

MILITARY ASSISTANCE: SOME UNIFORMITIES
AMONG DONOR – RECIPIENT RELATIONSHIPS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
Fulfillment of the requirements of the
Degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1974

19990427 140

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June, 1974		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis August 1973 - June 1974	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Military Assistance: Some Uniformities Among Donor - Recipient Relationships				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Mott, William H., Major, USA					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 250 Gibbon Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Classified annex is published separately.					
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution is unlimited; public release is authorized.				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words) Economic, military, and political science all boast at least one basic theory. But concerning military assistance, the critical nexus between them, that theoretical structure that exists rests on normative assumptions and intuition. Within the general problem of developing a theoretical base for military assistance, an initial problem is to analyze the donor-recipient relationship to deduce from the experiences of history a set of uniformities that characterize successful military assistance. This paper addresses that problem by comparing the experiences of history and deducing such a set of uniformities. The problem of generality is addressed by applying the deduced set pro forma to random episodes of military assistance chosen from a population that excludes all but two of the episodes from which the set was deduced. The problem is to deduce and verify uniformities within the donor-recipient relationship that can be related to a successful use of military assistance. The general approach to the study is analytical. Research involves observations of historical data.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS military assistance programs; foreign aid				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 493	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT U	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE U	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT U	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT U		

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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Title of Thesis MILITARY ASSISTANCE: SOME UNIFORMITIES
AMONG DONOR-RECIPIENT RELATIONSHIPS

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.
(References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

Statement of the Problem

Economic, military, and political science all boast at least one basic theory. But concerning military assistance, the critical nexus between them, what theoretical structure that exists rests on normative assumptions and intuition. Within the general problem of developing a theoretical base for military assistance, an initial problem is to analyze the donor-recipient relationship to deduce from the experiences of history a set of uniformities that characterize successful military assistance. This paper addresses that initial problem by comparing the experiences of history and deducing such a set of uniformities. The problem of generality is addressed by applying the deduced set pro forma to random episodes of military assistance chosen from a population that excludes all but two of the episodes from which the set was deduced. The problem, then, is to deduce and verify a set of general uniformities within the donor-recipient relationship that can be somehow related to a successful use of military assistance.

Methods and Procedures

The general approach to the study is analytical, rather than experimental. Research is not based on controlled experiments, but involves, rather, observations of historical

data and analyses of those data. The study operates through the case method. Data are historical and were gathered from primary and expert secondary sources, as well as from official documents and objective reports. The dependent variable is achievement of donor aims as announced by, or imputed to, the donor. Independent variables are the components of the donor-recipient relationship. Initial research involved detailed analysis of seven cases to establish a set of uniformities within the donor-recipient relationship that seemed related to achievement of donor aims. Case studies for initial research were chosen arbitrarily for ease of data collection. Subsequent research imposed the uniformity set upon a sample of nineteen military assistance episodes. This sample for subsequent verification was randomly selected from a population of contemporary episodes.

Conclusions

The set of uniformities that was the object of the initial research has four basic elements. When given to a recipient actively engaged in war, military assistance promoted achievement of donor aims most effectively when:

1. Donor and recipient shared common aims and concepts of employment of the recipient military forces;
2. Donor retained sufficient control of resources transferred, and adequate influence over the recipient military forces to ensure promotion of donor interests;

3. Combined donor and recipient military capabilities surpassed that of the common enemy in decisive theaters, and was adequate to achieve donor aims through military operations;

Corollaries

(1) Donor was willing and able to commit forces as necessary to ensure achievement of donor aims,

(2) Donor strategy was complemented by recipient strategy in pursuing donor aims,

(3) Military assistance supported those forces most effective in achievement of donor aims;

4. Donor integrated foreign policy, military strategy, military assistance, and economic policy into a single policy for pursuit of donor aims.

Subsequent verification research and analysis indicated several relationships:

Incidence of donor control, donor troop commitment, and donor policy integrity was highest at the high success level and lowest at the low success level;

High coincidence of donor and recipient aims occurred with high success and low coincidence with low success;

Presence of multiple independent variable is higher at high success levels;

Presence of a single independent variable is higher at low success levels.

These relationships indicate that the uniformities

deduced during initial research were indeed present to a significant degree among the cases of the random sample. If the statistical accuracy and confidence level of the sample can be accepted, as well as the more subjective elements of the analysis, these relationships, and hence the uniformities, can be extended to the general population of donor-recipient relationships. The uniformities did not prove unreliable in relation to observed facts. Rather, they were verified as uniformities by those facts.

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PART I

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

CHAPTER I

The Problem:

Military Assistance--

The Donor-Recipient Relationship

INTRODUCTION

Of the apparent innovations that have been emphasized in the modern practice of foreign policy, few have been more controversial or more subject to criticism than military assistance. No less confusing than the bureaucratic intricacies of the United States Military Assistance Program (USMAP) are the purposes, goals, and objectives of military assistance in general. To what extent must political cooperation accompany successful military assistance? Can a donor release complete custody of military equipment and still expect positive results from his efforts? Can military assistance be used as a substitute for donor military forces?

These are obviously germane questions relevant to a sound theory and successful practice of military assistance. Yet it is difficult to find anything approaching a coherent theory of military assistance, that addresses such questions

in anything beyond situational, unique contexts. The fields of military strategy, international economics, political science, and even the more esoteric, specialized political-economic fields all boast at least one sound, coherent theory or set of hypotheses. But in the critical nexus between them, what theoretical structure that can be found rests on assumptions and acceptance of the intuitively obvious. In many cases one can find no evidence of tests against the tenets of a sound theory, or even comparisons with the experiences of history.

The broad purpose of this study is to take a small first step in the direction of a sound theory of military assistance.

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

The absence of any theoretically sound and defensible tenets regarding military assistance leads public discussion, legislative debate, and governmental pronouncements to focus upon two extreme poles of the question. One group of commentators is concerned with the broadest principles of governmental policy, the morality of military assistance, the assertion and repetition of dogmatic philosophical and moral tenets, etc. A second group searches for, and finds, specific administrative discrepancies and deficiencies, and generalizes these to a judgment of the entire program. Supporters of military assistance usually defend it on broad principles, whereas

opponents attack it on specific administrative lapses. The resultant debate, while often emotional and sincere, is just as often inconclusive, unrewarding, and fails to contribute anything to the system. Neither critics nor supporters can offer any criteria for a donor-recipient relationship that will lead to successful achievement of donor purposes. None can adduce a typically successful donor-recipient relationship. Issues concerning the very existence of a typical successful relationship and the effects of a particular relationship remain unresolved.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM SITUATION

Military assistance has been used as a major instrument of foreign policy since the beginnings of modern history and throughout the world. In many cases it has been the primary instrument used in promoting donor interest. As an instrument of foreign policy, military assistance involves the provision of equipment, funds, and training to the military forces of a recipient nation. Whatever the stated, indirect, devious, or secondary objectives, the fundamental objective of military assistance is to strengthen or increase the military capabilities of the recipient nation, and thereby achieve whatever other goals and purposes might be involved. It is through these secondary, or ultimate, goals and purposes that military assistance attains its uniqueness and involves a blend of political, economic, military and other considerations. The inability

to denominate military assistance as either military, political, economic, or something else, has some important implications. First, success cannot be easily measured. Second, the purposes and objectives behind decisions regarding military assistance are often far from clear. Third, collateral effects may obscure or negate the original purposes and objectives. It requires but brief consideration to realize that a major area of concern to the administrator, the critic, the supporter, and the student is the absence of any sound standards whereby to assess military assistance. The need is apparent for some criteria or guides that are unaffected by these problems.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This study does not attempt to examine thoroughly the full range of foreign policy aims and the effectiveness of military assistance in achieving them. Nor will it resolve the ambiguities and uncertainties surrounding success, purpose, objectives, goals, and effects of military assistance. It has two much more modest aims in what might be termed a seminal investigation. The initial purpose is to investigate several instances in which provision of military assistance was manifestly successful or unsuccessful in contributing to successful achievement of donor purposes, and to deduce a set of uniformities common to the successful instances and absent from the unsuccessful cases. While far from establishing a logical criterion, such a set of uniformities

is a prerequisite to responsible analysis of the total phenomenon of military assistance in any degree beyond individual analysis of separate instances and situations.

A second purpose is to explore more widely the possibility of a degree of generality or universality in the uniformity set deduced initially. By applying the set pro forma to a random selection of contemporary military assistance episodes, some degree of assurance of generality or universality may be imputed to the set. In effect, accomplishment of this subsequent intent will serve as both verification and extension of the original effort.

SOME QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED

The broad, general question that must be answered deals with the donor-recipient relationship. What characteristics of that relationship are relevant to or affect successful achievement of donor aims? Scores of subsidiary questions can be asked in endless levels of detail and with countless assumptions. Types of questions deal generally with comparative national purposes and objectives in giving and receiving military assistance, degree of control or influence exerted by the donor, other economic, political, military, and commercial relationships of the donor and recipient, relative military strategies and comparative economic positions of the two countries. Although heuristic and interesting, such pragmatic and empirical questions cannot be responsibly

addressed without prior establishment of some coherent theoretical and logical frames of reference.

ASSUMPTIONS

Although accuracy demands consideration of all aspects of the problem, even the most trivial, pragmatism assumes that a concerned reader will not dwell upon trivia. In order even to begin such a study as this, one must assume that the relevant characteristics of the donor-recipient relationship can be assessed, that some similarities and even generalities exist among various relationships, and that a constant generality over several episodes of military assistance is in fact a generality and not merely a series of parallel randomly consistent factors. A more substantive assumption is that the donor intends military assistance resources to accrue to the benefit, improvement, or increase of recipient armed forces. Since governments need not announce any or all of their intentions in establishing an international relationship, it must be assumed that the bases for decisions regarding military assistance can be discerned from governments' subsequent and prior actions as well as from their formal iterations.

RATIONALE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Although this study is limited to an initial investigation of uniformities, it would seem in order to discuss the outlines of a more complete analysis and to

attempt to develop some frame of reference for further efforts. We should first consider the nature of military assistance. It is a technique of extending foreign aid, an instrument of foreign policy which is itself one of the major functions of government (some of the others being domestic policy, defense of the polity, and self-regulation). Military assistance is also an instrument of national defense, and must be co-ordinated, if not fully integrated, with national strategy and tactical defense plans. Here, in the basic nature of military assistance, we find a difficulty which, while not analytically or theoretically crucial, is administratively insoluble except at the level of a national policy which subsumes both foreign and defense policy. Any treatment of military assistance must consequently consider the interrelation of two sets of aims, among both of which must be the objectives of military assistance.

In order to determine credible objectives, we must determine the capabilities and limitations of military assistance. Speculation to this end is as easy as it is unrewarding. Thus, only by analysis of past instances of military assistance can we determine the realistic uses to which military assistance can sensibly be put. Such an analysis cannot be a mere historical panorama, but must consider, and explicitly define, all relevant variables affecting the attainment of a particular goal. We must determine the actual, as well as the announced objectives

(the disparity between these should also be noted and any reasons therefore), and explicate some sort of measure for their attainment within both sets of goals (defense and foreign policy). We must note the nature and size of any disparity between goals and attainments and include the effects of military assistance, suitably isolated within specific parameters in our analysis. Limitations will not be merely those purposes not achieved, but must include qualifications of capabilities by specific parameters and environments. Thus the "China lesson" and the "Korea lesson" may not be contradictory or even paradoxical, but may in fact be totally consistent within the capabilities and limitations of military assistance applied in different parameters and environments.

A discussion of objectives and capabilities must invariably evolve to consideration of types of military assistance and necessarily include a rigid, explicit definition of military assistance. Any definition must include both purposes and resources, for it is apparent that U. S. Marines on duty in American embassies in foreign countries are not, and should not be, included in military assistance resources, nor can the development of a steel or automotive industry in a recipient country be deemed non-military. We may find that a substantive definition is impossible and be forced to use a functional or legislative one, e.g. the funds administered by Department of Defense other than National Defense and administration, or that assistance

authorized by Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act, etc.

We may establish some taxonomy of military assistance types, using resources as a discriminator, e.g. those pertaining to a particular service--naval, air, military (as opposed to naval); or those pertaining to type of support--personnel, materiel, cash, credit, etc. Some types of military assistance are patently inappropriate to extend for attaining of some particular objective. Again, by historical analysis, it would seem possible to develop through correlation of resources expended, objectives sought, parameters involved, and environment encountered, some functional measure of effectiveness. Implicit in any such measure is a set of standards of evaluation of the degree of attainment of, or disparity between achievement and aspirations. Although we can visualize a dichotomous standard or a continuous standard, a continuum or series of continua would seem preferable; at least intuitively so. We must define indices of the measure of effectiveness relative to the specific objectives of military assistance, the goals of foreign aid, and the purposes of foreign and defense policy.

A low-level or micro-theory incorporating the foregoing questions and considerations into some sort of logical model or set of hypotheses could easily be translated into a set of precepts or principles for the administration of military assistance. A middle-range theory will address other more general questions and

subsume any micro-theory which may develop. A middle-range theory will address methods of extending aid, whether to individual countries, to formal regional groupings, informal or donor dominated groupings, world organizations, functional alliances, etc. Data referrant to this question will obviously be more discreet and involve fewer cases than micro-theory data. Variables will differ as will objectives. However, we must assume similar policy in all levels of theory since policy, although affected by the theoretical level is exogenous to the theory itself at this level. It may be useful to adapt the methods, standards, criteria, etc., from micro-theory to the similar needs of middle-range theory.

A second important question at the middle-level is allocation between countries, regions, functions, etc., of military assistance resources. Charles Wolf makes a seminal attempt at this, and his methods, if not their substantive content, are heuristically worthy.¹ We must use the entirety of our micro-theory in this question and in addition consider donor foreign policy in the area concerned, as well as the position of the area in any strategic defense plans and donor commitments to defense of the area. One must at this level establish some commensurability or substitutability between donor and local military forces. Whether we use marginal utility, absolute cost, relative effectiveness, or a hunch, the theoretician must develop some criteria for choosing to

provide whatever degrees of military assistance and donor defense commitments seem in the national interest. (The term is used here in its broadest, undefined sense merely to imply some positive value.)

A natural corollary to this question is that of extending some military assistance or none. This question must be answered at any level of theory. A micro-theory will pose it in terms of propriety of objectives and resource types. At the middle-level it must be posed in terms of foreign and defense policy. It is almost aphorismic to say that military assistance must not impede either foreign or defense policy. A contention that military assistance will not affect either foreign or defense policy amounts intuitively to a null hypothesis. We must first explicate foreign and defense policy and arrive at some criteria for its furtherance. Having done this, we must analyze the instances of military assistance for their effects upon meeting these criteria, in order to determine whether a relationship exists, and if so, what it is. The existence or lack of a relationship will provide a choice for the use of military assistance in furtherance of foreign and defense policy and provide a basis for the decision to use military assistance or something else.

Although the question of alternatives to military assistance is primarily one of macro-theory, the choice between economic aid and military assistance may be made

at this level. Professor Wolf posits the incommensurability of economic and military assistance,² and he relegates the necessary decision between them to one that "must rest heavily on judgment and intuition."³ Neither political scientist nor decision maker can, here, like the Supreme Court, refuse jurisdiction on political questions. We must establish some objective frame of reference, if not standards and criteria, to choose between the alternatives, regardless of commensurability. This frame of reference must include considerations of micro-theories of economic and military assistance, objectives and goals appropriate to foreign and defense policy, available resources, the threat in space, time, and thought/belief, the international milieu, etc. We can discriminate and evaluate comparatively, even if we cannot measure military and economic assistance or a single continuum or even a set of continua.

Another consideration at the middle-level is that of ancillary results, which may be subliminal objectives. This group includes modernization of donor military forces through transfer of obsolescent materiel, training and experience for donor military personnel through advisor missions to nations at war, maintenance of a significantly efficient military industry, etc. Any quantification of these considerations will be extremely weak, if at all credible. Nevertheless, a qualitative treatment should be attempted.

Further investigations will be almost exclusively in

the realm of macro-theory. With the exception of purely political discussions, this field has been investigated only marginally by theorists. It is a normative field, highly sociological and psychological involving such questions as "What should national policy be?" "How much should we allocate to defense?" "What are national priorities?" etc. Although the decision-maker can, and should, refuse jurisdiction here in favor of the political process, the political scientist is not so privileged. He must investigate such things as the position and effect of military assistance in the formulation of national policy; the question of massive retaliation vs controlled response; the concepts of "fortress America" and the "arsenal of the free world," of "Pax Britannica," and a world army; the interrelationships of domestic policy and military assistance; allocation of resources; "national interest" vs "the good of humanity"; wars of national liberation and export of ideology, etc.

The foregoing paragraphs do not purport to define the limits or even to indicate the shape of any theoretical treatment of military assistance. They serve merely as a frame of reference to guide the investigation. It would seem that the development of a logical method for dealing theoretically with military assistance is practicable and well within the capabilities of the current state of political science methodology. The data are discrete and definable and in most cases accessible. The dearth of

investigations of these data may reflect a tendency among political scientists to deal with less parochial matters, the aspects of which affect or include more general facets of political life. However, it seems apparent, or so we premise, that military assistance is a necessary, effective, and real technique of foreign policy in the era of co-existence and development, and that it will continue for a significant time in a significant role. Consequently, a discussion regarding its efficacy is in order and should be conducted. An integral theory will allow planners and decision-makers to maximize the allocation of resources insofar as they are able to do so within the political system.

DELINEATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Primary variables to be investigated include the prominent components of the donor-recipient relationship. An attempt will be made to compare donor and recipient purposes and objectives in entering the relationship. Possible combinations include identity, complementarity, neutrality, dysfunctionality, and antagonism. A second variable within the relationship is the degree and level of donor control and influence over the actions of the recipient nation and the recipient military force. A third variable is donor will to commit its troops to support military assistance in achievement of donor purposes and objectives. A final variable is the integrity

of donor military assistance actions with other national policy aims. The present study must limit itself to consideration of donor foreign policy and military strategy, while acknowledging the relevance of domestic effects of donor military assistance actions.

IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

If verified by the study, the hypothesis set will provide a practical tool for assessing success probabilities of potential military assistance, criticizing current assistance policies, and explaining previous assistance episodes. An assessment can be made without reference to normative judgments or application of values, and without addressing the problems listed earlier. While not providing a cohesive theory of military assistance, the hypothesis set will furnish a basis for further theoretical development in the field as well as a potential analogue to a parallel theory of economic assistance.

If repudiated, the hypothesis limits the field and provides guidance for further research.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Although most terms express adequately a relatively precise set of concepts, many important terms have become so burdened with personal or institutional attitudes, bureaucratically invented usages, and common colloquial interpretations that they no longer convey a clear concept.

Among these latter is the term "military assistance." Within this study "military assistance" connotes an international relationship involving a donor nation who provides things, money, or knowledge to a recipient nation for use by the recipient nation's armed forces, and who expects no money or other good from the recipient nation solely as a result of that provision. The term is generic in that it encompasses all such relationships and is not specifically referent to the United States Military Assistance Program (USMAP), to which this study will uniformly refer by its acronym, USMAP. USMAP is but one species within the genus, military assistance.

The privilege of purchasing military equipment on commercially competitive terms is not military assistance, although the difference between commercial terms and actual transaction terms is military assistance. Loans at commercial rates do not constitute military assistance, although the difference between commercial rates and actual loan rates is legitimately deemed military assistance.

The true donor-recipient relationship will exclude, thus, sales of military equipment by one nation to another, the buyer-seller relationship being essentially commercial. Despite the fact that the buyer-seller relationship has often been altered by non-commercial credit arrangements, preferential or below-cost prices, seller legal limitations on the qualifications of buyers, and US Congressional

bifurcation of the USMAP into Grant Aid and Foreign Military Sales, that relationship involves something other than a true donor and something other than a true recipient. It is a unique and interesting relationship, but the complexities of its accounting procedures, its enormously significant collateral effects, and logical and philosophical disparity from the donor-recipient relationship put it beyond the scope of the present study.

Success and Failure

The concept of success and failure is the dependent variable throughout this study, and is inextricably linked to purposes and objectives. The fundamental objective of military assistance will be considered the benefit, improvement, or increase of recipient military forces. The purposes of decisions to provide military assistance will be those announced by, or imputed by antecedent and subsequent actions and decisions to, the donor. Goals of foreign policy and military strategy will be determined as will purposes of military assistance decisions, for both donor and recipient nations. Success and failure will be assessed solely in terms of these objectives, purposes, and goals.

Collateral Effects

Collateral effects are all results or consequences of provision of military assistance beyond the primary objectives of benefitting, improving, or increasing recipient military forces; changes in relationships between

donor, recipient, and other nations consequent to the provision of military assistance; domestic results in donor nation; and consequences not intended by either donor or recipient. It is evident that donor and recipient leaders will probably attempt to maximize the effectiveness of military assistance through reinforcement of collateral effects supporting their respective purposes and goals. It is also apparent that decision makers can impute primacy to collateral effects, and even posit collateral effects as the primary purposes for providing military assistance. Despite the increasing tendency to do this among donor leaders, this extremely interesting aspect of military assistance theory cannot be subsumed within a limited study as is the present effort. As with military sales, the heuristic aspects of collateral effects should not be responsibly addressed without a prior theoretical basis.

SCOPE AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Emphasis throughout the study is on the donor-recipient relationship and possible connections between the characteristics of that relationship and success or failure in achievement of objectives, purposes, and goals. Collateral effects will be recognized but not treated as germane to the study except as they affect the primary objectives, purposes, and goals. Other relationships between donor, recipient, and other nations will be recognized as significant only in their effects on the

military assistance donor-recipient relationship or upon success or failure of military assistance. The study will not attempt to analyze donor objective, purposes, and goals, other than to define them. The propriety of military assistance in achieving them, the interrelationships involving political, economic, and military aspects of donor decision-making, capabilities, and limitations of military assistance, as well as other elements of donor political decision making processes and morality must be excluded from this study. Questions of middle-range and macro-theory will not be addressed. The study will simply attempt to portray the relevant factors and analyze them in terms of the donor-recipient relationship at the level of micro-theory.

OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

The study itself is organized into two sections. The first is a series of case studies whose purpose is to establish a set of uniformities concerning the donor-recipient relationship that seem correlative to, coincident with, or even causally related to successful instances of military assistance. The second section is an attempt to verify the set by imposing it upon a randomly selected sample of military assistance episodes. The results of this test will indicate either that none of the factors identified have adequate generality to be useful, or that one or more factors are sufficiently general to form a

seminal criterion for assessing military assistance and to provide a basis for construction of a coherent micro-theory.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The United States has been seriously in the military assistance business for approximately three decades, but as yet no one has developed an intelligible theory of military assistance that could provide standards and values and guidance for supporters, opponents, or administrators of a particular issue or of the entire system of military assistance. Many politicians, most involved bureaucrats, and some political scientists have advanced propositions, analyses, observations, and even opinions as to the solution to the military assistance problem. What is wanting is a body of theory which will provide a frame of reference for analyzing past errors and successes in military assistance, which will allow military assistance to fit into a model of contemporary democratic government, which will legitimize military assistance as an instrument of national power, which will provide a guide to the legislator and administrator, and which will allow an observer to criticize germanely.

Hans Morgenthau attacked the problem in a paper aptly titled "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid." Such a title will lead his readers to expect great things from the man who put national interest into theory. After lamenting the absence of any theory, he says, "The

first prerequisite for the development of a viable foreign aid policy is the recognition of the diversity of policies that go by that name."¹ He lists six, of which military aid is one. He defines and discusses these six quite well and then ends his paper by saying:

When all the available facts have been ascertained, duly analyzed, and conclusions drawn from them, the final judgments and decisions can be derived only from subtle and sophisticated hunches. The best the formulator and executor of a policy of foreign aid can do is to maximize the chances that his hunches turn out to be right.²

Another less pretentious, but more portentous treatment is that of George Liska. He attempts to analyze past experience with U. S. foreign/military aid and deduce some inner structure and principles behind the incidents. He discovers a good deal of fumbling, much fallibility, and a general degeneration from the clear contracts of Louis XIV, although he draws basic similarities. He attempts to express formal patterns in the extension and receipt of aid. He devotes considerable attention to the problem of control by the donor and discusses methods of maximizing real control as a result of wise and proper aid extension. He posits non-identification of the donor as a positive factor of control, in the sense of a private contract between two national leaders and a disregard for ideological principles in the deal. In this and a few other aspects his analysis seems a bit too Machiavellian to fit the modern world. His main argument is for consistency

in foreign military aid policies over time and over various countries, and coherence with all other donor policies and the state of international society. He stresses qualitative comparison, not quantitative. Responsive or preventive aid cannot support a viable foreign policy. The responses to aid within a state must be reconciled with the same response among states.³ Liska's exercise in rather hazy model-building leads to a business-like transaction of foreign aid in much the style of a great corporate merger. Although perhaps a list too mechanistic, his treatment is undoubtedly the most heuristic in depth and scope.

Colonel Ames A. Jordan's work, Foreign Aid and the Defense of South East Asia,⁴ is written at a practical level and makes no pretension about explicating a theory. He presents an analysis of military assistance at the country level with the frame of reference of the administrator rather than a planner, legislator, or theorizer. After presenting analyses of the rationale, practice, and interrelation of military and economic assistance, invaluable to the theorist, he concludes that a basic theory is needed to deal with objectives, means, administration, and limits of aid.

Brown and Opie,⁵ after a fine historical treatment of foreign aid, devote a few words to a rather low level theory. They posit enlightened national interest as the only significant basis of U. S. foreign aid policy, other altruistic notions notwithstanding. Successful

foreign aid must rest upon mutuality of interest between the donor and receiver. They pose military assistance as a cheap means of obtaining security while not committing American military forces. They see an end to foreign assistance as a result of increased U. S. liberalization of its commercial trade policies. Although its theoretical content is minimal and sketchy, Brown and Opie's book is an excellent historical treatment of the subject.

Charles Wolf in the work cited above, does explicate some hypotheses. His primary concern is with the allocation of resources between recipients and between military and economic aid. In treating this problem he assumes that political stability is the goal of U. S. aid programs and he measures political stability by the absence of political extremism which he links quantitatively to economic aspirations, economic expectations, and economic reality. The net result is an "economic index of political vulnerability." Many of his relationships are extremely tenuous and his quantitative measures approach the limits of credible surrogation. His assumptions of linearity and discreteness of the direct relationship between political vulnerability and the difference between economic aspirations and economic reality seem to simplify to the point of hopeful speculation. Such statements as, "Vested interests in preserving the status quo are, in other words, likely to be more pervasive in rich, than in poor countries,"⁶ seem to contradict basic concepts

of competitive pluralism in modern, wealthy countries, as differentiated from the authoritarian integration characteristic of traditional, poor countries. His use of one set of dubious, incomplete data to verify his hypothesis and blithe assumption that some of his own significant variables are insignificant since he had no data to measure them, make his conclusions and his hypothesis mutually contradictory.

His treatments of aid allocation are similarly weak and almost vacuous when he tries to choose between economic and military aid to a given recipient.

The trial pairs (of possible allocations of military and economic aid) are chosen arbitrarily, subject to the condition that each pair equals total Mutual Security aid, B, available for the region. . . . our goal here is not that of establishing commensurability, but simply that of assisting responsible decision makers to do so, by showing the allocation results [based on intra-country allocation models described earlier] of various arbitrarily assumed combinations of military and economic aid.⁷

Professor Wolf's models have little, if any substantive value, as he himself recognizes, but derive their value solely as heuristic concepts:

The models are too incomplete, and too ruthless in their simplifications, for this [to provide answers] to be their purpose. Rather they are intended to stimulate further research and to help focus judgment where it is needed if better allocative decisions are to be made.⁸

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES

OVERVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL SCHEME

The general approach to the study is analytical, rather than experimental. Relevant research cannot be based upon controlled experiments, but will involve, rather, observations of historical data and analyses of those data. The study will operate through the case method, amassing data not through controlled experiments or surveys, but through series of cases which are rigorously observed and compared. The facts with which this study deals are not phenomena, sense perceptions, or physical entities. They are merely statements about phenomena, and, if properly verified, are as much facts as are instrument readings in a laboratory. The thorny problem of epistemologically satisfactory verification has not yet been resolved, and may never be. This study will consequently accept the premise that history is not a fable, that historians are honorable men, and that their works are not collections of tricks played upon the dead. Facts for the study will be provided by historians and reporters.

But, regardless of their source or validity, facts will not simply arrange themselves into a place that they make for themselves. Although it is impossible

to define a specific relationship between facts and the conceptual scheme that orders their arrangement, it is clear that a conceptual scheme is separate from those facts and provides the rationale for collecting and analyzing them. Although many social scientists find metaphors useful in describing conceptual schemes, the military assistance donor-recipient relationship, because of its unique nature, is not readily adaptable, with any close analogy, to such a treatment.

The relationship involves two separate, sovereign, independent, interdependent nation-states. Both have initiatives, interests, goals, and purposes. Both are attempting to pursue their national interests through their policies in a world of other perhaps competitive nation-states. One is more powerful than the other, in some broad, undefined sense. The more powerful perceives that a military force in the smaller, weaker (really in fact or merely perceivedly) might be contributive in pursuing its own interests, and, since it possesses the means to support such a force, offers, or agrees, to do so. The smaller nation perceives either that a military force will assist it in its own national policies, or that military assistance from the larger nation will do so, and, since it does not possess the means to support that force, or chooses not to devote its own resources to that force, requests or agrees to military assistance. The result is a donor-recipient relationship in which two

nation-states are using the same resources provided by only one of those nation-states to pursue their separate national interests. It becomes obvious after short consideration that the foregoing conceptual scheme is totally inadequate in describing any donor-recipient relationship. Its value lies in the ease with which one may attach to it the infinite variations, mutations, and appendages in order to construct the truly complex relationships that are a part of modern, dynamic international relations. This conceptual scheme may be used without committing its users to any ideological premises, political theories, or moral precepts. The term nation-state is used here in the conventional sense to denote one of the actors possessing territory, population, and legal, recognized sovereignty in the international world community,

LOGICAL OPERATIONS

One of the essential logical operations to such a study is detachment. Realizing that absolute or pure detachment is unattainable, this study must be satisfied with describing men, their actions, and their thoughts without changing them for better or for worse by using, perhaps inadvertently, words that necessarily have pejorative or adulatory connotations. This study is an attempt to describe and analyze, without condemnation or praise. It will attempt to use and apply the same

evaluative criteria used by the men who made the decisions involved.

Another logical operation, or series thereof, involves the possibility of finding some uniformities in the arrangement of facts in the conceptual scheme. Here the study will employ induction, deduction, imputation, interpretation, and even perhaps construction. A full consideration of historical uniformities would necessarily be long, tedious, and metaphysical, and will contribute little to this study. History is essentially an account of men's activities, and few would assert that the behavior of men is not subject to at least some kind of systematizing. While all historical events have unique aspects for the purpose of this study, it is assumed that military assistance efforts have common characteristics which can be compared and evaluated.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The initial case study portion of the research involves detailed historical case studies of the donor-recipient relationship. Independent variables include, but are not limited to, complementarity of donor and recipient objectives, purposes, and goals; degree of donor control; donor willingness to deploy troops in support of his purposes; and integration of military assistance with other elements of foreign policy. Dependent variables

will be success or failure in achievement of donor objectives, purposes, and goals. Initial hypotheses posit positive relationships between independent and dependent variables.

The second verification portion will involve application of the variables to randomly selected donor-recipient relationships to determine any degree of generality of links between independent and dependent variables.

Procedures During Initial Research

In a search for generalities among a large number of cases, the initial assumption that such generalities exist allows the use of non-germane criteria for selection of cases from which to deduce these generalities. Thus the initial study, "England and the Wars of the Coalitions," was chosen for ease of research effort. First, data were available from primary and acknowledgedly expert secondary sources. Second, military assistance was manifestly unsuccessful in achieving intended English purposes and objectives, which were not unreasonably cloudy. Third, collateral effects did not obscure the main policies. The goal of the initial study was simply to identify some factors that seemed relevant or contributory to the failure of military assistance.

The second study, "The Iberian Campaigns," was a natural sequel to the first and was chosen for much the same reasons. In this case, successful military assistance

provided a significant contrast to the Wars of the Coalitions. Also, collateral effects were highly significant in Iberia, to the extent of endangering the entire policy implementation. Here also the donor-recipient relationship was significantly different.

In both of the first two studies the donor, England, was initially belligerent and attempted to use military assistance to gain belligerent allies. The third and fourth studies, "The China Experience--Before and After V-J Day," were chosen because the recipient, China, was belligerent before the donor, entered the war, and continued hostilities in a civil war after the U. S. had ended hostilities. In addition, the China Experience provided another chronological dimension to possible generalities.

The fifth study, "The War of American Independence," admits considerable obfuscation of donor purposes, provides a success-failure dichotomy for recipient and donor policies, indicates dominating collateral effects, and suggests the viability of a recipient that is not recognized as a nation-state.

The sixth study, "Cuba," was a deliberate attempt to find a case that refuted previously identified generalities. Initial cursory research and uninformed opinions indicated that U. S. military assistance policies had incorporated most of the generalities associated with success in other cases, yet led to failure in 1959. Further research mitigated initial attitudes, supported some, and

refuted none, of the previously identified factors.

Procedures During Subsequent Verification Research

During subsequent research, the imputation of generality again allowed certain non-germane characteristics to enter the selection process and in defining the population of military assistance episodes for random selection. First, a donor-recipient relationship must have been established and extended for not less than three years (either three annual payments or three calendar years). Second, the relationship must have been terminated prior to 31 June, 1972. Third, data must be available to permit adequate analysis. Fourth, both donor and recipient must have been legal nation-states throughout the period of relationship. Fifth, the relationship must have begun after 1 January, 1946.

The perhaps arbitrary imposition of a three-year minimum upon the donor-recipient relationship is a necessary compromise between a desire to exclude unique shipments of military equipment and to include more deliberate programs that require up to three years between the initial agreement and the actual delivery.

The requirement for termination of the relationship reflects a need to assess success or failure. The assumption is implicit that termination is a result of success in achieving the purpose and objectives of military assistance, or donor admission of failure, or of donor abandonment of the original unachieved purposes or objectives for some

other reason.

While the relationship between a legal nation-state donor and a non-nation-state recipient is both interesting and heuristic, as is the converse, it is in many ways different from the donor-recipient relationship that is the focus of the present study. It is thus, like the buyer-seller relationship, beyond the present scope.

The limiting date for the search field represent a compromise between infinite universality, pragmatic modernity, contemporary dynamism, and historical perspective. The inclusion of earlier studies in Part I may perhaps partially compensate toward achieving a credible degree of generality, while the more recent studies of Part II are biased toward contemporary pragmatism. The year 1946 was chosen since it conveniently excludes Lend-Lease and other wartime programs, includes all cold-war programs, and marks a distinct change not only in military assistance, but in world affairs in general.

The population chosen for the experiment consists of 82 donor-recipient relationships that meet these criteria. (See Appendix A) Random sampling techniques within the population produced a sample size of 19 cases necessary for a confidence level of 95% within a confidence interval of 1 standard deviation. Continuation of the random sampling process produced six additional cases to become sample members if any of the original 19 cases were

found in subsequent research to be eliminated by any of the foregoing criteria. Since the population was classified into six strata according to donor, the sample is similarly classified by allocation proportional to sizes of the strata. The sample population consists of these randomly chosen 19 episodes of a military assistance donor-recipient relationship:

U. S. donorship--to Norway, Italy, Yugoslavia,
and Japan.

Spare case is Iraq.

UK donorship--to Congo (K), Ghana, and Pakistan

Spare case is Lebanon.

USSR donorship--to Cambodia, Uganda, and Guinea.

Spare case is Tanzania.

FRG donorship--to Niger, Israel, Nigeria.

Spare case is Malaysia.

PRC donorship--to Yemen, Algeria, and Indonesia.

Spare case is Guinea.

Other donorship--to Tanzania (from Canada),
Turkey (from Italy), and Greece (from Canada)

Spare case is Turkey (from Canada).

Limitations

This is a study involving a perhaps logically and epistemologically pure concept of military assistance, and deliberately avoids certain other relationships that are colloquially and bureaucratically subsumed under that name. In USMAP terms the study deals with "Grant Aid" only. Any

effort purporting to be totally pragmatic would consider necessarily "Foreign Military Sales," "Military Training," and the many other various ways of providing military equipment and knowledge to recipient nations.

The study deals deliberately with primary objectives and merely recognizes collateral effects. While realizing that the propensity is growing to employ military assistance primarily for the sake of its collateral effects, this sort of seminal study must address more appropriately the primary objectives. Collateral effects in both donor and recipient nations deserve a more extensive consideration that is available in such a study as this.

PART II

INITIAL RESEARCH

CHAPTER IV

BRITISH DONORSHIP IN THE WARS OF THE COALITIONS AND PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS

INTRODUCTION

I think that this mode will be less likely to produce a coldness between us and the Court of Berlin; and if he [Frederick William III] agrees to the idea, it would be more advantageous than any cooperation he has yet afforded in the war. The expense will be comparatively speaking no object, if it produces a real and efficient force at our disposal, in a quarter where it is essential to act with vigour, as part of the general plan for the next campaign.¹

William Pitt the Younger refers to military assistance as practiced in the Eighteenth Century. While techniques familiar to Pitt and William Lord Grenville might appear ill-advised to Dean Acheson or inefficient to Robert McNamara, the basic political foundations of Pitt's subsidies and McNamara's Forward Defense Programs are the same. Stripped of political rhetoric and historical location, military assistance is a transfer of resources and knowledge in order to improve or increase a recipient military force.

A search through history will produce many examples of military assistance, some successful and many unsuccessful, but few in which issues are more clear or concepts more easily demonstrated than in that of British aid to Europe

during the Napoleonic Wars. The British subsidy policy of William Pitt and the military assistance policy of Richard, Marquess Wellesley, provide chronologically and conceptually contiguous examples of an archetype of military assistance policy: that of England from 1793 until 1815. The two policies mentioned are antipodal and exemplary: that of Pitt being eminently unsuccessful, and that of Wellesley as eminently successful.

WARS OF THE COALITIONS

Background

Early in 1793 Britain went to war with France. It is a gross understatement to say that the British army was unequal to the task. "The army included thirty-two thousand soldiers in the British Isles, besides an equal force in the East and West Indies and thirty-six regiments of yeomanry."² Of eighty-one battalions of Regular Infantry, Fortescue places fifty-three overseas in December, 1792:

...leaving twenty-eight, besides the guards and cavalry, to defend and keep order in Great Britain and the Channel Islands, to man the fleet, and to meet the multitudinous calls of an empire on the verge of war. The whole of these regiments at home were far below their strength, not exceeding in all fifteen thousand men.³

Hiring German mercenaries was the cheapest and fastest means by which the government could field a credible army, but a prolonged war might force the government to rely increasingly on British manpower. It soon became apparent

that a long war was quite probable. What was needed was a coalition of all powers in arms against France, and also the support of some who were not belligerent. Pitt envisioned a huge coalition of all European powers, held together by specific war aims acceptable to all the allies. This vision became a major obsession to British diplomats and ministers until it was finally achieved 20 years later. Military assistance in the form of subsidies, and on two occasions loan guarantees, was the primary tool used to achieve that union.

It is convenient to consider British subsidy policy in three relatively unique phases: that of the first three coalitions of which Pitt and Grenville were architects; that of the peninsular wars; and that of the Grand Alliance created in the Treaty of Chaumont signed by the four great powers (Austria, England, Prussia, Russia) on 9 March, 1814, and binding each of the signatories to maintain an army of 150,000 troops in the field against France. England was to divide five million pounds among her three allies annually. Although the Grand Alliance, in that it led to the defeat of France, was the most eminently successful of these phases, the coalitions and peninsular wars are more useful for analyzing military assistance policies. The Grand Alliance was an extension of successful policies developed during the peninsular wars combined with a network of military alliances.

British and Continental Policies and Interests

The death of Emperor Leopold on March 1, 1792, removed the only hand able to restrain and temper those forces that had been pulling Europe into the vortex of war for over two years. Eight months earlier he had offered asylum to Louis XVI and the royal family, and had joined with Louis in calling upon the other European monarchs to aid in freeing the French king from popular restraint. Louis' attempted flight in June, 1791, failed, but Leopold's call for support led to a conference between the emperor and Frederick William II of Prussia in August, 1791, and ultimately an offensive and defensive alliance against Republican France to restore the French monarchy, signed in February, 1792. As events tended inexorably toward a Franco-Austrian war with the massing of three French armies on the frontiers and the development of joint war plans between the allies, the death of Leopold and the murder of Gustavus III of Sweden left Frederick William the senior, and, therefore, dominant, monarch on the continent. His interests lay in Poland and he was hopeful of sharing in a Second Polish Partition with Russia, but his deep sense of chivalry forced him to oppose Louis' humiliation. He felt strongly that the French Revolution was a threat to all crowned heads of Europe, including his own. To allow Austria the honor of suppressing the Republicans would forfeit much of his position of seniority and dominance. Thus, when on April 20, 1792, France declared war on Austria, he began to mobilize his army.⁴

The alliance between Austria and Prussia was an uncomfortable one from the beginning. Frederick had real personal solicitude for Louis and was concerned about his position under the new constitution. He felt that he must make some attempt to suppress the Republicans, and was well aware that the monarch who did so would rise to a position of dominance, if not hegemony, in Western Europe, an office that he would not yield easily to Austria. Leopold, however, wanted merely to intimidate the French people. He had more concern about the safety of his sister, Marie Antoinette, and the Franco-Austrian alliance that she represented, than for the constitutional position of Louis XVI. This attitude was maintained by Francis II, Leopold's successor, until the execution of the French queen in October, 1793. The allies in fact had only one object in common: to exclude each other from sharing in the plunder anticipated in the imminent Second Polish Partition. By allying themselves in a war against France, each hoped to weaken the other, or at least to insure that neither profited handsomely from the situation, and to preclude interference in Poland. Russia looked on the whole affair as weakening both Austria and Prussia and perhaps eliminating both of them from a share in the spoils of Poland. Catherine, the Tsarina, had no concern whatever about the French business, and showed little interest in Louis' situation. This lack of any common amiable interest, and salience of jealous enmity among these powers was to emasculate much of British war

strategy and subsidy policy for the next two decades.

The British attitude toward France was one of nonintervention. None of the great powers really took Republican France seriously yet in 1791. Lord Auckland wrote from the Hague in January, 1791, "If that Russian business [conflict among Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Poland over political control in Poland] could be happily settled, we might sit still and look at the French story like spectators in a theatre."⁵ Pitt was unable to muster the Triple Alliance of 1788 in Poland's behalf, and could not carry a vote of credit in Parliament to go to war over Poland. "That Russian business" was settled happily for Russia in August, 1791, but without British involvement. After that, Britain no longer even pretended that the old alliance system was still viable, and Pitt attempted to withdraw from the center of Continental diplomacy.

England was in a mood to wash its hands of Continental matters. France had been crippled, some thought permanently, by revolution, and provided a spectacle, but not a threat. It was difficult to think seriously of Russian power in the East as a threat to British interests. Austria and Prussia were moving toward a ridiculous war with a ludicrous enemy, the Republican Army of France. Until the end of 1792, George III wished to remain at peace, and Pitt's cabinet was prepared to recognize such rulers of France as should conclude a peace and remain pacific and noninterfering in other

kingdoms. While French occupation of Antwerp in December, 1792, and the subsequent opening of the Scheldt threatened Britain's naval position, only the execution of Louis XVI and a French declaration of war on February 1, 1793, finally brought Britain into the war.

The divergence between British policy and those of the chief Continental potentates was made apparent with the entanglement of Britain in the war with France. Catherine II desired to extend her rule into Poland and Turkey and saw the French war as a diversion of any Continental opposition. Frederick William, after the allied defeat and humiliation at Valmy in September, 1792, determined to pursue his interests in Poland. Prussia was to obtain in Poland indemnification for her expenses in the French war without Austrian interference. Austria was to obtain Bavaria in exchange for the Belgic Provinces, which had unfortunately been occupied by the French armies after the allies' agreement. British policy involved a military defeat of France and her consequent abandonment of the Belgic Provinces, the Rhineland, Savoy, Nice, and Avignon.

On this territorial basis, then, the foundations of the First Coalition could be laid; but in the sphere of moral, as distinct from material, interests, there was slight hope of an understanding, save with the smaller States threatened by France.⁶

The First Coalition

Instead of a firmly knit coalition, what is called the First Coalition was in fact a confused system of

bilateral agreements tying Britain to every power on the Continent, large and small: Austria, Naples, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, Spain, and the German states. Subsidies did not play a major role in the formation of the First Coalition (Sardinia alone received a small subsidy), since its members still did not take France seriously. The Coalition, such as it was, was complete within six months of Britain's entry into the war, but due to dissimulation by Catherine, greed in Frederick, jealousy in Francis, disinterest in Spain, and incapacity in the others, it never did function well and British efforts and resources were spent not against France, but in holding her partners together.

Prussia-British subsidies and control. Shortly after the coalition treaties had all been ratified, Frederick decided in September, 1793, in response to increasing belligerence in Poland, that protection of his interests there was more important than continuance of the French war. To this end he shifted nearly half of his army from the western front to Poland and took his field headquarters on September 29 from Mainz to Posen. The Prussian army in the west assumed a defensive position and went into garrison along the Rhine. This de facto withdrawal of Prussia from the war left England in a position that was militarily untenable and politically disastrous. The British plenipotentiary in Berlin was informed that Prussia's continued participation in the war could be guaranteed only if Britain were to

give Prussia a subsidy. Britain was placed in a desperate situation. Pitt had the choice of placating the French or furnishing military assistance in the form of subsidies to Frederick's treasury. The climax of seven months of negotiations was precisely that. Under the terms of a treaty signed on 19 April, 1794, Prussia was to retain an army on the western front, and Britain was to pay a monthly subsidy in specie to Berlin, and maintain the army. Total and absolute control of the Prussian army was to remain with the Prussian commander who was to consult with British and Dutch representatives regarding its employment. Prussia was no longer a principal in the war, however, contrary to British expectations. Neither were the Prussian troops merely mercenaries under British direction.⁷

While treaty negotiations with Britain proceeded slowly at the Hague, more violent events occurred in Poland. From September to November, 1793, the Polish Diet had sat at Grodno and had ratified Russian and Prussian treaties of new border delineation and alliance with those powers. Russian and Prussian troops had seen to proper voting. Subsequently in March, 1794, the citizens and Polish troops of Cracow had expelled the Russian garrison. On 24 March, Kosciusko, the exiled Polish patriot, was proclaimed commander-in-chief, and, in effect, declared war on Russia and Prussia. On 4 April, he gained a costly victory at Radalwice, and on 18 April, occupied Warsaw.

This treaty [of Prussian subsidies] was actually contemporary with events in Warsaw which made it so

much waste paper. Probably in any case it could not have worked satisfactorily. England looked upon the Prussian troops as so many mercenaries to be employed wherever the cabinet in London saw fit, i.e. in the Netherlands. Prussia, on the other hand, expected to be handsomely paid for looking after her own interests, and deemed it degrading to a great power to allow the movements of its troops to be directed by another. Besides, the defence or the recovery of the Netherlands would primarily benefit Austria; and no Prussian statesman or soldier wished to do that. But these inherent objections to the treaty were as nothing compared to the obstacles placed in the way of its execution by the Polish uprising. If the news had come earlier, the agreement would certainly not have been signed. As it was, nothing remained for Prussia but to disregard its provisions.⁸

The army actually provided was only two-thirds of the strength promised and was obviously the dregs of Prussia's armies. For seven months the subsidized Prussian army sat in garrison on the Prussian frontier refusing to move ostensibly because 1) its commander disagreed with the proposed mission, or 2) the monthly subsidy payment or maintenance allowance was late, or 3) King Frederick had not authorized such action, or 4) any movement of the force would expose Germany to attack by France. In October 1794, the union with Prussia was abandoned by Britain. Prussia signed the peace Treaty of Basel with France in April, 1795.⁹

The failure of Pitt's initial attempt at subsidizing a great power was the natural result of the conditions in Europe and relations between the two countries. The goals and interests of Britain and Prussia had nothing in common, and each set of national leaders perceived France differently: Pitt saw France as a major threat to British security;

Frederick saw only an annoying nuisance whose wars did not really affect Prussia. Britain, forced into the role of a mendicant, albeit a wealthy one, by the weakness of the British army, could exert no pressure or influence upon Prussia regarding the deployment of subsidized troops. In such a position, Britain could not even ensure that subsidies were used to support Prussian troops on the western front. It is not surprising that Frederick should see to his own interests first and use British guineas to do so if he could.

Austria--lack of control and disparate interests. As Pitt and Grenville realized that the Prussian subsidies had been a bad bargain, they turned increasingly to Austria whose forces had borne the brunt of the fighting for two years. However, Francis, smarting from his exclusion from the Second Polish Partition, retained a desire for Polish loot and lands. When Catherine and Frederick began to discuss a Third Partition in July, 1794, he moved Austrian troops into southern Poland. French victories in Belgium caused him to despair of territorial indemnity in the low countries (the Belgic provinces were no longer his to exchange for Bavaria), and Austria, like Prussia, looked to Poland for indemnity. Since her entry into the war in 1792, Austria had been fighting constantly and had received nothing, whereas Russia and Prussia now shared Poland, and Britain had taken France's Indian and Caribbean colonies.

In August, 1794, Austria informed the British

government that she would withdraw her forces from the low countries (Britain's major interest in the conflict) unless substantial aid was forthcoming immediately. Expansion of those forces was impossible since Austrian interests in Poland were at stake. Such a withdrawal would mean defeat for allied forces in the north, and French occupation of all Europe west of the Rhine. The Prime Minister could do nothing but accede to these demands as he had to those of Prussia a year earlier. Mindful of the recent Prussian experience, Pitt insisted that a British supreme commander was to be the sine qua non of a British guarantee for an Austrian loan from a London bank; as well as transfer of the Prussian subsidy to Austria, payment of which was to be subject to Austrian military effort in Holland. However the treaty signed in May, 1795, was not what Pitt had hoped. By that time England had become literally desperate. The emperor was required to maintain (the word "employ" was not used) 170,000 troops in Germany (Holland had been occupied by France in December, 1794) and 30,000 troops in Italy. The British government was to guarantee the loan and make any interest payments in arrears. No mention was made of command and control of the forces or of the subsidies, although the loan was, in both effect and result, a subsidy without controls.¹⁰

In February, 1795, Holland allied itself with France. In summer of that year French armies crossed the Rhine and began to occupy the German states that had been supplying

mercenaries to the British army. Despite the British loan, the imperial armies were falling back in disorder, sustained only by the monthly British advances on a new loan to be arranged in the future. In April, 1797, Austria signed a preliminary peace treaty after a short series of French victories.

The treaty upset Pitt's negotiations in London for a government guarantee of a new Austrian loan. Pitt announced that England would advance no more money, and instead arranged to sponsor an Austrian loan to reimburse the Treasury for the 1795-1797 advances. On 1 June, 1797, Austria announced that she would make no more payments on the 1795 loan and refused to ratify the treaty agreeing to the new loan. Francis completely reneged upon all of his financial obligations to England!

The 1795 Austrian loan was doomed to be ineffective for the same reasons that had emasculated the earlier Prussian subsidies: lack of common national interests between donor and recipient, absence of British control due to her military mendicancy, and inability of Britain to contribute a military force to the alliance. In both cases Pitt had been forced into the agreement by a desperate military situation. Advancement of British interests depended wholly upon the actions of another power whose interests did not coincide with those of Britain, and that had no responsibilities to Britain. Subsequent subsidies were to be made upon the premise that no amount

of subsidies can induce a nation's leaders to commit that nation effectively to a course of action that is not seen by them to be in their national interest. Military assistance is not the same as hiring mercenary soldiers. A subsidized army fights under its own flag. A sovereign state can be assisted in achieving its own war goals, but unless its war goals coincide with those of the donor nation, no amount of subsidies or military assistance can induce a nation to fight another nation's war or pursue another nation's war goals.

The Second Coalition

Failure of the Anglo-French peace negotiations at Lille in September, 1797, convinced Pitt and Grenville more than ever that only a coalition of all the European powers could defeat France and restore the European balance of power. Experiences with Austria and Prussia proved that coalition members would expect British subsidies. Subsidization would be a regular part of British war expenses on an equal priority with her own military and naval budget.

During 1798-1799, Britain set herself to building the Second Coalition, hoping to include Russia, Prussia, and Austria initially, and later the Scandinavian countries. Lack of rapport precluded any possibility of a compact with Austria and was apparent even in 1797 when Anglo-Austrian diplomacy foundered over the loan question. Even so, Austria announced in April, 1798, her willingness to join a coalition of great powers if Britain guaranteed subsidies.

No mention was made of the 1795 loan.¹¹ To Britain's proffered subsidy the Prussian court responded that "the system adopted by Prussia since the Peace of Basel [Franco-philie neutrality] is the only one agreeable to her true interests."¹²

The attention of Paul I (Tsar since Catherine's death in 1796) shifted slowly to things military as British and Austrian ministers played upon his whimsical nature in the spring and summer of 1798. Bonaparte's capture of Malta on 12 June, 1798, galvanized Paul into action. French outposts at Ancona, Corfu, and Malta betokened a threat to Russian interests in the Black Sea, as well as a heinous personal affront to Paul who accepted the title of Grand Master of the Order of Malta on 27 October, 1798. On 29 December, 1798, after sending unsubsidized troops to Austria, he signed a subsidy treaty with Britain in which he agreed to furnish 45,000 troops to be used in conjunction with Prussian troops against France. Britain and Russia now devoted their joint diplomatic efforts to gaining Prussian accession to the coalition. But neither generous subsidies nor the French attack on Austria could induce Frederick to arm against France, any more than could Britain's offer of territorial gains in Holland.¹³

At the outbreak of the War of the Second Coalition in March, 1799, that coalition consisted of a British agreement to subsidize a Russian army on France's northeast frontier, and a weak alliance between Russia and Austria, the former providing a small (18,000) corps under Suvorov

in northern Italy. Suvorov's success in Italy induced Paul to agree in June, 1799, to commit his subsidized forces in Switzerland under Rimsky-Korsakov without Prussian support. He also decided to provide a second corps under Hermann and a small fleet (both heavily subsidized) for an Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland in autumn, 1799. Britain decided where subsidized Russian forces would be deployed, but field command remained with the respective Russian generals.

Suvorov's spectacular victories in Lombardy rekindled latent antipathy and conflict of interest between Russia and Austria, which had been suppressed only by the expediency of a joint effort against France. In order to save the Russo-Austrian effort, Britain arranged in July, 1799, that Suvorov leave Italy and join Korsakov in Switzerland with Archduke Charles' Austrian army in sweeping the French from the cantons. However, as Korsakov marched into Switzerland from the north and Suvorov from the south, the Archduke marched out and took a position on the middle Rhine in order to ensure that Austria might share in any spoils resulting from the proposed allied actions in Flanders and Holland.

The gap between the Russian armies was immediately filled by a French army which then proceeded systematically to defeat both armies in detail. Only brilliant generalship, superb soldiering, and Russian stubbornness enabled the Russians to go into winter quarters in October, 1799. The Archduke's perfidy in Switzerland provided the climax to a

series of incidents between Russia and Austria. Suvorov's report from Zurich reached Petersburg early in October. On the 23rd Paul wrote to Francis abrogating the treaty of 1798, and recalled both Suvorov and Korsakov to Russia. Paul's pique at Austria was so severe that he, in effect, demanded that Britain choose between Petersburg and Vienna as allies. Britain chose Austria whose armies in the field outnumbered Russian forces, and were still capable of combat. By April, 1800, all Russian troops were in their homeland and the British alliance was ended.¹⁴

The Second Coalition had a more auspicious birth than had its predecessor. Russian armies were already in the field against France when Paul agreed to accept British subsidies and some degree of British control. British and Russian interests coincided with regard to the war in continental, western Europe, if not elsewhere. British need for control of Russian subsidies was thus lessened, although it depended in fact upon Paul's whimsy rather than upon any British influence or power. Britain was by 1799 able to field a small army jointly with a Russian force and had shed some of her earlier mendicancy, although Russia still made the major military effort. Dissolution of the Second Coalition was the result of the actions of a third country, Austria. British diplomacy and foreign policy had not reconciled the differences between Russia, Austria, and Britain. Despite Anglo-Russian rapport, the questions of Polish or Belgic indemnities for Austria, the

1795 loan, and Austrian ambitions in Italy (which was being conquered by a Russian army) presented bugbears to any action involving both countries. The possibilities of British reconciliation of these differences involve sheer speculation. It is enough to note that British policy and strategy did not take these differences into account, or else London would not have attempted a campaign into an area to which Austria looked for possible indemnity (in Flanders) without including Austrian forces. Although this oversight in British policy cannot be adduced as the sole cause of the dissolution of the Second Coalition, it was intimately involved in developing the precipitate cause.

The Third Coalition

The Russian withdrawal forced Britain and Austria to come to terms. In February, 1800, Francis ratified the 1797 loan convention and agreed to absorb into his army a German mercenary army hired by Britain, as well as a British subsidy. While Francis' foreign minister, Baron Thugut, was extorting the British government for a higher subsidy, Napoleon was mounting an attack to retake Italy. On 14 June 1800, the Austrian army was decimated at Marengo. The subsidy treaty was concluded 9 days later on British terms. Mercenaries and subsidies were duly provided in hopes of a victory in Germany to offset the debacle at Marengo. However a German version of Marengo, the Battle at Hohenlinden on 2 December, 1800, ended any further Austrian war effort.

