the world around it. One must assume that the threat of total isolation will also help to bring about greater realism in the policies of U.S. leaders.

Weinberger, Abrahamson Speeches

LD061021 Moscow Television Service in russian 1445 GMT 5 Sep 86

[From "The World today" program presented by Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] Why is it that despite all the demands of the world public and the warnings of leading scientists, the thunderous road of nuclear explosions is continuing in Nevada?

From today's incoming reports it is graphically clear that, despite all the statements by certain representatives of Washington administration, the Nevada tests are by no means intended for checking on the reliability of the present U.S. nuclear arsenal, but for building it up and modernizing it. This is above all a matter of an attempt to get nuclear weapons into space to be used in star wars.

Incidentally, this was admitted in his most recent speech by General Abrahamson, director of the U.S. military space program. He said outright that the SDI program has already gone far beyond the framework of research and has entered the stage of practical development [razrabotka] and creation [sozdaniye] of space weaponry components.

The Pentagon has officially announced that during the next few days the launch of a Delta rocket is scheduled. It is to put two objects into orbit: One of them will be used as a target, and the second will perform the role of a killer satellite. What kind of a term is that -- a "killer satellite?" These are even the linguistic paradoxes that are being produced by the substitution of Washington's Star Wars strategy for the peaceful cooperation in space that is being proposed by our country.

Outlining this strategy, Weinberger, the Pentagon chief -- who incidentally was like Abrahamson, his general, speaking at the convention of the American Legion, one of the largest militarist organization in the United States -- emphasized in every possible way that the SDI could not even be the subject of any kind of talks and that it should be implemented energetically and ahead of schedule, so that it might be deployed as quickly as possible. Strength, Weinberger pontificated, is still the optimal principle making it possible to ensure security. There you have yet another example of the same old political thinking based on the principles of the stick and fisticuffs!

Weinberger Interview on MX, Talks

LD051544 Moscow TASS in English 1452 GMT 5 Sep 86

[Text] Washington September 5 TASS -- TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev reports:

U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger came out with a statement which confirms that the course at [as received] the further build-up of the strategic nuclear arsenals and the implementation of the "star wars" programme remains the main contents of the present administration's policy.

In an interview to "DALLAS MORNING NEWS" he admitted that during the stay of the Reagan administration in power the United States "built up a great deal of its military might." "We haven't finished the job," the head of the military department emphasized, however. Specifically, he admitted "a great deal to worry about" the U.S. Administration has over what is believed to be insufficient accuracy and yield of U.S. inter-continental ballistic missiles. [sentence as received]

This is why it is "essential", Weinberger said, to deploy new MX nuclear missiles with greater accuracy and greater yield. He asserted that without the deployment of such missiles it would allegedly be impossible to create a "situation in which deep reductions in those missiles" could be made.

And he himself had immediately to admit that "this is the paradox again".

The Pentagon's chief spoke with unconcealed irritation about the recent decisions made by the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The amendments to the Pentagon's budget which prohibit the testing of anti-satellite weapons, which reduce appropriations for nuclear testing and the "star wars" programme, the amendments endorsed by the congressmen under the pressure of the country's public opinion, were described by him as "pieces of the Soviet agenda". Meanwhile, the head of the U.S. military department himself had to admit that "the Soviets want an arms reduction agreement." Yet, he tried to present the Soviet Union's determined striving for working out a treaty, containing truly radical measures in the sphere of disarmament, as a result of the military build-up now made by the Washington administration. But as the recent voting in the Congress showed, such absurd statements no longer convince anyone.

Actions Contradict Statements

LD041417 Moscow TASS in English 1435 GMT 3 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 3 TASS -- The U.S. refusal to stop testing nuclear weapons does not at all tally with the American declarations of the desirability of an eventual ban on the these weapons and their removal from the arms arsenals of all the states, Valentin Falin says in th September 4 issue of the weekly NEW TIMES. But the course of developing new system and types of nuclear weapons fits perfectly the U.S. steps aimed at wrecking the mechanism of arms control assembled with so much efforts in the 1960s and 1970s. The refusal to join the Soviet moratorium, the subversion of the ABM Treaty, continued explosions in Nevada and the avowed intention to violate the SALT-I and SALT-II accords are all linkd of the same chain.

The stubborn attempts of the USA to involve the Soviet Union in a competition in the development of new weapon system, which are becoming costlier from one day to the next, also are a means of warfare. There was a time when the Americans called it the Cold

War, although the philosophy behind it was little different from that of a shooting war. The idea was formulated in 1947 externally to increase enormously the burden on the USSR with a view to either destroying or gradually eroding the Soviet form of government. Today similar nonsense is being called the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The USSR does not reduce international relations to Soviet-American relations: The international community consists of almost 160 countries. Yet the condition and ebb and flow of Soviet-American relations directly affect many others, if only because American first-strike weapons are deployed in Western Europe and Asia and because U.S. military bases form a dense web in the old and new worlds. Hence when the weapons are being made deadlier and more sophisticated with the help of nuclear tests, the community as a whole is affected. New, more efficient weapons immediately detract from universal security and the process is growing worse. Military technology cannot be allowed to decide the future of mankind, Valentin Falin says.

Test Ban Resistance

LD072040 Moscow TASS in English 1826 GMT 7 Sep 86

[Text] New York September 7 TASS -- There is abundant evidence in American-Soviet relations that Moscow wants to stabilize the relationship, wants to deal, wants specifically an arms control agreement that will halt the gathering arms race in space.

On the other hand, there is the administration's determined resistance on all of these points, THE NEW YORK TIMES says today.