The Peace of Luneville in February, 1801, between Austria and France led to a preliminary peace agreement with Britain in October, 1801, and the Treaty of Amiens in March, 1802.

Henry Addington, the new Prime Minister, began attempts at a third coalition as early as October, 1802, when he sounded Russia in vain. Again in March and July, 1803, subsidy offers to St. Petersburg and Berlin fell on fallow ground. Once again as in 1798 it was the French action that moved the Tsar. French activities in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean caused Russia to invite British assistance in diplomatic, but not military, action against France. Britain responded by offering to subsidize any coalition formed by the Tsar which included both Austria and Prussia. Pitt's new government, after Addington's fall, informed the Russian envoy that Britain would provide 5 million pounds to subsidize any coalition that would wage war with France, with no prior conditions. On 6 November, 1804, Austria signed an alliance with Russia. Britain was then invited to offer a plan of finance for the league. Pitt agreed to underwrite the total war expenses of both allies at just over 12 pounds per man per year if Napoleon would not accept an ultimatum from the allies involving return of France to her pre-revolution boundaries, and creation of a series of buffer states around the Republic. An agreement was signed sub spe rati on 11 April, 1805, between Russia and Britain, which differed significantly from the British

plan. Pitt would not ratify it, but proposed another plan in June, 1805. Both the Tsar and the Emperor refused to ratify the new plan until they learned of Napoleon's annexation of Genoa. In July Naples became a formal participant with a subsidy pledge from Britain. In October 1805, Sweden was promised a quarter million pounds for her participation. Pitt had purchased his allies dear. Anticipated subsidies were 7 million pounds and at least another million for Prussia if Frederick would accept it. While ministers were still conducting final negotiations of the treaties in Stockholm, Nelson destroyed the French-Spanish navy at Trafalgar during 18-22 October, 1805. A week earlier Napoleon had destroyed the Austrian army at Ulm during 11-16 October. The destruction of the Third Coalition was completed with the Russian defeat on 4 December, 1805, at Austerlitz. Austria and France ratified the peace Treaty of Pressburg on 1 January, 1806. Russian capitulation was completed on 2 July, 1806, in Paris.¹⁵

Conclusions

These instances of British subsidies to Austria, Prussia, and Russia must be accounted significant failures by nearly any judgment criteria. The ultimate British purpose, defeat of France, was not attained, as were not the multitudes of ancillary and implicit goals from restoring the Bourbon monarchy to ensuring friendly Dutch control of the Scheldt. A secondary goal which was achieved was the virtual non-participation by British troops in the war after

the loss of Holland in 1795, (The single exception was the Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland in 1799, which lasted 7 weeks and involved only 20,000 British troops.¹⁶) and only minimal participation before that. The withdrawal of British troops from the Continent in 1795 was followed (but not necessarily caused) by the loss of all military objectives in 1795, 96, 97, 98, and 1800. (With the signal exception of Suvorov's victories in Lombardy, the few defeats sustained by French forces on land were isolated battles and had little strategic significance, even if one assumes that the allies had a coherent strategy.) British military efforts in the Second and Third Coalitions were token only.

In all three coalitions, Britain resorted to military assistance as a last resort in a desperate situation. Pitt was faced with the equally unpleasant alternatives of acceding to his allies' demands, raising a British army, or suing for peace. Lacking a credible and strong army, or, later, the will to use it, Britain was forced into the position of a suppliant and the donor of military assistance subsidies somehow became the recipient of their results.

In all cases Britain, due to military necessity for agreement, surrendered command and control of the military forces provided by the recipient of British subsidies. With the exceptions of Korsakov in Switzerland and Hermann in Holland no subsidized force was at all

responsive to British desires or interests, which were generally unimportant to the recipient governments.

Prussia was concerned with Poland, Austria with Poland and Italy, Russia with Poland and the Levant. With the single exception of Belgium, which Austria wanted to exchange for Bavaria, none of the recipients had any serious interests at all west of the Rhine where lay Britain's major interests.

With minor exceptions, subsidy payments were made in English specie, sterling or bullion directly to the national treasury of the recipient, with no provision for eventual devolution to the appropriate military force. It is an open secret that millions of British guineas were spent in subjugating Poland, and later in supplying the Grand Armee.

British diplomacy, foreign policy, and military strategy had been inadequate. The British Foreign Office had approached the subsidy treaties as economic contracts involving an exchange of goods and services, rather than attempting to create a mutuality of interest to whose promotion both parties might contribute. Neither Prussia from 1795 to 1805, Austria in 1795, nor Russia until 1798, was convinced that French hegemony in Western Europe was inimical to its own national interests. British military strategy had failed to adduce any credible war goals or campaign plans beyond Pitt's obsession with expelling the French from the low countries. To a certain extent it may be said that the subsidy treaties were in lieu of

foreign policy and military strategy.

Of the British army in 1793, whose home establishment numbered only 17,000, Fortescue could say:

The British, with the exception of the Guards, were, in the opinion of foreign critics, very deficient in training and discipline, for precisely the same reason as the Dutch, namely, persistent neglect. . . . both officers and men were so ignorant of their work that, at first, they could not even throw out vedettes and outposts without instruction from foreigners. The field-guns were inferior to those of the rest of the Allies; the ammunition-wagons were heavy and unwieldy. . . . Discipline for the most part was bad, especially among the officers . . . and though there were still among their infantry good men who had learned their business in America, far too many were absolutely ignorant as well as neglectful of their duty.¹⁷

The situation improved under the guidance of the Duke of York, appointed Commander-in-Chief in 1795, as the size of the army increased fourfold during the coalition wars. But the creation of a viable fighting force under the military ineptitude and ignorance of Pitt and his ministers took nearly fifteen years. At no time during the coalition wars was the British Army a threat to France on the Continent, or even a significant feature of the European military situation.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN

The death of William Pitt in January, 1806, and the subsequent withdrawal of Lord Grenville to his seat in the house of Lords, after a brief and unsuccessful attempt to form a government, led to the emergence of a new set of politicians and policies in British Ministries.

Pitt's heirs in concept, if not in policy, were George Canning who altered Pitt's subsidy policy initially; Richard, Marquess Wellesley, who, with his brothers Arthur, later Duke of Wellington, and Henry Wellesley, Ambassador to Spain, developed the subsidy policy unto one of military assistance; and Robert Stuart, Viscount Castlereagh who conceived and directed the policy shift from subsidies to military assistance grants. The policy concept that these men developed may be perhaps considered an extreme ideal type.

By 1807, Britain had mustered a significant army and had regained mastery of the seas. The victories of Sir Sydney Smith at Acre (1799), General Abercrombie at Alexandria (1801), Sir Robert Stuart at Maida (1806), General Moore's brilliant but inadequate campaign in Spain and Portugal (1808-1809), and Nelson's victories at the Nile (1798) and Trafalgar (1805) had re-established a British reputation as a military and naval power.

The disposable British army in the spring of 1808, exclusive of the militia, the volunteers, and the regular troops occupied in defence of the various colonies of the Empire, amounted to a hundred thousand men, in the highest state of discipline and equipment.¹⁸

By August of that year, Britain had deployed an army that seriously challenged Napoleon by defeating a French army at Vimiero near Lisbon on the 21st. This growing military capability allowed Canning much more latitude in his diplomatic negotiations than Pitt or Grenville had had. No longer was Britain mendicant before the great military

powers of Europe, all of whom had been soundly defeated by Napoleon. The fresh attitude and perspective with which Canning was able to see the war is clearly seen in his negotiation of a subsidy treaty with Austria in a post-mortem attempt to revive the Third Coalition.

The Hofburg was not to be offered subsidies as a bait to enter the war, but whenever Austria was 'unequivocally committed against France and embarked in the common cause . . . His Majesty will not then be backward to consider the necessities of his ally.' ¹⁹

Canning's policy had the effect of obviating any British diplomatic efforts to create a common cause since unequivocal commitment against France was the sine qua non of British assistance. While conflicts of national interests were not precluded, they were, nevertheless, proscribed to issues beyond the scope of immediate war goals. After the demise of the Third Coalition, Britain paid no subsidies to her former allies, except during the brief Austrian War of Liberation in 1809, until the formation of the Grand Alliance in 1814.

In 1808 Spanish revolutionary juntas and the Portuguese Regency petitioned Britain for aid in their rebellions and defenses against Napoleon. Responding generously, but with little reference to Pitt's examples:

Canning at once declared Britain's official sympathy with the Spanish uprising and her desire to provide material help. 'We shall proceed upon the principle that any nation of Europe which starts up with a determination to oppose a power which is the common enemy of all nations, becomes instantly our essential ally.' Acting upon this principle . . . Canning, in close conjunction with Castlereagh . . . despatched Sir Arthur Wellesley to Spain, and set

on foot the decisive Peninsular adventure.²⁰

No treaties were signed. Britain had no legal commitments and thus placed the recipients in positions as suppliant, not demanding, partners. Assistance was given in the forms of arms and military supplies as well as money and credit, the former consigned to British agents who delivered them to local military forces in the field through Wellington's Commissary. Of signal importance was the deployment of a large British army with orders to join the Spanish nationalists in driving the French from the Iberian peninsula, and a 10,000 man British force garrisoned in Lisbon.

The debilitating features of the coalitions were absent in Peninsular War policies: the new allies shared identical war goals; Britain was now the dominant partner in the alliance, not a mendicant paymaster; British military capability precluded any dependence upon the recipients alone for military action; the capability to deploy British troops gave Canning a flexibility impossible for Pitt; the absence of treaty commitments and its concomitant implication of withdrawal of British support for recalcitrant allies, the presence of British troops, and provision of arms and materiel as well as specie and credit led to complete British control and primacy of British interests and war goals.

Initial Aid to Portugal

On July 20, 1808, General Sir Arthur Wellesley

sailed from England. He first touched at Corunna where he was met by the Galician junta, one of several that had requested aid:

They desired British gold and arms, but not a British army. They certainly did not wish Wellesley to land his force. They suggested instead that Sir Arthur should sail on to Portugal and fight the French army there.²¹

He did just that, fought the Battle of Vimiero, and was recalled to England. The striking bustle of successful encounters in 1808 and 1809 (the series of Spanish victories, Moore's Campaign, and Vimiero) quickly confirmed the wisdom of Canning's policies, as well as a growing British capability to execute them. But the Grand Armee of nearly a million men, and veteran of 15 years of heavy combat was not to be routed by even the brilliant generalship of Sir John Moore at the head of only 30,000 troops.

In spring of 1809, Wellesley, later Duke of Wellington, took command of all British forces in Portugal, roughly 24,000 men. He had been preceded by General Heresford who had been sent to train the Portuguese army equipped and supplied by British aid:

Under Beresford's reorganization of the Portuguese army, infantry battalions already contained [in April, 1809] several British officers and had been drilled and trained by British NCO's. All units were armed and organized approximately after the British fashion; many of them were paid, clothed, and fed by Britain.²²

All aid payments were made by an agent of the British Army Commissary at the direction of the British

minister in Lisbon. Wellesley was made Marshall-General of all Portuguese forces with the right to sit in the Regency Council when it dealt with military or financial matters. The efficacy of these arrangements was shown by Wellesley's initial successes with Portuguese as well as British troops. He entered Spain in July, 1809, leading an undefeated and battle-tested Anglo-Portuguese army.

Aid to Spain

Wellesley's entrance into Spain forced London to reconsider its relations with Spain, blighted by the junta's refusal to discuss British trade with the Spanish colonies and the polite rejection of Wellesley and his army at Corunna. Necessity for cooperation in the Spanish campaign obliged London to be generous. In June, 1809, 200,000 pounds in Treasury Bills was delivered to the junta at Seville, and in the following months, supplies and field equipment for 30,000 men were sent to Spanish armies in the field.²³ The junta, representing King Ferdinand in exile proposed a formal subsidy treaty including 30,000 British troops to be placed under Spanish command.

Canning immediately rejected it:

British support for Spain would remain on an informal basis for the foreseeable future. Shipment of arms and supplies were continued, but the Junta received no more British money during the remainder of 1809 . . . The Junta must realize that future British aid depended upon the 'opening to British commerce the Ports of Spanish America, and thereby enabling this Country to recruit the Stock of Specie which has been exhausted in the service of Spain.'²⁴

British economic and foreign policy was now integral with military assistance policy and military strategy. The quid pro quo concept of British aid for Spanish American commerce reflected not only increased British control, but more importantly, the focussing of all British efforts upon the war. Not only military strategy and assistance, but also diplomacy, foreign policy and commerce had been integrated into a comprehensive war policy supported by everything that Britain could muster.

Canning's problems with the Spanish ministers in London were matched by Wellington's problems with Spanish generals in La Mancha. By August, 1809, Wellington had defeated the French at Talavera despite his Spanish allies who had subsequently deserted his flank and permitted the French to envelop his rear without firing a shot, Wellington:

had already learned that his sole dependence in the field was his own army of twenty thousand men . . . Indeed from the moment Wellington entered Spain, he experienced the wide difference between the promises and performances of the Spanish authorities. They were willing to receive British aid in repelling their enemies, and freely offered the cooperation of their armies in such undertaking; but when their soldiers encountered the Frenchmen, they fled from the field, and when their allies needed food, they left them to starve.²⁵

Finally in desperation to save his own army, Wellington, like Moore, left Spain to shift for itself. Wellington would not depend upon Spanish units again until he commanded them. Overwhelming French superiority forced him back

nearly to the coast.

Positive British Control and Integrated War Policies

A new British cabinet determined in 1810, despite serious financial problems, to wage war against France with all the strength that Britain could command. Wellington's army was reinforced and British troops were sent to succor the Spanish Junta authorities in Cadiz, the only important city in Spain not in French hands. Increased support was pledged to Portugal (or rather to Wellington), but Spain was to be merely pensioned until the Junta would concede Spanish American trade privileges as well as military command, control, and authority to Britain. By summer, 1811, Wellington and Beresford had created an allied army under British command and financed by Britain, that would gain and retain the offensive until Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo.

Prior to 1811 the logistic support of Wellington's army was nominally provided by two separate commissaries, British and Portuguese, however, in fact the Portuguese were supplied and even paid by Wellington's British commissary, the Portuguese Junta de Vivera barely sufficing to feed and clothe the Portuguese garrison in Lisbon. In August, 1811, the Portuguese Regency Council agreed to accept all British aid payments (they were no longer even called subsidies) into a military commissary separate from the national treasury and to accept a substantial part of the payments in commodities rather than specie

(Military commodities had always been delivered directly to the army commissary, but a large part of the payment, provided in specie, had been delivered to the national treasury.) Commodity aid was no longer limited to military ordnance, ammunition, and stores, but now included a limited inventory of non-military commodities destined for issue both to the army and to civilian agencies. By 1812 British subsidies had evolved into a sophisticated military assistance program vaguely prognostic of the Truman Doctrine of 140 years later. Payments were of three general types: 1) provisions, supplies, arms, and pay to Portuguese troops furnished by Wellington's commissary or indirectly through the Junta de Vivera; 2) goods shipped from London to Lisbon to support the crumbling economy of Portugal; and 3) specie payments to the Regency Council to enable it to maintain political order.²⁶

The concept of supporting a war effort and a military strategy by providing specifically non-military assistance was novel, if not unique, in 1810. Despite any similarity, it is due perhaps to coincidence and definitely not to deliberate intent that Wellesley's military assistance program established a precedent for American efforts during the cold war. At the outset of the war, Britain had only undertaken to subsidize Portugal in return for a Portuguese army under British command. However, by 1810 this arrangement was ineffective and by

1812, it was a myth. Portugal's financial weakness, administrative inefficiency, and beleaguered position forced Wellington to use his own resources to support her units in the field, as well as necessitating economic assistance to keep Portugal out of bankruptcy. It is fatuous to impute to British leaders any concepts of "national development," "nation-building," "self-help," or altruism in providing non-military assistance to Portugal. Rather the British Treasury took advantage of the concession of the Regency Council in agreeing to commodity aid at all. Paucity of hard money in England had created a severe financial crisis, which was only exacerbated by subsidy payments. Nevertheless, and coincidental necessity for economic assistance notwithstanding, the realization that non-military economic assistance was necessary for successful attainment of war goals was indicative of the broad perspective within which Wellesley perceived the war effort, and the need for an integrated war policy focussed upon a single point: attainment of war goals defined within the national interest.

The situation in Spain was quite different. Britain did not have the economic or military strength to repeat the Lisbon strategy mutatis mutandis. The Regency in Cadiz steadfastly refused to accede to British control without massive support, even greater than that given to Lisbon, despite its total dependence upon British aid for survival. Nor could Britain allow Cadiz

to fall for lack of money and supplies. Thus, British aid allowed Spain to subsist until Wellington could mount a campaign in Spain. When English and Spanish troops joined forces in the summer of 1812 and took Madrid on August 13, Spain became the de facto twin of Portugal despite the Cadiz government's intransigence, since Cadiz had no power at all save that of the British Treasury and Wellington's army. In December of that year Wellington assumed command of all allied forces in the Peninsula. As the danger to the governments of Spain and Portugal diminished, British aid was increasingly devoted to the field armies, and was sent through Wellington's Commissary General.²⁷ (American and allied logistical support during the Korean conflict was ultimately provided in much the same fashion.)

Decline of the Donor-Recipient Relationship

Wellington's victory at Vittoria on June 21, 1813, destroyed Napoleon's power in the Peninsula and with it the sine qua non of the success of the British military assistance program. Wellington's recommendations and requests were increasingly either ignored or received with cold hauteur by governments no longer fighting for survival, and fast losing interest in a war that no longer threatened them.

Despite the numerous and energetic representations of Wellington, the government of Cadiz had given its whole attention to political intrigue, and neglected the army; its troops were neither clothed nor paid by its exertions, but left to depend on British rations . . . The Cortes, excited to madness by the incessant

efforts of the republican press at Cadiz, now dreaded nothing so much as the success of the allied arms; and did all in their power to thwart the designs of Wellington, whom they openly accused of aspiring to the crown of Spain.²⁸

The approaching end of the war led the Council of Regency in Lisbon to devote its attention to its interests within its own borders.

Portugal again feared the likelihood of Spanish aggression, and in an effort to conserve the national resources for use in the future, the council allowed the Conscription Laws to lapse. As a result, no replacements were sent to make good Wellington's losses from death and desertion.²⁹

British response was to move their main supply base from Lisbon to Santander much nearer the front (and with it, considerable customs revenue), and to reduce payments made to Lisbon and Cadiz to the subsistence levels of 1808-1811. 70% of the Portuguese payments, and 80% of the Spanish payments went directly to Wellington to supply Spanish and Portuguese troops directly in 1813-1814.³⁰ Final victory in the Peninsula was won only with the help of Spanish and Portuguese soldiers clothed, fed, and armed by Great Britain whose commissary also provided their pay and some of their mustering-out allowances after Waterloo.

In stark contrast to the coalitions, the war in the Peninsula was an unequivocal military success. Britain's immediate purposes had been achieved, and foundations laid for the Grand Alliance which would finally crush Napoleon and re-establish British security and perhaps a balance-of-power dominated by Great Britain.

Britain's national interests had been served and her defense made more secure.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Donor Military Capability

British military capability in the period 1808-1813, far surpassed that of the preceding period 1793-1805. The British Navy, a significant and effective force even in 1790, was never again challenged by France after Trafalgar in 1805. The army that could inspire no confidence in 1793 was in 1813, defeating every force arrayed against it. Wellington's army was the heart of a modern effective fighting force which belied its origins in the old men, lunatics, and boys sent to face the French in 1793. The growth in British military capability is one of the essential elements of the success of Canning's policies as well as a major portion of the failure of Pitt's.

Although the death of William Pitt the Younger was indeed a tragic blow to the British government, his demise allowed the emergence of a new set of leaders better able to operate a war government. The new politics of these men created a national capability, strength and will unimaginable to Pitt and Grenville. Britain was dedicated to the defeat of Napoleon at all costs. The decision, supported by Parliament and popular opinion, to commit not only money, but men, commodities, ordnance,

even the entirety of British economic resources and reserves to combat, was an essential new ingredient in a successful war policy of military assistance. Britain now had the military strength to deploy, the economic resources to extend massive military assistance, and the national will to do both

Donor Control

In the northern coalitions of Pitt, Britain, lacking a credible military capability, had been a desperate petitioner for military strength in her war against France, and thus was a junior member, albeit a rich one, in any coalition. Britain had no army or general in the field of sufficient stature or power to exert command and control, even if the other coalition partners had been willing to accept British leadership. Mollendorf's refusal to deploy his Prussian army in response to General Cornwallis' directives in 1794 illustrates Britain's weak position. The formal, legal, and binding commitments embodied in the various subsidy treaties required Britain to pay the agreed subsidies regardless of the military or political situation, and thus robbed Pitt of any vestige of control that he might have had in the form of cessation of payments or the threat thereof. The general result of such a situation, excluding the successful and responsive (for a short time) Russian armies of Rimsky-Korsakoff, Hermann, and Suvoroff, of Pitt's subsidy policy was a transfer of English specie and credit to Europe in return for rather

arbitrary and spasmodic military noises by the European powers, but no concerted, controlled military effort to defeat France or to promote British interests and war goals. British guineas financed not the liberation of Holland, but the Partition of Poland, the brief expansion of Prussia into the German states, an abortive Austrian drive into Italy and the Balkans, and a Russian bid for power in the Ottoman Empire and the Mediterranean Sea, all of which schemes were seen as inimical to British interests.

In contrast, British control in the peninsula may be described as often despotic and always firm. The military and naval predominance of Britain rendered nugatory any serious attempts by Spain or Portugal to divert British aid elsewhere than to the war in the Peninsula. (Although both Spain and Portugal attempted in the early years to finance colonial wars in South America from the British Treasury, such practices were discontinued under duress when Britain learned of them.) The absence of the treaty commitments (a deliberate policy, not an oversight) to provide any aid at all gave to British diplomats an effective means of control in the form of suspension or manipulation of aid payments. So great was this control that Lisbon and Cadiz became de facto dependencies of London, although in the guise of sovereign states, Wellington's nominal and legal positions as Marshal-General of all Portuguese armies and Captain-General of all Spanish forces complemented his Commissary-General's de facto

position as supplier of those forces, to provide through Wellington complete British control and command of all military operations in the Peninsula.

Donor and Recipient Purposes

It is of considerable significance that Spanish and Portuguese acceptance and support of those arrangements disintegrated as Wellington marched north, and disappeared when he crossed the Garonne in southern France. The Iberian governments perceived their national interests not in fighting Napoleon to defeat in France, but in resuming sovereignty in the Peninsula. The Spanish nationalists and rebels were not Francophobes but rather patriots whose interest ended at the Pyrenees. While French armies occupied the Peninsula, British, Spanish and Portuguese interests were identical, if differently motivated. While the war promoted these mutual interests, Spain and Portugal could easily yield to British hegemony, and, feeling that they were acting in their own national interests, could devote most of their meager resources to the war. When they saw the war as irrelevant to their national interests, and British hegemony and British war goals as inimical, their support of British policies disappeared. Britain was forced to move her supply bases, and in effect commandeer Spanish and Portuguese soldiers for use in France.

Early in the Peninsular campaign, British resources were transferred directly to Portuguese and Spanish national treasuries, as was the case during the coalitions,

and only in part directly to their military forces. The result was a niggardly commissariat in both armies and two affluent capitals, again as in the coalitions. As noted above, the situation had reversed by 1812, and provided thereafter a relatively effective fighting force at the expense of both civilian economies. The intended result, a successful military campaign, was deemed worth that expense, at least it was in Downing Street. Such a situation as Wellington controlled in 1812 never obtained during the coalitions.

Integration of Donor Policies

It was suggested earlier that subsidies during the coalitions were often regarded as substitutes for military strategy and were usually at odds with British foreign policy. Such was not the case during the Peninsular campaign. This may be due to the fraternal ties of the Wellesley brothers serving simultaneously as Foreign Minister, Field Commander; and Spanish Ambassador. British foreign policy was devoted to the immediate support of Wellington's army and the ultimate defeat of France. To this end, British diplomats attempted to expand British markets overseas and in Europe, and incidentally to reduce the flow of specie from London, and to maintain friendly pressure upon the prospective coalition countries in preparation for an ultimate Grand Alliance. British dominance in the Peninsula was attributable as much to

British diplomacy in Lisbon, Cadiz, Rio de Janeiro, and Vera Cruz as to Wellington's military genius. Military strategy devised in Downing Street included several military ventures onto the European continent, timed to coincide with Wellington's moves in the Peninsula (limited but non-committal support of the Austrian Liberation Movement and the abortive Prussian rebellion; constant military pressure at Cadiz; and deployment of a British trained, supplied, commanded, and reinforced Sicilian army into Catalonia in 1812). The integration of foreign policy, military strategy, and military assistance by Downing Street during the Peninsular campaign approximated the efforts of General Marshall, Secretary Stettinius, and Secretary byrnes at the end of World War II.

Donor Economic Assistance

With the exception of Russia, and perhaps Sweden, all recipients of British subsidies were in the throes of economic disaster as a result of the war. Thus, an initial reaction of all recipient governments to a subsidy was to attempt to divert some part of the British funds deposited in their national treasuries to purposes necessary to these governments but not so to Britain. The governments of Austria and Prussia habitually diverted funds not only to their interest in Poland, but also to internal political needs. Russia and Sweden, whose subsidies were more closely controlled and less in the nature of blackmail, violated British interests less flagrantly, but lost no opportunities

to extract cumshaw from British largesse. Portugal, Spain, Sicily, Naples, and Sardinia received not only military assistance, but also commodities, specie, and credits intended to alleviate the economic problems in those countries. In these countries an attempt was made to relieve economic pressure upon the governments, and to obviate diversion of British subsidies through the use of non-military assistance as well as stringent controls. There is little doubt that British subsidies as well as persecution of the war exacerbated economic chaos in all recipient countries; however, in the latterly mentioned countries Britain made some attempt to mitigate or alleviate that effect, and achieved a greater advancement of her national interests in terms of war goals than in the northern countries. No causal nexus can be adduced, but an inference of some post ergo propter relationship is not wholly untenable.

Time Involved

None of the various coalitions lasted much more than two years, even informally without a treaty. Britain expected immediate results upon payment of subsidies, and when they were not forthcoming at once discontinued the subsidies, and when they were not forthcoming at once discontinued the subsidies. Portugal was subsidized from 1796 to 1801 with no return to Britain. Subsidies resumed in 1808 and continued until 1815. It was not until the battle at Torres Vedras in 1811 that the war began to turn

in Britain's favor. It was assumed in the Pitt cabinet that lack of money alone prevented French defeat, and that the catalyst of British guineas would immediately remove all obstacles to a coalition victory. Canning and Wellesley apparently adopted, or at least reflected, the attitude that the creation or mobilization of an effective allied fighting force required much more than money: i.e. military supplies and training, economic support, political pressure, time to develop a joint combat force, a high degree of political and military control, etc., and they were able to infuse the British government and people with sufficient patient and national perseverance to enable their investment to attain maturity. It might seem thus that a wartime military assistance policy requires considerable time to mature. This belief is supported at least superficially by the Lend-Lease experiences of World War II and the "Vietnamization" program in the Vietnam Conflict.

Cost

The cost of a wartime military assistance program has often been assailed as an unwarranted contribution to a nation's war burden. Prior to 1808 subsidy payments never exceeded 2.6 million pounds per year; Home Establishment expenses (including army forces in Europe) exceeded 3 million pounds only in 1795; and total annual service costs rose from 9 million pounds in 1793 to 40 million pounds in 1807. (See Appendix C for detailed costs.) The increase in total service costs can be largely attributed

to a four-fold increase in Britain's standing army during the period and to Pitt's ill-conceived amphibious operations against French and Spanish colonies in the West Indies and abortive operations on Corsica. Between 1808 and 1813 subsidies fluctuated between 2.6 million and 4.4 million pounds per year while total military costs rose to 57 million pounds. Ten months of combat in 1814-1815 cost 20 million pounds in subsidies while total military expenses rose to nearly 100 million pounds. Total costs of the army and navy between 1793 and 1816 were 830 million pounds. Total subsidy payments were less than 8% of that figure and at no time exceeded 14% of British government annual revenue, the proportion being just that in 1794 when subsidies began and in 1814 after which they were soon terminated completely. During the coalitions, subsidies regularly exceeded the expenses of the army in Europe, whereas the situation reversed when a British army was deployed to the Peninsula. Wellington's army cost nearly 80 million pounds between 1808 and 1816. Subsidy remittances were only about half that much.

Although no conclusion may be drawn from the above data, it is probably not overly presumptuous to summarize them in general terms. When military assistance accounts for a large proportion of war expenses, which remain relatively low, likelihood of success in terms of attainment of war goals is also low. (One might be tempted to say that such military assistance expenditures are dysfunctional

or wasteful.) When military assistance expenditures are a small proportion of a much larger total resource expenditure dominated by deployment costs of the army and complemented by military and economic assistance, likelihood of success rises. Causality or even criticality of any such relationship must remain moot since it is only one of several factors contributing to wartime success.

Deployment of Donor Military Forces

Even though the size of military assistance costs relative to total war expenses does not seem to be a significant factor, the foregoing analysis is indicative of actual deployment of donor forces. As has been mentioned earlier, during the Wars of the Coalitions, British troops were essentially not involved in the combat operations that did take place. The inability of British military forces to take the field led to British mendicancy, absence of British control, inability of London to integrate war strategy with other aspects of foreign policy, and perhaps a certain public non-involvement and disinterest in the war which contributed to the lack of national will already mentioned.

The deployment of British forces to the peninsula eliminated all of these weaknesses of the Coalitions. Questions of British control, when raised, were easily dispelled by Wellington's large British army. London effectively dictated terms to Cadiz and Lisbon and was in

a position to enforce obedience that did not exist in the relationships with Berlin, Moscow, Vienna, or Stockholm. London's war strategy was the only strategy allowed during the Iberian campaigns, and thus it could be, and was, integrated into all aspects of British foreign policy. The growth of British national will has already been mentioned, and while that will undoubtedly sprang from politics of the new leaders, it cannot be assumed that the sight of thousands of British redcoats marching down to Dover to defeat the republican armies of Napoleon did not contribute significantly to British public martial ardor. Nor were the reports of British victories in Portugal likely to induce rebellion in Birmingham or Manchester.

But, in any case, and regardless of the ramifications, deployment of British forces in support of British war goals was a significant difference between the two periods.

Recapitulation

Before addressing a second case study, it may be helpful to restate briefly some conclusions as a series of tentative uniformities for a taxonomy of successful wartime military assistance:

- 1) Donor must maintain a dominant military capability including the will to employ and deploy donor military forces
- 2) Donor must maintain control of resources transferred to recipient and must control the employment of the recipient military force

- 3) Donor and recipient must pursue common aims.
- 4) Donor must integrate the entire foreign policy, military strategy, and military assistance program.
- 5) Economic assistance may be necessary to enable the recipient to use military assistance effectively.
- 6) Donor must be prepared to continue assistance for a long and indefinite time.
- 7) Donor must include deployment of donor military forces, military assistance, and economic assistance in his war plans.

CHAPTER V

THE CHINA LESSON

WARTIME CHINA

Introduction

In June, 1940, Dr. T. V. Soong visited the United States to ask for arms and economic credits for the Chinese government in its war with Japan. However, at that time the United States was anxious not to provoke Japan.

Moreover, since Germany had just overrun Europe to the English Channel, the United States itself seemed in danger, and the American munitions stock was not great enough to provide for China after American needs were met and after the United States supported Great Britain, whose plight seemed most directly to affect the United States.¹

Japanese occupation of northern Indochina, and the Japan-Germany-Italy pact signed in September, 1940, changed the situation significantly, and on December 19, 1940, President Roosevelt approved a Chinese credit of \$25 million for military aid. One hundred P-40 fighter aircraft were immediately ordered for the ten forming American Volunteer Group (AVG) of the Chinese Air Force.

The President signed the Lend-Lease Act on March 11, 1941, and on March 31, Dr. Soong presented Chinese requirements. On May 6, President Roosevelt signed the statement that China was vital to the defense of the

United States and was, therefore, eligible for lend-lease aid. Within two weeks the first lend-lease equipment left New York bound for Rangoon, the only port available to the Chinese government in Chungking. At that time Japan occupied the entire coastal littoral of mainland China including all Chinese port cities and off-shore islands.

In July, 1941, Japanese Imperial armies occupied southern Indochina. Following the seizure of northern Indochina in 1940 and Hainan in 1939, the Japanese advance was extremely ominous to a British economy dependent upon Asian resources and to a motorized America dependent upon Malayan rubber.

U. S. Purposes and Strategy

On July 23, 1941, the President approved Joint Board Paper 355 which recommended inter alia "approval of the program for aid to China, including the CAF [Chinese Air Force] project, the AVG program, and the sending of a U. S. military mission."² The paper also defined the strategy behind aid to China: "The continuation of active military operations by the Chinese is highly desirable as a deterrent to the extension of Japanese military and naval operations to the South."³ The concepts behind this strategy statement were to provide the basis of American military assistance policies in China throughout the war.

Unlike Wellington in Iberia, General Joseph W. Stilwell was not to command a conquering allied army. His

final instructions included no concept of developing and employing offensive power involving U. S. troops.

His functions and purposes were to maintain the Burma Road, ' command such Chinese forces as may be assigned to him, . . . assist in improving the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army . . . and increase the effectiveness of U. S. assistance to the Chinese Government for the prosecution of the war.'⁴

By February, 1942, when Stilwell received those instructions, the Anglo-American agreement that the Atlantic should be the main theatre was an established part of American policy,⁵ and despite Roosevelt's obsession with China's "Great Power Status," General Marshall was determined the U. S. effort should be concentrated in Europe.

Burma was last on everybody's list . . . when it came to a choice between East and West, Marshall did not waver. When planes from the Japanese carriers attacked Ceylon on April 9 [1942], justifying [Field Marshall Sir Archibald P.] Wavell's alarm he agreed to assign the Tenth Air Force [ostensibly under Stilwell] to the defense of India. This was the price of Britain's agreement to begin the buildup of forces in the British Isles for the cross-Channel invasion of Europe . . . China's interests were in fact secondary.⁶

The Quadrant Conferences in Quebec in August, 1943, re-emphasized the American attitude. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the American plan to begin a major offensive toward Japan through the islands of the Central Pacific, "while steadily increasing Allied air power in China and improving the Chinese Army would complete the ring around Japan, wear down Japanese resources, and put weight on Japan from the direction of Asia."⁷

American purposes in China did not approach the

grandiose plans of Pitt, nor were they as monolithic as the aims of Wellington in Iberia. They were formed as a part of a global strategy, given a particular priority, and pursued on the basis of that priority. They were not only integral to a total global military strategy, but served U. S. foreign policy insofar as that policy was not antithetical to military strategy. Roosevelt's insistent policy of creating in China a great power (despite the Gilbertian cast in Chiang's government) was supported by military assistance and Stilwell's mission, whereas less assistance might have seen Chiang's fall, and more would probably have led to American hegemony. Many of the problems that Stilwell faced arose out of the incompatibility of the Atlantic first policy, China's great power status, and the realities of Chiang's China. The ultimate dominance of military strategy is not surprising in a nation at war.

Chinese Purposes

American strategy, as President Roosevelt put it at Cairo in 1943, "to keep China in the war tying up Japanese soldiers,"⁸ was complemented by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's attitude:

He thoroughly intended in his own mind to stay out the war, if necessary, in the last provinces of the west, no matter how much of China was lost, until the Allies should defeat Japan and he could emerge on the winning side . . . Believing that the war could be won for him without his additional effort, Chiang predicated his policy in so far as he had any, on survival in power while the Japanese were defeated by the Allies outside China.⁹

Both nations had identical purposes, different motivations notwithstanding: the common purpose to keep China in the war on the winning side and the mutual disinclination to conduct a major strategic campaign in China. Chiang's desire to improve his own domestic position vis a vis the Communists does not degrade the significance of the commonalty of American and Chinese war goals, although it does pose a major obstacle, among others, to any amicable community of interest in any more ambitious goals, such as any unlimited effort, including the Communists, to drive the Japanese from China.

U. S. Control

As was mentioned previously, the Joint Board paper approved by the President on July 23, 1941, called for a military mission to China. The orders given Major General John Magruder included a directive to:

- . . . assist the Chinese government in obtaining prompt and co-ordinated administrative action by the United States authorities necessary to insure the orderly flow of materials and munitions from lend-lease agencies to the Chinese military forces.¹⁰

The military mission was primarily intended to ensure that lend-lease aid was effectively applied to projects in the U. S. interest, although diplomatically it also provided one more in the series of warnings and deterrents to Japan, such as the oil embargo, reinforcement of the Philippines, and several stern notes.

Initial Lend-lease shipments were aimed at improving the Burma Road and at constructing a Burma-China railway.

Both projects were terminated by Japanese occupation of Burma in May, 1942. Lend-lease equipment and shipments were used primarily to equip and train the Chinese Air Force, and to create large training centers in India where Chinese ground forces were trained and equipped. General Stilwell, having been appointed Commanding General of all U. S. forces in China, Burma, and India, and designated Chief-of-Staff to Chiang Kai-shek in February, 1942, was also named, in May, 1942, the agent of the Munitions Assignment Board. In the latter capacity he was to receive Lend-lease supplies in India for China and to deliver those supplies to the Chinese Army. In September, 1942, U. S. Army Services of Supply assumed control of all Lend-lease and other China-destined material in India, and assumed responsibility for receipt, storage, and transshipment of all material entering China. Stilwell set priorities for dispatch of cargo by U. S. aircraft.

This latter provision meant that as the proportion of U. S. aircraft flying cargo to China steadily increased Stilwell's power to determine what cargo went to China increased with it ... Now, administrative processes were extending this control. Since there was only so much air cargo space at his disposal, Stilwell, as events showed, was adamant that it should be used only for effective prosecution of the war.¹¹

Such control seems what Pitt's subsidy programs lacked in the Wars of the Coalitions. However, Stilwell's very real control of materiel and resources was degraded by several significant problems that vexed both him and General Wedemeyer, his successor. Stilwell had gone to China with the understanding that he would command Chinese armies. On

March 6, 1942, Stilwell reported to Chiang and discussed the question of command. He was informed that he would command forces in Burma. "G-mo said we'd set up the joint staff next day. It was a relief to find that the G-mo contemplates command in Burma for me."¹²

Three days later Shang Chen of the Chinese General Staff

...came with the expected abortion, making everyone equal and with me the chief-of-staff for Allied forces alone ... Hedged about as it is, it's much more than I expected this afternoon. I thought I was destined to be a tailor's dummy and go to Tuesday meetings.¹³

Chiang's disinclination for offensive operations, mentioned earlier, proved an emasculating impediment to Stilwell's command powers.

Reluctance to attack seemed to drench the spirit of the Chinese command beyond any measurement of encouragement Stilwell could give. In the course of the next two weeks Stilwell found that his authority to command was an authority of courtesy, not an authority of action.¹⁴

Stilwell's facade of command was confirmed by General Tu Li-ming's comment to Governor-General Doorman-Smith of Burma,

...the American General only thinks that he is commanding. In fact he is doing no such thing. You see, we Chinese think that the only way to keep the Americans in the war is to give them a few commands on paper.¹⁵

Stilwell's debility in command was complemented by his inability to exact any quid pro quo from Chiang in exchange for Lend-lease. In a letter to General Marshall, President Roosevelt in March, 1943, explicitly rejected

Stilwell's proposed bargaining technique:

...my first thought is that Stilwell has exactly the wrong approach in dealing with Generalissimo Chiang ... when he speaks of talking to him in sterner tones, he goes about it just the wrong way ... He is the Chief Executive as well as the Commander in-Chief, and one cannot speak sternly to a man like that or exact commitments from him the way we might do from the Sultan of Morocco.¹⁶

Lack of adequate support in Washington as well as in Chungking prevented Stilwell from conducting any major strategic offensive operations. But, as mentioned earlier, such campaigns were not a part of American strategy. American goals in the China-Burma-India Theatre were not predicated upon engaging and defeating the enemy, but upon China's continued existence as a nuisance to Japan. Chinese operations were to pull and keep Japanese troops out of the Pacific. For achievement of such goals, it was not necessary to command, or even to control, an army. Nor was it critical to ensure that Lend-lease was used to reform the Chinese Army, or anything else beyond keeping it in existence. As long as that army was deployed against the Japanese, combat or no, and as long as the Chinese government survived in some viable form, American interests would be served. Stilwell did have adequate command and control to ensure that Lend-lease did serve American strategy and policy. One may speculate that General Stilwell, had he had as complete and effective command and control as did Wellington, might have built the Second Burma Campaign into a major offensive drive to Canton or Shanghai, and that the allies might not have been able to

support it simultaneously with campaigns in the Western Pacific and Europe.

Continued Support and Deployment of U. S. Troops

The Cairo Conference in November and December, 1943, marked a distinct turning point in Sino-American relations. The occasion that was to have propelled China into Great-Power status instead pushed Chiang into a minor position in the war. The disastrous performance of the Chinese General Staff in the military conferences was culminated by President Roosevelt's decision on December 5 to cancel "BUCCANEER", the joint amphibious-airborne operation that was to have made the China-Burma-India Theatre into a major war effort. Chiang's response was to demand a billion dollar loan. Denied that, he threatened termination of his contribution to the Allied war efforts unless the United States would pay the official Chinese Government rate of exchange (six times the market rate) for airfields for the new B-29 bombers. Despite the sudden appearance of several alternatives to Chiang and support of his government, the American policy of keeping China in the war was not changed.

All in Washington were agreed that the United States could not and would not accept the official rate, but the State Department was anxious not to weaken, and Roosevelt not prepared to drop, Chiang Kai-shek ... Meanwhile under various financial compromises, the Chinese people built the fields and the B-29's flew.¹⁷

Despite Chiang's perversity, U. S. policy was prepared to support him through the war, if only to obtain bomber bases and occupy Japanese troops. Lend-lease

supplies continued to flow through India to China throughout the war, almost as a routine semi-permanent operation.

On February 19, 1944, the first American combat troops arrived in the China-Burma-India theatre. The 5307th Provisional Regiment (Merrill's Marauders) was assigned to the South East Asia Command formed at the Trident Conferences in July, 1943. The Americans were to participate with the Chinese in the Second Burma Campaign to stop the Japanese 1944 Offensive and open North Burma for construction of the Ledo (Stilwell) Road. The Americans were committed immediately as were British troops. Chiang, however, refused to deploy his troops until Washington agreed to support Stilwell's threat to stop Lend-lease supplies if Chinese troops were not put into combat. On April 14, 1944, the order was given to Chinese divisions to move against the Japanese.

Strategy and Tactics

Real command of Chinese troops, which would have completed Stilwell's likeness to Wellington, was urgently recommended to Chiang by President Roosevelt in July, 1944. Three months later in October Stilwell was recalled. Roosevelt, tired and ill after twelve years in office, concerned about ending the war in Europe, and perhaps distracted by Marshall and Stilwell in the persistent promotion of a Wellingtonian image of Stilwell in China, began to build that image.

Roosevelt's action was not necessary to, or even functional in, American strategy of Europe first, Pacific

second, and China last. Nor was it consistent with his policy of a Great Power China. American combat troops were not needed to keep China in the war, although their presence may have been necessary to ease America's burden by opening the Ledo Road. American troops and an offensive campaign, strategically unnecessary though tactically urgent, led to the quid pro quo of Chinese offensive action for Lend-lease in April, 1944. The offensive was similarly strategically unnecessary though tactically urgent. The Second Burma Campaign, insofar as it was more than a response to Japanese operations, had little basis in American strategy, but was tactically sound as a necessary operation to facilitate supplying China through North Burma. American insistence upon command for Stilwell had not even these tactical bases and could be justified only if the operations of Chinese forces were to assume a critical role in U. S. strategy. That such was not the case was made manifest at the Quebec Conferences in September, 1944. "All plans for operations against the Japanese assumed no action in China beyond containing some enemy forces on the mainland."¹⁸ When told of the conferences Stilwell commented in his diary, "This theatre is written off and nothing expected from us. No [American] troops will be sent."¹⁹

In such a situation during wartime other factors must yield to military strategy. Thus when President Roosevelt was forced to choose between American strategy of keeping China in the war and an alternative of abandoning

China or forcing China to choose between Stilwell's command with Lend-lease, or Chinese command without Lend-lease, he could only choose to recall Stilwell. To force Chiang to accept Stilwell as a quid pro quo ran the risk of forcing Chiang out of the war, an event perceived as adverse to American interests. After the Stilwell command crisis, Lend-lease was continued until December, 1945, when all pre-V-J Day commitments had been met.

Conclusions

Military assistance to China during World War II in the form of Lend-lease was quite successful in achieving U. S. purposes, even those purposes were quite limited. The precepts suggested at the end of Chapter IV were all present. U. S. military forces, although inferior in 1941, became dominant and were deployed as necessary in China-Burma-India Theatre and in the Pacific Theatre as a major force. The United States was never mendicant as was Britain during the coalitions. Generals Magruder, Stilwell, and Wedemeyer maintained adequate command and control to serve U. S. interests and to achieve U. S. purposes. Although they were unable to mount joint operations or to direct the movements of Chinese forces to any great extent, such efforts were superfluous to U. S. purposes. Both China and the United States wished to keep China in the war and to avoid extensive offensive combat. Lend-lease to China was definitely integrated with military strategy and foreign policy. Slight economic assistance was provided through the loans in 1940

1942 and as non-military Lend-lease goods. Nevertheless economic assistance was not deemed necessary to further U. S. interests. Lend-lease was provided China to serve U. S. war aims, and was continued as long as the war lasted. No evidence indicates any intention to terminate Lend-lease as long as China remained in the war, regardless of the length of the war. President Roosevelt's refusal to use a id pro quo technique was a virtual guarantee of Lend-lease as long as needed. Although Wellington and Stilwell are quite dissimilar, their experiences are sufficiently similar to lend some validity to the tentative uniformities listed in Chapter IV and mentioned above.

POST-WAR CHINA

tent of Post-war Aid

With the formal surrender of Japan, Chinese Nationalists and Communists began a race to accept surrenders of Japanese troops in occupied areas of China. The Communists held the geographic advantage while the Nationalists maintained military superiority. United States forces in China, about 60,000 at the end of the war, provided air and water transport to move government troops into vital areas, and deployed 50,000 Marines from the Western Pacific into North China to maintain control of vital areas, installations, and facilities, and to repatriate the nearly three million Japanese in China. By December, 1945, wartime commitments to use Lend-lease funds to equip a 39-division Chinese army

had been met. No further formal military assistance was authorized by the U. S. Congress until the China Aid Act of 1948. Upon termination of Lend-lease agreements and their extensions, military assistance slowed to a trickle. It consisted of fixed installations evacuated by homeward bound U. S. forces, surplus non-combat commodities, naval stores and spare parts. When the Marines evacuated China during 1946 and 1947, they abandoned vast stores of ammunition, the majority of which was either unserviceable or unfit for Chinese weapons and tactics. Military advisors, like materiel, were provided under the President's wartime authority. Congress failed to provide legislative authority for either in both 1946 and 1947. Only a small group of 300 naval advisors was prescribed in Public Law 512, passed by the 79th Congress in July, 1946, to oversee the transfer and subsequent use of 271 surplus non-combat ships to China. In 1945 and 1946 military assistance to China was in terms of terminating wartime commitments, transfers of abandoned or surplus materiel, U. S. personnel deemed necessary to oversee these operations, and advisors forbidden to participate in combat operations. Only in the latter half of 1947 were large amounts of surplus ammunition and airplanes made available to the Nationalist Government. Economic aid in 1945, '46, and '47 was almost totally directed to rehabilitation and recovery. It involved food, clothing, and consumer goods, although some financial credits were also made available for non-military uses. The China Aid

Act finally passed in June, 1948, provided a grant of \$125 million in military assistance to China and \$338 million in economic aid of which \$275 million was appropriated. This grant for military assistance was expended in 1948 and 1949 and merely delayed the ultimate Communist victory. Total aid provided for China since V-J Day was placed at just over \$2 billion by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a letter to President Truman dated July 30, 1949.²⁰ The Chinese Nationalist Government qualified that amount by saying that it received only \$225 million worth of effective and appropriate military assistance prior to removal of the government to Formosa. Freda Utley calculated the amount to be \$360 million.²¹ The U. S. State Department claimed that \$797.7 million was expended in military aid to post-war mainland China.²²

New National Interests and Purposes

Pre-V-J Day military assistance had been used to keep China in the war. Both President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang shared that goal. After V-J Day and the repatriation of Japanese nationals, the common enemy was a defeated nation and the common purposes of China and the United States vanished with their achievement. The decision-making processes of each government began to operate in terms of new sets of national interests that did not coincide.

American aims were explicitly set forth in December, 1945. In a policy statement on December 15, 1945, President

uman declared:

It is the firm belief of this government that a strong united and democratic China is of utmost importance to the success of this United Nations organization and for world peace . . . It is thus in the most vital interest of the United States and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly by means of peaceful negotiation . . . The United States recognizes and will continue to recognize the National Government of China and co-operate with it in international affairs and specifically in eliminating Japanese influence from China. United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife.²³

merican policy had two essential aspects: "to do all we could to restore a 'strong, united, and democratic China' without intervening in the Chinese civil war but by reconciling the warring factions. Pending that time, we would continue to recognize Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government."²⁴

Competition between Nationalist armies supported by American transport and troops, and Communist armies in exerting control over occupied China soon led to active combat between them. In pursuance of the American policy of reconciliation, President Truman sent General Marshall on December, 1945, to mediate a cessation of hostilities in China. On February 25, 1946, he issued a directive to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy:

...to establish jointly a United States Military Advisory Group to China. The strength of the Advisory Group should not exceed one thousand officers and men ...The object of this Advisory Group will be to assist and advise the Chinese Government in the deployment of modern armed forces for the fulfillment of those obligations which may devolve upon China under her international agreements.²⁵

It was the original intention of the United States that military assistance whether in the form of material and equipment, training and advice, or U. S. troops would be designed and used to assist in the reorganization, consolidation, and integration of the several distinct and, in some cases, autonomous Communist and Nationalist armies into one Chinese army, under principles defined by a Nationalist-Communist coalition. This concept was implicit in General Marshall's mission.

Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, who collectively comprised the national government of China, in contrast to the American view toward reconciliation, negotiation, and compromise, found Chinese interests supported by the suppression of the Communists, and Kuomintang dominance over any opposition groups. In a statement on August 13, 1949, on the anniversary of Japanese surrender, President Chiang, referring to the Communists, said, "we must not permit another state to exist within a state; nor permit a private army to operate independent of a national army."²⁶ Both the Nationalists in Nanking and the Communists in Peking saw as their goal total dominance in all China and concomitant suppression of the other.

Yenan was seeking a dominant not a satellite role. Chiang Kai-shek also wanted dominance in all China, including Manchuria, and believed he must gain it by military means . . . What brought about the total failure of the Marshall mission was not the independence, or lack of it, of Yen-an from Moscow, as much as the death wish of the Kuomintang in taking on an offensive military campaign against the Communists for control of all China.²⁷

S. Mediation

General Marshall's initial attempts at mediation are moderately successful. Negotiations between the communists and the National Government, induced by General Patrick J. Hurley in mid-1945, continued after V-J Day. Shortly before his departure on September 22, 1945, General Hurley reported:

The spirit between the negotiators is good. The rapprochement between the two leading parties of China seems to be progressing, and the discussion and rumors of civil war recede as the conference continues.²⁸

Despite the favorable tone of the negotiations, civil war, even in September, was not out of the question. The communists had refused to recognize orders of the National Government, and were proceeding to accept surrender from Japanese forces, seize enemy materiel, occupy enemy territory, and hold them against the National Government. The resultant series of increasingly widespread and frequent armed clashes spread to other areas and seemed to presage a severe civil war. In this setting military action or inaction soon became a sine qua non for political concessions or even negotiations.

On January 10, 1946, the negotiators reached an agreement, under the influence of General Marshall, for the cessation of hostilities. Agreement was reached on February 7, to a plan for reorganization of the national army to include the Communist armies. It was in support of this agreement that the U. S. Military Advisory Group was formed and sent to China. Despite the accord in Nanking,

he basic enmity and distrust between Communists and Nationalists led to clashes in Canton, Hopeh, Honan and particularly in Manchuria:

Even at this stage the National Government seemed determined to incur no restraints on its freedom of action in Manchuria, and appeared bent on a policy of complete military occupation of the area and elimination of the Chinese Communist forces if they were encountered.²⁹

Communist capture of Changchun in Manchuria on May 8, 1946, immediately after Russian withdrawal, and its subsequent recapture on May 23 by the National Government made obvious the deterioration of the rapprochement seen to be "progressing" by General Hurley. A truce was arranged on June 7, 1946. During July, however, hostilities spread from Manchuria into China proper. On July 7, the Communists protested American military and financial aid to the Nationalist Government. General Marshall was in the untenable position of mediating between the two Chinese groups while simultaneously the U. S. Government was continuing to supply arms, ammunition, and equipment to only the National Government. (Transfers of materiel at this time were not formal military assistance, but were transfers of surplus and excess military and naval stores in the Pacific Theatre.)

Conflicting U. S. Policies

The conflicts between a policy of mediation and one of support for one side effectively subverted any success for either policy. Mediation and formation of a coalition could

not succeed in China while either side saw a possibility of suppression of the other and dominating China. While U. S. support allowed Chiang to maintain a viable military position by supplying or selling material and providing advisors to assist in incorporating Communist armies within it, he was loathe to grant important concessions regarding his military position, so necessary to the success of any negotiations. The Communists, faced with a U. S. National Government, were no more amenable to conceding any of their advantages of territory. This is not to suggest that mediation failed because of U. S. support for Chiang, for, in the words of Dean Acheson,

The unfortunate but unescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result. Nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it.³⁰

Policies of mediation and support were simply either integrated nor even complementary. While support for Chiang hindered negotiations, an explicit policy of nonintervention and mediation did not allow American officers to obtain or exercise sufficient influence over Chiang and the Nationalist army to achieve U. S. policy goals in that area involving reorganization and inclusion of the Communists.

U. S. Control

To support his mediation effort, General Marshall requested the American government to prohibit the export of munitions to China. The prohibition became effective in

August, 1946, but extended only to combat types of military equipment. The prohibition apparently had little effect, since only in November, when the Nationalist Government had reached the farthest limit of its military expansion, did the Kuomintang agree to cease hostilities again. Failure of American efforts to bring peace and unity to China was recognized, and General Marshall's mission terminated in January, 1947.

Chiang's disinclination to disengage from the communists was matched by American advisors' incapacity to influence military operations and growing inability to influence their Chinese counterparts at all. Although implied by conversations between President Truman and Dr. Song as early as September, 1945, and implicit in P. L. 12 passed in July, 1946, United States withdrawal from its position of military influence was not acknowledged formally until late in 1947. On November 28, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall wrote to Ambassador John L. Stuart concerning the limits of U. S. influence and responsibility, and the concomitant surrender of any powers of command and control.

I am willing that General Barr should make his advice available to the Generalissimo on informal and confidential basis and that Army Advisory Group should supply advice with respect to reorganization of Chinese Army Services of Supply should that be desired. I am however not willing that we should accept responsibility for Chinese strategic plans and operations ... implications of our accepting that responsibility would be very far-reaching and grave and such responsibility is in logic inseparable from authority to make it effective.³¹

As commanding general of the U. S. Advisory Group in China, Major General David Barr submitted in 1949 a report that was replete with references to Chiang's disregard of his advice, for by that time all semblance of American supervision had disappeared. In early 1946, American military strength in China was at a peak of 113,000. By Christmas, 1946, that number had been reduced to 12,000.³² On January 29, 1947, the State Department announced termination of the Marshall Mission in China, and announced the immediate withdrawal of military personnel assigned to that mission. The only American troops remaining in China were a few small guard and medical detachments, and Army units searching for graves and bodies of Americans who had died during the war. Not more than 8,000 - 10,000 soldiers were scattered through China, including the 1,000-man advisory group mentioned above. The 300-man naval mission provided by P. L. 512 was created by Executive Order on April 25, 1947. The entire advisory effort was ordered removed from China in late 1948. During this period none of these advisors had any valid role involving command and control of military forces or resources. The policies announced by Truman and Marshall prohibiting U. S. involvement and responsibility remained despite Chinese requests for American officers to command Chinese forces and American advice on military operations.³³

U. S. Military Assistance

In April and May, 1947, and continuing through the

mer, the Marines abandoned to the Chinese Government
 rces approximately 6,500 tons of ammunition as they
 thdrew.³⁴ On April 25, 1947, President Truman ordered the
 ansfer to China of 131 naval vessels authorized by P. L.
 2 the preceding year. On May 26, Secretary Marshall
 rected removal of the American prohibition on export of
 ms and ammunition to China. The first shipments of arms
 d ammunition left Seattle on July 14, 1947. Just ten
 ys earlier the Chinese National State Council had passed
 General National Mobilization Resolution that was, in effect
 declaration of war on the Communists. On July 7, in
 porting the resolution over radio, President Chiang Kai-shek
 clared,

...Suppression of the Communist rebellion, therefore
 is aimed at preserving the highest interests of the
 state ... Our struggle against the Communist rebels
 is as sacred as was our resistance against the Japanese
 aggressor.³⁵

On July 11, President Truman instructed Lieutenant
 neral Albert C. Wedemeyer to make an appraisal of the
 tuation in China and to submit recommendations regarding
 sistance policy. The Wedemeyer Report, submitted on
 ptember 19, recommended in general a program of at least
 ve years for American military and economic assistance to
 ina. The report also recommended integration with the
 rldwide American policy of military and economic assistance
 specified nations. No assistance should be provided
 thout some sort of quid pro quo stipulation regarding
 litary, political, and economic reforms, and effective

merican supervision of the program.³⁶

The subsequent proposed program of aid for China, presented to Congress in February, 1948, included few of General Wedemeyer's specific recommendations beyond its integration into a worldwide program. (It is interesting that General Wedemeyer's recommendations closely parallel the conclusions of this study.) Military assistance was not specifically requested. The State Department considered the \$570 million economic assistance program sufficiently large to free Chinese foreign exchange for purchase of military supplies.