In announcing the first extension of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing, Mikhail Gorbachev argued that, in the absence of a positive American response, Moscow has every right to resume nuclear tests. But he emphasized that his purpose was to avoid being trapped in the dreary, futile action-reaction syndrome that has so long frustrated progress in arms control.

Expert observers believe that a test ban is perhaps the cleanest, most decisive way to terminate the further development of nuclear weapons, and then want to work for reductions from that point, with the negotiations freed from the constant pressure of technological innovations. There is no doubt among scientists that test-ban verification can be assured.

Washington's response to test ban proposals has been categorically negative, but the successive extensions of the Soviet ban have exposed the true nature of the Reagan policy. The administration first argued that it must go on testing because we still lag behind in missile modernization, despite an unprecedented military buildup over the past five years. When this ploy fell flat, it resorted to the theory that we must test in order to assure the reliability of the existing weapons stockpile.

This was an argument never heard before and, in the view of many experts, it is simply not true. The way you determine whether nuclear weapons will work is to take them apart, check and reassemble their mechanical, non-nuclear components. The properties of their mechanical, non-nuclear components. The properties of uranium and plutonium remain the same from year to year. Test firing is not necessary to assure the reliability of weapons. It is necessary only if the aim is to create new, more accurate, more sophisticated weapons. The administration has dropped its reliance on the verification issue as an obstacle to agreement, but new obstacles have been invented.

The real reasons for refusing a test ban are simple, the President is obsessed by the fantasy of "star wars," certain components of which, notably the x-ray laser, will require testing if the program is pursued, and administration advocates of war-fighting strategies want to go on building new and more sophisticated offensive weapons. Mr. Reagan is thus the first president to show no interest whatever in a cessation of nuclear testing. His road to "real agreements" runs through the uninterrupted building of more weapons as a means of providing America with a coercive edge in negotiation. Either he and his advisers fail to grasp the demonstrated futility and danger of that approach to arms control, or they reject a test ban because it inconveniently conflicts with their own visions of American power and dominance.

September Talk Show

LD071946 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 7 Sep 86

["International Observers Round Table Program" with Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, international affairs journalist; Radomir Georgiyevich Bogdanov, deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and Kim Antonovich Gerasimov, All-Union Radio commentator]

[Excerpt]

[Gerasimov] Hello, Comrades! So, the first week of autumn is drawing to a close. From the political point of view, I think it has been a highly active one. There were many events in various countries, on various continents, and some of them were tragic ones. Blood was shed in Soweto, the African suburb of Johannesburg; at least 40 people were killed in a single day. Blood was shed, too, on the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq war. It is difficult to state the number of dead. Many thousands are most likely to have died. These daily deaths in the black ghettos of South Africa and on the shores of the Persian Gulf, alas, have become customary, though are no less terrible for that.

The same can be said for the consequences of catastrophes and natural disasters. Unfortunately, there have not been few of these, either, in the past week. There were terrorist actions; a civilian aircraft was hijacked. Preparations were under way at full speed during the week for the next nuclear explosion at the nuclear testing ground in Nevada. There also were, of course, various talks, visits, and exchange of message.

I would like here, however, to draw attention first and foremost to two events of the past week which have one important feature in common: I want to say that the start of the week was dominated by public manifestations in various countries in connection with Peace Day, which fell on 1 September, and with the trade union day of actions for peace. The manifestations were indeed on a mass scale, and even for this reason alone, they merit mention. The end of the week was dominated by the end of the Eighth Conference of Leaders of the Nonaligned States, who had gathered in the Zimbabwean capital of Harare. The chief topic of the conference was that of international security in the nuclear age, which -- as the French newspaper LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, for example, and many other European and U.S. newspaper commented -- eclipsed other topical themes, even that of the colossal indebtedness of the developing states, which amounts to almost a trillion dollars. Words of support for the latest Soviet peace initiatives resounded vigorously at the conference.

With regard to last week, all the same, one could go through the events one by one as they happened. I would like, however, to stress precisely what did not happen this week, nor, incidently, in many other preceding weeks, either: Namely, there were no nuclear explosions at Soviet nuclear testing grounds.

[Shishlin] This, however, is truly a significant silence, of course, and a very important one. One should, by the way, take into consideration the fact that the decision to extend the Soviet unilateral moratorium for the fourth time was itself, indeed, no easy one; for many people not only in our country but also abroad, are asking themselves how long patience can be tried, how firmly the Soviet Union will adhere to this decision, under conditions when its example of good will remains without response from the United States. All sorts of opinions and guesses are being aired on the subjects as to who will win and who will lose, although, of course, the categories of winning and losing are wholly inappropriate here.

I think it would be correct to say that with the extension of the Soviet unilateral moratorium, the struggle to ban nuclear tests and to overcome the arms race has entered a new, very important, and vital stage.

But, we are at the beginning of that stage: One should not simplify the picture of events. For we all, probably, took note of the fact that, for instance, following Mikhail Gorbachev's appearance on Soviet television, voices expressing support for accord with and understanding for this Soviet action were audible in Western Europe and in the United States, as well. Later, however, these expressions -- as concerns government circles in the Western European states, and U.S. official circles -- began to be overlaid with phrases such as the following: There is nothing to worry about, there is no need to hurry. After all, this problem is just one of many, and nuclear weapons are, in the final analysis, a phenomenon to which mankind has become reconciled for over 4 decades already. There is to be a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting -- they said -- this is scheduled to take place, it is expected, and this meeting will sort out everything, will discuss everything, and will put everything into place. This in itself, of course, strikes a false note: for the legacy to be handed on to the forthcoming year by 1986, declared by the United Nations as Peace Year, will essentially be determined now, in the autumn months.

[Bogdanov] I took note of one point in your analysis, Nikolay Vladimirovich, which seemed to me to be very significant for understanding what is heppening. You said that the moratorium and its extension for the fourth time now should be regarded as a process, as a struggle thrust upon the United States by the Soviet Union, I stress, a struggle thrust upon it by the Soviet Union. This is very significant because, indeed, none of us falls into the category of day-dreamers, and none of us expected the United States to react immediately equally positively and declare a moratorium on its own part. I think that when the decision on declaring a moratorium was taken, it was from the very start actually regarded as an action which, in the first place, would show how one should behave under the new conditions, at the new stage of the nuclear space age; and, in the second place, as an action which, if you like, mobilizes public opinion and draws attention to the major part of what you mentioned, that the nuclear threat remains the chief thing.

I would also like to subscribe to what you were saying about the influence, so to speak, of the U.S. public, upon what is happening with the moratorium. On 2 September this year, if I am not mistaken, THE NEW YORK TIMES published a very interesting article by the well-known journalist Michael Gordon. This article analyzes the conduct of U.S. presidents following their election to the White House. It turns out that practically all the U.S. presidents who got to the White House with the knowledge that

they possess such a terrible weapon were always struggling with the temptation, so to speak, of responding to all events taking place in the world -- especially those which they consider to be hostile to the United States -- by the use of nuclear weapons. This article made a pretty big impression upon me, I can tell you.

I would like to draw attention to the latest U.S. Administration we are dealing with, the Reagan administration. Outwardly, this administration has so far, apparently, threatened no one publicly with the use of nuclear weapons, if I am not mistaken, Nikolay Vladimirovich...

[Shishlin, interrupting] No, in fact, it has not.

[Bogdanov] In contrast, for example to the Carter administration, and other administrations.

It seems to me, though, that they are doing real things in the sphere of nuclear policy which are in some degree even more dangerous than simple threats. For example, the continuation of nuclear explosions: Wherein does the essence of this problem lie, in fact? What are we worried about, and why do we so persistently propose that nuclear tests should be stopped? I would compare this to a nuclear dragon, which has teeth stuffed full of atoms, and these teeth are continually being polished, sharpened, and improved. This is what is happening with nuclear tests; weapons systems are being developed [sozdavatsy] which let some people think they can wage a nuclear war, and win it.

[Gerasimov] But their arguments are somewhat different, as I understand it: They believe that it is we who are trying to foist this method of explanation, as it were, on them, do you not think so? For every one of our arguments they have an argument of their own.

[Shishlin] Well, I think that on this occasion, they look fairly bare of arguments. Well, you know what their system of arguments is at the moment: First of all, they declare that the Soviet position is pure propaganda, and second, that the Soviet Union has forged ahead in perfecting nuclear warheads. That is in the context of the fact that the United States has for a long time been the unfailing record holder and leader in terms of quantity of nuclear tests not just by comparison with the Soviet Union, but even if one is to take the sum total of nuclear tests, of other nuclear powers as well. Then they declare -- and they do so haughtily and without any particular details whatsoever -- that stopping nuclear tests does not meet the security interests of the United States and of U.S. allies. In his latest speech, in Cincinnati, the U.S. secretary for defense -- who, I think, has one merit in the fact that he often says what the administration is actually thinking -- says that nuclear tests are essential, both for the implementation of the SDI plans and for a breakthrough to military superiority over the Soviet Union. And, naturally, they will deal with military superiority in the most noble manner, but who is to believe this? In this sense Radomir Georgiyevich is absolutely right that, of course, this problem of nuclear tests, per se, really is a problem of the continuation of the arms race, the build-up of these arms, and this is a problem which entails the potential of a destabilization of the military-strategic balance which has taken shape now and is being maintained fairly firmly.

[Gerasimov] It seems to me, Nikolay Vladimirovich, that there is some sense in reminding our listeners of the comparative statistics of nuclear tests: the poor and simple-minded United States, which the sly Soviets have allegedly twisted round their little finger, has so far carried out more nuclear blasts than all the other nuclear powers put together, namely over 800. This is one-third more than us. If one is to

take the most recent years, then in 1984, our country and the United States carried out an approximately equal number of nuclear blasts. But in 1985, the highly moral United States exploded about 20 nuclear devices, while the wily Soviet Union exploded only 9, and that is before it announced its unilateral moratorium. All in all, after our moratorium, the United States has exploded almost 20 nuclear devices. What are the given statistics evidence of? From the viewpoint of the Washington specialists in searching out counterarguments, only of, it seems to me, the Soviet Union's insidious striving to put the United States into an uncomfortable position.

[Shishlin] I would like to draw your attention to yet another thing: That, per se, the issue of stopping nuclear tests does not concern only the Soviet Union and only the United States, and not only the nuclear powers.

You were quite right to say at the beginning and to draw attention to the fact that in Harare, at the conference of nonaligned states, particular emphasis was put precisely on the problem of international security. And yet, this group of countries has such strident problems!

[Bogdanov] Yes, South Africa, and debts, and many other problems, of course...

[Shishlin, interrupting] And nevertheless, they really have put the problem of curtailing the arms race and ending nuclear tests as such, at the top.

[Bogdanov] Finally, a key idea has penetrated the consciousness: that without the presence of international security -- and present international security signifies security for all without detriment to the security of any country -- all the other problems acquire, I would say, a theoretical aspect: They are unsolvable without the presence of this main condition. Perhaps this new idea, this new idea which was heard in Harare, I think, is very important. And, I would say that this group of nonaligned countries, to some extent, in their comprehension of the situation, is overtaking very many so-called civilized and advanced capitalist countries...

[Shishlin, interrupting] That is very interesting.