It was not considered desirable that the United States embark upon a military aid program calling for the use of United States military advisors in combat areas or upon measures of military aid which would have led to United States military intervention in China.³⁷

The conference bill passed by Congress on April 2, 1948, authorized for one year \$338 million for economic aid and \$125 million to be used at the discretion of the Chinese government. Legislative history of the bill made it clear that the latter grant was assumed by the Congress to be military assistance. It was agreed, however, in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that the broad language of the bill should not be interpreted to include use of American armed forces for combat duties in China.

Despite provision of this aid, the position of the Chinese Government continued to deteriorate. In October, 1948, the Communists obtained complete control of Manchuria with the fall of Mukden. The China Aid Act of 1948, whose

thority expired in April, 1949, was replaced by new legislation that made available to the President any portions the economic aid appropriation as were unobligated at at time. (The military assistance grant had been completely pended.) No new funds were authorized and military assistance was not renewed. Dean Acheson defined U. S. policy in a letter to Senator Tom Connolly on March 15, 1949.

... to furnish the military means for bringing about a reversal of the present deterioration and for providing some prospect of successful military resistance would require the use of an unpredictably large American armed force in actual combat, a course of action which would represent direct United States involvement in China's fratricidal warfare and would be contrary to our traditional policy toward China and the interests of this country.³⁸

S. Strategy and Foreign Policy

American military strategy, forces, and tactics in the Far East between 1945 and 1950 were in the throes of conversion to those of a nuclear power. The Eighth Army in Japan, the Pacific Fleet, and the Tenth Air Force were deemed sufficient military forces to meet any threat. Even, however, in 1946, those forces were well on the way to massive deterioration, made manifest in 1950. With the possible exceptions of port privileges and air landing and overflight privileges, China proper had no place in American military strategy. There was, to be sure, some vague feeling inherited from Roosevelt that China should have a military force to meet the international commitments of her Great Power status. Even recognizing these commitments, and China's internal security requirements, it was felt that China was not crucial

American national security. American military planners saw no strategic value to the United States in maintaining military force in China. The Chinese forces were regarded as a purely technical, professional, military issue involving the exercise of professional expertise in winning battles and campaigns with those forces. Washington was not concerned with the creation of an effective fighting force that would contribute to the promotion of U. S. security through military strategy.

U. S. policy regarding the Chinese civil war was fairly constant after V-J Day: the United States was not to be involved. American policy toward the Chinese political situation was less rigid. Secretary of State Byrnes wrote in an enclosure to General Marshall's diplomatic instructions:

It is essential that the Central Government of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise ... We also believe that it [Chiang's government] must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well organized groups who are now without any voice in the government of China.³⁹

By late 1948, U. S. policy toward Chinese politics had become ambivalent and negative. On August 12, 1948, the Secretary of State informed the U. S. ambassador that:

The United States Government must not directly or indirectly give any implication of support, encouragement or acceptability of coalition government in China with Communist participation ... Overt United States opposition to Chinese Government compromise with the Chinese Communists (or even secretly expressed opposition which would likely become known) would at this juncture provide ammunition in China for propaganda alleging that the United States was encouraging and prolonging the civil war.⁴⁰

October the embassy received guidance to the effect that, increased aid would violate all basic considerations underlying American policy toward China."⁴¹

It requires but little intuition to realize that any military assistance at all is probably non-supportive of, if not inconsistent with or dysfunctional toward, such policies announced by the several Secretaries of State. Even the haphazard provision of such aid as was provided through P. L. 80-2, the sale of surplus commodities, and President Truman's 100-man Advisory Group can be seen as anomalous. The failure to provide formal military assistance until 1948 was probably based upon the announced U.S. policy of nonintervention, and was generally quite consistent with it (with exceptions noted). However the Congressional mandate in the China Aid Act to provide military assistance was not occasioned by a change in policy, nor did it induce a change in policy. It merely led the Secretary of State to contradict himself in the same message, explaining that the United States would neither support coalition nor yet oppose it. (Supra p. 40.) He noted that "increased aid would violate . . . American policy,"⁴² in October, 1948, six months after Congress had passed the China Aid Act which provided increased aid. Although State Department policy as announced probably reflected what were perceived as U. S. national interests at the time, the actual incidence of military assistance seems to have had only a nominal connection to that policy and was largely based upon other

actors, not including military strategy as noted above.

Other Factors

Political exchange, compromise, and Congressional bartering were probably the critical factors leading to the inclusion of military assistance in the China Aid Act. Prior lend-lease commitments accounted for much of the military assistance to China in 1945 and 1946. A plethora of surplus war materiel facilitated the sales of surplus commodities. Sales of surplus war goods to China provided a fast and inexpensive method of disarming after World War II. Withdrawal of U. S. troops from the Far East left numerous fixed installations and facilities of no further use to the United States. A sense of obligation, and perhaps moral responsibility for, a wartime ally, and dedication to the myth of a Chinese Great Power in world affairs may have been instrumental in furnishing U. S. training and advice to Chiang in attainment of his new role. These statements are not offered as reasons for U. S. policy toward China, but merely as suggestive of the disparity between military assistance in fact and announced U. S. policy.

Explicit American support of Chiang's government in Nanking and the responsiveness of that government to American influence in 1946 and decreasingly in 1947, were in bold contrast with American non-support of the Communists in Yen'an and consequent lack of influence on Communist policies. American pressure upon Chiang to compromise

could not be matched with similar pressure upon Mao Tse-tung. American parsimony of military assistance and alleged Russian largesse toward the Communists served not to induce compromise, but rather to bolster Communist intransigence and to inhibit coalition forming. It is relatively clear now, and was suspected then, that Moscow had considerable influence in Yen-an, but was not exerting it in terms of the civil war, for whatever reasons one wishes to adduce. American diplomacy in Moscow would not, or could not, but in any case did not, elicit anything more than a few pious political platitudes from Stalin regarding the Chinese situation. Russia remained officially aloof and honored, in a strict sense, treaty commitments to Chiang, for a time, despite whatever efforts American diplomats made. Whether Russia could have been induced to support actively the American position involves sheer speculation and is as unrewarding as it is tempting. In any case, Washington chose not to pursue the issue.

One might argue that American China policy was simply a low priority aspect of total American foreign policy at that time, and that Russian support for the United States in China was foregone for some other goal of higher priority. Such an argument, to be effective, must offer some goal of higher priority that the United States gained by foregoing Russian support of its China policy. A discussion of such a question is far beyond the scope of this paper, and is not really germane to the issue of

military assistance in China. One might impugn the low priority of China in American foreign policy simply by noting that no less a figure than George C. Marshall was chosen to pursue U. S. interests there, and that \$2 billion were spent there in the pursuit of U. S. goals.

American influence in Yenan was almost nonexistent primarily because Washington chose not to recognize the Yenan government or to conduct official relations with the Chinese Communist regime, but also due to the fact that American unofficial efforts were insignificant. American diplomacy had no means available to influence the Communists. Political support was impossible. Economic and military assistance had been prohibited by Washington. Diplomatic recognition was contradictory with recognition of Chiang. The only communication between the Communists and the Americans was the contact between General Marshall and Zhou En-lai in Chungking and later in Nanking. Marshall had nothing to offer the Communists, or to withhold, beyond his good graces as mediator.

These instances of American positions toward Moscow and Yenan argue not a failure of American diplomacy, but rather a somewhat isolated or parochial cant of American China policy and a lack of any sincere or effective attempts to integrate it with other aspects of American foreign policy at that time. This disparity may be seen perhaps as a contributive factor in the failure of the China policy to promote U. S. avowed objectives and interests. It

further supports a major premise of this paper that a military assistance program in order successfully to promote donor national interests must be integrated into both foreign policy and military strategy.

Economic assistance to Spain and Portugal was devoted to government support and to economic stabilization to enable the recipient governments to continue their war efforts. The relationship was reversed in China with military assistance being justified as necessary for economic reforms and development based upon economic assistance. Economic and military assistance were of approximately equal magnitude, just under \$800 million in each case. (Utley's calculations indicate that economic assistance was more than twice the amount of effective and appropriate military assistance.⁴³) Approximately 65% of the economic assistance was devoted to war relief and rehabilitation, of which most was spent through multilateral agencies (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and the Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs, an international organization established by the Chinese government to coordinate rehabilitation affairs and to centralize efforts.) Although 70% of the economic aid authorized by the China Aid Act was to be devoted to provision of relief commodities, by early 1949, that proportion had risen to 95%. Economic assistance for industrial and rural reconstruction was primarily in the form of credits, and was generally ineffective due to the civil war. The United States made

only nominal efforts to assist in economic stabilization. A \$500 million credit was proposed, but never implemented. Attempts at economic stabilization by the United States were specifically rejected by the Department of State and the Treasury Department, and the Federal Reserve Board:

Since inflation in China is essentially an internal problem, the basis for a permanent solution will ultimately have to be provided primarily by the Chinese themselves. Funds are, therefore, not provided for currency stabilization in the proposed China Aid program. The program does, however, assure a continued supply from abroad of commodities and raw materials essential to the prevention of starvation and the maintenance of industrial output, and in this sense is anti-inflationary.⁴⁴

In any case, U. S. economic assistance other than that devoted to relief, recovery, and rehabilitation was insignificant, and cannot be said to have been a major factor in U. S. policy, except in its absence. Economic assistance was not in practice, and was not intended to be, complementary to military assistance. Whatever the intent, American economic assistance devoted almost exclusively to commodity relief, and military assistance devoted to providing military equipment and ammunition, and to reorganizing the Chinese army, were not integrated, mutually supportive, or even complementary.

CONCLUSIONS

These American experiences in China seem to support the contentions suggested by the British aid experiences during the Napoleonic Wars. Thus, it is possible to reiterate that set of precepts mutatis mutandis with some

im to empirical generality and theoretic value: In
er that a wartime military assistance program promote
or national interests effectively, contribute to donor
ional security and defense, and be successful in
eral Wood's definition,

- 1) Donor must maintain a dominant military capability and must be willing to employ it as necessary in conjunction with a military assistance program.

Corollaries:

- a. Donor must be willing to continue military assistance for a long, indefinite time
 - b. Donor must be willing to deploy troops into combat in conjunction with recipient troops
- 2) Donor must retain sufficient control of resources transferred and adequate influence over the recipient military forces to ensure promotion of donor interests and achievement of donor purposes.
 - 3) Donor and recipient must share common national interests expressed in terms of purposes.
 - 4) Donor must integrate foreign policy, military strategy, and military assistance into a single policy for promoting national interests.

Corollary: Economic assistance must be integrated with military assistance.

CHAPTER VI

FRENCH ASSISTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES DURING THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

BACKGROUND

The political milieu in Europe was as changed by the treaty as was the cadastral face of North America. France and Spain, world leaders of the early 18th Century, were reduced almost to ciphers in the European political system. England had become the greatest power in the civilized world, and was resolutely pursuing a policy of aggressive expansion in commercial monopolies and establishment of colonies overseas, always at the expense of powers with weaker navies or European liabilities. France had been forced to abandon Louis XIV's colonial dream and had reverted to her traditional continental policy of preventing the jaws of the Hapsburg vice from crushing her, and of pulverizing any crystals of German unity. But neither Louis XV, Louis XVI, nor their respective foreign ministers, the Duc de Choiseul and the Comte de Vergennes, abandoned the conviction of Louis XIV that British power is based upon her colonial empire and that a fatal blow would best be struck elsewhere than in Europe.

FRENCH PURPOSES

Almost immediately after the peace of 1763, it (the French government) sought in the propensities of the English colonists to revolt against their metropole the chance to take revenge on England and tear up the Treaty of Paris.¹

France maintained secret observers in both America and London from 1764 to report on military intelligence and the political temper of the colonists.

It was not until 1775, nearly a year after Louis XV's death, that Vergennes began to realize that the opportunity for reversing the balance of British power was imminent. After calling the attention of the Spanish ambassador in London to the substantially increased shipments of troops and military supplies from London to America, Vergennes set himself the task of enlisting Spain as a French ally against England. By the middle of 1775, Vergennes felt that he could rely upon Spanish support in his next move, the active support of the American rebels.

Although veiled and coded references to some support of the Americans began to appear in French despatches as early as December 1774, the first direct mention of his purpose of intervention appears in Vergennes' note of August 1775, to Marquis d'Ossun, the French ambassador in Madrid:

. . . we believe here that upon the first open act of hostility by England, it would be proper to seize all English ships that we meet at sea or in port. We believe, however, that it would be well to except the ships belonging to and chartered for the inhabitants

of North America, . . . It might even be proper to issue a common declaration which should address them as a free and independent people, inviting them to our respective ports and assuring them therein freedom and privileges of commerce. But the part to take in that regard would depend upon circumstances in America at that time.²

Early in the following month, September 1775, a special, secret French observer was sent to America with instructions to:

. . . render a faithful account of the situation and general disposition [in America]; and to reassure the Americans against the fright that some have sought to give them of us . . . we would be glad if favorable circumstances should send them in liberty to frequent our ports; the commercial facilities that they would find there would soon prove esteem that we have for them.³

Despite the protestations in state documents, either the king nor any other members of the French court had any sympathy for the insurgents. With several exceptions such as Lafayette, de Kalb, French nobility felt no disposition to help the rebels, but rather saw in the rebellion an opportunity to strike a fatal blow at British power. It was as a simple and natural refinement of the French policy since 1763 of taking revenge on and weakening England that led to the belief that restoration of the glory of France lay in the success of the American Revolution. It was this latter belief that animated French foreign policy for the next eight years. Late in 1775 Vergennes prepared a memoir for Louis XVI which outlined what was to become a policy of French military assistance to the United States. Vergennes perceived at that time that the colonies "have come to the determination to throw off the yoke of the mother-country."⁴

fter elaborating prospective losses to England and gains
 o France, Vergennes comments on the colonies themselves:

The war which the colonies are now carrying on will exhaust and impoverish them to such an extent that it will be a long time before they can think of taking up arms to attack their neighbors . . . They are in need, first, of munitions of war; second, of ready money; third, of a good navy. Thus it would be necessary to see to these three needs if we were to respond to their appeal for aid.⁵

ergennes proposes three schemes to provide secret, clandestine military assistance to meet these needs. While not necessary to supply anything now, France "must sustain the courage and perseverance of the 'insurgents' by flattering them with the hope of effective aid as soon as circumstances will permit it."⁶ He concludes by affirming that, since war with England is inevitable,

. . . prudence says that we should prepare early the means to wage it with success and advantage. We venture to believe that the most effective means would be to make sure of the Colonies and to make common cause with them if need be.

Vergennes thus proposed a policy of using covert military assistance to exploit the American Revolution to weaken England until France perceived a good opportunity to declare war and deliver the fatal blow. Although neither American nor French decision makers perceived it in these terms, the American Revolution provided an opportunity to further the achievement of both French and American national purposes. French intent at this point was to give the Americans enough assistance to enable them to maintain an active war and to occupy the British army and navy until

France felt strong enough to strike. The actual operations of the American forces were seen as irrelevant, as long as they operated. The major military effort was seen as a large French-Spanish effort aimed at British colonies. France was to obtain its rewards during peace negotiations with England and was unconcerned about military campaigns, victories, or even occupied territories in America as long as the Americans continued to fight. Thus Vergennes was not concerned about influencing the Americans, beyond ensuring their belligerence, but was more interested in influencing Spain who needed nothing that France had, was not anxious to go to war, and possessed military and naval forces essential to France's success.

Vergennes was not yet ready to commit himself to committed, albeit covert, military assistance to the Americans without Spanish support. Many months of diplomatic maneuvering climaxed in March, 1776, when the Spanish foreign minister wrote to Vergennes and agreed in principle to secret assistance:

It is certainly desirable to us that the revolt of these people continue, and we ought to want the English, and them, to exhaust themselves reciprocally . . . the King is ready and offers to join reasonably in all expenses.⁸

COVERT ASSISTANCE

Initiation of Military Assistance

Finally on May 2, 1776, Louis XVI ordered that one million livres (One [1] livre was approximately equivalent to

\$50,1815.) be supplied secretly to the Americans through Jean-François de Beaumarchais, a secret agent of Vergennes, in the guise of a private trader under the fictitious name of Rodrigue Hortalez and Company. Charles III of Spain matched Louis' gift with another million livres also to be distributed through Beaumarchais. Thus before the first American agent had appeared in a French port, the French government, in a gross example of Machiavellian power politics, had provided secret military assistance to the colonies and was preparing for a major war with England.

In July, 1776, Mr. Silas Deane, the official American Commissioner, arrived in France with authority to make contracts and also to request formal military assistance from the French government. During the rest of 1776, Deane and Beaumarchais collected, purchased, and shipped military equipment to America through R. Hortalez and Co., which was in fact the intermediary between the French government and the American colonies. During the next year this fictitious trading company sent to America eight ships full of war material valued at more than 6,000,000 livres, and drawn in large part from French royal arsenals. The first convoy of three ships left France late in 1776, carrying among other items 200 field cannon with full trains, 17 mortars, 100,000 rifle balls, 13,000 bombs, 30,000 rifles, 290,000 pounds of gunpowder, 3,000 tents, and clothing for 30,000 men.⁹

Vergennes continued his machinations to bring

Spain into a war with England. On October 8, 1776, Spain agreed to join France in the war. On October 11, Vergennes learned of Washington's defeat on Long Island and consequently adopted immediately a non-war policy. Whether the Colonies had been conquered or merely crippled, he could no longer think of war. Thus France maintained its policy of secret encouragement and providing enough covert assistance to prevent American capitulation. In November a new Spanish cabinet was formed and the Spanish attitudes toward America and England changed somewhat. It soon became apparent that while Spain remained kindly toward the Colonies, she was opposed to American independence and had no disposition to go to war with England.

Dr. Benjamin Franklin landed in France in December 1776, with plenipotentiary powers to solicit formal French recognition and a commercial treaty. On January 5, 1777, the American representatives presented a formal request for assistance to the French court for eight warships and arms and munitions of war. Four days later the king's reply established French policy as it was to be for some time. Over military assistance in the eight ships was not offered; however:

His Majesty will demonstrate his concern and good will to establish for them secret resources which will strengthen their credit and to increase the number of their purchases.¹⁰

The "resources" mentioned in the note to the American consisted of four payments of 500,000 livres to be paid in

January, April, July, and October, 1777. An additional sum of 1,074,496 livres was paid directly to Beaumarchais by Vergennes in May, June, and July, 1777.¹¹ Whether these payments to Beaumarchais were meant as subsidies to the colonies or as indemnification for Beaumarchais' losses is unclear. But, whatever the intent, it is clear that they were applied ultimately to purchases of goods for the American colonies.

The first foreign loan to the United States was obtained in 1777 from the "Farmers-general of France." This was a pseudo-governmental association that leased public revenues for which it paid the royal treasury a fixed rate. Profit was contingent on current interest rates. As it became apparent that the American Revolution was to be a long affair, the secret committee of Congress realized that the small subsidies from France and Spain would not meet the needs of the American commissioners in Europe. It was thought necessary to purchase equipment, arms, and stores, especially gunpowder, from whoever would sell in whatever country, and to build warships to harass British commerce in European waters. While waiting for the construction of the large ships, many small, swift ships were obtained and equipped as privateers with the connivance of the French court and funds of the American commissioners. To meet these expenses Deane applied for a loan to the French ministry, who referred him with approbation to the "Farmers-general" which could loan public

monies upon government approval without diplomatic complications. On June 4, 1777, 1,000,000 livres was advanced to the commissioners as advance payment on 5,000,000 pounds of tobacco to be shipped when available. Three shipments were made on this contract and the balance of the debt merged in the general account of the French debt in 1793.¹²

Once again in July, 1777, France determined to declare war on England, but Spain would not join now. Earlier Spanish reasons for war had had nothing to do with England or America, but rather were based upon quarrels with Portugal, which had been settled early in 1777. This Spanish rebuff, as well as Burgoyne's successes at Ticonderoga, once more forced Vergennes to maintain a policy of clandestine support and watchful waiting.

FORMAL ALLIANCE

News of Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga arrived in France in December, 1777. Fear that England would offer generous peace terms as a result led Vergennes to promise diplomatic recognition and a treaty of assistance to the Americans. On February 6, 1778, France and the United States signed a treaty of amity and commerce, and a second treaty of military alliance. Although discussed, provisions for military assistance were not included in the final treaty. Three weeks after signing the treaty, the American commissioners received the first of 21 payments collectively amounting to 18,000,000 livres.

This loan of 18,000,000 livres between 1778 and 1782 was not recorded in official documents until the Franco-American Treaty of July 16, 1782, made for the purpose of defining the financial relationships of the two countries. The primary researcher of this loan felt that

... it is probable that it was in its inception in the winter of 1777-1778 not so much a loan as a subsidy ... advanced without an expectation of repayment, though with a stipulation that it should be repaid.¹³

Throughout the war this series of quarterly payments provided the sole reliable income that kept the colonies in the war. In addition, the French king was "pleased to make a present of and to forgive the whole arrears of interest to this day and from thence to the date of the treaty of peace."¹⁴ Franklin estimated the value of this interest at "near two millions ... the free gift made to us at different times [was] an object of at least twelve million [dollars]."¹⁵

FRENCH DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE

The motive of France in the Franco-American treaties of 1778 was recognition of the independence of the United States. However, this recognition, and the treaty that announced it, were still means to achieve the final end of revenge on England. Prior to 1778, the American policy of Vergennes had been made possible by a lull in European affairs. The death of Maximilian Joseph, Elector of Bavaria, on December 30, 1777, forced Vergennes to choose between his current American policies and the ancient French continental

policies. Since Maximilian Joseph left no apparent heir, the fate of Bavaria was uncertain. Austrian Emperor Joseph II felt that he could seize Bavaria since, Russia, Prussia, France, and England all seemed occupied elsewhere, and consequently he occupied most of Bavaria in January, 1778. Frederick the Great replied by mobilizing his Prussian armies. Both Prussia and Austria then promised territorial compensation for French participation. Vergennes was thus forced to choose between the traditional Bourbon policy of profiting by European quarrels to secure additions to French territory in continental Europe (overt French policy since 1763), and the heretofore covert French policy of crippling England. The unhesitating resolve with which Vergennes and Louis XVI rejected the prize for which Louis XIV had fought four unsuccessful and bloody wars, showed the deadly determination of the French court to humble mighty England. It was consequently in France's interest to maintain calm on the continent, and thus Vergennes replied with an offer of mediation. Successful mediation led ultimately to amicalties between France and Russia, and between France and Prussia. These were valuable adjuncts to Vergennes' contemporary project of enlisting the European powers as armed neutrals against British sea power.

The primary purpose of French policy after the American alliance was to get Spain into that alliance, or at least into the war against Great Britain, and to line up the neutrals in Europe in opposition to British maritime principles.¹⁶

FRANCE ENTERS THE WAR

In January, 1778, Vergennes proposed to send a French naval squadron to America where it could "strike an advantageous blow by going directly to the theater of operations to attack English naval forces and to destroy both their warships and their transports."¹⁷ On April 13, 1778, a French fleet of twelve ships and fourteen frigates sailed under Admiral Count d'Estaing for America. From July, 1778, until peace was declared in 1783, a French fleet was somewhere in American waters. The orders given to Count d'Estaing in March, 1778, left little doubt about the tenor of French policy at that time. Nowhere in the instructions was he told to aid the Americans in general terms, but rather "to attack the enemy where [he] would be able to hurt them more and that appear to [him] most contributory to the interests of His Majesty."¹⁸ He was told not to contribute to American conquest of Canada. (A combined Canadian-American nation would be a major threat to French colonies and fishing interests in the North Atlantic and the Caribbean. An antagonistic British Canada and an independent United States would constitute a significant drain on English power.) But if such a campaign were to succeed, he was to defend French interests against both the British and the Americans. He was to defend French colonies and "offer [to the Spanish governors] all means at [his] disposition to defend themselves ... and regard the interests of the

two crowns as [his]."¹⁹ He was to aid the Americans in projects against Nova Scotia, but only in return for a base for commerce and fishing. He was

... expressly ordered to execute a military action advantageous to the Americans, glorious to the arms of the king and appropriate to display the protection that His Majesty accords to his allies before going to the islands of Central America.²⁰

While from the American point of view, the French alliance made it possible to win their war of independence, Vergennes, and perhaps Louis himself, saw it as an extension of the earlier policy of covert military assistance by which France was exploiting the American war to weaken England. The French navy was, in fact, not working to the end of American independence; it was continuing its traditional campaign to weaken England's sea power. After two unsuccessful attempts "to execute a military action advantageous to the Americans" at New York and Newport, d'Estaing refitted his fleet at Boston and sailed to the Caribbean to assume his primary mission of destroying British sea power.

Since this struggle tied up a great part of the British sea forces and extended the war even into the Indian Ocean, England was strained to the utmost and eventually worn down. The British blockade of the American coast was weakened enough so that a formidable fleet of privateers could operate ... Washington knew that the war could be won only by combined land and sea action, and when the French finally co-operated in this obvious strategy, Yorktown was accomplished ... For almost three years Washington had no great help from the mighty Bourbon navies (French and Spanish) which were carrying out their own objectives. The strategies of the allies diverged, but between them they bled Britain white.²¹

The absence of the French fleet in the winter of 1778-1779 returned the tactical initiative to the English who moved the continental war south to Georgia where Savannah fell in December, and thence into South Carolina. D'Estaing postponed his return to France and appeared before Savannah on September 1, 1779. After a single premature assault by French and American forces, the Americans retired to South Carolina and the French to their ships. The siege was raised and d'Estaing sailed at once for France, leaving only a few ships to return to the West Indies.

De'Guichen commanded 22 French ships in the West Indies from March to August, 1780, when he returned to France with 15 ships. However, on July 12, 1780, Count Rochambeau arrived at Newport with seven warships and 5,000 troops, which remained inactively blockaded at Newport until employed at Yorktown in 1781. These troops were, by order of Louis XVI, under the command of General Washington, and were inferior in precedence to American troops.²² Rochambeau was to

...second with all his force every undertaking in which his cooperation [should] be asked ... We shall not propose any operations ... it will be for General Washington and the Council of War to decide upon such as may be useful. All that the King desires is that the troops whom he is sending to the aid of his allies, the United States, shall cooperate effectively to deliver them once for all, from the yoke and tyranny of the English.²³

SPAIN ENTERS THE WAR

The sudden Franco-American alliance of 1778 was seen in Madrid with pique, apprehension, and actual distrust. Spain remained opposed to American independence and was

assuredly not willing to go to war solely to humiliate Great Britain. Count Floridablanca, Spanish principal minister, saw French interests and Spanish interests as quite different, if not opposed. He did not share Vergennes' view of the necessity of British humiliation, and was not impressed by Vergennes' warnings of imminent Anglo-American attacks on Spanish colonies. The Spanish ministry unanimously decided against war and so informed Great Britain. As 1778 passed into 1779, France became an eager suppliant for Spain's help. Vergennes made more and more specific offers to Floridablanca who calmly decided that Spain's price for an alliance would be the recovery of Gibraltar. He intended to have it from Britain as the price of neutrality or from France as a co-belligerent. By 1779, Floridablanca had become convinced that George III would not offer Gibraltar or anything else for Spanish neutrality. On April 12, 1779, The Convention of Aranjuez brought Spain into the war.

The convention provided that both France and Spain should make common war against England until such time as both should achieve a series of goals, all of which would seriously weaken Great Britain. Since France was pledged by the Treaty of 1778 to remain belligerent until the establishment of American independence, it is significant that American independence was not a goal of the Convention. In his anxiety to enlist the Spanish navy in his abasement of Great Britain, Vergennes had been obliged to make concessions that constituted "a flat incompatibility, technically at least,"²⁴

with the Franco-American alliance.

Thus was the purpose of the war in which the United States were already bound to remain to the end, altered and enlarged, not only without their consent, but without their knowledge.²⁵

While the protestations and public utterances of the French government alleged the altruistic goal of American independence, the war policies of Versailles did not reflect any such concern. Private statements, as well as the actual deeds of that court, enunciated the much more parochial purpose of humiliating and weakening England. Thus in Versailles the Convention of Aranjuez seemed a natural and consequent continuation of a constant policy. Elements of that policy included military assistance to America, diplomatic and commercial support for the colonies, a major French military force in the field against England, a refusal to split French efforts between British abasement and French aggrandizement in Bavaria, and now alliance with Spain, all of which efforts were pointed at a single purpose. France now had two separate allies with diverging interests, goals, and strategies, and was thus far successful in keeping both effective in France's campaign against Great Britain.

THE LEAGUE OF ARMED NEUTRALS

The third complement of Vergennes' strategy was "to oppose a union of neutrals to the dominion that the English government exercised over the navigation of the seas."²⁶ Vergennes outlined his policy in instructions to the French ambassador to the United Dutch Provinces in November, 1776

to stir up the Patriot Party opposition and to exploit the eagerness of the Amsterdammers for war profits; to influence the Province of Holland to support the maintenance of neutral maritime rights as written into the Dutch-English great of 1674 and to reject the casus foederis of the Dutch-English treaty of 1678; and to lead the United Provinces into the role either of an alliance with France against England or as a neutral with rights of unlimited convoy.²⁷

Although the questions of neutral property and ships on the high seas were still major controversies, the maxim of "free ships-free goods, unfree ships-unfree goods" had evolved almost into a principle, and was codified in several treaties. According to this concept, enemy property, except contraband, in neutral ships passed free from hindrance by a belligerent naval force and neutral property in enemy ships was subject to confiscation. The definition of contraband was unclear and was usually specifically defined in treaties. It, thus, was a vital interest of France to ensure that neutral powers enjoyed the principles of "free ships-free goods" and a restricted list of contraband that excluded naval stores.

Unable to achieve a triple alliance for maintenance of neutral rights between France, Spain, and the Netherlands, Vergennes adopted a policy of influencing and coercing neutrals to carry goods to French harbors according to existing treaties incorporating "free ships-free goods," and to make the neutral carriers enforce this doctrine against

Great Britain.

On July 26, 1778, a royal ordinance in direct denial of "free ships-free goods" reversed the ancient French prize law and forbade French ships to detain neutral ships under any circumstances except when carrying contraband, whose definition did not include naval stores. Perhaps the most significant article of the ordinance was reservation of the right to revoke the "free ships-free goods" principle from any neutral nation of England which did not accord similar treatment within six months.²⁸ Since England was at war with France, the implication was obvious that neutrals were to demand British acquiescence and then enforce the principles with their own armed convoy escorts.

Since the middle of 1776, American privateers, equipped and purchased with military assistance funds provided by the French court and harbored in French ports, had preyed on British and neutral shipping in the North Sea and English Channel.²⁹ Losses of English cargoes by neutral skippers at the hands of the Americans who did not respect the French naval ordinances, had been steadily increasing when the British Admiralty issued instructions to construe naval stores as contraband in contravention of the Dutch-English treaty of 1674. Consequently losses of French cargoes to English vessels also became a problem.

Dutch Actions

Dutch response was to convoy commercial vessels

carrying non-military cargoes to both belligerents under the protection of Dutch warships, since the Estates General could not achieve unanimity about either the French ordinance or the response to British demands to refrain from carrying naval stores to France. After a three-month extension until March 1, 1779, Vergennes revoked the "free ships-free goods" principle, ordered confiscation of all enemy goods on Dutch ships, and laid a special tax on Dutch ships entering French ports. The most significant aspect of the revocatory decree was its non-application to ships from Amsterdam and Harlem since these cities had supported the French position in the Estates General. In April Great Britain announced that it would arrest all neutral ships bearing naval stores to France even if under naval convoy escort. On May 1, France declared a tariff of 15% in addition to the special tax on all neutral cargo except naval stores. On July 22, 1779, Britain demanded the casus foederis of the Dutch-English alliance of 1678.

As the various cities and provinces succumbed to the economic and diplomatic pressure and supported the French position, the "free ships-free goods" doctrine was re-applied to ships from that city or province. Even so it was not until April 24, 1780, that the Estates General passed a measure for unlimited convoy and naval armament. In effect, the United Provinces had severed ties with England and espoused the French position. Dutch ships would henceforth carry naval stores to France under

protection of Dutch naval convoys. Louis XVI immediately restored the maritime ordinance of July 26, 1778, and repealed special tariffs on Dutch ships in French ports.

Russo-Danish Concert

The French ordinance of July 6, 1778, did not apply only to the United Province, but to all neutral countries. Another consequence of the ordinance was the Russo-Danish "concert" of 1778-1779, whereby Russia and Denmark used both England and France. This action was also influenced by similar French pressure in those courts. Continued violations of "free ships-free goods" neutrality finally precipitated the "Declaration of Catherine II on February 28, 1780, which proclaimed "free ships-free goods" and excluded naval stores from contraband. Subsequent declarations of acceptance and enforcement by the other neutrals ultimately resulted in an alliance for mutual armed assistance to protect these neutral rights against all belligerents. Since France had re-enacted the ordinance of July 26, 1778, this resultant alliance was in effect a league of armed neutrals against England for the benefit of France. Dutch accession and a consequent hostile manifesto from George III against the United Provinces on December 20, 1780, fulfilled Vergennes' hope and goal of complete isolation of England. Britain was thus forced to enjoin privateers to observe "free ships-free goods" according to treaties with Portugal, Denmark and Russia, and to prohibit privateer and naval

action in the Baltic.

However, this triumph at which Vergennes and his ambassadors had worked so hard was so long in coming that it had only a minor, indirect effect upon England, although it did contribute significantly to the French economy during the last months of the war, but not enough to cheer Vergennes who was acutely aware of the ominous military situation in America and difficult financial situation in France during the winter of 1780-1781. Vergennes found himself where George III was to be one year later after Yorktown. Thus, while mustering the last of France's resources and what few ships of the Spanish fleet could be pried away from Gibraltar, he also was exploring possibilities of a mediated peace if the military or naval situation should collapse during the summer of 1781.

END OF THE WAR

Additional Aid From France

It became readily apparent in the winter of 1780-1781 that America's resources were no longer capable of controlling or affecting the outcome of the war in America. The sole strength remaining was the alliance with France. "If France delays a timely and powerful aid in the critical posture of our affairs, it will avail us nothing, should she attempt it hereafter."³⁰ In response to requests for troops, ships, money, and arms, the French

king decided to provide no more troops, a major fleet, and a gift of six million livres with which to provide clothing, arms, and equipment.³¹ In responding to the Congress' request for a loan of 25 million livres, Vergennes explained the financial difficulties of the French court before concluding that:

All these difficulties being duly considered. . . it was the unanimous opinion that the loan requested by the Americans should not be authorized in 'France. . . But his Majesty . . . has determined . . . to advance them, in the form of a gratuitous subsidy, the sum of 6 million livres tournois.'³²

The only money transferred to the United States, over whose use France exerted any control was this subsidy of 6,000,000 livres. Any part or all of the 6,000,000 livres might be spent in France with no restrictions.

The rest was to be sent to the United States with the view of re-establishing the credit of the government. The French government had evidently learned the slow, wasteful, and inefficient ways of doing business by committees or boards established by Congress; and, as the gift was wanted more especially for the army, Washington alone was authorized to draw bills of exchange for it.³³

Loans in Holland

American attempts to borrow money in Holland, initiated in 1779, had had no results, when in March 1781, Col. John Laurens arrived in Paris with instructions to negotiate for a loan. He was able to convince Vergennes that France had not yet provided enough assistance to America and that another effort must be made. In April the French foreign office began "negotiating in Holland a

further loan of ten million of livres which was to be made to the United States and guaranteed by the King of France."³⁴ However, the Hollanders still refused to deal with the United States. Various houses either distrusted the security or were apprehensive about British reaction to lending the Americans money to enable them to pursue the war. The King

...now engaged to become himself, responsible for the sums which might be furnished. In consequence of this and the exertions of Mr. Adams, a loan of ten millions of livres was obtained in Holland. The money thus borrowed, although intended solely for the United States, having been obtained on the credit of France, became a debt due to that country.³⁵

5,000,000 livres were immediately paid into the French treasury for supplies furnished to Col. Laurens who had returned to America. The balance was soon expended in redeeming bills of exchange drawn on the Congress' authority as much as three to four years earlier.³⁶

Emphasis on the Naval War

The decisions of the King's Council concerning aid to the Americans in 1781 indicate a subtle change in French policy. The French treasury had been depleted to the extent that France might well have been considered financially unsound. The French government literally could not afford to provide unlimited support to the Americans. The French court had judged that the critical theaters of the war were at sea and not in America. The campaigns in America were supporting campaigns and the greatest chance of success lay at sea in a joint venture with the Spanish. Thus the expensive French reinforcements necessary to mount a

decisive land campaign and funds necessary to maintain a large, viable American land army were withheld and enough assistance given only to preclude the capitulation of the American land forces. Rendition of naval aid was subordinated to assisting Spain in the West Indies and before Gibraltar, and to a French naval campaign in the Indian Ocean.

Since 1779, the Spanish court had once more become ready and willing to take an active part in the war, and the Spanish fleet had developed into a formidable and ready naval force while the Americans seemed an endless drain on French resources.

As between an ally able to contribute something to the common cause and one needing constant bolstering, good sense dictated that the real work of the campaign should be undertaken in cooperation with the former.³⁷

French good sense prevailed in Versailles, and a strategy was designed for the campaign of 1781. Attrition of British resources was to continue in America. The French and Spanish fleets were to strike decisive blows at British naval power in the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and the East Indies. Vergennes, equally aware of the depletion of the French treasury, was well aware that England would, at the close of hostilities, be more weakly lodged where she had most recently been attacked. He turned his diplomatic efforts toward peace and a treaty favorable to Spain.

In point of fact ... Vergennes already had in mind the possibility of France's acquiescing in a very substantial curtailment ... of American independence, if an otherwise available opportunity for peace should offer itself.³⁸

De Grasse sailed from Brest on March 22, 1781, and arrived in the West Indies on April 28 with 20 ships of the line. After some minor and indecisive encounters with the British fleet, he sailed north in response to a request from Washington and Rochambeau and arrived on August 30 in Chesapeake Bay. The concentration of Washington's and Rochambeau's armies and De Grasse's fleet led to the well-known surrender of Lord Cornwallis on October 19, 1781.

It will be recalled that De Grasse had been instructed to go to North America "toward the approach of next winter," and that the forces sent were to "depend upon the need which the Spanish have of our assistance."³⁹ That De Grasse was able to move at all to the Chesapeake was due to Spanish unreadiness to mount active operations in Florida. The 3,000 troops brought by De Grasse to Yorktown were a part of the French-Spanish expedition contracted by Versailles and Madrid for the conquest of Florida under military authority of Spain. The Yorktown campaign was thus not in response to French plans or instructions from Versailles. It depended upon the

... fortunate - not to say, fortuitous - coincidence of three circumstances in Rochambeau's friendly solicitude for the American cause, De Grasse's patriotic willingness to stretch a point in his instructions for the common good, and [Spanis Admiral] de Solano's unreadiness, so characteristically Spanish, for the enterprise for which de Grasse's expedition had been planned. In other words, Cornwallis' surrender owed little or nothing to the intention of the French government itself.⁴⁰

The End of Hostilities

The Yorktown campaign, so definitely beneficial to the Americans, was equally disastrous to French strategy.

A decisive blow had indeed been struck, but British naval forces had not been crippled and the beneficiary had not been Spain. With both Gibraltar and Jamaica still British, a new campaign with its attendant expenses was necessary to meet French commitments to Spain. The possibilities of peace had diminished considerably since British abandonment of inland positions in America had allowed British forces to concentrate elsewhere in superior strength. In addition, the recent victory had renewed American reluctance to accept anything less than total independence.

The French-Spanish campaign of 1782 in the Caribbean had as its object the conquest of Jamaica. However, defeat of De Grasse's fleet on April 12, 1782, ended that campaign in British victory. Relief of Gibraltar by the British in October, 1782, ended hostile operations and allowed peace negotiations to produce the definitive treaties of peace in September, 1783.

The last French loan was made in 1783 when peace had become certain and was perhaps not military, but economic, assistance, since America had, in 1782, decided to demobilize its army. The American treasury was so utterly exhausted that it was unable to provide mustering-out pay and travel expenses to return discharged soldiers to their places of enlistment. Thus, Franklin obtained a final loan of 6,000,000 livres in September, 1783, to enable his country to survive the peace.

ANALYSIS

Results of the War

Vergennes' policy of military assistance to the American colonies can at best be termed a partial, equivocal, and temporary success, and, at worst, a prelude to the French revolution. The ultimate French purpose, humiliation of England and consequent maritime and political dominance of France, was only partially achieved. Vergennes in 1784 felt that the treaty of peace had erased the stain of 1763. Louis' principles and strategy had "won the confidence of Europe, so that all nations had been content to see him lower the pride of England and labor for her enfeeblement."⁴¹

As if in harmony with French triumphal anthems sounded the contemporary lamentations of Englishmen at the reduction of England to an inconsequential island. Edmund Burke caustically asked in Parliamentary debate following receipt of the news of Yorktown:

... are we to be told of the rights for which we went to war? ...that have cost England 13 provinces, 4 islands, 100,000 men, and seventy millions of money? ... that have lost to Great Britain her empire on the ocean, her boasted, grand, and substantial superiority? . . . that have taken from us our rank among nations, our importance abroad . . . our trade, our manufactures, and our commerce; that have reduced us from the most flourishing empire in the world to one of the most unenviable powers on the face of the globe?⁴²

Late in 1782, an anonymous writer referred in the London Chronicle to American independence as:

so disgraceful and ruinous a dismemberment of the empire, which must in its consequences give to France

the dominion and commerce of the European seas and render Great Britain the least significant among nations.⁴³

These and countless other contemporary exclamations go far to approve Vergennes' policies with the approbation of the statesmen of his generation. In 1782, England was regarded as the loser of the war and indeed a second nation to France. England had been humiliated and enfeebled. France dominated Europe. However, these results were neither solid nor durable and were obtained at a cost that eventually incinerated Bourbon glory in the pyre of French Republicanism.

The first event that Vergennes did not foresee was England's swift recuperation and adaptation of her policies to the new world of Industrialism and Empire that replaced the Mercantilist world of the Old Regime. In 1783, both England and France were exhausted. That England was able to recover rapidly is due partially to events of the war and partially to internal circumstances not attacked by Vergennes. England possessed a stable political system in the English constitution (George III could no longer exercise "personal rule" after the war), whereas France possessed no such stability, only a weak king and a bankrupt treasury.

The French government was made bankrupt by the war, and that bankruptcy led to the Revolution. Altogether France had spent a billion livres on the conflict, and the interest on the national debt was dragging the treasury down day by day toward insolvency.⁴⁴

Although both governments had staggering debts, only

England, through Pitt's famous sinking fund, was able to liquidate its resources and turn them into channels of trade and industry. Britain successfully concentrated her efforts in India and was able to draw within a few years an annual revenue of 15 million pounds sterling. France chose to revert to her aforementioned continental policy and had no comparable colonial incomes. Thus, at the close of hostilities, France was already crippled by her own internal political obsolescence, inefficiency, and an increasingly anachronistic foreign policy and perception of the world.

Connections Between England and America

A primary purpose of Vergennes' military assistance policy was to break the political and commercial connection between England and America and, so far as the former was concerned, his success was unquestionable. Military assistance and deployment of French forces determined the results of the war in America, and the gratitude thus engendered in the American people was a significant factor in the political weaning of America from England. But severance of the commercial bond had been the more important objective, to which end political separation was seen as a means. Vergennes realized during the war, and became painfully aware soon after, that considerable trade was still flowing between America and England. His secretary Pierre Dupont wrote early in 1782:

. . . if the war be not too long continued, the Americans will be closer to England than to us, since their language and former relationships will lead them nationally to trade with the English rather than with France. 45

There is no evidence of French efforts to establish extensive commercial ties with the American colonies before, during, or after the war. (Robert Morris' tobacco monopoly was primarily an American effort.) This is one point to which Vergennes' calculations, based on a mercantilist economy of closed trade between metropole and colony, were inapplicable. The new American republic was not simply switching metropolises, but rather denying the entire mercantilist system and establishing its trade on independent commerce and what would one day be called laissez-faire economics. Thus, although French military assistance did in fact achieve its objective of sustaining the American military effort until independence could be achieved, the invalid assumption that political separation would result in commercial separation ultimately negated the results of political separation.

Within several months after the formal peace treaties, Vergennes recognized that American independence not only had not destroyed British-American trade, but that it had not affected the vital sources of British power: her commercial and naval fleets and her system of bases around the world. The peace treaty itself returned to England her bases in the West Indies and took from her only Minorca (which she regained in the next war) and it

was the French fleet, not the English that had been defeated at the Saints, Ushant, and Gibraltar. In a memoir of March 29, 1784, he urged the king to maintain and strengthen the French fleet since the English fleet would soon be "more numerous and more powerful than it was at the moment of peace."⁴⁶

Military Actions

France did not achieve maritime superiority during the war although the constant requirement placed upon the British fleet by the continuing war in America forced a dispersion of the British squadrons that could have permitted the locally superior French squadrons to defeat the British in detail, were French captains not constrained by a strategy not adapted to defeating a naval fleet.

The French, with rare exceptions, subordinated the action of the navy to other military considerations, grudging the money spent upon it, and therefore sought to economize their fleet by assuming a defensive position and limiting its efforts to the repelling of assaults.⁴⁷

The traditional French naval strategy had been to act as an arm of the land army, to defend shore bases from naval attack. It was considered a tactical blunder to meet a hostile force and an admiral's duty was to avoid action honorably. The ultimate objects of a war or campaign were more important than fighting the enemy's navy. Ramatuelle reflected the policy of the French government during the war when he wrote:

The French navy has always preferred the glory of

assuring or preserving a conquest to that . . . of taking a few ships . . . The essential point is to attack them (the English) in their possessions, the immediate source of their commercial wealth and their maritime power.⁴⁸

It was this doctrine of port first--fleet second that French fleets in the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Caribbean followed scrupulously to defeat when the reverse of this maxim might have led the British fleet to defect in detail. In a war whose key was dominance of the sea, such a doctrine/strategy could lead only to defeat.

This fatal defect of naval doctrine was reflected, or extended, in Vergennes' Grand Strategy. The superior combined fleet of allied France and Spain could have given Vergennes a strategic advantage of the choice of where, when, and how to engage the enemy. The grand plan was to nibble at the outskirts of the British empire in the West and East Indies and to batter Gibraltar for two years. The only serious military, not naval, effort of France, the expedition of Rochambeau, occurred in a secondary theater and was the result of fortuity rather than strategic planning, and, in fact, ended the American war and terminated the beneficial fragmentation of British strength which had been the strategic purpose of that campaign.

French naval efforts in the West Indies reduced a number of petty British island garrisons, generally, in the absence of the English fleet. But the French never attacked the force which sustained these and other isolated garrisons. Spain did as she pleased in Florida and employed a vastly

superior force to obtain victories irrelevant to French purposes. Although the British channel fleet was severely outnumbered throughout the war, Spain anchored her fleet before Gibraltar while the French chose to remain in port. The only significant naval actions in European waters (except Gibraltar and Minorca and the abortive invasion of England in 1779) involved the American navy and colonial privateers, supported by French military assistance. If Vergennes made a bad assumption by considering political and commercial connections between America and England as identical, he made a bad judgment by not recognizing the British fleet as the vital source of British power.

European Efforts

However, we cannot forget that France's ultimate end was restoration of French leadership in a peaceful Europe including the insignificant island of England. Crippling British sea power was to have been a means to this end. Here also France was crippled by an anachronistic perception of the world. The Europe of Louis XIV no longer existed. Poland, Sweden, and ~~Turkey~~ were no longer prominent powers; Austria and Prussia were not dependencies of France; Russia could not be dismissed as a mute barbarian; the low countries and Scandinavia defied successfully both France and England. France had hoped simply to undo the Seven Years' War and reassume in 1783 the place that Louis XIV had held in 1753 of the "superb prerogative" of setting the tone of the European concert and keeping the peace.

however, in Europe of 1783, the restoration of French prestige and British humility affected the actual balance of power very little, if at all. Vergennes himself recognized his new world soon after the war:

It was difficult to flatter oneself of a long peace or to regard even the present one as better than precarious, unless the power which alone gave the tone found itself in a position to make itself respected . . . good example alone would not suffice, were it not supported by imposing means. . . Force is the surest measure of respect, particularly when it is exercised with wisdom and employed with justice.⁴⁹

Diplomacy

It has become apparent that Vergennes' military and naval strategies, his economic view of the world, his perception of his enemy's strengths and weaknesses as well as his anachronistic view of political systems contributed to a dysfunctional and nonsupportive war plan. The remaining aspect of France's attempt to displace England was Vergennes' international diplomacy or negotiations. His primary purposes in this field were to achieve a military partner in Spain and to effect isolation of England. Both purposes were eventually achieved, although neither success contributed materially to achievement of his war goals. France was not ready in 1775 to begin operations against England. Both Vergennes and Louis XVI realized France's unpreparedness in 1775. However, America's untimely and inconsiderate rebellion was that unique, never-repeated opportunity that would enable France to strike a decisive blow at her hereditary enemy. Thus,

Vergennes began as early as 1775 to attempt to achieve both the Spanish alliance and British isolation. Such an effort might have taken Louis XIV six months. The former took Vergennes four years and the latter five years. Even in 1775 France could no longer "set the tone." It had become painfully obvious by mid-1776 that Louis XVI could not summon allies against England as could Louis XIV. It became necessary to keep the American rebellion viable until Vergennes could marshal his forces. While fortifying the Americans with dribbles of clandestine military assistance, he began to ask and influence rather than to demand his intended supporters. By 1777 Vergennes was beginning to lose control of things. The Americans demanded an alliance, Spain was recalcitrant, the United Provinces were determined to maintain strict neutrality, the Northern countries were ignoring him, and Russia was dealing with Turkey while Catherine enjoyed the company of the British ambassador. By 1778 he had lost control completely and was approaching other courts as a mendicant for aid. In 1779 he was allied to the country whose rebellion he was to have exploited; he was offering anything at all to Spain and tax-free monopolies to Dutch traders; he was actively promoting Austrian, Prussian, and Russian independence and local hegemony and literally paying for the American rebellion; and in moments of despair sought an honorable peace in an unwanted general war. Neither the Spanish Treaty nor the League of Armed Neutrality achieved the desired results.

in was never an effective ally and the League was completed too late to affect the war. Even the final treaty of peace is not a French triumph. France obtained an island in the West Indies, a bit of land in Africa, fishing rights in Newfoundland and suppression of British control of the North American coast, hardly results to justify five years of war.

Vergennes' diplomacy suffered also from the weakness of anachronism, failing to see the world as it really was. It was thus directed at impracticable goals and ignored opportunities presented by the present situation. As mentioned above, no attempt was made to supplant British trade with French business. No attempt was made to provide ports and facilities for American privateers in neutral ports. No attempts were made to stop England's supplies of Russian mercenary troops. Russia, Prussia, and Austria were ignored as sources of support against England. Even in the administration of military assistance, the only French program that functioned as envisioned and was an unqualified success in achieving its purpose, France exerted no control except over the six million livre subsidy of 1781 and consequently could neither influence the ground campaign nor divert resources to reinforce the successes of American privateers and naval forces.

French and American Aims

The national goals of France and the United States, while similar in terms of American independence, diverged even contradicted each other beyond that. France hoped

for a long exhausting war of attrition in America that would leave England exhausted and America independent but unstable, insignificant, and dependent upon France. America strove for a short war involving superior French forces leaving America independent, promising and free from all connections with Europe. Not only did French ministers in America make only feeble efforts to achieve these goals, they did not seem to recognize, or regard, the divergence in national purposes. After Yorktown the Americans perceived that British hegemony in the colonies was definitely ended. They became receptive to peace negotiations from the British and had arrived at an initial peace settlement by December 1782, in violation of the Franco-American agreements to negotiate jointly. After the absence of American support in the campaign of 1782 and violation of these agreements, Vergennes was forced to observe:

If we may judge of the future from what has passed here under our eyes, we shall be but poorly paid for all we have done for the United States and for securing for them a national existence.

You may well judge if conduct like this encourages us to make demonstrations of our liberality.⁵⁰

It might even be said that American diplomacy achieved American goals, except a short war, at the expense of those of France.

The unique combination of circumstances with French strategies worked to put France into an inferior position in her relationship with America despite the desperate straits in which the Americans constantly found themselves.

At all times during the war France possessed the capability

to achieve military and naval superiority in any theater of the world. Although superiority was achieved many times it was employed only at Yorktown, due to fortuitous coincidence, and not to French doctrine and strategy. France made no attempt to exert control over military operations consequent to provision of military assistance. The Battle of Yorktown actually contravened Vergennes' strategy by allowing British forces to concentrate subsequently in the West Indies and at Gibraltar. It is tempting to consider the naval battle at the Saints and the relief of Gibraltar in the case that Yorktown had resulted as did the siege of Savannah. Thus we see the success of French strategy fully dependent upon American initiative and action over which France deliberately exercised neither control nor influence.

It seems apparent that several things contributed to France's failure to succeed in the American rebellion:

- 1) Although France (and Spain) possessed naval and military superiority, this superiority was either not deployed or not employed against the British.
- 2) France exerted no effective influence or control over the Americans and thus could neither break the British-American commercial ties, nor ensure that American military actions supported French strategy.
- 3) America's primary and ultimate purpose was merely a sub-goal for France. Other American

purposes conflicted with French primary purposes.

4) America and France had totally dissimilar world views.

5) French strategies were not viable.

6) France did not integrate military assistance, diplomacy and strategy to employ the successful American navy and privateer fleet although help was repeatedly requested.

7) French strategy was not adapted to the war that was being fought.

8) Vergennes fought four separate wars independently:

- a. A Franco-Spanish naval war
- b. A diplomatic/economic war in Europe
- c. A military/naval war at Minorca and Gibraltar
- d. A military war in America

9) The only coordination of any two of these separate wars at Yorktown was neither intended nor controlled by France.

10) French leaders failed to recognize the contemporary world as fundamentally different from that of Louis XIV and consequently adopted inadequate and inappropriate policies.

Although it seems apparent that many factors contributed to France's failure during the war, it is significant that the same precepts developed in analysis of the Wars of the Coalitions, the Peninsular Campaigns, and the

China Lesson reappear in the analysis of the Anglo-French war of 1778-82. It is thus possible to modify those precepts further after consideration of this instance of military assistance. In order that military assistance to a recipient that is engaged in active war promote achievement of donor national goals effectively:

- 1) Combined donor and recipient military capability must surpass that of the common enemy in a decisive theater, sector, or campaign.

Corollaries:

- a. Donor must be willing and able to commit forces as necessary to promote goal achievement.
 - b. Donor strategy and recipient strategy must be complementary and appropriate to donor goal achievement.
 - c. Military assistance should support those recipient forces most effective in donor goal achievement
- 2) Donor must retain sufficient control of resources transferred and adequate influence over the recipient military forces to ensure promotion of donor interests and achievements of donor goals.
 - 3) Donor and recipient must have common goals, purposes, and concepts of employment of recipient military forces.
 - 4) Donor must integrate foreign policy, military

strategy, military assistance, and economic policy into a single policy for promotion of donor goal achievement.

CHAPTER VII

THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE

BACKGROUND

During the first 30 years of Cuban independence, the veterans of the war of 1895-98 failed to create a credible and viable political system. Although much of the blame for this lack may be attributed to traditional Spanish habits of corruption, indolence, and personal exploitation of the body politic, U. S. policies of the period were also a significant factor. The dominant U. S. economic position in Cuba was accompanied by an ambiguous political position that, through both action and inaction, prevented the necessary fluidity of political power that could lead to a responsible political system. Thus, in the interests of a quiet life and business confidence, the U. S. underwrote internal stability at the cost of political development and supported that regime that could most efficiently control Cuba for the benefit of U. S. business interests. The overwhelming economic power of the United States in Cuba conferred upon Washington a commensurate political power which was used to benefit U. S. economic interests with little reference to other considerations.¹

The foreign and war policies of Cuba, existing under the aegis of the United States, were dictated by

the special political and economic relations arising from the island's geographic proximity to continental United States, its strategic importance, U. S. imperialistic pressures, and repeated overt U. S. intervention. After World War I, nascent feelings of American solidarity began to assert themselves in Latin American nationalism and anti-United States noises. Cuba was no exception. Even in 1920 one could discern in Cuba, as in many other Latin American republics, the germs of popular nationalism, national pride, concerns over sovereignty and freedom of action, resentment toward U. S. economic hegemony and intervention in Cuban affairs. But in 1920 U. S. policy was to maintain business as usual and Cuban policy was to cooperate.

1933 was a momentous year for both Cuba and the United States. By 1933 Cuban opposition to the regime installed by Washington had developed into revolutionary proportions. Since the war of independence in 1895-98, the old Cuban masters of society had been replaced by North Americans. The holders of economic power, the only power in Cuba beyond military forces, had become non-Cuban. The old society of Cuba had been replaced by international free enterprise. Simultaneously a major political occurrence was the development of a Cuban nationality or:

. . . the increasing identification of the nation of Cuba, such as it was, with the people, the workers, the millworkers, the Negroes, las humildes. . .2

In 1933 these Cuban forces came in contact, perhaps fortuitously, with the "Good Neighbor Policy" in the person of Sumner Welles. The resultant revolution ultimately brought Fulgencio y Batista to power and produced a genuine Cuban nation, one of whose primary purposes for the next quarter century was to be definition of itself and taking its place in the world.