[Gerasimov] Yes, the bankruptcy of the arguments of the opponent of stopping nuclear tests is obvious to any unprejudiced and fairly informed person. But that is the point, that in the United States and other Western countries there is a mass of people who are indeed not sufficiently informed, who often are not informed at all. Our listeners probably remember the scenes shown on the "Vremya" program of a poll of the U.S. subway passengers. Did they know -- people asked -- that the Soviet Union has not been carrying out nuclear tests for over a year. Most answers were simply astonishing: I do not know; I have not heard; really?; and so on. It is really possible that there can be such ignorance? After all, we ourselves, in conversations with our listeners and our readers, often work with data taken from U.S. newspapers such as THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE WASHINGTON POST and others. The orientation of these newspapers, in their activity as a whole, is of course anti-Soviet and anticommunist, but they also report many really interesting facts. By the methods of brutal natural selection, as well as purposeful selection, in the United States they train reporters to be capable of penetrating the smallest keyhole and obtaining literally any information. So that, in general, the U.S. mass information media, however they may have regarded it, have nevertheless reported the Soviet moratorium, and nonetheless there is a staggering lack of information and ignorance. And where, one may ask? In the society whose apologists are literally bursting with pride for the Americans who allegedly enjoy absolute freedom in information. But, Radomir Georgiyevich, as someone who knows the realities of United States' domestic political life well, what can you say on this subject?

[Bogdanov] The United States does not live only in Washington or only in New York; I would say not much of it lives there. All in all, the U.S. political elite there, according to the calculations of U.S. political scientists themselves, numbers all in all something between 5,000 and 7,000 people, while the rest of the United States, the millions, live in the so-called backwoods. That is where all begins. Have we ever presented to our reader the broad picture of what goes on in the provincial U.S. press that appears for these millions of Americans?

Allow me to tell our radio listeners the following, I think, interesting example. Recently I had the opportunity to meet one American woman — a very respectable professor, a doctor, a psychiatrist, with a very big reputation in the United States — a respectable women of about 75 years of age, who, regularly, at the head of a group of women demonstrators, protests against the nuclear blasts on the Nevada test site. She recently was arrested during another protest, and was taken to a courtroom. She tells me that when the judge interrogated her, the floor of the building was rocking because another nuclear blast was taking place. The judge sentenced her to 20 days imprisonment and a fine of several thousand dollars. And she says: Mr Judge, how is it that you are sentencing me when the Russian have stopped their nuclear tests? The judge was so amazed, she says, that he dropped his gavel. [laughter in background] He said, how do you know that the Russians have stopped their nuclear tests. She says, how is that, how come? Our newspaper have written about it. And he says, I only read my Nevada newspapers, and I only watch my television. When they took her to prison, she ended up in the women's section. The female warden said: Ma'am, you are so respectable, so famous, why do you get involved with these people. She says: Listen, they have stopped their tests. She was similarly amazed and said: No, don't you go doing any propaganda in prison, that could never happen. I think that that is a sufficiently eloquent example of what really happens with the Americans' level of information.

[Shishlin] And then, Radomir Georgiyevich, there is also the following matter which, by the way, is customary for the U.S. mass media: An event takes place such as the extension of the Soviet moratorium. This, by the way, is evident in the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center here. Whereas the representatives of other newspapers and of television and radio are continuing to sustain the liveliest interest in what the Soviet Union is doing and how it is seeking to advance its initiative, U.S. journalists are displaying a complete lack of interest in this.

That is one matter. The second is that they are attempting to divert attention to other topics. If you now open any U.S. newspaper, you will see that in the first columns, the issues of ending nuclear tests will not be ther at all. You will find all kinds of things there: threats to Libya, condemnation with regard to the terrorist activity of Libya. You will find discussions about contacts between Soviet and U.S. experts, and the impression will be formed that some kind of new, good process is starting and gathering force in Soviet-U.S. relations: But this sore spot will be avoided.

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CSO: 5200/1560

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA REVIEW FOCUSES ON MORATORIUM EXTENSION

PM030844 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Aug 86 First Edition p 4

[Boris Orekhov "International Review"]

[Excerpts]

Tomorrow is the first day of fall. Summer -- the time of holidays, the season of mass vacations -- is behind us now. But there is no recess or vacation in international affairs of interstate relations. The summer which leaves us today had none such recess. Quite the contrary, it was distinguished by much foreign policy activity and the high pitch of the struggle for peace and the people's security, against the nuclear threat, and for disarmament, a struggle in which our country set the tone.

Turning the Key

The final 10 days of August passed against the background of a major USSR foreign policy action which is still evoking a response and will long continue to occupy the minds of politicians, ordinary people, and all who are concerned for the fate of their children and of mankind. The action in question is the Soviet decision to extend until the new year the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions and the proposal to the United States to sign an agreement on ending nuclear tests.

The wave of world reaction caused by M.S. Gorbachev's statement on Soviet television on 18 August has been unusually powerful. It goes without saying that the reactions to it have varied in both spirit and tone. Whereas all those who value peace greeted the Soviet initiatives with approval and hope, those to whom it was directly addressed quickly responded to it with a hasty "no."

U.S. newspapermen, who just adore curious facts, noted that the first "no" was uttered by a Washington administration spokesman a mere 40 minutes after the news of the latest Soviet initiative arrived. Of course, there could have been no serious examination of our proposal there. It seems that the conditioned reflex developed by official Washington in recent years played its part, a reflex based on the thesis that everything originating from the Russians is good for them but bad for the Americans.

In Koltushi Academician Ivan Pavlov tried in an experiment to make dogs salivate in response to a bell which usually preceded feeding time. But in time the dogs began to salivate merely in response to a bell not accompanied by marrow bone. Something similar is happening with the Washington administration, which, by its conduct, seems to be trying to illustrate the great physiologist's teaching on conditioned and nonconditioned reflexes.

If it is serious, Washington's sweeping "No!" in response to our proposal caused bewilderment even in the U.S. allies' camp, with the sole exception of Britain. Then Washington became alarmed and began creating a fuss. The fuss, however, amounted to a feverish search for reasons to justify the negative reaction to the Soviet initiative. It began to surpass itself in inventiveness in its attempt on any pretext to avoid accepting the Soviet proposal. It invented arguments designed to cast doubt on the sense and logic of our proposal. Large numbers of different arguments, great and small, have been appearing recently as though conjured from a magician's sleeve.

They tell us, for example, that the stocks of nuclear weapons will not disappear because of a moratorium on testing.

Is that so? After all, the ending of tests is also the way to eliminate the existing nuclear arsenals. Specialists, above all military specialists, are convinced that if the existing nuclear weapons are not tested and subsequently modernized they will slowly but surely lose their effectiveness and ultimately must simply cease to exist. But even if stocks of nuclear weapons do continue to exist for some time after the cessation of tests, elementary logic dictates that this is still better than a continuing arms race. After all, when tests are ended it will be possible to discuss in a calmer atmosphere new ways and steps toward eliminating the existing weapons stocks.

They also tell us something else -- that prior to the announcement of the moratorium the Soviet Union had fundamentally modernized its nuclear armed forces whereas the United States is only now carrying out just such a modernization in response to the Soviet actions. Another trick. The United States has carried out more nuclear explosions than all the other nuclear powers put together -- more than 800. If you compare the U.S. test explosions with ours, it turns out that the Americans have carried out a full one-third more. The picture of recent years -- and it is obvious that this is the period that the initiators of the Washington "argument" mean -- is also very typical. In 1984 our country and the United States carried out roughly the same number of nuclear weapons tests. In 1985 the United States carried out around 20 nuclear explosions whereas the USSR prior to the moratorium conducted only 9, 2 of which were for peaceful purposes. Just during the year that the Soviet moratorium has been in operation the United States detonated 18 nuclear devices. That's their "gap" for you...

"Patience is the foundation of all wisdom" said the philosopher Plato. What context brings to mind this maxim of the great Greek? The following context.

Back in 1955 our country proposed that all the states then possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons assume a commitment to stop testing such weapons. Thus, the idea of ending tests is quite old -- more than 30 years old.

It is common knowledge that we did not find mutual understanding at that time and it was not until 8 years later that the well known Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water was concluded, thanks to the efforts of our country, which played the decisive role then. At that time, too, the Soviet Union campaigned for the cessation of all tests without exception, including underground tests. Had our proposal been accepted, that silence which is music to man's ears would now reign at all the test ranges, including the one in Nevada. But the United States, Britain, and France were opposed. The fruits of that position are with us now: Mankind has drawn nearer the nuclear abyss.

In 1974 and 1976 respectively, treaties were signed between the USSR and the United States, one limiting the yield of underground test explosions, the other regulating

peaceful nuclear explosions. The United States is to blame for the fact that both remain unratified to this day.

On 6 August last year the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions came into force. It has since been extended several times by the Soviet Union and remains in force until 1 January next year.

Even this brief list of dates and events enables you to understand the persistence and patience with which the Soviet Union has been working to end nuclear tests. Behind this there stands state wisdom and concern for the fate of mankind.

Why do we attach such significance to the ending of nuclear tests?

A man who has sat behind the wheel of a car just once knows that to switch the motor off he has to turn the ignition key counter clockwise, that is, to stop the supply of current to the ignition system. In the nuclear arms race, as with other types of weapons, the role of that key is played by tests -- both for the creation of new types of such weapons and for the improvement and modernization of existing systems.

If you turn the ignition key in the opposite direction, that is, if you end nuclear tests, the nuclear race immediately slows down rapidly, loses speed, and then inevitably stops. Without tests it simply becomes impossible after a certain time. Herein lies the main point of the Soviet moratorium, of our urgent appeals to the U.S. side to join it, and of the proposal to sign an agreement to end nuclear tests.

The world is indivisible and everything in it is interconnected. There is not and cannot be security for some at the expense of others. No matter how much it wants, the United States cannot expect security for itself if that security is to the detriment of our country. The chief of the Soviet General Staff expressed this idea with soldierly concision at the 25 August press conference. He spoke as a military specialist, as a man who by virtue of his post has a perfect knowledge of questions of military rivalry between the two great powers. How much easier it would be for everyone on earth if the Soviet marshal's words were to reach those who sit in leadership posts in the Pentagon and in the offices of the U.S. military monopolies.

In a work by Marx there is a famous idea about the greed of capital that suggests that, for 300 percent profit, it would commit any crime even at the risk of the gallows. The U.S. military-industrial complex today is undoubtedly the greediest of all capitalist groups. But can those people who now control the military billions in the United States not have understood the simple and, in human terms, so natural thought: Is it not time to call a halt, to consider what is going on, to look around, to ask themselves the age-old question: "Quo vadis?" Where are we going which way are we pushing mankind?

Alfred Nobel, the well known military industrialist of old, was convinced that his dynamite production plants could end war more quickly than peace congresses. At the same time, however, he regretted that "simply intensifying the lethality of armaments will not bring peace" and that the "difficulty is the limited effect of the explosive," and thought that "to overcome this deficiency must become equally deadly both for front-line troops and for the civilian population in the area." Now the "deficiency" which then worried the manufacturer of death has been overcome -- nuclear weapons pose an equal threat to all mankind and set it a dilemma: Live together or die together. However, the facts suggest that the U.S. military industrialists and those who defend their interests in Washington are obsessed by the psychology of suicide and are ready to assume the role of latter-day kamikaze pilots.