THE CUBAN ARMY

The Cuban army, founded in 1909, was intended by its American tutors as a police force to control the violent conflicts of local politics. The army had always been political. All prominent politicians had army backgrounds and cliques of active officers whose loyalty they claimed. By 1932 martial law was normal and army officers controlled even milk deliveries. After World War I increasing numbers of junior officers became imbued with "revolutionary" ideas, perhaps as they were influenced by the U. S. Army:

Available data indicate that 111 officers attended schools or served training tours in the United States between 1923 and 1929 . . . it is significant that almost 20 percent of the Army officers received United States training in the six years for which data are available.³

North American influence on the Cuban army was total. Doctrine, equipment, organization, and administration were entirely of North American origin. One observer noted that:

. . . there is little to distinguish the Cuban soldier from our own until he opens his mouth in a

spurt of fluent Spanish. He wears the same cowboy sombrero, with similar hat-cords for each branch of the service. He shoulders the same rifle, carries his cartridges in the old familiar web belt, wears his revolver on the right, as distinct from the left-handed fashion of all the rest of Latin-America. He salutes, mounts guard, drills, stands at attention precisely in the American manner, for his 'I. D. R.' [Infantry Drill Regulations] differs from our own only in tongue.⁴

The Cuban army was thus fully dependent upon the United States for military equipment. The United States War Department had encouraged, if not implemented, Cuban dependence through a tacit pseudo-policy which posited military dependence as a supportive and necessary complement to Washington's manifest economic and political hegemony. After being equipped initially with U. S. arms and re-equipped in 1918, Cuba could not practicably opt otherwise:

The only source from which Cuba will be able to obtain replacements and spare parts for such military equipment is the United States War Department. It will be to the advantage of the United States to continue the resultant relations with Cuba.⁵

In addition to being Cuba's only source of military equipment, the United States was also Cuba's only source of military doctrine and thought:

. . . there was undoubtedly some transfer of American military attitudes regarding a constitutional role for the Army. Perhaps as much as one-third of the officers had received training in the United States and the influence of American thought was strong in military schools. Since the Cubans readily accepted the United States armed forces as a model for everything military, it is likely that some also considered the United States pattern of civil-military relations desirable.⁶

By 1935 Batista was acknowledged as the only source

of authority in Cuba, yet he merely represented the only strong force in a society whose traditional bonds had either burst or been removed. The army was the only political unit in Cuba which had a national organization with armed representatives in all cities. The army had the ideology of revolution, not yet enunciated in political, social or economic terms; it was an army that believed, and was told, that it was leading a revolution. Batista, as leader of the army, was genuinely revolutionary, nationalistic, and egalitarian. He not only proposed repeal of the decrees of former presidents Grau and Machado, but intended to disavow the Platt amendment and all vestiges of U. S. hegemony and to negotiate a sugar arrangement with the U. S. as an equal power.

THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY

Although it is too much to impute to President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull the prescience in 1933 to see the need for hemispheric defensive alliances in the 40's, the Good Neighbor Policy was seen as an unending effort at attaining hemispheric solidarity through diplomacy and recognition of mutual interests. U. S. hemispheric policy became a sort of compromise between assertive hegemony by energetic wielding of the "Big Stick" and hemispheric chaos from the aggressive nationalism of a bevy of Latin American nations each with its own brand of "machismo." By 1940 this broad policy had been developed

by careful diplomacy into the Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas. The "Good Neighbor Policy" had brought the Latin American nations to agree that:

. . . any attempt on the part of a non-American state against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty, or political independence of an American state shall be considered as an act of aggression against the states which sign this declaration.⁷

During the immediate pre-war years the United States had retained its traditional hemispheric goals but had adopted an entire new set of policies to achieve them. Thus the "Good Neighbor Policy" simply replaced "Gunboat Diplomacy" in:

1. stabilizing the local economies and orderly marketing of American products
2. stabilizing U. S.-Latin American political relations to favor and protect U. S. and inter-American business interests
3. maintaining U. S. freedom of action in all areas
4. maintaining a credible military, economic, and policial deterrent to non-American intervention in the western hemisphere

The brief phase of Cuban-American relations immediately following Batista's "Sergeant's Revolt" on September 5, 1933, was marked by extreme Cuban nationalism, and by suspicion and animosity in Washington.

Although the Platt Amendment to the Treaty of

Relations of May, 1903, gave to the United States "the right of intervention for the preservation of Cuban independence and the maintenance of stable government,"⁸ the decision not to intervene in 1933 was made with reference to the "Good Neighbor Policy." Instead the United States formulated a general response designed to stabilize Cuba without overly antagonizing other Latin American countries:

This policy has been called 'watchful waiting,' but it involved more than passive waiting. Basically it could be reduced to two points:

1. non-recognition of any government believed to be radical;
2. the active encouragement of groups or individuals which might be able to form a conservative, pro-United States government.⁹

The Cuban internal political problem was resolved to Washington's satisfaction in January, 1934, when Batista placed the army in support of the conservatives, installed a puppet president and assumed military control of the island. Four days later, Washington formally recognized the new government and soon began negotiations for a new treaty that abrogated the Platt amendment, but retained the U. S. naval base at Guantanamo. With the resolution of the political problem, Washington was able to address the economic situation and found Batista amenable to anything that left Cuba in his hands. The Reciprocity Treaty of August 1934, gave Cuba some tariff benefits for sugar, rum, tobacco, and vegetables. In return, Cuba further lowered

import duties on many U. S. goods, agreed not to increase duties on U. S. products, to abolish or reduce internal taxes on U. S. products, to impose no quantitative restrictions on U. S. goods, and to impose no fiscal restrictions on transfer of funds or means of payment. The Jones-Costigan Act of May 1934, authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to determine annual sugar requirements of the United States and to assign to Cuban, and other producers a quota of the market determined by marketing between 1931 and 1933. The Second Export-Import Bank was created in March 1934, to resolve the financial crisis of the Cuban government and to increase U. S. exports. U. S. relations with Cuba were to follow the pattern established in 1934 for the next 25 years.

WORLD WAR II

U. S.-Cuban Relations

By 1939, Americans had begun to realize that the war in Europe did affect the western hemisphere in general and Cuban-American relationship in particular. As Ambassador Wright noted in Havana in discussing the 1934 agreement:

In case of a European war . . . Cuba would obtain a higher and practically limitless market for her sugar which might change certain aspects of the situation entirely . . . a friendly Cuba--perhaps achieved by reasonable elasticity in this matter, might be of greater value to us than an antipathetic Cuba.10

Washington was made painfully aware that Cuba might well take advantage of the war to raise sugar prices in new

non-American markets. Cuban officials in Havana and Washington were certain that American counterparts did not overlook this possibility. The German government was openly discussing better agreements in Havana and the spectre of German competition reinforcing greater Cuban economic independence led to a new interim agreement in December 1939, that satisfied neither party.¹¹

During World War II, Cuba cooperated closely with the U. S. Cuba entered the scene of hemispheric defense long before war reached the Caribbean. As early as June 1939, Cuba indicated expected acquiescence and participation in U. S. plans by permitting U. S. military and naval aircraft to fly over Cuban territory subject only to filing reports of planned flights.¹²

In June, 1940, Batista agreed in principle to:

- (1) the construction of adequate airfields (which we [U. S.] would be prepared to finance, although they would of course be entirely under the sovereignty of the Cuban government);
- (2) the use of Cuban ports in time of need, and
- (3) adequate protection and vigilance by Cuba of her own coastal waters and of other activities within the republic.¹³

Meanwhile in the summer of 1940, the Cuban delegation in Washington was busily reminding both the War Department and the State Department of Cuba's strategic position astride the eastern approaches to the Panama Canal and less than 100 miles from Miami. Nor did the ministers forget to mention Cuba's sugar role in World War I. Since December 1939, when he announced his candidacy

for president in the general elections of 1940, Batista had been threatening neutrality in the coming war. All this pressure had been applied to obtain delay in payment of some debts owed the U. S. since the Machado regime in the late twenties. Finally in September 1940, the U. S. agreed to a new loan and the Cuban congress passed a bill to settle the Machado debt. During the same month Batista agreed "in writing that our government [U. S.] shall have full use of Cuban territory not only in the defense of the U. S. and Cuba but of the other American republics."¹⁴

U. S. Arms Policies

Prior to 1940, U. S. policy had been

... official disapproval of foreign munitions sales, illustrated by current instructions that required American military attaches in Latin America to avoid, whenever possible, the discussion of arms purchases from United States firms.¹⁵

The situation in summer, 1940, seemed to indicate a new policy toward arms supply to Latin America. The U. S. recognized the military and strategic importance of the Latin American countries as well as U. S. inability to arm those countries due to its own current military expansion. On June 24, 1940, President Roosevelt issued a policy statement:

It is decided that by providing small amounts of munitions at intervals, the urgent requirements of the Latin American countries requesting munitions may be met. Credits will be provided for purchase of munitions.¹⁶

A second policy statement made on August 1, 1940 provided:

a. for arming the countries named to the extent indicated, as determined in each case by our estimate of their requirements: ...

(3) Guatemala ... Cuba ... Dominican Republic--
to insure internal stability ...

b. for providing these arms on financial terms
these republics can meet

c. for assistance in the matter of military,
naval, and industrial personnel

d. for adjusting the economic relations between
the United States and Latin American states to insure
the latters' political cooperation ...¹⁷

For a variety of reasons, dominant among which was
scarcity of weapons, the record of military assistance to
Cuba, and all Latin American nations prior to December, 1941,
is one of good intentions, planning, and refinement of policy,
but no performance by the U. S.

Military assistance to Cuba was treated as a portion
of the larger program of military assistance to Latin America.
The Joint Advisory Board, created in late 1940 to deal with
Latin American arms requests, defined its control policies
in its meeting on March 3, 1941. Its recommendations,
subsequently approved by Secretaries of War, Navy, and
State, were:

...
5. a. that plans for hemisphere defense be considered
principally the responsibility of the United States, and
that as far as possible, all plans and agreements made
with the American republics be an extension of our own plans.

b. that all armaments furnished to the American
republics be in accordance with our own plans and estimates
of their needs for hemisphere defense, and that these
armaments be procured through the established agencies of
the Army and Navy, in order to obtain the following
advantages:

(1) To avoid interference with the procurement
plans of the British, Chinese, Greek, or other
foreign programs.

(2) To insure that American republics will be equipped with our own standard material.

(3) To permit control over the deliveries without interfering with our own Army and Navy programs.¹⁸

Early in 1942, the Department of State proposed the creation of an Inter-American Defense Board. Such a board was created by the Rio de Janeiro Conference of Foreign Ministers, and met between January 15 and 28, 1942. The policy of the Army and Navy was to avoid deliberation by the board of topics requiring bilateral negotiation. Thus, the work of the board was limited to matters of only peripheral significance, and it was not concerned with the operational conduct of the war. The board's primary utility during the war arose from its symbolism of hemispheric solidarity and its foundation of a vehicle for continuance of a close military association after the war.¹⁹

Lend-Lease

In March, 1941, Congress passed "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States, and for Other Purposes," better known as the "Lend-Lease Act." In order to include Cuba in the terms of the Lend-Lease Act, President Roosevelt certified on April 23, 1941, that Cuba and other American republics were vital to the defense of the United States. The second Lend-Lease supplemental appropriation act of October 28, 1941, approved \$150 million specifically for Latin American munitions. Negotiations that had continued since shortly after Batista's agreement in June, 1940, finally culminated on November 7, 1941, in the Cuba-U. S. Lend-Lease

agreement. The United States promised to supply arms and munitions valued at \$7,200,000 for which Cuba promised to pay \$4,200,000 by July 1, 1947.²⁰ By the end of the war, Cuba had received \$6,154,000 in grants under Lend-Lease.²¹ (See Appendix E for detailed accounts.)

Cuban Contribution to the War Effort

In early October, 1941, the U. S. offered to buy the entire 1942 sugar crop. Russia and other allies were also bidding since the vast Ukrainian beet fields had fallen to Germany. Russian military requirements were nearly 1,000,000 tons. Cuba might well have sold the entire crop to European buyers.²² Cuban sugar growers were convinced that the world market would yield better prices than the U. S. The question was solved by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The immediate declaration of war by the Cuban Congress gave Batista emergency powers whereby he confiscated German, Italian, and Japanese holdings and assumed control of the sugar industry. The Lend-Lease Agreement of November was a major factor in the swift conclusion of a second trade agreement signed in January, 1942, whereby the entire crop was sold to the U. S. Similar agreements were negotiated over the complaints of the sugar growers for the total crops of 1943, 1944, 1945, and 1946.²³

Cuba's greatest contribution to hemispheric defense was provision of air bases and naval sites used for anti-submarine patrols, movement of aircraft, and air crew training. After declaring war on December 9, 1941, Cuba responded to

U. S. requests of December 15 and 29, 1941, by extending and enlarging previous agreements. Batista permitted the Army Air Corps to post several 15-man detachments at airfields throughout Cuba; unlimited flight over Cuba and use of Cuban airfields and airports; unrestricted movement of U. S. military personnel in Cuba; aerial photography of Cuba; and assignment of U. S. aviation personnel at the three large commercial airports in Cuba -- Rancho Boyeros, Camaguey, and La Fe.²⁴

By May, 1942, the U. S. Navy had expanded its operations from Guantanamo to the San Julian airfield in western Cuba which became a base for anti-submarine operations. A flight of B-25 bombers was stationed at Havana and patrolled the Yucatan Channel.²⁵

In summer, 1942, Batista authorized the construction of Batista Field near Havana, and the housing of a 300-man U. S. aviation unit at Camaguey. The Agreement for Military and Naval Cooperation of September 7, 1942, gave such general authorization to the United States to cover future contingencies that it allowed deployment of U. S. troops in any number from "one hundred to one hundred thousand" to Cuba.²⁶

In accordance with an agreement of cooperation between the Cuban Navy and the U. S. Navy's Gulf Sea Frontier signed in February, 1943, the ten Cuban submarine chasers provided by Lend-Lease were to patrol in areas designated by the U. S. commander. It was on one of these cruises in June, 1943, that "the Cuban Navy bagged its only German submarine,

after a battle which took place off the north coast."²⁷
 Although many Cuban vessels were torpedoed during the war,
 this was the only combat action involving Cuban military forces.

U. S. Deliveries and Policies

When deliveries of Lend-Lease arms to Latin American countries began in January, 1942, U. S. policy was not to provide heavy, offensive, or chemical weapons. Aid was to be granted only in the forms of military equipment and services for hemispheric defense. By Spring, 1943, when levels of war production could permit regular arms deliveries to Cuba, the Strategic aspect of the war had changed considerably. Japanese expansion in the Pacific had been contained, and the successful invasion of North Africa had eliminated any serious threat of attack in the Caribbean or in South America. A revised policy statement approved on August 6, 1943, allowed delivery of military equipment to Latin America for

(1) the continued development and preparation of such Latin American ground, naval, and air forces ... as may be required for joint employment with forces of the United Nations in anti-submarine and other military operations in defense of our common interests

(2) the training and equipping of such Latin American forces as may be employed in conjunction with forces of the United Nations in offensive operations overseas
 [Only Brazil and Mexico sent troops overseas]

(3) the repair and maintenance ... of existing equipment and that to be furnished in the future

(4) the furnishing of munitions and equipment of types and in the quantities best designed to maintain internal stability in those countries whose governments continue to support the United States²⁸

By 1944, the Army's policy had become to provide as

little aid as possible to Latin America, and during the last two years of the war, equipment deliveries were limited to repair parts, minor replacements, and items ordered prior to the new policy.

Conclusions

U. S. policy toward Cuba, of which military assistance was an integral part, attained the major policy goals toward which it was directed during World War II. In addition to securing political and military cooperation, U. S. policies succeeded in

- (1) stabilizing internal Cuban politics by providing Batista the means to remain in power
- (2) stabilizing Caribbean regional relationships
- (3) securing uninterrupted access to Cuban sugar
- (4) employing Cuban naval vessels in coordinated Caribbean defense roles
- (5) securing the use of air and naval bases on Cuban territory.

U. S. military dominance. Throughout the war, the military and naval forces of the United States uncoubtedly dominated, or could have dominated it threatened, the western hemisphere. Even at the outset in early 1942, American planners and policy makers considered Latin American contributions to combat forces as un-needed, unwanted, and more trouble than they were worth.²⁹

U. S. military forces were deployed not only in Cuba

and Cuban waters, but throughout Latin America in conjunction with military assistance both to control the use of military assistance equipment and funds, and to operate with recipient armed forces. After 1942, combined U. S.-Cuban task forces were common, as was U. S.-Cuban operation of airfields in Cuba.

U.S. control. Provision of military assistance during the war to Cuba and Latin America was strictly controlled from its inception. If physical stewardship of U. S. forces was not desirable or possible, then the equipment provided was limited to that deemed necessary by U. S. authorities for achievement of U. S. purposes, goals, and objectives in Cuba.

U. S. and Cuban policies. After the landings in Africa and even perhaps before, the U. S. considered Cuba as within a secondary theater of war operations. U. S. war goals in Cuba did not involve combat activity, but merely the maintenance of a stable, reliable resource base. Even during the war, the "Good Neighbor Policy" remained lurking behind U. S. war interests. Thus U. S. policies during this period complemented quite well Batista's desires to centralize his control, to create a national Cuban government based upon the 1940 constitution, to establish Cuba as a significant independent nation with its own army, navy, and air force, and with the steadily growing force of Cuban nationalism. The single vexing problem was sugar, but since Cuban businessmen and workers were making record profits, they

allowed their complaints to be ignored and allowed Batista to mold Cuba into a viable national reality by V-J Day.

Integration of U. S. policies. Military assistance to Cuba during World War II was but one increment of a total global strategy and policy combination that applied all U. S. efforts to winning the war. Efforts and resources expended in Latin America were not allowed to compete with support for primary theaters. The base systems of which Cuba was a part were designed to counter an Axis invasion of Brazil and later to resupply U. S. forces in North Africa. Although the amounts are small, military assistance to Cuba during World War II made positive contribution to U. S. efforts in Latin America as well as supported U. S. control of Cuban sugar which was an extremely critical resource by 1944.

THE COLD WAR

Communism and Prosperity

Since establishment in 1942 of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Cuba had become one of the focal points of Communist propaganda in the Western Hemisphere. It was also a control center for dissemination of party orders and guidance to other Latin American nations. By the end of the war, Communists controlled all unions, a radio station, and a newspaper. Before Russia entered the war, the U. S. was the primary target of Cuban Communist propaganda. Then the war was instantly transformed into a

"people's" war against Nazism and Fascism."³⁰ Roosevelt's death provoked another reversal and "the greatest anti-American campaign ever launched in Latin America."³¹ That the cold war had reached the Caribbean became apparent in late 1945 as the Cuban Communists began to differentiate between Roosevelt's "international collaboration for peace" and the imperialistic basis of Truman's "American Century" in Fundamentos, the local party journal. By September, 1946, the campaign against the United States was extremely violent. It was not until April, 1947, that President Grau recognized the Communists as a threat to his government and appointed Carlos Prio Socorras as Minister of Labor. Prio immediately began his successful campaign to break the Communist control of labor and replace communist leadership with his own.³² The Communists lost considerable power and prestige between 1947 and 1952 and were not able to revive until Batista's second regime.

In 1945-47, Cuba was, as at the end of World War I, in a new era of prosperity consequent to the end of the world war. In comparison with pre-war figures national income had doubled; real income had increased by 40%; government revenues were rising; money supply had increased five-fold and cost-of-living by 145%. Dollar holdings had risen from \$25 million to \$400 million.³³ Under these conditions, government leaders were able to amass vast personal fortunes through blatant graft, theft, and mismanagement while popular discontent grew and remained

pacified with money, good living, and easy times. Had Cuba been a normal country, such patent and persistent mismanagement in government would have produced immediate and serious economic and political consequences and extraordinary revolutionary demands from the suffering poor of the nation. But the Grau and Prio governments continued until 1952 against a background of rising prosperity.

U. S. Postwar Policy

After World War II, the United States government diverted its attention from prosecution of a war with the Axis nations to the developing Cold War with the Soviet Union. Latin America ceased to be a secondary war theater and became irrelevant to U. S. security since the continent was quite secure behind the Monroe Doctrine and the Good Neighbor policy. Basic goals of U. S. - Latin American policy were not changed by the Cold War. The phrase "anti-Communist" was added to the diplomatic vocabulary, but implied the same meaning as the older words "order," "stability," "political cooperation," etc. To prevent Communist infiltration, the United States concluded a number of inter-American agreements pledging cooperative efforts against aggression and attack. It is largely upon the basis of these postwar treaties that pursuit of the U. S. goal of preventing the diffusion of communist influence rested.

A major portion of U. S. postwar policy in Latin America has been provision of aid. It was during the war

that direct economic and military assistance was first provided. Although wartime aid was a direct result of the war emergency,

. . . there is little doubt that many of the assistance measures, notably the activities of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, went beyond the more immediate requirements of wartime assistance.

. . . After the war the United States did not by any means abandon assistance to Latin America. The continued operations of the Export-Import Bank and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs affirm this fact, though it must be admitted that aid no longer flowed so abundantly to Latin America.³⁴

Compared with Exim wartime credits of \$19.2 million, Cuba received post-war credits of \$10.49 in 1946 and more in 1947-51.³⁵ IIAA post-war grants were \$31,000 compared to \$220,000 before V-J Day.³⁶ Technical Assistance, however, increased from \$283,000 during the war to a total of \$455,000 in the years 1946-1951.³⁷ As with many other nations much authorized aid was not used in Cuba. In 1951, the Exim bank reported \$12 million of unused loan authority for Cuba.³⁸ Although loan applications had been made, the bank would not approve a loan without supervision by reliable technicians as insurance that the loans were wisely and appropriately spent. Sensitive nationalism and government corruption in all countries and particularly in Cuba under Grau and Prio resented and rejected U. S. meddling and controls.

It is clear that the United States abandoned neither Latin America, Cuba, nor the Good Neighbor policy. Nevertheless, as the post-war years became the post-war

decade, discontent and resentment toward the U. S. grew in Cuba and all of Latin America. Latin American aid was paltry compared with that provided to European and Asiatic nations. The combination of perceived (or perhaps real) second-class treatment by the U. S., rampant official and government corruption, sensitive and immature nationalism, and an aggressive, if patient, Communism produced a significant weakening of Latin American solidarity. This fact of deteriorating relations was noted in Washington and perceived as another minor nuisance with the Latins.

In September, 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson discussed U. S. Latin American policy in a speech before the Pan American Society of the United States. He outlined three major objectives: security for the United States and the hemisphere; encouragement of democratic representative institutions; and positive cooperation in the economic field. He commented that the official loan policy was not to extend loans when private capital was available. To increase private capital flow, the Department would attempt to achieve treaties to give assurance to investors against nationalization while also protecting the political integrity of host nations.³⁹

POST-WAR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Early Post-war Efforts

Lend-lease provision of military assistance had been terminated at the end of the war. After that date,

the U. S. had no real program for supplying military assistance to Latin America until 1952. In October, 1945, the Inter-American Defense Board recommended that the American governments standardize the organization, training, and equipment of their armed forces. Subsequently in May, 1946, President Truman submitted the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act to Congress providing for arms supply and training to Latin American armed forces. This act was opposed both by Congress, who rejected it both in 1946 and 1947, and by Latin American nationalists. Congressional reasons for opposition were many and varied, but most congressmen felt that since no threat to the U. S. could be perceived in Latin America, no requirement existed to meet a military threat by fostering an arms race. Latin Americans also saw no military threat and saw a resurgence of Yankee imperialism through military/economic dependence. Many feared that U. S. arms would only reinforce the dictators and the military caste.

The Surplus Property Act of 1944 and 1945 permitted sale of armaments to various Latin American countries at reductions of up to 95% of the actual price. Under provisions of this Act, Cuba obtained in 1947 three frigates from the U. S. Navy and miscellaneous aircraft, ammunition and spare parts procured at a cost of \$15.6 million for which Cuba paid \$504 thousand.⁴⁰ Expiration of these acts was followed in 1949 by the Mutual Defense Act which authorized sales of surplus weapons and equipment for cash.

Formal Military Assistance

Not until 1951 did Congress provide for military assistance to Latin America in an appropriation of \$38.15 million for "direct military assistance to Latin America, to be used in those countries whose participation was judged by the President as indispensable."⁴¹ In Title IV, Congress specifically declared that military assistance was to be provided to Latin American nations:

. . . only in accordance with defense plans which are found by the President to require the recipient country to participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere.⁴²

A military assistance agreement with Cuba was reached on March 7, 1952. By its first article Cuba undertook to use all assistance received for the purpose of defense plans accepted jointly by the two governments. According to the provisions of the Cuban agreement, the first with any Latin American country, which was typical of all such agreements, the United States agreed "to make available . . . equipment, materials, services, or other military assistance . . . to promote the defense of the Western Hemisphere."⁴³ Also Cuba pledged:

. . . to facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States of America for such period of time, and in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon or raw and semi-processed strategic materials required by the United States.⁴⁴

Although legally a bilateral agreement between Cuba and the United States, the Cuban agreement, as well as the other Latin American agreements, was partially in

response to and remained tied to the Inter-American Defense Board as the military organ of the Pan-American Union. The Union had recommended in 1951:

. . . that the American republics strengthen their armed forces and keep them in a state of readiness for the defense of the continent, and that they cooperate with each other in military matters in order to develop the collective strength necessary to combat aggression against any of them.⁴⁵

As the sole agency for binational or multinational planning in existence, the board became the focus for hemispheric security planning in accordance with these agreements. The board thus intensified its efforts and on November 15, 1951, forwarded to the respective governments the General Military Plan for the Defense of the American Continent.

U. S. Perspective

In the early 1950's the United States was preoccupied with the Korean conflict and placed Cuba in much the same perspective as it had in the early 1940's. U. S. policy emphasized political order and stability, protection of American business interests, political and economic cooperation, a secure source of raw materials, primarily sugar but also nickel, and a positive attitude of anti-communism. This foreign policy was part of a more comprehensive world-view held by American statesmen of the period. While opposed to large closed empires, cartels, alliances, spheres of influence, etc., U. S. policy often insisted that the nations of the world act so as to protect American interests and to achieve American goals. Implicit in this

position was the assumption that U. S. interests were synonymous, or at least complementary, to those of other nations. Perhaps this assumption acted as a filter on U. S. perceptions of postwar Cuba and allowed U. S. decision makers either to ignore or to misperceive the state of Cuba.

CUBAN REALITIES

Perceptions

What was perceived in Cuba, as Cuban elections approached in 1952, was the failure of democracy in twelve years since the 1940 Constitution; a prospering Cuban economy consequent to the Korean conflict; a governmental edifice that was incapable of controlling or governing, strong labor support for government; widespread gangsterism; uncontrolled violence; corruption that beggared that of Tammany Hall; and a growing belief among Cubans that politics was simply a spoils system.

What was misperceived, perhaps, was the indirect influence of the United States in Cuba. Cuban-U. S. relations in 1952 were essentially what they had been in 1934. The U. S. bought approximately two-thirds of Cuba's exports and furnished two-thirds of her imports.⁴⁶ Sugar constituted 80% of Cuba's exports.⁴⁷ U. S. business controlled 90% of Cuban utilities, 50% of Cuban transport, 40% of raw sugar production, and nearly 25% of Cuban bank

deposits.⁴⁸ Despite token efforts of the government, Cuban producers could not compete with U. S. imports.

. . . over the years private Cuban and American commercial arrangements tended to restrict Cuban trade to the United States and to discourage the development in Cuba of import-substituting industries.⁴⁹

These ties to the U. S. brought obvious prosperity to the island and true luxury to some of its inhabitants. Cuba was a nice place to live for those who were not interested in politics or anything more than a comfortable living. The U. S. had brought relative order and good times, but only at the cost of any development of Cuban national potentiality and economic independence. A strong under-current of Cuban nationalism had been developing since 1934 and was becoming more and more directed at what Cubans regarded as undue U. S. influence and interference. Most of the nationalists resented U. S. domination of Cuba and felt that foreign business interests, being non-Cuban, were exploitative and, therefore, threats to Cuban nationalism and progress:

The nationalists began to accept the idea that the Cuban government should play a greater role in managing Cuba's economic life and regulating foreign business interests.⁵⁰

Concentration on the cold war and finally the Korean conflict led U. S. officials to ignore, misperceive, or disregard the signs in Cuba that basic social, economic, and political change was imminent and necessary. While Americans thought of stability in terms of external factors, Cubans were thinking in terms of new ideas such as social

and economic justice, economic independence, anti-colonialism, etc. While the regimes of Grau and Prío remained highly amenable to U. S. influence, they were themselves gaining the animosity of Cuba and suppressing or destroying opposition both to themselves and to the U. S. By failing to look beyond the embassy windows, U. S. officials continued to see Cuba as America's sugar bowl as it had been before the Good Neighbor policy. The nationalism whose growth had been interrupted by the world war was rapidly developing into a viable, if inchoate and incoherent, political force that was increasingly opposed to U. S. goals and interests in Cuba.

After an aborted coup attempt in 1951, Batista looked to the elections of 1952 as a vehicle to power. However, despite a large and costly campaign in latter 1951, by January 1952, Batista was convinced that he was not a serious contender. Thus he renewed his plan for a coup d'etat. One factor which probably influenced the date of the coup was the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed on March 7, 1952. Although U. S. military training teams had been in Cuba since 1950,⁵¹ no formal assistance was provided until fiscal year 1953.

It seems that Batista waited until after the agreement was signed to avoid a delay or cancellation in the program, which would be blamed on his action. Although there was little evidence of a corporate spirit among the [Cuban] officers on most matters, all were in favor of the modernization that military aid would provide. They were embarrassed by the fact that in 1952 almost all of the Army's infantry and artillery weapons were of World War I vintage. Batista would

have risked alienating his source of power by blocking the treaty. Also, Batista had always made United States support a key part of his political formula. By waiting until after the treaty [sic] was signed he avoided a possible diplomatic problem.⁵²

BATISTA'S SECOND REGIME

Initial Promises

In the spring of 1952 the Cuban political system was moribund as an effective instrument of government. Thus, neither the U. S. government nor the Cuban people were greatly distressed when on March 10, 1952, Batista became for a second time ruler of Cuba consequent to a military coup d'etat. The coup was greeted in Cuba with tranquility and passivity. Only the students voiced significant opposition in a statement on March 14. The army aided Batista and was well-rewarded with pay raises and high prestige, as well as new equipment provided under the military assistance agreement of March 7, 1952. The students of Havana University attempted to organize a general strike but the army intervened. Closure of the university forced the students and faculty into the opposition.

The stamp of acceptance was soon given by the North Americans. On March 27, the U. S. ambassador delivered official U. S. recognition to Batista's new foreign minister. Within a few weeks most U. S. firms had followed the lead of United States Steel Co. in announcing that U. S. capital responded favorably to U. S. recognition of Batista, and that U. S. capital could and would continue to supply

Cuba with whatever was needed.⁵³

Batista was full of promises:

He announced that all international treaties and pacts [including the new military assistance agreement], as well as obligations assumed by Cuba with the United States, would be respected and fulfilled. He said that if the United States were attacked by or involved in a war with the Soviet Union, Cuba would fight on the side of the Americans. He promised protection to all United States investments or such capital as might make future investments in Cuba.⁵⁴

He announced that he fully supported the United States' cold war against the Soviet Union. He would send troops to Korea if needed; he would build 12,000 houses, would finish current public works projects. Most American officials regarded Batista as a rock of stability and anti-communism in the Caribbean.

Personal Rule

For the next two and one-half years Batista governed as a Provisional President under a decree that was based upon the 1940 constitution but omitted any references to representative government. Legislative functions were vested in a cabinet and legislative advisory council. The abolition of political life and popular participation in Cuba meant also the abolition of gangsterism, violence, and corruption that had been uncontrolled under Grau and Prio. By midsummer, 1952, Batista had suppressed all open opposition by students and active politicians. Also by midsummer, a new opposition was beginning to articulate itself, although it was embryonic and fissiparous and included only a few of the many tributary movements that

would ultimately form Castroism.

There were meanwhile constant arrests and continuing strengthening of army and police forces. Batista's rule was rapidly becoming highly personal and authoritarian. Military and polic leaders responded not to the cabinet, but to Batista alone. Batista and his supporters were nervous, insecure and suspicious, of each other and of all opposition elements and personalities. Soon the army and police were both networks of intrigue and distrust. The summer was full of plots, counterplots, rumors, arrests, and beatings as the largest sugar harvest in Cuban history was reaped.

Open Rebellion

By spring of 1953, the students had staged several riots resulting in several martyrs and many arrests. In May the Havana press called for the force of arms to oust Batista. On July 26, armed rebellion began with Fidel Castro's attack of the Moncada Barracks at Santiago. The attack was soon converted into a rout as 1000 well-armed soldiers turned on the 100 poorly armed rebels. The battle lasted one hour. The sequel to the battle was a period of brutality, torture, and terror underwritten by Batista, who was apparently as frightened, angry, and confused as the officers and soldiers at Moncada. The government panicked, the entire army was placed on alert, and hundreds of people were detained, arrested, beaten, and tortured, and assassinated. Within a few weeks most of the

rebels who had somehow escaped had been captured. Castro's trial in October was somewhat anti-climactic since the government reaction had already crystallized the opposition into the force that would succeed ultimately in overthrowing Batista.

The Moncada attack was quite inopportune for Batista's regime since the intrigues and struggles within the armed forces were almost uncontrolled. The officers who had been in office under Prio still retained considerable power and continued to use it to personal profit. Although the Batista officers who had manned the March 10 coup had been rewarded, they were highly antagonized by the power in the Prio officers. Batista had just agreed to a general reorganization of the army when the Moncada crisis began. Consequently the reorganization was cancelled. Batista thought it best to retain the present command structure in both armed forces and police. The morale of the army sank daily as officers and men saw popular hostility growing, felt antipathy toward the Prio officers who seemed beyond the control of Batista's new government, and experienced a growing disappointment in Batista himself who seemed to be moving Cuba back to the era of Machado-type dictators.⁵⁵

Batista's Anti-Communism

In the Indian summer of 1953, Batista's star was indeed rising in Washington. Martha Batista had been received by Mrs. Eisenhower and Secretary Hobby. The

regime seemed a bulwark of freedom in an increasingly communist world, fully accepted by U. S. business and government, its enemies in jail or exile. The new U. S. ambassador, Arthur Gardner, regarded Batista as the savior that would bring Cuba to her rightful place in world affairs. A recent sugar conference in London had allotted to Cuba 40% of the world sugar market above her sales to the U. S. Batista was taking positive steps against communism by outlawing the party on November 10 and barring its publications. With every month Batista was improving his position in Washington. Political gangsterism and graft were no longer apparent, labor relations were good, foreign exchange was stable and reliable. In May, 1954, Batista offered amnesty to all exiles and promulgated a new anti-communist decree which made communist activity grounds for dismissal from any of several organizations, the Civil Service, the university, labor unions, etc. He also created a special organization to fight communists, the Buro de Represion a los Actividades Communistos (BRAC) consequent to U. S. requests. Batista had promised such an organization to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who arranged with Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency to support it with U. S. money. Although the U. S. helped Batista's organization, it was never effective and "most of the money [meant for BRAC] never reached the proper destination."⁵⁶

Election and Opposition

On November 1, 1954, Batista was elected president against no opposition. Although the university was still in turmoil and bombs appeared sporadically throughout the island, by May, 1955, Batista felt strong enough to grant amnesty to all political prisoners including Castro. The general atmosphere in Havana seemed to be that Castro and his followers were too radical to be taken seriously. The opposition groups were well organized and had no need of Castro as a leader. The middle class professional Cubans were generally responsive to conservative groups who felt that negotiation with Batista was the only viable course of action since Batista held all of the power and did not hesitate to use it. Ultimately Castro left Cuba to form his group in Mexico for a later return to Cuba in force.

As Batista's regime mellowed, the democratic opposition in November agreed upon a platform of demands including new elections in 1956. Batista agreed to a series of discussions which began in March 1956, but were stopped after a week of meetings because Batista denounced any opposition demands as ridiculous and absurd. The oppositions' demand for election in 1956 was unacceptable; there could be nothing before November, 1958.⁵⁷ After an aborted military coup and a suppressed student revolt in April, 1956, Cuba passed the remainder of the year in relative peace and prosperity until Castro's landing in

December.

THE CUBAN ARMY AND USMAP

The Leaders

The military elite that sustained Batista's regime was perhaps the most political in Cuba's history. All of the senior commanders were Batistianos and well integrated into the political power structure around Batista. Graft among these men was conducted as it had been under Grau and Prio, primarily to maintain their personal loyalty to Batista. Regimental commanders controlled illegal lotteries and gambling concessions.⁵⁸ Other charges include misappropriation of ration money,⁵⁹ prostitution,⁶⁰ and collaboration with Castro.⁶¹ These officers had abandoned the non-political military ethic observed earlier and consequently had risen overnight in 1952 from company commanders to national positions of military leadership and command. Their general lack of professional preparation probably contributed significantly to the Army's failure against Castro's guerrillas. However, junior officers, not having had even the opportunity for political involvement, were probably as professionally oriented as any group since 1933. As in 1933 the military philosophy among Cuban officers was borrowed from the U. S. army.⁶² In addition to Cuban military schools modelled upon U. S. service schools, many Cuban officers had attended U. S. schools during and after World War II. After the signing of the Mutual

Assistance Agreement, the influence of U. S. military thought increased as more and more junior officers attended U. S. training. One estimate indicates as many as 1,000 officers were trained in U. S. schools under USMAP between 1952 and 1958.⁶³

This figure seems a little too high but the number probably approached 1,000. A check of Department of the Army records revealed that in 1955 (the only year for which unclassified data on Cuban officers receiving training in the United States is available) sixty allocations were approved for Cubans to be trained in United States Army schools. An unspecified (and probably greater) number were approved for training in the School of the Americas in the Canal Zone [fn: Extracted from the files of the Training Division, Military assistance Program, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army. (Telephone interview with Mr. Hofstader of that office on February 9, 1970.)] Probably more were approved for Air Force and Navy courses. The total receiving training in 1955 was almost certainly over 100. If this role is considered as being average for the years in which Cuba received aid under the Military Assistance Program (1952-1958) well over 500 would have been trained in that period alone.⁶⁴

Given a background and training in U. S. style non-political professionalism, it was not unnatural to see growing discontent among the junior officers outside the elite. In particular junior officers chaffed at Batista's disregard of institutional modernization and normal promotion opportunity outside the elite of Batistianos. Graft was also unpopular, but perhaps more significant was an increasingly hostile public opinion. The Army, as the most visible organ of Batista's government, was being blamed for Batista's excesses, as well as for propelling him to the presidency in 1952. As junior officers

saw public support of the Army eroding while Batista suborned its needs to his personal control and power, Batista became an obstacle to professional development and modernization of the Army. Although Batista had rewarded the army well with increased pay and privileges, for the above reasons he did not have the genuine loyalty that he had had in 1935. He had a hired mercenary Army motivated by self-interest.

Batista's concern about U. S. military assistance⁶⁵ and the armed forces reorganization are indicative of the junior officers' desires for modernization and professionalism. A general staff, one infantry division, and a new system of military districts were created. Impressive in concept, they had little significance in practice beyond the creation of more senior positions for deserving Batistianos. The staff did nothing since Batista ran the Army from the president's palace; the division neither assembled nor functioned as a unit; a new tank regiment was employed as palace guards. The navy was furnished some new support facilities but no new ships. No significant changes were made in the Air Force of 88 U. S. 1943-44 bombers, fighters, and transports.

During Batista's second regime, the Cuban armed forces were more than adequate for Cuba's needs with a total strength between 25,000 and 30,000 including a relatively modern, well-equipped air force and navy. The army's primary weapon, however, was the Springfield

M-1903 bolt action rifle. This weapon had been obsolete since the introduction of the Garand M-1 rifle in World War II. As the political climate grew more tense after the battle at Moncada, young officers began to realize that any enemy against which they might be sent would probably be armed with automatic and semi-automatic weapons. This realization contributed further to the decline of morale within the rank and file. Batista allegedly had the opportunity to rearm his Army with the M-1 rifle in the early years of his administration at a cost of only \$9.50 each, under the Mutual Security Program.⁶⁶ For some unknown reason, he chose not to do so until after Castro's landing.

USMAP

U. S. military assistance was only a small part of the Cuban defense budget. The largest amount, \$5.5 million, was provided in FY 1957 when Cuba spent \$55.3 million for defense. Although gross figures are available for each year, no information indicates what equipment was provided. It is known that one infantry battalion was fully MAP supported and several training activities were fully subsidized. Navy and Air Force hemispheric defense mission capabilities were also fully MAP supported.

U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CUBA⁶⁷

(Millions of Dollars)

Fiscal Years	Appropriated Aid	Grants from Excess Stocks	Total
1949-52	--	--	--
1953	0.4	--	0.4
1954	1.1	--	1.1
1955	1.6	0.1	1.7
1956	1.7	0.1	1.8
1957	2.0	3.5	5.5
1958	3.0	1.6	4.6
1959	0.4	0.1	0.5
1960	0.2	0.1	0.3
1961	0.1	0.1	0.2

The Army

During 1956, incidents of violent opposition to Batista continued to plague the Army. Although each incident was in itself minor enough, the combination of many incidents and the consequent government "over-reactions" solidified opposition to Batista in the general public. However, after the aborted coup attempt in April, none were intense enough to test again the loyalty or combat effectiveness of the Army. As Castro sailed from Mexico in December, the Cuban armed forces presented an image of strength and solidarity to the world at large. On the eve of civil war, the only combat experience in the entire

army was the one hour Moncada battle which was lost by the Fidelistas, rather than won by the army. Senior officers were generally unqualified, inexperienced, and untrained for their commands, and did not have the respect and loyalty of their subordinates and units. Junior officers were well trained but estranged both from their seniors and from their government. Although more than adequate for Cuba's needs, major equipments of the Air Force and Navy were obsolescent, whereas the Army was equipped with obsolete weapons that were inferior to those available to any potential opposition group.

THE CONFLICT WITH CASTRO

First Battle

The first contact between the armed forces and Castro's band was probably the best fought of the entire war. A Navy vessel found the landing site only a few hours after the landing on December 2. The Air Force delivered air strikes which separated the guerrillas and destroyed some equipment.⁶⁸ The 1st Artillery Battalion was airlifted to Oriente, and, acting as infantry, on December 5 killed 25 rebels, captured 32 and scattered the remainder. Batista then withdrew the unit on December 7 and decided to let the remaining rebels starve to death in the Sierra Maestra. On December 14, Batista declared the revolt suppressed and ended.⁶⁹ Although the Army had inflicted a crushing defeat on the rebels, Batista's

forces assumed a defensive posture in the Sierra Maestra, patrolling the perimeter of the rebel zone without making any efforts to search for Castro or to contact the enemy forces. Batista's concern was not with the rebel force, but with its effect on public opinion. Army and police terror was applied to civilians thought to be rebel supporters. Thus, consequent to a significant battle victory, Batista adopted tactics that gave Castro a safe haven in the Sierra Maestra and alienated the civilian population of the area.

Renewed Action

During the next six months, Castro rebuilt his force and initiated his favorable press campaign that helped greatly and gained U. S. popular support for him. It was not until May, 1957, when Castro took a rural guard post, that Batista's forces in the Sierra Maestra even developed a plan to deal with the rebels. The initial plan was to evacuate all civilians and employ 5,000 soldiers to find and destroy Castro. Two days after commencing the operation, Batista ordered it terminated in response to a press comment that it was similar to a U. S. operation in 1895.⁷⁰ The new plan was to isolate Castro with a ring of soldiers around the Sierra Maestra, a hopeless task. Guevara indicates that an aggressive army operation to patrol constantly throughout the mountains using the Air Force reconnaissance capability could easily and quickly have found and destroyed the

fewer than 200 Fidelistas in mid-1957.⁷¹

While Castro was hiding in the Sierra Maestra, another opposition group linked with Prio determined to attack the palace and execute Batista. On March 14, 1957, nearly 80 men attacked the palace but failed in their objective of reaching Batista. Troops from Camp Columbia promptly and efficiently reinforced the palace guard and repulsed the attack. Two results of the attack were overwhelming endorsements of and sympathy for Batista as the intended victim and subsequently heightened repression and terrorism.

U. S. REACTION TO THE CIVIL WAR

It was in the spring of 1957 that U. S. official attitudes toward Cuba and Batista began to change, perhaps as a result of the articles written by Herbert Matthews after visiting Castro in the mountains, in which he eulogized Castro and presented him as some sort of political Robin Hood comparable to Abraham Lincoln. Ambassador Gardner's pro forma resignation upon Eisenhower's election was accepted. He had always been closely and personally identified with Batista, and replaced by Earl Smith who knew Cuba only as a tourist. Although official policy, appearances, and attitudes remained unchanged, the change of ambassadors for no apparent reason and other small signals, such as the difference in Smith's introductory speech sent in advance to Batista and that actually read at

the ceremony, indicated a stiffening U. S. attitude toward Batista and his government. Smith arrived in Havana on July 15, 1957. The capital was calm but the atmosphere seemed filled with terror. In Santiago the country was in near-open war. Rebel flags appeared on top of buildings as often as bombs beneath them. As a result of continued terrorism on August 1, 1957, Batista suspended civilian law and imposed total press censure. On July 31, Castro destroyed another Army garrison in the mountains. Meanwhile a five-day general strike spread through the island. Constitutional guarantees were suspended.

At this point the world began to admit that Cuba was in a state of civil war proceeding in the, by that time, familiar pattern of an imperial power attempting to suppress a revolt. Also according to pattern, the Cuban rebels had the sympathy and support of large portions of all classes of the population. It was inconceivable that the U. S. could remain simply an observer. U. S. military advisors continued close relations with their counterparts. U. S. appropriated funds furnished most of Cuba's weaponry. U. S. businessmen remained intimate with the regime. Businessmen, soldier, tourists, and diplomats remained silent concerning Batista and his actions. In the eyes of the world, "silence surely meant commitment; and commitment, enmity" toward the rebels.⁷²

On September 5, the army suppressed a revolt of navy personnel who had joined the local rebels at the naval base near Cienfuegos. Batista ordered elements of the infantry

division and the air force to intervene. B-26 bombers, provided by USMAP, bombed and strafed both the city and the naval base. Tank and motorized infantry regiments, also equipped with USMAP material, arrived from Havana and quickly restored order. The original plot included a plan to take the naval headquarters in Havana, and threatened bombing of the president's palace by the air force. Both actions in Havana were aborted and the bombers supporting the army's counterattack dropped many of their bombs into the bay.⁷³

Batista's use of bombers, tanks, and armored cars could not be concealed from the U. S. embassy or military mission. The use of this equipment provided under USMAP was legally a violation of the U. S.-Cuban Military Assistance Agreement since the weapons were used neither in accordance with joint defense plans, nor in hemispheric defense. Accordingly, Batista was asked to explain.

"We did not get that satisfaction from them,"⁷⁴ testified William Wieland in later Senate investigations. In the succeeding weeks

...the entire hemisphere defense unit supplied with U. S. grant equipment was eventually ... scattered in combat areas throughout the Eastern part of the island. This was done without asking our prior agreement.⁷⁵

Lobbyists and supporters, both Cuban and American, began to press the U. S. government strongly to terminate military assistance to Cuba since Batista had violated the Agreement and refused to explain his actions. During the winter of 1957-'58, this question was the main issue in U. S.-

Cuban relations. Despite such pressure in Washington, a large shipment of arms went to Batista in November, 1957, in response to urging by U. S. right-wing men that an arms embargo for Cuba would certainly lead to communism.

TURMOIL IN HAVANA AND WASHINGTON

As 1957 became 1958, arrests, deaths, bombs, and terror continued daily in Havana on both sides. The unrest in Cuba was affecting even Labour. While the various opposition groups militated for a general strike, Labour leaders identified themselves more and more overtly with the regime. Batista and Labour leaders announced that Labour had no need to strike. Indeed, wages had risen. Despite murder, terror, and war, total income from sugar was at \$680 million, the highest since 1952. New investments of foreign capital totalled \$200 million. Christmas bonuses were large and money flowed throughout the island. American and Cuban businessmen were annoyed with the war and wanted Batista to crush the rebellion so that they could "get on with business".

In Oriente Province, the rebels were attacking the soldiers daily.

Although the Castro rebels had not struck a major blow at the army, their tenacity and determination was beginning [sic. - continuing?] to undermine the morale of the soldiers.⁷⁶

In early 1958, Radio Moscow announced open support for Castro and asked that his forces be aided and abetted in overthrowing Batista. The Daily Worker in New York argued throughout late 1957 and 1958, that the Cuban communists were

not receiving adequate credit for their support of the rebels. The Soviet government had referred to Batista's regime as a "terrorist government that strangles and tortures its people."⁷⁷ William Wieland, State Department desk officer for the area commented:

... he [Batista] is not playing ball with the Communists ... On the other hand, Fidel Castro is surrounded by commies. I don't know whether he is himself a communist ... [but] I am certain he is subject to communist influences.⁷⁸

American business interests were overtly pro-Batista because his government was giving them protection against sabotage, terrorism, raiding, and looting by the rebels as well as the economic benefits and incentives provided by U. S.-Cuban treaties. Ambassador Smith reported,

The balance of trade favored the United States when I was Chief of Mission in Havana. Cuba bought more goods in dollars from the United States than the United States bought from Cuba, even though the United States purchased approximately 3,000,000 tons of sugar per year from Cuba with a subsidy of more than two cents per pound, which represented approximately one-half of Cuba's entire sugar production.⁷⁹

The official policy of the U. S. government at that time was based upon the desire for political stability in, and political cooperation from Latin American countries in an attempt to prevent communist subversion. It had not yet been established that Castro's rebellion was communist influenced. Many government officials, as well as a significant portion of the U. S. press, felt that regressive dictatorships such as Batista's, were more inimical to U. S. interests than were actual communist rebels. Herbert Matthews advised newly-appointed Ambassador Smith that Batista was a

"ruthless and corrupt dictator . . . who would soon fall, and that it would be in the best interest of Cuba and . . . the world . . . if Batista were removed."⁸⁰ The anti-Batista officials and reporters:

. . . though not pro-Castro, felt that resentment was building up in Latin America because of U. S. support of dictatorial regimes not only in Cuba but throughout the hemisphere as well.⁸¹

It was thought that such regimes fostered genuine, nationalistic, democratic opposition groups, which, when forced into rebellion by dictatorial suppression, were easily subverted by insidious communist proselytes who overwhelmed the naive and politically unsophisticated Latin Americans. U. S. public opinion, enchanted by Matthews' romantic descriptions of gallant young rebels in the mountains who had dedicated their lives to achieve liberty and equality for all Cubans, eventually added credibility and force to the growing U. S. opposition to Batista.

In the ambivalent atmosphere of Washington, many decisions regarding Cuban policy were not based upon sound and definite U. S. foreign policy, but rather upon the personal attitudes of the man involved. In 1957-58, one could build an anti-communist position on either Batista or Castro. Batista represented a certain degree of stability, but to support Castro meant an end to civil war. Batista continued to guarantee Cuban support of any U. S. position in the U. N., but he would not permit personal freedom, free elections, free press or democratic

institutions in Cuba. Castro guaranteed the latter. The result of such considerations produced a flaccid U. S. policy that responded to events while waiting for the situation to resolve itself. Thus, Cuban exile activity in Florida went virtually unchecked while U. S. arms shipments went to Batista.

U. S. interests in Cuba became vague in 1957-58 as the U. S. lost control of events and chose not to exercise control of things. Early in 1958, U. S. mission officers were directed to avoid all publicity and to be sure not to have:

their pictures taken in connection with arms which were in Cuba under the Military Defense Assistance Program. . . . Also all mission personnel, including the attaches, were reminded not to be near combat areas.⁸²

The U. S. had chosen to adopt active non-intervention rather than to attempt to bring its power to bear in pursuit of U. S. interests, perhaps because no one could determine what those interests were in Cuba.

Quid Pro Quo In Reverse

By January 1958, U. S. military assistance had become a critical element of U. S.-Cuban relations. The quid pro quo concept was introduced into the relationship, but not by the U. S. Batista offered to restore Cuban constitutional guarantees if the U. S. would assure delivery of 20 armored cars that he had ordered.⁸³ At the same time William Wieland in the State Department

proposed that "the U. S. should put pressure on Batista's administration to speed its final downfall."⁸⁴ Ambassador Smith felt that, "the United States would never be able to do business with Fidel Castro."⁸⁵

Castro Gains Support

Meanwhile the war continued in eastern Cuba, it began to be evident that Castro was in Cuba to stay and that nothing could be gained by supporting Batista's army. By February, Castro had issued his first administrative decree, begun publishing a newspaper, established a system of criminal jurisdiction and established a radio station in the Sierra Maestras. At about this time the Cuban Communist party decided to support Castro openly, although no alliance was made and contact was initially limited to visits to Castro's headquarters.

By March, the Church began to denounce the regime and proposed the formation of a new government of national unity. Batista responded favorably by shuffling his cabinet for the benefit of the U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee which was hearing testimony on Cuban use of U. S. grant-aid military equipment. Batista had still provided no explanation of his use of it in defiance of the military assistance agreement of 1952.

On March 12, Batista suspended civil rights and imposed press and radio censorship. Secondary school children went on strike. Castro threatened a general revolutionary strike and declared that the provisional

government would collect taxes in lieu of Batista's government on April 1. The country as a whole was to consider itself in a state of war with Batista's tyranny.

On March 13, Batista told Ambassador Smith that he would accept:

. . . all reasonable requests by the Church's commission of harmony; he would investigate allegations of brutality. . . he would accept all suggestions for elections; and he could afford an amnesty to all revolutionaries providing they left their arms behind. He himself would stand down on February 24, 1959.⁸⁶

Embargo and a Firm U. S. Position

On March 14, the U. S. suspended shipment of 1,950 Garand M-1 rifles for Cuba and ordered the ship unloaded at New York. No more arms were sent officially to Batista except some rockets in exchange for previously supplied defective items.⁸⁷

This arms embargo, be it intervention or non-intervention, effectively terminated any ambiguity of the U. S. position. Ambassador Smith was directed to:

. . . assure the government of Cuba that there was no change in the basic policy of the United States; that the steps enacted to suspend the arms shipments were taken only because of the great criticism and pressure being brought to bear by the press in the United States and by members of Congress.⁸⁸

However, he, himself, knew that after March 12, it was impossible to engender any official U. S. support for Batista. Batista's suspension of constitutional guarantees, and civil rights, censorship of the press, and the school strikes were accompanied on that date by the opening of

Raul Castro's second front in the Sierra Cristals.

Since January, 1958, Washington's attitude toward Batista had been couched in terms of constitutional guarantees and free elections. Thus, the news of March 12, provided an easy legalistic decision that did not involve a definite iteration of U. S. policy. The only certain doctrine was anti-communism. Yet no one in Washington was able to determine whether the greater communist threat lay in the presidential palace or in the Sierra Maestras. Although several authors allude to some sinister connection between Batista and the Cuban Communists, by 1958 it was becoming apparent that local communists were being literally forced by Batista's police into semi-rebellion and ultimate alliances with Castro.⁸⁹ That communism was germinating under Batista's repression was evident. U. S. information on Castro's movement was a good deal less clear. Although Lyman Kirkpatrick implies that CIA agents were successfully placed in the Sierra, the only apparent possible agent, Arthur St. George was back in the United States by 1958, and any reports that might have been submitted have never been made public or available, even to Congress.⁹⁰ Ambassador Smith had recommended placing agents with Castro in late 1957. Apparently this could not be done, and the CIA remained favorable to Castro throughout the rebellion.⁹¹ The primary, if not the sole, sources of U. S. government information on Castro's organization at that time seem to have been newspapers almost exclusively

pro-Castro, and Castro lobbyists in Washington.

Conclusions

Thus, in March, 1958, the U. S. government imposed a suspension of arms shipments that effectively terminated support to the existing government of Cuba, but announced to that government no change in policy. The basic concepts and principles of U. S.-Latin American relations established over the previous half-century were thus abandoned or ignored in Cuba in the face of a perceived communist threat of uncertain size from an unknown source.

Traditional hemispheric policy goals were thus subordinated to anti-communism. U. S. actions in 1958, despite diplomatic pronouncements of neutrality and non-intervention produced a sort of anti-support for Batista and the elected, legal government in Cuba. Only legal government of some sort could produce economic/political stability and serve U. S. business interests. By removing U. S. influence on Batista through increasing pressure culminating in the arms suspension in March, the U. S. progressively limited its freedom of action to control events in Cuba. The events of 1958 eventually led to a significant decrease in the deterrent to non-American intervention in the western hemisphere and led eventually to an overt threat to the physical security of continental United States. The question of democratic representative institutions, mentioned by Dean Acheson in 1949, remains unclear since it was never answered. It seems apparent,

however, that Batista's subsequent malleability on the subject of elections, guarantees, and civil rights indicated a more remunerative and functional course than non-supporting him and legal government, and non-intervening while a dubious revolutionary government was formed. Under the parameters of U. S.-Latin American and U. S. -Cuban policy and precedent in 1958, neither support of Castro nor non-support of Batista seemed the best policy.