An editorial in the London newspaper THE OBSERVER wrote recently that "the West will have to decide whether it is going to turn its back on the proposal which represents the likeliest way of slowing down the arms race. If we set ourselves the goal of completely stopping the present crazy race, then sooner or later nuclear tests must end. Why not now?"

Yes, patience is indeed the foundation of all wisdom. But our patience and the patience of all who are concerned with the situation in the world should not be tried indefinitely. [paragraph continues]

People cannot and will not live indefinitely under the Damoclean sword of the nuclear threat. They are tired of listening to Washington's fabrications, trickery, and pseudoarguments designed to convince them of the need to continue nuclear tests.

The authors of these schemes must finally realize that the point of their trickery has long been clear to the naked eye. They should understand just how repulsive are the grimacing and capering with which they hope to fool mankind and divert attention from the ominous meaning of the thundering explosions in Nevada. They must understand finally the unseemly picture, unworthy of civilized people, which they present in their dangerous and patently obvious playing with fire.

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CSO: 5200/1560

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SWEDISH DAILY ON GORBACHEV TEST BAN INITIATIVE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Aug 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Gorbachev's Test Ban"]

[Text] Michail Gorbachev plays his disarmament melody with dash. Practically all of his many initiatives are worth applause; taken one by one they are difficult to criticize by those who want to see a reduction in the super-power arsenals. To a greater degree than earlier, however, it is unclear what the Soviet leader thinks he can attain by announcing that the Soviet Union is going to extend its unilateral test ban, in force since August last year, until January 1, 1987.

Some judges are as critical of Gorbachev as they are of Ronald Reagan. The London Institute for Strategic Studies, renowned in the West, accused both of them of "unrealistic goals" and "humbug" last spring. But unlike any other Soviet leader since Chrustjev, Gorbachev at least gives an air of consistency to his disarmament policy, something that can hardly be said about Reagan.

For decades, a ban on all nuclear weapons testing has been seen as an essential disarmament measure, one of the most, if not the most, important. During the 1970's, it was believed that the super-powers might even be able to agree on this point. With his test ban announcement, Gorbachev meets a large international opinion halfway. It is interesting that the Soviet Union can go for such a long period without testing its arsenal; obviously Gorbachev realizes the propaganda value of this.

The Soviet leader indicates that he is aiming for a summit meeting with Reagan this fall. At the same time he suggests that an agreement then between the super-powers about a continued test ban would constitute the kind of concrete result that he has maintained all along would be the object of the meeting.

Pressure on Reagan? At the present time there is nothing to indicate that the United States' administration is considering a test ban. On the contrary, Washington continuously stresses how important it is for the United States to test its weapons, not only for its strategic space defense but also to "catch up with" the Soviet Union. The main thing that the United States has offered, is that the ABM-treaty will be in effect for another five to seven years, provided that the Soviet Union accepts American testing in space. This means absolutely no concession or sacrifice.

Moscow could give up on Reagan and wait for future, possibly more favorable, disarmament times. However, at the opening of the final session of the Stockholm Conference last Tuesday, both the super powers were expressing a remarkable confidence. It is to be hoped that they have better contact under the surface than what the advancement and retraction of conditions seem to indicate. We cannot do much more than hope.

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CSO:5200/2755

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

NORDIC PARLIAMENTARY GROUP URGES GOVERNMENTS ACT ON NWFZ

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 27 Aug 86 p 12

[Article by Christian Palme: "Denmark As NWFZ: Appoint Group Now"]

[Text] Copenhagen--The decision to postpone the appointment of a group of experts for the Nordic nuclear weapons free zone was criticized when 18 Nordic parliamentarians met last Tuesday in Copenhagen to discuss the free zone idea.

The parliamentary group, which was formed on the initiative of Anker Jorgensen, Denmark's Social Democratic leader, is now going to send a letter to the five Nordic governments, in which they are urgently requested to appoint the group of experts as soon as possible.

It was at the meeting of the Nordic foreign ministers in Copenhagen two weeks ago that it was decided to wait six months before the expert group is appointed.

In the meantime, the parliamentary group has started to work. However, most of the Nordic countries' non-Socialist parties were conspicuous by their absence at the first meeting in Copenhagen last Tuesday.

Only the Social Democrats and the Left Wing Communist Party took part from Sweden. The Center Party had appointed a member, but he was not present. Neither the Liberal Party, nor the Moderates had sent representatives. Nor had the non-Socialist parties in Denmark or Norway appointed any members to the group. On the other hand, all the parties in the Finnish parliament took part and of the Icelandic parties only the Conservative Independence Party stayed away.

Open Door

Anker Jorgensen, who has adopted Bulganin's and Kekkonen's old idea of a free zone as his own pet, did hold the door open for the parties that were missing.

"If the governments appoint the group of experts, it is possible that more parties will take part," said Anker Jorgensen to the DAGENS NYHETER after the meeting on Tuesday.

"The invitation is still open to all parties," said Jorgensen with assent from Sture Eriksson of the Swedish Social Democrats.

"Temporary"

"The lack of interest is only temporary. I am convinced that both the Moderates and the Liberal Party will join in later on," said Eriksson.

At the first meeting, the parliamentarians went through a list of issues that Jorgensen had prepared and decided, among other things, that the goal of the group should not be to prepare a draft for a free zone treaty. Instead it will suggest guidelines that will constitute the basis for a suggested treaty. The parliamentary group will meet again in Copenhagen on November 3.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

FINLAND'S FOREIGN MINISTER THANKS USSR FOR NUCLEAR TEST BAN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Sep 86 p 10

[Unattributed article: "Vayrynen Thanked USSR for Nuclear Test Ban]

[Text] "A generally observed nuclear test ban would be a significant step toward a nuclear test ban agreement," said Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen, Friday in a press conference with Soviet journalists. The Soviet news agency TASS said Vayrynen thanked the Soviet Union for the announcing of a unilateral nuclear test ban, and hoped that it will aid in bringing a complete halt to nuclear testing.