THE SUMMER OFFENSIVE

The failure of Castro's general strike called April 9, 1958, reduced his prestige immensely. Sabotage and terrorism declined; few civil servants resigned; people continued to pay taxes to the Batista government. Prior to the strike, Batista, whose support was by that time limited to the armed forces, labor, and civil servants, had passed a law giving himself absolute authority to regulate the size of the armed forces, to retire and promote military personnel, and making all government employees members of the Army Reserve and subject to military law.⁹² In March he began to replace policemen with soldiers.⁹³ On April 1, he declared a state of emergency and assumed unlimited powers.⁹⁴ Although the army assumed control of the Labor Ministry, it only played a minor part in combatting the strike which failed for lack of support.

The U. S. policy of active non-intervention prevented

U. S. arbitration between Castro and Batista, did not permit suggesting a truce, and even prohibited furnishing transportation to move a papal arbitration team to the Sierra Maestras.⁹⁵

The Church was prepared to carry the ball [mediate a cease-fire or truce between Batista and Castro] by itself, but even the Cuban Episcopacy could not bring about a peaceful solution without the support of the United States. . . . The [State] Department was not willing actively to support any propositions for a peaceful solution. The reason given was that any such active support would be considered as intervening in the internal affairs of Cuba.⁹⁶

U. S. actions in refusing to ship arms, and subsequently expressing disapproval of other countries' offers to sell arms, indicated forcefully to the Cuban armed forces that the United States no longer supported Batista. While demoralizing Batista's troops, it convinced Castro of U. S. support. In addition to the 1,950 rifles, the U. S. action stopped shipment of 15 training airplanes, and 20 armored cars. At approximately the same time as the U. S. arms suspension, Batista decided to enlarge the army for an offensive campaign against Castro. By April, 7,700 recruits had been called.⁹⁷ These were all volunteers, mostly teenagers, and Cuba's World War II draft law was not used until July.⁹⁸ The U. S. arms suspension merely caused Batista to obtain arms elsewhere. By April 2, he had received at least five plane loads of weapons and ammunition from General Trujillo in the Dominican Republic.⁹⁹

The suspension of U. S. weapons was a nuisance, caused delays and forced sub-standard equipment upon

Batista, but it was not militarily decisive. By late June, Batista was able to form a provisional division of 12,000 troops in Oriente Province. The initial encounter of Batista's offensive involved two battalions which were ambushed on June 28 by Fidelistas occupying ridge lines overlooking the road on which the army forces were advancing. The government force suffered 10% casualties, lost 65 weapons, a radio, and the signal code which was not changed until July 25. On June 12, the government force retreated to its base.¹⁰⁰

The second government attack began twelve days later with an amphibious landing south of the guerrilla base area. After initial light contact the battalion made no more for three days, then lost one platoon in an attempt to return to the beach. Attempts to reinforce the battalion on July 17 and 19 were repulsed with light losses. Air support was ineffective. On July 20, the battalion surrendered, its commander joining Castro while the soldiers were released.¹⁰¹

The third attack was begun on July 18 and was essentially the first operation repeated with similar results. Thus ended the summer campaign.

Important as it was in determining the result of the rebellion, Batista's offensive was given only second priority in Washington during June and July. During the summer, Raul Castro's force kidnapped and held 46 U. S. citizens. Release was to be conditional upon cessation

of U. S. provision of spare parts and fuel to Batista and assurance that U. S. military equipment would not be used against the rebels. Congress, the public, Ambassador Smith, the Department of Defense, and many others felt that U. S. military intervention was required for the safety and release of U. S. citizens. The State Department argued that while a landing would be easy, accomplishment of the mission, disengagement, and withdrawal would be extremely difficult without intervening in the internal affairs of Cuba and providing critical, if collateral, support to Batista. Eventually the prisoners were released with neither concessions nor intervention. Despite maximum favorable publicity surrounding the release, an effect of the kidnappings was a loss of considerable U. S. good will toward Castro.

THE FINAL MONTHS

In August 1958, Castro, having been named commander-in-chief of military forces of a front formed of all opposition groups, except the Communists, began to extend military operations west of Oriente province. He continued dialogue and negotiations with the communists and accepted their support in all operations. He began to assume the attributes of a political leader in levying and collecting taxes, and appeals to the public for voluntary boycotts and support for rebels in any and all ways. He began to formulate his post-victory programme: agricultural

reform, purge of the army, and state supported children's boarding schools in each province.

During August the entire Batistiano army withdrew from the Sierra Maestra. The High Command panicked and degenerated into a gaggle of corrupt, cruel, and lazy officers, without combat experience, incompetent and unwilling to lead an army into battle. Fearing total extinction from an enemy whose numbers and location were totally unknown, they devoted all of their time and efforts to self-preservation and left the army to local and unit leaders. Four complete battalions had been destroyed or had collapsed. The rebels had taken considerable equipment: a 14-ton tank, 12 mortars, two rocket launchers, twelve heavy machine guns, and 21 light machine guns, 142 Garand rifles, 200 Cristobal machine guns, and large quantities of ammunition. Rebel losses were 27 killed and about 50 wounded.¹⁰²

The largest field command in Cuban military history had been defeated by about 300 guerrillas. It was an untrained Army, composed of almost sixty percent raw recruits. It had been committed in such a piecemeal manner that never more than two of the battalions could be brought to bear on the enemy at the same time. The unit leaders generally went where they were ordered, but without exception, immediately went on the defensive and withdrew when they made contact with the guerrillas. Units repeatedly abandoned their missions with less than ten percent casualties. The Army's will to fight was gone.¹⁰³

After the failure of the summer offensive, the army ceased to pose a threat to the guerrillas. It retired to the barracks and fought only when attacked. Desertion to the Fidelistas became common. Army officers began to seek

compromise solutions in order to retain their perquisites. By December nearly the entire officer corps was seeking to join or promote some plot to preserve the army and its class position under a new government. The history of the Cuban Constitutional Army ended on January 2, 1959, when Camp Columbia in Havana was occupied by the Fidelistas.

Batista placed the blame for all of his problems on the U. S.; not only had Washington refused to provide him with arms, but U. S. officials were negligent in letting the rebels obtain arms from U. S. sources. On the U. S. mainland, Cuban exiles were still condemning Eisenhower as committed to Batista. The official presence of the U. S. military mission in Cuba for hemispheric defense was decried as a transparent effort to camouflage covert aid to Batista.¹⁰⁴ Further, the U. S. had permitted England to sell fifteen Sea Fury fighters to Batista, without objection.

Cuban cities became calm as the population responded to Castro's call for passive resistance. Police reacted savagely to what terrorism did occur. Americans were kidnapped and released within a few days. The U. S. embassy evacuated American citizens from the Nicaraguan nickel plant in a publication of its lack of faith in Batista's ability to keep order and protect them.

While Castro was concluding a formal alliance with the communists, and implementing his agrarian reform program in the east, the military operations in central Cuba were gaining momentum under Che Guevara. In November the presidential

election was duly held and Batista's candidate was elected. No one noticed. Only 30% of the electorate voted with some districts polling as little as 10%.¹⁰⁵ In fact the army had prepared and marked a complete set of election papers which had been distributed by the air force long before the election.¹⁰⁶ The president-elect appealed to Ambassador Smith for U. S. aid and support in seeking a peaceful solution to Cuba's political problems. State Department officers responded

... that there was no possible solution to the Cuban problem through United States aid to the [president-elect] Rivero Aguero government, as they did not think that any of the respected civil and military elements would associate themselves with the government of the newly elected president. Further, they did not want to support and stimulate an effort by the Church to stop the fighting.¹⁰⁷

On December 17, 1958, Ambassador Smith informed Batista that he no longer had U. S. support or confidence in his ability to maintain control. On January 1, 1959, Batista resigned and left Cuba.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

U. S. and Cuban Interests

Although not immediately apparent in 1959, it soon became obvious that U. S. policies in Cuba since World War II had failed to achieve even the implicit goals of friendly relations between the two countries. Military assistance, despite the small amounts, had been significant in pursuing U. S. goals in Cuba both during World War II and during Batista's second regime. During World War II, the U. S.

and Cuba were both belligerent allies against a common enemy. U. S. and Cuban forces fought as allies in the Caribbean and U. S. forces were deployed in Cuba. Both nations perceived a threat and met that threat as allies. In 1957-58, only Cuba was belligerent against Castro. The U. S. did not perceive Castro as a threat and consequently was not prepared either to commit resources or troops against him, whereas he was a distinct menace to Batista and the Cuban government. Thus, Havana and Washington by perceiving Castro differently, were able to react differently in terms of their own national interests which were different. The Cuban government, in the person of Batista, was concerned with defeating the insurgents and maintaining personal power. The U. S. was looking toward economic and political cooperation and stability and the growth of democratic institutions in Cuba. Provision of military assistance to provide for hemispheric security did not address U. S. policy goals of stability, cooperation and freedom and was irrelevant to Cuba's security problems which not only were not hemispheric, but did not involve aggression. (The self-contradictory phrase "internal aggression" had not yet appeared.) Batista's second regime saw a growing divergence of U. S. and Cuban national goals and interests, although the continued economic well-being and profit in both countries concealed the widening political fissures until U. S. denunciation of Batista in 1958.

U. S. Military Dominance

U. S. military and naval forces had dominated Cuba and the Caribbean area since the Spanish-American War and even in 1962 were able to control the area militarily. Nevertheless, Washington did not employ those forces in Cuba, even to rescue U. S. citizens who were in fact captured prisoners of a belligerent force. As in China in 1946, the U. S. chose to nonintervene and in so doing deprived the other elements of foreign policy implementation of their credibility and weight.

U. S. Control

British forces under Wellington, U. S. forces under Stilwell and U. S. forces in Cuba during World War II exercised close control over military assistance resources and equipment. No such force existed in the 1950's in Cuba. Although some U. S. advisors supervised training and the defense attache maintained liaison with the general staff, no U. S. control over military assistance equipment existed after transfer of that equipment to Cuba. Latterly, U. S. military personnel were forbidden to interfere or even to visit the battle areas. The deliberate renunciation of U. S. control over delivered items probably contributed to Cuban violation of the Military Assistance Agreement in 1957 at Cienfuegos. That Washington took six months to react to Cienfuegos with more than requests for clarification implies either a renunciation of political

control, as U. S. arms continued to go to Cuba, or an uncertain ambiguity in the military assistance policy itself.

Integration of U. S. policies

Military assistance to Cuba was framed within overall U. S. foreign policy and military strategy, both under Lend-Lease and in the 1950's. The U. S. was to dominate hemispheric defense during World War II and enable Latin American armed forces to support U. S. efforts. During the 1950's the U. S. was building an anti-communist front in Latin America based upon a military response to anticipated external aggression and relying primarily upon private investment for non-military capital. Throughout Latin America, these policies were consistent and integrated. Primary U. S. attention had turned to reconstruction in war-damaged areas and "containment" of communism in other areas of the world. Within the context of post-war reconstruction, Roosevelt's non-intervention, and building of Latin American solidarity, a small, uncontrolled policy of anti-communist military assistance for hemispheric defense with minimal economic aid was obvious and rational, despite its failure to address the real situation. In fact, the threat was not military. Latins saw no communist threat, but rather an economic threat that was being exacerbated by U. S. protective tariffs, quotas and economic policies. Nations that felt a need for cheap capital for resource development and social construction

received military equipment , training, and weapons. Burgeoning post-war Latin American nationalism could neither attract foreign private investment nor meet the stringent requirements of World Bank or the Export-Import Bank loans. The basic assumptions of adequate/sufficient private capital and a significant communist military threat in the early post-war years led the U. S. into policies and strategies which, despite good execution, led to poor results throughout Latin America and exemplified in Cuba. It was perhaps not until Vice-President Nixon's trip in 1958 and Dr. Eisenhower's second trip shortly thereafter that U. S. policy makers began to revise their assumptions.

Some conclusions reached in other case studies seem to be valid in regard to this analysis of the U. S.-Cuba relationship. In Cuba, as in China, and the Wars of the Coalitions, failure of military assistance was accompanied by non-deployment of donor forces. During the Coalition Wars, Britain lacked the physical capability. In post-war China and during Batista's second regime the U. S. chose not to intervene although U. S. military forces could have dominated both combat areas and affected the military contest.

In the American colonies, during the Coalitions, in post-war China, and in post-war Cuba, the donor nation did not exert control over either military assistance delivered equipment or over recipient military forces. In

all of these cases of unsuccessful military assistance, military forces behaved contrary to donor interests whereas in Wellington's and Stilwell's campaigns and during Cuban Lend-Lease, recipient armed forces were either commanded by or effectively controlled by donor military forces.

In the American colonies before Yorktown, during Wellington's campaigns before Vittoria, and during World War II in China and Cuba, recipient and donor nations shared common or complementary war goals. After Yorktown, Vittoria, and V-J Day, they lacked common goals and adopted increasingly disparate objectives.

While the Cuba experience gives added generality to three of the general conclusions suggested earlier, it does not discriminate in terms of the fourth since the three elements of foreign policy, military strategy and military assistance were in fact mutually supportive in both cases.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY

It would seem that one can draw some broad conclusions from the previous study of several episodes of military assistance. First, in spite of their real, dramatic, and undeniable differences, they do present some simple uniformities that are germane to the conceptual scheme used as a basis for study. Second, military assistance is, in fact, a viable method for pursuing national interests, if those who use it realize its capabilities, limitations, and inability to do more than support other policies and actions of the donor. Third, although military assistance is a political instrument, it cannot be divorced from its unalterably military foundations.

When one has made due homage to those who insist upon emphasizing the unique aspects of historical and human events, it must be admitted that the studies do indicate some apparent uniformities that are too obvious to be dismissed as parallel coincidences. The conceptual scheme that formed the studies can once again be used to emphasize the uniformities. It is thus useful to recapitulate the points of comparison offered by that scheme in developing the studies.

First, both donor and recipient were separate, sovereign, independent nation-states with purposes,

interests, goals, and objectives. Relationships that led to donor aims invariably involved parallelism, or at least complementarity, of donor and recipient aims. Each state involved in the relationship determined its own interests and aims consequent to its own perceptions of the world and independently of other nations. When the aims of two nations coincided, they co-operated successfully, each nation contributing to the common effort. This situation obtained for a short time in the Peninsular Campaigns, the early years of the American Rebellion, early in World War II in China and Cuba. All of these episodes were successful in achieving donor aims.

Second, both donor and recipient had independent initiative and capabilities to act and a certain degree of national power, all of which were devoted to achieving national aims. The actions needed to achieve those aims changed as the world situation changed and as the aims themselves changed. In none of the cases studied was permanence a characteristic of either the world situation or coincidence of donor and recipient national aims which themselves changed. When perfect coincidence was not present, control of the military assistance relationship became essential to achievement of donor aims. Positive donor control was present in all cases of successful achievement as donor aims. Wellington and Stilwell actually commanded recipient military forces and controlled the distribution of military assistance. On the

contrary, Batista and Frederick William used donor resources in projects that not only did not contribute to donor purposes, but may have impeded donor policies.

Third, both donor and recipient conceived that a military force could somehow serve its own interests and policies, and that that force probably should operate within or near the recipient nation. Deployment of donor military forces as a part of this force to achieve military superiority over the common enemy was a factor in all of the successful relationships. British forces were in Iberia after 1808, but not in Europe in the 1790's. U. S. forces conducted joint operations with Cuban forces during World War II, but were not deployed in the Caribbean during the fifties. (Although the USMC garrison at Guantanamo was present on Cuban soil, it never deployed with or in support of Cuban forces, and not even to rescue American citizens held by the rebels.)

Fourth, both donor and recipient had many international relationships other than the donor-recipient relationship. Integration of these many relationships with many nations was present in all successful episodes of military assistance. During World War II all U. S. efforts were devoted to winning the war both in China and in the Caribbean. No such unity of effort existed after V-J Day.

These four uniformities and their incidence in the studied episodes may be summarized thus:

	Coal- ition	Penin- sula	Am. Rob	WWII Chin	Postwar Chin	WWII Cuba	Postwar Cuba
Coincidence of aims		Y	par- tial	Y		Y	
Donor Control		Y		Y		Y	
Donor troop deployment		Y	Y	Y		Y	
Integration of donor policies		Y		Y		Y	
Success		Y		Y		Y	
Failure	Y		Y		Y		Y

The set of uniformities that was the object of the first section of the study has four basic elements. When given to a recipient actively engaged in war, military assistance promoted achievement of donor aims most effectively when:

1. Donor and recipient shared common purposes, goals, objectives, and concepts of employment of the recipient military forces.
2. Donor retained sufficient control of resources transferred and adequate influence over the recipient military forces to ensure promotion of donor interests.
3. Combined donor and recipient military capabilities surpassed that of the common enemy in decisive theaters, sectors, or campaigns, and was adequate to achieve donor aims through military operations.

Corollaries:

a) Donor was willing and able to commit forces as necessary to ensure achievement of donor aims when recipient forces were inadequate, unable, or unwilling to do so.

b) Donor strategy was complemented by recipient strategy and both were appropriate to achievement of donor aims.

c) Military assistance supported those recipient forces most effective in achievement of donor aims.

d) Donor integrated foreign policy, military strategy, military assistance and economic policy into a single policy for promotion of donor goal achievement.

This last uniformity suggests another conspicuous, but perhaps not very important phenomenon in these episodes. During the successful episodes world conditions were such that the donors could narrow the focus of their foreign policies onto one situation or onto a small group of events which comprised a large collective group of events that could be treated with rough similarity. During the Peninsular campaigns, Britain was able, and in fact chose to focus her attentions and efforts on defeating Napoleon in the Iberian Peninsula. All other theaters were subordinate and supportive, and all diplomatic and economic efforts were similarly focussed upon Iberia. American

efforts during World War II were totally pointed at winning the war. China was one event that could be treated just as several other events in the great war effort. After the war, America's efforts and interests could no longer be focussed upon any one event. One set of policies was needed for Europe, another for Latin America, another for Asia, another for America itself, and another for Russia. During the American Rebellion, France was fighting England in four separate wars, each of which required different policies and separate consideration. The same situation obtained in the 1790's when England was fighting several wars at the same time. Military assistance required management and full attention within an integral total policy. When for some reason donor decision-makers were forced to divide their attention between military assistance and its objectives and other events in the world, the objectives of military assistance suffered. Whether this phenomenon resulted from an inherent inviability of a multi-dimensional foreign policy, coincidental low priority of military assistance objectives, inability of decision makers to divide their attention, or some other situational factor is not apparent in the studies.

PART III

VERIFICATION

CHAPTER IX

ASSESSMENT OF THE UNIFORMITIES

General

The aim of Part II was the modest one of attempting to establish certain first approximations of uniformities found in three successful episodes and four unsuccessful episodes of the donor-recipient relationship: British military assistance during the Wars of the Coalitions and the Peninsular Campaigns; French military assistance during the American Rebellion; and U. S. military assistance to China and Cuba. It should be quite clear that not all episodes of military assistance will conform to any pattern that may have emerged from the study of these episodes. They may not even be typical. They are simply important episodes that were chosen to begin a work of systematization.

Far from attempting to establish absolute truths, social science is quite content to establish working statistical uniformities. The firmest laws or theorems of the "exact" sciences like physics, astronomy, or mathematics, are no more "absolute" or "infallible" than social science's uniformities. All may be upset and denied at any time they

are proven unreliable in relation to observed facts. The experiences of an individual, even his personal perceptions of reality, may well contradict such uniformities. Indeed the real and abiding significance of any human, historical, or political event may well be the statistically false, or unreal perceptions of it and the moral and emotional stimuli that it provides. Individual experience and perceptions will probably be more exciting and certainly more apparently real. Yet statistics are present and inescapable.

It remains in Part III to assess the uniformities invented (not discovered) in Part II "in relation to observed facts". Such an assessment is essentially a mechanical process involving definition of the "facts", and comparing them with the uniformities. The population and sample within which the "facts" are to be observed was explained and derived in Chapter III, as was the methodology involved. The uniformities were developed in Part II. Research in Part III consists of 19 brief case studies in which the facts are compared with the uniformities.

Questions and Answers

Seven questions were asked and answered in each study:

1. What was the extent of military assistance provided?
2. What purposes, goals, and objectives were shared by donor and recipient?
3. What control did donor exert?

4. What were donor troop deployments and commitments?
5. Were donor policies integrated?
6. Were donor purposes, goals, and objectives achieved?
7. What was the total effect of the relationship?

The first question establishes the episodes as being a relevant "fact". The second, third, fourth, and fifth determine the incidence of the uniformities "in relation to the observed facts". The sixth and seventh assess incidence of the dependent variable, success.

All questions except the fourth could be answered by directly observing each episode. The fourth addressed an action normally taken only in wartime (either cold or hot). Since most of the episodes did not involve actual active war, a surrogate was required. Modern politico-military usage accepts the concept of "commitment" during peacetime as a promise, to some degree binding, by the committed state to deploy its troops, or expend its resources, according to the agreement, if a certain type of war develops or occurs. This concept of commitment is, then, the peacetime equivalent of deployment, and was used during the research and analysis as an acceptable surrogate.

The question of surpassing enemy military capability was unanswerable since, in most episodes, no enemy was ever specifically identified. Here again, commitment can serve as an acceptable surrogate. Donor and recipient strategies cannot be assessed comparatively unless war occurs or formal combined planning for war happens routinely. Commitment in

modern practice includes a certain degree of combined planning. Thus commitment was also acceptable as a surrogate for strategic complementarity. (It is clear that donor and recipient strategies in actual war could be complementary with or without commitment or combined planning. However, in the absence of positive evidence, commitment was acceptable as a surrogate.)

Answers to the sixth and seventh questions dealing with success and effect of the relationship are necessarily judgmental. Donor and recipient aims were defined as:

Purposes - Broad aims of policy and strategy, to whose achievement many instruments, policies, and actions contribute.

Goals - Ends that are to be achieved by developing recipient armed forces; uses to which those forces are to be put.

Objectives - The specific force development to be accomplished by military assistance. This grouping is for convenience only and should not be significant in assessing the donor-recipient relationship and the set of uniformities.

Each aim was compared with the situation at the termination of the relationship, and assessed simply as achieved or not achieved. While it is evident that such a relationship has effects that may eventually achieve or counter achievement of a donor aim long after termination, any attempt to predict the results of those effects after termination would lead to speculation and trend-guessing,

neither of which is as rewarding as it is easy.

Conclusions

Individual case studies are presented in Appendixes F through Z. Tabulated and cumulative results are in Appendixes AA through DD. Analysis of research results dealt with four independent variables and one dependent variable. Independent variables were:

Coincidence of donor and recipient aims

Donor control (C)

Deployment or commitment of donor troops (DC)

Integration/Integrity of donor policies and strategies (I).

The dependent variable was Achievement of donor aims, or success of the relationship.

Coincidence of aims and degree of success for each case were measured as High (H), Medium (M), or Low (L) relative to the entire sample. A convenient division between the levels of coincidence and success placed approximately one third of the total cases in each level. Coincidence indices and success indices for all cases were equal to the ratios between the shared aims or achieved donor aims and total donor aims. Those 5 cases with the highest coincidence indices were considered to have high coincidence. Those 7 cases having respectively medium and low indices were considered to have medium and low coincidence. Similarly 7 cases had high success, 6 cases had medium success, and 6 had low success. The absolute value of the indices is unimportant since they

only serve to establish a relative order in measuring coincidence and success. The other independent variables, C, DC, and I, were assessed simply as present or absent. Appendix AA presents the cumulative results of the research for all 19 cases. Appendix BB presents the relationships between each of the independent variables and the three levels of success. Appendix CC presents the relationships between possible combinations of C, DC, and I and the levels of success. Appendix DD presents the relationships between the coincidence levels, variable, and success levels.

The three analyses portrayed by Appendixes BB, CC, and DD indicated several relationships:

Incidence of the variables C, DC, and I was highest at the high success level, and lowest at the low success level.

High coincidence occurred with high success and low coincidence with low success.

Incidence of multiple variables is higher at high success levels.

Incidence of single variables is higher at low success levels.

These relationships indicate that the uniformities presented in Part II were indeed present to a significant degree among the cases of the sample. If one can accept the statistical accuracy and confidence levels of the sample, these relationships, and hence the uniformities, can be extended to the general population of donor-recipient relationships. The uniformities have not been proven

unreliable in relation to observed facts. Rather they have been verified as uniformities, but not laws or theorems, by those facts.

It is clear that the set of uniformities that has been developed by this study is somewhat vague and undramatic. The individual statements are not nearly as interesting or alarming as the concepts of behavioral analysis or organizational decision-making, etc. But even such vague concepts as coincidence of national aims, integrity of donor policies, and adequate control are, we hope, not completely trivial in the study of men and their nations. In themselves and taken singly, they amount to little, but collectively they suggest significant phenomena that may merit further description.

Wider uniformities will, if the trends of political science continue, one day appear in more complete studies of the relationship. Hence, at this point, one cannot hazard much beyond the set of uniformities developed through this analysis. Nevertheless it may be useful to recall several phenomena that emerged from the studies, but were not specifically within the parameters of the conceptual scheme, and thus were not developed. The relationships between economic and military assistance were mentioned in Part I and glimpsed in Part II. The relative cost of military assistance compared to other instruments of foreign policy was also mentioned in Part II. No attempt was made in this study to ascertain the propriety of military assistance to any certain aim, or to any sort of priority that donor may

have given to his aims. In Part III, research suggested that some variable may be more significant than others in achieving high levels of success. These and many other questions have been suggested by this study. But even in suggesting such questions the study serves the purpose of all first approximations in science - to suggest and orient further study of the facts, especially where an insufficient supply of facts is apparent. No scientist should ask more, even though the public does.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DEFINITION OF POPULATION AND APPLICATION OF SAMPLING TECHNIQUES

The population chosen for the experiment consists of 82 donor-recipient relationships that meet the aforementioned criteria. Ten other cases of U. S. donorship extended for less than three years or were intermittent, and were thus excluded. The same criteria excluded eight Soviet donorships, eight PRC donorships, at least one French donorship, one Danish donorship, two FRG donorships, two Italian donorships, one Indian donorship, two Egyptian donorships, probably four Israeli donorships, and perhaps more clandestine or covert donorships.

The second criteria, termination, eliminated 51 U. S. donorships, nineteen Soviet donorships, ten PRC donorships, one NVN donorships, one UK donorship, two French donorships, one Australian donorship, six FRG donorships, one Italian donorship, one Argentine donorship, and one Brazilian donorship.

The third criterion, available data, excluded two Soviet, two PRC, three French, and many donorships that were also excluded by another of the criteria. Initial investigation did not positively establish availability of adequate data to conduct a complete analysis. Consequently some of the relationships chosen may be found to be inade-

quately reported, and must then be removed from the population sample and replaced by others from the same stratum.

Since many of the recipients were colonies whose metropolises became military assistance donors, for these countries the relationship begins at independence. Thirty-three of the relationships in the population thus began at recipient independence.

In applying the first two criteria, it is necessary to deduce the intent of the donor in many cases, since no donors except the U. S. and the FRG have established formal military assistance programs that continue each year according to a preconceived notion or plan. The USSR, PRC, UK, and others generally make bilateral executive agreements, or occasionally treaties, that concern a single transaction or short series of deliveries. Non-U. S. agreements are generally camouflaged by sales contracts. Until further data become available for other donor countries, we must assume that extant reports of up to 95% discounts are accurate and that these relationships do involve military assistance in intent, in fact, or both, as military assistance is approached in this study. Where data permit, the commercial relationships will be separated from the donor-recipient relationship. To do otherwise would be to define military assistance to the few score U. S. and a handful of foreign explicit episodes that have not been camouflaged. While USMAP is neatly bifurcated,

other donors have not been so kind to the researcher.

The population is stratified according to the donor.

U. S. recipients in the population are:

01 Luxembourg	1950-64	14 Cambodia	1956-64
02 Belgium	50-64	15 Japan	53-70
03 Denmark	50-67	16 Iraq	55-61
04 France	50-66	17 Lebanon	57-72
05 Germany (FRG)	56-66	18 Ecuador	52-71
06 Italy	50-67	19 Haiti	56-63
07 Netherlands	50-67	20 Libya	58-70
08 Norway	50-71	21 Sudan	61-68
09 Portugal	51-72	22 Mali	61-67
10 UK	50-66	23 Senegal	62-69
11 Yugoslavia	52-59	24 Costa Rica	60-68
12 Syria	64-68	25 Jamaica	63-68
13 Burns	68-70		

UK recipients are:

01 Kenya	1959-68	10 Libya	1952-69
02 Nepal	65-71	11 Ghana	57-67
03 Pakistan	54-65	12 Sierra Leone	61-65
04 Malaysia	63-68	13 India	62-68
05 Burma	48-54	14 Algeria	65-67
06 Jordan	48-57	15 Iraq	58-60
07 Lebanon	57-61	16 Muscat & Oman	59-68
08 Congo (K)	65-67	17 Sudan	59-68
09 Turkey	58-60	18 Saudi Arabia	47-56

German (FRG) recipients are:

01 Israel	1960-65	08 Sudan	1962-65
02 Ghana	67-72	09 Turkey	64-69
03 Nigeria	63-69	10 Greece	64-67
04 Guinea	62-71	11 Iran	66-72
05 Kenya	66-70	12 Malaysia	62-64
06 Morocco	68-72	13 Niger	66-71
07 Tanzania	63-65		

USSR recipients are:

01 Morocco	1960-67	06 Cambodia	1963-69
02 Ghana	61-66	07 Guinea	60-67
03 Uganda	65-68	08 Mali	61-67
04 Nigeria	67-69	09 Tanzania	66-70
05 Laos	60-62	10 Indonesia	58-65

PRC recipients are:

01 Algeria	1960-67	05 Yemen	1964-71
02 Cambodia	63-70	06 Mali	61-68
03 Indonesia	58-65	07 Guinea	63-65
04 Uganda	65-68		

In order to avoid excessive weighting in the selection procedure, the last nine recipients are included in a single stratum although five donors are involved. These recipients are:

French donorship:

01 Cambodia	1963-70
02 Morocco	-66
03 Chad	-70

Canadian donorship:

04 Greece	1963-68
05 Turkey	64-68
06 Tanzania	64-69

Italian donorship:

07 Turkey	1964-70

New Zealand donorship:

08 Malaysia	1964-69

Czechoslovakian donorship:

09 Yemen (San'a)	1956-64

It is almost intuitively obvious that the relationships within the population are not fully homogeneous. Although many classification schemes are viable and heuristic, that of donor nation stratification is adequate, non-controversial and obviates any subjective evaluations of either donor, recipient, or the relationship. Thus, the sample stratum of US recipients contains 25 members, that of UK recipients--18, that of USSR recipients--10, that of FRG recipients--13, that of PRC recipients--7, that of France, Canada, Italy, New Zealand, and Czechoslovakia--9.

Although the data in this study have not been developed in terms of statistical methods, one can assume that if the data were somehow quantified, they would have some distribution, some mean, and some standard deviation or standard error. In order to achieve some degree of reliability, a random sample must be large enough to provide assurance that its distribution approaches that of the parent population.

Let n = the number of relationships in the sample of a given stratum of the population. Then:

$$n = \frac{K^2 T}{d^2 (T-1) + K^2},$$

where K = the multiplier of the coefficient of variation for the distribution used in establishing confidence levels,
 T = the number of relationships in the population, and
 d = the confidence interval in units of standard deviation.
 (See Appendix B for development of this formula)

Using the 95% confidence level and the 1 standard deviation confidence interval, the formula yields these sample sizes for the strata of the population:

$$\text{US: } \frac{4 \times 25}{1(25-1) + 4} = \frac{100}{28} = 3.6 = 4$$

$$\text{UK: } \frac{4 \times 18}{1(18-1) + 4} = \frac{72}{21} = 3.4 = 3$$

$$\text{FRG: } \frac{4 \times 13}{1(13-1) + 4} = \frac{52}{16} = 3.3 = 3$$

$$\text{USSR: } \frac{4 \times 10}{1(10-1) + 4} = \frac{40}{13} = 3.1 = 3$$

$$\text{PRC: } \frac{4 \times 7}{1(7-1) + 4} = \frac{28}{10} = 2.8 = 3$$

$$\text{Mixed: } \frac{4 \times 9}{1(9-1) + 4} = \frac{36}{12} = 3.0 = 3$$

Random selection of the 19 cases to be observed in terms of the uniformites developed in the initial research was done with a random numbers table. The table used for the selection is reproduced below.¹ The digits in six columns were used since the population has six strata. Since none of the strata has more than 99 members, the third and fourth

subcolumns of the set of five subcolumns comprising each column provided entry parameters into the table. Entries were selected by entering a column at an arbitrary line and reading the entry in each succeeding line until the entire sample for a single stratum had been chosen. Another column was arbitrarily selected for another stratum and the population of that sample was selected similarly.

The U. S. sample population was chosen by entering column (3) at line 17. The four cases to be observed were thus chosen to be: 08, 06, 11, 15. The spare case, to be used if any of the primary selections were inadequately reported, was the next number in the table, 16.

Similarly the three U. K. cases were chosen from column (7) by entering at line 29. Cases to be observed were: 08, 11, 03. The next number in the table was 07, which case was selected as the spare case.

Soviet cases from column (9) entering at line 59 were: 06, 03, 07. The spare case was 09.

FRG cases from column (13) entering at line 104 were: 13, 01, 10, with 12 as the spare case.

PRC cases from column (08) entering at line 151 were: 05, 01, 03, with 07 as the spare case.

Mixed donor cases from column (02) entering at line 73: 06,07, 04, with 05 as the spare case.

Thus the sample population consists of these randomly chosen 19 episodes of a military assistance donor-recipient relationship:

U. S. donorship - to Norway, Italy, Yugoslavia, Japan

Spare case is U. S. to Iraq.

U. K. donorship -to Congo(K), Ghana, and Pakistan

Spare case is U. K. to Lebanon.

U. S. S. R. donorship - to Cambodia, Uganda, and Guinea

Spare case is U. S. S. R. to Tanzania.

FRG donorship - to Niger, Israel, and Nigeria

Spare case is FRG to Malaysia.

PRC donorship - to Yemen, Algeria, and Indonesia

Spare case is PRC to Guinea.

Mixed donorship - to Tanzania from Canada, Turkey from

Italy, and Greece from Canada

Spare case is to Turkey from Canada.

Subsequent research determined that adequate data
for analysis were unavailable for:

U. K. assistance to Congo(K)

U. S. S. R. assistance to Uganda

Canadian assistance to Greece

Thus these cases were replaced by the spare cases for their
strata:

U. K. assistance to Lebanon

U. S. S. R. assistance to Tanzania

Canadian assistance to Turkey.

600

Table of Random Units

A TABLE OF 14,000 RANDOM UNITS

Line/Col.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
1	10480	15011	01536	02011	81647	91616	69179	14194	62590	36207	20469	99570	91291	90760
2	22368	46573	25593	85393	30995	89198	27982	53402	93065	31095	52666	19174	39015	99535
3	24130	48360	22527	97295	76393	61809	15170	24830	49440	32981	30680	19655	63348	58621
4	42167	93093	06243	61680	07856	16176	39440	53537	71341	57003	00849	74917	97758	16379
5	37570	39975	81837	16656	06121	91782	80168	81305	19681	60672	14110	06927	01263	54611
6	77921	06907	11005	42751	27756	57498	18602	70659	90655	15073	21916	81825	44394	42550
7	99562	72905	56420	09994	98572	31016	71194	18738	44013	48810	63213	21069	10634	12951
8	98301	91977	05463	07972	18876	20922	94595	56869	69014	60145	18425	84903	42508	32307
9	89579	14342	63661	10281	17453	18103	37740	94378	25331	12566	58674	44047	05585	56941
10	85475	36857	43342	53988	57060	59333	38867	62300	08138	17983	16439	11458	18593	64932
11	28918	69578	88231	33276	70997	79936	56865	05859	90106	31595	01547	85590	91610	78198
12	63553	40961	48231	03127	46026	69445	18663	72695	52189	20817	12234	90511	33703	90322
13	09429	93969	52636	92711	88974	33488	36320	17617	30015	06272	84115	27156	30613	74952
14	10365	61120	87521	85088	18237	32267	07669	93384	01511	26058	85104	20285	29075	89818
15	07119	97336	71048	08178	77233	13916	47564	81056	97735	85977	29372	74461	28551	90707
16	51085	12765	51821	51259	77452	18308	60756	92144	49442	53900	70960	63900	75601	40719
17	02368	21382	52404	60268	89364	19585	55322	44819	01188	63235	64835	44919	05944	55157
18	01011	54092	33362	94904	31273	04146	18594	29852	71545	83030	51132	01915	92747	64951
19	52162	53916	46369	58586	21216	14513	83149	98736	23495	64350	94738	17752	35156	35749
20	07056	97628	33787	09098	42698	06691	76988	13602	51851	46104	88916	19509	25625	58104
21	48663	91245	85828	14346	09172	30168	90229	04734	59193	22178	30421	61666	09904	32812
22	54164	58492	22421	74103	47070	25306	76468	26384	58151	06646	21324	15227	96909	44562
23	32639	22661	05597	24200	13363	38005	94342	28728	35806	06912	17012	64161	18296	22561
24	29334	37303	87637	87308	58731	00256	43834	15398	46557	41135	10367	07694	36188	18510
25	02488	33062	28831	07351	19731	92420	60952	61280	50001	67658	32586	86679	50720	94951
26	81525	72295	04839	06423	24478	82651	66566	14778	76797	14780	13300	87074	79666	95727
27	26676	20591	68086	26432	46001	20849	89764	81530	56645	12659	92259	57102	80428	25240
28	00742	57392	39061	06432	84673	40027	32832	61362	98947	96067	64700	64584	96096	98253
29	05366	04213	25669	26422	44107	44048	37937	63904	45766	66134	75470	66520	34693	90440
30	91921	26418	64117	94305	26766	25940	39972	22209	71500	64568	91402	42416	07844	69618
31	00582	04711	87917	77341	42206	35126	74087	09547	81817	42607	43808	76655	62028	76630
32	00725	69884	62797	56170	86324	88072	76222	36086	84637	93161	76038	65855	77919	84006
33	69011	65797	95876	55293	18088	27354	26575	08625	40801	59920	20841	80150	12777	48591
34	25976	57948	29888	84604	67917	48708	18912	82271	65424	69774	33611	54262	85963	03347
35	09763	83473	73577	12908	30883	18317	28290	35797	65998	41648	34952	37888	38917	86020
36	91567	42595	27958	30134	04024	86345	29880	99730	35536	84855	29080	09250	79658	73211
37	17955	56349	90999	49127	20044	59931	06113	20542	18039	02898	73708	83517	36103	42791
38	46503	18594	18845	49618	02304	51048	20655	58727	28168	15475	56942	53389	20562	87338
39	92157	69634	94824	78171	84610	82434	09922	25417	44137	48413	25555	21246	35309	20465
40	14577	62765	35605	81263	39667	47358	56873	56307	61607	49518	89636	20103	77490	18062
41	98427	07523	33362	64270	01638	92177	66969	08420	04880	45785	46565	04102	46880	45700
42	34914	63976	86720	27653	31176	17032	87589	40846	32427	70012	70663	88863	77775	69348
43	70060	24277	39473	46473	23219	33416	94976	25832	69975	94884	19661	72858	00102	66794
44	53976	54914	06990	67245	68750	82448	11398	42878	80257	88267	47363	46634	06541	97809
45	76072	29515	49980	07391	56745	25774	22987	80059	89911	96189	41151	14222	60697	59583
46	90725	52210	83074	29992	65831	38857	50490	83765	55657	11661	31720	57375	56228	41546
47	84364	67412	33339	31926	14883	24113	59744	92351	97473	80286	35931	04110	23726	51909
48	08962	00358	31662	25388	61642	34672	81249	35048	56891	69112	18373	45578	78547	81788
49	95012	08379	93526	70765	10593	04542	76463	51328	02349	17217	28863	14777	62730	92277
50	15684	10403	20492	38391	91132	21969	59516	81652	27197	48221	46751	22923	32261	85653

Table of Random Units

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A TABLE OF 14,000 RANDOM UNITS (Continued)

Line/Col	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
51	16408	81859	64153	53381	74401	21438	83035	92359	36293	31238	59549	91771	72772	62114
52	18629	81953	05320	91962	04739	17092	97662	24822	94730	06496	35690	04822	56772	94251
53	73115	35101	47498	87637	99916	71060	84824	71013	18735	20296	23153	72924	35155	42740
54	57491	16703	23167	49323	45921	39132	12544	41935	90760	45393	41912	12315	94791	91252
55	30405	83946	23702	14422	15059	45799	22716	14793	99963	74333	66668	30429	70735	25494
56	18631	35006	85900	98275	32344	52390	18815	69294	82732	38480	73417	32523	41961	44437
57	96773	20206	42559	78955	03390	22164	24369	34224	35043	19687	11052	91491	60333	19746
58	38935	64202	14349	82674	66523	44133	09087	35532	35970	19124	63318	29688	03387	59446
59	31624	76384	17403	53363	44167	64486	64758	73866	78534	31601	12614	33072	60332	92325
60	78919	19474	23632	27889	47914	02584	37680	20901	72152	39339	34806	03930	85001	87820
61	03931	37171	57047	74211	63441	17381	62825	39908	05907	91294	69933	25570	39819	40920
62	74429	10072	10119	69917	15065	52872	73223	73144	98602	58770	74492	51805	99378	
63	10072	10072	10072	10072	10072	10072	10072	10072	10072	10072	10072	10072	10072	10072
64	42238	12126	87923	14267	20976	04394	64535	31355	94764	29472	47689	05974	52468	16834
65	16153	03062	26504	11744	81059	65642	74240	56202	09033	67107	77310	70625	28723	34191
66	21457	40742	29820	96793	29400	21840	15035	34537	33310	06116	95240	15957	16372	08004
67	21581	57802	02050	89728	17937	37621	47075	42040	97403	49826	68985	43803	33336	21597
68	55612	78095	83197	33732	05810	24813	86402	60397	16449	03264	98525	42756	03269	92532
69	44557	66999	99324	51281	84463	80561	79112	93454	68976	25471	93911	25850	12682	73572
70	91340	84979	46949	81973	37949	01023	43997	18263	80544	43942	89203	71795	99533	50501
71	91227	21199	31935	27022	84067	05462	35216	14486	20491	68607	41867	14931	91696	93065
72	50001	38140	66321	19424	72163	05538	12151	08578	91903	19719	34405	56987	82799	70925
73	65390	05224	72958	24099	81406	39147	25549	44542	42627	45233	57202	94617	23772	07896
74	27504	96131	83914	41575	10373	09019	64482	73923	36152	05184	04142	25249	94387	34825
75	37169	94851	39117	89632	00959	18487	65536	49071	39782	17095	02330	74301	00273	48280
76	11508	70225	51111	38351	19444	66499	71945	05422	13442	78675	84091	68938	93654	39594
77	37449	30362	06694	54600	04052	53115	62757	95349	79662	11163	81651	30245	34971	52924
78	46515	70331	85922	34329	57015	13765	97161	17869	45349	61796	66345	81073	49106	79580
79	30986	81223	42416	58353	21532	30502	32305	86452	05174	07901	54339	58861	74918	46942
80	63798	64995	46553	06765	44160	78128	83091	42865	92520	83531	80377	35909	81250	54239
81	82486	84846	99254	67632	43218	50076	21361	64316	51202	98124	41870	52689	51275	53556
82	21885	32906	92431	09060	64297	51674	64126	62579	26123	05155	59194	52799	28225	35762
83	60336	98782	07408	53458	13564	59089	26445	29789	85205	41001	12535	12133	14645	23541
84	43937	46891	24010	25560	86355	33941	25786	54990	71899	15475	95434	98227	21924	19585
85	97656	63175	89303	16275	07100	92063	21942	18611	47348	20203	18534	03862	79095	50136
86	03299	01221	05418	38982	55758	92237	26759	86367	21216	04442	04303	56613	91511	75923
87	79626	06486	03574	17668	07785	76020	79924	25651	83325	88424	65076	72411	22717	51585
88	85636	68335	47591	03129	65651	11977	02510	26113	99447	68645	34327	15152	55230	91448
89	18039	14367	61337	06177	12143	46609	32989	74014	64708	04333	35398	54409	13261	47448
90	08362	15656	80627	36478	65648	16764	53412	09013	07832	41574	17609	82163	60859	75367
91	79556	29068	04112	16268	15347	12456	66227	18358	24478	73173	88732	09443	82558	05359
92	92608	82674	27072	32534	17075	27998	98204	63803	11951	34648	88022	56148	34325	57031
93	23982	25835	40055	67006	12293	02731	14827	22235	35071	99704	37543	11601	35503	85171
94	09915	96306	05908	97901	28395	14186	00821	80701	70426	75647	76310	88717	37890	40129
95	50937	33300	26005	62247	69927	76123	50842	43834	86654	70959	79725	93872	28117	19233
96	42488	78077	69882	61657	34136	79140	97526	43092	04094	73571	80799	76336	71255	64239
97	46764	86273	63061	93017	31204	36692	40292	35275	57306	55543	53203	14008	47625	88644
98	03237	45130	55417	63282	90816	17349	88298	90183	36600	79406	08216	95787	42579	90730
99	86591	81492	32667	61584	14972	00033	89534	76076	49199	43718	97348	94379	46370	24672
100	38534	01715	94964	47288	65680	43772	30560	12914	65532	62738	19826	51123	23730	56845

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Table of Random Units

A TABLE OF 14,000 RANDOM UNITS (Continued)

Line/Col.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
101	13284	16834	74151	92027	24670	36665	00770	22878	02179	51002	07270	76317	97275	43960
102	21224	00370	30420	03883	96648	80428	11583	17504	27395	63904	41548	40197	82277	24120
103	90032	47887	81085	64913	66279	80432	65793	83287	34142	13241	30590	97760	35848	91983
104	00199	50903	98603	38452	87900	94624	89721	57484	67501	77638	44331	11257	71131	11050
105	60578	06483	28733	37967	07936	98710	98539	27180	31237	80612	44488	97819	70401	95419
106	91240	18312	17441	01929	18163	60201	31211	54289	39296	37318	65724	90401	79017	62077
107	97458	14229	12063	59611	32249	90466	33216	19358	02591	34263	88419	01912	07436	50813
108	35249	38646	34475	72417	60514	60257	12489	51924	86871	92446	36607	11458	30440	52639
109	38980	46600	11750	11900	40743	27860	77940	39298	97838	95145	32378	68038	89351	37005
110	10750	32745	38749	97365	58959	53731	89295	59062	39404	13198	59960	70408	29812	83126
111	36247	27850	73958	20673	37800	63835	71051	84724	52492	22342	78071	17456	96104	18327
112	70994	66986	89744	72478	01174	42159	11392	20724	54322	36923	70000	23233	65438	39685
113	99638	94702	11463	18148	81386	80431	90628	32506	02016	95151	88598	47821	00265	82525
114	72055	15774	42857	98805	10119	76939	25993	03341	21560	83471	43989	90770	22965	44247
115	24038	65541	56788	35885	38845	59399	13790	35112	01324	39520	76210	22467	83275	32296
116	74976	14631	35905	25221	39470	91548	12854	30168	09073	75887	36792	00268	97121	57676
117	35553	71628	70189	26496	63407	91178	90348	55359	80392	41012	30270	77786	89578	21059
118	35676	12797	51134	82076	42010	26344	92920	92155	58807	54644	58581	95331	78629	73344
119	74815	67523	72985	23182	32446	63594	98924	20633	58842	85061	07648	70164	34994	67662
120	45246	88048	65173	50089	91060	80894	38063	32819	68559	99221	49475	50558	34698	71800
121	76509	47069	86378	41797	11910	49672	88575	97966	32406	10083	54728	81972	58975	30761
122	19689	90332	04315	21358	97248	11188	39062	63312	52496	07349	79178	33692	57352	72862
123	42751	35318	97513	61537	54955	08159	00337	80778	27507	95478	21252	12746	37554	97775
124	11946	22681	45045	13964	57317	59419	58045	44067	58716	58840	45537	96345	33271	53464
125	96518	48688	20996	11090	48396	57177	83867	86464	14342	21545	46717	72364	86954	55590
126	35726	58643	76869	84622	39098	36083	72505	92265	23107	60278	05822	46760	44294	07672
127	39737	42750	48968	70536	84964	64952	38404	94317	65402	13589	01055	79044	19308	83623
128	97025	66492	56177	04040	80312	45028	26408	43591	75528	63341	49044	95495	81256	53214
129	62814	08075	09788	56350	76787	51591	54509	49295	85830	50960	30883	89660	96142	18354
130	25578	22950	15227	83291	41737	79599	96191	71845	86899	70694	24290	01551	80092	82118
131	68763	69576	88901	49662	46704	63362	56625	00481	73323	91427	15264	06969	57048	54149
132	17900	00813	64361	60725	88974	61005	99709	30666	26451	11528	44323	34778	60342	60398
133	71944	60227	63551	71109	06624	43836	58254	26160	32116	63403	35404	57146	10909	07346
134	54684	93691	85132	64399	29182	44324	14491	55226	78793	34107	30374	48429	51376	09559
135	25946	27623	11258	65204	52832	50880	22273	05534	99521	73791	85744	29276	70326	60251
136	01353	39318	44961	44972	91766	90262	56073	06606	51826	19893	83448	31915	97764	75091
137	99083	88191	27662	99113	57174	35571	99594	13931	71057	53961	61448	74909	07322	80960
138	52021	45406	37945	75234	24327	86978	22644	87770	23753	99926	63898	54886	18051	96314
139	78755	47744	43776	83098	03225	14281	83637	55084	13300	52212	58781	14905	46502	04472
140	25282	69106	59160	16257	22810	43009	12224	25643	89884	31149	85423	32581	34374	70873
141	11959	94202	02743	86847	79725	51811	12998	76844	05320	54236	53891	70226	38632	84776
142	11644	13792	98190	01424	30078	29197	55363	05197	47714	65140	22016	79204	08862	94451
143	06307	97912	68110	59812	95448	43211	31282	88880	13040	16458	43813	80416	42482	33939
144	76285	75714	89585	99296	32640	46518	55186	90754	88932	19937	57119	23251	55619	23679
145	55322	07589	39600	60866	59007	20007	66819	84164	61131	81429	00676	42807	78296	29015
146	78017	90028	90220	92503	83375	26946	74399	30845	88567	29169	72816	53357	15428	86932
147	44768	43342	20996	26331	43140	69744	82928	24948	94237	46138	77426	39039	55596	12655
148	25100	19336	14605	86693	51690	97678	24261	02461	86563	74812	60069	71674	15478	47642
149	83612	46623	62876	85197	07824	91392	54317	37726	81628	42221	10268	20692	15699	29167
150	41347	81666	82961	60413	71020	83658	02415	33322	66036	98712	46795	16309	28413	05417

Table of Random Units

603

A TABLE OF 14,000 RANDOM UNITS (Continued)

Line/Col.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
151	38128	51178	75096	13609	16110	73533	42564	59870	29399	67834	91055	59917	51096	89011
152	60950	00455	73254	95067	50717	13878	03216	78274	65863	37011	91283	33914	91303	49326
153	90524	17320	29832	96118	75792	25326	22940	24904	80523	38928	91374	55597	97567	35914
154	49897	18278	67160	39408	97056	43517	84426	59650	20247	19293	02019	14790	02352	05819
155	18404	99209	81060	19488	65596	59787	47039	91225	98768	43088	00438	05548	09443	82897
156	65373	72984	30171	37741	70203	94094	87261	30056	58124	70133	18036	02138	59372	09075
157	40653	12843	04213	70925	95360	55774	76430	61768	52817	81151	52188	31940	54273	49032
158	51638	22238	56344	44587	83231	50317	74541	07719	25472	41602	77318	15145	57515	07633
159	69742	89303	62578	83575	30337	07488	51941	84316	42067	49692	28616	29101	03013	73449
160	58012	74072	67488	74580	47992	69482	58624	17106	47538	13452	22620	24280	40155	74716
161	18348	19855	42887	08279	43206	47077	42637	45606	00011	20662	14642	49984	94509	58380
162	59614	09193	58064	29086	44385	45740	70752	05663	49081	26960	57454	99264	24142	74648
163	75688	28630	39210	52897	62748	72658	98059	67202	72789	01869	13496	14663	87645	89713
164	13941	77802	69101	70061	35460	34576	15412	81304	58757	35498	94830	75521	00603	97701
165	96656	56420	96475	86458	54463	96419	55417	41373	76886	19008	66877	33934	59801	00497
166	03383	82042	15942	14549	38324	87094	19069	67590	11087	68570	22591	65232	85915	91499
167	70366	08390	69155	25498	13240	57407	91407	49160	07379	34444	94567	66035	38918	63708
168	47870	36605	12927	16043	53257	93796	53721	73120	48025	76074	95605	67422	41646	14557
169	79504	77606	22761	30518	28373	73898	30550	76684	77366	32276	04690	61667	64798	66276
170	46967	74841	50923	15339	37755	98995	40162	89561	69199	42257	11647	47603	48779	97907
171	14558	50769	35444	59030	87516	48193	02945	00922	48189	04724	21263	20892	92955	90251
172	12440	25057	01132	38611	28135	68039	10954	10097	54243	06460	50856	63435	79377	33890
173	32293	29938	68653	10497	98919	46587	77701	99119	93165	67788	17638	23097	21468	38992
174	10640	21875	72462	77981	56550	55999	87310	69643	45124	00349	25748	00844	96831	30651
175	47615	23169	39571	56972	20628	21788	51736	33133	72696	32605	41569	76148	91544	21121
176	16948	11128	71624	72734	49084	96303	27830	45817	67867	18062	87453	17226	72904	71474
177	21258	61092	66634	70335	92448	17354	83432	49608	66520	06442	59664	20420	39201	69549
178	15072	48853	15178	30730	47481	48490	41436	25015	49932	20474	53821	51015	79841	32405
179	99154	57412	09858	65671	70655	71479	63520	31357	56968	06729	34465	70685	04184	25250
180	08769	61089	23706	32994	35426	36666	63988	98844	37533	08269	27021	45886	22835	78451
181	67323	57839	61114	62192	47547	58023	64630	34886	98777	75442	95502	06141	45096	73117
182	09255	13986	84834	20764	72206	89393	34548	93438	88730	61805	78955	18952	46436	58740
183	36304	74712	00374	10107	85061	69228	81069	92216	03568	39630	81869	32824	50937	27954
184	18884	67429	86612	47307	10242	44880	12060	44309	46629	55105	66703	93173	00480	13311
185	18745	32031	35303	08134	33925	03044	59929	95418	04917	57596	24878	61733	92834	64454
186	72934	40086	88292	65728	38300	42323	64063	98373	48971	09049	59943	36338	05976	82118
187	17626	02944	20910	57662	80181	38579	24580	90529	52303	50436	29401	57824	86039	81062
188	27117	61399	50967	41399	81636	16663	15634	79717	94696	59240	25543	97989	63306	90946
189	93995	18678	90012	63045	85701	85269	62263	69331	00389	72571	15210	20769	44686	96176
190	67392	89421	09623	80725	62620	84162	87368	29560	00519	84545	08004	24528	41252	14521
191	04910	12261	37566	80016	21245	09377	50420	85658	55263	68667	78770	04533	14513	18099
192	81453	20293	79929	59839	23875	13245	46808	74124	74703	35769	93588	21014	37078	39170
193	19480	76790	48539	23703	15537	48855	02861	80587	74539	65227	90799	58780	96257	02708
194	21456	13162	74608	81011	55512	07481	93551	72189	76261	91206	89941	15132	37738	39284
195	89406	20912	46189	76376	25538	87212	20748	12831	57166	35026	16817	79121	18929	40628
196	09866	07414	55977	10419	01101	69343	13305	94302	80703	57910	36933	57771	42546	03003
197	86541	24681	23421	13521	28000	94917	07423	57523	97234	63951	42876	46829	09781	58160
198	10414	96941	06205	72222	37167	83902	07460	69507	10600	08558	07685	44472	64220	27040
199	49942	06683	41479	58982	56288	42853	92196	20632	62045	78812	35895	51831	83334	10689
200	23995	68882	42291	23374	24299	27024	67460	94783	40937	16961	26033	78749	46704	21953

REFERENCES

APPENDIX A

¹Chemical Rubber Company, Standard Mathematical Tables (Cleveland, Ohio: Chemical Rubber Company Press, 1972), pp. 600-603. The Table of Random Numbers is reproduced at Inclosure 1 to Appendix A.

APPENDIX B
DEVELOPMENT OF SAMPLE SIZE

It is clear that the mean of a sample ordinarily will not be exactly equal to the true population mean of the total distribution because of sampling error. The general magnitude of this error is usually indicated by an estimated range of values with a given high probability of covering the true population value. It has been shown that with any given probability, all possible sample means must lie within a constant multiple of standard errors to either side of the true mean of the population with normal distribution.¹

Let M = the sample mean, m = the true mean, and S = the standard deviation (standard error) of the sample. Then:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{prob}(-\infty S \leq m-M \leq +\infty S) &= 1.00 \\ \text{prob}(-2.58S \leq m-M \leq +2.58S) &= 0.99 \\ \text{prob}(-1.96S \leq m-M \leq +1.96S) &= 0.95 \\ \text{prob}(-1.64S \leq m-M \leq +1.64S) &= 0.90 \\ &\text{etc.}\end{aligned}$$

The multipliers of S are values of normal deviates corresponding to the stated probabilities.

The width of any confidence interval about a mean depends upon the standard deviation (error). Anything that reduces the standard deviation (error) of the sample reduces

the width of the interval. Any increase in sample size, operating to reduce the sample standard deviation (error), will make the confidence interval shorter. Thus, given a normal population with standard deviation s , a sample of size n has a 95% confidence level for a confidence interval based upon any sample mean between

$$M - 1.96\left(\frac{s}{n}\right) \quad \text{and} \quad M + 1.96\left(\frac{s}{n}\right).$$

A sample of size n^2 has the same confidence level for a confidence interval between

$$M - 1.96\left(\frac{s}{n^2}\right) \quad \text{and} \quad M + 1.96\left(\frac{s}{n^2}\right).^2$$

Thus one can by establishing some probability as a confidence level, and defining some confidence interval around the mean of the sample, determine the sample size necessary to meet the given standards.

In the present case of donor-recipient relationships, let us adopt a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of one standard deviation (error) from the true population mean. That is:

$$\text{prob}(|M-m| \leq s) = 0.95.$$

This is equivalent to requiring the confidence interval to have limits of $M \pm s$. But this is the same as saying

$$1s = 1.96S.$$

But it has been shown that in a finite population

$$s = \frac{s}{\sqrt{n}} \sqrt{\frac{T-n}{T-1}} \quad \text{where } T = \text{finite parent population}.^3$$

Ergo

$$ls = 1.96 \frac{s}{\sqrt{n}} \sqrt{\frac{T-n}{T-1}}$$

$$l \sqrt{n(T-1)} = 1.96 \sqrt{T-n}$$

$$ln(T-1) = 3.84(T-n)$$

$$ln(T-1+3.84) = 3.84T$$

$$ln = \frac{3.84T}{1(T-1+3.84)} .$$

In general form

$$n = \frac{K^2 T}{d^2 (T-1) + K^2} ,$$

where K = the multiplier of the sample standard deviation used in establishing confidence levels, d = the multiplier of the population standard deviation used in establishing confidence intervals, T = finite parent population, and n = sample population $\neq T$.

QED

REFERENCES

APPENDIX B

¹Frederick C. Mills, Statistical Methods (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1955), pp. 157-160, and Table I, pp. 765-768.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 672 ff.

³William L. Hays, Statistics (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963), p. 211.

APPENDIX C

SUBSIDY PAYMENTS 1793-1815

In Pounds Including Goods and Credits

1793	Hanover*	452,551
	Hesse-Cassel*	190,622
	Sardinia	150,000
1794	Baden*	20,196
	Brunswick*	17,659
	Hanover*	601,476
	Hesse-Cassel*	418,132
	Hesse-Darmstadt*	91,372
	Prussia	1,200,000
	Sardinia	200,000
1795	Austrian Loan	4,600,000
	Baden*	6,794
	Brunswick*	46,778
	Hanover*	340,192
	Hesse-Cassel*	317,492
	Hesse-Darmstadt*	85,224
	Sardinia	150,000
1796	Brunswick*	53,645
	Hanover*	3,736
	Hesse-Darmstadt*	62,651
1797	Austrian Loan	1,620,000
	Brunswick*	15,565
	Hesse-Darmstadt*	19,249
	Portugal	10,000
1798	Brunswick*	7,000
	Portugal	103,000
1799	Portugal	87,675
	Russia	1,386,070
1800	Austria	816,666
	German Princes*	1,066,667
	Portugal	10,000
	Russia	537,126
1801	German Princes*	200,000
	Hesse-Cassel*	100,000
	Portugal	200,000

1802	Hesse-Cassel*	33,451
	Russia	200,000
1803	Austria	1,000,000
	Russia	63,000
1804	Hesse-Cassel*	83,303
1805	Austria	1,000,000
	Hanover*	26,190
	Russia	300,000
	Sweden	132,500
1806	Austria	500,000
	Hanover*	76,865
	Hesse-Cassel*	18,982
	Russia	50,000
	Sweden	311,400
1807	Hanover*	19,899
	Hesse-Cassel*	45,000
	Prussia	187,613
	Russia	614,183
	Sicily**	1,094,002
	Sweden	248,128
1808	Portugal	140,156
	Sicily	353,438
	Spain	2,325,668
	Sweden	1,094,023
1809	Austria	1,187,500
	Portugal	539,369
	Portuguese Loan	600,000
	Sicily	313,836
	Spain	473,919
	Sweden	300,000
1810	Portugal	1,986,069
	Sicily	425,000
	Spain	557,952
1811	Portugal	1,832,168
	Sicily	275,000
	Spain	539,554
1812	Portugal	2,276,833
	Sicily	628,532
	Spain	1,036,598
	Sweden	500,000

1813	Austria	700,00
	Prussia	650,039
	Portugal	2,486,102
	Russia	1,058,436
	Sicily	440,000
	Spain	877,200
	Sweden	1,334,992
1814	Austria	939,523
	Denmark	121,917
	Hanover*	525,000
	Portugal	1,345,082
	Prussia	1,438,643
	Russia	2,708,834
	Sicily	316,666
	Spain	1,820,932
	Sweden	800,000
1815	Austria	1,654,921
	Hanover*	270,940
	Portugal	54,915
	Prussia	2,156,513
	Russia	2,000,033
	Sicily	33,333
	Spain	147,295
	Sweden	608,048

* Indicates pay for hired mercenaries employed by Great Britain

** Indicates total of all subsidies to Sicily between 1804 and 1807

The above information is taken from the summary and analysis tables in

John M. Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 365-368.

APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AID TO CHINA
1937 TO MARCH 21, 1949

Pre- V-J Day	Grants***	Credits***
Export-Import Bank		120
Stabilization Fund-1941		50
Treasury Credit 1942		500
Lend-Lease*	825.7	20
TOTAL	825.7	690
Post- V-J Day		
Lend-Lease		51.7
UNRRA (US)	474.0	
BOTRA (US)	3.6	
Export-Import Bank		82.8
Surplus Property		55.0
Dockyard Facilities Sales		4.1
Ship Sales		16.4
US Foreign Relief	46.4	
ECA	275.0	
Lend-Lease*	513.7	181.0
SACO*	17.7	
Surplus Sales*		20.0
Naval Vessels*	141.3	
China Aid Act*	125.0	
TOTAL	1596.7	411.0
Grand Total	2422.4	1101.0
US Loss**	846.0	

* Military Assistance

** Difference between procurement cost and cost to China of goods sold by U. S. government. Does not include depreciation.

*** Figures are millions of U. S. Dollars.

Abbreviations:

UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration

BOTRA Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs

ECA Economic Cooperation Act (China Aid Act of 1948);
Economic Cooperation Administration

SACO Sino-American Cooperative Organization Agreement

Data presented are extrapolated from tables in

U. S. Department of State, United States Relations
With China With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949,
Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30,
(Washington, D. C.: State Department, Division of Publications,
Office of Public Affairs, 1949), pp. 1043-1044.

APPENDIX E

U. S. ASSISTANCE TO CUBA UNDER THE LEND-LEASE PROGRAM

This appendix is published as a Confidential document separate from the main paper and is filed at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Library.

APPENDIX F

U. S. to Norway

Extent of Aid

USMAP aid to Norway began in 1950 and terminated in 1967. Various equipment was provided. With the attainment of economic self-sufficiency, USMAP grant aid was discontinued by mutual consent of both governments, although a military trade agreement replaced the formal USMAP agreement. See Appendix Z, Section 1 for details.

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives.

U. S. military assistance to Norway after 1951 was provided under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and succeeding years. The U. S. Congress defined the broad purposes of all U. S. military assistance in the Act itself:

The Congress declares it to be the purpose of this Act to maintain the security and promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security, independence, and the national interest of the United States, and to facilitate effective participation by those countries in the United Nations system for collective security.¹

For specific U. S. aims see Appendix Z, Section

1.

The first task facing the Norwegians after the war was rebuilding, particularly in North Norway where many of the towns had been more or less completely destroyed by the Germans when they retreated to the south in 1944. A general rehabilitation of industry as well as an improvement of living standards was greatly aided by the assistance under the Marshall Plan provided by the United States. Improvements were made in the welfare program and urgently needed housing programs were launched.

In the international field, Norway abandoned her former neutralist position after the war in favor of participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. She continued her activity begun under the League of Nations in support of international cooperation by giving generous, constructive support to the United Nations and related organizations.²

Norway's membership in NATO was not a goal in itself, for Norwegian leaders and even the people themselves took seriously their new commitment to the West and hoped that NATO might develop into something more than simply a defensive alliance, but might undertake economic and cultural activities also. Norway has always exhibited agitation and displeasure when some of the member states of the alliance evidence undemocratic procedures.³ Norway had taken a vigorous and definite democratic position early in the post-war years. The position of the Norwegian government was made unmistakably clear in 1948 by statements of Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, who, in a public lecture in Oslo, said, "We are a part of Western Europe, geographically, economically, and culturally, and . . . we are and will continue to be a West European democracy."⁴

The close association between the United States and Norway beginning with the emigration of nearly one million people has led to repeated emphasis in Norwegian policy

that Norway is a member of the Atlantic community and not limited to a European viewpoint. But even within the Atlantic community, Norway maintains the purpose of retaining national integrity and independence. Consequently Norway maintains a constant reserve in her dealing with larger, more powerful states.⁵

Norway's economic purposes included "a planned economy at home directed by the state and . . . free trade among the nations."⁶ Norwegians consider that democracy includes economic planning by the government:

to take active part in achieving full employment and the utilization of resources through a planned economy, the government having powers to stimulate, control and direct a mixed economy of private and public enterprise.⁷

External economic purposes involved "the ideal international division of labor" which meant unrestricted free trade throughout the world.⁸

Norway's goals included some sort of defense guarantee from the West:

The three little Nordic countries, the Norwegians argued, were simply not strong enough to defend themselves against the Soviet Union, even if they stood together. . . . It was simply a pipe dream to imagine that they could hope to survive without the backing of the big Western powers, above all of America.⁹

Norway was not willing to accept the stationing of foreign troops on Norwegian soil. An answer to a Russian protest to Norwegian adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty include the sentence:

The Norwegian government will never join in any agreement with other states that contains obligations for Norway to open bases for the military forces of

foreign powers as long as Norway is not attacked or subjected to threats of attacks.¹⁰ [sic]

A third goal of Norway was to obtain the necessary credit to continue her recovery and development program:

In 1948, in the nick of time, as Erik Brofoss, the brilliant Minister of Commerce put it, there came aid from the United States under the aegis of the Marshall Plan. . . . For Norway the Marshall Plan and subsequent forms of American aid meant that it could continue and even speed up its planned reconstruction.¹²

Norwegian objectives include building up her own defenses in general, defending the Soviet-Norwegian common border in the North, raising and maintaining a Home Guard to prevent another invasion such as that in 1940,¹² and, absence of any nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil except in time of nuclear war.¹³

U. S. Control

U. S. control has been largely unnecessary due to the parallel aims of the two governments on most points. However, on those points of disagreement such as nuclear weapons, base rights, Spitzbergen, internal politics and economy, anti-communism, and free trade, the U. S. has been unable to influence Norway who stubbornly maintains both independence and integrity. One could probably say that U. S. control and influence in Norway exist at the sufferance of the Norwegians. The U. S. has maintained a small MAAG in Norway that primarily dealt with technical and administrative problems, since the Norwegians have developed separate but complementary military techniques appropriate

to their own concepts of defense. The major accession to U. S. influence or desires was the emphasis on an extensive air defense system.

U. S. Troop Deployment/Commitment

Deployment of U. S. troops in Norway is prohibited by agreement between the two governments, except in time of war. U. S. troops have not been deployed in Norway; however, the North Atlantic Treaty constitutes a formal commitment to Norway's defense and a reasonable assurance of U. S. troop deployment in case of aggression into Norway. Norwegian acceptance of this assurance during the period was demonstrated by their maintenance of empty U. S. bases in Norway ready for deployment of U. S. troops when necessary.

Integration of U. S. Policies

As in Italy and throughout Europe, U. S. postwar policies have been lauded for their integration in Norway. Economic aid, military assistance, military strategy, confrontation diplomacy have been applied as successfully in Norway as in other areas of the world.

Conclusions

1. Two of ten purposes were not shared by both governments. One of the eight shared purposes was defined differently by each government and does not imply true agreement, although disagreement is not evident. The unshared purposes were non-military in nature. One goal and five objectives were not shared.

2. U. S. exerted control at the sufference of Norway who desperately needed U. S. support, but refused to yield independence.

3. U. S. troops were committed, but not deployed, in defense of Norway.

4. U. S. policies were integrated in all aspects of U. S.-Norwegian relations.

5. One U. S. purpose, one goal, and two objectives were not achieved.

6. The total effect of U. S. military assistance was beneficial to both countries and furthered the interests of both countries.

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APPENDIX G

U. S. TO ITALY

Extent of Aid

USMAP aid to Italy began in 1950 and terminated in 1963. Various types of equipment were provided. With the attainment of economic self-sufficiency, USMAP grant aid was terminated by mutual consent of the U. S. and Italy. As a supplement to its own production, Italy has become increasingly reliant upon U. S. Foreign Military Sales as a source of U. S. military equipment, technology, and training. Between 1946 and 1963, Italy received more than 3.4 billiong dollars in economic aid through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the European Recovery Plan, in addition to grants and loans through the Mutual Security Economic Program.¹ See Appendix Z, Section 2 for details.

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

U. S. military assistance to Italy after 1951 was provided under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and succeeding years. The U. S. Congress defined broad purposes of all U. S. military assistance in the Act itself:

The Congress declares it to be the purpose of this Act to maintain the security and promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security, independence and the national interest of the United States, and to facilitate effective participation by those countries in the United Nations system for collective security.²

For specific U. S. aims see Appendix Z, Section 2.

Italian purposes included "the restoration of Italy's position in the world, usually described as making Italy's 'voice' heard, Italy's presenza felt, on the international scene;"³ "the consolidation of that Western orientation which she had already chosen in June 1947 when she adhered to the Marshall Plan;"⁴ full participation in NATO and establishment of some sort of European Union or Federation;⁵ maintenance of "the ever-present fight against the Communists" while at the same time attempting to implement the provisions of the new Italian constitution;⁶ economic progress "by means of her insertion and integration in ever wider economic areas of supra-national character;"⁷ western solidarity against external Communist penetration while ensuring that "this solidarity did not and would not interfere with trade with the Soviet states;"⁸ and protection of the domestic social structure from internal dangers.⁹

Italian goals included some sort of defense guarantee by the U. S. for Italy and acceptance of U. S. bases in Italy as a part of U. S. forward deployment in

Europe;

The Italian government agreed to the American missile bases, and they have already been constructed and are in operation. In 1958 and for some time thereafter, the Italian Government opposed any kind of disengagement in any form.¹⁰

"extension of the [Italian] sphere of freedom and prosperity in the Mediterranean sector;"¹¹ and maximum foreign aid to assist in reconstruction and development of Italy's resources.¹²

Italian objectives posited the Italian Armed Forces operating within the framework of the Atlantic Community and the Western European Union and "to set about improving the instruments of defense already at her disposal."¹³

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments are summarized in Appendix Z, Section 2.

U. S. Control

The United States Government has exerted an intensive influence on Italian policies through all the means mentioned earlier: diplomatic, political, economic, military, cultural. . . . Mrs. Clare Booth Luce, when ambassador in Rome, was instrumental in making it American policy to restrict offshore procurement contracts to firms in which the largely Communist CGIL [Labor Union] received less than 50% of the vote in plant elections. . . . The United States has tried to influence elections by openly warning the Italian people, as in 1948 and 1953, that continued American aid depended on the election of Christian Democratic-led coalitions.¹⁴

The uses of the Italian Armed Forces were prescribed by NATO, its equipment was planned by the United States Department of Defense as was its force structure, and both were carefully monitored by a large MAAG which also

supervised and conducted training.

U. S. Troop Deployment/Commitment

U. S. forces occupied bases in Italy at the end of World War II, and maintained many of those bases, including two major headquarters, with U. S. military dependents throughout the period of the donor/recipient relationship and even after its termination. The North Atlantic Treaty constituted a formal commitment of American military power to the defense of Italy. There is no doubt that Italy and the world considered the U. S. committed to the defense of Italy.

Integration of U. S. Policies

Since World War II, U. S. policies have considered Europe as a single entity for most purposes, and have concentrated political, diplomatic, economic, and military efforts in the European area. The integration of all appropriate U. S. resources and power into NATO, UNRRA, FEA, MDAP, and MSA in the European area and the efforts made at forming Europe into a conglomerate entity through these means are well documented and seem almost doctrinal in their sanctity as an example of good foreign policy. U. S. efforts to influence Somalia through Italy, U. S. use of MSA influence to obtain a solution to the Trieste problem, U. S. limitations on military assistance until the Italian economy could absorb and support the programmed forces, early attempts to influence France through Italy, and

attempted integration of Yugoslav and Italian defense efforts at the Ljubljana Gap are merely a few examples of the continuing integration of all aspects of U. S. policy with regard to Italy.

Conclusions

1. Three of the eight purposes were not shared by the two governments; four of the goals and one objective were not shared. The unshared goals and objectives were either acceptable or not opposed by the government that did not adduce them.

2. U. S. exerted positive control over all aspects of the relationship.

3. U. S. troops were deployed and committed to the defense of Italy.

4. U. S. policies were integrated in all aspects of U. S.-Italian-European relationships.

5. All U. S. purposes, goals, and objectives were achieved.

6. The total effect of U. S. military assistance was beneficial to the U. S., to Italy, and furthered the interests of both countries.

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APPENDIX H

U. S. TO YUGOSLAVIA

Extent of Aid

USMAP grant aid to Yugoslavia was initiated in 1952 and terminated in 1958 upon Yugoslavia's request. The entire grant aid program provided approximately 695 million dollars.¹ Prior to 1952, U. S. military assistance consisted of 16 million dollars diverted from Yugoslav Emergency Relief funds in 1950 to feed the Yugoslav Army² and an uncertain quantity of old World War II stocks, captured German arms, Soviet arms captured in Korea, and other miscellaneous non-standard equipment provided in an improvised, unauthorized, and legally questionable fashion.³ Economic non-military aid prior to this period consisted of a loan of \$20 million in 1949, two (2) Export-Import Bank loans totalling \$40 million in 1950, \$11.5 million worth of flour under the European Recovery Act, \$50 million under the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Act, a World Bank loan of \$28 million in 1951, an Export-Import Bank loan of \$15 million in 1951, and a relief grant for \$42 million in 1951. From 1952 to 1958 economic aid under the Mutual Security Act consisted of \$36.5 million in loans, \$332.6 million in grants, and \$449.8 million under Public Law 480.⁴

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives.

U. S. military assistance to Yugoslavia after 1951 was provided under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and succeeding years. The U. S. Congress defined broad purposes of all U. S. military assistance in the Act itself:

The Congress declares it to be the purpose of this Act to maintain the security and promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security, independence and the national interest of the United States, and to facilitate effective participation by those countries in the United Nations system for collective security.

As early as 1948, Ambassador Cannon in Belgrade recognized that the growing quarrel between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union presented an unprecedented opportunity for U. S. efforts at achieving a major purpose of foreign policy: the weakening and eventual disintegration of the Soviet bloc.

A major U. S. purpose that crystallized during the period was to force the Soviet empire to retreat from important areas through non-military means, which included for this purpose military assistance and any other actions short of U. S.-Soviet military confrontation. This concept would ultimately involve a definitive shift of a country from the Soviet bloc to the Free World.

U. S. goals in Yugoslavia were derived from these purposes:

On the American side there was at least some expectation that the mere fact of growing economic, cultural, and military relations would inevitably tend to draw Yugoslavia toward the West and to encourage changes at home, almost in spite of the regime's wishes. Informally American aid to Yugoslavia was described as a policy of 'keeping Tito afloat.' That is to say, it did not represent any attempt to include Yugoslavia in any general plan for European recovery, to raise its living standards, or to ensure the success of its current five-year plan. It consisted of a series of emergency measures [especially prior to MSA-51] to help Yugoslavia avoid economic difficulties that would undermine its capacity to maintain independence no matter how firm the political will of its leaders might be.⁶

By October, 1951, "Keeping Tito afloat" had become a common policy of the Western world. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program agreement signed in 1951 was a formal recognition of the purpose of both governments, to pull Yugoslavia through a critical period without military attack or economic disaster. Successful resistance by Tito would enable Yugoslavia to be independent of the Soviet bloc. Separation of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc would be a significant political victory for the West.

Another reason for American support of Tito was the possibility of the spread of "Titoism" among the other bloc states. Although the State Department was fully aware of the significance of a successful heresy in the Communist world, this possibility was considered as a collateral effect and did not form a positive factor in U. S. policy.

By 1955, American officials were beginning to

explicate the export of ideology that was formalized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963. Yugoslavia was perhaps the first recipient of American aid to be affected by this concept. In a speech from Geneva to the people of Yugoslavia on November 5, 1955, Secretary of State Dulles announced, "You want to be independent, prosperous, and free to choose your own government. This is what we Americans also want for Yugoslavia."⁷ (Italics added.) Although not an initial goal, this democraticization became increasingly significant in U. S.-Yugoslav relations throughout the period of military assistance.

Major U. S. military objectives were to deter military aggression by the Soviet bloc nations, and to train, equip, and deploy a force to defend NATO's southern flank. With Belgrade's co-operation and Yugoslav division, Italy might be defended at its natural line of defense, the Ljubljana Gap, rather than on the Venetian Plain; and Greece might be defended in the upper Vardar valley instead of at Salonika. Although Yugoslav membership in NATO was beyond reasonable hope, if Belgrade were not hostile but only neutral, the strategic balance in the Adriatic/Balkan area would shift in favor of the West.

Yugoslavia's purposes rested on the principle of sovereign equality of socialist states and national independence within the Soviet bloc. Consistent with these principles, he had no intention of being anything other than a socialist on the road to Communism. Dulles' speech in

1955 was directly contradictory to Tito's policies since free choice of government had no place in his programme. Yugoslavia's goals included "keeping Tito afloat" as an independent nation without military attack or economic disaster. He was interested in developing Yugoslav resources and in establishing Yugoslavia as a socialist/communist nation independent of all blocs and self-sufficient in the world. He was determined to strengthen Yugoslavian national Communism at the expense of Soviet Communism, and to retain control of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, not in Moscow and not in Washington. He shared U. S. objectives of deterring military attack on Yugoslavia, but was not particularly interested in defending Italy or Greece. He was sincerely concerned about his own eastern and northern borders which were being actively threatened by Hungarian and Bulgarian troops.

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

PURPOSES	U.S.	Achieved	Yugoslav- ia	Achieved
1. Mutual Security of Free World	Y	Contribute	N	
2. Development of Yugoslav Resources	Y	Y	Y	Y
3. Yugoslav Participation in UN Security System	Y	Y	Y	Y
4. Weakening/Disintegrating Soviet bloc	Y	N	N	

(Continued)

PURPOSES	U.S.	Achieved	Yugoslav- ia	Achieved
5. Force retreat of Soviet Empire by Non-military means	Y	Partial	Limited	Y

GOALS

1. Draw Yugoslavia Toward West	Y	N	N	
2. Encourage Domestic Change in Yugoslavia	Y	N	N	
3. Keeping Tito Afloat	Y	Y	Y	Y
4. Avoid Yugoslav Economic Difficulties	Y	Y	Y	Y
5. Yugoslav independence of Soviet bloc	Y	N	N	
6. Yugoslav independence within Soviet bloc	N		Y	Y
7. Spread of Titoism	Hope	N	N	
8. Strengthen Yugoslav National Communism	N		Y	Y
9. Democratization of Yugoslavia	Y	N	N	

OBJECTIVES

1. Deter military attack on Yugoslavia	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. Defend NATO southern flank	Y	N	N	
3. Defend Yugoslavia's N and E borders	N		Y	Y

U. S. Control

The usual MDAP agreement was not made between Yugoslavia and the United States. The agreement omitted the requirement for the recipient to fulfill its military obligations under agreements or treaties to which the United States is a party. Yugoslavia was thus exempted from any support or co-operation with NATO. Tito agreed to use American arms "exclusively in furtherance of the Charter of the United Nations" and "for strengthening the defense of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia against aggression."⁸ The agreement did not specify what rights of inspection U. S. officers would have and required that U. S. personnel in Yugoslavia be as few as possible. In addition, military personnel were to be a part of the U. S. diplomatic mission and not establish a separate military chain of communication.⁹ Although many Americans opposed the idea, the agreement included no references to political demands and asked no concessions of Yugoslavia. The military mission was able to ensure that USMAP was directed largely to equipping those divisions stationed in the area of the Ljubljana Gap, but bilateral planning and strategy were never achieved.¹⁰ Requests for reports on end-use of USMAP equipment were usually either refused directly or adroitly disregarded by the Yugoslavs.¹¹ By 1955 the lack of U. S. control over USMAP in Yugoslavia led the Congress to call for a halt in U. S. aid to Yugoslavia until American inspectors were permitted to

see how the aid was being employed.¹² In 1956 as the rapprochement between Belgrade and Moscow gained momentum, U. S. military assistance was suspended until the situation could be accurately evaluated.¹³ Military assistance was resumed in May, 1957, and finally terminated by the Yugoslavs in December, 1957.

U. S. Troop Deployment/Commitment

U. S. forces, other than the military assistance staff of the embassy, were never deployed to Yugoslavia. Stalin had not attacked Yugoslavia at the time of the initial break in 1948 because he felt it unnecessary. By 1950, "Stalin could see, with the growing Western involvement in Yugoslavia, that an armed attack on that country might bring on a general war."¹⁴ In the hostile international milieu of autumn, 1950, the arrival of American supplies and arms in Yugoslavia signalled explicitly to the Yugoslavs and to Moscow the commitment of American power to Yugoslavia's defense. The American reaction in South Korea followed by U. S. arms in Yugoslavia were at that time undeniable indicators to the world that the aggression in Yugoslavia would be met by American troops. The true degree of U. S. commitment must remain speculation, but in the eyes of the world, America was as fully committed as if a division of U. S. troops had been in Belgrade.

Integration of U. S. Policies

The entire U. S. policy in Yugoslavia was the result of a fortunate opportunity, the Russian-Yugoslav split of 1948. All aspects of U. S. policy and actions concerning Yugoslavia were integrated with each other, and all supported the set of U. S. goals, but other U. S. policies throughout the world were seen as separate and disconnected from Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavian situation was properly seen as separate and unique. If not fully integrated into other U. S. policies and programs, Yugoslav policies neither conflicted nor competed and were not pursued in isolation. The U. S. obtained economic and political co-operation from several NATO countries for its Yugoslav policies and actions, although as mentioned above military strategy was never integrated.

Conclusions

1. Two thirds of the individual purposes, goals, and objectives were not shared by the two governments. One of the three military objectives was shared. Both governments wanted to equip and train the Yugoslav Army, but they did not agree upon how it should be trained or who should train it. Concepts for the use of that Army were not shared.

2. The U. S. at no time exerted anything more than mild influence over Yugoslav military forces.

3. U. S. troops were not deployed, although the world perceived a definite U. S. military commitment to the

defense of Yugoslavia.

4. U. S. policies toward Yugoslavia were integrated among themselves, but only generally with other U. S. policies and not at all with U. S. strategy.

5. Of five U. S. purposes, two were achieved, two were supported, and one was not achieved. Of seven U. S. goals, two were achieved, and five were not achieved. Of two U. S. military objectives, one was achieved.

6. Although the total effect of U. S. support of Yugoslavia was definitely beneficial to the U. S., the greatest benefits arose in the form of collateral effects, and not as a direct or intended result of U. S. economic or military assistance to Yugoslavia. The definite aims of both the total policy and of USMAP were at best partially and temporarily achieved, and at worst were exploited by Tito who achieved all of his purposes, goals, and objectives.

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APPENDIX I

U. S. to JAPAN

Extent of Aid

USMAP grant aid to Japan was initiated in 1954 and terminated in 1967 except for previously programmed equipment that was delivered through 1970. Various types of equipment were provided. For details see Appendix Z, Section 3.

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

U.S. military assistance to Japan was provided under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and succeeding years. The U.S. Congress defined the broad purposes of all U.S. military assistance in the Act itself:

The Congress declares it to be the purpose of this Act to maintain the security and promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security, independence, and the national interest of the United States, and to facilitate effective participation by those countries in the United Nations system for collective security.¹

For specific U.S. aims, see Appendix Z, Section 3.

Japanese purposes involved generally a desire to resume a significant position in international life, as well as to develop a viable domestic society in the homeland.

In foreign policy, Prime Minister Hatoyama seems [in 1955] determined to continue Japan's ties with the United States. But he also feels it would be in Japan's interest to resume relations with the U.S.S.R. and

Communist China. ... To the Japanese the issue is purely economic and does not involve any ideological surrender.

During the period, Japan's policies, both foreign and domestic, were heavily influenced by economic considerations.

However, she also strongly advanced general policy objectives [read purposes in this paper] of increased participation in the United Nations and in international organs, the improvement of her position in the Afro-Asian world, and greater independence within the framework of co-operation with the West, particularly the United States.³

After the years of occupation, the Japanese began to chafe under the real American domination of Japanese existence. They began to feel the need for an independent national existence, and to resent the fact that U. S. priorities and policies in Japan were based upon American interests first and Japanese aims only second. However, they still realized that Japan was a weak nation and probably could not have an independent existence without the protection of the United States.

However great this suspicion of American motives may be [in 1956], most Japanese will admit that in the immediate future Japan stands to gain much by continued co-operation with the United States. Japan recognizes that one of its major objectives [read purposes in this paper], the development of closer economic ties with Southeast Asia, can be promoted by Japan itself only to a limited extent and that its best hope for success in this field is by playing a leading role within the overall framework of American programs for assistance to underdeveloped areas. This is a major reason why the Japanese seek to avoid misunderstandings with the United States, and why they hesitate to pursue independent goals, however attractive, without first winning Washington's understanding.⁴

Japan, not being blessed with a self-sufficiency in natural resources, cannot exist without international trade. The expansion of Japanese trade was perhaps an

all-encompassing purpose during this period, as were efforts to involve Japan in international trade organizations, to lower trade barriers, to attempt to induce the U.S. to ease its restrictive trade policies with Communist countries, and to support free trade in general.⁵

The desires of national pride which were beginning to demand economic independence from the U.S. in the mid-fifties were still muffled in 1954 by the recognition that "substantial procurement spending by the United States is desirable for closing the gap in the balance of payments,"⁶ and that the presence of U.S. troops and logistic procurement bases in Japan was a guarantee of sizable amounts of such procurement. Although by the sixties, this attitude had changed somewhat, in 1954, a Japanese goal was to provide this special procurement to U.S. forces in the Far East.

Japanese goals during the period involved the newly formed Japanese Self Defense force, and the U.S. troops in Japan. In keeping with the growing forces demanding independence from the United States, Japan's various governments in the fifties strove to reduce gradually the contribution made by Japan to the support of U.S. troops in Japan

In an official statement of its defense policy issued in May, 1957, the Kishi government declared its intention to develop gradually a military establishment of its own capable of handling all the requirements of Japanese security. Until such forces could be developed, the Japanese said, they would continue to base their security structure on the Japan-United States Security Pact, but only 'for the time being'.

The Self Defense Force, which had originated during the American occupation, had, according to the laws which

established the Defense Agency and the Self Defense Forces in 1954, the mission:

...to defend the nation against direct and indirect aggression in order to preserve peace and independence, maintain national security and, if necessary, take charge of keeping the public order.⁸

The Basic National Defense Policy adopted by the National Defense Council in May, 1957, added certain additional Principles among which are:

...recourse to the joint security system with the United States to cope with aggression and pending effective functioning of the United Nations in preventing and removing aggression.⁹

Another goal of Japan resulted from her experiences during World War II:

As the only people who had suffered nuclear attack, the Japanese showed particular sensitivity to nuclear weapons. They were adamantly against any thought of the introduction of such weapons into Japan, even for defense purposes, and passionately protested their development and testing by other nations, particularly by the United States.¹⁰

Japan's basic objective in accepting military assistance was the development of the Self Defense Forces. The platform of the Prime Minister's party, announced on January 1, 1956, "called for the development of self-defense 'so as to prepare for the eventual withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in this country.'"¹¹ Said the Prime Minister himself, "National pride does not allow the indefinite continuation of a situation in which national defense is mainly dependent upon foreign military forces."¹²

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments are summarized in Appendix Z, Section 3.

U.S. Control

The U.S. maintained technical control through a large MAAG throughout the period. The Security Treaty of 1951 gave considerable control to the U.S., and, although the Treaty of 1960 reduced that control somewhat, the U.S. retained sufficient control to ensure that its objectives were being met. The total dependence of the Japanese government upon the U.S. for defense, and even existence, early in the period provided de facto control to whatever degree the U.S. chose to exert. Closer to the end of the period, U.S. control became less effective as the Japanese became more self-sufficient. However, by that time U.S. control had been largely replaced by voluntary co-operation based upon mutual interest.

U.S. Troop Deployment/Commitment

U.S. combat troops were stationed in Japan until 1957-1958. U.S. support troops were stationed in Japan throughout the period. The Security Treaty of 1951, as well as that of 1960, committed the U.S. to defense of Japan in case of aggression.

Integration of U.S. policies

With the possible exception of international economic policies, U.S. policies regarding Japan were integrated throughout the period. Military strategy involved Japan as a major logistics base. Military assistance, diplomacy, and economic policies supported this position. A closer

Japanese-U.S. relationship might have been built if U.S. import policies had not caused the Japanese economy to develop unevenly. An inconsistency is perhaps apparent between the renunciation of war in the Japanese Constitution, which was essentially written by the U.S., and the expectations of the U.S. that the Japanese would develop a viable military force. This particular question was a major source of violent dissention throughout the period, both within Japan and in Japan's international relations. But this seeming inconsistency is maybe a counter to the other inconsistency of disarming Japan and reforming her economy. government, and society only to support and protect her. The entire spectrum of international economic policies during the period seems to indicate that American policies toward and in Japan were inconsistent, or could have been so, with policies elsewhere in the world, such as U.S. policies toward the two Chinas, toward competition between Europe and Japan, and toward Japan's World War II enemies.

Conclusions

1. Of 12 purposes, 4 were not shared, and two were accepted but not supported by the U.S. Two goals were not shared. One objective was accepted but not supported by the U.S.
2. The U.S. exerted total control at the beginning of the period, but only minimal control at the end of the period
3. U.S. troops were committed throughout the period to the defense of Japan. Substantial numbers of troops were

deployed in Japan throughout the period, although combat troops withdrew early in the period.

4. U.S. policies toward Japan were integrated with the exception of economic policies involving the U.S. domestic economy and some other areas of U.S. interest throughout the world. The problem seems to have been that domestic economic policy and European economic policy may have had a higher priority of importance for U.S. policy makers. Consequently, economic consistency toward Japan was sacrificed.

5. All U.S. purposes, goals, and objectives were achieved.

6. The total effect of military assistance was beneficial to both countries and furthered their interests.

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APPENDIX J

U. K. to LEBANON

Extent of Aid

U.K. aid to Lebanon extended from 1957 to 1962. Exact amounts are unavailable, although various types of equipment were provided. For details see Appendix Z, Section 4. In addition to equipment, a 10-man Royal Air Force team supervised training in Lebanon, and some training was provided for Lebanese personnel in England. However, the Lebanese government paid for all training.¹

Purposes, Goals, and Objectives of Donor and Recipient

After the Second World War, U.K. interest in the Middle East changed in proportion to British reliance on food imports from Australia and New Zealand, and dependence on oil from the Middle East.² The primary purpose of British policy in the Middle East had not changed, however, since Napoleon's Grande Armee was relieved in place by His Majesty's forces in Egypt: "to ensure that the area should not pass under the domination of any potentially hostile power, so as to exclude Britain from it."³ By 1957, this traditional purpose was couched in terms of maintaining stability, peace, prosperity, and independence of the sovereign nations in the area;⁴ retention of what was left of British influence in the area after the Suez debacle in 1956; gaining or regaining

lost prestige and influence;⁵ and making and keeping friends and allies who would support British positions in the Middle East.⁶

After V-E Day, it soon became apparent that the British Empire would never again be what it had been. The Truman Doctrine was the first public acknowledgement that Britain was no longer omnipotent. By 1957, NATO had been made aware also. After a decade of Russian attempts, and some recent successes at penetration to the Middle East, following the Sputnik sensation, the NATO Council resolved in December, 1957, that

Our alliance cannot be concerned only with the North Atlantic area or only with military defense. It must also organize its political and economic strength on the principle of interdependence and must take account of developments outside its own area.

Thus did NATO announce to the world that Britain was no longer able to represent the interests of the entire free world in the Middle East, and that NATO did have some jurisdiction in the area. Earlier in that year, the Eisenhower Doctrine, expressly designed to provide a basis for U.S. military action in defense of Middle Eastern states "against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism,"⁸ was, in fact, an extension of the American sphere of influence into an area that Britain could no longer influence effectively without assistance. From this decline in British power arose another set of British purposes in the Middle East. Since British interests in the area had not diminished significantly,

London was anxious to have those interests defended by other powers with those same or similar interests (NATO and the USA).⁹ Another purpose was to have the U.S. directly associated with the defense of the Middle East.¹⁰ In the Middle East, as throughout the Empire, Britain was contracting her defense forces, and generally trying to replace troops with sterling. In the Middle East, this purpose took the form of British relief from commitments to the defense of petty feudal rulers on the Persian Gulf,¹¹ and contraction into a few strategic bases under the umbrella of U.S. power and NATO legitimacy.¹²

One goal was containment of the revolutions that were occurring in Iraq and Syria, and protection of the oil supplies from extension of those revolutions into other countries.¹³

For other U.K. purposes and goals, see Appendix Z, Section 4.

British objectives were the equipment of an internal security force, and maintenance of a Lebanese armed force to the extent necessary for Lebanon to retain credibility as a mediator in Mid-East confrontations between Arabs and non-Arabs.¹⁴

The basic purpose of Lebanon was to achieve a benevolent neutrality involving mediation of inter-Arab conflicts and playing the role of the "good neighbor". Lebanon found it necessary to pursue a purpose of "being conciliatory to Abd al-Nasir without compromising Lebanon's traditional friendship with the West and neutrality in Arab Affairs."¹⁵ But even while avoiding compromise,

Lebanese leaders insisted on the country's autonomy and its right to cooperate with either the West, the East, or the Arabs, as it suited Lebanon's national interest.¹⁶ Achievement of the purpose of maintaining a balance between the West and the Arabs¹⁷ was necessary to avoid straining relations with Syria, with whom Lebanon shared a long indefensible border.¹⁸ During this period, specifically the Civil War of 1958, Lebanese leaders came to realize that only by achieving some sort of unity of the Lebanese people could the "confessional democracy" survive as an independent nation.¹⁹ An economic purpose was to adopt a laissez faire policy while attempting to cause other nations to do the same.²⁰

For other Lebanese purposes, see Appendix Z, Section 4.

Lebanese goals were to maintain internal security and to maintain a military force that could delay any external aggression for sufficient time to permit the intervention of outside military assistance.²¹ Additionally, Lebanon felt the need to maintain, or at least to announce as a goal, an armed force of sufficient size to present a token force against Israel, in order to avoid criticism from other Arab countries.²² Pressures from Arab countries forced Lebanon to strive to obtain arms and military assistance from sources other than the U.S., as Arabs perceived an increasing U.S. influence in the Middle East.²³

In addition to its traditional objective of maintaining

its Armed Forces to keep internal security in reinforcing the Gendarmerie and police, Lebanon desired to obtain some of the outward trappings of a modern conventional army, and to keep pace with the latest military technology,²⁴ perhaps in an attempt to use its army as a symbol of sovereignty, since Lebanon could not, without a serious drain on its economy, maintain forces large enough or sufficiently sophisticated to defend the country against external attack.²⁵

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

Purposes	UK	Achieved	LEB	Achieved
1. Prevent anti-British domination of Middle-East	Y	Y	N	
2. Maintain stability in Middle East and Lebanon	Y	N	Y	N
3. Prosperity in Lebanon	Y	Y	Y	Y
4. Peace in Middle East and Lebanon	Y	N	Y	N
5. Independence of nations in Middle East	Y	Y	Y	Y
6 Retention of U.K. influence	Y	Y*	N	
7. Friends and allies to support U.K. in Middle East	Y	Y	N	
8. NATO and USA defend British interests in Middle East	Y	Y	N	
9. U.S. directly involved in defense of Middle East	Y	Y	Y	Y
10. End of British commitment to sheiks	Y	N**	N	

Purposes	UK	Achieved	LEB	Achieved
11. A few strategic British bases under US protection	Y	Y	N	
12. Lebanese benevolent neutrality	N		Y	Y
13. Lebanese mediation of Arab disputed	Y	Y	Y	Y
14. Lebanon as good neighbor	N		Y	Y
15. Conciliate Arabs	N		Y	Y
16. Lebanese friendship toward West	Y	Y	Y	Y
17. Lebanese autonomy	Y	Y	Y	Y
18. Maintain balance between West and Arabs	N		Y	Y
19. Unity of Lebanese people	N		Y	Y
20. <u>Laissez faire</u> economic policy	N		Y	Y
Goals				
1. Containment of Iraq and Syria revolutions	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. Protection of oil supplies	Y	Y	N	
3. Internal security	Y	Y	Y	Y
4. Military force to delay external aggression	Y	Y	Y	Y
5. Token force against Israel	N		Y	Y
6. Arms and military assistance from non-US sources	N		Y	Y
Objectives				
1. Equipment for internal security force	Y	Y	Y	Y

Objectives	UK	Achieved	LEB	Achieved
2. Sustain Lebanese role as mediator	Y	Y	Y	Y
3. Outward trappings of modern army	N		Y	N
4. Latest military technology	N		Y	N

* Under U.S. aegis

** At end of U.K. grant aid program

Additional purposes and goals are summarized in Appendix Z, Section 4.

U.K. Control

U.K. exerted no overt control over military assistance to Lebanon, other than the implicit threat to terminate it. The RAF team in Lebanon was involved only in technical and tactical advice and training, and exerted no influence on Lebanese policies. The fact that USMAP equipment provided to Lebanon's armed forces was used by government partisans²⁶ indicates that U.S. control was not effective even over USMAP. Thus, any attempt to suggest an American surrogate in USMAAG-Lebanon for British control cannot be supported by the evidence.

U.K. Troop Deployment/Commitment

With the exception of the RAF training team, no U.K. troops were deployed into Lebanon, although they were deployed to Jordan, and U.K. forces were designated as the reserve for U.S. forces that landed in Lebanon in 1958. Thus, with the U.S.-U.K. relationship in the Middle East, and the

particular situation, U.K. forces could be considered as certainly committed, and ready for deployment. The fact that they were not needed, and thus were not deployed, does not change the reality of their commitment.

Integration of British Policies

U.K. policy in Lebanon seemed somewhat anomalous and hasty, rather than deliberate and integrated. Throughout the rest of the non-European world, Britain was withdrawing and diminishing defense commitments, yet a completely new defensive undertaking was begun in Lebanon in 1957-1958, notwithstanding the U.S. acceptance of U.K.'s traditional role in the Middle East with the Eisenhower Doctrine; or Lebanon's irrelevance to major British interests, except in an indirect way; or French traditional and current dominant influence in Lebanon. Britain was at that time shifting into a modern strategy involving a few small bases, such as Cyprus and Aden, and a concept of strategic airlift to replace British troops on the ground all over the world. Lebanon did not fit into this strategy. The only serious threat to Lebanon was internal, or perhaps in a minor way, from Syria. Britain did not have significant British investments, concerns, or subjects in Lebanon, and had in Lebanon little to protect from anything. British efforts in Lebanon may perhaps be seen as one of the last feeble gasps of a dying empire, or perhaps "a bit of show" as London grudgingly acknowledged that the U.K. had been replaced by

the U.S. as the unchallenged leader of the free world, and that London's views were considered, but were not necessarily decisive. In any event, while not significantly dysfunctional or counterproductive, U.K. efforts in Lebanon were not integrated into British strategy, foreign policy, or the new British image in the world.

Conclusions

1. Over half of the individual purposes, goals, and objectives were not shared by the two governments. Eight of 20 British purposes were not shared. One British goal was not shared. All objectives were shared.

2. U.K. exerted no control over Lebanese military assistance.

3. U.K. troops were committed in 1958 to assist in the Lebanese civil war, although they were not deployed.

4. U.K. efforts were not integrated with British strategy or foreign policy.

5. Four British purposes were not achieved. All British goals and objectives were achieved.

6. The total effect of the relationship on the U.K. was negligible. Since U.S. efforts in Lebanon were aimed at similar purposes, goals, and objectives, U.K. efforts may have been redundant, although this conclusion may not have been apparent in July, 1958. Many British aims were not directly related to the situation in Lebanon, and the contribution of U.K. efforts in Lebanon to their achievement was negligible, although real. One is tempted to speculate

that British aims would have been achieved in much the same fashion, had military assistance not been provided at all. U.K. military assistance was probably irrelevant to achievement of U.K. aims, and to resolution of the situation of the situation in Lebanon,

The total effect of U.K. military assistance on Lebanon was not significant since the influences of France, the U.S., and the Arab states were hyper-dominant.

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APPENDIX K

U. K. to GHANA

Extent of Aid

United Kingdom grant aid to Ghana began at Ghanaian independence in March, 1957, when Ghana inherited part of the Royal West African Frontier Force which had been equipped and trained by the U.K. Last deliveries of military equipment or British-funded training were in 1967.¹ After 1966, U.K. provided only three helicopters and a loan to build a frigate in Ghana.² The U.K. maintained a British Joint Services Training Team in Ghana from 1961 until 1971. Prior to 1961, British officers occupied all key positions in the Ghanaian Armed Forces. The BJSTT was over 200 British officers at its largest.³

See Appendix Y, Section 1, and Appendix Z, Section 5 for details of the British program.

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

As Britain was preparing the West African colonies for independence during the mid-fifties, very little money was spent for their armed forces.⁴ Through the decade of the fifties, the importance of the defense of the Commonwealth was gradually replaced by concern over Britain's obligations as a member of NATO. By 1960, the Annual Report on Defense did not even mention the Commonwealth, but referred instead

to Britain's part in NATO, CENTO, and SEATO.⁵ It did speak about a British "military presence to help preserve stability in sensitive areas for which she has a particular responsibility."⁶ The feeling was growing that

... a large number of so-called commitments which the United Kingdom now carries outside the Continent of Europe are out of date and do not make sense in 1961 in either military or political terms.⁷

After the Second World War, Britain tried initially to preserve the defensive unity of the Commonwealth. But the combination of armament technology, Britain's greater commitment to and interest in Europe, the growing dominance of the USA, the growth of nationalism in the Commonwealth, and domestic pressures, led to a major British purpose of transferring colonial defense responsibilities to the newly emergent Commonwealth nations with only minimal British commitments. British policies were directed at maintaining British influence in former colonies in order to encourage economic and political stability and rational growth within the general, rather vague parameters of the new "Commonwealth" that replaced the "British Commonwealth" of nations.

For additional British purposes and goals, see Appendix 2, Section 5.

British objectives involved the creation and maintenance of a military force that could successfully meet any threat to British interests, and the assurance that that force would meet those threats.

Ghana achieved independence in 1957. The primary purpose of Ghanaian leaders during the period in question

was to assume a place in the world as a truly independent nation. Two broad purposes involved increasing productivity and accumulating capital for the expansion of industrialization. Ghanaian leaders, particularly Kwame Nkrumah, posited as a basic economic purpose the achievement of a form of Socialism, which was known in Ghana as Nkrumahism.⁸ Another purpose was known as "PanAfricanism". Under this concept Kwame Nkrumah was to lead all Africa in forming a single Africa united for the benefit of all Africans. The power of this purpose may be suggested by a provision in the Ghanaian Constitution of 1960, that the development of a "Union of African States" was one of the purposes of the Constitution.⁹ Other ancillary purposes included obtaining foreign aid and investment without any commitments or political strings.¹⁰ Ghana retained a pro-Western bias immediately after independence and even opted to retain the British monarchy prior to the 1960 Constitution. Nkrumah characterized Ghanaian foreign policy as having three branches: "African independence, African unity, and the maintenance of world peace through a policy of positive neutrality and nonalignment" in 1962-1963.¹¹

By 1960, Nkrumah was beginning to believe that the West might not provide him with all of his wants, although his nonalignment still favored Great Britain. When Western investment and aid did not appear in Accra, the offers of the Soviet Union became more and more attractive. When the U.S.S.R. offered immediately the aid that the West had refused for two years to provide, Nkrumah opted for balanced nonalign-

ment, and shifted his interests from London to Moscow, for precisely the same reasons that he had supported London.¹²

The army had played no role in the independence struggle, since it was the instrument of colonial law and order. With independence, the army became a symbol of nationhood, prestige, and national independence, in addition to retaining its traditional roles of internal security and border protection. After Nkrumah's adventure into the Congo, a rapid expansion of the army was begun, not only to provide national security, but more importantly to make available an African army to maintain a "Pax Africana", and to free states from dependence upon external military power.¹³

Ghana's objectives included the simultaneous modernization and expansion of the Armed Forces, at the same time that the British officers were gradually being replaced by Ghanaian officers.¹⁴

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

Purposes	UK	Achieved	GHANA	Achieved
1. Stability (economic and political)	Y	N	Y	N
2. Transfer of responsibility to Ghana	Y	Y	Y	Y
3. Minimal British commitment	Y	Y	Y	Y
4. Maintain British influence	Y	N	N	
5. Growth within the Commonwealth	Y	N	N**	
6. Viable Ghanaian nation independent of U.K.	Y	Y	Y	Y

Purposes	UK	Achieved	GHANA	Achieved
7. Increased productivity	N		Y	Y
8. Accumulating capital	N		Y	N
9. Ghanaian Socialism	N		Y	N*
10. Pan Africanism	N		Y	N
11. Maximize foreign aid and investment with no commitment	N		Y	N
12. African independence	N		Y	N
13. African unity	N		Y	N
14. Positive neutrality and nonalignment	N		Y	Y
Goals				
1. Replacement of British forces by Ghanaian forces	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. British influence over Ghanaian forces	Y	Y	N	
3. Ghanaian Armed Forces as symbol of nationhood	N		Y	Y
4. Internal security and border protection	Y	Y	Y	Y
5. African army for Pax Africana	N		Y	N
Objectives				
1. Ghanaian force to meet any threat to British interests	Y	Y	N	
2. Assurance that Armed Forces will be favorable to U.K.	Y	Y	N	
3. Modernization and expansion	N		Y	N

Objectives	UK	Achieved	GHANA	Achieved
4. Ghanaianization	Y	Y	Y	Y

* Prior to the coup d'etat in 1966

** After 1961-1962

Additional purposes and goals are summarized in Appendix Z, Section 5.

U.K. Control

From independence until 1961, British officers occupied key positions of actual command in the Ghanaian Armed Forces. From 1962 until 1971, a British mission maintained decreasing control over the Ghanaian Armed Forces. In addition, the traditions and training of the Ghanaian Armed Forces were totally British. They looked to British officers habitually for advice and guidance, if not leadership.

U.K. Troop Deployment/Commitment

At no time after independence were British troops deployed into Ghana as combat units. No treaties were signed, nor did London announce or imply any commitment to Ghana. Nevertheless, the situation created by British officers either seconded in the Ghanaian Armed Forces or serving with the British Joint Services Training Team, as well as a large group of British subjects and significant British holdings and investments in Ghana, lent some credence to an imputed British commitment in Ghana. While nobody believed that the Royal Army would defend Ghana's borders, the entire world probably felt that London would not abandon British

subjects and interests in Ghana.

Integration of U.K. Policies

U.K. policy in Ghana was a deliberate part of world-wide British policy at that time, that of gradual transfer of responsibilities to local governments in all areas of the world, while retaining some intangible links of mutual dependence and respect. The fact that Ghana's policies sometimes clashed with those of London does not imply non-integration of British policies, but rather success of British disengagement.

Conclusions

1. Approximately one third of the individual purposes, goals, and objectives were shared by the two governments. One half of the goals were not shared. Only one of the objectives was shared.
2. The U.K. was able to exert significant control throughout the relationship.
3. U.K. troops were not deployed or committed, although a significant British involvement in Ghana cannot be ignored.
4. U.K. policies toward Ghana were well integrated with other U.K. policies at the time. No clash was apparent among the various policies applied within Ghana.
5. Of 11 U.K. purposes, 6 were achieved, one was ultimately achieved in a variant form, and one was sustained at the former level of success without improvement. Of four

U.K. goals, all were achieved to some degree. The three U.K. objectives were achieved.

6. The total effect of the relationship was generally that intended by the U.K., and Ghana, although the Nkrumah period was definitely opposed to British interests and aims.

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APPENDIX L

U. K. to PAKISTAN

Extent of Aid

U.K. aid to Pakistan extended from 1954 to 1965. Various types of equipment were provided. See Appendices Y, Section 2, and Z, Section 6 for details of the program.

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

After the Second World War, Britain tried initially to preserve the defensive unity of the Commonwealth. As late as 1948, after Pakistan's independence, the British Defense Minister could talk seriously of convening an "Imperial Defense Conference".¹ In 1950, Prime Minister Attlee could discuss parallel action of the British Commonwealth "when the things for which we all stand - freedom, democracy, and peace- are threatened."² By 1954, Britain had become defensive about the Commonwealth: " ... we must not let the idea of the Commonwealth entity fade into the background."³ The British government had accepted the need for and directed its policies toward a gradual contraction of British forces from the Commonwealth. Combinations of armament, technology, recognition of more immediate British interests in Europe, the growing dominance of the U.S.A., the growth of nationalism in the Commonwealth, the Dominions' demands for greater independence and responsibility, as well as increasingly serious domestic and economic pressures led to a major British purpose of transferring defense responsibilities

to the developing and emerging Commonwealth nations with only minimal British commitments. The main purpose of the contraction was to ease Britain's burden and yet enable her to retain some influence by participating in regional defense pacts.⁴ British policies were directed at maintaining British influence in former dependencies in order to encourage economic and political stability and rational growth within the general, rather vague parameters of the new "Commonwealth" that replaced the "British Commonwealth" of nations.

British objectives involved the continuance of a British dominated military force in Pakistan, and the maintenance of a Pakistani military force that could prevent war and disorder in the area.

See Appendix Z, Section 6 for additional U.K. purposes and goals.

Pakistan, having attained status as a viable, independent nation, was still, in 1954, concerned essentially about internal affairs and relations with immediate neighbors. The Pakistani government was still floundering in uncertainty and attempting to define its roles and political philosophies. Achieving political stability and national unity were primary domestic purposes.⁵ As in nearly all developing countries, another purpose involved accelerating economic development and industrialization.⁶ By 1954, Pakistani ideologies had posited as national purposes some sort of planned economy, not necessarily socialist, and a form of democracy whose

ideals were subordinate to political stability.⁷ Later in the period, an opposition to Communism developed, but it was not accompanied by any rejection of, or antagonism toward, communist nations.⁸ The primary purposes of Karachi's foreign policy were to obtain the Kashmir; to establish Pakhtunistan as an integral part of Pakistan, thereby defeating Afghani irredentism; and to resolve the problems of distribution of the waters of the Indus Basin and of the Ganges River.⁹ Pakistan's purposes in the global milieu involved creation of some sort of Muslim solidarity bloc,¹⁰ a sort of non-neutrality which leaned toward the West but did not exclude dealings with the East,¹¹ and a search for friends and supporters in all quarters of the globe.¹² The consequence was an ambivalent attitude toward the Commonwealth, including the feeling that the Commonwealth relationship had no value unless Great Britain would support Pakistan in its quarrels with India, a position that London would never take.¹³ Similarly Karachi's alliances with the United States, Iran, Turkey, and others, were only entered after a determination that they would support Pakistan's positions concerning India, Afghanistan, and Islam.¹⁴

Pakistan's goals arose from a general need for money and arms, and a similarly general inability to pay for what Ayub Khan felt was needed for national security and defense of Pakistani interests. Karachi saw a real need to defend her frontiers and perhaps to occupy Jammu and Kashmir, or Pakhtunistan by force. Since independence, the civil

government had shown itself to be extremely inept and unstable, while the Army was, in fact, the only stable institution involved in Pakistani politics. Thus, a major Pakistani goal was to obtain money and equipment for the army from whatever sources could be found.¹⁵ Linked closely to this was the desire to achieve some degree of national security from Indian aggression through military ties with the great powers.¹⁶

Pakistan's objective was to increase her defensive strength while contributing to economic stability and international peace and security.¹⁷ The Partition of the Indian Sub-continent had resulted in a similar partition of the Indian Army and its stores. Although the Muslim soldiers ultimately arrived safely in Pakistan, the Indian authorities were rather remiss in proportional partitioning of the stores. Although exact figures will probably never be known, Pakistani Army figures estimate about 15% of the stores, 5% of the trucks, no armored vehicles, ammunition, and less than 1% of the machinery were ever delivered in Pakistan.¹⁸ Thus Pakistan's immediate objectives were to equip the Army, Navy, and Air Force with all sorts of equipment, to provide requisite training, and to build a modest defense industry.