Touched on in the press conference were the CSCE meeting, the Nordic nuclear weapons free zone and the life work of President Urho Kekkonen, who is being buried Sunday.

Vayrynen reminded that Kekkonen had introduced the idea of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Nordic area as early as 1963, and Vayrynen said that the Nordic countries were manifesting ever increasing attention and estimation regarding the idea.

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CSO: 5200/2763

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

UK'S SDP LEADER URGES GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT NUCLEAR TEST BAN

Leeds YORKSHIRE POST in English 18 Aug 86 p 9

[Text] THE SDP leader, Dr. David Owen, today urged the Government to throw its full weight behind calls for a nuclear test ban. He believes there is growing support within the United States for a re-opening of talks with the Soviet Union for a comprehensive test ban treaty.

In a letter to Mrs. Thatcher he said: "I believe a climate does now exist in which it is possible to make progress towards the nuclear test ban."

Dr. Owen called on the Government to become "a positive advocate for progress," and said Britain's previously expressed concern over verification of any ban could now be met.

He added: "A test ban would not, as some hope, stop all nuclear weapon development. It would not be a recipe for nuclear obsolescence. Scientists have enough knowledge from past test data to continue to manufacture warheads but it would curb the endless race for ever-increasing sophisticated new strategic warheads."

Dr. Owen expressed particular concern that the U.S. may use a small nuclear explosion in space to power the lasers for its planned Star Wars defence system.

He asked Mrs. Thatcher: "I would hope that you would take the opportunity of confirming that Britain has no conceivable interest in seeing an extension of nuclear explosions into space, and that you will follow in the footsteps of your predecessor, Harold Macmillan, who did much to help to bring about a ban on tests in the atmosphere."

TORY plans to send Mrs. Thatcher on a meet-the-people tour in the run-up to the general election have been enthusiastically welcomed by Opposition MPs.

They are convinced that the new strategy, aimed at promoting the Prime Minister as a more humane and caring figure, will backfire on the Government.

Tory party strategists believe Mrs. Thatcher must meet as many people as she can between now and the election to boost the party's chances.

But Labour's Mr. George Foulkes

said: "This is very good news — the more people she meets, the better. We want to give her maximum exposure to help us to victory at the next election. Trying to package Mrs. Thatcher as a humane and caring person is like trying to sell Dracula as a favourite uncle."

Leading Liberals also greeted the new plan with amusement. The chief whip, Mr. David Alton, said: "We believe the more people she meets in her own inimitable manner, the more damage it will do to the prospects of her party."

Meanwhile, some senior Conservatives have started a new campaign to test party reaction to a possible political comeback by Mr. Cecil Parkinson.

Their aim is to convince Mrs. Thatcher she can now recall the man whose political career was shattered three years ago because of his affair with his secretary, Miss Sara Keays.

They believe his presentational skills are vital to boost the party's public support but realise there is still strong opposition in some quarters to his recall.

STAFF at Brighton's Grand Hotel will today receive their first guests since the 1984 IRA bomb outrage which left five dead and 31 injured.

The 30 guests checking in — many of them journalists — will find the hotel much changed following refurbishments which cost over £11m.

Room 629, where a 30lb. bomb hidden behind bathroom panelling exploded and devastated the building, no longer officially exists. The sixth floor room is still there, restored to its former Victorian glory and much enlarged, but it now has a new number, which the hotel manager, Mr. Richard Baker, 32, refuses to disclose.

The hotel's official re-opening ceremony will be on August 28.

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CSO: 5240/082

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

DENMARK'S SDP CHAIRMAN: NORDIC NWFZ WOULD SERVE AS MODEL

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Aug 86 p 7

[Unattributed Article: 'Anker Jorgensen: Nordic Countries Will Show the Way']

[Text] A Nordic nuclear weapons free zone is a link in a worldwide effort for detente.

This was said by Social Democratic Party Chairman Anker Jorgensen yesterday evening, when he spoke at a peace meeting in Goetborg at the Jarntorget [name of central square], which was renamed the Olof Palmes Plads.

"A Nordic nuclear weapons free zone is to be seen as one zone among many zones, which are about to appear. The two superpowers declare again and again that they wish limitations in the spread of nuclear weapons and a complete elimination of nuclear weapons as the final goal."

Jorgensen does not believe that we in the Nordic countries alone will be able to secure the world against nuclear war. "But we can make a large and strong contribution. We can become an example for emulating. The Nordic countries should be along to give hope for the future," he said.

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CSO: 5200/2765

RELATED ISSUES

UK: LABOR'S DEFENSE POLICY DOCUMENT REJECTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS

London DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 8 Sep 86 p 4

[Article by John Keegan]

[Text] Labour is the first of the major political parties to endorse the strategy of barrier defence for the security of Nato's central front.

In a policy document issued today, Labour outlines a military programme based on rejection of nuclear weapons, increased reliance on conventional arms, and withdrawal from defence commitments outside Europe.

The document argues that the removal of nuclear and dual-capable weapons will make more money available for the defence of Europe by conventional means.

It also intends to economise by ending the practice of sending air, ground and naval forces to take part in exercises outside the Nato area, and to end out-of-deployment, as in the Falklands.

The army's airborne brigade would be given a wholly Nato role, and a greater emphasis would be placed on the employment of reserve forces in central Europe.

Disarmament hopes

In disarmament, Labour would seek to take the long-running mutual and balanced force reduction talks to a successful conclusion.