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

Purposes	UK	Achieved	PAK	Achieved
1. Maintain the Commonwealth	Y	Y	Y*	Y
2. Withdrawal of British forces	Y	Y	N	

(Continued)

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Purposes	UK	Achieved	PAK	Achieved
3. Transfer of defense responsibilities to Pakistan	Y	Y	Y	Y
4. Minimal British commitment	Y	Y	N	
5. Ease Britain's burden	Y	Y	N	
6. Maintain British influence through regional defense pacts	Y	Y	Y*	Y
7. Political stability	Y**	Y	Y	Y
8. National unity	N		Y	N
9. Economic development	Y**	Y	Y	Y
10. Industrialization	Y**	Y	Y	Y
11. Planned economy	N		Y	Y
12. Opposition to Communism	Y**	Y	Y	Y
13. Obtain the Kashmir	N		Y	N
14. Obtain Pakhtunistan	N		Y	N
15. Resolve Indus Basin problem	N		Y	Y
16. International Muslim solidarity	N		Y	N
17. Non-neutrality	N		Y	Y
18. Friends for Pakistan	N		Y	Y
Goals				
1. Defend Pakistan's frontiers	Y**	Y	Y	Y
2. Obtain money and equipment for the army	Y	Y	Y	Y
3. Military ties with great powers	Y	Y	Y	Y

Objectives	UK	Achieved	PAK	Achieved
1. British dominated military force in Pakistan	Y	Y	Y*	Y
2. Pakistani capability to prevent war and disorder	Y	Y***	Y	Y***
3. Increase Pakistani defensive strength	Y	Y	Y	Y
4. Economic stability	Y	Y	Y	Y
5. International peace and security	Y	Y***	Y	Y***
6. Equip and train Pakistani armed forces	Y	Y	Y	Y
7. Modest Pakistani defense industry	Y		Y	Y

* Ambivalent, but generally Yes

** implicit

*** Yes prior to Indian-Pakistani conflict which terminated the donor recipient relationship

Additional purposes and goals are summarized in Appendix 2, Section 6.

U.K. Control

U.K. exerted minimal control over the Pakistani Armed Forces, and relied primarily upon the ties developed during Pakistani dependency and the "idea of Commonwealth". It is perhaps significant that during the period of the relationship, the U.S. maintained a MAAG in Karachi based upon the standard USMAP agreement. The positive control exerted by the US MAAG according to the agreement may have served as a surrogate for British control since the U.K. and

U.S.A. were close allies during the period, and had relatively complementary aims in Pakistan. This is not to suggest a formal substitution or collusion between the two donors, but rather that control over a recipient military force to the benefit of a controlling donor may inhere to the benefit of all complementary donors with complementary aims, unless the recipient force is broken into separate recipient groups for each donor. USMAP was not provided to Pakistani forces in either East Pakistan or the Kashmir. Presumably these forces were equipped by British assistance. The degree to which any surrogate or imputed control would have affected these forces is sheer speculation.

U.K. Troop Deployment/Commitment

British troops were not deployed into, or in support of, Pakistan during the period. Nevertheless, both the U.K. and Pakistan, as well as the rest of the world, saw an informal commitment by Great Britain in the Commonwealth relationship, and a formal military commitment by the U.K. in the Baghdad Pact or CENTO.

Integration of British Policies

U.K. policy in Pakistan was a deliberate part of worldwide British policy at that time, of gradual transfer of responsibilities to local governments in all areas of the world, while retaining some intangible links of mutual dependence and respect.

Conclusions

1. One third of the individual purposes, goals, and objectives were not shared by both governments. Six of 16 British purposes were not shared. All British goals and objectives were shared.

2. The U.K. exerted no overt control over Pakistani forces, although the indirect control of tradition, training, and previous dependency cannot be ignored. U.S. MAAG control may also have inhered to the U.K.

3. U.K. troops were not deployed, although a definite U.K. commitment was perceived, and probably did exist.

4. U.K. policies toward Pakistan were integrated during the relationship.

5. All U.K. purposes, goals, and objectives were achieved.

6. The total effect of the relationship was definitely beneficial to both governments.

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APPENDIX M
USSR TO CAMBODIA

Extent of Aid

Soviet military assistance to Cambodia was initiated in 1963 and terminated in 1969. The entire program provided less than \$20 million.¹ Prior to 1963, military assistance to Cambodia had been primarily from France and the USA, and Cambodia had avoided friction with its traditional opponents, Thailand, and Vietnam. With a major change in Prince Sihanouk's foreign policy in 1963 came the announcement in September that the Soviet Union had agreed to provide military assistance. The first deliveries occurred between September, 1963, and February, 1964, and consisted of three MIG-17 jet fighters, 24 anti-aircraft guns, one radar station, one jet trainer, and several trucks and mobile field units.² A second delivery occurred in late 1964 and contained two MIG-17 fighters, two Il-14 transport aircraft, one Mi-4 helicopter, eight 85mm anti-aircraft guns, sixteen 67mm artillery pieces, fifteen 82mm mortars, 40 miscellaneous vehicles, 36 light machine guns, and 500 submachineguns.³ No further deliveries were made until April, 1967, when the Soviets provided five MIG-17's two An-2 transports, eleven trucks, eight anti-aircraft guns, and additional anti-aircraft system equipment.⁴ In 1958, an additional military assistance agreement was made

for \$6 million.⁵ The first and third deliveries were gifts to Prince Sihanouk. No information is available concerning the 1964 delivery and the 1968 agreement.⁶

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

Soviet military assistance to Cambodia was not part of a definite and continuing program with any defined purposes. Rather it was a Soviet response to a perceived opportunity which appeared with Sihanouk's deliberate change of policy in 1963. Soviet interests would be served by strengthening Cambodia against Thailand and South Vietnam, the allies of the United States. More importantly, the Soviets wanted to stem the rise of Chinese influence in Cambodia.⁷ In Cambodia the Chinese had managed to outbid the Soviets in economic aid.⁸ Consequently the Russians apparently chose to use military assistance to challenge the Chinese in Cambodia. It seems clear that the Soviets wanted to preserve an independent Cambodia in order to prevent either Chinese or U. S. domination of Indochina. Whereas the arms deliveries in 1963 and 1964 were directly responsive to similar Chinese deliveries, the deliveries in 1967 and the agreement in 1968 were directly responsive to the U. S. war in Vietnam and increasing fear that it would cross the border into Cambodia and thus encompass Cambodia in the U. S. sphere of influence.

The central element of Cambodia's policy during the period was the desire to remain independent. To accomplish

this, the country was trying to maintain a position of balance in foreign affairs, while recognizing the proximity and importance of China in Indochina politics. In discussing the critical events of 1963, Prince Sihanouk said:

All Asian leaders are certainly aware that the interlude in their history marked by European intervention in Asian affairs is drawing to a close and the time is fast approaching when they will be faced with that recurrent factor: a resurgent China with which they will have to come to terms as best they may.⁹

As early as 1955, Cambodia was anxiously trying to avoid outright alignment with either the West or with China by simultaneously renouncing SEATO protection and promising Chou En-Lai not to allow foreign bases in Cambodia, and accepting U. S. military assistance. When U. S. aid ceased in 1963 as a result of the Clay Committee Report, Cambodia turned to the Soviet Union as a balance to the increasing significance of China in the area. By 1963, Sihanouk had become convinced that America's principle commitments were to Thailand and South Vietnam, traditional foes of Cambodia, both of which were providing bases of operations for Khmer Serai insurgents. By 1963, it was apparent in Phnom Penh that North Vietnam would soon defeat South Vietnam, and that the unified Vietnam would be dominated by China. Thus, in order to maintain Cambodian independence, Sihanouk could do nothing but create a "balance between menaces" from Vietnam, Thailand, and China, and to balance this balance with support from the Soviet Union.¹⁰

The acceptance of Soviet arms assistance fitted into the pattern of Cambodia's efforts to preserve its independence from Peking and served to balance Chinese influence. The spectre of Russian inroads in Cambodia was also calculated to draw more foreign aid out of China as well as France, the two powers which had most to lose if another power were to gain too much influence in Cambodia.¹¹

It seems apparent that neither donor nor recipient had any significant military goals or objectives beyond those inherent in the nature of military assistance. During the period the Soviet Union had no military objectives or goals in Indochina, and Indochina fitted only peripherally into Soviet military strategy. The extent of Soviet military assistance indicates the low priority given Cambodia, as does the absence of deliveries from 1964 to 1967 when support of North Vietnam received a much higher priority in Moscow. Cambodia's 37,000 man military force constituted little more than a royal guard for Sihanouk and did not permit any serious attempt to defend Cambodia's frontiers against attack from either Thailand, Vietnam, or even Laos. The significance of Sihanouk's acceptance of Soviet military assistance is, therefore, primarily political, rather than military.

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

PURPOSES	USSR	ACHIEVED*	CAMB	ACHIEVED *
1. Stem rise of PRC influence in CAMB	Y	N	N	
2. Diminish U. S. influence in CAMB	Y	Y	Y	Y

(Continued)

Purposes	USSR	ACHIEVED*	CAMB	ACHIEVED*
3. Preserve CAMB independence and neutrality	Y	Y	Y	Y
4. Balance Chinese influence in CAMB	N		Y	Y

GOALS

1. Strengthen CAMB against THAI and RVN	Y	insig	minor	insig
2. Maintain "balance of menaces"	N		Y	Y
3. Draw more foreign aid from PRC and FR	N		Y	Y

OBJECTIVES

1. Increase CAMB armed force against THAI and RVN	Y	insig	minor	insig

*The fall of Sihanouk in 1970 induced the de facto failure of all purposes, goals, and objectives of relationships with his regime. Success/failure conclusions of this chart do not consider the coup, but are made with reference to the situation immediately prior to the coup.

Soviet Control

Soviet purposes, goals, and objectives were not contingent upon the use of the Cambodian military forces, or upon the use of the equipment provided, but rather upon the mere acceptance of Soviet equipment and assistance by Sihanouk. Thus, no control was necessary to achieve Soviet intentions, and none was used. The Soviets did not

even have a significant military advisory mission in Cambodia, and provided training in the Soviet Union for only a small number of Cambodians. Military assistance agreements were non-restrictive in nature, and were directed at nothing more than pleasing Sihanouk, with as little cost as possible.

Soviet Troop Deployment/Commitment

None was made, intended, or even discussed. An agreement with the PRC in 1955 specifically prohibited deployment of foreign troops into Cambodia.

Integration of Soviet Policies

Military assistance to Cambodia was not a deliberate program of the Soviet Union, and, thus, was not integrated into any general policy or strategy. It was seen as a response to a fortunate opportunity in an insignificant kingdom, and was treated accordingly with a quite low priority in Moscow. Moscow was attempting to recover from the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, responding to economic problems in Russia, and attempting to maintain cold war antagonism while making noises about peaceful co-existence. Moscow apparently chose to regard Cambodia as essentially irrelevant to these problems, and thus chose a generally supportive, but effectively innocuous, policy in Cambodia with regard to the West. Russia's primary adversary in Cambodia was China, and the Sino-Soviet adversary relationship in Cambodia was supported by and supportive of the

same relationship in Africa, the Middle East, Indonesia, and throughout the world. But even these various complementary activities were not parts of any master plan, but simply coincidental situations in which Moscow saw a possibility of challenging Peking. It cannot be said that integration of Russian military assistance with other Soviet policies and strategies was more than coincidental, and it was by no means a part of a world-wide, or even regional, program such as USMAP.

Conclusions

1. Over half of the purposes, goals, and objectives were not shared by the two governments. Neither government saw the Cambodian army as a significant element of the relationship. The Soviet Union was in an adversary relationship with the PRC, whereas Sihanouk was trying to win Chinese support, and wanted no part of any adversary relationship.

2. The Soviet Union exerted no control or influence over Cambodian Armed Forces, and had no significant influence over Cambodian foreign or domestic policies.

3. Soviet troops were not deployed, no Soviet commitment was made, and neither government even seriously considered it.

4. Soviet policies toward Cambodia were not integrated with other Soviet policies by any more than concept and coincidence. No complementarity or mutual support was intended or attempted.

5. Of three Soviet purposes, the primary was not

achieved, and the two secondary were achieved.* The single Soviet goal was achieved, but only to an insignificant degree. The single Soviet objective (which was not defined by the Soviets as an objective) was achieved to an insignificant degree.

6. The total effect of Soviet support of Cambodia was probably insignificant in terms of Soviet foreign policy, since neither benefits nor direct ill effects resulted from it.

* It is apparent that Moscow chose not to support Sihanouk after the coup in March, 1970, when Sihanouk was in Moscow. It is an interesting speculation that all of Moscow's purposes might have been achieved and Cambodia might have become a Soviet satrapy had Moscow chosen to support Sihanouk and reinstall him as Head of State. Moscow's actual decision might indicate the irrelevance of Cambodia to Moscow, or the correct perception that Chinese influence in Phnom Penh would be replaced by U. S. influence with Lon Nol, which would support Soviet-American detente and the Sino-American detente and the Sino-Soviet split of the 1970's.

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¹Actual numbers and amounts are unavailable. Estimates are from: Winfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert, Soviet Military Aid as a Reflection of Soviet Objectives, 1955-1967 (Unpublished report submitted to Director of Doctrine, Concepts and Objectives; Headquarters U. S. Air Force, October, 1968), App. 3, p. 86, and from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1971), p. 404.

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APPENDIX N

USSR TO TANZANIA

Extent of Aid

Soviet military assistance to Tanzania (Zanzibar/Tanganyika) was initiated in 1964, continued in 1966 and 1967 and perhaps in 1970, although deliveries are unconfirmed in 1970. The entire grant aid program provided at least five million dollars and at most twelve million dollars.¹ When the Arab government in Zanzibar was overthrown in January, 1964, Moscow and Peking immediately extended recognition of the new government within one week. After awaiting vainly some sign of support from London or Washington, President Karume accepted military assistance from communist sources. In March, the first Russian technicians and arms, trucks, mortars, and artillery arrived in Zanzibar.² Soviet and East German instructors organized and operated a military training base at Chukwani on the island.³ In November more Soviet field guns, small arms, and anti-aircraft weapons arrived.⁴ Further weapon supplies and continued training were provided in 1966 and 1967. One An-2 light transport was provided during this period.⁵ No information is available concerning the 1970 delivery.

Soviet non-military aid seems to have been limited to specific projects to be built by Russians in coordination

with technical assistance provided by Poland, and financial support from Czechoslovakia, as well as economic and technical assistance from East Germany, whose embassy in Zanzibar was their first in a non-communist country.⁶ Estimates of the amounts of non-military aid from the Soviet bloc vary, but it seems certain that the total is at least 45 million dollars.⁷

Donor and Recipient Objectives, Goals, and Purposes

Sub-Saharan Africa commands a relatively low priority among Soviet strategic interests, but within that low priority area, the nations of East Africa, particularly Kenya and Tanzania, are special objects of Russian concern over hostile domination of the shores of the Indian Ocean. The airfields at Nairobi and Dar es Salaam offer convenient strategic bases, refuelling stations, and airheads for entry into Africa, or other strategic deployments. A more general purpose than obtaining physical access to strategic land bases and facilities was that of neutralizing the paramount influence of Western power in ex-colonial countries.⁸

With the emergence of Sino-Soviet antagonisms and growing competitions, the preclusion or diminution of Chinese influence and presence became an additional purpose involved in Soviet activities in Tanzania. By the time of the third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Tanganyika in 1963, an active rivalry had developed, wherein the Chinese supported the most potentially violent groups, while the Russians pledged unstinting support to national

leaders without regard to their ideologies or aspirations. Within Tanzania, this rivalry reached its most intense level as Russians and Chinese blatantly bid against each other in offering arms, military equipment, economic and technical assistance, and trade.

A goal that we may impute to the Soviets, based upon the subsequent occurrences, is the ability to support indirectly the subversive groups operating in East and South Africa against pro-West governments. A key reason behind Moscow's attempt to aid the rebels seemed to be to block the Chinese from adopting the movements and simultaneously demonstrating Russian support of wars of national liberation. Already by 1963, Dar es Salaam had become a base for South African exiles, Rhodesian rebels, and terrorists from the Congo, Cameroons, etc. By supporting the Tanzanian government against these groups, and by assisting these groups in their own small wars, the Soviets hoped to accomplish all of their purposes, even though they were somewhat contradictory.

Russia had no real objective in giving military assistance other than that the desire of Tanzania for military assistance seemed a good opportunity to achieve other goals and purposes. Russia had no strategic or military interest in the area, except possibly as mentioned above. The 2,600 man Tanzanian armed forces could not possibly be anything more than a symbol of national sovereignty. Despite the unstable situation in Mozambique,

the strengthening of the white front in Southern Africa, and the recent Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia, the only significant military threat to Tanzania was South African and Portuguese aircraft that might occasionally cross the frontier in search of rebel and guerrilla camps in Tanzania.⁹ Thus, Tanzania's desire/requirement for a palace guard, some sort of modest counter guerrilla force, and an air defense capability seemed a relatively simple task for Russian military assistance.

While such objectives may probably be imputed to Soviet military assistance by the actual equipment and training provided, a second objective was probably considerable restraint in the use of these forces against rebel groups in Tanzania, whom the Russians were clandestinely supporting.

Tanzania's primary purpose was national development,¹⁰ involving creation of a viable nation, and establishment of a reasonable standard of living. Like Kenya and Uganda, Tanzania suffered from scarcity of capital and local resources, as well as an absence of skilled native labor. To achieve this purpose Tanzania was attempting to expand its economy through industrialization and improved agricultural methods.¹¹

A political purpose was Tanzania's aim "to develop into a true Socialist State . . . in which all people are workers and in which neither Capitalism nor Feudalism exist."¹² However, Tanzania's socialism was not the traditional

socialism on the road to communism. Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's president, explained that:

. . . it should be founded on the tribal principles of traditional African society which he called Ujamaa--familyhood, or African socialism. This differed from traditional socialism in that it did not have its roots in the class struggle but grew out of the ideal of sharing everything that was available.¹³

Nyerere was one with other sub-Saharan African leaders in his foreign policy of non-alignment and independence from the major power blocs. In 1964, he commented that Tanzanian foreign policy was unchanged by the appearance of Chinese and Russian military missions, that his policy was still non-alignment.

Admitting that many states would not approve the decision to accept the Chinese mission, Nyerere concluded that he did not like Tanzania to be 'subjected to the need to balance one set of facts against another' in order to obtain the necessary aid for development of the state.¹⁴

We are ready to commit our country to support everything we believe to be right and just in international affairs . . . We intend to judge each case on its merits. We are not going to reject some measure just because the West brands it as a 'Communist-inspired plot' or blindly criticize some other action because it was described as 'an imperialist maneuver'. We hope to be friendly with all nations but these bonds will not entitle our friends to choose our enemies.¹⁵

As implied by earlier statements a major purpose of Nyerere throughout the period was to obtain as much foreign aid as possible from any source. With this in mind, he deliberately allowed the West German military mission to be withdrawn and subsequently all West German aid terminated when he invited the East Germans to provide

their aid, thus receiving also the various forms of assistance from the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia also.

Nyerere's goals for military assistance were intimately involved with his purposes of national development and nonalignment. He desired to minimize military expenditure. "We'd rather spend our money on bread."¹⁶ Secondly, he wished to minimize the risks to himself and his government in possessing an army. The army mutiny of January, 1964, demonstrated the dangers of an army to an emergent government. Said Dr. Nyerere:

There is always some element of risk about having an army at all in a developing country, but since you can't do without an army, in these times, the task is to ensure that the officers and men are integrated into the government and party, so that they become no more of a risk than, say the civil service.¹⁷

The politicization of the army would thus ensure its loyalty, and simultaneously undermine its political strength, as would the expansion of the police corps.

Thirdly, Tanzania sought to avoid dependence upon any one source for training and equipment, and particularly to avoid dependence upon the superpowers. This diversity of training and equipment was designed to avoid the emergence of an officer corps that was unified by parallel training under the aegis of any superpower, and also to avoid any reliance that might compromise Tanzania's non-alignment policy.¹⁸

Tanzania's specific objectives for military assistance involved the perceived threat to Tanzania and

Myerere's concepts of employment of his army. As has already been mentioned, Nyerere felt the need for a military force as a symbol of sovereignty. He also felt some vague threat arising from the unstable conditions surrounding him in Mozambique, South Africa, Rhodesia, the Congo, et., as well as the relatively frequent violation of Tanzania's frontiers by South African and Portuguese aircraft. His objectives, then, were to build a force that could meet these perceived threats, remain firmly within his control, and cost as little as possible. Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

PURPOSES	USSR	ACHIEVED	TZ	ACHIEVED
1. Airfields and Ports available to USSR	Y	Y	accept	
2. Neutralizing Western influence	Y	N	N	
3. Neutralizing Chinese influence	Y	N	N	
4. National Development	N		Y	Y
5. African socialism	N		Y	Y
6. Non-alignment	N		Y	Y
7. Maximize foreign aid (all sources)	N		Y	Y

(Continued)

GOALS	USSR	ACHIEVED	TZ	ACHIEVED
1. Clandestine support to rebels	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. Support Wars of National Liberation	Y	marginal	Y	Y
3. Minimize military expenditure	N		Y	Y
4. Politicization of army	Y	Y	Y	Y
5. Diversity in army	N		Y	Y

OBJECTIVES

1. Restraint in countering guerrillas	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. Symbol of sovereignty	accept		Y	Y
3. Border protect/counter guerrilla	accept		Y	Y
4. Air defense	accept		Y	Y

USSR Control

The USSR approached Tanzania in much the same manner of suppliance that was seen in England during the Coalition Wars. Since Tanzania's good will was one of the purposes of the assistance, the USSR was in no position to antagonize Nyerere by exerting control over its assistance. Russians had no way of inducing Nyerere to decrease relations with the West or the PRC, since any attempts to do so might result in termination of all Soviet influence in Dar es Salaam. While the PRC and the West

seemed prepared to engage in definite long-term programs, the USSR dealt only in specific projects. This typical Soviet style further served to degrade any vestiges of Soviet control that existed in the relationship, after Nyerere demonstrated his willingness to terminate military assistance with a country (West German) that annoyed him. The Soviet military mission numbered only 70 advisors in addition to the embassy staff.

USSR troop deployment/commitment

At no time were Soviet troops committed to or deployed in Tanzania.

Integration of Soviet Policies

Soviet policies of military assistance, economic and technical aid, and diplomacy in Tanzania seemed mutually supporting, as did parallel efforts in other African nations, particularly Kenya and Somali, in terms of Russian expansion into the Indian Ocean. Support of both the legitimate government of Nyerere and the wars of national liberation that were supported from bases from Tanzania was conceptually contradictory and ultimately led to emasculation of both efforts. Soviet policy in Tanzania was specifically supportive of its policy regarding East Germany. Soviet policy in Tanzania was, in general, fortuitous and opportunistic, rather than deliberate and carefully planned as a portion of any world-wide effort. It was a hopeful response to what

might have been a fortunate opportunity. The fact that it was integrated with some other aspects of Soviet foreign policy was probably due more to coincidence and the broad nature of Soviet purposes both in Tanzania and elsewhere, than to any mighty Machiavellian purposes hidden in the Kremlin.

Conclusions

1. Two of three Soviet purposes were not shared. None of Tanzania's purposes were shared. Three goals were shared. Although only one objective was shared by both governments, the USSR adopted Tanzania's objectives since it had no others.

2. USSR did not exert control, or even significant influence, over Tanzania or the Tanzanian armed forces.

3. Soviet troops were neither deployed nor committed.

4. Soviet policies were integrated among themselves in Tanzania with the exception of attempting to provide support to antagonistic sides in the general context of wars of national liberation. Integration with other Soviet policies was either deliberate or coincidental, but probably was not a significant factor in designing either policies in Tanzania or elsewhere in the world.

5. Of three Soviet purposes one was achieved (presumably since landing rights and port rights were never requested.) Of three Soviet goals, two were achieved and one was marginally supported. The single Soviet objective

was achieved.

6. The total effect of Soviet military assistance to Tanzania was considerably less beneficial to the USSR than to Tanzania. Western influence has diminished somewhat in Tanzania, but it has been supplanted by the PRC, not the USSR. Although military assistance obtained little influence for Moscow, considerable prestige was obtained, and although Tanzania is not within the Soviet bloc, Russia is an active competitor for influence in Dar es Salaam. This effect cannot be attributed to military assistance, but military assistance was a contributory part of the entire policy.

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APPENDIX O

USSR TO GUINEA

Extent of Aid

Soviet military assistance to Guinea was initiated in 1960 and terminated in 1967. The entire program provided approximately \$6 million.¹ Prior to the break with France in 1958, military equipment and training for the Guinean military forces had been provided primarily by France. In 1959, Czechoslovakia provided some equipment and eighteen technicians to train Guinea soldiers.² In March, 1960, Moscow provided a loan of \$3 million,³ but the amounts of equipment received indicate a considerably larger sum.⁴ By 1967, the Guinean army was equipped completely with Soviet bloc materiel, including 105mm and 122mm howitzers, T-34 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and anti-aircraft guns.⁵ The Guinean air force had acquired eight MIG-17 fighters and six An-transport aircraft, and some trainers.⁶ In addition, the Soviets provided adequate small arms, ammunition, and vehicles to equip the 5,000 man Guinean army. (In 1960, the Guinean army was 2,000 men, in 1964, 4,000, and in 1967, 5,000.⁷) In 1960, Russian aid established a national airline in Guinea with six Czech Il-14 and three Russian Il-18 airplanes.⁸ In 1966, the Soviet Union gave two An-transport aircraft to Guinea.⁹ Soviet aid also included the construction of a

jet airfield at Conakry.¹⁰

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

General Soviet concern in Africa during the sixties derived from Moscow's aim to neutralize the paramount influence of the western powers. This purpose is reflected in its efforts to be identified with African aspirations for independence and neutralism and to project a Soviet image as the champion of anti-colonialism. A more specific goal was the obtaining of landing and over-flight privileges, for which Soviet assistance built a jet airfield at Conakry. Although President Toure manifested clear Marxist leanings in his policies, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union sought to provide military assistance to Guinea on the basis of his political ideology. Rather, Moscow was probably responding to fortuitous developments which seemed to offer political gains for Soviet interests. Actually Guinea took the initiative in establishing the donor-recipient relationship with the Soviet Union.¹¹ The Soviet Union's favorable response was part of a general offensive to undermine western influence in Africa whenever the opportunity appeared. From the Soviet point of view, by complying with African requests, Moscow could hope to win political gains in the world-wide cold war with relatively little effort or expenditure.

A major Soviet objective in Guinea was to gain influence with its leaders. By supporting Toure, the Soviets hoped to strengthen the anti-West-Pan-African

movement and eventually perhaps to enlist it in the Communist camp. "The Russians also supplied Toure with arms for re-export in order to encourage the more militant and anti-western elements of African liberation movements."¹² The improvements of Conakry airport may have been made with strategic military objectives in mind, but no evidence exists to support the hypothesis. With the single exception of the Conakry airport, military considerations seem to have played no part in Soviet aims in Guinea.

Toure's decision in 1959 to accept Soviet bloc military assistance was consequent to both his Marxist ideology and his foreign policy goal of close political ties with communist powers. Furthermore, he was determined to demonstrate his independence of France in particular and the West in general. His political ambitions of pan-Africanism needed the prestige of a modern, well-equipped army, as well as the weapons and equipment to provide to other African insurgents opposing pro-Western governments in order to establish himself as the leader of the pan-African movement.¹³ Strictly military considerations played a small role in Toure's motivations. His Soviet-equipped army was used primarily for civic-action type projects and to reinforce his control of the country. Guinean national security was provided ultimately by Toure's Cuban trained and equipped "people's militia."¹⁴

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

PURPOSES	USSR	ACHIEVED	GUIN	ACHIEVED
1. Neutralize Western influence	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. Close political ties between Guinea and communist powers	Y	Y	Y	Y
3. Strengthen Pan-Africanism	Y	N	Y	N
4. Convert Pan-Africanism to Communism	Y	N	N	
5. Demonstrate Guinea independence of FR and West	N		Y	Y

GOALS

1. Landing and overflight privileges	Y	N	N	
2. Re-export of arms for benefit of USSR	Y	N	N	
3. Re-export of arms for benefit of Toure	N		Y	Y

OBJECTIVES

1. Soviet influence over Guinea leaders	Y	N	N	
2. Use of Conakry as strategic air-base	Y(poss)	N	N	
3. Prestige of a well-equipped army	N		Y	Y
4. Use of army as civic-action force to strengthen Toure's control	N		Y	Y

Soviet Control

The Soviets made no attempt to control either the uses of the Guinean army, or the equipment provided, or to extract any concessions or actions from Toure. Although a significant Soviet presence was present in Guinea, that it did not control or influence Toure is evident from the expulsion of this group and the Soviet ambassador in late 1961. Lack of political influence or control was again demonstrated by Toure's refusal to grant landing rights at Conakry during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.¹⁵

Soviet Troop Deployment/Commitment

None was made, intended, or discussed except in 1962, when landing rights were denied by Toure.

Integration of Soviet Policies

Soviet military assistance diplomacy in sub-Saharan Africa was closely linked to its general foreign policy toward the newly independent countries of that area. Soviet policy consisted essentially of an effort "to keep ideology in step with policy, and policy in step with the aspirations of the new states."¹⁶ On no occasion did ideology interfere with any other aspect of policy. Compared to other developing regimes, sub-Saharan Africa and Guinea in particular commanded a relatively low priority in Soviet foreign policy. Moscow had no vital strategic interests in the region, and no direct interest in central Africa. Soviet policy in Guinea was integrated with other policies in sub-Saharan

Africa to the extent that a fortuitous policy of taking advantage of opportunities can be integrated. The Soviet support for Toure supported generally its cold war competition with the west and opportunistic reinforcement of any perceived erosion of Western solidity. It cannot be said that anything about Soviet support for Guinea was dysfunctional to other Soviet policies. At worst, or best, Guinean support was irrelevant and consistent with current Soviet global policies.

Conclusions

1. Two of the five purposes were not shared by the two governments, and none of the goals or objectives were shared. The nature of the three shared purposes was essentially non-military and not limited to a military relationship for success.

2. The Soviets never exerted control, or even influence, over Toure.

3. Soviet troops were never deployed, and were denied permission even to transit the country.

4. Soviet policies were integrated, although it can also be said that Soviet support of Guinea was essentially irrelevant to other Soviet non-African policies.

5. Of four Soviet purposes, two were achieved. None of the Soviet goals or objectives was achieved.

6. The total effect of Soviet military assistance was beneficial to the Soviet Union only insofar as it was detrimental to France and the West. No positive benefits can be seen.

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APPENDIX P

F. R. G. to NIGER

Extent of Aid

The Federal Republic of Germany extended military assistance to Niger between 1965 and 1972. Total amount of aid was not large, and included a small variety of equipment. The only weapons provided were 2 river gunboats, but it is not certain whether these are part of the program or were commercial purchases.¹ Although some training was apparently conducted, the extent and funding arrangements are uncertain.

For additional information, see Appendix Z, Section 7.

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

Political considerations were predominant in FRG's military assistance policies, as evidenced by weak industrial pressures early in the period and increasing government control over the programs. Three main factors influenced the development of FRG policies on military assistance: the German situation in Europe; FRG-USA relationships; and domestic criticism and political pressures within West Germany.²

For the Federal government, a major purpose was to gain and maintain support on the German issue. Thus, non-recognition of East Germany became almost a sine qua non for military assistance. Additionally, military training

programs were intended to serve as a general education aimed at winning "friends who get to know and understand the German situation."³ Bonn was also greatly concerned over East Germany. A major purpose was to demonstrate FRG superiority over the German People's Republic and to deter recognition of East Germany.⁴

For additional purposes, see Appendix Z, Section 7.

German goals in Niger emphasized the economy and infrastructure, rather than the military establishment directly. A major goal was the internal security of Niger,⁵ and stability of the domestic situation.⁶ An economic goal was the creation of a market for the growing German industry.⁷

German objectives were supportive of German goals. Military assistance was designed to strengthen Niger's internal security forces and police-type forces, rather than defense forces.⁸ A second objective was to improve the communication and transportation infrastructure.⁹

Since gaining independence in 1958, Niger had avoided serious crises. President Diori had maintained a relatively stable government and had had relative economic success in balancing the budget and increasing national income. Niger's purposes included development of some production capacity, as well as agricultural development. Diori was trying to develop Niger's infrastructure, especially the lines of communication and transport throughout the country. Since independence, public expenditure had been rigidly controlled and austerity had been a constant policy

of the government. This broad purpose of low public expenditures could only be met by achievement of an ancillary purpose of finding external sources of finance.¹⁰ Political purposes of Niger were similar to those of most French West African nations: African unity based upon common economic interests rather than some messianic ideology like Nkrumahism; some vague form of democracy; a controlled economy short of true socialism; nonalignment with either of the cold-war blocs; and relative freedom of action in the international milieu.¹¹ Domestic purposes were the stabilization of government; security of the people; and suppression of the subversive elements that had harassed the government since independence.¹²

Niger's goals included an armed force that was "the visible sign of our political independence and of our proclaimed will to defend it against all aggression."¹³ In addition, the armed forces were to provide internal security and eventually suppress the active subversives in the country.¹⁴

Niger's objective was the equipping of a force that would extend government control, perform police-type internal security duties, and provide a symbol of sovereignty.¹⁵ Significantly, defense of the nation from other armies was not apparently an objective, since Diori did not perceive any threat from other national armies, but only from Niger's own subversive elements

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

Purposes	FRG	Achieved	NIGER	Achieved
1. Support on the German issue	Y	Y	N	
2. Obtain German friends	Y	Y	N	
3. Demonstrate FRG superiority over PDR	Y	Y	N	
4. Deter recognition of East Germany	Y	Y	N	
5. Niger production capability	N		Y	Y
6. Niger agricultural development	N		Y	Y
7. Niger infrastructure development	Y(goal)	Y	Y	Y
8. Develop Niger's roads and lines of communication	Y(goal)	Y	Y	Y
9. Lower public expenditure in Niger	N		Y	Y
10. External sources of finance	N		Y	Y
11. African unity	N		Y	N
12. Democracy	N		Y	Y
13. Controlled economy	N		Y	Y
14. Nonalignment	N		Y	Y
15. Niger's international independence	N		Y	Y
16. Stability of Niger government	Y(goal)	Y	Y	Y
17. Internal security	Y(goal)	Y	Y	Y
18. Suppression of subversion	Y(implied)	Y	Y	Y

Goals	FRG	Achieved	NIGER	Achieved
1. Internal security of Niger	Y	Y	Y(purpose)	Y
2. Domestic stability in Niger	Y	Y	Y(purpose)	Y
3. Creation of FRG market	Y	Y	Y(implicit)	Y
4. Armed forces as symbol of sovereignty	N		Y	Y
5. Armed forces a internal security force	Y	Y	Y	Y
Objectives				
1. Equip internal security forces	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. Improve infrastructure (transportation and communication)	Y	Y	Y	Y
3. Equip armed forces as symbol of sovereignty	N		Y	Y

F.R.G. Control

FRG exerted no control over military assistance to Niger in a direct way. The Republic's Federal Basic Law and the War Materiel Control Act placed specific limitations upon arms exports. An end-use certificate was required to prevent misuse of exported items. Deliveries of equipment could be made only to countries that presented orderly domestic conditions - geordnete innerstaatliche Verhältnisse - and could not be an area of tension - Spannungsgebiet.¹⁶ Given the nature of FRG's aims and their distinctive donor orientation, these prerequisite controls seem to have been adequate to ensure that military assistance did support FRG aims.

FRG Troop Deployment/Commitment

FRG did not deploy troops into Niger or in support of Niger. FRG was never committed to the defense of Niger, either implicitly or actually.

Integration of FRG policies

FRG military assistance to Niger was developed in response to broad FRG policy requirements, and had no other justification than support of those policies. The FRG Foreign Trade Act prohibits exports of strategic goods where such exports disturb the FRG's foreign relations. Military assistance is managed by the Ministry of Defense, but must be approved by several committees of the Bundestag after recommendations from the Foreign Ministry. FRG thus has institutional integration of military assistance with other policies and strategies.

Conclusions

1. Sixteen of 33 individual purposes, goals, and objectives were shared by the two governments. Eight of 16 German purposes were not shared. All German goals and objectives were shared.

2. FRG exerted no overt control over Niger's forces or policies, however the prerequisite controls seem adequate for FRG's aims.

3. FRG troops were not committed or deployed to Niger.

4. FRG policies were fully integrated.

5. One FRG purpose was not achieved. The single nonachievement, FRG influence in Niger, is not considered significant since another FRG purpose was to avoid any suggestion of building German spheres of influence; and since such a determination is at best a subjective judgment which in this case is based primarily upon lack of positive evidence.

6. The total effect of the relationship was definitely beneficial to both governments.

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APPENDIX Q

F. R. G. to ISRAEL

Extent of Aid

The F.R.G. extended aid to Israel between 1960 and 1965. Estimates of the total amount of aid range from \$37 million¹ to \$75 million². Authorities agree that the equipment provided included small arms and artillery, trucks, anti-tank missiles, communication equipment, anti-aircraft guns, medium tanks, armored personnel carriers, utility and transport aircraft, and helicopters.³ Some training was also provided.⁴

See Appendix Z, Section 8 for additional details.

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

The first agreements concerning military assistance by the F.R.G. were made "on the request of a friendly power,"⁵ the United States. Both Erhardt and Adenauer were concerned about the obligations of West Germany toward the Jewish people. In discussing German policy in the Middle East in 1965, Erhardt described German motivation.

With the Arab world we had a historically and traditionally untroubled record of friendly relations ... Our relations with Israel, on the other hand, were heavily incriminated. Germany was and is guilty of the crimes committed by the Third Reich, and consequently has to carry out a high moral obligation.⁶

A significant purpose of German foreign policy was involved in all FRG military assistance of the period: that of demonstrating superiority over, and deterring

recognition of the German People's Republic in East Germany.⁷

See Appendix Z, Section 8 for additional German purposes.

German goals included the continued existence of Israel as a nation in order to continue its contributions to the balance of power in the Middle East, and to remain an object of penance in assuaging Adenauer's conscience. Another goal was the disposal of obsolete or obsolescent U.S. military equipment provided by USMAP.⁸ An economic goal of the Israeli program, as well as others, was the creation of a market, albeit a small one, for the growing German defense industry which was unlikely to succeed in selling equipment commercially to the Bundeswehr, which was at that time committed by executive agreement to the purchase of military equipment from the United States as a part of the general "offset agreements."⁹

German objectives in Israel were equipping and maintaining the Israeli armed forces as a viable defense against the surrounding Arab nations which were perceived as the only significant threat to Israel's existence. Germany had no military or strategic interest in the area, other than those mentioned above, and accepted Israel's objectives for its armed forces as congruent with German interests.

Israel's purposes were all based upon the need of the nation to survive in what was perceived as a hostile environment. Even in 1960, it was still striving to attain

recognition and acceptance by the international community, and to overcome that isolation imposed upon it by the Arab states.¹⁰ The policy of developing international ties, making friends and influencing nations was another significant purpose of the Israeli government during the period.¹¹ Israel was striving to be a free nation, equal to other nations, and a model of Jewish society.¹² Economic independence and growth, and integration into the world economy were major purposes.¹³ Politically, Israel opted for an international position of "nonidentification" with a definite orientation toward the West.¹⁴ A critical purpose was to maintain the integrity of Israeli territory,¹⁵ and the security of the Israeli people.¹⁶ These purposes led, during this period, to another purpose of obtaining economic and military aid from external sources.¹⁷ Israel was specifically determined to maintain a military deterrent as well as a political deterrent to war with the Arabs,¹⁸ although avoidance of war was the initial purpose.¹⁹

Israel's goals included an independent military strength that would become the basis of a deterrent to war with the Arabs.²⁰ In support of the Israeli strategy of independent strength was the goal of many variegated sources of supply for Israeli armed forces.²¹ To achieve this goal of multiple sources of military supply required, in this period, sources of supply that were at least compatible in their products. Thus an ancillary goal was obtaining military assistance from sources that provided

either the same or similar equipment.

Israel's specific objectives were the modernization of the current Israeli forces and procurement of additional equipment.²² An additional objective was to strengthen the Armed Forces, and by so doing to increase Israel's political sovereignty.²³

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

Purposes	FRG	Achieved	ISRAEL	Achieved
1. Satisfy US pressure	Y	Y	N	
2. Obligation to Jewry	Y	Y	N	
3. Show FRG superiority over PDR	Y	Y	N	
4. Nonrecognition of PDR	Y	Y	N	
5. Survival of Israel	Y	Y	Y	Y
6. Recognition and acceptance of Israel	N		Y	Y
7. Overcome isolation of Israel	N		Y	Y
8. Develop international ties and friends for Israel	N		Y	Y
9. Free and equal Israel	N		Y	Y
10. Model Jewish society	N		Y	Y
11. Economic independence and growth of Israel	Y	Y	Y	Y
12. Integration of Israel into world economy	Y	Y	Y	Y
13. Nonidentification	N		Y	Y
14. Integrity of Israeli territory	N		Y	Y

Purposes	FRG	Achieved	ISRAEL	Achieved
15. Security of Israeli people	N		Y	Y
16. Obtaining military and economic assistance	N		Y	Y
17. Deter Arab-Israeli war	Y	Y	Y	Y

Additional purposes are summarized in Appendix Z, Section 8.

Goals

1. Continued existence of Israel	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. Disposal of obsolete military equipment	Y	Y	N	
3. Creation of market for FRG	Y	Y	Y	Y
4. Independent Israeli military strength	Y	Y	Y	Y
5. Multiple supply sources for Israel	Y	Y	Y	Y
6. Compatible equipment sources	Y	Y	Y	Y

Objectives

1. Equipping and maintaining Israeli forces	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. Modernization of Israeli forces	Y	Y	Y	Y
3. Strengthen Israeli forces	Y	Y	Y	Y

FRG Control

FRG exerted no overt control over military assistance to Israel, except that implicit in the threat of termination of the program. The small amount of training conducted in Germany cannot be seen as a control measure, since the training

was primarily technical. No end-use inspections were required, and FRG did not maintain a military mission in Israel.

FRG Troop Deployment/Commitment

Frg did not deploy troops into Israel or in support of Israel at any time. FRG was never committer to the defense of Israel, either implicitly or actually.

Integration of FRG Policies

FRG provided aid to Arab countries and Israel simultaneously. To the extent that support of both antagonists was dysfunctional, FRG policy was not integrated here. However, the nature of FRG aims was such that achievement of most of them was not dependent upon the situation in the Middle East. With the exception of the German obligation to Israel, FRG aims were totally donor-oriented, and the recipient was simply a means to the donor's end. FRG was not trying to accomplish anything in Israel, and consequently the fate of Israel was only important in that Israel's existence allowed FRG to pursue its aims. Thus the apparent dysfunction of providing aid to both Arabs and Israelis was not an impediment to achievement of German aims in extending such aid. Otherwise, FRG policies were well integrated with Bonn's domestic policies relating to German industry, concern over NATO's southern flank, and the USA-FRG relationship.

Conclusions

1.16 of the 39 individual purposes, goals, and objectives were shared by the two governments. Six German purposes were not shared. One goal was not shared. All objectives were shared.

2. FRG exerted no effective control over Israeli forces or policies.

3. FRG troops were not deployed or committed to Israel.

4. FRG policies were integrated in terms of FRG, but dysfunctional in terms of Israel.

5. All FRG purposes, goals, and objectives were achieved.

6. The total effect of the relationship was definitely beneficial to both governments.

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APPENDIX R

F. R. G. to NIGERIA

Extent of Aid

West Germany extended aid to Nigeria between 1963 and 1969. Primary effort was toward the Nigerian Air Force, although some equipment was provided for the Army. By the end of 1965, 92 pilots had been trained in West Germany and the small air force in Nigeria possessed two Noratlas transports, 14 Piaggio P-149D trainers, 20 Dornier Do-27 light planes, and miscellaneous support equipment.¹ Arrangements for the purchase of more aircraft were cancelled in 1965 after the coup d'etat, and some aircraft were sold back to the FRG.² Details of post-coup deliveries and arrangements are unknown, but it is assumed that the terms were better than commercial, since Nigeria could have received preferential commercial terms elsewhere. No arms deliveries or arrangements have been announced or observed since the 1969 deliveries. Total value of the program is difficult to determine since many of the arrangements have not yet been divulged. Cost to FRG of advisors and seconded officers was \$1.3 million.³

For additional details, see Appendix Y, Section 3, and Appendix Z, Section 9.

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

Political considerations were predominant in Germany's motives for providing military assistance. Industrial pressures for markets were weak early in the period, and the Bundestag exerted increasing stringent prerequisite restrictions upon export of arms in the latter part of the period. Three main factors influenced FRG policy decisions on military assistance: the German situation in Europe concerning East and West Germany; FRG-USA relations; and domestic criticism and political pressures within West Germany.⁴

For the Federal government a major purpose was to gain and maintain support on the German issue. Thus non-recognition of East Germany became almost a sine qua non for military assistance. Additionally, military training programs were intended to serve as a general education aimed at winning friends "who get to know and understand the German situation."⁵ Bonn was greatly concerned about East Germany. A major purpose was to demonstrate FRG superiority over the German People's Republic, and to deter recognition of East Germany.⁶ It seems apparent, despite German denials, that certain economic purposes were involved. Germany concluded many commercial sales agreements with Nigeria, as well as with other recipients of FRG military assistance.

See Appendix Z, Section 9 for additional German purposes.

German goals in Nigeria were directed at the economy and infrastructure, rather than at the military establishment alone, particularly in the period after the coup. A major goal was internal security of Nigeria⁷ and stability of the domestic situation.⁸ An economic goal was the creation of markets for growing German industries.⁹

German objectives were supportive of German goals. Military assistance was designed to strengthen Nigeria's internal security forces and police-type forces in the period after the coup especially.¹⁰ Before the coup, German military assistance was oriented toward a second goal of improving the communication and transportation infrastructure of Nigeria.¹¹ Improvement of defense forces did not seem to be a German objective.

The broad purposes that formed the basis of Nigerian foreign policy were announced early by the Prime Minister, and frequently re-affirmed during the period. Nigeria would try to maintain friendly terms with all nations. Membership in the Commonwealth and the United Nations were basic positions. Nigeria would adopt a policy of nonalignment, but not neutrality, that would avoid association with any of the power blocs routinely, and would allow freedom of action to meet any occasion. Nigeria would attempt to establish and strengthen common ties with other African nations based upon common economic situations, rather than any attempt at political affiliation. While maintaining a strong attitude of anti-colonialism, Nigeria would maintain a definite orientation, if not commitment, to the West.

Another purpose was to solve African problems within Africa, to respect international boundaries and sovereignty, and to oppose extra-African intervention in African affairs. The cold war was to be kept out of Africa, and Nigeria would enter no military pacts. Nigeria needed capital as much as any other developing nation, and consequently adopted as major purposes the receipt of foreign aid from any source, improvement of Nigeria's international trading position, and increased trade with Europe as a major market. Improvement of intra-African communication and transportation systems was an ancillary purpose to increased development of intra-African ties. A major domestic purpose was building Nigerian unity, politically and socially. Economic development and industrialization were also major purposes, as was achievement of a higher standard of living.¹²

Nigerian goals included, prior to the series of coups in 1966, expanding the armed forces "largely for purposes of national prestige."¹³ In addition to prestige, the armed forces had the traditional tasks of assisting the police in maintaining internal security, and of defending the republic against any external aggression, although no serious external threat could be envisioned in 1963.¹⁴ During the civil war, an imposed goal was "to suppress the current disorders in the Western region and in the Tiv area of the Northern Region,"¹⁵ and subsequently in the Eastern region, and "to maintain law and order in the Federation."¹⁶

Nigerian objectives during the early period included creation of an Air Force, expansion of the Navy, rebuilding and increasing troop barracks, equipping of a new military academy, and construction of a national ordnance factory.¹⁷ During the civil war, the imposed objective was obtaining weapons, ammunition, and military supplies from any source.¹⁸

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

Purposes	FRG	Achieved	NIG	Achieved
1. Support on the German issue	Y	Y	N	
2. Obtaining friends for FRG	Y	Y*	N	
3. Demonstrate FRG superiority ... over PDR	Y	N	N	
4. Deter recognition of East Germany	Y	Y	N	
5. Nigeria on friendly terms with all nations	N		Y	Y***
6. Membership in Commonwealth and United Nations	N		Y	Y
7. Nigerian nonalignment	N		Y	Y
8. Common economic ties with African nations	N		Y	Y
9. Pro-West anti-colonialism	N		Y	Y
10. Nonintervention in Africa	N		Y	N
11. Cold war out of Africa	N		Y	N
12. No military pacts for Nigeria	N		Y	Y
13. Foreign aid from any source	N		Y	Y
14. Improvement of Nigerian trading position	Y	Y	Y	Y

(Continued)

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Purposes	FRG	Achieved	NIG	Achieved
15. Increased trade with Europe	Y	Y	Y	Y
16. Improved intra-African communication	Y(goal)	Y	Y	Y
17. Nigerian unity	N		Y	Y
18. Economic development and industrialization	Y	Y	Y	Y
19. Higher standard of living in Nigeria	N		Y	Y

Additional German purposes are summarized in Appendix 2, Section 9.

Goals

1. Nigerian internal security	Y	Y**	Y	Y**
2. Domestic stability	Y	Y**	Y	Y**
3. Creation of markets for German industry	Y	Y	Y	Y
4. Expand armed forces for prestige	N		Y	Y
5. Defend against external aggression	N		Y	Y
6. Suppress disorder	N		Y	Y
7. Maintain law and order	Y	Y**	Y	Y**

Objectives

1. Strengthen internal security/police force	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. Improve communication and transportation infrastructure	Y	Y	Y	Y
3. Expansion of armed forces	N		Y	Y
4. Rebuild/increase barracks	N		Y	Y

Objectives	FRG	Achieved	NIG	Achieved
5. National ordnance factory	Y****	Y	Y	Y
6. Obtain weapons, ammunition and military supplies	Y	Y	Y	Y

*Before the coup and after the civil war

** The coup and civil war are aberrations in the total evolution. Both represented attempted revolutions that were diverted.

*** During hostilities several nations imposed embargoes, but did not sever relations

**** Not a part of military assistance, but approved by the Bundestag as a German sponsored project.

FRG Control

FRG exerted positive control over military assistance prior to the coup, in that German officers actually commanded the Nigerian Air Force. (British officers commanded Nigerian Army and Navy units at the same time.) After the coup, no control at all was exerted, beyond the prerequisite controls imposed by the Bundestag.

FRG Troop Deployment/ Commitment

FRG did deploy German personnel into Nigeria, although no units or organizations were deployed. In their capacity as seconded officers, these personnel must be considered both deployed and committed to Nigerian defense or any operation of the Nigerian Air Force. The concept of "seconding" implies that seconded officers will participate in combat

operations with the host force. Although neither the Luftwaffe nor the Bundeswehr would have defended Nigeria's borders, a group of "seconded" officers does constitute both deployment and commitment, albeit of a special kind.

Integration of FRG Policies

FRG military assistance to Nigeria was provided in response to FRG policy requirements, and was consonant with the policies of FRG's allies. Institutional integration of military assistance with foreign policy and strategy is a major characteristic of the German decision-making procedure.

Conclusions

1. Fifteen of 38 individual purposes, goals, and objectives were shared by the two governments. Eight of 15 German purposes were not shared. All German goals and objectives were shared.

2. FRG exerted positive control over military assistance prior to the coup, and no control after the coup. (The amount of military assistance after the coup is uncertain.) The apolitical nature of the armed forces prior to the coup may indicate that German control was primarily technical and tactical, rather than political. Subsequent events surrounding the withdrawal of the Germans corroborate this hypothesis.

3. FRG troops were seconded to Nigeria prior to the coup in a special form of commitment/deployment, but were

neither deployed nor committed after the coup.

4. FRG policies were fully integrated.

5. Two German purposes were not achieved. Lack of FRG influence is not considered significant since another FRG purpose was to avoid any suggestion of a German sphere of influence. The second, FRG superiority over PDR, involved one of FRG's primary aims. This nonachievement is indicated by an increase in trade with PDR during the period, and is probably attributable to the absence of positive political controls over Nigerian policy.

6. The total effect of the relationship was definitely beneficial to Nigeria, and largely beneficial to Germany in terms of German aims, although expulsion of the German Air Force personnel and subsequent replacement by advisors and equipment from Warsaw Pact nations can be considered a diplomatic failure. However, this result must be considered a collateral effect, since it was not addressed by either Germany or Nigeria as an aim of the relationship.

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APPENDIX S

P. R. C. to YEMEN

Extent of Aid

Chinese aid was extended to Yemen between 1964 and 1971, and included only a small inventory of equipment. One source claims that the Royalist forces received Chinese weapons in 1964, but cites no source for his information, and is not confirmed by any other reports.¹ Chinese technicians and laborers began to arrive in Yemen immediately after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the imamate and the People's Republic in 1956. By 1958, approximately 1,000 Chinese technicians were in Yemen and were building a modern paved road between Hodeida port and the chief city of San'a in the interior.² By 1968, Chinese military experts were in Yemen, and operating with Yemeni Republican forces. Both Chinese and Soviet technicians and military experts were among the forces besieged at San'a in 1968, and Chinese personnel accompanied the Yemeni relief force to provide construction capabilities, road repair teams, and bridge building parties.³ No evidence exists to indicate that Chinese personnel operated as combat forces.

See Appendix Z, Section 10 for additional details.

Chinese economic aid during the period was at least \$45 million and included the Hodeida-San'a road, a textile factory, several minor projects, and considerable agricultural

training and advice.⁴

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

The primary purpose of Chinese relations with countries of the "Third World" has been since 1949 to minimize and erode the influence of the West in general, and of the United States in particular. Since about 1960, Chinese efforts have been directed at the Soviet Union as well.⁵ China's military assistance has been contributive toward several purposes: development of closer relations with recipient governments; strengthening of support for Chinese positions in international relations, including opposition to U.S. influence; support for admission of China to the United Nations; and non-recognition of the Republic of China.⁶ In conjunction with the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in China's domestic policy, the concept of Revolution from Below was the basis of China's export of ideology. In Yemen, as in Algeria and elsewhere, the revolutionary movement was ultimately to become dependent upon Peking, to be directed by Peking, and to become a political base for the continued spread of Chinese Communism.⁷ Yemen was to be one of a worldwide network of revolutionary bases from which the Chinese Communist Revolution would spread ultimately to overwhelm the cities and towns of the West.⁸

Chinese goals in Yemen included the use of training and infrastructure assistance to develop the Yemeni armed forces along the Chinese model, and to establish some

sort of exploitable relationship between Yemen and the PRC.⁹ Yemen, like Algeria, was to become a physical advanced base for Chinese activity in the Middle East and Africa.¹⁰

Immediate Chinese objectives were the ultimate establishment of the Yemeni Republican government as the legitimate regime in Yemen, and destruction of the Royalist movement. The Yemeni armed forces were thus to be equipped and trained along Maoist guerrilla lines, while Chinese experts and technicians provided limited support operations for specific situations.

The primary purpose of the Yemeni Republican government was to obtain international support to sustain it against the counter-revolution led by the deposed Imam Muhammad al-Badr. Thus efforts of the new regime were to obtain any sort of assistance from any source.¹¹ In many of the Republic's first pronouncements, the new head-of-state, Abdullah al-Sallal announced his intention of eventually establishing some sort of Republic of South Arabia, as well as bringing political, social, and economic reform to Yemen itself.¹²

Sallal's ultimate goals involved assertion of Yemeni independence. Immediately after the revolution in 1962, Egyptian troops literally occupied Yemen and conducted operations against the Royalist counter-revolution. The Yemeni armed forces were literally unable to conduct combat operations unaided. In order to assert Yemeni independence, Sallal needed some sort of viable armed force that could at

least take the field, and eventually replace Nasir's troops of occupation. Thus, obtaining any and all military assistance for the Yemeni armed forces, as opposed to Egyptian forces, became a significant goal. Since most Soviet military assistance came through Cairo, other sources were needed. Sallal was also sincerely concerned about his borders with the British areas to the south and Royal Saudi Arabia to the north.

Yemeni objectives were to obtain equipment and training for an armed force that would capitalize on the Yemeni people's characteristics: tribal organizations, unsophistication, Arab individualism, disinclination to regimen, and poverty. Thus, what was wanted was a source of small arms, guerrilla training, and technical assistance.

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

Purposes	PRC	Achieved	YEMEN	Achieved
1. Minimize influence of West	Y	N	N	
2. Minimize influence of USSR	Y	N	N	
3. Develop PRC-YEMEN relations	Y	Y	Y	Y
4. Support for PRC positions	Y	Y	N	
5. Support of China in Sino-Soviet split	Y	N	N	
6. Third World-Free World split	Y	N	N	
7. Support admission of PRC to UN	Y	Y	N	
8. Spread Maoist revolution	Y	N	N	

Purposes	PRC	Achieved	YEMEN	Achieved
9. Yemeni dependence on China	Y	N	N	
10. Political base for spread of Chinese Communism	Y	N	N	
11. International support for Yemen	N		Y	Y
12. Maintain Republican government	Y	Y	Y	Y
13. Assistance from any source	N		Y	Y
14. Establish Republic of South Arabia	N		Y	N
15. Reform in Yemen	N		Y	Y
Goals				
1. Yemeni armed force on PRC model	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. Exploitable relationship Yemen-China	Y	N	N	
3. Physical base for China	Y	N	N	
4. Viable Yemeni armed forces	Y	Y	Y	Y
5. Withdrawal of Egyptian forces	N		Y	Y
6. Security of Yemeni borders	N		Y	N
Objectives				
1. Establishment of republican government	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. Destruction of Royalists	Y	Y	Y	Y
3. Maoist guerrilla army	Y	Y	Y	Y
4. PRC technical assistance	Y	Y	Y	Y

PRC Control

At no time did the PRC exert any significant degree of control over Yemeni operations or policies. All Yemeni operations were effectively controlled by Egyptian commanders and occupation authorities. Peking was unable even to enforce the terms of payment for the Hodeida-San'a road. No evidence exists of significant indirect ideological influence upon the Yemeni. Unlike Algerian tactics, Yemeni-Egyptian tactics were essentially those of modern organized armies, not those of guerrillas.