Labour's new espousal of barrier defence in central Europe, is interesting. This is a respectable policy, with wide support from orthodox military opinion in Germany and elsewhere, but lacks credibility unless linked to a commitment to use nuclear weapons in the last resort.

Our Naval Correspondent writes: Labour's maritime defence proposals would mean surrendering control of the Atlantic to the Russians, thus making the very early use of nuclear weapons inevitable in a European war.

Defence of Europe hinges on the timely arrival of seaborne reinforcements from North America. Without them a conventional war could be fought for only five days; after which the choice would be between using nuclear weapons or surrender.

The purpose of Allied Atlantic Command's "Forward Strategy", which Labour opposes, is to seek out and destroy Russian ships and submarines close to their northern bases before they can range freely in the Atlantic and attack convoys.

The strategy relies on British and American nuclear submarines, American carriers and allied shore-based aircraft and ship-launched conventional cruise missiles to penetrate the heavily defended waters around Russia's northern bases.

Labour's emphasis on building more conventional rather than nuclear submarines is contrary to its party leaders' claims earlier this year that after the Trident missile submarine orders had been cancelled at Barrow they would be replaced by nuclear hunter-killers. The paper also appears ignorant of the shallow-waters role of diesel electric submarines.

RELATED ISSUES

FRG PAPER CALLS FOR GREATER EUROPEAN INDEPENDENCE IN NATO

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLEGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 23 Jul 86 p 1

[Editorial by Michael Stuermer: "European Options"]

[Text] In 1945, President Roosevelt said in Yalta that the Americans would leave Europe within two years. But Stalin lacked the patience to wait and the Americans stayed--in spite of George Washington's warning to beware of "entangling alliances." At the end of 40 years of containment, Europeans must ask themselves if it would not be best to handle their own security needs by themselves. Three options present themselves: an illusion, a miscalculation, and a challenge.

First the illusion: America will not waver in continuing to play the role it has played in Europe for the last 40 years despite the doubts that have plagued the politically aware in both parties, despite the mood projected by the American media and the public, and despite the malaise within the Atlantic Alliance that has surfaced in the wake of the Libyan crisis. In this country, only a few have understood that, in the wake of the Mansfield Resolution and the Nunn Amendment, budget constraints will play an important role and will have far-reaching political consequences for the Atlantic Alliance. Other measures will replace the Gramm-Rudman budget restrictions, which were blocked by the Supreme Court.

The high priority given SDI, together with the low opinion of European loyalty vis-a-vis the American superpower, could lead to a dramatic reduction of the American presence in Europe without a return of the favor by the Soviets. On 13 May, Henry Kissinger said in the WASHINGTON POST that he recommends the withdrawal of all troops and systems necessary for an American global policy, because one can no longer rely on Europe to cooperate in case of war. It is not only the opinion of this seasoned foreign policy expert which counts, but even more so, the importance attributed to it by the Pentagon and the State Department. Not long ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski recommended in FOREIGN AFFAIRS to entrust Europeans with their own security.

Second, there is the miscalculation: This scenario begins with the kind of "Europeanization of Europe" that is recommended by quite a few leading thinkers of the German Social Democracy and ends with the miracle of a Soviet Union that

has forgotten its Leninist mission to make the world safe for communism. Between its beginning and end are ominous road stops, such as a reduction of the Bundeswehr--and logically of all other NATO forces in Europe--to a state of "structural incapacity to attack." This is to take place whether the East returns the favor or not. There is also the SPD-SED draft agreement concerning chemical weapons that undermines the negotiating positions of the Western alliance; together with the consultations with the OED about the party line after Godesberg. And finally, the ideologically motivated flirt with a communist inspired half-blind post-war anti-fascism that is supposed to reshape the past and mold the future.

How can one catch up with the driving force of such ideas once they have been unleashed in the heart of Europe? Taken as a whole, they amount to a capitulation in advance, as a previous advisor to Helmut Schmidt once warned publicly. This is the reason for those "incertitudes allemandes" ["German uncertainties"] which have visited Germany's neighbors with such tragic consequences. The issue is--in spite of all the pious words about Europe--a contemporary variation of Germany's fateful and special course to go it alone--and, if necessary, against the West.

And finally, we come to the challenge, namely to create for free Western Europe a political and strategic identity to complement its cultural and economic identity. This task has European as well as Atlantic components. Those who think only in European terms would--knowingly or unknowingly--play into the hands of Gorbachev--who would love to be master of his "European home." Those who think only in Atlantic terms could never unite Europe.

A Europe that wants and has to be in charge of its own destiny has no other choice but to rely on French and British nuclear capacity, to group around it a conventional fighting force and to develop the capacity for an "extended air defense" that complements with SDI. Yet the final guarantee has to rest with America's "extended nuclear deterrence," which has to retain its European foothold near the Elbe by means of American troops.

It was the Pax Americana together with its nuclear guarantee that enabled the countries west of the Elbe River to once more lift themselves up after 30 years of war and civil war in Europe. Today we are in need of a Pax Atlantica. This idea demands that Americans share responsibility along the lines of Kennedy's "twin pillar" concept, of which one is reminded so often today. The demand put to Europeans is the same now as in the times of Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer--it is the courage to face reality.

The key concepts are logically and materially connected. They are: the variable geometry of institutions, the realization of the Luxembourg Resolutions for a greater common market and currency, an "espace technologique" together with a space exploration policy that independent yet connected to American, and, above all, the "twin pillars" of NATO.

All this would put Atlantic relations on the level of a partnership and would give Europe the means to play a part in questions of security and arms control. There is no one more interested in this achievement and no one with a greater share of responsibility for its success than the German people in the free part of Germany. To be successful requires a grasp of the situation, an ability to define our interests, and the courage to stand by our convictions.