PRC Troop Deployment/Commitment

Although Chinese support troops did participate in some combat operations, their presence in Yemen was not in the role of combat troops, and was not seen by either the Yemeni or other parties involved as any commitment by China to the Yemeni. It was not considered troop deployment by the Chinese themselves. An essential precept of Chinese foreign policy at that time was the avoidance of confrontation between the West and the PRC, as well as accepting only minimal risk to the PRC. In Yemen no commitment was either intended or perceived.

Integration of PRC Policies

PRC military and economic support of the Yemeni Republic was fully consistent and integrated with other policies, both domestic and foreign, and was contributory to Mao's master plan of revolution from below. PRC actions in

Yemen were a part of China's general activities in Africa and the Middle East during that period.

Conclusions

1. Two of eleven PRC purposes were shared. Two of six Yemeni purposes were shared. Two of six goals were shared. All four objectives were shared. Nine of the non-shared purposes were opposed by the dissenting government (1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13). The others were acceptable, irrelevant, or unopposed by the dissenting government. Two of the non-shared goals were opposed (2, 3).

2. PRC did not exert any control or influence.

3. PRC troops were neither deployed nor committed.

4. Chinese policies were fully integrated.

5. Of 11 Chinese purposes, 4 were achieved. Of 4 Chinese goals, 2 were achieved. All 4 Chinese objectives were achieved.

6. The total effect of Chinese military assistance to Yemen was at best irrelevant to China, and at worst, harmful. Soviet influence in Yemen, and the Middle East in general, was ultimately greater than that of China. Unlike Algeria, Yemen did not become even a poor base for the spread of revolution. Although China was not excluded from Middle Eastern politics, the PRC has not been a significant influence. The failure of achieving most of the Chinese purposes indicates a relative failure of the effort in Yemen.

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APPENDIX T

PRC TO ALGERIA

Extent of Aid

Chinese military assistance to Algeria was begun in 1959. The last known deliveries were made in 1965. The entire grant aid effort provided approximately 10 - 12 million dollars.¹ After recognition by the PRC in September, 1958, the FLN sent a three-man mission to Peking in December, at which time it was offered arms and training facilities.² A nine-man party, including three senior officers of the Algerian Army of National Liberation (ALN), went to China in March, 1959. Peking made a substantial gift in cash to this delegation.³ Later in 1959, Peking offered, and the Algerians accepted, an interest-free credit in convertible currencies estimated at 10 million dollars to be repaid when Algeria gained independence. This credit was intended for the purchase of military supplies in Europe.⁴ In addition to this credit, the Chinese furnished an unknown quantity of infantry weapons, light artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons to FLN forces in 1959-1960.⁵ The credit was fully drawn and presumably used as planned. In 1960, Peking made an offer of airplanes and Chinese volunteers to fight alongside the Algerians, neither of which the FLN accepted.⁶ The offer was apparently kept open by China, and the FLN exploited it in bargaining for peace talks and independence with France. In 1963

Radio Algiers announced that 75 army officers and 14 pilots had gone to training courses in China. Chinese teams were reported training Algerian army personnel in 1963-1964. In 1964 Ben Bella created a "People's Militia" on the Chinese model and under Chinese tutelage. On February 11, 1965, an agreement was signed whereby China would provide as grant aid an unspecified quantity of arms and ammunition for the new militia.⁷ One delivery was made in June, 1965. No further deliveries were made after Boumedienne's dissolution of the militia in August, 1965.

Chinese economic aid to Algeria consisted of a large delivery of wheat, steel, and medical supplies in 1962, a 50 million dollar credit in 1963, and several small special projects.⁸

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

The primary purpose of Chinese relations with countries of the "Third World" has been since 1949 to minimize and erode the influence of the West in general, and of the United States in particular. Since about 1960, Chinese efforts have been directed against the Soviet Union as well.⁹ After the Quemoy crisis of 1958, and as a part of Mao's efforts to create a favorable external environment for the Great Leap Forward, China adopted a policy of "revolution from below". In conjunction with the Great Leap Forward, China would no longer confront the West directly as had been the policy in the past; instead the confrontation would be done by Chinese proxies in the Third World. Risks to the PRC would thus be

minimized while the Great Leap Forward occurred; Chinese influence would spread as the nascent revolutionary movements of Asia and Africa became dependent upon Peking; and the resources and energies of the West would be dissipated throughout the world.¹⁰

Shortly after the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, China began slowly and deliberately to seek opportunities in Asia and Africa to extend ties and gain influence.¹¹ Beyond China's traditional spheres of influence in Southeast Asia, Africa was given highest priority because it seemed especially vulnerable with its bevy of emerging, weak, independent nations, to the Chinese "classic type of revolution for colonial and semi-colonial countries."¹²

Communist China's humiliating position vis a vis the Republic of China was reinforced by her exclusion from the United Nations and the refusal of most countries of the non-socialist world to recognize her diplomatically. Consequently a major purpose of the new Chinese foreign policy was seeking allies and diplomatic friends or supporters, and at the same time developing bases for the continued spread of Chinese Communism.¹³

In short, the master plan of Mao's foreign policy of the period was that the whole underdeveloped world was to become Chinese Communism's battlefield, rich in resources, filled with people with whom to become allied and amenable to Chinese influence and leadership, anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, and ripe for revolution. In order to continue

the revolution begun in China, the first requirement was the establishment of political bases through new friends. From these isolated political bases, Mao's forces would spread over the world, encircling the cities and towns of the West, and finally overwhelm imperialism, as Mao's forces had overwhelmed those of Chiang Kai-shek a decade earlier.¹⁴

Peking's goals in Algeria were fully supportive of the new policy. As Mao became disenchanted with Nasser's attitudes toward local Communists in Egypt, and with his formation of the United Arab Republic, he sought a more militant "political base" in North Africa. Algeria was the obvious choice. From 1958, the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) was Mao's political base outside China. Algeria was to be the model of anti-imperialist revolution, under the guidance of China, to be emulated throughout Africa and Asia. Upon attainment of independence, Algeria was to become a physical base for Chinese activity throughout Africa and the Middle East.¹⁵

Another goal was to exert Peking's control over the masses in Algeria through Algerian groups such as the army, political parties, and regional/ethnic groupings, and through these groups, over other African peoples. In 1958, the ALN was the only organized anti-imperialist group in Algeria with any sort of cohesion. Peking wanted to bring this group into association with similar Chinese groups (the PLA), and thus to establish an intimate and exploitable relationship

with the centralized leadership in Peking.¹⁶

China's immediate objectives in 1958 involved defeating the French as the first triumph of the Maoist model in Algeria. After independence, the ALN or its successor was to support similar movements and revolutions elsewhere in Africa, and to form the vanguard of Mao's revolution from below. Thus the ALN was to be equipped and trained along the lines of the PLA and the Maoist guerrilla model.

The essential purpose of the FLN was announced in a proclamation made on the first day of the revolution in 1954:

National independence within a North African framework ... to avoid association with any particular group and to provide all Algerian patriots . . . with an opportunity of joining in the fight for freedom, unhampered by any conflict of loyalty ... National independence by restoring the sovereign, democratic Algerian state within the framework of the principles of Islam ... to assemble and organize the efforts of the Algerian people to liquidate the colonial system ... to bring about union in North Africa within the natural Arabo-Muslim framework.¹⁷

After independence in 1962, Ahmed Ben Bella came to power. His solution to Algeria's problems was personal dictatorship. Thus Algeria's purposes became those of Ben Bella.

Ben Bella's chief interest was to maintain himself in power; everything else was secondary and subsidiary--even the formidable task of establishing the Algerian state ...¹⁸

Ben Bella posited some vague form of socialism as a national purpose, and saw Islam as an advanced form of socialism. Marxism was not a part of Ben Bella's socialism, and socialism itself must wait until "Arabization" was achieved.¹⁹

As for Algeria's position in the world scene, its policy would be non-engaged and neutralist while Algeria's multiple vocations would include an African, and Arab, and a Maghrebi orientation.²⁰

FLN goals in 1959-1960 were to "internationalize" the Algerian problem. France remained intransigent. The revolution had been going since 1954 with no external assistance until 1956. The ALN needed significant support to continue the effort. FLN leadership felt that the best hope for the revolution may have been to focus U. N., U. S., or Soviet attention on the conflict by either involving a major power, or creating an East-West "incident" similar to the Berlin issue.²¹

After independence the army soon became essential to maintain Ben Bella's position. His goals became suppression of his opponents, both in Algeria and in neighboring Morocco and Tunisia, to the extent of mild terrorism in Algeria, a war with Morocco, and subversion in Tunisia aimed at overthrowing both Bourguiba and Hassan.²²

The FLN's objective was simply to maintain an army that would defeat the French. It accepted any and all military assistance from anyone who offered. Ben Bella's objective was the maintenance of an army that would keep him in power and suppress his opponents. He also accepted military assistance from several sources.

Purposes , goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

PURPOSES	PRC	ACHIEVED	ALG	ACHIEVED
1. Minimize influence of West	Y	Y	N	
2. Minimize influence of U.S.S.R.	Y	N	N	

PURPOSES	PRC	ACHIEVED	ALG...	ACHIEVED
3. Avoid PRC-USA confrontation	Y	Y	N	
4. Third World-Free World confrontation	Y	Y	N	
5. Spread Maoist revolution	Y	N	N	
6. Make Third World dependent on PRC	Y	N	N	
7. Dissipate energies of West	Y	Y	N	
8. Extend PRC ties and influence	Y	Y	N	
9. Seek allies and friends for PRC	Y	Y	N	
10. Develop base for spread of Chinese Communism	Y	Y	N	
11. Algerian independence	Y	Y	Y	Y
12. Avoid Algerian association with any group	N		Y	N
13. Islamic government for Algeria	N		Y	Y
14. End of colonialism in North Africa	Y	Y	Y	Y
15. Union in North Africa	N		Y	Y
16. Maintain Ben Bella in power	Y	N	Y	N
17. Algerian Socialism	N		Y	Y
18. Arabization	Y	N	Y	N
19. Non-engaged neutral	N		Y	N

GOALS

1. Chinese control over Algerian masses	Y	N	N	

(Continued)

GOALS	PRC	ACHIEVED	ALG	ACHIEVED
2. Political base for China	Y	Y	N	
3. Algerian model of Maoist revolution	Y	N	N	
4. Exploitable relation between Algeria and China	Y	N	N	
5. Internationalize Algerian problem	N		Y	N
6. Support for Algerian revolution	Y	Y	Y	Y
7. Suppress Ben Bella's opponents	N		Y	N

OBJECTIVES

1. Army to defeat Franch	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. Army to support Ben Bella	N		Y	N
3. ALN support of revolutions outside Algeria	Y	Y	Y	Y

PRC Control

At no time did PRC exert physical or constraining control over the FLN or the Algerian government after independence. Nevertheless, in the ALN the effect of Mao's revolutionary model was significant. Much of the tactics and strategy was based upon Chinese experience and upon Mao's military thinking. Until 1963-1964, the paramount influence upon the Algerian army, other than the century-old French heritage, was Chinese. Officers were impressed with Mao's

thoughts and eagerly expressed a desire for more contacts.²³ This indirect influence was probably the most effective form of control that Peking ever had over events in Algeria.

PRC Troop Deployment/Commitment

At no time did PRC troops deploy to Algeria in other than advisory roles or as instructors. However, as mentioned above, Peking evinced an apparent willingness to deploy Chinese troops if the FLN so desired. Although this offer cannot be strictly interpreted as a commitment, the threat of Chinese deployment may have had the same effect as a specific treaty or other commitment. In that sense one must admit a certain degree, albeit small, of commitment by China.

Integration of PRC Policies

PRC military support of the FLN and later the Algerian government were fully integrated into Mao's master plan and were a deliberate element of that plan. In fact, support of Algeria was designed to support China's internal policies, Mao's master plan for revolution from below, and China's policies in the pragmatic world of international relations.

Conclusions

1. Four of thirteen PRC purposes were shared. Three of nine Algerian purposes were shared. One of seven goals was shared. Two of three objectives were shared. Six of the non-shared purposes were opposed by the dissenting government (2, 5, 6, 10, 12, 19). The others were acceptable but irrelevant to the dissenting government. Three of the non-

shared goals were opposed by the dissenting government (1, 2, 4). The single non-shared objective was opposed by the PRC.

2. PRC did not exert control, and only minimal indirect influence, over the FLN, the Ben Bella government, or the Algerian army.

3. Chinese troops were not deployed, although some degree of indirect commitment may have existed.

4. Chinese policies were fully integrated.

5. Of 14 Chinese purposes, 9 were achieved. Of 5 Chinese goals, 2 were achieved. Both Chinese objectives were achieved.

6. The total effect of Chinese military assistance to Algeria was beneficial to China in that overall Chinese policy and world position were considerably stronger in 1965 than in 1958. Chinese activities in Algeria did contribute to that improvement in position, although other activities were probably more significant in the change. Although Maoism did not spread through Africa, China is an active participant in African politics. The fact that most of the Chinese purposes were achieved indicates that Chinese policies were more successful than not. This effect cannot be attributed to military assistance, but military assistance was a significant part of the entire policy.

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APPENDIX U

P. R. C. to INDONESIA

Extent of Aid

Chinese aid to Indonesia began in 1958 and terminated in 1965. Most equipment went to the Indonesian Air Force. The exact periods of delivery are uncertain. In 1964, the PRC began providing weapons to the Indonesian Communist Party, allegedly with the connivance of Sukarno, who sent his Air Force commander to Peking

to clinch a deal under which the Chinese Communists would deliver 100,000 small arms to Indonesia, through unorthodox channels of the President's choosing and without informing the army or regular defense ministry officials.¹

The amount of ammunition and arms provided under this agreement is unknown. Since the coup on September 30, 1965, Chinese aid and military assistance have been suspended, and no deliveries made. (See App. Z, Sec. 11)

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

Chinese purposes in Indonesia were similar to those in other recipient nations, and were within the context of a stable foreign policy during the period. China was seeking to gain status as a first class power, and to break the isolation imposed upon it by events after the Chinese Civil War.² Asia was the area of primary Chinese interest and the one over which Peking aspired ultimately

to dominance, if not hegemony.³ The ideological component of Chinese policy was the desire to support revolutionary movements and to extend Chinese Communism. Consonant with that ideology was the Chinese purpose of reducing Western and Soviet influence. However, these purposes were hindered by the Chinese need to avoid confrontation with either the United States or the Soviet Union.⁴

With the end of the Pantja Sila period in 1959 during the hostilities near Ladakh, Tibet, Indonesia became the main candidate for replacing India as China's Asian partner.⁵ But even as early as 1954, China sought alignment with Indonesia in a Peking-led coalition that would lead to a political order in the Far East that was dominated by China.⁶ A final subordinate, but still significant, purpose of Chinese efforts in Indonesia was the promise of improved access not only to Southeast Asia, but through the traditional links between Madagascar and Indonesia, to Sub-Saharan Africa as well.⁷

In pursuing these foreign policy purposes, Chinese military assistance had several goals: development of closer relations with Indonesian leaders, particularly Sukarno; encouragement of adoption by Indonesia of international positions favorable to Peking through the use of forces organized and equipped along the Chinese guerrilla model; and prevention of the presence on China's southern flank of a large military force that could pose a military threat to Chinese security.⁸

Immediate Chinese objectives were to decrease the political power in Indonesia of the anti-Communist, Soviet dominated elements within the Army; to support Sukarno in his attempts to counterbalance anti-Communist forces in Indonesia; and to strengthen the Indonesian Communist Party which was Chinese-dominated.⁹

Since independence, Indonesian leaders had been increasingly animated by three general purposes.

One is the requirement that Indonesia should be independent of the cold war power blocs - that she should remain "non-aligned" or "neutral". The second is fear for the territorial safety of the young Indonesian nation. Lately, a third element has been noticed - the claim that Indonesia should be recognized as the first power in South-east Asia and the leader, internationally of what are called the new emerging forces.¹⁰

Sukarno wanted to project Indonesia's influence throughout the world to aid in "the struggle to eradicate imperialism from the face of the globe."¹¹ He wanted to assume a global status for Indonesia that was "commensurate with its size, natural resources, and strategic location."¹²

From 1957 until 1962, Indonesia's first priority goal was the elimination of the last Dutch positions in West Irian. Another key goal was suppression of the Army mutinies in Sumatra and Sulawesi.¹³

Indonesia objectives involved the equipping and maintaining of an armed force that would allow her to become an internationally recognized leader of nations, and at the same time fight a guerrilla-type jungle war and win the hearts and minds of the people.

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

PURPOSES	PRC	Achieved	INDON	Achieved
1. Hegemony over Asia by PRC	Y	N	N	
2. Minimize influence of West	Y	N*	Y	N*
3. Minimize influence of USSR	Y	N**	N	
4. Develop PRC-INDON relations	Y	N*	Y	N
5. Support for PRC positions	Y	N*	N	
6. Support of China in Sino-Sov split	Y	N	N	
7. Spread Maoist revolution	Y	N	N	
8. Avoid confrontation w/USA or USSR	Y	Y	N	
9. Indonesia as China's Asian partner	Y	N*	Y	N*
10. Improved access to Africa and SEA	Y	N	N	
11. Indonesian independence of cold-war blocs	N		Y	N
12. Territorial integrity of Indonesia	N		Y	Y
13. Indonesian international leadership	N		Y	N
14. Indonesian world status	Y	N	Y	N
GOALS				
1. Close PRC relations with Indonesian leaders	Y	N*	Y	N*
2. Use of Indonesian forces in PRC interests	Y	N*	N	

GOALS (continued)	PRC	Achieved	INDON	Achieved
3. Prevent military threat to PRC flank	Y	N	N	
4. Elimination of Dutch in West Irian	N		Y	Y
5. Suppression of mutinies	N		Y	Y

OBJECTIVES

1. Decrease power of anti-communist Army elements	Y	N	Y	N
2. Support Sukarno in anti-communist balance	Y	N	Y	N
3. Strengthen Indonesian Communist Party	Y	N*	N	
4. Armed Force to exert international leadership	N		Y	Y***
5. Guerrilla-type army	N		Y	Y

*Y before 1965. N after Sukarno's fall

**Y after 1965 as result of Sukarno's fall

***Provided by Soviet military assistance, not by PRC

PRC Control

PRC did not exert any overt control over the Indonesian Armed Forces or Indonesian policies, except through the Indonesian Communist Party. The party was, in effect, an extension of the PRC in Indonesia since it was totally dominated by Peiping. It was also one of the most important political elements in Indonesian politics before 1965. Undoubtedly, the PRC exerted some control over Indonesian policies and the armed forces through the Party, but the extent of that control, as well as its methods, is unknown.

PRC Troop Deployment/Commitment

PRC troops were never deployed or even committed to the defense of Indonesia or to any of the conflicts in which Indonesian armed forces found themselves. However, on May 15, 1961, Radio Peiping broadcast a Chinese offer to send thousands of volunteers to help Indonesia suppress the army rebellions in Sumatra. An official statement said that China was prepared to send further assistance as requested by the Indonesian government. Results of meetings between Indonesian officials and Chinese officials concerning foreign intervention were never made public. In any case, the Sukarno government did not accept the offer.¹⁴

Integration of PRC policies

As were Chinese efforts elsewhere in the world, the policies in Indonesia were designed in response to major foreign policy decisions, and were consonant with domestic activities. A significant inconsistency appears when one realizes that the PRC was simultaneously supporting an existing government, Sukarno, and a revolutionary movement, the Indonesian Communist Party, and the armed forces, specifically the air force and navy, each one of whom was vying with the other two for power. While support for the Party was part of the revolution-from-below concept, support for Sukarno, despite his periodic support for the party was antithetical to that concept which at that time was the basis of Chinese expansive foreign policy. Thus, because of the peculiar political circumstances in Indonesia,

China could not adopt a policy that was consistent with itself and with the regnant concept of Chinese foreign policy outside Indonesia.

Conclusions

1. Three of ten PRC purposes were shared. Three of six Indonesian purposes were shared. One of five goals was shared. Two of five objectives were shared. Five non-shared purposes were opposed by the dissenting government (1, 3, 6, 11, 13). None of the non-shared goals were opposed. Two of the non-shared objectives were opposed (3,4).

2. PRC exerted no overt control or influence, although some indirect influence or control must be assumed.

3. PRC troops were neither deployed nor committed.

4. Chinese policies were inconsistent both in Indonesia and with other policies elsewhere in the world, although no evidence exist to show conflict with non-Indonesian policies.

5. Of ten Chinese purposes, one was achieved (four more were achieved prior to 1965 only). Of three Chinese goals, none were achieved (two were achieved prior to 1965 only). Of three Chinese objectives, none were achieved (one was achieved prior to 1965 only).

6. The total effect of Chinese military assistance to Indonesia was not beneficial to China. Although some

collateral effects seemed to be favorable prior to 1965, the final result was "the obliteration of the Indonesian Communist Party, and the worst defeat the Chinese Communists had experienced since Chiang Kai-shek put them down [sic] in 1927."¹⁵

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APPENDIX V

CANADA TO TANZANIA

Extent of Aid

In 1964, at the request of President Nyerere of Tanzania, Canada initiated a program of Army training in Tanzania. Over a period of five years, Canadian advisors advised the Tanzanian government on planning and organization in the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces. Thirty Canadian officers arrived in 1965 to establish a military academy, and twelve Tanzanian cadets were sent to Canada.¹ After interruption of the West German aid program, in 1965, Canada agreed to the "establishment of an air transport wing, [which] by providing increased mobility, will complement the advisory and training assistance Canada is already providing to the Tanzanian army."² Canada helped with the training of approximately 400 air crew, ground crew, and support personnel, of whom about half were trained in Canada. In addition, Canada delivered five Caribou, six Beaver, and eight Otter transports.³ An unknown number of small arms was provided in 1964; however, this delivery was made prior to initiation of the Mutual Assistance Program. Details of the transaction are unknown. In 1969-1970, the program terminated and Canadian advisors were replaced by Chinese advisors. The termination was

the climax of growing differences between the Canadians and the Tanzanian government. The main reason for the termination was apparently the refusal of Canada to provide, or even agree to, the procurement of jet fighter aircraft for the Tanzanian Air Force.⁴ (For amounts of aid see Appendix Z, Section 12.)

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

The most obvious characteristic of Canadian foreign policy is its continuing attempt to create conditions of world relationships in which Canada can have a significant influence on world events within the Western bloc and in the larger international community.⁵ The second significant aspect of Ottawa's purposes is a genuine ideological commitment to concerted, collective action as the best assurance of international peace and stability. This commitment is also evident in Canada's concept of collective, governmental action to provide basic social services and to stimulate economic development, which is a major purpose both in Canada's domestic policies and in Canadian foreign aid and military assistance policies.⁶ Canada thus had as a purpose an attempt to play a significant part in the "race to improve the quality of life on this planet."⁷ Canada hoped to "help the less-developed countries of the world achieve a degree of economic development which accords with the needs and aspirations of their peoples."⁸ and a higher standard of material well-being which would lead to

a sense of responsibility and self-reliance.⁹ Canada disclaimed any immediate political aims, attempts to gain political advantages, or to buy friends,¹⁰ but hoped that somehow economic development would lead to the evolution of political forms and governments consonant with Western political thought.¹¹ Canada adopted as a purpose the improvement of relations between the less developed countries and the more developed nations of the world,¹² and the assumption of a position of leadership among middle powers, new states, and underdeveloped areas.¹³

Canadian goals included de-emphasis by Tanzania of military preparations and emphasis on economic planning, co-operation, and technical assistance.¹⁴ Another goal of Canadian military assistance was "the assurance of stability, which depends, in part, on adequately trained and equipped security forces, and is a prerequisite to sound economic and social development."¹⁵

Canadian objectives were, initially with the Army training program, the training of a security force and its integration into economic and social development through adequate organization, and the organization, training, and equipment of a non-combat air force that was adaptable to developmental missions rather than to specifically combat missions.

Tanzania's primary purpose was national development,¹⁶ involving creation of a viable nation, and establishment of a reasonable standard of living. Like Kenya and Uganda,

Tanzania suffered from scarcity of capital and local resources, as well as an absence of skilled native labor. To achieve this purpose, Tanzania was attempting to expand its economy through industrialization and improved agricultural methods.¹⁷

Another political purpose was Tanzania's aim "to develop into a true Socialist State . . . in which all people are workers and in which neither Capitalism nor Feudalism exist."¹⁸ However, Tanzania's Socialism was not the traditional socialism on the road to Communism. Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's president, explained that:

. . . it should be founded on the tribal principles of traditional African society which he called Ujamaa--familyhood or African socialism. This differed from traditional socialism in that it did not have its roots in the class struggle but grew out of the ideal of sharing everything that was available.¹⁹

Nyerere was one with other sub-Saharan African leaders in his foreign policy of nonalignment from the major power blocs. In 1964, he commented that Tanzanian foreign policy was unchanged by the appearance of Chinese, Russian, and Canadian military missions, that his policy was still nonalignment.

Admitting that many states would not approve the decision to accept the Chinese mission, Nyerere concluded that he did not like Tanzania to be subjected to the need to balance one set of facts against another in order to obtain the necessary aid for development of the state.²⁰

A major purpose of Nyerere throughout the period was to obtain as much foreign aid as possible from any source. With this in mind, he deliberately allowed the

West German military mission to be withdrawn and subsequently all West German aid terminated when he invited the East Germans to provide their aid, thus receiving also the various forms of assistance from the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, also.

Myerere's goals for military assistance were intimately involved with his purposes of national development and nonalignment. He desired to minimize military expenditure. "We'd rather spend our money on bread."²¹ Secondly he wished to minimize the risks to himself and his government in possessing an army. The army mutiny of January, 1964, demonstrated the dangers of an army to an emergent government. Said Dr. Nyerere:

There is always some element of risk about having an army at all in a developing country, but since you can't do without an army, in these times, the task is to ensure that the officers and men are integrated into the government and party, so that they become no more of a risk than, say the civil service.²²

The politicization of the army would thus ensure its loyalty, and simultaneously undermine its political strength, as would the expansion of the police corps.

Thirdly, Tanzania sought to avoid dependence upon any one source for training and equipment, and particularly to avoid dependence upon the superpowers. This diversity of training and equipment was designed to avoid the emergence of an officer corps that was unified by parallel training under the aegis of any superpower, and also to avoid any reliance that might compromise Tanzania's nonalignment policy.²³

Tanzania's specific objectives for military assistance involved the perceived threat to Tanzania and Nyerere's concepts of employment of his army. Nyerere felt the need for a military force as a symbol of sovereignty. He also felt some vague threat arising from the unstable conditions surrounding him in Mozambique, South Africa, Rhodesia, the Congo, etc., as well as the relatively frequent violations of Tanzania's frontiers by South African and Portuguese aircraft. His objectives, then, were to build a force that could meet these perceived threats, remain firmly within his control, and cost as little as possible.

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

PURPOSES	CAN	Achieved	TAN	Achieved
1. Canadian influence on world events	Y	N	N	
2. Collective action	Y	N	N	
3. Provide basic social services	Y	N	N	
4. Economic development	Y	Y	Y	Y
5. Canadian role in development	Y	minor	N	
6. Higher standard of material well-being	Y	Y	Y	Y
7. Responsibility and self-reliance	Y	N	N	
8. Western political forms and ideals	Y	N	N	

(Continued)

PURPOSES	CAN	Achieved	TAN	Achieved
9. Improved relations between LDC and developing nations	Y	Y	Y	Y
10. Canadian leadership of middle and new states	Y	N	N	
11. National development	Y	Y	Y	Y
12. African socialism	N		Y	Y
13. Nonalignment	N		Y	Y
14. Maximize foreign aid (all sources)	N		Y	Y
GOALS				
1. De-emphasis of military preparations and emphasis on economic planning, cooperation and technical assistance	Y	N	N	
2. Stability	Y	Y	Y	Y
3. Minimize military expenditure	N		Y	Y
4. Politicization of army	N		Y	Y
5. Diversity in army	N		Y	Y
OBJECTIVES				
1. Training of security force	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. Non-combat air force	Y	Y*	N	
3. Army as symbol of sovereignty	N		Y	Y
4. Border protection/counter guerrilla	Y	Y	Y	Y

(Continued)

PURPOSES	CAN Achieved	TAN	Achieved
5. Air defense	N	Y	Y**

*Prior to 1969

**Consequent to third country assistance

Canadian Control

Canadian advisors in Tanzania were limited to a technical/tactical role and never achieved any degree of influence upon political decisions. Since many of Canada's aims were political, the absence of political influence inhibited achievement of those aims. While other countries, including the PRC, seemed quite ready to engage in general long-range efforts, Canada dealt only in specific "high leverage" projects to enforce "centres of strength in the multilateral programs."²⁴ While this concept of continuity, integration, and coordination of efforts on priority objectives is probably the most efficient and effective method of achieving development, it requires participation of all donors and the recipient in a conscious multilateral program that did not exist in Tanzania. Donor competition between PRC, USSR, and Canada in Tanzania removed any possibility of effective donor control, particularly after Nyerere demonstrated his willingness to terminate military assistance from a country (West Germany) that annoyed him. Also, the Canadian style of avoiding political advantage and assuming that the proper

political decisions would automatically result from economic development consequent to Canadian aid was, in effect, an abdication of any control that could have been exerted in the situation.

Canadian Troop Deployment/Commitment

At no time were Canadian troops committed to or deployed in Tanzania. No defense agreements were made, and neither Ottawa, Dar es Salaam nor anyone else gave a thought to the possibility of Canadians being involved in operations in East Africa.

Integration of Canadian policies

Canadian policies in Tanzania seem mutually supporting with the possible exception of diplomacy that should have been using the "high leverage" of Canadian aid to influence Nyerere in the direction of Canadian aims. Canadian efforts in Tanzania were quite irrelevant to military strategy which, by that time, was completely oriented toward NATO, NORAD, and UN peacekeeping operations. Canada had no strategic interests in East Africa. The program was initiated, and expanded, at Tanzania's request, and was encouraged by Canada's allies, FRG, UK, US, who were relatively unpopular in Dar es Salaam. Canada was, in effect, a surrogate for those allies with more active foreign policies who were anxious to prevent dependence of Tanzania on socialist/communist countries, but were unable for a variety of reasons to react to PRC/USSR initiatives.²⁵

Although the inconsistency seemed to have little effect upon the Tanzanian effort, the total absence of any collective, concerted, intergovernmental efforts in Tanzania was in direct contradiction to Canada's ideological commitment to world cooperation. Finally, it must be noted that Canadian efforts in Tanzania did promote the export of transport aircraft although the total number of planes involved was not great.

Conclusions

1. Seven of 24 aims were shared by the two governments. Four purposes, one goal, and two objectives were shared.

2. Canada did not exert control, or even significant influence over Tanzania, or the Tanzanian armed force.

3. Canadian troops were neither deployed nor committed.

4. Canadian policies were partially integrated in Tanzania itself, but seemed inconsistent with the general Canadian foreign policy of the period.

5. Of eleven Canadian purposes, four were probably advanced, if not achieved (4, 6, 9, 11), and one was achieved although the achievement was relatively insignificant (5). Of two Canadian goals, one was achieved. All Canadian objectives were achieved.

6. The total effect of Canadian military assistance to Tanzania was neither beneficial nor harmful to Canada, and quite beneficial to Tanzania. Western influence

diminished in Tanzania, although Canada did not suffer expulsion (as did the FRG) nor political attack (as did the USA).

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APPENDIX W

ITALY TO TURKEY

Extent of Aid

Italy agreed to provide aid to Turkey in 1964 and made no deliveries after 1971. The amount of aid was not large. Italy delivered 33 helicopters in 1966, some of which may have been attributed to the 1964 NATO agreement. Seven more were delivered in 1967. Fifty were delivered in 1968-1969.¹ It is probable that most of the deliveries in 1968, 1969, and 1970, were pursuant to the NATO agreement, and possible that some of the earlier deliveries were also grant aid. No deliveries of trucks have been reported. Italy has provided no training or advisors to Turkey. (For additional details, see Appendix Z, Section 13.)

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

Italian foreign policy was oriented toward the domestic Italian situation. The primary purpose of Italian foreign policy during the period was thus "to protect the domestic social structure from internal dangers."² Italy was the major threat not in external aggression, but from internal subversion and intrinsic corrosion. Thus, membership in NATO, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the Common Market, as well as

alignment with the Western powers, all became purposes whose value lay in the defense that they might give to a private market economy, social and political institutions, and the highly stratified social order of Italy in the mid-sixties.³

A secondary purpose of Italy was the restoration of Italy's position in the world or making Italy's presenza felt on the international scene.⁴ Another purpose was opening economic and trade frontiers to facilitate the overseas expansion of Italian industry. Modernization and expansion of industry were necessary for Italy's domestic reconstruction and development, even though that industry was not supported by an adequate financial market and could not meet international competition.⁵ Rising costs of defense production and the rather low procurement level of the Italian armed forces, forced industry to find new markets outside Italy. The Italian aircraft industry was expanding rapidly during the period and needed overseas markets and outlets.⁶

Another purpose of Italy was to establish Italy as an independent middle power, and to improve relations and ties with Arab and Muslim countries.⁷ (See Appendix Z, Section 13 for additional Italian purposes.)

Italian goals included the promotion of arms exports, particularly aircraft,⁸ and "extension of the Italian sphere of freedom and prosperity in the Mediterranean sector."⁹ Italy had no goals in Turkey specifically, since

Turkey did not enter Italian strategy and had little relevance to what was considered the major threat to Italy: internal subversion.

Italy had no specific objectives in Turkey since the Turkish Armed Forces played no role in Italian strategy, other than the fact that Italy and Turkey were allied in NATO.

Turkey's fundamental purpose was to preserve her national territory, national wealth, and sovereign independence. Turkey sought economic development, economic-industrial and scientific-intellectual strength, and internal power behind a shield of military impregnability. The Turks, in addition, wished to be recognized as Europeans and assimilated into the European civilization.¹⁰ They wanted to belong to the political and military organizations of the West.¹¹ Turkey espoused an independent foreign policy in order to pursue another purpose of improving relations with the Soviets and Soviet allies, as well as with the nations of the Third World. By 1960, the Turkish leaders had determined to extricate Turkey from the isolation in which it had found itself as well as from what was almost blind obedience to United States policies.¹² A significant purpose thus was to de-emphasize reliance upon the United States while not jeopardizing Turkish security or provoking Moscow.¹³

Turkey sought to establish friendly relations with all nations in the Middle East, regardless of superpower

support. Ankara announced a policy of non-intervention in Arab-Israeli conflicts or Middle East disputes, and attempted to establish a Turkish influence in the area through mediation of arguments, trade and contributions to development of the area while maintaining close cultural contacts with the Moslem nations.¹⁴

Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil described Turkish foreign policy in 1969:

Turkish foreign policy has three major principles: to serve world peace; to secure national security; to assist her economic development efforts with foreign aid.¹⁵

The third principle leads to the purposes of procurement of maximum foreign aid and an attempt to raise Turkey to the economic and social level of contemporary civilization.¹⁶

Turkey, like all Middle East governments, aspired to develop an air force.¹⁷ A second goal was modernization of the entire armed forces,¹⁸ and to support and maintain a military force large enough to meet Turkey's manifold commitments to NATO.¹⁹

Turkey's objective was simply to equip the Turkish armed forces as a modern force that could meet Turkey's NATO commitments and defend Turkey against external Soviet aggression.

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

PURPOSES	IT	Achieved	TUR	Achieved
1. Protect Italian domestic social structure	Y	Y	N	
2. Italian membership in NATO, ECSC and ECM	Y	Y	N	
3. Italian <u>presenza</u>	Y	Y	N	
4. Economic/trade frontiers for Italian industry	Y	Y	Y*	Y
5. Modernization/expansion of Italian industry	Y	Y	Y*	Y
6. Italian overseas markets and trade	Y	Y	Y*	Y
7. Italy as independent middle power	Y	Y	N	
8. Improved Italian relations with Arab/Muslims	Y	Y	Y*	Y
9. Preserve Turkish territory, wealth, and independence	N		Y	Y
10. Turkish economic development, internal power and military impregnability	N		Y	Y**
11. Westernization/Europeanization of Turkey	N		Y	Y
12. Independent Turkish foreign policy	N		Y	Y
13. Improved Turkish relations with Soviets and Third World	N		Y	Y
14. Extricate Turkey from isolation	N		Y	Y
15. De-emphasize reliance on U. S.	N		Y	Y
16. Foreign relations between Turkey and all Middle East nations	N		Y	Y

(Continued)

PURPOSES	IT	Achieved	TUR	Achieved
17. Turkish influence in Middle East	N		Y	Y
18. Maximum foreign aid for Turkey	N		Y	Y
19. Close Turkey contacts with Muslim nations	N		Y	Y
(Additional Italian purposes are summarized in Appendix Z, Section 13.)				

GOALS

1. Promotion of Italian arms exports	Y	Y	N	
2. Extension of Italian sphere of influence	Y	N	N	
3. Development of Turkish Air Force	N		Y	Y
4. Modernization of Turkish armed forces	N		Y	Y
5. Support military force adequate for NATO	Y***	Y	Y	Y

OBJECTIVES

1. Equip Turkish armed forces	N		Y	Y

*Both Italy and Turkey are considered as Mediterranean states. The wording does not imply a special relationship between Italy and Turkey that is different from similar purposes with other Mediterranean nations.

**These concepts are ideals and are never completely achieved. The Y indicates significant progress toward achieving these

purposes.

***Imputed

Italian Control

Italy exerted no control whatsoever over military assistance to Turkey. The Italian procedure for export licences was a mere formality that made no attempt to exert control.

Italian Troop Deployment/Commitment

Italian troops were never deployed to or in support of Turkey during the period. Mutual adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty was actual commitment of Italian troops to the defense of Turkey. Although NATO operational plans may not have envisioned deployment of Italian troops to Turkey, the alliance did constitute real commitment.

Integration of Italian Policies

Italian policies were integrated since they were all directed at developing Italian industry, supporting Italian domestic policies, and some general defense within NATO. Italian foreign policy during the period was essentially expansive and commercially oriented. Turkish military assistance and the supporting commercial aspects were definitely supportive of that policy. Although Italian national military strategy did not include Turkey, the overall NATO strategy integrated both Italy and Turkey and was accepted by both Italy and Turkey. Thus, Turkey was indirectly integrated into Italian strategy.

Conclusions

1. Seven of 26 individual purposes, goals, and objectives were shared. Four of nine Italian purposes were shared. Three of five Italian goals were shared. Italy had no objectives.

2. Italy exerted no control over military assistance to Turkey.

3. Italian troops were committed through NATO to the defense of Turkey.

4. Italian policies were integrated.

5. All Italian purposes were achieved. Two of three Italian goals were achieved.

6. The total effect of the relationship on Italy was beneficial, since it provided a significant market for the Italian helicopter industry. The total effect of the relationship on Turkey was beneficial in that it provided the majority of the helicopters in the Turkish Air Force, at minimal cost to Turkey.

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APPENDIX X

CANADA to TURKEY

Extent of Aid

Canada extended aid to Turkey between 1954 and 1970. The variety of equipment was small and the total amount of aid was moderate. See Appendix Z, Section 14 for details.

Donor and Recipient Purposes, Goals, and Objectives

The most obvious characteristic of Canadian foreign policy is its continuing attempt to create conditions of world relationships in which Canada can have a significant influence on world events within the Western bloc and in the larger international community.¹ The second significant aspect of Ottawa's purposes is a genuine ideological commitment to concerted, collective action as the best assurance of international peace and stability. This commitment was also evident in Canada's concept of collective, governmental action to provide basic social services and to stimulate economic development. This concept was a basic purpose both in Canada's domestic policies and in Canadian foreign aid and military assistance policies.² Canada thus had as a purpose an attempt to play a significant role in the "race to improve the quality of life on this planet."³ Canada hoped to "help the less developed countries of the world

achieve a degree of economic development which accords with the needs and aspirations of their peoples,"⁴ and a higher standard of material well-being which would lead to a sense of responsibility and self-reliance.⁵ Canada disclaimed any immediate political aims, attempts to gain political advantages, or to buy friends,⁶ but hoped that somehow, economic development would lead to the evolution of political forms and governments consonant with Western political thought.⁷ Canada adopted as a purpose the improvement of relations between the less developed countries and the more developed nations of the world.⁸ Canadian leaders also aspired to a position of leadership among middle powers, new states and underdeveloped areas.⁹

Canadian goals included de-emphasis by Turkey and NATO of military preparations, and emphasis on economic planning, co-operation, and technical assistance.¹⁰ Another goal of Canadian military assistance was "the assurance of stability, which depends, in part, on adequately trained and equipped security forces, and is a prerequisite to sound economic and social development."¹¹

Canadian objectives were equipping a Turkish military force capable of maintaining internal security and of meeting Turkish commitments to NATO; and sustaining this force in order that the quite large force not be a hindrance to Turkish economic development.

Turkey's fundamental purpose was to preserve her national territory, national wealth, and sovereign independence.

Turkey sought economic development, economic-industrial and scientific-intellectual strength, and internal power behind a shield of military impregnability. The Turks, in addition, wished to be recognized as Europeans and to be assimilated into the European civilization.¹² They wanted to belong to the political and military organizations of the West.¹³ Prior to Cyprus, Turkish policy was totally obedient to U.S. policies. After the Cyprus incident, while not abandoning NATO, CENTO, or any other of the connections with the West, Turkey espoused an independent policy in order to pursue another purpose of improving relations with the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as with the nations of the Third World. Turkish leaders determined to extricate Turkey from the isolation in which it found itself, as well as from blind obedience to United States policy.¹⁴ A significant purpose in the latter portion of the period was to de-emphasize reliance upon the United States while not jeopardizing Turkish security or provoking Moscow.¹⁵

Turkey sought to establish friendly relations with all nations in the Middle East, regardless of super-power support or cold-war position. Ankara announced a policy of non-intervention in Arab-Israeli conflicts or Middle-East disputes, and attempted to establish a Turkish influence in the area while maintaining close cultural contacts with the Moslem nations.¹⁶

Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil described Turkish foreign policy in 1969:

Turkish foreign policy has three major principles: to serve world peace; to secure national security; to assist her economic development efforts with foreign aid.¹⁷

The third principle leads to the purposes of procurement of maximum foreign aid and an attempt to raise Turkey to the economic and social levels of contemporary civilization.¹⁸

Turkey, like all Middle East nations, aspired to develop an air force.¹⁹ A second goal was modernization of the entire armed forces,²⁰ and to support and maintain a military force large enough to meet Turkey's manifold commitments to NATO.²¹

Turkey's objective was simply to equip the Turkish armed forces as a modern force that could meet Turkey's NATO commitments and defend Turkey against external Soviet aggression.

Purposes, goals, and objectives of the two governments may be summarized:

Purposes	CAN	Achieved	TUR	Achieved
1. Canadian influence on world events	Y	N	N	
2. Collective action	Y	N	N	
3. Provide basic social services	Y	Y	Y	Y
4. Economic development	Y	Y	Y	Y
5. Canadian role in development	Y	minor	N	
6. Higher standard of material well-being	Y	Y	Y	Y
7. Responsibility and self-reliance	Y	Y	Y	Y
8. Western political forms and ideas	Y	Y	Y	Y

Purposes	CAN	Achieved	TUR	Achieved
9. Improved relations between less developed countries and developed nations	Y	Y	Y	Y
10. Canadian leadership of middle and new states	Y	N	N	
11. Preserve Turkish territory, wealth, and independence	N		Y	Y
12. Westernization and Europeanization of Turkey	N		Y	Y
13. Independent Turkish foreign policy	N		Y	Y
14. Improved relations between Turkey and Soviets, Turkey and Third World	Y	Y	Y	Y
15. Extricate Turkey from isolation	N		Y	Y
16. De-emphasize reliance on U.S.	N		Y	Y
17. Friendly relations between Turkey and all Middle East	N		Y	Y
18. Turkish influence in Middle East	N		Y	Y
19. Maximum foreign aid for Turkey	N		Y	Y
20. Close Turkish relations with Muslim nations	N		Y	Y
Goals				
1. De-emphasis of military preparations and emphasis on economic planning and technical assistance	Y	N	N	
2. Assurance of stability	Y	N	Y	N
3. Development of Air Force	N		Y	Y
4. Modernization of Armed Forces	Y	Y	Y	Y

Goals	CAN	Achieved	TUR	Achieved
5. Support military force adequate for NATO	Y	Y	Y	Y
Objectives				
1. Equip Turkish military forces	Y	Y	Y	Y
2. Sustain Turkish military forces	Y	Y	Y	Y

Canadian Control

No effective control was exerted by Canada over Turkish military assistance. No advisors were stationed in Turkey, and no Turks were trained in Canada. Although assistance was suspended in 1964, the suspension was temporary and had little effect upon Turkish policies.

Canadian Troop Deployment/Commitment

Canadian troops were not deployed to Turkey, nor were they deployed in support of Turkish operations. Mutual adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty was actual commitment of Canadian troops to the defense of Turkey in that Canadian troops were deployed in Europe in defense of the alliance. Although NATO operational plans may not have envisioned deployment of Canadian troops in Turkey, the alliance was perceived as a commitment to the defense of all of its members, including Turkey, by all of its members, including Canada.

Integration of Canadian Policies

Canadian support of Turkey was fully consistent with

broad Canadian foreign policy and strategy which were directed toward moderate expansion of Canadian roles, collective action, economic development, and NATO defense. Possible weak areas in policy integrity were Canada's lack of attempts to achieve or exert leadership in Turkey. This lack may have been in deference to U.S. hegemony or to NATO primacy of interest, but was, perhaps, inconsistent with Canada's announced desire to achieve a position of leadership of middle powers and developing nations. Canada attempted unsuccessfully to involve NATO in this and other similar attempts at economic development and re-orientation of efforts from military to developmental emphases. Failure to achieve collective action in this area does not imply non-integrity of Canadian policies. Although Turkey had no place in Canadian defense strategy, the overall NATO strategy integrated both nations into a single strategic concept acceptable to both.

Conclusions

1. Eleven of 27 individual purposes, goals, and objectives were shared by the two governments. Seven of 11 Canadian purposes were shared. Three of 4 Canadian goals were shared, and both Canadian goals were shared.

2. Canada exerted no effective control over military assistance to Turkey.

3. Canadian troops were indirectly committed to Turkish defense through NATO.

4. Eight of 11 Canadian purposes were achieved.

Two of 4 goals were achieved, and both objectives were achieved.

5. Canadian policies were integrated, with some possible minor exceptions.

6. The total effect of the relationship was beneficial to both governments, although Turkey received considerably more benefits than did Canada.

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APPENDIX X

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³R. H. Wagenberg (ed.), Canada and the United States in the World of the Seventies (Windsor, Ontario: University of Windsor Press, 1970), p. 85.

⁴Martin, Op. Cit., p. 87.

⁵Ibid., p. 92.

⁶Wagenberg, Op. Cit., p. 89.

⁷Martin, Op. Cit., pp. 87-88.

⁸Wagenberg, Op. Cit., p. 88.

⁹Melvin Conant, The Long Polar Watch (New York: Harper and Bros., 1962), p. 178.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 69-70; see also Ries, Op. Cit., p. 5.

¹¹Canada, House of Commons, Debates, House of Commons, 1965 (Ottawa: House of Commons, 1966), pp. 11-12.

¹²Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 69, 70, 358, and 376.

¹³Ibid., pp. 355-356.

¹⁴Ferenc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), pp. 95, and 131.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 131-132.

¹⁶Vali, Bridge, p. 311.

¹⁷Foreign Minister Caglayangil, Speech before the Mixed Budget Committee of Parliament on January 6, 1969, Cumhuriyet [Ankara], January 7, 1969.

¹⁸Vali, Bridge, pp. 327, 352, and 357.

¹⁹J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 102.

²⁰Ibid., p. 104.

²¹Vali, Turkish Straits, p. 123.

APPENDIX Y

CONFIDENTIAL EXTRACTS

This appendix is published as a Confidential document separate from the main paper, and is filed at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Library.

APPENDIX Z

SECRET EXTRACTS

This appendix is published as a Secret document separate from the main paper, and is filed at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Library.

APPENDIX AA

The first column of the accompanying table lists the recipients of military assistance. The Coincidence column contains four entries: the first indicates the ratio of donor purposes shared to total donor purposes; the second is the ratio of shared donor goals to total donor goals; the third is the same ratio for objectives; and the fourth entry indicates the level of coincidence relative to the other eighteen (18) episodes. (H indicates the upper third, M, the middle third, and L, the lower third.) Determination of coincidence level is based upon the ratio of total donor aims shared to total donor aims.

The second column indicates the presence (Y for Yes) or absence (N for No) of donor control over the relationship and military assistance resources sufficient to ensure use of recipient military forces in pursuit of donor aims.

The third and fourth columns indicate the presence (Y) or absence (N) of deployment or commitment of donor troops and resources to the defense of the recipient nation or as necessary to pursue donor interests.

The fifth column indicates the presence or absence of integrity of donor policies.

The sixth column with four entries indicates the ratios of donor purposes, goals, and objectives achieved to

total donor purposes, goals, and objectives. The letter H, M, or L indicates the level of success as High third, Middle third, or Lower third of all episodes, based upon the ratio of total donor aims achieved to total donor aims.

	COINCIDENCE			CONTROL	DEPLOY	COMMIT	INTEGRATE	SUCCESS				
	P	G	O					P G O				
Lebanon	$\frac{12}{20}$	$\frac{4}{5}$	$\frac{2}{2}$	M	N	N	Y	N	$\frac{16}{20}$	$\frac{5}{5}$	$\frac{2}{2}$	M
Italy	$\frac{6}{6}$	$\frac{8}{8}$	$\frac{4}{4}$	H	Y	Y	Y	Y	$\frac{6}{6}$	$\frac{8}{8}$	$\frac{4}{4}$	H
Nigeria	$\frac{7}{15}$	$\frac{4}{4}$	$\frac{4}{4}$	M	Y	Y	Y	Y	$\frac{13}{15}$	$\frac{4}{4}$	$\frac{4}{4}$	H
Yugoslav	$\frac{3}{5}$	$\frac{2}{7}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	L	N	N	Y	N	$\frac{4}{5}$	$\frac{2}{7}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	L
Cambodia	$\frac{2}{3}$	$\frac{1}{1}$	$\frac{1}{1}$	H	N	N	N	N	$\frac{2}{3}$	$\frac{1}{1}$	$\frac{1}{1}$	M
Guinea	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{0}{2}$	$\frac{0}{2}$	L	N	N	N	Y	$\frac{2}{4}$	$\frac{0}{2}$	$\frac{0}{2}$	L
Algeria	$\frac{4}{14}$	$\frac{1}{5}$	$\frac{2}{2}$	L	N	N	Y	Y	$\frac{9}{14}$	$\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{2}{2}$	L
Japan	$\frac{6}{7}$	$\frac{4}{4}$	$\frac{1}{1}$	H	Y	Y	Y	Y	$\frac{7}{7}$	$\frac{4}{4}$	$\frac{1}{1}$	H
Norway	$\frac{8}{10}$	$\frac{5}{5}$	$\frac{4}{7}$	H	Y	N	Y	Y	$\frac{9}{10}$	$\frac{4}{5}$	$\frac{5}{7}$	M
Indonesia	$\frac{3}{10}$	$\frac{0}{3}$	$\frac{2}{3}$	L	N	N	N	N	$\frac{1}{10}$	$\frac{0}{3}$	$\frac{0}{3}$	L
Yemen	$\frac{2}{11}$	$\frac{2}{4}$	$\frac{4}{4}$	L	N	N	N	Y	$\frac{4}{11}$	$\frac{2}{4}$	$\frac{4}{4}$	L
Israel	$\frac{8}{14}$	$\frac{5}{6}$	$\frac{3}{3}$	M	N	N	N	Y	$\frac{14}{14}$	$\frac{6}{6}$	$\frac{3}{3}$	H
Niger	$\frac{8}{16}$	$\frac{4}{4}$	$\frac{2}{2}$	M	N	N	N	Y	$\frac{15}{16}$	$\frac{4}{4}$	$\frac{2}{2}$	H

(Continued)

	COINCI- DENCE	CONTROL	DEPLOY-	COMMIT	INTEGRATE	SUCCESS	
	P G O						P G O
Ghana	$\frac{6}{11} \frac{3}{4} \frac{1}{3} L$	Y	N	N	Y		$\frac{6}{11} \frac{4}{4} \frac{3}{3} M$
Pakistan	$\frac{10}{16} \frac{4}{4} \frac{6}{6} H$	N	N	Y	Y		$\frac{16}{16} \frac{4}{4} \frac{6}{6} H$
Tanzan(USSR)	$\frac{1}{3} \frac{3}{3} \frac{1}{1} M$	N	N	N	Y		$\frac{1}{3} \frac{3}{3} \frac{1}{1} M$
Turkey (IT)	$\frac{4}{9} \frac{1}{3} \frac{0}{0} L$	N	N	Y	Y		$\frac{9}{9} \frac{2}{3} \frac{0}{0} H$
Tanzan(Can)	$\frac{4}{11} \frac{1}{2} \frac{2}{3} L$	N	N	N	N		$\frac{5}{11} \frac{1}{2} \frac{2}{3} L$
Turkey(Can)	$\frac{6}{11} \frac{3}{4} \frac{2}{2} M$	N	N	Y	Y		$\frac{8}{11} \frac{2}{4} \frac{2}{2} M$

APPENDIX BB

The stratification of Coincidence and Success into three levels of High, Medium, and Low increases, in effect, the number of dependent variables to three, and the number of independent variables to six. The relationships between these variables may best be depicted in a matrix:

	Control	Depl/Comm	Integrity	Coincidence			Total
				High	Medium	Low	
SUCCESS							
High	3	5	7	3	3	1	7
Medium	2	3	4	2	4	0	6
Low	0	2	3	0	0	6	6

Thus, of seven cases in which success was high, three cases exhibited donor control, five exhibited either deployment or commitment of donor troops, all seven displayed integrity of donor policies. Three had a high coincidence of donor and recipient shared aims; three had a medium coincidence; and one had low coincidence. It is apparent that the incidence of the independent variables, Control, Commitment/Deployment, and Integrity, was highest at the level of high success and lowest at the level of low success. Also high levels of coincidence alone appeared at the low level of success. The relationship between the first three variables taken singly and the level of success seems to be direct, as does the relation-

ship between the level of coincidence and the level of success.

APPENDIX CC

Combination of the three independent variables: Control, Deployment/Commitment, and Integrity, produces eight possible variations, each of which may be a separate independent variable. Thus:

	C-DC-I	C-DC	C-I	DC-I	C	CD	I	NONE
SUCCESS								
High	3	0	0	2	0	0	2	0
Medium	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
Low	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	2

Of the seven cases of high success, three exhibited all three variables, two exhibited only Deployment/Commitment and Integrity, and two displayed only Integrity. The table indicates that the incidence of multiple variables is higher at high success levels and lower at low success levels. Conversely the incidence of single variables is highest at the low success level. The most significant combinations appear to be C-DC-I, DC-I, and I. The first two seem to be directly related to the level of success, whereas Integrity seems to be balanced. Further analysis indicates that Integrity seems to be relatively insignificant except in combination with Deployment/Commitment. Control seems to be insignificant except when supported by the presence of the other two variables.

Although at this level of research and analysis,

little more than intuition can be posited, it would seem that the most significant combination of variables for attaining high success levels is that of Deployment/Commitment and Integrity, and that the most significant effect of Control is to reinforce that combination.

APPENDIX DD

Attempting to combine the three levels of coincidence with the eight combinations of the other independent variables does not yield significant results. Eleven of the cases are unique combinations. Two cases have high coincidence, all three variables and high success. Two cases have low coincidence, no variables, and low success. Two cases have low coincidence, Integrity alone, and low success. Two cases have medium coincidence, Integrity alone, and high success. While not significant, these observations do not contradict other results.

	Coincidence Level	Independent Variables	Success Level
Lebanon	M	DC	M
Italy	H	C-DC-I	H
Nigeria	M	C-DC-I	H
Yugoslavia	L	DC	L
Cambodia	H	NONE	M
Guinea	L	I	L
Algeria	L	DC-I	L
Japan	H	C-DC-I	H
Norway	H	C- ~~DC~~ *-I	M
Indonesia	L	NONE	L
Yemen	L	I	L
Israel	M	I	H

* Deployment was specifically prohibited.

(Continued)

	Coincidence Level	Independent Variables	Success Level
Niger	M	I	H
Ghana	M	C-I	M
Pakistan	H	Comm-I	H
Tanzania (USSR)	M	I	M
Turkey (Italy)	L	Comm-I	H
Tanzania (Can)	L	NONE	L
Turkey (Can)	M	Comm-I	M

It cannot be demonstrated that the presence of any combination of variables compensates for a low level of coincidence. Nor do the data indicate that any combination of variables uniformly affects the relationship between coincidence levels and success levels. Each situation of an apparently abnormal or unexpected relationship is contravened by another situation wherein the same variable combination has no effect or an opposite effect on the relationship. Nor can it be demonstrated that a given level of coincidence will affect the general relationships between the other three variables and success levels.

It seems intuitively apparent that the two sets of relationships complement each other, but these data do not indicate any reinforcement, compensation, or interruption of either relationship by the other, although they probably do not operate independently.

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